Mr. Horowitz was the first Labor Attaché in the United States Foreign Service.

Early Years:
- Masters Degree from New York University 1936-1937
- Research Division, National Labor Relations Board 1936-1937
- New York State Labor Department 1937-1939
- New York State Labor Relations Board 1939
- Harvard University, Littauer Fellow in Public Administration

Harvard University, Senior Labor Professor 1942
- Trade Union Fellowship Program; Executive Director and Professor

National War Labor Board: Trouble Shooter, New England region 1942-1943

Washington, DC: Department of State 1943
- Establishment of Experimental Labor Program in State Department
- Establish “Auxiliary” Labor Officers
- Views of Ambassador Messersmith
- Views of Ambassador Claude Bowers
- Views of Labor Department
- Isador Lubin
- Sam Berger
- US Labor Unions

Santiago, Chile: Labor Attaché 1943-1946
- Circular Instruction to Embassies
- John Fishburn
- Embassy’s reception
- Contact development
- Nitrates
Germany relationship
US security concerns
Reporting and representation programs
Government
Trade Union movement
Communists and Socialists
French influence
“Falange”
Graciella Mandujano
Labor reporting

Expansion of Labor Attaché Program worldwide
Early Labor Attachés and their assignments

State Department: Intelligence Organization Project 1946

State Department: Dept. of International Labor, Health and Welfare Affairs 1946-1956
Organization
Assigning Labor Attachés
Philip Kaiser
David Morse
Labor Department role
Relations with geographic bureaus
Relations with US Trade Unions
US Labor leaders
Free Trade Union Committee
International Trade Unions
Trade Unions and the Marshall Plan
West European Trade Unions
AFL-CIO relations
Labor officers to US foreign aid programs
Greek-Turkish aid program
Unions in East/West Germany
Soviet Union and East Europe
Cold War
Lou Wiesner
CGT (French Trade Union)
Trade Union Congress (TUC)
Italian trade unions
Reorganization of Labor Attaché assignments
Jewish attachés in Middle East countries

Leave of Absence
Rome, Italy: Research 1949-1951
Italian labor unions
Influence of US labor unions
US government and labor union relationship
European governments and labor union relationship
Issues with Franco’s Spain
Memorandum re strengthening European non-communist Labor organizations
Tom Lane
Communist labor unions
AFL/CIO differences
AFL Anti-Colonial policy
Franco
Spanish labor union leaders

State Department (Continued)

McCarthyism
Scott McLeod
European emigration
Refugee Relief Act
Dennis Flinn
Robert Mu

Leave of Absence

Research and travel 1955-1956

Paris, France: Labor Attaché 1956-1960
Dick Eldridge
Algeria
De Gaulle
Force Ouvriere
French labor unions
General strikes
Communist Party
Bothereau
Irving Brown

New Delhi: Labor Attaché 1960-1962
Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS, Indian Socialist Union)
Mahadeov Singh
Singh’s US visit
Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC)
Congress Party
The National War College 1962-1963
Confusion regarding assignment

The Hague: Political Counselor 1963-1965

University of Kansas: Diplomat in Residence 1965-1966

State Department: Coordinator, National Interdepartmental Seminar 1966-1969

State Department: FSI: Dean for Academic Relations 1969-1971

State Department: Special Assistant to the Secretary of State 1971-1973
For International Labor Affairs
Labor Attaché Program/Foreign Service integration
Bill Cargo Report
Training program
Bill Hall
Labor role in foreign policy
AID International Labor Office
Congressional interest in Attaché appointments
Bill Macomber
Trade Union International Committee
Commercial Attaché

Naples, Italy: Consul General 1973-1975

United States Representative to the International Labor Organization (ILO), and Special Assistant to the Secretary of Labor for ILO Affairs 1975- ?
US withdrawal from ILO
John Dunlop
US Policy Committee
Arab countries
Communist influence
Operations
Conflict over US/ILO relationship
Bill Maynes
US rejoins ILO

General comments on the Foreign Service and Labor Attachés

INTERVIEW
Q: Today is May 27, 1994. This is Herbert Weiner interviewing Dr. Daniel L. Horowitz for the Labor Diplomacy Oral History Program. Dr. Horowitz was the first Labor Attaché in the American Foreign Service. Dr. Horowitz will now give his personal background which led up to his participation in the Labor Attaché Program.

HOROWITZ: Like most career selections, I suppose, my own, in regard to the Foreign Service, was by chance. The background, however, involves the kinds of positions I held prior to being included in the Foreign Service. I had graduated from New York University, got my Master's Degree there in political science and labor economics, and had a series of jobs after graduation which involved work in the labor field. My first job was with the Research Division of the National Labor Relations Board in its very early days of 1936 and 1937. With the Labor Department of the State of New York I helped set up minimum wages for women during 1937, 1938, and early 1939. In early 1939 I transferred to the New York State Labor Relations Board as a field examiner. I worked there for several years, then took leave to go to Harvard to continue my graduate work as a Littauer Fellow in public administration. There I completed my doctoral work and was asked by Professor Sumner Slichter, the senior labor professor at the university, to stay on and become part of a new program which he developed.

Starting in the fall of 1942, he had raised money for a program which became and still continues as the Trade Union Fellowship Program. At the time the fellowship program was limited to American trade unionists, unionists who had had at least ten years experience on a national level, and being Harvard, it was not to be like the typical university trade union training program. It was to be for the development of the national leaders of the American trade union movement. In any event, the group started in the fall of that year. I had the responsibility of executive director of the program and taught two of the courses in the program: techniques of collective bargaining and labor history.

During that first year, as the Second World War was under way, the National War Labor Board had set up a regional office in New England. I became a principal trouble shooter for settling labor disputes in the New England area, which I did in addition to my responsibilities at Harvard. At the end of the school year in the spring of 1943, I made a short trip to Washington to visit my brother, and when Professor Slichter learned that I was going to Washington, he asked that I look up an ex-student of his, who he had heard had recently transferred from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of State, and that at the Department of State, he was doing something in the labor field. I agreed to look up Otis Mulliken and did.

I got in touch with Otis Mulliken in Washington, had lunch with him, saw him again in the State Department, and he explained that he had been hired in the State Department, because the White House had recommended to the State Department that it develop a program in the labor field. Apparently in the White House, there had been consideration of post-war problems in international affairs, and one of the things which they gave importance to was the fact that labor, both in its trade union aspect and in its political aspect, would have important influence on foreign policy in these countries, both in
determining the nature of the problems as well as the policies themselves, and that we had better develop specialists in the Foreign Service who had the background and experience to handle this area in foreign policy. At the time, the Foreign Service was made up of generalists without any long-time specialization in any particular field. During the war the government had begun to hire as "auxiliary" officers specialists of various sorts to fulfill its needs abroad. And so in the field of labor, it was decided in the White House to recommend to the State Department that they do the same in the labor field, starting it off as an experimental program.

Mulliken explained all this background to me, and said that he found the process a very interesting one at the State Department because there was, by and large, little understanding of this range of problems in State, and that he was discussing how to get an experimental program under way. It would start in Latin America since it was the only area of the world where one had both a normal, that is a non-war, situation, as well as several countries with important trade union movements and political parties of the left influenced by labor. He also introduced me to several people in the State Department who were then concerned with the problems, and we discussed the various aspects of it, purely in terms of a basic interest that I reflected without ever feeling that I was involved personally in the program. In any event, after my return to Cambridge some weeks later, I received a telephone call from Mulliken saying that it had been decided finally in State to proceed with the experimental program, that the program would be started either in Mexico or in Chile, and he wanted to know whether I would be interested in conducting the experiment. I hadn't thought about working in foreign affairs previously, but having been turned down by the Army for physical reasons and feeling uncomfortable in the academic atmosphere during the war, I did want to consider it as well as consult with my wife, who was quite comfortably and interestingly working as an economist for the War Labor Board in Boston.

We did decide to go ahead, and so in late August of 1943 I came to Washington and began to prepare to go to one of these two countries. It turned out by the time I got to Washington that the decision had been made to go forward in Chile rather than in Mexico, and the reason for that is symptomatic of the kinds of problems that arose from time to time with respect to a specialist program like the labor program. That is, the State Department had written both to our Ambassador in Mexico and our Ambassador in Chile asking for their reaction to having the experiment conducted in those countries. These countries had been chosen because they represented the ones with the most important trade unions and labor influenced political party activity.

Our Ambassador in Mexico, a well-known and important Foreign Service Officer by the name of Messersmith wrote back at great length deploring the notion of having specialists in the Foreign Service, urging that we maintain the tradition that Foreign Service generalists could do any work required in the Foreign Service. In contrast, the reaction of Claude Bowers, Ambassador to Chile, who had previously been Ambassador to Spain, and had originally been appointed to Spain after having been a speech writer for Roosevelt during the first presidential campaign of 1932, was sharply in contrary to that
of Messersmith. He favored the idea and said he would welcome having the experiment conducted in Chile.

My preparation for going to Chile during the fall of 1943 involved meeting many of the people in State concerned with the country, of course, being briefed background, and making an effort to reach out and meet, consult with people in the labor field, both in government and outside. I met with Frances Perkins, who was then Secretary of Labor and some of her senior officials, including Faith Williams, head of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and others. All of them expressed interest in the program, but it was quite clear that they didn't feel any particular notion that they would be directly involved in it, other than that there were certain kinds of information they would welcome having of a statistical nature. The interest of the Labor Department in this program developed some years later.

I should add that one of the principal people in the White House who had pressed for this program was Isador Lubin, who at one stage had been the Commissioner of Labor Statistics, and at the time was a Special Assistant to the President. Given his background, he had, of course, a special interest in the labor field, and had, in 1942, encouraged someone he knew who was on the staff of Harriman at the time assigned to lend lease program.

Q: He was head of the Economic Commission to Great Britain at the time.

HOROWITZ: The individual whom Lubin knew was Sam Berger, who was on Harriman's staff as an economist. Harriman encouraged Berger to write him a letter every couple of months about what the situation was in the labor field, and this had developed into a series of letters which were circulated in the State Department as interest generated with regard to the then British situation. I then reached out and met many of the people whom I'd known before, others that I had not in the AFL [American Federation of Labor] and in the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations], including Matthew Woll who was head of the AFL International Committee, Jacob Potofsky, head of the CIO International Committee and others. Their interest was considerable, but it was more curiosity than interest in participation.

As far as language [training] was concerned, there was no systematic program available to me, nor did I have the time for it, but I did study Spanish as intensively as I could. In any event, my wife and I departed for Chile in December of 1943.

Q: When were you actually appointed?

HOROWITZ: I'm not sure. I think my appointment dated from late August of 1943, and my departure was in December, with the usual several months of preparation involved. In those days planes did not fly at night in commercial routes, and so it took three days to fly down to Chile.
Q: May we take up a moment? While you were in the Department, had they also sounded out the rest of the Foreign Service or looked at additional sources for labor officers? I think, for example, in the case of John Fishburn who was already made a technical specialist.

HOROWITZ: Well, I should have mentioned this. No, not in terms of additional appointments because my going to Santiago was regarded as an experiment to find out whether it was practical to have labor specialists appointed from outside and develop a specialty in the foreign service. However, what had been done during the late summer of 1943, about the time that I was coming to Washington, I don't remember now whether the instruction went out before I left or not. I think not. There was a circular instruction sent out to Latin American countries which included a wide range of questions in the labor field, background questions about the nature of the trade union movement, labor legislation, government attitudes and the rest. It was a typical circular instruction but one that represented the first time that this had been done systematically in the labor field.

The response to that was rather uneven from embassies. The most --

Q: This was about when, in 1943?

HOROWITZ: Yes. As I had mentioned, about the time I was going to Santiago. And so, the answers came in, I was not on the Washington end of this, I didn't follow it nor learn much about it until later, but the most systematic effort to respond to the instruction was done out of Buenos Aires, where an economic analyst, who had been appointed from outside as an economist to the embassy, had volunteered to respond to the instruction and had spent a good deal of time getting up the material for it.

Q: His name?

HOROWITZ: His name was John Fishburn, who, because he developed an interest or had an interest already, in the labor field, did continue occasional reporting from the labor field, though his principal responsibility in Buenos Aires was other things. He did, however, if I remember correctly, later in 1945 go on to other assignments. In any event, he later served as a Labor Attaché in many other places. But while in Buenos Aires, he was simply an economic officer who did occasional reporting after this instruction.

My arrival in Santiago was rather interesting. As we arrived by plane, the usual thing, someone from the Embassy was sent out to the airport to welcome us, and this Foreign Service officer's first words were, "So you are the Communist who has been sent down from Washington." While said in jest, it did reflect the kind of skepticism and uncertainties felt in the Foreign Service, that Washington suddenly had become interested in the labor field, and that someone who was a labor specialist could be other than someone from the far left.
The atmosphere in the Foreign Service at the time, one must remember, was still that which had characterized the 1920s, 1930s and earlier, an elite service made up of people who, by and large, came from elite universities, who regarded their service in the Foreign Service as an opportunity to be involved in foreign affairs without specializing in any particular area, but being able to do all the work required. They were quite skeptical about many of the officers who had been appointed during the war to do special tasks, and having the labor field covered in this way sounded like a rather strange operation to them. The fact is that my early experience in the embassy was not all that negative in that the Ambassador, of course, set a certain tone to welcome this kind of activity, and I simply went about my business rapidly developing contacts around the country, first with the government. I did a lot of traveling, and of course Chile was important to the United States at that stage in the war for two reasons.

First, the country was a principal source of nitrate, which was important for war production. Nitrate mines were run by American companies, Anglo-American companies. The other was the fact that Chile had a fairly substantial immigrant population from Germany, largely the result of the mid-19th Century economic and political conditions in Germany which resulted in large scale emigration from Germany both to the United States and also to Chile. In Chile the German population had settled in one particular region of the country, had maintained their language as the ordinary language spoken in the home and in the schools. Their schools were maintained as German schools. In a strange way, they had not been absorbed into the country enough to have taken on the culture of the country, but rather maintained nostalgically their relationship to Germany.

This did represent, in some regards, security problems which were of concern to the United States because Chile, having a long coastline into the Pacific with the concern as well for the mining exports. The United States had assigned a number of FBI officers to Santiago to concern themselves together with the Chilean Government with this type of security problem. This was, of course, before the days of the CIA, and the FBI had been assigned this kind of responsibility in Latin America while the OSS, of course, carried on in the war areas.

Nonetheless, as far as I was concerned, the focus was mainly in developing systematically the kind of reporting program and representation program which would be meaningful from the point of view of U.S. interest.

In terms of reporting, what I gradually...

Q: May I interrupt? What sort of reception did you get from the local [population] in terms of this is a strange operation for an embassy to be involved in?

HOROWITZ: Yes. That's an interesting point. I think that by and large my experience was a good one in this regard. First, I should mention that Chile was a country with a long democratic history. It had democratic institutions which had existed since the late last century. It had trade unions which were developed over the years, it had left political
parties. It was the only popular front government in the Western Hemisphere during the 1930's and into the late 1930s, and the government which was in power at the time that I was there was a center-left coalition, which did not include the Communists, who had been dropped from the popular front government in the very late 1930s. Nonetheless, it was a government which was sympathetic to labor, which had representation from political parties which had strong influence among wage earners; it was accustomed to dealing with the trade union movement, and so government officials were both interested, surprised and welcomed the fact that the United States Government would send someone to specialize in this area. And so my relationships with government officials became quite close and easy.

In the trade union field there was a single trade union movement at the time which combined the very strong influence of Socialists and Communists. The Socialists were the stronger of the two groups, and the head of the trade union movement, Bernando Ibanez, was a Socialist. His deputy, Salvadore O. Compo, was a Communist, and also a Senator.

I should note that the political party structure and the whole political culture was very much in the tradition of France. By and large, people who could afford to be educated beyond local universities were educated in France before the war. And there had been this long cultural affinity with things French. So too in the political field. The parties mimicked the parties of France. There was a strong radical party, which was, in fact, the major party in power in the coalition at the time that I was there; a radical party which, in French terms, was not radical at all, but rather more center than left. But it included the Socialist Party, the Liberal Party and other parties.

The party which later became so important, the Christian-Democratic Party, did not exist during the time I was there. Its predecessor, which interestingly was called the "Falange," had no relationship with Franco Spain, but rather was a kind of Catholic-oriented group which had relatively little representation in Parliament. It was just starting out at that time.

The trade union leadership, both at the top and in the various regions as I traveled around the country, were friendly, and while I didn't make a point of exclusively having contact with the Socialist trade union officials, it turned out by and large to be the case that these were the ones I had most contact with, but not exclusively. It's interesting that when I returned to Washington from Chile some years later in 1946, I discovered that there had been, on the basis of an anonymous letter, an accusation against me as a security risk, because I had been seen in Parliament, in the Parliament dining room, with Communist deputies and senators. Apparently when this anonymous letter was sent to Washington, Washington sent a copy to the Embassy to inquire what the Ambassador's reaction to it was. There was a second accusation that my wife Loucele had been very friendly with a principal Communist woman in Chile, Graciella Mandujano, who was not a Communist, but was head of the consumer movement in Chile, and Loucele having had some
experience in the United States, had advised Mandujano with respect to organizational problems.

In any event, Bowers answered in a long letter, saying that he was delighted to hear that I had been doing my job and that if I was seen with a Communist in Parliament, it was under his instructions to do so, that there was no way I could conduct my work without having such relationships, and that he was delighted -- though he had not known this -- that my wife had been a friend of Graciella Mandujano, since he, Claude Bowers, was a very good friend of hers and regarded her as the principal and foremost woman leader in the country. In any event, nothing much came of all this, particularly since the FBI representatives in Chile also took the position that there was nothing to it.

Q: Dan, for purposes of clarification, were you the first one to have the title Labor Attaché, and further, you've come back to Washington now, and at that time there was a general expansion of the Foreign Service and of the Labor Attaché Corps. Could you go into why and what the philosophy was behind it, and where we had our principal foreign policy problems that would involve labor, and why the government was so anxious to involve labor in its foreign policy planning after the war?

HOROWITZ: The answer to your first question is yes. I had the title of Labor Attaché and was the first to be named as Labor Attaché. Remember, this was an experimental program at the time, but it moved quite rapidly after the first couple of months. Apparently in Washington after a couple of months of my service in Santiago, the reports must have been rather favorable from the Embassy. I learned later that the desk officer for Chile began to regard my reporting as a principal source of information for his own evaluation of the general developments in Chile. I developed two types of reports on a regular basis. One was the straightforward, generally unclassified economic development questions, statistical and other. The other was a classified report on political developments which covered the labor field, but also reached into the political parties which were influenced by labor, and early became of considerable interest in Washington.

Within a few months, within a year certainly, of my arriving in Santiago, the decision had been taken in Washington to expand the number of Labor Attachés rather rapidly. So during late 1944 into 1945 a considerable number of Labor Attachés began to be appointed, first in Latin America, Jim Bell in Columbia, Ed Rowell in Brazil. Then as the --

Q: Did Fishburn become one at that point?

HOROWITZ: I'm not sure. I think Fishburn, when he transferred to Uruguay in 1945, was given the title Labor Attaché and assigned to do labor work. As far as Europe was concerned, as the war began to look as if it would be wound up after the invasion of the Continent, a number of Labor Attachés were appointed rapidly as the countries were liberated in Europe, and even in the case of France, the Labor Attaché, Dick Eldridge,
was appointed as part of the staff in London preparatory to go into Paris with the liberation in 1944.

Q: Is that General Mark Clark?

HOROWITZ: Yes. Well, it was a combination. Yes, but he [Eldridge] was the first, then, in Europe. Sam Berger, of course, [was] in London. He was then a captain in the Army assigned to the Harriman mission, and eventually in 1945 to the Embassy where he reported on labor. And then at the end of the war about a dozen labor attachés were appointed throughout Europe so that the program starting out as an experiment in one country, Chile, after the initial couple of months of experience with it was expanded very rapidly as conditions permitted in other parts of the world.

Q: When Rome was taken, wasn't there a labor officer with the [occupation forces]?

HOROWITZ: Yes, yes, Adams. John Clark Adams was the first Labor Attaché in Rome. I don't know the exact timing of this, but within a year after the war, there were Labor Attachés not only in Britain -- though [in Britain] without the title, Sam Berger, nonetheless, was a full-time labor officer -- [but] in France; in Italy; in Belgium, Smith-Simpson; in Norway, Walter Galenson. There was even an Assistant Labor Attaché in France, Milt Fried, and . . .

Q: Was John Correll Labor Attaché at that time?

HOROWITZ: About that time. I'm not sure exactly when, but yes, within that time frame John Correll was appointed Labor Attaché to South Africa, and there was even a Welfare Attaché in Switzerland, Dorothy Sell, I think, was her name. In any event, there was a considerable group of labor attachés within two years after the experiment started in Chile.

Q: When you returned from Chile, you went back to State. What was the organization, or how was this function carried out from the State Department? Where did it fit?

HOROWITZ: Before we come to that, let me say that as far as the officers in the Embassy were concerned, gradually I believe I was accepted across the board by them, so that there was no problem with personal relationships. This was also true of my work in the labor field, which became an accepted area of interest to the Embassy. It was a peculiar kind of experience I had which represented the extraordinary circumstances at the time, but characteristic, I suppose, at the time of the Foreign Service, too. Before leaving from Chile in 1946, one of the officers asked to have lunch with me. We had lunch, and I went through this disconcerting experience, this officer saying, "You know, when it was announced that you and Loucele were coming to Chile, I remarked to my wife what an extraordinary thing, Horowitz. I wonder how the Jew will fit into the atmosphere of the Embassy. This may very well turn out to be a problem." Without realizing how insulting he was being, he said, "Do you know, after you and Loucele had been in the embassy for
some months, you both fit in so well that we gradually forgot that you were Jewish and accepted you." The Foreign Service was still a very parochial organization, and it was not part of the culture of that elite organization to accept Jews as normal colleagues.

To turn to your question, I came back for a short consultation visit in late 1945, and by that time the decision had been taken to appoint additional labor attachés, all, by the way, appointed from the outside. There had also been established within State a division called "Division of International Labor, Health and Welfare Affairs," ILH, and as part of the labor side of this a number of specialists were being recruited to backstop the labor attachés being appointed, and also to represent the kind of analytic work which was related to their fitting into the general policy-making operations of the State Department. Strangely, this division was attached to the International Trade Policy Office on the economic side of the Department. It didn't particularly fit, but that for the purpose of organization is what had been done. In any event, when I left from Santiago the following spring, 1946, I had been offered the position of Assistant Chief in ILH in charge of the labor operations and decided I would continue working in this field. I should say that as far as the experience that my wife and I had in Chile, we made more friends, closer friends, than at almost any other post in later years.

On arriving in Washington in the early summer of 1946, for about three months I did not report to ILH because an old friend and colleague of mine, Just Lunning, had been appointed chief of the then Management Planning Division of State, and he urged that I spend a few months on a project that was then very much on his agenda. The project was that having disbanded the OSS, the overt part of intelligence was assigned to the State Department. And the question that was posed for management planning staff was what organizational structure should be given to this operation. Arrangements were made for my assignment to this project; so I became the one who ran it, and it was for me an enlightening experience, because it meant I had to consult and did consult throughout the Department in the geographic bureaus from senior officials down to desk officers and became well acquainted with the structure and functioning of the Department. The basic question at that time for that project was, did one distribute the function among the various geographic areas so that they would be close to policy-making officers, or set it up as an independent bureau, where it could maintain independence from the pressures of policy and do analytic work in a more objective way. My recommendations were that the latter course be followed. This was accepted by Dean Acheson, who was then Under Secretary of State and that is the structure that was then set up and which continues until today.

In any event I started in ILH then in the fall of 1946 and it was really quite a singular achievement that Otis Mulliken had been able to gather together consistently high caliber people both among the labor attachés appointed in the field and on his staff in ILH. People were drawn from outside, and were extraordinarily competent. [They were] not always long-time labor specialists, but [they were people] who adapted well and worked well together.
Q: In this structure, you had a central office, and then there were regional labor attachés at that time attached to the various bureaus --

HOROWITZ: No.

Q: There was none.

HOROWITZ: This was the structure. ILH was the single place at State where there was labor specialization. Within the division, it was broken down by labor, health, welfare, and labor was my responsibility. There was also an economic division separate from that.

Q: Did you have any input with respect to assigning labor attachés or picking them?

HOROWITZ: Yes. Well, it played a principal role in this regard. It was Otis Mulliken who did most of the actual recruiting for people because these were the people that I mentioned earlier who were assigned, recruited from outside, and it was Otis Mulliken who did the recruiting, obviously fitting into the personnel system of State so that as the personnel system took care of other considerations.

Q: What about, say . . .

HOROWITZ: But the assignment of responsibility for selecting people rested mainly with Mulliken, and as I say, in ILH the specialists were really quite noteworthy people.

Q: What about in terms of reassigning people in the field. If someone goes from one post [to another], did ILH play a role in that, in shifting assignments of people already in the service?

HOROWITZ: Well, but you're dealing then with later periods, because when you talk about 1946, you're talking about the first or second year of service of officers. The transfer questions didn't arise until a year or two years later. Meanwhile, what happened in Washington with respect to this whole area is that Labor Department, which had been only academically interested in the development of the program in the very early days, developed a very specific concern and interest in the program as it developed, so that in 1946, I'm not sure of this, I think it was 1946, David Morse was appointed as Assistant Secretary for International Affairs in the Labor Department. He, in turn, brought in Philip Kaiser as a special assistant.

Q: Morse was handling the office.

HOROWITZ: Yes. I think that's right. In any event, here were two very energetic, intelligent, experienced people, who took a very considerable interest in the program. Their main thrust during those days became, as one would expect under those circumstances, that of developing an influence in the administrative processes. So your question about transfer, by the time transfer questions arose, they were playing an
important role with respect to such transfers in the negotiations which sometimes had to take place in order to work out arrangements for things like transfer. These did not become terribly onerous problems in the early days, because one had at that time an expanding situation, and so there weren't difficult decisions to make. They were decisions that sometimes represented different views, but resolvable.

And so when I took over the labor function in ILH in 1946, the Labor Department was beginning to play a role in the area of labor attachés. And on my staff there were people who were really quite competent in each of the geographic areas. There were specialists for each geographic area. By that time Val Lorwin for Western Europe, Irwin Tobin for the British Commonwealth countries, Philip Sullivan for the Far East as it was then called; William Brown, a very knowledgeable fellow for Africa; Sarah Roberts for Latin America, who was eventually replaced by John Fishburn, when he was assigned back to Washington. In any event, among the concerns at the time were how best to have the division fit into the general working of the State Department, because here we were as a division off on the economic side of the Department, attempting to have an input into the problems which were faced every day by geographic officers in geographic bureaus, and this meant, of course, developing liaison with these bureaus, with the desk officers of the individual countries, with the divisions, and these were not always easy to do because quite naturally, we were by and large regarded as outsiders who didn't really belong in the geographic bureaus, and this focused the problem in a way which eventually, end of 1949, resulted in the break up of the division and the assignment of individual labor advisors in the various geographic bureaus, so they would be closer to the operations [of the bureaus].

But during those years, 1946, 1947, 1948, the program flourished in a way which was really quite astounding in terms of numbers, in terms of the relative competence of people, and by and large the gradual acceptance within our Missions abroad of the useful role that a labor specialist could play and did play in the general operations of the embassy. As one would expect, the amount of acceptance varied a great deal. A good deal depended on the personality, competence and energy of the individual officers assigned to the labor field. As I have mentioned, they were at that stage all from the outside. The first officer assigned as a career officer assigned to the labor function was you, Herb Weiner.

Q: How did that come about? I know what happened to me, but I don't know what went on behind me.

HOROWITZ: Well, it was kind of interesting because here was a young officer who had just been accepted into the Foreign Service who happened to have a doctorate degree from Columbia in the labor field.

Q: That came a few years later. I had a good part of it.

HOROWITZ: Who had graduate work in the labor field.
Q: Well, a Master's. I had most of my doctorate done by then.

HOROWITZ: And who expressed an interest in doing work in the labor field. And of course this was welcome. There was no argument about the desirability of using someone like that either in the ILH or in the Labor Department. And so it was resolved rather easily among the labor specialists at State and Labor, but required, of course, the blessing of the personnel system. And there too, it did not turn out to be a terribly complicated process, though regarded as somewhat unusual because the personnel system of State was not accustomed to having someone who was a career officer assigned to this specialty. It was the first time was done, but it was done without too much pain and trouble, and there you are. You ended up assigned to London as assistant to Sam Berger.

Q: This was 1947, and instead of going to Reykjavik to which I was originally assigned to do visa work, I went to London, which I accepted gladly.

HOROWITZ: Yes. So this was the first time, and yet it was regarded as an exception because there was relatively little interest in that, so long as the avenue was open to recruit people from outside. It seemed more satisfactory to have people with specialized background go in, land on their feet, be able to do their job immediately, if they fit into the culture of the Foreign Service -- This was the big if. -- than the other way around, which, of course, was the way it developed later. In later years, when the question of recruiting from outside became more restricted for budgetary reasons, then the system gradually changed into one of training people within the career service.

Q: Dan, could you describe relationships at this point with the American trade unions, because there was so much international activity that was just exploding at that time, and the role this was playing within American foreign policy?

HOROWITZ: Yes. I think this is important to follow, because what gradually happened in those years was that the labor movement, which had always had an interest in international affairs, institutionalized that interest and developed important influence from World War II onward. The AFL had had a long history of concern and interest in international affairs. It was started by William Gompers, head of the AFL, in the early part of the century, and yet it had never been institutionalized particularly. The AFL had, for a time, been a member of the International Federation of Trade Unions in the 1920s, but had dropped out, dropped its membership for a time when it seemed to them that the IFTU, the International Federation of Trade Unions, was too much under the control of Socialists.

What happened, however, during the war was that on the side of the AFL, because of the energetic interest by David Dubinsky, Matthew Woll and a few others, including George Meany, the Free Trade Union Committee was established. And the effort of the Free Trade Union Committee with its -- I'm not sure whether he was called secretary or director, Jay Lovestone, whose background, of course, was rather special and different from that of the usual AFL people. He had been head of the Communist Party in the United States at a young age, in his 20s, for a couple of years when Stalin threw him out
and replaced him. He had gone then through an evolution, first forming an opposition Communist group, then gradually shifted his orientation to that of strong anti-Communism. In any event he had been named by Dubinsky to run the day-to-day work of the Free Trade Union Committee.

The concerns of the Free Trade Union Committee were several: Try to get trade union people whose lives were in danger out of Europe; get the leadership out so that they could someday return and recreate trade unions; to attempt to have some influence on the Allied governments with respect to the importance of getting the people out, cooperating with OSS through the contacts they had among trade union people in Europe, to obtain intelligence information in occupied Europe, and then toward the end of the war, more the AFL as such than the Free Trade Union Committee, -- the Free Trade Union Committee was the dynamic element, however, in shaping the attitude toward the structure of the international labor movement. As the war drew to an end, conversations started in 1944 among the British Trade Union Congress and the CIO with the Soviet Trade Unions to establish an international labor organization which would include all trade unions. This was part of the atmosphere of "One World" at the end of the war, the feeling that we could overcome basic ideological differences by cooperation. They succeeded in obtaining widespread support and organized the World Federation of Trade Union (WFTU). The AFL was the single, most important organization to hold out against this policy and refused to join the WFTU. The AFL played an important role in attempting on its own to build free trade unions, that is, democratic trade unions in the devastated countries as they were liberated in Europe. So the AFL became very heavily involved in that process.

And the CIO, of course, had an internal problem in this regard as it related to policy positions, because it had within its ranks very strong Communist leadership in several of their important unions, and this affected the kind of balance which resulted in positions taken.

I don't want to go into the history of the fall away from the WFTU into the establishment of the ICFTU. Mainly let me say, however, that the precipitating element in this regard was a governmental policy: the decision on the part of the American government that it could not afford to permit Europe, European countries, to continue in the devastated state without hope of recovery without a very special effort from outside, an aid program which became the Marshall Plan to reestablish economic progress and recovery in Europe. That program which started out as an effort to offer the Europeans the possibility of recovery, and which did not in its initial form exclude East Europe or the Soviet Union, did, however, end up with the condemnation from Moscow of the program with Moscow preventing Czechoslovakia, which was interested in participating in the program, from participating. This was before the coup in Czechoslovakia. The USSR also prevented Poland [and Yugoslavia] from participating.

Nonetheless, what happened then was, on the basis of the initiative taken by Ernest Bevin, then Foreign Minister in Great Britain, an organizational structure developed among the Europeans for allocating the resources supplied by the United States to
Europe. This represented a watershed as far as the World Federation of Trade Union was concerned, because the Communist unions, taking their signal from Moscow, opposed the Marshall Plan program; whereas the democratic unions of the Western Europe, and here the CIO found themselves basically in agreement with the AFL, supported of the Marshall Plan. As the Communists used the WFTU to attack the Marshall Plan, the result was a split in the organization with the creation of the ICFTU, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, after an intermediate period of European unions with the AFL and CIO functioning alongside the WFTU as a European Recovery Committee of Trade Unions.

Q: Yes. The ICFTU didn't, as I recall. It had its first opening congress or convening organizational congress in November 1949 in London.

HOROWITZ: No, no. WFTU?

Q: No, the ICFTU.

HOROWITZ: Oh, the ICFTU.

Q: After this interim period, there were a lot of questions about whether the trade secretariats.

HOROWITZ: Oh, yes. As early as the spring of 1948 the trade unions of Western Europe, although members of WFTU, had called a meeting to establish the European --

Q: I remember that well.

HOROWITZ: ERP, and then I attended the September 1948 meeting in London when both the AFL and CIO as well as these unions organized a continuing committee.

Q: That's right.

HOROWITZ: . . . to cooperate with the Marshall Plan American institutions, and to further the objectives of the Marshall Plan. This represented the staged, gradual climax of difference within the WFTU, and then as you say, the establishment of the ICFTU.

Q: If I may interrupt at this point, I remember that well, having been the Embassy control officer for the meetings. And one of the rather interesting features in just making the physical arrangements was that while the AFL and the CIO both participated, yet you couldn't put them together in the same hotel because of a lot of personal animosities that carried through at the time, and also policy differences on other matters. Sorry, go ahead, then.

HOROWITZ: Well, just a humorous note in that regard. Earlier in the September 1948 meeting on the Marshall Plan set up by the trade unions, at that organizational meeting I
happened to be staying at the same hotel in London with the AFL contingent, Dubinsky and others.

Q: Irving Brown was there at the time. Oh, yes. And Jim Carey came from the CIO.

HOROWITZ: Transportation turned out to be difficult. It was the New Hyde Park Hotel, and no taxis were available. Gradually the people from various stages found themselves in front of the hotel frantically looking for taxis until Dave Dubinsky noticed a truck, an open one of these one-ton open slat trucks stopped to unload baggage. He negotiated with the driver to have everyone transported to Transport House where the meetings would be held from the center of London. And so all these high-powered trade union people found themselves clamoring up on top of the open truck and holding onto the slats, riding through London to arrive at Transport House where the horrified TUC officials had to welcome the American delegation off this undignified truck.

Q: TUC stands for British "Trade Union Congress," who was the host.

HOROWITZ: Interest was very deep and very significant at the time. In the United States, both the AFL and the CIO helped organize grassroots support for the Marshall Plan when it had to face the congressional committees and in obtaining appropriations.

As far as trade union interest in the Labor Attaché program is concerned, they obviously developed an interest as the program developed. They were not responsible for, nor did they push for in those very early days, the development and expansion of the program. But as it did expand, as it did take place, as their own interests in international affairs expanded, so they developed an interest in the labor attaché program. More importantly, in terms of precipitating the interest at the time that the Marshall Plan structure was set up, there was the decision based on earlier decisions taken with regard to the Greek-Turkish aid program that there should be labor specialists assigned, and that many of these specialists would come out of the trade union movement. The feeling was that this kind of a program would have more effect in these countries where trade unionists on the American staff could deal directly with trade unions in these countries.

I referred back to the Greek-Turkish aid program, because in 1947 when the British walked away because of financial difficulties from their role of providing the major support in the Greek situation and the Turkish situation, when in Greece a civil war was in progress, Truman made the decision that the U.S. would take over responsibility that the British had dropped in the laps of the Americans. A mission was sent out first to Greece and an American trade unionist, Clinton Golden of the Steel Workers, was appointed as the labor specialist in the mission; he took with him Alan Strachan, who also came out of the trade union movement and later played a role as Labor Attaché in several countries. The trade union situation was regarded as crucial in the Greek Civil War and before the American program got under way a joint US-British team was sent to Greece to analyze and try to affect the situation. Sam Berger was temporarily assigned from London and worked with a British counterpart, Braine. Their efforts met with
considerable success. To continue the program, Smith-Simpson was transferred from Brussels to Athens to be the U.S. Labor Attaché. This is the background against which the Greek-Turkish aid mission included American trade unionists. The Marshall Plan missions in turn gave importance to labor matters and included labor specialists, frequently recruited from the American trade unions. The American trade union movement played much less of a role with respect to the Labor Attaché program in those years. It became more important in succeeding years.

Q: Dan, at this particular time there was a parallel development going on in Germany over the recreation of the German trade union movement as a way of obviating the return of Right-wing militarism and so forth in Germany and the role that Lou Wiesner played there as labor attaché and advisor to Lucius Clay and the very active role of the old AFL in Germany, particularly Berlin.

HOROWITZ: That's right. This was true in Germany at that time because of the ideological and power conflict that took place among the occupying powers. The cooperation among the four powers, the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States and France, gradually broke down, as we all know. I don't want to go through the history of the beginning of the Cold War, but the fact is that in the American Zone, as in the other Western Zones, the effort was made to influence the structure and the orientation of the unions. Within the American Military Government there were individuals who clearly had pro-Communist leanings. In one or two cases they even went over to East Europe when accused of being pro-Communist and made a career in the East European countries. There were many others who were innocent in this regard, and who sometimes played the role of helping Communist objectives without knowing it. Part of this then took place in terms of the inter-governmental relations, partly within the American administration.

Lou Wiesner has, I understand, already taped an interview where he has developed this rather fully, and of course he had a long document which I remember guarding very carefully in our security system because it was so highly classified (and has since been declassified), which gives a full account of the internal differences of this sort which took place during that period in American Military Government. I don't want to develop it here because, as I say, Lou has held forth quite completely about it. But the fact is that this kind of set of considerations played a vital role in determining the future of the trade union movement in Germany. Vital to this, of course, was the role, in addition to the American government, played more directly by the AFL and CIO, mostly the AFL. It was Henry Rutz who played the most important role. He was the representative of the AFL in Germany, and had enormous influence on a day-to-day basis in affecting military government attitudes and because of his relationship with the German trade unions. In quite a different way you had the same situation developing in Italy. No need to develop that. The fact is that back in Washington where we sat, we of course had close relationships with the Marshall Plan office in Washington, as with our labor attachés who cooperated in these regards as Lou Wiesner did in Germany. It was an exciting period,
and I don't think it's necessary to go into a lot of detail about the Marshall Plan, because here there are others who played important roles in Europe and have recorded their experiences.

Q: Dan, as you know, at the time when the Cold War began to evolve, what was interesting from our point of view is that at that time there were rumors sweeping Europe that the Soviets might try to take over Western Europe by military force because their army was still relatively intact and the Allied armies were largely coming apart. Instead, they didn't do that, and they began to wage war first almost surreptitiously in the factories using industrial issues for political purposes to impede production. This, I often wondered, how did this look in terms of how was the Cold War seen as it evolved? How did it look from the Washington end, and particularly since the Cold War began to develop as a sort of industrial guerilla warfare on the factory floor?

HOROWITZ: Well, there was little disagreement in Washington, mainly because of the position which the Soviet Union had taken first in rejecting the Marshall Plan and insisting East European countries do the same, then in their effort to destroy or prevent any progress through the Marshall Plan in the recovery of European countries. This was done so directly that there was little expectation among the officials in the United States in Washington that one could bridge this gap. It became perfectly clear that if Western Europe, and by Western Europe was meant mainly France and Italy, were to be saved from falling into the hands of the Soviet Union, it had to develop institutions, and primarily a trade union movement which would be both strong enough and democratic enough to withstand the attacks on the society by the Soviet Union. When I say society, I mean that in France, as you hinted, in the winter of 1947-1948, once the basic decision had been made by the Soviet Union to oppose the Marshall Plan, the Communist trade unions of France were their chosen instrument. Aside from the Catholic unions, which were of relatively little importance at the time (they became more important later), the trade union movement was unified in the CGT and was dominated by the Communists. When the CGT was used as the instrument to attempt to destroy the French economy by having a general strike declared in the winter of 1947-1948, in a country which was still devastated and had not started to recover, it became perfectly clear to anyone in Washington that this had to be opposed in any way that was possible. So there was little argument about it.

As you know, in France there was a split in the CGT with the Force Ouvriere established by the non-Communist elements including the Socialist unionists and others to lead a back-to-work movement which succeeded, and which then continued as a permanent trade union organization in competition with the CGT. In Italy the same kind of tactic was followed, a little more subtly, as only Italians can be. The Moscow orders obviously were the same, or at least the Communist conclusions were the same, but it was not done in dramatic fashion as in France by calling a general strike. They simply achieved the same purpose by having rolling strikes, each with a flimsy excuse of economic objectives, but perfectly clearly as one province and industry after another was closed down, the objective was the same as that in France. And here there was a gap of time before one had
a series of splits in the trade union movement because here too you have a unified CGIL. Nonetheless, it did begin the following year.

As far as the Washington end was concerned, there was never any doubt that these kinds of developments were vital to the future democratic existence of these countries, and the important role that was played more directly in attempting to bolster the democratic elements was played by the AFL. This was a heroic period for the AFL, played largely by Irving Brown with a few others, but Irving Brown mainly as the European representative of the AFL in that very trying period of 1947, 1948 and 1949.

**Q:** Dan, you’ve touched on a very, very important point here looking at it from a European perspective, that while there was no division in the United States with respect to what the Soviets were up to, there was always a very important degree of ambivalence in Europe, all through Western Europe in terms of how to deal with the Soviet Union, and this became a very important policy difference between European countries and the United States, so that in any of these countries, France, you mentioned a split, Italy you mentioned a split, in Britain there was a lot of ambivalence and sympathy saying, "Well, the Soviets are not so bad." In Germany, there were problems too that became a drag on American policy with respect to the Marshall Plan.

HOROWITZ: Well, as seen from Washington, I think it was more Britain than the other countries because the Trade Union Congress, the TUC, played, as you say, this kind of ambivalent role, and they continued to play that ambivalent role straight through up until the time when they were still having dealings only with the official unions and ignoring Solidarity when it started in Poland in the 1980s. The British played that role because of ideological blinkers, which is strange in that it is not Marxist in origin, in contrast to the continental unions, but idealistic in origin. Yet, it did play that role. Less so in France, Italy, or Germany, because in these countries stark reality overcame illusions.

I remember meeting with some of the Socialist trade union leaders in 1948 in Berlin during the Air Lift, and the attitude was, we've learned our lesson. Hitler taught us a lesson. No longer can Socialists argue for the nationalization of all industry. That much power in the hands of anybody will destroy democracy. And the predisposition of these Socialists was confirmed, of course, with the very direct opposition which they faced from the Communists both on the governmental level and the trade union level. [This was] true to a somewhat lesser extent, but still true in France. What one found -- and in this regard there is some similarity with the British trade unions -- what one found, but to a lesser degree and to fewer people, were Socialists who still regarded somehow that their Socialist orientation had a kinship with Communism, because they both came out of the extreme left or left Marxist ideology, and that while the Soviet Union was all wrong in the turns it had taken, that somehow there was some kind of kinship. There was this kind of visceral reaction. That gradually disappeared with the immediate events which caused them to have to fight for their political lives within the trade union context.
In Italy, of course, it was different in that the Socialist party drew different lessons than that of the German or French Socialist Party, and the Italian Socialist Party, the Nenni Socialist Party, resolved that to develop and defend democracy in the aftermath of fascism, one must never split the left. And that resolve never to split the left, of course, made the Socialist Party for many years simply a Communist fellow traveler organization. It started out as the strongest party in Italy, and ended up as nothing more than a weak support for the Communists. It wasn't until the end of 1950s and gradually by early 1960s that the Socialists completed the split away from the Communists. So in Italy you had that ambiguity. It was only the split within the Socialist Party itself which reflected the differences when Saragat in early 1947 led a split in the Socialist Party, and then in 1948 and 1949 a whole series of other splits took place.

Q: In Tape I you described some of the political developments in Western Europe with which you had to contend in Washington. There was a large expansion at that time also in the labor function generally into all our aid programs and all these things that were spawned by the Marshall Plan in its early days; and as the world grew, so to speak, in other words, as you began to get newly independent countries with nascent trade union movements and our aid program largely expanded, could you give some indication of the kind of policy considerations that went into this at the Washington end and where the labor role might fit in and why it should be important in expanding into our aid policy, or the other policies that were hand maidens of our foreign policy?

HOROWITZ: Yes. Well, I think I referred to this already in Europe in that with the lines so sharply drawn as the Cold War developed, and the necessity for achieving recovery of the economies and political stability. . . The role that labor played in all of this was vital and clear to anyone concerned with the situation at all, in that labor obviously had been used and could be used as a means of unstabilizing economies, destroying political structures, and in general was a favorite weapon of the Communists. In any event, this obviously made labor a prime target for us as well, and this in turn meant that we had to maintain contact with labor in its various manifestations and in various ways. I have already referred to the Marshall Plan representation. There were, as you mentioned, alongside the European mission programs, development of labor specialists in other geographic areas as well.

In any event, without spending too much time on this, it became clear within the State Department that labor had an important role to play, and it was not accident that around that time, 1948, 1949, the place which the labor function had in State was reconsidered, and it was decided in late 1949 that the labor division was to be broken up into assignment of labor advisors in each of the geographic bureaus where they could then be closer to the operating parts of the department, and this, in fact, was implemented at the beginning of 1950. I should mention that I took a long leave of absence from the end of 1949 until the fall of 1951 to do research on a book on the Italian labor movement, and spent most of that time in Italy.
Q: You had been European Labor Advisor in that break up. When the ILH broke up, you became European Labor Advisor?

HOROWITZ: No. When I left, ILH was about to break up, but I knew I was leaving. There was a kind of interesting mix up with respect to the assignments, because what happened at that time was that the European Bureau (EUR) and the Middle East Bureau (NEA) had a question about who would be assigned to which, and we had in ILH in the planning agreed that Irwin Tobin would be recommended to the European Bureau as Labor Advisor, and that Bernard Weisman would be recommended to NEA as Labor Advisor. In NEA, somehow Bernard Weisman sounded and seemed Jewish, and they didn't want a Jew as Labor Advisor. Tobin sounded and seemed Irish, and so they said they would take Tobin, and let Weisman go to Europe. The only problem with that was that Tobin was Jewish, and Weisman was a practicing Catholic, and so we got that straightened out eventually.

Q: How did they explain this business about not wanting a Jew?

HOROWITZ: Well, on straightforward grounds that given the conflict that existed within the Middle East, it would be more difficult to handle the problems if a Jew were a Labor Advisor. But that was straightened out soon enough. It was a rather amusing side show. Philip Sullivan, who had been on the ILH staff and was a long-time Far East specialist, became Labor Advisor to the Far East [Bureau]. So it went. I went off then to Italy. During the time I was in Italy I had relatively little contact with the Embassy [in Rome].

Q: So who was the European Labor Advisor?

HOROWITZ: Irwin Tobin.

Q: Oh, I thought he went to the Middle East.

HOROWITZ: No, no, no. They straightened that out.

Q: That got straightened out. Okay.

HOROWITZ: So Tobin went to Europe, and Bernard Weisman ended up after a time in the International Organization Division concerned with ILO matters, which was really what his specialty had been.

As I say, while in Italy I had contact with Tom Lane, whom of course I knew well. He had by that time been named Labor Attaché having previously been a labor specialist in the Military Government. We had our differences. Nonetheless, there was no problem with the relationship there. I didn't see him very often, because I felt, as I think he felt, that it would be better if I simply stayed away. I did not want to be labeled as someone who was representing the Embassy in the widespread contacts or relationships that I developed in
my research. In fact, it's rather interesting that there were differences in attitude which were the result of a different role that I was playing.

For example, when the UIL was established in mid-1950, no one from the Embassy showed up at the convention. I was the only American who was there. I was free to go there, because I was an observer. I knew all the people involved anyhow, whereas from the Embassy point of view it was perfectly understandable. The UIL was established despite the efforts of the American Embassy to develop a single, non-Communist trade union opposition to the Communist unions; whereas the tradition, the history, the background of the Italian political and trade union relations were such that the Christian Democrats, who dominated in the CGIL and the successor organization CISL, would have found it very difficult to share power with the Social Democrats and Autonomous Socialists, and this latter element would have found it very difficult to work under the domination of Christian Democrats. The result was a split among the groups. No one liked the split, but that was the reality.

The Embassy refused to cooperate, and let me just make one point about this and then I'll leave that period. The Korean War started in June of 1950. At the time when the war started no one was sure in Europe whether that was a feint by the Soviet Union, and that the real objective was aggression in Europe. There was great fear that this might happen.

Q: I remember that.

HOROWITZ: And this permeated all parts of society. Now this was particularly relevant in Italy, where the strongest union was the Communist union, CGIL, and the non-Communist unions, the CISL, predominantly Christian Democrat, UIL just organized and predominantly Democratic Socialist. The official U.S. attitude was that the UIL was an illegitimate organization, because it wouldn't join with the CISL in one organization, and that therefore every effort had to be done to destroy it and force it to merge with CISL. When the Korean War started, I was on leave of absence, but nonetheless I felt I should make my views known, and I wrote a memorandum. With the possibility of war in Europe, if the Soviet Union moved toward Italy, the Communists and the CGIL would be able to dominate all of industry, and that the effort had to be made before that started to maximize the strength of the non-Communists. Forget ideology, forget the desirability of only one organization. As long as one had two organizations, strengthen them both as rapidly as possible in order to overcome, to some measure, the Communist domination of industry.

I wrote this memorandum and intended for it to go to only two people in the State Department: Paul Nitze, who was then head of Policy Planning, whom I knew, and to Perkins, who was Assistant Secretary for Europe. In the handling of that memorandum, I thought I had made adequate arrangements. Instead, it was delivered to the external branch of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). In other words, it was treated simply as a public contribution, and interpreted to be the outline of the book I was writing; of course, it had nothing to do with my book. It was distributed widely as an
unclassified document. It created quite a bit of a stir, and I won't go into it, some embarrassment for me from a security point of view which never really materialized, but people worked at it very hard.

Fortunately when Tobin saw it, he recognized it for what it was and insisted that it be classified with circulation very limited. He got it recalled, but it was too late; it had gotten all the way around government, and into the AFL where, of course, the difficulties developed. But so much for my...  

Q: But this raises a very important broader question, Dan, and this is an excellent illustration of that. Although both the American Trade Union movement and the State Department and the labor attachés are active abroad often on the same issues, there's been a tendency to label them as having identical objectives, or being a rather than one following government objectives and the other following trade union objectives. In your experience, how have you seen those objectives diverge, and yet within the general framework of being on the same, shall we say, ideological line?

HOROWITZ: By and large I don't think there was a sharp dichotomy. I think in the case of the Italian example that I cited, there was an identity of interest. The objective was the same. And, in fact, the policy followed both by the AFL and by the American government was the same as it related to the UIL. The difference arose interestingly with the CIO, which favored the UIL again as against the CISL. That is, they did not take the position that I had urged in this memorandum. They took the position that the UIL should be supported but the CISL not, because here again, it was --

Q: But both were non-Communist federations splitting up the old CGIL.

HOROWITZ: Both were non-Communist, one basically Christian Democratic oriented, one Democratic Socialist. But in the CIO, it was the Reuther attitude that Socialists should be supported. And therefore, you had that kind of dichotomy between the two organizations. But the CIO counted relatively little in Italy; whereas the AFL counted for a good deal. My position in that regard was that it did not matter whether you're right or wrong logically. If a policy did not succeed, you had to look for a different policy. It was perfectly clear that the policy of forcing the UIL to disband and join with the CISL was not going to work. If it was not going to work, then you have to look for some other policy, whereas the effort here had become ideological. No one would review policy on the basis of it not working. It was that we have to keep trying. Eventually both the State Department and the AFL realized that the UIL policy had to be changed. But that came a few years later. 

However, there are considerations that would sometimes result in a difference of attitude. For example, when France was attempting to hold on to its North African colonies, first Morocco, then Tunisia, and finally of course, most drastically, Algeria. The American Government, by and large, attempted to get the French Government to move on these issues, but did not force the issue, whereas the AFL took a straightforward anti-colonial
position, so you had a difference in that regard with respect to colonial matters. This was particularly true as one entered the Algerian period later on in the mid-1950s, when Irving Brown was almost declared persona non grata in Paris and his life was in danger because of the sharp differences between the AFL position as expressed by him and the French Government, whereas the American Government was much more soft on this issue because of wider consideration. There are such situations that develop in which you do get a divergence in view, but they are the more exceptional situations rather than typical. The differences which developed then are not on a continuing basis, but rather in individual circumstances.

Q: I raised the issue because I had heard, and I'm sure you did too in your own experiences, that others, particularly the left, particularly the Communists in Europe, would raise, and I'm sure in other countries, elsewhere, in Latin America, that the AFL, AFL-CIO subsequently and the CIO itself were accused of being agents of the State Department, agents of American foreign policy.

HOROWITZ: Yes. There have been those accusations. And yet, it reflects ideological blinkers or naivete in not understanding both the personalities and the institutional independence which were represented in the labor movement. It is impossible for anyone with an understanding of the way the American Trade Union movement functions to imagine that over time the AFL-CIO, first the AFL and then the AFL-CIO, would adapt their attitudes in order to accommodate the government on a continuing, broad range of issues. There was cooperation certainly. There was close cooperation, but there was close cooperation because there was an identity of interests and of policy.

There never was control because the trade union would not permit itself to be controlled. Irving Brown, as the European representative of the AFL, and then of the AFL-CIO, had one boss, and that was his headquarters back home. He would never have permitted himself, nor would the headquarters have permitted him, to subordinate his activities or his interests or his attitudes to that of the American Government, if there were divergent views.

Franco's Spain is a good example of divergent views, in which it would have been futile for the American Government, which for reasons of broader strategic interests continued to support Franco, whereas the American trade unions refused to have anything to do with the labor organizations organized by Franco. It would have been futile for the American Government to have felt it could further its strategic interest by trying to force the American trade union movement to take a different view. It tried in fact at some stages in later years, but without success.

Q: Do you recall on what kinds of issues?

HOROWITZ: Yes. The issue of when the American Government, in its general strategic attitude toward Franco, financed leader grants to the United States for labor organization representatives from Spain. The American government representatives here tried very
hard to get American labor officials to see these people. They never succeeded. The American trade union would not see any of them, because they were regarded as nothing more than the controlled representatives of Franco and not of independent trade unions.

**Q:** As far as you know, did the American trade union movement, financially or otherwise, assist the underground labor movements that were developing in Spain at the time?

HOROWITZ: I just have no information about that. I don't know. What's more, I don't have the impression that there was terribly much going on in that regard in those years. The crumbling of the Franco structure was a gradual one, and the efforts of the old trade unionists who had their headquarters outside Spain, in southern France, to influence things in Spain had some importance but did not play the same vital role as did the internal forces which were developing in Spain.

**Q:** Switching to another subject, yet one that affected the Labor Attaché Program was at the time of the Cold War, parallel with it, you had the issue of McCarthyism and Labor Attachés were especially vulnerable and accused, or in my own experience without foundation, but nevertheless they were accused of being susceptible [and were] the targets of some of the investigations.

HOROWITZ: That's an interesting kind of problem and experience which we all went through in that period. Let me personalize it in this regard. This took place, of course, after my return [to Washington, D.C.] to the Department [of State], and I was then Labor Advisor to the European Bureau. Within the Bureau, because of the kinds of things we have been talking about, within the Bureau labor was regarded as a vital element in the defense of democracy in Western Europe. And so the Labor Advisor didn't have to sell very hard the importance of his function.

My office was next door to the Assistant Secretary. I attended the daily staff meetings of the Assistant Secretary with a few of his senior people, the heads of the divisions. There was a close relationship, because it was simply assumed that [labor] was important. Along came McCarthy. In the European Bureau, as far as the Bureau itself was concerned, the atmosphere was more sophisticated than in most places because Livingston Merchant, who was then Assistant Secretary, later Ambassador to Canada, very clearly reflected in these daily meetings contempt for the whole McCarthy process. Half of our time was spent meeting with Special Agents and giving background about individuals or opinions about people, and it was perfectly clear that these agents knew little about the nuances of political differentiation on the left. In many cases they just didn't understand that Socialists weren't Communists. And so one had to grope with this "know-nothingness," and yet it was made at least palatable to some degree by virtue of the fact that in the Bureau the atmosphere was one of contempt all around from the top down.

Now, as far as the Administration at this point [was concerned], Scott McLeod had been named Under Secretary for Administration by the Eisenhower Administration. This was
during the McCarthy period. Scott McLeod had been Chief of Staff for Vermont Senator Styles Bridges.

Q: A very conservative senator.

HOROWITZ: An extraordinarily conservative fellow. Anyhow, Scott McLeod was different from McCarthy because McCarthy was a demagogue. He didn't really particularly believe in what he was saying. He just did it for political effect, whereas Scott McLeod was a true believer. He believed all this stuff.

Now I happened, through a combination of accidental circumstances, to get to know Scott McLeod very well. It resulted from the following: As Labor Advisor to the European Bureau, I had been aware of the position taken by The Netherlands and Italy in the NATO meetings about the importance of increasing the amount of emigration out of their countries into the United States because of the huge unemployment problems they had. And I had written a memorandum before the end of the Truman Administration in 1952 to the Assistant Secretary to be sent to the White House recommending that legislation be enacted to permit special visa quotas for these two countries. The memorandum was accepted in the White House and was recommended to Congress, but nothing happened to it in Congress.

So when the Eisenhower Administration came into office, I started the process again because the same pressures were mounting in Europe, particularly from Italy. I wrote another memorandum addressed to the Assistant Secretary to be forward to the White House. The Assistant Secretary forwarded the recommendation to the White House. Maxwell Rabb was Special Assistant to the President in charge of minority problems, and to him this idea struck a chord, because he felt this was a way of getting Italian support for Eisenhower, so he recommended in the White House that it be sent to Congress. Eisenhower was still in that early period of his administration when he thought that a President should not get involved in the legislative process. The President could make recommendations, but it was Congress's function to legislate.

Well, nothing happened with his recommendation, and Congressmen who did have an interest said, "Let's have some specific program, a text of a bill sent from the White House, so we know what you want in more detail." Finally that took hold, and so I was named chairman of an interdepartmental executive committee to develop legislation that could be sent to Congress. On this committee we had represented the Justice Department, the Commerce Department and other departments, but also within the Department [of State], we had the Visa Division, and we had Congressional Relations, and Scott McLeod for security. And it was in this context that I got to know Scott McLeod quite well, so that when he turned his attention, quite inevitably, toward Labor Attachés... Who are these strange characters? Fortunately by that time he didn't regard me as a subversive and thought he could trust me. And so to a certain extent, I think, I was able to influence McLeod and educate McLeod enough that he accepted the basic notion that the fact that someone was a labor specialist didn't automatically make him suspect with regard to
security. That, however, did not prevent, of course, a number of Labor Attachés from facing security problems of one sort or another, many of them frivolous, but nonetheless disconcerting from a career point of view. But it was a rather interesting, strange kind of combination.

By the way, what happened with that bill which we finally developed was that it was sent by Eisenhower to Congress with a recommendation for action. In the negotiations with Congress, the White House made more compromises than I would have liked, but Congress did enact legislation within the year. This became the Refugee Relief Act, and it had so many restrictive security provisions in it that no one ever got a visa. But the attitude of supporters of the program was, and they were right, let's get the bill through. If it doesn't work, we'll get it modified, and that's what happened. They got no visas under the first version of this legislation because the security provisions were impossible to meet. And so after a year they modified the security provisions.

Q: As a footnote to your remarks about Scott McLeod, at one point, this was after I'd come back from Australia, I had known the political officer in Canberra, when I was assigned to Sydney.

HOROWITZ: Oh, that must be Dennis Flinn.

Q: Dennis Flinn.

HOROWITZ: Oh, yes.

Q: And Dennis, when he came back, was assigned as the deputy to Scott McLeod for security clearances. And at that time you may recall there was an Assistant Secretary of Labor whom the Eisenhower Administration was trying to get rid of.

HOROWITZ: Wilkens?

Q: Not Wilkens, the previous one. The follow from New Jersey, who had been a road commissioner and friend of Bernie Weisman's, who was. . . . Anyways, who didn't want to leave quietly, and he laid down an accusation that all the Labor Attachés were Communists, or they were a nest of Communists. Dennis Flinn, fortunately, had done some. . . . He and I had worked rather closely together, I as Labor Attaché in Sydney, he as political officer, who did some labor work and with whom I had a regular relationship. And so when these lists of Labor Attachés and accusations about them came through, he and I would talk them over. He knew that a lot of these things were just flimsy charges, and besides not even reasonable charges, having been exposed to the labor scene and the labor attachés' work. So as a result, as we talked about each case, one at a time, and we had some very important cases which involved labor attachés who later turned out to be invaluable in key posts when we needed them most, I'm thinking particularly of Ed Ballin at one point, we didn't lose a body among the Labor Attaché Corps. But looking on it, there were some very, very close calls. And I suppose the exposure of Scott McLeod on
his level to something having to do with labor and the exposure of Dennis on his level turned out to be sort of the dirty secret of how the Labor Attaché Program ended up unscathed by the security pressures on it.

HOROWITZ: Yes. I think that's right in many respects. Dennis Flinn was a more sophisticated person, conservative but sophisticated person, than Scott McLeod. As I say, Scott McLeod was a true believer, and it's only as we got to know each other well and we saw each other socially with wives that he began to realize that perhaps life was more complicated than the straightforward, black and white Styles Bridges had taught him to see.

Q: I'd like to back track a bit. This goes back to the first tape, but I think it's an important point. During the early formation of the free trade unions in Western Europe and the support for them, particularly in the case of Germany, we also had a case in Japan, the idea that the American government as a foreign policy would foster the building of free trade unions was, the instruments of that policy or the agents you might say, or to a large degree in any way those who were deeply involved were the military people, the generals. Eisenhower was a particular friend very close to. . . Irving Brown got to know Eisenhower very well. The Japanese constitution had this clause in it about trade unions and fostering them. Clay in Germany, I think, dealt closely with Lou Wiesner. But anyways, how did it strike you in Washington at that time that here is the military, the people you would least expect to be favorable to labor, turning out to be very, very friendly?

HOROWITZ: Well, I would say to a certain extent the fact that it was the Cold War period. . .

Q: But turning out to be a benefactor of labor programs.

HOROWITZ: . . . distorted the question of "Are they pro-labor or against labor?" None of these people necessarily cared a hoot about labor. What they recognized, and they recognized it not because they were military people, but because they were close to the developments of the countries in which they were assigned, or in the case of Eisenhower because of his general relationships, they were close enough to, and realistic enough, to see the relationships between society's stability and the nature of the trade union, and that the nature of the trade union movement could easily determine the fate of the country they were concerned [about]. So that one got judgments of that sort made realistically by senior military people, who I suppose they were senior because they were bright to begin with, and they were realistic. What's more, in every case they had advisors. They were thick with advisors, and these advisors counted for a great deal because if one looks, let's say, to Clay in Germany, the vital area in middle Europe, Bob Murphy was his political advisor.

Q: Identify Bob Murphy.
HOROWITZ: Bob Murphy was a career Foreign Service Officer who worked his way up from clerk to the senior position at that time, carrying the rank of ambassador as senior political representative to Clay, the Allied Military Government, and headed the American diplomatic mission in Germany. He later became Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the most senior career position in the State Department, a very bright, sophisticated, down-to-earth person who had represented Eisenhower in negotiations during the war in North Africa with respect to the whole question of who among the French would govern. In any event, Murphy was a sophisticated fellow, who understood all these problems, and of course with people like Lou Wiesner working closely with Murphy, this meant a great deal in terms of the education of these military people. You want me to stop.

Just to wind up on the years when I was Labor Advisor in EUR [European Bureau, Department of State], one of the remnants of my leave of absence and research in Italy, of course, was the fact that it was known in EUR that my position with respect to the Italian labor policy differed from that of the official policy still in effect at the time. It raised no general major problems for me in the Bureau. It did raise, of course, problems of relationships, or rather of point of view with respect to the Italian desk officers and the West European division headed, by then, Homer Byington, and the Assistant Secretary, knowing of these differences, tried to have us work out our problems by direct conversation and negotiations.

It didn't work very well in that regard. The situation, however, didn't remain a terribly difficult one because gradually it became perfectly clear that the then official policy of the Government, attempting to destroy the UIL and to bolster the efforts of CISL to become the sole anti-Communist trade union organization competing against the Communists, simply failed. UIL continued to exist, continued to grow, continued to operate. Eventually a review of American policy was required simply by the movement of events, and eventually the policy, which I had urged in my memorandum of 1950, became official policy both for the Government as well as for the AFL, which went through the same process as did the government with respect to the change circumstances. In any event, this played no large role with respect to my relationships in EUR, and as I've said, by and large because of the enormous importance of labor in those years for the future of Western Europe and the competition with the Soviet Union, with respect to internal stability and development through the Marshall Plan and other efforts, labor was given a star role in all of these events, and as a result my own situation with respect to advising in the European Bureau was a welcome one and did, in fact, play an important role.

So much for the EUR period. Unless you have any further questions, let me move on to my assignment in France in 1956. I should say that for about a year, ten months in 1954 and 1955, I again was on leave of absence, spending most of it in Italy, part of it at Harvard in Cambridge, and continued my research for the book that eventually was written and published, so that I didn't have a continuous period from 1951 to 1956, but had this interrupted by the 10 months of leave. In any event, by late 1955 it had been decided that I would be assigned to Paris.
I succeeded Dick Eldridge, who had been Labor Attaché at the Embassy in Paris from 1944 until his transfer in 1955, more than eleven years. Let me take just a moment to talk about Dick Eldridge. I think he deserves some underscoring as one of the bright stars in the early period of the Labor Attaché Program. Eldridge had known France intimately over half a lifetime by the time he became Labor Attaché. He had been a volunteer in the French Army in the First World War and had served in France for the International Chamber of Commerce for a number of years. During the period when he was Labor Attaché he was intimately associated with the whole range of trade union, employer association, government, and political people. Eldridge was regarded in France as an intimate associate of all those interested in the political-labor situation and was accepted as such by the French. His relations on the American side were extremely good; he was highly respected by American officials in the Embassy, the State Department in Washington, and elsewhere.

He had one ideosyncrasy, which perhaps might be called a limitation and yet didn't limit his influence, and that was that he hated to write reports, and he wrote very little. Part of this was an inhibition against writing; part of it was that he did not trust the distribution system and felt the kind of analysis which he usually embarked on would end up with a lot of people who knew nothing about the French situation and would misuse the information. One of his favorite methods of reporting was to tear a restaurant menu in half, use the half as a post card and scribble comments and insights on the French situation [and send it] in the open mails which he felt were safer frequently than the classified documents. He was well regarded throughout government. A few people, perhaps more interested in form than substance, more concerned with having the reporting requirements fulfilled than the insight and influence which grew out of Eldridge's relationships, were critical, but they were few and had little influence.

In any event, my coming to Paris to replace Eldridge represented an interesting challenge but a rather different one from what had been frequently the case for Labor Attachés assigned in a new post; that is, the Embassy and the State Department recognized labor as a vital and fundamental influence on the stability of the country. Trying to step into Eldridge's shoes was a considerable challenge, but at least it didn't represent the necessity of convincing people that labor was important. In any event, I went about developing my associations on the French scene, trade union, employer association, political, government, and journalists. The latter were useful, from the Agence France Press and some of the important newspapers from Le Monde to others. They were worth cultivating as they followed the labor-political scene intimately and were quite knowledgeable.

In any event, over time my associations were wide and close, and the test of the role that a Labor Attaché can play came dramatically, when in 1958 the French military in Algeria rose up against the French Government. The Government was faced with a rebellion in which de Gaulle eventually came back to power. The background, of course, was that the French had been attempting to hang on in Algeria for years in a military situation where the Algerian nationalists had been attempting to fight free, and increasingly frustrated by
the march of events, the military finally revolted. May 13, 1958, then became the crucial date, the date of the uprising, and during the following approximately two weeks, there was utter chaos in the country. Keeping up with events, attempting to report on developments, to analyze what was happening then became a difficult task, because the normal channels were closed for normal operation of government and the political parties. It turned out that the only people in the Embassy who had the kinds of contacts that were meaningful in this situation were myself and one of the young political officers, who had intimate contacts with various political party people. In any event, this period was a rather dramatic one, not only for France, but personally for me in that it meant a lot of chasing about, little sleep, reporting all hours of the night. It became rather dramatic with time that there was no way that the government could gain control of a situation that was rapidly running out of the normal channels of administration, so much so that when de Gaulle announced his availability for return to power, and that he would be the only one who could save the situation for France, there was little that the political parties felt they could do to prevent this.

The one dramatic gesture which was attempted by the Communist CGT was to announce that they would call a general strike throughout the country in order to defend democracy and prevent de Gaulle from coming to power. They made this conditional on the agreement of Force Ouvriere, the Independent Social Democratic Trade Union, and of the Christian Democratic Trade Union, CFTC. It was during that dramatic weekend when the political parties, feeling they could do little to overcome the situation, and the Socialist Party executive committee met during the evening of Saturday to urge that Force Ouvriere go along with the request of the CGT to call the general strike. It turned out that Force Ouvriere played the crucial role of holding the line against the Communist assumption of leadership. The CFTC had decided that it would do, whatever the Force Ouvriere decided to do: It would follow along in the general strike if the Force Ouvriere did; it would oppose it, if Force Ouvriere opposed it.

The Force Ouvriere Executive Bureau met during the night of Saturday to Sunday and Robert Bothereau, who was then the General Secretary, took the position and succeeded in convincing his executive to go along with him, to oppose the general strike. His position was that if a general strike was called, the Communist Party, the CGT and the Communists through them, would then become again the group which would claim to have defended democracy, and that since the workers had no arms, the situation would turn into a Spanish civil war telescoped into 24 hours in that the military first would intervene, and the workers would be overcome with a great deal of violence. Again, the Communists would be able to play the heroes, but the result would be not that de Gaulle would come to power, but the most reactionary and anti-democratic military officials would, in fact, take power, destroying the trade unions as well as democratic institutions.

Bothereau, who had had the reputation, and had been criticized by some Americans, of being too mild-mannered, too introspective to be effective as a leader against the Communists, turned out that night to contradict all of the generalizations that had been made about him. In any event, once the Force Ouvriere decided not to go along with the
general strike, to oppose it, the CFTC going along with them, the CGT, the Communists, were forced to pull in their horns, cancel the general strike call, and simply have a demonstration strike of 24 hours in industry. De Gaulle did come to power, of course, with the approval in Parliament of the traditional political parties who felt they had no alternative but to go along.

What was interesting is that there is little reference when this period is discussed by historians to the crucial potential role which this call for a general strike might have played and would have played had Force Ouvriere not played the role it did. At the time, however, it was recognized for what it was, and again labor dramatically became a crucial element in at least not saving the pre-existing democratic institutions, but keeping the situation sufficiently within control to have a transfer of power to de Gaulle within at least the formal institutions of pre-existing government.

Q: Dan, did Irving Brown play a role in these events, and can you describe what his relationships might have been with Bothereau at the time?

HOROWITZ: Well, yes. Irving Brown, as I discussed earlier, had been very much in contact with the anti-Communists in the French trade union scene, during the famous effort of the Communists in the winter of 1947 to 1948 to destroy the French economy and prevent it from recovering through their general strike. During that period when those who were opposed to the Communists left and organized Force Ouvriere, Irving Brown was very much involved with these people whom he had known quite well in the previous year or two, working at that time within the CGT. He continued, of course, to have important relations with the Force Ouvriere people throughout the succeeding period. That he played a particular role that night, no. This was Force Ouvriere alone. This was Bothereau alone, and the decisions made were not influenced particularly by outside elements. They were determined by the Force Ouvriere trade union officials.

What was interesting and useful was that having, as I had by that time, free access through long-time association with trade union leaders in the Force Ouvriere, I could call and did call Bothereau at 12 at night or two in the morning and discuss whatever developments were on the horizon at the time. It should be kept in mind that when this crisis started on May 13, the political parties realized that they were in a situation in which they could no longer function as they normally did. What was required because of the expectation that dramatic developments might call for a drastic response (the landing of the insurgents on the mainland was feared), what was required they felt was that there be contact throughout the country with the masses of people, and the political parties could not serve that function. Only the Communist Party had that kind of structure. What did exist, however, were the trade unions, and here the Socialist Party, in agreement with other parties, called on Force Ouvriere to use its machinery, its structure, to keep in intimate contact with the people throughout the country, and it did this by calling out Force Ouvriere to turn its offices into a 24-hour alert system. All Force Ouvriere offices throughout the country, all local unions, all regional unions, all provincial unions, went on a 24-hour alert. They were the means through which communication could be effected
from the center to the country, from Paris throughout the provinces. It dramatized the fact that the machinery of the trade union movement is uniquely structured to serve the kind of political function which normally is not required in a democratic country but which fit the requirements of that emergency situation.

After the advent of de Gaulle to power in May of 1958, there were no dramatic changes on the labor scene for the next following years in that the same kind of competition which existed before continued. De Gaulle did turn things around in Algeria in the sense that he did eventually give Algeria independence, and while it was a slow and painful process for France, nonetheless it was achieved within three years.

As far as my own assignment was concerned, in the period immediately before my transfer in 1960, I was slated to go to the National War College. This assignment was changed when it was urged on me that instead, I accept an assignment to India, where it was felt the situation was tense as a result of the policies of the Nehru Government in playing a third-world role of neutrality leaning toward the Soviet Union. The trade union picture in India became terribly important as the independent trade unions, the trade unions independent of the Congress Party, mainly Socialist unions -- the Hind Mazdoor Sabha trade union organization (HMS) -- could play a crucial role in whether or not the general political scene swung more definitely in the direction of the Soviet Union. The Hind Mazdoor Sabha, being a Socialist-oriented trade union organization and very much a minority, nonetheless had a very vital importance, because its principal strength was in the transportation field -- the longshoremen, stevedores, railroad unions -- and it counted for a great deal as a result.

In any event, I agreed to go to India and did go there toward the end of 1960. For me, India was a fascinating assignment in that it was the first time that I served in what could genuinely be called a completely different culture. I traveled a good deal around in the country, made associations with trade union people and political people around in different parts of India.

With respect to the HMS union and the concern with its general orientation, the head of the organization was a member of Parliament from Hyderabad, Mahadeov Singh, and so he spent a good deal of time in Delhi. In any event, we got to know each other quite well. Singh liked to discuss ideological questions and general political orientation questions, and we did at great length to a point where I saw him often enough that one of his colleagues, who was generally Western oriented, once in a conversation with me said, "Look, it is hopeless. I know what you're trying to do with Singh. You're not going to succeed because with Singh it is not a question really of ideology. It is a question of color." Well, it turned out actually that this was something of an exaggeration, because with time Singh's general orientation was modified enough that he did in general begin to favor a Western orientation.

One of the things which had an influence on him was a trip to the United States. I had, after some time, suggested to him that he consider a leader grant to visit the United
States. I was in Bombay on a trip at about that time, and Singh came through Bombay. We met in my hotel room and discussed the possibility of a leader grant. He had considered it, and he was prepared to accept, but he said, "Look, the only shoes I own are these sandals I'm wearing. I don't own any ordinary shoes. How can I go to the United States without any shoes?" I leaned over, took my shoes off and handed him my shoes. He made the trip, which turned out to be a very good one from the point of view of his exposure to the United States and meetings with trade union people and others. He came back quite impressed, and it had some long-time influence on him.

The principal trade union organization, the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), was Congress Party controlled and oriented, and the Congress Party, of course, reflected the policies and positions of Nehru and his government. By and large the policy was neutralist. The relationship between the trade union movement and the government was a close one, but one in which the direction of things generally ran from government to party, or from party to government, and to the trade union rather than in general the reverse. The HMS played a more independent role, and in this regard did have greater independent influence.

Because of the very different cultural background that characterized India, I volunteered to stay an extra year... -- At that time the assignments were two years. -- ...an extra year in order to maximize any benefits that would come from my associations. Nonetheless, again, the National War College possibility raised its head, and Foreign Service Personnel decided that I had better go to the National War College that year, the fall of 1962. As it turned out, when I got to Washington in August of 1962, I was told in Personnel that I was no longer scheduled at the War College. This was rather startling to me, because I had had an assignment to the War College washed out three times in the past. The first time had been in 1948, when I was in ILH, and in 1948 the personnel office had slated me for the National War College until they looked at my age and decided I was too young at that time to go, and so I was told, "No, you'll be recommended some years from now." 1953 was the second time that I was recommended by Personnel to the National War College. This time, at the time I was Labor Advisor in EUR, and without consulting me the Executive Director of EUR notified Personnel that I simply could not be spared from the Bureau, and therefore my name should be scratched from the list. I didn't learn this until some years later. The third time was, of course, in Paris as I mentioned, when my assignment was scratched in order for me to go to India.

In any event, when I got to Washington in 1962 and was told that I was no longer slated to go to the National War College, I was quite angry and upset and tried to track down what had happened. I couldn't get any answers until I finally got to the Under Secretary for Management, and he explained to me that this was a decision that had not been taken in the State Department, that the State Department had no control over it, that it was a White House decision, and we'd better abide by it. It turned out on investigation that the decision had been made in a conversation between George Meany, then head of the AFL-CIO and President Kennedy.
The background was that in 1961 with the Kennedy Administration taking office, a new position was set up in the State Department, Special Assistant to the Secretary for International Labor Affairs, and the person named to the job was the former head of the State, County and Municipal Workers Union. He didn't...

Q: Chapman?

HOROWITZ: Chapman, that's right. Apparently he did not fit in well and was a disappointment. So he left, and the question was: Who would be assigned? The State Department, knowing that Meany was coming in to see Kennedy and knowing the subject that was going to be discussed, recommended to the White House that President Kennedy take the initiative and suggest a name, my name, as the successor to Chapman. Kennedy, who didn't know me from Adam, nonetheless accepted this recommendation, made it to Meany, and Meany said, "Fine, I'll take it." The result was that an agreement [was made] between Meany and Kennedy that I would become "S/IL," as it was called, Special Assistant to the Secretary [for International Labor Affairs]. No one in the State Department was prepared to try to upset it.

Well, having been prevented three times before from going to the National War College and finding myself again in that situation, and it seemed to me this was the last time I would have an opportunity to go, I was more upset about having my assignment to the War College washed out than thinking kindly of the kind of the assignment which had been offered as an alternative. And so I set about trying to upset the decision. No one in State, of course, would get involved, and so I consulted with Michael Ross, who was then head of the International Department of the AFL-CIO, whom I knew quite well, explained my own situation to him, my reasons for not wanting to take S/IL at that time, and he agreed. He went to Meany and he said, "Look, this is going to interfere with Horowitz's career interests. Let's wash out this agreement you made." Meany agreed, and Ross went to the White House, got it washed out, and I did go to the National War College. The irony is that nine years later I, in fact, did take the position of S/IL.

Well, I spent the next number of years after the War College on non-labor assignments. I was Political Counselor in the Hague, where I was Acting Deputy Chief of Mission for much of the time there; I went to the University of Kansas as a diplomat-in-residence, at the time an experimental program, which has developed since then into a regular feature of assignment of senior Foreign Service Officers to universities; I became first a faculty member and then coordinator of the National Interdepartmental Seminar, which was the so-called "counter insurgency course" developed by the Kennedys, particularly Robert Kennedy and required of all senior officers assigned to Third World Countries from any of the foreign affairs agencies. And finally in the Foreign Service Institute I was made Dean for Academic Relations in supervising the assignment of officers to universities in various capacities, generally for study. While on that last assignment as Dean for Academic Relations, in 1971, I was called in by the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Bill Macomber, and offered the assignment, which I had turned down in 1962, of Special Assistant to the Secretary for International Labor Affairs.
In 1962 after I had succeeded in avoiding the assignment [as S/IL], the position, after a
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gap of some months, was filled by Philip Delaney, who came out of the AFL, and he
remained on that job for some years. Macomber, in attempting to interest me in the
assignment, suggested that the experience with people from the trade union movement
assigned to the job had not been an all together happy one, that they wanted to have the
Labor Attaché Program better integrated into the general Foreign Service, that the job of
Special Assistant could be done best by someone who came out of the Foreign Service,
and that the original motivation for creating the position in 1961 had been the recognition
of the need for coordinating the various activities in the labor field by the labor attachés,
by the labor advisors in the geographic bureaus, and having top level input with respect to
general policy matters if labor played any kind of role in its impact on those policies. I'd
been away from the labor field for a number of years, and I felt that if I came back, it
would have to be with the support of the Department to build the program on a genuinely
career basis, and have the support of the Department to recognize it as belonging within
the Foreign Service as an integral part of the Foreign Service.

At the time that I was offered the position of S/IL, there was a study in the Department by
a group headed by Bill Cargo, who was head of State's policy planning. Cargo had been
named head of this group to survey and make recommendations with respect to the future
Labor Attaché Program. This had resulted from conversations between the American
trade movement leadership and people in the White House at the time. The Cargo Report,
and I don't remember now whether it came out just after my appointment or just before
my appointment at S/IL, contained many elements which I had tried to insist had to be
undertaken by the State Department, if I were to take the position as S/IL. What I urged
on Macomber was that if the Labor Attaché Program were to be regarded within the
Service as an integral part of the Service, then certain things had to be done. First, many
of the positions in the field had to be reviewed and their general classification raised, so
that there would be more senior positions for Labor Attachés. Secondly, there should be a
greater number of promotions from within the Labor Attaché service, so that the specialty
would be regarded as a desirable one within the Service. This was against the background
of the fact that because of budgetary considerations and perhaps other considerations, it
was perfectly clear that in the future positions in the Labor Attaché specialty would
largely be filled from within the Service rather than from outside, and that therefore it was
necessary to attract and keep career Foreign Service Officers into this specialty, so that
promotions became one of the key elements of course. Another was that a special
additional training program be set up, so that Labor Attachés named from within the
Service would have the kind of training necessary for them to do the job effectively. And
finally, that the number of Labor Attaché positions be expanded in the Embassies, and
that a number of Assistant Labor Attaché positions be named in addition to the one or two
that existed at the time.

Macomber agreed to all this, and on that basis I accepted the position of S/IL. I should say
that the Cargo Report, and as I remember... -- I don't remember whether it came just
before or after my assignment. --... contained most of the same elements that I had
discussed with Macomber with all the affirmative recommendations that were part of
what Macomber had accepted. In any event, I found that the administrative side of the Department, led by Macomber and by Bill Hall, who was the Director General of the Foreign Service, came through on the commitments which had been made to me. The fact is that Bill Hall, before becoming Director General, had headed a committee to downgrade positions in the embassies to make them available to more junior officers. He later complained to me, that at the same time that he was doing this, he was reclassifying labor positions by raising them, doing exactly the opposite of what he was doing generally in the Service, but this was a commitment that was made, and they were living up to it. The same was true after a while with promotions. At the following round of promotions, Hall called me in and said that he wanted me to agree to something which was rather unusual, and that in the statistical results of the promotions, instead of breaking out the labor attaché group as a separate group, that they be included within the political category and not identified, because there were so many promotions among Labor Attachés that many in the rest of the Service would complain, and that by folding them into the general political classification, they would not be identified as much and made the object of criticism. To a surprising extent the commitments were kept. There was an increase in number of Labor Attaché positions as well, and as S/IL, I found that the Department by and large did recognize the place labor merited in the formulation of foreign policy.

I should say that at the time of my appointment to S/IL, at the time of my discussions with Macomber, his point about not having someone out of the trade union movement and having someone from the career service resulted in my commenting that while that might be desirable, it was certainly going to be impossible for anyone to function on that job without having the confidence of the trade union movement. I urged that the trade union movement not be asked whether they would approve of my appointment, but that since I knew that Bill Rogers, then Secretary of State, played golf occasionally with George Meany, who was still then head of the AFL-CIO, that the next time they played golf, Rogers should tell Meany that he was planning to appoint me, and that if Meany had any kind of negative reaction, Rogers would certainly hear it without having to ask whether he approved of my appointment. That was done, and Meany's reaction was a favorable one, so there wasn't any problem on that score. In functioning as S/IL, I attended the Secretary's daily staff meetings.

Q: This is a continuation of the interview with Dr. Daniel L. Horowitz, first Labor Attaché in the Foreign Service, who continues his recounting of his period of tenure as the head of S/IL.

HOROWITZ: I had regular weekly meetings with all the geographic Labor Advisors in the State Department for purpose of coordination, and in addition to the position of S/IL, Special Assistant to the Secretary, I had also been named, as had Phil Delaney, my predecessor, as head of the International Labor Office within AID [Agency for International Development]. So that in addition to being the senior official in State Department for labor matters, I was also the senior official in AID for labor matters, automatically then providing for a kind of coordination which had increasingly become
necessary as the programs of AID continued alongside the diplomatic institutions of State. This meant that a considerable amount of my time and energy was devoted toward the AID labor matters, which in turn reflected the increasing importance for AID of the trade union labor institutes which operated in East Asia, in South Asia, Middle East and Africa as well as Latin America.

By and large, the relationships which were necessary for coordination purposes within AID were achieved through staff assignments, in that I had a significant staff within the Labor Division of AID, and also with my direct access and regular meetings with the head of AID and his deputies. As far as the relationship with the AFL-CIO was concerned, this was more complex for obvious reasons. On the one hand, my own relationships within the AFL-CIO were on a regular continuing basis with, however, the proviso that for general foreign policy matters, it made no sense for the head of the AFL-CIO to channel his views exclusively through me, since he had direct access and wanted to continue to have direct access to the Secretary of State. This, in fact, represented no special problems, because this was understood all around to be the part of the necessary relationships of a political nature which existed between the AFL-CIO, Secretary of State and with officials in the White House. But it did leave a huge area of coordination and relationship to be achieved with the trade union movement by S/IL.

I might mention one rather disturbing episode toward the latter part of my tenure in S/IL when in a telephone call from the then Under Secretary of Labor it was suggested to me that the Special Assistant to a prominent senator wanted very badly to be named Labor Attaché in London, and that this was being supported by the Under Secretary of Labor. My own reaction was thoroughly negative, saying that this couldn't possibly take place, that I would oppose it, that if this chap had any abilities, we might consider him if a position from outside was open, for one of the junior positions to have him tested out, but that was as far as I could go. I knew that the follow-up to my conversation [resulting from] my response to the Under Secretary of Labor would be that he would immediately telephone either or both the Deputy Under Secretary for Management or the Under Secretary of State, and so I immediately got in touch with the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Bill Macomber, told him of my conversation, urged that he respond in the same way that I did, and that, if any other response was made, it would mean that all of the commitments which he had made to me to rebuild the Labor Attaché Program on a career basis would be destroyed, that one couldn't appoint from outside someone to a senior labor position without belying all the commitments which had been made to build up a career service for Labor Attachés. Macomber agreed and agreed to take that position. I then went to the Under Secretary of State, John Irwin, and reported my conversation with both the Under Secretary of Labor and with Macomber, and Irwin in turn did agree as well to take the same position. The result was that while the phone calls were placed to the these people from the Labor Department, the response was the same as the one I had given, and the situation was controlled in this fashion. This kind of consideration, I suppose, of appointing someone to the top from outside as a result of political pressures is one of the kinds of things which occurs from time to time. Sometimes it can be resisted, sometimes not, but it would have represented for the labor field at that time the
destruction of all the commitments that had been made to strengthen and rebuild a career service for Labor Attachés.

Let me take a moment to discuss an issue that I know has been raised from time to time, though not terribly seriously during that period, and that is why should the Labor Attaché Program be within the control, be housed in the State Department and run by the State Department with the outside advise of Labor Department rather than placed within the Labor Department itself. Part of the explanation is historical, because as I recounted in my experience in 1943, it was the White House and the State Department which started the program because of specifically political and diplomatic interests, and that Labor Department at the time had little interest in the development. It was only later that it did develop such interests, and while it was recognized early on that the Labor Department had legitimate concern and interest in the program, nonetheless its interest was in the nature of things somewhat more limited than that of other types of specialist programs as the Commercial Attaché or the Minerals Attaché. And the reason for that is that the initial impetus for the undertaking of labor specialization and the focus of the program throughout its existence have necessarily been on the political role of labor. By all means, the economic and technical and statistical aspects of labor activity abroad are of interest, and these are the kinds of interests which the Labor Department, of course, has primacy in. What is of fundamental importance, however, for the formulation of foreign policy, for affecting the political concerns of the State Department, in which the Labor Department has little role to play simply in the nature of division of responsibilities in government, the political focus of labor is a primary concern to the State Department, and would always remain such.

I don't recall now whether I mentioned it or not, but in 1953 and 1954, when I was Labor Advisor to EUR, the Labor Department established a Trade Union International Committee, and it had been agreed that because Labor Attachés were being appointed from outside, that the AFL and CIO, which were then separate, would take turns nominating Labor Attachés, and that the Labor Department would automatically support anyone nominated by each of the organizations in turn. As a pressure group, the Labor Department had obviously important influence on the naming of Labor Attachés, and in fact this system which was started by Labor Department began to take effect in 1953 and 1954. Some of the people were good; some were not. The labor movement, like any other organization, was not prepared to give up its best people in order to appoint them outside its own organization and sometimes simply named people as a way of getting rid of them.

In any event, in EUR I was quite concerned with what might happen to the program if we were subject to this kind of patronage, and when the pressures mounted considerably to have appointments made as they were being made in other areas of the world, I suggested to the then Assistant Secretary for Europe that if the pressure mounted to a point where concessions had to be made in the quality of Labor Attachés, that, unfortunate as it might be, the State Department should consider giving up the "Labor Attaché" title and letting the Labor Department take control of those who would have the title of Labor Attachés, and that the State Department develop special political officers who would handle the
political aspects of labor, that our concern was sufficiently vital for the political function that we had to have in State control of the type of people and the quality of people who would be assigned to do the job. At the time, Assistant Secretary of Europe, Livingston Merchant, agreed to this, but it never came to a point where this issue was pressed, and we never had to face that problem. In any event, the fact is that the Labor Attaché specialty is different from that of Commercial Attaché or other types of attachés.

At the time that I was assigned to S/IL, I had told Macomber, Under Secretary for Management, that I didn't want to have the assignment extended for more than two years, and that after two years I'd like to go on to something else. As the two years drew to a close in 1973, Macomber and Bill Hall, Director General, suggested to me that they would like to recommend me for an ambassadorship in Africa, and they had two or three posts in mind. While I was gratified at their suggestion, my reaction was on the whole negative, in that the assignment I really wanted was that of Consul General in Naples. I regarded that assignment as more important than the ambassador jobs that were likely to be offered. I knew Italy intimately. The book I'd written on the Italian labor movement had been published by Harvard University Press, translated into Italian, and become the standard text in universities in Italy. It was regarded in Italy as the classic history of their labor movement. But I had never served in Italy. And so when the Consul General in Naples, who had been on that assignment for a number of years, retired in 1973, I urged that I would like to have that appointment rather than an ambassadorship, a rather strange choice from career considerations in that every Foreign Service Officer is supposed to aspire -- the baton in his knapsack -- to an ambassadorship. But to me it made no sense in the circumstances. In any event they agreed, and I was appointed Consul General in Naples where I served for two years.

At the end of those two years, I decided that I'd had enough of the Foreign Service, that I wanted to do some writing, and so in the late spring of 1975, I offered my resignation from the Foreign Service, retired, and came back to the United States. Within a few months, however, because of special circumstances that developed, I was drawn back into government. A crisis had developed in the U.S. Government relationships with the ILO, the International Labor Organization. The International Labor Organization, as part of the U.N. system, was the only organization which had continuity from the time of the League of Nations. It had developed over the long years of its existence based as it was on a tripartite system of government, labor and management, had developed international conventions of labor standards, which when adopted by countries became part of international law as far as these countries were concerned. Complicated procedures for due process had been developed to review standards of labor in various countries, and the organization had a reputation which few other international organizations had achieved, that of having developed a reliable judicial process.

The difficulty was that in the years of the 1960s and early 1970s more and more the organization was used for political purposes in a combination between the Soviet Union, Communist-oriented countries and Arab countries in an effort to obtain a condemnation of activities, particularly in Israel, but in other areas where political condemnation seemed
desirable on their part. None of the due process procedures were followed. Condemnations were made without regard to substance or fact, and this increasingly developed into a situation in which the United States felt it had no alternative but to regard this as a crisis. The American trade union movement felt even stronger than the American Government about the necessity of bringing the crisis to a head. So in the fall of 1975, the American Government, following the constitutional requirement of the ILO, gave notice to the organization that within two years it would withdraw from the organization if the situation complained about was not corrected, and the organization did not return to following its usual pattern of due process before condemnation of countries.

It was when the notice given to the ILO that I was asked to return to government by being named by then President Ford to be the government representative to the ILO. The notice of withdrawal had made clear that the United States did not want to withdraw from the organization unless it was forced to do so, and it was hoped that during these two years of notice it would be possible to turn the organization around, and therefore make it possible to withdraw the intention of canceling our membership to the ILO. John Dunlop, who was an old colleague of mine from Harvard, was then Secretary of Labor. He took the initiative in urging that I be named. He obtained the agreement of Kissinger, who was then Secretary of State, and the two obtained my nomination by the White House. So in the fall of 1975 I returned to the government payroll as U.S. Representative to the ILO. At the time I made it clear that I would return just for the two years, that whether we won or lost I would leave at the end of those two years. In addition to being the U.S. Representative in the ILO, I was named as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Labor for ILO matters, and because of the importance attached to the issue -- the first time the United States Government had ever given notice of withdrawal from a U.N. organization -- the White House appointed a policy committee which was made up of the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of State, and the National Security Advisor to the President. The Secretary of Labor was named as Chairman, and I was named as Counselor to the committee to set up its agenda and generally act as counselor.

The two years were a fascinating assignment in that what was involved basically was the effort to attempt to get governments to live up to their obligations under the ILO constitution, and to withstand the kinds of pressures to which they were subjected by the Soviet Union, the Communist world and by the Arab countries: not all of the Arab countries, but the extremist regimes were able to intimidate the majority of the Arab countries. My own activity was divided between Washington, where I acted as counselor to the interdepartmental committee, Geneva where I was the U.S. Representative to the Governing Body of the ILO, as well as chairman of the annual delegation of the ILO Conference, and then in addition my activity involved traveling around the world to meet with foreign ministers, labor ministers, sometimes heads of government to attempt to obtain commitments that they would follow the procedures required in the ILO and make it possible for us to remain in the organization.

During those two years I traveled around. . . -- I once calculated that it was something like 70,000 miles, not counting the visits to Europe -- . . . visiting third world countries in
Latin America, Africa, East Asia, Middle East. By and large the experience was both a satisfying one as well as a frustrating one, because what gradually emerged, and this focused mainly in Africa, was that while the officials in individual African countries with whom I consulted were willing to go along with our suggested posture to make it possible for us to remain in the ILO, they were subject to enormous pressures from the Arab countries with enormous sums of money offered from the Middle East for technical assistance at stake, which they knew they would lose if they didn't follow the preferences of the Arab countries with respect to ILO issues. The result was that while in the Governing Body [of the ILO] it was possible for us to win occasional victories, particularly since the tripartite nature of the ILO made it possible to overcome the government pressures if we could achieve secret ballot, . . . -- In some cases we did, in some cases we didn't. -- . . . in the Conference it was more difficult. The annual conference of 1977, the last conference before we had to make up our minds, started out under promising circumstances. Within the Arab group, the moderate elements with whom I had been consulting closely through the previous two years succeeded in obtaining a majority within the group for about 24 hours, and then lost it again to the extremist elements, and from then on it was all downhill. Everyone agreed at the end of the conference that it had been a disaster from the point of view of the issues with which we were concerned.

It then became necessary for the United States Government to make up its mind. What had happened through our campaign of the previous two years is that the Soviet Union had generally spread word that we were bluffing, that it was not our intention to leave the ILO, and that we were simply using the threat of leaving as blackmail to force governments to do what they didn't want to do. Many of the countries found it difficult to accept the fact that we were serious in our determination to leave the organization if things were not turned around.

When the notice had been given to the ILO in 1975, a statement was issued by President Ford which underscored the importance which he, the President, gave to the organization and the issues involved, but that he was committing the government to withdraw at the end of two years if things were not turned around. When Jimmy Carter became President at the beginning of 1977, I had drafted a similar statement which he issued underscoring the same kinds of considerations which were contained in the statement of President Ford. And so, in the late summer and early autumn of 1977 in meetings of our interdepartmental advisory committee, the question then was debated as to what was to be done. Up to that point there had been no dissent from the official position. What had shaped up in the months after the conference of late June 1977 was that many of those officials who had supported the policy of the government really didn't have the stomach for pulling out when the issue came to a crunch. One of the principal people reacting in this fashion was the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs in the State Department.

Q: Who was that?
HOROWITZ: He had been Editor of *Foreign Policy*, Carnegie Foundation, Bill Maynes.

*Q:* Bill Maynes?

HOROWITZ: Bill Maynes, a very bright fellow, but he obviously couldn't envisage our pulling out of a U.N. organization. In any event, what he did was informally to circularize governments around the world to promote appeals to the United States to stay in the ILO. And so a flood of appeals came in because the natural inclination of governments in any event was to keep United States from pulling out of the organization. What Maynes did with this material was unfortunate in that in the briefing that he gave to Vance, then Secretary of State, he described these appeals as commitments to live up to the objectives that we were seeking. No such commitment was involved. All they did was appeal for us to stay in.

It was all focused then by those who were reluctant to have us pull out that we extend for another year our notice, and that we see whether we can turn things around in one more year. The difficulty with that kind of approach was first we had been saying that we were serious and would pull out at the end of two years. To have extended it for another year would have been belying our sincerity, and in any event would have violated a constitutional provision which requires simply a two-year notice, not a three-year notice. The meeting where recommendations were to be made in the advisory committee was attended by the principals, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of State, National Security Advisor. The AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce had an advisory role, and they also attended. Ray Marshall, who at that time was Secretary of Labor, presided at the meeting. The Secretary of Commerce was Juanita Kreps, who had apparently in private conversations indicated that she would support the position that Ray Marshall and I had taken, that we had no alternative but to get out of the ILO. Nonetheless, in the actual meeting, she decided that Commerce did not have a sufficient interest in this issue to take a position. On the other hand, Brzezinski as National Security Advisor took the position that we should not pull out but extend the notice by a year as did Secretary Vance.

The argument for pulling out, which I made at the meeting and which was opposed by both the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, was that we had exhausted our bargaining power within the organization, that we would have more bargaining power outside than we would within the organization, that the intention was not to pull out forever but to pull out until things had changed, and that we could get those changes made better if we were outside than if we were inside. In any event, the meeting then ended up in a divided position, and it was on that basis that it was agreed that the recommendation to the President would reflect the two points of view, leaving it to the President to make the decision.

This was done, and when the memoranda arrived on President Carter's desk, he had a typical straightforward reaction that characterized so much of his personality. He said, "But haven't I made the announcement, haven't I issued a statement that if we didn't
achieve certain objectives, we would pull out of the organization at the end of two years? Everyone agrees that we did not achieve our objectives. Then what's the question? Obviously we must pull out," and he decided, I think for the first time on a major issue, against the advice of his Secretary of State and National Security Advisor and agreed that we should pull out of the organization. The statement of withdrawal, which I mainly drafted, expressed regret at having to pull out, hope that things would change, that we would continue to have an interest in affairs of the ILO, and that it was our hope that we could within a short time return to the organization. With that we left the organization, and as I had agreed in taking the position as U.S. representative that I would leave at the end of two years, I resigned and retired at that time.

That was my last labor assignment. That was my second retirement. This concludes the chronology of my experiences in the Foreign Service in the field of labor.

Q: We'll write it, say, as a postscript.

HOROWITZ: A postscript to the ILO affair. The fact is that during the two years following our withdrawal, things improved sufficiently that it was possible for us to return to the ILO in 1980, as I remember it. This does conclude my discussion.

Q: All right. This is Herbert Weiner. Dan and I will now have a bit of a discussion as to what are some of the lessons we've learned from these experiences in the formation of the Labor Attaché Program which might be of value to us today and some of the issues that are arising. For example, in my own interview I've mentioned that the Labor Attaché was a wide-ranging officer which didn't fit into any one organizational niche, and that my assignments had varied ranging all the way from political-economic to even technical issues.

During the Cold War, the labor attachés became more and more politicized in terms of the problems they dealt with. The Cold War is now over, but the question remains; What sort of functions do the Labor Attachés have now? Do they matter? Are they needed in countries that have no democratic governments. The big issues are now international trade. Our relationships are heavily economic now. The reconstruction of Eastern Europe involves economic, political, mixed political-economic issues. Is a labor officer merely another form of political officer. Dan, would you care to comment on some of these observations?

HOROWITZ: Sure. As far as my own experience is concerned in terms of administrative assignment within the embassy, it didn't matter whether I was assigned, as I sometimes was, to the economic section or sometimes to the political section. In every case, I functioned as if I were part of both. I attended all the staff meetings of the economic section as well as the political section, and where there was a country team, I was a member of that country team. It never was a choice between political and economic; it was a matter of relative emphasis. In the kind of reporting which I did, there always were regular economic reports as well as regular political reports. The countries that I was
assigned to generally required, from the point of view of our foreign policy, more emphasis on the political than on the economic, but that was a result of circumstances of these individual countries.

As far as the change of general framework resulting from the end of the Cold War [is concerned], in that regard we've come full circle. We must remember that the labor attaché program was started before the Cold War. In 1943, 1944, and 1945, there was no Cold War, and yet the logic, the rationale, for the establishment of the Labor Attaché Program at that time exists again today. One could say that on the basis of the considerations at that time toward the close of World War II, it was felt that labor in its political form, in its trade union form, and in its mass organization form would have significant influence on the direction of a country's foreign policy, and that it was important that we understand these underlying forces within the country in order to understand their foreign policy that necessity exists as much today as it did then.

In some respects perhaps one could say that the Cold War period, covering as it does most of the years since the establishment of the Labor Attaché Program, nonetheless was a distortion of the normal expectations, which had prompted the felt necessity at the time of establishing a Labor Attaché Program, and which exist even more now. Whether the focus be toward economic or political is a function of both foreign policy contingencies as well as the particular country which is subject to analysis, but for an understanding of pressures which exist within a country in one direction or another of any issues, for an understanding of the stability of countries, for an understanding of yes, even with an emphasis on trade and the rest the importance of understanding how much commitments are worth, as well as the longevity of governments, one must have an understanding of the underlying pressures that exist in any country.

The question of political versus economic is in some regards a false issue, because as far as labor is concerned it automatically, of necessity, covers both. The concern that in some countries where the trade union movement may not be a principal organization influencing affairs is only one aspect, or should be only one aspect, of the concern of a labor specialist on assignment in an embassy. What he is basically concerned with is the direction that a mass movement may take and its potential impact. And this involves the ability to travel, to understand social movements, to develop relations with leaders and potential leaders, to have close concern for the direction that things may take in mass organizations. To argue that if it's principally political, then all you need is a political officer, carries one back to the situation that existed before the Second World War, when the Foreign Service Officer was regarded as someone who could do anything, and it was discovered, when the war got under way, that a Foreign Service Officer couldn't do everything. You needed specialists. You needed people that understood certain kinds of technical and social phenomena. You needed officers who had training to understand mass movements. You had the need then for specialization.

If one were to dig out of the files and read the letter written in 1943 by our Ambassador to Mexico, Ambassador Messersmith, one would have all the classic arguments for the need
to have generalists in the Foreign Service without any specialty. If the argument today is made that if labor is largely political, then it can be done by political officers, it's the same logic which had been followed by Messersmith. Surely the history of the last 50 years in our Foreign Service has underscored, and I should hope that we've learned, that a Foreign Service Officer, however well educated, however competent, however intelligent, cannot do everything. The world is too specialized, the scope of interest in foreign affairs is too wide. We must have specialists. Surely that's not an argument which should arise 50 years after it was settled, settled not just by administrative judgment, but by the facts which evolved in those succeeding years.

This is not to say that I regard the Labor Attaché function to be simply a political function. It is a function which includes heavily economic, social, and political, and that the interest of the State Department has largely been social and political does not mean that political should not be taken in its narrow sense which involves then simply trade union organizations. It never was intended that way, and surely we've learned by now that the underlying pressures that exist in a society, whether institutionalized or not, ultimately determine the direction that that society takes, and therefore the foreign policy which that society follows is something which we as a government must continue to be concerned about.

Q: I do have one more question, Dan. In terms of your experience, and we're talking now about a half century, in terms of sources of this talent that we're looking for in the Labor Attaché Program, are there any specific characteristics or sources that you see preferable to one over the other, or do you just have to deal with each case as it arises?

HOROWITZ: I would be a little reluctant... 

Q: I raise this question because the argument has been made that only somebody who comes from the trade unions could be a good Labor Attaché, [because they are] the only ones who would have sensitivity to the labor issues.

HOROWITZ: Well, the latter point which, as you say, is sometimes made makes no sense to me whatsoever. The fact is that one does not have to be a trade unionist to understand trade union problems, certainly not societal problems. Where the Labor Attaché should come from, my own feeling has been through these many years when for a time Labor Attachés were simply drawn from outside, and then for a longer period trained within the Foreign Service, that what is necessary is a mixture of the two. One should not depend entirely on people from outside, nor should the people from outside uniformly come from one milieu.

In the early days of the Labor Attaché Program, most of the people who came to the specialty had come out of academic pursuits, or from other government agencies. None had come from the trade union movements. I say movements because at that time there were, of course, the AFL as well as the CIO. And that had its weaknesses too. No. To draw people from outside, in my view, means to draw not on the basis of the origin of the
individual, not on the basis of his experience alone, though that counts, but also basically and primarily on the evaluation made of the individual. Some trade unions can make it; some cannot. Some academic people can make it; some cannot.

At the same time, what they generally lack is, almost by definition, experience in the foreign affairs field, in the State Department, in diplomacy. This, the Foreign Service Officer, basically has, training as a diplomat. If he is to be a Labor Attaché, . . . -- and I think what will probably continue, with the budget constraints that exist, will be that most of the Labor Attachés will be drawn from the career service, and this is not a bad thing, provided it is most and not all. -- . . . a Foreign Service Officers trained as a Labor Attaché should be well trained. This may involve an investment of time, money, technical training, but will pay off in the long run.

For me, the mixture is important. People from the outside [should be] brought in occasionally, not to top positions but to lower and middle rank positions to set certain standards from the outside, whereas the bulk of the Foreign Service Officers who will become Labor Attachés would provide the background which people coming in from outside generally lack, and that is the familiarity with diplomatic processes and the atmosphere which one must live in the Foreign Service. Does that cover your question?-

Q: That covers it fine. I have two more questions that used to come up regularly. Somehow they have faded now, but they will show up again I am sure as when there are foreign policy strains. One, for a long time, and I know I myself was once the subject of these kinds of attacks, the argument was made that Labor Attachés were CIA agents or had been. In other words, in a sense they were spies, and they were frequently labeled as CIA agents. In your experience, is there anything to substantiate that kind of an attack? I certainly have heard it made from, quote, so-called respectable quarters who I thought would know better.

The other thing, in a sense a related kind of an issue, was that the American trade unions were sort of a cat's-paw of American foreign policy in carrying out American government foreign policy. Could you talk about those two points?

HOROWITZ: As to the first, the allegation of CIA control or service, I never felt that I had to contend with that kind of attitude as a handicap in my work. The important thing for a Labor Attaché in his associations with the trade union people, management people, political people, government people, journalists or the rest, the important characteristic which he must demonstrate is that he knows the problems, he knows his field. If this is evident to his contacts, to his associations, then the question of CIA control becomes subsidiary. That the American government would have interest in knowing what is going on in another country has by now percolated down sufficiently that it doesn't automatically carry the label of covert intelligence. I don't regard this as a major issue.

To some extent we have had in the past the reverse kind of issue in the AID programs and in the early days in the Marshall Plan. Practically all of the labor specialist positions were
named with people of trade union background. Too frequently the people on their jobs abroad tried to give the impression that they were still acting as trade unionists, and this is the kind of thing, which I'm tempted to say, doesn't fool anybody. They knew what payroll these people were on, and to pretend that they are trade unionists... You know, the badge they carry... is short run nonsense and doesn't gain anything. I should cite my own experience in this regard. In India where on arriving, the AID labor officer, a bright, intelligent, capable officer, ex-UAW (United Automobile Workers) functioning as if he were still on trade union payroll and not on government payroll, trying to convince people that he was still a trade unionist, out of good intentions offered to take me around when I first arrived and introduce me to the trade union people who were his contacts in Delhi and around the country. I was put in the embarrassing situation with this good-natured, intelligent fellow saying to him, "Thank you very much, but no thanks. I'll make my own way." I had no intention of being labeled as a successor to my own predecessor who had also been posing as a trade unionist. No one was fooled by it, and I had no intention of functioning in any other way, or giving the impression in any other way of being other than an officer of the embassy.

The second question you raised...

Q: Particularly in Europe that the American trade union movement was merely a cat's-paw of American foreign policy, an agent of American foreign policy.

HOROWITZ: Right. If I remember...

Q: This came not only from the Soviets, but from us as well.

HOROWITZ: If I remember correctly, I covered part of this earlier in my interview so that I don't want to cover ground that I've already gone over. But the criticism in this regard of trade unionists generally emanated from left wing elements in the United States. It was a way of attempting to repudiate, to discredit the kind of work which the American trade union movement had undertaken, particularly in Europe as you say, and particularly during the period when it was so vital as to whether the countries of Western Europe would succumb to Communism using the fulcrum of the trade union movement.

No, the American trade union movement surely has demonstrated over time that it will be no organization's cat's-paw, and certainly not that of the government, that the interests of the American trade union movement and the American Government coincided for long periods of time. On the other hand, from what I saw, there was a good deal of reason to believe in fact that more frequently than not, the influence was the other way around. That is, the American Government, which in most cases did not make labor its principal focal point of interest in foreign affairs, sometimes accepted the analysis or the pressures or the presentations of the American trade union movement on specific issues. Not always. In fact, there were differences. Or what can one say when at one stage in France there were two representatives of American labor, one of the AFL and one of the CIO, and where the two worked at cross purposes and in different directions? Which one followed the lead of
the Government? The answer, of course, is neither, and I think over time people in the
countries where the American trade union movement has worked have understood this,
just as now it is true [for] the foreign labor institutes sponsored by the AFL-CIO. In this
case, there may be more substance in the allegation, but still not fundamentally so,
substance in a sense that most of the funds overtly come from the AID, and while the
American trade union movement itself finances part of the operations, much of the money
does come from Government, and yet the programs developed by these institutes
represent either the interest of the American trade union movement, or they aren't
conducted at all. By now, I think this kind of argument really carries little weight indeed.

Q: This concludes the interview with Daniel L. Horowitz on the origins, his experiences
and his comments on the future of the Labor Attaché Program in the American Foreign
Service. Of course, it is subject to supplementary comments as further thoughts come to
mind. Today is June 2, 1994. This is Herbert Weiner.

End of interview