

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

MARGARET CARNWATH JONES

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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Q: Today is July 22, 2010. I'm interviewing Margaret Carnwath Jones. Where does the Carnwath come from?

JONES: My middle name is a Scottish name; it was mother's maiden name and it means "a pile of stones beside a brook."

Q: Okay, I understand the name Kennedy in Gaelic means "ugly head."

JONES: That's not so good!

Q: Okay, Peggy, well, when and where were you born?

JONES: I was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Q: When?

JONES: On November 21, 1944.

Q: Let's get a little family background. What do you know, on your father's side? What were the Joneses and others up to? Do you know how they got to America?

JONES: Yes, some of them. I was going to trace some of it back and then never got around to it. I have some of the names.

Daddy was a birthright Quaker, which means his parents were married in the Quaker Church. As Quakers his ancestors were early settlers in Pennsylvania, some arriving in the early days of the colony in the late 17th century. Members of the family continued to farm into the 60s in the area around Route One in Delaware and Chester counties in Pennsylvania. His father was from Bucks County, more to the north. If you dig back enough, I'm related to most people with a Quaker descent in that area.

Q: On your father's fairly direct line, grandparents and all, what sort of activities were they involved in?

JONES: Farming. I was one year old when my grandfather died. I was born late in my parents' marriage, so I never knew him. I only knew my one grandfather, on my mother's

side.

But he was a farmer. My grandmother on Daddy's side was a schoolteacher in one of those one room schoolhouses which Daddy attended. He would listen to all the other lessons, so I think he graduated from high school at the age of 13 to 14, and ended up going to medical school at a fairly early age. He was an orthopedic surgeon.

Q: So where did he take his medical degree?

JONES: At Hahnemann Hospital and Medical School in Philadelphia. Hahnemann was a homeopathic doctor who established a hospital. Daddy went to school there but by then the curriculum was not dominated by homeopathy.

Daddy was one of the most intelligent people I've ever known, interested in a number of things. In World War II he enlisted in the navy on December 8, 1941 and ended up being in charge of amputation and rehabilitation for members of the navy and marine corps; if they came from families located east of the Mississippi, they came through the naval hospital in Philadelphia.

He continued to work for the navy after he was back in private practice, including some very hush-hush work. He would go out and use a telephone outside our home and he sometimes canceled appointments and would be picked up by military flights in Philadelphia. My mother and I never knew what type of work he was doing for the navy. I've always intended to try to find out more about this. I think I now might be able to do so since he died more than fifty years ago, but I haven't started the process yet.

He died in 1961, at 56.

Q: Very young.

JONES: It was his third heart attack, but that was before bypass surgery. I think with some of the advances now, they could have done something to prolong his life.

Q: What do you know about your mother's side of the family?

JONES: My grandfather James Carnwath was a Protestant from Northern Ireland who emigrated at the age of 18 to Philadelphia. He was an identical twin and there were other children in the family. He had a pushcart for a while, but he then established a factory business that made boxes and crates in Philadelphia.

Q: And your mother, where'd she go to school?

JONES: She started at Randolph-Macon, then went to Goucher College, near Baltimore. She became a medical social worker, working at Hahnemann Hospital where she met my father.

But coming back to her antecedents, her mother was descended from folks from the Orkney Islands, in Scotland. I never knew her, she died relatively young.

Daddy was in essence an only child. He was born very late in the marriage and his sister had already died of scarlet fever. His older brother died of a heart attack fairly young, before I was born. His brother had one child Bertha Gail, who suffered from kidney disease and was therefore warned never to have children. She eventually had a kidney replacement but died several years ago.

On mother's side, there's a lot more relatives, but I was an only child. My mother, when she was 16, which was before antibiotics or penicillin, had a ruptured appendix and she ended up spending six months in the hospital.

It was considered a miracle that she survived at all, because of the infection from the rupture. The day when she was originally ready to leave the hospital she woke up in this sea of pus so she was not released. Ironically, her doctor's assistant died of a ruptured appendix while she was there.

She had so many adhesions and scarring as a result that the doctors didn't think that she'd ever have children. Eventually though I was born two weeks before their 10th wedding anniversary.

Q: All right, let's see, where did you grow up?

JONES: I grew up in Media and Wallingford, Pennsylvania, which are in Delaware County. Media's the county seat. Wallingford is close by, near Swarthmore, on the train line out of Philadelphia.

Q: Was it a Philadelphia suburb, really?

JONES: Yes, in a way.

Q: Then, what was it like?

JONES: Media's just an old fashioned town where you knew a lot of people and you could walk around, visit little shops. My parents left their house in Media when Daddy enlisted since he might be sent overseas and they moved to my maternal grandfather's house in Elkins Park, Pa. Daddy did get a number of orders to go overseas but they were always canceled since his work at Naval Hospital in Philadelphia on amputation and rehabilitation was considered too important to let him go. After the war, they moved back to an apartment in Media which is the home there I remember.

Q: Everybody knew you?

JONES: Yes. And then we moved to Wallingford where my parents bought a house. Wallingford is only a 10 or 15 minute drive from Media so we are not talking big

distances here. The places had separate identities, but they also kind of merged.

Q: Was the area going through sort of you might say the gentrification process, or not? One thinks of some of the fancy New York authors and all moving down to Bucks County.

JONES: No, it wasn't like that. What I mean is as housing was developed the lines became the towns blurred. There were and are beautiful homes in our area, but if someone was really interested in society, they'd probably have settled in Bucks County or on the Main Line, which is Bryn Mawr and that area. The latter designation referred to towns located along the main railroad line from Philadelphia. By and large there were not social climbers in Wallingford. But we did have Dick Clark living in our area as our notable celebrity.

Q: The dance

JONES: Yeah, he was hosting his influential TV show in Philadelphia, which I watched as a teenager, with the dances and everything..

Q: Teenager dancers, or something.

JONES: Yes and promoting popular music and groups. He and his second wife would sometimes be seen in matching jump suits, which for that era was a little bit different, but nobody cared.

Q: Let's talk about being a young kid. First place, was your family Quaker?

JONES: No, Daddy didn't practice the Quaker religion. He actually thought they were a bunch of hypocrites. Perhaps that fact that his mother died when he was 11 or 12 had an effect on this.

So I was raised as a Presbyterian, which was my mother's faith.

Q: Was religion very important in your

JONES: I think so, not as important, now, but it was, it was there.

Q: What about politics? Where'd your family fall, when you were a kid?

JONES: They were Republican, really Republican, though, interestingly, one of Daddy's cousins beat out Republican machine members to run as reform candidate within the party. He served one term as treasurer of Pennsylvania and was active in Delaware County politics. Daddy followed some of that. I would describe them as moderate Republicans.

Delaware County was Republican. If you wanted to work in the courthouse, you pretty well had to be Republican. When I was growing up, it was run by a group called the War

Board and it was really a one party district, run by this group. One man in particular that ran Chester city was a very unsavory candidate.

Philadelphia of course was very Democratic.

I always remember my parents referring to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “who sold us down the river at Yalta”. My father, being a naval medical officer, had a pretty good idea of how sick the president was, which the general population did not

Q: Yes . Looking back at the pictures, realizing how close to death he was.

JONES: But they were also shocked when he died. They heard it at a cocktail party and they were shocked the party just continued on as if nothing had happened. My father was very patriotic.

Q: Well, what it like, let's take sort of early years, up through maybe elementary school, growing up in Media and all? You have a kids group you went out with?

JONES: It's interesting, there were different ages, there was a large Catholic family who lived across the street, and I saw them a lot. You just played, as kids. It was a range of ages and you did your things. I can't remember what we did.

Q: Today, we're looking at children who are sort of scheduled up to a fare thee well, they're taking piano lessons, they're playing soccer, they have to be driven here or there. Maybe I'm making an assumption, that you were allowed to go out in the street, because the streets are safe.

JONES: Oh, yes, you could go out and play around down in the woods quite safely. My parents would even leave the house unlocked at times. I did take piano lessons for a time, but my mother wasn't big into scheduling people.

Of course when you get to school you get busy and she had to act as a chauffeur at times.

I was much affected by the fact that I am an asthmatic. I had my first asthma attack when I was six months old. There weren't any medications then. I remember when Benadryl, which is nothing but an antihistamine, came along when I was about three or four.

If I'd get an attack as a baby Mother would have the steam kettle on and be rocking me in a chair, because there was no medicine available unlike today when there are suppositories for babies and all sorts of atomizers.

And I could get asthma from running, so that affected what I could do, but my parents didn't hold me in or anything. I'd also get asthma when I first played in the snow, but after I rested I could go out for the rest of the day.

One time Mother shocked this lady that worked for us for years, because I came up and

said, “Mommy, I have an asthma attack” and she looked at me and said, “Well, you’ll get many more in the future” which made Stella very angry.

So I was an only child, did a lot of reading, still read a lot.

Q: Were you much of reader?

JONES: Oh, yes.

Q: Let’s talk about sort of the early years, what kind of books attracted you? Any have an effect on you, or not?

JONES: I couldn’t have dogs, I was allergic to them, we had a dog when I was first born and then we tried one another but I only went six months before getting a serious asthma attack. I also loved horses, so I read a lot of dog and horse things. I completely skipped the teenage romances, I have no idea why, but they weren’t of interest to me.

I read a lot of children’s classics and then in the sixth grade and seventh grade, skipped into adult literature.

Q: Probably read Albert Payson Terhune

JONES: Yes, yes, the collie

Q: Wrote a lot on collies and all that.

JONES: Yes, yes, I read the collie ones

Q: And then there was My Friend Flicka and whatever.

JONES: And *Black Beauty*.

Q: Black Beauty and all that.

JONES: And then there’s a dog book my father loved called *Beautiful Joe*, which was written against cropping dog’s tails and ears.

I can’t remember which publisher, every month they published a well done historical book and my parents got them for me. I learned a lot of history from those books. There were ones on early man, history of Scotland Yard, etc.

Q: I think Time-Life did a lot of that.

JONES: Or Random House. One of them had this monthly book. I don’t think I have any of them anymore, so I can’t verify. My parents also had lots of books I could look at, got me encyclopedias early and always read newspapers and discussed politics and current

events at the dinner table. There were also magazines such as Life, Look, National Geographic and Reader's Digest.

Q: Well this was it. You're an only child. Were you sort of included in the discussions at a fairly early age?

JONES: Oh, yes, nobody in my family's very reticent. If you were, you got trampled.

Q: In elementary school, what subjects did you like and what ones didn't you like, or did you differentiate?

JONES: I just liked school. I liked schools. I liked all the subjects and I could do math as well as read. I liked foreign languages, when I got to them.

Q: Your elementary school, what kind of school was it? Was it a pretty small one, or

JONES: I guess it was pretty small. When I graduated from high school, my graduating class was I think 135 people. So I would imagine the grades were kind of around that, you'd have about that many people in different classrooms and all. So it was small enough that you knew everybody.

And it was an integrated school, in the sense that there was one section of town where African-Americans lived and they came to the school, so we did have diversity within the school of various backgrounds.

Then across the street from the elementary school there was an orphanage and people from the orphanage went to school, too.

Q: In elementary and even high school, how did the mix work? Were there any problems?

JONES: You mean between the groups?

Q: Yeah. Any tensions, or

JONES: No, a lot of people from the one area in the school district weren't college bound, so there would also be secretarial courses, and shop in addition to more academic courses in high school. So there was kind of a divide according to classes and goals as you got into high school.

But I don't recall any real tensions and I graduated from high school in 1962, which was really before the drugs. When people got into trouble, it was drinking beer. There weren't drugs around. It was just before that.

Q: In high school, did you get involved in extracurricular activities?

JONES: Oh, yes, yes. The last year I co-edited the school paper. I couldn't play sports,

but I was manager for a couple of the teams such as the hockey team and would go to the games.

They didn't really have as many extracurricular options as I think they have today. But then you would come to school for the games, if there's a basketball game, you come for the game or whatever and you do that or the football games and the fall. There were things to do, there weren't enormous amounts of extracurricular things like chess clubs or whatever.

Q: In high school, did your sort of reading focus on anything, history or literature?

JONES: No, I started liking murder mysteries early, but I read a fair amount of good literature. Also, I do like biographies and history, so I probably read a lot of those. One thing, I first read War and Peace in seventh grade.

Q: Oh, boy!

JONES: And my mother was worried. She asked the teacher who responded "She'll get out of it what she can get out of it." There was a public library in Swarthmore within walking distance from home. Sometimes the librarian would call and ask Mother if she I could check out the books I wanted. For example, Thomas Hardy aroused some concerns. Mother always said yes.

Catherine Drinker Bowen lived in our area and I actually went and interviewed her, I did a report on her in school, read her biographies. A lot of history, now I think about it, I read a lot of history. And I had an aunt that loved to read.

Q: Catherine Drinker Bowen wrote a biography of Oliver Wendell Holmes.

JONES: Yes and she wrote a very good one on Sir Edward Coke, the Elizabethan attorney general and early advocate for parliamentary rights under James I. I had an aunt who loved to read about English history.

Q: Did you get involved in sort of the early history of Pennsylvania and all that? Was that

JONES: Not too much. We had it in school and you had it around you, you'd go to Valley Forge, go to Philadelphia. With the family history you had a little bit, they were there as farmers.

And actually where my parents are buried and where I'll go is Birmingham Meeting House, which is in Chester County. It was a hospital during the Battle of the Brandywine in the Revolutionary War. In our area you know the Revolution more than others might, because it's just around you.

Q: Because where we are here in Virginia of course it's

JONES: The Civil War, yeah.

Q: You graduated from high school in '62. I assume you were probably pointed towards college, weren't you?

JONES: Oh, yes.

Q: Where did you go?

JONES: I went to Duke.

Q: Why Duke?

JONES: I really wanted to go to Stanford, but my mother had a talk with me and said she didn't think it would be very fair, being an only child, to go so far away. We looked at schools in the South because I had developed cold urticaria when I was eleven which means that I get hives from the cold. Our thought was to go where it wouldn't be so cold if you were sitting in a football game. And so I selected Duke and was admitted on early admission, so Daddy knew it before he died.

Q: So were you at Duke

JONES: '62 to '66.

Q: When you arrived there, how would you describe Duke, what was it like?

JONES: When I arrived at Duke, it was still segregated, there were no blacks. There were civil rights activities taking place in town. There was a women's college, with a separate campus. Now, it's much more intermingled and you have the guys and the girls all together in dorms.

But there were very good teachers, a very good school, good library and I had a number of friends, I'm not a demonstrator, but I had a number of friends who were involved in the demonstrations that were going on and some of them went to Birmingham and all.

They would have civil rights demonstrations downtown and the police would arrest everybody and put them in jail overnight and only let them make a call in the morning. Well, in the girls' dorms we had to sign out and you had times when you were supposed to be back in.

So people would be in jail overnight and not in the dorm on time. So Duke said, "Okay, if you're going to the demonstration, just sign out for the demonstration and if you don't come in by curfew, we're just going to assume you're in jail," which, when you think about it, is very, very funny.

Q: The demonstrations were all because of

JONES: Racism and civil rights.

Q: Racism, it wasn't Vietnam?

JONES: No. That was a little bit later.

Q: Was there much in the way of sort of student body rejection of integration, or was this sort of an outside influence and the students didn't see the problem?

JONES: Well, Duke integrated while I was there and started admitting blacks. There was no reaction. I had a roommate my first year from Tennessee and she said, "Oh, a Yankee!" There's a different mentality down South.

You see a bit of it today: sororities are so much more important than up North and all sorts of other things, how people thought about things. They played Dixie during basketball games, nobody thought anything about it. But there was a black college in Durham as well, where I once went to hear Joan Baez, in a separate part of town.

Vice President Humphrey came to speak once and the Klan came out. It was really the only time the Klan was walking around Durham while I was in school. You didn't see the Klan much down there, but of course further south it was a different story.

Q: Did you feel very much sort of a northerner and these people like the Klan are poor, benighted, ignorant loafers, or not?

JONES: No, I felt very much a northerner, but I think northerners also had blinders on, because it was much easier to avoid seeing segregation in the North than it was in the South.

In the South, at least, people are much more intermingled and I thought in some ways there may be more hope for working out some things about among people than if you're completely in two different spots.

Q: Yeah, because when you think about Philadelphia and all, it was quite segregated, really.

JONES: Yes and even when you think about the black section of town, they're far from where everybody else lived. Now, in high school I had a wonderful social studies teacher and one thing he did and this was in '61, was take us into Philadelphia where we heard Martin Luther King Jr. speak in a small setting and we met him. I've never forgotten that.

Q: You were in high school when the election of 1960 took place.

JONES: Yes.

Q: But did you find that candidate Kennedy struck a responsive chord for you, or not?

JONES: No, I was still in the Republican mode then, I think.

Q: And race was not part of the election debate.

JONES: No, it was more religion. Of course, when Kennedy was assassinated, I thought, "Oh my God, Lyndon Johnson is president!"

Q: How'd you find classes at Duke?

JONES: I thought they were good. Sometimes I talked my way into special ones, like a graduate course, but I had very good professors and good classes. I majored in political science.

Q: Why political science?

JONES: I was always interested in other countries and international relations and politics. I don't know why, but I just was. Contemporary, rather than historical.

Q: Well, political science was in a way a different creature then than now. It hadn't gotten quantitative and

JONES: There was some already. There was that strain already in political science. But I had a wonderful professor of international relations, he was Polish, had been in the Polish diplomatic service, left Poland after the war, a very wise person. Said that when you think of a course of action, try to think to where it might lead and various possibilities and ask if you can accept the possible consequences.

Between my sophomore and junior year I went on a work project in Nicaragua to a village called Pearl Lagoon on the eastern side of the country and did various things. They had built a clinic there a year before and they were staffing it a bit and doing things and so I did that. We had medical students with us and we also had donated vaccinations.

And I went to France with the Experiment in International Living one year.

Q: In Nicaragua, what were you doing?

JONES: You were trying to figure out what going on in town, maybe help with children, helping with the cooking and stuff. It was very interesting, destroyed all your stereotypes, because it was a part of Nicaragua which is English-speaking and Protestant. There were still some Indians in the area, but they didn't really go into the village but lived in a very low, marshy, desolate area nearby. There was one person in town who was very enterprising, did shrimp fishing and everything.

And the main store was operated by this old Chinese couple who spoke some dialect of Chinese and very little English. Their two sons were more modern, but one of them married a girl from Costa Rica and the other had married a mail order bride from Hong Kong. You'd go into the store and there was a picture of Chiang Kai-shek next to one of Somoza.

Because the English were there in the eastern part of Nicaragua, rather than the Spanish, the missionaries that came through were Protestants. You still had a lot of Protestant missionaries working in that area.

So I thought, "Here we were, Latin America, they speak English, they're Protestant."

Q: Just looking at a map there

JONES: You would fly across to Bluefields and then you went north by boat for about six hours. Then we did some excursions to nearby towns and islands by boat. And in virtually all the towns, you'd find a Chinese merchant.

Q: Did you develop a taste for working abroad?

JONES: Yeah, I think I did. I wanted to learn about other cultures and I didn't think you really learned about them as a tourist. But then I found out that there's other restrictions in the Foreign Service, in how much you learn about a culture, but, anyway, staying for a while seemed more appealing to me than just whisking in and whisking out again. I liked reading about diplomacy and this kind of thing.

Q: Well, did the Cold War intrude on you?

JONES: I don't think so, except I felt I spent more time studying socialism and communism than I probably wish I had. Oh, when I think of some of those courses! Oh, well!

No, it didn't really intrude on me and it was funny, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, I tend to like to read presidential speeches instead of sitting through them, so I was in the library when Kennedy gave his speech and I was so calm in the following days.

People around me were panicked: "What's going to happen to my brother? Are we going to be bombed?" I was just kind of floating along. So that one didn't really hit me, for some reason.

But, the Cold War, well, it shaped our life for a while. We did have bomb drills in school and

Q: "Duck and cover" and that sort of thing?

JONES: We had a couple close to where we lived that built a bomb shelter.

Q: And while you were in college, did you or any of your compatriots, were they talking much about government service?

JONES: No.

Q: This wasn't something you were particularly pointed towards?

JONES: I thought about the State Department, of course. It was more when I went to Johns Hopkins School of Advanced international Studies or SAIS after college, that I was thinking more about it.

But, also, I was the campus representative for the National Student Associations that was considered kind of liberal. I was the head of it when we were voted off the Women's Campus in '65. That was a year things took a very conservative turn politically and the campus went more conservative, it really did, the way people were thinking.

My senior year in college, they started a French dorm, where you spoke French, which I joined.

There were sororities and fraternities at Duke, but only about half the student body were members and I didn't join.

Q: Did our involvement in Vietnam intrude much on your activities?

JONES: No, it was more a concern for the guys, the draft and all. I was very much against the war, we had wonderful political debates at home, with friends and everything, I just thought it was a war that wasn't winnable and I didn't see the point of it.

Of course it affected all of us, the experience of it, people that died. There were two people out of my high school class that died in Vietnam and I went down to the Vietnam Wall and picked out their names, thinking "What a waste."

You walk along the Vietnam War Memorial and all you can think is, "What a waste! All these people, they could have done something more productive in the world and they're dead, they've been dead all these years!" There's something about seeing those names there that just really, it's very moving. I thought, "I have to go look."

Q: Then you graduated in '66. What were you pointed towards?

JONES: Going to graduate school or law school and I ended up picking SAIS. I was accepted by the University of Pennsylvania Law School, but I guess I was really interested in doing international work and I thought doing international work through a law degree is much chancier than heading more directly towards it.

I spent my first year, '66-'67, at their Bologna Center and then I finished up at SAIS in

'67-68.

Q: So how was the Bologna Center?

JONES: It was great, it was really great. Bologna's a wonderful town. We had good professors. I did a lot of study of French politics, de Gaulle and all.

When I think about the Italy of '66, the European Union hadn't developed, as it has today, and it was much poorer than it is today, a lot more people on motorcycles, it was somewhat a different Europe, where now everything has gotten bigger.

A lot of us lived in apartments in a building that was then on outskirts of town, but which is now fully within the city. And you learned about the unions, you get some feel for European politics.

I'll always remember a bus strike in Bologna. They didn't have the money to just go out on strike, so they went out about six hours a day, in two hour segments and you'd get on the bus and there was this schedule about when the bus would operate that day and the following days. It would almost have been more convenient if they had simply shut the service down totally.

Q: Did you sort of get out and around in Italy?

JONES: Yes, we did some. I didn't tour as much as I did later, when I was assigned there, but we did do some and we went up to Paris one time and we'd go around Bologna a bit.

Some people did more. Some people went to Florence a lot. And of course we were there the year of the flood and some of my fellow students went down and helped clean out the library and other places in Florence.

My mother and an aunt came that Christmas and we were in Florence for New Year's Eve. We were near by a restaurant I was interest in so I said, "Let me go see if we can go there for New Year's Eve." I popped around the corner and there were people sitting at large table looking at me with astonishment.

Well, it turns out it was the staff getting together and planning to reopen the restaurant for all their friends on New Year's Eve and here was a tourist in front of them already. So we went there and we had a good time. You could see where all the inundation had been there and everything. Boy, that flood was something.

Q: Did SAIS at Bologna have any you might say tilt towards the right or the left or not?

JONES: I don't think so, in a way, because, in a certain sense, too, the whole thing of the Cold War did color what a conservative is and what a leftist is.

There were fall trips and I went to Belgium and Germany, the SAIS program did that and

I went up to visit friends in Munich and I met a friend in Vienna, went up there.

Q: Did you have any contact or feel for the Foreign Service at that point?

JONES: Not really. Got it more in Washington.

Q: You came to Washington in, what

JONES: '67.

Q: '67. Well, this is the beginning of real stuff around Vietnam?

JONES: Yes and in fact I went to the March on Washington. I still have my pin with the Pentagon and the dove on it. One of our professors from Bologna, his sons were very active, in fact they were arrested as part of the Seattle Seven.

The antiwar cause just seemed natural to me, all these demonstrations. What was lacking was a similar phenomenon when we headed into Iraq. Where was the protest? Nowhere to be seen.

Q: No draft.

JONES: That's true. You're right, you're right, yeah, you're right.

Q: Self-interest is important.

JONES: And that's very bad, I think. We've gotten to a place where the military lives off by itself and is very conservative and is kind of unique. I've worked with the Pentagon, I've been in Iraq, I've worked with the military, I don't like what I see where we have all these people pontificating and making decisions that have never fired a gun, they have no idea what it's like to be in battle.

Q: I agree.

JONES: I was also in Washington when Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated. It was the last day before spring break. I was at SAIS and went out and looked and you could see the smoke over the city and then the look of fear on people's faces. Seeing people fleeing the city in their cars, the expression on their faces and then seeing blacks heading back towards where all the troubles were taking place, because in a way they were destroying more black businesses than anything else.

I lived up on Connecticut Avenue at that point, on a hill. I got a friend who lived near Dupont Circle and had a Jaguar to stay with me that night. Another friend couldn't make it. And then we went on the roof of my building and we could watch the fires burning along Fourteenth Street.

Q: I recall, I was here, leaving the State Department, getting a ride with somebody and going up Wisconsin Avenue and here we were, all whites, heading for Bethesda, etc and the poor blacks who were mainly working in service jobs or something, waiting on the street corner to somehow get a ride back to their area, which was really under threat and some of it was burning. It was all very sad.

JONES: And then the curfews at four p.m. and the tanks in Dupont Circle. I was a little afraid to go over to Union Station to go home and my mother's always interested in going places, so she came down and collected me and drove a friend home, too.

Also that year, there was Resurrection City, when Ralph Abernathy came in with the mule-drawn carts and a tent city was created on the Mall. I was at a free concert at the Library of Congress the day they closed it. They announced at intermission that "If you don't have a car, you should leave now. There's a curfew that's been put into place." And I walked out of the Library of Congress to an absolutely empty set of streets, there were no buses, there was nothing.

A cab driver came along, when you still had local Washingtonian cab drivers, you don't see many of them anymore, but a local black Washingtonian, he had a black couple and a child with him and he screeched to a stop and he said, "What are you doing here?"

And he asked his fares, "Mind if I take her home after I take you?" and they said "No" and so he saved me and got me home.

Q: As you're getting close to graduating from SAIS, what were you up to? What were you planning?

JONES: Well, I ended up going to Columbia. I considered the State Department before going although I hadn't taken the Foreign Service exam yet. At the time the State Department required women to resign if you married and I thought, "I'll do some more work and come back and they'll change. This is silly."

Q: Oh, about five years, around '72-'73, then things really started to change.

JONES: Yes and that was funny in a way because State did a study of the family and then changed all sorts of rules about families as well as about women officers. For example, one change was that families could not be mentioned in foreign service evaluations.

When I worked on the '85 women's conference in Nairobi for two years at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations or USUN I met a Canadian woman diplomat who had changed the rules for women diplomats in that country. The Canadians had the same rule, but she got married and she waited for them to tell her to resign. Nobody said diddly squat, so end of rule.

So I have always found it interesting that the rule on women diplomats resigning when they married ended that way in Canada while we typically did so with a study.

Q: And it sort of turned out that there really wasn't a rule, it was accepted and some of the ladies I've interviewed said, "All right, where does it say I have to resign?" and it didn't say anywhere, it was sort of accepted practice.

JONES: But women like Elinor Constable resigned and came back in, because I came into the Foreign Service with a group of women who had resigned after marriage and who then were coming back in. So something happened somewhere.

Q: So in '68 you left SAIS?

JONES: Yes and went to Columbia.

Q: And what were you doing at Columbia?

JONES: Attending the School of International Studies. My second year at Columbia I started working part time at Lehman Brothers, the investment bank, where I was the research assistant to George Ball.

Q: Well, now, at Columbia, were you going towards a PhD?

JONES: Which I never got, anyway, somehow, got bummed out. Various things happened. One is them is that I was a rape victim in my building and somehow it destroyed my concentration, it took a while to get it come back and that played a part in not completing the doctorate, because it really did affect the concentration.

Q: Was that in New York? The details are personal, but was there the equivalent, today there may be over-counseling, but how did you find you were treated, by sort of the authorities and all that?

JONES: The authorities seemed all right. I never had to go testify, because the attack against me was one of several eventually committed by a young man from our neighborhood that had just been released from some institution. He lived with his grandmother one street away; I could look from my bedroom and see the building where they lived.

And he was just escalating, so they had enough people that he had attacked to testify without calling me. He accosted me in the elevator with a knife at my throat. The authorities were fine. I didn't go for any counseling then.

And of course there would have been some consequences for rape, but there was a point in the early seventies where you really had to have fought and been injured to have the attack taken seriously. People talked about combating the crime, but in reality they didn't prosecute the crime a lot, they didn't give it due importance, I don't think. And this is probably still true, with the trafficking in women and rape cases. Sexual crimes against women are just not treated seriously enough.

But, then, finally, almost 13 years later, the memories started to surface again. I went to a counselor then, just in New York City, I was up at USUN and I saw her a few times and got what I needed, which was mainly to confront the possibility that I might have been killed. When asked, "Do you want more?" I said, "No, because I don't want to excavate the past, I want to move forward."

I had learned that the fear of death was part of the reaction. Having the knife at one's throat and the sense of personal violation does some primordial damage. I had buried those feelings, which uses up a great deal of psychic energy. But suddenly the memory was coming back and I couldn't bury it any more so I had to deal with it.

Q: How did this play out? Was this part of the reason you didn't get your dissertation finished?

JONES: I think so. I was also working part time and then finally I was struggling with my topic, it was supposed to be on French international monetary policy and I kept turning down the State Department, I would take the exam for the State Department and they'd call and say, "Come in two weeks" and I'd say, "Oh, go away!" And then in '75 they came and gave me a reasonable amount of time and I just went.

Q: Well, you said you worked for Lehman Brothers for a while?

JONES: Yes, I did.

Q: What were you doing?

JONES: I was the research assistant to George Ball. I also did some international research, working on international bonds and keeping records. But Ball wrote a lot of articles so you never knew what you were going to research.

Q: First place, a little bit of the background for somebody reading this, on George Ball and on your evaluation of his method of operation, impression of him.

JONES: Well, he's a very smart guy and if you've read the insightful articles he wrote on Vietnam, you sometimes wonder why he didn't resign as a matter of conscience. But he was working on important European questions, such as carrying forward the European Economic Community he had worked on with Monnet.

But he was interested in a lot of topics. And he was more of an eminence there, really, he wasn't an investment banker.

I was also there when Pete Peterson came. Bobby Lehman was still alive when I was there although I never met him. It was still a private, not a public firm, very social people in the investment banking world. Roger Altman was there and a descendant of the Carnegies and Theodore Roosevelt IV.

Women really had not broken into the profession yet although they were starting.

So I learned a lot at the firm, meeting these people.

Q: Ball, it's sort of interesting, during the time he was with the State Department, people I've talked to say that it was sort of almost an unwritten law: Ball was responsible for Europe and Rusk took the Far East, Vietnam and all.

JONES: That wouldn't surprise me at all.

Q: And Ball was considered sort of the house dove or something on Vietnam.

JONES: He wrote a couple of memos on Vietnam which from my perspective made a lot of sense when they became public.

Q: But he was an important figure there and particularly he pushed something which gets sort of lost sight of, but the whole idea of the European Union, really it was American policy. We picked it up from Jean Monnet, but the point being that this was sort of

JONES: The barbell idea, have the two equal weights.

Q: This whole idea of having the European Union to prevent these damned civil wars that broke out in Europe, World War One and Two and other ones.

JONES: It began with the Coal and Steel Community and went from there.

Q: And, anyway, it was a policy that we stuck to and really pushed for a couple generations and was very successful, because we could have taken a different view, well, this would be competitive with our economic interests and maybe we shouldn't do, but we didn't go that way.

JONES: The other thing we did, under Marshall, was provide the aid to Europe. Even in '66, when you went to Europe, you could see that they were still coming back from the ravages of World War II.

I can't remember if Ball was Monnet's American lawyer, but he was very close with Jean Monnet, who had the idea for the Coal and Steel Community, which became the European Union and finally led to German reunification.

Q: Had you taken the Foreign Service exam a number of times?

JONES: Yes, I always passed.

Q: How about the oral exams?

JONES: Yes, I passed those, too. But then they would call and say, “Come in two weeks.” I’m up in New York and I’ve got an apartment and a roommate. I think they gave me about three months notice the time I decided to do it.

Q: When did you decide to go in?

JONES: In ’75.

Q: By that time, the married woman officer issue had been pretty well solved. It never will be fully solved, but the basic change had been made.

JONES: And also I’d been in a very competitive environment, not part of the competition, really, but seeing it and I much preferred something like the Foreign Service, where, yes, there are rivalries, but you’re basically working to try to meet common goals, a commonality of effort, rather than the more individual rivalries you get in business and investment banking.

Q: I would assume getting into an organization like Lehman Brothers really would be every person for themselves.

JONES: And they thought I was really funny. I’d be analyzing, say a potential investment in Argentina asking, “Well, do you think you’ll be able to get your money out in five years?” or “What do you think will happen politically?” and they all thought I was hysterically funny.

Q: But were you pretty well fixed into you might say the financial world of things?

JONES: No, I was on the periphery. Ball was on the periphery, really, within Lehman, in the sense that he wasn’t doing the big deals, the mergers or whatever, he was cachet to try and bring clients in.

And then when I worked on these things, I was there part time, so I was more on the periphery.

Q: You recall, any of the times you took the oral exam, any of the questions that were put to you?

JONES: No. They kept changing the exam especially the oral. I always kept taking it as an economic officer, even though my degree was in political science, but I wanted to do economics and you just need to show that you might not know the answer, but you had an idea where to find it, because that’s the most important thing, you can’t carry all everything in your head so admit when you don’t know something, that’s important, rather than to try to fake it through. If you don’t know it, you don’t know it.

Q: So you came in

JONES: '75, yeah, in a very big class. We were sworn in by Kissinger.

Q: What was your class like? How did you feel, the composition and maybe the spirit of the thing?

JONES: We were unusually large, at least a hundred or so, so we didn't become as close as a smaller class might have.

Q: And, too, this would be one of the first classes, sort of the Vietnam thing was pretty well over by that time.

JONES: Yes, because I had a friend that went in a couple of years earlier and he served in Vietnam. It would be over by then.

Q: How'd you find sort of the briefings, the instruction, of the A-100 course?

JONES: Don't remember that much. Part of it is trying to have a process while they match you with an assignment.

Q: Were you picking up any emanations about the role of women in the Foreign Service? I would imagine this was a pretty hot topic, particularly among the women who were coming in, wasn't it?

JONES: We didn't discuss it that much. Eventually there were just more women than there used to be and there were some who had married and resigned that came back in, when the policy changed.

The reason I never did consular work is that for my first job, I was picked to go to an office in Economics and Business Bureau EB to replace Elinor Constable, working on countervailing and anti-dumping cases. Of course Elinor's one of the women that came back in and did very well. So I knew kind of the history there.

But the other thing is that even though more women were coming back in, when you would get to an embassy or a bureau or whatever, there weren't necessarily that many women there.

When I went to Brazil in 1981, I think I was the highest ranking woman in the embassy and I wasn't very high in rank at the time.

Q: So where did you go, what was your first assignment, after finishing A-100?

JONES: The Economic and Business Bureau.

Q: And you were doing what?

JONES: Anti-dumping, countervailing duty cases.

Q: What does that mean?

JONES: Anti-dumping cases are where people sell into a foreign market at prices lower than they charge at home and countervailing duty is related to the rebate of taxes and non-market prices on inputs.

For example, I ended up with two court cases related to whether the rebate of value added taxes was permitted under the legislation. One case dealt with the rebate of value added taxes in Europe and covered all the car manufacturers in the EU and the other one was against the rebate on Japanese televisions in a case brought by Zenith.

The government wanted the Zenith case to go first for reasons I will explain.

The attorneys on the car case submitted a very extensive and to my mind unreasonable series of questions for discovery. The government chose not to challenge any of the questions because doing so made it more likely for the Zenith case to reach the courts first. I did a good job on some parts of the discovery process, but found records were lacking.

For example I traced the decision that the value added tax could be rebated on exports back to the OEEC or Organization for European Economic Cooperation but it wasn't very clear how the decision came about. We supported it. We weren't members of the OEEC, but we were observing. We became members of the successor Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development or OECD when it was formed. But the history of how the value-added rebate came about was not very clear in what I could find.

These cases go first to the Court of Patent and Custom Appeals and then they go to the Supreme Court. If at any point in this judicial process, there is a ruling against the United States, you have to do take measures to withhold the potential duty liabilities.

While the procedure is to post bonds it can be disruptive to trade in the product covered the case. The reason that they wanted the Zenith case to be the one taken up by the courts is that they felt it would be easier to manage the fallout of any ruling against the government in the case of televisions in Japan rather than one concerned with all the car producers in the EU.

The Zenith case did go to the Supreme Court which upheld the rebate of the value added tax.

There was another case, if anybody wanted to research this, that went on and on and on, i.e. the Polish golf cart case. The Poles, looking for an export market, decided that they would make golf carts, which are really just carts used inside factories adapted for use on a golf course, and they started selling them in the United States for less than American manufacturers who then brought a case.

But of course there was no comparison price in Poland for a golf cart plus you had the problem of how pricing is done in communist economies. It's complicated because cost elements can be subsidized and in some case things might be given free to a factory which disadvantaged overseas competitors.

So, anyway, to have a comparison to be used for the case the Poles went and bought a Canadian golf cart company. And it dragged on and on. It was finally settled in some way. It went on 10 years at least, or something. I've always remembered that the Polish diplomat I dealt with most often wore a tie with little pigs on it as a symbol of being a male chauvinist pig.

Q: Some of these things, you can make a career out of this. How did you feel about the bureau? You were in the economic bureau?

JONES: Yeah. It was very good then.

Q: Was Frances

JONES: Yes, yes. Frances Wilson was the executive director. She was wonderful.

Q: Because, unfortunately, she died before I even came on the scene, but her name, every time I talk to people of a certain era who were in the economic bureau, they know Frances Wilson, because she was a civil servant, came in and really developed a cadre of economists.

JONES: I missed her so much.

Q: She fostered people, made sure they got good assignments, made sure that her people well. She really was a remarkable person.

JONES: When you think about, economics then wasn't given the kind of weight it was later, but it was very important. She was a wonderful woman, very professional, good bureaucrat, got the resources for us.

Q: She was also a very good bowler.

JONES: Oh, I never went bowling with her, I don't know.

Q: Somebody was saying that in her spare time, she went out and bowled, was very, very good.

JONES: Yes, she was inspirational. And I worked a lot with the Treasury Department, because the Treasury had the legal lead in investigating these cases.

Q: How would you describe relations with Treasury, at that time, when you were doing this?

JONES: I thought we had good relations in this area. I don't know about monetary policy, or whatever. I can't remember any fights on the determinations.

But there are weird things in this area. There are certain industries that love to bring these cases. It's really amazing what the sugar industry has done and still does in this country.

The countervailing duty cases have their origin in rebating taxes on sugar in Europe and an 1897 Supreme Court case on sugar from beets. And then in the 20th century, we give all these concessions to the sugar industry and what it does to economic assistance is pretty awful.

Q: Well, we used to talk about Senator Ellender from Louisiana was the sugar senator.

JONES: I didn't know about that senator. I just knew they were so powerful on the Hill and everywhere, getting all those concessions. They still do. Whether the higher price we have paid on sugar all these years to maintain a level of domestic production in the case of war as opposed to buying cheaper supplies from other countries is justified I don't know.

Q: Were you typed as an economic officer by this point, you feel?

JONES: Well, after the EB assignment I took the six month economic course at FSI and then I went and I worked at the Treasury attaché's office in Rome for two years.

Q: You finished this first assignment in the EB bureau, when did you finish that?

JONES: That was just two years, so '77.

Q: Then where did you go?

JONES: FSI, the econ course.

Q: Was this six months or something?

JONES: Six months, yes.

Q: That's a pretty thorough course.

JONES: It was very good, it really was. And then after that they sent me to an economic assignment, which is how a consular assignment got squeezed out, because I had done an EB assignment and then the econ course,

Q: Oh, yeah, it makes perfect sense.

JONES: But they don't do assignments that way anymore; it's unusual not to start with an

overseas assignment . But that's all right. It's really anomalous. I think the fact that I was older and I had had this experience in Lehman Brothers played into me getting the job in EB, because it was two grades above my personal rank at the time.

Q: So, after the economic course, where'd you go?

JONES: I went to Rome.

Q: You were in Rome from when to when?

JONES: From '78 to '80. After the econ course and some Italian language training, I went to Rome in the summer of '78.

Q: How would you describe the situation in Italy when you got there in '78?

JONES: There was a lot of terrorism. The Red Brigades were active. Moro had been assassinated.

Q: Just been assassinated.

JONES: Yes, they found the body just before I got there. Actually, it was found close to where I lived. So there was a lot going on in Italy.

And then we were really so stupid then to have a policy that we won't talk to one party or another. Discussions with the Communist Party there were still very restricted, hemming us in, because to change the policy, that's a big statement, whereas if you had just talked to them from the beginning, you could have adjusted the interaction more easily.

Q: The "opening to the left" was a tremendous matter of debate for years.

What job did you have? You were in the economic section, I suppose?

JONES: No, I worked in the Treasury attaché's office.

Q: What were your interests? What were you all doing?

JONES: Well, economic forecasting, studying what was going on, but we also did forecasts a year ahead, a couple years ahead and I worked on those things and trying to learn as I went.

Q: The Italian economy, an awful lot is sort of the gray economy.

JONES: Or black, yes.

Q: How did you do your job, with these

JONES: I can't remember how I did the calculations. We had some rules and we were working with people who tried to develop some formulas to try and to see if that worked, we fed certain data in, how it would go and find what was going on in the economy. The Banca d'Italia was solid and good.

Q: Had the scandal about the Vatican bank broke yet?

JONES: No, that was after I left.

Q: During part of this time I was consul general in Naples and Naples, I was told, was the capital of the glove industry, in the world and there wasn't a single registered glove factory in Naples, so I was told.

JONES: When you looked at the value added tax, there was a camera shop that sold one camera a month. The tax evasion, hiding things, that's very Italian.

Q: I was watching a program, the problem is absolutely acute in Greece today. The Greeks don't pay taxes and are living on borrowed money. This is almost a Mediterranean attitude.

JONES: Also, in Italy, the northern Italians say, "Africa begins in Rome." There is still that north-south cleavage. And one tends to forget how recently Italy was formed.

Q: 1870. Americans of Italian descent would become ambassador and they'd be speaking some incomprehensible dialect. They thought they were speaking Italian. They're not.

JONES: Well, the language actually did change, I think, with unification, the TV and the modern communications.

Q: It's changing now.

JONES: Richard Gardner was my ambassador.

Q: How did you find him? I'm getting sort of a face.

JONES: He's a talented guy, smart, professionally good. I didn't run into him that much, however, but dealt more with the Deputy Chief of Mission or DCM.

Q: Bob Paganelli for part of the time.

JONES: Yes, during the time they killed the ambassador in Afghanistan. Boy, I remember that, Valentine's Day, oh, my lord!

Q: Spike Dubs.

JONES: And then they took over the embassy in Iran when I was there. Allen Holmes,

another very talented diplomat, was my first DCM there.

Q: Was the Italian economy an effective economy, despite the fact of most of its work was off the books and all?

JONES: It seemed to be. Certainly coming back to Italy 12 years after I'd studied in Bologna I saw how the country had progressed. Of course that was partly due to the Common Market which helped create growth. But prosperity seemed to be growing. It was uneven growth.

Q: I was in the Mezzogiorno and they had a big automobile factory there, where they had recruited local labor to build the factory and then they said, "Okay, fellows, now we going to hire mechanics and people to run the factory" and they refused, they said, "No, no, no, we've done it, we'll run it!" So they had to train this group, which was basically an agricultural group of workers and who really had other priorities. And so they had a factory that could turn out some factor times thirty cars a day and it would turn out about ten times, rather than thirty times, because they didn't show up. You had these local problems.

JONES: And I guess also the quality, when I think about it, the quality of Italian luxury items is very good, but I don't know that the level of the manufactured products was necessarily as high.

Q: And, also, there was a peculiar thing, I had friends who'd say, "Oh, if you want to call the United States, I have a friend who works in the post office." For God's sakes, you had to have connections.

JONES: People also had two jobs. They'd have a government job and then they'd never appear in the afternoon, they were somewhere else.

Q: It took some getting used to. Did you feel under threat because of the terrorism?

JONES: No, I did not. I was cautious about my own car, though. I kept the local tags on rather than a diplomatic plate, mainly because it made it easier to sell it on departure.

I lived in a wonderful apartment in the Palazzo Orsini, which was secure. The others that lived there were quite wealthy and afraid of kidnapping so there was good security. I had a ground floor apartment, which my predecessor had found. The first day in Rome I learned that you'd have to make illegal turns to survive and I learned how to go down a one way street the wrong way, backing up. At least you're pointed the right way if stopped!

They had the sidewalk restaurants and if someone wanted to sit outside, they'd bring a table, they'd move the barrier and the table would be plunked down.

Q: Italy of course is delightful. We had quite a bad earthquake while I was there.

JONES: I heard that in Rome, I remember. It was very strange. I was reading in bed and it sounded like there was a giant coming, “Thump, thump, thump, thump, thump” and then the movement began.

Q: It was sort of I think November of '79.

JONES: And then we had two popes die when I was there, Paul VI and John Paul I, so we had four U.S. delegations, always very exciting. Had the Economic Summit as well.

Q: Then they had the Dozier kidnapping.

JONES: That was before, I think, before or after.

Q: Probably after, I think. Working for Treasury, were you tempted to maybe move over to the Treasury side?

JONES: Their political analysis was very, very good, we're not talking about an organization with an economic blindfold on, but I think I needed more economic grounding, really, to do such a switch. In a certain sense, in the Foreign Service you most need to understand the trends, that's the more important thing, because the numbers are like a language, you can play with them. Numbers are really one way of describing the world around us.

I did economic analysis in Brazil after that, but the figures underneath were corrupted, just like you're talking about the figures in Italy, they were corrupted. Now, if the corrupted figures are compiled in the same way over time, they will show you trends.

Q: In '80, where'd you go?

JONES: I came back to study Portuguese and I went to Brazil.

I just wanted to mention that in '80, I asked the admin counselor to help cover the Economic Summit in Venice rather than the presidential visit to Rome. It was great fun in the lead up to Rome, because they flew in the helicopters, because the President of course has to travel in U.S.-controlled vehicles. So they brought in these big choppers and did practice flights over Rome.

But I went up to Venice during the Summit. They brought up the admiral's ship from Naples for Carter. And it took the ship half an hour to dock, because of all the currents, and the inexperience of the US pilots with them. That was such great fun.

During the run-up, I think there was even one cable where the Secret Service asked, “Why haven't you given us any motorcade routes for Venice?”

And with the papal-related activities, by the time this process ended we'd seen Miss

Lillian, Rosalynn Carter, we had Teddy Kennedy, we had all sorts of folks – senators, representatives, mayors – coming for the ceremonies. That was really amazing, to run the control rooms and take care of these people. As I recall most countries' delegations were limited to five at the ceremonies but we were allowed more. And we had people come that were not part of the official delegation as well.

Q: Of course, every American politician has to make a call on the pope.

As Treasury representative there, did you cover the Vatican?

JONES: The Vatican was not a separate embassy then, but there was a separate office.

Q: But, on the Treasury side, the Vatican has significant resources, doesn't it?

JONES: They didn't get into that that much that I know of. We didn't study their resources. I'm sure the office that dealt with the Vatican did not; it dealt more with political issues.

Q: OK, today is 13 May 2011 with Margaret C. Jones. Now I want to make sure that we don't get confused. There is another....

JONES: Also known as Peggy.

Q: There is another Margaret Jones or not?

JONES: Not that I know about.

Q: Because I have a Jones who served in the Vatican or in Rome. You never served there.

JONES: I served in Rome. I was in Rome from '78 to '80.

Q: OK, that is it. We were talking about the Vatican. OK so that is good. We ended the last time, did your UN work come before that or later?

JONES: Later.

Q: OK, well then we left this, I just played it.

JONES: OK, so we were in Rome.

Q: And you were ready to leave. I think 1980.

JONES: Yes. I remember I gave the party just before leaving in the wake of the Economic Summit to forget Venice or “Dimenticare Venezia” which was also the name of film being shown then. I invited the entire Embassy – both American and local staff – because people were so curious about my apartment. The Palazzo Orsini is built inside the Teatro di Marcello so it is the only building on an ancient Roman site that is occupied. And many came from the ambassador to his chauffeur.

Q: You were going to take Portuguese.

JONES: I started taking Portuguese to go to Brasilia. So I was in Brazil from 1981 to 1983.

Q: Do you want to describe Brasilia at the time.

JONES: Gee. I would say it is a funny place because it was designed so that you had to drive in the opposite direction and then turn to get where you were going. It was designed for cheap gas, driving cars. There wasn't much public transport. Niemeyer, the leftist or communist who designed the place had a vision of people of all different classes just living in apartment houses in Brasilia. It was divided into two wings. There was a commercial section; there was a section with the embassies and the church and everything. Then people started to build houses around the lake. Niemeyer was horrified. I think he withdrew after that. A lot of people lived in the houses. I lived in one of the apartment complexes. They had little commercial areas between them. Really it was funny. There were cities that grew up around it which were normal cities, but Brasilia isn't a normal city. You have to get on the highway and drive. Maybe now they have more public transport, but it was really strange then. If you went to see some of the monuments and the famous Cathedral there was nothing around you. They were just stuck out in the middle of nowhere it seemed. There wasn't even a vendor if you needed water. There was nothing there if you tried to be a tourist.

Q: It really sounds like some of our assignments in the middle of the desert or something like that. I mean you pretty well had to take care of yourself. I mean the people there made your own.

JONES: We made our own fun. It was interesting. That was about that time that the VCR was coming in, Video Cassette Recorder.

Q: Video Cassette Recorder which is now the DVD which probably will be something else. Anyway it was a form of transporting television broadcasts or movies to the television set.

JONES: Because I remember we had a showing of Raiders of the Lost Ark at the embassy, and that was really neat. But also we had recorders so people could send us tapes in the pouch and we could get television programs. I had to school my mother in how to do it. I remember one tape, I think I still have it, where she recorded Olivier's King Lear with Miss Marple's Murder in the Library which I think was a really nice juxtaposition of programming. Anyway this helped keep us connected to the United States. I mention it because it did transform how folks in the foreign service could interact with each other and other diplomats, and it also changed how we could relate to the culture back in the United States. I remember when I was in Rome before this looking at this big headline: "Who Shot JR?" in the International Herald Tribune about the series Dallas. I hadn't the foggiest idea who JR was. I had never seen Dallas. But after that you could start getting the programs while serving overseas.

Q: An interesting phenomenon for the foreign service I think was, and I felt it, this Dallas program was extremely popular all over the world, but moderately so in the States. People were talking about this thing, and I had never seen a show but Europeans, you learn to kind of bluff your way through this.

JONES: Yes and it helped create a certain image of the United States with the wealth and the scenery, but in a way the program was like some of the local shows I was seeing in Brazil. I had a TV in Brasilia and I also listened to the radio a lot and watched "telenovelas." The "telenovelas" were serials a bit like the daytime soap operas in the States that ran for about eight months and then a new series would begin. They had Dallas on as well. Somehow in the States I would fall asleep after about two minutes of Dallas, but in Portuguese it was pronounced "Jotta Ere" instead of JR and all seemed like more fun. But in Brasilia, like most foreign service posts, there were the Hash House Harriers, a runners' group that sponsored weekend events such as runs and socials that brought people and families together.. We also had a little club in the embassy area where members of the different diplomatic missions would come. And then we knew everyone in our apartment houses, it was fine.

Q: What was your job?

JONES: I was in the economic section and worked on some of the economic analyses, the financial analyses I had done in Rome. So that was very interesting.

WQ: I would imagine that Brazil would be particularly important because Brazil has had its ups and downs. If you would look at a financial chart of Brazil over the years it looks like a roller coaster. How stood it at this time?

JONES: It was on the roller coaster. Then in the last period they headed into a financial crisis. It was so important that our treasury attaché actually did a lot of the main work on

the problems. I worked with him. That was a period when we were working with Brazil to keep them from going under financially. The treasury attaché was on the phone all the time with Washington and there were all sorts of things going on financially. They kept saying with Brazil that the light was at the end of the tunnel, but maybe that just the light of an oncoming train! Brazil was also the kind of economy, and I just saw a recent article, it is still the same way, that some people talked about it as Belindia, that is a combination of Belgium and India in the sense that you had some very developed sectors, some very well off people, but you also had populations that were impoverished. For example the northeast of Brazil is still horribly poor. When I was still there we started the Caribbean Basin Initiative. It was really ironic and funny/sad if you read the criteria for countries to join that and be helped by it. The northeast of Brazil on its own would have qualified. I didn't serve up in that area but made one brief trip there. But it was feudal and run by these big land owners. So this is still a problem for Brazil. It hasn't educated a lot of its people. There are a lot of really poor people.

Q: Well how did you find Brazilian economic statistics?

JONES: Not very reliable in the sense that I know of some cases where they manipulated the trade figures. They held up figures to put them in the next year and whatever. So I tried to caution that when you tried to compare years you weren't necessarily comparing the same things. I felt you could get the direction of the economy but I wasn't going to go to the death for the accuracy of any particular figure derived from the official statistics. On a few occasions they would change how they calculated statistics so they didn't track with previous years. I would go down to Rio and I talked to some of the people who worked on the statistics. I mean there are some very good economists in Brazil. But I think there was some manipulation of how things were calculated and this type of thing.

Q: Did you deal mainly with the ministry of trade or Treasury or who?

JONES: It was the finance ministry.

Q: How did you find the people over there?

JONES: Very good. But something that also struck me very much in Brazil that may apply to some of the debates we have had at various points. They had a requirement that the budget had to balance. So the only thing that happened was you had incredibly complex things happening off the budget and you still spent the money. You had to. The balanced budget wouldn't hack it and its effect was to make government finances confusing and less transparent. But they always shared the figures with us, they always knew. But just the whole structure was very complex because of this requirement.

Q: Who was the ambassador.

JONES: Tony Motley, a political appointee.

Q: Did he pay much attention to the economic...

JONES: Yes he did, and he was very active in the efforts to keep Brazil afloat financially during the debt crisis there. Very active, and because he had such good political connections I think he was able to get some attention. Because the other thing you learn is that the attention span of the higher ups in Washington is extremely limited. We couldn't get attention on the Brazil financial situation until the shit started hitting the fan. But before then Ambassador Motley got the problem as much high level attention as possible. Then when it hit the fan then all of a sudden you got the attention and they are ignoring all sorts of other problems. That is probably still the case.

Q: Did you get any feel though in sort of emotionally politically in relations between Brazil and the United States at that time?

JONES: Yeah we were, I think a couple of other things. When I was there the Brazilians still had a military dictatorship. Toward the end of my assignment the military started to lose authority perhaps due to economic problems and other things. It was absolutely fascinating. I couldn't put my finger on it, but I just felt that day to day the leverage and the power of the government were seeping away . Also, coming back to Brasilia, I think it was a good thing they created Brasilia as the capital. When we went down to Rio there was a Carioca mentality that is not terribly serious. Moreover Rio is a very difficult city to get around in with terrible traffic problems. Just a narrow stretch around the hills. I think if the government had stayed in Rio it wouldn't have worked as well as it did.

Q: Well this often I mean was it still what I heard was on the weekends everybody took off, anybody who could afford it, took off to go back to Rio.

JONES: People did travel when they could on the weekends but that was limited by cost. You would have to fly because driving anywhere was very long. In summers I did take time to travel. I went to Minas Gerais which is very interesting where you find some of the old colonial structures. One weekend I took myself off to the Amazon. I traveled to Recife and Bahia as a diplomatic courier taking a pouch to the consulates in each city. But also we made our own fun. One weekend day we drove to a town in the area where they reenact the conflict between the Moors and Christians on horseback. You play bridge. I got interested in gemstones, because people would come by selling various gems. There was a lady in the Dutch embassy who was married to a Dutch diplomat. She was a very good designer, and she made me many pieces of jewelry. I looked and looked, At first I was overwhelmed, but it got so that I could open up a packet and I could just say close it or I could pick the best stone out for the stones here. People got interested in doing that. Time went by somehow.

Q: Did you get any visits from higher ups?

JONES: Oh yes. We had Vice President Bush and President Reagan. During the Bush visit I was in charge of gifts as a lowly embassy person. This turned out to be quite an experience. There was a former secretary who had worked for Vice President Bush for a long time who was now assigned to protocol. She was very difficult and not focused on

gifts. In the event the Bush gift to the Brazilians vanished for hours. It turned out the Secret Service had stuck it in the trunk of one of the cars. After we tracked it down, I was able to persuade her not to go to the foreign ministry and I carried there myself. Everybody was saying stay away from her; stay away from her. But that was the only problem; otherwise the trip went well. Then Reagan came and called Brazil Bolivia in one of his toasts. But overall that visit also went well. There were a couple of funny incidents. I stayed in the control room because I didn't think I needed to go to the embassy and see the President. So I stayed back there, allowing colleagues to be free to go. When the Secret Service is involved the motorcades just roll out whether everyone but the President is there or not. Secretary Schultz was late getting down and missed the motorcade. At the Embassy they were asking "where is the Secretary" when a taxicab drove up with Schultz on board. He was lucky to get a cab because we had most of the taxis under hire to ferry messages and staffers around. Oh my god a presidential visit is something else because about 500 of the president's nearest and dearest, including the press, descend on you. They brought in an armored car and extra equipment. There was an enormous transport plane sitting down at the end of the airport that dwarfed the terminal. I was in the arrival group at the airport and all along the tarmac there were these telephones set up which were linked to the States. When the reporters discovered the phones they were leaping on them. They also installed drop phones linked to the White House at every site the President visits as they did in Rome and Venice. The plane arrives at the exact minute scheduled.

We had a wheels up party afterward but on the next morning, a Saturday, I was the duty officer and got a call from a reporter in the terminal about an incident involving the press plane that had been with the president. As it took off from the airport in Brasilia one of the tires struck a light at the end of the runway. They circled and dumped fuel and then came in, the landing gear collapsed and the plane slid on its belly. So things went crazy for a time, with notifying Washington and calling in staff to assist the press. Experts came from Washington to investigate arriving on the Sunday. It turned out that the plane was really overloaded They had had trouble taking off from Sao Paulo, to the extent that the reporters all had bets about how long it would take to trundle down the Brasilia runway to take off. A stewardess was timing it with a stopwatch. Because Brasilia is at a much higher altitude than Sao Paulo and the air is thinner the plane struggled to take off. We had some of our military out at the airport. They said it was by the grace of God that plane didn't crash. It could have been a lot worse.

Q: How did you see sort of economically, Brazil has always been, not always it is changing now. But sort of like India a closed economy form what I understand. They wanted to pretty much produce their own computers and airplanes and their own cars, that sort of thing, which is usually the road to disaster for anybody in the world of international trade. How did you see this thing working out at that time?

JONES: Well they were trying to build their own industries, but I never thought of them as closed as India was at that point, or as resistant to foreign investment. They were open to foreign investment but where investments went varied. The territory of Brazil is larger than the continental United States. It is an enormous area, much of it unpopulated, much

of it difficult to exploit. There is industrial Sao Paulo, there are farming areas, there are varied mineral deposits and there is the very poor Northeast.

Q: Well had Brazil turned into a supplier of orange juice and things like this at this point or what?

JONES: I think they had. It is kind of foggy. They had a freeze at one point that affected their orange supply. They also have a big trade in Robusta coffee, because they don't have the altitude to grow Arabica coffee. It was natural that they pushing industrialization rather than simply providing raw materials. They had the offshore oil production. They had minerals. They were also trying to open up the country. But still the distances are really vast.

Q: Well after, you were there what, two years?

JONES: Two and a half.

Q: Then where?

JONES: Then I went to our mission to the UN in New York, where I was the executive officer for the third committee which covers human rights and social issues.

Q: this would have been when?

JONES: '83-'85. Jeane Kirkpatrick was our ambassador for most of the period with Vernon Walters there at the end.

Q: They are kind of fun people.

JONES: Yeah Jeane was. I didn't see much of Ambassador Walters, but of course he was a legend.

Q: How about Moynihan?

JONES: What?

Q: Who was the ambassador before? Well what were some of the issues particularly at the time the third committee was dealing with?

JONES: Well, the main thing I worked on was preparations for a '85 world conference on women in Nairobi, Kenya which were politically charged due to developments in the previous conferences.. The first conference was held in Mexico City in '75. In the fall of that year the General Assembly adopted a resolution equating Zionism and racism at the UN. The Zionism-racism issue got interwoven with the early days of the women's conference. During the '80 women's conference in Copenhagen the outcome documents included language on Zionism-racism. The biggest political issues we had for the Nairobi

conference were Zionism-racism and the South African issues because of our policy at that point.

Before continuing on the conference I would like to describe something that happened in my first year when a decision on how to vote was thrown into my lap which illustrates a bit how the UN works. Iran proposed a resolution on women prostitutes which included a provision that prostitutes should be educated as to their true role in society. At first they were all on their own but some countries eventually worked with them to draft a more acceptable resolution. The tradition in the UN system with the issue of human trafficking is that you don't blame the victims. In addition, the Bahá'ís were very active at the UN, very much suppressed in Iran as they are today, and they said that they thought the resolution was really meant to provide a basis to move against the Bahá'ís in Iran because their marriages were not considered legal there. When I asked for guidance from Washington I was told the choice was mine. I ended up abstaining. First I still had concerns about the Bahá'í issue. Second, prostitution is legal in some states in the United States.

Q: Yeah, Nevada.

JONES: Back to the conference and the Zionism-racism issue. In '84 there were repeated attempts to keep naming the United States and Israel in resolutions. The UN practice is everybody might know whom you are talking about, but you are not supposed to name them. We knew we couldn't defeat the resolutions but we were on this kick to excise mention of the United States and Israel and had the majority to do so. During the General Assembly in the fall of '84, there was a series of resolutions on Africa. Well the Iranian ambassador stood up and said "This is a most important question." In the UN if it is a most important question a 2/3 vote is required to adopt, not just simple majority. The Africans couldn't say it wasn't a most important question, so everybody said OK. So we start losing the votes on taking out the names because we couldn't muster 2/3s. We had a very good legal advisor. So the next day after complaining about unfairness, we started calling for votes on paragraphs that mentioned the United States and Israel rather than offering amendments to delete the references. We discovered that there were not enough votes to hit 2/3s. So instead of excising the names, whole paragraphs started dropping out of the resolutions. But we also realized at that point we had a blocking third on Zionism Racism.

I listened on the mission intercom and the Nigerian president of the assembly sounded like he had been gob smacked. He just was reeling and the Africans were so mad at the Iranian after this. And the Iranians were funny because you could always identify them because they all wore plaid cotton flannel shirts and no tie. It was so uncomfortable for poor Ireland because it was Iran, Ireland, Israel in the alphabetic seating.

So we went forward on the women's conference. It was difficult. They appointed someone to head the delegation who didn't work out. She just wasn't on. My first year I had fantastic backup from Julie Jacobson who then resigned from State to care for her family. Her successor was inept and not up to the job. I was on my own for months, no

help anywhere.

Q: Well didn't Maureen Reagan...

JONES: She came in afterwards.

Q: I have heard accounts that she was not easy to deal with.

JONES: We will get to Maureen. What was to be the last preparatory meeting for the conference was held in February of '85 and it was just not good. This one woman, my supposed backup in the department spoke a good game and didn't do anything. I obtained the whole draft document weeks in advance. I sent it to Washington making sure I cabled that it was on its way because I feared the woman named to head the delegation and my backup would do nothing with it in terms of collecting interagency views or developing strategy for the meeting. Unfortunately my fears were realized and the prepcom was a disaster. It was at that point that Maureen was named the new head of the delegation.. Nancy Clark Reynolds had been working women's issues and was pushing for Maureen. Nancy was in fact a very interesting person to work with, nice, very good, politically astute But heavens that woman also liked to shop. Anyway....

Q: What was her background?

JONES: She was a lobbyist at that point, a Republican working with Democrat Anne Wexler, who broke a lot of ground for women in her career and who was the first woman to found a lobbying firm. But Nancy also knew President Reagan very well and helped introduce the Reagans to Washington after his election. One time she managed to get into Srinagar in Kashmir when it was very difficult. I remember she bought belt buckles that had been used by Russian soldiers in Afghanistan and gave them to the president. So Maureen came in at the last moment. Backing her up in Washington was Ernie Grigg who very tragically died of a brain aneurysm shortly after the conference. He was fabulous to work with. I can see how some people could consider her difficult but I never had a problem working for Maureen. I admire her a great deal, because she wanted to help women. She recognized that she was not going to get any great credit for leading the delegation, that people would probably snipe at her, but she was willing to do it. She helped work on violence against women. She never talked much about it but in the early stage of her life, maybe her first marriage, she had been the victim of abuse, so she identified very much with that, although she didn't make a big thing about her personal experience. But her cohort in working on the conference was Alan Keyes, the UN Ambassador in my area for whom I had worked for two years. Talk about difficult.

Q: Alan Keyes was a perennial presidential candidate, an African American with academic background. I am told that when he had the bureau of international affairs he used to lecture as a rather young man, lecture his staff who were far more experienced than he.

JONES: He was an ambassador at the UN mission earlier than that. Jeane Kirkpatrick found Alan, I think in one of our Indian consulates, and brought him to the UN. He was

married to a lovely Indian lady. Alan was really gifted and very articulate, not your average foreign service officer. But he also had his demons. He was insecure. That was the worst part of dealing with him because you never knew when he was going to turn on you. He turned on me one time and I thought he was going to hit me, but he didn't. He was scheduled to give a statement before the third committee one morning, but he didn't come and he didn't come. So I had to move him to the afternoon because he didn't get there in time. He was so mad at me because I didn't manage to keep those people sitting there for another half hour before he arrived. It was just awful. But anyway what we did was surmount all of this because at the end of the women's conference Alan said he thought I had the best people skills he had ever seen. We survived but I really did think he was going to hit me that time. He was like a bomb that could go off at any time. It was like you were working with a ticking grenade. Though actually I saved his hide once, because there was a resolution on Israel and at that point our instructions were we had to clear things with the Israelis and we had to do what the Israelis want. Now this offended me very much as a U.S. diplomat because I don't believe that our interests are completely synonymous. But those were the instructions. I managed to get him the information he needed to make the proper decision on our vote.

Q: Well I think this is true of most of us. Looking at the Israeli connection. I mean politically you had to examine. It is important for votes but American interests? It is somewhat counterproductive and qualified.

Q: I suppose that any of these especially third committee you had to spend all of your time looking for an anti Israeli bomb that could go off.

JONES: Well they were easy to see. We were also being very tight on UN spending and our standing instructions were to call for a vote and vote no if any resolution would add more than \$10,000 to the budget. We did not participate in votes on combating racism because of the Zionism-racism issue nor in drafting resolutions on the issue. That was one resolution on racism which satisfied the Israelis but it had financial implications so under the standing instructions I would have had to vote no. In the UN most of the work is done by consensus. Countries hate to vote It is amazing what you can do by threatening a vote. I had one resolution where Alan told me I wasn't to negotiate or do anything with it. Negotiations broke down between the Russians and the Canadians. I was following instructions but the Russian came over to me and said that the negotiations had failed. "Well that is a shame because I will have to vote no as it stands for X, Y, and Z reasons." 20 minutes later they were negotiating and got it worked out. But I did not negotiate that resolution. So returning to that resolution against racism, Alan just said, "vote no" because of the cost. The problem was that whereas the resolution could be adopted by consensus there would have been problems if countries had to vote in favor. I couldn't go over his head to Jeane. Not me. I just didn't think I could do that. There was a new Israeli on third committee. I said, "You know I have taken it as far as I can. I have taken it to Ambassador Keyes. You need to talk to Ambassador Richard Schifter." I had to push the Israeli but eventually the Israelis called Schifter and we didn't have to vote against the resolution.

Q: What about abortion? Did that an issue that you had to deal with?

JONES: No because that is more in the economic committee because you are dealing with the programs. The policy was there already. We didn't have to deal with that so much.

Q: On women's issues, what were your major concerns?

JONES: From the diplomatic side for the United States it was the Zionism-racism and the South African language in the draft document. We couldn't go along with it. Language on Zionism-racism was included in an official document adopted at the '80 conference in Copenhagen. The Russians were able in a very controversial parliamentary maneuver to get a chair ruling that Zionism-racism was not a most important question which meant that a simple majority rather than 2/3s was able to adopt language unacceptable to the United States . We just couldn't take that. Those were the things I worried about, South Africa and racism.

We ended up holding a resumed Prepcon in New York after the failure in Vienna earlier in '85. I have always regretted that I agreed to a Russian suggestion the first day of that meeting. In discussion of the conference, people referred to "equality, development and peace." I agreed that they could be included in the document so everywhere there are those three words. But anyway that was early in the meeting. Ernie Grigg and I went to the sessions. Alan Keyes thought two weeks was too long and didn't want to pay for that period. So we met for a little over a week including weekends. In that period the Security Council didn't meet on weekends but we did. I was exhausted, so tired. I would leave the mission at two or three in the morning and I had to be back at seven to review cables and organize. I was staggering. Periodically most of us would sit around waiting for the group of 77 to decide what they wanted to do. Because in the group of 77 they left decisions to a small group like Yugoslavia, Egypt, Cuba I told the rest of the G-77 you just handed your foreign policy over to these countries. But anyway by the last day I was actually seeing big yellow and brown polka dots in front of my eyes, which I didn't think was a very good sign. I got back to my office after it ended and I just sat there. I couldn't move. Maureen had offered to have people come in place of us for some sessions but Ernie and I said you can't do that. There is no way anyone would understand that you would do that just because you think we are tired. They would be looking for some complicated American plot. So we went through it.

Then we went to Nairobi. We had instructions in Nairobi that if Zionism-racism language was adopted in the document the American delegation was going to walk out. Everybody knew that. So heading into the last day we first faced an Iranian resolution with such language. We spent a long time going back and forth and the Iranians eventually withdrew the resolution. I always remember the Iranian women in their burkas with their male handlers running around; a Moroccan colleague said they looked like black crows. Then there was the Palestinian resolution actually managed by the Soviets. Oddly enough at the conference in Nairobi, if I remember correctly, the largest delegation was the

Kenyan, but contrary to what you would expect the second largest was not the American but the Palestinian. That just went back and forth with backroom negotiations coordinated by the Kenyans. Kenyatta's daughter Margaret Kenyatta was the conference chair. Finally the resolution was withdrawn. The Israeli ladies could not believe it. They were in tears of joy. They just could not believe it. Again behind our success was that we knew we had a blocking third. If it came to a vote – and they couldn't get away with not deeming it a most important question – they could not pass that language. We won but it took almost all night. I left to call the hotel to tell Washington that we had won. Returning I ran into the Kenyan UN ambassador. He had smoke coming from his ears. Entering the conference room there was a horrible atmosphere. Alan had just given a statement that during the resolution negotiations the United States had not been treated fairly. Then we had to move on the South African portions. We voted against a couple of paragraphs on apartheid which didn't help the atmosphere. They didn't know that Maureen had gotten permission for an unusual step and I think only Maureen could have done it. Normally in the UN if you vote against a paragraph you can't vote for the whole resolution or document. She got permission for us to vote in favor of the entire document so long as those portions we voted against were footnoted to indicate our vote. It ended about three or four in the morning. I stayed with my friend Rose from the Kenyan mission and watched. Everyone except the Kenyans and myself had left. Minister Matiba was there. The Kenyans had written a song for the conference and they started singing it. They formed a conga line and they danced out of the conference center at four in the morning. Actually it was amazing. The center of Nairobi was so locked down you could walk any time of the day or night in perfect safety. I went to Nairobi a bit early before most of the delegations arrived. In my hotel I heard people screaming in the night. I didn't know if they were pulling in the prostitutes or something. But it was safe during the conference.

Q: How stood relations between Keyes and Maureen Reagan?

JONES: They were good. They got along. Actually I think in a way they got along in a way that fed some of the volatility. Maureen was committed to making it a success. She was committed to women and she wasn't doing it for herself, so I really admire her a great deal.

Q: Well did you find you are a woman. In this thing did you find it a certain within the male delegates not just the American but others a sort of....

JONES: I could have cared less. The politicians and diplomats took all their political issues and tacked the word women to it. If you look through the documents you see all this junk. Well such is life. But Jeane Kirkpatrick, of course, was strong for women. She wanted the conference to be a success. And people questioned the cost and utility of the conferences. I think the need for governments to report on what they were doing for women from conference to conference had a positive impact. First of all the vital economic contributions of women were highlighted. For example in African economies it is the women who did a lot of the agriculture work. Inheritance laws were changed and women's ministries formed with the reporting requirement an impetus for change. I was

personally was devoted to giving options to women. Not every woman wants to go out and work but women need options.

At the UN I was also working quietly to support those working to put women's issues into the UN budget. It's not flashy but it promotes future work on the issues.

Q: You were doing this at a particularly important time. My impression is really there was a real shift. It was work at the UN of people like yourself the United States and others to put women on the table you might say.

JONES: Yes, absolutely.

Q: And then over time, I mean once it is on the table it is kind of there.

JONES: And it mandates programs and work though we worked to decrease the frequency of the conferences. We managed to get it so the next one was in '95 when Mrs. Clinton went as opposed to having it again in '90. We did get the break, because these conferences cost a lot of money, translators, whatever and five years ad infinitum seemed too frequently.

And I got us draft documents in Nairobi as early as possible. I yak with everybody so over the years of preparations I had spoken a lot with the document people in Vienna. And they were the document people in Nairobi and they would give me things hot off the press. I got them invited to the United States reception in Nairobi. But anyway there are a lot of good people.

Q: Well you must have taken a real satisfaction didn't you? I mean to keep your thumb in the works.

JONES: Yes I did. Actually Nairobi in a sense was easier for me than the preparatory work because there were so many people there. I was so run down I got two illnesses there. There was a horrible flu going around. I managed to survive that and then got something else. I was worn out. But we did as well as we could. It was nice to see the Russians squirming.

Q: That makes the way the Cold War should particularly intrude in the women's issue or not.

JONES: Everything intruded into the women's issues, Again for the men all the other issues were more important than women, so of course Cold War issues were there. But it was also as part of their policy that the Russians were backing the Zionism is Racism within the UN, so of course they just carried it through into the conference. Everything is carried through. You could never get any issue out of the UN documents . And you learn you can never give away a word. It is really distressing in a way how much time we spent there fighting about words. I said to some people if we just put this effort into trying to get safe drinking water to everybody in the world, which would be an enormous task, we

would do a lot more good than this. Words, once you give away a word in a policy it is gone. Other countries swallow it and they don't give you anything in return. The UN is really the fulcrum. I don't know if it is still the same but there is a fulcrum there. The objective for people at the UN is changing US policy. We anchored policies. When we move the policy moves. We anchored it and we learned to call for votes. Other people had the right to do it but did so rarely, but we just had to do it. You could feel the room against you. There was one issue that we managed fast. There was a convention against torture that the Western group got through the first year it came to the UN General Assembly which was quite an achievement. The Dutch took the lead there.

Q: How about the Vatican? Did they, I mean when you start dealing with women's rights the Catholic Church has got a spotty record.

JONES: I didn't see the Vatican active on them. They were observers at the UN. I never dealt with them on it. I guess if they wanted to get something through they would go through predominantly Catholic countries rather than necessarily come to us. And really the issues that were of the most concern to them such as abortion weren't issues at Nairobi. And they certainly would support the economic development objectives.

Q: Well did you have difficulties with women's advocacy groups within the United States, because often an advocacy group by its definition is sort of unyielding. They have something in particular that they are pushing and they don't like any compromise on that.

JONES: We did, but it didn't hit me directly. My focus was foreign policy and other departments like Health and Human Services were engaged on women's issues. We had our foreign policies set and then we would do what we could on women issues. I worked with other people who were very engaged with the women's groups. We had people that had been in Mexico City and then in Copenhagen. It was in Mexico City that Zionism is Racism came in, not in the official document of the conference but in another document and then in the fall of '75 was adopted at the UN. So we worked, I didn't see them. You had people like Bella Abzug running around Nairobi.

Q: Well then you left the UN when?

JONES: I left them in the summer of '85.

Q: Whither?

JONES: Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. The economic section again.

Q: You were there from when to when?

JONES: '85 to '87.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

JONES: Dennis Kux.

Q: Well in a way at that time, today it is a problem with the civil war and all of that, but particularly at that time the Paris of Africa and all that.

JONES: A great success story and all that stuff.

Q: What was the situation sort of politically and economically in the Ivory Coast?

JONES: It was pretty good. We had Houphouët-Boigny who was the original president. That is one of the things. We had all the people descending on us saying after Houphouët, what? I thought my God I might be dead by the time he goes. I can't spend much time on that. It was clear he kept decisions to himself but he also was very open. He was very inclusive in his politics. The political officer dealt with the opposition people.. The opposition can be difficult if they become rulers because compromise is often not in their vocabulary. But the economy was doing pretty well. They had cocoa, coffee and other exports. I didn't however see where the economy could really go because you had a lot of these primary products but in terms of trade and other industry what did you do? Part of the post colonial legacy in Africa is that countries just don't communicate with one another. The tariffs were high. It was cheaper to bring in batteries from factories in Singapore than to ship them around West Africa to the next country because of the post colonial structure. I felt that was like a vise, So I wasn't as rosy on the future as most people. The embassy didn't want to report too negatively, so I did would include other views by interviewing people and then reporting what they told me. We got some of that in. Sometimes we were hustled. There was one time when the US director for the African Development Bank which was also in Abidjan was annoyed by some of the reporting I had done. The embassy backed me up because it was based on interviews with people. I was reporting on what I heard and I didn't care if he didn't like what I had heard. So there was that tendency. I think there is always that tendency in embassies not to be negative. We had a big mission, and there was a regional AID Mission. We didn't do much development work in the Ivory Coast because they were successful. So it was in pretty good shape.

The crime was increasing as I left though. When the Pope came to bless the enormous cathedral Houphouët had build in his home town the President released prisoners in an amnesty that led to an increase in crime. In fact where I lived I think practically every house around me had had some attempt on it. Mine was OK. We had bars on the windows and a bedroom with a radio and a steel door to make a safe room. At one point a criminal beat up one of the guards across the street and his employers didn't help the wounded man afterwards. My night guard then came to me and said he wanted to buy poison arrows. I checked with the security officer at the Embassy and didn't say yea or nay. He bought them on his own and I eventually reimbursed him. He would have the light on in the garage and line up the two or three arrows on top of a bench in the back so anybody who looked over the wall would see them. We had the doors and the radios. I bought some of those little fog horns for boats, gave them to the guards and told them, "If

anything happens sound this, because then I will hear and I will call for help.” So I had done that and we were all right. Sometimes all the guards on the street would all be sitting in front of my house, and I didn’t mind. I also made the night guard my gardener which gave him something to do and I often gave him coffee before I went to sleep. I was very touched that just before my departure he went to a scribe and had him do a letter saying how much he had appreciated working for me. As I was leaving there was a carjacking at an American residence indicating the worsening crime..

Q: What was the role of the French there when you were there?

JONES: Oh predominant. They called the shots.

Q: When you are doing your economic stuff were you basically going over to the Frenchman in the ministry and finding out what was going on?

JONES: Yes. There were Frenchmen in the ministry. Colonialism affected so many things. One example is that they didn’t have fish processing factories but sent the catch to France to be processed into cans. Anyway the French were dominant there. They had the biggest embassy.

Q: Was there a sense that Houphouët was beginning to lose it, I mean building this big cathedral and all that?

JONES: I don’t think there was a sense of him losing it. I think there was a sense of what always is. He was a chief by birth. People knew he was going to die in office. Chiefs don’t resign. Houphouët held the country together and emphasized what the tribes, animists, Christians and Muslims had in common. But his successors focused on the divisions in search of political power. Then it was really ironic. I dealt with peacekeeping years later when the real trouble came when the Ivorian peacekeeping force came back from a mission in the Central African Republic. They came back and they weren’t paid properly. They started trouble. It is an ironic aftermath from a peacekeeping mission, but you have got to treat your military well.

Q: I have heard that some of these peacekeeping missions are considered by the people whom they are keeping the peace are looting missions. I mean.

JONES: Well that can happen but is rare. One thing I would say is also I brought a visit by Maureen Reagan to Cote d'Ivoire. She was on her way to South Africa and she knew I was there, so she demanded to stop by. So we had a two hour visit. I managed to get her a group meeting with women’s groups, a meeting with Houphouët, a visit to the Abidjan cathedral and a visit to market.

Q: In two hours? My god!

JONES: I know. It was so funny because I was working on my arrangements and talking to people and all of a sudden the protocol chief from the presidency comes to the

embassy and asks me to come to the presidency. I met with him and the security chief and they just adopted my schedule. They gave us an escort of motorcycle police. I didn't think she would like it, but that is the only way we could do it. They closed roads as we went and we made it back to the airport on schedule. We did it all. I don't know how. I told Maureen "if you see anything in the market you want just whisper to me because if you point it out they will give it to you. I will go back afterwards." So she indicated two things she liked and I went back later and got them for her and sent them. It was fun and great to see her again.

Q: What happened to her?

JONES: She had skin cancer on the back of her leg so they didn't catch it in time.

Q: Were we particularly interested in the economy or were we sort of observing the economy there, I mean since the French seemed to be in charge?

JONES: There were some American businesses that were interested in working there and part of our job was to help them. It wasn't completely a French enclave. I remember one case where we worked hard to promote the importation of American grains which required working against the French.

Q: Well where did you go after that.

JONES: I came back to Washington and worked in the regional office on Latin America on debt issues which dominated during my tenure there.

Q: You were there from when to when?

JONES: I was there from '87 to '89. Also I don't have strong memories about that one. Nothing really to talk about.

Q: Well then in '89?

JONES: I became the desk officer for Zaire for two years

Q: Oh boy. '89 in the first place all hell was breaking loose in Europe. I mean the Soviet Union was beginning to disintegrate. Zaire had been using the Soviet Union as a counterpoint for getting stuff from us. How stood things in Zaire during this '89-'91 period?

JONES: We did not pressure them much. Mobutu knew the issues. Whatever leverage he had, including the Cold War, he would use it. He was really good at that. My second year there was some additional leverage because Zaire was on the Security Council during the Gulf War crisis. Hank Cohen was the assistant secretary, a fabulous diplomat. But we never moved against Zaire or pushed against them much. I would attribute that partly to President Bush, the elder. Among other things we were counting on their support in the

Security Council. In a way Zaire was on the back burner. Nobody paid much attention to it given everything else that was going on. Then we get the phone about the Security Council, I take the call. We have got to find the foreign minister immediately. I finally tracked him down in Tokyo of all places.

They were talking and then they negotiated various things. That brings to mind an interesting episode -- the Libyans from Chad.

Q: Is this the Toyota wars?

JONES: The Toyota wars in Chad with Toyotas with guns mounted on the back being used as the vehicles of choice. Libya was fighting Chad over mineral resources such as uranium. Chad held Libyan prisoners that they suddenly had to get out of the country. I finally don't remember the details but the Libyans were airborne and Nigeria wouldn't let them in. Only Mobutu would accept them. Then they became a diplomatic football and he used them for all sorts of leverage. It was an item on Saturday Night Live. We finally got them out of Zaire to Kenya, thank god. The Libyans, including the head of Libyan intelligence, then descended on Zaire. They wanted Mobutu to send the prisoners back to Libya. And the prisoners were being held at the Kamina military airfield where there was a secret portion that was a base for our activities in Angola. I have to say I was not cleared for access to information on that Angola program but I knew about the airfield anyway.

Q: Well looking at the history of Zaire following Mobutu, was there also the feeling while you were dealing with him OK, he is a rogue and is a lot of things, but the point is he is holding this country together. I mean I served in Yugoslavia with Tito and we felt OK Tito is holding this diverse country. It took awhile but after Tito, we ended up fighting a couple of wars in the Balkans there. If you look at what happens with some of these guys who understand, well like Houphouët-Boigny. I mean they know how to play the game by taking all these divisive elements of religion, the tribes, the various interests, military and all one way or another. Basically they pay them off, but they know the formula for paying them off. The new guys on the block don't.

JONES: There is that, plus we have our interests and our interests often conflict with our ideology. Once the United States reached a certain position in the world, we also acted in favor of stability which was easier than if other countries were changing. There is a bias for stability versus change, for people we know versus those we don't. Your mention of the fall of the Soviet Union brings back memories of watching the wall being torn down. I remember saying I am going enjoy today because this is going to be the last good day for a long time, and we will see consequences around the world. The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union created a lot of stability. It was not just the political skills of leaders like Mobutu, it was the conditions created by this rivalry, the division of people and things. Once that went change and strife followed. One of the interesting books that people can read on the early days of Zaire, the rise of Mobutu and the effects of the Cold War on diplomacy is the book The Congo Cables. The authors got hold of State Department cables and put them in the book. It's a fascinating book giving insights

into our diplomacy with Africa in the Kennedy administration.

Q: Yeah, I remember I never served even close to it but you knew the name of Tshombe and Kasa-Vubu and all these people who were involved in the Congo.

JONES: Much of what happened was related to a dismal colonial experience. It's hard to decide whether Portugal or Belgium was the worst colonial power in Africa, although I lean to Belgium. They did not educate the people; they did not build roads. There was no infrastructure in that country. You still can't drive from one place to another. But people do tend to think that they are Zairian though I would not be surprised to see the country eventually fall apart. It is hard to see how the east is really connected to the west in Zaire.

Q: Well as desk officer in this period, Zaire from a Congo, from 1960 on had been known as the CIA territory. I can't think of the man's name but there was a CIA man who was practically living with Mobutu at one point.

JONES: His name is Larry Devlin.

Q: So close that the ambassador was sort of off to one side. How stood things while you were there? Were you aware of CIA interests or influence or what?

JONES: Not so much, but they did have the operation in Angola and they used Zaire for that, so there was obviously much going on. I was not cleared to see much of the Angola related material. While I knew him Larry Devlin, the ex-CIA guy, was working for Maurice Tempelman, a leading diamond merchant. Larry, a charming and likable man, often went into Zaire in connection with his work, so he kept his connections. He once told me about a day in his early days as station chief when he was almost killed in the early days. He was seized by Congolese troops but the UN peacekeepers were able to save him. Another time someone came to give his poison to use against Lumumba but he just dumped it in the river. Though it seems like the eventual betrayal and murder of Lumumba was more linked to the Belgians than to us. Larry has written an autobiography that I have not read.

Q: Oh yes, Lumumba.

JONES: Then there was the death of the UN Secretary General in that plane crash while trying to mediate peace. But for Lumumba they did send out poisons to kill him. The CIA was into those things then I guess. I don't know if they were very successful.

Q: Well did you have much contact with the CIA?

JONES: No that would be the ambassador. In any case I was the desk officer, not serving at the embassy.

Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there.

JONES: Bill Harrop. Harrop was very good.

Q: Oh yes, very professional.

JONES: For awhile he was afraid that he would be PNG'd, i.e., declared persona non grata and expelled. I said, "Well many of our ambassadors had been. It might be a mark of honor." Ironically when we did have to evacuate people it was first from Congo-Brazzaville rather than Zaire. But that was after I left. People said I was so lucky I changed jobs just before everything blew up. Melissa Wells, another fabulous diplomat, was the ambassador in the latter period.

Q: Did you have much contact with the Zaire embassy here in Washington?

JONES: Yes we did.

Q: How did you find them?

JONES: They were OK. I dealt most with the DCM.

I did get one trip to Zaire, including visiting the copper producing area around Lubumbashi. When I was leaving there I was trying to get to Belgium in time to sit in on meetings Assistant Secretary Hank Cohen was having in Brussels. So I was flying to Kinshasa and then on to Belgium. There was one plane good for international flights in the Congolese air company known familiarly as Air Peut-Etre, "Air Maybe". The plane appeared in Lubumbashi and I thought "Oh I can get out because the plane is here." One has to remember that flight schedules in Africa then were very iffy. Its first leg was the weirdest experience. Because it was an internal flight from Lubumbashi, I get on this plane and meet the surliest stewardess I have ever encountered in my life. And bare bones. They put this fish and potato dish in front of us which I ate because heaven knew when more food would be coming. When I got back on the plane after a layover in Kinshasa it had been converted into an international flight. Smiling stewardesses, blankets on the seats, pillows. It was the same plane reborn.

Sometimes Mobutu would just take the plane for his own travels. Mobutu took a lot of money for himself but he also needed a lot of money to govern as he did. He would use force and pressure against people but he was not so much of a killer as some other leaders. He preferred bribes, preferred to use carrots rather than sticks.

Q: Opposition people would become ministers for awhile and then they would be thrown out.

JONES: That was the case but then they might come back in.

Q: Some of these African leaders were brutal. He wasn't from accounts I have heard.

JONES: No he wasn't; not like some of them. Though he was not above using torture I

understand.

Q: He was corrupt as hell but an awful lot of the corruption was based on paying other people to keep them from raising hell.

JONES: The most prominent example was Nguza Karl-i-Bond, who served as prime minister and foreign minister at various times. Mobutu had him beaten at one point, but he didn't kill him, and Nguza served him again after it. Mobutu greased the wheels a lot. Of course there are a lot of resources in Zaire. I sometimes wonder if those countries in Africa with the most resources are cursed to suffer rather than benefit from them.

Q: Yeah. Then where?

JONES: Then I went to work on trade issues again.

Q: What sort of trade issues.

JONES: We were in NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) negotiations with Canada and Mexico and I had the office lead on two of the negotiating teams.

Q: How did you find the negotiations for NAFTA?

JONES: Interesting. One of the teams I was on concerned rules of origin; Treasury had the lead. We negotiated item by item in the customs list on how you determine if a product originated in the United States or whatever. For example, I remember the discussion of refrigerators. As it turns out the really essential part of a refrigerator to determine origin is the shell, the plastic shell, not the motor or other parts.

Q: Really?

JONES: Yes. Both Mexico and the United States had wonderful negotiating teams on rules of origin which are essential to the operation of a free trade area where the origin of a product is a key issue.

We also dealt labor issues with our Labor Department in the lead. The lead negotiators were excellent. I was not an expert in the subjects but kept a watching brief in case issues cropped up where the State Department should be more directly involved. I also kept State apprised of the progress of the talks.

I remember from this time how primitive our IT support was. First at some time in the past, the State Department in its infinite wisdom (which even I thought silly at the time) had decided to only procure Wangs. They finally decided that we needed PCs to do computing related to economics but we only had one PC to share between two offices in EB.

Q: We are talking about a very primitive, it was really more a typing machine called the

Wang. It was called a computer but it was typing machine with a screen on it.

JONES: It was a typing machine or word processor. Actually we finally learned to do cables on them which at least meant communicators didn't have to retype all the cables for transmission. Then they finally started bringing in regular computers. So we were two offices and there was one stupid computer for all of us to use.

Q: that period was something.

JONES: Well anyway.

Q: Where did you go then?

JONES: I then went to Mauritius as the DCM.

Q: You were in Mauritius from when to when?

JONES: I was in Mauritius from '93 to '95.

Q: You are sitting in the middle of the ocean, it is quite a unique society isn't it?

JONES: Yes, it is very interesting. It was originally a French colony taken over by the British in the Napoleonic wars, but there was still a very strong French influence. There were more people descended from French settlers than from British. There was also a mestizo population descended from slaves brought in from Africa. The African slaves had some difficulty in surviving the difficulties of sugar cane production, still a major activity in the island. So then indentured workers from India and Pakistan were brought in; their descendants were the largest component of the population. One restraint on the economy is that Mauritius is frequently hit by cyclones. You can't produce tree crops because the cyclones will destroy the trees. Sugar cane however will survive a cyclone. We had a really bad cyclone while I was there. So the Mauritians were working on banking and textiles to supplement sugar production.

Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there?

JONES: Leslie Alexander. He was originally supposed to go to Benin after serving as DCM in Haiti, but we had downgraded relations and he would have had to go as Charge and he didn't want to do that. He wanted the ambassador title so he came to Mauritius. The AF bureau had selected me as DCM, not Ambassador Alexander. But we met, he agreed to keep me on and I went out several months before he got there. We didn't get on especially well so perhaps in retrospect it would have been better for him to have made his own choice. Ambassador Alexander liked to close things down. Before he got to post State closed the embassy in the Comoros and assigned coverage to Port Louis. He eventually closed out the Peace Corps there which reduced our coverage to periodic visits. The Comoros was interesting; I went up there a few times. As chargé I made the mistake of thinking we wanted to be more engaged that we did so I made a proposal for

visits that was rejected in Washington, but that is all right.

The Comoros is very underdeveloped and has few resources. There were three islands which had chosen independence when a lot of the French colonies became independent. A fourth island remained part of France but French influence was dominant throughout. I only went to Grande Comore. There is an active volcano sitting right next to the airport which I didn't think was the best location. People did not have many resources but would spend lots of money on weddings. The first time I went up there we hadn't gotten rid of the residence so I stayed there. On the next visit I stayed at a big resort at the one end of the island quite a distance from the capital town. It was very strange to go from people there for a beach holiday into the center of this very undeveloped island. A plane that crashed just offshore from the resort after my last visit and they were able to save everyone.

Q: Had there been any on the Comoros they have these filibusters, these guys trying to take over. Didn't they have mercenaries or something/

JONES: At one point, but the mercenaries were defeated. I met this guy who was in charge of security in the Comoros, a very impressive man and he took the government for over for awhile. I never got to the other islands. Some others from the embassy did. Another thing that happened to me when I was up in the first visit, there was a Moslem religious ceremony that the woman in charge of the embassy arranged for us to attend. Well it turned out we were the only women there, and we were asked to leave. I think that even made the BBC. I couldn't have dressed more conservatively, but no one had offered the view that we shouldn't attend because we were women. That and the fact that one of the people involved in the embassy bombing in Nairobi was from the Comoros might have indicated that we should have stayed more engaged than we were because of the Islamic influence. But this wasn't worth a candle to people interested in pulling back. I think the Seychelles is now covered from Mauritius as well.

Q: Mauritius was this a pretty big tourist place?

JONES: Yes.

Q: How did that impact on you all?

JONES: Not too much. It was a tourist place but it didn't attract many Americans. So there wasn't much in the way of consular impacts. It offered nice places we could go visit and things to do on the weekends. The resorts were on the coast and a drive both from where we lived and the capital and few tourists visited Port Louis. Most Mauritians lived in the interior in the more elevated areas. That stemmed from the time when malaria was a problem. Mauritius did a fine job in eliminating malaria from the island and authorities were vigilant to assure that it did not return.

Q: Were there many issues with Mauritius?

JONES: No. The one wasn't really a Mauritian issue but arose from the fact that so many of the people from Diego Garcia had been resettled in Mauritius by the British. At one time there were all sorts of rumors, including one that atomic weapons were being stored in Diego Garcia. Ambassador Alexander arranged for a delegation of Mauritian politicians to visit Diego Garcia. It was of course strategically important to us since the British held Diego Garcia and that we could use the naval facilities so we had a subsidiary role on the issue.

Q: So you were there until when?

JONES: I was there until '95, June '95.

Q: Then what?

JONES: I went to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington.

Q: How did you find that?

JONES: I enjoyed it very much; that was a good year, learning more about the military and other things. I got a chance to go to the Soviet Union on a spring tour with them.

Q: It was Russia then wasn't it?

JONES: Yes. It was a combined trip for the War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces or ICAF. Most ICAF students did spring trips associated with industries that they were studying during the spring semester. I was in a seminar studying computers and their impact, but because I was also in a group studying Russia I was able to go there and I was really thrilled. We went to Moscow and St. Petersburg. We went out into the countryside around Petersburg. We visited a former soldier trying to make success of an agricultural life, living in a depressing cottage, against formidable odds. I've often wondered what happened to him. At that point St. Petersburg was pretty much a backwater, while Moscow was very dynamic and growing. We also went down to Yekaterinburg, the city where the Tsar and his family were imprisoned and killed, which had been a closed city for so long. There you saw what a rust belt looked like. We also met with these guys, formerly soldiers in Afghanistan, which seemed to be like a mafia. They had this club in a house with a game room and all. Outside Moscow we also went to a missile museum on a military base outside of Moscow with our guide saying how strange it was to be showing Americans the missiles the Soviets had been trying to put into Cuba. So it was interesting.

Q: Then where?

JONES: Then I was detailed to the Pentagon to work on peace keeping operations; I mainly did Haiti with them. It was fascinating to see how the military and the Pentagon operates.

Q: What piece of the action were you given?

JONES: Haiti mostly and general things, but we had a peace keeping mission in Haiti.

Q: With Haiti, what were the main things concerns that you had about Haiti and our mission there/

JONES: Well there are provisions under an assistance letter for the U.S. to provide peace keeping support to the UN, so we had work related to that. We had paperwork and had to deal with the mission change from more of a military one to more of a police action, although the policy lead was at the White House. By the time I got there is wasn't much of a peace keeping mission. I kept saying it was smoke and mirrors and that the mirrors were cracked. Much of the House was against it and Senator Helms followed it closely.

Q: It didn't seem to be a very effective group down there.

JONES: No.

Q: I mean an awful lot of our concern was we didn't want Haitians going out to sea and ending up...

JONES: ...in the United States. That was an underlying concern but people didn't talk about it much. From working on peace keeping missions there I went back to State as one of the two deputy directors in the peace keeping office in IO, the Bureau of International Organizations.. So I worked on peace keeping for quite awhile from '96 to '01.

Q: You must have gotten very much involved with Bosnia and all of that.

JONES: Yes. My main focus in the office was the African missions. But Bosnia and then Kosovo were very interesting. And during the Kosovo conflict I was acting director. During the military action everybody was saying, "Oh we don't need the UN, we don't care about the UN, forget it." My deputy assistant secretary and I looked at the situation and said, "But when the military action ends they will want the UN." So we started immediately planning for Kosovo and the peace keeping mission that would be needed. I remember that we pushed the UN to structure the operation so that judicial reform would not be in peace keeping. Congress really opposed funding ongoing judicial reform as part of peace keeping, as we had learned in Haiti, so we wanted to avoid that conflict in Kosovo, which we did.

It was really amazing, the Congress required monthly reports on peacekeeping. We would trek up to the House and the Senate. I don't know of any other area that had so much reporting requirements. I do remember going up in an August and telling them that we might have to go into Zaire. Very interesting to see everybody go pale in front of me. The Middle East missions were not in my portfolio.

In Africa we supported a peacekeeping mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea. I think we went

in prematurely before the parties were really focused on peace but Assistant Secretary Susan Rice wanted the UN in. The thing with a peace keeping mission is the UN cannot really go in and enforce the peace. It just cannot do it. If you are going to be fighting someone you have to have a multilateral coalition. You have to have a lead nation for that coalition. Multilateral coalitions can also deploy fast; it takes time to put together a peace keeping mission.

If there is a peace that can be held it can work. The one where everything went faster than I anticipated was Guatemala. They did it in three months which is what they said they would do. They had been having the peace talks and they wanted the UN for confidence building during the final stage. The rebels wanted to lay down their arms. They actually moved close to the encampments where they were to hand in their arms before the UN got there. Another where there was not really a peace was Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone was really bad because various rebels groups with no political objectives; they were just looters and diamond traders. It was a country dissolving.

Q: People just had these child soldiers.

JONES: The British really took the lead and finally got their forces in there and cooled down the situation.

East Timor was another mission that fell under me. I had heard of East Timor but knew little until reading a cable reporting that President of Indonesia said, "Well if they vote against this autonomy resolution we will just give them independence." I went, "Oh, Shit!" There it is. It was funny-sad that the Indonesians just could not believe that they would vote for independence. But we knew. So we worked with the UN over setting up the referendum and we began talks with the Australians on how we could help after the vote. We knew how the vote was going. We didn't know things were going to be quite as bad after the vote, but there wasn't much we could do in advance. When the violence broke out after the vote we couldn't go in until the Indonesians let us in because they had so many soldiers and police in the territory that there was no way you were going to get authorization for a force to fight its way in. Again it was still part of Indonesia. The UN performed well in the turbulent aftermath, and they stayed with the people and got some people out. The Australians ended up being the lead country in the multilateral force, with crucial support (communications) from the United States. It is hard in a country without very much in the way of reserves, although they do have offshore oil and gas in the future, which is one thing that Peter Galbraith negotiated. So overall East Timor went pretty well.

The Middle East missions just go on and on. But there we did achieve adjustments in Lebanon. In fact the oldest peace keeping mission in the world still exists in the Middle East.

Q: That is a lifetime occupation, dealing with the Middle East.

JONES: We didn't actually. The current peace keeping operations largely date from the

fall of, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the stability that the United States and the Soviet Union maintained in various areas. After the Security Council voted for a Korea operation which Soviet diplomats were absent, peace keeping operations were not really an option for many years. Then in the post Soviet era after the condominiums broke apart it became more active and kind of a learning experience, like Somalia. After Somalia there has been a great reluctance and congressional opposition to have American participate in peace keeping missions with boots on the ground. For example, from the beginning we assured the Congress there would be no American boots on the ground in the Congo. Many people had grandiose ideas (including 100,000 man peace keeping force) about the Congo but the point is there aren't enough peace keepers to do all these things anyway. There are a limited number of countries that have militaries that can do it. All countries have been cutting back on their military strength, so they just don't have the disposable forces even to put in to some of these peace keeping operations. So in a certain sense we had just been kind of toddling along and doing what we could with resource limits both in terms of manpower and money.

And back to the limits of UN peace keeping in Bosnia the peace keepers didn't have the strength and authority to keep order. So you had massacres the Dutch could not prevent. And there was Rwanda.

For some countries like Fiji and Nepal it is a way of earning money for the country. The peace keepers are paid a fair amount but not the whole amount that goes to the country.

Q: No, of course not.

JONES: That is one of the things that happened to the Ivory Coast. The money went to the Ivory Coast but they didn't pay their soldiers. That is not a good idea. Not good!

Q: How long were you dealing with peacekeeping.

JONES: Let me think, I retired in '02 so I left peace keeping in the summer'01. For a year I was director of technical UN agencies in IO. That dealt with UN technical agencies such as WHO and ILO. There were anti smoking negotiations in WHO that I participated in which were very interesting.

I retired formally in '02 but I have had four different assignments at State since. On the first I went into Kuwait and Iraq with General Garner's group in '03. People didn't want to do it and State was actually cut out of the decisions on Iraq. But one thing we had in the peace keeping office was oil for food. I don't know how oil for food got into the State peacekeeping office, followed by general sanction issues, but it did. And the office director at the time knew we would have to get the oil for food up again as soon as possible because the Iraqi people had become very dependent on it.

Q: Yes. Actually I was going to say it was a very effective system.

JONES: One section of General Garner's operation focused on planning for refugee

movements and possible humanitarian assistance with the war. So I was attached to that operation partly to be the eyes of the office in IO in what was going on. It was funny. I had a trip to India planned. Will Embrey called me in and said, "Will you do it." I said, "Yeah, but I am going off to India and I am committed to do that. He said, "Well it may not be here." I said, "I will take my chances." Of course the opportunity was still there. Nobody wanted to go. We had briefings and were issued gear like gas masks and clothing. We also were revaccinated for smallpox and got shots for anthrax. We were so unprepared. Of course General Garner knew that. He told us George Marshall had years to plan for Japan, and we have had a couple of months. Rumsfeld had also told him not to look at all the work state had done on postwar Iraq. They had this idea that we would get to Baghdad and people from the ministries would call us up and that everyone would pass over easily. It was unbelievable, surreal. I deployed a bit later than the main group because I had to finish up a few things. So we are out in Kuwait waiting. The British and us and the Kuwaitis sponsored this place in town to meet. The non-governmental organizations or NGOs were there and we would have reports and briefings and everything. I was then in the last group to go out to Baghdad. I had been having knee problems which got worse in part because I had to suspend swimming for a time after the smallpox revaccination. My knee really froze up on me and I had a cortisone shot the day I left. It got a bit better but still gave problems (I had a knee replacement that fall). They said "you can't run if they fire at you", so I was kept back in the office.

I think I did my most valuable work when I was left in Kuwait after the first groups had transferred to Baghdad with reporting back and forth there. The British had Basra with its port which would be crucial for oil and for the oil for food shipments. So I was able to funnel information back to Washington. We had terrible relations with our embassy in Kuwait, I don't know why. Maybe the military was throwing its weight around. Actually I think the embassy could have done better. Communicating was difficult since we were basically dealing with unclassified Emails on our personal Email accounts. I had my earthlink web mail and somebody else had their hot mail and so forth. So we are reporting back to Washington unclassified in Email. I told Will, the office director, if we ever had to see a cable just tell me please so we would somehow get it out of the embassy. The members of the Garner group moved to Baghdad in three convoys; I was in the last group. One thing I passed on from Kuwait came up in a funny way. State wanted to know if the rail lines from Baghdad to Basra were intact. The British came down from Basra to report. They were trying to figure out how to test the railroad lines when this train from Baghdad arrives in Basra. Some of the people in the railroad had taken a train down. So we knew, "OK, the line is working."

It was hard with the Iraqis. They were so used to operating under orders. They didn't take initiative in many cases though some went ahead. There was a group which regulated the Euphrates in certain seasons for irrigation and that sort of thing and they continued working without direction.

We drove to Baghdad from Kuwait. I had a one page strip map with a little line from Kuwait. This was supposed to be our map. Luckily our lead people had more developed maps and we had somebody that knew the route. At one point convoys were going further

East through some towns but there are more and more incidents of kids throwing rocks at the Suburbans, so our route was more to the West. It looked like the moonscape. I mean parts of Iraq so desolate, not a bit of green in sight. We saw the tanks that had been destroyed. Then we arrived at one of the presidential palaces in Baghdad adorned with large Saddam Hussein busts along the roof.

We lived in this palace that wasn't meant to hold so many people. We had bombed out all the communications and we had bombed out the power source for the palace. I slept in a room with most of the women from the Garner group on cots. We couldn't use the johns because of no electricity, and so it was a long walk through the palace to the john at night. About an hour a day women had access to the showers. I never knew before how nice a shower could be. The benefit lasted about five minutes and then it was hot again but blissful for that short period. Many people slept on cots in the basement and available rooms. There was one room we called the Elvis room because it had all this red furniture in it. There was shlocky furniture in several rooms, gilt but very insubstantial. By the time I got there, the mural in a central rotunda depicting the great success of Iraq was already covered up. I saw other murals including one that included SCUD missiles. Communications continued to be bad for several weeks. Many people had satellite Thuraya phones but when they rang people had to race out of the palace into the garden to get reception. The Australians and the British came in with window antennas to improve reception but we didn't have them. We had no phones in there. Installation of communications was delayed when one of the satellite receivers was damaged in transit. The military had cobbled something together but we were still using our personal Emails and unclassified communications. There was so interoffice communication so to see someone you had to walk to their office only to find them out. And the distances were not insignificant in many cases.

I rarely got out because they didn't send me to meetings because I couldn't run if there was trouble. There were a lot of security restrictions on doing the work because you needed to go with protection and you had to have the vans and the cars with protection. There were not enough vans and protections to schedule needed meetings. I did get out to see an arch modeled on Saddam's arms, skulls from the Iran-Iraq war and a looted museum near the palace. I also got down to see Babylon because one of our people was going down, and there was room in the car, and I begged to go because I was really going stir crazy walking around the palace. I did get out another time; it was an interesting, fun evening. The Italian chargé d'affaires was very colorful, wore a white suit and everything. He was always in the palace, sometimes arranging medical evacuations. He had some of us over for dinner and so I got to meet the singer Gianna Rolandi who was working on charitable activities. He sent a Carabinieri escort and a vehicle to take us out and back. That was my third time out of the palace. In addition our office was working on reopening the convention center so it could be used for government office space. It turned out that the U.S. advance was so fast that there wasn't the refugee flow that people had anticipated although there was some internal migration. The refugee movements came later than the in the process. The oil for food issue ended up in the economic section in Baghdad, I think partly because the supervisor of our section wasn't so interested in carrying it forward. So like everybody I think from State and AID in Garner group we

came out very depressed at the lack of preparation for the postwar situation. It was so horrible to see.

Q: Also I have talked to people I mean the expectations were you were going to sit at the side of ministers and all. The ministers weren't there. There hadn't been the planning. It was very badly done.

JONES: It was, and of course one was restricted by the limited ability to get around, insecurity, few communications, and minimal resources at first. Of course I don't know to what extent the destruction of the ministries was spontaneous or part of a sabotage plan. I don't know to what extent the ravaging of the infrastructure might have been planned or whether it just arose for economic reasons. For one thing there was just a lot of hubris involved because it turned out that getting an economy the size of Iraq going after years of economic sanctions was harder than anticipated. Coping with the electrical grid, hit by sabotage and looting, was beyond the capabilities of the corps of engineers and all. On the electrical side was people would go into like power stations and they would take out like one little piece of the equipments that would make it inoperable because it was irreplaceable. Because of the oil sanctions they had not updated the equipment in the electrical system so replacement parts were often lacking. They were taking down power lines and stripping the copper out. So the electrical situation was a mess, and here we all are roasting to death. Baghdad in June is starting to get hot. The people thought the U.S. would come in and they would have electricity. No they didn't and they struggled.

It turned out the health system was like a mafia. We had to move medicines with escorts. They had been ripped off and everything. During an initial visit to Baghdad staff had visited the UN and the Red Cross and were shot at perhaps because of the medical mafia group.

The whole situation was just awful. It was too big for the NGOs and even the U.S. found it difficult to handle the electrical problems. The continuing insecurity did not help.

We didn't have fax machines. Brenner comes in and we get an organization chart, and I had to report back in an E-mail describing the chart, which I couldn't fax. People in Washington kept asking what is going on? I told them as much as I could, but Bremer's team was very close mouthed. I did as well as I could. I think I was one of the few sending anything back to the department.

Q: Well when, I am just looking at the time. What happened afterward. You left there when?

JONES: I left there I was just there six weeks, so I left in June.

Q: Then what?

JONES: I had a break. I worked a few months in '04 in IO/UNP to replace some people

who had been seconded to Baghdad. Of course they didn't replace them, so they needed people to work on Middle Eastern and other issues at the UN and USUN.

But to conclude on Iraq, I think Garner had the right idea. He was trying to set up local governments. He was trying to get the Iraqi military to come back in and do protection and everything. He thought all but the leading Ba'athists could work for the new government. Then Bremer just stopped it. That was bad. Garner was left on his own and I don't think had much influence in Washington. For example, I was trying to find out the text of the draft Iraq resolution at the UN. Will told me he couldn't send me the draft resolution because it was classified. He couldn't send it in an unclassified E-mail. So finally I was on the web and I found a draft resolution in the New York Times and sent him an E-mail and said, "I am assuming this is it." It was. Then I took it to General Garner. He hadn't seen it. They didn't discuss the resolution with the guy who was supposedly in charge in Iraq.

I was told he only signed on for a limited period like I had. Medical had only cleared me for four months because I require two medications to control my blood pressure. Then it started going out of control. I thought Oh god I can't even take work pressure anymore. But I spoke with medical personnel who served in Baghdad afterwards. They said the problem was that the cafeteria meals were heavily salted before they got to us so I couldn't control salt consumption. Now you need an unlimited full medical clearance to serve there.

But we were all disgusted and we thought we could have done better, for example in building up the police. It is not rocket science and people know what to do, but experience was not drawn on. Then we started to see a flood of new people eager to remake Iraq. Nobody wanted to go out during the war but then you have got these idealistic conservative reformers. They were going to make it a financial economic model of conservatism whereas the problem was getting the country running. One bright light was Ryan Crocker who knew what he was doing. Oh it was sad overall. I said to Will when I came back, "I did my analysis before I went and decided I was going at the safest time." He said, "How so?" I said, "I knew we were going to win fast and by the time I was going to be there, the Iraqis wouldn't have had time to organize much resistance, and there wouldn't have been time for international terrorists to flow in." So I figured and I was right. Driving up to Baghdad, this military guy is telling me that it is safer now. I said, "Are you out of your mind? It is not going to be safe here for at least five years. What are you talking about? It is going to get worse. It is like, and I am not a Middle East Expert, we took the pieces of the Middle East and we threw them up in the air and they are still reassembling themselves. And we will not control it." One good thing about getting bogged down in Iraq I may say is that we had all these guys in the military saying should we got to Damascus or should we go to Tehran? Thank God we didn't do either. I mean it was this hubris.

Q: Well I tell you I have got to stop it at this point.

JONES: Ok, could I take two minutes.

Q: OK.

JONES: In '04-5 I did the document search for the oil for food inquiry under Volcker for State and USUN. We knew some of the stuff that was going on. We knew that Jordan and Turkey were getting Iraqi oil. We didn't know the extent of the corruption of UN officials. But what people didn't describe is that oil for food was a concession to keep sanctions and the no fly zone in place. It was meant to keep Hussein from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. I think in retrospect whatever the cost of the oil for food program, and whatever the corruption with it, it met its goals. He didn't build up weapons of mass destruction, and I think that should be noted because that was the U.S. goal and we met it. Then the other thing I did afterward I came back and worked on avian influenza for four years, and the efforts of preparing for that.

Q: I will tell you what.

JONES: I don't know if that is worth it, but any time coming back.

Q: Maybe we can come back one time.

JONES: OK, but a shorter time. My work with the avian influenza might be interesting to people.

Q: OK, today is 17 May 2011 with Margaret C. Jones.

JONES: Yes.

Q: And you go by Peggy.

JONES: Peggy, right.

Q: Let's go back and talk more about the Iraq experience. In the first place how were you recruited?

JONES: I was recruited by my former office director and colleague. His name was Will Embry. He would also be a good interview at some point. Will was the director of the office of peace keeping operations which was then peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. I never understood that title since the only humanitarian operations we seemed to have were sanctions, which was a stretch. But the office was the one at State where we followed oil for food issues in terms of the impact on the people and the politics at the UN. So the thinking as the Garner group (Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance of ORHA) was put together was that there was a great possibility of a massive movement of refugees. A lot of preplanning went into humanitarian operations. In addition Will knew that once the war was over they would have to re-start oil for food rapidly because the Iraqi people were so dependent on the

distributions. He asked me to go out in a way as the eyes of that office on the operations. A former PDAS for IO George Ward was on leave from the U.S. Institute for Peace to head up the humanitarian side of the Garner operation, and we had people from AID and various things, but that was our focus.

Q: What sort of preparation had you and your group made before you went out there?

JONES: I was not involved in the preparations of the group beforehand. When Will asked me it was about ten days before I was supposed to leave on a trip to India where I committed to a roommate. It would have been a total financial loss had I bailed. So I told him I was going on the trip. He said, "Well this opportunity might not be here," But there people were not fighting to go to Iraq just before the war. I think a lot of people like myself were very much against the war. But on the other hand I didn't think if there was any way I could make a contribution in terms of humanitarian operations I could just sit home. So when I came back it was still open. They were able to process me with the original group going out but I ended up finishing up my preparations and all and going out shortly after the group by commercial airlines. I actually flew just after the war began. We actually went to a Friday and Saturday retreat and briefing. The military didn't know quite what to do with the civilians so they decided they would equip us like the troops. So we got our clothing and gear. We were fitted for gas masks. We had our flak jackets and everything. We had some discussions. It seemed to me the planning was very airy fairy. But, I mean I have been told, and I think Garner himself has said that he was told by the Pentagon, presumably Rumsfeld, to ignore the State Department plans and papers on a postwar Iraq. . So they didn't draw on all this work that had been done and the insights of the people who knew the region. One reason they picked Garner was that he had worked with the Kurdish refugees in the north in the no fly zone after the Gulf War and knew something about the area. I was told he hadn't committed to stay for a long time. He certainly wasn't treated well at the end but I think he had originally planned to go by July. I think all of us knew you could see very much that we were a temporary organization for initial work on Iraq. We knew we were going to win the war; that wasn't in doubt there, but the people, the politically committed, the Republicans with all their ideas and everything and all these enthusiastic young people, did not want to go out at that point. They poured in after us, so it was kind of clear we were going to be a transitional organization and how we would transit wasn't quite clear at that point. That is what happened. I only had medical clearance to stay until July anyway. Garner was appointed in January and was going out to Kuwait and then Iraq in March. He did remark to us about how he had about six weeks to look at the task whereas General Marshall had years to be plan for the occupation of Japan and the post war situation. So he was very conscious of the lack of planning. This is one case where things went wrong and you can't blame the State Department, because we weren't involved in the planning. I don't know why it was handed over to the Pentagon the way it was. I just don't understand. There was a bias against nation building, but what the heck did they think we were going to be doing after the war. I don't understand. I never will understand.

Q: Well it was the Secretary of Defense, Don Rumsfeld, was very much I am going to take over; I am in charge, plus the fact that I think there was from what I gather, there was

within the ranks of the true believers, they were going to walk in and the ministries were going to be taken over by people who essentially had been in exile or else the ministries are going to be intact.

JONES: Oh absolutely. Plus there was a lot of neo-con influence throughout the government, and I am not in any position to speak to it directly. But looking at it from the outside because I was retired by the time some of this planning was done, the influence of the Vice Presidential office and Vice President Cheney was so enormous in all that. He was connected with all these people. I myself haven't read President Bush's book, but I have a suspicion we might not have gone to war with Iraq without Cheney. He was also tied to what was the name of that Iraqi, the exile group?

Q: Yeah, he was in London and all.

JONES: Because one of the things that I have not seen anything on this. I don't know how it was done. Somehow Defense, I presume it was Rumsfeld and without discussion in the administration and a full policy review, arranged to fly Ahmed Chalabi (of the Iraqi Nation Congress) into Iraq with his protection and everything. He was flown into Iraq before Garner was allowed to go up. I think they thought the Iraqis would say "Oh Yippee, we have a new leader. We will just go behind him." The guy is so corrupt and some of his people were reportedly involved in the violence. I don't know anything about how this came about but I think it was negative.

Q: Let's talk about you and so on. When you went in there you were feeling OK, I don't agree with the war but when you went in there did it look like there would be something to work with?

JONES: I didn't even know that much. I just said to myself because I didn't know how it was organized when I agreed to do it. I knew a little about some of the people involved. I didn't know if I could make any contribution but I just thought I don't want to live with myself if I say I don't want to go just because this inconveniences me when I might make a contribution. I just wanted to look myself in the face and say I went and I tried.

Q: When did you go in?

JONES: I went in March, about three days after the war started. I flew in through the Emirates and then landed in Kuwait. There was a fairly new Hilton beach resort there, and we had taken over the whole thing. So we were all put in these houses and we would troupe up to the main Hilton building to eat our meals. We had all these SUVs – Suburbans -- there. I said it was like driving around with a big target on your roof. Apparently they needed to get cars fast and this is what was available. I mean the Kuwaitis must have been making tons of money on this stuff. We had set up with the British and the Kuwaiti government a center in Kuwait city and we would come together daily and exchange information. The NGOs were there, there would be briefings, this type of thing. Probably some intelligence operatives, but I don't know about that.

Q: Had Baghdad been taken when you went in?

JONES: No. The first group was sent in even before the war started. Evidently there was a little bit of fear about possible attacks in Kuwait. For many weeks we had to carry our flak jackets and our gas masks with us at all times. But they really didn't attack Kuwait then. We also watched on TV. I always remember a Defense official whose name I forget who was working with the Iraqi resistance. Ahmed Chalabi has a nephew working within ORHA. The Defense official was always out talking on his Thuraya. There was one house at the Hilton resort that had all of these Iraqis associated with them. They went into Baghdad with the first group. The people who worked with the legal group worked in the house where I stayed. As I mentioned, we did not have good relations with the embassy, and maybe some cables were coming over, but it was very strange for me to be operating in such an information vacuum. When I was in Kuwait, I saw maybe one or two cables because Will told me to get them and so I made a request and got them through the embassy. In Baghdad I never saw a cable. All the communications that we had were unclassified.

Q: When did you finally go into Iraq actually?

JONES: They went after they took Baghdad, they sent people up in three waves. First of all there had been a reconnoiter mission, and Garner went in and one of our doctors went in. They went to see the International Red Cross in Baghdad, and there was an attack on them. One of the doctors that went in, I think he was a dentist or something, he had a wound that meant he couldn't practice medicine anymore. But we found out afterwards that there was a medical drug mafia that flourished under Saddam and they saw their interests as being threatened which is why attacked medical facilities. ORHA drove up in three different convoys, each about an eight or nine hour drive. The first group had the worst of it. They had to clean the palace where ORHA was lodged.

Q: So which group did you go up with?

JONES: I went with the third group. I was having knee problems and had a knee replacement later that year and a second the next year. I was swimming and keeping going. But because I couldn't swim because of the smallpox vaccination until it healed, somehow the knee really froze. I had a cortisone shot the day before I left. At the Hilton I was in house farthest from the dining facilities. The walk up to have meals was over a mile. Rushing with my flak jacket and gas mask to meetings really did in the knee. So they kept me from doing things because they said I couldn't run if I was fired upon. I got to know the people in the ORHA watch center well. That really helped me up in Baghdad because I could always go to them and get things.

Q: What was the situation for feeding?

JONES: Oh in Kuwait we were eating at the Hilton buffet.

Q: But I am talking about later on.

JONES: Oh there.

Q: Your job because you were talking about food for peace.

JONES: Oh I see what you mean. The main thing that I was focused on trying to find out initially was the condition of the port of Basra which would be instrumental for bringing in shipments. So people wanted to know how things were there. Then they wanted to know if the rail system was intact. The British were in Basra and would come down to Kuwait for briefings. So to the extent that I knew what was going on in Basra I would send back what I could unclassified. At one point they were briefing us and there had been a group of Iraqis that had gotten together and had come down by train so we knew that the train lines were intact. We also knew that Basra required some work. Again with all the sanctions they hadn't replaced key parts of the infrastructure equipment. There were dredgers going in to make it better to get some oil shipments out but also to get shipments in. So they were working to organize the Iraqi staff. The British were saying it was hard because under Saddam the Iraqis were so afraid to take a decision that everything was referred up. It was a little hard to get people to make decisions. Then when we went to Baghdad George Ward wasn't very interested in oil for food so it ended up in the economic group. I did my stuff within our group and I informed Will who was doing what. I was trying to keep him apprised. Then after awhile Jerry Bremer arrived with his group, I sent what reporting I could. There we got a little more organization within the operation. Pat Kennedy came in to work with Bremer, but it was very much a closed shop in terms of decision making

Q: You were frozen out essentially.

JONES: Everybody was frozen out if you didn't come with Bremer's crew. I mean there are a few people who got in and worked with Bremer, and then when Ryan Crocker came I think he was involved in that. It was also a transition from the ORHA crew as new people flowed in. Sometimes I heard people talking about creating a model economy which I found baffling and unrealistic. And then there was the flawed operation to build up the police forces. We had built up police forces in peacekeeping operations. It is not rocket science. It had been done although it is hard. Now this is a very vast operation, but they named former police commissioner Bernie Kerik from New York City and he just went around and didn't do diddly squat. They were simply delaying things. General Garner had been trying to start local governments and trying to get the former armed forces involved with security because security was a real problem. As long as you didn't take the supreme commanders who were really tainted, those with Baath affiliations, which you needed to work, could be put to work. But Bremer came in and stopped that completely. Thus all these former military people saw no chance of a livelihood or anything. That has been analyzed and discussed and I don't need to go there. But I am not sure from what I read subsequently whether Bremer made the decision on his own. Then for the military a former deputy secretary from Defense, Walter Slocombe was supposed to be running it. He may have been there once or twice but not enough and they didn't know what the heck was going on. Well I hope more will be learned about what

happened.

Q: You were there, did you have an office?

JONES: So we finally got an air conditioner. I ended doing a lot of research on the internet trying to find out what was going on, feeding things to people, because I was not supposed to go to meetings. I had to be in the office, so I had to look for a role. It was hard communicating with other groups because they had offices throughout the palaces. You had another 20 minute to half an hour walk because you couldn't call them, and you would get there and nobody was there, so you get to walk back your room. We were moved to a new office the day I left. That was because General Sanchez wanted to have a center in the palace which was like the center back in Kuwait and all. I don't know what the lumber cost. They built this enormous platform with desk tops and computers and communications and everything and he took our old office. At the end there wasn't an initial humanitarian crisis. There were some refugees, but it wasn't as numerous as it became subsequently as the violence continued. I talked to some Iraqis and there was internal movement. There were people going from small towns to villages and large towns to smaller towns, so there was some refugee flow but it was not over the borders. Another of our people worked on rehabbing the convention center and getting offices and meeting places there. In fact that is where the Iraqi government sits now in the green zone. Then they were also working on getting the hotel up and all sorts of things. I have to confess I don't think George was so interested in our work. I sometimes thought he was more interested in writing up job opportunities for the U.S. Institute for Peace after the post war than doing some of the humanitarian operations. His heart was not in it. He had only come for a limited period too. So oil for food went to the economic section headed by Robin Raphael and she and her economic team did a lot. Robin did a lot directly. She was on the telephone on the conference calls. So in terms of being into the organization Robin would know things that I had no access too. Then we also the political operation was headed by former ambassador to Yemen, Barbara Bodine, although she left prematurely after a conflict with the military guy working on administering Baghdad..

JONES: But also you had that army corps of engineers. I attended some of their meetings and it was clear even when they were meeting back in Kuwait that the whole situation of restarting the country infrastructure was vaster than they imagined. I don't know if people had analyzed the damage or the effect of the sanctions on the state of the infrastructure. There was targeted sabotage. People were stealing the lines and selling the copper. They were targeting electrical facilities and taking out key components and since they were so old they were not easily replaced. They were killing and threatening people too. I mean there would be violence where they would go in and try and threaten operators of electrical facilities to divert it to one place or another.

It was also a disappointment to the Iraqis. They thought the big United States would come in and services would move along fine, but they had lower levels of services than they had under Saddam and it was difficult. If you don't have electricity and it is hot and people are up on the roofs. The lack of security was also a disappointment. One Iraqi woman who worked with our group was a pharmacist but she just felt she couldn't work

as a pharmacist. It was too dangerous. So in a certain sense the Iraqis were still in prison. They were imprisoned by the violence around them and by the lack of services, and I think that was probably very hard. It didn't help us at all. Health services were also difficult. In the initial days some of the Iraqis had looted medical facilities, sometimes those that had only been available to high ranking Baath or military officers. They weren't available to the general public. In Baghdad there was even one facility where they even took the patients out of their beds, put them on the floor, and took the beds. Medicines were also lacking. We were trying to get basic things in there but also reminding people that you had a population with a lot of chronic illnesses such as heart disease. The Iraqis loved their sweets which contributed to diabetes and heart disease. We were trying to get medicines in the pipeline to take care of patients with chronic illnesses as well. This comment on one little sector hints at the complexity of the postwar situation.

Q: Well how long were you there?

JONES: I went out in March spending six weeks in Kuwait and six weeks in Baghdad. I left in June about the time they were disbanding our group.

Q: Well how did you feel when you were disbanded? Had you done anything?

JONES: I felt frustrated. I don't know that I did very much. I think I did my best work in some ways when I was still in Kuwait and others had left, because we were getting information in and I was feeding it back to Washington. It had impact on oil for food and all. So I felt that I was doing my thing. It was hard to do anything effective in Baghdad. The ministries had been looted, set on fire. To go around town you had to have security. But there weren't enough cars and security personnel. The normal life of a foreign service officer is not to be sitting in a palace and not being able to talk to people or be out there doing stuff. The AID people got out more, especially the DART. Now I know George was very critical of the DART teams. I thought they did a very fine job.

Q: DART stands for what?

JONES: Disaster Assistance Response Team. The Iraqi situation was too big and precarious for the NGOs. DART teams go in after a disaster and assess needs which NGOs then pick up. There was a feeling they would do this in Iraq but the problem one, you didn't have the security, and two, the problems were beyond the capacity of most NGO's to tackle. I mean if our Army Corps of Engineers couldn't tackle some of them, I an NGO couldn't. The DART had armored vehicles, and they really went everywhere and did a lot of things. George didn't like what they were doing, but I thought they did fine. So it was the lack of security that corroded everything for years to come. It still exists for the common Iraqi, the violence. We said we conquered the country, Bush did his big thing on the boat, but we could bypass the most difficult things. The military just bypassed Fallujah and that triangle of death around there, and just went north, but that wasn't pacified at all. Going to Jordan was very dangerous because you had to go through that area.

I did want to talk about one thing that is funny. When I went in I had actually gotten a diplomatic visa and I went in through the regular process and had my passport stamped and everything. But when we went up to Baghdad, the military wasn't going to stop at the border for stamps. Everything was zoom. So people started to flow out and go back through Kuwait. The Kuwaitis were charging them a fairly substantial sum in dollars and you had to pay in cash, for all the days their visa hadn't been renewed. So I started saving my money up while people started to think of a way around the difficulties. They devised a rubber stamp for us. I mean to give it to State for its archives since I got the first stamp. But when we got to the airport, you could also travel on DOD IDs. So although I entered on my diplomatic visa I left on my DOD ID and I wasn't charged any money. But the charge and tax would have been over \$1,000. I was busy cashing checks and saving it up in case I had to do it. The whole thing with the Kuwaitis, they made a lot of money from all these operations. We were really helping them. We had saved their hide in the past, but then they were sticklers on what was a minor detail. Oh well.

Q: Then what were you up to? You left there, then what?

JONES: Then I came home. I went back to work. I had gone WAE (when actually employed) because I signed up with IO so I could keep my security clearance and work. Then they contacted me the next year, in '04 to work in the IO/UNP which works with the UN for several months because people had been deployed to Iraq, but they were deployed encumbering a position in Washington. A number of offices were short staffed because they had employees in Iraq but they couldn't backfill the job. So I went in and worked with them for several months until I had my second knee surgery. It was kind of interesting since I had never worked on Israeli issues before. But I pick up issues rapidly and help out. I think I worked Afghanistan a bit. That was interesting because they were talking about an ongoing problem -- do you go out to try and eradicate drugs or do you want economic development going. So that debate was going on. Then the Israeli issues, I dealt with them. I know the rhythm of the Security Council. I was working with people I had worked with before. People don't realize, even people within State, the great importance in moving fast. The Security Council is going to meet. So it might be nice to debate the issue but you need to know how you are going to vote in an hour. And we were getting the answers in time. So that was interesting. Then later in '04 after the knee surgery, my old office contacted me again because there of an investigation headed by Volcker on the oil for food program and corruption. The document search is tedious and consuming and so they asked me to come back and work on the document search at USUN and in Washington on what we knew or didn't know. In terms of people that were said to be corrupt, I didn't see any evidence that we knew that. We did, they were saying. People honed in on the fact that Jordan was getting oil from Iraq, but we knew that. We also knew the Jordanians needed it. As I mentioned the other time we made concessions. The oil for food was a concession we made to get the no fly zone and to try to make sure that Saddam Hussein did not build weapons of mass destruction. Although they were used as one of the causes to go to war, I think the investigation afterward showed that the policy had been successful, or at least there weren't weapons of mass destruction to be found.

I didn't have anything more work with IO. It is always so difficult there since they never budget for WAE but were able to employ me for three cases of pressing need.

In '06 I started working with the Avian Influenza Action Group which Ambassador John Lange headed. We had funding and the issues were fascinating. President Bush took the lead in pushing action. Some people feel looking back that the effort that went into avian influenza may have been a reaction to Katrina and the perceived inaction there. If the new avian influenza, which is fairly lethal in the humans that catch it, mutated to be easily transmissible and caused a pandemic similar to the Spanish influenza of '18 people might say you didn't do enough preparation on that either.

I was brought in to work with the international organizations especially the World Health Organization, WHO. The first year I wasn't full time and but the Indonesians sparked negotiations that turned it into a full time job for years. Indonesia was one of the epicenters for the human cases that were found. Like the '18 Spanish influenza it affected mostly young people and young adults, turning on their immune system which in a way kills them in reaction to the influenza. Older people and young people don't have as active an immune system, and were not as affected. The cases were limited but the kill rate was high which was one reason this new influenza virus sparked such interest. The fear was that it would mutate so as to be easily transmitted from human being to human being.

Indonesia's very difficult health minister decided that it was unfair to share their virus samples when vaccine companies would make money and the supply of vaccines for Indonesia would be limited. So Indonesia stopped sending virus samples to the World Health Organization network that developed after WWII for to analyze virus samples. The samples go to labs in developed countries like the U.S CDC or Centers for Disease Control. There is one in Italy, and there is a network for animals as well. Those experts study what is happening and then they make recommendations on what should be in the yearly influenza vaccines that come up. And the prevalence of influenza in certain regions may differ so the recommended vaccines will also differ. Manufacturing influenza vaccines is still based on using eggs and there is a large lead time being starting the process and producing the vaccines. Thus there is also a large lead time between when a pandemic starts and the when the relevant vaccine is available. Supplies are limited and generally developed countries have signed up with manufacturers leaving less developed countries at a disadvantage in getting the vaccine. So this is a hole in the system.

Indonesia and other developing countries were concerned they wouldn't have access to vaccines if there were a pandemic. Indonesia was also concerned about the entire vaccine system and used its samples as leverage. As a result very complicated negotiations started on sample sharing. In one sense the Indonesians seemed to want to be paid for the samples. The issues were tangled but one was that if you weren't providing samples you were impeding the study of the virus as it evolves and couldn't also impede development of a vaccine if it becomes very infectious. We were also looking at ways we could get

vaccines to developing countries because there was a basis to their concerns. Lots of countries don't use the normal yearly influenza vaccines. So we had negotiations started. They can get very convoluted. Influenza vaccines are covered by a lot of the rules that cover weapons of mass destruction. So for example, if you were sending an influenza vaccine to Cuba you had to get all sorts of special permissions in case they would back engineer it into a weapon of mass destruction or a biological agent. You can't waive these rules. Avian influenza was covered so when the Indonesians asked for the return of a sample the CDC ran into these rules. The original samples are highly pathogenic and must be handled in labs with sufficient bio security. When you are talking about the vaccine, they engineer the viruses from those samples so that what goes to the drug companies and the vaccine is not the highly pathogenic virus but a low path form. You had to certify that the vaccine was going back to a lab in Indonesia with a sufficient bio security to handle it, and then you had to do the export license. You could see how the hard it was to explain to the Indonesians why the response to their request for the samples back was not immediate. People would say can we waive this? I would say, "You are in an area where there are no waivers. You do the procedures or you don't do the procedures. This is national security you are talking about. No there isn't a waiver." So it is interesting how many seemingly simple issues become complex. And this specific example surely contributed to Indonesian distrust. I have to go on line and see how the negotiations were concluded. They just were demanding things we couldn't do. Then some tried to relate it to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Under the Convention people own resources from their country, and they want to make sure that drug companies don't come in and use a resource from their country without compensation. We were arguing that we really didn't think those rules applied to something like an avian influenza. Under biological diversity one of the goals is to maintain the diversity of sources in the world in case they become useful in the future. But the goal with an influenza virus is not to maintain it. You want to kill it to get rid of it. Though as a footnote, smallpox has been eradicated but the U.S. and Russia still have smallpox samples in their labs. Each time the question of destroying those stocks comes up in WHO it is deferred. I don't think they will ever give them up.

Q: Well how long did you work on this?

JONES: I was there three and a half years. Then in the middle of '09 the Avian Influenza group was changed and we were moved into an office in OES. At that point Ambassador Lange was very dissatisfied with the way things were going since the coordinated multilateral work to on pandemics was being cut back despite continuing biological threats out there. He retired from the State Department and went to work for the Gates Foundation as their first diplomat employee. His replacement did not like the way things were going in OES and resigned after a few months. The funding was drying up and OES just wasn't interested in doing it. While we were in OES a variety of swine flu, luckily not terribly lethal, became a pandemic. We worked on the response including the development of the vaccines. After that they began phasing out the WAEs in the office and so my tenure there ended January 15, 2010.

Q: This is Bill and Melinda Gates.

JONES: Yes. Ambassador Lange is working with them on programs in Africa. But he is based in their Washington DC office. OES just has its problems as a bureau. But the powers that be were not interested in the Obama administration were not interested as those in the Bush administration. Of course when Obama was a senator he would point out the danger of avian influenza but they were regarding it our under the terrorist aspect of things. I don't know if they are still going but under Homeland Security, there was a daily telephone call check on what was going on following developments in various areas. Of course CDC follows things very much. They have wonderful relations. Another aspect of the Indonesian thing was that the negotiations led to trouble for a U.S. Navy there. The Indonesians raised questions about visas and I don't know if the laboratory is still there. We have similar facilities in Egypt, which I presume is still doing well and which was kept operational even in the darkest days, and one in Peru.

Q: I am going to guess, is it still there?

JONES: Yes, it is still there. Doing very good work in Africa, very good. Of course Egypt had a number of cases of swine flu. We were afraid that Egypt or maybe Africa might be the place where a pandemic started. There were cases where there were outbreaks of avian influenza. They would go very fast. We worked intensively with our embassies. We helped get the resources to the governments to stop avian influenza outbreaks in poultry to eliminate the disease in an area and stop the exposure of humans to the disease than can result in mutations. When avian influenza was detected, poultry in the area was killed and there was heightened attention to the health of the farm workers. We put a lot of effort in improving relations between UN agencies and in promoting cooperation among agricultural and health department. The Food and Agriculture Organization or FAO improved its capacity to deal with crises such as avian influenza; FAO is basically an agriculture development organization so it took a bit to develop this additional focus. They developed the protocols based on a realization of how human and animal health is bound together. So if you have an outbreak of avian influenza you don't just send your agriculture expert in, you send your public health experts to make sure that the workers haven't been infected. We had such efforts in India and parts of Africa and worked on it. Also it was very good in Africa that the public and animal health people got more involved with each other and got to know each other more in exchange in working with AID and everything. Hopefully there were some permanent positive aspects out of the work that was done. It was really very broad.

Q: did you have very much contact with the Indonesians?

JONES: I did not but others did. It was fun. Ambassador Lange could really tell the story about the Indonesians.

Q: OK, well I guess this is you basically retired-retired.

JONES: Yes. I am still on the State rolls as a WAE and maybe something will come up, but IO doesn't have the money. I am not sure I still have quite the energy level for full

time. I can't do the all-nighters anymore.

Q: Well one begins to slow down. I am. I am finding it harder. I used to lead a much more active oral history thing and now I am doing it more one a day rather than two a day.

JONES: I know, but I appreciate being able to record some of the issues I have worked on. I don't know if it is of interest to anybody, but I'm glad I had the opportunity.

Q: OK.

End of interview