The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR MICHAEL H. ARMACOST

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INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview was not edited by Ambassador Armacost]

Q: *Let me first of all start with questions about your background. Where were you born and where were you educated?*

ARMACOST: I was born in Cleveland, Ohio. I went to school in Williamsburg through third grade. Then I went through the end of high school in Redlands, California. Then I went to Carleton College where I got my BA [Bachelor of Arts] in international relations in 1958.

My interest in international relations was really stimulated by Reginald Lang, a professor at Carleton. He was a sort of fabled professor on campus; he liked jocks—a club to which I belonged. That helped considerably with the grades he gave out and since he taught international relations, I gravitated to that subject matter.

I visited in Europe for about a month during the summer following my junior year. That was one of the factors that led me to apply for a Fulbright. That was just one experience that heightened my interest in international affairs although in my early undergraduate days, I really had not settled on a specific subject matter.

Another professor in Carleton's government department alerted me to the existence of the Fulbright scholarship program. My principal interest at the time was to become a college professor. My father was a professor and a college president. I thought I wanted to follow in his footsteps.

From there I went to Friederich Wilhems University in Bonn, Germany, thanks to a Fulbright scholarship that had been granted to me. There I studied comparative politics. I had studied German at Carleton, so that Bonn seemed to be a good fit—although I soon learned that a couple of years of German at an American university was inadequate. I assume that the Fulbright staff thought that Germany was the only country where I might be comfortable. I don't remember whether I specifically requested a scholarship to a German university or whether the Fulbright staff made the assignment on its own.

I spent almost a year in Bonn and I had a great time. I played a lot of basketball; I learned German. I traveled throughout the country as a member of the Bonn University basketball team. Since we went mostly by cars and busses, I saw a lot of Germany. I should note that our team only had three Germans on it; it had a couple of Panamanians, a Hungarian, and a couple of Turks, one of whom was the captain. It was a motley crew and we had a lot of fun.

During my year in Bonn, I got married—in the United States during a semester break—and that helped make the experience thoroughly enjoyable. In one respect, I am glad that I started out in Bonn by myself; I learned a lot more German that way because I lived with a German family and that required me to be thoroughly immersed in the language and culture. That probably would not have been possible had I been married. I did spend a semester in a university seminar which was conducted entirely in German. That also required a major improvement in my German language skills. It was an advanced seminar; fortunately, I knew a fair amount more than my fellow students because they were all students of jurisprudence. The subject of the seminar was a comparison of Bonn and Weimar regimes. It turned out to be a great confidence builder for me because most of my colleagues were ten years older—German students tend to spend a lot of time in universities. They tended to focus on the constitutional and legal differences between the two regimes; that made them over-look the political aspects which I knew were the core issues.

There were other Americans at the university, but I didn't have much to do with them. I wanted to be fully and totally immersed in German.

After that, I went to Columbia University for my MA and my PhD, which was granted in 1965. I was in the law and government program with a specialization in international relations. In my second year, the university created a program for "international fellows." This program was run by Dick Gardner, David McKeckron, David Smith and some others who had practical experience in international relations. They brought us in contact, as part of our classroom work, into contact with business leaders, international civil servants, American Foreign Service officers and representatives of other countries, such as ambassadors. All of these people had spent a life-time in international affairs which brought a degree of realism to our academic studies. It also exposed me and my colleagues to the various career opportunities in the international affairs world.

I remained at Columbia for the summer of 1965 to turn my thesis into a book. I was

associated with that university's Institute for War-Peace Studies. This was largely T.R. Fox's institution; he was my major professorial mentor; he asked me to stay at Columbia for a few more months in order to write "The Politics of Weapons Innovation." I didn't do any teaching; I wrote the manuscript which was finally published in 1969.

I did take the Foreign Service entrance examination and passed the written, but I did not pursue this possibility because my goal was still a teaching career. I obtained a faculty appointment at Pomona College. I started there in the fall of 1962. During my first year at Pomona, I wrote my dissertation and later I passed my oral examination, so that in 1965, Columbia granted me a PhD degree. My dissertation concerned the politics of defense policy—specifically about inter-service rivalry in the missile program. I focused on the Thor-Juniper missile and the continual battle between the Air Force and the Army about who would control that program. The topic allowed me to do considerable research and dealt with politics—a subject which fascinated me. The missile program also had international affairs aspects—the missiles were deployed overseas—which made it the nexus of a lot of subjects that interested me. Since the program had been the major topic of Congressional oversight, I had a lot of unclassified material to work with. It also offered the opportunity to interview a number of high-ranking administration officials, including President Eisenhower and the secretary of defense, and lower ranking DoD (Department of Defense) officials involved in the program. The international aspects were highlighted when we withdrew these missiles from Turkey in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. So, the topic had a lot of ramifications, which made it very interesting to me.

I should note that Columbia specialized in bureaucratic politics in the defense field which made my interest in this missile program appealing to the faculty. _____ Polix was one faculty member who was interested, as was Warner Schilling. The faculty of large universities are usually in continual change; so that while I was in Pomona, my original faculty advisor—Sam Huntingdon who went to Harvard— changed and I was passed on to Schilling. He however was also in Cambridge when I had to defend my dissertation; so, Roger Hilsman became my principal Columbia faculty contact. I had first met Hilsman at DoD (Department of Defense); I was to see him at Columbia and later in the Department of State. I was impressed with his career that had taken him from government to academia and then back to government. That pattern intrigued me and I began to think that I might emulate that sort of career. It would give me an opportunity to see what government was like, without necessarily dooming myself to a life-time bureaucratic career. Bill Olson, my predecessor in Pomona, had left his post to serve for a tour as the head of International Division of the Congressional Reference Service. I had heard that he really enjoyed that assignment which further piqued my curiosity about a tour in the government. At this stage, I don't think I had given much thought to my long career interests; I had started down the teaching track which I was enjoying greatly and which gave me considerable satisfaction. Pomona had wonderful students and I thought I was making some impact on their development.

I taught at Pomona, first as instructor and then as assistant professor until 1968, when it came time for me to take a sabbatical. Almost right after I arrived, the chairman of the

international relations program—which was an interdepartmental effort—left to go to the University of California at Irvine. So, as a very young fellow, I succeeded as the chairman which made my stay at Pomona even more interesting than it might have been. So, I had a fair amount of responsibility at a very early age; fortunately, as I said, we had some excellent students.

So, I was not looking to leave the academic world, but I had for some time in back of my mind thought that it might be interesting to actually participate in international relations. I felt that it might be worthwhile to see whether what I was teaching had any relationship to the "real" world. But I spent my sabbatical as a visiting associate professor at the International Christian University in Tokyo. This was a Japanese university that allowed some of its courses to be taught in English. This was an opportunity for me to become acquainted with the Far East.

The public affairs department at International Christian was very small—four people. We all taught American politics, government, U.S. foreign policy, international politics and a variety of other subjects. The wide range of subject matter as well as the paucity of teachers made the year a very intensive teaching experience. It was a formula for becoming a dilettante rather than a research specialist. It was a lot fun; I found the students very stimulating.

When it came time for my sabbatical, I was invited to participate in a project on arms control, part of which was being done at Princeton and part at Columbia. I was not particularly interested at the time in that subject and therefore I had to think of something else to do on my sabbatical. There was a retired missionary in Claremont, CA (California) who told me about the International Christian University, which was located just outside of Tokyo. As I mentioned, some of its courses were taught in English which made me a candidate. It just happened that the dean of the university was visiting California as I was trying to make up my mind in the spring, 1968. He confirmed that the courses that I could teach were indeed in English; their current professor was on a sabbatical at Temple University, so that International Christian would indeed welcome me if I were interested. I should note that some of the courses were taught in English because after the war, the Rockefeller Foundation, with the encouragement of people like Ed Reischauer and others, wanted to create a liberal arts college in Japan. The school was modeled after an American liberal arts college; it was oriented towards an exploration of Japan in the modern world and therefore had a number of foreign students. For example, the California state system sent quite a few students. The student body consisted primarily of the off-spring of Japanese diplomats, bankers and others who had lived or traveled outside Japan. These children were somewhat disadvantaged when it came time to enter a top-notch Japanese university because they had lived so long overseas. So, the International Christian University met a real need. It may not have been in the upper tier of Japanese universities, but it had a very interesting student body—more cosmopolitan than the usual Japanese student body with a wider range of experiences, particularly international.

I didn't want to teach a full load; I wanted time to do some research on Japan on my

own—a country which was a complete mystery to me, which was an important country. An appointment to the university was also a way to keep my family together. So, the appointment to the university was by sheer serendipity; it was not something that I had targeted. As a matter of fact, until the opportunity arose, I had not given the Far East much thought—much less Japan. So, my career in the Far East started by accident.

I taught a course in international politics. But after my first quarter, the students went on strike, as did students at many universities around the world at this time. So, I did not even have to teach the full course. I spent a lot of time at faculty meetings. We lived on campus which made it almost mandatory that I participate because the meetings had a hard time getting a quorum even though the topic was how to get the students back into the classrooms. The faculty had no clue, and they turned to me on almost a daily basis to give them advice. The meetings would begin at noon and often did not end until midnight. The meetings were conducted in Japanese; that gave me an opportunity for immersion in the language. In addition, I had a student who taught me the language three times per week. But the faculty meetings gave me an opportunity for continuing an intensive exposure to the language, although what I learned there was not your usual daily vocabulary. The meetings were about educational politics—not a subject that was discussed in the course on daily living. But these meetings were useful in my learning process, even though it came entirely unexpectedly.

I found Japanese very difficult to learn. At the same time, I found it intriguing because the ideographs were fun to write. As in every foreign language, it is much more intriguing to learn it as a participant, rather than a far-off observer. You can use it on a daily basis—in fact, you have to use it to survive. It was a challenge to get directions to where you wanted to go, to buy one's daily needs in a store. It provides reinforcement to the learning process that would not occur unless one lived in the country.

The Japanese students were vastly different from American ones. They were considerably more passive in class. The typical high school emphasized the pouring of information from the teachers into students' heads. The students had to sponge up this information if they had any hope of passing any university exams.

Also, we have a different system at the university level. In Japan, once a student has been admitted, then he or she is almost assured matriculation. So, students tended to relax during their four university years, having worked very hard and diligently at the high school level. University years were interim steps during which the students did a lot of socializing and developed their networking talents. They joined clubs, played sports, and secondarily went to classes. So Japanese universities and colleges did not do much to improve a student's analytical capabilities nor his or her skills in an adversarial climate. The students did not devote much time to studies; they were too busy with the development of their social and athletic skills.

The strike that I mentioned before was ostensibly undertaken because when the rumor of a strike reached the faculty committee responsible for campus security, it increased the number of security guards patrolling the premises. The security force until then consisted

of a few elderly gentleman—mostly in their 70s—who rode bicycles around the campus. The faculty committee hired a few younger guards, and then undertook some security exercises which the students chose to regard as a provocation. The students then demanded that the "private capitalist violence force", as they called the security guards, be disbanded and that the faculty committee which had been responsible for the "provocation" be eliminated. Furthermore, the students demanded that they be allowed to vote in all faculty committees that dealt with issues of direct concern to them.

That was the rationale for the strike at International Christian University. As a matter of fact, the students' actions were part of a much broader effort by students throughout Japan in 1968 to assert greater control over campus affairs—in anticipation of the renewal of the Japan-United States security treaty. In those days, and perhaps even today, Japanese universities enjoy considerable autonomy from civil authorities, thereby essentially barring any governmental police force from entering campuses. So, if students could control universities, then they could rally against the Japanese government's decisions on national security matters. For example, International Christian University was located near a series of U.S. military installations; that gave them readily available targets for their demonstrations. If they could then race back to the university grounds before the Japanese police had arrested them, they were safe and free. In 1968, 118 Japanese universities were closed down by the students. So, International Christian University was certainly not alone in its tribulations.

The hot topic concerning U.S.-Japan relations in those days was Vietnam. I arrived in Japan shortly after the Tet event; so, the American involvement in Asia in an active combat situation concerned a lot of the students. They demonstrated against the United States, foremost because of our involvement in Vietnam, and by extension against our military presence in Japan, which was perceived as a potential source for Japan being drawn into a war in Asia. These views got me involved into a lot of debates, which was an interesting experience. I found out later that one of the two of the student leaders was a _____, a young man whose father was the deputy vice-minister for foreign affairs. I am sure that did not sit too well with the old man.

I saw some of the students again during my subsequent tours in Japan. By that time, all were respected members of the establishment. There may been others who stayed outside, but for those that I saw again, the student period was just a right-of-passage and an expression of youthful idealism. The same syndrome occurred in France, Germany, the United States, and in many other countries.

I must say that my language skills were still somewhat rudimentary by the end of my year in Japan. I never studied it; what I learned was the result of sitting in on meetings and what I could glean from a tutor. I used what I could, but I didn't approach the language as I would have if I had thought that I wanted to become a Japanese expert. On the contrary, I viewed my stay in Japan just as a sabbatical leave; I learned as much as I could in the course of day-to-day activities focusing on history and political science from English texts—my Japanese not being up to a level necessary to read scholarly works. I expected that by the fall of 1969, I would be back in Pomona resuming my teaching career.

Q: *Then in 1969, you were appointed as a White House fellow. How did that come about?*

ARMACOST: I believe that sometime in the winter of 1969, while still in Japan, I received a letter from the White House Fellows program director who reported that the chairman of my department at Pomona had nominated me for one of the fellowships. He had suggested that I might be interested in an assignment in Washington to check how my views from academia accorded with the real world. He thought that the time was appropriate for me to do that. He already had a potential replacement to take on my course work—the same fellow who had covered for me while I was in Japan. I am just guessing about this background because no one ever told me the full story behind the nomination.

The White House Fellows Program sent me an application, which I completed and was then invited to a meeting of applicants from the western United States, which was held in San Francisco. This invitation presented a dilemma because then it cost $550 to fly from Tokyo to San Francisco and back. That was real money then; I was on a teaching salary which was exceedingly modest by any standard and I also had a family of four—my wife and three children. We lived modestly even though the exchange rate in the later 1960s was by far better for the American dollar than it is today—or has been for the last few years. So, the plane ticket would have made a major dent in the Armacost's budget, particularly since there was no guarantee that I would pass through the regional competition, much less the final one. But we decided to take the gamble; the idea of a year as a White House Fellow intrigued me because the fellows received an exposure for that one year which was unmatched by any other possibility. There were 16 fellows; almost all were assigned to a cabinet member with possibilities of meeting a wide range of very senior administration officials as well as members of Congress; one worked in the White House itself, for the vice-president, if I remember correctly. One was assigned to the Office of Economic Opportunity, which then was headed by Don Rumsfeld. In any case, the stated purpose was to assign the fellows to cabinet members; all were given tasks which enabled them to get a sense of how the government worked.

It was a great way to find out how policy was developed and implemented in Washington. So, I was attracted by the possibility, even though I was not that confident that I would be chosen. I suspect that in the final analysis, the fact that I came all the way from Japan for the interviews was a plus for my candidacy. I don't think any of my competitors bet their whole income in order to participate in the selection process.

Every fellow was asked for his or her choice of assignments, but that didn't necessarily mean that one got his choice. I had asked for the National Security Council with State being a second choice. One of the fellow program participants of the previous year had been assigned to the National Security Council; he asked whether he could extend his appointment for another year—a request that was granted. So, I ended up in State.

I have maintained contacts with a number of my colleagues; they became very close friends. Periodically, we see each other. Annually, there is an alumni meeting of White

House fellows; I have gone a couple of times so that I have some idea of what has happened to most of the fellows. Some of them are well known: Bud McFarlane, Colin Powell, and Wes Clark—people with whom later I had a working relationship.

As I said, all candidates went through regional and national competition—the regional ones were essentially interviews run by graduates of the White House fellows program. At the time I applied, this program was almost new—only a couple of years old. The final interviews were in Annapolis and those were conducted by members of the commission, as well as some former fellows. Art Fleming, the Secretary of HEW (Department of Health, Education and Welfare), was the chairman of the commission. Doris Kearns (now Doris Kearns Goodwin) had been a member of the first class and was on the interview board the year I appeared. She was several years younger than I was, but that gives some idea of the caliber of the people in the fellows program.

During these interviews, we learned a little bit about the program and the expectations of the commission. I learned about the program primarily from conversations with interview board members. I had the opportunity to talk to one of the previous fellows, an Army officer, who had been assigned to State (Department of State) in 1968. Much of the learning process came at a dinner that the commission hosted for the candidates. He was still assigned to State (Department of State) when I arrived there and he was very helpful in orienting me in that bureaucracy. I should mention that the State Department (Department of State) did not have a very good record in the way it dealt with the fellows that had been assigned to it. It considered that anyone who came in from the outside and who did not have some specialized knowledge, like congressional relations, could not really be useful. For example, my predecessor spent his year in the Executive Secretariat, which put him at the center of activity, but did not allow him to establish a personal relationship with the secretary. That was different from the experiences of fellows in other departments; they became special assistants to the secretary of the department and became deeply involved in a secretary's work and had a most rewarding experience.

The White House fellows had frequent meetings—three or four times each week. The program was educationally very active. These were opportunities to hear senior officials from the executive branch, usually at lunch or dinner. The group also took a trip to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. So, we become well acquainted with each other. This immersion in the group included the wives as well, who also became very friendly. It was a very intensive year; it was a great year.

When I first arrived in the Department (Department of State), I was introduced to the principals and staff of the Seventh Floor, where the secretary, the deputy secretary and the undersecretaries had their offices. It became apparent to me in quick order that Secretary Bill Rogers was not personally going to be involved in the fellows program. Eliot Richardson, the deputy, on the other hand was very much interested. The staff in his office, like Mort Abramowitz and Jonathan Moore and Charlie Cook, became my close contacts. They saw my presence as another body that could help them out. Officially, I was assigned to the Policy and Coordination staff (S/PC) on the assumption that this was the one office which would give me an opportunity to become acquainted with all the

major policy issues. In light of my academic background, the powers-to-be thought that S/PC (Policy and Coordination) would be the most rewarding place for me to spend my year.

In fact, S/PC (Policy and Coordination) was undergoing major changes at the time. The director was Bill Cargo. Art Hartman was in charge of coordination working closely with the undersecretary's office. Marian Camp was in charge of planning and I became part of her staff. But I had more wiggle room than others assigned to S/PC (Policy and Coordination) because I was part of a White House program and not an employee of the Department. I had a pretty free hand in selecting what I would work on. I had a pretty good year in S/PC (Policy and Coordination).

There were a number of very good people in S/PC (Policy and Coordination) with whom I had the opportunity to interact. Most of them were FSOs (Foreign Service Officer); Herb Spiro was one exception; he had come from Amherst where he taught. Ray Albright, an economist, was on the staff; he had served in the Treasury Department. They were a few other "outsiders" —including a couple of military officers— but most of the staff was professional Foreign Service officers.

I found the atmosphere somewhat akin to a university faculty—small with many capable people. For someone coming from academia, this was an impressive staff; they knew a lot about foreign affairs. I learned a lot that year.

I think the S/PC (Policy and Coordination) staff assumed that because I had just returned from Japan, I was an expert on that country and region. I assured them that I wasn't, but in case, they put me to work on a lot of Japan or Japan-related issues. Seligman was the S/PC (Policy and Coordination) expert on these issues; he was a FSO (Foreign Service Officer) assigned to S/PC (Policy and Coordination). I found him very helpful and I learned a lot from him. I must say that for a while, I was embarrassed because I really did not know the subject matter as well as my colleagues thought I would.

I found that the staff both in S/PC (Policy and Coordination) and other bureaus and offices was quite impressive. I thought that the level of analytical talent was exceptional. The atmosphere was quite congenial and cooperative. There was a lot less back-biting and petty intrigues than I remembered existed on academic faculties. But I did notice that the Department (Department of State) was somewhat marginalized in the foreign policy development process. Nixon and Kissinger had centralized the management of the process in the White House, starting in the early months of that administration. I remember that I had considerable contact with Dick Pederson, the counselor of the department. Don McHenry was his special assistant. They were responsible for the department's (Department of State) liaison with the NSC (National Security Council), along with the deputy secretary and his staff. This meant essentially attending a lot of meetings which were spawned by the frantic atmosphere engendered by Kissinger from the start of the Nixon Administration. The bureaucracy, even a year later, was still flooded by NISSMs ("national security memoranda") calling for studies on one subject or another). I think this paper avalanche was generated in part to establish an institutional

memory on some of the major issues confronting the United States and in part just to keep the bureaucracy busy while the NSC (National Security Council) developed policy without "interference."

This approach to management of foreign affairs created a lot of paperwork and meetings. There were a lot of National Security Council committees and working groups; since the fellows were "free hands" we were volunteered to write papers and attend the meetings and keep track of what was going on in the National Security Council system—no simple task in light of Kissinger's *modus operandi (mode of operating)*.

As I said, I had a lot of contact with the deputy secretary's office; so that I had many opportunities to observe and participate in the liaison work; it gave me a good appreciation of how an executive branch department viewed the situation as it existed in the Nixon-Kissinger days. Eliot Richardson was the key department official; he was able to move matters along in the National Security Council system. Alexis Johnson also had a role, but I did not have the opportunity to watch him closely during that year. He was primarily staffed from the regional bureaus, as had been the tradition in the Department of State.

I should note that on the one hand, I worked in an office which was somewhat at the margins of the policy development process in the Department of State. No one knows exactly what to do with a planning staff. Its stock rises and falls with the personal connection between the secretary of the department and the planning director. Bill Rogers wasn't that interested in the planning function; he looked for support from his Seventh Floor colleagues and the bureaus. So, S/PC (Policy and Coordination) under Bill Cargo only had a remote connection with the secretary and his deputies. Not that it made much difference since State (Department of State) itself had been largely marginalized in the process with the leadership and management falling to the National Security Council. In light of these factors, I didn't have the sense of being in the mainstream of the policy process, but I did have a pretty good view of how the process worked at that time, especially since as a member of a prestigious fellowship program, I had through my colleagues, views into the operations of the National Security Council, where I had several contacts, and other major cabinet departments.

When I first arrived in State (Department of State), I was given an orientation program which exposed me to all the regional bureaus and several of the functional ones. In addition, my Middle East trip gave me the opportunity to become well acquainted with NEA (Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs). It didn't take long before Cargo and the rest of the staff treated me like a regular member of the S/PC (Policy and Coordination) staff, rather than just a White House fellow. So, I was given certain coordinating functions which brought me into frequent contact with EA (Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs), particularly the assistant secretary's office—the assistant secretary at the time was Marshall Green—as well as the country desks. As I mentioned earlier, Jonathan Moore, of the deputy secretary's office, was one the first people I met in the Department of State. He transferred to EA (Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs) soon after that, and when the Cambodia invasion took place, he had me detailed to EA (Bureau of East

Asia and Pacific Affairs) so that I could work on some urgent matters, like "out of channel" messages. I think that since I was a White House fellow, it was a lot easier for the personnel system to accept my floating from S/PC (Policy and Coordination) to a bureau or office.

That EA (Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs) experience was pretty daunting for me because Bill Sullivan, one of the department's hard chargers, who was a second deputy in EA (Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs) had done the same thing that I was asked to do at the time of the Laos crisis. He of course knew the Laos situation intimately where as I was a neophyte on Cambodia and didn't have a chance to learn a lot about it before being put to work.

In general, I think the S/PC (Policy and Coordination)-regional bureau relationships were pretty good at this time in part because S/PC (Policy and Coordination) was not that influential. The regional bureaus had a lot more say about policy development and implementation. Marshall Green, for example, was a very formidable operator, whom the National Security Council tried to crowd out on some issues.

This exposure to EA (Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs) foreign policy challenges stimulated my interest in the area. I extended my knowledge beyond Japan; I was assigned to write some papers on China—e.g., the UN (United Nations) representation issue. I drafted some papers on Vietnam as well as other countries in the region. As I mentioned, I became involved in other issues, but I think most of my time was probably devoted to Asian matters. By the time I had finished my internship, I had added considerable knowledge of East Asia beyond what I had picked up during my 11 months in Japan. Of course, this was 1969 and the focus was on Vietnam. I think I was one of the few people in the Department (Department of State) who had not been there. But that didn't stop me from writing about it.

I wrote a couple of papers on Korea because S/PC (Policy and Coordination) had undertaken bi-annual meetings with its Japanese counterpart during which many Asian issues were discussed. I attended these talks. I thought they were quite interesting, particularly since this was my first exposure to government-to-government relationships. For the first time, I became acquainted with the Foreign Office's views of the world. As an unintended consequence, these meetings also provided an opportunity to meet some Japanese officials who at the time were at my grade level, but by the time I became ambassador, they were vice-ministers. So, I established friendships which would continue through the years. I think these planning meetings had considerable utility; we certainly learned from them and I think they were useful in drawing the Japanese away from the usual narrow issues into a wider perspective.

Let me just say a few words about our Middle East trip. It was conceived as an opportunity to expose the fellows to an actual foreign policy concern and to acquaint them on how the U.S. government functioned overseas. Half of the class went to Europe and the other half to the Middle East. We went to Iran, Israel, Egypt and probably another one or two—all in about a week's time. All of this was just orientation; we had an

opportunity to be briefed and visited some U.S. sponsored projects. I found it very interesting, particularly in light of my general interest in foreign affairs. It was fascinating to see how things were "on the ground" rather from reports or other written material. But I was not that smitten with the Middle East that I wanted to abandon East Asia.

I should not end this discussion of my first year in the Department (Department of State) without making some comments about Eliot Richardson. I had fun working for him. He was very intelligent; he was very open and appeared to be the Seventh Floor principal most involved in the large issues. I thought Rogers was very smart and nice, but I had very little to do with him. I remember having lunch with him and some of my S/PC (Policy and Coordination) colleagues because on this occasion, the secretary mentioned that the president regarded the Department (Department of State) as being a sieve—everything leaked through; Rogers did not appear to disagree. So I came away from that luncheon with the conclusion that the secretary of state was not going to mobilize the forces at his command to fight bureaucratic battles against the White House; on the contrary, he seemed to feel that he was in the Department (Department of State) to protect what the president wanted to accomplish from any interference from the professionals.

Q: *What was the next step in your career?*

ARMACOST: In fact, when my year's fellowship came to an end, some people in the Department (Department of State) asked me whether I would stay on for another year. I had been contemplating taking a teaching job at the Fletcher School which was going through a major change in the faculty. So, I didn't know who else would be there. In any case, I had enjoyed my year in the Department (Department of State) and decided to give a try for another year. I don't think I ever consciously decided to make a career in the Department (Department of State); in fact, at that stage I was just going from year to year pursuing the most interesting opportunities that presented themselves, keeping always in mind that eventually I would return to academia as a teacher. At one stage in the early 1970s, I suggested to my wife that I continue this year-to-year career until it became less interesting; then I would go back to academia. I never anticipated spending the rest of my life in the bureaucracy accumulating enough credits to warrant a federal annuity. It was pure coincidence that new challenges and interesting assignments kept coming along.

So, I stayed in S/PC (Policy and Coordination) for another two years. My portfolio was essentially East Asia issues. I worked with Al Seligman who also covered East Asia. I think Dick Finn was there at that time also working on East Asia.

My views on our relations with that part of the world developed during my first S/PC (Policy and Coordination) tour. They were essentially compatible with the general direction of U.S. policy. For example, my experience in Japan made me a strong proponent of Okinawa reversion. In the course of this second year in S/PC (Policy and Coordination), that was one problem that was solved. It was a major U.S. policy initiative which I thought was absolutely correct.

In addition to this key issue, we used to write papers about trade issues, focusing on such primitive goods like textiles and steel. The Japanese had not yet developed capabilities in the auto and computer businesses. I was not an economist or a trade specialist so I didn't get involved in the details of the issues, but I did attend a lot of meetings—some of them at rather high levels—some of which were rather contentious. I was able to observe the style of combat in trade talks, but I wasn't deeply involved. My focus was on military issues and I attended the trade meetings to insure that our policy on these issues would not interfere with what we were trying to achieve in the military area.

I noted during these meetings that the discussion was highly scripted. Rarely did one principal or another wander away from his "talking points." In preparing for meetings with the Japanese especially, there was a stress on formalities and the absence of spontaneity. On the one hand, this made these meetings very predictable and therefore less interesting; on the other, it gave the staff considerable influence since it was they that essentially wrote the scripts. Rarely were there any surprises. The Japanese emphasized this discipline because their Foreign Ministry was dead set against any surprises. Our officials were happy to oblige. There was a lot less predictability when the meetings were with other parts of the Japanese bureaucracy or society. Of course, in the early 1970s, State Department's (Department of State) role in setting economic policy was very modest. Nat Samuels, the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs was the Department's (Department of State) principal representative; he had a hard time being included in the U.S. delegation.

On Vietnam, I was a little more "dovish" than the administration. This was somewhat ironic because at Pomona I was considered a "hawk" on this issue. By the time I left academia, I was skeptical about a positive outcome; I didn't know exactly where our engagement would lead, but I was skeptical that it would be a positive outcome. The magnitude of our involvement was suppressing the capacity of the Vietnamese to develop the kind of capabilities that Vietnamization required. So, I was more skeptical than many of my colleagues about the possibility of a favorable outcome. I did write a paper on the subject during my first year in S/P (Policy and Coordination) which I managed through one of the White House fellows to get to Mel Laird, but it never went anywhere.

On China, I was only peripherally involved in the initial steps which led to normalization. We in S/PC (Policy and Coordination) tracked what EA (Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs) was doing on this initiative; they did most of the spade work, developing options—even though unbeknown to the Department (Department of State), Kissinger was off actually implementing a program of his own. I think that somewhere along the line, the EA (Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs) work became helpful. We of course knew nothing of Kissinger's visit to Beijing; I thought it was a great initiative. Unlike many of the professional Foreign Service officers, I thought that there was considerable logic behind the centralization of foreign policy-national security in the White House. In light of my academic background, I did not consider the bureaucratic battles particularly helpful if one was to change the direction of American foreign policy. I viewed the constant struggles among bureaucracies primarily as an observer since at that time I still saw my future as an academic practitioner. I must say that much that I learned during my

fellowship year came from the private briefings that Kissinger gave to us. They were really seminars in foreign policy—informative, provocative and fascinating. They were off-the-record and highly classified. The written record, in a red binder, was circulated to us. I think this exposure during my fellowship year made me more detached from the bureaucratic battles than my State (Department of State) colleagues. As long as the results were good, I really did not resent the fact that the Department (Department of State) was not involved or just tangentially involved in some key issues. I recognized that some results could only be achieved if the discussions and implementation was restricted to a very few people.

I first visited Korea in 1971, probably in conjunction with a joint planning staff meeting with the Japanese. This was in the last few months of Ambassador Porter's tour in Korea. I went to the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) and was impressed by the tensions along the North-South border. I was also impressed by the strength of the South; in fact, throughout my career, I felt confident that the South's capabilities would overcome any adversities—even though when I was in the Pentagon, our net assessments indicated that the North had overwhelming military strengths—a claim which I did not find totally credible.

As I suggested earlier, S/PC (Policy and Coordination) had some role in preparing the Department (Department of State) position on issues that were being discussed in the NSC (National Security Council) chain. We were not the Department's (Department of State) representatives at NSC (National Security Council) meetings. Our role was essentially to review the papers that had been prepared for the Department's (Department of State) representative and then to track the implementation process. I found that the process did produce a lot of excellent analytical work, but I found it a little stodgy because so many offices and bureaus had to be satisfied with every comma and period in the papers. But on Okinawa reversion, for example, I thought that the work was excellent. The work on China was of a different caliber partly because it was such a hot issue, both domestically and internationally, and because knowledge was so highly compartmentalized—in ways that I didn't fully understand at the time.

I did some work on the UN (United Nations) representation issue. After a while, I was pretty conversant with the issue and tried to help out Tom Shoesmith, who was the country director. I learned the nuances of the Taiwan/China issues, but I was not deeply engaged in these debates. As I said, I thought that normalization was logical; I was eager to see an appropriate formula worked out, although I was not expert enough to suggest one myself. I never visited Taiwan during this period; in fact, I didn't visit the island until after my second tour in Tokyo.

I worked on a NSSM (National Security Study Memorandum) dealing with Cambodia ending up as the State (Department of State) man on the interagency working group. I came away from that experience quite impressed by the knowledge that the analysts had acquired. The working group was a good device to force departments with disparate interests to agree at least on a common statement of the problem which then led to a series of policy options from which the leadership could choose. I must say that I was

overwhelmed by the amount of information that was provided to us, particularly since I was given a relatively short time to draft this paper. The word of my assignment apparently had spread because I was deluged by people who wanted me to know one thing or another. I guess everybody thought that I could be influenced.

As you can see, I did a lot of writing while on the planning staff. That is what all of us did. Much of our output was essentially contributions to broader papers; in retrospect, I wish I had the time back that I devoted to some of the memoranda. They were not literary works which the world will long remember; it was part of the busywork that Kissinger imposed on the Department (Department of State) and the NSC (National Security Council) system; eventually some of the work was useful in outlining options and helped the decision maker in the final determination, but we spent a lot of time drafting and redrafting and redrafting. It was rare that the outcomes were exactly how I hoped they would be, but there were some small victories here and there when my words or views were included in the final draft.

The annual foreign policy statements which Kissinger initiated used to come to S/P (Policy Planning) for review. I would look over certain sections. I thought that the statements were very useful, particularly when compared with what was done before and what happened later. They were among the most literate statements on foreign policy; eventually they became verbose and took on a congratulatory tone. But I thought the process was a very useful discipline to force the bureaucracy at least once per year to focus on what should be the essential goals of U.S. (United States) foreign policy and how they related to each other. That was helpful.

These two years in S/P (Policy Planning) were fun and educational. Had they not met these criteria; I would have left since I still did not consider government service as a life-time endeavor. I kept participating because I found the work stimulating and challenging. I learned a lot.

Q: *In 1972, you returned to Japan. How did that happen?*

ARMACOST: During one of my trips to Tokyo for the joint U.S.-Japan planning meetings, USIA (United States Information Agency) asked me whether I would spend a couple of weeks touring Japan to speak to various audiences. I did that together with Lucien Pyle and Bill Griffith, both MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) professors. We visited all of the American Centers, giving lectures. We had fun, played tennis and took full advantage of the opportunity. At the end of the two weeks, we returned to Tokyo for our last day in Japan.

I then got a call from Bob Ingersoll, the new U.S. ambassador, asking whether I could drop by his office. That I did on the assumption that all the ambassador wanted was to say goodbye and perhaps "thanks." Instead, he asked me whether I would be interested in transferring to the embassy to become his special assistant. I was sort of stunned because it was totally unexpected; I had never met him before. He told me that at Borg-Warner, where he had been the CEO (Chief Executive Officer), he always had a special assistant

who focused primarily on the matters of interest to him—Ingersoll.

The offer sounded intriguing even though I didn't have a good idea about what ambassadors did from day to day. I liked Ingersoll right off the bat. On my way to the planning talks, which were being held in Shimoto, I asked a question quite innocently. When I was at ICU (International Christian University), the only time I had ever been invited to the embassy was when it held a meeting for the Fulbright fellows. Jim Morley, a former professor at Columbia, had been Ambassador Alexis Johnson's liaison with the academic community. Among his duties was to serve as chairman of the Fulbright Commission. He had found out that I had been a Fulbrighter and therefore he invited me to participate in the committee which interviewed Japanese candidates. At the end of the selection process, a reception was held at the embassy to which I was invited; that was my one and only time at the Tokyo embassy.

In any case, I went to Shimoto with Dick Sneider, the DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission), and Bill Sherman, the political counselor of the embassy. I asked how it was that Jim Morley was working at the embassy. This was just out of idle curiosity and just conversation. I remember that Bill Sherman, after my question said: "That's it!" I had worked with Morley and we had had an excellent relationship; he was a marvelous guy and an expert on Japan—essentially bilingual. He had been of great help to Ambassador Johnson. When he left the embassy, he was succeeded by a USIA (United States Information Agency) officer, who had excellent Japanese, but didn't have good contacts with academia. So, the job kind of languished.

I might mention that the job of liaison with academia was originally started by Reischauer. The first incumbent was someone who had a background in both culture and academia. When Alexis Johnson became ambassador, he continued the job, but gave greater stress on contact with the academic community. He selected Jim Morley, whom I mentioned earlier. Jim was a source of advice to the ambassador on a lot of matters, but he was especially helpful in keeping the ambassador informed of the views of the political science community in academia. When Ingersoll selected me for the job, he emphasized that he wanted the contacts with academia resurrected, which in light of my background, I was delighted to do. I should note that the job on the official staffing pattern was shown as a USIA (United States Information Agency) position; so I assume that there were some negotiations between State (Department of State) and USIA (United States Information Agency) which allowed me to fill the job even though I was on State's (Department of State) payroll.

Ingersoll had been badgering the Department (Department of State) to get a special assistant, to work on the issues which were of greatest interest to him. The Department (Department of State) was trying to find the right person for the job, without success. I don't know this for sure, but I assume that after the planning talks, Sneider and Sherman talked to Ingersoll and suggested that they had found a candidate for him. In fact, Sneider, having heard that I had taught at Pomona, was quite interested because his oldest son went there the year after I left to become a White House fellow. He chose Pomona because he had heard that it had a good political science-international relations program.

So, Dick had a good impression of my department at Pomona. So, either or both Dick and Bill figured out that in addition to being a good candidate for Ingersoll, I could also assume the mantle of liaison to the Japanese academic community. They also had negotiated with USIA (United States Information Agency) so that I could be afforded opportunities to lecture around Japan at the American Centers. So, the job that Ingersoll was offering me had a variety of responsibilities.

I couldn't give the ambassador an immediate answer; I had to talk to my wife first. At the time, we had three children: twelve, ten and seven. But I did like the challenge that the job seemed to provide. Furthermore, it provided the family with an opportunity to become better acquainted with Japan. Our children were grown enough that a couple of years in Japan looked like an adventure. My work in S/PC (Policy and Coordination) on Japan showed me how little I really knew about that country and its people. I felt that I could be of assistance to Ingersoll, particularly after I had become better acquainted with Japan. I wanted to continue my study of the language. So, the circumstances were right for the Armacost family. My interview with Ingersoll was in July; by October we were residents of Japan again.

We took up residence in _____ in a house that the U.S. government had expropriated during the occupation days. It has since been sold. Phil Trezise had lived there. It was near Tokyo University across town from the embassy in an area in which there were very few foreigners. It was great fun. The house was an old Mitsubishi house with a vault large enough for the kids to set up a train set. We had a marvelous time there. It gave us a good feel for Japanese life which we could not have gotten had we lived in the American compound. The kids went to the American School near Takata which was about an hour and a half ride for them each way on a train and subway. They had a great time; they were young and loved the travel adventure. It gave the older ones a sense of responsibility for having to take care of the seven-year-old. At first, my wife Bonnie felt she would have to escort them to and from school every day; that would have taken up six hours of her day. She finally came to the conclusion that if the Japanese kids could ride the train and the subway, so could hers. We discovered later that the youngest used to put his clothes over his pajamas because he was so afraid that he would be left behind; so, when he was told to get up in the morning, he did it in a great hurry. He did get lost one time when he fell asleep on the train on the way home. His brother got off at the subway stop; he woke up three stations later. He had enough presence to figure out how to cross over and take a train back the other way. Bonnie then wasn't sure whether to chide him for his negligence or praise him for his ingenuity. After that, she didn't worry about her kids' daily travels.

Ingersoll was the type of leader who was highly operational, without losing focus on issues of interest to him. I was asked to follow up on issues. Once a month, he would chair a meeting of embassy senior officer to identify a major issue. I would then be asked to write a paper on it which would become the basis for subsequent discussion. From that discussion, would emerge a cable to the Department which not only discussed the issue but had recommendations. Ingersoll did not want to be always at the receiving end of instructions from the Department (Department of State); he wanted to be the instigator of

certain policy decisions and a participant in the debates leading up to those decisions. So, he used this system as a way to influence policy. For that he needed someone who could write, gather information and collect all points of view. That person also would write the cable to the Department (Department of State). That was the major part of my job.

We had a certain number of planning exercises that were forced on us by the Department (Department of State). These were the days when planning and budgeting were the latest fads in the Department. So, there were a certain number of paper exercises that fell on me to do.

For most of my tour, Tom Shoesmith was the DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission). I should note that for most of my tour, which was only about 18 months, he was the charge' (Charge d'Affaires) because in 1973, Ingersoll returned to the United States to become the assistant secretary for the Far East and later deputy secretary. When I left in 1974, Tom was still the charge' (Charge d'Affaires).

The job was mostly in-house. I had no duties that required conversations with the Japanese bureaucracy or politicos. Of course, I did have the job of liaison with the academic community; that provided opportunities to become acquainted with a lot of professors, including some like Sadaka Ogata, the present head of UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). I mentioned that I was also asked to lecture periodically in one American Center or another. I was probably the most traveled embassy officer; I spent a lot of time on the road. That gave me the opportunity to meet a lot Japanese around the country. I didn't meet with officials very often, but I had very good entrée into Japanese society, particularly outside of Tokyo. That kept me in touch with academia, the media and the business community which might attend my lectures. So, my perspectives were quite different from those of my embassy colleagues. I enjoyed those public speaking appearances greatly; as I said, that was what I was doing when Ingersoll offered me the job as his special assistant.

Interestingly enough, my contacts with students were very limited. American officials were not welcomed on campuses because of Vietnam. A lot of professors would attend my lectures at American centers, but very few students. Alan Carter, the embassy's PAO (Public Affairs Officer), had a very good feel for what was going in the country. He had a catalogue on each area, where one could find the names of key elites that USIA (United States Information Agency) was targeting. They were quite purposeful about it and I thought they did a good job. But students in general did not attend the lectures; they were not a priority for USIA (United States Information Agency).

I started taking language lessons every day from an embassy instructor. I was not fluent by any means and since I was not in a language-requirement position I was not tested, but in the 18 months we spent in Tokyo, I think I learned enough to carry on a reasonable conversation, unless it lapsed into some esoterica or technical subjects. As I said, we were living in a part of town where we were practically the only foreigners. We would go to the public baths at night and did all of our shopping at local stores. So that forced us to use our Japanese; it was a very good way to learn the language. I reached a level where I

could understand a question asked of me in Japanese at one of the American Centers, but I was not able to give a complete reply in Japanese. I think I always had a good accent, so that my Japanese interlocutors thought I knew more of their language than I actually did. I am sorry that I was not required by my job to become fluent in the language, both reading and speaking, as I had learned German by living with a German family. But my Japanese tour was quite different. I took up the daily language classes when I became ambassador, but I never got to the point where Japanese was just second nature.

To get back to Ingersoll's interests, the top priority was probably our security relationships. In the early 1970s, that relationship was essentially one sided, with the United States providing strategic guarantees, but the Japanese brought very little to the table. Vietnam was still an active issue because we were providing logistic support, but the opposition in Japan was strong enough to make it difficult to get material to the ports for loading on ships. So, we had great difficulties providing logistical support out of Japan. I spent a lot of time working with Bob Pursley, who was the USCOMUS-JA (Commander, United States Forces Japan) commander, framing the issues which needed to be addressed so that our strategic guarantee could be transformed into a functional alliance. We wrote and talked a lot about joint planning, exercises, burden sharing—all sorts of politico-military issues. These issues were so sensitive that if discussed in public, undoubtedly would have resulted in the government's downfall. Large parts of the Japanese public objected to the security relationships that existed; any closer ties would have generated a major back-lash. So, my work on these politico-military issues was handled very delicately with a minimum of American participants. Later, when I was serving in the Pentagon, we were just beginning to implement very gingerly some of the actions we had considered five years earlier.

The alleged presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on American ships using Japanese ports was one of those issues that people did not talk about it. We would never comment on the question and hadn't done so since 1960.

My job had less to do with the operational side of our mutual security—we had a very good political-military counselor, Chuck Schmitz. He had to handle a lot of tough day-to-day issues, many stemming from our Vietnam involvement—movement of ammunition, munitions storage sites, etc. These matters were often discussed at the senior staff meeting, and I could get to express my view then, if I had one. My responsibility was more in the planning area. I want to talk later about Ambassador Ingersoll's perchance for planning; he certainly had an interest in looking at the future of the Japanese-U.S. alliance. In the early 1970s, that "alliance" was more a one-way strategic guarantee; there was very little that Japan added to the mix. We had no joint planning, operational exercises, very little sharing of intelligence—all the attributes of a well-coordinated military alliance. So, the American military had very little to do with its Japanese counterparts. Bob Hersey, who had been the military assistance expert for eight years in the Pentagon, and therefore very close to McNamara and Laird, was very attuned to thinking about these issues and was very eager to tackle them. Together, he and I wrote a paper which foreshadowed many of the issues which later did in fact confront us. These were all new to me, but I had a thorough lesson in what military alliances needed to

worry about—issues that took up many hours in later years as the military partnership became a reality. This "look ahead" gave me an opportunity to become acquainted with our military, for example, J-5 (Strategy, Policy, & Plans Directorate of the Department of Defense), J-3 (Military Advisers to U.S. Force Commanders) —and its thinking.

I thought that the U.S. military presence in Japan was vital for the stability of the area. But I don't believe that I was ever convinced that there was something magic about a specific level—contrary to some views which held that if a component was reduced from 5,000 men to 2,000 our whole deterrent posture would collapse. In the early 1970s as well as later, we had a large troop presence, but it was not a serious problem as long as we managed the adjustments in an intelligent way. There was no question that some of the Japanese were inconvenienced—sometime severely—by the presence of U.S. military bases, not to mention periodic incidents of unlawful behavior by some of our soldiers. The question of criminal jurisdiction was a constant source of irritation. Some of the problems stemmed from operational requirements, for example, firing over highways, etc. Some of the tensions in certain areas just stemmed from Japanese fatigue with foreigners running around in their country protected by special laws. Then of course in the early 1970s, our military presence reminded the Japanese of our Vietnam involvement which many, if not most, rejected. After 1975 and our departure from Vietnam, cause and effect was a little easier to determine. But in the early 1970s, we had to emphasize the importance of the bases to our Vietnam efforts, and were always concerned that we might well exceed Japanese willingness to play host to our military. There is no question that the problems of our military presence in Japan was closely related our Vietnam efforts, at least until 1975. All of these factors required us to be constantly vigilant about our presence; in fact, we were obliged by our legal obligations to review our presence so that bases and facilities which were no longer needed could be returned to the Japanese.

None of the problems I have mentioned in any way diminished my basic view that a United States-Japan military alliance was critical. I had no doubt that it had to grow from the practically empty shell it was in the early 1970s to a robust alliance that would be a force for stability in the area. Yet in that period it was an impossibility to move toward this goal in light of our strong differences about Vietnam and the legacy of WWII (World War II). The slightest hint that there had been even a conversation about such an alliance might well have brought down the Japanese government. The Japanese people would not have stood for even the most innocuous conversation on a security relationship while Vietnam was on going and the memories of WWII (World War II) were still very vivid. The self-defense forces were still in a very embryonic stage with the emphasis being on "self-defense"; there was absolutely no support for even considering use of those forces outside Japan. Even the issue of an alliance with the United States was very contentious with the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) —the leading party—in favor and the socialists and communists very much opposed. Both the socialists and the Social Democratic party had platforms which did not include a robust alliance with the United States.

I think my job gave me an opportunity to really begin to understand the Japanese view of the world. They still had a strong pacifist streak in their thinking. Of course, their views and ours were greatly complicated by the Vietnam situation. It was hard to distinguish

between the true pacifists and those just opposed our Vietnam policy. In the early 1970s, a lot of the activity was focused on such actions as our return of land to the Japanese in return for their assistance in the construction of facilities which enabled us to consolidate our operations in the country, making them less vulnerable to attacks from leftist and students. Not until we had withdrawn from Vietnam, did the Asians in general and the Japanese in particular begin to worry about the possibility of U.S. withdrawal from the region. The Japanese policy in 1972-74 was to keep at arm's length from our Vietnam policy; they did that by honoring the letter of their treaty obligations, rather than the spirit of an alliance.

It was in this period as well that there was the beginning of acute trade problems. We were still operating in a very paternalistic way. I got involved because trade issues were among those close and dear to Ingersoll's heart. I wrote papers on various aspects of the trade problems.

I think that the passions in academia had calmed down quite a bit from my last experience on Japanese campuses. In 1970, the security treaty was extended indefinitely thereby eliminating one of the main causes for student unrest. My job as academic liaison brought me essentially in touch with the academics who had an interest in international affairs—I think they might have been a little more thoughtful than the rabble rousers of a few years earlier. I never ran into any problems having my luncheon or dinner invitations accepted by Japanese academics; they were not disturbed being seen in public with American Embassy staff. I concentrated on those faculty members who specialized in security and politico-military issues because those were areas in which Ingersoll—and I—were interested.

Japan had a stable governing structure. The Sato government had been in power for over five years by 1972. Shortly before my arrival, the embassy's political section had submitted a cable which accurately predicted who the next five prime ministers would be. The sequence wasn't entirely correct, but the embassy did identify the five Japanese leaders who would rise to the top. This prediction was relatively easy to make because Japan had a government ruled by the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) —had been, was then and would be for a long time. So, it was mostly a matter of identifying the faction leaders and making some assumptions about the sequence of their assumption of power. In the early 1970s, there were main and anti-main stream factions within the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party); that split provided the stimulus for debating policy, even though it was all within one party. The party structure could and did therefore support administration policies since they had been debated within house before being adopted. This system provided stability to the political system; surprises were few and far between.

As a special assistant, I did not have the contacts with Japanese political leaders and government officials that the political and economic staff did. As I said, my job was essentially internal. But we did set up periodic planning meetings with some of the office director level officials of the Foreign Ministry; both they and I had participated in the past in the formal inter-governmental planning talks. Bob Duemling and Chuck Schmitz were

interested in the planning process. We would usually meet on Saturdays either at the ministry or the embassy. On the Japanese team, there were some guys who would become heavy hitters in the ministry later on; we all became quite friendly and remained so to this day. One was a Harvard PhD graduate, who had written a well-received book and who taught at Harvard for a few years. He was probably one of the only people in the ministry who did not enter the service at the bottom straight from a Japanese university. One became ambassador to the U.S. (United States) and another was the vice-minister when I was the ambassador. I found all these officials to be very thoughtful and cerebral and first class; we had many interesting and confidential discussions which I think were very helpful in each side understanding the other better. But those were really my only contacts with Japanese officials, except for the occasional requirement I might have had to fulfill one of Ingersoll's assignments.

Tanaka was the prime minister during my tour and in Japanese terms, he was a strong prime minister. As I said, I didn't have many contacts with the bureaucracy and none with the politicians, so that my impressions were formed basically on my colleagues' reporting of conversations with their contacts. One of the government's major drives was to decentralize moving functions and responsibilities out of Tokyo to the islands. That program was not going very well; it first of all inflated the land prices throughout the country. Tanaka was considered to be somewhat "out of the mold" because unlike most other prime ministers, he was not a graduate of Tokyo University and had not risen through the bureaucratic ranks. This "normal career track" tended to establish a close relationship between the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) and the bureaucracy; most of the politicians had been in the bureaucracy at least some of their working lives. So, they had no problem in turning many of the issues to the bureaucracy for resolution. It was not a situation in which the bureaucrats were held closely accountable to the political leadership. On the other hand, the consensus in Japan on the major issues, for example, economic ones such as an export driven growth—had been pretty much established and accepted by almost everybody. So, the bureaucracy was free to operate as it wished as long as it pursued the agreed policy goals.

As I said, this was my first Foreign Service assignment. I didn't know much about the Service (Foreign Service) when I landed in Tokyo in 1972. Ingersoll was probably not the typical ambassador; he had a very open relationship with his senior staff. He had a lot of respect for the embassy professionals because they filled in a lot of the background gaps that he had—and vice versa.

I was fortunate to be invited to attend the senior staff meetings which gave me insight into how an embassy operated and what senior staff did (and did not) do. It was a very good learning experience for a neophyte. I was very impressed with the caliber of the embassy staff as I had been with the Foreign Service people I had worked with in the department (Department of State). Tom Shoesmith was a first rate professional. He knew Japan and its language. Bill Sherman, who was followed by Bob Duemling as political counselor, was also a real professional. I learned a lot from him. I didn't have as full as an exposure to the economic section because that was an area which the ambassador knew well; he didn't need much staff work to help him. But I think it was also a very

impressive section. The younger officers like David G. Brown, for example, were top notch; many of them knew Japanese quite well as did many of the USIA (United States Information Agency) people.

Ingersoll had a very good rapport with Tom Shoesmith. He himself in light of his background in private business was very good in dealing with the Japanese; he had a very good personal touch. As far as I was concerned, Ingersoll was a "model" ambassador whom I tried to emulate when I became a chief of mission. I learned a lot from him which I think I put to good use when I became ambassador to the Philippines. I was particularly impressed how he managed day-to-day operations; how he delegated certain functions to the DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission); how he would invite various members of the mission to meetings so that he was "flesh and blood" to the staff and so that he could hear a wide variety of views. Every couple of weeks he would meet with the country team; I learned a lot how an ambassador handles his relationship with the U.S. (United States) military.

At the ambassador's request I worked on a lot of security issues which put me in direct contact with Bob Purlsey, as I mentioned before. So, I think in my first overseas assignment, I had a rare opportunity to learn a lot of lessons that a junior officer in one of the embassy's sections could not. I could not have asked for a better first assignment; it was a terrific learning experience. I should also mention that the ambassador was very interested in planning exercises; he was a man always concerned about the next steps and tried to look ahead. As I mentioned earlier, he initiated some planning exercises, the results of which—a policy paper— he hoped could be submitted to Washington every several weeks. I was responsible for getting these exercises underway and to make sure a report was sent at the end. I was smart enough to know that if I had tried to write those reports from the front office, without giving the sections their dues, they would be resisted by the professionals leaving very little left for all the labors. So, I made sure that all sections in the embassy that had an interest in a particular subject were deeply involved in both the exercise and the report drafting. In this way, I learned a lot about what embassy sections did and how they behaved.

These were the days of planning-budgeting process, which had actually started in the mid 1960s. I think in my days it was called CCPS (Comprehensive Country Programming System). Every mission was required to file an annual plan which was to outline the general goals and the specific objectives of the mission and a statement of the resources required to carry out these programs. I don't think it had much effect in Washington, but we had to go through the paces. I relieved the operating sections of much of the work-load involved by drafting the embassy's response. Ingersoll, in light of his business experience, took the process very seriously. I think it was a useful exercise within the mission; it provided the vehicle for an annual evaluation of our position in Japan, what we were trying to accomplish, and what resources were required to achieve our goals.

During 1974, after Ingersoll left, I was a special assistant to a non-existent ambassador; as I said, Shoesmith acted as charge' (Charge d'Affaires) for many months. That raised the question in my mind of how long I should stay. The difficulty was that the Armacost

family really enjoyed Tokyo and Japan; we were able to greatly improve our language skills. We had been in Tokyo for about 18 months when Winston Lord called me to see whether I would be interested in rejoining S/P (Policy Planning). At the time, I didn't know how long it would take the administration to fill the ambassadorial position. If I had known that James Hodgson would be coming to Tokyo soon, I may have made a different decision—at least I might have explored whether he would want a special assistant and if so, whether he would consider me for the job. In any case, I did not know when the next ambassador would be arriving and so I agreed to the S/P (Policy Planning) offer. It turned out that Hodgson was a great guy and I would probably have enjoyed working for him, but I did not know any of that when I had to make a decision.

Q: *Then in 1974, you returned to S/P (Policy Planning). You mentioned that Winston Lord, then the director of S/P (Policy Planning), called you while you were serving in Tokyo. Why did he focus on you?*

ARMACOST: He was looking for a Japan/Asia specialist. We had known each other since I served as a White House fellow and he was on the NSC (National Security Council) staff. I am not sure why he focused on me, but he did call me to offer me a job on his staff. I thought that it sounded interesting and since we were essentially treading water in Tokyo awaiting a new ambassador, I agreed to come back to S/P (Policy Planning). Winston had just moved to the Department (Department of State) a few months earlier to stay close to Kissinger. Had that close connection between the secretary and Lord not existed, I am not sure that I would have accepted the offer. I had never felt that S/P (Policy Planning) was very influential under previous directors and secretaries, but the Kissinger-Lord nexus was unique and I thought that S/P (Policy Planning) would be different from what I had worked in before.

In retrospect, I was glad that I did go to S/P (Policy Planning). Not only did Lord have the secretary's ear, but the staff he had put together had some great people on it. Sam Lewis was deputy when I arrived; he was followed by Reggie Bartholomew. I hadn't known either one, but as their careers clearly indicate, they had first class minds.

As I said, I was assigned to work on Japanese issues as well as some of the Asian regional ones. I worked closely with EA (Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs) and had a very satisfactory relationship with that bureau. I never saw any purpose in competing with the regional bureau since it knew a lot more usually than S/P (Policy Planning) did. I was expected to express the S/P (Policy Planning) point of view on various questions, but that is different from competing with a regional bureau; that was participation in the policy development process. I think that at least in the areas I worked, the policies which were developed made a lot of sense.

Winston personally handled many of the PRC (People's Republic of China) relationship issues; he had knowledge about the situation that few others had. He worked closely with Art Hummel, when he became the assistant secretary for EA (Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs). Dick Finn, who also was a Japanese expert, was my colleague in S/P (Policy Planning) with whom I worked most closely; I also worked with Doug Pike who

was the Vietnam expert in S/P (Policy Planning).

As I said, my main focus was Japan and some regional issues, like ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and Korea. For me, it was a great learning experience; I learned a lot about the region that I had not known. Furthermore, I had a chance to work with Phil Habib, while he was the assistant secretary for EA (Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs). That is an experience that one does not forget.

S/P (Policy Planning) under Lord was a very pro-active bureau. He initiated a lot of papers as a basis for some policy development. I wrote a lot of speeches about the area, which were used by Kissinger. Winston perceived, quite rightly, that speeches were one of the principal vehicles in the policy making process. Once the secretary had publicly pronounced the U.S. position on an issue, that was policy. So, speech writing became a very important tool which Winston used very effectively. This task gave S/P (Policy Planning) an influence that it had not enjoyed previously. I spent a lot of time on speeches; the writing process was very stressful. Kissinger, as is well known, was very meticulous about the speeches he gave; drafts kept coming back for revision time and time again. Some of my colleagues were very unhappy with this process, but I found it fun. As I remember, Kissinger used to have three or four speech drafts going simultaneously; whoever was working on each draft would be called to the secretary's office—usually late Friday afternoon. The secretary would give his views in a manner consistent with his background as a professor; the meetings were mostly like graduate seminars. We of course were then requested to provide another draft within 48 hours. I must say that my experiences with this process were not too brutal; for some reason or other, I was fortunate to be working on drafts which were somewhat better than the others the secretary was focusing on at the same time; it is the latter that really took the brunt of his criticism. That is not to say that I had not considerable anxiety about my drafts or that I did not feel under pressure, but others I think had worst times. In some cases, I actually found it fun in one respect; as speech day approached, Henry would become more engaged and he would actually do a lot of the drafting himself. If you were fortunate, some of your pearls of wisdom would survive and be included in the final text.

As I said, I was also involved with the writing of some policy papers. One major subject that Win asked us to look at was U.S. relations with the Third World. That review took several months. Other papers had to be drafted in connection with the visits of some heads of state or foreign affairs secretaries or Kissinger visits overseas. In addition, the NSC (National Security Council) system was still levying assignments which had to be completed. I can't say that I had a real pattern of work in S/P (Policy Planning); it all depended on the requirements of the moment and I could never be quite sure what the next day would bring.

I don't think Kissinger ever thought of himself as a Far East expert—not as he was on Europe. But I don't agree with those who say that he neglected that part of the world. He devoted a lot of time to China, to Vietnam; so, he obviously knew and learned a lot about the region. He didn't spend a lot of time on Japan, in part because he was attracted to free and open discussions about world affairs and national security concerns. The dialogue

with Japan, as I indicated earlier, was very scripted and didn't fit Kissinger's predilections. They were too cut and dry. There was no Japanese leader in those days with the scope and erudition that, for example, Zhou En-lai showed; he could converse easily about the world and its major problems. That kind of dialogue engaged Kissinger. Japan had no leader able to do that. So, he found the interplay with the Japanese much less rewarding because at least the formal meetings involved a high degree of stage management devised by the bureaucracy. As someone said, the Japanese "drained all spontaneity out of meetings"; that is the way they wanted to avoid any surprises. That was not Henry's style; he loved the give and take of open debate; that the Japanese were not prepared to join. I think that may be the main reason why Kissinger tended to discount the Japanese more than perhaps he should have.

Kissinger's forays into the Far East were considered by the Japanese to be "_____" (jumping over Japan). I remember that there were speeches given at the time during which Nixon and Kissinger spoke about a five-power world—that did not include Japan. On the one hand, the Japanese did like the world's attention to be diverted away from them, but on the other, they didn't want to be left out of the list of great powers. They did have a military capacity as well as a powerful economy. I think Kissinger understood that we had to have a special relationship with Japan, but I think he assumed that it was just a matter of time before the Japanese returned to a more traditional role. I think he may have underestimated how long that period was to be; their focus for decades was almost exclusively on economics, relying on us to worry about their security and any problems that might require force. They were slowly building a military capacity which I guess could have been strengthened in an emergency, but that probably would have taken a couple of years before the self-defense forces could become a vigorous fighting force which could assist us if we ever needed help in the Far East. Their position was strictly non-threatening.

Let me now briefly turn to Korea. As I said, I spent a little time on this problem. During my tour in S/P (Policy Planning), I think negotiations were begun to establish periodic joint meetings between the planning staffs of both foreign ministries. I visited Korea a couple of times when I was in the Far East on other business. I spent time then to talk to the embassy and some of the foreign ministry staff, but I think formal planning talks did not start until 1976 or 1977. The troop withdrawal issue raised its head during the 1976 election, with Carter's question about the necessity of maintaining a U.S. military presence on the peninsula. We wrote a number of papers on the issue. I was one of those who felt that there was probably room for some adjustments in the level of our presence. The South was clearly becoming the predominant economic power; to me the issue was more about the tactics used to make some adjustments. In the final analysis, I think we ended up with the worst of scenarios with practically no military draw-down and a lot of hard feelings on the Korean part.

I don't know who suggested troop withdrawal to Carter, but Congressman Frazier was certainly one of most vocal opponents of Park Chung Hee. I suspect that there was small cadre of Congressional people who believed that we should cut all ties with what they perceived as an overbearing dictatorship, which completely disregarded human rights.

I did not transfer to a new assignment until the fall of 1976. So, I observed the American presidential campaign from that vantage point. The campaign had considerable impact on our work in the sense that in fact until a new president was elected all foreign policy planning was abandoned. During 1976, the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) talks essentially became moribund. Kissinger focused primarily in that year on two issues: nonproliferation and Africa. Those were issues that could be handled without raising any problems for the Ford administration. He had some leeway to make progress on both issues. He also spent a lot of time summarizing the Nixon/Ford achievements in foreign policy; in the post-Vietnam period, foreign affairs did not rank very high in the American public's agenda. It was concentrating on domestic issues, but Kissinger tried to keep some interest alive with his presentations.

One of my rewarding experiences while in S/P (Policy Planning) was to work with Mort Abramowitz who was then one of the deputies in the Pentagon's Office for International Affairs. We traveled together on a couple of occasions and he introduced me to a number of important people in such countries as Korea. Being in S/P (Policy Planning), I had no formal reason why I should travel with Mort, but since we were good friends, we would coordinate our trips so that we would end up in the same country at about the same time. I did a lot more of this when I joined the NSC (National Security Council) staff. He was of course more senior and therefore could open a lot of doors that might not have been available to me if I had been by myself. For example, it was Mort who really introduced me to CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific Command) which was very useful.

Q: *Then in 1977, you transferred to the NSC (National Security Council) staff. How did that come about?*

ARMACOST: It was either the end of 1976 or early 1977, just around New Year's.
I don't really know how the assignment came about. I know that the Department (Department of State) considered that NSC (National Security Council) position—one of the East Asia positions— as its "own". Bill Gleysteen had occupied that position, but I believe that Phil Habib wanted Bill to return to the Department (Department of State) to be the principal deputy to Assistant Secretary-elect Dick Holbrooke. That meant that the NSC (National Security Council) position came vacant and I was assigned to it. One day, while in West Virginia for a brief skiing vacation, I was called by Zbig Brzezinski (or David Aaron), who was to become the President's NSC (National Security Council) Advisor. I had had some forewarning from some of my State (Department of State) colleagues that I might be getting such a call; so, it did not come out of the blue.

I had taken courses from Brzezinski at Columbia, but I don't know whether he remembered me from those days. So, I have never been quite clear how this assignment came about. In any case, I readily accepted the opportunity; I thought it might be fun. It certainly would have been different from any of my previous jobs. Marshall Green used to say that he did his best work after he had been on a job for six months until he had been there about two or three years. I felt the same way about the S/P (Project Planning) assignment; I had been there twice already and that was enough, even though the second

time around was much more satisfactory than the first in part because we worked for an aggressive, even dominant Secretary of State and in part because Win Lord was so close to the Secretary (Secretary of State). On the first occasion, the Secretary was not a major player and the planning staff director was very nice, but had no special access to the Secretary (Secretary of State). So, my second tour was a lot more fun and my work much more consequential.

After my return from West Virginia, I went over to see Brzezinski—just so he would know my face. I also met some of the other staff members, such as Rick Inderfurth, who was working on the staffing of the NSC (National Security Council). I also talked to David Aaron. I think all of this happened before the Inauguration—probably in early January.

My closest contact in the NSC (National Security Council) was Mike Oxenberg. We shared an office on the third floor of the old Executive Office building. He was the "China" man and was responsible for Vietnam and Taiwan as well.

I was not at this stage fully familiar with any of the new directions or initiatives that President-elect Carter had in mind. What I knew had come from media reporting of the campaign, but by this time I had been in government service long enough to view campaign promises with considerable skepticism. So, I didn't assume that all of the promises made during the campaign would ever be heard from again. I assumed that many of the new "directions" would be subjected to considerable scrutiny and would probably be revised—some even substantially. In fact, that is what happened, although some of the commitments—such as the withdrawal of an Army Division from Korea—took much longer to be shaped.

As I said, the State Department's new assistant secretary was Dick Holbrooke, whom I had never met. I had heard of him, but had never met until sometime during the first week after the Inauguration. I developed an excellent relationship with Dick. My first operational assignment, after the Inauguration, was to meet Vice President Mondale in Paris to escort him, along with Holbrooke, to Tokyo. The vice president was making a quick survey of the situation overseas and visiting the capitals of our most important allies.

I first met Dick when the two of us boarded a "red eye" to Paris. He turned out to be very smart and very engaging. Then we flew through Reykjavik to Tokyo for a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda. Mondale had been instructed to inform the Japanese of our decision to withdraw the Army Division from South Korea.

This first trip with Dick could have turned out to be a small catastrophe because I was under instructions from Dave Aaron to make sure that Dick did not attend the Mondale-Fukuda meeting. That seemed to me to be pretty stupid instructions. After all, my job was to be the coordinator of U.S. policies and activities in most of the Far East. It was my assumption that the Assistant Secretary in the Department of State was a vital player in our system of policy development and execution. I did not see how I could play

my role effectively if the Assistant Secretary were to be shut out of an important meeting; at a minimum, he would be very resentful. That was not the way to start a new administration.

I wrestled with this dilemma for several hours. Finally, I figured out on the way to Tokyo a way to get Dick into this meeting—in contravention of my instructions. From my Japan experience, I was pretty sure that the Japanese and Embassy had agreed to a certain number in the U.S. delegation. I was told that it would be just three—Mondale, the American interpreter and myself. The number had probably been approved by someone high in the NSC (National Security Council) staff and was obviously designed to freeze Holbrooke out.

So, I called my old friend, Jim Wickle, who had been our official interpreter for many years. I told him that I had a dilemma and that the limits on the size of the U.S. delegation would bar Holbrooke from attending. I asked him whether he would be kind enough to give his seat up to Dick; we would rely on the interpretation services of the Japanese interpreter, Mr. Yamasake—whom I knew was very good and reliable. It would have meant not having our own literal notes, but I thought I could capture enough of the meeting to provide full coverage of it. So, we worked it out that way and I managed to stave off what would have been a very painful and disastrous situation. I don't know whether Dick ever found about what had been done, but in any case, we developed a close working relationship and also prevented a further deterioration of the relationship between Aaron and Holbrooke—which never became very close. In light of my instructions, I assumed that this relationship was not a happy one, even before the inauguration of the new administration. In any case, I don't think Aaron ever raised the matter with me after our return from Tokyo. Fortunately, by and large, my work didn't bring me into close daily contact with David, so that if he had been irritated by my disregard for his instructions, he either vented his frustrations on someone else or accepted that the course I took was the correct one.

I might just add another footnote to the Mondale trip. Not only was he instructed to inform the Japanese of our Korea withdrawal decision, but he was also to enlist Fukuda's intercession with Marcos of the Philippines to make it clear that unless he—Marcos—improved his human right record, we might have to consider withdrawing from Clark Air Force base. The whole instruction was bizarre; it came to us in a sealed envelope which I think was delivered to our plane as we were about to take off from Paris to Tokyo. Not only was Mondale instructed to inform—not consult— the Japanese of an American action—U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea— which they found distasteful but we also put them on notice that we might withdraw from the Philippines as well.

Dick Holbrooke, Mort Abramowitz—at the time in the Defense Department—and I were all aboard the vice president's plane. We greeted these new instructions with astonishment and considerable concern. We thought that both instructions were pretty silly. The news about troop withdrawal would have been sufficient shock to the Japanese without further heightening their concern by threatening a further diminution of American power in the Far East through a closing of a vital air force base in the

Philippines. Furthermore, the notion that the Japanese would be willing to take up our human rights cudgels was truly mind-numbing—not to mention the Filipino distaste for being preached to by the Japanese on anything—and particularly human rights in light of Japanese behavior during WW II (World War II). Almost every Filipino you might encounter will fill with one horror story or another about Japanese atrocities in the Philippines.

In any case, these instructions would have left our interlocutors with the idea that our military presence in Asia could be used as a bargaining chip on other issues, such as human rights. This of course would have further exacerbated Japanese fears of U.S. (United States) resolve. So, the three of us all went to Mondale and told him that the present instructions were just a recipe for disaster. We recommended that he go back to the White House to get the instructions changed. Mondale turned to us and said that we should do so. He thought that this was our responsibility. We pointed out that these were Presidential instructions which had been agreed upon far above our level. I don't know what Mondale did—if anything—but he never raised the issue of our bases in the Philippines with the Japanese.

He did tell Fukuda about our plans to draw down the last division from Korea. The Japanese were predictably alarmed; they also were not very happy with how the news was being delivered—no consultation, but merely a transmission on a unilateral U.S. decision. The Mondale visit generated considerable soul searching and it took a long time before the Japanese got over it.

Neither Holbrooke nor Abramowitz nor I supported the troop withdrawal plan as envisioned by President Carter and some of his supporters. I could envision using the troop withdrawal proposal as a negotiating device with North Korea. The idea of a unilateral withdrawal—without extracting any benefits to the United States from either the North or the South—did not seem to make much sense to any of us.

One of the first policy analysis initiated by the new administration was on the question of troop withdrawal. I believe Bill Gleysteen was asked, in about March, to head up an interagency group to develop a Policy Review Memorandum (PRM). This however came after the instructions to Mondale to inform the Japanese that we had already reached a decision—although there had been no discussion or analysis in the U.S. government. When the study was finally initiated, it was astonishing to see the multitude of reservations that were expressed by all the Cabinet Departments involved. We understood that Carter was trying to honor a campaign pledge—as he did in other cases as well. I think he kept a book of campaign promises made in the election and was trying to keep as many as possible.

Of course, the troop withdrawal issue was not the only one we had with South Korea. There were questions about the storage of U.S. weapons on Korean soil; there were questions about Korean armament efforts and weapon development. But for the next four years, both during my tour in the NSC (National Security Council) and subsequently in the Pentagon, we worked very hard at developing a huge compensation package which

would have, in part at least, attempted to assuage Korean fears of being left defenseless by our withdrawal. This included major increases in delivery of armaments—tanks, planes, etc. But essentially, the bureaucracy engaged in guerrilla tactics which on one hand required the development of a compensation package and on the other, a gradual whittling away of the basic decision. For example, there were major efforts made to reduce the number of troops to be withdrawn, so that by 1979, the U.S. proposal was so minimal as to make it almost meaningless, while the compensation package was quite large. Finally, during Carter's visit to Korea, the whole plan was essentially abandoned. It was clear from the beginning, that the professionals in all of the Cabinet Departments were very concerned by the Carter decision, and that they all agreed that somehow or other, the decision had to be reversed, or at least formulated in such a way to minimize the harm that it would have engendered.

Included in these bureaucratic efforts were a net assessment conducted by the intelligence community which came to the conclusion that we had grossly underestimated North Korea's military strength. This of course reinforced the views of the professionals that withdrawal was a very dangerous course. I am not sure that I ever really believed the intelligence estimates; they were welcomed for policy reasons and helped achieve the desired results, but our intelligence about North Korea was woefully inadequate and the estimates were guesses at best—based on hunches and fragments of hard evidence. I think in general our evaluation of the situation on the peninsula depended largely on whether one was optimistic about the South and pessimistic about the North or vice-versa. In any case, the intelligence estimate served a useful purpose.

My service in the Carter administration certainly increased my awareness of human rights as a goal of foreign policy. I must say that I tended to be more on the traditional side. I have always thought that nations' primary interests were affected by their external contacts. It was not self-evident that our emphasis on the behavior of other countries—obnoxious as it might have been—could necessarily be molded by U.S. public condemnations. We would probably have been more successful had we concentrated on reinforcing the determination of certain groups to resist submitting to dictatorial or authoritative regimes. This was probably a "conservative" point of view, but I was never participated in the bureaucratic struggles that took place in the State Department, i.e., the continual fights between the regional assistant secretaries and Pat Derian and her human rights staff. As in most major decisions, one aspect of foreign policy had to be weighed against many others; I would never argue that human rights were an important U.S. goal, —in fact in some cases may have been our major legitimate goal—but in other cases, the drive to bring greater freedom to the citizens had to be balanced with other considerations, particularly our national security.

I thought it was a mistake to institutionalize the concern for human rights considerations. Perhaps having a staff almost entirely devoted to remedy the undemocratic aspects of another government may have been alright, but then to add to that a process which established a committee, headed by the Deputy Secretary, which was to be the guardian of our human rights goal, I thought was a little too much. I personally learned the risk of weighing the foreign policy scales too much in favor of a single goal when I became the

ambassador to the Philippines where the issue of Marcos' violations of human rights became the predominant U.S. concern. I was then forced to become a human rights partisan, which was quite ironic in light of the skepticism I expressed earlier. As I said, during my tour in the NSC (National Security Council) and the Pentagon subsequently, I thought that the establishment of a high level committee on human rights was a mistake; I felt less strongly about Pat Derian because I was not in State (Department of State) during the Carter administration and therefore did not have to confront her on a daily basis as Dick Holbrooke and some of the other assistant secretaries did. It is they who had to carry the burden of engendering some balance in our foreign policy. Fortunately, Holbrooke was a consummate bureaucrat who could carry the day in State (Department of State) when he wished.

I did have occasional meetings with Derian. She was obviously very intelligent, totally dedicated to advancing her agenda. Our meetings were almost always about the appropriate priorities of U.S. interests in a certain country and how tactically we could get maximum mileage in meeting all of our important goals; i.e., without having to lecture others about their alleged human rights violations.

Since I have mentioned the Philippines, let me just briefly turn to our relations to that country. In 1977-1978, we were going through another round of base negotiations. It was the Filipinos who were playing a delaying game trying to exert maximum leverage on us to increase our *quid pro quo.* The Filipinos paid considerable advantage to those rights we were exercising which in their view were limitations on their sovereignty. This was not a negotiation in which I was as deeply involved as I would be later although I did participate in a number of bilateral meetings. Our principal players came from State (Department of State) and CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific).

Human rights were raised with the Philippines, but once we began base negotiations, that goal was no longer the predominant one. It had to be put in context of our strategic requirements. I believe that Pat Derian visited the Philippines during this period, carrying the usual message, but, as I said, once the negotiations started, other issues predominated.

I think it is worth mentioning that as far as Far East policy and implementation, we had the best interagency process of which I am aware. Dick Holbrooke chaired a weekly meeting that took place at 4:00 p.m. every Monday. The attendees were Mort Abramowitz, then from Defense (Department of Defense), Holbrooke's deputy—Bill Gleysteen—, Bill Graver first and then his replacement from CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and myself. Those people represented the key agencies; Holbrooke led very open discussions. Occasionally, a representative of S/P (Policy Planning) would be invited. This weekly meeting was a very effective way of keeping the key players fully informed on all the major issues in Far East. I thought it was a particularly effective method of exchanging information and ideas and of developing policy at the working level. I think that process still survives today, although I am not sure how Stanley Roth uses it now. But it did survive through many assistant secretaries and other occupants of the NSC (National Security Council) and DoD (Department of Defense) positions.

Other groups who were interested in Far East policies were involved through the individual efforts of the members of this informal group. As I said, for example, Pat Derian fell in Dick's province, although I believe that Dick had been able to win the full confidence of the secretary and the deputy secretary, that he was given a considerable measure of bureaucratic power. He was very skillful in obtaining the support of Cy Vance and Warren Christopher. So, I think that other parts of the Department (Department of State) had very limited role in the development of U.S. policy toward Far East countries, most of which must be attributed to Dick's bureaucratic skills. I doubt that he lost few, if any, battles within the Department (Department of State).

We in the NSC had our own "believers". Jessica Matthews was the NSC (National Security Council) staffer responsible for global issues, such as human rights and arms control. She was very influential with Zbig (Zbigniew Brzezinski). She was very skillful at pushing her agenda in the bureaucracy. Bob Kimmitt, later Under Secretary of State, was one of her staff members. I don't remember that I or any of my colleagues got into major battles with Jessica or her staff. It was much more of a cooperative effort despite perhaps our difference of views and perceptions. I don't think I spent much time, for example, worrying about the internal politics of the Philippines or South Korea. I did visit all the countries in my portfolio during my NSC (National Security Council) tour, but I was much more concerned with security issues and the role of the United States in maintaining stability in the area. So, I concentrated on base rights issues in the Philippines and the issue of U.S. forces in Korea.

In the Philippines, I maintained contact with people like Johnny Enrile (Juan Ponce Enrile) and Estorita Mandoza. Both were part of Marcos' inner circle, but also had their own status. Enrile was a political figure in his own right, who was considered to be an expert on defense matters. Mandoza was an extremely intelligent lawyer—Harvard trained—who didn't strike you as "just a crony." Both of these gentlemen were some of our principal contacts on base rights issues. The internal political atmosphere in the Philippines was of interest to me as it touched on the base negotiations. They used it as a bargaining chip during these negotiations—the usual ploys, such a stirring up some Filipinos to oppose the renewal of our agreement. But I don't remember reaching any conclusion at the time about the need for us to place the internal governance practices of the Marcos regime at the top of our agenda. I think I can make the same statement about South Korea. As I said, my agenda in our dealings with these countries stemmed from my philosophical proposition that our principal goal in the Far East was the defense of our interests in the area and therefore, the foreign policies of those governments, rather than their internal ones. I didn't believe that we could be very good social engineers in other cultures.

My portfolio also included Japan and ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations). On the former, this was a period of increasing tensions on trade matters and further efforts by the Japanese to increase their independence. For example, despite our opposition, the Japanese built a nuclear reprocessing plant at Tokaimura—the one that is currently so much in the news. We felt that it was unwise for any other country to acquire this capability because it made our nonproliferation policy that much harder to

implement. But the Japanese ignored our warnings and built the plant. So, although there were no major blow ups in the 1977-1978 periods with Tokyo, it was a period of continuing tensions in the relationships of the two countries.

As for ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), in this period, those countries began to work together, under the specter of a perceived Vietnam's increasing influence in the area. Although most of the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) ministerial meetings—one of which I attended with Vance (then Secretary of State Cy Vance)—were devoted to economic issues, there was certainly a deep undercurrent of concern for political and security matters. As I said, I thought that the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) countries were during this period beginning to pull their act together, leaving their age-old animosities behind in face of a common threat—Vietnam. I found that the ministerial meetings were very useful for exchange of views and clarification of the positions of the various players.

I remember Marshall Green saying that he did his best work after he had been in a job for six months until he had been on it for about two years. My tour as a principal deputy lasted only about 18 months. I think that tells much of the story, although at times I thought I was cramming two years' worth of work in 12 months. I was therefore not unhappy to be in limbo for several months; it allowed me to regenerate my batteries and gave me a chance to visit some people in Washington who would be helpful in my next assignment.

Q: *So, in 1982, you went to the Philippines. Was there any problem with your confirmation?*

ARMACOST: No, my main problem was to be selected. I knew through the grapevine that there was a Texas businessman who knew Imelda Marcos; her people were anxious to have this gentleman appointed as ambassador. They worked on the White House staff to stall for time. I presume that that was also the reason why my *agrement* (formal permission from the government of the country which would receive the nominated ambassador) was not acted on by the Filipino government for some time. Eventually, General Charlie Gabriel, the Air Force Chief of Staff, got involved. He had been a classmate of Eddie Ramos at West Point. Charlie also knew Johnny Enrile as well. He or Mickey Weisner or both had a conversation with some of the movers and shakers in the Filipino government. Almost immediately, the Philippines approved the *agrement*.

In the meantime, Carlos Romulo, the foreign minister, invited Bonnie and me and President _____to have dinner with him in New York—at the "Sign of the Dog" restaurant—a restaurant on Park or Fifth Avenue. This took place around Thanksgiving towards the end of the UN (United Nations) General Assembly session. It became rapidly clear to us that this was some kind of audition. His wife was also there as well as one or two other Filipinos. We had a lovely time and things went very smoothly after that from the Philippines side. Because of the holidays, and I assume other weighty matters, it took the White House some weeks to complete the paper work for my appointment. Then of course my confirmation had to be scheduled. The whole process

took months. I had no problem getting confirmed; the hearings went very quickly; my only recollection is that it was sparsely attended. I don't remember any difficult questions or issues arising.

Our embassy in the Philippines was, I think, at the time the largest U.S. mission in the world—Cairo and Manila were always one and two. We had a large number of Americans and even more locals. Manila was relatively inexpensive; the climate was good and living was easy. So, it became a hub for regional organizations for a large number of agencies. We had a large CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) presence, a large AID (Agency for International Development) mission, a large USIA (United States Information Agency) presence and a well-staffed MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group). So, we had representatives of all departments and agencies that had the slightest reason to have an overseas presence.

Frankly, I was so happy to have a posting that I was not too disturbed by anything I found.
We had a post in Cebu and a small presence in Davao, which was principally to house a USIA (United States Information Agency) presence. I gave several speeches around the country, which always seemed to attract a lot of attention. There were only three newspapers in the Philippines at the time; it was well known that they printed only material, which was acceptable to the Marcos regime, if not actually having been written by a regime member.

We had a large country team in light of the multitude of U.S. interests represented in Manila. In addition to the embassy in Manila, we had large military—naval and air force—contingents stationed in the Philippines. It was clear to me from the outset that much of the management of these various U.S. representatives could not be delegated to my DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) or anyone; this was a job that I had to do personally, which took a lot of time. Bob Rich, my DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission), worked hard on the management of the embassy and did a great job, but there were actions and functions that only I could realistically perform. I had selected Bob and he was very good; I had known him when both of us were working on Korean issues—he had been the country director. I relied on him a lot for general management of the embassy, but the liaison with the military and the supervision of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) component was something that I had to do myself. In general, I must say that we had a good country team.

Our activities were primarily driven by events, which took up a lot of my time, especially in the early phase of my tour. First of all, there was state visit that Marcos had been invited to make to Washington in the fall of 1982. I participated in that event. I arrived in Manila in March and spent much of the summer preparing for the Marcos visit by becoming acquainted as quickly as possible with all our issues with the Philippines, and their issues with us. The visit was an opportunity to discuss some very important issues, but there were no resolutions. Marcos had not been in the United States for many years; the Carter Administration certainly did not wish to have much to do with him. So, Marcos was not too happy with the United States until he got Reagan's invitation. So, his

visit to the United States was such a boon to him that subsequently we were able to capitalize on his renewed "affection" for the United States as, for example, in the base negotiations which had never been seen as being linked to a Marcos visit. The timing was a coincidence— fortunately a happy one.

Then there were the base negotiations which were very time consuming. We were able to capitalize in these negotiations on the good will that had been generated by the state visit, thanks to President Reagan's efforts. But the negotiations were quite intense; they were finally completed in early summer of 1983.

Then Aquino (Ninoy Aquino) was assassinated in early August 1983 as he was returning from the United States, therefore, the rest of my tour was almost totally devoted to the repositioning of our relationship with the Marcos regime. You will recall that the assassination was greeted with horror in the United States, the West in general and in the Philippines as well. That public reaction demanded that we change our attitude towards Marcos and his regime.

I had been on a couple of trips to the Philippines during my Washington assignments. I was in large groups and although I met Marcos, I can't say that I really knew him. My initial contacts with him as ambassador were a little rocky. The first instruction—or one of my earliest—was to go to see Marcos to tell him that his son was a problem. He had been arrested for speeding on one of the interstates in the East while working in the United States. The police also found contraband—drugs or guns— in the car. The officials in the States (United States) were obviously not interested in publicizing this event; on the other hand, they could not let the matter go unnoticed. So, I had to go see the father to ask that he bring his son home. That was not a pleasant task under any circumstances; it was particularly unhelpful as a new ambassador's first act.

Then Senator Inouye (U.S. Senator Daniel Inouye) came on a visit. Marcos and Inouye were old friends and I was not invited to the meeting of the two. I wasn't happy about these arrangements, but there wasn't much I could do about it because in fact the meeting took place during some social occasion. Generally, thereafter I made sure I was in all meetings of American officials with Marcos until late in my tenure when Dick Walters came to Manila as a special emissary. I wasn't very happy about that arrangement, but Walters was a senior government official whom I trusted. We had long talks before his meeting with Marcos as well as after. This was at a time when we were trying to convey our strong urging for some positive action by the Filipino government in the aftermath of the Aquino assassination. It may be just as well that I didn't attend that meeting but as a general proposition I didn't think it proper for any U.S. official to see Marcos privately; I think that is true in any country; an ambassador should be present at all meetings with the chief of state. Not only does such attendance diminish the chances of miscommunications, but it also does not undermine the authority of the U.S. ambassador.

Private businessmen were a different story. We had several American business people who saw Marcos privately. They were usually old friends—e.g. Ray Johnson of CALTEX (part of Chevron Corporation). He had lived in the Philippines for 17 years; so he knew

his way around. Ray was a great guy and we worked closely together. When he arrived in Manila, he and Marcos would have a private meal as old friends; I couldn't take any exception to that. I am sure there were other senior American businessmen who saw Marcos privately. Some found it useful to have me come along to bolster their case.

When I first arrived in Manila, I found an American business community in flux. As I remember it, I think they did not feel they were getting adequate support from their embassy. One of the first messages I received after George Shultz became secretary of state was to make promotion of American business one of the embassy's top priorities—if not the top priority. I worked very hard to work with the American Chamber of Commerce to see how I could be of assistance to it. I was able to help because after Marcos' state visit, I was cultivated by both the president and his wife, Imelda. In fact, they pursued me so diligently that I think that in some ways it was detrimental to my standing with many Filipinos. I was invited continuously to one occasion or another; I would be placed conspicuously so that my picture would show up in the newspapers and TV (television) constantly. I was being viewed as an omni-presence in the Marcos' "road shows." On one occasion, Bonnie and I attended a presidential dinner; immediately thereafter we were invited to the presidential yacht on what we thought would be an overnight trip to Leyte landing ceremonies. In fact, the trip took about ten days. Since the media was government-controlled, the Marcos always got considerable coverage and unfortunately so did I. I tried to counter this image with some private travel to the provinces, just to get out of Manila and the Marcos' embrace. I think the perception that many Filipinos had that I was one of Marcos' "cronies" was beginning to be a problem.

This relationship was helpful in some ways—e.g. the base negotiations and the promotion of American investments and sales. Since I spent so much time with the president, I had lots of opportunities to make my pitches. For example, when we took that trip on the presidential yacht, Marcos and I would sit on the deck at night to talk about some deal that the Filipino Cocoanut Bank was trying to strike which was in contravention of what Marcos had just agreed to in Washington. I was able to tell Marcos that the Filipino bank's proposal was just unacceptable; since both he and I had been in Washington and we had participated in the same meetings, I was able to show him the "error of his ways." So, my frequent access to Marcos was helpful in stopping some unfortunate proposals and to promote some things that were important to us. Had we had a "normal" relationship, I suspect I would not have been as effective. That was the positive aspect; the negative, as I said, was that many Filipinos saw the U.S. ambassador as being too close to the president.

I had a pretty good relationship with Imelda, at least until the Aquino assassination. After that, I had almost no contact with her. She was a charming woman when she wanted to be. She liked to dance and being tall, I sort of became her dance partner—when George Hamilton was not in town. As I said, after their visit to the United States we spent a lot of time at the presidential palace as well as traveling with them around the country. So, we got to know the Marcos quite well. His *modus operandi* (mode of operating) was to stay through a dinner, but to excuse himself right after dessert. That left Imelda in charge and

she would preside over the festivities into the early morning. I had many opportunities to listen to her theories of development—which I am not sure I ever understood— as well as other policies.

Imelda was hugely influential. Not only was she the president's wife, but she was also the minister for human settlement—which seemed to be a ministry without a defined scope. So, she used to get into all sorts of policy discussions. It later it became quite clear that she was very influential with those Filipino ministers responsible for the government's finances. She would call the central bank and get money for one of her pet projects or another.

She would often travel without her husband, both within the country and overseas. Those trips would take a couple of Philippine Airline planes out of circulation for weeks and sometime months. Some of the trips were essentially for shopping, although she did that wherever she went. So, Imelda was a major player in the top council of the Philippines. She had been on the scene for many years; she was ambitious (she may well have had ambitions to be president someday); she had in her entourage some young men who were quite entrepreneurial.

I was very happy with the results of our base negotiations. We managed to insert some flexibility in the use of the bases while sustaining Filipino support for their existence; all of that for a price that we could afford. There was never any doubt in my mind that the bases were an essential component of our Far East strategy. They were an anchor to our presence in the region. In addition, they were important in providing rest and recuperation (R&R) facilities; they provided valuable training grounds for our military in the area.

I traveled to virtually every province in the country and went out of my way to make sure that anyone who wanted to see me was afforded that opportunity. I rarely heard a critical comment about the bases, except in some universities. The Filipino Congress did not raise any objections, but it was at that time a largely domesticated legislative body that rubber stamped the wishes of the president and his regime. I think that there were only two opposition members in the Congress. For all intent and purposes, it was not a factor. There were in the country a few well known nationalists whose views were widely known, but they were not an influential group. So, there was some opposition to the renewal of the base agreement, but it was hardly a ground-swell and it was not at all organized in my time. By keeping the negotiations under wraps and completing them in record time contributed, I think, to the absence of any vocal or influential opposition to the agreement renewal. Previous negotiations ran into some difficulties by being prolonged; this enabled the regime to mobilize some nationalist pressure to enhance its bargaining position. The way we did it never really gave either the regime or any other voice the chance to mount a counter campaign. I was the senior U.S. negotiator; Imelda's brother, who was at the time the Filipino ambassador to the United States was the senior Filipino negotiator. He would come from Washington whenever another round would start. So essentially the negotiations were left to him and me with Scott Holford and Captain Rogers doing the staff work for our team and _____ and

_____ working on the Philippines side. The numbers of people who knew what was going on were very small and that also helped in moving the negotiations along in good time without much publicity. It probably took no more than three months—record time, I believe.

While I was in Manila, in the summer of 1983, Secretary Shultz paid the Philippines a visit. It went well. I think he was dumbfounded by what he saw. He attended a luncheon that went on and on and on. That was followed by a fashion show, accompanied by Imelda's singing. It was quite an event which I don't think Shultz ever forgot. I think his staff thought it would be useful for the secretary to visit countries like the Philippines where the issues were rather minor and provided the secretary a change of pace. So, the official meetings went smoothly and the secretary was not required to enter into negotiations.

I am not sure that I viewed the Philippines in the same way that the secretary and his staff may have. I was representing the president and I was new to that task when I arrived in Manila. My experience had been almost entirely with the American bureaucracy; even when I served as Ambassador Ingersoll's special assistant, it was primarily a job within the embassy. So, I had practically no experience in the management of the day to day relationships with a foreign government and country. At the beginning of my tour, I was focused primarily on our military relationship with the Philippines. Then I worked on representing our president as best as I could, regardless of my personal views. President Reagan had a personal relationship with the Marcos as did Mrs. Reagan. His administration tried to differentiate itself from its predecessor by emphasizing the need to get along with all of our allies and by not publicly chastising friendly regimes—nor publicly advising them how to run their own countries. So I probably was not as involved in the strictly internal Philippine affairs as some of my predecessors had been. My focus was on issues of direct consequences to the United States such as the base agreements and assistance to American business interests who needed our help to get through some extraordinary and arbitrary economic hurdles as well as mazes of bureaucracy. We had some officers in the embassy—e.g., John Meisteller, the political counselor—who were very articulate about internal Philippine policies. There was one member of the political section who had responsibility for this subject; he used to brief me frequently on what was going on. It didn't take long for us to find out about all sorts of monkey business—i.e. corruption—, but I still felt that our principal responsibility was state-to-state relationships rather than preaching to the host government on how it should or should not do its business. I restrained myself as much as possible on the latter set of issues, although I did not divorce myself entirely from internal politics. I would gladly see opposition leaders to assess the stability of the Marcos regime.

The most outspoken opponent of the Marcos regime was Armstrong, whose advice I valued greatly. He was quite skeptical of the benefits that might accrue to the United States from our close relationship with Marcos. Our reporting did reflect the possible areas of instability; as I said earlier, we did not shy away from the opposition; on the contrary we kept in close contact with it. But there was never a "dissent" message to the Department (Department of State).

I thought in general our substantive reporting was pretty good. I had a close relationship with all members of the country team including Bob Grealy, whom I had known for some time and the military attaché. The senior members of the embassy staff had a collegial attitude; so we got along very well and shared with each other our views and findings. Of course, in light of my relationship with Marcos, I knew better than anyone else in the embassy what was on the president's mind. When I met him, I would usually go alone; that meant that the reporting of those conversations was all done by me. I think I reached the decision to see Marcos alone after the first or second meeting; I noticed that he was always alone and I thought that he would feel more comfortable if I were the only embassy official present. This pattern I think served us well particularly after the Aquino assassination because then we would discuss matters that a president of a country would rarely discuss with the American ambassador.

I think that many, if not all, of our meetings were probably taped; some parts showed up on Filipino TV. But in general, as I said, I went to the meetings with Marcos alone. This was natural because many of our discussions took place on the trips to which I was invited to go along with Marcos. I was often the only other official in the president's party; so, I would spend hours talking about all sorts of issues. So, I developed a close personal relationship with him and in some respects became a sounding board for some of his ideas. My guess is that the Marcos-Armacost relationship was probably unique in the annals of president-ambassador interactions—in any country around the world.

Let me now turn to the Aquino assassination, which I mentioned on several occasions and which was a real turning point in Philippine history. I thought then and still hold to the view that the event was managed by someone close to Marcos rather than the president or senior members of the regime. It is inconceivable that the regime would have sponsored an assassination in a major airport in the presence of thousands of witnesses, even if most stood behind glass walls rather than being on the tarmac. I don't think that Marcos or any of senior staff would have been so stupid to think that a public event of that kind would have gone unnoticed or without serious objections.

I remember well the day it happened. It was on a Sunday; I was playing tennis at the Manila Polo Club. I was called off the court; I had a message to go to the embassy right away. I did that, but on the way over I heard the radio report that Aquino had been shot; so, I was prepared when I got to the embassy. At that time, it was not clear whether Aquino was still alive. I chatted briefly with Bob Grealy and Bob Rich; then I called Eddie Ramos, the head of the constabulary and the national police. I thought that if anyone knew what had happened, it would be Ramos. When I got him, I asked him what was going on. He told me to listen to *Radio Veritas*, which was the Catholic radio station and which Ramos said was probably the best source for information. That was an eye-opener. I remember that going home that night I asked my driver what he thought had happened. He told me that everyone knew what had happened; it was Marcos' doing. I don't know if he meant the president personally or was using his name to stand for the whole regime. In fact, Marcos was seriously ill at the time and probably not able to give these orders—a few days before I had gone with Congressman Solarz to visit him; he

then looked like death warmed over. The meeting pumped him up so that he was quite lucid for more than an hour. I surmised that at the time of the assassination he was probably capable of being briefed on it, but it was difficult for me to imagine, given the iron control he liked to exercise on the Philippines for so many years, that his subordinates would have taken such a major action without his blessing. All of this is of course pure conjecture

On the other hand, his regime was well known for many assassinations, some done in very public places—e.g. the steps of a church in one of the provinces. The average Filipino came immediately to the conclusion that this was just another effort on the part of the regime to silence one of its critics. The more we learned, the more we tended to side with the popular opinion, although, as I said, I don't think that Marcos personally or his close advisers were involved. But members of the regime had the motive, the means and the stupidity to pull such a stunt. They had done it before and had gotten away with it. The way many of them reacted afterwards just became more circumstantial evidence in my view to support the theory that someone in the regime was responsible—if not Marcos himself, than someone close to him. I was never able to deal thereafter with the president or any of his close advisors without feeling their complicity. So, the assassination was a real watershed for me; my role in Manila changed measurably thereafter.

After the assassination, the U.S. policy was to put as much distance between us and Marcos. So, whatever happened, we did not want to be damned in the eyes of the Filipino people with culpability or some responsibility for that evil and stupid deed. My personal mission was to stay neutral in the succession struggle that we knew was coming; neutral, but in touch with all contenders so that we would have a relationship with the new president. We tried to keep our day-to-day business going without going to Marcos. This situation lasted until my departure—about eight months after the assassination.

There were of course occasions when I had to be seen in the company of the Marcos's. I went with visitors who wished to call on Marcos. For example, Mark Hatfield and Lloyd Hand—and their wives— visited Manila in late 1983. We invited them to our residence for a dinner. Lloyd, who had been the chief of protocol in the Johnson administration and very friendly with Marcos's, called to ask whether Imelda couldn't be invited. This was the last thing in the world I wanted; the Hatfield-Hand visit happened about the time of the funeral. Such a dinner at our residence would have allowed the press to focus on the U.S.-Marcos relationship in the aftermath of the Aquino assassination. So, I told Hand that I would have great difficulties with his request. He answered that this was just a private party. I told him that if he and Hatfield wanted Imelda invited, I would do it as long as long as there would be no press in attendance or any publicity. She normally traveled with a huge entourage including TV and media representatives; for this occasion, that was all barred and we escaped unnoticed for that evening. I don't think that there were any stories about this dinner in the media at all.

But there were no more intimate get togethers, nor did I travel with the Marcos's after the assassination. As I said, Marcos was not well and did not travel very often anyway.

Fortunately, the presidential palace was under construction and that further limited the Marcos's entertainment. I was invited to the palace toward the end of my tour, but I didn't have much contact with the president or his wife after the assassination. Most of my contacts were members of the opposition. I went to the Aquino funeral which was sort of a break with the Marcos's.

After the assassination, I lobbied heavily with any Filipino who would listen for a special board of inquiry, such as the Warren Commission. When the Marcos's continued to claim innocence, I would say that a commission could clear them publicly, as long as it was composed of widely respected, non-political Filipinos. I thought the commission should have investigative powers untrammeled by any restrictions that a regime might wish to impose. One day, after having made this pitch to the president, I returned to the embassy just in time to field a call from Mrs. Marcos. She wanted to know why I was pushing for a commission which would just be a waste of time since she and her husband were innocent. I went to see her under a pretense that I was actually paying a call on her husband. I was sitting in the waiting room which was the first time that I had been there when no one else was there. I got in to see the president and Imelda was there. The Marcos's had in mind a commission of a different composition than I did; it was clear that their commission would not be found credible or respected. Eventually, a commission was established, under the leadership of Mr. Grava; I think its findings came as a shock to the Marcos's because it was considerably more independent than anticipated.

I should add that after my meeting with Marcos's, I ran across Imelda's brother who was just passing by on the palace grounds. I stopped and chatted with him and told him that I would be attending the Aquino funeral—I decided on that action on my own without instructions from the Department (Department of State). I had met Aquino just once while he was at Harvard; we both attended a conference at Tufts. I found him to be very impressive. But I had never met the family except for the daughter; she was married to a reporter for one of our television stations and I had met her through that connection. But otherwise, I didn't know any other member of the Aquino family. Under the circumstances, I thought it would be appropriate to pay a condolence call. I called ahead to see whether that was alright. I was received and met Aquino's mother. I was greatly impressed by the dignity which the family exhibited under these tragic circumstances. That alone would have been sufficient reason for me to attend the funeral, which was also handled with great circumspection, somewhat to my surprise. For example, my presence was not mentioned in the press. But my presence was known to the Marcos's; they got the message and thereafter our relationship was strictly business; there were no more social affairs, as I mentioned, which suited us fine.

I did not find it too difficult to take a very different approach to the Marcos's. We were lucky that many of the friends we had made since arrival in Manila—both Bonnie and I—were very skeptical of Marcos even before Aquino's assassination. When the assassination did occur, they rapidly got off the wagon. Among the women we knew, there were some who took to the streets with their posters and banners. There were some who were quite disgruntled with the regime.

I don't remember issuing any special instructions to the staff. The embassy officer who gave me the greatest concern was our consul general, _____McRidge. He was well liked by all the Filipinos because he was eager to give visas. That made him a public figure. That was alright with me; the last thing I wanted was to become involved in the issuances of visas. I knew if I interceded in one case, then I would be flooded with other requests—I would have to spend my waking hours doing consular work. I had had enough of that because as soon as we arrived, I had to face the case of Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo who had been given some rough treatment at some American port of entry. He happened to match a profile that the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) was developing for arrivals. He noticed for example that when a Japanese Airline flight arrived, its passengers went right through immigration and customs. But whenever a flight from Manila would arrive, all passengers, including the foreign minister, were subjected to rigorous inspection—close to harassment, in his eyes. So, on one of my early calls on him, he made a big deal about his treatment at U.S. airports and that got me involved in consular matters. I went to work to expedite our consular services, trying to reach the desired goal of a "one day" turn-around. This was a major challenge since the consular section dealt with 1,100 nonimmigrant visa applications every day. We also worked with the immigration authorities in Hawaii and U.S. mainland airports to try to eliminate the kind of experience that Romulo had had. He apparently had been subjected to special scrutiny because INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) had begun to "profile" airlines and was looking very closely at all PAL(Philippine Air Lines) flights. On one of my first calls on the foreign minister, he described his ordeal to me; after that I paid close attention to the consular work and the impact that our operations as well as those of INS had on our U.S.-Philippines relations.

In any case, the consul general was a big deal in the Philippines. He liked the Marcos's and he liked the attention that was being heaped upon him. I therefore had to have a heart-to-heart talk with him to make sure he followed U.S. and embassy policies. Again, he presented the same danger as Bob Grealy did; that is, that the regime would turn to him and bypass the embassy and the ambassador. But I was perfectly happy to have the consul general issue the visas; they were the coin of the realm and had I shown interest in one, I would have been swamped with requests and could have spent all of my waking hours doing consular work.

Those were my only reservation after the U.S. position was changed. I don't remember having any particular problems with any of the embassy staff when we decided to distance ourselves from the regime.

After the assassination, I saw Marcos a number of times. Our first focus was to encourage the establishment of a credible investigating commission. Then there was a whole series of issues, many of them related to the legislative elections which we maintained had to be "clean." These were scheduled for the spring of 1984. We kept pressing the regime to put safeguards in place so that the Filipinos and the world could have some confidence in the outcome.

We continued to have our stream of American visitors. Many of them dealt with financial issues because in the aftermath of the assassination, the Filipino economy took a real dive. That raised a lot of questions about the viability of many American investments and for the IMF (International Monetary Fund) loans. This required my constant attention and continual contact with the prime minister, the finance minister and the head of the central bank.

A number of the visitors were invited to the presidential palace; so, I saw Marcos periodically; it was just not in the intimate setting that existed before the assassination. As I said earlier, our relationship might not have continued in any case because Marcos was ill and was very limited in what he could do.

President Reagan was planning a visit to Manila when all hell broke out. We had had a number of advance teams during the summer preparing for a fall presidential visit. This was to be a return visit. It was to be an important event in Philippine-U.S. relations. When the assassination took place, everyone paused to reconsider the situation. As the situation in Manila developed, it became clear that a presidential visit would not be desirable. The White House took the right action and canceled the visit—thanks in part to the work of Siger and Pratt of the NSC (National Security Council).

There were a number of sighs of relief, although Marcos begged and begged. At one point he suggested that President Reagan just stop at one of the American bases for "refueling" so that they could have a meeting, brief as it might have been. The excuse that Marcos dreamt up was that since the main subject of the discussion would have been the security relations between the two countries, meeting on a base would have been justifiable. I think that a president of a foreign country was willing to have another president meet him on a foreign base—not on his territory—was a clear indication of Marcos' desperation.

I think I had very good support from the Department of State. One of the benefits of my continuing journey throughout the Washington bureaucracy—NSC (National Security Council), State and Defense— was that I had a lot of friends who were very helpful. I could and did phone around town quite a bit, usually to senior officials. I found contacts quite responsive and helpful, when needed. So, I didn't have any problems getting the assistance from Washington that I needed occasionally.

I think I left the Philippines with considerable hope that its future would be better than its present. I didn't know how that might come about, but I certainly felt positive about that country's future. Bonnie and I had a great time in the Philippines; we loved the people. We hated to leave. I left in April before the rest of the family so I could start on my new assignment. Bonnie really hated to leave; she stayed through June while my son was finishing up at his high school; it was a wrenching experience for the whole Armacost family to leave the Philippines.

The thing that impressed me about the Philippines as it went through its political travails—upheavals, actually—was that the opposition and the government had no love

for each other and yet they all felt part of a family. They knew each other well; many of them were in both camps through marriage, through common churches, through common educational experiences. When I spoke of reconciliation, it had a different meaning in the Philippines than it might have had in other places because they all were on the same team on week-ends. There were a lot of personal connections that survived the change in regime. So somehow you had to come away feeling that eventually the tension would ease and the country would return to a more stable governance, even if not up to the standards that one might hope for.

The Philippines, while I was there, was in desperate economic straits. As I mentioned, I gave speeches around the country—more at the beginning of my tour than after I had been there a while. We were always asked to speak informally—when you read the program in one of the provincial towns, I would often see the line: "An Inspirational Address by Ambassador Michael Armacost." That was always daunting. Of course, the Filipinos were very adept at speaking extemporarily. They would rise and give a rousing speech which would end with thunderous applause and uproarious laughter. They were a hard act to follow. Carlos Romulo was usually my partner on the podium; I could never match his rhetoric.

I did give a speech one time on the Philippine economic situation. I highlighted the fact that the Singaporean economy relied heavily on external financial investment—95% of equity was foreign financed. In the Philippines, the comparable figure was about 5%. One of the reasons was that the Filipinos were so fearful that multinational businesses might become such an economic power that it would rob the Philippines of its economic and political independence. So, they chose to finance their development with loans. The Filipinos took out a lot of loans, most with variable rates. In the 1970s and 1980s, the rates went so high that they paid for these loans through the nose, but this was their choice. They preferred that to equity financing. My view was that their economic development would depend on whether they would continue to rely on these very expensive loans or whether they could overcome their suspicions of multilaterals—particularly American— and finance their development through equity financing. This concern of foreign domination is even evidenced today through the strict restrictions of foreign ownership of land; in fact, foreigners can only lease land. In my days, the lease could only be for 25 years which certainly was a damper on foreign interest and especially agro businesses. Those businesses could find more friendly and potentially more profitable investments in such countries as Malaysia. So, I hoped that the Filipinos could overcome this fear and allow foreign equity investment. They could not rely to any large extent on foreign assistance as long as the political situation was so fluid. So, in my speech, I made a strong pitch for the Filipinos to change their view of equity capital. But I must say even if that attitude had changed, I am not sure that at this stage it would have made much difference since political stability had to be the first order of business. With the succession issue up in the air, I doubt whether much foreign investment could have been expected particularly since with the political uncertainty, came a lot of capital flight.

I should mention a couple of other things which happened just shortly before I left.

During my last week—on a Saturday morning—, I got a call from Lessie Tantoco, whose family ran the _____department store. When we had first arrived in the Philippines we ran into a tradition of long standing. One of the ladies who was in Mrs. Marcos' inner circle would become a sort of unofficial social sponsor for the American ambassador—and I think other foreigners as well. Mrs. Tantoco was given that assignment; she saw to it that we were invited to their home, that we were looked after during social occasions. But after the assassination, we did not see the Tantoco's very much because they were such bosom pals of the Marcos's. In any case, Lessie Tantoco called me expressing her regrets that I had had such a falling out with Mrs. Marcos; she said that she was very unhappy that we would be leaving with that relationship so damaged and she hoped that somehow it could be repaired. She asked whether we would attend a dinner she would host for Imelda. I agreed, since I thought it would have been very impolite not to do so.

So, I went to the office where I found Scott Halford waiting for me. He told me that I would be amused by what Mrs. Marcos was saying. During the swearing in of some official commission on Friday, Imelda was bragging to everyone who would listen that she was responsible for my departure. I felt that she had really twisted the facts; here was the first lady of a country trumpeting that she was responsible for the departure of an American ambassador when in fact I was leaving for the job of undersecretary which I and most others regarded as a promotion. But she was taking credit for me being "booted" out of the country. When I heard this story, I called Lessie and said that, with all due respect, it would be very hard for me to be seen in the company of the person who was taking credit for my departure. I thought the evening would be quite strained.

Hardly had ten minutes gone by when I received a call from the deputy foreign minister who told me that Mrs. Marcos would never have said that she was responsible for my departure. Furthermore, he had been authorized to invite me to have lunch with her. I was curious to hear what Imelda would say. So, I went to the lunch which was just for the two of us. She went on and on denying that she had said anything such as I was told. Sometime during the lunch, the president came in and we chatted. I should say that I listened while he gave one of his usual lectures—he did protest too much. He also denied that Imelda said anything about my departure, but since I had heard it from someone who was present at the ceremony, I thought my information was probably correct. I expressed some skepticism, but tried to be as pleasant as possible.

Later we were invited for a farewell dinner at the presidential palace. I think in fact it had originally been supposed to have been a dinner to honor some visiting international trade group (Bill Brock was one of the members as well as some ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) foreign ministers, but at the last minute they decided to make us the honored guests. So, we all went through the motions of having a pleasant evening and thanking our hosts for their kindness to have such a dinner for us. I tried to be cordial, although I think my remarks had some edge to them. I couldn't resist one last jab.

During that same last week, I got a call from the Libyan ambassador's wife. Mrs. Marcos, to amuse herself, would often ignore protocol and at state dinners would keep the head

table for herself and the president. The guests would be seated according to protocol precedence or as close an approximation as the Filipinos could muster. Mrs. Marcos would then wander through guests and ask certain ones, depending on her whims, to join her at the head table. I was invariably one of her targets and frequently would be seated between the Libyan and Cuban ambassadors. That was her sense of humor. But through this strange process, I got to know the Libyan ambassador, who seemed to be a decent guy, well-educated and civilized. His wife was also very nice. In the weeks before my departure, the Libyans were having a lot of trouble around the world trying to put down some rebellions from their embassy staffs—younger staff members throwing out their ambassadors and taking over the chanceries.

This happened in Manila and a long struggle ensued as to who was running the Libyan embassy. Finally, the ambassador was recalled to Tripoli to be "inspected." In fact, he was put under house arrest and kept there for months. His mother had visited him and then had come to the Philippines. Her report was that the ambassador was getting so desperate that he was experimenting with disguises; she felt he was doing that because he hoped to escape, but that he was so impracticable that he would surely botch up the attempt. This news of course really alarmed the ambassador's wife. So, the wife called me and briefed me on her husband's situation. I asked her why she was telling me all that. The answer really floored me; she wanted to know whether the CIA could not mount a rescue operation so that her husband could be freed and taken from Libya. I told her that I thought that her request could probably not be met and that she shouldn't put much hope in such a rescue. But I told her I would take it up with someone in Washington upon my return which I did and got the obvious negative response. I thought perhaps the agency would find it an interesting challenge, but it did not and rightly so. I found it very amusing that Libyans, despite Qadhafi's sermons, would turn to Americans for help in an hour of need—particularly since we had no presence in Libya.

I guess I would have to say that it was always a barrel of fun in Manila. We had a great time and as I said, hated to leave. We were in the Philippines for two years and a month—the longest time I had been on a job until then. I made up for it in my later assignments.

Q: *In 1984, you came back to Washington to become the undersecretary for political affairs. Since much of what you were involved in is still classified I am going to concentrate on process, rather than specific policies or U.S. actions. Let me start by asking you to describe the seventh floor team in 1984.*

ARMACOST: The secretary was George Shultz and the first deputy secretary I worked with was Ken Dam. He was replaced about a year later by John Whitehead. As you know, the undersecretary's job is somewhat ill-defined—or I might say not defined at all. Secretary Shultz, when he first approached me, just mentioned that Eagleburger was retiring and that he would like me to take the job. I found that rather daunting; the offer came entirely unexpectedly and just out of the blue. I had not really been part of the professional Foreign Service and yet I knew that Shultz viewed that job as the most senior post for a Foreign Service officer. I told Shultz that I was really flattered by his

offer, but that I didn't think I really qualified as the most senior Foreign Service officer. He told me to go see Eagleburger, which I did.

I asked Larry what was going on. I pointed out that there were at least a dozen people who were qualified and were part of the professional Foreign Service. I said that my area of expertise was Asia, where the United States didn't have any major problems at the time. The U.S. focus was really on other regions where I could not, at least initially, make a contribution. In his usual manner, Larry said :"Armacost, there are three things that you must keep in mind: 1) this is the best job in the Foreign Service; 2) you don't get asked twice; and 3) although you may have been in the Foreign Service for only a short period, you should have learned that in that Service you do what you are asked—that is the first rule." I left that meeting with a sinking feeling that I was destined to become the undersecretary, even if I thought that I was not really that well-qualified and I knew that Bonnie would hate to leave Manila.

Fortunately, Shultz gave me a couple of months to consider his offer. I took the opportunity to read up on it as much as I could from Manila. About the only lead that I could find was to do what Larry had been doing. That was about all the guidance I could find on what the undersecretary's responsibilities might be. His main task was to oversee the regional bureaus. While I was still in Manila, I heard that the secretary was planning to initiate a process which would focus on the longer term and which he wanted the undersecretary for political affairs to lead. Other than that, I think it was assumed that everybody knew what the undersecretary did and that I was expected to do that (whatever "that" was.) I spent a little time with Larry, trying to understand what he did.

I had the advantage of having worked on and with the seventh floor for many, many years; I had seen Alexis Johnson often when he was the undersecretary. So, I had some feel for how things worked, but I can't say that I knew all—or very much—about what the job required day in and day out. I took the job therefore with considerable trepidation, not knowing exactly what to expect. I must say that the job in 1984 was a little less mysterious than it became in the 1990s because for one thing George Shultz was a manager and had a style that was clear and understood by all around him. Furthermore, there weren't as many undersecretaries as there are today which made the management of the seventh floor considerably easier than the jungle that exists today. There weren't then undersecretaries for every global issue or other special functions, which no doubt today must complicate the decision-making process immeasurably. The current staffing pattern almost guarantees that all issues have to be resolved by the secretary personally. In 1984, we had four undersecretaries: political, economic, security assistance and management—the latter two having circumscribed duties. But it was clear that the undersecretary for political affairs was the third ranking officer in the Department of State, after the secretary and the deputy secretary. So, there was no question who would be acting secretary when the two principals were out of town.

It was clear that all regional bureaus reported to the secretary through the undersecretary for political affairs. There were of course issues that were of legitimate interest to the other undersecretaries, but it was clear what fell in each jurisdiction—most of the time.

The secretary's management philosophy was that the day-to-day operational responsibilities laid with the assistant secretaries. The role of the undersecretaries was to facilitate the bureaus' and offices' work, to provide assistance when needed, to identify differences of views which required the secretary's decisions. It was clear that the undersecretaries were not to compete with the bureaus—a situation that I think had developed in the Department in the last few years. Our objectives were to support the bureaus and facilitate their work. In addition, if we saw a vacuum developing, we were authorized to take some initiative to plug that hole. As I suggested earlier, I think that in general, the organization of the Department in the early 1990s was considerably more stream-lined than it is today thereby avoiding much of the bureaucratic friction that exists today.

Shultz' concept was that he and the deputy secretary and I would serve as a management committee. It was our job to keep up to date on all matters so that in the absence of either of the two seniors, I could step in and handle their work. The deputy and I were of course expected to help the secretary in his oversight responsibility for all of the Department's work. When Max Kampelman became the counselor, he was included in this management team. The concept as I suggested was that the operational responsibility laid with the assistant secretaries and the general management responsibilities were the role of the secretary, the deputy secretary, the undersecretary for political affairs and the counselor. So, when Shultz met with an assistant secretary for the weekly discussion, the management team was present as well. We were also always present at the morning staff meetings, large or small. The weekly meetings also included the executive secretary, the Department's spokesman and the assistant secretary for Congressional relations. I found these sessions quite useful; they were very helpful for morale because all those who needed to know to do their jobs effectively were included. So, we had a good team.

These periodic meetings were helpful to highlight for the secretary the major problems of the time. They were also helpful to the assistant secretaries because they could note to their interlocutors that a specific matter had the secretary's personal attention. Terrorism, for example, was one of the issues in which the secretary was personally involved. Diplomatic security was another issue that required the secretary's personal attention. The penetration of our embassy in Moscow was another matter that involved the secretary personally. All of these issues became matters of personal interest to the secretary because he felt that security was not being given adequate attention by the bureaucracy and he wanted to raise the Department's consciousness on this very important matter. By taking it seriously, the secretary insured that his senior staff also took it seriously. Shultz used to have regular meetings with the people responsible for security matters.

The secretary also took an active interest in resuscitating the Foreign Service Institute. He gave full support to the development of a new campus at Arlington Hall. I was involved in this enterprise as were many other senior officials of the Department. This was almost standard procedure; if Shultz was interested in a subject, so was his management council. I must say that George had a schedule every day which would have taxed any man; I could not possibly have attended every meeting that he had. But I had the right to be in every meeting and that was bureaucratically helpful; people knew that I could get to the

secretary any time I wanted. I was also able through this close contact to resolve issues thereby saving the secretary's time.

As it turned out, we had a kind of informal division of labor. Deputy Secretary John Whitehead took a very active interest in Eastern Europe; so, he played a large role—much larger than I did—in the development of policies for that region. In many respects, there were many economic issues that arose in connection with Eastern Europe, but in light of his interests, he also was deeply involved in the political issues. The USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was handled a little differently. I think I may have made a bureaucratic error at the outset; I had been in my job only a short time when the question arose about how to organize for a forthcoming Summit meeting. I didn't press very hard to be involved in the planning; there were others who were quite vigorous in their pursuit for participation. So, I didn't really get involved in the planning very much; that may have been a mistake because the issues that were to be discussed at the Summit were closely intertwined with other issues which I was handling. So, after this Summit and as we looked forward to a continuing series of meetings, I suggested that it would be worthwhile to have someone overseeing all the discussions at Foreign Minister levels and below and at the Summit. These meetings were not restricted to solely U.S.-USSR relations; they included discussions on such matters as Afghanistan, Central America, China, Cambodia, Angola and occasionally other parts of the world like the Persian Gulf. Shultz thought that my suggestion made sense; so, I became responsible for the management of the agenda which was to be used by Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The preparation of the agenda and the follow-up involved a number of bureaus. I didn't participate in any Summit meetings nor meetings at secretarial level because as a general practice, if Shultz traveled, I stayed in Washington. If meetings were held in the Department in Washington, I did attend those, but none outside the building.

In my days, some of the support bureaus, like Political-Military and Economic and Business Affairs, reported to the undersecretaries to whom they had a linkage (like "T" (Arms Control) and "E" (Economics and Business)). I had a direct linkage with the Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR); I was largely responsible for bringing Mort Abramowitz back to head that bureau. Crisis management was one of my responsibilities and therefore I had jurisdiction over the Counterterrorism Office; I had a major role in bringing Bob Oakley to head that office. The Bureau for International Affairs (IO) was responsible for the back-stopping of our UN (United Nations) mission in New York, but issues related to that function would fall on my desk. That was also true for the Human Rights Bureau. So, I had a lot of functional bureaus and offices to assist me which gave me tools to handle some regional bureau problems. That pattern has changed since my time and I think now the role of the undersecretary for political affairs is a lot harder than it was in my time. Now there is so much fighting over "bureaucratic turf" that the job of all undersecretaries is much more difficult.

The S/S (Executive Secretary) procedures required that all papers dealing with political matters addressed to the secretary and the deputy secretary flowed through my office. I can't of course vouch that this practice was adhered to 100 per cent since one never knows what one does not see, but I don't recall any major oversights in this regard.

Papers dealing with economic issues would go through the undersecretary for economic affairs; we would get copies, but they did not require any action on my part. But all papers dealing with political matters, whether generated by a regional or functional bureau, flowed through my office. I have no doubt, given the nature of bureaucracy, that some material did by-pass us, particularly if I was out of town or the matter allegedly required immediate attention by the secretary. If the assistant secretary could get by Charlie Hill, who was the secretary's special assistant while I was the under secretary, then the papers would get to the secretary right away. Charlie had been the executive secretary when I reported to the Department in 1984; when he became special assistant, he was followed in S/S (Executive Secretary) by Nick Platt and Melvyn Levitsky. I enjoyed working with all of these fine professionals.

I would see the secretary every day. George (Shultz)was a highly organized individual; he would hold daily staff meetings, but in addition he would have a meeting with each regional bureau assistant secretary once a week. I would be invited to attend those. He would also hold weekly meetings with all assistant secretaries.

I was somewhat surprised by the intellectual scope of the job. In that respect, it was extremely challenging. I was also surprised at the beginning by the apparent lack of focus of the Policy Planning staff. As a graduate of that office, I was a little chagrined by the apparent difficulty it had in finding a role. I worried about this problem and after a while, I think we managed to make a useful role for it. When I took on the "P" (Under Secretary for Political Affairs) office, Steve Bosworth had been the director (of Policy Planning); he was very good and had a good relationship with George (Shultz), but he left in early 1984 and was succeeded by Peter Rodman, who didn't have the same kind of relationship with the secretary that his predecessor had. But Peter turned out to be first rate and a great conceptualizer and after a short hiatus, S/P (Policy Planning) became a very important player on the seventh floor (the top floor of the Department of State where all senior officers are located).

There were some activities that did not fit neatly into the jurisdiction of one bureau or another. I inherited from Eagleburger a special responsibility for South Asia, which had been a sort of an orphan because the assistant secretary for the Near East and South Asia was completely bogged down by the Middle East peace process and had very little time for anything else. My first focus was on India and Pakistan. Larry (Eagleburger) had considered the U.S.-India relationship important, and I agreed with that view. He had started periodic discussion with both the permanent under-secretaries of the India Foreign Office and the Pakistan Foreign Office. I picked up that role.

Soon, I had to spend a lot of time working with Islamabad working on nonproliferation. Then the Afghanistan problem grew into a major negotiation. There wasn't an assistant secretary who could focus enough on these issues, nor was there any other undersecretary who could take these issues on as part of his portfolio, so I took on all these South Asia issues. I was helped to a great extent by Arnie Raphel (who subsequently became the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan before he was killed in a plane crash), the deputy assistant secretary for that region. He had had experience in South Asia, which I found very

beneficial.

I also spent a lot of time—more than I had expected — on crisis management. I think starting in 1985, we encountered a series of terrorist episodes, mostly in the Mediterranean, which seemed to pop up on almost a weekly basis. My office was the natural "home" for handling the U.S. response. In these matters, I got great support from Mort (Abramowitz) and Bob (Kimmitt) —both very alert and intelligent and pro-active in the bureaucracy. Since they had the essential information, they worked with me on the management of these activities. Of course, regional bureaus were always involved as well as PM (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs), IO (Bureau of International Organizations) and others. Other agencies had interest in this aspect of our foreign policy, so that our response was discussed in interagency fora. I wasn't really expecting that so much of my time would be devoted to terrorism and counterterrorism, but with the outbreak of terrorism, I had to spend a lot of time on these issues.

There were some surprises. For example, I did not anticipate the political and bureaucratic struggles that broke out often with DoD (Department of Defense) and the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). I thought that relationships with those agencies would be as cordial and business-like as I remembered them to be when I worked in the Pentagon and the NSC (National Security Council). That was not the case during my service as undersecretary; we had some very tough slogging. In some respects, our problems reflected Shultz's unhappiness with the secrecy with which the NSC conducted a lot of its business and the DoD intrusion into areas that he thought were primarily the Department's (State Department) responsibilities. I shared George's views on these issues. The CIA was way in front on a number of issues, both in the operational and analytical spheres. So, I spent a lot of time sorting out these interagency tensions.

These tensions were quite obvious when it came to the findings resulting from the investigation of the Iran-Contra affair and the findings. When I became undersecretary, I heard of the old 40 committee; I did some research into the history and operations of this committee and found that by 1984, the committee had atrophied so that it only existed on paper. This committee had been established to develop findings supporting certain covert operations which required presidential approval. The committee had been designed to include the undersecretaries of relevant department and agencies—DoD, State, CIA and the NSC. It was an orderly procedure which tried to bring all views to bear on proposals for covert action, instead of rushing a piece of paper from the CIA to the president through the NSC. So, I tried to resurrect the 40 committee and was able to bring some order back to what had been a pretty haphazard process. Unfortunately, these procedures were violated and bypassed when it came to one of the most delicate covert operations ever conducted (Iran-Contra).

In the early and mid-1980s, most of the covert operations took place in Central America. This reflected the intensity of political feeling about events in that area. That gave the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) an opening to work around established procedures which came to light later through reports to the congressional intelligence committees. But in any case, I did spend time on those Central American operations of which we were

aware. So, I was surprised by the amount of time I had to spend on intelligence matters. It was one of those responsibilities for which the undersecretary for political affairs had a reporting obligation to the Congress. In most cases, when it came to congressional hearings, I was rarely involved, in part because the committees wanted a political appointee—the secretary or his deputy— to speak for the Department. The (Congressional) sub-committees raised a different problem; the secretary had decided that he did not want anyone from the seventh floor to appear before sub-committees, even though all meetings were closed to the public. He did not want to start a precedent and therefore had determined that witnesses before sub-committees would be an assistant secretaries or someone from a bureau or office. But because of the sensitive nature of the issues as well as their scope beyond the responsibility of a single bureau, intelligence matters were left to the undersecretary requiring my periodic appearance before the relevant congressional committees—all in closed hearings. I was informed on a lot of issues, but I don't think I had knowledge—at least full-knowledge—of all the aspects of intelligence operations. I think that perhaps on most of those, the secretary was fully informed, but no one below him.

I did get involved in some disarmament discussions, but Paul Nitze was the secretary's senior advisor on this subject; he had a background that very few, if any, could match. I participated primarily to see how disarmament might impinge on other issues that we were handling, but the secretary had all of the advice he needed from Paul and his team. I had people who followed developments in START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) so that I had a chance to comment on any proposals, but my role was quite limited.

As I said, I spent considerable time working in interagency matters. During my time, the NSC (National Security Council) system called for much of this coordination to take place at the undersecretary level, rather than at the deputy secretary's level. So, as I said earlier, all matters related to interagency issues flowed through my office, and I would try to work it out with Fred Iklé at Defense, _____at CIA and the NSC Advisor (Bob McFarlane was the first advisor I worked with; he was soon followed by Admiral Poindexter) and Art Morrow, who was the JCS' (Joint Chief of Staff) representative in the NSC. The NSC deputy advisor was Don Fortier of the NSC; he was also one of the key players until his untimely death. This committee later was raised to the deputy secretary level.

We would hold meetings periodically as necessary; sometimes, that meant almost daily.
So, I spent a lot of time representing the Department to other agencies. In later years, this coordination responsibility was elevated to the deputy secretary level. I think the system in the mid to late 1980s was probably better because the interagency coordination was left to the official who in State was responsible for the supervision of the regional bureaus even though he may not have ranked, bureaucratically speaking, with the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) deputy director or the NSC (National Security Council) advisor. The Pentagon's representation tended to vary from issue to issue; sometimes it was represented by the deputy secretary or sometimes by Iklé who was an undersecretary and sometimes by the ISA (Intelligence Support Activity) assistant secretary—who had a lot of influence with Secretary Weinberger, and therefore was a key player in the high

council of DoD (Department of Defense).

In any case, we established a forum which in some cases was used to resolve issues that the secretaries would not. We came to conclusions without denigrating the objectives of our bosses. That helped move the process along. This approach helped to bypass the personal frictions that existed among some cabinet members; that problem eased considerably when Carlucci became the NSC advisor with Colin Powell as his deputy. We were to do some things that might not have a conclusion had it been taken up by more senior officials.

As I suggested earlier, this committee was quite active. Not only did it handle day-to-day problems, but was also heavily involved in crisis situations. So, the five or six of us spent a lot of time together in what I think was a very collegiate atmosphere and a very positive enterprise.

The undersecretary also had some management responsibilities, dealing primarily with personnel. In my time, the deputy secretary was the Department's representative in the negotiations leading to the selection of ambassadors. He was assisted in this bargaining process by a selection committee consisting of the undersecretary for management, the director general of the Foreign Service, and myself. The assistant secretaries made the initial recommendations and were invited to make their pitch before the deputy secretary's selection committee which would then make recommendations to the secretary and from there to the White House. This committee also reviewed DCM appointments as well as senior departmental appointments. As assistant secretary positions became available, I would be consulted on potential candidates, as the senior Foreign Service representative in the Department. I was also asked for views on other appointments, since I knew many of the people being considered. The Department did not of course always get its way on ambassadorial appointments, but we had a process for selecting the best Foreign Service candidates. I think I played a central role in the selections of some FSOs (Foreign Service officers) such as Abramowitz, Oakley, Platt and others who were chosen for key jobs in the Department.

I was also tasked to pay some attention to economic and military assistance. Peter McPherson of AID (Agency for International Development) would meet periodically with Ken Adelman, the director of ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency). ACDA, AID and USIA (United States Information Agency) had independent status, but were under the direction of the secretary of State (Department). I was the focal point in the Department if any of these agencies had issues which they couldn't resolve at lower levels. I also tried to see that these independent agencies kept in mind our political objectives for each country as they developed their country programs. This coordinating function took a fair amount of my time. As I said, these three agencies were autonomous, had their own budgets, and reported separately to Congress.

I thought McPherson was a very effective manager. He had his own agenda and goals, but he wanted to be kept up to date on the secretary's views. Each of the heads of these autonomous agencies had a direct relationship with the secretary which they cherished

and got a fair amount of his time. But short of the secretary, I was their point of contact in the Department.

I had less to do with security assistance which was handled by Under Secretary (Arms Control and International Security Affairs) Bill Schneider. If he had a problem with a regional bureau, we would discuss it. But he was an independent official and I don't think I spent too much time worrying about his area of responsibility. He was very intelligent; he had a sound approach to the management of his programs—security assistance, arms transfers, sales of weapon systems—; and he also was very good with Congress, which he knew well from his prior service there. He was a considerable asset to the Department. I was very glad that I didn't have to involve myself in the arms sales or technology transfer issues.

There were other seventh floor principals who played key role in the policy development and implementation processes. Ed Derwinski, who succeeded Bill as undersecretary in 1987, was the Counselor of the Department during most of my tour as undersecretary (for Political Affairs). He focused particularly on Pacific Basin issues. Dick Fairbanks was the assistant secretary for legislative affairs (H) when I first arrived; later he became an ambassador-at-large. He focused on the Middle East and was the coordinator of our efforts in that area for some period of time. Later, he inherited the Pacific Basin issues. Dick Walters, who was also an ambassador-at-large, did a lot of the representational work with foreign leaders and handled a number of delicate issues. All of these people had important roles and were part of the Department's management team.

I undertook some travel, but it was not a frequent event. As I said earlier, the secretary viewed me as part of a team, which meant that when he was out of town, I was expected to stay in Washington. Shultz traveled a lot, so that my opportunities were severely limited. I made some initial trips primarily for familiarization. There were a number of areas which I had never visited as well as areas that I had not been to for a while. Since I was to be very active in South Asian affairs as well as Turkey-Greece, I did travel to both of those areas. Turkey and Greece, which were fierce rivals although both were members of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), needed some seventh floor attention, especially as the Cyprus problem remained unresolved. I also visited Asia to bring myself up to speed on events in that region, as well as one trip to South America and Africa. These trips were primarily at the request of the regional bureaus who had some issues that needed high level consultations.

The United States had special consultative arrangements with a number of countries—e.g. Japan, Korea— and much of my travels were devoted to those meetings. I visited Moscow with the secretary to discuss some regional issues like Afghanistan. We had regular discussions with the Chinese. I traveled with then Vice President Bush on a couple of occasions. We also had periodic meetings with the Israeli prime minister. These were not part of the planning talks process; they were meetings at senior levels below the president and the secretary, in some cases.

I saw a lot of foreign ambassadors. There are many countries who expect their

representative to be received by a seventh floor principal. The secretary was of course not always available. So, if the issue was a regional one or a country-specific one—usually of an operational nature—, I was designated to talk with the ambassador. There were some with whom I had had long standing relationships which I continued when I became undersecretary. When a foreign or defense minister was in town, if the discussions required the presence of a State (Department) representative, that fell on me. These duties also took some of my time. I also spent a fair amount of time initiating discussion of issues with ambassadors.

Fortunately, I was not very much involved in State Visits—either here or in a foreign capital. My main task was to review the briefing memoranda that were addressed to the secretary or the president. This was not an onerous task because there wasn't much of a role that I could play in this process.

I thought that the policy development and implementation processes worked pretty well in State and in other agencies as well. Toward the end of my tour, we began to reap the harvest of a lot of work that had been done in the previous years. George (Shultz) had been in the secretary's job for a while; he had established his preeminence in the foreign affairs field; he had a close relationship to the president and the foreign policy team worked well in the later stages of the Reagan era—with the departure of Casey from CIA and the advent of a competent and cooperative NSC (National Security Council) leadership. George was in command of the process and the Department benefited thereby. As I have suggested earlier, I think the State team was very good; it worked well together.

It has been said that the seventh floor can't handle more than two crises at any one time. I am not sure that was true. For example, we had a continuing operation working on Afghanistan and the continuing management of processes working on various hot spots, such Middle East, Cambodia, Angola where we had an operation which called for an American presence in that country. I should mention that Angola was a situation which we tried to avoid, but events both there and in neighboring countries finally forced us to try to do something. Of course, these were on-going processes; if the issue concerned unexpected events, such as a terrorist event, I don't remember that we had to handle more than one of those at any one time. These events of course occurred all the time, but I don't think we ever had to handle two at one time. That was just as well because the seventh-floor responsibility for U.S. reaction to these occasions happen to fall on the same people, regardless of the location. The more difficult a problem was, the more the seventh floor got involved. Not only was a regional bureau involved, but so would be the Office of Counterterrorism and INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research). That helped alleviate the work-load a little for the seventh-floor principal, but in the final analysis, the management and the decision-making rested in some office on the seventh floor.

Fortunately, I had a good staff so that when these unexpected events took place and I had to devote my attention to them, my assistants, who were just great, could keep the day-to-day activities going. They had great net-works in the building; they knew where to get necessary information or who to talk to on specific issues. They were quite unobtrusive, but very effective. We were not in competition with any regional bureau; we

did not try to get involved in matters that could be handled satisfactorily by an assistant secretary or his bureau staff. The secretary tended to work closely with the seventh-floor officials, although as I said before he saw the assistant secretaries frequently, both in staff meetings and in private sessions. We were part of a transmission belt so that the secretary's views, if not personally imparted, were made known to the operating officials.

The way Shultz managed the Department in some ways made it a little easier for us on the seventh floor because he unmistakably held the assistant secretaries responsible for operations. He was an experienced and professional manager, having had great experience both in the public and private sectors. His stock in trade was to employ effective managers and hold them responsible. That made life for us considerably easier; since the assistant secretaries were responsible for policy and programs in their regions, we on the seventh floor did not have to continually scurry around putting out fires.

As I mentioned before, Shultz' door was always open so that whenever an assistant secretary or any of us needed his guidance, he was always available. His approach was very orderly; he did not fly by the seat of his pants. The staff meetings were an important aspect of the Department's management; participants' comments were welcomed and the secretary kept up to date on situations in this manner. He used these meetings effectively and reached decisions sometime right then and there. I think there was no doubt in our minds how the secretary wanted the Department to operate; he was quite clear on that and all knew whom he held accountable for various issues.

Baker was also a very successful secretary but he had an entirely different *modus operandi (mode of operation)*. He tended to operate with a small cadre of close associates, who then would impart his wishes to the operating bureaus. In Shultz' case, I think we all felt part of a team. This was one of reasons, I think, why officers recall the Shultz regime with considerable fondness; their roles were clear and they felt they participated in the decision- making process.

I became much better acquainted with the relationship of domestic interests to foreign policy. Everyone knows about domestic pressure groups, but as undersecretary I had an opportunity to watch how the process worked from close up. The domestic interests in some foreign policy issues is very intensive. The first day I was in my office I got a call from the Israeli DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) alerting me to the fact that there was a memorandum in my office which needed attention. He knew better than I did what was on my desk! That was my first experience with the Israeli grapevine; it was formidable. I soon learned that some issues required more attention than others because of their domestic interest.

Occasionally, certain Members of Congress would call and tell me about some memorandum which was on my desk in which they had an interest. But this didn't happen too frequently. I did spend considerable time on matters of interest to Congress; Congressional Relations would turn to me when it needed something in a hurry. These were usually telephone calls that the secretary could not make. John Whitehead, the deputy secretary and I would have a weekly lunch with Senator Pell, who was the

chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. He was not as active as he might have been so that these weekly meetings were not as much a burden as they might have been, but they did give us the opportunity to keep him up to date on the major issues and to find out what his interests were. Occasionally, I would go to Congress in connection with a special problem that needed higher Department representation than an assistant secretary. I tried to get interested Members of Congress to support our views. There were a certain number of people who had special interests who would call me and we would discuss the matter.

As I said, my testimonies tended to be in the Intelligence Committees in closed sessions. There was one occasion when I ducked testimony in an open session. Casey (Head of the CIA) insisted that State and Defense representatives sit along with him when he testified on _____. This was a rather contentious session. When it came to a question about findings, I did not participate, much to Casey's displeasure. He threatened to have me fired because I had not supported him sufficiently. When I returned to my office after this session, I had a call from Chairman Dante Fascell or Lee Hamilton—I have forgotten which one—asking me to testify before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in open hearings in a couple of days. I would have testified in a closed session, but I didn't want to testify in an open session because in institutional terms, I was representing the Foreign Service. I did not think it would be proper where I either had to be honest or disloyal—or just incompetent. My testimony would not only have me held accountable, but I think it would have tarred the whole Foreign Service. I couldn't get Fascell to call off the meeting; so, I went to the secretary to make the case that my testimony would have put the Foreign Service in a very difficult position. I told the secretary that this was one of those issues that I thought should be discussed by a political appointee. Shultz agreed and sent Whitehead to testify—I think John thought that I was a wimp. John was quite honest and critical. I think we and the White House all watched his testimony. He had hardly returned when he got a call from the White House with its comments. So, the process turned out just as I feared it would; I did not want to be put in a position to have to be critical of the Foreign Service or the Department. So, my testimony was usually before the Intelligence Committees in closed sessions.

As I suggested, I felt that one of my roles was to represent the Foreign Service as an institution. George's (Shultz) view was that there should be someone on his management committee who represented the Foreign Service, who had been part of it and understood it, who knew its members and could tap the proper expertise. He wanted the Foreign Service officers to be comfortable with him. In many respects, that was unique approach; it has not been the usual secretarial pattern. But that was Shultz' reasoning and was one of the reasons why the Service recognized him as a worthy leader. He had one advantage in that when he became secretary, he had Eagleburger already in place. Larry (Eagleburger) was very good at representing the Foreign Service and knowing people. So, it was natural for me to inherit that role.

I think my principal contribution in representing the Foreign Service arose during personnel decisions, especially ambassadorial and senior Department appointments. I tried to support professional officers for most of these positions. I did not get involved in

issues that the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) raised. They fell into the province of the undersecretary for management. My role was really part of my supervisory responsibility of the regional bureaus; not all of those were led by Foreign Service officers. Motley (ARA – Bureau of Inter-American Affairs), Burt (EUR – Bureau of European Affairs), Wolfowitz (EA – Bureau of East Asian Affairs) and Crocker (AF – Bureau of African Affairs) were non-career political appointees, but were very effective. They were professionals, even if not part of the Foreign Service. I don't think this was a problem; the career people accepted these political appointees because they knew they were well qualified.

We did have a system that permitted memoranda from officials of all ranks to reach the secretary without going through the normal process. It was called the "Dissent Channel." It was not used very much at all because the secretary's door was always open and people could reach him with their views; he didn't want to be shielded and that made the "Dissent Channel" superfluous. I don't think there were more than six such memoranda in the five years I was on seventh floor.

I might just briefly make some comments about policy during my tour. During my time, there were major events taking place throughout the world, although the fruition—e.g., the end of the Soviet Union—did not come until the end of my tour. We were certainly aware of the potential seismic changes that could be taking place, but the results did not come in until 1989.

My most vivid recollection of the changing times occurred when Eduard Shevardnadze, then the USSR's (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) foreign minister, came to talk to us—I think in January 1987. He asked to talk to Shultz privately—one on one. He told him that the Soviets would be out of Afghanistan within a year. By this time, we had enough of a relationship with Shevardnadze to trust him although that view was not necessarily accepted throughout town. The suspicions built up during the Cold War were long lasting, but I felt that we had developed a relationship and confidence with Shevardnadze that could be trusted; I did not believe that he would break this relationship he had with Shultz by providing false information. That was one clue that the USSR was moving in an entirely new direction.

I must say that I thought that our planning for a different future—a future for example without Afghanistan (as an issue)—was quite good. It wasn't abstract planning; it involved negotiating with the Soviets on specific issues. The context within which these negotiations took place changed although the agenda—human rights, bilateral questions, etc—remained pretty much the same. It was a pretty comprehensive agenda that we discussed with the Soviets. We developed enough of a sense of rapport with our counterparts to make these discussions and negotiations fruitful in many ways.

I am not sure that any one of us foresaw the falling of the "Berlin Wall", but we did have a growing appreciation that the Eastern European countries were developing against the USSR. There was an interesting angle to our dealing with the Soviets; this was a case in which it was better to handle discussions outside the government and in the private

sector. That technological relationships—the information revolution—was changing the nature of the world was quite clear. Walt Richmond did some interesting work on this subject which eventually resulted in the book "The Highlight of _____." The work he did led us to the conclusion that scientific innovation would require us to change our approach to many issues. The information dissemination was just too powerful to withstand the historic barriers set up by some countries. He foreshadowed the developments of the ensuing decade and even beyond. Gorbachev soon recognize that he could not stop the tide; his management of the issues might not have been nearly as enlightened if we did not have that close rapport with the Soviets.

As history has recorded, it was during my tenure that our relationships with Latin America were quite tense on certain issues. We had to worry not only about the "hard liners," but the "soft" ones as well. There were a lot of Congressional resolutions and amendments which influenced the way we could deal with the challenges. In most cases, when you got to a negotiation, George Shultz looked to someone to be responsible. In the Latin America case, that fell primarily to Harry Shlaudeman, the assistant secretary for the region. So, Harry took on the negotiation job and he did that superbly. My job was to be a presence when required; that is why I traveled once to the region. I went to Honduras and visited some of the camps where they made _____. When these issues arose in the (Congressional) Intelligence Committees, I tried to respond to requests, many of which were stimulated by suspicions concerning what we might be doing. There were a lot of cases which required the administration to explain what it was doing. I had weekly lunches with Mort Abramowitz, then the head of INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), to try to keep up to date on activities in the area.

In general, the activities of the "hard liners" in Central America was a challenge. They had practically a free hand to do anything they wanted. They didn't care about any collateral damage which their actions might generate as long as they met their objectives. These were issues which highly polarized debates; dialogues were difficult because the "hard liners" had a single objective with very little give. We had an interagency committee on Central America co-chaired by the NSC (National Security Council). This was one of the matters in which I was not deeply involved because that committee focus on operations which normally did not need my involvement.

I have been asked whether I thought that the various funds used in international relations—economic aid, military assistance, information programs—were useful to the conduct of our foreign relations. Unfortunately, during the last three years of my tenure, funds were being sharply reduced—something like 30 percent in the three years for the 150 account (International Affairs Account). Throughout this period—and before—Congress would "earmark" a considerable portion of the budget, leaving precious little for the Executive Branch to manage. So, between the reductions and the "earmarks", there was very little discretionary authority left for us, not enough I think for me to make a judgment about the effectiveness of these assistance programs. Many of the "earmarks" were made to satisfy domestic constituencies which had little relationship to the achievement of our foreign policy objectives. This lack of flexibility was a frustration.

I think military assistance was one of the few resources under the Department's (of State) control. I had to deal with economic assistance when in the Philippines; I had some first-hand acquaintance therefore with the lack of responsiveness in the AID (Agency for International Development) bureaucracy; by the time I got to Manila, there was more interest in maintaining a detailed paper trail on the disbursement of the resources than there was in results. The paper work involved in developing a project, selling it and then keeping track of its resource use was horrendous. The disbursements never caught up with the appropriations. Too often, nothing would happen to our proposals, except the generation of a lot of paper work despite the many hours we devoted to developing our ideas, getting consultants to look at them, feasibility studies, etc. Even if the project was approved, by the time it got underway, it was useless in terms of meeting some specific policy objectives. The goal which the project was to assist in meeting was by implementation time, long ago achieved or dropped. We had a huge assistance program in the Philippines—65 or 70 American officers. I became very skeptical about the utility of a lot of the programs and projects in terms of meeting foreign policy goals; I was fully aware of the bureaucratic nightmare that the program administration had become. So, I can't say that I was a strong proponent of the idea of using assistance as a tool of foreign policy. I didn't think that the bureaucratic hurdles would ever permit a close linkage between foreign policy goals and assistance programs. They also put a straight jacket on any attempts to relate projects to basic human needs.

I think security assistance was a much more malleable tool of foreign policy. But we had very limited resources for these programs since the lion share of the appropriations were legislated to be provided to Israel and Egypt. So, this program was useful in foreign policy terms, but of marginal utility for lack of adequate resources. I might make a similar comment about covert operations.

By 1989, I thought the U.S. foreign policy was in pretty good shape. We were harvesting the results of a patient, but firm position, particularly against the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). There were signs of real progress on regional issues, such as Afghanistan, which had been essentially resolved. The Cold War was winding down. Central America issues were still difficult. It was left to Secretary of State Baker to resolve the domestic passions which that region seemed to foster. When he was able to do that, then more opportunities for resolution of the Central America issues arose. I was satisfied that there would be improvements in Soviet-U.S. relationships, as well as Sino-U.S. relations. The improvements in our relationships with the Soviets were leading to the resolution of regional issues which were of paramount interest to us. In East Asia, we had a very successful transition in the Philippines; the dangers of an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula had been reduced, although never fully eliminated. As I suggested, our relationship with China was satisfactory. So, I was satisfied with the situation as I left the undersecretary's job, thanks primarily to the work that George Shultz and some of my Departmental colleagues had done. The interagency mechanisms were working quite well by the end of decade of the 1980s.

I enjoyed the job. I was not worn out, although the days had been quite long. The only

troublesome aspect was that after five years, the challenges were beginning to be somewhat wearing and therefore I was ready for another assignment. Also, my career had been a steady flow between assignments that focused on a single issue or country and those which had broader horizons. The involvement of an undersecretary or any senior official had by necessity to be at a somewhat superficial level; these officers cannot become experts or ever deeply steeped in all of the details of a foreign relationship. While that broad reach was satisfying, I did yearn to return to a manageable relationship with one country so that I could focus on some details. This is not to say that I was looking for just another job; it had to be one that I would have found challenging.

I might just make a brief comment about the transition from the Reagan to the Bush administration, which took place while I was undersecretary. It was not as smooth as one might have expected. When George Shultz was secretary, he used to have monthly breakfasts with then Treasury Secretary Jim Baker, which I attended, along with the deputy secretary and our Treasury counterparts. From what I could observe at these meetings, Shultz and Baker had very cordial relations. The conversations were always very substantive and went quite well. There of course, the natural potential problem that arises when one of the principals had been in the other's shoes—i.e. Shultz had been Treasury secretary some years before. But George was quite sensitive to this possible problem and refrained from encroaching on Baker's territory, at least as he saw it, because he remembered how jealously he guarded his "turf" when he was secretary at Treasury.

So, I was surprised when Baker first came to the Department of State. He was provided transition offices on the first floor while he waited for his confirmation and swearing in. At Shultz' direction, I sort of oversaw the breaking in of the new secretary. We prepared a very thorough briefing book for Jim; George expected to have a lot of conversations with him before he left his seventh floor office. But in fact, the two only had one brief lunch. Baker handled the transition at somewhat of an "arm's length". Bob Kimmitt had been tagged to take over from me. I had worked closely with him when we were both members of the NSC (National Security Council) staff during the Carter Administration. He was then a young Army major working on military assistance issues. His accession to my job went very smoothly; I stuck around and as a matter of fact had to act as secretary because George (Shultz) left before Baker was confirmed. I signed Baker's commission on January 19, 1989—an act of which he has reminded me.

I was still acting secretary when the Panama issue arose. Reagan had been persuaded to accept the Department's (of State) view which called for a negotiation of President Noriega's "retirement" and departure from the country in exchange for some legal immunity against any proceedings that may have been brought to a U.S. court. On this issue, it was clear to me that Bush and Baker had different views than Reagan and Shultz had had. It had been a campaign issue, and I think they were reluctant to let Noriega off that easily. In any case, I had to represent the Department's views as I had earlier in a variety of interagency fora.

I was asked by Kimmitt about some possible assignments. Since I was in a senior

position, I think the new team was anxious to give me a good job. I knew most of the staff around President Bush well and I had no problem continuing to work for the new president. Originally, it seemed that the new team might have been interested in sending me to China. I told Kimmitt that I really had no interest in that ambassadorship; I didn't speak the language and I thought that there were a number of people better qualified. I also said that if I were to go abroad, the only post that would have interested me was Japan. If that was not possible, I certainly did not want to become a "problem" for the new administration and I was prepared to leave government. It turned out that at this time the Hoover Institute was looking for a new president. They had contacted me and I thought it sounded intriguing. So, I was in a good position; both of my future possibilities—Japan or Hoover—seemed quite appealing. I think the new team faced some problems with my view because Gaston Sigur, who had been the Far East expert in the NSC (National Security Council) , was very keen on getting the Japan job. He was well qualified having done a good job at the NSC. In the end, sometime in January, Baker called me and asked whether I would go to Tokyo. The answer of course was "yes", but I didn't leave until spring when Kimmitt was confirmed. I tried to do the job as best I could, but I was certainly not in Baker's inner circle; Baker operated quite differently from Shultz.

Q: *Then in 1989 you were chosen to be our ambassador to Japan. I am not going to ask you to discuss this assignment in any great depth because you have written a very comprehensive book about your experiences between 1989 and 1993. The title of the book was Friends or Rivals? The Insider's view of U.S.-Japan Relations published by Columbia University Press in 1996. I would like to pursue some of the points you made in that book. Before we get to the book, let me ask you to describe whatever differences you noted between the Japan of 1968, 1972 and 1989.*

ARMACOST: I had visited Japan regularly throughout this 20 plus years, so that I was not surprised by what I found in 1989. I guess the major change was that when I left Tokyo in 1974, the oil crises had left Japan in somewhat of an economic shambles. It had put a crimp in their growth and their self-confidence, and there was some question concerning how quickly they would recover from that blow. By 1989, the Japanese were doing very well economically and were viewed as one of the world's economic powerhouses. They had, in fact, adjusted to the oil crises much quicker than anyone else. In some respects, that led them to some overconfidence; they felt by 1989 that they could handle any economic adversity that might come their way. In the 1990s, they have proven not to be nearly as adept at meeting economic crisis as they thought they were by the late 1970s.

On the political side, in the mid 1970s, the predominant Liberal Party faction was that which was headed by Tanaka. When I returned in 1989, the prime minister was Noboru Takeshita, who had been one of Tanaka's chief lieutenants. So as far as the political leadership was concerned, the same political faction that had governed in the 1970s was still in control in the late 1980s.

In my book I said that "I was personally convinced that the ties between Tokyo and

Washington are in our vital national interests." Just to expand on that thought a little, I should note that if we don't have access to our military facilities in Japan, it becomes much more difficult, if not nearly impossible, for us to maintain a balance of power in Asia. If we didn't have an alliance with the most powerful country in the region, that changes the security picture dramatically. Furthermore, if the United States can ally itself with the second most powerful nation in the world, that makes the management of the world's economic life much easier.

Politically— Japan is a democracy—flawed to be sure as all democracies are in one way or another; the absence of a close relationship to another democracy would certainly make us less effective in the region. It is important for all countries in a region which share the same political philosophy to have a close affinity if they wish to influence the political trends in that region to move in their direction.

I think that by and large, the Japanese recognized the value of the U.S. connection. There were times when they resented the degree of "guidance" which they received from their old "friend," the United States; they have at times felt that they were a power to be reckoned with on their own and felt that Japan should have a more autonomous policy. There were some Japanese who felt that their country should counter-balance American influence with a much more independent policy in Asia. The frictions arising from our differences on trade issues as well as our actions in the Persian Gulf were quite noticeable. The Japanese leaders had no doubt about the value of the alliance; there were some who felt that some adjustments in the balance was called for; there were others who doubted our reliability over the long term - they felt that they should hedge their bets a little more. But we frequently talked to the Japanese about the advantages of having a global partnership; from our point of view, since Japan was firm in its opposition to playing any military role, its main contribution to global stability was to contribute resources to mitigate frictions that were arising not only in Asia, but in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

Q: *Did you run into any racial animosity stemming from our atomic bombing of Japanese cities?*

ARMACOST: Not in those terms. The Japanese have a well-developed sense of victimization. They like to present themselves as the aggrieved party in negotiations. I don't know how far back that feeling goes, but it certainly exists in modern times. We did of course break their isolation from the world with Commodore Perry and his ships and interfered with their policies in more modern eras. In the case of the atomic bombing, it was one way of creating a moral equivalence to their attack on Pearl Harbor and their various invasions of East Asian countries in the first half of the century with all the devastation that those actions brought. So, it was part of their psychology to try to expunge their historical record and in indulge in certain historic amnesia.

I remember visiting the Hiroshima Peace Memorial and coming away feeling rather upset about what I had seen. There were picture after picture of the bombing and its aftermath; the captions, which were all translated into English, left the clear impression that in

August 1945, totally unexpected and without provocation, came some American bombers which dropped some bombs on the innocent Japanese and flew away. There was no context for our action at all—no reference to Pearl Harbor, or Japanese behavior in China, Korea or south-east Asia. I suppose that the only act of concern that I witnessed occurred when Jim Baker gave a speech in the early 1990s about organizing a political grouping from Vladivostok to Vancouver. That had an odd ring in Japan because it suggested a kind of isolation from the West, of which the Japanese had a primordial fear. It was a theme that Baker had played in Europe where it may have been well received, but in Japan it gave rise to a feeling of concern. I heard that concern more in political than in racial terms. That is not to say that there weren't racial feelings in Japan; it is just that I never encountered them in my day to day contacts with either officials or the public.

Q*: In your book, you refer to the problem of officials, both American and Japanese, by-passing the embassy. Was that a frequent occurrence?*

ARMACOST: No, nor was a major problem. But as in the case of any Embassy, it is useful to be kept posted on what officials of each government are saying to each other. I don't know whether it was better or worse in Tokyo than in other capitals, but Japanese politicians liked to have their special "relationships" with certain Americans. Since the Japanese political scene is highly factionalized, each grouping had to have access to American leaders, leading to the great possibility of confusion. On our side, I think it is a matter that people tend to get themselves caught in the Washington bureaucratic competition with each bureaucracy tending to open their channels of communications with their Japanese counter-parts leading also to the possibility of confusion. Modern communications facilitate these personal contacts, which gives further impetus to bypassing an embassy. Indeed, it is even harder and harder for chiefs of mission, particularly the larger ones, to monitor what is sent by their own staffs because of the volume and the method of transmission—e.g. over the Internet.

This advent of rapid and informal communications and the ease of travel has fundamentally changed the role of an ambassador. No longer can he or she depend on controlling what emanates from a mission through the approval of messages—or the reading of them after dispatch. Leadership now rests on entirely different approaches. Historically, in several countries, chiefs of mission have had important and sometimes difficult relationships with the CIA embassy component and the American military command, if one existed in that particular country; these relationships become crucial to the effective development and implementation of U.S. policy in a country.

The challenges as far as our military relationships were, of course, different in the Philippines than they were in Japan. We had no base negotiations, but we did have continuing discussions on host nation responsibilities and burden sharing. During the Carter Administration, the emphasis on our relationship with Japan was often budgetary. The Reagan Administration changed the discussions by talking more about roles and missions to be carried out by each country. That was a helpful change because it focused Japan what it had to do in its own self-defense—e.g. by contributing to the monitoring of

the sea lanes south of the islands. Once that mission was established, the Japanese could decide, in consultation with us, what their role would be. Once they had decided what needed to be done, it was remarkable how quickly they provided the required resources and how much they stuck to their plans. I think I mentioned in my book that in the summer of 1993 I attended a sub-committee meeting of the SCC (Security Consultative Committee) to be briefed by the Japanese on what they had done in their five-year plan. They had acquired every system that they had projected in the plan, except for a few aircraft where they cut the procurement rate very slightly because they found that the attrition rate had not been as high as had been anticipated. In the United States, it is unthinkable that any plan would be good for two years, much less five. After the first two, the plans are either completely re-done or ignored. But not the Japanese; they stuck to their plan and at end of the five-year period, had met all of their goals. The Japanese bureaucracy had a lot of latitude and therefore could implement long range plans. They didn't have to wrestle every year with questions of how much procurement should be allowed in that year, which always impinges on your future plans. They had a plan and were able to stick to it.

In 1991, we worked a new agreement in which the Japanese accepted a larger financial burden for the cost of locally employed labor, intra-Japan communications and some other costs. These were really extensions of concepts that had been in effect or had been discussed for some time. The main difference between the situation in the Philippines and Japan was that in the first place, all we had was base negotiations, while with Japan much of the discussion centered on its role in a coalition if hostilities were to break out. In the Philippines, our main political concerns were to adjust our base requirements to the local political sensitivities; there was no question of burden sharing. The issue was how much we had to pay to keep the bases. In Japan, we did not pay for our facilities; on the contrary, if a problem arose, usually the Japanese would resolve it by increasing their share of the costs of our military presence.

I had an excellent relationship with General Davis, the commander of U.S. forces in Japan. He was extremely helpful. He was very thoughtful. I think we were both helped by having an outstanding officer in Okinawa, wing commander _____. He had had two previous tours in Okinawa and could speak a little Japanese. His wife was Chinese-American. He was sensitive to the kinds of issues which arise in a situation where we have a large presence, not always welcomed by the natives. He managed to communicate to his troops the urgent need for strong discipline; he did that not only at staff meetings, but whenever he had a chance to talk to the lower echelons. While I was in Tokyo, we did not have to confront some of the tough base issues that have arisen in the last few years. Before I got to Japan, the USS Tower fired on a Japanese ship; after I left a similar accident happened in Tokyo harbor, but fortunately all was quiet while I served as ambassador. This is not saying that we did not have problems arising from GI (a U.S. Government soldier) behavior, but they were all rather minor and manageable.

The other major difference between the Philippines and Japan was that when I was in the former, it was during the height of the Cold War—e.g. a Korean airliner was shot down by the Soviets—requiring maximum vigilance whereas by the time I arrived in Japan, the

Cold War was winding down and that made considerable difference to politico-military issues.

The problem faced by the Bush Administration was that with end of the Cold War, it had to face considerable domestic pressure for *pell-mell* demobilization of the sort we engaged in after WWII (World War II). The Bush Administration, in order to try to pre-empt that, came up with a strategy for East Asia which called for a periodic review of the political situation in the region and consequentially, what U.S. forces would be required to protect our interests. If cuts seemed justified, we would consult with our allies to make sure that our withdrawal was done judiciously to avoid any unintended consequences. After the first of these reviews, Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney came to Tokyo to brief the Japanese; there were no surprises because the Japanese knew pretty well what cuts were being considered—mainly headquarters reductions which affected about 5,000 troops. Since the process had carefully taken Japanese concerns into consideration, the cuts didn't cause any ripple in Tokyo. It was assumed that we would make these reviews every two or three years; there was one further review before I left. The cuts that were proposed in 1992 focused on Korea, but they were suspended in light of North Korea's experimentation with nuclear and missile weaponry. Then a new administration came along and the periodic review process came to an end—to their subsequent regret, I should note because I think the new administration messed up the relationship with Japan for the first year or so; that relationship is always delicate and needs the right touch. So, at the height of our concern for nuclear development in North Korea, it saw the need to stabilize our relationship with Japan and it set a floor of 100,000 troops which we committed ourselves to keep in Japan for the following 20 years. That was an entirely different approach; we froze troop levels which was quite different from the approach of the Bush Administration which recognized that troop levels might well vary from time to time, depending on the international situation. These fluctuations would have been perfectly acceptable as long as the levels were the result of negotiations and therefore had the concurrence of the Japanese.

I should add that an embassy's relationship to the Department of the Treasury has become increasingly important, and in some cases becomes perhaps even more critical than the relationship with the military and the intelligence communities because with the globalization of finance, the Treasury (Department of the Treasury) is talking confidentially to its foreign counterparts all over the world. There is of course a good rationale for making that dialogue as private as possible and at the highest levels only; if the subject, for example, is exchange rates, the fewer people who are privy to those exchanges, the better—even if it cuts out the chiefs of mission. But the problems arise when the senior Treasury (Department of the Treasury) officials have established these confidential channels, that they would be used for matters on which the chiefs of mission should be informed. Treasury in addition to its responsibilities for exchange rates also had other major interests with Japan, many of them very sensitive.

It is impossible to monitor the Federal Reserve Board; that is a problem in a country like Japan where the FRB (Federal Reserve Board) and its Japanese counterpart—the Bank of Japan— had institutionalized relations, but not nearly as great a problem as the

discussions between the FRB (Federal Reserve Board) and the European Central Banks—now only one—because in that case, the FRB (Federal Reserve Board) chairman could get on a plane, complete his business and be back in Washington late the same day or early the next morning. To do the same thing with Japan, it takes several days which reduces the incentives for face-to-face negotiations. Mr. Greenspan only came once during my four years in Tokyo.

I must say that I had some qualms about our approach to Japanese economic policy; I don't know that I would have become so deeply immersed in it. But since we had decided to go down that path, I thought the best I could do was to try to diminish the degree to which it had become a one-sided process, which only increased resentment and opposition. So, I concentrated on trying to make these discussions two-way streets so that the Japanese could raise questions concerning some of our policies with which they had problems. I think that helped to balance to some degree the intrusiveness of our approach. Most of the issues we raised cut pretty close to Japanese domestic habits—issues which normally would not have been part of bilateral negotiation. It is a fact that if trade is being discussed, it is hard to avoid such issues as tariffs or other barriers, mostly in the regulations, to free exchange of commodities. These barriers were part of the Japanese domestic fabric, but they seriously impinged on free and open trade. In the end, the discussions were manageable; they were tricky, but I think we managed to mute the nationalistic tendencies of certain segments of Japanese society and even made some progress in opening the Japanese markets. It was a tough sell, but we tried to manage by providing a wealth of information on certain proposals initiated by the Japanese which made them more acceptable since they had come from Japan and not off-shore. Several of these suggestions were made to rectify some perceived problems in Japanese society, so they weren't just gratuitous suggestions. They came from a host of different sources; some from academia, some from national commissions, some from individuals; that made the negotiations either because we could not be accused of trying to force solutions down Japanese throats—since many were their own formulations. We would say that such and such a proposition had been suggested by some Japanese professor; the Japanese representatives might not consider us as authorities, but here were the views of a leading Japanese authority.

Q: *In your book, you allude to the difficulties that the Japanese bureaucracy has in reaching hard decisions. Why is that?*

ARMACOST: I am not sure it is really harder for them than it is for any other bureaucracy. Japan is a conservative country. It tends to rely on consensus, which normally had to be pretty broad. That is a factor that slows up decision making, but it also speeds up implementation. The implementers were involved in the decision and supported it; therefore, they made sure that it would be implemented as rapidly and as conscientiously as possible. The Japanese bureaucracy is different from ours in two respects at least: a) it is much more powerful because the political leadership is weak thereby largely leaving to the bureaucrats the management of the government, for example, the bureaucrats drafted all the laws, using very expansive language which allowed them a lot of leeway in the interpretation which the bureaucracy did, rather than

the courts as it is in our case; and b) the ministries are highly compartmentalized. The laws that created the ministries gave tremendous powers to the minister, which is more a fiction than a reality because ministers come and go rather quickly in Japan leaving the permanent bureaucracy all the power that was assigned to the minister. In Japanese law, accountability is put on the cabinet officer, not the prime minister; so, the ministers not only are powerful within their own realm, but their views can only be over-ruled by cabinet consensus. But in a cabinet meeting, a minister will guard his or her "turf" jealously; therefore, there is an inhibition built in against a cabinet overturning the views or decisions of any single member. So, it is very difficult for a prime minister to marshal the support of a cabinet if he wishes to overturn the ruling of one of the ministers.

This was one of the problems we ran into during planning consultative meetings. We had plenary meetings which were attended by representatives of a variety of ministries to discuss issues which were in the province of a single ministry. The Japanese hated this system; the Ministry of Finance could not stand having the Ministry of Post-Telecommunications or the Ministry of Health sitting in on discussions on tax or budget policies—issues which they thought were exclusively in its domain. The fact that these ministries are so autonomous in specific spheres makes it impossible or very difficult at least to talk about trade-offs which we were proposing which involved two or more ministries. But I don't know for sure if in fact the Japanese have a more difficult time with these cross issues than other governments. I should note that since I left, the Japanese bureaucracy, in light of its miserable management of the economy, including a series of scandals, has lost much of the people's respect and consequentially, its confidence. That even further slows down the decision-making process; decisions which it made quite readily, have now become much more difficult for the bureaucracy. This indecision has created a power vacuum which is not being filled by the politicians. They are weak and not accustomed to making decisions or public policy; their job is to pass the laws that the bureaucracy has drafted and to help certain groups through the regulations maze while they collected contributions.

Q: *In your book, you discuss the CODEL (Congressional Delegations) and secretarial visits. What conclusion have you reached about what makes for a successful visit?*

ARMACOST: I didn't have many secretarial visits. I think that Jim Baker approached his job as secretary of state on the premise that he should focus his personal time on those matters which he could personally influence. This is just my speculation; neither he nor anyone else has ever said that, but that was my observation. During my tour in Tokyo, the Cold War was coming to an end and we were engaged in a war in the Persian Gulf. It is not surprising that the secretary of state during this period would devote the major portion of his time to east-west issues or the Middle East.

Our policy toward Japan had a close relationship to those events in other parts of the world. But our meetings with Japanese officials had always been highly choreographed; they tended to plan every meeting down to the most minute detail—particularly what each side says to each other. So, you can see why a secretary of state, concentrating as he was on other parts of the world and not liking being restricted to "talking points" that his

staff had prepared, might be reluctant to take the time to travel to Tokyo. During my tenure he was there only twice. The first time was a multilateral meeting and therefore his time for Japanese issues was limited to a matter of hours. The second time he came it was in connection with a forthcoming presidential visit. So, each of Baker's stops in Tokyo were brief and I couldn't really draw any conclusions about secretarial visits from those two instances.

The CODEL (Congressional Delegations) visits were also very infrequent. That really surprised me. I had a number of visits by individual members of Congress, but not as many as one might have expected given Japan's importance. There were a number, like Senators Rockefeller and Bingham, who visited periodically in connection with some economic issue in which they had a personal interest. In Rockefeller's case, he wanted to sell West Virginia coal; Bingham was interested in technology issues. Other than that, we did have some other visitors, but CODELs (Congressional Delegations) were conspicuously absent—I think they preferred to go to Berlin to be photographed standing in front of the crumbling wall or to the Persian Gulf to be photographed with the troops. Tokyo was an expensive town; the issues were often contentious and furthermore, it really was off the beaten track. So, I didn't see many CODELs (Congressional Delegations). When I would return to Washington, I would spend a couple days walking the halls of Congress badgering members to come to Japan. I got many promises, but few deeds. That was regrettable because I think it deprived Congress of a good understanding of what we were trying to do. It was hard to develop that understanding if a person did not see what was happening right on the ground. So, I was anxious to have more congressional visitors; I have always felt that such visits are valuable to fortify people's understandings of what we were trying to accomplish. Once they have visited, it is much easier to get support with just a quick meeting or even just a phone call. So, I was very sorry we didn't have more CODELs (Congressional Delegations). I think that this unfortunate situation was also due to a general reduction in congressional travel resulting from some unfavorable publicity that some of these trips—the "junkets" —generated.

When Clinton won the election in 1992, I did submit my resignation, as all ambassadors were requested to do. Some people were asked or on their own were asked to leave their posts before January 20th. Others did not get that request; they were asked whether they would be willing to stay a little longer. I was told that I might have to stay for several months because it was not likely that the new administration could fill my job very quickly. I think they had some difficulty agreeing on a new ambassador. Time passed; finally, the administration remembered that a summit meeting was to take place in Tokyo in July and it didn't want a charge' at the embassy at that time. So, they asked me to extend my tour, although it was never very clear for how long they wanted that to last. I knew it was at least through the summit, but I had no idea what would happen beyond that. I had already decided that I was going to leave the Foreign Service. I didn't want to stay in Tokyo until winter because I wanted to return to academia or a related institution, which would have been hard after the summer. Eventually, I told them I would be leaving by a date certain—one week after the end of the summit—because the appointment process seemed to be drifting without resolution. I had a good deputy—Bill Breer—who would have been a very competent charge'.

In the meantime, the administration was exploring other assignments for me. They asked me whether I would be interested in being the Bosnia negotiator or going as ambassador to Israel. There were several different possibilities, but I had made it clear that I was going to retire and that I really was not interested in any further governmental jobs. I think the new administration would have kept me; as a matter of fact, shortly after my retirement—three months after—Strobe Talbott, called me to tell me that I was on a very short list of candidates for the deputy secretary job. He almost left me with the impression that the list might only have one name on it. He wanted to know if I were asked, whether I would accept the job. I told him that I had just retired and that I was not looking for a job. If I had wanted to stay with the government, I would not have retired. I had to leave; I was tired and had to recharge my batteries somehow. I then suggested that he, Strobe, would be a fine candidate for the deputy position. I thought that he knew the international affairs business well and he was closely connected to the new president. That seemed to me to make him eminently qualified.

I thought that ended any conversation concerning my returning to government. But about three weeks later, I got a call from Secretary Warren Christopher asking whether I would reconsider my position. He said that they were looking for an "Eagleburger" to take some of the load off the secretary. Cliff Wharton was the deputy at the time; so, it was even more surprising that I would be called again. I told Christopher that I didn't regard myself as an "Eagleburger"; later I gave that terminology further thought and remembered that Eagleburger had grown up in a very Republican administration. He had been a great professional, working equally superbly for Democratic and Republican administration, but there was no doubt where his sympathies laid. He had been out of the Department (Department of State) for about six years, making a lot of money, but came back when asked; he felt comfortable with the new team that he joined and therefore had no problem defending the administration's positions. I had been a life-long Republican, although not particularly partisan. I would not have been comfortable defending the Clinton policies across the board. I felt that I had done the undersecretary's job well enough; under the way Shultz had organized the seventh floor. In those circumstances, the undersecretary's job was a better fit for me than the deputy secretary's, given my interests.

So, the offer made by Christopher presented me with a serious dilemma. I respected the secretary based on his previous service. Furthermore, when a secretary calls and offers you his deputy job, it requires considerable consideration; in fact, it is hard to say "No." I told him that I would think about. Then Christopher asked me whether I would take a call from Dave Gergen, who was then at the White House. I said "Of course" and Dave did call. He wanted me to know that the president was personally interested in me taking the deputy position, but that Clinton did not want to put me in a position where I would agree solely because the president had asked me to do so. That was the opening I was looking for; it gave the excuse to refuse the offer again. I had met Clinton only once, when he attended the Tokyo summit meeting. We had gotten along well at that time, but I really did not want to go back into government.

I might just add a couple words about the summit meeting itself. My main connection

with it was during the preparation for it when we had the usual sizeable advance team in Tokyo. I had very mixed feelings about remaining as ambassador during the summit because my experiences with these meetings had not been the most pleasant. I mentioned earlier that the presidential visit to Manila was canceled after the Aquino assassination. It is not usual for an ambassador to watch the president of another country practically burst in tears when bad news was brought to him, but that was certainly Marcos' reaction. Then I was ambassador when President Bush visited Tokyo. You will recall that he got sick during the state dinner which was not a pleasant experience for any of us. So, the summit meeting would have been the third presidential visit that I would have been involved in while overseas. My experiences with the first two were not great, although the cancellation of the visit to Manila was a boon. The advance teams are always a burden trying to decide what to do, but since I was leaving Tokyo, I left the details to Bill Breer, my deputy. He had the patience to deal with those problems. As far as substance was concerned, since this was a multilateral meeting, the embassy did not have a large role to play in preparing the president and the secretary for that.

There was a small amount of the president's time devoted to bilateral issues, on a day when the summit was not meeting. Some of his time that day was devoted to giving a speech at Waseda University; we had a reception for him. He had a breakfast meeting with Suharto of Indonesia, undertaken at the request of the Japanese who were trying to assuage Suharto's ego since he had been barred from participation in the summit. That scheduling created a little bit of a problem because the president chose that morning to try to call the family of a young Japanese who had been tragically killed in Louisiana during Halloween. He was delayed in getting the call through which just further aggravated Clinton's inability to stick to a schedule. So, Suharto, who had been a president for about 35 years longer than Clinton, had to cool his heels at the residence for about 25 minutes. As Clinton saw it, the meeting with Suharto came off well and therefore we were viewed with some favor.

The bilateral issue that came up was the framework for economic talks that were scheduled to take place later. The administration chose to pursue quantitative measurements to look at the trade balances—imbalances, really. I didn't support that approach, but happily I was not involved in negotiations. The new economic team was in Tokyo for the summit. It returned later several times, usually headed by Charlene Barshefsky, Alan Blinder, and others. They were capable and experienced people; they listened to us, but they had their own agenda, as most new administrations have. Like other new administrations, they did not rely on the people on the ground, but they did listen to us and although they didn't dismiss our advice out of hand, they had a different approach. We had left them with enough problems in the economic/trade area that I am sure they felt that a new approach was not unreasonable. But I can't say they had any more success than their predecessors. They did create a lot more friction, but I don't think the fundamental issues have yet to be resolved. I am not sure that there will ever be a resolution satisfactory to us; the Japanese have their ways of doing things and we ain't going to change them.

Q: *Do you have any thoughts, with hindsight, about your career in the Foreign Service*?

ARMACOST: I found that career exhilarating and rewarding. Much of it I think was due to just plain dumb luck. I had the fortune of coming into the government on a fellowship, which then turned into a career. I must say one assignment led to another in ways that I could never have imagined. I never regretted leaving academia. Sometime during my career, I remember saying to my wife Bonnie that I was enjoying what I was doing and that as far as I was concerned, I would happy to continue in government service as long as interesting assignments kept popping up—at least until I was getting near retirement. I didn't want to end my career just sticking around waiting for my annuity. That is why I always felt that I had a great advantage having another career home—academia. I am not sure how realistic that was after having been gone from there for ten years or so, because once you have left the teaching world for an extended period, it is not so easy to be let in again. But I always felt that I had an option—a view that gave me independence. If I were to be asked to undertake an assignment that was not appealing, I felt I could always have walked away from it. Fortunately, this choice never arose; I had one great assignment after another. The only reason I retired at all was because at 56, I thought I had the best jobs the Foreign Service had to offer; I really wasn't interested in another ambassadorial assignment just for the sake of being an ambassador again. The overseas assignments I had were unusually challenging; they were in countries where the American ambassador had some influence, regardless of the person, because the United States had considerable sway over the well-being of the country. That was particularly true in the Philippines; Japan was exotic enough so that unlike in most other major posts, a lot of senior people recognized that they didn't know as much as someone who lived there and had followed that country over an extended period as I had. So, the second guessing was minimal; the embassy's views were given very serious consideration not only because of its expertise, but also because the president and the secretary had many urgent matters on their plates, we were given latitude in the management of U.S. (United States)-Japan relations that normally would not be permitted. So, after Manila and Tokyo, there could not have been any ambassadorial assignment that would have matched them in interest and challenge. I didn't have a personal agenda which would have called for more ambassadorial assignments; furthermore, I was at the age when I thought I could have a satisfactory career in some other field.

As far as the deputy secretary ship was concerned, I really felt that I was not the right person for that job. I always felt that to do a job satisfactorily, one had to have a sense of enthusiasm about your work. Having watched the deputy secretary working 15-18 hours a day, I knew that it would be very difficult arising every day with the necessary enthusiasm, particularly if you had to defend domestic and international policies with which one might not agree, as probably would have been true in my case. It would have been a disservice to both the administration and myself. Furthermore, I had reached a time in my life when I wanted to do something else, particularly since I had retired from government service and was ready to move on. But I never had any regrets about my life in the government and especially the Foreign Service; my assignments were all good, which I ascribe primarily as I said to pure dumb luck.

I was very fortunate joining the Foreign Service laterally. I took the Foreign Service

exam while in graduate school; had I entered the Service (Foreign Service) at that time—1962—I would have been sent to Vietnam. That was not a very attractive prospect. I always felt that I was fortunate to have had another career in the private sector, which, as I said, I could have fallen back on if necessary. I have been asked whether I would advise young people to enter the Service (Foreign Service) as a career. Based on my experience, I would advise them to have another career first although I recognize that opportunities today for lateral entry are very limited with the Service down-sizing as it is. Also, the average age of new entrants has increased dramatically; new junior officers assigned to Manila and Tokyo were closer to 30 than they were to 20. I think that has changed the Service (Foreign Service) a lot and as far as I am concerned, has made it less attractive. The Department (Department of State) is disparaged now; the Foreign Service does not marshal a lot of support in Congress. With graduate students having a larger and larger choice of careers with an international content—for example, investment banking, nongovernmental organizations—the attraction of government service is diminished. I think the Congress and administrations have done a lot to strip away the respect and prestige that the Service (Foreign Service) had once upon a time; it is harder today for a Foreign Service officer to have a sense of mission and fulfillment. A young person can have a sense of purpose in another career at remuneration greater than he or she would be receiving from the Service (Foreign Service). So, the competition for young blood has greatly increased for the Foreign Service by careers which may be psychologically just as rewarding in institutions that are more hassle free and much less bureaucratic. I feel that I entered the government in the best of all possible worlds—the late 1960s—when it was still involved in major activities which were very meaningful. My colleagues all had a sense of mission and were great to work with. The political appointees were also very capable; so that I had the best circumstances possible which a young officer today may not find.

Q: *Let me just briefly now turn to your present job as President of the Brookings Institute, one of the pre-eminent "think tanks" in the United States. First of all, in what aspects of foreign relations is Brookings interested?*

ARMACOST: We cover all major issues facing this country. With a small staff, we can't of course give full coverage to all aspects, so we tend to focus on those areas in which we have particular competence. The program of the Institute (Brookings Institute) has changed substantially since my arrival. When I came, I found that the work Brookings was doing in foreign policy field was rather theoretical—cooperative security, sustainable development, equity issues. I thought that interesting as this work might be, it did not have any great applicability to current concerns. The work was not very helpful to the policy makers who were wrestling with actual problems. So, we wanted to refocus the program back to its originals purposes concentrating on ideas and instruments of foreign policy in a few regions that were important to the United States and where we could develop enough of an expertise to potentially assist the policy makers. So, we changed the staff almost completely and concentrated on South-East Asia and Europe, dropping whatever we had been doing on Latin America and Africa. We did some work on the Middle East with Richard Haas and _____. But we don't have full time staff members devoted to that area as Bill Quandt used to be. We have a great corps

of people working on South-East Asia and a growing group working on Europe. We have some capability on defense issues; we are trying to rebuild our competence in the arms control area. So, we now have a more traditional operation focusing on current actual problems.

I think that the role that a "think tank" plays will vary from time to time. Occasionally, it will come up with a big idea which may change entirely the way people look at a problem. That is relatively rare. We can and do offer thoughtful comments on Syrian issues, which I think gave us some credibility. I don't know how an influential role we play, but I think we had an impact on Bosnian policy because we raised questions about the means that the administration was using, forcing it to look at other, and we believe, more effective options, including military ones. We created a climate of opinion which forced the administration to review and change course. We offer a pool of people who are well qualified to take on senior positions. So, when an administration changes, we have a staff from which the new team can choose candidates for key jobs. We have made a major effort to recruit some younger people in their 30s, who are very bright and would do well in positions at the deputy assistant secretary levels. We are also prepared to use people from a former administration who are able to hone their skills and knowledge further. Brookings can also serve as a haven for those who need a breather from a very demanding career. These people have thoughtful reflections on their experiences which they never had an opportunity to express; Brookings can give them that chance.

We don't have any illusions that we will change the world, but we hope that occasionally we will come up with that big idea that will be very influential. What we can provide is a thoughtful institution staffed by people who have been involved and know the pitfalls as well as the opportunities. They can bring a different perspective because they are not overwhelmed by their in-boxes and the daily operational requirements which are so time consuming. I know when I was in government, I cherished the time I had to spend with thoughtful people outside the bureaucracy—e.g., Bill Barnett, Phil Trezise, Bill Quandt, and Ed Fried—experienced hands in foreign policy who at the time had a little more time to reflect on current events and challenges. In return, they increased their knowledge about what was going on, which was valuable to them. I think these dialogues were probably more helpful to me and the bureaucracy than the research that "think tanks" undertake.

Brookings is not in an adversarial relationship with government. We are non-partisan. Our contribution has always been to efforts to improve governmental operations. We are unlike the Heritage Foundation, for example, which works on an ideological basis and therefore would be adversarial to some administrations and an extension of other administrations or the Progressive Policy Institute that represents points of views at the other extreme of the political thought spectrum or the CATO Institute which looks at issues from a libertarian point of view. We don't operate that way. Brookings was founded during a progressive era when people thought that if you properly applied the laws of social science, there was always a better way to do things. So, its founding was not ideological, but based on the conviction that governmental processes could be improved. That allowed Brookings to hire Republicans and Democrats and give advice to

any administration on how processes could be improved—if its advice was followed. So, we don't see ourselves in competition with any administration; we may suggest different approaches on specific issues which an administration may regard as unhelpful, but that is consistent with our role as a critic. We go to great length to protect our image as independent so that we can play the role of critic without accusation of political bias. We don't do much contract work for the government; we fund our research from private support and want to keep it that way. There was a time when the research revenues were at least 20 percent government derived, but today it is less than 2 percent—in part because we prefer that way and in part because the paperwork involved in getting a government grant is so horrendous that it is hardly worthwhile. Government takes a long time to decide and a long time to disburse; that is not a very inviting prospect. Lots of people do it, but that is not our bag. The present process allows the government to intrude into matters that are best left to the recipients.

Q: *Thank you very much for an insightful and perceptive narrative.*

End of interview