

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR JOHN H. KELLY

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INTERVIEW

Q: First of all, please accept my thanks, on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies, for giving us the time necessary to conduct this series of interviews. I am sure that your history will be a valuable addition to the Oral History Collection. Let me begin by asking you to tell us a little about your background and your pre-Foreign Service life.

KELLY: I was born in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin in 1939. After WW II, my family settled in Atlanta, where I grew up and I consider that to be my home. I went through primary and secondary school there and graduated from Emory University which is also in Atlanta. I majored in history and took some courses in political science, English and Russian literature, but no international affairs. After college, I went to Duke University Law School, but left that institution after one semester to become a high school teacher. I did continue my studies to some extent by taking some courses at Duke on the Asian subcontinent--India and Pakistan. At that stage of life, I was not really certain what I wanted to do. In my teens, I had given a fleeting thought of attending the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, but I didn't pursue that for very long.

One day in 1963, I received a form letter from the American Historical Association, announcing that the Foreign Service examination was being given and that if any one was interested, they could fill out a card that was enclosed with the letter. The Association had been requested to send this advertisement to its younger members. In 1963, I didn't know much about careers in the international field. I had had some interest in the subject matter, partly at least as consequence of being a member of a family that held vigorous discussions over the dinner table on all sorts of subjects including international affairs. My father had been in the Navy during WW II; one of my grandfathers had spent considerable time overseas as a member of the US Army. I had always thought that the Foreign Service was reserved for Ivy Leaguers, who had been raised overseas, knew many languages and had independent incomes--a notion that I think many Americans shared at the time.

When the AAH's flyer arrived, I talked to my wife. She had two uncles who were career officers with the Central Intelligence Agency. Both were serving overseas at the time. So she had become quite familiar with talk of living overseas and was intrigued by the idea of doing that. I put the application card on my desk with full expectation that I would fill it in and return it to addressee. A couple of weeks later--on a Sunday--, my wife asked me whether I had sent the card in; I admitted that I had not done so and when I looked at it again, I saw that it was due in Washington the following day. I immediately drove to the main post office in Danville, VA and banged on the back door. When someone stuck their head out, I told him that I had to get that card to Washington by the next day and wanted to send a special delivery. After much grumbling, the fellow obliged and sent the application.

Apparently, the card arrived in time because three months later I took the written examination in Chicago, IL. We had moved to Niles, MI to teach high school there and Chicago was the closest examination point. The written examination, which I took in September, 1963, took one full day. I passed it and a few months later I was invited to go to Chicago to take the oral examination--on March 21, 1964. During the evening before exam day, a blizzard had broken out. I started towards Chicago and after three hours, I had gone fifteen miles. In fact, I became stuck in a snow drift in South Bend, IN. I called the US Customs House in Chicago where the exams were being given. I told one of the examiners of my predicament and said that I thought I could not arrive at the appointed hour. He very kindly said that if I could make to Chicago at any time that day, they would try to fit me in. I abandoned the car and took the South Shore Railroad which took me to Chicago. I finally showed up at the US Customs building, sometime late in the afternoon. The three examiners, after completing one of their interviews, asked me whether I wanted to join them in a cup of coffee. I did that, and then returned to the examination room where I was interviewed for just an hour--I guess I must have been the last of the day. It didn't dawn on me until later that the coffee session had become in fact part of the examination. In any case, I passed the oral examination as well. I can still remember that the chairman of the examining board was John Hay, who, I think, was the grandson of one of our distinguished Secretaries of State and who ultimately became Consul-General in Strasbourg and had some other similar assignments. The only thing I remember about the other two members of the panel was that their last names also started with the letter "H".

I remember clearly what we discussed. There were a lot of questions on economic issues, such as the structure of steel production, vertical and horizontal integration of industries. There were questions about the proper conduct of a Cultural Attaché in an embassy such as Cairo if confronted by a virulent Arab nationalist who accused you of representing a bankrupt cultural society. How would such an American official point to US leadership in the arts? There was also a question about the origins of the Panama Canal Treaty and the "Roosevelt corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. I was very happy with that line of questioning because I had just been teaching about those Latin American issues. There were a number of questions that I could answer rather easily because I had been religiously reading The New York Times and TIME magazine during the previous year. The questions that I could not answer I deflected by stating that I didn't know anything about the subject matter--I later found out that honesty was the right policy in that examination--bluffing or going on at length would not win many points. I was told at the end of the interview to wait outside the room while the examining panel deliberated. After a brief period, I was invited back into the room and told that I had passed muster.

Then I had to go through security and medical clearance. In June, 1964, after the end of the school year, my wife and I moved to Washington on the naive assumption that once one passed the written and oral exams, it would only be a matter of weeks before one reported for duty. When we arrived in Washington, I called the Board of Examiners only to be told that my security clearance had not even been initiated. So I worked on a number of short term jobs around the area--e.g. United Parcel Delivery. I was also studying French at Georgetown and was told that since 1964 was an electoral year, both the National

Democratic Committee and the Republican National Committee were looking for help. So I applied to both--I needed a job! The Republicans hired me in August, but I was dismissed after a very few days because I told them that I was not certain that I could vote for Barry Goldwater. I was naive enough to think that my views would not make any difference, but learned otherwise.

Sometime later, I went to Rosslyn to meet with a security agent. he got very excited when he asked me whether any member of my family had ever been a member of the Communist Party. I said that one of my great uncles--Frank Keefe-- had been Secretary General of the Communist Party in Canada, although I added that perhaps that was not really relevant to his question. But the agent got very excited and called in a colleague; then the two of them proceeded to ask me a lot of questions about Frank, who had immigrated to Canada from Ireland. My grandparents had also immigrated from Ireland. Uncle Frank settled in Regina, Saskatchewan, and in the 1920s became a communist. Later he became the Secretary General of the Party. I had never met Uncle Frank because he could not come to visit the US in light of his political affiliations, but I had heard a lot about him at family gatherings. My father voted for FDR in 1933, but never voted for Democrats thereafter. In any case, this bit of family history seemed to agitate the agents, probably because I may have been the first who had admitted some family connection with the Communist Party--dim as it was. The agents said that they thought that they should contact the Canadian Mounted Police who apparently had responsibility for Canadian security matters. But somehow, nothing ever seemed to come of that conversation because my clearance was granted soon thereafter. Cooler heads must have prevailed because I certainly had not the remotest connection with the Communist Party.

Finally, in September, I was called and was asked to join the October entrance class because a vacancy had just occurred. That good fortune reduced my waiting time considerably. I started the A-100 class in October 1964. There must have been 26-28 students in the class, including four or five USIA officers. The class was all white with six or seven women. Among my fellow students was Ed DeJarnette, now an ambassador in Africa, Eleanor Savage, Charlie Salmon--the POLAD at CINCPAC; these are all still n active duties. I think the others have either retired or left the Service earlier. I must say that at the time I thought that I was probably not be able to compete with my fellow students. On the first or second day, we each had to give a short presentation about who we were, where we had studied, where we had traveled, what languages we spoke, etc. I was very impressed by the credentials of my colleagues; we had a lawyer or two in the class, several MBAs, lot of people who had studied and traveled abroad and who knew some foreign languages. I had none of those experiences--no graduate degree, never traveled outside the US, etc.

It was a very congenial group. Someone had the idea that we should visit together every ethnic restaurant in Washington so that we could get some initiation to our future meals. So twice each week, we went to an ethnic restaurant together with our spouses and friends; we ate too much and drank too much, but had a great time and developed a great sense of collegiality. We did not take the A-100 course very seriously for its eight week duration; it was then run by a Foreign Service officer-Garret Soulen--who took it very seriously; he had

been the DCM in Reykjavik. Mr. Soulen tried to impress on us how arduous career the Foreign Service was; in fact, I think in our hearts of hearts we were awed by the prospect of a Foreign Service career, but certainly would never have admitted it publicly. We did a lot of silly things and had a great time and became good friends.

In retrospect, I think we learned very little about the Department. We got brief lectures on many, many subjects; none of that remained with us for very long. We did visit some other agencies like the FBI; I remember that because the irreverent class got into a big argument with some agents over a suggestion one of my classmates made that the FBI computerize all of its fingerprint files. The FBI people explained that was just impossible then and would never be possible; that debate took some of the luster off our visit to the FBI because we came away with the impression that the Bureau was filled with bureaucrats who would never modernize. We also went to the Commerce Department, but I don't remember a thing about that except the comment that someone made on the bus back to the effect that there was life after death and we had just seen it. We went to Baltimore to visit a steel mill and a factory that produced dredges; that was interesting. But the A-100 course as a whole was very good for establishing a sense of comradery, but I don't think we learned very much. The principal memory I have of it came from a documentary that Metromedia--then a budding television network--put together while we were in the A-100 course on "The Making of a Diplomat". Intermittently, the crews would come and film some of our sessions. Soulen told us that when the filming was being conducted, we were to be dressed appropriately, look alert, watch our language, be polite and in general try to make a good impression. Those admonitions brought forth considerable amount of quiet laughter. On the day we received our assignments--the last Friday of the course--Metromedia was there with its cameras. In 1964, the name of each member of the class was read out along with his or her assignment; again we had been warned that no profanity was allowed if we were disappointed with our assignment. We all had had a private sessions with a representative of the Junior Officer Division of Personnel, where we were invited to state any assignment preferences that we might have. I had no idea where I wanted to go; as I said, I had never been overseas nor did I speak any foreign languages, beyond the French I had learned in high school and college; in my test, I think I score a 1-1 (or the lowest score above failure). Because of the two CIA uncles that I mentioned earlier, I told the Junior Officer officials that I preferred Greece, Turkey, Iran or Cyprus (the GTI area)--where my uncles had served; they assured me that these were nice and interesting countries. I also thought that my chances of being assigned there were far better than had expressed a preference for Western Europe. During the A-100 course, each entering officer was supposed to study one country in some depth; I ended up with Iran; that further raised my interest in GTI.

So the announcement of assignments was my first public appearance in the Foreign Service. When they came to John Kelly, the State Department official mentioned a post without also specifying the country in which it was located. It was "Adana", of which I had never heard. But since the klieg lights were on me, I looked wise and happy. But I was really quite embarrassed because I didn't know where Adana was; my classmates all seemed to know where their posts were. After the ceremony concluded, I very quietly sneaked away to the FSI Library to find out what and where Adana was. It turned out to be

in Turkey, which delighted me and which became a very happy experience. After finding out where I was going, I rejoined my classmates for a riotous evening together with our spouses and friends. That evening, one of my classmates who had been assigned to Martinique, announced in a loud voice, after a couple of drinks, that he was not going to go to that backwater post because he was going to go a major capital where he could make foreign policy; he said that on Monday morning, he would march into the Department and tell them to cancel Martinique and to give him a real assignment. In fact, he did that and was given St. John's, Newfoundland, instead. The fellow who was supposed to go to St. John's went to Martinique much to his delight.

The Adana assignment was as vice-consul--the third officer of a three man post. For a while, I was somewhat envious of my colleagues who had managed assignments to the major capitals, but I was reading Harold Nicholson's *Diplomacy* and discovered that his first assignment had been to Adana. He noted that it was far better for a young officer to start his career in Adana because in a small post like that, he would learn to do all tasks whereas if he were to be the junior officer in a mighty delegation in Constantinople, he would be assigned only a tiny portion of the post's responsibilities. An officer at a large post would take years to learn what his colleague would learn in weeks in a small post. I think Nicholson was absolutely right.

Before leaving Washington, I attended the Near East study course, that lasted for three weeks. I also read every book on the area I could find. There was a lot of material about south and southeast Turkey, all of which I tried to absorb. I also talked to some people who had served in Turkey, including the desk, although I must say that he was far too busy to give me much time.

Not all of the class was assigned to consular positions. In fact, we received a variety of assignments. Following the eight weeks of the A-100 course, we then took four weeks of consular training--all of us in the class. That was followed by four months of French and qualified to get off language probation, having mastered the language well enough to pass with a 3-3 score. Just as I was finishing language training, we had a son--David. That prevented my wife from traveling; so in the beginning of June, I boarded a plane in New York and flew directly to Ankara, where I changed to a domestic flight and arrived in Adana. There I was met by people from the Consulate. The next morning, I met the Principal Officer--Thomas W. Davis, Jr--who expressed some amazement that I had arrived because he had sent me a telegram a couple of weeks earlier suggesting that I wait until my son was old enough to travel so that the Kelly family could arrive all at one time. I told him that I appreciated his thoughtfulness, but that unfortunately, his message had never reached me.

Davis was a wonderful teacher. He was not a great success as a Foreign Service officer, if we measure that by promotions and an ambassadorial appointment that he so deeply craved, but he was a wonderful teacher. As I said, I was the low man on the totem pole. I started as the post's consular officer--passports, visas, etc--and the administrative officer. I also was responsible for a biweekly economic report. This range of assignments was a

reflection of Davis' view that junior officers should get their feet in all the activities of the Foreign Service. Later, I branched out and did some political reporting as well. Davis spent a lot of time with me, talking to me about the Foreign Service and its different dimensions. Even though there were only three Americans in the Consulate, Davis devised a training schedule that did give me an opportunity to all facets of Foreign Service work; he also spent time teaching me about various techniques used by Foreign Service officers in doing their tasks. Once, all the junior officers in turkey were brought to Ankara for a conference--orientation and training. Davis told me that I should listen carefully and observe who addressed us and how it was done. When I returned to Adana, he asked me which officers I found impressive and which were lackluster and why. Davis was very consciousness about his junior officer training responsibilities. He told me a lot of lore about why certain people succeeded and others did not.

I knew practically nothing about administrative work. I first thought that it was a burden because I didn't really know how to do anything. I was asked to be the Class A cashier--I was bonded--, I approved all the vouchers, the procurement documents; I wrote the annual reports on language training, on motor vehicles expenses, a post differential questionnaire and heaven only knows how many other annual reports were required. At the beginning, I was of course at the mercy of the local staff, but I soon learned enough to able to review their work. The local staff was a mixture of some very competent and some less competent people; many had been with the Consulate for many years, but even the "old timers" made many mistakes. We had to dismiss one of my consular local employees for taking bribes. So I learned early in my career about how one gets evidence and acting on it by dismissing an employee--it is not an easy or pleasant task.

I must say in retrospect that our political reporting was quite shallow. There was little in Adana that really was of interest to the US, except the local politics prior to an election, but near the city was a Turkish Air Force-NATO base that was of politico-military interest. The US had a large US military contingent assigned to that base; it had been the base from which U-2s had taken off--Gary Powers, etc.--At one time, we had stationed B-47s there. When I was in Adana, we had F-4s fighters and EB-66 reconnaissance planes; the old U-2 were still there although they had not been flown for four years although the Air Force still had a U-2 detachment--10-10--assigned there. So the air base had a strategic function --the bombers--, a tactical function--the fighters--, and a large intelligence collection function. The American presence created a major consular work-load for us; the bulk of the passports issued were to Americans service personnel. Then of course there were the usual "American citizen protection" responsibilities because the airmen had their usual tangles with the Turkish law. We spent considerable time extricating them from those difficulties and when that was not possible, seeing to it that they received a fair trial in Turkish courts. So I had an early lesson also in the NATO "Status of Forces" agreement particularly the intricate question of when a "duty certificate" could or could not be issued. I found the consular work interesting, although I doubt that I would have liked to have a career in that work. But doing it for a year was very good for two reasons: a) it taught me a lot about human nature and b) it gave me a stock of anecdotes to use at parties for the rest of my life.

The consular district covered all of south-eastern Turkey to the Iran and Iraq borders. So we attempted to report on the Kurdish issue, which was alive then and still is today. We tried to analyze how accepting they were of Turkish rule and how politically active they were. We traveled widely into Eastern Turkey into the predominantly Kurdish areas. One American member of the Consulate staff did that every month, primarily to distribute 400-600 Social Security checks to wonderful, old retirees who emigrated to the US before WW I, had worked in the US--mostly in the automobile and textile factories--and then returned home to their mountain villages for their retirement. Their checks enabled them to live quite well in Turkey. One interesting aspect of this double migration was that many of those who had emigrated to the US had not married in the US because there were not enough Muslim women there, but waited until they returned to Turkey before taking a wife. Even after returning for retirement, they sired children, even though some were actually bed ridden giving rise to the question of how they had managed to father a child. With each child, the Social Security benefits rose and it happened frequently enough to give rise to some suspicions about true parenthood. Because of the likelihood of fraud, the Social Security Administration in Baltimore would provide travel funds to enable us to go to Eastern Turkey every month to distribute the checks and to investigate potential abuses. We used these travel opportunities to cover political matters at the same time. I must say that we did a great job for the Social Security Administration, but a somewhat less than satisfactory job of political reporting on the Kurds. Part of that was due to the language gap and part because the Kurds worked very much "underground"; they were reticent to talk to us because any Kurd suspected of supporting separatism or autonomy was subject to severe penalty by the Turkish authority. Therefore the political active Kurds tended to work clandestinely; in fact, it was naive to think that an American representative could enter into a meaningful dialogue with a Kurd or even to take the political "temperature" of the region. We did feel some undercurrents and there were occasional clashes between Kurds and Turkish authorities which told us that violence was not too far below the surface, but it certainly was not nearly as active then as it is now. We also have to remember that Southeast Turkey had been an area closed to foreigners until 1964, unless they had a permit from the Turkish authorities. When I got to Adana in 1965, the area had been open for just one year for any traveler, but the Turkish government was very apprehensive about what foreigners might be up to and kept a close eye on us as we traveled through that area.

I was kept very busy in Adana and I was very happy there. We had a large apartment which was cold in the winter--no central heating--with one kerosene heater in the living room to heat all the rooms. But we were young then and enthusiastic and loved every minute. We became friends not only with Turks, but also with Americans at the base. One of the sad episodes concerned an American pilot, whose wedding to an American nurse we attended; soon after that he was sent to Vietnam and in a couple of weeks he was shot down. That really shocked me and it is an episode I'll never forget. The relationship of the Consulate to the American military authorities was excellent during most of my tour in Adana; towards the end a new Colonel was assigned as the American base commander and then we had some problems. On his first day at the base, the American Colonel refused to pay a call on the Turkish base commander, who on paper at least was the "boss" of the base. So our Consul had to tell the Embassy of the problem; that was followed by direct orders to the

American Colonel that he would pay a call on his Turkish counterpart and on any one else that the American Consul deemed advisable. That made for a rocky US civilian-military relationship which had its ups and downs thereafter.

I can remember clearly the spectacle of rescue teams flying over the Black Sea looking for pilots whose planes had gone down in the waters. When they were not found or were not alive, there was a real pall over the Air Force base.

I loved my first year in the Foreign Service. I was almost sorry when I was transferred after only 14 months in Adana to Ankara. This transfer was a result of an Inspection Team's recommendation, after one day's visit, which stated that Adana was not a good first assignment post because the officer's experience was so narrow and limited that his or her career would be stunted. The Inspectors recommended that the junior officer's position in Adana be abolished and be replaced by a regular consular officer position. The Department accepted that recommendation, despite the Consul's objections. I was the third "rotational" junior officer who had been assigned to Adana; I don't think any of my predecessors suffered from their full two year tours in Adana. The Embassy did not intervene, to the best of my knowledge; so I was transferred to the Embassy in Ankara so that my training could be "broadened"--I don't know what more I could have done than I was doing in Adana. It was obvious that the inspectors had not read Harold Nicholson.

In Ankara, I was initially assigned as the junior person in the Economic section. This was at a time when the assistance mission and the Economic section were ostensibly integrated. The Economic section was physically located in the aid mission building; the Economic Counselor had the title of Associate Director of the assistance mission. That mission was huge--400 or 500 Americans. The State contingent in this "integrated" operation was 10 officers, some of whom were not really State Department employees. As the tenth officer in that Section, I had very little to do. I discovered that very early into my new assignment. I think I was assigned to the Economic section to fill a vacancy, although there may have been a training aspect to it since I had not done any economic work in Adana.

So partly to fill my time, I started taking language training--two hours per day. I also read a lot of economic text books that I borrowed from the Ankara University library. But despite all these extra-curricular activities, I found the assignment very boring; it was my first and last experience with boredom in a Foreign Service assignment. I had practically nothing to do. The Counselor--Randolph Williams-- wanted me to spend the first few weeks becoming oriented. That essentially meant browsing through files. When I tired of that, I asked Williams for a specific assignment or task. I wanted to do something on my own; the attendance at a very few meetings was not very exciting or challenging, even though I may have been the note-taker. Williams asked me to take a look at the Turkish State Railroads, which was in the process of buying some railroad cars. He believed that was a piece of action in which a US manufacturer might well be interested. I was asked to make study of the market potential of the Turkish railways. He suggested that I start by reading all available material, which I did for several days. I then went back to Williams and suggested that I was ready to talk to the railway officials. He thought that was a little premature and

that I was a little too junior for that; he thought that a more senior officer should make those calls. That really frustrated me; I was almost on a state of panic because I thought that I was being totally stifled. But then, by sheer coincidence, a telegram came from the Department announcing that President Johnson was going to make a tour of the Pacific and that the Department was looking for junior officers to assist in the support of this trip. The Department had designated two junior officers in Ankara to help out and we were instructed to leave for Wellington, New Zealand within 48 hours. The other junior officer--Bob Blaise--and I would work for the advance team.

So the two of us left for Wellington to help the Embassy, which was very small, and the advance team to get ready for Johnson and his entourage. We flew thirty-six hours to get there. Willy Woodward, a political appointee, was in charge. Idar Rimestad was the senior State Department representative and we worked for him. I didn't know the first thing about Presidential visits or about New Zealand, as a matter of fact. When we arrived, we were housed on a ship because Wellington only had a few hotels that were all booked up. The ship was an inter-island ferry, named the *SS Hinomoa*--better known as the *Tilting Hilton*. The ship was tied up to the pier, but it rolled enough to make one Secret Service agent very sea sick. I slept for about twenty hours catching up on what I had lost on the way from Ankara. I then reported to the Embassy, where I was told that I would be in charge of airport arrivals and departures and the motor pool. These were not subjects with which I had much experience, but I plunged in and did what seemed sensible to me. It was an interesting and, in retrospect, a fun experience which gave me something to do contrasted to Ankara.

LBJ must have been in Wellington for 36 hours at the most. It was very exciting and I enjoyed that experience. I figured out that there was a pecking order on a Presidential trip. I learned that it was very important to figure that out. I also learned that White House staffs were mercurial and that in the case of LBJ, it reflected the personality of the President. LBJ did outrageous things; I remember one night, at 3 a.m., Johnson wanted something to eat. He wanted beef salad, strawberries and red wine. It was the sort of whim that only despots get. But people did get up and went shopping, looking for stores that might have the desired goods. Then they woke up the owners, asked them to come from their beds to the store and bought the food. And sure enough, LBJ's wishes were satisfied that night. Of course, the President traveled with his own chef and a huge larder of foods--Texas steaks, hamburgers and all of his favorite foods. But I think, just to be devilish, he ordered things in the middle of the night that he knew had not been brought on his plane. In any case, not many of us got much sleep during that visit. A lot of my colleagues were appalled by the antics; I was fascinated.

Idar must have thought that I had done a reasonably good job because before leaving Wellington, he asked me whether I wanted to go to Australia to support that visit. I did that and then Idar sent me to Bangkok to work on that advance. The other junior officers had all returned to their posts; Idar must have thought that I had some talent or that I was a real glutton for punishment. Bangkok had a large Embassy, run by Ambassador Graham Martin. No one at the Embassy could figure out why this young whipper snapper, junior officer named Kelly had been sent. But since they had received instructions from Idar, they

put me to work. In retrospect, I did learn a lot of trivia about Presidential visits, but as anyone who has had any experience with them knows, trivia is what makes or breaks Presidential visits.

I can remember, for example, an episode in Bangkok which illustrates the importance of trivia. At every post, after a Presidential visit, lots of "Thank You" letters are written for Presidential signature. Johnson had a particular style which I had absorbed watching the process in Wellington and Canberra. In Bangkok, I noticed that the Embassy was writing the letters in advance even of the visit. Someone asked to take a look at them, since I had seen others at previous stops. Every letter read: "Claudia and I want to thank you for.....". No one in the world called Mrs. Johnson "Claudia"; she was "Lady Bird", particularly the President. So I told the officer who was writing these letters that "Claudia" was not the right name for Mrs. Johnson. He told me that when he wanted my opinion, he would ask for it. Of course, when it came time to send the letters to the President, his staff noted the grievous error and all the letters had to be re-written, which kept half of the Embassy up all night retyping them. This were the days before computers and word processors and changing a letter meant a whole retyping. That is an example of the importance of details.

In Bangkok, I was asked to write a speech for the President because by that point exhaustion had long overtaken members of his traveling party. LBJ would give several speeches during the course of a day and his writers were completely out of words. I happened to be in one of the control rooms with Idar and Bill Crockett, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration and the chief State Department honcho of Presidential trips. Johnson was in one of his usual piques because he didn't like the draft he had been given. Someone asked me whether I could write. I said I would try. So I wrote a speech which the President delivered the next day and everyone patted me on the back. I don't think it was a particularly good speech, but it was different from the last dozens he had given and it was used. That was enough! Johnson stayed in Bangkok for four days; he was stretching out his Asia trip for electoral purposes. The trip in general was much longer that it needed to be for pure international affairs reasons.

Another of my tasks in Bangkok was to be the "gifts" officer. That was a last moment assignment because the official who was supposed to have that task--he had accompanied the Presidential group throughout Asia--got drunk and was out of combat. So I suddenly became the "gifts" officer which entailed accompanying the President and Mrs. Johnson to all their calls, with a satchel full of gifts. My task was to pull the right one out for the right person at the right moment. The gifts were all engraved and I had to be sure that there were no slip ups, inadvertent or otherwise. So I felt like a valet to elected royalty. I found it a lot of fun and not at all demeaning.

In Bangkok, I had an occasional opportunity to watch Graham Martin in action. I remember how magisterial he was. During the "advance" period, I attended a meeting in Martin's office which included members of the White House's and State's advance teams during which an argument had arisen about which Embassy's offices would be turned over to the Presidential party, which included the Secretary of State. Graham Martin insisted that no

Embassy offices would be turned over to the any member of the President's party and that the Secretary of State could certainly not be accommodated at the Embassy. He and others in the visiting party could work out of their hotel rooms. The S/S representative found that very hard to swallow; he wanted the Secretary to have an office in the Chancery. But Martin would not give. I had not been exposed to many ambassadors, but I wondered how any ambassador refuse to have the Secretary of State stay in his or her Chancery. That gave me a sense of who Graham Martin really was.

In any case, I spent a month on the road advancing and supporting Johnson's trip. I along with all others got our White House cufflinks, pens, tie clasps and other souvenirs. Mrs. Johnson, who is a very gracious lady, called me into the Presidential suite at the end of the Bangkok tour; she had noticed that I had been at several events during their various stops. She gave another set of cufflinks--better than the ones that were being passed around. In any case, those Presidential visits were a real learning experience; I put that knowledge to good use in later assignments when the President, or the Secretary of State or some other high ranking official would drop in on my post of assignment.

When I returned to Ankara, I was met with the welcomed news that the junior officer in the Politico-Military section (known as Mutual Security Affairs section) had been transferred directly to Asmara, Ethiopia, leaving a vacancy for me to fill. I never returned to the economic section, but started on my career path in politico-military instead. That work I found stimulating and fulfilling. That section, which was a separate section reporting to the DCM and ambassador, consisted of three officers: Frank Cash was the Counselor for Mutual Security affairs, Bob Pugh was the second officer--he later became an ambassador--and I was the third. It was a great situation for me. Cash was another boss who had an interest in teaching junior officers. He was very good. Both he and Pugh were nonsense people. We had a lot of work, generated primarily by the large US military presence in Turkey, which also got us involved in NATO issues. Cash and Pugh would give as much work as I could handle; they were not inhibited because I was only a junior officer.

The experience I had had in Adana stood me in good stead; I knew something about the issues as they arose at bases; what the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) covered and the rights and privileges enjoyed by US military in Turkey. That enabled me to become a working member of the staff rather quickly. I didn't need a long learning curve. SOFA issues arose regularly, both in specific issues and during bi-monthly meetings we would have with a Turkish negotiating team consisting of representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry and the Turkish General Staff. In those sessions we would discuss such things as privileges that other NATO countries may have already granted, but which the Turks had not. SOFA issues were unending and a continual subject of discussion. We were always trying to expand the coverage of the SOFA; the core privileges had long been established and acknowledged, but the Turkish bureaucracy was terrible and the most mundane matters, such a custom clearances, often became nightmares. But we would always try to get more privileges. We would build a facility for a specific purpose and then the Turkish Foreign Ministry would complain that we were going beyond the agreed upon requirement and trying to build something extra. We in the Embassy would not have

known that, but undoubtedly some American military units went beyond agreed construction plans. There were a lot of US military who felt that if Turkey was really a US ally we should be able to do what we pleased there. The SOFA was in fact our Bible; Frank and Bob knew it thoroughly; I knew the sections for which I was responsible, but they were very familiar with the whole tome. I probably spent part of every day in the office on some SOFA problem or other. Of course, the Judge Advocate's office of the US military command was also thoroughly familiar with SOFA; they had some very good people working on these issues as did the JUSMAT. Many of the problems arose in units that were commanded by some general who resided outside of Turkey. For example, there was a unit called AFTAC (Air Force Tactical Application Command). They operated the seismic network established to detect nuclear explosions. AFTAC had several stations in Turkey, which reported to a command stationed in Las Vegas. The general in command might visit Turkey once every three years. so that he could not possibly be familiar with SOFA. His units were assigned for the US Logistic Group in Turkey (TUSLOG), but in fact they got their support and orders from Las Vegas. They didn't pay much attention to TUSLOG because their careers depended on performance ratings written in Nevada.

As I said, I enjoyed PM work immensely; I liked the people I worked for and with and I was a happy employee. The then Ambassador, Parker T. Hart, had only recently succeeded Raymond Hare, who had been the Ambassador while I was in Adana. The DCM--Ed Martin--was a wonderful officer--knowledgeable, articulate; but he didn't need to become involved in politico-military affairs because Frank Cash didn't really need any help. Martin tried to steer the Ambassador, but he, and all others, were not very successful at it.

Hart's relationship with the US military was not particularly close to the US or Turkish military. I don't think he related to the US military's problems well. I can remember one instance when the US military became very upset with Hart for what I thought were very good reasons. The incident happened on June 2, 1967--Italian National Day. The UN forces had been withdrawn from the Sinai giving rise to the likelihood of war in the Middle East. The "Six Day" war started on June 5, as a matter of fact. At the time, the US had a squadron of fighters stationed in Jordan, with Jordanian markings--I don't know why. Someone in Washington in late May or early June came to the conclusion that it would not be prudent to have an American fighter squadron in Jordan, particularly one that flew under Jordanian markings, if war broke out. So the US decided that they would have to fly out in a hurry. The Embassy got a flash message from the Department instructing the Ambassador to seek immediate permission from the Turkey authorities to transfer the aircraft from Jordan. The explanation of why they were flying Jordanian markings was not very convincing, but it was made clear that there was no time to have the planes repainted. The American general in charge of US forces in Turkey got an information copy of this urgent message; he naturally was eager that the Washington instructions be followed. When the message came to the Embassy, it was given to Cash for action because the Ambassador was at the Italian National day reception. Frank called me in, gave me the message and told me to scurry to the reception and give the Ambassador the message--in private. I was also instructed to suggest to the Ambassador that since all the Turkish high officials were also at the reception he might wish to avail himself of the opportunity and talk to the Prime Minister

or the Minister of Defense or any high Turkish official; Frank thought that the clearance could be gotten right there and then. So I hightailed to the Italian Embassy and went through the receiving line. I had met the Italian Ambassador before; so he knew that I was not on the guest list, but he was very charming, greeting me like all the other guests and thanking me for coming. I then rushed into the large reception area where there were many, many guests eating canapes and drinking looking for Hart. I couldn't find him anywhere. In my search, I bumped into our Air Attaché, Colonel Brady; I decided that he might be a good source for advice, which was a mistake. I pulled Brady away from the crowd and showed him the telegram, hoping that he might pick up the ball in the absence of the Ambassador. He said that he wouldn't get near that issue. Finally, I found Hart and I took him away from the crowd and showed him the telegram. He looked at me and wondered why I was at the reception, bothering him. He said he couldn't read it right then and there because of the presence of other people who had joined him. So I half dragged him into the men's room where he read the telegram. The Soviet Military Attaché came in to use the facility and I thought that I had made a major mistake. But Hart got through the telegram and put into his pocket with a comment that he would take care of it. So I left and reported to Cash what had transpired. We then waited and waited for a word from the Ambassador; nothing was heard. Finally, Cash tracked the Ambassador down having lunch somewhere. Hart said that he had not taken any action; he had not raised the matter with any Turkish officials at the reception because he didn't think it was appropriate. Cash, loyal as he was, showed some disgust and hung up. He then went rushing to the Foreign Ministry to see the Secretary General and to try to get the clearance. Needless to say, the American officers, who learned of this episode, were dismayed and thereafter viewed Hart with some disdain because he refused to discuss an urgent piece of business because he thought that the site was not "appropriate". In fact, the Turks gave permission rather readily and the deployment went well without any difficulties, even though the planes had taken off from Jordan before they actually had permission to land in Turkey. But this incident and his general demeanor towards the military made Hart somewhat less than a hero in the eyes of the American military.

I should also note that Hart was not very much respected by the Turks. I went with him as note taker on several calls when he was supposed to be delivering demarches. Hart would talk about everything except the purpose of his visit, but as he was leaving he would mumble something about how useful it would be if the Turks would do whatever the demarche called for. We would then return to the Embassy where I would write a brief report. Hart would invariably rewrite the report fictionalizing his role and his presentation, emphasizing how vigorous he had been in making demand of the Turks. Those reports were pure fiction; it was part of my education.

The Mutual Security Affairs section had close relationships with the military. Cash had been a West Point graduate; he knew his stuff. So it was a natural fit. With the Turkish military, we had an arm's length relationship. We had good relations with the Foreign Ministry and the civilians in the Defense Ministry, but the Turkish military at that time was not prepared to have close contacts with the American Embassy. We were not their natural contacts; we were "diplomats" and they probably didn't completely trust us. The Turkish

military would talk to the American general in charge of JUSMAT (the Joint United States Military Assistance Team) and the general in charge of TUSLOG (the American Air force units based in Turkey). I think they would have talked to the Ambassador because he was the Ambassador, but they were not interested in talking to lower level diplomatic officials. There was still a fair amount of paranoia in Turkey at the time; Westerners were still viewed with some suspicion. The leftist press was always accusing the CIA of meddling into everything in Turkey.

The annual security assistance budget submission was primarily the responsibility of JUSMAT. They worked very hard on that and we would work with them and help wherever we could. In those days, JCS had issued many taskers--primarily the JSOP (Joint Strategic Objective Plan). So there was a lot of paper work, which the JUSMAT took very seriously and put a lot of work into completing these reports. We in the Mutual Security Assistance section met regularly and worked closely with them; in fact, we were all on the same wave length and had no major differences with the US military. Our military assistance program to Turkey was huge, including aircraft--for example, F-86s which were old planes but still very usable--, tanks, artillery tubes--the Turks were manufacturing their own ammunition--, vehicles, helicopters. We had advisors but I am not sure that they had much of an impact because I think that the Turkish military didn't really feel that they needed a lot of advice. They needed equipment and technical assistance, but not military advice.

The Turks had a mountain cavalry brigade which still in the mid 1960s used horses and donkeys. It was stationed in Eastern Turkey. One of the things that an American military assistance team, supported by the Pentagon, insisted on was that such a unit was a waste of money. We wanted that brigade converted into an air mobile unit--trade the horses and donkeys for helicopters. That made that brigade much, much more expensive to maintain. That unit was used primarily for internal security purposes against the Kurds; so I am not sure that we gave every good advice on this issue. Today perhaps a mobile unit makes sense; then the conversion was probably premature. I remember attending the last parade that the brigade put on before it got rid of its horses and donkeys in Siirt, a town in Eastern Turkey. It was a wonderful scene because there were probably 2,400 men on horseback riding by; you don't see sights like that anymore.

One of the issues that we were always sensitive to was the use of US military equipment being used for internal security operations. But in the 1960s there wasn't that much action; the Kurds were not yet in active revolt. There were occasional ambushes of gendarmes by a few Kurds, but it was a minor matter. Cyprus was the main concern, both politically and in politico-military affairs. The Turks had bombed parts of Cyprus in 1964 in retaliation, according to the Turks, for the atrocities inflicted on their countrymen by the Cypriot Greeks. You can still today see pictures of Turkish babies laying slaughtered in bathtubs. The Turks had used Incirlik Air Force base as the take off point. That meant that we had watched the planes take off from that airfield although since the Turks often did that for training runs, it didn't necessarily follow that we knew what the Turks were up to. But the Greeks and Cypriots insisted that we could have warned them and I suspect that that was probably true. That incident led to a letter from President Johnson to the Turkish Prime

Minister stating in effect that if Turkey were to become involved in a war with Greece, we might not come to their assistance; that letter was a perfect illustration of what made US-Turkey relationships difficult. It was sent in the hopes that such a threat would head off what the US administration thought might well become a Turkish invasion of Cyprus--an event that actually did take place, but much later. From 1948 on, we had been perceived by the Turks as their greatest allies; they resented Johnson's letter and viewed essentially as a betrayal. So our relations with Turkey in the mid-1960s were difficult; the Johnson letter was undoubtedly another reason why the Turkish military did not wish to get too close to the US Embassy as a sign of displeasure. On the other hand, the Turks accepted the military assistance ungrudgingly.

There were continual Congressional questions about the use of American arms, especially whether any of them would be used in a Turkish attack on Greece. So our concern was not so much with the use of American arms for internal security purposes, but rather their potential use against either Greece or the Cypriot Greeks. As always, the Greece-Turkey relationships was on a roller coaster and we were always sensitive to those changes. During my tour in Ankara, there was no active Turkish military involvement in Cyprus beyond over-flights which were gestures to indicate that bombings could be renewed. As far as I can remember however, we in the Mutual Security Affairs section did not discuss Cyprus with the Foreign Office; any conversations on that subject would have been conducted by the Ambassador, the DCM and the Political Section.

I was aware of a number of intelligence operations that we were conducting against the Soviet Union, several of which were not even secret then. There were giant radar towers that could be seen which were tracking Soviet missile tests. I visited all of those installations, but I certainly did not go to all of our sites; there was just no reason for me to do so. Frank Cash and Bob Pugh had visited most, if not all, of the American military installations. I think that when Frank first arrived in Turkey, the military had made a plane available to him to take him around to the various installations. You have to remember that there were something like 51 separate sites in Turkey ranging from major sites to those that only were manned by a handful of people. I don't think that someone from the Embassy had visited every American installation, but certainly Frank and Bob had visited most of them. The PM Section had a big briefing book which listed all of the installations, so that we knew in some detail the disposition of our forces in Turkey. There was no way that our military presence could have been hidden because, if for no other reason, each site required an agreement with the Turkish government which spelled out the parameters of the site and its purpose. The binder containing all of the agreements was an important and vital source of information for us. Our relationships with the CIA Station were very good, although we did not have too many professional contacts with it.

I did witness a number of anti-American demonstrations in Ankara, stimulated by our position on Cyprus as expressed in President Johnson's letter and other statements. We were perceived as having a pro-Greek bias. So crowds of several thousands of people would gather and then march towards the Embassy. The Turkish police never allowed the

demonstrators to get close to the Embassy; they would ward them off a block or two from the Chancery.

I made a lot of Turkish friends, mostly staff members of the Foreign Office. I ran into a few of them later in my career. One, for example, is now the Turkish Ambassador to NATO, although when we first met, he was a low ranking officer like I was. There were some very fine young officers in the Foreign Ministry and they made the tour in Ankara an enjoyable experience. We would invite them to our house and socialized with them quite often. These friendships and the PM work made my tour in Ankara a very enjoyable one. It started me down a career path from which I did not deviate until towards the end of my career, although even my assignment in Adana had a very heavy PM component to it. But my work with Frank and Bob really wetted my appetite for politico-military affairs; I really enjoyed it and have never regretted specializing in it.

I think that our relationships with Washington on politico-military affairs were very good during these two years. The major area of friction was the levels of security assistance. Not surprisingly, we always wanted more than the Department would allocate. In the mid-60's, John McNaughton was the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs in the Department of Defense. He would come to Ankara periodically to explain to the Embassy and the Turkish government the limitations the US government had in allocating security assistance resources. As a junior officer, I was struck by the fact the Mr. McNaughton had to undertake this task personally; he did it very well; the Turks got his messages, but I found instructive that no State Department official could undertake the same task. It apparently wasn't possible for a State official to tell the Turks the unvarnished truth. I think Howard Furness, from the State's G/PM staff, came to Ankara; I remember that because he asked me to work for him in Washington. But I don't remember Jeff Kitchen, the head of the G/PM staff ever coming to Ankara so that the tack of delivering the "bad" news was left to Defense.

One of our tasks in Ankara was to extricate American contractors from some kind of jam or other. There were a lot of American contractors in Turkey and they always created some work for us. We got involved in labor disputes, particularly those generated on American bases. There were a lot of Turks working with and for the American military; they organized themselves into HARB-IS--a workers union for those Turks employed on American bases. Annually, the US government representatives would sit down with that union to negotiate a contract. The principal recruiting agency for base staff was an American contractor. We in the Embassy would meet with that contractor and the Turkish unions to talk about labor's demands; I spent a fair amount of time on those matters. I think that illustrates the broad range of activities that the Embassy's PM Section used to get involved in.

Before ending the discussion of my tour in Ankara, I might mention two other events. One was the Six-Day War and the other was an incident that involved an American sergeant from an Air Force intelligence unit. He was arrested by the Turkish police for selling guns--illegally. He was procuring guns through a US military "Rod and Gun" Club and then

reselling them on the Turkish black market. Neither we or the Turks were very happy with that; it was contrary to our regulations and their laws. The sergeant was caught with a number of rifles in his possession; a check of the records of the "Rod and Gun" Club indicated that he had purchased far more than necessary for personal consumption. So the sergeant was imprisoned by the Turks. He was provided American and Turkish lawyers, at the expense of the US tax payer. He was visited regularly by members by our Consular Section and especially Paul Taylor. At one stage, somebody on the Consular suggested that someone from the PM Section visit the sergeant to discuss his status under SOFA. So I went to see him. He told me that he wanted to renounce his American citizenship. Fortunately, I remembered from my Consular course that at the time you could not renounce your citizenship unless you were physically on US territory, including State Department establishments overseas. The reason I remembered that lesson was because Elizabeth Taylor had renounced her citizenship to an American consular officer which was later held to be invalid because it had not taken place in an American establishment. So I told the sergeant that his wish could not be honored because he could not come to the Embassy. He kept repeating his request and I corresponded with him and saw him on a couple of more occasions. The sergeant kept asking his lawyers to find some way for him to go to the Embassy so he could renounce his citizenship. I tried to prevent that, partly because I thought that it was really not in his interest to pursue that course--he had a wife and a couple of children who would have been seriously impacted by his renunciation. After all these contacts with the sergeant, I came to the conclusion that he would try to defect to the Soviet Union. He never told me that, but I think I heard enough vibes to come to that conclusion--he made it quite clear that he was very unhappy with the US and Turkey. I had shared my intuition with the American military authorities who had alerted the Turks. Finally, after spending a few months in the Turkish jail, he was released on bond. Sure enough, the next day the Turks arrested him as he was trying to enter the Soviet Union's Embassy. The Turks had tapped his phone and knew of his call to the Soviet Embassy to set up an appointment. The Soviets were delighted to make the appointment to see him; we were happy that the Turks took the actions that they did. I was pleased that I had been able to detect the sergeant's interest and was praised by my superiors for my insight. The end of the saga came when the Turks decided that they didn't want to pursue the case and our military took the sergeant and shipped him home for trial in the US. We also insisted that the Club's regulations be tightened up so that there was strict limit of guns than any member might purchase in a year.

As for the Six Day War, I have already mentioned our effort to get American aircraft out of Jordan. You have to remember that Turkey was the largest non-belligerent in the area with a significant American military presence on its soil. So our forces played a major role in the evacuation of people from Jordan and Syria. We got involved in those efforts, both in the planning and execution phases. We not only evacuated Americans, but citizens of other countries like Soviets, Germans and the British. Most of the Jordanian evacuations were conducted by the use of US military airlift capacity. I remember that the Jordanian said that the C-130s could land in Amman, but only if they were painted white with nondescript markings. Some American general balked at those requirements; he was not going to paint

"his" airplanes white. So the Embassy had to intervene and we had to explain to the general that he had no option except to do what the Jordanians wanted.

The Consulate General in Aleppo was burned with its staff still inside. It made a dramatic escape breaking through a concrete wall in the vault and sliding down a rope to the ground. They suffered major rope burns on their hands; it could have been far worse. I picked them up and gave shelter to one of the staff members; I had to shave him every morning because his hands were so badly damaged and bandaged that he could not hold a razor. When the Embassy in Baghdad was evacuated, the Turks agreed to act as the protective power. So our people handed over the keys to their Turkish colleagues in Baghdad, only to find out at the last minute that the Turkish Foreign Ministry got cold feet and decided not to act as the protective power. Washington sent us a FLASH Message demanding that the Ambassador go see the Foreign Minister immediately to request a reversal of the latest Turkish position, which Parker Hart did. I remember being on a short wave radio with Baghdad at the time and fielding a stream of request from our people asking what they were supposed to do next. I received the last message from Baghdad announcing that it was destroying its communications equipment and that they were set out immediately over land to try to reach the Iranian border with an armed escort. In the final analysis, the Belgian Ambassador, on his own volition, decided to take on the role of protective power. It was a very strange set of events because while the Turks let us down in Baghdad, their Ambassador in Damascus arranged for the evacuation of our personnel there.

On the second night of the war, we got a FLASH telegram from Washington telling us that the evacuation from Beirut, which had been arranged to take place by commercial airline--PAA and TWA--which would bring all of the Americans to Ankara, starting at 7 a.m. the following morning. We were told to expect 6-7,000 evacuees. Frank Cash called me at home and told me that I would be in charge of the reception process and that I would have to see that they got out of the airport and on to their temporary domicile--the Embassy's PM Section had been selected because this operation would certainly need the full support of the US military. I frankly had some doubts that we could mobilize the necessary resources with just a 24 hour advanced notice. I was delighted that we had an American military in Turkey; they were just great in providing assistance to such people as the evacuees. We established a receiving team at the airport, shuttled them all on busses to a big hotel in Ankara where we processed everybody and gave them all temporary housing, in hotels, empty school buildings, in American private homes--anywhere where we could find room for a cot. We took care of 6,000 people on that day. No one went without a bed or food that night or in the following days and nights. Eventually, we moved most of them out of Turkey on scheduled airline flights, but it was a major effort that I must say went pretty well. I worked first at the airport, then at the hotel; our consular people really pitched in as did the US military, which had several hundreds of people at the hotel. We might have been able to handle the 6,000 people without the US military, but there is no question that their presence, willingness to assist and resources make such an operation a hell of a lot easier. The military provided transportation, beds, food; this was first, but alas not my last, experience with emergency situations; there are some basic matters that have to be taken

care of in any emergency which I first learned in Turkey and used in subsequent evacuations.

The Turkish government was sufficiently cooperative to waive all entry formalities. It didn't actively assist us; on the other hand, they did not do anything to hinder us. There was no concern about Turkey becoming involved in the war, which made things somewhat easier. I was surprised that the Turkish sentimental favorite in the war was Israel; I had assumed that they would support their Islamic brothers. When I went to get a haircut on the fourth or fifth day of the war, all the Turks in the barbershop were supporting the Israelis. A lot of that support could be accounted for by the historic enmity between Turks and some of their Arab neighbors, which showed itself in disdain for Syrians, Lebanese and Iraqis.

That evacuation was massive undertaking because we took people out of all of the Arab countries. I think it was a job well done.

Q: Your tour in Ankara ended in July, 1967. What happened next?

KELLY: I was assigned to Thai language training, which lasted for one year at the Foreign Service Institute. I had asked to be assigned to Arabic language training; the Arab world seemed like a good place for a professional Foreign Service Officer although I must say that at the time, I didn't know how long I would last in the Foreign Service--I didn't really have a strong self-image and thought that possibly I might not succeed in my career, even though by this time I had been promoted twice in three years--although I didn't find out about my first promotion for six months because the Department had fouled up the paperwork. My paycheck reflected an increase, but I never received the form which announced my new grade. I was so naive in those days that it never occurred to me that the new pay reflected some kind of promotion. My bosses kept telling me that I was performing well, but I always had some self-doubts about my future in the Foreign Service. I didn't know whether I had learned the "secret hand-shake" or whatever it took to be a success in that profession.

In any case, my progress was rapid for someone my age. For some reason, I didn't think I could penetrate the "Western Europe" club; I was not a member of that self-anointed elite. I thought that the people in Bonn, Paris and London had a special line into the decision-makers that I didn't and that I might find very difficult to learn. I did love the work--with exception of that brief tour in the Economic Section. So I decided that the Arab world looked interesting and that it was one that might challenge me as a political officer and one that could be a home for me.

But Personnel thought otherwise. It decided that Thailand was in my immediate future. So I knew when I left Ankara where I would be spending the next year. Thai is a difficult language; fortunately by the end of the year, I was rated as a "3-3" speaker--minimal professional level proficiency. As a matter of fact, it was perfectly adequate for Bangkok where I spent a year because so many of my contacts spoke English--everybody I dealt with at the Foreign Ministry or SEATO had been to Harvard or Oxford or the Sorbonne. I was glad to have for every day life, but professionally, I could have gotten along without it. In

fact, many Embassy officers had Thai language fluency, although they also conducted much of their business in English. Ambassador Unger knew a little Thai, but not enough to use in official settings. He gave some speeches in Thai which had been written in advance, but he could not negotiate in Thai. Unger's Thai was fine for social occasions, which was very helpful for public relations efforts, but, as I said, not quite good enough for professional use. As for myself when I was sent to Songkhla to open a post there the following year, I found the Thai very useful, if not essential. I could not have operated in Songkhla without Thai. It became good enough so that I could use it in negotiating sessions

The prospects of an assignment to Bangkok didn't fully please me. I had visited the post the year before when working on President Johnson's visit. I remember that I got lost in that city one night. I was riding in a *samlor*--the three-wheeled motor bike taxi cab. A terrific tropical storm broke out and I hopped into the cab just to get out of the rain. The driver didn't speak any English; at that time of course I spoke no Thai. So we rode around in this violent storm--rain by the bucket loads, thunder, lightning. I thought I was in that cab forever. Finally we ended up where we had started and I left the cab, thoroughly disgusted and soaked. I remember thinking that Thailand was really a foreign country--it had a culture and a language that I couldn't comprehend and one that I thought I could never master. When I returned to Ankara from that trip, I told my wife that Thailand was one country to which I never wanted to be assigned. I should have kept my mouth shut because I know that the good Lord was listening as I spoke.

Later, I found out that my assignment had been pushed by Bob Dillon; he had been in the Political section of the Embassy in Ankara and we had become good friends--as a matter of fact, we had traveled together in Eastern Turkey. When he left Ankara, Bob went to work in Personnel in the Assignments Branch. Several years later, Bob told me that my name had been on a list of officers to be assigned to Vietnamese language training to be followed of course by a tour in Vietnam. At the time, officers assigned to Vietnamese language training could only be excused from that if they went to Thai language training instead. He didn't have time to call me to ask my preferences, but thought that I would prefer Thailand; so he went ahead and changed my language training from Vietnamese to Thai. None of this was known to me until several years later. All I knew that around May, 1967, I got a telegram saying that I was assigned to Thai language training. My first reaction was that that was one country I didn't want to serve in. But I had learned that a good Foreign Service officer goes where he is assigned and that I did. That probably was naive, but I was young and inexperienced at the time.

I should mention that we had pulled an "April Fools" joke on one of my colleagues in Ankara. He worked for USIA and was vehemently opposed to our Vietnam policy. So, with the assistance of the communicators, we wrote a fake telegram assigning him to Vietnam to some remote provincial town, dated April 1. The cable looked legitimate and the USIA guy hit the ceiling and immediately called Washington, threatening to resign if the Agency insisted on assigning him to Vietnam. I am sorry that I didn't get a chance to monitor that conversation because I am sure that it must be a very interesting one with Washington not having a clue about what my friend was talking about.

So I returned to Washington to attend FSI. I not only became immersed in the Thai language, but also had an opportunity to read up on our relationships with that country. Every Thursday afternoon, we would meet with some knowledgeable officer to discuss some Thai or Southeast Asia issue. I read books about Thailand and attended some lectures on my own. I attended especially those delivered by Joseph Campbell who later made a very successful television series. Campbell used to lecture at FSI and those sessions had priority for me ahead of anything else. I thought he had the greatest insights into other cultures and what made other people function as they did. I also listened to Ed Wright on inter-cultural matters. I also talked to many people who had been in Thailand; everybody, but the Thai desk, was very helpful. I think I worked hard on preparing for my assignment to Bangkok.

When I finally got my travel orders, I did not know what position I would fill in the Embassy. Someone in Personnel may have told me that I would first work in the Political Section, concentrating on international organization issues--UN, etc. I thought that might be alright; I think I would have been happy with any assignment to a Political or Politico-Military section. But after some time had passed, Personnel told me that the incumbent in that position had extended and that no other assignment in Bangkok seemed to be available. It was suggested that I might go to Laos as a consular officer. The Department was willing to give me a three months conversion course that might have enabled me to learn Lao. That came as a real blow having believed for six months that I was going to Bangkok. Nevertheless, still believing that a Foreign Service officer went where he was assigned, I went along. Then about a month before the end of the Thai course, Personnel said that a vacancy had opened up in the Politico-Military Section; I was to replace Linwood Starbird who was leaving Bangkok. I never knew who made all these moves; I found out after I arrived in Bangkok that in fact many of the decisions were made by the Embassy. That was a reflection of Ambassador's Graham Martin's operating style which spilled over into the Leonard Unger and Norm Hannah regime. In any case, the final assignment sounded a lot better to me than consular officer in Laos.

The Embassy in Bangkok was huge; it probably had 1,000 Americans working for it. I think it was greatly over-staffed for the programs it was trying to conduct. We had a separate and independent Politico-Military Section. It was large--probably about ten officers. It was unique in that it was staffed by both Foreign Service and military officers--about half and half. I knew very little about this set up before leaving the US. Because the final assignment decision was not reached until the very end of my stay in Washington, I really didn't have a chance to bone up on Thai Politico-Military matters. In fact, I had the wrong name for the Counselor in charge of the section. I thought it was Monty Spears, but in fact it was Bob Foulon. My misunderstanding was straightened out by whoever brought me into town from the airport.

As I said, Unger was the Ambassador and Hannah was the DCM. Because of the circumstances existing in Southeast Asia, there were other huge sections in the Embassy. For example, the Embassy had a large Counter-Insurgency Section separate from the

Pol-Mil or Political Sections, headed by a non-career officer, George Tannen, former Vice President of Rand. That Section was to develop counter-insurgency doctrines and strategies for the Thai situation. It had been set up by Peer DeSilva, the former Station Chief in Saigon who had been brought to Bangkok by Graham Martin to head up our counter-insurgency effort in Thailand. That Section was part of the Embassy; it was not a CIA operation. As I said, Tannen was the head of the section; his deputy was Bill Stokes, who also headed up an Embassy Section called "Mission Coordination". The embassy's organization chart looked like a spaghetti bowl. As might be expected under those circumstances, there were tensions and rivalries among the sections, mostly about which section had responsibility for a particular issue or program. There were too many people worrying about the same thing. In fact, the Embassy grew even during the year I was in Bangkok.

The Counter-Insurgency Section also had US military officers in it, as well as CIA officers under cover and Defense Department civilians whose Washington "home" was the International Security Affairs Bureau in DOD. In addition, that Section also people detailed to it from ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency) in DOD. In fact, Thailand had become a laboratory for our counter-insurgency and political stabilization efforts in Southeast Asia.

We also had two Economic Sections, one to handle Thai issues and the other devoted to regional economic development--e.g. the Mekong Valley project and other regional economic development projects. In addition, there was an assistance mission. In fact, Bangkok was a perfect illustration of bureaucracy out of control. Martin managed to run this hodge podge well as did Unger.

My position in the Pol-Mil section was the SEATO affairs officer. I was the one person in the embassy who spent most of the time worrying about SEATO, even though that was a flimsy organization, primarily in paper. It was important because it provided some, even if thin, juridical underpinning to our role in Vietnam particularly and in Southeast Asia in general. SEATO had a large headquarters building in Bangkok, a large bureaucracy and a large military planning staff headed by an American Major General. The organization consisted of eight nations; its founders had tried to model SEATO after NATO, but in fact it never reached that level--not even close. In the first place, the French had essentially abandoned SEATO and were only conspicuous because of their trouble making predilections. The Pakistanis played no longer a constructive role even though their nationals still participated in the international bureaucracy. Vietnam was never a member of SEATO nor were any of the other former French colonies in Indochina. Washington cared passionately about SEATO--it was in our interest that SEATO remain alive and provide support to our efforts in the region.

SEATO held annual ministerial meetings. The PermReps met at least monthly; our Ambassador in Thailand was the US Permanent Representative. I staffed the Ambassador for those meetings; I wrote all of the papers and telegrams dealing with that organization. I attended all of the meetings. SEATO had an Intelligence Assessment Committee in which

we were represented by our Station Chief and I was his deputy. In that committee, we shared Southeast Asia intelligence findings. SEATO also had a Permanent Working Group which met weekly to oversee the day-to-day SEATO business and decide on operating issues. I was in essence the US Representative on that Group although I was never given the title. A more senior Embassy officer had the title, but he never went to any of the meetings or did any of the work. But my role as the SEATO officer gave me greater access to the Ambassador and the DCM than an officer of my rank would have had under normal circumstances. I was the only Embassy officer that spent full time on a subject that both Unger and Hannah had to become personally involved from time to time. So I got to know them relatively well. I remember one time, just before one of the SEATO Perm Rep meetings, Stokes came to me to suggest that I take certain actions--write certain papers, etc. Stokes was not my boss, but he was a senior Foreign Service officer. Sometime later, he asked me whether I had done what he had suggested; Foulon had left by this time and the new Section chief was rather weak and unwilling to tell Stokes to mind his own business. So in one of my meetings with Unger, I had an opportunity to tell him about Stokes' interference and his request for a lot of unnecessary papers. Unger asked me the nature of Stokes' requests and when I told him, he said he would take care of it and that I didn't to worry about it any longer; it was obvious that Stokes did not have enough to do. I never heard another word from Stokes. But this also illustrated to me that the Embassy leadership was aware of the over-staffing of the mission. It is true that the Embassy met its goals, but it took more people than were really necessary. I must say that the Embassy's team work was pretty good on important matters despite the disputes over jurisdiction.

My Washington contact was Bill Clark--later an Ambassador and an Assistant Secretary. Bill came to Thailand in connection with the one ministerial meeting that I attended in the Spring of 1969. Secretary Rogers came and it was his first meeting, with the Nixon Administration just having taken office. We had received advance notice that Rogers and his senior staff viewed SEATO as a Cold War institution. Indeed, Rogers said so in Bangkok. The US was not opposed to peaceful settlement in Vietnam; therefore the final communique for that meeting, unlike all of its predecessors, did not start with the usual pledged that SEATO members would never permit the Communists to take over Vietnam; rather member countries pledge to seek avenues for a peaceful solution to the Vietnam war. That was a major change in tone and emphasis. Rogers was of course new to his position; he was an able lawyer and he handled his participation in the SEATO ministerial in an American lawyerly fashion. He had a little problem with the Secretary General--Jesus Vargas of the Philippines--who felt much more comfortable, I think, with the hard line that the US and SEATO had taken previously in Vietnam. He voiced his differences with the new US approach as evidenced in the communique.

My job required me to have daily contacts with the American military. I was particularly involved in the work of the Military Planning Staff, headed then by General Autry Maroun. SEATO had prepared in the preceding decade a number of military plans covering all the contingencies that anyone could think of--e.g. a Chinese military attack across the Mekong. When Maroun took over, he decided to update and revamp all of these plans. That was probably a normal reaction for any military planner. He started with SEATO Plan V which

dealt with the liberation of Laos. His planners came up with a new plan in August, 1968--shortly after my arrival. It called for 6-8 US divisions to invade Laos, along with the usual air power and naval forces. The plan was over 150 pages long and took the military step by step through a process to drive the Pathet Lao and the Communists out of Laos. Soon after I arrived I was handed this document which was being circulated to all member governments. There was a strong belief in the Embassy that anything that SEATO produced that was circulated to member states also ended up in Moscow and Beijing and their allies. I read the plan and was surprised that it had been written because I had never heard in Washington any mention of the possibility or desirability of invading Laos. I thought that there was absolutely no chance that we would provide 6-8 divisions particularly when we already had 500,000 troops in Vietnam. So I thought the plan entirely unrealistic. Not to mention that I was flabbergasted that Plan V was even being considered. I talked to Unger, Hannah and Foulon and they all agreed that even raising the subject was completely foolish. Had we been certain that the revision would just be placed on a shelf to collect dust, that would have been one matter, but assuming that Moscow and Beijing would read it, we were very concerned that those countries would believe that this was a major SEATO effort which needed to be taken seriously. That would have crossed the "invisible line" which I believed was developed in 1961 when the neutrality agreements with Laos were being worked out. In theory this line would not be crossed by either side, although I think the record will show that the line was in fact breached by both sides. But the very thought--or even the perception--of putting American divisions in Laos would have changed totally the nature of the conflict in Southeast Asia as we saw later when Nixon sent American forces into Cambodia.

After having read the plan several times, I wrote a "Top Secret" telegram to Washington and CINCPAC outlining it. Everybody was horrified; it was beyond the pale. So I, a very young officer, was instructed to see Maroun to straighten him out. No one else showed any interest in taking on the General--which is not unusual. I was to get Plan V out of circulation and to kill it. I think Maroun had told the Pentagon and CINCPAC that he had planned to review all of the contingency plans and undoubtedly got no objection. He picked Plan V because he probably didn't like the idea of the Communist being in Laos; he may well have also seen himself as the head of the expeditionary force to free Laos. In the absence of any clear direction, he just started his revision.

Then Admiral John S. McCain, Sr--who was CINCPAC at the time--visited Bangkok. We briefed him, although the Admiral was fully familiar with SEATO Plan V, having read our cable traffic with Washington on the subject. Bob Fearey--a Foreign Service officer--, who was the Admiral's Political Advisor had previously sent us a message saying that he was unable to get the Admiral to tell General Maroun to back off. So the Admiral's visit started with a meeting at the Embassy with the Ambassador, the DCM and the Pol-Mil Section. McCain listened to our pitch that the issuance of the revised plan might stir up anxieties in the Communist world, far more dangerous than the revision of an entirely unrealistic plan might be. At the end of our presentation, McCain said that he would take care of General Maroun, using the usual salty language of a military officer. I should note that General Maroun, with whom I had been discussing the issue for months, had told me repeatedly that

I didn't know what the President wanted to do and that it was clear to him that Washington wanted to rid Southeast Asia of the Communists and that he would not listen to a second secretary of the American embassy. In the final analysis, McCain explained the facts of life to Maroun; that brought the General back to the real world. I spent much of the rest of my time in Bangkok redrafting Plan V to make it a more realistic and acceptable document.

I should note that I don't think Secretary Rogers understood anything about SEATO Plan V. He showed little, if any interest, in the subject when he came to Bangkok for the ministerial meeting, but by that time, fortunately, the issue was well under control thanks to McCain's intervention. I must say that I still had a picture of Secretaries of State being able to "walk on water" and that his senior advisors also were a members of the "club" and knew things that a junior officer like myself had never learned.

While in Bangkok, I was involved in a process called "country clearances". This was a function entirely unrelated to SEATO. It was a process established by Graham Martin which prohibited any American military personnel from entering Thailand without the Embassy's approval, partly at the urging of the Thai government which continually complained about the size of the US military presence in their country. That applied to a private as well as a four star general. Unger continued the enforcement of that rule. By this time, in addition to the 500,000 troops in Vietnam, we had 50 or 60,000 troops in Thailand itself. So the "clearance" requests were a mountainous pile every day. I was supposed to ensure that only the absolute essential military into the country. That of course always put me at odds with the military who thought that every one of their people was essential and would argue about any denial that I might issue. The military sometime invoked their friends in the Pentagon who would call their contacts in the Department who would then issue instructions to me to release the clearance. So we rarely made any of our denials stick. I made a *cause celebre* of combat artists. They are the people that cover the walls of the Pentagon and other offices with sketches of American troops in action. I think their paintings and drawings are wonderful and tell a real story. But whether they needed to be in Thailand was another question; I didn't think that there was a compelling reason to let them into Thailand; I didn't think that the success of our efforts in either Vietnam or Thailand depended on their presence. I lost that battle as well. My whole function was essentially to tilt at windmills.

Along the same lines, the Thai had delegated to the American ambassador the authority to approve combat missions to be flown from Thai bases. That was then a secret agreement. That meant that every day, the Embassy received from the Seventh Air Force command in Saigon and from SAC headquarters in Omaha--for the B-52s--, what were called "launch messages". These messages contained a list of the targets in North and South Vietnam and Laos to be hit the following day by planes using Thai bases. The Pol/Mil Section was the action office. The duty to review these messages rotated among the military officers of the Section, except on weekends or holidays when one officer of the section would be "on duty" for this action. Colonel Bill Baker would plot the targets on a map and then either the Section Counselor or the DCM authorize the strike or deny the request. We did have certain targets and zones that were off-limits as established by Washington. If we believed that a

strike was targeting one or more of those zones, we would block that action. If problems arose, then the Ambassador would become involved. Those issues were almost always targeted on the Cambodian border or across the border. The new Nixon policy of hitting Cambodian targets did not translate into a revised list of "off-limits" targets. I found out later, from documents that I read, that in fact, the Seventh Air Force, after running into Embassy objections, was ordered by the White House to deceive the Embassy and provide us with a false list of targets to be hit.

The last thing that Bob Foulon did before the end of his tour in late 1968 was to ask us to draw up plans for the reduction of our military presence in Thailand. He understood that the Vietnam war could not on forever and that in fact, President Nixon sounded anxious to bring it to a conclusion. It was a plan to which all members of the Pol/Mil Section contributed. I think that our maximum presence was reached in 1968, with perhaps an increase in 1971 when we were drawing down our presence in Vietnam. In 1968, we had seven major airfields in Thailand and a port at Sattahip. We had a gigantic military presence that Bob knew could not be there forever and believed that the time had come to plan a phase down. The Foulon plan was put in effect in 1973; it stood the test of time well, although I should note that after we had put it together, it was in fact "put on the shelf" after having submitted it to Washington. I think it was probably reviewed by EA and PM; I know it was put on a shelf at the Pentagon because when I became the Thai desk officer in ISA (DOD) in 1973, there it was and we used it. At the time we submitted it, the Washington civilian community essentially said "Good plan, but premature" and the military asked whether we were trying to undermine their fighting efforts. We had shared the plan with our military in Thailand, but never asked for their concurrences; it would have impossible for the military to give such a plan serious consideration.

In any case, after 1968, I think there were no more new units coming to Thailand; if they did, they replaced units already in country. There occasions when on a temporary basis we would expand the presence of one combat unit or another, but these were all temporary assignment and the military associated with them were withdrawn right after a particular combat need was met. But single individual or small groups still tried to enter Thailand for one reason or another and that is why the "country clearance" system persisted. Periodically, we would report the size of our presence to the Thai government. These reports were as accurate as we could make them except they did not include people on temporary detail. That was a large loophole because the US military uses TDY assignments widely, even though their tours in Thailand were essentially limited to 180 days. The Thais did look to us to try to limit the US presence in their country and we did try. The Thais were basically concerned that we might leave it in a lurch at some stage. They were happy to have us in country, but were not at all sure that we would be there for the long haul. They were especially concerned about the eventuality that would have the Viet Cong or the Pathet Lao march across the Thailand border and on to Bangkok. They depended on our presence to defend them in that case and were not sure that we would be there when needed. I don't think they really cared much about what was happening in Vietnam; they hated the Vietnamese and didn't want the communists to take over Thailand; they saw our presence as the real barrier to that eventuality. But they worried about our constancy.

We did not have a Status of Forces agreement covering our troops in Thailand. Our Section did get involved in issues raised by our military presence, but that was not my job. Contrasted to Turkey, there was much less Embassy involvement in the issue of troop behavior than there was in Thailand. The major reason was that our military in Thailand had a special fund which allowed it to settle claims on the spot if we had caused any damage to property or life. Had we had such a fund in Turkey, we could have avoided most of the complaints that we had to settle. There are always unexpected incidents created by the presence of our military--not major to us perhaps, but of considerable importance to the indigenous population--damage property or person. In Thailand, the day after the incident, a US officer--mostly likely from the Judge Advocate's Office--would show up with cash in hand and settle the claim right there and then. That would end the case and kept the negative reaction of the local people down to a minimum. I ran into a similar system in Germany where payment for damages was taken care of immediately and most often to the satisfaction of the injured party. But unfortunately, that was not the case in Turkey. There claims had to go through a long bureaucratic channel which ended usually with dissatisfaction by all concerned. I never did understand why a standard practice was not applied in Turkey; it would have saved all of us a lot of time and effort--and would have been good public relations.

Let me now turn briefly to our counter-insurgency efforts. All of us in the Pol/Mil Section were involved in one way or another, although, as I mentioned, primary responsibility for this function laid with a separate Embassy section--in fact, we were viewed by them as poachers. My assignment was to follow events in North Thailand, which was one of the country's three regions. I had to attend meetings about the counter-insurgency efforts in North Thailand; I read all the papers on the subject and had considerable contacts with the people who were conducting the operations. I became involved in counter insurgency also because SEATO had a large program and funded a number of large counter-insurgency projects--largely with US money. Some of the money went to the procurement of what was called "SIOP jeeps"; that is, jeeps with movie projectors in the back that could be readily used to show films--mostly propaganda--to the smallest hamlets. SEATO would send fleet of these jeeps to the Thailand hinterlands. Counter-insurgency was a big program in Thailand; we had US efforts, Thai efforts, SEATO efforts. This was THE program of the time. I believed that foreigners could never really have a successful counter-insurgency program in Thailand; I thought that the Thais could conduct a successful program. In that respect, I agreed with Mao. That view was also the Embassy's view, starting with Graham Martin, even when he had DeSilva set up the special section. He insisted that Americans play a supporting role only; the Thais were to take the lead and be seen out front on counter-insurgency. Unger full embraced that view and if anything was even a stronger proponent of Thai efforts. This Embassy view led to a lot of Embassy-military disputes as well as Embassy-AID and Embassy-CIA bickering. I certainly could appreciate the difficulties that our doctrine created for the US military. They had advisors assigned to Thai units, who, however, when those units engaged in counter-insurgency efforts could not accompany their units into the field. We took these restriction seriously and a number if US military officers who had accompanied their units into the field were transferred out of

Thailand in a hurry. The Ambassadors were determined not to repeat our Vietnam experience.

The Thais eventually became quite proficient at counter-insurgency. Some of their small military units became very effective; some of the governors and provincial officials became well motivated and very effective. Some officials were corrupt and brutal and disasters for counter-insurgency programs. However, in the final analysis, it was probably geo-strategic events that probably effected the insurgency in Thailand, such as China's cessation of support for the Thai insurgents. *(NOTE: John, if you could expand a little on the counter-insurgency movement, I think that would be very useful. I should have asked you why in your view the Thai efforts were not more successful, beyond the behavior of the governors and provincial officials. Was insurgency largely an ideological struggle and/or did was essentially a matter of economics? Was the Thai government serious about its counter-insurgency program? In other words, what do lessons did you draw from your experience with the Thai counter-insurgency program?)*

Most of my contacts with the Thai government were with the SEATO Division of the Foreign Ministry. I found them easy to work with: bright, well trained, knew their business. We never really gave the form of the Thai government much thought. It was hard for us to see it as a dictatorship, even though it obviously was. But it was then very benevolent; there was no sign of authoritarian rule. The average Thai lived a normal life, disturbed very little by the government. There were no troops in the streets, no road blocks, no check-points. A Parliament did meet, even though it may not have been as representative or as deliberate as we might have wished. I think the Thai government in this period was certainly one of the most benevolent dictatorships in the world. If you use Jeane Kirkpatrick's definitions about authoritarianism and totalitarianism, one would have to conclude that authoritarianism isn't always bad for the people of a country, at least in the short run. In Thailand, there was the overwhelming presence of a King, supported by the common belief that if things really went bad, His Majesty would always be there to correct them. He would not permit the military rule to get out of hand. In the context of Third World governments I have seen in action, I would consider the Thai military one of the late 1960s to be one of the better ones. It was certainly much more efficient than many of the Middle East governments with which I later became acquainted.

It is true that there was corruption everywhere in Thailand. Corruption has been an integral part of Thai society for at least 1,000 years. There was probably no governor in the country who was not corrupt. Even the SEATO permanent staff I dealt with did not escape suspicion; there were some allegations that they were getting cuts out of SEATO projects. I think the Filipinos and the Thai there had their hands in the till. I couldn't prove it, but I certainly believed it.

There is such a thing as prebendalism--an arcane word--which is used to describe the practice of supplementing governmental salaries through bribes or kick-backs. For example, a citizen had to get his or her identity card renewed. The fee for that service might be ten baht. From time immemorial, the district official, as authorizing officer, was allowed to take 10% of the costs as his cut from the renewal fee. That supplemented what everybody

agreed was an inadequate government salary. The population all knew what the fee and the take was; for them this was an acceptable way of doing business. When we reached the modern era, the district officer's household expenses rose sharply--kids had to go to college, most likely outside of Thailand; he has to drive a large foreign car; he has to have a color TV. That requires a major increase in income. Consequences: the identity card renewal fees jumps twenty fold and the district officer's take increases to 95%. The Thai people accepted prebendalism--the concept that all officials were permitted to take a small amount from the fees paid. But they resented the corruption; that is the large increase in both the fees and the official's share. The standard 10% gave way to the venality of the officials who took as much as the traffic would bear. All this I learned later when I went to Songkhla. I learned about the difference between acceptable fee taking and corruption. The English word "corruption" had been absorbed by the Thais and used as part of their language.

The American community in Bangkok was huge. We saw each other socially; I had an advantage in that one of my uncles and his wife were stationed there. My wife's uncle, Walter Snowden, was there with the CIA. He was under cover as a first secretary in the Political Section. They helped us get started in the social whirl of the community. Also Bob Foulon managed to run a Section with the highest morale of any section that I have observed in my career. The five FSOs and the five military officers and their families were happily together both day and night and I still see a number of them now twenty five years later. The military officers in the Section moved along in their careers and all ended with stars in their shoulders before they retired. I still see some of them. The Pol/Mil Section had an amazing *esprit de corps* which stood it in good stead during the working hours and socially after work. In addition, as the SEATO officer, I had contacts in the international community, which brought into contact with a lot of other nationals stationed in Bangkok. Our representational life was certainly active--much more than one might expect from an officer at my grade.

Both the work and the people we met made the tour in Bangkok a very good one. I enjoyed it greatly, as I did all of my Foreign Service assignments, except the one tour in the Economic Section in Ankara. There are a number of things I learned from this tour that stood me in good stead in my career. First of all, I learned to be suspicious of any Embassy that had a Deputy Ambassador--that is the formal title. Hannah was the DCM, but because we had a Deputy Ambassador in Saigon, pressures were continually applied to Unger to establish a similar position or positions in Bangkok. The head of the Counter-Insurgency Section wanted the title as did the AID Mission Director. It never happened in Bangkok, but I was always on guard against such "title creep". I also learned to guard against the proliferation of the "Minister" title. We had seven Ministers in Bangkok and that was certainly too many and created a lot of unnecessary tensions. I also learned in Bangkok that it is far better to work and entirely "up front" with the American military than going behind its back. That lesson was first brought home to me in Turkey by Cash and Pugh, but was really reinforced in Thailand. There is no point in being devious with the military; they don't behave like that and if they find that you can't be trusted, then there is no relationship. The best illustration of the direct approach is illustrated by the story I told earlier about

McCain and Maroun and SEATO Plan V. A lot of people told me that I shouldn't involve CINCPAC or if I did, I would find that the military always supports its own. That was not my experience; if you have a good case and present forcefully and openly, then the generals and admirals will give you a fair hearing.

I also learned that with the right leadership, inter-agency teams can be very productive. Military and civilians can work together, civilians from different agencies can work together. The key is to getting the right people; then their agency parentage is immaterial. It is a lesson that I had to learn because I had somehow I had become suspicious of personnel of agencies other than that of the Department; that probably had been inculcated in me by my Foreign Service seniors. One example of the inter-changeability in Bangkok was Jim Devine who was a Pentagon civilian assigned to the Embassy in Bangkok. Graham Martin then took him to Rome as the Pol/Mil Counselor and later Jim ended up in OES. There were others who had ended up in various capacities after their Bangkok tours.

Q: After a happy year in Bangkok, you were then assigned to open a new post in Songkhla. How were so lucky?

KELLY: Songkhla was in South Thailand, 600-700 air miles south of Bangkok---about 1,000 miles by road. Ambassador Unger had persuaded the Department that the US needed to have representation in South Thailand, primarily to coordinate the counter-insurgency programs--police advisors, military advisors, propaganda, special forces training, experimental projects run by ARPA--that were being supported by the US government in that part of the country. There were other US programs--Peace Corps, AID--in the region which needed some supervision, but they were of less importance than the counter-insurgency ones. By 1970, we had consulates in Ching-Mai and in Udorn in the North-east. State Department had no presence in South Thailand, which is the long peninsular stretch from Bangkok to the Malay border. But there were lots of Americans from other agencies, both civilian and military working in South Thailand--CIA, USIA, DOD--both civilian and military. There was no mechanism to coordinate these disparate programs except from Bangkok, which was far removed and not able to coordinate the day-to-day activities. There were three weekly flights from Bangkok by Thai Airways, two weekly flights by Air America and two weekly flights by US military cargo planes. There was a railroad connection and a steamer line that ran along the coast. So it was not too hard to reach Songkhla, but still it was hard to coordinate all of our activities from 1,000 miles away.

Some troubling developments had taken place in South Thailand. The exiled Laotian right wing dictator, Phoumi Nosavan, was living in Songkhla; he had permission to do so from the Thai government. He was only 1,500 miles away from Laos. It happened that some of the US government employees in South Thailand had befriended Phoumi and had decided to help him mount a coup which would have returned him to power in Vientiane. These Americans were free lancing and operated without the blessing of their parent agencies. They truly thought that Washington and the embassies in Thailand and Laos would be delighted when they found out about these coup plans. In fact, Phoumi and his American

friends worked out all the plans necessary to run the coup; they identified resource sources--money and weapons. In fact, the Americans brought the plan to the Embassy in Bangkok and told us that all the pieces were in place and that as soon as the Ambassador approved, the plans could be put into action. These Americans were flabbergasted and horrified when they were told that the plans ran against US government policy, but this American participation in what was obviously a "no no" was one of the reasons Unger decided that some State Department representation was necessary in South Thailand.

After the Department approved the opening of a consulate, Lyle Bracken, a young Foreign Service officer, was chosen to open the post. However, simultaneously, some one in Saigon decided that Bracken was needed there and that is what happened despite Unger's appeals. So Unger decided to send me instead. I was delighted with the assignment. I was only 29 years old and thought having your own post at that age was a real reward. Of course, it was a small post and a somewhat unusual one, but I could hardly believe my good fortune. My wife was a good sport. I told her, after Unger had reached his decision, that we had to view the assignment as a sort of Peace Corps tour--it was a long way away from "civilization" and it lacked many creature comforts. She prepared herself as best as one could and it wasn't until the end of my tour in Songkhla that she told me that she had hated the assignment. She said that she had never mentioned it to me because she thought that I had enough to worry about as it was. That was a disciplined Foreign Service wife!

We didn't know much about Songkhla. I had been reading reports from South Thailand during my year in Bangkok, but I had never been there. We in fact got there on the steamer I mentioned earlier. There were two insurgencies in the area: one was generated by the armed wing of the Malay Communist Party which had been beaten by the British during the emergency in Malaysia. They had infiltrated into South Thailand and formed four regiments of several thousand armed and hardened fighters; of course, they enjoyed sanctuary from the Malay and British authorities and lived and operated in a strip 10-40 miles deep from the Malaysia-Thailand border. They lived in the jungle and pretty much ruled it the way they wanted. From their jungle hideout, they raided various parts of Thailand wreaking some havoc on the local population.

There was also a small Thai Communist armed insurgent group--about 400 men--that operated independently in South Thailand. They were under some control of the Thai Communist Party which operated in the middle of the country. Although small, the group was expanding and was making its presence felt. In addition, there were Muslim separatists operating in the southern end of Thailand. Historically, the four most southern provinces of Thailand had been part of the Malay states. Thailand had acquired them during a confrontation between Britain and France at the turn of the century. So the population in these four provinces was predominantly Malay and Muslim. There were strong separatist currents with many people wishing to rejoin Malaysia. All of these movements made South Thailand a very volatile area with many violent movements operating there. My area of jurisdiction covered fifteen provinces: the four primarily Muslim ones to which I have already alluded and eleven others. The Communist insurgents operated in about five of

them, but we had counter-insurgency programs in all of them in an effort to keep the rebellions from spreading.

The US government was greatly concerned in the late 1960s and early 1970s by communist insurgencies. We were involved in a total struggle in Vietnam; that led us to fear other "Vietnams" in the regions. The Communist-led insurgencies in Laos and Thailand were perceived as threats--the "dominoes" theory. I personally wasn't sure that the outcome in Thailand would be similar to the one in Vietnam. I thought that the Thais had some things going for them that the Vietnamese did not. In the first place, the Thais did not have a history of colonialism; they had always been independent and sovereign. Secondly, the Thai population was homogeneous to a very large extent. It had a common culture and religion (Buddhism)--except in the four southern provinces. Finally, the Thais had a deep veneration and respect for their monarchs. These factors, I thought, made the Thai situation considerable different from Vietnam; Thailand was not likely to fall to communist insurgency as South Vietnam did. I was aware that there was venality, corruption, an unequal distribution of economic assets, exploitation of villagers by government officials--all factors that kept the insurgencies alive. I, along with many others in the Embassy, was convinced that the struggle in Thailand was one that only the Thais could win or lose; it was not a battle that we could undertake. much less win. There ere many Americans in Bangkok, both civilians and military, that believed that we had made a fundamental mistake in Vietnam when we undertook the lead in trying to suppress the insurgency there. It was our view that an indigenous insurgency could only be won by the native population and not by an outside power using methods foreign to the local culture, history and practices. I think that Ambassador Unger and his senior staff sympathized with this view and felt that insurgencies in Thailand could only be overcome by the Thais themselves. The US had a role: to encourage, persuade, hector, induce the Thais to take on the struggle against the insurgents, but that under no circumstances should Americans be out front in the struggle; as a matter of fact, we should not be involved in any actual fighting. I think that the most of the Embassy felt the same way, so that we didn't really have internal disputes about our general policy. There were some individuals in various agencies who felt that the Unger's general policy was wrong. For example, I had long arguments with one individual in South Thailand about this policy. he felt that the Thais were not competent enough to subdue the insurgencies and that only we, the Americans, could do that job. He tried his best to get us involved in military action, but fortunately, he didn't get any support from his superiors.

The Thai Army had a large presence in the area--the Fifth Regimental Combat Team and some smaller units. There were some Thai Army mobile units, modeled after some of our efforts in Vietnam; these were trained troops whose principal mission was civil development. There was a large Thai border police presence along with the Thai provincial police. And of course, there were the typical Thai governmental representatives--governors, district officers, teachers, medical personnel, etc.

Songkhla was a city of 35,000 people, located on the beaches of the South China Sea, filled with palm trees and other tropical flora. It was a beautiful site to see. The Thais are very

hospitable and made us feel welcomed. We became part of a very small American community of no more than twenty adults, I would guess. I should note however that very near this "heaven" there was violence out in the countryside. There was a lot of disease in the area. We had Americans stationed in all of the other provincial capitals. There was a small American business community in Phuket--a famous resort area. Union Carbide had built a tin smelter there--the largest in the world at the time. That accounted for the large majority of the American business community. We had American missionaries in the South Thailand--both Catholic and Protestant. Most of the missionaries were very friendly and we had good relations with them. Many of them had been stationed in China and had been forced to leave when the Communists took over in the late 1940s. They were very knowledgeable about Asia, but had a very difficult time making any converts. The successful ones ran schools and health facilities which were welcomed by the indigenous population. The Seventh Day Adventists ran a couple of hospitals; there was a large colony for lepers run by a number of Protestant missionaries. There were some--Southern Baptists and Pentecostals--who were in Thailand solely to convert Thais, but as I said, they had limited if any success.

Upon arrival, we moved right into an office that at one time had been the British Consulate. The British had left Songkhla a few years earlier and had turned part of their building over to the Malays. The rest of the building was leased to DOD who used for ARPA personnel. ARPA turned out to be a real boon. They let us use some of their space, they lent us some of their vehicles, they provided me a single-side band radio and other equipment. That radio was my life-line to the Embassy and I used it every day to communicate with Bangkok. We did have secure telegraphic communications to the Embassy, but since we had to do operate the equipment which is quite tedious and time consuming, we generally wrote very short messages. I used the radio to communicate with the JUSMAAG components in South Thailand. If I had a message for other military components, the JUSMAAG would relay my message to other military commands. So between the radio, a good reliable Thai domestic telegraph system, a phone system that worked occasionally, we managed to stay in touch pretty well with all American units in South Thailand. Communications were therefore not major impediment.

Roads were another matter; there were very few paved ones. There was not for example a road to Bangkok that was fully paved. Sections had been, but not the whole stretch. I traveled to the fifteen provinces by jeep. Land Rover, airplane--I could on occasions request Air America to ferry me as well as small US Air Force planes. Sometimes, I even used Thai helicopters belonging to the police and Army. I would hitchhike on those planes if I had some urgent business in one of the provinces. I also traveled by boat using the existing canal system. So, while I took a trip every week, getting around was not a major problem; we just had to use some ingenuity.

I hired a few locals--most of whom had worked for the British or other foreigners before. I rented a house--which was actually the house that Phoumi had occupied. We had no screens, which was a problem because mosquitoes ruled the nights in Songkhla as did other insect during the day. We--my wife, myself and three servants whom we had brought with

us from Bangkok--pulled our water out of a well with buckets; later we drilled our own well and put a pump in it.

The office set up was interesting. I was the only State Department officer, but I had five consuls--one from USIA and four who worked for other parts of the US government. These five had all been in Songkhla when I arrived. I had consular privileges, but I was not authorized to issue visas or passports, which left some people mystified. I remember one Thai gentleman calling on me and after a few minutes of pleasant chit-chat, offered me \$25,000 for an immigrant visa. I explained that I did not have a visa plate and therefore could not issue him a visa, even if I wanted to--which I didn't in any case. He completely misunderstood my statement and thought that my refusal was just a way to up the bidding. So he asked me to name my price! On visas and passports, we forwarded any request we received to the Embassy. In the consular field, we did provide protection and welfare services for American citizens and took care of sending home those that were seriously ill or dead. We did have some Americans who were shot by insurgents, but fortunately, none died of their wounds. For example, a missionary couple was ambushed and shot by insurgents; to this day, I am amazed that they survived. Their jeep looked like it had been made of Swiss cheese. I think I counted 38 bullet holes in the vehicle. But both escaped with their lives, even though seriously wounded.

My role had been made quite clear to me by Ambassador Unger. I was given a written charter--a three paragraph statement of my responsibilities, including my role as coordinator. That statement was published in a Senator Symington subcommittee hearings publication after he held hearings in 1969 on US security commitments abroad. My charter was published along with those of my colleagues in the other three consulates. In any case, Unger's directives was sent to all of the agencies represented in Thailand through their chief representatives in Bangkok. These agency heads were instructed to disseminate these rules to their people in South Thailand, which was done. The directive was useful, but by itself it would never been very effective. I faced a particular problem since I was younger than most, if not all, of the agency representatives in the area. In fact, if I was at all effective, it was because I worked hard to try to obtain cooperation. I did have run-ins with some people who resisted any effort to coordinate their activities. They would not keep me informed or did not follow my advice. In those cases, I got complete support from the Embassy. In one case, I had to recommend that a USIA officer be shipped out of the country which was done, even over the objections of the USIA Public Affairs officer in Bangkok. Those objections were essentially bureaucratic: "I am not going to have some 29 year old Consul run my program in Thailand". But with the Ambassador's and Washington's backing, the USIA man was transferred out of Thailand. There was also an Army Colonel who was recalcitrant; he was admonished by a general to cooperate and that took care of that problem. The general, who headed the MAAG Mission in Thailand was very supportive of the concept of coordination. It was true that I could only be of limited help to these agency representatives; if they needed additional resources and if I agreed with their views, I could and did support them in their arguments with Bangkok and Washington. But my role was more of a control; the Ambassador wanted the US presence in South Thailand reduced. I

did make several suggestions for reductions which were carried out. That of course didn't make me very popular with the agencies being reduced, but it got their attention real quick!

The philosophical background for this reduction was the thesis that Americans should not be conducting the counter-insurgency effort; we could and should advise, but not conduct. For example, we had a Special Forces A Team in South Thailand--about 65 men, led by a captain. They were well trained--almost all veterans of Vietnam. They were supposed to be training the Thai border police; they were not supposed to be going into operations. When I and some people from the Embassy visited the unit, we found that, in fact, it was not engaged in training at all; the Thais were not sending any of their people to be trained. So, not surprisingly, these soldiers were accompanying Thai units of their patrols, which could easily have involved them in fire fights with the Communists--contrary to US government and Embassy policy. So within three months of my arriving in Songkhla, I recommended that the Special Forces Team should be pulled out of South Thailand and the Country Team approved. We all agreed that when the Thais had soldiers ready to be trained, members of the American Team could come to South Thailand on TDY to conduct the training. I believed that to have a permanent presence in the jungle camp, subject to Communist fire, was not appropriate. In fact, the Communists did enter the Team's camp one night and stole a lot of its weapons.

My relationships with the provincial governors varied. Some were very good; they were the progressive ones interested in the welfare of their people. Other were very venial and corrupt. To be a governor in a border province was a much sought-after position, because he had the ability to control the smuggling activities and therefore a source of considerable income. This particularly true on the Thailand-Malaysia border or on the coast where smuggling took place by boat through the South China Sea. I tried to maintain good relations with all of the governors, but I didn't succeed with all of them. Although I don't specifically remember any governor trying to use me for his purposes, that was not true of some other officials. I remember one Colonel of the Border Police trying to use me to get more M-16s even though his American advisor had decided that they had enough weapons. Such situations arose in other circumstances, but that was not entirely surprising given our major presence and the foibles of the some of the Thais.

As I said, I traveled a lot. I visited provincial officials, Thai Army units, Thai police units, schools, as often as I could. I tried to go to the most active provinces--i.e., those having the highest rate of violent incidents--every month and to visit all fifteen provinces every three months. I would usually drive to a town in a jeep with a Thai driver. It was on these visits that my Thai language really became useful. Without that capability, I would have been seriously handicapped because in South Thailand, English was known by only a few. So I used Thai every day, all day. By the time my tour was up, I think my Thai was pretty good--good enough to interpret for visiting Americans; it was rated 4-4 by FSI. The inability to speak Thai hampered many of the Americans working in South Thailand. Most of the American advisors did not speak Thai and had difficulties communicating with their Thai counterparts. When I really became proficient and was able to pick up some of the subtleties of the language, I did overhear the Thais making considerable fun of their

American advisors--I think that they didn't think that any American could understand the Thai language well enough to understand them.

They called one American the "water can" man because he always carried a can of potable water with him. It was obviously a sensible health precaution, but didn't necessarily sit well with the Thais.

On these visits, I would try to see the governors who would brief me on events and issues. Then I would see his military advisor or the police chief or the education chief or the head provincial medical officer. I would try to visit more than just the provincial capital because I wanted to confirm with my own eyes and ears what was really happening in the province. So I visited villages, although I recognized that Thai villagers were not likely to be fully open with foreigners, but I think I was able to at least pick up a sense of how the villagers felt they were being served by the provincial officials. If I stayed overnight in a village, I would spend the evening sitting around drinking rice whiskey; pretty soon some of the veils surrounding the villagers would begin to drop and I would hear stories about the police and its misdeeds or how the health officials sometimes sold their services--or withholding their services because many Thai villagers thought the spraying of their huts with DDT would be harmful and would pay the health workers not to spray their homes. These discussions gave me some sense of what was going on and how the villagers regarded their officials. When there were flagrant cases of abuse--rape, kidnapping, major thefts--I would try to intervene with the provincial governor or at least make the governor aware of the misdeeds of his officials. I was under no illusion that I or any number of official Americans could make a difference; that could only come from the Thai officials themselves.

The governors were essentially independent of Bangkok. In Songkhla province, the governor was a Prince--the grandson of the previous monarch. The title that he carried had the same weight in Thailand than that of the Prince of Wales in England--i.e., the heir to the throne. The Thais made a lot of jokes and puns about that situation. The district officers, similarly, were the absolute rulers in their districts.

I think I came away from my tour in Songkhla with a number of conclusions about the causes of insurgency. First of all, there were the exploitable grievances. Every one in the world has grievances, the difference is that some can be exploited by others to force some changes. In the case of insurgencies, the driving force was violence, supported sometimes by non-violent participants who supported the fighters with moral and some physical support such as food or working as a look-out or as a village guard after some training by the insurgents. This cause suggested two ways for subduing the insurgency: a) minimize the exploitable grievances by improving the living standards of the villagers and by reducing the level of malfeasance that the people felt was so burdensome, and/or b) a vigorous suppression of the insurgents, particularly those that had taken up arms against the government and were terrorizing the locals by assassinations and other violent means.

I met some of the captured insurgents. They were mostly the village level leaders or cadre; I don't believe I ever met any of the real chiefs. I did on a couple of occasions discuss their grievances with them. I talked to some ex-members of the insurgents. I think that most

people who left their villages to go live in the jungle permanently as soldiers did so because of the wrongs which they believed had been done to them personally by some representative of the state. Included in this list of grievances were rapes and murders allegedly perpetrated on members of the family. Many of the insurgents were literate and young; they had been persuaded by the traditional communist siren songs that promised "heaven on earth". The Communist used to distribute on a regular basis newsletters in the villages and towns. They also had two radio stations that which could reach every corner of the country. One was a division of Radio Beijing and other was called "the Voice of the People of Thailand", which broadcast in Thai 12-14 hours each day. Both stations broadcast from the Yunan Province in South China. Eventually, these stations began to attack me by name. I thought that that might become a problem for our security, but fortunately, it did not have that consequence.

Of course, "The Voice of America" was being heard as well; the Thais had their own radio stations. We worked with the Thais on many publications as part of their counter-insurgency efforts. The best Thai propaganda came from the daily newspapers and radio station. TV had not yet penetrated the villages, by and large. USIA had a large unit that wrote stories for the Thai newspapers; it also published monthly magazines in Thai; it translated hundreds of books into Thai and distributed them. I have already mentioned the USIA SIOP jeeps that would show two films in the villages; one would be a popular movie, which was the attraction, and the other was a propaganda piece. They would usually show one reel of one movie and one from the other and then shift back and forth to ensure that people would stay and watch the propaganda film. I have never reached any conclusions whether this movie efforts was useful; it is very hard to measure the effectiveness of propaganda, particularly in a large rural area. I believed then and do now that the best propaganda is the truth, i.e., true accounts of the Thai government performing well for its people. We, as a nation, have a bias against propaganda, but I think we would all agree that publicizing positive governmental actions is a legitimate and useful tool. I learned that you couldn't fool the villagers; they knew when something good had happened. They knew when the government built a foot bridge across a river that was needed; the word of that deed got around quickly and widely. By the same token, if the police stole a couple of water buffaloes, that word got around quickly. The informal network was alive and well in South Thailand!

But back to the intellectual insurgents. They would move into the jungle because they bought the Communist propaganda. But most of these people tended to return to their villages after three or four months; the jungle was not a hospitable place to live and their beliefs, strong as they might have been, did not overcome the difficult living conditions they met in the jungle. Of course, many managed a foray or two into town, but nevertheless, living in the jungle was very difficult. You had to admire those that did for long stretches of time, such as the Malay Communists who had been living in the jungles for a dozen of years.

We did have visitors occasionally from the Embassy and Washington. I would put them into a jeep and take them to a village. I tried to avoid showing them the "Potemkin"

villages, in which all the indigenous were trained to answer the questions in the "correct" way. These villages were convenient to visit from Songkhla and therefore had become the stopping places for American visitors. These villagers had seen lot of foreigners over the years and knew what the questions would be; they had "canned" responses for all of them. The anthropologists that visited came away enthralled by the answers and their experiences in these villages. But I decided that it was far better just to drive away from those villages and stop in others at random. The Thais are very hospitable; they would sit down with the visitors and talk; sometimes they would invite you to share a meal with you and sometimes they would give you a tour of the rice paddies. I enjoyed this escort duty for it was helpful to me as well; I enjoyed the visitors. You have to remember that Songkhla was a very isolated town and, in retrospect, I am sure that I was somewhat lonely; so I was delighted when someone took the trouble to visit Songkhla. That was particularly true for the Washington visitors, who brought news from another planet.

There was a narcotics trade that went through South Thailand, but it was not as virulent then as it is now. We did not have any anti-narcotics program in South Thailand at the time. That was done by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs office in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Occasionally, one of the agents would come to our area and then we might get a request to use our pouch to ship small amounts paraffin or morphine-based drugs that he had acquired which he wanted to have tested in a lab. The narcotics were grown primarily in North Thailand, but they shipped south into Malaysia through our area, either by rail or boats. But the route through South Thailand was not a primary one, as was, for example, Hong Kong; we were at most an alternate and probably not used very often. The going price was about \$25,000 per kilo of morphine-based drug.

I might just add one word about my relationship with the Embassy. The DCM was my official supervisor; that is, he wrote my efficiency reports, which were then reviewed by the Ambassador. That was the same procedure used for all officers who headed constituent posts. But in fact, I dealt most often with the Counter-Insurgency Section of the Embassy, although on occasions, I would communicate with other sections as well. There was one officer--an Army Colonel--who had been designated as my liaison and support officer; he was a fully integrated member of the Counter-Insurgency Section. He was a wonderful man, who became a life long friend. He had fought and had been wounded in both Korea and Vietnam. I would talk to him almost daily by radio; I would keep him up to date on what was going on in my provinces. He was there to help me when I needed it. He also provided a lot of wise counsel; he taught me a lot about the reality of insurgencies and how to someone should conduct himself or herself when in dangerous situations.

He was a source of great help and strength for us. One day, our American flag was ripped up in a typhoon. He sent me a replacement. He shipped medicine and supplies. We had an American child who had been seriously injured in a fall; in fact , the kid was close to dying. The organization that controlled the med-evacuation helicopters wouldn't send a chopper until the cost and reimbursement issue was settled. I talked to the Colonel and asked him to cut through the red tape; which he did and the child's life was saved. He was a source of real support and strength. He went on to become a two-star general, I must say that that tour

aged me quickly. For the first time in my life, I saw people dying from violence. That was shocking and very sobering. It was the first time I had seen a large number of dead bodies. I am not talking about masses when the senses are so overwhelmed that a single death doesn't strike home. But I used to see groups of people--up to nine--who had been killed in ambushes. That brings brutality home! I went to a lot of cremations of Thais who had been killed by the communists. Saw a lot of maimed people. I was with an American as he was dying--he had been stabbed through the eye socket with a picket fence pole by just a common criminal. These are experiences that are very sobering indeed and which are remain with you. I saw a lot of people who became very sick--about half of the Americans in the southern provinces were medically evacuated; many were in comas caused by jungle diseases. There was a harshness to life in South Thailand which sobered me quickly and thoroughly. I fortunately escaped unscathed; my son caught parasitic amoeba, but was cured. The rest of the family, besides the occasional dysentery that was inescapable, survived Songkhla.

We did have a close call. We had a cook who tried to poison us; I think in retrospect he was mentally ill. We had brought him with us from Bangkok. We did a lot of entertaining and I think somewhere along the line, the cook decided that he was over-burdened. She decided that if she could put small quantities of a poison that she had gotten from a Chinese apothecary into our food--both ours and that of our guests--they would get sick and not accept anymore invitations to eat with us. I found out about this "plot" after we had left from some of her co-workers who squealed on her. The Embassy's security officer went to Songkhla and took affidavits from our former household staff and the Chinese apothecary and others who knew of the cook's plot. She didn't want to kill anyone; just make people sick enough so that they wouldn't come to the house and thereby reduce her workload. She did in fact succeed with some of our guests; one guest's heart stopped beating. The local doctor who lived next door to us had to come over and inject adrenalin into our guest's veins. That revived our guest, but he was only one of the many people who became sick from the food we served. I also got sick as did one of my sons. We had to go the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital which was 30 kilometers away; there we had our stomachs pumped out. We did not suffer further damage, but it was not a pleasant experience. But the cook's plot in some ways fit in with the Wild West living that we encountered in Songkhla.

As I said, I was not aware of the cook's plot until after we had left. My replacement was briefed on these activities by some of the other servants. After the story was thoroughly investigated, the Embassy sent me a cable asking whether I wanted to prosecute the cook. I didn't and I hope my successor's meals were better than what we had been fed.

My tour in Songkhla reinforced my views that the US was following a correct policy when it insisted that the Thais take the lead in any counter-insurgency effort and action. In fact, the Thais were up to the challenge and there is no counter-insurgency in Thailand today. The Thai "domino" did not fall. The cessation of insurgency was only due in part to the efforts of the Thai government; important was also China's decision to eliminate any support to the insurgents; that dried up one of the principal spigots of support. China provided much of the financing and some of the weapons. They were shipped into South

Thailand in small loads. Many of the weapons used by the insurgents were in fact captured from Thai military stocks. The black market for arms taken from the Thai government was very active during my tour in Songkhla.

When we lucky enough to get some defectors or other members of the insurgency, they would tell us about the Chinese involvement. The best insurgents, after having spent a year or two in the jungle, would be sent to China for advanced training on insurgency tactics. So we knew clearly that the Chinese were thoroughly involved in the Thai insurgencies. The major contribution was unquestionably financial resources; we had intelligence reports about caches being shipped to the Thai insurgents. Without those resources, the insurgency probably would not have been as virulent or lasted as long as it did.

Q: In 1971, you were assigned to the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, VA. Was that done at your request?

KELLY: Yes, I requested that assignment because I wanted to pursue my interest in the politico-military field. I had some experience in the area both in Turkey and in Thailand. But I had never served in the military. It was clear to me that I needed some immersion in US military thinking. I had talked to people who had attended the Staff College; all spoke positively of their experience. It was the only military training program available to mid-career officers. So I applied for the State Department slot and was selected.

I loved the ten months in Norfolk. I had a lot of fun. we lived on base with all the other students and that was adequate. I attended courses every day and had an opportunity to pursue some of my own interests. We read a lot of material; participated in some athletics and had the opportunity to become acquainted with a number of bright, up-coming military officers and some civilians. I met a number of my classmates later in my career and stayed in touch with six or seven of them. One of the civilians who was at the College was Doug McKakken of the CIA who is now the Deputy Director for Intelligence at the Agency. It was a good year which permitted me to recharge my batteries and explore new areas of intellectual pursuits. I enjoyed it immensely.

We visited a number of military bases, giving me a greater appreciation of the US military capacity. I think that by the end of the course, I had a much better understanding of the military mentality, which would prove very useful in my career. I learned about the philosophy, structure and organization which underpins the overt positions taken by the US military. I am glad to say that in the few tests that were given to us and were graded, I managed to get very good grades. We had tests on each of the three major military services: Army, Navy and Air Force. I finished first on the Army test among the 270 students who had taken the test; that was a source of some merriment among my Army colleagues. I liked the subjects; they interested me and they were not too difficult to understand and to remember.

I must say that at the time, I was not assured of a career in politico-military work. I pursued it because I was interested in it; I had no assurance that the Department would share my

enthusiasm. My career counselor never mentioned that my future laid in politico-military work. In fact, I don't think that I was ever counseled in any meaningful way by anyone in Personnel--and that covers a span of thirty years. A number of Personnel people told me that I would never be able to do what I wanted to, but fortunately they were wrong.

Q: Then in 1972, you were assigned to the Bureau for Intelligence and Research (INR). Was that your choice?

KELLY: I just got assigned there as part of the regular process. In fact, I knew I would end up in INR even before leaving Thailand because my travel orders read that I was to be assigned to the Armed Forces Staff College for nine months to be followed by a tour in INR/STA. I didn't know what STA was; so I called George Newman, then the DCM in Bangkok, and asked him. He said that that was very good because he said that was the staff that was concerned with strategic issues. He thought that I would learn a lot in that office. And he was right. Since no one had asked me what my Washington preferences might be, I am glad that he was right.

When I reported to INR, I went to work in the Office of Strategic Affairs. Frank Perez was the Director and Larry Finch was the deputy. Neither was a Foreign Service officer, but had been hired by the Department because they were experts in strategic systems. Frank had come from DIA. Most of the people in that Office--six or seven officers--were experts on weapon systems; there were only two FSOs. That was very useful to me because I learned a lot from those experts.

Much of the work we did was rather esoteric, although today it seems a lot more commonplace. The existence of satellite imagery is now widely known; in the early 1970s, it was very much top secret. My main task was to analyze intelligence collections that had a bearing on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and on biological-chemical weapons threats. I never had encountered any of these issues, so that I had lots to learn. Fortunately, the non-FSOs believed that as part of their responsibilities, they were in the Department to train FSOs. So they spent time with me and also sent me to courses to learn as much as I could about these strategic weapons. For example, they sent to Fort McClellan, Alabama to take a course in biological-chemical warfare that was given essentially for the US military. I learned a lot about "bugs and gas". Since I was dealing with strategic weapons on submarines, my bosses got the Navy to send me to Charleston, South Carolina where I could see attack submarines and submarines equipped with ballistic missiles. I had the opportunity to sail down the river on both kinds of submarines. The submarine Captains had been instructed to teach me all about their vessels, including all of the most sensitive information. That was an invaluable lesson. These training opportunities at least gave me the chance to say that I had seen these weapon systems up close and knew something about their launches and capabilities. Not many FSOs ever had such opportunities.

In the early 1970s, the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs was headed by Ron Spiers. His deputies were Ray Garthoff and Tom Pickering. Ron had made it a practice to have an INR briefer attend his daily staff meetings; that briefer would provide the senior PM staff new

information of a politico-military nature. Occasionally, I was the briefer. Spiers, Garthoff, Vince Baker, Chuck Flowerree, Jack Shaw--all of whom were involved in the SALT negotiations--would ask for information from INR. That kept us very busy and we felt that we were a key support element of the US negotiating team. We worked very closely with PM and to a somewhat lesser extent with ACDA. In fact, sometime during my INR tour, ACDA sponsored a trip for me to Europe so that I could talk to some Europeans about SALT. That was also very useful.

There were some deep fissures within the Department on SALT issues. The views of PM differed from those of S/P, where Sey Weiss was then assigned, as well as Leon Sloss, Jerry Kahane, Jan Koliski, Chuck Zemach. Hal Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger's Soviet expert was then at the NSC along with Bill Hyland; eventually both moved to the Department when Kissinger became Secretary of State. They differed with some of the State positions, more or less vigorously depending on the nature of the issues. There were bitter inter-agency disputes particularly on intelligence estimates on the size and capabilities of the Soviet strategic missile force--how many RVs were on a new Russian ICBM, what was the range of the Backfire bomber, was that bomber a significant strategic weapon or was it more an intermediary range platform, were the Soviets "cheating" on the Biological Convention limitations. There were many inter-agency disputes which were vigorously pursued by all participants. The differences within State--between PM and S/P, for example--were pursued as vigorously, although perhaps in a more civilized way. INR took positions on these issues, based on the evidence that we saw. You may have noticed that I have not mentioned the Regional Bureaus at all; they were just not players when it came to strategic issues. S/P and PM were the major actors, with INR providing the material needed by the debaters and being party to the discussions themselves. The Department's arrangements for handling strategic issues changed somewhat when Kissinger became Secretary because then Sonnenfeldt and Hyland became the leaders within the Department. I might note that I later found out that Kissinger was not as involved in these issues as he was thought to be at the time.

We had another heated debate on whether the US should pursue a comprehensive test ban treaty which would have ended nuclear testing. The principal issue there was whether how such a treaty could be verified after its signature. The experts in INR--I learned from them--believed, after consultations with experts outside the Department such as the scientists at the Los Alamos lab, felt that the limitations in the treaty could be verified. There were others in the Department who were sure that they could not be and they accused INR of being a "wishful thinker" and perhaps "naive about Communists".

But INR's principle was to "call them as we saw them". Ray Cline was the Director of INR at the time, but he became involved in these strategic issues only occasionally. He was constructive when he did get involved, but that strategic issues were not a daily chore for him and furthermore, he hated Kissinger. It was Perez and his staff that represented INR when the strategic issues were discussed.

I found the intra-Department debates on Soviet intentions very instructive. Usually Sey Weiss and Leon Sloss, both of S/P and later PM, were the "hawks" in the debate. Their basic position as the Soviets could not be trusted under any circumstances; their intentions were always detrimental to the US. PM and INR, on the other hand, felt that verifiable agreements were possible; the negotiators had to be very tough, but if a sound agreement could be reached, then the US could assure itself that the provision were being scrupulously followed by the Soviets.

We did work in vaults--no windows--because of the highly classified nature of our work. But thanks to my INR bosses, PM and ACDA, we got out and met a lot of the strategic arms experts in the US and in Europe. We would meet with Gerald Smith--the head of ACDA--and Garthoff on almost a daily basis. Often, PM would ask us to along to meetings of inter-agency working groups which were working on various SALT issues and which were charged with developing US positions. I must say that there were times when I felt overwhelmed by the number of people that other agencies had working on strategic issues and the number who attended the inter-agency meetings. State's resources were very small compared to DOD for example or CIA; both of those agencies had dozens and dozens of analysts spending full time on these issues. These were people who were fully grounded in the subject matter, particularly the scientific aspects. I remember that at the end of one meeting, someone asked me whether I had my degree in physics or electric engineering. Having been a history major, that made my day! I did read a lot of scientific material--books and publications, including large volumes of Congressional hearings. I lived in Reston then and had long commutes by bus to work which gave me about two hours every day for this reading. I did not lack advice from the experts who kept suggesting material hat I should become familiar with. I must admit that the material was all very seminal; if one could understand it, it was an experience akin to getting a Master's degree in two weeks.

I am now, and I suspect I was then, a believer in vigorous advocacy. If you are persuaded that your position is sound, then I think it is incumbent on the official to state his views often and sharply to try to make it the prevailing US position. That point of view was not always shared by the senior State officials whom I accompanied to the inter-agency meetings. There were times when I thought the State representatives did not press their view points well or with sufficient vigor. State people were not very tough, while some of the people from the other agencies were tough as nails. My view is that one should not skew the facts when presenting a case or be unnecessarily controversial, but I do believe that a forceful advocacy of a position is a virtue; I was generally disappointed with the State representatives on that score. Garthoff of PM was the main State representative; he knew his stuff--in fact, he was the expert, but he was gentle by nature. Vince Baker, who headed the PM Office of Strategic Affairs, was incredibly shy--he couldn't lead a round-table discussion if his life depended on it. He was probably the wrong man for that job; his strength could have been better utilized in INR. Vince's deputy was Edward Ifft--a charming, nice man, a Ph.D. physicist, but not very forceful.

The State problems in the inter-agency context was not one of rank. If a position was well thought out and vigorously presented, then rank mattered little. The chairs of the inter-agency group--Phil Odeen first and Jan Lodal later--were the NSC staff members were people with strong technical backgrounds with little regard for an official's rank and status. It was competence that counted with them. It was this inter-agency group--and its subgroups--that did most of the work on strategic issues. I think the NSC principals met to discuss some of the questions, but I don't remember that those were a major factor. I did attend one of those meetings when the INR representative was ill and I went along with Bob Ingersoll, then the Deputy Secretary to one of those meetings at the White House. I also remember the day I went with a some PM and INR people for a briefing of Secretary Rogers and Ingersoll on some issue. After a few minutes devoted to a briefing, Rogers said something along the lines that the issue seemed very complicate and that he hoped he would not have to deal with it. That is not a morale booster to the State people in the trenches who lived with these issues day in and day out. But my view may be skewed because as the junior member of the INR staff, I was not really involved in discussions that took place on the Seventh Floor or the White House. I witnessed the debates among the mid-level officials in the government which took place almost daily, week after week.

I must say that my INR assignment far exceeded my expectations and my tour was very rewarding. That was despite the fact that a few people from other agencies cast aspersions about me, particularly during the debates about chemical and biological weapons. So some of the debates were personalized, but I think, in the main, they tended to reflect the deep-seeded convictions of some very smart people in the government. I knew for a fact that at the higher levels the issues tended to become personalized. I knew that Gerry Smith was forced out as Director of ACDA, that Ambassador Jim Leonard--a senior ACDA official--deplored the treatment that some staffers were receiving. So I was aware of some personal animus, but it didn't really impact me; I was too low on the totem pole to be a target.

I found that much that I learned during my INR tour was very useful in subsequent assignments. So, as I have said, the one-year assignment in INR was interesting and stimulating.

Q: You left your position in INR after one year. What happened?

KELLY: In January, 1973, Kissinger announced that he had reached agreement with the North Vietnamese. That resulted in a cease fire, which was to be monitored by 50 FSOs who came from all assignments. The one qualification was that they had to be Vietnamese speakers. One day in late January or early February, I was called by John Dexter, the Director of the Office of Thai-Vietnam Affairs in EA. He asked me whether I could leave for Thailand the next day. He said that because the 50 FSOs who had been assigned to Vietnam had denuded certain Embassies. One of those that was left high and dry was the Political Section in Bangkok, which had lost almost all of its officers to this "highest priority" assignment. The Embassy and the Bureau were searching high and low for some replacement and were particularly interested in a Thai language officer. I told Dexter that I had to speak to my INR bosses first, but if they agreed, I would be ready. At the time,

Dexter was thinking of TDY assignment to last approximately a month. INR first said that it would not release me. Then I understand that Tom Pickering, then in PM called Len Weiss, the INR Deputy Director on behalf of EA; that apparently broke the log-jam and I was released. So I went home, packed my bags and flew off to Bangkok.

That Thai assigned in fact stretched out to about four months. That was longer than I had anticipated and it became a drag. I missed my family--my son made his first Communion and I wasn't there. That hurt. I was anxious to return home. Four months after my arrival in Bangkok, Len Weiss came to Thailand. I told him that I wanted to return. He said that he would try to work out a return the following week, but only if I agreed to stay in INR for an extra two years. I think he was still miffed that I had been hijacked from his Bureau. That didn't sit very well with me; that sounded very much like blackmail and I didn't really liked it. So I agreed, but I had no intention of living up to that understanding. I did go home the following week and reported for work to my old Office of Strategic Affairs. I thought I would spend another year there; as I said, I had no intention of staying beyond that.

I had been in Washington only for a short time when someone in the Pentagon called to ask whether I would be interested in an assignment in DOD. State and Defense had an exchange agreement and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (ISA) was looking for a someone to take over Thai and SEATO matters. The officer who had the job--a DOD civilian--left and ISA was anxious to have a replacement who knew the subject matter and didn't need any extended training period. I told the Pentagon fellow that I would be interested, but that I didn't think that INR would release me. Dennis Newlin, then a Deputy Assistant Secretary in DOD, talked to Pickering, who once again took up the cudgels. This time, he ran into a stonewall. Weiss told Tom that I had agreed to stay another two years. Tom, in his customary fashion, would not be deterred and went to Personnel; within two weeks I found myself in DOD. I was sorry to leave Frank Perez and my colleagues in the Office of Strategic Affairs; they had been very good to me and had been excellent teachers. But I was still sufficiently angry with Len Weiss for trying to extract an extra pound of flesh out of me that my loyalty to INR had dissipated. As I was leaving INR, I had a chat with Len Weiss, who was not a very happy camper; he thought that I had stage-managed the transfer. I doubt that he ever believed my protestations of innocence, but in fact it had been Pickering and Newlin who had managed the whole transfer.

I found that the SEATO-Thai job was a good job, which was an extra bonus because not only did I get out of INR, but had an interesting assignment to boot. I knew that ISA was a bureaucratic power-house in terms of its standing in the Pentagon and in the US government. It was known as the "Pentagon's Little State Department". I had heard of ISA going back to my Turkey assignment, so that an assignment to that Bureau pleased me. I knew some the players there and thought highly of them.

It turned out that I went to work for Rear Admiral Tom Begley, the Director for South-east Asia. He reported to Newlin. One of the great advantages of working in ISA was that you had regular access to the Secretary of Defense, unlike the State Department where some

one of my rank was lucky to see the Secretary once a year. In the Pentagon, I actually got to see and talk with the Secretary of Defense. Of course, One of the reasons was that South-East Asia was an important area of the world for DOD and the Secretary had to be personally involved in many issues emanating from that part of the world.

There were several things that surprised me about the Pentagon. I had not been prepared for the informality and the access that even mid-career officers like myself had to high officials. It was much less bureaucratic than State. It was much easier to obtain clearances, certainly within ISA. Clearing messages with the Joint Chiefs of Staff was considerably harder. I learned what people meant when they said that "it was a good thing that JCS was not in charge of pulling fire alarms" because the building would burn down before all the required papers had been written and approved. My contacts with State, which were almost daily, were good. I dealt primarily with EA/P--Victor Thomsen--and John Dexter. Above them, I dealt with Monty Stearns, the Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for South-East Asia.

The Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger preceded briefly by Elliot Richardson, as I have said, became personally involved in Thai and SEATO issues. Henry Kissinger, by then the Secretary of State, also had become personally involved in Thailand issues. A number of the issues that I dealt with were discussed at the weekly breakfast that Kissinger, Schlesinger and Scowcroft used to hold. Those breakfasts had an agenda that was widely distributed. Decisions would be made at those occasions, but of course Kissinger neglected to ever inform any of his staff what had been discussed or decided. Schlesinger, on the other hand, would immediately return to the Pentagon and dictated an action memorandum summarizing what had been discussed, who had said what and what had been decided. So by shortly after 9 a.m. we would leap into action, sending "Execute" orders to military units and taking what ever actions were necessary. We would call our counterparts in State to tell them what we were doing only to find that our colleagues there had not been given any instructions; they had to rely entirely on us to tell them what had been decided at breakfast. We used to rib our State colleagues unmercifully about this situation. They, of course, were in a very difficult and embarrassing position.

I remember clearly what the major issues were at the time. Kissinger had arranged a cease-fire agreement with the North Vietnamese. That mean that US forces could be withdrawn from Vietnam--they had been ever since Nixon's "Vietnamization" program had gone into effect. But during the 1973-74 period, the bulk of the American forces and equipment, primarily combat aircraft, was being withdrawn. Many of those troops and aircraft were transferred to Thailand, generating serious problems. The Thais, correctly, viewed us as a force that was leaving South-East Asia. That raised a question in their minds whether it was wise to permit this major influx of US personnel and equipment; they finally agreed that some could brought into their country.

Schlesinger and many DOD senior officials felt that our combat role in South-East Asia was finished. That view, reinforced by the ever present budgetary pressures, led the Pentagon to push for a rapid withdrawal of troops and equipment from the whole region, including Thailand. This policy stance permitted me to dust-off the plans developed in

1968 by the Politico-Military Section of the Bangkok Embassy that I described earlier. So five years later, I was able to use a plan that I had participated in drafting many years earlier. I think we used essentially 90% of what had been drafted in 1968, which spelled out which units would leave Thailand at specified times. Of course, some changes had taken place in the intervening five years, but I was amazed how much of the original plan held up well. It turned out to be a very useful document.

Of course, Schlesinger had major debates with Kissinger on whether any assets should be withdrawn from Thailand. Comparable arguments took place at lower levels between DOD, State and the NSC. Kissinger, I was told, believed that to withdraw any military assets from Thailand would send signals to the north Vietnamese and the Chinese that the US was disengaging from the region--as in fact we were. All one had to do was to listen to the debates in Congress to realize that the American people were not about to support any further US involvement in the South-East Asia. But Kissinger really objected to any withdrawals; he got absolutely no support in the Pentagon. JCS wanted withdrawals for budgetary reasons; OSD wanted them for budgetary and geo-strategic reasons. So the battle lines between State and DOD were sharply drawn and every withdrawal proposal became a major issue.

On a second policy tier, there were questions about stock pile disposition. The military services wanted to bring home as much material as was useable; ISA and State wanted to leave as much as we could for the use of the Thai military. So on that issue, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and State Department joined in opposition to the US military services. There were also many other issues--for example, what to do with intelligence assets, the Mau tribe in Laos--which the CIA and our military had armed and trained for many years and were now facing the prospects of an unfriendly government, etc. So there dozens and dozens of issues, both large and small, related to our withdrawal from Vietnam.

ISA viewed itself as the DOD's voice in the government's international affairs community. We used to argue with State all the time about whether it should clear cables with the JCS directly. We insisted that they send us the cable and we would obtain all of the necessary DOD clearances. We spoke for DOD since we were part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. State almost instinctively sought both OSD and JCS clearances; I have never fully understood that tactic, but it was a practice that had grown up over years and we had a very difficult time trying to end it. I must say that I was greatly surprised when I discovered that ISA worked on the principle of sharing as little as possible with the JCS, especially when it came to decision-making. Part of that position stemmed from a well established pattern of inability to reach decisions in the JCS, to which I have alluded earlier. Part of that position came from a rigorous concern for the maintenance of civilian control of the military. I might say that this "game" went both ways. For example, the JCS used to be briefed regularly by ambassadors returning to Washington for consultation or other reasons. ISA was never invited to those briefings, which were arranged directly by JCS with the PM Bureau in State. I was always told by both the JCS and State that these briefings were very useful and valuable. This briefing process was one of the ways in which State maintained its direct contacts with the JCS. I should note that the national command chain runs from

the President of the United States to the Secretary of Defense to the theater and unified commands in the field. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not in the chain of command; they are an advisory body. Most people in State did not realize or recognize that chain. They always wanted to interject JCS into the chain of command and of course, the JCS did not discourage that practice. They did not interpret "advisory" as the dictionary might. By law, it was the Secretary of Defense's prerogative to directly instruct our commanders in the field. He did not have to go through the JCS. I think most Secretaries have tried to preserve that chain religiously; they did not want to share the authority over the field commanders with JCS.

During my one year stint in ISA, I had an opportunity to observe military "politics". They manifested themselves in two ways: a) budget issues that divided the services--a service would, in my view, mindlessly defend a procurement or an other expenditure in the face of overwhelming logic which clearly militated against such expenditure just because the procurement was dear and near to the mission that the service had envisaged for itself, even if another service could have performed it more effectively and efficiently. As a taxpayer, I thought that such procurement were a great waste of money. And b) there was a sense that officers of a uniformed service owed a loyalty to their service which transcended, in some situations, the loyalty that the officer owed to a joint organization to which he or she may have been assigned at the particular time--such as a theater commander, the JCS or OSD. I witnessed officers who were removed from duty and whose career were thereby ruined because they had espoused policies or actions that ran contrary to the professed interest of their "mother" service, but which was favored by a unified command. They were punished for "lack of loyalty"--a warped definition of "loyalty" in my mind. In a strange way, this perception of where "loyalty" should lie made some military wary of me because they thought that my principal loyalty must have devoted to the State Department and not OSD, even though that was my employer at the time. They believed that my loyalty to the Foreign Service would supersede any loyalty I might have to my employer at the time. That was absolutely wrong! That thought would never cross my mind. In the first place, my loyalty is to the US and its government; secondly, my loyalty went to organization to which I was assigned and I would do what my best for that organization as long as it neither unlawful or unethical.

Let me briefly return to SEATO, which was at the time, barely breathing. In the five intervening years--between my work in Bangkok and then the Pentagon--our involvement in South-East Asia had changed dramatically. Our withdrawal from the area was essentially a death knell for SEATO. The organization still existed, but it was an ever diminishing interest to Washington. The Secretary General still made his annual ceremonial visits; he called on the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense. Except for protocol issues that might have arisen, I don't think SEATO created any work load. But the SEATO part of my title, did give me exposure to issues that involved Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam--for part of the time.

Most if ISA was staffed by DOD civilians and military. there were other Foreign Service officers on the staff at the time. One was in the Foreign Military Rights Affairs Office; that

was the Office responsible for base rights, etc. ISA in general was a very effective office; it was a bureaucratic power that was highly respected. In fact, it was the place to work in the Pentagon. In general, the ISA staff had a high degree of *esprit*; the staff knew that it had access to the highest levels of the Pentagon and that it would get a hearing on any issue it felt strongly about. That enabled ISA to challenge positions taken by other parts of the Pentagon and to say to others that if they felt that it was just speaking for the Secretary, it would be glad to have the Secretary confirm the ISA view in writing. We could get issues to the Secretary in an hour; the same issues would take weeks before a lowly Deputy Assistant Secretary in State would address them.

I became friendly with a number of military officers. Within a week or two after my arrival, one of them took me out for lunch and said: "You know of course why the Department sent you to ISA?" When I answered in the negative, this officer said: "It was to give you a course in 'back bone'!". I think he said that half in jest, but probably felt that there was some truth in his comment. I learned a lot from him and other military officers. I especially learned that direct, frank responses are very useful for communications. I also learned that taking firm positions was a valuable asset to have. I must say that in fact I did acquire some of the Pentagon culture and perhaps "back-bone" as my military friend would have called it. I certainly became very impatient with the clearance process which in State took forever. Of course, the fact that ISA was so much smaller than State accelerated the process there considerably; I could get almost all messages cleared in ISA in a half-hour. That would never be possible in State. Furthermore, the Pentagon culture did not require that everybody and his brother be involved in every issue, as was true in State. For example, on New Year's Day, 1974, Schlesinger called Newlin from his house. He wanted the wing of EB-66's moved out of Thailand the next day. These were old electronic warfare planes, which had long past their utility. But that wing had become part of the running bureaucratic battle we had had with State and others who were opposed to any drawdowns. Newlin called me at home and instructed me to go to the office to write an "Execute" order so that the Secretary's order could be carried out. I did that. When I had finished writing it, I called someone in EA/P in State--this was still on New Year's Day. I told him that I would send the message within two hours unless I heard any objections from him. The next thing that happened that one of Kissinger's special assistants--Jerry Bremer--called me and told me that I couldn't send that message. I told him that we certainly could and would in fact do so that afternoon. I told him that the Secretary of Defense had decided that he wanted that wing moved and that is what I intended to do. Bremer said that that course of action was contrary to Kissinger's wishes and policies. I asked Jerry whether he had talked to Kissinger. He said that he had not and wouldn't since it was New Year's Day. So I sent the message. The next day, Kissinger called Schlesinger and told him that he was not at all happy with what had happened the previous day. But the deed was done and the EB-66 wing was removed to Thailand, much to the Air Force's delight because its presence in Thailand was a budgetary drain that it didn't really want to incur. We never cleared the message with the Air Force; on principal, we almost never cleared "Execute" messages with the organization that would be responsible for its implementation; we tried not to share responsibility for actions with any military service of joint command. We might advise them of what was coming, but rarely cleared with them because that would have

given them a veto right on actions to be taken by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary was in the chain of command, as I explained earlier--not the services or the JCS.

It was another good tour. I learned a lot in that one year in ISA, enjoyed the work, made lasting friendships which keep me in touch with all sorts of people in many different activities to this day.

Q: Your tour in ISA lasted for only one year. Why such a short period?

KELLY: Sometime towards the end my year in ISA, in 1974, I received a call from Bob Martin, the Deputy director of the Office of Strategic Affairs of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in State Department. He wanted to know whether I would be interested in working in his Office, which was then deeply engaged in the SALT negotiations. Vince Baker was the Office Director. It was an entirely unexpected call because I thought that I was really back to my South-East Asia track; also I had fully expected to spend two years in ISA, which I was perfectly happy to do. But PM dangled the opportunity to return to strategic issues, including the possibility of accompanying our SALT delegation to Geneva. That possibility was a real attraction because not many young officers had the opportunity to participate in such high level talks. So I discussed the offer with Dennis Newlin and decided, after considerable thought, to transfer back to State.

When I began to dig into the state of the SALT talks since I left them a year earlier, I found that not much had happened during that period. What ever progress had been made had been glacial. So I didn't have to spend much time catching up. My main challenge was to learn a lot more about the negotiating process since in INR I had focused on the more technical issues. Also the leadership of PM had changed in the intervening period. George Vest was now the Bureau Director, having followed Sey Weiss who had headed the Bureau for only six months before being sent to the Bahamas as Ambassador--at Kissinger's behest. I had known Sey, who had the reputation of being a "hard liner" while he was in S/P because I would brief him every morning on strategic intelligence. I would take the material to his office, let him read it and then listen to his comments. It was a good learning experience for a young officer because I had the opportunity to hear the views of one part of the spectrum of opinion on strategic matters. Sey of course did not view the PM and ACDA positions with any relish; he thought that they were being much too forthcoming to the Soviets. I think it is fair to say that Sey's departure brought a greater consensus to the State positions because George and Jim Goodby were not nearly the "hard liners" that Sey and his deputy, Leon Sloss, had been. Also, when Sonnenfeldt and Hyland transferred to State, there was a lot more vigor in the Department in its pursuit of its policy objectives and negotiating positions. The bureaucratic power shifted from the NSC to State--even though Kissinger was acting both as the Secretary and the NSC Advisor--, giving it a much greater and more forceful voice in the inter-agency councils. Sonnenfeldt's and Hyland's support gave us a great advantage in the inter-agency process.

Jim Goodby was the Deputy Director of the Bureau responsible for strategic issues. Tom Stern was the Deputy Director for Arms Transfers and Security Assistance. I worked on

issues that had arisen during the SALT negotiations, supporting the development of negotiating positions in the inter-agency councils. Once positions had been agreed upon, I would then try to incorporate them into instructions to our delegation in Geneva. And as promised to me by Martin, Mark Ramee and I were supposed to take turns being part of our delegation in Geneva. As things turned out, in fact, I never got to Geneva. I had started in PM in September, 1974 and I was scheduled to go to Geneva for six months starting in March, 1975. Before that time could come, I moved to Hal Sonnenfeldt's office and never did go to Geneva. Everyone else in the Office managed to get at least one trip to Geneva during the period I was in PM, but I was too inexperienced to be able to squeeze a trip out for myself. I was left behind to attend the endless inter-agency meetings and to argue forever about negotiating positions. As I mentioned earlier, the agenda for those meetings had not changed substantially during the year I was in ISA. The substantive issues were essentially still the same, although some of the issues had been resolved by the SALT I agreement.

In August, 1974, Kissinger decided to conduct an interesting exercise. The US government was deadlocked on what proposals to make for the new SALT negotiations. Kissinger authorized a process, which was somewhat akin to "let a thousand flowers bloom". Every one who had anything to do with arms control--from negotiators to lowly staff members to contractors--was invited to submit a paper on his or her view any or all issues facing the US. It was essentially a "brain storming" exercise except that first of all there was no meeting, just papers. When I first walked into PM, I was confronted with 24 serious papers all dealing with issues that needed to be taken up in the next phase of arms control negotiations. Being the newest and lowest officer on the totem pole, they were all dumped on my desk and I was requested to analyze them. It was a horrible task, but certainly reintroduced me to arms control issues in a hurry. I had to separate the wheat from the chaff and digest the important aspects of the papers so that my superiors could be briefed and then I had to write a briefing memo to Kissinger. In fact, there were some good ideas in those papers, some of which actually became part of our negotiating positions. Then these suggestions had to be introduced into the inter-agency fora and there they were thoroughly debated in ways that only an inter-agency group could do.

I had an opportunity to observe Bill Hyland often. Hal Sonnenfeldt did not participate very often in inter-agency meetings. Hyland took the leadership role for the Department, partly because he had more background on strategic and arms control issues than George Vest, who, at least according to the organization charts, should have been the main spokesman for the Department on these issues. It was Hyland who would call the meetings in his office to decide the State position on any issues that arose. He also tasked various officers to take actions--e.g. drafting papers or messages. When I first met Hyland, I thought he was a real tough, mean person; in fact, he was a real gentle man, but he understood that to be a successful bureaucrat in Washington, you had to portray a sense of toughness and meanness.

In this period, the main actors in State on arms control matters were Hyland and INR, PM and S/P. No regional bureau played an important role. Hyland was the Director of INR, but

he, being so close to Kissinger, really didn't have much regard for organizational niceties. He would ask anyone in the Department to do things. He ran all of the participants in the deliberations as one team without regard to which organization the officer might have been attached. It was a very good system. S/P still had three officers devoted to strategic issues: Kahane, Koliski and Zemach--all of whom I mentioned earlier. They had Ph.D.s in one science or another and were policy wonks in addition who had worked on the issues for many years.

I had interaction with DOD almost every day. I must say that just because I had just been at DOD, I was not spared any of the barbs that that organization threw at State. I was dealing with a different part of ISA which did not credit me for the service I had given to them in the previous year. I did not have a chance, while in ISA, to become very well acquainted with its experts on strategic issues. South-East Asia and strategic issues were worlds apart. Once I had started in PM, I became well acquainted with those DOD officials; some of the meetings took 6-8 hours. For better or worst, you get to know the people around the table. I came to the conclusion that State's positions were not pushed as forcibly as they should have, unless Sonnenfeldt or Hyland were representing the Department. Below them, the Department was represented either by well-meaning scientists who did not enjoy the rough and tumble of inter-agency combat or by bureaucrats who did not have the necessary scientific background. Strategic issues do require the master of some arcane technical issues. We did not have enough bureaucratic assertiveness.

Q: How did you get to Sonnenfeldt's office?

KELLY: Norm Terrell was working for Sonnenfeldt as his special assistant. He followed the day-to-day arms control events. All of a sudden, in 1975, Terrell gave Sonnenfeldt two weeks notice because he was going to take a job in NASA; he resigned from the Foreign Service and joined NASA. That left an vacancy, which Sonnenfeldt wanted--and had to--fill immediately. Hal needed someone who was somewhat conversant with the subject matter. Sometime during this period, Kissinger, in his role of NSC Advisor, was to chair a meeting on arms control. State was to be represented by Bob Ingersoll, then the Deputy Secretary; he knew little about the subject. Before this NSC meeting, a briefing session was held, which was customary before any NSC meetings. The PM people who would have normally attended took ill and I had to represent the Bureau. During the meeting, someone made a statement that was factually incorrect; I jumped in to correct the error. It was just a reaction; I was not trying to upstage anyone. But I did and do believe that when erroneous information is presented, all the people in the room have the responsibility to correct the error before it becomes dogma. Since I was sitting in the back of the room, my intervention obviously was noticed. Sonnenfeldt happen to be at this meeting and apparently was sufficiently impressed to ask someone after the meeting who I was. As luck would have it, about three days later, was summoned to Sonnenfeldt's office and asked whether I wanted a job there. I asked a day to consider the possibility and returned to PM to talk to George Vest, who is one the nicest and wisest people that one would ever the fortune to run into. George said that I had to take that job; it was a "once-in-a-lifetime" opportunity because it would give me the kind of visibility that would not be available anywhere else in the

Department. He thought that an assignment to the Counselor's Office would be great for my career. He warned me that Sonnenfeldt had the reputation of being very unpleasant and demanding and that therefore the tour may not always be very pleasant, but he said that Hal was just as bad as his reputation made him out to be--George would probably have said that about everybody in the world--and furthermore an assignment to that Office would be good for my career. So I accepted the offer and went to work for the Counselor of the Department of State.

George was right. Hal was very demanding and had an intellectual rigor that I admire to this day. He did not accept sloppy work and when unhappy, he would shout at people. I was the recipient of one of his outbursts soon after my arrival. I responded that I did not appreciate his behavior and that seemed to have some effect thereafter. In fact, our relationship became a friendship. I learned that Sonnenfeldt, as was true of most senior officials, was over-worked, over-stressed and under unimaginable pressures which were not evident to most of the people in State. He had a very demanding management style; he was not the "model manager" but he was effective. His redeeming feature was his intellect; he was right about most matters. If he had been wrong, he would have been a disaster, but in light of his "batting average", he was a valuable asset to the Department, despite his personal predilections.

Hal spent part of every day working on strategic issues. I would be communicating with him almost constantly throughout the day. He wanted to know what was going on every day, both in Geneva and the interagency fora in Washington. He was always curious about what people outside Washington were doing and thinking. There were always tasks that he would assign. One of the major communication transmission systems were terse notes--many, many of them during a day--along with very brief conversations. He was always on the move, so that brevity was essential. I had been in the office only briefly when Hal said that he was going to take me to a meeting with Kissinger to talk about arms control. He said that Kissinger wanted a note-taker at every meeting; he was after all a historian and insisted that a record be kept. Hal warned me that he had tried to take Terrell along as a note-taker, but for some reason, Henry never trusted him. So Hal warned me that Kissinger might scream when he first saw me and might try to throw me out. He told me that I should not take it personally if that happens; it was just Kissinger! On the other hand, Kissinger had asked that all meetings be recorded, so Hal was going to take me.

So I went with Hal; it was my first opportunity to observe Kissinger up close. At this meeting, was Scowcroft, the Deputy NSC Advisor, Hyland, and perhaps Jan Lodal--now an Under Secretary of Defense. As we entered the Secretary's office, Hal pointed to a chair and told me to sit in it. Kissinger was working at the desk and hadn't looked up yet to see who had entered the room. He then left the desk and went to his easy chair and started to talk about the latest Soviet proposal. I started to take notes--I don't take shorthand, but I was scribbling away furiously. All of a sudden, there was silence. I heard Kissinger say: "What is this?" pointing at me--not "Who", but "What." Sonnenfeldt said that I was John Kelly, a new member of his staff, whom he had brought along to take notes. Hal said that I knew the subject matter well, and that I would be an excellent note-taker. Hyland chimed in and

supported Hal and vouched for my loyalty--which was important to Kissinger who was always afraid of the leaks that others might engender. Kissinger kept looking at me and then started talking again. I thought I had gotten over the hurdle. And I started to write furiously once again. All of a sudden I felt a presence behind me; as I turned around, I saw Kissinger standing behind my chair reading what notes I was taking. That was not a pleasant moment! You don't often have the Secretary of State lurking over you reading what you were writing. In any case, Kissinger stood there for some time and then the meeting went on. After the meeting, I hurried back to my office to dictate as close to a verbatim record as I could muster. My dictation was then written up in two copies and both sets of notes were sent to Kissinger's office, where it went to his personal files. In any case, I guess I must have passed whatever test Kissinger was giving because thereafter, day in and day out, I would be asked to take notes at Kissinger's meetings on arms control. It was then that I found out that Kissinger did not follow the day-to-day negotiations; in fact, many of his meetings drifted off into other subjects. I remember that as Saigon was falling, Kissinger would exclaim: "What is that Graham Martin think he is doing?" And then the rest of the meeting was devoted to Vietnam. At Sonnenfeldt's suggestions, I took notes on all that was discussed so that Kissinger could have a complete personal file on all of his meetings. So I took notes on many subjects other than arms control; I heard a lot of comments about Martin, Thieu and Nixon. So the meetings covered the globe and my working hours increased steadily because in addition to my regular job, I now had a major workload writing notes of Kissinger's meetings--that when the Secretary was in town that might be as many as four hours of meetings and then the time necessary to dictate the notes, which had to be done on the same day as the meeting and the typed product delivered to Kissinger's secretary. As time went on, Hal added European affairs to my portfolio. So I had a full plate and more.

The major issue that we dealt with in the 1975-76 period was SALT I and the negotiations leading up to SALT II. There were a number of contentious issues which we had to deal with. For one, there was the question of whether the "Backfire" bomber should be included in the treaty as a system that was subject to numerical limitations. Secondly, we wrestled with the questions of how to deal with Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRV). A third set of issues dealt with cruise missiles--whether they should be included in any treaty and if so, how. Then there was a long list of verification issues, starting with the accusations by many in and outside the government--people like Senator "Scoop Jackson" and many others, who insisted that the Soviets were violating SALT I already. Another item for discussion was the question of whether the US should become in negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. The actual negotiations that were then ongoing culminated eventually in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which set a limit of nuclear underground explosions. Then there was a range of other issues, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group--the association of nations that manufactured and sold nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

As you can see, many of the issues required considerable technical and scientific knowledge. Lodal had that; Scowcroft and Hyland were very good. Kissinger never became fully familiar with the technical details of arms control, but had great faith in his

understanding of the major points. I had learned a considerable amount by this time, which I used when I graduated from being just the notetaker to an actual participant in Kissinger's small group. That happened about six months after I started attending these meetings. How I became a participant was an interesting story. I was sitting in my usual corner, busily engaged in taking notes, when Kissinger, in his best funeral tone, said: "Kelly, what do you think?" I looked up and saw that both Sonnenfeldt and Hyland were giving me signs to speak up. So I put my two-cents in. After that, Kissinger would periodically ask for my views or comments. Although I have described the arms control group as a small in-house collection, we did consult with side experts. By this time, I had become the note taker for a lot of Kissinger's meetings, even those with outsiders if the subject matter was disarmament or arms control. That would put me sometime as only the third person in the room. The calls from his office became more and more frequent. It was always: "Kelly, come in a hurry and bring your notebook." Sometimes I had no idea who was going into the meeting with the Secretary; one day, I sat in on a meeting with Elizabeth Taylor--I have no idea to this day why I was chosen to be the note taker for that session. But one day, I was paged to take notes at a meeting that Kissinger was going to have with Dr. Edward Teller--one of the fathers of the atom bomb. He wanted to get to see President Ford because he had some ideas on new weapons. Scowcroft, Lodal and Schlesinger and many others had decided that the Teller ideas were potentially destabilizing and therefore were doing their best to keep Teller from seeing the President. As part of this game to keep Teller out of the Oval Office, Teller was sent to see Kissinger. I subsequently found out that the two men detested each other, but accepted that they did exist and tried to live with each other. Kissinger did believe in the importance of stability and he, too, was wary of any new weapon systems that might destabilize the US-Soviet relations. But Teller was caught up in technology--any new gadget had to be good. In any case, when Kissinger introduced me to Teller, he said that I was a physicist and one of his technical advisors. Teller's eyes lit up; he was delighted to see a fellow scientist. So he and Kissinger talked for about half an hour; towards the end, I could tell--by now I knew Kissinger quite well--that he wanted to get rid of Teller. He suggested that Teller go with me to continue the conversation; he told Teller that I would write up a complete report on the conversation. When we reached my office, Teller asked where I had gotten my degree. I told him that it was from Emory University, without elaborating on which subject was my major. Without hesitating, Teller then launched into a three-hour discussion of the physics of the new weaponry that he had in mind. Somehow, I managed to capture the essence of the presentation in a memorandum to Kissinger; in fact, I think I understood the main scientific points that Teller was making. I subsequently talked to a real physicist on the NSC staff--Roger Mulhollander--who was one of the founders of "Ground Zero." Between the two of us, we managed to cobble this memorandum together. The main point I wanted to make is that there was enough scientific and technical knowledge, in the government and in the State Department, that we were not overwhelmed by those aspects of arms control. When Kissinger wanted to find out how a certain weapon system or a component of a system worked, we could rely on our own resources. It was important that we have such capability because verification certainly depended on technical means as did other parts of arms control and we always had to answer Henry's questions immediately that day. Of course, my ability to get the answers was helped immeasurably by the fact that the people knew that I worked for Sonnenfeldt

and participated in the small inner group's deliberations. I got great cooperation from everyone; everybody responded as best they could. The experience proved to me that you didn't have to be a scientific or technical expert to deal with arms control issues. I got some good advice from my brother, Michael, who does have a degree in electrical engineering and a doctorate in computer sciences. He is now the chief scientist for the BDM Corporation. He told me that if a scientist cannot explain his theory or proposal to a layman, then you need to be very wary; there is likely to be something fraudulent about the proposition. I believe that to be a sound analysis; I believe that there are ideas that can only be expressed in mathematical symbols, but they are the exception. Most valid ones can and should be explained in plain English. So the Kissinger group was not afraid of scientific or technical issues; it was not an impediment to policy development, particularly since we were supported by a number of people in S/P, PM and INR who knew the science. The regional bureaus, lacking that asset or any interest in acquiring it, were not able to be players.

I mentioned earlier that my brief was expanded to include European affairs. Early in my stint in the Counselor's office, the staffer responsible for European issues was away and Sonnenfeldt asked me to give him a paper on the "cheese war." I said: "Yes, sir," and walked out of the office not having the faintest idea what the "cheese war" was. It turned out that it was dispute between the US and the EC over dairy exports. Of course, I picked up the phone and called people in EUR. I found a couple of people who seemed to know what the "cheese war" was all about. It turned out that some Foreign Minister had just had a meeting with Kissinger and had said that the "war" had to be solved immediately, if not sooner. After the meeting, Henry had called Sonnenfeldt and told him that he wanted the "war" settled. Hal called Carla Hills, then the chief trade negotiator, and she had given him her version of the story. In any case, after listening to various people, I wrote an anonymous paper the next day with suggestions on how the "war" might be settled. That became the government's policy and soon that "war" was over. That was another learning experience which taught me that as you rise in the bureaucratic ranks, the less of the details of an issue you might know, but the more you are required to resolve issues, even when you don't know all there is to know about the subject. You just have to absorb the essentials, as best you can filter them, and come up with an answer in a hurry. So, as I said, my portfolio kept growing, usually in a very highly organized fashion. There were three or four of us in the office: Bob Blackwill handled CSCE issues--better he than me because I don't really like multilateral diplomacy--, Bill Shinn, who handled Soviet issues, and Jack Middleton, who handled the rest of the world--as it impinged on the Counselor's Office; e.g., the war in Angola that Hal kept getting involved in because of the Soviet angle which prompted strong reactions from the Secretary.

Hal had a strange arrangement with the Secretary. He kept, at the head of his desk, a memo from Kissinger which listed four or five things that Sonnenfeldt was not responsible for. Their relationship was complicated and tangled, but marked by mutual respect and mistrust; I guess that somewhere along the line, Hal just said to Henry that he had more on his plate than he could handle and that he wanted a memo from the Secretary excluding him

from a number of duties. He undoubtedly would periodically remind Kissinger of that memorandum!

We have heard much in recent times about Kissinger's demand that his phone calls be monitored. The Department's rule was that if a call was to be monitored, both parties had to be aware of it. But I don't think that was ever honored much on the Seventh Floor. When Henry would call Hal, we were directed to listen in; that, of course, saved time for Hal because he didn't have to debrief us after the call. The extension which we used for this monitoring had a "dead" key which, when activated, prevented any sound from filtering through the speaker. When Kissinger had phone conversations on arms control matters, I was often summoned to go to the Secretary's office to monitor and record in my notebook, the gist of the conversation. Sometimes, I was even the note taker on telephonic conversations that the President and Kissinger might have held. That "duty" also expanded eventually, and I was the note taker on telephone conversations that Kissinger had with others on subjects other than arms control. As with my meeting note-taking responsibilities, would make a record of the conversation and take whatever action seemed to be required, if any. Of course, like all members of Kissinger's circle, I was under strict instructions not to discuss whatever I had heard. That was not a problem because we were free to brief people on substantive issues and Kissinger's views on various subjects; it was the gossip that often was thrown into the meetings and telephone conversations that were unmentionable. One of our major problems was to find out what happened at the Kissinger-Rumsfeld breakfasts. I have already mentioned how better Defense was at being debriefed by Schlesinger when he attended those breakfasts. Kissinger just did not readily communicate the outcome of the breakfasts. In fact, most of our information about those sessions came to us from Scowcroft, who, when asked, would debrief us. We, in Sonnenfeldt's office, because we worked so closely with the NSC had a special relationship with Scowcroft and his staff; we could get information that most of the Department could not. If Scowcroft told us that at breakfast something had been decided, then we would find out and would so inform the action officers; e.g., Art Hartman in EUR or Jim Goodby in PM. But the Defense system was far better; it didn't have to rely on third-hand information. Also, what we were told primarily was about decisions made; usually we did not, as the people in Defense did, get a flavor of the discussions that were held.

Also, all of us in the Counselor's office had access to the so called "back-channel" messages. Those were messages that the Secretary and the NSC Advisor sent to the field using non-State communication facilities. There were only a handful of State officials that had access to those messages. Kissinger carried on an extensive correspondence through this "back-channel," even sending some messages to the chairman of our SALT delegation, Alexis Johnson, through this means. Occasionally, he would instruct Alexis to do things which had not been cleared in an inter-agency fora. That, of course, put Johnson in very difficult positions because he had instructions that none of the members of his delegation, which represented a number of government agencies, had ever heard about. Not having heard of it, they would point out to the chairman that they had not had any like instructions and therefore assumed that Johnson's instructions did not have inter-agency blessing--as, in fact, they didn't. Alexis would then have to invoke his privilege as chairman of the

delegation and proceed to follow his instructions. But I am sure that it was not easy or pleasant for Johnson. I was also in a difficult position because, although I had to know what the "back-channel" messages contained--in order to do my job--I could not even divulge the existence of a "back-channel," much less acknowledge the substance of the messages. Of course, if I happened to attend an inter-agency meeting when the representatives of the other agencies would raise the roof because the chairman of our delegation had taken a certain action, I was able to defend Johnson because I knew why a certain decision had been taken. I am sure that the members of the delegation suspected that Alexis was getting unilateral instructions from Kissinger. Sometimes, Kissinger's instructions were well received in State because in some cases, his decision reflected State's positions which its representatives had not been able to clear through the inter-agency maze. It was a very strange way to manage a negotiation, but that is the way Henry Kissinger operated. I must confess that on a few occasions, I did brief Hartmann or Vest on some matters that under strict interpretation of Kissinger's rules, I probably should not have. Such exceptions had to be made for the benefit of the process.

The nuclear suppliers' group was also an interesting experience. There were at the time several major potential proliferation problems looming around the world. For example, there were Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Pakistan. In each case, the Germans, the French and we were competing to sell what was called the "full nuclear cycle"; i.e., all the parts of a nuclear cycle which enabled these countries to become self-sufficient in nuclear power generation, but which would have allowed these countries to produce enriched uranium or plutonium--material required for a nuclear weapon capability. So we all became concerned that proliferation might eventually increase the number of nuclear armed countries. It fell to the nuclear supplier nations to establish a control regime, which although providing countries with power generating facilities--or other peaceful uses--would also limit their capability to build bombs. Over a period of several years, the possible restraints that the suppliers could exercise was discussed by the US, Germany, Great Britain and France. In 1974, at a G-7 meeting, that group was broadened to include all members of the G-7. The difficulty of exercising restraint was roughly the same for every government. Each was faced by a powerful group from the private sector all trying to sell their wares outside the borders of their country. Article III of the NPT specified that nations that had nuclear technology had to share with others. In 1975, the governments of the nations that were the major exporters of nuclear technology agreed to meet, first in London, under British chairmanship. Kissinger asked George Vest, then the head of PM, to chair the US delegation. That chairman designation had been made after a big inter-agency struggle; there were many candidates, like Dixie Lee Ray, then the Assistant Secretary for OES, who had been the chairperson of the AEC. She, however, was considered too pro-nuclear. Her deputy, Myron Kratzer, was also a candidate for the chairmanship. Of course, there were people in other agencies who aspired to take on the role. Finally, Kissinger asked George who was viewed as the most objective of all the candidates who also had excellent persuasive powers--both attributes required by the chairman of a fractious delegation. George did. Over the period of the next 18 months, the group held five formal meetings. An agreed document was approved by all the delegations that placed limits on nuclear exports. The amazing part of this document is that it is still the governing charter for nuclear

exports; George deserves a vast amount of credit for delivering a product few thought would be possible to manufacture. It was particularly a triumph for George because Kissinger, once having appointed the chair of the US delegation, in fact rarely barely involved in the deliberations and conclusions of the group. It was George Vest who forged this document in cooperation with the other delegations. I should also mention that George's feat was made even more remarkable because even within his own Department there were disagreements. He also did not always have the support of his delegation; I remember that at one meeting, Vest made a statement of the US position on some issue, only to be followed by a member of his delegation--Hans Bengeldorf of OES, but formerly from the AEC--who took issue with his chairman's position. He did, however, have the substantive support of the government's leadership, from the President on down, that export restraint of some kind was the right course to pursue. We had to persuade other governments of the correctness of our views and we had to get other governments to get their nuclear exporters under control, which was not an easy task. For example, in Germany, *Kraftwerkunion* Company had billions of contracts pending with Latin American countries. The French had a huge project in Pakistan that their manufacturers were anxious to start and finish. There were economic pressures on all government to permit exports. My role on the delegation was that of enforcer and "political Commissar". The Soviets always knew what I was doing. After Bengeldorf made his statement, I went over to him and told him that if he ever opened his mouth in public again, he would never attend another international meeting. I don't know if I could have made that restriction stick, but Bengeldorf didn't know and someone needed to bring some discipline to the US government delegation. I attended all the five meetings as "recording secretary of the US delegation"--a title that George pulled out of the air, but it did give me access to all communications and papers. But in fact, as I said, my job was to enforce discipline on the members of the US delegation as well as being Sonnenfeldt's eyes and ears. It was in fact a very strange experience. The Soviets knew Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt well. Because I worked for Hal, they accorded me a lot of credibility. So eventually, I became the main informal point of contact between the US and Soviet delegations; I would take the chairman of the Soviet delegation out to lunch to tell him what the Soviet position really should be, according, as I would say, to Henry Kissinger. When the Soviets did take the position that I had espoused, many members of our delegation would accuse me and others from State of having put the Soviets up to supporting us--it was bizarre. But in the end, the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed on a document that had stood the test of time; George Vest did a wonderful job.

I personally was fully supportive of the positions we took. I believed that nuclear technology proliferation was a destabilizing--at a minimum--nefarious problem for the world. The Suppliers Group was trying to restrain and control that proliferation. It was the right policy. Even then, we were concerned that sometime in the future a non-member of the nuclear club could procure sufficient knowledge and material to build at least a crude bomb or two. I still feel today that the risk of that development is still high and that if a country acquires a nuclear weapon, it may well be tempted to use it. I just need to mention India and Pakistan as an illustration of my concerns.

One of the duties I also picked up somewhere along the way was to be Kissinger's escort when he appeared before Congressional Committees on arms control issues. I think it evolved from my duties as the note-taker. I used to work on his testimony, after the action office had finished the first draft. Somebody decided that Henry needed someone to accompany him for his appearances, who could pass him notes if he needed reminders, etc. I think that during one of his early appearances, I reminded him of some important points and Kissinger decided that he would like to go along on all arms control appearances, even those held in closed session. I sat on the left of the Secretary at the witness table and would pass him notes from time to time. He then of course, in a loud whisper, would tell me not to pass him any notes; he thought it made him look like an idiot before all those TV cameras. When we came back, I would write action memoranda because Kissinger, like many witnesses, would promise to do something or look into something. It was not a very meaningful job and after a while, others took over this chore. I was happy that this chore finally withered away. In watching Henry in action, I learned something about how one treats Committee members. I could never emulate him; Henry was a master of empathy and played to his audience like a virtuoso. He was particularly effective in closed sessions, when the cameras were not present, because he could flatter his questioner, even if the question was one that a first grader might put to him. Giving that kind of flattery, no Senator or Congressman was a match. There were some exceptions, like "Scoop" Jackson. In open session, Henry was a master of evasion. If he knew the answer well, he would and could make a masterful presentation. Otherwise, he would just beat around the bush and promise to get the interlocutor a piece of paper on the issue. He would answer questions that were not asked regularly; he would answer some questions only partially, although I never heard him lie outright.

I should mention at this stage that I wrote some speeches for Kissinger, during one of the lulls in his speech-writer's job. Henry kept firing his speech-writers--on sort of a whim at times. During one of the interim periods, Sonnenfeldt said to me that Henry had decided that I should be his speech writer. It was not a job that I wanted, but Hal insisted. Kissinger wanted to give a major speech on defense policy in Texas to where he had been invited by Bill Clements, the Deputy Secretary of DOD--later Governor of the state. This was to be an appearance before a large group of major defense industrialists. Kissinger saw this as an opportunity to present a very philosophical exposition of his views and positions on American defense policy, thereby taking the stage away from his opponents. Hal said that after I had written speech, if Kissinger liked it, I would become his permanent speech writer. That was the last thing I wanted to do, but I plunged in. Kissinger took speech-giving very seriously. Unfortunately, we had fundamental disagreements about the form and nature of the speech. Kissinger, falling back on his professorial role, felt that each speech had to be fifty minutes long--no more, no less. I thought that was far too long; no American audience would listen for that long, even to Henry Kissinger. Secondly, he believed, in a joking fashion, that verbs come at the end of a sentence--the Germanic tradition. But he did believe in very long sentences. Short, declarative sentences were not in his repertoire. Thirdly, I must admit that the time, I did not have a vision of what the American defense policy should be for the foreseeable future. I got a little guidance from Eagleburger, from Winston Lord, from Hal Sonnenfeldt, from Jan Lodal--precious little from Kissinger himself who preferred to look at drafts and then react. So I lacked the

substantive background to draft a speech on this subject and we had fundamental differences about the structure of the speech. But I took a crack at a first draft. It was given to Kissinger and the next morning, bright and early, I met with him with some trepidation. For about two weeks, I met with Kissinger twice each day to discuss the speech, starting each day at 7:30--it was the first item on his agenda. He would take the draft at home at night and the next morning he would tell me that it was awful and that it was the worst speech he had ever read. He said that whoever had granted me a University degree should be jailed; he was always full of praise like that. I was thoroughly abused, and didn't enjoy that period of my life at all. Much of the abuse was done in front of an audience--whoever happened to be there at 7:30 a.m. After about a week of this, he generously admitted that he would give the latest draft a "C" if it had been a work by a Harvard University undergraduate. Eagleburger thought that that was real progress. It was a nightmare and I was thoroughly burned out after those few weeks. I think the speech was to be delivered on a Monday night, as I remember it. On the preceding Friday, I gave him a draft; on Saturday morning he came to the office ready to tear up the speech and start all over again. He called in Eagleburger, Sonnenfeldt, Lord, Veliotis--then the deputy in S/P--and others, and threw a real Kissinger tantrum. He yelled and screamed that he was surrounded by incompetents and idiots; that we had all failed him and that he would rewrite the speech. And so he did. He spent all day Saturday closeted in his office. Every half hour or so, a long yellow piece of paper filled with his writing would come out and be typed up. When I read it, I can't say that I recognized any sentence that I could have called mine. The speech was almost exactly fifty minutes long with long boring sentences. He gave it in Texas, and I was told that he lost his audience soon after he started; they just went to sleep. He got no press coverage. In any case, Kissinger decided that I was not his speech writer for which I will always be thankful. It was one of the best things that ever happened to me.

I might just make one comment to end this part of my career. I worked very hard--many, many long hours. I missed a lot of important times with my family which I believe was a contributing factor to the break-up of my first marriage, and, perhaps, also contributed to some difficulties that my son had in his later years. The hours were a real negative which I regret to this day. For example, I remember clearly the meeting we had with Kissinger on the evening before Thanksgiving Day, 1975--it started about 7 p.m. We had come to another key point in the SALT negotiations. During the meeting, Kissinger turned to me and asked me to write a paper, taking a new approach to the SALT negotiations. He then said that all the assembled group--Hyland, Sonnenfeldt, Lodal etc.--that he wanted to get together with us the next day at 2 p.m. to review the paper. Someone piped up and reminded Kissinger that the next day was Thanksgiving. His answer was: "In that case, we will meet tomorrow at 7 p.m. so that Kelly can have his Thanksgiving meal with his family!" So I went back to the office and started to draft. I took my work home and rose at 5 a.m. to go back to the office to work on it some more. I worked till 3 p.m. and then went home, arriving late for the Thanksgiving dinner. During the meal the phone rang; it was the Operations Center calling me to tell me that a young Czech tennis player then in New York was asking for asylum. It was Martina Navratilova. I was asked whether it was all right for the INS to accept her request. The answer was "of course"; it would not have taken a brain surgeon to figure that out, but because Kissinger had so centralized the decision-making

process, no one down the line in the Department was willing to make any decisions. Defections particularly had become a delicate issue after the Lithuanian seaman had been permitted to be taken back to a Soviet ship, even though he had asked for asylum--with the agreement of some State official. Thereafter any defection request had to be passed on by the Seventh Floor. In any case, in my role as Sonnenfeldt's "clone," I approved the request; then I hurried back to the Department to make sure that the final typing of my paper had been done properly and that the requisite number of copies were produced, followed by the meeting with Kissinger at al. I know that a lot of officers of my age and rank would have given their right arm to have been in my job at that time, but I think I paid a very heavy personal price for it.

Q: In 1976, you were assigned to our Embassy in Paris as the politico-military officer. How did that assignment come about?

KELLY: I don't think that I requested an assignment to France. In early 1976, as the Presidential election campaign was beginning to move into high gear, Hal Sonnenfeldt told me that he would be leaving government regardless of the outcome by the end of 1976. He volunteered to be of help to me if I wanted another assignment before the end of his government service. He suggested that I look around for another assignment. He did at the same time admit that his support might damage my chances of getting a good assignment and that therefore I should weigh his offer of assistance very carefully. So I went to see my friendly Personnel officer and reviewed possible assignments. He was pushing me to accept the job as permanent Chargé d'affaires in the Seychelles Island. That was a two-officer post. Our Ambassador in Kenya was the accredited ambassador, but the permanent US representative was the resident Charge. We had a NASA tracking station and some other facilities on the islands which was one of the reasons for a diplomatic presence. So my friendly assignments counselor wanted me to go there. I was not interested; I had had my tour on a tropical beach--Songkhla; furthermore the Seychelles was far remote and isolated--not a good post for a family, even if being Chargé had some attractions.

Anne Armstrong, then our Ambassador in London, heard about me from someone, and asked that I spend sometime with her, which I did. She offered me the job as her executive assistant in London, but that didn't work out because she wanted someone immediately and I was not available that soon. Then someone mentioned to me that the politico-military position in Paris was going to be vacated. I was only an FSO-5 at the time and my personnel counselor didn't think that I had a chance to be selected because I was just too junior. Many more senior officers had applied for it, including one senior officer who was willing to take a job rated below his rank. Somehow, Art Hartman, then the Assistant Secretary for EUR, learned of my interest and he called me. As I mentioned earlier, he and I had been involved in a number of issues so that he knew my work first-hand. He thought I would be the right person for the job; I said that I would love to get that assignment. A week or so passed by and I got a call from my Personnel officer, who told me that the assignment was mine. I am sure it was all Art's doing; as far as I know, Hal never got involved.

During the last two months in the Counselor's Office, I went to FSI to refresh my French. That was a full day's tutorial. I would go back to my office at 4 p.m. and worked usually until 10 p.m. I also started the day at 6 a.m. until it was time to take the bus to FSI. It was crazy, and I don't recommend it, but I did it. It was probably my period of peak efficiency because I had no time for anything extraneous, but again, my family life suffered.

In any case, in the summer of 1976, we went off to Paris. We arrived at the beginning of August when the Parisians flee their city. Hank Cohen was the Political Counselor and my boss. Sam Gammon was the DCM and the Ambassador was Kenneth Rush, formerly the Union Carbide CEO, Ambassador to Germany, Deputy Secretary of Defense and briefly Deputy Secretary and Secretary of State. I was the only politico-military officer in the Embassy, although a number of my colleagues were involved in P/M issues.

My main responsibilities were to deal with the Foreign Ministry on arms control--which the French viewed with some skepticism and with the Defense Ministry on NATO programs that still involved the French. When the French, under De Gaulle, decided to withdraw from NATO's integrated command structure, General Lemnitzer, then the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO troops, and French General Ayaray, initialed an agreement which preserved French participation in a number of NATO activities, such as the European air defense system, the integrated communication system and some other systems. So we had some NATO business that had to be transacted with the French.

I also dealt with the Defense Ministry on the sale of American defense articles to France. By mid-1976, these items were almost entirely high tech systems, such as the AWAC aircraft, which the French ultimately built with Boeing. I spent a lot of time selling the French on that acquisition. I also reported on French defense policy, its independent nuclear deterrent, the defense budget, etc. I was also reported on some French domestic issues--how French political parties or politicians viewed defense or arms control issues.

Even though NATO had moved to Brussels, there were still vestiges of a US military presence in the Embassy. For example, we had personnel, both military and civilian, who worried about the NATO petroleum pipelines which carried products through France to Germany and Belgium. We had some uniformed personnel who worried about the European air defense system. There was also a large Defense Attaché Office, an Office of Defense Cooperation, which handled military sales and American Monuments Commission office. I worked with all of these groups. Our relationships were very good, which was a major change from previous eras when relationships had deteriorated seriously. My predecessor, who regrettably committed suicide some months after leaving Paris, had had an extremely difficult time both within and outside the Embassy. He had feuded with the DCM, with the Political Counselor, with the American military. So I inherited a situation which could only improve, and I think everyone was looking forward to a more normal relationship. Unfortunately, my predecessor had destroyed all the files before he left, including the index cards and listing of his contacts. So I had in many ways to start from scratch. I tried to talk to him before I left Washington, but he kept referring me to Cohen; it was not until I had gotten to post that I understood how bad the situation had been and how troubled my predecessor had been. I had been told that there was a difficult

situation by both Hartman and Lowenstein, the DAS, because they told me that one of my first tasks was to rebuild relationships both within the Embassy and with the French. But I was certainly surprised by the depth of the problem that I encountered.

My contacts with the French military started as being "correct"; i.e., not warm but on speaking relationships. Over the four years I was in Paris, I am glad to say that they grew to be quite close. I was even invited to be a lecturer at the *Ecole Superior de Guerre*--the French War College. I became involved with a lot of activities with the French military. These things developed even though my French in 1976 was lousy; that is 3-3, but that was not good enough to transact business. I remember the trepidation I had the first time I went to the *Quai d'Orsay* which is right on the other side of the Seine from the Embassy. I didn't know how I could really communicate the *demarche* I was supposed to deliver. I went through it in my best school-learned French. My interlocutor, a former ambassador, listen to me and took some notes. At the end of my presentation, he told me that he was a little hard of hearing and asked me to go through my presentation again; that was a very kind way of commenting on my language skills. I had been told to expect the French to be very rude; in fact, I found them to be very accommodating and forgiving to someone who was butchering their language and they tried to help me overcome my deficiencies without hurting my feelings. I studied French every day and after four years, I was very comfortable with the language. I had decided during my first year that I wanted to do some public speaking which forced me to improve my French. But I must admit that I found public speaking and the "question and answer" sessions that would follow my presentation exceedingly difficult at the beginning, but by the end of my tour, that was not a problem any longer. The Embassy did not object to my public appearances; I was under no restrictions. Gammon and Cohen, in fact, encouraged me to make these appearances; they never put any limitations on me either on public appearances or contact with the French that I considered necessary, regardless of their rank or position. I had a free hand and I took advantage of that liberty. I talked to a lot of French both in the public and private sectors. They were delighted that I was interested in public appearances because I may have been one of the few people in the Embassy who actually enjoyed it and sought it out. Hank Cohen did a lot of it, but most officers were very reluctant. Hartman, when he replaced Rush, appeared regularly on radio and television, although I know that he agonized over some of his utterances because they may not have been grammatically correct; he was very effective. It was hard enough to speak publicly in English; to do it in a foreign language as the official representative of one's own government makes it exceedingly difficult. I had done it in Thailand, but that was an entirely different environment. I found that despite French not being my "mother" language, I could communicate with people effectively as long as I didn't completely butcher the language and thereby hurt people's sensibilities. I would appear before military groups, as I mentioned, student groups, etc. I made a point of telling people as I met them that I would be delighted to appear at universities around the country. There are many student clubs in France; there are many political science clubs; France had an active network of "think-tanks"--smaller than what we have here in the US, but nevertheless very active. Pretty soon, invitations began to come in--more, in fact, than I could handle; after some initial appearances, the "grapevine" took over and people learned

that I would be available. The French loved meetings and were happy to discuss NATO strategy or US foreign policy or many other subjects with which I had some familiarity.

In my public appearances, I met the traditional French skepticism about US government policies and actions. Jimmy Carter was not terribly popular in Western Europe. The most controversial subject that I addressed was arms control because I usually met either with a student audience that wanted to ban all nuclear weapons or disarm unilaterally if not international agreement could be reached or a more *bourgeois* audience that felt that any efforts to limit arms were bound to fail and therefore the Western countries had no alternative but to continue the development of its weapon capacities; that audience was also often critical of the lack of US assistance to the French nuclear deterrent. So I was vigorously challenged by almost every audience that I addressed, I can't remember any unpleasant confrontation. It is, of course, not easy for an officer, particularly one of my rank, to be current on arms control strategy being discussed in Washington, but I did my best to remain current by reading French newspapers and a daily DOD publication called the "Yellow Bird," which included clippings from THE NEW YORK TIMES, the WASHINGTON POST and other leading American papers. I used to copy selected articles from that source and give them to my French contacts in the defense community. I also used the phone frequently to Washington; I am sure that I ran up a sizeable long-distance phone bill, talking to people in the State Department, DOD, ACDA and the NSC staff. The contacts I had made during my tour with Sonnenfeldt certainly came in handy then! Finally, I was very fortunate that about twice each year, I used to return to Washington for consultations; that was highly unusual for a mid-career officer. I have Leslie Gelb and Reg Bartholomew to thank for that process. They, as Directors of PM, thought that it was important that their people in the field--London, Paris, and Bonn--should be brought back to Washington for a few days of discussions and briefings about twice each year. These were very useful sessions because we could, in a face-to-face situation, bring our Washington counterparts up to date on European thinking and at the same time have the opportunity to hear about Washington's thoughts.

I had good contacts with our delegation to NATO, particularly Bob Brown, the POLAD to General Al Haig, the SACEUR. Haig knew and was very conscious of the approach that the French were taking towards NATO, which was different from that of all other European countries and needed special handling. Haig would come to Paris every three months on a private trip. He would spend a full day talking to the French General Staff about defense issues. There was minimal publicity about these trips, and I think it was a very useful technique. Brown might come a week or two earlier to set things up; he would read my files and talk to various Frenchmen. He would then prepare a lengthy briefing memo; but when Haig came, he came without the POLAD and only one military aide. These were very low key visits--no motorcade, no fanfare, no Embassy escort. But Haig would always see Hartman at the end of the visit for a debriefing of his meetings. If Hartman was not available, he would send his aide--usually Colonel Tony Smith--to debrief me and then I would brief the Ambassador. We didn't report to Washington about the Haig visits; there was nothing in Haig's conversations that contradicted US policy, but the fact of his visits was not widely known in Washington--the Secretaries of Defense and State and the NSC

Advisor knew--, which was as it should have been; wider knowledge might well have jeopardized further visits--by leaks to the media--or at least seriously hampered them. I know for a fact that Harold Brown, the DOD Secretary knew what Haig was doing and that he very likely received a briefing after each visit in a highly restricted channel. I think that the P/M Directors knew that Haig did make these forays, but they showed little interest. I think the Haig visits were invaluable. In the first place, it made NATO-France cooperation very easy. While I was in Paris, there were two operations in the Shaba region of Zaire which required participation of US airlift capability because in both cases, Westerners were in jeopardy. American aircraft carried French and Belgian troops into the area who restored order. Our participation was obviously useful for the French and the Belgians, but it was also useful to us. After the policy were set at governmental levels, the actual technical decisions were worked out by Haig and General Marit of the French General staff. The French sent three officers to Stuttgart, where our European command was located, to work out all the details. It was a very smooth operation. The same kind of operation took place when Westerners had to be evacuated from the Chad. The Haig-French connection was very useful to reach decisions on the practical details. The French used our aircraft for some of their African operations. That cooperative effort worked very smoothly.

I should note that just because France did not belong to the NATO integrated command did not make them irrelevant to the defense of Europe, if conflict should ever had broken out. So Haig was able to discuss with the French about possible scenarios and NATO and French reactions to various threats. Of course, no action could have been taken by either NATO or French military units without political approval, but at least the technical military details had already been a subject for discussion. This was not a re-integration of France into the NATO military command, but it lay out a framework for what NATO and France might do in case of confrontation. I think I should make it clear that the talks had the blessings of France's highest political authorities, like the President, and the Defense Minister, but I think that the French military were ahead of the many political leaders in understanding that if a European military crisis should ever arise, it was absolutely essential for the French and NATO to work together very closely. I think that France then and still today is only one of five countries in the world that sees itself as a global power. The US could talk to the Soviets--and the Russians now--, the Chinese, and the French about problems in any part of the world. They will all have a view. The Germans are still very Eurocentric; they have very little concern for events in the Pacific or Africa. The British have lost their empire and although they may be interested in affairs far away from their homeland islands, they have lost much influence east of Suez. The French aspirations are probably larger than their capacities, but they maintain a global view and still tries to remain a player in all corners of the world. Given that perception and since the Cold War was still on in the late 1970s, it made life in France for an American diplomat very interesting and sometimes very irritating since the French would try to be players in areas where they had absolutely no possibility of making a difference. They French never had any doubts that they could be influential; they might use different means than we might have, but they always thought that they could make a difference everywhere in the world.

The students were divided to some extent on the question of France's role in the world. Particularly among some leftist students, whom I got to know, there was a view that France was a very corrupt society and that France's policies in the Third World was primarily a commercial effort intended to line the pockets of French manufacturers, especially the arms producers, or French politicians. The word "corruption" included bribery of foreign and French officials which seemed to appear in the media periodically. The President of France, Giscard d'Estaing and his wife had accepted fifty large diamonds from Emperor Bokassa of Central Africa, which, after the story appeared, the d'Estaings said they intended to sell and give the proceeds to some charity. So there were a number of Frenchmen, young and old, who believed that corruption was rife. There was considerable support to what the French called *La Mission Civilatrice*--"the civilizing role of France"--the cultural leader and the developer of ideas. There was a significant French minority in France that viewed the "merchants of death" with great skepticism.

While on the subject of arms sales, I might say a couple of words about my role in the sale of US weapon systems. As I said, AWACs was our major possibility. I used to talk to members of the French General Staff and Air Force and parliamentarians, especially those who were members of the Defense Committees about that plane. The French were faced essentially with four choices of planes that would be able to survey large expanses. Since they saw themselves as a major force especially in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, the French did not seriously consider relying on any other nation to conduct the surveillance. They wanted "eyes and ears" to look out for long distances. One choice was to build one themselves, but the more they examined that option, the more problematical it became. They did have a domestically-produced limited capability, but its long range use was out of the question. If they wanted to buy into a long range surveillance capability, the French had three choices: the British-built Nimrod system, which was cheaper but inferior to the AWAC, an American system built by Grumman--the E-2 system--a naval system which had a longer range than the Nimrod, or the Boeing E3A-AWAC (Air warning and control command), which had the longest range of all and one that became the keystone of our own surveillance system. It played a major role in the Gulf and every major military operation in which the US was involved; it allows a commander to have information about what was happening on the ground and in the air 300-400 miles in the distance. I was not a high pressure salesman; I focused on the French desire to have a system and if they had reached that conclusion, then to suggest they might as well procure the best. I worked closely with Boeing's resident representative in Paris, who was a retired American Air Force General. We held a continuous dialogue with the French decision-makers and staffs. I did not get any urging from Washington; neither State or DOD seemed to be indifferent to the sale; certainly not as interested as Boeing or the US Air Force was, but on the other hand, Washington did not put any restraints on us. The sale would have encompassed four or five aircraft, which was not a major sale. In any case, in those days, the US government was not as involved in foreign military sales as it subsequently became and is now. In fact, during the Carter administration, there was considerable discussion and in fact some actions designed to reduce US sales.

I attended two Paris air shows. They are monumental; I would guess that a Paris air show is the biggest one in the world. It took place at Le Bourget airport outside of Paris; that was not an operational passenger airport; it was used primarily for cargo, although it had been the field that Lindbergh had used in his first transatlantic flight in 1927. But the airport was large enough to accommodate the 400-600 aircraft that out on exhibit at the air show. Then there were thousands of exhibitors who set up displays; ever aerospace company in the world would show its latest wares. Some just had small areas consisting primarily of desks and perhaps photographs of their products; others had "chalets" which were substantial structures--looking something like town houses-- one next to another stretching along runways. Each chalet would have a big room with lost of comfortable chairs, with a well stocked bar. Some had a first class restaurant which served excellent meals. All these features were intended, of course, to attract potential buyers; they would be served food and drink and given sales pitches with videos or in some cases by giving them a first hand look at the product which might well be parked right outside the house. Each chalet had a huge observation deck--usually in the roof--which enabled people to see the actual aircraft perform periodically, as it did throughout the day. You could watch fighter aircraft performing stunts, or the *Concorde* or a Soviet TU-144. Every company was trying to show the maximum capability of its aircraft, which unfortunately led to a number of serious accidents. In my first show, in 1977, Fairchild introduced the A-10 plane--called the "Warhog"--which was a very powerful anti-tank platform. The first A-10 took off and the pilot attempted to make a loop. He got up perhaps as high as 600 feet, made a loop, but as he was approaching land, ran out of room and crashed, nose first, into the runway. The pilot was killed and the plane destroyed. The Soviets had a crash when their TU-144--their supersonic transport--stalled when it went into a climb and fell to earth. The French continued to tighten the rules with every show to minimize the chances for crashes by prohibiting the pilots from exceeding the minimum safety standards for their aircraft. But the test pilots were paid large bonuses by the manufacturers to push their planes to the limit in order to try to impress potential buyers. A transport aircraft, like the TU-144, should never go into a vertical climb; it is not needed in regular operations and the plane is not built for that purpose. Vertical climbs are reserved for fighter aircraft. Similarly, an A-10 should not do a loop-the-loop on take off; so many of the crashes were caused by pilots who abused their aircraft. In any case, there were lots of aircraft on display at the Paris Air Show. The "Harrier" was always a big hit with its capacity to take off straight up, flying backwards, flying forwards, flying sideways. It was a great show with lots of new innovations put on display and lots of souvenirs. It was a great bazaar.

Both times I attended the Paris Air show, it was as an escorted officer for an American Congressional delegation. The show itself lasted about ten days; I would guess that for 80% of that time we would have in Paris a Congressional delegation performing the taxpayers' business which was to observe how the world's aircraft industry was doing. Since I was the Pol-Mil officer, I was always the designated escort officer for the Armed Services Committees of both the House and the Senate. I got to know a number of Members of Congress that way. We would go out to the Air show, visit the various American exhibitors and the visit foreigner producers such as the Israelis. One time, Mel Price, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, decided that he wanted to see what the Soviets were

showing. So we went to their chalet and I explained to the greeter that I had the American Armed Services Committee in tow. That created a major uproar in the chalet; the Soviets finally decided to deny the Congressmen access to their chalet. It was a stupid reaction on their part; obviously they were not displaying any secret weapons, but in the heat of the "Cold War" their bureaucratic minds could not think of word but "Nyet". In the evening, I would escort the Congressmen and their spouses and their staffs to restaurants or receptions given by each of the major exhibitors. Those receptions had food and drink of all sorts available in copious portions.

The uniformed American military were not at the show pushing American wares; the Carter administration frowned on such activities; in fact they were barred from participating in any way. There were many American military civilian clothes, most from the intelligence services taking notes and pictures of the competition. They were invited to the receptions and enjoyed the bounties available there. But the military services refrained from becoming part of the sales efforts. Other military services were much more active; the French, for example, had a huge military presence, in part because this was their home turf. The French drew no distinction between government and private sector efforts; to them, every Frenchman should be involved in sales efforts. Of course, in the case of most other countries, each only had one major defense producer in each sector; we on the other hand had multiple producers of fighter aircraft; so we couldn't endorse just one American manufacturer. The Germans were very active in supporting the sales of their products as were the British, the Soviets, the Chinese, the Italians and most of the other Europeans as well. If you were a buyer from a country that was in the market seriously, you would be wined and dined for days on end. Many of the buyers were Europeans; during my first Air show, the raging question was which new generation of fighter aircraft would meet the needs of five European countries--the F-16 from General Dynamics or the Mirage F-1 from Dassault or the F-15 from McDonald Douglas. So in this case, Europeans were both potential buyers and potential suppliers. Then, of course, there were a number of Third World countries in the arms market as well as Asian ones. Not all were looking for major new weapons systems; some were just interested in parts or avionics or commercial products.

I might say a word about my involvement in arms control issues. As I said earlier, I was on the phone with my Washington contacts frequently. The French felt that there was a chance that we would enter into an arms control agreement with the Soviets which would reduce our ability to defend Europe. Of course, it was somewhat paradoxical for the French to exhibit this concern because they were the major proponents of an independent nuclear deterrent. On the other hand, they also wanted us to be strong enough to defend Europe if necessary. Sophisticated French military analysts and politicians realized that a realistic defense of Europe against a Warsaw Pact attack without the US was impossible. So they wanted us to be involved and they were apprehensive that we would lose that capacity somehow in the negotiations with the Soviets. That fear was never realized, but the French, with their time honored skepticism, were always concerned. They were also concerned that we might sign an agreement that would directly impact on their military capability, conventional or nuclear.

The arms control field was my major substantive concern. I was one of the channels to the French Foreign Office on arms control matters. The French were every active in Washington and had developed a good network there. Furthermore, I doubt that a month went by without a visit to Paris by a delegation from the American government--ACDA or Paul Warnke, our chief SALT negotiator in Geneva or Ralph Earle. And the French would visit Washington often. This constant interchange enabled me to really stay up to date on all the discussion, both intra-and inter-governmental and in Geneva--in the arms control field. A lot of my colleagues complained by the heavy traffic of people--to much time had to be devoted to the visitors--, but I found it very useful. I attempted to accompany as many of the visitors as I could when they met with their French counterparts. I interpreted for Harold Brown, the Secretary of Defense, when he came to Paris. These meetings and visit enabled me to stay current on all developments. Just meeting and delivering people at the airport was useful because that is when I picked up a lot of "background" information--useful tidbits of gossip; that also happened at other informal moments--lunch or after-dinner drinks. So I was really up-to-date on what was going in the arms control field. The visitors were a valuable resources. Once the French developed some confidence in my knowledge and my ability to accurately describe an American position or actions, that gave me credibility and much greater access to the French policy makers in the arms control field. The ability to have this constant flow of information from a variety of American sources was invaluable to me.

In 1978, the UN had a special session on disarmament, which, like most UN special sessions, didn't have much impact. But Giscard d'Estaing, the President of France, went to New York to give a speech. Like all Presidents he felt he had to something new. So he called for a "Conference on Disarmament in Europe"--an idea that the Soviets had been pushing for years and we had rejected many times. I had heard about six hours before the speech that d'Estaing would be including his suggestion in his speech. He made a number of other proposals, including one that would have internationalized photo reconnaissance--at the time, only we and the Soviets had that capability; the idea was that the pictures would be given to a UN agency. Of course, the availability of these photos would have saved the French billion of dollars because they would not have needed to set up their own surveillance system. That proposal was very attractive to the Third World who would have dearly loved to have access to the information that the satellites found. In any case, I was able to give Washington a few hours' lead on d'Estaing's speech; that gave the administration's spokespeople time to prepare responses particularly to some of d'Estaing's more provocative ideas. I think that is a useful role that a Foreign Service officer can play; i.e. give some warning to Washington of upcoming events so that the government will not be caught flatfooted and give some spur-of-the-moment reply, which too often just creates more problems. In this case, the brief period of notice suggested to me that the Foreign Office had probably sent over a very bland draft and that the major initiatives that were included in the final speech probably came from the President and his staff--as happens in most countries. So there was probably only a small group of four or five people close to d'Estaing who knew what was going to be in the final text. In retrospect, I take some pride that these officials knew me well enough and have sufficient confidence in me to give me

as much advance notice as they did. In fact, the final text was not approved by the President until his flight on a Concorde plane across the Atlantic the day before; the information I passed to Washington was red off the presses. In France, the President plays a major role in defining his country's role on defense issues. De Gaulle, when he set up the Fifth Republic, saw to it that the President would have a very strong role in defense and foreign policy. The French bureaucracy may not stray very far from well established positions, but French Presidents may and have.

d'Estaing's speech confronted us with a new dilemma. The Soviets supported the French, we opposed them and the Europeans split. Eventually, the Conference did meet and, after fifteen years, adopted a treaty on limiting conventional forces in Europe. In any case, the French President's speech opened up old and new areas for debate.

Another event that comes to mind was Secretary Vance's trip to Moscow in March 1977. This was his first trip to the Soviet Union. During his visit, he introduced some arms proposals which were quite different from what we had been saying to that time. On his way back, Vance stopped in Paris, Bonn and London to brief those governments. Vance and his party were in Paris for approximately twenty-four hours. I went to the meetings with the party at the Foreign Office and heard our views, some of which had been seriously criticized by the American press for not having been sufficiently vetted. By and large, I didn't have any serious reservations about the new proposals, although I felt that they needed to be fleshed out further. I believed then and do now that arms control, if seriously negotiated, can produce a more stable world. There are a number of ways of achieving worthwhile goals, but I did view some of the efforts of the Carter administration as feckless. I was particularly concerned by the Conventional Arms Transfer talks which were started in 1978. In fact, those talks never resolved any of the issues; some people described them as being too ambitious. The goal of setting limits on the flow of conventional weapons around the world is in principal a worthwhile one, but achieving it is a monumental task. Even with the Carter administration, there were opposing views giving rise to the undercutting of our negotiator, Les Gelb, by Zbig Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor. We did not put a very good showing in those talks. I attended those meetings that took place in Paris as the note-taker.

Carter came to Paris in January, 1978 for about three days. His visit raised another hot issue between us and the French--the control of nuclear exports. I have already mentioned the issue; it was very key question for the French because while I was still in Paris, they were having talks with the Pakistanis, the Iraqis and to some extent even with South Korea and the Argentine on possible sales of parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Occasionally, we and the French disagreed on the wisdom of certain sales which led to some fairly harsh exchanges. Carter had lectured Giscard d'Estaing as well as Helmut Schmidt about nuclear exports. Neither found that tact very appealing and certainly did not enhance their willingness to cooperate with the US. I must say, however, that the French got over the Carter lecture and cooperated with us pretty effectively. Of course, many of the disagreements we had with the French stemmed from their much more cynical view of the world; that made a dialogue particularly with Carter especially difficult.

Finally, I should mention the tremendous difference in the interest in pol-mil issues exhibited by Ambassadors Rush and Hartman. Rush was very superficial; I don't know whether that was due to the aging process or because he didn't seem to have great interest in the subject, although as former CEO of a major company, Secretary of Defense, etc. would suggest that he certainly had the necessary background to understand the issues and show some interest in them. But during the eight months during which we overlapped, he was very cordial to me, but took very little interest in pol-mil issues--or I might say, any issues. The DCM did almost all of the substantive work; Rush was socially engaged which generated a huge amount of work for the Embassy staff. We used to have to prepare huge briefing books for his trips around the country, regardless of the size of the cities he would visit; we also had to provide a biographic paragraph on each guest who might be invited to a reception, some of which were humongous. So the Embassy was saddled with a lot of work for very little useful purpose. I think Rush was just very superficial. Hartman, on the other hand, was a professional--a very smart man comfortable discussing the issues. He was very interested in pol-mil matters. He had been instrumental, as I mentioned, in my assignment to Paris. So I saw him very frequently; in fact, I was surprised that he was as patient with me as he was. The change in DCMs--from Gammon to Chris Chapman--and in Political Ministers--from Cohen to Warren Zimmermann--also made a tremendous difference. Chris was very interested in pol-mil issues, having just come from the Pol-Mil Bureau. I had been given permission to authorize my own telegrams, which I did in the main except for exchanges of a controversial or potentially controversial nature. Those I would discuss with Hank and Sam. I had started this practice soon after my arrival, not as a matter of principle, but because I had enough confidence that I knew the subject matter well enough that I could be expected to represent the Embassy's views accurately. But it was an unusual arrangement for someone below section chief to sign out his or her own telegrams on his behalf. But I was lucky that I worked for good people who gave me lot of room to do my job, just as Sonnenfeldt had done.

But Chris found this practice hard to accept; so very morning he would call me into his office to discuss the previous day's traffic that I had signed out. He would examine my messages minutely and ask a lot of questions; that was in the nature of a tutorial for me. Ultimately, he was satisfied that I knew my business and that I could be relied upon to send good messages, but it took him a while to accept that. Zimmermann had no problem with that arrangement even though he didn't know me very well when he arrived at post. I must say that I was somewhat suspicious when he arrived, but I learned that he was a very able and intelligent officer and I think he found me to be a good officer.

Among many other actions, the Carter administration decided to save money by requiring the lowering of all thermostats in government buildings. In Paris, we were all freezing in our offices. But Hartman had in his office a large fire place, stocked amply with firewood. He would have a fire going during the cheerless, murky Paris winter days. I knew him well enough so that one day I took my in-box from my office and without asking anyone's permission, I went into the Ambassador's office. Hartman was at his desk, working away. I went to the easy chair in front of the fire and sat down. Art said: "Good afternoon, John.

What can I do for you". I replied: "Good afternoon, Mr. Ambassador. I hope you don't mind if I do my work here in your office in front of the fireplace until we get some more heat in our offices. The secretaries are trying to type with their gloves on, the officers have their coats on and everybody is miserable, except perhaps you". That prompted immediate action; Hartman called the Administrative Counselor to talk about the working conditions in the Embassy. He did not scream at me or throw me out of the office, as he might well have. But the temperature was raised. I must say that in retrospect that was not a very judicious action on my part; I probably should have been immediately transferred to sub-Saharan Africa. I am now a little ashamed for my behavior. Fortunately, no one else found out about my behavior; I realized that evening how brazen I had been and refrained from telling any one else about it. My action perhaps can be partly justified because during my first year in Paris, my marriage broke up and I went through a prolonged period of depression, during which I did some zany things. For example, at one point, I decided that the world was filled with false appearances and duplicity and that I was going to help change that by always being truthful. That led me to many social *faux pas*; if some lady asked me how I liked her hair do, I might have told her that it was awful. That "honesty" not only did not change the world, but led me to several unpleasant encounters. I also refused to wear a tuxedo to some formal engagements; Hartman was very tolerable and allowed me to attend in a suit, after I had told him that I had given up "black tie" for life as a matter of principle. I must say that in retrospect, I am amazed by the patience and forgiveness shown by my seniors; they were also much more charitable about my work than I thought I deserved. Hartman, Gammon and Cohen were very supportive in these very trying days; fortunately, after a period, I began to recover and returned to a more normal behavior, including the wearing of tuxedos. Perhaps the most amazing part of the story was that despite this very personally emotional period for me, my efficiency ratings were good enough to warrant a promotion in 1979. I was very fortunate to work for such able and understanding professionals.

Overall, I think I did a good job in Paris after the first year or so. In the first place, as I suggested, I had some very good bosses. Secondly, I got out of the Embassy often; I made a lot of friends among journalists, defense analysts and French uniformed personnel. None of that would have been possible if I had stayed in by office in the Embassy. That is a lesson that I believe all young officers need to learn: get out of your office, particularly those, who like myself, might be responsible for a single substantive area; I handled pol-mil work by myself and therefore seldomly had to clear messages laterally with colleagues in the Embassy. My Paris experience was entirely different from the one I had experienced in Ankara, where I was a member of a pol-mil section and where my boss did in fact discourage me from having contacts with Turkish authorities and people.

I should mention another aspect of the Paris assignment which had some relationship to counter-terrorism. This was an activity which started by chance. In September, 1976--a month after my arrival--a TWA plane was hijacked as it flew from New York to Paris, via Montreal, Gander and Reykjavik. It was hijacked by a gang of Ustashis--the old fascist Croatian gang which had become infamous during WW II. They were American citizens of Croat descent; they were making supporting an independent Croatia. After the plane had

been hijacked--and that happened essentially before the plane really took off--the gang told New York authorities that they had left a note in a Grand Central station locker. When a policeman opened the locker, a bomb which had been planted inside, exploded and killed him. So the everyone was on notice that this was a deadly group that had to be dealt with--as I learned later, there is a difference between hijackers that have killed and those who have only made threats. In any case, I happened to be the duty officer at the Embassy the weekend of this hijacking. After it had refueled in Iceland, it became clear that the plane was heading for Paris. As you can well imagine, the eighteen hours of this episode was one of great tension; the hijackers finally surrendered after prolonged negotiations. I have described my role that weekend in some detail in a Georgetown University publication entitled "Diplomats and Terrorists: What Works and What Doesn't". What I did, after receiving the first call from Washington, is described in that book.

I mention this episode because during this weekend it became clear to me that no one in the Embassy--and that included the CIA, FBI and FAA components--knew much about French counter-terrorist capabilities and how they went about handling terrorist incidents. A few days after the hijackers surrendered in Paris, I decided that we had not been able to answer with any great specificity the questions that Washington kept posing to us during that weekend when we had an open telephone line with the Department, which kept asking about French capabilities, intentions and operational methods. At one stage, a psychiatrist got one the phone from Washington urging me to tell the French to treat the hijackers gently so that they would not get upset and potentially take it out on the passengers. So I took upon myself to find out more about French anti-terrorist doctrine, capacities and approaches. Through a French friend, who was a writer on defense issues, I was put in touch with the *Groupe d'intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN)*, which was an organization comparable to our DELTA Force. I asked whether I could visit their base and they were delighted to host me. They told me that over the preceding years, they had tried to contact the American government to exchange information and to try to acquire American weapons so that they could train their men on as many weapons as they could; this would help them to know the kind of capability that any adversary might have. For example, this French force had no M-16s, which are the basic weapon of an American infantry unit. They said that no one in the Embassy or in the US government had shown the slightest bit of interest in their approaches. This special unit was run by a young French Captain who later became famous and infamous. In light of their evident interest, I arranged another visit for one of Colonels from the Defense Attaché Office and a representative of one of our intelligence agencies. Over the course of the following years, this relationship grew; I and others visited this French force frequently and did members of our Delta force. Once having built this bridge, I sort of eased out of it since other members of the US government, much more involved in anti-terrorism, maintained the contact with the French. I did help them get 5 M-16s and some other American weapons, through the US government's licensing process.

There were two results from that purely coincidental connection. One was that a relationship between US and French anti-terrorist forces developed. secondly, because of my efforts, the word seemed to get around in the Embassy that I was a terrorist expert. So I

got invited to meetings on the subject, although there were very few people at the time that were real experts. I learned a few things which stood me in good stead later on.

Q: In 1980, you were assigned to the Executive Secretariat. Was a Washington assignment at your request?

KELLY: Yes, it was. My assignment came about in a somewhat unusual way. Every year, we and the French had policy talks, alternating between Washington and Paris. The participants were essential members of the Department's Policy Planning staff and its French counterpart. I had attended a couple of these meetings when working for Sonnenfeldt. When I got to Paris, found that no one in the Embassy wanted to be involved because the Embassy's representative was essentially a note-taker and responsible for all the logistics. I took the job, because it got me involved in some important discussions and those were my favorite assignments. Peter Tarnoff, then the Executive Secretary of the Department, always attended the policy planning talks in Paris. It was a sort of homecoming for him since he had studied at the *Ecole Nationale de la Administration (ENA)*--the first American Foreign Service Officer to ever attend. *ENA* of course is the premier graduate school for French government officials. Tony Lake, then the head of S/PC and now the National Security Advisor, also came. So I got to know Tarnoff and Lake. On one of the trips, Peter asked me when my Paris tour would be over and what did I want to do. I told him that I wanted to return to Washington and that I would like to work in the Secretariat. And that is what happened, although I also had an opportunity to work in PM. My years in S/S were very useful and I learned a few more things about how Washington really operated. Tarnoff and Bremer, Peter's deputy, offered me the job as Director of the Secretariat Staff while I was back in Washington around Christmas, 1979.

When I started in S/S in June, 1980, Muskie had just become the Secretary of State. I had hardly gotten off the plane when Tarnoff and Bremer told me that my first project was to support the Carter's and Muskie's trips to Venice for the G-7 meetings which were to begin a week later. I was to be the Department's action officer. I told them that I would be plunged into that maelstrom so soon, I might have gone to PM instead. I knew nothing about what was involved, but they told me to just to do what seemed rationale. In fact, it was my office's responsibility to support the Secretary in his overseas trips. So I and some members of my staff went to Venice. I knew a little about Presidential trips from my experiences with the Lyndon Johnson South-Asia tour, but that had been many years earlier and Presidential trips are a little different from Secretarial ones. But fortunately, in a swim-or-sink situation, I somehow managed to stay afloat and learned something about what it takes to support a Secretary when he travels overseas.

We were responsible for making sure that all material that a Secretary might need was available and that the briefing papers were available, correct and short when needed. We handled all communications to and from the party, assigning action to various officials accompanying the Secretary and making sure that action was taken; on outgoing messages, we reviewed for clearances and clarity. We would also be the note takers for any meetings

that the Secretary might hold. In other words, we did almost all that a Secretariat does in Washington for the Secretary of State.

By June, 1980, the White House staff was by now well coordinated; they knew what each member was supposed to do on Presidential trips and how they did them. But as in most Presidential trips, there was some friction between the White House and the Secretariat staffs. In the Venice case, Muskie was brand new--this being only his second overseas trip as Secretary and his first as part of a Presidential delegation. Many of Muskie's immediate staff, who had joined him in the Department after working for him in Congress, were new to the Department; they really didn't know what they wanted for the Secretary, except that they didn't want him outshined by any other Cabinet officer. Of course, 1980 was a campaign year; so the White House staff had that very much in mind. The staff had decided to hire an efficiency expert--only White House staffs why they do such things. He was from the private sector--a Mr. Alonzo McDonald. In the week before departure for Venice, McDonald held daily meetings at the White House on travel "efficiency". He had never worked for the government, to my knowledge, nor had ever been on a Presidential trip and didn't have the slightest idea how it worked. But he did lecture us on "efficiency". So the trip included its usual measure of friction and chaos, but in the end, all the briefing papers were ready, everybody got on the right planes and arrived in Venice. First we stopped in Rome for a couple of days for a State visit which included an audience with the Pope. Someone very generously included me in that audience and had my picture taken as "a nice Catholic boy from Georgia". I even had a tour of the city at 2 a.m. given to me by the Ambassador's secretary who had worked for me in Thailand. It was a two hour tour and I saw Rome as few others have. I much preferred that to any sleep I might have had.

Then it was off to Venice for two or three days. This was during the period when the "Red Brigade" was a major factor in Italy. The Italians were terrified that there would be some incident and that one of the participants in this summit would be a target. They essentially cleaned Venice out; certainly all tourists were bared and I think many of the residents were also ask to take a vacation elsewhere. So that beautiful city looked very strange without people in the streets, piazzas and canals. Of course, Venice presented a special challenge to the trip planners because all the motorcades had to be "boatcades"--movement around Venice is by boat. So the issues revolved around how many boats were needed and who would get into which one. But all worked out in the final analysis. In Venice, I met an old friend, Freck Vreeland, who was stationed with the Embassy in Rome but detailed to Venice to help our delegation. His wife was an architectural student and she was in Venice as well. One evening, Muskie told us to take the evening off and to take his boat for a tour of the city.

After the Venice meeting, Muskie went to Ankara for the NATO Ministerial and Australia for the ANZUS Ministerial. But I stayed with President Carter who went to Belgrade, Madrid and Lisbon. David Newsom, then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, stayed with the President as the senior State official. So I stayed with the Presidential party to support Newsom and the White House. Ray Seitz went with Muskie.

As with all Presidential trips, one has some bizarre experiences. We arrived in Belgrade a few months after Tito's death. Carter had been widely criticized at home and abroad for not attending Tito's funeral. So this was in a way, Carter's "make up" visit. The big question was whether Yugoslavia would remain as one country. We now know what the answer was, but it wasn't totally clear in 1980, despite the consensus among political analysts that the break-up would occur in the very near future. Carter's purpose was to show American interest in Yugoslavia and all the different ethnic and geographic entities were trying to impress Carter with their earnest interest in maintain a united Yugoslavia after Tito. The briefings books for Carter were very good. Larry Eagleburger was our Ambassador in Belgrade and he of course was on top of all substantive issues. So all I had to worry about were the logistic details. The White House staff, whom I knew relatively well by that time, suggested that I'd be given access to the White House communication system so that they could talk to me. They also invited me to go with them to various meetings and functions, which I had not planned to attend. They treated me as a member of their team, although it would have been better for me to have been left out of the social occasions so that I could handle the continuous flow of cable traffic. I remember particularly the big State dinner that the Yugoslavs hosted. I was a last minute addition and sat at the edge of the dining room. When dinner was over, everyone else rushed back to the motorcade; I couldn't get out in time and missed it. But some Yugoslav official took pity on me and directed me to one of the guards. He proceeded to put me in the front seat of a large Mercedes, sitting with us with his Tommy gun at ready. The driver took off at frightening speed with siren going and red lights flashing. I assumed that he was trying to catch up to the motorcade, but soon it became clear to me, although I knew nothing about the geography of Belgrade, that we were leaving the city. I couldn't communicate with my escort because we didn't speak a common language. We drive for about twenty minutes into one of the mountains that surrounds Belgrade. The driver never let up on the gas pedal, despite the fact that we were driving on narrow mountain roads. We finally arrived at a restaurant somewhere up in that mountain. There, much to my surprise and I assume their, I saw Zbig Brzezinski and some of his the White House press corps friends. He was hosting them at a late night supper. Brzezinski heard the screeching of tires and when he saw me getting out of the Mercedes, wondered what I was doing there. I told him the story and someone kindly then told the driver and the guard where I really wanted to go and they took me to the hotel. When I got back to the hotel and my temporary office, I was awaited by thirty messages from Washington; I am sure that my callers wondered where I was goofing off when they had "important" business to transact. I had been absent for about four hours and had to detail my whereabouts during this period to all of them. Those are the memories one has of Presidential trips.

We stopped in Madrid for twenty-four hours. Baggage call--i.e. when you are supposed to put your baggage outside our room for security check and pick up--was very early in the morning. I had gone to bed rather late because of work and I had put my bag outside the door before going to sleep. I woke up early in the morning and went through the telegrams received during the night. Unfortunately, as I was getting dressed, I noticed that I had packed all my socks. My suit was pressed, my shirt was fresh, my shoes were shined, but no socks! It is kind of strange to be in the Presidential party with naked ankles. I went to see

the concierge and tried to explain to him my dilemma. He didn't have any socks and all the stores in Madrid were still closed. I asked a Secret Service guy to call the airport to see whether my suitcase could be found and opened to retrieve a pair of socks. Pretty soon my plight became widely known, Jody Powell, Carter's press spokesman, heard of my troubles and got a laugh out of it. He attributed my "oversight" to the fact that I was a Georgian who are known to dislike socks and shoes. But I was feeling quite foolish; there was going to be a large farewell ceremony hosted by the King. Jody suggested that I take a black magic marker and color my ankles black so that oversight would not be as noticeable. But that was too much for me and I boarded Air Force 1 without socks. The Secret Service had not opened my suitcase and gotten me my socks. I was the object of much joking on the plane. I attended the arrival ceremony without socks, but the first thing I did in Lisbon was to go to a store and buy myself a pair of black socks. Ever since then, I have made it a practice always to carry a spare set of socks in my briefcase!

Muskie was a great guy to travel with; he was always solicitous of the staff even after, as all Secretaries are prone to do, blowing off at one or all of us for some perceived stupidity. One other night in Venice, he and Mrs Muskie took all of the State support staff--10-12--out to dinner, paying for it out of his own pocket. Muskie also played poker on flights; he was a high stakes player and if he had won big from some junior officers, Mrs. Muskie used to make him give his winning back at the end of the flight. I mention the exceptions to the normal 20 hours per day routine; Secretarial trips are a lot of work for support staffs. But at that age, I could take it and didn't mind the grind.

I also had a chance to travel with Haig after he became Secretary of State in 1981. He was a very different personality from Muskie, but the support process was pretty much the same. We didn't have to change our procedures a great deal to support Haig. By this time, I had been promoted to Deputy Executive Secretary, replacing Bremer who became Executive Secretary. I went with Haig to the NATO Ministerial meeting in Rome in May, 1981. By that time, Haig had already traveled overseas frequently. That was the principal reason I went to Rome; we had to divide the Secretariat's work and the Director of the Secretariat's Staff had done more than his share of traveling as had his deputies.

Presidential trips are crazy. When we left Lisbon to return to Andrews Air Force base, everyone on board was exhausted. We had just finished ten grueling days, working days and nights--little sleep, working on adrenaline mostly. So you board the plane and slump into a seat hoping for a small opportunity to recharge. All the seats on Air Force One are nice--plenty of leg room, soft, etc. The steward comes by and offers you a drink and you begin to unwind. Then the President's secretary, Susan Clough, came back and told me that the President wanted to review his "thank you" notes. Among my other duties, I was also the custodian of the Presidential "thank you" letters. On this trip, I believe that there were 124 of them. It was at that moment that I first realized that Jimmy Carter took these notes seriously. So for the rest of the trip--roughly 6 ½ hours--he went over the letters; I had absolutely no rest. I would pass each letter to the front cabin; it would be sent back out to me after Carter had reviewed; many were filled with notes such as "this is poorly drafted", etc. I remember one letter to a Chief of State who had given the President a statue of what

appeared to me to be a deer. So the letter had thanked the Chief of State for the gift of a "deer statue". Carter personally came out of his cabin to tell me that was not a deer, but a stag! So the letter was retyped and in those days, retyping was a laborious process and real work. For a staff member of a Presidential trip, there is no end of tasks: mostly petty--only occasionally significant.

Haig was very disciplined and that made supporting him much easier. It was easy to attract his attention to any issues because he was always interested in everything that went on. He was well organized and had a personal staff that was very competent. Those factors have not always been present. I remember Charlie Hill, who was Shultz' Executive Assistant telling a group of ambassadors that to attract the Secretary's attention was to tell him something he didn't know, but that was of interest to him and would gratify him. My experience with Shultz was that the only news that fell in that category was when I told him that the French Foreign Minister had resigned.

Muskie was a person who treated all memoranda equally; that I think came from habits that he picked up in a lifetime as a Member of Congress. There you have to handle a ton of issues every day and your staff tells you how to vote because you just don't have the time to consider most of the issues. I think many Members of Congress, if not all, frequently vote on the floor without the slightest idea what they were voting on. So Muskie learned to follow staff advice religiously. I knew how to get Kissinger's attention; once I sent a telegram--under instructions-- which started with the proviso: "Eyes only for Sonnenfeldt. Under no circumstances may this telegram be distributed to Secretary Kissinger". As we knew, ten minutes later it was on Kissinger's desk; we had put that proviso on the telegram to make sure that Kissinger would get it and read it. So how to attract a Secretary's attention varied with the individual. The Executive Secretariat could send all sorts of papers to a Secretary, but what he actually will read will vary from person to person. Jim Baker probably read 150 telegrams each day; he would read anything you sent to him; he was a vacuum cleaner. He read rapidly and was interested in many things. He would continually astound me by asking me whether a certain ambassador was doing a good job, even those in far flung places. When I asked why he had asked, he would tell me that he had recently read a telegram from that ambassador which had raised a question in his mind.

Shultz used to tell people that he read perhaps a dozen telegram each day. After a while, a good Secretariat learns what the traffic will bear. I must say that I never worried about attracting a Secretary's attention; I was more worried about the next echelon. I don't think that ambassadors need to worry about attracting a Secretary's attention, except in the most unusual situation when matters of war and peace or a the saving of a human life might be at stake. If you can get an assistant secretary's attention or a deputy assistant secretary, you will most likely find someone who has enough sense to alert his bosses. An ambassador should not worry about whose attention he or she draws; he or she should only worry about getting the issue of immediate concern dealt with effectively. I have seen Executive Secretaries who were very good at alerting Secretaries about upcoming issues and then I have seen others who did not so an adequate job as far as I was concerned. I think it is the role of the Secretariat to alert the Secretaries and his deputies both on the progress of issues

in which they have already engaged and in issues that may or should reach them soon. Usually, the classification of a cable or the "slug" lines will not do the trick; you must know your customer and frame your argument or report in such a way that you know will attract the Secretary's attention. At a lower level, the opportunity I had in Paris to come to the US about twice each year was very helpful as was the availability of a phone that I used almost daily to talk to Washington.

During my tour in the Secretariat, I also went with Bill Clark, the Deputy Secretary, to South Africa; that was a fascinating trip from a substantive point of view. When the Deputy Secretary travels, that is different from other trips--the Deputy doesn't have all the support that the Secretary or the President has. The South African trip was the first overseas trip that Clark had taken in his new post. The South Africans believed that since the conservatives had won the election in the US, it would exhibit a much more understanding of their policy of *apartheid* than its predecessor--or as they described it: "their embattled position". As it turned out, that was not to be, which was one of the reasons which made the Clark trip so interesting. Chet Crocker was with the delegation, having been sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State just one hour before we took off. His confirmation had been held up by the Senate for an extended period. We flew on an Air Force C-135. Elliott Abrams, then the Assistant Secretary for International Relations was with us as well as some people from L and AF. It was a difficult trip, substantively; it was also a long trip because we had to fly 20 hours to get to Cape Town. As soon as we landed, we were put in cars and driven into the city. That route took us past "Crossroads"--a large slum area, populated exclusively by blacks of course. Half of it was on fire because the government had brought in bull-dozers to knock down the shanties that had grown up like weeds all over the area. The people who had lived there were to be shipped off to their "homelands". Some of the shanties and other structures began to burn. It was an unbelievable sight--smoke drifting in the air, fires burning everywhere, black homeless people standing forlornly with their few possessions surrounded by government troops. Although it took as only a few minutes to drive by, the sights were unforgettable. It was "Welcome to South Africa". I was not in the car with Secretary Clark, but I was certainly moved by the sights and I am sure that all who saw were affected. I had grown up in Georgia under segregation and I had expected to see something like I had seen in my youth. But I quickly found out that *apartheid* and segregation were two entirely different processes; South Africa was much more aggressive in its racist policies than the South was.

We had dinner with some South African officials that evening and the next day Judge Clark met with P. K. Botha, the President and the Foreign Minister. In fact, the South African welcomed Judge Clark and said that they now hoped they would not be dealing with an unfriendly government any longer. They expected the Reagan administration now to support them or at least not publicly oppose them. They invited Clark to tour the country, leaving in about an hour; it was clear that they had high expectations for this visit. Clark answered that he appreciated their offer of a tour, but that he had made other appointments for the afternoon, mostly with black and colored leaders, like Bishop Tutu. Botha then said that those appointments had been canceled. Clark, to his unending credit, said that he intended to keep those appointments and that he had no intention of going on a tour. And

that is exactly what happened. Clark, as a former judge, asked one of his South African interlocutors about *habeas corpus* in South Africa. He was told that it did not exist. So he learned quickly that there was no *habeas corpus* or due process and a lot of other rights that we take for granted.

From South Africa, we went to Namibia and Zimbabwe. Clark came back and reported to the Secretary and the President that the South African system was just not acceptable, particularly to country like the US that firmly believed in the Bill of Rights. He recommended that we should be very careful about how we dealt with South Africa and that under no circumstances should we be supporting the South African *apartheid* policy--or even be perceived as doing so. Since Clark was an old friend of Reagan's from California days, his comments carried considerable weight. So I think the trip became every important. Chet Crocker was very good in introducing Clark to the South African problem and the trip was probably useful in further stimulating Chet in the development of his South African strategy, which he had initially outlined in an article in "Foreign Affairs". But I am no sure that Reagan and Clark had necessarily accepted the Crocker thesis until after the trip. I assume that both the President and the Deputy Secretary might have believed that the Carter administration had been unduly harsh on South Africa and that the US should take into consideration South Africa's strategic and economic importance in its policy towards that country.

I assume that the results were disappointing to the South Africans whose expectations were quite different from the results. Interestingly enough, do not believe that Namibia would have been settled without Chet Crocker and that Crocker could not have had the support he did have without Clark's support and his strong belief in the principles of "justice under the law" which prevented him from falling under the spell of the South Africans.

Q: You stayed in the Secretariat for one year. Why was it just such a short tour?

KELLY: In March 1981, my former wife called. She had been assigned custody of our son following our divorce. She said whether I could take custody of our son; I readily accepted. That required an immediate change in my working pattern; I could not be an adequate parent to a fifteen year old and be absent from home as much as I was. As I indicated, the working days were very long and I traveled frequently. We stayed in the building long after the Secretary and the other principals went home, making sure that the last piece of paper had been processed. We did not allow any back-log to build up; no memorandum ever stayed in the Secretariat overnight without some kind of action having been taken on it. That was true of all action telegrams which required the concurrence or approval of a Seventh Floor principal; they were also given out by the end of the day. The system by the end of the day was clean; not a piece of action was left undone. That was a lot of work that required me to be in the office by 7 a.m. and to stay there till 8 or 8:30 p.m. Sometimes it would be 10:30 p.m. before we could close up; Friday nights were the worst because it seem that all the bureaucrats in Washington leave everything till Friday afternoon before sending it for action to the Seventh Floor.

I concluded after this year in the Secretariat that in general the paper processing system of the Department worked well. It had two major problems. Many of my thoughts were expressed to the transition cy that were established after Reagan's victory and the advent of a new administration in 1981. One problem was that too many papers were too long. The principal just did not have the time to absorb--or even read--these long papers. One of the reasons for the length was that each paper had to get too many clearances which required that the views of all participants be expressed in writing. I remember that we circulated an example of this problem after deleting the names of the author and all of those who were involved. This was a memo about a visit that the Prime Minister of Italy would be making to the White House in October, 1980--Columbus Day. It was to be essentially a photo opportunity for President Carter because the two had met just three weeks earlier at the UN. The two were scheduled to meet for just five minutes to give all the photographers an opportunity to snap their picture. As is usual with all foreign visits, the Department was to prepare a briefing memorandum. The night before the event, the Department's bureaucracy prepared a 24 page briefing memorandum--single space--for a five minute photo opportunity. I would guess that this memo had 30 or 40 clearances, which is one of the reasons it became so long. Everybody and his brother had to put in a paragraph on every conceivable issue that the Italian Prime Minister might raise. The Italian desk officer would dutifully include the paragraph in the briefing memorandum. Everybody lost sight of the nature of the event, but every bureaucrat had an opportunity to make his or her pitch on any matter that at the moment might have been under discussions with the Italians.

This was just an illustration of the flood of paper that the bureaucracy was producing. There was just too much of it and too many people were involved. Of course, memoranda are required to prepare the principals for upcoming events or for decision-making, but there were also of "look at me" memoranda--i.e. information memos about all the good deeds done by the bureaucracy. Too often, people with an ego took advantage of the system and recorded their day's activities. There of course many information memos that are important, but that there were also a lot of "time wasters". So the Seventh Floor was inundated by too many memoranda, too long with too many clearances. But I must confess that even today, I don't have a perfect answer to these problems. As I have suggested before, I am a great advocate of "common sense"; the Italian desk officer, when tasked to prepare a briefing memorandum for a photo opportunity should have written one or two paragraphs, saying essentially that "the Italian Prime Minister was coming to the White House to have his picture taken with you, Mr. President. You saw him in New York three weeks ago where you discussed all the outstanding issues, none of which need to be reiterated". But the Italian desk officer couldn't withstand the pressures from his colleagues and his superiors didn't have the time or the gumption to throw the whole thing out and send a one pager. A good bureaucrat has to be able to fend off all of the pressures from other parts of the Department and the other parts of the government; the ability to do so could certainly reduce the size of the memoranda going to the principals. the other challenge is just as difficult: Capsulating complex issues in short and even terse sentences and paragraphs. Experts have so much to say on those subjects that they know well that distilling the essence is very difficult.

The extent of clearances required reflected in part some organizational problems in the Department. For example, PM would have intermittent feuds with regional bureaus; that is they disagreed strongly on some issues. These differences occasionally would be carried to extreme lengths. A geographic bureau might refuse to clear a memorandum or cable with PM because it did not want the Seventh Floor to be aware of the differences between the two bureaus. So the Secretariat would receive two pieces of papers: one from the regional bureau and one from PM. Interestingly enough, each of those documents would have been cleared with other bureaus. That left the Secretariat to play the role of referee--a role that was not in its basic charter. We could observe the various "turf" battles or personal feuds as they developed in the Department. Change in administrations doesn't seem to help this problem over any long period. Then there were some Assistant Secretaries who insisted that their bureaus be shown on every memorandum as evidence that their staffs are very busy; those same people also tend to send a lot of information memoranda. I think all administrations had a process called "night reading"--i.e. a one page memorandum from each bureau reporting on its major activities of the day. These memos would be put in a briefing book and the Secretary would then read it at night. Haig would always find this exercise very amusing because he would periodically find two or more bureaus reporting on the same activity, each taking credit. But I don't know any solution to that problem; we all want to be appreciated.

When Haig became Secretary, we made some small changes in our process to accommodate to his working style, but there were no fundamental changes in the organization or procedures of the Department. In fact, there were two transition cycles that worked on the Department. Soon after Reagan's election, the transition team that was responsible for the "big picture" of the whole government was established under Ed Meese's leadership. Meese sent a small transition team to the Department--about fifteen people. They moved into the suite of offices on the first floor that had been reserved for the transition team. That team stayed for about four or five weeks, asking questions, being briefed on the functions and responsibilities of the Department of State. Some of the team members were ideologues. After Haig's appointment was announced in the first week of December, he came to the Department and sat down with Muskie. Then Haig went to see the transition team and had a meeting with them. He thanked the team for its good work and disbanded the group right then and there. I have been told that Richard Pipes, a professor from Yale and an authority on the Soviet Union, had proposed abolishing the Bureau of European Affairs and the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and substituting for them a new Bureau of Communist Affairs and a Bureau for Free Countries Affairs. I heard that there were a number of similar proposals. I remember George Vest discussing the Pipes' ideas and finding them impractical.

I should mention two other major events that took place while I was in the Executive Secretariat. One was the release of the hostages in Iran and the other was the attempted assassination of President Reagan. On the first issue, this had been a long running episode throughout 1980, that was a major concern for everybody in the administration and throughout the elections. There were daily briefing memoranda to the Secretary which were sent to the President. Much of the time of the Department's leadership was devoted to the

issue of the American captives in Tehran--the negotiations in Algeria, etc. We had in the Operations Center's Conference Room an around the clock the spouses, other relatives and friends of the hostages. They had been given free access to the Operations Center and essentially the whole Seventh Floor. Someone on that floor might be writing, or reading or telephoning in his or her office and all of a sudden find a relative standing at the door demanding to see all of the telegraphic traffic on a specific subject related to the hostage situation. This was a real anomaly and I am not sure that free access of non-employees to all corners of the Seventh Floor really contributed to the efficiency of our efforts to gain the hostages' freedom. My general view of the effort to gain release of the hostages was that a lot of people were fiddling with dead end alleys; i.e. a lot of people were involved in considerations that obviously were a waste of time. There were lots and lots of memoranda back and forth within the Department and from the Department and to the White House. Anyone who interfered with that traffic was subject to an assignment to Siberia--even comments that such a piece of paper might not be relevant. We saw many memos that we thought really did not add to policy development or even the White House's knowledge, but we learned very early that anything that remotely touched on the hostages was to be given free and rapid ride to the addressee. Any perceived interference with this massive traffic was deemed to be "heartless, without compassion and treasonous". Even though we dealt with a massive number of papers, I am not sure that we saw all of the traffic. Memoranda went here and yon in ever conceivable fashion; there was absolutely no discipline to the process nor any sense of proportion or rationality; S/S lost control over the process: one) because many relatives, for understandable reasons, would intervene in the process and be a completely free lance player. They would interject some of the wildest rumors and force people to pay attention to the wildest schemes. It seemed that every Iranian who would show up on the administration's door steps with a story would be given a hearing by high ranking members of the government. I think the whole process became chaotic and out of control, despite that some first-class people worked on the issue day and night. Secondly, the President's personal involvement did not help to discipline the process, not did the involvement of so many White House staffers and the Seventh Floor. Even Secretary Vance, who resigned in protest over the ill-fated effort to free the hostages by military means, came back to the State Department four or five days before Reagan's inauguration without publicity and slept on a cot in the Operations Center for three or four nights; he was trying to play a constructive part in the process and hoping that he might be able to help solve the problem. He finally did go on a plane on January 20th after the hostages were freed to meet them in Germany. But the whole Iranian hostage saga was very bizarre and sad; I had friends among the hostages; I played Santa Claus to the children of one of the hostages. So I had great sympathy for all the people who were trying to do their best, but I don't think that our efforts were at all well organized. I believe that in the final analysis, it was Reagan's election which actually gained the hostages' release. It was Khomeini's apprehension about the advent of a hard-line government that finally convinced the Iranians that holding the hostages was not worth running the risk of being bombed or whatever else the radicals in Iran thought that the new administration might do.

This Iranian hostage crisis was a real lesson for me which came in handy when later I became involved in the Lebanon hostage process, as was Jerry Bremer, who by then had become the Director of the Anti-Terrorist Office. We at least remembered what not to do.

The second event was Hinckley's attempt on Reagan's life. We were hard at work that afternoon; I was in my Deputy Executive Secretary's office which was adjacent to the Secretary's office when I heard that the President was shot. Like everyone else, we turned on our TVs. Haig was in his office. At first, of course, we heard a lot of misinformation or poor information. When it became clear that the President had been seriously wounded, Haig asked for a briefing on the Constitutional process that determines succession. I think that was very appropriate; the senior member of the Cabinet should be up-to-date on this question. There was some confusion in the senior levels of the government. Haig talked several times to Meese and Deaver, both of whom were distraught. The president was totally incommunicado; the Vice President was on an airplane heading for Hawaii. Haig talked to others as well and it became clear that no one was doing anything to bring the panic under control. By mid-afternoon, the world knew that the President was in serious condition, but not much else. Larry Speakes, the White House spokesperson, went on TV and did not make a reassuring appearance; it was clear that he was very shaken as was all of the White House staff. In the Department, we knew, based on previous similar experiences, that the US had to assure its allies and adversaries that its government was functioning normally; that despite the temporary loss of its leader, the US had the situation well in hand. Bremer and I and someone from L probably drafted a "flash" message to all our embassies overseas, telling them what we knew the situation to be, including the President's medical situation and requesting that they convey to their host governments reassurance that the situation was under control. Some of the Assistant Secretaries were on the phone talking to some foreign leaders, some of whom had called the White House and may not have been put at ease by Dick Allen, the National Security Advisor or whoever they may have talked to. In any case, Haig saw the necessity to calm the fears in other capitals. So I thought the Secretary was approaching the issue as it was supposed to be addressed. In one of his conversations with Meese, Haig suggested that the Cabinet be convened, which was done. There ensued an alleged argument between Haig and Weinberger which has been widely reported in the press. It was reported that Weinberger, on his own authority, had raised the "alert" status of our armed forces. This was a subject that Haig knew far better than Weinberger; he felt that in absence of any threat the alert level should not be changed and that, on the contrary, this action gave just the opposite impression from the one that was to be conveyed; i.e. normalcy. The last thing that was needed was to get into an accidental conflict. So the Secretaries of State and defense had a clear difference of opinion. Speakes appeared again in public, still looking shaken and unsure. We saw Speakes on the TV, but we didn't know whether the Cabinet was also watching in the Situation Room. So we called the Sit Room and asked that a message be passed to Secretary Haig; we suggested that some one of stature appear on TV to reassure the country and the world because we thought that Speakes was falling far short of doing that. We may have overstepped the boundaries of our responsibilities, but we did send such a message. Sometime after that, Haig ran up to the press room and made his famous statement that "I am in charge here" in answer to a question. It was an unfortunate phrase because all he wanted to convey that he was the

senior Cabinet officer present; there is no doubt in my mind that he was not trying to usurp the prerogatives of various officials, but his comment contributed to Haig's reputation as a "hot head"; it was just an unfortunate use of words, which was blown all out of proportion.

The day Reagan was shot, we set up a task Force in the Operations Center, sent reassuring messages as soon as the surgery was finished and the doctors had given a guarded optimistic evaluation. Dick Kennedy, the Under Secretary for Management, chaired the Task Force. By 11 p.m. that day, we actually dismantled the Task Force because it was clear that no special action would need to be taken. But it was an interesting day.

This one year in the Secretariat was very instructional. I learned for example that on the "hot" issues there were usually too many people involved. To the extent that an administration can discipline itself to manage a tight ship under trying circumstances, that is very positive. I believe that many people can be involved in an issue, but then it becomes mandatory that each knows what his or her role is and sticks to that without interfering in someone else's business. I also learned that first reports of any incidents are almost always wrong. The situation is never what it appears to be initially: it is either much worse or much better, but never as initially reported. I learned that collegiality can go a long way to make a government function effectively; a government official should always go an extra step to make sure that his colleagues in one's own department or in another department has all the information she or he needs--in the hopes that he or she will reciprocate in the future when the shoe might be on the other foot. I learned a lot about the absolute necessity to write briefly and concisely for senior officials. Finally, I learned that it is very difficult for any administration to focus on more than two crisis at one time. Henry Kissinger always said that it could focus only on one, but I think in fact that an administration can effectively deal with two, but no more.

Q: Then in 1981, for reasons that you have already explained, you left the Secretariat and spent a year at Georgetown University. How was that?

KELLY: 1981 happened to be the year during which the Department started a new sabbatical leave program. That was tailor-made for my circumstances. So I became one of the members of the first Una Chapman Cox Foundation fellows. That provided me with a year's sabbatical--at full salary--plus \$25,000 in expenses; in exchange, I was to pursue a study in depth on some subject of interest to me.

I decided that I would write a book on national security decision-making. I chose that topic in light of my service on the Seventh Floor; I had done a lot of reading on the subject matter already, such as Mac Destler's book and other material. It was a topic which still engaged my curiosity and for which there was an audience. I was encouraged by a lot of people to pursue this interest. David Newsom was at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, and I certainly discussed my views with him. I talked to Landrum Bolling who was at Georgetown--he was a great researcher--; we shared an office townhouse with him. My office mate was a British diplomat--Lawrence O'Keefe, who later became the British Ambassador to Prague. Lawrence and I would frequently exchange drafts. But I did not get

much reaction from the faculty in general; they have some reservations about practitioners. Some of the school's administrators showed some interest in my work, but the faculty in general didn't show any. I talked to a number of professors; I introduced myself during the first few weeks to several of the faculty, as a good Foreign Service officer would do when he or she arrived at a new post. Universities offered a wealth of meetings to attend; I went to a lot of those and therefore met a lot of the Georgetown community.

Father Healy, the President of Georgetown, set up a curriculum review committee to look at undergraduate education. That committee was to spend one year reviewing the required courses for all undergraduates and suggest any changes in the curriculum. The committee had seven faculty members on it; Peter Krogh, the Dean of the Foreign Service School, suggested that I be added to the committee to provide an outside perspective--in part, I think, because he himself didn't want to get involved. Healy agreed and so I became a member of the committee. It met once a week and we reviewed what courses every student at Georgetown was required to take. The problem of course comes when you have to decide if a course is no longer required, must there be another substituted for it?; e.g. if you reduce foreign language requirement, is a math requirement added? After listening to the discussion for many months, I had one suggestion--Georgetown should not graduate any student who was not computer literate. In 1981, that was a revolutionary concept; I had used some of my grant money to lease a computer for myself--I had learned to use it ten years earlier at the Army Staff College--and I saw from first hand experience how useful it was and I could guess about its value in the future. The committee wanted to know how I would implement such a suggestion. I thought that was relatively easy; the University had a big main frame computer which was not totally used. That would give every student an opportunity to get some practical experience on the University's computer. No new faculty would be required; the computer had tutorial software which each student could use as he or she became familiar with this new gadget. All my suggestion required was a scheduler who would see to it that each student during his or her four years at Georgetown, got an adequate amount of time on the University's computer. It did not seem to me to be an undue burden either for the University or the student. Of course, not many, if any, of the committee members had used a computer--remember that this was 1981. They thought that the few hours necessary to become computer literate would take away from learning much more important--in their eyes--matters. So my modest proposal went nowhere. There were many other proposals that were hotly debated--e.g. to add more economic courses, with which I certainly could agree. But in every case, the committee decided that it could not recommend an increase in required courses, because it could not see where an offsetting decrease might take place. So there were a lot of vigorous debates, but in the end the report to Father Healy essentially blessed what Georgetown was already doing.

The stipend enabled me to travel around the country to interview various people, such as Dean Rusk and Zbig Brzezinski. Unfortunately, the book is still in the making, although I have a 400 page manuscript--yet unpublished. I did manage to get two articles published in prestigious journals and gave a lot of speeches. I even got as far as signing a book contract with Praeger; they decided that, after reading the first few chapters, they would like to see the full product and even assign an editor in New York to work with me. I did send Praeger

the full text, but by this time I had left Georgetown. The editor sent the manuscript back with a number of suggested changes. I had every intention of working on the revisions on weekends and at night, but the transcript unfortunately still sits in a cardboard box at home partly because my subsequent experiences taught me that what I had written needed a complete overhaul. Times have changed and I have learned a lot more about decision-making. I thought I knew a lot about the national security apparatus in 1981, but it was only after that that I became a deputy assistant secretary, an ambassador and an assistant secretary. In 1981, I was trying to describe the process as I had witnessed it; it was a fair description of that, but my subsequent career gave me so many more opportunities to participate in the process itself that just outdated what I thought I knew in 1981. Some day, I am going to go back and bring the draft up to date and perhaps try to find another publisher.

For example, one of the chapters in the book is entitled "Above the Level of Expertise". I was describing the problems of politico-military policy development and focusing on the well known phenomenon in which the decision making level is raised above the level of the experts and the bigger the problem, the higher the decision making level becomes and the further away it gets from the experts. I held in 1981 that the bigger the problem, the less likely it is to be addressed by anyone who knows anything about it. For example, an NSC meeting is chaired by the President and is attended by the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of CIA and the Chairman of the JCS. The subject may be the evacuation of Americans from Gabon. Unfortunately, none of the participants know the situation existing in Gabon in sufficient depth. The office director or the CIA analyst, who could answer questions with some precision, is excluded from such a meeting by long-established practices. The same is often true for meetings on the Seventh Floor of the Department of State. The process is designed to miss obvious opportunities to resolve problems or crisis or worse, decisions are made which aggravate or exacerbate problems. When I wrote that chapter in the Georgetown ivory tower, I included what I now see as naive recommendations. In 1981, I was still too green; the subject still fascinates me, but now I view it quite differently than I did 14 years ago. My research though did give me the opportunity to learn a lot about how the national security systems had worked under earlier Presidents like Truman and Eisenhower. That led me to the rather obvious conclusion that the system was adapted in each new administration to serve the needs of each President. The system was also different under the same President depending on who the actual players were. Changes in Cabinet officers made a difference.

While at Georgetown, I also audited a weekly seminar on "national policy problems", which was being given at the Foreign Service School by Alan Goodman, the assistant dean of the school. It was a good course. Occasionally, I would attend other classes or address classes. I was not expected to lead any seminars, although I would have been happy to do so. As I mentioned earlier, I did do a lot of public speaking around the country. For example, when I went to the Truman Library in Independence, MO to do some research, I first called the Public Affairs Bureau and asked whether they had any opportunities for presentation. P also jumped at my offers; they had more requests that they knew what to do with. They would invariably find an audience--more often audiences--and sometimes

schedule me for radio broadcasts and newspaper interviews. This was the first time I had had an opportunity to address American audiences and I loved it. I found most audiences very receptive; there were a few that had no interest in foreign affairs. I got a lot of invitations for return appearances; that gave me a clue that I had performed adequately at least. I am convinced, based on my 1981-82 experiences and later ones that there is a big demand in the US for speakers on foreign policy issues. I haven't done any in the last three years, but certainly in the 1980s there was a huge interest. As I learned in my subsequent assignment, the demand far outstrips the supply.

All in all, the year at Georgetown was a wonderful year, particularly for personal growth. I traveled a lot and expanded my personal knowledge of America and its people. That fellowship also led to my serving on the Una Chapman Cox Foundation Board of Directors. I got to know Mrs. Cox before she died; she had come to Washington to give some money to the Department. She had sent her lawyer and her accountant earlier to talk to the Department about this gift. They were not really welcomed by the Department officials whom they met; they went back to Texas and reported what they had heard. She told them that they had talked to the wrong people; she started to call various friends in Washington and then sent her representatives back to Washington. This time they met more interested people and eventually a Foundation for the benefit of the Foreign Service was set up, separate and apart from the Department--which was just as well because the Department would have dissipated the funds or used the funds to cover any shortfalls in appropriations. The Department hosted a lunch for Mrs. Cox before the Foundation was established and I was invited; that is how I became acquainted with her. Then I met her on another couple of occasions.

I went to her funeral in August 1981. I also became acquainted with Harvie Branscomb, who was the chairman of the Board of the Foundation. I joined the Board after getting repeated calls from Branscomb asking for my views on a variety of request that he was receiving from the Department--mostly for activities that were inadequately funded by regular appropriations or for which appropriations had been denied. I would Harvie not to give money for those kind of activities; I saw those request essentially as budgetary support. That did not make me very popular with units like FSI who were trying to tap the Foundation. The Department just wanted the proceeds from the sale of the estate to spend as it wished. The funds would have been spent very quickly. I saw the Foundation as an opportunity to enhance the Foreign Service by providing support that could not be obtained from any other source. When in 1983, the question of whether I could join the Board, Joan Clark, then the Director General, said that it would not be appropriate--potential conflict of interest. I must say that I never understood that ruling; my sabbatical was ended and couldn't see where any of my official business would be involved in my duties for the Foundation. I called Branscomb and told him of Clark's decision. He then called Clark and told her that her ruling was wrong--he was a lawyer himself and therefore his arguments carried some weight. The L staff member who had first ruled that here was conflict of interest, reversed himself and therefore in the end I became the first active FSO to sit on that Foundation's Board of Directors. Although the Foundation was well established by then, I did not find that by 1983, its direction was entirely clear. So I had an opportunity to participate in some debates about the Foundation's direction together with about another

dozen Board members, many of whom were retired FSOs. Joan Clark was an *ex-officio* member. She was there because Branscomb felt that the department should have a formal voice in the operations of the Foundation. There have been periods when the Department cut off all communications with the Foundation, basically because its representative was just too busy. I have never understood that; the Foundation is prepared to help the Department and yet the official spokesperson is too "busy". That is how "you look a gift horse in the mouth"!

The Board leadership was very anxious to work closely with the Department. They felt that the Department should know its needs better than anyone else and therefore should have a major input into the Foundation's decisions. Branscomb and some of his colleagues were from Texas and knew very little about the mechanics of foreign affairs. They have learned a lot in the last fourteen years, but it took time. My views on the direction that the Foundation should take were very much inspired by Mrs. Cox. She had often said that the Foreign Service was a very tough career both for the officer and his or her family. She thought that her gift should go to supporting an officer for a year so that he or she and the families could get a break for a period of time. She was not hung up on what precisely an officer would do during the year; she didn't necessarily see it necessary that great works of literature be produced during the sabbatical. The main goal was that the year be spent in whatever would be of greatest benefit for the officer and the family. The idea had spore from her own experience. In 1948, she had been helped by a vice-consul and she was grateful for that for the rest of her life. So that is how she came to the idea of helping the Foreign Service. She told me once that she could have built another wing at a local hospital, but she pointed out that everybody did that. She wanted to something different with her assets. Unfortunately, the Foundation did not follow her path; it diverged from her views. I was involved in this evolution which came about for a number of reasons. The main one was that in the early years, the investments generated too much money. Sabbatical were understood by all, but they did not cost enough to satisfy the IRS rules about foundation expenditure rates. That raised the question about what else could be done with the rest of the proceeds. That gave all who knew an opportunity to dream all sorts of proposals; EB wanted to fund a special training program for economic officers--that was too much like the sabbaticals and was turned down. The Foreign Service Wives Association wanted funding for a survey of all the spouses to see why they were dissatisfied. FSI wanted seed money for a new program. The Library wanted funding for more books on careers in the Foreign Service. Everybody had ideas; many of the operating units of the Department had proposals for the use of the Chapman Foundation's resources. The Board didn't like most of the ideas. So the Board decided to make a film about the Foreign Service which was a very expensive project. It took about five years to complete--much longer than it should have. It also funded the start up costs of the American Academy of Diplomacy--the Newsom project at Georgetown. As I said, much of the problem came from having too much income in the early years which had to be expended. There were not enough projects that could have benefitted directly the Foreign Service officer and his or her family. Of course, the Academy might have been useful, particularly if it had been able to reduce the number of political ambassadorial appointees thereby increasing the opportunities for career officers. As far as I know, it never met this goal. In any case, I am not sure that the Foundation's resources were spent in

line with Mrs. Cox's original intentions. I always thought that the Foundation should have stuck to the principle of helping Foreign Service officers and families. I always thought that Mrs. Cox's idea was a wonderful one; I certainly benefitted from it. I don't know how else I would have managed to take care of a fifteen-year old son. One of my colleagues in the first class of sabbatical students was Bob Tynes, now the CG in Tel Aviv. He and wife traveled around the US visiting the district offices of various Congresspersons. At each stop, they would explain to the staff what the Department could or could not do for their constituents. These staffers were in the front line of constituent complaints and requests for assistance and needed that briefing; it saved them the time to refer these issues to the Member's Washington Office which then in turn would have sent the inquiry to the Department. Bob and his wife wanted to do this because they had been overseas for a dozen of years straight; they wanted to become reacquainted with their country and at the same time serve some useful purpose. I think they were quite tired by the end of their program; they had seen too many motels. Bob gave a lot of speeches to all sorts of group on the Foreign Service and its responsibilities. By the end of his travels, Bob had a good idea of what these district offices needed and was able to develop some material that he thought they would find useful--whom to contact for each type of constituent inquiry--, which the Department distributed. Bob's project was completely consonant with Mrs. Cox's views because his sabbatical not helped him and his wife, but also helped the country understand better the nature of the Foreign Service--a lack that Mrs. Cox had detected. That is one of the reasons she was a great supporter of officers who were involved in public speaking during their sabbatical year. I think the Foundation has deviated far too much from Mrs. Cox's original concepts; it is spending most of its funds on a project with the National Geographic Association--one of the world's wealthiest non-profits. Two years ago, the Foundation did not fund a single sabbatical; this year just one. That is too bad! Of course, now it also has resource problems.

Q: In 1982, you were assigned to the Bureau for Public Affairs (PA) as a deputy assistant secretary. Was that a job on your "wish list"?

KELLY: When I heard that a vacancy would occur, I did show interest in it. I had looked around and had not found anything that looked particularly challenging. The Department's personnel system had suggested that I become the desk officer for Turkey. I had rejected that notion. Andy Steigman, the Deputy Director of Personnel, called me and told me that I would never get another job unless I took the Turkish desk officer one. He added that no one in high places--friends of mine--would help me and that my career was over unless I changed my mind. I thanked Andy for the advice, but told him that I would take my chances and look around some more. In July, 1982, I was called to the White House by Jim Jenkins, who worked for Ed Meese. I had never met Jenkins.

He had been asked--presumably by Meese--to take a very sub rosa look at the NSC. Dick Allen had left the National Security Advisor's job--after only a few months--and had been replaced by Bill Clark, the former Deputy Secretary of State. The press had been criticizing the NSC operations; Al Haig was complaining about it. So the White house decided that it would very quietly make its own review. Somehow, the word had filtered to the White House that I was writing a book on the national security decision making process. Jenkins,

a Californian businessman, was given the assignment. He was a nice fellow, but had absolutely no background to make the survey. In any case, he called me over and I spent several hours talking to him. The next day, Bud McFarlane, the new Deputy NSC Advisor, called me and asked me to come to his office, which I did. He was looking for a Director for Western Europe for the NSC staff. He told me that he and Clark had intended to fill all jobs within the next four or five days. I had met McFarlane before when I worked for Sonnenfeldt and he was working for Kissinger and Scowcroft. As far as I know, the Jenkins and McFarlane calls were not at all related.

I went off to Hawaii to keep a speaking engagement for the Department. McFarlane tracked me down in Hawaii and called me at 3 a.m. to say that he would let me know within the next twenty-four hours whether I had a job on the NSC staff. About one hour later, Admiral Jonathan Howe, the new Director of the Department's Bureau of Politico-Military affairs called, and offered me a job as one of his deputies. So from having no job, all of a sudden I was flooded with possibilities. I believe that Howe and McFarlane, who were friends, had talked and each knew what the other was discussing with me. I would have taken either job with alacrity, although I would have preferred to work for the NSC, primarily because I knew Bud much better than Howe.

But I went on to California to make some more speeches. I did not hear from McFarlane, despite his promise, for a month when I happened to meet him purely accidentally. I had tried to call him several times during that period, but I never got through. Jackie Hill, who had been a top-flight secretary in the Department was then McFarlane's secretary and she kept putting me off. The other secretary in that office was Wilma Hall--the mother of Fawn Hall of Oliver North fame. Both Jackie and Wilma kept telling me that Bud had not made up his mind and that there were some organizational problems that had to be taken care of first. But they assured me that he would call as soon as he had something to tell me. In any case, when I bumped into him, he apologized, but said that in the final analysis he just couldn't hire me. Jonathan Howe, after having offered me the deputy job, took Arnie Raphael instead--he could not have done any better.

Then Haig resigned as Secretary and was succeeded by George Shultz. So I was back to "no job." Larry Eagleburger, then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs kept reassuring me. He kept saying: "Don't worry about. Sit tight", which I did, working at Georgetown trying to finish my manuscript. Sometime in the Fall, Ray Seitz, who was the senior deputy in P and a close friend from Secretariat days, called me to tell me that Shultz had just offered him the job of Executive Assistant to the Secretary and that Shultz was about to appoint a new spokesperson and Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs--John Hughes, former Editor of the "Christian Science Monitor". Seitz asked me whether he could recommend me to Hughes as his replacement; I readily agreed. Four or five days later, I had an interview with Hughes. I guess that went well because Hughes offered me the job which I accepted the next day. I then rushed back to Georgetown to finish the manuscript and a few weeks later became the deputy in P. I should note that I understand that when P called Personnel to tell them of Hughes' decision, Steigman said that I could not have that job because it was graded far above my rank. That was not really true, but Hughes, not familiar with the

machinations of the Department's personnel system, said that he would have to talk to Shultz about my assignment. That threat seemed to be enough to get Personnel to agree to my assignment.

As I said, Hughes was brand new to both the job and the Department. He intended to be the Department's spokesperson and he knew from conversations that he had had with some of his predecessors, that that role would take much of his time. He knew that he needed a deputy who could run the Bureau, which was what I did. The deputy spokesperson was Alan Romberg, a wonderful career FSO. So Hughes and Romberg, with the assistance of the office for Press Relations, handled the media and I handled the rest of the Bureau--five offices. I did participate every morning in the deliberation of the potential daily questions and the discussion of the various answers that might be given. So I had a continuing familiarity with the press relations work of the Bureau.

But I spent most of my time supervising the other five offices. One was the Historian's Office--which took very little time, even though we had to face significant budgetary issues concerning that Office. Bill Slany, the Historian, was a professional and was supported by an excellent staff. My main role was to defend their budgetary requests which were sizeable because the cost of producing the volumes of "Foreign Relations of the United States". The printing costs were huge, making the Historian's Office a convenient target for budgetary reductions. Otherwise, the Historian's Office needed little supervision, except on occasions when we urged them to speed up their work on one project--the famous Claus Barbie case. Barbie was a former member of the SS who had been accused and found guilty of atrocities in Lyon. He was a war criminal, who had been in hiding for many years. He was finally found by Serge Klausfeld, the famous Nazi hunter, based in Vienna. The French extradited Barbie from Argentina, I believe. The Department was charged to find out what the US Army's involvement had been in first retaining Barbie's services after the Allied victory and, when he was exposed as a war criminal, providing him new documentation which enabled Barbie to flee to Latin America. We found that there had been some American involvement, some wittingly and some unwittingly. In any case, the Barbie case was a hot political potato, in which the Historian's Office could make a major contribution by providing information to the Army and helping to make sure that a responsible search of the files were conducted. In that case, I had to urge the Historian's Office to speed up its usual pace and that the research be done thoroughly and that nothing be swept under the rug.

Then there was the Office of Public Correspondence, which in those days, handled about 250,000 pieces of mail each month. There were letters from the public primarily to the White House which then went over to the Department since they concerned foreign affairs. The Secretary of State and the Department also received huge piles every day. All these letters expressed some views--pro and con--about US foreign policy or asked questions about foreign policy. This major volume of correspondence was dealt with in mass. We had about 400 pro-forma responses, that were updated intermittently. It was the substantive bureaus that were responsible for the updating which they often did reluctantly and only after much screaming from us. Fortunately, but this time, the Department had become

sufficiently modernized so that the responses were in the computer and the PA analyst would just pull up the appropriate response. So the operation was largely a self-sustaining operation which needed too much supervision except to assure that adequate and updated responses were provided the public. It was this Office that made me aware of the pluses and cons of the "wheel"--the auto pen that was used to sign the letters. By tradition, the signatory was either the Assistant Secretary for PA or his senior deputy. Hughes decided that he didn't want his name on all of these letters; that meant thousands of letters went out each month carrying the name "John Kelly" on the bottom. Soon after that happened, I began to get letters from irate citizens who wondered about my sanity and probity. I would then ask to see the form letter that had brought me all this vituperation; often I would find out that way that the response was out dated or not properly framed. I would then insist that the letter be rewritten by a substantive bureau.

We had an interesting operation in the Office of Policy and Opinion Analysis which had been established during Kissinger's regime. This Office had two of America's leading authorities on public opinion polling data and analysis--Bernie Roshko and Al Richmond. Both had had many years of experience with the Gallup and Roper organizations. They were part of a small group of experts in the US who take the results of polls and divine their meanings. They would produce each month several analysis of public opinion polls on foreign policy issues. They would take any and all public opinions conducted and put them under heir microscopes. Sometimes, they were lucky enough to be able to get one of their questions included in the poll; the polling community was small enough that most experts were on a first name bias and Bernie and Al could get their questions included in polls done by Gallup or other organizations. Their analysis were very interesting. When I became the deputy, their analysis were being sent to the P front office; I thought this work deserved greater circulation and we sent their analysis around the Department and to the White House. People who are involved in politics are slaves to public opinion polls, so that we had trouble finding an audience for this analysis. There were even a few people on the Seventh Floor who showed some interest, but not many. So I think we widen the circle of clients for these analysis. As the title of the Office suggests, it was also supposed to occasionally produce policy papers on the public affairs aspects of foreign policy --that didn't happen very often nor were they particularly well done. This was the period when the administration was being beaten up on its Central America policy; as often happens, the negative view of the policy was perceived as the fault of the inability to express and explain the policy adequately. It is a view that I have seen expressed in every administration that I have worked for. So occasionally, this Office would be asked for ideas on how the policy could be better explained to the American public.

We had an Office of Publications, which produced the Department of State bulletins, the monthly record of US foreign policy, the "Gist" series--a short summary of American foreign policy and the many other intermittent documents that the Department issued. This was also a very much of a self-generated operation which had been producing all these documents for years. I sometimes got involved if some extraordinary aspect, which it did when it published a study on Armenian terrorism. That document managed to offend both the Armenian-American community and the government of Turkey. That led to

Congressional hearings, tons of correspondence, endless meetings within the Department and with US citizens of Armenian descent.

Then we had the Office of Executive Director, which was responsible for all of the Bureau's administrative work--personnel, budget, etc. And finally we had an Office of Public Speaking which arranged for speakers for all sorts of appearances around the country. Although its work was generally routine, it had a problem because it was seldomly possible to get high level officials to participate. We develop a plan and held a meeting of all Seventh Floor principals, trying to get commitments from them to make six domestic speaking trips each year. They all agreed to do that, but very few ever met this goal. I didn't think that all of them would ever find the time for six forays, but we did manage to get them to double the number of their appearances. We also were able to discipline the process a little. There were a number of Seventh Floor principals that had a Chicago connection. Shultz had taught at the University; Kenneth Dam, the Deputy Secretary was a Chicago native and had graduated from the University of Chicago and had worked there for much of his life as an attorney; Jerry Van Gorkom, the Under Secretary for Management, was a Chicago native with family and business ties to the city; Ed Derwinski, the Counselor, was a former Congressman from Chicago. One of our problems therefore was that any invitation from Chicago was received with open arms on the Seventh Floor; all the principals wanted to speak in Chicago and often. Getting them to go to Dallas or Boston or San Francisco was different matter. We made a matrix of the 35 leading media markets in the US. Then we assumed that every one of the principals would travel every other month and we were then able to show each one of them where they would be over the course of the following year. We displayed this matrix at this meeting chaired by the Secretary and all the principals took a pledge to appear when and where the matrix suggested. But, as I said, our plans were never fully implemented. I must say that, entirely by accident and not recognized or planned at the time, this effort gave me some visibility and exposure to the Seventh Floor which I probably would not have had otherwise.

My experiences in PA have led to me some conclusions. First of all, I don't think it is possible to measure the impact of public speaking appearances. There is no way that I know of to measure the impact of a speech in any American city, even if it is given wide media coverage. There is no way to measure the impact, even with polls. We might have been able to try to do that, but it would have cost lots of money and the results would have been marginally sound at best. Foreign policy, unfortunately, is in general of interest only to an elite audience. So it hard to judge what impact the organizations of elites--like the Foreign Affairs Councils-- has on the general population. I would guess that they must have some trickle-down effect, but it is not measurable. I was persuaded, as were most others, that appearances by State Department officials had an impact, at least on their audiences. Kissinger, I was told by people who were involved, was convinced that there was an impact. He stimulated a lot of work in the Department to increase, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the Department's out-reach efforts. I talked to Carol Laise, who had been the Assistant Secretary during some of Kissinger's regime, about what they had tried. During the Carter administration, after START I had been signed, a task force was formed to send speakers out into the country to discuss that agreement. So most administrations accepted

the thesis that public appearances had a positive effect on American public opinion and thus making it more receptive and supportive of the administration's arguments. The exception was the Baker regime during which Margaret Tutwiler believed that national television and radio made major impacts on public opinion, but that speaking to small groups had much less impact. Margaret was the first Assistant Secretary who intentionally minimized appearances by Seventh Floor principals to audiences around the country. She pushed people to appear on national TV shows like "Meet the Press" or "Face the Nation", but didn't support other appearances.

We tried to build contacts with the local media into every speaker's tour. In general, I think we were successful in exposing our folks to the media. I tried to test the efficacy of our efforts by requesting that every speaker whom we sponsored submit, along with his or her travel voucher, a list of all the persons whom he had met and talked to at any great length. We also had a check list that was given to each P program officer to remind them of all the bases that should be touched when they were setting up an itinerary for one of our speakers. That check list reminded them that included in each speaker's program should be contacts with local media--TV, radio and press. We had a contract with a private organization to monitor American press for stories about foreign affairs. So eventually, in most instances, we knew what kind of coverage our speaker received.

I myself went on a speaking tour at least once per month, partly because I enjoyed it, as I have indicated earlier, but also because I considered part of my job. I found that the local media was very interested in talking to someone from Washington. I think almost all of my visits and speeches were covered. It was much easier to have coverage in Texas, for example, than it was in New York. I think that the foreign affairs coverage in local press was obviously less than we would have hoped, but it was not a subject that was neglected entirely. I think our speakers' program was very helpful in raising foreign affairs coverage. The rest of the time, the press would pick up a few wire stories and perhaps a syndicated column or two; it has been true that for years, foreign affairs has not been given the kind of coverage that we certainly would have preferred; their readers just didn't have foreign policy very high on their agenda; the subject just doesn't sell newspapers. There is nothing new about that; it has always been so and I think continues to be so to today.

I do believe that these public appearances were also useful to us in getting a feel for American views on specific foreign policy issues. It certainly gave me a certain amount of cache in inter-agency fora because I could say from first hand experience that a specific policy or action would probably find resistance among the American people or that the people in City X were mad as hell about a certain issue. My public appearances certainly enabled me to detect moods and trends in the audiences I was addressing. I had hoped to institutionalize this fact finding aspect of public speaking through that questionnaire that I insisted each speaker answer before his or her travel voucher was paid. Among the first questions was one dealing with the reactions of the audiences that the speaker had addresses--e.g. what was on people's minds? Now it is true that some speakers were unresponsive, either because he or she was too busy to answer the questionnaire or because he or she did not listen well enough to hear what I always thought were loud and clear

messages from the audiences. Of course, even without these speaking engagements, we knew that Central America was a hot issue and that the administration's policies were not really popular. Congress made sure that the administration understood that! But I think that it was useful for the policy makers to hear how Americans felt on certain subjects. I do believe that every administration has a responsibility to attempt to explain its policy, as I have indicated earlier. So I encourage every administration to get its people to present its foreign policy views as often as possible. Conversely, I believe that every administration has a responsibility to take into consideration the views of the American public in the development of its foreign policy. That is done now primarily through consultations with Congress; that at times has been an effective influence as it was on Central American policy during the Reagan years.

Issues such as arms control, being very technical in many aspects, is a more difficult area for a conversation with the American public. I used to give speeches on the subject and I always found an interest. I think that the broader aspects of arms control can be subject to a meaningful dialogue even with non-experts. I thought the discussions I had with various audiences on arms control were worthwhile; I encountered many criticisms of the administration's policies. Reagan was widely viewed as an ideologue on communism who would never undertake serious arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and that he used a massive military build up to get their attention. I think there was considerable understanding among the audiences that I talked to on the broad principles of arms control, but of course these were audiences of elites, who followed closely even some of the more esoteric issues and who depended on public sources--i.e. the media--for its information. I think all American adults understood that nuclear weapons existed and that they had tremendous killing power. They understood that a massive nuclear exchange between the US and the Soviet Union might destroy much of the planet and that therefore that was an outcome that had to be avoided. That was not a very subtle basis for a discussion, but it was a basis. I could go from there to talk about the more subtle aspects of arms control. I remember addressing a Hawaiian audience, after the one of its legislatures had declared a "nuclear free zone." Of course that was not feasible since the Navy had nuclear weapons in Hawaii. I had to point out to my audience that it should not take much comfort in that legislative action because if there were a nuclear war, even those in a "nuclear free zone" could be severely impacted, either from a direct attack or from the fall-out from a blast some thousands of miles away. I suggested that instead of voting in favor of an inconsequential and meaningless "feel good" resolution, they should get serious and talk about how nuclear weapons might be brought under control. I found the issue stimulating and I found people, from all sorts of life, willing and interested in discussing nuclear arms and their control.

I found that there was very little communication between PA and the rest of the Department. PA was staffed almost entirely with Civil Service personnel. At any given time, there are 1-4 Foreign Service officers in the Bureaus. The Civil Service had been doing their jobs well for a long time. It did not come naturally to them to call up a desk officer to find out what the latest events were in a certain country. Conversely, the desk officer just wasn't mindful of the needs of PA staffed by Civil Servants whom he or she

didn't know and whose responsibilities didn't have much relevancy to his or her daily tasks. The exception to this generalization was the Press Office, which had to get answers to questions posed or about to be posed by reporters and columnists. The Press Office had an insatiable need for information and guidance, usually in response to queries. Occasionally, we would get inquiries from a regional bureau about the results of certain polls that may have been taken on subjects of concern to it. I think that interest tended to stem more from the political appointees in the bureaus than the professional staff. For example, Elliott Abrams, when he was Assistant Secretary for American Republics was very interested in public opinion polling about Central America or the Panama Canal or other hot issues under his purview. But must say that he was an exception; most of the Department was not very much concerned with public opinion polls or with media coverage.

We had a number of committees that concerned themselves with the issue of relations with the American public. One was the "Interagency Public Diplomacy Committee"; that met each week in the Old Executive Office building. It was chaired by Bud McFarlane, the Deputy NSC Advisor. In that forum, we would discuss the hot issues of the week, the upcoming hot issues, how the issue was being played in the press and how the administration looked, was there sufficient coverage and was the administration's "spin" being heard. That Committee, to the best of my recollection, was a McFarlane innovation--of rather recent vintage when I arrived in PA. The Committee included Charlie Wick, the USIA Director, and some of his staff, the Department of State, DOD--often represented by Fred Iklé, the Under Secretary, JCS, ACDA and David Gergen, the White House Director of Communications or someone from his office as well as Larry Speakes, the White House spokesperson or someone from his office. On occasions, Bill Casey, the CIA Director, attended, although that always surprised me because I didn't think that CIA had much to contribute to public diplomacy or public opinion. I never have figured out why Casey was in attendance. Depending on the issue under discussion, a regional assistant secretary might be invited. I was the permanent Department of State rep, but often the assistant secretary most knowledgeable about an issue would be invited. Most of the issues we discussed fell into the arms control area because that was the hot issue in the country at the time. We were about to deploy Pershing and Cruise missiles in Europe. The other continuing hot issue was Central America.

The Committee had a number of subgroups that worked on specific topics; for example, the arms control subcommittee was chaired by PM and the Central America public diplomacy subcommittee was chaired by a Marine Colonel by the name of Oliver P. North. This was the first, but not last time, that I would encounter Ollie North. Elliott Abrams participated in that subcommittee as did Sanchez, a deputy Assistant Secretary in DOD and an ex-CIA employee, Constantine Menges from the NSC. That group came up with some "unique" ideas. This group had a tendency to at least consider covert actions, but it did not. All of McFarlane's efforts were strictly overt and public. There were no efforts made to plant any stories in the United States; it worried primarily about telling the administration's story in the US.

I also worked on that subcommittee and was under explicit instructions from John Hughes to make sure that this group didn't do "crazy" things; e.g. a disinformation campaign for the

American public. Even in 1982-83, the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs was showing some anxiety about the what the Central America "gang" was doing; he had good reason to be concerned. You may recall that a public press conference in the Department, we introduced a Nicaraguan--a defector--who was about to tell the world all of the infamies perpetrated by the Sandinistas on their country. Some called him the Nicaraguan "smoking gun". In fact, after his defection, the Nicaraguan was debriefed by the CIA and then was turned over to the Department. Casey had called to tell someone what a great find this had been; so John Hughes paraded the Nicaraguan in front of the State Department correspondents, where he proceeded to denounce the United States and made allegations that he had been bribed by the CIA. Hughes was burned by that performance; he never forgot it and it made him quite wary of American officials that were working on Central America.

In addition, there was another Nicaraguan who was sold to us as a "genuine article". Craig Johnstone, then one of ARA's deputy assistant secretaries, and I were sent to a CIA debriefing that lasted six hours to find out whether he was credible--e.g. did his story make any sense, would he hold up under pressure, was he presentable? We concluded that his presentation was not good enough; we didn't think that he was a "plant" as the first one probably was, but that his story was just not credible enough. Hughes, having burned once, was very careful thereafter and wanted Craig and myself to personally interview the Nicaraguan. Both Elliott Abrams and Hughes didn't want a repeat of their previous experience.

There was a public diplomacy subcommittee on the Middle East peace process. At the first meeting, Nick Veliotis, then the Assistant Secretary for NEA, suggested that I be named as chairman of that subcommittee. Everybody agreed and so there I was. When I talked to Nick later, he told me that the only reason he had suggested the establishment of a subcommittee was that he was concerned by some of the wild ideas that people were suggesting for a public relations campaign. He didn't any part of it and he wanted me to chair the subcommittee to insure that nothing would happen. That I did and that subcommittee never produced any action plan.

In general, I think it prudent for any administration to try to put its best foot forward. All administrations have a responsibility to explain to the Congress and the public what its policy is. Where the Reagan administration made its mistake which could have been monumental was to inject zealots in the public diplomacy area. That comment is related primarily to the Central America issue. although occasionally, zealots appeared on other issues as well, but not to the extent shown by the Central America people. On arms control, for example, the Conference of Catholic Bishops had drafted a paper on the morality of a nuclear deterrent which it was going to issue. Some one in PM had seen the draft and then the administration became very nervous. So McFarlane put that on the agenda of his committee. Someone suggested that we form a group of Catholic laymen who would take issue with the Bishops' position--people like John Lehmann. The idea was that he and others would go to talk to the Bishops to try to show them the error of their ways. I expressed the view that it was unlikely that the Bishops would change their opinions.

Beyond appearing before Appropriations Committees, I did not have much contact with Congress during my tour as Deputy Assistant Secretary. The big issue on appropriations was the cost of printing, to which I alluded earlier. We were paying the Government Printing Office (GPO) outrageous fees to print the volumes that the Historian's Office had so laboriously put together. It was clear to me and others that we could reduce our budgetary expenditures considerably if we been able to seek competitive bids for the printing and binding of these publications. But, by law, GPO has a monopoly; a Department or agency has to go to Congress to seek an exemption. I tried to launch such an effort and got as far as having an amendment attached to our appropriation bill which would have authorized us to seek competitive bids. The government unions of course opposed that vigorously and were able to defeat the amendment at that time. But about four years later, such authorization was approved; it was high time!

I stayed in PA for only one year. It was the first time that I had a had an opportunity to supervise a large staff; that was good experience. It was the first time that I had worked with a large number of Civil Service employees. I found that many of them were very good and very professional and very responsive to the guidance of all administrations. I thought that mixing Foreign Service officers and Civil Service people was good for both and for the institution. It helped bridge a gap between PA and the substantive bureaus, which, as I mentioned before, was rather large. In fact, on the Speakers' Office had much contact with the rest of the Department; the rest of the Bureau was far too separate from the rest of the Department.

Q: One year after entering on duty with PA, you moved to EUR. How did that happen?

KELLY: In 1983, Richard Burt, then the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, asked me to come to his office. He told me that his principal deputy, Bob Blackwill, was going to Harvard; he wanted to know whether I would be interested in that job. I talked to John Hughes who said that I should accept the offer. I had known Burt since 1976, when he was at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London as a research fellow. I had read some of his articles and during a trip to London, I took the opportunity to meet with him. Our relationship got off to a rocky start because during this first meeting we had a significant and unpleasant argument about the wisdom of the ABM Treaty. The following year, he became the national security correspondent for the "New York Times" and then I would occasionally bump into him. Then when Burt, at the beginning of the Reagan administration, became the Director of PM, I got to know him well through my duties in S/S.

The Burt offer came out of the clear blue sky. I had no idea that Blackwill was leaving. I had some trepidations, as I have had with most of my assignments, about taking a job for which I had too little background. As the senior deputy, I was to be involved in many European issues, most of which I had observed as an outsider. So I was apprehensive as I had been and continued to be whenever I started any new job. EUR, in 1983, had eight offices, including the Office of Regional European Affairs (RPM) which handled NATO

and other regional issues, such as arms control. There was also an Office of Regional Economic Affairs (REP) which dealt with EC matters and regional economic issues. Then there were six geographic Offices. EUR had at the time five deputies: Tom Niles--Canada and economic affairs--, Mark Palmer--Soviet and Eastern Europe--, Ed Dobyns--Western and Southern Europe and arms control--, and James Needas--a political appointee who handled public affairs, Congressional relations--and myself. I had no specific area of responsibility; I was the senior deputy available to any assignment that Burt wished to give me. I had to keep up with Rick to know what he was doing and to make sure that he got the necessary support on all of the issues in which he was involved. I also served as the acting Assistant Secretary during his absences.

I thought that the EUR organization, as I have described it, worked quite well. It took me a little while to orient myself and to learn what everyone was doing and what my role would be. We had a superb staff, which always helps a lot. Some of the issues, particularly in the economic area, were new to me. But I had some familiarity with almost all of the political issues and of course I was very comfortable in the arms control field. My service in Paris, S/S and even in PA gave me a good background for European political issues. I had a learning curve, but it was not steep.

The job required me to travel. Soon after I reported to duty, I found that Rick was supposed to go to Bonn for a meeting of the Foreign Ministries' political directors from our major European allies--France, the UK, Italy, Germany. These meetings were held in some confidentiality because the participants were not anxious to have the non-invited feeling left out. For some reason, Rick had to cancel at the last moment and I had to go in his place. I remember that panic struck me on the flight across the Atlantic; I was thrown into the big leagues in a hurry. Fortunately, I had a great set of briefing papers which I almost memorized word for word and got through the meeting without major catastrophe. There were some issues that were entirely new to me and at those meetings, people tend to talk in shorthand, which was not very enlightening to a newcomer. But I would stop the dialogue and ask questions for clarification. Thereafter, I attended a number of those meetings when Rick was not available.

I also traveled on several occasions on fact finding missions during many of which I also took the opportunity for some public appearances. These were speaking engagements stemming from invitations that had been sent to me; e.g. the French Institute for International Relations, the NATO Defense College in Rome, ISSA, etc. I accompanied Vice-President Bush on two trips--one in 1984 and one in 1985. The first one took us to the UK, Luxembourg, France and Germany. A day or two before departure, Brezhnev died. Bush was then designated as the head of the American delegation to the funeral. That meant that the schedule had to be revised, in the usual frantic manner.

We went to London first to spend the weekend at Checkers with Margaret Thatcher. That was a fascinating couple of days; I had an opportunity to watch Mrs. Thatcher up close. We went to Checkers Saturday afternoon for meetings, which were attended on our side by the Vice President, Charlie Price--the American Ambassador--, Don Gregg--then the VP's

assistant for national security--, Admiral Dan Murphy--Bush's chief of staff--and myself. Mrs. Thatcher had with her Howe--the Foreign Secretary--, Haseltine--the Defense Secretary--, Powell--her private secretary--and one other. I was the sole State Department representative. The discussions covered the world. We talked about Brezhnev and Andropov--his successor, arms control, the Euro-missile issue, Lebanon where the battleship "New Jersey" was firing into the Shuf Mountains (both Howe and Haseltine expressed reservations about our activities in Lebanon, saying that European did not understand why the poor villagers had to be killed by our gun fire. At one point Mrs. Thatcher banged on the table and told them that in a war situation, a government was committed to help its troops in any way it could. She just didn't agree with her Ministers on this issue at all. I might note that eventually, both Ministers left the Cabinet because of policy differences with Mrs. Thatcher, which eventually led to her downfall).

We met for several hours Saturday afternoon and then had drinks. Then the Bushes and the Thatchers had a private dinner, while the rest of us fended for ourselves. I had dinner with some British friends. On Sunday morning, we hustled out to Checkers again--only the Bushes stayed there overnight. I remember being very worried about being on time; you never know in these kinds of events what problems you might encounter--security, flat tire, etc.. So I got to Checkers very early Sunday morning even though the meetings were not to start until 8:30 a.m. I probably got out there an hour or an hour and a half earlier! The staff let me in and wondered around Checkers. It is an old country house, with one room leading to another. we had had a Mrs. Thatcher-guided tour the day before, so that I had some idea where I was

Mrs. Thatcher was about the best hostess I have ever encountered. People who know her as the "Iron Lady" would not think of her that way, but she was a hostess *par excellence*. The tour she had given us was just fabulous; she knew the history of each room and of each [piece] of furniture. In any case, I wandered through the house looking primarily for a cup of coffee. Of course, as fate would have it, I ran into Mrs. Thatcher, still in her bathrobe. She greeted me like a long lost friend, and asked me whether I had had my morning coffee. When I said that I hadn't, she asked me to go with her and took me to the kitchen, where she gave me a large mug of coffee. She was very gracious and suggested how I might spend the rest of my time before the meeting. Very human and touching.

So we met again Sunday morning from 8:30 to 2 p.m., while Dennis Thatcher and Mrs. Bush went to church. Then we had a big lunch and flew off to our next stop. So the business meetings were extensive and gave the two sides ample time to cover the major issues of the day. Bush was on top of all the issues as was Thatcher, so that the meetings were very useful. From London we went to Luxembourg where we had dinner with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. The next morning, we had an audience with the Grand Duke and then went to the cemetery at Bastogne--of "Battle of the Bulge" fame. The Vice President held a ceremony there--it was February--very foggy, very damp, very cold--but also very moving. Then we had lunch with the Grand Duke and the Prime Minister and moved on to Frankfurt to see Chancellor Kohl. Bush and Kohl met at the airport because both were about to fly to Moscow for the funeral. Part of that meeting was private; i.e. Bush and Kohl alone. The plan was for me to escort the Vice President to Moscow for the funeral, but just about a half an hour before departure, Dan Murphy came to see and told me that there was

no room on the plane for me because Bush had invited a Congressional delegation to accompany him on the plane to Moscow. I was asked to go to Paris to wait for the Vice President and his party; they were to be there in 48 hours or so. I was a little upset even though I knew that I would not have attended the funeral which had to be restricted to just a few members of each official delegation. After short consideration, I thought that I would prefer to be in Paris than in a Moscow hotel room.

Since originally the Vice President was supposed to be in Paris on that day, I had no trouble getting a room at the Carillon Hotel, where the VP was supposed to stay. My friend, Johnny Berg, who has run the Embassy's Travel and Visitors' Office for several decades, put me in the VP's suite. It had already been paid for and was ready for occupancy. There was no reason for me to sleep in a smaller room. So for two days, I lived up in the Carillon's largest and best suite. Upon arrival, I immediately got on the phone and called all my old friends in Paris. I invited them all to come to see my "digs" and have drinks with me. It was great! The two days gave me an opportunity to see a lot of my old haunts and friends.

Then Bush and party returned from Moscow and we met with Mitterrand and his people. On our side, it was the same team that had met with Mrs. Thatcher except that Ambassador Galbraith was there instead of Price. I must say that I don't remember the meetings in Paris nearly as well as I do those that were held at Checkers because Mrs. Thatcher was such a dominant personality who was so well versed in all aspects of foreign affairs. The meetings that a Vice President has with foreign leaders are an exchange of views; under certain circumstances, some negotiations might be begun by a Vice President, but the 1984 trip certainly did not fall into that category. Its essential purpose was for Bush to hear the views of European leaders at first hand and vice versa. My main role was that of note-taker; I also did memoranda of conversations for distribution to senior officials in the US government. I believe also there were daily reporting cables for the benefit of the President and the Secretary of State. As in almost all trips of senior officials, the staff got very little rest because after attending the meetings, it had to write up summaries and send reporting cables back to Washington. Most of that work-load fell on me. The Secretary was very interested in the trip; at the next weekly meeting that Shultz had with Burt--he met with each Assistant Secretary at least once each week--I had to report on the trip.

The second trip took place in June, 1985. We went to Italy--the "pasta war"--, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Germany. In Brussels, Bush also met with the NATO and EC representatives. For NATO, David Abshire, our Ambassador, hosted a dinner attended by twelve European defense intellectuals. Craig Fuller had replaced Murphy as the V.P.'s chief of staff. On this trip, in addition to Gregg and myself, we had a member of the NSC staff, as well as Parker Borg, the Deputy Coordinator for Terrorism in the Department. That last minute addition came as the result of the June, 1985 TWA hijacking to Lebanon. For some reason, some one decided that the Vice President should have a terrorist expert with the party because the subject was going to be one of the major topics to be discussed.

The "pasta war" was the first real negotiation that the Vice President got involved in his European trips. The President had approved a "301" retaliatory tariff imposition against the EC which doubled the duties on imported pasta. We were having a dispute with the EC over corn glutamate. The President had signed the determination on a Friday and we left two days later for Rome. In real terms, the action that the US had taken had very little significance since we do not import any great amounts of pasta; we manufacture most of it at home. In 1985, there was about \$ 30 million of Italian-made pasta imported into the United States. But the symbolic gesture certainly got the Italians' attention. As soon as the plane had left Andrews Air Force base, Gregg and myself and a couple of experts from STR and the E Bureau of the Department were summoned to the Vice President's cabin to discuss how he should handle the "pasta war." We spent about the next four hours, first briefing Bush on the background and then discussing possible courses. By the time we landed, we had developed a position that the Vice President could table with the Italians. It was not a matter that had been discussed or settled in Washington before departure, so that we were left to our own devices. And certainly the Italians would have found it disingenuous if the Vice President of the United States had landed and said that he could not discuss the hot issue of the day. My guess was that the determination had probably been drafted many weeks earlier, without any thought having been given to the Vice President's trip. The timing of the signing and Bush's departure were pure coincidence which left a vacuum that that VP had to fill. I could well imagine that some bureaucrat, who had been pushing this paper for weeks and finally managed to get a Presidential signature on it, woke up the next morning in some panic because no one had thought of the VP's trip when the paper was put in front of Reagan. So as I said, the VP was left on his own devices and we had to develop a negotiating strategy, including a fall-back position. We cobbled all of this together and then informed Washington of what Bush intended to do. In any case, Bush's visit became the starting point for the development of a compromise which was finally agreed to a few days later. I don't suppose that this sort of thing happens very often, but it illustrates how the best bureaucratic plans can go awry through sheer inadvertence. Craxi, the Italian Prime Minister, just had to show that he had made extraordinary efforts to correct this US "injustice" which meant that the Vice President just had to become engaged. I can well remember that while in Rome that every pasta course was accompanied by humorous toasts and jokes. In any case, Bush was able to start the resolution process and he became the hero of the "pasta war".

I think that all embassies, on both the 1984 and 1985 trips, did a very good job in supporting the Vice President. A VP trip is almost as massive a logistic nightmare than a Presidential one. Around the clock operations had to be set up on hotel suites; the Secret Service and White House communication staffs had to be supported; all the whims of the Vice President and his party had to be satisfied. Of course, embassies in Europe are by now completely familiar with Presidential and Vice-Presidential trips and have pretty much of a set routine. It is the smaller embassies in more remote areas of the world which find such visits overwhelming. These visits are a great inconvenience, but by now, they are accepted as part of diplomatic life. I think that Vice President and his staff came away from both trips satisfied that they had been given good support by the embassies.

I found, during the second trip, the discussions of terrorism very interesting. I learned how feckless the Europeans were on that issue, torn between their desire to buy off the terrorists and their understanding what a dangerous game such "giving in" was. I began to appreciate how difficult it was to deal with an on going terrorist incident such as the TWA plane where Americans were among the victims. It is a lesson that I would soon have to use in my future assignment in Beirut.

I was already in EUR when KAL 007 was shot down by the Soviets in August 1983. In fact that was my first major crises in EUR. I happened to be in Rehoboth Beach at the time, on my first day of a two week vacation. Rick Burt called me and told me to hurry back to Washington, which I did. There were three issues involved in the crises. One was the credibility of the representation of our analysis of events leading up to the actual shooting. As it turned out, my experiences in PA and especially on the Public Diplomacy inter-agency working group, was very useful and relevant. The event took place rapidly, but then there was a lot of high level discussion--Shultz, McFarlane and Clark--about whether we should make available to the public the tape of the voices of Soviet ground controllers and their pilots as the MiGs began to close in on the Korean airliner. Some members of the intelligence community were very much opposed because they feared that such disclosure would compromise their collection methods and assets. Others thought that the tapes should be "doctored" the tapes to mask the technical capabilities that we had. There were even some suggestions that the tapes be "doctored" to make the Soviets look even more cold-hearted than they were. I thought that we should make the tapes public, but I was certainly unalterably opposed to "doctoring" the tapes. I knew that without question that fact would become public much to our discredit and subjecting us to manufacturing evidence. I could sympathize with the concerns of the intelligence community, but the position of some showed little understanding of the world of public diplomacy. Fortunately, no senior administration official gave any support to the idea of "doctoring". So the major issue at the beginning was whether and how we would use the intelligence material that we had.

Part of that decision depended on knowing what intelligence activities we were undertaking in the Pacific area at about the time of the shoot-down. There had been a RC-135 (a collector of ELANT) in the area whose air signature was roughly similar to the Korean airliner. That RC-135 had been flying in the area about four hours earlier and undoubtedly the Soviets had tracked it. So one possibility was that the Soviets might have thought that the RC-135 was returning for another pass, but when the tapes were made available to us, it was clear that the Soviets knew that the surveillance plane had landed in the Aleutians. But of course, when I arrived at my office several hours after the event, all I knew was what I had heard on the radio. I was also aware that we and others were about to send some strong signals that this kind of behavior was just unacceptable. The President had already issued a statement to that effect. Congress had also already express strong criticism, which was particularly vehement since one of the passengers on the airline was a Congressman--Larry McDonald. So I knew that we were heading into a major world crisis.

The RC-135 flight was known within the government when I arrived in Washington. Rick wanted me to rush over to the NSC to take the lead in the process that was being established to examine all of the evidence that we were collecting for public presentation. He had already obtained the Secretary's blessing for a public presentation of our knowledge. But the next many hours were spent debating on the extent of our disclosure and discussing some of the wild ideas emanating from the intelligence community. Shultz, I believe, was actually in California on vacation, but he was in constant contact with Burt by phone as was Eagleburger. Initially, the government's working group was established under the aegis of the NSC. Once we had agreed that the evidence would be made public, that we would seek a UN resolution of condemnation and that there would be an international air boycott of the Soviet Union, a working group, under the chairmanship of EUR, was set up to implement the diplomatic strategy that had been decided by the White House. Rick was the chairman; all agencies were represented. I remember the first meeting; there must have been 40 or 50 people in attendance. Everybody and his brother wanted to be on the hot issue of the day. So the first thing we had to do was to reduce the size of the working group; we couldn't possibly work effectively with all those people. The decision by this time had already been made to release all of our intelligence collection to the UN and the public. By the second or third day after the incident I was satisfied that we had conclusive evidence of Soviet responsibility. My experience in INR had given me some familiarity with exotic compartmentalized information, so that I had some understanding of the reliability of the intelligence that had been collected. My understanding was bolstered by some conversations I had with some old friends in the intelligence community, which allowed to verify independently that we were getting good and complete reports. So I was comfortable that we had all the evidence we needed to make a convincing and strong public case.

This interagency group was charged with developing and implementing a diplomatic strategy. Part of that task involved getting a majority of votes in the Security Council on our side so that our resolution could be adopted. Ultimately, that resolution was approved, but not until we had to resort some shenanigans to get the Malta and the Zimbabwe votes. Robert Mugabe was due to visit Washington soon after the KAL 007 incident; nevertheless, Zimbabwe refused to vote for our resolution. Due to that position, it lost \$50 million of assistance.

Malta, two hours before the vote, was still not going to go along. Eagleburger and I called the Maltese Foreign Minister in Valletta. He demanded as a *quid pro quo* that the US sign a bilateral treaty with Malta which would guarantee that we would not shoot down Maltese airliners, even if they strayed over American air space. The Maltese would agree not to fire over American airliners flying over their air space. It was the height of ridiculousness; Malta at that point had two planes, neither of which ever flew across the Atlantic and no American airline served Malta. So Eagleburger readily agreed to sign such a treaty and Malta voted with us. Later, the Department's lawyers pointed out that Eagleburger didn't have the necessary Presidential authorization to give assurances. Lawyers can always find reasons why actions should not be taken; fortunately Eagleburger didn't hesitate and the Malta vote was ours. In fact, the next day, we drew up a treaty which we and Malta signed.

The most serious problem we faced was how to implement an international airline boycott. We invited Duffy, the President of the Airline Pilots Association, to attend one of our working group's meetings. He also headed at that time IALP (the International Airline Pilots Association). We assumed that the pilots would be very supportive of our actions intended to protect airliners. In fact, the IALP became a major lobby with all governments for our boycott. They were very helpful as we tried to persuade governments to join the boycott. We didn't want a repeat of the Carter administration's experience with the boycott of the Moscow Olympics where the US was essentially the only power that didn't participate. We tried to entice a uniform boycott by limiting its time and scope. There were some "hard liners" in our group that were seeking an indefinite boycott, but most of us understood that the "all or nothing" approach would most likely leave us with "nothing". So we proposed a three week boycott; that was enough to have all the major countries in the world to join us except Sweden and Ireland. A lot of neutrals joined us: the Swiss, the Finns, but the Irish wouldn't because they were making money from the Soviets for the use of Shannon airport, which Aeroflot used for its Latin American service. The Irish didn't want to jeopardize that income. A Swedish diplomat told me that he and his government had not been persuaded by the case we had made, even though it had plenty of evidence supporting him. He suggested that the tapes might have been "doctored". I threw him out of my office! But in general, it was an effective boycott which I am sure got the Soviets' attention.

There was another highlight of the KAL 007 aftermath that I might mention. A few days after the episode, the Secretary and Burt went to Geneva for what was supposed to have been the start of the CSCE Ministerial Review Conference. The Conference was scheduled to last one week; it broke up after one day because of the KAL 007 incident. When Burt left, I became the acting Assistant Secretary for EUR. One action that had been approved by the Secretary and the President was that a diplomatic note be presented to the Soviets requesting that they acknowledge responsibility which they had of course refused to do because their position was one of total ignorance of what happened. The note also demanded that after they acknowledged responsibility for the tragedy, we demanded that the Soviets also pay retribution to the Republic of Korea and all of the victims' families. I called in the Soviet Charge; it was an unpleasant meeting which TIME magazine described in some lurid detail. I knew that the meeting would be widely covered in the press; so I did not offer the Charge a chair, but just handed him the note. In fact, this was a tactic that Gromyko had used on Shultz and Burt during a brief meeting which they held in Geneva just a few days earlier. The Charge and I knew each other from previous meetings. He read the note and threw it on my coffee table; I picked up and gave to him again and told him to take it, which he eventually did. I then called him in several times thereafter during which I went through our position and he steadfastly refused to acknowledge any responsibility for the shoot down. In fact, in accordance with the Soviet line, he said that if there had been any shoot down, it was the fault of American intelligence services who were mounting covert actions against the Soviet Union.

But about a week later, to everybody's surprise, Marshall Akrimayoff, the CINC of all Soviet Forces, held a press conference during which he acknowledged the shooting down of a

civilian aircraft, but insisted that it had been a spy plane. This was the same general who committed suicide after the unsuccessful coup of 1991.

There was another dispute involved in this crises. The annual meeting of the General Assembly was to start a couple of weeks later. Under normal circumstances, Foreign Minister Gromyko would have flown to New York in a Soviet plane, but because of the Soviet's refusal to acknowledge responsibility for the shoot-down, we denied overflights rights to Gromyko's plane. I had the pleasure of delivering our diplomatic note which included this denial to the Soviet Charge'. Gromyko never attended that session of the General Assembly. The Soviets, on their part, suspended all negotiations on arms control, which turned out to be a favorable move for us. This was just one of the periods when I was acting Assistant Secretary. In fact, by the end of my two years in EUR, someone calculated that I was acting for about one-fourth of that time. Because Rick had to be away with the Secretary at a meeting in Geneva, I became the main contact with the Soviets during these tense days.

I was also deeply involved in arms control negotiations because it was the central issue in US-European relations. It was a subject that Rick knew very well, so that my expertise was not absolutely essential to EUR. In addition to Rick himself, EUR then had Mark Palmer and Jim Dobbins; it was well staffed with arms control experts, several of whom Rick had raided from PM when he took over in EUR. He had decided that the regional bureau would play a much greater role in arms control than had been true under his predecessors; he in fact took the arms control portfolio with him when he transferred from PM to EUR. By raiding PM, not only did he bolster EUR's capacity in the field, but he also denuded PM of some of its best talent. In large measure, Burt managed to make EUR the central Department bureau on arms control matters. Rick was in on all negotiations with the Soviets on arms control. Rick traveled with Shultz to Europe all the time. My job was to mind the store in Washington. But because Rick did a lot of work on arms control, I did a lot of work on it, although I was spared much of the tedious staff work. Arms control was Rick's number one preoccupation.

I thought we were on the right path on arms control. We were showing determination to stick to our objectives in the face of Soviet pressure. There were many people who wanted to make concessions to the Soviets and who would not take firm positions on some issues. There were many--in ACDA, in State--who showed great concern for the impact that the deployment of Euro missiles might have on arms control negotiations. They would have deferred the deployment. But we stuck to our position and I certainly favored a resolute policy. I thought that a vigorous presentation of our views to the Soviets would be understood by them and would produce, over time, some results, as in fact, it did. I was persuaded very early in his presidency that Ronald Reagan was serious about arms control; most people were not. It was by sheer accident that when in S/S I saw the first hand written letter from Reagan to Brezhnev, which was written from the President's hospital room. I always believed that Reagan was a real "arms control" devotee; I always believed that he would have preferred to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. There were many people in the administration who thought that the President was bluffing; I never shared that view. I took

him at his word and I thought that he was generally on the right track. If I had any disagreements, it was perhaps on tactics, but certainly not the strategic goals. I always felt that a positive and resolute position in negotiations was the right one.

When the "Star War" speech was given in 1973, I was surprised. I thought that Reagan had been sold a bill of goods. Over time, I changed my view; that was particularly true after I had had an opportunity to discuss the issue with some serious European students of arms control. They viewed Reagan's approach with some favor because they felt that he was really exploiting American technology superiority. Even though a perfect defense against incoming missiles was never perceived as possible, there would be many good by-products from the effort to build such a shield--technological advances that would redound to US benefit. After those discussions, I had to reevaluate my position; I never became an advocate of the huge investment that "Star Wars" would have required, I did believe and do believe that there is considerable merit in the idea. There were a number of people in the bureaucracy who agreed with me. Shultz would periodically return from a meeting with the President and call us up to his office where he would tell us that the President wanted a plan to eliminate nuclear weapons. That was too much to ask of the bureaucracy; it was focused on the goal of stability of weapons around the world, hopefully at a lower level than then existing. To think of a zero sum game was more than a bureaucracy could digest. The people who met in Shultz' office had the sense that the President's vision was just too radical to become part of US policy. After Shultz had been asked several times for such a plan, he had to confess to the President that he could not get his staff to produce a paper. He would return from those Oval Office sessions and look at the group and ask: "Does any one have any ideas?". No one had any idea how the world might get rid of all nuclear weapons. We would take Shultz' charge and discuss it in Rick's office; no one had any ideas. That would upset Rick who felt that the Secretary had charged him to come with a plan, but no one could figure out how to get from where we were to zero. We could develop ideas on how to make some progress--even if incremental--but no one knew how to reach Reagan's goal. Today, I must say, the possibility of achieving Reagan's goal seems more possible; we are discussing today dramatic reductions that in the mid 1980s were not foreseen in our wildest dreams. By the year 2000, we and the Russians will have eliminated 40,000 nuclear warheads; that was just inconceivable even ten years ago. For those countries that insist on developing their own capability, "Star Wars" may be an adequate defense; that makes missile defense a subject still worth pursuing.

I did sit in on meetings that Rick used to have with Richard Perle, the DOD lead man on arms control. The two of them had a very healthy and good relationship. Both Richards are very intelligent, ambitious, hard drivers. They often disagreed, although I think the tone of their disagreements was in part for show. In fact, they agreed on many more issues than they disagreed. For example, they agreed on the need for a strong defense, the need for a firm line with the Soviets. Their disagreements were more often about tactics, not goals. They had a profound respect for each other; in fact, they were friends who would--and still do--socialize together. A lot of people in the media, in the government and in Congress, refused to believe that the two were friends and that they were in full agreement on many issues. Strobe Talbott encouraged Burt to write a book about that relationship and Perle

wrote a novel about some aspects of the relationships. Lots of people just refused to believe that they were two compatible officials. I think a lot of the vehemence of their differences was for public consumption; the media just loved the way they played off each other. Burt and Perle did have some fundamental differences which the media highlighted, but they were a very useful duo for the US.

I found Richard Perle one of the most reliable DOD officials that I ever knew; if I had a serious or difficult problem, I would rather deal with him than anyone else; he was the smartest guy in DOD, saving considerable time trying to explain the issue, and he was decisive--the answer was either "yes" or "no", without equivocation. I remember one petty issue which I brought to Perle's attention. It concerned technology transfer--an export license to a Western European country. I called Perle and told him that the Department wanted to take a certain course of action. He told me that he would flatly oppose that. I asked him what it would take to change his mind. He said: "The assignment of a military officer to the US mission to COCOM in Paris." There was no connection of the two issues, although I guess you might say that both pertained to arms and technology transfers. It just happened that at the time, that assignment was high on Richard's agenda. I said I would look into his request. As it turned out, State Department, for stupid budgetary reasons, was eliminating the position, which made Perle's request much easier to get through the bureaucracy. From a policy point of view, the assignment of a military officer may not have been a wise move, but since the civilian position was to be cut anyway, the addition of another body was welcomed. In the bargaining process, we even got a chance to select the military officer and got DOD approval of a technology transfer that we wanted. Perle was a horse trader--a negotiator and bargainer supreme. Perle was not the easiest guy to get to agree to do something, but once he had done so, you could rest assured that it would be done. He did play a lot of bureaucratic games; he was an expert at that. But we thought that we were pretty good at that ourselves. I know that a lot of my desk officers had a lot of complaints about Perle, mostly dealing with transfer of military equipment or technology. I must say that on a number of issues I was in Perle's corner, even though my staff thought that I had lost my marbles. Perle was an ideologue when it came to the Soviets or their allies; that did not make him wrong or unreasonable all the time.

During the first year, we made very little, if any progress, on arms control. In 1979, NATO had made the decision that if there were not to be any progress on limiting intermediary range theater nuclear systems by December 1983, then Pershing and Cruise missiles would be deployed in Europe. So in Fall, 1983, massive demonstrations took place all over Europe. I thought that the NATO decision was the right one. The Soviets had broken off negotiations after the failed UN session and then took a much too hard line--threatening Kohl, Mitterrand, Thatcher. That was all these leaders needed; if they had any thoughts of being more accommodating, those threats stiffened their backbones. Parliaments all over Europe voted in favor of deployment. Those were key votes because they gave evidence of public support for our strategy. I think the Soviets really misread the mood of European publics. In October, Gromyko sent letters to all Western European heads of government, saying that arms control negotiations would be suspended. That was followed by the first

deployments in December. In January 1984, Gromyko met with Shultz in Stockholm to discuss the resumption of arms control negotiations. By June, the talks began again.

I became involved in more economic issues than I had expected: corn gluten, intellectual property rights, etc. Those fell in my lap primarily because I was the acting Assistant Secretary so often or because if Tom Niles, whose province these issues fell in--and he was very good with them--was out of town, I would have to pinch hit. Also I found that as I traveled in Europe, those issues were high on the Europeans' agenda. I must say that the more I became familiar with them, the more intrigued I was with these economic issues. I began to realize their importance. I know that some people thought that arms control issues were esoteric; I thought that economic issues were esoteric; we were all wrong. Many of the issues in both areas required primarily common sense and did not need an encyclopedic knowledge of the subject matters.

I spent a lot of time on the management of the Bureau, primarily personnel assignments. Rick had no interest in any assignment below the ambassadorial or DCM levels and at that, he didn't really want to spend much time on those either. So he let me manage the personnel process; all I needed to do was to keep him informed. I cared about the assignments of counselors and section chiefs. I started the practice of requiring my approval of all ambassadorial, DCM, principal officers and section chiefs assignments. That took up a lot of time, but I think it was important work. This was during a period when PER was the responsible office for assignments--as you know, that pendulum tends to swing between the regional bureaus and PER depending on who the Under Secretary for Management might be. That meant that we spent a lot of time negotiating with PER. It was my first major exposure to the personnel process of the Foreign Service.

I was shocked and disappointed to find out that there was still overt discrimination against female FSOs. People would repeatedly say to me that a woman could not go to an assignment because she was a female. This was 1983-85 and these were European posts! These comments came from people in EUR and after overcoming my initial shock, really upset me. I thought that that attitude was a real mark of lack of professionalism in the Foreign Service, and I was deeply disappointed to find that out. I believed then, had for many years and believe now, that gender is irrelevant to assignments. I am only interested in the qualifications of the individual.

At the same time, I did not encounter any racial discrimination. No one ever suggested to me that an assignment might not be appropriate for an officer because of his or her skin color. But the gender issue came up repeatedly and as I said, that upset me. After a while, people stopped using that rationale because by that time, my staff had found out what my strong reactions were. I discussed this issue with George Vest, then the Director General of the Foreign Service. As a matter of fact, I talked to George frequently; he was one of the people I felt I could always approach for wise counsel. It was never PER that raised the gender question; it was always the EUR people. They may have felt that I was not part of the "club" since I had only served in Europe for a one tour, unlike Niles and Dobbins who were "EUR bred".

I can recall having a number of discussions with George--it is impossible to have an argument with George--about training assignments. The Department at the time was very high on the importance of training. I certainly supported the concept, but would often find difficulty with some specific PER suggestions. That usually happened when we had the perfect assignment for the officer at one of our post, but PER wanted to send him or her for training. It was hard to convince PER to do otherwise. I thought that PER took a too rigid approach and a number of officers missed good field assignments in order to go to training.

During this period, the assignment process was fairly easy to manipulate. That was not necessarily good. I wanted to bring into EUR officers who had served primarily in other areas of the world. The "bid" system was already in effect; the regional bureaus would get the list of all the officers who had bid for vacancies in their offices. In EUR, all the deputy assistant secretaries and the office directors would get together and meet for an interminable amount of time--fortunately, this happened only two or three times each year. We would review all the bids for jobs above the most junior levels. Then the game began. One of our guys knew someone on the list; he liked him and thought he would be good in a certain position, either in Washington or overseas. I think it was a great waste of time, but I participated in this time-honored practice because I was anxious to have "new blood" brought into the bureau. I thought that EUR was still far too in-bred. I think I was fairly successful in this effort, although much too often I had to go to Rick to get him to sign a memorandum directing the Bureau to accept Mr. or Ms. X, Y or Z, who was not a member of the "EUR club". He did that almost automatically since he didn't know any of the people involved and left the judgement of qualifications up to me.

Even in the mid-1980s, not only did we still have a strong "EUR club", but we had many "sub-clubs": the German, Soviet, French, Italian ones. These informal networked were still very vocal in support of their own; I thought that those days should have passed from the scene long ago. We were all part of the Foreign Service of the United States and I thought these cliques were wrong and not helpful to policy development. I used to get some phone calls, primarily from DCMs and even from some ambassadors about certain assignments asking for a specific individual or most likely, suggesting that another candidate be found for one of their vacancies. On section chief jobs, I didn't mind hearing from the posts and I would certainly take their views into account as long as their positions were well reasoned. For jobs below that level, I had very little patience for pleas from the field.

I think that all the personnel in EUR were very good. Most had served in the area for many years. They were a little resistant to the unusual. For example, in 1984, when we were evacuating the American military forces from Lebanon, there was a proposal to station some military helicopters on Cyprus in one of the British military bases. These choppers were intended primarily to support the American Embassy in Beirut. I first heard about it from the Pentagon; I was called by a DOD official--maybe it was Perle--and informed that one of my staff members was "sitting" on a telegram which would have instructed our Embassy in Nicosia to seek Cypriot assent to station the helicopters in their country, even though they were to be on a British base. So I went to find the telegram and found that the

action officer had not done anything on it for four or five days. There were some EUR people who objected to the Pentagon's suggestion, partly out of fear of Cypriot rejection and partly because they didn't think we should have American forces on that island under any conditions--although we had had several other facilities for many years. I called a meeting of all the EUR people involved and the consensus was that we should not even ask the Cypriots. I suggested that some concern should be shown to their colleagues in Beirut who needed help--little did I know what my future would hold! I thought we should proceed and if the Cypriots wanted to say "No", then we would worry about it at that time. In any case, I decided that the cable should be sent. The Cypriots immediately agreed. I mention this just as an illustration of the conventional mind set of many of the Europeanists; if something has not been done before, let us not start now. There were a number of situations of that kind. But the staff was smart, alive and given good direction, would perform well.

By the mid-1980s, the problems of dual assignments--husband and wife--had become a real factor in the assignment process. Fortunately, the issue arose most often in the assignment of more junior officers, as you might well expect from a fairly recent phenomenon. So it was easier to accommodate a working couple since there were obviously more jobs at the lower levels than there were at the Counselor level. I always thought that, all other things being equal, we should do our best to accommodate the needs of a "tandem" couple by assigning them to the same post. I believe we manage to satisfy most of those situations.

I did have one problem in the general personnel area, which I would categorize as the "care and feeding" of ambassadors. In the mid-1980s, we had about 35 ambassadors in EUR. The majority of those were "political"; i.e. non-career--appointees. There were only about ten Foreign Service officers serving in ambassadorial positions. What I had not anticipated was that in any given month, several would get into trouble--which ranged from financial problems to servant requirements. The last category always amused me; we would get a frantic call from an administrative officer who would report that his ambassador had requested the issuance of official government travel orders to his wife so that she could go to Paris, for example, to interview prospective members of the household staff--most often a chef. Another problem used to arise when the paintings from the "Arts in Embassy" program, which had hung in an ambassadorial or DCM residence, had "mistakenly" been packed with the rest of the household effects and shipped to the next post. We would be advised by the GSO of the new post or some other source that the household effects of the former DCM in an EUR post contained paintings which looked very much like something that might have belonged to an "Arts in Embassy" program. I viewed such situations as pure theft. This happened much too often, involving both career and non-career officials. One case involved the employment of a cook who was known as a KGB agent; she was hired as a cook, but enjoyed her time off in the ambassador's bed! Frankly, I was amazed by the number and variety of issues of this nature that were brought to my attention. The Foreign Service certainly had a "Peyton Place" aspect. Rick never wanted to touch any of these situations. These issues were so sensitive that the Executive Director used to bring them to my attention. I would then in many ambassadorial cases go to see Ken Dam, the Deputy Secretary--Shultz also didn't want to get involved in these matters. We would try to

figure out a solution; in the case of financial malfeasance, the resolution was reimbursement. In other situations, we might send an inspector for investigation. Paintings would be shipped back at the employee's expense. As I said, I was astounded by the frequency of these problems; there were far more than I encountered later in NEA.

I also became generally involved in budgetary matters, although our very good Executive Director, Mary Ryan, handled most of that area. What defense I had to present in Congress on our resource requirements dealt with security assistance programs for Greece, Turkey, Spain and Portugal--the Azores. These appearances were essentially perfunctory. Several times I had prepped to appear before Congressman Obey's appropriations subcommittee that handled the State Department budget, but for one reason or another, I never had to appear. As far as Greece, Turkey--and Cyprus--were concerned, we were at a stalemate. A number of special emissaries had tried to put Cyprus back together again. They spent considerable amount of the taxpayer's money making trips back and forth without any results. In my time, Richard Haas was the Special Coordinator for Cyprus; he had many other duties besides that one. I believe that there was no movement on the Cyprus issue because all the major players were reactively satisfied with the *status quo*. No one could see any progress being made without running the risk of jeopardizing his domestic position; that perception did not provide much of an incentive to reach an accommodation. Both the Greeks and Turks had strong domestic constituencies that they did not believe they could effort to affront; any settlement was a "high risk, low return" strategy. Any Greek or Turkish politician who might have considered some resolution would be accused of not giving adequate protection this constituency or community in the island. The only people who really suffered from the split in Cyprus were those who were displaced after partition or those who owned property on the other side of the dividing line. The Cyprus division was of little concern to the people who lived in Greece and Turkey and was by his time acceptable to the two communities in Cyprus. Those communities had adjusted to the partition and since there was no longer much danger of bullets flying, they had accepted their fate. As far as the US was concerned, we certainly would have preferred a settlement of a dispute between two NATO allies, but as long as the risk of an outbreak of hostilities was relatively small, the resolution of the Cyprus problem was not high on our foreign policy agenda. We did not have any bright ideas which would be satisfactory to all sides; no one ever said that he or she had the solution. There was no serious pressure to force a resolution. So lived with the *de facto* separation. We had to report periodically to Congress on what was happening on the Cyprus problem and the issue would invariably arise during discussions of the Greek and Turkish aid programs. We held meetings with the Greek-American lobby; we met regularly with Archbishop Karkavas and other leaders of the Greek-American community. They would first call on the Secretary and then went to see Derwinski, who met with every ethnic delegation. Then they would come to the Bureau, where we would brief them and occasionally we would lunch together. We did that with other groups as well, such as the Armenian-Americans.

One noticeable event in Greek-US relations in the 1983-85 period came when the Greek government freed a known Palestinian terrorist, who had been involved in the murder of some Americans and some Israelis. We retaliated by issuing a "traveler's warning" warning

Americans travelers of the risks involved in visiting Greece. My guess is that enough Americans were scared off to cost the Greeks about \$100 million in income from canceled reservations. The financial drain was serious enough to get the Greek government's attention.

I did testify on a number of occasions on issues other than assistance when Burt couldn't appear. I remember discussing human rights in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Soviet Jewry and international child pornography. I never knew anything about this major problem; there was in fact a major traffic between Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and even the U.S. in child pornography. I had to educate myself on the issue for these appearances. I was absolutely horrified when I found out the extent and nature of that traffic. It was despicable and even included video tapes of children being murdered and tortured. Senators Roth and Specter were the ones that brought this tragedy to the public's attention. They may have done so for the publicity, but they did bring to light one of the most depraved crimes that I ever encountered. Child pornographers should be condemned and punished as severely as possible; there was no excuse for the traffic. The hearings produced some legislation which tightened controls in Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark. I called in the ambassadors from these countries and confronted them with the evidence that we had on pornographic traffic. When I visited the capitals of those countries, I used to raise it with the Foreign Ministries; everybody was ashamed and their protestations of a "free country" sounded very hollow. Those countries then passed legislation and I think in part that was the result of Congressional hearings. The hearings were big news in those countries; not only was the subject abhorrent, but that the US Congress had to hold hearings on the subject to try to bring the problem under control. It is absolutely true that the Department was not cognizant of the problem until the Congressional inquiries started.

I should talk a little about our relationships with other agencies. I have already discussed our association with Richard Perle. He had a deputy, Ron Lauder, who later became our Ambassador to Austria, with whom we dealt. He was a member of the S.D. Lauder family. He did not however become deeply involved in the issues that were of importance to us and Perle. On military assistance, I dealt with Glen Rudd, the Deputy Director of DSAA, as well as my colleagues in PM and T. The seven-ten ratio between Greece and Turkey kept us out of most intra- and inter-agency disputes on those major programs. The fact that there were some Congressional support for the ratio and the programs kept the debates to a minimum. By the mid-1980s, our assistance programs to those countries had been ingrained into our positions vis-a-vis those countries; we did not expect any *quid pro quo* and kept the programs going just not to upset the on-going relationships. Richard Perle was a firm believer in the theory that the Turks were the linchpin of our Southern NATO flank. It was a pleasure to testify with him on assistance to Turkey and Greece; he had all the intellectual arguments for the importance of Turkey which he delivered in his usual eloquent fashion.

I used to see one or another or more of the principals on the Seventh Floor daily. The Shultz regime was very open and free. People who had valid reason to see one of the principals

could do so without difficulty and that included the Secretary. There was a free flow of ideas and views between the Seventh Floor and other offices. I thought it was a very effective operation.

I might mention one more incident that occurred during my tenure as principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for EUR. I refer to the speech that Ronald Reagan made on June 6, 1984--the 40th Anniversary of D-Day. He went to the Normandy Beach and gave a speech at Point le Hoc--the bluff that the Americans Rangers liberated on that day in 1944. That speech was considered by many as having been his best and most lasting speech ever. Great credit is given to the White House speech-writers for the job they did on it, but as usual, the Department is asked to submit a draft or ideas; as a matter of fact, we would submit speech drafts whether we were asked or not. Early in May, I had volunteered--something I rarely do when it comes to speeches--to draft the first version. In fact, I did the first three drafts. I still have copies of them. The reason I volunteered is because when I was serving in Paris as the Politico-Military officer I had to negotiate the transfer of the land at Point le Hoc from France to the United States. So I had an emotional attachment to that piece of land; I had learned its history quite well and had visited every inch of it. So I told Rick that I really wanted to take a crack at the President's speech. I was delighted that it turned out as well as it did and that I had a chance to participate in its development. It was one of those rare occasions when one gets to combine the professional and the personal.

Q: We are now in mid-1985. Burt was about to leave to be the American Ambassador to West Germany. What was your career plan at that stage?

KELLY: I had learned about Rick's appointment a few months earlier and knew that Roz Ridgway, our Ambassador to East Germany, would succeed him. I had known Roz for several years and liked and respected her. I wrote her soon after I heard of her forthcoming assignment to let her know that since I had been in Washington for five years, I thought it was time for me to return to the field. I thought that she would wish to pick her own deputies, but I told her that I would be willing to stay as long as I was needed for the transition. She wrote me a note of thanks and asked me to stay for a brief period, noting that she expected to have her team in place fairly soon and then that I would be free to pursue my career. So I started to seek overseas possible assignments.

My first preference was to become the DCM in Paris. A new Ambassador was about to be appointed--Joe Rogers (former chairman of the Reagan-Bush campaign committee)--and I had hoped that he might select me. I finally had been appointed to the senior service and for one of the rare times, I was eligible for that position. In fact, that promotion in 1984 came in the nick of time because I had only one year left before I was probably going to be selected out for having failed to be promoted into the senior service. Joe ultimately called and said that he preferred someone who was married; he thought that since this was his and his wife's first experience in the Foreign Service, he felt more comfortable having a married DCM. I was greatly disappointed because I thought that Rogers and I had had a good luncheon meeting and I knew that Shultz, McFarlane and Burt had given me strong support. It was a job that really interested me.

Somewhere along the line, Shultz talked to my brother Jim, who was working in the Pentagon, and reassured him that some good assignment would be found for me. Shultz and Burt discussed my future. The Secretary then called me to see whether I would be interested in becoming the Ambassador to Ireland. I was packed before the Secretary could finish his question! But Shultz warned me to sell all my assets because this was a job that normally did not go to a professional. In fact, there was a stalemate in the White House; several large contributors were vying for the job, which had put the White House in a very difficult political position. Shultz, under the circumstances, had suggested to McFarlane that perhaps the time had come for a professional to be appointed to Dublin. The Irish had mentioned the same thing to McFarlane. Bud went as far as informally asking the Irish deputy Foreign Minister whether my nomination would be acceptable; the Irish find it so. So all the signs were positive and my hopes were raised, although I kept all of this as quiet as I could. A few weeks later, I opened my Sunday *Washington Post* and read that Don Regan, the new White House Chief of Staff, had decided to fire Margaret Heckler, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. To smooth the way for this removal Regan had decided to nominate Heckler as Ambassador to Ireland. That was the end of my dream, but fortunately I had always told myself that the odds were still against me and therefore was not too upset by his turn of events. In any case, all my friends rallied around and promised me that they would find another equally attractive assignment.

On one day in late July or early August 1985, I got calls from Ron Spiers, the Under Secretary for Management, George Vest, the Director General and Mike Armacost, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. All three said that they had meant to call me for several days, but just had not had a chance to get around to it. They wanted me to know that Reginald Bartholomew would be leaving Lebanon where he was our Ambassador as soon as another assignment could be found for him. He had been wounded and it was time for him to leave. Then would come a pause and my heart began to beat quicker. In each case, I was asked whether I would think about being put on a list of possible candidates for the Beirut job. By the second call, I knew that these conversations had not been initiated by coincidence. By the time the third call, I commented that the subtlety displayed had the all the earmarking of a sledge hammer hitting a pavement.

I went home that night and told my son that I thought that Beirut might well be in our future. He wanted to know why they had focused on me. He was about to join the Air Force, so that I had no family to worry about. Furthermore, I had no assignment and then I added that I thought that Lebanon might be a very interesting assignment. So I told the powers-to-be that I was willing to be considered. Nothing happened for several months, even though Dick Murphy a few days after the Spiers-Vest-Armacost calls, told me not to consider any other assignments; he was sure that I would be sent to Lebanon. Also, the next time Bartholomew came to Washington, we got together so that he could give me at least an initial briefing. But as far as I knew, no paper work was moving. I continued in my job in EUR until the end of September, then I went on leave for a couple of weeks. Then I was supposed to be given some short term assignments--"make work" mostly. In any case, I started working on this project. One day, while walking down a corridor, I ran into Peter

Rodman, then the head of the Policy Planning Staff and Mort Abramowitz, then the Director of INR. They looked at me and asked me what I was doing. I told them that I was waiting for the Lebanon appointment and that in the meantime I was working on some short term assignment. Their faces lit up; they asked me how I would like to go to the South Pacific. I thought they were joking, but it turned out that they were looking for a senior officer to head a fact finding mission on the South Pacific territories. They wanted me to leave in a couple of days because they needed some one reliable in a hurry. I was puzzled. Rodman and Abramowitz told me that Kiribati, a newly independent state--formerly known as the Gilbert Islands--had signed a fisheries treaty with the Soviet Union, which allowed Soviet "fishing" vessels to fish in the waters around the island for \$2 million per year. George Shultz had been part of the American task force that had liberated the Gilberts from the Japanese in 1943; so he had a personal attachment to Kiribati; he had fought on those islands. In fact, he had visited the islands in 1984. He got very upset when he read the report for this treaty and tasked Rodman, Abramowitz and Sigur, the Assistant Secretary for E/AP, to come up with a plan to rescue the South Pacific from the Soviets. As good bureaucrats, the first step of their plan was to despatch a fact finding mission to the area. Of course, they did not have anyone in mind to head the mission when they sent their suggestions to Shultz. I must have seemed as *deus ex machina* when they saw me in the hall. They told me that I would probably be gone for about two months. As I said, the original idea was to send a team, but the travel costs in that part of the world were so high that no one could afford to send more than one person. So I went alone to 14 states and territories in the two months. actually, I ended up with the single most expensive airline ticket that the Department had ever bought.

I was sent out to survey the area and develop a plan which would prevent Soviet penetration of the South Pacific. I started in Hawaii, then Tahiti, the Cook Islands, Western Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, Vanuatu and Australia. I missed the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea because of scheduling difficulties. After the fact finding, I wrote a report and made recommendations on how the US could prevent these impoverished mini-states--all except Nauru--from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. The Soviets were beginning to spread their cash around the region, while we were cutting our assistance programs--from a pittance to almost nothing. The French controlled Tahiti and New Caledonia; that latter country was very unhappy. No one from the US government had visited a lot of these places; they were just dots on the map for most of us. I think it was a wonderful trip. I used only commercial airlines, although it would have been cheaper and far more efficient to use a military aircraft. Commercial aircraft might fly two times a week to some of these islands, if you are lucky. Some of the planes were six or eight-seaters--puddle jumpers.

I sent telexes to all of the governments involved. We of course had no representation on most of them--we had embassies in Fiji and Papua New Guinea. The ambassadors there were accredited to the other governments in the South Pacific, but few if any representatives ever went there. But the embassies could communicate with the island governments through commercial telexes. That is the way they announced my arrival. I had very little competition with the local media, such as it was, because news from the outside

world was scarce in these remote areas. Probably the newscasts from New Zealand or Australia, which could be received on the islands, included an announcement of the visit of a USS government representative. So when I landed, I was treated like a big shot--South Pacific islanders are known for their hospitality. but I think I got special treatment. Some people who had been to these islands gave me tips about which hotels to use--some which had historical interest because people like Somerset Maugham or Robert Lewis Stevenson had frequented some of these spots. Once I had settled into a hotel, I would call the Prime Minister's office--all had one digit phone numbers--and announce my arrival and request an appointment. They all saw me within twenty-four hours and would spend a half a day talking with each of them. Then there were always ceremonies and large meals and I would spend two or three days, talking and eating with the local leadership. Then it was off to the next island. It was wonderful!

I spent much of the time talking about the Soviets and islands' economic situations. The South Pacific nuclear free zone would invariably arise because of the test being conducted in their backyards. All the islanders were convinced that the waters surrounding them was being poisoned, even though most were 2,000 miles away from the French explosion sites. Many of the leaders felt that the ocean was becoming radium active, despite all the tests that the French had undertaken, indicating the sheer absurdity of the claim. So they all cared about a South Pacific nuclear free zone. The Pacific Forum, which was their regional conference, had already drafted the text of treaty which would make the South Pacific nuclear free. The fact that the West was not willing to sign such a treaty became a very popular platform for Soviet propaganda.

My report was in fact put in the "deep freeze" because I advocated that the US sign on to a South Pacific nuclear free zone. That draft treaty would not have covered port calls by nuclear-powered ships or transit by such ships, so that it would have not harmed us in the least. In fact, Admiral Hayes, who commanded CINCPAC, told me, when I saw him in Hawaii that he could live with the treaty. he said that it was Washington, including Richard Perle, who wouldn't consider signing on to that treaty. He was of course concerned about the precedent that the South Pacific treaty might become. In addition, I supported an expansion of our assistance programs, at least back to the levels they had reached previously. The Prime Minister in Kiribati had told me that he had signed an agreement with the Soviets for \$2 million; he was willing to cancel it if the US would give him \$2 million and one. The Prime Minister of Fiji pointed out that his country had always supported us in the UN and thought that his was the only country that in fact had done that. He said that he had nothing to show for his loyalty; on the contrary our assistance program had been sharply reduced. That did not sit very well with him or his countrymen. Thirdly, I recommended that we sign a tuna fisheries agreement with those islands, which we had refused to do for years because our industry was exploiting the tuna grounds in the area. Finally, I recommended that USIA establish a satellite broadcasting system so that the islanders could get US perspectives on events and subjects. The New Zealander and Australian broadcasts had a Fabian socialist tinge to them.

But because of the nuclear free zone problem, my report was killed. It ran into opposition from PM and the Pentagon and was the end of that. In fact, the Soviets never did really expand their influence in the South Pacific because not long after my trip, the Berlin wall fell and the Soviet empire came apart. The Soviets paid the \$2 million to Kiribati and did conduct some fishing, but never really expanded into the whole South Pacific. I returned to Washington on Christmas Eve 1985. By late January, I had filed my report.

Q: After your fact finding to the South Pacific, what happened next in your career?

KELLY: As I may have said, before leaving for my fact-finding mission, I knew that I was the Department's choice to become Ambassador to Lebanon. So for about four or five months--due to the typical inefficiency of the government--, I waited for the nomination process to take its course through the White House and the other various clearance points in the Executive Branch. There was no sense of urgency in the bureaucracy to move my nomination because Reg Bartholomew was still in Beirut. He left around May 1, which spurred the bureaucracy to give my clearance a somewhat higher priority.

I spent part of my time while waiting on two special assignments for Ron Spiers, the Under Secretary for Management. First, I studied the responsiveness of the Department to field requests on matters of security. This interest was in part due to the great interest that the Department showed at the time in response to the Beirut bombings and other terrorist threats. There were many ambassadors who complained to Spiers that their security request were being ignored. So I reviewed that process for Ron; I found it very useful in my next assignment. I also conducted a study for Spiers on the question of whether the Department's policy for maintaining a time limit on FS-1 who had applied for entrance into the Senior Service, but who had not been admitted for six years. An individual who had not been promoted to the Senior Service after that period was involuntarily separated.

In early June, I was told one day that the President was about to call me to officially ask me to become his representative in Lebanon. That had been President Reagan's style; he called every one of his ambassadorial nominees personally. The President in fact did call and I told him I would be delighted to go to Beirut. Then the paper work really began to move and a couple of weeks later, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee gave me a hearing. Soon after that, my nomination was cleared for Senate floor action, but as happens frequently, my nomination and that of several others got caught in a two-month "hold", requested by Senator Jesse Helms. He was having one of his periodical disputes with Secretary Shultz and that put a hold on all nominations. Just before the Senate recessed in August, at 3 a.m., my nomination and one other were released by Helms and we were approved by the Senate. I guess those two nominations were the most urgent of a fairly long list. Of course, no one informed me of the Senate action. In fact, I left on vacation, believing that the Senate still had a "hold" on my name. The newspapers didn't carry the story; no one I think, in fact, knew what had happened at the last minute before adjournment. At that time of morning, there was no representative of the Department's Office for Congressional Relations present.

Before I left, I gave the phone numbers where I could be reached with Congressional Relations and others and left blissfully ignorant of what had transpired for Rehoboth. I thought I would spend a couple of weeks on the beach. The day after I got there, I got a call from someone in the Department; I was told to return immediately because I had been confirmed and that Deputy Secretary wanted to see me the first thing the next day and that I would be leaving for Beirut right afterwards. Only in the Department!

I had had an opportunity in the previous six months to bring myself up to date on our policies and on the situation in Lebanon. I had read a lot and had talked to many people, including Amnesty International, the American Task Force for Lebanon--a citizens' organization--, another human rights group, the American Israeli Political Affairs Committee, the governing board of the American University in Beirut and several other groups. I met with many academics, journalists who had been in Lebanon and anybody who had some knowledge about the situation in Beirut. I found those contacts very useful and I wish that more ambassadorial candidates would have the time to be able to meet with American groups that have an interest in the applicable foreign country.

I was briefed in great detail by the ex-National Security advisor, Bud McFarlane, who although retired from government service, was still involved in clandestine activities. This participation only became public after Iran/Contra was exposed in November 1986, but he told me when he briefed me before my departure for Beirut about everything he was involved. I also met with Dennis Ross, then the Middle East expert on the National Security staff. I did not see Ollie North before my departure; I had met him when I was working in Public affairs, but I did not talk to him about my assignment before I left Washington. I tried several times to make an appointment to see him, but he seemed to be out of town all the time. Ollie did arrange for the McFarlane briefing, although I knew Bud and would have talked to him in case because at one time he had been our negotiator for Lebanon--before he became the NSC advisor. I had no idea when I went to see McFarlane that I would be briefed on one of those most sensitive--and bizarre--operations then being conducted by the US government. I had been given indications in other briefings that Ollie North was involved in some strange activities; in fact, April Glaspie, then the Country Director for the Levant, told me that Ollie was on a trip trying to free the hostages.

Bob Oakley, then the counter-terrorist coordinator, told me that North was up to some scheme to try to buy the hostages out. But no one ever told me--including Shultz--anything about McFarlane. I also went to see Secretary Shultz before leaving assuming that if the Secretary had anything important to tell me about Lebanon, he would do so during my farewell call. I spent about 45 minutes with Shultz during which he told me about his close affinity to the President of Lebanon, about Lebanese politics, about security of the Embassy and its staff. But he never even suggested that there might be something covert going on in Lebanon. Never did he indicate any suspicions--if he had any--and certainly never alerted me that he wanted reports to him on anything that I might find out about Iran/Contra. Unfortunately, I saw Shultz before I saw McFarlane and therefore didn't have a chance to raise the question of what the Secretary knew. But McFarlane certainly gave me a complete

briefing and I think I knew what Ollie and his colleagues were up to as far as the hostages were concerned.

I was also steered to some people whose reputation was not always stellar. We still had hostages in Lebanon and from the President on down, there was a lot of concern for their fates. So I talked to some characters who would meet with me furtively in some out of the way bistro; each of them had a relative or a close friend who knew the kidnapers and could help us get the hostages released. These were self-appointed intermediaries, none of whom, as far as I could find out, were able to do anything constructive. Usually, the American who arranged for these trysts assured me that this particular contact was well connected either with the Iranians or the Syrians or Hezbollah or the Mossad--each of which, I was assured, held the key to the releases.

I arrived in Beirut in late August 1986. I found that there was daily fighting--artillery barrages and shelling--across the "Green Line". There were about four or five Americans who were being held hostage. The Lebanese cabinet had not met for about a year because of the feuding among the different factions. It was a very volatile situation.

When I arrived, the Embassy was staffed by 47 permanently assigned Americans, five or seven temporary duty people and 100 Lebanese employees who had been with the Embassy for many years--they had survived the two bombings which had take a heavy toll on our Lebanese staff. Beirut had been a regional center and therefore used to have a huge staff of locals, but those operations were terminated after the bombings. Nevertheless we had far more Lebanese employees than we needed, but since many had been wounded or injured in the bombings, we kept them on the payroll until they were eligible for retirement. We also had about 650 full-time contract employees--primarily security guards. That was our own militia, which was said to be the fourth largest in the country.

Over the months I spent in Beirut, I became acquainted with many factional leaders. Most of the Lebanese I met were gregarious, charming and intelligent. The leaders, not surprisingly, were all charming and gregarious. A leader of an armed faction would undoubtedly have had blood in his hands; all had had members of their families who had been murdered and I have no doubt that they had all participated in some violent and deathly action. They were very mistrustful of each other, even when allied with each other--temporarily in most cases. Almost all of the leaders mistrusted the United States; as the old saying goes: "Just because you are paranoid does not mean that you don't have a reason for being so." All leaders had real enemies--certainly inside Lebanon and some even outside--plus a few imagined ones. Except for Hezbollah--the armed Islamic fundamentalists--none of the Lebanese factions were particularly interested in harming Americans--most of the time. Hezbollah was a major threat to us. The other factions thought that they could use us for their own individual benefit or that we might even be helpful in certain circumstances.

The major factions were the Phalangists--Maronites Christians--, the Druids led by the Jumblatt family, the Shiites which were divided into two wings--Hezbollah (the extremists

led by Sheikh Fadlallah) and a more moderate group--the Amal movement led by Nabih Berri. Then there were Sunni groups, including one extremist fundamentalist group which was headquartered in Tripoli, run by Sheikh Shabban. An another more moderate Sunni group was led by the Prime Minister Rashid Karami. Then there was a Greek Orthodox faction, who were advisors to every one--brilliant men and women with feet in lots of camps. Then there were the Palestinians as well as Greek Catholics, the Armenian Orthodox, the Armenian Catholics, a very small Protestant group and a minuscule Jewish group of no more than two hundred, most of whom were elderly. The latter were actively hunted down and murdered by Islamic extremists.

As you can see, the factions centered on religious faiths, but not all of the fighting was due to that. Before I left Washington, I read an intelligence report that identified 44 different armed groups. So here were many armed groups within each religious community that often fought each other; in fact some of the most terrible, vicious and bloody warfare pitted one armed faction of one religion against a faction of the same faith. Once I had become familiar with the situation on the ground, I found that my briefings had been quite adequate and that Washington had a good grasp of the situation in Lebanon.

Even in 1986, the question of "why an Embassy in Beirut" kept arising. The Lebanese civil wars had gone on for ten years with no end in sight. When I started my briefings, there was no document that spelled out our interests in Lebanon. But a picture emerged as I talked to a large numbers including the Secretary of State with whom I spent at least 45 minutes before leaving for my post. From these various conversations, I wrote a statement of objectives, which I showed to several officials and generally got their approval.

I basically saw four tasks for the Embassy and myself. The first was to stay alive. That may sound dramatic, but it was a *de minimis* objective, important for political reasons, not to mention personal ones. An bombing of the Embassy, particularly if it took the lives of some Americans and especially an Ambassador or a DCM, would have been a major coup for all those who wished to drive the US out of the region--which was the aim of the fundamentalist extremes. They expected, and I think probably correctly, that if there were enough Americans killed in Lebanon or the region, we would withdraw, leaving the playing field entirely to them. It was clear to me that if the Embassy were bombed again, we would close up shop in Lebanon. Larry Eagleburger, who was no longer in the government, told me in New York that I was taking a big risk; he was referring not only to my physical risk, but also to my career because if there had been any mishap, I would have been the "fault guy". No one had been held accountable for the two bombings that had already occurred; Eagleburger thought that if there were a third attempt, some one would have to shoulder the blame and he thought that would be the Ambassador. In fact, minimizing the Embassy and its staff as targets in not as easy as some may believe, but it was crucial to our mission and was our number one objective.

Secondly, I listed the finding and rescue of the hostages. Thirdly, I listed the administration of our assistance program, which ran approximately \$50 million per annum, in commodities. We had a program because we are Americans; that is when we see some

need, we try to help. Also there were a lot people in the US who had guilty consciences because in 1982 we had inserted a peace keeping force into Lebanon, then had pledged that the troops would remain until peace had come to the country. We also had negotiated a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel which was never signed--for reasons beyond our control. Nevertheless, we had for many years been quite public in our desire to see peace restored to Lebanon and how we would stand with the Lebanese people to bring such a peace. In 1982, the Congress appropriated more than \$500 million for assistance to Lebanon--a significant amount for a country of 2 million people. So in the early 1980s, the US had made a major effort to help the Lebanese, both in bringing peace internally and in bringing peace between it and its southern neighbor, Israel. In fact, we failed; that left a large pool of guilt in Washington. The \$50 million of assistance was in part an effort to assuage that guilt.

The fourth objective was to try to encourage the Lebanese factions to come to some closure to the fighting. So I was charged with getting into contact with most of the warring factions. Hezbollah was out-of-bounds; I was not permitted to talk to any member of that group. The belief was that they were so extreme, so radical, so murderous that any contact with them might well turn out to be a trap from which one might not return alive or might become a hostage. Furthermore, the very act of even suggesting a contact would elevate Hezbollah to a political level that we did believe was not warranted. So there was no official contact--at any level--with the Hezbollah.

Also before I left Washington, I was instructed not to meet with the commander of the Christian militia--the so called "Lebanese forces"--not to be confused with the Lebanese Army. The commander, Samir Geagea, was viewed as a murderer in Washington. This was a characterization which I later found made no sense because every one of the faction leaders had assassinated or had assassinated some one. I did not understand why we singled Geagea out. I had to get permission every time I wished to contact him, which I did initially. By the time I left in 1991, I saw Geagea whenever I wanted. I also found of interest that my staff could have contacts with Geagea's minions; in fact, I met regularly with his deputy. It was only the commander that was on the restricted list because he had been implicated in one of the many, many brutal murders that took place in Lebanon. There were a few others who fell in this category--"do not contact without Washington's approval". Among those was the leader of the gang that went through the refugee camps at Shatila and Sabra slaughtering Palestinians. I did not meet with so-called South Lebanese Army because it never came to Beirut and I never went that far south in the country; in any case, I doubt that we would have met with them because to do so would have granted them a political status equal to the other factions. We did not view the South Lebanon Army as an indigenous force; therefore, I doubt that we would have met with them even if there had been an opportunity; our Embassy staff in Israel was barred from meeting with that Army, even though members of that group went into Israel on a regular basis. I think, in all fairness, I should say that there was no doubt in my mind that various American assistant defense attachés had *sub rosa* meetings with that Army, even though it was against US policy.

I was pretty certain that I was on top of what was going on in Beirut and the in the areas where we operated. No American--regardless of agencies--went into the Bekaa Valley, but I had full confidence that my Embassy staff--State and other agencies--kept me fully informed of their findings. After all, we lived with each other 24 hours a day and we all recognized that our lives depended on each other. A camaraderie and friendship arises in such situation; from that comes a rapid judgement on whom one can trust. So I was very comfortable with my staff and had full confidence in their judgments; they would talk to me on a daily basis and I would be very surprised if I didn't know all that was going on. These conversations were often highly personal; I knew their fears and apprehensions.

I think there was some hope of bringing at least the end of the fighting to Lebanon. In any case, our objective to bring some stability to that country was a worthwhile objective because a Lebanon in turmoil is a seed bed for fundamentalism. If we could assist in bringing some kind of stability, thereby diminishing it as breeding ground for extremists who were attacking Israel and terrorizing any targets of opportunity in the whole world--e.g, assassinating Americans in Paris--that would have been a major achievement for the world's benefit. Our hopes had some realistic base for them because all the Lebanese factions thought that if we, the United States, wanted to achieve any objective, we had the power and means to achieve it. Since all political and military leaders believed that were possessed with such extraordinary powers that we could shape events--a highly doubtful premise in the main--there was a chance that we could utilize this grandiose image of us to bring political change in Lebanon. During my whole tour, almost all the senior Lebanese leaders believed that we had a large naval fleet just over the horizon which I could command just by picking up the phone on my desk; I could order that mighty armada to attack or shell any part of Lebanon. In fact, in 1982 and 1983 such naval shelling had taken place, but by 1986, the Sixth Fleet was not "just over the horizon" nor was it to be used for attacking Lebanon; everybody in Washington, whether in the Executive or Legislative Branch, had had enough of Lebanon. It was watchful of events in Lebanon because had we to evacuate that country, it would have been the Sixth Fleet that would have extracted us.

But because we had this all-powerful image, we did have a role to play in Lebanon. In fact, we did have the power to intervene, but not the will. The Lebanese had an exaggerated perception of our power; I don't believe that a military attack by the Sixth Fleet would have been useful during my tour. The Lebanese certainly did not understand our political will--or lack thereof. This image of American power is not unique to the Lebanese; there are many other countries in the world who hold similar views. One day I left Beirut on a helicopter to fly to Cyprus--it was the only means of egress out of the country. As we took off, I looked that the front page of *Loin de jour*--the major French newspaper in Beirut. It said "President Reagan meets Gorbachev in Iceland to discuss Lebanon". When I landed in Cyprus, I looked at a Cypriot newspaper; its lead headline read "Gorbachev meets Reagan in Iceland to discuss Cyprus". Of course, never a word was spoken in Iceland about either country. But lots of countries around the world believe that they are the focus of super-power attention all the time. They also believe that our advanced technology and economic power, not to mention our military force, enables the US to do all sorts of marvelous things--actions that we wouldn't or couldn't take. Many countries have a highly exaggerated

perception not only of their importance, but also of the US' abilities and political will. Some of the Lebanese views may have been shaped by information they received from their kin in the United States, but I don't think that was a major factor. Lebanon became independent in 1943. There has never been a Lebanese Presidential election in which the winner was not backed by a foreign power. First, it was the French, then the Italians in one election in the early 1950s. Then, in 1958, Eisenhower ordered the Marines into Lebanon and refused to let Camille Chamoun run for another term as President, backing General Fuad Chehab instead. That was the first of the "American-installed" Presidents. Every Lebanese I met in 1986 believed that I, John Kelly, would select the next President of Lebanon in 1988. Every one believed that I would provide resources--financial, votes--to elect "my" candidate. I remember meeting with Bartholomew before leaving for Beirut. He told me that I would not believe how important the Lebanese believe the American Ambassador to be. In a small exaggeration, he said that the American Ambassador is viewed as the second most important man in Lebanon, right after the President of Lebanon. He added that on a "bad day", I might be viewed even as more important than the President. I took Reg's comment with a grain of salt, but I found out that he was not too far off target. In fact, in 1988, despite thousands of assertions by the Secretary of State, by the Assistant Secretary and by me, we ended up trying to select the next President of Lebanon.

By and large therefore I was not able to convince people that the US was able or willing to wave a wand and rectify all wrongs. I did meet all the factional leaders, except those that had been ruled "out of bounds". Each of those leaders, as well as all the journalist and other Lebanese, would greet me warmly and told me how highly they respected the US. Then, in almost a whisper, they would lean towards me and ask: "What is the plan?" I would answer: "There is no plan". That would invariably bring the response: "Oh, come on. You can tell me! What is the plan? How are you going to extricate us from this morass? Who are you going to make the next President? What is the deal you are going to make with the Syrians and the Israelis? If you just tell me, I can help you. Just take me into your confidence!" Everybody--Shiites, Druids, Armenians, Maronites, Sunnis, Greek--wanted to know what the "plan" was; there was no way of dissuading them that we had a plan, despite my protestations to the contrary. Interestingly enough, I had been assured by Secretary Shultz that no one, but no one, was under the impression that we had a "plan". He understood that if the Lebanese thought that we had a "plan", they would behave in ways that they would believe was promoting our "plan", which would have made the situation even worse. We had told ourselves--and I think Washington convinced itself--that we would not involve ourselves in Lebanon any more, but like an alcoholic who has sworn off his drink, we got involved again--in 1988. There was no "plan"; there was no intention of developing a "plan" and my job was to tell all Lebanese that there was no "plan"; it was up to the Lebanese to solve their own problems. We, nor any other country, would not play *deus ex machina*; they were on their own. I kept telling them that they had only one way of out of their terrible civil war: all the factions had to sit down together and hammer out a political solution, which would require compromises from all factions as well as a re-apportionment of political power.

Of course, Reg had told them exactly the same thing for a long time. As I mentioned earlier, there was a gap between his departure and my arrival. Some Lebanese attributed the delay in my arrival to a new review of US policy toward Lebanon, which at the end of it, would blossom into with a new "plan" which I would bring with me and carry out. It was complete phantasy, but shows you the depth of the feeling in Lebanon that the "great United States" would deliver it from its miseries. The Lebanese did not have the political will in 1986 to do what they would have to do in order to restore peace. All Reg's pleadings followed by mine could not move the Lebanese. The history of animosity between the different clans, factions and individuals was so ingrained that no movement toward a resolution was possible. To that formidable barrier, we would have to add the personal ambition and greed of some of the leaders. The concept of redistributing political power--in any country--will, by definition, create winners and losers; it a zero sum game. It was very clear that the Muslims outnumbered the Christians; yet the Constitution, based on a 1934 census, maintained that the Christians were in the majority. The change in demographics had never been officially recognized; stability therefore could only have been reestablished if demographic reality was engendered into the political process with the Christians ceding some of their power to the Muslims. At the same time, the situation required a Muslim leadership willing to accept modest incremental increasing power rather than a rapacious policy of taking it all at one time. Any leader, on either side, who was willing to pursue such "moderation", would be immediately attacked by his colleagues as a "traitor". The situation in Lebanon was essentially "frozen".

The costs of this lack of political will could be seen by the human eye. It is true that some of Beirut's beauty still existed in 1986; the mountains still loomed majestically, the coast line and shores were still breath taking. The food was still wonderful even after the many years of civil wars. Beirut was still a busy metropolis, but it was not the Beirut of fifteen years earlier. The GNP had dropped precipitously while the unemployment rate had risen sharply. The physical damage to the city was clearly evident. There were people who understood the costs of war to the country's economic health, but I found many more who were even more concerned by the toll that the war was and would be taking on the next generation (s). That was a much greater concern than then the abstract concept of GNP; there was no mass starvation, in part because we provided humanitarian assistance.

The assistance was managed by non-governmental organizations--e.g. "Save the Children", "Catholic Charities", the "Shiite Charity". When a shipload of flour would come in, my staff would watch the off-loading at the port from the ship to a fleet of trucks which would then deliver them to the NGOs. There was no doubt in my mind that as these trucks passed through the various checkpoints--of which there were many because every militia and every thug had mounted checkpoints--some part of the deliveries were off-loaded. Checkpoints were not only security measures, but also centers of economic activity because, just as in the old European robber baron days, tolls were charged to anybody who had to cross those points. There were days when I would travel in Beirut and have to cross twenty or more checkpoints. There was no freedom of movement in Lebanon, as there is probably in many other countries. Our food imports not only went to feed the needy in Lebanon--about one-quarter of the population--, but it also kept the prices of staples under

control because the free distribution drove down the prices of the locally grown and manufactured food goods. That made food stuffs available to a much larger proportion of the population. The theoretical arguments pro and con assistance of this kind can get very hypothetical; e.g. some of it ended up in the black market and some of the flour was baked into breads that were sold in Cyprus. But there was no question in my mind that our assistance kept a large portion of the Lebanese population from a potentially very destructive economic situation. It was greatly appreciated. On balance, it was better to provide assistance than not to.

I did have a big battle with Washington on whether we should "monetize" the program; i.e. importing the food stuffs for sale on the local market with the proceeds going to the government for the construction of new housing for refugees and other groups whose homes had been destroyed by the war. I vehemently opposed that policy because I believed that the cash generated would undoubtedly end up paying for villa constructions in Switzerland for those Lebanese who would be managing the program. It was far better to distribute the aid free, thereby assisting those who might not be able to pay while at the same time forcing prices for other food stuffs to be kept at levels which would make them available to a larger part of the population. There was no question in my mind that the program, if put on a cash basis, would have been totally corrupted.

As much as I might have wished, there was no way to use this humanitarian assistance to bring greater political stability to Lebanon. There were some in Washington who would occasionally suggest that food assistance should be cut off to one faction or another or one area of the country as punishment for some misdeed or as a coercion device. The fault with this thinking was that the leaders who made the decisions were already living well; any punitive actions on our part would have no effect on them; it was the innocents who would be punished for something for which they could not be held responsible. In any case, we could never have fine-tuned that strategy sufficiently to have any effect. There was one brief period during which Washington decided that I should re-direct the food assistance directly to Sheikh Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of Hezbollah--our arch enemies--in the hopes that he might influence the release of our hostages. It was another effort to buy out the hostages. I refused to do it.

That episode was an illustration of directives from Washington, which came from time to time, which I found unacceptable. The Lebanon situation was highly politicized, even before November 1986, when the Iran-Contra scandal erupted. After that, every instruction and decision was even more political--in American terms--than it had been. I came to believe that the leadership in the Department, when it came to Lebanon, was increasingly out of touch with the realities on the ground. The pursuit of an agenda driven by American political considerations was not a recipe for success in Lebanon. The problem of how the American government dealt with Lebanon was not a function of the differences between the political parties in the US nor did it reflect an issue close to the hearts of the American public. In fact, most Americans who even thought about Lebanon felt that it was a mess that we would be best advised to leave entirely, taking the hostages with us without paying any price. That view might not have been a bad policy, if it could have been carried out.

What I believe was one of the main causes for our vacillating Lebanese policy--or some of the directives that I received--was the relationship between Shultz and Weinberger--they detested each other. Their differences, which had begun many years earlier when both were working for Bechtel Corporation in California, lasted into their service for Governor Reagan and then President Reagan. The net result of this conflict was the State Department and the Defense Department often worked at cross-purposes in deciding what to do in and about Lebanon. The National Security Advisor's position was occupied by seven different people in eight years; there is no question that this lack of continuity had a lot to do with what was charitably called the Lebanon "policy". Each NSC Advisor had a different style or a different set of priorities. So when I speak of the US domestic political influence on Lebanese policy, I am referring primarily to these bureaucratic problems which were more important than the partisan political aspects of foreign policy making. When I left for Beirut in 1986, I knew that Shultz and Weinberger didn't see eye-to-eye on much; I knew that there were some shenanigans going on among the National Security Council staff, but I wasn't even close to perceiving the effects of all of the Washington turmoil on me and the situation in Lebanon. I got a hell of an education in the 1986-88 period, not only about Lebanese politics, but American as well.

This Washington intrigue became clear to me as I testified before Congress, as Secretary Shultz attempted to dismiss me, as people contacted me by phone and vice-versa. I was in daily contact with at least the Lebanon desk officer in the Department; he kept me abreast of all of the bureaucratic infighting that was taking place. I used to talk every day with lots of people on secure phones, which were mobile and could be set up anywhere I needed it. I used to carry one in the trunk of my car and whenever I needed to make a call, we would rig up an antenna on the side of the road and talk to Washington. I communicated with people in State and Defense and even in the NSC, at least until the Iran/Contra operation became public. After November 1986, I did not have any further contacts with the NSC.

Let me now talk about our objective to obtain the release of the hostages. There were four or five hostages when I arrived in Beirut in August, 1986. By January 1987, there were twelve. I had been briefed on the hostages situation before leaving Washington--many, many hours at the Counter-Terrorist Center at CIA. I knew the suspected locations and something about the groups that held them. We had huge amounts of bits and pieces of intelligence on the hostages and I was thoroughly briefed on those. I visited the Special Operations Center at Ft. Bragg, NC, where I was briefed on contingency planning for a forced rescue of the hostages. I learned many arcane things about the legitimate, but covert, efforts that had been made to free the hostages. No one, except McFarlane, told me that there was significant covert operation underway. Oakley had given me a hint, but had told me that I would have to talk to North about whatever was going on. Richard Murphy, the Assistant secretary, also suggested that some strange activities seemed to be going on. Gaspie, over the 4th of July weekend, suggested that some hostages might be released because North was traveling. All these people hinted, but I don't think that they shared with me all they knew; only McFarlane did that. I am absolutely sure that the Secretary of State did not tell me all he knew, as later the documentary evidence that Congress made public,

clearly indicated. Shultz never said to me that there was a half-baked, zany effort being made to free the hostages by giving weapons to the Iranians and that he disapproved of all the efforts that Poindexter and North were undertaking. Never said a word, as I have said earlier. My guess is that Bob Oakley had most of the story, but he only hinted at it; he never told me all that I believe he knew. I found out later that in June, 1986, Bob had sent a memorandum to the Secretary describing the North operation and suggesting that it should be reined in. It is that memorandum that Shultz, even in his memoirs, denies that he ever saw.

I did however have a pretty good idea of North's operation in Lebanon, as given to me by Bud McFarlane. I think he told me everything he knew. I did not know that the proceeds of the sale of the weapons to the Iranians were being used to finance the Contra operations, but I was certainly aware of the sales and the relationships between those transactions and the liberation of the hostages in Lebanon. Bud told me that I would receive "back channel" instructions--i.e. instructions that were not transmitted over the Department's communications network--from John Poindexter, if and when the Iranians appeared to be ready to help us in obtaining the hostages. Then, he said, I might be asked to assist in the extraction of the hostages, which might include taking some unusual and perhaps odd actions. He also warned that I might have visitors from time to time; their arrival would be announced to me by Poindexter.

In addition to the NSC efforts, there were other activities being undertaken by various parts of the US government intended to find out the location of the hostages to see whether they could be rescued either by force--I think I have referred earlier to my briefings at Ft. Bragg, Pentagon and CIA on this effort--or by persuasion. There were 100s of people in the US government who were spending day and night in trying to find the hostages and to liberate them legally, without bribery, but including, if necessary, the use of force. Oakley was fully briefed and kept current on all of these activities. There was a small gap perhaps in coordination, but Shultz had been given a full "Top Secret" memorandum in January, 1986 describing the efforts of the various US agencies. We know that he had read that because his initials and notations show up on the original memorandum. So I was satisfied that when I left Washington I had a good grasp of the rescue plans being developed by the US government departments and agencies. The military in Ft. Bragg assured me that if they were to initiate any action, I would be forewarned, in part because they expected to need the Embassy's assistance.

As I said, when I arrived in August, 1986 there were about five hostages. In September, three more were taken--e.g. Cippio, Tracy--people associated with educational endeavors in Lebanon. Washington went ballistic; I was getting calls at all hours of day and night. Most of the inquiries focused on how many more Americans were in Lebanon who were potential targets. I was told that the political heat in the US was getting very intensive; the President wanted to know why I couldn't get all of the remaining Americans out of the country. I was told that I would have to make those Americans leave. In fact, we had no authority to arrest any Americans abroad and remove them forcefully, if they didn't want to go. We could have arrested someone landing in the US for having been illegally in

Lebanon--a travel freeze had been imposed some time earlier--, but in Lebanon, we had no judicial authority. In fact, there were several thousand Americans in Lebanon, most of whom were dual nationals, as we have so many in other countries as well. I know that Reg tried his damndest to get these Americans to leave; I did the same. Neither of us were very successful. I would call up these Americans, particularly the adult males who were the obvious "target of choice". If any women were taken, they were hostages for only a short period, probably primarily for romantic reasons. I told the potential targets that they were running a real risk. The answer would often be : "I have been in Lebanon in for thirty years; all my friends are Lebanese; I am married to a Lebanese; I have converted to Islam. They are not going to kidnap me, Mr. Ambassador!" The next thing we knew, one of them would be kidnapped. The well known syndrome "It can't happen to me" was in full flower.

That point of view was prevalent even though after the first spade of kidnapping in 1985, it didn't take too much intelligence to figure out that for Americans to continue residence in Lebanon was dangerous. American journalists got the message; they left, especially after a few Irish and British newspaper men were kidnapped. Many professors at AUB left. But hundreds stayed. One fellow to whom I spoke asked me where else he could get a job. he said that he would be willing to leave if I could find him employment in the US. He had been a teacher in Beirut for four years; he used to teach at the State University of New York, at Ohio State, at California, but he had not been tenured at any of these places. AUB had given him tenure; he had gotten a nice apartment and was living comfortably. He told me he would leave immediately if I could find him a professorial job in the US. That was his economic argument, in addition to the standard view that he felt safe because his Lebanese friends would protect him and that he was being very careful. The kidnapping continued and many American males did leave, but not enough, despite the additional kidnapping in November, which were followed by more in January- -the so called four "BUC professors". The American community on Beirut kept shrinking, but there was always a sizeable core that refused to move. For those who had finally seen the light after the September kidnapping, we would send an armed motorcade to get them at their apartments, take them to the port, where we guarded them until the next available ship would take them away. Even after the January wave, a sizeable core of Americans remained in Beirut.

Some, I am convinced, also believed that if they were kidnapped, Uncle Sam would come to rescue them. Others were far more realistic. it is true that leaving Lebanon for many would have been extremely difficult; they had no contacts anywhere else and certainly none had any immediate employment opportunities available. Some were people who had no fixed address. Tracy, for example, had been living on the benches at a "Wimpy's" in West Beirut. His last job had been a door-to-door salesman of the Koran. He obviously had mental problems. Before he was kidnapped, he had sent me a letter saying that he was a direct descendent of George Washington and that he was the Mossad chief in Beirut--not something one mentions publicly in a country populated by many Muslim fundamentalists. I am sure that no one could have convinced Tracy to leave Beirut for anything. So he was kidnapped.

The people who were to be kidnapped were targeted. They were under Hezbollah surveillance for some period before the kidnapping. They were taken because they were Americans and the kidnappers thought they would bring a handsome reward. The Hezbollah knew that North and McFarlane were sending thousands of Hawk missiles to Iran who would in turn send millions to the Hezbollah as a payoff for release of a hostage. Any American male served this "fund raising" purpose. I think as the numbers of Americans in Beirut diminished, the kidnappers took any American male they could find. Joe Cippio was taken because he was the last American faculty member at AUB--out of the 400 who had been there. He stayed because he felt that it was important for one American to remain at AUB.

During my tour, I spent a lot of time on this hostage issue. I talked to political leaders, to Islamic religious leaders, to any one I thought might have some influence on the kidnappers. Members of my staff worked diligently trying to locate the hostages; they collected considerable information. A number of my senior staff members also engaged in conversations with Lebanese on the subject of the hostages; we all were looking for opportunities to find ways to get the hostages released. We would get many expressions of good will and nothing more. After I got to know these leaders better they would tell me that the release of the hostages was a very simple matter. We all knew that the Hezbollah was holding them and that they would be released after an appropriate ransom. This was after all, a long standing Lebanese tradition; in fact, there many Lebanese kidnapped--a fact that the world largely ignored--and they were all released after appropriate payments were made. Richard, the Lion Hearted, on his return from the Third Crusade in 1196, as kidnapped by the King of France and held for seven years, until an appropriate ransom was paid. In the Middle Ages, all of so-called "Christian" Europe, it was common practice to kidnap the rich as an income producing economic enterprise. It is a practice that the Lebanese emulated and are still doing it today. So the advice I always got was that if I wanted the hostages released, I would have to pay a price. When I would say that we don't engage in such practices, I would be told that was not true. The Ollie North program was always mentioned as an illustration that the US does pay ransom. I was told that the Hezbollah was just waiting for the Iran/Contra scandal to blow over because they thought that then we would then make payments.

I don't want to leave the impression that the issue revolved entirely around money. I was told that the Israelis held about 600 prisoners in the Khiem prison--in the South Lebanon security zone. Some Lebanese suggested that if we could obtain the release of those prisoners, then we might get some of our hostages back. Some even assured me that such a swap would be possible. One man, who was referred to me by a friend, came to see me and told me that he could make all of the arrangements--all he needed was \$100 million. I was taken aback; I expected something like \$1 million per hostage--nut even I was shocked when I heard the figure of \$100 million. We had lots of self-proclaimed "fixers" come to the Embassy all the time; I saw very few, but all were interviewed by our security staff. There was no shortage of "volunteers" who guaranteed the return of the hostages for some money. Occasionally, a known member of the Hezbollah would contact us; he would get close attention, but usually we found that these were disaffected former members or were

about to be assassinated or threatened and were looking to make a deal to save their own skins. But we certainly listened closely to any one we knew was a member of or closely associated with the Hezbollah.

I did not talk to the Hezbollah both because I was barred from doing so and because I thought that it would have been unwise for me or any member of my staff to do so. Sheikh Fadlallah was part and parcel of the kidnapping ring; he was not likely to be persuaded by our arguments. Ambassadors of other countries, whose citizens had been kidnapped, would go see the Sheikh and seek his assistance. He consistently would say that he knew nothing about such activities and as a man of peace he would never engage in such events. It is true that nationals of other countries were released after payment of ransom--usually \$1 million per person. The money was never paid directly by a foreign government; it was always laundered. To my knowledge, those payments did not go through Iran; the foreign governments did use intermediaries, but not Iran as far as I know, although they were in contact with Iranians. In the case of the French, President Mitterrand pardoned some Iranian terrorists, even though they were serving life sentences in France and sent them back to Iran. He also waived the Iranian debt for a nuclear reprocessing plant. So the Iranians were probably involved, but the actual ransom was paid to the kidnapers in Lebanon. The French paid the price--steep as it was--but they got their hostages out eventually. Some of them died in captivity. The French also had one of their ambassadors assassinated; the French lost some of their troops on the same day our Marines were attacked.

The other ambassadors would brief me on most of the conversations they had with Sheikh Fadlallah. We had a good working relationship among the foreign ambassadors in Beirut. There weren't many of us--e.g. the British, the Germans, the Italians, the Chinese, the Soviets--; I guess there must have been about twenty. We would see them regularly, although many were so terrified that they seldom left their houses or apartments.

I think clearly we could have obtained the release of the hostages were we willing to pay a hefty price. But I thought such a policy would be a great mistake because I am convinced it just would have led to more kidnapers. I believe that one of the reasons kidnapping increased in late 1986 was because Hezbollah and others became full aware of the North operations which in fact was a ransom for the release of the hostages. The willingness of the US to provide weapons to the Iranians, who then, as I said, would pay the Hezbollah, just increased Hezbollah's appetite for hostages. North's rationale, which was supported by those in the CIA who were helping him, was that the kidnapers in Lebanon were a different group from those who were getting the payoffs--"Our Shiites are reliable; it is a different group of Shiites that are doing the kidnapping". It was total hogwash! The myth of the "moderate" Iranian persists to today; just last week there were those who said that the President should not declare a further embargo on Iran because that would just weaken the "moderates" in Tehran. It is the same syndrome that prevailed among some Americans when it came to the Lebanese situation; there were some who thought that the Hezbollah had a "moderate" element, with whom we could deal. A great misperception! During some of my consultations in Washington, I would meet with the intelligence community and

listen and participate in major debates on whether Hezbollah was a single entity or was composed of factions--the Jihad group, the Justice group, the Liberation group. The question to which se turned time and time again was whether Hezbollah was one organization operating under three names, or three organizations operating under one name. Both sides of that argument had proponents, with Ollie North and his contingent arguing that Hezbollah was in fact three different organizations. Of course, part of that perception may well have stemmed from the vested interest that those who were dealing with Iran had in believing that they would not be betrayed. In fact, Hezbollah did release a hostage or two, only to capture four or five more. So the North point of view was only hopeful thinking; it was not based on reality. As the intelligence community collected more and more information, it became clearer and clearer that Hezbollah operated as one unit. That was one point on which George Shultz and I agreed totally.

Ollie North came to Beirut two or three times after I arrived in Beirut during one week in connection with the release of David Jacobsen. I found out later that Ollie really had no reason to come to Beirut. He came in a chopper, sit in my office for an hour or two and then chopper out again. He did nothing except to brief me on something that he wanted me to know. It was clear that he was thrilled to be involved in such a covert caper and also that his visits enabled him to say to the few people in Washington who knew what he was up to that he had been in Beirut--at great personal risk. But he didn't do anything in Beirut except to chat with me and David Jacobsen, after his release. When Jacobsen was released, he was brought to my house. It was my intention to move him out of the country as quickly as possible to get him to an American military hospital in Germany for a thorough physical--he had been held for 555 days. But Poindexter and North ordered otherwise. I was to keep him in Beirut, which we did for almost 24 hours, during which there was shelling--which might well have landed on him. I was told that there might be second release which Washington did not wish to have jeopardized by premature release of Jacobsen's release. Of course, the press had gotten wind of the release within two hours of the event. It finally dawned on me that the real reason was that Ollie wanted to be in Beirut and escort Jacobsen out on the helicopter to Cyprus. It was a big boost and thrill for North to be able to do that. The same thing was true for Terry Waite; he also had to be in Beirut to escort Jacobsen out. We could have moved Jacobsen out to safety from Lebanon in one hour, except that he had to stay in Beirut awaiting North and Waite. That was a sham!

I never reported the three North visits to the Department. Admiral Poindexter had asked that I not report to the Department on any matters involving the North operations. As I mentioned, I had been advised by Bud McFarlane that I would from time to time receive "bach channel" instructions for Poindexter and North, which I should follow. Bud also told me at the time that Secretary Shultz was fully apprized of the North operations and that although Shultz did not approve of them, he was nevertheless fully informed. You will recall that I saw McFarlane after I saw Shultz and therefore I never had an opportunity to raise the question with the Secretary. So when I received instructions from Poindexter or North, I felt that the Secretary of State knew about them. In any case, both the oral and written messages from Poindexter--which became part of the Congressional investigation files--on all matters relating to the hostages clearly instructed me not to contact the

Department of State. The messages also said that the NSC staff were keeping the Department of State informed. I had no reason to doubt the veracity of that comment. The use of "back channel" instructions which were not shared with the Department was not a new phenomenon; I had seen it being done when I was working for Sonnenfeldt--and through him, for Kissinger; I had seen "back channel" instructions while serving in Paris and Saigon. The concept of direct White House-embassy direct communications which were not to be shared with the Department was therefore not new; it had been done by many administrations before the Reagan one. Usually the phraseology was put in positive terms; i.e. "you should communicate on this matter only via this channel with the NSC and should not refer to these communications in messages which are sent through "open" channels."

Furthermore, Ollie North was captured on TV boarding a helicopter at Larnaca airport on his way to Beirut. I assumed that some one in the Operations Center would have caught that. The whole world knew that North and Terri Waite were coming to Beirut; it didn't seem necessary for me to report a fact that TV was showing.

I didn't know what was going on with Iran/Contra. I heard nothing about this operation from the time I arrived in Beirut in August, 1986 until late October of that year. One day, while hosting a Lebanese guest at lunch, I was interrupted by a secure telephone call from Washington--Admiral Poindexter. He told me that progress was being made on the release of more hostages and that I would be hearing more about that from Ollie North. Ollie was in Europe and would contact me to give me further instructions which I was to follow. That phone call was followed by written instructions which just repeated what Poindexter had told me orally. I was alerted that there would be more action to follow. As I suggested before, most of my oral conversations with Poindexter and North were subsequently confirmed in writing; also the Situation Room in the White House kept logs on all telephone calls made from there. Both the confirming messages and the telephone logs were very helpful later when I was accused of all sorts of derelictions. I didn't realize the full import of this record until I was about to be grilled by Congressional Committees investigating Iran/Contra. Before appearing, the committee staff, just a couple of hours before a hearing, would show me what written material it had collected. That was very helpful because it clearly showed a paper trail that would support my position. I was amazed to find that the Situation Rooms were so complete that they not only recorded all telephone calls, but also included brief notations on the subject(s) discussed during the phone conversations. Those logs not only supported my recollections of events, but also Poindexter's avowals that the Department had been kept informed about the Iran/Contra operations. I mentioned this to the Secretary during one of our bitter exchanges later on. His defense was that if the Department had been in fact been kept up to date, no one had told him--which I don't believe! I believe that the logs were accurate since they were kept by a clerical staff that had no axe to grind. I was satisfied that the logs were accurate and truthful.

A couple of hours later, I received a call from an NSC staffer, requesting that I call a certain number in Germany to ask for a Mr. X which was the cover name that Ollie North used--I

immediately recognized the voice. He told me that he was on his way and would be in Beirut that evening. So North and General Secord arrived by helicopter that evening.

This may be an appropriate moment to make some comments about my relationships with Secretary Shultz. They were very good when I left for Beirut in 1986. We had become well acquainted when I was the principal Deputy in EUR. As I previously mentioned, he had tried to get me the ambassadorship to Ireland. I admired Shultz; I think he was a very good Secretary and in light of his efforts on my behalf, I assumed that he thought that I had some good qualities. He honored me by backing me for the Lebanon post. As I also have mentioned, I had a long session with the Secretary before I left for Beirut; he then went off on vacation. I met McFarlane a few days later when I was briefed on the NSC Iran-hostage operations. Later, Shultz mentioned to me and others that I should have immediately contacted him after my McFarlane briefing, even though he was out in California and did not return until after my departure. In truth, it never occurred to me to contact the Secretary because McFarlane had assured me that Shultz was fully aware of the Iran operation. I had no reason to doubt Bud on that score. Bud did tell me that Shultz was in disagreement with the NSC operations, which I took as further indication that Shultz was fully familiar with what was going on. So I did not try to contact Shultz in California because I believed what McFarlane had told me.

In late October or early November, Jacobsen was released as result of the North's dealings with the Iranians. As I mentioned before, North and Wait were seen publicly in Cyprus boarding our helicopter to go to Beirut. At about the same time, a rather obscure Lebanese weekly--*Ashirak*--published a long story about McFarlane's visits to Iran, the negotiations on the hostage release, the sale of weapons to Iran, etc. Some of my Embassy staff members saw the story and when showing to me, opined that it was one of the usual Lebanese flights of fancy, although they thought this was even loonier than most. I asked them to translate the article and send it to Washington; I sensed that there may have been some truth in the story. Of course, the wire press picked up the story and that was the unraveling of Iran-Contra operation.

A few weeks later, I received a cable which had been sent to many embassies, requesting any information that a post might have had about Iran-Contra--contacts with certain individuals, movements of certain individuals, etc. The message requested a full and immediate report on any information that a post might have in Iran-Contra. So I sent in a report that I did indeed have conversations in Beirut with North and Secord--that message is part of the public record. I believe that I sent the cable on a Thursday. On Saturday night, I got a call at home from Arnie Raphel, then the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in NEA. He said that I would have to fly to Washington as soon as possible because the Secretary was really upset about the whole NSC operation. I asked Arnie how much trouble I was in--we had been close friends for many years. He told me that Shultz was very mad and that I was in lots of "hot water". I was scheduled to go to London the next day for a Chief of Mission conference to be chaired by Dick Murphy, the Assistant Secretary for NEA. So I went to London, met with Murphy Monday morning and then immediately left

for Washington. Murphy didn't tell me much at all--he and I had never been particularly close--; Arnie had been much more forthcoming.

While I was flying back, Shultz was testifying; he said that he had been shocked when he found out about North and his activities. He said that his Ambassador in Beirut--John Kelly--had been carrying on a secret correspondence with Poindexter and North, unbeknownst to him and that Kelly had seen North and Secord and had never reported any of these activities to the Department, much less him. When I landed at Dulles, I was met by a giant horde of media representatives--TV, radio, print media. I knew nothing about Shultz had said and that he had lambasted me for my activities and lack of reporting. So I was completely taken by surprise by the media attention and by the questions that were being asked of me. Arnie had warned me that I was in some trouble, but the depth of it didn't strike me until my arrival at Dulles. In any case, I thought I had a very good defense and rationale for everything that I did and did not do. So I told the press that I had been working under the instructions of the President's National Security Advisor; I did not have copies of any of messages I had received because in Beirut we destroyed almost everything as soon as we could for security reasons. But I knew and said that all the cables would be on file at CIA, which was the transmitting agency, and at the NSC. Those cables would support my assertions, which indeed, once located, they did.

Shultz left right after his testimony for Europe. I went to my brother's house and watched all news on TV; the next day I was the lead story in the "Washington Post" and "The New York Times". The stories were not very complimentary. That evening, I was called by the Department and told to be in Mike Armacost's office at 7:30 a.m. the next morning. Mike was then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Nick Platt, the Executive Secretary, joined us in Mike's office. They told me that I was subject to dismissal for cause, both from my ambassadorship and the Foreign Service. I was told that the FBI would be interviewing me, as well as by some Departmental lawyers. I was instructed to cooperate fully with all official investigations and told to go see Abraham Sofaer, the Department's Legal Advisor. That I did and was strongly advised that I should retain legal counsel to defend myself. I took the position that I hadn't done anything wrong and therefore didn't see the need for counsel nor did I have the financial resources to do so. He said that he could not advise me because he was the Secretary's lawyer and therefore a party to the dispute. I did not obtain counsel.

I was interviewed by the FBI, which tape recorded my statements. They started by reading my "Miranda rights"--that is that I could remain silent, but if I said anything, it might be held against me in a court of law or other legal proceedings. In fact, the government was beginning a criminal investigation for a)"illegal diversion of funds" on the grounds that I may have been involved in the diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan Contras; b) violation of the Arms Export Control Act for being involved in the legal shipment of arms to Iran; etc. My case had gone far beyond the accusation of failing to keep the Department advised about my relationships with Poindexter and North; I was being investigated as a co-conspirator along with North and Secord, etc. When Arnie told me I was in trouble, I had no idea how big a book was about to be thrown at me; in fact, it was only the FBI that

gave me an idea of the extent of the difficulties I was facing. They asked me lots and lots of questions about my activities in Lebanon--who I had met, what I had done there, about my alleged participation in Iran-Contra, etc. I was thoroughly drained after the FBI interview. I must say that the two agents that interviewed me and did so again the next day, were very thorough and very courteous. I did feel that I was being given fair interviews. In fact, at the end, they said that they thought I was being "hung out to dry"--a comment which undoubtedly they should not have, but with which I fully sympathized.

In the afternoon, Nick Platt instructed me to write a memorandum to him in which I was to cover everything that I knew about Iran-Contra--my meetings with McFarlane, Poindexter, North etc, the instructions I had received, both orally and in writing. I did that, entirely from memory because I had no documentation with me and the Department did not have either. NEA gave me a secretary and I dictated to her for a couple of hours. I put together my best recollections. By this time, I believe all the documentation had been brought together, even though North had tried to destroy much of it. The written material had been assembled from CIA and other sources, but I still had not had an opportunity to review it.

That evening, I talked to some friends at my brother's house. When they heard about my FBI interview, they all agreed that I needed a lawyer, even though I was still resisting since I felt that I had done nothing wrong. The next day, I continued to work on my memorandum to Platt, talked some more to the FBI and had a meeting with John Whitehead, the Deputy Secretary. I had also had gotten to know him when I was a DAS in EUR. I told Whitehead that I was very distraught; I believed that I was an innocent bystander in a large drama and that I was being unfairly accused of all sorts of misdeeds, which indeed I had not committed. I felt that I was being treated unfairly and that the threats to dismiss for cause were entirely without merit and could not be substantiated. Whitehead thought that I was being wronged by Shultz and promised to do his best to get a public vindication and apology from the Secretary. He put at least part of that commitment in a note to me that I still have. That was a very positive gesture and I felt much better after my conversation with the Deputy Secretary. I must say that this period was a very emotional for me; there were many of my Foreign Service colleagues who treated me like a leper. That added to my disappointment. On the other hand, George Vest, the Director General of the Foreign Service, took me out for lunch; he said that there wasn't much more he could for me, but I was grateful for the gesture. I suggested that meet at noon; he countered with a later time when the press would be eating after their daily noon briefing. He wanted to see the press that he was having lunch with John Kelly. George, having been the Department's spokesman, understood the press mentality; so we had a late lunch. Sure enough, that evening on the TV news, Marvin Kalb reported that there was a division in the Department about John Kelly, that the Director General had taken me to lunch and that there were many people in the Department who felt that I was being treated unfairly. I am sure that those reports did not sit well with Shultz.

That afternoon, I spent a lot of time on the phone with Congressional staffers and many others. Everybody was advising me hire a lawyer. So finally I agreed to talk to some lawyers. There had been three law firms that had been repeatedly suggested to me. By sheer chance, I started with Myer, Brown and Platt--a big firm headquartered in the Middle West.

I met Andy Fry and three of his colleagues; I had never met of them before. They were very kind and gentle. They listened to me and we had a four hour meeting. They agreed to defend me pro bono--I did not have enough money to pay them. For the next several days, I answered questions from them and others, but eventually, the memorandum that I had written to Platt became the basic document which answered many of the questions posed. My attorneys were upset that the FBI had questioned me without counsel, but I told them that I had made the choice to see the agents without a lawyer because I felt that I had nothing incriminating or improper. They were also shocked that none of the written documentation had been made available to me. They also felt that Platt's request for a memorandum was improper and that if necessary they would seek to squelch it if anybody wished to use it as evidence. I think they were horrified by the process the Department and the FBI had used.

By the third or fourth day of that week, my case began to appear as a regular feature of newspaper columnists, most of whom condemned the Iran-Contra operation and tarred me with it at the same time. Shultz returned from Europe at the end of that week. I met with him on Monday of my second week in Washington, along with Charlie Hill, his personal assistant who was the note-taker (those notes were subsequently provided to special Iran-Contra counsel, Mr. Dash). Shultz told me that he had not had an opportunity to read my memorandum to Platt or any of the message traffic that I referred to substantiate my case as an innocent victim. He said that he would read the material, but wanted me to know that he was very disappointed with me; he could not understand why I had failed to inform him of the North and Poindexter operations. He obviously was very angry with me--red faced. I told him that I had not sent him any messages because I was under the clear impression that he had been thoroughly briefed and kept current. He denied knowing about what went on. He had admitted under oath that he and Weinberger had been at meetings when the arms-for-Iran-for-hostages deal had been discussed and that he had opposed the plan all along. In January 1986, the President had signed a "finding" which authorized at least a part of the Iran-Contra deal involving the sale of some arms to Iran. In May 1986, Ambassador Charlie Price had called him from London to say that there was a negotiation underway; that came as a surprise to Shultz because he thought that the whole operation had been brought to a halt. This call was received by Shultz in Tokyo where he was attending an Economic Summit. He then, according to his testimony, confronted Poindexter, who told him that there was no truth to the Price report and that there was nothing going on. According to Shultz' testimony and memoirs, he did not know anything that anything was going on from May to November, when the whole operation was exposed. So Shultz was upset that I had not reported my August briefing from McFarlane, that I had not reported about the cables that I had received from Poindexter and that I had not reported the North visits to Beirut. He thought all of these serious delinquencies showed a great lack of judgement. I told him that, as I had said to everyone else. that I was under the impression--and had in fact been told--that he knew about the operation. In fact, I pointed out that there was at least one cable from Poindexter that explicitly said that the Secretary of State had been fully briefed. Shultz said that that had been a plain lie; he knew nothing about what was going on.

By this time, I had found out that in June, Oakley had sent Shultz a memorandum giving a full description of North's activities and recommending that the Secretary intervene and bring the North operation to an end. I mentioned that to the Secretary; it became obvious that my comment made Shultz even angrier because he perceived that I was pointing out that he did know--or should have. He claimed that he had never seen that memorandum and that someone must have stopped it short of his desk.

During this meeting with Shultz also mentioned that, after Jacobsen was released, that I had sent a "Flash" message to the Department noting that he had been released and that I wanted instructions what to do with him. He denied ever seeing that telegram as well. I later heard from a number of people that my cable had been suppressed--all copies were recalled and destroyed.

Then Shultz asked me whether there were any other things that I had "neglected to tell him about". I asked him whether he knew of the military contingency plan for a forceful rescue of the hostages. He denied knowing anything about that as well. I told him that I had seen a Top Secret memorandum describing the option which clearly showed that he had read it in January, 1986; it had his initials on it and it as well as marginal notes that he written. He continued to deny any knowledge of the contingency plan or the memorandum to which I referred.

I should note that by the time I had the meeting with Shultz, two of our ambassadors in the field had sent in cables defending me. I had seen those. One was from Richard Boehm in Cyprus. He had been the host for all the comings and goings--North and Wait. He pointed out that he also knew that North was traveling to and from Beirut and that some of these trips had been recorded by American TV. So he as well as I could assume that North's travels were well known to the Department; Boehm felt that I was being wrongly accused of holding information. Richard Burt, then in Bonn, also sent a supportive telegram, stating that Oakley, during a visit to Germany in October, had briefed him in full detail about the North operation much of which was taking place in Germany as North and the Iranians negotiated their deal there. Burt thought that I was being charged unfairly because Robert Oakley was fully aware of what was going on. He added that many people knew of North's efforts; it was a subject for discussion among many people. I mentioned these cables to Shultz; he again reacted very angrily and concluded the meeting saying that he would study the record; in the meantime, I was to stay in Washington.

Two days later--Wednesday--about noon, I was called to the Secretary's office. I met with Shultz and Hill again. The Secretary looked very angry. He looked at me and said that he had just come from a meeting with the President and the Vice-President, in which he had sought to have me dismissed from my post as American Ambassador to Lebanon. But the President had refused and had in fact said that I had conducted myself valiantly. Therefore, the Secretary was ordering me back to my post, but that I would be admonished for "errors in judgement". I subsequently discovered that "admonishment" is an oral reprimand. Then the Secretary handed to me a statement which he said the Department's spokesperson, Charles Redmond, would be reading at the Department's daily press briefing, which was by

then almost to begin. I read the statement; it said that I was being admonished for "errors in judgement", but that I was returning to Beirut. There was other defamatory verbiage in the statement that I found unacceptable and said so because I thought it would ruin my reputation. Shultz said that I had no choice and that the statement would be issued as written. I finally said: "Mr. Secretary, if you release this statement, I will go public and bring you down". Shultz told me to get out! As I was leaving, I said that I would take that statement to my lawyers. That brought an expression of surprise from Shultz. I told Shultz that I had employed legal counsel and that I would give them his statement for legal considerations. The Secretary exclaimed: "You have lawyers! That proves it!". He was in a rage.

So I left his office and went with Hill to his small office right next to the Secretary's suite. I repeated to Charlie what I had said to the Secretary, namely that I considered the statement as defamatory and that I would then try to bring the Secretary down. I said that I had enough documentary evidence to prove my case and to show that Shultz was disassembling. Charlie tried to calm me down, but I was not only upset, but also deadly serious. There was no doubt in my mind that if that statement were released, that I would try to drive Shultz out of office. Up to that point, I had not talked to any reporter despite repeated invitations. I had been advised not to talk to the press and had stuck to that religiously. But after my meeting with Shultz, I was prepared to take the offensive and provide the media all the information that I had at hand. I was sure that I could have gotten on national television in light of the stir that Iran-Contra and all of its sub-plots were making. I think I could have made a major stink about George Shultz. As I have said, available documentation clearly supported my version of events; Shultz' credibility about not knowing could have been seriously damaged. Charlie suggested that I return to my office and just sit for a few minutes. In five minutes, Charlie called and said that the statement would not be released that day; they would work on another draft. I immediately went to my lawyers and reported on what had transpired. We talked for a couple of hours and changed the text of the statement to make it acceptable. The rewritten statement said that I had been admonished; that had happened and I was not going to try to change that. We did delete the defamatory garbage and I took the cleaned text back to Hill. He called me the next morning and told me that Redmond would be reading the statement as we had rewritten it. I still have copies of both statements; after my experiences of those days, I have kept copies of all correspondence pertaining to my activities. For those who wish to read more about this meeting with Shultz can find an accurate description of it in his memoirs, written seven years after the events. He wrote that I had uttered a threat against him, which is an indication that he is still upset by that meeting and the preceding events. He was not very complimentary.

My conclusions were that the Secretary correctly opposed North's lunatic scheme, but that when the President approved it and the operation continued, he did not wish to carry his opposition any further because that might have meant that he probably would have had to resign. So he chose to pretend that he was an unknowing bystander. I think Shultz was in many ways a wonderful Secretary of State, but in the of Iran-Contra case he did not cover himself with glory. He had indisputably seen the January briefing memorandum--his written notes covered it. It is quite possible that he had forgotten that had read that

documented--after all a Secretary sees thousands of documents. It could also have been true that he did not see the June memorandum from Oakley. Some people have told me that he had read it, but I have no first hand knowledge of that. But to deny any knowledge of the Iran-Contra plan and operation was totally disingenuous. He was just saving his own skin. He did not carry his disagreement to the logical conclusion because he understood that the President was determined to get the hostages out in any way he could and that the only choices that Shultz had was to resign or to play the game that he did. I think I became a convenient scape-goat which allowed him to deny knowledge of the North operation because "his Ambassador in Beirut had neglected to keep him informed".

About six months after these events, I was caught in some heavy shelling in Beirut. My house came under the fire of big guns. Shultz called me and asked whether I was alright and if there was any help that he could provide. I was touched by that call and I believe it was his way to begin making amends. What I didn't know, that he was about to appear before a Congressional Committee. His opening remarks began with a description of his call to me and our conversation. So I revised y opinion and now feel that Shultz called me just so that he could tell the Committee that he had just spoken to me.

I should add that Charlie Hill, who was one of Shultz close confidants and who would have known more than anyone what the Secretary might have seen, has never discussed these events. He of course had a confidential relationship with the Secretary which I respected; I was not going to do anything that would strain that by asking Hill a lot of questions.

In 1988, about eighteen months after my run in with Shultz, I was ambushed in Beirut, Shultz and Hill happened to be in Cairo at the time. When they heard about the ambush, Hill called me and asked me to come to Cairo to see the Secretary. He told me that Shultz wanted to show support for me and thank me for all that I had gone through in Beirut. So I flew to Cairo, stayed for twenty-four hours and never saw the Secretary. But on his way to the airport, Shultz did talk to me for a minute in front of the press. It was a cameo appearance. He did then talk to me privately about Lebanon. I also saw him a couple of times when I returned for consultations although it was obvious that neither of us were very comfortable with the other.

The North plan was just stupid. It led to the kidnapping of more Americans. It was a complete and abject failure, causing a lot of embarrassment to the administration and the US. Fortunately, I escaped unscathed, but it was a very close call. As a lot of journalist noted, that my reward for having been "saved" was to send me back to Beirut in harm's way.

For the remainder of my tour, my staff and I worked very diligently in trying to obtain the hostages' release. I met often with the families of the hostages, some of whom resided in Beirut. The others I would see whenever I returned to the US. These meetings were often difficult and emotional, for obvious and understandable reasons. Terry Wait became a hostage himself; I had warned him not to come to Lebanon because we had heard that the Hezbollah was mad at him; they thought that Wait had tricked them while pursuing his own agenda. The word on the street was that Wait would be kidnapped if he returned. But I

believe that Wait ignored our warnings because he was trying to redeem his reputation; some were saying that Terry had become North's pawn. So he returned to Beirut on his own and was indeed taken hostage. That was very unfortunate, but Wait had a big ego. He had hoped--and talked about to me--to be nominated for the Nobel peace Prize; in fact, he asked me to submit a letter of recommendation. So he did have a personal agenda which ended in a unfortunate and unnecessary period of captivity. The record however must show that Terry Wait did accomplish some good; he was an imperfect human being as are we all, but his accomplishments should not be diminished by aspects of his behavior.

The Iran-Contra operation had a noticeable effect on my dialogues in Beirut. The Lebanese have an unfortunate tendency to see the world in distorted ways. They clearly believed that I was the most powerful ambassador in the US diplomatic corps because even the Secretary of State couldn't fire me. Unfortunately, my encounters with the Secretary enhanced my reputation in Beirut. Some "yellow" newspaper wrote that I been assigned responsibility not only for Lebanon, but for the whole Middle East. The story said that Tom Pickering in Tel Aviv reported to me. It was pure fabrication, of course, but it was illustrative of the misperception that the Lebanese held about the world. But despite my alleged new powers, I could not affect the release of the hostages; I wished I could have. I think that my efforts had in essence no effect. We might have had an effect if we had tried to forcibly rescue them. In 1988, I thought we could mount an armed rescue operation which would have had a high chance of success--that is, we might have gotten three or four of them out alive--out of about a dozen. Those were the ones which we thought we knew where they were being held. We did not in 1988 believe that any of the hostages would be killed, even though we did not know for sure where they were located. I did not believe that the hostages would be killed even in retaliation for some American rescue mission. None of them were in fact ever intentionally killed, except Peter Kilburn, after the bombing raid in Libya. We worked, as I suggested earlier, on the theory that live hostages were worth something; dead ones were not. Peter was killed because Qadhafi had "bought" him so that he could take his revenge out on some American. The hostage issue had to be viewed as a commercial enterprise with religious and political overtones. Hezbollah wanted money and it wanted to humiliate the US. At times, they proposed prisoner exchanges--e.g. for their "brothers" in Kuwait prisons who had blown up the American and French embassies there or the prisoners held by the Israelis in southern Lebanon. At times, they also demanded Israel withdrawal from southern Lebanon. So Hezbollah had political demands that it would surface from time to time. When Jacobsen was released, he was given a set of demands which he was to convey to the American government. I think, that had we met those demands, we might have gotten a few hostages released, but certainly not all and we might well have encouraged the taking of others. I do not believe that one should give in to terrorists or kidnapers; it only encourages further despicable behavior. I am sorry to say that by the time I left Lebanon in 1988, there were still a dozen hostages in the hands of Hezbollah, as there were French, Italians and Germans. The Italians did get released fairly rapidly as did the Germans; their governments paid for their release. Besides our unwillingness to pay ransom, Americans had greater political value--it was far more "impressive" to humiliate the US than any European country. But I should note that Hezbollah had particular agendas for each country; in the case of Germany, they were demanding the release of two of their colleagues

who were imprisoned in Germany for having set off some explosives. The same was true for Italy; it held a couple of Hezbollah terrorists that their Lebanese "brothers" wanted released. The Spanish had some so Hezbollah kidnapped the Spanish Ambassador.

Hezbollah had its base among the very poor in Lebanon--the bottom tier of Shiite society. Since the Shiites were viewed as the bottom of the Lebanese social structure, the poor Shiites were really the lowest level, as perceived by other Lebanese. Hezbollah recruited their "soldiers" through good works; e.g. it provided medical assistance to the poor, education, small loans, charitable activities, etc. Through these charitable acts, Hezbollah indoctrinated its clients with militant Islamic beliefs. It taught that Hezbollah members had a duty to engage in armed conflict, if sanctioned by a *fatwa*--a religious approval. The world, in its view, is divided into Holy and Satanical forces. It, of course, was the Holy part. An act approved by a religious leader would give the perpetrator eternal blessing, even if that act killed many innocent lives. In fact, Hezbollah provided a religio-philosophical overlay over what we would consider criminal activity. That overlay becomes all consuming; it gives individuals the courage to commit suicide for some alleged higher purpose. Islamic fundamentalism provides a fervor that takes activities beyond criminal and commercial reasoning. Some of the powers behind the scene are certainly motivated by more earthly rationales--political, economic. But Islamic fundamentalism, with its veneer of righteousness, becomes a very powerful force. I believe that it will last at a minimum of 50 years in the form that it has taken at the present. A review of Islamic history, one will find periods of tremendous fervor and I think we are now witnessing the latest round of that phenomenon; it will not go away very soon. It will not overwhelm the Middle East nor any other significant parts of the world. I say that in part because I believe that Islamic fundamentalism as practiced in Lebanon is different from that practiced in Egypt which is different from that in Algeria, etc. There is no connection between the movements in different countries. Qadhafi's Islam--a weird brand--is very different from Shiite Islam. It is interesting to note that Hezbollah considers Qadhafi as one of the world's great villains because it believes that Qadhafi murdered the vanished Imam, who was in the line of succession from Ali, the Prophet's grandson. That is a very serious charge. So I prefer to talk about "politicized Islam" when referring to this fervor that is running rampant throughout the world. That describes the general phenomenon and takes into account the differences among movements in various countries. We should be looking at each movement separate and apart from the general phenomenon if we want to have a better understanding of the Islamic world and if we want to find some ways to abate the fervor of these movements. The country movements may have similarities, but also have their own unique basis.

I should make one final point about the hostage situation in Lebanon. I don't think that most people who were involved in it learned any lessons from it. There is still a temptation among politicians and leaders to try to free hostages by bargaining with the kidnappers. I believe that is a tragic mistake because it leads to innocent people becoming victims of the kidnappers. I do believe that had we not entered into the negotiations that are now referred to as the "Iran-Contra Affairs" fewer hostages would have been taken and the ones that were taken would have been released sooner. The more anxiety we showed about the

unquestionably cowardly and dastardly act of hostage taking, the more valuable the hostages became. The policy of the Bush administration--to downplay the incidents, not to publicize it, not to negotiate with the kidnapers--was far more effective. I recognize that that tact must have been very disappointing to the families, but the refusal of the administration to entertain any thought of bargaining with the hostage takers or to take much notice of them, was far more efficacious. Those hostages were finally released, although it did take a long time. I must also say that it was very difficult to defend the policy of "benign neglect" with the families.

Let me now turn to the first objective that I was given when I became Ambassador--namely, to stay alive. Needless to say, I took that assignment to heart. We paid a lot of attention to our security. I was constantly reminding the staff for the need of extraordinary vigilance. I made sure that everyone at the Embassy varied his or her arrival and departure times. I am not talking about a few minutes difference. In Beirut, one might go to work at 8 a.m. one day; the next day you might go not at all--since we worked seven days per week, we could stagger work days; and on the third day, you might go to work at 11 a.m. The Marines, who lived in the Embassy compound, kept a log--at my request--of the arrival and departures of all of our staff. My security staff would review the logs, just as terrorists would. I found that the women employees were the ones most likely to keep regular patterns because they felt a much greater sense of security; they believed they would not be kidnapped. They might be ambushed, but not kidnapped, according to their lights. In fact, some did drive into ambushes accidentally. So I took this deliberate varying of movement patterns very seriously and insisted that it be religiously followed.

I also insisted that routes were to be varied. Again, I don't mean a block here and there. I meant major daily changes in routes. My security staff was very good and it, worked very hard and for long hours how to get from point A to point B in as many ways as they could dream up. We finally developed thirty-two different routes between the Chancery and my house. We systematically tried to use all thirty-two routes. We would decide on which route to take just before departure to insure that there would be no opportunity to give any advance notification to adversaries. There was always a choke point at the beginning and at the end of a trip, since I traveled in a caravan, when the lead cars would be on the look out for cars that might be filled with explosives. We traveled rapidly in armored vehicles with sirens wailing. We had a scout car that preceded the caravan by two or three minutes; it would keep in touch with the main part of the convoy by radio. We would often and at random make U-turns and then take different routes. We did everything we could to avoid being a sitting target for terrorists. Sometimes, that required us to crash into cars that may have even innocently crossed the path of our caravan. The lead car would push any object that seemed to interfere with our movements out of the way. We would not stop for anything. If we damaged an innocent bystander, we would send a lawyer later and pay for a new car or any other damage that we might have caused. But nothing was to impede our rapid movement through the city. I might say that this *modus operandi* was used by others as well such as the President of Lebanon, the leaders of all of the armed factions, etc. It gave Beirut an atmosphere of wildness, but for us it was a matter of life or death.

We never walked on the streets--I may have once in a while walked for about a block, but it was always as a surprise. I was never alone; I was usually surrounded by 40-60 bodyguards. We never discussed our movements over the telephone. We were always well armed--I mean very heavy weapons. We had call on two APC which belonged to the Lebanese army; one was always parked in front of my house, to be used in a serious emergency. In fact, we would use it if we were caught in the middle of an artillery barrage. The standard issue was the AR-16; in the motorcade, we carried a couple of M-58 machine guns. If we had to cross the "Green" line we would take anti-tank weapons. We had RPGs to defend the Chancery; that kept vehicles away from the compound. In fact, we had the government, after the two bombings of our Chancery, declare the surrounding area as a non-traffic, non-parking area. We put up signs outside this "safe" area that anyone breaching the rules might be subject to immediate destruction.

The Lebanese army provided security perimeters around the Chancery and my residence. We took no chances; we shot at people who looked at all suspicious. All of our guards--American and Lebanese--had permanent authority to fire whenever they felt a threat. One night I was coming from the President's house up in the mountains; it took about a half hour to come down that mountain to the sea drive highway. It was pouring. As we pulled onto the coastal highway, a car came at us at a very high rate of speed. One of our Lebanese guards fired one round; he hit the right front tire. The car went out of control and ended up in a ditch. Of course, we didn't know that the car might not have been booby trapped. The drunken driver was very distraught. We did reimburse him for the cost of the car, which turned out to be a Buick. But we were quick on the trigger; we never knew, under the existing circumstances, who was friend and who was foe. We leaned to the side of prudence. We worked with our weapons all the time; every week or every other week we went to a rifle range and practiced to perfect our shooting. Before I left for Beirut, the Department's Office for Security Affairs trained and qualified me to use a DS-357 Magnum and an Uzi submachine gun. I always carried the Magnum with me; the submachine gun was kept in the car; if the security risks appeared very high, I might have carried the Uzi in a pouch. Under no circumstances, would I permit myself to be kidnapped; I might, in fact was, ambushed, but it would have been a major problem for the US if its ambassador had been taken hostage. That just could not be permitted to happen.

Everyone in Lebanon knew how well armed we were. We were a very tough target; we could not be blown up again by a car bomb. The Hezbollah knew that we would destroy any vehicle before it got close enough to us to do any damage. The Chancery and the compound was surrounded by big and thick walls--something you might find around a medieval castle. Unfortunately, those walls only went up after two major tragedies which took too many lives. We smartened up very late. Once we received some credible intelligence that a car bomb attack was being planned. I immediately closed the Chancery for four days--Washington told me that I was not authorized to do anything like that. My reply is unprintable. I doubled the guard force and advised all that any car which might try to breach our perimeter would be hit with an RPG. We later found out that the putative perpetrators had surveilled our security measures and decided that they could not penetrate our defenses. So we took very extraordinary measures, which are not likely to occur in many, if any, other posts. I should also note that we had very good intelligence; we knew a lot. It is

always difficult to distinguish between real threats and false alarms, but in the particular incident I just mentioned, we had every reason to believe that the report was accurate, which was subsequently verified.

We had a big wall around the house. It also had a large and well fortified bomb shelter. As I mentioned, the Lebanese army provided a perimeter defense which was bolstered by our own large security force. The residence was only 100 meters from the Presidential palace and close to the Ministry of Defense; that gave us added protection. There were efforts to penetrate that perimeter, but it was not easy. Our major concern at home was shelling. Some factions would try to shell the Presidential palace or the Ministry of Defense; any slightest misdirection brought the shell down on my house. We were also targets for the shelling and sometimes we didn't know which target was being shelled, but we all were subject to shells falling from the skies. I can say without equivocation that having shells pour down on you is very frightening. We all head for the bomb shelter. We had different sorts of ammo fall on us--sometimes it was mortar, sometimes anti-aircraft shells, sometimes it was RPGs, sometimes it was heavy artillery-- up to 132 millimeters. The heavy artillery was the worst. The shelling could come from any direction--from the bottom of the mountain we lived on or from above us. We usually had trouble figuring out who was doing the shelling. One Saturday morning, we were being hit very heavily. We were down in the bomb shelter; the guards were still manning the perimeters, in their foxholes. The Residence had a full communications set up as a back-up to the system we had in the Chancery so that if either facility was ever blown up we could still communicate with the outside world. When this shelling started, I called the Department on the secure phone. The Operations Center answered and I reported that we were under a severe rocket attack--things had gotten to the stage that when there was only one or two rickets, we did not bother to report them. But this was a very heavy attack and the risk of damage and life was very high. I told the Department that I was pretty sure that the fire was coming from an area under the control of the Syrian army, which meant that it was either the Syrians or the Druze that were responsible. I wanted the Op Center to call Bill Eagleton, our Ambassador in Damascus--immediately so that he could get to a Syrian official who could stop the shelling. It turned out that Eagleton was not in Damascus and the Charge'--David Ransom--called me on the secure phone after he had protested to the Syrians. He said that the Syrians wanted to know where the shelling was coming from and asked me to leave the bomb shelter to take a look. I told him that he had lost his marbles; neither I or any of my staff would stick their noses outside the shelter. Interestingly enough, the firing stopped within five minutes, which suggested to me that it was indeed the Syrians who were pulling the triggers. I think that it was probably inadvertent and that the Syrians were really aiming at some other target like the Ministry of Defense. Churchill once wrote that there was nothing more exhilarating than to be fired upon and missed. So we would very concerned during the shelling, but afterwards we had a feeling of severe intoxication. It was a high. I felt the same way the day I escaped a car bomb. The adrenaline really flows after you survive a life threatening event.

As I suggested, it was very difficult to determine the origins of the shells. We didn't have any radar tracking; the Lebanese army's facility was limited; in any case, often the weapon

that had fired would be moved to another site for another round of shelling. There were of course there were many Lebanese who observed the shelling; most of the guns were being fired from populated areas. The Hezbollah had very few heavy weapons; they had probably the least amount of fire power. The heavy weapons usually belonged to other factions, but we couldn't tell whether it was the Druze or the Palestinians or the Amal. I suspected that sometimes it might even had been some Christian element that fired on us to try to make us believe that some Muslims were again shelling us. Friends were few and far between in Lebanon. When I was ambushed, it was the President's own bodyguards that attacked. It was clear that destroying the Chancery or the Residence or killing the American Ambassador or some of his senior staff was obviously a feather in almost any Lebanese hat. The factions were never reliable; one month they would love us and the next the would hate us. One time, the Druze and the Palestinians fired on each other for a week. We were not the direct target, but we took a lot of stray rounds--shells or bullets know not whom or what they hit. We could tell when the firing was indiscriminate from when we were the target, just from the amount of fire power that came down on us. Occasionally, we got word that some faction or other was going to fire on us, but not always. When we did get notice, I would call the leader of the faction that was intending to shell us and told him that some of his men were intending to us harm. I would of course always get a denial; I always replied that if as much as a peanut was thrown our way, I would told him personally responsible. Since these factions always thought that the Sixth Fleet was right off shore and that I could call it up for retaliatory strike, my words had certain resonance. They were afraid that the mighty US would rain destruction and ruin on them. That usually worked; there was no firing. When there was firing, we could never be sure who was the culprit or why; we might find out later because often the faction leader would brag about what he had done and why. The "why" was usually for a perceived--always misperceived--slight that the American Ambassador or one of his men had perpetrated. But these "retaliations" were usually done on the slight because all Lebanese were afraid of the potential damage that the Sixth Fleet might do their faction. The Israeli would overflight Beirut daily in their RF-4s and with their remotely piloted vehicles. They would photograph the scene; so the Israelis had a lot of tactical intelligence. So we knew that there were tanks in the southern suburbs; the trouble was that some belonged to the Druze, some to the Palestinians, some to Amal, some to the renegade Lebanese army. Any of those could have fired; so it was seldomly clear who happened to be firing at any particular time. Often the firing came in the dark. So the origins of the attack was usually very murky. So life in Beirut was chaotic; you could be sure you would be shelled, but that could come from any direction, any faction at any time. But I was determined that we would take all necessary precaution; I was not going to have anyone killed on my watch. I badgered and nagged my staff to exercise utmost caution every day; I worried about security every moment. I did have a few who did not take the security issue seriously enough; they were sent home.

I was also ambushed once. On May 15, 1988, I got married in Finland to a lady whom I had met in Beirut. The Department gave me permission to marry. I returned to Beirut a few days later. On June 1 or 2, I was driving from my residence to the Chancery at about 11 a.m. A small gang opened fire on my motorcade with AK-47s, after an altercation. The details of this incident are recorded minutely in a long cable that I sent in immediately after the event.

My guards returned fire; in fact the whole episode took no more than 30 seconds. But it was very frightening while it went on. We could never be sure when it was over; we were moving when the firing began and kept moving during the fire fight and didn't stop until we got into the Chancery. Until then, one could never be sure that the danger had passed. Fortunately, no one got hurt; a couple of vehicles got damaged slightly. The ambushers were obviously not very good shots, but I am glad that they were not tested again. An ambush was different than being shelled. We had discussed the possibility of an ambush on a number of occasions and were as well prepared for it as one can be for a surprise; in fact, we practiced being ambushed. We all had a role to play in case of an ambush. Mine was to be the radio operator because, despite my training, I was not primarily a gunner. The radio permitted us to be in touch with the Marine guards who upon getting word of an ambush were to sound a general alert so that every one would take cover. So I was lying on the floor of the sedan, trying to talk into the radio. I had my 357 Magnum ready, but I doubt whether I really could have used it since we were driving at a very rapid pace over some bumpy roads. Some of the motorcade cars did get into collisions, but I didn't really find out about that until later. Events move so rapidly that you don't really have any time to do anything but your assigned task. After it was all over, then I was really scared. Since we didn't know whether the ambush was an isolated incident or part of larger assassination attempt, when we reached the Chancery, we crawled from the vehicles into the building. The Marines gave me cover--they would have taken any bullet that might have been directed at me. Once I got inside, I first of all asked whether everybody had made it through the ambush and whether we had any wounded. Soon, I was told that everybody was all right; there were a few minor casualties like sprained ankles or scratches. That was a blessing. The head of my Lebanese guards--Maher--came over to kiss me and I kissed him. Then I sent the FLASH message to the Department; after that I began to shake, mostly in anger. I was mad at the ambushers. I called the President and told him about the incident and who we thought the perpetrators were--word travels fast in Beirut. He said that it was impossible that his men--whom we knew had been the shooters--had been guilty. He thought that in my distraught condition, I was accusing people whom he was certain were innocent. The President said he would send his Foreign Minister and his Chief of Intelligence to see me immediately. But I told him that if we could not count on his people to protect us, then I would immediately close the Embassy. I was not very polite in my comments, but I did get the President's attention. His senior officials came to see me and in fact the President did as well before the end of the day. As I mentioned earlier, we later got confirmation that the ambushers were mercenaries who were being paid by the President, among others, to protect him; it was an extortion racket. The Lebanese did arrest some people and I was not ambushed again--fortunately. I think the full story, as it came out subsequently, was that one of this gang lost his cool and, because of a traffic altercation, took out his weapon and began to fire. He undoubtedly was a psychopathic killer who would shoot at any perceived slight. We concluded that the shooting was not politically motivated.

In any case, the wire services picked up the story; it was reported that I had been hurt. I immediately sent a "FLASH" message to the Department reporting that I was alive and well and that no one got hurt. I asked the Department to let my family know as well as those of my staff. It just happened that on the day of the ambush, my recently wed bride was flying

to Cyprus. A SEABEE from the Embassy met her at the airport and said that he was going to drive her into town. On the way in, the sailor said; "Too bad about your husband". He assumed that she knew of the ambush; she of course had not the slightest clue. The SEABEE had heard in the radio that I had been wounded. So, in answer to questions, my wife was given the false report and therefore for a while was under the misapprehension that I had been seriously hurt. Fortunately, she soon was given the right information, but it was a hell of a way to start a marriage. We still laugh about the phrase "too bad about your husband". It is a great opener!

Shelling was much scarier than the ambush, whether you are in a protected area or moving from one place to another. Shells can fall on you at any time; I never got used to the shelling. We all tried to pretend that we were not scared, but if asked we did admit that we were terrorized. I think I became more scared as I endured more shellings; you never get used to them and the more you go through, the more you worry that your luck may be running out. When you could, as soon as the shells began to fall, I would head for a bunker; then you begin to worry about whether everyone else was alright and under cover. Then I would call the Chancery and report that everyone at the house was alright and that all the staff should take cover--the residence was shelled much more often than the Chancery. The noise of a shelling is incredible. It is louder than the loudest noise you can imagine. The ground shakes and so do you; you being to wonder why the ceiling hasn't yet fallen in, even though you know that it is well fortified, but you wish that more had been done. Then I would get angry. We reported to Washington only those shellings that we thought came from the Syrians; those were the only ones that the Department might be able to do something about. The rest of the time we just hunkered down and hoped for the best; I never got accustomed to it and I don't know of anybody--Lebanese or American--who did. I remember meeting a Lebanese Colonel one morning and he looked very distraught. I asked him how he was; he could barely answer me. He told me that a shell had hit a building across the street from where he was living. He told me that fortunately no one had been hurt. I was somewhat surprised by his anguish since shelling into residential neighborhoods was a common event. Furthermore, this was a Colonel in the Lebanese army who had been subjected to shelling many times. It turned out that his horror had been that he had not been able to convince his eight year old son to go to school, because he was so terrified. It was his son's fear that really got to the Colonel; he was accustomed to danger, but when his young son froze with fear, that was more than he could bear. Unfortunately, the Colonel's experience was not a rare one; the city was traumatized; it is a horrible experience for all who have to suffer through such civil wars. Too many died in Lebanon; too many were scarred forever for no good reasons.

The first time I crossed the "Green Line" I was shot at--a minor nuisance to veterans, but very scare for a newcomer. I crossed it many times after that, but I didn't like it one bit ever. I shook with fear every time I did. The Department kept sending psychiatrists to look us over; they were amazed that none of us cracked under the strain even given the fact that we were all volunteers. The fact that we had a close bond helped immensely; it is the same relationship that troops develop when they share foxholes.

Despite all the trials and tribulations, I had no doubt that our presence in Beirut was essential for our foreign policy. I accepted the fact--in fact emphasized it--that our presence should be limited. I reduced the staff by about 10% in the first few weeks I was there. By October or November, I had reduced by another 50%. After of that, there was an increase back to by about ten Americans. But the staff was still small enough--about 35--that I could tell what everyone was doing and thereby had a good feel for who was necessary. Whenever we had any indication of a major fire fight we would evacuate personnel to Cyprus. Some people whom I forced to leave were upset. But under those circumstances, I used a very strict criteria for who was "essential" : one communicator who had to work long, long hours, one good security officer, one good political officer, one good military officer and one administrative person, in addition to myself. We could get by for a few days with kind of staffing. I could never convince Washington to reduce the size of the permanent staff to the level that I thought was acceptable. We might have been able to operate satisfactorily with less than twenty Americans. For example, we had six Marines--all wonderful and brave men, but in the Beirut environment, where we needed hundreds of guards, six did not make any difference and we could have survived with no Marine guards. Marines did not go on motorcades; they stayed with the Chancery. The post was closed in 1990; when we re-opened it in 1991, it had no Marine guards.

I felt that we needed a post in Beirut for a number of reason: a) to show that we could not be driven out, particularly from a Middle East post; b) we still had hostages and had to have a presence to keep track of that problem. As I said before, I believe that a forced rescue could have been successful, at least for a number of the hostages; under those circumstances, it would have been essential for a diplomatic presence in Beirut.

This part of my Foreign Service experience should not overlook the relationships we had with other American embassies in the region. Our relations with our people in Tel Aviv and especially Tom Pickering were excellent. We would see each other periodically either in Washington, London or Cairo. We didn't have a lot of daily business, but we could communicate with the Embassy in Israel by secure phone. The issue of southern Lebanon was discussed, but it was not a major concern of mine. We cared about the UN presence there; it was renewed every six months. We had a few Americans with that force as observers. One unfortunately--Colonel Higgins--was kidnapped and killed. But during my tour, south Lebanon was relatively quite. Beirut was a much more of a war zone than south Lebanon.

As I was leaving to undertake my Beirut assignment, Dick Murphy told me that relationships between the American embassies in Damascus and Beirut had traditionally been tense. He expected me to improve that situation. I think we did that even if only marginally. Our political officer did go to Damascus and the political officer there came to Beirut for a few days. Similarly, other members of the staff went to Damascus in an effort to improve relationships. But we always believed that the Syrians were playing a very negative role in Lebanon and reported our views regularly. Bill Eagleton and his staff were a little more positive about the Syrians. In one particular incident, Rashid Kharami, the Prime Minister of Lebanon--a Sunni--was assassinated on June 2, 1987. The Syrian Vice

President told some Lebanese that I had some foreknowledge of the assassination--the implication being that by not making this knowledge known, I was a willing accomplice. The Lebanese who related that to me had heard that from the Syrian. I asked him to give the Syrian a message from me; if he believed that accusation, he should report it to Washington in a telegram. Apparently, the Lebanese did take the message back because I soon got a call from Eagleton chastising me for what he considered to be a breach of diplomatic protocol. In fact, I liked Rasheem Kharami. I was saddened when he was killed. I didn't like it when I was accused of having foreknowledge of the assassination. But that was an illustration of the tensions that periodically rose between our two embassies.

Our staff in Nicosia was very helpful; it supported us logistically and was our life line. It did everything we asked and more and we asked them to extend themselves on many occasions. One time, when the Lebanese imposed a surprise currency conversion, we asked our folks in Nicosia to find \$400-500 thousand in small bills--one dollar bills--in one day. Some people went into all the shops in town and bought all the small bills they could find. Some embassies would have just laughed at us and told us to forget it; the people in Nicosia never did and we were always grateful to them for their efforts.

I would characterize our relationships with NEA in Washington as strained. In the first place, I was not a member of the NEA club". I was not an Arabist nor had I served in that region for very long. I was viewed as an "outsider". So my views were seen as suspect by some people in the Bureau--I think at the beginning there may have been reason to believe that I did not have sufficient background. Almost of the senior Arabist had gone through language school in Beirut; so they all remembered Lebanon as it had been. Many still had friends in Beirut with whom they maintained contact--and therefore at least some thought they knew all there was to know about Lebanon. Furthermore, as students, they had formed certain views about various groups in Lebanon; they may have loved or hated the Palestinians or the Maronites or the Shiites, etc. I didn't have any of such history, which perhaps was a blessing. But I did find that the prejudices that these officials had developed in their earlier years did show even after the passage of time. The Druze were by far the favorite faction in NEA; they could commit any crimes and never be really condemned. The Maronites, on the other hand, were viewed with great suspicion as pawns of the Israelis. As I mentioned earlier, I could not meet with the commander of the Maronite militia without prior Washington approval because he was considered to "have blood on his hands". Of course, I could meet any time with Druze leaders, whose behavior had not been any better than that of the Maronites. I finally told Washington that I would not seek Washington permission any longer on any meetings that I wish to hold and didn't. That may have been part of the reason why the NEA Arabists may have viewed me as somewhat obstreperous and different; I was not a "team" player as far as they were concerned.

I had excellent relationships with Arnie Raphel, the senior Deputy Assistant Secretary in NEA at least for the first year when I was in Beirut. He became our Ambassador in Pakistan in 1987. My relationships with his successor, Ed Djerejian were good, but not on the same plane with those I had with Arnie. Ed is a good friend; he succeeded me as Assistant Secretary. But we had some differences. I was very emotional about my people in Beirut. I

thought they were all very brave and had performed well under very trying circumstances. Therefore, I thought they should all be rewarded in their next assignments. When they didn't get their first choice of assignments, I would be heard from. I remember calling Ed and raising all sorts of hell because I really felt that anyone who had survived Beirut deserved priority over anyone else competing for the same job. I was very vocal on what I viewed as slights to my staff. I think my temper was probably raised in part because Beirut was a very stressful assignment; I think anyone who has served there or in any combat zone understands what that stress really was. Under normal circumstances, I might have been calmer, but I was a "tiger" on all subjects relating to Lebanon and my staff. Occasionally, I would be quite sarcastic in some of my messages such as "I understand that you are risking your lives traveling on the Beltway". That didn't endear me to Washington; I might not have had to be that sharp, but believe me, shells flying overhead or landing near you, do color your judgement significantly. One of my DCM's primary task was to read my personal telegrams before they were despatched to tone them whenever needed or to hold them until I cooled down.

On policy issues, there were changes during my tour. I mentioned that Shultz had told me that we would not become involved in the Lebanese fratricide and that any political solutions would have to come from the Lebanese themselves. But in the end, we did propose a reform plan and I suggested earlier did become involved in selecting the next President of Lebanon. I thought that was wrong. I recognize the everlasting American tendency to try to fiddle around in other countries, but there are times when I believe it is just inappropriate. In September 1987, the UN General Assembly met in its annual gathering. I had been by then in Beirut for a little more than a year. The President of Lebanon went to New York to attend the opening sessions. He saw Shultz there with his NEA advisors. He told the Secretary that matters were not improving very much in Lebanon; the country was still a mess. He wanted American help. Shultz liked the President, for good and understandable reasons. He had been greatly involved in events following Bashir's assassination and he and Shultz had worked together. The Secretary said that he would consider the President's request and instructed Murphy and Glaspie to have dinner with the President to see where we could be helpful. Of course, in a few weeks, we had a plan which would have reapportioned political power, although the adjustments were hardly monumental. The Secretary had approved the concept, but I don't think that it had wide support or may even had been known outside the Department's confines. The Lebanese wanted the plan to be submitted to and approved by the Syrians. The Lebanese had at this time their own negotiations with the Syrians.

Therefore I advised Washington that we should wait for awhile before throwing our plan into the ring. Of course, as soon as the Lebanese heard that we had a plan, they ceased their discussions with the Syrians. Washington then adjusted the plan some more, making more changes in the political reapportionment. It was then sent back to me and was told that the President of Lebanon had to approve it first before the US could present it to the Syrians. It turned out that the President didn't like it at all. That meant that I had to negotiate the plan with the Lebanese; that took about three or four months. It was a strange process; we were trying to sell the Lebanese government on a plan to reapportion political power in Lebanon. We certainly would win very few friends with that approach. In the meantime, the Syrians heard of our plan and told us that whenever we worked it out with the Lebanese, then they

would be glad to review it. I am sure they were just delighted that we had become involved in the Lebanese political quagmire. Finally, Murphy came out and he shuttled back and forth between Beirut and Damascus; he didn't get anywhere--there were just too many groups that could scuttle the plan. There was no way that an American plan could ever fly in Lebanon; I believed, after having been in Beirut for a while, that the issues could only be settled by the Lebanese and that the act of the US making a proposal took pressure off the Lebanese to solve their own squabbles. The Lebanese may not been able to come to any solution, but they surely could and did criticize the American plan; it satisfied no one. The Syrians of course were delighted; they used to show sympathy--mock, at times, I am sure--for our difficulties with those "troublesome" Lebanese factions. In June 1988, Shultz called me to Cairo, as I mentioned earlier. I flew back with him to Damascus because I couldn't get a flight to Beirut on Nicosia. That was Shultz, last trip to the area as Secretary of State. On the plane, I told the Secretary that I didn't think that Assad would make any deal on Lebanon; Lebanese elections were coming up and he was focusing on who the next President would be and not on power-sharing. I suggested that Shultz tell Assad that we were interested in a free and fair election in Lebanon and that we would be very unhappy if the Syrians imposed their candidate on the Lebanese electorate. Shultz agreed to do that. I did also point out that even if Assad agreed that that did not meant a virulent anti-Syrian could be elected as President of Lebanon; there were limits to Syrian tolerance. In the meantime, all Lebanese that I talked to had asked us to intervene and to anoint a President. Very few Lebanese wanted a Syria-imposed candidate; only those who thought they could marshal Syrian support wanted to have Syrian involved in Lebanese elections.

For two years, I had been telling everyone that the US would not become involved in Lebanese politics. Then In July 1989, Murphy came on a visit and was told by the President and all faction leaders that a President could not be elected without US intervention. He was asked to find a candidate acceptable to Syria. Murphy asked the Lebanese to draw up a list of acceptable candidates. It took them a month to put such a list together, although the President in the final analysis would not accept any list--he wanted another term, even though the Constitution prohibited a President from succeeding himself. But the President thought that with American backing and Syrian concurrence, the Parliament would amend the Constitution and he could then serve for another six years. I told him that was entirely unacceptable to us. Finally, the factions did agree on a list which I sent to Washington in an EXDIS message. I commented that I thought that the Lebanese would accept almost any person on the list, although perhaps unenthusiastically. I also said that there was one person on the list that the Lebanese would not accept; he was a Maronite--Mekhail Daher-- who was close to the Syrians. Murphy took the list to Damascus. Assad insisted that we support that Maronite and Murphy said OKAY. Of course, that never happened because the Lebanese just wouldn't accept that man. Fortunately, I was not able to personally get involved in our campaign for the Maronite because about this time, I had to medically evacuated. The Chargé had to do that; Murphy visited Lebanon and told the factions that the Maronite was the man we were supporting. So we looked foolish once again for having supported a candidate who just was not acceptable. But by then I was in the intensive care unit of the Air Force hospital in Wiesbaden, Germany and had other things to worry about.

I should end this discussion of my tour as ambassador to Lebanon with a couple of observations. First of all, I should note that before my departure, I was very concerned about how I would react under fire. I thought that I might just break down and cry or run away. I think that is probably not an unusual reaction for some one facing combat. I had never been under fire and I didn't have the vaguest notion what it really would be like and therefore what my reactions would be. I talked to a friend who was a retired Army officer, who had been in combat. He assured me that I would find some way to deal with the terror. He did acknowledge that some people could not deal with bullets and shells, but he thought that, knowing me, I would cope. He added that being in a leadership position will bring out internal fortitude that I might not know that I had.

Fortunately, the military friend was right. But I needed that reassurance before facing realities. I believe that in fact most people will rise to a much higher level than they expect if under fire or pressure. It is not easy, but most of us have a reservoir of fortitude that permits us to face some of our worst nightmares. The great sense of camaraderie, to which I alluded earlier, certainly was invaluable; it is comforting to know that others face the trials as you do. I also mentioned the sense of elation that one experiences after having come through unscathed in one of those shellings, even if you know that there is another round just around the corner. We all were vulnerable; most of the staff lived in private homes, well guarded, but nevertheless exposed to random firing. Furthermore, as I noted in many efficiency reports, going to and from work every day was an act of courage; all of us were exposed during that trip. In fact, in 1991, we reduced the danger to our staff by putting them in a compound. We had not done so earlier because there were a number of our staff who had to be away from the Chancery frequently; their work required circulation in the city and the country. For them to live in a compound would have been a great impediment; if they had been the only ones who were not living there that would have been too great an exposure. We did encourage people to share apartments, which they did. We transported everybody in motorcades; so we provided as much protection as we could. In any case, the compound was too small for a staff of about 40; we could have done so in an emergency, but over a period of time, it would have been too cramped. Also there was always the concern of concentrating the Americans in one place; that would have made too tempting a target. By 1991, that was not any longer a major concern. The fact that the Americans lived in Lebanese neighborhoods was of some protection; we always believed that neighbors were an important part of our protection network. One of the guards at the home of one of our communicators, Alan Yak, one night spotted two people running away from the apartment building into some woods that were nearby. He gave chase; the two men dropped their RPG loaded with a grenade. We moved Alan out that night. We concluded, supported by the Lebanese intelligence groups, that these guys were going to drop a grenade into Alan's apartment. Our guards were good; they were alert. We trusted them although I must say that our occasional visitors did raise their eyebrows questioningly. In fact, we had very little choice; those guards stood between us and some bullets; we had a good number of them and they were loyal. They probably provided information about us, but they also protected us as did the Lebanese army. When we could not rely on the army any longer, we closed the Embassy in 1990.

I should mention also the importance of *esprit de corps*. There was no doubt in my mind and that of my staff that we in the Embassy in Beirut were the bravest, toughest and best group ever assembled in any US embassy. That was an important motivator. The psychiatrists who looked us over periodically would tell me that we were doing okay. I firmly believe that one of the reasons we did not crack is because of our self-image. We had a "us vs. them" attitude, with the "them" being those people back in Washington who didn't have the vaguest notion of what we were facing. In our case, that was a healthy attitude. It is true that people did behave sometimes in very odd ways--we celebrated birthdays, played basketball, etc. We did things that a whole embassy would not do normally. The women were part of the mainly man-team; they joined right in and were major contributors to our great morale. Our morale was great that some employees even asked to extend their tours in Beirut--the camaraderie, the "highs" after a shelling, the escape from their lives in the US. I would back one extension, but never a second, of what nominally was supposed to be a two year tour, although it was well understood that a transfer request after one year would be honored by the Department. My administrative counselor wanted to stay for a third year; the Department refused, even though I would have agreed to it. He was a solid, steady man whom I thought could stand the pressures of a third year in Beirut. That was not true of all of my staff; some I would not have supported for a second year, much less a third. We did have some problem with alcoholism. My predecessor, Reg Bartholomew, had made a wise decision; he had banned alcohol from the compound, after at one point, the drinking was just getting out of hand--people were drinking during the day. The only exception was the Marine House, where drinking in moderation was allowed. Only the Marines and some of our security staff lived on the compound. I kept that policy; I couple of guys did go overboard on some occasions. I would call them in and tell them they would have to shape up or ship out. They all stayed and kept their drinking under control.

I also wanted to talk a little about the downing of Pan Am 103. That occurred on December 21, 1988, three months after my departure from Lebanon. On board on that flight were four friends from Beirut, including Chuck McKee who had been with me for my entire tour there. Another victim was Ronald Riviera, who had been my chief bodyguard for my last few months; he slept in the adjoining bedroom at the Residence. Mat Gannon and Dan O'Connor were also associated with the Embassy. The fate of that plane was a terrible tragedy and a great surprise. It was an emotional shock for all of us who knew the passengers; we who had been in Beirut with those men and had survived the many trial and tribulations together were especially shocked. That act of terrorism became a major subject for my attention when I became the Assistant Secretary because the investigation of it was on going throughout that period. I and others had to meet with the families on several occasions. So the downing of that plane had a major impact on Beirut staffs, both those who were still there and those who had served there in the previous two years. We were all devastated by the loss of life.

As I mentioned earlier, my tour in Beirut came to an end when I had to medically evacuated to the military hospital in Wiesbaden, Germany. My heart began to beat irregularly and the doctors in Beirut thought that I might be having a heart attack. Fortunately, their worst fears were not realized, but I certainly did have arrhythmia, which was significantly dangerous.

Ultimately, it was brought under control by medication. Since my successor had already been confirmed by the Senate, there was no reason for me to return. First I had been told that I would leave in July, 1988. Then Dick Murphy asked that I remain until there was a peaceful Lebanese governmental transition, after the elections. I said that that might take years. My successor, John McCarthy, was nominated and confirmed in July, but he decided to keep him in Washington and me in Beirut for the Presidential transition. As it turned out, the medical problems intervened and I left Beirut in September, 1988.

When I was medically evacuated, I knew that I would be returning to Washington to be a member of the Policy Planning staff. I had hoped to become the Ambassador to Thailand, which I knew from previous tours; as I mentioned before, I was fluent in Thai--I had not forgotten too much of what I had learned many years earlier. Ron Spiers called me in Beirut during the summer and told me that Thailand had gone to some one else; it was given to Dan O'Donohue because he was "fluent in Thai." I told that Ron had been given the wrong script for our phone conversation; I told him that I was the one that fluent in Thai; Dan was not. Ron yelled some expletive, but the decision had been made. George Vest also called a few days later and asked whether I would like to be considered for Oman or Sri Lanka. I declined those post with appropriate thanks; I told George that I didn't want to go to another place with an insurgency--Sri Lanka--or to the end of the world--Oman. I probably believed that a larger and more active embassy would eventually open up. So the Department offered me the position of senior Deputy Director of the Policy Planning staff; in fact, Dick Solomon, the Director, had mentioned that possibility of a couple of occasions during the previous few months. I decided to accept in the hopes that after a while something more challenging might open up.

Q: So in 1988 you became the senior Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (S/P). What were your functions?

KELLY: I arrived in S/P in October 1988, just a few weeks before our Presidential elections. I was in S/P during the transition from the Reagan to the Bush administrations. Shultz left not too long after the elections, so that S/P was not very active during the late months of 1988 and the early months of 1989. Solomon had the delusion that S/P would be writing the policy papers for the new administration. The staff worked very hard turning out long papers, which in truth I barely read, and I don't think anyone else did either. I did not believe that members of a new administration, even one that worked for a man who had just been Vice-President, would pay much attention to what the views of the appointees of the past President were. Solomon traveled a lot in the last three months of his appointment, holding planning talks with the Russians, the Koreans, the Japanese, the French and the British and I stayed at home minding the store, whose shelves were rather bare. I can not say that these months in S/P were very active.

Q: After the change in administrations, you were appointed as Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs. How did that come about?

KELLY: I may not have mentioned the fact that I was offered a job working for George Bush before I left for Lebanon. Don Gregg, then the Vice-President's National Security Advisor, asked me whether I would be interested in being his deputy. I had known Gregg for many years and I had traveled with him when I escorted Bush to Europe on two occasions when I was the senior DAS for EUR. I met Admiral Murphy and Craig Fuller, both close advisors to the Vice President. As a result, when that vacancy as Don's deputy arose, they turned to me. I declined the offer with thanks, preferring at that time to go to Beirut as ambassador. Many people told me that I had made a very bad choice because one should never turn down an offer from a man who had a good opportunity of becoming President two years hence. Fortunately, they were proven wrong!

When Bush became President, Fuller left the White House and Gregg went to South Korea as our ambassador. So that when Bush became President, a whole new foreign affairs team was put together. Before the inauguration, the transition team announced that the new Secretary of State, James Baker, had selected several people to be his close associates; one of those was Dennis Ross who was going to be the new S/P Director. So I fully expected that I would be replaced, although I had known Dennis for years. I called him as soon as the announcement was made and told him that I thought that he would probably wish to have his own deputy and that in any case, I really didn't want to stay in S/P beyond perhaps a short transition period. I wanted a good embassy or I was prepared to leave the government in nothing suitable was available in the new administration. On January 1, 1989, I ran into George Vest; he told me that I then had a chance. In response to my question of "chance at what", he said that as long as George Shultz had been Secretary, I would never have been offered another meaningful assignment. I asked George why I was not told that six months earlier and as that the real reason why I had been turned down for Thailand and only offered Oman or Sri Lanka. All George Vest would tell me was that Shultz would never have approved me for a significant position.

In early February--a couple of weeks after the new administration had been installed--I was called at home by Baker's secretary, asking me to come to see the Secretary the next day--in Texas fashion, I believe the question was phrased: "Would you be willing to come and visit with the Secretary?" I told her that I would be honored to "visit" with the Secretary. Sometime later that evening, I also got a call from Richard Haas, who had worked on the transition team and had just begun his new job as the senior National Security staff member for the Middle East. I also got a call from Dennis Ross. Both told me that I was under consideration for Assistant Secretary for NEA and that that would be the subject of my meeting the next day with Baker. I had heard some "corridor" gossip about this, but those calls were the first serious indication that indeed my name was on a list that Baker was considering.

The next day, I did meet Baker--for the first time. We chatted a little; he wanted to find out what my background was, where I had gone to school, etc. He told me that I had been given very good marks by a number of people whom he trusted and that he was prepared to offer me the NEA job. He told me that he had already discussed the appointment with the President who fully supported me. I told the Secretary that I would like to consider the offer

for a day so that I could discuss it with my wife. I really wanted to discuss it with her because I knew that the job would mean long hours. We had of course talked a little about it the night before after the Ross and Haas calls, but that was different than actually considering a firm offer. She was pregnant and I wanted to make sure that my absences would not be too great a burden on her. Furthermore, there was some concern about my medical condition, although the medication had brought the arrhythmia pretty much under control. In any case, I thought that there were enough concerns that required serious conversation with my wife. Baker said that my request was fine with him; we then chatted a little more, during which he raised the question of whether there was anything negative or potentially embarrassing that might be revealed during the clearance and confirmation process. I asked the Secretary whether he knew that his predecessor had tried to fire me and that I had played a role, very minor, in "Iran-Contra". He said he knew all about that and was not concerned by those events. So I said that that was the only thing that could raise questions, but that since those events were all part of a public record, nothing new could come out. Baker then went on to say that my relationships with Shultz were not a problem for him, unless it was an indication that I had difficulties following directions. I said that I did not think that had ever been a problem and we parted on that note.

My wife had told me that opportunities like this one came along only once in a lifetime and she was adamant that I accept Baker's offer. I also thought it was a wonderful opportunity, but I had to make sure that I had my family's support. So the next day, I called Baker's office and asked the secretary to tell Baker that I would be honored to take the job. Then the clearance and confirmation process began and I was confirmed in June, 1989. I had been told before my confirmation hearings that Senator Moynihan, then the chairman of the Near East subcommittee had some questions about my role in "Iran-Contra". As is customary, I paid a courtesy call on Chairman before the formal committee meeting and we discussed my role in "Iran-Contra" and my problems with Shultz. He told me in his usual fashion that he had some "tough" questions that he would ask during the public hearings; that had been confirmed to me by some staff members. But when the hearings took place, Moynihan did not ask any difficult questions; the hearing only lasted for about an hour. Senator Helms voluntarily came to introduce me; I had met him, but he didn't really know me, but he recommended me nevertheless, based on what others had told him about me. I think some of my colleagues were shocked that Helms would have something nice to say about a Foreign Service officer. My guess is that he wanted to demonstrate that even he could find a Foreign Service office to commend. Moynihan asked a lot of questions, but I think he had just come from a convivial lunch and may not have asked all the questions that some of the committees blood-thirsty staffers had put in front of him. He regularly tossed aside little slips of papers that the staffers were passing him from the row of seats behind him. So the confirmation hearings went nicely without any rancor or raised voices. The only controversial issue that was raised concerned the location of the American Embassy in Israel: Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. There may have been only one question about Lebanon.

While waiting to be confirmed, I occupied a small office in the Assistant Secretary's suite. I read all the cables and memoranda that came to acting Assistant Secretary every day. Eagleburger had suggested that I actually move into the Assistant Secretary's office, but

that I should not take any official actions--sign papers, give out assignments, give directions, etc. It was the same advice that he gave to everyone else. I went to staff meetings and read as much as I could, but for the purposes of the Bureau's official business, I was invisible. I wouldn't even give my own views on issues; they were not pertinent at the time because officially I was nobody. I did have an opportunity to read many personnel files since I had to pick my own staff.

My predecessor had six deputies. I cut that back to five, but I didn't keep any of incumbents. I talked to each of the deputies and warned them I would be replacing them so that they could make arrangements for their next assignments--all but one were career officers. I told them I would help them if they wished in trying to get them the assignments of their choice. My "clean sweep" made the press for one day as a "Friday night massacre". My reason for changing the incumbents was based on my perception that they had gotten into a set pattern of doing business; my predecessor had been in the job for six years and had established a routine that was comfortable to him and which his deputies naturally followed. He was remarkable talented, but I was different character. He and Shultz had agreed on how Middle East policy was going to be run and that is the way it remained for six years. I wanted to bring some fresh eyes to the front office, so that we would at least have an unbiased review of what we were doing in the area.

I first brought in a young Foreign Service officer, Dan Kurtzer, to worry about the peace process. There were a lot of talent that was available, and I brought it into the Bureau. I chose four career officers and one political appointee to be my deputies--every bureau in both the Reagan and Bush administrations had to have at least one political appointee in its senior ranks. Not only did I think that was the appropriate direction to go, but the Seventh Floor encouraged us to do so. I was never directed to fire or ship off anybody. But Eagleburger and other counseled me to put in my own team. Some suggested that I should have waited until after confirmation to tell the incumbents that they would be replaced. But that would not have been fair to them; the assignment cycle needs lead time and if these people were to find suitable assignments, they had to had as long a lead time as I could provide them. If I had waited until summer to break the news to them, it would have been too late for them to find suitable assignments in that year's cycle. I understood that dynamic and therefore announced my plans to them in late March, after clearing it with Eagleburger. A lot of people were upset by my action, both because of its nature and because they felt it was premature, but the Department's assignment cycle waits for no one or for anything.

I might just mention the selection process of the political appointee. I interviewed about ten candidates and I selected Katherine Lyden who had worked for Senator Percy on the Foreign Relations Committee and had been at the Labor Department--an attorney, very bright. I was told by Baker that I had a complete free hand in picking my deputies; I was never told to take anyone. I was told that if I didn't like any on the first list, I should ask for another one. The ten names that were given to me came from the Seventh Floor which in turn had gotten them from the White House. I may have known one or two, but I did not know Lyden. It turned out that we had some common friends and that was the only connection. As it turned out, during my tenure, I had three political appointees as deputies.

Each time, the selection process worked the same way. I made Lyden the deputy for economic matters, Congressional relations and North Africa. One of the other deputies--Tezi Schaffer--covered South Asia, one--Jack Covey--covered the Levant, one--Skip Ganeen--covered the Arabian Peninsula and security assistance and the fifth was Kurtzer. All deputies had both geographical and functional responsibilities. I had known all of the four career officers, but I knew only one very well.

I spent considerable time during my tour as Assistant Secretary on personnel matters; very little on budgetary ones. I personally reviewed all ambassadorial selections, all candidates for DCM and office directors in addition to choosing my own deputies, as I described earlier. On budget issues, I had a very competent administrative staff; if I needed more financial resources, I went to the Seventh Floor and told them what I required. We had considerable credibility with the financial resource managers of the Department primarily because in "non-war" years we returned some of our allocations. Once the Gulf War started, we needed many more resources which were readily granted to us. I spent time on personnel because I thought it was a worthwhile investment; I knew that an initial careful selection of the right staff would save a lot of time later; the right people would not need close supervision to the benefit of our total effort. So I believed that time spent during the selection process would make for a more efficient operation later.

I have been told by many that Secretary Baker only consulted members of his "inner circle". That was certainly not my view or experience. I met with Baker every day while I was the Assistant Secretary; he religiously held an 8:40 meeting of all regional assistant secretaries whenever he was in town. More often than not, I would meet with him several times each day. I could call him and get through whenever I needed him; I don't think I ever waited for more than twenty minutes before he would return my call. In fact, I found it easier to get a hold of the Secretary than most of the other people in Washington that I had deal with. Ray Seitz, an old friend and then the Assistant Secretary for EUR, used to talk about our experiences; he felt that he had sufficient access to the Secretary, but he also chafed at the number of interlopers who wanted a piece of his action. Half of the US government wanted to run reactions with Europe. Hank Cohen, the Assistant Secretary for Africa, had pretty much of a free hand; he developed and ran African policy. As far as I was concerned, I found Baker a leader who wanted information, who wanted to be involved in issues; you could not however waste his time with inconsequential chatter. If you could give him concise and accurate answers, you could have direct access to him any time.

The Middle East peace process involved primarily Baker, Dennis Ross and myself--as third fiddle. The Persian Gulf war was principally the province of Bob Kimmitt, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Baker and myself, with Eagleburger being involved whenever necessary. Ross played a minor role in the Gulf crises. No one paid much attention to South Asia; that was essentially left to me, Schaffer and an NSC staffer. The only exception to that last rule was Afghanistan; on that Kimmitt played a role. South Asia has been a continuing problem for NEA Assistant Secretaries. My predecessor, Dick Murphy, for example, had visited the subcontinent twice in six years. I think as a generalization, one must conclude that South Asia had not received adequate attention; that

became clear to me as I was preparing to undertake my duties as Assistant Secretary. Congressman Solarz had reached the same conclusion and had filed a bill creating a separate South Asia Bureau. I was therefore determined, when I took over officially, to pay attention to South Asia. I visited the area three times during my first year in the job. I tried without fail, when in town, to have a weekly meeting on South Asia issues. That gave Schaffer and her staff an opportunity to teach me about South Asia weekly. I barely knew the area, so that they had a lot to teach me. But by the end of the first six months, whenever I appeared before Solarz or others, I was able to answer their questions adequately. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, I was forced to forego my good intentions; I just did not have enough time to spend on South Asia for at least the following year. So those who were concerned about higher level attention to South Asia, did have a legitimate criticism; the structure of the Department of State did give the Assistant Secretary for NEA too large a span of issues particularly whenever one of the sub-regions was in turmoil. Before my confirmation, I went to see as many of my predecessors as I could--McGhee, Hare, Battle, Hart, Sisco, Atherton, Saunders, Veliotis and Murphy. We discussed my responsibilities and I think almost all of them warned me to pay attention to South Asia because it was important, but all of them noted that there would be times when it would be impossible. So I got off to a good start, but, as in the case of my predecessors, was drawn away from South Asia by immediate and pressing concerns.

I must have appeared before various Congressional Committees at least 20-25 times. Most of the hearings were held by the House's Foreign Affairs Committee; I met with the Senate only semi annually. But Lee Hamilton, the chairman of the FRC's subcommittee on Europe and the Near East wanted me to testify on a multi basis, at least. Almost all of hearings focused on the Arab-Israeli confrontation; they were almost always well attended by Congressmen with an interest in the area along with a mass of media representatives. Many of these appearances were on live TV. I think those sessions were the toughest part of my job. I enjoyed public appearances, but they were in different category from Congressional sessions. There was always pressure during testimony. First of all, the witness is on an uneven footing from the Congresspersons as exemplified just by the physical layout of the hearing room. The Congresspersons sit on two dais--one below the other--and the witness sits in a well. The Members are free to make long introductory speeches, before they get around to asking any questions. The statements and the questions were often quite critical and antagonistic, taking the form of *ad hominy* admonishments, towards me. I was a convenient scapegoat for those who for their own reasons wished to take issue with administration policy, but didn't want to attack the President or the Secretary. I was a very convenient target as were my colleagues of comparable rank. I hasten to add, however, that at no time did I ever feel that I was being "left to dry" by the administration. There were times, when I was the subject of criticism, Baker or Eagleburger would, during their next appearance before a Congressional Committee, take the opportunity to express their confidence in me, either in answer to a planted question or in some response. They went our of their way to insure that their support of me was in the written record. Twice, after particularly rigorous hearings, the President personally reassured me--one at the White House and once in New York. He told me that he had watched me on C-SPAN and that he had approved of my conduct. He understood that the hostile questions were actually

intended for him and not me. So the support from the President, the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary made things much easier.

The opening statements by Members were often rambling musing about the nefarious policy that we were conducting and the follow-up questions would accuse me of all sorts of dastardly deeds. Some of the hostile questioners would then, after the hearings, take me aside and tell me to forget what they had said; they really did not mean it. One of them, Larry Smith(D-FL), who later was sentenced to jail, often sought me out after a hearing and told me that his vitriol was for public consumption and that he really didn't mean it. There of course some who would seek me after a hearing to tell me that they were absolutely serious about their comments and expressed the hope that I would remember their words. One of them, after my first appearance, told me: "You make me vomit." He was furious with me over an incident that had taken place in Israel. A Palestinian had wrestled the steering wheel of a bus away from the driver while the bus was traveling on a mountain road; the bus had ended up at the bottom of a ravine, causing the death of 18 Israelis. It was a terrible accident. The Department's spokesman, a few hours after the event, in response to a question, had said that the Department did not know whether that event was the doing of a terrorist or whether the Palestinian was just deranged. I testified the next day and was severely criticized by several members of the Committee for the spokesman's careful reply. They wanted an immediate condemnation of the act as having been perpetrated by a terrorist. I was trying to explain the Department's first response; at the time, all we had was a sketchy wire service report; we didn't know what the circumstances was, who the alleged attacker was, etc. Governments must be judicious in their responses; that may take more time and be more careful than the visceral response of the man-on-the-street. Many of the Members were not pleased by our careful reaction.

I think it has to be understood that every answer I gave had the potential of being headline material--primarily in the Middle East--, not to mention it becoming troublesome for our relations with other governments. The number one subject in the Middle East was and probably still is the Israeli-Arab relationship. My appearances were always well covered by Israeli and Arab journalists who were always looking for a story to file--preferably one that would be the lead column of their newspapers. The TV cameras were not much of a problem; in fact, after a hearing would begin, I was not very conscious of their presence--they are on the side out of direct sight. I was always knew when cameras were to be used; in walking to the hearing room, I would see tons of electronic equipment stacked in the hallways. After a while, it became clear to me that people in the administration were in fact watching the proceedings; the President would have them taped and then watch them in the evening. Baker watched a lot of times; when I would go to the morning staff meeting, the Secretary would refer to my previous day's appearance. He might well comment to any of us who might have appeared the day before that he would have handled a question differently. I found that the Secretary was watching a positive aspect.

The major problem in testifying was, in addition to having to walk a fine line between Israel and the Arab countries, that often there were negotiations--many quite secret--on the issues that I was being asked about. So the answers had to be framed in very carefully chosen

words so not to upset the "apple carts". Sometimes, the answer to a question could become very controversial as happened a few days before the beginning of the Gulf War. Although not a major problem, there was always the issue of the classification of the information for which I was being asked. There were Congressmen who would ask me questions, knowing that I could give a straightforward reply because the matter was classified. Those Representatives would intentionally try to "put me on the spot". Of course, I would always say that I could not answer the question but that I was prepared to provide the information in a "closed" hearings. That would invariably bring the retort from the questioner that I was trying to avoid providing the public information which it had every right to have. Posturing and theatrics were often the motto of the day. Occasionally, I had to appear in "closed" hearings where we would discuss classified information. I remember that after one such meeting, at which "Top Secret" material was discussed, some of what I said was in the hands of newspaper reporters within a couple of hours. I immediately wrote a letter to Chairman Hamilton protesting the leak of information from the Committee. He acknowledged that his Committee had been the source; he even told me which Congressman was responsible.

For most of my testimonies, I would be the lone witness. Sometimes, an assistant secretary of Defense would also be at the witness table--usually on security assistance. Every once in a while my counterpart in AID would also be a witness, but usually I was all alone. Lyden was very helpful; she had enough contacts on the Hill to have some idea of what questions might be asked and she had a lot of common sense; the more often I appeared, the better I became at anticipating each Member's interests. I also became well acquainted with the internal mechanics of the Committees. The Office of Congressional Relations, at the working level, was not much help; it had a mixture of effective and ineffective staffers. It is not an Office to which career officers wished to be assigned; a tour there is not usually useful for promotion purposes. That made it unattractive for many career officers.

At times, I was asked to give background briefings to the Department's press corps. I attended very few formal press conferences, except during the Gulf War when we might be traveling. I did very little briefing of individual reporters; Dennis Ross did a lot of that on the Middle east peace process. I was just by inclination not moved to do that kind of thing. If Tutwiler asked me to talk to someone, I, of course, would do so or if a reporter might call to check a factual point or confirmation of a story, I might talk to him, but I never sought reporters out. Reporters find out very quickly who would talk "out of school" and who didn't; since I belonged to the second category, I was not pursued very much. I did do a fair amount of public speaking; that I enjoyed. I did less than I would have liked to and less than I tried to get my predecessor to do when I was the deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. I just didn't have the time.

I met with such organizations like AIPAC (American Israel Political Action Committee) every once in a while. I met with Tom Dyne, the Executive Director. I met with him every January as what was called the "Javits report" was sent to Congress. That was the annual forecast of our security assistance sales for the coming year would be. I would brief them about what sales were anticipated in the Middle East. Occasionally, they would object to a

specific anticipated sale--although since this was a briefing, we would not change our position--, but because of that annual briefing AIPAC was never surprised by our sale announcements. These meetings enabled me to defend our sales policies; then I would occasionally meet with AIPAC in other venues. I did not deal with them on a weekly basis, which did not enhance my standing with them; in fact, I don't think they regarded me very highly. Dick Murphy had met with AIPAC frequently, but I don't know that he held the same formal review that I did on an annual basis. All of my predecessors had told me that relationships with AIPAC were difficult and tortured. But I, perhaps naively, decided to make the relationship as open and as normal as possible. I knew that the day the "Javits report" went to Congress, AIPAC would immediately have it. I thought that some preemption might be positive.

I met regularly with the Conference of Presidents of major Jewish Organizations, which represented all of the large Jewish groups in the US. Those sessions were separate and apart from my meetings with AIPAC. I felt that it was a disservice to American Jewish community for me to communicate with it only through AIPAC. The Conference of Presidents is a much broader organization than AIPAC. I also met regularly with the Presidents of major American-Arab organizations. I tried to cover as many of these constituent groups as I could--not only those interested in the Middle East, but also those representing former South Asian people. I would guess that I saw probably three or four of these groups each month, usually at their request. I thought that such contacts were important. There must have been some linkage between my meetings with these constituency groups and the questions I would receive during Congressional hearings. AIPAC, before every one of my appearances, would provide suggested questions to one Congressman or another. Those questions would be transmitted to us before the hearings so that we knew what questions AIPAC was seeking to be asked. I don't think my outreach efforts made much difference to my Congressional appearances; I think I would have blasted or praised regardless of what these constituent groups may have felt. I don't think meeting with AIPAC would have made any difference. AIPAC, and other constituent groups, have their own agendas and I doubt that any meeting that I might have with them would have changed their views. They had their views and our differing perceptions, freely expressed, is the core of strength of a democracy.

I would occasionally get a call from the Conference of Presidents advising me that it was thinking about issuing a statement, but wanted to have my views first. Sometimes, they would call me back and tell me that they had not issued the statement in light of my presentation. So I think maintaining contacts with constituent groups, is useful, even if it has very little effect on Congressional hearings. In fact, I found my contact with Conference to be quite useful. I learned a lot from it. In general, I would urge my successors and any other assistant secretary to be in contact with the American public and its constituent groups as much as possible. It is good both for them and for the Department; it precludes an isolation that talking only to other diplomats can well engender. It is important for the Department's leadership to be in touch with the American public; I said that when I was the deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and I still maintain that view.

In this discussion of relations outside of the administration, I should note that my bosses were very relaxed about "social requirements". Baker didn't attend any official social occasions unless it required the presence of the President. Both Baker and Eagleburger told us that we were free to do whatever we wanted on the social front; so I did not become immersed very deeply in the Washington social life. We did entertain some and went to social occasions some, but the family requirements came first. I did most of the social requirements at lunch. Soon, the ambassadors for the 25-26 countries for which I was responsible came to understand that I was delighted to have working lunches with them and senior members of their staffs or that I would be happy to host any visitor they might have, but that I would not be available every night. I did attend all the National Day celebrations if I were in town; usually I was the senior Departmental official present. As I suggested, I saw ambassadors frequently; sometimes my deputies would receive them. Of course, all ambassadors at one time or another have to see at least an assistant secretary if only to let their capitals know that they had delivered a message at sufficiently high level. There were some that were more active than others, but I saw a lot of ambassadors at a lot of times.

One thing that I remember well from my days as assistant secretary was the long hours that I had to spend on the job. Before the invasion of Kuwait, I would get to the office approximately 7:45 a.m. and leave about twelve hours later; that was the routine for five days a week, then on Saturday, I would be in the office for another five to six hours. I tried to stay away on Sundays. Despite that work schedule, I was not completely comfortable that I was on top of all of the issues confronting the Bureau; I doubt whether any assistant secretary believes that he or she has sufficient knowledge. Travel was always an additional burden. I mentioned that I went to South Asia on three different occasions during my first year in office. We held an annual ambassadorial conference, in Bonn--chosen because any place in the region would have made too attractive a target for terrorists. In addition, I think I was on the road about every six weeks--that was before Kuwait. After the invasion, for the following year, I probably crossed the Atlantic on about 35 trips. It was just plain back and forth, back and forth.

Fortunately, the Bureau was and still is well staffed. In athletic terms, I would say that NEA is in good physical condition because it always has at least one crisis to handle; therefore it gets plenty of exercise. EUR did not have such crises for a long period of times. NEA attracted a lot of good officers; it was well staffed in the field, so that there were very few big time surprises. My senior deputy had a very heavy burden because of my frequent absences particularly after Kuwait. He was the acting Assistant Secretary for about one-third of the time during my two years. The key to a smooth operation, in a situation like mine, was the availability of good deputies and good country directors. It is true that there may have been some weak links, but we found ways to work around those--fortunately, I think there were only two weak office directors, but they had good strong desk officers who compensated for any deficiencies that their bosses may have had. I don't think NEA was unique in this respect; any organization is bound to have some people who may not be able to carry their full load and others have to pick up the slack. In light of my schedule, it was absolutely essential that my deputies have access to the Seventh Floor, which indeed they did. Under Secretaries, I think, are paid to hold meetings; they were always having them.

Reg Bartholomew would hold meetings on security assistance; quite often either Geneen or Covey would have to attend those in my place. Reg would occasionally call up and complain about my absence; we were of course friends of long standing, so that he understood my plight.

The Bureau would start the day with a quick early morning staff meeting of the deputies, the executive director, a staff aide and my personal secretary in my office. Late in the day--around 6 p.m.--we would hold what was called "Vespers"--another quick meeting to discuss the day's events. Those meetings were essential to our communications; it enabled all of us to keep up to date on what was going on. When I traveled, I was sent a daily activities report which covered the activities of every Bureau office. I also chaired a weekly meeting of people of assistant secretary rank people from other agencies: DoD, CIA, and NSC. I was satisfied that we coordinated well in the US government. I got good cooperation from all the other agencies. I was surprised that the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs in DOD showed up at these weekly meetings; I had fully expected that DOD would be represented by Art Hughes, the deputy for NEA, whom I had strongly supported for that position. But, in fact, Henry Rowen, the Assistant Secretary came to the preponderant number of the meetings. So the right people came weekly and we got a lot of work done during those sessions. I felt that we had a collegial relationship with the other agencies. It worked well because our respective secretaries and directors worked well together, even though Webster, the CIA Director, was never a full participant in the Washington bureaucracy. I remember one time when Geneen and I roared up to Baker's office to complain about something that Secretary Cheney had done. We urged Baker to call Cheney to get his decision reversed and were ready to draft a stern letter taking Cheney to task. Baker looked at us with a smile and said that in his view one of the reasons the administration had had some success was because he did not speak ill of or take serious issue with his fellow Cabinet officers and they didn't speak ill of him or berate him. He was not about to start because we were upset; he thought that there must be a better way of handling our problem. In fact there was and our concerns were taken care of, but that episode was an illustration of the collegial approach that the Cabinet was taking. That rapport trickled down the bureaucracy, making for far better working relationships and eliminating much of the normal tensions that are created by bureaucracies.

I had of course heard a lot from public administration experts about the importance of delegating responsibility down the chain of command. I tried to do that not only because apparently it was the preferred management style, but also because circumstances did not leave many alternatives. I was comfortable in dumping as much as I could on others. I found it worked quite well. I think the Bureau worked well.

Now let me turn from management to some of the policy issues that confronted the Bureau during the 1989-91 period. First let me mention the peace process. In December, 1988, Secretary Shultz had broken the ice with the PLO. Arafat appeared in Geneva where he went through a carefully scripted statement about the National Covenant and its relationship to the existence of the State of Israel. On the same day, by prearrangement, the State Department announced that the US government would begin a dialogue with the

PLO. So the Bush administration, when it took over in January 1989, had a new Middle East scene; there had been a host of peace plan proposals, none of which met with any success. The Intifada--the uprising on the West Bank and Gaza--had started in 1988; that obviously complicated matters.

The new administration did not have a specific plan when it took office, although Baker, in some of his early speeches--drafted by Dennis Ross--suggested that efforts would be made to foster face to face negotiations between the Israelis and the Arabs through the use of so called "confidence building" measures--actions that the Israelis would take in the administration of the occupied territories and actions that the Arabs would take which might ease Israeli security concerns. In fact, no "confidence building" measures were ever undertaken by either side--other events intervened. That was the philosophical framework within which we operated.

Then there was the great thorny issue between the US and Israel over the settlements in the occupied territories. That issue became acute when Prime Minister Shamir visited the US in April 1989; it was a sore point between the two countries until the end of the Bush administration. So the relationships between the US and Israel were not nearly as good as they had been under previous administrations. I must note that that was certainly not our intent at the beginning of the administration. I spent considerable time worrying about that deterioration; I viewed Israel as a very unique country. It has a more direct cognizance of threats to its security than any other country on the face of this earth. It is strategically located; it has a long and torturous history; it has ancient traditions. That gives it a more acute edge to its life and gives it a perspective on life not shared by many other countries. I always considered myself as a supporter of Israel starting with the Six Day War in 1967 through all the ups and downs of 1973 War and the various acts of terrorism perpetrated on Israelis. During my tour in Lebanon, I had many vigorous arguments with Lebanese about Israel. I think the Israelis, by and large, were pleased with my performance in Lebanon; I have been told by some Israelis whose judgement I respect--particularly the commanders of the IDF--Shimon and his successor Barach--and who knew what I was doing in some detail in Lebanon that they thought I had performed well as far as they were concerned. So I believed that I had some credibility in Israel; I was certainly a supporter of that country. I was surprised by the expectation that many Israeli and their American supporters presumed about our policy; I think they automatically expected the US government to come down on their side in all disputes. That certainly accounted for some of the strains in the relationship; I think we--the President, the Secretary and we at lower levels--all felt that Israeli disappointment. We believed that in most instances there were two sides to most disputes and issues; that was certainly true for the question of settlements. That view was certainly not shared by the Israelis, certainly those in the Likud government; they saw only one side--theirs. There was no argument, as far as they were concerned, about the merit of settlements. I visited Jerusalem many times during my tenure--15 or 16 times. I met Sharon on several occasions and had dinner with him. When I first met him after becoming Assistant Secretary, he was on his best behavior--pleasant, engaging; he was the Minister of Housing with responsibility for the settlements. He said that he thought we had a lot in common because we both had been through some very tough times in Lebanon, although

several years apart. We shared anecdotes about various Lebanese; talked about various restaurants in Beirut, etc. He put on his best charm on that first meeting. I saw him subsequently on a few other occasions; he was never personally antagonistic although I really didn't have much business to transact with him. Of course, he was outspoken in his criticism of the administration; I found many of his comments about the US government very offensive and said so.

My contacts with the Israeli government were primarily through the Foreign Minister--Moshe Arens and then Later David Levy. I always saw Shamir when I went to Jerusalem; I also always saw Rabin, the then Minister of Defense; I often saw Peres, then the Minister of Finance. You couldn't go to Jerusalem and only see one or two; anything we did was viewed in a political context and we therefore had to be as careful as possible to avoid the domestic political mines. So if I was in Jerusalem for only a few hours, I would have to see the leaders of the various political groups. Occasionally I would see Eban, who although no longer a political force, I found to be an interesting person and an important observer. Intermittently, I would make a call on the Knesset to visit with its Foreign Affairs Committee or its Defense Committee. Those were always "challenging" meetings! I did not have any spare time whenever I visited Israel and particularly Jerusalem. Israelis wanted to talk to American officials and we tried to accommodate them as much as possible, even as meetings became increasingly difficult in light of the tense relationships. These meetings would start on a friendly note and would end on the same note, but in between could be very divisive. Arens' recent book talks about this relationship; I think he is accurate in describing events, but I was surprised by his bitterness about various actions that we took. I understood how intense the Israelis felt about their cause, but I did not grasp that bitterness. "Evenhandedness" is a phrase often used, but rarely understood by others. An American official who attempts to be "evenhanded" on Israeli-Arab issues considers himself or herself to be fair and virtuous. To most Israeli politicians, an American official who is "evenhanded" gives Israel less than it deserves. In part, that judgement is based on the notion that it is not correct to assume moral equivalency between Israel and Arab states. Israel, according to this view is a democracy; the Arab states are totalitarian. Therefore the two sides can not be judged on an equal level; the democracy must always have the benefit of the doubt. This different starting point for discussions between American and Israeli officials make conversations very difficult.

I had hoped during my tenure that progress could be made on the peace process. That may have been naive; one of my dear friends is a life-long Arabist--one of the best. He and I had gone through a lot together. Early in my tour as Assistant Secretary, I had a meeting with the Conference of major Jewish Organizations--a practice to which I referred earlier. I told them that we were determined to break the ice somehow or other to bring about relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. After my statement, I answered a lot of questions. My Arabist friend had been present and when we rode back to the Department together, he commented that he thought the presentation had been very effective, particularly since he thought that I didn't mean a word I had said. I told him that I really did believe what I had expounded and that I fully intended to devote as much energy as I could must to achieve the goals I had just outlined. My friend showed considerable skepticism because, as he

correctly pointed out, history was against me; efforts to bring about face-to-face dialogues had been tried since 1948 and with the single exception of Israel-Egypt had failed miserably. He thought that I didn't have a chance and that Bush, Baker, Ross, I and others would end up being completely frustrated. He viewed Arab-Israel relations as an irreconcilable chasm which would not be bridged in the foreseeable future. He predicted that we would end up paying off both sides without making any progress. I told him I thought that he was wrong and that we could make a difference. If I had not believed that I would have resigned; there would have been too much grief if I had thought that we would be tilting at wind-mills. As I said, I may have shown at that moment a considerable degree of naivete, but I knew that Baker felt the same way and I was determined to give the peace process a boost in whatever way I could.

During the first month in office, a senior member of the Saudi Royal family came to visit Washington and the Secretary. In my briefing memorandum to Baker before his meeting, I had listed some suggested talking points, including the suggestion that the time had come that the Saudis reach out to have contacts with the Israelis--secretly or publicly. I noted that the PLO had done so, as indicated by Arafat at the previous year's UN General Assembly meeting. Sure enough, Baker made the pitch, almost flooring the Saudi Prince. It was a novel experience for the Saudi, but he listened carefully. I made the same pitch to all who would listen to me during my initial visits to various Arab capitals. I pointed out that the world had changed and that the Arab countries needed to get over their time honored perceptions and positions. I asked all of them to reach out to the Israelis. Of course, many of my interlocutors looked at me as if I had two heads, but I did not leave any doubt in their minds what US government policy was on Israel-Arab relationships. We wanted a fresh and different approach. I think, even before I started as Assistant Secretary, that it was Hal Saunders who told me that unfortunately it sometimes took wars to make peace in the Middle East. In fact, it was the Gulf War that fundamentally changed what had been the frozen positions of the Arab countries in the Middle East. But we were determined even before the war to try to break the stalemate; countries in the region had to be nudged, pushed and nagged to move forward on their relationships with their Israeli neighbor. Dennis Ross deserves a lot of credit for his efforts in this area; even though he was then the Director of the Policy Planning staff he played a major role in developing the concepts and coordinating the many activities of the US government in the peace process.

Ross had made a trip to the region before I was confirmed. I then took a trip to the region after becoming Assistant Secretary and then went a couple of more times in 1989. I played the role of supporting actor; that is, the concepts and push for progress on the Middle East peace process came from Baker and Ross. Dan Kurtzer, whom I mentioned before as the DAS for the peace process, worked with Ross on a daily basis. Ross and I had known each other for about ten years and we had a good working relationship. There were some who tried to engender a rivalry by pointing out that Ross was managing the most important issue in NEA; they didn't succeed because there was plenty of work for everyone and I was very happy with the arrangements as they developed. Had Dennis and I not gotten along personally, that may have made the Department's internal process much more difficult. We met frequently along with our deputies--his was Aron Miller--during which we would

discuss and agree on our next steps. NEA and S/P worked together on the peace process and I think quite satisfactorily. Dennis was a great "idea" man and we carried out his visions. That Middle East process was never far from being on the top of my daily agenda; it was of course very High on Dennis' list as it was on Baker's. I was somewhat surprised by the Secretary's continuing interest because he had come to the Department with a reputation of never being involved in a losing proposition. The betting was that he would not get very much involved in the Middle East since so many people's reputations had been broken when they had become involved in that messy issue. The people who talked to me about their perception of Baker predicted that I would be stuck with the problem and that I would be the fall guy if anything went wrong. They were dead wrong; Baker staked his reputation on making progress on the peace process and pushed Ross and me to continue to work on it.

The Kuwait crisis, of course, called for a drastic reappraisal of the whole peace process. It heightened the need for an Arab-Israel dialogue and as I suggested earlier in fact opened opportunities that were not available before the war. Our action in defense of some Arab states enabled us to cash in on some IOUs. The last thing I did as Assistant Secretary was to attend the Madrid peace conference from which stemmed all of the subsequent progress because it was the first round of direct Israeli-Arab negotiations. It was a very high note to leave on. The President chaired the US delegation; Secretary Baker was there as was Dennis Ross, Ed Djerejian--my successor--, Dan Kurtzer, Aron Miller, and Margaret Tutwiler were the major members of the delegation. I think Madrid was a major diplomatic triumph; it took from 1948 to 1991 to get the Israelis and the Arabs to talk directly to each other. That was the event that everyone in 1989 had predicted could not happen. And despite come commentators--ill informed--it was a significant conference. The Arabs were forsaking in principle, terrorism and armed attacks against Israel and Israelis while the Israelis recognized that a Palestinian entity would sooner or later come about in return for a genuine peace. I firmly believe that Madrid was a historic event; it reversed 45 years of Middle East history. The subsequent events are mind boggling; they could not possible have been imagined in 1989--peace between Jordan and Israel, between the PLO and Israel, the possibility of a Syria-Israel accord. Madrid was not only a first step; it was the event that removed all past barriers to the peace process.

The Gulf War ended in March 1991. Within two weeks, Baker and I were in Riyadh meeting with representatives of the Gulf States, Egypt and Syria. We talked about two issues: security in the Gulf and a re-launching of the peace process. We met each country representative bilaterally and then all of them together in group sessions. Our credibility in that part of the world had never been higher since we had just defeated Hussein, despite all of his highly vaunted force. We had been telling the Arab States that after the liberation of Kuwait we would really give the peace process a major push. We told them that we would then expect each and every one to break from their 45 year old mold and strive with us for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. So when we met in Riyadh, we started a process that led to the Madrid conference that met in October 1991. It took a lot of sweat and tears and an extraordinary diplomatic tour de force by Baker. He visited the region ten times between March and October 1991 to bring a nascent into reality. Dennis did the lion's share of the spade work, but there was plenty of work for everybody. I and my staff worked

on the Madrid idea every day; I traveled with Dennis every time he went to the region. Ross was supported by

Aron Miller, his deputy, and my NEA staff. The same people that went with Baker on his trips to the Middle East went with Dennis and myself on our trips. In fact, S/P and NEA were one organization when it came to the Middle East peace process.

Before we left on each of these trips, Ross and I would send a joint memorandum to Baker, summarizing the situation at the time, analyzing prospects for progress and providing points that we wished to discuss. The Secretary always the choice of either traveling himself, or calling all the Arab country leaders as well the Israeli ones or sending us. Almost all of the memoranda had a "Next Step" section which included other actions that should be taken. Such memorandum was sent at least twice a month and sometimes even more often. Often the next steps involved a trip because we found that there was no substitute for a face-to-face dialogue; that was particularly true in Baker's case because he was an outstanding negotiator and had great credibility in the region. We used to come back to Andrew Air Force base, worn out, promising each other that we would not go again for three months at least. We never had that luxury; in fact, a few weeks later we would all be in the air again for another exhausting round of discussions.

The meetings themselves, aside from the strain of travel, were exhausting. The Saudis would meet all night long; that is when they transacted their business. King Fahd would often start at meeting at 11 p.m or midnight which would go for hours. Then we would fly to our next destination for another day or night long sessions. These were physically demanding and punishing trips. When we traveled with Baker, we would devise our tactics as we flew to the next stop. The Secretary would be in contact with the President at least once a day and sometimes twice. Usually Dennis and I would monitor those conversations; there was full sharing of information among the staff that flew with Baker. Baker would brief the President on his last meetings and suggest a course of action for the next sessions. The President usually blessed whatever Baker wanted to do, but he was fully engaged and would often suggest directions to go or comments to be made to the next interlocutor. But the day-to-day tactical decisions were made on the plane as we moved from one country to another. Baker was a very organized person--that made him a pleasure to work for; he knew exactly what he wanted to accomplish on each trip, relying to a large extent on our suggestions. We would take stock during the trip how much further we had to go to meet our objectives. So our approach to each stop was very methodical. Rarely did we engage in "shuttle diplomacy"; it was not kind of process. After our last stop, we would sit down and write up a detailed cable for the President summarizing what had been accomplished and we would also write a briefing cable for all US embassies in the region and in the major European capitals, summarizing the results of the trip and forecasting what we would do next. That set of us a new agenda to work on in the following weeks. Those cables took us about three or four hours to complete; then people would relax--they were strewn all over the plane's floor trying to catch up on lost sleep. So I believe that the written record of those trips is complete and comprehensive; together with our "Next Step" memoranda, a historian will have no difficulty reconstructing those trips. The paper trail is I believe quite full and clear. The only things that might be missing are some memoranda of conversations

because they were never written; we were so busy that we never got around to writing up some meetings. I wrote up almost all of the memcons of meetings with Arab leaders; Dennis wrote those dealing with meetings with the Israelis. I attended, I believe, all the meetings with Arab leaders and 90% of the meetings held with Israeli leaders. Occasionally, when Baker met Shamir, the Secretary expressed the view that he thought it would be more productive if he took only one assistant and that was usually Dennis along with our Ambassador. Sometimes, the same thing would happen in the Arab countries when Baker would decide to take only me and the ambassador. That was no problem; we would brief each other after every meeting, so all of us were up to date on all conversations. So it is easy to understand that given all of our workload, some memcons were never written. Some meetings were hard to summarize; if you have met with Assad for twelve hours, you could write a book. But we always in our reports listed what had been accomplished or what we had failed to achieve. Ed Djerejian, then our Ambassador in Damascus, was left most often with the task of writing up the Assad memcons. In any case, I think the written record documents fully what the trips were all about.

I must say that some trips end with "diminishing" returns because of sheer exhaustion. We used to talk about that factor, especially in terms of the number of trips we made. We concluded that on the first few days, we could get by on sheer adrenaline and little sleep. Then exhaustion sets in; that is the lowest point of the trip and that may last for a couple of days. Then you could expect to get sick; someone always had a cold. His or her germs would spread throughout the plane of approximately 42 people--officials, crew, security guards, etc. Finally we would get over the jet lag, the initial exhaustion, over the illness and get our "second wind". But all of us made some family sacrifices--birthdays missed, anniversaries missed, families missed--and that took its toll as well. The longest trip I ever took lasted for three weeks; that included a side trip to Moscow to consult the Russians who were chafing at something or another. That was a long trip! There is no question that the fatigue factor can play a role. Baker carried the largest burden of all; he was the spokesman for our delegation and carried on almost all of the conversations and negotiations. He could not sit back and relax; he had to be on top of his game all the time. The rest of us could let our minds wander periodically or we could just send him notes with suggestions, but he had to concentrate all the time throughout all the meetings. He was spared the laborious task of writing the day's reports or the memcons and therefore was able to catch some badly needed rest.

We had wonderful support from the secretaries. The Secretary's personal secretaries who was always with us on these trips was great; they used to help all of us, unlike some personal secretaries who would only work for the Secretary and no one else. Then there a couple of secretaries from S/S; I took my secretary on some of the trips, as well as Dennis'. We really had lots of great help from all of the staff--secretaries and communicators. That made life a lot easier.

Let me talk a little about our relations with the PLO. The new administration started with a history of one meeting that had been publicly announced by the Carter administration which had taken place in Tunis between Ambassador Bob Pelletreau--now the NEA

Assistant Secretary--and a PLO representative. Subsequently and occasionally, we had "free lancers"--some within the US government and some outside--who wanted to engage the PLO; all such suggestions were rejected. We insisted that Pelletreau would be the only channel for communications. He had regular exchanges with the PLO, which we reported, as required by law, to the Congress every three months. That was one of the subjects that required my periodic testimony. I did meet with West Bank and Gaza Palestinians when I visited Jerusalem; they would invariably start our meetings by telling me that they were the PLO representatives. I would always respond that that couldn't be because I could not meet with the PLO and that we had only one official channel to the PLO. I would add that as far as I was concerned, I was meeting with a group of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians because I wanted to listen to their points of view, but that I was certainly not meeting with PLO representatives. They would insist that they were the PLO; I would then point that if that were the case, they would all be in jail. So after this initial dance, which occurred regularly, we would settle down and have a discussion. It is true that some of those Palestinians I met with, like Faisal Hussein, eventually became part of the PLO negotiating team, but before that, I insisted that they could not be representing the PLO. We also met with residents of the occupied territories if they visited the US; I met with the Mayor of Bethlehem and many other Palestinians in that way. We were careful about meeting with members of the PNC (Palestinian National Council), which was the parent organization of the PLO. This was a tricky matter because some PNC members, like Edward Said... We would meet with them only after lengthy consideration; we wanted to be sure that we were meeting with PLO representatives outside established channels only if it made sense. Shultz himself had met with PNC members, so that we had ample precedent, but we weighed each meeting very carefully because it invariably raised Israeli and some Congressional objections. So those were meetings that we entered into only after very lengthy and weighty considerations. Sometimes we concluded that there wasn't much point in talking to the PNC, as long as Pelletreau could talk to Arafat's lieutenants in Tunis. That does not mean that I was entirely satisfied with our dialogue with the PLO; it was not substantively rich enough for me. The PLO always wanted us to meet with Arafat; we did not rule it out, but said that we would not do so until there were sufficient reasons to do so; i.e. that there would be concrete decisions to be taken by the PLO. Essentially, our position with the PLO was that they had to take certain actions in regard to such issues as terrorism, the Intifada in the occupied territories, etc. All the PLO wanted to talk about was a Palestinian state. So we talked past each other. We knew what the PLO would say on certain issues as they knew what our positions were on matters of interest to them.

I would be asked regularly by Congress whether this dialogue with the PLO was making any difference. I said in one of my appearances that up to that time, the dialogue was very unsatisfactory; it had not led to any concrete results. Abba Eban wrote an op-ed piece for the "Washington Post" saying that I had been wrong; he thought that the dialogue had already brought some results because the PLO had abandoned direct terrorist acts. I thought we should have achieved more. This dialogue with the PLO continued for eighteen months. Then in May 1990, there was an attack on Israel proper. A couple of PLO adherents landed on a beach near Tel Aviv, killed a few Israelis on that beach and then were themselves killed. It turned out that these men were members of Fatah--Arafat's organization. We had

clear and credible evidence that at least Arafat's lieutenants, if not Arafat himself, had advance knowledge of this terrorist attack. That was clearly a violation of the pledge that the PLO had made in 1988. So we suspended the dialogue in June 1990. We never resumed that dialogue with the PLO while I was Assistant Secretary. It was resumed under the Clinton administration.

We talked to a number of different PLO people--Abu Mazzam, Abu Alam--in Tunis. We were satisfied that we were covering a range of PLO views. The senior PLO leadership loved to talk to professors and journalists. Each of them had to write a memorandum of conversation reporting on their meetings. We therefore had adequate information about PLO views. We also had a lot of good intelligence on the PLO.

Finally, in discussing the Middle East process in the 1989-91 period, there are two factors that come to mind. One is the fecklessness of the Europeans. They always tended to be enamored by Palestinian nationalism, even its more extreme forms. The Europeans continuously lectured us how useful it would be if we would talk to Arafat. They--e.g. John Major, then the British Foreign Secretary-- did go to Tunis to meet with him. The French were also in the "amen" corner. All the Europeans would do is preach "Be nicer to the Arabs, be nicer to the Palestinians". most of their fervor was based on commercial interests of one kind or another. I found them unimaginative, set in their ways and not very helpful on most Middle East issues.

On the other hand, I must commend the Egyptians for their creative and important initiatives. They were major players on all aspects of the peace process. They of course had their own positions, but they perceived the situation in the region through the prism of a country which had already concluded a peace agreement with Israel. Egypt was therefore not bound by the inhibitions that restricted the other Arab countries. Even more importantly, the Egyptian government was willing to run risks; they always brought imaginative and creative solutions to the table. They provided major contributions time and time again. They would give us ideas to overcome blockages in the process. They would almost always suggest new tactics and strategies regardless whether the obstruction had been built by Israel, the PLO or another Arab country. They would sometimes even "front" for us; Mubarak might propose a course of action to a country on our behalf. He was a man of action; if we had a problem with Assad, he would immediately jump to his phone and talk to Assad. We usually had an interpreter with us, so that we could understand what Mubarak was saying; some I could also understand with my very limited Arab. I really admired their willingness to stick their necks out. Of course, they had a big stake in the process themselves. A positive resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict would be a feather in their cap. They also saw the opportunities that their interventions might bring to their re-establishment as the leading country in the Arab world--a role they lost after Camp David. Egypt also needed our good will because we were the key players in reducing their foreign debt, which was a major economic problem. Nevertheless, Egypt was a very positive factor in the peace process. I also must commend the Egyptians for their patience; they would never let their frustrations block their imagination and drive. If something didn't work, they would just say: "Let's try something else". I had to admire that creativity and

spunk. They would never give up! I had never worked too intimately with the Egyptians, but once I started, I was filled with great admiration; they were diplomats *par excellent*.

The Israelis were terribly smart. They had a clear view of their purposes and goals. The Likud was in ascent in Israel; it had an almost unchallenged hand in determining their foreign policy. Therefore, the Likud could afford to stand its ground; it was never very flexible on most issues. Every important decision was made by Shamir, who was described by many as the toughest Likud member of all. I am not sure that I would fully agree with that categorization; Shamir had a much broader vision than many of his colleagues. I don't think the Israelis would ever have come to Madrid without Shamir; as it took Nixon to open relationships with Beijing, it took Shamir to go to Madrid to talk to the Arabs. I was sometimes irritated by my visits to Jerusalem because I had been personally criticized by an Israeli spokesperson or newspaper. They, like many of the Arabs, made matter more difficult than they needed to be, but I never left the region without feeling that progress was being made on the peace process. I never lost hope that some day the Arab-Israel confrontation would cease. In fact, this view became stronger and stronger as time passed. I shared the President's view that the Gulf War had presented us and the countries in the Middle East a "once in a lifetime" opportunity to bring decades of confrontation to an end. I felt good about progress that was being made.

Let me turn now to the Iraq story. Shortly before I started as Assistant Secretary--in 1988-Iran and Iraq had concluded a cease-fire agreement which surprised many observers because Iran, in effect, gave up many of their claims. In 1989, we had a cease-fire embedded in hatred. The Iraqis withdrew from some positions as did the Iranians. The prisoner exchanges called for in the agreement never did take place. In 1989, there were still 200,000 POWs on each side. That was just one indicator that the high level of animosity between the two countries continued. The firing stopped because both government felt that their people were exhausted. The Iranians were genuinely exhausted; the Iraqis, as subsequent events proved, were not really in that bad a shape--at least as far as Saddam was concerned.

I had been following Iraq's policies while in Beirut. Soon after I began as Assistant Secretary I told our Iraq-Iran Country Director that he had the worst portfolio in the Department because he was responsible for the two countries which were major human rights abusers, terrorists supporters and instigators and which treated their people and others with a contempt and brutality unlike that of few other regimes. There were few if any Country Directors in the Department that had a portfolio covering two such countries. The Country Director was a very upbeat guy and pointed out that both Iraq and Iran were very important countries and that he thought that the US should improve relations with both. I thought that both countries were ruled by almost inhuman regimes and that our chances of improving relations with either was a most unlikely scenario. We did have relations with Iraq, but Saddam, with the help of the Baath Party, ran a criminal regime, as bad as any in the world. It is true that we had supported that country in its war against Iran because of all of the options available to us, an Iranian victory would be seriously damaging to our interests in the Gulf region. It must be noted that our support for Iraq was shown in two

ways: we provided intelligence to Iraq about Iranian troop movements--which was of vital interest--and we provided agricultural credits; that was less important than the military intelligence. Contrary to many writings, we had not provided military assistance or allowed the sale of weapons to Iraq for many years.

Just before I started as Assistant Secretary, there was an inter-agency review of our policy toward Iraq. That was done in the Spring 1989. I read each succeeding draft as it was being issued by the working group, but since I had not yet been confirmed, I did not go to any of the meetings. The final draft was sent to the White House for approval before I was confirmed. I did not have any argument with the content of the report. It shared my view that Iraq was being run by a horrible regime--a bestial dictator--, but it did recognize that Iraq was a potential major market for US exports and investments, which could be exploited if we could engage Iraq in a dialogue to bring about improved behavior. It was the same problem that we faced in many parts of the world--e.g. South Africa, the Soviet Union, etc. The question facing the US in all of these case was whether we would oppose these regimes at every conceivable turn or whether, primarily through the "economic carrot" we would try to ameliorate the regime's behavior. In most cases, we took the second option an so did the Iraq working group.

The President finally approved the recommendations of the report in October 1989. The report had the unanimous support of all participating agencies. The CIA at the same time produced a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Iraq, which is now public. It said that Iraq was exhausted by the war and that therefore Saddam was unlikely to begin any further military ventures in the near future.

During my confirmation hearings, I was first put on notice about Iraq. Senator Moynihan asked a lot of questions; he accused the Iraqis of using a lot of chemical weapons against the Kurds. He wanted to know if that was not a violation of international law and he wanted to know what I was going to do about it. My answer was that we had knowledge of some use of chemical weapons during the previous year and that the administration then in office had convened a conference on the use of chemical weapons, during which the Iraqis pledged not to use those weapons again. Moynihan indicated that he did not believe that that was enough. I promised that we would monitor the Iraqis closely on this issue.

The fact that Iraq was a potential malefactor was not new to anyone. But in the Spring of 1989, it was not the issue that ranked first on my agenda or anyone else's. At the UN General Assembly meeting in September, Terrace Ariz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister was in New York; as usual the American Secretary of State was trying to meet with as many Foreign Ministers as he could. We tried to get Ariz and Baker together, but we could never work out a mutually acceptable time. We suggested that I call on Ariz for one hour; the response was that I should schedule at least two hours. I didn't have that much time since I had to go with Baker to another meeting. So the meeting never came off. But Ariz stayed in New York and sent word to us that he was prepared to come to Washington to see Baker. I suggested to Baker that he should see Ariz.

I then went off to India and Pakistan. Ariz and Baker did meet; they discussed the agricultural credit program and some other minor matters. Aziz did tell Baker that Iraq thought that the US was trying to destabilize the Saddam regime. Baker denied having any such plans. The next important meeting between the two countries occurred in February 1990 when I went to Baghdad, as part of a trip I was taking to all of the Gulf countries. My staff insisted that I go to Baghdad; so I went rather reluctantly since I had no sympathy for that regime. I saw Ariz for about six hours. As in many Arab states, one's schedule is never really set even after arrival at a capital. So I didn't know whether I would see Saddam.

Ariz and I had a "strong" exchange of views, but they were "correct". We did not defame each other. I berated the Iraqis for their human rights violations. He again repeated his charges about US policy. Kuwait did not arise either in my meeting with Ariz or the one I had with Saddam. Saddam was very tough during our meeting; he exhibited absolutely no sense of humor or humanity. He was not vituperative as he would become publicly subsequently. We discussed the Arab-Israel confrontation and other issues; he was as tough as nails.

The issue of Kuwait did arise at a dinner that the Iraqis hosted by Nizar Hamdou, the Deputy Foreign Minister and now the ambassador at the UN, for me at midnight at a hotel. The guests were all career officials. In what was allegedly "casual" conversation, I was told that the Iraqis felt very strongly about Kuwait and the "occupation" of Bubyian Island. In retrospect, they might have been sending a message, but at the time, I thought that they were just registering their views. We were talking about all of the countries in the Gulf and the Kuwait issue just arose as part of a total over-view. That territorial issue, as well as others similar ones, had been around ever since Kuwait's independence in 1961. The comments made to me were no different from comments made in the past by the Iraqis.

A couple of weeks later, after my return from the trip I have just mentioned, I went to the Kuwaiti Embassy for their National Days. There I met two or three Arab ambassadors, all of whom said that they had heard that I had had a great visit in Baghdad. I gather that Saddam had called the King of Jordan after our meeting to debrief him about our meeting. Then each of the ambassadors went on to ask what had we done to the Iraqis to make them so mad at us. There was apparently a VOA broadcast about a week after my visit which called for the people of China, Cuba, Iraq and some others to rise and throw off their dictatorial masters. That broadcast did not have State Department clearance; I did not know anything about it until these ambassadors mentioned it to me. When Baghdad heard about it, Ambassador Glaspie was called to the Foreign Ministry and given a formal protest. Saddam at about this time was in Amman at a meeting of the Arab Coordination Council and took the opportunity to blister us; he was particularly upset by our naval presence in the Gulf. So I asked the Iraqi Ambassador to call on me the day after the Kuwait Independence Day. When I had seen Saddam he had not mentioned a word about our naval presence; I asked the Iraqi ambassador what had changed in the intervening two weeks because no one had mentioned the American presence when I had visited Baghdad. I said that I found Saddam comments inconsistent with his expressed desire to have good relations with the US. The Ambassador said that all he could do would be to report my comments; he did not have an explanation. Of course, I never heard back.

Tension continue to rise after that. A month later, about April, Saddam made a speech promising to burn Israel if it attacked Baghdad with nuclear weapons. We were becoming increasingly concerned about Saddam's rhetoric. In fact, after that last speech, I recommended that we discontinue extending agricultural credits to Iraq because it was one of the few remaining ways we had to make a point. We convened an inter-agency working group meeting, under my chairmanship, to examine Iraq's behavior. I felt very uneasy about Iraq, but I had no evidence that it was about to make a military move. In April, I still viewed Iraq as an outlaw regime that was reverting to its outlaw habits. Glaspie was informed about my recommendation; I don't think she was very happy about it because she viewed the agricultural credits as one of the few remaining links that she could use to stay in touch with the regime.

The Iraqis had committed a series of violations. For example, they had executed the Anglo-Iranian journalist Baazol, whom they had arrested for allegedly spying on them. Margaret Thatcher intervention had no effect whatsoever. Some Iraqis had been apprehended in the US and the UK trying to smuggle cyclotron triggers for their nuclear devices. Then there was the story about the "super gun"--the giant long range cannon that the Iraqis were trying to build with pipes being shipped out of the UK. The Iraqi record of subterfuge and unacceptable behavior was growing longer with each passing day. I was asked to testify regularly on Iraqi behavior. The hearings were controversial; a minority of both Houses of Congress had introduced legislation which would have required a suspension of agricultural credits or an international embargo on Iraq. The administration's position was to oppose these draft bills because a) they infringed on the President's Constitutional authority on the foreign affairs field and b) an international embargo would be impotent if only the US would adhere to it; to mount an effective embargo, the international community would have to support it and that was just not in the cards at the time. So the hearings on Iraq were always very controversial and somewhat heated. It put me in the interesting position of arguing publicly against suspension of agricultural credits by legislation, while within the administration I was arguing for just such a suspension, as well as a unilateral economic embargo. In fact, we did suspend the credits. If there had been more actions that could have put additional pressure on the Iraqis, I certainly would have recommend further negative actions. I later discovered that we were selling the Iraqis equipment that could have had dual purposes--civilian and military--but in the first half of 1990 that was not brought to my attention. These exports were licensed by the Department of Commerce and referred to the Department of State. I did know that Chrysler was selling \$900 million worth of commercial trucks; I later found out that in fact these trucks were militarily configured, but Commerce had chosen to describe them as "commercial". Chrysler, in its application for the licenses, had given full description of the nature of the trucks; it was Commerce that chose to ignore their military potential. I must say that after I found out about this, I felt let down; I believe that the decision makers on the export license application in Commerce were not abiding by the spirit of the administration's policy.

The fact that we were not happy with some of the Iraqi activities was well known in Baghdad. I used to call in the Iraqi Ambassador; we instructed Ambassador Glaspie on

several occasions to protest one Iraqi action or another. In May, the Arab countries held a Summit meeting in Baghdad, during which Saddam made a particularly long and nasty speech, criticizing not only the US, but a number of the Gulf states. The speech was sufficiently unpalatable to drive Mubarak of Egypt away from the conference to return to Cairo before the end of the conference. I had a series of meetings with Arabists to see whether they had any understanding of Saddam's motivations. They all told me that Saddam was giving out "Arab rhetoric" which should cause me no concern. I asked the same question of a number of Arab ambassadors, including the Ambassador of Kuwait. They all reassured me that Saddam was all talk and that I should not worry about his words. They said that the Iraqi rhetoric just part of "Arab family" quarrels. They told me that Saddam was an extremist, but that he had been that for twenty-five years and that I should not be excited by his words. So there was a general consensus that Saddam was not up to any military action.

Sometime in June, the Iraqis sent a very threatening note--filled with invectives--to the Finance Ministers of the Gulf States. That letter was made public by the Iraqis; *The New York Times* carried its context in its Business Section, without much fanfare. I remember that two people noted that story with some concern; INR experts and other all said again that it was just more Arab rhetoric. Osama el-Baz, Mubarak's National Security Advisor, happened to be in Washington when this story broke. I told him that I read *The New York Times* and asked him whether he had seen it. He had and he told me that it was very worrisome; he thought that the Iraqi's threats were not just idle chatter, but had to be taken very seriously. This came from an Arab, experienced in the ways of the Middle East and someone who knew Saddam. The other person who sent out warning signals was Harry Rowen, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He also raised the warning flag. Those were the only two people that I heard who were alarmed.

In mid-July, there was direct threat sent by the Iraqi Prime Minister to Kuwait and the UAE, exploiting money. That was the beginning of the crisis; Sheikh Zayid, the President of the UAE, requested us to send refueling aircraft to refuel UAE fighter aircraft so that it could fly a full time air patrol. Within two days, Saddam began to move his troops toward Kuwait. All this happened while I took a few days off in the Virginian mountains. My deputy called me and kept me abreast of the events. On July 18, David Mack, the Deputy Assistant Secretary--I was still on vacation-- called in the Iraqi Ambassador to tell him that the Prime Minister's letter containing so much invective and so many threats was totally unacceptable. At the same time, Glaspie was instructed to make the same remonstrations in Baghdad. Tutwiler also commented during her noon press briefings that threats were not an acceptable way to settle international disputes. So there should have been no doubt in Iraqi minds that we were very unhappy.

When I returned on July 20, I found that the Iraqi build up was continuing. It was an open military movement; every media channel had it. The Iraqis camped right on the main road from Basra to Kuwait in plain sight. The road was still open to general traffic; our military attachés from Baghdad and Kuwait were driving up and down the road, counting the troops as they drove along, confirming all that we could see from our satellites. By approximately

July 23, the Iraqis had amassed 75,000 troops, then that increased to 100,000 and ultimately to 300,000 in a week or ten days. So it was clearly more than a maneuver, although the Iraqis continued to call it just that. Starting mid-July and with increasing frequency, the Deputies Committee--an NSC mechanism--was meeting--eventually on a daily basis. The President talked to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, King Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt. Those three were still insisting that this was an intra-Arab family squabble which did not require US involvement. They understood the danger, but thought that they could resolve the problem and were unanimous in their opinion that US involvement would exacerbate the situation. In addition, some high ranking Kuwaitis were telling our Ambassador, Nat Howell, to ask the US administration to play down the Iraqi actions and that we should not further provoke the Iraqis with comments and actions. Under the circumstances, we accepted the advice of the Arab leaders with whom we consulted. Bob Gates, who became the Director of Central Intelligence, asked later whom we could should have believed at the time: a GS-11 CIA analyst who was warning about Saddam's threatening posture or the Arab leaders, all of whom were consistent in their predictions that combat would not break out. They unanimously felt that Saddam was just "shaking down" Kuwait.

I believed that the Kuwaitis would resolve the issue by making a major financial contributions--in the neighborhood of \$10 billion. In light what most people had told me, I also came to believe that the Iraqis were trying to exhort money from Kuwait and that Kuwait would eventually comply. In mid-July, Saddam had called for major increase in oil prices. OPEC, in fact, did meet on July 25 and did raise the prices. That gave Saddam part of the additional financial resources that he needed, as were the Kuwaitis, who, after the price rise, could better afford Iraq whatever it was that was being demanded. Unfortunately, I think that all experts and policy makers misread Saddam and his intentions. In retrospect, had we had better read Saddam, I think we would have sent a tougher letter than we actually did. The Bush letter, dated either July 26 or 27, might have taken a tougher stand; that might have prevented Saddam from proceeding on his military road. That letter was drafted by the NSC staff; I cleared it.

I also think that a special emissary might have been sent. We had used this technique in the previous May when we sent a special emissary team--Gates, Haas and I--to India and Pakistan. According to Seymour Hersch, we prevented a nuclear war--he is not necessarily a definitive observer, but I think we did have some effect on the India-Pakistan tensions. In the case of Iraq, had the experts understood Saddam better, I think I would have strongly recommended the despatch of a special emissary. And finally, I think we might have made more efforts to engage the Europeans. That would have been a tough sell because as I have said before, the Europeans were not inclined to take any action in the Middle East. They were content to interpret the rising tensions between Iraq and its neighbors as the Arab leaders did--a intra-family squabble.

During the last week of July, my time was fully devoted to the Iraq situation, as it had been for weeks. There were lots and lots of meetings to attend--in State, in DoD, in CIA, at the NSC. The US government in general from the President on down was consumed by the

Iraqi challenge. I kept calling the Iraqi Ambassador into my office; in fact, I had called him in the day Saddam started his invasion. The point that I kept re-emphasizing to him was that the military build up was an indication of an imminent hostile action by Iraq. We wanted the troops pulled back from the Kuwait border. That was the only way, we believed, that the world would accept Iraq's protestations of innocence. The guise of "exercise" just was not credible any longer; the build up had gone far too far and too long to be seen as an exercise. No one yet knows when Saddam made the decision to move into Kuwait. We do know from captured Iraqi generals that they did not receive orders to move to attack until about 48 hours before the event. Some felt that the order was premature; they did not have sufficient time to prepared for the invasion. Even if true, it did not take the Iraqis very long to occupy Kuwait.

While the storm was brewing, Congress continued to hold hearings--most of them chaired by Lee Hamilton. One of them--I think the one on July 28--became somewhat notorious because, in answer to a question by Hamilton, I said that we did not have a defense commitment or treaty with Kuwait. That was the truth and factually correct. Every time that question was asked--and that was about five times-- I also added that we did not approve of international disputes being settled by force or coercion. Many believed then, and some still believe today, that I, on behalf of the administration, was sending a signal to Saddam that the US would not oppose Iraq's conquest of Kuwait. There was never any intention of that at all; I answered the question truthfully and correctly; very few heard my additional proviso. There was no defense treaty with Kuwait. I asked Hamilton after the hearings what answer he expected; he said he wanted a stronger statement of support for Kuwait. Secretary Cheney, on background, had, at breakfast the day before, made strong statement about our commitment to defend the borders of Kuwait. I didn't know that he had said anything like that. In any case, there is a big difference between talking to journalists on background--when your name can not be used and sometimes even the words can't be used--and testifying in public in front of TV cameras. I never got instructions from the President or the Secretary to threaten Iraq publicly with an armed response if Kuwait were invaded. I also told Hamilton that I wondered what his and the Committee's reaction--not to mention the public's--would have been had I said that we would oppose the invasion of Kuwait with our own forces. He acknowledged that the Committee would have gone through the roof. I would have been grilled by many members not only about the policy, but also on the Constitutional issues on the rights of the Commander-in-Chief vs. the US Congress. Such a statement on my part may have attracted Saddam's attention, but would not necessarily deterred him. Aziz, in some interviews, was asked whether Glaspie or I had given a misleading impression of US intentions. Tariq Aziz is not a reliable witness, but he did say that neither Glaspie or I had misled the Iraqis; he thought that we, as professional diplomats, did what we had to do; i.e. announce and defend the position of our government. Perhaps our most controversial statement concerned the "merits" of the territorial dispute between Iraq and Kuwait; I and Glaspie did say that we took no position on that issue. That had been our position since 1961; I was just repeating what had been said for almost the last two decades.

The question of whether the US should take a position on Iraqi's territorial claims was discussed in the Deputies Committee. They agreed to leave the US position unchanged because every border in the Persian Gulf is under dispute--Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Yemen and Oman, Oman and the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain, etc. It was the wise course not to take a position on any of these border issues. My statement before the Hamilton Subcommittee was the same statement that Margaret Tutwiler had been making to the press for days. The Deputies' Committee had cleared her statement when she first enunciate it. So what I said was a recently blessed formulation of a long standing US policy. I believe that in fact Lee Hamilton should not have asked the question about our security commitments to Kuwait; he knew what the answer would be. His emphasis on the issue made it front page material. I don't know--not does any one else except Saddam himself--whether my response caused Iraq to feel that it had a free hand. I must re-emphasize again that I had been advised by the Government of Kuwait that its preference was for a non-belligerent US position and that the major Arab leaders consistently told us that this was just an intra-Arab family squabble, which would be settled peacefully. As I suggested, I made some strong statements to the Iraqi Ambassador, but what messages he sent and how they resonated in Baghdad, I do not know.

I should also mention that there was a vocal minority, led by Bob Kimmitt, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, in the US government who wanted to deploy ships from the Indian Ocean into the Persian Gulf. Defense opposed vigorously any military moves in the region. Kimmitt and others wanted to reinforce our presence in the Gulf as a warning to Saddam. I thought moving a naval task force at least toward the Gulf made good sense; it would have been visible evidence of our interest in the security of the Gulf. I think the day before the Iraqi invasion some one proposed that we move some B-52s to Diego Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean what we used as a staging base. There were people who objected to that; it would have required British permission because Diego was their territory. Also there was opposition because of costs considerations as well the belligerent nature of such an act. Invariably, people who opposed any US action fell back on the advise that we had received from the Arab leaders. In the final analysis, DoD won out.

Let me talk about another issue always arises in connection with the Iraqi invasion. April Glaspie left Baghdad the day before the invasion. I was aware of her leave plans; she, as all ambassadors, had requested Departmental permission to be absent from post. That she had done in the Spring. Glaspie had with her in Baghdad, her mother who had lived with her many, many years. She was bringing her mother to Europe for some medical attention. So there was a very valid reason for April to leave Baghdad. After her meeting with Saddam just a few days before the invasion, Glaspie reported on it; she mentioned that she had advised Saddam that she was going away for a brief period, but asked him whether she should cancel her plans. He told her to proceed and go to see President Bush to report orally what Saddam had said. In a separate cable, she told us that Saddam said that she should go on vacation, but asked for conformation by the Department. I decided to let her go, after weighing all the pros and cons, because I knew of the mother's condition and furthermore I did not think that Glaspie's whereabouts would make much difference to Saddam's plans. I had come to the conclusion that Glaspie was intimidated by Saddam Hussein; she was not a

very effective conveyor of our position; that had been an issue in my mind for several months. Her absence from Baghdad, in my mind, would not have made any difference. But again, until August, neither I or any of the other policy makers thought that we had an issue of war or peace. She was not the only ambassador in the region that I considered less than optimally effective. But I should hasten to add that I didn't think then or now that even if we had the most effective ambassador in the Service in Baghdad in 1990 that it would have made any difference in Saddam's behavior. I don't believe that Glaspie had any effect on Saddam's decisions nor that any ambassador might have. We might have had an impact on Saddam if we in Washington had been more forceful and shriller, both in private and in public. No one should hold Glaspie responsible for Saddam's invasion of Kuwait; she could not have made a difference. By the time Glaspie met with Saddam, I believe that he had already made his decisions; I suspect that he had calculated that the US would not interfere--we would not risk the loss of American lives, after Vietnam, over a little piece of territory called Kuwait. It is likely that Saddam thought he could reach a deal with us after he had taken Kuwait; in fact, after their conquest, they did make overtures to us. They promised to give us a privileged position on energy exploitation in Kuwait in exchange for acceptance of the *status quo*. It has also been said--although I can not vouch for the accuracy of the comments--that Saddam had drawn a number of lessons from our experience in Vietnam: we would either not intervene or if we did we would do so with inadequate forces which after getting a bloody nose, would be withdrawn in a hurry. It is a fact that Iraq had imported thousands of Vietnamese laborers to assist in their construction programs--dams, roads, etc. It has been reported that once Saddam visited a dam site and saw all these Vietnamese in rags carrying buckets of dirt; he allegedly exclaimed that it was almost inconceivable that these people had defeated the Americans, but that they had really done so. That perception may have also skewed his view of the world; he obviously underestimated our determination and our staying power.

Even in January 1991, when we met with Ariz in Geneva, he told us that we didn't know how to fight in the desert and predicted that our Arab allies would desert us if things got tough. He said that we might win the war in light of our technological superiority, but that Iraq would win in the final analysis because we would be bled for months and months, finally turning our people against any military presence in the Gulf. That comment further reinforced by view that the Iraqi leadership had assumed a repetition of our Vietnam experience and were counting on that. My guess is that this misperception of US resolve that led Saddam down his perilous road; it was not what our Ambassador may or may not have said to him.

By the time the war started, the bureaucracy had all of its processes well in place. Logs had been developed for the working groups, extra people had been designated to participate in the working groups, all exigencies were planned for. All this contingency planning had been done even though there was still considerable doubts in our minds that war would break out. It was only a few hours before the actual invasion--Dick Kerr, the Deputy Director of CIA--had told me that the Iraqis were on the move--that we gave up all hopes of a peaceful resolution. Kerr talked to me around 5 p.m.; the invasion actually started 7:30 p.m.--Washington time--on August 2, 1990. When Kerr gave me his report and prediction,

I knew that a battle was coming, but even at that point, none of us--the Deputies Committee, CIA leadership, etc--we doubted that Saddam would take the whole country. We assumed that he would take some part of Kuwait--filled with oil wells-- and then stop as they had they had done in 1961 and 1974. In 1961, the British sent troops and the Iraqis pulled back; the second time, the Arab League sent an Arab force and the Iraqis pulled back. So even on August 2, hours before the invasion we assumed that if there would be one, it would be only a shallow one, just enough to extort a sizeable financial "contribution" from the Kuwaitis. I think it is pretty clear that this time, the Iraqis were bent on taking the whole country of Kuwait. There is no evidence that commanders in the field stopped at any point to get additional orders from Baghdad; they moved full speed ahead. They also bombed Kuwait City. So I think that on August 2, Saddam wanted all of Kuwait.

I remember exactly where I was on August 2, 1990. I was standing in the kitchen of my home, having just gotten home. It was about 8:35 p.m. The telephone rang; it was a call from the Operations Center. They reported that the Kuwaiti Ambassador, Sheikh Saud Nasir Sabah, was trying to reach me. They patched us together he told me that he had just been informed from Kuwait that the invasion of his country had just started. I asked him a number of questions about any detailed information he had; he told me that the Iraqis had already reached the outer limits of Kuwait City; he was despondent about the situation. I asked him whether he had talked to anyone; he said that he could not reach anyone. I told him that I was returning immediately to my office and asked him to stay in touch with me through the Operations Center. I tried to call Bob Kimmitt--Baker was in Siberia at the time. It turned out that Kimmitt had already been alerted and was also on his way back to the Department. The reason why the Kuwaiti Ambassador Sabah couldn't reach anyone was because all the high ranking official were out of the country or in transit from their offices to their homes. At the time, very few had car phones--that has changed in five years. When I arrived at the Department, I headed for the Operations Center. I first went into one of the task forces rooms and then into the video conference room. In that room, we could hold secure video conferences with the White House, CIA, DoD and the JCS. That gave us the opportunity to hold classified meetings without actually getting together. So within minutes we held a conference that went on all night. The immediate decisions were essentially using the video conference facilities. We talked to Tom Pickering, our Ambassador to the UN and requested that he convene the Security Council so that an international condemnation could be issued and a request for Iraqi withdrawal could be made. Scowcroft, representing the President, was in one the conference intermittently. Haas, the NSC Middle East staffer, was there continually. That night was the first of about 200 video conference that were held by video during the next 8 months. We also immediately sent a cable to all embassies asking them to call on the appropriate officials in their host governments to seek support for our UN resolution and to make our position clear on where we stood on that act of aggression.

We immediately convened a task force; as I mentioned before, we had made all the contingency plans ahead of time and knew therefore exactly who would be assigned to the task force. That task force remained in operation until March, 1991. It was charged with

taking care of immediate operational questions, such as consular issues and all issues relating to Kuwait.

The first matter we discussed was just to exchange information as to what was happening on the ground. After the initial alert from the Kuwaitis, a steady stream of intelligence reports began to come in. Of course, the invasion was over in five hours, so that there wasn't much more than our military intelligence capabilities could tell us. I talked a number of times to Ambassador Nat Howell, who was bunkered down in our Embassy in Kuwait City. I talked to the Kuwaiti Ambassador as well as ambassadors from other Arab countries. Around 10 p.m., Howell reported that the Kuwaiti government was requesting US military intervention to repel the Iraqis, but the government had requested that neither its request or our response be made public. My immediate response was that the Kuwaitis were being ridiculous; in the first place, there was no way we could get any force into Kuwait in time to do any good and secondly, the idea of keeping a US military engagement from the public was ludicrous; it showed a certain lack of reality. Nat called back in about thirty minutes and told me that the Kuwaitis had withdrawn their request to keep the matter from the public. But even as we spoke, the Emir was fleeing his country to Saudi Arabia. Within a couple of hours, the country was totally occupied by Iraq and resistance had for all practical purposes, ceased. I also talked to our Embassy in Baghdad couple of times that night, which was among the last to know that the invasion had begun--the Iraqis had not made any public announcement of their moves.

I strongly supported the idea that the UN Security Council be convened so that resolutions of condemnation and withdrawal could be issued as soon as possible. Secondly, I wanted an international economic embargo against Iraq started along with a freeze of all Iraqi assets in the US. I also supported the deployment of US military forces. At about 2 a.m. of August 3, on the instruction of the President, I met with Bill Webster, the CIA Director and the Chief of Saudi Intelligence, Prince Turki Al-Faysal, who happen to be in Washington during this period. We wanted the Prince to talk to his King to find out what the views of the Saudi government were on the issue of American forces being injected into Saudi Arabia, initially to defend the Kingdom. It has been written that President Bush didn't have any idea how to respond to the Iraqis in the hours following their invasion. It is alleged that he didn't develop any plan until he saw Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, the next afternoon in Aspen, Colorado. It has been said that she told Bush that he had to take a firm stand and that only after that did the President consider the possibility of sending US troops into the Gulf. That is not an accurate description of events. In fact, as I said, by early January 3--about five hours after the start of the Iraqi invasion--Bush was already considering the defense of Saudi Arabia with US forces.

None of us of course knew what Saddam's full intentions were. Would he be satisfied just with the conquest of Kuwait? Would he then swap that for some cold cash or oil price manipulation? Or did he have his eyes set on Saudi Arabia or at least the eastern part of that country where most of the oil fields were located? Had he done that, he could have controlled 40% of all oil produced in the world. That possibility made us quite apprehensive. That prospect, in addition to the naked aggression, led us in the Department

to certainly support military intervention. It was clear of course that without Saudi concurrence and the participation of many countries, we could not undertake any effective military operations in the Gulf. Therefore, we had to meet with Prince Turki.

The Iraqi assets were frozen in the middle of the night. State and Treasury drafted the necessary papers, which were signed by the President in the early hours of August 3. We also persuaded the British, the French, the Germans and the Japanese to follow suit that night. We also froze all Kuwaiti assets because they were now under the control of Iraq. We didn't want the Iraqis to get their hands on any of those assets. The coordination of these economic moves were done through telephone conversations between Washington--Scowcroft, Kimmitt, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury--and senior foreign officials in the various capitals. Speed was of absolute essence.

I went home about 4:30-5 a.m. and tried to catch a quick nap. We were back in the Department at 6:30 a.m. We met with the President at about 8 a.m. in the Cabinet room; it was the first formal meeting of the NSC chaired by the President. The US options were discussed. Schwarzkopf had flown up from his headquarters in Florida and he and JCS Chairman Colin Powell briefed the military options for deployment to the region.

It had become clear during the night that the Arab states in the Middle East were extremely angry with Saddam. He had deceived them; in fact he had really lied to them when he told Mubarak and others that force would not be used. So he had no support in Egypt; no support from Saudi and other Gulf States that began to feel threatened. We felt that the Arabs were upset, but they were obviously not going to make a move until they knew what we would do. That was true for many countries around the world; everyone was watching to see what we would do. At the early meeting in the Cabinet room, President Bush decided that he would personally call King Fahd, President Mubarak and King Hussein to discuss the possible insertion of US military forces into the region. I believe that he also said that he would call President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen and one other leader. He did talk with each of these Arab heads of government, both about sending US troops and other actions that might bring pressure to bear in Iraq.

As had been true for sometime, but became clearer after the invasion, there were in the US government proponents of two different approaches voiced at that meeting with the President: a) how does the US protect Saudi Arabia and drive Iraq out of Kuwait? and; b) how does the US adapt the new situation on the ground--e.g. Iraqi control of roughly one-third of the world's oil supply? It was primarily Nicholas Brady, the Secretary of the Treasury who wanted to discuss the second option. He was willing to accept the Kuwait conquest as a *fait accompli* and wanted to see what we should do to protect our oil supplies and costs. He foresaw a potential economic crisis and wanted to start talking to other Western countries on what actions might be taken to soften the blow of rising oil prices. I think the two points of view were in juxtaposition--one wanted to reverse the situation on the ground and the other wanted to adapt to it, based on the assumption that we could engender a reversal. I personally wanted to take a tough stance and drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait; I think that was the Department's view in general.

For the next six or seven months, the Iraqi situation continued to be the major issue on my desk, but I had to devote sometime to other matters as well. For example, I can remember that on August 3, after the meeting with the President, coming back to the Department to work on some non-Iraq matters, including a meeting with a high ranking official from a country in the non-Arab Near East--I can't remember precisely who that was. We did discuss the Iraqi aggression, but talked about other issues of more immediate concern to the visitor. Life in a regional bureau goes on despite major crises. My deputies understood my situation and I suppose carried a greater load; I know that we all spent a lot more time at the office than we had before the invasion.

Congress was still in session during the early part of August and the leadership demanded to be briefed. Some telephone calls were made--I think primarily by Scowcroft--, but there had been no formal briefing. But the leadership insisted on face-to-face briefings; no one in the administration was very eager to engage in that activity because many of the questions that would be asked of the witness could not be answered, particularly in public. Undoubtedly Members would be interested in "what did we know and when did we know it?" and "what is the administration planning to do?". Without having had reactions from the Saudis and other governments, we had no good answer to the second question. So, as the low man on the totem pole, it was decided that the briefing chore would fall to me. At 4 p.m., accompanied by a couple of people from our Office of Congressional Relations, I went to the Hill. Along with me were also two burden some people--one from CIA and one from DIA--middle level analysts who had never testified before. They were absolutely useless in trying to explain what had gone on. I had never met them before and I learned that day never to testify with other administration witnesses whom you didn't know.

We first met in the Speaker's room with the Speaker, the Majority and Minority leaders of the House and a few members. Then I went to the Senate and briefed Senator Mitchell and a few other Senate leaders. Then I went into a secure briefing room in the Capitol and talked with 48 Senators. By this time, it was nearly 8 p.m. But we pushed on. We then went to the largest committee room in the Rayburn Office Building and briefed 240 members of the House in a zoo-like atmosphere--plus staffers, so that think there were probably 50 people in the room. Dante Fascell chaired and he was very helpful. These Members had been waiting for a long time for our briefing; it was being postponed and postponed because I was involved in the prior briefings. So by the time we started, they were a restless and unhappy lot. It was a very raucous atmosphere. It was of course impossible to satisfy many of the Members because I did not have an authoritative answer to many of their questions, particularly those relating to the use of US military forces. That meeting went on for 60-90 minutes and finally Fascell mercifully called to an end. Many attendees took the opportunity to make speeches about their views and asking why we didn't anticipate the invasion and prevent it--many were quite caustic about the administration's predictive capabilities--they of course knew just from newspaper that Saddam would invade! It was a very difficult and unpleasant meeting.

After those meetings--and it was now close to 11 p.m. and I had been up practically for 2 days--I did some more work. I probably talked to Kuwait and Baghdad and cleaned up a few other matters. Then I went home to catch a few hours of sleep. It had been a very hectic 48 hours!

The responsibility for briefing Congress was essentially left to me thereafter. I was probably on the Hill every day. Later, in light of the heavy work-load that briefings entailed, I assigned David Mak--one of my deputies--to it. I just could not handle it myself any longer in light of my other work requirements, although I still had to appear at formal hearings until the middle of October when the President and the Secretary decided that no one would appear at Congressional hearings except Cabinet members--that was after I really got roughed up a couple of times, as did some Defense witnesses. It became clear that the Iraq situation was becoming a political football for some Members and that that required the testimony of Baker, Cheney or General Powell. After October, I did not testify again on Gulf issues or on Arab-Israeli relations until after the war was over. The Mack briefings continued throughout the war; eventually they became a regular weekly session for any Member and cleared staffer who wished to be brought up to date on events and actions. David did a great job; briefing Congress in midst of a crisis is a very difficult job, but he was up to date because, as I mentioned earlier, I held a staff meeting every morning and every evening with my deputies, the Office Director for the Gulf States and the head of the Kuwaiti task force--Mary Ryan, who had just left her job--involuntarily--as Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs. She was great. So we met intensively several times each day, which mean that everyone was up to date and information flowed freely to all participants. The only exception to that rule was military planning; I was not privy to the development of those plans, but I understood why it was closely held and never complained. I think only three people in the Department knew what those plans were: the Secretary, Eagleburger and Kimmitt. They were briefed probably once a month at the Pentagon by Cheney and Powell or while the President was being briefed. I also did not know when the war would start nor when it would be stopped. But other than that, information was shared well.

One of the reasons that David had to pick up the briefing task is because my travel schedule became very heavy. Five days after the invasion, I accompanied Secretary Baker to the region. He had just returned from a trip to Saudi Arabia and practically turned around immediately to go back to the area. It was during that first trip that King Fahd had decided to allow American troops to come to Saudi Arabia. It was not an easy decision for the King. In the first place, there was always concern about the presence of foreign troops--especially non Muslim--on Saudi territory. Many Saudis had reservations about that presence. Furthermore, the Saudis were afraid that we would send only a token force which would be pulled out at the first sign of danger. They remembered that in 1978, when Iran was threatening, President Carter had sent a squadron of F-15s to Saudi, but while the planes were on their way, the White House announced that they were unarmed and did not and would not carry any weapons. That didn't ingratiate us to the Saudis. So King Fahd emphasized that he didn't want a repeat of the 1978 fiasco.

It didn't take us long to figure out that the defense of Saudi would require a substantial force. When Schwarzkopf briefed the President, in response to a question, said that he needed about 140,000 troops. You could hear a pin drop at that point in the Cabinet room. It was then that the magnitude of our response was becoming clear. It was the US military's contention--well justified--that the US needed a large force to repel a large Iraqi army. In the final analysis, as we all know, the final number of troops was over 500,000 built up over a period of six months.

Back to my trip with Baker. We first went to Turkey to obtain Turkish assurances that they would cut off the Iraqi oil pipeline, as the Saudis were doing. When those pipelines were cut off, Iraqi oil exports came to an end for all practical purposes. Before we had even left Washington, the Turks had told us that they would have to be reimbursed for the lost revenue that they earned from the pipeline flow. They calculated that their earnings might range between \$200 million to \$1.5 billion per annum, but that they would have to refine those figures before they could give us a definite answer. But they wanted a guarantee that, whatever the amount of loss was, the US would pay. Baker asked me to call the Kuwaitis to see whether they would pledge the required reimbursement to Turkey. I talked to the Kuwaiti Ambassador and asked for a firm commitment to underwrite the Turkish loss. He said that he was confident that his government--by then in exile--would do that. When he asked me what amount I was talking about, I said that the range was between \$250 million and \$2 billion. He said he would call me back, which indeed he did within ten minutes. He said then that his government would pay the Turks up to \$2 billion. That was the fastest \$2 billion I ever made in my life.

With the Kuwaiti commitment in hand, Baker got President Ozal's agreement to shut the oil pipeline. The Turks also deployed aircraft to south-east bases near the Iraqi border which required a response from the Iraqis; they had to move some of their aircraft north, away from bases that were used for the Kuwait invasion. Baker then went on to Europe to consult with those countries. I went to Syria and Saudi Arabia for discussions. I also went to Ad Dammam in Saudi Arabia to call on the exiled Emir of Kuwait. I received from him a letter to us invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter, which authorized requests for assistance for self-defense of a country that had been aggressed against. That was a legal requirement to permit us to mount a naval blockade of Iraq and other military moves. As you can well imagine, that meeting with the Emir was rather dramatic and emotional. One of the Emir's brothers had been killed in the invasion. The Kuwaitis were obviously upset by the course of events and apprehensive about their future. They had heard about atrocities from refugees that were still trickling out of Kuwait. Our intentions had not yet been made clear, so the Kuwaitis did not know whether they would ever see their homeland again. All these factors made the meeting a significant one.

There were other meetings that were also significant. I believe that the sessions we held with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad were very important. In those we asked the Syrians to join the coalition and they agreed; they joined in taking some military measures. The trip that I took after leaving Baker laid the foundations for the coalition that was formed later to throw Saddam out of Kuwait; it also brought the Arabs together in a coherent front. The

only hold-out was King Hussein; at the time of my trip we already were aware that the Jordanians was very critical of us; King Hussein had indicated strong reservations about any US action in his telephone conversations with President Bush. Even after the invasion of Kuwait, the King maintained that he would be able to smooth the waters in the region; he believed that he could somehow work out an agreement between the Iraqis and the Kuwaitis--he still viewed the invasion as an intra-Arab family dispute. He certainly was opposed to any US involvement, but I must point out that he was the only Arab leader who felt that way after August 2. His brethren, except Algeria and Tunisia, changed their views after the invasion; only King Hussein stuck to his pre-August 2 line. The Algerians and Tunisians indicated mild disapproval of US intervention; they of course were a long way away and didn't have any immediate concern about Saddam.

Subsequently, as I mentioned earlier, I went with Baker on all of his trips to the region, including "the cup in hand" trip during which we sought financial contributions to the war effort. I was responsible for suggesting to the Secretary what amounts he should seek in each country. There had been an inter-agency group established to determine those amounts, based on such economic statistics as GNP, reserves, ability to pay, etc. We did not ask any poor countries to contribute. As is usually the case, the inter-agency group came up with a "committee product" which reflected more compromises among agencies rather than a defensible standard approach. I think it grossly underestimated the ability of many countries to make contributions as well as their willingness to do so.

So I reworked the numbers which then became the starting points for Baker's requests. I actually did that on the plane as we took our next trip with Baker. On that trip, the party consisted of Don Atwood, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Robson, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and a lot of more junior officials like myself. A separate group, headed by Eagleburger and Secretary of the Treasury Brady went to Japan and a couple of other places. On our plane, which was headed for the Middle East, Italy and Germany, the inter-agency working group paper was passed out--we went to Italy at the insistence of the Italians and we decided to ask them for \$1 billion, of which they ended up paying half--it was an expensive visit for them. When I reviewed the work of the inter-agency group, I thought that the numbers were ridiculously low--rich Arab countries were being asked for peanuts. I immediately recommended sizeable increases--in some cases, 600% higher than those recommended by the working group. We had some preliminary estimates from the Pentagon on what the costs might be, but those figures were based on a force less than half of what it eventually turned out to be. Even those preliminary estimates told us that this was going to be a very expensive operation. In light of the uncertainties, all governments were advised that our request were based on incomplete plans and if the total costs did not add up to the total level, we would of course reduce our requests. On the other hand, all governments were warned that this was only be a first round of requests and that as plans became firmer, we would return soon to seek additional assistance if necessary. Everyone cooperated exceedingly well. On that trip, we got commitments for more that \$20 billion, which was just a less than half of the final bill of \$55 billion.

We went to Helsinki to meet with Gorbachev for what I believe was a very important meeting--that was September 13. The Russians agreed at that session that if all other measures failed, they would support the use of force against Iraq. That commitment was absolutely critical to the development of our diplomatic efforts for the following several months. The coalition also strengthened by its knowledge of the Russian position; it did not have to be concerned that the Russians would undermine our efforts and that the Russians would not object the use of force, all other actions having failed. In the final analysis, the Russians voted for the UN resolutions sanctioning the use of force. The meeting with Gorbachev was very business-like; that was a new experience for me, having been brought up as a "Cold War warrior" and a devout anti-communist. I found it very hard to accept and believe that the Russians had changed their policies so drastically. It is true that I had not been involved on a daily basis on US-Soviet relations, but I had maintained contacts with them through the regular bilateral meetings we held to discuss the Middle East. I think I probably had four meetings with them starting in mid-1989--never in Moscow because the Russians always wanted to meet outside their country so that they could buy foreign goods. It turned out that my counterpart in the Foreign Ministry, Basilic Koletushoff, was the Soviet Ambassador to Lebanon while I was the American Ambassador there. So we had met before 1989; I think he did a good job in Beirut, but I never trusted him then. When the Lebanese would tell me that the Soviets were actually supporting our efforts, I would get very cautious and tell people not to trust them. But there was an evolution in the Soviet Union and Russia that passed me by; I did not really come to recognize it until much later. It was from intelligence reports that I became to recognize that the Russians were actually supporting our peace process efforts in the Middle East. I found it very hard to accept and kept looking for deception; an old anti-communist found it very hard to change his views. I found the Helsinki meeting very refreshing and from that point on, I thought that the Russians were very helpful on Middle East matters. We worked closely with them at the UN, both in the General assembly and the Security Council. For example, we held a three party session with the Crown Prince of Jordan during which both we and the Russians were very outspoken in condemnation of Jordan's policies. I remember Shevardnadze telling the Crown Prince that the Iraqis had taken a naked step of aggression; they had swallowed up a small neighbor and that the world in which we lived could not tolerate such behavior. I really began to believe that the Russians could become valuable and trustworthy allies in the Middle East. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were remarkable leaders, capable of inspiring the people that worked for them in very positive ways.

As I said, I went on two trips in September, one in October, which was primarily taken to gauge the receptivity of the coalition to an increase of US forces. By then, we had begun to think about needing 500,000 men and women. I was seeking to find out whether at that stage we could mount strong support in the UN for the use of force. As in a previous case, I started on this trip with Baker and then branched off on my own to some countries--like Syria, Tunisia, Algeria--countries that Baker did not have time to cover. I also went to Brussels to brief the North Atlantic Council of NATO and the European Commission. Of course, both the President and the Secretary used the phones frequently to stay in touch with our European allies. Normal diplomatic channels were also used, but the President really used the phone. We used to joke that we would have to tie his dialing finger behind

his back. He was personally involved in the Middle East crisis every day. Bush, having had lots of government experience, understood the importance of having the bureaucracy know what he was doing. Therefore there was usually a note-taker or a interpreter available on a phone extension when he talked to foreign leaders. This monitoring was well know to the other part with whom Bush was talking; it was very helpful because within an hour we knew what conversation had taken place and what had been said and what was agreed upon. If the Secretary was about to call someone, I was paged so that I or Jack Covey could monitor his conversations. That system worked well; the involvement of the President and the Secretary was not only very helpful, but the process they used enabled the bureaucracy to factor their conversations into our own actions and recommendations. Had they not permitted such monitoring--as others have done--our job would have been exceedingly difficult, to put it mildly.

I took another trip in early November to certain Arab capitals to brief them on our latest diplomatic plans at the UN and to seek their views on their reactions if Israel were to be subjected to Iraqi bombings. I was not the one who first raised the need to any attempts to hide anything; they would have been created by sheer exhaustion.

I did not visit Israel after the Kuwait invasion. We carried out most our discussions with that government through the normal diplomatic channels--i.e. the ambassadors-- and through the frequent visits to Washington of the Israeli Foreign and Defense Ministers. We met them in Washington and in New York. Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, Paul Wolfowitz of DOD and Dan Kurtzer visited Israel on a number of occasions after Iraqi SCUD missiles began to fall; I did not go on those trips. It was during one of those trips that arrangements were made to deploy American Patriot missiles and crews to try to provide some protection to Israel. The main reason why Eagleburger went is because he had great credibility with the Israelis; he had a nice, warm and fuzzy relationship with many Israeli leaders. They liked him; had known him from many years from his days as Under Secretary under Shultz; he was the logical choice and an excellent one to lead the American delegation. I did not go because in the fist place I was tired of traveling and secondly, I did have some chores in my Assistant Secretary office that had to be attended to.

After the fighting broke out, I made only one trip overseas and that was to Morocco with Deputy Secretary Eagleburger. After the fighting was over, I was on the road again several times. The first trip was just a week after the end of the fighting and we went to Kuwait, Cairo and Riyadh. A week after returning from that one, it was back unto the plane to attend a meeting of the six Foreign Ministers from the Gulf States, Egypt and Syria. Our objectives for all of these trips after the war were two-fold: a) to organize the post-war security arrangements, and; b) to launch the peace process. Everybody to whom we talked since the preceding September knew that we would be knocking on their doors about restarting the peace process as soon the Iraqis had been thrown out of Kuwait.

It was Dennis Ross, Dan Kurtzer, Aron Miller who were working on the post-war peace process during September 1990-March 1991 period. It is true that after the UNGA meeting in September, the peace process lost all momentum; it in fact came to a halt. The war

became the predominant issue which didn't leave room for discussion of much else. Mitterrand made a speech which was widely criticized in the US in which he suggested that one of the ways to reverse the Iraqi aggression would be to satisfy the Palestinian demands for a "home"--he suggested that in return for meeting the Palestinian demands, Saddam, somehow or other, would leave Kuwait. In the customary Mitterrand ways, the speech was much more elliptical than I have suggested; the words were there, but he was never as explicit as I may have suggested in my summarization. In any case, no government was really worrying about the peace process, except for people like Dennis who were developing strategies and tactics. The Arabs were worrying about Saddam; the Israelis, with the Likud in charge, were not very anxious to do much and we had other more important immediate issues to address. We knew that not much would happen, but as I have said, we certainly put all countries on notice that we would begin to push the peace process again after the end of the war. So the day the war ended, Ross and company went into high gear. So when we went on our trips right after the war, we knew what exactly what we wanted out of the peace process: face to face talks between Israelis and Arabs. We were ready to propose steps to be taken. We were well prepared. The US strategy was probably outlined in a joint Ross-Kelly memorandum to Baker, written by Kurtzer and Miller. There were several of us--perhaps naively--who were convinced that in light of our military intervention in defense of Arab states, we could successfully re-launch the peace process and perhaps even have some success with it. I believed that our war efforts would give us a cache of credibility upon which we could draw.

There was a very vocal group--so called "Arabist"--who thought that the administration's policy from August-December would not work and that the coalition would fragment if conflict ever broke out. They firmly believed, and said so in many articles, that the "Arab men on the street" supported Saddam because they had no respect for Kuwait which was an out-dated, authoritarian run country which lived off the sweat, blood and tears of immigrants--mostly Palestinians--while the Kuwaitis were becoming rich and indolent. These "experts" proclaimed that the common Arab would rise in support of Saddam and prevent their governments from going into battle against him. That assumption led these "Arabist" to predict that after the debacle, we would not be in any position to push the peace process. Among those who were very vociferous with this line was Hermann Eilts, our former Ambassador to Egypt. Some of the "gloom and doom" soothsayers testified before Congress and so predicted in their appearances. I never bought their assumptions for one minute; I steadfastly believed that the coalition would stick together even in conflict and that our credibility in the region would thereafter be sky high. I may have been very naive; my views were bolstered by my frequent trips to the region where I did not see any vacillation. We all faced a common enemy and that created a real bond. I may also have not had the hang-ups that a lot of the "Arab experts" may have had. There were several of them who told me that even if the coalition held together, the Arabs would never meet face-to-face with the Israelis. To think that they might, in their view, was to misread the Arabs entirely. In fact, it was some of these experts who did not realize the fundamental change that had taken place in the Arab world. There were others, like David Mack, who did, but I think he and some others were in a minority.

On April 1, we went on another trip--this one was to the Turkish-Iraq border to watch the Kurds fleeing their homes in Iraq to seek refuge in the snowy mountains. That was an incredible experience; it is hard to find words to describe the misery and suffering that we saw. After meeting with President Ozal in Ankara, we flew to Diyarbakir, where we changed to helicopters that took us up to the mountains--roughly 12-13,000 feet--in eastern Turkey. It was sort of homecoming for me because that was a region that I had visited when I was assigned to Ankara a quarter of a century earlier. As we approached the Iraq border we could see streams of people wandering through the landscape in search of a resting place--may laden down with the few belongings that they were able to bring with them. From where the helicopters left us off, we then drove in jeep further up on very rough and barely passable mountain snow covered roads. As we drove around a curve in the road, we all of a sudden looked down into a natural bowl, covered with snow and 50-60,000 refugees--men, women and children--huddled together trying to protect themselves against the elements. The snow was beginning to melt forming rivulets of water, which were being used drinking water, bathing, washing and as waste drainage ditches. There was absolutely no shelter or any man-made facilities on that whole area. It was a frightening and sickening sight. We drove into Iraq and talked to some of the refugees in that bowl. After that we met with some of the Kurdish leaders in a nearby village. After that we drove back to the helicopters, flew to Diyarbakir and on to Jerusalem--to keep the peace process momentum going. In Jerusalem, Baker called the President and described what we had seen. He strongly urged that some US humanitarian action be taken because it was obvious that the bowl would become a death camp if assistance were not provided in a hurry. That call turned into "Operation Provide Comfort" which continues today. No civilized human being could have witnessed what we had seen and not wish to provide assistance to those poor Kurds. And we had only seen the top of the refugee iceberg; there were probably ten times as many refugees in other passes or natural shelters.

The Kurds were always an issue, even before the Gulf War broke out. They were and are sizeable minorities in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and, to a lesser extent, in Syria. They were and are continually agitating for a "homeland" of their own. Their aims are therefore an issue in one country or another. In all honesty, in the pre-Gulf period, I don't remember spending much time on the Kurdish issue. We were accused by the Iraqis of stirring up the Kurds against the Saddam regime; in fact, there was some reason--minor however--for Iraqi concerns; we had stopped supporting the Kurds during Kissinger's regime as a favor to the Shah, but even in 1989, there were still some agencies in the US government that held regular meetings with Kurdish leaders; we were not providing any assistance, as we had in the past. During the Gulf crisis, we held many discussions about the future of Iraq. It was clear then as it is still today that the Department vigorously opposed any dismemberment of Iraq. We wanted Iraq to remain as a viable entity within pre Gulf war borders. Right about the time the war ended, President Bush made an off-hand comment suggesting that the Iraqi people might rise up and overthrow Saddam Hussein, which was widely interpreted both here and abroad as a call for a Kurdish revolt. I do not believe that that was, in fact, Bush's intention; I think he was merely suggesting that a Saddam overthrow was entirely possible. In any case, the Shiites in the south first took to arms and then the Kurds in the north followed, but I do not attribute either uprising to the President's comments. I think that both minorities had been

watching for an opportunity to gain independence and seeing that the Saddam regime had been significantly weakened, decided to take up arms. The Shiites had been trained and armed for many years by the Iranians; crossing the border down in the south was no major trick. The Iranians, seeing the disarray in Baghdad immediately urged their "clients" to throw the Iraqis out of the border region. That doesn't mean that all Shiites were pro-Iranian, but they were generally all anti-Saddam. The Kurds came to the same conclusion about Saddam's weakness and launched another one of their uprisings--one more in a long history of such episodes. It is true that both the Shiites and the Kurds expected US assistance--or at least said so after the fact--and used Bush's words as one of the reasons for their beliefs. I don't think that they took the proper interference from the President's words, although Bush might have expressed his views a little more artfully.

We have never taken a position on the Kurdish drive for independence. We have always supported the territorial integrity of the Middle East states, although we did come to the rescue of the Iraqi Kurds and are now giving some measure of protection to their independent rule of the northern part of Iraq. We have not ever supported an independent Kurdistan. After the war, I met with some of the Kurdish leadership; I repeated to them again what the US position was on their desire of their own "homeland"; they were not surprised since it had been so historically. I did say that we would support autonomy for the Kurds in Iraq and that we thought a federal system would be quite acceptable. We believed, and so stated, that the Kurdish movement should adopt a democratic system and show concern for protection of human rights. Unfortunately, the Kurds spend much of their time fighting each other; that happened in 1991 even during the uprising against Saddam and still goes on today. Both Barzani and Talabani--leaders of the two main Kurdish factions--met with Saddam separately, trying to make separate deals with him, thereby undermining the other's negotiations. The Kurds are a sad and tragic story. There were many commentators--in the Congress and the media--that have argued that we should have supported the Kurds in 1991--with arms and other assistance and politically. But we had not done so since the Nixon era when we provided covert support and were not about to reverse our 15 year long position. We have never supported a Kurdish uprising in Turkey. I agreed fully with the position that we should not support an independent Kurdistan; the world is filled with many minorities that aspire to their own independence; if were to support one, we would begin a process that no one can predict where it might end up.

I should mention another problem in this connection. A lot of Kurdish leaders have employed techniques that are abhorrent to American standards. That statement is also applicable to other parts of the Middle East. There are a lot of Kurdish leaders--some of whom I have met--are pretty unsavory characters. They may well make good fodder for "feel good" articles and editorials, but in fact many have a lot of blood on their hands and are certainly no great defenders of human rights. I was severely criticized by some Members of Congress for not dealing with one Kurdish leader or another; I did not do so because I knew that that particular leader had a very checkered past. It would not have been appropriate for me to reveal all the information I had in a public hearing; the member of Congress who might have berated me did not wish to be briefed in private because he enjoyed the limelight that his comments brought him.

I must say that by the time I left the position of Assistant Secretary, I had no hopes that the Kurds would in fact achieve autonomy in Iraq. Turkey is another story. There are a lot of Kurds in that country who were satisfied with their political situation. There are 10 million Kurds in Turkey; I suspect that only a minority was dissatisfied with the *status quo*. It is the PKK--an extremist group--that is in revolt. If you give people a fair shake, they will normally adapt to their conditions. And I think that in Turkey, at least, the Kurds can get a fair shake.

I want to go back a minute to the trips which took me to Kuwait when I saw the burning oil wells. As I mention, our first trip to Kuwait was very shortly after the end of the fighting. Our pilot flew at low level over much of Kuwait so that we could get a good close look at about 700 wells which were already up in flames. It was a scene out of Dante's *Inferno*. We had some feeling for what we might see because the rain in Riyadh was already black. We had encountered a light shower before taking off to Kuwait and that was black water. In Damascus--800 miles away--the rain was black as it was in Tehran. The atmosphere had been thoroughly polluted. So we had some inkling of what we might see, but it was far worse than I expected. Fifty miles away from the oil fields you could see a huge, black cloud hanging over the area. In fact, it wasn't a solid cloud; we could fly over the oil fields picking our way through the clouds. As we crossed the Kuwait border, we could see the huge ditch that the Iraqis had dug--for hundreds of miles across the desert. As we approached the fields, even through the thick smoke, you could see the huge tongues of fires burning out of the wells. The starkness of that image became even clearer as we flew between clouds and could see the ground clearly. It looked like the earth had opened up and volcanoes had sprung up everywhere. It was incredible; I have never seen nor hope to see again such horror. We flew over the wells for a while and then the pilot took us on the so called "Highway of Death" which led north from Kuwait into Iraq. Our planes had decimated hundreds of vehicles which lay scattered on the road, in the ditches, in the desert. That was also an unforgettable sight. We then landed in Kuwait City in what appeared dusk, although it was mid day and the sun shone brightly above this black layer of smoke. This was March 1991. The temperature in Riyadh had been in the '90s; in Kuwait City it was in the '50s. The oil clouds were so thick that the sun could not shine through them. The airport itself was almost entirely decimated; the city itself was jammed with inoperable tanks and vehicles, most of them having been shot by the coalition air forces. There were still some fires smoldering here and there even though this a week after the Iraqis had fled. We spent the rest of the day in Kuwait City. Our clothes rapidly became covered with the soot that was falling from the sky. Our hair became matted with the stuff. The things we touched felt oily. Saddam had managed to change the environment; fortunately his damage was reversible. His actions were environmental war; not only did he cover Kuwait and much of the Arab states with that black soot, but he also opened the oil pipeline sluices which flooded the Gulf itself with oil slicks, severely damaging all animal life in its path and endangering Saudi's water intake plants further south. He created an environmental catastrophe in the Gulf area.

On one of our subsequent visits to Kuwait, we went out and watched the "Red" Adair crews extinguish an oil well fire. That was a sight! The noise of oil burning is unbelievable from the pressure of the oil geysers and the roar of the flames. The ground was littered with little white flags marking the location of land mines. We watched the Texas crew maneuvering a bull-dozer covered with a heat shield; they sprayed heavy doses of water on the fires and on the vehicle so that they could continue to use it. The driver of the bull-dozer used a mechanical arm to maneuver a pipe on top of the flames forcing them to rise higher into the atmosphere in a column of red. Then they would plug the pipe and thereby extinguish the fire. The one they chose for us was a relatively easy one, but they told us that no one had ever had to extinguish 700 oil wells in the same area; the most they had ever done were three or four at one time. They used the Kuwait challenge to perfect their techniques; once they had done that, they did three or four wells each day. I think it only took them six months to do all 700 of them, which was a real feat.

I was not involved in the decision to stop the war. I was called to Baker's office; he told me that the President had decided that we would cease hostilities at a time certain. In that room were Baker, Ray Seitz, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Bob Kimmitt, myself and a couple of others. He asked Ray to call the French, British, German and Italian ambassadors and he asked me to call the representatives from the Arab coalition states. President Bush was going to call King Fahd and President Mubarak, but I was to call the ambassadors from those countries as well. Baker said he would call a couple of leaders. So we all headed for the phones and passed the tidings. I don't think anybody in the Department, except the Secretary and maybe Eagleburger, knew the precise military situation on the ground. I knew that we were being quite successful and that we were very close to completing the encirclement of the Iraqi forces. On the night of August 2, when the Kuwaiti Ambassador called me at home to let me know that his country had been invaded, as I said, I rushed to the Department. On the way, I passed Arlington Cemetery. I remember that as I drove past, hoping that we would not have a war which would bring additional bodies to that Cemetery. When the war started, I, like everyone else, was very apprehensive about the costs to American lives. After the 100 hours of ground force attack, which drove the Iraqis out of Kuwait in complete shambles with relatively minor US casualty rate, I was elated and thankful. I fully supported Bush's decision to end the war. I don't remember anyone objecting to the decisions, at least for several days. I was never told what went on in the White House councils; I don't know whether any one raised any objections there, but I would doubt it. I am absolutely certain that Bush, Baker, Cheney, Powell and Scowcroft felt a huge responsibility for the lives of the young people they had sent into battle; they certainly had absolutely no interest in having any of them killed unnecessarily. I knew they were conscious of their awesome responsibilities five months before the war and in mid January, 1991. So the decision to end the war did not come as any surprise to me and I believed that it was the correct one.

All of the ambassadors had the same reaction that we did; they were all thankful that it was over and praised the US again and again for its role to stop aggression. Not a single ambassador--and I think I talked to 14 of them--gave even the slightest suggestion that we should try to find Saddam and take care of him. All were thankful that the war was over and praised the US for its deeds.

As has often been said by everyone involved in the councils of US and other governments, the death or capture of Saddam was never a war objective. It was never mentioned in any of the UN resolution. It was never discussed in any of the meetings we held with our coalition partners that I attended, except in one planning meeting we held with the British which took place around New Year's Day in Washington. One British general, in that meeting, expressed the view that after the liberation of Kuwait, we should move on to Baghdad to get Saddam. I asked him whether the British Army was prepared to under take such a task or was he suggesting that the US Army do that. He answered: "The American Army". That got under my skin and I told him that he seemed to be very cavalier about spilling American blood; if on the other hand, he was volunteering British soldiers to do the job, I told him I would pass that on to my superiors. That General was quickly disavowed by his colleagues. Undoubtedly he was making a serious suggestion, but he was the only person from any country in the seven months of the crisis that I heard express the view that we should not stop until we had gotten to Baghdad. In that seven months period, I include the few days after February 4, 1991. I think everyone thought that an advance to Baghdad would be very costly; the other fifty percent of the Iraqi forces--500-600,000 troops--that Saddam never used in the Kuwait way were still combat ready. Half of all of the Republican Guard divisions had never been committed to the Kuwait invasion.

Liberating Kuwait was one objective. We had been able to rout them from there. As Colin Powell pointed out, they may well put considerable more resistance of they had to defend their home land. We did have some speculative chatter about what we would need to do to get to Baghdad, mostly on long airplane flights. These were not serious conversations, but just idle speculation. The consensus was that to march on Baghdad would be militarily very difficult and costly, particularly in American casualties. Furthermore, our occupation of Baghdad would have had no significance as far as Saddam might be concerned; he would have left the city long before we got there and probably would have gone into hiding. He probably would not have surrendered, but would have challenged us to find him at cost of more American lives. In addition, we all assumed that the coalition would have fragmented as soon as we made our intentions to move on Baghdad be known. None of the Arab countries had joined to conquer Iraq; they had supported the liberation of Kuwait and that is all. I think we would probably had the same reaction from our Congress; it had given lukewarm support for our efforts to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait; I don't think it would have supported anything beyond that. Lee Hamilton and Joe Biden, who had vigorously opposed a resolution supporting the use of force, would have had a field day. The original resolution only passed the Senate by four votes and the House by 14. That resolution was restricted to the expulsion of Iraq and the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait. No one, at any time, even whispered about the possibility of going to Baghdad. Any military move beyond the Congressional resolution would have lost us the support of our allies, our Congress at the cost of many, many American lives. We might well have engendered a Congressional resolution forbidding the further use of military means. So I think no one gave any serious consideration to keeping the war going so that we could march toward Baghdad.

In the long run, I hope that people will remember certain things about the Gulf War. First, it might have been avoided if all of us had acted differently in July, 1990; i.e. conveyed stronger signals to Saddam. I personally do not believe that that argument is supportable, but it should be remembered that some have made it. Second, a country does not create and maintain a coalition without many, many direct face-to-face meetings between leaders. Not every President is going to use the telephone as much as George Bush did, but some personal Presidential involvement is absolutely essential. Not every Secretary of State will travel as much as Jim Baker did--nor is every Secretary of Defense as Dick Cheney did--, but that is also an essential ingredient in building and maintaining coalitions. In the third place, the leader of the coalition must have a constancy of purpose. George Bush did; that was invaluable in holding everybody's feet to the fire and in staying together. Fourth, a leader must be prepared to take significant risks. There were many, many people who would not have suggested or agreed to committing 100,000, 200,000--much less 500,000--military manpower to the Persian Gulf. Just witness the current discussions of 14,000 troops in Haiti or 20,000 in Bosnia. Not only does the leader have to be willing to run risks, but he or she can not do it "on the cheap". If there is a military requirement then the leader must be willing to use all the manpower that his military leaders tell him or her are necessary. Finally, the diplomatic international effort was vastly assisted by the free flow of information within the US government--the President, his inner circle of advisors and we in the bureaucracy who had to implement the strategy on a daily basis. The only matters that were highly restricted were the military plans and the decisions to start and stop the war. I have served in administrations which would not have given that much attention to restricting strictly military information.

let me just briefly mention now our security assistance program. NEA was of course the major consumer of those resources, given that Israel and Egypt were in our area. In addition, we also had Pakistan which was the third largest recipient of US assistance. I believe that, including ESF, Pakistan was receiving about \$700 million of security assistance per annum. That largesse was essentially the result of Pakistani assistance to the "freedom" fighters in Afghanistan. In September, 1990 the Pakistan aid program was suspended by Presidential determination as required by the Pressler amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. That provision required the President to suspend all assistance if the administration had determined that Pakistan had acquired fissionable material which might be used in the manufacturing of a nuclear weapon. In September, I recommended to the Secretary and the President that assistance be suspended. It was one of the issues that could not be ignored, particularly during the Gulf War. Based on the intelligence available to us, it was clear that Pakistan had indeed become subject to the Pressler amendment. I had no qualms in making that recommendation; the evidence was overwhelming, although I did think that the Pressler amendment was a terrible piece of legislation. I have always opposed the Congressional micro-management of foreign affairs; it reduces an administration's flexibility and makes the achievement of worthwhile goals that much more difficult. But since the amendment had become law, I had no hesitation, based on the evidence available, that assistance had to be suspended.

The two major recipients of assistance in the NEA area were of course Israel and Egypt. The levels of that assistance had been set at Camp David as part of the peace accords. Those levels were like the faces on Mount Rushmore: set forever. It didn't make any difference whether one would have preferred higher levels or lower levels; they were untouchable. During my Congressional appearances, I would be told by some Congressmen that the assistance to Egypt was "money down the drain". A few Arabs made similar comments about assistance to Israel because they were concerned that our assistance was funding the settlements. The answer to all who objected was that the levels had been set and that was the end of that. My response on the assistance to Egypt was always that although the economy might not be as well managed as we might liked, it was improving and that many organizations like the IMF were trying to help the Egyptians. Hamilton might mention that his committee had authorized funds for a housing project several years earlier and that as far as he knew, no family had yet moved into the new apartments although the funds had been spent. My standard reply would be that our AID Mission had assured me that new tenants would be moving in the following month. The committee wanted to make a record and I defended the level and use of our assistance funds as best I could; we all knew that the total amounts of assistance were set and immutable. We did work hard in trying to get the Egyptians to use the resources more effectively; there were a number of vigorous meetings that we held with them on that score. Even Secretary Baker became involved on how the Egyptians were using the funds. Some critics questioned the ability of the Egyptian to absorb this large amount of assistance year after year; I didn't believe that they had a valid position, but I was well aware of the shortcomings of the Egyptian bureaucracy. I also had reservations about the job that our AID Mission in Cairo was performing. It was a huge mission--500-600 people--who lived very comfortably; they had no incentive to streamline the program.

I visited a number of projects on a few occasions in Egypt, Pakistan and Bangladesh. I thought the projects in the latter country were mostly very good. There were not providing funds for political reasons; the levels were set to meet certain development and humanitarian goals. The program was proportionally small as was the AID Mission and I think we actually had some impact on the daily lives of the population. When I visited Bangladesh, I expected to find visible signs of the poorest country in the world and a place without much hope for the future. Not so! In fact, after my two visits, I came away persuaded that although it had a lot of problems, Bangladesh was country that had many people that were working very hard at improving their lot and that of their fellow citizens. Our main, and perhaps, sole interest in Bangladesh was humanitarian. We had no major differences with that country's leadership on the use of the scarce resources and were even supportive of some of our political goals, such as reversing Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. They sent troops to the Gulf.

I mentioned earlier that I traveled to India and Pakistan three times during my first year as Assistant Secretary. The first trip was for orientation; I mentioned that Murphy had only visited the subcontinent twice in six years and had been criticized for that. I wanted to avoid that disapproval and be seen as an active participant in South Asia. On two of those trips, I had a military jet at my disposal; that certainly made my travels a lot more efficient.

The third trip was with Bob Gates, then the Deputy NSC Advisor and Richard Haas, the senior NEA staffer on the NSC. That trip was triggered by a finding by the intelligence community that there was a better than 50/50 chance that war between Indian and Pakistan would break out in the next two months. By 1989, a war between those two countries could have engendered a nuclear exchange because India certainly had nuclear weapons and we thought that Pakistan was very close to developing its own bomb. So we first went to Pakistan where we saw the President, the Defense and Foreign Ministers and the Commanding General of the Army. Then we went to Delhi where we saw the President and senior officials. Some have said that we diffused the tensions; others have said that we made little difference. Seymour Hersch has written a book about this period in which he said that the world was closer to a nuclear war than they ever had been before, even including the Cuban missile crisis. I am not sure that I quite share that analysis, but the risks were certainly high. But I think we did manage to force both governments to think long and hard about the potential consequences of their rhetoric and military maneuvering. Some of the actions that we asked to take, they did; some of our offerings were refused. For example, we offered to provide both sides daily intelligence information about the military deployments of their adversary. We were concerned that there might be an outbreak of hostilities because one side or the other might have miscalculated; i.e. one side would strike preemptorily because its analysis showed that the other side was preparing for an attack. So we believed that if we could provide both sides with reliable intelligence from satellite photography, then that might avert miscalculations. We would have told both governments what we were reporting to the other side--no secrets. Interestingly enough, neither Pakistan nor India accepted our offer for a number of reasons including their desire to keep their actions from their own public. They were afraid of leaks. Ultimately, the Indians withdrew some of their forces from the Thar desert and the Pakistanis backed off some of their forces and reduced their level of readiness. By July, the monsoons broke out and that made fighting impracticable; so between us and the weather, a war was averted.

I felt all along that each side was really misreading the intentions of the other. I thought the potential for actual fighting was great. All that was needed was some "hot head" to set off a spark. There are still artillery exchanges occurring almost daily along the disputed border of Kashmir on the Siachen Glacier, even when relations seem to be fairly tranquil. All that was needed was an artillery duel that might have gotten out of hand or some commander who might take some over-aggressive action. The rhetoric was deteriorating on both sides--worst on the Pakistani side. Mrs. Bhutto was inflaming crowds of over 100,000 referring to "our" Kashmir, which had to be liberated to make it part of greater Pakistan. That led us to propose a cooling of the rhetoric which in fact happened. As I said, I think that our trip brought a sense of reality to both sides; we helped explain to each what the consequences of their rashness might well be.

I might just at this stage say a few words about our view of India during the Gulf War. I recently attended a meeting in which some people said that we were very unhappy with the Indians during that crisis. I must say that I did not have that perception; as Assistant Secretary responsible for our relations with that country, I certainly was not unhappy with

the Indians. In fact, India took some very constructive actions that were never made public. For example, the Indians allowed to overfly their territory with military aircraft which was flying from the Pacific theater to the Gulf and back. They allowed us to refuel military aircraft at one of their bases. That was precedent breaking. The Indian representative in New York gave a number of speeches which were not entirely to our liking, but I learned that he was on a very long leash--his instructions were quite vague giving him freedom to say almost anything he pleased. The major exception to that rule was on matters concerning Pakistan. There he had to follow a fairly rigorous set of guidelines. Otherwise, he "free lanced" often and certainly did not represent the views of the government in New Delhi, which was quite helpful. So I was surprised to hear at this recent meeting both Indian and American businessmen decrying the era of "bad feelings" that allegedly existed during the Gulf War.

After the trip I took with Bob Gates, I did not have either a chance or a need to focus again on the subcontinent. The "Pressler" amendment was a recurring problem as were some of the issues arising out of the Afghan war. But the Indo-Pak relationships did not take up much of my time after late 1990. Relations were relatively tranquil and in any case, I had my hands full with the Gulf crisis and its aftermath. On Afghanistan, I might note that when I became Assistant Secretary, there was still a high level of fighting in that country. We still had a program of assistance for the *Mujahideen* who were trying to oust the Soviets, who did not leave until 1991. In 1989, we were devoting better than \$500 million to the support of the Afghan resistance movement. I found a major debate raging within the Executive Branch as well as the Legislative Branch on whether we should be supporting the "freedom" fighters and if so which factions. Many of the *Mujahideen* were Muslim extremists. Some of the experts maintained that the Soviets were reaching the end of the rope and that therefore we could afford to begin to reduce our assistance. The Soviets continued to use their air force frequently and brutally and fighting continued on the ground. My predecessor had started some negotiations in 1988 with the Soviets over Afghanistan trying to find a settlement. I continued that process intermittently; I held 10-12 negotiating sessions with the Soviets over a couple of years. The Soviet representative was not my former colleague from Beirut because his jurisdiction did not cover Afghanistan; so I met with a whole different set of Foreign Ministry officials. They showed very little flexibility; as the Soviet-US relations improved, they did admit that they had very little to say about Afghanistan within their government. They would gladly have settled their mess, but the shots in Moscow were being called by the military and the KGB. They added that even if Gorbachev ordered the army to withdraw from Afghanistan, it was not certain that he would be obeyed. So the negotiations were doomed from the start and I said so to Baker in writing on a number of occasions. Once I had become familiar with the Soviet situation, I was convinced that only Gorbachev could end the war, but that it would take a major political gamble on his part to do so; the issue was more a matter of domestic Soviet politics than an international matter that could be resolved by diplomacy. I had to testify on Afghanistan in closed session before those committees that were responsible for the funding of intelligence activities as well as the foreign affairs committees. All of these committees, even after having heard from the intelligence community, would insist on a State Department witness because the issue were controversial and the US commitment

sizeable. The administration basically took the line that neither the Soviets nor Najibullah, the Afghan "Soviet Front" President, should be given a victory because of our denial of financial support--a victory which they could not obtain either on the field of combat or at a negotiating table. I personally had a lot of doubts about our policy. It was fairly clear to me that the *Mujahideen* would probably prevail and be able to oust the Soviets, despite the fact that they spent much of their time fighting each other rather than the Soviets. Furthermore, I became convinced that significant amounts of resources were not being applied to the purposes for which we were granting them. They were being diverted for other purposes which were not necessarily in the US interests. It was not easy, because the use of the funds was heavily veiled, to track them precisely, but from conversations I had in Pakistan and from bits of intelligence that were available to us, it became clear to me that funds were being diverted. I would have preferred to reduce our support. The last appropriations which I was involved--for FY 1992--was "closed out" funding.

We did develop a plan that called for a meeting of the different Afghan factions to allow the various factions to concentrate on ousting the Soviets and to set up a government-in-exile. We finally managed to get the rebels to set up such a government, but it was pretty ineffective.

I think for historical purposes I should note that the Indian government regularly warned us about the risks we were taking in arming and training future terrorists. The Indians found that some of the Kashmir insurrectionists had been trained and armed by us; these were Afghanistani and Arabs who were captured by the Indians; they participated in the Kashmir "holy" war which was only one of the several "holy" wars that the *Mujahideen* was fighting at the time. The Indians repeatedly told us about these captives, although I don't believe that during my tour at least, the *Mujahideen* fighters in Kashmir made much of a difference. They did provide the Indians with a justification for their actions in Kashmir. There was no question that some of the weapon we were providing for the liberation of Afghanistan were ending up in Kashmir and in the Punjab, as well as in the Persian Gulf--some of our missiles destined for Afghanistan were showing up in unfriendly hands in the Gulf. The Indians were quite vocal about militant Islam on the march. They did not receive much of a sympathetic ear; we were focusing on getting the Russians out of Afghanistan; that was my first priority. In any case, if the Indians had a case, it should have been made with their great friends in Moscow; if the Russians had withdrawn from Afghanistan earlier, much of this diversion of arms, funds and terrorists would not have occurred. We could have stopped our financial support and training for the *Mujahideen* much earlier. When I made this point to the Indians, they would usually respond with a lame defense of the regime in Kabul--a brutal dictatorship--which certainly did not endear them to us. But, as far as I know, the Indians were the only ones concerned about the spread of the trained and armed Muslim extremists.

I had to testify on Nepal, which was of minimal interests to US objectives. But because I had to testify, my statements and comments were fully reported back to Kathmandu--Page 1 story. I am sure that I must have commented on our views about human rights violations in Nepal; those were certainly not welcomed by the government which viewed it as

interference in their own domestic political process. I never had time to visit Sri Lanka, which also had its plate full of human rights violations; it was committing atrocities as were the Tamil insurgents. Our Ambassador in Colombo recommended once that we provide helicopter gun-ships to the Sri Lankan government, which I thought was one of the dumbest ideas I had ever heard. The Sri Lanka civil war was one of the few in which we were not engaged; I thought that it would be very foolish for us to do so. The Ambassador kept sending in his request; I finally saw him when he was back in Washington and told him that his idea was incredibly stupid. I suggested that if he wished to continue in his post, he should drop his suggestion immediately, if not sooner. I might say that that Ambassador is now the Deputy Director of the Carter Center in Atlanta where he can no longer request US military assistance to one side or another of a civil war!

I had the opportunity to visit Saudi Arabia three times before the beginning of the war. Our interests in Saudi then, as it has been for decades, was oil, which had generated a considerable stream of income for the kingdom making it also an attractive country for US business. The central role that Saudi plays in the energy field has also propelled into prominence in the international arena. So Saudi views on international issues is very important. The regime was, as it had been for decades, very conservative. The country was managed by some very talented technocrats, who also happened to be members of the Royal family. The stereotype of a Saudi Prince is just plain wrong; he is not a playboy, but most often a conscientious, dedicated and able manager. Saudi Arabia was and is well disposed toward the US, which prefers the peaceful resolution of disputes. I believe that the government is generally supported and accepted by the Saudi by the Sunni population, which is the majority; that may not be true for the Shiites. During some of my discussions with Saudi officials, I raised the issue of supporting Muslim fundamentalists. I had received complaints from other parts of the region that Saudi resources, from Saudi private citizens, were being sent to Islamic extremists. These comments were always followed by a plea that we try to stop this flow of support. I always told the Saudis about these complaints, which were emanating from Algeria, Sudan, Pakistan, Afghanistan or in the occupied territories. I always got a hearing; in some cases, depending which area I was complaining about, I even got request for the names of the Saudi individuals who were allegedly providing the support. In some cases there was even a cessation of the support. I have no doubts that some of this assistance was being sent without the knowledge of the Saudi government; it is not always an efficient government and I am convinced that some Saudi citizens, even members of the Royal family, were providing support surreptitiously. In some cases, the Saudis would tell me that my information was incorrect. That may well have been true. That Saudis provided support was incontrovertible, but that some person in Algeria or Tunisia or Sudan, aware of the discontent of the population, might well blame an innocent party, just to find a scapegoat. So it is quite possible that some of my information was wrong.

I might say a word about my experiences with the Saudi government. They went through two phases: pre-Gulf crisis and post-Gulf crisis. When I started as Assistant Secretary in 1989, I had an extensive exposure to the Saudis through discussions which they sponsored, on behalf of the Arab League. The subject was peace in Lebanon which interested me for a

number of reasons, not the least of which had been my personal experience with the issue. Saud al-Faysal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, took an active role in along with the Algerian and Kuwaiti delegates in attempting to broker a settlement in Lebanon. To succeed, it would have required some major revisions of the Lebanese constitution. I spent a lot of time with the Saudis discussing the Arab League's initiative. The Saudis did a fine job and won a certain amount of respect from me for their diplomatic skills. I also visited Saudi Arabia a couple of times before the Gulf War and met with different Cabinet Ministers, discussing a wide range of topics of mutual interest.

Saudi Arabia is a difficult country for a foreigner to understand. Never having been there before not having worked with the Saudis before 1989, I think I probably underestimated their capabilities. As I mentioned earlier, the Saudi government is not well organized, but it is staffed by some first rate people. So some matters are taken care of quite expeditiously. The major issue has and is whether a conservative monarchy--a huge family--can survive in the next Century. I believe that it will, particularly if it makes some adaptations over time. There are bound to be generational changes, but the Saudis will probably make a successful transition to a more modern government. I expect the monarchy to survive, although a very different institution than it is today. I am not as sanguine about the future of authoritative governments in some of the smaller Gulf states.

In the 1989-91 period, we had a fairly open and extensive dialogue with the Saudi regime on many issues, including human rights. We talked to them about the need for them to understand that a transition would be coming and that that required some careful management. The Saudi leadership is well aware that times are changing and that the kingdom is subject to many strains. There have been intermittent demonstrations and some armed uprisings in Saudi in the last 15 years, sponsored by Islamic extremists. The Great Mosque was occupied not too long ago by some discontents; that led to the death of about 500 people. The Saudi royal family is well aware of some of the political under-currents in its country. The fate of the Shah of Iran was instructional as is the situation in Libya, under Qadhafi's "popular democracy." There is no question that the leadership recognizes the major societal forces that are pressing both from inside and outside the kingdom. It is not idly sitting by, hoping that these pressures will dissipate; the Saudi leadership recognizes the need for change. So the transition was not an issue that we had to bring forcefully to Saudi attention; they had recognized it before we even mentioned it. What they will do to ease their way into a modern society and government can not be accurately predicted. They will make decisions which in their eyes will engender a peaceful transition; only time will tell whether they will be successful.

I spent a certain amount of my time worrying about Libya trying to figure out how it may be contained. Libyan activities were of concern to us. So I intermittently had to spend considerable time worrying about Libya and its adventuresome activities in the Sudan and Chad, about Qadhafi's harboring of terrorists and his proclivity to sponsor terrorism or at least permit the use of his country as a launching pad for terrorist activities. We worried about the chemical plant that he was building since we believed it would be used to manufacture chemical weapons. I think we could have done more than we did to contain

Libya. For example, we could have launched a military strike against the chemical plant; I certainly would have supported such action. I don't believe that any broader scale attack would have had enough impact to off-set the political furor that it would have undoubtedly unleashed. I used to have many debates with my Egyptian friends about Libya; they maintained a fairly good relationship with Qadhafi, and we did not. I also discussed Libya with Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco--all states geographically close to Libya. They were not as concerned about Qadhafi as we were; neither were the Italians or the Greeks, which had extensive trade with Libya and rely on Libyan oil. But in reality, there weren't many options available to us beyond the surgical strike.

We had been involved in training and equipping an anti-Qadhafi group in the Sudan. We finally had to move it from the Sudan to the Chad to Zaire to California. It was a half-baked insurgency in which I do not believe we should ever be involved. This episode leads to make a few observations about CIA. I think when I became Assistant Secretary, I was well briefed on certain subjects; I can not say that I was well briefed across the board. There were some activities taking place in my region which had not been adequately explained to me. Unfortunately, some of these cases had consequences, which forced me to make some forceful comments to the Agency.

INR, which theoretically is supposed to be knowledgeable on all CIA activities, was not very clear on its role in the 1989-91 period. It was not clear whether that bureau was supposed to be a conduit of information to the regional bureaus or whether it was just a depository of information to be kept to itself or whether it had a monitoring and approval role. I must say that this role confusion existed even when I worked in EUR as the senior deputy. My experience suggested that the best way to deal with CIA was to do it directly. I would have liked INR to play the role of "watchdog" so that I could be alerted if any important intelligence development were in the offing. On a few occasions, my hopes were realized, but too often they were not. In all fairness, INR was at the center of considerable controversy on the matter of Afghanistan. It was widely believed--and so reported in the press--that INR was basically anti-*Mujahideen* because it felt that CIA had recruited a bunch of crazy Islamic extremists, which it supported regardless of potential consequences. There was no question that INR and CIA fundamentally disagreed on the course of events in Afghanistan and the US role there. INR used to report every *Mujahideen* set back with glee! NEA tended to side more with CIA, so that there was internal disputes within the Department on this issue as well.

While on this general question of relationships with CIA, I should point out that we had generally very good relations with other agencies. Bill Rugh, who headed the NEA division in USIA, had been our Ambassador in Yemen and become one again later, had the very rare experience of having been a DCM (in Syria) as well--that is a position normally only filled by State FSOs. So he was very familiar with us and that made for a very good working relationship. In DoD, we had generally good relations with ISA and DSAA as well. As I mentioned earlier, I used to chair a weekly Thursday afternoon meeting of all of the heads of offices and bureaus in other agencies responsible for activities in the NEA area. That helped us coordinate and discuss matters of mutual interest.

As I suggested earlier, our relations with Egypt were very good in the 1989-91 period. I was very satisfied with it. We did have concerns about the activities of Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt. Their terrorism was already very evident in those years. I have always believed that good governments solve many problems--and that goes for all countries--and that therefore any improvements in Egypt's governmental capacity undermines the power base of the dissident Islamic extremists. We were also interested in "keeping ahead of the game". Our Embassy in Cairo was requested to submit a quarterly report in internal stability in Egypt; a measure of that stability is not always easy to come by, but the Embassy gave it its best shot. Fortunately, that Embassy happened to be particularly well staffed at the time--quality wise. I encouraged some other embassies in the region to institutionalize a similar report, so that Washington could monitor the level of violence in the region and observe any patterns that might develop. But I have always believed that Islamic fundamentalism varies from country to country. Algeria is the principal illustration of violent Islamic extremism. No one knows how the Algerian saga will finish, but it is a very dicey situation. Some of my staff in NEA alerted me early and effectively to conditions in Algeria. They drafted for me some excellent and prescient Congressional testimony which I presented in 1989; my comments then are still relevant today because the forecasts that NEA made for Algeria's future were on the mark. My role was just to be smart enough to realize that the people on the desk and in the Embassy knew what they were talking about and I was able to use their analysis almost *verbatim*. I personally felt then and do today that Algeria may well fall under the rule of a politicized Islamic government. But I don't think that will ever happen in Egypt because of societal differences in the two countries. Egypt is a society with roots to the past that actually effect daily life and outlooks. That will buffer extremism; Algeria does not have those societal buffers. Algeria has been a society in painful transition for a century; Egypt has been a society in slow transition for thousands of years. So I see fundamental differences between Egyptian and Algerian societies which will make one much more vulnerable to Islamic politization than the other.

In the Spring of 1990 in Bonn, I chaired a Chiefs of Mission conference whose main topic was "Political Islam". I chose the topic and asked four of our more intellectual ambassadors to make short presentations which we then discussed for the following two days. There were a number of other issues that I could have used as a theme, but I preferred to focus on this one theme almost exclusively for the whole conference. So we were certainly aware of the phenomenon and were trying to stay ahead of the movement. I have already stated my views on the future of Islamic fundamentalism, at least in Egypt and Algeria. There were several ambassadors who did not share that perception; they felt that although the movements might be different in each country, that there were common threads which tied all Islamic fundamentalism together. Some thought that my views of Egypt's prospects were far too rosy; they thought that the situation there was much more dire than I believed.

Algeria was a time consuming issue for me. As I said, I considered Algeria the real test for Islamic extremism versus the Arab liberalization. After the very destructive war for independence and after 25 years under the stifling regime of the FLN, Algeria had suddenly found that political openness was possible and even desirable. It went from a one party state

to one in which 34 different parties were competing. Undoubtedly that was too many by far, but it was far better than one. The press went from completely government-run operation to totally open; the same could be said for the economy which was transiting from centrally directed to market driven. It was clear that Algeria was moving in a direction, if successful, might become a model to be emulated by the rest of the Arab world. This was particularly true since Algeria is an important emotional and political symbol in the Arab world because of its history. So the blossoming of a society careening towards democracy and a market economy was a signal event; the threat of that progress stopping or even worst being reversed by Islamic extremism was of great concern to us, demanding a lot of my personal attention. I saw Algeria as the battlefield of liberalization versus extremism--a battle that was important for the US. I didn't believe that we could influence events very much. I did meet several times with the Spanish, Italians and French--and to a lesser extent with the Germans and the British--to talk about North Africa and to explore what any of us could do to influence events in a positive way in Algeria. Most of the suggestions came down to more economic assistance--from us, of course. But that was not realistic; we could not have gotten any larger appropriations from Congress for Algeria. I fully recognized that much of the extremism in Algeria and other countries was driven by a low standard of living level. People who are dissatisfied with their economic conditions look for causes that might bring some benefits to them. Politicized Islam, as Communism did earlier in this century, offers explanations of the evils of society and of the reasons for economic deprivation and most importantly, offers solutions. The poor and the exploited will jump at that in any country, as they did with Communism. Arab nationalism also tried to suggest solutions to people's economic woes, but was never really successful. The analysis and solution to economic deprivation is common to all Islamic extremist movements, from Indonesia to Algeria.

I might just say a few words about my former home--Beirut. In 1989, Lebanon was split between a Maronite general, Michael Aoun, who called himself President, even though not so elected or inaugurated, and Sunni Muslim Prime Minister, Salim al-Hoss, who also called himself President of Lebanon. Furthermore, there was an armed Christian militia which did not support Aoun. So there was a war among the Christians along with the battles between the standard factions. In fact, in many ways, the civil war among Christians was worse than some of other disputes in the country. In September 1989, a large group of Aoun's followers demonstrated in front of the American Embassy and attempted to block egress and access of Embassy personnel. That these demonstrators were also the Embassy security force made the situation even more dangerous. In one case, one of the demonstrators pressed his gun against the temple of one of the Embassy's officers and threaten to bring the building down in way or another. As soon as I heard of these events, I immediately recommended to Baker that the Embassy be closed since we had no longer any security protection. We met with the President and Secretary Cheney and within twelve hours, we evacuated all our personnel out of Beirut without any losses. The Embassy stayed closed until early 1991. We reopened again after, in September 1990, General Aoun was attacked by Syrian and Muslim forces; within four hours, he surrendered and took refuge in the French Embassy. He now lives on the French Riviera. Then in November 1990 a new President of Lebanon who actually had been elected in the previous year took

office, but he was assassinated three weeks later. Since then, however, there has been no more military conflict in Lebanon, except in the far south, in the so called "Israeli security zone". When the fighting stopped, I concluded that we could and should reopen our Embassy. We had assurances from the new President that the Embassy and its staff would be protected; I knew him well enough to trust him and so our Ambassador returned in November 1990 and the Embassy opened up soon thereafter.

Lebanon looked differently from Washington than it did from Beirut. When I was in Beirut, I assumed of course that Washington spent considerable time worrying about me and my staff and events in Lebanon. In fact, my priorities in Beirut were considerably different than those that I had to develop as Assistant Secretary. That didn't come as great surprise; the shock was more in the amount of time I could devote to Lebanon affairs while in Washington. The problems looked essentially the same from either capital. But as Assistant Secretary, I had considerable more input into the policy making process of the US government. In fact, I think we changed our policy toward Lebanese affairs in the 1989-91 period. As I mentioned earlier, the US government had spent considerable time in 1988 worrying about who should be the next President of Lebanon; we had struck out badly. We indirectly caused General Aoun to take over the country by becoming involved too deeply in Lebanese internal affairs. One thing I was determined to do as Assistant Secretary was to avoid a repetition of that badly misguided policy. And we did change out interventionist policies in Lebanon.

I did spend time on the hostages in Lebanon. I was involved in intermittent tactical meetings which were held to review how we were dealing with the hostage situation. In the Spring, 1990 the kidnappers said that they would release one hostage if I, John Kelly, would go to Beirut to meet with them. Of course, the media picked that up and played it widely. The administration--wisely--decided that we would not give in to the kidnappers' demands; we would not negotiate with those rogues. The family of that hostage did not accept our decision warmly, as could be expected and as understood. It thought that just a brief trip to Lebanon by John Kelly would result in a release of their loved one. As Assistant Secretary, I had periodic meetings with that family and all families of the hostages. Some I had known because they and I had been in Beirut at the same time; the others I got to know through these meetings, many of which were very emotional and intense. Many of these families had members who had been hostages for four or five years; the passage of time without release made them increasingly unhappy with us. They did not react kindly to what they perceived to be our inaction and were not bashful about expressing their views in the strongest language. The last hostage was finally released in October 1991--my last month on the job. I do not believe that there was a connection between the two events, but I did leave my job satisfied that this unhappy period in our history had finally been brought to an end. President Bush decided at the beginning of his administration that he would not repeat his predecessor's mistake; he would not speak publicly about the hostages and the evils of the kidnappers, thereby reducing their importance and value. That change was not welcomed by the families, but I believe that it was an effective tactic which eventually led to the release of all the hostages. They had diminished political value; furthermore, our

relations with Syria improved which probably resulted in pressure from Assad to release the hostages.

Also the Iranians may have decided that the hostages were becoming a liability for them. I should mention in that connection that during the 1989-91 period we had an extensive indirect dialogue with Iran through the Swiss, because we had no diplomatic relations with that country. During the Gulf crisis, we may have had as many as three exchanges per week with Iran. For example, we gave the Iranian warning about our military involvement in Saudi Arabia. We tell them in advance of our military deployments; we were obviously trying to assure that our actions would not be misinterpreted in Tehran and read as hostile to Iran. We did have occasional inadvertent overflights, as might be expected with the thousands and thousands of sorties that we flew both from land and sea bases. We forewarned the Iranians that that might happen and assured them that no action against them was contemplated; our sole target in the area was Iraq. The last thing we needed was a military confrontation with Iran. Occasionally, American citizens who were held hostage in Kuwait and Iraq escaped into Iran; when we detected such moves, we would forewarn the Iranians and seek their help, which they extended in all situations. So we had a quasi-working cooperation with Iran on a very minimal level during the Gulf crisis. This did not change our fundamental view that Iran was a rogue state intent on fostering terrorism. We knew that they were still actively sponsoring terrorists against American targets; we had absolutely no doubt about the Iranian activities. These activities, sometimes carried out through Lebanon, occupied some of my attention. The Iranians had just decided that the US was the "Great Satan" in the world and were preoccupied with that concept. When we held the Madrid Peace Conference in October, 1991, the Iranian Islamic hierarchy issued a *fatwa* condemning to death every delegate to that conference, including Gorbachev, Bush, Baker, Shamir and all the other delegation leaders. The Iranian Muslim leadership had a grandiose view of the world and their role in it; unfortunately, they were deadly serious about their mission. In fact, that *fatwa* has not been lifted and all the delegates to Madrid are still potential victims of some demented extremist who might take these religious injunctions as his entrance into blessed eternity. Iran still operates on 13th Century European model of international behavior. I firmly believe that Iran has both a skewed view of the world and has domestic political pressures that lead to extremism. As I suggested, Iran reminds me very much of the kings and lords of the Middle Ages who decided that they were instructed by God to go to the Middle East to kill as many "infidels"--Muslims-- as they could. There are a lot of Iranians who think that their God wants as many Americans killed as possible. In addition, I don't believe that the Iranian political leadership has any understanding of the West. In the 1989-91, we had direct dealings with Iran at the World Court in The Hague. There was then and still is a US-Iran tribunal which meets to decide on the disposition of Iranian assets frozen by the West after the Shah's overthrow as well as some Western claims for assets in Iran. Some of the Iranian positions in that tribunal come out of "left field"; they bear no relationship to reality, as we know it, despite the fact that many of the attorneys representing Iran were educated in the West. Living and studying in the West has had no effect on these people's views of the world; they may have experienced that society, but certainly do not understand it. We saw the same syndrome appeared when Tariq Aziz justified Iraq's invasion of Kuwait by using

as an analogy the Japanese rationale for their attack on Pearl Harbor. The Iranians don't see why we resent so much their *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie; they consider that a perfectly appropriate response to a literary work. It shows a complete lack of understanding of our views of the world and our psychology. I believe that the Iranian government and the Iranian religious establishment are very much as they portray themselves; Iran has not been "kidnapped" by a small bunch of religious revolutionaries. The majority of Iranians support this fervor; they just suffer from a major misperception of reality, as seen by most of the rest of the world. Therefore, I do not believe that there is a major battle in Tehran between the extremists and the so-called "moderate faction". This is a fiction that has been around for years. I do not see the see-saw political battle in Tehran between these two factions nor do I believe that President Hashemi Rafsanjani is a "moderate" who is buffeted by one side or the other. Rafsanjani is not a moderate by any standard. He countenances assassinations in the name of religion; he is personally convinced that his religion requires him and all other "good" Muslims to take all measures against "infidels"; that is God's will!

Our main objective in the 1989-91 period was to isolate Iran. I discussed this goal with our European allies as well as the Russians. I didn't get much sympathy; the Europeans all admitted that Iran was not behaving as a civilized country should, but it was just going through a bad period during which its leadership was crazy. They thought that most Iranians were civilized and that eventually, the "crazies" would leave the scene. They also thought that if we would only treat Iran better, it would respond in kind. Of course, all European countries and the Russians had large commercial interests in Iran. In their view, it was we, the US, who had a skewed view of the world. It was a perfect illustration of the old maxim that "what you see depends on where you sit." The Europeans would admit in private that the Iranians were not behaving as a civilized country should. In Paris, there had been assassination of some Iranian opposition members and the Iranian diplomats had been involved in questionable practices, such as importing the guns used in these killings. The French officials would shrug their shoulders and tell me that that was the world--unfortunate situation, but beyond the control of anybody except the Iranians themselves. Then gratuitously they would point out that it was still we whose nationals were being held hostage in Lebanon. They didn't have any hostages because they would deal with the kidnapers; the US would not. It was the typical *realpolitik* one gets so often from the French. The Germans would tell us that we did not understand the Iranians and the British took the line I mentioned before--treat them better and they will improve their behavior. So we did talk to the Europeans about what might bring Iran back into the family of nations. I should note that George Bush, in his Inaugural address, said to the whole world that there were no reasons that we had to have adversarial relations with Iran; in fact, the US was prepared to open a dialogue with Iran if it wanted to improve relations. In other words, we were ready to sit down with the Iranians and discuss our differences at any time they chose. During my entire tour as Assistant Secretary, I received regular messages from Tehran which invited me or an American emissary to meet with their delegation anywhere in Europe, but that the meeting must be secret. Our standard reply was that we were prepared to meet, but that it would have to be a meeting that we could publicly announce. The Iranians could never allow that degree of openness. I think they insisted on secrecy so that they could disavow whatever might have taken place or whatever might have been said. In

my view this nervousness was due to Iranian domestic and international politics; if a government takes the public position that the US is evil incarnate, then it would be hard to justify meeting with it.

I do believe that the Iranians want to be a major player in the Muslim world--which they are not presently--but to become one means a radical departure from their present positions. I met regularly with the President of the Islamic Conference--who, at the time, happen to be a Nigerian. That Conference meets regularly, although it is largely ignored by the Western press. We tried to follow what transpired at the Conference because it took positions on many issues of interest to us. Iran was trying to influence the Conference; it spent money trying to influence other Muslim countries; it would and still does buy the air tickets and other support for delegates not only to the Conference, but to other meetings including the UN. The Iranians opened embassies in many former parts of the Soviet Union as they became independent; in fact, they mounted assistance programs for the countries in central Asia, most of which were predominantly Islamic. So the Iranians are very active in trying to play a major role in the Islamic world.

Let me now turn briefly to Israel. As I said, I visited that country on many occasions--approximately 15 times, but never between August 1990 and March 1991. We had difficult relations with Israel during my tenure as Assistant Secretary. We differed with the Israeli government on settlement issues, and on the Bush 1991 decision not to support a \$10 billion guarantee for housing for new Russian immigrants--unless settlements ceased to be built. I joined with some other State people in making that recommendation to the Secretary and the to the President. So my visits were always difficult; we had lots of disagreements and the Israelis were unhappy with us; they were diffident in making their displeasures known to all American visitors, although I think it was easier to beat on me than on a Cabinet officer. For example, when Shamir met with Bush, he was always non-confrontational and generally did not challenge Bush's comments about settlements or other disputes. I should hasten to add that Shamir, although always firm, did not try to pick a fight; he was often less confrontational than some of his colleagues in the government. Sharon was the most confrontational, but others were also not "wall flowers". I was concerned by this Israeli attitude because I felt that, except for the settlement issues, our mutual interests were very close, both in the bilateral and in the multilateral areas. Even when our goals were identical, we had different strategies and tactics.

(JOHN: I think it might be appropriate if you would end your discussion of your tour as Assistant Secretary with a summary paragraph or two which might speak to the questions of what you thought about the assignment, what new lessons you might have learned, etc. I should have asked you those questions, but)

Q: In the Fall of 1991, you were appointed as US Ambassador to Finland. How did that come about?

KELLY: On one of our trips to the Middle East in the Spring of 1991, Secretary Baker asked me what I would be interested in doing after the end of my tour as Assistant

Secretary. He knew that I wanted to leave that position; I had told Under Secretary Kimmitt that I was physically exhausted. I had mentioned that problem to him even before the Gulf war combat had actually started. I had added that I was not going to leave in the middle of a crisis, but that I hoped that once the war was over and the situation the Middle East had stabilized, that I could be considered for another assignment. So soon after the last shot was fired in the Gulf, Kimmitt asked me whether I still wanted to be re-assigned. I said that indeed I did because by then I was completely worn out. The first response from Kimmitt was to offer me the job as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, after it had been decided that Ray Seitz would go to London as our Ambassador to the Court of St. James. I told Bob that I was very flattered by his inquiry, but that going from one assistant secretaryship to another would not give me the kind of change that I really needed. I knew that I was being complimented, but all assistant secretaryships require long hours and lots of travel. That was not what I needed in 1991.

I asked Bob whether he could not find me an assignment overseas. He mentioned a couple of possibilities and obviously had discussed my request with Baker. On the way back from one of our trips from the Middle East, the Secretary asked me whether I still wanted an overseas assignment. I said "Yes" and then he asked me what post I might be interested in. I said "Finland"; it was a nice, normal country. He then noted that I had a Finnish wife; he asked me who the present Ambassador was. I told him it was Jack Wyman--a Republican political appointee from New Orleans. Then Baker wanted to know what kind of a job he was doing and I rated him as okay. The Secretary said he was sorry to hear that; he would have preferred to have me say that he was doing a lousy job; then he could have asked the President to fire Wyman. Baker then said he would try to give it "his best shot."

Sure enough, two weeks later the Secretary called and said that Finnish assignment was mine. He had talked to the President and gotten his approval. When I asked what he intended to do with Wyman, he said that I should not worry; the Department needed a new Chief of Protocol. When the President asked Wyman whether he would be interested, he was apparently delighted--he didn't know what a terrible job it was. So my name was sent to Congress for confirmation. I had about seven weeks after the Madrid Conference before arriving in Helsinki. I began to disengage from NEA right after Madrid and arrived at my new post a few days before Christmas, 1991.

Finland used to be a major listening post for us; we surveilled the Soviet Union from there. Now the Cold War was over and the Embassy's efforts had to be brought up to date. We still had a lot of people in Helsinki who thought that they should be monitoring Russia, despite the fact that our Embassy in Moscow had grown to something like 400 Americans. I never did learn what they were hearing in Russia! That was a sore point with me and I had differences on that issue with some people in Washington and in the field.

My job as Ambassador was to maintain good relations with Finland, which was hardly a challenge because they were good and the Finns are so friendly to the West. Secondly, I had to promote economic ties, primarily by helping American companies to export to Finland. Finland and just the European Union and was potentially a very good market for us. So I did a lot of commercial promotion; in fact, we increased American export to Finland better

30% each year I was there despite a recession. We also concluded a \$3 billion sale of American aircraft. We spent a lot of time supporting American exports. I gave lost of speeches, opened libraries and attended a lot of other "ribbon cutting" events. Fortunately, 90% of Finns under the age of 40 speak English, having been taught the language for twelve years during their primary and secondary education.

I must admit that it took me a little while to get used to the pace in Helsinki. Dinner at home became a regular routine, something that I had not been accustomed to do for several years. One of my first acts in Finland was to visit Lapland, which is my wife's family home base. I spent two and half wonderful years in Helsinki, free from the past pressures--no bodyguards, no crises. The Embassy was a good size--75-80 Americans--perhaps a few more than were actually needed. When I arrived, I notices that the staff worked late and came in on Saturdays. I knocked that off; I closed the communications center of 5 p.m. Telegrams that were not ready by that time had to wait until the next day. I knew that no one in Washington was just waiting for a telegram from Helsinki. I also insisted that the Embassy be closed on Saturdays. If someone couldn't do their job in Helsinki in a 40 hour week, there was something seriously wrong. Since the Chancery and the Residence were in the same compound, I had a good opportunity to make sure that my orders were being followed. My decisions were not always popular; the communicators regretted not being paid overtime. But in fact, the Embassy staff worked very much like many other embassies; it would piddle around until 4:30 p.m. and then work very diligently to finish their reporting cables. That would take them past 6 p.m. when they would take the traffic to the Communications Center for despatch.

I had a good time in Helsinki. I liked fostering of American exports. I cut back on size of the staff to some extent and returned money to the Department's budget office. I would have cut the staff more, but those people belonged to other agencies and as Ambassador, I had limited say over their staffing. There were only four substantive State positions in the political and economic sections of the Embassy. So there were six substantive State people, including the DCM and myself, out of a total complement of 75-80 Americans. In all fairness, I should mention that we did have a major supporting role for our Embassy in Moscow and the fifteen embassies in the former Soviet Union countries. We also started to support Beijing logistically while I was Ambassador to Finland because upon examination it turned out that we could do that much more cheaply than it could be done from Tokyo or any other Asian capital.

So we had a large administrative section. We had two big warehouses--one secure for classified equipment and material and one for unclassified. We stocked everything from refrigerators to memo pads to health supplies. We had a very competent indigenous staff that did all of the work. Finnish Air and the Finnish trucking services did excellent work at competitive rates. For example, when the US opened the Consulate General in Vladivostok, the Department sent a test shipment via Anchorage and Tokyo. In fact, the Japanese freight forwarder sent it to Helsinki--without telling the Department--because he knew that it was faster and cheaper to get it to Vladivostok that way. It was the freight forwarder in Helsinki, who did a lot of work for us, who told us about this test shipment.

When we informed the Department of this circuitous route, it investigated and found that it costs twice as much to send freight via the Pacific than it would had it been sent straight through Helsinki in the first place. It then occurred to the Department to see whether Helsinki might not also be the cheaper trans-shipment point for freight to Beijing. That turned out to be 40% cheaper, so our business grew exponentially. So about 15 Americans on my staff were devoted to administrative functions. Much of the rest of the staff came from agencies that did not recognize that the Cold War was over. Sad to say, I was never able to convince them otherwise, despite my strong protestations and some acrimonious debate with Washington headquarters. The only agency that reduced staff was Commerce; that, I thought, was the wrong move. That was the one agency that I wanted well represented in light of the commercial opportunities that I saw in Finland. In fact, both commercial officer positions in Helsinki were eliminated during my tour, dumping that workload on the two economic officers that State had assigned. It was the wrong action by Commerce Department. There may have been some other minor reductions, but not nearly as many as I thought were called for in light of the new international circumstances.

Washington left us pretty much alone, except in one regard. I didn't keep track of this requirement, but our Ambassador in Copenhagen did. Between January 1, 1994 and March 31, the American Embassy in Denmark received instructions to transmit 175 different demarches to the government of Denmark. I did not keep track of our workload in Helsinki, but I would guess that our requirements were quite similar since the embassies to Scandinavian countries tended to receive the same instructions. This process went totally out of control when the Clinton administration took power. It turned out that every proponent for every hobby horse that could be ridden--and in a bureaucracy that is a huge number--could get an instruction out to require an embassy to deliver a demarche. The range was staggering from environmental concerns to human rights to economic assistance to Panama or Nicaragua or El Salvador to contribution of UN peace keepers for Kashmir, Bosnia or wherever. No one in Washington never sat down to try to discriminate and weed out the less important issues. All instructions started with "Ambassador should seek immediate appointment at highest level to deliver the following demarche." It was ridiculous! There was absolutely no effort made to prioritize these various demands. All were of equal importance and all were of "major importance." I used to complain to EUR, but they said they were helpless in the face of the importance that the administration was placing on global issues. We would try to make some distinctions at the local level; we even at times refused to deliver a demarche on the grounds that it had no relevance to our dialogue with the Finns. My staff would caution me that I was making enemies in Washington unnecessarily, but I just thought that the whole process had gone awry. When I used to refuse to deliver demarches in Beirut, I could get away with it. But by refusing to do so in Helsinki, I became resented in certain parts of Washington; no one likes sarcasm from Finland. In my thirty years, I have never seen the process so out of control. Every once in a while, I would get a first person message from the Secretary saying that he had designated the subject of the message as one of his highest priorities. The subject might be population control or deforestation in the Amazon--subjects that clearly showed me that even the Seventh Floor staff was not able to control some of the elements in the Department. A Secretary of State can not have too many "highest priorities"--they all lose their punch. I

suspect that some under secretary or assistant secretary asked the Secretary that a message on a certain subject be sent out in his name; I seriously doubt that the Secretary ever saw the message itself and knew how often his name was taken in vain.

I was a bear on getting out of the office. I was out frequently and insisted that my staff follow the same practice. We can not represent your government sitting behind your desk. I would call on American business firms, on Finnish businesses that might be attractive investors or partners with an American firm, on politicians. I met with a lot of media people, talked to a lot of publishers. I traveled a lot; I visited every University I could and had all the Rectors to the Residence for dinner. I did a lot of things that in most missions, the US ambassador doesn't have time to do. I had lots of fun.

We did have some visitors--even some Congressional delegations--Les Aspin, etc. There were many American business people who came to Helsinki. President Bush came during my first year; Secretary Baker came as did Cheney, and Eagleburger. The only Clinton cabinet member who came was Perry. Bush came for the CSCE Summit in 1992 as did Baker. Eagleburger came for a CSCE meeting; Cheney and Colin Powell came for bilateral meetings. Perry came in 1993 on bilateral matters. None of these visits created any major problems; my staff was very competent and the logistic requirements--onerous as they may have been--of VIP visits were handled well. Quayle brought the largest contingent of all--far in excess of requirements. My biggest problem was getting Finnish visitors received at appropriate levels in Washington. The President of Finland visited Washington in 1993 to give the key note speech on the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He was not received by either the President or the Vice-President nor did the Secretary of State call on him. I never did understand that; it would have been just common courtesy to have the President of a friendly country to the White House for some occasion, small as it might have been, especially when his country's airline had just bought \$3 billion worth of American aircraft. I think the Clinton administration blew it! So the President of Finland came to Washington and saw no one--he was not invited anywhere nor did anyone call on him! It left a terrible impression in Finland. It was true that the Clinton administration had publicly announced that it had no intention of devoting as much attention to foreign policy as its predecessor ones had; unfortunately, it lived up to its promises. The Finnish President was not the only head of state who got that treatment. The Dutch had the same problem as did the King and Queen of Spain. This high level administration inattention to common international courtesies was real fodder for our chiefs of mission conferences.

In September, 1993, I was told that I would be replaced by the Director General. I was told that a friend of the President's had been selected, but he was trying to decide whether he wanted to go to New Zealand or Finland. If he were to select Helsinki, I was told that I would leave a few months short of completing a three year tour. That didn't bother me; I had been around long enough to understand the process. The selection turned out to be the Deputy Secretary's brother-in-law whose wife worked for Hillary Clinton. He was also a Clinton college room-mate at Yale. The gentleman made up his mind shortly before Christmas and then I was told that I might have to leave in January, 1994. In fact, he did not

come until June--in part because he had to undergo a very tough confirmation process--so that I was in limbo for a long time. He was finally only confirmed by three Senate votes on the floor. Being left in limbo, when everybody knows you are going to be replaced, is not a comfortable feeling. All my Finnish friends used to ask when I would leave and I was never able to give them an answer.

When the Director General had first told me that I was going to be replaced, I asked her what my prospects for another senior assignment might be. She told me that it was very difficult to find any positions for career people, but she said we could have a further conversation when the actual replacement would take place. I asked again when I was called around Christmas and I was told that no onward assignment was being contemplated. It became clear to me that after making inquiries to friends in Washington, that the new administration would not offer me a senior position. finally I was told that the Under Secretary for Management would invoke that section of the Foreign Service Act which requires ex-ambassadors who have not been reappointed within 90 days to retire. I might have accepted another assignment, if it had been an important one. In fact, in June 1994, I was called by the Executive Secretary of the Department to see whether I would be interested in becoming the negotiator for Bosnia. That query came in the same week that I was told that the Under Secretary for Management intended to force me into retirement. I pointed that out to the Executive Secretary and then I asked "Why me?" The answer was that I had been involved in Lebanon negotiations as well as Middle East; I obviously had some experience as well as being not afraid of difficult challenges. I thought about the offer overnight and then called back to say that I would take the job subject to six conditions, such as reporting directly to the Secretary, etc. I also said that I wanted to talk to the President and the Secretary before finally accepting the job to make sure that I was in accord with their objectives. I never heard another word! So I retired, bringing a thirty year plus career to an end. It was fun!

End of interview