

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

PATRICK F. MORRIS

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is February 12, 2007, Lincoln’s birthday. This is an interview with Patrick F. Morris. And do you go by Pat?

MORRIS: Yes, I do.

Q: And this is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Pat, let us start at the beginning. When and where were you born?

MORRIS: I was born May 9, 1925, in Anaconda, Montana.

Q: Okay. With the name "Morris" and Anaconda, it sounds like you were of a mining family?

MORRIS: Correct. Actually, Anaconda is a smelter town; Butte is the mining town and my grandfather was an Irishman, an immigrant, who ended up as a contractor to build the foundation for a smelter west of Butte where the newly formed Anaconda Company decided to smelt its copper. And so my grandfather was one of the founders of the town of Anaconda in 1883.

Q: Okay, what do you know about the Morrisses? Where do they come from and how did they get over here?

MORRIS: Cloonlumney, Ballaghaderren, County Roscommon. That was on the border with the county of Roscommon and in later times the border was changed and now that town is in Roscommon rather than Mayo. But anyway it is western Ireland. And my grandfather, evidently, this was 1873, and my grandfather migrated to the United States and he had uncles who had migrated before him who were living in Syracuse, New York. He arrived in Philadelphia. (He was born in 1850) It was 1873 he arrived in Philadelphia, went to Syracuse. The family name was Morrisroe.

Q: Is that r-o-u or-?

MORRIS: R-o-e. The family name was Morrisroe and there are still Morrisroes living in that part of Ireland today. And his uncle told him that that was a clan name and he did not have to carry the clan designation anymore; he was in a new country and so he cut off the "roe" off of his name and became Jack Morris. And he went from Syracuse to the booming town of Chicago, which was right after the great fire, to look for work and from there he went to the Southwest. In Ireland he had been a drover, which was really a cattle herder, so he was comfortable around horses and he went to work for a freighter carrying goods in the Southwest and over time evidently had his own teams of horses and his own wagons and was doing freighting. And at that time that part of the United States the Indians, the Apaches and other Southwestern tribes, were on the warpath and later he got malaria and decided he had better go to the mountains. And so he went to Leadville, Colorado, worked in the lead mines and then heard about the great copper find in Butte and moved from Colorado to Butte. And there, he was contracted by another Irishman by the name of Dwyer. He was hired by Dwyer who had a contract with the newly formed Anaconda Company to build the foundation for a new smelter. So that is how the Morris family came to Anaconda.

Q: How did your- what do you know about your grandmother?

MORRIS: My grandmother was also Irish; her name was Cuffe. And I have very little information on where the Cuffes came from in Ireland. There is some indication that they may have come from Cork because most of the miners in Butte came from Cork and practically all of the people who moved into Anaconda had been in Butte prior to going to Anaconda. So there is a possibility that the Cuffe family came from Cork. I have not done any research on it so I just do not know but he, my grandfather, was a friend of a couple of brothers named Cuffe and they brought their sisters over and my grandfather married one of them.

Q: Well, where was your father born and what did he do?

MORRIS: My father, of course, was born in Anaconda after the marriage. He was born in Anaconda and was brought up in Anaconda and he was a very good baseball player. He was a left-hander and he was drafted into the minor leagues and played ball all over the West for a couple of Canadian teams; one of those was a farm team for the Chicago White Sox. And he played one season with the White Sox before he threw his arm out and that was the end of his baseball career. But he went on to be a baseball trainer at West Point and from there had different jobs in the East; ended up in Florida working in Palm Beach, at the Royal Poinciana Hotel where he met my mother. My mother was an immigrant from England who had migrated to Canada and had lived in Canada for a number of years, working. She was a salad chef in some of the bigger hotels; she worked at the McAlpin Hotel in New York City as a salad chef. She then went to Florida during the high season and was working as a salad chef in Royal Poinciana, which is still in existence in Palm Beach. She met my father there, and they were married a couple of years later. My father actually had to leave Florida to go back to Anaconda because his father was in bad health and he stayed, I think primarily because my grandfather had become a fairly large property owner; he had houses, he had a couple of boarding houses and he had other real estate in Anaconda and so my dad decided, I guess he decided, he had to stay to take care of my grandfather's investments. And so he proposed to my mother and she came west to Anaconda and I was born there and I have two brothers younger than me.

Q: Now, what do you know about your mother's background?

MORRIS: Well, she had a very interesting background. Her mother was a concert pianist; they were from Manchester. And her father was an actor and that did not make for a very good marriage. She had, let me see; she had three sisters and one brother. The marriage broke up; the family took the oldest sister and the youngest sister and the two in-between, my mother and her brother were put in an orphanage. As soon as her brother reached the age of 16 he migrated to Canada. And then my mother when she became 18 went to Canada to be with her brother. But other than that rather sketchy history I know little of my mother's background. My mother had aunts in England with whom she corresponded for many years and I met a couple of my cousins in England but I did not get very much more history of the family than that.

Q: How much education did your parents have?

MORRIS: My dad lost his mother at a fairly young age, too. Even though he was brought up in Anaconda his mother died when he was 10 or 11 years old and so he was put in a boarding school and that boarding school was a Jesuit school in Spokane, Washington, called Gonzaga, which later became a university, just like Georgetown here; Georgetown was a Jesuit high school and became a university. And so he went through, I think he went through high school at Gonzaga but I think he was spending his summers in Anaconda because he started to play baseball in Anaconda. And then he says that he went to some kind of a commercial school in Butte for awhile but I would say that his education probably was through high school. But he was a voracious reader and a well known orator and he was very active in union affairs; whenever there were negotiations with the ACM Company [Anaconda Copper Mining Company] he was always chosen to be on the negotiating committee because of his very good memory and his knowledge of all aspects of the company operations.

Q: And your mother? I take it she did not really have much of a chance to go beyond high school.

MORRIS: She probably went through the eighth grade.

Q: Well, you mentioned your father was involved in union affairs and of course there was a pretty violent period in Montana with union- I cannot think of the gentleman's name who was a big figure in union and involved in a big bill or something. I mean, did you father ever talk about union affairs?

MORRIS: Oh yes. Actually the whole town of Anaconda must have been and up until 1980 probably one of the most unionized towns in the United States. Nobody could do anything if they did not belong to a union. And I think most of the people in town were very familiar with union history and what had gone on. The union- Butte Miners Union was the Local Number One in the old, Western Federation of Miners.

Q: The National Workers.

MORRIS: No, I think it was the Western Federation of Miners. The Butte local was Local Number One because the union was founded, the national union, was founded in Butte so the union membership was almost universal in both towns.

Q: Did your family, did you grow up in Anaconda?

MORRIS: I did.

Q: How Catholic was your family. I am thinking you were Catholic.

MORRIS: Yes.

Q: How Catholic would you say your family was?

MORRIS: Well it is interesting. My dad, who was educated by the Jesuits, never went to church. He said, "I used to have to get up and go to church every morning all the time I was with the Jesuits." He said, "I have had enough church to last me the rest of my life."

Q: I went to an Episcopalian boarding school run by Episcopalian monks and that took care of me, thank you very much; I did the same.

MORRIS: Well anyway, that was my dad. And my mother, of course, was Episcopalian, I mean, Church of England, but she was converted because my dad did want to raise his kids as Catholics so she was converted and we grew up Catholics. And my brother is a Jesuit priest.

Q: Well how much, sort of as social history, how much did the Catholic Church and the local priest and all, what influence did they have, would you say, from your recollection?

MORRIS: You know, it is interesting; we had, in Anaconda, I would say it was maybe 80 percent Catholic. But that included Irish, Croatian, Slovenian, Italian; so that there was a good ethnic mix there. And then we had the nuns; there were two parishes and there were two Catholic school systems one in each parish. And the nuns, I think in both of the parishes, even though they were from different orders, the French influence on the nuns, I think in both, was overwhelming and so we got a Catholic education with a pretty heavy overlay of French Catholicism. But the Irish who were dominant in both Butte and Anaconda were, by the time I was going to school, were already realizing that the second generation growing up were forgetting Irish history and forgetting that the only enemy in the world were the English. And so the Irish were strong enough by that time to influence the Catholic Church in Montana to require Irish history in high school. So here were all of these Italians, Croatians and so forth all learning Irish history in Anaconda. It was ironic; it was the Irish Catholics influencing the Church rather than the Church influencing the Irish Catholics.

Q: In your recollection did the priest get up and say do not see such and such a movie?

MORRIS: Oh yes, there was a lot of it, and up to a certain point it had its effect. I remember that I was in junior high school, I think, and one of the gals became pregnant and she had an abortion. This was all rumor, but boy, there were very, very strong sermons, you know, from the pulpit about abortion was murder and that people who condoned this kind of thing were destined to hell. And it obviously had an effect on people's behavior. But on the other hand the unions were leftish, to say the least, and in some cases were definitely infiltrated by the communists. And so you had this tension all the time in Anaconda. I do not know; there is one story and I do not know whether- this has nothing to do with my family but it illustrates the point that in, and this is, you know, 1960, yes, about 1960, the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, headquarters in Denver, had become infiltrated by the communists. Actually the

communists had taken over the union and the head, the president of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers was from Butte; he was out of Local Number One out of Butte. And so the people in Butte were very loyal to him, the people in Anaconda were pretty loyal to him too, and he, as far as anybody knew; in fact, I think it has never been proven that he was ever a member of the communist party but he had surrounded himself with card carrying members of the communist party.

And a friend of mine—by that time I was already in the Foreign Service—but a friend of mine who came back here to Washington, Catholic University, told me a story about when he was a member of the union; he had gone to Carroll College, which is another Catholic school, but he was recording secretary or something of the local union and they were fighting the company as usual and there were many charges made against the union; that it was communist dominated. And this friend of mine said that there were internal problems in the union and he went to the local priest, he was a devout Catholic. He went to the local priest to get help. And the priest gave him a lecture and told him that he had to resign from the union because the union was communist dominated.

Well, he did not resign from the union, and he did not quit going to church. You know, it was a standoff and later when he came back to Washington, he went to Catholic University; he was - he was of Italian decent - and I think he was interested in becoming a priest but instead he went into social work in the community and later went to work for the D.C. Government in social work and has close ties to the Church to this day.

Q: Well, let us talk a bit about family life. I assume that your family was pretty much dedicated Democrats or?

MORRIS: Oh yes. Not only my family, the whole damn town. I mean, you know, the fact is that Montana, until Anaconda Copper gave up the ghost in 1980, Montana was a Democratic state because of the existence of Anaconda Copper in the state. There was Butte, there was Anaconda and there was Great Falls and all three of these towns were union towns and that took care of about 50 percent of the population of the state. And the unions were organized and so they supported Democrats. The company subsidized the Republican Party and the ranchers and the farmers were conservative by nature and were Republicans. And so there was always tension in the state legislature and in the election of the governor as to which way the elections would go. And the company spent thousands and thousands every election to make sure that the Republicans were at least in contention. But on the national scene the company really did not care who was elected to Washington because they were interested in controlling things at the local level and so we had a host of very prominent democrats at the national level, Senators Walsh, Wheeler, Murray and

Q: Well Mike Mansfield.

MORRIS: Mike Mansfield, Burton K. Wheeler, Walsh, who prosecuted the infamous Teapot Dome scandal during the Harding Administration.

Well Walsh, who was a Democrat, Democratic senator out of Montana, held the hearings and pushed hard the Justice Department to prosecute all of the people involved in Teapot Dome. He was later named as Roosevelt's first attorney general, but he died just before Roosevelt was inaugurated.

So anyway, on the national level, Montana was democratic; on the local level you had lots of tensions. You had Democrats and Republicans trading back and forth all the time; he company really influencing both parties. During the legislative sessions they had an open bar where drinks were free to all the legislators all the time. And they ran an operation to make sure that their interests were protected.

Q: Well now, growing up there, I would assume that this would be a pretty rough town even for kids.

MORRIS: It was; it was a rough town. But in a way it was a very safe place. Nothing really very- you know, there were robberies and theft, very few murders, and it was tough in the sense that kids grew up knowing how to defend themselves. There were lots of fistfights but there was also a great deal of freedom. We used to roam the hills; we knew every nook and cranny within five or six or seven miles from our house. We hitchhiked to go swimming in the creeks. So it was a tough place because life was hard. But growing up, I think that most kids growing up in Anaconda had a great sense of self-confidence and independence.

Q: Well let us take elementary school. Was this one run by the nuns or not?

MORRIS: Yes, the nuns.

Q: How did you find the nuns? You know, you get various stories.

MORRIS: Yes, right.

Q: How were your nuns?

MORRIS: It is interesting. To me they were good teachers. And of course they had certain systems and one of the systems was, of course, that you had to learn decent handwriting and in first grade and the second grade, that was very strong. Learning how to write correctly, what is it, the old Pittman System, yes. But anyway, I found, my experience actually, I went to the fourth grade in the parochial schools and then my dad said now you have got your religion, next year you are going to the public school; they have a better record of teaching. But the four years I spent with the nuns I think I got a good education. But one interesting thing that I tell my kids is in the fifth grade we had music. Now, that was the first time I had ever had music. And we had the music books and you had to keep time, you had to keep time and you learned the notes. I had never seen a music book because in the Catholic school I suspect that they have so many hours in the day we were probably learning religion when the kids in the third and fourth grades of the public schools were probably learning music. Because here I was in the fifth grade,

I was given a music book and I did not know how to use it. And the teacher came up to me and she could not believe that I could not recognize a note, I did not know what a note was, I did not know how to keep time; I did not know anything.

Q: Did you find yourself particularly drawn to any courses and the reverse, repelled by any type of thing in your formative years?

MORRIS: You know, one of the things that I would have liked to have gotten a lot more of, I think I was good at it, was public speaking. But we did not have any formal courses in public speaking. We had, for a couple of years, I remember, extemporaneous speaking but they were contests; you did not get any instruction on how to do it you were just given things to read and then told to get up and speak about them. And that is one thing; it seems to me, that for most of us it is important to be able to express your ideas in public. I had to learn the hard way, in my career, to be able to explain what U.S. foreign policy was all about.

Q: What about, were you much of a reader or not?

MORRIS: I was a reader. My dad was a reader and I was a reader. I had a very good friend, when we were in grade school, and he could read much better than I could and that always bothered me because he read faster and he could tell me more about the books than I could tell. But that, for me, was a real challenge and so I worked much harder than I probably would have worked otherwise to be a good reader.

Q: Can you think of any, in the first place, the type of books that you were particularly interested in? Were there any books that you would call ones that particularly attracted you or influenced you?

MORRIS: Well I remember, and this was before the movie came out, I remember Mutiny on the Bounty.

Q: Nordhoff and Hall.

MORRIS: Nordhoff and Hall. And then I read the sequel.

Q: Pitcairn Island.

MORRIS: Pitcairn Island.

Q: And Men Against the Sea.

MORRIS: And Men Against the Sea. Exactly. I read them all. I thought they were great; I thought they were wonderful. Yes, yes. And then I remember when I was a junior in high school and I was looking for something to read and my teacher suggested that I read George Washington Carver. What was that? I am trying to remember the name of the book. Well anyway, I cannot remember the name of the book. And I read it and then she

asked me about it afterwards and I was not impressed at all with - I could not relate to what he was talking about. Here I was in Anaconda; we had four black families in the town and I had little contact with them. They were friends and they all went to school together, there was no segregation in our schools but there was racism nevertheless but it was not on the surface. I could not relate.

Q: It probably was his autobiography.

MORRIS: Yes, yes, it was Up From Slavery. Up From Slavery, yes. And I said to my teacher-

Q: Was this Booker T. Washington?

MORRIS: Booker T. Washington, right, not Carver, yes, Booker T. Washington, Up From Slavery, that was it. And I said to my teacher well he is talking about things in the past. I said none of this exists today. I didn't realize until I was in the service in the South what segregation was all about. You know, this was the limits of my experience in Anaconda, Montana. Yes, Booker T. Washington.

Q: Yes. You went to high school also in Anaconda?

MORRIS: Right.

Q: What was it like? What was high school like?

MORRIS: I think that, I do not know exactly why, but I think that we had quite high academic standards in Montana. And we got, I think, a first class education. Now I wasted a lot of time in high school. I was not challenged. In fact, I even got a job as a bellhop in the Montana Hotel in Anaconda on the afternoon shift. I started at 3:00 and went to 11:00. We used to get out of school at 10 minutes after three and the hotel was only three blocks or four blocks from the high school. So they put up with me arriving 10 minutes or 15 minutes late every day. But we got all of the basic courses and you know, for the time, I have a granddaughter now who is in the third grade and she is already doing algebraic equations. But for our time, you know, you got algebra in your freshman year and you got geometry in your sophomore year and you got trigonometry I guess in your junior and senior years. And I took a commercial course because at the time I thought that would be the only way I could pay my way through college, was to be able to take shorthand and type. And so I did not take biology and I did not take chemistry; I am sorry that I did not. And I did not take physics. You know, those are the three courses that I think were very important that I should have taken and I did not.

Q: I would like to, before we move on to the military, back to- did you get involved in sports or plays or anything, extracurricular activities?

MORRIS: Yes. You know, everybody, anybody who had- well, I was, in grade school, you know, we had football teams and basketball teams; I was on both football team and

basketball team in grade school and junior high school. In high school I went out for the football team. You could not play football until your sophomore year in high school but at the end of your freshman year, in the spring, they had tryouts for the sophomore year and I was a quarterback. I was small but I was fast. But I was in an automobile accident that summer, I broke my arm, and so in the fall my arm was still in the cast and so I missed out on that year and I was a little bit too short to really be a good basketball player so that in my sophomore, junior and senior years in high school I did not play any sports and I went to work at the Montana Hotel as a bellhop. I was never interested in music and I remember in junior high school, when we first got to junior high school, they had assigned me, without asking me, to work on the school newspaper and I resisted. I did not have anybody to council me and so I resisted all through high school working on the school newspaper which I regret now because this was something that obviously would have been of great benefit to me.

Q: Tell me something. In the first place, what were sort of the dating patterns in those days?

MORRIS: Well you know, when I look back on it I think how innocent we were. And you know, there were dances and so forth but it was all, certainly as far as the boys were concerned, none of us were particularly good dancers and we much preferred to be around other boys than around girls. And you know, obviously we were aware of sex and so forth but we were not really prepared in any way to do anything about it.

Q: Yes. There was a lot of misinformation floating around, I am sure.

MORRIS: The thing is, in both of these towns, especially in Butte, there was a big red light district.

Q: I would imagine so many of the miners were single.

MORRIS: Yes, right, exactly. But anyway, there was a big red light district. In Anaconda there was a red light district; it was much smaller and we knew about it and we talked about it. I do not know anybody who ever went.

Q: Well how about as a bellhop? I would have thought you would have been- were you pressed into service?

MORRIS: Well you know, it is interesting. We knew about things that were happening in that hotel; we knew about it but it never got past talking to each other about it. You know? I do not think, I cannot remember anybody who ever really had any firsthand experience.

Q: Well, with the war, the war was on, you were in high school for about a year.

MORRIS: Well it was two years, right.

Q: So I mean, this must have, I mean, there was no doubt in your mind that you were going to go in the military.

MORRIS: Oh no, everybody knew. I was happy that I had gotten such a good score on the ASTP (Army Specialized Training Program) or on, actually, I cannot remember the name of the test that they gave us but my eyes were bad so I could not get into the Navy and so they took me in the Army. But a lot of my classmates who had not passed the ASTP, they just went to work on the smelter because this was a defense industry and they got deferments; they did not have to go into the military. In the end practically all of them did because the deferments were one year deferments and the situation got worse and of course they were preparing for the invasion of Europe and all the rest of it so in the end practically everybody, all of my classmates eventually were drafted.

Q: Well then, you say you were taking engineering?

MORRIS: Yes well, in ASTP yes, I was taking engineering.

Q: What sort of engineering?

MORRIS: Well it was just, you know, basic courses. It was probably college freshman basic courses for eventual engineering and of course- So here I was without physics taking physics, but taking college physics now and boy, I struggled. I struggled and I really worked hard to keep up. Most of the other subjects I did not have too many problems with but boy, I sure had problems in physics. I figured if I make it through this it will be by a miracle. Well, what happened is that after I had been, I guess it was second quarter, I was in the second quarter and they decided that they were going to end the program.

Q: Yes, the whole program was closed down.

MORRIS: The whole program was closed down and I went into the infantry.

Q: How did you find basic training?

MORRIS: You know, since having grown up in Anaconda and having had all the freedom we had and having roamed the hills and all the rest of it, we did these 10, 15, 20 mile hikes and I never had any problem with any of that. And of course I had been familiar with a rifle since I was young. But the interesting thing is that I am naturally a left-hander and I had always shot a rifle off of my left shoulder and here, coming into the military and I find that these Garand rifles and they taught you, you know, you had to take them apart and put them together and so forth, and I thought man, if you hold the rifle on your left shoulder when the cartridge is ejected it goes right past your eyes. And I thought most of these guys have never had a rifle, held a rifle in their life and they are just learning from scratch and so I am going to pretend that I never had a rifle either and I am going to learn from scratch. And so I learned to fire a rifle off of my right shoulder.

But for the most part basic training, it was hard. There is no doubt it was hard. And I guess I did learn discipline. My mother used to pick up after us at home and you know when you go in the military nobody picks up after you. And I think that that has been a benefit to me for the rest of my life, that I learned a little bit of orderliness and learned- I probably had internal discipline but I think that it was fortified by the time I spent in the Army.

Q: Where did you take basic training?

MORRIS: Fort Benning, Georgia.

Q: A delightful place.

MORRIS: Well, at that time it was called the Home of the Infantry. So I had infantry training at the Home of the Infantry.

Q: So what did they do with you?

MORRIS: Well, from Fort Benning I went into ASTP and then when ASTP closed down they put me into an infantry regiment; 394th Infantry, 99th Division, Fort Maxie, Texas. And I was at Fort Maxie with the division and went overseas with the division.

Q: What was your- were you regular infantry?

MORRIS: Regular infantry, yes, just infantry. I was the first scout in the rifle company. But we trained together, we went through basic training again at Camp Maxie, we did it all over for a second time and then we went on various exercises out in the field before we went overseas. We were well trained and well prepared by the time we got overseas.

Q: Where did you go overseas and when?

MORRIS: We left the States in September, 1944. The invasion of Normandy was in June of '44, we left in September. We arrived in England, did some more training in England and then we crossed the Channel, arrived in Le Havre, which was completely bombed out, and loaded in trucks and driven through France and into Belgium up on the Siegfried line in Germany. That is how far we had advanced. This was late October by that time. And we were there, in combat, static actually because the line was drawn and we had patrols and so forth but rather quiet. Well, we had a number of casualties; we had casualties from mines and a number of people were killed on patrol. But then December the 16, 1944, the Germans initiated the Battle of the Bulge.

Q: Which corps- army were you in?

MORRIS: First Army, Bradley.

Q: First Army.

MORRIS: Yes. And we were- 99th Division held a front, three regiments held a front about 15 miles long. And there were three German divisions against ours when they came through-

Q: You were in the Ardennes.

MORRIS: In the Ardennes, that is right. And three German divisions came through the area where we were and they pushed us back and they went around us, just to our south. I was in the 394th and we were on the furthest right and then next to us was the 106th Division and which had just gotten on the line three days before, and there was complete confusion. That whole division was wiped out.

Q: The whole regiment.

MORRIS: No, the division, the whole division, 106th Division. Most of them were taken prisoners. So the Germans came around behind us and we held them off in our area for about five days and during that time my platoon got separated from the company through bad liaison, our runner decided that he was not going to come back up there to tell us what the hell was going on. The company pulled out during the night and we were there alone, one platoon. And the next morning we were firing at what looked like a whole battalion of Germans and here we were, 30 men, and a lot of our guys were killed and I was captured. So I was a prisoner for the last five months of the war.

Q: Firstly, prior to your capture but the fighting there, how did you find it? What sort of things were you doing?

MORRIS: I have written this up, on December 16, the artillery, German artillery started about 5:00 in the morning. I had been on guard duty from 2:00 to 3:00 that morning and so I was still fully dressed. We were supposedly in reserve; we had been on the line and we had been pulled back. Actually we were only about five or six miles behind where we had been on the line but we had moved into an abandoned house and built bunks in the house so we were not sleeping in foxholes. And I had just gotten back to my bunk and I decided, I would just take my shoes off, and I just laid down on the bunk and went to sleep and 5:00 in the morning all hell broke loose. The artillery was coming in at a tremendous volume and we all immediately got out and went down into the basement and I took long enough to put on my shoes before I went down but a lot of the guys just grabbed their shoes or grabbed anything and just went running down into the basement. There was two feet of water in the basement. At least I had my shoes on. But that house got about four direct hits; there was nothing left of it. I do not think we had any casualties because everybody was in the basement and we all got out. But you know, whatever you had left upstairs, that was the last you saw of it.

And so then, of course, we immediately started to dig foxholes - our company headquarters was at a little railroad station - and down the railroad tracks came an infantry company of Germans and, of course, we engaged them and fought them off.

They retreated and then we continued digging and then we got another tremendous artillery barrage and we expected another infantry push, but German infantry push did not come. And just as we had gotten our holes down deep enough, well you know, probably two feet, but deep enough maybe to hide in for an artillery attack, we got orders to move out. And our platoon sergeant picked me, to be first scout for the platoon. And this was about four in the afternoon. It was already getting dark. And I said where are we going? And he said they need us, A Company has been hit bad and they need us—we were L Company—A Company had been hit bad and we were needed to reinforce them. And we got out on a road and here I am, the first scout, way out, and our platoon sergeant, his name was Morgan, said just stay up there and just keep going; he said, if I want you to do anything else I will let you know. By the time we really started to march it was already dark and we just went down that road and we could hear the Germans on both sides of the road. And finally Morgan said we are going to get off the road. And so we got off the road and he said, we are going to dig in here. You know, we could hear Germans on all sides of us but I figured he knew what he was doing.

But anyway, there was snow on the ground and the ground was frozen and we were supposed to dig in, and here we are, working with out little pick axes, trying to dig in, and you know, we must have spent two hours, three hours just trying to get through that damn cold, frozen dirt. And then we got orders to move out again. We moved out, we practically did not even get on the road before we were attacked. There were just shots coming from every direction. And we moved and to this day I cannot put that scene together. The whole day we fought; we ran and we fought and we tried to keep together and it was just complete chaos. I do not know whether anybody knew what was going on. You know, we ran across places where our troops had been because there were rations laying around. Well, you know, we had not eaten in two days and we picked up pieces of these rations and put them in our coats and moved on and fought. Every once in awhile you would see some Germans and you would open up on them and then you would run and this went on until well into the afternoon. And finally it looked as though, here are more of our guys together, and it looked like we were still a unit and we were ordered to go up on the road—we had been fighting in the forest. But this was a different road than the road we had been on. But we were ordered to go up on the road and the first ones up and the first guys up were mowed down with machine gun fire.

And so then nobody went up on the road and we moved along and we were going west. That was away from the line. We moved west and most of, well I do not know how many of our platoon had already gotten it by that time but we were still together as a platoon. We went into a little town, Moringen, where the regimental commander was and he ordered us to dig new positions on a hill overlooking the same road that we could not get on before. So we started digging and luckily the ground was soft. It was sand, it was easy digging and we dug our holes and it did not take us any time to be down deep enough. And I fell asleep.

Q: What?

MORRIS: I fell asleep. And my buddy fell asleep too, we both fell asleep; we had not slept for two days. And the next thing I remember is I heard rifle fire and it was coming from one of our holes; they were firing down on that road and sure enough, man, that road was full of Germans and they were marching along the road. That must have been a division because there were artillery pieces and they were all coming along this road and some of our guys had already started shooting at them. And so, you know, we were awakened and began shooting too. Then some of the German infantry, as soon as this shooting started, they turned off the road and came up the hill at us. We were firing back and there was a fog; the fog came up the hill faster than the Germans did and so they were completely enveloped in fog. About that time somebody said to us, we are moving out. So they pulled us out of our holes and we moved back. It turned out that during the night the whole company, actually the whole regiment, had moved back to more defensive positions and here we were, all alone, one platoon. The company had probably lost 30 or 40 guys by then but anyway, what was left of the platoon, there we were. We had a number of casualties right there and what was left, we still had a young lieutenant platoon leader and a platoon sergeant and a couple of squad leaders besides whatever privates and PFCs (Private First Class) were there and we tried to make our way back to our own lines, because the Germans had already taken Moringen where the regimental commander had been; they had already taken that town. We tried to make contact with the company. Well, we did not succeed. We engaged in a couple of firefights with the Germans and then we were surrounded and surrendered. And we became prisoners.

Q: Okay. I would like to stop at this point because I stop at the end of a tape and explain where we are so can pick it up.

Surrendering in a combat is always one of the trickiest businesses so I thought next time I will ask you about how the surrender went. I mean, it is not easy to do. And then we will talk about your time as a prisoner of war and then we will move on.

MORRIS: Very good.

Q: Today is the 23rd of February, 2007. Pat, okay, where were you, how does one surrender? I mean, you know, this is a tricky thing. It is not an easy process.

MORRIS: No. As I mentioned, I have written this up but this was in the Battle of the Bulge, we had been fighting for four days and we were withdrawing and my company withdrew and we as a platoon were not informed. The runner for my platoon was afraid to come back to tell us and he went with the company and there we were, surrounded by Germans. Not realizing that we were surrounded we opened fire on them—we were dug in on a hill—we opened fire on them and there must have been at least a division coming up a road; there were artillery pieces pulled by horses which we were amazed at to see that the Germans were in such bad shape they were pulling their artillery pieces by horses. But a whole company of infantrymen, we were on the side of a hill, a whole company of German infantrymen came at us and only then did we get the word that we were a lone platoon on the side of that hill and that we had to get out of there. Luckily there was a fog and it moved up the hill, it covered the Germans but it also meant the

Germans could not see us, so we moved out of our positions and moved back into the woods where we ran into more Germans and there was a firefight and my buddy and I separated from the others in the platoon and hid in a foxhole and stayed there the rest of the afternoon and into the night. And during that time we heard another firefight going on and we learned later that the rest of the platoon was captured.

So here we were the two of us, in the woods and we decided that we would try to get back to our lines. The way- there was artillery fire coming in and we knew that it was American artillery fire from the direction it was coming and we decided that we would walk toward where the artillery was coming from, hoping that we could get back to our lines. And we walked the rest of that night and at daybreak we ran across some scenes of terrible combat where there were lots of dead bodies and ruined vehicles and so on. And we could see a village on a hill, Krinkelt, and we thought well now maybe - but we could not see any movement in the village; this was early in the morning and we could not see any movement in the village and that was a bad sign, we thought. So we did not know whether it was occupied by the Germans or whether our troops were there. We had to cross an opening where there were no trees, cross a stream to get to the woods on the other side, which we did, and then we walked for another hour or so and again we ran out of woods. We did not want to get out into the open anyplace but there was no place to go and by this time that village was on our right; before that it was straight ahead of us, and we decided, since we had not- by that time there was no artillery fire and there were no signs of either Americans or Germans and there was no combat, there were no guns going off. We decided to cross the road, get into a field, go through a hedgerow, get into a field which had tall grain of some kind in it. It was the wintertime but evidently it had never been harvested. Which we did and we violated one of our resolves, which was that we would only travel at night. Here we were in the middle of the day going across this field and we heard, in very good English, somebody say to us halt, drop your rifles, the war is over for you. And we turned around and here was an American .50 caliber machine gun on top of a Jeep pointing at us but with a German behind it. The Germans, of course, had captured our Jeep. And it was not the guy with the machine gun who was talking; we could not see him. But then he told us to come over to the Jeep, we had to cross the hedgerow onto the road, and there was a German colonel who spoke perfect English and he told us to get into the back of the Jeep. So we did. We left our rifles lying on the ground. And he said I am going to take you back to battalion headquarters but first I have an errand. And they drove down the road to what had been an old sawmill and which evidently had been turned into an American headquarters of some kind; there was a kitchen and a repair shop there. But the most terrible slaughter that I have ever seen in my life; there were body pieces and bodies everywhere, some with their heads off. These people had been under a very bad artillery barrage and they were all our guys. And I am afraid to say that it was friendly fire because the Germans had been moving through that area and these guys got caught.

But anyway, the German colonel walked into what looked like what had been a kitchen and came out with a sack of flour over his shoulder. And he said, "Tonight I am going to have a cake." And with that he drove us back to the headquarters and then they put us under guard. Then the next morning they moved us and we were - the first couple of

nights, it was probably a company headquarters but it was a house and they put us down in the cellar. There were no lights, there was nothing in the cellar and it was damp and it was smelly and we discovered that there were other prisoners down there. Not many, there were about three or four other guys down there and a dog. Well every day, for the next couple of days, they brought the dog up to feed him and then they would throw down to us a large piece of bread and let us divide it among ourselves. So that was the beginning of my prison life.

We were- that was around the 20th, I think it was the 20th of December that I was captured and I remember by the 25th, which was Christmas Day, they had put us with other prisoners and they took us from town to town, cleaning up after bombings. And we- remembering Christmas Day, we were crowded into a shed and there must have been 100 of us or maybe a little less but it was so crowded that we could not sit down. They just locked the door. And then of course Christmas Day we did not, I am not sure that we knew exactly what day it was but when nobody came by to open the door in the morning we began to speculate that it was probably Christmas Day and they were not going to come to get us to take us out to work on Christmas Day. Well finally around noon they did come and they let us out and they gave us our ration, which was a piece of bread, and then they locked us up again. And the next day they moved us. That was the most crowded quarters that I was in but the next couple of weeks were pretty bad.

They kept moving us east. We crossed the Rhine at Bonn and then they put us in railroad cars and moved us south.

Q: How were they moving you, by truck or walking?

MORRIS: No, we walked all that way. We walked from the place that I was captured, we walked all the way, marched I guess because the further back we went the more prisoners there were and the longer the lines got. And we were strafed a couple of times by our own planes. They saw- these guys see a column on the road and they would strafe us. Luckily we all managed to get off the road in time. I think there were two strafings and nobody was killed or hurt that I know of in those strafings.

Finally, at Bonn, they put us in railroad cars and took us south. I am trying to remember the name of the place; Limburg on the Rhine. And there we were processed by the Germans. They took our- got our names and our serial numbers and interrogated us.

Q: Was it much of an interrogation?

MORRIS: Well it is interesting. As I say, I have written this up and for me it was a joke and for my buddy, he claims that- because we were captured together and we had been together all this time, but he claims that they beat him up. They did not beat me up. My interrogator, I had been in the ASTP, Army Specialized Training Program, which was a program that took people who had a certain IQ and sent them to college. And that program was disbanded in March of 1944 and we were all put in the infantry so I was in the infantry from that time on. But I had a patch in my wallet from that program and that-

of course they took everything from us and they took my wallet and I had had it up until the time that we arrived at this place but then they took it - and then they gave me back my wallet and wanted to know what that patch was. The guy softened me up before he started asking me any questions and I was probably tricked but you know the Army rules are you give your name, rank and serial number and that is it.

Then he showed me the patch and I said oh, that is a dead program. I said, that is just a memento of a dead program. So I explained to him what and he said, well you must be pretty bitter having to be here as a prisoner of the Germans instead of back in school. And I said, "Well, I am not as bitter as you must be." I said, "I saw artillery pieces being pulled by horses along the road. You guys are losing the war. When are you going to surrender?" And that was the end of the interview. So I went back to the barracks and my buddy said, boy, he said, you really got me in a lot of trouble with that patch. He said, "I would not tell them anything and they beat the hell out of me."

Anyway, from there we were put in railroad cars again, and these are the old forty and eights where- cattle cars- and they were about-

Q: Forty people or eight horses?

MORRIS: Right. And there were about 50 of us in each one of those cars and they locked them up and we started to move east and at stops they would pass in water but we did not get any food and I think we were on those trains for two days. And finally we ended up at a prisoner of war camp, Stalag 4B in Muhlberg, on the Elbe River, and I was there for the next five months. I had contracted, diphtheria, an infectious disease, I am not sure on the road or after I got to the camp but I was put in an isolation ward with others who had the same thing. So for about two months I was there. I had diphtheria and for about two months I was there with others who had diphtheria and actually there were an awful lot of guys who were caught too late. They died of the disease soon after they were put into quarantine. Actually the International Red Cross brought vaccine- not vaccine but-

Q: Serum?

MORRIS: Yes, serum; they got serum into us and we were injected and that stopped the progress of the disease for me but it had side effects. And they told us before we were injected; they told us about the side effects which was that you might be paralyzed momentarily and for some time, depending upon your system and your age. Well, I was only 19 at the time but there was a Dutchman there who had been in that ward a couple days before me and he was very helpful to me because he could speak German and he could speak English so he was a good interpreter for me. He kept me aware of what was going on. But for me the serum stopped the advance of the disease. I had momentary paralysis of my throat muscles and a little bit in my hands. But that went away after a couple of days. But the poor Dutchman, he was completely paralyzed, completely. He was much older than I; I was 19, he was 32 and he was completely paralyzed. And I fed him, tried to feed him but he could not even swallow because nothing would go down. And slowly he began to recover and I took care of him as best I could and finally he

could begin to swallow a little bit. I was discharged from that ward after about oh, six weeks I guess and by that time he was recovered enough that he could take care of himself, more or less. I never saw him again. Then I spent the last month-and-a-half, two months in the camp.

We were liberated by the Russians, Cossacks, horsemen, who rode horses that only had blankets on them, no saddles and they had a halter, no bridle. Most of them were Orientals and they liberated our camp and they strung up whatever German guard or any German military; we found them hanging in trees when we left the camp. And of course we went into the little town of Muhlberg looking for food because in the camp all we got was watery soup and a piece of black bread every day. I was 150 pounds with no fat on me when I left England in September of '44 and when I reached American lines I was weighed. The first thing they did is weigh me and I was 96 pounds. And that was typical. People ask, you know, did they torture you? No, they did not torture us but they did not feed us either.

Q: How about while you were in the camp; what were you doing? I mean, was it pretty obvious that you were kind of waiting for the war to be over? I mean, were things in such a thing that you all realized that, you know, this is not going to last too long?

MORRIS: Yes. We knew, I knew anyway. It was reflected in my conversation with that interrogation officer that we had all expected the war would be over by Christmas; that is what Eisenhower promised us. So we knew that the Germans were on the losing end and so it was just a question of waiting.

This camp that I was in was a very large camp; there were 20,000 prisoners. There was a large Russian section, Russian prisoners, and then there were British. And they threw us in with the British. In this particular camp, there were very few Americans; there were less than 1,000 Americans in the camp. And I was in a barracks with British and South Africans who all spoke English, of course, and most of them had been prisoners for two or three years. They had adjusted and they had received Red Cross packages of food and I think maybe even some packages from home; I am not sure of that. But anyway, they had adjusted. We were "Johnny-come-latelies;" we had nothing, we never got anything from the Red Cross while we were there and we never got anything from home. In fact, I wrote three or four, they had little sheets that you could write on to send letters, and I sent three of those. My mother got them after the war was over; they never arrived until after the war was over. So all of the time that I was a prisoner I was just listed as missing in action.

But getting back to the prison camp, we used to see those 1,000-plane raids going over that went to bomb Dresden and we would clap, you know. These were the guys that were going to get us out of that camp. They would leave the vapor trails, just endless planes going over. And those were the planes that bombed Dresden, among other places.

Q: Well were you aware, in the group that- stories really did not come out until fairly recently about how the Germans - some units had taken because the Battle of the Bulge was one of the significant blow to prisoners.

MORRIS: Oh yes, yes.

Q: ... three regiments that they took American soldiers they identified as Jewish and put them in the thing. Was this something that you all were aware of?

MORRIS: No. We were not aware of it but there is no doubt that the Jews in my platoon, in my squad, were really frightened that something might happen to them. And as far as I know none of them were separated out but now, keeping up with the ex-prisoners of war, I have learned that some of the people in my division but not in my immediate squad or platoon or even company, in other words, individuals that I knew, none of them were taken. And I think it was a very hit or miss proposition; it was not very well organized.

Q: Well how about while you were in the prison; was it just sort of, I mean, were the Germans beastly to you or was it just a lot of boredom, the sitting around waiting or what?

MORRIS: You know, prior to being put in the camp itself I had contact with the Germans who were taking care, the guards mostly. And they were just doing their job and if you got out of line, you know, they had no compunction about not hitting you with a butt of a rifle or whatever. Except they would march us through these little towns and the people would throw rocks at us or whatever, you know, because of course the American bombers were coming over and dropping bombs on their cities and they had to take it out on somebody and they took it out on us. But the German soldiers were just soldiers; they were just doing their job. And in the camp I practically- well, I did not see any more Germans except when they had a head count every morning and every night; you had to stand out there for hours in the cold while they counted you and if there was a miscount they would do it all over again. But other than that, I did not see much of the Germans.

Q: How about when the Soviets come in. The Soviet army I mean, did the Germans all of a sudden disappear?

MORRIS: They did. They all disappeared. They knew before we did that the Russians were close and they abandoned the camp. But there were still evidently some of them around and those are the ones that got hung from trees. And I will never forget, I had gotten separated from my buddy before we ever got to the camp and then suddenly the same day we were liberated I ran into him; he had been put in another part of the camp and he said I hear that there is a big hole in the fence down in the Russian compound and we can get through it, we can go into Muhlberg. And so we went down to the big hole in the fence and we went to Muhlberg, walked to Muhlberg; it was only two miles. We were looking for food at the German houses. We would knock on doors and nobody would answer and we would open the door and go in and you would find some German in there hiding because they were afraid of the Russians and they would said ah, Americanish.

They wanted us to take them with us. There we were prisoners of war, we did not have anything to protect ourselves, and when we began to realize what the situation was we decided there was not any food in this town and we were a lot safer if we went back to the camp. And then our - the highest ranking officer, American officer in the camp was a major, and he negotiated with the Russians to let the Americans march out of the camp as a unit. The Russians had already put a pontoon bridge across the Elbe right near the camp.

Q: So you were right on the Elbe-

MORRIS: We were right on the-

Q: -where the two forces, the Americans and the Russians met.

MORRIS: Exactly. Well, we were only 12 miles south of that.

Q: Torgau.

MORRIS: Torgau, exactly right. It was at Torgau that the Americans of the 69th Division met the Russians; they met at Torgau and we were only 12 miles south of there. I do not know, probably that meeting took place maybe a day or two days before the American major had the negotiation with the Russians and they let us cross the bridge.

Well, the war still was not over and the Germans had not surrendered and here we were, 1,000 Americans walking along a road; no arms, nothing. We did not even know where we were going. And I said to my buddy, "You know, this is ridiculous. We are not going to survive very long." So we took off. We went into a house by the side of the river and it was abandoned; it was a beautiful house and it was abandoned. We started going through the closets. We found medical equipment so it was probably the home of the doctor. And we went upstairs and there were these wonderful beds, feather beds, lovely things.

Q: Your eyes are lighting up as you say that.

MORRIS: And so here, man, here we are, feather beds. I had never slept in a feather bed in my life. And then we thought, we can take a shower. Well of course, we took a shower but it was cold water; the heating system was gone. But we took showers in cold water and then we slept that night in those feather beds and that was real luxury. There we are, starving but we were at least - And there was no food in the house; there was no food anywhere.

So the next morning I felt very uneasy. I said, "We have got to get out of here. We were letting ourselves in for trouble." And we got back on the road and started walking along the road and we ran into an SS roadblock, German soldiers with rifles and there we are. They must have realized that we were POWs and we were Americans and were not Russians and they let us go, they just told us to keep going. So we got through that

roadblock and I, to this day I do not know what happened to the other 800 or 900 guys that were walked down that road the day before.

Then we ran into a guy, a Canadian, a French Canadian who could not speak English. I knew there were French Canadians who spoke French but I did not know there were French Canadians who could not speak English. But anyway, he had been in the Canadian army and he had been a prisoner of war in this little town, Oschatz. He said just keep going, a couple miles down the road. And he said there is food there, you can get something to eat and you can get a place to stay. You know, we got all of this by sign language and a little bit of French that we had. But he said there was a British sergeant major who had declared himself mayor of the town. We got to the town, we went to the center, we went into the mayor's office and there was this British sergeant major and he told us where to go and he said you will get a bed and you get food. So we went down and there was not only bed and food but there was all kinds of schnapps and we drank more than we should have and we got sick as dogs, we were really sick because you know, we ate too much and we drank too much and so we were sick.

But during the night an American major in a Jeep with a trailer on the back, had come in. He was from the 69th Division and their headquarters was quite a ways back to the west. And they were just out on a fishing expedition, you know. They were probably unauthorized and they were just driving around seeing what they could liberate.

Q: Liberate is a fancy term for looting.

MORRIS: Exactly. Exactly. But in the morning we run into these guys and I, right away- I forgot to mention that I had been wounded during the battle. I had gotten shrapnel in my leg and that, throughout my whole experience, had sort of limited what I could do. The fact is, because of the malnutrition it never healed, and it would just run; I had a running sore on my leg and it was infected. While I was in the camp the prisoners had organized, because we had medics, medics who were captured too, so the prisoners organized and they, the medics, regularly changed the bandage on my leg. Once a week I got a change of bandage on the leg. But here we were now, this was going on maybe a week and I had not- and my leg was really getting bad so I really wanted to get back to some kind of medical attention and so we asked this guy and he said sure, get in the trailer. So he drove us back to his, I guess it was battalion headquarters, and the first thing I said was that I'd like to see the medics and they sent me. I went to see the medics and that was the last time I saw my buddy until about two or three years later in the States. But as soon as they saw my wound and saw my condition, that was where they weighed me. I weighed 96 pounds. I had weighed 150 pounds when we left England. They just told me to wait there and they put me in a Jeep and took me to an evacuation hospital. And I was there when the war ended; I was in the evacuation hospital.

Q: Where was the evacuation hospital?

MORRIS: I really do not remember wherever that battalion headquarters was but it was in the area east of Leipzig, someplace in that area but I never did know exactly what the

name of the town was. But anyway, I got there, it was the day before, it was May the 7th because the next day was the surrender on May the 8th. And the first thing they did, you know, they took my stinking clothes and gave me some pajamas and a bathrobe and gave me a bed and the next day there was nobody around. Everybody was gone. Well, you know, it was the end of the war, everybody went out to celebrate and we the patients, we did not have any clothes; we could not go off so we just had to wait. I guess all the Americans had a great time that day celebrating the end of the war and there we were in the hospital with no clothes to go anywhere. We just had to wait.

But within two days or three days I was ambulatory, I could walk, and so they took me out to an airstrip and there were lines of people and about every half-hour a plane would come in, the old, what were they?

Q: C-47s?

MORRIS: C-47s, the cargo planes, yes, the old cargo planes. Yes, actually the same plane as the old DC-3, C-47s. And about every half-hour a C-47 would come in and they would load, both ambulatory and litter patients. In fact, they would load the litter patients into it and then whatever room was left over they would ask for so many ambulatory. And after about four planes came in I was up in the line and I got in the plane and it flew us to England.

But I will never forget that trip. It was the first time I had ever been in an airplane. And I sat, there were no seats but I rolled up something and I sat near a window. We must have flown directly west and then north. We flew to the Rhine and then north along the Rhine across the Channel to England. I will never forget the devastation. We had bombed that place. And those planes, they flew at 2,000 feet, you know, so you could see well what was on the ground. It reminded me of a blotter, an ink blotter, where somebody had taken a pen and made large ink blots. Those were the bomb craters, all over, on both sides of the river, just mile after mile after mile of devastation. It was terrible. It was just awful. That is what war is; war is just terrible.

Q: Well then, sort of moving on, you went to the hospital and then sort of what happened? Where did you, how did you get out of this?

MORRIS: Well then I was in two hospitals in England and they were both American Army hospitals, one in Salisbury and the other in Bristol. I was diagnosed with malnutrition and a wounded leg and neither one life threatening in any way. In Salisbury they would not give me a pass to go out of the hospital but in Bristol I got a pass. The only thing that they were really concerned about- They must have given me something; this was before the days of antibiotics but by the time I got to Bristol my leg was healing and it may have been that I was just getting three good meals a day, actually. The prescription for what I had was four meals a day. So I had four meals a day and when I got my first pass in Bristol I came back and there on my nightstand was a hamburger and a milkshake. I thought, I am in heaven. From there we were put on a hospital ship and came back to the States, Charleston, South Carolina.

Q: Were you processed out of the service rather quickly then?

MORRIS: Well you remember, I think I mentioned to you the last time we talked, coming back on the ship we were informed that we would be going to hospitals near our home, our places of residence but that as soon as we were discharged from the hospital we would be shipped to the Pacific for the invasion of Japan. And that, was all of us. We thought the war was over and of course the Japanese were still in the war. We were informed on the ship. I think the Army just wanted to make sure that none of us were getting out until the war with Japan was over.

I got leave from the hospital in Fort Lewis, Washington, Madigan General Hospital, went to my home in Anaconda, Montana, and had time with my parents - I was in the train station in Butte, to go back to Madigan General and we got word that they had dropped the atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan.

Q: But first, it was Hiroshima first.

MORRIS: Oh yes, that is right, Hiroshima.

Q: And then Nagasaki came seven days later.

MORRIS: Right, exactly. And I really did not appreciate the significance of that, but my dad, who was there with me, said son, this is the end of the war. He said, you will never have to go to Japan. And I said, I hope you are right. And I got back to the hospital and I guess within 10 days the Japanese surrendered.

Q: Well then, you were processed out?

MORRIS: I was processed out very quickly. I was discharged on the 26th of September, 1945, and I went back to my hometown, went to work with the Anaconda Copper Mining Company on the smelter but with the firm intention of going to school. In fact, while I was still at Fort Lewis, I had gone to the University of Washington to check into possibly going there. I was interested in getting a degree in economics. And then when I got back to Anaconda I had an old school friend who was two or three years older than I was who started at Georgetown in Washington and I became interested in Georgetown School of Foreign Service and entering the Foreign Service. I applied to both University of Washington and to Georgetown and was accepted at both. By that time I had decided that I would go to Georgetown so I quit my job just before Christmas 1945 and enrolled in Georgetown on January the 2nd, I think it was, 1946.

Q: Okay. Well, let us talk about what got a guy from Montana to think about the Foreign Service.

MORRIS: I am not sure- Well first of all, Georgetown is a Jesuit institution. My dad had been educated by the Jesuits and although he was not a very good Catholic he still had a

very high esteem for the Jesuits and he, as a young man, had traveled a lot of places and he just thought it would be great if a son of his would go into the Foreign Service. I do not know whether I was brainwashed or whether I just became enchanted with the idea. There is no doubt that he was the influence that made me decide that I should go to Georgetown. I had always been interested, I had taken Spanish in high school and I had always been interested in languages and in fact, when I went into the Army Specialized Training Program I had specified language and area studies and so the Foreign Service sort of fit into that.

Q: Did you ever run across a real live Foreign Service officer or done much reading about what the State Department did?

MORRIS: No. I did not have a clue. And in fact, even at Georgetown I was of two minds. I knew that I wanted to specialize in Latin America and I also knew that if you went into the Foreign Service you could not specify where they would send you and also that you started in the Foreign Service in the consular- in consular work and you might not ever get out of it. I tried to orient all of the courses toward Latin America but I also took commercial courses at Georgetown because at that time the School of Foreign Service was the School of Foreign Service and Business. So I had a mixture of classical Foreign Service curriculum plus business school curriculum.

When I got out I did not take the Foreign Service exam; I went to Mexico because I knew, that even though I passed the oral, the Foreign Service oral exam in Spanish, that I could not speak Spanish. I thought, I have got to learn this language if I am going to live in Latin America. So I went to Mexico. I still had some time under the GI Bill and I enrolled in Mexico City College and while I was there I discovered that the U.S. Department of Agriculture was running a very large program there. It was the famous aftosa, that is hoof and mouth disease program. There had been an outbreak of aftosa in Mexico and the U.S. Department of Agriculture did not want that infection to move to the United States so they started a big program in Mexico. I got a job with them after two quarters at Mexico City College.

Q: I want to take you back. 1946; what was Georgetown campus, I mean life at Georgetown, the Jesuit training, how did you find that?

MORRIS: Well first of all, the war affected all the colleges in the United States. They all went on quarter systems and to keep going, Georgetown recruited very heavily in Latin America and there were lots of wealthy Latin Americans going to school at Georgetown and also from other places. In fact, one of my classmates was the son of Ambassador Romulo from the Philippines. But Georgetown was still, first of all, was still an all male school, but the influx of veterans must have changed the life considerably. When I was accepted I made arrangements for a room on campus and my first thought on arriving there was I am back in the army. I had a room, the bathroom was down the hall, there were communal showers and I thought-

Q: Bunk beds?

MORRIS: Not bunk beds but almost. And in fact the army, they did not have it at Georgetown, but all over the United States they did have programs in which people who were in the army were going to college and so there were lots of campuses that had bunk beds.

Q: And Quonset huts.

MORRIS: That is right. In fact, before I went into the infantry I was at Arkansas State in Jonesboro. So when I got to Georgetown and I was in this room, this little room and going down the hall to a community shower I thought to myself, this is not for me. After a month I found another guy who had been there a little longer than I; he wanted to get off campus too and so we got a room in a boarding house not too far away and I lived in a boarding house the whole time I was at Georgetown.

Q: Did you have any contact with Father Healy at all?

MORRIS: You mean Father Walsh?

Q: Father Walsh I mean.

MORRIS: Healy was of another generation.

Q: Founder of the school.

MORRIS: Walsh was the founder of the School of Foreign Service and he was still there when I arrived. He taught geopolitics. He not only taught it but he had set up the course and that was sort of his trademark; geopolitics was his trademark. But, while I was there, the first quarter, the U.S. Government drafted Father Walsh to go to Germany with Chief Justice Jackson to put together the procedures for the Nuremburg trials. And so for the rest of the time I was at Georgetown Father Walsh was only a visitor. I mean, he came from time to time from Nuremburg but the trials went on for the whole time that I was a student at Georgetown.

But the one thing that I do remember about Father Walsh; he came back from Germany and the prime minister, De Gasperi of Italy, was visiting President Truman and Father Walsh invited him to Georgetown to speak to us. I always remember in the very ornate Gaston hall at Georgetown.

Q: Oh yes. It was like a cathedral, was it not?

MORRIS: Yes. But I have very vivid memories of De Gasperi trying to speak in English and having a hard time and Father Walsh, at the end of De Gasperi's speech, acting as a cheerleader asked us to give him the Georgetown cheer. And we were all veterans and we did not even know what the Georgetown cheer was.

Q: I have talked to a man who later was- who is a former Jesuit, my next door neighbor. But he has talked a bit disparagingly of what he called the lack of American students. He said so many came from wealthy classes and did not take studying very- They were playboys.

MORRIS: That is right. That is exactly- it is true, it is true.

Q: And sort of, I mean, there was a real difference. They were having a good time and their sort of Anglo-Saxon colleagues were sweating their tails off.

MORRIS: That is right. Well you know, this of course is a complete aside but my daughter got a degree in linguistics from Georgetown and then taught English as a second language at George Washington and she taught Saudis and that is exactly the same thing. She said these guys were not one bit interested in learning anything.

One of the Latino students at Georgetown at that time was Arturo Cruz from Nicaragua. He was at Georgetown when I got there and he graduated, I guess he graduated a year before I did; he graduated in '47 and I graduated in '48. But Arturo later was fairly prominent in opposition politics in Nicaragua he had been put in jail under Somoza and when he got out he was working for the overthrow of the Somoza regime and he became part of the Sandinista movement. In fact, he was ambassador; he was named ambassador here under the Sandinistas. Then he defected because of the direction that the Sandinistas were going in and he became, during the Reagan Administration, a leader of the Contra movement in the United States. I still see Arturo from time to time; he is still around. But he was one of the many Latin Americans who were at Georgetown at the same time I was.

Q: Well now, then we move to Mexico. You were in Mexico; this would be '49, '50 or so?

MORRIS: Yes, the end of '48. Actually I stayed in Washington, I graduated in June but I stayed in Washington because I wanted to vote in the elections in November.

Q: This was the Truman-Dewey.

MORRIS: Truman-Dewey. And it looked like poor old Harry Truman was going to get beaten and I thought, well I am going to stick around long enough to vote for Truman. We were so happy when Truman beat Dewey. And then right after the elections I went to Mexico.

Q: Well you got involved in this, the Department of Agriculture hoof and mouth disease but what were you doing?

MORRIS: I started as an administrative clerk. We had regional offices and under the regional offices there were area offices and an administrative clerk was in charge of an area office. That was where I really learned my Spanish, I will tell you. At Mexico City College and living in Mexico, my Spanish became much improved but boy, working out

there. I was in charge of the office. Under the office I had two veterinarians and 50 cattle inspectors, both American and Mexican. The veterinarians were American and Mexican too; they were co-workers, one American vet and one Mexican vet. They were out in the field doing the vaccinating.

Q: Where are we talking about?

MORRIS: Well, I was in western Mexico, southwestern Mexico in the town of Uruapan in the state of Michoacán. I was in charge of making sure that the vaccinators had enough supplies and vaccine. The only other American with me was a pay master and he had to go out and pay the Mexicans for letting us vaccinate. Otherwise they would not bring their cattle so there was an incentive program. I had charge of the office and I had charge of all of the supplies and making sure that there was enough vaccine and there was enough ice to keep the vaccines. And I got the full reports every morning on how many cows were vaccinated and how many sheep were vaccinated, how many goats were vaccinated, how many pigs were vaccinated, etcetera. Every morning we had these two-way radios and I would sit down and they would go through their reports with me and I would take it all down. And this was all in Spanish. Then, after they finished their reports, they would then list all of the supplies that they needed and we had contracted with a little company there that had two-seater airplanes and they would fly over the area and just drop the stuff out, you know; they would fly low and drop the stuff out because there were no roads; all these cattle inspectors were on horseback. So they would give me the list of supplies- I tell this story because it is indicative of how I learned my Spanish. They would go down the long list of things and I had a secretary there and she would be writing it all down and we had to make sure we got it right, how many of this and how much of that. This Mexican veterinarian was on the other end and he said 3 cajas de bujias. And I said como? He said 3 cajos de bujias. And I said no entiendo. He repeated it a couple of times, then he said, three boxes of sparkplugs, you goddamn gringo.

Q: You know, looking at it, how effective do you think the program was?

MORRIS: It was spectacularly effective. Do you know, in 19- You know, the Marshall Plan started in 1948. The aftosa program had started in 1947.

Q: How do you spell that, by the way?

MORRIS: A-F-T-O-S-A. Aftosa. I guess it is Latin; I do not know what it is. But anyway, the aftosa program started in 1947. The Marshall Plan started in 1948. When I started to work with aftosa we were spending two million dollars a month and at that time we were spending more money than the Marshall Plan was spending; they were just getting warmed up, you know, they really had not gotten going yet. But nevertheless we used to compare ourselves with the Marshall Plan; we were spending two million dollars a month and they were spending less. In those days that was an awful lot of money.

The program started off wrong because there had been one or two outbreaks in earlier times in the United States and the way that they took care of it was slaughter; they

slaughtered all of the cattle and they buried them and covered them with lime and then covered the holes. They tried that in Mexico, that was the way they started in Mexico and they succeeded in spreading the disease across Mexico because the people immediately started to move their cattle. So then the whole southern half of Mexico became infected. The U.S. Department of Agriculture then realized that that was a losing proposition. They had already been working on a vaccine; well, they had developed the vaccine and so they decided that they would have a vaccination program for cattle. So they did that. And then they had sanitary zones; during those years you could not get into Mexico either by bus or by train or by plane without having to step into some kind of a solution that was in sand, there was a box and even in airports you had to step into this to make sure that you were not carrying the disease - evidently it was a disinfectant of some kind. And there were roadblocks for cars driving in; not at the borders but further south where they had drawn a line indicating the disease had not gone further north than that line. And it was at that line on all roads. There were stops where the cars had to be disinfected and the people had to be disinfected. But it worked; it worked. And Mexico to this day is free of aftosa.

Q: Well then, did you get any feel for Mexican administration? You know, per se or not?

MORRIS: Well yes, you cannot live in Mexico. You know, la mordida, la mordida. That is the bite a bribe. You know, and it's just a part of Mexican culture.

Q: You might explain what it is.

MORRIS: Yes well, you know, it is a bribe. You cannot do anything at any level. At all levels if you wanted to get something done you had to bribe somebody. And that, of course, was a turnoff for most Americans but it was just a fact of life. And of course I had a fairly good sized budget and I had to buy hay for the horses and I was offered bribes all the time and I never, ever accepted them. If anybody offered me a bribe that was the end of the discussion. I just would let them know that this was the U.S. Government and we were not going to do business with them. I am afraid that this is still one of Mexico's real problems.

Q: Well, you did this for how long?

MORRIS: For two years. No, let me see, 1948, 1949, 1950; a year-and-a-half probably and then I went to Peru.

Q: How did that come about?

MORRIS: Well, I just resigned the job because I wanted to see Latin America and my reason for having gone to Mexico was to learn Spanish and now I could speak Spanish. And so I decided I wanted to see South America. I still had some GI Bill and I enrolled in San Marcos University in Lima, Peru, and I got a degree from San Marcos.

Q: You were there from when to when?

MORRIS: I was there, I arrived in 1950 and I left in 1953. Since I had worked for the Department of Agriculture in Mexico I decided that if there were any other U.S. Government programs in the area that I would try to get a job, banking on my experience in Mexico. There was the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, which had been set up by Nelson Rockefeller during the war, the beginning of the war, and in a lot of the Latin American countries there was a mission, an Institute for Inter-American Affairs mission and they had programs in agriculture and in health and in education. These were technical assistance programs. And I went in to see the head of the agriculture program in Lima and he hired me. But he hired me on the local payroll. He asked me what kind of experience I had besides my operations in Mexico and I told him that was it. He said do you have any accounting? Well, I had taken accounting at Georgetown and he said I am going to put you in our business section. So I went to work for the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in their accounting department and before long they assigned me to the auto repair shop, to the accounting department in the shop. When I saw the way they were doing their accounting—I had taken cost accounting at Georgetown—so I set up a cost accounting system for them. By that time the Institute of Inter-American Affairs had been absorbed in Washington under a larger program called Point Four, the old TCA, Technical Cooperation Administration.

Q: Point Four being one of Truman's-

MORRIS: Exactly. Four points.

Q: Four points.

MORRIS: Four points, yes. And that was technical and economic assistance to the developing world. Since the Institute was already doing this in Latin America it was just absorbed into TCA.

Q: Just to get this straight, the Institute was an American- Nelson Rockefeller was assistant secretary for Latin American affairs I believe during this time.

MORRIS: He was named Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs.

Q: And so this was an institute, it was not a Rockefeller institute-

MORRIS: That is right, it was-

Q: -it was a government institute.

MORRIS: It was a government institute, but the interesting thing about it was it was a government corporation. It was incorporated in the state of Delaware and so it had tremendous freedom. And this was one, I think one of Rockefeller's innovations because he wanted freedom; he wanted to experiment; he wanted to see what worked and what did not work. And I must say that from my own experience those programs, those

Institute of Inter-American Affairs programs throughout the hemisphere were some of the most effective technical assistance programs that I have ever run into and I have no doubt that in many ways the basis for the ministries of agriculture, ministries of health, the ministries of education in Latin America grew out of those programs.

Q: You did not feel, I mean, one of the great complaints about aid, well of course you were a part of this but later on was the very heavy hand of Washington and the turgid bureaucracy. I mean, the idea of you instituting an accounting method without having, you know-

MORRIS: Right.

Q: -20 people back in Washington giving you instructions on how to do it.

MORRIS: Well you know, I would like to spend a little time talking about the servicio system because to me this is a mechanism that really worked and that has gone unrecognized in the area of transfer of technology. And I do not know what its antecedents may have been but I think to some extent they were based on the Rockefeller Foundation experiences working in public health in the United States and also the New Deal experiences in working with farmers during its early days when there was so much desolation in rural America. I think that the idea of the way the servicios went about their business probably grew out of that. And then the next thing that I think was tremendously important was the caliber of people that they hired to do the jobs. We really had some outstanding people, names that nobody knows today. You know- I am going to make a little segue here to make a point.

You know, they talk about Chile being this island of economic progress and growth in a Latin America that to this day is pretty stagnant. And they talk about the Chicago boys and Milton Friedman.

Q: These are students who cannot get graduate degrees from Chile at the University of Chicago.

MORRIS: At the University of Chicago, that is right.

Q: And they came back and used the-

MORRIS: And used the theories at the University of Chicago to orient the government and so forth. But the full story and I cannot give the full story because I never served in Chile, the full story of laying the foundation for that goes back to the servicios and it goes back to an individual named Albion Patterson. Albion Patterson was a linguist. Now, this is interesting, the kinds of people that Rockefeller hired. Albion Patterson was a linguist and he was in charge of the agricultural servicio in Paraguay for a number of years. Patterson was really a Renaissance Man and he just had a feel for things; he had a feel for how to get things done and he knew what the basics were. He was transferred to Chile and I am not sure exactly but Patterson made friends with Ted Schultze. Ted Schultze-

Q: Who was a correspondent for, oh I think it was Time.

MORRIS: No, no, no, no. You are thinking of another, this was Ted Schultze.

Q: Oh, Ted Schultze.

MORRIS: Ted Schultze. And Ted Schultze was an education economist at the University of Chicago and he got a Nobel before Milton Friedman got a Nobel. Ted Schultze. Albion Patterson made friends with Ted Schultze and Schultze convinced Albion Patterson that he ought to start sending Chileans to do graduate work at the University of Chicago. Patterson did an awful lot of things while he was in Chile; he was always experimenting with ways to do things. So that was the beginning of the relationship between Chile and the University of Chicago. But the servicio programs themselves worked through the government ministries in the countries that they operated. And the servicios were organic parts of the ministries. There were co-directors; there was a representative of the ministry and there was the representative of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs who were the co-directors of the servicios.

Q: Were these directors Americans or?

MORRIS: One director was an American and the other was a national of whatever country. And out of these servicios grew, in certain cases, ministries. In Peru, when the Institute arrived, there was not a ministry of agriculture. They started a ministry of agriculture at the behest of the Institute so that they could begin to institute programs for farmers, extension service, research services, outreach, etcetera, etcetera. And the servicio in Peru then was set up under the ministry but a ministry which had not existed before then. And so the American director and the Peruvian director of the servicio ran their own little programs but they would also recruit Americans not only to work for the servicio but to provide technical assistance to the ministry in areas other than what the servicio was doing. The servicios operated little programs as demonstrations with the idea that when they grow to a certain size then they would be transferred over to the ministry with the people who had run the demonstration so that nothing would be lost in the transfer. And this was very successful.

I worked in Peru and then I worked in Ecuador. By that time the TCA had been absorbed into FOA (Foreign Operations Administration) which later became ICA (International Cooperation Administration). So we were absorbed into ICA and I was transferred then to Ecuador in the ICA program as a program officer.

Q: I want to go back to Peru. What were you doing in Peru?

MORRIS: I started, well I started as an accountant and then I moved- then when Point Four came into existence they made me the training officer. The training office really was nothing more than an office where we processed people, locals, for training in the United States. So it was an administrative office, taking care of all of the paperwork necessary to

get a person ready to go to one school or another in the United States. And the *servicios* were recommending these people and were also choosing where they would go to school in the United States.

Q: Well what, I mean, this is in what specialties?

MORRIS: Agriculture, health and education.

Q: Were there any particular places where you were sending the Peruvians?

MORRIS: Yes. Maryland, the school of agriculture at Maryland; North Carolina; Texas A&M. Those are the ones that occur to me offhand and that was all in agriculture.

Q: Did you notice as you were doing this, you know in Peru, from the other Latin American countries there is quite a difference between the, what do you call them? The Native Americans, the former Incans; I mean, in other words the Indians there and the non-Indians or the mixed blood, were the Indians sort of beyond the pale as far as living in the mix?

MORRIS: You know, that is a very good question and it certainly is something that needs to be studied in very great depth. The fact is this is one of the things that I discovered when I went from Mexico to Peru; the Mexicans had not only discovered their Indian past but they glorified it. You know, Diego Rivera, you know, the whole artist movement in Mexico.

Q: Sure, it is very sort of Indian oriented.

MORRIS: Exactly. And to this day I will never forget a Mexican ambassador to the United States who became a friend of mine when I worked in Department of State, I cannot remember his name now, but he looked like an Anglo-Saxon and there was never a conversation where he would not say, and *como soy* 100% *inio*. That means "I am 100 percent Indian". Because part of your credentials in Mexico were that you were an Indian. In Peru and in the rest of Latin America that was not true. There were class lines, there were racial lines and they were very difficult to cross. In fact, they were not crossed. To this day, what is happening in Bolivia is an example of how deep this problem is and how far from any resolution it is. And so the *servicios*, if the *servicio* failed in Peru it was on this level in the sense that we were working, the *servicios* were working with small farmers and they were working with Indian farmers too but only within the norms that were already established in the communities. And so there were large Peruvian haciendas that had serf labor and we were helping those haciendas with the new techniques, you know, demonstrations using fertilizer and using insecticides. The *servicio* was promoting all of these things. There was never any thought and certainly no discussion of thinking about instituting social change.

I must say, though, that we were in contact with anthropologists who were working with these Indian communities. The only program that I know that had an anthropologist on its

staff was in Brazil; a fellow named Kal Olberg. Kal Olberg is supposed to have invented the term “culture shock” but he was the only anthropologist I know that was working with the servicio program. In Peru we were in contact with an anthropology program run by the Smithsonian but they were strictly anthropologists and they were not looking at the operational aspects of how we operated and we were not looking at the significance of their work to what we were doing.

Q: So the work was not pointed toward what I suppose we would call equal opportunity or something? We were not saying well how will this benefit the Indian population. But it was not part of our program to try to change the culture of a country.

MORRIS: That is right. We were not and we were assuming that what worked in the United States would work in Latin America and that was true up to a point but obviously it was not enough.

Q: Well you did mention about Bolivia—I just put in here as an aside—we are talking about, what is his name? There is a new president of Bolivia who is the first-

MORRIS: Indian. Evo Morales

Q: -Indian, very obviously Indian president who is trying to create a social revolution to give the Indians more say in the government and it is going very one- As we are speaking in 2007, he was just elected last year, where this is going. It is a social, economic and cultural revolution which is still very undecided at this point but showing the barriers to getting the Indians into the-

MORRIS: Absolutely. Absolutely.

Q: And Peru just in the last decade had an Indian-

MORRIS: Well no, he was a Japanese, Fujimori.

Q: But he was followed a little later by-

MORRIS: Oh yes, oh that is right, yes, right, Alejandro Toledo.

Q: He came from Indian stock.

MORRIS: Oh yes, exactly. He claimed to be 100% Indian. He was a shoe-shine boy who went on to earn a PhD from California. Right.

Q: But it is still, you know, it is still a very problematic thing.

MORRIS: Yes, yes.

Q: Well in this whole business in Peru, how did you find the Peruvians you were dealing with responded? I mean, were you- did you find the government was-

MORRIS: Oh you know, again, I think that you have to take into account the quality of the leadership on the U.S. side in the Institute. Another name that is not renowned but who is well known in Peru is John R. Neale. John R. Neale was head of the agricultural servicio; he was there for 12 years. He became the first AID (U.S. Agency for International Development) director in Peru but because of Neale's diplomatic ways, his soft-spokenness, he was accepted and admired throughout the Peruvian official community and I think that Neale was outstanding but he was also an example of the really first class people that were in charge of the servicio programs in Latin America.

Q: What sort of government did Peru have at the time?

MORRIS: Nominally democratic. Well, actually not. I misspoke. At that time the government was under a military dictatorship, the Odria dictatorship. But they had had elections in previous decades and then there was the military coup; Manuel Odria was in power for about 10 years. That government was overthrown and there were new elections. So you had this mixture. And this was true throughout Latin America, where you had periods of democratic governments and then periods of military dictatorship, even in some of the traditionally democratic countries like Uruguay and Chile; those were probably the two administrations which had the longest democratic traditions. But in both of those countries the democratic regimes at times had been interrupted by short terms of military dictatorship. So during the time I was in Peru it was a military dictatorship and I think, I cannot remember but I think the servicio had been founded under an elected government just before Odria came to power.

Q: Well did you find that the military rule intruded much or did they say, you know, agriculture is not something that the military really normally would pay a hell of a lot of attention to; did they sort of turn that- I mean, did you feel sort of out from under the hand of-

MORRIS: Yes, actually there were restrictions on freedom of expression; the press was censored but ordinary life under the dictatorship was not much affected except for the fact that you felt the military presence all the time. You knew, but in terms of the ministries themselves, they were mostly, most of the ministers were civilians; not all of them. If they wanted to do a favor for a certain military man and they wanted to get him out of the service for some reason they would give him a ministry. But I think the minister of education, for example, was a military man but the minister of agriculture was not a military man and there was a long agricultural tradition in the country and people who had studied agriculture and so forth and so there was a pool of people to fill these higher positions.

Q: Well did you feel that there was much progress, innovation in agriculture during the time you were there? Did you see things taking hold?

MORRIS: Oh, absolutely. I mean, this is why I say that we had, our assumption was that what worked in the United States would work in Peru and of course to a certain extent that was correct. I mean the application of fertilizer, for example, the use of chemical fertilizers; the use of insecticides; the importation and use of large scale agricultural equipment for harvesting and planting and so forth and so on, all of these things made sense to the Peruvians but it did not really address the poor subsistence farmer. They went on living as they had always lived; they grew enough for themselves and they might sell a little in the market and that was that. And they probably did not use fertilizer, they did not use chemical fertilizers and they did not use insecticides and they did not use any kind of mechanical equipment.

Q: Well was, would you say the people who relied on food stuffs in Peru did better and was the economy of Peru better because of what you all were doing?

MORRIS: There is no doubt that agricultural production and productivity increased substantially while we were there and I would think that our being there had a great deal to do with those increases in production and productivity. We justified our programs, this way - the war was over, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs had gone there during the war to help stimulate agricultural production but mainly in the export fields so that food could be exported to the United States during the war. We expanded after the war into other areas and our justification changed. So most of my career, and I was in the programming part of AID for most of my career, we justified what we were doing on the basis of increasing the size and prosperity of the middle class. And there were- we had lots of benchmarks so we could measure our progress. I like to say that during my entire career, that is, from 1950 to 1980, economic progress in Latin America was measurably better year by year during the entire time that I served in AID. When we used to send our presentations to Congress we always utilized the benchmarks that we had; production and productivity and whatever the crops were, that was in agriculture. In health mortality rates, morbidity rates. And we could always demonstrate improvements. There is no doubt that during my time in Latin America working on programs of mostly technical assistance, although there was some economic assistance from time to time in certain countries, but this was mostly technical assistance and our budgets were miniscule. But we could always point to economic progress and we theorized that economic progress meant an increase in the size of the middle class and the increase in the prosperity of the middle class was the basis for democratic government. That was our bottom line.

Q: What about living in Lima, social life and all that. How did you find it?

MORRIS: Well, those were great days. I was a bachelor. It was a wonderful time. I still was not making very much money but since I was setting up the accounting department in the shop there was always a car around that I could use and so I had transportation. And you know, the wonderful crowd of young people, lots of Peruvian girls. You know, Lima is a strange place climate-wise. It is under a cloud, literally, for eight months of the year; you never see the sun. And the humidity is so high that sometimes you feel like you are walking through water. I mean, there is water on the ground and you feel it on your skin. But then there were four months of sun and we used to inhabit the beaches and that

was great. So I had a car and we would go to the beach, we would have a gang and go to the beach. I went to the beach every day during the summertime. And Lima, since everybody wanted to take advantage of the four months of sun, had special working hours during the summer. I got off at 2:00; we started at 8:00 and got off at 2:00. And I would go home and get my swimming stuff and drive to the beach. At that time in Lima they used the European system, set up tents on the beach, little tents, and you would go down, you would take your stuff, you would change your clothes in the tents, just hang them up there. You rented the tents. Well, you know, I made friends with all kinds of guys so we would pitch in and rent the tent for the season and it was our tent, you know, and you would go there anytime and the beach boy knew you. It was a great life.

Q: Was there, at that time, you were there from when to when?

MORRIS: I was there from '50 to '53.

Q: Was there any anti-Americanism there at the time?

MORRIS: There was a little. I told you that I registered in San Marcos. I left Mexico and so I was a student at San Marcos and this was the time when Truman was president and the Puerto Ricans shot up Blair House.

Q: Well Pat, we were talking about anti-Americanism.

MORRIS: Oh right. Most of the Peruvian students at San Marcos were very, very friendly. I had no problem at all fitting in except I spoke Spanish that I had learned in Mexico and in Mexico, one of the few places in the hemisphere, I do not know how it is today but I think that probably still they use formal, "usted". In South America generally, I think probably in the Central American countries they use more the formal form of "usted" but in South American countries it was all "tú," informal. And so when I went to the university and I talked to everybody in the formal form they thought I was stuck up. One of the guys got me aside and he said, "Why don't you address me, tu?" And I said, "I do not know how. I never learned the forms."

Q: I used to have that problem in Serbia.

MORRIS: Yes. But anyway, I made lots of friends at the university. But remember the Puerto Ricans shot up the Blair House. As a result of that they had an anti-American demonstration at San Marcos. But it was a passing thing. I never sensed any strong anti-Americanism.

Q: Okay. Is there anything else you'd like to add before we stop?

MORRIS: Yes. Soon after the IIAA (Institute of Inter American Affairs) we incorporated into the TCA (Technical Cooperation Administration), the Peru mission was visited by some of the headquarters staff from Washington. Among those in the delegation was Jonathan Bingham, the son of Hiram Bingham III, who as a graduate student of Yale

University, discovered Machu Picchu in 1911. Jonathan was third in command of the new agency in Washington. When we were informed of his visit, we assumed that he would want to visit the famous Inca ruins. John R. Neale, who was the newly designated mission director for Peru, mentioned in a staff meeting that we would have to make preparations for such a visit and asked for volunteers to accompany Bingham to Machu Picchu. I spoke good Spanish and had recently visited Machu Picchu, so felt qualified for the job, so I volunteered and had the honor of accompanying Bingham, his wife and others from the delegation to Cuzco and on the Machu Picchu. This was his first visit to the ruins.

Hiram Bingham, of course, besides discovering Machu Picchu became prominent in U.S. politics and became a Senator from Connecticut. His son, Jonathan followed in his footsteps and served in the U.S. House of Representatives. Years after that visit to Machu Picchu, he visited Paris as a Congressman while I was serving there. At a cocktail party given in his honor, I reminded him and his wife of our earlier encounter in Peru. He said that visit was the only time he had set foot in Machu Picchu.

Q: Okay. And we will pick this up the next time, 1953; we have got a new administration, Eisenhower is in, you are off to Europe.

MORRIS: Ecuador.

Q: Ecuador. And so we will talk about that then.

MORRIS: Okay, very good.

Q: Today is the 7th of March, 2007. Pat, you were in Ecuador from when to when? 1953 to when?

MORRIS: 1953 to 1955. Let me see, yes, it was just a little over two years. I arrived in the middle of March of 1953 and I left about the first of May, 1955.

Q: Okay. How would you describe the Ecuador situation and our interests in Ecuador in 1953?

MORRIS: 1953 we were still, of course, in a post-World War II mode in Latin America at that time and the overall U.S. policy toward Latin America was still operating pretty much on the basis of World War II in which our primary interest had been to keep the shipping lanes open between Latin America and the United States so that we could continue to receive exports from the Latin American countries, strategic materials such as copper and food stuffs, coffee, cocoa, sugar and so forth from the Latin American countries. Then we had a number of military, strategic military bases in Latin America and in Ecuador there had been, during the war, an air base on the Pacific coast, on the Salinas Peninsula. So we described our interests still in 1953 as- our interest in Ecuador was protection of the Panama Canal from the south and making sure that the United States had access to cocoa; cacao, coffee; rice; and bananas which were the primary

exports of Ecuador at that time. Of course I had started with the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in Lima and the interests of the U.S. Government, first of all initiating the Institute programs was to make sure that they, in case of economic blockade from Germany and maybe Japan would be able to produce enough food stuffs to supply their own populations. In the area of health: to improve the basic health of the indigenous populations so that they could become more self-sufficient in terms of providing, through a growing labor force for their needs. And later on the Institute got into education programs using the same philosophy. So that when I went to Ecuador this was the general mode and the programs that were operating in Ecuador at that time under the Institute of Inter-American Affairs were an agricultural program, a health program and an education program.

The agricultural program was a holdover from a Department of Agriculture research effort. The Department of Agriculture had at that time and for a number of years after that an Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations and they had established in a number of Latin American countries research programs, agricultural research programs in basic grains and potatoes and a number of other tropical products such as bananas and balsa wood and quinine to fight malaria.

Q: Quinine comes from the bark of a what?

MORRIS: It comes from the bark of a tree, actually that grew wild in the jungles of Ecuador and Peru and well, it was the Amazon Basin. So the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations had set up research programs to improve the quality and quantity of some basic products, tropical and otherwise. In the highlands of Ecuador of course it was basic grains. But in Ecuador that program had been absorbed by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs into its agricultural activities. But it had not operated on the same basis as the Institute programs had. The Institute programs, as I explained with regard to Peru, were all cooperative *servicios* in which the *servicio* was part of the ministry, the corresponding ministry, and there were co-directors of those *servicios*. The OFAR (Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations) program in Ecuador, the OFAR research program in Ecuador, this was strictly a U.S. Government operation. While it hired locals all of the senior staff was American and they directed all of the activities. So when I arrived in Ecuador they were just beginning to move toward operations using the *servicio* model for their activities.

In health this was a long-standing, very well operated Institute of Inter-American Affairs program which had concentrated on potable water supply for the small rural towns, villages and some fairly large towns which did not have potable water. Hospital administration and nurse training; those were the three areas that the health *servicio* had been operating in.

The education *servicio* was concentrating on rural primary education. I think that is generally what the situation was in Ecuador when I got there.

The political situation was interesting from the point of view that there had been a regular tradeoff between military coups and democratic elections. I arrived at a time when the first successive democratic election had taken place. In 1948, after a military coup, there was a democratic election and Galo Plaza became president. He was president for four years and in 1952, I think, yes 1952, he was replaced in another democratic election by Velasco Ibarra. José Velasco Ibarra had already been president of Ecuador twice before. He had been elected both times and he had been overthrown in earlier coups. So this was his third time as president.

Velasco Ibarra was a great orator and a very honest man but not a very practical man and even though he as an individual was honest and did not profit monetarily during his presidency, it was nevertheless a very corrupt regime because all of his supporters took advantage, of course in ministerial positions, feathered their own nests and were not particularly interested in furthering national interests.

So this was the general atmosphere that we were operating in but there had been good progress, especially under the health servicio. The number of rural water systems had there were in the neighborhood of 50 to 100 new rural water systems opening every year and these were operated by the local municipalities. The servicio, which was a joint Ecuadorian-U.S. Government operation would make agreements with local municipalities and get a commitment from the local municipality that they would pay half of all of the cost of putting in the local system and the servicio would pay the other half. The servicio money, the United States Government provided grant money for the operation of the servicios but they had to be, those funds had to be matched on at least a 50/50 basis and in some countries where projects became very popular the local governments were willing to put up even more money. So in some countries in certain areas the local contribution was up to 75 percent and in Ecuador I think it was around 60 percent that the local government was putting in and then the municipalities were putting in 50 percent more for all of the water supply projects. In addition to providing funds the servicios also trained the engineers who would run the municipal water supply; train the bookkeepers, teaching them how to bill customers and so forth. So it was a very complete system and it was a very successful system and I think that during the 15 years or so that the servicio operated they had a tremendous rate of success.

Q: In the first place, could you tell me what does doing a water system involve in a village for example?

MORRIS: Well first of all you have to locate a source of clean water and usually it might mean building a reservoir or it might mean digging deep wells. But whatever it took it required resources on the part of the community and at least half of what the servicio did really was just organizing people to do the job. But once a reservoir was built, say, there had to be a little filtration plant to assure that the water was not contaminated and so forth. And all of these things- the servicio had engineers, local engineers, usually one U.S. engineer who would be head of that particular division and then they would train the local municipal engineers to run the system. As I have mentioned before, in Ecuador, that certainly was the most outstanding operation that the Institute had.

Q: Did you find you were getting involved with politics? I mean the rent man or the mayor or something would want to get- I mean-

MORRIS: Well it is interesting that usually the communities themselves - there was local participation and therefore the community's greatest needs were taken into account and the politicians who were interested in staying in office, in Ecuador unlike a lot of other Latin American countries, there were locally elected officials so that they, up to some point, were responsible to the electorate. So if they wanted to stay in office they had to do things which the people wanted and of course almost everywhere a clean water supply was a number one priority. And so we did not have very much interference. There were the usual kind of things where a supplier might try to bribe somebody to get a contract, either for hauling rock or for whatever, but on the whole the servicio itself had a sterling reputation for not either getting involved in politics or for being corrupt in any way so that the municipalities on the whole knew that if they were dealing with the servicio that they would get what they contracted for. The interesting thing is that the program was so popular and the servicio had limited resources in terms of making commitments for water supply that there was sometimes a delay of one or two years from the time that a municipality approached the servicio until the time that they could begin to work on the water supply because there was just a limited number of projects that they could work on at any given time.

Q: Well what was your role in this?

MORRIS: I went from Peru to Ecuador as a program officer. That is a good question because it leads into the changes that were taking place in Washington at the time. The Institute of Inter-American Affairs had operated on the basis of individual programs, health, agricultural, education and each one of those divisions had an office in Washington and they operated pretty much independently of each other; there was no real coordination. There was the agriculture servicio that reported directly to the ag office Washington; the health servicio that reported directly to the health office Washington and the education servicio that reported to their office in Washington. And although they were part of the same organization, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and there was coordination in Washington, they were fairly independent in the way they operated in the field. So the servicio directors, the American servicio directors knew each other but may have gotten together or may not have gotten together and they each went their own way.

Well when Truman started the Point Four program the TCA, Technical Cooperation Administration, it was organized differently and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs was incorporated into the TCA as the Latin American branch of TCA but the Institute had to reorganize itself in the model of the rest of TCA, which had insisted on having a country director in each country, a program office in each country and a controller in each country. This was quite a different model from the way the servicios operated; the servicios operated through their individual offices in Washington; each servicio had an American director and the local servicios had what they called a business manager. There was an American business manager and a co-business manager from the local country.

There was no thought of program officers for planning joint programs so that when I left Peru and went to Ecuador the Institute was just changing over from the servicio approach to the TCA approach and the TCA had already named the country directors in all of the Latin American countries. In Peru the head of the agricultural servicio became the country director. In Ecuador the head of the health servicio became the country director. I came in as program officer, a new office which had just been instituted in Washington and the idea was that the country director would coordinate all of the activities of the TCA in the country and that there would be joint planning of projects. And the program office had the responsibility of making sure that each one of the servicios would budget, plan its programs and then clear them through the country director, and the program office was responsible for making sure that there was joint planning, there was joint programming and that the budgets, all of the budgets from all of the servicios then came to the program office and the program office had responsibility for making sure that all of the figures added up and didn't exceed the amount of money that had been allocated to us. This also became the basis for presentation of future projects to the Congress, the congressional presentation. So I was the first program officer in Ecuador and I put together the various elements and began to consult with the various organizations to present this information to our offices in Washington.

Q: Pat, when you were talking about the early 1950s, the Eisenhower Administration came in, you mentioned bananas. And one cannot help thinking of the United Fruit Company and its role in these small countries, particularly in Central America but also I imagine in Ecuador. Could you talk about the agricultural situation, how we saw it and sort of the American role and the pressures fruit companies might have, whatever the situation was and what you were doing on that?

MORRIS: This is very interesting because Ecuador I think was unique in the way the banana industry developed. United Fruit and Standard Fruit were the two large American enterprises dealing in bananas in Latin America. They started in Central America and had large plantations, very advanced. They had whole agricultural sections which worked with the people and helped establish the latest, most modern agricultural practices to increase production and to get them to market. This was industrial agriculture. And they, those two companies also had brief interludes in Colombia using the same techniques that they used in Central America with mixed results in Colombia. But as in Central America and in Colombia there was an aura of imperialism connected with the enterprises and there is no doubt in Central America United Fruit and Standard Fruit really ran the areas of the country that they operated in and had tremendous influence on the governments.

Q: Hence the name "Banana Republic."

MORRIS: Hence the name "Banana Republics." And those companies were interested primarily in the bottom line; they were not interested in any particular development of the countries themselves and stayed out of politics as long as their own interests were not threatened. But at any time that their interests became threatened they moved in with a heavy hand and took care of the situation.

I learned just recently, it is interesting that I would not have known it before; I learned just recently that United Fruit did have a plantation in Ecuador but for some reason they really stayed below the radar. When Galo Plaza became president, Galo Plaza was a very interesting guy.

Q: He became president when?

MORRIS: He became president in 1948. And when Galo Plaza became president he had a degree in agricultural engineering from the University of Maryland. He spoke perfect English and he spoke Quichua, which is the Native Indian language because his family had owned large haciendas in the highlands, and he had grown up with the Indians, the local serfs, peons. So he spoke perfect Quichua and he spoke perfect English because he was born in Brooklyn. His father was counsel general of Ecuador in New York City and they had a house in Brooklyn and Galo Plaza was born while his father was counsel general. There is the story of the, I cannot remember which New York daily newspaper it was, but when Galo Plaza was elected president the paper's headlines were "Local Boy Makes Good." Galo Plaza was born in Brooklyn.

But Galo Plaza was a convinced democrat; that is with a small "d" but he really believed in democracy, having lived a good part of his life in the United States. He really believed that it was important to do whatever you could to make sure that democracy flourished in Ecuador. He, I do not remember the name of his agricultural minister at that time, but they decided that they would institute a program of small holder ownership for banana plantations. United Fruit that was there, evidently Ecuador was a little too far away from the U.S. to get bananas to market early enough so that United Fruit, as far as I know, had no influence whatsoever on what happened in Ecuador. Galo Plaza's instituted a program of small holders for banana cultivation in the coastal areas of Ecuador. This resulted in thousands of 10-acre, 15-acre plots all over, in all of the coastal areas. Then those bananas were marketed mostly through local merchants or middlemen to the larger banana companies. That was the way it started and later some of those local merchants became big enough so that they had their own shipping arrangements; in fact, they owned their own ships taking bananas to the United States.

Q: Did we get involved in those?

MORRIS: We did. Shortly after I arrived there was an outbreak of a banana disease known as sigatoka and this was just devastating for the banana farmers. I think that the OFAR program had begun even before the sigatoka outbreak some basic studies on banana diseases. But with the outbreak of sigatoka it became a priority for the Ecuadorian Government so this was a perfect match for us to work with them in finding a cure for sigatoka. One of the unheralded heroes of Ecuadorian banana cultivation is a man named Russ Rossier. Russ Rossier was with the Department of Agriculture, a research guy, who headed the sigatoka research project in Ecuador. There was a banana research station in the Ecuadorian lowlands and Russ lived there at the station and he had about oh, maybe six or seven other local Ecuadorian pathologists, plant researchers working with him. They were experimenting with all kinds of different things; they were mixing oils with

different chemicals and setting out the usual research plots to test how the crops reacted to these various things. At one point—they were fumigating these plots by airplane — and at one point the oil that was loaded into the plane was by mistake just pure oil; it had no chemical in it at all. And it was that plot, the plot that was sprayed with no chemical in the oil that rendered the best results. This then became the formula for preventing sigatoka and over time eliminating the disease as an economic threat.

Q: ...but in other parts where you were working.

MORRIS: Well, you have to talk about it almost in international terms. The campesinos throughout Latin America have lived in abject poverty and the Industrial Revolution passed Latin America by. Right through the end of World War II you could say that mercantilism was still the basis for trade. These were countries that produced raw materials, did not fabricate much of anything. At the end of World War II that began to change and you began to see local industries grow and prosper. But the lot of the people who lived in the rural areas had not changed a bit; did not change at all. There was talk of land reform and it happened in Bolivia but it did not happen in Peru or Ecuador to any large degree except for this experiment that I mentioned in the lowlands of Ecuador where the small holder banana plantations caught on and those growers in the lowlands advanced rapidly to becoming middle class, lower middle class maybe. Their lot was much superior to the highland Indians who still lived on these large haciendas and were day laborers for all practical purposes.

Q: How did you find working there with the government in your particular area? I mean, you say it was a democracy but rife with corruption. How did this play out from your work?

MORRIS: We had very good relations with the government. They were enthusiastic about our programs because they worked. This was a time, of course, when the United States was- after World War II and the United States was admired all over the world so that we were- it was easy for us to work with government ministries and to promote our programs and to be accepted. We stayed away from getting involved in anything that was close to political and in fact, as a result, we really did not, and this is an institutional problem, not just the Institute of Inter-American Affairs but the whole U.S. Government; we did not really address the social issues, we did not address the social issues. We worked around the edges so that we did not promote land reform; we talked it up but we did not promote it. At that time, if you recall, the United States had engaged in land reform in Taiwan.

Q: Yes. And in Japan.

MORRIS: And in Japan, exactly. And these were examples that we were aware of and we talked about them, we talked to the locals about them and we suggested they might do something about them but there was never, on our part there was never any real effort to try to promote land reform. And of course even though the United States had engaged in land reform in Taiwan and Japan there was a very, very strong lobby, if you will, in the

United States which was against the United States ever getting into any of this kind of thing. And I think that that particular attitude persisted during almost my entire time in Latin America.

Q: Well then you left Ecuador in?

MORRIS: Fifty-five.

Q: Fifty-five. Whither? Where did you go?

MORRIS: Washington, D.C.

Q: What were you doing there and you were there from when to when?

MORRIS: In Washington?

Q: Yes.

MORRIS: I was in Washington from 1955 to 1958. I was in charge of the office of Peru, Ecuador affairs, Institute of Inter-American Affairs TCA, which had now become ICA. Well, I had served in both countries and I knew them well and I knew the programs so I became the desk officer for those two countries.

Q: How did you find the perspective there? I mean, did you find that working out of Washington, I guess it was ICA by this time.

MORRIS: ICA, right.

Q: International Cooperation Administration.

MORRIS: Administration, exactly. Harold Stassen.

Q: How did you find it from there?

MORRIS: To me, I was convinced that what we were doing in Latin America at that time was exactly the right thing. I was convinced that the United States really had an obligation to try, first of all to promote democracy but through economic means by building up the middle class. So I was delighted to find that getting to Washington and seeing that these ideals, if you will, had now sprouted into an international program that went not just to Latin America but went worldwide in the developing areas. So I found it rather exhilarating to be part of this and I think that the organization at that time was new enough that it had not gotten into a rut and it had not gotten tied up in bureaucracy. And I became quite rapidly attuned to working within the organization, at all levels. So I think I took to it and I think as a result I was fairly effective, not only doing my job but in helping our Institute of Inter-American Affairs, which had now just become the Latin American regional office for ICA, in helping us to have clout within the organization

itself. In other words to get our ideas listened to and maybe accepted by the rest of the organization. Because the rest of the organization was starting out from scratch and here we had 10, 15 years of experience in Latin America so we believed that we had something to offer the rest of the organization. I was quite active in inter-regional activities, pushing for certain ideas with regard to technical assistance.

Q: Was there a feeling of, oh I do not want to use this in a pejorative term, I use it in the positive term, almost a missionary feeling that we had a message to get out, that we had both the resources, the know-how and all to do something?

MORRIS: Absolutely. Absolutely, yes. This was the feeling and while I was in Washington, this is sort of jumping, but we can get back to the earlier part of it but while I was in Washington ICA established a four month course at SAIS, School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins for program officers. And so toward the end of my tour in Washington I was chosen to go. There were about 30 of us, I guess, from all over the world and we were exposed to all of the recent writings on U.S. development assistance and a lot of academic writings on the pros and cons of engaging in these kinds of activities. So we got a very good grounding in the debits and credits of this kind of activity but I must say that all of us in the class, about 30 of us from all over, all different parts of the world, we had all had experience and we would all be going out again as program officers, we really dismissed any thought about negative aspects of what we were doing. We pretty much were true believers.

Q: What would be negative aspects?

MORRIS: Well you know, The Ugly American was written at that time, Graham Greene.

Q: Graham Greene, he did not- yes he wrote The Ugly American and The Quiet American.

MORRIS: The Ugly American was about Thailand or Vietnam, it was about Vietnam.

Q: The Quiet American was-

MORRIS: The Quiet American was Graham Greene.

Q: -in Vietnam; The Ugly American was William Lederer and Eugene Burdick about the Philippines.

MORRIS: Right, right. You are right, exactly. But anyway, these books came out about that time and so you know, it was really the American as missionary and the naïve missionary, so we were aware of that and we accepted some of the criticism but we really believed that we could change the world. My own experience in Latin America, I could see the changes taking place.

Q: Yes. I mean, it is easy to get cynical about these things because we, our efforts were really quite positive in many places.

MORRIS: And for an extended of time. You know, I say that when I entered the program, which was 1950, until I retired in 1980, that is 30 years; 30 years of solid progress, 30 years of solid progress that we could point to. We had benchmarks, we had statistics that we used every year in our congressional presentations to prove that we were on the right track, that we knew what we were doing and that it was paying off. I must say that from 1980, when I retired, until the present Latin America has been in the doldrums and not only in the doldrums but economically they are just treading water.

Q: Yes. The head of the, when you were in Washington, was Harold Stassen?

MORRIS: Harold Stassen was the head of ICA.

Q: How did you find his administration?

MORRIS: Well, actually Stassen was there when I arrived but he left soon after. He did not get on with Eisenhower. John Hollister replaced him. We had about four different directors of ICA before the Kennedy Administration came in and turned it into AID. But Stassen did not get along with Eisenhower but he had some very good people at the next level. I cannot remember the hierarchical titles but D.A. Fitzgerald, who eventually at one point was acting for a number of years; D.A. Fitzgerald was the deputy for an awful long time. He had been in the agricultural section of the Marshall Plan and what happened, of course, when Stassen came in the Marshall Plan was winding down and so what was left of the Marshall Plan was incorporated into ICA. So we had a lot of people who had European experience who were now part of our organization. And in fact they dominated. And we in Latin America had dealt only in technical assistance; we did not have economic programs. We provided technical assistance and small grants to help the technical people promote certain practices and that was it. So that the programs that we carried out in Latin America remained distinct in many ways from what was happening in other parts, which had a Marshall Plan, a macro-economic, orientation.

Q: How did you find working within the State Department? I mean, being separate but within it. There was the Foreign Service and all; was it a different environment than you were used to?

MORRIS: Well it was interesting. I will never forget I pushed through the first PL 480 program in Latin America; maybe in the world. I think it was the first one. PL 480; I probably should describe what PL 480 is. PL 480 was a program to utilize surplus U.S. agricultural production. The U.S. Government had provided such large subsidies to agricultural production in the United States that we always had surpluses that were a drag on the market and the U.S. Government was buying them up. And then the Government had to decide what to do with them. So Hubert Humphrey I think was the one who started the PL 480 program when he was a senator so that- Public Law 480 was established and there was a drought in Peru. I was the Peru desk officer and I heard about this new

program and so we started to talk about how we could get some agricultural products, U.S. surplus agricultural products, to send them to Peru to help people in the drought area. And I had to work through the bureaucracy with the Department of Agriculture because the Department of Agriculture had the responsibility for the program, not ICA. But they did not have any foreign missions. I had to work with the bureaucracy, our bureaucracy, with the bureaucracy of Department of Agriculture. And this was an area that was completely foreign to me; I was dealing with legal documents most of the time, trying to get everybody onboard so that we could start this little program, because it was not very big, in Peru. Since it was the first one nobody knew exactly what to do and so I was dealing with lawyers a large part of the time. And your question had to do with the State Department.

Well, when I finally got everything ready to go then I still had to get the State Department's clearance and I ran into some of the worst nitpicking that I had ever experienced in my life and here I was, a very practical guy who had only operated on programs on the basis of what you could see and what you could do and so forth and so on and here I was tied up with the State Department in all kinds of legalisms that I did not understand and that I thought were completely irrelevant to what I wanted to do. So from that, obviously with time we got it taken care of and we got the program started but from that experience with the State Department I thought man, this bureaucracy is just awful. But at the same time, at the same time I had already, while I was in Ecuador, since I was the program officer in Ecuador, I had to coordinate everything that we were doing with the embassy. So I had- and I had very high regard for everybody that I was dealing with in the embassy; I dealt mostly with the ambassador, the DCM, and the Economic Counselor.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

MORRIS: There was a wonderful guy named Shelly Mills. He retired after that but the interesting thing is that- I am trying to remember the DCM but they were both good friends of mine. In fact Shelly Mills wanted me to move over to the State Department and he worked on me all the time I was in Ecuador and he said now when you go to Washington, I want you to go some office and initiate an application to enter the Foreign Service, which I did not do. You know, this is interesting. I have always had the highest regard for what State does and the State Department operation overseas but I really believed that what I was doing was much more exciting than being in a reporting job in the embassy or whatever.

Q: Oh yes. It is more operational and delivery.

MORRIS: Yes, that is right. So I resisted the idea. Here I was in Ecuador/Peruvian affairs, Shelly sent his DCM, who had come into Washington on business, to invite me to lunch and asked me how things were going. Had I filed my papers to get into the Foreign Service? And I had a good excuse; I told him, which was true and it was a concern of mine, my father was in ill health, I did not know whether I wanted to go out again. At that time, the ICA, when you came back to a Washington job you had to leave - we were

FSRs, Foreign Service Reserve, and we had to transfer to the Civil Service. Well we came back to the States and so I had already transferred back to Civil Service and I was not sure whether, because of my father's health, whether or not I wanted to go out again in the immediate future and I thought I am in an organization that is doing the kinds of things that I think are important and so I did not want- if I signed up for the Foreign Service I knew what the drill was there, that I would not have much choice about when I could leave and when I could stay at home. And so I did not do anything about it but I had lots of dealings in the State Department. They had a desk officer for Peru and they had a desk officer for Ecuador and they had a desk officer for Chile; well I had Peru and Ecuador so I dealt with two different desk officers in the State Department. And I had lots of dealings with them and they were always friendly; I had respect for them and they had respect for me. So that I think in general my experience with State, and later on we will get into, actually I was in State Department jobs later on; the Latin American bureau integrated with the State Department and I held a couple of jobs during that time within the State Department hierarchy, being rated by State Department officers.

Q: Well you left this job in '58, was it?

MORRIS: Fifty-eight.

Q: Where did you go and what did you do?

MORRIS: I went to Bolivia.

Q: You could not get away from that area, could you?

MORRIS: Well, I really did not want to. You know, even at Georgetown I thought that I wanted to specialize in Latin America and so I did not really want to. Of course, not necessarily Latin America but the Andean area, here I am, I was in Peru and then I was in Ecuador and now I am going to Bolivia. I had already, as Peru desk officer, visited Bolivia once and that was related to the drought in Peru because it was in the area next to Bolivia, the Puno area of Peru where the drought was. And so I had visited La Paz as desk officer and I knew most of the people who were working there. It was not a great shock or surprise; Bolivia was not a desired post. La Paz is 12,000 feet altitude and it- Bolivia was probably the least developed country in South America. Mining was the primary source of income and revenue for the government. The famous tin mines of the Patinos and the exploited miners had finally resulted in a revolution in 1952, a democratic revolution but also was considered by many in the United States to be a communist revolution.

I think luckily for the United States Government, Eisenhower was president and he had a very intelligent brother named Milton. Milton Eisenhower headed a commission to study Latin America and one of the countries they went to was Bolivia. And of course the reason was because at that time, this was the beginning of the Cold War and there was the thought that here, we are going to have a communist government in Bolivia and it is going to spread to the other countries and then we are going to be in real trouble. So they

sent Milton Eisenhower, and his recommendations to the president were really right on. He recognized that this had very little to do with international communism, that it had to do with social justice and that these people, while certainly full of Marxist doctrine and Marxist rhetoric were really concerned about the terrible distribution of income in the country and the poverty of nine-tenths of the people. And here was a government that was dedicated to doing something about it. They had already, before Eisenhower got there they had already had land reform, instituted land reform and taken large estates away from land owners and they had nationalized the Patino mines; all of the large mines had now become government owned. Milton Eisenhower's recommendation to his brother were simple, that this is a government you can work with, they are not a threat to anybody. They are going to have an awful time, having nationalized everything, they are going to have a terrible time staying in power, for one, and secondly making good on their promises to the people. It made sense from the United States' point of view to work with them.

The Institute of Inter-American Affairs had had very limited programs in Bolivia and I am not sure why they were. There was no agricultural servicio, there was no health servicio. I do not remember, I think there was a small education servicio; that is all there was in Bolivia. Then after the 1952 revolution and the recommendations of the Eisenhower Commission, we started something that was unique and certainly unfamiliar to the Institute of Inter-American Affairs; we started a program of grant budget support to the government. We were providing direct funds to keep that government solvent. Because the inflation rate had taken off because the government was printing money, inflation had taken off and you needed a suitcase full of bills to go buy anything in the supermarket. Actually, no supermarket, just the market; the money was practically worthless. After the Milton Eisenhower mission they sent an international banker down to make recommendations and one of his first recommendations is that we had to give the government budget support and then help them set up a very strict central bank, anti-inflationary policy, cutting down on the printing of money.

So all of these things were already in motion, had been initiated by the time I was assigned to Bolivia. The revolution was in 1952; I think we established the mission there in maybe 1953 or '54. The first director of the Bolivia mission was a guy named Oscar Powell and he had been the Marshall Plan director in Greece. So Oscar Powell viewed things in terms of macroeconomics and I think that this was the beginning, this was the first time that any of us in the Latin America area had thought in macroeconomic terms and not technical assistance terms.

Q: When you say "macroeconomics," what do you mean?

MORRIS: Well, I am thinking primarily of the effect of monetary policy on economic development and the utilization of budgetary support from the U.S. Government to the Bolivian Government as a way of helping them manage their economy and help them develop economically. But of course the fact is that Latin America and especially Bolivia was not Europe and while dealing only at the macro level with the bankers and the fiscal

managers was sufficient in many places in Europe it was not sufficient in Bolivia. We still had to deal at the micro level with a lot of technical assistance programs.

So when I arrived inflation had been brought under control. We still had a substantial budget support program and the Bolivian Government was saddled with all of the mistakes that it had made a failing land reform program and its nationalization of all of the tin mines. And actually, they had a small oil industry and they had nationalized that as well. So they were still in very, very difficult circumstances. For the whole time I was there, by that time- I was assigned as program officer and within six months the fellow who had been deputy director of the mission had resigned or retired and I became deputy director of the mission. So we were dealing with both macroeconomic problems and technical assistance, doing both at the same time and trying, as best we could, within the framework of U.S. Government policy trying to promote democratic government. And it was very important for us, that is the U.S., that even though this government had come in as a result of a coup that they establish democratic practices and have honest elections and that had taken place just before I arrived. Paz Estenssoro, who was the first MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario) president presided over democratic elections and Siles Zuazo was his successor. And so all the time I was there Siles was president.

Q: You were there from when to when?

MORRIS: I was there from 1958 to 1961. Actually, it was the end of 1958. I guess I arrived the last day in December of '58 so it was really '59 to '61.

During that time democratic practices seemed to take hold and they had inflation under control and we, with them, were making real progress in certain areas. Before I got there they had set up a road servicio; that is, an organization that would build and maintain roads. They had a ministry of transportation, which had a very small budget and could not do anything but pay the people who worked for them; they did not have enough money to do anything. And they were so badly organized that even if they had gotten the money nothing would have happened.

We set up a road servicio and we got fairly large grant money to help them begin to build highways and to maintain a basic road structure. The first highway that went from La Paz to Santa Cruz was built, actually first to Cochabamba and then to Santa Cruz, was built under the road servicio. We decided, while I was there, that the road servicio had made such progress and was such an outstanding success that we could turn it back over to the Bolivian Government completely and we did that while I was there.

Q: Was drug; was that a problem at all?

MORRIS: No, it was not. It was before; it is interesting, cocaine, cocoa; the cocoa leaf is a basic commodity in Bolivia. All of the Indians chew cocoa, the highland Indians chew cocoa and it is both a stimulant and a substitute for food. If they chew cocoa they do not feel hungry. And this practice of chewing cocoa dates back to the Incas themselves so this is a cultural thing and it was not unusual during my time in Bolivia to see truckloads

of cocoa leaves coming from the Yungas, which is really highland valleys, sub-tropical highland valleys, large truckloads of cocoa leaves coming up to La Paz to be sold in the markets. This was before the '60s, I guess, which is the drug culture in the United States so that there was no thought of export. And the interesting thing is that even beyond the Indians you could go into any restaurant and have cocoa tea and this was part of the culture.

Q: Of course Coca Cola originally had- Well anyway, how about, did you have any interaction; I mean your program and you at all, with the miners who were a breed apart almost.

MORRIS: Oh yes, yes. The head of the miners' union was a man name Juan Lechin. Juan Lechin was, in Latin American terms, a cacique. A cacique is an Indian chief and in Latin America it means a boss. And Juan Lechin was like John L. Lewis in the United States. Lechin was a flamboyant character who lived very well and he was not only the head of the miners' union but he was also vice president under Paz Estenssoro and so he was a labor leader and a politician. And the nationalized mines were run by the government as a separate corporation called Comibol. And Juan Lechin was also the head of Comibol. He used the miners more as a militia than anything else and in fact, all the time I was in Bolivia the central government, it is a little bit like Kabul is today. The central government just controlled the city of La Paz and a little bit of the outskirts and then the rest of the country was patrolled by militias, various Indian militias. Juan Lechin by any stretch of the imagination was probably the strongest man in the country because he controlled the miners and the miners were probably the largest single militia force in the country. And he could bring out the miners to march down the streets of La Paz any time he did not get his way. So all the time we were there there was infighting in the government.

Q: Well did you find that this intruded into your programs?

MORRIS: Oh yes, very much so. You know, it was very difficult at time. The road servicio, especially because they were moving through the country building roads where roads had never been built before and they were always intruding on somebody's turf. In fact, when I used to go on field trips you would drive along and you would run into a roadblock and here would be Indians at a roadblock; they either wanted a bribe or they wanted, if you had firearms they wanted your firearms. We had an awful time, you know, negotiating with these people and being able to operate. And some of our people, some of our technicians would run into real problems from time to time with these militias because they were all over the country. The highland agricultural workers had some kind of organization but there were militias and we had to deal with all of them and our local people, our servicio people, learned who the militias were and how to get along with them and find out what they wanted and try to be cooperative in helping them get what they wanted. So we were not only dealing with the central government we were dealing with all of these factions throughout the country. I suppose that even today that Bolivia still has some of these elements. In other words, the central government and its extensions do not necessarily indicate what is happening in the countryside.

Q: By the time you left were you, you talked about the roles- were you doing other things?

MORRIS: Yes, we were. We had some very good successes in agriculture. We set up agricultural vocational schools, a large one in Cochabamba and another one in Santa Cruz and we were working on rice production, sugar production and by that time the Development Loan Fund came into existence. This was a TCA innovation to help us in our areas of technical assistance where we could get additional money. And so we had a lending office, lending, making loans to various enterprises throughout the country. We had loans for Brazil nut production; we had another couple of loans for sugar production. And these were successful loan programs where we really did help people get started in various activities and they were successful at them. And they paid back their loans.

We had an education program which was basically primary education, expanding the number of primary schools throughout the country. And we had a nurse training program in health. Those are the areas that I recall most specifically.

I think that on the whole the programs that we were operating there were useful and successful in terms of advancing specific project areas.

You asked earlier about the miners. Since we were engaged with the Comibol- we had resisted, all the time I was there, even though we were providing budgetary support to the government we resisted that any money go to Comibol. This was a corporation that was operating mines that presumably could make enough money to stay in operation; maybe not making fabulous profits but tin, selling tin on the international market was a good business. And we resisted helping Comibol. The IMF (International Monetary Fund) had a representative there all the time I was there and the IMF's primary concern was that the Bolivian Government keep inflation under control. The Bolivian budget was growing; we were not increasing our money to the Bolivian Government so there began to be pressure on us to begin providing budgetary assistance to Comibol as well. The entire time that I was there we resisted that. After I left there was a change of aid directors and there was a change of ambassadors and the ambassador who came in later on and the aid director decided that they would begin providing budgetary assistance to Comibol. I am not sure how that worked out but I still think it was a mistake.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

MORRIS: Well, the ambassador while I was there was Carl Strom.

Q: That is right; I remember him.

MORRIS: Carl Strom had come from Cambodia. So all the time I- Well, actually when I arrived Phil Bonsal was the ambassador. And Phil went to Havana; he was the first U.S. ambassador, maybe the only U.S. ambassador, during the time of Fidel Castro. Bonsal

dealt with Castro I guess until maybe he was declared persona non grata at some point. So it was Phil Bonsal and then it was Carl Strom.

Q: You left in '61?

MORRIS: Sixty-one.

Q: I think this is probably a good place to stop.

MORRIS: Okay, very good.

Q: And we will pick this up in 1961 when you are off to where?

MORRIS: Venezuela.

Q: Venezuela. Okay.

Okay, today is the 21st of March, 2007. Pat, Venezuela. You were there from '61 to when?

MORRIS: I was in Venezuela from '61 to '65.

Q: Alright.

MORRIS: Let me see, I was there, I am trying to remember now, I guess I arrived in Venezuela in October of '61 or maybe September of '61. I left Bolivia in July, I think, of '61. Kennedy had been elected president in 1960 and was installed, of course, in January of 1961 as president and I was still in Bolivia at that time. But one of the early changes that Kennedy made in the foreign assistance program, first of all he changed the name of the organization. It had been the International Cooperation Administration and he changed the name to the AID, I guess that was Administration for International Development. He also initiated a new program for Latin America which he called the Alliance for Progress.

One little note about those early days in the Kennedy Administration. Having noticed that Arthur Schlesinger recently died I recall that at the time I was- when I was still in Bolivia, probably in February or March of 1961, at that time Bolivia was the largest assistance program in the hemisphere because for the most part the old Institute of Inter-American Affairs was a technical assistance program and there were not large sums of money involved but our program in Bolivia involved large cash grants to the government for budget support so that in money terms we were spending more money in Bolivia than any other country in the hemisphere. So the Kennedy Administration, when it came in, they focused on that, I imagine, trying to get some idea of how they would fashion an alliance, the new Alliance for Progress. And so there was a delegation from the White House that came down and among the members of that delegation was Arthur Schlesinger. And I really do not remember much about what they looked into while they

were there but I do remember that I was giving a cocktail party at my house—at that time I was the deputy director of the aid mission there—I was giving a cocktail party at my house the day after they arrived so I invited the whole delegation to the cocktail party. I remember my wife saying, as these people filed into our house, who is that fellow in the dirty raincoat? That was Arthur Schlesinger and it really was a dirty raincoat. And that is the only thing that I remember about Arthur Schlesinger.

Q: Well now, Venezuela, now, you know, we are looking now, we are sort of at cross purposes with Venezuela, with Hugo Chavez, who is sort of, you know, acting as the new Castro and all but with lots of oil money.

MORRIS: Right.

Q: Now, Venezuela, we are talking about then, what was an aid program doing there if they had all this oil?

MORRIS: Well this is interesting. The fact is that there was not an aid program there; there were- the Rockefellers had always been very active in Venezuela. Obviously there were still ties to the old Standard Oil in Venezuela. There were at least four large U.S. oil companies operating in Venezuela; there was Atlantic, there was Mobil, there was Exxon, actually at that time it was still Esso, Standard Oil, and Gulf. Those were the active oil companies. Venezuela was exporting about three million barrels of oil a day and it was all under private enterprise. But Venezuela had gone through a fairly violent revolution; it did not last very long but the military dictatorship of Perez Jimenez was overthrown and there were two very strong popular movements that were the beginnings of political parties; the AD, that is Action Democratica and the COPE, which was the social Christian movement and they were jockeying for power. This is before I got there, this was 1960, when Perez Jimenez was overthrown, there was about a year where the country was in practical anarchy.

The American oil companies, of course, continued to produce and they were not being attacked but the situation was very dicey and there was an interim military junta that took over, Wolfgang Larrazabal, who had been a general. But they immediately and I think probably because of very strong U.S. pressure, organized to hold reelections. And the two political parties, the two strongest political parties, the AD and the COPE, both had good candidates and Romulo Betancourt won that election. Romulo Betancourt was a newspaper man and a long-time politician who had been thrown in jail a number of times during the dictatorship of Perez Jimenez; finally was in exile in Costa Rica, came back to Venezuela and ran for president and was elected. Immediately the two parties reached an agreement with regard to democratic practices, that they would not attack each other and they held almost equal strength in the congress. And Betancourt would not have been able to have made many economic and political reforms without some kind of an agreement with the opposition party. They worked out an agreement that they would support each other in certain areas so this was the beginning of a more orderly democratic development in the country. But the situation was still not very stable and so when

Kennedy came in they decided that the United States ought to give very strong backing to Betancourt.

I had come back from Bolivia and was in Washington without an assignment. I was not sure where I was going to go. AID, the new AID still did not have a director. D.A. Fitzgerald, who was the deputy was acting and they had not- the Alliance for Progress was something on paper and they had not even named a new assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs so there was a lot of confusion in Washington at the time. I was first scheduled to go to Jordan as aid director then I was interviewed by the new ambassador to Brazil, who wanted me to go to Brazil as the deputy director of a large aid program in Brazil. I got a call from the new ambassador who had been named by Kennedy, Lincoln Gordon, and so I met with him. He understood that I had just come back from Bolivia. He asked me what I thought about going to Brazil. Well, I was not very happy about the idea of going to Jordan so I said fine, I would not mind going to Brazil as the deputy director. And when D.A. Fitzgerald found out that Lincoln Gordon had interviewed me he called me and said, I do not want any ambassador interviewing AID people for jobs that I do not know anything about. And that was the end of my assignment to Brazil.

Then, I am trying to remember; then Fitzgerald called me again about a week later and said, you know, they are talking about setting up a new program in Venezuela. Are you interested in that? And I said yes. But I did not know for a number of weeks and you can imagine, here I had come out of Bolivia and I had three kids and we were living in our house, we had a house in Washington that had been recently vacated but it did not have any furniture; we had rented it while we were abroad. So we moved into the house and we rented some temporary furniture. And here I was waiting for an assignment, not knowing where I was going, and things were so confused in the transition from one administration to another. So finally they decided that I would go to Venezuela to set up a new AID mission with the idea that we were setting up the mission primarily to give strong backing to the new democratic government in Venezuela, instituting a democratic tradition which, for Venezuela was something new because there had been long periods of dictatorship; there had been only a couple of very short-lived democratic governments.

So I did not have a clue how the program would evolve but it was very clear to me that this effort was an effort primarily to solidify the foundations of democratic development in Venezuela. My own experience had been with the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and then, of course, with this large economic assistance budget support program in Bolivia. So arriving in Venezuela I was not sure what kind of a program we could put together but from the beginning I knew that whatever we did it had to be visible and it had to indicate strong U.S. support for the newly elected democratic government. The Venezuelans had already set up by the time I got there a central planning office in the president's office and that was my main contact, the central planning office. So I worked together with the people in the central planning office. Of course, by that time my Spanish was good and I had no problem communicating with them and spending long hours working out different kinds of programs where the United States could provide assistance. We settled on low-cost housing as one of the primary areas and agricultural

credit, not agrarian reform, but the government had already instituted an agrarian reform program. We decided that this was a sensitive area, that the United States ought not to get too directly identified with and so we worked on agricultural credit but supporting the agrarian reform program. We also tried to influence the expanding of agricultural extension and agricultural research. We gave some marginal assistance in that area. We also decided to provide some of the traditional assistance in the area of education, both primary and secondary education. And we got into small enterprise development, limited loans and small enterprise development. At that time Venezuela was, the Venezuelan Government, was very centralized; everything, the state governors were appointed by the president, they were not elected. I cannot remember whether there were municipal elections or not but all of the taxation and revenues were concentrated in the central government and then they were distributed to the states. So I backed a small organization there that was aimed at municipal reform and moving towards larger democratic activities in the outlying states and municipalities.

So we were in public administration in that area and then we were in small industry development and we were in agricultural credits and we were in a large housing program. And our housing programs were by far the largest single element of our funding. There were two or three different organizations that we made large loans to and all of it was for affordable housing.

Q: Well what was your impression? You got there how long after Jimenez has been overthrown?

MORRIS: I got there, let me see, I think it was '59 when he was overthrown; it was '60 when Larrazabal was there and it was during the Larrazabal time that Nixon visited; Nixon was vice president and had visited all the Latin American countries.

But the situation was very dicey and Nixon - Venezuela was the last stop in his South American tour and he was almost killed. It was very, very close. I think Nixon covered it in one of his books but that was a very, very close thing. They attacked his car on the highway and he was lucky to have escaped. But that is just an indication of how dicey the situation was. And then I got there after Betancourt had been elected, '61. I am not sure but Betancourt was probably elected at the end of '60 so he had been in power, when did I arrive? I think I arrived again, I said I guess I arrived in October, I think, of '61.

Q: I am trying to get a feel for how did you view sort of the people and the bureaucracy and the system that you were going to be dealing with for housing, for agriculture and all. I mean, here was a state that had money but was it dominated, was corruption running it, was revolution ruining it? I mean, what was going on?

MORRIS: Well, there is no doubt that under the Perez Jimenez dictatorship there was the usual corruption. But here you had a new regime. The army and the police force were completely dismantled. The ruling generals, some of them were put in jail and others went into exile and all of the top ruling people of the Perez Jimenez regime left the country. Well, most of them went into exile. So when I got there there was still the attitude of the

new broom sweeping out the old. Just before I got there, just to illustrate how effective that new broom was, there were no police, they had no police force and they had Boy Scouts directing traffic. So they had to set up a whole new police force. That reminds me that we did finally get into police assistance, we had a small police mission there helping the police force organize.

So you had a lot of reformers, some of them with very little experience but with great ideas about all of the things that had to be done in the country. But I must say that I was fortunate to be working with some good professionals. The head of the planning office had been working with the United Nations in economic planning for a number of years. He was a Venezuelan in exile so he had been out of the country but he was a PhD in economics, came back, headed the planning office. His assistant was another economist, Hector Hurtado, and so these people had a good understanding of what was required. There were other offices that I worked with, there was a small public administration office that did not have a clue what they were doing and we tried to help them but we did not get very far.

In agriculture, all through the Perez Jimenez dictatorship the Rockefeller Foundation had funded a little organization there that was working on various aspects of agricultural development. So after Betancourt came into power these people then took over the ministry of agriculture so they were professionals. So we were working with good people in agriculture, people who understood the kinds of reforms that had to take place. And a lot of other professionals in education and in public health; that is right, I forgot We had a small- we gave limited assistance in the area of public health; nothing large. But these people, I remember the minister of public health, he had been in exile too but I think he was working in the Inter-American system in some health capacity so that he came back and, Gabaldon was his name, he had an international reputation and he was very good, he knew exactly what a ministry of public health ought to be doing. So it was uneven; it was uneven.

In the housing area we were dealing with professionals in a number of our loans but there were one or two where we actually had to suspend our funding of the programs because their accounting was off or they had not complied with the provisions in the loan agreements. So it was uneven there.

Q: You sort of take one look- cannot help but look ahead. Was there a consideration about one, sort of corruption within the system and two, the dominance of, you know, the 10 big families or 100 big families?

MORRIS: Well, for me it was very interesting to hear the Venezuelans talk about their own history. The fact is that Venezuela had been in almost continuous revolution from the time of Bolivar onward. There had not occurred the accumulation of great wealth by any particular sector that lasted very long, just because of the internal fighting and civil war, if you will, that went on. The discovery of petroleum in Venezuela made a lot of money for foreign oil companies. And there were incipient great fortunes in Venezuela but Venezuela, when I arrived there, enjoyed the fruits of large exports of petroleum and

was full of nouveau riche. But you did not have the old resentments that you had in other Latin American countries with regard to the elite. There were incipient new fortunes that had been there long enough and today, when I look at the names, I can see- There was a German family that had started a brewery in Caracas about probably the 1920s; they are still there and by the time I got there they had breweries in three or four other towns and they were one of the new elite in the country. So you can see- And there were lots of Italians in the building trades who'd made good money.

Gross inequality in economic wealth was true in Venezuela as in all of the other Latin American countries. And Betancourt instituted an agrarian reform program and gave great support to organizing farm labor. The government gave a subsidy to the farm labor union and there was- the AD Party was really bent upon changing the status of the people in the campo, the people living in the countryside.

Betancourt had set up the agrarian reform program but it really was not very effective. While I was there there was not an on-going program, everything was in the planning stage, if you will. You know, these were the great changes that were going to take place and it was a time of great optimism but it was also a time of deep resentments and there were still a lot of people in the military, at the lower levels because the leaders had all gone into exile. But there were still a lot of resentments in the military against all of this populism and there was, and I suspect probably in the business community, too, that you had a lot of communists that were taking over the country. And there is no doubt that at one time Betancourt had been a member of the communist party. So you had right wing resentment and then you had the growing figure of Castro in Cuba who was already getting the beginnings of assistance from the Soviet Union and a lot of funding from the Italian communist party. There were the beginnings of plots of overthrowing the democratically elected government of Romulo Betancourt.

Q: Well was there not an aborted landing or supplies or something?

MORRIS: There was, there was.

Q: During the time you were there?

MORRIS: Yes, exactly.

Q: Can you explain what that was?

MORRIS: Yes well, let me- Before we get to that let me give you the general picture. Just before I got there, Betancourt was on his way to the Circulo Militar, which was a large complex on the outskirts of Caracas in which the military had its private clubs and it had large headquarters buildings, a parade ground and so forth. And Betancourt was on his way to give a speech at the Circulo Militar when the automobile he was in, a small Volkswagen was coming in the opposite direction and it blew up beside his car. This was not a suicide bomber as we are now familiar with; this car had no driver in it. It was controlled electronically. It blew up, it killed Betancourt's bodyguard, it killed the driver

of the car, it very seriously wounded his aide-de-camp and it burned Betancourt's hands and his face. He was in the hospital for a couple of weeks and all the time he was in the presidency he had problems with his hands from those burns.

Now, this was a plot within the military but it was funded by Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.

Q: Who was unknown- yes, and the right _____.

MORRIS: Of course. See, the right had a monopoly on the Caribbean at that time with Perez Jimenez in Venezuela and Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. So the military plotters in Venezuela were able to get funding and assistance from Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and they almost killed Betancourt.

So that was what was happening on the right. And then on the left you had Castro and the Soviet Union and the Italian communist party. The Italian communist party was funding some of Castro's adventures in the Caribbean. While I was there there were 26 coup attempts; 26 coup attempts against Betancourt. Most of them did not even get into the newspapers because they wanted to keep things calm and most of them were nipped in the bud so that they did not become full blown. But as you mentioned there was an invasion from Cuba. I mean, these were Venezuelans, these were Venezuelan leftists and the Cubans had helped them bring large arms caches into the country and the Venezuelan military caught them as they were unloading these military caches on some of the beaches. At the same time the Venezuelan communist party was getting funding through Cuba and the intelligence reports that we got indicated that it was coming from the Italians, the Italian communist party and they were financing guerrilla operations in eastern Venezuela and also in the Andes. So there were leftist guerrilla operations in the eastern mountains and in the western mountains. All of these coup attempts, there must have been four or five rightist attempts and then there were leftist attempts. So this was a very dicey time and we were doing our best to make sure that everybody knew that the United States was strongly supporting this democratic government.

I will never forget, in the staff meetings, the ambassador-

Q: Who was the ambassador?

MORRIS: It is interesting. When I first arrived there is was Teodoro Moscoso. He was a Puerto Rican named by Kennedy and he had been one of the central figures in the economic development of Puerto Rico and was quite well known. And then right after I got there he was called to Washington to take over the new Alliance for Progress for the hemisphere and Allen Stewart, who was DCM, was named ambassador. Allen Stewart had been a newspaperman in Caracas before World War II and he and Romulo Betancourt had been old buddies; both newspapermen, I think Allen Stewart was AP or something in Venezuela. So this was a natural combination, this was a very good combination because they were on very friendly terms and of course the Kennedy Administration recognized immediately that it made a lot of sense to name Allen

ambassador to work with this government that the administration had decided was key to the image of the United States as supporting democratic governments in the hemisphere. In the staff meetings Allen would lecture the members of the military mission because it was obvious that within the military themselves there were a lot of them who thought Betancourt was a communist, and Allen would lecture the members of the military mission, "If I ever hear that any of you giving any support whatsoever to any talk about overthrowing this government you are going to be out of here in a minute." And so, I am sure that our military mission people were well aware of what side they had to be on and they had very good relations with the Venezuelan military, our missions, and I am sure that the Venezuelan military got the message too. But nevertheless the situation was worrisome.

The whole time I was there, just before I arrived Moscoso had gone to the university to give a talk. His car was attacked and like Nixon before him he also barely got out of there with his life and he never went back. The universities in Latin America were autonomous and the civil police could not go into the university, the universities had their own little police forces and the students had taken over the university and they were all leftists and they were getting support probably from Castro. So the university was off limits to us; we could not even get near the university.

Q: Well you know, politics aside it sounds like not much education was going on.

MORRIS: No doubt. There was not much education going on, exactly. But see, as in most of these Latin American countries this is the state university. Then you had Catholic University; education was going on in Catholic University.

Q: So this is where you got your cavalry, really.

MORRIS: Exactly; exactly.

Q: What about, you mentioned there was guerrilla stuff going on. At that time were we doing anything, you know, sending in special forces to train or anything like that?

MORRIS: No, we did not do it. As far as I know the Venezuelan military was not interested in or maybe we were not pushing it; I do not know. And these outbreaks here and there were not very well organized and the military, I guess, the Venezuelan military thought they could take care of themselves. I was involved later on with SOUTHCOM, the military in Panama, with regard to Bolivia but we will get to that later. But in Venezuela I just do not think that we ever did send any of our troops or give any particular special training in counterinsurgency or any of that. We may have sent some members of the Venezuelan military to Panama for training.

But we were under pressure all the time we were there. We had one kidnapping; a military attaché was kidnapped. The house of the political consular was raided during the day when he was in the embassy at work. His wife was there, she was tied up, they painted graffiti all over the walls but they did not hurt her. They planted a bomb in the

rest room of the embassy; I do not know how they got in. Rest room on the fourth floor where the ambassador's office was blown out. And all of this was in 1962. So you know, we talk about terrorism and so forth today but it was going on back then.

Q: Did Colombia- how were relations between us, as we saw it, relations between Colombia and Venezuela at the time?

MORRIS: Venezuela had a dictator, Perez Jimenez; Columbia had a dictator, Rojas Pinilla. They were both military men and Venezuela had all the money and Colombia had all the problems. I do not- since they were both military men there really was not very much difference in their outlook and so the relations between the two countries was probably fairly good. Rojas Pinilla was overthrown before Perez Jimenez so you had a new democratic government in Colombia and then you had a democratic government in Venezuela and they more or less saw eye to eye. Relationships were friendly but there was not very much cooperation other than just friendly relations between the two countries.

Q: What was your impression of the American oil companies involved in Venezuela? Share the wealth, milk the country for everything they could get out of it or what?

MORRIS: Well you know, you had five different companies. Exxon, Esso at that time was the largest, Standard Oil. They already had the Rockefeller stamp which was beneficent. There was, I am trying to remember, Creole was the name of the company, Esso, the Exxon oil company was Creole; Creole had a foundation, it was large, that gave grants for all kinds of worthy projects. I would say that Creole was very forward looking in every sense of the word. Mobil was happy that there was another oil company taking care of those kinds of things. They were interested in just making money. That is right, Texaco was there too. So there was Mobil, Texaco, Atlantic and Gulf; so there were six of them. And they were just big businesses for the most part except for Creole and Creole, which was the dominating company. And we had U.S. Steel there as well. U.S. Steel was putting in a large steel mill on the Orinoco River. So we had a lot of U.S. capital and therefore U.S. business interests in the country. And they, for the most part, understood our political push although they also had suspicions that Betancourt was really a communist and that he was going to nationalize the oil companies, which eventually did happen but it did not happen under Betancourt and it did not happen under his successor; Leoni or Caldera, it happened two changes down the line. But I think just in terms of looking at where Venezuela is today and why all of these great dreams of a more equitable society did not pan out, and I have followed Venezuela very closely since I left there because I left at a time when it looked as though we had help establish a working democracy where there was peaceful succession from one democratically elected government to another. When I left, I was there for five years, and when I left I recommended that we could begin phasing down, to phase out, our assistance program there because we had accomplished what we had come to do and our hope was, at that time, that these reform programs would take effect and the affordable housing and the agrarian reform and all of these things would begin to have an effect of creating a large, viable middle class and a reduction in poverty, both rural and urban. Those things did not

happen. And there is no doubt that by the third succession, democratic succession in Venezuela all of the old patterns of corruption had seeped back in and had taken over. And some of the people that I knew, Carlos Andres Perez, became president, you know, they were there with Betancourt and they knew what the dream was. But they got lost someplace; they got lost someplace!

Q: Well then you left in '67?

MORRIS: Let me see, when did I, no, I left in '65.

Q: Sixty-five.

MORRIS: Sixty-five, yes.

Q: Okay, where did you go then?

MORRIS: Sixty-five. I came back to Washington and by that time the- in the Latin American area the State Department and the Alliance for Progress, which of course was part of AID, but the Alliance for Progress was incorporated into the State Department. We became part of the State Department and I was given a State Department job. I became office director for Bolivia-Chilean affairs. And we integrated all of the AID offices and the State offices and so I had under me a Bolivia desk office and a political desk officer and an AID desk officer and a Chile political desk office, a political desk officer and an AID desk officer. And so I was in that job from 1965 to 1968 and during - well, during that time there were two - in Chile, this was the time of a populist movement, Christian Democratic populist movement in Chile that resulted in the election of Eduardo Frei. That party was a new party in Chile that became very popular and came to have a great influence and again, from the point of view of the Kennedy Administration, was another sign of great change.

Q: This would be the Johnson Administration by this time.

MORRIS: Let me see.

Q: Yes, '65.

MORRIS: You are right; you are right. Yes, yes. In fact, yes. And so let us go back just a bit here to what had happened in Venezuela. Betancourt left office in '63 and Leoni, also of the same party, was elected president. So that there had been a transition in Venezuela, democratic transition in Venezuela and at the same time, just before that election, Kennedy was assassinated. I was on home leave at the time and I went back to Venezuela. Betancourt had made a state visit to the United States and Kennedy had made a visit to Venezuela while I was there. And so there were very good relations between the two countries and there was real sadness when Kennedy died and Betancourt himself said to Allen Stewart, "It is really ironic that Kennedy was killed. He kept telling me to be

careful because he thought for sure that I might not last out my term, that I would be killed and it was he who died.”

So that is right, it was the Johnson Administration.

Q: Well, let us take Chile first. I would have thought that Chile would be somewhat like Venezuela. It did not have oil but it was a fairly well run, sort of democratic country.

MORRIS: That is correct.

Q: As opposed to Bolivia. And did it need help?

MORRIS: Well, unlike Venezuela, Chile had copper. This was one of the primary sources of government revenue. But overall it did not have any- it did not even come close to Venezuela in terms of prosperity. The price of copper fluctuated and the revenues to the government from copper fluctuated with the price of copper. The arrangements that they had with Anaconda Copper and Kennecott were modest in terms of the amount of money coming in to the treasury from copper. Chile was an agricultural country really; had good agricultural practices and had therefore- had a standard of living that was higher than Peru and Bolivia but not as high as Argentina and not as high as Venezuela in terms of- I say Venezuela, that is those prospering under the oil economy. But Chile had a long democratic tradition, interrupted one or two times by military coups but for the most part it was one of the countries in Latin America that had a better record of freely elected democratic governments than most.

But the Institute of Inter-American Affairs had had programs in Chile, I think beginning, well beginning during World War II; just it had in the other countries. They were not large programs, I think it was mainly in public health and maybe something in agriculture but they were not large programs. So the Institute had been there and the Chileans, like the Argentineans had never really declared themselves one way or the other with regard to the Second World War and were not too cooperative with the United States on many things. They had a large German population in the south and so the U.S.-Chilean relations were proper but not too warm. When Frei came in, this, in a way, was revolutionary in the sense that this was a very reform minded government and there was talk of agrarian reform and there was talk of redistribution of income and so forth and this frightened a lot of people. But again, the Kennedy Administration saw this as the beginnings of the kind of change that ought to be taking place in Latin America and so we gave strong support to Frei. So when I came on Chilean affairs in the State Department we had already established large loan programs; we called them program loans. Now, these were different from the kind of support that we gave to Bolivia, had been giving to Bolivia before when I was in Bolivia, in the sense that the loan money that we gave - were grants, they were not loans. We gave large grants to the Bolivian government for budget support. The program loans that we gave to Chile were loans, first of all, and secondly they were to support general areas of economic activity within the country. But those areas were identified so the loan money was dispersed to specific areas of development; agriculture, port building, whatever. And at that time, when I took

over Chilean affairs, the two largest programs in the hemisphere, new Alliance for Progress programs were Chile and Colombia. The program that I had started in Venezuela in the early years before the program loan started was the largest in the hemisphere but by the time I took over Chilean affairs there were large program loans going to Chile. Really this was monetary support for a democratic government, is what it was.

Q: How did they handle it?

MORRIS: For the most part there were never any scandals on how the money was used. From my point of view as office director I was not convinced that our accounting systems were all that good in following where the money was going but since there were no scandals that ever came to light I guess we have to assume that in general the money was used for what we had intended it to be used. And this support was very important for Frei because just like in Venezuela there were great doubts in the business community, that is the Chilean business community, and the conservative parties in Chile that Frei was just another communist in camouflage. But nevertheless we carried on a very active assistance program to Chile and we had a very good relationship during the time that I was there.

One of the things that I tell people, in my whole experience as a member of the U.S. foreign policy organization, I never ran into any other government that was so skillful at manipulating the United States. The Chileans were masters at knowing exactly what to say and how to say it and when to say it to get their way with the United States on practically every issue and I could do nothing but take off my hat to their skill.

Q: Were you aware of this game being played on you?

MORRIS: I was; I was. And of course they really were not playing the game on me because they were playing the game with the United States Government and I just admired how daft they were at it. But I will never forget, Radomiro Tomic was the Chilean ambassador and Radomiro was a prominent politician in the Christian Democratic Party with presidential ambitions. In fact, he did run for president after Frei left but he was the Chilean ambassador to the United States and I was the office director and Radomiro would call me and say I have to see Secretary Rusk. And I would say well okay, Radomiro, you know, I have got to write up a request to the secretary and what do you want to talk about? So he would go through the motions and I would say, Radomiro, that is not going to get you into the secretary's office. And he would insist; he would insist that he had very important business. One time he called me with one of these requests. He got in to see the secretary quite often, actually. I went along as a note taker. One time he called me and said I have instructions from the foreign ministry to see Secretary Rusk immediately. I said what is it about, Radomiro? And he said the Bolivians are mounting a military attack against Chile. He said our intelligence shows that the Bolivians have been moving troops to the border for two weeks now and I have got to talk to the secretary. And I said well, Radomiro, we have been following the same movements and we do not think that there is any danger of the Bolivians actually

mounting an attack; we do not think they have the force. And he insisted and I said okay, Radomiro, I will do my best to get you in to see the secretary. He said look, I cannot go back to the foreign ministry saying Secretary Rusk refused to see me. And I said okay, Radomiro, I will do my best to get you in but I said, Secretary Rusk has probably even better information than I have and from what I see there is no threat whatsoever. And he insisted so I wrote up the memo and I called up, it was probably Larry Eagleburger because he was the aide to Rusk at that time, I am not sure that it was Larry.

Q: It would not have been Larry Eagleburger at this time; Larry was actually in Yugoslavia.

MORRIS: Oh, okay. Yes, that is right, Larry was there later; he was aide to Kissinger, I guess.

Q: Yes.

MORRIS: Yes. But anyway, on the basis of my call to whoever the aide was, Radomiro got in to see Rusk and typical, he spent about two minutes on this threat. He wanted to talk to the secretary about Vietnam. And I am sure that he did it to be able to, on the diplomatic cocktail circuit, to say well, when I was talking to Secretary Rusk yesterday about this in Vietnam, just to burnish his own image. But anyway, Rusk was very friendly and tolerant of Radomiro; he called him Brother Tomic. He would say Brother Tomic, and then he would justify our presence in Vietnam. But from my point of view it was quite educational in the sense that I got to hear Rusk's speech on why we were in Vietnam and there is no doubt that it was heartfelt. I mean, Rusk believed, he probably believed to his death that we did the right thing. But Tomic was very good; a good- in the typical expert Chilean fashion knew how to get around and knew how to make himself known and to advance Chile's interests. And all the time I was head of the office we had excellent relations with Chile and the Chileans usually got what they wanted.

Q: What about Bolivia? What was happening?

MORRIS: Oh yes, yes. You know, this was the time of Che Guevara.

Q: Oh yes. I am thinking maybe this might be a good place to stop.

MORRIS: To stop; I think so, yes. And then we will do Bolivia.

Q: We will pick this up the next time when you had both Bolivia and Chile affairs. We have covered Chile and now we will talk about Bolivia the next time.

You were there from when to when doing that?

MORRIS: 1965 to 1968.

Q: Okay. We will pick it up then.

MORRIS: Right.

Q: Today is the 2nd of April, 2007. Pat, Bolivia. What are we going to talk about?

MORRIS: Well, I just gave a general resume of the situation in Chile when I was in charge of Chile/Bolivian affairs in the State Department. Now I am going to review the situation in Bolivia.

I had been in Bolivia from the end of 1958 to 1960, July of 1960, and then I went to Venezuela. Actually, I left Bolivia in July and then I was in Washington on home leave and finally arrived in Venezuela the end of 1960. So now this is 1965, I had left Venezuela and was in charge of Chile and Bolivian affairs in Washington. During the time that I was in Venezuela the situation in Bolivia had deteriorated; they had successfully elected- had elections, two separate elections. The same political party was in control, that was Paz Estenssoro who headed the government after the 1953 Bolivian revolution and then he was succeeded by Siles Zuazo and Siles Zuazo was succeeded by Paz Estenssoro again and it was during the second presidency of Paz Estenssoro that there was a military coup. So when I came on Chile/Bolivian affairs there was a military junta in Bolivia headed by General Ovando from the army and General Barrientos from the air force. They were co-presidents, if you will, although Ovando had the title. But it was a co-presidency and not long after I arrived in that position Barrientos moved into a controlling place and was named president. I cannot recall now exactly what the mechanics of that was but Ovando still had a lot of influence but Barrientos became the front man for the regime and during most of my time the U.S. ambassador in Bolivia dealt with Barrientos in diplomatic negotiations of any kind. The U.S. ambassador was Douglas Henderson, Doug was a career officer, had been economic consular in Lima and was named by the Kennedy Administration as ambassador to Bolivia. All of this took place before I arrived so when I arrived Doug was in his job and Barrientos was the president or the president of the junta, I guess probably is what his specific title was.

But Bolivia had not made very much solid economic progress from the time that I had left earlier, although we had continued, the United States Government had continued to provide substantial economic assistance. We had technical assistance programs and a large budget support grant program providing funds to keep the government operating. This had changed somewhat in that the U.S. Government was giving a lot of money now to the mining corporation which was not the case during the time that I had been there. This was something that I personally and the AID director, I was deputy director, had resisted all the time we were there. We thought it was throwing money down a rat hole but subsequent administrations in Bolivia, that is AID people, had made other decisions; the State Department as well, made other decisions so that we were now heavily funding the mining corporation.

Q: The mining corporation was Bolivian mining corporation?

MORRIS: Well, what had happened was that the revolution in 1953, they had nationalized all of the mining operations in the country and they were put under a single administration. All mining operations were put under a single administration. Well, I take that back. All of the tin mines were put under a single administration. There was a ministry of mines that had responsibility for other disparate mining activity that might be going on in the country and in fact there were a few private mines still in existence, small, mostly in the precious metals, in gold and silver but the tin mines, which had been the basis of the Bolivian economy for about 20 or 25 years was now under the mining corporation, Comibol, and Comibol was headed by Juan Lechin. And Juan Lechin was a politician, a very able politician, and union leader and he operated Comibol like a political slush fund; he spent lavishly on himself and those around him but had the full and enthusiastic support of all of the miners because he could give great speeches about how they were in charge and so forth and so on. And there probably was an improvement in the conditions in the mines, minor improvements of conditions in the mines and maybe some improvements in the miners' salaries. But the fact is that the mining corporation almost from the beginning was losing money; they were spending more money than they were making. And here the United States was in a position of propping up this failing enterprise.

Q: What is the rationale?

MORRIS: The rationale was that there would be chaos in the country if we let Comibol go under, because the miners were a very strong political force. There would be just widespread revolution and chaos. And so it was really a handholding operation. But I suspect, and I have never looked at the record, but I suspect that we were not completely unhappy that the military took over and kicked out Juan Lechin from the mining corporation and began to try to bring a little bit more order into what was happening on the economics scene in the country. But nevertheless the situation throughout the time that I was there was minor chaos. When I had been in Bolivia the fact is that the elected government really did not have control of the country. They controlled major cities but there were organized militias throughout the country and these militias were controlled by political leaders. And so each one of these political leaders had their fiefdom and Juan Lechin had the miners. But there were peasant organizations, the campesinos, which also had their leaders and you could not travel in Bolivia from one city to another without being stopped by roadblocks a half-a-dozen times; at each point you had to pay some kind of a tribute to get by. So that was the situation when I was there.

It improved a little bit under the military junta because the military could follow orders; the military was in charge and the military enforced their regime on the country more effectively than had been done previously. Nevertheless the economic situation continued to be rather precarious and it was during this time, I am trying to remember the date now; let me see, 1962, 1963, March the 17th, 1963, we got the first reports in Washington coming out of Bolivia, coming out of the CIA. Actually we had earlier reports of some kind of a revolutionary movement in the lowlands, in the Santa Cruz area and further to the south near Tarija, of strange guerrilla activities. And it was- the date sticks in my mind, March 17, 1963, when we got the first report that this was a group of Cubans

organizing the campesinos in the area to begin to take over portions of these rural areas and Che Guevara was heading that group. The CIA had operatives in that area and I am not sure exactly- they had not infiltrated the insurgent movement but they had a pretty good idea of what was going on and they were working with the Bolivian armed forces and had become aware of these activities. When we were certain that this was an attempt by the Cubans to start a peasant revolution in Bolivia we, in cooperation with the Bolivian military, actually the Bolivian military came to us for assistance, and we sent a couple of Ranger battalions out of Panama to Santa Cruz, not to engage the insurgents but to train the Bolivians in counterinsurgency. And we continued to get regular reports through the CIA as to the activities of the insurgents and the guerrillas in the lowlands and they had successfully evaded any confrontation with Bolivian armed forces for the most part. There were a couple of minor skirmishes but nothing of any significance.

But as this went on there was a surge of almost hysteria in Argentina because the Argentines were getting the same kind of reports and although the area that the guerrillas were in was closer to Paraguay, it was not close to the Argentine border, but since Che Guevara was an Argentine the Argentine military began making preparations to invade Bolivia and take care of this insurgency because they did not trust the Bolivian military. And the situation- we began getting urgent messages from our ambassador in Argentina, who at that time was Ed Martin, saying that he was doing everything that he could to calm down the Argentine military and that the situation was under control, that the United States was providing assistance to the Bolivian military, training them in counterinsurgency and that the Argentines did not have to consider moving into Bolivia to take care of this. The Bolivians could take care of it themselves, but he was not, he said, having very much success. So he asked for somebody to come down from Washington to help assure the Argentines.

So the assistant secretary asked me to go down; we were in contact with the U.S. ambassador, Doug Henderson in Bolivia; but the assistant secretary asked me to go down to Bolivia and to visit the counterinsurgency training camps in Santa Cruz that were the U.S. Ranger battalions- the training camps set up by the U.S. Ranger battalions. So I went first to Panama, to SOUTHCOM (U.S. Army Southern Command), and got a full briefing from the people there as to exactly what they were doing in Bolivia and then I went to La Paz and spent a couple of days with the ambassador talking about what he knew and what the immediate situation in the hinterlands was. Then I went to Santa Cruz and spent a couple of days with the Ranger battalion observing the training and getting assessments on the capacity of the Bolivian forces to take care of this insurgency. Then from there I went to Buenos Aires and spent a couple of days with Ed Martin going over everything that I had learned. Ed finally decided, on the basis of what I told him, that he did not think that it would be necessary for me to talk to the Argentine military, that he would take care of it, that he could use my conversation and the assurances that I had gotten on all levels about the competency of the Bolivians to take care of the situation.

I came back to the United States and shortly thereafter the Bolivian Ranger-trained battalions caught the Cuban insurgents and surrounded them and wore them down and either captured or killed all of them. In that roundup Che Guevara had been wounded but

was captured and he was taken to a Bolivian army outpost someplace in the area and was assassinated by the Bolivian army and his body was absconded so that nobody would ever know where he was, so as to prevent anybody from building a shrine to him or in any way trying to utilize his death to further their cause. We were following these events fairly closely in Washington on the basis of the CIA reporting and by that time the CIA had incorporated a number of Cuban exiles into the Bolivian armed forces and at least one of them was there at the time of the assassination of Che Guevara. So we got fairly detailed and accurate reports of what was going on, what had been going on the whole time.

For me, the most surprising event out of all of this was that five days after we had gotten word that Che Guevara had been killed by the Bolivian military there appeared in Time magazine - Time had a stringer in Bolivia who must have had very close connections with the Bolivian military and it was not even a bold or a sensational article; it was just a, sort of almost an afterthought in Time saying that it had been reported from La Paz that Che Guevara had been killed by the Bolivian military. A short article and nothing more. In fact, I had known this stringer when I lived in La Paz and I guess I did not ever talk to him after that but I talked to the Time magazine people here in Washington and they would not talk about how they got the information. But the fact is that during that time it appeared only once and never again, as far as I know, in the U.S. media, about how Che was killed. Later on, of course, there were books and articles which detailed the whole thing, but at the time there were just indications that the Bolivian military had taken care of the insurgency and they had killed Che Guevara but there were none of the details about how he was killed.

Q: Was there any accusation at the time or any hint that we were involved in the killing?

MORRIS: Yes, there was some. And probably to this day - there are still some - I am not familiar with all the different books but there probably are accusations that we were involved in it. Actually we were not involved but we were aware of what was going on.

Q: One of the stories I have heard is that Che Guevara ended up trying to create a revolution in an area where he did not speak the language and with, basically with Indians who just did not- were not of the revolutionary type or something.

MORRIS: Well, that is exactly right. The fact is that the Andean Indian, not only in Bolivia but in Peru and in Ecuador and probably in Colombia too, had been exploited by outsiders for so long that they do not trust anybody. So here you had these mostly white Cubans, maybe a few blacks among them but mostly white Cubans who spoke Caribbean Spanish; and of course, Che spoke Argentinean Spanish, trying to convince Indians who spoke practically no Spanish and Quechua or Aymara speakers to start a revolution. From the reporting that we got it was clear that these people were really lost, that is the Cubans, they were really lost trying to get support. In fact, they had lost all support from the Bolivian communist party. The Bolivian communist party thought they were crazy and the Bolivian communist party was right. And so the Cubans cut themselves off from the Bolivian communist party because it was 100 percent against what they were doing. So

they, as far as I know, they had some local support but mostly they bought it; they had money and they bought it. But I cannot think of any local groups that were ideologically tied to them which gave them any assistance. So it was a lost cause from the beginning.

From what I read about Castro, Castro was just glad to get Che Guevara out of his hair in Havana because he had sent Che to The Congo before that. And as long as Che was in The Congo he was out of his hair and then he came back to Havana and he was in the way so he encouraged him to start a revolution in South America. And the idea, of course, in the Argentine military was 100 percent correct; Che's idea was that if they could start this movement in the Bolivian lowlands that they could easily spread it into the hinterlands of Argentina and into Paraguay. But obviously it was a pipedream.

Q: Well then, how long did you have the Chilean/Bolivian job?

MORRIS: Until 1968.

Q: Then what?

MORRIS: And then I was given a sabbatical and I went to Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, and got a Masters degree in international finance.

Q: How did you find that? This is '68 to?

MORRIS: Sixty-eight to '69.

Q: How did you find that?

MORRIS: Well you know, I do not know what your experience has been, Stuart, with regard to universities but I had graduated from Georgetown. We had two or three outstanding professors and then the rest were mediocre to nil. I found the same thing at SAIS, that there were two or three outstanding people and that the student body is what made the university and not the teachers. Isaiah Frank was my counselor at SAIS. Now, we did not write a thesis; they had decided that that was a waste of time and I agree. Isaiah Frank was an old State Department hand who had left State oh, maybe five or so years earlier and became professor there. He had a PhD in economics and was a first-rate teacher. So he agreed that on the basis of my experience in Latin America and especially in Venezuela, I should research rising unemployment in spite of all of the U.S. assistance that we had provided the country.

So even though I had gotten my degree in international finance, because I did take a lot of international finance-type courses, I really concentrated my own personal efforts in the area of development and unemployment and wrote several lengthy papers relating what was happening in the developing world and rising unemployment. I actually confirmed, in my own mind, part of Marx's earlier thesis with regard to development causing unemployment. The sequences in the earlier time that Marx was writing may have been different than the present time but the fact is that modernization in the developing world

meant that a large portion of the rural population was being deprived of employment because of the industrialization of agriculture. And these people were moving to the cities and were not being absorbed into modern economy fast enough and so you had, all over Latin America and from my later experiences other parts of the world were the same, where development, modernization was not keeping up in terms of rural to urban migration, could not keep up with the need to employ and to bring into participation the large movements of people and therefore throughout Latin America you had these shanty towns in the urban areas that were growing. And that was the area that I concentrated on during my time at SAIS.

Q: Well then, then came '69. Whither?

MORRIS: I came back into AID and was assigned to the Office of Program and Planning, the central planning office in AID. And I was put in charge of the liaison with State, AID, United Nations on development, all development matters. At that time the United States had been pressuring the United Nations' Development Program, which, if you recall, the UNDP started out as a small organization to do development work similar to what AID was doing but under UN aegis. And Paul Hoffman, who had been the administrator of the Marshall Plan, became the first administrator of UN Development Program. But it was a small program and the U.S. believed that it was an inefficient program and that it needed a real shot in the arm and so I became the lead man in the U.S. hierarchy working with IR (International Relations) in State and the Policy and Programming coordination in AID, pushing for reforms at UNDP (United Nations Development Program). And they had commissioned a study by McKenzie and company and had employed a Brit; he was an Australian by the name of Jackson, I cannot remember his first name; he had quite a reputation in the United Kingdom and so was a man of stature. But when I came onboard the Jackson report had just come out and my office became the central point in the U.S. Government for pushing U.S. efforts to implement the Jackson report. And so I spent a lot of my time in New York working with the U.S. delegation to the UN in New York, primarily, in fact 100 percent of my time, was working on UNDP. I had my office in Washington but every other week or so I would be spending two or three days in New York working with UNDP and with other UN delegations. That, of course, was our whole point, was working with other UN delegations, other country delegations to the UN, to get them to support our efforts to make the necessary changes within UNDP.

Q: What was, you might say, the thrust of both the Jackson report and our desires to make the UNDP a more effective program?

MORRIS: I cannot, at this time, recall the details. We had conducted a thorough review of the Jackson report and supported most of its recommendations. So we were pushing to have it adopted by the UN hierarchy.

We were interested in improving the whole recruitment process and making sure that they improved their professionalism. Their programming was very amateurish. And Paul Hoffman, a wonderful guy, he was treated like a god up there and with reason. You

know, here was a man who brought the Studebaker Corporation out of bankruptcy and turned it into a going organization and then went on to head the Marshall Plan in Europe. But Paul Hoffman was, by this time in his 80s, a venerable figure and a wonderful guy. He had, I cannot remember his name now, he had an assistant, an American, who had the second top job in the organization who was a professional in every sense of the word but they were just living within the realities of the UN system at that time and they, both Paul and whatever this fellow's name, both realized and they accepted the recommendations of the Jackson report in toto and were happy to have the United States pushing the other delegations to get it implemented. But as in any multi-national or even any organization that has multiple interests you get all kinds of different obstacles and people had already built up their little fiefdoms and they were resisting making any changes so that even if Paul Hoffman had wanted to he would not have been able to do it without a very strong support from member nations and of course that is what we were engaged in.

And I was on that job for, let me see, '69, yes, I guess all of '69 and then I was offered a job in Paris at- U.S. delegation to the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) as deputy director of the delegation to the DAC, which was the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. We had at that time four people on that delegation. And that was of great interest to me for two reasons. All the time I have been in the field I had become intimately familiar with the operation problems and I think that I had a very good understanding of what made a program work and how you made it work and what you had to do to make it work and so forth. But I had never had an opportunity to step back from the trees and see the whole forest. What was going on at the DAC looked at the development assistances worldwide. The United States had established, after the Marshall Plan in Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and within that organization there was the Development Assistance Committee that coordinated or attempted to coordinate the activities of all the countries in the industrial world that were providing economic assistance to the developing world. And I thought that that would really complete my understanding of development, both from a micro point of view and from a macro point of view. And so I was quite interested and in fact, it just happened that that particular activity was part of my responsibility in Washington; my office within AID had a responsibility for coordinating all international program activities. I had spent nine-tenths of my time on UN because the DAC was almost problem-free and we had routine requirements to provide the delegation in Paris with information and expertise whenever they needed it in particular areas that were under consideration by the DAC. So I had continuing contact with the DAC all the time I was doing the UN work and our delegate to the DAC at that time was Stuart Van Dyke. And Stuart asked me if I wanted to come to Paris and since I had spent my whole career in Latin America this was an opportunity to go to Europe, to work in Europe and in a great city like Paris. And of course my wife was delighted when she heard that I had an opportunity to take a job in Paris. So we went to Paris in January of 1970.

Q: And you were there how long?

MORRIS: Two-and-a-half years.

Q: What was your impression of the organization there? Were you up against the fiefdoms and-?

MORRIS: Probably; probably. But the play there was interesting because it had to do with governments pushing their own themes and it was great fun because part of the DAC process was that each year the heads of the various development organizations of the various countries had to come to the DAC to defend their programs; to explain their programs and to defend their programs. And so it was great fun to pick holes in everybody else's programs. And of course, you know, our programs were criticized and most of the criticism was political criticism; it was not development criticism. My interests, of course, were in the mechanics of development but this devolved on that level, at least, although we had lots of other meetings where we did get into the essence of development and we were- I think that the organization itself, OECD and the DAC, are absolutely essential to continuing interchanges between countries and among countries on what they are doing, why they are doing it; it gives you insights that are really essential to make international assistance work.

Q: Did you pick up on, I mean, there were many other themes but the fascination of, particularly Scandinavian countries with Nyerere in Tanzania and all where he was really driving his country, it was my impression, into the ground using the Fabian socialist model but he was a great talker and you know, particularly Scandinavian countries fell in love with him, kind of.

MORRIS: Yes, yes. Well, you know the Scandinavians were in many ways above the battle, they are above the ideological battles and they really thought of their programs really as philanthropic efforts. But, you know, their own development models had evolved into socialist or semi-socialistic models which worked for them and so it made sense in their view to support similar efforts around the world. And, it is an interesting commentary, really, that Sweden at the turn of the last century, that is the beginning of the 20th century, was almost 100 percent rural and agricultural and during the progress of the 20th century became a leading industrial nation.

After I served in Paris I eventually went to the Dominican Republic and I cannot remember why but at some point I had the idea of comparing the Dominican Republic and Sweden, their advances, industrially. Probably one of the reasons was that they had comparable populations; very different in every other way but they had comparable populations and comparable land mass. Maybe Sweden is a little larger than the Dominican Republic but not too much larger. And the evolution of Sweden in the 20th century, alongside the evolution of the Dominican Republic, there is a difference of night and day. And of course I think in the minds of the Scandinavians they had accomplished great things following, you say a Fabian model. Yes, they are following a Fabian model and they saw no reason why this would not work in the rest of the world.

Let me see. Where are we now?

Q: Well did you- Talk about when you were with-

MORRIS: OECD.

Q: -OECD. Did-

MORRIS: And the DAC. OECD has top notch staff but mostly provides statistical and economic development information reports; reports, reports. But all of this information is extremely valuable because it is all analytical, and it gives you insights.

You know the World Bank does some of this and you find a lot of World Bank reports being cited but I think that the OECD reports are just as valid and many times better reports on development problems than the World Bank reports are. In terms of U.S. development programs or any other country development programs, the DAC reviews did not really make much difference in terms of the direction that those programs took. The programs, each one of the country programs were pre-determined long before the DAC reviews took place and they continued on their way regardless of our reviews. I think they were useful in the sense that the people who ran the programs became aware of the professional judgments that were being made on their areas of weakness.

For example, we all played a game of how generous we were and the United States included- Well first of all, the funds for U.S. development assistance included our economic assistance to Israel, our economic assistance to Egypt, which took up almost 50 percent of the budget at that time. And those programs were politically determined.

Q: Well actually, we were not giving as much to Egypt at the time you were there because it was only in the mid, late- '70s that we-

MORRIS: Well yes, you are right; you are right.

Q: But we were giving significant amounts to what is now an underdeveloped country.

MORRIS: Exactly. But we were counting it as development assistance. And of course by the same token the French included in their development programs a lot of their overseas territories that even had representatives in the French parliament.

Q: Yes, sure.

MORRIS: For example those Caribbean countries the French-

Q: Martinique.

MORRIS: Martinique, yes, and there are a couple of little islands off of Canada.

Q: Yes, yes, those two little islands.

MORRIS: Right. And they were part of the French development assistance programs and of course we would criticize them, that this was French, not overseas assistance, just territorial assistance.

Q: How about the Cold War? How did this intrude?

MORRIS: That is a good question. I think that for the most part we were all on the same page.

Q: Were the Soviets doing- Because the Soviets had quite a program in Africa.

MORRIS: Yes but they were not part of the OECD.

Q: Oh, that is right.

MORRIS: They were not part of the OECD. But you know, the thing is that we were in Vietnam and we had a large assistance program in Vietnam and obviously we included that and we got very, very strong criticism from everybody else for including Vietnam as a legitimate development assistance program. Privately I could agree that you cannot do very much legitimate development assistance in the middle of a war, just as we are seeing again in Iraq, where it is very difficult to justify any kind of traditional development assistance program when you have a war going on.

Q: You left the OECD in?

MORRIS: Seventy-three.

Q: Seventy-three and there you went to the Dominican Republic was it?

MORRIS: No, no. I came back to Washington and became deputy director of Panama affairs; that is- the Latin American bureau was completely integrated and this was State Department Panama affairs and of course the primary focus of everything we were doing in Panama was the extended Panama Canal treaty negotiations.

I arrived at exactly the same time that Ellsworth Bunker had returned from Vietnam and was named the U.S. negotiator for treaty negotiation with Panama. We had a substantial development program in Panama. At that time a military dictator, Omar Torrijos, had taken over. Panama like a lot of the Latin American countries varied regularly between military takeovers and democratically elected governments. When I arrived on the scene Torrijos was the military leader, a paratrooper, and he was a very skilled political leader in the sense that the Panamanians probably would not have gotten the canal, gotten us to sign a treaty turning the canal over to them in the year 2000, but for Torrijos skillful pressure on the United States and making an issue out of the fact that the canal cut Panama in two. It was all nationalistic emotions. The fact is that the canal provided for the wellbeing of- probably 50 percent of the Panamanian population, most of it related to employment by the Panama Canal Company. But nevertheless, there had been riots in

Panama against the United States during the Johnson Administration and that resulted in the beginning of negotiations.

By the time I got back or by the time I came into that job Nixon was on his way out because of Watergate. He had not resigned yet but during my time there Ford had taken over as president, Henry Kissinger had become secretary of state and Bunker was quietly negotiating with the Panamanians on the canal. I had nothing to do directly with the negotiations. I had responsibility really for just keeping our other activities in Panama on track and of course I was in almost daily contact with our ambassador in Panama, who at that time was Bob Sayer, and I had worked for Bob previously when I was Bolivia/Chile; he was deputy assistant secretary under Lincoln Gordon. There was a great reluctance throughout the bureaucracy, I think, the State Department bureaucracy, about actually turning the canal over to the Panamanians. There was concern, and there was even greater concern in the Pentagon, because the strategic importance of the canal for the passage of ships in time of war so that the general attitude was that we could negotiate indefinitely with the Panamanians and that we would never, ever have to really face up to eventually turning the canal over. Nevertheless, even in the Pentagon there was recognition that the strategic importance of the canal had diminished almost to the point of not being relevant. Nevertheless there was a great sentimental attachment to our staying there.

Q: We stole it fair and square.

MORRIS: Yes, right. A great sentimental attachment to it, And of course within the United States there is no doubt that public opinion believed that the canal was ours and had been ours from the beginning of time. Even though I was not engaged in the negotiations per se I was enlisted to make speeches all over the United States, bringing people up to date on the status of the canal, what was going on, what our negotiations were and I have, in my file, a letter from a fellow who had heard one of my speeches. He wrote to President Ford and he said Patrick Morris, who works for the State Department, said in a speech that the Panama Canal does not belong to the United States and everybody knows that that is a lie and I have a friend from the FBI who says that anybody who thinks that we ought to give the canal back to the Panamanians should be shot and I propose that number one on that list is Patrick Morris. So the White House sent me the letter, they probably never answered it, it was a crank letter, but it is one of the mementos that I have from that time.

Q: Well on these talks how did you find your reception by audiences?

MORRIS: Well, I can give you a number of examples. I went to the American Legion convention in Miami and spoke to one of their panels on the negotiations. You know, they had set up a specific panel and we had a request from the American Legion, I mean the State Department had a request from the American Legion, to send somebody to address this panel on the Panama Canal negotiations. I had been doing this on a number of occasions so it did not come as a surprise. I went there and I got a very hostile reception. But I was familiar with the facts; I was not surprised by the reception I was getting and I had good arguments, at least in my mind and the State Department's mind

we had good arguments for carrying on the negotiations with the Panamanians. Of course, in pointing out the diminishing strategic interests of the United States in keeping the canal and the threats, and these were real threats in the sense that the Panamanians could have sabotaged the canal with such ease had they gotten into a furor and of course I used all of these arguments. In fact, after the treaty was signed the New York Times reported that the Panamanian government had plans to sabotage the canal and blow up the railroad if we stopped negotiations.

There is another letter that I have in my file from the commander of the American Legion after my appearance. Again, a letter to the White House commending me for assisting in one of their panels and explaining in ample detail the reasons for the negotiations. So even though my memory of that occasion was one of having been under intense pressure, the fact that they were gracious enough to emphasize my effectiveness in their report to the White House was gratifying.

Q: How about your dealings with that particular brand of Americans, the Zonians?

MORRIS: Well, the fact is that I never had to deal with the Zonians. But I did participate in a State Department, what did we call those things? Public education, I guess it was. You remember we used to send out groups of three or four people to different areas of the country and I was the Latin American representative on one such panel. In other words, anything that came up on Latin American I was supposed to handle, not just Panama. And one of our first stops was—what is the capital of Florida? Tallahassee. Was Tallahassee, Florida; that is very close to Panama City, Florida, which is full of retired Zonians. So I did- But that was the closest I ever got to ever having to face them head-on and recognize that we were really ending a way of life as far as they were concerned. And of course it was true.

Q: Yes. Well, did you, in your innermost thoughts, I am talking about you and the others dealing with this, saying okay, we cannot hang around with nationalists but we cannot hang onto the Panama Canal forever, we have got to make a pretty good- I mean a deal to get out of it. But was there a feeling also that- You know, Panama is not a very stable, the political situation is not the greatest there and maybe they will run it down or it will be an unstable, there will be riots or what have you. How did you feel about, you know, in your heart of hearts, about Panama the country?

MORRIS: Well as I said earlier, the fact is that within the bureaucracy the thought was really reluctant negotiation. In fact, I learned the phrase that I had not been familiar with until I took that job. The phrase was, “we are managing the situation.” The treaty negotiations were managing the situation. We could not see where this would all lead but the important thing was to manage the situation. So through the Johnson Administration, through the Nixon Administration, through the Ford Administration we managed the situation. We never allowed it to boil over but we never, ever dissuaded the Panamanians from believing that eventually the canal would be theirs.

And then, of course, Carter came in with a firm belief that the Panamanians should have the canal. And he named Sol Linowitz to be the negotiator. When I had Bolivian/Chilean affairs Sol was U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States, OAS. I had known Sol from that time because I was in charge of Chile/Bolivian affairs we went to staff meetings together and from time to time he would consult me on one thing or another that was coming up in the OAS that had to do with Bolivia/Chile. But of course I had nothing to do with Panama by the time Sol came in; I had already left that job.

That whole negotiation, to me, is an example of the best in diplomacy, how diplomacy really ought to work. Even though you had real passions on both- both in Panama and in the United States, we were able to keep that thing on an even keel for an awful long time. And of course it was finally brought to a close by the treaty that came into existence and I think to everybody's surprise, even to those who believed deeply that the Panamanians should not have the canal; I think that the results are much better than anybody ever expected. So, of course, from time to time we get people who think oh, the Chinese are going to take over the Panama Canal because they have taken over the banking in Panama. Actually, that is Hong Kong Chinese that are doing that. But nevertheless to me, I would love to teach a course in diplomacy and use that, an example of really first rate diplomacy. You know, passions were really strong on both sides.

Q: Oh yes. And you know, I mean, this was really striking in the United States, I mean-

MORRIS: For me, one of the most convincing demonstrations of the success of this long drawn-out diplomatic effort, which began in 1964 and culminated in the 1977 treaty, was the gradual reversal of positions held by each side, in the U.S. and in Panama, opposing the treaty. As the year for the transfer of the Canal to Panama, the year 2000, drew near, Panamanian public opinion, which during the long negotiations was inflamed and overwhelmingly in favor of Panama taking over the canal, had cooled considerably and there was a strong movement to keep the U.S. operating the canal and the U.S. armed forces in the canal zone. The Panamanian government was sounding out the U.S. about keeping the military in Panama using some of the same arguments about the Canal's strategic importance to the U.S. that had been used by U.S. opponents of the treaty earlier. In the U.S., the opposite had occurred. By 1995, what had been a hot-button political issue for Barry Goldwater and his supporters and later Ronald Reagan was a dead issue. The proximate turnover of the Canal just didn't register on the political radar screen. Not only that but the red hot political arguments used by Goldwater, Reagan and supporters about the absolute and never diminishing strategic value of the Canal to U.S. security was nowhere in evidence. The Pentagon, which had never actively supported that argument during the treaty negotiations and recognized the decreasing strategic value of the Canal, had long-since moved on. It had already reestablished SOUTHCOM in Florida and had begun right after the treaty was signed to dismantle its infrastructure in the Canal Zone. It was, in the late 1990s, actively resisting all entreaties by the Panamanian government, pushed by public opinion, to maintain a presence in Panama.

Q: Right.

MORRIS: You know. And the interesting thing, you know, this is a side light. Ronald Reagan, as governor of California at that time and of course this was before the whole Goldwater thing, you know, the Panama Canal is ours and Reagan was making similar speeches; but here is John Wayne, John Wayne who was admired by Reagan and is married to a Peruvian and had a feel for the Latinos. He went to Panama, became a great friend of Torrijos, came back and said that the U.S. really ought to think about getting rid of the Panama Canal.

Q: Was Torrijos there the whole time you were there?

MORRIS: Yes.

Q: Because he died later.

MORRIS: Yes, that is right. He was there and I could tell you a number of colorful stories, which I will not.

Q: Tell me a couple.

MORRIS: No, no, none that will go on the tapes.

Q: Torrijos was not celibate.

MORRIS: Absolutely. And the fact is, and again it is not going to go on the tape, but some of the Americans who became Torrijos's friends, members of the U.S. Government who became Torrijos's friends were not very celibate either.

Q: Yes. You were saying you would go down to Panama and see Ambassador Bob Sayer from time to time.

MORRIS: Right, right. And Bob definitely had his reservations with regard to whether or not the Panamanians should take over the canal completely, yet he recognized that this was a very delicate situation and he as ambassador was in a very peculiar situation. First of all, he was U.S. ambassador to Panama but then there was the Panama Canal Zone, which was run by the American military. And the canal was in the zone and the U.S. ambassador to Panama had no say about anything that happened in the zone. This was run by the Pentagon and the Pentagon used the zone not only for things concerning Panama but they had set up SOUTHCOM (U.S. Army Southern Command) in Panama, which was the command for all of Central and South America. The housing for canal employees and the military was in the zone and of course Sayer, and all U.S. ambassadors to Panama for that matter, felt left out of a lot of U.S. policy that was being made that really did affect them in one way or another but they had no say in the matter. When I used to talk to Bob about it I do not remember whether he was the one that suggested it or whether I suggested it but I had come to the conclusion that the west coast countries of South America had a much more vital interest in the continuing operations of the canal than the United States did because nine-tenths of all of their exports, their bulk

exports, nine-tenths of all of their bulk exports, that is Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, went through the canal because the markets for most of those were on the east coast of the United States, not on the west coast. And yet those countries were not even consulted in these negotiations; this was between the United States and Panama. And Bob and I both thought this probably should have been handled within the OAS structure but we also recognized that that would just complicate things unbearably.

Q: Yes, you would have gotten sort of the, rather than the practical you would have gotten the political in there.

MORRIS: That is right.

Q: Well Pat, I think it is a good place to stop.

MORRIS: I agree.

Q: And I will put this, we are talking about the time you were dealing with the Panama Canal from when to- I mean, not the Panama Canal but Panama per se, from when to when?

MORRIS: Let me see; 1973, it was a little over a year, 1973 to maybe January of 1975.

Q: Okay. One last question—if you have anything more I will pick it up too—but I would like to ask you, did you get involved with Congress? Were they a factor? And we will talk about that and then move on to other things.

MORRIS: Very good.

Q: Okay, today is the 23rd of April, 2007. Pat, we are talking about this, '73 to '74 period, approximately. We have talked about Panama, have we not? I would just want to add that last question about the Congress.

MORRIS: Yes. I did not get involved in any direct negotiations with Congress but I did have a very close association with congressional staff, especially out of Senator Bentsen's office.

Q: From Texas.

MORRIS: From Texas, Senator Bentsen from Texas. Sally, I cannot remember, her last name, she later became an ambassador.

Q: Sally Cowal by any chance?

MORRIS: Sally, no, Sally something. Well, that name may come to me. And then another young fellow out of Senator Kennedy's office who later served on the NSC (National Security Council) under the Carter Administration and again, the name does

not immediately spring to mind. And then, of course, Bill Richardson, who at that time had just joined the State Department, congressional liaison office, and who took a particular interest in the Panama Canal. Bill, of course, was on State Department staff but since I was dealing with the congressional staff people, Bill and I exchanged notes regularly on what the congressional interests were. I had numerous meetings with them, just keeping them informed. In fact, we made it a point to let them in on any interesting developments that were taking place in the negotiations. And again, I say that I was not part of the Canal negotiation. There was a separate office with a separate staff under Ellsworth Bunker and we of course concentrated on bilateral Panamanian affairs on all levels and of course that meant the military, which was a very large function in Panama because SOUTHCOM was located there and we also- the usual State Department concerns and then AID, we had a large AID mission there, working to improve the economic situation in the country. So it was a fairly large office and we kept up on the canal negotiations but that was not our primary function.

Q: Seventy-five, where did you go?

MORRIS: Well, at the end of '74, actually. And here I changed back to my development career. The AID for Latin America, that is the Latin American bureau of AID, was making changes and I was asked to head up the program office as deputy assistant administrator for programming for Latin America. So I moved in, I guess it was the summer of '74 or maybe the fall of '74 to take over program planning for the Latin American area of AID. And that involved relations with the Congress; we had responsibility for putting together our congressional presentations each year and defending them before the Congress. We worked directly with each one of the Latin American missions in helping them put together their proposals for the coming budget year and then we had to reconcile our own projections for future spending with the possibilities of the appropriations. So I had to negotiate with the individual missions and their desk officers in Washington to come to agreements on what their programs would look like and then I had to negotiate with central AID on how much we could expect support from central AID in funding. This was our primary function. And of course we also had to, in our congressional presentations to devise justifications for each and every one of the programs. These justifications were usually written in the first instance at the country level but then we had to make sure that those country justifications made sense and were cohesive within the whole so we had to make revisions and then make written presentations to the Congress. Before that happened, of course, we had to negotiate within AID and then AID had to negotiate with OMB (the office of the bureau of the budget) to arrive at final figures that we would propose to the Hill.

Q: Well now, at this point AID was an integral part of ARA.

MORRIS: That is correct.

Q: How did this fit in, you might say sort of on the political-economic side of the Latin American bureau? I mean, here is what you are doing obviously has impact and how much were they involved?

MORRIS: Well, it is interesting. In my Panama job I was an AID employee but I had a State Department title. Even my performance ratings were made by the deputy assistant secretary. And now I moved into an office where I was reporting directly not to ARA but to the Latin American AID office. And the ARA stayed pretty much out of day-to-day operation of USAID programs and programming. There, of course, was intimate contact between the assistant administrator of AID for Latin America and the assistant secretary for Latin America but it was more on the policy level and not on the individual projects or programs, with two exceptions which really were not run out of my office, that is the program office. We had two countries that were getting program loans; that was Colombia and Chile. And those were decided with very heavy input from the ARA deputy assistant secretary for economic affairs and it was mostly based on macro economic considerations, which had to do with balance of payments and other concerns. These program loans were made to the governments in Colombia and Chile and actually later on we were doing something of the same in Brazil. Those program loans were included in our programs but we really did not have, my office that is, really did not have much input into shaping them or determining their size.

Q: Well now, did you find, when you were basically reviewing the programs and saying go ahead, how did you find the country response because I would assume you would have two factors going. There would be, I will not say questionable but I mean certainly raise issues. One would be the program that did not seem to be going. You know, it was a nice try but it seemed like well, you know, maybe we ought to quit on this; it just does not seem the objectives are being reached. And the other one would be, I would call the hobbyhorse factor; you have the AID director in a country and you find he was dealing with forests when maybe it was not appropriate. You see what I mean; those two.

MORRIS: Yes, right. Well, I will take the latter first. Now, in that case this is obviously, for the most part, an internal AID matter in the sense of what are your priorities, what priorities do you have? And the priorities, it is interesting how priorities were established and how priorities changed over the years. And I am going to move away a bit here from what I was doing at that specific time to talk about how priorities were set and how they changed over time.

I had mentioned to you in previous conversations about- that our programs in the old Institute of Inter-American Affairs were directed toward three particular areas: agriculture; health and education. And it was only after TCA came into existence-

Q: TCA?

MORRIS: Technical Cooperation Administration. That was President Truman's Point Four program. It was only after TCA came into existence and the Institute became integrated with this worldwide program that new programs, which the Institute had not considered or ever dealt with, were brought in. And this was the result of the fact that most of the TCA staff in Washington had moved from the Marshall Plan, the European plan. ECA, I think it was, Economic Cooperation Administration, the old Marshall Plan

moved into TCA and of course brought all of the baggage. And I use the word advisedly because what worked in Europe did not necessarily have any application in developing countries.

Q: Sure.

MORRIS: So we got industrial development programs, we got public administration programs, we got shipping programs, etcetera. And they were almost forced down the throats, in the Latin American bureau, of people who had already had a tradition and had a philosophy with regard to development, what you did and how you did it and when you did it. So almost all of the missions had to accept some of these programs because there were people in Washington whose job it was to push them. None of them were accepted universally throughout Latin American but in different countries you had, for example in Peru they decided that, yes, they could use a ports advisor but the ports had never had any particular priority within the old Institute of Inter-American Affairs program. So they got a ports advisor. And in Ecuador they got a small industry program which in the end turned out to be handicrafts. And it was a decoration; you could justify it on its own terms but you could not justify it within a country development program.

Q: Yes.

MORRIS: But anyway. So this was the kind of priority setting that went on. But in Latin America the tradition of agriculture, health and education was so strong, and these programs had substance, they had a history, they had a record and for the most part these records were good. You know, each program could point to specific successes over the years and they could set priorities and objectives for the future within the framework that they had already been operating in. So that my office in Washington operated recognizing that we had to accept that certain changes had taken place.

And then of course by the time I got to that job we had one more large change, which was the Alliance for Progress for Latin America, which came in with a whole new set of priorities. In fact, my whole program in Venezuela was based on political objectives primarily. You asked me earlier how could we even justify a program in Venezuela, that was so wealthy, oil rich. And the justification was really political rather than economic. The idea was that the United States had an interest in supporting democratically elected governments in Latin America and here was a good example of the overthrow of a military dictatorship, the setting up of a democratic constitutional government and the necessity for making sure that that government was successful. And interestingly enough, with regard to Venezuela, the priorities of the Betancourt Government coincided almost 100 percent with AID's own views of how development should take place. So it really was not very difficult, and I was able to put together a program in Venezuela that at the time became, it is interesting, it was not by design, but by the time I left Venezuela it had the largest assistance program in Latin America. Because I put together very large housing programs that were aimed at taking care of middle class and lower income housing. So we worked with, oh four or five different Venezuelan institutions and made most of the loans for greatly expanding housing. And then the other area was agrarian

reform. The government of Venezuela had already put into place agrarian reform. So we supported it wherever it seemed logical and where we had certain expertise and maybe the Venezuelans did not have. We never got into policymaking in land reform but we did get into helping them implement what they had already initiated.

But there was one other change that I think, with regard to the Latin American programs that came with the Alliance for Progress, which was, in my view, a terrible setback for technical assistance, for the whole idea of technical assistance in Latin America. And the first thing that the new people who came in to head the Alliance for Progress decided was that the *servicios* had to go, that the *servicios* made no sense. I do not know. This decision was not based on any study of what the *servicios* had accomplished, they just decided that, well, I guess the theory was that we were too closely associated with the local governments. And it is true because the *servicio* was part of the local government and that, from our point of view, was the basis for their success, that they were local government programs with which we were working. And of course, we were directing the *servicios* but they were so tied into the local government that when we left the local governments could carry these programs on. What the government lacked, of course, was the discipline that these programs had because of our association, the lack of corruption. But the *servicios* were ended.

Q: Could you go back and, I know you explained before, but what was a servicio at this time in the '70s?

MORRIS: The *servicios* were joint U.S.-local government programs that were negotiated between the two governments in which there were co-directors of the *servicio* and there were co-heads of all divisions within the *servicio* in which an American and the local government official acted. And at the technical level local technicians working with American technicians worked devising programs. The model was that the United States would help fund a central fund within the *servicio* to carry out projects which had to be matched by the local government. In some cases, as in the case of Peru, by the time I left the matching was five to one; that was the Peruvians were putting in five times more money than we were putting in. The same thing happened in Brazil in the health *servicio* where I think the matching was maybe even 10 to one because the governments saw the health *servicio* in Brazil and the agricultural *servicio* in Peru as vehicles for real progress in these particular areas so they were willing to put in the money. These programs were very, very successful and it really is unfortunate that they were discontinued. Not only were they discontinued but the whole philosophy of joint planning, operation and execution was lost.

Q: Did you see a falling off of delivery once we got out of those programs?

MORRIS: Oh, there is no doubt. Now, I was not in a position to make any kind of evaluation of individual programs but the fact that the *servicios* died, disappeared, meant that there was a residual, there is no doubt that there was a residual of well trained people who had worked with the Americans long enough to have a work ethic that probably lasted. But they were absorbed and then, of course, various other things occurred over

time where there was no way of knowing whether or not what the servicios had accomplished really had lasting impact in the country.

In the case of Peru, and I think it is interesting to note this, in the case of Peru you had a military coup, General Velasco, this was years after I left, but you had a military coup which nationalized everything; nationalized the large sugar plantations in the north, took over the International Petroleum Company, nationalized the mines, nationalized and abolished what was left of the servicio programs. The servicio had already disappeared but then you had, on top of that, a local government change which just devastated whatever was left of our programs there. I am not sure that this was a rule throughout Latin America but I think if you went back today to try to evaluate what lasting effect the servicios had it would be very difficult.

Q: How did you find again, during this oversight job that you had, did the ambassadors play much of a role?

MORRIS: It depended on the ambassador. Well, I think that you have to look at it from the country point of view, that it really varied very much from country to country. In some countries the ambassadors were interested in the programs and took a particular interest in certain aspects of the program and made sure to let Washington know that they thought this was something that had to be supported and was doing well. But for the most part the ambassadors depended upon the AID directors in their countries to make most of the determinations and in the two countries where I was AID director I had, luckily, very good relations with the ambassadors. I had full support from the ambassador, and getting ahead of myself, but I think it is relevant here, when I was in the Dominican Republic, this was later and we will get into that, but when I was in the Dominican Republic I had known the ambassador; in fact, he asked that I be assigned to the Dominican Republic as the AID director so I was on very good terms with him. It was a very interesting situation because the Dominican Republic had gone through a revolution and a U.S. Army occupation when Trujillo was overthrown so we had pumped a lot of money into the Dominican Republic during those years. I came after that. By the time I got there President Balaguer, was not interested; he did not want to contract a lot of international debt and so he was very reluctant to authorize additional loans, but I, being conscious of this, went ahead and continued to make surveys for possible future loans and programs. We had an ongoing program and it was quite large but the question was whether or not we were going to institute any new projects, any new programs as some of these others were coming to an end. And having been in AID a long time I knew that you cannot just manufacture projects out of thin air at the last minute and so I had my project development staff working full time looking at different possibilities for new projects.

In one interview with the ambassador, the ambassador just got back from a meeting with the president; in fact, we went together because we were talking about AID projects and when we came back, the ambassador, Bob Hurwitch, said to me, "You know, I think on the basis of the president's reluctance and even resistance to undertake any new international debt maybe we should just not start any new programs." And I said, "I am in 100 percent agreement that we ought not try to force projects or programs on a country

that does not want them. But, remember presidential elections in the Dominican Republic are coming up within six months, seven months. If there is a new president who has a different outlook and wants the United States' cooperation, I am sure you will want to support that." And he said, "Of course." So at this point I said, "I am going to go ahead and continue to look for areas where we can cooperate with the Dominican Government and do basic surveys as though we were going to go ahead. But if the new government is not interested in our program I will be the first one to say okay, let us start shutting them down." And I think that in most of the countries that was the kind of relationship that existed between the ambassadors and the AID directors.

Q: Well Pat, where did you go- I guess if we were talking about when you moved on, you were there a year doing this review?

MORRIS: Yes, '75, '76, yes, I had that job from about I think it was probably September '74 to December of '75, I think. And then I was named AID director to the Dominican Republic.

Q: You were in the Dominican Republic from when to when?

MORRIS: I was in the Dominican Republic beginning of '77 to the middle of '79.

Q: Did you, when you went to the Dominican Republic and even slightly before that, we had a new administration, the Carter Administration, which I understand had a different outlook toward AID. Did you feel that where you were?

MORRIS: Yes, I did, but before we get to that I think that there is one particular incident in my career that I think is of some significance in terms of how AID made its decisions on where money would go. And this has relevance to the Carter Administration approach.

During the time that I was in the program job, deputy assistant administrator for programs, there was a movement in the Congress to redefine how our assistance money would be used and it was determined, by the Congress, that we should concentrate our assistance on the poorest of the poor. I do not know whether you remember that. And this meant in effect, for Latin America, this meant that of all the countries in Latin America there were probably two, maybe three that could be considered the poorest of the poor.

Q: Haiti always being one.

MORRIS: Yes, Haiti, Bolivia and maybe Paraguay but that was it. So all of the time that I had that job I was trying to defend a program in Latin America that had been eminently successful in terms of providing effective assistance and being able to document the effectiveness of the assistance. So here I was trying to defend all of our Latin American programs that were in existence on the basis of their importance to the United States and on the basis of their effectiveness. Because of this push in the Congress the central AID office, which was program policy and planning, that had to sign off on all of our programs was not very sympathetic.

After I had fought tooth and nail to keep some kind of a program going in Latin America and fought within AID and then fought again with the bureau of the budget, now OMB, to keep Latin America at some kind of a decent programming level. Then, after all of that was finished, the program was put together at a reduced level to be sent up to the Hill. It had to be signed not only by AID Administrator Robert Parker, it had to be signed by Henry Kissinger, who was then Secretary of State; this was the Ford Administration. And so Parker made an appointment with Kissinger to bring the program up to have it signed. I got a call from Herman Klein, who was then the assistant administrator for Inter-American Affairs and he said, "You put this program together and Parker is going up to see Kissinger and he wants representatives from each one of the bureaus to be with him in case Kissinger has any questions. So you go representing us." So I went to the meeting. Kissinger took the package and he flipped through the pages, this is the entire meeting; it lasted about 10 minutes, maybe 15, but Kissinger opened the document, started to flip through it and he said to Parker, where is Brazil? And Parker looked at me and you know, I would have said it was eliminated by central AID but before I could say anything, Kissinger did not even wait for an answer. He went further on and he said where is Mexico? And Parker looked around and Kissinger did not even give him a chance, he said, "I am supposed to sign this document? Here are the two most politically important countries in this hemisphere outside the United States and we do not even have them in this program." He said, "What kind of an agency are you running, Bob?" And Parker said, "Well, you know it is the Congress; the Congress has decided that all this money goes to the poorest of the poor." And Kissinger said, "Look, I am going to sign this but this is the last document that I will ever sign that does not have something in it for Brazil and Mexico." And that was the end of the meeting and he did not talk about anything; he did not talk about anything else, he did not talk about anything in the program, any of the other areas of the world or anything else.

I cite this for two reasons. One because of the irony of it all, but secondly because Kissinger, when he became national security advisor and later secretary of state, really did not have a clue about Latin America. You know, I mean, his whole orientation was otherwise. But during his time evidently he got the message that these countries were important to us. And I will never forget that, because it is, to me, and I think that it goes to some of the questions that you have been asking about what role did the ambassador play and so forth in these discussions; to me, coming out of the Latin American area probably had a lot to do with my own view, but there was never any doubt in my mind that the real reason that we were in Latin America was for political reasons, not economic reasons; for political reasons. And to disregard the political reality when you are putting together a program did not make any sense at all.

Now, when the Carter Administration came in they were imbued with this, the poorest of the poor and so we got another dose from the Carter people about what you could do—where you ought to be concentrating your funds in Latin America. Well, by that time I was in the Dominican Republic. And of course the other thing that I resented from the Carter Administration was the assumption that since we had been under Republican administrations of Nixon and Ford that everybody working for AID must be Republican.

Q: That happens again and again with administrations.

MORRIS: Yes, exactly. These turnovers; and I am a registered Democrat. In fact, I am trying to remember now where in my career; oh, it was before I went to Paris that I had come out of Venezuela, I was in the State Department position as director of Bolivia/Chilean affairs and I was waiting for a new assignment from AID overseas and I had a very good friend who had become chief of personnel in AID. This was during the Nixon Administration. That was when I went to Paris because he told me, frankly, you are a registered Democrat. And he said do not expect to go out as an AID director as a registered Democrat right now. The Nixon people had looked up my voter registration. These things go through phases, of course, even within an administration; as they get towards the end they have already placed all their political buddies. But I went to Paris because, well, I liked the idea of going to Paris but besides that I could not have gotten an AID director's job during the Nixon Administration because I was a registered Democrat. And then the Carter Administration comes in and of course I had been named an AID director during the Ford Administration, to the Dominican Republic, and there is no doubt that Ford was a breath of fresh air during those brief years he was there.

But anyway, there were no political considerations when I went to the Dominican Republic but then here come the Carter people and they are assuming that everybody was a political appointee of the Republicans and you had to prove yourself all over again. I was a registered Democrat and I had been stopped from getting an AID director's job during the Nixon Administration and now I was in the Dominican Republic and the new Carter people were coming in and saying, you know, he must be a Republican if he has got an AID director's job in the Dominican Republic. But I was not intimately aware of all of the machinations going on in Washington during the Carter Administration. I had already set up; well first of all, I inherited a program in the Dominican Republic that was large and diverse and had well known political objectives that was working very well.

When the new assistant administrator for Latin American affairs of AID, one of his first visits was to the Dominican Republic; Abelardo Valdez, a Texan, later became State Department chief of protocol, and he had been an intern, he was a Harvard graduate law school, bright guy, he had been a scholastic intern in the White House when Lyndon Johnson was president. And he came in with all of the moxie of the Carter people and set out to change everything and one of his first visits was to the Dominican Republic and he was my houseguest while he was there. I took him around, we talked, I showed him our projects. I was surprised at what a limited attention span he had. He could not concentrate on anything for over five minutes so it was very difficult to try to get him interested in what we were doing and why we were doing it. So I was not sure when he left what his impressions were of my program or the job we were doing or anything else.

Then, right after that, we had a visit from the new head of AID, and I am trying to remember his name now, ex-governor of Ohio, a Democrat; a nice guy.

Q: Celeste or something?

MORRIS: No, no; it was John Gilligan. A very nice guy, Irish-American, and he was very different from Valdez and was interested in everything we were doing and was very complimentary of what he saw. Well, he- and I have already described my conversations with Bob Hurwitch about whether or not we should cut back the program or whether we should just maybe even begin to phase out and Hurwitch agreed with me that with the coming change of government in the Dominican Republic we ought not to make any decisions until the new government came in and we saw what it looked like, and in the meantime we would carry on the projects that we had there and the programs that we had, doing the best we could. Gilligan understood this and agreed.

An interesting sidelight on this. Years later, I still see Valdez from time to time. He left AID, became chief of protocol at the State Department then he joined a law firm with ex-Senator Tidings and has been practicing law in the District ever since. And I see him from time to time and at one point, years ago when I talked to him, I asked him, what was his impression, and his people in Washington, of my program in the Dominican Republic? And he said oh, you were always known as a producer. He said you were always coming up with new and interesting projects. And I thought well, at least I had a good reputation; after they got to know the program they came to appreciate the fact that we were doing the kinds of things that even the Carter Administration could support.

Q: Well, when you got there in '77, the Dominican Republic, could you first explain what the, sort of the political and economic situation was and all? You know, who was president and all that.

MORRIS: Yes. When I got to the Dominican Republic- oh, by the way, just one little side note but it was very endearing for me. When I was sworn in to go to the Dominican Republic, they have these formal swearing in ceremonies at the State Department, and a lot of people were invited. My wife was there, a couple of my kids, I guess, but I did not invite very many people; I sort of figured it was fairly routine and the people who put these swearing in ceremonies together just routinely invite certain people, and I was delighted to see Ambassador Bunker, who came. Because Bunker, beside the fact that I worked with him, not for him but I worked with him; he was the head of the Panama Canal negotiating team and I was Panama affairs, so I knew him well and I was happy to see that he had come to my swearing in. And he made a point of, after my little acceptance speech, to come up to me and wish me the best of luck. In fact, I referred to him, when I saw him in the audience, I referred to him in my acceptance speech since Bunker was one of the chief negotiators to put into place a transition government in the Dominican Republic after the overthrow of the dictator Trujillo. And he had lived in the Dominican Republic during those negotiations for about six or eight months during a very dicey time; this was when Lyndon Johnson was in the White House and he sent this massive military force to the Dominican Republic after Trujillo had been assassinated. So Bunker was there, under OAS auspices, to stabilize things there and to put in place a transitional government and then preside over elections, democratic elections. Well, those elections resulted in the election of Joaquin Balaguer.

Joaquin Balaguer had been an intimate associate of Trujillo, almost maybe an administrative assistant, chief of staff, but one of the most talented Dominicans in the history of the country. He never married, seemed a bit effeminate in mannerisms but was a genius in political intrigue and political operations. Balaguer and one of the best orators in the history of Latin America, really a splendid orator, and oratory in Latin America is something that is prized. Most of the countries that I served in, most of the public figures were good orators, but Balaguer was superb. His oratory captured the imagination of the Dominican people.

Now, that was in, let me see, I was in Venezuela at the time, that was, maybe 1966, it was probably 1966 when Balaguer was elected. Well here now it is 1976, '77 and Balaguer is still president. He has already been reelected once and new elections are coming up and he was going to run the third term- No, I guess that is not right; there were term limits. I got there in the last half of his second term. But Balaguer was going blind and in fact for all practical purposes he was already blind. He needed people to read documents for him; he could not read the documents. But he had a tremendous memory and he was in control and he had a number of basic philosophical viewpoints about leadership. One of them was that a leader to be remembered had to construct large monumental projects. So during his presidency he was a builder. He did urban renewal in the old part of Santa Domingo and he had monuments built all over the place and that was what he imagined his legacy to the future would be. New bridges over the Ozama River, a new airport, a new concert hall and civic complex. After I left in another term he built a large monument to Columbus' discovery of America. Remember, the first Spanish settlement in the New World was in Santo Domingo.

He was also very tight with money and he really controlled his budgets and he did not want to have a lot of foreign debt. And so he was very careful about which programs, which projects AID might get into that was not going to cost the Dominican Government money. He recognized that the country needed a lot of things; a great deal of, terrible poverty in the Dominican Republic, a legacy of the Trujillo years and before, the colonial years; a large rural population in poverty. But he did not really have any understanding of development, long-term development needs and he depended on his ministers to make decisions in these areas. And we had very good relationships with the ministers that we were dealing with. I had very good relationships at all levels. One of the things that I was struck with in the Dominican Republic that in the private sector there were a lot of really outstanding people that were well educated and could make, and were making, a lot of money for themselves and were making some contributions to long-term development in the Dominican Republic so I cultivated those people as well. Our program followed the old Institute model only to a degree because by that time almost 10 years had passed since the Institute had been absorbed but we did have projects in agriculture. I was just putting together a possible education sector loan at the time that I left and that- my idea was that we would leave it until the new government came in to see whether they would be interested in the program because education was an area where the Dominicans were really in bad shape; they were in terrible shape. The level of public education at the primary and secondary levels was miserable.

Q: Well what was the problem?

MORRIS: Lack of a system, really. They had a very rudimentary system of elementary schools and secondary schools, teachers were poorly paid, they were not well trained and only the private schools could you get any kind of a decent education at the elementary and secondary levels. And of course you had the Catholic Church and you had the parochial schools but they were mostly in the urban areas. The rural areas, they were just not covered. And of course the parochial schools charged tuition and the poor people had to depend on the public schools and the public schools were in very bad shape lacking in space, materials, an qualified teachers. So this was an area that I was interested in doing something about and I brought a team down from Washington to do an education sector survey to begin to put together possible projects within the education sector where we might make a difference.

Another area that I took a personal interest in was employment. The unemployment rate was 20 percent, 25 percent and this was at a time when there was a certain amount of prosperity in the Dominican Republic; they were not doing badly. Their primary export, of course, was sugar and of course then they had tourism and some mineral exports; those were probably the large foreign currency earners. But they were not sufficient to employ the large numbers of people that were moving from the rural countryside into the urban areas.

Q: What about Haiti? What was the impact of Haiti on- I would think that, you know, the people, the Dominicans are moving into the cities the Haitians would be moving into the sugar fields or something of this nature.

MORRIS: Well it is interesting. You know, I can see that you are quite well informed about certain aspects of the Latin American picture and I am glad you ask the question because it is relevant and a lot of people do not know but the Dominicans got their independence not from Spain; the Dominicans got their independence from Haiti. The Haitian revolution against France spread into the Dominican Republic and the first Republic of Haiti took over the Spanish side of the island as well. So for two years here this larger piece of the island Espanola was being governed by these Haitian revolutionaries that had overthrown the French Government. And of course the Dominicans, who still declared their loyalty to Spain, were incensed that they were being governed by these wild black people from Haiti. So it took two years before the Dominicans were able to militarily defeat the Haitians and declare their independence. But that's enough history of the Dominican Republic.

Q: Yes, let us talk about the time you were there.

MORRIS: Right, exactly. But that particular historical event had a lasting effect on the Dominican view of Haiti. The border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic has always been closed and not easy to cross but when the Dominican Republic, under Trujillo primarily, expanded its sugar plantations- the Dominican Republic is a natural area for growth of sugar cane. It is like Cuba. Sugar cane can be grown in large quantities

economically on both of those islands; much higher yield in sugar than in Louisiana, for example, or any place in the U.S. So the Dominican Republic under Trujillo had become a major sugar exporter and the sugar cane producers, cultivators of sugar cane needed a large influx of seasonal labor which the Dominican Republic itself could not supply so they imported Haitians, contract labors who worked under slave conditions, slave-like conditions. They contracted- Trujillo contracted directly with the Haitian Government and brought Haitians in. The Dominicans, by that time most everything in the Dominican Republic was owned by Trujillo; he just kept taking over private properties in his own name. And the Dominican Government paid the Haitian Government and of course the Haitian workers were treated pretty much like slave labor for generations. And in fact a large portion of the Dominican population is African-American, not completely, not exclusively but primarily as the result of the large influx every year, year after year of Haitian labor moving across the border into the Dominican Republic. There was never really good relations between the two because the Haitians felt exploited, and they were. There were people in Haiti who were making a lot of money from this arrangement but it was not the people who were doing the work.

Q: From your perspective how concerned were we about Cuba there? During that time.

MORRIS: It is interesting. You know Cuba, for some reason or another, did not really seem to come up at all. I remember when I was in Venezuela that there was a real concern and I think that I mentioned this, that the Cubans had actually financed the sending of arms to guerrillas in the mountains in Venezuela. But for some reason or another and I am not sure why Cuba just did not even seem to exist. You know, Puerto Rico was the problem and it did not have anything to do with politics, it had to do with Dominicans wanting to get into the United States and the easiest way for them to do it was to cross into Puerto Rico on makeshift boats and take on Puerto Rican identities and then come to the United States.

Q: Did you find- one remembers with Trujillo there was some congressman, this was the same with Somoza in Nicaragua, some congressmen became sort of too palsy walsy with both the Somoza- the Trujillo regime. Was there any carry over of this? In other words, very close ties to the Dominican Republic within Congress, did you find?

MORRIS: No. I think by that time, by the time I went there I think that particular episode was in the past. And as far as I know there was general ignorance in the Congress with regard to the Dominican Republic. We had a number of visitors. Andrew Young came down. Andrew Young at that time was the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. He came down on a visit and he had some people from the Congress in his delegation and I was really almost shocked at how ignorant they were of the Dominican Republic and what it was all about. And there were a couple of staff people that I knew, that I had known from my Panama Affairs days who were on that junket. A young guy, later- he was out of Kennedy's office, I cannot remember his name now, he was a bit more knowledgeable but the congressional people on that delegation were not knowledgeable at all and so I suspect that the Dominicans had probably neglected trying to romance American congressmen.

Q: Well then, you were there until '79. Did you sort of feel that the Dominican Republic was sort of out of the Latin American circuit in a way?

MORRIS: No.

Q: Events in Latin America did not particularly-?

MORRIS: No. It is interesting. I understand where your question is coming from. This is a Caribbean country but the Caribbean and Central America were sort of tied together under the old Institute of Inter-American Affairs and so there was a long history. Even during Trujillo's time the Institute had some programs in the Dominican Republic. This was a dictatorship, a military dictatorship but we were doing business with military dictators in other countries as well. You know, the Somozas were in Nicaragua; we had programs in Nicaragua all the time the Somozas were in power. So no, the Dominican Republic was just part of our historical relations with Latin America.

Q: What really were you getting, not sort of the official reading but in talking to people in the Dominican Republic about 15 years after but about our sending troops there after- Was this a good thing or was it resented? How did people-?

MORRIS: Well it is interesting, you know, because there were two areas under the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine where we used these fig leaves to justify our intervention. You know, the first interventions took place during World War I under Wilson in both Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic; Haiti and the Dominican Republic, both of them. We had troops in Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1917 and we also had troops in Nicaragua. At that time it was for the collection of foreign debts. Because the Germans were trying to collect money from the Dominicans and the Haitians and Wilson was afraid that the Germans would actually invade to collect their money so he sent troops to both Haiti and the Dominican Republic as a precaution. But they stayed there until 1932. In fact, it was the United States that put Trujillo into the leadership in the Dominican Republic. There was a long period in which the United States military was the governing force in the Dominican Republic, the same as in Nicaragua. In fact, both Trujillo and Somoza were products of U.S. military intervention in those two countries. So the Dominicans, when Trujillo was assassinated and it looked like the government was disintegrating, they probably welcomed- I do not know what the reaction was at the time but I never, ever heard, while I was there, any real resentment of U.S. occupation.

Q: This is tape seven, side one with Pat Morris.

Pat, where did you go after, in '79 you left and where did you go?

MORRIS: Well now we are coming to the end of my career.

Q: Yes?

MORRIS: I left the Dominican Republic in 1979, yes, in July I guess of 1979, came back to the States. I expected that I would probably have some kind of a position in the Latin American bureau but there was no job offered me before I left and when I arrived, I went on home leave and I, I am trying to remember. I do not recall exactly how it came about but somebody in the Near East bureau called me and asked if I were interested in taking over an office in the Near East bureau of AID that was going to become vacant. And since the Latin American bureau had not offered me anything I said sure. So when I came off of home leave I was assigned to the Near East bureau of AID, in an office which was sort of a collection of countries that did not seem to fit easily into a geographic unit that spread from Afghanistan, Iran; Iran at that time did not have an AID program but they had a large loan overhang which we were trying to collect.

Q: This is, of course, after the hostage crisis.

MORRIS: No, it was before the hostage crisis but we had already phased out our AID program under the Shah. When the Shah was still in we phased out our AID program but they were still paying off some of the loans and somebody had to take care of it so my office had that. I had Afghanistan, Yemen, Iran, Morocco and Portugal.

Q: Well how long did you do this?

MORRIS: I did it for about six months. I retired in March of- So I was not on the job long enough to visit any of those countries and not long enough to really have made any contribution to the AID programs in those countries. But I will never forget, and this may be the only thing of significance that happened to me while I had that job, I am trying to remember his name—Joe Wheeler. Joe Wheeler was the assistant administrator for AID for the Near East and I got a call from him one day and he asked me to go to a State Department meeting on Afghanistan. It was some kind of committee that he was on and, but he couldn't make it. So I went, I did not have much of a feel for Afghanistan yet, but the Soviets had- remember the American ambassador was killed.

Q: Yes, Spike Dubbs.

MORRIS: Yes.

Q: In '79.

MORRIS: Yes, he was shot in his office, I guess.

Q: No, he was shot in a hotel. He was abducted under very peculiar circumstances.

MORRIS: Yes. But anyway, of course there was no doubt in anybody's mind that the Soviets, the communist party in Afghanistan, was active and probably responsible for what happened. And the meeting, I cannot recall exactly what the meeting was about, why the meeting was called, but the discussion really disturbed me. And here I was, a newcomer, and when a number of people wanted to bring up the Soviet involvement in

Afghanistan, whoever was chairing the meeting, and I do not even remember who it was, would immediately stop the discussion and say well, this is not why we are here, or something to that effect, and he would change the discussion around. It was very difficult for me to understand what the U.S. position was on Afghanistan at the time, but I left that meeting very disturbed that here, officially, we seemingly were ignoring or papering over something that had been reported in the U.S. press. Of course, I did not have any inside information at this point and there must have been lots of inside information.

Q: Right.

MORRIS: And yet it could not be freely discussed in a meeting on Afghanistan. I have never forgotten that. And years later a roommate of mine from Georgetown who worked in NSA-

Q: That is the National Security Agency.

MORRIS: The National Security Agency.

Q: Which is the eavesdropping arm of the government.

MORRIS: Right. And he told me, of course this also years after he had retired, said that at NSA they could never understand why the Carter Administration was turning a blind eye to what the Soviets were doing in Afghanistan.

Q: Well, of course we did not. As a matter of fact at a certain point the Carter Administration revved up all things. We stopped our participation in the Olympics, we cut off lucrative grain deals for ourselves; we did all sorts of- we cut off exchanges. I mean, it was-

MORRIS: But that was after the invasion.

Q: Yes, after the invasion.

MORRIS: But see this was before the invasion; this was before the invasion. I think I retired a week or two weeks before the invasion.

Q: Well the invasion was on Christmas, essentially Christmas '79.

MORRIS: Seventy-nine, okay. So I was there then. But that particular meeting happened before the invasion. And then presumably, as a result of the invasion they finally took their blinders off to what was happening.

Q: Yes, well, it was a complete- Well, the Carter Administration came in; they were going to be able to do business with the Soviets.

MORRIS: Right.

Q: And they sent Ambassador Watson from IBM there, a businessman. You know, I mean, the whole idea was we can do it better and they did not.

MORRIS: And they did not is right.

Q: Well Pat you retired, and just sort of briefly what have you been doing since?

MORRIS: Well, I retired in 1980 and I did consulting until 1994, mostly on AID-related projects. My consulting was with consulting firms, I was never directly contracted by AID; they were using my expertise in the AID development assistance area. And I consulted mostly in Latin America, South America, Central America. Right after I retired, almost two weeks after I retired, I got a call from the University of Arizona that had a contract with AID to do an agricultural sector assessment in Yemen. And I guess the Yemen office suggested that since I had been office director that maybe I might be interested. I took the job not because I knew very much about Yemen but I thought that I might be useful in terms of development policy and so forth. So that was my first consulting job and then afterwards they were in various areas in both South America and Central America. The Yemen job was the only one that I did outside- Oh, no. The last, no, not the last either; I did one consulting job and I guess I should put in that I also was hired for a year as a consultant by the Pan American Health Organization and was working on a project trying to help them put together a mechanism so that country health ministries could access contributions other than governmental contributions; access contributions outside of the government. So we were putting together a funding mechanism that health ministries could use to get additional funding for health projects. I did that for a year and as a result of that the fellow who had hired me for that job was a public health doctor by the name of Lee Howard, who had worked for AID mostly in Southeast Asia. But he later went to a consulting organization and he asked me to help him put together, that organization had gotten a contract from AID and they wanted to do the same thing for Africa. They wanted to put together a mechanism for government health organizations to attract contributions from outside donors. So on that contract I spent a month, I guess, or six weeks in Africa. I went to Kenya, Malawi, Niger and the two Congos, the French Congo and at that time it was, what was it?

Q: Well there was-

MORRIS: Kinshasa.

Q: Yes, it was Zaire.

MORRIS: Zaire, yes.

Q: And Congo Brazzaville.

MORRIS: Congo Brazzaville. So those were the countries that I covered during that particular consultancy. Yemen and Africa I did only those two outside and the rest of my consulting work was in Latin America.

Q: Okay. Well, I want to thank you very much, Pat. This has been very interesting.

End of interview