

Excerpts from the Germany Country Reader

(The complete Reader, more than 2000 pages in length, is available for purchase

<http://adst.org/store/#/~category/id=4169163&offset=0&sort=normal.>)

GERMANY

COUNTRY READER TABLE OF CONTENTS

Carl F. Norden	1938-1939	Consular Officer, Berlin
Lawrence Norrie	1940-1954	Head of Youth Reorientation Program, Public Affairs, USIS, Frankfurt
Douglas MacArthur, II	1942-1944	Detention Camp Prisoner, Black Forest
Alfred Puhan	1942-1944	Broadcaster, Voice of America, New York City, New York
Patrick F. Morris	1944-1945	Prisoner of War, Germany
Robert E. Asher	1945	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Frankfurt
Louis A. Wiesner	1945-1949	Labor Officer, Germany
Anthony Geber	1945-1954	Intelligence Officer, Bonn and Berlin
Robert Lochner	1945-1955 1961-1968	USIS, Germany Director RAIS, Berlin
Edmund Schechter	1945-1946	Head of Radio Berlin, USIS, Berlin
Michael Weyl	1945-1948	Acting Head of Libraries, USIS, Stuttgart
Karl F. Mautner	1945-1958	82 nd Airborne, Berlin
Robert R. Bowie	1945-1946 1950-1952	U.S. Military Officer, Germany U.S. Military Officer, Germany
Helmut Sonnenfeldt	1946	U.S. Army, Germany
Dorothy Jester	1946-1948	Secretary and Consular Officer, Munich

Dayton S. Mak	1946-1948	Vice Consul, Hamburg
Ray E. Jones	1946-1949	U.S. Army, Berlin
Stuart Van Dyke	1946-1950	U.N. High Commission, Germany
Thomas J. Dunnigan	1946-1950	Office of the U.S. Political Advisor, Berlin
Chester E. Beaman	1946-1951	HICOG, Heidelberg
Jordan Thomas Rogers	1946 1946-1948 1948-1950 1950-1953	Consular Officer, Stuttgart Visa Officer, Berlin Trade Officer, HICOM, Frankfurt COCOM Officer, Office of German Affairs, Washington, DC
Alfred Leroy Atherton, Jr.	1947-1950 1950-1952	Vice Consul, Stuttgart High Commission Staff, Bonn
John W. McDonald	1947-1950 1950-1952	OMGUS, Berlin Allied High Commission, Secretariat, Bonn
Henry Byroade	1947-1952	Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Washington, DC
Robert B. Houston	1947-1949	Officer in Charge, Bremerhaven
Edmund Schechter	1947-1955	Chief of Radio Munich, USIS, Munich
Kenneth P.T. Sullivan	1947-1949	Visa Officer, Berlin
Anthony J. Perna	1948-1951	Air Force, Berlin Air Lift, Berlin
Dale D. Clark	1949	Civil Affairs Division, Bremen
Slator Clay Blackiston, Jr.	1949-1950	Vice Consul, Stuttgart
Edward W. Mulcahy	1949-1950	Visa Officer, Munich
Archer K. Blood	1949-1951	Displaced Persons Program, Munich
Wilbur P. Chase	1949-1951	Head of Refugee Visa Program, Hamburg
David E. Mark	1949-1951	Deputy Protocol Officer, Berlin

David E. L'Heureux	1949-1952	Displaced Persons and Visa Officer, Butzbach and Frankfurt
Stanley D. Schiff	1949 1949-1950 1950-1952	Orientation, Frankfurt Kreis Officer, Schwabischvish Hall Kreis Officer, Baden
Hans N. Tuch	1949-1952	Director, Amerika Haus, USIS, Wiesbaden/Frankfurt
Dwight J. Porter	1949-1954	Head of Office of Management and Budget, High Commissioner in Germany, Bonn and Berlin
Frank E. Maestrone	1949-1954	Vice Consul, Hamburg
Yale Richmond	1949-1951 1951-1952 1952 1952-1954	Kreis Resident Officer, Germany Cultural Affairs Program Officer, Munich Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, Nuremburg Exchange Officer, Stuttgart
Woodward Romine	1949-1950 1950-1951 1951-1953 1953-1954	U.S. Displaced Persons Commission Assistant Land Observer, Freiberg Political/Economic Officer, Stuttgart Assistant Travel Control Officer, Bonn
Horace Y. Edwards	1949-1955	Educational Exchange Program, High Commissioner in Germany, USIS, Germany
Jacques J. Reinstein	1949-1950 1950-1951 1953-1955 1955-1958	Acting Chief, Division of German Economic Affairs, Washington D.C. Director of German Affairs, Washington D.C. Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Washington D.C. Director of German Affairs, Washington D.C.
Jonathan Dean	1949-1951 1952-1956 1956-1960 1968-1972	Kreis Resident Officer, Limburg Political Officer, Bonn East German Desk Officer, Washington DC Political Counselor, Bonn
Charles W. McCaskill	1950-1951	Refugee Officer, Schwierfert

George Allen Morgan	1950-1951	Director, Eastern Element, Berlin
Kenneth P.T. Sullivan	1950-1951 1950-1951	Political Advisor, Frankfurt Land Observer, Tübingen
Harry I. Odell	1950-1952 1954-1955 1955-1957	Kreis Resident Officer, Frankfurt Visa Officer, Hamburg Economic Officer, Berlin
Talcott W. Seelye	1950-1952	Kreis Resident Officer, Frankfurt
Carleton S. Coon, Jr.	1950-1952	Kreis Resident Officer, High Commissioner in Germany, Frankfurt
Walter E. Jenkins, Jr.	1950-1952	Kreis Resident Officer, High Commissioner in Germany, Bonn
William E. Schaufele, Jr.	1950-1952	Kreis Resident Officer, High Commissioner in Germany, Pfaffenhofen
Moncrieff J. Spear	1950-1952	Political Officer, Frankfurt and Berlin
Joan Seelye	1950-1952	Spouse of Foreign Service Officer, Mosbach
Arthur T. Tienken	1950-1952	Kreis Resident Officer, High Commissioner in Germany, Schweinfurt
Henry L. Heymann	1950 1950-1952	Visa Officer, Stuttgart Chief, Visa Section, Hamburg
Frederick H. Sacksteder	1950-1951 1952	Kreis Residence Officer, Wuertenberg- Baden Information Officer, Dusseldorf
William N. Turpin	1950-1951 1951-1952	Kreis Officer, West Germany Consular/Political Officer, Munich
William A. Helseth	1950-1953	Consular/Economic Officer, Frankfurt
George L. West	1950 1951-1953	Political Officer, Frankfurt Chief, Foreign Relations Division, Bonn
Emmerson M. Brown	1950-1954	Kreis Resident Officer, High Commissioner in Germany, Frankfurt
William N. Harben	1950-1951	Vice Consul, Frankfurt

	1951-1954	Political Officer, Bonn
Albert Stoffel	1950-1955	Economic Officer, Berlin
Manuel Abrams	1950-1955	Trade and Payments Officer, Economic Cooperation Administration, Frankfurt
Alan G. James	1950	Kreis Officer, High Commissioner in Germany, Frankfurt
	1951-1956	Administrative/Political/Consular Officer, Munich
Martha C. Mautner	1950-1958	Political Officer, Berlin
Terrence Catherman	1950-1952	Kreis Resident Officer, Heidelberg & Bonn
	1952-1953	Amerika Haus Director, Heidelberg
	1953-1955	Information Program Officer, USIS, Bonn
	1970-1974	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, West Berlin
	1985-1990	Public Affair Officer/Director USIS, Germany
John A. McKesson, III	1951-1953	Economic Officer, Berlin
L. Michael Rives	1951-1952	Refugee Relief Program, Frankfurt and Bonn
L. Bruce Laingen	1951-1953	Displaced Persons Program, Hamburg
Paul K. Stahnke	1951-1953	Political Officer, Hamburg and Kiel
Henry Dunlap	1951-1954	Director, Amerika Haus, USIS, Bonn
Cecil B. Lyon	1951-1954	Special Assistant to the Commissioner, High Commissioner's Office, Berlin
John G. Kormann	1951-1952	Resident Officer, Neumarkt
	1952-1953	Public Affairs Officer, Coburg
	1953-1955	Chief Editor, U.S. Press Service for Germany, Bonn
Melville Blake	1951-1952	Displaced Persons Program, Schweinfurt Displaced Persons Camp
	1952-1953	Principal Officer, Bremerhaven
	1954-1957	Refugee Relief Program, Bonn
	1957-1958	Special Assistant to the Minister for Economic Affairs, Bonn

	1975-1979	Deputy Principal Officer, Frankfurt
Alexander Frenkley	1952	Set up direct Russian Broadcasts from Munich to USSR, Munich
William E. Schaufele, Jr.	1952-1953	Labor Officer, Dusseldorf
Michael H. Newlin	1952-1954	Vice Consul & Rotation Officer, Frankfurt
Gerard M. Gert	1952-1954	Public Relations Officer, USIS, Berlin
Maurice E. Lee	1952-1954	Press Officer, High Commissioner in Germany, Bremen
Norman L. Pratt	1952-1955	Consular Officer, Berlin
William G. Bradford	1952-1955	Public Safety Officer, Berlin
Robert C. Brewster	1952-1955	Political/Administrative Officer, Stuttgart
Frank Snowden Hopkins	1952-1955	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Stuttgart
Kenneth P.T. Sullivan	1952-1955	Labor Officer, Dusseldorf
Parke D. Massey	1952-1953	German Area and European Economic Studies, Columbia University
	1953-1956	Treasury Attaché, West Berlin
William Root	1952-1955	Office of the High Commissioner, Bonn
	1971-1974	Economic Counselor, West Berlin
James E. Hoofnagle	1952-1956	General Manager, US Information Program, Germany
	1961-1964	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, West Berlin
Robert A. Stevenson	1952-1957	Political Officer, Dusseldorf
Denise Abbey	1952-1960	Cultural Programmer, Amerika Haus, USIS, Mannheim
Robert M. Beaudry	1953-1955	Military Security Board, Koblenz
Archer K. Blood	1953-1955	Chief of Official Reception, Bonn
Dorothy A. Eardley	1953-1955	Clerk-Stenographer, West Berlin

Milton Leavitt	1953-1955	Information Officer, USIS, Munich
John A. McKesson, II	1953-1955	Political Officer, Bonn
Michael H. Newlin	1953-1955	Rotation Officer, Frankfurt
William E. Schaufele, Jr.	1953-1955	Visa/Economic Officer, Munich
John C. Leary	1953-1956	Economic officer, Dusseldorf
Jack A. Sulser	1953-1957	Political Officer, Dusseldorf
Philip H. Valdes	1954	Interviewed Communist Defectors, Frankfurt
Paul F. Du Vivier	1954-1955	Economic Officer, Berlin
John M. Anspacher	1954-1956	Special Assistant for Policy and Plans, USIS, Bonn
Gerald Michael Bache	1954-1956	Consular Officer, Munich
Joseph N. Greene, Jr.	1954-1956	Political Officer, Bonn
Mark C. Lissfelt	1954-1956	US Army, CIC, Germany
R. Keith Severin	1954-1956	US Army, Germany
S. Douglas Martin	1954-1956 1961-1964	Consular Officer; Berlin Desk Officer, Office of German Affairs; Washington, DC
Cole Blasier	1954-1957	Economic, Commercial, and Political Officer, Bonn
Ridgway B. Knight	1954-1957	Deputy Assistant High Commissioner, Berlin
David Eugene Boster	1954-1958	Political Officer, Bonn
Owen B. Lee	1955	Civilian Employee, U.S. Army, Wurzburg
Frank E. Schmelzer	1955-1956	Visa Officer, Refugee Relief Program, Frankfurt
William Lloyd Stearman	1955-1956	Political Officer, West Berlin

Thompson R. Buchanan	1955-1957	Defector (Soviet) Reception Center, Frankfurt
Walter E. Jenkins, Jr.	1955-1957	Economic Officer, Berlin
Charles Stuart Kennedy	1955-1958	Refugee Relief Officer, Frankfurt
Charles K. Johnson	1955-1961	Economic Officer, Berlin
McKinney Russell	1955-1962	Radio Liberty, USIS, Munich
Robert F. Franklin	1956	Deputy Director, Radio in the American Sector, Berlin
James H. Bahti	1956-1957	Personnel Officer, Bonn
James A. Klemstine	1956-1958	Refugee Relief Program, Hamburg
Dorothy Jester	1956-1958	Assistant Commercial Attaché, Bonn
James M. Wilson, Jr.	1956-1958	Director, Office of Military Rights and International Security Affairs, DOD, Washington, DC
Robert Theodore Curran	1956-1957 1957-1959	Public Affairs Officer, Berlin Executive Director: American Institute in Tübingen; Stuttgart
C. Gary Bream	1956-1959	Economic Officer, Bonn/Bad Godesberg
William C. Trimble	1956-1959	Deputy Chief of Mission, Bonn
Lewis D. Junior	1956-1959 1960	Consular Officer, Hamburg Staff Assistant to Ambassador, Bonn
Hugh G. Appling	1956-1960	Political Officer, Bonn
William Lloyd Stearman	1956-1962	Press Attaché, Bonn
John A. Baker Jr.	1957	Russian Language Training, Oberammergau
Vladimir I. Toumanoff	1957-1958	Peripheral Reporting, Frankfurt
Hans N. Tuch	1957-1958	Policy Officer, Voice of America, USIS, Munich

Lewis W. Bowden	1957-1958	Russian Studies, Oberammergau
Frederick W. Flott	1957-1959	Mixed Duties, Bonn
John A. Buche	1957-1959 1959-1960	U.S. Army, Germany Student, Tubingen
James H. Bahti	1957-1960	Consular/Economic Officer, Hamburg
Allen B. Moreland	1957-1960	Consul General, Stuttgart
Alexander A. Klieforth	1958-1960	Chief of Inspection Team - RIAS, Berlin
Kempton B. Jenkins	1958-1960	Political Officer, Berlin
Alfred Joseph White	1958 1959-1961	German Language Training, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, DC Vice Consul, Bremen
Betty Jane Jones	1958-1962	Consular/Economic Officer, Berlin
George F. Muller	1958-1962	Access Officer, Berlin
Albert E. Hemsing	1958-1964	Information Officer, USIS, Berlin
Robert Gerald Livingston	1958-1960 1964-1968 1968-1970 1970-1971	Economic-Labor Officer, Hamburg East German Affairs, Berlin Political Officer, Bonn Council on Foreign Relations: East Germany Study Group, New York
Kenneth N. Skoug	1959 1959-1961	German Desk Officer, Washington, DC Political Officer, Munich
Herbert Daniel Brewster	1959-1961	Political Officer, Berlin
Bruce A. Flatin	1959-1961	German Affairs, Intelligence and Research Bureau, Washington, DC
Claude Groce	1959-1961	Radio Operator, Voice of America, USIS, Munich
Kenneth N. Skoug	1959-1961	Political Officer, Munich
Perry W. Linder	1959-1961	Consular Officer, Hamburg

Richard R. Wyrrough	1959-1962	US Army, Germany
Wade Matthews	1959-1962	Consular Officer, Munich
Paul M. Kattenburg	1959-1962	Political Officer, Frankfurt
Richard W. Boehm	1959 1959-1962	Assistant General Service Officer, Hamburg Economic Officer, Berlin
Paul D. McCusker	1959-1963	Chief, Economic Section, Hamburg
Gunther K. Rosinus	1959-1963	Director, Amerika Haus, USIS, Koblenz
Edward Alexander	1959-1964	Head of Cultural Programming, Voice of America, USIS, Berlin
Ernest Koenig	1959-1964	Assistant Agricultural Attaché, Bonn
Lucian Heichler	1959-1965	Political Officer, Berlin
Susan M. Klingaman	1959-1960 1963-1965 1973-1975 1977-1980	Fulbright Scholarship, Mainz Vice Consul, Dusseldorf Political Officer, Bonn German Desk, Washington DC
William Piez	1960-1962	Rotation Officer, Frankfurt
Walter B. Smith, II	1960-1962	Political Officer, Frankfurt
Dorothy M. Sampas	1960-1962	Consular Officer, Hamburg
Elizabeth Ann Brown	1960-1963	Political Officer, Bonn
John L. Loughran	1960-1964	Economic Officer, Bonn
Moncrieff J. Spear	1961	Berlin Task Force, Washington, DC
George Lambrakis	1961-1962	Political Officer, Munich
Peter S. Bridges	1961-1962	Soviet Studies, Oberammergau
David J. Fischer	1961-1963	Consular Officer, Frankfurt
Edwin Cronk	1961-1965	Economic Counselor, Bonn

Karl F. Mautner	1961-1965	Berlin Task Force, Washington, DC
Aurelius Fernandez	1962	U.S. Army, Berlin
James A. Placke	1962-1963	Consular Officer, Frankfurt
George Quincey Lumsden	1962-1964	Economic Officer, Bonn
Clarke N. Ellis	1962-1964	Junior Officer, Munich
Paul M. Cleveland	1962-1964	Staff Assistant to Ambassador, Bonn
Edward H. Wilkinson	1962-1964	Courier, Frankfurt
Gary L. Matthews	1962-1964	Junior Officer, Bonn
Thomas J. Dunnigan	1962-1965	Political Officer, Bonn
Gerald J. Monroe	1962-1965	Commercial Officer, Dusseldorf
Emmerson M. Brown	1962-1966	Economic Officer, Bonn
Arthur R. Day	1962-1966	Chief of Political Section, Berlin
Haven N. Webb	1962-1966	Consular Officer, Hamburg
John Todd Stewart	1963-1965	Rotation Officer, Munich
Richard B. Finn	1963-1966	Deputy for German Affairs, Berlin
William E. Ryerson	1963-1966	Staff Aide, Berlin
Kenneth P.T. Sullivan	1963-1966	Assistant Labor Attaché, Bonn
George F. Bogardus	1963-1967	Consul, Stuttgart
Owen B. Lee	1963-1967	Analyst, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC
Albert Stoffel	1963-1967	Civil Air Attaché, Bonn
Martin Van Heuven	1963-1967	Legal Advisor, Berlin
William M. Woessner	1963-1967	Eastern Affairs Section, Berlin
Thomas L. Hughes	1963-1969	Director, Intelligence & Research,

Washington, DC

Maurice E. Lee	1964-1965	Information Officer, USIS, Bonn
Peter B. Swiers	1964-1966	Rotation Officer, Frankfurt
Charles Lahiguera	1964-1966	Rotation officer, Munich
Albert E. Hemsing	1964-1967	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Bonn
Bruce A. Flatin	1964-1969	Public Safety Section, Berlin
Nelson C. Ledsky	1964-1969	Political Officer, Bonn
Alfred Puhan	1964-1969	Head of Office of German Affairs, Washington, DC
Allan W. Otto	1965-1967	Visa Officer, Berlin
Arthur H. Hughes	1965-1967	Rotation Officer, Frankfurt
Ulrich A. Straus	1965-1967	Labor Officer, Berlin
Geroge Jaeger	1965-1967	Political Officer, Berlin
Irving Sablosky	1965-1968	Amerika Haus Director, USIS, Hamburg
Brandon Grove	1965-1969	US Liaison Officer, West Berlin
Arthur F. Blaser, Jr.	1965-1969	Financial Attaché, Bonn
Thomas Stern	1965-1969	Administrative Counselor, Bonn
Richard E. Thompson	1965-1970	Diplomatic Courier, Frankfurt
G. Norman Anderson	1966-1967	Russian Language Training, Garmisch
J. Richard Bock	1966-1968	Vice Consul, Bremen
Bruce W. Clark	1966-1968	Rotation Officer, West Berlin
Sol Polansky	1966-1968	Political Officer, West Berlin
Dennis Kux	1966-1969	Political Officer, Bonn
Patrick E. Nieburg	1966-1969	Lecturer/Speech Writer, Bonn

Robert L. Barry	1967-1969	Russian Language Training & US Army Training, Garmisch-Partenkirchen
David L. Hobbs	1967-1969	Rotation Officer, Hamburg
Henry L. Clarke	1967-1969	Rotation Officer, Munich
George Jaeger	1967-1970	Political Officer, Bonn
Hans N. Tuch	1967-1970	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Berlin
Halvor C. Ekern	1967-1969 1969-1973	Political/Military Officer, Bonn Political Advisor, Heidelberg
Robie M.H. "Mark" Palmer	1968-1969	U.S. Army Training Program, Garmisch
William J. Dyess	1968-1970	Chief of Liaison to Soviet Authorities, Berlin
Neul L. Pazdral	1968-1970	Science Attaché, Bonn
Paul F. Du Vivier	1968-1972	Deputy Principal Officer, Frankfurt
William V.P. Newlin	1968-1972	Office of German Affairs, Washington, DC
Gerard M. Gert	1968-1980	Chief, Radio in the American Sector, USIS, Berlin
Joseph C. Walsh	1969-1973	Executive Officer, Bonn
Owen B. Lee	1969-1973	Political Officer, Berlin
Richard C. Barkley	1969-1971 1971-1972 1972-1974	German Affairs; Washington DC Ambassador's Aide, Bonn Eastern Affairs Section, Berlin
Nelson C. Ledsky	1970-1972	Germany Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Philip H. Valdes	1970-1972	Political Officer, Berlin
George F. Ward	1970-1972	Political Officer, Hamburg
Fred Charles Thomas Jr.	1970-1972	Commercial Officer, Bonn
James E. Taylor	1970-1973	Consular Officer, Munich

Kenneth P.T. Sullivan	1970-1974	Consul General, Bremen
C. Arthur Borg	1971-1974	Deputy Assistant Chief of Mission, Berlin
Richard C. Barkley	1971-1972 1972-1974	Aide to Ambassador Rush, Bonn Political Officer, Eastern Affairs Section, Berlin
Oscar J. Olson, Jr.	1971-1974	Economic/Commercial Officer, Berlin
Thomas F. Johnson	1971-1975	Director of Information Center, USIS, Heidelberg
Albert L. Seligmann	1971-1975	Political Advisor, Berlin
Thomas F. Johnson	1971-1975	Director of Information Center, USIS, Heidelberg
McKinney Russell	1971-1975	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Bonn
Geoffrey W. Chapman	1971-1973 1973-1976	Office of German Affairs; State Department Political Officer/Liaison & Protocol, Bonn
Gerald J. Monroe	1971-1976	Deputy Civil Air Attaché, Bonn
Peter B. Swiers	1972-1973	Protocol, Berlin
Clint A. Lauderdale	1972-1975	Administrative Officer, Bonn
Jack A. Sulser	1972-1975	Deputy Principal Officer, Frankfurt
Philip H. Valdes	1972-1975	Monitored Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, Munich
Joseph A. B. Winder	1973-1975	Economic Officer, Bonn
Thomas G. Weston	1973-1976	Economic/Commercial Officer, Bremen
William Bodde Jr.	1973-1974 1974-1977	Political Officer, Berlin Political Officer, Bonn
Gunther K. Rosinus	1973-1977	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Berlin
Arthur H. Hughes	1973-1977	Political Officer, Bonn

G. Jonathan Greenwald	1973-1977	Legal Advisor, Bonn
George F. Muller	1973-1978	Political Advisor, Stuttgart
Wallace W. Litell	1974	Cultural Counselor, East Berlin, GDR
Anna Romanski	1974-1976	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Hamburg
Brandon Grove	1974-1976	Deputy Chief of Mission, East Berlin, GDR
Wallace W. Littell	1974-1976	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, East Berlin
Francis M. Kinnelly	1974-1977	Economic Officer, Bonn
Victor Wolf, Jr.	1974-1977	Consul General, East Berlin, GDR
Walter E. Jenkins, Jr.	1974-1978	Consul General, Stuttgart
Ray E. Jones	1974-1978	Secretary, Berlin
Herman Rebhan	1974-1989	General Secretary, International Metalworkers Federation, Washington, DC
John A. Buche	1975-1978	Counselor for Consular Affairs, Bonn
James Alan Williams	1975-1979	Economic/Political Officer, Bonn
Alexander A.L. Klieforth	1975-1980	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Bonn
Paul H. Tyson	1976-1978	Rotation Officer, Bonn
Edward Alexander	1976-1979	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Berlin
Sol Polansky	1976-1979	Deputy Chief of Mission, East Berlin
Gerald Michael Bache	1976-1980	Economic Counselor, Bonn
Philip C. Brown	1977-1978	Russian Language Training, U.S. Army Russian Institute, Garmisch
Roger Schrader	1977-1980	Labor Officer, Bonn
J. Michael Springmann	1977-1980	Economic/Commercial Officer, Stuttgart
Vladimir Lehovich	1977-1980	Chief Internal Political Unit; Political

		Section, Bonn
Richard C. Barkley	1977-1979	Deputy Director, Central European Affairs, Washington DC
J. D. Bindenagel	1977-1979 1980-1983 1983-1986	Economic Officer, Bremen Germany Desk Officer, Washington, DC Political Officer, Bonn
Elden B. Erickson	1978-1979	Deputy Consul General, Frankfurt
Ralph H. Ruedy	1977-1980	Public Relations Officer, USIS, East Berlin
Richard E. Thompson	1977-1982	Diplomatic Courier, Frankfurt
Shirley E. Ruedy	1977-1980 1980-1984	Wife of USIS Officer, East Berlin Wife of Public Affairs Officer, Dusseldorf
Robert T. Hennemeyer	1978-1981	Consul General, Munich
Martin Van Heuven	1978-1981	Political Officer, Bonn
Christopher E. Goldthwait	1978-1982	Staff, Foreign Agricultural Service, Bonn
Patrick E. Nieburg	1978-1984	Director, Radio in the American Sector, USIS, Berlin
Albert E. Hemsing	1978-1983	Director, Amerika Haus, USIS, Freiburg
Robert M. Beecroft	1979-1983	Political Officer (Internal), Bonn
Jack Seymour	1979-1983	External Political Affairs Officer, Bonn
Walter B. Smith, II	1979-1983	Deputy Chief of Mission, East Berlin, GDB
J. Richard Bock	1979-1983	Senate Liaison Officer, Berlin
William M. Woessner	1979-1985	Deputy Chief of Mission, Bonn
Ellen M. Johnson	1980-1982	Secretary to Deputy Chief of Mission, Bonn
Thomas G. Weston	1980-1982	Germany Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Isabel Cumming	1980-1984	Secretary to Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Bonn

Ralph H. Ruedy	1980-1984	Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Dusseldorf
Hans N. Tuch	1980-1985	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Bonn
Mark C. Lissfelt	1980-1983 1983-1986	Political Officer, Bonn Deputy to Minister, Berlin
Bruce W. Clark	1980-1983 1983-1987	East Germany Desk Officer, Washington, DC Political Advisor, East Germany
Herbert John Spiro	1980-1989	Free University of Berlin, Berlin
Russell Sveda	1981-1982	Russian Language Training, Barmish-Partenkirechen
Gunther K. Rosinus	1981-1984	Public Affairs Officer/Deputy Chief of Mission, USIS, Berlin
Nelson C. Ledsky	1981-1985	Minister/Deputy Commandant, West Berlin
Rudolf V. Perina	1981-1985	Protocol/Senate Liaison Officer, Berlin
Rozanne L. Ridgway	1982-1985	Ambassador, German Democratic Republic
Richard C. Barkley	1982-1985	Political Counselor, Bonn
Greg Thielmann	1982-1985	Political Officer, Bonn
William Veale	1982-1985	Political/Military Officer, Berlin
George M. Lane	1982-1986	Political Advisor to the Deputy Commander in Chief of the European Command, Stuttgart
Thomas G. Weston	1983-1986	Deputy Political Counselor, Bonn
William Bodde, Jr.	1983-1986	Consul General, Frankfurt
George F. Ward	1984-1985	Chief Internal Political Unit, Bonn
Ralph H. Ruedy	1984-1986	German Desk Officer, USIA, Washington, DC
Thomas F. Johnson	1984-1988	Consul/Branch Public Affairs Officer,

		Frankfurt
Dale V. Slaght	1984-1988	Commerical Attaché, Munich
Robert M. Beecroft	1985-1987	Officer-in-Charge, German Affairs, Washington, DC
Pierre Shostal	1985-1987	Consul General, Hamburg
Geoffrey W. Chapman	1985-1989	Deputy Political Counselor, Bonn
James Dobbins	1985-1989	Relations with Russians, Bonn
Anna Romanski	1986-1987	Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Bonn
Robert A. Martin	1986-1990	Political Advisor, Frankfurt
James Alan Williams	1986-1990	Political Advisor, Berlin
G. Jonathan Greenwald	1987-1990	Political Counselor, East Berlin
David J. Fischer	1987-1991	Consul General, Munich
Ralph H. Ruedy	1987-1991	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Bonn
Shirley E. Ruedy	1987-1988 1989-1991	Political Officer, Bonn Staff Assistant to Ambassador Walters, Bonn
Anna Romanski	1987-1991	America House Director & Branch Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Berlin
Richard C. Barkley	1988-1990	Ambassador; German Democratic Republic
Harold W. Geisel	1988-1992	Counselor for Administration, Bonn
Peter K. Murphy	1989-1990	Consul General/Minister-Counselor for Consular Affairs, Berlin
J. D. Bindenagel	1989-1990	Deputy Chief of Mission, East Berlin, GDR
J. Michael Springmann	1989-1991	Political/Economic Officer, Stuttgart
Anthony C. Zinni	1989-1991	Deputy Director of Operations for the European Command, Stuttgart

Helen Weinland	1989-1991	Senat Lisison Officer, Berlin
George F. Ward	1989-1992	Deputy Chief of Mission, Bonn
Jon Gundersen	1990	Regional Security Officer, Frankfurt
Shirley Elizabeth Barnes	1990-1992	Counselor for Administration, Bonn
Pierre Shostal	1990-1993	Consul General, Frankfurt
Donald B. Kursch	1990-1994	Minister/Counselor for Economic Affairs; Deputy Chief of Mission, Bonn
John Nix	1990-1994	Political Advisor, Berlin
Nelson C. Ledsky	1991	Participant, German Reunificaiton Discussion, Washington, DC
Katherine Schwering	1992	Senior Economist, Germany Desk, Washington, DC
Joseph R. McGhee	1992-1995	Deputy Political Counselor, Bonn
John Helm	1992-1996	Regional General Services Officer (NIS), Bonn
Greg Thielmann	1993-1995	Officer in Charge of German Affairs, Washington, DC
J. D. Bindenagel	1994-1997	Deputy Chief of Mission, Bonn
Joseph C. Wilson, IV	1995-1997	Political Advisor – SACEUR, Stuttgart
Edward H. Wilkinson	1995-1999	Minister-Counselor for Consular Affairs, Bonn
Shirley E. Ruedy	1997-1998	German Desk Officer, Washington, DC

CARL F. NORDEN
Consular Officer
Berlin (1938-1939)

Carl Norden attended boarding school in Switzerland where he became bilingual

in English and German. He served in Yugoslavia during World War II. He then received a master's degree in political science from Harvard University and worked for City Bank for six years before he entered the Service. He has served in Prague, Paramaribo, Havana, and with the Bureau of Latin American Affairs. This interview was conducted in 1991 by Ambassador Horace G. Torbert.

Q: So you went on and took the oral exams? You got into the service in July of 1938 and you went to Berlin. That was when things were going 'to hell in a hack' as far as relations were going. Would you talk about Berlin.

NORDEN: I had great difficulty whether I would remain in the service afterwards because I said I would never have anything as exciting as this again. You could really see it coming.

Q: Was Hugh Wilson still there or had he already left?

NORDEN: I think he was still there.

Q: This was a training job, was it consular?

NORDEN: The first thing they asked was whether I spoke German, which I did, I had been to boarding school in Switzerland and I was bilingual. I certainly was in a position to use my German. It was the most trying assignment that you could have had at that point. These people were fighting for their lives.

Q: These were the Jews who were still in Germany at that time.

NORDEN: It was trying because they were not the most prepossessing people that could be found.

Q: You had a certain dichotomy between the humanitarian and the interests of the United States I suppose.

NORDEN: That was a very difficult chapter because the immigration rules were not responsive. The people you had to turn down were in many cases very deserving, it was very difficult. Then there were some bad moments, you have heard of the "Kristallnacht"?

Q: That was before you got there?

NORDEN: No, I practically walked into it. On the other hand what made that post extremely interesting was that you could see the war on the horizon, or just over the horizon. I still remember when the Sudeten crisis was still hot. I remember going out and dancing with our military attaché's daughter and we were saying that it might blow by tomorrow morning. That was before Munich.

Q: Did you have any particular contacts at that time that you remember with other diplomats that you remember that were useful to you later?

NORDEN: Yes. You know my next post was Prague and because I had excellent contacts in Germany and the reason I had them was my uncle, my mother's brother, I got from him a bunch of introductions. There were a bunch of people who had married well in Germany; they were American beer brewers' daughters and they saw to it that their daughters married well. Marrying well means titles.

Q: *Your uncle was a German citizen?*

NORDEN: No. I got introductions. A lot of these people were well connected in Germany, not always with your favorite people. I did meet, partly by accident, some very nice Germans. There was one German girl who liked to ride and I used to ride with her. German horses are very difficult to ride. We would ride before breakfast. She was well-born too. Her father had been in the German Foreign Office and her mother was a titled lady. Her uncle was the head of the German government stud - which was pretty good. I learned a lot about German psychology that way because I remember her saying, "Maybe you can explain to me, what is wrong with the Dutch?" "We don't understand in Germany why the Dutch declared war on us." I asked "Why do you object to that?" "Well, to declare war on Germany is a very serious matter." I said, "And visa versa." She said that "If the Dutch took it into their heads to invade Germany wouldn't you declare war?" She said, "Well, that is quite different because they are so small."

LAWRENCE NORRIE
Head of Youth Reorientation Program, Public Affairs, USIS
Frankfurt (1940-1954)

Lawrence Norrie was born in 1903 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and received a B.S. degree from Springfield College. He later received a master's degree from Columbia University. In 1945, after working for the YMCA, Mr. Norrie became head of the reorientation of German youth program in Berlin. In 1955, he joined the Foreign Service, serving with USIS in the West Indies, Ecuador, Austria, and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1990.

NORRIE: In 1940, I was transferred to the National Council of the YMCA as Assistant National Secretary and responsible for work in the seven Pacific Southwestern states. In 1945, I was interviewed by the War Department for going to Germany, to take over the reorientation of German youth. I was assigned to Berlin and my job was to give leadership to the programs necessary to point youth in the right direction to live in a new environment called democracy.

In 1955, five years later, the State Department took over in West Germany and the Foreign Service attracted me, and I took the examination in Germany and passed.

The Army set up an educational and information program as a special branch to which a lot of civilians were recruited. Really, that was the forerunner of what later became the USIE, then the USIS.. It was called ECR -- Educational, Cultural, and Religious Affairs. I was assigned to that

division. My job was the reorientation of German youth. I got into that challenge through General Clay's concern over the gangs that were developing, the destruction of government property, attacks on the government people, including civilians and military, and he wanted something done about it to give youth another incentive. He asked American youth organizations for suggestions, and because of some experience I had had in Hawaii, that's why I was apparently asked to take over that position.

The branch was expanded to include several other responsibilities, e.g. women's affairs, adult education, etc. First of all, we had to liquidate the remnants of the Hitler Youth Organization. Actually, I think the youth of Germany had become disillusioned with their leaders and were not too happy about accepting new ones from the United States and other countries.

Under the Army, we first dissolved the Hitler-type organizations, liquidated their assets, dispersed their leaders, and gave permission for youth to organize only on a local basis. We forbade organization above the local group. We wanted them to organize around their own hobbies or interests, or just for fellowship, but have no national organization because of the tendency in Germany to look to the top for leadership. We wanted them to have the experience in determining their own fortunes and their own organizational patterns. That was the first thing we did. We forbade uniforms, marching, and military insignia.

We then set up leadership training schools. We had three of them, one near Wiesbaden, one in Stuttgart, one in Berlin. We also approved youth groups asking the Army to help them with their organizational needs and equipment. The Army was very helpful and very cooperative. They provided tents for camping, tables for ping pong, books, all kinds of things, e.g. places to meet, baseballs, etc. This was the beginning of the friendship between the military and the German youth organizations, and it grew like wildfire. In that little pamphlet I showed you yesterday, "Youth Between Yesterday and Tomorrow," you will find how fast they grew from 83,000 to a million and a half in two years, i.e., youth in democratically organized groups.

If they were a music group, they started a glee club or a band. If they just wanted fellowship, the YMCA or the Boy Scouts came in and developed educational programs. There were all kinds. The YWCA was very active in that period, too. They all sent experienced leaders to Germany at a later date, to help in the rebuilding of German youth organizations.

We also brought in a great many organizations that wanted to do something about Germany. The Friends Service Committee, for instance, came in and set up an exchange program with school youth middle grades, and they brought in work groups to help rebuild towns, set up camp in a little town and rebuild the fire station or rebuild the school. This was very effective. We had a lot of those all over Germany.

The Army helped a great deal. At one point, a little later, we were given permission to take over unoccupied castles, public buildings that had belonged to the Nazis, such as bomb shelters, safety centers, where people could go. We set up youth organizations in them, and they were very effective. The Army helped a great deal in furnishing them and giving leadership to their efforts. That was the early days.

It was probably the most important time in history where the military played a role of such importance in the democratization of another country. An edict was sent out from the military command asking each U.S. military organization in the country to get busy in helping German youth with their organization problems. They needed places to meet, they needed play facilities, basketballs, nets, tennis rackets, and so forth. Through voluntary giving and help from the United States directly, voluntary help in the United States, they were able to supply unlimited [amounts] for these needs. Much material was transported to Germany on government ships.

At holiday times, the youth were entertained in American military homes. Skilled troops acted as coaches for basketball and other games, e.g. baseball. They acted as hosts for social events. A hall was provided for dances and things like that. It was a program involving all of the military throughout the American zone. I think it lasted and is still is going on in a way. I just had Christmas cards from the GYA retirees, who are now approaching my age, in Berlin, and they still meet. They still have their organization going. They still are promoting U.S.

The leadership training schools developed under the help of the State Department -- it started the cultural exchange program, it they sent leaders to teach. I remember Elmer Ott from Minneapolis YMCA who came over and organized a camping organization for Germany, set up camping programs with them along the American camping lines. They were democratic organizations, not military, as they were under the Nazis. Other organizations sent volunteers over to work in other programs. The Department sent them over, paid their way, in some cases, paid their salaries. They worked under our supervision and we kept close touch with them. They wrote reports and recommendations for the organizations' use and for our use.

I entered the Foreign Service in the Office of Public Affairs, whose responsibilities covered all of the American zone. But then I was transferred out of Germany after eight years, to the West Indies.

The youth activities branch became "community activities," and included women's affairs, community organization, adult education, and motion picture sections, as well as youth and sports. I took the first group out of Germany, which was a group of religious leaders, to the World Conference of Churches in Oslo. That was a great experience for them to get out of Germany and go somewhere. Then I took a group of young leaders of German youth to Williamsburg, U.S.A., for a conference with American youth leaders who came from all over the United States to Williamsburg, and sat with this group of German leaders for a week. It was a fabulous experience for them and for us, too. One of those leaders is presently in the Bundesrat, I believe; Willy Birkelbach was the head of the labor youth movement.

The policy regarding GYA relationships was worked out in HICOG, yes. But the initiative was worked out in Washington, including the Pentagon. It was my operation that presided over the breakup of the former Nazi centralized sports groups, the "Einheitsverband." . We didn't like the idea of the inclusion of all sports group under one head. It lent itself too much to dictatorial policies. We wanted a more democratic approach to sports, and therefore we urged organization at the local level. And not till some years later did we permit youth groups to organize above the local level. We provided for their leadership to emerge from the local groups.

We tried to give them as much leadership as we could by establishing leadership training schools for their personnel. That was under my direct jurisdiction and our local staff out in the field. Our staff was a branch within the Public Affairs Program.

The Army rose to the occasion on one special event that I will never forget. I think it was the precursor of European Union. I like to think that, anyway. The youth all over Europe were interested in European cooperation. You see, we established what we called Kreis Youth Committee. Kreis is a county. The Kreis Youth Committee was made up of youth groups of that county. That was the first instance of intergroup cooperation. They later developed regionally in the Regungsbezirk and then nationally. But they decided they wanted to hold a European conference in Germany, and the site was set at the Lorelei on the Rhine, famous in German lore. They came from all Europe, from Finland south. But they had to have a place to stay. The Army provided huge Army tents. They were set up like a city. They elected their own mayor and city council to control it, and the conference went on for a week. I went up there on several occasions during that week. It was not too far from where we were stationed.

The request for facilities came through us. From their needs through us to the Army, and the Army was immediately responsive without any problem. There are many other ways in which the Army helped in that endeavor. Sanitation, facilities were provided, a mess hall was provided, and so on.

There were other occasions when we needed help from the military. Once we brought together a group of the chancellors or presidents of several of the German universities. That was after the McCloy Fund had been formulated. McCloy Fund was a block of money taken from the German marks that were paid to us. -- the GARIOA fund. We called a meeting of the university rectors in Bad Neuheim. They came to the ambassador's house. Mrs. McCloy, as always, was the perfect hostess, and all of these people were there. McCloy outlined the purposes for which the money was given, and asked the rectors for their opinion as to what they would need. They all submitted papers at a later date, but discussed openly there with him their needs for the universities. Some places, they needed a new building. Some places, they needed scientific equipment. Others wanted to exchange professors, wanted to send theirs to the United States and bring someone over to lecture on some new facet of education. It was a very successful meeting, and we were able to get the money to help them in the way they felt they needed help. We convened that meeting.

One staff member from my staff became the manager of that McCloy Fund and received petitions or requests from various youth organizations and communities and schools and churches and other groups; e.g., I went with McCloy to see the damaged church at Cologne, the tower of which had been bombed out. He said, "Well, we will fix that up," and he did. He got the new dome put up there. These were the kinds of things that created public impression that we were there to help and not to just boss them around.

This fund went far and wide. There is a book published on this, a report, on the entire McCloy Fund. Unfortunately, I have lost mine. I sent it to American University of Vienna. A couple of professors there were writing a history of the American occupation and its influence on education. They came to the U.S. to interview several early participants in the HICOG staff. I

was one of those interviewed.

Incidentally, in this respect, I like to think that in a way, the Free University of Berlin had at least part of its encouragement to start right in our home. We had a program in Berlin in the very earliest days, whereby Americans invited groups of university students to meet in their homes. We had two groups meet at our home, one on Thursday night and one on Sunday. They came from Humboldt University. Humboldt University was in the Russian zone. These students were constantly hungering for more independence, more ability to pry and ask questions, but they felt they were being indoctrinated all the time. They constantly expressed a wish for a university in the American zone or the British zone or somewhere where they could attend in complete freedom. McCloy, I suppose, got the pressures from various groups and people, but eventually he did grant a building and funds to establish a Free University in Berlin, which has prospered ever since.

You know, to show how Americans react, when the access to Berlin was cut off by the Russians, in spite of the treaty agreement, the Americans set up an airlift, brought coal into freezing Berlin, and food and clothing and other supplies, one plane after another landing at the Tempelhof airport, and unloading and taking off again and bringing another load. It was a great undertaking.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, II
Detention Camp Prisoner
The Black Forest (1942-1944)

Ambassador MacArthur was born into Navy family; his father and grandfather were career Navy officers. Ambassador MacArthur graduated from Yale University and then joined the Foreign Service. He served in Canada, Italy, Belgium, France, and Japan, and was ambassador to Austria. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1986.

MACARTHUR: We were on the edge of the Black Forest in Baden-Baden. There were three camps in that area, one with British soldiers taken by the Germans in North Africa; another was a mixed bag of various people that had been collected here and there -- some of them "irresponsible people" or what the Nazis considered irresponsible people from some of the Eastern European countries they had overrun; and I forget what the nature of the third camp was. We were interned in a hotel. Our treatment there was correct, and we had only one extremely painful and disagreeable business when the Gestapo came down and went to work on Thomas Cassidy, our assistant naval attaché in Vichy, their brutal interrogation, and it's no fun to hear someone being interrogated, when the moaning stops, and you know they've passed out. Cassidy was being interrogated probably because he was a contact point with some of our French Resistance people. Actually he worked for Colonel Donovan's OSS organization, and obviously some French contact who had been taken by the Gestapo and tortured had given his name. So the Gestapo came down and if it had not been for the intervention of a fine young Swiss diplomat who periodically visited us -- his name is Kiya Bordier (phonetic), who was later an ambassador -- Cassidy might have ended extremely badly, rather than just being painfully abused for a

couple of days.

We were taken by the Germans after the Allied landings in North Africa at the beginning of November 1942. The Germans burst into our Embassy, although we had so called diplomatic immunity. They burst into our Embassy with tommy guns and started removing us, when the dean of the diplomatic corps of Vichy, Mr. Stukey, heard what was happening and went to Laval, and said that this would create a major scandal for the Petain/Laval Government if it wasn't stopped immediately. So Laval called the Germans off and said we would be interned and exchanged for the members of the French diplomatic Vichy mission in Washington, headed by Ambassador Henrier.

They interned us, shipped us down to Lourdes, the shrine city in southern France, of Bernadette fame, but we had been there only a very short time when Laval gave the Germans the green light, and a group of SS and German soldiers arrived and bundled us into a train and took us off to Germany to hold as hostages.

We remained in Germany from that time -- that is the end of 1942 until March of 1944 -- when, finally, an agreement was negotiated for the exchange of our group plus a few very badly wounded Americans against some Germans that had been taken by us in North Africa during the North African campaign, including Ribbentrop's niece and her husband and some other Germans that we had picked up in this country or in transit between Latin America, where they had been active.

When the agreement was finally reached in 1944 -- the end of February -- if I recall correctly part of that agreement was that we would be repatriated to Lisbon, and the neutral Swedish vessel Gripsholm was to carry over those exchangees that the Germans wanted from the United States and the others that had been in North Africa, would be brought together in Lisbon, and we would be exchanged there. So we left Germany on a sealed train that went through France, to the French border. There we were held overnight to await the final arrangements with the Spaniards for transit across Spain, and we were put in a sealed train, but no longer with the German guards, and dispatched from Confront, which is just below Biarritz on the French-Spanish border to Lisbon. Maybe it wasn't Confront. It was the border point just below Peau.

In Lisbon, after a couple of days processing, we were placed in the Gripsholm and returned to the United States.

ALFRED PUHAN
Broadcaster, Voice of America
New York City, New York (1942-1944)

Ambassador Alfred Puhan was born in Marianburg, Germany, (now Poland) of an American father raised primarily in Illinois. He was educated at Oberlin College, the University of Cincinnati and Columbia University. During World War II he was employed in radio broadcasting, first by the British Broadcasting

Company and later by the Voice of America. In 1953 he joined the Foreign Service, serving in Vienna and in Washington, where he served as Executive Director of the European Bureau and Head of the Office of German Affairs. In 1969 he became US Ambassador to Hungary and served there until 1973. Ambassador Puhan was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1990.

PUHAN: Before World War II or before we entered the war, I think most of us who were in the academic field were asked to sign some sort of a questionnaire asking what particular qualifications we had that might be of use in case we were in the war and I had put down that I knew German and French. I received a telegram at Rutgers in New Brunswick, NJ from something called, I think at the time, Coordinator of Information or some such name and asked to come to New York. This was in May of 1942.

I went there and that evening was an announcer in the German language over the facilities of the BBC. I had to ask what the BBC was and when told that it was the British Broadcasting Corporation I asked what it was doing in New York. I was told that the Voice of America, which this was, was in its infancy, still had no facilities of its own and was using the BBC facilities.

I moved rather rapidly from announcer to producer to scriptwriter and producer/scriptwriter and spent the next 11 years at the Voice of America.

Q: Did you go overseas at anytime? I presume this ultimately merged into the OWI, Office of War Information. Did you take any overseas assignment in the Voice?

PUHAN: Yes, my first check was paid by something called Short-Wave Research, Inc. which I believe was part of Wild Bill Donovan's operation, OSS. This was to become shortly thereafter the Office of War Information with headquarters in New York City.

Yes, I went overseas in 1944 to head the German language broadcast at the American Broadcasting Station in Europe, the acronym is ABSIE, and spent most of 1944 there. This was during WWII—the Blitz was over of course, but the V-1's had just begun, were just beginning while I was over there. I had a brief respite at home at Christmas time '44 and then went overseas again in February or March of 1945, first to London and then to head German Broadcasting from Radio Luxembourg which, as you probably know, was to become the sort of forerunner of the German post-World War II network.

I stayed there until September. In September of 1944 I accompanied three other officers in a jeep. We went to Frankfurt to look into the setting up of Frankfurt as the headquarters of the German network. And I suppose I was destined to become the head of the new German radio network under Allied, under American control.

A vehicle accident, automobile accident, in the Hunsrueck Mountains of Germany—I was sitting in the passenger seat next to the driver, two captains in the back seat and a jeep coming from the opposite direction containing a chaplain got off the side of the road and swung back too quickly and we smashed it head on. We weren't going very fast, 35 miles an hour. Otherwise, I suppose I'd have been killed. The three others were all thrown out. I was in the jeep, went down an

embankment and fractured by hip. I was taken to the 97th General Hospital in Badnaheim in Germany where I spent the next three months recuperating. That ended my career as the head of broadcasting or future chief of broadcasting of German stations.

Q: I'd like to ask you a few questions now about the earlier part of your broadcasting experience. The first question I would like to ask is exactly what did you look upon as your objective? What was it you were trying to attain? Were you talking to the German troops? Or were you trying to get to the German populace and influence their thinking and activity? What was your main purpose in your broadcasting, from Luxembourg for example?

PUHAN: Well Lew, let's go back just a bit. You know the objective, of course, of the information program, the Office of War Information under Elmer Davis and Robert Sherwood overseas was to seek the defeat of the Germans.

When we went to London the idea here was, I suppose, to show the Germans that the Voice of America—not only troops there in England, but the Voice of America had moved closer to the mainland. We were not a black station, like Soldatensender, for example, which was a black station. Our objective here was to broadcast the news of the advancing of the Allied troops and German defeats or occasional German victories. In Luxembourg it soon became a matter of broadcasting to a defeated nation. So in neither case was this specifically aimed at German troops.

Now, I might add, in addition to news and editorial and so on, we also broadcast the music of Glen Miller. I was the man who taught Glen Miller enough German so he could say a few words before playing a number. My secretary was the Mistress of Ceremonies. These appealed, of course, to the young people, soldiers and younger women and so on. So in that sense we were broadcasting to the troops. But that was not generally the goal. The general goal was to address the Germans as a whole.

Q: On a more personal basis, when you made this trip into Frankfurt and perhaps around Frankfurt, did by any chance you have a man by the name of Ed Schechter with you in that group?

PUHAN: Well, I know Ed Schechter very well, but he was not in that group, no. I knew him somewhat later than that, but he was not in that particular group. He was not at Radio Luxembourg to the best of my recollection, at least not while I was there.

Q: Well, he did go to Radio Luxembourg. Whether he was there at the same time that you were or not I don't know. But he went to London in 1944 and then was moved forward when the Allied armies moved into Europe and began fighting their way into Germany. He did make a trip which later took him down to Frankfurt and then into Austria which was his native area. So I thought he might have been there when you were.

PUHAN: Well, no. I have no recollection of Ed Schechter at that point in time. As I say I know Ed very well and we've exchanged Christmas cards and so on, and I have no doubt—and it's possible that he was in Luxembourg. But you see we had a colonel, an American Philadelphia

lawyer incidentally, who was the head of the station in Luxembourg and I was the civilian deputy to him.

Now, the big guns were, well, Golo Mann, the son of the famous German writer Thomas Mann, was our chief broadcaster. But I don't recall Ed Schechter at that time, no.

Q: So as you began broadcasting to the Germans as a defeated nation, your music program, I suppose, was designed to soften the attitude of the Germans for what would happen when you ultimately took over the control of the country. You said that your career in the broadcasting area terminated with your injury and your hospitalization. What did you do and where did they send you immediately after you were released from the hospital?

PUHAN: Well, I spent—the accident took place early in September of 1944 and I was not ZI'd (Z-I stood for Zone of the Interior), as they called it at the time, sent home until December of 1944. I spent some time in limbo, you might say, recuperating. I went out to Sandwich, Illinois, where I grew up, with my young wife and we stayed there until I received a letter from Werner Michel who was the Program Director and who had hired me originally, asking me to return and rejoin the Voice of America.

PATRICK F. MORRIS
Prisoner of War
Germany (1944-1945)

Mr. Morris was born and raised in Montana. Educated at Georgetown University, Mexico City College, and San Marcos College, Lima, Peru, Mr. Morris served in the US Army in Europe during World War II, where he was captured and imprisoned by the German Army. He joined the newly established Point IV program in 1950 and worked with that agency and its successors in various senior level capacities in Washington, D.C., in Paris and throughout Latin America. His final posting was in the Dominican Republic, where he served as Director of the US AID Mission. Mr. Morris was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.

Q: Where did you go overseas and when?

MORRIS: We left the States in September, 1944. The invasion of Normandy was in June of '44, we left in September. We arrived in England, did some more training in England and then we crossed the Channel, arrived in Le Havre, which was completely bombed out, and loaded in trucks and driven through France and into Belgium up on the Siegfried line in Germany. That is how far we had advanced. This was late October by that time. And we were there, in combat, static actually because the line was drawn and we had patrols and so forth but rather quiet. Well, we had a number of casualties; we had casualties from mines and a number of people were killed on patrol. But then December the 16, 1944, the Germans initiated the Battle of the Bulge.

Q: Which corps- army were you in?

MORRIS: First Army, Bradley.

Q: First Army.

MORRIS: Yes. And we were- 99th Division held a front, three regiments held a front about 15 miles long. And there were three German divisions against ours when they came through-

Q: You were in the Ardennes.

MORRIS: In the Ardennes, that is right. And three German divisions came through the area where we were and they pushed us back and they went around us, just to our south. I was in the 394th and we were on the furthest right and then next to us was the 106th Division and which had just gotten on the line three days before, and there was complete confusion. That whole division was wiped out.

Q: The whole regiment.

MORRIS: I have written this up, on December 16, the artillery, German artillery started about 5:00 in the morning. I had been on guard duty from 2:00 to 3:00 that morning and so I was still fully dressed. We were supposedly in reserve; we had been on the line and we had been pulled back. Actually we were only about five or six miles behind where we had been on the line but we had moved into an abandoned house and built bunks in the house so we were not sleeping in foxholes. And I had just gotten back to my bunk and I decided, I would just take my shoes off, and I just laid down on the bunk and went to sleep and 5:00 in the morning all hell broke loose. The artillery was coming in at a tremendous volume and we all immediately got out and went down into the basement and I took long enough to put on my shoes before I went down but a lot of the guys just grabbed their shoes or grabbed anything and just went running down into the basement. There was two feet of water in the basement. At least I had my shoes on. But that house got about four direct hits; there was nothing left of it. I do not think we had any casualties because everybody was in the basement and we all got out. But you know, whatever you had left upstairs, that was the last you saw of it.

And so then, of course, we immediately started to dig foxholes - our company headquarters was at a little railroad station - and down the railroad tracks came an infantry company of Germans and, of course, we engaged them and fought them off. They retreated and then we continued digging and then we got another tremendous artillery barrage and we expected another infantry push, but German infantry push did not come. And just as we had gotten our holes down deep enough, well you know, probably two feet, but deep enough maybe to hide in for an artillery attack, we got orders to move out. And our platoon sergeant picked me, to be first scout for the platoon. And this was about four in the afternoon. It was already getting dark. And I said where are we going? And he said they need us, A Company has been hit bad and they need us—we were L Company—A Company had been hit bad and we were needed to reinforce them. And we got out on a road and here I am, the first scout, way out, and our platoon sergeant, his name was Morgan, said just stay up there and just keep going; he said, if I want you to do anything else I

will let you know. By the time we really started to march it was already dark and we just went down that road and we could hear the Germans on both sides of the road. And finally Morgan said we are going to get off the road. And so we got off the road and he said, we are going to dig in here. You know, we could hear Germans on all sides of us but I figured he knew what he was doing.

But anyway, there was snow on the ground and the ground was frozen and we were supposed to dig in, and here we are, working with our little pick axes, trying to dig in, and you know, we must have spent two hours, three hours just trying to get through that damn cold, frozen dirt. And then we got orders to move out again. We moved out, we practically did not even get on the road before we were attacked. There were just shots coming from every direction. And we moved and to this day I cannot put that scene together. The whole day we fought; we ran and we fought and we tried to keep together and it was just complete chaos. I do not know whether anybody knew what was going on. You know, we ran across places where our troops had been because there were rations laying around. Well, you know, we had not eaten in two days and we picked up pieces of these rations and put them in our coats and moved on and fought. Every once in awhile you would see some Germans and you would open up on them and then you would run and this went on until well into the afternoon. And finally it looked as though, here are more of our guys together, and it looked like we were still a unit and we were ordered to go up on the road—we had been fighting in the forest. But this was a different road than the road we had been on. But we were ordered to go up on the road and the first ones up and the first guys up were mowed down with machine gun fire.

And so then nobody went up on the road and we moved along and we were going west. That was away from the line. We moved west and most of, well I do not know how many of our platoon had already gotten it by that time but we were still together as a platoon. We went into a little town, Moringen, where the regimental commander was and he ordered us to dig new positions on a hill overlooking the same road that we could not get on before. So we started digging and luckily the ground was soft. It was sand, it was easy digging and we dug our holes and it did not take us any time to be down deep enough. And I fell asleep.

Q: What?

MORRIS: I fell asleep. And my buddy fell asleep too, we both fell asleep; we had not slept for two days. And the next thing I remember is I heard rifle fire and it was coming from one of our holes; they were firing down on that road and sure enough, man, that road was full of Germans and they were marching along the road. That must have been a division because there were artillery pieces and they were all coming along this road and some of our guys had already started shooting at them. And so, you know, we were awakened and began shooting too. Then some of the German infantry, as soon as this shooting started, they turned off the road and came up the hill at us. We were firing back and there was a fog; the fog came up the hill faster than the Germans did and so they were completely enveloped in fog. About that time somebody said to us, we are moving out. So they pulled us out of our holes and we moved back. It turned out that during the night the whole company, actually the whole regiment, had moved back to more defensive positions and here we were, all alone, one platoon. The company had probably lost 30 or 40 guys by then but anyway, what was left of the platoon, there we were. We had a number of

casualties right there and what was left, we still had a young lieutenant platoon leader and a platoon sergeant and a couple of squad leaders besides whatever privates and PFCs (Private First Class) were there and we tried to make our way back to our own lines, because the Germans had already taken Moringen where the regimental commander had been; they had already taken that town. We tried to make contact with the company. Well, we did not succeed. We engaged in a couple of firefights with the Germans and then we were surrounded and surrendered. And we became prisoners.

Q: Okay. I would like to stop at this point because I stop at the end of a tape and explain where we are so can pick it up.

Surrendering in a combat is always one of the trickiest businesses so I thought next time I will ask you about how the surrender went. I mean, it is not easy to do. And then we will talk about your time as a prisoner of war and then we will move on.

MORRIS: Very good.

Q: Today is the 23rd of February, 2007. Pat, okay, where were you, how does one surrender? I mean, you know, this is a tricky thing. It is not an easy process.

MORRIS: No. As I mentioned, I have written this up but this was in the Battle of the Bulge, we had been fighting for four days and we were withdrawing and my company withdrew and we as a platoon were not informed. The runner for my platoon was afraid to come back to tell us and he went with the company and there we were, surrounded by Germans. Not realizing that we were surrounded we opened fire on them—we were dug in on a hill—we opened fire on them and there must have been at least a division coming up a road; there were artillery pieces pulled by horses which we were amazed at to see that the Germans were in such bad shape they were pulling their artillery pieces by horses. But a whole company of infantrymen, we were on the side of a hill, a whole company of German infantrymen came at us and only then did we get the word that we were a lone platoon on the side of that hill and that we had to get out of there. Luckily there was a fog and it moved up the hill, it covered the Germans but it also meant the Germans could not see us, so we moved out of our positions and moved back into the woods where we ran into more Germans and there was a firefight and my buddy and I separated from the others in the platoon and hid in a foxhole and stayed there the rest of the afternoon and into the night. And during that time we heard another firefight going on and we learned later that the rest of the platoon was captured.

So here we were the two of us, in the woods and we decided that we would try to get back to our lines. The way- there was artillery fire coming in and we knew that it was American artillery fire from the direction it was coming and we decided that we would walk toward where the artillery was coming from, hoping that we could get back to our lines. And we walked the rest of that night and at daybreak we ran across some scenes of terrible combat where there were lots of dead bodies and ruined vehicles and so on. And we could see a village on a hill, Krinkelt, and we thought well now maybe - but we could not see any movement in the village; this was early in the morning and we could not see any movement in the village and that was a bad sign, we thought. So we did not know whether it was occupied by the Germans or whether our troops

were there. We had to cross an opening where there were no trees, cross a stream to get to the woods on the other side, which we did, and then we walked for another hour or so and again we ran out of woods. We did not want to get out into the open anyplace but there was no place to go and by this time that village was on our right; before that it was straight ahead of us, and we decided, since we had not- by that time there was no artillery fire and there were no signs of either Americans or Germans and there was no combat, there were no guns going off. We decided to cross the road, get into a field, go through a hedgerow, get into a field which had tall grain of some kind in it. It was the wintertime but evidently it had never been harvested. Which we did and we violated one of our resolves, which was that we would only travel at night. Here we were in the middle of the day going across this field and we heard, in very good English, somebody say to us halt, drop your rifles, the war is over for you. And we turned around and here was an American .50 caliber machine gun on top of a Jeep pointing at us but with a German behind it. The Germans, of course, had captured our Jeep. And it was not the guy with the machine gun who was talking; we could not see him. But then he told us to come over to the Jeep, we had to cross the hedgerow onto the road, and there was a German colonel who spoke perfect English and he told us to get into the back of the Jeep. So we did. We left our rifles lying on the ground. And he said I am going to take you back to battalion headquarters but first I have an errand. And they drove down the road to what had been an old sawmill and which evidently had been turned into an American headquarters of some kind; there was a kitchen and a repair shop there. But the most terrible slaughter that I have ever seen in my life; there were body pieces and bodies everywhere, some with their heads off. These people had been under a very bad artillery barrage and they were all our guys. And I am afraid to say that it was friendly fire because the Germans had been moving through that area and these guys got caught.

But anyway, the German colonel walked into what looked like what had been a kitchen and came out with a sack of flour over his shoulder. And he said, "Tonight I am going to have a cake." And with that he drove us back to the headquarters and then they put us under guard. Then the next morning they moved us and we were - the first couple of nights, it was probably a company headquarters but it was a house and they put us down in the cellar. There were no lights, there was nothing in the cellar and it was damp and it was smelly and we discovered that there were other prisoners down there. Not many, there were about three or four other guys down there and a dog. Well every day, for the next couple of days, they brought the dog up to feed him and then they would throw down to us a large piece of bread and let us divide it among ourselves. So that was the beginning of my prison life.

We were- that was around the 20th, I think it was the 20th of December that I was captured and I remember by the 25th, which was Christmas Day, they had put us with other prisoners and they took us from town to town, cleaning up after bombings. And we- remembering Christmas Day, we were crowded into a shed and there must have been 100 of us or maybe a little less but it was so crowded that we could not sit down. They just locked the door. And then of course Christmas Day we did not, I am not sure that we knew exactly what day it was but when nobody came by to open the door in the morning we began to speculate that it was probably Christmas Day and they were not going to come to get us to take us out to work on Christmas Day. Well finally around noon they did come and they let us out and they gave us our ration, which was a piece of bread, and then they locked us up again. And the next day they moved us. That was the most crowded quarters that I was in but the next couple of weeks were pretty bad.

They kept moving us east. We crossed the Rhine at Bonn and then they put us in railroad cars and moved us south.

Q: How were they moving you, by truck or walking?

MORRIS: No, we walked all that way. We walked from the place that I was captured, we walked all the way, marched I guess because the further back we went the more prisoners there were and the longer the lines got. And we were strafed a couple of times by our own planes. They saw- these guys see a column on the road and they would strafe us. Luckily we all managed to get off the road in time. I think there were two strafings and nobody was killed or hurt that I know of in those strafings.

Finally, at Bonn, they put us in railroad cars and took us south. I am trying to remember the name of the place; Limburg on the Rhine. And there we were processed by the Germans. They took our- got our names and our serial numbers and interrogated us.

Q: Was it much of an interrogation?

MORRIS: Well it is interesting. As I say, I have written this up and for me it was a joke and for my buddy, he claims that- because we were captured together and we had been together all this time, but he claims that they beat him up. They did not beat me up. My interrogator, I had been in the ASTP, Army Specialized Training Program, which was a program that took people who had a certain IQ and sent them to college. And that program was disbanded in March of 1944 and we were all put in the infantry so I was in the infantry from that time on. But I had a patch in my wallet from that program and that- of course they took everything from us and they took my wallet and I had had it up until the time that we arrived at this place but then they took it - and then they gave me back my wallet and wanted to know what that patch was. The guy softened me up before he started asking me any questions and I was probably tricked but you know the Army rules are you give your name, rank and serial number and that is it.

Then he showed me the patch and I said oh, that is a dead program. I said, that is just a memento of a dead program. So I explained to him what and he said, well you must be pretty bitter having to be here as a prisoner of the Germans instead of back in school. And I said, "Well, I am not as bitter as you must be." I said, "I saw artillery pieces being pulled by horses along the road. You guys are losing the war. When are you going to surrender?" And that was the end of the interview. So I went back to the barracks and my buddy said, boy, he said, you really got me in a lot of trouble with that patch. He said, "I would not tell them anything and they beat the hell out of me."

Anyway, from there we were put in railroad cars again, and these are the old forty and eights where- cattle cars- and they were about-

Q: Forty people or eight horses?

MORRIS: Right. And there were about 50 of us in each one of those cars and they locked them

up and we started to move east and at stops they would pass in water but we did not get any food and I think we were on those trains for two days. And finally we ended up at a prisoner of war camp, Stalag 4B in Muhlberg, on the Elbe River, and I was there for the next five months. I had contracted, diphtheria, an infectious disease, I am not sure on the road or after I got to the camp but I was put in an isolation ward with others who had the same thing. So for about two months I was there. I had diphtheria and for about two months I was there with others who had diphtheria and actually there were an awful lot of guys who were caught too late. They died of the disease soon after they were put into quarantine. Actually the International Red Cross brought vaccine-not vaccine but-

Q: Serum?

MORRIS: Yes, serum; they got serum into us and we were injected and that stopped the progress of the disease for me but it had side effects. And they told us before we were injected; they told us about the side effects which was that you might be paralyzed momentarily and for some time, depending upon your system and your age. Well, I was only 19 at the time but there was a Dutchman there who had been in that ward a couple days before me and he was very helpful to me because he could speak German and he could speak English so he was a good interpreter for me. He kept me aware of what was going on. But for me the serum stopped the advance of the disease. I had momentary paralysis of my throat muscles and a little bit in my hands. But that went away after a couple of days. But the poor Dutchman, he was completely paralyzed, completely. He was much older than I; I was 19, he was 32 and he was completely paralyzed. And I fed him, tried to feed him but he could not even swallow because nothing would go down. And slowly he began to recover and I took care of him as best I could and finally he could begin to swallow a little bit. I was discharged from that ward after about oh, six weeks I guess and by that time he was recovered enough that he could take care of himself, more or less. I never saw him again. Then I spent the last month-and-a-half, two months in the camp.

We were liberated by the Russians, Cossacks, horsemen, who rode horses that only had blankets on them, no saddles and they had a halter, no bridle. Most of them were Orientals and they liberated our camp and they strung up whatever German guard or any German military; we found them hanging in trees when we left the camp. And of course we went into the little town of Muhlberg looking for food because in the camp all we got was watery soup and a piece of black bread every day. I was 150 pounds with no fat on me when I left England in September of '44 and when I reached American lines I was weighed. The first thing they did is weigh me and I was 96 pounds. And that was typical. People ask, you know, did they torture you? No, they did not torture us but they did not feed us either.

Q: How about while you were in the camp; what were you doing? I mean, was it pretty obvious that you were kind of waiting for the war to be over? I mean, were things in such a thing that you all realized that, you know, this is not going to last too long?

MORRIS: Yes. We knew, I knew anyway. It was reflected in my conversation with that interrogation officer that we had all expected the war would be over by Christmas; that is what Eisenhower promised us. So we knew that the Germans were on the losing end and so it was just a question of waiting.

This camp that I was in was a very large camp; there were 20,000 prisoners. There was a large Russian section, Russian prisoners, and then there were British. And they threw us in with the British. In this particular camp, there were very few Americans; there were less than 1,000 Americans in the camp. And I was in a barracks with British and South Africans who all spoke English, of course, and most of them had been prisoners for two or three years. They had adjusted and they had received Red Cross packages of food and I think maybe even some packages from home; I am not sure of that. But anyway, they had adjusted. We were “Johnny-come-latelies;” we had nothing, we never got anything from the Red Cross while we were there and we never got anything from home. In fact, I wrote three or four, they had little sheets that you could write on to send letters, and I sent three of those. My mother got them after the war was over; they never arrived until after the war was over. So all of the time that I was a prisoner I was just listed as missing in action.

But getting back to the prison camp, we used to see those 1,000-plane raids going over that went to bomb Dresden and we would clap, you know. These were the guys that were going to get us out of that camp. They would leave the vapor trails, just endless planes going over. And those were the planes that bombed Dresden, among other places.

Q: Well were you aware, in the group that- stories really did not come out until fairly recently about how the Germans - some units had taken because the Battle of the Bulge was one of the significant blow to prisoners.

MORRIS: Oh yes, yes.

Q: ... three regiments that they took American soldiers they identified as Jewish and put them in the thing. Was this something that you all were aware of?

MORRIS: No. We were not aware of it but there is no doubt that the Jews in my platoon, in my squad, were really frightened that something might happen to them. And as far as I know none of them were separated out but now, keeping up with the ex-prisoners of war, I have learned that some of the people in my division but not in my immediate squad or platoon or even company, in other words, individuals that I knew, none of them were taken. And I think it was a very hit or miss proposition; it was not very well organized.

Q: Well how about while you were in the prison; was it just sort of, I mean, were the Germans beastly to you or was it just a lot of boredom, the sitting around waiting or what?

MORRIS: You know, prior to being put in the camp itself I had contact with the Germans who were taking care, the guards mostly. And they were just doing their job and if you got out of line, you know, they had no compunction about not hitting you with a butt of a rifle or whatever. Except they would march us through these little towns and the people would throw rocks at us or whatever, you know, because of course the American bombers were coming over and dropping bombs on their cities and they had to take it out on somebody and they took it out on us. But the German soldiers were just soldiers; they were just doing their job. And in the camp I practically-well, I did not see any more Germans except when they had a head count every morning and

every night; you had to stand out there for hours in the cold while they counted you and if there was a miscout they would do it all over again. But other than that, I did not see much of the Germans.

Q: How about when the Soviets come in. The Soviet army I mean, did the Germans all of a sudden disappear?

MORRIS: They did. They all disappeared. They knew before we did that the Russians were close and they abandoned the camp. But there were still evidently some of them around and those are the ones that got hung from trees. And I will never forget, I had gotten separated from my buddy before we ever got to the camp and then suddenly the same day we were liberated I ran into him; he had been put in another part of the camp and he said I hear that there is a big hole in the fence down in the Russian compound and we can get through it, we can go into Muhlberg. And so we went down to the big hole in the fence and we went to Muhlberg, walked to Muhlberg; it was only two miles. We were looking for food at the German houses. We would knock on doors and nobody would answer and we would open the door and go in and you would find some German in there hiding because they were afraid of the Russians and they would said ah, Americanish. They wanted us to take them with us. There we were prisoners of war, we did not have anything to protect ourselves, and when we began to realize what the situation was we decided there was not any food in this town and we were a lot safer if we went back to the camp. And then our - the highest ranking officer, American officer in the camp was a major, and he negotiated with the Russians to let the Americans march out of the camp as a unit. The Russians had already put a pontoon bridge across the Elbe right near the camp.

Q: So you were right on the Elbe-

MORRIS: We were right on the-

Q: -where the two forces, the Americans and the Russians met.

MORRIS: Exactly. Well, we were only 12 miles south of that.

Q: Torgau.

MORRIS: Torgau, exactly right. It was at Torgau that the Americans of the 69th Division met the Russians; they met at Torgau and we were only 12 miles south of there. I do not know, probably that meeting took place maybe a day or two days before the American major had the negotiation with the Russians and they let us cross the bridge.

Well, the war still was not over and the Germans had not surrendered and here we were, 1,000 Americans walking along a road; no arms, nothing. We did not even know where we were going. And I said to my buddy, "You know, this is ridiculous. We are not going to survive very long." So we took off. We went into a house by the side of the river and it was abandoned; it was a beautiful house and it was abandoned. We started going through the closets. We found medical equipment so it was probably the home of the doctor. And we went upstairs and there were these wonderful beds, feather beds, lovely things.

Q: Your eyes are lighting up as you say that.

MORRIS: And so here, man, here we are, feather beds. I had never slept in a feather bed in my life. And then we thought, we can take a shower. Well of course, we took a shower but it was cold water; the heating system was gone. But we took showers in cold water and then we slept that night in those feather beds and that was real luxury. There we are, starving but we were at least - And there was no food in the house; there was no food anywhere.

So the next morning I felt very uneasy. I said, "We have got to get out of here. We were letting ourselves in for trouble." And we got back on the road and started walking along the road and we ran into an SS roadblock, German soldiers with rifles and there we are. They must have realized that we were POWs and we were Americans and were not Russians and they let us go, they just told us to keep going. So we got through that roadblock and I, to this day I do not know what happened to the other 800 or 900 guys that were walked down that road the day before.

Then we ran into a guy, a Canadian, a French Canadian who could not speak English. I knew there were French Canadians who spoke French but I did not know there were French Canadians who could not speak English. But anyway, he had been in the Canadian army and he had been a prisoner of war in this little town, Oschatz. He said just keep going, a couple miles down the road. And he said there is food there, you can get something to eat and you can get a place to stay. You know, we got all of this by sign language and a little bit of French that we had. But he said there was a British sergeant major who had declared himself mayor of the town. We got to the town, we went to the center, we went into the mayor's office and there was this British sergeant major and he told us where to go and he said you will get a bed and you get food. So we went down and there was not only bed and food but there was all kinds of schnapps and we drank more than we should have and we got sick as dogs, we were really sick because you know, we ate too much and we drank too much and so we were sick.

But during the night an American major in a Jeep with a trailer on the back, had come in. He was from the 69th Division and their headquarters was quite a ways back to the west. And they were just out on a fishing expedition, you know. They were probably unauthorized and they were just driving around seeing what they could liberate.

Q: Liberate is a fancy term for looting.

MORRIS: Exactly. Exactly. But in the morning we run into these guys and I, right away- I forgot to mention that I had been wounded during the battle. I had gotten shrapnel in my leg and that, throughout my whole experience, had sort of limited what I could do. The fact is, because of the malnutrition it never healed, and it would just run; I had a running sore on my leg and it was infected. While I was in the camp the prisoners had organized, because we had medics, medics who were captured too, so the prisoners organized and they, the medics, regularly changed the bandage on my leg. Once a week I got a change of bandage on the leg. But here we were now, this was going on maybe a week and I had not- and my leg was really getting bad so I really wanted to get back to some kind of medical attention and so we asked this guy and he said sure, get in the trailer. So he drove us back to his, I guess it was battalion headquarters, and the first

thing I said was that I'd like to see the medics and they sent me. I went to see the medics and that was the last time I saw my buddy until about two or three years later in the States. But as soon as they saw my wound and saw my condition, that was where they weighed me. I weighed 96 pounds. I had weighed 150 pounds when we left England. They just told me to wait there and they put me in a Jeep and took me to an evacuation hospital. And I was there when the war ended; I was in the evacuation hospital.

Q: Where was the evacuation hospital?

MORRIS: I really do not remember wherever that battalion headquarters was but it was in the area east of Leipzig, someplace in that area but I never did know exactly what the name of the town was. But anyway, I got there, it was the day before, it was May the 7th because the next day was the surrender on May the 8th. And the first thing they did, you know, they took my stinking clothes and gave me some pajamas and a bathrobe and gave me a bed and the next day there was nobody around. Everybody was gone. Well, you know, it was the end of the war, everybody went out to celebrate and we the patients, we did not have any clothes; we could not go off so we just had to wait. I guess all the Americans had a great time that day celebrating the end of the war and there we were in the hospital with no clothes to go anywhere. We just had to wait.

But within two days or three days I was ambulatory, I could walk, and so they took me out to an airstrip and there were lines of people and about every half-hour a plane would come in, the old, what were they?

Q: C-47s?

MORRIS: C-47s, the cargo planes, yes, the old cargo planes. Yes, actually the same plane as the old DC-3, C-47s. And about every half-hour a C-47 would come in and they would load, both ambulatory and litter patients. In fact, they would load the litter patients into it and then whatever room was left over they would ask for so many ambulatory. And after about four planes came in I was up in the line and I got in the plane and it flew us to England.

But I will never forget that trip. It was the first time I had ever been in an airplane. And I sat, there were no seats but I rolled up something and I sat near a window. We must have flown directly west and then north. We flew to the Rhine and then north along the Rhine across the Channel to England. I will never forget the devastation. We had bombed that place. And those planes, they flew at 2,000 feet, you know, so you could see well what was on the ground. It reminded me of a blotter, an ink blotter, where somebody had taken a pen and made large ink blots. Those were the bomb craters, all over, on both sides of the river, just mile after mile after mile of devastation. It was terrible. It was just awful. That is what war is; war is just terrible.

ROBERT E. ASHER
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
Frankfurt (1945)

Robert E. Asher was born in 1910 in Chicago. He attended Dartmouth, the University of Chicago and the University of Berlin. His career included posts mainly in Germany, Switzerland, and England. He also spent a year as part of the Land-Lease Administration in North Africa. He has held several positions in the State Department and the Brookings Institution. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November 2000.

Q: What were you doing during this time?

ASHER: At SHAEF headquarters?

Q: Yes.

ASHER: We were following the maps of where there were clusters of displaced persons either in camps or not. And sending out the instructions on what to do about them: keep them, wait for further instructions, send them home to France and Belgium and Holland and Norway and Denmark when they were ready to go. Asking about the health of these people. There were some that were in terrible health, although by and large I was surprised, I must say, at the relatively good condition people were in. Disease wasn't rampant, starvation wasn't. They had eaten thin rations but in the last few weeks they had beefed up a lot. It seemed a very hectic period for us because we would get these messages during the night, at all hours, "we have a group that's all ready to go, but if we send the truck, we won't have enough transportation left to get the food tomorrow." Things like that. But it somehow worked out. We got them a truck or food from somewhere. The military, while they professed to have pretty well turned over their responsibilities to UNRRA shortly after VE day, were fully cooperative. They had become heavily involved in this job before UNRRA took over and they wanted to see it finished right. As a matter of fact we took on to the UNRRA payroll some of the ablest people in our Displaced Persons Branch who were involved in this. Charles Schottland, for example, a colonel in the military displaced person's branch, who later became, under Eisenhower I think, Secretary of Health Education and Welfare. Other fine military personnel were taken onto the UNRRA payroll, more than a couple. Some were eager to get out of uniform and into some civilian capacity, simply because they thought that they would get home quicker that way. We had to hold off a bit, let them find their own level, but the Displaced Persons Branch of SHAEF was integrated, between civilians and military personnel. After VE day we continued to operate fairly well.

I moved to Frankfurt about the middle of June '45, I guess. The SHAEF offices in Versailles were abandoned and Allied Force headquarters was in the IG Farben building, one of the few undestroyed buildings in Frankfurt. I was billeted in a house that had obviously been recently evacuated by the Germans. I felt a little bit guilty when I found a wonderful library at that home, the inhabitants having had to leave without getting a chance to carry with them any of this. But war wasn't kind to people and the military, U.S. and British, felt quite rightly that they had to have some place to billet people. So, evacuate the Germans and billet the Americans and British. That's what they did. Depending on your rank, you could be pretty well billeted. They may have hired back some of these Germans, as interpreters, kitchen personnel, mechanics and so forth.

I just happen now in 2001 to have some correspondence with a professor of German at the

University of Massachusetts, who apparently as a very young child was in Frankfurt and was evacuated at the time when we came in. She has relieved me, we didn't force them to leave at the time of SHAEF's arrival; their house was bombed before and they were already on the outskirts of Frankfurt. Being an occupying power isn't very enjoyable either. Maybe some people found it so, but not those of us who really weren't wounded during the war or hadn't starved, and who moved with the troops in pretty classy ways. It just didn't sit well with me.

Q: Speaking of UNRRA, who United Nations was it at that time?

ASHER: UNRRA's headquarters were in Washington and it had a European Regional Office in London. At headquarters we had a Russian deputy. It took a long time before we got Russian administrative personnel into the field. UNRRA had missions later in Byelorussia and the Ukraine. They were not headed by Russians, in keeping with the principle that an UNRRA country mission should not be headed by a national of that country. The Russian deputy felt, and I think with reason, that he was left out of a lot of decision-making, but the Russians were very troublesome when they were left in. Terribly hard, they just saw things differently. Politics for them was the continuation of war by other means. They had a real grievance that all the Western Europeans were being repatriated while these Russians who should have been at home helping with reconstruction were still in camps, trying to get visas for the USA, Argentina, Brazil and all sorts of western hemisphere places. And getting them. A distinguished American, Herbert Lehman, had been head of the predecessor of UNRRA, the US Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, and he was succeeded in UNRRA by Fiorello La Guardia, a colorful, brilliant, dynamic, exciting personality to be around, but erratic as an administrator. He would fire somebody in the morning and in the afternoon he would ask for that person and be told, "Well, don't you know he left?" and he'd say, "Get him back, I need him." La Guardia then was given some important post with military government in Italy I think.

His successor at UNRRA was a man named Robert G.A. Jackson, Robert God Almighty Jackson we called him. Do you know anything about him? He was a New Zealander. Very dedicated person who revved himself up for the whole war and postwar effort. In the military service he had been a commander. He thought of UNRRA as a sort of command-post job. He was here in Washington then, it was the headquarters. There was a staff meeting every morning. He usually slept on a cot in his office as though it were important that he be there between midnight and five AM. But the war was over by then. He, I thought, didn't have too good a sense of proportion. He would have on his agenda when he would get to the morning office meeting, I am getting a bit ahead of myself, that the flag wasn't flying straight and somebody should do something about that, and where are those drugs for Albania that pharmaceuticals had promised? That was obviously much more important than whether the flag was flying straight or not. His agenda always had a checklist on it that somebody important should get busy on right away.

He married a person whom I found utterly charming, Barbara Ward, a brilliant, eloquent, beautiful economist. I didn't really know her at all until well after the war, when I was a founding member of the Society for International Development. Barbara Ward came into the organization early and she was one of our most eloquent people. She'd written a book called The West at Bay, and she later got interested in the development of the less developed countries, in particular Africa. When she spoke honestly about the situation in Africa it brought a lump to my

throat, tears to my eyes, a determination to do something. She was wonderful. Her husband I admired in some ways, but Barbara I loved.

Q: When you were dealing with the headquarters, were any nationalities giving you particular problems? Either because of internal politics of their country, or just being difficult to get to go from here to beyond.

ASHER: UNRRA was the first operational international agency. It had a real function in the field. Every country felt that it was entitled to have some personnel at the headquarters. They were willing to supply them. UNRRA needed to build up fairly quickly. It operated at headquarters only in English. This was probably a severe handicap to a lot of people. It was hard, much harder to build an integrated international staff of collaborative personnel, it takes longer, takes more effort in bringing out people at staff meetings, etc. The Personnel Division had people like Mel Spector, who were very aware of this, very good at trying to give us team spirit, so to speak.

I was brought back from Europe to be head of a division called Procedural Coordination to issue UNRRA's regulations and principles and so on. One of the things I tried to do, with the full understanding of Jackson and other people at the top, was to get the clearance and consent of all of the key officers in the organization before getting out some new regulation. You never could get the Russians to agree that people should be repatriated only with their consent. On the other hand, you could persuade them that this regulation was going to apply to a lot of other people, and if you don't go along you are going to slow down the repatriation of people in other countries. There was still an aura, a residue of combined forces, of having together beaten the Nazis, and it carried over a little bit to the UNRA headquarters. I had some good Russian and Yugoslav friends. It was not quite the same kind of intimacy that you got with American and British colleagues. I think that the people at the top of UNRRA were sensitive to this problem, but it's just much easier to pick up the telephone and talk to somebody in English, who will then go along with the proposed action, or want to qualify it, or disagree or something, than it is to explain it to someone brought up in another culture.

Q: The fallout if I understand it, was that you did as much as you could and then you start getting into these DP camps. When I came to Germany in '55, they were no longer DP camps but they were refugee camps. The same thing. They really didn't get rid of them until about around 1960 or something.

ASHER: It went on forever, long beyond the life of UNRRA. There was, what is it called, within the UN...?

Q: High Commissioner for Refugees.

ASHER: Yes, the IRO [International Refugee Organization] took over the displaced persons problem from UNRRA. There was a sense of urgency at home about putting an end to some of these wartime agencies.

Q: As you started this were you aware that no matter what happened you were going to end up

with major residue of people who weren't going to go anywhere?

ASHER: I was, and I think others were. I think we realized that we were going to have a hard core of persons who couldn't be repatriated but we didn't know where they should go or what should be done about it. Therefore some of these people who had suffered the most during the war were the last ones to be released from the camps. Many were never repatriated. A handful went to Brazil and a handful to Canada and some other places. Israel came into being and took on a lot of displaced persons who were Jews from the concentration camps. But war in the Middle East created a horde of new refugees. It was -- still is -- a very sad and terrible situation, as I said. Thousands of people who suffered badly during the war and had every reason to hope that at the end of the war they would be able to rejoin their families, get back to somewhere, were being held because they wouldn't or couldn't go to where they weren't wanted.

Q: Eventually, Congress passed the Displaced Persons Act. And as you say there was Brazil, Australia...

ASHER: The U.S., too.

Q: ...and other countries were looking to do this. Was this all being in the works while you were there?

ASHER: Just the beginnings of it, because I came home towards the end of 1945 to UNRRA headquarters here. I was here for a year. By that time, that late in the year, it was perfectly clear that we had this large group of persons in displaced persons camps and that those people would have to be maintained somehow. The U.S. did take in what a lot of us thought was an inadequate number, but nevertheless not insubstantial. When you look at university faculties even today, you realize how many of them were refugees.

LOUIS A. WIESNER
Labor Officer
Germany (1945-1949)

Louis Wiesner became interested in foreign affairs in graduate school at Harvard from 1937 to 1942, where he earned a master's degree and went on to do part of the work for a Ph.D. in European history. He was however unable to complete his dissertation due to World War II. He joined the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in the post-war planning unit. His career took him to Germany, Turkey, Southern Rhodesia, Canada, Vietnam, Pakistan and Bangladesh. He also served as Labor Advisor of EUR. He was interviewed by Don R. Kienzle in 1992.

Q: Could you tell us how you got to Berlin and what the stages were?

WIESNER: Yes. The stages were that the Mission was part of SHAEF, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces Europe, which were in Bushy Park, England, on the

grounds of the Hampton Court Palace in a whole series of temporary buildings. The part that we were in was called the United States Control Group Council for Germany, U.S. Group C.C. I flew over there under wartime blackout conditions in a plush C-54 in December 1944. We arrived at Prestwick, Scotland, and were marooned there for a week by fog. They have a lot of fog there. Finally, a special train, one of the King's trains, was sent up to get us and carry us . . . - There was a whole bunch of people then destined for one or another agency in London. -- . . . and carry us down to London. So I arrived just before Christmas of 1944.

We stayed there right during the V-2 period and that really was a serious thing. One V-2 over a weekend landed in a gasworks right across the street from the WAC barracks and blew the walls out of the barracks. Fortunately the women were bunked in double-decker, heavy wooden bunks, so the roof trusses came right down on top of their bunks and didn't hurt them. It scared them to death and scattered secret documents all over that end of Great Britain. I was living in a small residential hotel in London itself, and we were taken, as were most of the people in the various hotels, back and forth by bus under blackout conditions and again in heavy fog.

We stayed there until March 27, 1945, the day the last V-2 fell on London, and then went over to Versailles, France, where we were billeted by arrangement with the French Government, only in houses that had been occupied by the Nazis. I was billeted in the servants quarters of Elsie de Wolfe's Lady Mendell house in Versailles, a lovely place, but the servants' quarters had not been heated during the entire war, and they had walls of stone two feet thick. I had never been so cold in my life. We had to go into the main house, where the senior officers were billeted and which had heat, in order to take showers, but then after a couple of weeks the weather became very mild and it was really lovely. The offices were in the Hotel des Reservoirs in Versailles, our offices, U.S. Group C.C. ,while the rest of SHAEF were in the Grandes Ecuries of the Palace of Versailles, so we could walk around in that lovely area. Lady Mendell's House was backed up against a Petite Trianon, and we could just go right into those grounds. Then as General Patton's Third Army swept across Germany much faster than anyone had expected, the military ran out of Military Government Officers including labor officers, and therefore they came to U.S. Group C.C. and asked if they could borrow some of us. Paul Porter was borrowed and went to Frankfurt. I was borrowed for what became the northern half of the French Zone but was occupied by the U.S. at that time, the Saar, Palatinate, South Hesse, Trier, Koblenz area and with our regional military government headquarters in Neustadt an der Weinstrasse, the Street of Wine, or Neustadt an der Hardt. The river was the Hardt. Paul and I went together; we flew from a little airfield outside of Paris to Verdun, where the 12th Army Group was headquartered and Captain Henry Rutz, who was the labor officer for the 12th Army Group, briefed us and put us up for a couple of nights until the entire 12th Army Group Headquarters moved on one day from Verdun to Wiesbaden, some 397 vehicles on the road, tank-carriers, everything. On the way, it got lost in Metz and wound around through its own tail. The leader of the convoy eventually found the right road and got out of town. I understand he was demoted for that.

Q: Do you have an approximate date when this took place?

WIESNER: This was about mid-April 1945, before the war was over.

Q: Two or three weeks before the end of the war?

WIESNER: Yes. So I became the Assistant Military Government Labor Officer in that regional detachment in "E Detachment" it was called. We worked on among other things restoring the Arbeitsaemter, the labor offices, which were employment offices, the Sozialversicherungsamter [social insurance offices], all of which is described in this report [Organized Labor in Postwar Germany by Louis A. Wiesner, Washington, D.C., 1950]. After working in the headquarters to develop guidelines to do this,... Well, I want to back up a little bit. One of my first jobs outside of Neustadt was to go and kidnap a wine coordinator from Speyer, which was then occupied by the French. This report describes how, as the Nazi regime collapsed and the Allies took over, the whole of German society dissolved, and it became what I call the "atomized society." I mean the whole Nazi structure was immediately eliminated by the Allies. This was something that people, whether they liked it or not, had come to rely on as the structure around their lives. It not only included governmental structures but economic organizations, the Deutsche Arbeitsfront, the German Labor Front, which organized labor and took over all the property of the trade unions, etc., and really mobilized their lives, and women's organizations, and youth organizations, etc., including, of course, the governmental and semi-governmental structures which organized economic and employment matters. So with all of this destroyed, the people were left in a state of "psychological anomie," you might say. They had nothing to cling to except their own families and their little villages if those were intact, and they were in this region, but they needed, or felt they needed, something to reorganize their economic and social life, so that they could carry on, and one of the things they needed was a wine coordinator. This was a wine producing area, and there were wineries and so forth. There were quotas that were traditional for the various vineyards as to how much they could produce in the way of grapes and where they were to deliver them, and there was marketing to be done of the wines, the quality control, labeling, etc. The commander of the 23rd Corps, I think it was a lieutenant general, called on us to find him a wine coordinator, and I was tapped to do it. Are you interested in hearing all this?

Q: Yes.

WIESNER: We civilians had to go in of course in uniform, in full officers' uniform without rank or insignia. That was primarily to keep our own soldiers from shooting us, because the war was still going on. I was assigned the owner of a local winery there to help me, and we went in his car and went down to Speyer right through the French lines and up to this guy's winery because he knew him. It was a big structure with factories and an administration building about six floors high. We climbed those stairs and went up and knocked on the door to the owner's apartment, and he came to the door. I said in my best college German, which was pretty rusty at that time, "You have been appointed wine coordinator of the Saar-Palatinate-South Hesse, Trier and Koblenz area. You have one hour to get packed and come with us."

Q: This is how you kidnaped the wine coordinator?

WIESNER: Yes. This was in the days of non-fraternization. You were forbidden to be friends with Germans, which was a stupid policy but anyway! He was of course both shocked and delighted and at the same time did not want to leave his home. He asked if could take his family with him. I said, "No, unfortunately not." So he invited us in. He went and changed clothes and did some packing. As we sat rather stiffly in his living room . . . -- It was a nice living room. -- . . .

. a young boy came in, one of his sons, who could not have been more than ten or eleven, maybe twelve, and then an older boy, who could not have been more than 17 or 18, with a deep scar down one side of his face. I asked how he got that scar and he said that he had been a Luftwaffe pilot and had been shot down. This kid! Well, the hour went by and his wife came in and tried to shake our hands, and of course I wouldn't shake hands with her, but the winery owner did. We talked a bit and the hour went by and he wasn't ready. Finally I said to the sons, "Well, we'll go out and I want to do some sight-seeing in the town. We'll be back in an hour."

We had come into this winery through the front gate and passed French soldiers. The first thing they wanted to know was, did we come to buy wine, because they were not about to let us carry wine away. We assured them we weren't and didn't say anything more, but I wondered how we were going to get this owner out through those soldiers and into the car to carry him away, because they probably would not have allowed that either. So the young boy offered to accompany us and show us the sights. We said, "Fine." He took us to the great cathedral at Speyer, which had been pretty well destroyed in the bombing. We talked with some priests there, and they weren't at all bitter. Then after about an hour, we came back, and the boy directed us to the back gate of the winery compound. There weren't any soldiers there. We went up, and he [the winery owner] was ready. He came down with us and his whole family and all of his top winery officials and so forth were gathered in the street outside. They were tearful and laughing at the same time and bidding him goodbye. We got in the car and drove away and went back to Neustadt. So we got the wine coordinator.

Well, after we had done our preparatory work about restoring the Arbeitsaemter and the Sozialversicherungsamter, it was time for me to go around to the various towns to get these things started, or if they were started, to see if they were functioning properly and were denazified. I had a jeep and a sergeant as a driver. On May 8th we came to Worms. In each case, we checked in with the local "I" detachment, the local detachment which was three officers and three enlisted men. When we came to Worms to the "I" detachment, I had a long questionnaire. They said, "Hell, man, don't you know that the war is over. We'll get your goddamned questionnaire filled out, then we are going to go out and celebrate. If you would like to stay with us, you are welcome to do it."

Q: Who said that?

WIESNER: These were the Americans in "I" detachment. So, we did that. Well, I could go on, but that's enough on that. Then in another couple of weeks, or even less perhaps, they got their permanent [people] . . . -- They already had a captain as a labor officer. -- . . . and I was free to go back to U.S. Group CC, which by then had moved into the I.G. Farben Building at Hoechst. We continued our planning working with the British and the French. On August 2nd the Russians let us into Berlin. They had come into Berlin at the end of the war in early May. In fact their coming into Berlin and the suicide of Hitler ended the war. During that period before they let the Western Allies in, they had thoroughly communized East Germany and Berlin. We can go into that, but it is all described in here [in my report]. They had thoroughly looted Berlin too, taken out whole factories, power plants, everything. Their soldiers had raped and looted and all of that. It was a terrible thing. When we came into Berlin, . . . -- It was the 2nd Armored Division that led the way, a very disciplined group of soldiers. -- . . . Berlin was utterly destroyed. I had

seen a lot of destruction in West Germany, mainly from the bombing. The bombing hit city centers and factories and things like that. Mostly it was targeted bombing by the Americans. The British did pattern mass bombing. But the outskirts of cities in the west and the villages were untouched, like Neustadt an der Weinstrasse, which was a medieval town. Only here and there were there houses missing. Berlin was destroyed all the way out to the outskirts, because the Russians had to fight their way in through this bitter Nazi resistance. So everything was gone. The first house in which I was billeted had a third of the roof shot off, and it was raining. It was the rainy season, and it was pretty miserable. There were bodies floating in the canals, and the Germans, of course, were much more miserable. So there again the first job had to be . . . -- and the Russians hadn't done a damned thing to provide food or anything else for them. -- . . . was to restore the economy and get things going and get the people fed.

Q: What were your duties as Labor Advisor?

WIESNER: I was the Labor Attaché, and my job then was to help in restoration of . . . Well, the decommunization to the extent we could do it. . . . of local government on the labor side, although we couldn't. The agreements for the Control Council for Germany and the agreements on the zones of Germany, which put Berlin deep inside the Soviet Zone, all provided that decisions of the Allied Control Council and the Berlin Kommandatura had to be unanimous, so there was no way we could throw out this government that the Russians had installed. What we could do and what I immediately set about doing with some of my friends in the Manpower Division was to find anti-Communist trade unionists, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, etc.; establish contact with them, which we did despite non-fraternization rules: and encourage them to organize against this massive apparatus that the Russians had installed. They had brought in a complete government headed by Wilhelm Pieck as President and Walter Ulbricht as the Head of the Communist Party and the . . . -- I forget his title, but he was the real boss. -- . . . and with people all the way down the line, who had been exiles in Russia during the war, in the Soviet Union. They brought them all in and installed them in positions including the trade unions, the Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund as they called it, the FDGB. Do we want to go into all of that or do we want to rely on the book?

Q: I think a little bit would be helpful. How did you go about contacting the Social Democrats and were there ones who stuck out in your mind as particularly helpful in the process?

WIESNER: Yes, actually during those years that I was with OSS and working on the Social Democrats and the trade unionists, I had compiled quite a sizable biographic file of people that we knew to be alive in the underground and exiles including Willy Brandt, who was then in Sweden; Ernst Reuter, who was in Turkey; and others. They came in . . . -- Reuter just a year later . . . -- Willy Brandt and others came in at the same time the Allies were permitted in. Willy Brandt was in the uniform of a Norwegian Army major, and he was their press officer. There had been a debate within our own offices as to whether the Western Allies should encourage and facilitate the return of democratic exiles in their own countries. By and large we were pretty cautious about that on the assumption that if we did that the Russian would bring in the Free Germany Committee and everything. That was kind of naive on our part.

Q: They had already done it.

WIESNER: They had already done it and we delayed in bringing in some of the democratic people from the West, although OSS had contact with them all, including Hans Jahn, for example, who was in Britain and who had been head of the Railway Workers Union and came back to head it. I knew a number of these people while we were working in Britain. I'd gotten acquainted with them in part through the Social Democratic leaders there and in part through the International Federation of Trade Unions, the IFTU, which was preserved in Great Britain with its headquarters there. But in Berlin, it was really a matter of their finding us, the people who were the opposition leaders.

Even in the West, in Neustadt, for example, I was approached almost as soon as I got there by a middle aged man -- whose name I have in this book, but I have forgotten it at the moment -- who was badly crippled, and he explained that that had happened during his stay in a concentration camp. He said he wanted to set up a trade union organization. Our instructions, which I had helped to write, were to permit local trade unions, and so we did. And the same thing we found elsewhere in that region, that there were democrats who had come forward, trade unionists, mostly Social Democrats but some Christian Democrats too, who spontaneously set up trade unions, usually on the basis of one big union encompassing all the crafts and all the industries. Then they would spread out. There was none of this building from crafts and industries to a top. They did it from the top down, and that's the way the Russians established the FDGB too. It was a unified thing and they spread it throughout all of Berlin and all of the Soviet Zone.

We got into a prolonged battle within the U.S. Military Government between those of us who were the anti-Communists and wanted to permit this restoration of trade unions as rapidly as the people were capable of doing it and a group of pro-Communists. They were scattered all through U.S. Military Government. This was the period when it was U.S. policy to get along with the Russians. So Communists and "fellow travelers" were taken into Military Government. This was a struggle which lasted a number of years, roughly until 1947. These people insisted on the formation of trade unions "from the bottom up" as they put it. First, shop committees, then organizations which were inter-shop and inter-factory on a local basis by industries, and then the creation of local federations and so on up through the Laender, the states. In the course of that, they did everything they could to see that German Communists and "fellow travelers" got these positions of leadership, particularly in shops where shop stewards had from the time of the 1918 Revolution always been the centers of radical activity in factories. Well, eventually we won and the book here tells how we did it.

Q: Did you screen the labor volunteers for the denazification process?

WIESNER: Yes, everybody was screened for that.

Q: Were there very many who were former Nazis who tried to present themselves as democratic labor leaders?

WIESNER: No, not in the trade union field, not in the political party field and the reason for that is that the real anti-Nazis had already identified them and excluded them. They knew who their people were. Many of them had held together during the entire Nazi period in little cells and so

forth, which had been repeatedly betrayed and destroyed by either Nazi infiltrators or by Communists. So those who survived knew who their enemies were, and they did the denazification really on their own. In the Manpower Division, for example, there was a young lieutenant by the name of George Silver, who had come from the Jewish Labor Committee in Philadelphia originally. He had come through Army Intelligence, and he was a Socialist. He knew enough German that he was really a pioneer in finding the right people, whom he always began to call "Du", the familiar "Du", rather than "Sie" from the very beginning. He was one of the really authentic heroes of the reestablishment of the labor movement, and he, like so many of us, took up with a German lady whose name Hanna Bornowski. She was half Jewish and a Social Democrat, who had been hidden by non-Jewish friends all during the Nazi period. Between those two, he got CARE packages sent to him and anything else that his friends back in the States could send through the mails, and she set up a kitchen, so to speak. They founded the Wilhelm Leuschner Institute. Wilhelm Leuschner had been the leading trade unionist in the July 20th 1944 conspiracy that almost assassinated Hitler and had been found and killed. Then later as the Freie Universität was established, and that was fairly soon, she set another kitchen there. Between those two, they literally preserved the lives of many of these democratic leaders.

Q: Did they also screen for Social Democratic bona fides?

WIESNER: Yes, indeed, and he knew how to do it. I was more on the political side dealing with leaders who emerged in the Social Democratic Party. Don't forget that my mandate was national, so I had not only Berlin but also all of West Germany, the three zones of West Germany. So I quickly got acquainted with, for example, Kurt Schumacher, again a concentration camp survivor, who became the leader of the Social Democrats, even though political parties were not legal at that time, but they organized anyhow, and he was the recognized leader. Then a whole bunch of them were in Berlin. Jacob Kaiser was the leader of the Christian Democrats. I forget the names of others. Ernst Lemmer was the leader of the Liberal Democrats. All of these became my friends, and I entertained them at dinners and other parties in my home.

We were billeted again in Berlin in whatever housing we could find that was suitable. I quickly moved out of that place with a third of the roof shot off and was moved in with three others into the smallest of the town houses of the von Siemens family, the big electrical manufacturers, and we stayed in that house, which was magnificent, a lovely place with lots of servants and all of that, until the blockade of 1948 started, at which point coal was cut off and power plants were curtailed and we as Allies got six hours of electricity in every 24. The Germans got four hours. The Air Lift, by the way, brought in a whole power plant in pieces. Well, this was an all electric house, and so we had to move out of that into another place.

Q: Was the fraternizing relaxed by that time?

WIESNER: Officially it wasn't relaxed until about 1946, but one of the things about the American Foreign Service is that it's traditional that you make friends with the people who are your contacts and you entertain them. Now they could not entertain us because they had nothing, but they willingly came to our parties and of course during that time various delegations of the AFL and the CIO and Congressmen and this, that, and the other thing were coming into Berlin and we would include them in some of these parties and receptions as well. But basically what I

was doing and my colleagues in the Political Division -- because I was part of the Political Division of US POLAD, which in turn was part of OMGUS, as U.S. Group CC became OMGUS, Office of Military Government U.S., -- we all did this and were led in doing so by everybody up to Ambassador Murphy himself, who, because he was so close to General Eisenhower and then General Clay, was not permitted to violate the non-fraternization policy, but he thoroughly approved of what we were doing and his deputy, Donald Heath, for example, the DCM. . . . -- He wasn't called DCM, but he was his deputy. -- . . . then Jimmy Riddleberger and a whole series of political counselors, wonderful people, approved of what we were doing. We also worked very closely with the British Political Division, which had a more liberal policy and a lot more resources than we did. And then we worked, to the extent that we were permitted to, with the U.S. Information Service Division, which rationed newsprint and things like that to publications. That was crucial for publicity, and we kept pressing them to allot more to the democratic elements because the Russians overwhelmed their puppets with all these goodies, all these resources, and they were winning the battle to stay in power and to maintain their organizations. Well, I don't need to go into all the details as to how gradually within the Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund in Berlin these democratic elements began to assert themselves and to clamor for democratic elections which were never held.

The Russians forced through a merger of the Social Democratic Party in Berlin and in the Soviet Zone with the Communist Party and that was called Die Sozialistische Einheitspartei [The Socialist Unity Party], the SED with the "D" standing for Deutschland (Germany). The Social Democrats forced a referendum on that issue in Berlin, and in the Soviet Sector the merger went through of course. In the Western Sectors it was overwhelmingly defeated. Some of us political officers in the Military Government including myself in full uniform without the rank insignia went into the Soviet Sector to observe the referendum there to be sure that it was, to the extent to which we could see, carried through fairly. I was arrested then by the Russians and held for about four hours. I was arrested again later during some other elections. What I did was to storm at them and say, "You can't do this to a fellow Military Government Officer" and so forth, and I eventually got released. It was a very, very tense and difficult situation, which eventually resulted in splitting the city and splitting the country.

Q: And splitting the labor movement as well?

WIESNER: And splitting the labor movement as well. Then gradually after we had, with the help of Joe Keenan by the way, who . . . Does that mean anything?

Q: Could you just say a few words about him?

WIESNER: Joe Keenan was the Secretary-Treasurer of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. He had been in the War Production Board as a Deputy to . . . I forget who was head of it. He was selected by General Clay to come over and be his Labor Advisor. When he came the first time, these Communists within the Manpower Division got a hold of him and convinced him that the "bottoms up" approach was the right way to go. Of course his was a very, very powerful voice, and Sidney Hillman backed him up.

Q: Could you tell us who Sidney Hillman was?

WIESNER: Sidney Hillman was the President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, I believe, and had been a very powerful CIO leader. He had also served in the War Production Board or some such place in the administration, and he was one of the founders of the World Federation of Trade Unions. Sidney Hillman came on delegations, and he backed these people up, and Joe Keenan did too. He was taken in by them. Well, then the AFL . . . -- In the meantime all of us had been in touch with the AFL, Irving Brown and Zimmerman of International Ladies Garment Workers Union and others like that. -- . . . and they called Joe Keenan back to Washington for consultation. He stayed there, I think, a couple of months, and they really lit into him for what he was doing. So when he came back again in 1946, he . . . -- I'm not sure of my dates but they are all in here. -- . . . he was a completely reformed man, and then he led the fight to get trade unions organized throughout the Western Zones, the U.S. Zone and federated with those in the British and French Zones and in Berlin. He was a tower of strength in that fight, which eventually split the Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund in Berlin with a non- Communist offshoot call UGO, Unabhaengige Gewerkschaftsorganisation [Independent Trade Union Organization]. We all helped in that. Just how we did it is all described in this book.

Q: Is that the point at which the decision was made to have 17 or 18 large industrial unions in the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund?

WIESNER: Yes, it was really done in the British Zone through the organization there headed by Hans Boeckler, who became the first President of . . . -- I forget which union he came from. -- first President of the DGB, die Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund [The German Trade Union Federation]. But in the U.S. Zone as well, one thing . . . I have to go back a bit. In pre-Nazi Germany in the Weimar Republic, you had union organization by party and by religious confession. You had the ADGB, die Allgemeine Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund [the German General Trade Union Federation], which was largely Social Democrat; you had a Christian trade union organization; you had a separate white collar organization, which was rather right wing. One of the things that was decided, and curiously enough almost unanimously in both the underground and among the exile groups, was that that would not be perpetuated in the new Germany. There would be one non-partisan, non-confessional trade union organization, and that in fact is the way they were set up. As I mentioned earlier, in West Germany the tendency at the beginning was to set up just one organization and then divide it by industries, and that of course was killed by the "bottoms up" approach. They were required to organize first in the shops and then by industries. In the British Zone, none of that took place. They didn't have a bunch of Communists there, and so they organized again from the top down and with these 16 industrial groups and that was the pattern that eventually prevailed in the West. Again, even with the industrial groups, it was highly centralized. The DGB was much more centralized than either the CIO or the AFL in the U.S., but gradually in later years of course the industrial unions have come to the fore as very, very powerful, like die Metalarbeiter [The Metal Workers' Union], for example, and the Public Service Workers and all of that. They do their own bargaining, and they do their own striking, if necessary. I can go into all of that too because one thing that emerged during those years was a movement toward what was called Mitbestimmungsrecht, co-determination in the factories, the worker representation on the boards of directors of companies.

Q: Did that occur in the period from 1945 to 1949?

WIESNER: Yes, it did, even though General Clay opposed it, and Ludwig Erhard who was the Economics Minister, first of the Bizone and then of the German Federal Republic, opposed it, but it went through and exists today. It's a very strong element in "industrial governments" so to speak in Germany.

Q: Could you say a few words perhaps about Irving Brown's role during the period?

WIESNER: Irving Brown's role was minimal. I got acquainted with Irving Brown through the periodic Labor Attaché conferences that were held mainly in Geneva and became very close friends of Irving. Irving paid little attention to Germany. His primary interests were France, where he was the leading force behind the creation of the Force Ouvriere and Italy, where he and Tom Lane were the leaders in the organization of CISL [Confederazione Italiana Sindacate Lavoratori], the democratic trade union federation there. He came into Germany now and then, but he played little role in these events that I'm describing. For some reason, he is not mentioned at all in the book, whereas Zimmerman and of course Joe Keenan and many others were.

Q: But Irving Brown did support the "top down approach" of the Social Democratic forces?

WIESNER: Oh, yes, certainly, but as I say, he had no real role because he was fully occupied with France and Italy and north Africa. He was very active in supporting the independence movements in north Africa. A wonderful person, as I say, but he wasn't much involved in this.

Q: Did he know most of the personalities in the Social Democratic ranks in Germany?

WIESNER: I guess he did. I doubt if he knew them very well. For one thing, he didn't speak German.

Q: He didn't?

WIESNER: Oh, no. He spoke French and some Italian and so forth, but he didn't speak German. These others did. Not Joe. Joe never learned any other foreign language. Neither did Sidney Hillman. Victor Reuther was very helpful to us.

Q: Could you describe his role?

WIESNER: Well, Victor at that time was, I guess, the International Affairs Chief of the UAW, the United Auto Workers, and he was one of the very few CIO people who were anti-Communist and supportive of democratic trade unions and the Social Democratic Party.

Q: Would you like to comment on the effect of the Cold War and McCarthyism?

WIESNER: Yes, obviously we were part of the Cold War. The interesting thing is that we won the Cold War in Germany including West Berlin by purely political action, not by military action, not by the threat of military action, except of course during the blockade the Allied and U.S. military were used through the Air Lift to bring things into Berlin, but the fight that I have

been describing and is described in this book was political. It was a "people's war" so to speak without weapons. We on the advisory side did not have weapons, and more particularly the German democrats didn't have weapons, whereas the Soviets did have weapons, and they arrested many of my friends and took them off and some of them just disappeared for ever. I am trying now, and one of the things I'll do on this forthcoming trip of mine [to Berlin], is to find out what has happened to some of them. They went into concentration camps, or they were killed. The Soviets had the power, the military might and they used it. The Western Allies didn't use their military might. They didn't have to defend their own zones, because the Russians never tried to invade them, but they did have to in the sense of the Air Lift into Berlin. It was the German democratic people, the forces of their leaders and of their followers, who won this war in Germany.

Q: Were the exiles who returned as effective as the those who had stayed?

WIESNER: Yes, they were. I had been afraid that they would not be well received, because they had not gone through all of the sacrifices of those who stayed and endured the concentration camps, but in fact there was none of that. They were received joyfully. Willy Brandt I have mentioned. Ernst Reuter, who became the Oberbuergermeister [Governing Mayor] of Berlin; Max Brauer, whom I had known in New York, who became the mayor of Hamburg; the whole group from England, Hans Jahn on the trade union side, Eric Ollenhauer, who became the Secretary-General of the Social Democratic Party and others from other parts. They were received and integrated very quickly.

By the way, I have used that as an argument for trying to entice the Afghans in the United States to go back to Afghanistan now, because I am on the Board of the International Rescue Committee, and we have had programs among the Afghans both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan for years. They are very hesitant to do so, and our people in the field in Pakistan and Afghanistan say they would not be well received, but that was not the case in Germany. They were welcomed. They climbed as their abilities enabled them to to positions of leadership and particularly in the political parties and to a lesser degree in the trade union movement.

Q: Did the Weimar experience have enough roots to provide the structure later on for a viable trade union movement?

WIESNER: Well, as I say, the Weimar experience was politically divided and confessionally divided trade unions. That they abandoned. That they decided they would not repeat. It would be a unified trade union movement bringing in everybody and not affiliated with any political party. By and large that has been preserved to this day. That was a fundamental difference. The book describes some of the planning that was done by the exile groups and by some of the underground groups.

Q: They learned from their past experience?

WIESNER: The learned from their experience. Their divisions within the trade union movement had been a primary cause of its failure in the face of Hitler, also lack of militancy and that was particularly true of the Social Democrats and the trade unionists, both of which had large

bureaucratic and property interests that they were determined to uphold by one concession after another to the Nazis. They became bureaucratized and hidebound and above all wealthy, and that again is described [in the book]. They didn't have the militancy, so the people who developed the new trade union movement were determined A) to be unified and B) to be militant in defense of their interests and of their beliefs, and they sacrificed an awful lot for that.

To read more visit: <http://adst.org/store/#!~/category/id=4169163&offset=0&sort=normal>