The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
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JANET L. BOGUE

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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is May 18, 2007. This is Tape 1, Side 1, with Janet Lynn Bogue.

Janet, let's start at the beginning. When and where were you born?

BOGUE: I was born in 1955 in Tacoma, Washington, the State of Washington not the City of Washington.

Q: I knew it was going to happen. I have somebody who was born the year I entered the Foreign Service.

BOGUE: My last job in the Foreign Service was handling the new entries. I started to see people who weren't quite born when I came into the Foreign Service, but it was certainly close.

Q: Let's start on your father's side, the Bogue family. Tell me where they came from and what you know about them.

BOGUE: I don't know a lot about them. Some of that family history is a little bit murky. My best understanding is that they were French Protestants who initially settled in the Carolinas. There is an area of North Carolina called Bogue Bay, Bogue Sound, Bogue Inlet. There is a town of Bogue. Apparently, they originally settled in that area and then spread out.

My father's father came from Illinois; they were farmers in Illinois. They had been farmers in Illinois and that area for some generations, because some of his ancestors, I think my grandfather's grandfather, had fought in the Civil War on the Union side and had come from Illinois and Michigan. In fact, one of my Bogue ancestors was killed right here in Virginia, in the famous battle of Cold Harbor, a great slaughter.

Then on my father's mother's side, there was the typical sort of American background: mixed German, French, and a lot of Pennsylvania Quakers on that side of the family.

Q: What did your grandfather on your father's side do?

BOGUE: My grandfather's name was Freeman Bogue. He was raised on a farm, served in France in the Army in World War I. He then returned to the Midwest, married, started a family, and the Depression came along. He traveled with his family out to Seattle where two of his sisters-in-law, his wife/my grandmother's sisters worked as school teachers in

Seattle. They told him there were jobs available in Seattle. He worked as a clerk and bookkeeper/accountant in a lumber shipping company in the port of Seattle. The job doesn't really exist anymore. He would look at a whole lot of logs and compute in his head the number of board feet of lumber that would come out of those, things like that. He would do all those calculations and work it out. He really was retired when I first remember him. He did live to be 96 years old, so I actually had a long association with him.

Q: Great. And your father?

BOGUE: My father was the second of three sons, born to this family. He grew up in Seattle, Washington, and went to public school there. He was in the navy during World War II. He was at the University of Washington as a student, then on active duty with the Navy. The Navy sent him to medical school at the University of Nebraska, in Omaha. He was there when the war ended and was demobilized, but finished his medical studies there. Shortly after doing his residency, he was drafted into the Army for the Korean conflict. Although he had served in the military already, he had not served as a doctor. He had become essentially a new person. So he did his army service in the Korean War.

Q: He did what in the Korean War?

BOGUE: He was actually in Port Townsend, Washington, of all places, at a place called Fort Warden, which is a state park now, not an army installation. He was one of the doctors at the army hospital there.

Then he and my mother settled in a very small town on the Olympic Peninsula called Gig Harbor, a town at the time of about 1,000 people that needed a doctor. He became a general practitioner there. About a year later, my older brother was born, and then I was born. Then there is another younger brother.

Q: How did your mother and father meet?

BOGUE: They went to high school and college together in Seattle. My mother was also raised in Seattle and they both went to Roosevelt High School in Seattle, and then to the University of Washington. Like a lot of middle class kids, they went by streetcar to college and lived at home. They married during the Second World War actually when my father was in the Navy. My mother then accompanied him to Nebraska and worked while he was in medical school.

When they settled in Gig Harbor, she became a housewife for several years, but was very active and involved in local government kind of issues and ended up spending 13 years as the Mayor of Gig Harbor. It was great fun for her.

Q: Let's go back on her side of the family.

BOGUE: Her side consists mostly of immigrants from Sweden who settled in the Midwest, mostly in Nebraska. They initially came from Sweden to Chicago, worked in foundries. Again, the typical American story, until they had some money to buy some farmland. They settled in Nebraska.

Her father had grown up in Nebraska in a big farm family. He went as a young man to Alaska, just kind of on an adventure, to work in Alaska. Then World War I broke out. He enlisted in the Army, and they assigned him to Camp Lewis, which is now Fort Lewis, in Washington State. He liked it there a lot. He really liked it. So when he left the army, he stayed and went to work there, and met and married my grandmother.

My grandmother's family was originally mostly from Canada of English-Scottish descent in Canada, although some of them came down into what is now the United States' part of the Pacific Northwest. She was actually born in Washington when it was still a territory, so one of my four grandparents was actually born in what is now Washington State. She was raised in Tacoma and met and married my grandfather there. They lived their lives mostly in Seattle.

Q: Was she mainly a housewife?

BOGUE: She worked as a young woman. She finished high school. She worked in a jewelry store in Tacoma until their marriage. After the marriage, she was a housewife. She was very active in her church work and did the sort of volunteer work that ladies did in those days.

Q: Let's move now to your mother and father. Speaking of church, was there a particular religion?

BOGUE: Actually, we weren't churchgoers. My mother was raised as an Episcopalian. My father was a Methodist. They did not go to church and they did not have any of their children baptized, because they thought that was a decision we should make later in life. If anything, particularly growing up during the Vietnam years, I sort of felt the influence of what had been one strain in my family, which was Quakerism, and was quite interested, as was my mother, for sometime in Quaker thinking. But we were not raised in a religious household at all.

Q: The other religion, politics: where did they fall?

BOGUE: I would say that when I was a small child that my parents were probably members of what seems to be a vanished species today, which is liberal Republicans. I would say that over time my father stayed there. My mother moved in a more liberal direction. She is still living and is a very much left of center Democrat. They were active in the local community and school board, planning board, city council, that kind of thing. But they were not active on the large scene politically.

I don't mean to jump the gun at all, but it may be the most interesting thing in that sense about my hometown. My hometown of Gig Harbor was settled mostly by immigrants from Croatia. At that time, it was a heavily Croatian town that made its living from commercial fishing. They fished for salmon in Alaska and Puget Sound in the summer. I think that was particularly interesting, more than my parents' involvement in politics. For me, there were still mail order brides coming in the early 1960s, when I was a child, from the former Yugoslavia, from Croatia.

Q: You are probably talking about ladies I sent there. I was in charge of the Consular Section in Belgrade in the mid-1960s. Our whole job was to stop that trade, with singular unsuccess.

BOGUE: One neighbor up the hill was a lady who had come from Croatia. The people in my hometown were mostly from the Island of Brac, which lies off Split, you will remember, one of the large islands. Interestingly, in a parallel development, it used to be a fishing community and is now a tourist community. My hometown used to be a fishing community and is now a very wealthy suburb of Tacoma and a tourist environment. So they have had kind of a parallel evolution.

Q: We will come back to the family. Let's talk a little bit about Gig Harbor. You grew up there, did you? Let's talk about you as a kid, elementary school and earlier. What was it like growing up in Gig Harbor?

BOGUE: I have very fond memories of Gig Harbor. It is a very small town. I think it was probably a very nice environment for a young child because everyone you saw was someone you knew. It was probably a terrible environment for a teenager.

We had a grand time, my brothers and I. We lived sort of like Huckleberry Finn. We lived on about six acres of property. There were woods all around us. It was a small town but in a very rural environment. We were outdoors constantly, doing things like fishing, swimming and goofing around in the woods. I went to the local elementary school and all through the local public school system there. We walked to school when I was in elementary school. It is kind of a lost life now. You would walk to school and walk home, all those kinds of things.

It was a little bit of a throwback even then. I think we were definitely behind neighboring towns. We had no movie theater; we had, I think, one restaurant, one café, and one tavern, but not much in the way of urban attractions. It was still a big deal to go into Seattle across the bridge, paying the toll and driving a long way. It seems like nothing now, but at the time, it was still kind of a big adventure to go to Seattle where my grandparents lived.

Q: Did you become a water kid? Did you have a skiff or something?

BOGUE: We had a little boat when I was a kid. We had a nine-foot sailing dinghy, which you could row or sail. My family had a little boat when I was a small child. We had a 19-

foot, what was called then a runabout. It was an open boat with no cabin, and we took our vacations every summer in the San Juan Islands and the Gulf Islands in Canada. We would camp on the beach, spending about a month up there. My father as a doctor had one requirement for his vacation and that was there would be no telephones anywhere nearby. This of course was long before cell phones came along. So we would go up and camp out and just tool around in our little boat. We definitely became water kids.

My younger brother, who still lives in the Seattle area, has a boat and still does the same thing in summer. He goes to the San Juans. It is much more developed up there now, but he still goes there every summer on vacation.

Q: What is the age grouping of your two brothers?

BOGUE: I have two brothers, one older, one younger. We were all born very close together. One born in 1953, I was born in 1955, and my younger brother was born in 1957.

Q: Were you a gang?

BOGUE: We were, in some senses. We were a gang partly because there weren't a lot of other kids in the neighborhood. So, if we didn't play with each other, we weren't going to play with anybody. Like all siblings, we had our elbows out with each other at various times. I have often said that being the middle child and only girl was a great introduction to diplomatic life. There was a lot of negotiating early on. I learned about the value of alliances.

Q: How about family life? You didn't have a lot of outside entertainment. Was there a lot of talk around the dinner table? Did the world intrude? Or how did things look?

BOGUE: It wasn't so much talk around the dinner table, because my father's chair was pretty much wired to the telephone. The minute he sat down, the phone would ring. There wasn't a hospital in our town, so he was the emergency room in a sense. We tended to eat dinner very quickly because of all those things that were happening.

I would like to say a couple of things. One is that my mother was very interested in all things foreign, travel and things like that. When I was a kid, we had some exchange students from Germany stay with us.

Also, and I think that this is in my generation at least a real tie that binds the Foreign Service: we took the National Geographic magazine. Even though we were in a town that didn't have a lot of contact with the outside world in that sense, although our neighbors came from foreign countries, so we were certainly aware of that. We did grow up on the National Geographic, and I have found that among people my age, especially those who come from small towns or rural areas, that had an immense influence on their early childhood. I am proud to say that this afternoon, I am participating in a National Geographic event, their so-called BioBlitz of Rock Creek Park, where they inventory all

the species in Rock Creek Park in 24 hours. I still feel an abiding loyalty to National Geographic all these years later.

Q: My son works as a consultant to National Geographic. Of course, I am of a certain age where my first pictures of women's breasts came out of National Geographic.

BOGUE: I think that was probably true for my brothers as well.

Q: It is a major world institution that has opened up; it is a very important publication. It certainly has its influence, I think, on the diplomatic community worldwide.

BOGUE: Could I throw in one more thing about the National Geographic, because this is one of those ways in which, you don't realize it, but it has a huge influence on your life later.

One of my parents' neighbors when they first moved to Gig Harbor was a couple named Alf and Frieda Jerstad. They were both teachers at our high school. I had Mrs. Jerstad for Algebra. Their son was then a college student and star basketball player at the local university. His name was Lute Jerstad. When I was eight years old, in 1963, Lute Jerstad was one of the first Americans on Mount Everest. In 1963, National Geographic sponsored an American expedition on Mount Everest. He was completely our hero of course as children. That is one thing that when you are living in a small town, we were following with intense preoccupation a whole map of the route that came in the National Geographic. We followed very carefully the progress of that climb. It is still a big deal, but it is not an uncommon thing any more to climb Mount Everest. At the time though, this was really only the second expedition after the Hillary expedition. Lute was one of the four, who summited and came back to Gig Harbor. My father had a convertible, an immense act of optimism in the Seattle climate. He drove Lute in the little parade that greeted him. It was all terribly exciting. I ended up serving in Nepal many, many years later. We will get to that at some point. But Lute came over with his grandson and we actually trekked up to Everest Base Camp together, which was really something.

Q: Janet, both you and I got enmeshed in Balkan or Yugoslav politics, during different eras. I ask this with a certain amount of real curiosity. How did the Croatian element play in your town?

BOGUE: First of all, it is interesting that at that time, I am talking now in the 1960s, they identified themselves as Yugoslavs, not Croatians specifically. They were from the Dalmatian Coast, the Island of Brac. For instance, there was a social club that was called the Yugoslav Hall. There were certainly Croatians; there may have been a Slovene or two thrown in there, but mostly Croatians. There was not this firm definition of themselves in that sense until more recent years and events had transpired. Of course, at the time, Tito was still very much alive. I was very much aware that the people who had immigrated to the United States, starting in the 1920s really to my town, were very much anti-Tito, anti-communist. There was certainly that aspect of it.

I got very interested in all things Balkan from having grown up in this town. When I later, fast-forwarding just a little, was doing a junior term abroad in college in Vienna, I took the spring break to go to Brac and see what the island was like. I think when I was in the Foreign Service later and applied to learn Croatian and go to Belgrade, people said, "Learn Russian and go to Russia. That's where the action is." I was adamant that no, I was really very interested in Yugoslavia. Of course, I had no idea that some years later, it would become a real growth industry, in the most unfortunate sense.

Q: Nothing in the Foreign Service is better than to have a horrible crisis in your area of specialization.

BOGUE: Suddenly, there is a demand for people who have area expertise and language skills.

Q: Speaking of this, how much did you … the work of fishermen, particularly ones who go up to Alaska, one hears about how it is probably the most dangerous trade in the world. Was that part of the town? Or were they fishing in safer waters?

BOGUE: I think they were mostly salmon fishermen, only a few did halibut fishing which is probably the most dangerous. I think I've got this right. It tends to be in the deeper, further offshore waters. I don't remember a fatal fishing accident among my townspeople when I was a child. I don't recall any fatalities. I recall certainly people breaking bones, losing fingers. It is a really hard job. I also remember, in the way children remember things, immense astonishment at realizing that some of them did not know how to swim, on the theory that when you went over, you were just basically dead. You went off the boat, you were dead. It didn't matter if you could swim or not because the water is so cold and you are wearing so much gear.

It was a difficult life and it was a very precarious economic existence as well. Some years were great and people made a lot of money. Some years were terrible. Essentially, except for odd jobs people could pick up in the winter, carpentry or something, they had to live for a year off the summer catch. Someone once asked my mother what the economy in Gig Harbor was during the winter months. She said, "Well, we sell each other gas and stamps." There wasn't much to do in the winter.

Q: Let's go to school. In the first place, were you much of a reader?

BOGUE: Completely. I started wearing glasses when I was very small to read. My older brother taught me how to read when I was three as a surprise for my mother. So I learned to read very early and I was, and remain to this day, an immensely devoted reader. I read everything I could get my hands on: from the back of cereal boxes to my father's medical magazines that I couldn't begin to understand at that age. I loved to read things.

Q: In the first place, where did you get your books? Was there an equivalent to a Carnegie Library nearby?

BOGUE: Actually my parents were very involved in the founding of a library in Gig Harbor, the first one. My parents had a lot of books at home. I remember very vividly complaining to my mother one day that I was bored. She pointed at a whole shelf of books and said, "When you have finished reading those, you can tell me you are bored. As long as there are books in the house that you have not read, you are not bored." We had a lot of books at home. We also participated in a lot of those young people's book clubs: the Young American Book Club, Scholastic Book Club, those kinds of things where you got new books every month.

Q: Did you read the Foreign Service Manual for potential female Foreign Service Officers, in other words, the Nancy Drew series?

BOGUE: Absolutely, I am a huge fan of Nancy Drew. I love Nancy Drew. I read all of those. And because I had brothers, I read all the boys' ones too. I read the Hardy Boys, Tom Swift, and all those. Secretly, once in a while, they would read Nancy Drew, as long as I promised not to tell anyone at school. Now it is in my oral history. I absolutely read every single thing I could.

Q: Looking back, was there any book or series of books that you might say was influential; that kind of opened your eyes?

BOGUE: I am not sure that there was any one. There were books I read, and read, and read again. Interestingly, a Foreign Service colleague and friend, Bea Camp, who is principal officer in Chiang Mai now, we had a moment of epiphany one day when we realized we had read the same books over and over and over again as children.

They were by a Hungarian author named Kate Seredy. I am not sure I am pronouncing it right because it is a Hungarian name. She wrote two books about the children in a family growing up in Hungary before, during and just after World War I. One was called *The Good Master*, and the sequel was called *The Singing Tree*. I remember reading them over and over and over again. And so did Bea, interestingly enough. They were definitely chick books; my brothers did not read those.

The books my brothers read over and over, and I with them, and our mother had read them to us and then we all read them again, were the children's classics. We loved *Treasure Island*. I still love *Treasure Island*. And *Kidnapped*, and all those kinds of books that generally appeal a little bit more to boys. But my brothers and I were just crazy about them all.

Q: How about elementary school? What sort of subjects grabbed you and didn't?

BOGUE: I really liked everything in elementary school. I loved going to school. I was just a complete little nerd at school. I was so happy at school, learning things.

I should say that was not true in the first grade when my parents sent me to a private girls' school in Tacoma, which I hated. I hated every minute of it. Then I was transferred from the second grade on to our local public school.

Q: What was your local public school like?

BOGUE: Very small. Again, it was a large rural district so some children, not me, had to come miles and miles on the bus to school every day from far-flung areas. There was not an anticipation in the school that children would necessarily go on to university. I would say probably most did not.

Q: Were these farming folk?

BOGUE: Fishing folk, some farming folk, some worked in logging and other forest kind of industries there. There were not many so-called "white collar" jobs in my town. My dad had one. The teachers had others. They were definitely working class, middle class, lower middle class people.

My memories of the teachers are very positive, wonderful teachers. I have one of those incredibly vivid memories that I was in the sixth grade when President Kennedy was assassinated. Our teacher told us that he had been killed. This was a huge impact because most of my classmates were Catholic, because this was mostly a Croatian-American town. Of course, the election of Kennedy as a Catholic, the first Catholic to be President, was immensely exciting. It was a public school and it was during one of the big early debates about prayer in public school. I remember Mrs. Eaton, my teacher, saying that first of all, we didn't know the fate of the President at that point, just that he had been shot. She said, first of all she thought everyone would understand if people wished to say to themselves a prayer for the President, but that she would ask that we also said a prayer for the person or persons and their families who had committed the assassination. I remember how powerfully that struck me. I am thinking, here I was in a little dinky rural school, miles from nowhere. I think it was a very enlightened teacher, who probably had a bigger influence on me than I realized at the time.

Q: Did you like writing early on, and all that?

BOGUE: Yes, I was definitely more of a verbal than a math person. My older brother is a tremendous mathematician and a real math brain. I was much more on the reading and writing side.

Q: Did you have spelling bees?

BOGUE: Oh, yes.

Q: How were you?

BOGUE: I loved them. I was very good at spelling.

Q: I would have hated you. It was always nasty little girls.

BOGUE: It was always girls, I know. Girls memorized those little sheets.

Q: It took me a long time before computers came along to take care of that.

BOGUE: Now, I loved writing my lists of spelling words. It was definitely a girl thing.

Q: Just to capture: were there girls and guys?

BOGUE: Certainly not in elementary school and even in junior high. It was partly because we all grew up together in a small community. Girls have a little bit of an advantage physically because they grow earlier. I remember in the sixth grade, for instance, when we used to play softball, by far the best player on our team was a girl, Nancy Jerkovic, a good Croatian name you will recognize. She was way taller and stronger than anyone else. I had a few glory years when I could throw a football further than either of my brothers, who are now great tall, six foot six inch guys. I just sprouted earlier as girls do and so, we could still sort of play and the kind of things you still want to do in grade school. Everyone wants to be playing football and softball. We could all play together in a sort of equitable way. There weren't all the hormones clicking in yet, so you didn't have that. There was not all this kind of separation of guys and girls. I think where it made a difference were things like books, which were really considered, as there were girls' books and boys' books. Then there were books everyone read. Nancy Drew was definitely for girls.

Q: I read Nancy Drew too. Secretly.

BOGUE: Exactly. This was definitely under the covers with a flashlight for the boys.

Q: How about news? How did news get to you all?

BOGUE: We did have a black and white television at home. I know my mother used to watch the evening news, Huntley-Brinkley and all that. We also had radio. We listened to the radio a lot, not in the old fireside chat sense, but just in having it on in the car, having it on at home. My mother would listen in the kitchen. The radio news would be on.

We did take the local Tacoma paper, which was a daily, the Tacoma News Tribune. I would not hold it up as an example of fine journalism, but we did take that. And we took Time magazine, Life magazine. We did a lot more magazine reading. I take very few magazines now.

Q: They had their era.

BOGUE: This was the grand era. Actually I remember that my mother liked to sew. She took Vogue magazine, which came with the fashions and the patterns. I remember

looking at Vogue, growing up in a working class rural town, and saying, "Mom, where do people wear these clothes?" I had never seen anyone as she used to say, in New York.

The first time I went to New York, I was seventeen. Sure enough, there were people wearing those magazine clothes.

Q: I still look at these fashion shows and say, "Well, I don't see them around."

BOGUE: Well, in New York you do.

Q: Junior high, what was it like?

BOGUE: I went to a middle school that had just seventh and eighth grade. I don't remember a lot about middle school except that I participated in a summer program, which was kind of the first kind of travel, experiential learning that I did. We spent the spring term, one class. If you were going to do the summer program, you signed up and spent the term studying Washington State history, geography, geology, industry, crops, the whole thing. Then in the summer, we actually got on a school bus and went all around the state. We slept on gym floors at other schools to keep costs down. It was called Mobile Education, Mobile Ed. The cost was quite minimal because we did stay in schools. We went around and looked at all these things. We went to Grand Coulee Dam.

It was also the first time I ever flew in a plane. A company called Air West, which doesn't exist any more, one of the old Howard Hughes airlines out west, gave us a free flight. It was a low altitude flight, so that we could look from above. I remember I had never been in a plane before. I was terribly motion sick. What I distinctly remember is finally understanding some things about geography. I had never felt that. When seen from the air made perfect sense, but when seen from the ground are very hard to comprehend. I remember how exciting that was to make this trip around and realize how much you had learned being out there.

Q: Being in the State of Washington, did Canada and the Canadian territories ring any bells?

BOGUE: Completely. We spent every summer in Canada in the San Juans and the Gulf Islands. We would cross into Canada and we would visit Victoria and Vancouver Island. I was in Canada much more than I was anywhere else in the United States, outside of maybe Oregon, as a child. I didn't really think of it as a foreign country in any way because British Columbia and Washington State are actually very much alike. Except I remember going to Vancouver and it was the first time I ever saw a man in a turban because they had a Sikh community in Vancouver from the early 1900s. That is something you never saw in Seattle. We had an Asian population, not a South Asian population. That was the first time I ever saw a man in a turban. I was absolutely fascinated by that. Again, it was like something out of National Geographic.

Q: How about California? Was this an attraction where one went for lotus blossoms or something?

BOGUE: We made this boat trip every year. We didn't make a lot of family lengthy car trips, like many Americans do, because we had our boat trip. We did go one year, the Washington Huskies were in the Rose Bowl. This was January 1964 maybe. My parents were UW (University of Washington) alums and loyal Husky rooters. They decided they would go to the Rose Bowl and take us kids along and we would go to Disneyland, which had opened eight years before and was still a huge attraction. We did that. We went to Disneyland. We drove to California and went to Disneyland, and my parents went to the Rose Bowl. And we drove back.

California was seen as an exotic place that had palm trees. It was an amazing thing. Highways, much more developed freeways and highways that we had. Washington State was not so developed.

Q: Was Gig Harbor changing?

BOGUE: Not then. It has changed radically since to become essentially a very wealthy suburban community. Gig Harbor itself was still very much a very small, not very prosperous working class community.

Q: What high school did you go to?

BOGUE: I went to Peninsula High School, the only public high school in our area at the time. My graduating class had fewer than 100, in the 90s, so there were probably about 400 people in the four-year high school. This was during the Vietnam War. Even though it was not in the city, there was a rainbow of students from wanna-be hippies to people who couldn't wait to graduate and join the army, and everybody in between. The way high school culture is everywhere. It divides itself up. I was in the nerdy/good student group.

Q: Did you run across, I guess today we would call it diversity? I am thinking not only of African-Americans, but also Japanese-Americans or Korean-Americans? Can you give me a feel for that?

BOGUE: There were no African-Americans in our community or in our school at that time. There were a lot of African-Americans in Tacoma, largely because of Fort Lewis and also McCord Air Force Base and Bremerton Navy Yards and Naval Base, which were all nearby. But not in Gig Harbor. Again, the dominant ethnic group was recent immigrant Slavs from Croatia. There were also a lot of people of Scandinavian ancestry. There were East Asians, not Koreans really but there were people of Japanese ancestry about whom, I must say, we knew shockingly little about the World War II internment.

My father told me once a friend of his who was also a doctor in Tacoma had been working with him. He said he was born in an internment camp in California. I didn't

really know what they were. I hadn't heard a word about it in school. He had to explain to me the very long and tragic story of the internment of Japanese-Americans.

Q: In high school, you were mentioning the groups. Who were the various groups? Were the battles of the 1960s being fought out particularly there?

BOGUE: A little bit in our very own small way. For instance you will remember the Vietnam War moratorium, the Sam Brown organized day. One group of students, in which I was involved, wore black armbands and at lunchtime, read a list of the names of the young men from the county who had been killed in Vietnam.

Another group of students who considered themselves very patriotic, one of them actually came to school with his dad's hunting rifle. Again, this is a rural area and a lot of families had shotguns and things at home. I remember the incredible shock of someone bringing a gun to school. It was unheard of at the time. He didn't point it at anyone. I'm not sure he even took it out of the truck, but he had a gun. There was a lot of anxiety and discomfort about that. There were fistfights about these things. In the way that high school students usually settle these things, which is mockery and exclusion or inclusion.

I couldn't wait to get out of high school actually. I knew by then, I was old enough to know that there was a world out there, beyond this. All the sort of pettiness or cliquiness of high school wasn't what there was to life. There was something out there that was going to be much more interesting. There was just no way to hit fast forward.

Q: How about dating patterns and things like that? Was there much, or what was going on at the high school?

BOGUE: Do you mean were people dating across groups?

Q: Were there different groups dating? Where did you fit in in this whole thing?

BOGUE: I was not only a complete little student nerd, but I was two years younger than my classmates. Because my brother taught me to read, I had actually started school early.

Q: That can be a problem.

BOGUE: Although I was my current height because I grew early, I was two years younger and socially, sort of, not moving in the older crowd. So I had a few dates in high school but didn't have a steady boyfriend or anything. I hung out with a group of friends who had been friends since we were small children.

Q: How about extra-curricular activities: sports, band, stage, anything like that?

BOGUE: I was on the debate team and the speech team, and had a great time. We traveled all around the state, debating and speaking. It was a lot of fun.

Whatever game was in season: softball, basketball. We played a kind of cross between field hockey and soccer, a game that was, I think, just limited to schools. I have never seen it played outside of a school. We did that or we went bowling or we went on a field trip or something.

Now my family actually did quite a lot of sports. We hiked a lot. My parents loved to hike. We did a lot of hiking. And we skied. My father didn't ski because he saw the bad injuries from skiing, the fracture end of skiing. My mother skied and my brothers and I skied. We did ski as children quite a lot. So we were very active in non-organized, non-school sports.

Q: Because I am trying to capture the period, did you feel at the time you were in high school that because you were a girl, you were off on a different track, not to think too seriously about anything except maybe to go to college and get an Mrs. degree or something like that?

BOGUE: I didn't feel that. You certainly had a gender trapping system at school. Girls had to take Home Ec (home economics). Boys had to take Woodshop and Mechanical Drawing. Girls were not allowed to take Woodshop or Mechanical Drawing, even if they wanted to or had some talents in that direction. It was just, you are not allowed. Obviously, that has all changed now.

I had somewhat the opposite experience in high school. When the teachers got hold of a student who really was academically interesting and intending to go on to university, they tended to work with you a lot. I had a couple of teachers in high school who really spent a lot of time with me, gave me a lot of books from their own library at home to read. Things like that to do in order to keep me stimulated and interested, pushing myself on to other kinds of things to read.

For instance, there was no diversity in our town. One of my English teachers gave me the whole modern cannon of that time of African-American literature to read: *A Manchild in the Promised Land*, *Invisible Man*; all these kinds of things to read. She said, "You are going to go out into the world and you have no background in these experiences. So, read these books. At least you will have some sort of sense of what is going on out there."

So I didn't feel that all this is wasted on you because you are just going to get married anyway. I didn't feel that pressure from my family or from my school either.

I am sure that there was a lot more pressure in every way on the boys. Pressure socially, pressure academically. It was much easier for girls to be a little bit under the radar.

Q: Of course too, the Vietnam War was right there.

BOGUE: Right. And the draft was facing them. A lot of boys in my class enlisted in the military right after high school. They wanted to be in the military, wanted to serve in the war rather than be drafted. That was very much a reality for them.

Q: You graduated in what year?

BOGUE: In 1971.

Q: Outside of Vietnam, did the Cold War intrude, or anything of that nature?

BOGUE: The Cold War intruded in the way that it did for most kids in my generation, which is that we had these bomb drills in school, when you got all under your little child's desk, and then awaited Armageddon. I mean, even as children, we knew it was a little bit ludicrous that this would help. I remember asking my parents once what would happen if a nuclear bomb landed in Gig Harbor. My father saying well, that would be it. You would probably see a big flash of light and it would be over. And my mother saying the thought that anyone would bother to drop in Gig Harbor was a little ridiculous. Of course, as a child, you think you are in the center of the world.

I think there were some things I completely missed. For instance, a boy came to our school when I was in grade school. His name was Paul and he spoke French. He was from Algeria. He was just a new student from a place that I had only heard of because we had one of those games where you had to match the flag with the country. It never occurred to me to question why they had moved to Gig Harbor or why they were not living in Algeria. Of course now that I am an adult, I wish I could go back and find him to hear his story, his parents story. Clearly, they were in fact refugees from Algeria, or something, because of the timing of it. At the time, I had no idea that anything was happening in Algeria. Vietnam, absolutely yes. Cuba, Cold War. Not the kinds of things, even by the time I was in high school; there was Bangladesh, Biafra. I was beginning to have more of a consciousness of those issues around the world.

Q: I assume, given the background of your mother and father, that you were pointed toward university.

BOGUE: It never crossed my mind I wouldn't. I never even asked myself that question. I think there was an expectation of theirs, and something that I had internalized. But also, I wanted to go. I remember a friend of mine saying to me that she went to college because there were more books there than there were at home. She went to graduate school because there were more books there than were in college. I remember just being completely excited with the thought of going to college. I didn't feel that this was a ticket that had to be punched. I thought that this was going to be so much fun for me.

Q: Where were you pointed?

BOGUE: I went to a school that I could commute to. I went to a college called the University of Puget Sound in Tacoma. It is a small liberal arts college with 2,500 students.

I had just turned 16. I was coming out of a town with 2,000 people, and a school of 400. I just felt like a big school was going to be, I didn't know what I wanted to study.

Q: It sounds like a very wise move.

BOGUE: Way overwhelming for this kind of bookish kid from a small town. So I actually just went to school in the next town and lived at home until I went away to study abroad when I was a junior.

Q: Let's talk about the University of Puget Sound. What was it like?

BOGUE: It is a very hands-on teaching place. That is, the faculty does the teaching, including the freshman classes. I had some wonderful faculty members there. At the time, the school was going through a transition from being an okay school to being quite a good school. So the new-hire faculty, the young faculty, were a big step above the faculty that had been there, much more rigorous. Of course, they were very energetic at the start of their teaching careers. I am still in touch with several of those people, and they are not much older than I am really. Especially now that we are all older, the difference has sort of flattened out. I had a very good experience there.

I also discovered that my real joy was the interdisciplinary aspect of it. I remember one day in particular when all four of my classes, through no prior planning, we ended up talking about the excavations at Troy, but from completely different points of view. One in history class, one in an archeology class, one in a German class there was a German named Schleimann who excavated Troy and we were reading about it in German. I can't remember what the other one was; maybe it was a science class or something. It all just happened. It was one of those moments when you kind of start to put your education together and see that it's not just learning a bit here and a bit there, but it's a look at the pieces and putting them together as a whole.

Q: Where was the student body from?

BOGUE: It was largely drawn from two places. One from the Pacific Northwest all the way down into Northern California. It went down to, I would say, San Francisco. And Hawaii. About one in every four students came from Hawaii.

Q: That's interesting.

BOGUE: I think it was partly just a tradition that people knew people who had gone there. It was partly that if you are from Hawaii, it is away from home but it is not all the way to the East Coast, which makes it a very difficult trip. We are already five hours away from the West Coast flying. We had a huge number of Hawaiian students, which included native Hawaiians, Japanese-Chinese-Hawaiians, and mixed.

Q: How did you find it? I am told there is a little problem in Hawaii with the native Hawaiians who don't have quite the same educational ethic as the Japanese or Chinese. Did you find that at all?

BOGUE: I didn't see that at all. This is partly a self-selected group who has come to university. The Hawaiian students were a real presence on campus, because they were like a quarter of the student body. I never saw any difference. I saw individual differences in students, but not group differences.

Q: When we were coming out of the Vietnam War, where were people pointed? What were some of the interests that were going on?

BOGUE: I would say the two biggest issues aside from Vietnam when I was in college were: one was Watergate. I think I was a junior when Nixon resigned. We all spent hours just glued to the television watching the Watergate hearings. And then there was the environment. It was kind of the big age of environmentalism developing. Also to an extent, I guess, was the kind of classic, you might call it, of 1970s feminism – sort of Betty Freidan, Gloria Steinham era was also going on.

In college, we didn't have any of the kind of differences we had in high school in terms of curriculum. Nobody in college said, "You can't take that because you are a girl" or, "You have to take that because you are a girl." It was a coed college. Everything was open to everybody.

Q: One thing I was wondering. In the State of Washington, through this whole period we are talking about, was there sort of an anti-Washington, DC? People up there are causing all sorts of problems, you know?

BOGUE: You know, that is funny. On the side of the state I am from, which is the wet side, the Seattle western wet side, I have never seen that. You see that more in the Rocky Mountain west – Montana, Wyoming, kind of the ranching west. And you see it in eastern Washington, which is ranch and farm country. More, "those government bureaucrats coming in."

It may be partly because there is a huge amount of federal employment in the west.

Q: Tacoma, Bremerton, that whole?

BOGUE: A lot of military people, a lot of federal employment there. So it may be that the attitude toward the federal government was different. I never felt in the part of the country we were from that there was that hostility to the federal government in the same way that you would find it in the Rocky Mountain west and the very deep distrust of government.

Over there, on the Seattle side, we didn't feel that way. I think you would find the same thing if you went down the west coast, if you divided Washington and Oregon.

Q: Even the voting patterns pretty well point that out.

BOGUE: Exactly.

Q: Something just occurred to me. Was Boeing much of a presence?

BOGUE: Huge. One of the interesting things is that Boeing was an overwhelming presence in those days. In those days, the year I graduated from college, one out of every five employed persons in the State of Washington worked for Boeing or a subsidiary of Boeing. When it had its ups, Seattle had its ups. When it had its downs, Seattle had its downs. Nowadays, of course, there is Microsoft, Adobe, Starbucks, Gen Tek, and everybody else is there. But in those days, it was very much a one company town. Of course, a company that is very dependent upon federal contracts.

I tease my brothers because they both work in what were the "old" industries of Seattle. My younger brother is at Boeing, and my older brother works at the University of Washington, which was the other huge employer in Seattle at the time.

Boeing was an immensely dominant force. One of the other interesting things, partly because of Boeing and partly because of shipping and the lumber business, which were the other dominant economies, is that we really were focused on Asia. That is where our trade was. That is where our markets were. I was amazed when I first came to the East Coast that it was so focused on Europe, because we were so focused on the Pacific Rim.

Q: What sort of courses were you taking at the university?

BOGUE: I ended up with a degree in History. That was largely because it kind of encompassed everything. Did you study history at all?

OTHER: No, I am actually a Graphic Design major.

Q: I am a History major.

BOGUE: It kind of took in everything and I wanted to study everything. I took some sciences. I took other social sciences or a lot of English because I enjoyed it. Foreign language: I had started German in high school and I continued with German.

Q: Why German?

BOGUE: Why German? We had only two languages offered at our school: Spanish and German. German was taught by a native speaker just by chance. My mother spoke German. My father had studied German. We had exchange students from Germany staying with us. I think, at that time, German was still sort of the scientific language. They thought it would be a better one to learn than Spanish. So I studied German all through high school and then continued it in college as well.

Q: How was the environment, were there tree huggers in that period? Was this the year of the spotted owl and all that?

BOGUE: It was a little early for spotted owls, which was more in the 1980s. In fact, one of the huge differences I noticed in Washington when I was a kid in high school and college, my brother and I would go hiking up on the Olympic Peninsula. We were always welcomed everywhere. You would go into a little town to get a burger when you came out of your hike. People would want to know where you had been.

Some years later, my sister-in-law and I were hiking, this was sort of post-spotted owl, and we were hiking up on the Peninsula. We came down and went into a little tavern to get a bowl of chili. We were soaking wet. Of course, we had all our gear. We basically were not admitted to the place because we were those city people, hikers, environmentalists, who were ruining their lives. They basically said, "You are not welcome here." This was kind of stunning for me because it was not the environment I had grown up in. Things had become much more polarized.

Q: You hit just about the time when feminism was really cranking up: Ms magazine, the whole thing. How did it affect you?

BOGUE: I felt pretty strongly about it. I certainly was encouraged by my mother and others in the fairness aspect of it. I think one of the big issues at that time was equal pay for equal work. Two people could be hired to do exactly the same job. The man would be paid more because, even if he were not married yet, he would be expected at some point to be supporting a family.

I think I already knew, for instance, friends of our family where the husband had died very young and the wife was supporting the family. This was unfair and she should be given the same amount as a man for the same job. I think that I felt there was a huge unfairness to that aspect of it, or a huge unfairness that people could be prohibited from something.

I must say I also felt the other side of it. I also felt that women had to take on all the same responsibilities as men. I felt very strongly that when there was still a draft that women should be drafted too. I still feel that there should be some form of national service in the United States. It's just my own view, and that women and men should be equally responsible for performing that national service, whether it is military or not.

Q: Did you have, I mean in your reading while you were at college going through this, it was a major change in the whole outlook and the United States was really leading the way in the role of women. Did you have any women role models that you were looking at?

BOGUE: I am trying to think if there was anyone. Because I can't think of anyone in particular, I guess I wouldn't say a particular individual. I certainly read all the women's

studies, which were appearing on campuses. I read the classic books of feminism, The Feminine Mystique, and those kinds of things. I would not say there was one person who ran for office, or there was one person who convinced me that I could do this. I got a lot of encouragement from professors, from peers. I only can think of a few cases in which people said to me, "Well, there is no point embarking on that because you will probably just get married and then you would have to stop anyway." I can remember a few people saying that to me, but no one ever saying that such-and-such is something you cannot do, or are not allowed to do.

At the same time, I think I was probably pretty passive about questioning some things. It didn't occur to me that certain professions or certain roles in the military were closed to women. I was not seeking to enter the military. It didn't occur to me that they should be open. So that was a slower evolution on my part to say, "Well, why shouldn't women be fighter pilots" or "Why shouldn't women do this or that?" Probably my own thinking changed along with the thinking of the country.

Q: Another thing, look at where you ended up. Did foreign affairs, diplomacy, loom at all in your thinking?

BOGUE. No. I didn't know what the Foreign Service was. I didn't ever take a single political science class in my college career. I skipped the part in my history textbooks when it got to the long, drawn out negotiations over the Treaty of Whatever. I just thought, ugh.

Q: You didn't study fishing treaties in the Northwest?

BOGUE: No. There was a lot going on with that, but I didn't study it. In fact, when I got to graduate school, when someone suggested to me that they thought I might be interested in the Foreign Service, I initially, literally, misheard them, and thought they said, "The Forest Service", because I loved to hike and be outside.

I did go abroad as a junior in college and did a study abroad program in Vienna, which I absolutely loved. I think I mentioned before that I took the opportunity to travel to Yugoslavia, still during Tito's time. And I also traveled to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, all behind the Iron Curtain in those days. I found it absolutely fascinating. In a sense, it did loom in that there was clearly an interest there in things international, but I had not in any way connected that with the Foreign Service. I had no idea even what people did. Once my roommate and I spent the night in Salzburg because we had our passports and wallets stolen. We spent the night in the train station until some friends could get us some money. It never dawned on us to go to the Consulate. We wouldn't have known what they did. We really were completely ignorant.

Q: How did you get your passport? What did you do?

BOGUE: We didn't need the passport to get back to Vienna from Salzburg, so we just needed money. We bought our train tickets and we then did find out what people did in

embassies. Actually, I still had my passport. Hers was lost and all her money was gone. Mine must have been in a different pocket.

Q: You didn't show the initiative. I remember when I was in Belgrade two American students left their passports on the train; the train left without them. So they called up George Kennan, our Ambassador and said, "Could you help us?" He referred them to me at about 4:00 a.m. in the morning.

BOGUE: Right no, we had no such thought. We sort of thought it was our responsibility.

Q: Let's talk a little bit about your time there. You were looking at Eastern Europe. Did you come away with any particular feelings, particularly about communist rule and that sort of thing?

BOGUE: Here we were a student group. When you would go over the border, everything would be ripped apart, all your belongings. These are weekend belongings, so you had a rucksack or a little suitcase or something. Everything would be taken out. At that time you will remember, the bad old days when there were all these currency regulations that you had to change a certain amount per day. Then they had to all be changed back or spent because you could not carry a single coin out of the country. Everything, all your pockets had to be turned out. I turned 18 or 19 when I was there. So here I am, a 19 year-old with five guys with machine guns, and I am turning my pockets inside out in case I have a penny with Copernicus on it left over by accident. I remember thinking that it was all so unnecessary. This huge, aggressive thing that was probably unnecessary. But also remembering how down at the heel all those places were.

Vienna was not prosperous then either. It did not have the boom it had in recent years. Vienna looked pretty shabby. So did Budapest. Warsaw looks glamorous now, but it was terrible in those years. Everything was peeling apart, buildings kind of crumbling; nothing had been painted in years. The level of infrastructure breakdown was really overwhelming. That was a huge impression that I went away with.

I went away with the same impression that everybody had in those days. That was, that despite all that, the people we ran into were incredibly friendly. And they all had relatives in the United States in all these places. You know, you meet someone in Poland who says, "My son is in Milwaukee," or "My daughter is in Toronto," and on and on. There was nothing but good will. The disconnect between the good will and the machine guns was severe.

Q: Did Yugoslavia strike you as being any different than that?

BOGUE: Yugoslavia did strike me as different. Partly, their version of a search at the border was to sort of wave at you and ask if you had any cigarettes. You will remember this. It was not what you would call rigorous. Of course, in those years, they prided themselves on being different. Staying on Brac was still… the facilities weren't well developed yet. But again, people were extremely friendly and hospitable.

I'll tell you if I may, one short story that is not about me but that kind of illustrates it.

When I stayed on Brac as a student, I was in line at the post office. A woman behind me tapped me on the shoulder and said, "Are you American?" I said, "Yes." She was a graduate student, getting her PhD. from Berkeley in geography and she was doing her dissertation research on Brac. She was thrilled to meet another American. She said, "I've got a car. Do you want to tour the island? We can goof around." I said, "Sure." She told me this lovely story.

This is of course before e-mail, and so all of the correspondence is through the mail. All of hers came opened, but very obviously opened and very obviously taped back together. Her father had died a few months before she came to Brac. She was writing very frequently to her mother, and her mother was writing back. This was to try to help her mother at this time. One day, there was a knock on the door. She spoke Croatian well. The postman is there. She opens the door. He hands her a letter that is heavily taped, takes off his hat, puts it over his heart, and says, "We knew your father had died. But until this letter, we didn't realize how recent it was. All of us down at the post office want to tell you just how sorry we are."

To me, that was the difference. They are reading your mail; but on the other hand, they are really sorry that your dad passed away. And the postman comes to the house to tell you that. They aren't even trying to hide that they are reading your mail. So there was a kind of softer side to it in Yugoslavia.

I was just fascinated by the place as well. Of course, the Dalmatian Coast is really beautiful and very interesting.

Q: Well, Brac also was where Tito had his headquarters, wasn't it, during World War II, towards the end?

BOGUE: Right, at one time they were.

Q: When did you read Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*? I know you did…*

BOGUE: I didn't read it until somewhat later. I actually read it later when I was in the Foreign Service. The first thing I read after that about Yugoslavia was the Fitzroy MacLean book, *Eastern Approaches*, where he is on Korcula through much of the war. I read Mangelos's memoir. *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* was a little daunting at first.

Q: I was given that when I joined the Foreign Service by a cousin. I was in Germany. I read it and my wife read it. We had to go to Yugoslavia.

BOGUE: It is a fascinating book. I did find it a daunting read.

Q: What were you pointed towards when you were at the university?

BOGUE: I wasn't sure what I wanted to do. I thought that I might continue on in academic life, but I wasn't sure about that. I really didn't know what I was going to do. So when I graduated in 1975 and I actually worked for a year for the federal government, in a kind of experimental federal welfare program in Twin Falls, Idaho. I was in Twin Falls, the program was countrywide.

Q: Talk about that a bit.

BOGUE: The program was interesting first of all because the federal government was concerned that many of the people who most needed welfare assistance were in groups that declined to take it, such as the elderly, because of pride, and things. So they decided if they linked a welfare program to the Social Security Administration, it would seem like Social Security which people didn't have a psychological problem with. It was called Supplemental Security Income and it was meant for people who were blind, disabled or over 65 who had very limited incomes and were, for whatever reasons, not qualified for Social Security. They administered it out of Social Security offices so you didn't go to a welfare office. I was hired right out of college in the Seattle region, which included Idaho. I went over and lived in Twin Falls, Idaho, which I didn't like very much, I must say. It was a very isolated life for me there as a 20 year-old arriving from out of town. I think I did read every book in the Twin Falls public library that year.

After about a year of that, I really decided that wasn't for me and I moved back to Seattle and got a job in downtown Seattle working for a firm of consulting actuaries. I used to describe my job as an English-to-English translator. They wrote reports for their clients which people who weren't mathematically inclined would have a hard time plowing through. One of my jobs was to understand what they were getting at and write them in layperson's English. And just be a general dog's body in the office, an office helper. It was fun. It gave me a little bit more of a glimpse of what the world of work was like.

I then decided I did want to go back to graduate school. I stopped working that summer. An old friend of mine since the sixth grade and I drove across the United States and back in a battered Volkswagen beetle. We spent seven weeks driving back and forth across the country. Then I enrolled as a graduate student at the University of Oregon in Eugene in the fall.

Q: You were at the University of Oregon from when to when?

BOGUE: 1977 to 1980.

Q: What were you taking?

BOGUE: I was studying European History. I started out doing Medieval and then went into Early Modern. Actually, again, that proved to be very interesting, considering where I ended up, because it's the whole nation building period, the whole emergence of the modern nation state and that period.

Q: How did you find the teachers, the professors?

BOGUE: Terrific. Absolutely fantastic. Again, I am still in close touch with several of them. One of them came to dinner the other night in Washington. One and his wife who were very close friends visited me I think in two of my postings, maybe three. They visited me in Kazakhstan and when I was in Vienna as well. I stayed in very close touch with all of them.

Q: I was wondering, maybe this might be a good place to stop. I put at the end of the tape where we were so we know how to pick this up.

You said you went to the University of Oregon from 1977 to 1980. We haven't really talked much about what you got out of that and what you were pointed towards. We will pick that up next time.

Q: Today is May 30th, 2007.

You were at the University of Oregon?

BOGUE: I was there as a graduate student in Eugene, Oregon.

Q: As a graduate student, from 1977 to 1980? What were you taking?

BOGUE: I was in European History. I did a masters degree there and then continued on, starting my PhD. program with a view and expectation probably that I would then go into academic life

(Humming sound)

Q: When you say European History, was there any particular era or place?

BOGUE: I started out as a medievalist, studying medieval history and over time, studying the early modern period – the Reformation, the early nation-building period, which turned out when I was in the Foreign Service to be very interesting. I ended up involved in a lot of places that were going through a nation-building process, or not their own. I ended up in that.

Q: How did you find the teaching there? What was your impression of the faculty?

BOGUE: I had a deeply positive impression of the faculty there. The late 1970s were kind of a glorious time in a lot of ways to be a student, partly because there were funds for graduate assistantships and things like that. It was also a very tight market in academia, which wasn't good for students graduating and coming into the academic world. It meant that all across the country, all universities were able to hire really top-notch faculty at that time.

Q: Was there any residue of anti-Vietnam War protest people? You know, there were people maybe that sought refuge in academia to stay out of the draft, etcetera. Was there a fire going on within the faculty? Were you catching any of this anti-government stuff?

BOGUE: Not so much by this time. We are now quite a distance from Watergate. Certainly, I would say the faculty was probably left of center if I had to pin down their political views. There were a lot of very serious scholars there and a lot of them engaged with us on that basis, rather than on a political basis.

Oregon was not the most political of campuses. On the other hand, the environment around Eugene is very liberal and we used to joke that Eugene is where hippies went to retire. It is an extremely pleasant community. Land was still available cheaply so a lot of people set up for organic farms and things like that. It was that sort of environment.

Q: Was there much of an Asian orientation there?

BOGUE: Some, not as much as you find in Seattle. Eugene is inland in an agricultural valley. It is not like Seattle or Tacoma or Portland, you know a port city, where you have all the trade and things like that. But certainly, there were very strong programs in Asian History and things like that. Definitely, the Pacific and Asia had as much of a grip on imaginations as Europe.

Q: How would you define yourself politically?

BOGUE: My family has always sort of laughed about me joining the government because I have always been quite left of center in my own political views. At the time, I suppose the big political issues internationally were about Central America.

Q: This was the Reagan period.

BOGUE: Actually, it is not Reagan quite yet. This is the Carter era and so on. Reagan comes a little bit later.

Q: Was there much in the way about civil rights or anything of that nature or was that all settled?

BOGUE: I wouldn't say even today that the issue is settled by any means. In Oregon, the issues of affirmative action and civil rights tended to be more about Asian populations than Native Americans. There were also more and more issues regarding migrant farm workers, mostly Spanish speaking. Those issues were certainly still very lively. So were issues of feminism and women's rights. All of those were definitely in the mix. Oregon was that kind of place where those kinds of issues were around. I wouldn't describe it, certainly not like Berkley or something like a highly politicized campus.

Q: I am fishing just a little bit to get an idea. Was there much in the way of any religious movement going on? I think coming from a farming community often you find a certain level of fundamentalism.

BOGUE: Not at Oregon, no. The University of Oregon is a very laid-back place. You have lots of different kinds of students: from leftover hippies in a sense, I mean Ken Kesey was still living out there in Eugene at the time in his famous bus. His son was a student at Oregon. There was sort of everything from that to the basketball team and its fanatic supporters. Like a lot of large state universities, it encompassed a whole range.

Q: You got out in 1980?

BOGUE: Right.

Q: You came out with what, your masters?

BOGUE: I took a masters and stayed on for a year in their PhD. program. Then I went on leave in 1980 to go to Alaska and teach.

Q: Where did you teach in Alaska?

BOGUE: I taught in a program that brought teachers to remote sites in Alaska to provide a sort of college-level instruction in one-year courses. So I taught in different places in the Alaskan bush, as they call it.

Q: Was this what you'd call your Peace Corps experience?

BOGUE: Sort of. I always laugh because I came into the Foreign Service from there and was assigned to London. I used to laugh that they looked and saw that I was coming out of Alaska and decided to put me in a more civilized place for my first tour. That is not actually the way it went, but a couple of things happened.

In Oregon, I was having really mixed feelings about whether I wanted to pursue an academic career and I didn't want to devote the time and energy to completing my PhD. if I wasn't really committed to it. And I had taken the Foreign Service exam and passed at that time. I was essentially beginning to think about that whole process. In the midst of all that, I saw an opportunity to have a big adventure in the bush in Alaska, which seemed like a lot of fun. So I decided to go off and do that, teach in Alaska because it was in this remote site. They only wanted a term-to-term contract. You didn't have to make a contract for an entire year or even an academic year. It would be easy for me because the Foreign Service then had somewhat of the same problem that it has now, which is that you wait and wait and wait, and then they say, "Come this week." So I wanted to be on a shorter-term contractual basis.

Q: I want to go back to Alaska, but do you recall when you took the oral exam, any of the questions that you were asked then?

BOGUE: I do, as a matter of fact. Actually, I recall quite a lot about the oral exam because I was already in Alaska and I took the exam in Seattle on a trip out of Alaska. I had to dash off to get a dress, because I was coming out of Alaska in my parka and mukluks and thought that probably was not the right outfit for the Foreign Service exam.

I was asked a whole variety of questions. They still did the written inbox test then. You know, "There you are. The Ambassador is in the north of the country. The DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) is on home leave. The only other experienced person has been medevaced. Here are all the problems you have to deal with."

In the oral exam, I recall being asked for instance if I were to put on, at an overseas post, a series of films on America's Native American heritage, what films would I pick? If I were to bring four outstanding Hispanic artists of any of the art forms to post to demonstrate the diversity of the Hispanic experience in America, which artists would I bring? A lot of it was very heavily cultural, American cultural. And then situational. I remember they sort of did a good cop, bad cop approach.

Q: This is Tape 2, Side 1 of Janet Bogue.

You were saying that with the group?

BOGUE: Right, I distinctly remember the group exercise. It was one of these typical things that actually does happen in an embassy. That is, there is enough money to send three people to the United States on a study tour. There are nine of you and you each have a candidate you like. The group has to agree on which would be the best three candidates, meaning six people are going to have to give up their candidate.

I remember thinking at the time, having been given a candidate who I would not have wanted to send. I was ready to pitch this candidate overboard. He was a police captain who had been involved in human rights abuses, but was pressing very hard to get a trip to the United States. He wanted it for his own benefit. Realizing that this guy was not, compared to the other candidates, I thought pitching him overboard and putting my support behind some of the candidates I thought would be better. I realized that some of the people in the group thought that you did well on the test if your candidate won. So they were hanging on to incredibly bad candidates, and sort of missing the point that it was having the group reach the right decision rather than having your candidate win. I remember a couple of these guys, to my astonishment during the exam for the Foreign Service, could lose their tempers and start screaming at other people. That cannot be smart!

I do remember very vividly these guys getting into a screaming match with each other. I wondered at the time if they were planted, if they were not actual candidates but there to see how other people would react. I realized subsequently that they were real candidates. I have never met them in the Foreign Service.

Q: Quite obviously when you were thinking that way, this shows you have the proper mindset to the Balkans.

BOGUE: It must be.

The main thing about the exam was that I was very relaxed. I was not at all sure that I wanted to be in the Foreign Service. I was not at all sure that I would be chosen. I was not at all sure that if I were chosen, that it would be the right thing for me. I think that made the exam much easier for me. There were people who were very much pointed toward this as their career goal. Of course, because it all is like playing a Super Bowl or something, it all happens on one day. If you are not on your game that day, too bad until next year. So for them, I think it was incredibly nerve-wracking. I was so ambivalent about the Foreign Service that I thought if I don't pass, that's fine; if I do pass, that's fine. As a result, I think I was far more relaxed than a lot of the other candidates. And I was not inclined to shout at people and so looked very good in comparison to them.

Q: Let's go into the bush of Alaska. Could you give an idea of some of the places you were?

BOGUE: The way that this program worked was that they moved teachers so that in the course of a year, each place got essentially a full curriculum. You would stay three months in one place, then move to another place for three months, and then move to another place for three months.

I started out at Cape Lisburne, which is well within the Arctic Circle. It is sort of on the most northwest corner of Alaska. If you picture Alaska as a square with Point Barrow here and Nome here, Cape Lisburne is right up there. It is well above Nome, say two hours flying in a small plane. It's right on the sea ice, the Arctic Ocean. In fact, the ice almost extends so that you could in theory walk to what was then the Soviet Union, in a year that it is thick enough.

I spent three months in a town called Takotna, which is near Denali Peak, near the park. You could see Denali, Mount McKinley, on clear days there. It is a small town. The nearest bigger town was called McGrath, in central Alaska.

I spent three months at Fort Yukon, which is right on the Alaska-Canada border at the confluence of the Yukon and Porcupine Rivers.

And then I spent three months on Shemya Island, which is the next to the last rock in the Aleutian chain. Only Attu is further out. Shemya is about the next to last. You are actually closer to Tokyo than Anchorage at that point. In fact, when you look at a map, the International Date Line makes a jog around to bring the Aleutians in so that they are on the same day as the rest of the United States. Otherwise, they would be over the date line.

Q: What was living like in those places?

BOGUE: I actually was housed in each of those places on Air Force bases. There essentially wasn't any other housing for someone just arriving for a few months. The Air Force was cooperating in this program, because its students were students in the base's program.

So you will recognize that some of these were old, old DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line sites, radar sites meant to detect an invasion from the Soviet Union coming across the Pole or across the North Pacific. Others were bigger installations; some had fighter jets. Shemya had an immense array of antennae, aircraft, etc. Shemya was used for all sorts of purposes. It actually had a landing strip dating back to World War II.

I was fed and housed by the Air Force, and so I was quite comfortable. Obviously, these were all places you had to fly in and out of. Flying was exciting and often. The weather was terrible in most of the places. But I had a fabulous time. I fished and hiked and panned for gold. This was a great adventure.

Q: What were the students like?

BOGUE: The Air Force students were highly motivated because if they got better than a C, the Air Force paid their whole tuition. Plus, these were all remote sites where they didn't have their families, so when they weren't working, there wasn't all that much to do. There was a chance to build up some college credits while they were still in the Air Force. They often were students who had not had the advantage of a lot of academic preparation where they had grown up, but they were motivated now to learn and do their homework. They were terrific.

I had some other adult students as well. I think any teacher will tell you that teaching adults is a complete joy, because they are only there because they want to be there. They are often making up for something they didn't get a chance to do when they were younger. You don't have any discipline problems. They just work twice as hard as they need to and soak it up. It's a lot of fun to teach them.

Q: What type of courses were you teaching?

BOGUE: I taught basic freshman level History and English, the kind of thing you would take at a community college or your first year: U.S. History, Western Civilization, Expository Writing.

Q: It sounds like – In the Foreign Service, they talk about challenges – this wasn't a challenge, this was fun.

BOGUE: Yes. Of course, I felt that way about every place I was in the Foreign Service. The most remote and difficult posts, I thought they were fun.

I remember a few years ago, Deputy Secretary Armitage was making a speech, and I was sitting with Beth Jones, my old friend from Pakistan and Kazakhstan. He was going on about the sacrifice people make in the Foreign Service, and certainly people do. In the middle of his talk, Beth leaned over and said, "Weren't we having the time of our lives?" It was absolutely true.

Q: I have to say that having an interview program with people in the Foreign Service, these are not dismal interviews. In a lot of professions, they could be, but not here.

BOGUE: I had some tough posts for sure, but not typically because of living conditions. It was typically because there was a war going on and people were dying. I never minded the deprivation of material things, because I always thought that, wherever it was, was such a hoot. I didn't care if we couldn't get particular kinds of food.

Q: Looking back, was there an attitude of the Air Force people you were teaching? Were they a conservative crew?

BOGUE: There was a real mix. In the case of the Air Force people I taught, I usually asked them at some point – here we were spending a couple of months together in these remote areas and you got everybody's life story eventually – the typical life story of these enlisted personnel was that they grew up in a town, say a coal mining town in West Virginia, about to finish high school, and realized that the only real option was to go into the mines, like their dad or their uncles. They hitchhiked into the nearest big town and enlisted in the Air Force because they wanted something different. They wanted to see the world a bit.

A female student I had told me essentially the same story. She grew up in a small town in Missouri. It was a community in which very few people went to college or could have afforded to go to college. Most of the girls got married and stayed in that town right out of high school. She just had a little bug in her that wanted to see the world, so she surprised everyone by joining the Air Force. She has been to Egypt, Germany, Korea, and Iceland. Now, she was up in Alaska. She was in fact seeing the world, which is what she wanted to do, and enjoying it very much.

For a lot of the same motivation that I heard in the Foreign Service was very much echoed by people often coming from a very different educational and socio-economic background: people wanting an adventure, something more than they felt was offered to them.

Then, there were a lot of kids who would kind of shuffle and look at their feet, act a little embarrassed and say, "Well, I wanted to serve." The feeling that service was meaningful, and this was a chance to do something meaningful in their lives. This was a constant current. You would meet a 19-year old from Mississippi and say, "Why did you join?" I talked to people from the South a lot because they were always freezing in Alaska, and spent a lot of time indoors. They took a lot of classes. They would say, "I know it sounds hokie," or "It sounds corny but I really wanted to serve somehow." Or, "My dad was in

the service. My grandfather was in the service. Everybody in my family was in the service."

You see the same thing in the Foreign Service: family tradition, service, adventure, doing something different.

Q: I have a certain appreciation for what you were doing because but for the grace of God – I was an enlisted man for four years out of college, I was in the security service. They had a post up in Adak. I could have gone there, but luckily, I didn't. I was in Japan, Korea and Germany. I thank God for that and not Adak. In those places, you either have a wonderful time learning, or you can go…

BOGUE: There was that definite division. There were people who – this was true of the local community, not just the Air Force – spent their time drinking and fighting, and going stir crazy. Then there were people who just threw themselves into what there was to do, which was fishing, hunting, hiking, or outdoor pursuits of various kinds. Or they used the time to take classes, to read, and do things like that. I suspect that now, with distance learning on the internet, there are a lot more opportunities for people to use their time in that way. It wasn't possible then. I doubt that they even bother to send teachers out any more.

Q: Were you out on the circuit when you got the call?

BOGUE: Not exactly. I should back up and say again that I took the written exam when I was at the University of Oregon. I passed the written exam. It was going to be about a year before the examiners for the oral exam came to Seattle. I was neither so sure of a Foreign Service career nor so wealthy as to be able to fly to Washington for a test, so I was going to wait until they came to Seattle. In that intervening year, I finally started talking to some people, found some Foreign Service people who had retired to the area and had conversations with them. I did a little more homework about the Foreign Service, because when I took the exam I really knew nothing about it. I was encouraged to take it by friends, but I didn't think about it. In that time, I started doing that.

I was in Alaska trying to do all the things you had to do when I came out. I came out of Alaska for a break at one point and did my physical at the public health hospital in Seattle at that time. I filed all my security papers. It was sort of a slow process partly because I was in Alaska and in very remote locations. At one point, I came out of Alaska at Christmas time. I either needed to sign a new contract for the next three months or not. I called back just to try to get an impression of when I might be called. I had no sense of where I was on the list or how many they were hiring, and how that all worked. I was told that if I wanted to join the Foreign Service I should not sign a contract to go back because I would get called soon. So I decided to do that.

I had made up my mind in Alaska that I would try the Foreign Service for a few years. I really didn't see myself doing this as a career. I thought I would probably go back into

teaching, but that it would be a fun thing to do for a couple of years while I was still in my twenties. I made that decision to go ahead if they offered me the job.

I came out of Alaska in late December 1981, and flew back to Washington on March 1st, 1982.

Q: You started in 1982? What was your initial class, the A-100, like? What was the composition and the spirit of the class?

BOGUE: Apparently, we were quite unusual, which I didn't realize at the time. We were thirty members and we were half women and half men, which was still unusual in 1982. I didn't think anything of it at the time, but as we went and talked to people, they kept looking out and saying, "My gosh! You are such an unusual class because it has so many women."

The other distinctive thing about the class was that most of us, as it happened, were from outside of Washington, so we didn't know anybody else. I knew no one in Washington, DC, and neither did most of my classmates. We ended up forming quite a strong bond together. I still remain very close to several members of that class.

Q: Who were some of the members?

BOGUE: Deborah Grey, who is our Consul General in Milan right now, was a classmate of mine. Steve Mull, who is Ambassador in Lithuania. Some others have already retired. I would say Carol Foster; Jack Zakulig; Richard Albright, he's back in Washington now but was in the Middle East.

Q: You came in 1982. In the early Reagan Administration, foreign affairs changed radically over the years, but at the beginning, it came out of the conservative right. I assume most of the class, more like you, were more out of the liberal left. Was there any kind of talk, sort of, "What are we doing?"

BOGUE: Definitely. There was a lot of talk about that. There was a lot of, "What are we doing?" because this is also your career, individuals weighing it. But also, there was the whole question of our foreign policy. The focus was Central America. There was a huge amount of concern among all of us about what was going on with the Contras and the whole Central American situation.

Q: Nicaragua and El Salvador?

BOGUE: Right. I remember seeing someone at FSI (Foreign Service Institute), then in Rosslyn before we moved out here, who had just come back from the Embassy in El Salvador, wearing a t-shirt that had a picture of helicopters and said, "El Salvador – Apocalypse of Democracy." That was the issue comparable, although not as big, as Iraq is today.

We were being dispersed to consular spots all over the world. The exciting thing for our class was that posts were just opening in China. Every generation in the Foreign Service has its kind of new frontier, whether it is the Central Asian posts, or whatever it happens to be. The new frontier in those days was China. All the consulates were just opening in Guangzhou, Shanghai, and all those consulates, after having had only Beijing. That was where people wanted to go. People were not happy about or interested in going to Central America because of policy concerns. People were very excited about going to China.

Q: With what was happening in Nicaragua and El Salvador, there was sort of a hard sell at the time because there was a lot of opposition to this. Were there people coming to FSI and talking to some of you while you were there? Were any of your members or you fighting back, saying, "What about this? Or that?"

BOGUE: I think yes to the first, and no to the second. Yes, we did have people come. I remember a very senior person coming and saying, "If I were a young officer today, I would be headed to Central America, because that's where the action is. That's where you can really make your mark," and so on. And we were all thinking, "uh-huh." People asked questions, but in an extremely polite way. I think we were all so new and so green that we were all very polite and careful in our questions. There was not any outright pushing. We would debate it at length later among ourselves. I think we were not quite sure of pushing back.

Q: Did any leaders kind of emerge, obviously bound for bigger and better things, in your class? Did you see a certain stratification?

BOGUE: There were some people who were definitely leaders in the class. A couple of them were women who were mid-level entrants. We had the program to bring people who had been, for instance, in the Civil Service, at the mid ranks. Because they had a lot of State Department experience and took us all under their wings in that regard, they became natural leaders of the class. Also, by force of personality, several of them had terrific charismatic personalities. They were the ones who were quickest to question things, or say, "Don't believe what you are told about that." They had been in the system. I wouldn't say they were jaundiced at all, but they had a much more critical evaluation of what was said.

There were clearly people who were not going to stay in the Foreign Service. There were clearly people who were already in A-100 and were miserable, unhappy, and not feeling that this was at all right for them. Most of them left during their very first tour.

Q: In a class that was fifty percent women, did you feel any of the problems of being a woman? That is, going into a career if you got married, had children, that sort of thing. Was this at all in any of your thinking or talking?

BOGUE: People talked about it a lot, men as well as women. A couple of the men in the class were engaged to be married and their fiancées were very concerned about what they

would be doing in the Foreign Service. This was kind of a constant problem for everyone, as it remains.

If I jump ahead to my last assignment, which was handling all the new people in the Foreign Service, officers and specialists alike, I would say the overriding personal concerns all of them had were, "what about spouses?" or "What about children?" or "What about the care of elderly parents?" These are major issues that everyone faces, but the Foreign Service creates some additional tangles for that. I think that is true for men, as well as for women. It is probably still more of a challenge for women to be accompanied by a non-working spouse than by men, but it is a challenge for both genders in that regard.

It was something that people talked about a lot. We had very few people in the class who were married. I think we had one person who had one child already. He's still in the Foreign Service, John Hepburn, who is DCM in Indonesia. He has four kids now, but he just had a small baby at the time. Everyone else, if they were married, had no children. It was definitely a concern.

On the other hand, I would say, and this is typical today as well, most of us thought we would just be in the Foreign Service for a short time. Most of us looked at it like going into the Peace Corps or the military. This was going to be a two, four or six-year deal, and then we would do something else. The fact is that most of us stayed in the end.

Q: It's insidious. It's addictive.

BOGUE: When I was dealing with entry-level folks, I would hear kind of grumpy criticism from more senior people saying, "They are coming in expecting that they are only going to spend a few years and not committing themselves right now to a lengthy career." So did I. So did everyone else. The trick is when they are in, if they are good, to persuade them to stay somehow. That's the challenge for the Foreign Service, to make life interesting enough that they would stay.

Q: Did you feel at the time, looking at the Foreign Service, were you looking around for female role models? Did you feel this was a place as a woman with pretty good opportunities or not?

BOGUE: I think we saw some senior women role models right away. That is my recollection. We saw Joan Clark, Roz Ridgeway. I remember being particularly impressed by Roz Ridgeway, who I later worked with and continued to be impressed by her dynamic performance. And Joan Clark as well, who was the Director General, and sort of a remote God-like figure to entering people. It was not at all a parade of only men in terms of people who came to speak with us.

I certainly knew that the demographics were that the Foreign Service was largely white and largely male. In our class, everyone felt the world was changing. I don't think any of

us felt that we were going to have, therefore, a horrible struggle in the sense of institutions.

Q: Where did you want to go?

BOGUE: I wanted to go to China. My class was assigned, and I only understood this when I started assigning people myself and it makes perfect sense now. Everyone who passed the language test went to an English-speaking post. I came in and did the test in German, and passed, which meant that part of the anxiety of the first few years was over. I already completed my language requirement. Almost everyone else who passed a language went off to an English language post because we didn't need to start a language. Those who didn't have a language started either Spanish, to go to all the consulates in Mexico, and/or Chinese, to go to one of the consulates there.

I was very fortunate to be sent to London. It was great fun.

Q: When were you in London?

BOGUE: I was there for 18 months. That was when an introductory consular tour was 18 months. The only reason it was on our list was because Richard Queen, who you will remember was one of the Tehran hostages, had multiple sclerosis and had to be medevaced from London because of his condition worsening. So there was an opening. This sticks in my mind because when you get orders, it's always "Vice" somebody going to a post: "Vice Smith" or "Vice Jones" or "Vice Kennedy" or "Vice Bogue." My orders to London said, "Vice Queen" which was kind of a nice touch, having the Queen stepping down. It happened to be Richard Queen, not The Queen.

I was there for 18 months on a straight consular tour.

Q: What was your impression of the Embassy in London?

BOGUE: It was unbelievably huge. It was like working at the State Department. It was an enormous place. This was before the visa waiver program, so we still actually issued visas for any British subject who needed to go. We were processing well over a million non-immigrant visas a year. There were still massive numbers of Americans in military bases all over Britain, so we did probably 24,000 reports of birth abroad a year. There were around 10,000 lost and stolen passports for tourists a year. It was just huge. The consular operation alone was just huge. Then, of course, there was the rest of the Embassy, which we almost never saw, even though we were in the same building.

In fact, I remember seeing a guy in the cafeteria one day and the only other time I had seen him was during Presidential and Vice Presidential visits. He had a thing in his ear and he was out on the street. I thought he was in the Secret Service. I saw him in line in the cafeteria and I said, "Oh, does your being here mean we are having another big visit?" He said, "What are you talking about? I work in the Econ Section." He had just been one of the site advance people. Honestly, I never saw anybody outside the Consular Section.

Q: Who was Consul General?

BOGUE: A guy named Robert Maule.

Q: Were you doing visas the whole time?

BOGUE: No, typically everybody switched. In an 18-month tour, you did nine months to a year of non-immigrant visas, and then did something else. You did the immigrant visas or you did some form of American Services: passport, prison visits, etc. I was one of the people who was switched to American Services afterwards, so I did passport, nationality adjudication, prison visiting, lost/sick/distressed Americans, deaths.

Q: Let's talk about the visa process. Was most of it routine or did you find out about the foreign _____?

BOGUE: That was our work essentially.

Q: To the non-Brits?

BOGUE: For British subjects, most visa issuance was very routine. They were going to Disney World on holiday, things like that. We only had a few issues like, at the time, a lot of illegal _____, before there was a program for that.

The vast majority of our work was interviewing third country nationals who were applying in London for their visas for instance, because there was no longer an Embassy in Tehran. A lot of Iranians and Africans. We had a lot of people from the former British colonies: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Jamaica, who may or may not have been resident in Britain, but for whatever reason, they were in London. That was the vast majority of our work.

Q: How did we treat the Iranians and Africans?

BOGUE: For one thing, they all had to get a special security clearance at the time. So there was a rather involved process. We had a lot of especially young men seeking visas, presumably partly to avoid the draft because the Iran-Iraq War was in progress then. There were a lot of people trying to get out of Iran for whatever reason. There would be sort of the rumor of the week, which was that if you were an Iranian passport holder and a Christian, you could get a visa. So people would come in with a shiny enormous cross hanging around their neck and say, "I know it says Mohammed in my passport, but my parents didn't want me to be beaten up as a child. I really have a Christian name and it is Paul." I remember asking one guy, "So you were secretly raised a Christian?" He said, "Yes." I said, "Well, what is the Trinity?" He said, "I think it is a college in Connecticut." It was a good answer, but not the one I was looking for.

The problem we had with Iranian applicants aside from security issues was that we had no way of judging their ties to Iran. People would come in and say, "Of course, I am going to go back. I own property. My mother is there." There was no way of knowing. It is so different from being in a place and understanding how it works.

Q: Was there a pretty high refusal rate of Iranians?

BOGUE: Yes, for sure. Again, I honestly don't think it was hostility on our part, so much as they were desperate to get out and it was very hard for them to establish that they would in fact ever return.

Also, I should add that, for instance, those who would use a medical thing and say, "I have to go to the United States for medical care." Well, they were already in Britain. There is not a particular reason unless they are having some very bizarre thing done that wasn't being done in Britain, there was no reason since they were already in London to proceed to the United States for medical care. They could get adequate medical care there.

Q: What about the Indian-Pakistani types? There are a huge number in Great Britain. What kind of people were coming?

BOGUE: I would loosely put them in two categories. One was people who were not resident in Britain who were sometimes visa shopping, and had been refused already in their home country. They thought they would be able to try again in London. There was a huge refusal rate. Unbeknownst to them, we did have enough technology already to know that they had been refused. Then there were people who were actually residents of Britain who were not yet British subjects, and there were long-time residents of Britain who were British subjects. In the case of that group who had established long-term residency in Britain, it was not terribly difficult for them to get visas. In the case of the group who had come to Britain as immigrants, but were not necessarily settled there for long, had only been very recently settled there, we looked at those a lot more because we were a lot more concerned about whether they were essentially immigrating illegally on to the United States and not planning to return.

Q: Did that same dynamic work for the Caribbean?

BOGUE: Not so much, because people from Jamaica and everything had a much longer history of immigration in Britain. They had typically been there since the 1950s or the 1960s, whereas the immigration from the sub-continent was much more recent. For Caribbean people, it was much more likely that they had already been a generation or two in Britain, more settled.

Q: Did you run across IRA (Irish Republican Army) problems?

BOGUE: Not so much. They generally applied at our Consulate in Belfast and at the Embassy in Dublin. We didn't see so much of it in London in terms of consular issues.

We did have IRA issues at the time. It was the time of the IRA bombing campaign in London. It was one of these things where you go off in the Foreign Service, and your parents are holding their breath saying, "They won't be sending you anywhere dangerous. London, great." Then there is a bombing at Harrods, a bombing in a movie theater, and a bombing at Piccadilly Square. All of a sudden, there are bombs going off all over London. Your parents are thinking that maybe you should have gone to Rwanda after all. It was the era of the IRA bombing campaign in London itself, so we did have some terrorism issues.

The other big issue we had at the Embassy in terms of security concerns and things like that, was it was also the era of Reagan putting missiles in Europe, and in Britain.

Q: The SS-20s?

BOGUE: The SS-20s, right. So there were protests every day at the Embassy, without fail. Most of them were completely peaceful. There was a women's group that kept a peaceful vigil. There were sometimes some that would erupt into violence, although it was usually handled in a good way by the local authorities. We did have daily demonstrations at the Embassy on those issues. The invasion of Grenada brought out protests, and various other events.

I remember the day we saw a whole line of protesters come into Grosvenor Square where the American Embassy is. Suddenly, it turned across the square to the Canadian High Commission, which is in the old American Embassy building right across the square. It was Green Peace protesting the seal harvest in Canada. We were quite pleased and called up all our chums over there and offered to bring them sandwiches, because we were old hands at managing food. You couldn't get in or out. They were besieged briefly.

Q: What were some of the dynamics in the Consular Section? As you know, I was a Consular Officer for a long time. As a personnel officer, you have problem cases, and we tend to send them to London or a big embassy. Sometimes this is a problem because you've got young junior officers like yourself learning the trade, and then you've got these old – I won't say duds – but these were people who had been around a long time and they were problems.

BOGUE: We definitely saw some people at the middle level. It was clear nobody wanted them running their own section somewhere. They could do less harm there. For instance, one of our supervisors was subsequently reprimanded for having written exactly the same EER (Employee Evaluation Report) on every person, word for word. It was the old cut and paste.

Q: Are these the efficiency reports on which promotions are based?

BOGUE: Exactly. Admittedly, we were all kind of interchangeable parts. It was probably a challenge to think of different things, but this was kind of an excessive lack of interest. So I would say there was some frustration among the junior officers, most of whom were

second tour officers. One of them was sort of a reward post for people who had been in a hardship post. Most were already on their second tour. Often they would come out of tougher places and they tended to be more vocal about their frustrations.

Q: Was there any attempt by more senior people in the Consular Section, or the Embassy, to bring you in and introduce you to diplomatic life, to do more than just be visa issuance drudges?

BOGUE: Part of the problem was that we were just overwhelmed with work. The pound was very strong and huge numbers of Brits were traveling. It was hard to break people loose to go and spend much time in other sections. The junior officers ourselves set up a little kind of lunchtime speakers program. People from different sections would come and chat with us about the work. We tried to volunteer to work on visits, that kind of thing, to get that experience and have a break from the day-to-day grind. We invited our young British colleagues, their entry-level people, to events. There was the trickle down theory of diplomatic events where the first diplomatic reception I ever went to was a Malawian Independence Day where someone couldn't go, and kept passing their invitation down. It's a good thing to do. Someone very senior from the Embassy did go, probably the DCM, to represent the United States, but there were extra invitations floating around and they would fall to us. We would go and learn to do that sort of thing.

Honestly though, it was not only a huge Embassy and we had a lot of work, but because it was London, it was like working at the State Department. It wasn't like being in a small, remote post under difficult conditions where people sort of bond. People came to work and then went home and did their own thing. You could do your own thing. You could travel all you wanted. There was no language issue. There were no security restrictions.

Q: When you moved over to American Services, what sort of things were you doing?

BOGUE: We registered newborn babies. We adjudicated citizenship issues for people. We had a lot of Americans who lost their passports, fell ill, or sometimes died. We had just about a death a day. We had about 360 deaths a year. Partly because there were a lot of Americans resident there; partly because people felt that even into their very late years, they could still travel to London, when they would not have gone to Afghanistan or Thailand or something. They could still make a trip to London. We had a lot of death cases. We had a lot of Americans in prison at the time.

Q: What were they in prison for?

BOGUE: Mostly drug offenses. Although we had everything from people in prison for murder to writing bad checks. Some of them were American citizens but resident in Britain. Others were people who were there temporarily. We went to visit them on a quarterly basis. Then, just the usual kinds of things that happen to people. People get robbed. American citizens are there who are mentally ill and need assistance, either in getting medical care or in getting home. So there was a whole range. People need notarial services.

I remember the great excitement when Jimmy Connors came in during Wimbledon, in his tennis clothes still, because he was going through a very highly publicized divorce from his wife and he needed to have some papers notarized for the divorce. He cheerfully gave out autographs for about half an hour in the waiting room while we prepared the papers. And then we charged him for my autograph, because it was a notarial fee of $3.00.

We also had various American celebrities turn up: Jerry Hall who was married to Mick Jagger then was an American citizen. James Clavell who wrote *Shogun*. A lot of these people lived in London and they would turn up periodically, just for normal things like new passports.

Q: In American Services or in Visa Services, do you have any consular stories?

BOGUE: As you know, the few of our colleagues who never did consular work are just hopeless at dinner parties. They have no good stories. There are a lot of good stories. My own favorites were prison visits in a sense, because you get on a train and go to some town. The British prisons are actually less violent than American prisons, but tended to be physically much older, almost Dickensian. Some guy with a big chain of keys and muttonchops would come out and open this huge gate and say, "This is no place for a young lady." It was all sort of out of the past. That was always fascinating. Also, hearing the stories of the prisoners.

I suppose my best consular story in that regard might be the man who was actually a white-collar criminal. He was an American citizen serving about a five-year sentence for a massive financial fraud in London. He was a highly educated man. Once, when I went out to see him, he said he had a favor to ask and that was that his son was coming to visit. The son was graduating from Georgetown University and was coming to visit his father in prison. His son was very interested in the Foreign Service, and in fact he graduated from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. This man said, "You are the only Foreign Service Officer I know. Would you be willing to meet with my son and talk to him about life in the Foreign Service?" I said, "Sure. I would be happy to."

I took his son to lunch when he came. He was a very nice, young guy. He never did join the Foreign Service; he went off and did something else instead. It had not occurred to me that one of our prisoners would be actually seeking career counseling for his son.

It was kind of sad. I felt very sorry for the young man who had a life with a lot of turmoil.

Q: Did the consular officers band together and do things?

BOGUE: Absolutely. We were a close bunch. Various groupings of us traveled and explored together. I remember one Fourth of July; one of the female consular officers had married a British Naval Officer. His naval unit actually invited us all down to Portsmouth, to be their guests over the Fourth of July weekend, which was a very nice gesture. So maybe 15 people from the consulate all went down.

Because it was so big, you only became section duty officer every six months or so, which meant that the rest of your weekends were very free to travel.

Q: What would happen to an American Consular Officer being married to a British Naval Officer? Did she have to resign eventually, or was she able to keep going?

BOGUE: They were able to keep it going, partly because he retired from the Navy at the earliest opportunity. They were separated a few times. He was a bit older than she was anyway, so was able to retire. I can think of two female American officers who married British Navy officers, while they were in London. In the case of the other one, her husband retired a few years later and became a trailing spouse.

Q: In doing these oral histories, we are trying to create a collection of work for people who are in the Foreign Service, among other things, to find out more about the places and pass on Foreign Service lore and history and work methods. Were you getting much about the Foreign Service from other people? Was it pretty much the blind sharing their impressions with the blind in the Consular Section?

BOGUE: There was a lot of that certainly. I was one of the only first tour people there. The people there had been out serving in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and all around the world. They had a bit more experience. I realized at the time that I was not experiencing the Foreign Service, either in the work or the life. I was having a wonderful time in London, but I knew that the work would not be this way elsewhere and I knew that the life would not be this way elsewhere. If I were really going to experience the Foreign Service, I would need to go on to another overseas assignment. Again, my plan still being that this was sort of a four or five-year kind of deal. I could not really judge a decision on whether to stay in the Foreign Service or not in London.

What I did know was that I liked my colleagues. I really enjoyed my colleagues. I thought they were committed, smart, fun, and even in a big post like London, quite solicitous of each other. I remember, for instance, that somebody arrived two days before Thanksgiving, as a new arrival at post. He told me he had waiting for him six invitations to Thanksgiving dinner. Seeing that he was coming right before, people had left him invitations to make sure that he had a place to go. Even at a big post, there was that spirit.

I liked the local staff a lot. A lot of the local staff were of Caribbean island origin who had come to work for the Americans because their accents or their skin color would not be a detriment to them in the American Embassy. They were huge fun and terrific people who took us into their hearts. Although we often came from very different backgrounds, there wasn't that sort of barrier of class. They could often tell from our accents where in the United States we were from, but they couldn't tell what class we were from. Whereas in Britain, it is such a giveaway when you open your mouth: the education you have had, the class you come from. So it was much easier for us as Americans to go out one night with Lord and Lady So-and-So, and the next night with the brand new Anglo-Indian 17-

year old school leaver working in the Consular Section. We could move that way, vertically in British society, in a way that the Brits themselves didn't.

I also learned a lot about Britain that way. I remember the brightest kid. I mean kid because they left school at 16 or 17 and came to work for us. He was an Irish fellow who worked for us in the Consular Section. He was so smart and so capable. I was really encouraging him at one point to go on to get some higher education. He said, "But what would be the point? I would come out with a degree but I would still have an Irish accent and I would still be from an Irish working class family. I wouldn't ever be able to be more than a clerk anyway. Unless I emigrate to Canada, Australia or the United States, someplace where it doesn't matter."

I thought what was sad about that was that he saw his future as completely constrained. He was an only child. He really just saw his future as being in a complete box. Those kinds of things were very revealing to me about the different ways the Americans saw themselves from the way the Brits saw themselves.

I found the environment very convenient, in terms of both my American and my non-American contacts.

Q: Did you have any control over where you went the next time?

BOGUE: I had very little, especially since I was coming out January-February, which was not the normal transfer time. I landed up back in Washington in the Operations Center, because there were very few other jobs available. That was available, so I went back to Washington, which was a new post for me as well. I spent a few months there.

Q: The Operations Center, someone was looking out for you, or something. This is basically the key to really working ahead rapidly in the Foreign Service, or can be. This is where all the best candidates…I didn't know the Operations Center was around when I was a junior officer.

BOGUE: It started in the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Q: By that time, I was over the hill.

BOGUE: It had its 25th anniversary while I was there. I didn't realize that at the time. You did have to have your boss nominate you. It was one of the few things available on the list, and I asked him. He kindly nominated me for it. I was chosen to come back to Washington.

Q: You were in Washington for how long?

BOGUE: I then was in Washington for 18 months, because I did a year in the Operations Center, and then went into language training.

Q: Let's talk about the Operations Center. What were you doing?

BOGUE: All the junior people were what we called, WOEDS (Watch Officers and Editors). We were eager on the watch, handling issues that came up and alerting people to them, or we were writing these little morning briefings for the Secretary of State, then George Shultz, that we compiled from overnight cables.

To truly date myself, there was no CNN (Cable News Network) yet. There were no 24-hour news networks at all. So, it was based on phone calls and telegram traffic coming in from posts.

Q: Who was running the operation? What was the spirit of the organization when you were working there?

BOGUE: The head was Jim Collins, I think, who was subsequently Ambassador in Russia. He was head of the Operations Center then. One of the Deputy Heads was Bob Pearson, who was actually my watch captain initially. He then became the Deputy Director, and subsequently Director General and Ambassador.

The big issues the year I was there were bombings in Beirut. Big bombings took place in Beirut took place that year. Also, hijackings. There were a huge number of Middle East hijackings such as the TWA (Trans-World Airlines) hijacking in Beirut.

Q: This was where they killed a man, is that right?

BOGUE: Right. Those were the major issues.

There were a lot of things I really liked about the Ops Center. I liked the camaraderie of the small team working hard, late into the night. We got to know each other very well. We stayed up all night, so we talked. We didn't have CNN to watch. I really enjoyed my colleagues there. I liked the fast pace. I liked the fact that no matter how hard you were working on something, after nine hours, someone came to relieve you. It wasn't that you had to work 36 or 72 hours straight. You would often stay to help if it was particularly busy, but you did get to take a break and come back. That was a great way to do it.

It was a very positive place to work. I had two team captains, senior watch officers, Bob Pearson and then Allen Shippy. They were both terrific bosses to have. Some of the other teams were not as happy. There were some personality conflicts on some teams. We were lucky to get along well. I enjoyed that very much. I was glad when it came to an end, because I was really tired. I kind of lived in a state of exhaustion all year because of the change in shifts all the time.

Q: One of the things that people often say when they come out of that is that they understand who does what to whom. In other words, they understand the wily diagram of the Department of State, which can be a rather complicated place.

BOGUE: Exactly. And that was huge for me, because I had not ever done an internship at State. I had come in and three months later, I was already in London. I had no experience with the Department and I think that first was understanding who does what in the Department. Second was meeting some fantastic people like, for instance, Arnie Raphel, who spent a lot of time on Middle East issues. He was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Middle East Bureau then.

Another thing for me was just that it was a very quick, intensive course in everything from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. You had to be at least conversant with what was going on everywhere. You had to because you could get a call saying, "I see that the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister just said this." I said, "Well, you needed to know that he said that" and how to get him on the phone, who was our Ambassador in Nicaragua and how to get him on the phone.

Just to show again how green I was, one of the first telegrams I saw came from Indonesia and said "DAS MONJO" does such-and-such. Well, I thought Das Monjo must be an Indonesian name; that's not an American name. I have got to look it up and figure out who he is. This was before the internet, before Google. I am frantically looking through the lists of world leaders, the Fact Book, and I cannot figure it out. Of course, as you already know, Deputy Assistant Secretary John Monjo had been out in Indonesia. I didn't even know the acronym for a Deputy Assistant Secretary. I probably spent an hour running around, trying to figure out who this Indonesian figure Das Monjo was, before I realized it was our own guy.

For that kind of thing, I crammed five years worth of experience into a year, really, in the Ops Center. There is no doubt about it. I continue to recommend it to people.

Q: How about your fellow watch officers? What were they like?

BOGUE: Again, I found them fun. They tended to be very fast moving people with good senses of humor typically. Because nobody does that on their first tour, everyone had been to one or two places already, so I picked up a lot from them about the work in different parts of the world. People had come out of China, Africa, etc. That was really fascinating.

Q: Did you have any competitiveness or sharp elbows? There was no point in being competitive, I guess?

BOGUE: There were a few people who were. It's very much a team environment. Also, when things happened, we weren't there to help on good things. We were there when bad things happened. I remember being stunned when a colleague, not on my team – I had happened through sheer bad luck been on watch for one bombing and one highjacking – actually said, "You've had all the luck. It is going to look so good in your performance review because you were on watch when this happened." I didn't consider a bombing and the loss of colleagues and a hijacking as luck. I considered it horrible. And for anyone to even think in those terms was beyond me, to think about this as a great career move.

What a great career move: there was a hijacking while you were on watch. What a horrible thing to happen. Thank heavens we were able to help a bit.

Only one colleague of all the people working there at the time ever openly expressed those kinds of competitiveness, "I've got to get a hijacking on my watch" to look good. Everybody else had a much more sober view that these were human beings, and often our colleagues.

Q: Did you get a feeling while you were there, because you were dealing with the whole world, that of the various bureaus or areas, which ones were more responsive or faster on their feet, when you contacted them?

BOGUE: I would say that I was very impressed with all of them. That surprised me because I had heard a lot of myths. There are stereotypes that this bureau is like this, and that bureau is like that. Again, the people we saw and worked with were the staff assistants, who were typically very sharp, capable, fast moving people. Then we worked with the Office Directors and the Deputy Assistant Secretaries. And they tended to be really good.

I must say in my day, because most of the action by then was in the Middle East, I probably saw most of the Middle East Bureau. I was very impressed by the people in that Bureau. It was a hot spot and I remember thinking how cool – these were people who had a war before breakfast twice a week – and they were cool and calm professionals, and steady. They dealt well with others. They took time, even though they were so busy. Arnie Raphel was killed in Pakistan, but here he was, a million crises at a time, he spent a lot of time with people on the watch. We weren't even working with him, but when he was waiting for instance – you would have to wait half an hour for a phone call – instead of just going away, he would sit down with somebody who wasn't busy and talk to them about their plans, what they would like to do, how they would like to develop. It is no surprise to me that the award for developing young talent in the Foreign Service is the Arnie Raphel Award. He really did give whatever spare time he had. He probably spent over the course of that year, two hours talking to me about what I wanted to do. I had not been in NEA (Near East Asia) and was not particularly pointed that way. He was just very good.

Q: Did you get any feel for this basically select group, George Shultz and his team?

BOGUE: We were all huge fans of George Shultz and his wife Helena Schultz as well. They were unfailingly wonderful to all of us. George Shultz was not a screamer. Whatever he may have done with his peers, I don't know, but he and his wife were unfailingly kind to all of us. This was to the point that, for instance on Christmas Eve – the watch goes all the time, so people are working on Christmas – Mrs. Shultz and various grandchildren arrived with home baked cookies for everybody on the watch. She arrived late, late at night. People were working. The Shultz's were incredibly gracious. George Shultz used to drop by the Ops Center and thank everyone. You didn't get the

impression that someone had said, “Hey, don’t forget.” He would just be walking by, have a minute and stop in. And we were grateful.

I remember being very impressed, chatting with his security detail. They know them far better.

Q: You did that for a year?

BOGUE: Right.

Q: Do they pretty well wring you out?

BOGUE: Yes, you are definitely ready. You are just exhausted.

Q: Being in Washington, were you able to get closer to figuring out what you wanted to do?

BOGUE: I think so. I decided I really needed to make up my mind. I was getting close to turning 30 at that point. I needed to make up my mind about whether the Foreign Service was going to be right for me. To do that, I needed to go overseas to a more normal embassy, not like London. I needed to work in the cone I had been put in, which was political, which I knew nothing about. I had just been put in it when I took the exam. They said, “Okay. We are putting you in this cone.”

As you will remember from our previous conversation, I had had a long interest in Yugoslavia, because I grew up in a town that was full of immigrants from Yugoslavia. Everyone wanted to go to the Soviet Union in those days. For people in the Slavic speaking world, that was the most important place. Yugoslavia was a little bit bizarre. Tito was dead by then, but it was pursuing its own path. It wasn’t in the mainstream of the whole Warsaw Pact. That’s where I wanted to go.

Here is where again the Ops Center really helps you out. I went to see the Office Director for that part of the world who was Ops Center alum himself, and very favorably disposed to Ops Center people. He agreed that I could go to Belgrade as the junior most of the political officers. I still was not tenured yet because I had been in such a short time from the time I applied, so I was assigned to five months of language training in Rosslyn. I then headed off to Belgrade in the summer of 1985.

Q: How did you find the language? Were you picking up anything about the culture of Yugoslavia?

BOGUE: I was definitely picking up a lot about the culture. I found the language very challenging. I worked very hard at it. I was a very motivated student. I had had German before and some French, but I hadn’t tackled a Slavic language. I enjoyed the language a lot. And I definitely picked up a lot about the culture because, for instance, the Serbian and Croatian teachers didn’t speak to each other. They were all in the same department;

there were six of them in total. They wouldn't speak to each other. It was a good introduction.

They all were native speakers who had come out of communist Yugoslavia, and they all had pretty strong views about things. They were not at all shy about sharing them. That was good. It got you right into the sort of mode of having those conversations with people.

For me, language training was such a relief from the Ops Center, because the hours were regular. You could actually get enough sleep.

Q: So you went to Belgrade when?

BOGUE: In the summer of, it must have been August 1985.

Q: And you were there until when?

BOGUE: Until 1987.

Q: Who was the Ambassador when you got there?

BOGUE: Jack Scanlan.

Q: Was he the Ambassador the whole time?

BOGUE: He arrived just a few weeks before I did.

Q: How would you describe the situation in Yugoslavia when you got there in 1985? How were relations with the United States?

BOGUE: Relations with the United States were very positive. Yugoslavia was still doing its famous balancing act, trying to be a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement but also be on good relations with the two big powers. I would say it had a better relationship by far with the United States than it did with the Soviet Union. It deeply suspected the Soviet Union wanted to… Because it had broken out of the Warsaw Pact, it was deeply suspicious of the Soviet Union's intentions toward it. It prided itself on its openness. People could come and go; the borders were not closed. You could get magazines and newspapers from the outside world there. It was definitely a much more open environment than elsewhere, although it was a single party communist state. So relations were good. We had a very positive and healthy thing. That didn't stop us from being followed and harassed by the police.

Yugoslavia had boom years in the 1970s, economically speaking, developing tourism and bringing in a lot of Western currency. Then, the oil crisis of 1974 hit. Yugoslavia is completely dependent on petroleum products from the outside world. It went through an economic freefall and it was still in place when I was there. There was huge inflationary

pressure. All the weaknesses in a socialist economy anywhere, like keeping unviable plants open because they were providing employment. You can get away with that for so long, but you just cannot get away with it forever.

Yugoslavia had a couple of particular issues. One was that part of it had a modern, Western European economy, in Slovenia and parts of Croatia. Parts of it were hugely backward. They used to say to themselves, "We are combining the economies of West Germany and India in the same country." So that in places like Macedonia, it was very impoverished, very backward, very limited old-fashioned industrialization, and a lot of very unmodern agriculture. In Slovenia, they were making skis until _____, making skiing popular _____ telephones and modern electronic equipment and the combination of all the historical resentments among the various people of Yugoslavia. The hatred by the communist government over the war, but also the growing economic resentments with Slovenes saying, "We work hard. Why do we have to subsidize the Macedonians?" There were definitely those kinds of resentments and the system that Tito set up to replace him was extremely cumbersome and clumsy. It could not change rapidly. It could change but it was very ossified. So there were growing pressures economically and a system that could not respond to those pressures. That being said, in 1985, you did not see this kind of suffering.

By 1987, you had the first stirrings of Slovenia and Croatia going their separate ways. They started doing things. There was universal conscription for men. The old rule had been you always got assigned to a state or province or whatever you called them that was not your own. So if you were a Slovene, you would get assigned to someplace that was not Slovenian; if you were Bosnian, not Bosnia. The ostensible reason for that was it helped to promote brotherhood and unity throughout Yugoslavia, as you will remember, and got people out of their homes and meeting people and others. Presumably, the real reason for mini-states that require significant police or military presence was that it is easier if the police or military come in and crack down on demonstrators or disturbances. It is much easier to do that when it's not. So, the Slovenes in 1987 started saying things like, "When our young men are conscripted, they will only serve in our units; they are not going to serve in other units." There were the first things like that happening.

In 1985, we were certainly aware of issues left over from World War II. For instance, one of the things that happened was that there was a man named Andrea Artukovich, who had been the Interior Minister in Croatia during the war. He was extradited from the United States, I think in 1985 or 1986. He had been the head of the camps in Croatia during the war. He had come to America and claimed, as many people did, that he was anti-communist and that is why he needed asylum to be given residence. Finally, the United States had years and years later when he was quite old, stripped him of his citizenship in the United States and sent him back for trial in Yugoslavia. The reactions to that, the difference in reactions to that… On the day he was flown back in I was called, and so was almost everyone in the Embassy, by friends in Serbia, colleagues, contacts saying, "Come over and have some vinyac and celebrate the fact that this war criminal has finally

been returned to justice." Meanwhile, our consulate in Zagreb was getting bomb threats, as the United States had returned this great hero for trial.

So the differences in the way the war was understood, and those issues were still very clear and strong.

Q: What happened after that?

BOGUE: Artukovich was found guilty and sentenced to death. Then the court made the sensible decision that while they reviewed his medical status, he would just sit in prison until he died of natural causes. They actually did not want to execute him. They didn't want that kind of disturbance. I remember at the trial that his lawyers argued that he should not be punished because he was already so old, sick and frail. I remember the prosecutors saying that because of him, a great many people did not have an opportunity to become old, sick and frail. It was a tremendously emotional event all over Yugoslavia, for different reasons.

Q: I remember, back when I was in Yugoslavia in 1962 to 1967, Artukovich was very much a name that came up every time you mentioned Serbia. He was basically the Himmler of the Croatian Ustashi government, and he was getting very strong support from his brother or somebody, a wealthy contractor, in California. He contributed very heavily to the Republican Party. Also, the fact that he was portrayed as being anti-communist. It was a nasty case.

BOGUE: Right. I think there is no genuine question of his guilt, partly because he engaged in some of this himself. He wasn't just a bureaucrat. He would actually go out to the camp and he would actually kill people. So that was there.

Maybe not for this time, but one of the things that might be interesting for the record, is that one of the things I did in Yugoslavia was when Kurt Waldheim's full Nazi past was unveiled when he was going to become President of Austria. He had served in Bosnia, as well as in Thessaloniki. I was the person who went through military archives in Yugoslavia to look for the records because I read German as well as Serbo-Croatian. And because I was so junior, I was expendable for several weeks, which I spent in the archives. That might be a fun thing to do next time.

Q: I am thinking that this is probably a good place to stop at.

So, we have talked about the general situation in Yugoslavia when you were there as a junior officer in 1985 to 1987, and we talked about the Artukovich case. We will talk about the Waldheim case, what you did and how the embassy operated at the time. Did you get out to Macedonia, Bosnia? And the relations with our Consul General in Zagreb and how that worked. What were you doing as a junior political officer? So, we have quite a bit to talk about.

Today is June 18th, 2007. Janet, do you want to say something? We will do a little test.

BOGUE: Sure. We'll see if this works a little better if I speak into the microphone more.

Q: I want to talk about the Waldheim case. It is rather appropriate. You might explain why.

BOGUE: We left off last time mentioning the investigation into Kurt Waldheim's war crime activities. As the irony of the universe would have it, he passed away this week and there were a lot of obituaries that focused very heavily on his war crime activities and the questions about his Nazi or non-Nazi past.

While I was in Belgrade was when this issue first came up. It was a revelation in, I believe, an Austrian newspaper. It may have originally come out of a Yugoslav newspaper and then been picked up by an Austrian one.

Q: This was during the time you were there?

BOGUE: Right. It was in 1986, maybe 1987. Waldheim had, in fact, participated in wartime atrocities in the Balkans during the Second World War, being a member of the German army. Waldheim's own official position had always been that he had served on the Russian front, been wounded, and spent the rest of the war in Austria. In fact, that turned out not to be true. The Office of Special Investigations in the Justice Department, which was the office that essentially chased Nazis in the United States, asked if we could work with the Yugoslavs to see what records they had. This newspaper article referenced the military archives of Yugoslavia.

So I was dispatched to do that, partly because I read both Serbo-Croatian and German; partly because I had done my graduate work in history and knew my way around an archive; and partly because I was a junior officer and expendable for several weeks. If I were out of the office for several weeks, it really wouldn't have a big impact on the embassy. Off I went to the military archives of Yugoslavia, which was absolutely fascinating for a number of reasons.

One was that there were a lot of older gents in there who found it a refuge from crammed apartments, full of children, in-laws and grandchildren. They were all writing their "How I Won the Partisan War" memoirs. I found them very engaging. We started taking doughnut breaks together and I heard their stories about being partisans in the Second World War, which was absolutely fascinating.

The records in the archives were actually records that had been captured from the Croatian fascist government, the Ustashi government, and from the Germans at the end of the war. It was really heartbreaking. What you would have is an order in German, coming from the German military headquarters in Croatia to the government of Croatia, saying, for instance, "All the Jews of Andaluca are to be rounded up by such-and-such a date and delivered to the camp at Jasenovac, the infamous concentration camp.

Q: Where was the camp located?

BOGUE: In Croatia.

Then you would see, attached to it in Croatian on the letterhead of the Croatian government, a thing that says, "In connection with your order of such-and-such a date, all the Jews of Andaluca numbering so many men, so many women, so many children, were delivered to the train station at such-and-such a time, and put on the train to Jasenovac Camp.

The thing one always hears about but I had never seen in person, this very banal and bureaucratic transaction involving all these lives. So I spent about two weeks in the archives. What I was essentially doing was a reconnaissance mission for the Office of Special Investigation, figuring out if there was enough in those archives for them to send over a team of specialists to look at them. I did as much research as I could. The old chaps at the archives were very supportive. Many of them were hard of hearing. One morning, when I came in and sat down, I could hear one of them say, "Who is she?" Another one said, "She is from the American Embassy."

Q: This is Tape 3, Side 1 with Janet Bogue.

BOGUE: Various people who worked at the archives, civilian and military, would arrive at my desk with a box of things and say, "You might want to look at this." I was trying to find it by the archival methods I had been taught, but obviously they knew the archives very well.

Q: What was the attitude there? Were they purely professional? How were the Yugoslavs treating you?

BOGUE: They were treating me extremely well. The Director and military officers, I would say they were both professional and extremely friendly and hospitable in the way you will remember from your days. I started going in the morning and leaving at noon, so that I wouldn't spend the whole afternoon drinking vinyac. It was professional, but all work stopped at three while they all go and have a vinyac. They were very helpful to me. They very much wanted Waldheim's activities to be revealed. That was clear because they were appalled that he had attained the position with the UN that he had while lying about his activities during the war.

Q: Were they quite familiar with Waldheim? Was this well known?

BOGUE: They were well aware of his unit and his activities. Before his unit went to Thessaloniki, where it became quite infamous, it had been in Croatia and in Muslim Bosnia, the parts of Bosnia that had been occupied by Croatia – Andaluca and that region, Sarajevo and so on – and they were well aware of the activities of that unit there. I think they were incensed that Waldheim would carry off this level of deception.

In a funny way, having been through the war, I think they would have accepted it had he said, "Yes. I served there. It was terrible. In war, terrible things happen." The fact that he tried to conceal it and so on. There was also, again, as you will remember, a great deal of pro-American sentiment about the war in Serbia because we were seen as allies.

In fact, one of the great fun things I did – there are so many fun things you get to do in embassies – a group of four farmers from Ohio who had all been part of one air crew that was bombing Romanian oil fields. They had been shot and the plane damaged. They managed to limp back over Serbia, actually Burvadena, and bail out over Burvadena. They had been rescued by Partisans, smuggled out to the coast, taken aboard a British submarine, and returned to allied care through this kind of underground railway of Partisans. They came back. There were eight on the original crew; four were still living. One of the farmers in Ohio organized them all to make a great return trip.

I went with them. We went up to Burvadena where they actually met the then old man who had been the young Partisan leader of their village. The tears flowed. The alcohol flowed. When we arrived, a young man who was then the mayor of the town, or some official in the region, pulled out of his pocket and held out to me a pocketknife. One of these guys had given him this when he was a small boy in the town. He still had it, all these years later, this army air force issue pocket knife. It was a grand thing. There was a lot of strong sentiment that during the war we had been allies. We had fought the Germans together. It was genuine; it wasn't put on.

I had a very warm welcome in the archives, including from the other patrons. We started taking doughnut breaks together. This was part of my thing because they all ate doughnuts in the archives, with the jelly spilling on the records. It drove me crazy. We would go outside and they could smoke. Everyone smoked in the archives. The kind of things you would never see here where essentially you walk into the archives with a pencil and nothing else.

Q: Did you have any feeling that there were people in there looking to get things on Croatians and all that at that time?

BOGUE: Not the patrons who were there when I was there. As far as I knew, no one was working on the same set of records I was, which included these records that had been captured from the Ustashi government. They included a lot of things that were not related to the German army. I looked through them out of curiosity and to see if I could find German army records in there. No one else seemed to be working on those. The things people were working on were these personal projects, writing their memoirs. From what I saw, not a lot of memoir writing was being done. It was kind of a social club, a sort of VFW (Veterans of Foreign Wars) or American Legion. Everyone lived in these crammed apartments. At the archives, there was heat in the winter and air conditioning in the summer. There were like-minded fellows around. People came, drank coffee, and hung out.

Q: In sum, did you set the path towards further investigation?

BOGUE: I think that's a good way to describe it. In my own mind, it was clear to me that Waldheim's unit was up to its neck in the transfer and deportation of Jews, Roma, and others.

Q: Roma, being gypsies?

BOGUE: Right. I never found a smoking gun, as it were, in the sense of something with Waldheim's signature ordering that. The unit he was in, which was an intelligence unit, only had a handful of officers. There were only three or four officers. The unit was doing all this. If he were unaware of it, he was the most incompetent officer in the German army. I am not saying that is not possible. He also received a number of awards in the course of time. Again, people get awards when they don't deserve them sometimes. The fact is that he had to at least be aware of it, even if not personally culpable.

Q: Just to sort of finish this off: what was that unit doing?

BOGUE: In Bosnia, which was the part I looked at the most, it was essentially the liaison between the German army, the Croatian police, and the Interior Ministry. The German army gave the instructions and the police of Croatia obeyed. It was Waldheim's unit that was issuing those instructions. Those instructions included deportation of people: Jews, Roma, and political undesirables to camps.

Q: Was the camp a death camp or was it a place where they collected them and then sent them off to a death camp?

BOGUE: It was itself a death camp. To go back to the Artukovich case, many of those crimes were committed when he was in charge of Jasenovac Camp. It definitely was a death camp. It has become, of course, a huge issue between Croatia and Serbia, about what actually transpired at Jasenovac. I think it is quite clear from the historical records that it was a death camp.

Q: After you came back with this, what happened?

BOGUE: We sent off a very detailed description of what was in the records. Based on that, the Department of Justice sent a team of researchers, historians, people with proper linguistic skills and historical training. They set up camp in the archives for quite a long time and did the work. Out of a lot of that work came the eventual travel ban on Waldheim. A lot of that was based on material from the archives.

Q: Did your work get into the papers?

BOGUE: Our own, the embassy work? No. Do you mean the local papers?

Q: Yes.

BOGUE: No. When the Department of Justice came, Neil Sheraton himself came and was head of OSI at that time. He and his team met with government officials. That was heavily covered in the press. They always graciously thanked the embassy for its help and support. The fact that I was working, beavering away in the archives, another good reason to send a junior officer is that people in the archives knew. Military people who were quite disciplined knew it was premature to say anything. The right time would be if the Justice Department came. I stayed in touch with the Justice people, once they came, to see what they were finding. Of course, what they found was what I had found to a great extent, but in a lot more detail. They went through every single piece of paper there.

Q: Were people coming at you in the archives saying, "Hey, look at this?"

BOGUE: They did. The Director of the archives was a colonel in the army. He would often sit down and chat with me about how things were going. He would make suggestions about things I should look for. People would turn up with a box and say, "Here, you should look at this." You mentioned before about were people out to get Croatians. Sometimes what they brought me were some records from the Croatian fascist government that were not related to the German army. I was only looking for Waldheim related things. I was only looking for the interface with the German army. Sometimes they just brought me these things.

For instance, one woman who worked there brought me a whole box of records. Abortion was illegal in Croatia then. They had taken this sort of a step further. Any woman who was admitted to hospital with a miscarriage was subjected to police interrogation to ensure that it was a genuine miscarriage and not somehow an abortion or attempted abortion. There were these pages of interviews with these women, often heartbreaking. Some woman saying, "My husband and I have been married for eight years. We have been trying and trying with no success to have children. I finally became pregnant and then had a miscarriage. I have been praying to St. Jude." These policemen were then saying, "Did you take any medicine before you had this? Did you consult anyone?" They were trying to find evidence of this. There were boxes and boxes of this stuff. It was incredible.

It is the kind of thing you see in a police state, regardless of the ideology. Every kind of detail of people's lives being subject to this very intense scrutiny.

Q: For somebody looking at this, this is just a reminder that the Croatian government at the time was very Catholic and took one of the strictest views of Catholicism. It was obvious one reason why they took this view on abortion.

BOGUE: Right. I am not having a quarrel with them having this law. The intensity to which these cases, and in some cases, then interviewing. I remember in the case of one woman – I didn't read through all of these because it was off the point – but I got started and got fascinated with one case, interviewing the woman who had miscarried, her husband, the woman's mother, the neighbor, and so on. All of them attested to the fact

that this young woman was in fact very distressed that she hadn't been able to have children, and that they couldn't imagine that she would be.

Q: While we are on the subject, did you run across any women subjected to a rape? This is wartime.

BOGUE: No, but by this time in the records, Croatia is quite stable at this point. There wasn't fighting going on. In every case that I looked at – again, I looked at a sliver of all the cases – the woman was married and the husband was the presumed father, and they were being investigated in case it was an attempted abortion.

Q: Then, you came back after this intense, fascinating look at the war. Anybody who serves in the Balkans – there are various times, you aren't necessarily going to 1487 – history is always with you in the Balkans. This was recent history. What were you up to?

BOGUE: In terms of my other work?

Q: Yes, your other work.

BOGUE: I had a wonderful and eclectic portfolio. I covered religious groups, minority groups, and two of the republics that were considered insufficiently important to give to a more senior person which were Bosnia and Montenegro. I traveled all over Yugoslavia for fun, and my own pleasure and edification. I spent a lot of time in Bosnia and a lot of time in Montenegro.

Q: When I made my trips, I always made sure for social security, that I had _____.

BOGUE: Some of the best scenery, not to mention the best beer and fish.

Q: Let's talk about some of the minorities. In the first place, did you get the Roma?

BOGUE: I did.

Q: Let's talk about the Roma as you observed at the time.

BOGUE: It was very interesting because there was a kind of two tier of Roma in Yugoslavia that I saw at the time.

One was people who were well integrated into society but the King of the Gypsies as he was called, was actually a man who was a poet and a professor at the University of Belgrade who was the titular King of the Gypsies. He lived in an apartment in Belgrade. I got to know him quite well. Then there were a lot of events. For instance, the Jewish community and the Roma community did a lot of commemorative World War Two events together because they had both been victims of the Nazis. They did them with the Serbs because all of them had been victimized by the Nazis. Part of the "Bratstvo I

jedinstvo" (Brotherhood and Unity) business, of course, was to include the Roma. On the other hand, the Roma, in many cases, were living in the lowest possible economic realms in Yugoslavia, often in extremely poor housing. There was still an unresolved problem within the Roma because the Yugoslav government, like most European governments, had decided that the Roma should be a settled people; that they should live in apartments in cities. They should not move from place to place. They should have settled occupations. The children should be going to regular schools. For many of the Roma, this was a great conflict with their own cultural desires and interests. There was that sort of conflict.

Then there was the sort of Roma who were well integrated and who were part of the system, in a sense, including some at fairly senior levels.

I looked also at some of the other – when they said minority groups, they didn't mean Serbs, Croats, or Slovenes. They meant Ruthenians, Vlachs; some of these very tiny groups that were in Yugoslavia at the time.

Q: Where were the Vlachs from and where were they located?

BOGUE: The Vlachs were maybe on the northeastern fringe. Maybe you find Vlachs in a bit from Ukraine all the way over to Poland, Hungary, the old Czechoslovakia, and into Romania. They were a very small number of people. There were Vlachs in Bosnia during the war. Ruthenians I knew a bit better. They were Eastern Rite Catholics who also were in that jumbled region of Eastern Poland, Western Ukraine, all through that region where peoples are quite mixed. These were very tiny groups that had not been given the distinction of being a nationality under the Yugoslav constitution.

Q: In looking at them, was this the role of playing ethnologist? Was there anything going on there that was of interest?

BOGUE: The questions were more issues of human rights and things. One of the ironies of the Yugoslav setup at the time was that it recognized various nationalities and had set up all these schemes to rotate all those nationalities through positions of power. Of course, if you were in one of these tiny groups, there wasn't really a spot. There was no point at which a Ruthenian rotated to the Presidency. You had to be a Slovene, a Croat, a Bosnian, a Serb, a Macedonian, a Montenegrin. There were special arrangements for the Hungarians and the Kosovar Albanians. It was the people in even tinier groups than that.

I wasn't being an ethnologist. Personally, I love talking to people about those kinds of things. It was more looking at questions of human rights. A much bigger part of my portfolio was religious groups and their rights and their relationship with the government.

Q: The government at that time, I imagine they were a signature to the Helsinki Accords. How did they stand as we were looking at the human rights element?

BOGUE: Remembering that at that time everything was seen through the prism of the Cold War and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, they were way, way ahead. There was much more freedom of movement. People came and went. They traveled as guest workers and on vacation to European countries. You could hold a passport without a problem. There was much less of an onerous police state atmosphere than there was in the Eastern Bloc. There was actual encouragement of these groups to hold cultural festivals and the like.

On the other hand, there was still censorship. The media at the time was all controlled by the government. Employment was controlled by the government. For various jobs, you had to be a Communist Party member. It was officially a one-party state. It wasn't what we would consider full human rights. I would say they have not lived up to all the Helsinki Accords. They were a lot further on that path than most communist societies. Even if you look at their neighbor Albania, at the time which was under Hoxha, one of the most extreme.

Q: It and North Korea were probably the two most extreme and oppressive regimes.

BOGUE: Right. I think that we certainly had human rights issues while I was there. One of the big ones was abuse of psychiatry against political opponents. That was a tremendous issue at the time. There were similar kinds of issues, but it was not in the dire human rights league of the very oppressive governments.

Q: Did you get into, or was it too big for a junior officer, the Kosovar issue.

BOGUE: It was definitely too big for a junior officer. Other people covered that. I did visit Kosovo while I was in Yugoslavia. As I said, I covered Bosnia and Montenegro. I did not cover Kosovo. I didn't have any Albanian language training. Incidentally, we didn't have anyone formally trained in Albanian in the Embassy, but our Consul General, Bill Ryerson, essentially taught himself Albanian because we had so many Albanian speaking consular cases and visa applicants. On the strength of that, it helped to establish our embassy when we did open in Tirana, and he became our first Ambassador in Albania. It was all because of visa applicants.

Have you talked to Bill?

Q: Somebody has. Have you seen him?

BOGUE: I haven't seen him recently. He has retired here in Virginia somewhere. I think they live in Charlottesville or someplace in Virginia. He had a very interesting time in the Balkans as well.

Q: What were you picking up, because all hell was going to break loose shortly? When you were going into Bosnia, what were you getting out of Bosnia after a time? You were there from when to when?

BOGUE: I was there from 1985 to 1987. In Bosnia, in the cities like Sarajevo and Mostar, I didn't see any of what was to come. What I saw were quite cosmopolitan places. Of course, Sarajevo had hosted the Olympics just a few years before. It was quite a cosmopolitan place. People went to each other's holidays. I know that because I went with them often. When I was visiting one time, the Deputy Mayor of Sarajevo at the time, I had a meeting with him and he had to rush off because he was off to his neighbor's saint's name day. This is like a birthday. If you are Orthodox, you have the name of one of the saints as your confirmation name, and that day, you celebrate as if it were a birthday. One of his neighbors who was a very dear friend was having his name day. I was supposed to see him there later. He said, "Why don't you just come with me? We will drop in on name day. It will be a thrill for my neighbor to have a foreign guest on name day. Then we will go on to the other event."

He wasn't going because he was the Deputy Mayor. He was going because it was his neighbor. The crowd at the name day party was a huge mix of Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim people. They all were all neighbors and friends from school days. We see this later when Karjich had a Muslim best man at his wedding, just a few years before he kind of promised the Muslims they would all be slaughtered in the street. In the cities, you saw that.

In the countryside, which I saw only by driving and traveling through, it tended to be much more in another century. You would leave sophisticated Sarajevo and go 20 miles down the road, and see people plowing their fields with oxen. There were people dressed in what we would consider folkloric costumes, but were their normal wear.

Q: To me, the most vivid experience I had was that one time, I had a ride in an ox cart. My god, those things are slow!

BOGUE: And bumpy! There are no shock absorbers on those things.

Q: If you are living near ox carts, it's a different world.

Did you get any sampling of what… When you talk about the Church in Bosnia, you really can't talk about a Muslim … They really weren't very Muslim, were they?

BOGUE: No. Well there was a multi, a wulmayet on many occasions. Again, remember that all the churches had to make some sort of arrangement or accommodation with the communist government. You are not going to get somebody who isn't ready to state the party line, in a sense, among these folks at the time. Muslims by an odd quirk of history were Europeans who became Muslims during the Ottoman period. A combination of their own history there and the recent communist history meant that they had a completely Europeanized education. People dressed in Western European ways.

The distinction for me is that I later served in Pakistan. The difference between Pakistan as a Muslim state and Bosnia as a place with a largely Muslim population is quite amazing to me. The first time I went to Sarajevo, I actually arrived by train in the winter

in a heavy snowstorm. I arrived on Friday night and the mosque was letting out, and here were all these tall, blond guys in Rossignol ski parkas coming out of the mosque. It is not what Americans think of as Islam.

Again, this was a communist world. People were careful not to display their faith too ostentatiously. They could do it. They weren't being prevented from attending services by the state, but there was a line that I think people understood and didn't cross. That was true of all the faiths, not just Islam. People drank alcohol. People ate pork. People wore tank tops and shorts, things like that. It was not the kind of things that Americans, when they think of Islam, they think of a sort of Wahabi Saudi form of Islam. Certainly, that was not what you saw. I visited Turkey while I was in Yugoslavia, and I guess it was more westernized than Turkey at the time.

Q: Let's take the Orthodox Church first. Did you get any feel for what the Orthodox Church was doing there? Was there any hint of their passing on prejudice and hatred, that sort of thing, which you were picking up?

BOGUE: I would say yes and no to that. The Patriarch Garamond, I think, was not in that business. You will probably remember the old saying that the Serbian Church says "all our Bishops are either saints or brigands." I think he fell more on the saintly side than the brigand side. Certainly, if you got some of the bishops started talking, they would talk about the suffering of the Serbs in the Second World War. As you yourself recall, they were much more obsessed with the Turkish period, in a funny way, with the Ottomans, than with recent history.

I was more interested, first of all, finding that kind of line of what the Church was allowed and not allowed to do, what it's relationship with the government was, and how they accommodated themselves psychologically or even theologically to the communist government. The answer was that they took a very long view that governments are temporary; they are made by human beings. The Church is made by God and is eternal, and will go on no matter what the ups and downs and flips of temporal life are.

The first problem I had with the Orthodox Church was just getting to see them because of gender. My boss was Dick Miles in the Political Section. When he told them I was going to come and see them, they said fine. They didn't realize at the time that Janet was a woman's name. Since it ends in a consonant, it would be typically a man's name in Slavic languages. They told Dick when they realized that I was female that they would really rather I didn't come to see them and be the person from the embassy who covered them. So Dick handled this in a very wonderful way. He was very supportive of me, but he didn't get confrontational with the Church. He just sort of scratched his head and said, "Well, let's see. She will be here for two years. Who knows who will follow her? It could be a woman. It could be a man in that job. Maybe in two years, we will have someone to work with you again, but maybe not."

He didn't say, "Yes, we will swap her out and put someone else in." He made it clear that that is who it was going to be from the embassy. They either had to work with me or not

see people from the embassy. So they very quickly agreed to see me and I actually developed very warm relationships with a number of the bishops in the Orthodox Church after that.

Their views on gender were not what Americans would consider progressive. In fact, we had a multi-religious delegation from the United States come, and they were very worried because there was a woman minister. She was in fact a nun who was the President of Marymount Manhattan, and that was fine. A nun was fine.

Q: How about your name? Which means " God"?

BOGUE: I didn't tumble to quite what a problem that was going to be at first. It first struck me when I would call a restaurant to make a reservation. Of course, what they are hearing is, "This is God. Table for four." If it were really God, it would be a table for 13. People would just hang up the phone as if it were a prank call. Then, it made the church people very uncomfortable that I had this surname. So I decided that since no one in Yugoslavia could tell with Americans what was their first name and what was their surname, I would just use my first name. I was just known as Janet. Some people called me Miss or Mrs. Janet, thinking it was a surname. Others called me Janet, thinking it was a first name. It was all fine with me. I didn't much care what I was called.

Q: How about the Catholic Church?

BOGUE: I had less contact with the Catholic Church because the Archbishop and everyone were in Zagreb, and covered by the consulate there. I did work quite a bit with the Papal Nuncio who was in Belgrade. I talked to him a great deal about his efforts to kind of heal what he saw. There were two things. One was to protect the rights of Catholics and the rights of religion generally in a communist state. Two, to heal some of the bitterness left over from the Second World War, from the sense that the Croatian fascists had been somehow allied with the Pope or with the Catholic Church.

The most interesting thing I found about the Catholic Church the whole time I was there was that there had been believed to have been an apparition of the Virgin Mary at a place called Medjugorje in Bosnia, right outside of Mostar. I went down to visit because there was an American woman who claimed there were severe human rights abuses going on, that the police were beating everyone. This was actually not true at all. It turned out she was a consular case who was very severely mentally ill. The priests there were only too glad to turn her over.

The interesting thing about the Catholic Church there was that the apparition was strongly supported by the Franciscan brothers who were there, and strongly opposed by the regular diocesan Catholic clergy. It was one of the reasons why no Pope, and the Catholic Church generally, had not declared this an official apparition like some of the other ones. It's kind of an informal pilgrimage site.

But the fight that raged between them was a typical Yugoslav kind of fight. All these letters to the editor started up in the Mostar paper between the Franciscans and the regular clergy. They all went straight back to the 15th century, with the Franciscans saying, "During the Great Plague, you all ran back to Rome. We stayed here and died with the people." This same obsession with who did what hundreds of years ago was spilling over into, is this a real apparition of the Virgin Mary to these school children, or is it not? Who is going to control the site? And so on.

That was my only real contact with clergy on the ground.

Q: Did you settle any arguments?

BOGUE: I did not.

Q: When you were talking to the Papal Nuncio, did you get any feel for Pope John Paul coming from Poland and being a Slav? Did that have any resonance? Also, his dealing with the Soviet communist world, did that have any resonance in Yugoslavia?

BOGUE: A bit, although again, Yugoslavia had diplomatic relations with the Vatican. It had a much more open religious environment than the Warsaw Pact countries had. So the situation was not nearly as fraught. In fact, the Papal Nuncio had only been in Belgrade for a year. His name was Antonio Calsuono. Despite his name, he was Argentine. He was called back to the Vatican by John Paul to be the first head of the new office John Paul created for relations with Warsaw Pact countries. This was John Paul's attempt to create a much different relationship between the Vatican and those countries. So Calsuono went back. We were neighbors as well as friends and colleagues, and he came to see me to tell me he was leaving. He was rather disappointed because he had only been in Belgrade a year and felt he was just starting to make some progress on some of these issues. He was in the diplomatic service, which I knew very little about. He said that, well you know, diplomatic services are the same the world over. I said, "What happened?" He said, "I was called. The guy in charge of our human resources said, 'The Holy Father wants you to return to Rome.'" Calsuono said, "Mind you, this man is a Jesuit." Calsuono was not. He said, "I told him I would have to pray about it." An answer I never thought to give any of my career development officers. "The phone rang two hours later and the Jesuit in Rome said, 'The Holy Father wants to know if you have finished praying yet.'" At that point, Calsuono said, "Tell me when I should appear in Rome." He submitted to his fate, but did an excellent job. I followed him from afar and he really did a great job.

The people who have been in Zagreb can tell you a lot more. There were still the issues of the Archbishop who was under house arrest, Stepinac, starting the process of being beatified.

Q: Stepinac being the Cardinal Archbishop during the Nazi occupation.

BOGUE: He was then under house arrest for the rest of his life. There were people who wanted him beatified and sainted. It was a very awkward issue for the Vatican.

Q: I have to admit my Belgrade prejudice because I was there. I got that the Catholic Church played an unhappy role, and I am using the term politely, against the Serbs particularly in the Croatian area during World War II.

BOGUE: And sad to say, much as the Serbian church during the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the very end.

Q: This brings me to a subject: were we looking at what the churches were doing, not with their pronouncements, but at the parish priest level, Orthodox and Catholic, usually with the mothers who were raising the kids? The fathers were somewhat out of it. One has a feeling that it was the women who attended church services in both faiths. Some of the poison came out of the mother's milk. It was learned at the mother's knee.

BOGUE: I would agree with that. I would also say, and this comes directly out of my experience working with religious groups, is that even among those who never attended church, the cultural identification of your ethnicity with a particular religion was so strong. For instance, I went and spent a lot of time with a small group of Baptists in Yugoslavia. It was fascinating to me because I interviewed a lot of them at length about what had brought them to be interested in being Baptist and this alternative form of religiosity. Protestantism was not at all understood. I had a very funny experience once when someone asked me in Yugoslavia what my religious background was. When I said Protestant, he said, "Are they those people in airports?" He was meaning the Hare Krishna at the time. People knew about Judaism, Islam, Catholicism, and Orthodoxy. It was stunning sometimes to Yugoslavs to learn that Protestantism was even the state religion in places like Sweden and Norway and England. There was not much understanding of this. There was a small group of Baptists, just as there were small groups of Jehovah's Witnesses, which was another big human rights issue for us because they refused conscription.

I went out and interviewed a lot of these Baptists. What was so interesting to me was that significant numbers, because I was in Belgrade, were mostly Serbs and a few Hungarians, they never attended Orthodox, or Catholic in the case of the Hungarians, services any more. They attended only Baptist ones and they were very devout. They went to Bible study. They went to men's groups. They went to this and that. They had declined baptism in the Baptist adult immersion in the Danube sort of way because it would be so upsetting to their extended families because that is a sign of turning your back on your cultural heritage. For them to say, "I have been baptized as a Baptist" means, "I am not a Serb anymore" or "I am not a Hungarian anymore." People didn't make a distinction between their ethnic background, their cultural heritage and their religious affiliation. So that if you are a Serb, you are Orthodox; if you are a Croat, you are Catholic; if you are Hungarian, you are Catholic. And to accept baptism as a Baptist, even though you have as far as we would be concerned become a Baptist in your practice and your religious thinking, would be to deny your culture, to deny your parents.

I remember one man saying to me, "Well, I can't be baptized as a Baptist. I would like to be, but it would be to deny my parents. It would be as if I had no parents because my parents are Serbs and therefore, they are Orthodox." That to me was the most interesting aspect of religion. People didn't go much to church. They might go to a church wedding or a church funeral. They didn't go to church much. Even those who weren't wrapped up in Communist Party things didn't go to church much, except as you say the little old ladies. And rural women tended to go to church. Men tended to watch soccer on Sundays, not go to church. There was still this intense identification that if you are from this ethnic group, you therefore are of this religious group and no sense that your religious and ethnic identities could be distinct or different, but somehow compatible

Q: In a way, it runs to… I have always sort of identified myself as a Christian, although the older I get, the more I'm a rock hard atheist. I think the whole thing doesn't make any sense. In a way, why fight?

Did you get any feeling of what was going on in the local churches? Because we are talking about, I don't know if it's Croatian or Catholicism or Serbianism or Orthodoxism, but these people are out killing each other within a decade from the time you were there. Did you get any feel for what was stirring this up?

BOGUE: Not at that level. The only sort of parish church level things I attended were actually from the non-major religious groups, the Baptists, the Jews. I know I went to a Passover with a small Jewish community and a small group of Lutherans who were in the Vukavar area. I didn't get at that parish level. The only time I came close was when I visited a couple of women's cloisters or nunneries that were way up in the Serbian hills, like so many of them, tucked away from the Turks. These are contemplative; the nuns do not work in the world. They are not teachers and nurses. They do all have some sort of craft or trade. They might make honey or paint icons or something, or sell church vestments, but they stay apart. Typically, girls would enter them just after puberty. And if not, a decision typically made by an adult woman but a young woman, girl. What stunned me in most cases was really how completely cut off they were. Of course, they didn't have television or radio.

I remember when I actually spent the night in one of these. A woman could be their overnight guest. I spent the night. Some of the best, I must say, homemade lakia I have ever had. They had their own little store. There were only about 12 sisters there, ranging in age from the very old to a woman probably in her 20s. They raised their own vegetables and they had a milk cow. They were pretty self-sufficient.

I had arrived with coffee, sugar and things that were hard to get, as gifts. After dinner, there was an hour or so when everyone read to themselves, not communally, but read on their own. I had brought a book, in English of course, to read. The sister sitting next to me, who was probably in her 50s or 60s, asked me what I was reading. I replied what the book was about. She said, "No, what's that you are reading?" I said, "It's in English." And she said, "No, what's that you are reading?" She had actually never seen the Latin alphabet. She asked me what it was. Then she had me write it all out. I showed her where

the convergences were with the Cyrillic alphabet; we wrote that all out too. We wrote her name and my name in both alphabets.

Then she said, "Those are the two alphabets in the world, are they?" I said, "Oh no." I realized then that this is an extreme case of someone who came into this remote thing at the age of 14 or 15 and really had seen nothing of the world. Again, not everywhere in the Serbian context, I found bitterness about the Second World War, but I didn't find people actively preaching hatred or revenge.

Q: Within the Jewish community, I know it was small, but was there – I am trying to think back and I can't really recall – any anti-Semitism that I think maybe just because there wasn't enough to do at the time – did you get any feel for that?

BOGUE: No and interestingly, the Jewish community was probably on a better footing with the government than any other religious community because a lot of the early Communists were Jews. The Chief of Staff of the Parsons, Moishe Piata; Moishe is Moses. Tito's doctor was a Jew. The fellow who was the head of the Jewish community when I was there was named Vladislav Karlberg. He was, as I recall, quite senior in the administration at the university. The Jewish community had not been in opposition to the Communist government and often had been fully involved in the creation of the members of it; not as a community but maybe members of it. Tito's doctor, who was someone I got to know, went to Jerusalem for Passover every year.

In fact, we had one of these funny experiences where an American group came over. I was accompanying them, but they didn't check with us first and I didn't know they were going to do this. There was a rabbi with them and we went to see the Jewish group. They had an aide open up a suitcase and they said, "I have sort of smuggled you matzo for Passover." The rabbi started laughing and said, "Janet might explain to you where the Jewish members of the embassy get their matzo." It was true. Every year, he called me up before Passover and said, "How many Jews are in the embassy this year? I will send over some matzo." You couldn't buy it locally, but he had it. He didn't have to smuggle it. He just got it in Germany or wherever, and he gave it to us. I would go around the embassy and ask who needed matzo for Passover. I would say that we needed three boxes or four boxes this year, and he would drop it off. Here was this somewhat condescending American saying, "Poor benighted oppressed fellow, here is your matzo" when in fact they were our suppliers for the Jewish members of the embassy.

They were actually on good terms. You are also right; the community was small. The large community had been in Bosnia, in Sarajevo, which was wiped out during the war, almost to a person. Sarajevo had actually had both Sephardic and Ashkenazi populations, both very large. They actually had one Yiddish speaking and one Ladino speaking rabbinical seminary. They had a very vital and active Jewish community life there, which was destroyed completely in World War II and has only recovered in the tiniest amount. There are just a handful of Jews in Sarajevo.

Q: While you were doing Bosnia, what about the Croatian, the Serb enclave, to the west? What was that called? In Bosnia.

BOGUE: There is the Kraina in Croatia.

Q: What about the Croatians in Bosnia?

BOGUE: There were the Croatians in the west of Bosnia, Serbs mostly in the northeast, and the Muslim population tended to be more urbanized and more numerous in the cities than in the countryside, although Mostar was for the most part, largely a Croatian city at the time. I visited a lot of folks there. At the time, all the government officials, all the university officials, all the media officials, were all of the school that, "Yes, there had been terrible problems in the war but now, relations are so much better." Sarajevo was the only place where I really spent enough time and developed enough friendships to see people at home, and see people interacting with their neighbors and their friends where I really did think people were quite relaxed about these things. In fact, the statistics say that before the recent war, in say the 1970s and 1980s, something like a third of all the marriages in Sarajevo crossed ethnic lines. I don't think there is really bitter hatred. I don't think you have that many …

Q: Well, we are seeing an example of when people start working at it. In Baghdad today where Sunnis and Shiites are killing each other, where it wasn't a big deal. You can stoke these things up.

BOGUE: I think when we get to the point of looking at the war itself that is really one of the interesting things to try to understand. What did take a situation? There were no active problems of that nature. There was a lot of inter-marriage. What turns that into a situation where all trust or familiarity is lost and neighbors are doing these things to neighbors?

Q: When you turned it over to Montenegro, what were you picking up there?

BOGUE: Montenegro was one of the more conservative of the republics. It was very disdainful of the Slovenes who were going green and talking about making their own way. Again, Montenegro was on the receiving end of the economic subsidies and the like. Very determined and proud of their own distinct past that the Montenegrans have, but they were not interested at all, in those days, in independence, which they felt would be a disaster for them economically. They were closely tied, not only politically but also through personal connections of property, work, schooling, with Serbia, and also to an extent with Bosnia.

It was kind of a quirky, funny little place. In the way that the Yugoslav government, you will remember, had been set up, every government office was completely replicated at every level. So you had the federal parliament and then the state or provincial republic level legislatures. Then every town had its Upsnia assembly, which had 300 people in it. Half the town would be on the town council.

Montenegro had a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a Ministry of Agriculture. It was a tiny, tiny place. I loved Montenegro. One of the things I did to amuse myself in Yugoslavia was that I got the records from the National Archives of our legation to Montenegro when it was an independent country from about 1905 to 1911 or 1912, whenever it was. Our Ambassador to Greece was accredited to Montenegro and he wrote accounts of his visits, which are in the National Archives now and are completely charming and very much like Montenegro is today.

On my trips there whenever I had free time, when I had finished my appointments and had a day or half a day to fill before our flight back, I went to the old Grand Hotel in Cetinje and found what was the old American Legat's office in rooms in the hotel. I just poked around and that part interested me, our earlier representation in Montenegro in the days when you took a ship to Kotor from whatever that port is right outside of Athens, Piraeus. Then ride horseback or donkey back up that serpentine hill to Cetinje.

I found Montenegro completely charming and fun. I didn't think of it, with apologies to my Montenegrin friends, as having nearly the significant role that for instance Bosnia had economically.

Q: As you went around, what were you picking up on the legacy of Tito? We are talking about the whole area you were covering.

BOGUE: Tito died in 1980. When I got there, it was already five years after his death. There were all these kinds of anniversary events and all this sort of cloak of Tito. I think there were a lot of mixed feelings about Tito.

One was people were sort of rolling their eyes at the post mortem deification of all these Tito celebrations and Tito this and Tito that. I think that was something people were finding a bit ridiculous. There was still a law on the books against insulting the memory of Marshal Tito.

A great junior officer job for any junior officer always is that I like to cover rock and roll bands. There was a rock and roll singer called Aldenandic, I think, who during a big outdoor concert had enormous amplifiers, which were Marshall brand from England. One of them blew during the concert. He leaned into the microphone and said, "The Marshall is dead, but the show must go on." He was given 30 days for insulting the memory of Marshal Tito.

People were beginning to think that things like that were just completely backward and embarrassing. It made Yugoslavia look idiotic in the world.

Some people looking at the rather lackluster leaders, who were then rotating through various offices, thought on the other hand that Tito had had something that others had lacked, some charisma or some style. He managed to give Yugoslavia a bit of a place in

the world that these others were not up to. The others were kind of communist bureaucrats.

And others were angry about Tito. They were angry about him imprisoning people, people like Djilos and people who were ideological foes. They were angry that he had spent a lot of Yugoslavia's literal, not figurative, capital on things like the Non-Aligned Movement when economic development lagged so much. There was a lot of concern about that.

Q: As a junior officer, usually you are more attuned to seeing if there was a generational difference. Did you see a generational difference in Yugoslavia in the areas you were covering?

BOGUE: Yes, there was starting to be. Younger people were not as interested in being Young Communists and things like that. The kind of younger people who went into the League of Communist Youth, or whatever it was, which you could be in until you were about 40, were seen as a kind of party hack types in the making. A lot of younger people were really looking towards Western Europe for a model, and to the United States to some extent. Whether it was music or art, or what they were writing, there was a very kind of very trendy theater scene in Belgrade, a younger person's theater scene at the time. There were a lot of rock and roll bands, some of them quite good and quite iconoclastic, certainly in Yugoslav terms.

There were little shops that started to open up that sold things that were right on the edge. There was a wonderful little shop run by a couple of guys who were artists, down in the old central square. They sold things like an apron, a sort of barbecue apron. It had the hammer and sickle on it, and it said, "Hero of the Socialist Kitchen." It wasn't anything you could arrest somebody for because you could pretend to be that with a straight face. There was a lot of irony around it. There was a lot of that, a lot of irony.

People traveled freely in Europe, so they thought things like censoring magazines was ridiculous because you could just take the ferry over to Italy and buy them there. I think there was more of a sense of the ridiculousness of it, rather the sense of being oppressed. The only young people who I think really felt oppressed, were people who were Jehovah's Witnesses, boys who would spend years in jail for refusing the draft. They were never going to be able to get jobs as teachers, because you had to be a Party member.

Q: How big was the movement there?

BOGUE: It was fairly small. Again, it was all the non-mainstream religious groups, maybe a couple of thousand. Several of whom worked at the embassy by the way because it was one of the few places where you could get jobs. Our cashier was a Jehovah's Witness. They had no law against double jeopardy in Yugoslavia. What would happen was at eighteen, a Jehovah's Witness boy would refuse to be drafted and would serve two years in jail. This is the same length of time as the army term. He would come out at age

20 and be drafted again, refuse again, and that would go on until he was 35 and no longer draft eligible. They were spending 17 years in prison. We objected to that on human rights grounds saying, okay if you don't have an alternative of non-military service but don't keep incarcerating them for the same crime.

Q: I may have pointed out that Jehovah's Witnesses were sort of a burr under the saddle of a lot of Western Europeans and the United States. They refused to salute the flag. It was a confrontational setting that caused headaches for a lot of Western leaning governments.

BOGUE: Yes, they are non-conformers wherever they are. I admired them usually in Yugoslavia because they so willingly endured what was essentially 17 years of imprisonment before they could get started on their lives again. It is a huge commitment. I admired that level of commitment.

Q: The generational gap: what about matters of sex? Did this get involved? The sexual revolution had been going along for some time.

BOGUE: The sexual revolution in Yugoslavia was compounded by the housing problem. Essentially, people had no space of their own and no privacy. People lived at home with their parents and their grandparents and their aunts and uncles, crammed into these socially owned apartments. Even when they got married, they often lived with one set of parents or another because it was almost impossible for a young couple to get an apartment of their own.

I remember a woman I was friendly with telling me when she got married and moved in with his family. They lived in his boyhood room, which still had a Snoopy bedspread. She said, "Here we are, a grown-up married couple, sleeping on a little single bed with a Snoopy bedspread."

What was even more complicated was when a couple got divorced; they often had to continue to live together because there were no other housing options. Some friends of mine were divorced and were trying to navigate dating again, when they were still living in the same apartment with their ex-spouse. How do you manage the new girlfriend or the new boyfriend plus your kids and their girlfriends and boyfriends when you are all crammed into a little apartment together?

I think that the sexual revolution for Americans was partly a matter of that it was possible. In a way it was much more difficult in Yugoslavia. It could be a fairly straight-laced society, but you would often see a lot of public displays of affection in parks and things, because people had no place else to go.

Q: I was in Naples somewhat earlier. They still had those problems and you would see cars in the public park with newspapers taped inside of these small cars, bouncing up and down, and the motor was not running. We can laugh at it but it was a serious matter.

BOGUE: The other thing in the Yugoslav context was that contraception was not readily available, nor was it readily available for married couples. A lot of the women I knew who were 40, had maybe two kids and four or five abortions. As it was in the Soviet Union, that was standard contraception at the time. There were things about the sexual revolution that were possible in America, like contraception and privacy, which were not possible there.

Q: When I was in Yugoslavia, again we are talking about the 1960s; everything was still done by state production. They never really came up with a good sanitary napkin; it was sort of cotton. This is just a bunch of guys running the economy.

BOGUE: Yes, consumer goods were terrible for the most part.

Q: Speaking of the generational gap, how did it work in the embassy? Usually young officers, and you were still of that category, often have quite a different outlook about how things should be done and recorded than the more senior officers.

BOGUE: It was a big embassy but it didn't have a lot of junior positions. It was a big embassy, not in comparison to London or Tokyo, about 80 Americans at the time. It was big compared to the Warsaw Pact embassy. This was partly because we had a huge contingent from the U.S. Information Service because they couldn't operate in all of the Warsaw Pact countries.

There was not a huge generation gap in the embassy. Most of the people in the embassy were Soviet veterans. At the time, Yugoslavia was a kind of R&R (rest and recuperation) post for the Moscow hands. It had better water. It was more laid back. The language was easy to learn if you already spoke Russian. Most people were coming out of that. I think that if anything brought that perspective, probably part of the reason we all enjoyed Yugoslavia so much was partly knowing how different it was.

I was dating a guy who was at the time at our embassy in Poland, so I used to go up to Poland every now and then. He would come down to Yugoslavia and would rave about all the things that were in the stores, how nice it was, how sunny it was. Of course, Poland, this was in the Jaruzelski days of martial law and it was pretty bad. Similarly, our colleagues who were in Romania used to drive over, spend the weekend with one of us at the embassy, and go to the market to buy things like potatoes and onions. So we had an incredible perspective that we were really lucky to be in Yugoslavia. Things were so much better there than they were in neighboring states.

I met a young Swiss couple who were assigned to the Swiss Embassy in Tirana. I met them in Titograd, now Podgorica, in Montenegro.

Q: Was it Titograd when you were there?

BOGUE: It was Titograd when I was there, now reverted to its earlier name. They had actually come up to Titograd for a nice weekend of restaurants and shopping. Titograd

was pretty bleak in those days. I met them and we became friends. They would come and stay with me in Belgrade. Again, compared to their lives in Tirana at the time, we were living life at the palace. It was all a question of perspective.

I didn't feel a big generation gap in the embassy.

Q: Sometimes in outlook you feel you aren't reporting the right things. This happens in some places. There's no particular reason.

BOGUE: I had a wonderful boss, Dick Miles, and I did not feel at all that I was in this situation. He had been in Yugoslavia before. He had been desk officer for Yugoslavia, a real pro on Yugoslavia. He worked hard on Yugoslavia. I didn't feel like somehow we were dissing our _____.

Q: Again, as I mentioned before in the last session, did you get any feel for relations with that hostile state in Zagreb? Our Consul General there? How were things at that time?

BOGUE: Things were a little prickly. I am proud to say that one of my achievements in the Foreign Service is that I have always had very good personal relations with the other posts, whether it was Karachi in Pakistan or Zagreb. It has always driven me a little crazy, but so many people spend so much of their time focused on fighting with another post, instead of getting the job done. There was a certain prickliness between Zagreb and Belgrade. I had a great many friends there who I had met in our training and through other ways. I quite enjoyed going up there. I enjoyed seeing Zagreb and talking to our friends there. There were a lot of disagreements above my head on reporting. That is one of the moments when it is great to be a junior officer because you are sort of aware but it does not involve you. You can be happily oblivious and just make friends and enjoy what is there.

Q: Who were some of the people you dealt with in Zagreb?

BOGUE: Bill Lawrence and his wife, Lee; he was the USIS (United States Information Service) Chief at the time. Jim Swyheart was there; he was the Consul General while I was there. Bob Mustain was the Chief Consular Officer. Zagreb was pretty small in those days. Leonardo Williams, he was a nice person.

Q: Leonardo and I were in Athens together. We used to play war games.

BOGUE: I got along fine with all of them, but I wasn't the Ambassador, I wasn't the DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission), I wasn't any of these jobs. I was just a junior officer.

Q: You left in 1987. Where did you go?

BOGUE: I went to Vienna to the Conventional Arms Control Talks.

Q: You did that from when to when?

BOGUE: From 1987 to 1990, for three very long years.

Q: How did that come about?

BOGUE: At the time, arms control was one of the Big Things, both conventional and nuclear. It was a really hot thing. The Cold War was still going on. There was a chance to do multilateral diplomacy that I thought might be terribly interesting … Then frankly, it was a chance to live in Vienna. I had been there as a student. I loved Vienna. I thought it would be great to go back and try my hand at multilateral diplomacy and do arms control. I did not enjoy the work at all. It was great fun being in Vienna. It was an exciting time because it is when the Berlin Wall came down. All that started to change. It was very exciting to be in the area when all that happened. But I have to say the work just left me completely cold.

Q: Before the Wall came down, I imagine things were changing. What were you doing and who were your bosses? Was this part of the problem?

BOGUE: Vienna was one of these places with multiple Ambassadors. The bilateral ambassador was Ronald Lauder and then Henry Gruball was there. There was the CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe), now the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) talks. They were going through one of their regular processes, a three-year process. Ryan Zimmerman was the ambassador there.

Q: He's an old Yugoslav hand. I served with him when he was a junior officer.

BOGUE: It was just before he went back to Yugoslavia as ambassador that he was at the CSCE. There was the Mission to the UN (United Nations), the UNV Mission it was called. Then there was the Conventional Arms Control Talks. Steve Ledogar was the Head of the Arms Control Talks when I arrived. Bob Blackwell left just a few weeks after I arrived and then Steve Ledogar came. After Steve Ledogar was Jim Woolsey, who subsequently became head of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency).

For me, it was really that I found the work stultifying. Part of the problem that I had not realized was that nobody on any side wanted this treaty. So the negotiations were a kind of elaborate kabuki theater. The treaty did eventually go into force, but only after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, essentially when it didn't matter so much anymore.

I just got very frustrated because I felt we were wasting a lot of time. It was my first introduction to multilateral diplomacy. There were these endless plenary sessions at which everyone had to speak at length on every subject. It has to be translated into six languages. For me, it was not what I wanted to be doing. I wanted to be driving through Bosnia. I wanted to be splashing through rivers in a jeep, monitoring an election somewhere. I did not want to be sitting in the Hapsburg castle, listening to endless speeches on the dangers of …

Q: Did you find that you were an alpha and some of the people there were betas? In other words, on your delegation, were there people who were cottoned to this?

BOGUE: There were some people who cottoned to it. I remember that arms control was considered a really hot thing. It attracted a lot of terrific people, some of whom did not work well in the multilateral environment. There were really three levels of negotiations. There was the NATO-Warsaw Pact (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) negotiation. There was the intra-NATO negotiation, which was very difficult. The most difficult of all was the inter-agency U.S. government negotiation. Going on at all of these three levels. At the NATO level, the American Delegation first of all was always way too big. We would always arrive with 20 people and everyone else had two or three. The other thing was that sometimes Americans felt that it was litigation, that somehow if you scored a point or won the argument, you had won. In fact, within the context of NATO, what you were trying to do was get the consensus that you have to get to. That is mostly done over lunch. There is cajoling and flattery involved, and horse-trading. To embarrass someone at a NATO caucus meeting in front of their peers by scoring a point on them or pointing out that they were factually wrong about something did not make them come over to your side.

Q: Was it because we had too many lawyers?

BOGUE: We did have too many lawyers. That may have been part of it. Part of it was sometimes people in the background. Sometimes people came out of more of that, more of a political background where you are trying to trounce the opponent rather than get everybody on board. It was not just us by any means. The huge problem within the NATO caucus was between Greece and Turkey, over how much of Turkey would be included in the area that would count for their conventional weapons.

Q: Were the Greeks trying to embarrass the Turks?

BOGUE: Yes, there was that. There was also the port in Turkey. There was a great debate about how much of Turkey would be in the area. From the Atlantic to the Urals had to be defined. The Soviet Union's interest was getting things like Incirlik Airbase included. We understood that. This was a Cold War thing.

Q: On the western flank of Turkey, on the Mediterranean?

BOGUE: Right. The Greeks wanted to make sure that the Turkish port that was used for the invasion of Cyprus was included so that the Turks would have to report any troop movements or anything with conventional forces in that area.

Q: The Turks had already invaded; were sitting very solidly on Cyprus at this point.

BOGUE: Yes.

Q: They came in 1974.

BOGUE: Right; this is years later. Just looking at that map back there, there was a huge debate within the NATO caucus over how much of Turkey would be included.

There was also an on-going struggle within the NATO caucus between the French and the Germans over who was really in charge on the European side with the Germans arguing that since the French did not participate in the military aspect of NATO, they would have very little to say about this. The French argued that because they were the French, they had everything to say about it. So there were a lot of difficulties there.

The most fascinating thing for me about this was that in the course of the negotiation while I was there, essentially the Warsaw Pact collapsed. So, for instance, the Czech delegation went from being Communist Party officials to being a guy who had been in the Foreign Ministry for many years but had then been involved in the 1968 events, the Prague Spring. He had been thrown out and had been working as a bus driver in Prague ever since. He showed up as the new representative. It was absolutely fascinating. He was very wonderful and very funny. In fact, we were organizing an annual picnic in the mountains for all the delegations and their families. He raised his hand and said, "I would be happy to drive the bus."

You had this where the new Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia had been working as a furnace boiler man because he also had been bounced out of his job for being a dissident. Things like that. That was absolutely fascinating, all these changes. You saw Trabants on the streets of Vienna.

Q: Trabants being ...

BOGUE: The East German cars. I remember turning on the radio one morning. They had the news and the weather, then the traffic report. The traffic reporter actually started by saying that since cars from the Eastern Bloc were now able to drive freely in Austria and so on, would people please be careful because all the Mercedes and BMWs were just running over these little Trabis and other Eastern European-made cars. They pleaded with drivers to be alert and slow down, be cautious about the Eastern European cars.

We started seeing tourists from Eastern Europe showing up in Vienna. That was just tremendously exciting. People felt very strongly. We kept doing these nonsensical set pieces, kabuki theater pieces, at our meetings. At the same time, I think everyone felt that Europe was really on the edge of something.

Q: Didn't the Czech and Polish delegations in these negotiations say, "Look, let's get rid of all this stuff." It wasn't so much switching sides as saying, "What's this all about?"

BOGUE: Right. In fact, the troop withdrawals that the treaties had been aimed at were in fact being accomplished by dint of the change of governments. Now that the new Czech government was not going to keep Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. Interestingly, and it really was a danger in a way, that an agreement in a sense might codify permission for

Soviet troops to be there when the governments no longer were going to happen there. It didn't work out that way. I would have loved to have been a mouse in the corner at the Warsaw Pact caucus meetings after these changes started to happen, and all these new people started showing up, with the first being the Czechs.

Q: Let's take the floor again when some of the Wall came down. What were you doing, you yourself?

BOGUE: I worked on the NATO side. We had people who did the Warsaw Pact side political reporting and we had people who did the NATO side. We always had a Russian speaker who did the Warsaw Pact side. I did the NATO side of that job. I covered the NATO conferences. There was a lot of paper. We were preparing talking points, position papers, interventions as they called the speeches, doing all that kind of thing. I realized I was a real field person and I liked being out. I liked being out having tea with people at the market. I didn't like rushing around saying, "Here is our latest draft on how to destroy a helicopter. Do you want to take a look at it? It just did not appeal to me at all. I was very ready to move. I loved Vienna, but I was very pleased to go.

Q: As my career developed, I found they kept telling me as a political officer you would do this and that. I liked being a consular officer. I found that writing analyses had no appeal for me whatsoever.

Did you get any feeling watching the Gorbachev phenomenon in the Soviet Union that things were really happening? This was before the Wall came tumbling down. Was that so much above your pay grade that it wasn't a factor?

BOGUE: It was way above my pay grade. I watched it with interest. And being in Europe was a lot of fun because you are right there, as it is happening. I remember, for instance, the United States still owned its old consulate building in Bratislava from the days when Claiborne Pell was a vice-consul there.

Q: I interviewed him later. He was very proud of that fact. He always had a warm spot for Slovakians because of this.

BOGUE: We had this beautiful little flatiron building right downtown. It is only 60 kilometers from Vienna. The Czech government was always trying to get it back from us. We had to show continual use. So one of the things they did was set up a bunch of little TDY (temporary duty) apartments and keep the key in the embassy in Vienna. You could go up and stay for free for the weekend. You could drive up, take the key and stay for free. That way, we could show that our people were using it. This was kind of a fun thing to do.

I remember the first time I did it, having to go and get the visa weeks in advance. There was a two-hour wait at the border while the car was searched and everything was stamped. Two months later, I don't get a visa, I drive up, the border guard waves me through, and I am there. Just seeing those changes happen before your eyes was an

incredible thing and a very exciting thing. Seeing also the Austrians who I didn't find all that outward looking for the most part, at Christmas when the Ceausescu's were overthrown in Romania. There was some very bloody fighting in the streets. The Austrian Red Cross set up mobile blood banks in Vienna. They would then take the blood to Romanian hospitals. Just to see over Christmas weekend the lines of Austrians lined up to donate blood for people in Romania. The kind of excitement that Europe was at last breaking out of a situation that had been, in a sense, fixed since 1945.

Q: In the fall of 1989, were there increasing numbers of people going to the German Embassy in Prague? Were other things happening? Was there a sort of sense that something was going to break?

BOGUE: We were all completely glued to the radio. I do speak German, but it is not perfect. I remember the radio alarm would come on in the morning and I would listen to the news and say to myself, "My German must be worse than I thought because I think they just said that people have torn down the Berlin Wall. That cannot be true." Then going to the office, switching on the television and seeing in fact that people had punched through with sledgehammers. It was sort of like, a few years later, when I would wake up and the radio would say, "Today, our forces, loyal to _____ have captured something." I would think, "Is this a Star Trek rerun, or did this happen on my planet?" It was just so bizarre, but so exciting at the same time.

I went for a walk in Vienna and seeing a family, you could tell they were from Eastern Europe because of their clothing. They are standing in front of a McDonald's in Vienna. The kids obviously were dying to go in. You know they don't have the money to afford it. I actually went up to them and spoke to them in German, which the father spoke. They were from Czechoslovakia. They had come to show the children Vienna but they didn't have any money to eat there. They had brought some sandwiches from home. I tried to give them some change so the children could go into McDonald's. They wouldn't take it. They said no, they wouldn't take any money.

It was incredibly exciting, but it was also this realization of what a gap there was between the haves and the have-nots.

Q: How about the sessions after the Wall came down? Did anyone say, "What are we doing?"

BOGUE: No. I am sure that in private, everyone was saying, "What are we doing?" In public, it was droning on, these endless interventions. I was so driven mad that I was listening every day in a different language. I would listen in Italian this day, and Spanish that day. Things like that because it was just the same thing. You got it all handed out anyway. You didn't have to hear it; you had it all in front of you. It was just the same, droning on. I think we just kept going through the dance even though the world was changing all around us.

Q: Were you able to say, "Let me out of this insane asylum?"

BOGUE: I decided no more multilateral diplomacy. Also, I decided no more European posts for a while; go somewhere new. I was chosen for a position in our embassy in Pakistan. I was wildly excited about it. Typical of the group of diplomats who make European multilateral diplomacy their life's work – I don't mean just the Americans, but Europeans as well – when I told people where I was going next, they all said in all seriousness, "Did you do something wrong? Did you offend people at the State Department? Is that why they are sending you to Pakistan?" Of course, I felt like I had won the lottery, because it just seemed so wildly exotic to me.

Q: There are often beta people in the diplomatic business I think. I don't know what you want to call it, but the one group being able to go from Berlin to Warsaw to Vienna and Paris and London, is the be all and end all.

BOGUE: Well I remember actually being in Athens years later for a NATO ministerial, and a party, who shall remain unnamed, said his foreign posts had included Ottawa, London and Rome, looked around at Athens and said, "God, I could never live in the third world like this." Of course, for those of us who had been in Pakistan and other places, Athens on any terms I think is gorgeous. I love Greece and Athens. I had just come back from Pakistan and I thought it looked pretty swell. After Vienna, I had vacationed in Western Europe since then very happily. I only served in hardship posts and had served in the Third World since then. In my Foreign Service career, I decided I did not want to be doing diplomatic work in the developed world anymore. It wasn't my cup of tea.

Q: When we pick this up the next time, did you take language before you went to Pakistan?

BOGUE: Unfortunately not.

Q: I'll pick this up in 1990. You are off to Pakistan. We will pick it up there.

(Note: Conversation ends at Counter 80 and restarts at 88)

BOGUE: … Afghan issues. I was part of what we called "Embassy Kabul in Exile". It was a closed mission in Kabul by that time and a number of those positions had gone to the embassy in Pakistan and its consulate in Peshawar. I was the Afghan watcher, you would call it, in the embassy in Pakistan. I really was not so concerned about Pakistan per se as I was about the Afghan issues. It was just at the time of the so-called Negative Symmetry Agreement, by which both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to stop supplying their proxies in Afghanistan, in order to bring the war there to a conclusion. So that was really my focus. I lived in Pakistan, but worked on Afghan issues.

Q: Let's talk about Afghanistan. In 1990, what was the situation in Afghanistan?

BOGUE: You still had Najib, by then styled himself Najibullah, Najib of God, in power to everyone's surprise. They thought the minute the Soviet troops pulled out that Najib would fall. He was still in power. The Mujahideen groups were still fighting the government at this point, rather than the Soviet Army, and jockeying with each other for power and position in what all assumed would be some sort of succession to the Najib government at some point. There were still, if I remember the figures right, some two million Afghan refugees or so in Pakistan. Many of the Mujahideen groups had offices and in any case, their leadership actually lived in Pakistan at that time. That was still the big staging area for them.

I never set foot inside Afghanistan. We weren't allowed to go at that time. I did not go into Afghanistan during the course of my tour. I spent a lot of time in what is now becoming more familiar to Americans, the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, that is the Northwest Frontier Province, also Balochistan, which is where the Afghan refugee camps and the Mujahideen headquarters were.

Q: What was your Embassy in Exile? What was the constituency?

BOGUE: We were completely integrated into the embassy in Pakistan. I reported to the Political Section chief, the counselor there, and through him to the DCM and the Ambassador. We were not a separate mission. There was a separate envoy to the Mujahideen. There was the U.S. Envoy to the Afghan Mujahideen, one of the Ambassador-at-Large or Special Envoy situations. He was based in Washington and he would come out periodically on visits to Pakistan. I assisted him and traveled with him when he came out.

Q: Who was that?

BOGUE: It was Ambassador Peter Tomson when I was there.

On a day-to-day basis, my reporting and my operational work went all through the embassy.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

BOGUE: My first year there it was Robert Oakley. It was the last year of Bob Oakley's ambassadorship. Then Nicholas Platt came. I was there for the first year of Ambassador Platt's ambassadorship.

Q: What was your impression of how we were viewing Afghanistan at that time? Between your group and the regular embassy in Pakistan, was there any particular division there, on outlook, or something like that?

BOGUE: I wouldn't say so much at the time. There was to a small extent. The Mujahideen were still seen – I used to laugh, they practically had an acronym and were called The Fiercely Independent Afghan Mujahideen. We called them the FIAM because

that is how it always appeared in the press. They were still seen in this kind of heroic light, in many cases, quite justifiably. I would go see them and they would be barefoot in their office. They had taken on the Soviet military machine and they were seen in that way. Certainly Najib, the government still going on in Afghanistan, was still very much perceived as a puppet government of the Soviet Union and as a very severe abuser of human rights, and a very corrupt and evil government. At the same time, I have always thought it was vastly more complicated than that. The Mujahideen, despite their valor and heroism in standing up to the Soviets and their undoubted toughness. First of all, a lot in Afghanistan has to do with tribal politics, regional politics, a revolt against control by the center. In the case of some Mujahideen groups, there was huge resistance to things that the Najib government had put in, like mandatory elementary schooling for girls. It is a rather funny situation for Americans to be in, when you are supporting the groups who oppose education for girls. It wasn't seen through that prism. It was seen, as everything was in those days, in a Cold War prism. These are the guys who are resisting the Soviet invasion. They are resisting Soviet occupation. They are resisting the puppet government that has been created. Therefore, we are on their side. It is part of our whole Cold War with the Soviet Union.

I must say that some of the Mujahideen were just incredibly impressive characters. I would have to just add to that I probably never met the most impressive of them because I think they were in Afghanistan, not sitting in Pakistan. Some of them were venal and corrupt and egotistical. They were people. You could not really define them with an acronym or a simple phrase, as people and the press tried to do at the time.

Q: Did you get any impression of the CIA operation there? I was wondering whether there was what you were reporting on and what the CIA was doing. It's no secret that we were supplying weapons and all that. I was wondering whether there was a feeling that they were much more operational and not necessarily paying much attention to the future.

BOGUE: No one saw the future in Afghanistan the way it turned out. I will come back to that point in a minute. I would say that certainly you are right; it is no secret that the CIA was paying, equipping, funding, and so on, the Mujahideen. By the time I came on the scene, as I mentioned this Negative Symmetry Agreement had been made. The Soviet forces had departed in fact. The idea was that the United States would stand down on its claim and equipping at the same time. That was part of the deal. Interestingly, while I was there, we spent some time cooperating with the Soviets. For instance, the Soviet Ambassador once gave us a list of their missing soldiers in Afghanistan and asked if we could use our contacts with the Mujahedeen to try to find out the fate of some of them.

In fact, we did find out the fate of some of them. The only ones that the Mujahideen would talk to me about were those soldiers who were in fact Muslim, at least nominally, to begin with, say from Central Asian republics. They said they had been captured, had voluntarily taken up the cause. How voluntary it was is not for me to say. Some had married an Afghan woman, settled there and had no desire to go back, in which case we asked that the Red Cross be able to see them and ascertain that was so.

So we were in a different phase. This was at the very tail end of things when I was there.

I think that there were certainly some thought, I guess voiced at the time above my pay grade, that the CIA, some of the groups that they liked – perhaps liked because they were more operational and successful in Afghanistan – were the ones that the United States on the whole might be less comfortable with because of their radicalism. Again, this was going on well above my head.

Q: What was your slice of the pie?

BOGUE: My slice of the pie was to do three things really. One was to be working on what Pakistan was doing vis-à-vis Afghanistan and to make our representations to the Pakistani Foreign Ministry about Afghanistan. A second was to work with the Mujahideen leaders in country, in Pakistan. Most of them had offices in Islamabad. And then to support the work of the Special Envoy.

But let me just make two other points about the future. One was, of course, there was already a lot of concern in the U.S. government about the stingers. The stingers were a shoulder-fired, man-held weapon that can be easily carried and fired by one or, at most, two people. They are essentially a heat-seeking missile fired by a shoulder-fired device. They were inordinately successful in Afghanistan at bringing down Soviet helicopters and other aircraft. People, who understand these things far better than I do, argued that the stingers were really one of the things that enabled the Mujahedeen to be effective against the Soviets because they could bring down aircraft. The U.S. government was supplying stingers to the Afghan Mujahideen. Everyone had seen the photographs of these fellows out in their turbans, in the desert, with this thing that looks like a large bazooka, resting on their shoulder. They were tracking and taking down aircraft.

The fact was that once the war was over, what was going to happen to those stingers? The old saying about South Asia is that the bazaar is always open. There are deals to be made. Obviously, there was concern that these might fall into the wrong hands.

The thing that I think none of us saw coming was – the United States of course had a lot of other programs in addition to arming and supporting the Mujahideen. We had health programs, education programs, programs for women. We had all sorts of programs going on in the refugee camps. We certainly spent as much as could be done in a very limited way in Afghanistan: agricultural programs, canal cleaning programs, mining programs, all these kinds of things. What I don't think anyone saw was that once the Soviet threat was over, and in fact the Soviet Union proceeded to break up, that U.S. assistance to Afghanistan would dry up so fast and so thoroughly. We didn't stay in for the reconstruction phase. I do remember a long telegram that Ambassador Platt sent back to the department at one point, essentially arguing that we needed to maintain our commitment to Afghanistan through the reconstruction process. Now was the wrong time to walk away. All those refugees had to return home. The place was in shambles, and so on. If we didn't, there would not only be a lot of lawlessness, a lot of warlordism, a lot of

poppy production; all the kinds of things that have since come to pass. I think part of it was a recognition in the case of the warlords, having gained immense power locally, why would they let that go? Why would they submit or agree to being governed by a central government that they didn't like? A lot of the warlords were classic younger sons or distant cousins who were not going to ascend power through the traditional tribal networks.

Q: How did you see the Pakistani government as it worked with the Afghan leaders, this being part of your pie? There have been many stories about how the Pakistan intelligence service sort of got in bed with the radical Muslims and this is one of the big problems that we are faced with today. At that time, how did you see it?

BOGUE: I think at that time there were already, the divisions in the Government of Pakistan were very clear. Maybe I was hoodwinked, but my impression was that the Foreign Ministry in Pakistan, while certainly maintaining a very strong, long-time "interest" – and I am putting quotes that you can't see on the tape around the work interest – in the sense that Pakistan had always tried to manipulate things to its own advantage. I think in the case of the Inter-Services Intelligence group, called ISI in Pakistan, the feeling was quite strong, in the U.S. government, that they were the conduit essentially for things that flowed to the Mujahideen. They definitely had groups they favored and presumably, they favored groups they felt they could control and manipulate in the interest of Pakistan.

Q: As you were dealing with this, was somebody in your office sort of keeping a book on these various groups in the Mujahedeen, noting these problems? Were we particularly worried about radicalism or was this not much of a factor?

BOGUE: There were a couple of groups we were very worried about. I would say the group that worried us the most was Gulbadin Hekmatyar, who was in a way of the seven or so main Mujahedeen groups we were working with – there was kind of a seven party alliance – was by far the most radical. We perceived him as the one with the most potential to be trying to put himself in sole power and would not be willing to create any kind of power sharing situation. There was a very strong perception that the government of Pakistan favored him. They felt, rightly or wrongly, that he was in their control. And there were very strong perceptions in parts of the U.S. government that the CIA favored him as well. That isn't true now. Hekmatyar insomuch as he is a continuing player in Afghanistan, is one of the most vitriolic anti-Americans.

Q: At the time, to put this in perspective, was there concern about Afghanistan and we just didn't want to see a strong, nasty leader? Did we have any concern about what this might mean for the region or not?

BOGUE: We wanted the Communists out and we wanted Afghanistan to be stable in the region. I think that was the big goal. Goal number one was accomplished: the Communists were out. The Soviet Union left and Najib's government fell a year and a half or so later. Stability didn't happen, obviously. Stability didn't happen for any number

of reasons, many of them related to them fighting with one another. Stability, in my own view, didn't happen because we and other Western donors felt the real job we would all do was done. Also, as always happens in these times, there are always many more demands on funds than there are funds. I am sure that today, now that so much of our resources are directed toward Iraq, someone somewhere in the world is jumping up and down saying, "But, but, but… This is going to come back to haunt us because we are no longer supporting X." Sure enough, ten years from now, we are going to say, "Well, we didn't do this because all the money is going to Iraq."

In fact, I have been editing the transcripts you gave me and one of the hard lessons I would guess of your job Stu is seeing how often we make the same mistakes, over and over.

Q: How would you feel you were supported? I don't want to get into methods and operations, which are off limits. As you were working with the Mujahideen, did you feel that you were getting a pretty good picture of who these people were and what they were up to? From either the CIA or military intelligence or the Pakistanis? Or was there a lot of information about these people?

BOGUE: There was more operational information than I would have guessed. Not about things that had been carried out in Afghanistan, keeping in mind this was the tail end of things, not the height of the drama. There was a fair amount of briefing on what was perceived. Remember that we were not in Afghanistan, so all our information was coming filtered through the Mujahideen themselves or through the Pakistanis. We had this one – I have to use the word heroic for him – we had a heroic FSN (Foreign Service National) at our embassy in Kabul who kept the building going. He would come out by truck and car and foot and mule, whatever he had. He would come out every few months to Islamabad so we could give him some money to keep paying the bills and to keep paying him, and so on. He would always sit down with me and give me his perspective on what was happening in Kabul. I also quizzed anyone and everyone who had been to Kabul as journalists. There were people, NGOs (non-governmental organizations) who then were starting to work, like the Halo Trust, the landmine NGO. UN people who would go in. I would quiz to try to get as much first-hand accounting of Afghanistan. People going with UNICEF and the Red Cross and the like. I would work on them. I should go back and say that the gentleman in Kabul whose name I forget now…

Q: Is he still alive?

BOGUE: He is and he won a huge award after we reopened. He was brought back here.

Q: I would like to see if we could get somebody to do an oral history with him.

BOGUE: Yes. He is an absolutely delightful, charming guy. At tremendous risk to himself, he kept our property together. When folks went back in to open up the mission again, they tell this great story about this whole row of Volkswagen Golfs or Volkswagen Jettas, now almost antiques in the Volkswagen world. They were all lined up and when

you turned the key, they all started because he kept the batteries charged. He maintained the vehicles, the building. There was some damage to the building, through no fault of his but through the fighting that had gone on in Kabul. He really kept things together. He was also a source.

Other people had embassies there. The Pakistanis had an embassy there. Other countries had embassies there. I tried to meet with their folks when they would come in.

Q: You were there from when to when, by the way?

BOGUE: From 1990 to 1992.

Q: In dealing with the Mujahideen, how were you received as one, the American representative, and two, as a woman?

BOGUE: First of all, things were completely intertwined. I think I would have been not nearly as well received had I not been an American representative.

First of all, my way had been paved by many women who had gone with Doctors Without Borders, the Red Cross, and other NGOs, into Afghanistan. Interestingly to me, when Afghans in refugee camps first saw me, they all assumed I was a doctor because that is what a Western woman would be doing in the refugee camps typically in their minds.

Also, there had been women there as journalists and so on. So I was not, by any means, the first.

Second, I was from the American Embassy and we had things they needed. Remember the old song, "Send lawyers, guns and money?" Therefore it would have been against their own interests to be inhospitable. Another thing is Afghans are tremendously hospitable. They do live by a code of hospitality. They knew Western women were playing under a different set of rules than Afghan women. I tended to emphasize that. I wore a very modest dress, but I didn't wear a local dress. I never went to a refugee camp in a shalwar kameez; I went in a blue blazer and a long skirt. Everything was all covered, but I was definitely in Western garb to emphasize the fact that I was playing by the Western set of rules.

There was only one of the seven Mujahideen leaders who would not receive me, Abu Sayyaf as he was called, or usually just Sayaff. He was one of the most radical of the group. The others all received me very graciously.

In fact, I never met Hekmatyar in person, but I met his representative frequently. The first time I met him, I remember saying to myself, "All right. So this guy is going to be very conservative. I need to see if he is going to be willing to talk to me at all."

He greeted me in wonderful, colloquial American English, which he learned from a Peace Corps teacher in his village. He went on to tell me all about her and that he still received Christmas cards from her, a woman living in Ohio, and how he was very attached to America, even though the ideology of Hekmatyar was very Islamist.

It was not an issue for me. I felt in the job since the Afghans had a very nice way of, rather than refusing to shake your hand, they would simply put their hand on their heart as a way of greeting you, which I found to be a lovely custom. It is a nice gesture. In the germ-rich environment that is South Asia, and I say this not about anyone else's cleanliness because everyone was sick all the time, actually shaking hands with anyone, including a fellow American, is not a good idea. They would just put their hand on their heart and make a little bow. The Afghans were immensely cordial. I never had an issue with an Afghan I worked with saying or doing anything inappropriate. In fact, they tended to be extremely correct in their relationships with women. With me, they were gracious and hospitable, but they never made an untoward remark. This is in stark contrast to say, walking through a market in Pakistan, where you would be sometimes grabbed.

Q: You were of an age where you had been brought up where women's lib was in full flower. On the spectrum, how did you fall in the women's lib movement? I am thinking in terms of your observations, particularly of a society which is not very benevolent towards women.

BOGUE: There were plenty of times, and I am going to say this more about Pakistan because that is the society I was living in, in a sense, socially, than Afghanistan. The Afghans I saw were not at home, they were in camps, which is a far different situation than when they were at home.

In Pakistan, it was maddening a lot of the time. They were, at the time, the only country in Asia where the birth rate was rising and the literacy rate was dropping. The indicators were all going the wrong way. Female children, except among the well-to-do classes, were far less likely to get health care or any kind of education than male children. Women had to be completely covered and escorted when they went out of the house in many places, not in all parts of Pakistan.

I was a real oddity socially there because I was a single woman clearly of an age to be married. I didn't quite fit. Had I been Pakistani, I would have been married to my cousin years before. In fact, I remember a Pakistani I met saying to me, in a very kind way, "How many children do you have?" I said, "I don't have any children. In fact, I am not married." He said, "Oh, you have no cousins? I am so sorry there is no one for you to marry." It is a very different set of social expectations there that everyone got married at a very young age and typically to a relative, a cousin or a second cousin. The marriages were typically arranged by the parents. This was such a different social experience that I found it sometimes very frustrating. I found it frustrating when some of the problems for women were the result of deliberate government policy. That I found very frustrating.

In terms of being able to do my work, I felt that I was able to do my work and that I was completely supported by the embassy. The Deputy Chief of Mission was a woman.

Q: Who was that?

BOGUE: Beth Jones. She ended up being a four-star career ambassador, a very senior American diplomat. She was the Deputy Chief of Mission. There were other women in very significant roles within the mission. I didn't feel at all as though someone was saying, "Well, you cannot do that because you are a woman. You can't do this because you are a woman. You can't go because you are a woman." There was none of that at all.

I did feel immense frustration about a situation for girls and women in Pakistan, particularly those from the poorer classes. I felt the same frustration for men in the poorer classes. Children, especially boy children, were out working at very young ages and not getting school either. You would go to a bike shop and here were all the little boys repairing the bikes and not in school.

My frustrations with the situation in Pakistan were not gender specific. They were a little more universal. It was a feudal society.

Q: What was your impression of the non-governmental organizations, the NGOs? By this time, they had really come into full flower.

BOGUE: My contact with them was mostly in the world of the Afghan refugees and the efforts to go in and clear landmines. I was very impressed with the people who were doing that, the people who worked with the refugees. I was very impressed with their commitment. They lived in a very tough environment in Pakistan. They lived out in the Northwest Frontier province or in Balochistan, which was not easy. Islamabad was clean and green and had a lot of amenities compared with the parts of Pakistan they were living in. They were very, very committed people. I was also very impressed because great numbers of the NGOs there were what would now be called faith-based organizations, like the Salvation Army. Yet, as far as I could tell, they carried out their good works without being a religious mission. They were there to feed the hungry and to clothe the naked and heal the sick, but not to convert or proselytize. I also worked very closely with people in the UN and all the UN agencies such as UNICEF, UNIFEM, all the alphabet soup of UN agencies. I also very much admired their commitment.

Q: Sometimes the UN is greatly criticized, but it is usually at the management level, the top level. At your level, these are dedicated, hard-working people.

BOGUE: Exactly. There were young Swedes, Turks, Malaysians, Paraguayans, and people from all over the world, who were in their 20s and 30s, working on the ground in a difficult and sometimes dangerous situation. They were terrific, most of them. Again, as is so often the case in any big organization, whether it is the army or the State Department or the UN, what you see in the field and what you see at headquarters are very different.

Q: How did the Gulf War intrude on your work? How was it received?

BOGUE: It was interesting because this was one of those cases where officially the Government of Pakistan supported the coalition in the First Gulf War, and even sent troops. The Mujahedeen even sent some troops. I think they were embedded with the Pakistani forces or with somebody else's forces, maybe the Saudi forces. The public response to the Gulf War was much different in Pakistan. The public was opposed. There were very inflammatory newspaper headlines saying, "10,000 American Troops Destroyed, Praise Allah," that sort of thing. The security situation for Westerners deteriorated very badly in Pakistan. In fact, we evacuated the post.

I remained behind with a small group, but family members and most of the mission were evacuated during the Gulf War. I think countrywide that about 100 of us remained with maybe 65 or so in Islamabad, and the rest in our consulates in Peshawar, Lahore and Karachi.

Q: Did you have to take special care to go into the souk?

BOGUE: Yes, there were whole areas that were off limits to us. We had kind of self-imposed curfews. For instance, Friday was a day you did not want to be hanging about when the mosques let out. We sometimes would say that if you came to the Embassy on Friday morning, which was a day off for us, but if you came to do some shopping to play softball or catch up on work, then you needed to stay until the mosques had been let out and the crowds had dispersed, usually nightfall.

We paired up. For instance, a colleague of mine moved into my house with me. First of all, this reduced our footprint, but also, if you didn't show up one day at home, someone would know you were missing. We took a number of different actions. I used to describe it as a sort of glorified house arrest that we were on. We did have to use care. Once you were on the Embassy compound, you could roam around. It was huge and had swimming pools, ball fields, weight rooms, a restaurant and things to do.

It was sort of like how people used to joke about "Club Fed." It was sort of a soft prison in that you were stuck there but it was very comfortable. We did have some problems with people having windows shot out of their homes. I was not famous enough to attract the kind of attention that some people would have attracted who were much more senior and well known, who had their photos on television and in the papers.

We did have to be careful. There were a few scary episodes. The colleague I was sharing the house with and I were once on our way to work when we were chased by a couple of young guys brandishing AK-47s out of the windows of their car. They did not fire at us, but they kind of chased us in their car. There was a bit of a nerve-wracking time from a security point of view.

Q: What was your impression of the Government of Pakistan? What elements were you dealing with and what was your impression of how they dealt with things?

BOGUE: I dealt mostly with the Foreign Ministry. I did see occasionally people from Pakistani intelligence, usually when the Special Envoy was there and I would traipse along with him to his calls. I think they thought, and you will recognize a pattern here in Pakistan even at this time, they could control all of this. Yes, there were groups who were radical. Yes, there were groups who were this, but they could control them.

Also on the part of some of the groups themselves, they were clearly playing domestic politics without much understanding or concern of what that would mean for other people. I remember, for instance, the fellow who was then the head of the very radical Pakistani political parties used to give these fire-breathing speeches about America. "May America be burned completely to ashes. May no two bricks be left side by side in America." And then would calmly come in to see the ambassador with his son's passport to ask the ambassador to renew the son's visa since the son was a student at the University of Houston. I remember Ambassador Oakley sort of saying with his Louisiana drawl, "So, when you said America would be burned to ashes, you didn't mean the part around the University of Houston campus where your son is a student?" His name was Kazi Ahmed Hussein. He said that of course he didn't mean it at all; the ambassador had to understand this was the red meat to his political constituency. The ambassador, and rightly so, just laid into him that it was fine for him to think it was just red meat for his constituents. But the fact is that when he said those things, people came and torched the Embassy, killed people, shot people. This was a very irresponsible thing to be doing.

Interestingly, I was once having a conversation with a Pakistani about this kind of thing. He was talking about how people like Kazi Hussein were so honorable, they were the true men of God, and so on. I said, "But they are hypocrites. They send their kids to school in the United States." He said, "Oh, no. That is not true. That is just propaganda put out to make him look bad. It is not true that his son goes to school in the States." They kept it very hidden that a huge number of these guys had green cards. A huge number of them had kids in school in the States. They just kept that hidden from their constituents, so they could pretend to be this kind of populist leaders in Pakistan.

Q: Were there Embassy attacks or high level visits, or anything like that when you were there?

BOGUE: We did not have a Secretary of State or Presidential visit or anything like that during the time I was there. There were a lot of demonstrations in the area of the Embassy or on the way to the Embassy. Very few of them made it to the Embassy because we were in a diplomatic enclave, which could be closed off. Occasionally, there would be things like that. Some of them were about the Gulf War; others were about other things. This was kind of a constant in Pakistani life.

In fact, I remember when Nick Platt went to present his credentials, he was accidentally tear-gassed by the police. There was a demonstration at the presidential compound that

had nothing to do with us, but the police were tear-gassing the demonstrators, and tear-gassed Ambassador Platt on the way. He was very good humored about it all. He said, "It's been years since I was a junior officer and got to go out and see these things. I haven't been tear-gassed for 25 years." He took it all in good spirit.

I think again that the authorities thought, as they often seem to express now that they can control all of this, that they have got their fingers on the button somehow. I am not as sanguine as them.

Q: How about Congressional or staff visits and that sort of thing?

BOGUE: We did have a lot of Congressional visits because of the Afghan presence, and the concern about Pakistani nuclear capability. I would say the visiting was more keyed toward Afghan events such as the Charlie Wilson Brigade.

Q: There was the book called, Charlie Wilson's War. He was a Congressman from California or Texas?

BOGUE: I think Texas.

We did have Congressmen come from time to time. The Secretary of State had come out at the time that General Zia was killed, and our Ambassador Arnold Raphel and General Wassom from our embassy had been killed. That had been only a short time before me.

Q: You left in 1992? In your opinion, whither Afghanistan, as the wheels went up on your plane?

BOGUE: I think we all felt that Afghanistan was in for a period of struggle among the Mujahedeen for control. This was of course before the Taliban appeared upon the scene. When Najib fell, the various Mujahedeen leaders were lined up practically outside of the ambassador's office, trying to be recognized as the rightful new Prime Minister or President of Afghanistan. They were not able to broker compromises with each other. There was already a lot of fighting going on amongst and between different groups. One of things I was sure we would see after the fall of Najib was a devolution of central authority, more back into the region. Ahmad Shah Massoud was up in the north. He controlled the Panjshir at that time and he would keep control of the north. Others were squabbling over Kabul, Kandahar, and other different areas. Abdul Rashid Dostum had the Uzbek area up on the border with Central Asia there. Ismail Khan had Herat. They would control their areas and scuffle then for who ran Kabul.

That was the fate of Afghanistan for some time until the Taliban rolled in. It was one of the reasons that the Taliban were able to attract any kind of public support, the constant fighting.

Q: I realize you were at a certain level. This would be above your pay grade, but were you and your fellow officers looking at Iran?

BOGUE: We realized actually that that was one of the gaping holes in our understanding of Afghanistan. Whereas I think something like three million refugees had gone to Pakistan from Afghanistan, another million or million and a half or so had gone to Iran, including many of the Shia population of Afghanistan. We had very little contact with those folks. The best we could do was to draw second-hand accounts from UN people, other diplomats from other countries, who did travel to Iran and talk to refugees and the Iranians there. We didn't have any direct contact ourselves.

The Iranians were presumed to be doing the same thing on their side of the border that the Pakistanis were doing on their side. That is, try to manipulate people and events to their best interests. We had very little contact with that side of it. It was a big missing piece. Every time we would write a cable saying what the refugees are going to do, we would be very careful to say that we only knew through the UN what we think might happen with refugees in Iran.

Q: After having settled everything in Afghanistan, where did you go?

BOGUE: I came back to what was then an even bigger mess, which was the Balkans. I left Pakistan to return to Washington in the summer of 1992 to become the desk officer for the former Yugoslavia. At that point, Croatia and Slovenia had already broken off and the war in Bosnia was well underway.

Q: In 1992, you have the Yugoslav desk essentially? How long did you have it for?

BOGUE: I had it for less than a year, for reasons that will come to you, involving dissent.

When I say I had the Yugoslav desk initially, despite the fact that all these things had already happened, it was still really a one-person desk in the office, as it had been. That had not changed, even though there were multiple countries and embassies: an embassy in Zagreb, an embassy in Ljubljana. There was a war in Bosnia.

I think there were two things about that. One was something you remarked on earlier Stu when we were chatting before we started today, which was the desire to not deal with this problem. If you stack up for a war, you are somehow dealing with the problem. Also, the European Bureau – again, this is my opinion of how this worked out – had had a very static situation since the end of the Second World War. It had been very static. There had not been border changes. There had not been wars and this kind of thing. The bureau was not used to reacting swiftly to change. The Middle East Bureau had a war before breakfast every morning. They could turn on a dime and get people on the problem. The European Bureau didn't know how to do that.

So when I took over the desk with the war going on in Bosnia with all these embassies and all these things happening, it was a one-person desk. We had two people on the Portuguese desk. No offense to our ally and friend Portugal, but it seemed to me wrong. I very quickly realized I was completely overwhelmed. There was more than a person

could do, even if I worked all day and all night, every day and night. I could only fall behind more slowly, rather than get ahead of things. I went to my office director who first of all said, "It's always been a one person desk before. One person has always been able to handle this before." There was a kind of refusal to recognize changed circumstances. Then the conclusion of the European Bureau was that it would be unfair to make someone who thought they were going to work on Portugal, to make them work on Bosnia. That just would not be fair to the person. If I needed extra help, I could go round up any help I could round up on my own. I could have that. This was a very different atmosphere that we have today on Iraq, for instance, where everybody is being thrown at the problem.

So I did. I went and rounded up people who had been medivaced and who needed a three-month bridge between assignments, old friends who had an assignment cancelled because a family member fell ill. I rounded them up and put together a group of about six people. We named ourselves The Yugo-slaves, because they didn't really give us any additional room, or stuff, or secretarial help, or anything like that. We used children's school desks in order to fit them all in. We had to sit sideways to the table, because our knees would not fit under the children's desk. It was ridiculous. Just as you said, the U.S. government and the State Department were just sort of wishing this problem away.

Q: In interviewing people, there was a case of this in July 1974. Greece and Turkey had always been in the Middle East Bureau. They were moved to the European Bureau. They had a coup on Cyprus, on July 14, 1974. The Greeks took over. Then the Turks reacted by sending troops in. I may have been talking with Tom Boyatt. The European Bureau all of a sudden had never had NATO allies fighting each other. I think the man who was responsible for this was asking for help and went to the head of European Affairs – I believe it was Ron Seitz at the time. He said the look he got from colleagues was as though he had shat on marble floors. This was not supposed to happen in Europe.

BOGUE: That is exactly the reaction I was given. First it was, well why can't you handle it? It has always been one person before. Then it was, you can't ask people working on Portugal, you can't ask people who might have tickets to the Kennedy Center some night to stay late or work too hard. It's a very different European Bureau nowadays because they have been through this experience. At the time, the Yugo-slaves and some people I got into the office but we didn't even have desks for them and they lived like nomads dragging their belongings to wherever someone was sick that day. For instance, the Albanian desk officer is out sick or at his daughter's graduation today, so we are going to put you here. It was just a nightmare from a management point of view as well.

Q: Who was principal head of European Affairs at the time?

BOGUE: Initially it was Tom Niles, an old Yugoslav hand himself.

Q: I was Tom's first boss in the Consular Section in Belgrade.

BOGUE: He certainly knew the place and the people well. That was at the end of the George H.W. Bush Administration. When President Clinton came in it was a political appointee named Steve Oxman, who did not last all that long on the job.

Again, the front office's attention was all elsewhere. There had been a policy determination made by Baker and George Bush, Sr., that this was a European problem, the Europeans had come to us and said, "We are all grown up now. We can handle this kind of problem." We said, "Fine. Handle it." Of course, they didn't and they couldn't, for a lot of reasons, structural and otherwise.

We were holding very firm to the idea that this was not our issue.

Q: Could you describe, and it can be fairly detailed because I think people want to understand what had just happened at the time you took over.

BOGUE: I took over; I am going to say, on August 23, 1992 I took over on the same day James Baker left being Secretary of State to try to go and save George Bush's campaign against Clinton. Larry Eagleburger became acting Secretary and then the first ever career diplomat to be full Secretary of State. Obviously a man with immense knowledge of Yugoslavia.

What was happening was, first of all in terms of the management, the former Yugoslavia was in an office called the Office of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia. So it was in with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc., the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries and Yugoslavia. It was still in the old Cold War structure of the European Bureau. The person who had been working on Yugoslavia had just resigned. That was George Kenney. He had resigned and made a very interesting … I don't know if he is someone you are interested in interviewing. He resigned in protest. He sent a letter of protest about Bosnia and that we weren't doing anything. He later was invited by some Serb groups and became the Bosnian equivalent of a Holocaust denier. He completely flipped sides and has published… He doesn't get much of an audience for this. I don't know what he is doing now, but he did publish some papers in which he denied massacres; he denied these kinds of things.

Q: It sounds very odd, doesn't it? Is he a Foreign Service brat?

BOGUE: I don't know George. I have met him twice maybe. I have no idea what is in his mind. He had just resigned. There was no one on the desk. In addition to the fighting in Bosnia, this was just at the time when Roy Gutman, the journalist, of Newsday, had just revealed the existence of the concentration camps in Bosnia. The war was really in full swing, but the revelation of the rapes, the holding of men in camps. The photos we hadn't seen since the Second World War of these living skeletons in these camps were all just coming out.

I will come back to the point, because Stu I think you hit it on the head so much about how we were so much in a sense running away from these problems. Either Time or

Newsweek, I don't remember which, had a cover story on the rapes of Muslim women in these so-called rape camps. They showed a photo of a Bosnian Muslim woman who had been rape victim. She is blond and dressed in a European women's suit. I remember one of the senior people in the European Bureau saying, "My God. She looks almost Western." And I said in the meeting, "She is Western. She is a European with a European education and a European outlook and European travel, who is, through a quirk of history, a Muslim." They really had in their minds that Muslims were people who wore burkas and turbans and lived in sandy deserts. The idea that this Muslim population was in fact a completely Europeanized population was so hard for people to understand. I remember this guy saying, "My God. She looks almost Western," having no idea that the Muslims of Sarajevo were Western, just like the Muslims of Turkey were, at least in Istanbul and the cities of western Turkey, which were quite westernized.

Q: It is so hard to explain to people. When you went to Albanian Kosovo, at that time, there was an ethnic difference of some sort. In Bosnia though, you just have people being different just like between Unitarians and Catholics.

BOGUE: One of the reasons I am talking about this so much is because I am trying to sort of show a little background for the dissent that I was involved with. That is to come.

Q: Refresh me. Had you served in Yugoslavia before?

BOGUE: I had been in Belgrade for two years and I had covered Bosnia during that time.

Q: You were bringing all this to the table.

BOGUE: That is why they wanted me for the job. I had the background. It was that background that made me the right candidate for the job. It was that background that made me want to do the job.

Q: You were replacing George Kenney?

BOGUE: I actually replaced a guy named Richard Johnson. George had been doing the day-to-day work. Having said that it was a one-person desk, they had had two people on it. I am not sure where they had gotten George from, whether he had been brought in temporarily, or how that worked.

My chain of command within EUR was fed up with the Yugoslav problem. This was the age of the exciting, dynamic new Europe. Poland, the Wall had come down, all these folks were charging toward NATO and the European Union and full European participation. This was supposed to be a glorious moment for Europe. The skunk at the garden party was Yugoslavia. They really did not want to deal with it. The Europeans were clearly failing. The United States didn't want any part of it for any number of reasons.

They said it was all ancient hatreds we can't do anything about. These are Balkan people, i.e. primitive; we can't do anything about it. We will get mired down like we did in Vietnam. There is no exit strategy. We can't do anything about it. This is a European problem and the Europeans really need to handle this. It is not our problem. It does not touch our interests in any way. And so on and so on.

Q: How about Somalia?

BOGUE: Somalia came later. The disaster in Somalia is still down the road.

There was a huge view that we should not be really engaged except in a humanitarian way. We were going to provide aircraft for the UN to fly food and medicine into Sarajevo. We were going to drop food and medicine in the countryside. We were going to try to feed people, but we weren't going to put on a diplomatic effort. Certainly, we were not going to put on a military effort of any kind.

Q: Was Croatia a separate country? Had we opened our embassy there?

BOGUE: Yes.

Q: I have been interviewing Ron Knightsky. He was Consul General, then Chargé and talks about his problems of getting things. I am not sure if it was from you. Somebody said, "Quick, send us more Croatian atrocities. We are getting so many Serbian atrocities that we are trying to balance these off." The point was, I think there was a study done later that it was ten to one. The Serbs were really being beastly.

BOGUE: I spent a lot of time apologizing to Ron and others because the demands as you know when you are in Washington; most of the demands don't come from your embassy. They come from the seventh floor, the senior leadership, your own front office. They come from Congress, the press, and all these various places. In this case, particularly at the very beginning when I was alone, we could pay very little attention to our missions. We had an embassy by then in Slovenia. We had one in Croatia. We had one in Belgrade. We were not staffed to look after them very well, I am very sorry to say. Poor Ron, I felt his pain. We could not do that kind of research in a timely way for him, because we just did not have the horses to do it at the time.

We did then get staffed up with our motley crew of Yugo-slaves, as we called ourselves. Eventually, some additional positions were created to bring in people. Often, typically, initially not made permanent; made a one-year position, because all this will have blown over in a year. Then we can go back to just a desk officer handling all this again.

I kept arguing at the time on a management basis that even if the war ends tomorrow, you are going to have multiple countries and multiple embassies, where there had been only one before. So in fact, you are going to have to have a Croatia desk officer, a Slovenia desk officer, this desk officer, that desk officer. It is never going to go back to the previous situation. It is too late for that now.

In any event, this was the period of the great revelation of the atrocities. It was also the period of the encirclement, the sieges and the shelling of the cities of Bosnia: Sarajevo and the other cities that were essentially encircled by Serbian artillery. The citizens in there, of all ethnicities, whoever was there, were essentially trapped in those cities. The UN convoys could only come and go with the permission of Bosnian Serb commanders. We had airlifts into Sarajevo. They were just pounded with artillery and with sniper fire. I think that people know that about Sarajevo. They know about the snipers. They know about the so-called Sarajevo roses, the bloody pavement where snipers had taken victims. They know about the shelling.

What is less known was there were at the time, five or six other cities or towns that were enduring the same sort of encirclement, that didn't have the stature. People knew about Sarajevo because of the Olympics. It had a functioning newspaper. It had journalists who were working there. It had things people could recognize. The journalists all stayed at a Holiday Inn hotel. It had things that people could relate to better. There were these other towns. Also, it had vowels in its name. Places like Brcko, no one could begin to pronounce or spell. So the scene I would set is that all of this was happening.

I came on in late August. In November, we had a presidential election. Clinton was elected President. He had promised in his campaign that the first issue he was going to work on was Bosnia. He had been merciless with George H.W. Bush about failure to address the problem in the Balkans. In fact, when Clinton was inaugurated, NSDD 1 (the National Security Decision Directive) was going to be on the Balkans. I spent that Inauguration Day in my office. I was there late enough to see the inaugural fireworks that night. I was sitting in my office writing the paper for this. We had very high hopes that U.S. policy would change.

I want to just add one other thing that was happening at the same time. That is, the Holocaust Museum was being finished on the Mall. The Holocaust Museum was in the process of inviting a lot of Eastern European folk to the grand opening including, you will recall the controversy about whether Tudjman should be invited.

Q: Croatian President Tudjman was not very sympathetic towards other groups. Thank God that he and his wife were not Jewish.

BOGUE: So our office writ large, not just the Yugo-slaves, but the people working on Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and so on, were all working with the Holocaust Museum. The officials and curators at the Holocaust Museum said to us one day to thank us for all the work we were doing with them, and because of what was happening in Bosnia, would we like a special tour of the museum on a weekend before it opened. We could come and bring our spouses or significant others and children who were old enough. They would give us a tour before it opened up.

So we went. If you have been to the Holocaust Museum, one of the things is a series of glass panels, etched into them are the names of towns. Of course, many of the towns were

in Croatia, like Lukavac and Osiekin. Many, many, were in Bosnia: Banja Luka and these other towns, which were again suffering great expulsions and killings. The phrase that was in the air as April came near, for the Holocaust Museum was, of course, "Never again." Everyone was talking about the Holocaust Museum; it was there so that this could never happen again.

For those of us who were working on Bosnia, all the politicians and everyone was saying, "Never again" and yet, Never Again seems to be happening. Again in Europe and again in some of the same towns. At that same time, the Clinton Administration had now been in office for three months and it was by now clear that, to quote The Who or whoever it is, "Say hello to the new boss, just like the old boss." Despite all the campaign promises and all the rhetoric, our policy was not going to change in the slightest and that the United States was going to continue to have a complete hands-off approach to the former Yugoslavia. I think the combination of working on this problem and the constant new U.S. rationales for not being involved, the disappointment with the Clinton Administration which came in with such promise about this, which then did not happen, and the fact of the Holocaust Museum and all the brave and noble statements that people like Clinton were making about the Holocaust, all kind of came together and resulted in the Yugo-slaves launching a major dissent against U.S. policy in April 1993.

You may remember that at the inauguration of the Holocaust Museum, Eli Wiesel, the author and Holocaust survivor, actually diverted from his speech text and turned to Bill Clinton and said, "Do something, Mr. President." I think all of that coalesced.

What I would like to suggest Stu is that, maybe we have a little time, we do that dissent as more of a whole piece next time, if that is alright with you.

Q: All right. We will stop at this point. But I have one last question.

I have just finished reading a book called, Love Thy Neighbor by Peter Maass, who was a reporter for the Washington Post at this time. For anybody who is reading this, I refer them to that as a major source. I was wondering whether it was really the newspaper reporters or the media that was giving you the most information about what was happening.

BOGUE: Yes. First of all, we did get a lot of very useful and tremendously helpful information from our missions. I would leave Ljubljana out, not because they weren't helpful, they weren't involved in Bosnia. We did get a lot from Zagreb and Belgrade.

Q: Could you get much from Belgrade? In a way, they were kind of cut off. They were on the Serb side.

BOGUE: They were actually doing heroic and magnificent reporting. This is after Warren Zimmerman had departed. We had a Chargé there. Rudy Pairner was there. Bob Rackmales was there. They did a heroic job in trying to figure out what was happening. So did Zagreb. We got a lot of information from UN and NGO people on the ground. We

got a lot of information from the press. A very young man, who I think is now the editorial page director at the Washington Post, John Pomfret from the Washington Post would come to see me. I knew Elizabeth Neuffer, who wrote the most marvelous book called *The Key to My Neighbor's House*, about the search for justice in Bosnia and Rwanda. Elizabeth Neuffer, I am very sad to say, died in Iraq in a car crash a few years ago. This was a very great loss, a tremendous journalist and a wonderful person. The journalist Roy Gutman had assembled a tremendous amount of information on the documentation on the camps. In fact, the U.S. government launched a very intense and heartbreaking program to interview people who came out of the camps, who were then refugees in places like Austria or in Croatia. We sent out people with good language skills to interview, for instance, these women who had been raped, so we could assemble a dossier of abuses that was credible.

Q: The irony of this is that here we are documenting something we are not doing anything about.

BOGUE: We were documenting like mad. We were pushing the UN to issue these reports of human rights abuses.
Q: This is Tape 5, Side 1, with Janet Bogue.

We are winding up this thing. We are coming to your period of dissent in April 1993. You have been talking about some of the information that was coming in. I wonder if you would give your impression of what the United Nations was doing there. Also, I don't imagine you have much time to contemplate it, but did you get any feel for the role of the French, the British, maybe the Germans?

BOGUE: That would be a great place to start.

Remember, this is a time when we are refusing to do anything and François Mitterrand actually went to Sarajevo and walked in the streets of Sarajevo, which was an incredibly brave thing to do at the time. The French were much more out in front in many ways than we were.

Q: Talk about that and then go into what was going on and how your reports were being received above you. You mentioned some of this. Here you are again: "My God, here comes Janet with the daily rape report. You are making the sign of the _____; don't come into my office". I can imagine that it is very difficult.

BOGUE: We were pariahs essentially. One of my senior colleagues actually said to me once when I walked into his office, "Well, here comes the Black Angel of Bosnia with more bad news."

Q: Well okay, we will pick it up there.

You were also saying next time that…

BOGUE: The Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Pavle, came to see Secretary Eagleburger. I was the note taker for that meeting. Secretary Eagleburger completely lost his temper and threw the Patriarch out of the State Department because of the refusal to recognize that horribleness is horribleness and wrong is wrong. I will tell that story next time, if you like.

Q: Today is July 27th, 2007.

Janet, you were dealing with this from when to when?

BOGUE: I came onto the desk for Yugoslavia in August 1992. Through a variety of circumstances that will shortly become clear, I left the desk in May 1993.

Q: What was your impression of the United Nations' efforts at the time you got on and as you saw it from your vantage point.

BOGUE: I am a defender of the United Nations in Bosnia at this time. They get a bad rap around the world, particularly a bit later with Srebrenica and so on, they get a horrible rap for not having a strong enough response to things. I think the one thing that has to be remembered is that it is not the UN that makes decisions; it is the member states. The member states would tie the hands of the peacekeepers and only allow them to do certain things. I think people forget that significant numbers of UN peacekeepers died in the course of duty. They made heroic efforts to get food and medicine to people under terrible circumstances in which they were not allowed to go out and deal with things militarily. They were not allowed to respond militarily in most cases to people who were acting in a military way.

I think all things considered, they really did a great job, particularly when relieving the sieges of the cities, relieving them with food and medicine. I don't mean relief in the military sense, but providing Sarajevo and the other encircled cities with regular supplies of food and medicine at great difficulty and risk to themselves.

The other country that has gotten a very bad rap in more recent years in the Balkans is France. France has been accused of being obstructionist, being a friend of the Serbs, protecting Radovan Karadzic, revealing the fact a French officer has been convicted for passing NATO information on to Serbian forces, and so on. Again, looking at the earlier Bosnian campaign at the time I was working on the desk, they had probably already lost about two dozen soldiers in Bosnia. Mitterrand came, as I mentioned before, and made this quite courageous walk around Sarajevo at a time when sniper and artillery fire was killing lots of people, and he was a very obvious target. I think the French were really pushing very hard diplomatically and politically for the West to take a stronger role in this, to take a more forceful role in protecting civilians, protecting lives, and being more aggressive about what was a horrible humanitarian crisis at the time. I think that, regardless of events later, I do think that the criticism that is often leveled at the French, particularly at the UN, is somewhat undeserved.

Q: At the time, what was your reading about what we were doing vis-à-vis the UN? Were we trying to get them to be more aggressive? Were we willing to stay with the situation as was?

BOGUE: First of all, we did not want to get involved at all, further than we were. We were involved in humanitarian aid on each side. We provided a lot of aircraft and a lot of relief supplies to the UN; we assisted with that side of it. A little known fact is that we actually did have a few military personnel in Bosnia who were there to see the other end of the aircraft side of it, the U.S. aircraft coming in. We had some Air Force personnel on the ground who assisted with those flights that would come in with food and medicine. Typically, they would carry out some injured or wounded Bosnians, a huge program. A lot of children had, for instance, eye injuries because they tended to rush to the windows to see what was happening and would be hit with glass. Johns Hopkins' famous ophthalmology program had a program of treating those kids who would fly out on the UN planes.

We were encouraging the UN to be active and robust on humanitarian relief. We were not pushing the UN to be any more active. In fact, we were opposing any more activity on the military front.

You mentioned last time Stu that there was this tremendous irony in that we were the ones compiling the rape reports and the reports of human rights abuses for the UN, the United States was. We had the horses to do it essentially. We had the resources to do that. At the same time, we were opposed to any kind of military action or aggressive stance. I think that was where things stood with us and the UN. Interestingly, we had some episodes that I think really highlighted that.

For instance, we had three local employees in Bosnia. There was an American library there, which in fact, heroically stayed open through the early years of the war. It was a place people could come to read books and just have a little break, which was less and less possible in Sarajevo. We had three Foreign Service National employees. You will be surprised to learn one was a Croat; one was a Bosnian Muslim; and one was a Bosnian Serb. They all got on famously with each other, as people in Sarajevo generally did. They had become a target, or the American library had become a target of the Serbs, partly because of the defiance in staying open. I was shown, after the war, some of the books that actually had bullet holes in them from people shooting into the library. Our three employees became very much targets. I wanted to get them out, with their families. I had arranged for USIS, the United States Information Service in Zagreb to get them all jobs if they could get to Zagreb. I had arranged for the UN that they could come out on one of these flights. They would be low priority because they weren't injured. One had been shot earlier in the war but had recovered. They would be low priority, compared to the injured children, but they would get out on a space available kind of basis.

What the UN wanted was an official U.S. government request, which I was not authorized to make, not being at that rank. I could not get anyone in my chain of command to make that request. Again, we are not getting involved. If they make their

own way out to Zagreb, it is not our problem. We are not going to ask the UN to do this. On and on. I just got excuse after excuse. Finally, I did an end run and went to Eagleburger through one of his aides, who I knew. I knew he knew these people. I knew he would care about it. I knew he would think all the excuses were nonsense. He, in fact, ordered the European Bureau to make this request in the UN. They did come out and they did get jobs in Zagreb with their families there. And they all lived through the war.

An interesting side note to that is that even when they left, the library stayed open. They left the keys with the local people. The local people started staffing it in volunteer shifts and kept the library open, which I think is just remarkable.

It was that kind of an attitude in the State Department, that we were not going to make any move, in this case for me it was particularly horrifying, to protect our own people. We are seeing a little bit of a rerun of this in Iraq today. Bless Ryan Crocker for insisting that we look after people who have been working for us.

There was very much (an attitude of), we don't take any steps that might somehow bring us deeper into this conflict. The reasons were that it would be another Vietnam. These are ancient hatreds that we can do nothing about. They tied down six German divisions in World War II. There is no way to beat them. This is a European problem, etcetera, etcetera. You just heard this constantly as an excuse for not taking any further action, even trying to get something like a no-fly zone.

Q: You talked about the French. What about the British and the Germans? What were you either observing or doing with them?

BOGUE: With the Germans, almost nothing, certainly at my level. I had almost no contact with the Germans. With the British government, we did have a lot of contact because Laurie Owen was deeply involved with attempts to negotiate a solution to the war in Bosnia. There was the so-called Vance-Owen Plan. Cyrus Vance, who had been Secretary of State under Jimmy Carter, and David Owen, by then Lord Owen, had created a sort of cantonment division of Bosnia. We called it the Leopard Spot map, because it was not possible to simply divide the country into three neat sectors. It was more typical that a town might be Muslim and the surrounding countryside might be Croat or Serb. They had kind of leopard spot concentrations; each one would be a cantonment, like in Switzerland. They have a great deal of autonomy and self-government. We worked with the Brits a lot because Lord Owen was so deeply involved in that effort.

Q: I think I mentioned before I have just finished going through this book, Love Thy Neighbor*, by Peter Maass, a* <u>Washington Post</u> *reporter at the time. He likened the Vance-Owen Plan to a complete appeasement to the Serbs, à la Munich in a way. Basically, it was a fancy way of dismembering Bosnia in favor of giving the Serb government what they wanted. How did you view that?*

BOGUE: The U.S. government actually opposed the Vance-Owen Plan for a lot of reasons. This was awkward since Vance was essentially the U.S. government and was picked personally to work on this. Then the U.S. government rejected the plan. I think we were right to reject the plan. It was a partition essentially of Bosnia in a very convoluted and difficult way. We could see this just becoming immensely difficult down the road. It was, to a certain extent, appeasement of the aggressor parties, but it was also a statement that you just can't fix these problems. The ethnic problems are intractable. The only thing you can do is partition.

I think that in addition to that being wrong for Bosnia, it would have been a horrible precedent, given what else is happening all over Europe with all these countries which have multiple ethnic groups and things like that. You could try to partition almost village by village. It was what Boutros Boutros-Ghali had called, when he was Secretary General of the United Nations, "micro nationalism." Every village is its own sovereign unit. I think we were right. Of course, Vance was very unhappy with the U.S. government's approach.

Q: These people have been living together for thousands of years, at least since Christianity and Islam... The people had been Serbs, Croats and Muslims and hadn't been fighting each other. World War II was basically an aberration. At some point, they are going to get back and suddenly get it. There seems to be almost the mindset, "Oh, these people have been fighting forever. They are going to go back to fighting. You just can't control this beast." We are getting the same thing now in Iraq about Sunnis and Shias, saying, "They hate each other." It is a stimulated hate. There are reasons right now. One looks look back and they have not been fighting each other forever. Was anybody sort of saying, "Wait a minute, look at history."

BOGUE: I would say we on the desk, and we who had some experience in the Balkans, were arguing those points without success. The senior officials in Washington had in a sense accepted Slobodan Milosevic's propaganda thoroughly and internalized it. I don't know because I can't read their motives, but I don't know whether it was because it was convenient to accept that, or whether they really did believe it. We would make the arguments.

Just what you are saying Stu. If you look back in modern history, even ancient history, but particularly modern, the fact is that peaceful coexistence among these groups was much more the norm than conflict between the groups. Conflict tended to flare up only on rare occasions.

Q: From outside forces as in World War II or a Milosevic.

BOGUE: Right. It did not happen spontaneously and internally on any kind of a regular basis. In fact, the kind of thing that might provoke it, a child is assaulted or someone is murdered, tends to be seen as a criminal isolated act, rather than an ethnic provocation. We tried to push back these ancient hatreds. I remember Warren Christopher repeating that, Bill Clinton repeating that. "Well, it's just ancient hatreds." That was one of

Milosevic's constant lines, "There's not much we can do about this because it is an ancient hatred." He also repeated the line over and over again, "We tied down six German divisions in the Balkans during World War II. It will be another Vietnam. You will get in the mountains of Bosnia and be lost." They then swallowed that whole.

Maybe it was just a political expediency; maybe they really believed that was the truth. When you tried to look at that in an objective way and looked at the Bosnian Serbs, what equipment they had, what military organization they had, compared to what we and others in the West could bring to bear on them, it was absolutely absurd. Even our attempts on the desk to level the playing field, there was an arms embargo on the Bosnian government. That was a UN embargo strongly pushed by the United States and supported by the United States on the argument that the last thing you wanted were more arms in the Balkans. So what it meant was that one side had all the arms because Bosnian Serbs had recourse to the arms and armament of the Serbian army. It had recourse to armament factories in Serbia and the Bosnian government did not. So in a great sense, our policy kept the playing field unlevel, rather than keeping it level.

It was very difficult to say to people things like, "look before this little war started," because it was still then a little war, "before this conflict broke out, a third of the marriages in Sarajevo crossed ethnic lines." If you really have entrenched ancient hatreds, you don't have these Romeo and Juliet marriages happening. One out of every three marriages were in fact what would be considered ethnically mixed marriages. It was very common.

Q: One of my favorite officers, I don't know if you have run across Liz _____. Who was an ambassador to a couple of places in Africa, but served with me in Seoul. Her parents: one was Croat Serb and the other was Croat.

BOGUE: A very common mix. I think one of the tragedies of Bosnia is, partly as a result of the war and partly as a result of the peace and the structure set up by the Dayton Accords, there is not a lot of room for anyone who is not one of the three groups. If you are mixed, or if you are Jewish, or if you are a Vlach or a Ruthenian or a Roma or something, the political structure has essentially no place for you.

Q: It will probably take decades, maybe even centuries, to work that out.

BOGUE: So we were battling a tide of perception that was not at all in tune with reality. Just like Milosevic would say, "These abuses are terrible, but they are being committed on all sides." That is true. They were. As you mentioned this before, if you looked at the proportions, it was like ten to one. You could not say it is all the same thing; there is no differentiation between the players there. We were not at all successful in getting that message through.

Q: It points out something. Conventional wisdom in Washington sort of sets in and often, it is at considerable variance with the facts. Often conventional wisdom is what is most convenient.

BOGUE: It is too suited to the political agenda, conventional wisdom.

Q: Talk about the Orthodox Patriarch and Larry Eagleburger.

BOGUE: Larry Eagleburger was of course Secretary of State during the brief period between August-September and the inauguration of Bill Clinton. He is a man, as you well know, of immense Yugoslav experience, having been there as a junior officer and the ambassador and so on. At one point in the midst of the Bosnian war, Patriarch Pavle, the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, came to call on him, in all his robes and so on. I was the note taker at that meeting. We were all up on the seventh floor. They are having a perfectly civil meeting until the moment that Eagleburger raises the issue of the rapes and the human rights abuses.

What he was doing was pushing the Patriarch in a non-aggressive way, especially for Eagleburger, but starting to push him gently about how as head of the church, how helpful it would be if he came out against these things. Pavle said, "Well, you don't understand the history of our country," which of course was an immensely uninformed thing to say to Mr. Eagleburger. He said, "You don't understand our history. Terrible things were done to us by the Turks." On and on. He started this line that you and I and others have heard from Serbs over the years, which essentially justified all of these things, based on the history of Ottoman occupation.

Secretary Eagleburger completely lost his temper. He said, "First of all, I know your history. Don't lecture me about your history. Second, there is nothing in your history that can possibly justify to a man of the cloth, the rape and murder of little girls. There is nothing that can justify that." Then he switched into Serbian and began what I would have to describe as a vocabulary-expanding experience for me, though I spoke Serbian reasonably well, he included some phrases that were known to me and some that were new to me. He stood up and said to Patriarch Pavle, and everyone was stunned around the table, "Get out of my building. Get out of my State Department." And threw him out.

So the Patriarch and his entourage had to leave the building. They didn't finish the meeting. Eagleburger was just completely enraged. I had the job of writing a cable about this meeting. I trotted back down to my desk, and my phone rang not long after that. It was Secretary Eagleburger.

"Are you writing the cable?"

I said, "Yes, I am."

He said, "How good is your Serbian?"

I said, "It is adequate. I understood most everything you said; not quite everything."

He said, "How good is it?"

I said, “Well, I missed a few phrases and words, but I got the gist of it sir. I followed the gist.”

He said, “That is not what I am asking you. How good is your Serbian?”

I said, “Sir, I am sorry. I am not understanding what you are asking me.”

He said, “Was it good enough to know what stays in and what stays out of the cable?”

I said, “Yes sir. Point taken.”

It was really quite extraordinary. Part of the reason I tell this story is that Eagleburger has been faulted by many people saying he was too pro-Serb, he was too soft on the Yugoslavs. It was partly his fault that intervention was so late. That was not my experience with him in that short time that I worked with him.

Q: Let’s move on to when you are getting close to May 1993. What was happening to you?

BOGUE: I actually brought in some clippings because I thought you might enjoy reading them, given your Balkan past, but also to refresh my own memory.

Last time, I had mentioned that a number of things were coming together at once. One was that we were hopelessly overworked on the Yugoslav account. We had the Yugoslave army and we had very little support. Another was that our views were not being heard. We felt very strongly that they were being stopped from reaching the seventh floor. This is by now Secretary Christopher and the Clinton Administration. We had the tremendous disappointment, after all the Clinton promises, of no change on Bosnia policy. Our views, not just opinions but facts being presented, were completely revised before they got to the seventh floor in order to support a no-intervention policy.

Q: Did you get any feel about where or who was doing this?

BOGUE: In my own view again, it went all the way from our Office Director who kept saying to me, “I don’t like this memo. There is no way I am going to let my son fight in Bosnia,” to the Assistant Secretary, a political appointee, who felt that it was not our job to present information, policy options and recommendations to the seventh floor. It was our job to wait for the seventh floor to tell us what they wanted, and then send up memos supporting that. A kind of backward approach.

I actually saw a couple of memos after they had been radically revised by our bosses to, for instance, downplay human rights abuses and play up this whole idea that it was useless for the United States to even attempt to do anything more than drop more hamburgers on Bosnia. So that was very frustrating. Again, you will recall that in the Foreign Service we do what we are told in a policy sense. We weren’t elected to be the

president and we do what we are told. I think that people can accept that much more readily if they feel that the facts and views of people working on the issue, whether at an embassy or in Washington, are at least presented. We felt very strongly that was not happening.

We had a combination of miserable working conditions, poor management, a very agonizing situation in Bosnia, poor policy from our point of view, and then what brought this all to a head was the opening of the Holocaust Museum. All the politicians from the United States and European countries saying, "Never again." When in our view, Never Again was happening in Bosnia and no one was interested in really doing anything about it.

All of this came to a head on a Friday afternoon, when one of my colleagues, Marshall Harris, who was the Bosnia desk officer, drafted a letter to the Secretary of State, essentially saying, here is a dissenting view on policy and here is why. What this was was an effort to get some information and views directly to the Secretary without it being sliced off in between. And Marshall shared this letter with a group of us. He and I were office mates. Everyone was an office mate, since we all sort of became one big mess there. But other people working in, say, the Bureau of International Organizations and the Bureau of Refugee Affairs who were working on Bosnian issues, asked if they would like to sign it.

We ended up negotiating for some time over the language. I thought that Marshall's letter was too based on emotion and not enough based on a kind of bedrock of U.S. interests and hard facts and analysis. We all massaged it a bit and we changed it around. One of our colleagues was on leave in Florida and I wanted to make sure he had the chance to participate, so I phoned him. He said, "If you are fine with the letter, I am fine with the letter and you can sign for me."

At the end, there were 12 of us at the end of the day with a text that we agreed to. We did not clear it with anybody. We did classify it because we had taken an agreement among ourselves that this was meant to be a private letter to the Secretary, and not a public dissent. We adhered to the code of the Foreign Service that this would stay in-house. I took the letter, a very dear friend of mine, Beth Jones, who was the Secretary's senior executive assistant, and another very close friend of mine named Peggy McGinnis, was one of the few staff assistants to the Secretary. So I knew I could get it directly into the Secretary's hands through Peggy and Beth, without going through all the layers of bureaucracy.

I gave it to Peggy and I explained what it was. This was on a Friday afternoon. She gave it to the Secretary. The Secretary was leaving, so she ran down to the garage and handed him as he left so that he could read it. He invited us to meet with him the following Monday. We then felt the honorable thing to do was to, after the fact, alert everyone in our chain of command in between that we had done this. Although they would be blind-sided, they would be blind-sided less badly. We told them.

Of course, they were furious that we had done this. They wanted to see the letter. We declined. If the Secretary wanted to share it with them, that was his decision. This was a private message and we didn't want to share it outside of our group.

On Monday afternoon, we met with the Secretary. He was extraordinarily polite, as he always was. I hasten to add that one of the things that Secretary Christopher emphasized to differentiate himself from his predecessor, James Baker (skipping over Eagleburger for a moment), was his openness to dissent. So he invited us up. He said very little. He heard us out. The group actually asked me to be the spokesperson as I had been on the desk longest and was the most senior in that regard. Also, a couple of the folks were so completely angry and emotional about it that the group argued that they would not make the best speakers. I was a little more Quaker-like in my approach to this: speak truth to power, but quietly.

So I spoke and some others spoke. Christopher listened and said he found it all very interesting. He asked us some good questions, like, if we got in, how would we get out? What did we see as an appropriate outcome in Bosnia? These were all excellent questions. We had a very cordial discussion with him. We left feeling two ways. One was that we felt we had been heard. He had heard us out. He did not lecture us. He did not ignore us. He listened politely and asked questions, as was his wont. And the other feeling very strongly that nothing would change.

We went back to our desks and sort of contemplated what next. Well what next was that on Thursday, I think it was, the Holocaust Museum was dedicated, the official dedication. Also on Thursday, which would have been April 22nd I think, someone, and I still don't know who, although I have my suspicions, leaked our letter to the New York Times.

Q: It always happens. It could be up and down the line, but once somebody has a different agenda or an ego problem, there are all sorts of things. It always happens.

BOGUE: Exactly. I got a call late that night. I think it was late Thursday night. I got a call from Peggy McGinnis, staff assistant, who had gotten a call from the Public Affairs Office saying the New York Times had given the State Department a heads up that this would be on the front page. So Peggy called to let me know. I called Beth Jones so that she could alert the Secretary that this was happening.

Of course, I didn't sleep any more that night. I felt sick and betrayed. Not because I would take back the dissent in a minute. But because someone had leaked something we intended to keep private.

As it happened, we took turns coming in super-early to do the press guidance. It was my super-early morning and I came in at about six o'clock in the morning. I had the extraordinary experience of writing press guidance on myself. With the questions being, how would you characterize these Foreign Service officers? Of course, the temptation was to write intelligent, witty, good looking….

I was going to call Beth Jones and ask how the Secretary wanted to handle this and should someone else write this guidance, when she just appeared in my office, gave me a big hug, and said, "I know you didn't want this to happen. I know none of you wanted this to happen." I am told by others that Beth argued forcefully in the staff meeting with the Secretary that we were a group of very serious and committed people. There were a couple of people in the Secretary's retinue, not the Secretary himself, who were arguing that we be punished.

Beth argued forcefully that we were a group of serious and committed professionals who did not want this to happen. A case in point, we hadn't leaked it when we wrote it. A whole week had passed. The other person who really stuck up for us was the spokesman, Richard Boucher. When he did the noon briefing that day, it was all about this. He said very bluntly that there would be no punishment; there would be no recriminations. This was a private communication that had been entirely appropriate, and so on.

We couldn't get anything done all day because the phones just went crazy. Even though it had been leaked, we had met that morning, the 12 of us, we agreed that didn't alter our own commitment to keeping this private and that we would not talk to the press, even though the leak was out.

I want to say a wonderful thing about the Foreign Service. Within 24 hours, I had probably 150 e-mails in my queue. Most of them were from complete strangers colleagues, people I didn't know who were serving in Latin America, Africa, East Asia. They were essentially saying either, "I don't know anything about Bosnia, but I am completely committed to the principle of dissent and this was part of the obligation of a professional Foreign Service officer, so you have got my support."

Or saying, "I have been watching Bosnia in anguish and good for you all."

Or saying, "Gee, if you had asked me, I would have signed too."

I think that one of the really heart-warming things about that whole episode – I can't begin to describe how sick and disappointed I felt that this had been made public – the reaction among our colleagues was tremendous. In fact, a very dear colleague, we couldn't be more different politically, but we served together overseas. We were good pals with him and his wife and their kids. He was a very conservative fellow who disagreed with me totally on Bosnia. He called me up at about three in the afternoon and said, "You have a listed phone number and you have an unusual last name, not Smith. Your name was spelled correctly in the paper today. If you go home, your life is going to be hell with people calling, reporters and everything. Why don't you come and have pizza with me and the kids?"

Here is somebody who could not disagree more, but a Foreign Service colleague, and I am going to look out for you. You are my colleague. You are my friend. It is a rough day.

He was right. When I finally got home that night, there were 56 messages on my answering machine, which I just deleted. I figured my family would call back. Over the next few days, I did start taking messages. I got some hate calls from some Serbian-American groups and things like that, threatening kinds of calls. But from everyone else, immense support.

I called my mom, because I thought moms should never be blindsided either. I called her and said this was going to be in the paper. She said a wonderful thing. The day before in the New York Times, the front-page story had been about the Tailhook investigation, Tailhook being the naval aviators' annual conference, which had gotten out of hand. There had been groping and sexual harassment.

Q: Really quite a disgusting episode.

BOGUE: A few male naval aviators were named by name in that story, as the offenders. I think it's a lot easier for you to explain to me that you dissented on Bosnia, than for Lieutenant Whoever to explain to his mother that he's been groping women in the hallways of the hotel. Which was quite true.

So, tremendous support from everybody. But we were pretty much done on the desk at that point. Our bosses up through the front office of the European Bureau had completely lost confidence in us. They were furious.

Q: I never understood. These were professional working officers, weren't they?

BOGUE: Except for the Assistant Secretary.

Q: I am surprised they didn't say, "Well, I couldn't do it, but bully for you." Do you feel, this is maybe going into the mind a little too much, but do you feel they were mad at you because you bucked the system or mad at you because they supported the policy?

BOGUE: I think they were mad at us because we had embarrassed them. What we were saying was, "Mr. Secretary, our views have never reached you. Our bosses have suppressed those views and we need to come to you directly." I remember one person in the chain just saying to me in amazement, "Why didn't you just come to us?" And I said, "We did. Every day, for months. And got nowhere. So we finally reached the end of that road and went elsewhere." I have to say, the other thing was that very senior people in the State Department were immensely supportive. The late Warren Zimmerman, who was then the Assistant Secretary equivalent in the Bureau of Refugees (they used to have a different name for it), asked me to come see him and essentially just gave me a big hug and said "more power to you."

So Warren Zimmerman gave us his personal support in the form of saying "I appreciate what you're doing and think it's the right thing to do" But again, clearly we were done on the desk. Two people resigned: Marshall Harris and a guy named Steve Walker. Actually, Steve hadn't been one of the signers, I think he had resigned a little later than that.

Marshall resigned and everyone else scattered. We weren't exactly fired, but it was made clear to us that we no longer should be there. In fact, the Assistant Secretary said that he was going to look for people to work on Bosnia who "did not have opinions", a kind of interesting personnel approach. Find people with no opinions. So all of us either, in one case resigned from the service. In other cases, some people stayed in their offices, people in International Organizations. But everyone who was in the European Bureau working on the desk went somewhere else.

Q: Who was the Assistant Secretary?

BOGUE: Steve Oxman. He was a law school classmate of Hillary Clinton. He had been an investment banker or lawyer in New York and had been brought in to do this.

We all scattered to the four winds. I ended up in a kind of unusual situation. Right at that moment, Secretary Christopher's speechwriting office was looking for one career diplomat to put in there. The speechwriters were all from the campaign and political appointees. Richard Boucher had seen, first of all, a lot of my writing, because I wrote a lot of press guidance. He also thought that if Warren Christopher really wanted to demonstrate that he was someone who tolerated and encouraged dissent, one great way to do that was to put a known dissenter onto his own staff. So, I moved over in May or June, it may have been June by the time it all happened. I moved over to Public Affairs and I worked in the speechwriting office for Warren Christopher. In a matter of a few weeks, I considered myself fired although you don't really fire people in the Foreign Service. But it was made clear to me that I needed to move on. So I did. I landed up writing speeches and still doing a lot of work on Bosnia.

Q: Was anybody telling you, "You will never lunch in the EUR dining room again," or something like that?

BOGUE: No, not at all. There was one person, someone who I have known for a long time. I wouldn't say we were close friends, but we had known each other for a long time. We were certainly warm acquaintances. He saw me one day in the hallway. Nobody was around. He sort of said, "Psst, psst, come over here." I said, "What's up?" He said, "You know, I haven't called you to go to lunch or anything. I just don't want to take the risk of hurting my career by being around you. I hope you will understand." I thought it was the most amazingly pathetic thing to say. I laughed it off. I thought it was kind of sad that he actually thought in those terms. Everybody else was wonderful. I really have to say that no one said, "You are never going to eat in the European Bureau's lunchroom again." No one said anything like that.

In fact, I have to say I was treated with immense civility and courtesy by everyone, outside of my immediate chain of command.

Q: What was your impression of the press treatment of this?

BOGUE: I talked to a couple of reporters later. I didn't talk to any reporters at the time. In fact, I started traveling with the Secretary from time to time because I was one of the speechwriters. Of course, there was press on the airplanes. I was very careful not to just sit in the back and play cards with them and chit chat, for just that reason. I didn't want to talk to anybody about this at all.

Years later, when I ran into some of the journalists I knew, a couple of them said to me that for the press, this was a golden opportunity because the press had been the ones leading the charge on all the terrible things that were happening in Bosnia. Here at last, in their view, was a sort of crowbar into the government. There were in fact cracks and fissures and dissent within the government on this issue. The people who knew, the people who were the experts, the people working the issue. There were articles done. I think it was in a way an opportunity for the press to really push the issue even harder.

Richard Holbrooke told a colleague of mine, so this is third hand, that he thought that while the dissent itself didn't accomplish anything immediately; it was the thin edge of the wedge that changed policy later.

It is true that a year after the dissent, policy had completely changed on Bosnia. But I don't want to give the 12 of us credit for that. I think it may have played a role, but it was not certainly the whole amount of pressures.

Q: For somebody looking at this, it gives a feel for the process. It takes little wedges. In various elements of the government, the pressure begins to build up and all of a sudden, the government has to respond positively. If too many people talk about septic problems anywhere, coming in from the experts, you have got to pay attention to them.

BOGUE: Right. I brought you another thing that was from Time. My mother became my clipper, because she is my mother. There was a little thing about the Yugo-slaves up here, saying, "At least they are going to get better lighting now. They are not going to fix the policy."

Q: This is in Time of September 13th, 1993 and it says, "Yugo-slaves of the State Department, Washington. At the State Department, unhappy souls in Eastern European Bureau assigned to work on Bosnia, are nicknamed 'Yugo-slaves.' So far, three have quit in the past out of frustration with U.S. policy. The department's embarrassed high command recently had a meeting to head off more defections. The solution is to at least reduce the physical discomfort involved in standing by at Foggy Bottom while genocide is committed in the Balkans, and the Yugo-slaves will get better lighting and more space."

Oh golly.

BOGUE: Exactly. That was kind of the way it went. Rather than change the policy, they decided, well at least we can make sure everyone has a desk and a phone and a light that works.

By then, I had already moved on and was writing speeches.

Q: I just want to repeat something I got from Warren Zimmerman. I have an oral history with Warren. When he was with Secretary William Rogers as his speechwriter, he was told by Rogers, "In your speeches, I want you to make absolutely certain that I don't make headlines." That was William Rogers.

For Warren Christopher who was such a lawyer and such an unemotional and cool character, not nasty. He's just a very solid, quiet, calm lawyer. I imagine it would be like writing speeches for a schoolmarm or something.

BOGUE: Warren Christopher was not God's own orator, that's for sure. What was interesting to me was that given a prepared text, he was a terrible speaker. He stumbled and tripped over lines. Give him a chance to speak from notes or to simply speak off the cuff in response to questions, he did something almost none of us can do. He spoke in well thought out and grammatically complete sentences, and, here's the kicker, he was funny. Something people didn't guess about him. We could not get him to move to that mode. We could not get him to work from notes. I think it was the lawyer in him. He was afraid of making an error.

One of the things that had happened on Bosnia was at one point in a press conference, this was before there was any United States engagement in Bosnia outside of humanitarian, and someone asked him if the United States intended to step up its engagement. He said, "No, I think we've done all we can for Sarajevo." The following day was the heaviest artillery barrage in Sarajevo up to that point. I think the realization that the Bosnian Serb commanders were watching CNN along with everyone else and saying, "Hey, the United States has just given us a free pass." I think that kind of a thing, along with his lawyerly disposition, made Warren Christopher very cautious about what he said.

On issues like the Middle East, every word is coded. If you literally say "happy" instead of "glad," it means something different. So he was very determined that he would only speak from a carefully, thoroughly vetted, prepared text. He did not read well off the teleprompter. He wasn't funny. If I may indulge in a story, because it illustrates his lawyerly disposition.

We were out in Seattle for the Asia Pacific Economic Conference meeting. I had been sent out a little bit early because I am a 'native' and I spoke Seattle very well. We didn't have an embassy there to do all the advance work, so I went out with the advance team. I was also preparing speeches. One of his speeches was going to be an after-dinner speech held for the Seattle Chamber of Commerce at the Boeing Museum of Flight, which is sort of a small version of the Air and Space Museum here. It has gorgeous early airplanes hanging around and then they set up a big dinner area.

Secretary Christopher, you will probably remember, liked to make fun about his age. He was by far the oldest in the Clinton Administration and made jokes about that all the time. So we thought, here's the perfect one. We wrote a remark in the speech that he would begin the speech by saying, "Wow, looking around here today at these beautiful old airplanes reminds me of my first flight that took off in South Dakota. We flew around. I could see my house. I could see my friends' farms. I could see our little town. It was so exciting that when we landed, I ripped my goggles off and said, 'Wilbur, can we go around one more time?'"

We thought, first of all, a person his age would distinctly remember their first flight. Second, this fed into this whole thing. I remember this conversation with him because he said, "Well, I was born in 1925 and the Wright brothers' flight was in 1904. So I could not have flown with the Wright brothers and people will know that, so this won't be funny."

We said, "Well Mr. Secretary, a lot of humor is based on exaggeration and people will have had a few glasses of wine. It is an after-dinner speech. It is Seattle and they love airplanes. They will laugh."

I remember that he looked at me and said, "How do you know?"

And I said, "Well, I am from here. You are just going to have to trust me that people will laugh."

He finally agreed. He argued with us for a long time because he kept saying, "But it is inaccurate; it is not correct."

And we said, "It's not a lie. It's a joke."

He agreed finally, reluctantly. The great thing about him was that he was so deadpan that he could pull off deadpan humor. Sure enough, everyone has had their glasses of wine and their dinner. They are happy and relaxed. He gets up at this gorgeous wooden seaplane right next to him, and he told the story. He got to the part where he said, "I ripped off my goggles and said, 'Wilbur can we go around one more time?'" The place just fell apart laughing.

He looked over at me like, why are they laughing? He still couldn't understand why people were laughing. That's what it was like writing speeches for him.

Q: I am trying to get the workings of government and foreign policy. You were speechwriting. Can you talk about some of what goes into the Secretary's speeches? What sort of things were you involved in, and how do these things get put together?

BOGUE: We had a lot of different kinds of things we did for the Secretary. Everything from the swearing in of an ambassador or recognition of Black History Month or Women's History Month, to major policy speeches. Again, given his reticence and

lawyerly disposition, he didn't do so many of those. He left those more to President Clinton, one of the great speakers of our time. He tended to make more almost technical kinds of presentations at ministerial meetings.

The typical thing was that we would be doing two things. One was looking ahead at the calendar and seeing where he was going and what he was going to be doing, and what we would need for that. Also, looking for things he should be doing. Were there auspicious moments he should use to advance policy or stake out a new policy on a particular issue? For me, I kept doing a lot of work on Bosnia. Of course, Bosnia was still very hot and heavy. I did the Congressional testimony on Bosnia. Also, by then, on Somalia and Haiti. I went with him when he traveled, for instance to Paris to talk to European leaders about Bosnia. I went along to do the speechwriting, partly because it was in my head and I could summon up a lot of the information quickly.

What would typically happen was we would decide or propose to the Secretary, we being the whole Public Affairs apparatus, an occasion or venue, the kind of thing he had to do. Or there would be an automatic thing, such as a NATO ministerial: he would have to make a speech at something like that. Then we would send to the appropriate bureau in the department a request for what were called 'Building Blocks.' That is not essentially in speech form, but those were the points that needed to be made, the information that needed to be included in some kind of logical order, we hoped. The idea was that we would then take that and massage it so that what came out at the end was a speech.

Major policy speeches had to be then vetted through the White House, which was done speechwriters' office to speechwriters' office. We had close contacts there in the speechwriting office for President Clinton. An in-house thing was just cleared in-house. The information was supposed to come up to us from the bureaus and we were supposed to turn it into a speech.

There were a lot of things that I enjoyed about the job. Part of the thing I realized as I went along with it, in our context, at least in that place and time, speechwriting was pretty much substance-free. We were just the writers. We weren't developing any of the substance. That isn't always true. In the old days, speechwriting had been part of policy planning in the recognition that the speech is in fact a vehicle for moving policy forward.

Q: You had some really top-grade people: Peter Rodman and obviously, George Kennan, but others such as the ambassador to China. We had some people who were sort of part of a think-tank crowd in a way there. At this point, this was not really the case, was it?

BOGUE: No, the speechwriting function had been moved into Public Affairs. There were four of us in the office; three had come off the Clinton campaign and then I was there.

Q: A couple of things. What about the White House connection? Sometimes the White House wants to make sure their principal, the President or the Vice President, gets all the goodies. Did you sense a conflict there in that?

BOGUE: Not a conflict because Secretary Christopher deferred to that.

Q: This wasn't his thing anyway.

BOGUE: Right, and with President Clinton's great gift for speechmaking, he was going to always be the one with the fine oratorical or rhetorical flourishes. He was also the emotion guy, the guy who felt your pain. That was not Warren Christopher.

Q: We are not trying to denigrate Warren Christopher.

BOGUE: But his personality was very reserved and a gentleman of the old school in a sense. He wasn't going to have these soaring emotional speeches. So we didn't have a conflict that I felt with the White House speechwriters, because they were doing different things. It was a rare occasion when they both spoke on the same subject at the same time. Things like NATO ministerials, and I say this with all respect for my colleagues and myself who spent hours writing these things, but they tend to somewhat sink into the … I don't think any NATO ministerial speech, and I could be completely wrong about this, has been included in the book of the world's great speeches.

Q: What about Bosnia? Here you are, full of piss and vinegar about Bosnia and you are supposed to write speeches. How did you treat this?

BOGUE: First of all, I was immensely relieved to be out of the European Bureau at that point, and not dealing with all that. Discouraged as I was on Bosnia, I did feel that the Secretary had listened to our views. Also, this was the time when things were starting to change on the policy front on Bosnia.

This was the time we were in Paris meeting with the French when there was the terrible – not the marketplace – it was the kids who went sledding. The first couple of days with no shelling and a bunch of kids took their sleds out, and the Serbs just opened fire and wiped out all these kids sledding down a hill in the snow. I remember this distinctly because the secretary was about to go see Mitterrand. We were all sitting around prepping him for this meeting and Ambassador Pamela Harriman was there. Some of Secretary Christopher's aides were saying, "We are not here to talk about that. We are going to meet the Chinese." Mitterrand had facilitated that meeting. It was all about human rights. Just tell them you are not here to talk about Bosnia. Ambassador Harriman said, "That is not possible. You have to talk about it."

So it was agreed what the secretary would say and then I would be dispatched to go off and quickly write up the points. By that time, we were already starting to see a shift that there was not going to be a public tolerance any longer, in the United States or elsewhere, for little kids. What happened later, in one of my introductions to the way the world worked, was when the marketplace shelling took place. All these people standing in line for bread were shelled by Bosnian Serb artillery, with fifty-some killed in one go. When that came up on CNN, I was sitting in the office of one of Secretary Christopher's senior political appointee aides. He was shaking his head and saying, "This is terrible. This is

terrible. This is terrible. This is just awful." I said, "I agree that it is terrible, but I just have to remind you that this has been going on for a long time. This is not the first time innocent civilians have been shelled horribly." He turned to me and said, "No, what is so terrible is that (I think it was) Tom Brokaw happened to be in Sarajevo at the time." If it wasn't Tom Brokaw, it was Peter Jennings.

Q: We are talking about one of the top anchors for one of the major television networks.

BOGUE: Right, one of them. My memory says it was Tom Brokaw, but it might have been Peter Jennings. It might have been Dan Rather. One of the top anchors of the nightly news from one of the three big broadcast networks at the time, just happened by coincidence to be in Sarajevo and so went straight to the market with bloody limbs everywhere. Here is this person, this anchor, with immense personal credibility saying, "This is what is happening in Sarajevo." And this aide said, "What is so terrible about it is that because (let's say) Tom Brokaw is there, now we have to do something." In other words, it was media-driven.

Q: Horrible things can happen. In a way, the Rwanda thing was happening out of the sight of reporters and it took quite a while for everything to filter back.

BOGUE: A lot of the reporters had been evacuated. It was a lesson to me that so much of this policy was media-driven, or public opinion-driven, and the media drove public opinion to a great extent. Already, during my speech writing time, there was starting to be more and more of a sense of inevitability that the United States and the West in general would have to take a stronger line. It was also clearer that Milosevic could not be trusted.

On these trips, the secretary typically had some big formal 'do' in the evening. The staff not involved in that would take advantage of the fact that you are in Paris and go out and have a nice meal. I ended up having dinner with three or four friends, one of whom was Dennis Ross working on the Middle East. Dennis was fascinated by Milosevic and he asked me about him: what he was like in person, and so on. He said, "You know, he plays the West like a fiddle. He is so good at it." Referring to the first Gulf War, he said, "If Saddam Hussein were as clever and canny and knowledgeable about the West as Milosevic, he would still be sitting in Kuwait. He would still be saying, ``I am going to withdraw but I have got a real problem with my rightist politicians." He would just keep on this thing. Of course, Milosevic had lived in New York. He spoke English well. He had been in the West. He knew how things worked in the West. Horrible person that he was, he was not stupid.

Q: He was also a consummate liar.

BOGUE: And he was a consummate liar. He would sit down with people over vinyac and say, "Now my friend, tell me…"

Q: I've had long interviews with Rudy Perina. He had to hold his hand at Dayton and dealt with him. He said, "That man could tell the most outrageous lies and look you straight in the face. He never lost his temper."

BOGUE: That was one of the keys to his success. Things he did, even shows of temper, were Kabuki Theater. They were stage managed. They were for a purpose. He was a great manipulator.

These kinds of cracks were starting to appear. I still recall that conversation with Dennis. I doubt that he does, because he had a lot of other things on his mind and plate. It was quite interesting to get his view from outside of the Bosnian thing, but very familiar with the characters that we were negotiating with.

Q: I would assume that every Secretary of State can't stay out of the briar patch of the Middle East. Things are of such a closely entwined nature. You have already mentioned that you say the words 'glad' or 'happy' that means something. You almost have to have a professional Middle East speechwriter or two.

BOGUE: We worked immensely closely with the bureau that handled the Middle East on those kinds of speeches. On some occasions, Dennis for instance who was the Special Envoy on the Middle East, would himself sometimes write whole sections where the importance of getting every word right. Of course, the irony is that then somebody gets up and interprets it as who knows what.

Q: Then it goes into Hebrew and Arabic.

BOGUE: It was very crucial for our Secretary Christopher's record that … it is possible with a word to change policy inadvertently. He certainly did not want to be in that situation.

Q: For instance, one of our spokespeople talking about dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian problem said, "We want to be neutral in thought, word and deed," or something. He slipped into Episcopalian and caught hell for it.

BOGUE: It is very tough. That was a very tough thing. I think one of the things that the speechwriters who came off the campaign trail were used to was throwing a lot of stuff out there, as you do in a campaign. And also, they were used to the fact that you make a speech in Kansas City and then you move on, and then you make a speech somewhere else. People in Omaha may not pay that much attention to what was said in Kansas City. Whereas in the foreign affairs world, everybody is paying attention all the time, is what you are saying. That was a bit of a struggle for them as well.

Q: How did you deal with the campaign types?

BOGUE: I think we had some interesting discussions. They were initially a bit distrustful of me because I had obviously worked for Republican administrations. I pointed out that

I had also worked for Democratic administrations. They saw us somehow as mercenaries who would just hire our diplomatic services out to whoever was running the country. That made them nervous. I kept pointing out that they needed to understand that our perception of ourselves was that we were patriots and we worked for whomever the American people chose. We didn't work for only one party. We were focused on the interests of America, rather than the interests of a party. It was not a line that had a lot of success, but it was a small office. Over time, we developed personal relationships that helped to overcome that.

I think the reason that they sought a person from the inside was partly to help handle the inside work, like a swearing in of an ambassador, which is a very different kind of speech than a speech you would give outside. Also, just to say, "Wait a minute," because early on, there had been a terrible gaff, which you will appreciate. The speechwriters, in a flight of fancy and not looking at the map, had written--"Gone are the Cold War days" was essentially the theme--"Gone are the days when we feared Soviet tanks rolling across southern Germany through the Fulda Gap." I said, "One or the other, fellas." They said, "What?" And I said, "Here is the Fulda Gap. Here is southern Germany." They didn't have the sort of insistence that we had all been raised on, on getting it right geographically, getting it right ethnically, getting it right in how people in countries describe themselves, and so on. They wanted someone who would help them do that.

I think also they had run into some rough spots in their dealings with the professionals, because they did come off the campaign and it is a pretty rough and ready world out there. Besides the fact that we are diplomats--I think partly because we served together abroad and need to get along with each other, we know each other's family and we know each other's pets--I think we tend to treat each other with a certain level of courtesy, even when we are disagreeing. It may have been a matter of personalities more than anything, but the chief speechwriter would tend to call up a desk officer and say, "What you sent me is total crap." That is not the way we talk to each other in the Foreign Service. So one of my jobs was to be the person between them and the bureaus, to talk to the bureaus about what we needed, how best to package it, when we needed it, and so on – to try to smooth over that relationship a bit.

Q: Were there any instances of you all getting the secretary into a problem, or the secretary almost getting you all into something that you had to dig out of?

BOGUE: Not that I can recall. Again, I attribute that to the lawyerly professional carefulness that is a tremendous characteristic of Secretary Christopher. He did not dig a hole for himself like that. I think what we wrote for him was vetted by senior aides of his before it became a speech. Again, when we would meet with him before a major speech, he would go over it with us, line by line by line. Not editing for rhetoric, but "Why am I saying this? Is it actually true that this is our specific policy? Did the president actually say that? Show me where and when."

Q: As a speechwriter, were you or your colleagues monitoring what the president was saying?

BOGUE: All the time. We followed him. We got advance copies typically of speeches he made on foreign policy issues from the speechwriters' office. We did try to keep track of that very carefully.

Q: You mentioned the Wilbur Wright thing. Did you have a joke file or something? Most of us are all told to start a speech with a joke or something. Sometimes you have heard it from five people. Did you have this?

BOGUE: We didn't have a file. We had a person. There was a person working then in the Legal Department who had been with Secretary Christopher at his law firm in Los Angeles. This is a fellow called Mark Steinberg, not to be confused with Jim Steinberg in Policy Planning. Mark Steinberg was a litigation lawyer who had started life as a filmmaker, but found that he really wasn't going to be able to feed his children as a filmmaker. So he had gone to law school and ended up working closely with Secretary Christopher in his firm. The Secretary had brought him into a job in the Legal Department, which he did, whatever job it was. On the side, he helped us. He knew Secretary Christopher inside and out. Mark was a very funny guy himself. He knew what the Secretary would be able to tolerate as joking in his speeches, and what would go beyond the pale. I think he was the one in the end who privately pushed Secretary Christopher over the line on the Wilbur Wright joke. I don't think he really accepted my assurances that the people of Seattle would laugh. I think Mark probably convinced him that this would go over well in this particular environment. So Mark did that actually.

Q: Did you ever have any contact with the secretary and the Balkan desk? Did the secretary ever look at you and say, "How do you feel about this?" Was this an episode that had gone by?

BOGUE: Not at all. I need to go back because I just remembered that we didn't have a joke book, but one of the things we did have – of course, Secretary Christopher had to make a lot of speeches over the years in his private life as well – he had a notebook of favorite quotes he liked that he kept over the years. They were from General George Marshall, Dean Acheson, all sorts of people he admired and respected. He gave us copies of that notebook and said, "Feel free to use these because these are quotations I really like and have found inspirational. I would be happy to use any of them again, many of them from former Secretaries of State." You will remember that he had been Deputy Secretary of State in the Carter Administration, so he had to do a bit of this before.

Coming back to Bosnia: no, I often was taken along on trips because it was two-for-one. I could do the Bosnia work and the speechwriting work on the same trip. Sometimes these trips came up very suddenly or were secret, and the only reason I even knew was that my friend Beth Jones, the Secretary's Senior Assistant, a career person, would call me up and say that "it wouldn't be a bad idea if on the way home tonight if you picked up your dry cleaning." This was her way of saying, "You are traveling. You need to get everything organized. You need to have somebody look after your apartment and you need to be ready to go." We would take off very suddenly on these trips.

The value added to them was that I knew the Bosnia stuff well. Interestingly, the European Bureau and the desk did not object to that. I think they were swamped with work. There was no animosity with the new people on the desk. A lot of them were personal friends of mine. I liked them very much. I didn't feel any animosity about their being there. Assistant Secretary Oxman had not succeeded. They had opinions too, it turned out. He hadn't found the opinionless people he was looking for. He ultimately lost his job. He was replaced. He did not fill out the full term. I think the frustration with him over Bosnia; maybe he was a scapegoat. There was a sense that he wasn't doing the job on Bosnia that was very strong in the department.

I continued to work a lot on Bosnia from a speechwriting point of view, or writing talking points and things like that. It was not at all set aside and I was sometimes called into meetings where maybe the speechwriter wouldn't have been called in because they had a Bosnia angle, especially on trips.

Q: Did you have your Bosnian contact, someone on the desk who kept you apprised of what was happening?

BOGUE: I talked to them a lot. I saw them a lot. Of course, I was reading all the cable traffic still and kept in touch that way. I found it very interesting to be in that circumstance. It wasn't so much that Secretary Christopher would come to me for advice. A few times, someone would say something about Bosnia using shorthand, and he would turn to me and raise his eyebrows and say, "Explain." And I would explain what that meant, what the background was.

His senior staff, particularly the spokesman, Mike McCurry, would often talk to me at length about Bosnia.

Q: How long did you do this?

BOGUE: I did that until February 1994. At that time, something happened that was very exciting for me. Since we had opened the Central Asian Caucasus posts, I had been champing at the bit to go. To me, this was very exciting: new embassies, new countries. We had opened these very tiny little missions in all the countries in 1992. In 1994, the department decided to expand them a bit from their six or eight people, to be slightly bigger embassies. There were suddenly a bunch of new openings to start that summer in Central Asia and the Caucasus. I really wanted to go.

I wanted to go because I was very excited about that part of the world. I wanted to go because I wanted to get out of Washington. I felt very cynical and jaded about policy at that point. I thought the one thing that might really re-energize me was to go to a new embassy and a new country where we were doing lots of good and positive things. So I went down to the head of the Central Caucasus office and I gave him my pitch about why I would be a good person to go. I spoke Serbo-Croatian, so I thought I could learn

Russian quickly. I had served in Pakistan which wasn't similar, but it was in the region of kind of remote Central Asia.

Q: Islam.

BOGUE: I thought I could do all that and I gave him my big pitch. He listened very politely. He was someone I had known for many years. At the end, he said, "You know what? Anyone who wants to go, gets to go."

So in February, I started a shorter course in Russian. By summer, I was in Kazakhstan.

Q: You were in Kazakhstan from…

BOGUE: I was there from 1994 to 1997.

Q: What was your position there?

BOGUE: The first two years, I was the Chief of the Political, Economic and Science Section. I emphasize science because one of our biggest projects was nuclear issues. My last year, I was DCM. I was sort of a brevet DCM, I guess you would say, in the old Civil War sense. I had a battlefield promotion to DCM for a year.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

BOGUE: When I arrived, it was Bill Courtney, who was known for arms control work, and that is the reason he had come out there. He had Russian. He had done a lot of the nuclear arms control…

Q: This is Tape 6, Side 1 with Janet Bogue.

You were saying Bill Courtney had been in Arms Control.

BOGUE: Right. And he spoke Russian. Kazakhstan was one of the four nuclear successor states of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union broke up, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had nuclear facilities, materials and presumably, weapons. One of our big projects was going to be dealing with that. I think that is one of the big reasons that Bill partly was chosen. It was a very small embassy at the time, skin and bones. In fact, I think there were nine State Department officers when I arrived, and there were 60 when I left three years later. It grew immensely. Of course, the first issue when I got there was weapons and materials. By the end of my time there, that was done, and the issue was all about oil.

Q: What was the situation in Kazakhstan, political, economic, our interests, and all of that?

BOGUE: Kazakhstan was perhaps the most reluctant of the newly independent states. It was the last one to declare its independence. It is a huge country. I think it is the ninth biggest by landmass in the world, severely landlocked, and very sparsely populated. Most of it is steppe or desert. The population is very interesting because Kazakhs are not a majority in Kazakhstan. Maybe 40 percent of the population were Kazakh. The rest were the most amazing collection of people – ethnic Russians, ethnic Ukrainians, ethnic Poles, ethnic Germans, ethnic Koreans. Kazakhstan had been one of the places of the exiled labor camps. For example, Dostoyevsky had been in Kazakhstan; Solzhenitsyn had been in Kazakhstan, at various times, in exile or in camps. But also it was the place that Stalin had moved whole populations to because he feared during the Second World War that they would collaborate with the enemy. He moved, for instance, ethnic Koreans from the Soviet Far East to Kazakhstan because he feared they would collaborate with the Japanese. He moved ethnic Germans, ethnic Ukrainians to Kazakhstan because he feared they would collaborate with the Germans. After that time, there had been a large influx of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians to the north of Kazakhstan, because of the virgin land campaign of Khrushchev trying to make it a wheat-growing region. Before that, in the time of Catherine the Great, she had settled the so-called Volga Germans, had brought in German settlers as agriculturalists, and many of them had settled in Kazakhstan. So, there was a huge mix of ethnicities.

When friends of mine came to visit me in Kazakhstan during my tour, I put them on a train for Moscow. As we were waiting on the train platform, I remember my friends looking around and finally one of them saying, “All God’s children are actually here, on this train platform.” And it was true. The mix was just stunning. Also, remember that the Soviet Union had sponsored people from all over the Third World to come and study; from Africa, Latin America; mostly from Africa and Asia. Some of those people had married locally. It wasn’t so common, but you did occasionally see that.

Q: Were the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz basically the same stock?

BOGUE: Yes. I would get myself into trouble there if I said that. The Kazakhs were nomads, unlike the Uzbeks who had settled cities -- you had the great cities of Central Asia of Samarkand, Khiva, Bukhara, are in Uzbekistan. There was not that tradition in Kazakhstan. People had been nomads, and there are still ethnic Kazakhs in Mongolia and in Western China, the whole region.

Q: You mean horse and camel herders?

BOGUE: Right. They are livestock herders and they travel from place to place, rather than building cities as the Uzbeks had done.

Q: So a place like Bishkek was like a new city?

BOGUE: It was a Russian military outpost called Frunze in its previous life. With a lot of these towns, Almaty was the capital but it looked like a little Russian city. It did not look Central Asian in the way other places did. The current capital, which is called Astana,

which just means capital, the old Kazakh name was Aqmola. Then it was Tselinograd in the wake of the Virgin Lands campaign. Then it reverted to Aqmola and then Astana. All these places had gone through lots of iterations.

Q: When you got there, what was the state of things there?

BOGUE: Kazakhstan was still really finding its feet. There was a lot of excitement among the population about being their own country. In fact, the day the flag was raised at the American Embassy, before I arrived, a lot of people came to see it because to them, it was tangible proof that they really were independent, because the Americans had an embassy there. Kazakhstan had been largely, almost completely, closed to foreigners during the Soviet times for several reasons.

One was that they did an immense amount of their nuclear testing there, in the north of the country. Another was that their space center was there at Baikonur. Their space launches took place from Central Asia. It had been a place that foreigners did not normally come to. Kazakhstan was one of those places where when you went out in the villages, even though literacy was practically one hundred percent and people had education, but when you went out to the villages in 1994 and 1995 you still could be the first foreigner they had ever met. Quite an extraordinary place.

Like in almost all the Central Asian and Caucasus places, the former communist strongman had reinvented himself as a nationalist leader. Still in power, President Nazarbayev had been head of the Communist Party.

I think one of the other exciting things when I was there, people had a real sense of possibility about the future. I think a lot of that has changed because it is now seen as autocratic and corrupt. All the fantastic resources they have in oil. They have something that developing countries would love. They have a huge natural resource, a small population of 16-18 million, lots of room and a highly educated population. You can drink the water in Kazakhstan. The germ theory of disease is firmly established. Hygiene is good. It is a very different situation than in the developing world. I think people had a tremendous sense of hopefulness, because of their great situation with tremendous natural resources and a low population, that they would in fact become quite successful economically. As it has happened, the rising tide has not lifted all boats. It has lifted the yachts of the wealthy, unfortunately.

I was there at the time of excitement. The time when people still thought this would be a great change.

Q: I spent three weeks at Bishkek about that time. I was retired but I was helping as a USIA type advisor talking about setting up a consular corps. All the Kyrgyz' seemed to be carrying briefcases and obviously Russians were doing all the work other than office work. They were running the small stores. How was it in Kazakhstan?

BOGUE: It was interesting the way jobs were divided up. The rural farming type jobs or herding were still being done by Kazakhs. You are quite right, for instance, in that all our drivers at the embassy were ethnic Russians. For some reason, this was a job for ethnic Russians that men did. A great many of our interpreters were ethnic Russian women. That was a field women had gone into traditionally there. Whereas a lot of our professional contacts tended to be Kazakh, certainly in the political sphere, the senior ranking people. Although not exclusively, many of them were Kazakhs. I remember, for instance, only two members of the cabinet who were non-ethnic Kazakhs when I was there. Clearly, they were getting a firm grip on political power.

The Kazakh language was rarely, if ever, spoken when I got there. Even President Nazarbayev spoke it badly. He worked very hard at that and now speaks fluent Kazakh, but at the time, the first two sentences and the last two sentences of his speeches would be in Kazakh and the rest in Russian. This was partly because of the way people were educated, but partly because of this immense ethnic variety in Kazakhstan. Russian was the lingua franca, to make a bad joke, but it was the common language. That has changed to a great extent now. There is much more Kazakh spoken than there used to be and much more education offered in Kazakh. All of us who went out there in the beginning were Russian speakers.

Q: Was there, while you were there in 1994 to 1997, a substantial exodus of ethnic Russians or ethnic Germans? In other words, the non-Kazakhs getting out?

BOGUE: It was certainly true of the Germans.

Q: In fact, Germany was welcoming them.

BOGUE: Right. And I wanted to make that clear. I don't think it was so much of a push, as it was a pull. Germany said essentially that anyone of German background could come. So, lots of people who had… In the old Soviet passports your citizenship was Soviet but your nationality was listed, and if your nationality was German, you could immigrate to Germany. Lots of people did that. I would say chiefly for economic opportunities, to help themselves and their children.

The Korean situation was much more tricky because the Koreans who had been brought to Kazakhstan were from the Soviet Far East. This means that had they been from Korea, they would have been from North Korea. Well, nobody was going to repatriate themselves to North Korea. It clearly presented an awkward situation for South Korea if it started suddenly taking back people who weren't from there. They weren't taking them back. They would be taking in ethnic Koreans who theoretically, at least, would be North Koreans. So the South Korean government's solution to this was not to do what the Germans had done and welcome everyone back; but instead to pour a lot of resources into helping Koreans in Kazakhstan develop entrepreneurial businesses. Also, creating a whole program of Saturday or Sunday lessons in Korean language and culture for children. So the culture could be kept alive but people would be kept in place.

Q: How was the economy?

BOGUE: The economy was really staggering then. The oil revenues had not started to flow yet. The western companies were only beginning to come in to take on the development of the Caspian oil fields. The transition from the Soviet system to the modern, what they considered their modern, system was very difficult. Suddenly, all the old subsidies fell away. The high quality education people felt they had gotten for free. The healthcare, which was maybe of medium quality but had been available to everyone for free. Subsidized housing. All of those things. A tremendous safety net that they had under the Soviet system, which for all its faults as everyone said, they all had education, they all had healthcare. Suddenly, that all disappeared. For those who were talented, energetic, young, well educated, and quick on their feet, that was okay because they could find a new way to make a living. But for pensioners, for example, living on a pittance of a pension and too old to find a new job, it was hell. It was really a very difficult situation. I think that period of transition was very agonizing for a lot of people.

I remember, for instance, a headline in the paper when the government decided to put in water meters and charge people for water use, which was something new. There was a huge headline, "What next? Will they charge us for the air we breathe?" All of these things had been entitlements and taken for granted under the old system. It was a very rough time. We saw some painful scenes of elderly, often ethnic Russian women, widows begging on the streets.

Q: With their little stands with a couple light bulbs, two or three cigarettes…

BOGUE: Right. A few matches. That was really very painful. You also saw people who were working for us at the embassy were astonishing. We have had, literally, rocket scientists, working as payroll accountants because they could do math. People for whom the bottom had fallen out. We had a neurosurgeon on our guard force. The doctors just weren't getting paid any more. He had a family to feed. He came to work on the guard force, which was fantastic because our guard force could respond to trauma better than anyone in town with a trained neurosurgeon on the staff. Again, what the embassy offered for people was stability, wages that would arrive, benefits that would arrive, being provided the proper equipment if you were in a technical job like an electrician. We had people who were just extraordinarily capable.

Q: I think also that compared to other places, we held an awful lot of respect for the people.

BOGUE: And Americans were friendly, despite what they heard all those years. It turned out Americans are kind of friendly and fun. They like to go out after work and have a barbecue or something like that.

There was a lot of excitement among the staff too, about doing something new.

Q: I hope one of the things that people looking at this, in particular the Soviet Union, wanting everyone the same. Actually the Stans were the gross beneficiaries of the system because the Soviet system had poured a lot of money in to keep these people from being restive. They plunked a helicopter factory into Bishkek. They were getting subsidies, as opposed to other parts of the ethnic groups that weren't getting subsidized.

BOGUE: The Kazakhs had a slightly different take on that because of the nuclear testing. They had in the north of the country enormously high rates of cancer and birth defects. Remember that until… was it all the way until Gorbachev that it was above ground? No, Gorbachev stopped the testing, but it had been above ground testing until the 1960s. Then belowground testing. Soil in the area was unusable for animals. You could not put herds out in that part of the steppe because the soil was so contaminated with radiation. I think they felt that because they were non-ethnic Russians, because they were Asians, they were considered expendable. So they had borne the health and environmental consequences of this. As one person said to me at one time, "If it was so safe, why didn't it happen right outside Moscow?" So, I think actually they felt some bitterness and anger about the way that they had been treated in that regard by the Soviets. They liked the education, the healthcare, all that, but the testing had been very destructive for them. Next time, we can talk more about what we did about all of that.

Q: I think this is probably a good place to stop. We will pick this up the next time when you arrive as the head of a large portfolio in Kazakhstan from 1993 to 1997. We have talked about the background of Kazakhstan, but we haven't talked about what you were doing there and the developments at that time. Some of the questions I would like to ask would be related to oil. How do you get it out of Kazakhstan, without letting the Russians siphon it all off?

BOGUE: A continuing problem.

Q: I was struck because of my short time in Kyrgyzstan about the role of non-governmental agencies who went in there for good, or sometimes trying to do the right thing, but uncoordinated. I would like your impression of dealing with them, and the Christian missionaries. And many other things. We want to take some time to really talk about this because this is a fascinating period and very important for later on how we got into the whole area.

Also, as a single woman, I talked to a person, I can't remember her name right now, who said it was not much fun there because the idea of going out and having a good time with the Kyrgyz men was to go and get a bottle of vodka, sit at a table and drink it all down.

BOGUE: I had a blast, but we will talk about that more later. You are right. The culture of drinking in Central Asia and throughout the former Soviet Union is very strong. I was very grateful when I got to my next post, which was Nepal, where the culture of drinking is non-existent.

Q: I had my problems with slivovitz in Yugoslavia.

Today is July 31st, 2007. Talk about your job.

BOGUE: The embassy was growing rapidly under pressure from all the issues that faced us in Kazakhstan. When the Central Asian posts were initially opened, they were meant to be very lean, small embassies. That was Secretary Baker's vision for them. But the number of issues and the range of issues facing us in Central Asia, particularly at that time in Kazakhstan, just didn't permit such a tiny embassy. We had nuclear weapons, oil, and a lot of American businesses starting up in Kazakhstan. We were adding all kinds of positions at the embassy. One of those positions was to have a chief of combined political, economic and science sections. Another reason wasn't just the growth in the embassy, but a kind of State Department conundrum that over the years often is our youngest and most inexperienced people who end up in our toughest outposts, or our newest embassies. They are young, adventurous, often don't have kids who need to be in school, and can often go somewhere where the health circumstances aren't so good. It's partly natural, partly that junior people are the ones we can order around more readily than more senior people. Typically, when a junior person goes out to a post, if there is a sole consular officer or a sole general services officer there, there are Foreign Service Nationals, locally engaged employees, who have 30 years of experience to help them. Of course, in a place like Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, that wasn't so. The locally engaged staff was also brand new. So there was a little bit of the blind leading the blind, with all good will on every side to do a good job, but there was a lack of experience. I think it took a while to adjust to that. Part of it was creating positions for more senior people, I understand probably a Two, so in the middle ranks.

Q: Sort of at the major level?

BOGUE: Yes, the equivalent. Or a lieutenant colonel level. I had quite a few foreign posts under my belt already.

Another way we did it was to bring in, for instance to the Consular Section, the State Department created a position in Moscow and a quite senior consular officer came out and spent all of his time – it happened to be a man when I was there – traveling to these posts to make sure the Consular Sections were running the way they should be. He would teach people that, "Really, this isn't the best way to track your blank passports. You really need to do it like this." He would hold training sessions for the local staff. He would go from place to place to place constantly. A job he found a lot of fun, fortunately for him since he was on the road all the time. This was an immeasurable help to us.

Similarly, people who were retired management officers were brought in for six month stints at a time to help regularize those sections. I was part of that effort in a sense. I helped regularize the missions, which had grown up so fast and without often the benefit of experienced hands. It was even a time when USIS and the Department of Commerce were actually going out and simply hiring people on short-term contracts, two or three years, who had excellent Russian, but had never served in the Commerce Department or USIS before. They were brought in because of their language skills.

So, those sections were growing too with people, often with immense talents, but no experience whatsoever in the embassy.

Q: We are talking about really exciting times for everyone concerned. But at the same time, exciting times don't necessarily mean you are going to get things done right.

BOGUE: Exactly. A lot of my job had to do with the issues that were facing us: the nuclear materials and weapons, oil, and those kinds of things. A lot of it was also essentially trying to help pull the place together, to start operating in the way a normal political-economic-science section would. Missions had been off the hook for their first few years in existence in doing a lot of the annual reporting that our missions do: commercial reports, various kinds of refugee reports, drug reports and other reports we are obliged to do annually. These missions were given a kind of pass for a few years. We were trying to get ourselves in gear and do all those things, along with the rest of the missions around the world.

It was a lot of fun, both internally and in terms of the issues.

Q: Let's first talk about your impressions of the Kazakh government, your counterparts and dealing with them at various levels. I imagine that politically you wouldn't have a lot to report on. Was there a way you could count who was standing on the equivalent of the Kremlin wall or something?

BOGUE: It wasn't quite that bad as in the old days of Kremlinology.

Maybe I could start to have initial impressions of Kazakhstan itself. I had never been to Central Asia at all. I had been to Pakistan and I thought there might be some similarities. I was so wrong about that in every way.

I got off the plane and there was the immigration officer, a woman. She was wearing a kind of uniform short shirt and cap, like the old Soviet style. And a black leather miniskirt with high heels. Well, we're not in Pakistan.

My very first week there, I went out to the Chinese border on the eastern border of Kazakhstan on a reporting trip about cross-border trade between China and Kazakhstan. A Kazakh captain in the border guard hosted lunch for me. This man was an ethnic Kazakh. Of course, vodka was served at lunch, as it would be. He picked up his glass and he held it up to me and said, "Bis m'Allah rahkman." I was completely stunned, having been in Pakistan, that someone would make a toast, the equivalent of saying, "Skol" or "Bottoms up" or "Here's to your health." But he actually used the phrase, "Bis m'Allah rahkman" being the Islamic blessing, essentially "Thanks be to God."

I must have looked a little stunned, because he said, "Perhaps you are not familiar with the phrase."

I said, “Yes, I have heard the phrase. I haven’t heard it used in this context before.”

As time went on and after the vodka flowed a little bit and he was very relaxed, I said, “Is it permissible in Islam to drink alcohol?” He said, “I think you are not allowed to drink alcohol on Wednesdays.” He was perfectly serious.

One of the fascinating things that had been done in Central Asia was a study by an American scholar called Nancy Lubin, in which a whole lot of questions were asked. For instance, “Do you want your country to be a democracy?” And everyone overwhelmingly said yes. “Do you believe the newspapers should be able to print whatever they like?” No. “Do you believe people should be able to say whatever they like about the President?” No. A similar question was “do you consider yourself a Muslim?” A great majority of the ethnic Kazakhs said yes. “Do you believe in the statement, there is no God but God and Mohammed is his prophet?” Well, not really. “Do you believe you should abstain from pork?” No. “Do you believe you should abstain from alcohol?” Well, hell no.

So what you had was an idea people had in their heads, that they were Islamic without a sense of what that meant really, as a result of years and years of the Soviets.

Q: To me it’s like my Bosnian friends.

BOGUE: I had that moment too, that I was back among my Bosnian brothers and sisters. Also, to come to your question about the political scene, the same thing was very much true on the political scene. While people liked the idea that they would be a democratic state, there was a lot of discomfort with what that meant in practice. I think people really hadn’t thought through in their own minds yet what it means and what you have to accept if you are a democracy, including papers printing whatever they like. At the time I was there, there was still a lot of hope that in fact Kazakhstan would develop in a democratic direction. That hope has been very much dashed over the years in Kazakhstan, but it was still there then and people were very curious about those things.

Although they were very nervous about things like non-governmental organizations, and anything not controlled by the state. There was a strong perception that it was the Greens, the environmentalists in Russia, who had helped bring down communism there. These kinds of organizations were always political and were always out to get the government.

One of the programs we did once was to bring over a group of women from the New Jersey branch of Mothers Against Drunk Driving, MADD, to talk about what kinds of things non-governmental organizations can do, such as lobbying for stronger drunk driving bills. People kept asking these women, “Who got you to do this? Who is paying you to do this? Who is behind you?” They kept saying, “What got me to do this was that my child was killed by a drunk driver in a traffic accident. So I just went out and called a friend who had the same experience. We did this and we did that.” That was something that made people in Kazakhstan very uncomfortable.

Q: In many of these places, many groups like MADD are very American. If there is an injustice and there is something wrong, you do something about it. Maybe you go to your government, but if not, it's hell no, we'll do it. This is, I would say, un-European too.

BOGUE: I agree completely.

Q: We were hoping something would develop in a country that we would be tertiary in their experience. First go to Russia, then go to Western Europe.

BOGUE: It wasn't as if Kazakhstan was returning to a remembered democratic past, as you might say would be the case in the Czech Republic or something like that where they had a history that was quite different from that in Kazakhstan. As a whole, there was a wave of hope for some years. I think now people have settled into the reality that it is going to be a very autocratic state.

Q: Also too, the genesis of Kazakhstan really came about reluctantly. It was not as though this was a great liberation, as the Czechs had, and other places really getting rid of an oppressor. Actually, the Russians were the people who sort of brought goodies to them.

BOGUE: Kazakhstan was the last of the republics to secede, as I recall, and quite reluctantly. I think that there was not, partly because it is a very multiethnic state and partly because it is a bit of a made-up construct, something we are very familiar with in Yugoslavia. It is a little bit of a construct. Again, not having been a settled people, Kazakhs had been nomads, to draw the borders of a state is a tricky proposition. One of the fascinating things about it was trying to see a new country find a definition for itself. In many places, there is a shared history, a shared language, a shared culture, a shared ethnicity, and a shared religion. That was not the case in Kazakhstan where it is so multiethnic, and there was not a shared past with its own architectural monuments and the like. What the United States would argue, and probably Canada and Australia and New Zealand, was that then you create a shared civic entity in which there is allegiance to a political system. Because that didn't occur either, the government became increasingly autocratic. One of the questions that I personally think remains unanswered is, what does it mean to be a citizen of Kazakhstan? What is the glue that holds the place together? What is the sense of shared past, shared present and shared future? When you look at nation building, as it happened in Western Europe, that whole process didn't take place in a sense in Kazakhstan.

Q: As I found in Kyrgyzstan, was there a hat? The Kazakhs have the same hat, don't they? Others don't wear it.

BOGUE: That was again part of the issue. If you create an identity that is based on being ethnic Kazakh, where does that leave the non-Kazakhs? It was much different in Kyrgyzstan where ethnic Kyrgyz were a much greater proportion of the population than others. Kazakhstan was much trickier in that regard. My own view is that it is generally true across the Central Asian republics, Kyrgyzstan was going to be the new Switzerland.

It was going to be mountainous and democratic. The mountains are certainly there. The democracy part didn't work too well.

Q: I have a vision of Janet Bogue going around the country with a lantern looking for a democrat.

BOGUE: Very few.

Q: What about the role of Islam and the Orthodox Church during the time you were there? Do you see these as being powers or centers of something or not?

BOGUE: No. The Orthodox Church was I think like many Orthodox Churches at the time, its congregants tended to be female and aged. I know if you went to an Episcopalian Church here on Sunday, you would find the same thing.

Q: I went to a couple of popes' funeral services in South Korea, and I was about the only male there at the cathedral among all these little elderly Korean ladies.

BOGUE: Exactly, it is women who go to church. And that was true in Kazakhstan as well.

I actually went to as many different manifestations of religious practice as I could in Kazakhstan, out of interest and curiosity as to what was happening after years of state-controlled religion. There was a very small Catholic Church, which interestingly had Korean priests. By the time I left, there was a growing Pentecostal movement, in which the church I visited had a preacher who was ethnic Russian, but had been to the United States for training in Tennessee. He had adopted magnificently the look of Elvis Presley with the tremendous sideburns and the slicked back hair. He didn't wear the jumpsuit, but he came from Tennessee looking alarmingly, I have to say, like Elvis Presley.

In the case of Islam, of course the state had controlled religion in the Soviet period and appointed the imams and run the mosques and so on. There had been almost nothing in the way of religious education for people. The great fear on the Kazakhstanis part, expressed quite openly by government officials and private citizens, was that the Pakistanis, the Saudis, the Iranians, and others in the neighborhood at large, who adhered to what the Kazakhstanis looked on in all cases as a more extreme version of Islam, would come in and try to create a similar movement in Kazakhstan. It is true that some of the new mosques that were built were financed by foreign money – Saudi money, and so on. Interestingly, in requesting help in things like religious education and the building of mosques and the training of clerics, the state turned to Turkey, looking for a model. Of course, there is a relationship in that they are all Turkish people. But they were looking for a model that was more compatible with a secular government and what they perceived as a less fanatic model.

Q: My understanding is that the Turks, when all the Stans were created, saw this as a great opportunity for greater Turkey. They were putting up embassies. This was going to be a whole new world for them. What was happening there?

BOGUE: I would say that the Turkish influence was very strong, mostly in a commercial way. When others were very nervous about investing in a place like Kazakhstan, it was the Turks who came in and built hotels. The Turks started all sorts of commercial ventures in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Again, they had somewhat of a commonality of language and background. I also think that the people in Kazakhstan saw themselves really as part of Europe. Even though they are in Asia, they had European educations. They had looked to Moscow for years and years. Now, in the independence period, the organizations they joined were Western ones. They joined the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) based in Vienna. They joined the Partnership for Peace, which was the NATO-run operation to help put the military establishment on a more Western basis with civilian leadership and open budgeting and all that sort of thing. Those were the places they looked. They were looking to Europe. I think it was much more natural for them to look to Turkey, rather than for instance to Pakistan.

I had a particular interest, having been in Pakistan, in how the Pakistanis would be perceived. I was in Pakistan when the Central Asian states became independent. The Pakistanis thought this was a golden opportunity for them to exert their influence, and that they would go and be the big brother. Well, a couple of things happened.

One was that Kazakhstanis – no one likes to be condescended to – thought the Pakistanis were saying, "You are our new little brother." They also thought they were way beyond the Pakistanis in literacy, health, and education. And they were. Pakistan has an enormous illiteracy rate.

So for the Pakistanis to come and say, "Dear little brothers, we will show you the way after years and years you have been denied it." The Kazakhstanis were saying, "We don't want to be like Pakistan. More than half of our population has at least a bachelor's degree. We don't want to be illiterate."

Turkey was a much more acceptable model for them. Again, Turkey is part of NATO, Turkey is part of western institutions and the Turks are educated and, in the view of the Kazakhstanis, a civilized people. So the Turkish diplomats, the Turkish businessmen, the Turkish engineers, made far more headway among the Kazakhstanis, partly for cultural and linguistic reasons, but largely in the way they presented themselves. They did not arrive in a Little Brown Brothers mode.

Q: How would you characterize how we felt about the developments we have been talking about? Various Islamic countries coming in, in their various NGOs, particularly religious organizations playing around. Did we worry that one day we are taking away our influence or were we trying to say, "Go to it. We don't want to get overly involved." What was our attitude?

BOGUE: I think the one thing that concerned us and the one thing that I can recall Ambassador Courtney for instance quietly cautioning Kazakhstani government officials about was becoming too deeply indebted, literally or figuratively, to someplace like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and to be careful not to assume they could ride a particular tiger. As far as others coming, I think we felt at the time, and it would be interesting to see now in the post 9/11 environment if there is a different atmosphere, that there was a free market in religion like there was in anything else. After the Soviet's heavy hand on that issue had been removed, people ought to do as they please.

The place that I don't know well but the place where this has really played out is in Uzbekistan, where radical Islam has become, or in a sense any non-state controlled Islam, radical or not, has become the political opposition to the dictator for life, Karimov. So there you have the leadership presenting itself as the bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism. That particular development has not happened in Kazakhstan.

Q: Did President Khomeini of Iran make a trip to your area?

BOGUE: I don't recall Khomeini coming. There were certainly Iranian representatives there. I know there has been a great deal of fuss made in the last few days because Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Baghdad had actual talks with Iranian counterparts. We actually participated in talks in which Iranian representatives were present because there were talks about things like shared use of the Caspian Sea, among all the nations that border the Caspian Sea. I remember going to one of those meetings as an observer and there were all the Iranian representatives there and, quite interestingly, the Iranian representative was speaking to everyone in English, being a graduate of the University of California at Los Angeles. There were a lot of issues with Iran about the Caspian. That was the main contact with Iran.

Q: Let's not leave the Caspian Sea. That was a terrible ecological disaster. Did the Kazakhs understand how much of a disaster this was?

BOGUE: Yes. There were huge ecological disasters all over Central Asia. One was the Caspian Sea. Even worse was the Aral Sea, which had essentially dried up because its waters had been diverted for irrigation. The Aral Sea is a lake that straddles Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Its waters had been diverted when the Soviet government, in the Soviet way, decided that Uzbekistan in the desert would be a cotton monoculture. It took massive irrigation to do that. It wasn't suited at all for growing cotton. In those days of wonderful central planning in Moscow, they said, "We can make it grow cotton. Empty the Aral Sea and cotton will grow."

So there was the Aral Sea. There was the Caspian with not only ecological issues, but overfishing and poaching of sturgeon. There were all these countries which border the Caspian arguing about how to divide it up for oil rights, for drilling in the Caspian.

Then Kazakhstan had the very particular environmental catastrophe of the former Soviet nuclear testing programs that had devastated the environment in the areas of mostly northeastern Kazakhstan.

Q: On the environmental issue, how much did the people, the informed populace, know about the disaster there and what was happening?

BOGUE: They knew because they and their children were sick. They had astounding rates of leukemia and other cancers. They had astounding rates of miscarriage and of children born with severe birth defects. All the things we have come to understand are associated with radiation exposure.

We did a whole series of health and environmental remediation activities. Part of that was our end of the bargain for removing highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan to safe storage in the United States. That is something we can talk a little more about. That was one of the personal highlights of my career and a very exciting project. One of the things we did in return was to provide health, medical and environmental remediation.

For instance, in the Who Knew category, the air force keeps something called a Tumor Registry. The air force tracks I think in the United States. It did this in places where there was also testing. I think they track the incidence of cancers. They have software that does this very nicely. Teams would go in and set up this software so that Kazakhstani doctors could start to trace and track the places that had suffered tumors.

Also, we donated a huge amount of sophisticated hospital equipment. Everything from CAT scanning equipment to -- another thing that was a constant problem in that region was kidney stones. We donated several lithotripters, which are essentially the machines you go into to have your kidney stones smashed without surgery. We provided things like that. We made a huge effort to assist on that side.

Another thing we did was remote sensing, aircraft-based sensing with a U.S. Navy plane equipped with these special sensing radars that could look beneath the surface and see how deep the radiation poisoning was in the soil, how far it had gone, and to what extent it was in aquifers. A part of the problem in Kazakhstan was they could not use the steppe there for grazing anymore.

Q: In the steppes, was the consumer part of the country just basically off-limits?

BOGUE: Most of the country is just flat. There is a little part around Almaty that looks like Kyrgyzstan. It is very mountainous, very beautiful. The rest of it is flat all the way to the Ural Mountains. A huge section of northeast Kazakhstan was still not usable for agriculture because of radiation problems. That wasn't true in the center of the country, or in the far west.

Q: Was there much that you were seeing of cooperative effort from the aftermath of Chernobyl on the side of the Soviets, the Ukrainians, dealing with that. Did that transfer over?

BOGUE: It is an interesting aspect. I hadn't really thought about that, except that I did meet a couple of Russians who had been in the army and had been in the army teams that had gone in to deal with Chernobyl. They went in with very little protection. These particular officers were from Kazakhstan, although ethnic Russians. They opted to transfer over to the Kazakh army. I happened to meet a couple of them later when we were working on some of these nuclear safety and security projects. We in fact arranged for one of them to be treated at Walter Reed because he was suffering from cancer, probably, almost certainly, as a result of Chernobyl.

Q: We were finding out these things. In the first place, did you think that the Kazakh government was making good use of the efforts that we were putting in there?

BOGUE: I think so. We had a number of efforts. I think the nuclear safety and security one was huge. The environmental and health remediation was huge. Our USAID programs, some were wildly successful; some encountered a lot of resistance. Our USAID program there was very different from what we think of traditionally in Africa or Asia. It wasn't about basic development. It was more about restructuring an economy from the Soviet command-style economy to a modern market based economy. That was a very difficult and painful process for many people.

For instance, in Kazakhstan, factories and mines would be kept open even if they were not profitable. Businesses stayed open even if they were not profitable. Of course, in a market-based system that does not happen. Some of the things were well received. There had been no basic commercial law, no bankruptcy law, and no fundamental banking laws. All those kinds of things USAID helped to develop. Other things that were more painful as part of the transition met with a lot of resistance. Politicians do not want to see a painful transition for people on their watch. That was very tough.

One of the fun things about being in Kazakhstan was that it was a new country. Everything was being done from scratch. Sometimes at the Foreign Ministry, they would ask us how in the world you did things. They had a lot of people who had never been diplomats before. They had some very experienced Soviet diplomats who were Kazakhs and who shifted into the Kazakh service. They knew they needed English speakers so they offered any young men who would otherwise face mandatory military service if they spoke English to a certain level. If they had been taking it at university, they could do their service at the Foreign Ministry rather than in the army. Of course, they leapt at it because being in the army was not much fun. So you would go to the Foreign Ministry and there would be three really nice kids who had no idea what diplomats did. None.

I remember this coming home to me once when they called me to say they had a problem with a diplomat at the embassy. I went over to find out what it was, thinking, "Gee, I wonder why I haven't heard about this." They said, "Here is the person. Here is the

name." I said, "But that person is not a diplomat at our embassy." It turned out that this was an American who had come over, sort of an adventurer, presented himself at the Foreign Ministry as an American and talked them out of a United States diplomatic license plate, not by claiming that he was a U.S. diplomat, but by saying, "This is how it works. Any American who lives here gets a U.S. diplomatic plate." So they said, "Really? Okay."

I said, "No, no. You only give out those plates to us when we request them. We will send you a note with the person's name and description of the car. Then you will give us a plate, and we will all know the number. When that car is sold, we are going to give that plate back to you."

They said, "Great. That sounds really good."

It was all brand new. We were signing the kind of treaties that we signed with Italy in 1890. We will deliver your mail if you deliver ours; that kind of thing. This was a lot of fun, but there were a lot of bumps in the road.

Q: Did you find that you or any of the other foreign diplomats were holding the equivalent of little diplomatic seminars, talking about the work and that sort of thing?

BOGUE: Yes. In a very informal way. I must say it was such a delightful time because it was all so informal. I think it has probably gotten very grand now.

One day, I was flying back late on a Saturday night and the Deputy Foreign Minister stopped by my apartment to drop off some signed treaty papers that I was going to hand carry back to the State Department. He had finally gotten all of the last of the Kazakh side's signatures and he just said he would drop by my apartment. When he arrived, I was in the process of moving furniture around, because my belongings had just arrived. He just took off his jacket and spent two hours helping me move my furniture. I think that would not happen today.

In those days, it was so amazingly informal and just incredibly casual. It was still such a thrill for the Kazakhs to be an independent nation. They hadn't kind of gotten this idea that you need to act in a grand way. The diplomatic community was very small.

Q: This was a lot of fun.

BOGUE: Exactly.

Q: How about the other members of the diplomatic corps, particularly the Western ones? How were they?

BOGUE: They were lots of fun. Again, in a small community, we all got to know each other very well. The first attempt at a combined European embassy took place in Kazakhstan. I think it was the first serious attempt. The Germans, French and British

Embassies all shared one building. They had separate floors but they shared the administrative costs of security, parking, that kind of thing. We had great friends there. The British Ambassador particularly, was a very dear friend of mine. He and his wife and I used to joke about the danger of having the Brits run the cafeteria, the French run the security, and how you could get this all wrong. You had to be careful in how you assigned tasks.

The Russians were there, and all the other Central Asians and the Chinese. There were very few embassies from Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia, although there was a Thai Embassy. I recall in Bishkek I think there were only something like nine embassies at the time.

Q: Were the Kazakhs concerned about the Chinese? Certainly in Bishkek, I think you have got four million people and they have got two million sitting on just the other side of the mountains. It wasn't because of military invasion, but all they had to do was have some Chinese start coming over the passes to open up restaurants and laundries or something. Perhaps they would be wiped out, there would be so many.

BOGUE: Exactly the same concern existed in Kazakhstan. The Chinese were easy to blame. When people felt economic hard times, they tended to blame the Chinese for bringing all these cheap goods and undercutting the local products and local merchants. There were Chinese restaurants that started up while I was there. There was more and more Chinese business. There was very little other overt Chinese presence, in the form of official presence. There was an embassy, but the Chinese were lying pretty low, politically.

They did make a striking agreement with the Kazakhs while I was there about clarifying some issues of the border, which had been disputed, and opening more border crossings. There had been very few in the many years of tension between Russia and China, and very few border crossings. There was a good relationship, but definitely with some wariness if not anxiety on the part of the Kazakhs.

Q: Was there much cooperation between the American Embassy and the Chinese Embassy?

BOGUE: Not so much. We worked mostly with the other assistance donors in groups. The Chinese were not in that group. We worked with the Europeans, the Turks, others who were providing assistance, and others who were members of NATO or other members of the OSCE. There were joint demarches, things like that tended to be based on OSCE membership or NATO membership.

Q: Did the Russians have a military presence there?

BOGUE: I am not sure what the actual answer to that is. They did not have the kind of thing they had in Tajikistan, where the Russians themselves were the border guards. The Kazakhstanis had their own border guards who were part of the Kazakhstani government

apparatus. The Russians were not handling the border, as they did and probably still now do, in Tajikistan. Also, in Turkmenistan, I think they did that as well.

It is a hard question to answer. There were certainly military attaches and the like. A huge number of the officers in the army had been officers in the Soviet army, either because they were ethnic Kazakhs or because whatever ethnicity they were, they were from Kazakhstan. They made the decision to come over and become officers in the Kazakh army. Their personal and professional ties to Russia were certainly very strong.

Q: What about the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, the Committee for State Security in the former USSR) or the equivalent thereof?

BOGUE: Only one initial changed. It became the KNB (National Security Committee). There was a lot of overlap in membership. It wasn't one of those things you had with the huge contrasts with something like the Czech Republic or Poland or Hungary. If you had been in the service of the old regime, you were almost automatically and universally considered not a person who could be allowed to not be in the service.

I am putting this very awkwardly. For instance, if you had been in the old Hungarian or Czech services, I think you probably got pitched out and replaced. If you were a technician who worked on dams or something, you could probably keep your job. In Kazakhstan, given the wholesale rollover of people who had been in the KGB or in one of the security services in the old Soviet system that had simply rolled over into the new iteration of that. Again, they had close relationships with their counterparts in Moscow.

They also had close relationships with us, and a lot of the same worldview, a lot of the same training and tactics. We have seen a lot of that in Kazakhstan since. The one and only newspaper that takes advantage of press freedoms suddenly finds that its warehouse holding newsprint is burned to the ground, so it has no newsprint to publish on. Through various ways, we came to believe that that had been an effort sponsored by the security services. Again, one of those ideas: very American, is your loyalty to the constitution or to a person or is your loyalty to the state and its people?

One of the most amazing examples I saw of this was with one of the first group of visitors we had, and we had a lot because Central Asia was the flavor of the month or the year. Pete Peterson and his group were trying to find out what had happened to Missing in Action and Prisoner of War Americans from Vietnam, Korea and the Second World War. Because of the prison camps in Kazakhstan, they were particularly interested in trying to find out if there had been something in Kazakhstan. Pete Peterson, then a congressman, before he went out to Vietnam as Ambassador, and that group that worked on this issue came out and spent about four or five days in Kazakhstan.

I went around with them. I remember at dinner one night, being seated between two enormous Kazakh generals. They looked completely Soviet. Their uniforms were almost the same. So picture the huge guys with lots of vodka and lots of medals. They were absolutely fascinated that the United States was willing to spend all this money to try to

find out what happened to people who, in some cases, were surely dead. In the case of the World War II veterans for instance, just age, let alone whatever had happened to them, would suggest that by now chances were, they were dead.

I was trying to explain, in my far from perfect Russian, the whole idea of bringing closure to the families and the social contract of the military: you may get hurt, you may die, you may be captured, but we will eventually find you. Even if you are dead, we will find you and bring you home in some way or another. And this is part of the unwritten contract the military had with its people.

The generals were saying, "If we ever stopped having the draft and went to a voluntary military, I guess we will have to start thinking like this."

I said, "What happens here?"

They said, "In the old Soviet days, if we had a recruit killed in a training accident, we just buried him there and did not tell his family. When his mother would come six months later, demanding to know why she hadn't heard from little Ivan, we would say that he had run away and we hadn't seen him since. So now the mom thinks her child has deserted the army and has not even bothered to get in touch with her, when in fact all along, Ivan was dead and buried."

So that whole Soviet mindset was very much there. One of the projects that we worked very hard on through the partnership with the NATO programs was things like that: taking care of military spouses, children, providing health care for military family members and decent housing for them. All those kinds of things that make it possible for people to be willing to serve, to be willing to stay in, and to create a professional non-commissioned officer corps, the backbone of any military.

Q: I interviewed Admiral Crowe who said the head of the Soviet military said that our main asset was our non-commissioned officer corps, which is true. As an enlisted man, I know the sergeants run the outfit. We take care of them, we give them authority. Not only that but they have responsibilities too, as well as authority. It makes a tremendous difference. The Soviets sort of leave the soldiers off on their own, at the mercy of the older guys, and the officers run everything.

BOGUE: The American military was always stunned at what the Kazakh military had captains and majors doing, what we would have sergeants and staff sergeants doing. That of course ran the other way. The Kazakhs were stunned to see a 24-year old staff sergeant with no college being in charge of a whole group of people, with no officer anywhere in sight. It was a very, very different approach.

I think that was what Kazakhstan was going through, both writ large in the sense of what we are as a country, and then writ small in every hospital and department.

Another example was they did have very well trained doctors, but their solution for almost everything was to hospitalize you. There was almost no outpatient treatment. Once they went to a market model, the costs were just going to go through the ceiling unless they developed some sort of outpatient model for treating run-of-the-mill illnesses. Something that we would be sent home for, strep throat, we would be sent home with a pile of antibiotics and told to stay in bed for a week. People there would be hospitalized for two weeks.

Q: Who was the head of the government?

BOGUE: Nazarbayev.

Q: What was your reading of him and his coterie at the time you were there?

BOGUE: Nazarbayev was and is quite an interesting character. He always presents himself extremely well in public and people admire him. I remember how contemptuous he was. He allowed a little bit of his contemptuousness to show about someone like Yeltsin and the spectacle he made by being drunk on his aircraft and being unable to meet the Irish President. Yeltsin came to Kazakhstan once and was drunk on the aircraft. That is the kind of thing Nazarbayev would never do in public.

I mistakenly thought when I got there that Nazarbayev had only daughters, three daughters. I thought at least we don't have a son, as you do in so many of these places, who is going to replace the father. I hadn't really thought that through because there are the sons-in-law. Actually right now, one of the sons-in-law is on the outs and the daughter has made the decision that – I just won a friendly wager with an old friend: I said she can always get a new husband, but she can't get a new dad, who is president for life in Kazakhstan. Sure enough, she has divorced the husband, and taken the father's part in all this.

Nazarbayev himself presents a very kind of respectable, self-controlled, fit image. You don't see him drinking in public except maybe at a toast; he will have a little sip. He certainly, I am told, drinks in private but not in public. He keeps himself very fit. Ambassador Jones (Elizabeth Jones, arrived at post on October 18, 1995) and I used to have our private weekly staff meeting very early on Sunday mornings at the outdoor ice skating rink up in the mountains. We would skate around without phones ringing and talk about whatever personnel problems or whatever was going on in the embassy without being interrupted and without being overheard. One day, as we were skating around – and I hasten to say that Ambassador Jones is an expert ice skater and I am a terrible ice skater, so we were moving slowly because of my pace – somebody came up behind us, linked our arms together, and skated us off. It was President Nazarbayev, also up for an early morning skate. We had a nice chat with him. He really worked at keeping himself fit.

That said, he is a complete autocrat. He has worked very hard to centralize more and more power in his own hands. Like autocrats everywhere, he has become increasingly

paranoid over the years about things. He has been very reluctant to let anyone else become a center of power. His longtime other person he was close to, the Prime Minister when I was there, a man named Akezhan Kazhegeldin, is now the main opponent. As is typical in these cases, he had a falling out with his closest associate. The family is very powerful and very corrupt. A huge amount of state assets are controlled by them and funneled into their hands. They have magnificent homes and palaces and the like. The coterie around him is also very corrupt and very powerful.

The sad thing is, for me, they could have done a lot for the people of Kazakhstan in terms of health care, education, housing, and so on, because of the oil revenues. A huge amount of money and a very small population. They could have really rebuilt the collapsed infrastructure. Instead, everybody in the government has to have ten Mercedes Benz, not just one. The money has gone into private pockets and into conspicuous consumption. There is a large group of young men who were always known as, when I was there, The Nephews. I think we see the same thing developing in Russia. Young men with fancy cars, huge amounts of money, and they terrorize the population. They go into nightclubs and if they don't get what they want, they shoot the barman. That kind of behavior. It is not unique to Kazakhstan at all, but it is a very sad development for the country.

Q: Let's turn to nuclear matters. You said this was a move that gave tremendous pleasure. What was the situation and what were you doing?

BOGUE: As I think I mentioned last time, Kazakhstan was one of the four successor nuclear states: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, all had nuclear weapons, nuclear facilities.

Kazakhstan made the decision, I think a very wise one, to get rid of its weapons. I think two things: one was the legacy of all of the health and environmental damage and the bitterness left behind. The other was, as you can see when you look on a map, they lived in a lousy neighborhood. There was going to be a lot of pressure there to sell it. It was going to be difficult for them to protect it. They decided they would do much better to get rid of it.

The project we did, destroying the missiles. We also had huge projects to increase both safety in the sense of the way these things, nuclear materials, were handled. The Soviets did this with a kind of casualness that they handled a lot of safety issues. Also security. I was told by people from the Los Alamos lab in New Mexico who had come out that there would be one rusty padlock to guard whole supplies of nuclear materials.

Kazakhstan had also been a producer of biological weapons and there were biological weapons labs that needed to be dismantled as well.

Our main projects included, for instance, we cut up the missiles. We also imploded the test tunnels. When they went from aboveground to underground testing, they dug what are essentially mine shafts in order to do underground testing. Once one is used, it collapses and it is unusable again. It is also heavily radiated. It is full. They still have lots

of them. They were not going to pursue a nuclear program themselves; they were starting to get inquiries from some interesting characters in the neighborhood about renting their test tunnels.

So they asked us to destroy them. We had teams come over from the United States, I always call them the Dayglyn Mountain Boys, because the test tunnel was at a place called Dayglyn Mountain. The fellows who came over were from Tennessee and they were all good old southern boys with tremendous accents, but they were experts in imploding tunnels and sealing them so they could not be used. The Dayglyn Mountain Boys went out there and imploded the test tunnels. We did this at our expense. The U.S. government paid for all that.

Our most terrific achievement in this was that one day – and one of the things I love about this story is that diplomacy really can work – the science minister was skiing with a colleague of mine, and said to him at the end of day, "Do you mind if I tell you a secret?"

The fellow said, "Well, no. Go ahead."

He said, "Well, we have around 500 kilograms of highly enriched uranium which could be made very easily into warheads. We would like to get rid of it. We would like you to have it. We would like you to box it up and take it away. And we would like this all done quietly so that nobody grabs it in the meantime, or starts bidding for it."

The U.S. government at first wanted nothing to do with it. We could not get anyone interested. Although that didn't stop all of them taking credit once it happened. Finally, the U.S. government agreed that we could move this 500 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan to safe storage in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. It was a highly secret project called "Operation Sapphire." The reason it was so secret is that once the stuff, the uranium, is bundled up in a safe way, this is the best time for the bad guys to take it because it is safe for them to grab. There had already been cases in the former Soviet Union of someone walking out of a facility with a briefcase full of unprotected things and died three days later in a hotel room of radiation poisoning.

This was going to be the most handy possibly arrangement. First the U.S. government said, "It can't be highly enriched uranium." So the embassy actually went and took samples of it and sent them back. Sure enough, it was. Finally, reluctantly, the U.S. government said, "We negotiated a deal in which essentially we would purchase it mostly for environmental, health remediation efforts in the areas affected by that, and safety and security work with your facilities."

The whole project was well over a year, including bringing over a whole crew of fellows from Oak Ridge, who lived up at the site while they did what they had to do to package up the uranium in what almost look like little beer kegs. They are lead and make it possible for you to move it in a safe way. Then flying in C-5s, huge cargo aircraft, one of which broke down. They were leaving from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey and one of them

broke down. It was snowing that day. The convoy going to the airport had heavy security. One of the cars ran off the road, fortunately not one of the ones with material on it.

To make a long story short, it was loaded onto the aircraft and then they flew straight to the States with midair refueling because of the problems landing. You will remember Spain and the atomic weapon that got away.

Q: I talked to Ken Towall who had to go out and swim with the ambassador because we dropped a hydrogen bomb off a Spanish beach. I think it was fall and the water was pretty cold. He had to get out there and swim, just to show that it was okay.

BOGUE: The things we do for our country.

So they had to refuel frequently in midair. They landed at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. The material was transferred onto a truck convoy, highly protected, and taken straight to Tennessee and put deep underground. Once that was announced Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry of the Defense Department, and Secretary O'Leary of the Energy Department, all did a press conference.

It was very late at night already in Kazakhstan, but we all converged on a colleague's house and brought some vile, sweet Kyrgyz champagne from the champagne factory there. It really was one of those moments in your career when you felt like, I actually did a concrete thing that made the world safer. Five hundred kilograms of highly enriched bomb-grade uranium is stuck away where whoever in this neighborhood, or whatever rogue elements, cannot get at it. That was a wonderful thing.

Q: You were saying that there was reluctance on the part of the government. What did you do? Send off a cable saying, "Here we are. Come and get it." What happened?

BOGUE: I think the U.S. government just thought this would be expensive, and why can't they take care of it themselves? We don't want to get involved with this. We have enough problems with nuclear materials in our own country. I think our ambassador then, Bill Courtney, I want to give him a lot of credit for being very persuasive on this issue in the non-proliferation context. One of the things we all did when we were in Washington at various times while this was going on, was to just haul out a map and say, "Look. Look at the neighborhood. Iran. Afghanistan. Pakistan. Iraq. All these folks in the neighborhood who have interest in these kinds of weapons and here it is made for them. They don't have to figure out how to make it themselves."

Q: This is Tape 7, Side 1, with Janet Bogue.

BOGUE: So, in the end, you do what you always do to get Washington. You say, "This is going to look really bad in the Washington Post. All this material, because we said we wouldn't take it, when all of it ends up in the wrong hands, it is going to look really bad."

Anyway, we did it. It was a magnificent success. We all just kind of sat with our champagne on the floor, looking at the press conference on television, and feeling like something we had done had really made a difference. Again, it was old-fashioned human diplomacy. It was the fact that one of our guys was out skiing with the Science Minister, because they had developed a very friendly relationship and they liked to ski together. The Science Minister had developed enough confidence over time that he felt he could pose this question on behalf of his government. It was not something they wanted to present in a formal way. They wanted to get the agreement quietly and keep it all under wraps.

Q: And you were watching the heads of the departments in the States who originally didn't want to have anything to do with it?

BOGUE: And I have to say the only one who didn't try to claim full credit was Warren Christopher, a very modest man. Vice President Gore, Secretary Perry, and Secretary O'Leary were all patting themselves on the back. That's what happens in politics. It is not anything unusual. I don't mean to be criticizing them personally, because in fact, when they did agree, they didn't stint in terms of providing support for the project.

Q: Were we doing anything as far as destroying material there? I have interviewed Jane Floyd. I don't know if you know her.

BOGUE: She was in Moscow.

Q: She was out with her husband in the depths of Siberia.

BOGUE: They were in Ulan-Ude, doing the ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles).

Q: Were we doing anything like that?

BOGUE: We did that. We cut up missiles so they could not be used or sold. I actually didn't go to those sites. I have seen the photos of them. Colleagues of mine were out at those sites, seeing the nosecones being actually cut off with an enormous what looks like a band saw. It was a marvelous project, and credit to the Kazakhstanis for deciding they did not want to be a nuclear power.

It took Ukraine and Belarus a little longer to come to that decision. The Kazakhstanis were very much out front and they got a tremendous amount of positive press for it. Internationally they got a lot of positive benefits in terms of people trying to be helpful on environment, health, and things like that.

Q: Was there any effort to get the President of Kazakhstan to go to the United States?

BOGUE: He did go. He visited the United States a lot. He and Vice President Gore had developed a special relationship. You may remember that Vice President Gore was the one who traveled to Central Asia. He came to Kazakhstan.

Secretary Christopher came. Secretary Perry came from the Defense Department multiple times while I was there. A lot of the cabinet came through with intense attention paid to Kazakhstan. The Secretary of Commerce came.

President Nazarbayev certainly did travel to the United States very frequently. At that time, he was getting tremendous recognition and support from the United States. He still was touting that it would all be a democratic government. This was before the frequent changes to the constitution that would allow him to stay in power forever.

Q: Also, the President of Kyrgyzstan was also… All things seemed to be moving in the right direction.

BOGUE: It was an exciting time to be there.

I have to say that for sheer fun, I left the department very discouraged about the whole Bosnian mess, and came to Kazakhstan. Nothing could have reenergized me about diplomatic work more than, first of all, the sheer fun of the place.

Chevron had come in to do oil deals. As part of being a good corporate citizen, they started a little league for Kazakhstani orphans. We all coached. I coached for three years, little league. We just had a blast. We hiked. We snowshoed. We enjoyed local hospitality everywhere. We had a wonderful time. People there were hugely excited about the future. In many cases, not all cases. We were excited about it.

I am always reluctant, I am sure people ask you all the time too, "What was your favorite post?" They are all so different, it is really hard to say, "This was my favorite." For sheer fun and everything being very new and different, Kazakhstan was really up there.

Q: This is sort of a dream job, isn't it?

BOGUE: Yes.

Q: Were there any reflections, as you followed events from Kazakhstan, about what was happening in Yugoslavia?

BOGUE: I was following that, although the fighting in Kosovo didn't start until my next tour in Nepal. This was the period in which Dayton was completed and the fighting had very much quieted down. I was following it from afar, insofar as I could. I felt glad to have a break from the Balkans. I felt confident that the Balkans were not going to go away as an issue, and I would probably work on it again at some stage. It was a good time to have a break, and especially a break that was so energizing and made me feel again like we were doing the right things out there. This work was fun. It was important. We really had a critical role to play. Operation Sapphire, with the removal of the highly enriched uranium, was such a great example. It was all diplomacy in action, and it showed the work and value of the human contacts that were built up over time.

Q: Was Ann Wright in the area?

BOGUE: Ann was in Bishkek at the time.

Q: Later, she went to Ulaanbaatar. I have interviewed Ann, but I never quite… She resigned. Did you get any feel for what went on there?

BOGUE: What was happening in Mongolia?

Q: Well, what was happening with Ann?

BOGUE: While she was in Mongolia? Or while I was in Kazakhstan? She was in Bishkek while I was in Kazakhstan.

Q: Excuse me, we are talking about Iraq. She resigned over Iraq and so this was not during the period.

BOGUE: The time I met Ann was while she was in Bishkek. She had also taken a job in Central Asia for the fun of coming to Central Asia. We became very good friends. We are still in touch. And whenever Ann is in town for one of her many political and anti war activities, I often see her. In fact, when I was living in upstate New York, she would pass through and we would offer her the hot shower, laundry and cold beer treatment when she was on the road. She became a very good friend while she was in Bishkek.

At the time, everyone in Bishkek, you may recall, had to come through Almaty because there were no international flights.

Q: I slept on the couch in the administrative officer's office.

BOGUE: Exactly. A great many folks slept in my apartment. I just kept a key hidden. They would arrive in the middle of the night and let themselves in. I would wake up and find colleagues from Bishkek. We went there a lot for weekends. Bishkek was a much smaller and more remote embassy because of the lack of flights. You develop a lot of friendly spirit between and among people there so that they would be a little less isolated. We had things that they didn't have at the time. Some restaurants started up in Almaty and a lot more shopping. Things like that came to Almaty before they came to Bishkek.

We started out with nothing too. The first winter I was there, you could not find fresh fruits or vegetables. You could not buy gasoline. There were tremendous shortages. It was freezing cold because the city couldn't pay for coal to heat the apartments. It was very, very cold. By the time I left two years later, it was like time-lapse photography: there were Tex-Mex restaurants, bowling alleys, fancy Turkish hotels, and fancy German supermarkets. It all happened in an incredibly short span of time.

Q: What about the oil people? Again, on my Lufthansa flight to Almaty, it was full of oil people. How did you find that culture? It is a whole different world.

BOGUE: It is. The oil business, as they always call it. So many of the Americans are from Louisiana. We had a huge contingent of Scots also who came from the North Sea platforms. That was an entirely new world for me, the world of oil, and the world of oil and geopolitics. All the main American companies were there: Chevron, Texaco, Mobil, which were still separate companies in those days. The French and Italians were there. The Russians were there with Lukoil, Neftoil, and Gazprom. All of those Russian companies were there. There was enormous competition to win the ability and opportunity to develop the oil fields in Kazakhstan and the other countries that bordered that area.

All the oil politics, for reasons you mentioned in passing last time, were complicated by geopolitics. Kazakhstan is not only landlocked, but it is often described as the most landlocked country in the world, because it is so far from any deep-water port. The nearest deep-water port is Karachi, Pakistan. This means you would have to run a pipeline across Afghanistan. The prospect of that, both in terms of the geography and in terms of the warlords and everything else that would happen on the way, I used to always say that by the time you turned the tap, you would be lucky if one drop came out.

There was of course an existing pipeline network, and that all ran through Russia. Russia sometimes demonstrated its authority in the region by turning the tap on or off, or changing how much Kazakhstani oil they would allow through. Of course, they had their own oil coming from Siberia and the Russian Far East. They would adjust things. Therefore, they really had Kazakhstan, to make a really bad pun, over a barrel in this regard.

The ambassador had a bumper sticker on her private car that said, "Happiness is multiple pipelines." The United States view was that there should be multiple pipeline routes. There should be routes that did not go to Russia so that there were lots of different routes for getting extracted petroleum to market. That was a source of huge controversy. The Russians did not want multiple pipelines. They had a monopoly and they liked it. They fought very hard against any change. During the period of Russian-British competition in Central Asia in the 19th century, if the great game were being repeated, it was the competition between Russian and the West, essentially over pipelines.

Q: By the time you left, how did the pipeline business stand?

BOGUE: There was still only one pipeline. The route is only now, finally, getting underway. The person who really knows this backwards and forwards is Beth Jones.

Q: I talked to Beth, who has set up an appointment.

BOGUE: Great. I spoke to her last night and she said that she was very eager to get that going again.

The route that we were pushing hard for was going through Baku in Azerbaijan, and Ceyhan, pronounced chay-han, in Turkey. That would link into either European pipelines or could be shipped from Turkish ports. There was much back and forth about the financing and the international politics of these deals. One of the things I learned, that made oil so interesting, was that it was so hugely about politics in that context, and not about what made sense. The various routes had to be driven by politics. There were all sorts of questions about whether it would ever be secure to go through Georgia, or whether it would be secure to go here and there and everywhere.

It is a complicated and fascinating problem, and still not solved.

Q: I guess you were blessed by, and correct me if I am wrong, by not having a bunch of American oilmen in the field drilling for you, or were they?

BOGUE: We did have them, but they were in the far west of Kazakhstan. They were not around Almaty. They would be flown into their site and they would stay there. They lived like people did in Alaska during the pipeline days. They would work 30 days on, 30 days off; be flown out and flown home.

I went out to the oilfields once. Beth made multiple trips, but I was only out there once. I stayed in a kind of prefab housing that they had brought in for the workers. It was very plain, but very nice. It was certainly clean and decent housing. At that time, a huge number of the oil workers were Hungarians who were brought in. There were also lots of Americans and lots of Kazakhstanis.

Q: With no particular problems?

BOGUE: No, but I got a glimpse of what you are talking about once. We had a reception at the ambassador's for some of the oilmen. This crew of Scottish guys arrived and they didn't leave the house until there was no more alcohol in the house. And they left on all fours, I have to say. They didn't break anything or hit anybody, but they were off their site and they were enjoying life to the fullest.

Q: Before we quit this session, could you talk a bit on social life there?

BOGUE: For us?

Q: Yes.

BOGUE: I found it was harder to get to know Kazakhs than it had been to get to know Serbs, Bosnians, Croats and Yugoslavians. Of course, they didn't have a lot of experience with foreigners. They didn't have like people from Yugoslavia had, everybody had a relative living in Canada or the United States who had emigrated and had generally warm feelings that way. For the Kazakhstanis, it had been off limits for so many years, I think it was hard. Also, a lot of people were going through strained financial circumstances. It

would be kind of embarrassing sometimes if your apartment was tiny and cramped with a lot of people in it. As happens in cases like that, an awful lot of our window into society was through our local staff who did take us to every celebration, every wedding, every event. They brought us home to meet their parents and their friends. That was a lot of fun.

And we would go along on hiking trips on the weekends and so on. By then, they were accustomed to us and comfortable with us. They began to see us as being somewhat like them, in the sense of liking outdoor pursuits, being sporty, liking barbecues and casual entertaining. So there was a lot of back and forth there.

Like a lot of new posts and new adventures, there were a lot of, I would say, characters who turn up, sometimes dubious characters. I'm not talking about embassy people but people who come out to make a quick buck, or because they have got some shady thing they want to do, or whatever it is. There were people who came in hopes of procuring falcons there. Falconry is a traditional Kazakh and Kyrgyz endeavor. There were people who turned up with all kinds of weird stories and agenda. There was a bit of a Wild West feel to it.

One of the things we were trying to do was, in a sense, domesticate the embassy, by making it a place where people could come with their families and their children. There were some fantastic expats and other diplomats there. There was also another kind of group of people.

Just last week, I was able to see the movie, *The Last King of Scotland*, about Idi Amin. There is a young fictional character in it; a very young newly qualified Scottish doctor who gets very caught up in the Amin government, partly because it is a huge ego rush, to have this kind of power and access. He is 25 or 26 maybe, and suddenly he is making decisions in the government and has all this power. Well, you saw that. I was watching this with friends who had also been in Central Asia. I said, "We know these guys. We have seen these guys."

They went out to Central Asia and found that they could, partly because of naïveté on the part of their host, or partly because there weren't any other options, they could get a position that they would never have in the United States. They really didn't have the experience or the capabilities. Then they found that because they had money and they were Americans, they could have gorgeous women on each arm and they could live the sort of life they could only have imagined. You did see a certain amount of that. There were some unsavory types for sure. There were also some very wonderful people. As always, it was a mix. That was part of what made it fun.

I have a wonderful story. I hated to leave Kazakhstan. It was such a great post. I was then DCM and Beth was the ambassador. She said, "Well, I want to organize a little farewell lunch for you." I said, "I really don't want to do that. I hate the fact that I am leaving. I am in denial. I don't want to do that." She said, "We have to do something. So, bring me a guest list."

So I brought her a guest list. She looked at it and she said, "What in the world are these people doing on this list?" because it was the kind of people we had so much trouble with. For instance, an American citizen who was there as an aid contractor had, right in front of a big sign saying in about five languages including English, "Don't cut down the trees here. This is a protected national forest." He cut himself a Christmas tree. When a policeman had come to stop him, the American had robbed the policeman of his pistol, pointed it at the policeman, and essentially held the policeman hostage.

It was that kind of person on the list. Beth said, "You hate these people." I said, "It is the only thing that is going to make me feel happy to leave is the knowledge that I will never have to see them again."

So we had this luncheon that Beth came to refer to as the "he must die" guest list. I am sure they were all looking at each other saying, "Why in the world was I invited to this?" All these skuzzy characters who had made our lives miserable.

I am sure there are folks like this in Iraq now.

Q: While I was in Vietnam as Consul General, my God, we had all these people. Some of them at that point, they were civilians, but their records went back to siphoning gas off of my troops when they were going across Europe towards Berlin. These guys were working the black market. Then they went to Korea. Wherever the action is, these guys are there.

BOGUE: In every section of the embassy, there was fascination and fun. I want to tell a story from the Consular Section. I wish we had had the time to do what you are doing now with these people.

In the 1930s, quite a few Americans moved to the Soviet Union to be part of building socialism. A lot of them were African Americans. Others were welders and ship fitters who were white, or African American, whatever color, and they were going to be part of this great experiment. They often married locally. Of course, when the Cold War came, it was a very bad thing to be an American and they had to really lie low. They suffered a lot in those years, and they concealed their children and their grandchildren.

Q: The kids were known as red diaper babies.

BOGUE: Exactly, the red diaper babies. Now that these countries were independent and emigration was possible and everything, it dawned on some of the children and grandchildren of these people that they might in fact be American citizens; that they might qualify for American citizenship.

Some of these people started coming out of the woodwork who literally had not been in the United States since 1934 or 1936. They were coming to see if either they could make a claim to citizenship for a child or petition for an immigration visa for a child. Often the children or the grandchildren wanted to emigrate to the States. I always wanted to hear their stories. Their stories were remarkable.

I remember one fellow. I was helping down in the Consular Section. They were swamped and very understaffed. I had taken on the project of speaking with this American. The consular staff knew I was interested in these cases, and they would often call me and say, "We've got one." It didn't happen that often.

He had brought a black and white picture with him for a new passport. It was entirely the wrong size. It was one of those great big old ones from our old passports. He said he guessed he would have to go back to the village and get a new picture made. I said, no, there was a place right next to the embassy where he could have his passport photos made; they knew the right sizes, and so on. He said he would have to wait a week or more while they developed it. I said, "No, actually it is called a Polaroid and it is instant. They will give it to you right there."

I remember he just looked at me and said, "I have missed a lot, haven't I?" He had no idea. He was from Detroit.

Q: A lot of them came from the industrial places. A lot of them had said, "I have seen the future, and it works." That type of people went there and they got caught.

BOGUE: Remarkable human stories there. With this fellow, we spoke in Russian all the time. His English was still there. I would switch to English sometimes when I didn't have enough Russian, and he could understand me. He was much more comfortable in Russian after all these years. He would reach in English for words. He just could not summon them up any more. He was an older gentleman at the time, but a fascinating man.

Just as I felt the highly enriched uranium was a huge highlight, we also processed the first ever adoption by an American family of a Kazakhstani child. She was a seven-year old girl of mixed ethnicity, which is what made her adoptable. I remember when the parents got the visa and everything. Ambassador Jones had said she would like to meet them, the parents and the child, for this first-ever case. Up we went. Ambassador Jones dropped down to her knees to be at the child's height and chatted with her in Russian. I remember the little girl saying that she had just one question about America: Was there chocolate there? I remember Beth saying, in Russian, "Oh sweetie, you have no idea."

That was also incredibly exciting and wonderfully gratifying.

Because we coached the kids at baseball, we had been in the orphanages. They were clean. The people who cared for the children really did care for them. It was not Dickensian in any way, except that they just didn't have money. So there weren't any extras. There weren't stuffed animals, or books, or any extras. So the idea that some of these children, who otherwise would spend their whole life in an orphanage, could be adopted, was really a very exciting one for us.

By the time that she left, the whole embassy was in tears. We were so excited about it. It is a wonderful story. I felt the same way about that that I felt about the uranium. A wonderful, delightful story.

Q: Was there much in the way of students from Kazakhstan going to the United States to study? I am thinking of George Soros and his foundation.

BOGUE: Not yet. It has become much more so lately. One of the problems was that very few of them had much English at that stage.

I will just digress for a minute, if I may. One of the most interesting social changes in Kazakhstan was in the financial status of women because of English. English was the subject girls took, and they became interpreters. Boys took engineering. Girls took English or French and became interpreters. It was a low status, low paying profession. Suddenly, when the oil companies and the embassies came in, they wanted people who had good language skills. They didn't need engineers: oil companies had their own engineers. They needed interpreters. And the people who were getting those jobs were women, and the pay was very, very good. Suddenly, the women who had always had the low paying jobs were vaulted into a much higher income bracket.

I remember having a bunch of the local staff over to the house for dinner or something. The women, sometimes talking a bit about how much strain it caused at home that suddenly they were making a huge amount of money. Maybe their husband's job had disappeared in all the restructuring. English became the most sought-after skill. Suddenly, people were speaking English a mile a minute. I think we will see more Kazakhstani students, but it is hugely expensive to come to the States. Not many had good English at that point.

Q: This is probably a good place to stop.

You left when?

BOGUE: I left in 1997 to go to Nepal.

Q: Okay. We will pick it up then.

Today is August 20th, 2007. Janet, you are off to Nepal in 1997. What is your job and how did you get it?

BOGUE: I went off to be the Deputy Chief of Mission in Nepal. I lobbied shamelessly, I must say, for Nepal. It is actually a smaller post than Kazakhstan. I had, since childhood, a really strong desire to go there. When I was eight years old, living in Gig Harbor, Washington, our neighbor's son, Lute Jerstad, was one of the Americans who summited Everest in the 1963 American Everest Expedition. In the days before guided climbs on Mount Everest, this was a huge deal. There were newspaper headlines all over the country every day. It was like the first moon landing to know where the climbers were.

This guy lived next door. He was in his 20s then, but we had known him when he was in college. His mom was my algebra teacher later in high school. His dad was the shop teacher. This was a really small town in those days. We were just ecstatic that our neighbor, who used to play basketball with us, had climbed Mount Everest.

I developed this huge fascination about Nepal. I was reading from that time everything I could about Nepal. So when the opportunity came up to go to Nepal, I really jumped at it. Like many things in the Foreign Service, it was a match made by friends.

The ambassador going out was someone I didn't know, but we knew a lot of people in common. I might add a Seattleite, born and raised in Seattle.

Q: Who was this?

BOGUE: Ralph Frank was his name. He completely beat the odds. Unlike so many ambassadors, he had two first names instead of two last names. He was a University of Washington graduate with a wonderful story, if you have a chance to interview him.

He has another story you would particularly appreciate. His dad died when he was a baby. He and his mom were on welfare for many years. Through the opportunities afforded by good public education in the public schools and at the University of Washington, and the GI Bill, he ends up twice being a U.S. Ambassador. He is a wonderful guy, just a terrific guy.

People we knew in common thought that we would be a good balance for one another, which turned out to be the case.

Q: In 1997, what was the situation in Nepal? It's not a calm little country.

BOGUE: The great sort of Shangri-La, hippie trail, Nepal was no more in a sense by then. Although it was not severe yet, there was already an armed Maoist insurgency in Nepal, which was cutting a path of destruction through a lot of central parts of Nepal. This is not the part the tourists go to, not the mountainous part. In the central and most impoverished parts of Nepal, there was already an armed insurgency that was destructive and got worse and worse and worse, until late last year when a peace deal was finally concluded. There are still a lot of bumps in the road, but there has been a lot of progress in the last year. Things were getting worse then.

Q: What were the roots of this Maoist thing?

BOGUE: I think a combination of things. I don't put a lot of stress on its Maoist nature. The Chinese were, of course, neighbors of Nepal, and the first to disavow this movement, which modeled itself on the Shining Path movement in Peru. It was sort of classic Nepal. Nepal is sort of like stepping back in time. It is sort of ironic that in Nepal, when everyone else had abandoned the communist and Maoist models, Nepal was picking it up

40 years after everyone else had decided it was not such a good idea. I would say among the leadership of the Maoist movement were ideologically committed Maoists. The rank and file tended to be illiterate and impoverished people who would not, for the most part, have been to explain Maoist doctrine, but they had a lot of grievances.

One of the newspapers published a list of the dead of the Maoist side. In Nepal, you can often tell what ethnic group or caste someone is from their surname. I just went through the list. At that time, it was maybe only 200 people. I noted that far and away one ethnic group dominated the list of the dead. The group was called the Magars. It is a group that has been shut out of economic and political participation in Nepal for years. They are terribly downtrodden. They are not like the Untouchables in India. It is not that sort of thing, but they are an ethnic group that is at the bottom of the heap.

Interestingly, in talking with one of the American Jesuit priests who came to Nepal in the 1950s to start higher education there, he told me that almost all the converts to Catholicism in Nepal since he had been there, were also Magars. In a sense, it is a group of people for whom the system is not working in any way. Some chose a different religious expression. Some chose to join an insurgency; an insurgency that promised all sorts of things that, I used to say, we could not disagree with: free public education for everyone, including girls; an end to bonded labor which is still very common in the countryside, including the bonding of children; campaigns to promote literacy for adults; clean drinking water; access to health, all those kinds of things like that.

I suppose what made them Maoists was their insistence on single party government, that the Maoists would take over and institute single party government, and the fact that they called for tremendous land reform and land redistribution.

Q: Where did the leadership come from? In Peru, with the Shining Path, so many intellectuals came out of the university.

BOGUE: That was the case in Nepal as well.

Q: Were they coming from India or Britain, or were they local?

BOGUE: They were Nepalis. They were from the Brahman caste; that is the highest caste. They were highly educated. Several of them had PhDs. Most had studied at Indian universities, which I assumed accounted for their virulent anti-Indian nationalism, because they had gone off to India and had been treated as the little brown brother. Nepal, historically and for good reason, had a very strong chip on the shoulder about India, which dominated it and condescended to it for generations. They were absolutely from what would be considered the upper class people in Nepal. One of the interesting things, when the tactics used by both the Maoists and the police, and later the army in combating the Maoists, were hugely destructive of their own rank and file. I often wondered, it would take an anthropologist or a sociologist to really look at this, but the leadership on both sides were these educated Brahmans, or Chhetris another high caste group, then the

rank and file tended to be from castes that didn't have those social, political and educational backgrounds.

I often wondered if there wasn't a sense on both sides of the leadership of cannon fodder. These folks were cannon fodder and not as important. That is probably unfair to the leadership on both sides. It seemed to me that their approach was awfully unconcerned about preserving lives. For instance, the United States donated body armor to the Nepalese government for use by its soldiers. It sat in warehouses for months and months and months. It was not distributed. At one point, when some was distributed, it was only distributed to officers, not to enlisted personnel, until our folks raised hell. They said an American army officer would not go out on patrol wearing body armor if his or her soldiers didn't have body armor. They just wouldn't do that. They wouldn't say, "My life is more valuable than yours."

Q: Can you talk about Ambassador Frank and how he used you as DCM? It is a relationship at any embassy and always done differently. How did you find it worked?

BOGUE: Ralph had been in the navy. We divided things along sort of traditional navy patterns. The Captain and the Executive Officer. That is, Ralph took on the traditional duties of the ambassador, particularly being the public face of the embassy. This really left me with a free hand to run the embassy, to make sure that was all taken care of. I was certainly included and acted in the policy side of things. It was a very small post and I had to be ready to step in whenever he was away.

Ralph had served in Nepal before. He had been the management officer there. He was a career management officer. He had chosen me in part because I came out of the political side and he felt that would be a good balance. One of the things he could offer me, in a sense, was some mentoring and guidance on management, which he did. He was a marvelous manager of human beings and programs. He taught me a tremendous amount.

He also did a wonderful thing. Having been the management officer there before, it would have been very easy for him to meddle in the management side of things, but he left both me and the management officer both a very free hand. It was funny sometimes when we would find memos in the files, when we were looking for something, there would be a memo that Ralph had written from years before. He was an excellent ambassador for all of us in the embassy. He was a very warm and caring person who spent a lot of time with new employees, junior officers, communications people, office management specialists, everyone. He devoted a lot of time to them and a lot of time to families. He really was terrific. He was the kind of person who, when one of our staff members' spouse was medevaced to Bangkok, leaving him with two young children, Ralph just sent his cook over to take care of all the meals while the spouse was in Bangkok. He worked really hard at making it a great place to come to work.

Q: When you say Nepal – I have been doing these oral histories for a long time – I can't help but recall one political ambassador there, a lady, who was renowned for being sort of like Catherine the Great. I am not sure if she reviewed the entire royal guard in her

bedroom but the point being I've always rather admired her because I've heard from so many of our political ambassadors, who were male, who changed secretaries all over the place, particularly in Scandinavia, that it was nice to have a lady. A sort of sauce for the goose and sauce for the gander.

BOGUE: She's still a legend in Nepal, I have to say. She was probably a bit mentally unhinged because when she finished her tour she decided not to leave Nepal and pitched a tent on the grounds of the ambassador's residence and lived in it and ate out of the kitchen. The staff just fed her. For some time…

This is legend, I wasn't there for this, I'm sorry to say. I'm sorry to have missed this. The legend is, and it's still widely told in Nepal, that she strolled nude like Lady Godiva, only covered with her hair, down what was known as "Freak Street." It was the street that the American hippies went to for their drugs and their souvenirs and things when Kathmandu was sort of the end of the hippie trail; Celebrated in Janis Joplin songs and things like that. When she had done that for the second time or so, it was declared time that she go home. Somehow, she was persuaded to get on a plane. We actually had a lot of that. A lot of Americans came to Nepal. I know they go to India as well. And I know they go to Jerusalem and try to walk across the Jordan River at Easter because they think they are Jesus. This is something that you would have seen a lot of in your service as a Consular Officer.

A lot of Americans sort of had a Nepal-shaped hole in their heart, or felt they did, and came because it was regarded as a spiritual place to cure what ailed them. They often stopped taking their medications before they even landed. We dealt with a lot of Americans.

Q: You had to deal with yourself from a very early age about this Nepal thing.

BOGUE: Right, exactly. Although for different reasons. We did have people often. Another thing was that it was cheap to live there. We sometimes had people with mental health issues who would come to our attention eventually.

Q: While we are on the subject and as an old consular hand, being a vice-consul, I would imagine you got involved too? I wouldn't imagine that there would be a very good support system in Nepal. How did you deal with problem cases, mental cases and drug cases?

BOGUE: If there were no other reason for having an embassy in Nepal, it would be there for American Citizen Services. That was the most important and, in many ways, the biggest part of our job, for exactly the reasons you say.

First of all, because of mountain climbing and trekking, there are a lot of opportunities for people to get sick and injured and die. We didn't have so many drug cases as the embassy had in the 1960s and 1970s, when Nepal was a huge hippie destination and

people often sampled for the first time full strength heroin or something, and died of overdose in considerable numbers. We did have a lot of deaths.

Embassy Nepal is famous as having what is always described as the only morgue of its own in the Foreign Service. It is not in fact a morgue. It is a refrigeration unit. It is a two-drawer refrigeration unit, because it is hot in Nepal. Nepalis cremate their dead immediately, so there are no facilities for storage of remains, or there certainly weren't for many years. More typically, Americans want remains returned. In order to provide a way to store them until they could be returned, the embassy actually built a refrigeration unit with the two drawers there. It was in regular use.

We used it for American dead, but also other embassies would call us. You would get this call from some poor duty officer on the weekend saying, "I think I need to use your refrigerator. Have you got any space?" We would go over there and help them with that.

When I first got there and when we did have – now there are more senior consular personnel there – but at the time I got there, we had very junior vice consuls. Ambassador Frank and I got very involved in consular cases, partly to just help the younger people with a more senior hand. It is not an easy thing to do, to call a family and make a death notification. It helps to be a little older and to have been around the world a few times to do that.

One of our vice consuls, a delightful person who did a marvelous job, there was one person who would embalm bodies, and she actually had to go for an American being embalmed. She told me she had fainted when her cat got a shot at the vet. I thought, "Well, this isn't going to work very well." So I went with her to provide moral support and help her out because this was something she was going to have to do subsequently.

I am a doctor's daughter and have a very strong stomach. I can cope with this more easily than she did. She turned into a terrific consular officer and did a great job. She just needed a little hand holding at the start.

When people were hospitalized, we brought them food and we helped them do all those kinds of things. It was the same with prisoners. We took them food and medicine. It was not that the Nepalis were not eager to help, but as you say, the infrastructure just wasn't there.

Q: What about prisons? Were Americans kept for a long time? Was it one of those things where they were arrested, put in jail, and then try to get them the hell out as soon as they could?

BOGUE: The Nepali approach tended to be, "Let's just deport these guys." They might stay in prison for a few days or weeks, but it was very unusual to have a long-term prisoner. This was a burden that the Nepalis really didn't want. They really were very fearful that someone would fall ill or something because of water or food-borne illnesses. They had a lot of illnesses in the prisons just because of overcrowding, so they were very

anxious to be shed of these problems. Do the old consular officer thing: get them out of here. Let them go and cause problems in Thailand or somewhere else.

During the time I was there, I can think of no long-term prisoners. We had short-term.

Q: Just a technical thing: Mr. X dies there and is put in your refrigeration unit. The family says, "Send him home." How did you get Mr. X from your refrigeration unit back to the United States?

BOGUE: There were coffins available. We had body bags in our storeroom at the embassy, and we had coffins, in order to do just that.

Q: You could put them on a plane?

BOGUE: We would put the body on a plane at that point. A number of families chose, which we frankly encouraged because of the expense and the storage problems, to have the person cremated locally. It was much easier to return the ashes.

When I got there, my predecessor told me that in my lower left-hand desk drawer were the ashes of an American who had been cremated a few years before. His sister had said she would come to Nepal and scatter his ashes up in the mountains, which is what he wanted. She had to save some money for the trip and get time off, all that kind of thing. I didn't know what I was supposed to do with Dennis in a drawer in my desk, which turned out to be quite funny. I never got a security violation the whole time. The marines were completely freaked out that I had ashes of a dead person in my desk. It didn't bother me at all. They had been there all along. While I was there, Dennis' sister did actually come and take Dennis' ashes. She took them up on a trek and scattered them in the mountains. He was finally put to his proper rest.

He was my company on the weekends when I was working.

Q: Not to leave the consular side, because I find it interesting. As you say, it was a major job there. What was the community like? Things had changed; The 1960s and 1970s was full of the young people and the hippies, and that sort of thing. How would you typify the group of Americans who were there during your time?

BOGUE: There were a lot of long-time residents who had come in the 1960s and 1970s. They had come as Peace Corps volunteers, working for NGOs, or come on a personal trip. They fell in love with the place and stayed.

The first day I was in Nepal, I thought, "I have never seen so many grey ponytails in my life." There were all these people, my age and older, who had come as hippies and stayed. Again, Nepal was a very pleasant place to live. It was inexpensive to live there. It is a very laid back culture. There was a lively ex-pat community.

There were also large numbers of expats who had come to study Tibetan Buddhism, because there were large numbers of Tibetan Buddhist exiles in Nepal, and a lot of monasteries and teaching centers there. There were American missionaries in Nepal. There were lots of people working in NGOs. People fall in love with Nepal.

Did you ever go to Nepal?

Q: No.

BOGUE: People fall in love with it, and I understand why. I fell in love with it too. People always say they come for the mountains; they come back for the people. The Nepalis are extraordinarily gracious and generous, wonderful people. People just fall in love with the place.

It is also, despite all these years of tourism, one of the most exotic places on the planet, and still is. It has hung onto its own culture. I would walk to work many mornings, and all the housewives on the street would be taking their little plate of offerings of marigold petals and things down to the little shrine, and sprinkling them. Guys who worked for Barclays Bank, the Nepali men, would be in a three-piece pinstripe suit, with marigold petals in their hair.

My neighbors had a huge problem. They had a little fence around their compound. The wall had a little v-notch in it. People had taken to dumping garbage there. This was, the way I thought of it, a classic Nepali solution. Instead of putting up signs saying, "Don't dump your garbage" or having a guard or something, they cleaned it all out and they put up a little statue of the god Ganesh.

Q: This is the elephant god?

BOGUE: The elephant god who brings luck and happiness. Everyone loves Ganesh. So people stopped dumping their garbage. Instead, they would just leave a few flowers. This was sort of the way Nepalis solved their problems, which I thought was just charming and absolutely lovely.

There was a long-established American expat community there. We also had the huge waves of mountain climbers who came in from Seattle. My brother was a mountain climber. I actually knew quite a few of them when they came through. I spent a lot of time with them. Of course, that was a very high profile, that consular work was part of our job. Whenever anyone disdained consular work, I used to point them to the John Krakauer book, *Into Thin Air*, where the consular officers and the consular local staff are thanked profusely for their efforts in the rescue, that great Everest accident. I said, "This kind of publicity for the U.S. government you cannot buy." That was a big part of our job.

Q: Again, still on the subject of mountain climbing: how did that involve you all?

BOGUE: It did in a consular sense, when there was an accident. Ralph Frank was a very proactive ambassador. He wanted to get out and see Americans. One of the things he actually liked was that he was a regular guy. He was not somebody with lots of last names who went to all these exclusive schools, which ordinary Americans could not relate to. He was this kid from Seattle who happened to be in the Foreign Service. He made a real effort to invite people over to the house. I tried to see a lot of the climbers. We tried to stay in very close touch with the various groups. Because of the advent of satellite technology, you could actually email people while they were on the mountain. We actually got consular notifications that way. We would get an email from base camp from somebody with a laptop and a satellite uplink. They would send us an email and say that something had happened and could we help with this and that.

Q: Were you getting lots of inquiries from concerned parents and others?

BOGUE: Not so much with the mountain climbers. Usually, their families have learned willy-nilly over the years what that's about with serious climbers. Certainly, with trekkers. We got an awful lot of the "my son or daughter went to travel through Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Nepal. We haven't heard from them in three weeks. Can you find them?" It was the old needle in the haystack problem. That was the more typical inquiry.

Q: Were there problems with the Nepalese government as far as climbing, or was that pretty regulated?

BOGUE: It is a huge moneymaker for the government of Nepal, because there are fees to climb the big peaks, Everest, Makalu and Annapurna, and the other 8,000 meter peaks. They were very helpful and cooperative about the climbing.

You might be interested as a consular officer that we also took care of Everest accidents on the Tibet side of Everest. The consulate in Chengdu was eons away and not only were we much closer, but we were very familiar with the drill about mountain climbing accidents. We had arrangements with the Chinese authorities so that they would permit the bodies to be brought to Kathmandu. That worked out very well. Although the total legal consent and knowledge was with Chengdu. This was something Consular Affairs in Washington knew about as well. Informally, our consular district just bumped slightly into Tibet.

Q: How about rescues? Was there a drill? Was there an apparatus for dealing with mountain accidents?

BOGUE: On the mountain, the mountaineers have to rescue themselves or each other. There is nothing the embassy can do except organize, for instance, a helicopter to fly to base camp. The helicopters, because of the altitude -- in fact, the rescue in the *Into Thin Air* case in 1996 set a record for high altitude helicopter rescue. The Nepalese pilot was doing things like taking a pen out of his pocket and throwing it out of the helicopter before he left to reduce the weight. It was that desperate. They were just shoveling everything, flashlights, everything off to do that rescue above the base camp level.

Normally, the highest they could get to was base camp. Even that is iffy, and of course the weather plays a huge role. The altitude is very severe there. What we could do at our end was engage the Nepalese Army and the private helicopter companies in getting assistance up. What commonly would happen was a trekker would break their leg somewhere and would need a helicopter rescue. Or a trekker would get appendicitis and need a helicopter rescue. We would organize that side of things and organize their medical care.

We sometimes went along in the helicopter and sometimes I did that too, when we were shorthanded. I kept a little bag with my hiking boots, a parka, and non-work clothes in the office and once in a while would jump into a helicopter and would assist as well, if it were low enough altitude that you could carry the extra passenger weight and it looked like someone was going to need help. Other times, a doctor would fly up if somebody was going to need medical care right on the ground.

It is tremendously exciting consular work. It is a fantastic consular experience. I encouraged lots of junior officers to go there because you see everything. You see every possible permutation. I had done my consular tour in London where you ring up the British hospital. They were very well set up to handle accidents. This was the complete other extreme, where we did an awful lot of it ourselves. We bought medicines at pharmacies and took them to the hospitals for people. We bought clean dressings, all those things. In Nepal, the part that the family was expected to do, we did for Americans.

Q: What about the Peace Corps? I have done oral histories with people who talked about being pointed up the mountainside and told, "It's about two days' hike up to the place." We were putting our people in very remote areas. How did you find the care and feeding of our Peace Corps people there?

BOGUE: It really was the old Peace Corps in the sense that they would fly to a provincial center, take a bus for a day and then start walking to their village. It would often be two or three days' walk. The biggest concern Ambassador Frank and I had was developing an evacuation plan to include how to communicate with them, how to get them out if they needed to get out as the Maoist threat grew more. The permanent threat in Nepal is a devastating earthquake. How would you get people out and questions like that.

The Peace Corps volunteers either loved it or hated it from the first minute. When I was in Nepal, of all the Peace Corps programs in the world, it had the highest first six-month attrition rate, but it also had the highest extension rate for a third year. So if you liked it and made it through the first six months, people tended to stay longer. We had fantastic Peace Corps volunteers. They were doing such terrific projects in the environment, forestry, health, and all sorts of things. They really were out in the boonies.

When I took vacation, I would go trekking and I often would arrange my trek to drop in on some of them. To ensure my arrival was welcome, I arrived bearing chips and salsa, M&Ms. I once took a whole pack full of M&Ms, which turned out to weigh a lot. I was

greeted with raised arms and loud shouts as you can imagine. There were two volunteers there and they couldn't meet me for breakfast the next day because they had in fact consumed M&Ms and they were so sick, they couldn't get out of bed for two days. They were great people, just fantastic.

It was the oldest Peace Corps program in Asia. A tremendous number of well-known U.S. diplomats are alumni of the Nepal Peace Corps, as you probably know: Peter Furley, Peter Tomson, Vic Tomseth. There is a long line and I know I am leaving out some. There is a long list of American ambassadors who were Peace Corps volunteers in Nepal early on in the 1960s and early 1970s.

I cover this later, but I went back to Nepal for a brief period as Chargé for three months in 2004. Right after that, we unfortunately had to close the Peace Corps program because of the Maoist problem and security problems for the volunteers. They are just now looking at the possibility of reopening it, which I think would be great.

Q: At this point were the Maoists working in that area?

BOGUE: They were really in five central districts in the central part of Nepal. They were districts called Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, and they were very powerful but only in those regions. We didn't have any Peace Corps volunteers there. We brought them out of those regions because of the Maoist concern. At the time I was in Nepal, the Maoist activities were pretty much confined to that area. Once in a while, they would try to light a stick of dynamite in the capital to flex their muscles a bit. It was later, after my time there, after 2000, that they really extended their activities across the whole country.

Q: You were there from 1997 to 2000?

BOGUE: Right.

Q: Let's look at the capital. What were relations with the government and our interests in Nepal?

BOGUE: When I was there, King Birendra was still living. This was the one who was murdered in 2001 by his own son, the Crown Prince, in a massacre of the royal family. He was still living and I think was a really constructive figure. He had been an absolute monarch and in 1990, in the face of street protests and against the advice of his family and courtiers who advised him that if he just shot enough people, this would all go away. He instead chose to give up absolute power and create a constitutional monarchy and democracy in Nepal. There was a sort of British system with a Prime Minister and parliamentary party system with a constitutional monarch. The king still did hold some powers. He was still the commander-in-chief of the army, and so on. King Birendra exercised those with a very light hand. He felt that he needed to give democracy a chance to flourish. Particularly because he had been an absolute monarch that any indication of heavy-handedness by him would be misinterpreted as trying to regain his former powers.

I think personally he was quite devoted to the welfare of the people of Nepal. I cannot say that about most of the rest of the royal family, including his successor.

Q: What was the influence of the rest of the royal family?

BOGUE: There were some members who devoted themselves to good works, but they were in the minority in the royal family. Most of them devoted themselves, the older generation, to enriching themselves, and the younger generation to fast cars and hard drink and drugs. They formed this group of swaggering young drunks who would barge into bars and beat people up. The man who is today the crown prince, Prince Paras, the son of the present king, was quite famous for vehicular homicide while under the influence of alcohol. He had, while drunk, ran down and killed the most popular pop singer in Nepal. On another occasion when a policeman tried to stop him, he actually held a gun to the head of the policeman and threatened his life. This was the kind of behavior that…

King Birendra had done things like when he returned to Nepal from getting his education abroad, he had walked the whole width of Nepal on his own two feet to better acquaint himself with his country. He was a much more revered figure. The rest of the royal family is not. It is unlikely the Crown Prince will ever become king because I think the monarchy's powers will disappear and the monarchy itself will probably disappear.

Q: What were you seeing in the political life there at that time?

BOGUE: The parties were mostly scrapping among themselves internally for position and splitting up. Have you ever seen the movie, *The Life of Brian*? It is a Monty Python movie set in the Middle East and Brian is a sort of Jesus-like figure, or is mistaken by the people as Jesus-like figure. There is a great scene in there when all of these radical political parties are splitting until finally, each is a party of one. The fellow is saying, "No, no. I am the People's Liberation Front. No, I am the Democratic Liberation Front for the People." That was sort of happening in Nepal. There would be the Communist Party of Nepal Marxist-Leninist; the Communist Party of Nepal United Marxist-Leninist; the Nepali Congress Such-and-Such Branch. They were splitting and fighting, mostly about who would get to be the leader, the prime minister. It was very unfortunate because the parties were not addressing the real social problems. There are very genuine problems with poverty and development in Nepal. They were not answering the hopes of the people that democracy would improve their lives.

Nepal is one of those places where you get inspired as an American, and embarrassed at the same time, because people finally got the chance to choose their own government. Their voter turnouts were immense. People would walk for three miles and stand for three hours in the hot sun for the chance to choose who their leaders would be. I was observing an election in a village once and the mayor and his wife invited me over for tea in the course of the day. The mayor's wife was apologizing profusely that their turnout was only about 85 percent because people had to work in the fields and couldn't get there. She was so apologetic. She said, "Remember we are a new democracy. We will do

better. I am sure that you are disappointed." I thought, "What in the world am I going to say? Well, I am just going to say the truth, and say how embarrassed I am that our turnout is normally under 50 percent." They were stunned. They said, "How?" I said, "Well, people take it for granted. They don't come out and vote." There are few sights more inspirational than seeing people line up like that to vote.

I remember the Election Commissioner, a wonderful guy, coming to us to say that women's turnout tended to be lower than men's. He did surveys to find out why. It was partly that women did not have the time. They had so much work to do at home and with kids, they could not stand around for three hours. Also, sometimes standing in line, they were bothered or groped or something. So he created separate lines for women that would therefore move faster and they wouldn't be harassed, in order to increase women's turnout. He came to tell us that because he didn't want us to misinterpret that separate lines for women meant somehow less equal. It did boost women's turnout by something like 15 percent at the next election.

People were so excited about voting. They were so eager to vote. The parties disappointed them terribly. The parties were corrupt and much more interested in how many Land Rovers they could get from the aid agencies than alleviating poverty. In the perception of people, it was a huge disappointment.

Then the Maoists came along and were attractive to some people, but to other people, they were murderers and extortionists. They kidnapped children to serve the Maoists. People were just seeing the government on the one hand not only unable to protect them, let alone provide schools, health programs, and things. Then the Maoists on the other hand were doing these things. Ordinary people were just whipsawed between all these forces. They led very difficult lives in the village.

They started out with difficult lives. They had the highest maternal mortality rate in the world at the time. They had a very significant infant and child mortality. They did not have long life spans. Their lives were very much already on the margin, even without the Maoists and the failures of government.

The marvel of all this is that you go to these villages and people are enormously hospitable and welcoming. I never saw a child struck the whole time I was in Nepal. You would go to these very poor places. For those who think that child abuse is purely a result of poverty, in Nepal, you saw babies and children handed from aunt to uncle, from brother to mother to neighbor, and played with and fussed over all the time in situations of really dire poverty. It is not to say that child abuse did not exist, but it was not a widespread problem despite the widespread poverty.

It was an amazing place in that regard. The poverty was so grinding, yet people did not fall into a lot of the kind of social ills associated with poverty.

Q: Would you have squared this with the religion, or the Buddhist tradition?

BOGUE: Most Nepalis are Hindu, but a large portion are also Buddhist. They don't really distinguish heavily between Hinduism and Buddhism. They see it all as part of a continuum. After all, the Buddha was a Hindu. They see it as a very interconnected event.

I wondered about this a lot. I have talked to friends who are anthropologists about this a lot, about how much you attribute to religious influence and how much there really is a cultural character, and there is a cultural value, and people are raised to be kind and nice to each other. That's inculcated as a value from early childhood. At the time I was there, literally, a woman alone could walk across Kathmandu at 2:00 a.m. and not be bothered. There was almost no violent crime against persons. This is one of the reasons that the Maoist insurgency was so stunning to Nepalis, because it was so violent. This was not the Nepali way.

I don't really have an answer to that. I must say though that I am not one of those people who said, "Keep them in their happy bliss of poverty." People deserve schools and decent health care and electricity to generate pumps that can pump clean water, and all those things. Everyone should have that. One of the great reasons Americans fall in love with Nepal is that the Nepalese remind them you can have a rich and full and satisfying life without having a lot of stuff. It is not about the stuff. That probably is a religious thing.

Q: What about the political branch of our embassy? Was there much you could do as far as work with these splintered political parties, or just report on the various doings? It sounds like an impossible job.

BOGUE: We did our best to help work U.S. government funded programs through the National Democratic Institute for instance, which tried to teach the political parties how to operate and how to focus on their role as legislators and as administrators when in power, to govern properly rather than just have their version of 'inside the Beltway fights.' We did a lot of this kind of encouragement of trying to support the institutions of the young democracy, trying to support training for court officials. We were the people who computerized the election commission so that returns could come in more quickly from this terrible terrain and difficult country to get around so that people would have confidence that returns were coming quickly and accurately. We tried to work with the institutions of government. Our whole goal was to try to institutionalize democratic bodies.

In Nepal, the government had been and continued to be under the political party, a very personal affair. One of the things that diplomats do is try to make lemonade out of lemons. We had the whole Clinton-Monica Lewinsky impeachment. This is a little embarrassing when you're in the field. One of the things we kept emphasizing was that, "Okay the President is in trouble. The President is being impeached. The President is distracted, but everyone is still getting their Social Security check. The embassy is still open. We are still interviewing visa applicants. That is because the institutions of government are not dependent upon one individual to operate. They keep running. They are staffed by career government servants, public servants. They continue to run. VA

(Department of Veterans Affairs) checks are still being issued. All those things are happening that are supposed to be happening, even though the president is in trouble."

In Nepal, if you had a situation like that, the government would be essentially paralyzed. In Nepal it was a very complicated procedure and it helped to have friends in the right places just to get a driver's license. All those kinds of normal functions of government were the things that we tried to support. That they would develop strong enough institutions that they could survive weak leadership when it happened. That was our focus.

Our real focus in Nepal was with development and poverty issues. We had a very large program through the Agency for International Development. We had the Peace Corps. We had a lot of programs to combat trafficking in women, which was a significant problem in Nepal.

Q: I was thinking of Ukrainian women being sent to Western Europe, but I don't think of Nepalese.

BOGUE: Nepalese girls, some boys, and young women, were trafficked to India. To brothels in Bombay, now Mumbai. They tended to be lighter skinned and were considered sort of exotically attractive in India. That was a major, major problem.

Q: With this problem, what were you doing?

BOGUE: We had a three-pronged approach to this. One was prevention. All of our poverty alleviation programs tended to be directed toward women in Nepal. When we did surveys, we found that when men got money in the village, they spent it on gambling and alcohol. When women got money, they spent it on their children, on education for their children. They did not spend it on themselves; they focused on their children. So the idea was that you want to get money into the hands of women and do development that will allow women to get money. So we did both the poverty alleviation, but also we did comic books and other forms of consciousness-raising. If someone comes to your town and says, "There are great jobs for you in Kathmandu. We only happen to be taking girls aged 13 to 20." Don't believe them. You are being hoodwinked into this. Or if some man comes to your village and says, "Your daughter is so beautiful, she could be a film star in India and I am going to make her one." Don't fall for that. So prevention was one side of it.

We also worked very hard to strengthen the courts, the prosecutors and the police on looking at the traffickers and trying to bust the traffickers.

Then we had significant projects for rehabilitation of those who had returned. Typically, the girls would go to India but return within a few years because they were HIV-positive by then. Because of their illness, they could not go back to their villages. They could not marry. They were often shunned by their families and their villages. So we worked with some local Nepalis and NGOS, which provided sheltered homes for the women in

Kathmandu. For those who weren't in the final stages of the illness, they provided job training to be tailors and other jobs they could do. For those who were very ill, they provided medical support and a kind of hospice surrounding for them.

So we kind of looked at it from trying to stop it to trying to help those who had been the victims of trafficking. Again, doing the consciousness raising, trying to gain more public acceptance for the returned victims. That was a project that I think we all … one of the nice things about being in Nepal was that we were really doing positive things. It wasn't a policy to rack your conscience about. We were doing things that I think nobody ever minded working extra hours on projects like that. Our whole hearts were in that.

Q: What about the Western European powers? What were they doing in Nepal? Or were we pretty much a major presence?

BOGUE: We were certainly a major presence in assistance. So were others: the Japanese, the Scandinavians, the Germans, the Indians, and the Chinese who built infrastructure projects. Nepal is sandwiched between two huge powers. One of the former kings had not so poetically said, "We are a yam between two boulders." The way they felt was ultimately squishable.

The Indians were looked on with deep suspicion by the Nepalis. Nepalis of all political persuasions feel that India intends to make them another Sikkim or Bhutan, essentially just a little province of India. They are very suspicious of India.

We were generally seen as good guys because it was clear we had no territorial, or those kinds of interests, in the way that India or China might have. Our motives were seen as innocent ones.

The other huge players of course for historical reasons in Nepal are the Brits, although Nepal was never a British colony. Britain was a very significant player and is still in part because of the recruitment of the Gurkha soldiers.

Q: Could you talk a bit about the Gurkhas and explain their role when you were there?

BOGUE: The Gurkhas are one of Nepal's many ethnic groups. They are a hill people, a mountain people. They are, because of growing up in the mountains, immensely physically tough. Back in the days of the British Empire, the British government began to recruit Gurkhas to be soldiers in their army. They became quite famous for their toughness, their ability to withstand the most terrible conditions, their bravery on the field, and so on. They became and still play a significant role in the British army and the Indian army. The Indian army has Gurkha regiments recruited from Nepal. The British army still has Gurkha regiments. They served in Kosovo, Bosnia, the Falkland Islands. There are Gurkhas in Iraq.

Q: There was something not too long ago about the Gurkhas getting into Buckingham Palace.

BOGUE: Right. The Gurkhas are sort of a catch-all phrase. They do serve on active duty in the British army and in the Indian army. They typically retire quite young. They are typically taken at the age of 17 or 18, and serve for 15 years. When they come out, they are in their mid 30s, they speak English well, they have fantastic military training, they have a pension – not a huge one but significant in Nepal terms – and one of several things happens to them. Either they start a business in Nepal; many of them have been very successful with that. Or they do things like the police force in Singapore, which is largely Gurkha. The security force on lots of cruise lines is largely Gurkha. Again, they speak English well; they are very presentable. They do lots of work around the world. Lots of Gurkhas are hired. At our embassy, a lot of our security personnel are former Gurkhas.

In fact, one of the problems we had with them was when we wanted some guy to mingle with the crowd a bit, we could not get them to look scruffy. That British military training with that haircut and pressed shirt, when we tried to scruff them up a little bit, it didn't work. They couldn't take it. "What? Not shave? No!"

So they have a tremendous tradition.

Q: This is Tape 8, Side 1 with Janet Bogue.

I was just saying that the former president of our labor union AFSA (American Foreign Service Association) was Tom Boyatt, who was ambassador at a couple of places. Tom, as one of his opportunities after he retired from the Foreign Service, essentially ran a Rent-a-Gurkha service of security people internationally. If you had some Gurkhas standing outside your bank or something, you were in pretty good shape.

BOGUE: They do have a ferocious reputation on the battlefield. As a consular thing, interestingly, when we would process visas for those who were going to work for Carnival Cruises or something, one of the things the consular officers would do to establish that the person was truly Gurkha was ask to look at their thumb. The Gurkha tradition is that you can never take out your knife, the kukri, without drawing blood. It can never go back in its scabbard without drawing blood. So if you were dealing with your kit and just cleaning it, the tradition was that they would nick themselves at the end of their thumb to draw a few drops of blood so they could maintain the tradition. All the real Gurkhas had this tremendous callous of scar tissue. If some man presented himself as a Gurkha and presented hands without that, the consular officers would say, "Sorry, you're not the real thing." The famous Gurkha thumb. And it could only really be developed over years. Someone couldn't really try to do it in just a few days.

Q: I assume there was Nepalese Army and was this a significant factor in the political mix?

BOGUE: Yes, the Nepalese Army really initially had two roles. One was ceremonial. They guarded palaces. And the other was they were very good UN peacekeepers. They served in Lebanon with the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon) forces

there. They had been on Cyprus. They had been in various places. Again, they were much in demand as peacekeepers because Nepal is a country no one has a quarrel with. Sometimes if you are peacekeeping in the Middle East, for instance, there are some countries that are going to cause sensitivities locally, but Nepal is not one of those countries. It was not going to cause local sensitivities. They were well-disciplined peacekeepers. There weren't horrible incidents that you sometimes get with some peacekeepers. They were very much in demand. It was something that they liked because it was prestigious and it was good publicity for them.

Q: And it was a source of income.

BOGUE: And it was a source of income. It was good military training and employment for an army that otherwise had no real role. Realistically, the army was not going to defend the country successfully against either India or China.

Q: They would be slightly outnumbered.

BOGUE: Right. The army, though late in my time there, was drawn into the conflict with the Maoists, which initially had been a matter for the police and the army had stayed out of it as a domestic issue. The army did play a significant role politically. Partly because it was that the king still had power, partly because he was the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The army was the Royal Nepalese Army and loyal to the king, not to the constitution, not to the parliament. That is something that has now changed. Now the Nepalese army and the oath of allegiance is now to the Constitution of Nepal, rather than the king.

So the army was always seen as a very conservative and pro-monarchy force, and therefore potentially as an anti-democratic force. There were always fears on the part of the parties that the army would engineer a coup or something like that to position themselves with the King back in power. The political parties definitely saw the army not as the servant and protector of the people, but as the servant and protector of the monarch. That was something that the army found very hard to overcome.

On top of that, once it became involved in the Maoist thing, inevitably, if you throw a bunch of 18-year old ill-equipped, ill-trained young fellows out there, bad things are going to happen. Among the bad things that happened were the human rights abuses. Suspected Maoists were killed. They were tortured. Women were raped. Girls were raped. The army's prestige sank very, very low. The trust and confidence people had in the army sank very low.

The army, of course, did what institutions do in these cases, which was deny, cover up, refuse to investigate. They did not handle these things in a proper way. Privately, a lot of officers were absolutely horrified at some of the things that happened. They tended to say, "Well, the Maoists are worse," rather than trying to come clean.

You know, we see this in our own military; we see it in institutions all over the world; we see it in the Catholic Church with the child abuse scandals. The impulse to protect the institutions is so great among people that they don't necessarily do the right thing.

So the army was going through a very difficult time. One of the things that will be very interesting now is to see whether it can reshape itself as a modern and democratic army, if it can bring in some of the former Maoist fighters and integrate them into a truly national army. It will be a very interesting development.

Q: Could you talk about the Indian Embassy and our relations with it? I assume you were watching what they were up to. Then, we will talk about the Chinese.

BOGUE: The Indians were huge players for lots of reasons in Nepal. India controls Nepal's access to the sea. India could and did sometimes just shut off its routes into Nepal. This meant things like petroleum didn't get to Nepal.

When Rajeev Gandhi was Prime Minister at one time, the Indians said in a fit of pique with Nepal, "Close the border." That meant that Nepal really suffered for lack of foodstuffs and oil, and things like that. Nepal was in a situation of tremendous dependency on India.

India also accounted for the vast majority of tourists in Nepal, far more than westerners. It is close. It is cheap. It is pretty. Lots of Indians came as tourists. India was by far the major source of goods and services.

Q: How were they as tourists?

BOGUE: Most of them came to shop. Most of them weren't trekking somewhere. Most came just for one weekend to shop and enjoy the cool air, a relief from the heat in India, things like that. They were fine. They spent a lot of money in Nepal.

There was the resentment and fear that any small country has about a very large neighbor. Even large countries like Canada and Mexico often feel this way about the United States. We certainly saw this in the reaction of Nepalis to India, the sense of cultural domination. Their cultures were very similar. You didn't feel culture dominated by the Chinese, because their cultures are very different. They felt very much dominated by India. The Indians, I think, did meddle significantly in Nepali politics, and they had much more reason to be concerned about Nepal's instability than anyone else, because they had a not very happy border with China over the years. There is a country falling apart that is part of that border in a sense, that is the buffer in that border. They had a lot of concerns. They don't have an entirely spotless history when it comes to meddling.

Q: What was your impression of the Indian Embassy while you were there?

BOGUE: This was an important post for India and they sent very sharp, very good people. In fact, the man who was ambassador when I went back in 2004 went from there

to being the Foreign Secretary, the highest-ranking career diplomat in India. This was a critically important post for them. They sent very senior people. They were smart, capable, in the know, and plugged-in in New Delhi, and very good.

We had very good relationships with them. There was a long tradition of the British, American and Indian ambassadors having a regular breakfast, lunch or something together, very frequently and talking. There was a sense that the three countries who were all big players there for different reasons had common interests in Nepal's stability and Nepal's democratic development.

Q: Did Pakistan play any role there at all?

BOGUE: Very little. It was a minor player in Nepal. They did have an embassy there, but they were a really minor player.

Q: How about China?

BOGUE: China played a huge role in investment and in aid projects.

China did something we, alas, have stopped doing, which was infrastructure projects. They built roads, bridges, dams, which we had given up doing as aid projects. The Nepalis were in need of and very grateful for those projects. China also had a lot of investment and business in Nepal.

The old trade routes go through several passes in the mountains there and actually Kathmandu probably got its start because traders from India had to cross the lowlands between Nepal and India in the winter (when it wasn't malaria season). But because it was winter, you couldn't get into China over the passes. So they had to hunker down somewhere. And people coming the other way, had to come across in the summer, headed from Tibet to India to trade, had to cross the mountains in the summer but then sit out the winter season. So Kathmandu developed as the place for all these merchants.

Q: This was part of or one of the Silk Roads, wasn't it?

BOGUE: It was a little off the traditional Silk Road. It runs a little further north through Central Asia. It is definitely one of the old Silk Roads. It was one of the great trades in salt: salt from Tibet in exchange for goods from India, went back and forth and still do, on yak backs. Still, sometimes in remote parts of Nepal, you see yak caravans carrying salt down and bringing back goods.

Q: Was Tibet almost a separate entity? How did you view Tibet from Nepal?

BOGUE: Most American travelers to Tibet enter Tibet through Nepal. That is the easiest and handiest way for trips there. The Chinese government was very anxious about American diplomats coming in from Kathmandu into Tibet, because they assumed we were only there to stir up trouble. So we at the embassy didn't go. We wouldn't have

been granted visas by the Chinese to let us go in from there. The Chinese, of course, have a lot of anxieties about Tibet and Nepal had to walk a very delicate path.

In the 1950s when the Dalai Lama and other Tibetans began to flee, many settled in Nepal, although more settled in India where the Dalai Lama settled around Dharamsala. There was still a steady stream of Tibetan refugees walking across and coming into Nepal. The deal was that Nepal would take them in temporarily, while they got medical care and were processed by the UN, but then they went on to India. The new groups coming through couldn't stay and settle in Nepal. Nepal tried to walk this tightrope of letting the refugees come out, fulfilling their responsibilities toward the refugees under, of course, pressure from us and other westerners and the UN and so on to do the right thing, but not having them stay and build up a huge Tibetan community in Nepal. There was a small one there, but the focus was to have them go on to the large Tibetan community in India, based around Dharamsala.

That was a constant source of some friction every year when the passes became passable and Tibetans would start coming over. The Chinese side wanted the Nepali border guards to kick them back into Tibet. We wanted them to be admitted. In fact, the Nepalese government would come to us and say, "We will let them through, but just don't make a big deal of it. Do we have to talk about this in public all the time? It just makes the Chinese mad at us and then they bully us and throw their weight around and it all gets ugly."

Q: I can see that being aware of the reputation that Nepal, being between China and India, and both those areas are probably the greatest supplier of shopkeepers the world knows. How were shopkeeping hours in Nepal?

BOGUE: Shopping in South Asia is a sport. It really is a sport and it is a sport for the merchants as well. This was always because to us the prices seem so ridiculously low. And the merchant would say, "It's so many rupees." You would say, "Okay." And they would be completely deflated. And then they would almost say, "But I'm just starting the tea and you haven't sat down. I haven't seen pictures of your children yet. You are not playing your part here." Shopping is a complete sport. Nepal, we would sometimes say, was for visitors a kind of "India light," because it is smaller and more laid back. It has the charm and fascinations but without the aggressiveness and the huge numbers of people. People didn't feel claustrophobic or something as they would in visiting India. A walk down the tourist district of Nepal was just a treat for visitors, always. It was fun for those of us who had reached middle age, because somebody was always offering to sell you drugs, which made you feel young again. Somebody would come out and try to sell you something. "Thank you for asking." It's like being carded in a bar, you know. "Thank you for asking. No thanks to the drugs, but thanks for thinking I might still be interested." It was a lot of fun.

I am not a big shopper, but I just loved to walk through the markets a lot. I just liked the sights, the smells, the sounds, and the brilliant colors. You see people carrying toys on their heads. Puppeteers selling their wares. It was not something you would find at

Montgomery Mall. I just loved the vitality of it, and the constant motion. People come to the markets not just to do their shopping, but also to see their neighbors and their friends. The conversations that went on, the kind of lively life at the marketplace, is very much a part of life there.

Q: Did you find a clash between Indian merchants and Chinese merchants, or did they get much of a foothold there?

BOGUE: It was mostly Nepali merchants there. There were some merchants from outside, but it was mostly Nepali-run businesses. There were a few Chinese merchants and a few Kashmiris from India and Pakistan. There were a few Indians.

Some Nepali populations had a lock on certain things. The bead market, where you went to have beaded things made. You could have beaded necklaces or things made in whatever color or pattern you wanted. This was typical if you were getting ready for a wedding or something, you could have beads made. All the bead makers were Muslims. They were Nepali Muslims. There was a small population of Nepali Muslims. They had a complete lock on the bead industry for reasons I don't understand, just traditionally that's what they did.

Other groups had a lock on other items such as the pottery industry, the rug and carpet industry. The carpets were mostly made by Tibetans.

Q: Did the outside world intrude much? Was there any interest in Bosnia or other areas? In other words, was the media a factor there?

BOGUE: It did much more than in the past because of satellite television and the internet. When I came to Nepal in 1997, there were two internet providers and about 150 subscribers. When I left three years later, there were about 20 private internet providers and there were well over 1,000 subscribers by then. And it was booming. It was set to take off.

Satellite television had come. Star TV from Hong Kong was there. You could get CNN and BBC television and everything. One of the interesting things was that all the little kids in Nepal who lived in town and had access to television could speak Hindi perfectly well because so many of the programs, especially the cartoons, were in Hindi, and they just picked it up.

That said, most Nepalis don't have access to television or the internet, because most Nepalis don't have electricity. If you live in a village, you don't have electricity. You might have a battery-operated transistor radio, but you don't have all those things. On the one hand you have Kathmandu which is becoming very plugged in with the world. On other hand, you have the rest of Nepal.

One of the fascinating things we were involved in was some efforts to use technology to bridge those gaps. For instance, there are almost no doctors in rural areas. The doctors all

practice in Kathmandu. They don't want to raise their families out in places that have terrible schools and things like that. So the doctors all flocked to Kathmandu. It is very hard to get medical care in the villages. A team from Yale was developing something they called, "telemedicine" where you could train a village person to operate what looked like a travel hair dryer. It was essentially a hand-held scanner. It would be hooked up to the medical school in Kathmandu, where specialists would sit there and look at it.

These guys from Yale went with a climbing group up to base camp and actually were able to successfully demonstrate it. One of the Sherpas was experiencing very severe back and abdominal pains. So they had their laptop and a satellite uplink. A bunch of us were sitting in Kathmandu and there were a bunch of people at Yale medical school. The Sherpa pulled his shirt up and they ran the little scanner over him and three doctors simultaneously said they could see the kidney stone. They said, "drink five gallons of water and start walking to Namche," which is the closest airstrip. "If you haven't passed the stone by then, just get on a plane and come to Kathmandu and we will take care of him."

To be able to do diagnosis remotely for cases like that was one way that the Nepalis, with some assistance from us, were looking at; using technology to deal with the rural-urban divide.

The Nepalis never had black and white television. By the time television came to Nepal, it was already in color. Most Nepalis will never have a landline phone, because it's too hard to put everything in. For most Nepalis, the first phone they will have will be a cell phone. There is no point in running landlines over that terrain when you can do it with cellular technology instead.

It's a situation where they go from no technology to leap-frogging over several generations of it.

Q: The great example of course is India where they jumped into the IT (information technology) age with gusto, at least with a certain group in Bangalore and all that. Were you seeing any reflection of that when you were there in Nepal?

BOGUE: There were some efforts to get that kind of thing started. Again, you had a population where those people who were educated tended to be the good English speakers and they could do things like the medical transcription. The time difference works in their favor. They can do it while they are awake and the United States is asleep. They didn't catch the front of that wave in the way that India did with the 800 numbers and all those kinds of things.

In fact, many of the young Nepalis who went to the States and got degrees in information technology were very frustrated when they came back. There were very few opportunities for them in Nepal. Things had not developed economically. The economy was still very backwards there. Most people still stick to subsistence agriculture.

There wasn't a boom in Kathmandu at all, let alone in high tech. In a way, it's the kind of development some people were really seeking because it tends to be environmentally clean, doesn't destroy natural resources and takes advantage of an educated population. It didn't take off in the same way that it did in India. I think the Indians were much savvier, partly because they had the whole generation that went to Silicon Valley and came back to India and established that whole thing. Nepal did not have that sort of generation that created a new Palo Alto in Bangalore. It could be done. People did see that as a possibility, again because of the English language skills. Also, for things like 800 numbers, the immense kindness and courtesy of the Nepalis lends itself to customer service kinds of professions.

Q: Was there any Nepalese immigrant community in the United States?

BOGUE: It is very tiny. It is really almost statistically insignificant. Nepal is a small country to begin with and its immigrant community is very, very tiny. The interesting thing is that Nepalis do extremely well when they come to the United States. They attribute it to the fact that they are not held back by caste barriers or traditional barriers. Americans don't know the difference between a Rai and Newari, and they don't care. It is meaningless to us. No one is going to say, "Well, I don't want him in my company because he isn't from the right caste." They do spectacularly well. They work hard. They do the classic immigrant thing of the parents working multiple jobs and live very frugally to provide everything for their children, to make sure they get good educations. There just aren't very many of them.

Nepalis are crazy about Nepal. They would rather be in Nepal. First of all, their family is very close knit. All my Nepali friends said the thing that astonished them the most about us at the embassy was that we were willing to live away from home. No matter how nice Nepal was. We weren't where our parents and siblings were. Nepalis get homesick a lot when they are abroad. They really miss Nepal.

Some Nepalis too, I want to give immense credit to some very talented people. There were two brothers I knew well who were journalists. One working for the UN in New York, and one was working for the Asian Development Bank in Manila. They had very good careers, very good incomes, but they said, no. Actually Nepal needs people like them not to leave, but to come back and start making it better there. They have come back and they have started a school. They have started very good independent newspapers in Nepali and English. They have started a whole bunch of really fantastic projects there. Sacrificing lots of income and comfortable lives outside in order to do that. I really give people like that huge credit.

Q: How did you find the social life there?

BOGUE: Exhausting. Literally, the day I arrived, after the embassy people dropped me off at home, there was a knock on the door five minutes later. I was just getting ready to shower. It's the neighbor, who is Nepali. He welcomes me warmly and says that their son is getting married in about two days, and probably I have never been to a Nepali

wedding, and would I like to come? I was not to worry, that the niece who has been studying at MIT will be there and can explain everything that is happening to me. This is a two-day event. I didn't have to come for the whole two days; a day and a half or so would be just fine.

And it was like that until the day I left. Nepalis scoop you up, take you into their family and their hearts, and it is exhausting. You spend all your time there. The diplomatic community there was small and very friendly and tight. They entertained each other a lot. There is an American community that is very active, plus the normal obligations of embassy life; the things we did, hosting and having visitors and all those kinds of things. If I saw an open evening on my calendar, the idea that I could go home and just read a book for the evening was really kind of a precious night. It was all immensely fun.

Also, you didn't want to miss anything. Local staff would invite you to a festival in their village and they want you to come and enjoy it, see it. Every local national who got married while I was there, I went to their wedding. They'd invite you and they really want you to come. And it was fun! Also, you didn't want to hurt their feelings by not coming to their wedding. It was a big event for them.

So Ralph Frank and I used to sit down with a calendar every week and figure out if there were things that we both didn't have to do. Maybe there were some receptions one of us could cover so both of us didn't have to go to them. Just to give each other a little break. Also, I turned down probably 100 invitations a week from the second grade class of some school who would write and say, "Wouldn't you like to come and visit us?" Of course, I would, actually, and I did as much of that kind of thing that I could. We also just took our junior officers and junior staff and shoved them out to do that. It was a great experience with friendly audiences and to get some practice in the public side of diplomacy. All built up immense good will for the United States. We just turned them loose on as much as they could take. What's not to like about it? All these little cute, adorable second graders who were all wanting to practice their English on you. "What country are you?"

Q: Did you have many high-level visits?

BOGUE: We did. We didn't have the visits the Nepalis really wanted as a matter of national prestige. The last cabinet officer who had visited was Spiro Agnew. It had been a long time. There wasn't another one until Colin Powell visited a couple of years after I was there.

In the three years I was there, I think something like 17 members of the U.S. Senate came. We had a lot of congressmen. It was a popular place to come, probably because it's Nepal. Everybody wants to go to Nepal, as you know. Also, the Tibetan refugees were there. That's an issue that there is a lot of congressional interest in, so people would make a point of stopping there.

We got a lot of high-level military visits because of peacekeeping. For reasons mysterious to me, because it is a landlocked country, Nepal is in the Pacific Command's

theatre of interest, CINCPAC. The admiral who was the commander of CINCPAC came out regularly. At the time, we were really working hard to develop the Nepalis as a peacekeeping force that could be deployed around the world. We were working on improving their English skills and things like that, so they could be more deployable.

We did have a lot of visits and that kept us incredibly busy at the embassy as well.

Q: I think this is kind of a good place to stop, unless there are some aspects of Nepal you want to put in here.

BOGUE: I don't think so.

Q: If you remember something next time, we will do that.

What did you do in the year 2000?

BOGUE: After surviving the famous Y2K. When the year rolled over to 2000, there was a great worldwide panic that computers were not properly programmed for that year change, and so all infrastructure around the world would collapse. In the event, it didn't happen.

In Nepal, there wasn't any great computer infrastructure anyway, so we had to do what every embassy in the world had to do. In fact, I hosted a big New Year's Eve party in my office because I had to be there in case anything went wrong. All these kinds of things they were worried about were things like the nuclear power plants shutting down. Well, not applicable. Or the traffic lights not working. Not applicable. We don't have any. So, we had a very easy time of it there. Of course, we were already set up as an embassy to supply our own power and water anyway.

I came back from that and entered the Senior Seminar, the year-long training program.

Q: Okay, so we will pick this up the next time in the year 2000. You go to the Senior Seminar. That was 2000-2001 in which you were able to realize how well the United States could run an election too.

BOGUE: That was that year. You are exactly right.

Q: Today is September 27th, 2007.

Let's talk a bit about the Senior Seminar. It is now defunct, but it was quite an institution. I was Class of 17 in the Senior Seminar.

What was its program and what was your impression of it?

BOGUE: The program was meant to bring together about 30 people, half were new seniors in the Foreign Service or the Senior Executive Service at the State Department,

and the other half drawn from all the uniformed services, plus the Coast Guard. I guess that is a uniformed service, but not one of the armed services. Also included were the CIA, National Security Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Commerce Department, USAID, Agriculture, and all the federal agencies that had a foreign policy involvement or interest essentially.

They brought those people together right at the start of their step into senior executive management. The military officers tended to be full colonels who were likely to end up in the general ranks. They would spend a school year, ten months, together looking at not so much foreign policy issues, but American domestic issues and how they affected foreign policy.

The theory was that most of us, certainly most of us in the Foreign Service but also the military officers, had spent many years overseas. In fact, we were not as well versed in what was going on in America as we might be. That was certainly true in my case. I had been overseas a lot and had spent very little time in the States during my Foreign Service career. What time you do spend in the States is spent in this odd place, Washington, which is not necessarily reflective of the views of Omaha or El Paso or Sacramento or many other places.

We traveled a lot around the country together. Part of it was to look at American domestic issues and part was to develop a kind of understanding of and confidence in our colleagues from other services and other agencies; to overcome preconceptions and barriers there as a way to help us work as senior people in our own services, where you had to do a lot more inter-agency activity.

Q: What things struck you? You were exposed to a lot of different places and things. Did any one stick in your mind?

BOGUE: I think the thing that most impressed me, again having been overseas for a long time – I don't know if you felt this way too – but sometimes, you look at the United States and say, what is this country I am representing? You start to feel sometimes that if you have been overseas for a while, like Philip Nolan in *The Man Without a Country.* You are very American overseas, you are seen as an American, and respond to and feel very American. You can come home and feel a little dislocated from America sometimes.

I think the thing that impressed me the most were the numbers of people we met out there in little towns and big cities all across the country who were really doing fabulous things. Teachers, pastors, youth group coordinators, and all sorts of people who were working so hard on the most difficult issues in America: poverty, race relations, working with new immigrants. All these kinds of things. They were devoting their whole selves to this with almost no pay, no recognition, and none of the kind of perks we had in our job or the fun of being overseas. It was very inspiring to me.

We spent a couple of days on an aircraft carrier off the coast of California doing some work. We ate breakfast with the sailors and lived as the sailors did. The sailors we ate

breakfast with were not hand selected for us. We would just go down and plop ourselves at a table and start chatting. I just can't tell you how many young men and women, 19 and 20-year olds with a high school education, we asked, "Why did you join the navy? What made you do that?"

Some of them said, "Adventure." "To get out of my town." "It looks like fun."

A huge number of them would shuffle their feet, sort of blush a little, and say, "Well ma'am, you know I really wanted to do something bigger than myself. I really wanted to do something for my country, for Americans." There was a tremendous sense of service that was running through these people.

I think all of us in the Senior Seminar felt that way. I remember one of my colleagues, an air force officer who has now become a general, a very wonderful guy, who came from an air force family, his father was in the air force, and all of his brothers were in the air force. He said one of the great things he had learned was that there were lots more ways to serve than putting on a uniform.

It was tremendously inspiring and reinvigorating to be in the Senior Seminar.

Q: During the 1970s when I was doing this, we went up to Detroit and it reminded me of the aftermath of World War II with burned out places and all. In talking with mayors and people, you realized the excitement of local government, which we tend to disdain. Foreign Service officers tend to think in megaterms. You feel a sort of "Washington think," particularly when we talk about the government and all these people shuffling papers, or passing laws, or something, really aren't contributing as much as many of the civil servants and others who were working on real problems on a day-by-day basis, rather than intellectually or at a great distance.

BOGUE: Yes, I have to say inspired is the best word. I really felt that no matter how much you have read about the "Me" generation and very distressing things in America, a growing gulf between the haves and the have-nots, income disparities, and so on, there were fantastic people at every level. At the most local in small towns and in big cities, they were really doing great things. Somehow, there was this network of people who didn't know each other who were all working for the common good. I really enjoyed that.

I also enjoyed my colleagues immensely. I think we developed a real rapport with people from other agencies. I think they earned a newfound respect for the State Department. For instance, one of my colleagues had been in the embassy of Phnom Penh and was describing what happened when some asylum seekers came into the embassy. They were protecting human rights activists who came in from the government. Someone just said casually, "Well why did you have to stay there at night to protect them? You must have had marines there."

My colleague, a female who was there with her husband and teenage children, said, "We didn't have marines. It was too dangerous a post. The marines could not be allowed to be posted there because of force protection issues."

The idea that we would go in and serve unarmed in places where the marines were reluctant to put a detachment, and have our kids there, was so stunning to people. I think the image of us in Paris or passing the champagne around was well erased in the course of that.

Q: I made a slighting remark about the election of 2000. Most of us spent time trying to explain to other countries how you can have a good election system and how this works. All of a sudden to have something which amounted to something like the World Cup, where you have this tremendous apparatus of competing teams and it ends up with one penalty kick to decide it. It ended up in the Supreme Court.

BOGUE: It was really fascinating from a professional point of view. There we were studying all these things. We had a chance to bring in people who were working on both sides of that at the time and hear them talk about how it would be resolved.

Because of the places I had served in I was just completely horrified. I had been through the horror of America's low voter turnouts because of places like Nepal and Pakistan where people generally hadn't had the opportunity to choose their leadership. And when they did, they turned out in fantastic numbers to do so.

Had this been in a foreign country we would have been extremely critical of its handling. Personally I already found myself quite critical. I normally, like most Foreign Service Officers, vote by absentee ballot. I had found myself in Seattle for a local election and thought I would go in person to vote at my voting district in Seattle, just for fun. When I got there, mind you I had never voted at this place in person, only by absentee, and they didn't ask me for any identification. I was horrified and kept insisting that they really needed to ask me for my passport or my driver's license or something. They kept saying, "No, no. Your name is here. No one else has come in and said they were you today."

This was very disturbing to me. Again, we would have been highly critical of such a sloppy practice elsewhere. I think that it bothered me immensely that people around the world were still looking to us as an example of democracy and as their lodestar on that. I found it really painful that we were having these problems. I find it still painful that this many years after, these problems have not been fixed. After the commission that Jimmy Carter and others were on to make recommendations about changes to our election system and it still hasn't been fixed.

I think another thing about the senior seminar that you mentioned is that usually we are so busy putting out fires and dealing with what is happening that day that we don't have much time to sit back and think about what we do and why we do it. I think that was a real blessing of the senior seminar too, with the luxury of having time to think, read, and talk about why we do what we do, instead of just doing it as fast and furiously as we can.

Q: In a way, this is what we are doing right now is all about. For the professional to at least develop a resource where they can go and find out what other people did. As you say, it is pretty much a fireman operation. We pick up the paper and open it to see what the headline is today, or what is on the ticker tape or what have you. That's our problem, as opposed to picking out where we are going to go.

BOGUE: Exactly. It was a really positive experience for me.

Q: What did you want to do? Did you have anything in mind or did anybody have anything in mind for you?

BOGUE: I wanted to stay in the United States, partly because I had been overseas so long, and I thought it was a good time after the senior seminar to reacquaint myself a bit with working and living here. Also, my mother was already beginning a long illness that she is unfortunately still in the grip of. I did not want to be in Fill-in-the-Blank-istan, a long way away and very hard to get home. I wanted to be closer by. So, I was looking at Washington opportunities. It happened that an old boss and colleague of mine, Beth Jones, was chosen by Secretary Powell, after the election was finally settled and President Bush was sworn in, to be Assistant Secretary for Europe and Eurasia. She asked me if I would come and be one of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries, the one who covered the Balkans.

I reminded Beth that the last time I had worked on the Balkans, at the time of dissent on Bosnia, it had all ended in tears. She said that was one of the reasons she wanted me in the office, because she actively wanted someone who would say, "We are steaming toward an iceberg," rather than just seeing the iceberg out there and saying to themselves, (as happens in Washington sometimes) "When we hit it, it is really going to hurt," but not wanting to say that there is an iceberg in our path.

Beth is one of those people who has the self-confidence to surround herself with people who will disagree with her or who will say, "You are heading straight toward an iceberg." It is one of the things I admire very much about her. She asked me if I would do that.

It seemed to me a wonderful opportunity to come back and work on the Balkans again in a situation in which even if there wasn't a lot of progress within the Balkans themselves, I could make it a more positive experience for people working on the issue than it had been when I had been there some years before. I could make sure their voices were heard. I could make sure that they were able to work in a collegial and positive atmosphere, and bring those leadership lessons from the senior seminar to there.

So, I came on board just in time for the war in Macedonia. I did miss the Kosovo War completely; I was overseas for that. My first day as the Deputy Assistant Secretary, I spent the day evacuating our embassy in Skopje.

Q: You were doing this from when to when?

BOGUE: I started in June 2001, and I did that job for two years, until June 2003.

Q: Before we move to specifics, let's do a little tour of the horizon.

What were the Balkans? Definitions vary. I got into trouble when I was in Greece by calling the Greeks Balkans.

BOGUE: You get even more trouble in Croatia for referring to Croatia as part of the Balkans. I'm using it as shorthand; we actually said Southeastern Europe in the State Department at this point because of all the sensitivities surrounding the word "Balkan." I was actually Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Southeastern Europe. Southeastern Europe in this definition includes Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria and, who am I leaving out? Montenegro was still part of Serbia. Romania had been promoted to the Office of Central European Affairs, as has now Bulgaria been moved to that office. They are NATO members. They are on the way to European Union membership. They now have more in common with those countries, and they have been moved to a different office. They haven't moved geographically, obviously, but they are handled by a different office.

Bulgaria I used to say was the star of my portfolio, which tells you something about the portfolio. Kosovo, as it remains today, was in a state of limbo. Just two days before I started to work, Milosevic was taken to The Hague. Milosevic is now in The Hague preparing for trial. He is out of the picture. There has already been the soft revolution in Serbia, which has brought the reformers into office. Croatia is still vacillating between governments that are quite right wing and centrist. Bosnia is locked in its state of tremendous governmental gridlock, and that continues to this day. Albania, chopping along, changing governments every few months, but managing in a funny way. Bulgaria is trying to shed itself of its past, as much as possible. The past of poison tipped umbrellas and attempts to murder the Pope. The worst of the heavies of the Warsaw Pact days, and is trying to be a much more modern western-looking state.

The big crisis was in Macedonia when I first started.

Q: Let's talk about Macedonia. What was the situation in Macedonia as you saw it at that time?

BOGUE: Macedonia had become independent when the old Yugoslavia broke up.

Q: Was it a reluctant independence?

BOGUE: Yes, in a sense it was the last. It had not been trying in the way that Croatia and Slovenia had been trying to break away. There was a certain reluctance to it. Macedonia had been, along with Kosovo, the poorest parts of Yugoslavia and had relied heavily on economic subsidies from the richer parts, namely Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia. I think

there was reasonable concern, which remains a concern to this day, on how Macedonia would support itself as a nation. This whole country, I used to remind people during the war, when we moved NATO forces in managing this, had fewer people than my hometown in Seattle. The whole country had fewer than 3 million people. The insurgency or the conflict there was that the majority population in Macedonia is Slavic speaking, but there is a very large minority of ethnic Albanians. The ethnic Albanians have traditionally not been included to a great degree in the economic and political life of the country, nor had they had so many opportunities to do their advanced schooling and the like in the Albanian language. Probably helped along by the events in Kosovo, there was a lot of agitation among ethnic Albanians in Macedonia for greater participation and greater rights.

In fact, I saw this a little bit differently than a lot of my colleagues. A lot of my colleagues saw this as a kind of fomenting of discontent by people in Kosovo. Certainly, there was a lot of help in the way of money, arms, materiel and people coming over from Kosovo. I tended to see it as much more of a civil rights struggle. In absolute fairness, the Albanians had been shut out routinely of all sorts of opportunities and even things like government services. If you were an 84-year old Albanian woman, it was hard just to go to a government office and get something done. No one would speak to you in your language. It seemed to me to be not at all unreasonable that if you went to the post office, and you were 84, there might be somebody there who would speak your language, particularly because this was such a large group. It is not just a handful of people. It is a very significant part of the population.

One of the things that I was pushing for in terms of resolution of this was to look at language issues in other states of Europe. For instance, Finland has a large Swedish-speaking minority, and how they have worked out those language arrangements. Belgium has multiple languages and has worked out ways of handling that. A lot of countries in Europe have dealt with multiple languages.

Q: Belgium might be a bad example, the way it is split.

BOGUE: Finland is a much happier example of having successfully worked with the Swedish-speaking population in a way that has not resulted in warfare. It has allowed people to preserve their own language and culture, but also to integrate nicely into the larger Finnish-speaking population as well. I shouldn't say integrate, but work comfortably and harmoniously with one another.

We were trying to do a number of things to keep this from being another Balkan conflagration. We were trying to frame this in terms of a small armed insurgency occurring not as an attempt to create a new state or something, but as an attempt in a way to force change on the civil rights front.

With immense help from NATO and the European Union… I used to say that with every Balkan war, we got better at handling them. We did a miserable job on Bosnia, a better job on Kosovo, and a much better job on Macedonia. I think people have come to realize

that early intervention is really important. Go ahead and put troops on the ground. It creates confidence on all sides. It allows you to do things.

We had a program where the insurgents could turn in their weapons. They weren't going to turn in their weapons to the government because they were fearful that they would be massacred. They were very willing to turn in their weapons to NATO. We worked out a whole wonderful program where NATO – it actually turned out to be Hungarian troops – would take these arms and cut them up on television. There would be confidence on all sides. There weren't just weapons being handed in where people could say, "Well, they are just going to get them back." They would actually be sawed up on live television.

Now, this is the Balkans. That is not to say that somebody cannot go and get more weapons. The fact is there is a statement of confidence when people are handing in weapons in droves. It is not just Uncle Ilmar's old shotgun. It is actual modern, working weapons. A lot of things like that early on with positive intervention by NATO, positive intervention by the European Union on economic and social issues, all those kinds of things. Getting the carrots for the government. Some members of the government were very reluctant to compromise, but the carrots were always European Union membership, NATO membership. If you get yourself out of the traps, that was what awaited you at the end. But if you screw it up and don't allow participation, and treat this as terrorism that must be crushed rather than as people who have been shut out, you are not going to end up on that path to prosperity.

I think the other thing that people did really well was that the Albanians had no university in Albanian. Again, you ask yourself, "How useful is that going to be, to be churning out Albanian-speaking university graduates?" Also, you don't want a situation where all the Slavic-speaking students go to one college and all the Albanian-speaking students go to another. It would promote further separation and segregation, and so on. The brilliant solution to all of this was that there would be a new university teaching only in English that would attract the top students from both sides. If you are going to work outside of Macedonia where the opportunities are very limited, if you are going to work in the modern world, using computers, working internationally, you are going to have to have really good English. You would draw the best students from all ethnic groups to the English-speaking university. I thought that was a stroke of genius.

Q: I have been away from it for a while, but English is becoming more the lingua franca in a way because it is spoken by two major countries, besides science and everything else.

BOGUE: Right. And computers. Every kid who can use a computer now in the Balkans can speak English to a limited degree, not fluently, but they can manage.

Q: You were saying to get the Hungarians to come in as part of the solution: how were these things arrived at? Somebody gets a bright idea, okay. To get NATO in and all this, was there a think tank within the various foreign ministries?

BOGUE: I think again there had been a lot of experience on the Balkans in the United States, the European Union, and NATO, with efforts that had been made before. I think there was a lot more willingness to deal with things early on. There were regular and constant consultations. There was this thing with a funny name: the Contact Group. You may remember the Contact Group from the Bosnia days and the Kosovo days. It still existed. It was a consultative mechanism that included Russian, France, Italy, the United States, the UN, the European Union, Germany, Britain; the big players on the European front plus Russia. Also the big international players: the European Union, NATO. They met regularly to work on Balkan issues.

So when this issue came up in Macedonia, people in Washington and the European capitals, in Brussels as the European Union and as NATO headquarters, moved very quickly to take action to get involved to try to prevent this from becoming another Bosnia. Also to make sure there wasn't a humanitarian crisis on top of it. I think that all worked really well.

The reason you now have these interesting things, we tend to consider one NATO soldier as replaceable with another. In fact, the realities are that that is not so. Not only do different nations bring different capabilities, but also there are sensitivities. When NATO was involved in Kosovo and started bombing, NATO decided that Turkey would not be included in that because the memories in Serbia went back generations to being occupied.

Q: Five hundred years under the Turkish yoke.

BOGUE: So having Turkish fighter pilots bomb your city was not going to be a good thing. The same with the Hungarians who had developed a particular expertise in destruction of these weapons. Also, they didn't have baggage in Macedonia.

Q: In Serbia they might, but not Macedonia.

BOGUE: Exactly. So you can bring in the Danes, all sorts of people who don't have baggage in that particular environment. There was a mixture. I happen to remember the Hungarian unit that was doing a lot of the weapons destruction. There were lots of different units involved there. The NATO presence was very reassuring for all sides.

It came about with very little debate or controversy, both in the United States and Europe. Nobody wanted to see another Bosnia. Nobody wanted to see refugee flows and ethnic cleansing. Nobody wanted to see the kind of humanitarian horrors and those permanent political problems. Nobody wanted Bosnia ten years later with troops still in place, all that kind of thing.

Q: In Macedonia itself there are only 3 million people. Was there a hard core of Serbian nationalists or Macedonian nationalists?

BOGUE: Yes, there is a hard core of Macedonian nationalists. Part of Macedonia's problem was a very deep-seated insecurity about its identity as a nation. It couldn't use

the name Macedonia because the Greeks said that name belonged to them and had blocked for years the use of the name Macedonia. So, this country still went by the most appalling acronym, FYRoM, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, because the Greeks said, "No, the name Macedonia belongs to us. (Phillip of Macedon) That's our name. You can't have it." There had been negotiations for years and years over various formulations that might be used, but had not come to fruition.

The Bulgarians claimed that Macedonia is really part of Bulgaria and that the Macedonian language is no different from Bulgarian, and that these are really Bulgarians.

Macedonia does not have its own Patriarch of the Orthodox Church. It is under the Serbian Patriarch. Here is little Macedonia, already feeling that it doesn't have much of an identity. Other people keep claiming that they are really Greeks. They are really Bulgarians. They are really this. They are really that. It is a very tiny country with little in the way of an economy.

I think it saw itself potentially just disappearing unless it could somehow establish itself. Part of the reason that there was resistance to the Albanian demands was long-time real prejudice in the Slavic Balkans against Albanians. Part of it was also the fear that the Macedonian identity, which was very fragile, would disappear. I remember that, as part of this, at one point one of the things that the Macedonians asked was to include some kind of a statement in the peace agreement that the United States brokered recognizing the historical importance of the Macedonian people.

For Americans, this all seems kind of nonsensical, but they did not have a strong sense of their identity as a nation. A nation like ours has quite a strong sense of its own history, its identity. Of course, we are physically very large. We are a power in a lot of different ways. We need to all appreciate that a lot of tiny countries often feel…

Q: You have got Serbia right up there; the Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks. You keep using the term "Macedonia." Did you use that in your job?

BOGUE: Do you mean vis-à-vis the Greeks?

Q: No, I mean just in normal talk.

BOGUE: I did, all the time. It certainly drove my Greek colleagues crazy. What do you call people who are from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia? Do you call them FYRoMians? It sounds like Star Trek. So, I referred to them as Macedonians. It was after my time as the deputy assistant secretary that we did a huge reorganization and said, "Just forget it. The United States is going to recognize them under the name Republic of Macedonia. If the Greeks don't like it, too bad. We don't think it takes away at all from Greece to have somebody use the name Republic of Macedonia.

We do recognize them as such. The European Union still does not because Greece is a member and can veto that. Probably in the UN, they are called FYRoM. I called them Macedonians.

Again, you have this constant problem in these places where a country is identified with a single ethnicity. If you say you are Macedonian, to us it means you are a citizen of Macedonia. To them, it means you are an ethnic Macedonian, which means that you are an ethnic Albanian and you are out. That is something that we, Canada or Australia, you can be American, Canadian or Australian, and have come from all sorts of different places. You might hyphenate it and say, "I am African-American," or "I am Italian-American," or "I am Greek-American," or "I am Chinese-American," but you are still American. That is something that countries in the Balkans didn't have. There was not a sense of citizenship in the country apart from ethnicity, ethnic identification. That was something that I found very difficult, especially when the country is struggling with establishing an identity for itself.

Q: At the time, was there a push on the part of the Kosovars to take over a hunk of Macedonia? Or were the Albanians? Before the civil rights thing, did the Albanian-Macedonians want to stay in Macedonia and not get involved in the whole Kosovar business? What were the dynamics?

BOGUE: There was a little of each of that. The leadership of the main insurgent group, which was called the NLA (National Liberation Army) – I don't remember what the initials stood for in the Albanian. The group was led by a man named Ali Ahmeti. He was very firm that he was not seeking to attach the mostly Albanian northwestern corner of Macedonia. There was a geographical area where most of the Albanians were concentrated. He was not seeking to attach that to Kosovo, nor to Albania. This was not an attempt to create Greater Albania, but he was seeking more rights, more local autonomy within the territorial boundaries and integrity of Macedonia.

Incidentally, you will remember that the way the old Yugoslavia was governed was hugely centralized. A mayor there had no control over his or her own budget, police force, fire department, etcetera. The mayors were always stunned when they came to the United States and saw how powerful a mayor is. They have their own budget, their own employees, and so on. There, they were essentially federal officials.

The Albanians said you could break down a little bit of the central authority and let local communities have a little more say. For instance, there is a national police force, as there is in most European countries. It was largely ethnically Slav, so the policing in the Albanian community was being done almost entirely by Slavic policemen, many of whom had deep-seated prejudices about ethnic Albanians. We have seen this problem in the United States with all-white police forces in African-American communities. So, the Albanians were saying they needed to recruit Albanians into the police force. Local communities should be able to have a police chief who speaks the language of the local community, as well as the language spoken at police headquarters. There should be community policing, done by people who can communicate, and so on.

All this seems perfectly reasonable to Americans. It did not necessarily seem reasonable to ethnic nationalists in the government. I think many people did understand that this was a reasonable solution.

To be able to show models from prosperous, progressive European countries like Finland was very helpful. Here's what the Finns have been doing. They have been working very well with their Swedish population. This is a non-Balkan country. This is a wealthy country. This is a happy country at peace. This is what your country could look like as well.

There were, of course, some people who did see this as a Greater Albania opportunity. There were some people who would see this as a way to annex this part of Macedonia to Kosovo. The Kosovar leadership was very careful to disavow that. The last thing they needed going into negotiations on their status was to be seen to be aggressively causing wars in other countries and glomming onto other people's territories. That just was going to be a non-starter for them. Officially, they had to disown it.

The Albanian government was not involved with this. One of the things people didn't realize when they expressed fears of a Greater Albania, was the deep cultural divide between Albanians and Albania, and Albanians and Kosovo and Northern Macedonia. Albanians in Kosovo and Northern Macedonia, poor as they were, were not only much more prosperous but much better educated in general than those in Albania. They tended to view the Albanians as country bumpkins, their cousins from the backwoods.

Q: The hillbillies?

BOGUE: Right. They were not interested in affiliating with that state. They were quite disdainful of them.

Q: The Balkan mix is a study unto itself. I remember trying to explain to a Greek movie about war in Yugoslavia, the partisan ethics. You had every different nationality fighting in there. It was very difficult to understand. Were the Bulgarians or Greeks mucking around in Macedonia at the time, trying to destabilize it, with the idea of grabbing a hunk?

BOGUE: The Bulgarians, not at all. The Bulgarians had been on their best behavior vis-à-vis Macedonia. They were working really hard to shed their old image as the kind of heavy or the thug of the Warsaw Pact. They were very careful. There were always a few loonies in Bulgaria. They said, "It's part of Bulgaria. It belongs to us." The government was always very careful to keep its hands off. Bulgaria had enough issues of its own without mucking around in Balkan Wars at that point. They were really hands off.

The Greeks did not have a distinguished record in the Balkan Wars. They backed Slobodan Milosevic. They really backed the wrong horse. As a result, they were deeply mistrusted in the Balkans. They had used their economic power in disastrous ways,

cutting off supplies, turning on or off the taps of gas, convoys of food. Everyone distrusted Greek behavior and intentions. Now again, the Greeks were at this point trying to clean up their act. One of the very positive things was that in recent years, the Greeks, realizing they had put themselves on the outside of the European Union and others with bad behavior in the Balkans, decided they needed to play a more positive role. It was hard for them to play that positive role because there is a lot of distrust built up. I think they have made a very honest effort to do things like provide humanitarian aid, economic investment, that sort of thing, and play a positive role, instead of a negative role. Their continued intransigence on the name issue made things very difficult in Macedonia.

It is one of those big country-small country things. Big countries need to relax and let small countries have something because the big countries don't need that. Greece needed to be secure enough in its own identity and prosperity and things. It didn't need to think that no one in the world could ever use the name Macedonia except them. They need to move on from that. They realized that one way they could promote stability among their neighbors was to grant this kind of concession.

Again, there was a lot of internal Greek politics going on about this. This becomes one of those kinds of issues that you can beat your political opponent over the head with internally. So there were dynamics.

Q: I served five years in Yugoslavia and four years in Greece. Talk about touchy!

From your position in the State Department, were you able to deal with a sort of Macedonian working group of other embassies and all on this? And how did our embassy work within this?

BOGUE: The Contact Group I mentioned, which met regularly in various places, was mirrored in Washington among the participant embassies and in Balkan capitals among the participant embassies. In other words, the Contact Group would meet, let's say, in London. I would fly out to London and people would come in from Russia and so on, and we would meet. Then to follow up, the same embassies would have representatives here and we would all meet in Washington, and their representatives would all meet in Belgrade, to try to ensure that whatever the Contact Group had decided was followed up on the ground in the respective places. Actually, the international coordination was quite smooth. It was in fact, in my opinion, smoother than the U.S. inter-agency coordination, which was far less smooth.

Q: How about the Russians? Their main card is the Slavic card in the Balkans: "We are the protectors of the Slavs." This goes way back in history. Did they get caught up in the Slavic nationalism?

BOGUE: In Macedonia, they didn't get caught up in this. Really, the country they had run their lot in, I am sad to say, at the time was Serbia. They were not really interested in Macedonia. They did not present any kind of an obstacle or difficulty. They did not feel that they were somehow protecting Macedonia from the West or Albania. I think their

position with Serbia – first of all, if you are in Russia, Serbia is much more important in the region. Also, they felt that it was the West picking on Serbia, not just the issue of internal things. Of course, the Russians have a particular concern about Kosovo because of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and so on. The idea that pieces might be broken off is worrisome to Russia in a way that Macedonia didn't matter to them. So they were not an impediment.

I found my Russian colleagues for the most part extremely easy to work with on Balkan issues, not obstructionist. We were not negotiating Kosovo's status at the time. On Bosnian issues and Macedonian issues, they were very easy to work with. I worked a lot with the embassy here and they were cooperative and helpful on the issues.

Q: During your time, were many things resolved? Did you see progress?

BOGUE: We really did see progress. A really gratifying thing for me was to complete a bit of a circle on the former Yugoslavia. We really did see progress.

To go back to Macedonia, a peace deal was agreed and has held reasonably well. There were a few fits and starts at implementation. The kind of money that implementation takes hasn't necessarily been there from the donor states because very rapidly attention was diverted elsewhere.

There has been progress in the Balkans. More people die in the Balkans now of car accidents, smoking, than die in ethnic violence. One of these days, we will get on to that whole seat belt thing. I say this because Stu, as someone who has also served in the Balkans, you know the driving is unbelievable.

In general, the countries were starting to make progress toward integration with Europe, integration with the European Union, integration with NATO. Instead of being this little area of constant conflict, they were starting to catch up and make the kind of political, economic and social reforms that had really been set back.

You and I remember when Yugoslavia was way ahead of Poland, the Czech Republic, all those places, in its economic policy and its social policy. They lost a decade or more because of the conflicts. Now, they are way behind Poland, Hungary, and so on. They were turning that corner away from violence. Things like elections were getting better and better. The OSCE had stopped even monitoring the elections in Bulgaria because they were being done completely to Western standards.

The elections in Albania got cleaner every time. They had a lot of them. The government was falling about every few months in Albania at this time. They have a parliamentary type government, so it would fall. The man who was then prime minister was an extremely funny fellow. I had gone to Albania and was visiting with him one day. He said, "You know Janet, you told us to look at Western models. Unfortunately, we picked Italy. Of course the Italian government also falls every few months. So our government, like the Italians', must fall every few months."

In general, things were getting better. All across, there was progress being made on human rights, on minority rights. Serbia now has probably, ironically enough, the model minority rights statute in all of the former Yugoslavia. It may end up being the only truly multiethnic, multicultural society. There was definitely progress on all fronts.

Another thing that intervened very early in my tenure – I started in June 2001 and, of course, 9-11 happened. One of things that meant was that we went from having immense U.S. focus on the Balkans and immense U.S. resources on the Balkans, to very little U.S. focus and very little U.S. resources on the Balkans. That was good in some ways because it gave the occasion for the European Union to step up. For instance, the European Union now provides the peacekeeping troops in Bosnia, rather than the old U.S.-led I4 and S4. The United States still has some small involvement in Bosnia in the military sense, but very little.

When NATO went into Afghanistan, the European Union took over the Macedonia effort from NATO. I think that has been a very positive development for the European Union to start taking those kinds of responsibilities in Europe.

My staff was very downhearted and said, "Well, we aren't on Page 1 any more." I said, "Actually, this is good, because now it means it's on us to come up with the policies. It's not being decided at the White House now. We are not just the implementers of what everybody is focused on. Everybody is now focused on Afghanistan and then focused on Iraq. It's up to us to keep working on the Balkans, but it's going to be up to us to generate the ideas and the proposals. We need to see this as a huge responsibility, but a huge liberation at the same time. The President is not our desk officer any more. It is on us to do this, and to do it without the fun of being on the front pages." I say "fun" in an ironic sense.

Q: This is Tape 9, Side 1 with Janet Bogue.

BOGUE: I remember having a conversation with Richard Armitage, who was then Deputy Secretary. I don't know if you are familiar with him. He looks like what he was, a wrestler at the Naval Academy, a huge guy with no neck. A wonderful guy. I admire him immensely.

He talks like this (with a deep, commanding military tone), "You know your job, don't you?"

I said, "Yes, sir. My job is to keep the Balkans out of your office."

"Yes. That's right. You've got it."

Obviously, they were completely overwhelmed, as everybody was, in the wake of 9-11, and then Afghanistan, and then Iraq. Efforts and resources were all in that direction. My only concern was that we would not have a situation like we did in Afghanistan after the

Soviets left. We lost interest. The resources dwindled and we created an opportunity for the Taliban by doing that. I did not want that to happen in the Balkans as well. Fortunately, there is also Europe and Europe has an ongoing concern and interest in the Balkans for all sorts of reasons. European Union membership is the big prize for countries in Europe. I think that helped keep a steady flow of resources, although certainly not at the level they were going into southeastern Europe.

Q: Let's turn to Kosovo. What was the situation when you got there and what were our concerns? What were you doing?

BOGUE: In Kosovo, it was under UN mandate. There was a limited self-government. The rest of Kosovo was run by the UN. It technically remains to this day part of Serbia, but administered under UN Security Council resolutions by the United Nations. With the status left deliberately vague. At the time, I was working on it, what we had done was create – it was clear there had to be some sort of end in sight. You couldn't just say, this is going to be vague forever. There was the resource issue. There was also the demand on the part of Kosovars for independence, and so on.

There needed to be some bundle, in a sense, of carrots and sticks, to try to move progress along. It was a very complicated thing to do because anything we did could be perceived and used by Kosovars and Serbs to claim that either this showed they were still part of Serbia, or it showed they were becoming independent. This all had to be done very delicately. We tended to just focus initially on almost technical kinds of things: reforming things like the power structure, power in terms of electricity, water, utilities, things like that, creating a situation in which the local self-government could be done.

But also, this is all going to start sounding awfully familiar to people who have been following Iraq, laying out benchmarks, saying that certain benchmarks would have to be reviewed. There would have to be adequate progress on the benchmarks before discussions of the final status of Kosovo could be achieved. Those benchmarks included all sorts of things about governance, human rights, minority rights, progress on establishing institutions of democracy, working judiciary, working legislature, and so on.. We needed a situation in which there would be a working government, but also it would be a government that would work for everybody and not just for one ethnic group.

There was a lot of concern that if Kosovo became independent, those Serbs remaining who didn't flee, would be killed. It was still the case when I took over Kosovo that an 80-year old Serb lady going to the grocery store required NATO escorts. A lot of nice, young Norwegians would take her to the grocery store so that she would come back alive. One of the benchmarks had to be a level of security that would permit people to move about freely, to go about their business and so on. That was also very much a work in progress at the time.

Many Kosovar Albanians were working very hard to try to establish those institutions. Extreme Kosovar nationalists were working hard to try to get the remaining Serbs out.

Then, the Serbian population for the most part, was very intransigent about ever accepting the idea that they would be in a separate Kosovar-run state.

Q: Were we seeing at the time, looking ahead, this northern hunk of Kosovo would eventually move with Serbia? Were we trying to cram down their throats?

BOGUE: I think that in everyone's minds in the United States and Europe was the notion that Kosovo could not and would not ever go back to being a part of Serbia. The Kosovars would not accept that. There would be more bloodshed and more fighting. Serbia had, through its own behavior, lost the right to govern Kosovo. I think there was a view that it shouldn't happen right away. It shouldn't happen until maybe there was a government change in Serbia. It shouldn't happen until some passions have quieted down, if they ever do, in the Balkans. It shouldn't happen until some better guarantees were in place for minorities in Kosovo, and the like. In other words, it shouldn't happen in a way that would create further conflict and destabilization.

We were not looking at territorial partitions. We were not looking at any kind of leopard spots, the old Vance-Owen Plan for Bosnia, because there were towns that were Serbian, even though the surrounding area was largely Kosovar. We were looking at trying to create a better circumstance for human rights, for minority rights, for security overall. Again, like in Macedonia, more devolved government, more autonomy at local municipal levels rather than being centralized.

Added to this, and I think this is the thing that we always have to remind ourselves of, were all the reforms that needed to be made to get out of a communist command state economy and into a modern market-driven, Western style economy. That was overlaying all this.

Q: Was there any economy to work with?

BOGUE: That is one of the problems in Kosovo. An awful lot of the economy, for reasons of historical necessity in many ways, was a grey economy or an economy based on smuggling and things like that. Kosovo had very little. It had been terribly poor, terribly overpopulated. It faced immense destruction by Serbia of what little was left of its economy. It was really going to have to start from scratch, in many ways, to build an economy. In the meantime, as happens in these circumstances especially in the chaotic conditions of the conflict, is that thugs move in and they start a thug economy. That has to be overcome as well so a legitimate economy is able to grow up where people have opportunities where they aren't just smuggling.

One of the reasons that there was reluctance on the part of the Europeans to move to independence for Kosovo was that they perceived that either Kosovo would be essentially a welfare state of Europe for a very long time, because of their economic situation; or, it would be a criminal enterprise in Europe. I have to say that the Europeans share the prejudices about Albanians that Serbs and others have, and so they were convinced that this would be a little mafia state in Europe. So that was the reluctance on the part of the

Europeans to move too quickly, both for fear of destabilizing things in the Balkans, but also the fear that if you give independence before a legitimate economy could be established in Kosovo, then there would be ongoing problems.

Kosovar leadership was very interested in getting a legitimate economy going. They have a highly educated population. They wanted the clean sort of industries like software. They don't have a lot of natural resources. They wanted things like software development where they can put a lot of well-educated people to work in something that doesn't rely on natural resources.

Investors were reluctant to invest, partly because the status of Kosovo was uncertain and partly because the security situation, the human rights situation, and the corruption situation were very bad.

Q: Was there a problem of if you started a business you had to pay people off, and that sort of thing?

BOGUE: Yes, but because most of that was still under the control of the UN it wasn't so much that as it was that there were protection rackets and so on. There were a lot of additional taxes and levies, shall we say, to be paid on any business.

Q: Looking at this as a sort of embryonic state, was there a nerve structure beginning to develop there? Were municipalities able to become real municipalities? Was this happening or not?

BOGUE: It was just getting started. It is an interesting human problem because right at the time when people are for the first time able to take the reins of some central government, you are telling them that those reins aren't going to be on a big horse anymore; they are on a little pony now. You think, finally someone has come into a position of authority that has been denied for 40, 50, 60 or more years. Actually you are saying, "We are going to downsize the central government and give more power to the municipalities."

Of course, the people coming into power in the central government didn't really appreciate that.

One of the interesting developments, and I thought a very positive development for the future in the Balkans was that the mayors started to make common cause with one another across ethnic lines. The mayors all had the same interest, for whatever ethnicity they might be. I have been simplifying things by referring to only two ethnicities in Kosovo, because of course, there is also a significant Roma population there. There are some Bosnians there. There are other ethnicities there as well.

The mayors, no matter what ethnicity they were, wanted some local control. They wanted a budget. They wanted the ability to have municipal taxes so that they could have their own fire department, police force, and water company. They wanted to do the kind of

things mayors are supposed to do: patch the street, police the street, do all those things. So they were starting to work with each other across ethnic lines, because they had a common interest in empowering municipal government and reducing the control at the central level.

We also saw that as a positive change for ethnic relations, because if people in the municipalities had a bit more control over their own lives, they would feel less that they were just at the whim of the majority ethnic group governing from the capital. So we were very much supporting a stronger local government.

It was very interesting to see sometimes an ethnic Albanian mayor resisting the ethnic Albanian central government, and making common cause with his neighbor, the Serbian mayor, because they both wanted more local autonomy. To some extent, it is a power struggle, but it's one that had a certain usefulness in breaking some of the barriers.

We brought a whole group of mayors over here at one time for a conference. The first day, all the Serbs were sitting over here and all the Kosovars were sitting over there in the one room. By the end of the week, they all agreed that their problem was not each other; their problem was the central government. What they needed to do was speak with one voice together. That was a very encouraging development.

I think the wave of the future in Europe, because of the European Union, is very much for a strengthening of regional areas anyway. That is the way Europe is going. The regions are developing their own kind of voice and power economically, culturally, and so on. There is the European Union and the central governments of the countries and the regions. In a way, the balance of power shifts a little bit both to the European Union and to the regions, and a little bit away from central governments. That, in some ways, will be a positive development in the Balkans as well.

Q: Moving along, we will come back to Serbia. What about Albania at the time?

BOGUE: Albania hadn't had the ethnic conflict that Bosnia, Serbia or Kosovo had. It was coming out of the generation-long Enver Hoxha dictatorship. It was trying to establish itself as a modern state, and was having tremendous growing pains. Who would have thought that a pyramid scheme gone bad would plunge the country into a civil strife that lasted for months?

People had very odd ideas all through Eastern Europe and the former communist world about capitalism and what it was going to do for them. When things like ponzi schemes and chain letters came along, they thought this was all real. People threw what savings they had at it and were bilked or went broke as a result. There was an immense amount of civic instability and problems in Albania as a result of that.

That was starting to be sorted out. Things were getting much better in Albania. Albania had become a huge problem for Europe and for itself because of trafficking: trafficking people, trafficking of narcotics, trafficking of smuggled cigarettes and other stolen goods.

The Albanians themselves used to joke that there were so many Mercedes-Benz on the streets of Tirana that you could not believe it. Most of them were stolen. In fact, a group from Europe had done a little study. They had run the serial numbers of 100 Mercedes-Benz with the help of the police. They ran through the numbers. All but one were stolen cars from Europe.

They joked that their new tourism promotion was going to be to blanket Western Europe, and especially Germany, with billboards that said, "Come to Albania. Your car will be waiting for you." They would tell this joke. The problem was so outrageously bad.

It had also become a huge transit point for smuggling persons into Italy.

Q: I want you to talk about this because recently it seems to have become quite a focal point of our foreign policy and concerns. Yet when one looks at it, there are very few arrests made. Is it exaggerated? How did you view this?

BOGUE: There was no question that there was a lot of movement of people between Albania and Italy by small speedboat, Zodiac boat, that kind of thing, at night. The coasts are rugged and long on both sides. It was an easy enough thing to do. A lot of it was simply illegal migration into Europe, moving people from wherever who had gotten this far as Albania, and moving them into European states.

Q: How did they get into Albania? Were they going by ship? I can't imagine going across the mountains into Albania.

BOGUE: No, it was much more common to come up through Greece, or come through a route like that. Sometimes by sea, more typically by road. It was not hard to get into Albania. Their visa requirements were minimal, and sometimes could be substituted with cash. It was not a hard thing to do, to get in. Then there was quite an extensive network of traffickers and they carried whatever. They carried people. They carried cigarettes. They carried whatever needed to be carried. In fact, the problem was so severe that the Italian tax police, which is sort of their customs, actually had officers and uniformed troops stationed in Albanian ports. The port of Durres had a huge detachment of the Italian tax police there in order to try to prevent smuggling and trafficking of persons. It was always a real problem. It's very hard to get the numbers.

Q: When we are talking about trafficking in people, we are talking mainly about young women who are lured into Western Europe to be prostitutes, although often offered other jobs. Were we able to do anything? Or were there sort of holding pens in Albania.

BOGUE: I would say in Albania that there was more of an issue with illegal migration, not necessarily trafficked women, but migrants trying to get into Europe via Albania. The place where we have a more serious problem with trafficked women was Kosovo. That is, women were being trafficked to Kosovo because of the large presence there of foreign troops and administrators, and Bosnia too. So you had women from Moldova, from Ukraine, and from places like that, who were actually trafficked to Kosovo and Bosnia

because of the large presence of foreign troops there. To me, one of the great horrors, and this has happened elsewhere too, is that when the UN or NATO goes in as a protective force, sometimes because of the presence of the troops, it creates situations that did not exist, or only existed in a minor way, before. One of those is the presence of a large population of foreign, unattached men. Often what results from that is trafficking in women to provide brothels.

Q: I was a GI in Korea and Japan.

BOGUE: It is one of those frustrating things when you are sending U.S. police over to run the international police force in Kosovo. We send Americans over often, recently retired police officers. They go over to become police officers in Kosovo so that there will be an international police force that the local population can have confidence in. It is not on one side or the other in Kosovo. Ninety-nine percent of them were great guys and great women who did fantastic jobs there. Then there is the one percent that end up keeping trafficked women or abusing the population in some way. They find themselves in the role of being a very rich and powerful foreigner in a very poor and desperate place. Some people don't respond appropriately.

Q: I haven't gotten to that point, but Larry Rosen who was in Kosovo not too long ago was saying that he was told, "Please don't send any more protests about overweight American policemen." They were essentially saying, "You are sending us a bunch of policemen who are no longer with it. Send us some real policemen, instead of has-beens."

BOGUE: One of the Kosovars who I worked with a lot was actually a senior officer in the former Yugoslav army, which was unusual, as he was an ethnic Albanian. He was tremendously fit and one of these military officers who in his 50s has zero percent body fat. He kept himself incredibly fit. His English was spectacular. He had been to Fort Leavenworth for training. He said, "Janet, you keep sending us the overfed and the nearly dead." He said they just weren't physically up to the demands of the job. They couldn't chase the bunch of 20-year old Kosovar guys who had recently been in combat.

Q: Going back quickly to Kosovo, were we able to meld this English-speaking university in Macedonia into the Kosovar equation? It seemed to make sense.

BOGUE: There always was one in Kosovo. There was an American university in Kosovo already. There was a whole string of them. There was one in Bulgaria, one in Macedonia, one in Hungary, one in Kyrgyzstan. They teach in English. They offer a fairly broad curriculum, but they are especially strong in international business, computer science, and engineering. Those kinds of skills are very needed by the country and are very transferable.

Q: Is there some central control over these universities?

BOGUE: I think they are independent of each other but in a loose affiliation. I could be wrong about that. They do each have a board that is mixed with Americans and whatever the local is. They are certainly sought after. There is a lot of demand. The American University in Sofia attracts significant numbers of very good Bulgarian students. It is much cheaper than going to the States to study. You still get an American education taught in English. You emerge with very good English skills and a degree that carries with it some clout.

Q: On that subject, did you notice the internet, the computer, having a major impact throughout the region?

BOGUE: Very much so. It is one of these bizarre things. There is a huge generational divide between those who were computer savvy, those who were in the digital age, and those who were not. I keep hoping that will be one of the things that will make a positive change in the Balkans.

Of course, it is used for the wrong things too. The internet is where one nut case extremist finds friends with other nut case extremists. It can work against things too. The thing that has been unparalleled, and I think we are seeing it in Burma now, is that it is no longer possible for a ruling party of the state to shut down information because of satellite television, satellite telephones, and the internet. You cannot blockade information any more in a way that you used to be able to. I think the fact that information can now reach and be circulated among people because of the internet makes that an immensely powerful tool for people.

Again, my concern about the Balkans is much more that there aren't opportunities. Young people growing up in the Balkans don't necessarily see opportunities for them. Politically, economically, they see these places mired in the old struggles. They are in some ways relics of the past for a lot of young people, not moving forward. They see their future elsewhere. I think in Bosnia in the year 2000, there was a survey of everyone under 30, very extensive questionnaires followed up with interviews with many of them. Something like 98% of people under 30 in Bosnia expressed that their greatest desire was to leave Bosnia and settle somewhere else. That is not a future for a country. That is absolutely a place that has no future.

The reasons they gave were there are no jobs; the economy is bad; the country is stuck in this ethnic gridlock that is never going to go away, they are not going to get out of it. There is no hope for us here. We should just go somewhere else and live our lives.

In a place like Bosnia, because of the arrangements, there is no place for a lot of people. You have to be Bosnian, Serb or Croat to hold elective office, to participate. So if you are a Jew, a Ruthenian, a Vlach, a Roma, or if you are the result of a mixed marriage which was not uncommon in Bosnia, there was no place for you in that environment. So you are going to have to move on and go somewhere else.

I think that is more my worry about the Balkans. These countries, in a sense by insisting in many cases on staying mired in the problems of the past, they are creating a situation which – and you know people in the Balkans are very good at shooting themselves in the foot – by constantly focusing on the past, they are ruining their future, by not offering the children something to look forward to, or something to feel that they have.

Q: Right now, the Middle East is aflame and that is probably a dangerous problem too. Elders are forcing extreme religion and ethnic divides on the kids, and offering them no place to go.

BOGUE: I remember Bill Burns, when he was assistant secretary for the Near East one time when he was giving a talk, saying that in Algeria, for instance, the unemployment rate among men under 45 was over 80%. That 80% were now facing the fact as they approached the age of 45 that they would never in their lives have a job. Therefore, in the Algerian environment, they would never marry and have a family. It was no wonder that there were a lot of recruits to radicalism. Even if you told them when they were 20 that the job market was tight, but by the time they were 30, they could have a job and settle down and have a family. But what they were telling 80% of the men was that they were never going to have a job, were never going to be able to support a family, ever, in their whole lives. He said that they don't have anything to look forward to. They don't have a future. When you have a circumstance like that, there are bound to be some political repercussions.

Q: This European Union business, was it the pot at the end of the rainbow, or something like that?

BOGUE: Everybody wanted to be in the European Union. We wanted them in the European Union too. I used to try to soften expectations a little bit because people thought that if you joined the European Union suddenly you were rich, like those Germans and those Danes. I tried to explain that actually first you got rich, then you joined the European Union; it was sort of a rich country's club. They were going at this a little bit backwards.

Integrating themselves into those economies was the first step. All the kinds of things they needed to do in the way of restoring their own economy were the things they needed to do to come into the European Union.

The European Union publishes a book of what you have to do, everything from weights and measures to the width of your railroad track, in order to integrate. The book is about 18 inches thick and it is called the *Aquis,* the French word. So they come and say, "Well, here is what you need to do."

Those were all things that the countries needed to do anyway. They needed to rationalize their banking system. They needed to rationalize their commercial structures. There are also a few things that are political as well. They had to have certain human rights guarantees in place or you can't join the European Union. It is the same with NATO. You

have to have certain democratic and human rights guarantees in place to become a member of NATO. It is not enough to say, "We have an army and we are willing to join a common defense." You have to meet other criteria as well. Those were very positive things. It gave people an incentive. It gave leadership some cover to do unpopular things. Sometimes economic reforms are not going to be popular, but you can say, "Look, we have got to do it to get into the European Union." That is where you could focus on the next generation, because you could say, "Look, you want your kids to have the opportunities to study in Europe, to work in Europe, to live anywhere in Europe. The way to do that is for us to join the European Union and become part of that prosperity."

I think that did work in fits and starts. The odd thing was that at the moment when other countries are, with more or less good cheer, giving up aspects of their sovereignty to participate in the European Union. In the Balkans, they kind of missed the nineteenth century "getting to be your own nation" period. Everybody wants that. "We want our own country. We want all the symbols and trappings of sovereignty and all that stuff."

In a way, they were swimming against the tide of Europe a little bit, in wanting to have all these things that in a way are going to become unimportant once they are part of the larger European community. In a way, you could even say the difference between Albania and Macedonia, in a sense none of this matters once you are part of the European community because you can work wherever you want, you can live wherever you want. There was still this level of high nationalism that for historical reasons had not had its evolution in the Balkans. So they were trying to do that simultaneously by participating in this kind of supernational, extranational activity.

It was a difficult mental and psychological transition.

Q: Like watching an organism develop or something like that?

BOGUE: Yes. I'm an optimist, and you have to be an optimist to work on the Balkans year in and year out. But I was seeing a lot of positive trends. Bosnia, in some ways, was the country I was most worried about because the countries that tried to carve it up were actually getting themselves together and heading toward European Union and NATO membership. Bosnia really remained mired in the conflict and in many ways unable to get out of it. I think that at some stage, the Dayton Accords were immensely useful and stopped the fighting. It created a situation in which there could be stability and security. But in many ways, they are going to have to outgrow it. It was meant to be a floor, but it has become a ceiling in a way. It has created a very rigid situation that is hard to get past. At some stage, Bosnia is going to have to relook at Dayton.

Q: What were we doing in Bosnia at the time?

BOGUE: We were very focused on trying to create institutions, both economic and political, that would allow Bosnians to run their own government. For instance, there was an international police force and an international security force. The idea was to have a police force; a police force that was Bosnian that people could trust; a police force you

could call and not have to think that the ethnicity of the officer who answered your call would determine the officer's response to your problem.

It was the same with the military. The Bosnian Serbs had been allowed to keep their separate military units, insignia and uniforms. There were essentially two militaries in Bosnia, and they had two armies. They had the Bosnian Serb army and they had the federation army. They had two ministries of defense. This was totally untenable for a county to have two separate armies, distrusting each other.

One of the things we tried to do with defense reform was again offer carrots and sticks. The kinds of things that army officers wanted to do, such as participating in peacekeeping operations, going to the United States for training at Fort Benning or Fort Leavenworth or the War College. All those things became available only to people who served in integrated units in Bosnia.

So, whereas the older fellows who fought in the conflict and were then colonels were determined to keep things as they were. It was the young captains and such who really wanted to make a future as a military officer clearly weren't going to go anywhere unless they participated in a joint unit.

We tried to have these kinds of carrots and sticks. Part of defense reform was you couldn't get promoted to colonel unless you checked one of these boxes. Well, you could only check those boxes in an integrated unit. So, if you are a young captain, what are you going to do? If you are not willing to join an integrated unit, you had better give up on the army as a career.

So again, they are trying to use incentives and disincentives to draw people into the army who were interested in it being a single Bosnian army. There is still a long way to go. There are a lot of very intransigent tough people who are willing to sit there and not enjoy the carrots, suffer the sticks, rather than change. But there were also people who really did want change to come and wanted there to be a future for their kids, or themselves if they were younger. So we tried to do things like that. It was very, very slow.

It is interesting. You may remember the City of Brcko. Brcko could not be settled in the Dayton agreements. So, a separate arrangement was made for Brcko. Brcko became almost an independent city in the way of the old independent cities like Danzig, the free cities of Europe that were independent entities. Brcko had an administrator from the West, who happened to be American. He ran Brcko. Brcko had all three ethnicities there.

What they did in Brcko was absolutely fascinating. First, the parents said, "All the kids have to go to separate schools: a Croatian school, a Serbian school and a Bosnian school. A kid will not go to any school but their own." The Serbian administrator said, "Fine. No problem." And then he built a fantastic school for children who were willing to go to an integrated school. The teachers were paid very well. They had modern textbooks. They had lab equipment. They had all this great stuff.

Essentially, what this administrator did was to say to parents, “What do you want for your kids? Do you want a good education? Or do you want that kid never to sit next to someone who isn’t their ethnicity?”

Some parents voted for “I only want my kid to sit next to his or her own ethnicity if it means they get a terrible education.”

But, wouldn’t you know it? 90% of parents said, “What I really want is for my kid to get a good education.”

In Brcko, over and over, people did things like when the City Council became deadlocked over ethnic issues, and then garbage wasn’t collected. The administrator essentially said, “Do you want garbage collected? Or do you want this person to represent an ideological hard-line position?”

People said, “Well, what we want is garbage collected.”

Over and over, Brcko moved ahead because people started putting people in place who would provide technocrats essentially, who would provide services instead of ideology. They started electing city council members who would pick up the trash, have good schools regardless of their ethnic backgrounds instead of ethnic zealots who would let the trash pile up rather than ever let a garbage man from the other ethnicity have a job.

So, you could see that carrots and sticks could work, but it was very hard to apply them countrywide. That was just a very difficult thing to do and it was a very slow process.

Bosnia may still come out of this but it is not clear how that is going to happen.

Q: What about the problem of corruption?

BOGUE: Again, it was a very big problem. It was a problem in communist times, as you know from your time there. All the communist economies have gone through spasms of corruption as they have converted to western economies. Added to that was the vacuum created during the war when criminal gangs were able to get tremendous footholds because they had guns. But they also were doing things that people needed. You know, when Sarajevo was strangled, criminal gangs were able to get food through, and things like that. They were able to get rich because they were actually providing a service that people needed. It has been difficult to dislodge them from their positions. Of course there are groups of people who profit from these kinds of circumstances and they hate it when the war ends, because their position of power and influence and wealth is jeopardized. They do everything they can to hang onto that.

Q: Did you have a problem with various types of oversight saying “oh these people are a bunch of crooks and we can’t do this.” Or “there are lots of investigations” that would stop progress.

BOGUE: … No, we actually would have welcomed a little more of that interest, particularly locally. We would have welcomed a little more press activism on investigative journalism. That's a scary thing for people. If you are investigating criminal gangs, you might wind up in a gutter yourself. Look what has happened to journalists in Russia and other places who have done that. It's never a situation where sitting in safety in the United States you say, "You go out there and put yourself in danger." That is exactly the kind of thing these societies need. They need to develop those kinds of institutions. They need crusading journalists. They need Ralph Naders to say, "Hey! These cars aren't safe!" They need all the gadflies and the consumer advocates. They need Mothers Against Drunk Driving. They need the kind of things that we lump under the term, "civil society." They need citizens' groups. They need watchdog groups. They need all that stuff.

That did not exist under Communism. That is a long, hard, slow process to develop in people who are accustomed to being fearful of their government. They are accustomed to being way too busy just trying to get by and make a living, to have the kind of time they need to devote to that.

Things in the United States run on volunteers and that requires a certain level of prosperity to be able to do that.

Q: You go to a country such as France and the volunteer situation is still pretty weak. It's a centralized government. As you say, things are breaking down in Europe into localities where volunteers can flourish. Our oral history program is done essentially through volunteers and getting money from individuals rather than government support. It is hard to get something like that going in most European countries.

Were there indicators in Bosnia that things were beginning to break down? If these people under 30 are saying, "Screw this ethnic stuff," which is pretty primitive. Did you see this beginning to break down the system or not?

BOGUE: I saw more of that in Serbia, interestingly enough. A lot of young people who had left during Milosevic's time came back. A lot of them came back with excellent educations and experience that they had gotten outside the country. Also, there were some leaders coming up, not that all of them were perfect or perfectly pure themselves. Many of them had had to make their deals with the devil.

For instance, Zoran Djindjic, who had become the Prime Minister, was assassinated while I was working there. I went to his funeral. I was at ground level with the funeral party, so I couldn't see it, but when I saw on the news later the aerial photographs, they thought there were a million people on the streets of Belgrade following the funeral procession. This was a kind of Kennedy-esque figure. He was young, dynamic, charismatic, and terribly good-looking. He had a young wife and two very young children, a boy and a girl, who were there at the gravesite.

This was the moment when he was killed by the old Red Berets, the most extreme nationalist part of the army that had served Milosevic. He was probably killed because he had agreed to turn over some of the Serbian wanted war criminals to The Hague. He was shot to death.

His funeral became one of those moments when people said, "Enough of this. Here is finally a leader, for all his faults, he has been focused on the future. He has been holding out the idea of a European future for us, instead of just talking about how the Serbs are being oppressed and instead of being an ardent Serbian nationalist about past injuries. He is actually looking to the future."

I think you did see in times like that, people actively saying, "It is time for us to turn that corner."

Serbia has not done that all the way, still. You still have the problem of the war criminals. You still have a problem with people electing very radical, sort of nationalist, people. Kosovo has become a flashpoint now that the negotiations are underway.

You did see some potential for more positive leadership in the future. I met some very dynamic young Bosnians. I met very dynamic young people in all parts of that. The question was just whether in fact they would be able to carry forward with these policies.

Q: Looking at the time, this is a good place to stop now.

We are still talking about your time from 2001 to 2003, when you were Deputy Assistant Secretary for Southeastern European Affairs.

We really haven't talked too much about Serbia and Croatia. I would like to talk about developments there, and the role of young people who have left and come back or stayed away. What is the importance of this?

Also the war criminal business and how Milosevic during your time was in jail? Also, other war criminals.

Also, what was the role in both Croatia and Serbia of the churches? You have got two churches. Was it in 808 AD when they divided up the place between the Orthodox and the Catholic? And Montenegro, what was that up to?

What about the role of politics in the United States of ethnic groups to get you involved with Congress? Did the academic world have any role in this? And is there anything else you can provide?

BOGUE: I have got to do that.

I went out to Cleveland to give a talk about NATO and the newly-independent states at a Lithuanian American catholic church one evening, which I came to refer to as, "Our Lady of Perpetual NATO Membership." It was a lot of fun.

Q: I just wanted to add that I would also want to cover 9-11. You have already mentioned some of what happened in Macedonia. How did this affect us in other places? How have we used what we have learned out of the Balkans, which was a long learning experience in different phases? Were we trying to pass that on to our masters who are dealing with Afghanistan and Iraq?

Q: Today is October 15th, 2007 – the Ides of October.

We were doing a tour d'horizon at this point.

Montenegro at that point was part of Serbia/Yugoslavia, wasn't it? What were we doing about Montenegro at the time? Was it a separate entity, or what?

BOGUE: To some extent. There came a point during the Milosevic years when Montenegro staked out a position in opposition to Milosevic. The United States supported and encouraged that. Serbia and Montenegro were in fact still a unit. At some point along here, I don't remember exactly what year; they went from being called Yugoslavia to Serbia and Montenegro. This became the name of the country, as those were the two republics left from the original Yugoslavia formed after the Second World War.

The U.S. position about Montenegro's independence was ambivalent, as were feelings in Montenegro. Every time there was a poll taken in Montenegro, the Montenegrins were divided just about 50-50 on the subject of independence. About 50% wanted to be an independent country. About 50% saw this as… first of all they had a lot of ties to Serbia and they saw themselves as losing a lot. Losing the strength of the Serbian economy, Montenegro didn't have much of an economy. Losing access to the universities which were considered quite good in Serbia, considered quite poor in Montenegro. A Montenegrin student could freely go as a local student to any university in Serbia. They were all in the same country. Many Montenegrins saw themselves as having more to lose than they had to gain by this.

Serbia was quite anxious to hold onto Montenegro. First of all, pieces of Serbia had been breaking off: pieces of greater Serbia and pieces of Yugoslavia had been breaking off for some years, and they were getting smaller and smaller. Also, a lot of Serbs had property in Montenegro. They had relatives there, and so on. Finally, Serbia without Montenegro is landlocked. Serbia's continued access to a seaport really depended on Montenegro. The other ports that had served the old Yugoslavia were in Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia, although Bosnia doesn't really have a port, but it has some sea front.

The Serbs were anxious to hang on to Montenegro. Some Montenegrins, about one half at the time, were anxious to hang on, the other half anxious to break away.

I would say that we and the Europeans were all ambivalent about it for a couple of reasons.

One was that Montenegro did not have much of an economy. It is a very tiny place. It is mostly rocks. It has almost no industry. In fact, there used to be a proud boast in Montenegro that said, "Courage is our only industry." You may remember that phrase from your time there. It was their great boast because they historically regarded themselves as ferocious fighters, but they hadn't developed much in the way of industry.

Agriculture is poor. An awful lot of the economy that existed was, like the economy in Albania, based on smuggling things into Italy across the sea: smuggling cigarettes without taxes, and so on.

The Europeans were concerned that what they would get is a little criminal enterprise, rather than a state in Europe. It would be more of a criminal enterprise than a state. I think the United States was worried not so much about a criminal enterprise, but about a welfare state. This would be a state with essentially an unviable economy which would be dependent upon Europe and the United States for aid as far as the eye could see into the future.

Q: Was there any sort of feeling with any of the people you were dealing with in the United States, in the "department of revenge," that, "The Serbs gave us a rough time. Let's stick it to them here."

BOGUE: There were more voices like that; I have to say, in Congress and among some interest groups saying, "Let's take everything away from the Serbs, including Montenegro."

My view was more, "Who do we hurt here? Are we hurting ourselves?"

My job was to look after U.S. interests. I said if the Montenegrins want to become independent, that is fine with me. I don't have any reason to oppose that. We need to make it clear to them that we would not pay for them, subsidize them, forever. The way I used to put this to other Americans was, "If you want to take Montenegro away from Serbia because you want to punish Serbia, are you prepared to make Montenegro the fifty-first state?" That was the expectation, to a great extent, on Montenegro's part. Their reward for breaking off from Serbia would in fact be that they would not become a state, but they would be supported by the United States.

Even when we are highly disposed to provide that kind of funding, other things happen like Iraq and Afghanistan that drain off all the resources. So, you couldn't say to the Montenegrins, "Go ahead and become independent. We are going to support you for the next 25 years, until you get on your feet." You had to sort of say, "Get on your feet first and then become independent."

Q: Were you able to communicate this to the Montenegrins?

BOGUE: Yes, we had a lot of long chats with the Montenegrins. The government of Montenegro was very pro-independence at the time. Again, it was absolutely fine with me if they became independent. This was not going to cause a war. It was going to be more of a velvet divorce, like in Czechoslovakia. What mattered to me was that the Montenegrins went into it with their eyes wide open. They were not going to be financially supported by the United States if they became independent. They needed to understand that our aid programs would continue, such as they were, but they were not going to suddenly get bigger.

The Europeans felt the same way. If Serbia and Montenegro came into the European Union, Montenegrins would enjoy all the benefits of European Union membership. Montenegro on its own was a long way away from entering the European Union. Therefore, it was to Montenegro's advantage to come in as part of Serbia.

So the Europeans tended to be cautious about encouraging independence as well.

Q: I can't remember his name, the leader of Montenegro, a very personable person...

BOGUE: Right, a tall fellow, but they are all tall.

Q: Wasn't he a darling of the press, the media, wasn't he?

BOGUE: For a while. You know, a little country, a little tiny place standing up to Milosevic and disagreeing with Milosevic's views, and so on. Montenegro has an impossibly cute comic opera quality to it, a little tiny place stuck up in the mountains. In fact, there have been comic operas about Montenegro.

Q: Certainly, the Merry Widow!

BOGUE: Prince Danilo is from Montenegro. Although I think it is called Pontenegro in the opera, it is clearly Montenegro.

So there was this kind of interest. I think that started to decay a bit when the president of Montenegro was linked to some of the criminal enterprises. He was linked to a cigarette smuggling operation. He was linked to some other criminal activities. I don't know how that's all come out. There were investigations begun, and so on. He lost some of his luster at that point.

Also, at the time they were standing up to Milosevic, they looked more progressive in a way than they were. Afterward, in fact they were not making the kind of economic and political reforms that they would have had to make to join the European Union and so on. In fact, one of these odd circumstances is that after Milosevic fell and a new government took over in Serbia, Serbia got quite a bit ahead of Montenegro in reforms. Montenegro fell behind and ceased to be the darling of the press at that point I think.

Q: It sort of disappeared from the media.

BOGUE: Well, it has become independent now. Montenegro is an independent country now.

Actually, on the Fourth of July, I opened our Consulate in Montenegro. We had had a diplomatic mission there when Montenegro was briefly independent for six or seven years in the early years of the 20th Century. We had a mission there, just rooms in a hotel. It wasn't even permanent. It was staffed by our Embassy in Greece. We opened a consulate there before it was independent to cover Montenegro.

I had the fun of opening that consulate on the 4th of July. It must have been in 2002. The people of Montenegro very much took that as a sign that their independence was coming. It wasn't meant to be a sign of that.

It was kind of fun having had a diplomatic mission there before, to open one. Of course, now it is our embassy in Montenegro.

Q: Is it in Podgorica?

BOGUE: Yes, which used to be Titograd. After the communist period, it resumed its former name of Podgorica, which means "the bottom of the mountain" or "under the little mountain," literally.

It has become independent. It is its own country now, which I think is fine. I am not following it now, so I don't know how they are doing with economics and so on.

Q: When I was the Consul General in Naples, I used to watch the unmarked motorboats come in with packs of cigarettes.

BOGUE: Montenegro's economy will fall when Italians quit smoking.

Q: OK. Let's keep going.

Let's go up to Bosnia. Again, you were doing this from when to when?

BOGUE: From 2001 to 2003.

Q: Obviously, Bosnia was at the very center of all our concerns. How was it going at this particular time?

BOGUE: That was the country in the former Yugoslavia that I in many ways worry most about. I think that one of the great sad stories of the former Yugoslavia is that the two countries that tried to carve Bosnia up, Croatia and Serbia, are both doing much better.

Economically, they are doing better. They are making a lot more progress towards membership in the European Union and NATO than Bosnia.

Bosnia has a very sad situation. While I was doing this job, there was a poll taken of Bosnians under the age of 30, and 95% of them wanted to leave Bosnia permanently to settle somewhere else. You are not a country with a future, when almost every young person wants to leave.

It's normal anywhere for a certain number of young people to want to move somewhere else. It is just normal. But 95% said if they had the chance, they would move to Canada, the United States, Australia, somewhere else in Europe, anywhere to get out of Bosnia. And remember that there was no real violence in Bosnia at this time. The war was over. Refugees have largely returned home. A lot of the basic infrastructure damage has been repaired. Bosnia was stuck in an ethnic stalemate.

I don't want to say anything bad about the Dayton Accords, because I think the Dayton Accords were nothing short of a miracle to get the fighting stopped. It was absolutely the best that could have been gotten, and better than many thought could be attained under the circumstances.

They created this kind of frozen situation in which there is really no way to get past the ethnic divisions because everything – people's rights, people's political participation, everything – is based on your ethnicity. You have to be one of three groups. There is no room for you if you are a Jew, a Vlach, a Macedonian who lives there, a Roma. There is no space for you politically because the system is set up that you are either Bosniak which means a Bosnian Muslim, or a Croat, or a Serb.

Q: There are a significant number of mixed marriages.

BOGUE: Right. People like that saw the writing on the wall early on in the conflict. If you had a mixed marriage, which was very common in Bosnia, you needed to leave, because your children were going to be forced to choose one ethnicity over another. Everything is done this way. You cannot just vote for whomever you want, because it is not that ethnicity's turn. Let's say you have a great candidate. It's not the turn of that ethnicity. It's somebody else's ethnicity's turn to be Prime Minister, or turn to be Finance Minister. So the system is very inflexible. It doesn't offer a lot of hope for the future because any group can veto any law if they feel it is going to hurt them. There is still a lot of bitterness in the political class. This may change with generations but there is a lot of bitterness in the political class. What ends up happening is that somebody puts forward a law that might be good for everybody.

Let's just take a consumer protection law that says you actually cannot sell adulterated cough syrup. It's going to be illegal to sell adulterated cough syrup. That would be good for everyone. But because Ethnic Group A has put it forward, just on principle Ethnic Groups B and C vote against it. So there goes the law. There was no rising above that.

Plus, the system that Dayton setup allowed – again, no criticism of Dayton or Ambassador Holbrooke here at all – this made it possible to win the peace at the time. Bosnia has two armies. How can a country have two armies? Denmark doesn't have two armies, right? It has one, of course. It doesn't have an army for one part of the country and an army for another part. Bosnia has two armies. They don't cooperate with each other. One is the Bosnian Serb Army and the other is the Federation Army, which are the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims together. They do not cooperate with each other and so on.

What we tried to do was move beyond that and offer both carrots and sticks to get people to move beyond that. For instance, one thing officers in the armies of smaller countries want to do is go to professional military schools in the West. They want to go to study at Fort Leavenworth or Carlisle Barracks in the United States. Or they want to go study at Sandhurst in England, or something like that. That's a big prestigious deal for them.

So what we started doing was we started forming a joint army. We would only pick people to go for that prestigious training if they were part of the Joint Army. If they were part of just one or the other, they could not go. So in other words, if you are a young captain and you want to make a military career, clearly you are not going to have a future unless you go into the Joint Army. Bosnia offered to do some peacekeeping in Africa. We said, "Great, but we are only taking joint army people. We are not taking two separate armies from Bosnia to do peacekeeping. That is no way to do peacekeeping. What a terrible example for the country you are going to. We will only take people who are in the joint system."

Q: Well, that means you have got three armies.

BOGUE: Actually, the Federation Army became the Joint Army. What we were trying to do was bring the Bosnian Serb Army into it, with the idea that this would work gradually over time.

There were two of everything. There were two federal police forces. There were two separate court systems. All of this was set up so that there were in effect two independent units.

Q: Universities?

BOGUE: The universities are ethnically completely segregated. These kinds of things could work. You will remember the town of Brcko. Brcko was one of the areas that couldn't resolve at Dayton. There was huge disagreement over which side Brcko should belong to. So there was an agreement at Dayton that there would be a separate arrangement for Brcko.

There was a special arbitration panel that set up Brcko as a kind of independent city-state, the way Danzig used to be in Europe, before the war. There used to be these kinds of free cities, independent cities, that weren't really under a country's government. Brcko

became like that, administered by an American. In Brcko, what started to happen was that all the parents were sending their children to single ethnic schools. All the Croat kids go here; all the Serb kids go here; all the Bosniak Muslim kids go here. There were no joint schools. So the American administrator said, "Fine, no problem. You can send your children to segregated schools. We don't have a problem with that. We are going to build one really nice school that is going to have really nice lab equipment and modern textbooks. It is going to teach English, which for European Union purposes, everyone wants to know now. It is going to have computers and computer labs, and all that great stuff. Anybody who wants to send their kids here can, but they have to understand that kids from the other ethnicities will also be here. It will be a mixed school. So each parent can make their own choice. They can send their child to a terrible school with only kids from the same ethnic group; or they can send their child to a really good school that has numbers of different ethnicities there."

And guess what parents decided? They voted with their children for a good education. They started bringing their children. Except for some parents, who said they really didn't care if their children had a bad education, as long as they never had to mingle with any other group. Most parents, by far, wanted a better future for their children. They knew that getting a good education was part of that. So they started coming to the mixed school.

In places, you can break this down with incentives and so on. Bosnia is sort of trapped in this. At some point, I think Dayton is going to have to be revisited and reopened because what was meant to be a floor to ensure everybody having a voice has become a ceiling. You cannot get out of it. You cannot get beyond that. Their economic problems are very severe, but part of the reason is that people don't see any way out of this very inflexible situation.

Q: As the Deputy Assistant Secretary with this responsibility, what were our efforts or what were we doing about Bosnia in the time you were doing that?

BOGUE: We had a whole range of different things.

One was that we were definitely trying to begin the transfer of security to, on the one hand, the Bosnians themselves by creating a more professional local police force that would respond professionally. On the other hand, by having the Europeans take up a greater responsibility for the peacekeeping in Bosnia, which they have. They actually run the peacekeeping now. That was vastly spurred on by Afghanistan and terrifically by Iraq.

The State Department was very much in favor of the European Union taking this up as a trial run of the European Union's military operation. It sort of comes out of NATO, but consists of European Union countries. We were very eager to have them try this. Bosnia was quite stable and we thought this was great. The Europeans were already there in great numbers. We thought this was a great opportunity.

Initially, there was a lot of opposition from the White House and the Pentagon. Then as our army was drawn thinner and thinner because of Iraq and Afghanistan, then they couldn't wait to get out of the Balkans and turn this over to the Europeans.

Q: You were there basically when the Bush II Administration took over.

BOGUE: Right.

Q: If I recall, one of the things that Bush and his colleagues were saying was that they didn't want to have anything to do with this peacekeeping stuff, or nation building. So there you were, nation building. What did you do? Take your Lego blocks and go home and build a little nation?

BOGUE: This is one of the very interesting things. George Bush ran in his first campaign on a platform that we were way too involved in the world; that we should not be doing nation building. We should get out of the Balkans. We needed to get out of Bosnia. We needed to get out of Kosovo. This was not our business. This was not our problem. We should not be having troops in other people's countries. We should not be trying to build other people's nations. This was ridiculous. It was not part of America's mission in the world.

When he came in, a lot of the things we argued about – for instance, the White House wanted to set a date certain by which time every U.S. troop would be out of Bosnia. There were still war criminals at large. There was not active fighting, but there were still war criminals that NATO was looking for, and so on.

We were arguing that if you give a date certain, everybody could just wait you out. You can say, "Well, they are leaving in a year or so. So what? We will just wait them out. Why should we cooperate because they are leaving in a year?"

The White House said, "We don't care. There is going to be a date certain."

It is rather ironic now of course, because what you are hearing is the opposite of what the White House is saying about Iraq. They are saying to Congress, "No, you cannot set a date certain because then the insurgents just wait you out."

They took exactly the opposite position on the Balkans because they didn't want to be there.

Fortunately, the Europeans were there with us. The Europeans were just starting to stand up their own military capability for the first time, from the European Union. They were willing to take this on. Clearly, George Bush is no longer running on the "I don't do nation building platform" because their views on that flipped around radically in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Afghanistan and Iraq had a couple of profound effects on the Balkans. One was to drain away a lot of American resources and interest from the Balkans. That may come back to haunt us as it did in a previous Afghanistan adventure when we took a lot of our resources out of Afghanistan after the Soviet Union left, creating a space in which the Taliban could flourish. So it may very well come back to haunt us in the Balkans, although the Balkans are not without the resources because of the European Union which is very interested and has stayed active and concerned. There are still U.S. programs there.

The other way in which it affected us is that everything is somewhat seen through the prism now of terrorism, Iraq, and these struggles. In fact, I found that some embassies of ours and some foreign governments deduced that the way to get resources was to try to show that you were part of the War on Terrorism.

Q: Oh yes.

BOGUE: If you could show that, no matter how much of a stretch it was, that somehow it would draw in resources. People were in a way trying to fit their country into this. The Macedonians tried to make an argument that when the ethnic Albanians were protesting and had an armed insurgency and were seeking greater civil rights, the Macedonian government said that they were victims of terrorism no different from 9-11. When I think the real parallel to an event in America was the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, of a group that had been excluded from participation, seeking greater involvement and participation and greater rights, rather than an outside terrorist coming in.

So a lot of this was now seen … for some of the Balkan countries, it was a huge boost. Albania, for instance, decided to go gung-ho in support of the United States and the War on Terror. They contributed troops. There are still about 100 Albanian commandos who serve with, is it the First Division that is the Big Red One? The First Infantry Division in Iraq has 100 Albanians in it. They have been there since the beginning; not the same 100 guys, but they have had a unit there since the beginning.

Some really saw this as a way to fast track themselves into NATO, or to fast track their relationship with the United States. Many of the countries in the Balkans that were seeking NATO membership were ones that offered troops. The Macedonians offered not troops but medical personnel: doctors, nurses, and technicians. The Bulgarians had troops. They don't any more, but they had troops in Iraq and so on.

So all of our policy came to be looked at, as everything we do now, through the prism of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Q: Did you get any feel initially of how Colin Powell, our Secretary of State, felt about this? His policy was, "Don't get involved anywhere" really. Did you get any feel for that?

BOGUE: I didn't get any feel about the Iraq policy.

Q: No, I am talking about Bosnia.

BOGUE: I think he was wearing a different hat. When I was working on Bosnia during the Bosnian War, he was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was adamant that U.S. troops not be involved.

Ironically later, when troops were there and he was Secretary of State, he thought that they should leave but in an orderly way. He was not in favor of pulling everybody out. He wanted to see a proper process in the Balkans and was very supportive of that.

What happened with us, and the person I talked to more directly about this aside from my boss Beth Jones, was the Deputy Secretary, Richard Armitage. He was not a man of a lot of words, as you probably know. He is kind of gruff spoken. I don't know if you have ever seen him. He is a body builder, massive, with no neck and no hair.

He would say, "Janet, you know what your job is, don't you?"

I would say, "My job is to keep the Balkans off your desk. Right?"

And he would say, "Right. Just keep it off my desk. Do it. Fix it. Make it better. Keep them going in the right direction, but don't bother me with it. Don't make me think about it. Don't make me spend any time on it because we are so completely busy with Iraq and Afghanistan" and so on.

On the one hand, we obviously lost a lot of high-level attention. On the other hand, I have to say it is remarkably liberating to be running your own show without the President being your desk officer making every decision. It was really up to us to make that all happen and keep it off other peoples' plates, to keep it off the agenda.

Q: Let's talk a little bit about the leadership of Bosnia.

Every once in a while the Washington Post or the New York Times will come up with an exposé of horrendous corruption in the government. Focusing on the time you were dealing with, what was the government like?

BOGUE: The government was the most amazing and rather dysfunctional spectrum of people. It was dysfunctional partly because they represented such a spectrum. There were some immensely talented people who really wanted to bring Bosnia into modern contemporary Europe. There were people who used the word "digital" in their conversations. They were really focused on the future.

Then there were all the guys who you would recognize from all the Politburo meetings, who were essentially old communists who had reinvented themselves as radical nationalists whose only interest was hanging onto power through radical nationalism.

I remember having extraordinary conversations with people. I remember on the one hand you would have these fantastic conversations with really forward thinking, bright, talented people. They always thought we had a command economy like in the old days and the State Department could just tell Coca-Cola to build a bottling plant in their country. Then someone would say to you, "Just tell Coca-Cola to build a bottling plant."

"Well, actually that is not how it works here. Coca-Cola will decide."

"Well, why won't Coca-Cola come to us?"

I said, "Well, for one thing, Coca-Cola or Pepsi or anyone else, does not want a full-page ad in The New York Times that says Coca-Cola supports war criminals because the Bosnian Serb government was protecting war criminals, was not pursuing them, and was refusing to turn them over to The Hague. Coca-Cola comes in and they are going to be part of that problem. This is a public relations nightmare for Coca-Cola. Why should they do it? They could go to any number of countries around the world and put a bottling plant in. People are trying to attract them with tax benefits and things because they will employ people. They will provide benefits for the workforce there. Why should they come to you? Why should they help you protect war criminals by helping your tax base?"

They just wanted to have the investment. They knew they had horrible economic problems. They were not willing to take the political steps they needed that would actually attract Western investors at that time.

Q: What was the situation vis-à-vis war criminals at the time you were there?

BOGUE: At the time I was there, there were still a huge number of outstanding fugitives, and there still are. Every year, a few fugitives would either be caught, die, or turn themselves in. The two who were most sought, after Milosevic who was already in The Hague, are still at large: that is Ratko Mladic, who was the Bosnian Serb general responsible for the massacre at Srebrenica and many other actions; and Radovan Karadzic, the psychiatrist/poet/radical nationalist Bosnian Serb who has also been in hiding.

Q: This is Tape 10, Side 1 with Janet Bogue.

BOGUE: Just to make the point about a lot of these people who I thought were really only interested in power: Radovan Karadzic who became the leader of the Bosnian Serbs politically was very radical and threatened to annihilate every Muslim in Bosnia. The best man at his wedding 35 years before, was a Muslim, was his best friend in college. This had all come out of political struggle. This was his way to the top, just as it had been Milosevic's way to the top.

Q: I am told that what was good for Milosevic has nothing to do with ideology.

BOGUE: Exactly. I don't think Karadzic ever had any particular negative thoughts about Muslims growing up. He had a lot of Muslim friends and neighbors. This was his ticket to power. This is not the only place in the world where people have done this. You see this all the time, politicians riding a tide of nationalism. They may not personally endorse it that much, but it is their route to power. I think it is very cynical and very horrible, but it does happen a lot.

They were still at large, and they are still, to this day, at large. I think that is a great continuing festering wound in the Balkans.

Q: What was the problem? Why couldn't we get these people?

BOGUE: I think the problem was that… Well, there were multiple problems.

One was that we did not devote enough resources to the effort. We and NATO did not pour a lot of resources into this effort. Partly, some members of NATO were not very keen on doing this. They thought it would cause a backlash against the peacekeepers.

Q: The French actually did have a piece of territory.

BOGUE: Right, it was in French territory. There had been rumors for years that the French were somehow warning the fugitives. I think a lot of that is overblown. A lot of this came because a French military officer who was stationed at NATO in Brussels was in fact convicted of passing intelligence information on to Serbia.

That was an individual act, not a corporate act on the part of France. There was a lot of suspicion among other NATO allies that somehow the French were not helping. There was a lot of concern among other allies that their peacekeepers would be in jeopardy. It is one thing to keep the peace, but if you aggressively look for these folk heroes who are fugitives, then people are going to start shooting at you.

They had, as you have to have in the circumstance to be successfully hidden, a very good network of protectors and supporters including among the Serbian army, which we know now for a fact hid Mladic, who had been one of their generals, on their military bases in Serbia for many years. It was to the point where Mladic was seen dining out in Belgrade at restaurants in public. He went to his daughter's wedding. He felt comfortable enough to actually appear in public. Karadzic did not. Mladic had the feeling that no one would touch him.

I think if you have the support of the population and if NATO or NATO members are reluctant to really engage fully, then it makes it genuinely harder to catch people. They will be caught eventually or they will die.

Q: Were you involved, as part of your responsibilities, in pushing for these guys?

BOGUE: Absolutely. We had an inter-agency working group on this. It was meant to share intelligence, work up some operational programs and do the other side of it, which was the PR (public relations) campaigns about this, and work the diplomacy with the governments involved. Also, we had rewards. Rewards have been immensely helpful. It turns out that for a couple of million dollars, there are people who are willing to turn people in.

We did all these things at one time. My part of it was talking to the governments. We had economic sanctions on them if they did not comply with The Hague's requirements. We made it very clear that they wouldn't get anywhere, toward the European Union and things like that, unless the right things happened. Croatia is a very good example of this. They had one outstanding fugitive, outstanding in the sense he still hadn't been caught and he was the most famous. That was General Gotovina. He had immense popular support. I don't know how many Croatians have said to me, "Well, he is our George Washington."

Again, we were trying to say, "A war crime is a war crime. It doesn't matter if you were attacked first. It is the act. It is perfectly legal to defend yourself from attack. It is the act of summary executions of civilians, including elderly people in hospitals that is a war crime. That is always wrong. Not the act of defending yourself against attack."

They kept saying, "But the Serbs attacked us, so we cannot have committed any war crimes." There was immense resistance.

Finally, the day came that the European Union was about ready to start negotiating with Croatia on the process that leads to European Union membership. Croatia got it together, found him, and sent him to The Hague.

Again, there was a big enough carrot and a big enough stick that Croatia and the Croatian government accepted that its best interest was in fact not to protect a war criminal, but to let him go and have a trial in The Hague.

There were a couple of other things that helped, I must say. One was that two major Serb fugitives had been turned over. So Croatia couldn't just say, "Well look, they haven't turned anything over." But also, a couple of people had been tried and released, having been found innocent. I think they felt more that there wasn't an automatic guilty verdict at The Hague. In fact, there would be a trial, and in some cases, there was mistaken identity; in some cases, there was not. There was a case where of two Kosovar brothers, identical twins, the wrong one was arrested and sent to The Hague. Shortly afterwards, they realized they got the wrong brother.

I think all of those things acted as incentives for Croatia.

Q: Did you find within Bosnia the seedlings of a modern nation? Or were they so squished by the nationalists?

BOGUE: I think they were squelched by the nationalists and many then developed a new nationalism. People began to identify with more traditional Islam among the Muslim population, which hadn't been the case before. Again, I think for so many of the younger people who would have been that seed of a more modern Bosnia were just trying to get out. They were looking for any way out. They were bright, well-educated people who could get jobs elsewhere and make a life elsewhere. Those who had the opportunity did so.

One of the interesting things we saw was with refugees. In an extended refugee family, the grandparents came back to reclaim property. They were the people in the family for whom it was hardest to make a new beginning elsewhere. It was really hard to learn the language when you are 70 and have lived on your little farm all your life. It is hard to move to Washington, DC, and learn English and try to adapt to life here. The grandparents would come back and reclaim the property. The next generation and the grandchildren would visit but not stay. Even when refugees were returning, the demographics of the refugee return were skewed to an older population.

One of the many economic challenges facing Bosnia is that they are going to have the kind of thing Americans and Europeans worry about with social security and old age pensions of a population that has a lot more older people than young people of working age. Bosnia is going to have that problem. It never used to because it historically had a very youthful population. In the war, a lot of younger people were killed. A lot of young people left and didn't come back. Now, younger people want to leave.

So what you have is a population is a population more and more skewed toward the elderly, with more and more questions about who will be able to pay for their health care and housing as the years go on if there is not a younger population. Bosnians are not repopulating in great numbers either. Young people are trying to leave, but more because of the dire economic situation they tend to limit their family size.

Q: How were things working between the Bosniaks and the Croats? I think of people firing across the Mostar, that beautiful bridge. That's sort of emblematic of the situation. What was developing there?

BOGUE: Well the bridge is back. It's been rebuilt and restored. It's lovely again. That shouldn't be read as a metaphor of Bosniak-Croatian harmony. I think the Croats felt they had been shoved into a forced shotgun marriage with the Bosniaks in creating the federation. There are still Bosnian-Croats who feel, and this is one of the reasons Bosnia cannot move ahead, because they would like to rewrite Dayton too, but not to eliminate all these provisions that create a third entity. In other words, they don't want to be in with the Bosnian Muslims. They would like three separate entities, with three separate armies, three separate police forces, and the Croats would have their own forces. They feel they got a bad deal at Dayton. They got a bad deal because they got stuck in a marriage with the Bosniaks rather than having their own slice. When I went there to talk to politicians about the future, that is what they wanted to talk about. They didn't want to talk about

membership in the European Community. They wanted to talk about rewriting Dayton so they could have their completely independent portion of Bosnia as well.

There were a few individuals who weren't like that, but for the most part the Bosnian-Croatian politicians were very retrogressive, as were most of the politicians in their approach.

That is why I think, it is sad to say, that the two countries that we will see in the halls of NATO and the halls of Brussels and the EU, will be Croatia and Serbia, long before Bosnia, sadly, because they were the ones that tried to carve Bosnia up.

Q: How did you evaluate the role of the church, particularly the Serbian Orthodox and the Croatian Catholic? In many ways, they were responsible for the building up of the hatred. What was that like at this point?

BOGUE: The Serbian church underwent a considerable and positive change at various points. The Serbian church, which had been ultranationalist in supporting the Serbian point of view, at some point woke up to its responsibilities as a church. It began to condemn those who were killing in its name. It began to condemn the war criminals. For instance, the Serbian church called for those indicted by the tribunal in The Hague to turn themselves in, to voluntarily submit themselves to the courts. The Serbian church moved quite a bit in its position over time and started to play a more helpful role.

The Croatian church, I understand, has gone through a bit more of that evolution lately too, but that was certainly not the case when I was in that job.

Q: Couldn't someone have leaned on the Vatican?

BOGUE: This is part of the problem. Even among the Croatian bishops, there were differences. The Serbian church has a head, the Patriarch. The Croatians have bishops of the Catholic Church. And yes, "does the Pope like killing?" No. "Did the Pope support war criminals?" No. There was always the awkwardness that people were making the claim, "They are persecuting us just because we are Catholic." I think Pope John Paul II did take quite a strong position frequently on this. But I wouldn't say that any of the bishops or the priests were necessarily tossed out of the church.

Q: The Catholic Church's role in World War II was not very good, but you also had the Pope, Pius XII, who didn't really take a strong stand. The Catholic Church's clerics were pretty nasty.

BOGUE: All the ambiguity in that situation has never been resolved. There has never been a clear-cut or forceful position from the Vatican on any of that, past or present. I think that issue is still in evolution now. When Gotovina was turned over to The Hague…

Q: The general?

BOGUE: Yes, he was a general. You will recall this was actually after my time in the job. He was turned over. The church did not protest. They did not defend him. They did not claim that he was just being persecuted because he was Catholic.

There are some bishops who are way out there on the right wing. There are some bishops who are not.

The Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church when I was in Belgrade in the 1980s was named German. His vicar bishop, who is like an executive officer in the church, said to me once, "You know Janet, all the Serbian bishops are either brigands or saints. One or the other. Mostly brigands and a few saints." I used to remember that when the bishops were fulminating. Still mostly brigands and only a few saints.

Q: In Bosnia, how would you describe our embassy there and dealing with it? There was a little bit of pro-consul, wasn't there?

BOGUE: Not our embassy so much. There was a High Commissioner for Bosnia who was a European, first an Austrian name, Wolfgang Petrich, then British Paddy Ashdown was the High Commissioner. That person did have the powers of the viceroy essentially. They had the power to make laws, cancel laws. They were the local parliament, prime minister, and president. The High Commissioner could in fact strike down any law that violated Dayton or violated international standards of human rights, and so on. He could also impose laws. He could fire people in the government. And he did. He fired people who he thought refused to arrest war criminals, such as police officers.

So, it wasn't our embassy. It was all the Europeans. The High Commission was run by a consortium essentially of the European Union, the United Nations, and a group of interested countries called the Contact Group, of which the United States was one. We were not the sole power in Bosnia, by any means. We had a lot of say, because most of the troops were American (perhaps only by a small margin) and NATO's military commander in Bosnia was an American. So we had a lot of say but we weren't running the place.

Lord Ashdown really did run the place. He wasn't acting as the Americans' guy. He really did run it on behalf of the European Union, with a lot of consultation with us. His deputy was an American.

Q: Think about it: as a tour of the horizon, the Balkans are as bad as they have ever been in history practically, as far as how it has broken up. But now, it's Croatia's turn. What was the situation in Croatia?

BOGUE: Croatia was vacillating back and forth between electing ultranationalist governments and much more moderate governments. Sometimes the president was on one side of that and the prime minister was on another side, which created tremendous gridlock in their own government. The Croatians liked to present themselves as having

left the Balkans and being way beyond that. This was all ancient history. But they had several outstanding issues.

One was about war criminals, like we talked about.

The other was the return of refugees, non-Croats; specifically Serbs but not only Serbs. Also Roma and other ethnic populations that had been driven out of Croatia in ethnic cleansing in Croatia, not just in Bosnia, but also in Croatia itself. The Croats were resisting mightily the return of those refugees. They didn't want non-Croats in their country. Croatia is quite a single ethnic now. There are few non-Croats in Croatia. A lot of the refugees didn't have a house or an apartment to go back to because they had moved Croatians from Bosnia and other places into those vacant buildings; a household would be driven out and another put into it. There were a lot of problems.

Again, we tried to deal with this with incentives.

There was an American manufacturer who wanted to open a plant in Croatia because he wanted to start selling whatever widgets he made. I can't remember what he made now. He made some sort of widget. He wanted to sell it in Europe and he thought Croatia would be perfect because their wages were low, and the population was well educated. It was very close to everything. There were rail links. There were water links. Transportation was good. He could never afford to put this plant in Denmark or France or Germany because the cost of living, property, and everything was too high.

He didn't want the full-page ad in the New York Times saying, "Mr. Widget Maker supports war criminals" or something. So he asked us to introduce him to three or four mayors who were actually welcoming refugees back to their town and making things work well for the refugees, trying to restore that. We did. We introduced him to three or four mayors who did that. He talked to them all. He explained that if he put his widget plant there, he would be hiring people of multiple nationalities. Anyone who didn't like that could not come to work for him. That would be the way it was.

And he would build a basketball court next to his factory. He would have daycare. He would have a clinic. He would have this and he would have all these things. Everybody was going to come.

He did pick one town. He employed about 600 people, plus the basketball court and the day care and what not. All the other towns in the area came to us and said, "We want one too."

We said, "Fine. Do what this town is doing. Bring back your refugees. Welcome them back. Fix their houses. Make them welcome. Don't burn down their houses if they come back. Don't attack them in the streets if they come back. Do what they are doing, and then we will be able to recommend to an American company that this is a good place to do business."

This man was actually very happy to help in the restoration and recovery of the Balkans. He didn't want to be part of the problem at all.

Then, again, we tried incentives. I remember talking to one mayor who said, "I would rather everyone in town go broke than to have refugees back.

And I said, "Fine. Enjoy yourself. Enjoy being broke."

Some people did have what can only be described as a "pig-headed" approach. They would rather go broke than have somebody from a different ethnic group live next door to them.

Other towns said, "Hey. You know, a terrible thing happened here. We are all kind of ashamed and unhappy about it. We need to fix it. Also, we all just need to get on our feet again."

I remember this guy telling me that when he built the basketball court, the first thing that happened was some employees came to him and said, "We want the Croatian factory team and the Serb factory team. That's how we will decide on the teams."

He said, "No, I think anybody who wants to play will put their name in a hat and I will pick six captains and draw names out of the hat. That is who is going to be on the teams. Or you don't play. If you want to have teams, I will buy the shoes, uniforms, and basketballs. I will do all that stuff. Or, you can just not do it."

They thought about it for a while. The ones who couldn't stand the thought of playing with anybody else but their own ethnic group dropped out. Most Yugoslavs are crazy about basketball. The ones who wanted to play basketball said, "Wow! Free shoes, free uniforms, and a free court! Sign me up. I don't care who is playing with me, as long as they are tall and can shoot." They figured it out that way.

But those success stories are so few and far between.

Q: How about the European Union? What role were they playing in Croatia?

BOGUE: What the European Union did everywhere was its program of assistance based on what was required to get into the European Union. There is a book, maybe ten to twelve inches thick, called the *Aquis*. It has everything that is required politically, economically, socially, in order to join the European Union. You have to harmonize everything from weights and measures. The Brits have an exemption: they can still use miles instead of kilometers, and pounds instead of kilos. Everyone else has to get with the program and use the same weights and measures, and you can see why. The railroads have to be the same width everywhere so that when you cross a border, you don't have to put a different carriage chassis on the railcar. All those kinds of things. That is the kind of micro end and the macro end if you have to have a democratically functioning government. You have to have not only laws but implementation of laws and human

rights so everyone in your country has religious freedom, freedom of the press, all that kind of thing.

So European programs were based on that which was great. These were all things these countries needed to do anyway. The economic and social reforms, even if there hadn't been conflict in the Balkans, because they were coming out of a communist government, they needed to go through this series of reforms, just as Poland and Hungary did. In order not only to harmonize themselves with the practices of the European Union, but just to be a modern functioning European economy.

That was kind of how the EU approached these programs. Of course, the European Union had some other strong interests in the Balkans. Strong economic recovery was number one, but also the return of the refugees who had come to other parts of Europe. There were substantial refugee populations from the Balkans all scattered through Europe, especially Germany and Austria. Other countries that were closest to the Balkans. There was great interest in creating a situation in which those refugees could go home.

Q: Were European companies looking into Croatia, as had the United States, as a place to invest in because of the cheap labor and good workforce? Were they playing the same game we were or not?

BOGUE: I think yes, their companies were interested in investing in Croatia. They were also very interested in Croatia as a market for European goods. Of course, in the European market, you have to be prosperous enough to buy European goods. If you are going to buy Italian shoes, you have to have enough money to do it.

I know in the cases of a number of individual countries – I can't speak for EU policy on this – but I know in the case of individual countries they were working with some of their companies to encourage the companies to be socially responsible in that regard as well. When you are looking for a place to put your factory, you look for a place that is progressive on human rights. Again, the European companies don't want the bad press of being painted as part of the problem. They don't want to be in the middle of a political problem. They don't want a blow up to occur in some town in which they could find themselves embroiled.

Q: At the time, did you feel that Croatia was moving along?

BOGUE: Yes. For a long time, I thought they would try to just wait the West out and try to convince the West that they were so advanced economically that everyone could ignore the political issues, like the refugees and the war criminals. That didn't work in the end. They finally woke up to the fact that economic progress without political progress was not going to work. I think they were moving on it.

I actually thought every place was moving along. Some at higher speeds than others. Some were doing two steps forward and one step back; sometimes one step forward and two steps back. Every place was moving forward. That was the beauty for me of working

on the Balkans again, because with my previous stints in the Balkans, everything was going backwards.

My great joy was to be able to say, "This year in Bosnia, more people died in traffic accidents than died of ethnic violence. They need to wear seat belts. They need to work on that someday too."

The fact is that the actual ethnic violence had stopped, except for very occasional, almost individual actions, like bar fights. There wasn't ethnic cleansing going on. There wasn't slaughter going on.

Q: What about these right-wing nationalist people who got elected? Were they a problem?

BOGUE: They were. It has always been interesting to see how they operate once they are in office, whether they moderate the rhetoric that they used to get themselves elected, and start governing in a more moderate way that will give them the benefits of European Union membership, NATO membership, and the like. Or whether they will be like that mayor who would rather go broke than compromise his principles, as he saw it.

I think we are seeing a little of each in various parts of the Balkans. Even the most nationalist governments have had to back off from some of the extreme nationalism if they want to pursue NATO and European Union membership. You cannot have it both ways. I think they begin to realize that and sort of paint themselves as more moderate.

One of the things that has fascinated me over the years in the Foreign Service, is the ability of an individual politician to reinvent themselves every ten years or so into something completely different than they were before.

Q: You mean like someone who was opposed to nation building becomes a nation builder?

BOGUE: It could happen. I don't know if it does, but it could.

If you take someone who went from being a communist leader to being an ultra-nationalist leader to now being the great proponent of integration with the European Union, all in the space of a 30-year period. It is remarkable to see, is all I can say. And I wouldn't leave my wallet lying around near any of them.

Q: Slovenia seems to be a new success story, almost not a problem. How is that?

BOGUE: Slovenia was not in my area, even though it was part of the former Yugoslavia. Slovenia got away clean. There was no fighting, really, in Slovenia. Slovenia slipped away early and never looked back. It did not have the destruction, the killings, the refugee flows, all the other things the other countries experienced. Slovenia went on its merry way. In fact, in recognition of that, it was not going through the same issues and

problems as the rest of the former Yugoslavia. It was handled by the office that handled Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and so on.

Q: So, it was de-Balkanized?

BOGUE: Yes, it was. We de-Balkanized them. After I left the job, Bulgaria was also moved. Bulgaria became a NATO member and was moved from the Balkan office to the office for North-Central Europe. My replacement was Cathy Stevens, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for North Central Europe was Heather Connelly. A friend called me to let me know what had happened because I was in a different office and said, "I have to tell you that today Bulgaria went from Ms. Cathy's kindergarten to Ms. Heather's first grade." The big graduation into the next group of countries.

Q: Could you talk about when you were doing this, all of a sudden, the world discovered Google and the internet and it was having a tremendous influence on how interest groups get together. I would imagine that this would have quite an impact on your area.

BOGUE: It did and it didn't. There were fascinating websites. There were websites to defend Slobodan Milosevic. There were websites devoted to all sorts of things. The main way that it fed into our work was that everybody had information immediately.

I will give you an example of that. There was a website called Serbia News Net, which is available in English and is continually updated. When we get up in the morning, it is already lunchtime there, so things have already happened. For this job, I used to get up at about 5:00 a.m. I would get on the internet first thing. I would read through all the news things while I was still in my jammies. I would talk with all of my posts on the phone briefly, just to check in with everybody to see what was going on. Then I would go into the office and read all my emails and the cable traffic.

At 8:00 a.m., all the Deputy Assistant Secretaries gathered with our Assistant Secretary to brief her on what was happening in our parts of the world before she went up for the meeting.

Secretary Powell, as you may know, is a technology geek. He loves to have his cars and his new gadgets. He is very computer adept.

One morning, I am there in my jammies and bathrobe at my computer at 5:00 a.m. There is an e-mail from the Secretary to my home email that said, "Hey Janet! I just read this on Serbia News." He sent me the email at about 4:45 a.m.

I read it. First of all, I kind of sat up and tightened my bathrobe and then thought, "He can't see me." My second thought was, "Mr. Secretary, you have got to get a life because you shouldn't be reading Serbian News Net at 4:45 a.m." That's what he did. The next day it might be somebody else.

Also, normally there is a whole chain you go through to respond to the Secretary. He sent it to me on his home email! I thought "I can't send it back directly. My boss needs to know we talked. His aide needs to know. I can't just fire back an answer to him." So I called my boss and said, "Here's my problem. I got this e-mail from the Secretary and I know the answer. If I answer him back, it cuts out everybody else."

She said, "Call his aide and tell him the answer. Then go ahead and send him the email."

So there I am sending the Secretary an email, making sure I had all the capital letters in the right place. It was really weird. He knew the news from Serbia 15 minutes before I did because he got up 15 minutes before I did, or more.

That is what changed it. There was so much information available, so quickly everywhere. Our job was not necessarily to convey information. It was often to check on the veracity of information or confirm it, and to figure out what does it mean for them and what does it mean for us and what should we do about it?

We were much less information gatherers than we were previously.

Q: So the old days of when everyone would sit down and read the paper are gone?

BOGUE: I used to read the paper if I had time for lunch. The paper was too slow. It was a nice thing to do during lunch. Everything that landed on your doorstep in the newspaper was already outdated since it was printed the night before. The web had updates.

Q: Let's talk about how things are changing. People can whip off an email without an awful lot of thought behind it now. It gets you thinking and it allows a convergence of ideas and all that. At the same time, do you act on these?

BOGUE: First of all, I will tell you a little story. Maura Harty, who is now the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, was then the executive secretary of the department. She and I were meeting for lunch in the cafeteria one day. I was a few minutes late and she was already sitting down. When I joined her, she said, "I have to tell you something."

There were two interns at the next table and she couldn't help overhearing what they were saying while she was sitting there. The tables were very close. One of the interns was brand new. The other intern had been there for a month or so. The new intern said, "What are these things people keep talking about? Cables?"

The other intern said, "It's what old people call email."

We still had very strict rules about what had to be in a cable. Instructions to a post had to be in a cable. Conveying policy decisions had to be in a cable. The reason for that was to make sure that all the right people saw it before it went out, which you can't control with e-mail. You can just send it. If I or anyone else just whipped off an email, you have to think if the lawyers have looked at it. What if we said, "The Pentagon is going to do

this." Had the Pentagon looked at it? Or, "The president wants this." Had the president's office or the NSC looked at it?

So we still insisted that there be a cable process for that. In terms of my day-to-day contacts with posts on just exchanging information, thoughts and ideas, it was 100% e-mail or phone because the cable process was too slow and too cumbersome for that. So we sent out far fewer cables than we used to.

Some posts started doing very interesting and imaginative reporting. They were reporting on classified websites that could include photographs and things like that. There was some very wonderful reporting.

But again, when you are seeking instructions or giving instructions, we still agreed it had to go through the cable process.

I am out of it now, but I understand there is now an effort underway to create an e-mail system that will have those kinds of clearances so that you can do it by email which is so much easier, faster and cheaper, but it will not have the faults of e-mail. That is to say that anybody can send an email.

Part of the thing with cables is that only certain people can sign them out. Not anybody, a brand new junior officer who has just been on duty in my office for a week, did not have the authority to sign his or her signature across it and send it. Somebody a little more senior to see that cable before it went out. That wasn't true with e-mail, because anybody could send an email saying anything.

One of my first days as the DAS, a very junior person working for me decided to drop my name to get something he wanted done that I knew nothing about. He said, "DAS Bogue really wants this done today." I knew nothing about this. There were two problems.

One was that he was sending it to an officer who used to work with me and knew me very well. The other was that he spelt my name wrong. The woman at the other end who had been a junior officer of mine at a previous post got this email and forwarded it to me saying, "Hey, DAS Bogue (spelled wrong). One: do you really need this today? And two: when did you change the spelling of your name? Best regards." Of course, the guy was busted.

That kind of thing could happen. If she hadn't sent it back to me, I would never have known that he was using my name to demand things that I didn't know about or care about. He was trying to increase his own leverage by using someone else's name. We had a little chat.

Q: When Kennedy was president, he would sometimes call a desk officer, or someone would say, "This is the White House calling." This created a certain amount of hell because you thought, who in the White House? It may have been a very junior person.

I am looking at the time and I think this might be a good place to stop. We will pick up the minor problem of Serbia the next time.

There is one thing I would like to comment on. I came into the Foreign Service in 1955. I retired in 1985. You have mentioned, she, she, she, of all the people you are dealing with and two of the last three secretaries of state have been women and you were deputy assistant secretary and assistant secretary Beth Jones. At one point, after I started this oral history program, there has been quite a movement of women academics…

Q: We were making a big point of "well, as soon as women get empowered in foreign affairs we're going to have a gentler, nicer foreign policy."

BOGUE: Like Margaret Thatcher.

Q: Right, and Indira Gandhi and Golda Meir. But anyway, this is the thrust. I have to say, I was somewhat skeptical, but there was a very big push: let's get more women in. I was working very hard to find women who had positions of responsibility. They were few and far between. Now, the State Department is much more one gendered than it used to be, but I can't say that I have noticed anything warm or fuzzy about it. To me, it is a little bit amusing.

BOGUE: I didn't see gender differences. I had female bosses and female subordinates who were fantastic and who were terrible. I had male bosses and male subordinates who were fantastic, and I had those who were terrible. And I had everything in between. To me, it was an individual difference rather than a gender based difference.

I would say that when I was serving in the Islamic world in Pakistan and so on, I had an enormous advantage being female. People never think it is going to be that way. They think, what a terrible difference disadvantage.

The male diplomats could not talk to women at all. They could not go into the part of houses where women live. I was allowed to talk to the men because I was a diplomat and was treated sort of as an honorary man and was allowed to socialize and talk to men. I could also go into the women's quarters and talk to the women. I had a lot of opportunities to hear from, for instance, the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The male officers could only talk to the men. The female officers could talk to both the men and the women.

I spent many hours in people's kitchens and in the female quarters with the women and children. Of course, I heard their concerns, which were often different. The men's concerns were all about overthrowing the government, this Mujahedeen faction or that. The women were interested in healthcare for their children, education for the children, and safety for themselves. They were very concerned about sexual assaults in the camps and things like that. It was a completely different universe there. It was one I had access to and the men didn't.

Oddly enough, people always think coming back from Pakistan that it must be awful there. From a professional point of view, I had tremendous advantages over the men, because I had access to all parts of the population.

From a personal point of view, it could be aggravating as hell. People bother you on the street. It is so hot there and you have to wear long sleeves and long clothing all the time, even when it is 120 degrees, you cannot put on short sleeves. That is just annoying but that is something you can live with easily.

Q: Anyway, we all feel better because of this gentler approach to foreign policy.

BOGUE: Right. No more use of the military now that there are women in charge.

Q: We will pick this up next time. We have been going around and we have finally come square to the circle. We are coming back to Serbia. We will talk about Serbia and then move on.

BOGUE: Okay, great.

Q: Today is October 22nd, 2007.

Serbia: What was up? How did you view Serbia?

BOGUE: Serbia was in a tremendous tangle with itself. On the one hand, Milosevic left for The Hague the day before I started working as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau for European and Eurasian Affairs. That was a sea change in Serbia and a relief. It offered an opportunity for positive change.

On the one hand, there was a real streak of reform. People were very much fed up with the Milosevic era in every way; not only the wars, but also the corruption, the loss of civil liberties at home, and the destruction of the economy. On the other hand, there was still a huge amount of the old Serbian sentiment that, "We are victims in all of this. Everyone is against us. We are not going to send people to The Hague."

Serbia was mired in any number of problems. One was getting out from under the shadow of the Milosevic regime. Another was getting out from the shadow of communism. They had not gone through the reform process that the other former communist states had gone through.

On the one hand, you had some really terrific dynamic leaders. On the other hand, you had a lot of the retrogressive forces. The only way you could get elected was to try to walk a fine line among all the competing interests. It was a very tough situation for Serbs and Serbian leaders. It was a very schizophrenic time in Serbia.

I remember having a finance minister from Serbia, a young guy who had been educated and worked in the West through the Milosevic years. He had come back, completely on fire, to reform the stubborn old communist economy. He and I sat down with the Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs, Al – I have forgotten the name now – a wonderful guy who has now retired. You could tell they were two kindred spirits, two economists who understood each other. They would just take off and talk about all these things that needed to happen.

Then you would go out to Serbia and you would meet with people who the minute you mentioned any subject like the war criminals or Kosovo, they would launch into the long story of Serbian victimization which I know you have heard a hundred times yourself. There were some new chapters added in recent years with NATO replacing the Turks as the most recent victimizer. It was a complicated situation.

I personally think that in the end, twenty years from now, you might very well have Serbia being the most cosmopolitan and the most multi-ethnic of any state that came out of the former Yugoslavia, odd as that seems. In my mind, it is kind of the ultimate revenge on Milosevic because Serbia still has other ethnicities: Albanians, Hungarians, Roma, and other ethnicities in it. It has the most forward-looking law on national minorities of any country in the former Yugoslavia, developed with the help of the OSCE and others. It has the only large cosmopolitan city and university still, although Zagreb may take off in that regard.

I often thought that it was going to be quite ironic that having started all this mess that Serbia might end up being much more multi-ethnic, much more prosperous and a much more vital kind of hip place in Europe in terms of offering something for the future of young people than other places. That still might come true.

The thing Serbia has to get over – this is a syndrome you will also recognize Stu – is Serbia always thinks that Europe cannot manage without it. In fact, from a European view, Serbia is not necessarily a positive, but potentially a negative. Serbia can start wars. Serbia can cause problems. Serbia can do this. Serbia can do that.

But the Serbs tend to think they are such an important country politically in the region, such an important country economically in the region, that they don't have to make the kind of changes to get into NATO or the European Union that others do because they are so important, no one can manage without them. Somehow, they need to get past that. Yes, in their region, they are a big power, for good or for ill. In Europe itself, they are not a big power. They are not any more of a power certainly than Hungary, or the Czech Republic; less so, because their economy and political situation are poor. They are in fact going to have to go through with the reforms. The Serbs felt strongly that they could just sit back and wait. Eventually, Europe would say, "We just cannot manage without the Serbs, so we have to invite them in."

In a way, as so often happened in the past, Serbia is being held back by its own psychology, rather than anything else.

Q: What did you see showing promise? You have cases such as Ireland, which was sort of the armpit of the European Union for a long time, stuck way back. All of a sudden, now it is really jumping as far as being the "it" place, which is something you are referring to in the possibility that Serbia could become. What is there?

BOGUE: What I saw is that Serbia had many of its young people started returning after Milosevic fell. That is in very stark contrast to young people from Bosnia, for instance. People started coming back. Well-educated young people were interested in making a future, and saw a future for themselves in Serbia. That was very different from what we were seeing elsewhere.

Serbia has a real economy. It is old fashioned in a lot of ways, but it has manufacturing, agriculture, natural resources, and the like. There are things that an economy can be built on.

They still have, despite everything, a reasonably good system of education. Young people who go through the Serbian school system still come out with what amounts to a European education that is strong in math, science, and computing, and all those kinds of things that are heavily valued.

They were beginning to solve problems in a better way. They were beginning to deal in a much better way with the Albanians who lived in southern Serbia, in terms of establishing a much better regime of rights and economic participation, political participation, for them.

They were dealing with the Hungarians of Vojvodina in a very positive way, not the way they had dealt with other ethnic groups in the past.

They were beginning to make the kind of political and economic reforms that needed to come about. That was really exemplified by the group that really helped to bring Milosevic down. This was a group of Serbian young people who called themselves Otpor!. Otpor! was a young people's movement that did get support from outside. It got support from the Americans. It got support from the Europeans. It was thought up and directed by young Serbs. It was not a case of Americans creating a group saying, "You are going to be the opposition."

They are the ones who organized the street demonstrations against Milosevic. They are the ones who really did this. They had a tremendous commitment to Serbia and its future. They were dynamic young people.

The people they got to organize with them really came from all sorts of groups. You had marching and these wonderful protests. You had artists and writers, which you expected, from Yugoslavia; theater people. You also had the steel manufacturers of Nis, and the coal miners of such-and-such a place. The kind of people who in general had brought Milosevic to the forefront, but now were feeling a lot of the pain of the economic

policies, of the corruption, of all the problems that Serbia had, the pain of their children going off to serve in these wars.

Otpor! did a very good job of that. It was an indigenous movement. In fact, representatives from Otpor! have been invited to other countries to talk about how they did it. They were invited to Georgia before the Rose Revolution. They were invited to Ukraine and various other places to consult on how this was done.

One of the things they did, and one of the things that people like Zoran Djindjic who emerged from this in a leadership position, was to reach out to the police who had been seen very much as the enemy, and reasonably so under Milosevic. Something happened again from the years of war. This is a fascinating phenomenon that you see over and over again.

There comes a moment in revolutions when the police decline to shoot their own people. I think it is one of the beauties of the Otpor! movement was that they went to the police, not screaming at them that they were Milosevic's toadies. They said to them, "We are your neighbors. We are your nephews. We are your sisters. We are your kids. We are your brothers." They brought them roses. They brought them gifts of food. The day came when Otpor's group decided to go into the parliament and take over the building. The police had to decide whether to shoot them or stand aside. They stood aside.

A considerable amount of negotiations and prearrangement had gone on. The fact was the police were no longer willing. They were faced with not just a few. Milosevic would have called them just a few people who were out to destroy Serbia. They were faced with a cross-section of their neighbors, people who were legitimately the nephews and the sisters and the children of the police. They declined to fire on them. The protesters embraced them.

There is a beautiful film that shows the protesters and the police hugging, a great lovefest, on the steps of the parliament. That is the kind of thing that gave us all hope.

There has been a lot of backsliding since. There has been a lot of discomfort in Serbia about how to go forward. I think that young people were so committed and weren't saying, as they were saying in Bosnia, "I just want to get out. I want to move to Canada or the United States and get out." They were saying, "It is rough here, but this is my home. We need to stay here and fix it."

Q: While you were dealing with this, was there any movement towards the Serbs and the Croats opening up and getting things going again?

BOGUE: No. The problems between Serbia and Croatia remain very severe. There was no opening of highways. You couldn't fly from Belgrade to Zagreb. You had to fly to Vienna or Frankfurt and then come back. What was a half hour flight you had to make into a half-day or more journey to fly all the way out to one of the hubs in Europe and

come back. That problem continued to rankle, much more so than other relationships. I am excepting Kosovo from this.

Bosnia and Serbia still had a difficult relationship. Serbia and Croatia had a very difficult relationship still. That problem was not getting any better. It was a typical Balkan thing. "We will consider that when you apologize for X, Y and Z. We will consider this, but only if you admit that everything was your fault." There was a lot of that going on.

One of the problems in Serbia today is that you do have a large group of Serbs who were refugees or displaced persons from Croatia, from Bosnia, from Kosovo. They tend to be unemployed. They tend to live in terrible housing. They tend to be quite rabid in their political views. They present a real challenge to the government as well, in that you have this large group of discontented angry people who haven't been able, or who haven't chosen to go back depending on circumstances, but who also have not essentially thrown in the towel and said, "We will make a life here in Serbia now."

That problem isn't going to go away for a while either.

Q: It's just one of those things. It's a little bit like the Sudeten Deutsch, which took a couple of generations for them to die out.

Were we trying to do anything for resettlement, trying to help the situation?

BOGUE: We were trying to make sure that refugees, people who needed to cross the border who wanted to go home, could go home. One of the great problems was Croatia not welcoming home non-Croat ethnic refugees. In other cases, we did have some programs of economic development that were meant to try to help Serbia get on its feet, including everyone then in Serbia.

Of course, there was some resistance to that too. It was in the interests of some politicians, the more nationalist ones, to keep these people in a state of permanent refugee status. It doesn't do them any good, if you are a right-wing nationalist, to have people assimilate and get back to work.

Q: We have this problem with the Palestinian refugees that has gone on for over 60 years now. The policy of some Arab powers could keep them in camps.

BOGUE: Exactly. For internal as well as external policy reasons. I think you see some of that too.

In Serbia, there is going to be a lot of backsliding. I think again if you put it in the context, not just of what happened in the Balkans, but what happened in the larger Europe and you look at election results elsewhere, you see how Poland and other places have gone through a period of looking back with tremendous nostalgia for the communist period. The transition has been very harsh on people economically, and so on. If you take that and overlay it with all the other problems of the wars, the refugees, the war

criminals, and so on, it shouldn't be a surprise to anyone that Serbia sometimes votes for what we would consider extreme nationalist politics.

Countries going through a transition out of communism that had no war voted for right-wing extreme nationalist politicians, or voted to return to the old communist thing as well. This is all part of sorting out of life.

I actually had a Serbian politician say to me once after he had several drinks--and would have denied ever saying it if I repeated it using his name--that difficult as it was for the Serbs to accept the hiding off great pieces of its territory, in a sense they were like the Czech Republic after the split up of Czechoslovakia. Serbia was left with the natural resources, the factories, the highly educated population, and in many ways, the parts that had been the greatest economic drain had gone away. Montenegro was probably going to go away. Macedonia had already gone away. Kosovo probably would go away at some point. In fact, that would leave the heart of Serbia, which was economically quite prosperous, relatively speaking in the part of Europe. It would leave a reasonably highly educated population and so on.

Q: How about the Republic of Sirtzka, a little bit of land off Bosnia? What was happening to it?

BOGUE: It was refusing to wither. As time goes by, it becomes increasingly less relevant. At those times that the Serbs elected reformist governments, the Republic of Sirtzka was completely out of step with them. Although it considered itself close to Belgrade, it was really terribly out of step with those policies. It was very retrogressive on everything, not just the war criminals in Bosnia, but on economic policy, social policy, and so on. They were not doing well. They lived off huge subsidies from the government in Belgrade.

I must say that a huge mistake that I think the international community made, all of us collectively, was allowing these kinds of formal relationships to flourish. It is one thing to say, "Our identity is Serbian, so the Serbian government provides some help to us in cultural materials and things like that to make sure that we can retain our culture."

You had situations where parts of these places that were under international control – this is true in both Bosnia and Kosovo – actually had people working in them who were paid by the government of Serbia. I just thought it was nuts.

For instance, in the town of Mitrovica, the divided town in Kosovo, the north side was Serbian and the south side was Albanian. On the north side, the doctors, nurses and teachers were not paid by the UN, but by the government budget of Serbia, even though the UN controlled this territory. To me, this was just outrageous.

Even more outrageous is that it happened in a place like Bosnia. At least in Kosovo, it was a temporary protectorate with the final status uncertain, and still officially part of Serbia. Bosnia was now a fully independent state with a seat in the UN recognized by

other countries. Yet, you had a foreign government essentially paying teachers, administrators and soldiers. Soldiers in the Bosnian Serb Army could hold a dual commission in the Serbian Army and were paid pensions or were paid salaries from the budget of Serbia. To me, this is completely ineffectual.

Imagine if United States Army people who were of Portuguese descent were suddenly being paid by Portugal rather than by the United States. It was completely unacceptable and created a situation in which people's loyalties, financial as well as political, were to Belgrade instead of to Sarajevo. I really thought that the local government and the international community should have rejected these arrangements.

Q: During the time you were there, was there any thought or move towards straightening out this problem?

BOGUE: Every now and then in Kosovo, the UN tried to tell the local Kosovar Albanian elected officials that one way out of this was for them to start paying these people a salary. There were two problems. One was that the Serbs would not accept it. The second was that the Kosovar Albanians did not want to pay it. This was understandable on both sides. These people were very dug in. The Serbs were saying, "We are not going to take your money." The Albanians were saying, "Why should we be paying people who don't want to cooperate with our government at all?"

For the UN, the alternative was to say, "Okay. No more doctors and nurses. No more teachers."

Then, what have you got? And you have got north Mitrovica in an even worse situation with no medical care and no schooling for the kids. That's a huge problem obviously too.

Once they were in this mess, there was not an easy way out of it.

Q: How did you find the Orthodox Church during your time?

BOGUE: Again, I think the Serbian Orthodox Church had a spasm of conscience following its enthusiastic support of greater Serbian nationalism during the wars, and was now much more focused on the victims of the war, the wrongness of human rights abuses, and so on. I think it realized that it had been, like so many people, conned and used by Milosevic to a great extent. They never should have allowed themselves to be conned and used. They had been around for centuries and they should know better. It's a pretty canny group, you know?

Q: Milosevic was playing to their basic stand for centuries.

BOGUE: Exactly. But they did take a stronger line on things like human rights. One of the things that really changed people's opinions on Serbia was when Milosevic first started murdering a lot of prominent Serbs. He had a lot of the great heroes, and I say that in an ironic way, of Serbia during the campaign, like the commander called Arkan who

was murdered in a Belgrade hotel. The assumption supported by a lot of evidence is that Milosevic had him murdered because Arkan was the kind of person who could testify against him. Then Ivan Stanbolic, who was a long-time Serbian leader and a leader of the Communist Party who had been pretty critical of Milosevic, was also murdered in Belgrade.

I think for Serbs it was one thing when they could perceive Milosevic supporting greater Serbia by "standing up to the abuse of Serbs in Kosovo." Again, I put that in quotes. When he was starting to wipe out other Serbs in what was clearly a power struggle or megalomania, I think there was some change in public opinion.

Another thing started to happen. I am not saying Milosevic had a tremendous monopoly on information. You would think that is not possible any more in this age of the internet. There were some places people could go for other information, the nightly news and so on. You would see the same little film clip on the nightly news. When I was traveling, I would switch on the television and see the same clip in Croatia as in Serbia, the same dead body on the ground, with the Croatian television saying that this was a Croat murdered in Bosnia by the horrible Serbs. Then the same dead body was a poor Serb farmer murdered by the evil whomever.

One of the things that did start to change people's opinions was when some of these homemade videos started coming out. The homemade videos started to be shown after Milosevic's fall on television in Belgrade. What they showed were not heroic Serbs defending Serbs against the horrible attacks of Croats and Muslims. What they showed were a bunch of drunken guys taking great delight in torturing and shooting unarmed people, including children.

The Serbs who had claimed all along that this was just Western propaganda, another case of the world lining up against them, and had this belief that their warriors were these noble creatures. To see these people acting the way the West had seen them acting, I think was very shattering for a lot of Serbs psychologically. It all contributed to an environment in which it was possible to move forward a bit, although not in a smooth and steady way.

Q: Did you see the whole communications system, particularly the internet, every year it is more sophisticated than the last…

What period are we talking about?

BOGUE: This is 2001 to 2003.

Q: So, we are well into it. Can you comment on the impact of the fact you can get any idea or pictures out to people on the internet?

BOGUE: It worked both ways, of course. You can also get bad information and propaganda pictures. For all the websites that purported to give people good information,

there were others purporting to give equally good information. There were "defend Slobodan Milosevic" websites. There were Serbian chauvinist websites.

Another problem, not exclusive to the Balkans but a common problem I find, many of the NGOs or the think tanks, including the West, that were set up specifically to deal with Balkan problems, had very heavy political agendas. In other words, there were groups that would set themselves up as a think tank or an NGO, but they really only had the one agenda. The one agenda might be to bomb Belgrade into tiny little pieces. Or their one agenda might be to protect Serbia against the horrible people who are trying to smash it.

They would put out information that looked impressive because they had a think tank name, nice stationery, nice website, and all that. As you know, the problem with the internet is sorting the wheat from the chaff. It is very difficult on the internet.

Q: Could we do anything in that regard?

BOGUE: We had very little power to do that because we had become the enemy. The United States had been the one that had, in the end, pressed for the Dayton Accords. It was the United States that wanted to go ahead in Kosovo without any UN security resolutions. It organized NATO into that. I think the United States was not seen as any kind of an honest broker by the Serbs. We were seen as putting out propaganda that was not generally friendly to Serbia in the mind of the public.

That said, I have to say I was in Belgrade about five or six days after 9/11 of 2001. The embassy was covered with flowers. We had been bombing Belgrade ourselves not too long before. In fact, right across from the embassy were still charred ruins of the Ministry of Defense. The embassy did get a couple of phone calls from people saying, "Now you know how it feels. Good for those guys who blew up your buildings." It was maybe three or four.

Compared to that were these acres of flowers covering the embassy. The Serbs really saw this as a human tragedy. Most of them, as you know, Stu, have relatives in the United States or Canada.

Q: Thanks to my work as a consular officer.

BOGUE: Right. There is hardly a Serbian family that doesn't have relatives here, with all the visas you handed out.

Q: There were a lot of people.

BOGUE: There was lots of immigration from Serbia to the United States and Canada over many, many years, since World War I really.

There was a lot of human feeling there. But we were not seen as sources of good information. I remember talking to human rights advocates in Serbia who said, "The

worst thing for our credibility is to be supported by you. We don't want your money. It hurts us to have money from the United States. Then, we are just a tool of Washington, rather than Serbs who are concerned about human rights."

Q: Was this one of those things where we really couldn't do much? Would it screw up the work?

BOGUE: I think our programs in Serbia were good ones because they were focused on almost technical matters. They were focused on reforming the electricity sector, reforming the banking sector. Those are areas where our aid money and our expertise can do a lot of good, without it being heavily politicized; without it being seen as somehow our trying to manipulate the political process. I think that was an appropriate role for us to take.

Q: What about exchanges? Or students going to the United States? Was there much of that? I would think that could be a little bit tricky because the Serbs are getting such a bad name. "Oh, so you are a Serb. So you killed Bosnians in Srebrenica?" How did this work?

BOGUE: I would have to look up the numbers in terms of student visas issued. I expect, as you say, it's probably quite small. We did sponsor a lot of exchanges in the post-Milosevic period for mayors, parliamentarians, NGO and civic leaders of various kinds, bankers, and all sorts of people to come to the United States. It worked very well. I think that helped to break down a lot of people's views of what Americans were like.

I do know a Serbian kid who went to college in upstate New York. He felt himself a bit beleaguered by classmates and so on, who perceived Serbs as warmongers. As it happens, he is from a very liberal, anti-Milosevic kind of family. I think he spent a lot of time doing what a lot of foreign students have to do in the United States, which is explaining that everyone in that country is not alike. Everyone isn't a cartoon. It's the same thing Americans do when they are abroad. When people express surprise that they speak a foreign language, and have to explain that in fact a lot of Americans do speak a foreign language. Not all are like the cartoons of the ugly Americans abroad.

Q: Let's talk about Kosovo. What was happening?

BOGUE: Kosovo was in that horrible period of limbo when any discussion of status was taboo. The proper answer anytime anyone raised status among the internationals was, "This is not the right time. We have no indication of what the right time would be."

There was still a fair amount of violence in Kosovo. I don't mean fighting, but attacks on civilians, drive-by shooting kinds of things, farmers out in fields being shot. This was violence by Kosovar Albanians directed at Roma, directed at Serbs, mostly Serbs. People in the minority groups there had to have NATO escorts to go to the grocery store, things like that. It was still a difficult and challenging scene there.

As you will remember, many of the Serbs living in Kosovo have only been able to stay in Kosovo because of massive subsidies from Serbia over the years. Their economy was not tenable. So what you had was a Kosovar Albanian population hugely frustrated that there is no independent future in sight. People still entertained at least the theoretical possibility that they would remain part of Serbia. But none of the Western powers were willing to come out and talk about the future or even say, "Inevitably, you will be independent, but you have to make some steps in the right direction."

It was during that time that we developed a set of benchmarks, things that the elected local government in Kosovo could work on so they could come to a status discussion saying, "You gave us 10 tasks and here is where we are." It was everything from economic and political reform to human rights, security and safety, and the like.

There were all these awkward problems. One was the so-called Kosovo Protection Corps. This was what NATO had allowed: a corps of people who were former fighters from the Kosovo Liberation Army organized to be a kind of civil defense battalion. These were guys who had been fighting, and rescuing kittens out of trees really wasn't their idea of what men do. They saw themselves as the future army of an independent Kosovo. They wanted to be treated as the future army of an independent Kosovo. They wanted to go to military schools and get military training, all that kind of thing. The only thing the UN could accept for them under the terms of all this was that they be a kind of civil defense. It was really an employment scheme to keep these young fighters from hanging about with nothing to do and no money.

Everything was in limbo. You couldn't resolve the status of the Kosovo Protection Corps, because if Kosovo were going to become independent, then they would be the nucleus of the army. If they were not going to become independent, were you really just going to make them into a fire department, or were you going to disband them altogether? What in the world was going to happen to these people?

There were a lot of issues like that that were just left hanging. There was relatively little appetite for doing things like slogging through reform of the electrical system, with no indication that in the future you would in fact be an independent electrical utility. That was a very awkward and difficult situation.

Everything that came up that was affected by this in so many ways. One was, for instance, that Macedonia and Serbia needed to settle a little border dispute and really demarcate their border. That gets involved with Kosovo's border, and there is no official border yet. So that leaves Macedonia hanging with no resolution to its border problems with Serbia.

All these kinds of things just rolled on and on and on. There were immense difficulties and problems that resulted from this state of limbo. No one was comfortable. I think the international community hoped that things would just calm down after a while, and that would allow everything to go forward. There might be a more reformist government in Serbia and things would settle down.

As limbo went on, among the things that happened were that people became very frustrated and very restless about it.

There were other huge issues within Kosovo in terms of human rights; huge issues with how centralized the government would be or whether it would be a more decentralized government. That gets into minority rights as well, because if mayors and…

Q: This is Tape 11, Side 1 with Janet Bogue.

BOGUE: I was just reading an article about Kosovo in The New Yorker, a couple of weeks ago. In that article, Richard Holbrooke is quoted as saying that in the first Bush Administration, there was a smooth glide path toward Kosovo's independence. Milosevic was gone. There was a reformist government in Belgrade. Russia was not in any position to say no. The United States wasn't embroiled in Iraq.

In fact, it wasn't quite as simple as Ambassador Holbrooke makes it out. There was an insurgency in Macedonia. There was a rather fragile security situation within Kosovo itself. In southern Serbia, there had been an insurgency of ethnic Albanians. So it wasn't quite the smooth glide path. It was true that some of the external factors, like Russia, might have been easier to deal with then. In terms of the Balkans itself, this idea that it was a perfectly smooth glide path is a little hard to believe.

Q: When you look at the situation, a remarriage between the Serbs and the Kosovars seemed to be pretty unlikely, unless somehow you can get everybody to inbreed, or something like that. The other one is, looking at Kosovo, and we've both been there; Bosnia, you can imagine something coming out as a little Switzerland or something; but Kosovo looks like one big potato patch or something. It just doesn't seem to have anything going for it.

BOGUE. Yes. My own opinion throughout this time was that there was really no alternative for Kosovo except independence. They would never accept being back under Serbian rule. Serbia had, through its own behavior, lost the right to govern Kosovo. Independence was the only answer. I did think that the Kosovars had not made that answer an easy one for people to come to, both because of the refusal to respect rights for minorities in Kosovo, the Serbs or the Roma, the Roma had certainly not attacked them in the way they felt the Serbs had; but also their very bad behavior vis-à-vis Macedonia was not making anybody happy. Also, the trafficking in weapons, trafficking in human beings passing through Kosovo, and the lack of any kind of legitimate economy in this very small, resource poor and over-populated space made Europeans particularly nervous, since they felt they would bear the brunt of this. This would not be so much a state as a formalized criminal enterprise. That is unfair to most Kosovars.

But the fact is, as in Bosnia, during the war many of the people who had and took an opportunity were criminals. Here is a situation of chaos and criminals with guns. So they were going into a situation of chaos, and because they had guns and power, they could do

very well for themselves. The government in Kosovo had not, nor had the UN, succeeded in smashing those criminal networks, either in Bosnia or in Kosovo. It was a much bigger problem in Kosovo, a much newer and fresher problem than in Bosnia.

Part of the problem was what are they going to do for a living? It's not a tourist destination. It's not a place blessed with natural resources. There are a few mines. They have a reasonably well-educated population, and maybe they could become one of these places that does a lot of high tech manufacturing or something that isn't as expensive as elsewhere in Europe. That is a long way down the road.

Again, one of the problems not of the Kosovars' making but the fact that their status was still in doubt really and it was still a very unsettled situation. It made it impossible to attract foreign investment. Who in the world is going to invest in a factory when you don't know what country it may belong to in a few years down the road?

Q: We are talking about 2002. What was there to prevent us from saying, "Okay, we think you are going to have to be an independent country. So as far as the United States is concerned, you are independent." Or somebody making this decision. What went against that?

BOGUE: Well, it's interesting. Now President Bush has done just that vis-à-vis Kosovo in the last year. At the time, the White House was quite adamant that we not take that view. The White House did not want to see further instability in the Balkans. It saw Kosovo, partly because of the situation in Macedonia, as potentially being a destabilizing agent in the Balkans, causing wars in neighboring territories, rather than being a stabilizing influence. With Milosevic out of the scene, they wanted to get things stabilized and on a good path before that happened.

Also, they wanted to work with the Europeans and others, even Russia, although it wasn't as powerful as now. Russia was very adamant on this issue. For Russia, independence for Kosovo brings up immense issues about Chechnya and Dagestan, and other places in Russian territory that might very well seek independence. It's a very uncomfortable issue for the Russians to deal with. Plus they feel somehow that they are the protectors of the Serbs, as their younger brother Slavs. That was an issue even at the time that the Russians were very concerned with, that there be no precipitous moves to independence for Kosovo.

You will remember that when NATO and the Russians began military operations in Kosovo, the Russians went in early, ahead of schedule, and seized the airport in Pristina. It was their way of letting everyone know that they were going to have their say in this situation.

Q: In dealing with Serbia during your time, we weren't nice to the Serbs: we bombed the hell out of them. Who was carrying the Western waters, as far as dealing with the Serbs?

BOGUE: Well, not very many people above my level, I have to say.

Q: Not just about you. I am talking about the Western community, the Europeans.

BOGUE: Right.

Q: If we were, I won't say precluded, but certainly, we had to keep a relatively low profile from what I can gather you are saying. Who was doing the Serb contact business?

BOGUE: Well, there was the so-called Contact Group that met regularly with the Serbs. That was us, the Russians, the Europeans, and the international organizations like the UN and the European Union as a collective in addition to the individual members.

The Serbs did tend to see various countries as permanently hostile or permanently friendly toward them. They saw the French as their long time friends, dating back to the First World War. They saw the Germans as friends and allies of Croatia, dating back to the Second World War, and therefore in the enemy camp. They had mixed feelings about the Brits. They had mixed feelings about us, more generally negative than positive for many reasons. They saw Turkey as the enemy. They saw Greece as their friend. They tended to look at countries in a very black and white way.

It made it harder for them to deal with countries collectively, like the European Union or NATO, because it had all those countries in it. If they talked to NATO, there is a NATO position and yet, Greece is in NATO. France is in NATO, sort of. The same with the European Union. It includes countries they saw as their friends, as well as countries they saw as their foes. I think they are much more comfortable with those dealings now.

I would say on all the Balkan issues by this time, there was a strong European leaning. That was not so much a question of American credibility at that point; it was much more a question of American distraction with Afghanistan and Iraq. Also, the fact that we wanted the Europeans to play a bigger role in the Balkans. And they wanted to play a bigger role.

Q: Did you find them sort of taking tracts you were uncomfortable with?

BOGUE: We and the Brits tended to be on the tougher end of the scale about things like war criminals. Sometimes we worried that the Europeans would not be hard enough on making linkages, for instance, between turning over war criminals and starting the process of acceding to the EU. In fact, as it happened, as much as I followed it in the papers, the European Union has been very tough on these issues in the end.

The big worry Americans always have diplomatically about the Europeans is that meetings won't be followed up with action, that somehow a communiqué is not an event. I found in general that the Europeans working on the Balkans were very knowledgeable, very capable and very interested in fixing this problem.

Q: By the time you left there, did you feel things were moving on a relatively positive track?

BOGUE: I did. I couldn't have said, confidently, "Well, they have turned a corner. They are on their way."

But I could say that most of the countries in my purview were doing better. No one was at war, internally or externally. The level of ethnic violence, apart from war, attacks on people, that sort of thing; or attacks on churches, mosques, symbols; was way down. Some of the countries had in fact started the process of NATO membership and European Union membership. Many of them had started the process of starting to deal with each other as independent sovereign nations and neighbors again. So I did feel that there was a long way to go, that there were fits and starts moving in the same direction, and that there was reason to be optimistic about the future.

Q: You were doing this from…?

BOGUE: From 2001 to 2003.

Q: How did 9/11 affect your bureau and your area?

BOGUE: I think it did a couple of things. One was that in the area, it very much accelerated the move toward European lead on all things Balkan as the United States became involved, after 9/11, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. It took a lot of senior attention away from the Balkans, which was fine in many ways. You don't want to be on the front page of the paper all the time. You don't want the president to be your desk officer all the time. You want to have a chance to work on these things. Probably the single most important development was that it accelerated the move toward European lead.

In terms of how it affected us in the bureau, particularly after the war started in Iraq, that became all-consuming of everyone's time and attention. "You're with us or you're not." Countries in the Balkans are kind of struggling along, emerging from their own wars, and we say, "So, are you with us on Iraq?" And they were kind of, "Huh?" In fact, we did get some help in various ways from countries in the Balkans on Iraq.

Most important, and what I tried to tell my folks, was that now this was our opportunity. It was no longer a situation of us receiving the tablets from Mt. Sinai, and carrying out the things that were chiseled on them. It was up to us to develop ideas, to work with European colleagues and the international organizations to bring them to fruition, and to keep this off the plates of senior people.

I have to say that senior people were really good about it. Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage never failed to do anything I asked them to. But I was very tough with my folks about what we asked them to do. We didn't ask them to see everybody who came through. We only asked them when it was really, really truly important, and

they never said no. They always made time. They didn't say, "We can't think about that right now. We are too busy." They always came through, but it was always up to us to sort of police that for ourselves.

Q: Were you feeling, even before 9/11, the Bush II doctrine of "none of this nation building nonsense?"

BOGUE: Right. When I came in, the Macedonia insurgency was in full swing. The White House was just adamant that we shouldn't be in Kosovo. We shouldn't be in Bosnia. We have been there way too long. We shouldn't be doing nation building. We don't want to do it again in Macedonia. Although they had gotten the essential point about Macedonia, which is intervene early and small, rather than intervene later and big. It was much better to nip these things in the bud, and then support a NATO intervention in Macedonia very early on. They did not want to hang around and do nation building. They did not want to do any of that. I think we have all been quite stunned to see the extent of change in that approach with Afghanistan and Iraq.

Q: Okay. 2002, whither?

BOGUE: I had told Beth Jones, my boss, that I had really intended to do this job for only two years and that would be enough of 24/7 traveling and so on. The problem for me was that the Europeans had a meeting practically every other week on the Balkans. For them, it was a day trip wherever they were coming from in Europe. They fly or take the train, and they were home. For me, it was a minimum of three days with overnight flights, an exhausting kind of thing.

I had already decided that I was going to retire in 2005 when I turned 50, a decision I had come to for personal and professional reasons. The job I had my eye on for my last two years was to run the entry-level program. In other words, everybody new coming into the Foreign Service would pass through my hands. I would be in charge of their assignments, to get them assigned and trained and out to posts for ten years and so on. I thought that would be fun. I thought it would be a great kind of legacy job, a job where you could make some sort of stamp on the future in a positive way. You can certainly do that at an embassy or a post, but during the two years I did that job, I think maybe 4,000 came through. A whole generation was going to be in your care.

Q: This is the Powell generation too, isn't it?

BOGUE: This is the Powell generation, a very exciting generation. Colin Powell was our best recruiter. We had posters of Colin Powell that said, "I want to talk to you about a very important job." Immensely effective among all sorts of people. Colin Powell was one of those people who transcends race, gender, age, everything else. He could make contact in a positive way with men and women, people of every race, and people from little kids to elderly people. He was a great recruiter for us.

The other reason that it is the Colin Powell generation was that he managed to get Congress finally to increase the budget to make up for what were really enormous holes in the Foreign Service.

Our organizational chart is supposed to look like a pyramid, wider at the bottom, gradually getting smaller at the top. Instead, it sort of looked like an hourglass. We had a lot of senior officers and we were bringing in a lot of junior officers. There was nobody in the middle from the years when we had stopped hiring. He was trying to correct that by bringing in not just Foreign Service officers, what we think of as diplomats, but computer techs, security agents, English teaching specialists, and all the 19 different specialties that are in the Foreign Service as well.

It's a job I had always wanted in the Foreign Service and was lucky enough to get it, coming out of the European Bureau. So I spent my final two years in the Department doing that job.

Q: Where were you located and what were you doing?

BOGUE: I was located in the Bureau of Human Resources, what used to be called the Bureau of Personnel. I was in the Office of Career Development and Assignments, in the entry-level division. We were a very large division. We had control of assignments for everyone who hadn't been tenured, in effect, the first two assignments. It was our job to make sure they met the requirements for tenure, including language proficiency and so on, and also fill the needs of the service in assignments and try to accommodate whatever family issues and needs they had coming in as well.

Every post was crying for people. Posts had had vacancies go on for years. Consular work was booming around the world. Visa applications, American citizens' services were all booming in lots of places that hadn't been before, like China. A lot of Chinese visitors to the United States and a lot of Indian visitors to the United States, as those countries became more prosperous.

Everyone wanted people. It was our job to make sure that all worked and worked in a way that would give people adequate training, mentoring, and development as well.

I liked that job a lot. People who were coming into the service were wildly enthusiastic. They had gone through a very tough process to get in. So many people were taking the exam. That was partly Colin Powell; that was partly 9/11. An awful lot of people decided they want to do something to serve after 9/11. And it was partly the dot-com bust. Not only had it turned a lot of people out of work, they had made people realize there were some advantages to jobs that came with health insurance and some sense of permanency.

We had huge numbers of wonderfully qualified people coming into the service. It was just a lot of fun to work with them.

Q: One of the things I always find disturbing, at least going back to my experience which was back in 1955 when I came in, there wasn't much in the way of people coming in who knew much about diplomacy or foreign relations history. Was this something that was of concern?

BOGUE: It was partly that that wasn't emphasized in the A-100 course. I gather there now is a segment in the course that was involved maybe with you Stu in creating a segment.

Q: Our association did. It has USDiplomacy.org.

BOGUE: There is something now. We have an institutional memory problem anyway, because we change tours and move around so often. We have that, coupled with the fact that every generation thinks history starts with them. Also, the fact that the orientation program has so many things it was expected to do, from filling out thousands of forms about your health insurance to trying to get people ready to go off to their first posting. There is a very small amount of time. I really thought that they needed to do more like that.

When I was in the senior seminar, we spent a fair amount of time on a Marine Corps base. One of the things I thought the Marines did incredibly well was connect a 19-year old rifleman with a high school education to the history, traditions and legends of the Marine Corps. Partly, it made them feel they had something to live up to. If they screwed up, they weren't just letting themselves down, but the whole darn Marine Corps, going back to the beginning. A 19-year old kid in the Marine Corps could tell you about Chesty Puller, and they could tell you about all the legendary characters in the Marine Corps. I thought, can anybody, even these very highly educated people coming in, is there some way that we can connect them with the past? Is there a way that we can have them do some research in our archives that will make them realize they are also part of a long tradition?

I talked a lot to a friend of mine who is an archivist at a small liberal arts college. What they did at that college I thought was very interesting. They wanted every freshman to learn to work with original source materials. What they did was require every freshman to take a research seminar. The source materials they used were from the college archives. So they used original source material and it forced them to make a connection between what they were actually studying from the institutional past of the institution at which they were freshmen. In other words, they therefore were making some connection with that institution. I thought it was brilliant.

I thought somehow we needed to do something in the Foreign Service that connected people to the history of the institution. I know that now in addition to doing the course about history, the people who are currently running the orientation program, do a program called, "Living Legends of the Foreign Service." They invite Tom Pickering and various other people to have dinner with the group.

My job was not so much the classroom training but the assignments. What I tried to do was move away from what I saw was a culture of very much accommodating "where I want to go." I tried to have us be less of a travel agency and more of a "how are you going to serve and meet the needs of the service, but also stretch yourself, try yourself, in a lot of different circumstances in order to make yourself the most capable Foreign Service Officer you can be?"

I tried to bring in somewhat different assignment practices to move away from the "it's all about me and where I want to go" project. That's sort of the angle I was working on as to try to create and enforce the service concept of the Foreign Service.

Of course, people have to learn things for themselves. I could tell them until they were blue in the face that you could have a fabulous tour in Togo and a terrible tour in Paris, but no one believes that until they experience it for themselves. It wasn't about the glamour of the place; it was about the job you were doing and, most importantly, the people you were doing it with.

Q: I think of an interview I did with Joe Wilson who had been an African hand and just thirsting to be the African person in Paris. He was promised it, but unfortunately, it had been promised by somebody higher up to somebody else. So he was stuck. He ended up as DCM in Baghdad. Who went there? The ambassador who was going to head it up was Mr. America in Baghdad at the beginning of the Gulf War. He went on to greater fame, or infamy.

The point being that obscure places can all of a sudden blossom forth. I benefited greatly by being two and a half years in Dhahran, nothing in particular happened, but I absorbed an awful lot about the Arab world, which has served me ever since.

BOGUE: One of the things I used to remind people of is that they cannot control their career, if only because they cannot control world events. Things have a way of happening.

I remember Marisa Leno, an old friend of mine, went out to be Ambassador in Albania. She said to me, "Well, three years on the beach." At the time, Albania was a very sleepy post. Well, she spent three years on the beach, but she spent three years on the beach loading people into helicopters because that was when, who would have thought, a ponzi scheme gone bad plunged the country into civil war. You just never knew what was going to happen. Posts that looked sleepy turned wild. Posts that you thought might be wild were not. All you could do is kind of ride the current.

Especially those junior officers and junior entry-level specialists coming in who were often young and healthy and often did not yet have to worry about schools for their children, it was a perfect time to go somewhere way off the beaten path. They might not be able to go ten years later because of children or health issues, and things like that. I encouraged them all to get out and have the real fun of the Foreign Service, splashing through rivers in jeeps, doing the things that you and I thought were really so much fun.

Q: You know, this oral history program I have been working on now for 22 years. The basic philosophy, at least on my part, has been somehow or another to develop what West Point has, that is a Long Grey Line, the same thing as the Marine Corps. There have been people doing things who were real heroes. You think of Phil Habib, Terry McNamara, and Prubu Schnell. These are people who have done things. Sometimes it's very exciting. Sometimes it's fairly humdrum but rather important. Sometimes it's just doing a job, the fun of the job, and the interest, to learn from this.

Now, how to translate that into terms for people when they enter the Foreign Service is a problem. I think we are getting better now that we have a collection going on the internet. Orientation courses are probably not the place to do it because they are so loaded, but to get people to start reading afterwards, and how to do that is something we are working on.

BOGUE: Yes. One of the things I talked with the entry-level orientation staff about was if there are books we should have everybody read. Not books about management techniques, but books about the Foreign Service that would impart part of its tradition and lore. I mean traditions in the most positive sense. As you say, there are real heroes out there who have done things, sometimes in obscurity, sometimes with a great spotlight on them, that have been really terrific and amazing. Even a book that I would like people to read is the book, *Into Thin Air*, about the 1996 accident on Mt. Everest. It is one of the few best sellers in which consular officers are named and thanked profusely for the heroic things they did during a very desperate time. You cannot buy that kind of publicity, you really can't. It's the fact that it's all in this book: it's in the forward, acknowledgements, and the text of the book. As people are turning the pages, they say, "Look what these people did! I thought they were all just bureaucrats."

I think that kind of thing. It would be great to put together a kind of bookshelf for people. You have books on the opposite end like Warren Christopher's book about negotiating the release of our hostages in Iran somehow has managed to make an intense human drama read like a legal document, like a legal description of property.

Somewhere out there are some really great books on these things. Maybe some of them are yet to be written. I hope that through the history project, some of that will come out. Maybe entering people will be given some of the transcripts to read.

Q: I am trying to figure out a way.

The final question: You left at age fifty. I talked to people and your name is well known. You left a rather large footprint. Obviously, you are on your way to bigger and better things as an ambassador at a relatively early age and all that. Why did you leave at age fifty?

BOGUE: You probably remember from the refugee business, a push factor and a pull factor. The push factors were several. One was, and I say this with love and respect for

my friends who are still in the Foreign Service, I was being driven mad by the administration's policies. I say this for all my friends who are still there working to try to make things better.

Q: We are talking about the Bush Administration?

BOGUE: Right. The fact is that my next job would have been as an ambassador, I was at that point, in the Balkans or a former Soviet Union small country somewhere, or a small country in South Asia.

There were the administration's policies driving me crazy. Also, I realized it wasn't the life I wanted. I had been very close to the two people I had been DCM for. They were both wonderful ambassadors. They both found the job very lonely, although they had family members there with them and they had at least one good friend, me, in the embassy. I thought going out as ambassador where I would be going to post on my own that it would be a very lonely three years. Both of them kept waiting for the other shoe to drop. If someone invites them over and then a month later, their nephew needs a visa. You ran into this too I know, Stu. This kind of sense of being a bit jaded about people.

Another aspect of that was that in 2004, we were temporarily without an ambassador in Nepal, and I was sent back as Chargé for about three and a half months. They wanted someone who was senior, had been in Nepal, and had some experience. This was when the Maoists were in full cry and there was a lot of violence and so on. They wanted someone a little more senior to go out there and hold the fort. One of the things that had very much changed, maybe some of your other folks have spoken about this, is that I couldn't go anywhere without bodyguards. I found it so depressing. I felt the entire time that I was under house arrest.

When I came home to Washington and was able to just walk out my door to go to the grocery store, I realized that three years of bodyguards, although some people thrive on that, but I am not one of those.

The other side of this was the pull factor. There were a couple of things. One was the relationship problem that many Foreign Service people have that wasn't moveable overseas. Another very important one to me was that my mother, who had been a great Foreign Service mom and had visited me in all sorts of wacky places like Kazakhstan and has been a real trooper about these funny places I have been, had begun to fall ill. I really wanted to be nearer by. I didn't want to be a two-day flight from her.

Another thing was that I had joined the Foreign Service, as I explained many tapes ago, a little bit on a whim. It wasn't from the cradle that I had been saying, "Foreign Service!" I had joined on a bit of a whim. There were lots of other things that I had always thought I wanted to do. I was probably very much influenced by the fact that a very close friend of mine died during that time at a fairly young age. I thought, you never know how many years you have left. I am in splendid health, thank heavens. Here is a chance to go out

and do some of those things I have always thought about doing while I am still healthy enough to do them.

I had immense satisfaction in the Foreign Service. I loved what I was doing. I had gotten to do everything I ever wanted to do. I loved my colleagues very dearly. I had also realized that I had grown beyond the fun jobs. It's true in almost every profession. The great teacher becomes the vice principal and sees only the discipline cases. The great nurse becomes a nursing supervisor and fills out schedules all day.

Q: I found that I didn't like my last job. All of a sudden, that was it.

BOGUE: Right. I thought I could go out and be an ambassador and have the title. I don't need the title for anything. It's not going to change my life in any particular way. I have had a fantastic career.

Some of our colleagues are very bitter and unhappy people. I wanted to leave at a point in which any promising young person I met, I would still want to say to them, "Have you ever thought about joining the Foreign Service?"

I wanted to leave thinking this was a really wonderful thing and feeling very positive about it. So, I did. Like everyone, it was a complicated mix.

My mother, I should say, spent 13 years being the mayor of a small town in Washington State, Gig Harbor, for which she was paid $100.00 a month. She was able to do that because my dad had an income. She used to say that she was very grateful that she had the luxury of taking a low paying job. I feel that way now.

Q: What are you doing now?

BOGUE: I do some environmental education for young children, which is outdoors. It is the very opposite of Foreign Service work. I am outside all the time. I have replaced meetings and memos with frogs and turtles. I spend a lot of time with young children, particularly from disadvantaged backgrounds – Head Start kids, international kids.

I have done some volunteer work. I went to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina and stayed for quite a while doing volunteer work there. I really enjoyed having the luxury of being able to do that. I think everybody wanted to and not everyone could. I spent a lot of time with my mom. I do other little bits and pieces of volunteer things here and there. We have a program in the building I live in to help people age in place in our building, so that the younger people who have time drive them to doctors, the grocery store, and other things. I try to help out in that way.

I read for pleasure, something I rarely had time for. I get enough exercise. I get enough sleep. I cook for fun. I have friends over. Part of the problem for me in the Foreign Service was that when I got very senior, my life went way out of balance. It really was 24/7. There wasn't a way to stay in balance and keep doing the job, for me, with the

kinds of places I had been working in. So, I needed to get out to kind of restore that balance.

I don't know what the next years will bring. I am still new at this retirement thing. You have made a great success of it, Stu.

Q: I want to thank you very, very much.

BOGUE: This has been huge fun.

The one last thing I would say about the Foreign Service is that you and I had talked about where the word "serendipity" came from. It came from Sri Lanka, formerly Ceylon, formerly Serendip. I really feel that it was complete serendipity that got me into the Foreign Service and really was the most fortunate person to have been able to have, not only such an interesting career, but also one that I felt was tremendously meaningful.

Q: Also the people. As in football, a pretty good club about the Foreign Service.

BOGUE: Yes, I met wonderful people, friends that you know in ways that you don't know other people because you lived together so intimately abroad. Also, everywhere you turned and looked, there was someone who could speak this or had been there and had done that. It was really wonderful. That is something that is very hard to trade for in a career, to have great people around you. You feel at the end of the tour, if not the end of every day, you have done something that matters, is really tremendous. I cannot say enough good about it. I did not leave at age 50 in a fit of pique. I left very happy about what I was doing.

End of interview