

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
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AMBASSADOR THOMAS D. BOYATT

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Ambassador Boyatt's presentation at FSI September 30, 1992

Introduction by Ambassador Peck

PECK: Ambassador Boyatt will be leading the second part of our presentation today. Ambassador Boyatt was born in Cincinnati, Ohio. After receiving his BA from Princeton University and MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, he served in the United States Air Force and reached the rank of First Lieutenant. He entered the Foreign Service in 1959, and has served as vice consul in Antofagasta, Chile from '60 to '62, assistant to the Under Secretary of the Treasury until '64; second secretary at the American embassy in Luxembourg until '66; and first secretary at the US embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus from 1967 until 1970. He returned to Washington in 1970 as special assistant to Joseph Sisco who was Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East; and he was director of the Cyprus Bureau from 1971 to 1974, and named a member of the Senior Seminar in foreign policy the following year. In 1975 Mr. Boyatt became Minister-Counselor at the US embassy in Santiago, Chile. Mr. Boyatt was chosen to be ambassador to Upper Volta in 1978, and in 1980 he was nominated and confirmed as the ambassador to Colombia. In 1983 Ambassador Boyatt was promoted to the rank of Career Minister of the Foreign Service.

Ambassador Boyatt has also received many awards in the course of his career. In 1969 he received the State Department meritorious honor award for courageous behavior during the 1969 hijacking of the TWA plane by Palestinian guerrillas. Later he received the William R. Rivkin award for intellectual courage, disciplined dissent in taking bureaucratic and physical risks in the cause of peace on Cyprus from '67 to 1970. In 1979 Ambassador Boyatt was given the Christian A. Herter award for extraordinary contributions to the practice of diplomacy. He has also been decorated by several foreign governments. In 1971 Mr. Boyatt was elected vice president of the American Foreign Service Association, and he was elected president of AFSA in 1973 and served until he was transferred to Santiago.

In 1984 Ambassador Boyatt was elected a member of the Board of Trustees of Princeton University. He serves on the Advisory Boards and Advisory Councils of several other institutions including the Woodrow Wilson School, and the Peru Private Sector

Management Project. In 1984 Mr. Boyatt was brought to the Sears World Trade as vice president for Latin America by Frank Carlucci. And currently Mr. Boyatt is a partner in the IRC group, and president of US Defense Systems. Please join me in welcoming Mr. Boyatt.

BOYATT: Thank you very much Ed for that introduction which would have amused my father, and my mother would have believed.

Just as an aside, how many of you know the book, and the author from which the quote about “urine etching glass” comes from? All right, listen carefully. Generation of Vipers by Philip Wiley. You're already one up on the cultural affairs officer at any post where you serve.

I've known Ed Peck for 25 years, and during those 25 years we probably spent 15 or 20 of them together...well, more like 15 in Washington. When we've been in Washington together we see each other every day, and on every one of those days Ed Peck has made me laugh. He is a truly humorous person, and you all have had the benefit of that this morning. In addition to that, I've been playing poker with him once a month during those 15 years as well. So he has made a contribution of another sort to the well being of my family. And I want to take this occasion to thank Ambassador Peck for his contributions to Tommy, and Kit, and Jessica, Alexander, and Catherine, and to their educations. I mean, how can you not love a guy who donates \$100 a month to your cause?

But having heard Ed you've heard the good cop, and the funny cop. And now you're going to hear from the tough cop, with a story that is not funny at all. What I want to do is to take you through, step by step, in real world, real time, a Foreign Service case wherein in 1974, during the Cyprus crisis of that year, the Foreign Service system about which Ambassador Peck was talking, efficiency reports, and grievance systems, and the dissent channel, and hierarchies, and the corridor reputation, and the network, where all of these elements of the system were brought into play under tremendous pressure. Because the only time you can really find out about a system is when it's under pressure. And it's under pressure when the best interests of the United States are in play, when the reputations of senior officers are at risk, and when you as a more junior person, have a different view as to how the government should be proceeding, than your bosses do. And that's when it really counts because everybody is playing for keeps. And what I intend to do this morning is to give you a quick history of Cyprus, to tell you where the various national and bureaucratic players were in 1974, and then to step by step take you through a situation which I lived, which demonstrates, I think graphically, all of these elements.

First, a capsule history of Cyprus. Cyprus is an island in the northeast corner of the Mediterranean. It sits there like an aircraft carrier and dominates both east, west, and north-south movement. Every empire from the Egyptians to the British which has sought to dominate the Middle East has had to control Cyprus, and they all have. The Egyptians did, the Mycenaean Greeks did, the Achaean Greeks did, the Persians did, the Alexandrian Greeks did, the Romans did, the Byzantines did, the Crusaders did, and the

Ottoman Turks did, and eventually the British did. Every one of those empires controlled Cyprus for anywhere from 80 years to several centuries. And every one of those empires left an impact on Cyprus.

In the ebb and flow of cultures across the island, two stuck. The first, and the majority, is the Greek. The Mycenaean Greeks arrived in Cyprus in 1200 B.C., and there has been a Greek presence there ever since. In modern times the Greek portions of the island constituted about 80%, and that is an 80% majority which speaks Greek, believes in the orthodox form of Christianity, and has essentially a European culture. Unfortunately in the ebb and flow of history with all of its mistakes, the Ottoman Turks, who controlled the island from 1570 until the British came in 1870, for about 300 years, also left on the island a 20% minority spread throughout the island in kind of a measles-like pattern in enclaves, which was and is, Turkish, Muslim, and partaking of what is essentially an eastern or middle eastern culture.

The way Cyprus flowed into the interests of the United States, in the latter half of this century, was through the decolonization of the island. When it began to become clear that Great Britain was no longer going to be able to control the island as they had from 1870 until the late 1950s, the two groups on the island rose up in various ways in an effort to control what Cyprus was going to be after the Brits left. The Greek Cypriot majority of 80% wanted enosis, which is the Greek word for union. They wanted to unite Cyprus to the Greek motherland just as other chunks of Greece had been united to Greece--Crete is an example, Epiros is another example, Macedonia is another example. Historically what had happened was that after those provinces would win their freedom from the Turks, they would accede and become part of the Greek nation. And the Greeks on Cyprus wanted the same thing to happen with the island.

The Turkish minority, as you might understand, had absolutely no interest in being a minority in a Greek nation including Cyprus. So as the Greek Cypriots were fighting for union with Greece against the British in the '50s, the Turk Cypriot minority began to fight and to agitate for "taksim", or partition of the island with part of it being Greek Cypriot, and part of it being Turk Cypriot, and an exchange of populations to achieve that.

In '58 and '59 and '60 the British were in their typical decolonization situation between two sides. They were being shot at by both sides. It was a mess. They were trying to negotiate some kind of a constitutional modus vivendi, and in 1960 they were successful with the establishment of the London-Zurich Treaties and Accords. And under London-Zurich what happened was that instead of Cyprus becoming unified with Greece, or partitioned between Greece and Turkey, it was declared an independent nation wherein there would be a Greek Cypriot majority which would have the presidency and most of the cabinet posts, and a reserved power-sharing majority in the parliament; but where the Turk Cypriots would have the vice president, a certain number of cabinet posts, and total control over the local affairs--land, water, family, religion, all of that sort of thing. Not unlike the situation that was established in Beirut earlier. Great Britain became the

guarantor power, along with Mainland Greece, and Mainland Turkey, of this constitutional regime.

They stumbled along from '60 until 1963 in a very uncomfortable situation characterized by feuding between the two communities. Eventually Archbishop Makarios, who was elected president of Cyprus in a free election, and who was also head of the Orthodox Christian church of Cyprus, tried to change the constitutional regime to give more power to the central government, which the Greek Cypriots controlled. The Turk Cypriots appealed to Turkey, the Greek Cypriots appealed to Greece. Greece and Turkey both sent troops onto the island, and a crisis ensued.

The British were in that part of the world, as they were in other parts of the world, trying to shift their imperial responsibilities to the United States. Just as in Iraq, and the Gulf, and the Middle East, we found ourselves taking over the great power, third power adjudicator, referee, enforcer role. We found ourselves increasingly thrust into that role in Cyprus. Why? Because the United States could not afford to have its Greek and Turkish allies at each other's throats with armies, armed and trained by us, over Cyprus. So suddenly Cyprus became a major problem for the United States wherein it had in the past, like Palestine, and like Kashmir, and India-Pakistan, like Ireland, been a British problem, it suddenly became an American problem.

The differences were patched over in 1963. There was another crisis in 1967 wherein the parties almost came to war, but didn't. And Cyrus Vance, incidentally, was President Johnson's negotiator in that crisis and managed to avert a war, and indeed he managed to get a mechanism for negotiations established which exists to this day. It must be the longest on-going negotiation in the history of the world, still unsuccessful. In any case, the situation on the island deteriorated, and deteriorated, and deteriorated, and the position of the United States came more and more and more to the forefront, and the British withdrew. And if they could have they would have washed their hands of it. They had a treaty obligation. They couldn't get out of it, but they very clearly weren't going to play a major role, and they very clearly encouraged us to do so. And we, for our own reasons, we felt that imperative, and we played that major mediatory role.

So, that's where we were in 1974. I hope you'll understand this capsulized history. What it did was, it projected two warring ethnic groups, both of whom were connected to metropolises which were our allies in NATO, and whom we could not afford to see in conflict because of what it would do to the NATO alliance, and because of the advantages it would give to the Soviets to fish in these troubled waters.

In 1974 the situation on the island was as follows: the Greek Cypriot community was itself divided between those who supported independence, and those who were disappointed with independence, and in fact wanted to go back to enosis. And this latter group, more radical, the rejectionist front, went into clandestine guerrilla warfare against its own government. And they began robbing banks, the usual pattern. They began robbing banks to collect money, and they began using the money to buy arms. They began

raiding the stores of the Greek armies, and the Cypriot armies to get arms, and publishing inflammatory leaflets, and organizing, and doing the sort of guerrilla warfare things, both urban and rural, that one always does when one is in charge of a rejectionist front.

The government of Makarios remained in favor of a solution on the basis of independence. The Turkish Cypriots continued to rearm because they saw trouble coming, and because they increasingly heard the voices in favor of enosis. And both Greece and Turkey, of course, supported their co-religionists on the island.

The situation in Greece was that Greece was run by a military junta, led initially by a gentleman named Papadopoulos, a colonel, and eventually by another gentleman named Ioannidis, who was a general. These Greek military men in effect ran the country. They had a civilian face organization. They had a prime minister, and a defense minister, and a foreign minister, all of whom were appointed. But these people were puppets, and they didn't have any power, and they did what the Greek army generals told them to do.

In Turkey, in 1974, Bulent Ecevit, had been elected the prime minister, and was the first prime minister from the left side of the political spectrum, and the first democratic leader in the country in several years. The country had been run by the army. His situation was fragile, and the Turkish army allowed him varying parameters depending on what the issue was. On economic issues he had a fairly wide borders within which he could operate. On nationalist issues, of which Cyprus was the key, he had a very narrow parameter within which he could operate.

In 1974 the situation in Great Britain was that the discredited Wilson government was on its last legs. "Sunny Jim" Callaghan was the foreign minister, he wanted to succeed Wilson. He had absolutely no interest in the Cyprus problem. And he had no interest in having to have responsibility for the Cyprus problem because it would draw down his energy, and his resources, alienate the several hundred thousand Greek Cypriots who lived, and still live, in London. And generally the British were in a "wash my hands of it" mode.

In the United States, if you'll remember, the first six months of 1974, we were without a government. Nixon was in the final phase of Watergate, and it was clear that he was without power, virtually without portfolio. But what power he did have left, and what time he had left, was devoted to saving Nixon. So in large measure one could say that the United States was without a government. And into that vacuum stepped Henry the K. Henry Kissinger became, in effect, president for foreign policy. Both during the final stages of Nixon, because Nixon was without power, and during the Ford administration because Ford really didn't have any capabilities in that area, Kissinger truly "ran" foreign affairs.

But in any case, the point here is that the United States government was not functioning in any way with any degree of efficiency. The normal channels of government had

become clogged. The concern with Watergate was overwhelming. Washington was a very strange place in the first six months of 1974.

From a bureaucratic perspective there were a couple of wild cards. The first wild card was, that the defense establishment in the United States was very pro the Greek military government. Why? Well, the main reason was because Admiral Zumwalt wanted to home port the Sixth Fleet in Piraeus, the port of Athens, and in order to home port the Sixth Fleet in Athens he had to have the agreement of the Greek government. And since the Greek government was three or four generals and colonels, he had to have their agreement. So nobody in the defense establishment wanted to see any activity involving Greece which would alienate the military government in any way.

To complicate matters further, the CIA had a special relationship with General Ioannidis and Colonel Papadopoulos. Why? Well, the reason is historical. In the '40s and '50s when there was a communist guerrilla movement in Greece, and at that time, at least in the late '40s, we weren't sure whether Greece was going to go communist or not. We poured huge amounts of aid, and bureaucratic attention, into Greece. And among that bureaucratic attention was a huge intelligence establishment. And that intelligence establishment, as it always does in a liaison way, got in touch with the Greek military, and the Greek CIA. And it turns out that almost 30 years later, both General Ioannidis and Colonel Papadopoulos had been very friendly with the CIA in the '40s and '50s, and the CIA, in fact, had a very close relationship with both of them, particularly with Ioannidis. So, from the CIA's bureaucratic point of view they had a major asset in Athens. They had a relationship with the guy who ran the country, and they didn't want it disturbed. And they certainly didn't want it disturbed by the Cyprus problem.

From the point of view of the US embassy in Ankara they had all sorts of things that they were worried about in terms of the bilateral relationship, and they didn't want to see Cyprus impinge upon those relationships because from the Turkish point of view almost everything the United States did, or could do with respect to Cyprus, was anathema to any Turkish government. And particularly this Turkish government which was being observed very carefully by the Turkish army.

That was the world situation with respect to Cyprus into which one FSO-3--you would say O-1 today, I think--stumbled as director of Cypriot affairs. I was doing my job as the sort of super desk officer for the Cyprus problem, monitoring the situation, when over a period of time in late '73 and early '74 I began to receive increasing evidence that the government of Greece, the Greek CIA, and the Greek military, were backing the radical rejectionist front on Cyprus which wanted to overthrow Makarios and declare Cyprus part of Greece. Now I knew, I'm a Greek language officer, I'd spent a lot of time out there, I knew that were the Greeks, broadly defined, successful in establishing a government in Nicosia which was responsive to Athens, much less which became part of Greece, that Turkey would invade Cyprus. I knew that. And I knew that if Turkey invaded Cyprus we'd have two NATO armies fighting each other, illegally, with American supplied weapons and on the basis of American training, and that it would damage our position in

the eastern Mediterranean for a generation, and provided--who knew at the time--what opportunities for the Soviets.

The situation on the ground kept getting worse and worse and worse and the signals, at least to me, were clearer and clearer and clearer that the bloody Greek government was playing games with the pro-ensis extremists on the right wing of the Greek Cypriot political spectrum. The goal appeared to be to get rid of Makarios and install a government which would be totally responsive to Athens.

So what do you do? You're the initially responsible person. I took what I thought was the most responsible action. I drafted an instructional cable to the ambassador in Athens which said, in effect, go in to General Ioannidis, not to the prime minister, not to the defense minister, not to the foreign minister, to Ioannidis himself, and tell him in words of one syllable that even he will understand, that the United States being the only government in the developed world which is still on friendly terms with the government of Greece, that the United States strongly opposes any efforts by any element of the Greek government, overt or clandestine, to mess around in the Cyprus situation. And that we particularly oppose any efforts to overthrow Makarios and install a pro-Athens government. Because if that happens the Turks are going to invade, and that's not good for any of us. And I also drafted backup supporting cables for actions for our ambassador in Nicosia and our ambassador in Ankara to take.

The cable got as far as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the bureau and he called me in, and he said, "We can't do that." And I said, "We have to do that." He said, "Nobody in this town wants to alienate the Greek government." And I said, "You would prefer a war?" Anyway, we argued back and forth, he refused to clear the cable. So I went back and I redrafted it, and I toned it down but with essentially the same message, and I came back with another try. This time he said, "Okay." So we went to the Assistant Secretary, and the Assistant Secretary said, "We can't do that. Nobody in this town wants to hear this sort of thing." And I said, "We have to do it. As responsible people we just have to." Well, this battle went back and forth, and up and down, and finally along about April--I had started this in February, so two months had passed--I finally got in to see the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who was Joe Sisco, my friend and former boss in NEA had been promoted, and I said, "God damn it, Joe, we have to do something." And he said, "Look, this is very difficult. Nobody in Washington wants to do this, particularly they don't want to hear anything anti-Greek in the White House. Don't ask me why. I don't know why, but I know that's how they feel over there." So we had the same argument again.

Eventually in about June I managed to get a much watered down version of my instructional cable out of Washington with one version to our ambassador in Athens, and backup cables in Ankara and Nicosia. The ambassador in Athens instantly came back with a cable, which is his right, saying, "Those are terrible instructions that you've given me. I can't possibly do that. If I do that it's going to alienate the Greek government, and we won't have any influence with the Greek government. I reject these instructions.

You've got to change them." So I had to fight the fight all over again, but with one more enemy. And by this time the CIA and the Defense Department had discovered what I was up to and they were both opposed to doing this for the reasons that I stated before. In the case of one, because of home porting; and the case of the other, because they had a relationship with Ioannidis.

So I went back for about the eighth time to the drawing board and finally got another instructional cable out to the embassy in Athens. By this time it's July 5th. The ambassador in Athens promptly went on leave. And the DCM, instead of himself carrying out the instruction, gave it to the Political Counselor. And the Political Counselor, instead of going to General Ioannidis as instructed, went to a Greek Orthodox bishop who was reported to have close relations with the military, and gave the message of the United States government to this religious figure. All of this was reported back to Washington about the 12th of July. It became clear that the instructions had been carried out in a halfhearted manner at best by the embassy in Athens.

That same day we received a raw intelligence cable from the station in Athens which said, in effect, "We have been in touch with General Ioannidis, and we have been assured by General Ioannidis that the Greek government is not, and will not be involved in any clandestine activity designed to overthrow Archbishop Makarios, and to damage the situation in the eastern Mediterranean." That was a weekend, so all right, we'd had it from the horse's mouth. I went home. And about 3:00 a.m. on Monday morning, I got a call from the Ops Center at the State Department and the person said, "You better get in here. There's fighting in Nicosia, and something is going on and it doesn't look good."

So I went into the State Department, I went up to the Operations Center, and they said, "Here's what we've got." And he put two pieces of paper in front of me. On the left hand side was the Daily Intelligence Summary, which is done by the entire intelligence community for the President and the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the highest officers. And it said, in its lead item, "We have been assured by General Ioannidis that Greece will not move its forces on Cyprus against Makarios. To the right was a cable from Embassy Nicosia describing the fighting between Cypriots loyal to Makarios and Cypriots and Greeks trying to overthrow him. The Presidential Palace was in flames the Cypriot force has been decimated. We don't know where Archbishop Makarios is. We presume he's dead. A government has been installed in Cyprus, and the new leader is Nikos Sampson." Nikos Sampson happened to be an individual who had killed a lot of British policemen during the '50s, and he'd killed a lot of Turk Cypriots during the '60s, and for them to make him the president of the new nation of Cyprus, was just unbelievable, and unthinkable. And, of course, instantly the Turkish army mobilized.

Now think about this. There we were, sitting there with the entire intelligence establishment of the United States in all of its majesty, having been conned by a piss-ant Greek Brigadier General, on the one hand; and on the other hand the disaster which I had been trying to avert, and avoid, coming true like your worst nightmare. Well, it was in the fan, clearly. Several emergency meetings were held, and Kissinger decided to send Joe

Sisco out on a shuttle diplomacy mission to solve the problem. And I had been around Washington long enough, and had become cynical enough, that I knew that the minute Kissinger sent Sisco, instead of going himself, it meant that he knew that there was no hope, and he didn't want to have a loser identified with himself. So he sacrificed Under Secretary Sisco, and his staff, of which I was one. I mean it's a clear bureaucratic signal that you're not going to win. And we didn't.

We flew first to Athens where an ashen-faced ambassador received us and said, "We've made arrangements for you to see the foreign minister." And Sisco said, "I'm not going to see the foreign minister. If I can't see General Ioannidis, I'm leaving." And we had about a morning's go-around over that, but we eventually got to see General Ioannidis, and Joe Sisco went in there and said, "If you don't do something we're going to have a war, and you're going to lose the war. Now give me some elements of compromise that I can take to Ankara that we can work with." Whereupon, General Ioannidis launched into an emotional, weird, surreal, description of Byzantine history, and the struggle against the Osmanli Turks, and Constantinople, not Istanbul. We were clearly in real trouble because this guy had disconnected from the world, and he had all the power. And he didn't give us anything.

We went off to Ankara, and we met with Ecevit. We met with Ecevit just forever it seemed like, eight or ten hours. Talk, talk, talk, and Ecevit was just shaking his head, no, no, no. I'm not going to do anything. And finally our ambassador there, Butts Macomber, who is known to Ed, and Steve, and myself at least, and someone who had been Under Secretary for Management, with whom I had fought seriously as president of AFSA, but for whom I had a great deal of affection and respect, he sort of went like this, time out. And everybody stopped talking, and he turned to Ecevit, and said, "Mr. Prime Minister, you're a teacher and a poet. You're not a military man, and there are kids all over the world who are not going to forgive you if you let this happen." A tear rolled down Ecevit's cheek, and he said, "Mr. Ambassador, it's out of my hands."

The next morning the Turks hit the beach. They attacked northern Cyprus, they overwhelmed the Greek Cypriot forces in Kyrenia. They drove straight through to the Turkish sector of Nicosia and established a bridgehead on the island. We went back to Washington with a failed mission, and at that point I was, as you can imagine, self-righteous, and angry, and disappointed because American diplomacy had conducted itself in such a way as to bring damage, death, and destruction. The three Ds. It was, in my mind, unforgivable.

So, I wrote a dissent memorandum. And in that dissent memorandum I covered what I had tried to do, where I had been blocked, what the intelligence community had said and done, what the Defense Department had said and done, what had had happened. And, yes, I had to say, "you see, I was right," you know, a little bit of that. But then I said, "But Mr. Secretary,"...these dissent memoranda go straight to the Secretary..."Mr. Secretary, you have to go to the Turks now, and keep them inside that bridgehead because if they break, and drive to both coasts, they will divide Cyprus in half, and Greece and Turkey will have

another boundary over which they can fight until the end of time. And what's more, you will have them fighting with American supplied equipment which is contrary to their treaties with us, and our military supply relationships with both countries will have to be stopped...blah, blah, blah."

Clearly, Kissinger...I'm not sure he ever saw my memorandum. There's a requirement that they be answered within 30 days. In fact, my memorandum was not answered by Policy Planning for six months, and I'll get to that in a minute.

Meanwhile, on the island itself the Turkish tanks, two days later, drove out of the bridgehead, crashed across the island east and west in both directions, cut Cyprus in half, great slaughter of Greek Cypriots in the Turkish area, great slaughter of Turk Cypriots in the Greek area. A bloody mess. The government of the generals in Athens fell, and a democratic government took over but it was totally paralyzed. The only good thing was, it was clear that that democratic government was not going to get into a war with Turkey.

In Turkey, the Turkish army simply did whatever it decided to do and Bulent Ecevit had the choice of ratifying it, or disappearing, and he chose, however reluctantly, to ratify it.

On the island of Cyprus itself, everyone blamed the United States for what had happened. There was rioting, and there was a lot of shooting around the American embassy. And one particular morning the shooting was particularly bad, and as everybody ran for the safe room--a room with steel casings around it--one of our colleagues (long pause) was hit in the head, and her head was blown off. A Foreign Service national, and as the ambassador reached out to carry her, he took one right here, which tore his heart out, (pause) and he was dead before he hit the ground. A friend of mine, and Ed's and Steve's.

So, there you have it. We had alienated all three parties, the Greeks, and the Turks, and the Cypriots. We had caused severe death and destruction on the island. We had contributed to the death of friends, and in general made a mess of it. As you can see, it is difficult for me to this day. In any case, I got what I deserved. That is to say, I was simply fired. Kissinger said, "You are relieved of your job as director of Cypriot affairs." And I expected that. So I just went home, and stayed there.

The situation on the island went from bad to worse. Indeed, our relationships with Turkey and Greece were severely damaged. They stayed damaged for a generation, and we had a lot of problems in achieving our policy goals in that part of the world.

Well, what are the lessons of all this? What does it tell you? In order to make that clear I have to provide a postscript. And the postscript is what happened to me. Well, what happened to me was that, unbelievably for me, the Director General of the era called me up, and said, "I'd like you to go to the Senior Seminar." I said, "Hey, you can't be serious. I'm damaged goods." And he said, "No, no. We want you to do that." And, of course, I did. It's an honor assignment, it's fun. It's a great year. It's the senior most training

assignment that one can have, and I have to tell you that I was surprised, as well as delighted. That's what happened.

Half way through that year, I got a call from the intelligence committees on the Hill, the Church committee on the Senate side, and the Pike committee on the House side--it was the Pike committee that called me--and they said, "Mr. Boyatt, we have decided in analyzing US policy failures, we're going to do the three Cs, Chile, Cambodia, and Cyprus. And you had a lot to do with Cyprus, and we'd like you to testify." And I said, "You can't come to me directly, you have to go through the chain of command. If you want me to testify I'll have to call my superiors, and ask them." And they said, "That's fine. Do that." And mind you, I'm in a training assignment, all right? So I called Larry Eagleburger, who was the Under Secretary for Management, and who was very close to Henry, and I said, "Larry, the Pike committee wants me to testify." And he said, "You can't." I said, "Okay, I'll tell them that you said that." So he said, "Wait a minute." (Laughter) "Let me talk to the lawyer." So he went and talked to the lawyer, and called me back and he said, "You can't on the basis of executive privilege." I said, "Okay." I called up the Pike committee, and I said, "I can't testify. Under Secretary Eagleburger has said I can't testify on the basis of executive privilege." And the counsel for the committee said, "That's nonsense. Executive privilege flows from the President only to his immediate advisers, and not down to desk officers at the State Department. I'll call Eagleburger." So a big struggle ensued--with constitutional overtones, by the way. A fight between the Executive Branch, and the Legislative Branches, as to whether I could testify or not. And finally Kissinger said, "Okay. You can testify, but you can't say anything that's classified." So I saluted, and I went up to the hearing.

There were three or four Assistant Secretaries in the room, and Pike didn't call any of them. Instead he called me. So I went up, and was sworn, and he asked me a question. The first question he asked me involved a classified response, and I said, "Mr. Chairman, my instructions from the Secretary of State are that I can come, I can testify, but I can't divulge any classified information." "What!" And he went ballistic, and he cleared the room of all of the "riff raff" Assistant Secretaries, and the press, and everybody else, and the CIA's lawyer. And I'm sitting there all by myself, and they're all up there on this pedestal--you know how they intimidate you--and he went into executive session and he said, "Now you can testify." And I said, "Those aren't my..." Anyway, it went back and forth, and back and forth, and halfway through they discovered that there was a Boyatt dissent memorandum, about which I had heard nothing from the Foreign Service specifically. And they subpoenaed the dissent memorandum, and Henry, of course, resisted that mightily. This struggle went on and on, and eventually an agreement was reached under the terms of which I was allowed to testify in closed session, and answer questions up to secret but not beyond secret. And the Boyatt memorandum was cut into pieces, and those pieces were interspersed with other drivel made up by S/P designed to disguise what was the Boyatt memorandum because Dr. Kissinger was so concerned for protecting my anonymity. (Laughter) If you believe that, you will also believe anything.

Anyway, a constitutional compromise was reached. At the end of my year in the Senior Seminar I became the Deputy Chief of Mission in Santiago which is a great job. It's a career making job. I wound up being chargé there, and went on to two embassies, and retired when I was 50, and lived happily ever after.

What are the lessons? Well, there are a lot of lessons here. The first lesson is that you really test the system by how it performs under pressure. That's lesson number one. In my case, the system performed pretty well under pressure. While it is true that in a policy sense I was unsuccessful...maybe that's a fair way of putting it. I was unsuccessful in getting the United States government to do what it should have done, when it should have done it. And if I'd been successful, lives would have been saved and the best interest of this nation would have been much better served. But in the process of trying to do that, I spit in just about everybody's eye that you can spit into. I fought with the CIA at the highest levels, I fought with the Defense Department at the highest levels, I fought with two ambassadors at the highest levels, and I fought with everyone that was above me in the bureaucratic chain of command--the Deputy Assistant Secretary, the Assistant Secretary, and the Under Secretary, and there was an implied fight the whole time with Kissinger. And he knew it, and I knew it. And yet, I survived. And not only did I survive, I prospered.

Why? How? What were the mechanisms that made this possible? Well, I guess three. One is the dissent channel. I used it, and I used it in the proper way. I used it in the appropriate way. Two, I fought but I kept my fight within the building. At any point in this struggle, I could have gone to the press, or the "Hill", (the Congress) and I could have generated a counter-fire against Henry Kissinger and made him fight out our Cyprus policy in public. In which case he would have had...the case for what I wanted to do was so overwhelming, that had it gotten into the public domain, particularly the press domain, and the Congressional domain, that he would have been forced to do what I wanted him to do, but I did not do that. Now, I stayed within the system and a friend of mine was killed. But I did stay within the system. What did the system do for me?

Much to my surprise the first thing that happened was that I got a great efficiency report from the very Assistant Secretary I had been fighting. The Director General stepped in, and made sure that I got to the Senior Seminar. Somebody else stepped in and made sure I got a good onward assignment. In short, the old boy network, and it's still an old boy network, by the time you guys get up there it will be an old boy and old girl network, but in those days it was an old boy network, closed ranks, and everybody in that system did what they could to take care of me, and they did. And I lived to talk about it.

The questions? There are a lot of them, and the biggest one, of course, is did I do the right thing. Well, I don't know. Judgement is everything. Believe me, I would not have fought this fight over something that was unimportant. I wouldn't have fought this fight over an efficiency report, and I wouldn't have fought it over a travel allowance. But from my perspective the best interests of the United States were in play. So I fought. When your time comes, I hope you fight.

End of interview