

## Excerpts from the Russia Country Reader

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### SOVIET UNION/RUSSIA

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Teresa Chin Jones	1941	Born in the USSR to Chinese Diplomatic Parents, Novosibirsk
Clinton L. Olson	1941-1943 1943	Deputy Chief of Joint U.S.-U.K. Supply Program for USSR, Moscow Military Attaché, WWII, Vladivostok
James McCargar	1942-1944	Vice Consul, Kuybyshev and Moscow
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William A. Crawford	1944-1947	Administrative Officer, Moscow
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	1959-1961	Soviet Desk Officer, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
	1965-1967	Political Counselor, Moscow
Eugene Kern & Edward Goldberger	1948	Voice of America: Russian Program
Mary Ann Stoessel	1948-1949	Foreign Service Spouse, Code Clerk, Moscow
George Allen Morgan	1948-1949 1949-1950	Cultural Affairs Officer, Moscow Political Officer, Moscow
Robert O. Blake	1950-1952 1954-1957	Consular/Political Officer, Moscow Soviet Desk Officer, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
Richard Townsend Davies	1951-1953	Political Officer, Moscow
Sol Polansky	1952-1955	Translator, Moscow
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Robert R. Bowie	1953-1957	Policy Planning Staff: U.S. View of Soviet Union: Solarium Exercise, Washington, DC
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Vladimir I. Toumanoff	1956-1957	Soviet Studies, Harvard University
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.	1956-1958	Administrative/Political Officer, Moscow
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Harry G. Barnes, Jr.	1956-1957 1957-1959 1959-1962	Soviet Desk Officer, Washington, DC Publications Procurement Officer/Cultural Exchange Officer, Moscow Soviet Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Edward L. Killham	1956-1959 1968-1970 1970-1971	Consular/Political Officer, Moscow Analyst, Soviet Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC Soviet Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs Washington, DC
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Cole Blasier	1958	Temporary Duty, Moscow
Edward Hurwitz	1958-1960	Staff Aide to Ambassador, Moscow
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Vladimir I. Toumanoff	1958-1960	Political Officer, Moscow

Lewis W. Bowden	1958-1960 1974-1978	Political Officer, Moscow U.S.-USSR Economic Council, Washington, DC
Arthur A. Hartman	1958	Intelligence Officer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC
Gifford D. Malone	1958-1961  1963-1964  1964-1966 1966-1969	Intelligence Officer, Soviet Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC  Russian Language Training, Oberammergau, Germany Administrative Officer, Moscow Soviet Desk Officer, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
Walter B. Smith, II	1958-1960 1965-1967  1969-1979	U.S.-USSR Exchanges Officer, Moscow Publications Procurement/Political Officer, Moscow  Intelligence Officer, Soviet Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC
Hans N. Tuch	1958-1961 1961-1965	Cultural and Press Attaché, USIS, Moscow Deputy Director for USSR and Eastern Europe, Washington, DC
Samuel G. Wise, Jr.	1959-1961	Bureau of Intelligence & Research, Washington, DC
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William D. Morgan	1960-1962  1962-1964 1964-1966	Russian Language and Area Studies, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, DC and Columbia University, New York, New York  Publications/Political Officer, Moscow Soviet Desk Officer, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
Jack R. Perry	1960-1962	Exchanges Officer, Soviet Exchanges Staff, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC

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Vladimir Lehovich	1961-1962	USIS Exhibition Tour, Soviet Union
Richard Townsend Davies	1961-1963	Political Officer, Moscow
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Roger Kirk	1961-1962	Public Affairs Officer, Soviet Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
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	1963-1965	Consular/Political Officer, Moscow
Peter S. Bridges	1962-1964	Assistant General Services Officer/Political Officer, Moscow
Sol Polansky	1962-1966	Office of Soviet Affairs, Washington, DC
Thompson R. Buchanan	1962-1964	Intelligence Research Specialist, Moscow
	1968-1970	Soviet Affairs, Washington, DC
	1970-1973	Political Counselor, Moscow
James A. Klemstine	1963-1965	Consular Officer, Moscow
R. Keith Severin	1963-1966	Assistant Agricultural Attaché, Moscow
Ralph E. Lindstrom	1963-1965	Economic Officer, Moscow
	1967-1969	Economic Counselor, Moscow
Richard Funkhouser	1964-1965	Economic Counselor, Moscow
Marshall Brement	1964-1966	Political Officer, Moscow
Samuel E. Fry, Jr.	1964-1966	Soviet Desk Officer, Bureau of European Affairs, Washington, DC
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Frederick Z. Brown	1964	Russian Language Training, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, DC
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	1967-1969	Counselor for Public Affairs, Moscow
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Warren Zimmerman	1968-1970 1973-1974 1975-1977	INR, Soviet Policy, Washington, DC Political Officer, Moscow Policy Planning, Washington, DC
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Sol Polansky	1968-1971	Political Officer, Moscow
Anna Romanski	1969	Guide for "Education USA", USIA Exhibit, USSR
Robie M.H. "Mark" Palmer	1969-1971	Consular Officer, Moscow
John P. Harrod	1969 1969-1970 1975-1978	USIS, Moscow Exhibit, Washington, DC USIS, Moscow USIA, Assistant Cultural Attaché/ Press Attaché, Moscow
William N. Harben	1969-1971	Science Officer, Moscow
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William Veale	1975-1977	Soviet Union Desk Officer, Washington, DC
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	1976-1978	Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Mscow
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Kenneth Skoug	1976-1979	Economic Counselor, Moscow
Malcolm Toon	1976-1979	Ambassador, USSR
Robert William Farrand	1976-1978 1978-1980	Chief, US Commercial Office, Moscow Soviet Desk Officer, Washington, DC
William Andreas Brown	1977-1978	Political Counselor, Moscow
Thompson R. Buchanan	1977-1980	Consul General, Leningrad
Jane Miller Floyd	1977 1979-1980 1980-1982	Exhibit Guide, USIA, Moscow Intern, Soviet Desk, Washington, DC Rotational Officer, Moscow
William P. Kiehl	1977-1978 1978-1979 1979-1980 1980-1982	Russian Language Training, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, DC Cultural Affairs Officer, Exhibits, Moscow Press Officer, Moscow Soviet Union Desk Office, Washington, DC
Marshall Bremont	1978-1980	Soviet Desk, National Security Council, White House, Washington, DC
Thomas R. Hutson	1978-1980	Consul General, Moscow
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Philip C. Brown	1978-1981	Information Officer/Press Attaché, USIS, Moscow
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	1983-1985	General Services Officer, Moscow
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Jane Miller Floyd	1985-1987	General Services Officer, Leningrad
	1988-1989	On-site Inspection Agency Ulan Ude, Soviet Union
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	1988-1990	Political/Military Affairs Officer, Moscow
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Thomas Macklin, Jr.	1989-1991	General Services Officer, Moscow
Thompson R. Buchanan	1990	Consultant (Retired Foreign Service Officer), Moscow
Greg Thielmann	1990-1993	Chief, Office of Strategic Forces Analysis, INR, Washington, DC
David M. Schoonover	1990-1994	Agriculture Minister-Counselor, Moscow
Joseph R. McGhee	1991-1992	Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Affairs, Washington, DC
Robert S. Strauss	1991-1992	Ambassador, USSR
Nadia Tongour	1991-1993	Soviet Desk Officer, Washington, DC
E. Wayne Merry	1991-1994	Political Officer, Moscow
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Michael A. Boorstein	1996-1998	Deputy Director, Moscow Embassy Building Control Officer, Washington, DC
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Louise Taylor	1996-1998	Policy Officer for Eastern Europe and Newly Independent States, Washington, DC
Melissa Sanderson	2001-2003	Deputy Minister Counselor for Science, Moscow

**EARL PACKER**  
**Clerk**  
**Petrograd, Volgograd, and Riga (1917-1922)**

*Earl Packer was born in Utah in 1894. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in the Soviet Union, Hungary, the United Kingdom (Ireland), Turkey, Burma, and Tunisia. Mr. Packer was interviewed by Paul McCusker on October 27, 1988.S*

*Q: As of today, 94 years old, how did a young fellow born in Utah wind up in the Foreign Service?*

PACKER: Well, it's a great story. I was born in a middle class family, and we didn't have too much money. I was the youngest of five sons, and after completing high school in Ogden I had a variety of jobs, which lasted until I got the results of a civil service examination for a clerical job in one of the government departments in Washington. And that resulted in my going to Washington in 1915, and taking a job there in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, in the War Department. It was in a clerical capacity.

Well, I'd been with them approximately a year, until there came, to the State Department, a telegram from Ambassador Francis, in Petrograd, asking for a couple of male stenographic clerks. The appointment clerk in the State Department came to the chief clerk of the Bureau of Insular Affairs and said, "Do you have anybody who would like to go to Petrograd?"

A friend and I talked the thing over, and we put our bid in, and shortly we were on our way to Petrograd. And we got there in time to be present at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, in 1917 -- November 7, Western style calendar.

*Q: Excuse me, Earl. When you first went there, wasn't it still called St. Petersburg?*

PACKER: No, I think not. I think they had already changed it to Petrograd.

*Q: I see.*

PACKER: Well, in a short time the embassy decided to leave Petrograd and go east, and settled in a little provincial capital called Vologda. In the meantime, there were changes in the staff of the embassy proper, and a military mission was created; the head of which was General Judson. He was a colonel, but he was quickly promoted to a Brigadier General.

*Q: Why did we have a military mission?*

PACKER: We had come into the war, and it was considered desirable -- from a military point of view -- to have this mission created. It was called The American Military Mission to Russia. The job of being a clerk in the military mission came up, and it led -- in due course -- to my being commissioned as a first lieutenant of infantry, United States National Army (USNA).

From Vologda, as things progressed badly for Russia -- on the western front -- the decision of the allies was that intervention should occur, with a view to preventing the deterioration of Russia, as an ally of the Western powers, against Germany. A military expedition was sent into Archangel, and the embassy moved from Vologda to Archangel.

Then, of course, the development of the war on the western front eventually led to the peace, and the withdrawal of American forces from Russia. There was also some sort of intervention in South Russia, the details of which I don't remember. And at Vladivostok, as well as at Murmansk.

*Q: Now, the U.S. was not fighting against Germany in Russia, was it? What was the purpose of the mission?*

PACKER: The purpose of the mission -- looking at it from the point of view of Washington -- could only have been to somehow keep Russia active as long as possible in the war. But the military mission actually wasn't -- in my opinion -- a great success, because the Russian armed forces were not able to prevent the creation of a Soviet government, which put the Kerensky government out of commission. I would say it was a rather unexpected development, from the point of view of the American organization in Petrograd -- and later in Vologda; likewise in North Russia, in Archangel.

*Q: Did you go to Archangel, or did you stay?*

PACKER: In the military mission itself there was the general, two colonels, two captains -- one of whom was a National Army officer. He was of American-Russian extraction; his father was in business, and he was in business with his father until this opportunity came to get a commission in the National Army, and become a member of the military mission.

*Q: Well, you were there -- in Russia -- at the time the Revolution was going on. Wasn't living difficult for you?*

PACKER: Yes and no. We had no family there. Well, I think Prince . . . I don't remember when he got married. We somehow found quarters -- a house; and some of us lived in the house. Some of us were able to get living quarters with a Russian family. And we ran a mess at the military mission, for our own personnel. And we had Russian help there -- in the mission -- to look after the purchase of food, the preparation of food, the serving of food, and so forth.

*Q: Okay, let's try another approach. What were your biggest problems, Earl, during that period? Was it being out of touch with the United States?*

PACKER: Well, we could buy stuff on the local market, which the Russian people on the staff took care of. And the actual serving of food was arranged. We had Prince -- because he was absolutely perfect in his Russian. His mother was Russian, his father was American. He had a good deal to say about how the mission's Russian staff worked.

Colonel Stewart was the officer in charge of the military expedition to Russia. And Stewart, and our Colonel Ruggels -- who was a regular Army officer -- was in close touch with the military expedition. And there was, of course, a possibility of telegraphic correspondence, and written correspondence, sent through couriers set up by the embassy, to enable messages to go for information purposes, to Washington via use of commercial telegraph services.

*Q: So you did have constant communication possibilities?*

PACKER: Yes, they were quite handy. And then, of course, the diplomatic side was handled by Ambassador Francis and his staff. He had two or three secretaries -- first secretary, second, and so forth.

*Q: Earl, you were carried then as an assistant military attaché?*

PACKER: I was made an assistant to the military attaché. As I recall, for some technical reason they had to put the 'to' in there because . . . probably it related to appropriations.

*Q: But actually you were a lieutenant, at that time?*

PACKER: First lieutenant of infantry, U.S.N.A.

*Q: And that was attached to the embassy at Petrograd.*

PACKER: Initially in Petrograd, and then went to Vologda, and then to Archangel. Then when the war was over, why, we were all withdrawn.

*Q: And you went then to Washington?*

PACKER: Then I went back to Washington. I was demobilized. Then I was offered a job in the

State Department, with. . . I don't know what it was called; I don't remember. The biographic sketch may show what my title was.

*Q: It just shows that you were appointed as a Foreign Service officer and a vice-consul in 1920.*

PACKER: When I got settled on this job in the State Department, I resumed my studies at George Washington. In 1921 I got my A.B. In the meantime, I had taken the consular examination. I think there are some mistakes in that State Department Register record, but my recollections are not sufficiently firm to make any changes, really.

*Q: Well, obviously because of your experience in Russia, you were assigned to the Division of Russian Affairs.*

PACKER: Yes, it seems to me that initially we were an office in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. And then the Russian division was created. I became, in due course, the assistant chief of the Division of Russian Affairs. Many years later the Division of Eastern European Affairs was created in the Department; and it seems to me I had my initial assignment up to the Baltic States in that period -- before the Division of Eastern European Affairs was created.

*Q: That's what the biographic register shows, in fact. But it was 1922 when you were posted to Riga.*

PACKER: That is correct. But you see, at that time we hadn't recognized the Baltic States as independent, so they had the . . . some special title there.

*Q: Office of American Commissioner, I think.*

PACKER: Yes. A fellow named John A. Gade was the commissioner.

*Q: But you arrived, in Riga, sent there by the State Department?*

PACKER: Then I was sent up to Tallinn, to take charge of the consulate up there; the regular man was off on leave.

*Q: How did you get along in Tallinn? Was it difficult for you there?*

PACKER: No, I found there was a functioning office, with a Russian girl clerk. And there was an American clerk. I was the only person -- at that time -- with officer status, in Tallinn. And I found the Estonians very pleasant people to work with; until a new full consul was sent out to take charge of the office, and I was ordered back to Riga.

**EDWARD R. PIERCE**  
**Clerk**  
**Moscow (1938-1940)**

*Edward R. Pierce was born in Lexington, Mississippi and raised in Washington, DC. After working in the US Patent Office and attending Strayer College and George Washington University, he took a clerical job in the Foreign Service in 1937. Pierce held positions in Germany, Italy, Washington, DC, and the Bahamas. Pierce was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.*

*Q: You arrived in Moscow in November of 1938. Were you given any briefing when you got to Moscow about security precautions and all that? Was there concern about compromising American personnel or things that could get you into trouble, or things like that?*

PIERCE: Actually, no. I knew a lot. See, between the time I was told I was going to Moscow, and I actually left, I knew several people back in the State Department who had served in Moscow. See, the embassy opened in '34, actually '33, but we didn't have anybody in there. They had to staff it. So they sent at least two or three code people from up in David Salomon's outfit. A couple had come back, one of them had quit or been fired, or something. To be frank with you, there appeared to be an awful lot of homosexuality.

*Q: It's interesting, and this is what is known today as politically incorrect, but it does seem that within the code business, and the communications business, many of the people who were involved in this were sort of loners.*

PIERCE: They were the ones who were good at it.

*Q: It wasn't necessarily just plain homosexuality. They were sort of loners. In a way, they were different than you might say the more gregarious other people, which made them more susceptible, I think.*

PIERCE: It's a filthy story, I'm telling you. It's never been told. I know some things I'm not even going to tell you. But the reason is, I'm not sure to this day...the actual people are dead. The clock's taken care of most of them. But who's left behind? They're covering up. Now you can cut some of this out, if you want.

*Q: No, we'll leave it here.*

PIERCE: There's no question...I wasn't going to do this, but I'm going to show you a picture. You can draw your own conclusions. You see, when you talk about stuff like this, you begin to talk about people who are considered to be icons. When you attack an icon, any fool knows, you're liable to get hurt because most people would say, "Imagine that jerk talking about so-and-so." Truth of the matter is, the absolute facts, the truth has been covered up for 50 years. Fifty years. It's still being covered up. Because all this talk about documents coming out into the open, you know, is carefully managed. There's a lot of them that are not going to know.

*Q: What are we talking about, we're talking about the '38 to '40 period. What is this we're talking about?*



PIERCE: Well, we're talking about flatly, treason. I mean, you ask me if there were really instructions given to me on security, vulnerability from women, and stuff like that. All that's been going on, you know, for 2,000 years.

*Q: But when you go to a place where you know the NKVD [Narodni Kommissariat Vnutrennykh Del - People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs - Soviet secret police] was trapping people...I would think somebody would say, "Watch out for this."*

PIERCE: It's a very strange thing, and you ask a very good question. I guess it was assumed that everybody knew it. Certainly I knew it. But maybe I was more educated in the State Department world. But the same applies to any country. You hear it all the time. I mean, Jack Kennedy was supposed to have been involved with some German woman, stuff like that. Let me show you this...

*Q: You're saying that William Bullitt supposedly selected his staff. He was the first ambassador there, and he had...because I didn't have the tape on...they were...*

PIERCE: ...a weird bunch. A couple of them straight off the Left Bank in Paris. I'm telling you! Well, it's a wonder I wasn't stepped on and squashed long ago.

*Q: When you went out there what was your position?*

PIERCE: I was a clerk.

*Q: All right, there were other clerks who were probably putting you into the picture, weren't they? When you got there, they would say, "You know, watch out for so and so."*

PIERCE: Yes, right. Maybe it was my fault. I think I sort of felt I knew more than most of them, anyway. I'd been around longer, and from an early age, and so on and so forth. I'll tell you, even if you were there, staring at it day after day, it really doesn't... Certain things happened later on.

*Q: What was the atmosphere at the embassy?*

PIERCE: Very strange. It was wintertime when I first got there. Gloomy. The sun comes up at ten in the morning, sets at four in the afternoon. Everybody drank a lot. Anybody who was inclined to drink that was the worst place to send them. There was no organized social life for anybody but the top echelon at the embassy. Everybody else was left on their own. I'm telling you it was really strange. Well, I'm not going to say too much, but there were people there who had been there since the embassy opened. You understand? This is more than four years. Moscow was a hardship post. You're not supposed to spend more than 18 months there. How did these people remain all this time? It wasn't because they were forced to. It's because they wanted to, and somebody wanted them to be there.

*Q: You pointed out up above....yes.*

PIERCE: Absolutely. There they were. Nobody over a period of time...it was like going into the

Army and getting kicked around in boot camp...you don't have a chance. They've got ways of making you miserable, keeping you busy. I'm telling you. I'm probably, I'm not proud of it at all...I'm probably the only clerk that ever went there that had the background to be observant and the tenacity to hang on and be observant and the good friends... since I was 18 years old back in the States...to keep me on the payroll in spite of some efforts to do anything at all...disgrace me and what not. These people were vicious.

*Q: Let's talk about this. We're talking basically right now...what type of things were happening, socially...?*

PIERCE: The social life was left up to the individual. If you were interested, let's say, in ballet, or music, or something, you could keep really busy there in Moscow. If you were interested in athletics, you could go to ski and ice skate, and do this and do that. But there was no meeting place for, say, a young man like me, American, 27 years old to go and meet nice girls. So you didn't meet any nice girls. You met some bad ones. You had to presume that they were reporting immediately to the secret police, because if they didn't they'd be out in Siberia.

*Q: Did you have the feeling...I talked to somebody who was there somewhat later and said there was a hierarchy of I think they're called "sparrows." That if you were at the very top you sort of ended up with a ballet dancer and then you moved down by rank. But you were pretty much aware that these were young ladies who either were assigned to you or if you became acquainted with them they very soon had to make their deals with the NKVD.*

PIERCE: Without any question. You had to presume that. But everybody knew that.

*Q: Did it make any difference? I would think there would be the normal male/female liaisons.*

PIERCE: Absolutely. In these homosexual cases, God knows what they were doing. I had a girlfriend. Not right after I got there. I met her at the Metropole Hotel in a bar or something. I believe she worked for one of the government agencies right around the Kremlin there somewhere. From all appearances, she'd be like some girl you'd meet over at Annandale or Falls Church. But you had to know...it just made sense that...She never asked any questions. But she didn't have to because I would go out with her, and there would be a couple of other guys and their girlfriends, there's bound to be some talk back and forth. You know, they had a number of cases involving these Marines.

*Q: We're talking about in the '80s.*

PIERCE: Yes.

*Q: At that time they had 12 Marines?*

PIERCE: Yes. The Marines seemed to think that ordinary rules didn't apply to them. Of course, they didn't. I'll tell you why. Right up to the top everybody was hiding something. A guy like Bohlen, I have a lot of respect for Bohlen, I think Bohlen was one of the very few clean-living men in that embassy, in the sense that he was married. But there's such a strange story about how

he got married, how about that.

*Q: I'm not familiar with that.*

PIERCE: You wouldn't believe it.

But, anyway, it was a very strange setup, and designed to discourage anybody, rapidly. I came in for special attention from the administrative officer, a man named Angus Ward, who was later on glorified for his activities out in Manchuria.

*Q: He was incarcerated for more than a year, as consul general in Manchuria, and later ambassador to Afghanistan. He was an odd duck.*

PIERCE: He was never incarcerated. Blockaded for a bit. From what I understand now, and I'm not bragging. It was a set up. He was a Soviet agent and they used that stratagem to get him out of nowhere into somewhere and it worked. He's one of the ones they shuffled out of Moscow. They sent him to Vladivostok and they had to invent an office for him because there was none there. They sent him out of Moscow to save his butt.

*Q: What was he doing in Moscow?*

PIERCE: He was an agent, I'm sure. His record was this: His name was Angus Ivan Ward. His mother was Russian, came from Canada. Came to the States, served a brief time in the U.S. Army, got hurt somehow on a motorcycle. He became an American citizen, went with the food relief people over there in 1919, got fluent in Russian, wound up marrying a Finnish woman. Then he eased his way into the Foreign Service because of his language, and there he was. He was one of the ones that Bullitt took in from Paris who was still there in 1938 working away. I'm going to find this picture. If I've talked this much, I might as well show it to you. You're kind of going to have to use your judgment. I don't care. Because I know I'm on sound ground.

*Q: What makes you think that there were a group of Soviet agents, Americans, in the embassy?*

PIERCE: It was discovered. You never heard of it, did you? It's a 50-year miracle. It's the darndest story. If it breaks loose, it might be the biggest story in a long, long, time. But I heard it so long ago that I'm probably the only one still around that really has a good enough memory.

*Q: How did this come to your attention?*

PIERCE: Would you turn that thing off?

*Q: We'll quit at this point. We're talking about your time in Moscow and what I would like to do is cover the A-N-T-H-E-I-L, Antheil, Henry...to talk about that case in some detail. What you know about that. Then I would also like to talk about some of the other elements within the embassy. You say you felt there was a certain amount of hostility and there were cliques and all that, let's talk more about that. Then what your impression was of some of the people there, I guess Kennan, Bullitt, Bohlen. Was Llewellyn Thompson there, too?*

PIERCE: He'd gone.

*Q: Then more about life there and what you were getting from other people regarding the events in the Soviet Union at that particular time. Particularly as the war started.*

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*Let me make my announcement here. Today is the sixth of April 1998. Let's start. You were talking about this case, the Antheil case.*

PIERCE: This whole thing has so many ramifications. I have gotten immersed in it, more or less, over the years. There's one ramification represented by that board there, with all those pictures.

*Q: We're having pictures showing...*

PIERCE: That's wartime.

*Q: So we're sticking to Moscow.*

PIERCE: This is the best thing I have. I wish I had more. We had a fire in this house here about 25 years ago and lost a lot of stuff. This is, as you can see...

*Q: You're showing me a picture of the U.S. embassy in Moscow.*

PIERCE: The courtyard.

*Q: October 1938.*

PIERCE: Rather gloomy-looking picture. It was a gloomy place at that time. I'm not in this picture. I arrived there a month later.

*Q: That would be November.*

PIERCE: November 1938. At this time the embassy had been open, actually working, since 1934. The United States, Roosevelt, recognized Russia in 1933, and immediately appointed William Bullitt as our first ambassador to Russia. Gave him carte blanche in selecting his personnel which was, of course, tremendously important, etc. Bullitt charged right in, [from] all accounts. I met him a couple of times, but at his rank and at mine, it was just, of course, shaking hands at some cocktail party, or something. Very enthusiastic man, a brilliant man, but also very flawed. A fact which was successfully covered up. Like so many things get covered up. This picture, when I got there in November 1938, just beginning the winter of '38-'39...this man was ambassador.

*Q: You're pointing in the picture to Joseph Davies.*

PIERCE: This lady sitting here in the front row where all the ladies are...How many of them are there...one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight women, and I would say approximately 30 men. Unfortunately, about one third of them were homosexuals. No question about it. She was highly publicized at that time as the richest woman in the world.

*Q: Mrs. Davies.*

PIERCE: Marjorie Post Davies. Everybody's eating Post Toasties so they know about that. Here's Joe Davies, the ambassador, who really got famous for his book called *Mission to Moscow*. The word is, and I believe it, that he wrote about 10 words in the whole book. He didn't even trouble to learn a few words of Russian. He hated the place because she hated it. From all accounts she had all that wealth and they owned the biggest yacht in the world, which they kept moored up at St. Petersburg...

*Q: "Leningrad" in those days...*

PIERCE: ...and also down on the Black Sea at Odessa. They traveled down there. They spent little time in Moscow. This is the group that was there when I got there. I did not pick Moscow as a place to go to. Because I had been in the State Department, as I think I had told you before, for a long time and I know lots of people who had been in Moscow, clerks, that is, who served in that period between 1934 and when Bullitt arrived with his entourage, and the time when I got there, and everybody says, "Terrible place to go to," but I think I explained it to you...

*Q: You did go into how you got assigned there.*

PIERCE: So Davies was there but this man was actually running the embassy: Alexander Kirk. A career diplomat. Very smooth type of man, who'd you expect to be high up in the diplomatic service, and also very wealthy. His family, according to all the gossip among the clerks... God knows the gossip there was the time for that, because there wasn't much else to do... He was worth \$15-\$20 million. He was the sole heir to the Sweetheart Soap Company, a big soap company out in Colorado. Anyway, here's Kirk, Davies, Kirk... this is Lloyd Henderson. Now there's no reason for me to be reticent about these things. There's a room down in the State Department named for him. I feel that he was a traitor and a spy and a lot of other bad things, homosexual besides. There are a lot of fake marriages in here. Henderson's wife is in here somewhere. Here's Bohlen's wife. Here's Mrs. Davies. Ward's wife.

*Q: Angus Ward.*

PIERCE: Yes, there is. He's a bully. Everything else, despicable, but there he was. Now he and Henderson got into the Foreign Service by the side door. Which was the food relief program. Angus Ward was born in Canada. His mother was Russian. His name was Angus Ivan Ward. He crossed the frontier into the United States in World War I. Enlisted in the Army, did well, he'd probably make a good soldier, he had some vicious qualities that would make him good at that. He moved up in the Army, became a lieutenant, and became naturalized. He was a naturalized American citizen. No children, it was a fake marriage all over, as many of these marriages are.

I'm telling you the honest truth. These people had no children. Except for the Bohlens, there isn't a couple, and the ambassador and his wife, I think they had a couple of children...nobody had a child. It was a set-up. Regular technique. Ward was married to a Finnish woman. This man here, Chipman, Norris Chipman, was married to a Greek woman. Henderson was married to a Latvian woman but not at this time. That fake marriage occurred later. Kirk never made a pretense to be anything but a homosexual. This is Colonel Thamesville. Called the "Red Colonel" by some. A man named Grumman, etc. Now if I'm bouncing around, and you think I'm too harsh on these things, I'm just telling you what I think.

*Q: But that's what we're doing in this oral history. How did this atmosphere affect the work of the embassy?*

PIERCE: From my level, which was a clerk...and Ward immediately made me his private clerk, sat right outside his office...but the purpose of that was simply to have a good chance to criticize everything I did. Actually, I was the second best typist in that whole embassy. This man here, named Presley, who was a communist I now know, had lived in Paris on the Left Bank for a long time and was married at one time to Catherine Ann Porter, the author, who wrote *Ship of Fools* and that sort of thing. Presley was an extremely able office worker. But I determined later, just to my own satisfaction, that [he] was second best. But Ward, I couldn't do anything right for Ward, because his intent was to break my spirit and send me home with my tail between my legs.

*Q: Why do you think he did that?*

PIERCE: Well, do you really want to hear it?

*Q: Sure.*

PIERCE: It's the most childish thing in a way that you could possibly think of. There I was working in the State Department from age 18, trying to move up from the position of messenger... See that building there, of course...

*Q: You have a picture of the old Department of State.*

PIERCE: Well, I knew every room in that building from the basement up. I began in the mail room. Where else do you start when you're 18 years old? I worked every floor in that building out of the mail room. We had it split into three floors to service. The fourth floor, we took turns on that, that was where all the files were, you know. We used to go across the street the west wing of the White House all the time. There was no formality in those days. There was hardly any security at all. Amazing when you think back, but don't forget, this was a different Washington. Anyway, I knew every room in that building, every body, practically, there were only 600 people. From Cordell Hull on down. Of course, Kellogg was Secretary when I first went in there. Well, in any case, here I was, a messenger. I worked up a bit. I got to be a clerk, Class One, so on and so forth. I think I explained this to you before. Somebody got the bright idea about 1931 or '32, '33, of forming a Department of State Recreation Association.

*Q: I think you went into that.*

PIERCE: I went into that...the tennis. You asked me why Ward was picking on me. They ran the tennis, and I won it three times in a row. I'm not bragging, but I was a very good tennis player and besides I was young. A man named Robert Kelly...I went through this before, was great friends with John Forrest Simmons, who really, I thought... the best high-ranking Foreign Service officer I ever met who was a decent guy. The rest of them were snobs, or this or that or the other thing, in my opinion. Kelly donated the cup exactly...somewhat like that...even bigger..it's up at my daughter's place. Kelly donated the cup assuming that Jack Simmons was going to win it because he'd been the captain of the Princeton tennis team. The champion of the Ivy League, singles. But I beat him, I won the cup. Apparently that made me a great many friends among the clerks, but it certainly made me enemies of a certain group of...particularly Kelly. I found out many years later, from Mildred Dykie, who was the keeper of all secrets in the Foreign Service Personnel Division...one of these nice little old ladies who knows everything, never talks... She felt compelled to tell me years later after I won that tennis tournament the chief clerk, Percy Allen, rewarded me by sending me out to Egypt on a conference...

*Q: You mentioned all that.*

PIERCE: Yes, I mentioned all that. I earned the hatred of Kelly, there's no question about it. It sounds very petty, and it is very petty, but under certain circumstances it could be a pain in the neck, too. Kelly wrote a personal letter. Here's what happened. I came back from Egypt. I thought the Foreign Service was just the greatest thing in the world, and it had been out in Egypt. I applied for a job right down the hall in the Foreign Personnel Division, and the first thing I know I had gotten a notice to come down there, they told me I was going to Moscow. I was hoping to go to Paris, Madrid, Rio, you know.

*Q: Can I stop...[tape interrupted]*

PIERCE: ...working right under Ward's nose and it's very difficult, and I'd do this perfect work, and he'd mark it up and I'd have to do it over. I figured out what he was up to and I made up my mind he wasn't going to run me out of there and I stuck around. Where do you want me to go from here? This is the half of the embassy...

*Q: We talked about the case...*

PIERCE: Antheil? You're talking about dynamite now because that case has never been exposed, and it may be gone too, because the facts are all there. Here's Antheil right here. As usual, shining the shoes of anybody in authority. There's the ambassador.

*Q: He's right next to the ambassador, between Kirk and the ambassador.*

PIERCE: There's Henderson. This small fellow is Henry Antheil. There's the ambassador. This also is a rotten egg, a mechanic named Hontowski, who was furnished by the Navy. You had to have somebody around there who could fix things. He was an electrician, do this and all that. There's a story about him, too. This is Colonel Thamesville, who became fairly famous. That's Antheil, okay. Now here is a man you may know the name, and you may not. Tyler Kent.

*Q: I've heard the name, but Tyler Kent...*

PIERCE: Well, Tyler Kent was a spy. Antheil was a spy. I'm pretty sure Morris Shipman, Ward, of course, a couple others in here. Now here is Charles Bohlen, and here is his wife.

*Q: You were mentioning about Antheil and what he was up to.*

PIERCE: Here's the thing on Antheil. This is all heavy stuff, but I've got all the papers that I need and I've written up enough of it. Enough people know about it now, it's no big secret. First I'll show you the result of a year and a half...I know some people at State still...trying to find out what the Department...see the Department's covered this up 50 years or more. That's what you get out of the State Department when you ask about Henry Antheil.

*Q: You presented me with a form showing he was born 1912 in Trenton New Jersey, his address is there, education, high school in New Jersey two years, languages, German, and started at \$780. He applied in 1934, for clerkship. He was sent there in 1934 and transferred to Helsinki in 1939. He died in an airplane explosion June 14, 1940.*

PIERCE: That's a great record. That tells you a lot, doesn't it, unless you already knew a lot. They're not going to tell anything. Antheil, first place, he lied on his papers to the State Department. He never went to Rutgers. He was a high school graduate and that's all. He had no skills of any kind. He was twenty-one years old in 1933. Bullitt was given absolute carte blanche by Roosevelt to pick his own people to go to Moscow and that's understandable because it was very important. He picked a group....I don't know how many clerks around him, maybe 12 or 15, the language people like Ward, and Henderson, so on and so forth. Couple of military people like Thamesville and these guys over here. He reached out, Bullitt, from Philadelphia, reached out and grabbed this young man. With no office skills, nothing to recommend him. To go to this vital place just opening up. Furthermore, after they got over there within six months, he designated Henry Antheil, by that time 22 years old, as head code clerk of the United States embassy in Moscow. Now just on the surface it's ridiculous. But nobody noticed it enough or had the nerve to throw it to anybody's attention. Who would you throw it to when the ambassador himself picked this young guy out of Trenton, New Jersey, pushed him over there and made him head code clerk. Antheil's brother it turns out, was George Antheil, at that time a quite famous musician. Heard of him, maybe?

*Q: I've heard of the name.*

PIERCE: He was famous. He was a member of the Left Bank crowd in the early 1920s in Paris along with Hemingway, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Ezra Pound, so on and so forth. He was also a communist, which was very common in that group. Even Hemingway, you know, had leanings that way. Henry Antheil got the job because of his brother, George, who was a personal friend, perhaps even a homosexual friend, of Bullitt. Both of them were bisexual. Certainly Bullitt was. Anyway, Antheil gets the job. 1934. Here we are in '38 four years later, very, very difficult hardship post. Everybody agreed to that. Nobody wanted to stay in Moscow, particularly the clerks. They had no life. These people...



*Q: You're looking at the women. You're pointing to the women. The wives.*

PIERCE: Because I'm speaking about social matters now. These people and the career officers had access to the foreign diplomatic colony. They had, you couldn't call it a normal life, at that city at that time, under Stalin, the purge going on, and people getting shot every day around the corner at the Lyublyanka Prison. But at least they had a life, they even had a dacha, a country estate outside of Moscow with a tennis court, a swimming pool, riding horses, this that and the other thing. No clerks were invited out to that place with a couple of notable exceptions. This guy was invited out there to fix the plumbing or anything...

*Q: We're pointing to the mechanic...*

PIERCE: That's Hontowski. Antheil was a sort of a mascot of the women's group. He was quite young still, when I got there. He'd been there four years, can you imagine? It was a strange life. Antheil had access to all crannies of it, and he made full use of it. Kent had a good background, well educated. Had gone to Princeton for a while, then he went to the Sorbonne, and he was a linguist, so on and so forth. But he was not in the dacha crowd. The reason I'm stressing this is that dacha features in all the history of this entourage up to this point. Chip Bohlen was an excellent tennis player, I played him several times, always managed to win. He and his wife and a man named Charlie Thayer were the backbone of the dacha crowd. They were all wealthy as far as I could tell, certainly from my standpoint. Thayer, there's a fifty-thousand word story right there. Married his sister off to Bohlen. Did you ever read a book called *Eyewitness to History* by Charles Bohlen?

*Q: Yes.*

PIERCE: I'm sure you have good memory. Excuse me if I go wandering off down these paths. Listen, Bohlen in his book *Eyewitness to History*...I'm telling you, this is one of the things that set me off on what I'm doing. That book is 50% lies. Certainly the Russian part of it is. Bohlen credits a lot of his success, and he had tremendous success, culminated, of course, by being chosen to sit beside Roosevelt at Yalta and all that, to the contacts they maintained out at the dacha, horseback riding, this that and the other thing. There was a man on the staff of the German embassy who I got to know slightly because I was permitted to set foot on the sacred dacha grounds because of my tennis. I was invited out there to play.

If you recall from *Eyewitness to History*, Bohlen credited a lot of his reporting success out of Moscow at that time to his friendship with Johnny von Herbauer, the German Secretary. He was out there a lot. He was certainly out there...I was only out there four or five times and all the whole time I was there...and it was always to play tennis with Bohlen or somebody else who needed to have a pretty decent player on the court, you know. For instance, Jack Kennedy...we'll talk about that later. Bohlen, cultivated this dangerous, that is, for von Herbauer, that's the way Bohlen portrays it in his book, that Herbauer was actually soft towards the United States and was feeding him all this red hot secret information straight from the Kremlin, straight from Molotov, straight from Stalin. Straight from von Schulenberg, the German ambassador. All of those, von Herbauer would accompany von Schulenberg to the Kremlin and around. Then he'd be out in the

dacha, they'd take a ride in the woods. He'd spill all this tremendously important information. You can imagine at that time I'm talking about, which was '39 by this time. Bohlen would then go back to the embassy, get a hold of Steinhardt, the ambassador, and spend the rest of the night... They worked all night, many times. Of course, Stalin did that, too. So everybody in Moscow did it. I was one of the two secretaries who were good enough to do this kind of work. This guy was the other one. Anyway, we'd type the stuff up, super secret, eyes only, for Hull, Wells, and then very carefully take it, guess where?

*Q: To the code room.*

PIERCE: To the code room. To who? To this little traitor here. Henry Antheil. Who would then...he coded all the "eyes only" stuff himself, and decoded it. Which as we found out later, at least I've determined, gave him complete control of incoming and outgoing that he wanted. He could actually write cables and sign them "Steinhardt." He could see it on the incoming cable, like he did with the ones that ordered him to be transferred to London, not long after I got there. That's what happened to Bohlen's vaunted cables. I would guess within 12 hours, certainly, actual copies...of course, the codes were gone, compromised up to the ears, and had been for years under Antheil. He would walk across...I've got a picture here somewhere...

*Q: Well, it doesn't make any difference because we're doing this on tape.*

PIERCE: But I wanted to illustrate to you what would happen. Antheil was a snobby little guy because he had this inside track apparently, with all the top brass. He didn't hesitate to throw his little weight around. He was reputed...he didn't seem to have any Russian women friends like many did, or this that and the other thing. I can't swear up and down. Certainly if he was homosexual, he wasn't an aggressive type, and there were a number who were. Antheil would put his little fur hat on and take an evening stroll across Red Square, you could see from my front windows of the embassy, past Lenin's tomb, then you'd lose sight of him. That's an actual fact. You know where he was going? The British embassy.

I never met the guy. In fact, nobody ever met him, but Antheil had planted the...which had become fact in everybody's mind...that he had a boyfriend over in the British embassy across the river. That's how you got there. How long that was going on? He might not have had such a friend. You see, I never got onto this stuff until after I was out of there. It never occurred to me, but he did brush up friendship with me. Although I know now, he knew perfectly well what was going on, that I was under the gun, and the idea was to get me the hell out of there. There was something about me that worried them. And well, it might have been, if I had learned this stuff earlier, you'd have heard about it earlier.

Anyway, Antheil, would take Bohlen's "eyes only"...of course Steinhardt was a very intelligent man, but he knew nothing about embassy work, and he knew less about Russia. Bohlen was the brains of all of this. Second, I would say, would be Grumman, who I think was a straight guy. Bohlen, Grumman...Chipman was a spy, I'm sure of that. Ward, didn't get into the political work. He was administrative officer. So on and so forth. There were a couple...Henderson of course would get into these cables. But the brains was Bohlen. Here's the point. These cables, jammed with this world-shaking information that we were working all night encoding, not encoding, but

typing up and whatnot, and revising, then turned them over to Antheil. Those cables had been compromised for at least three or four years. The coding meant nothing.

I'm going to jump ahead. To June 14, 1940. Antheil finally had to leave Moscow, because it just became too apparent, apparently, him hanging on there, you know. Which had to be arranged topside, you know that. He was supposed to go to London, England as head code decoder. He altered the incoming cables and also the outgoing, he was indispensable. He had been doing that for years. This guy got sent to London. The linguist, who really didn't know anything about codes. Tyler Kent. Antheil, it must have been a terrific deal uprooting him out of Moscow to Helsinki, Finland which is as about as close as you can get and still be in the Soviet Union. Do you know the Antheil story at all?

*Q: I think you told me, but I think it was off mike. Would you just finish this?*

PIERCE: Antheil in September of 1939, right after the war broke out, that is, the Germans attacked Poland, got sent over to Helsinki. He'd been there many, many times before on trips. Christ, he'd been in Moscow five years. He got sent to this little legation in Helsinki as code clerk. Here he'd been head code clerk in Moscow for five years. On June 14, 1940, he wangled somehow, a trip across the Baltic to Tallinn, Estonia. That was done all the time every two weeks, I think, they took turns carrying a bag. You know, it's done all over. They used to do it down in Miami over to Havana or whatnot. The plane that he was on, on a return trip to Tallinn, was shot down by two Red Army fighters. Antheil, there were seven or eight people on the plane, was killed in the attack. So was everybody else. Some Soviet sub... There were Estonian fisherman who witnessed this thing, it was in broad daylight. These fisherman rushed to the scene and started to rescue whoever was there. There was no one, of course, but there was debris. A Soviet sub with a great big red star on it surfaced and chased them away and proceeded to collect whatever was there. No bodies, I don't think. June 14, 1940. The news, of course, got to Helsinki right away. Plane didn't come in and was shot down in broad daylight, everybody was killed. Somebody, and that's something I haven't been able to find out, but I'm sure it exists... Somebody or several people searched, as you would if you had been in charge at Helsinki, or me, his quarters to pack up stuff to send home to his family. Maybe you know all this.

*Q: No, I don't.*

PIERCE: They discovered, and it's incredible, but true, incontrovertible evidence that Antheil had been a goddam Soviet spy for five years, or four-and-a-half, anyway. Okay, what happens? They covered it up. They, of course, knew in Helsinki what had happened. You couldn't have telephoned in those days, I believe, from Helsinki. But you could still cable. They would have been informed immediately in Washington, the State Department, White House, whatever. Embassy Moscow, certainly. Probably Berlin, Warsaw, etc. They would have notified the big European embassies. By this time Bullitt, who was in on the whole thing, I'm sure, was the ambassador in Paris and considered himself ambassador to Europe for FDR. We all know about that. As of that date, June 14, Bohlen, Steinhardt, the crowd in Moscow, and all these other embassies, top men, State Department and the White House, and FBI, of course, I'm sure, knew that the codes had been invalid for years. Nevertheless, they pulled together in a real tight little ball and successfully covered up the news of this happening. Now, my point is this: It was good

reason to do so from their standpoint. There were about a dozen men who became U.S. ambassadors, high ranking. Bohlen, almost made it to Secretary of State. But Bohlen knew from June 14 on, 1940, that all those highly vaunted cables that he based on talks with von Herbauer were false. That they hadn't been secret at all. Nevertheless, he wrote his book. About a dozen guys got to be ambassador. This mystery is perpetuated. Do you know that as we sit here, the Estonians still don't know?

*Q: All this is news to me.*

PIERCE: Well, it's heavy stuff.

*Q: Of course it is.*

PIERCE: I don't know what's going to happen to it. It irks me tremendously. I spent three years in the Army, almost got killed a couple times, got a bronze star, shed some blood, I just don't like this crap.

*Q: You showed me that...*

PIERCE: You think I've got a few documents? Look at this.

*Q: You mentioned that Tyler Kent was arrested.*

PIERCE: Well, that's part of the cover-up.

*Q: He spent six years in a British prison.*

PIERCE: Incommunicado. They let him go at the end of the war. He may even have been given money to keep quiet. 'Cause Tyler Kent know all about Antheil. Here's the real point. Kent was arrested in London on May 20, 1940, open and shut. Open and shut because he had hundreds of... They put him in the code room, see? He was a very intelligent guy. I knew Kent for the brief time he served in Moscow, after I had got there.

He was privy to the exchange of very secret messages between Churchill and Roosevelt. Hitler was poised over in Europe after Dunkirk, ready to invade England. Nobody knows quite why he did it. Unless we had come into the war. Strangely enough, many people are still very suspicious about Pearl Harbor, the timing of it. Hitler would have overrun England, there's no question about it. The liaison between Churchill and Roosevelt was priceless. I'm not saying anything in criticism of that. Hitler would have overrun England and the world would be different today.

But here's the point of the story. 1940 was an election year. Roosevelt was elected in '32, '36, and he was running for the third term in 1940. Never been done before. The isolationists, of whom there were millions, were raving away, and gaining ground, really, all the time, because people didn't like the idea of what they saw coming. Father Coughlin, you ever hear of him?

*Q: Oh, yes, in Detroit.*

PIERCE: He was banging away, and various other people. Roosevelt wasn't even certain of getting nominated for a third term. A lot of people didn't like the idea of a third term.

*Q: Oh, yes.*

PIERCE: Here's Kent, May 20, 1940, arrested, guilty as he could be. He had hundreds of cables in his apartment including the super-secret stuff between Churchill and Roosevelt. His aim was to get it into the hands of the isolationists in the States. With the idea, and he was correct, if he could get that info there, that Churchill and Roosevelt were under the table maneuvering, Roosevelt probably wouldn't even get nominated much less elected. So what do they do? They put him away for five years on the Isle of Wight digging potatoes or whatever he did. Then when the war is over, late '45, they let him loose. Kent. He married a rich widow. Family that established Hyattsville, I think. Named Martha Hyatt, millionaire woman, much older than he. He just lived out his life, he's dead now, but he remained quiet. Okay, that's Kent. Okay, that's May 20, 1940. Covered up in a secret trial. Here's an American citizen. They put him away, secret. Three weeks later, on June 14, 1940, what happens?

*Q: Antheil was killed.*

PIERCE: Murdered. The Russian secret police killed him because he had become very dangerous. That's easy to figure out. May 20, June 14. Here we are, still in June, they haven't even held the conventions yet, political. That had to be kept secret. Those two things coming together would have done this: They would have knocked Roosevelt out of his third term. Wendell Willkie would have been elected. There would have been a turn in our policy, for good or for bad, who knows. That's what happened. Right there in that building, right there.

*Q: You're pointing to the pictures of the Old Executive...it was the old War, Navy, and State building.*

PIERCE: Yes, they were all in there. On the fourth floor of that building on the side toward the White House is the room that was used for many years by David Salomon, the head of files, codes. I knew him well. He patted me on the back about the tennis, too. There's a fireplace in that room. It's an old-fashioned building. One of the perks that Dave Salomon had was that gloomy days he could have a fire in his office. Anyway, sometime between June 14...you've seen the article that occurred in the New York Times, haven't you? Antheil's death?

*Q: No, I'd like to look at it. On this, I'm not sure. This is very interesting and I have no idea...*

PIERCE: It's probably outside your beat usually, right?

*Q: No. Your oral history will become part of our collection and this will be there. I'd like to go to something else. You were there in September of '39 when the war started. How did that play? There was the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. How did that play at the embassy?*

PIERCE: September '39, summertime of course, and it was more pleasant than usual in Moscow.

It was very tense, of course, because all this big stuff was going on. Steinhardt was the ambassador. Grumman had the rank of consular, I think, or maybe a man named Walter Thurston had showed up to be the consular. But the real political work was being done by Steinhardt and Bohlen. Strangely enough, there was a lot of social activity in the diplomatic corps, not that I got in on that, or any of the clerks. But there was a lot of back and forth feverish entertaining and what not. See, nobody had chosen sides yet. After I won that tournament there...I showed you that cup, didn't I?

*Q: Yes, you did.*

PIERCE: I'd go up to the German embassy and played a little tennis. The Italian embassy, particularly, because Madam Rosso, the Italian ambassador's wife, was a rich American woman and favored American friends, you know, and invite you over. So actually, it was more open, in a sense, than from the time I first got there. Or maybe it was just because I had become more familiar with life there. Anyway, the high-level stuff, of which I was a very close witness because I was doing...by this time I was doing code work.

Anheil was transferred...and there's something there that I am troubled to think about too much...somebody topside among the bad guys...must have figured out that Anheil had become a liability. Because although it was certainly the Soviets that finally killed him over the Baltic, there, the Soviets couldn't reach in and transfer him to Helsinki. That was done by, I think, Lloyd Henderson, who was by that time back in Washington, DC pulling the strings. He might have been the brains of the whole thing. Anheil got transferred at the height of all this activity to Helsinki. I think about the middle of September. The war had started. You could still go up to Riga and then over to Helsinki.

Within the embassy itself it was around-the-clock code work because so many things were happening. In August, too, a big British delegation arrived in Moscow. We know now they were there to sign a defensive agreement which fell through. Because at one point there in September, I remember going up to the Metropole Hotel, which was only three or four blocks, with a couple of the guys. Which we often did, you know, lot of tension, we had a couple of drinks and relaxed. Von Ribbentrop and his entourage had arrived. While many of them, I'm sure, were staying over at the German embassy, there was also quite a squad of them wandering around the Metropole Hotel. In those Nazi outfits, you know? It was at that point that von Ribbentrop pulled off the coup of the century, diplomatically speaking, and they signed the treaty which started World War II. So, I don't know whether I answered your question or not.

*Q: What happened at our embassy when this Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty was signed, or the announcement was made? Did that change things at the embassy?*

PIERCE: Nothing that you could...it was already tense and very active. Odd working hours, this that and the other thing. What it did was cut off any travel between Moscow and Berlin and Moscow-Warsaw which had been a customary route. Most of us had come in that way, I had. Other than that, everybody just notched it up a bit. Nobody blew their top or anything.

*Q: You said by this time you had moved over to the code room.*

PIERCE: I moved up to the ambassador's office on the third floor. I was the second best office worker in that embassy. Eugene Presley, the guy I showed you...how did he get to be number one in Moscow with his background? I'm telling you...the place...the rottenness was back in the States.

*Q: What was the problem with Presley?*

PIERCE: Presley was two things. He was a homosexual and he was a communist. His background was Left Bank Paris. He was a very intelligent guy. He'd been married to Katherine Ann Porter. Divorced. It's in the records. He was a Left Bank pinko, communist, and he'd gotten his job through some unknown guy, probably Lloyd Henderson or Bullitt, or Ada Burley, maybe. Stuff like that.

*Q: I was going to say...but your job, you had moved to the ambassador's office?*

PIERCE: Everybody who could read and write and had the aptitude at all was pressed into service in the code room from time to time. Including Tyler Kent. Which is what accounted for the fact that Antheil was able to shove him into that London assignment. Where he wound up in a prison farm. I was working like everybody else, 14 hours a day, maybe. A lot of my work was at night and also Presley because the big brains, Bohlen and Steinhardt and occasionally Grumman would be out at Spaso House cooking up the cables. We'd get taken out there and brought back, etc.

*Q: Spaso House being the ambassador's residence.*

PIERCE: From the first day they went into Moscow, that's his residence. It was just a frantic situation every day instead of once in awhile. Strange working hours.

*Q: You left there in June 1940?*

PIERCE: I left there on May Day 1940. May the first. I came out through Kiev. Bucharest, Budapest, Trieste, Milano, and down to Genoa. I was supposed... See, I was leaving. I wasn't going on leave. If I had any factor for suspicion of people other than what I know for a fact...anybody that ever left Moscow on leave and came back...there was something wrong with them. Unless they were a career officer, whose promotion...

*Q: This was a big job. You obviously gained the spotlight by being there, so I can see any officer wanting to be there.*

PIERCE: Get ahead, yes. (Inaudible) became ambassadors. If Bohlen and the rest of them had faced the music and realized, or not realized, they knew that these vaunted cables over these years, particularly in the case of Bohlen were spurious, had been betrayed years before, history would be different. Certainly their personal careers would never have... At least ten of them, after they got into this thing, which I am going to call...you know, the Mafia had what they called "omerta," "silence." This career bunch of Foreign Service officers involved with the Russian

situation rolled together in a tight ball. I'm sure their wives knew the secret. They knew that Chip Bohlen was their leader and they had no idea he was going to be able to jump right into the seat, next to Roosevelt and become as big as he did.

If he had let it be known what had happened with Herbauer and the cables and Antheil and Kent, those guys would have wound up as high-ranking language officers, or something. They would never have had those big careers. They all had something in common. What's even worse besides the career officers, there were a number of out and out traitors from the lower ranks who were let go free, never prosecuted, never tampered with until many years later. The most outstanding one of that kind was a man named Carmel Offie. You heard of him?

*Q: Yes. Later, he was Bullitt's secretary in Paris.*

PIERCE: Let's be frank. He was Bullitt's bedmate all over the world. He was as homosexual as you can get. I don't think he ever held a woman's hand if he could help it. Very intelligent, very energetic, and a spy from the word "go." I think they fixed that guy up, trained him in America. He was a poor boy from up in Pennsylvania. Father was a coal miner. Nothing wrong with that if you're an honest coal miner. But this guy owned William Bullitt. He lasted way past the wartime. He lasted until about 1954 when the Senator had to go on the floor of the Senate and speak about him. Then they got rid of him. But even then he had such protection that they pretended to harass him. He became a millionaire and so on and so forth. Carmel Offie's the worst of the lot, but there were others. I'm going to tell you something else, which I'd appreciate you'd keep to yourself.

*Q: Well, I'd better not, because it will be on tape. When I do this, it has to be on tape.*

PIERCE: Okay, I'm not going to mention this other name, then. Shocking, but I'll just say this. You know a lot, I'm sure, about English history. These names don't mean anything to you. Burgess, McLean, and Philby.

*Q: These were all part of the Cambridge group during the '30s who joined the Communist Party and became spies for the Soviet Union.*

PIERCE: Then defected to Moscow. They all...Philby's still alive, I think.

*Q: No, I think he died very recently.*

PIERCE: They're all dead now. But consider this. Here's these three aristocratic, wealthy well-educated fellows. Big successes. They were trained, it's now known, by the Soviets. They recruited them while they were underclassmen at Cambridge. They were trained to go into, the British Foreign Office and Foreign Service. They were all more or less brilliant guys, very personable, this, that, and the other thing. Burgess was homosexual, McLean was bisexual, nobody really knows what Philby is. I keep repeating that because it's very important. It's goes all the way through all of this stuff. It's never been emphasized, although it's generally known...but these guys were told "when you get out of here and get into the Foreign Office we want you to be the most outspoken anti-Soviet people around. That's the perfect cover for doing



what you're going to do for us."

Now, I don't know whether you believe that or not, but I do. Now, here's the other thing. In the scale of things the United States was ten times more powerful than Britain in those days. Do you think that they're going to take all the trouble to penetrate the Cambridge- Oxford crowd, they're going to leave the Ivy League alone here in the States? Can you tell me one single Ivy Leaguer who ever was identified as a spy, a traitor?

*Q: Yes, Alger Hiss was from Princeton, I think Princeton.*

PIERCE: Yes, Alger Hiss was a special case. Even he was not accused exactly of doing what these guys did. I'm just saying that there should have been ten times the effort to penetrate the Ivy League and it was penetrated by people whose names I'm not going to mention because I can't prove it yet. But it's all there, and some very strange upward movement was attained by people who never even took the exam. You understand? Where did that protection come from?

*Q: Yes. Well, who knows.*

PIERCE: When I started out on this story...the reason I started out was I got into this Ezra Pound thing. Then as I accumulated stuff on that it dawned on me where the little dotted lines led, here and there. It begins to dawn on you that they pulled off the damnedest stuff by just swaggering around assuming privilege, and everybody was willing to give it to them. Everything goes to a certain point and then all of a sudden, there's nothing. Well, it's there, and strangely enough...people make mistakes, it's documented.

**WILLIS C. ARMSTRONG**

**Clerk**

**Moscow (1939-1941)**

**Lend-Lease Officer**

**Washington, DC (1941-1943)**

**Director, Russian Ship Area**

**Washington, DC (1945-1946)**

*Willis C. Armstrong was born in 1912 in New York. He received a bachelor's degree from Swarthmore College and a master's degree from Columbia University. His career in the Foreign Service emphasized economic affairs and included posts in the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The following are excerpts from Armstrong's interviews with Charles Stuart Kennedy on November 29, 1988 and the British Broadcasting Corporation.*

ARMSTRONG: I was a graduate student of Columbia University, teaching in a girls' high school run by the University. It was a progressive school, and they wanted a program taught in

Russian history. I didn't know any Russian history, but the principal said, "You can learn." So I started taking courses in Russian history in the graduate faculty, and finally became persuaded that this was a good major field, because there was an endless amount of research material that wasn't being worked on, on hand in the Columbia library. I had a very persuasive professor of Russian history, a great man called Geroid Robinson, who is, unfortunately, gone now. He was later the head of the Russian section of the OSS in the research side here in town.

I studied Russian at the University of California at Berkeley in the summers of 1936-37, and took seminar work in New York. Then about 1938-39, the professor thought it would be a good idea if I went to Moscow to start working on my dissertation. My dissertation was "The Petrograd Soviet, 1917." (That was the right term for that city then.)

So he arranged with the Russian desk of the State Department for me to get a clerk translator's job, which was a temporary short-term assignment, and I went over in July of 1939. The European war started in September 1939, and I never got any research done, and I never finished my dissertation. I stayed in the government for 28 years without interruption. I guess I was one of the early Kremlinologists or Sovietologists in the United States, but I gave it up after the war.

I came back in 1941, and spent the next five years dealing with the USSR on Lend-Lease shipments and also UNNRA shipments. Then I peeled off from that in 1946, and I went into the economic side of the State Department, where on various occasions in the State Department, I had to do with Soviet relations, mostly in the context of keeping things away from them in the COCOM structure. So I've been on the supply side and the withholding side.

I got out of the Russian field at the end of the war, because I looked it over and considered that we were in for a long stretch of Cold War and diplomatic trench warfare, which didn't interest me. I got into things where I dealt more actively with potential friends and allies.

*Q: You arrived at a very dramatic time, just before the war.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes. You can check the dates, but the British-French military mission had gone there, I think a little before I was there, or maybe it happened while I was there. That was late spring, early summer. I was there when the German rapprochement with the Russians came, and I was there, of course, when the war began.

You wanted to know about American relations with the USSR. I'd say they were formal, not particularly friendly. The Stalin regime was never friendly with anybody. Being a foreigner in Moscow meant being ostracized by the local population, not because of anything that might happen to the foreigner, but because the local population was frightened. The Russians had just gone through their major purges in 1937-38, and a very substantial chunk of the elite had disappeared. If you ever did meet any Russians, you could tell that times were very strained. The Russians were kept pretty much in ignorance about what was going on in the world, if you could judge by what was available in the press.

My job in the embassy was to read the press. My first job was being night duty clerk. I did that from about August '39 until about the following March. I did some reading and research, but

mostly I was on duty in the office from 6:30 at night until 9:00 in the morning. I had a bed in the office, in the code room. We had a rather primitive code room and rather primitive communication facilities. So throughout the first stage of hostilities in Europe and throughout the Russian-Finnish war, I didn't get a great deal of sleep.

*Q: No, I imagine not.*

ARMSTRONG: But if you're young, you can stand these things. It was fascinating. Of course, I read the telegram traffic, which didn't amount to much.

American relations with the Russians was formal, nothing very noteworthy. There was hardly any business transacted. We had a new ambassador who came in the summer of 1939.

*Q: Who was that?*

ARMSTRONG: Laurence Steinhardt. His daughter was high school age, and the ambassador knew from friends in New York about me. Several of his friends had daughters who had gone to the school where I taught. So I fetched up putting her through two years of high school while I was there, in my so-called spare time. She, incidentally, lives in Chevy Chase if you want to talk to her. Her name is Mrs. Sherwood. She lives on Connecticut Avenue just above Chevy Chase Circle. We see her once in a while.

Steinhardt was a lawyer from New York who had served as ambassador to Sweden and Peru, who later served as ambassador to Turkey, Czechoslovakia, and Canada.

*Q: What was his approach?*

ARMSTRONG: Steinhardt was always interested in all sort of specific human stories, and some people said he was the best consul we ever had. He'd go to any length to help individuals who were caught in the trap of Soviet bureaucracy. He was a good loyal supporter of President Roosevelt, a campaign contributor, a very bright and interesting man. Paradoxically, my wife served under him when he was ambassador in Czechoslovakia, because she was then in the embassy there. She wasn't my wife then; I didn't even know her.

*Q: What was his reaction to the Soviet-German agreement?*

ARMSTRONG: We weren't at all surprised. We knew it was going to happen.

*Q: How did you receive the news?*

ARMSTRONG: Germans told us.

*Q: The German diplomats?*

ARMSTRONG: We were very friendly with the German Embassy. The Germans told us, in effect, that a deal was being worked out, and therefore, our chief political officer, who kept close

contact with the Germans, had the story. That was Chip Bohlen, who was later ambassador, a well-trained Russian expert. I worked for him for a while as his translator. That was before I got the night duty. (I got the night duty because I was the lowest ranking worm they could find.) But I had a lot of personal contact with Bohlen and other officers in the embassy. We had Norris Chipman, who was a very good Sovietologist, and we had a man called Ward, who was administrative officer, who was also a very competent, knowledgeable man about Eastern Europe. His wife was Finnish. Our counselor was Mr. Thurston, who had no experience on Russia, but who had a lot of experience on Latin America, and who was a good and sensible man, who handled things well.

The embassy was effectively functioning as eyes and ears of the U.S. Government during that time, but we were mostly spectators. We were spectators as far as what the Germans and the Russians did with each other. One reason we weren't surprised was that we were aware of how weak the Soviet Union was following the purges. Of course, it had a weak economy; it always has. But the whole command structure of the military had been pretty much obliterated, and it didn't look to our military people as if the Russians could fight their way out of a paper bag. Therefore, it was not at all surprising that they would try to get some kind of a cease-fire or standoff with the Germans. Obviously, if their intelligence was working at all, they knew the Germans were going to move in on Poland.

I have a comment on Poland. I went through Poland on my way to Moscow by train in July, from Berlin, woke in the night when we stopped in Frankfurt an der Oder, now, I guess, part of Poland. You could look out over the railroad yard, and you could see, as far as the eye could carry, flatcars loaded with military equipment. This was the middle of July of 1939. It was perfectly obvious that you don't put weapons on flatcars unless you're going to move them somewhere. You don't use your flatcars for storage. I observed that.

Then a chap, an American newspaperman, got on the train in Warsaw to go on to Moscow.

*Q: Who was that?*

ARMSTRONG: I think his name was Wolf. I'm not sure. He'd been in Warsaw for a couple of weeks. Somebody said, "There's an American up there." So I went up and said hello. This was my first visit to Europe. He said he'd been in Warsaw for two weeks, and he said, "The Poles are unbelievable. They think they're going to beat the Germans."

*Q: Oh, no.*

ARMSTRONG: They think one good cavalry charge will carry them right into Berlin."

*Q: Oh, dear.*

ARMSTRONG: Well, you know, it's perfectly true that the Poles have an international reputation for having far more courage than brains. They have a marvelous spirit. They'll fight anybody. Anyway, he said that was the mood in Warsaw: "Let 'em come. We'll beat the hell out of them." Of course, it lasted about 20 minutes, which, of course, the Russians presumably

expected.

*Q: That must have been clear to you, coming from Berlin, that war was definitely in the offing.*

ARMSTRONG: Oh, yes, sure. I didn't stay in Berlin. I just changed trains.

When the Russians moved their troops into eastern Poland, it was obviously by arrangement with the Germans. They had the demarcation line all worked out beforehand. It was an interesting experience to observe. I used to wander around markets and do a little eavesdropping, and I remember a couple of women talking to each other. The minute anything sounded like military activity, the Russians all got out and got into a line for whatever was being sold, because everybody knew that military activity meant shortages. A hundred years of that, and you get used to it. The lines were forming for kerosene. People were buying kerosene, taking it home and storing it in their bathtubs. They didn't wash much, but they kept kerosene in the bathtubs. They'd line up for potatoes, they'd line up for anything. I listened to a couple of women in the line.

One said, "Well, what do you think about the situation?"

"Oh, I don't know. We don't have war, but we seem to have military activities." "*Voyenniye dyeis Taiga.*" Then later in that same period, I was over in the barbershop at the International Hotel, and I heard a couple of Russians talking. One said, "What is this? Why are we being chummy with our enemies, the Nazis?" The Russian people had been strongly conditioned by anti-Nazi propaganda. He said, "I find this very peculiar, very strange."

The other one said, "Oh, don't worry. (On *znayet shto on delayet.*)" which means, "He knows what he's doing," was the answer. The "he" had a capital H. He was pointing toward the Kremlin, across the street. The Russian people, in general, had confidence that in external matters, the government had done and was doing what was best for the country.

*Q: How did the diplomatic community, the people who dealt with you as diplomats, present this?*

ARMSTRONG: I didn't have enough rank to be very active in the diplomatic community. I had a couple of friends, mostly clerical staff in the German, Swedish, British, Norwegian embassies. That was about it. The German girl seemed never to be able to understand why the Americans should have any objection to what the Germans were doing because, as she would try to explain to us, "This is a matter for the Europeans and should not be a matter of any concern for the United States." We would say gently that we thought we believed in Europe for the Europeans, but to us that meant all Europeans, not just one country. She was also astonished because she found that the Norwegian girl wouldn't come to the parties if she was coming. They were both called Hilda. This was after the German invasion of Norway.

*Q: Well, I'm not surprised at that.*

ARMSTRONG: But she didn't seem to understand. She said, "We went in there for friendly purposes, to help out the Norwegians." In other words, she believed all her own government's

stuff. She was a nice kid. I always wondered what happened to her with the cataclysm of the war. She came from East Prussia.

The Swedish girl was interesting. She was the most negative about the Russians of anybody in the community. This goes back to the Swedes having known the Russians longer and better than anybody else. She eventually married the clerk in our military attaché's office, and presumably has lived in the United States in the American service.

*Q: Shortly after that, the war broke out.*

ARMSTRONG: This was after the war had broken out. This German-Norwegian and other reaction was in the early days of the war.

*Q: I see. When the war did break out, how did you receive the news? You were in Moscow at this time.*

ARMSTRONG: Nobody was surprised. This was the first stage of the war.

*Q: September 1939.*

ARMSTRONG: September 1939. Nobody was surprised. We got a little busier, and there were a few little new touches, but mostly life went on in the normal fashion. After all, Russia had declared itself neutral, and it was a neutral country. We were a neutral country. It was spectator sports.

Then during the period of September to spring was what a lot of people called the phoney war, because the Germans were not very active against the West. They were consolidating in Poland and regrouping. The West wasn't up to fighting anybody, anyway, and presumably was pouring a little more concrete on the Maginot Line, which did them no good.

The interesting thing about Russian policy during that period, throughout 1939 to 1941, was that they never lost touch with anybody who might potentially be their ally. In other words, they kept their options open diplomatically. They were perfectly correct with us and quite polite. We had no serious problems in the embassy or otherwise. They maintained correct relations with the British. Sir Stafford Cripps, who was a very important man in the Labor party, was the British ambassador there. He couldn't always get in to see anybody in the Kremlin, but he was there. The French Government in exile, the Petain government, did maintain its post, and everybody else was there.

The war was background, but what everybody focused on, beginning in the autumn of 1939, was the Russian protective measures on the borders. Having taken the eastern half of Poland, they then moved in on the Baltic Straits, as you well recall. They told Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that they'd like an alliance with them, mutual assistance or whatever. By the following summer of 1940, they had consolidated their control over those three countries.

That first winter, though, 1939-40, they did not intervene in local affairs in Latvia, Lithuania, and so on. I went out to Latvia in January on a courier trip. In those days, our courier would go to

Stockholm, Helsinki, the three Baltic capitals, and to Berlin. We ran a shuttle courier from the embassy in Moscow who would go out to Latvia and deliver our pouches, and bring the new pouches in. We all took turns doing this, and we were always delighted to do it, because it gave me a chance to get out of the USSR for a couple of days.

So I was in Latvia in January for a few days, a perfectly normal train trip out, except for the weather and getting stuck on a siding, because of the deep snow. But going around doing business in Latvia, you were still in an independent country and doing business in Latvian currency, doing a lot of shopping for the colleagues and their girlfriends. I came back with 45 pairs of silk stockings. The Russians didn't have silk stockings. Almost everybody had a girlfriend. Not everybody. Some of the clerks were homosexuals.

On that trip I had luck. When I got on the train from Riga to Moscow, I found in the next door compartment Walter Durant, the famous correspondent of The New York Times. Of course, as a student of Russia, I had always been following him in the Times, so I went and got acquainted. I spent the evening with him, sharing sandwiches and brandy and so forth, and found him fascinating. He maintained two families. He had a Russian family and a Western family. He was going in to see his Russian family. I saw him a couple of times after that in Moscow, and I also got to know other American or British correspondents. As a matter of fact, since one of my colleagues and I at the clerical level did all the newspaper reading and daily reporting on the press, the newspaper correspondents in town, the Westerners, frequently would talk to us about our interpretation of what was in the press, and we'd compare notes with them as to their interpretation. That was an external contact that I did have.

*Q: Who were some of the American journalists?*

ARMSTRONG: Henry Shapiro was one, a very bright and able guy. Jack Scott was another one. He's gone now. I guess Henry's probably gone now. Jack was for years with Time magazine, Time-Life Publications, a very good Russian expert. He had a Russian wife. He got thrown out by the Soviets in about 1940 for reporting that was probably too accurate. There was a great discussion over whether his Russian wife and children would be allowed to go with him. They were. We all went down to the train to see them off.

The Western group of people in Moscow was a very small group, and you tended to know most of them who spoke English, even if you were at a very low diplomatic level. All the foreigners huddled together, all the embassies huddled together, even if their countries may have had great differences of opinion with each other. There's nothing like a Russian environment to bring everybody else together. They were all suffering under the same yoke, as they say.

To go back, I started on the Baltic states. Everybody looked at that and said, "The Russians are protecting themselves and they will eventually gobble up the state." The U.S. took a firm view of this, and the U.S. still has the same view. We do not recognize the Russian acquisition of those three states, and we still have shadow governments in exile representing Estonia, and possibly Latvia, I think, floating around in the United States.

*Q: How was this response manifested at the time?*

ARMSTRONG: The early stage, technically the sovereignty of those countries was not violated, because the Russians made a mutual defense treaty, which they theoretically fully accepted. But later, of course, when they actually moved and took them over, the way they did it was to organize their own fifth column and have it take over the government. Then having taken over the government, it would petition for admission of the country to the Soviet Union. So as far as the Russians were concerned, this was all done quite legally. Their reaction was, "This is perfectly legitimate. This is what the people in these countries wanted." Believe that and you can believe anything, but that's what most Russian people believed.

Then, of course, after they got in there, they've had a program of decreasing the indigenous population and increasing the Russian component, so that by now, the Estonians are a minority in their own country. I think the Latvians are, too. The Lithuanians are more numerous with a higher birth rate. Lithuanians have shown more resistance because they have the Catholic church. I think it was perfectly transparent, but again, the Russians convinced themselves they were doing it legally. They always liked to convince themselves they were right.

*Q: Yes, that sounds rather like the invasion of Finland.*

ARMSTRONG: I'm going to come to that next. What happened in about December, I think it was, was that they presented the same set of demands, in effect, on Finland, asking for a piece of territory near Leningrad, asking for bases and so forth, and a change in the Petsamo area so as to cut off the Finnish access to the Arctic Ocean, but really to get hold of the nickel mines. The Finns said no, they weren't interested.

We, of course, were very close to the Finns, diplomatically, and totally sympathetic. So we had an active cable traffic reporting on what the Finns told us about what the Russians had told them. The Finns had a remarkable ambassador there, Paasikivi. Was he there then or later? I think he was there later after they restored relations. He later became president of Finland.

We obviously took a very negative view. Therefore, our relations with the USSR deteriorated, beginning with the Finnish war, primarily, just because of American popular opinion about the Russian invasion of Finland.

*Q: I've been watching newsreel reports, and they're not, to say the least, very favorable towards the Russians.*

ARMSTRONG: Oh, Lord, no. I wasn't here. I was over there. But we had a lot of fun in the press reading section, because we'd take the Russian communiques every day, and I had some fun one time. They'd given an account of how many kilometers the Soviet troops had advanced, and I did a cumulative analysis of that, and it brought them out somewhere a little west of Norway, out in the North Sea after you'd added it all up.

*Q: A little optimistic, perhaps.*

ARMSTRONG: It was the coldest winter in the history of the Moscow Weather Bureau. There



were bread riots in Moscow which had no political connotation whatsoever; they simply arose out of the fact that the weather was so bad that it froze the bread delivery trucks. I was out in it several times when it was 40 below and 45 below, and it's an experience. The town was frozen solid. They could hardly get the streetcars to run. Cars wouldn't start. Of course, cars in those days were pretty primitive, and Russian cars are more primitive than other cars. Their basic car was a Ford model that they got somewhere in the 1920s. Everything came to a grinding halt, including their offensive with Finland.

Of course, then they also made a terrible mistake. They must have ignored any intelligence that they might have had about whether the Finns would fight. Of course, the Finns fought like wildcats. The Russians had gone in with what we would call a National Guard out here. The reservists in the Leningrad military district were the ones who went. They weren't ready for what they got, and they didn't have the right equipment. They got stopped dead. Later, of course, the Russians realized what they were up against, and they regrouped and put in a new troop structure. Then eventually, their manpower was so much greater than the Finns, there could have been no argument. You don't mind an anecdote?

*Q: Oh, please, go right ahead.*

ARMSTRONG: One night in about February or March of 1940, as the Finnish war was beginning to grind down, the Finns wanted to sue for peace, and the Russians didn't want to take over all of Finland, anyhow, they realized it would be an impossibility, they were negotiating privately. I went out to dinner at Henry Shapiro's. This is one of the unusual occasions when I actually met Soviet citizens socially, Soviet citizens of some status. I've forgotten the man and wife. They were somewhere in the artistic world, but they were representative of Russian intelligentsia, very nice people. Henry started to tell them, "Peace is being negotiated." They were astonished. Then he asked me for confirmation, and I didn't know where he got his information. I mean, I knew about it because I read the cables, but I wasn't supposed to talk about it. So I got caught on this.

The thing that was interesting was the reaction of this Russian couple, who could not understand why the Finns had fought them. They said, "We're nice people. We don't have any hard feelings. We're just trying to help protect the Finns. We offered them a defensive alliance. Why is that an occasion for them to fight us?" Sort of, "We can do no wrong. We're nice people." And this is essentially a major Russian self-justificatory view that you find, and it goes right on. It's still there. You read it in Mr. Gorbachev. "We're nice. Nobody's nicer than we are. Why don't you just recognize us? Nobody's more legitimate than we are." You know, all that. "We have civil liberties and we have a Constitution." You know. They tell themselves everything is all right.

There's another thing, too. They can be unspeakably crude, rude, and just plain filthy in their actions, but they always want to have the language be good. Euphemism is a Russian art in terms of describing things that happen in society. "All is for the best" -- Dr. Pangloss. "All is for the best. We're all right. Everybody is out of step but us."

*Q: Not very many people outside of the Soviet Union are fooled by this.*

ARMSTRONG: Oh, nobody outside is fooled, really, unless he wants to be. But they fool themselves. This is an insight into dealing with them. It makes it that much more difficult to deal with them, because they believe their own hypocrisy, and the public believes the government's hypocrisy.

*Q: That does make things rather difficult.*

ARMSTRONG: That's a side note about "why we're always right." Anyway, Soviet-American relations were not improved by the Russian attack on Finland.

*Q: What was the American response? Did they make protests?*

ARMSTRONG: There was a lot of money raised here for Finland, war relief, that sort of thing. Never overlook what the Swedes did for the Finns during that time; they turned out everything they could think of to help the Finns. Through Finnish and Swedish channels, we did a lot of volunteer stuff.

*Q: But the American Government didn't do very much other than that?*

ARMSTRONG: There were a few debts the Finns owed, and I think the American Government probably offered to forget and forgive interest payments and things like that. The Finns said, "Never mind. We'll pay it." They always pay.

*Q: Yes, they always pay their debts.*

ARMSTRONG: I visited Finland in the summer of 1940 for a holiday. I traveled all around in the lake steamers and went near the new Soviet border. I went there by flying to Stockholm and then flying over to Helsinki, then came back the same way.

Then in the spring of 1941, I took the train from Moscow to Leningrad, did sightseeing in Leningrad, and then went on to Helsinki by train and back, and stopped in Viborg. By that time it had become a Russian town. The Finns were not giving up. There wasn't much of anything to eat in Finland by the spring of 1941.

I was in the border areas in the summer of '40, near Savonlinna. I said, "I don't see any war damage."

They said, "We don't have any."

I said, "How come? You're only a short distance from the war zone."

"Oh, every so often a Soviet bomber will come over, obviously under instructions to bomb us, and he would fly over the town, then he'd go out over the lake and drop all the bombs in the lake, then fly away." This is a reflection of an early naive Russian teaching of its own military, which was, "We do not bomb civilian populations. It is wrong to bomb a civilian population." There was a certain amount of pacifist idealism in the early Bolshevik view of things. Of course,

they got into some real problems and it disappeared.

*Q: When they were bombing German cities, they probably took rather a different view.*

ARMSTRONG: They didn't bomb any German cities. They didn't have an offensive bomber force.

*Q: Oh, that's right.*

ARMSTRONG: Moscow didn't get more than one or two air raids. The Germans didn't bomb Moscow. I guess they figured it would be too expensive to use the air arm, and they were going to take it by the infantry. Of course, they never did take it by the infantry.

Anyway, the Finnish war was a major event, and it made the Americans officially quite cool toward the USSR. That carries you over to the spring of 1940. The summer of 1940 sees the German offensive in France, rolling over Belgium, Holland, and everything, and demolishing the French forces and imposing the Vichy regime.

My observation then was that the Soviets were astonished and worried, because they had had, obviously, a better evaluation of the Anglo-French military strength than was warranted by the facts. You could see them. They had vivid accounts in the press every day of what was going on in France, much more vivid than was usual on any activity outside the country. You could tell it bothered them, because: "if they can do that to the British or French, look what they can do to us." That's when they first really began, I think, to get scared and more watchful of the Germans.

*Q: That was a very dramatic example of what one had to fear from the Germans, non-aggression pact or no.*

ARMSTRONG: The Germans are very efficient military people. There's no arguing about it. I think that was our opinion then, that this kind of scared the daylights out of the Russians. ... From then on, really, until the following summer, they became more apprehensive. They didn't convey this to the people, though; everything was bland. German-Russian relations were presumably cordial. Their press would be critical of the British and French, and critical of us, and they were obviously in various ways trying to see whether it was possible to please the Germans enough to keep them off their backs. I think it was probably the spring of 1941 by the time they realized this wasn't going to work.

During the spring of 1941 was when you had the great German walk down through the Balkans, and again the Soviet press was full of lively reports on the German armies rolling into Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia. They made a brief and flickering effort to support the independence of the Yugoslavs, and the Yugoslav military mission came to Moscow to seek support somewhere about spring of 1941.

We got one interesting piece of intelligence. One of the Yugoslav generals who came had gone to the Russian military academy before the revolution, and he was entertained by a couple of his Russian classmates, who were then senior officers in the Red Army. We got a readout on that

which is fascinating. The Soviet general who had a fine, formal house, and the servants were in livery.

*Q: Oh, my heavens.*

ARMSTRONG: To a bunch of peasants like the Yugoslavs, this was something. Who's democratic, you know?

*Q: Yes, indeed. In livery, nonetheless.*

ARMSTRONG: In livery, yes. So the Russians kind of let the Germans know, "Look, we don't like all these things you're doing," but they didn't do anything more than just make motions. I am sure that from the time the Germans rolled into the Balkans, the Russians were then convinced that somebody in Berlin had their name on a card somewhere, and in due course, they would be presented with a bill.

Our general observation in the embassy was that the Russians really were surprised by the German attack in June of 1941. We had tried to warn them.

*Q: Yes.*

ARMSTRONG: We and the British tried to warn them with perfectly good intelligence, which we gave them.

*Q: Where did this intelligence come from?*

ARMSTRONG: Agents in Germany and just general open news in Germany, plus knowing what's going on, good hunches and good agents and so forth.

*Q: The Russians didn't want to listen?*

ARMSTRONG: British intelligence was damned good in those days and still is. Ours was kind of rudimentary, but it was functioning. So this was convincing. The Russians rejected it -- that is, Stalin rejected it. Our theory was that Stalin felt he was a big enough and important enough actor in the world stage so that even Hitler wouldn't dare treat him with contempt, that what he was going to get somewhere along the line was a set of demands -- economic, for supplies, because Germany was hurting, they needed grain, they needed oil, they needed other things, and assurance of non-belligerency, all that.

I think they thought they were going to be presented with a list. They never were. They just got hit on a Sunday morning with the full fire power of the German Army. They were so unsuspecting that they had, on their front airfields, all their fighter squadrons lined up for Sunday morning inspection. The Germans came down and washed them right out. They didn't have any significant defense in depth from the Polish border, and they simply were not prepared, in the military sense, for what hit them. I think probably their front line troops did a heroic job with what they had, but because there was not enough, they moved very rapidly and began to do the

thing that they did in France.

*Q: It's very similar to Pearl Harbor, don't you think, where the country that gets hit doesn't expect anything nice from their attacker, expects them to make some aggressive move, but not at that time and not in that way.*

ARMSTRONG: Not that way. I mean, the German Embassy was still in Moscow and so forth. The Germans told us what they were going to do.

*Q: They did? How did this come about?*

ARMSTRONG: We were friendly with the German Embassy.

*Q: You must have been very much.*

ARMSTRONG: This is intelligence. This is an intelligence in an amateur way without having a Central Intelligence Agency or anything. The U.S. Foreign Service is not a bad source of intelligence, and they worked hard at it. Our contacts were good.

*Q: How much notice did you get when they told you?*

ARMSTRONG: Enough so that we got our women and children out before the war started.

*Q: And you went to the Soviets, and they refused to listen?*

ARMSTRONG: We didn't go. The embassy didn't go. We'd made the official approach earlier through intelligence channels, and they said, "Baloney."

There were several little things in the press that spring which I recall. Every so often there would be a funny little story in the press which would be hard to fathom. There was one report in some newspaper somewhere in Europe to the effect that the Germans were going to force on the Russians a deal whereby they would take over the Ukraine and have access to the oil and grain.

The Russians ran in Pravda a little humorous article which referred to this and said, "What nonsense." It quoted and said, "We're supposed to be renting Kiev to the Germans. This makes just as much sense as the nursery rhyme." I translated it at the time, but I can't remember it exactly. I quote in Russian a nursery rhyme which sounds good in Russian and translates very awkwardly, which is, "The lobsters are cutting hay in the meadow with hammers." That's the literal translation. They said it makes just as much sense as that. They put this out and kind of let the Germans know that they noticed something and expected to get some kind of reaction, and never got anything.

There were a few minor good relations efforts during the first year of the 1939 Agreement. I remember the Bolshoi Opera decided to do Die Walküre. It was one of the funniest experiences you can imagine. Some of us in the American Embassy went. In the first two rows, there was the German Embassy solid. The stage machinery was excellent, the tenors and the basses were fine,

and the spirit of the thing was quite all right. It was good presentation, but the Russians simply did not have any Wagnerian sopranos. They didn't have any women in their cadre who could sing like a German soprano.

*Q: Yes, you do rather need that.*

ARMSTRONG: In connection with it, they put out a booklet in Russian, explaining the Ring. I think I've probably got it in my souvenirs somewhere. I didn't know much about it either. Wagnerian music had not been my bag, or at least I wasn't interested in the theology of it. We were kind of anti-Nazi around New York, anyway, so who bothered to listen to Wagner? I was fascinated by this pamphlet they put out. The Russians solemnly read it and tried hard to understand it. The Russians love songs and opera and all kinds of shows.

Another point. The Germans, when they did go in, made the grossest of political mistakes because they treated everybody like pigs. If they had gone in with the right kind of political propaganda, if they'd understood what they were dealing with, or if they'd wanted to understand what they were dealing with, they would have gone into the Ukraine as liberators, with Ukrainian-speaking soldiers. "We're not fighting you. We are Ukrainians." You know. Friends and all that. They could have had the whole Ukraine in about 20 minutes.

*Q: Just like they wanted.*

ARMSTRONG: Which is what they really wanted economically. But instead of that, they shot everybody. Any sentiments of anti-Moscow disappeared in about three minutes and the Ukrainians went out and fought like tigers, too.

*Q: This was rather a dramatic time for American policy, as well. One of our historical advisors claims that it's the German invasion of the USSR and the fact that the Soviets were able to hold on throughout that autumn and winter that convinced FDR to continue to pursue the possibility, then, of helping the Allies. What do you think about that?*

ARMSTRONG: He was already committed to helping the British.

*Q: Yes, indeed.*

ARMSTRONG: That was a firm commitment. There was no argument about that. It was a while later that Churchill took over. The British were kind of hard to help at that point.

I'll tell you the reaction in the embassy when the war started. The night before the war was to begin, there were two parties, one of the clerical staff and one of the officers' staff.

*Q: This is in September 1939?*

ARMSTRONG: This is in June 1941. Of course, the officers were at the ambassador's house. We had ours at one of the apartments in the chancery. We had a clerical party, a clerks' party. Some of the officers came over to visit our party, quite a number of them, in fact. I think they

wanted to get away from the ambassador. Our military attaché was at our party, an old friend of mine. He guess he was a major. I had known him as a captain, and we had both studied Russian together at Berkeley, California, a very, very nice guy and a good cavalryman, but not a great intelligence officer. He was satisfied the Russians would be rolled over by the Germans in very short order. I got into an argument with another clerk, in the presence of the military attaché. The clerk said, “The Germans will be in Moscow in three weeks.”

I said, “I’ll bet you on that.”

He said, “How much?”

I said, “Fifty dollars,” which was a lot of money for me at that point. I was the one who said, “The Russians will not lose.” I don’t know why I said that, except that I had a sense of the great strength of the Russian people, and I had a sense of their patriotism. I collected the \$50, incidentally. The other guy and I were both in Japan at that point, waiting for a way to get home.

But the military attaché turned to the other guy and said, “Your money’s perfectly safe.” But he was a dear friend and a good guy, and I always liked him. But his intellectual judgments were not great.

*Q: You were right, though, in that the Russians did hold on.*

ARMSTRONG: Oh, yes, no question about it. If you know Russian history, you know what happened to Napoleon.

*Q: Indeed. Same thing happened.*

ARMSTRONG: Same thing. Sure. The space and the numbers.

*Q: And the winter.*

ARMSTRONG: And the winter. So there was a division in the embassy, obviously, on what was going to happen. Ambassador Steinhardt was, I think, busy urging Washington that this was serious, that the Russians deserved some help, but that we ought not to give it to them without getting some political and other satisfaction on some of the things we thought were important.

*Q: What did he have in mind?*

ARMSTRONG: Some individual cases he was worried about. I know of one case where he told Molotov, “You know, I’ve got some passports here for exit visas.” They were American. “And I’ve got one more passport,” which was British, a local employee of the embassy who was really a Soviet citizen, also. He said, “I want a visa for her.”

Molotov said, “But she’s a Soviet citizen.”

“I know that, but you know, you gave me a list of military supplies you needed. I haven’t sent it

home yet. I want the visa on that passport.” He got it. She got out.

*Q: Quite effective bargaining.*

ARMSTRONG: He was a tough cookie in terms of specific bargaining. Another thing, they were very polite to us all leading up to this period, although they didn’t give in on Finland or the Baltic states, but they were very polite. Somewhere in the spring of 1941, the ambassador called me and said, “I need you this evening. Would you meet me in the courtyard at 7:00 o’clock.”

I said, “Sure.” I got in the car and said, “What are we doing?”

He said, “The Soviet police have picked up an American citizen, and they were decent enough to tell us that they had him on a gun charge and to give us an opportunity to see him.”

So I said, “Where are we going?”

He said, “We’re going to Lubyanka,” the headquarters of the NKVD, now the KGB. So I have actually been inside the headquarters of the KGB, the same building, still there, a big square building. We got in there, and in a room full of steely eyed KGB agents, all of their uniform hats on, sitting around, looked like a sea of blue, you know, they brought in a kid who was about 15. I had to translate, only he didn’t know any Russian or any English; he spoke Polish. He had been born in Fall River, Massachusetts, when his family was visiting from Poland, had gone back and grown up in Poland on a farm. He knew enough Russian so he could answer “yes” or “no,” so we had the most tortured conversation. The ambassador realized what the problem was, and he tried to be helpful to me. I was doing the best I could. It was an experience, but we got him out. The charge was kind of trumped up, which became evident when he told his story, and we got him out. The Russians let him go. This was a signal, I thought: “Look, we aren’t going to cause you any minor troubles.”

We had another event that spring, where somebody broke into the Roman Catholic church in Moscow, where the priest was an American, and there was always a great struggle over having him in there, because they didn’t like churches. One day somebody came and stole all the objects off the altar, the host, everything. The priest came screaming into the embassy at 9:00 o’clock in the morning, and I was on my way over to the ambassador’s to tutor his daughter. I said, “I’ll give you a ride.” I took him over, and he told me all about it.

We protested to the Soviet Government, and they sent a note back, which is a marvelous piece of casuistry, which I remember translating, which said that the appurtenances of a religious service are the property of the state and they’re made available to the congregation for its use, provided they take good care of them. The fact that they’ve disappeared indicates that the congregation is not taking proper care, and therefore, it’s your fault.”

*Q: Oh, my heavens!*

ARMSTRONG: When I translated that, I thought, “When we get the ambassador on this, he’ll go right up through the roof.”



*Q: Oh, I wouldn't blame him at all.*

ARMSTRONG: He was Jewish, incidentally. He did go through the roof. He went over and saw Molotov, banged the table and so forth, and said, "I happen to have observed the church is across the street from a major police installation. I thought you had pretty good police in this country. Where is the stuff?" So eventually, they dragged in some bedraggled guy and two-thirds of the stuff or three-quarters of it. Probably melted down some of it. But it was an example. He was a combative man, but he always dealt in specific cases, the specific problems, rather than broad policies. A very effective representative of the United States, a tough guy and good.

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... I came back from Russia by way of the Trans-Siberian, 14 days in a second-class car. This was the summer of '41, in June and July. I got to Vladivostok, was there two or three days, got on a Japanese ship, and went to Japan. I spent seven or eight weeks in Japan, unable to get out, along with a group of other Americans from the Moscow embassy. Because the U.S. had frozen Japanese funds, and the Japanese had frozen our funds, and because we couldn't travel on a foreign ship under Foreign Service regulations, we had a long unit. There was no American ship stopping in Japan because of the freeze. So we sat and twiddled our thumbs at the Imperial Hotel or up at the embassy every day, to ask if anything had happened. The administrative officer, it so happened, was Chip Bohlen, the former First Secretary in Moscow for whom I'd worked. We had a nice time in Tokyo, more or less. It was a great change from Russia. It was clean. But we got tired of sukiyaki.

Then we got on a Japanese ship and went to Shanghai, were in Shanghai another couple of weeks or so, and then an American ship came into Shanghai which had come from the Philippines. It was, in fact, a requisitioned liner which was then a troop transport, so we came home on that. I got into San Francisco in October, after leaving Moscow in June.

I came to Washington and looked around for something to do. I found that because I spoke and read Russian, I was in considerable demand. I guess I must have had about four or five different offers from different agencies, each of which said it was the most important agency in town. I never heard of some of them again. It was a time of mushrooms sprouting in the bureaucracy.

I joined the Lend-Lease Administration because the Russian section was being run by John Hazard, now still a professor at Columbia, who was an old friend and who had Russian experience, having obtained a law degree from Harvard and then a law degree from Moscow Juridical Institute. He's famous in the field. He was organizing a group of people to help the Russians with war supplies. Russia was not eligible for lend-lease as yet, but we were working on their defense orders and using up their money until it ran out, which didn't take long. I started there in October 1941. I stayed with that program up until the war was over.

My function in the Lend-Lease Administration was to supervise the handling of shipping, transportation. Altogether we moved about 1,750,000 tons of stuff in four years. We had terrible times because of convoy difficulties on the North Cape route in 1941-42. I remember one day we

lost 22 out of 33 ships. That was PQ-17.

In the springtime, the Arctic ice pushes out and the space between the North Cape and the ice is narrowed. The daylight begins to be greater, so you're running a great risk. The Germans had a base at Kirkenes in Norway, and they just blew us out of the water. I lost several friends on that route. I'd just sit here and organize convoys. We worked fantastic hours, six and a half days a week, and about ten hours a day. Well, we were not being shot at. Anyway, they did need somebody who spoke Russian and who could deal with the Soviet Purchasing Commission. So I was liaison with them and I became informally the coordinator of Russian lend-lease shipping.

The senior people I worked with included John Hazard, the civilian head of the office; our boss was General Wesson, a former Chief of Ordnance. We had a connection with General James H. Burns, General Sidney Spalding, General York, of the U.S. side of the combined Chiefs of Staff. They had a brief from Harry Hopkins to kind of keep an eye on the Russian program and make sure it worked all right. So I found myself working for three or four generals, and I was conscious of my draft eligibility. They said, "Don't you worry about it. Either we get you commissioned and have you assigned back here, or we can get you deferred."

I said, "Which is easier?"

They said, "It's just easier for us to go on having you deferred if you don't mind not wearing a uniform. It doesn't make any difference to us whether you wear a uniform or not. You're doing your stuff." I had very fine relations with our generals, and in that process, developed a great respect for senior officers in the U.S. Army. All of these gentlemen were absolutely splendid people, people of good judgment, good skills, and fine human beings. This was a very worthwhile experience in that context of getting to know senior military types. I've always continued that to respect, and have a lot of friends who are military people.

In the work, you got to know the Russians quite well, because you were dealing on a bare-bones basis with guys who were working hard, who weren't professional diplomats, but were shipping experts or electronics experts or machine tool experts, armor guys in the military or aircraft guys or whatever. This has all been well described in a couple of books, very well done, which I have and which I can refer anybody to. They are accurate and good accounts. Some of us who worked on this helped the authors.

At the end of the war, all the time we were in Lend-Lease, our liaison with the Department of State was very close. I made sure of that myself because I knew the guys on the Russian desk -- Elbridge Durbrow and other people. Because I'd served in Moscow, they weren't worried about me. They recognized that I had the Moscow experience and was on the same wave length, and that we would do what we had to do for the Russians. As one of my Russian colleagues said, "We are allies through misfortune." And we were. So the State Department Russian people counted on me and John Hazard to keep them informed.

We also worked very closely with the research side of the OSS, where the chief of the Russian unit was Professor Robinson, who had been my professor at Columbia, and where several other guys who had been graduate students of his were working. So the Russians assumed that all of us

in Lend-Lease were intelligence officers. Well, we were. Why not? That's the way they worked, so we worked that way.

The way it was handled was very bad. This was the fault of Averell Harriman, who was ambassador in Russia at the time. He came back here. I remember a great meeting in which a lot of people in the State Department and we from the Lend-Lease were talking about what we should do. In Lend-Lease, we had urged people in the State Department to please come to some kind of an agreement with the Russians as to how we would terminate Lend-Lease. They were absolutely stalled from doing anything about post-war planning with the Russians by the White House, because Mr. Roosevelt felt he was going to do it all himself, and he and old Joe would get along all right and they would settle everything after the war. Therefore, no significant preparations were made during the latter part of the war for any kind of a transition out of lend-lease, which I regarded as atrocious. Mr. Roosevelt played his own hand and paid no attention to intelligence about what the Russians were really like.

The interesting thing was the Russians had committed themselves to go to war against Japan within, I think it was, 90 days after cessation of hostilities in Europe. We had a special military program running for them to help supply or resupply their Far Eastern armies. We moved that entire program -- and I was personally responsible for this -- on Russian-flag ships, many of which we had lend-leased to them, right through Japanese waters in the five months before the Russians went to war with the Japanese. I remember the funniest requisition I ever cleared for military supply was 300 tons of hay for the cavalry in the Far Eastern Soviet armies. We declared hay a Lend-Lease article and sent it along. We also sent tanks, small arms, ammunition, and all kinds of stuff like that, right through Japanese waters on the Russian-flag ships.

Therefore, there was a problem. We needed to stop the Lend-Lease in Europe because the war was over. But the other program had to go on because the war wasn't over, and the Russians had a commitment to go in. But Mr. Harriman got awfully upset about this and wanted to cut off everything that went to Russia in Europe. He did it in such a categorical fashion, and everybody was so scared of him, since he was the ambassador, that it got too literal. Orders went out to turn around the ships *en route*. This was improper, because under Lend-Lease regulations, once you put the stuff on a ship, no matter whose ship it was, the other government accepted the goods. You couldn't just automatically reclaim them. Obviously, you could turn an American ship around, but you couldn't turn a Russian ship around. These were mostly American ships on the Atlantic, because Soviet-flag ships were in the Pacific run.

We turned the ships around and then everybody blew up. The Russians said, "You know, we expected you to cut this off sometime because it would be foolish to continue, but there was some other way of doing it besides stopping the hook at the dock in Philadelphia," (where we did most of the loading.) We sat there with ships half loaded, other ships dithering around the middle of the Atlantic. Do we go back? Do we go forward? What do we do? Finally, of course, what we did was let the ships continue if they were *en route*. Finally we finished loading the ships that were on berth. We didn't put any new ones on berth on the East Coast. Then we got into a discussion of what we should do about this stuff that was on order, that hadn't been delivered.

I found myself negotiating an agreement with the Russians at the end of the war, about

September or October 1945, in which we agreed to give them the stuff that was on order, and they agreed to pay for it. It took a bit of arguing, and they tried an end-run, which was to go to Mr. Crowley, who was the head of the Lend-Lease Administration -- or then the Foreign Economic Administration as it had become by then. They bypassed me. Hazard had left to go off and help prepare the Nuremberg indictment. General Wesson had left to go back into retirement. I was in charge of the office, and I was doing the negotiating with the Russians.

**TERESA CHIN JONES**  
**Born in the USSR to Chinese Diplomatic Parents**  
**Novosibirsk (1941)**

*Mrs. Jones was born in the Soviet Union of Chinese diplomatic parents. She was raised in the USSR and the United States. A specialist in Scientific Affairs, both civilian and military, Mrs. Jones' Washington assignments were primarily in the fields of international nuclear and scientific matters and included non-proliferation, arms control, East-West Trade as well as general Political/Military subjects. Her foreign assignments were in the scientific and consular fields. She holds two degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. Mrs. Jones was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.*

*Q: Today is July 2, 2007. This is an interview with Teresa Chin Jones. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. You go by Terry.*

JONES: Yes.

*Q: Well, Terry, let's start at the beginning. When and where were you born?*

JONES: I was born November 30, 1941, in Novosibirsk, USSR.

*Q: All right. So we want to figure out how you came to be born in USSR in Novosibirsk.*

JONES: Well in the summer of '41 Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. My father was a Chinese Nationalist diplomat assigned to the Chinese embassy in Moscow. They sent all the diplomatic dependents to Novosibirsk for safety. My mother still remembers going on the train to Novosibirsk, which was just packed with diplomats and their children, and looking at the troop trains going endlessly in the other direction. She doesn't think too many of those troops ever made it home again.

*Q: These were the Siberian divisions that were brought in that sort of turned the tide in the battle for Moscow.*

JONES: Well they were a never ending stream of men. Once my "expectant" Mom and Dad got to Novosibirsk, they settled in nicely, but on November 30, she fell down a flight of stairs. She

was eight months pregnant when I was born. Even Chinese, coming from wartime China, were horrified at the sanitation standards at the hospital. Doctors didn't wash their hands and wore their outside boots into surgery.

It was no surprise when Mom developed peritonitis - considered 100% lethal before antibiotics or even sulfa drugs existed. But fortunately, at this point in time Stalin wanted the Nationalists as friends, so Malenkov (the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs) listened to my father's complaints that a total incompetents dealing with my mother and actually ordered one of the better surgeons in Moscow to go there and take care of her. With no antibiotics, they could only operate to drain the pus that developed internally - at a rate of two operations a week. She was down to about 80 pounds and after several months during which she weakened steadily, they were sure she would die.

A good friend of hers, a Eurasian, the Polish Chinese wife of a Chinese diplomat and a very devout Catholic, managed to somehow find a priest to give my mother last rites and to baptize me -- Teresa, after her favorite saint. She also gave my mother the very last of her holy water from Lourdes which she had gotten years ago when on a pilgrimage.

My mother, then came out of the coma and, at age 85, is frail but still healthy. As my mother told us, she remembered that she died and was greeted by a little boy and a little girl carrying a lantern -- spirits whom traditional Chinese believed were there to escort dead souls to judgment. She prepared to go when she heard a loud voice tell her, "Not your time" - thus shocking her out of her coma.

She still had months of hospitalization during which her Russian became superb. She was 20 years old and a high school graduate, which was considered very well educated for a Chinese woman then. By the time she came out of the hospital she could read War and Peace easily in Russian; she could go to plays; and she could bargain for food in the bazaars.

After Novosibirsk, my father was sent to be the #2 at the Chinese Consulate General in Tashkent. I have only vague memories left of growing up in the Consulate General compound in Tashkent. The Consul General was also named Chin and also from Northern China. It was a busy enough post as there were large numbers of Chinese, probably illegal laborers, who got into trouble with the Soviet government. For example, at that time the easiest thing to get in the world was a Soviet Citizenship You went in to get a ration card, they put your thumb on a card and they told you, "You are now a Soviet Citizen." So there was a whole lot of pleading and begging at the consulate.

The area itself was strongly Muslim; and the locals often looked very Asian-probably as a result of centuries of Mongolian control. Even under Stalin there was very high crime, for example, the policeman in front of the Consulate gate was murdered.. For security the consulate bought a half wolf-half dog hybrid from the city zoo. So growing up I had the strongest impression that dogs kept their tails between their legs and howled.

**CLINTON L. OLSON**  
**Deputy Chief of Joint U.S.-U.K. Supply Program for USSR**  
**Moscow (1941-1943)**

**Military Attaché during World War II**  
**Vladivostok (1943)**

*Ambassador Clinton L. Olson was born in South Dakota in 1916. He received a bachelor's degree from Stanford University. He entered the U.S. Army in 1941 and subsequently received a master's degree in business administration. Ambassador Olson's Foreign Service career included positions in Iran, Austria, Martinique, the United Kingdom (England), Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. He was interviewed on April 17, 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

OLSON: ...I was a second Lieutenant, and became the Production Control Officer for the Small Arms Division in the Ordnance Department in Washington, DC. As such, I did the Production Control work three machine gun, and machine gun ammunition factories. That was in the spring of 1941 and by the summer of 1941 I was doing that work for nine machine gun factories. It was during this period that I became associated with a lot of people with our military supply programs. We were supplying machine guns to the British, the Aussies, the Dutch, and to some of our own people. One thing led to another and the "powers that be" decided to send a special mission to the Soviet Union -- The Lend Lease Program.

*Q: Is this prior to our entrance into the war or after?*

OLSON: Prior to our entry in the war. This was September 1941. They sent a joint British and American special mission to set up a Military Supply Program for the Soviet Union. Then out of the clear blue sky, I was selected as one of the staff to go to the Soviet Union. We flew to London where we met with the other members of our mission under Averell Harriman.

We were in London for ten days of conferences with the other members of our mission. Our mission was headed by Averell Harriman. The British part of the mission was headed by Lord Beaverbrook. Our London meetings concluded with a luncheon at 10 Downing St. hosted by Winston Churchill. Our mission then joined our two B-24 bombers at Prestwick, Scotland. This was the 24th of September 1941. This you will realize was before Pearl Harbor but the war in Europe was raging on.

Our bombers were B-24s (Liberators). We had never seen one of these since they were our newest planes. They were numbers 73 and 75 built. The actual numbers were "3" and "5" built. The numbers were to mislead the Germans.

On the late afternoon of September 24th we climbed aboard our planes in Prestwick, Scotland and were off to Russia. Our plane carried the crew and eight passengers, four on each side of the catwalk. They included Colonel Philip Famonville who became Chief of our mission to Moscow, Konstantine Oumanski, the Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. and Quentin Reynolds, Foreign correspondent of Colliers magazine. From Prestwick we headed for Archangel via the North

Cape. Off the Shetland Islands, we were suddenly attacked by three strange aircraft out of the setting sun, firing 20 M.M. guns. we thought we had had it, but the firing suddenly stopped and along side came three R.A.F. Spitfires. They waggled their wings to say "sorry chaps." the word hadn't reached the R.A.F. that we were flying in that area. Happily we had American flags painted on the wings so they finally recognized us.

It became quite an eventful flight off the North Cape. Some strange planes came after us but we were able to duck into some clouds and lost them.

We were supposed to land at Archangel but we saw that the airfield was too small to get out of if we landed there. After checking our fuel supply, we decided we could probably make Moscow with careful flying. So, to the consternation of the Russians, we flew on. They sent MiG fighters after us who dove on us but didn't try to knock us down. After about six more hours of flying, we were over Moscow and, after some miscues by the Russians, we landed. As we taxied up to the air terminal, all four engines stopped. We were out of gas! All this after 15½ hours of flying, which set the world over water record at the time. We flew most of the time at about 22,000 feet, which was the maximum altitude for B-24s. We were freezing to death in our heavy sheepskin flying suits but it was about 40 below zero at that altitude.

After landing, we were all taken to the Hotel National in Moscow, which was to be our home for a few days. That first evening, there was a reception for our mission at the ambassador's residence, Spaso House, to make a arrangements for the conference.

The conference began the next morning at Spiridonifka, the Government's guest home. Aside from the principal delegates - Beaverbrook and Harriman - the participants were: Soviets - Colonel General Yacolev, Colonel General Colkov, and some other Lt. Generals; the British were General Sir Hastings Ismay, Lt. General Sir Gordon McCready, Lt. General Sir Mason McFarland, Lt. General Sir Allen Brook and Colonel Exham. Our delegation was Major General James Burns, Colonel Bundy and Lt. Olson. What a surprise this was to be named a delegate - participant of the Military Supply Committee.

We met for two days discussing the lists of military and other supplies and equipment each side wanted and what each side was able to supply.

At the end of the day, we were all escorted to the Catherine the Great Room of the Kremlin, where Stalin served as host of an incredible banquet for about 80 people. I was by far the lowest ranking person present. The banquet consisted of 26 courses and there were 36 toasts of vodka, wine, etc., drunk. The session lasted until 3 a.m. with movies, etc. Needless to say no one was in very good shape by the time it was over.

The next day, Harriman called the American side together and announced that agreement had been reached on a military supply program for the Soviet Union, and that some would have to stay behind to administer the program. This was good news for me since it meant, I thought, that I could return home. To my surprise, Harriman said, "General Faymonville, you will be chief of the Military Supply Mission to the Soviet Union. Lieutenant Olson, you will be his deputy, for the time being. And thus it was nearly two years before I got out of Russia.

*Q: What was your impression of both your reception in Moscow and also Moscow at this time? This was just at the height of the German offensive.*

OLSON: We had the feeling that the Russians were ready for anything. They were losing ground to the Germans everywhere.

*Q: What was your impression of Stalin?*

OLSON: Well, I met Stalin. He was a man about five feet five inches tall and he shook my hand with a very limp handshake. He noticed the red, white, and blue shoulder patch on my uniform and he asked Oumanski, who was the interpreter, about it. Oumanski said to me, "I guess he thinks you're a Marshall, a big star. That is the sign of a Marshall in the Soviet Union." Quentin Reynolds and Wallace Carroll, who were correspondents, were standing behind me, and unbeknownst to me, they recorded all of this. About three weeks later, an article came out on the front page of the New York Times, saying, "Stalin mistakes American Lieutenant for a Marshall." Stalin, when you looked at him, had white hair and sallow skin and you wondered if he was this "man-eating dictator" of all the Russians. He was a quiet-looking little man, until you looked at his eyes. Then you could feel that here was a powerful person.

*Q: It was a pretty difficult time?*

OLSON: Yes, the Germans were at the gate of Moscow. On the morning of October 15th, I was following the reports for the military attaché on the radio and listening in and I went to General Faymonville and said, "I don't know what our policy is going to be, but it seems to me that we were sent here to help the Red Army even if the Germans come in and try to get around us." The General said, "Yes, I think that's right. I'll go and see the Ambassador." He went to see Ambassador Steinhardt and I didn't hear from either of them for several hours. All of a sudden, I got a telephone call from Faymonville and he said, "Clint, don't disturb anybody, but pass the word around that we've got to leave town in four hours." So I had to race around and get a hole of everybody who was in Moscow and we arranged to get to the American Embassy. In the meantime, a blizzard had come up. We could hear the guns. They were fairly close to Moscow. We had heard the guns earlier. This big storm came up and we were told that we were going to go take the train to the Kazan station and we would move out to the East. At midnight, we finally got the orders to move out. So, carrying what little baggage we had with us, we went to the station and the populace were already starting to panic. So, we marched to the station with the Soviets' Kremlin Guard holding back the populace. We climbed aboard the train and eventually under way. We headed toward the East or Southeast.

*Q: Where did you set up your quarters?*

OLSON: First, we were in Moscow. After that, we were in the American Embassy.

*Q: When you left Moscow, where did you go?*

OLSON: We left Moscow and were en route for almost six days to go 500 miles. We ended up in Kuybyshev. There was an old school building which we took over and that became our quarters



and our headquarters. It probably had 25 to 30 small rooms. That became our home away from home. We were not very well supplied. On the train going out, we had few supplies. Not much in the way of food, but we had an excellent supply of liquor. It kept our morale up on the train. It took us about six days to make that trip. There were a couple of trains behind us. One of them had the Bolshoi Opera and the Ballet and just by coincidence, all of us being young Americans, by the time we got to Kuybyshev, the trains were all mixed up. So we had the good luck to get to know a fair number of Bolshoi Ballet. As I said, we didn't have much to eat, but we had a lot to drink.

*Q: To move on, what was your mission doing in Kuybyshev? When were supplies starting to come in?*

OLSON: Some were coming in immediately. Our job really was to keep track of those supplies coming in, answering the requests of the Russians for the war supplies that they wanted. As it turned out, most of this was done through Washington, between Moscow and Washington. We really did not, honestly, have a hell of a lot to do a lot of the time.

*Q: Could you talk a bit about your Commanding General? He was an infamous figure. How did you see him at the time? I've had other views from books and so on. Jim MacArthur had very strong views about him. But what was your impression of him? Where was he coming from?*

OLSON: As you probably know from history, he was rather friendly towards the Soviets - somewhat pro-Communist. He was really one of the guys who selected me for this mission. I didn't know that much about him except that he went to Stanford. He was a brilliant man. He was a bit of a protégé of Eleanor Roosevelt, as it turned out. I didn't know all of this when we first got involved. They were sort of "ultra liberal" in their approach to things. He was very secretive for the most part. He was a very gentle, nice, guy in social occasions. He was so regarded, not only by the attachés, but also by the Embassy in Moscow. Some of them were absolutely convinced after a year or so that he was working for the Soviets. There was nothing to indicate that he was disloyal, but I can understand why these fictions came about. I had many conversations with the General in which I disagreed with him on what the Russians were doing, and on Russian policy. I could say this for Faymonville, instead of knocking my ears down, which he could have done, he allowed me to project my opinions.

*Q: From my understanding, part of the atmosphere was that they weren't giving due credit to the fact that these were our supplies coming and also our people were under tremendous restrictions. Here we were allies and were supplying them and we were being treated almost as an enemy. Was that true where you were?*

OLSON: Absolutely true. We were under surveillance wherever we went. They were doing some surveillance, as primitive as they were in those days. Although some of them weren't so primitive.

*Q: It seems that it happened at that time, it's almost hard to recreate it, but there were people who were like "I saw the future and it works." People were seeing the Soviet Union in a glorified way.*

OLSON: Like Joe Davies.

*Q: It's as if almost all judgment was suspended.*

OLSON: That was the Roosevelt sort of approach to things. That is all very true. I happily had an interesting diplomatic job, not to cross swords with the General and not cross swords with my comrades in the Army. We worked that out okay. That attachés sneaked an FBI guy in at one point and he made a report and about ten years ago when one of the books that was written about that period came out, I was quoted as saying, "General Faymonville is not fit to wear the uniform for the United States." I was very upset with what had been written. I was very upset by that because, while I disagreed with Faymonville on many things, I would never make a statement like that.

*Q: As a young man in this very tight little community, I assume that you were getting together with some of our younger officers, Tommy Thompson and those. Were they coming at you and saying, "Can't you do something about your General?"*

OLSON: No, the ones who were coming at us like Mike Michela, the Army attaché, who was really almost paranoid about Faymonville. He had been trained into that by Ivan Yeaton, the previous military attaché. They hated Faymonville. They felt powerless inside the Embassy. They felt the attaché should be more powerful than the Special Mission Officers.

*Q: It's the usual thing. Power goes to who's got something to hand out. If you've got something to hand out you're not going to get it, so maybe part of Faymonville's problem was the fact of the jealousy on the part of the attaché.*

OLSON: Well, even before that, Faymonville having been the military attaché in Russia back in the 1920's and 1930's, was much more experienced than these other guys. They were jealous of the history involved. He was a very capable guy and had quite a following of sycophants. His reputation was further denigrated by Roosevelt sending people like Joe Davies over on Special Missions. Joe Davies was one of the biggest idiots I ever met in my life and everybody knew that.

*Q: Yes, he was a very wealthy man who had been Ambassador there who portrayed Stalin as a benign ruler.*

OLSON: Well, he started showing his would be "Mission to Moscow" in the American Embassy in Moscow and the British Ambassador and all of the other allied Ambassador's were there to listen to him. After about half a dozen sentences, there were some giggles and pretty soon half of them got up and left. Joe Davies got mad at that point and walked out. He was mad that these people who had walked out on him. I could go on at length about Joe and my relationship with him.

*Q: Why don't we move on. What happened to you? What did you do?*

OLSON: In the spring and summer of 1942, I was sent to Murmansk along with a wonderful

Naval Officer, Admiral Frankel, then Captain, was holding the fort in Murmansk. In the meantime, they bombed up to 14 times a day from 20 minutes flying time away. They would drop their loads and would come back. I was blown out of bed and the floor above me blown away on one occasion. Happily, there were no injuries.

*Q: What was the impression during this period about the American Military community and the survivability of the Soviet Union, by this tie?*

OLSON: By that time, Laurence Steinhardt, who had been the Ambassador and the Military Attaché Ivan Yeaton were of the opinion that the German's would wipe out the Russians. Then came the evacuation of Moscow and they were all counting on that sort of thing happening. Actually when the Russians started to regain control and set off a couple of offensives that were quite successful in changing the atmosphere. Then everybody was pro Soviet, pro Russian and pro victory, and not afraid of losing.

*Q: How were you treated as Americans in Murmansk? The British and the Americans were taking tremendous losses in getting to convoys in Murmansk. How were you treated?*

OLSON: On the whole, fairly well. Frankel did a great job in Murmansk in gaining support. He was pretty well liked by the Russians up there and those who were right at the front line in effect were generally pro American. We had no great trouble. We didn't have the type of surveillance up there that we had when we were around Moscow. We were treated much better in North Russian than we were in Moscow.

*Q: Were you in Murmansk for long?*

OLSON: About two months.

*Q: And then where?*

OLSON: I went back to Moscow. In the meantime, we moved our headquarters in the Military Mission from Kuybyshev, back to Moscow. That was in January 1942. Then I sent off to Tehran, where we had the Persian Gulf Command coming in and I was involved in establishing communications and liaison with our Mission in Moscow.

**JAMES MCCARGAR**  
**Vice Consul**  
**Kuybyshev and Moscow (1942-1944)**

*James McCargar was born in 1920 and raised in San Francisco, California. He received a bachelor's degree from Stanford University in 1941. Mr. McCargar's Foreign Service career included positions in the Dominican Republic, Hungary, Italy, and France. He was interviewed by Charles Kennedy on April 18, 1995.*

*Q: How did you go to the USSR? Where did you go, and how did this work?*

McCARGAR: The U.S. Government chartered a Pan Am Clipper: the four-engine flying boat that was then the transoceanic air transport. The only way that you could get to Russia was through the Middle East and Iran at that point, unless you went on the supply run around the northern tip of Europe into Murmansk, which was deemed too dangerous for everybody -- and shortly was definitively proved to be just that.

So we took off from New York in the chartered Clipper. It was a very interesting bunch of people on board. Louis Fischer, friend of Chicherin, the great Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs during the Twenties, and author of an outstanding history of the Bolshevik Revolution (which I had read at Stanford, and which had made Fischer *persona non grata* to Stalin) was on his way to India to interview Gandhi (Fischer became a great devotee). Maurice Hindus, whose books on collectivization in the Ukraine and southern Russia (*Red Bread, Humanity Uprooted*) was on board. There were a number of military headed to India and China, among them pilots on their way to Kunming and the "Flying Tigers." An Army captain who was in fact in OSS -- then called the COI, Coordinator of Information -- who became a lifelong friend. This was very exciting, and instructive, for a young man just starting out.

We refueled in Miami and then Trinidad. As we crossed the mouth of the Amazon (and the equator) the captain executed a sudden drop in altitude, to initiate us as new subjects of Neptune (a peacetime ceremony adapted from ship crossings of the equator that quickly disappeared). Following which one engine went out. We waited one week in Belem for a replacement engine. Parker Hart was Consul there, and I quickly unloaded into his safe the diplomatic pouch which was chained to my wrist, in order to enjoy the sparkling social life then animating this metropolis of the Amazon.

After Belem we refueled again at Natal, and crossed the South Atlantic from there to Fisherman's Lake in Liberia -- a route that Pan Am had set up under Government contract. The co-pilot on our plane happened to be a Stanford man whom I'd known very well. He told me that when they first laid out the route they flew into Fisherman's Lake and, as they were about to drop this huge flying boat down onto the lake, they saw all the fishermen in dugouts on the lake leap out of their dugouts and run to shore. They quickly pulled back up for another round at putting the ship down in what they hoped was deeper water.

After Liberia our final Pan Am stop was to be Lagos, in Nigeria. But this was April 1942, and no one knew what the position of the French military in the West African colonies might be. From Liberia we flew south, far out to sea, and then turned east, following at a distance the line of the coast. From off the British colony of the Gold Coast, we had a fighter escort from the British base at Takoradi, which accompanied us until we were past the three French colonies preceding Nigeria, which was, of course, British.

*Q: There was still doubt. Vichy was in control there, and de Gaulle was beginning to make some moves, but that was all?*

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