The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

GLENN R. CELLA

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INTERVIEW

Q: When and where were you born?

CELLA: In Brooklyn, New York on December of 1935, the 19th to be exact.

Q: Let's start on your father's side. Where do the Cellas come from? What do you know about them?

CELLA: It's kind of an interesting story. They're from the north of Italy. They took Cella for whatever reason before I came along. My father was referring to himself as Cella and I picked up that habit but there is a place in northern Italy in the mountains of the Alps, called Villa Cella and my great-grandfather came from Villa Cella. It's a very small village, it's inland about 50 miles from Genoa on the coast, maybe about 80 miles or 100 miles from Genoa. And everybody in the village was Cella. There are very few people left there now. I visited several times. There were only two family names. I have forgotten the other one. It's sort of odd to be in a cemetery to see your name on virtually every gravestone in the churchyard. He married a Cella woman whose family was from Genoa.

Q: This is your grandfather?

On my father's side, my great-grandfather. And so two Cella families were united, both from the north of Italy and every Cella that I have met in this country during my lifetime one way or another we were related. It's not a particularly common name in Italy, and it's not at an all common name here. He migrated to the United States.

Q: Was he a farmer or a shop keeper or do you know?

CELLA: His job when he first came here, I'm not sure and I hesitate to say. He came from, of course, a very rural background and I think he may have been a shopkeeper at some point or possibly even a peddler. I'm just not sure. I may have some records at home that would tell me but I know part of the family, I guess a cousin of his or a brother. I'm talking about my great grandfather who was at one time called the peanut king of New England. He had a roasted peanut operation going on the Connecticut-Rhode Island border in the town of Westley, Rhode Island.

Another part of the family, again not my direct line, was very successful in the restaurant and fruit and vegetable trade in New York City. The family legend which I believe is accurate is that that line of Cellas sold some of the land that Rockefeller Center was built on. One part of the family was fairly affluent. My part I would say rose above genteel poverty but not into the carriage trade.

Q: Okay. Let's move down a generation. Grandparents?

CELLA: My grandfather, again on the Cella side, my father's side, was a baseball player among other things. His wife who was born in England to a coal miner was seventeen or eighteen years old, and they met in the United States. She didn't like the idea of a professional baseball player being her spouse because in those days, and we're talking now about the 1915 or 1920 time period, they were not considered to be particularly honorable or upstanding characters. And of course, she didn't like the idea that he would be on the road a lot. He was a fairly successful baseball player and again according to family tradition he was offered a contract by John McGraw, the famous manager of the New York Giants. The family was living in Newark, New Jersey. He played minor league baseball in Newark or in Jersey City. Again my grandmother nixed the deal. The family subsequently moved to a town on the Connecticut-Rhode Island border where my grandmother, Fanny Yates was her maiden name, supposedly burned her husband's baseball uniform, contract and glove and that got him out of the baseball business. He, if I recall correctly, worked in the mill and the town he lived in was called Pawcatuck on the Connecticut side of the Pawcatuck River. The other side a much bigger town Westerly and he worked on in the mill on the Rhode Island side of the border.

Q: And then your father?

CELLA: My father was born in Newark, New Jersey, he was raised in Pawcatuck, Connecticut. He was a very, very talented man, could do all kinds of things. He went to Bliss Electrical College which doesn't exist anymore. It was here in Washington, DC in Tacoma Park and got a two year, I guess we would call it an associate degree in electrical engineering. He was the first one in that part of the family to go on to any sort of higher education.

He had a rather severe illness when he was young, four or five years old, and they believe he probably had polio. The story was, this I know to be accurate, his mother, who as I said earlier was a very determined woman massaged, if this disease was polio it affected one of his legs, and she massaged that leg supposedly for eight or 10 months or 12 months and through her care and diligence he maintained the use of the leg. He never had a brace or crutches or anything like that. He was left with one leg and one foot slightly smaller than the other and he forever walked with a bit of a limp, not terribly noticeable but he did wear special shoes but again not terribly noticeable. After he finished at Bliss Electrical School he moved to New York City, settled in Brooklyn and went to work for the American Telephone and Telegraph Company in a long line of tradition as a

craftsman. That's where he spent his entire professional career. He began there probably around 1931 or thereabouts and retired in 1970.

Q: He was very fortunate. In 1931 was not a good date to start a livelihood.

CELLA: Yes. He was born in 1908 so he may have started just before the crash. He had a job throughout the Depression. At one point had developed several sidelines. He was a registered insurance underwriter, a fire claims adjuster, he had several sidelines that he pursued on his own time to bring in a little bit of supplementary income. He retired in 1970 and moved to Florida in 1971 and settled in the town of Dania where he had a fairly successful career in local politics and where he is still fondly remembered to this day. He passed away at the age of 80.

Q: On your mother's side, what do you know about that?

CELLA: My mother was born in Rostock and which is a port city on the Baltic Sea in Pomerania. It's a part Germany that after the war became East Germany. She was born there in 1912 on the 30th of November, as I recall. Her father was a trained stone cutter and he and he was from the university town of _____ which is also not too far from Rostock. The story there is that he had two cousins who were in the German Navy. They made a port call, I think they were in the submarine service. Anyway, they made a port call in London in late 1913 or early 1914 and when they came back from the ship's visit to England, they told my grandfather, my mother's maiden name was Bosna, they were sure there was going to be war in the not-too-distant future with England. That inspired my grandfather, who may have been contemplating it anyway, supposedly as the story is told in the family and as I heard it from him before he passed away, to move his family to the United States. His family at that time consisted of my mother, an older brother and of course, his wife and they came by ship to the United States. I looked him up on the Ellis Island site a couple of years ago and was able to pin it down. I think they arrived in late October in 1913 and I think the ship had sailed from Bremen. I have forgotten the name of the ship. When they arrived in the United States the war came along so presumably he was pretty happy that he made the decision he did make. They had a fairly comfortable lower middle class existence in Brooklyn.

Q: Was he a stone cutter?

CELLA: I don't know if he was doing that then. He had been trained as a stone cutter. He made tombstones. The family tombstone that is up in Rhode Island was made by him. He may have done some other things. I know during the war he worked in the defense plant during the Second World War.

My mother had a tragic incident which I think marked her very deeply for the rest of her life. And she tells it in 1918, the time of the great flu epidemic and she would have been about five or six when she saw her mother taken away in an ambulance. And her mother never came back. Her mother died. My mother who was not an overly dramatic person used to tell a very touching story about how for days she stood at the window on the

ground floor of a three-story walk-up in Brooklyn at the time and she waited at the window for her mother to come back. And of course her mother never came back. By then there were three children, the older brother, my mother and a younger brother who was born here in the United States, and I guess my grandfather had his hands full with three relatively young children. He had to work so she talks about spending much of her childhood moving from place to place, usually with other relations. She said she wasn't cut adrift but it was a sort of semi-forced child arrangement I guess that she had to endure during much of her early childhood. I think by the time she made it to high school she was able to return to the family hearth. Now she was old enough she could sort of take care of herself and so my grandfather didn't have to worry about what happened to his children while he was away at work.

She was smart, a good student but left high school I think after her sophomore year to go to work, and I'm not sure how many jobs she might have had but the principal one was a comptometer operator which I guess is a sort of adding machine in the accounting department in either the United Cigar Company or Whalen's Drugstores in New York City. She worked in the city itself by walking across the Brooklyn Bridge, to and from work, to save car fare. She's living in Brooklyn with her father. So she was working in New York City.

Her oldest brother whom she loved dearly, a very sweet man named Herbie was working with my father at the phone company and he introduced my father to his sister who became my mother. It was I guess a double date arrangement. My parents wound up eloping, they decided to go off and get married. They got married, I guess on the Saturday at a church in lower midtown Manhattan and took the sleeper to Buffalo, spent a day and a half in Niagara Falls, sent a telegram to their respective families saying here's where we are. Here's what's happened and came back and got back in time to go to work on Monday morning. They were married in 1933 and I was born in December of 1935. They moved shortly after my birth from Brooklyn to Queens County, New York City, and bought a house about 10 blocks from the city line between Queens County, New York City, and Nassau County.

Q: Did your mother keep working?

CELLA: No. Certainly after I was born she didn't. She was a stay-at-home mom.

Q: At home did you have siblings?

CELLA: About two years after I was born my mother had a miscarriage. That would have been another boy. One sibling survived and he is about nine years younger than me. We weren't really all that close. I fairly early on kind of moved out of the house. I was on the road a lot or away at college, in the Navy and then the Foreign Service. But I have one brother who currently lives in Atlanta, Georgia. He's in the financial business.

Q: As a child what do you remember about home life? What was it like?

CELLA: It was quite pleasant. We had a modest, three-bedroom unattached house complete with you a garage on a residential street not too far from the Nassau County line. The neighborhood was lower middle class, solidly middle-class. There were no really rich people; there were no terribly poor people either. There were a lot of immigrants, several firemen and a couple of policemen, their families lived on my street. One guy worked for the Edison Company, and my father as I indicated worked for the telephone company. Our next-door neighbor at one point worked for the New York Central Railroad, I don't think he was an engineer but he might have been. He was on the railroad. We had quite a decent, pleasant enough atmosphere. I don't recall any big complaints. I went to the local grade school on the street where I lived it just so happened there were a heck of a lot of boys. There were maybe 18 or 20 houses on either side of the street and there must've been at least a dozen or so boys within a year or two of me. We could form our own ball team, two basketball teams, a football team without having to go outside the block, let alone outside the neighborhood. We all got along pretty well. I went to public grammar school. I did the usual things: I was a Cub Scout and a Boy Scout, made it to Star Scout. I went to high school in New York City itself on 16th Street in lower Manhattan, Saint Francis Xavier Jesuit Military High School.

Q: What were the politics of your family do you recall?

CELLA: I think my mother was not a particularly political person. My father was interested, but my guess is, at one point he was a big union man, he was very active in the long lines, the telephone workers Union. I'm pretty sure he would have been Roosevelt supporter. I don't think he would have been a dyed in the wool Roosevelt at any price supporter. I think he probably voted Democratic and his wife did the same way. I don't recall campaign buttons all over the house and banners and my parents going to rallies and I think my father had a sort of healthy suspicion of politicians. He was sort of like an H. L. Mencken attitude of caution and circumspection. I don't recall being influenced politically by my parents one way or the other.

Q: What about religion?

CELLA: Both my parents were Roman Catholics.

Q: How Catholic was your upbringing, would you say?

CELLA: I would say they lived by the basic rules. Again I don't recall a holy water fountain in every room. We ate fish on Friday. And certainly went to Mass every Sunday and certainly partook regularly of communion, and there was a Bible in the house. I think religion was just sort of a matter of the fact thing. That was part of the human being, you had a religion. And you followed that religion.

Q: How about, you had the German-Italian mix. Did either of these play a role?

CELLA: Not really in my case growing up on the Italian side my grandmother was English so it’s an English-Italian and my grandfather had passed away the year before I

was born. My grandmother lived up until about the time I was 10 and I saw a fair amount of her. I remember she had an asthmatic condition. She was always taking her powder. She would come and spend fairly long periods of time with us. We still had the house up on the Connecticut-Rhode Island border and lived there with her daughter and her husband. She would come and spend fairly long periods of time with us. I knew her pretty well and was much more influenced by her English ways than by the Italian part of life. There was no conflict; I don't think there was any Irish Rose type thing. I think my mother's father accepted my father and my father's mother accepted my mother. I was never aware of any sort of internal tension because of that particular combination.

What I do recall about the German Italian part, of course growing up during World War Two and having an Italian name and a German background left me subject to some say needling from some of my peers. We used to play a game called war where you draw a circle on the pavement, kind of like a pie chart and the slices of the pie represented different countries. You play with a ball, a tennis ball or a pink rubber ball and you would stand there and say, "I declare war on this player representative country." So Glenn, you're going to be Germany, or you're going to be Italy. Every now and then I got to play the U. K. but what you did was I declare war and you bounce the ball into that guy's territory and then you have to run after the ball and attempt to hit the guy who had declared war with the ball. A good New York game.

The Bund had been active; there was a Bund hall not too far from where we lived. I certainly didn't have any intense anxiety, but the fact that I had some German blood and the fact that I had some Italian blood was considered by some to be a little bit noteworthy during war time.

Q: What about as a kid particularly at home, were you paying attention to news?

CELLA: Yes, of course. Gabriel Hedder was a staple on the radio every night and I can remember very vividly December 7, 1941 was kind of a chilly day and I was at home. I must've come back from church and I guess I was looking at the comic pages of the New York Daily News. We got word that Pearl Harbor had been bombed. Our next-door neighbor at that time, this was before the train driver that I mentioned a little while ago, he was a fine man from Pennsylvania and he was in the Army and he was killed during the Battle of the Bulge. He had been very nice to me when I was growing up and his wife was still living there at the time. She became a widow. I remember that marked my family fairly deeply.

My mother's younger brother was in the Army. He joined the Army before the war started and was in for the duration but originally with the coastal defense force then I think he went to Europe after D-Day. I know he finished up in Germany. I don't think he was ever involved at the front in any direct combat. We knew lots of neighbors who, either they or their children, were involved in the armed forces as a family. A couple of streets from us and I think their name was Blessington and as I recall like the story of the Sullivan Brothers, their merchant ships went down and took five brothers and so we changed the rule about having everybody or people from the same family on the same

ship. The situation something like that involving the Blessingtons and I remember that left quite a mark on the community. At the corner of our street right off the main boulevard, the main boulevard is called Levin Boulevard we were at the corner of 225th Street and Levin Boulevard there is a good sized bill board which carried the names of everybody from the community who is currently in the armed services and a little gold star next to a name would indicate that they lost their life in the war effort.

Sure, I collected cards you got out of chewing gum with war scenes on it you know, in various battles and events and personalities. And when I was quite young I listened pretty religiously to the radio and read the newspaper and followed the progress of the war pretty closely.

Q: Well, for somebody who eventually ended up in the Foreign Service this is a pretty good way of digesting a hell of a lot of geography.

CELLA: Well, yes, it's true. There is nothing like a war, a good two front global war to cover most of the spots of the world worth knowing about. I was always interested in geography and I think I would have been interested in geography even if we had managed to avoid a war. From a very early age I loved geography and history.

Q: I remember as a kid having a globe. I'm a little bit older than you I was born in 1928. I remember picking out the place where I wanted to go and live. And that was Wake Island. It seemed like. During the war it was an important Japanese conquest. Sort of in the neighborhood, the ethnic mix. New York you know has Italian districts and Jewish districts and Puerto Rican districts. Was there much of an ethnic mix in your neighborhood that dominated?

CELLA: My neighborhood had lots of ethnic people in it. People were immigrants or first generation Americans. It was quite a mixture. I think what it represented were people who had managed to advance themselves to be able to get out of the real ethnic neighborhoods of the lower either east side for example or Brooklyn, get out of their ethnic neighborhoods and move out into what was a new neighborhood. These were new houses.

I think that might have typified. The first glimmering of the American dream beginning to come true so we had all kinds of nationalities but there was no, you know, Irish group, Italian group or Polish group. We were all mixed together.

Q: How about at school? Let's say grammar school or early elementary school. Did you find that you were much of a student or not?

CELLA: I went to a public school and in those days, unfortunately, the New York City public school system was very much under the sway of Dewey, the philosopher from Columbia University, in educational philosophy. John Dewey. He took sort of a laissez-faire approach to learning.

Q: He was called progressive.

CELLA: And so that meant you didn't get a hell of a lot of education. In order to pass the entrance exam to the high school I went to I took supplementary classes. I went to school on Saturday morning to a special program that the high school sponsored for people taking entrance exams to schools around the city. I made it through the eighth grade without knowing too much about a subject and a predicate and things like that. I learned those things thanks to this special course that I took. In general, I would say education was very poor. There were some really excellent teachers, and I was fortunate to have some really excellent teachers who routinely would ignore the playbook and teach word problems in ways they thought they should be taught and would try to make sure that the pupils had some basic idea of grammatical structure and that sort of thing. On balance I regret my primary education because I never had to study. I had excellent grades. You asked me how I did. I was a straight A student, I think in maybe 120 boys in my class I think I graduated first or second. But I never had to study, I could do my homework, first of all there wasn't a heck of a lot of homework to do, but I could do it during class. I'd get my arithmetic homework at 10 o'clock in the morning, at one o'clock in the afternoon during history class I got out the arithmetic homework. And so that marked me. I was able to do very well without acquiring at an early age, a really disciplined approach toward academic work.

Q: Then by the time you go to high school things begin to change? As far as your approach to education?

CELLA: I had always been interested in acquiring an education, but like a normal red-blooded youth I didn't want to work any harder than I had to to acquire it. In high school it changed a little bit because, unlike grammar school, I went to a very academically rigorous high school that gave lots of homework, that concentrated on serious subjects and set very demanding standards. I changed a little bit. I never ignored homework, never ignored school I just knew I needed to do well and grammar school wasn't very much. In high school I had to do a little bit more. Thanks to God-given gifts and abilities I was able to do quite well in high school without working as hard as most of my peers had to work.

Q: Where did you go to high school?

CELLA: At St. Francis Xavier which is a Jesuit military high school on 16th Street on the edge of Greenwich Village in lower Manhattan.

Q: What do you mean by a Jesuit military school?

CELLA: Well, it had a junior ROTC program. We wore uniforms and took military science as an academic subject and had to go and drill one afternoon a week. We marched in the St. Patrick's Day parade and the Columbus Day parade. By the time I was 15, I could take apart an M1 and put it back together again and a lot of 15-year-olds couldn't do that. I'm not sure but maybe the school got some kind of subsidy from the

Army or the Department of Defense for providing a home for an ROTC unit. Every student enrolled in that school, roughly I think around 800 or 900 students, but we were all in ROTC for all four years.

Q: Were you getting a full blown Jesuit education?

CELLA: Yes. Everybody in the school took four years of Latin and of course, everyone took religion, that was a required course. Then you could do a math-science concentration or a classics concentration. If you were math-science that would mean four full years of math and physics and chemistry and if you did classics concentration it would be Greek, four years of Greek. I did the math-science.

Q: How did you find science and math?

CELLA: Math I was always very good at. I liked it a lot. Science, it's hard to say. I never had in either college or high school a particularly good chemistry or physics teacher. I made mainly decent grades, but I didn't know it is the way I knew mathematics. I could memorize the formulas and things like that. Obviously, chemistry formulas and the laws of, various physical laws but I would say that I did not have a strong aptitude nor a particular interest in the physical sciences.

Q: What about going back to grammar school and to high school. Where you much of a reader?

CELLA: I read a great deal. There was a time in the summer where I would read a, when I was 11 or 12 years old, I used to spend the summer up in Connecticut and I'd read the equivalent of a well, I probably read 20 books by Zane Grey, the popular Western writer of the 30s and 40s, Thomas Swift books, and I would read, depending upon whether it was raining or not, often close to book a day.

Q: When you get up to high school what sort of books were you reading then?

CELLA: Well, in high school as part of the English program there was you know, a fair amount of reading required mainly of short stories, poetry and Shakespeare plays. Books that I would read on my own, Treasure Island, The Tale of Two Cities, Huckleberry Finn, Tom Swift. And I also and this relates to the Foreign Service in a way, I mentioned in grammar school I did not think the system of education was particularly good, the philosophy of education. I had some excellent teachers and one of the teachers I had, I think in the fifth grade, I think her name was Mrs. Grove. For whatever reason she was a very good teacher and took a real interest in me, knew that essentially the system of education was delinquent and saw in me I guess a certain promise and started encouraging me to do different things quite apart from the regular curriculum. Her house was sort of between my house and the school. I walked to school; I lived about eight or nine blocks from the school. She would on occasion invite me home to talk about all sorts of things. She introduced me to a travel writer by the name of Richard Halliburton.

Q: Who does the seven league books? He was a great inspiration for getting the hell out, getting out and seeing things.

CELLA: Yes. The Royal Road to Romance, The Flying Carpet, his two books of wonders. So I read everything he had written except his, this was a collection of his letters called The Story of His Own Life's Adventure which I think was put together after he disappeared in 1939. He was sailing a junk from Hong Kong to San Francisco to the San Francisco World's Fair, and at the time I was, by the time I was 14 I had read everything he had ever written. Apart from the standard fare that I mentioned, Treasure Island and stuff that everybody reads, Richard Halliburton was one of my specialties. I don't know anyone else my age that was reaching reading Richard Halliburton.

Q: I think he inspired quite a few. It certainly gave young people a feel for the romance of getting beyond, I mean getting out there in the world.

CELLA: Yes, very definitely. I look in his books today and to some degree they are depressingly mediocre and a little bit of the PT Barnum aspect to them and some of the history is a little bit shaky, but nonetheless, he's a man who had a great influence on me and probably of all the people who influenced me that I never met in person he would be right up there with Jesus Christ.

Q: I certainly recall him talking about swimming the Hellespont. I certainly once cast doubt. I don't know whether he did or not. He certainly wrote about swimming the Hellespont..

CELLA: What he did was kindle a wanderlust. In my case it was already there for whatever reason. I liked to travel around. We had a 1935 Oldsmobile. Summers we would go up and spend a week or so at the family home in Pawtucket, Connecticut and I always looked forward to the drive up there and drive back. Kids today need TV sets to keep them entertained. I was happy to look out the window and look at the rivers that we crossed and look at the other cars going by and seeing the shoreline scenery. I never tired of it.

I can recall, I was probably about 12 or so in those days and this is 1945 or ’46, you could write away to the area's gasoline manufacturers and get something like a AAA triptych. You could write away and described your itinerary and they would send you back maps and brochures and I remember the best company was Conoco. Conoco put together a sort of loose-leaf binder really packed with information and it had great maps and you got every step of the way with terrific detail. I can remember one time I gave them an itinerary which I would think they would have questioned a little bit but it virtually took me all over the United States. I don't think I went to Canada, I know I didn't go to Alaska but I know I went to Washington state and to the tip of California and I know I went to St. Louis and New Orleans and Miami. So I got back I would say sort of a spiral plastic affair that you used to bind pages together that was probably two inches thick. It was probably seventh grade when I got a subscription to National Geographic. A friend my father’s subscribed to National Geographic and when we would go and visit I would

always make a beeline for the National Geographic's and leaf through those, and I eventually got my own description and yes, was an avid fan of National Geographic.

Q: My son one time gave a talk at the National Geographic. There are a lot of people there mentioning that National Geographic for me and will always have a firm part in the hearts of, it was the first time I saw photographs of women's breasts.

CELLA: I have to admit that they were fairly popular with me too, but I remember other things about them too.

Q: Did the family ever get away to Canada or to travel around the country much?

CELLA: In 1946 or 1947 we did take one trip to Canada. My father was a great fisherman. At the beginning of this interview I said he was a man of many talents and he was quite an accomplished outdoorsman as well as being a good engineer, an excellent plumber and house painter. He and a couple of his friends, my mother and myself and my younger brother went to Lake Tonogony [?] which is in Ontario, sort of central Ontario, it's north of North Bay, the town where the Dionne quintuplets came from. It's not way, way up there. The nearest town is called Cobalt. I'd say it's probably 200 or 250 miles north of the border. We had a cabin on an island and spent about 10 days fishing, not terribly successfully for lake trout among other things but it was a great adventure. I think that was the only foreign travel I did with my parents. We frequently made car trips up to the Connecticut-Rhode Island border. In 1946 we drove down to Florida. From New York City to Miami and back and I thought that was great fun even though it was hot as hell in the car, of course, it wasn't air conditioned. Those were the major travels. They don't amount to a hell of a lot but more than a lot of children my age and my socio economic circumstances.

Q: Did you get much of a feel for history? I'm thinking of Boston and Washington, DC and the civil war battlefields.

CELLA: Yes. Again for some reason I was aware of my revolutionary war history, my Civil War history, took some interest in it but not a hell of a lot. I was pretty interested in the French and Indian War, and the books of James Fenimore Cooper. I read a lot of his books. That was of some interest to me.

Q. Also Manley Machler also wrote some books about that.

CELLA: I don't know him. I was probably more interested in like all kids, prehistoric animals and loved to go to the New York Museum of Natural History over in Central Park. I was probably more interested in ancient history than in what would have to be called modern history of my own country. I had knowledge, I wasn't ignorant of it, I didn't disdain it, but for some reason it didn't really catch me. I probably read as much about well, I could probably write a book of historic biographies of 30 or 40 pages profiling Genghis Khan and Alexander the Great. So I probably knew more about Julius

Caesar than I knew about George Washington. That's probably not true I probably knew more about George Washington.

Q: When did you graduate from high school?

CELLA: I graduated from high school in 1953.

Q: Was there much of a dating pattern, boy girl sort of thing in high school?

CELLA: I went to an all boys' school.

Q: On weekends did you find an all girls' school or?

CELLA: Well it was a Catholic boy's school that I was in and there were plenty of Catholic girls' schools in the city, more than there are now I am sure and they would have things like tea dances and we had regular dances at our school. I had no particular girlfriend and I spent a lot of time working. For example, being at the dances I never went to any of the dances except I went to all of them. I was the coat checker making money. I worked weekends even winter many weekends at a golf course, and I played not with particular skill but I played a lot of sports. My time was pretty filled up with affairs other than those of the heart. I'm not sure it was particularly a good thing but I was interested in the ladies, God knows. I used to go to some social affairs and parties and things like that. Dating was not a big part of my existence.

Q: Well, in 1953 what were you pointed towards?

CELLA: To go back to finish on the travel part, thanks in part to Richard Halliburton when I was in high school I started going to sea in the summer, in the Merchant Marines. I spent time in the Scandinavian Merchant Marines during the summer and went exclusively to Latin America from New York, Buenos Aires, Rio, Santos and Venezuela and Montevideo. I was thinking in terms of the sea. My favorite aunt's husband was a sea captain, and my mother also had a cousin who was a sea captain so we were very at a very early age I had a little bit of maritime flavor in the house from time to time, maybe once a twice a year would see these people. I did the stuff with the Merchant Marines.

Q: What were you doing in the Merchant Marines?

CELLA: Well, I was on Scandinavian ships. I sailed on Scandinavian ships because that was the only union I could get into was the tanker union. As I mentioned my mother had relatives who were sea captains, one of whom was the port captain, sort of this port supervisory captain for I think it was the Mobile or Texaco oil tanker fleet. Through him I could have gone into the tanker's union and through him I got the documentation required to get my seaman's papers so I had Merchant Marine papers for ordinary seaman, wiper, which is the lowest rank scaled job in the engine room and food service person. So I had U.S. merchant Marine papers. I probably could have gotten on tankers which were paying pretty good, but my purpose in going to sea wasn't to spend three

weeks to the Persian Gulf, spend 24 hours there at the end of a line out in the water and then come all the way back. I wanted to see the world. In those days the Scandinavians had their own union hiring hall in Brooklyn on North 10 Street not far from the executive offices of the Brooklyn Dodgers and not far from where my parents lived when I was born. If you were willing to work for a dollar a day you could get on a ship going someplace where you could get to see something. They had boards like a travel agency. You'd go look at the board and see what the itineraries are and then go to the window and say well, I'd like to apply for this position and that position.

I worked for a dollar a day working in the lowest categories like cabin boy, deck boy, sort of an all-around errand boy. I usually had a fairly good choice of jobs and places to go based on where the ships were going. But you couldn't get to Europe because there were lots of Scandinavian sailors who wanted to get back, to work their way back home and so it was very hard for a non-Scandinavian to get on anything going to northern Europe. There were more opportunities for Latin America for that reason but also in those days there were Scandinavian lines that in fact traded exclusively north-south. They never went to Norway or Denmark.

So I had that kind of maritime bent in high school and took and passed and was awarded a naval ROTC scholarship so that meant I was going to be in the naval ROTC if I accepted that scholarship which meant again going to sea in the summers. And then in those days, three years of active duty once I graduated. I had other college scholarship opportunities, but this was by far the most attractive scholarship. It was a great scholarship; it paid room, board, tuition, books, the whole works. It cost me 50 bucks a month to go to college is what it amounted to. I needed an occasional sandwich and a not so occasional beer and maybe take a bus to Boston, although I would usually hitchhike.

So I take this scholarship my choice was limited to 52 schools, but they were all good schools. They had a deal worked that the school had to admit you, and then they would pick up your expenses. I had been in the clutches of the Jesuits now for four of the most formative years of my life, and so I was very susceptible to being steered toward the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, Massachusetts which was one of the four Catholic ROTC colleges. It was one of only two Jesuit ROTC colleges, the other being Marquette out in Milwaukee and the high school I went to, St. Francis Xavier regularly sent 20 or 30 or more seniors to Holy Cross. There were already a lot of people there that I knew and a lot of people in my class wanted to go there and so I put Holy Cross at the head of the list of my four choices for the ROTC format. I picked out four schools out of 52, and I put down the four Catholic schools with Holy Cross as number one. I was admitted to Holy Cross and so I went there on the ROTC scholarship.

Q: What were you when you were a sailor before this, did you get any feel for any particular countries? Did Latin America grab you or not?

CELLA: Again, thanks to Halliburton I really wanted to see Rio de Janeiro. I kept a journal. I'm a very poor freehand artist, I can copy things but I'm not very good at freehand, including a sketch I made of the Corcovado Bay as we sailed past Sugarloaf,

the entrance into Rio de Janeiro. I was really interested in Rio. As far as the world in general, at that stage ever since I can remember I loved to travel. At that stage I found everyplace sort of interesting, and I really hadn't sat down and said really, really where do you want to go? Where would you most want to go? Again I found everything interesting, and when I took the Foreign Service oral exam at the end of my senior in college they said well, I forget how the question was phrased, how do you feel about a really isolated backwater in Central Africa? How would you feel about that? I said, "If you can find things of interest in Puerto Cabello, Venezuela, which I did, I'm pretty sure I could find something that would interest me no matter where I was sent. That would not be my problem. There is language to learn, a culture to be studied, topography to be observed, there is a cuisine to be sampled, all of which may be terrible or third rate but they're different. At least the novelty would get me through part of the time."

Q: Well, you were at Holy Cross what, '53 to '57? What was Holy Cross like at the time?

CELLA: Sort of like a prison camp only the food wasn't as good. I exaggerate. Holy Cross was an all-male school and I think the total enrollment was around 1700 or 1800. It was a college not a university. It offered a Masters in chemistry that was the only postgraduate work that was offered at the school. It again followed very traditional Jesuit curriculums. You didn't get out of there without taking four years of religion and two years of philosophy no matter what your major was or what your interest was. We were all essentially philosophy minors. It was rigorous with curfews and bed checks and things like that to the extent that I moved off campus after my sophomore year and lived in a rooming house down at the foot of the hill on which Holy Cross is built. I was pretty content as I was getting a good education and had very, very good teachers who took an interest in me. As I look back on it maybe it was too structured. It's become a lot less structured now. I guess it had to become less structured or shut down. I didn't mind the discipline too much. The confinement, the prison camp aspect as I said for the last two years I lived off campus. In my freshman year the curfew, you had me back in your room technically by 10 o'clock at night, a week night. I had the prefect one was a priest, an older guy who got the idea that I was older than I really was, partly because I probably let him know I had spent time in the Merchant Marines. Anyway, he told me I didn't have to worry about bed check as long as I let him know beforehand I wasn't going to be there. My roommate was a guy who'd been a classmate of mine in high school used to get very nervous, because I wouldn't be in the bed when they'd go around and check beds and I kept saying not to worry about it. It made him so nervous that was one reason why he decided not to room with me the following year.

The regiment, when we had Mass, I think there was a daily Mass but not on Saturday at seven o'clock in the morning you had mass every day. You had to sign in and your presence was checked on, and you are allowed to miss three or something before you got weekend privileges denied. You had to figure out a way around it or for whatever reason be happy to live with it. So that didn't bother me too much. The education was good. A lot of people in the student body as I indicated I already knew, and we had numerous other friends and sort of an atmosphere in a way we were all brothers. We had these Jesuits cracking their whips over us. There was a fair amount of internal campus

cohesion, off campus there was a lot of cohesion. If you said you were from Holy Cross you had to fight with the Holy Cross guys who usually never did come to your aid. Too much cohesion. So much to the extent that I think probably they banned us from coming to any football games during my sophomore year because events during the previous year brought on by excessive Holy Cross cohesion.

On campus there definitely was a division though between those from affluent families and those from less affluent families. There was sort of like wearing white bucks. I did not have a pair of white bucks.

Q: White buckskin shoes which normally got dirty and that was part of the whole idea.

CELLA: It was an extra pair of shoes. But with the white bucks crowd I never owned a pair of white bucks because I couldn't afford. I had sneakers and a pair of shoes and the shoes that I wore with my Navy uniform. By the time I took care of that, that was the end of my footwear budget. So the white bucks' crowd was kind of snooty and the non-white buck crowd of which I was a prominent member. And also a certain division between Bostonians who looked down their noses at New Yorkers. New Yorkers would return the compliment for different reasons. There was a little bit of that although I wouldn't want to exaggerate it. You're going to have something like that no matter where you are and what the crowd mix is. Overall it was a pretty compatible group.

Q: Was there division between the Irish Catholics and the Italian Catholics?

CELLA: No. There was more of a division between Italian New Yorkers and Irish Bostonians. At Holy Cross it was more a matter of geography than ethnicity.

Q: Did you go on any Navy cruises?

CELLA: I had to, I couldn't avoid it. My first, that's when I decided I was going to make the Navy my career, I seriously thought about making the Navy a career. That shows you how irrational I could be. Every summer you had to go for training and after my freshman year in college my first midshipman cruise was on the USS Missouri. The ship that served in Tokyo Bay. It was about a seven or eight week cruise. We went to Lisbon and then down to Guantanamo Bay. For about the first third of the cruise I was down in the rotating room, one of the ships area's divisions and I was in the first division and my job at seven o'clock every morning was to shine the plaque on the level of the USS Missouri. That's how I began my military naval career.

Between my sophomore and junior year we did an amphibious/aviation cruise. We spent about 3 1/2 weeks in Little Creek, Virginia, the headquarters of the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Forces where we worried about how to scramble on and off troop carriers and various other aspects of amphibious operations. The air part was at the Naval Station at Corpus Christie, Texas where again you were introduced to the basics of naval aviation. It was a chance to pilot planes and fly the P-3's, an anti-submarine multi-engine aircraft. I went up in a P-28 trainer and that was a fairly vivid experience. They had a

Navy lieutenant aviator seated in the trainer's part of the cockpit, a two seat training aircraft and quite a capable aircraft for its day and the student pilot sat up forward. And I'm there as a student pilot and the trainer gets us up off the ground and about to 10,000 feet and all of a sudden over the intercom he says, "You've got it." I go, "I've got what?" He says, "You've got control of the aircraft." He said, "I suggest that you," I'm looking at all the dials and things, "you pull back on the stick." I said, "Oh?" He said, "Yeah. You've lost 6000 feet in the last 24 seconds and at that rate in 12 seconds we'll hit Mother Earth." I looked down and sure enough and staring right at it. I pulled the stick back and went zooming up and I damned near stalled the plane. The trainer had to be crazy to take this sort of risk. He took it and we made it back safely, and I remember the experience rather vividly.

Q: You graduated then in 1957. This meant the Navy for a while.

CELLA: Three years of obligated service.

Q: Let's talk about the Navy. You were in the Navy from 1957 until 1960?

CELLA: Three years.

Q: What were you doing?

CELLA: I was a paid killer. I was a gunnery officer on a heavy cruiser, the USS Newport News, C-148, the first fully air-conditioned ship in the Navy. The keel was laid as I recall toward the end of World War II. The ship was commissioned in 1947 or '48. There were three cruisers in her class, she was the last of the three, the Des Moines class heavy cruiser and the other two ships in the class were partially air-conditioned but the Newport News was air-conditioned throughout. It was a beautiful ship.

Q: I'm trying to think from 1957 to '60 there wasn't anything to shoot at, was there?

CELLA: I was part of the Lebanon landing in 1958. Actually, we arrived after the landing, but in 1958 I spent a month or so cruising back and forth off the coast of Lebanon.

Q: It was July-ish, wasn't it?

CELLA: Yes, mid-July. It was certainly the summer time and it wasn't late summer.

Q: Did you go after, I've heard people talk about all the ice cream vendors who were on the beach welcoming our landing force. Did you try to clear them out?

CELLA: No. We never went ashore and we never fired a gun in anger. We just went back and forth and it was called a rum line, patrolling off the coast to discourage anyone from interfering with our operations on the ground. We arrived there about a week after the landing. We had been on a midshipman cruise as I recall and received orders to proceed

to Lebanon. We offloaded our midshipmen and headed across the Mediterranean. We were in northern Europe when the order came to move to Lebanon.

Q: Your cruiser wasn't in the Sixth Fleet per se?

CELLA: We were detailed to the Sixth Fleet I think five or six times during my three years. In those days we would go on what was called Med cruise and went through the Straits of Gibraltar where you came under operational control of the Sixth Fleet. I was part of the Sixth Fleet but our ship was not a permanent part of the Sixth Fleet. Which was only actually one ship, a sister ship which was in those days was the USS Salem homeport on the French Riviera. That was the Sixth Fleet flagship, the commander of the Sixth Fleet rode that ship and the rest of the ships that made up the Sixth Fleet came on a rotational basis.

Q: How did you, well, the Med cruises were sort of a delightful thing, wasn't it? How did you find it?

CELLA: Being in the Mediterranean is wonderful. The trouble was the Newport News was not a delightful ship. Most of the time it was decidedly un-delightful.

Q: What was the problem?

CELLA: The problem was the Captain, a full Navy Captain, a four striper who was always on his own to make Rear Admiral. The Executive Officer, the number two on the ship, the DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) if you will, was a full Commander, a three striper always on his own to make captain. So one or the other was always to use Navy terms sweating his next promotion. And sometimes they both were at the same time. Beyond that, it was a very comfortable ship and so we frequently had an Admiral riding our ship as well. We had full flag quarters on the ship and so that made the already nervous Captain or already nervous Executive Officer both nervous at the same time even more nervous because they were under the eye of an Admiral and more fearful that any misstep would be the end of their prospects for future advancement.

This in turn led to a fairly strict regimen that was in general very hard on the ship's morale. I'll give you an example. This does not involve the Mediterranean. We had been on operations in the North Atlantic and were heading back to Norfolk and ran into some very severe storms, probably in the early spring of 1959, and delayed our arrival in to Norfolk. We finally got in to Norfolk about five o'clock on a Friday afternoon. And a change of command involving admirals was scheduled for eight o'clock the following morning. Our ship was often chosen as a venue for change of command because again it was a beautiful, impressive ship. We had been out at sea for three or four weeks and we pull up to the pier and the sailors are going to get off the ship. As is typically the case there were lots of families on the pier waiting for their loved ones and the Executive Officer decided that most of the ship's deck divisions could not go ashore because we were going to paint the ship. This was the superstructure above the water line, equivalent I suppose to a 14 story building and the length is the length of roughly two and a half

football fields. It's five in the afternoon, with the change of command at eight the next morning that's a pretty big task to paint an object that size in that period of time. The Executive Officer decided I should go back to take a look to see what rough weather did so the ship was a little bit beat up but it didn't look like it was ready for the trash heap by any means. Still, we wanted it to be perfect.

We didn't have enough time to paint the whole ship above the water line so we just painted the half that was pier side that they would see when they came aboard. Then you had a problem. He says, no we've got to paint it and with big spot lights we painted through the night but there was no way the paint was going to be dry before the guests and dignitaries started arriving so we stationed sailors about every 10 feet along the length of the ship from the forward quarterdeck to the fantail in the afterward, the back part of the ship where the ceremony was going to be held to make sure people wouldn't touch the wet paint.

By the way, you just don't paint a ship like you might paint a bookcase. You've got to chip away the old paint, put down a coat of red lead before you come to the battleship gray, to the real paint. So properly painted it's a rather complicated process. If you don't paint properly there is no point in painting because the paint is not going to adhere. The coat of paint isn't going to last. This is a totally ridiculous thing to do but we did it. If you looked at the ship bow on you could see the side to the pier was much different color than the side away from the pier. It looked like the old comic character, Daredevil, half his face was red and half was blue. So we do this, a waste of money, detrimental to morale because we hold the men on board, the sailors aren't done, they know that this is really stupid because all this paint work is just for show that they're going to have to go back and do it properly in the not-too-distant future. I've gone on at length about this particular incident to spare you 50 more similar to it. Morale was poor because of the way the ship was run. The ship was run the way it was run because in general we were under a regime of rather pronounced paranoia.

This imposed or taxed in particular on the junior level officers on the ship of which I was one because we were the ones who generally had the most direct contact with the rank-and-file sailors so how on the one hand you exert leadership and win the loyalty of the men under your command while on the other hand fronting for a regime that they find absolutely ridiculous. Turning that trick was valuable experience.

Q: Did the Captain make Admiral?

CELLA: I had four captains and out of the four, there was one who really took an interest in the crew. He was the best captain under which I served and he was the only one of the four who didn't make admiral. The best captain in terms of what might be called human qualities was the only one not to make it. Of the other three, two were real jerks and they made it and the fourth one who was my first captain was a hell of a good sailor, a highly decorated submariner from World War II. I and most others had tremendous respect for his ability as a professional naval officer. He was rather detached from the crew. He was not a bad person, he tried to make connections I think, but he was just one of these

personality types, maybe it had to do something with the war experiences, he really wasn't good at connecting with people. Under his regime morale was fair but to repeat and it's sort of interesting from a humane point of view and he also was an accomplished, well-qualified naval officer. The best guy we had did not make flag rank.

Q: Tell me, as a Gunnery Officer in time of peace obviously you've got to be up on your guns and all that. But what, what did they do with you most of the time?

CELLA: We spent a lot of time at sea or away from Norfolk which was our home port. I think in my three years we averaged about 70% of operating and 30% in port. That ratio would be even heavier in terms of being away from Norfolk were it not for the fact that during my three years we went in for an extended dry dock period of overhaul of the ship so that automatically kept us at ports of the Navy Yard for as I recall three or four months. Most of the time we were out at sea conducting various exercises. We operated during my time in the North Atlantic, Caribbean, never went to the South Atlantic, and most my time at sea was spent in the Mediterranean which as you indicated earlier was quite pleasant place to be because it was such a prominent vessel we got the best ports. We would call in Barcelona and somebody else would go get to go to Valencia, for example. Valencia is a very nice city as well but Barcelona is far preferred for any kind of tourist point of view. So we were conducting exercises and we were trying maintain our readiness. Every year we would go down to Guantanamo Bay and spend a week to 2 1/2 weeks engaged in various exercises where our readiness was evaluated in those days, they had something called the Navy E which was hangover from World War II. You get an E for excellence in gunnery and other things. We spent a lot of time training. We were also used as a vehicle for midshipmen cruises. We would take the Annapolis midshipmen in the summer time, again ROTC, so-called regular midshipmen of whom I had been one out to sea for oh, six or seven week cruise and during that time we would be training the midshipmen, in my case in gunnery. How do you load, aim, and fire a Navy gun? We had three inch guns, five inch guns and I think our biggest gun was eight inch. During my time as a gunnery officer I was a junior officer in the Fox division which was the fire patrol people, the technicians, the people operating the computers and other equipment used to train the guns. My battle station was in a director which is a mechanism on the superstructure of the ship used to aim the guns. We would have a direct officer with lights who would line up the target, the signal would be sent down into the computer room in the bowels of the ship and the fire patrol problem would be solved. The guns could be fired manually but we would usually fire them automatically. It was my job to acquire the target, any targets threatening the back half of the ship.

Q: Did, particularly on your Mediterranean cruises but maybe on your North Atlantic trips too in view of your subsequent career, did you get any feel for foreign affairs and that sort of thing?

CELLA: I took the Foreign Service written exam in December of my senior year of college, a few days short of my birthday as I recall in Boston. I passed the written exam and took the oral exam also in Boston and a Foreign Service secretary who was accompanying the three-person oral board was really impressed that I had passed. She

said that I was the first person they had passed in two weeks. And Boston being Boston that means they had a rich harvest presumably of highly competent young people. I passed the exams and prior to going back on active duty I decided well, I'll become a Foreign Service officer. I also decided I'm not going to or I think I'll become a Foreign Service officer. But I'm not going to make the same mistake that I did when I passed up other opportunities to go to college via scholarship in favor of NROTC. At the time that I took that scholarship as I indicated in our last session I had already gone to sea a fair amount, liked going to sea, I liked ships and I had thought very seriously about becoming a career naval officer. I did not get, thank God, an appointment to the Naval Academy, because I didn't have the right kind of political influence and so the local congressman supposedly had a competition. I think about 20 people went to these exams sponsored by my congressman, but his appointment went to another guy who was a perfectly fine fellow but it was already wired beforehand. This was back in the early 1950s and so it was probably that way in the early 1850s too and things haven't really changed that much.

So I didn't get to go to the Naval Academy. If I had gotten an appointment I would have gone there most certainly, but I had the next best thing, my way paid through college and a guaranteed commission as a regular naval officer, supposedly with the same standing as an Annapolis graduate. It was never the case either, but that's what the case is supposed to be. Anyhow, I would say that I had decided by about a week two of my first midshipman cruise between my freshman and sophomore year of college that I was not going to be a career naval officer. I made my cruise on the USS Missouri and within a week or two it was pretty clear to me that I wasn't going to do that. On the other hand, I wasn't going to pay my way through college, it was Korean War time and everyone expects to go into the military. I might as well go as an officer so I did not resign my NROTC scholarship.

When it comes to the Foreign Service I said, "Well, I'm not going to make the same mistake that I made the last time, that is signing up for something that doesn't really turn out to be where I had hoped it would be. At least I'm going to try to minimize the opportunities for making that mistake." What I did in various ports where we had a consular establishment I made a point of introducing myself to Foreign Service Officers and frequently I had official business with the consular section so I could meet these people anyway. So I spent a fair amount of time while I was cruising around with the Navy talking to Foreign Service Officers in various ports in an attempt to divine what they thought of the Foreign Service and you know, what was it really like etc. etc. I got to know probably three or four individuals fairly well in the process. I liked them all and what they had to say about the Foreign Service. I concluded afterwards that was pretty accurate and was favorable enough to encourage me to do what I wanted to do anyway which isn't to say that they did not make clear the deficiencies of the organization, particularly when it came to your pay packet. I remember one very interesting guy who became a friend of mine basically for life. We've kept in touch through the years. He was a Vice Consul in Athens, a guy by the name of Don Gelber who you may or may not have interviewed. He's worth talking to. He concluded his career as Ambassador to Mali.

Don was always a very well-dressed guy and when I met Don in Athens our ship was spending a few days in Piraeus. I went up to the Consular Section in downtown Athens and I walked in and told the receptionist that I would like to meet a Foreign Service Officer. I identified myself as a naval officer off the ship off Piraeus and the receptionist said why not see Don and he said, "Bring him in." I introduced myself and he said, "What can I do for you?" In this case I had no business. I said, "Well, I'm thinking of joining the Foreign Service. I've passed the exams and I've got a couple more years to do in the Navy. I would just like to take this opportunity if you've got the time to talk about a bit about the Foreign Service."

So he very kindly took me to a reception where then Crown Prince Constantine was the guest of honor and then we went off to a couple of Turkish diplomatic friends of his and had a lovely dinner at a bouzouki restaurant at the foot of the Acropolis. Don was just terrific to me. I had a great experience and got to see him a couple of more times and it's Athens, it's summer time, it's really hot but Don was always really well-dressed even when he wasn't in the office. I said, "Don, why you don't you ever wear any sports clothes?" He said, "I don't have any." I said, "You don't have any?" He said, "No, I figure I couldn't afford to look my best both for business and for leisure. If I have a leisure wardrobe then my business wardrobe would be somewhat deficient and so I basically invested in three very good white shirts. I do not have a sport shirt." Don came from relatively humble circumstances, came from a rabbinical family in Brooklyn so he was always well turned out. Anyhow, to reciprocate his hospitality I said, "Is there anything I can do for you?" This was a day or two before we were sailing. "For example, I'd like to have you on the ship tonight for dinner? Unfortunately, I have shore patrol duty so after dinner that would have to be the end of my social activities for the evening." Don says, "Oh, you shore patrol officer. There's a really big favor you could do for me." I said, "What's that?" He said, "I presume you will be patrolling the red light district in Piraeus which is a very, very colorful place." I said, "Yes, that's my beat for tonight." I could have been going off elsewhere but it so happened, I think it was a midnight to four in the morning shift as a shore patrol officer, going around the Piraeus red light district which as I recall an area about 10 blocks by five or something like that. Don said, "Well, I'd like to come with you." I said, "You want to come with me?" He said, "Yes." I said, "Well, that's not a problem given your official position but why in the world would you want to do that?" He was a Vice Consul there and he was a visa officer. He said, "I suspect that a lot of my clients hang out in that particular district and given my position I can't go there walking around on my own. If I'm found there with you in your uniform and your shore patrol band that gives me official cover and I would just like to take a good look at this place."

And so that's what we did. I remember one establishment featured an all girl orchestra; the only difference was that the leader of the orchestra was also a woman. There were all kinds of colorful places. Don was thoroughly enthralled and felt amply compensated for the great kindness he had shown me. You asked whether I learned anything about foreign affairs and the Foreign Service. I learned a fair amount about both during my time in the Navy.

Q: Do you recall any of the questions you were asked during the oral exam?

CELLA: I recall very well. In college I majored in theoretical mathematics. Since it was a Jesuit college and my minor, as was the case with everyone at Holy Cross, was basically philosophy. As an NROTC student I had to take naval science and as a student at a Catholic college in addition to philosophy I had to take four years of religion and so there weren't a lot of electives. My program was pretty well prescribed and the only course I took in college that you would think of when you think of the Foreign Service was I took one year of European history. That was it. I had no basic preparation for the Foreign Service, politics, extensive history courses, economics, and those sorts of subjects.

I took my oral right after the Easter vacation. I went home to Cambria Heights, Queens, the family residence, and spent my week plus vacation reading and I collected all kinds of books including a really good book on U.S. diplomacy from the Revolution through the end of World War II, I think. I read the book, it was about a 400 page book in maybe a day plus. I closed the book and I said, "Jesus, I plowed through this stuff, do you remember any of it?" I was sitting there in my backyard in Queens, New York and I said well, I know how we got Florida. That I remember. I was asked how did the United States acquire Florida. I forget how it was asked but the question suggested that we got it as one piece and I said, "Well, that's a common misconception. In fact, we acquired what it is today in Florida in two pieces." "How much did we pay for it?" "Well, the piece we got from Spain we didn't pay anything for. We assumed, I can't remember the number, six million dollars in claims against the Spanish crown so in essence we got southern Florida, Spanish Florida, for free." I knew that John Jay and the treaties and all that. Today I can't tell you all I was able to remember but I was able to hold forth for about a solid five minutes on how we acquired Florida.

I was a math major and they asked me to analyze the philosophical basis of dialectical materialism. I had written my senior thesis, had permission not write it on a mathematical topic, as a philosophical critique of dialectical materialism with Hegel and things like that. Then my very favorite author in those days as I suppose he is today is Joseph Conrad and so I read a lot of Joseph Conrad, and so they asked me if I knew anything about the character of Marlowe in Lord Jim. Well, I had read Lord Jim twice so I knew a fair amount about the character of Marlowe. And it was just one after another.

I'm sitting in Boston Common and had a half hour to kill before going down to the federal post office building where the oral was going to take place and I had a gym bag filled with reading material. I said, "Well, I'm going to reach in at random and pull something out." Well, what I pulled out was a college survey series book, 20th-century world history. A paperback book and I said, "Well, I'm going to open it at random and I opened it to a two page discussion of the 1912 or 1913 Republican Revolution in China. I was asked by the oral board what I could tell them about the Republican Revolution in China and I said, "Well, I can probably tell you a fair amount." So again I was able to hold forth for five minutes having just an hour before read a discussion about the subject about which I knew almost nothing other than Sun Yat-Sen's name two hours before. I could go on and tell you the rest of the questions. They asked me to name, going south to

north, the states bordering the Mississippi River on the east. I blurted out well, they should ask me about the West. And they said okay, name those. I always liked geography and I was able to do without any problem.

They asked me how I would manage the accusation that the U.S. doesn't have a culture comparing to Europe's culture and I did not say, “Well, I would agree with that.” I said, “Well, I might begin perhaps by pointing out the American musical and talking a bit about Porgy and Bess and Rodgers and Hammerstein. I held forth for a while on why Showboat which could be considered almost in the same league as Fledermaus. They asked me some personal questions. It went on for I think about an hour and a half, maybe two hours. I was sent off, sent out of the room and called back and they told me I had passed. I told the Foreign Service secretary that they had passed me and she was astonished. It turned out that I had a split panel that two voted for me and one voted against me. The guy who voted against me I think he probably did it on personal grounds. The reason he gave, and they brought this up, that I had no background in economics. During the oral they had asked me, they pointed out that my resume, my files indicated that I was pretty ignorant of economics and I said, “Well I’m a math major but a theoretical math major that exposed me to methods and analysis that one would use in looking at economic issues and I said I'm going to be floating around on the ocean for three years before I get to join the Foreign Service, assuming I am offered an appointment. If I pass this exam I will use part of that time reading about economics. I will not come in totally green.

How do I know it was a split panel? How do I know this fellow faulted me on economics? A friend of mine who I had gotten to know while I was in the Navy happened to be detailed as a junior Foreign Service Officer detailed to the Office of Personnel. Late one afternoon after closing time I was down there, we were going off somewhere and I came down to his office and he had files going back to the 1920s. I looked at the records of George Kennan's oral exam.

Q: I noticed George Kennan didn't do as well as you might have thought.

CELLA: No, I have forgotten but I think he flunked at least the first time around or was not accepted the first time.

Q: And my name being Kennedy I was on the Board of Examiners; I was an examiner at one point. Being Kennedy, I kind of looked up mine and then Kennan was right next to it. He had been my Ambassador at one point. He was alright but nothing fancy.

CELLA: I looked him up too even though C is not all that close to K. I looked up some of the prominent ones and I think he did not pass the first time around.

Q: I just remember seeing the score. Nothing great.

CELLA: I think it was on personal grounds. I'm pretty sure he just didn't care for somebody with an Italianate name who had gone to a Catholic college and was born in Brooklyn, New York.

Q: It's interesting because you know I was on the board. We gave exams during the '70s and they kept pleading with us to have grades higher than 75. We just couldn't bring ourselves and the only time and I think I gave several hundred of these exams, the only time that we gave an exam and it was a different group each time and I was on that hit into the 90s was a guy with an Italian immigrant who was a naval officer from the Sixth Fleet, I think. We were so impressed that we gave them the highest grade I ever saw.

CELLA: Well, that wasn't me.

Q: By the time 1960, had you pretty well decided that you are going in the Foreign Service?

CELLA: Yes. I decided that, I knew I'd passed and I was almost certain I was going to do it unless my informal survey of Foreign Service Officers had said would be crazy to come into the Foreign Service. I was going to give it a try. I had been thinking of the Foreign Service virtually lifelong interest in travel and that sort of thing back in high school at St. Francis Xavier in New York, Jesuit high school, Georgetown School of Foreign Service, opportunity to travel, opportunity to serve. I keep it pretty well under wraps because it is kind of a noble side. I sort of believe in leading one's life in a way that is of some use to others. I didn't have courage to be a Marine; I wasn't that big of a fan of celibacy to be a priest so I became a Foreign Service Officer to try to satisfy this urge to be of service. I thought about the Georgetown School of Foreign Service but then I came to the conclusion that, I can't remember what drove me to this conclusion, that the Foreign Service was basically for rich guys. It decidedly was not. And so I sort of lost interest in pursuing the possibility of going to Georgetown School of Foreign Service.

During my freshman year in college a Foreign Service Officer who graduated from Holy Cross came up to give a presentation, to visit the campus and one of the things he did while he was on campus to give a presentation to the NROTC unit. His name was Raymond Luddy. He had a lot to do with Cuba and Castro among other things. He was a very distinguished man, an excellent speaker and he wasn't there to deliver a sales pitch, it wasn't a recruiting presentation by any means; it was simply a discussion of what Foreign Service Officers did, what were his experiences and probably a bit about the challenges facing the United States in the world at large in 1954. I was very impressed by Mr. Luddy and so that rekindled my interest in the Foreign Service and Mr. Luddy did not appear to be the blue-blood sort, blue-blood stereotype that I had formed in my mind which had turned me off of the Foreign Service. So I said, "Well I'm going to take the exam." I was one of about 20 from Holy Cross that took the written exam. I think three of us passed and I was the only one to pass the oral exam from Holy Cross. That year as I recall there were 10,000 applicants competing for 100 slots, one of which was offered to me.

Q: Well, then you got out of the Navy in 1960. What happened?

CELLA: It's funny; this says something about the Foreign Service. At midway through my time on the Newport News which I have already indicated at some length was not necessarily the most delightful place to be although physically quite comfortable, for a while I was assigned as the ship's administrative officer. One night in the administrative office I came across, we were at sea, and I came across a Navy regulation which said that an officer serving on active duty who was offered a presidential appointment shall be relieved of his active duty obligation and released to accept the appointment. My heart leapt. Here's my ticket off the ship. We were at sea at the time operating off the coast of Virginia and North Carolina. We had about three or four days left before we were back to Norfolk. Those are among the three or four longest days of my life. I was so excited. I didn't have a car at the time and I got one I paid myself to drive up to Washington. I go to, I can't remember which office, in Personnel and I say," I'm on the list for a Foreign Service appointment, I'm currently on active duty with the U.S. Navy and there is a U.S. Navy regulation that says that if you are offered an appointment I can resign my naval commission to accept my Foreign Service commission. It might have been the Board of Examiners, whoever was in charge of appointments. It was somebody in that office. The person's name I can't remember probably because I was so crushed. I did my best to obliterate the entire experience because the State Department guy says, "We are well aware of that regulation. It's our policy not to formally offer appointments to anyone who has a military obligation." My ticket was torn up and thrown in the wastebasket. My heart sank.

I went back and completed my naval service and remained in touch with the State Department and I guess about a month before I got out of the Navy I got a letter saying they were now prepared to offer me an appointment to join the class starting on the 20th of June or the 23rd of June, 1960, the A-100 class. I got out of the Navy around the 17th, I left my ship which was in the Mediterranean and flew back to the U.S., got out in New York City. I was married by then, came down to Washington and found a place to live and a week later I was back on the federal payroll. There was very little space between the end of my active duty naval duty and the commencement of my active Foreign Service career.

Q: Where had you met your wife and sort of what was her background?

CELLA: Her father was a dentist; she lived in a very nice town north of Boston called Andover. I met her during my freshman year in college. She was from Andover, Massachusetts, went to Salem State College; I think she completed two years there before she went to work. I met her originally at a dance at a Catholic girls' school in Wakefield, Massachusetts. One of the priests at Holy Cross had a connection with this Catholic girls' school and once a year he would bring the boys from his corridor, 25 or 30 of them in a bus to take them up to the this Catholic girls' school in Wakefield, Massachusetts where there would be an evening dance. You get back on the bus and go back to Holy Cross. The school was partly a boarding school, but I don't think my wife in those days boarded. I met her at that dance and we stayed in touch and started to date. It was sort of

interesting. It just shows you how life can be filled with surprises. I did not live on the corridor where the priest was a prefect who had the connection with the girls' school, but a friend of mine lived in that corridor and he was a good friend of mine going back to high school days, a guy by the name of John Foley. Originally we were going to room together but John Foley's mother who was born in Ireland as was his father was a very determined woman and she forbid John to room with me in college. She said she wouldn't have it because she was afraid I would be a bad influence on him. So John and I did not room together. The afternoon of the dance I'm engaged in some underage drinking in an establishment near the foot of the hill on which Holy Cross stood watching as I recall the Miami-Notre Dame football game and John Foley comes into the bar and says, "Come on, Glenn. You're going to the dance with me tonight." I said, "No, I want to stay here and finish watching the football game." Well, he talked me into going to the dance. I wound up meeting my wife at a dance where I did not belong and I was not particularly eager to be. We got married near the end of my first year in the Navy, 1958.

Q: What was your A-100 course, your basic officers, the composition of it?

CELLA: Well, we were 20 all told, one woman, one black. I don't think we had any Jews. It was kind of an interesting group. In those days there have been quite a backlog in the appointment process and we were sort of the last group that were the leftovers. Most of us had been eligible for appointments for three or four years and so the average age was fairly high, I think around 28. I was the only one who didn't have a graduate degree. We had several lawyers, several Ph.D.'s and the rest of class except for me there may have been one other, at the most two of us out of the 20 did not have graduate degrees. I can only think of two that hadn't had active military service. One of the two was subsequently called up by the Coast Guard reserve to do a year of active duty after his Foreign Service appointment. So there was 20 of us, the course director was using the old rank system, which I have always preferred, was an FSO 3 by the name of Alexander (Sandy) Peasley who among other things had served in Hong Kong. He was the course director, the course chairman. It was an eight week course held in the basement of the Arlington Towers, the Arlington Apartments, the old, old FSI. It was eight weeks, one week of which was the poor man's imitation of the British diplomatic service country home test. We spent a week at Calvary remount station in Front Royal, Virginia in off-site training.

Q: How did you feel you fit with this group?

CELLA: I was sort of different but by then I had become accustomed to being kind of different. Well, I don't know now that I think about it. At the end of the course they picked me to give sort of the valedictory for the group. To me that was a favor, I don't know. Anyway, I was the only one stupid enough to take on this assignment and so I had to get up and speak for our class in front of the chairman. I guess it was the last class day, I don't know. At the end I was asked to take the floor and to talk about our experiences and conclusions from the past eight weeks. I got along well with everyone and maintained contact with most of the people in my class. There were one or two real snobs, incredibly pretentious. You know, the sort who thinks within two weeks they'll be

signing treaties. But even the two snobs were agreeable enough. There was another guy was really crazy. He was a really smart guy, but he was almost incomprehensible. He was into technology before technology was the thing to be into and this was back in 1960 and he was talking about negative feedback. His vocabulary was just totally foreign to the rest of us. He was a nice enough guy. He wound up in spending five years in a Vietcong prison. He was a Regional Development Officer taken prisoner fairly early on, certainly fairly early on in the country development program. We were basically a pretty harmonious group. I have fond memories of my colleagues.

Q: During this, did you have any feel for where you wanted to go and what you wanted to do?

CELLA: I wanted to go to Europe. I had no connections to the Foreign Service personnel system which was thoroughly corrupt then and I assume it still is and I didn't have the right connections, the right name, the right educational background. There was no way I was going to get to Western Europe. That's sort of where I wanted to go. Then I started thinking. You certainly didn't get assigned abroad those days with your first assignment as a general rule. I was assigned to Washington. I had a couple of years to mull over where I might want to go but Europe was my objective. But my wife had some misgivings about Foreign Service life. Another area that I had big interest in was Japan. And this was the time of strontium 90, the radiation contamination of milk and so she didn't want to go to Japan. My interest in Japan centered on the following; I was pretty good in languages and I felt, and again this is 1960-61 that if I became really proficient in Japanese I could always find a job. Japan was up-and-coming and there was going to be a need for some Americans who could speak Japanese. But my wife didn't want to go to Japan. And so that took care of Japan.

By then I had developed a connection that might have gotten me to Western Europe. The time came for my reassignment, and by then I was working for a terrific guy named Jeffrey Kitchen who was the deputy assistant secretary of state for political military affairs. He started what is now the PM (political military) Bureau. I was the fourth person assigned to that bureau and I was assigned as his staff aide. He was a deputy assistant secretary because they didn't want to go to Congress to get authorization for an assistant secretary level position. So he got the title deputy assistant secretary for political military affairs. There was no assistant secretary for political military affairs and so he was attached to the office of U. Alexis Johnson who was then the under secretary for political affairs. That was his chain of command. U. Alexis Johnson had a big interest in political military affairs. Kitchen in turn had previously been in the State Department on the staff of Dean Acheson, went off to the Rand Corporation and when the New Frontier landed, he landed back in the State Department as the deputy assistant secretary for political military affairs.

I was in INR at the time. My job in INR was being abolished by the hoax that every administration likes to pull. We're going to reorganize the government, make it better so they reorganized the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department and didn't save the taxpayer a nickel, but I wound up as a freelancer when they were looking

for somebody to be a staff assistant for Mr. Kitchen, so I was assigned to the PM office. He in turn had a big interest in Africa and Asia. He encouraged me to think about Egypt and it so happened that there was a junior officer vacancy at the consulate general in Alexandria, Egypt. So for a few moments my wife had some misgivings about the Foreign Service. I said, "Well, this might be a good test case because I don't want to discover 10 years from now she's totally incompatible with the Foreign Service." It's Alexandria and European enough and with enough amenities and Nasser and socialism hadn't yet totally wrecked the country and Alexandria was quite an agreeable place to be on the one hand. On the other hand, it was sort of exotic enough and there were enough difficulties. You had to wash the lettuce and make sure you didn't poison yourself with permanganate and things like that. You didn't have all the comforts of home. You didn't go down to the corner store for a quart of milk and diapers. Anyway, you didn't have the conveniences of home. There were a lot of things there to cushion the shock, and it was in many ways a European-style cosmopolitan city. I was happy in the end to take the assignment to Alexandria.

Q: You were in the A-100 course until when?

CELLA: I was in the A-100 course from about the third week in June, 1960 until I guess the first or second week of August, 1960. It was an eight week program.

Q: How did the class view the Kennedy-Nixon election? Was this something that engaged you all?

CELLA: Yes. I think the class was interested in politics and certainly far more sophisticated, in general, than I was about the American political process. We would have watched the debates. When we were in A-100 it was the run up to the conventions which took place in the middle of August. The candidates hadn't yet been picked so during the time, the A-100 period, I would think that most of our conversations centered on who the Democratic candidate might be. As I recall it was a forgone conclusion that it was going to be Nixon on the Republican side so there was no suspense there. I don't remember discussions; well, it didn't dominate. We were talking about where we might be assigned and what we wanted to do, about our new career and what we just heard that morning in the A-100 class. But certainly the upcoming political campaign was a theme that wove in and out of our conversations when we weren't talking about the State Department, the A-100 course, the baseball pennant races. A lot of the discussion was who the Democratic candidate would be. At that time one of the leading contenders was Lyndon Johnson, who wound up of course as vice president. This was again the generation of the '50s. The young people of the '50s were sort of considered to be not terribly creative or engaged, the man in the gray flannel suit just floating along and looking to make a comfortable life.

Q: Part of the silent generation

CELLA: The people I associated with weren't all that silent. I decided I wanted to take a course, a night school course in economics because I was going to do that in Washington,

DC before entering my Foreign Service career so I indicated I would stay in Washington. My first choice was the Office of Congressional Relations. In those days it was FSO-8 always assigned to Congressional Relations when Congress wasn't in session, somebody who was about to go abroad so the assignment would normally run from I guess, September to June. Then the post would be vacant until the following September. It was always a junior Foreign Service officer assigned to the Office of Congressional Relations. In 1960 the political conventions were in August, the officer had been who had been assigned to Congressional Relations was released and proceeded abroad in June, Congress didn't finish its business so it had to come back for month after the political conventions. The thought was that the Congress would not be in session again until several weeks after the August political conventions. Congress is back in session in the middle of August and all of a sudden the Office of Congressional Relations was looking for junior Foreign Service officer. I indicated that I was interested in congressional relations and so I wound up my first job in the Foreign Service was for one month, from mid-August until mid-September in 1960 as a staff aide in the Office of Congressional Relations which was then run by a man named William Macomber who went on to do other things but who was very good to me personally, which might come as a surprise.

Also the normal practice in those days was you would have for months of language training after you completed A-100 depending upon your pre-existing qualifications and skills. I was assigned to INR (intelligence and research) after four months of French language training. I do the one month of Congressional Relations so I began my French language training one month later than the rest of my A-100 colleagues, do the four months of language training and I landed in INR and by then it's January of 1961.

Q: Did you get any feel for congressional relations?

CELLA: Oh, yes, it was terrific.

Q: What was sort of your impression?

CELLA: My impression was that the State Department was overly deferential in treating these yahoos. We went crazy to please them, many of their requests were pretty ridiculous, and this was when we had some real statesman on Capitol Hill. I got a good feel for it because as good as you can get in a month, because one I dealt with a lot of congressional correspondence in the State Department, and I think this was Macomber's rule a congressional letter had to be answered in three days. You got a letter from a congressman hit your desk on Friday it had better be off your desk by the following Monday with a forthcoming reply. Part of my job was to bird dog some of this correspondence. Also when it was possible to do so Macomber used to allow me to work at his small conference table in his personal office on which there was a phone, and he would let me listen into his phone calls to the Senators and Congressmen. I had a pass to the diplomatic gallery, to both the House and the Senate and so whenever I was up on the Hill which was maybe four or five times during that one month period if I had a few free minutes I can pop into the diplomatic gallery and follow the debate. I could see Carl Hayden sleeping with his head on the desk and all sorts of things. And watch Otto

Passman perform his fan dance, Otto Passman being a congressman from Louisiana whose main stock in trade was condemning U.S. foreign aid and had a style of speaking and where it was extremely difficult for him to keep his body still. It was impressive to see his body moving around even while it was depressing intellectually to hear what he had to say. I can remember during one important foreign aid debate, I'm sitting there in the gallery, this was a crucial debate and Macomber had come up to witness it and he asked me to join him and he explained to me what was going on, the vote on the floor. Charles Halleck at one point pretty early in the voting procedure, a roll call vote and I think it was after Halleck's vote and McCumber said that's it. We got it. We're going to win by seven votes. And the bill wound up passing by six votes or eight votes. And they're still several hundred at least several hundred more votes to be cast.

I did occasional special projects. I remember one Senator Aiken, the famous light at the end of the tunnel guy from Vermont who foresaw what was going to happen in Vietnam about seven or eight years ahead of everybody else. Carl Aiken a very crusty guy from Vermont was all excited because we were building a new embassy in Mexico City and we were using Carrara marble rather than Vermont marble. Macomber assigned me the investigation. I made my investigation, came back and reported to Macomber. He said, "Well, why don't you tell Senator Aiken that? I said, "Me?" He said, "Yeah. You know a hell of a lot more about it than I do and it just sounds very plausible and were going to get the Senator on the phone and once I get the Senator on the phone I will call you back and I want you to explain to Aiken why we're using Carrara marble rather than Vermont marble." So I explained to him. There was actually a pretty good explanation. Actually, Aitken was gracious in accepting it. The explanation was the quality of the marble the architect wanted was found in Carrara more than Vermont. The color he wanted and the cost differential was negligible so it was pretty convincing.

Q: Given the amount of marble coming from Italy where so much of the sculpture marble was originally.

CELLA: Yes. It was his marble of choice. So I watched, John Rooney was a congressman from Brooklyn; Rooney had the State Department account on the House Appropriations Committee. Rooney would berate the State Department just take potshots and then the State Department guys would go up and be punching bags for this grunt from Brooklyn. He used to refer to our representational allowance as the booze allowance. It was a horrible time in trying to justify representation expenses money which is probably for the whole U.S. Foreign Service about one tenth what the Canadian Foreign Service is getting. It used to be scandalously low. Sophisticated people understood the level which we could afford to entertain people and the frequency compared to, again the Canadians, stands out. But pick anyone you want.

I was a pretty junior FSO and I remember saying that somebody or other in the Office of Congressional Relations ought to say, Mr. Rooney, if you promise to cut your trips abroad in half and when you are abroad to never show up at an embassy cocktail party we will reduce as you term it is our booze submission by 50%. We really need this booze allowance because of guys like you, Rooney.

Q: Yes, I have stories replete of who would go with Rooney and keep him boozed up the whole time. I mean, that's what he did.

CELLA: Why don't we just quietly go up to Mr. Rooney and say hey, we've got some pictures here of you in Paris that you might be interested in. We allowed him to push us around and the State Department admin people were his patsies. There was one guy who became an Assistant secretary for Administration.

Q: I think it was Crockett.

CELLA: Crockett was big in the administration. He was the guy who pushed the admin notion in management that we've got to be more into management. But there was a guy who was a particular patsy of Rooney. Rooney saw to it that he got advanced. He must've been friendly with Crockett and Crockett friendly with him.

You've interviewed him, Ed Peck used to talk about the Foreign Service ball or the State Department ball that it was under glass on the eighth floor. We had no balls. We were not assertive and we were used to well, going back a step. Sitting there in the A-100 class having an FSO sing the virtues of political appointee ambassadors. Now, does an aspiring surgeon in his last year of Harvard medical school have to listen to somebody explain why the virtues of having the chief of surgery of Boston Municipal Hospital a political appointee a cousin of the mayor? One of the real problems of the Foreign Service is that we don't make clear that this is a profession. At least as much of a profession as a shoe repairman that there are certain skills and disciplines that are required to be a successful diplomat. Consequently, everybody from newspaper columnists to hack politicians, to insurance salesmen from Missouri think that they can be a diplomat. We the diplomats don't do anything to disabuse them of that. And I'm sitting there with this experienced career guy and you know the old why it's great to have a political appointees, that they can be very useful with access to the White House. Half these guys don't have access to the White House, but we can save that for another presentation.

I can recall in A-100 saying, "Boy, this is kind of a dopey organization." Then I go to Congressional Relations, and this is really a dopey organization. They allow these twerps on Capitol Hill to push them around and they don't use the ammunition that they have to fight back. And we would tell ourselves in the Foreign Service of all the branches of government really wears a "kick me" sign and smiles.

The "kick me" sign and smile and we explain why we are getting kicked. I spent as little time in Washington as possible during most of my career. Whenever I was in Washington this would come up one way or the other. And it was that the Foreign Service doesn't have the clout within the government because we rotate, we're transient and therefore we're not in Washington long enough to build the kind of contacts there that are required to operate effectively with Treasury, DOD, whatever or on the Hill because whereas the civil service people are there forever develop these networks and so we were always at this disadvantage. So that's the explanation. Now, if you want to accept that explanation

the game is over. I thought on the contrary especially dealing with the Hill the Foreign Service, the foreign Foreign Service provides us with a certain edge. All these jerks like to travel. You had a chance to really get to know them and perhaps exert some influence.

Q: While you were in working with Bill Macomber, did you ever experience his temper?

CELLA: Yes, of course. That's what I say; some people find it hard to believe that he treated me very well. Yes, he had a terrible temper. He wasn't married in those days.

Q: He married a fine woman, a civil service secretary, didn't he?

CELLA: She worked for Dean Rusk in my time, a very nice woman. So, he wasn't married and there is a problem because his idea of fun was working on Saturday and he thought that was everybody else's idea and even Sunday so he worked all the time. I think the staff had certain affection for him. The man was kind of interesting, I mean he had a terrible temper. He tended to disdain the Foreign Service Officers, he tended to think of as a bunch of weaklings, with good reason as I just outlined. He had been a member of Merrill's Marauders, I think, although I may be mixing him up with Roger Hilsman, an elite group during World War II. Anyway, he was a Marine. He liked to see himself as a really hard charging guy, and he was very much into results and getting things done. He was not much as far as I could tell, into contemplation or reflection. And so temperamentally he was kind of ill-suited for any sort of position that required nuance and reflection. Since he was working with Congress he was perfectly suited for that job. He did an excellent job personally when it came to having relations with both sides of the aisle. When the Kennedy crowd came in they swept clean, they really wiped out all the Republican appointees with a vengeance. He was the only guy with any rank that I know of who was a Republican political appointee who survived the New Frontier. He wound up being Ambassador to Jordan, for which I think he was pretty ill suited. He made it through because Lyndon Johnson really liked him a lot. He had good friends on both sides of the aisle. He gave them good service, but he wasn't subservient. He managed to be fairly assertive even with the crowd on the Hill. Yes, his temper, I never did anything to get him angry but I saw him angry many times in one month. Again, not so much with the staff, he had a good staff and he treated them fairly well, besides working them to death, if you can overlook that, he treated the staff fairly well. He would chew out the State Department desk officers and others and yeah, he had a temper.

Q: Before we leave, do you have any examples of Bill Macomber's temper?

CELLA: No, I can't give you a good dramatic example. In general, I would say he would get steamed, for example, at Foreign Service Officers caution. Or difficulty in getting them to come out and say, black and white, here's what should be done. He was very impatient, in general, with Foreign Service Officers. As I said several times, he was very good to me, and he had one other FSO in Congressional Relations at that time who was his special assistant with whom he got along very well. I think he entertained the popular stereotype of the Foreign Service, which by the way is in many ways richly merited based on my own personal experience. Macomber liked to see himself as a man of action, I

mean his nickname was Butt. I'm not sure how he acquired that. It may have come from places where he was accustomed to putting his shoe, I don't know. I can't give you a really good example so I've seen him get annoyed at bureaucrats and bureaucratic process but a specific tirade, no.

Q: Did you ever find yourself or people around you in the position of either calming him down, you know going in deliberately I mean or may be somebody, maybe a secretary calming him down after one of these episodes or two the person who just got chewed out, saying, all right, you know this happens.

CELLA: I can't recall any one specific playing that role but again I was only in the office for a month although I saw a lot of him in one month's time, it was a busy month. It was a relatively small staff, counting everybody maybe 10 or 12 people and it was a pretty collegial group. It was a diverse group, but I think people kind of got on well with one another including Macomber. He was happy with his staff and they were good.

Q: You mentioned two things. We want to go back to the political-military side but before that you'd been in INR for.

CELLA: I was assigned to my first permanent assignment was to INR, to the resources branch and this too, this assignment was revealing about the State Department. I, in college had majored in theoretical mathematics and to the State Department personnel people they thought that was statistics. Well, theoretical mathematicians are fairly snotty people and they would tend to disdain even the study of statistics, never mind being branded a statistician. I was assigned to the resources branch of INR and essentially I was bureau's statistician. What I did was get a book on statistics and on company time I became a statistician with my Friedan calculator and a basic primer of statistics. I did primarily demographic statistics. In those days INR produced the population portion of what they called the National Intelligence Survey, it was a series that started after World War II. Each country had a volume which was periodically updated. As I recall I was told that this enterprise was born of the World War II experience where we found ourselves going to a lot of places that we didn't know very much about. To avoid falling into that trap again or avoid repeating that experience it was decided to do country by country very comprehensive studies of each country.

One section of these documents covered population. What was the makeup of the population and all sorts of statistics, much the way the U.S. Bureau of Census keeps statistics on all sorts of things having to do with population, what's the industrial population, the farming population, the ethnic makeup, the marriage and divorce rates, the fertility rates and all sorts of things. The text in those days was written in INR and the resources branch that I was assigned to did the demographic portion, the population portion and so during my time in INR I mainly compiled statistics having to do with population issues, including trying to decide how many Palestinian refugees there were at that time. This was late 1960 or early 1961.

In the last series we were working on Denmark and so we did a lot of work on Danish population. I prepared the graphs and charts that were covered by text written by one of my associates. INR was called the resources branch got its name for the fact we had no particular concentration geographically and people in the resources branch worked on a variety of so-called sort of cross geographic issues, we did transportation, we did textile trade, we did petroleum, mainly economic things. The New Frontier came to town. I learned a lot, I enjoyed my time in INR and made several lifelong friends.

Q: You were there how long?

CELLA: Just about six months. So the New Frontier came to town. I think we covered this a bit in the last session that every new administration has a plan to streamline government to make it work better. They decided pretty much to revamp INR. That was one of the programs they had and specifically they abolished the Resources Branch. They took the population people and sent them to the Bureau of Census. The person who did trade and textiles I think wound up in the Department of Commerce, one or two people wound up at the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and I wound up out of a job.

I'm reminded a bit of a funny little story occasioned by the breakup of INR. At that time INR had a fair number of non-native born American citizens. Oddly enough our transportation expert had been provincial station master for the Austrian state railroad before World War II. Many of these folks by 1961 were beginning to get on in years and were concerned about making the move. They were particularly concerned, I don't know if it was because they had anything to hide, but the rumor was that as part of the transfer to the CIA you had to take a lie detector test, which was accurate. There were folks who were concerned about having to pass that particular hurdle. I remember the head of the State Department library which at that time was part of INR, was all in favor of polygraph testing and in fact, he wanted included in the questions, “Have you returned all your State Department library books?”

Anyway, my work wasn't really abolished. Because I worked for everyone I guess it was assumed that the part I contributed would be picked up by the new agency which ever one it was to wherever these folks were to be transferred. So I wound up with no job.

Q: One of the underlying themes, this was when Walt Rostow, I think, had come up with his stages of economic growth and there was a takeoff theory which included population and all that. Was that something that was going on at the time?

CELLA: Yes, it was. It didn't affect my work in particular since one of the strong points in INR is you are pretty much supposed to tell the truth rather than meld the facts to a particular theory or a particular policy objective. Rostow and his stages of development and all that figured probably in the material of the A-100 class course. I can’t remember, we had several readings and classroom sessions related to the stages of development notion, and I think that was very much in vogue at least in certain sectors of the U.S. government and the political establishment. I must say that I was never in a position

where the sorts of ideas affected my work. It was an area where I was never involved in development economics or things of that sort.

As I said, I was out of a job and the new Bureau of Political Military Affairs was being established. They didn't want to go to Congress to get another assistant secretary slot authorized. So, the Bureaus established the Deputy Assistant Secretary as its head and it was placed under the authority of U. Alexis Johnson who was then the Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs. In those days you had an Undersecretary either of Political or Economic Affairs and then you had a Deputy Undersecretary. Chester Bowles at this time was Undersecretary for Economic Affairs along with a whole bunch of other titles and U. Alexis Johnson was Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs. My boss, Jeffrey Kitchen, the first head of the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, came in as a Deputy Assistant Secretary. I was selected to be his staff aide so along with Mr. Kitchen and his secretary, I was the third person. There may have been a fourth, George Newman who had been on U. Alexis Johnson's staff doing political military affairs. I suppose I was the fourth person assigned to what has become a rather large bureau of the State Department.

My job was staff assistant doing all kinds of things including arriving very early in the morning. Mr. Kitchen was a very smart guy. He was basically a hard worker but certainly not a slave driver. He had a great sense of humor; he too was very good to me. He went to the Secretary's staff meeting, which is quite unusual having the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary. In fact, from my perspective he was probably more powerful than any Assistant Secretary simply because he was smart, had the backing of Alex Johnson, had a lot of personal fortitude, wasn't afraid take on issues. He wasn’t pugnacious but he never shrank from a fight if it was necessary. So he used to go to Secretary Dean Rusk’s staff meeting. I prided myself making sure that Mr. Kitchen had when he went to that meeting read the overnight cables most likely to come up for discussion. I would get in every morning between 7:00 and 7:30 and go through the overnight cable take from around the world and have on Mr. Kitchen's desk by 8:30, as I recall the staff meeting was at 9:00, the 10 telegrams from sometimes hundreds that I had sorted through that I thought were the most likely candidates for discussion at the Secretary's staff meeting. It sounds boastful, but that perhaps is part of my character, I don't remember ever being told I had missed one, that something had come up that my man wasn't passably conversant or familiar with.

As a staff assistant I reviewed and monitored the flow of paper in and out of Jeff Kitchen’s office. I got to work on a few issues quite apart from the normal staff assistant routine. One involved the law of the sea. There was an internal controversy within the U.S. government and within the international community as I recall having to do with extending the three mile limit. There was a conference coming up and the U.S. position had to be developed on this issue. Because the Navy was very much interested in this question of maritime straits around the world and other issues of interest to the U.S. Navy the issue came out of the bureaucracy in the State Department without resolution and it wound up in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs. I guess what happened was Alexis Johnson got a paper representing the contrasting views, essentially, yes, let's expand or

no, let's keep it where it is, keep the three mile maritime limit. Alexis Johnson had his paper which laid out the problem and identified the positions of the various national players in what is known as the international community but didn't really have a strong recommendation one way or the other so Johnson gave it to Jeff Kitchen. He said, "Tell me how I should decide this. Which is it?" Kitchen turned it over to me. I went around to the various desk officers, the nations that were most pivotal, there were about 10 or 12 on this issue. I wound up producing a paper saying essentially what the original paper had said that there were good arguments on either side, here they are depending on the call one way or the other it's not clear. It's not a moral issue and here are the arguments depending on the ones you find most convincing. That's where you should come out.

I sent the draft to Jeff Kitchen and Jeff called me in and he said, "I want you to redo this. It's very good but you have a terrible flaw you have to correct." I said, "Well, what is that?" "You have the chance to tell the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs how we should decide an issue. Well, you decide and try to make that decision his. You have to come out and state what is your call." I'm not sure but I think I said let's stick with the three mile limit. My reasoning was that we're happy nationally with the existing regime, it seems unlikely that we would lose the debate in the international forum so since there's a pretty good chance our position would carry the day why change the law and leap into the unknown? I think that's roughly what I said. I can't remember. I may have said drop the three mile limit but I believe I voted in favor of the three mile limit. That was the position of Johnson and the State Department. The U.S. government eventually took that position. It produced an editorial I think in the New York Times denouncing that position. I was really proud of the fact that I had been denounced by an editorial in the New York Times.

Q: Naval right of innocent passage is, of course, for the three mile limit is a major thing. Did fishing come up at that point?

CELLA: Yes. The resources question was of primary importance to those who wanted to change the limit. The naval argument was considered secondary because it was against fisheries and to some degree, not nearly as much as would be the case today, obviously, offshore oil. Continental shelf resources.

Q: I think now it's a 20 miles or something. No, 200 miles.

CELLA: Yes, it's 200 for economic. The economic control line is out to 200 and the end of national military control line is out to either 10 or 20.

Q: Were we concerned at the time about Soviet trawlers which were basically spy ships that were hanging around our coast?

CELLA: Yes, it was a concern but it didn't figure prominently in the Law of the Sea issue in so far as I was involved but it may have helped shape the issue and the position taken by others.

Q: Did you get any feel, I mean this is a new Bureau and it was obviously dealing with very sensitive matters. You said Kitchen went to the Secretary's staff meeting. When a new Bureau comes in you're breaking somebody else's rice bowl. Did you get a feeling of sharp elbows in the geographic bureaus? You know, the particularly the European one which had NATO in it? You know, the growing pains of a new bureau in a bureaucracy are a sight to behold.

CELLA: I can't think of even a single occasion where that would be in evidence. It should be because we grabbed a lot of turf. We started with four people and pretty soon we were pretty damn big and had a heavy say in lots of the hot topics of the time. I think part of it stemmed from the fact that Kitchen had been in the State Department before, had been in the State Department before Rand, was recruited from Rand to come back to the State Department to head PM. He knew people and he knew his way around and his wife had been in INR. So the Kitchens both of whom were fairly well-known within the State Department I think had a pretty positive reputations.

The guy I mentioned a little while ago who was doing political military affairs on the immediate staff of U. Alexis Johnson was George Newman a civil servant who had begun a life in the State Department working on budgetary matters. He got Wristonized into the Foreign Service and wound up doing political military stuff out in the Philippines during the time I think that Charles Bohlen was the Ambassador. Anyway, George was a super-bureaucrat in the good sense of the term. Bureaucrat is usually used pejoratively because bureaucrats have to deal with the bureaucracy and it it's a skill. It should not automatically be, well, he's just a bureaucrat. The issue is he a good bureaucrat or a bad one.

George was very good in dealing with the bureaucracy in general, he knew his way around and he was generally liked by people. With one or two exceptions most of the people that Kitchen recruited or who were assigned to PM and accepted were people who were pretty adept at dealing with others. They were not, again with one or two exceptions, empire builders for empire building sake. Kitchen himself grabbed onto a lot of turf but he was not interested in self-aggrandizement; what he was interested in were the key issues and having a say in those issues.

During my time in PM a major issue was Berlin. The Berlin Wall went up in August of 1961 shortly after I arrived on the scene in INR. That was the central issue for quite some time, the central political military issue for quite some time. That was probably the first major issue, which was a new issue to come up after I arrived in PM. A task force was set up and was chaired as I recall by Martin Hillenbrand who was then I think in charge of German affairs in the European Bureau. We had a representative on the Berlin task force, it was a relatively small, task group or working group. I can't remember which it was, but anyway a Berlin group who were deeply involved in the effort to try to figure out what to do about the Berlin Wall. The fellow who was the action officer in our office for the Berlin issue was a guy named Seymour Weiss is who is also civil servant who started out in budgetary matters at the State Department. Sy Weiss was our guy on the Berlin task force and he had very good relations with Martin Hillenbrand. Martin Hillenbrand was a

good man besides so during my time whoever might have had real friction, the most likely candidate for that arises over Berlin; but there was no friction, at least none that I detected. I mean, there were debates, policy debates but from a turf point of view that never entered the picture. My sense was that the group was trying to decide what the hell to do about this potential casus belli and there was more exception to the rule but the energy was really devoted toward trying to develop some kind of.

Q: It was so bloody dangerous. Did Eleanor Dulles enter the picture?

CELLA: She was around, she was in INR, I knew her a bit but I never had any extensive dealings with her. She would have been the logical choice as one of the individuals with substantial say on this issue, but her role I get no personal knowledge from insight.

Q: I have talked to people who we were in Berlin when the Kennedy Administration came in. Like any new Administration they had people talking about flexibility and maybe a new approach and all. Our people in Berlin on the ground at the time were quite concerned because they felt that this was a an inexperienced Administration that might go, to use the later term, wobbly on Berlin, and this was not a place you could compromise much on. Did you get any feel for that?

CELLA: The fact that the Kennedy Administration failed to react decisively is clear, that's what they did. They couldn't figure out what to do. Then the arguments are all out there about this isn't worth the risk of war. Where will it stop if we don't take a stand here? There were people who said we've got to go in there and knock it down and knock it down now, and if we do not get down within 48 hours at the most then we were going to have big problems down the line. And the other argument was it's not worth the risk, maybe a partitioned Berlin isn't so bad anyway. Although you wouldn't find it articulated in public, I think there were more than a few people in this country and certainly lots of them in Europe who were pretty darn happy with a divided Germany. German reunification was not something deeply desired by the average person in Rotterdam in those days, and so I think some of the ambivalence or some of the uncertainty maybe more a part of legitimate policy considerations than in fact craven incisiveness per se. I have no idea what Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy thought about the subject. What they wound up doing was sending Lucius Clay, the very distinguished World War II leader.

Q: Also the hero of the Berlin airlift.

CELLA: Correct.

Q: I mean, we wanted to show that we weren't going to let Berlin go down the tubes because that was part of the concern that we might give up on Berlin.

CELLA: Yes. That's probably true. We sent Lucius Clay over and I can't remember how it was phrased, but he essentially said let's do nothing. By now several weeks had gone by and nothing more had happened. Many of the people had argued, by the way the Soviets did not want a unified Germany either. They've got things pretty well under

control in East Germany, but who knows what a united Germany might be like one day. I have no idea if that was the case or not, but the Soviets were perfectly happy in many ways to have a divided Germany. Anyway, we ended up doing nothing and nothing happened.

Q: I have a German friend; my translator in Frankfurt when I was with the refugee program. I have kept in touch with her and she later got a doctorate at Frankfurt U. and is a professor. She said that one of the jokes going around at the time of unification in 1989 was saying there are those who said that we should give Walter Ulbricht, the head of the East Germany, the honor cross for keeping East Germany out of West Germany for so many years. A lot of Germans weren't wild about bringing the East in.

CELLA: They're not to this day. My mother was born in Germany and I always had an interest in Germany and spent a fair amount of time there. I've got some good German friends with whom I've maintained regular contact and they're West Germans. By that I mean their familial roots were always in the western part of Germany and they're sophisticated folks. On a personal level they are less than delighted with the consequences of the reunification. They still feel the people in the East aren't pulling their weight yet. They haven't made full use of the generous aid that had been given, that to the degree that they've got a political extremist problem in Germany it is lodged in East Germany etc. etc.

Q: Konrad Adenauer used to have a train that would take him to and from Berlin and supposedly at one point anyway when they crossed over the Elbe Adenauer was supposed to have said, "Ach, Asia." In other words he was in the Orient. Of course, he was a good Rhinelander.

Did you have any problem with the desks getting things cleared?

CELLA: Not really. I can't think of anything. We had this big advantage in that Alex Johnson was our boss. We could represent ourselves as representing his views and that already gave you tremendous leverage.

Q: Yes, a desk officer wasn't going to cross Alex Johnson, with his tremendous prestige and rank.

CELLA: And he was a pretty impressive guy. He was a reasonable guy, who would listen to opposing views, at least in my experience. We did not originate a lot of cables and position papers of the sort that would require clearance from others. We didn't originate a lot of cables. We did provide policy papers but those generally went straight to Johnson or on up. For example, we did a lot of work on counter-insurgency. That involved a number of geographic desks in one respect. In another respect, when you're talking about counter-insurgency in general, how you develop the concepts, what sort of training programs do you have, counter-insurgency across the board as opposed to the Malaysian insurgency or the Philippine insurgency there really wouldn't be a geographic bureau who would have control of an issue like that. And developing our thoughts on the subject we

might consult with the geographic bureaus, but the issue of clearance, I can't think of it ever being a sufficient obstacle that I would remember it.

Q: Did you get any feel for the role of the White House, the NSC and all at your level? And when things come around that demanded urgency or something?

CELLA: You know, I was the lowest of the low, but the fact that I was staff assistant for Kitchen gave me access to all sorts of things out of necessity. I was involved in situations where I observed a lot of interesting people saying and doing interesting things. I think the general attitude of McGeorge Bundy and Kennedy was one of disdain for the State Department. If it was an issue that they thought was really important they decided what we're going to do no matter what view the State Department had. I think Dean Rusk was on fairly good terms within the Administration with people who accounted for security issues and formulating national security policy.

Shortly after I went to work for Jeff Kitchen President Kennedy came over to the State Department and addressed the senior officers of the State Department, Civil Service and Foreign Service in the 23rd Street Auditorium. I suppose no one below the level of Office Director was invited to this meeting. Kitchen got an invitation because of his position and he gave it to me. He said, “Glenn, here's a chance to see the President in person. I see him fairly often. I don't really need to go to see him again today but why don’t you go down and sit in?" I’m sure I was the most junior person in the room by a mile. There were maybe one or two others who got in the way I did, but I didn't see them as I looked around. Kennedy comes walking onto the stage. I have met in my life, been in the presence of three people who in my judgment really had charisma, people who would fill the room the minute they walked into it. There is just something about them. Kennedy certainly had that. His presence had a certain electricity about it. His manner was quite relaxed and good-humored, but he just projected in a way I can only think of two other people.

Q.: Who are the other two?

CELLA: Pope John Paul and Admiral Zumwalt, the former Chief of Naval Operations about whom I have something to say later on. I worked for him for a year and he had it too. The Pope, Kennedy and my friend, the Admiral.

Kennedy comes in and he’s got the audience eating out of his hand. And his main message was remember each country has its own ambassador, they don't need two. In a very charming, warm, friendly way he spent the better part of 30 or 40 minutes one way or the other lecturing the State Department on that supposed scourge, “localitis”.

Q: Explain what “localitis” means.

CELLA: The notion that we began to have the skin in a way, of the country that we are working on, that we see the world before working on Guatemala in Washington or in Guatemala we see the world from the point of view of Guatemala rather than seeing it

from the point of view of the United States. Kennedy's message was Guatemala has its own ambassador to Washington to argue the Guatemalan case. We don't need a State Department geographic bureau or State Department Embassy arguing the Guatemalan case too. We need people to look at the world from the point of view of U.S. interests, to argue against the host government when U.S. interests so dictate. I think probably there is some validity to the charge that the State Department has "localitis". FSOs become influenced by the local government to the detriment of their ability to advance and sustain U.S. interests. There may be some of that. The term wouldn't exist and it had come from somewhere.

Q: It's quite definitely there.

CELLA: I must say I never particularly experienced it, possibly because a lot of places where I spent time we were at odds with the government anyway. The ground for "localitis" was not particularly fertile in Nasser's Egypt or in Boumedine's Algeria. Anyhow, Kennedy had us eating out of his hand, and I was sitting there thinking he's insulting you people, you ought to protest. Get up and walk out. Put up your hand and say, "Mr. President, with all due respect, you're talking nonsense." Fine, it's a great line. They have their own ambassador they don't need two. Fine, use that, but don't make it the central theme of your supposed pep talk to a rather important element of the U.S. government. I saw how easy it was to con the State Department folks so no wonder we don't command a lot of respect among the political class in Congress. And by the way, the "localitis" issue to the extent I saw it was much more likely to be seen in a political appointee than it was in a career Foreign Service Officer.

Q: I'm told that at one point our Ambassador in Morocco, a political appointee, would send cables back talking about "our king."

CELLA: It wouldn't surprise me. I didn't see any of those.

Q: This was about 20 years ago.

CELLA: One of my jobs was to read through all the telegrams everyday that came in from around the world. At that time U. Alexis Johnson's staff assistant, junior staff assistant, was someone I had come into the Foreign Service with. We were in the same A-100 class. He didn't live too far from me and we would take turns driving to and from the State Department. He had to be in early too and one of the advantages was we had a parking pass. There was one pass between the two of us.

Anyhow, I kept a little file of the 10 stupidest telegrams that I had seen, and I would occasionally get one that was stupider than the 10 stupidest and the tenth stupidest would be thrown in the burn bag. I think the 10 stupidest telegrams or most banal or idiotic or whatever term you want to use most of all were consistently political appointees. The one from our Ambassador to the Republic of Ireland suggesting Teddy Kennedy's arrival remarks -- Teddy was being groomed for the U.S. Senate and so he was sent off on a trip

obviously to key places. He was running for senator from Massachusetts. He went to Ireland, he went to Italy, he went to Greece and he went to Israel.

Q: And to Portugal?

CELLA: I don't think he hit Portugal. Portugal is important in Massachusetts but more important in Rhode Island. The guy who's our Ambassador to Ireland, his qualification of coarse was he was a substantial campaign donor, possibly family friend of the Kennedys, his basic trade was he was a car dealer from Palm Beach, Florida. I think it was Stockdale. I can't remember his first name, I called him Will Stockdale after the country bumpkin in No Time for Sergeants. Each stop the way the embassy was asked to submit suggested arrival remarks for use by Teddy Kennedy when he hit the ground. The guy in Dublin, I can remember two elements from his telegram that qualified for my file.

One was cornball, idiotic. He had him saying, I guess Teddy had been to Ireland as a boy on a family trip or something, well this is my first time back to Ireland since I was knee high to a grasshopper. I can tell you it looks just as green from up here as it did from down there. The other element was dopey from beginning to end. Telling the Irish that at six foot two or whatever he is, Ireland looks just as green as when he was four foot two.

The other was to congratulate and express regret for not having any time for the Irish and, I forget if it was Scotland or England, rugby match. I guess it would be the Five Nations Cup. Anyway, a big rugby match. Express regret on your arrival that you didn't arrive in time to attend the match but you want to congratulate the Irish on their victory (to be used only if the Irish win). So, okay. I think you wouldn't congratulate somebody on a victory if they had lost because you'd look really stupid, and I don't think if they had lost you would even express regret that you weren't there to witness the defeat.

The Kennedy administration and the New Frontier, I only observed one year of it, or a year and a half of it. I observed early on the farce of the INR reorganization which in terms of saving money, creating greater efficiency, I don't think it did either, but it enabled people to say that they had streamlined the State Department, without saying by the way, we added to the Census Bureau. A rather major impression on the New Frontier senior appointees was in general they tended to be incredibly arrogant. As far as the State Department is concerned I wouldn't apply that to Dean Rusk, and I certainly wouldn't apply it to George Ball. There may have been some that I would have applied it to but we'll leave that aside. In general if they thought McGeorge Bundy and company thought an issue was important then they would take it over. They couldn't cover everything. And if the issue wasn't important they would clearly leave that for somebody else.

I can remember in those days Cheddi Jagan had come to power in British Guyana. Cheddi was a leftist and he was a cause for some concern. Cheddi was coming to Washington. Anyway, there were a bunch of meetings and papers generated about what to do about Cheddi Jagan, including a fairly high-level meeting held at the State Department which I went to as Kitchen's eyes and ears. As I recall, Arthur Schlesinger was the guy from the White House who came to this meeting. Arthur shows up late and

leaves early with no excuse either way as to why he was late or why he had to leave, and it was Arthur's way of saying I can't be bothered with this stuff, you worry about Cheddi Jagan. That impressed me as being kind of the approach of the administration in general.

Q: You left Political Military when?

CELLA: I left there in the summer of '62. I was there a little over a year.

My friend sent me a note saying too bad you missed all the fun. [Cuban Missile Crisis] You would have had a cot in your office. That was a sign of real prestige.

Q: Where did you go in August, 1962?

CELLA: In late July or August of 1962 I landed in Alexandria, Egypt at the consulate general. I earlier explained that I wanted to go to Europe, but I didn't have the pull to get there and Kitchen could've got me there probably. As I recall he said he might be able to land me in Milan, but he recommended that I not go there. He saw more opportunity for somebody like me without any kind of connections to speak of beyond him, although he's a damn good connection to try my hand elsewhere. I think I explained that my wife's attitude toward the Foreign Service was a bit ambivalent. Egypt I thought would be a good place to just test both my wife's and my own stomach for Foreign Service life. It was exotic enough, different enough and challenging enough, but it wasn't like being assigned to Poughkeepsie. On the other hand, it was a pretty sophisticated country, to put it mildly, and foreigners could survive there quite nicely. The cosmopolitan aspects of Alexandria were very much in place when Nasser was gradually obliterating the superstructure that supported the Alexandria Quartet.

Q: Who wrote that?

CELLA: Lawrence Durell.

Q: A very popular set of books at the time.

CELLA: Yes. And I think probably pretty accurate. I lived down the street from the British Ambassador's summer residence in Alexandria which is where a lot of the Durell narrative takes place. People of the sort that you had at the Alexandria Quartet were people like we dealt with regularly. It had a large foreign community many of whom had Egyptian citizenship. There are lots of Greeks there, for example, who were Egyptian citizens but they were Greeks. They spoke Greek and had their own community. A big Italian community, a large English community, there again a very cosmopolitan place. But the way, the life these folks had known for decades by '62 had already changed drastically thanks to Nasser. While I was there I was to see him put the finishing touches on and give the wrecking ball a final swing or two with his nationalization and that sort of thing.

Q: When you arrived in '62 how would you describe the situation in Egypt and then in Alexandria?

CELLA: We were now well into the Nasser era and the excitement of the Suez had begun to recede a bit.

Q: That was in '56.

CELLA: Yes. The Anglo-French-Israeli retaking by force the Suez Canal which Nasser had nationalized. I'm groping here because it depends on who you're talking about. Of course, that's natural, and applied to any society. I'd say the mood among the expatriates and among the wealthier Egyptians, the businessmen and the landowners, etc. was apprehensive. They were they had suffered a fair amount by nationalizations and sequestrations to use the term where Nasser or his regime had just simply taken, stolen from them a lot of their assets. Many of the upper class, the old upper class, were still surviving pretty well. They still had their country clubs, their tennis clubs and posh cafés and things like that. A lot of the trappings of the old way of life were still there and many of them hadn't been entirely wiped out so they were able to live well. But they were apprehensive. If he stops here, okay but who knows what's going to happen tomorrow? We are talking about when I first arrived in the summer of 1962.

Among the peasants, the fellahin, lower classes my sense was we're not doing so hot but we've never done so hot, but whatever enthusiasm there might have been among the lower classes for Nasser and socialism I think it had pretty much dissipated.

The one group that was conspicuously happy was the military officer corps to the extent I had exposure to them which was not a great deal. They were pretty happy because they had it good. They had a right to be happy. For example, I belonged to two sporting clubs while I was there, one of which after I left in 1964 I think both of them, were totally taken over by the military. While a lot of people still had places to go and play golf in 1962 by 1964 or 1965 or '66 those places have been taken over by the military. During my two years life continued to go downhill and became toward the end of my time, when there was a further round of sequestrations, things were really getting worse and Nasser began nationalizing the larger commercial enterprises. By 1964 he began taking up smaller operations which might be called instead of taking over a factory produced 10 million worth of goods of month he was now down to taking over biscuit factories that produced 20,000, 30,000 worth of product a month. Life in the country for the average person was certainly not getting better. What we had was the pulling down of the upper echelons rather than raising up the lower echelons. The guy sowing rice in the Delta was still sowing rice in the Delta. How he was living was still the way his grandfathers lived going back to the time of the pharaohs. A kind of social leveling off rather than a lifting up.

Q: Who was our Ambassador at the time?

CELLA: John Badeau. A very nice man, he had been head of the American University in Cairo, and I think he was at Columbia when the New Frontier made him Ambassador. One of the conceits of the New Frontier was to take academics. Badeau had a relationship with Nasser the details which I don't recall if I ever knew them, but somehow Badeau knew Nasser when Nasser was quite a young man before Nasser came to power. And Badeau again a very nice guy whose wife was charming, but Badeau thought he had an avuncular relationship with Nasser, and he really thought that he enjoyed Nasser's confidence and that Nasser had great respect for him. I'm sure he had a good relationship, but it was our perception that Nasser played Badeau like a banjo. For example, when I was there when Nasser moved into Yemen and tried to add Yemen as a third star.

Q: Continuing the United Arab Republic.

CELLA: Right. Which is always sort of a joke, it's kind of interesting story why that never worked. He had already lost Syria but he still had two stars and I used to ask my Arabic teacher, the United Arab Republic, who are you united with? Anyway, Yemen was to be the third star. The Egyptians were not very good colonizers, at least contemporary Egyptians. My perception was that they played a rather heavy hand in Yemen, and the Yemenis gave them a proper reception or a reception in kind, a fairly brutal strife going on in Yemen.

Q: Go up in the hills and the mountains up there, they gave the Egyptians a bloody nose.

CELLA: You had rumors going around Alexandria of heads being cut off and mounted on pikes and stuck in the ground as a caution to incoming Egyptian forces. My sense was it was a pretty bloody battle and people brutal on both sides. But Badeau didn't quite see it that way because he kind of admired Nasser, and Nasser would give him a line and Badeau would sort of buy it. We ended up sending Ellsworth Bunker out with the so-called Bunker Proposals for settling the Yemeni-Egyptian problem. These were developed I believe in consultation with Ambassador Badeau and there were three main elements. I have forgotten what they were. I do remember chatting with my colleagues in Alexandria saying this is really crazy. The Egyptians, they will say these things, but they're not going to do them. This may be totally unfair, but my recollection is that Bunker with encouragement from Badeau was thoroughly hoodwinked by Nasser. As I recall what happened in the end, was that nothing was really settled. The Egyptians said to heck with this and pulled out. The Yemenis beat them up until they finally decided to give up. I think the problem was still going on when I left Egypt. I lost track of it.

Q: Who was the consul general in Alexandria?

CELLA: Kind of a pathetic guy by the name of Harlan Clarke. Harlan Clarke, we'll use the old rank structure was an FS-02, was from Ohio. He was terribly eager to make FS-01 and wasn't sure he was going to make it. I can remember him doing pathetic things like going down to Cairo to be there when the cable came in with the promotion list. He hadn't been promoted in some time and maybe he was reaching the point where he would be thrown out for time in class. I can't remember what the rules were in those days, but he

was in FS-02 dying to become an FS-01. He had been in Yemen early on in his career, and I think he may have co-authored or authored or contributed to a National Geographic article on Yemen. At one point he had studied Arabic in Beirut at the Arabic FSI the private language school in Beirut. A contemporary student of his, I remember him saying one day, Harlan was one of those guys who more or less got up ground speed, but could never quite take off and his Arabic is pretty atrocious. That was sort of sad. But they wound up in Japan and I think he was Economic Counselor in Japan and as I recall, as was a fairly frequent occurrence in those days he had gotten in the bad books of somebody who was able to put the clamps on his career so he was held back for some time. That's why he was so nervous about getting to be a class one officer. He was an insecure guy and kind of a pathetic guy, likable in many ways and certainly not a dumb man, but he really didn't like me.

Q: What were you doing there?

CELLA: Well, a little bit of everything. I was primarily the Consular Officer and the Administrative Officer, which reminds me of one of fallacies at the cone system. I think every Foreign Service Officer, the world may have changed so much that this doesn't apply, should do early on consular work and admin work. Consular work because that's the only way area where a junior officer can make a decision of some significance. Whether a person gets a visa or not can be a determining factor in a person's life. You have responsibility, you have to exercise judgment, and you have the authority. And it's the reward to becoming a diplomat by doing consular work. How do you handle a situation where the Communist mayor's son wants a visa to go to study at the University of Kansas and he's a Communist mayor? The exceptional officers didn't want to do the job and it's craziness. You want to do admin work early in your career because that's how you learn the State Department rules and regulations including very crucially travel regulations. Once you've mastered the subject matter yourself then you can't be pushed her round or hoodwinked. I traveled numerous times and had the pleasure of traveling on Italian line vessels and every admin officer I had to deal with told me no, you can't do that, you have taken American vessel. Well, you didn't have to take an American vessel if you knew what the regulations were. And it gave you a feel of how the State Department really operates. I'm pretty sure it still applied I felt that there was a counter-management and that's the way the State Department manages itself. It's not as if they don't know what the role of the State Department and the Foreign Service should be. It's as if they know it very well and do everything they can to make it impossible to play that role properly. That's what I call counter-management. In Alexandria I did consular work, administrative work and when the Economic and Commercial Officer was away on home leave or when there was a gap between the departure of the old Economic Commercial Officer and the new one I did the economic and commercial stuff too. I learned about onions and cotton and things like that.

Q: Let's talk about consular work. Who were you seeing and what was happening at that time?

CELLA: If you talk about what was happening politically, Cairo was the center of action. Alexandria was a bit player and the local officials had no significance, no great significance. I mean, it was a very centralized decision-making process under Nasser. We had some commercial interests. Our relations with the Egyptians were in general fairly good. I mean, the Badeau-Nasser link I spoke about earlier I think in part helped us to enjoy fairly good relations. I was there when Kennedy was assassinated and there was a genuine communal outpouring. I was in charge of arranging the U.S. response to the local response to the assassination and also marking the sad event. I organized a mass, a memorial Mass at the local Catholic cathedral.

So, anyway, we had good, or pretty good relations except when you talk about key economic, political, commercial issues. The locus of the activity was definitely in Cairo. For example, I think the biggest wholly owned U.S. enterprise in Egypt, was a Ford assembly plant in Alexandria. It was our concern that the Egyptian government was going to take over the plant. There was a fairly difficult situation because the plant manager would keep the Consulate General informed of the real action but the real action was between him and the Economic Counselor up in Cairo. So for what I would call the important issues, the action basically was in Cairo.

On the other hand, Alexandria was an excellent listening post. The problem is what we would hear was not necessarily what Embassy Cairo would want to hear repeated. It was very clear that disaffection was growing among the lower classes, that the area was becoming increasingly less efficient. The upper classes were gradually being wiped out, having their authority eroded, leaving the country. So the picture that one saw in Alexandria was not the picture again that the embassy in Cairo was painting in regard to conditions in the country. For example, Nasser would come to Alexandria and yes, there would be crowds screaming Nasser, Nasser but it was all phony, it was all Potemkin-like. These people were either bribed or coerced to turn out and cheer the president.

On the golf course, I associated with a lot of caddies who are not from the cream of society but one could argue that because they did work for the upper classes they had upper class attitudes. In any case it was clear that they had a very low opinion of Nasser and the government and its efficiency and its ability to make their lives better.

In Alexandria the administrative officer would manage three fairly large properties, and a total foreign and local staff of 20 to 30 people. While I was there we moved from our old offices downtown to a rather palatial building on the edge of the downtown area. So this big office move suggests sort of administrative things kept me fairly busy. On the consular side we had a resident American population in the consular district but thank God, not a particularly large one, nor a very troublesome one. Many Americans who resided in the consular district were people who had been there for a long time and knew how to get along and knew what was going on. I didn't have many headaches. I had a few. I had a good local staff, but that also occupied my time. I did some spot reporting including a long Airgram on African population issues. The UN Economic Commission for Africa had a population conference in Cairo shortly after I arrived in Alexandria and to the great displeasure of Mr. Clarke the State Department, because of my demographic

experience in INR several years earlier, sent me to the conference as the U.S. representative. It was a two-week conference and I wrote about a 35-page Airgram reporting everything that went on at the conference which I thought was worth reporting on. The Consul General would criticize me for that. Where are the reports? For Christ's sake, I was working on them a good solid 40-plus hours doing the consular work and the administrative work and filling in on economic and commercial issues when need be.

One story, a consular case. We worked half a day on Saturdays. I can't remember if we had a duty officer or I think the office was open half a day on Saturdays and was open half a day another day during the week which worked out to be a 40 hour workweek. There was a Saturday, a departing Fulbright professor in Cairo comes into the office and he's really clearly agitated and upset. He comes in like at 10 o'clock in the morning. He's booked on an Italian flag ship due to sail at two o'clock that afternoon. It might have been on the American Export ship in those days, but it was still what was called the Four Aces, combination cargo and passenger ships operated by the American Export Lines regularly between New York and the Mediterranean, and Alexandria was one of their ports of call. One of the American interests in town was the American Export Lines' office.

Anyway, the professor comes in all agitated. He's got the equivalent of a steamer trunk full of books. The customs won't clear him to leave with those books until they've sorted through them all at and even then they might not let him leave with the books. In any case, if they did what they wanted to do and more he would miss his ship. They clearly wouldn't have it done before his ship was due to sail. Our shipping assistant was Nubian by the name of Said. Said was terrific guy, one of the more interesting people I have met, a very, very black Nubian guy and very proud of the fact that he was Nubian. He had excellent connections in the port. I sent the professor back to the port with Said. Said straightened it out and he comes back to the office and tells me it's all taken care of, the books are on the ship and the professor's going to sail and no problem.

About six weeks later I get a copy of the letter from this professor whose name I have forgotten he sent to Dean Rusk the Secretary of State. He said during his two years in Cairo he had become thoroughly convinced that the American Embassy staff existed primarily to represent the Egyptians to him rather than him to the Egyptians. He indicated he was quite unhappy with the treatment he received from the Embassy and again, back to localitis, they took the Egyptian point of view rather than the American point of view. Then he said, my very last day in Egypt, thank God I ran into the exception to the rule. You have a Vice Consul in Alexandria, Glenn Cella by name, who in my hour of great need came through brilliantly. He goes on and not in particularly great length but he added a sentence or two explaining he had this problem with these books and magically, said the guy, I was able to solve it. I didn't solve anything, Said solved it. He was, he was my magic potion. His last paragraph was great. It said, paraphrasing or capturing the spirit he says something like, despite Mr. Cella's impressive performance which I remain and always will be most grateful, I want you to know I have not changed my mind about the State Department in general and the quality of its representatives abroad. He's moved to take the time to write a nice thank you note, but on the other hand he wants to make

clear despite that pleasant experience he considered it a total aberration and will continue to have very negative views.

Q: You were fairly young then, weren't you?

CELLA: A lot younger than I am now.

Q: I remember, particularly during the Kennedy administration and thereafter for a while there was a great emphasis on youth. You were supposed to have a youth officer and all that. I assume there was an Alexandria University, probably several universities there. Did you have any contacts with the university students?

CELLA: We had a U.S. Information Service (USIS) office in a separate building. The Branch Public Affairs Officer was the main U.S. government interface with the student population per se. I saw students usually, except I didn't have anything direct dealing, usually in the context of a student visa which I didn't issue too, too many. Come to think of it, I don't know who that would be, but I can't pretend to have any real insight or expertise in regard to the attitudes of the young Egyptians. I would say in general, they were still quite pro-American. I can remember, on our way to Alexandria we took an Italian flag vessel from the American Export Lines to Genoa and from Genoa to Alexandria. We rode an Italian flagship and there was an Egyptian family on board who lived in Cairo and it was a mother and father, I can't remember if there was a son and daughter or just a son. I remember there was a son and he was probably in his mid teens. He and his parents were very friendly toward us and he was extremely pro-American. The fact that I was going to be the Vice Consul in Alexandria, well, that was tremendous.

I can remember the days when an American diplomatic passport was a magic wand and now it is a death warrant. I had no hesitation even after the Six Day War to identify myself as an American diplomat or an American government official and flashing my diplomatic passport when traveling in the Arab world. On the contrary I was happy to have them know that's who I was.

Q: In a way you said this was a testing out case for you and your wife in the Foreign Service. How was life?

CELLA: Well, we were in Alexandria, and it was quite pleasant. We didn't have a great house but a nice house. We actually had the lower floor of a fairly large house owned by Egyptians who lived on the upper floor in the apartment. It came with a nice garden and nice little terrace. It wasn't palatial but a pleasant place to live, in a nice neighborhood. We had lots of interesting friends, a very active but not overly taxing social life. I had a certain standing in the community and my wife did too. Except for sandstorms the weather was actually pretty agreeable and there was a very nice beach. The city itself was quite interesting although not as interesting as I thought it should be given its great age. I guess it's gotten more interesting in recent years and they have made a lot of archaeological discoveries that were yet to be made when we lived there. The only complaint that comes to mind is working for Consul General Clarke and my wife had to

deal with his relatively low-born British wife. This is sort of in the good old days when the Principal Officer's wife could treat his subordinate officers' wives as personal servants and flunkies if they wanted to. So that part we weren't unhappy to leave behind. The thought of resigning from the Foreign Service never crossed my mind because of the life we lived.

What happened was the Consul General didn't particularly care for me and really did me in on my performance evaluation. I said, "Well, I'm not too happy about that but I always have an alternative job in my hip pocket." For a number of years I always had another job lined up so that I didn't have take any more abuse than I was willing to take from the Foreign Service and people in the Foreign Service. I wanted to protect myself against the assignment process and again against the personnel procedures that led to the grievance procedure business that was established several years later where you could really be blasted without having an attacks and no defense.

Q: Was there a Deputy Principal Officer there or not?

CELLA: Yes, I think the Econ-Commercial Officer was fairly clearly the number two and was viewed as such. Whether he had the title, I don't think so. He was the guy to take over when the number one wasn't around.

Q: You left when?

CELLA: I left in the summer of 1964. I was there for two years.

Q: Where did you go?

CELLA: Martinique and the French West Indies. By this time I indicated that I wanted a European assignment and I can remember the personnel person points out when I get back to Washington said, "Well, you've got your European assignment." Of course, Martinique being an overseas Department of France and being in those days and still is under the French Desk of the European Bureau I said, "Well, the way I look at it I got my black African assignment." Anyway, I went to Martinique, to the Consulate in Martinique which was one of the six first overseas missions established by the United States after Independence. As I recall it had very important trade in those days with the rum, molasses and that sort of thing. And, of course, the French presence in the Caribbean, there were all kinds of things going on and so I think Martinique was one of the first six. I think Hamburg was another one, I can't remember the others. Anyway, I went to Martinique which was a two-man post plus a USIS officer.

Q: You were there from 1964 until?

CELLA: It was a hardship post. I had the option to extend but I was only obliged to stay 18 months and I exercised my opportunity to get out of there after 18 months. I liked Martinique very much but again, I ran into a terrible Principal Officer. I can remember way back when I first joined the Foreign Service I was a stamp collector and I used to go

over to the Foreign Service Protective Association office where a lady by the name of Mrs. Smith saved stamps for me. I could remember two sayings from her; one, that there are no hardship posts, just hardship people, and two, two moves in the Foreign Service were as good as a fire. I spent 18 months in Martinique.

Q: Who was the principal officer?

CELLA: Another kind of pathetic guy by the name of William Marvin.

Q: How was he?

CELLA: Another fairly insecure guy and I have a tendency I think to get on poorly with insecure people for whatever reason. My sense is that people who are basically insecure can't stand people that are basically secure. In those days if you had a dispute when they did their evaluation on you, you saw only half of it. The second half you didn't get to see. Well, Marvin, in person was an okay guy but a terrible supervisor, very incompetent guy. I can tell enough stories about him to fill up my allotted time. The report he did on me, he got a letter back from the personnel department, the personnel office in the State Department. I know about this because his secretary, a pretty funny and very intelligent woman really liked me and really disliked him. She kept me informed on things I needed to be informed about. He got a letter back saying you described two different people. The part that I saw was pretty much okay. The part that I didn't see wasn't so hot.

Q: They canceled each other out.

CELLA: Yes, well, to the extent that I found a pretty unusual but you sort of expect that anyway but to the extent that they would write back and say, which is it? I don't know how he responded. He apparently typed or handwritten the response himself.

Q: Describe Martinique. You were there from 1964 until 1966?

CELLA: I arrived in probably early August of 1964 and left in February, March of 1966.

It's a volcanic island, a beautiful island. There's a lot of history. It’s one of only two or three islands with a deadly poisonous snake indigenous to it. To the north it has an active volcano, Mount Pelée and to the south there is a petrified forest. The Southern beaches have beautiful white sand; the northern beaches have black granular sand. It's the birthplace of Josephine, Napoleon Bonaparte's first wife. It produces great dark rum but rather repugnant white rum. When I lived there, fortunately, the indigenous tourism trade had not been particularly well-developed although it's become tremendously developed since then. The potential was there. There were only a couple of Americans who actually lived there and the Americans during the cruise season but they would come in the morning and leave in the late afternoon or early evening. We had on the whole island only one hotel that would really be considered sort of resort category. Another second one was being built by the time as we were leaving. Wonderful food, rock lobster; we

used to buy right out of the boats from the fisherman for I think, fifty cents a pound, the French traditional cuisine married with the Creole cuisine meaning you ate well there.

An interesting place. It would have a serious riot including once in a while, I would say about every three years where the French would have to fly in troops from the Metropole to put things down. The mayor was a former Communist, Amié Césaire, a man of letters of some minor note who broke with Communist Party over Hungary in 1956. He was kind of an interesting fellow.

We were the contact point for a Cuban who actually lived on Guadalupe, which was on also in our consular district. A guy I would see every now and then. He was trying to get to the U.S. as a former Cuban Ambassador to Pakistan. Although he predated Castro, he had that appointment under Castro and so he was having a hell of a time getting clearance for a visa to go to the United States. I would see him every three or four months and would have interesting chats with him about what was going on in Cuba and about propaganda being broadcast, being beamed from Cuba to the French Caribbean. It was a pleasant and interesting place to be.

Q: Were you feeling any repercussions of Gaullism? To put the French imprint on things and so disturb the United States, or to keep the United States off?

CELLA: I didn't see that particularly manifest itself. I'll come back to it in a second. One reason I might not have seen that is that the French need not be concerned because we didn't give a damn about Martinique. I can remember when I came back from Martinique on my way to my next assignment I didn't even bother to talk to anyone on the French Desk. They had absolutely no interest. There was nobody else to talk to and so that was that. We were making no effort to subvert Martinique at all. In fact, Martinique as a Department of France was administered by the European Bureau of the State Department, but it was administered by the Latin American folks in the U.S. Information Agency. We were flooded with Spanish-language materials which were of absolutely no use on influencing anyone in Martinique. I think I ran into two people in a year and a half who were fluent in Spanish or admitted to being fluent in Spanish. I'd say the populace at large was friendly, pro-American. A lot of them had traveled to the United States, but among the officials they could be a little bit frosty.

I remember one incident in particular; there was a senior customs guy who was very important to me. That was the reason we had to be on good terms with the customs guy at least I did. The first time I met him he gave me a bit of a lecture. He had been tossed out of Indochina in time to get tossed out of Algeria. I remember him saying that we had Lyndon Johnson for a President and the French had Charles de Gaulle and the situation should be reversed. He said, "France is a relatively puny country but we have a great leader. You have a great country and a puny leader." As a rule he wasn't particularly friendly with the United States and not instinctively friendly toward American officials. I got on with him. We had an interesting chat and my relations with him were quite good.

Q: Did you run across any residue of Petainism or? You know, during World War II Martinique stayed on the side of, for while anyway, they let German submarines come in and they had a carrier Bern sitting there in the harbor.

CELLA: No. I can see why that would be, but no. By the time I landed there I saw no willingness to collaborate with the enemy, as it were. Amié Césaire himself was a Communist, but you know Martinique Communism. When he decided to break with the party in 1956 that pretty much eliminated the threat. The things that we worried about, there was a potential there that these social divisions, the disparity of income.

I can remember thinking to myself that if they went about it right, Martinique could be fairly fertile territory for Castroism and communism. But I figured that couldn't go right because you had the language problem which was French-speaking but the potential was there. About every two years the riots would be serious enough that the French would have to fly in the gendarmes. What would they be rioting over, the French lost control. The administration lost control a large part of the downtown area of the capital Fort de France for three or four days. The rioters just took over the streets. There wasn't an awfully lot of damage done, as I recall. The incident that provoked it I think was a gendarme hitting a Martinique citizen with a motorcycle. I think that was the social slight rather than a fight or a strife or something like that.

Q: I have seen pictures of groups in Martinique today and can pick up French TV and the news from time to time when Chirac goes over and shakes hands with them about once a year or so. It's all seen as black, basically. Was there a white ex-colonial elite there when you were there or not or?

CELLA: Well, there was. A lot of members of that elite were clearly of mixed-race but were considered white. There was definitely a white elite that went way back. We're talking 17th century in many cases. And then in Martinique your social status was very much determined by the color of your skin, how dark you were the further down the list the line you were. For example, what were called the high yellows are octoroons, people who are just black enough not to be white. They had their own church; it wasn't by dictate but by social practice. They went to their church and they considered themselves better than anyone who is darker than them. The lowest rank was jet black; the guys out cutting the cane in the field would be jet black. The guy who is overseeing him, not in a slave sense but the plantation manager, would be medium black. I think they went through about five grades and all discriminated against one another and differentiated themselves from one another.

Q: This was a time of social upheaval in the United States. The civil rights movement was going. Did that play at all in Martinique?

CELLA: I didn't see that. I'm pretty sure a lot of people were pretty unhappy. It was hard to identify real manifestation. Essentially they are a fairly gay people, they like to dance the beguine, it was Cole Porter's Begin the Beguine. They like to dance, they like to drink their rum, and in general were pretty happy people. But, I got a sense of least

beneath the surface that there was a fair amount of resentment and unhappiness there that could bubble up very sudden. I don't recall Martin Luther King being any particular hero of Martinique.

Q: How was social life there for you?

CELLA: It was fine. Again, not particularly demanding which was the way I like it. We would occasionally have American dignitaries come through and so I throw a party. The Consul, Bill Marvin pretty clearly considered me and my wife part of his servants. He would have a party and instead of hiring somebody he'd have me serving the drinks. Kind of bizarre. But interesting people came through, Robert Mitchum was there, a guy named Colin Mitchell who was quite a distinguished yachtsman came through with Gordon Parks who was a National Geographic writer and photographer. They were doing a piece on the Caribbean and they came to Martinique and stayed for a few days. They were interesting people. You get your occasional congressman or senator. There was enough going on that we didn't get particularly bored, but not so much that we felt overwhelmed by it. The local people, we had plenty of access.

One family we saw a fair amount of happened to be Chinese, Chinese who were descended from people who came after the abolition of slavery to work in agriculture. There weren't a hell of a lot of them, but there were a few Chinese remaining in Martinique. We were quite friendly with the most prominent family in that group. They were wonderful people to know socially and very good to know professionally. Two sisters and a brother. The brother owned a rather large agricultural establishment in the north of the island. One of the sisters had a sundry shop in town and the other sister was a prominent lawyer. Between the three of them you never ran out of fresh flowers, talcum powder or legal advice. They were wonderful cooks and terrific hosts. I would say we had something to do socially no more than once a week.

In town there were a couple of very good restaurants, one owned by a man named Gerard. He, as I recall, was an ex-convict but I think he'd been in jail in Haiti. Anyway, he wound up in Martinique with a Haitian girlfriend who was a stunningly beautiful woman and opened a restaurant called Chez Gerard that had as good a cuisine as you could find at maybe not a three-star but certainly at the equivalent of a one star in Lyon, or Paris. I can't remember. Gerard was a pretty strong guy with strong looking arms and he was very proud of his arm wrestling ability. One of my great moments in Martinique, one night I arm wrestled Gerard for our bill and won. Maybe he let me win so that I would come back, but it was a quite pleasant place to be.

The guy that I worked for was this klutz who treated me badly. I mean, he didn't yell and scream but you know, I'll give you an example. We used to send out a classified pouch about every three weeks via Barbados. We did a weekly limited official use and unclassified pouch which we sent via a Pan Am flight out of Martinique. The Pan Am flight left very early in the morning about 7:30 or so. Marvin said we're going to share these courier runs. Well, I was there a year and a half and I made one trip to Barbados

and he made one trip to the airport. That's how we shared the courier run. That was the exact type of the situation that made it unpleasant.

Q: How was the wife?

CELLA: She was I think probably a lower-class Brit. We've had bad luck with those folks and she could be unpleasant. She considered herself superior to my wife. I remember one time a Navy ship called. While the Navy ship was there the Consulate bought some stores off the ship, some frozen roasts and things like that. Marvin had at his residence a big freezer. We're not talking about truck loads of things we're talking about four or five items, a couple of pounds, things that you wouldn't find readily on Martinique or that were prohibitively expensive on Martinique. Anyhow, we stored our stuff in the freezer in the garage at the Consul's residence. About month later his wife accused my wife at stealing a pork roast which my wife hadn't done and didn't know what this woman was talking about. From then on she had it in for my wife.

Q: By the way, speaking of unpleasant things, I wrote a history of the Consular Service and I recall that we lost a Consul and his wife when Mount Pelee went off. How was Mount Pelee while you were there?

CELLA: It would smoke. I think it was still classified as an active volcano but we had no eruptions. We lost I guess a Consul and a Vice consul or two Vice Consuls. Their names are on the plaque.

Q: I think their wives went too. There was only one person who survived that and that was a prisoner.

CELLA: Right. There was a black guy Martin McKay who went on to appear in circus side shows afterwards and made a few dollars from his experience. Yes, it was called the Pompeii of this hemisphere. The Americans were out in the harbor as I recall on a boat and the boat caught fire. There were a number of people on the water who perished because of the heat.

Q: Tell me, while you were in Martinique was there any supervision or visitation from people in Paris? I would think it would be a nice trip.

CELLA: We reported directly to Washington. I can't remember if we got any kind of administrative support from Paris. There was some kind of link with Embassy Paris but no, nobody came.

Q: We'll pick this up in 1966. Whither? Where did you go then?

CELLA: I went to the relatively newly established FSI Arabic language school in Tangier, Morocco.

Q: All right and so you were learning Maghrebi Arabic.

CELLA: We took both. We learned to read written Arabic in classic Fus'ha the same all over the Arab world. For the reading and writing part we were working on standard classic Arabic and for the spoken part the local dialect was Maghrebian or I can say Moroccan. The Algerian street Arabic is fairly different. Tunisian and parts of Libya, come a lot closer to Moroccan. The Arabic was totally Moroccan and was not totally transferable to any other part of the Maghreb.

Q: Glenn, in 1966 you were off to Tangier. How long did the course last and how did you find it?

CELLA: The course was supposed be 23 months. I found it fairly terrible. Poorly supervised. I would have hated to have been put in that situation without having some idea what Arabic was all about. When I was in Egypt I used to take early-morning Arabic. I had a professor and I'd come in an hour early and I think I did three times a week maybe even five times a week. I had some feel, very imperfect, but some feel for what Arabic was all about and how tough it was. I worked hard and I completed the course in about half the time but overall again the course was poor. The classical part was developed by FSI Beirut, which I think was a much more competent operation—it would be hard to be less competent than FSI Tangier, was based on Lebanese newspapers. That was the reading part of the course, was classical Arabic, mainly Lebanese newspaper excerpts from a few years prior. That part of the program was okay as far as it went. I mean, I did learn to read the newspaper which for a diplomat is probably the most important thing to learn as opposed to poetry or something else.

Tangier when I got there had been open I think at least two years and they were still developing text for the spoken part for Moroccan Arabic. I don't think during my time there they did complete it. There would be 24 lessons and I think they'd gotten up to maybe lesson 18. The director of the project was just not too terribly dedicated. He was a smart enough guy and led a nice life, but I don't think he was competent for the task and certainly didn't apply himself with great amount of diligence. I did learn to speak passable Moroccan Arabic to the point where I appeared on nationwide television speaking Arabic. The course, I would have to say, was overall disappointing. I worked pretty hard which is not something I do all the time, because I knew it was a tough task. I knew the kind of guidance and the materials I had to work with were inadequate to the task. I felt if I was going to spend nearly two years of my life learning Arabic, God damn it, I was going to learn Arabic.

What happened was I completed and got to the 3/3 level in speaking after maybe 12 or 13 months, so roughly half the time. So I said now I've satisfied that requirement I can go really learn Arabic. Lo and behold the USIA wanted to operate what they called the national space mobile in North Africa. This was a specially fitted Chevy panel truck, specially fitted to carry a bunch of models and exhibits which would be part of a lecture on the U.S. space program. It was originally developed for I would say, juniors and seniors in high school in the United States, at about that level. USIA got one or more of these traveling exhibits and started using them abroad. This was in 1966, '67, '68 before

the first man on the moon. They decided they wanted to do this program in North Africa. USIA apparently had no one who could speak Arabic and French and who had some kind of a scientific background. So USIA came to the State Department and asked for somebody. I was fingered. I happened to be on home leave at the time. It was fairly unusual to be taking a hard language and get home leave in the middle of it. Because I finished the course for a variety of reasons home leave suited my personal requirement at the time, the summer of 1967. The State Department allowed me to come on home leave with the understanding that I would be returning to Tangier and returning to Arabic studies.

Personnel gets ahold of me and says we're turning you over to USIA to do this program, and I said well, no you're not. You still owe me 11 months or whatever it is of training and I expect to get that. So the personnel guy who by the way was himself an Arabic student which most of them said well, you've already exceeded our requirements. What are you, an overachiever? That's exactly what he said to me. This is the State Department and foreign languages is a subject which I could talk about for a long, long time. I said no, I'm not an overachiever, but I am a serious person. The State Department programs is that if you have a hundred people and maybe get two or three that are any better than half-baked Arabic language officer. I am now half-baked. I don't want to join the ranks of the half-baked. I want to be really proficient. The guy I was telling this to was one of the half-baked ones so that was wasn't very politic on my part.

To compress a very long story I negotiated an agreement with them whereby I would get an additional five or six months of training then I would do the space mobile tour and then I would come back for the remaining two or three or four months or whatever was owed to me and a bunch of the things including getting a proper translation of the space mobile lecture text in both Arabic and French which I undertook to do but I wanted funding for. I negotiated a bunch of things. I got back to Tangier and a couple of months go by, fortunately enough time to get the scripts prepared that I had previously negotiated. I, for example, found an English, French and Arabic dictionary of space terms. I can't remember where I found it, but that was very helpful.

Anyway, around October or November I had been back maybe about two months I got a telegram ordering me back to Washington for training with NASA pursuant to beginning this program in January. I cable back saying, "Well I, you've broken your commitments to me so I feel I have no commitment to you." Back came another telegram ordering me emphatically back to Washington, and I forget what the stick was. I think they were going to cut off my training funds or whatever so I came back to Washington and got into the NASA space mobile program.

Q: While all this was going on, I guess in June of 1967, the Six Day War started. How did that impact you all?

CELLA: It was very interesting and instructive at several levels. The Arabic language school in Tangier was located in the old city. As I recall, of all our properties this one had belonged to the US government the longest. They went back to 1824 or something like

that. Right there in the old city. When things first started up during my lunch break I would go out and wander around to see what was going on and try to take the temperature of the local populace. For the first couple days, no problem. The war was on everybody's mind and radios were tuned into news reports but so long as it looked like things are going pretty well on the Arab side, Tangier, Morocco was quite relaxed. Again this is back in '67. The Moroccans weren't all that engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict. They did send an army unit, I forget what the size it was, set off overland across North Africa. They were blocked, I think, by the Libyans, probably much to their relief. The Moroccans made this halfhearted attempt to get in on the action but never succeeded.

The Consul General who was a very fine man who has passed away, Ben Dixon, recruited the Arabic language students, I think there were four or five of us, to contribute to the consulate general report. I was most proficient in Moroccan Arabic of the group at that time, and I made consequently the larger contributions just because I was in the position to say here's what I heard in the market this morning. Here's what they were saying. The Consul General's reporting was quite good, I thought, maybe because I contributed to it. But it told a different story than the Embassy was telling and the Embassy was kind of all sweetness and light, that the Moroccans were handling this in stride etc. while what we were saying was that things started off okay but the mood is turning sour. When it began to hit home that the Arab side wasn't doing so well and that indeed they might be facing a question of defeat things started to get ugly. If it had gone on a little bit longer there could have been problems in Morocco. As it was, there was a Rabbi stabbed in Meknes and a couple of other incidents here and there.

I lived in the California section of Tangier with a view across the Strait of Gibraltar and at the top of my street was an orthodox Jewish school. I don't know how many students they had but they had more than a handful, 30 or 40, maybe more than that. They were all Orthodox Jews dressed as Orthodox Jews with the Star of David on it. The Moroccan Government provided armed guards for that school very quickly to make sure that the Jewish community was protected. Indeed I knew some of the members socially in Tangier, they were in pretty good shape. Had it gone a little bit longer it might have gotten ugly in that regard as well.

Once the war ended and the dust settled things went pretty much back to normal. To sum up, basically it was an interesting experience, but had no real impact on the operation of the school. I take it back. I think in the aftermath my teachers who were pretty indifferent when it came to things Israeli, at least one or two of my four, began to reflect a little bit of resentment and humiliation. You can see over the passage of time depending upon internal developments in Morocco if there was no movement on the Arab-Israeli front, this would begin to be a problem in Morocco.

Q: Were you getting any feel while you were there for the rule of Hassan?

CELLA: Yes, Hassan the Second

Q: Were you getting any feel for that regime?

CELLA: Yes, I think there were some corrupt people around him and for sure he enjoyed life. I think the educated Moroccans who were not on the dole, were not part of the palace structure, were little bit ashamed that they had a monarchy. On the other hand, I think the monarchy did a pretty good job of keeping the average person, peasants especially, pretty satisfied. Food was cheap. Rents were cheap. You could get a kilo of tomatoes for like ten cents, as I recall. Good tomatoes. You didn't see, and I traveled all over the country with my space mobile, the kind of grinding poverty and severe health problems among the general populace. With the masses, Hassan enjoyed a tremendous benefit in that he was viewed as both a religious leader and a political leader. During my time in Morocco or shortly after I left Morocco there were two separate attempts on his life and he survived both of them, including one rather miraculously. He was flying back from France in his Boeing 727. The Moroccan Air Force ,and I probably knew the pilots of the planes, tried to shoot him down. And they failed. It was sort of miraculous. This was reinforced in the minds of the people at large that here was a guy who was badakha, blessed, magic blessing from God. He's a fully charmed life.

I did feel that the monarchy would not last a heck of a lot longer. Indeed, I thought maybe his son might have trouble with assuming the throne because I can remember, I can't remember what the holiday was but I was in Fez and there was a military parade and I was sitting in the viewing stand and the king as I recall went by in an open car. Leading the formal military part of the parade was his then six year old son dressed up in a uniform. I got the sense where I was sitting there that maybe the local dignitaries and a smattering of representatives, diplomats etc. and a lot of senior Moroccan military that having this little kid to lead the parade was not the smartest move that the king could've made, but in fact the little kid is now on the throne himself.

Q: Before we leave the language school one of the charges that has been laid on the Arabists and the State Department that there's something about them, that they're inherently anti-semantic. Could you comment on this, about the group that you were dealing with?

CELLA: Well, it is 1:30 on Wednesday and if I gave you my general overview I could probably finish by Saturday. Let me try to hit a couple of points. I have never referred to myself as an Arabist. I'm not sure how that term was originally coined but it has certainly come to be Arabist as in a Zionist, Arabist meaning you are in love with the Arabs, you push Arab causes, you are blind to everything else. I have always referred to myself as an Arabic language officer or a Middle East North African regional specialist.

Q: An Orientalist.

CELLA: The term Arabist I find offensive. I refuse to apply it to myself. I think the notion that the Arabist is anti-Semitic is ridiculous since the Arabs actually are, or lots of them are, Semitic people. So the way anti-Semitic is used, used in my judgment too often as a gag to block or discourage or disparage genuine dialogue and genuine efforts to arrive at an understanding what is really happening in that part of the world. In my own

experience the notion that Arabists so-called are anti-Semitic in the sense of being blindly in favor of the Arabs and blindly opposed to the Israelis is a real corruption. The Arabists themselves have not been very good in defending against this corruption and preventing it and correcting it. I knew lots of them, Arabic language officers, at least specialists having dealt with the area, having lived there and in the Bureau in Washington for over a decade. So I tick off all the names and I'm sure they would be familiar to you, I've known them all. I can think of one or two who were perhaps extreme in their feelings, perhaps and only perhaps. The vast majority try to do what any good Foreign Service Officer is supposed to do, identify U.S. interests and look for ways to advance them as effectively as possible.

Many of the Middle East North African specialists, I think, felt a pox on both their houses. There used to be a saying when I served in the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs (NEA) in the early '70s. We used to say until you've dealt with an Israeli, I was on the Israeli desk, and if you've dealt with both the Israelis and the Arabs you can't be a truly broad-based anti-Semite. That's kind of a crude formulation. The notion captures that from the U.S. point of view both parties provide more than enough grief. Why would people want to continue to deal with them? Well, I got out of the business, but a lot of people stayed in, some for craven reasons, to advance their careers and others because it's an important subject matter. If you leave it to people who don't understand the area and its problems, then we'll probably be even worse off. Some people stayed for career advancement purposes, some stay for dedication to try to protect U.S. interests and some stay with it because there is a fair amount of fascination to be had in that part of the world. I am reminded of the quote attributed to an early so-called Arabist who was ambassador to Sudan. He said, he spent all of his life learning Arabic, worked hard so many years to master the Arabic language only to discover that he acquired a key to an empty room.

Q: I have heard that. Who was it: Horan, Pinkerton, Moose, Rountree?

CELLA: It was Moose.

Q: You're off to the United States to go to NASA to learn how to fly to the moon. How did you find that? Was this a completely different culture for you?

CELLA: Well, I had been in the military. Of course, the original astronauts were all military guys and the operational side of NASA was organized in ways that would be fairly familiar to someone who had had some exposure to the military. It was a very good program that was organized for me. The NASA space mobile was run by a contractor. The contractor made all the arrangements, the vehicle, the models that went in it, the text to go with the presentation and the training of the presenters. And in my case in late November or December of 1967, I spent about three or four weeks in a program developed by the contractor. I went to the Goddard Space Center and down to Houston and to Cape Canaveral. As I met several of the astronauts including Alan Sheppard one of my favorite Foreign Service mementos is a signed picture from Alan Sheppard wishing

me a good trip. I thought that was fun having an astronaut wish you a good trip. I got to meet these folks as I say, three or four astronauts one on one and talk at great length.

You got a real education, everything about the program from beginning to end, the food, the plumbing, and rocketry involved, preparations for the reception when the astronauts came back from the first moon landing. They didn't know whether they would bring back microbes that could wipe out humanity, that sort of thing. I got to see a Delta launch which was pretty small beer compared to a Saturn Five but still at Cape Canaveral for a launch. It was all very interesting and that was well done. During the six or seven months when I was doing my lectures I don't ever recall getting hit with a question where I didn't feel at least moderately prepared to give a reply. I mastered enough of the basic science and knew enough about how we would put a man up there and what he would do up there and what he was likely to find and all that sort of thing. That part, the NASA experience training part, was very well done and it was an experience that I value. I learned all kinds of things. I got to talk to their astronomers and their geologists, usually one-on-one in their labs with no real time limit. I enjoyed that thoroughly.

I came away with the feeling which is with me to this day. Let me go back a step. I said this to Alan Sheppard who treated me very cordially. It turned out we had some things in common, the fact that I was an ex-Navy guy, and he liked that so we hit it off very well right off the bat. One question, I said, "You know, I'm doing a tour in North Africa. A lot of people there are pretty poor and lead pretty dismal lives. What do I tell some poor North African who wants to know why the hell we are spending all this money to go to the moon when millions upon millions of people on earth don't have enough to eat?" His reply to me and this is not meant to be disrespectful to Alan Sheppard, he's a very good man, and I like him a lot, I have tremendous admiration for him, "Have they heard of Teflon?" I said, "Well, they probably haven't heard of Teflon and even if they had it wouldn't do much good because he sure as heck wouldn't have a Teflon pan even if he had an egg to fry in it." My point is that this massive effort and it boils down to Teflon. Of course, it doesn't.

Q: Teflon being a nonstick surface process.

CELLA: Which was developed as part of the space program. I think it was the coating on the nose cone. Teflon was developed as part of the space program along with Tang the other famous example. You know you go through this enormous effort to produce Teflon you know that's not very good. Again, I'm doing a great disservice to Sheppard although it is a true story. It typifies to me kind of the problem of the space program, in general. When I was going to the NASA program, NASA training or talking about I had the feeling that they were desperate to have the moon walk rekindle popular and congressional enthusiasm for the space program because by 1967 the missile gap was gone, the race with the Soviets had cooled off and NASA meanwhile had a big budget to sustain. I think that at that time they had not done a particularly good job of articulating in a meaningful way to the average person why is this NASA effort and expense really worth it? I can give you the philosophical answers. Why do you climb Mount Everest, because it's there. There's no doubt that there has been a lot of good science come out of

it, although some might quibble, it no doubt improved our ability to predict the weather or a whole bunch of good things, but might we not have gotten a lot of the same good things for a lot less money if we hadn't developed this whole space bureaucracy?

And in answer maybe it really is worth the effort, but I tend to question in my mind. What we doing now with this manned space station? What is really coming out of this? Is there is enough coming out of it which I tend to doubt that in gross terms justifies the effort and investment put into it, then the program's leaders have not done a very good job of making that case to the American people. I think now there's inertia so we keep it going. Of course, you've got all these companies, industries that are into the space business for their own profit that gives it great momentum.

Q: Let's move to your time when you were tooling around in North Africa. In the first place, why were we doing something there which I would think would be outside the interest of the great majority of the people you had seen or what difference did it make? Why were you doing it, why was the area picked out?

CELLA: Well, I don't know why the area. I think the decision, even after the Six Day War maybe it was to try and build some new bridges or strengthen some old ones. I don't know when they decided to do North Africa. Again, this was the U.S. Information Agency program.

Q: Didn't they have a supplementary landing spot in North Africa?

CELLA: No. There was no operational link. I was tapped for the program or Shanghaied for it right after the Six Day War. I could see somebody saying hey, everybody's fascinated with space, it's the good side of America, and we're the world leader in the field, so why not? I have no idea what the substantive justification was for putting the program in North Africa. It was relatively cheap to do, because I was being paid the wages of an FS-05 and the models already existed and all it was was a truck model. You had to buy the gasoline and as we went from country to country I had a local driver. And that was it. So it was a relatively inexpensive program to run.

There was a fairly high level of interest. I gave the presentation on national television in Morocco, at several military academies, several universities, lots of secondary schools, lots of general audience groups. I would say in general, the audiences were fairly engaged. Whether it was worth doing, who knows? Part was the fascination of seeing an American try to speak their impossible language. There's no question of that. That had at least something to do with it.

When I gave a presentation on Moroccan television it was the last night of Umm Kulthum's tour in Morocco. Kulthum, as you know, is Lebanese born. I believe she lived in Egypt back in the '50s or '60s or '70s and probably before the '50s. She is I suppose the best known female Arabic language singer in the Middle East. She would be in concerts broadcast from Yemen to the Pillars of Hercules. She would start out at 10 o'clock at night and it would go on until two or three in the morning with a little bit of a

break to catch her breath. She was huge, I mean, this is Ella Fitzgerald and Diana Warwick and Kate Smith all rolled into one.

Q: We're talking about hefty women singers of an earlier era.

CELLA: Mainly in Arabic, mainly love songs. She's winding up a tour in Morocco and is going to be televised live starting about at 10 o'clock at night. And at midnight they are looking for a filler. What are we going to do while she's not on stage? So I did my space lecture complete with my liquid oxygen experiment and all my models and the whole works. Thank God I wasn't doing it live on stage. I taped it that afternoon for Moroccan television. Well, that program was the single most watched program in the history of Moroccan television until that time. Afterwards wherever I went in Morocco or western Algeria which picked up Moroccan television it was common for people to come up to me and ask me about Kulthum what kind of person she was. They thought I was part of her troop.

A friend of mine was watching me on television in a café I think in Casablanca. He told me afterwards a really fierce argument broke out about how I could not possibly be an American. This had to be a CIA trick and that I was an Egyptian or maybe a Syrian. I was flattered by that story. It was really a fierce argument. I couldn't possibly be an American. The Arabs have this notion that no one could speak their language at all. That's not too far-fetched but there are a few non-Arabs who are fairly proficient. You mentioned one of them earlier, Hume Horan who is a terrific Arabic language specialist.

I found that I was good enough that I regularly passed, I've got sort of the coloring. It might not be the right thing in Morocco and vice versa and so people would say he's not one of us but he speaks the language too damn well to be an outsider, and therefore did you notice how he speaks **Arabic** rather than how he looks? He must be Egyptian. A sophisticated Arab I couldn't fool at all, but shopkeepers and hotel clerks and the works I regularly passed.

Q: Tell me, how interested, particularly at the high school level, the young people and in college were n this program and with the science and the adventure and all?

CELLA: I'm trying to think. As I said, I ran into a fairly high interest level. This evades your question a bit. There are lots of things I could tell you about this program beyond what I've already said. I'm in Libya that's where we begin the program and gave my first presentation. I get there about two weeks before I'm due to give my first presentation, and I marry up with the fellow who had run my NASA training program for the independent contractor. He comes out to Libya now to get things started, to get a supply of liquid oxygen, experimental liquid oxygen, and various other things. I had never seen a presentation given. David Newsom was Ambassador at the time and my NASA contractor mentor gave a program at the Ambassador's residence for about 50 invited guests so I got to see one time how you do all this stuff, what do you do with the model, how do you run the liquid oxygen experiment. Meanwhile, I'm spending a couple hours a day with a local radio announcer going through my Arabic script to make sure I was

using words that a Libyan audience would understand and correcting my diction and accent and that sort of thing. When I moved to a new area I always got somebody from that area to help me with the text which was basically classical Arabic. I would modify it to meet local usage. When I first get there I said to the USIS guy, please start me off with the softest audience you can. After all it was only six months after the Six Day War, its pre-Qadhafi and the Americans are in pretty good shape in Libya, but nonetheless, until I really build up my confidence level I want to start off with, you know, the Little Sisters of the Poor or the Tripoli equivalent.

A couple of weeks go by and my first presentation; it's a boys' secondary school. It's a very highly regarded school in Tripoli and the principal or the headmaster, I meet with him 10 minutes before the show was due to start. I set up my exhibits and models and it was in an amphitheater that looked like it was out of the Currier and Ives print, the discovery of ether, high, row after row of seats and the audience was closing in on you down in the middle of it.

The headmaster said, "Mr. Cella, you should understand one thing. It's a good school, we have good students, but these are probably the toughest group you can ever expect to give a presentation before. They have a tendency to be a little, in essence you're going before a collection of potentially very boisterous smart asses. So, I start the program in Arabic. There were catcalls and people yelling things. They were saying we can't understand you, who knows what they were saying? They were real smart asses. This is a true story. I feel I am engaging in self-flattering which I may be prone to do. The headmaster can't bring them under control. Absolutely cannot, so there was a racket, again it wasn't of riot proportions, I didn't feel my life being threatened, but you know, a bunch of 15, 16-year-old kids yelling things out. There were I guess, the audience 120, something like that, fairly good-sized, and the amphitheater setting magnified the noise. The headmaster grabs the microphone and tries to quiet them down. Total failure. So I say as loudly and as firmly as I can call, "Gentlemen. I'm very grateful to you, for the warmth of your reception this morning." I'm saying this in Arabic and I said, "I'm going to repeat it in English." And I say, "Apparently some of you feel that my Arabic is deficient. And you're right. But I think it's a hell of a lot better than your English. But if you can you can prove me wrong on that. So either you speak in English or you speak in Arabic but either I speak or you speak. If you'd rather do the talking fine, I'll pack up and leave. It's your choice, we do in Arabic or English and either I talk or you talk." That quieted them down, they said they wanted me to do it in Arabic, and I went through to the end with no further problem. Afterwards, the headmaster said to me, "I've never seen anything like that, the way you established control over the students. That really amazed me." How it happened I don't know. Maybe they did decide they do want to hear the lecture.

A lot of their questions, I don't remember now, when are you going to go? What happens if you can't leave them? What if they can't get off? The program consisted of explaining how rockets worked, explaining the purpose of the man on the moon program from Mercury through Apollo and how the various missions were accomplished and how is the series of building blocks that culminates in walking on the moon. What happens if he gets there, we put a man on the moon but he can't get off the moon? How do you keep from

burning up when you reenter the Earth's atmosphere? Food, how do you, how can you, carry enough food. I had samples, mockups, actually fakes of space foods I could hold up and say well, explained freeze-dried and that sort of thing.

Q: Did you in these things, would you say there was a different reception in Libya than in Morocco and did you get to Algiers?

CELLA: That's an interesting story about my not going to Algeria. No. I did Libya and Tunisia, and then I put the space mobile on a freighter to Marseille. Anyway, I flew over to Marseille, and then drove it around to Tangier. I'll come back to your question in a second.

An interesting little story, a Foreign Service story. In Barcelona on my way from Marseille to Gibraltar to get the ferry to Morocco they didn't want me to go through Algeria. We didn't have diplomatic relations, and so I was told it would not be a good idea to drive through Algeria with a "USA Space Mobile" painted on the side of my vehicle. So they said let's go around. I opted not to go via Senegal and instead I went over across the Mediterranean. I'm in Barcelona with my Chevrolet NASA panel truck. I go to the Consulate General to the Administrative Officer, identified myself, and said I would be grateful if you can help me with some gas coupons. The gas coupons are available to diplomatic consular corps and would represent a substantial saving over what it would cost the ordinary Spaniard at the pump. I have a U.S. government vehicle, a U.S. diplomatic license plate and I've got orders specifying that I will be in Libya, Tunisia and Morocco with this vehicle.

So the Administrative Officer, who went on I believe to be the head of the administrative course at FSI later on, would not sell me or give me gas coupons because I didn't have Spain on my orders. I said I don't have Spain on my order, but you've got a map and I do have Libya and Tunisia and Morocco and I don't have Algeria in there so I think it's logical that I would be here in Spain. He would not give me gas coupons for the vehicle so I bought them with my money. I would periodically submit a travel voucher. On my next travel voucher I submitted a receipt for my for the gas coupons. Well, I didn't want to run short so I had on the high side and I ended up with a bunch more gas coupons then I needed for my space mobile. So I don't know, for the next year and a half or whenever I went to Spain I rode free because I got reimbursed for what I had spent but I still had leftover coupons. That's State Department administration. I tell that story at the risk of prosecution, because I think it typifies the State Department approach to administration all too often, it has typified it in my experience.

In regard to reactions, more I think it varied more on the basis of social class and education level. I did all kinds of audiences including a camel market in Guelmim, Morocco. Sure, there were differences, there are fundamental differences between Libyans and Tunisians and Moroccans that are there. Looking at the narrow perspective of a reaction to the U.S. space program and my presentation on the same, the same classes, the same education levels reacted more or less at the same level of sophistication. One of the interesting things, really interesting, and an insight into the problems in the

Arab world and an insight into where all this radicalism comes from. Getting ready for this program I did a fair amount of research. I got a dictionary in several languages including Arabic space terms. The word for satellite was pretty basic to my presentation. There were several ways of saying it in Arabic, neither related to the other. That's one of the problems with the Arabic language. It's great for describing sunsets but I wouldn't want to try to build a suspension bridge in Arabic because of the linguistic peculiarities.

Anyway, I did a fair amount research including reading up on Arab contributions to learning in general and science in particular. I found, of course, that in the early years of Islam, Arab scholars have made tremendous contributions to our scientific and cultural heritage. And I found that including educated Arabs, they had no idea of their own history. Not all of them, but lots of them. One of the reasons that I did all this research was to enable me to wind up my presentation which I did what it in whatever language I was using. So, ladies and gentlemen roughly a year from now when you hear or watch it on television that there is a man walking on the moon or you're watching it on television and see a man walking on the moon, he may have an American flag on his space suit and it may be an American rocket that got him there, an American vehicle gets him back, but humanity in general has contributed in a very real way to that man being there, including the Arabs, which was a pretty cheap way of flattering the audience but I meant it. It was a lesson I wanted to leave these people that this was truly was a global enterprise and an enterprise that all humanity had a stake in, a very real part.

Well, one day I was giving this presentation for the U.S. Information Office in Benghazi run by the Branch Public Affairs Officer, a terrific guy who was the brother of Telly Savalas, Kojak the actor. I kick off the program and as I recall in an auditorium downtown, it might have been at the local cultural center for an invited audience and afterwards the BPAO has a reception at which I'm the featured guest for about 40 or 50 people including a very interesting, a very well-spoken, very sharp Palestinian who was working for the local newspaper. How he ended up in Benghazi working for the local newspaper I don't know, but he was a Palestinian and that's what he did. He came up to me at the reception and he said, “Mr. Cella, I was very impressed with your presentation this evening. I'm really glad I attended. I have one question". I said, "Sure." Here's a guy again, he's educated, not a kid, probably early or mid 30s, something like that, working in the media. He said, "You usually include in your talk about the Arab contribution to the space project. What have the Arabs ever done that has anything to do with this?" I mean, here's a guy who exemplified what I found to be a fairly common problem, that these are folks who don't know enough about their own heritage. They're also folks with a huge amount of pride, but they're not sure what they had to be proud about. And so these days what they’re being proud about is that they're more diligent in the practice of their religion than anybody else is in the practice of theirs, which I said earlier is a link with the problems that we have with these folks today. I explained to him about how science and antiquity was preserved in Arabic and how Arabic was the language of learning among scientists in Renaissance Italy and their contributions to mathematics and basic navigation was just tremendous and were fundamental building blocks. Here's a fellow who didn't know any of this stuff. I found that instructive and kind of disappointing.

Whereas in Tunisia we had very good relations with the government, probably as a result of the Six Day War, the University of Tunis was reluctant to host me. So I said, okay. I invited the dean of the faculty of science of the University of Tunis to come down to the auditorium at our cultural center, the U.S. Information Service cultural center in Tunis. I forget how many the auditorium held. It wasn't huge, maybe 80, maybe a hundred. I don't know, but whatever it was I said, "Well, if you would like to come down I will be happy to give you my presentation in the cultural center in an auditorium." He said oh, yeah. He would be interested in having me do that. I said, "Well we have up to 80 seats or 68 seats or whatever bring other students or faculty members, whatever. That's what he did. We filled up the auditorium and this was one of my first presentations in Tunisia. I had it tape recorded so that I could go over the presentation later with a local Arabic speaker that as I indicated earlier was to modify, change, and polish as need be to make my presentation most intelligible to a Tunisian audience.

The next day I get a call from the head of the science faculty to thank me, to say how interesting it was, how much we enjoyed and profited from it and he said it appeared that I was having it recorded. There is a booth with a glass window, a recording booth. I said, "You're quite right. We did record it." He said, "Do you think I can have a copy of it?" And I said, "By all means. For what reason?" He said, "Well, I have difficulty sometimes convincing people that sophisticated scientific subjects can be addressed properly in Arabic. I would like to use your presentation to prove my point." And that reaction that has stayed with me.

Q: Was there any particular difference between Libya at that time and Tunisia?

CELLA: Oh yes. I'll speak historically and go back to Roman times. In Libya you have Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, the dividing line where you move into eastern Libya you had a feeling you're really getting into the Middle East. East Libya feels like Egypt. Western Libya if you like, you're moving into North Africa. Western Libya feels more like Tunisia. I wouldn't want to go too too far in making that point but there's very much a distinction between the people. The Algerians are a separate case completely. Let's not talk about Western Libya and Tunisians. You had the feeling in terms of reactions to Americans probably the Tunisians were more friendly. Tunisians I think are more friendly to begin with. West Libyans were friendly enough, East Libyans a little more distant, a little more difficult to deal with. In terms of the internal system, I was there during the last days of the pre-Qadhafi, but you knew something was coming.

We had a strong suspicion that something would be coming. Why do I say that? The U.S. had a large Air Force Base for many years just outside the capital, just outside Tripoli. People who had access to the base were put in one class and the people who didn't have a access to the base were put in another class. Which is to say people who had access to the base for whatever reason, they worked on the base or one way or another, could get peanut butter or even a refrigerator somehow or other. They were privileged and those who didn't have access, people were envious of them. You had a feeling that people who were doing well under the regime were isolated from people who were doing less well.

The people doing less well had already built up a general unhappiness you can't blame, entirely blame them. I think Idris himself was probably fairly good as a monarchs go.

I remember talking to an old man who was like a night watchman. Anyway we started talking and he was telling me that oil was a curse. And how he remembered before oil was developed why you could get bushels of tomatoes for a pittance. Now you can't get even bad tomatoes because no one wants to grow tomatoes anymore because they make money participating in the oil development. It was hard for uneducated people to live. Things were better before. That was his line and he really meant that oil had just changed the way of life in the way that it had gotten rid of tomato growers.

Q: When you look at Saudi Arabia I think it looks like they've hit a dead end, a growing population, no technical skills, nothing to support them except oil which eventually will either run out or will be superseded. And this looks kind of sad.

CELLA: I think Amani tried to change that but I don't know what ever happened to him. The petroleum minister back in the early '70s.

Q: Yeah, Amani, part of OPEC and all of that. I read a book by Bernard Lewis called <u>What Went Wrong?</u> that talks about the Arab world and how they were leading in so many things in the world and then it stopped. Basically religion got in the way, I mean the fundamentalists come off promising openings and it never recovered.

CELLA: I have always felt, and this is probably a totally specious notion of mine, around the same time that you're talking about which is ninth century or 10th century or the 11th century when religion got more and more involved in what was to be put in books and what could go in the library and what was to be taught, their expansive energies had been sapped. They had long since been tossed out a various parts of Europe and their presence in Spain was being reduced. I felt that so long as they were expanding, their energies were directed outward and there was a fair amount of cohesiveness. Once they began to pull back at a least some of those energies were directed inward and then destructive rivalries developed within Islam. That also help to sap it of its strength and vitality. They could have conquered all of Europe and kept on going. After all, we're talking about a desert nomad type approach, it's energy kind of used up. If you can't move forward, you've got to move backward then you begin to have a problem.

Q: It's probably is a good time to move off the space mobile. Is there any other incident that you might think would be of interest? In Morocco or one of the other countries?

CELLA: I'll tell you one more anecdote. I told you I did my space mobile, I took it down to place called Guelmim which is fairly far south in Morocco. Every Saturday they have the famous camel market. I went down and gave an open air presentation in a schoolyard and met this local governor and invited people, a mixed crowd. It was fun because it was late afternoon or early evening and the moon was up high in the sky. You can see the moon so I'm talking about walking on the moon. I could point, there is the moon. And in the presentation one old fellow with a long white beard launched into an unbelievable

harangue, accusing me of being a heretic because it was in the Koran that man could never walk on the moon. I don't know. He accused me of heresy and really read me the riot act. Fortunately, other people in the audience told him to quiet down and they did get him to quiet down.

At the market itself I came across another guy, an older fellow with a great flowing white beard and a white turban, and I used to like to take pictures a lot so I asked him if I could take his picture. He said, "Yes". There were two younger people. He himself looked like he was 95, maybe he was 55 and had a hard life. There were two guys in maybe in their 20s and so he said, “Yeah, you can take my picture.” He said, “Before you take my picture let me ask you a question.” I said, “Fine.” “Where do you come from?” And I said, “Where do you think I come from?” And he said, “Are you Syrian? Are you Lebanese?” I said, “No.” I said, “I'm an American” at which point that was the end of my taking a picture of this guy. Unbelievable tirade about America's support for Israel, about how unjust it is and how it would lead to misery and not just for the Arabs for but for the Americans and Israelis too. He was too old to be a physical threat to me but he really had fire in his eye. The young guys who I guess were relatives said, “Hang on a minute. If he has enough respect for us to learn our language as well as he's learned it, he can't be all bad. Now maybe America is bad and its policy is bad but there are obviously some good American people and he must be one of them so quiet down old man.” And that quieted him down.

My point being that in 1968 at the camel market in Guelmim, Morocco there was an old man who was really pissed off at the United States because of our policy toward Israel. That ought to give people some pause.

Q: Tell me, during this time, here you are working your way into the culture. I would think in many ways this would although somewhat off to one side be probably the best training for a student of Arabic. I mean, did you find after the lectures you were going out to restaurants or was this an opening to the Arab society?

CELLA: Oh, yes. The problem was I didn't finish proper training. If I had had another 10 or 11 months to really solidify my command of both the vernacular and written Arabic then the experience really would have been terrific. As it was, it was wonderful and I learned a lot about all sorts of things. You know the music of North Africa, that you hear most often is called Andalusi from the time when the Arabs were in Spain. And it's called Andalusi music and it's basically string music. I was in Tunisia and they had a music academy and they gave a concert in my honor. I was sort of a celebrity. I already told you the Kalthoum story, and people asked for my autograph and that sort of thing so I had to sit through about two hours of Andalusi music which if you don't have a taste for it can be a little bit painful. The fact that I knew something about it greatly pleased the conservatory director and afterwards they treated me to a fine meal. I had good entrée and met lots of people and had a good feel for the several societies that I traveled through were like. Again, if I had had better Arabic training this would've been a wonderful adjunct.

Q: Well, in 1968, is there anything else you want to add?

CELLA: First on Arabic and Arabic language training at the State Department and I think I've already made the point that I never saw the State Department take any great interest in language ability per se. The fact that now we are concerned about this sort of thing is a bit ironic.

The standards for Arabic were much lower than for French. So where as I got to, I don't know what I finally reached, but I think I got S/4 or close to 4+ probably on the speaking side it was probably equivalent of a 3 or 3+ in the French department where I thought the courses were fine, the teachers are really good, it was a serious program, and it should have served as a model. The standards are much laxer with regards to the so-called hard language that I studied, namely Arabic. I think that's unfortunate.

With regard to the space mobile program there are lots of anecdotal stories I could tell. One or two kind of funny ones; I used to do an experiment where I would use balls of cotton soaked in rubbing alcohol in a Pyrex measuring cup, I guess quart size measuring cup. I would set them on fire and add some liquid oxygen to show the difference between something burning in the normal atmosphere of the earth and something burning in liquid oxygen. There's quite a dramatic difference. Wherever I went I had to find a supply of liquid oxygen. When I was in Morocco I think I got it from our Kenitra military base outside of Rabat. One time a supply that was diluted. When I went to do my little demonstration, it fizzled. Nothing very dramatic happened. The next time I did it I replaced the supply of liquid oxygen, but I decided that I would make sure I really got a reaction and I put in probably half again a dose of oxygen than I normally did at which point the cotton balls. There was an explosion and my cotton balls were going all over the place. I was doing this particular presentation at the USIS library auditorium in Rabat and there was a piano behind me on stage. I managed to set the piano keyboard on fire. No big fire but it got the audience's attention.

Another time also in Morocco I was in a gymnasium in a secondary school in a town called El Jadida down the coast, south of Rabat. It was a big room packed with mainly students, and I decided for whatever reason to give a little extra charge. I ended up blowing out a couple of windows which didn't endear me to the administration but the students thought it was pretty funny.

One substantive point I might make, and I may be wrong about this, but it was my sense that there was never any follow-up to the programs. Through this program I met lots of people and fairly important people, most of the members of the Moroccan Air Force. I knew a lot of senior educators, faculty, deans and that sort of thing. This was about six months after the Six Day War and I can remember in Libya, David Newsom, who was then the Ambassador there, commenting to me that he found it astonishing that I was able to get the entrée that I did get so soon after the Six Day War. This has nothing to do with my ego; it has more to do with a sense of values as a taxpayer that the purpose of staging this program is one to project an image of U.S. scientific prowess. I would think the secondary purpose that over the long term probably would be more important than the

primary one was to get entrée into important elements, particularly younger people in these various societies. Once you had that entrée it was not worth anything unless there was follow-up. I never felt that there was any real follow-up. I would give the American officials with whom I was dealing ideas on how to follow up the space mobile program, and I never found any evidence that there was any follow-up. There may well have been. I don't want to be unfair to the folks so many years after the fact, but it struck me this was not atypical. Would run abroad programs the cultural educational field or programs that were run for the programs sake, but with very little thought or effort invested in following up the program once it had been carried out.

Q: One of the things that astonished me in one of the interviews I was talking about, fairly recently, someone came up with a good idea to include Fulbright scholars in the country that had gone to the United States and had come back and have an active program built up of an alumni organization. I would have thought that would have been you know, from the beginning and it may have been in some countries but apparently in other countries they were lost. They were sent out and that was that.

CELLA: I think that would match my experience. There probably were some attempts in some places, but none that I am aware of to follow up in that way and the major investment has already been made. That's the relatively cheap way of trying to capitalize on the major investment although not so much in the case of Fulbright, but I'm thinking of the exchange visitors, many of the non-Americans I met, again this is not exclusively in the Arab world, where not talking about a very large universe, maybe about eight or 10 people. I only met one who had been part of an exchange visitor program that came back from the United States really pro-American. I met several who came back very anti-American and the rest, again we're talking about 8 or 10 people so one really pro-American chap and several clearly anti-American. They had a bad experience in the United States or they may have gone there with preconceptions and were looking for ways to reinforce those preconceptions. The other half dozen or so were half and half. Looking at this very small and unscientific sample one might say the exchange visitors program wasn't really doing us much good. We were creating as much anti-Americanism as we were creating pro-Americanism. Certainly, the broader issue of follow-up, I did not find very much follow-up with any of these programs.

Q: In 1968 when you finished this space program where did you go?

CELLA: I finished the space program in late spring or early summer of 1968. There was some talk of sending the exhibit to Senegal. I was doing it in French as well as Arabic and English. I was asked if I would be interested in going, continuing the program in Senegal, and I said, "Sure, why not?" In the end the truck route did not go to Senegal I don't know exactly why and I don't know where it was sent off to, but it was out of my bailiwick.

Contemporaneously with this, I had been assigned to be the Principal Officer at the American Consulate in Oran, Algeria. It took a while before the Algerian government finally formally agreed to having someone with my personality in their country on

official business of the United States. As I recall, the assignment was confirmed to me in May or June. Actually, I take that back. Now that I think about it I had been assigned to Oran some months before I completed the space mobile program. In any case, I wasn't going anyplace with the space mobile, I couldn't go to Oran because I didn't get clearance from the Algerians. We did not have diplomatic relations with the Algerians. We did have consular relations; they were not severed as a result of the Six Day War. It was probably mid-to-late summer before I finally landed in Oran, before I finally got the agrément from the Algerians to go to Algiers. I gather we were quite persistent in trying to get the formality completed, but it took a couple of months for that to happen. I still had about seven months or so of Arabic training that the State Department owed me. So that's what I did while waiting for the clearance to leave for Oran. I continued to study Arabic. When the approval came through, a day or two later I packed up my car and drove to Oran.

Q: You were in Oran from when to when?

CELLA: From late summer of 1968 until midsummer 1971. About three years.

Q: Let's take first Algeria. What was the situation there when you arrived there?

CELLA: Well, it was still fairly soon after independence so there were a lot of open wounds. It was kind of a mixed situation. You have to differentiate between the East and West, between the Berber-based population and the Arab or quasi-Arab population. I was in western Algeria and that's a part of the country that I was most familiar with. It was a mixed bag. Still even among the Algerians a lot of nostalgia for the French. One had the feeling that if the French had played it differently we might have far different outcome. It could be I was coming in contact with not totally representative segment of the population. Everywhere I have served I have always tried to get to know the people. From the mailman to the provincial governor, high officials that I should know. I always try to get to know the average people and then the not so well off people in an effort to get a real feel for the country and to be able to do reliable reporting on what the mood of the country truly was. My recollection is that there were several different currents. Most of the pied noir, the ethnic French and Spanish who made up the European segment of the population pre-independence Algeria, had left. Those who remained behind, here were a handful, were frequently second or third generation European settlers. So Algeria really was their country and they were perfectly willing to do their best to make the country successful. Unfortunately though, the exodus left Algeria, certainly in western Algeria, starved for managerial talent. While the French had left behind a sometimes excellent, but fairly good infrastructure, railroads, bridges and that sort of thing, by 1968 things were already beginning to crumble. Freight trains would run off the tracks.

In Oran itself we had an aging municipal gas system used for heating and cooking put in around the turn of the century. So it was pretty old no matter who was living in the country but it was really a problem because the people who were living there were not necessarily competent to repair the system and the government might not have the interest or funds to repair it. It was not uncommon for it happen, it didn't happen five

times a day, but it was not uncommon in Oran, which was then quite an advanced urban center, the gas mains would pop a leak and would send manhole covers flying four or five stories into the air, a little bit like Georgetown a few years ago.

Q: Not too long ago we had the same problem.

CELLA: The most sensational event was a small, little car wound up downtown perched on a third-floor balcony. That's perhaps the most dramatic example of the incipient decrepitude that was coming to grip the country.

The agricultural infrastructure in Algeria was, of course, a good source of for vin de table in France. The Algerians also produced some rather good red wine, they are less strong than whites but they produced some drinkable whites, and produced a very drinkable ordinary red that could be used as feedstock for common table wine. The Algerian government that came to power after independence decided that it was officially social and some argue that they were Communists. Well, they weren't Communists and it's pretty hard to make an Arab a genuine communist. They decided to follow the Yugoslav model of economic development. Agriculture was taken over by a self-management system whereby the management of the farms and vineyards was turned over to the workers and the results were such by the time I got there a few years after independence, it was common to refer to Algeria as the world's biggest producer of vinegar. They lost the market, most of the overseas market for their red wine. The Russians became the main consumer, but I believe that it was indeed turned into vinegar. It was not used for a drink. The Russians would send wine tankers over to pick up this stuff.

The goods available in the shops became quickly much more limited, the price of food went up and the quality tended to go down. This was evident to the common ordinary man. I don't think I ran across many if any Algerians who did not directly benefit from the regime change who were enthusiastic about the new regime. On the other hand, one had the sense that this was potentially quite a rich country, and a beautiful and interesting country. The people were a little bit difficult, but you saw potential there. They were making a big effort to develop particularly their natural gas resources with some success. But they've never, I haven't kept close track of Algeria in years, but my sense is that they've never developed a really cohesive political fabric nor skill in putting together a true national economic philosophy or plan or approach. So, the country overall was disappointing in light of their ambitions. I enjoyed it very much, I found it an interesting place, I extended my tour and partly because of that, but I came away with reservations about whether it would ever realize its full potential.

Q: I realize this is a generalization, was there an entrepreneurial gene in the Algerian? When you get to Levant you're talking about the Palestinians, the Israelis, the Lebanese you know, they do business. Did the Algerians have this?

CELLA: Some did, for sure. I got to know rather well a fair number of successful Algerian businessmen. But you had again this socialist overlay which bred kind of an "I'm alright Jack" sort of mentality, and at least I didn't sense that the Algerians were as

entrepreneurial as say the Moroccans or Tunisians, never mind the Palestinians or Levantine Jews. To the extent that there was that inclination there, the system kind of discouraged its development.

Though one group though that had the entrepreneurial in spades was the Mozabis. The Mozabis are very interesting group of people. They originally came from Iraq. I have no idea exactly what their ethnic composition might've been. They tended to be short people. They wound up and I've forgotten when it was, the 11th century or more likely the 12th-century, in an area of the north-central Algerian Sahara. The local river was the Mozab and they became known as Mozabis. You could tell a Mozabi almost all the time. They were easily identified, tended to be short people. I spent a fair amount of time in the Mozab, is an interesting part of the country and they ran their own show. They exported their youth to the north into Annaba to the east, to Algiers the capital center, to Oran in the west. In Annaba, as I recall, they tended to be auto mechanics. In Oran, they tended to be the green grocers. I don't recall what their specialty was in Algiers. They did business is in the coastal conglomerations and sent a fair amount of the proceeds back to their home stomping ground, the Mozab. I would have to look at a map, but I would say it is about 200 miles or 150 miles south of Algiers in the northern fringe of the central part of the Algerian Sahara. They had wonderful oases there, very interesting towns, there were three principal cities. These people, highly entrepreneurial established businesses in the coastal cities. Those businesses would stay in the hands of the clan or the tribe of the family from generation to generation.

When you traveled in Mozab, it would be cleaner, more prosperous, more orderly than in other parts of the country. They appointed their own religious leader. The central government tried to impose a religious leader from outside. One of the ways that the central government in Algeria in those days kept control of things was that they tended to take people from the east and put them in administrative positions in the West and take people from the West and put them in positions in the East to prevent any regional power centers. Well, they try to do this in Mozab, at least on the religious side. The Mozabis I got the sense were much more religious than the average Algerian. They weren't fanatics and they are basically quite agreeable people. What they did was, okay Algiers sends us an Imam and he's installed to be a figurehead. They really take the lead from their own Imam who they have located in another part of the region.

I was there one time for, I think, Algerian Independence Day or the commemoration of the start of the revolution, but I was traveling in the Sahara and I'm in the principal city of the region. I had become a member of the Oran Lions Club which was a pretty neat accomplishment for the American Consul in those days, and that was a tremendous asset in terms of entrée. The mayor this town was also a Lion. He invited me to a banquet that was held in an oasis just outside of the town where we're sitting on pillows and blankets under date palms having wonderful food and the mayor asked me to sit next to him. He flips out a bottle of Johnny Walker Black label and the party began. I was supposed to catch a plane at like 9:30 at night to go on to Tamanrasset 300 or 400 miles on down into the Algerian Sahara, and I started looking at my watch. I think the festivities began about six in the evening, and it gets to be about 8:30 or so and I say, "Mayor, I have to catch a

plane." I told him from the outset I said, "You know, I really should be going." He said, "Don't worry about it." It is nine o'clock and we're about 20 minutes maybe from the airport. I say, "Mr. Mayor, I really should go because the plane is due to leave and it only takes." "Don't worry about it," he said. "I guarantee the plane won't leave without you, and I shall personally take you to the airport and put you on the plane. Let's continue our discussion and let me pour you another drink."

The plane was probably delayed an hour and a half. I was delivered right to the stairs leading up to the passenger compartment, people on board gave me sort of funny looks, the plane took off, and I made it to Tamanrasset, an hour and a half late along with all the other passengers. I tell the story of some length because this was an Air Algerie, the national airline plane flight, but the Mozabis had so much of the economy, it shows you the degree in which they ran show. It was a pretty remarkable experience.

Q: I don't know Algeria that well but just recently looking at French news there was a lot of Berber discomfort and demonstrations about not being recognized basically by the city folk. I think as I recall Oran is one of the centers of this. Was there much at your time?

CELLA: The Berbers are in mainly the East, Constantine is their principal city. The Berbers are an interesting people. I don't know them particularly well, but I think they have sort of a tendency to be kind of unhappy with outside authority. Berbers played a major role, the Berbers of East Algeria which is where the revolution began in 1954, the Berbers were a major force in the Algerian revolution. I think if it hadn't been for the Berbers the French might well have hung on. The Berbers have always been a source of some unrest which I think has definitely gotten worse and you've got the language issue. The Berbers have nothing to do with Arabs, and the language has nothing to do with Arabic. The Berbers, as I understand it, came out of southern Europe across to Gibraltar. The Strait was a land bridge and the origin of the Berbers was quite far removed from the origin of the Arabs, the true Arabs. No, my area was pretty tranquil, and there was no Berber problem in the western part of the country.

Q: In your area what were American interests?

CELLA: We were just beginning to get involved in the development of Algerian natural gas and petrochemical projects. When I first went there a couple of months before I actually moved permanently to look over the lay of the land my now dear friend Ed Peck was then the Principal Officer, a really superior guy in all respects. I can remember asking Ed my first question after we exchanged greetings, "How many Americans are there in the consular district?" It was a rather large consular district. He said, "About 10." I said, "Well, that sounds about right." When I first went there there weren't many Americans but by the time I left the numbers had grown considerably. An American outfit was putting up a fertilizer plant outside Oran, they were involved in the development of natural gas, then El Paso Natural Gas signed a large contract with the Algerians. There were eventually enough Americans that they established an American school. They hired International School Services out of Princeton, New Jersey to put up a turnkey English-language school. Our interest was in participating in the development

and exploitation of petroleum gas resources and to maintain entrée for U.S. participation in such projects.

When I first went there, there was concern about the direction that Algeria might ultimately take. There was concern about falling under the influence of the Russians. And indeed quickly after independence the Russians moved to establish a foothold and they established a presence at the fantastic former French naval base in Mers El Kabir. They began a substantial military supply relationship with the Algerians. The Algerian navy was primarily Russian equipped. I think the same was true of the army and the air force. My principal task was to be a listening post and to just keep an eye on things. There was a major concern about the French naval base in Mers El Kabir, which is the finest naval base in the Mediterranean, that it would come under Russian domination. This was at a time when the Sixth Fleet after the long having its way in the Mediterranean was really beginning to be challenged a bit by the Russians. The last thing we wanted was the Russians to have this wonderful base in Mers El Kabir. It was modernized by the French to be among other things atomic bomb proof. They had an underground facility that's a network of 100 kilometers of underground facilities underneath these huge rocks, something like the Rock of Gibraltar, one of the better natural and protected harbors in the southern Mediterranean basin.

Just about the time that I moved to Algeria Paris Match, a somewhat more a literary version of Life magazine, did a two-part series on Algeria. I can't remember what it was tied to, something like Algeria, five years later or Algeria 15 years after the revolution or whatever; a two-part series rather heavily illustrated, many of the illustrations showing a rather dilapidated Algeria. As I recall, the basic theme of this series was that Algeria was coming apart at the seams and that the Russians were in the process of gobbling up the pieces. It was not totally yellow journalism but it was sort of alarmist and it mentioned the naval base in Mers El Kabir and that the Russians had established a presence there, that this presented a real threat to the West. So in a way that was our major interest, it was a negative interest to keep the Russians out. If we couldn't do that, we needed to know what the hell they were doing.

It was an interesting time. I think we can declassify it since we're talking many, many years ago. In the summer or early fall of 1968 the Navy, or some part of the Navy planned to stage a grounding of a merchant ship off the Mers El Kabir as cover and bring some people ashore to see if they could figure out what was really going on. You've got a bunch of installations on these big rocks that were not readily accessible even though you had sophisticated satellites, all you see is rocks. This sounded like a really cuckoo scheme. I was not aware of it. Right about this time I sent in a long secret Airgram about the Russians in Mers El Kabir and what was really going on. I developed some excellent sources. There was still a French Navy lieutenant commander who had access to Mer El Kabir in a liaison capacity. There was still a French airbase under French control about 15 or 20 miles outside Oran on the Mers El Kabir side. People at this airbase kept an eye on what was going on in Mers El Kabir. The Russians had maybe 50 families, maybe a hundred, housed in what would have been a French apartment block between the base and Mers El Kabir. It was easy to count the Russians and what they were doing by how

many apartments were there. I became friendly with the base commander and friendly with, including on a family basis, the lieutenant commander who was the liaison officer and, the French Consul General was pretty well informed about what was going on. Another very important source of information was an Alsatian friend of mine who ran the local brewery. In that context he would pick up some interesting information including from the French airbase because he would supply the beer to the enlisted men and officers' club there.

So through this little network I put together I wrote a lengthy Airgram saying here's what's going on in Mers El Kabir, here's the order of battle, here are the attitudes of the Algerians toward the Russians. This Airgram was spotted by a special, now defunct unfortunately, naval intelligence unit based in Arlington. They contacted me through the one Agency guy that we had in Algiers and asked me to come to London to brief the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, then based in London. To compress the story the people recruited me to give this presentation looking for a way to dynamite this cockamamie scheme of trying to ground a merchant ship. I went up and briefed the Admiral and his staff in London. I did charts and things and did my routine and established credibility with them.

Q: You had been a Navy man yourself.

CELLA: Which helped, right. I established confidence that they had a reliable pair of eyes and ears that were well plugged-in in Oran and would stick with our arrangement at least for the time being. That was one of my major accomplishments.

Q: What was your impression of how the Soviets took in Algeria? The Soviets had a problem, I mean, particularly about Europe.

CELLA: They were not a popular success. And I think there was a similarity to what we witnessed in Egypt a couple of years earlier. Russians with a true Soviet mentality do not mix with Arabs. It's very hard to successfully communize Arabs because they are just too independent. I mean, they will be subservient to their tribal leader or their clan leader, but they will not be subservient to an outsider unless they absolutely have no choice. We're seeing that in Iraq today. One of the reasons I wrote before the invasion that it's not going to work because you're dealing with a mentality that you don't understand. I don't care what you bring in, you're an outsider. They would rather be poorly run by one of their own than superbly run by an outsider. Lawrence of Arabia perhaps being one exception, but they never considered him one of their own.

I can recall, a small example, we'd get a Soviet naval vessel in Oran for a visit from time to time. Whenever there was a Russian ship in town, a navy ship, I made a point of going out and strolling around and observing reactions. The enlisted men always travel in groups of five, presumably keeping an eye on one another or one guy keeping an eye on the others, I'm not sure, but always traveling in a group. You never saw an individual or two or even three Russian sailors wandering around. There was a major department store, a little like GUM in Moscow. There are plenty of sardines today if what you want is

sardines but if you want tuna fish or anchovies or salmon forget it. It was a big store, shelves pretty well-stocked but choice virtually zero. The Algerians would watch the Russian sailors go in to the store and other shops and see how impressed they were with what the Algerians considered crap compared to what had been available in the time of the French. The local Algerians actually mocked the Russians. What they drew from this was what kind of a society can it be if even military guys can't go out and walk around on their own in a foreign country and what kind of a society can it be when they ga-ga over goods that five years ago we never would never have bought ourselves? I never lost any sleep over basic Russian penetration of at least my part of Algeria.

Q: Was there any residue, we're going back to 1940 of the British attack on Mers El Kabir? The British Navy sank a bunch of French ships and this led to Darlan's rise to power. Was this a factor?

CELLA: To local people, no. Again, not in my experience. I talked to people who observed the battle who sat on the hills behind Mers El Kabir.

Q: This was French-British issue. These were the Algerians and they were out of it?

CELLA: There may have been some who felt a pox on both their houses. I think and this is a probably a shortcoming I'm not particularly steeped in what the local politics would have been at that period. But you asked if there was a residue, if there was, it was not readily detectable. I think the Algerian elite was happy to go along with the French and let the French sort it out. They would be rooting for the French over the British if things hadn't quickly worked themselves out and fairly soon after the Americans were in.

Q: In 1943?

CELLA: We were in Algeria in 1942. The Consul General in Oran or the Consulate and the residence were in the same building and it's about the best house although now I think we're closing, we're shutting down small posts. We had a magnificent house right on the corniche on the cliff above the Mediterranean and I believe it's fair to say it was the best house in the city limits of Oran. It belonged to a very wealthy pied-noir family who left at independence and who in the interest of protecting their property were eager for the U.S. government to inhabit it. They gave it to the U.S. government a sweetheart, long-term lease. This house, the residence of the Consul of Oran had been used by Eisenhower as his base of operation during the brief time he was around at the time of the North African campaign.

Q: Was there much residue or feeling about America because of our North African campaign?

CELLA: John F. Kennedy had given a speech in the U.S. Senate in support of Algerian independence. He had a boulevard in Algiers named after him. You've got another, as I recall, principal street named after Roosevelt. I think we enjoyed generally high regard.

Q: Was Oran different, I mean, the government that you were dealing with and your relations to say our Embassy in Algiers?

CELLA: We didn't have an Embassy. We were under the protection of the Swiss and so we maintained the Embassy building and the Ambassador's residence, but during my time we flew the Swiss flag. I, on the other hand, could fly the American flag because we had consular relations. For a while after my arrival I was the only person identified as a U.S. diplomat on my Foreign Ministry ID card. The other Americans in Algiers were identified as being part of the Swiss Embassy. We reopened our Consulate in Constantine, Oran was never closed. Our Consulate in Berber country in Constantine in the East did close for a time during the Six Day War. We reopened that again a few months after I got to Oran. For perhaps six months or so I was the only American diplomatic/consular representative in the country recognized officially as such. In Oran there was some pretty fierce rioting outside the consulate during the Six-Day Wa. Ed Peck could tell you stories about that and probably has. There was a time when he thought they were going to come in. They were battering the doors down but that did not happen. Things quieted down fairly quickly. By the time I got there the local populace there were occasional signs that something would happen but not much.

I referred a while back to the one conspicuously successful visitors' program that I ever encountered. The governor of Oran, who was for my day-to-day work the number one guy mainly concerned with a fellow by the name of _____ had been to the United States a couple of years earlier on a three-week visitor's grant and he had a great old time. He was, given the circumstances, unabashedly pro-American. He couldn't be totally wild, because he never saw me alone. He was being kept an eye on too. When I made my first formal introductory call on him he gave me a warm welcome, wished me well on my tour and wished me success and said that if I ever needed anything or if there were ever anything he could do I should let him know.

The residence and the Consulate was under 24-hour a day uniformed surveillance. During my travel around, I knew my movements were being watched, not necessarily someone tracking every step of the way, but there was plain clothes presence both occasionally at the residence, in the area of the residence and when I would travel. I couldn't travel outside the immediate environs of Oran without a travel permit issued by the local government. I would have to apply for that three days before I was to leave. My phone I'm pretty sure was tapped. Still it was about as relaxed at as it could be and still have these elements present. I can recall when I would apply for a permit to travel outside the immediate vicinity I would get it back very quickly, sometimes the same day. Usually a motorcycle policeman would personally deliver it to the Consulate. One time the policeman came to the residence side which was just around the corner from the Consulate entrance. He rang the bell and my wife answered the door and he presented her with the permission and kissed her hand. I felt we got good treatment.

But I also felt, since I did a lot of surveilling of Mers El Kabir I took some "risks." The special media unit arranged my briefing in London. I did that every year there. Once a year I would go up and bring them up to date on the latest. They provided me with some

very strong telephoto lenses for my Pentax camera. Another thing we were keeping an eye on was merchant shipping because we overlooked the principal dock area so that was fairly easy to do because there was lots of Russian flag ship traffic. The Sixth Fleet was very interested in keeping track of the merchant ships, where they were and when they came and went. I did a fair amount of photography.

I remember one time I took a ride past Mers El Kabir with my wife's uncle who's a great guy and I used him as cover as a reason to be on the coast road in a tourism adventure. Going past the naval base I asked him to just reach over and hold my steering to hold the car steady and took a couple of quick pictures and then we went up in an area where I photographed the whole base complex up on the hills above. There was also some Russian radar equipment up there of some interest and he got very nervous. This guy was a Massachusetts Irishman a big guy and a man used to dealing with tough customers. At one point he was head of the Massachusetts State Parole Board. He said, "Jesus, I was never more nervous in my life." He said, "I thought for sure we were going to wind up behind bars before the day was out." I had the sense that the Algerians wanted me to know pretty much what the Russians were doing because there were times when given the fact that I was pretty well watched I did take some at least some marginal risks and I never had any problem. At a minimum I would have thought someone would have said to me, "Mr. Consul, you're very interested in photography. Just let me know if there's something going on." I had the impression they wanted us to know. They didn't want us to get too nervous and do something goofy.

Q: Was Algeria doing anything with its borders that concerned you all?

CELLA: No, I know much more about the Algerian-Moroccan relationship than the Algerian-Tunisian relationship although I believe there are some similarities. The Algerians and Moroccans did not have a particularly good relationship but from a territorial point of view there were no real disputes. I think the lines were pretty well accepted. The territorial problems were between Morocco and Spanish Sahara down in the south. I suppose the Algerians would have some concern about that, but with regard to the border you ask if they were keeping an eye on the border.

Oran is maybe 100 miles east of the border with Morocco. Right next door to my residence and office was another very nice house, occupied a peninsula on a roundabout on the corniche road. The Moroccan Consulate is next door to me in a nice house and nice garden. During my time he was a quiet and pleasant guy and liked the fact that I had lived in Morocco and could speak passable Moroccan Arabic. I think we usually conversed in French. I don't know if he spoke English. Anyhow, we got to be quite friendly. Every morning there would be a crowd lined up on the sidewalk outside his office. These poor people were Moroccans had been rounded up overnight to be sent back to Morocco and they were people who had wandered across the border without knowing they were crossing any border.

You talk to an uneducated Moroccan and ask him who are you? Who are you and you say I'm an American. That's about the fourth thing if he even says that as a Moroccan peasant

would say, he would give you his family name or his clan name or his village name. This whole concept of nation state had, at least at the time we're talking about, not taken fully root throughout society in North Africa. These people would wander into Algeria not having any idea that they were in a different country. There was always talk about not granting immunity. When I was living in Morocco Hassan II, the King of Morocco, came over for a visit. He visited with the Algerian President Boumédiene at one of the first towns of any size just across the Moroccan border. I remember that this was portrayed as very symbolic, Maghrebian unity was moving ahead. They were talking about having a common airline, which would make great sense, and all sorts of other things. But I did an Airgram talking about how they beat one another over the head with bouquets of roses but were beating one another nonetheless. Forget about unity, it's not going to arrive anytime soon.

The Moroccan Consul, along with others, used to refer to the paths that these people take across the border as unity road. These people were unified, but the political leaders; that would never happen. We have unity now as far as these folks are concerned.

Q: Did the French officially have any role in Algeria at that time? Did they have a representative?

CELLA: Oh, yes. They still had an air base which was huge. The garrison would provide the guards that rotated I think every four months. While I was there at least one rotation which included the French Foreign Legion parachuted in. I went out past Mers El Kabir to watch the French paratroopers.

Q: I haven't seen the movie quite recently, we'd seen at the Battle of Algiers with the paratroopers how they won the tactical victory but lost its strategic one.

CELLA: The Battle of Algiers was the best propaganda movie ever made, at least the best I've ever seen. I can recall about in October of 2003 we did a piece about how for people in the Pentagon the Battle of Algiers had become a hot thing to watch. I said well, there're about a year too late, you should've watched it a year earlier. One of my unpublished pieces refers to the Battle of Algiers and the lessons to be learned about what that sort of warfare does to both sides.

The Algerians in my part of the country felt a fairly strong nostalgia for the time of the French. Unless you were benefiting from the new regime, and that was a relative handful, in general your life was far better off under the French. In the Algerian mentality he's a hell of a lot more interested in getting a good piece of mutton than he is in having the right to vote for dog catcher. I guess it's the communist approach that doesn't translate well to many of the average people, not too well-educated average people. The idea of political freedom is not inherently an appealing one, provided they are not being abused. If you're having a good life and your family is doing okay then let somebody else run the mayor's office. It's a bit hyperbolic, but still independence was a less good life as opposed to the status of a colony. Remember Algeria wasn't really a colony. Hadn't been for a long time. Whatever status it had, the status quo ante was a better life, was a hell of a lot

better than independence and a less good life. I had better schools for my children, everything was better. The political leadership was aloof from the people and not particularly good at establishing and distributing benefits to the common individual. The French, yes, they won militarily and lost politically. It was stupid.

Q: Did the Algerians, the uppercrust that you are dealing with, did they head off to Paris for a week or two with their wives?

CELLA: Yes. There weren't too many upper crust left. The real upper crust were the high military and government officials and I didn't have a heck of a lot of contact with them. I've already talked about the Governor whom I did know pretty well, but I didn't see an awful lot of him. I would invite him to official functions from time to time. I don't think he ever came, I think he always sent one of his two deputies. I think for the Fourth of July he sent to his apologies and one of his deputies which was fine with me.

A lot of the professional class had been pied noir, that is to say non-Algerian. Pied noir is literally a black foot. This was a name that stuck to people who came over from the metropole France when Algeria was conquered in 1830. There are several explanations why they were called pied noir. One is that the name derives from the black boots worn by the French soldiers of the time. Another explanation refers to the fact that the relatively poor French peasants who followed behind the military who began to cultivate the Algerian soil did so barefoot and so their feet got dark. I'm not sure but the explanation refers to somebody who is of European extraction but has his residence, his abode in Algeria and may or may not come from a family that dates back to the original French colonization.

Anyway, a lot of the professional class were pied noir. In Oran besides the French you had a large group of people of Spanish origin whose families may have predated the pied noir. Oran was a way station when the Spanish chased the Moors out of the Iberian Peninsula. They followed them across North Africa.

Q: Was Ceuta in your consular district?

CELLA: That's a Spanish enclave in Morocco. Near Tangier.

Q: It is in Morocco then?

CELLA: Yes. There are two Spanish enclaves on the Mediterranean. Ceuta which is about an hour's drive from Tangier and Melilla which is about an hour's drive from the Algerian border, so one in the East, one in the West.

Q: What about social life?

CELLA: Let me finish about the professional class of Oran. They were either pied noir of European extraction or they were Algerians who had collaborated or were seen as collaborators of the French. Collaborator or not they just wanted to get the hell out of

there and had the means to do so. Oran never had a very large Jewish community but it had a Jewish community which was greatly reduced at the time of independence. I knew fairly well the head of the remaining Jewish community. I once did an Airgram saying that the Jewish community had no complaints. They were doing pretty well in Oran since the war. The head of the Jewish community once sat in my office and we had a long talk about the status of the community and how they were treated in which he was clearly very bitter against Israel. He said that during the struggle for independence and especially in the period leading up to independence the Israelis fear mongered like crazy with propaganda broadcasts beamed at the Algerian Jewish community. He said we would have been better off if they had stayed. A lot of left because they were convinced that they were in great jeopardy. I heard the same story from Moroccan Jews too who said that the Israelis had done their best to frighten Sephardic Jews into leaving as a way of building up their population base in Israel. There wasn't a hell of a lot of big elite left. A lot of businesses and things have been nationalized and taken over by the government.

The real elite such as there was came from the operational ends of the civilian government or the military. One time the head of the military district of Oran, a colonel by the name of Chadli who like Achli, the governor, had revolutionary credentials. It was always a guessing game among the small foreign consular community as to who was really number one. Was it Chadli the military guy or was it Achli the governor or was it the guy who was the local party leader? There was always a triumvirate, the party being the National Liberation Front.

We had no official relations between the U.S. and Algeria. I get an invitation from Colonel Chadli to attend the local officer's club celebration, it was either Independence Day the commemoration of the start of the revolution. I can remember my French and Spanish, particularly Spanish colleague being quite impressed. The French guy got an invitation. We had an Italian Consul, a U.S. Consul, a Spanish Consul General who actually had the rank of minister to give you an idea of the importance the Spanish community once had in Oran. They couldn't remember, and they had all been there a couple of years longer than I -- I never asked Ed Peck about this -- but they couldn't remember the American Consul getting an invitation. I got an invitation. So I get to the officer's club and Chadli greets me in a very friendly way and he's there greeting the distinguished guests and the first thing he says to me after we exchanged greetings, he said, "They tell me speak very good Arabic." The reason he invited me was to see if I could speak Arabic, a sign of the utility of the language and why for example to have a non-Arabic speaker as a senior representative in Baghdad doesn't make a hell of a lot of sense. Anyhow, I got the impression that he considered me a curiosity. He wasn't trying to develop a biographic profile, he wasn't an intelligence type. He just wanted to see this. One of the great things about Arabic is that most native speakers assume with a good deal of reason that only native Arabic speakers can speak the damn language. To meet a non-Arab that could speak passable Arabic really impresses the hell out of them.

Q: I think I mentioned this before but in my interview of Dick Parker he was talking about he was in a reception with most of the cabinet.

CELLA: Yes, they speak better Arabic than you do.

Q: Boumedienne was ticking his cabinet off because they were mostly French and they were more comfortable in French.

CELLA: You asked about social life. There was a great deal which was fine with me. I have never particularly relished that side of the diplomatic service, perhaps a reason why I have never served in an embassy, but there was enough because we had an Italian, Spanish, French, Moroccan, no Russian I don't believe, and U.S. consular representation so a very small consular core. We had our national days and that sort of thing and entertained back and forth occasionally had people to dinner. Within the local community eventually we had these some Americans involved with the petrochemical projects and the principal at the new international school. My Lions Club link gave me contact with not only pied noir but also real Algerians. There was a fairly compatible group of maybe 50 people that composed our social circle, well more than that. People that would invite me to things or I would invite to affairs at my residence. Again, regardless of nationality it was a pretty compatible group possibly because living conditions weren't all that great in many ways. There would be a rumor that the butcher down the street had just gotten in some real French salami. It wasn't a hardship, it wasn't a prison camp, far from it. But it was a bit of a challenge to get the spare parts for your car or to get a certain kind of food if that was what you wanted or if you needed a certain kind of medicine or to get a good bottle of wine. Both the Algerian people in this circle and the non-Algerian faced the same challenges but again I don't want to make it exaggerated, there was a certain camaraderie.

I had two or three fairly big cocktail parties a year, the biggest one was to introduce my successor, a guy named Bob Maxim who last I knew was Consul General in Québec City. This was about a few years back, about 15 years ago was the last time I saw him. We had it out in our spacious garden behind the residence. I think we had counting spouses 80 to 100 people there. Bob commented about what a homogeneous, gregarious, friendly group this was. And yes, the social life was fine. There was just enough. We got a fair number of visitors, some welcome, others not so welcome, but we had friends visit and some relatives visit. The British Ambassador was a very interesting guy who used come down a couple of times because the British had no representation in Oran. I was the unofficial British Consul as well. He knew if he had any problem, if his Embassy had any problem in Oran where I could be helpful pick up the phone and I would take care of it. So from the social point of view I think a real social butterfly would have felt terribly caged. To me it was just about right. You have to have some social activity to develop and maintain the contacts that provide you with information that you need to do accurate reporting.

Q: During the time that you were thee, were there any indicators, glimmers of what later became a very nasty business with Islamic fundamentalists, going around cutting throats and all that sort of stuff?

CELLA: No. I have my own theory where that came from and certainly there was fertile ground developing. But no, that was yet to happen. The closest we came to that would be

at the University of Oran, occasional student unrest which I suspect was more tied to the advent of the exam season than it was to anything else. About twice a year, maybe once a year, you could count on a fairly substantial student protest that would go on for a couple days, classes would be boycotted. One of the issues developing was a move, and I think this was on the part of the regime, to Arabize the curriculum at the University of Oran. Some students thought that was a great idea, others students thought it wasn't such a great idea. The attempt to replace French as the dominant language at the institution with Arabic. I think that's the kind of issue that's tied to the advent of Islamic radicalism.

That was when I was doing my Space Mobile. I was driving along the coast road of southern Tunisia, and there was a fellow alongside the road with a camel herd and with his 10-year-old son at his side. The little kid was listening to a transistor radio, and I remember vividly the thought crossing my mind when I saw that just how dangerous the transistor was. In fact in lectures or presentations I frequently refer to the transistor as the most dangerous invention of our time assuming that nuclear weapons are not used in anger again. Why is that? This opens up a world which you can't attain, never mind what television does. So that the odds that this 10-year-old, and we're talking now about 1968, will grow up and be content to be a camel herder aren't particularly good. If he can't do something else he's going to be frustrated. He may be begin to feel inferior. That's a particularly bad blend when you're dealing with the Arab mentality which places such a premium on pride and face, on appearances. So I think what's happened and then the language, Arabizing the curriculum as part of trying to cater to the sense of pride. I don't fault it. My problem is it's a question of practicality. I think what's happened is that the communications revolution has deepened the feeling of Arab humiliation and loss of face on the one hand and inferiority on the other. So what makes them superior? Their religion. They have a tremendous need.

For all our shortcomings, and we can be very critical of the American psyche, we can handle humiliation damn well. The Arabs have a huge problem handling humiliation. That's one reason why the formula adapted by Israel since its founding in dealing with their neighbors is so self-defeating. If I was Israel's worst enemy and could control their military and foreign-policy I would tell them to do exactly what they're doing. I actually mean that. I used to say if I were Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter asked me who I should appoint as the head of the CIA, I'd pick Stansfield Turner. If I couldn't name my brother-in-law. So again, there was not the problem, but you could see it developing. No, I would say you could see it developing, when it developed I can understand where it came from. The potential for it to take that kind of turn was certainly there.

Q: Where did you go when you left? You left in 1971?

CELLA: Yes. I had a family, and I had to come back to Washington. I was amused at an article in the paper the other day about how Condoleezza Rice is taking proactive measures to force people to serve abroad.

Q: Yes, this is a change from certainly my time. I did everything I could to serve abroad.

CELLA: That's why I joined the organization if I'd wanted to stay in Poughkeepsie I would have gone in to banking or become a lawyer and made real money. I had been abroad for nine years, and pretty much had to come back to Washington. That's when my real education began because I was assigned as the political-military affairs officer on the Israeli desk in 1971.

Q: Did you get any feel for the deep Algeria, you know, out in Fort Zendernuf, you know the Foreign Legion and all that adventure that I grew up on? With P.C. Wren novels and all that. Did you get any feel for that?

CELLA: I traveled a lot in the hinterland including visiting the old principal French Foreign Legion barracks. Every French Foreign Legionnaire began at Sidi Bel Abbés. I can remember traveling there with a couple of dear friends from our Interest Section in Algiers. One of them, in particular, was a P.C. Wren fan, and I think it was it was called the Grand Hotel. We went to Sidi Bel Abbés which by the way is the birthplace of Camus. Anyway we go to Sidi Bel Abbés, really ramshackle. The Algerians may have had a minor presence there but as I recall the base had been pretty much abandoned and put to other uses. Anyway, we are at Sidi Bel Abbés and thrilled to be there because of the tie to the French Foreign Legion. As I said the town is pretty ramshackle although I don't imagine it was ever a real garden spot. We went to the Grand Hotel which had gone to seed. They had a second-floor dining room and the desk clerk, maitre de, the manager was all one and the same, a rather tall, rather swarthy man but dignified, elderly. He served as a pretty passable meal and he recalled presiding over a banquet that was held in that same room for Eisenhower during the Second World War. He also regaled us with stories about Legionnaires and the parties they would have there.

Q: Did you get into the deep desert at all?

CELLA: Yes. I flew down to Tamanrasett which is pretty far down. There was a big Foreign Legion fort about 500 miles down and today abandoned. There is no town there. I went and climbed up and walked into the main entrance to the main building of the fort and it was kind of a scary experience because it was filled with bats. As I walked in I guess I disturbed some of them and they started flying around and flying out the door. There were probably 5000 bats in there. That had little to do with the nostalgia and the French Foreign Legion but it's got a lot to do with my dislike for bats. I traveled throughout the Sahara and oasis towns. The Sahara is a fascinating place.

Q: Was there anything going on there other than the possibility of oil or famine or what have you? I mean, what while you were there did we have any interest?

CELLA: As I recall when I arrived the French still had a military facility at Reggane which I never visited. That's where they conducted their first atomic test. They were still testing even after independence as I recall. They still had physical presence there when I arrived in 1968. That was abandoned shortly after my arrival. Otherwise, in the desert way down, and the place I never made it to but intended to, just all the way down in the Algerian Sahara there are iron deposits. How commercial they are, I don't know. There

was some nervousness about the Algerians in order to exploit these deposits with some support from the Russians making a move toward the Atlantic so that they could get an export point on the Atlantic. This would mean encroaching on either part of Morocco or the West Spanish Sahara. They wouldn't be occupying an awfully lot of land but there was wild thought that the Algerians just might be do this and that and the Russians might egg them on so they could get a friendly port on the Atlantic. The main center of interests were petrochemical or petroleum gas resources. They were in the process of building a highway across the Sahara so there was some commercial interest there, but I can't remember recalling any real American interest.

Q: You had several points, Glenn you wanted to?

CELLA: Yes. You asked if I had visited any of the French Foreign Legion forts down in the south. One that I wasn't sure of the name was Fort McMann. It was constructed by the French in 1893 or so and abandoned when I went through. That's when I had my visit with all the bats. We also talked a bit about the Mozabis, very interesting people live in a the north-central Sahara, south of Algiers. As I recall, I couldn't remember the name of the principal town of charming town which is Gharadia.

Q: In 1971 you were the political- military affairs officer for Israel?

CELLA: I was the officer of Israel and Arab Israel Affairs. The Arab part came in because we were involved with the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza.

Q: You are doing this from 1971 until when?

CELLA: Until 1973, just about two years.

Q: What was the, from your perspective in Washington, what was the situation of Israel and the Arab world in 1971 when you went there?

CELLA: Well, it's the same position that it has occupied ever since. That is to say that no one was really in a position to really challenge it militarily. But, the Israelis were not terribly secure so security issues were the major locus of our relations with the Israelis. Of course they will never be secure until they had some semblance of real peace with their neighbors. They cannot achieve security through military superiority in my judgment. Military superiority has over the years in many ways been eroded. I think it was substantially eroded as a result of the last dustup with Hezbollah.

Q: This was in 2006. We're talking now about 1971.

CELLA: The principal issue, bilateral issue, involved the provision of additional F-4 high-performance fighter jets to the Israelis. The Israelis were petitioning us for additional 76. Lyndon Johnson several years earlier had provided them with some F-4's. It was the first time, I believe at least above the table, we had provided the Israelis with a really sophisticated first line, U.S. system. Of course, the F-4 is a quintessentially attack

aircraft but was supplied under the guise of strengthening Israel's defense and the agreement prohibited use of the F-4s for attack. One of the first uses they made of the F-4s was to stage a raid on Egypt where they took out a school in Nile Delta and I think about 160 schoolchildren died in that raid. Anyway, by the time I arrived on the Israeli desk they were asking for maybe it was 72 additional F-4s and a final decision to approve the sale hadn't yet been made. It was made shortly, a positive one, positive in italics, was made shortly after I arrived on the desk.

Q: I was would think being political and military affairs officer on the Israeli desk is almost a non-job because what the Israelis want, the Israelis get and usually the political military officer is sort of monitoring military equipment.

CELLA: You spent a lot of time giving advice that is ignored. I was busy. There was plenty to do, but I had virtually zero influence. It was a very interesting position if you can get over the being appalled with U.S. policy in the area. From kind of an academic point of view, it was very interesting to observe the interplay. The political military affairs portion portfolio also included intelligence matters and monitoring with no real success Israeli espionage in this country and that sort of thing.

Q: Talking about equipment, anytime we give equipment to another nation we add all sorts of you can't use this against civilian populations, you can't use this for this and that. I take it the Israelis were breaking these rules all the time, were they not?

CELLA: They have total contempt for our spineless system, in my judgment. Yes, there were a few cases where they didn't do things that we didn't want them to do but in general they got their way and got their way rather easily. There would be a pretense of struggle or opposition or honest debate, but in fact, they would get what they wanted even in those days. Again we're talking 1971 to 1973 they could count on the automatic support of 76 senators, automatic. What the State Department did was to adopt a position which they have more or less maintained since then that the Israelis will only make peace when they feel secure so we have to build up their military establishment in order to put them in a position to be willing to make the hard choices in the compromises for peace. Now, this is a totally bogus line of reasoning for anyone truly familiar with this situation. It was used to salve the conscience of the bureaucrats who understood that to get ahead they had to give in to the what was the inevitable anyway. Why resist? So we created this fiction of arming them so they can make peace.

Q: What was happening at your level? Normally we try to monitor and see that things aren't misused and helping about peace and all and trying to tamp down things. Was there a feeling of abject subservience to, you might say, political pressures on the desk?

CELLA: No. We had good leadership on the desk, the Country Director was an officer by the name of Haywood H. Stackhouse, a very good, intellectually rigorous guy who went by the nickname Stack. He had served in both the Arab world and Israel. In the various bureaus in those days we used to joke that you can't be a true truly broad gauged anti-Semite until you have dealt with both the Arabs and the Israelis. Stack understood

Israel and the Israelis, I would say, close to perfectly. He would interpret and predict and forecast with uncanny accuracy what would happen in Israeli elections for example. I think he didn't feel as strongly about some of these issues as I did but he recognized what we were up against and did his best to put forward advice geared to U.S. national interests. When he finished his time on the desk which was about a year after I left he was assigned to Bordeaux as Consul General. It was a post he was actually looking forward to but in the end he decided not to go. I ran into him in the lobby of the State Department one day. He told me he had just resigned. He had just turned 50 or 51. I said, "You resigned? I thought you were looking forward to going to Bordeaux." He said, "I was, but then I decided I'd better get out while I still had some time to do something that might make some difference in the world. I'd like to do something that would make some difference." I think he found deep down that he saw the Mideast policies as crazy and he just gave up.

Q: Did you have a feeling, you and I am thinking about your colleagues too, that anything you wrote that might be at all challenging or calling into question methods or something about Israel would immediately get leaked to the staffs of Congress?

CELLA: I suppose there was a concern. The Israelis had many supporters in Washington and knew pretty much where individuals who were of any significance whatsoever in the US Israeli relationship stood on issues. For example, in two years on the Desk including a fair amount of time spent as acting number two and as the acting number one I was only invited to one Israeli social event and that was a celebration of the 25th anniversary of Israel's independence where they invited just about the whole world. The reception as I recall was at the Washington Hilton. I remember breaking my tooth on a miniature bagel and having to have a root canal. I wondered if that was somehow revenge for my "anti-Israeli" sentiments.

I'll tell you a story, it's rather a long one, that will illustrate many aspects of our relationship and how the Israelis operated and may anticipate some further questions you might have. One of my tasks on the Desk was to monitor munitions control cases. These are cases where a foreign government or foreign entity applies for the import of or the U.S. entity applies for the export of various things covered by the Munitions Act, which require State Department approval and clearance. That aspect of my work alone kept me pretty busy. As I recall, the number of applications involving Israel, munitions control applications involving Israel totaled what was roughly equal to all the munitions control applications for every other country in the NEA Bureau, which in those days went from Egypt across the Middle East to Iran and down through South Asia, India, Pakistan Sri Lanka. So it was a pretty big swath of territory including a number of countries with fairly robust military forces. I can't remember the numbers, but I do remember that the volume of cases involving Israel was about equal to all the other countries in the Bureau.

There was a Lieutenant Colonel exchange officer serving in the Office of Regional Affairs in the NEA Bureau at that time and the munitions control cases would be funneled through the Regional Affairs Bureau which would then parcel them out to the geographic desks. I worked closely with this fellow who was an Army officer, had been

an attaché in Syria at one point, a very astute guy. About once a week he would come up to see me with a stack of munitions control applications, anywhere from 10 to maybe 20 or 30 of them. Sometimes he would come by twice a week if there was a particularly heavy volume and we would go through them. If I didn't know I would say what does this do? If I thought that this was something we might not want the Israelis to have I'd recommend turning down the application. I occasionally won some of those.

In the course of screening these applications and following developments in Israel including monitoring FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) daily reports which are excellent I frequently got more things of analytical use through unclassified sources. I believe if you know what to be looking for open source can be really, really valuable, sometimes more valuable than so-called clandestine material collected clandestinely.

Anyway, I had been on the desk for about a year, and I came to the conclusion that the Israelis were trying to acquire the potential to build their own high-performance aircraft along the lines of the F-4 as well as their own tanks. Why did I come to that conclusion? Well, I came to that conclusion because the Israelis always believe that in the final analysis they can only count on themselves. They never really fully had confidence in us. That was in the early 1970s. This was before, as is the case today, they had taken complete control of the Congress and captured the Christian evangelicals. But my sense, they didn't shower me with social invitations, I saw an awful lot of the Israelis in action, particularly their Ambassador whom I got to know reasonably well. At that time it was Yitzhak Rabin who wanted to be Prime Minister then ended up being assassinated. He would come to the State Department to see the Assistant Secretary who in those days was a gentleman by the name of Joseph Sisco. I would be the note taker if it was a political-military issue. It almost always was a political military issue and Rabin was a frequent visitor. I'm sure I saw him at least a couple times a month. Sometimes the sessions would go on for quite some time. Anyway, I concluded that the Israelis reasoned as follows: how can you really trust a government that is so manifestly willing to go against its own best interests? I think the Shah felt the same way about the United States. Not for the same reason. The Shah felt he couldn't trust us in the final analysis. The Israelis essentially I think, had contempt for the U.S. Government and U.S. Congress because again, their willingness to act in ways that were manifestly contrary to long determined law and essential national interests.

Through information that came to my attention from a variety of sources, including as I mentioned, FBIS reports but also including a number of classified intelligence reports, through my analysis of some of the munitions control applications, I mean we were looking for pumps of the sort that you used in high-performance that you use in high-performance aircraft. If you took 10, 20, 30 cases and put them together, well, you have a jet engine, for example. During this period I developed a close relationship with the senior Middle East analyst over at the CIA. He had been Chief of Station in Israel, a guy by the name of John Hadden who was a very astute, very bright guy. I used to meet with him regularly to consult on development and trends. Anyway, I came to the conclusion that this was what they were trying to do. I brought a whole bunch of munitions control cases that I thought related to my analysis. I didn't try to have them

disapproved, I simply put a hold on them. They started to mount up and time is going by. My strategy was to build a conclusive case that this is what they were up to. To lay it out in writing to Mr. Sisco. I didn't want to reveal what I was up to, to anyone until I had everything really pinned down.

For example, during this time a gentleman by the name of Matí Hut came to Washington. He was the head of the Israeli Air Force. He came to meet with Joseph Sisco and it was obviously a military related call so I'm the note taker. I go down to the main entrance to greet the General and take him to Sisco's office. So while we're in the equivalent of the green room, the holding room, the General was there a little bit early. Sisco was tied up with something or other. I had a few minute moments alone with the General and I asked him if the Israelis had any intentions to try to manufacture their own high-performance aircraft. He said, "No, absolutely not." I made a note of that. In my prepared suggested talking points for Cisco I had him ask the general this same question, not quite as directly. And Sisco did and he got a negative response. There on paper I had a case of a senior military officer lying directly, what I thought was a lie, in fact it was, to a senior U.S. diplomatic official.

This went on for a number of months. I believe is worth telling because it really illustrates how the State Department and government operates vis-à-vis with Israel. I had a paper prepared in draft and I was about a week away from getting ready to pull the trigger. The guy who handled the Israeli cases in the office of munitions control, the State Department Office of Munitions Control, kept calling me about this case, that case because his boss was after him wanting to know what was going on because some of these things had been pending for months. I told this guy all along, you tell your boss's boss, the Office of Munitions Control in those days was headed by a man called John Sykes whom I had known. He had been the munitions control for a long time and I had known him way back from the time I was in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs at the outset of my Foreign Service experience. For some reason, and I really should've known better, I took pity on the guy and I said, "Okay, I'll go in and meet Mr. Sykes and explain to him face to face that it's not your fault that the cases are not moving forward." I went and told John Sykes what I just told you.

Probably that afternoon, or by the next day, Ambassador Rabin had called Joseph Sisco to ask what the hell was going on. Why? Because Sykes had passed on my information to a guy who was head of the Israeli military purchasing mission in the United States. I told Sykes, "I am telling you this stuff because I'm taking pity on your subordinate here but for God's sakes, don't talk, don't tell anybody anything until I get back to you." Okay, the cat is out of the bag. Sykes, as soon as I left his office probably called the Israeli to explain to him what was going on..

Sykes, to digress here but it's also illustrative, and this again was back in the early 1970s, God knows what it's like today, was a senior civil servant, a GS-17, or whatever, he was about as high as you could go. He had his own little empire in munitions control. Of course, the State Department being the State Department, they never understood or appreciated how important this office was. It was considered a backwater and I think

Sykes felt frustrated and under appreciated. At one point after Sykes spilled the beans on the aircraft project the Israelis invited him to Israel to advise on U. S. control procedures. He and his wife were invited. They spent a week in Israel as guests of the Israeli government and an additional week in any European city of their choice or wherever they wanted to go. I found out about this. It was patently against U.S. government regulations. I went to one of Sykes' superiors and said, "Hey, John Sykes is going as a guest of the Israeli government on this boondoggle." The idea that the Israeli government would hire John Sykes to advise them on munitions control procedures is in itself fairly ludicrous although Sykes certainly did know munitions control procedures. Because it was Israel, this fellow, the superior I'm talking about, who went on to an extremely distinguished career in the State Department was a man who always treated me well and I'm fond of him, wouldn't do a thing to stop the trip. I'm sure it was because it was Israel. So when Sykes retired he was put on the Israeli government payroll, I suppose as a nation's control munitions control adviser here in the United States. That's the kind of situation, but again that's 30 years ago, that we were involved in.

Okay, I have my paper just about ready in draft. It's about a 15-page analysis of what was going on, what the implications were. I included in it a list of reasons why this would be a bad idea to support this kind of program, including the fact that it would give the Israelis open access to leading edge U.S. technology. They were getting it anyway, but they had to do it illegally. This would give them reasons to be acquiring this stuff and talking to this engineer and that engineer. I also said it would free them to sell stuff wherever they wanted to and we'd have no real control over it no matter what kind of an agreement we had because of their leverage in Congress. In fact, a few years ago we did block a sale involving AWACS airborne early warning technology and airborne control technology to the Chinese. This was our stuff and they wanted to peddle it to the Chinese. I said, well we don't want to improve the ability of the Chinese to shoot down U.S. aircraft in the Pacific. The Israelis on that one did back off. It was so outrageous I think they realized that it wasn't worth the gamble to persist.

Anyhow, Rabin called Sisco. Sisco summons me to his office and asks me what the hell was going on. I spent about an hour and a half with him laying out the whole story and at one point he said to me, "So, you sound like Wendell Wilkie." I said, "Well Mr. Secretary, as far as I'm concerned, the world would be a lot better place if there were more Wendell Wilkies and fewer Golda Meiers." The case I built was rather strong. Sisco says, "Well, let me think about this."

The case was bucked up to an Undersecretary who had the management structure in early 1973 or probably late 1972, he was a senior security official in the State Department hierarchy, an Undersecretary or Deputy Undersecretary, above the PM bureau. So it went to him and it was finally decided well, we are going to send a study team to Israel to look at these issues. They put together a study team primarily of DOD (Department of Defense) civilian and military officials. It was a fairly large group, eight or 10 and maybe more. I was left off it. The study team goes to Israel, comes back, and writes a report that isn't particularly good because it doesn't cover some of the key areas. There is some resistance and now I'm to the point where I'm being transferred, leaving the Israeli desk.

In the end we wound up going along with the gag and they produced the Kefir aircraft which was never a particular success. The whole thing was rather costly in terms of both our political interests. Certainly in terms of our financial interests and certainly in terms guarding our leading edge technology. So this I think is kind of a case study in how the Israelis pretty much control things, have the ability to control things where the bureaucracy will put up a semblance of resistance. They say we're going to study this but in the end the Israelis get what they want

It was funny, about three or four months into this particular project I was talking to John Hadden one day. I walked across Memorial Bridge one evening shortly before our meeting and the thought crossed my mind, and I don't consider myself an overly dramatic person, maybe I am, I wonder if the Israelis want to bump me off? To be pushed off this bridge? So I said to John Hadden, "Do you think there's any chance that the Israelis would assassinate me?" And he said, "No." He said, "I don't think you have to worry for two reasons. One, you're such a low level functionary but if you were to die in any way mysterious it might generate some real interest. That in turn if anybody ever got the true story could be a matter of some embarrassment to the Israelis." And he said, "Two, they're pretty confident they're going to get what they want in the end anyway so why run any risk whatsoever in, you know, poisoning Glenn Cella's Sanka?"

Now, you asked about the risks you might run into being somewhat obstreperous when it comes to Israeli desiderata. In fact, two of my colleagues on the desk who were aware of what I was doing nominated me for the Rivkin Award which was the mid-level award to honor creative dissent. They had a luncheon to honor the principal nominees and the eventual award winners. The Rivkin Award is named after Ambassador William Rivkin, a political appointee in the mid-1960s. He might have originally been appointed by Kennedy, served in Africa when I was posted in Africa and I think maybe in Luxembourg at some point. Anyhow, when he was in Africa, I met Ambassador Rivkin and his wife at an African Chiefs of Mission conference which was held in Tangier in early 1966. After the luncheon, and I guess it was the spring of 1973, Mrs. Rivkin had me brought over to her table. She said she did not remember meeting me in Tangier but was the widow of the Ambassador who founded the foundation. She said, "I thought you should have won. I just wanted you to know that you really demonstrated apparently some really great strength of courage in your convictions and I just wanted you to know you got my vote. I'm sorry you didn't win." The guy who did win was my old friend, Ed Peck who I replaced in Oran. I'm nominated for paddling the Israelis on whether we should help them build a high-performance aircraft; he was nominated for his role, and I don't want to denigrate the accomplishment, in abolishing the joint State-Defense cable caption. It's sort of a story that illustrates again how the State Department ticks.

Q: 1971 to 1973. In 1972 there was a war, wasn't there?

CELLA: The Yom Kippur War was in October of 1973 so it was several months after I left the desk. In 1970 to 1971 there was yet another war which doesn't get much attention but it was a fairly significant one which involved mainly missile exchanges across the Suez Canal.

Q: What was it called?

CELLA: It never got formal appellation of war, but I believe the Israelis suffered more casualties, this went on for a number of months, suffered more casualties in that confrontation than they did in the Six Day War.

Q: Yes. There were missiles and Israeli aircraft. The Israelis found that they were having real troubles with Soviet missiles.

CELLA: The Israelis were worried about the so-called Soviet missile belt which the Egyptians had arranged along the canal to interdict Israeli incursions. Israeli policy was always to maintain the capability to strike any of their neighbors at will with gay abandon, as it were. And so they were very concerned about this missile belt and that was one of the reasons they gave for wanting more force. About this time the Army, or a defense contractor LTV developed something called the Lance missile. I've forgotten the range of the Lance. It was dual capable; it could carry a nuclear warhead or a conventional warhead. It was not terribly long range, but in those days a fairly long range missile.

I used to go to the military industrial trade shows every year because I found those shows were useful sources of information and intelligence. The Army used to have a show, the Air Force had a show, the Navy had a show, I guess maybe the Navy-Marine show, a joint show. The Army and Air Force would be in the Fall and the Navy-Marine would be in the Spring and they would be three day affairs. I'm not sure if they still go on. I'm sure they have been scaled back. They would be at the Shoreham Park Hotel complete with exhibits. Because I did all the munitions cases I had seen this hardware. I'm not sure what it is and so I'd go to the shows where you to looked at and talked to one of the technicians on the floor and find out what really did and that sort of thing.

I stopped by one of the shows of LTV, one of the larger exhibits at the show, and I started talking to some LTV employees and let them know that I do political military affairs on the Israeli desk. I wind up talking to the LTV project manager for the Lance Missile. They were eager to get approval for sales to Israel. The Israelis were really interested in the Lance. There was no official U.S. cognizance of this fact. The Israelis always know what's going on even before the U.S. Government does in some instances. So this guy is the Lance project manager who becomes interested in cultivating me as a way to smooth down stream approval for the sale of the Lance to Israel. I have a bit of a devious streak in me. I went to see this fellow and gave him no reason to think I would oppose such a project. I don't think I went so far as to really lead him on but I indicated great interest to know more what was involved. He comes by my office. I think I saw him at one show then I saw him at other shows. I had seen this guy two or three times and he asked to come by my office. What does he have? What does he want to show me? He brings a small portable video machine and tape, and he proceeds to show me munitions called cluster bomb units (CBUs). These were about baseball sized munitions that were loaded with sub-munitions and you put a bunch of them in a warhead and when you fire them off

they bounce off. They go in all directions and sometimes explode and sometimes they don't. At a U.S. military proving ground in Nevada a Lance missile was tested with a CBU warhead against a mockup of the Egyptian Suez missile site. How all this was arranged, I have no idea. I just tell the story again to illustrate the depth of Israeli penetration to repeat 30 years ago that could be the connivance of the U.S. defense industry, the Israeli military, and the U.S. military to test a weapon that the U.S. did not yet have in its inventory in a configuration that the U.S. would not be interested in against a mockup created of a site that the Israeli military was confronted with. I sometimes hesitate to get into these stories because unless you've seen it from the inside, it just sounds incredible. I probably come off as terribly anti-Israel.

[NOTE: APPARENT BREAK IN RECORDING.]

Q: out in the Atlantic. Now the Israelis had no interest in this but the Soviets did. The only conclusion you can come to is these Soviets were using this information as a bargain to get people out.

CELLA: Soviet Jewry was a big issue.

Q: Every time politicians make a move to try to get them out, the military and the intelligence community really gets its hackles up..

CELLA: Which tells you how bad the compromise was. It was after my time but I have been told that it was by far, maybe not by far, but certainly the worst compromise in the history of the United States. Well, the problem rarely comes up when Israeli Prime Ministers meet with the President.

Q: Tell me, you did mention the Israelis were conducting espionage in the United States. What would they need to have espionage for? Or were they, what makes you think that?

CELLA: Well because they can never have enough information. We have an agreement of many years standing that neither side will spy on the other, won't conduct clandestine information collection or clandestine activities on the soil of the other. In my experience which is now many decades old, in the early 70s we'd, as far as I could tell, honored that to a fault whereas the Israelis just totally disregarded it. In a way they don't have to conduct espionage the way the Hungarians might have to conduct it. They have this vast network of sympathizers who are willing to do pretty much anything that the Israelis ask. They don't necessarily get everything. And they don't necessarily know what to ask for. What to try and get. We're talking about leading edge developments, technological developments and that sort of thing real breakthroughs. I think it's true that they don't have to conduct espionage the way any other country would do it. By the way, almost all cases with Israel is always a special case it's sui genres written in capital red letters.

This story shows maybe why they would want to bother doing this. The guy I replaced on the Israeli desk was a meticulous fellow by the name of Bob Munn who left behind almost a perfectly clean desk. He'd wrapped up everything so that there was very little in

immediately pending business the day I arrived. The one file he did leave behind concerned the California Israel Committee for Trade and Technology (CICTT.) This is in mid-1971. The aerospace industry is in one of its periodic downturns. The CICTT was run out of the Israeli Consulate General's office in Los Angeles. One of the things they did was produce a newsletter that circulated in the California-based U.S. aerospace community advertising openings in Israel for various technology and technological specialties, low temperature physics, etc. For job seekers this is an interesting publication because the ad would usually have a lengthy inventory of jobs openings mainly in the then burgeoning Israeli aerospace industry. This organization came to the attention of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. I'm not sure how they got onto it. Anyhow, the file which was a rather length one including samples of the newsletter, was sent down to the Desk and given to Political Military Affairs Office part of the Desk, to my predecessor Bob, for a determination whether CICTT should be referred to Justice for registration as an alien agent under the Alien Agent Registration Act. When you went through the file it was clear that they should be registered. They were funded by the Government of Israel, run by the Israeli Science Attaché in Washington, backed up by the Consulate General in Los Angeles and their main job was to recruit U.S. talent, US technical logical talent to go and work in Israel. I say to my boss, Mr. Stackhouse, I read the memo and say yeah, it's clear. They should be referred for action at the Justice Department.

Because it's Israel things like this happen in the State Department all the time. Every desk gets involved in these things and it's usually very routine. It's usually handled by at tops the desk officer and the INR liaison person. To be on the safe side Stackhouse says well, we're going to refer this to Roy Atherton who was the Deputy to Joseph Sisco for the Middle East part of NEA. Atherton refers it to Sisco. Then Sisco decides it should go, I forget where it went next. We wind up going to the Under Secretary of State. Each time it was bounced back to me and they'd say do a memo referring it to this level. So it goes not to the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of State John Irwin. His Special Assistant calls me up and says, "What's this doing up here? I have never seen anything like this." I said, "Well at the Under Secretary's level you wouldn't normally see things like this. There are hundreds of these cases if not thousands in any given year involving all kinds of countries. Because this is Israel nobody wants to take the authority for referring the file to the Department of Justice." So this had been going on for weeks.

Finally, Irwin's assistant calls me three or four times and comes down to see me one time. He was a good guy but he's just sort of perplexed and he just wanted to be sure that he could explain clearly to Irwin why he was being asked to pass on this. Finally, it hits Irwin's desk. He sent it to Justice and comes back down, hits my desk. I go in to see Mr. Stackhouse and I said, "Eureka, we can now send the file over to the Justice Department." Cut and dried, this was an easy call. You didn't have to be a Harvard summa cum laude law graduate to know that these people should be registered. In 48 hours or less the file was back on my desk from the Justice Department verifying no grounds for seeking registration enforcement. This in effect was an espionage operation going on with the full knowledge of the U.S. Department of Justice and nothing is done

about it. So to answer your question, why do they bother to have the espionage network in the classic sense, that's a valid question.

Q: In the first place, was there any counterpart on the Arab side of the Egyptians, Syrians, or Iraqis or anything like that? I mean, I just want to put this in context. Were there efforts of this nature on the part of the Arab nations to do something like this or were they just not apt enough to do it?

CELLA: I'm sure there were efforts. I was not aware of any but that's not to say that they didn't exist. None of the other desks, the Egyptian Desk didn't have anybody doing my job. There was not an equivalence of me anywhere else in the Bureau as far as I know. Most of the political military stuff was handled by the Regional Affairs Office.

Attempts at penetrating or influencing, sure, I'm sure they make attempts but the comparison would be between, to borrow from Mark Twain, would be between the lightning and the lightning bug. You can talk about a number of, you mentioned the Pollock case earlier, cases involving Israel one way or another and when was the last great Arab spy case? I can't think of one. It may have been we overlooked them. Here I should throw in something, an important point. We talked a lot about Israel. I've made it very clear I was not happy with the way we managed relations with that country over the years. Anything that was seen as even remotely critical to Israel is branded as anti-Semitic and something that perplexes me very much is the way the anti-Semitic label is used to intimidate people or to apply a gag on what should be honest and open debate, much the same way that Jesse Jackson uses racism to thwart, subvert, blunt debate on racial issues in this country. I don't think you can get anywhere without honest, frank, objective debate. To resort to rhetorical devices to deform debate is, in my judgment, in the longer term against the interests of all concerned. To the extent that Jesse Jackson deforms debate on race relation in this country, it's bad for both blacks and whites. The extent to which Israel and its supporters in this country use anti-Semitism to try to gag people to deform debate is bad not only for the United States but for Israel as well. I believe that probably over the long-term the biggest threat to Israel's security is the relationship it has with the United States because we give them the wherewithal, including the physical and financial wherewithal, to make very bad decisions in the long-term. If they want to subjugate the West Bank and Gaza, they can do it, they can maybe do it for the next five centuries but they can't do it forever. Their only hope for real security is to achieve a genuine accommodation with their neighbors, which may not be achievable but that's the only long-term hope.

Q: I agree with you. Let's move to 1973. Where did you go?

CELLA: Well, I wasn't thrown out. In 1973 I was assigned as a political adviser to the U. S. chief of naval operations who in those days was the late, in my judgment, great Elmo (Bud) Zumwalt. He was the only member of the Joint Chiefs to have a political adviser. The fellow who came up early on in our meetings, Don Gelber whom I met in Athens when I was on active duty with the Navy my ship had made a port call in Pireaus, was Zumwalt's first political adviser. In 1973 he was up for rotation and I was up for rotation

and neither one of us really had to move but Gelber had managed to arrange to take a similar position with the Commanding Chief U.S. Navy forces Europe in London. So he could go to London even though he enjoyed working for Zumwalt. Zumwalt asked him to recruit someone to replace him. I ran into Don right around this time in the State Department lobby. He told me about this opportunity and asked if I would be interested. He said he would be happy to recommend me. He thought I would do just fine in the position. I said, "Yes, that sounds interesting, and if you want to recommend me I'd be very grateful."

So, I had a luncheon with Don and a Navy Rear Admiral who supervised the unit that Don was attached to. I guess I was being screened by this very nice, very agreeable Rear Admiral pursuant to making a recommendation, his approving Gelber's recommendation of me to Zumwalt. The next thing that happens is that I'm going to see Zumwalt. As with all things involving Admiral Zumwalt it was a bit different than what one might normally expect. It was more like I was interviewing him for the job rather than him interviewing me. Zumwalt had two people in whom he had confidence recommend me and so I was already his choice, even though we had never met.

I give you a couple of highlights from this first meeting with Admiral Zumwalt. He said, "You know, I'm known as a man in action, and I guess I have earned that reputation and sometimes my acts aren't always the most prudent" and he said, "And your number one job will be to tell me when I'm about to do something stupid in an area that you know far more about than I do." I said, "Well, what would that be?" "Well, international affairs." That was my number one responsibility was to keep him in check. Keeping with the man of action theme, he said, "If you ever see anything that needs to be done and you can't inform me, I'd prefer to be informed first, but if you ever see something that needs to be done and you're not able to get word to me, you have the authority to act in my name." Curiously, Navy colleagues of mine from my own days on active duty found it quite remarkable that the Chief of Naval Operations would give Glenn Cella this sort of authority, given Glenn Cella's performance during his time on active duty in the Navy. I said, "Well, that's a rather breathtaking responsibility or authorization or mandate. How many mistakes can I make?" He said, "Oh, about three", which was typical of his leadership style.

He knew how to motivate people, to get to be very loyal to him although we had lots of people who were not loyal to him for internal Navy reasons. He knew how to motivate his subordinates and his staff and cultivate their loyalty. It is my observation that most people teach you how not to do things. Most bosses I had taught me how not to supervise people and to deal with subordinates. With Zumwalt you learned how to do it. He was one of maybe three people in whose presence I have been in all my lifetime who truly merited the somewhat overused term charisma. Zumwalt really had it in spades. He was just a terrific guy to work for. He was very active on the international scene, the Navy with world wide responsibilities and activities. He took a sophisticated interest in international affairs foreign-policy issues. He was not a meddler but he was a guy who was genuinely, truly interested and interested in a sophisticated way. The year I spent with him was just tremendous.

Q: Which was?

CELLA: 1973 to 1974. His term of office expired in 1974. He would have been an excellent choice, although a Navy man has never held the position through the years, for Supreme Allied Commander of Europe. That post was coming open but they needed a place to put Alexander Haig so, I don't know if that was ever in the cards for Zumwalt but that was sort of mentioned. He was offered to be the Secretary for Veterans Affairs and he was interested in doing that thankless job because he had been a Navy guy in Vietnam and made it through that sad epoch. He felt very strongly that our Vietnam veterans weren't getting a fair shake. He felt again that real loyalty has to work both ways. One reason why he instilled such great loyalty to him was that he was loyal sometimes to a fault. He sometimes would back people more than they deserved to be backed. Anyhow, he had this deep feeling that we weren't dealing properly with our veterans. He was offered the position and he said he would take it but he had three conditions. Condition one was that he would have the freedom to choose his immediate subordinates. He did not want a bunch of politically connected hacks plugged-in underneath him. He wanted that authority because he understood the effectiveness of the number one guy depends a hell of a lot on who number three, four and five is. That was one. Two, he wanted a White House commitment that they would make an excellent effort to insulate the Department from congressional and other political pressures. In other words, he wanted a free hand to do what he thought was right and to ignore things people who wanted to do things that he didn't think was right. I can't remember what his third condition was, but in effect he was asking for the moon and the stars. He couldn't get these conditions met and so he didn't take the job.

Q: Did you get any feel for the forces that were around the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly the Chairman? You know, the Pentagon rivalries and the Kissinger White House, I mean Kissinger NSC and all that. Did you get a feel for that?

CELLA: I was working for the Chief of Naval Operations and we had a great relationship. I had access to everything I needed to do my job and access to anything else I wanted. I had all kinds of clearances for special intelligence programs and things like that and I was treated with complete candor so I had a number of insights on both points.

Kissinger has to be one of the most overrated men in the history of the United States if not the history of the world,. One little window onto Kissinger. Zumwalt used to have unpublicized regular, I guess, monthly meetings with Kissinger over at the NSC. These were unpublicized. One of my responsibilities was to write talking points for Zumwalt on subjects that I thought he might want to raise with Kissinger. That was one of the many attractions of the job was here is a chance for a lowly FS-04 Cella to communicate his ideas directly to Henry Kissinger. This may surprise you, but I saw a lot of things that we were doing that I didn't particularly agree with and relished the thought to get my views directly to the top. I remember the first, and as it turned out, only meeting that Zumwalt had with Kissinger during my time for which I could write the memo. I remember one of the topics I stressed was the Caribbean. From my days in Martinique I had the feeling

that we didn't pay enough attention to the Caribbean. We had our fixation with Castro and that was it. It always struck me as passing strange that we wouldn't pay more attention to countries on our doorstep compared to countries much, much further away. Now I'm not equating relative geopolitical importance or anything like that. But the fact I felt we never took sufficient interest in the Caribbean given its proximity to the United States. So, I think I did two or three brief papers for Zumwalt. One I remember was on the Caribbean and why don't you want to pay more attention that part of the world which is a natural interest for somebody involved with the United States Navy.

Well, the private Zumwalt-Kissinger meetings ended. The reason they ended and obviously I wasn't there, but it was my understanding and I think is borne out in things both Zumwalt and Kissinger have written since. Zumwalt was the only member of the Joint Chiefs that had this, what might be called, special relationship with Kissinger. Kissinger rightly saw Zumwalt as a smart military guy, and therefore a potential threat. Kissinger being Kissinger cultivated a relationship with Zumwalt and Zumwalt can't be bought off. He had virtually no ego in the sense of the Washington ego. Zumwalt of course, is delighted with the relationship, because here's a chance to get thoughts directed to Mr. Kissinger with no filters and to be able to discuss with him directly.

During one of their meetings around the time that I'm talking of, Kissinger had expressed the thought we ought to make the best deal we can with the Russians now while we still can because the U.S. is a country in decline. If you analyze how Kissinger dealt with the Soviets you might well come to that conclusion. That was one of the things that was driving a lot of the rhetoric of this genius. He let his guard down and let Zumwalt know that he thought that we were in decline. As it turns out Kissinger was about 30 years too early, but anyhow, that we were in decline and therefore we should make the best deal we can with the Soviets. By the best deal he meant we should give more than equal weight, more than due weight to their concerns in the SALT (strategic arms limitation talks) negotiations. The way he conducted the SALT negotiations in the end where he had an effect to negotiations going on I saw then as evidence in support of what I believe to be Henry Kissinger's inspiration for the way he dealt with the Soviets. Well, he let his guard down, he says this to Zumwalt or maybe he didn't let his guard down. Maybe Zumwalt challenges him and suggests that this isn't a very healthy intellectual construct to use in developing and managing relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

That little episode inspired Kissinger to break off the frequency of these chats with Zumwalt. Zumwalt never trusted Kissinger, and I think with good reason. He was a very duplicitous from my perspective to say the least and heavily influenced by ego, whereas Zumwalt, in my experience, never let his ego get in the way of his judgment.

In regard to the Joint Chiefs, Tom Moore, Admiral Moorer was chairman during my time and I had no real direct dealings with him but I certainly had a window on how the Joint Chiefs operated. My feeling is that the Joint Chiefs systems had not really taken hold, that we still didn't have unified positions and that the individual services spent a lot of time thinking about how to influence the Joint Chiefs. Joint Chiefs personnel spent a lot of time reporting back to their home service what was going on, what people were

thinking about, as opposed to a system where you have a Chairman who says this is what the national interest is we don't need aircraft carriers we need more bombers and a few tanks. As opposed to what can we build for the Navy and we're going to build an advanced bomber for the Air Force and we're going to build an armored vehicle for the Army showing the approach taken in Congress. This results in huge waste of resources, similar to the approach to military intelligence. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was instituted so you would have a way of getting the best, most rigorous military analysis possible as opposed to a Navy slant, an Air Force slant, and an Army slant. Well, you've got DIA, but you never did get rid of the Air Force Intelligence and Naval Intelligence or Army Intelligence. So you've got another institution without solving the problem and only making it worse creating another layer similar to the current establishment of the Director of National Intelligence, Mr. Negroponte. The concept, okay, you can defend the concept, but the implementation is ridiculous.

Q: Well, with Zumwalt one of the things I believe came about during his time, he had been there before, but there had been considerable problems, a racial problem on some of the carriers. I think I was Consul General in Athens at the time when the John F. Kennedy had some sort of an incident. The crews on some of the major ships were racially divided. Was that a problem?

CELLA: That was before my time. They had a major problem in San Diego as I recall. Yes, there were some racial problems in the Navy that led to some very unpleasant incidents, but exactly what inspired those problems and exactly how they were managed was before my time. I can recall discussing the San Diego case with Zumwalt's Navy physician. He would accompany Zumwalt on his trips abroad. He was my roommate on those trips, but I can't really shed any light on that. I can tell you that he was very interested in social issues and was criticized for his policies; beer in the barracks and beards and sometimes giving commands to officers normally be too junior for those commands. He had a squadron, a destroyer squadron, in the Mediterranean that was commanded by a Lieutenant Commander or Commander instead of a Captain. He was a progressive guy, saw the social composition of the country changing, and believed there was a need to change to change with it if the Navy was to succeed. Many of the old guard, a lot of senior naval officers, were very much opposed to Zumwalt and very disloyal to him and did their best to defeat his policies. The reason he relaxed in 1970 was that he understood that as an all-volunteer force, the Navy had to change. During his time I think it's correct to say that the Navy was the only branch of the service that regularly made or exceeded recruiting rolls and regularly got its major weapons systems approved and moving along. He was very successful in that regard.

I can remember I was in Oran, Algeria when Time magazine had a cover story on Zumwalt and Zumwalt got to be Chief of Naval Operations. I think he was 40, I don't know he was the youngest chief of naval operations in the history of the U.S. Navy. [NOTE: 49 on appointment as CNO.] He jumped ahead of I think it was 32 more senior admirals to be named CNO. In the process he incurred I think, a fair amount of wrath and jealousy. As I understand it the way Zumwalt got to be CNO he had had a fairly ordinary career through the rank of Captain. As Captain he went to work for Paul Nitze who was

then Secretary of the Navy. Nitze was very much taken with Zumwalt, his personality and intellect. We all know if you want to get to the top you usually need somebody pushing you. Nitze was instrumental in the flowering of Zumwalt's Navy career from that point on.

Before being named Chief of Naval Operations he was commander of naval forces in Vietnam. The new Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird comes out to Vietnam for a series of briefings including one given by Zumwalt on Naval operations in Vietnam. And as I understand the story, Zumwalt had in his pocket three different briefings depending on how he saw sized up Laird's attitude. One of the briefings he had was Vietnamization and that's the briefing he gave, talking about turning more and more tasks over to the Vietnamese Navy, trying to reduce the American profile in Vietnam as much as possible. I think he really believed in that. I have forgotten what the themes of the other two briefings were. As I recall the story which was told to me by an aide Zumwalt saw what Laird was in the mood for and what he wanted to give anyway and so he did the Vietnamization. Laird like that, Vietnamization was made Laird's own, the Administration's own idea, and Zumwalt was made shortly thereafter CNO.

Now, as I said earlier he had tremendous feeling for Vietnam veterans. He also had a tremendous feeling for Vietnam per se, he thought that we had really screwed things up royally there and in the process had screwed our many Vietnamese allies who at great risks themselves were very loyal to the United States. Finally, when Saigon fell I was still working for Zumwalt's successor, Admiral Hallwey, as political adviser to the chief of naval operations. Saigon was falling. Zumwalt had an office over at the Navy Yard. I used to go see him about once a week and bring him up to date on what was going on and discuss within various international developments. He calls me to his office at the Washington Navy Yard and he says, "Glenn, I wonder if you could help me get a message to Admiral Chan. Admiral Chan was the Vietnamese CNO, the head of the Vietnamese Navy. I had met and got to know a bit Admiral Chan and his senior aide. I flew with him on one occasion up to the Navy War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He struck me as really first-class guy. Zumwalt calls me and he says, "I need your help getting a message to Admiral Chan." I said, "Oh well, I'm not sure what I can do, but I'll be happy to give it a try. Why me? Why don't you go through the offices of Naval Intelligence, go through the Attaché in Saigon? I'm happy to do what I can for you, Admiral, but I would think you've got resources in a far better position than me sitting here in the Roslyn, Virginia." He said, "Well, they're not too interested in me being helpful." What happens, of course, is after Zumwalt is no longer CNO people aren't too interested in being helpful to him. People were jealous of him, but I think the word was out that if you were still on active duty you didn't necessarily want to be a conspicuous channel to Bud Zumwalt.

I called this guy at the State Department Operations Center and said I'm trying to get a message to the head of the Vietnamese Navy. The FSO in the Operations Center at the State Department said, "Well, we only have one phone lines to the embassy in Saigon. I'm not sure what I can do but," he said, "I met Admiral Zumwalt in Vietnam one time and he impressed me as being a really terrific guy so I will be happy to be helpful to him

if I can be. We've got this one line, one working line." This is another example of Zumwalt's charm. Here's an FSO and he meets him one time and remembers him to the extent that four or five years later he's willing to go out of his way with no obvious gain to himself to try and help the Admiral out. Well, he calls me back and said, "Well, I managed to get word to the Naval Attaché and he said he would do what he could."

If you were Vietnamese and you wanted to get out of Vietnam in these terrible last days, you needed a U. S. sponsor. The message Zumwalt conveyed to Chan via me, the Operations Center, the Naval Attach in Saigon was that he, Zumwalt who was not a wealthy guy by any stretch of the imagination, would sponsor. He was in the Navy and had brought up and raised four children. His father had been a surgeon or a doctor in the U.S. Public Health Service so he was a man of relatively modest means. The message to Chan was, I will sponsor you and anybody else from your family or circle of friends into the United States. Zumwalt wound up sponsoring 32 Vietnamese including Admiral Chan. That's the kind of guy he was. I remember one of the Admiral's sons came out for only a couple of days and went back to Vietnam. Chan or one of his sons or both of them decided they would go back to Vietnam. Zumwalt wound up sponsoring a whole bunch.

Q: I met him in Vietnam too about a ship that was hijacked to Cambodia. After Zumwalt left, you worked for Admiral Holloway?

CELLA: Yes. He was Admiral Zumwalt's successor. Again the Navy was the only service whose chief had a State Department political adviser. By the way, when Zumwalt established the position I think Seymour Weiss was the head of the Bureau of Political Military Affairs. I had known Sy Weise, again going back to my earliest days at the State Department. He said to Zumwalt I'd like to send you a political adviser who said, "Great." He said I'd be happy to give you your choice of ambassadors, senior officers. He said, "No, no. I want an astute middle grade officer." It was kind of instructive in Zumwalt's mind where the average service guy and service chief would want an ambassador for prestige purposes, the more noted the ambassador the better. Zumwalt said, "I don't need an ambassador to get me access. People take my calls. I've got high level access. I need somebody who knows people that I don't know, that I don't have access to, and who knows what's really going on." Again we're talking about the Nixon-Kissinger years when Washington wasn't as loony as it is today but it was almost as loony, total paranoia, and what was visible in terms of the tip of the iceberg, what was really going on was all beneath the sea. So, Zumwalt wanted somebody again who would get him access to people he did not have access to and who had worthwhile things to say. He could get the official line anytime he wanted it but what's really going on.

Q: You were with Holloway from when to when?

CELLA: Holloway replaces Zumwalt and he keeps me on as political adviser and I actually was with him one year, from '74 to '75. He told me I could stay on as long as he did. He was happy to have me there. As I mentioned earlier, the difference was between the lightning and a lightning bug. Admiral Holloway, it was hard to imagine how he could be more different than Zumwalt was in his approach to being chief of naval

operations. Initially, I was in a way eager to work for Admiral Holloway because I owed my college education to his father.

Q: I was going to say, his father was the Holloway Plan.

CELLA: When he was Chief of Naval Personnel he established the so-called Holloway Plan which is a program that provided NROTC scholarships to selective high school seniors with a view to using those people as a resource for supplementing the career naval officer corps, supplementing the officers provided by Annapolis. They needed roughly twice what Annapolis was capable of producing. Under that program I received my college education. It was an excellent program, you couldn't ask for a better scholarship. In my case it covered everything except haircuts; books, room and board, uniforms, lab fee; a tremendous scholarship.

I talked earlier about Zumwalt's revolutionary approach to naval personnel matters generated by his belief that the Navy had to change especially at a time of an all volunteer force. The Navy was the most tradition bound, conservative of all the services, in my judgment. For sure, it was pretty conservative and tradition bound when I was in it. Whether it topped the Army, I can't say for sure. It was for many senior naval officers, hard to come to grips with the idea that the Chief of Naval Operations would have a Foreign Service Officer, a State Department guy, a middle ranking State Department guy, privy to all the deliberations, discussions and thoughts on, involving international affairs, home porting and on and on when Zumwalt would have a meeting with a foreign official, military or civilian. And again, he was a very active guy. He had lots of meetings with foreign officials, frequently I would be the only other person in the room. I was always the note taker. I produced the background paper on the meeting, what was going to be all about, its objectives and that sort of thing. The Navy staff as background for a 15 minute meeting would produce a loose-leaf binder two inches thick. I tried to keep my memo one page or two pages tops. I know he always read my memos, I don't think he read through every binder he was given.

There was a lot of built in resentment and discomfort, not with me personally, maybe there was that too, but with this position. That was understandable. When it was first established, my predecessor Don Gelber could have had an office on E Ring at the Pentagon where all the senior military had their offices, right down the hall from Zumwalt's own office, or he was offered space over in Roslyn in offices maintained in a building right next to where FSI used to be for something called the CNO’s Executive Panel. The CNO’s Executive Panel was something established by Zumwalt and consisted of 15 people or so who would meet every couple of months for a couple of days to discuss various issues and to receive briefings. The CNO’s Executive Panel mainly was from the private sector although there were some people in government, including people like Alfred Wohlstetter, the University of Chicago academic. One of the government guys on the panel was Hal Sonnenfeldt, an old buddy of Henry Kissinger's. The purpose of this group was to give Zumwalt an outside source of advice, a sounding board. He would receive briefings on weapons and all kinds of stuff and we would talk about economic issues, resource issues, and military strategic issues. The purpose was to give

Zumwalt a source of outside advice, a sounding board and a way to keep up with what was really going on, another source of intelligence, if you will. It was a small staff of uniformed naval officers in a suite of offices in Roslyn who provided the staff work for the CNO's Executive Panel. Gelber decided to just informally attach himself to this group. Why did he do that? Don Gelber is a very smart guy. Normally, you'd say, God you want to be in the Pentagon? Well, Gelber correctly understood that he wanted to be as invisible as possible because of the resentment and unease problem. He didn't want to be rubbing people's noses in it, as it were. He understood that Roslyn wasn't that far away, that we had a minibus on call, and if there was a problem we could always get a sedan from the CNOs motor pool to take us back and forth. It took 10 minutes or so to get over there depending on the traffic. Remoteness wasn't a problem in terms of contact and providing and doing your job, and it was an advantage in as I say putting a little bit of the barrier between any resistance to the position and the position itself.

When Admiral Zumwalt would travel abroad, depending on the mission and purpose, he would normally take four or five people. They would be the Admiral, his Navy physician, a terrific guy and a great diplomat in his own way, one of his aides, either his Navy aide or his Marine aide and me, and depending upon the situation, his spouse. Four or five people and that would be it.

I remember another insight into Zumwalt's approach to things. We were at a naval commanders' conference in Newport, Rhode Island. It was a meeting that brought together heads of navies from around the world, there were about 30 or 35 or so. This is shortly before the October 73 war broke out in the Middle East. Zumwalt was due to go to France as a guest of the head of the French Navy and the official invitation provided for four people which included accommodations at a good hotel, about a week touring naval installations in France, a great trip. Zumwalt's office sends a telegram to the Naval Attaché in Paris saying here's the official party, responding to the French invitation. The Naval Attaché in Paris sends a private, an "eyes only" telegram back to Zumwalt saying that the French would probably have trouble seeing a civilian, Cella, as part of the party. They probably wouldn't understand that, suggesting in effect that I either not come or at least not be listed as one of the group of four, which is his aide, his wife, himself and me. So the telegram comes into Newport and the Marine aide happens to be the one who gets it and before he shows it to Zumwalt even though it's marked for Zumwalt only, he shows it to me. He says, "What do you think?" I said, "Well, I'll tell you what I think. The French being the French, would certainly say if he wants to bring Walt Disney, Dumbo The Elephant, he's allowed to bring a total of four, it's his call." And I said, "Also, the French being the French were aware of the fact that I was a civilian a hidden factor in conversations they might want to have with his Zumwalt or that Zumwalt might want to have them. They were really supremely capable of telling me to stay the hell out of the room and making that known. So Zumwalt's aide drafts a reply and Zumwalt signs off on it that simply says, "Cella is coming". A proud moment but then the fricken war breaks out and the trip was canceled.

Anyway, Holloway, I used to say he wasn't like Sugar Ray Robinson, he didn't need a big entourage. When the Chief of Naval Operations goes abroad there are all kinds of people

who would love to go with him. With Zumwalt it was usually four; with Holloway 10, 15. He had the Vice Chief of Naval Operations for this, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations for that. The Navy has its own political military structure and a rather sizable one. I, in effect was a one-man counterpart for 50, 5 not 50, 250, 300 people including a bunch of admirals. They would always try to get on trips to be seen with the lead man. By the time I arrived it was already established, Zumwalt's approach. Zumwalt leaves, Holloway is in, and the straphangers return. Holloway doesn't know how to say no. I don't mean to be critical, he was a nice man and he was very nice to me personally. His wife was totally charming. Holloway was clearly very uncomfortable because the Navy establishment was uncomfortable and he was the Navy establishment. Zumwalt was comfortable with me because he was anything but the Navy establishment. What counted with him was effectiveness. What counted with Holloway was appearance. Zumwalt liked to talk about international affairs and what was going on and what we should be doing. What about Ethiopia and Japan, nuclear weapons, all kinds of stuff. Holloway was uncomfortable with these subjects. Whereas Zumwalt would meet with a foreign dignitary, there would be a real discussion. Holloway preferred to absorb time with recounting stories from his past. Some of them, if I thought about it I heard so often I could probably recount them; about taking a carrier through the Suez Canal or a stormy night in Hong Kong. He absorbs the time by reminiscing. Zumwalt didn't absorb time or rather he absorbed it by listening. His technique was to have in mind what he really wants out of the interlocutor, ask the right questions and then be done with it. So it was a totally different atmosphere. Again, because Holloway didn't know how to say no I could have stayed there for the whole four years that he was CNO. After about a month or two the job wasn't fun, well, it was okay. It was interesting. It still had access to all kinds of information. He wasn't really comfortable having me there and wasn't really making much use of my ability, such as they were, so I let it be known that come June at the end of two years, June of 1975 I would be ready for another assignment.

Holloway's staff was sort of a reflection of him as well. It was totally different from the Zumwalt operation. One of the things I did, one of my roles on foreign trips, was his gifts adviser. The CNO had a gift locker with all kinds of, we're not talking Rolexes, but Seth Thomas clocks, colonial Williamsburg pieces, a variety of fairly good quality mementos. I would be asked by the aide who was managing the trip, either the Marine aide or the Navy aide, a Marine Lieutenant Colonel and a Navy Commander who were his principal aides as opposed to executive assistant. When he was doing a trip he would say, "Well, Glenn, what do you think would be appropriate for so-and-so and Mrs. so-and-so or whomever?" I would say, "Well, what we got? You say here's the inventory and I'd say okay. We'll give them that.

Holloway comes in and we are with his team and we're going off for a trip to Tehran, this was before the fall of the Shah, and Mrs. Holloway was going along as the guest of the head of the Iranian Navy. Holloway's Marine aide, a very nice guy but fairly young and inexperienced, he asked about the gift. I said, "Well for sure don't include a, it looked like it had been there for 50 years, they had a package in clear plastic four apertif goblets that were silver-plate and incredibly tarnished. I said, "Don't include that, whatever you do. Leave that behind. No one of us could give that to anyone, least of all to an Iranian given

the magnificence of their metal work. You don't want to give them this even if it was in perfect, shiny condition."

I wound up writing a letter from Mrs. Holloway, drafting a letter to be signed by Mrs. Holloway to the wife of the head of the Iranian Navy explaining why she wound up with four tarnished miniature aperitif goblets and advising on an item to be sent as a replacement. That's kind of a convoluted story but it sort of sums up the difference between Holloway's operation and Zumwalt's operation.

Q: With the Holloway operation did you get involved in the evacuation of Vietnam? The Navy had a big operation getting our people out and did that get you because I would have thought that would have been a foreign affairs operation. So many civilians and all.

CELLA: No. I was not involved in any way. Then in 1975 I ended up going to Vienna, Austria as a member of the U.S. delegation to a multilateral conventional arms control negotiation.

Q: You have something you wanted to add before we move on.

CELLA: Yes. I would like to make an addendum to material we went over concerning my time between 1971 and '73 as political military affairs officer on the Israeli desk. It concerns the affair of the USS Liberty.

The USS Liberty was an electronic and communications surveillance or spy ship if you will, which was attacked by Israeli surface and air forces on the 8th of June, 1967 off the coast of Gaza during the early days of the Six-Day War. While I was on the desk, the Liberty matter came up from time to time, for example whenever Golda Meir or some other senior Israeli official was in Washington which was fairly frequently. There was a fine lawyer in the legal affairs division of the State Department, who had the Liberty portfolio. He would regularly come up to see me prior to such high level visits to seek my assistance in getting some talking points into the Secretary's briefing book concerning the Liberty to urge the Secretary of State, then William Rogers, to raise the Liberty issue with the Israelis and it concerned the matter of compensation. After the attack on the Liberty, the Israelis moved rather quickly to settle personnel claims involving the 30 some odd sailors who were killed and 170 wounded, actually it was 34 men were killed during the June eighth attack and 170 wounded. I believe the settlement involved those families of the 34 deceased. In any case, the Israelis moved rather quickly to settle personal claims but totally stonewalled on claims for material damages. As I recall they typically offered the equivalent of one melin**(?)** on the dollar which we do not accept. The Israeli line was that they really couldn't determine what would be fair recompense for the material damages to the vessel without an actually inspecting the vessel. By 1971 when I joined the Israeli desk the Liberty had been sold for scrap and the Israelis were aware of that. In any case, it was clear that the upper levels of the U. S. government had no interest in raising with the Israelis these claims for material damages.

Toward the end of my tour on the Israeli desk the Freedom of Information Act was passed. The first freedom of information case to reach the Israeli desk concerned a petition to obtain the Liberty file. Since this was obviously a political military affairs matter, I was asked to take action on the petition. The petition was authored by a gentleman who lived up in Connecticut and his name escapes me. [Note: Norman Dacey] He made a lot of money off of a book called How To Avoid Probate. He asked for access to the Liberty file and specifically the file that emerged from the court of inquiry which was held on the island of Malta. The file was, as I recall, top-secret and I went over with a Navy captain, he might have been a commander and the two of us spent the day going through the file. After the attack the Liberty had been escorted to Malta for emergency repairs. It was during this time the court of inquiry was convened under the leadership or chairmanship of the Admiral Isaac Kidd. The file was in some ways as revealing for what it did not contain as for what it contained, it seemed to both the Navy captain and myself. There was a lot of material that had either been excised from the file or was never in the file or never came up in the proceedings which we would have thought very germane to a thorough investigation of this rather significant incident.

There was also a lot of interesting material in the file. The file made it clear that the attack occurred at midday on a perfectly clear sunny day as one is prone to find the eastern Mediterranean regularly in the month of June, that the attack was preceded by aerial reconnaissance by the Israelis, that the attack occurred in repeated waves, first from the air and later from the sea, high-speed patrol boats or gunboats followed up the initial air attack with an attack from the sea.

Interestingly, the hits were concentrated in three main areas; the bridge area, the after steering area of the ship, which is the emergency steering mechanism which all navy ships have, and the communications spaces where the sophisticated electronic and communication surveillance equipment was contained. Most of the dead if I recall correctly were in fact communications and electronics surveillance personnel. So it struck both the Navy captain and myself that the attack was indeed highly focused, designed to immobilize the ship and to take out those people most likely to have knowledge gained through surveillance, knowledge which maybe the Israelis did not want to share with other folks.

The ship flew holiday colors, had an American flag about the size of four large bed sheets stitched together. Again it was a perfectly clear day. The Israelis claimed that the ship was mistaken for an Egyptian vessel. Well, in Egyptian order of battle there was one ship that bore something of a resemblance to the Liberty in fairness, but it would be hard for me anyway, to accept the fact that misidentification could have happened repeatedly, again, several waves of attack occurred which I found rather significant on a perfectly clear day.

The file also contained a message that was sent from Washington on about the fifth of June, I don't recall exactly but shortly before the attack warning the Liberty away from the Gaza Coast. This message which should have gone through Naval Communications Station Asmara in Ethiopia was instead routed through the naval communications station

in the Philippines. The court of inquiry file contained no explanation for why this happened, just simply stated as fact that this message had never arrived in a timely fashion because it had been misrouted in the wrong direction around the world. It was just a curiosity, there are many curiosities about the Liberty case.

The captain and I were convinced that this in fact had to have been a deliberate attack. It had never been properly explained. The Liberty has ever since struck me as emblematic of the U.S.'s real relationship which is portrayed these days as an alliance but that never has matched in my definition of an alliance. It strikes me also that all these years later repeated efforts to get to the bottom of the case, there have been films made and there have been petitions to Congress and a lot of high-level backing for a full and thorough exploration of Liberty, those attempts have all been thwarted.

The Navy captain and I were quite pleased to authorize the release of the entire file. Somewhat to our surprise it indeed was released to this guy up in Connecticut who subsequently, about a year later, a couple of years later he finally produced a two-part series on the Liberty which appeared in Penthouse magazine of all things, which left me thoroughly disappointed because we thought we had given him basically a gold mine of material with which to write a provocative article, one which might have served national interests but instead he went off on several tangents. I can't remember any details. All I remember is that the two-part series was terrible.

Q: In this you are talking about when Israeli leaders came to the United States, you said they would practically commute. Did we have a special way of dealing with them as far as the desk was concerned as compared to someone on the French desk or the Egyptian desk or something?

CELLA: It's a little bit hard for me to respond because the Israeli Desk was the only geographic desk on which I ever served during my time with the Department of State. For sure, everything about Israel was different.

Quickly on the Liberty, if Canada had done what the Israelis did, there would have been hell to pay in Congress, in the press, throughout the country. I developed what I call "the Canada rule" when for example, you read about the Pollock spy case. Substitute Canada for Israel and imagine how the media, the Congress and the public would react. With that said, it obviously follows that Israel in my experience was always a special case in all respects. For the high-level visit we would prepare the briefing books, the talking points, the issues papers just as any other desk would prepare documents for any other high-level visitor. These went forward but you never had the feeling to the extent that they were at all, might give offense to the Israelis, they rarely were used, rarely were drawn upon. The Israelis always had a way to thwart any attempt to hold their feet to the fire on any particular issue or any attempt to block what they wanted in terms of say, military supplies or that sort of thing.

I don't remember discussing what we were doing on the Israeli Desk earlier. I know I mentioned the Director during my time was a man by the name of Haywood Stackhouse,

and I do remember saying how uncanny he was at reading Israeli political tea leaves and forecasting elections. In those days elections were pretty much a foregone conclusion in many cases. Anyway, I think I mentioned Stackhouse somewhat to my surprise retired prematurely rather than go on to Bordeaux as Consul General, an assignment he had coveted. The day he told me, I ran into him in the State Department lobby, that he told me he was leaving, he had just turned 50, I believe. He said he decided he wanted to leave while he was still young enough to possibly do something relevant in his life. I have no doubt that one of the things that inspired him to hit the street much earlier than he had to was his frustration with the perversion of American Middle East policy in ways that were demonstrably contra to U.S. interests.

Q: Let's move on to, you are off to Vienna when?

CELLA: I went off to Vienna in June or July of 1975.

Q: Tell me, what was the feeling when you were assigned there about these conventional arms negotiations with the Soviets? I mean these had been going on for years. At that point was there a feeling there might be something or was this just marking time?

CELLA: They hadn't been going on for years when I joined the negotiations. They started in 1973, I joined in 1975 so they had been going on for a little over two years. I would say the American perspective on the negotiations existed at two levels. One level, well, two levels and then for the bulk of the American U.S. government they didn't. Nobody really cared much about these talks. Nobody paid much attention to them. There was a small coterie of MBFR specialists who took great interest in them and there was a political interest in the negotiations. I think that for this small band of devotees, there was a lot of enthusiasm for MBFR, great belief in the enterprise and a lot of zeal and diligence and energy expended in trying to make the talks successful. A much larger group was highly cynical with regard to the talks and some did not want them to go anywhere, did not think they were in the best interests of the United States.

Persisting with his amendment, Senator [Mansfield] we can't do it unilaterally which would undercut, we share your goal of reducing the size of and cost of U.S. military presence in Europe but it would be irresponsible to do so so long as there is a hope that we could exact something from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in return. For the cynics the MBFR (mutual and balanced force reduction in Europe) negotiation was viewed, the talks really wouldn't go anywhere, that the Soviets were not about to respond favorably to the NATO position. The talks were officially between NATO countries and Warsaw Pact countries with military forces stationed in the so-called NATO guidelines area, which is essentially Central Europe and would have resulted in for the largest part, reductions in U.S. and Soviet forces since they were the largest forces based in that area. A lot of people felt, who took any interest in the enterprise, that the Soviets would never accede to the Western offer/demands and that the NATO side would never accede to the Soviet offer/demands. The head of the U.S. delegation at that time was Ambassador Stanley Reaser, a former Secretary of the Army during the Vietnam era.

A personal aside; this may be unfair and I acknowledge that. Reaser had a number, eight or 10 children, quite a few children, many of whom were male and none of whom served in Vietnam. He had been quite hawkish on Vietnam and somehow I got the impression that his MBFR crusade, and he was a true believer, was at least in part to atone for some of his positions he took during the Vietnam era. You saw similar conduct in the case of say Paul Warnke, former Secretary of the Navy. Ambassador Reaser was a great believer in the negotiation and his deputy, Jonathan Dean who had led the U.S. delegation at the preparatory talks which laid the groundwork for the negotiations, was a very determined and energetic, extremely bright individual who was thoroughly dedicated to getting an agreement. His view was that this might take a long, long time but it's worth doing. It's worth stabilizing the military confrontation in Central Europe.

The head and deputy head of our delegation in Vienna were strong supporters and great believers that the enterprise was worth pursuing, with energy and diligence. I think the majority of people working on MBFR either in Vienna under the leadership or back in Washington were highly skeptical. I just alluded to the grounds for skepticism, mainly that we would never offer enough to induce the Soviets into an agreement and vice versa. It should be recalled that MBFR set up shop in 1973 as a balancing act to the so-called CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) which was an East-West negotiation devoted to what might be called economic, social and political issues. It led to the Helsinki Accords. The Soviets were interested in pursuing it as a way of legitimating the status quo in Eastern Europe. In return, the Soviets agreed to the MBFR negotiations as a military balance wheel to the political, economic and social side. We were interested in trying to put the brakes on the Warsaw Pact military machine.

Throughout my time, one of the reasons why I was personally skeptical about MBFR reaching a successful conclusion was that it struck me the negotiations gave the Soviets about as much as they could've hoped to get have gotten out of an agreement without having to agree to any obligations on their side. What do I mean by that? One of the purposes of MBFR was to sustain the U.S. military involvement in Europe. I believe the Soviets in kind of a curious way were eager for that to continue to be the case as well. While I became highly skeptical about Soviet candor, I do believe that they legitimately feared the Germans, as strange as that may seem. In my conversations with Soviet and other Eastern European delegation members in Vienna I came away personally convinced that the even though it seemed to go against reason it did not go against history. The Soviets saw the Americans, their view of the American military presence in Europe was, of course, multifaceted. One facet was here was a break or a check on potential German substantial remilitarization and possible revival of German expansionism. While an agreement would have codified the U.S. military presence in Europe, the negotiation itself could be more less be counted upon to sustain the American military presence ala, as I mentioned earlier, blocking a Mansfield-like amendment or movement.

Secondly, an agreement would have involved the Soviets in Western or NATO military affairs, something they would like to be involved in. Negotiating in being also gave them an opportunity to comment on Western military developments and to some degree involve themselves in Western military affairs, again without any obligation on their side.

Thirdly, the negotiation in being provided a platform for the Soviets to sow dissension among the NATO allies which was something very desirable from their point of view and available to them without any sort of obligation on their side. It struck me while I was in Vienna that the Soviets indeed used MBFR to the best of their ability to go after issues that were neuralgic on the Allied side. For example, the Soviets wanted to get a specific limit on German forces, something the Germans did not want to give them. What we offered them was a collective limit so that there would be a ceiling above which the total NATO conventional force could not go but how the forces were disaggregated was a matter for NATO and the individual countries to decide. On the other hand, the Dutch, for example, would have been perfectly happy to have a limit on German forces. They couldn't come out and say that because that would be contrary to NATO position but you didn't have to be an Arnold Toynbee to understand why the Dutch might be happy with a limit on German forces. For example, in bilateral conversation the Eastern side would portray or would convey a much softer approach to a Dutch interlocutor than to a German interlocutor. They would say different things to different nationalities. This created a fair amount of friction. Of course, the Soviets were perfectly happy with that.

Q: One of the things you said about Soviet view was to keep the United States in. One of the phrases that was often said about NATO was to keep the Soviets out, the Americans in and the Germans down.

CELLA: Right.

Q: And in a way it got to a point where the Soviets were quite happy with that. Much of what we wanted in a way.

CELLA: That's quite true.

Q: What was your, what were you doing? In the first place, you were there from when to when?

CELLA: From the summer of ‘75 to the summer of ‘78.

Q: What slice of the pie did you have and how did you operate?

CELLA: My principal responsibilities were twofold; one, I was there to coordinate the Western position at the so-called working level. The second responsibility was to do standard reporting on the negotiation. I would do a weekly roundup, highlights of what transpired that week, and I would coordinate and do much of it myself reporting of bilateral conversations involving the Eastern and Western delegations. I also helped with preparing press statements, questions and answers in anticipation of opening an end of round press conferences and contributed on an ad hoc basis to all sorts of projects.

I suppose I should have begun by explaining how the negotiations were organized. There were several negotiations a year with recesses in between. There would be a spring, late

winter spring round, late spring or early summer round, and a fall, late winter round, so there were three rounds as I recall a year. The rounds would open with a plenary statement delivered by the East and a preliminary statement delivered by the West in the Hofburg in downtown Vienna, a very wonderful room. There would always be a press conference on either side at the opening of each round. During a regular week there would be a so-called informal session that would take place on a Tuesday and a plenary session took place on Thursday.

Early in the so-called preliminary talks between the East and West designed to set up or to reach agreement based on the objectives of the negotiations and how they would be organized, the Soviets made a very aggressive attempt to get the U.S. to agree to, in effect, a US/Soviet condominium, a vehicle for reaching an agreement over the heads of the Western Allies. As I said earlier, Jonathan Dean, commonly known as Jock Dean, was the head of the US delegation. He was always viewed as one of the more eager persons on the Western side for an agreement so to his credit he resisted the Soviet blandishments to informally agree that the U.S. and Soviets would devise a mechanism to cut out anybody else and get an agreement that suited them and then shove it down the throats of their respective allies.

When the actual negotiation began, it was clear that we were not going to make much headway in so-called plenary sessions where you had the heads of delegation on each side seated around a big round table discussing the East-West security issues. Such a forum was simply too unwieldy quite apart from any other considerations to get very far so the system instituted informal sessions. They were called informal because they were outside the formal plenary construct of the negotiation. At these informal sessions, there would be a representative or head of delegation from the Soviet side and the U.S. side always. On the Eastern side three delegations would be represented. These meetings took place on Tuesdays. There would be heads of two other delegations on either side. As I recall, on our side, the Western and NATO side always the U.S., always either the UK or Germany, the Federal Republic, and then the third member of the NATO team would be drawn from one of the other delegations on a rotating basis. The idea was that with a small group which included the core players would be able to discuss things much more freely and with much more real give and take that could happen in the plenary context. These always took place on Tuesday. Usually there were three topics delivered by either side. Each side would choose what topics they wanted to raise and there would be three areas for discussion.

Further, on the organizational side, the western group coordinated their work through meetings at two levels; one involved the ambassadors themselves usually several times a week to discuss tactics, developments, to report on bilateral conversations that had taken place since the last meeting involving members of their delegations with members of the eastern delegations and to approve statements made by the western side, talking points for the Tuesday informal sessions and the text for the Thursday plenary session and any major press statements.

Below the ambassadorial group there was a so-called working group. Among the other Western delegations there would be either the number two or number three from each of the delegations. I was the U.S. representative at the working group. Our principal job was to reach at the working level agreement on the text of plenary statements to be made by the Western representative. Where we couldn't get full agreement to illuminate areas of disagreement, bracketed text would show areas where we had not been able to reach a full agreement and to further illuminate the reasons why differences had not been resolved at the so-called working level and would be kicked up to the ambassadors to resolve those differences, to reach an agreed text to be presented to these. So part of my job was to make sure that at the working level we got the best possible text in terms of U.S. objectives for reference for final approval to the ambassadors. That was the heart of my responsibilities involving coordination of the Allied position.

Q: Was it part of the OIP or how did you do it?

CELLA: I said that my two major areas of responsibility, one was reporting and one was coordinating at the working level the Western position in negotiations. I did the latter by participation and representing the U.S. in the so-called MBFR working group. On the reporting side I would do a summary of the Western plenary statement, a summary of the Eastern plenary statement. The full text would go under cover of an air gram.

I'd do a weekly roundup in which I would include a summary of what went on in our week's informal session, briefly summing up what was said in the plenary session by the East and West. I would include any press developments, public affairs developments that seemed to be of any significance, and I would include anything else that might have happened that had a bearing on the negotiations. My purpose for this weekly report, the way I viewed it, was to provide in one document taken in totality the history of the negotiation where there would at least be a signpost to any significant development in the negotiation. This to provide in one single telegram a document that officers at other missions responsible for following MBFR with a coherent way of keeping track of what was happening in the negotiations without having to wade through the ton of documents that would be cranked out every week. The full text of the three hour informal session, the full text of an hour's worth of plenary statements, the full text of press conferences and press statements and so on. My purpose was to provide a checklist for anyone, anywhere interested in MBFR who, looking at that would say oh, I need to know more about that. Well, they would be able to find out more if they wanted.

Q: What about our delegation? The usual rule of thumb is the military doesn't want to give a damn thing and the State Department wants to concentrate on the issues. How was this played on your delegation?

CELLA: Well, we were a fairly compatible group. I must say I certainly enjoyed my time in Vienna if for nothing else for the opportunity to go to the Vienna State Opera at low cost. We used to go standing costs for $.50 and to see terrific opera. For three years I would put up with almost anything. In fact, I had to put up with Jock Dean, but that's another story. I was able to do that.

Looked at one way, it was a pretty sorry operation. Back to the rule of thumb, during my time in the State Department I knew plenty of pretty hard-line guys of whom I was sort of one. The notion that we are ready to give up everything, it's crazy, misguided, does the State Department a disservice and our inability to counter that notion more effectively is a prime example of just how feckless the Foreign Service can be unfortunately, in defending its own interests and projecting a proper public image. As regard to the military not wanting to give up anything, it depends. That sort of generalization obscures the reality. I think often the Air Force would be happy to give up tanks and the army would be happy to give up the fighter jets so as long as they got more tanks the Air Force got more jet fighters. They just don't want to give up anything pertinent to their service.

Q: But you didn't have the equivalent of a man by the name of General Rowney at the SALT talks who was just adamant, I mean, represented sort of the ghost at the banquet or something.

CELLA: That's an area I know far less about although I know a little bit about it. One of the things, Rowney was there to keep an eye on Kissinger who was ready to give up too much. I mean, to the extent you might criticize the role played by Rowney, you have to understand that role could be largely justified in terms of the behavior of Henry Kissinger who was duplicitous and not to be trusted with good reason.

Q: Well, it was also a handy negotiating device to do this. Good cop/bad cop type of thing.

CELLA: Yes, but I don't think, it may have been used that way. Again, I don't know enough about the real workings.

Q: But there wasn't that type of thing going on?

CELLA: Well, there was and there wasn't. The State Department was in charge of the delegation. There were senior representatives from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The ACDA representative, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a two star general, a fairly senior two star general and the office of the Secretary of Defense was represented by a senior civilian. All these each of these, and of course, there was a fairly senior CIA analytical presence and Defense Intelligence Agency analytical presence fully justified to support the negotiation because we were after all, discussing orders of battle and all sorts of technical and military matters. Each of the senior advisers had their own staff and while on the surface everything was rather cordial, Reasor and Dean, the head and deputy head of the delegation were always suspected of possibly making a deal that the military wouldn't want or that the Secretary of Defense might not want and that the ACDA person may or may not be happy with. There was a lot going on underneath the surface where there was back channel reporting on what Reaser and Dean might be up to. We had a classified secure phone link. You would see the DOD (the Office of Secretary of Defense) delegation and the Joint Chiefs delegation, one of their guys would be rushing to get on

the phone to get back home with the latest report on just what might be going on. I think as far as the outside was concerned it was a fairly unified front, but inside there was a lot of suspicion and distrust. I think most of it, I won't say it was groundless, but it really would've been pretty difficult for anyone to pull off something that one of the major component parts didn't want to see happen.

Q: Did you feel the hand of Henry Kissinger there or was this sort of a side show for him?

CELLA: Yes, sideshow. He was probably disdainful of the negotiation. When Carter came into office there was this great hope that now someone high-level would begin to take interest in the negotiation. My sense of the Kissinger approach was that it was a sideshow and not worthy of his time or attention. That it wasn't going to go anywhere so he didn't need to pay much attention.

Q: How did you and maybe your colleagues see the Soviets, the Soviet delegation, because I have had people say that during the nuclear negotiations the Soviet military got unhappy because our delegation was saying where they had their stuff and their civilians weren't cleared to know what our intelligence knew, that type of thing. Did you see a difference there or not?

CELLA: That sort of thing would not be something I would really have a bird's eye view on. The Soviet delegation, their military, their chief military guy during my time was indeed a hard-line guy. On the civilian side at the top they were also fairly hard line. The number two guy during much of the time I was there projected a much more reasonable approach to the issues. On the Soviet side when I first got there during the plenary talks the head of the Soviet delegation was a fellow who wound up in a principled negotiation later on, on the intermediate range nuclear negotiation in Europe. Clearly a sharp guy, I can't remember if he went into the first round. Again this is before my time. When I was there the number one was named Klestov, Oleg Klestov, the number two was Smirnov. I think these guys both were senior members of the Communist party Politburo. Anyway, they were senior guys.

About midway through my time Smirnov was replaced by a much more junior individual and later on Klestov was replaced by Ambassador Terasov. Klestov had fairly easy personality whereas Terasov was pretty much your cookie-cutter, stony Soviet functionary. I have no idea if this is a valid supposition, but it occurred to me when Klestov left that said that the Soviets had written off any chance there would be any agreement. Terasov was clearly old line, don't go a quarter of an inch over it. You didn't have the thrill of possible breakthrough rippling through the MBFR community as often under Klestov's time. It was always an occasion when he dangled out there which suggested well, maybe the Soviets will agree to a key demand.

Whether the Soviet military might have been unhappy with details being revealed the MBFR case was a contrary problem. They never would come clean on the details on their order of battle. In my judgment the negotiations, whatever chance they might have had in

those days of reaching some sort of a reasonably break through, foundered when the East finally responded to our insistence on the so-called data issue. What's the data issue? Well, if you're going to talk about reducing or capping military forces in Central Europe you have to know what you're talking about, mainly the numbers. We kept pressing the East to come forward with the actual order or the numbers of uniformed military within the NATO guidelines area in Central Europe on the Warsaw Pact side of the line. They resisted that and when they finally did cough up some figures, they were substantially different from the figures we had. Here I go back to one of the core issues, in my judgment one of the core problems with MBFR, is that it was a negotiation centered primarily on counting bodies in uniform. Well, bodies in uniform do not necessarily provide a good common measure of military capability. It's what the bodies in military uniform do and what they are equipped with that counts. The MBFR was a personnel centered negotiation.

Before we went into the negotiation, the intelligence community, and here I'm not speaking of personal experience because this was before my time but what I'm doing is conveying my best recollection and my understanding of the situation 30 plus years ago. The intelligence community did not spend a lot of resources doing headcounts. It was capability they were interested in. Headcounts are fine too, but you have a collection of resources, where are you going to concentrate? Well, you're going to concentrate on stuff that can really harm you.

When the MBFR negotiating program was designed our the intelligence community was asked well, how many forces are there on the Warsaw Pact side? Their initial estimate was not too far off from the number of people on the NATO side. That helped to inspire the notion that a negotiation based essentially on headcounts might work out because there wasn't that big of a difference.

In late ‘72 or ‘73 the intelligence community decided maybe they would task outside, I’m not sure where the impetus came. Well, we really wanted to pin down this number. Then they started spending the resources and time to count people in uniform. They discovered that there were all kinds of units, construction units, railroad troops, people that from a Western view would not be considered really military but in Eastern view they were military. One of the problems, of course, among many in the MBFR was agreeing on, does this unit count? Do the Dutch Marines count as ground forces or don't they? All of a sudden the Western side was confronted right off the bat with a mission impossible, where they thought it was a disparity of say 50,000 between East and West, it was more like a disparity of 250,000. So are you talking about reduction on the order of say one and a third for one, you're not talking about reductions of four for one, which was a much harder thing to sell. We were stuck with a number centric negotiating position and when we started to really count seriously and thoroughly the Eastern forces we found out were a hell of a lot more than had been originally anticipated. The military threat wasn't any different. Most of these additional people hadn't been counted because we just didn't pay much attention to certain functions whether the person was in uniform or not. Again it’s military capability that counted. So we're insisting on, the Eastern side, to put down their numbers knowing full well that we didn't want that but you had to have it. So again

you're locked with, the MBFR was replete with lunacy. We informally said, I know that senior U.S. officials said to senior Russians, when you put your number down make sure it's a good number. If you don't do that then we're going to have a real problem. Finally, I have to go back to look at the record, but during my time in MBFR the Eastern side, Warsaw Pact side, puts down their data. There's great anticipation for the numbers. We needed their numbers but on the other hand, there's also fear that they might not be the right numbers. Well, in fact, they weren't the right numbers. That happened about midway through my time in MBFR and that impasse, for the first half of my three years there was an impasse because they wouldn't put down numbers, the second half of my time there was an impasse because they put down the wrong numbers. After they put down these wrong numbers we spent, in the informal sessions, week after week on the western side asking questions. Well, did you leave out of the count cross-eyed people or bald people or people with Hodgkin's, trying to figure out a way to account for this disparity. During my time there, none of the Eastern responses ever managed to explain away the disparity.

We were talking about détente and concerned about war breaking out and the powers of MDFR. I'm not sure if that's where we began.

Q: You didn't feel that. How did we feel about the situation? Were we going to go to war? Was war a possibility? Was this is a concern, an immediate concern of trying to stop that?

CELLA: Again we're talking about the period of 1973 to 1975 and at that time we were still very much in the, I would say the Golden Age. Détente was very much in the air, very much in vogue. There was always a concern of course, that you have two usually antagonistic sides, both heavily armed, each with the capacity to annihilate the other, that there could be some kind of miscalculation that could create a serious problem. It was obviously always a possibility more than just a theoretical one, one that I considered rather remote. I personally was much more relaxed in Vienna in 1974 than I am here in Washington, DC in 2006 in terms of the overall world situation and the dangers contained therein. Nevertheless, I think that there was an eagerness if we could do it, to stabilize the military situation because who knows? Détente would not necessarily last forever, and it made sense if one could do it to stabilize the situation and create possibilities to reduce defense expenditures.

Q: Did we see the Soviet military capability as being something that could go right through Western Europe and did we see it somewhat limited? How did we see it? The so-called actual military threat of what they had at that time?

CELLA: My personal view is that they had a very substantial military but, I thought they also had fairly substantial weaknesses including the reliability of their Warsaw Pact allies. I always felt that in terms of basic cohesion that while the NATO side or the NATO situation was far from ideal, it was far superior to the Soviet/Warsaw Pact side. To put it another way, I felt I could always be more confident in the direction in which the Federal Republic of Germany forces would point their rifles than the Soviets could be

about Polish forces. One big advantage they had was an issue in MBFR and one which the Soviets never truly acknowledged. They did have a geographic advantage in that they had an enormous strategic depth which helped undo Hitler in the Second World War whereas we faced the potential for a breakthrough in North or northern Germany or central Germany to the North Sea which would create real military problems in an eventual war for NATO. That was something that could not be left out of account. I believed if you took all factors into account NATO was going to be in a good position, and I was not particularly nervous. There's no doubt that I was also skeptical of détente because I felt that détente was always played by the Soviets more for advantage than for trying to reach equitable agreements. I recounted earlier my impression that Kissinger's love of détente was born of his personal suspicion that the West was sliding downhill and we had to make agreements with the Soviets from our position at that time rather than later on because inevitably it was going to get weaker. I think the Soviet sensed that and sensed that Kissinger was more ego bound. His ego was bound up in everything. I think the Soviets felt that the pace of détente was sharper.

Q: One last question on this particular topic. Your relationship with Jonathan AKA Jock Dean? You implied that he was a difficult person or something like that. Talk about Jock Dean and your dealings with him and how you felt he operated. He was a major figure in European negotiations on various things including Berlin.

CELLA: Yes he was. A very interesting and very intelligent man. Let me begin by explaining how I wound up getting involved with Jock Dean. It was the spring of 1975. I was still Political Adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Holloway. I was in a great position to be vis-à-vis the State Department personnel system. I sometimes wonder if system is dignifying it too much to call it a system. I was working for the Chief of Naval Operations, I could stay there as long as I wanted. He was not about to get rid of me. The State Department was not about to tell the Chief of Naval Operations that he could not have the person of his choice in the position of Political Adviser. At the same time Admiral Holloway was far different from Admiral Zumwalt. Admiral Zumwalt was a dynamic guy, a man interested in doing things and very interested in international affairs whereas Holloway was much more a traditionalist. I think he shared the view of the naval establishment that the Chief of Naval Operations really didn't need somebody from the Department of State on his staff. However, he was also a real gentleman and he was not about to fire me, but the job had become substantially less interesting than it had been under Admiral Zumwalt so I was ready to move on.

I wanted to move on to a place and at a time of my choosing. Since on the books I was coming to the end of what would normally be a two-year tour I had gotten calls from personnel asking if I would be interested in this assignment or that assignment, all of them having to do with the Middle East. I remember Ambassador Murphy flattered me a great deal by trying to recruit me to come out to Damascus to be his number two, Dick Murphy whom I had known from our days together in NEA, the Near East South Asian Bureau. One of the last positions I was offered was Political Counselor in Beirut. I went over to see the chap in charge of the Middle East assignments. By now he was getting a little bit annoyed at me because he saw, by his likes, me turning down one plum

assignment, desirable assignment after another. Now comes Political Counselor in Beirut which was regarded as a choice assignment in the Middle East. I told him I was not too interested, and he asked me to come over and see him, which I did, and I proceeded to explain to him why I wasn't interested. I said, "I'm not interested for several reasons. The first is that unlike many others up until now I have withheld my prediction that chaos was about to be unleashed in Lebanon. I am now making that prediction. This was in I think April of 1975 just before the very beginning of the very long disastrous civil war. I said I'm not particularly interested in being in the midst of what I believe will be a long and bloody civil war. And I'm not interested all the more because unfortunately, I think our policy in the Mideast is totally bankrupt. I could not in good conscience defend it to anyone and I have now reached a level of seniority where I would be expected to go to the Foreign Ministry for example, and explain why you should trust us yet again on our latest effort to bring peace to the area or what have you. I think the policy is thoroughly bankrupt. There's no way I can defend it. I am not going to expose myself and certainly not expose my family to what I see will be the dangers, the increasing personal danger in the area, resulting from our years of this bankrupt policy, our years of misguided action and behavior. So you can forget about me for any assignment to the Middle East. I don't want to make your job more difficult than necessary, but I'm not interested in returning to that part of the world. So leaving that bridge in flames I decided I wanted to pursue an opportunity to go to Europe which I had always wanted to do. Of course, I was not part of the European clan so there was little hope of my really getting a decent assignment in the European area. Enter Jock Dean.

I happened to be at a swearing-in ceremony, this is in the mid spring of 1975, for Ambassador Sy Weiss who I have known for many years and was off to be our Ambassador to the Bahamas. And at that swearing-in ceremony I ran into Alan Ford whom I had known going back twenty years in the Political Military Affairs Bureau. Alan at that time was involved with senior assignments in the Office of Personnel. I told Alan about my interest and he asked me what I was doing and I explained to him what I was not doing was not returning to the Arab world. He asked, "Well what would you like to do?" "Well, I would like to go to Europe but I, of course, don't have the proper connections." He said, "Well, I might have something for you. We're looking for a relatively senior Political Officer to go to Vienna to be part of our MBFR team there." I said, "I would love to go Vienna. I'm a music lover, and I know some German and for a whole bunch of reasons Vienna was a very attractive destination." I said, "Sure I'd be interested in going there and have a rough knowledge of the MBFR negotiation from my time with the Chief of Naval Operations although that was not the main occupation of his. We did get all the considerable telegraphic and airgram traffic involving the negotiations, and I would occasionally glance at that material. So I had a rough knowledge of the subject. I said I'm surprised I would have an opportunity to go to Vienna. He said, "You'd have to work for Jock Dean." I knew the name, but that's all I knew about Jock Dean. He said, "Quite frankly, a lot of people are not particularly eager to go work for Jock Dean." I said, "Okay. You can put me on the list of those interested." He said, "Well, it would be as of now a list of one. If you want the assignment, you can probably get it."

Even if Alan had not issued that warning, I would have done some research anyway. I proceeded to ask people who didn't know John Dean or knew about him what they thought of my going to work for him. I consulted either directly or indirectly about 20 people. The verdict was near unanimous that I'd be crazy to work for a man who had a reputation for being a career assassin. Two or three people said they thought I could manage the situation. They didn't urge me not to go. They said if I did go and it didn't work out, I shouldn't blame them. The count was 17 dead against and three, we think you can survive but if you don't, don't blame us. Well, in a way that made the position more intriguing, and I let Alan Ford know that I was still interested in being a candidate.

Shortly thereafter, it was probably in May, Jock was in Washington and he interviewed me. I went to see him and I said to him after the usual pleasantries, "Well, Mr. Dean, a lot of people out there, based on my research suggest that I'm crazy to be even be in the same room with you, never mind putting my future career fate in your hands" and he said, "Oh, is that so?" I explained to him about my research, and I didn't identify my sources but I told him that I had about 20 people consulted either directly or indirectly, indirectly via friends of friends and that sort of thing that the verdict was 17 against and three maybes but it was strictly my call. I think Jock found my boldness a little bit amusing and to compact the story he wound up approving my nomination. A month or so later I was off to Vienna.

You asked about working with Jock. We got along very well in many respects. I did have a problem which I never totally erased which cropped up almost from day one. One of my jobs was to coordinate at the so-called working level of Western position in the MBFR negotiations. The fellow I replaced, I'll leave his name out, was thoroughly detested by everybody on the other Allied delegations because of his high-handed, somewhat arrogant comportment. He was a guy who would bring back what Jock wanted at any price. There was no compromise in him. He would use often high-handed tactics to get what he wanted. I moved into that position and I quickly sensed what the problem was. At an early meeting of the so-called working group the number twos or threes of the other Allied delegations, I can't remember what the issue was, but it was very contentious. It ent on and on and I was getting slammed at from all sides. As is not atypical, the U.S. position on whatever the issue was, was somewhat different from the position of most of the other allies. After the meeting one of my fiercest interlocutors came up to me and he said, "Mr. Cella, I just want you to know that what went on in there today and there were certain difficulties between you and I, there was nothing personal in it. I think you were the object of a lot of frustration that had built up over the behavior of your predecessor."

I decided that I would try to have the best possible relations with my Allied colleagues while maintaining the U.S. position. When I saw room for compromise I was not going to insist literally, getting every single word in that Jock Dean thought should be in a particular plenary statement. I guess word got back to Jock that the other Allied delegations were finding me a welcome breath of fresh air, a welcome change in demeanor. I hadn't been out there in Vienna very long when Jock calls me up to his office and says, "Cella. You're not here to win a popularity contest." I said, "Well, I'm pretty

well aware of that" and he said, "Well, I want to make sure you knew that." I said, "Well, as I see it Mr. Dean I'm here to uphold the U.S. position, advance U.S. interests which ideally are in parallel with overall Western Allied interests, and if I can accomplish that and still maintain a certain amount of stability in my relations with my Allied colleagues, that's what I intend to do." Jock had gotten the idea that I was too interested in being liked and not interested enough in advancing our very rigorously worked out, intellectual position on given issues.

Shortly thereafter, I was at a cocktail party or a dinner, hosted by the Canadian Ambassador whom I had seen at meetings but we had not previously had a long chat. When early on in the evening during pre-dinner drinks the Canadian Ambassador came over to me and said, "Mr. Cella, I hear that you're a very welcome change in the way your delegation behaves in the working group, and that's very much appreciated and I want you to know that I am going to make that point to Ambassador Reaser and Jock Dean." I said, "Mr. Ambassador, do me a great favor. Don't make that point to either of them. Don't even hint at it."

I could go on with lots of stories about Jock. You know how Foreign Service performance evaluation authors are often accused of being too flowery in the use of language and gilding lilies and that sort of thing. Well, Jock Dean's performance evaluations, at least based on the three that I got from him, were the absolute opposite. They were almost totally bloodless, devoid of adjectives and adverbs and so forth as far as possible. He certainly, at least in my case, did not engage in unduly flowery language with respect to my performance. I can remember my last year with the MBFR negotiation, the evaluation I got that year brings this part of my tale full circle. Jock had put into my draft performance evaluation that I was, I can't really remember the word, was superb, that I was a superb contact person, something like that. Superb at developing fruitful relations with other people. I said, Jesus. Anybody reading this who knows Jock Dean, all you've got to do is see that word superb and I'm in great shape. Obviously, I don't think any of us are ever totally satisfied with how others who evaluate us, but the evaluation could have been I thought, much better. It was fine, again I was banking on the fact that people reading my file that counted, that is to say who had influence over my future promotions and assignments might have some knowledge of Jock Dean and his reputation. In any case, with this final Dean evaluation the word superb, terrific. So I sent it back, the draft back up, made a couple of minor changes that were more factual in nature. Well, when the final version came back, it read the way the draft version read with my changes with one exception, the word superb had dropped out.

I don't think that Jock was being a double dealer in that instance. I think when he reread it, he just gagged on the word "superb". He possibly never used that with reference to any of his underlings in his career and that dropped out.

But I found him an interesting guy, a really bright guy. He would have excelled if he could he have found a job where he could work out of a phone booth or in some space where he didn't really have to deal with other people. A lot of people would find it interesting, really amusing. I can remember one time, the Italian delegation was very

formidable, very impressive, a small delegation, served as both the bilateral delegation for Austria and the MBFR delegation. Of course, Austria is an important country for Italy. The fact that this very small, tiny delegation could perform so well in these negotiations was really impressive. Both the Italian Ambassador and his number two were perfect gentlemen but never hesitated to take on Jock Dean. The Italian delegation had what might be called a hard-line position vis-à-vis MBFR whereas Jock, and I think to some degree unfairly, was suspected along with Ambassador Reaser of being somewhat soft and willing to concede certain Allied interests in an effort to get an agreement with primarily the Soviets. The Italians and Jock would in meetings aimed at hammering out presentations to be made by the West, presentations of the Western position, there would often be fairly intense verbal duels. I remember at one meeting the Italian number two said that something would be said or a formulation would be used over his dead body. His name was Tagianni. Jock said, "Well, much as I would savor the sight of Mr. Tagianni's cadaver, on this one I happen to agree with him." It sounds like, if you were not there, it's sort of a very undiplomatic remark, which it was. It was meant to be a little bit sarcastic, but it was taken in the right way. Mr. Tagianni was up to these sort of thrusts and parodies.

Jock, one of his failings was he thought he could accomplish everything himself. He was a super bright guy. I remember once early on in my time in Vienna when I got together with the CIA guy at the delegation. Everybody had a network and there was all kinds of stuff going on behind the scenes and everybody had a network to stay informed except for Jock Dean. Jock could not keep track of everything and there were things that I would know and my CIA guy would know about what was going on within the delegation, between the delegation and Washington, between the delegation and other delegations where Jock would do well to be informed. We went to a wonderful country inn, I guess it was in mid-December, outside of Vienna. The town had a wonderful little baroque church and Jock was a great fan of the baroque and loved baroque churches. I knew the proprietor of the inn. I had her cook up a roast goose for us and Jock was quite a trencherman and something of a gourmet, very knowledgeable about German wine. His father I believe had been in the wine trade in Connecticut. We took him out for lunch and said in effect, "Jock, hey you need some spies within the delegation to keep up with what's going on." He was not interested in taking us up on the offer, and he made it quite clear that he didn't really need that sort of assistance. I think actually he did. I would say that Jock's number one failing was this belief that he somehow could control everything, but he couldn't. Nobody could control everything no matter what the context. I think in the end I earned his respect and I found him an interesting guy to be around.

I remember one time one of his children said to me, Jock had a number of children, I was speaking well of this child's father and the child said to me, this child was probably in his 20s, "How can you stand working for my father? I said, "Well, for one thing it's never boring and I don't like boredom." A really interesting guy, I respect him in many ways, admire him in many ways.

Q: By the way, I've interviewed Jock. When did you leave the delegation and where did you go?

CELLA: I left the delegation in the summer of 1978 after three years, and I had the good fortune to wind up at U.S. NATO, our delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels as the deputy political adviser there. In the NATO context, head of the political section was called the Polad or the political adviser and his deputy was the deputy Polad so I was the number two in the political section in NATO.

Q: When you say NATO, I mean there are NATOs and NATO's. I mean, this was the military NATO?

CELLA: No, this was the diplomatic NATO, the military Air Force Supreme Allied Command of Europe was somewhat down the road. This was NATO headquarters, NATO's political headquarters where the Secretary-General resides in a dedicated compound between the Brussels airport and downtown Brussels.

Q: And you were there from 1978 until when?

CELLA: I was there from 1978 to 1984.

Q: A long time.

CELLA: Yes. I had two different jobs. My first job was the number two in the political section.

Q: Could you give a little idea of people you were working for and then what you were doing?

CELLA: Well, the head of the Political Section was a gentleman by the name of Norm Wilson so he was my immediate supervisor. I had a lot of contact with the DCM who was a very active fellow, Mike Glitman, who wound up his career as our Ambassador to Belgium some years later. The Ambassador was Tapley (Tap) Bennett.

A lot of issues I dealt directly with Glitman because they were issues he was interested in which Norm Wilson did not have a particularly great interest. I had a number of portfolios. NATO consults on all sorts of subjects and I had among other things the Middle East; the Arab-Israeli situation was one of my portfolios. We were six political officers plus the Polad so it was a seven officer section. I was in charge of administering the section. We did a lot of work at odd hours, making sure we had secretarial coverage, that sort of thing. The division of the actual portfolios was done by Norm Wilson himself. My task with regard to the international side was to be the U.S. representative on something called the Political Committee. In NATO you had the North Atlantic Council consisting of the NATO ambassadors. When I first went there there were 15 member nations. And then you had the Political Committee made up normally of the Political Counselors from the other delegations. In the case of the smaller delegations it would be their number two and in my case I was not the Political Counselor, I was the Deputy Political Counselor, but traditionally with that position went U.S. representation on the

Political Committee. The Political Committee served as a clearinghouse for exchange of information about all sorts of topics. Of course, the primary focus of NATO was the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The Political Committee would normally meet once a week and the meeting would begin with a general exchange of information, either in verbal form or documents that were passed around reporting on various aspects of subjects of interest, political interest to the alliance.

Q: Were the subjects of interest mainly focused on the Soviet Union or were they focused on what's happening within the Alliance?

CELLA: We would report on one another. Events related to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were the primary focus, but we also talked about all sorts of other things. We talked about Kosovo for example, and this was when Tito was still in power in Yugoslavia. We talked about developments within the Chinese leadership, the People's Republic of China. We talked about what's going on in the Horn of Africa. The political developments anywhere in the world that might have some significance for the North Atlantic Alliance and its mission or that might have some significance for individual member states. So, you know, if there was a coup in Argentina, the Belgian delegation might have a particular information on what that might portend for the future of Argentina, and they would share that information with the Alliance. We just cast a very wide net. Again, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union remained the primary focus, but the rest of the world would come up as in the case of say, China, fairly frequently.

NATO served as a venue for experts who would come out from capitals twice a year to consider various parts of the world. Experts would come out to talk about the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and other experts would come out and talk about the Far East. Another group would come out to talk about Latin America, another group would come out and talk about Africa, another group would talk about the Middle East and so there would be five groups of experts that would convene twice a year, usually with people coming from the capital.

In the case of the U.S. for example, the U.S. representative of the expert group dealing with the Soviet Union Eastern Europe was INR's Office Director for that part of the world. So you got fairly senior people who were genuine or should have been genuine experts on the part of the world under consideration. They in turn would produce a report which would be referred to and discussed at the North Atlantic Council, the Ambassadorial Council. This was a mechanism designed to make sure that the Alliance focused on all the parts of the world other than Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union at least twice a year. It was also a mechanism to make sure that trends and developments that might have significance would not go unnoticed in the Alliance. The political committee served as the coordinator of these meetings of experts.

Q: How did we view the "Soviet menace"?

CELLA: This was a time when the strategic arms limitation talks were very much the centerpiece of U.S.- Soviet relations. How did we view officially within the U.S.

government détente, at least pre-Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late ’79? I think up until that event U.S. government policy was one of seeking accommodation and agreement with the Soviet Union. Among the Allies I think opinions varied, but there was a fair amount of concern that we might conceivably sell out Allied interests in our efforts to achieve a bilateral accord with the Soviets. We regularly consulted with the Allies on our position in the strategic arms talks, SALT talks, but I think there was a concern on the part of a number of Allies but perhaps most specifically the Germans, certainly the French, that we might be inclined to go little bit further than we should in conceding points to the Soviets. It had more of a bearing on European security than U.S. security. There was always an undercurrent of mistrust. After the invasion of Afghanistan things changed somewhat. I think during the remainder of my time at NATO the view of the Soviet Union and the Soviet threat was fairly unanimous, fairly consistent. I mean there were some who took a softer approach than others, but in general I think there was broad agreement within the U.S. government, certainly post-Afghanistan. By now we had Mr. Brzezinski who replaced Mr. Kissinger as the chief architect of U.S. foreign policy. His approach was much more robust than that of Henry. I can remember concern that Brzezinski being the first Pole in several centuries could be in a position to do something bad to the Soviet Union would take advantage of that position. So we went from a time under Kissinger where the concern was that we might be too lenient to something of a concern that Brzezinski would take a too hard a line.

Q: Of course, on the other hand, Carter seemed at least when he came in, to be you know, we can get along with the Soviets.

CELLA: In 1978, I can't remember what he wanted specifically, but the DCM, Mike Glitman asked the Political Section to produce an analysis related to the Soviets and arms control. I can't remember what the original charge was. What evolved was an idea that I had for some time and sharpened during what was then only a very few months in NATO. The idea was that many arms control negotiations and we, of course, mentioned Carter and his approach, had all kinds of nuance control negotiations being launched. What often struck me was that in an arms control negotiation the Soviets would frequently pick out something that would be especially neuralgic for our allies and could be calculated to create friction within the Alliance that would not seem to be a salient point of the Soviet position or would not seem to be terribly important to achieve primary objectives, if their objective was to get an equitable agreement. If, on the other hand, the objective was to create problems within the Alliance, that was something else. Let me give you an example: In SALT, they made a big issue out of the limits on the Backfire bomber which was a much more important weapon system within the European context than within a U.S.- Soviet context. In the MBFR negotiations they made a big point about getting more limits on the Wehrmacht, the German army, specific limits, which the Germans were dead set against. The Dutch would have been happy with those limits. Jock Dean, I think, would have accepted those limits. So the Soviet preoccupation with hammering on that point, they would say different things to the Dutch than they would to the Germans in the bilateral talks had me scratching my head. There were so many other things. I could understand why they would want the Germans, the German army limited,

but I couldn't understand the kind of emphasis that they put on that objective given all the other elements in play in MBFR.

At NATO I did a lengthy telegram in response to Glitman's request for something about arms control and the Soviet Union titled the Soviet Approach to Arms Control: Seeking Agreements or Sowing Dissension. In the telegram, with some assistance from my colleagues in the Political Section, we picked out four or six arms control negotiations, MBFR, SALT, were two of them, chemical weapons treaty being another one, where we saw elements in the Soviet position which suggested that a, if not the, primary objective of the Soviets was not to get an agreement but to create problems with our allies. It was an analytical piece that ended with a very humble policy or administrative recommendation. We suggested that if our analysis was deemed to have any merit it might be worthwhile given the huge U.S. arms control bureaucracy to detail one person or assign one person the task of keeping a broad watch on Soviet behavior and arms control negotiations across the board to see if indeed there were patterns. You would think that this would be something we should be doing anyway given the legions of people in the U.S. Government working on arms control issues. As I recall, we labeled the telegram Secret and that wonderful acronym NODIS which is one of the most limited distribution categories you can assign. I don't think the telegram went anywhere other than the State Department and possibly the Department of Defense. It got very limited distribution, a very restrictive classification.

Well, the reaction from Washington was almost instantaneous. The Assistant Secretary for European Affairs called up on the secure phone between NATO headquarters and Washington, called up Mike Glitman on the secure phone to, in effect, read him the riot act. What were we doing sending in such a report? This is at a crucial time in trying to win Congressional approval for SALT agreement, Congressional backing for the SALT agreement. What if this leaked to Congress? Or to the press? Here we were making or mildly suggesting that the Soviet bona fides deserved some scrutiny, and again I thought this was an issue we would want to address in any case. The reaction was to chide us for putting in writing such thoughts at this very sensitive time. I tell the story at some length because I think it's instructive on how the State Department frequently approaches issues, which is to say, if you don't talk about them maybe they won't happen.

For example, if one made a suggestion and maybe this was done, to my knowledge it wasn't, but if somebody made a suggestion say in 1979 that we ought to do a serious analysis of the implications of the U.S. interests in the reunification of Germany. Do we really want Germany reunified? Sure, the Dutch didn't. What does this imply? Such a suggestion might have cost one his or her career. But this is precisely the sort of subject we should have been looking at rather than left to think about it after the fact, after reunification let's say. We wouldn't have opposed reunification. I'm not saying we should have tried to interfere with it, but I am saying is that that's a subject that really should have received before the fact careful and serious consideration. Some issues are too sensitive to talk about. Well, then developing a sound and comprehensive policy can be very difficult if there are certain issues that bear upon your policies that are too sensitive to discuss.

Q: We are dealing of course, with leakage. For example, if you're the American ambassador when it was a real issue: Québec: Is Quebec going to separate? What does it mean for American policy? We should have a position debated, figured out because there was a possibility. But you knew if we did this, that sure as hell, it would get in the press, it would be all over Canada and we would be accused of fomenting of this and all parties in Canada would jump on us for getting involved and for what should be a normal analysis. This is the reality. Sometimes because so much of leakage is not just that people want to know but it's designed to be used as a weapon, to get something, usually to stop something from happening. But there you are, that's Washington.

CELLA: Here I suppose my Pollyanna side will show up. If I was challenged at a press conference or by a question from Parliament or before a congressional committee I'd say, "Look, here's a map. That in itself should tell you why the future of Québec matters a great deal to the United States. Here's a graph which shows you how much of our electric power in the northeastern quadrant of the United States is obtained in Québec. I don't think I have to go any further in justifying why the U.S. government should be seriously interested in the future of Québec. That does not mean that we take sides in what we recognize as essentially a domestic or wholly internal matter. But it does mean is that we try to manage our affairs in the United States in a prudent way and part of prudence is to exercise informed foresight.

Q: Absolutely. But of course, that's unfortunately not the way things work.

CELLA: Well, as I say, that's my Pollyanna side.

Q: Logic says one thing and practice says another.

CELLA: In my telegram, as I recall, the wording was neutral. We did not make a judgment, we just said we think this is something that should be examined. We did not say the Soviets were knaves and liars and that we should flee for our lives rather than enter into an arms control negotiations. We simply said as part of our negotiating strategy this sort of analysis might be of some assistance. It was as mild as it could be but of course, the folks in Congress could take and distort it but then one could resort to the technique that we've recently seen here, declassify the telegrams and here's what it says, here's all it says. There was nothing in the telegram inherently classified. What was classified was the intellectual property.

Q: Did the telegram leak?

CELLA: No. It was funny when the Reagan Administration took over, by then I had moved on from NATO to the NATO international staff. I got a call from Mike Glitman. Turns out he had a right wing nut coming out who had ambitions to become head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and a guy that I knew. He was truly a right wing nut. Mike wanted to know if I could find a copy of that telegram, because he wanted to show it to this guy to prove that the U.S. mission to NATO had not been soft on the

Soviets and soft on arms control issues. I finally located it and I think Mike showed it to the guy who did not become head of ACDA, not to my knowledge.

Q: Again we're talking about the time that you were with this NATO staff. Did the Helsinki Accord which eventually turned out to be very influential, but at that time was it apparent that this was putting the Soviet Union, to opening it up to dissident groups?

CELLA: Well, NATO in general, viewed the Soviet Union with a certain amount of skepticism. CSCE was still kind of in its laughing stock phase. Most of the people at NATO did not see much coming out of CSCE. I mentioned I worked on the Political Committee. One of the functions of the Political Committee was to help coordinate policy on CSCE, exchanges on various CSCE issues.

Q: CSCE being?

CELLA: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or the Helsinki Accords. It was signed as I recall in April of 1975 in Helsinki by Gerry Ford. You can tell a real CSCE scholar and expert if he refers to Gerry Gord because if you look, I've only seen a reproduction of the final document, the signature line, you will see clearly where it's signed as Gerald Ford. He initially started the F in Ford as if he were going to be another G so to test somebody's commitment to CSE and depth of knowledge you mentioned Gerry Gord and see if you get a knowing twinkle in the eye back. In general, the atmosphere within NATO Headquarters was still skeptical. With that said, you did have your CSCE devotees to be found among the allies, more so among the Europeans I think, than among the Americans. I can recall being party to several CSCE review conferences. One was held in Belgrade, another was in Madrid, I'm not sure.

Q: Grossman was there in those two.

CELLA: Our representatives in Belgrade, I think, was Arthur Goldberg, the former Justice. I can recall that people were a little bit unhappy with him, unhappy with the choice, unhappy with his performance referring primarily to our allies because he was too tough on the Soviet Union, whereas hardliners including hardliners among the European allies were very happy with his performance. The general view of CSCE was that it was not going to result in anything in particularly momentous or earth shattering, and people who were very much bound up in CSCE process were suspected of lunacy with one of the big questions being how involved they were with reality.

Still talking about CSCE, when I moved over to the NATO international side, I had a very competent Dutch woman on my staff who knew everyone thing about CSCE. I loved that because again it was a matter for regular consultation within the Political Committee which by then I had become the chairman. I really valued the service of this Dutch woman because I knew on CSCE issues she was like having the Encyclopedia Britannica. It was something I viewed as an even more dismal science than economics. I knew no more about CSCE than I had to. That said, I must say that personally, I began to reflect by the late 70s when I was hearing you could find English-language newspapers, I

don't know if it was the London Times, the International Herald Tribune or whatever in Moscow hotels. The pressure for freer exchange of information and people was slowly building. I've spoken in fairly disparaging terms up until now about CSCE, I began to allow for the very real possibility that the CSCE would be a significant instrument of change in the East-West equation at some point. I think now looking back, it would be easy to exaggerate the influence of CSCE, but for sure it had some significance. I think the basic change in the East-West equation occurred more because of internal forces and inefficiencies than from outside. But there's no doubt that CSCE deserves mentioning in history books.

Q: Particularly in Eastern Europe where it gave some room for dissident forces to join together. It certainly allowed them to and with the Soviet Union getting weaker and weaker because of the essentially economic problems, disillusionment. I mean, these two combined.

CELLA: Specifically in the case of the Soviet Union, I think that Gorbachev recognized that you could not maintain a closed society and have absolute control and still keep up technologically with the West. I think the computer revolution posed a real problem for the Soviet Union because classically a communist state relies upon a monopoly of information as one of the cornerstones of its power. It was becoming technologically, satellite television and the evolution of computer technology, virtually impossible to monopolize information. And, with the overall technological revolution, the pace of technology changed. An absolute monopoly of information even if you could manage that, inevitably would conflict with your ability to compete economically and militarily with the West. So Glasnost and Perestroika. My view of Gorbachev was, once a Communist always a Communist. There was nothing in his background that suggested he was a great lover of liberty, but I think he was a very practical guy. He recognized that they had no choice. I think he sold this whole thing to his military by saying precisely look, to keep up with the West from a technological point of view we have to approach the West in a different way. Once we get our bearings and once we no longer need to have this whole ability then we can get back to behaving the way we always have. I don't think he was a liberalizer out of conviction, I think he was a very pragmatic person. Later on, having tasted liberty and greater freedom he may have decided, yeah, this is pretty good. I don't know. Initially, I always saw him as an extremely formidable potential foe if the West because he was a pragmatist, and I was always aware that the Soviet Union was the glue that held NATO together. Once that glue began to lose its viscosity which is an image I used in the lectures I gave at the time you will inevitably have problems within the alliance.

Q: Let's talk about what you were dealing with, your first job there. Can you describe your impression of the various major delegations. Were there any differences in outlook?

CELLA: Certainly with regard to outlook, and I made several references to distinctions between say the Dutch and the Germans. I'll come back to that point in a moment. In general, as was the case when I first went to MBFR the quality of the NATO delegations was pretty high. There were a few lemons here and there but, for example, at the

ambassadorial level all of the 15 had achieved some sort of distinction prior arriving at NATO, otherwise they wouldn't be there as ambassador, I'd say at least 10 out of the 15 were really, really first rate by any measure. It would change from time to time, but I would almost say that there were times you could say that about 14 or even 15 of the ambassadors were first-rate. Some were more personable than others but the quality of the average NATO ambassador by my lights had to be judged pretty high.

With regard to outlook, let's focus on the Soviet Union. There certainly there were differences. Of course, they were not consistent, they were subject to political change, domestic political change in capitals. Let's pick a point in time. I arrived there in the late or mid '78. At that time, the U.S. was viewed as being somewhat accommodating toward the Soviet Union, the British somewhat more reserved, the Germans very reserved, the Danes accommodating. The Danish Ambassador was interesting. The Ambassador in one his previous assignments had been Ambassador to Moscow. He personally took a rather jaundiced view of the Soviet Union. It was fairly clear that he did not always relish the instructions he got from Copenhagen as regards the formal Danish position on various issues. So you had a mix between those who might be viewed as verging on anti-Soviet, certainly no one would be viewed as being pro-Soviet, and those who were more inclined to take a live and let live approach let's say to East-West relations.

Q: How did you find the French?

CELLA: I enjoy their food and their wine and actually I rather like the French. For one you have to distinguish between the French that you meet in the provinces and let's say the French elite. One might argue that they are an acquired taste. I find them interesting, sometimes infuriating, but they're very interesting people and bright people and have done a lot for culture in the world.

At NATO it was kind of funny. My sense was that the instructions from Paris were always the same, but the way they were put across was a function of the ambassador. At NATO it was almost as if there was a conscious alternating between a very disagreeable ambassador and a very agreeable ambassador, because the instructions never changed but it was the way they were presented. The disagreeable guy would say this is it, we are sticking to it, and we know better than the rest of you so if you don't like that position, tough. The agreeable ambassador would have the same position and he would say, "Well, here's the position of my government." He wouldn't say, "I'm sorry, I got no choice", but he sort of conveyed a little bit of gentlemanly regret that he had to be, that the French had to be the fly in the ointment yet again. The French could be extremely irritating on the basis of personality beyond the basis of their actual position.

The French were perfectly capable of twisting things around to suit their advantage. For example, they had some years back under Charles De Gaulle withdrawn from the military side of the NATO alliance. They did not participate actively on the military side. Therefore, in the North Atlantic Council if you wanted to discuss something where it could be argued was primarily a military matter, the French would sometimes object and say we can't discuss that here. This is a military matter; this is not the proper venue.

However, the French made an exception when it came to air defense issues, and there you could discuss them in the political venues as well as military venues. Why? Because again you look at a map the air defense of France has a lot to do with the air defense of countries that neighbor France. Therefore, the French were perfectly happy to talk about air defense. You would point out this inconsistency, and I forget what the rationale, the French of course, are great at constructing rationales of their behavior.

I think NATO probably made a mistake in being bilingual in French and English. I can understand why when NATO was created, headquartered in Paris why people might've been perfectly happy to have everything in French and English or might've felt it was necessary to do that. However, from a functional point of view and from an economic point of view, big problems. We needed to have translators and interpreters, produce publications in two languages rather than one. There was always a problem with French if the English edition came out before the French edition, and the difference in language could needlessly prolong and complicate issues strictly on a linguistic basis.

I can recall we had a North Atlantic Council ministerial level meeting in Paris in the early ‘80s. NATO would meet, Foreign Ministers, I guess the U.S. Secretary of State, they would gather twice a year as would Defense Ministers. The so-called NATO ministerial meetings, the Spring ministerial in the early ‘80s in Paris. Shultz was there on the U.S. side and I’m trying to remember who the French was. The French Foreign Minister was a pretty agreeable guy. There was always a contentious issue of the day at that particular meeting. What I do remember was approving the final communiqué text. Schulz on the U.S. side and the French counterpart really locked horns and got into a prolonged, fairly heated disagreement which was strictly a matter of language, whereas the English word could be taken one way, and the French word could be taken in a somewhat different way. And I'm sitting there, I was on the international staff of at the time, behind Secretary-General Luns watching this thing go on and on and on and I finally leaned over to the Secretary-General and I said, “Mr. Secretary-General, there is no issue of substance here. There's nothing of principle. It's a matter of language.” A change without changing the meaning would have gotten rid of the problem. And so Luns who was a fairly good linguist said, “Yes, I know but that's the way Ministers are.” I said, “We can't sit here forever. Why don't you point it out and say, Gentlemen, I think we could argue about this language and this is the way I propose to resolve the matter.” I'm sorry I can't give the story more bite by giving you specifically the example. Anyhow, it prolonged the meeting. The Ministers were due to break at around noon time, the press had been alerted, and this stupid disagreement had prolonged meeting for about 45 minutes. The press got the idea that once again NATO Ministers were in turmoil and once again we have trans-Atlantic discord blah, blah, blah. That wasn't the case at all. The meeting had been prolonged because of a silly problem of verbiage.

Q: Did we ever use, the non-French ever use if the subject came up with the French initiated say, well that's really military? In other words, take it out of the hands of the group?

CELLA: I can't give you a specific example but I'm sure there are many where for tactical reasons the French would do all sorts of things which would irritate people. I said, "Well, they're the French" and I had had in my previous experience a lot to do with the French. I don't think any non-Frenchman ever understands the French. Just like I've frequently been struck by the fact that many French don't understand Americans as well as they think they do. I had a pretty good sense of who they were and was willing to accept, warts and all. I had made a number of French national friends, good friends. Yes, they could be terribly devious. They could make these clearly specious arguments or clearly self-serving arguments or clearly arguments contrary to arguments that they made on another issue. They could do that, no problem at all.

Q: Speaking of arguments, were you there or maybe straddled or something when we got into a dispute probably with Germany and some allies over the so-called neutron bomb?

CELLA: That came out while I was still at MBFR. That issue arose I think in 1977. I said at the time that the problem, as is often the case, was with terminology. I said we should refer to it as a property sensitive weapon and that would appease the Dutch immediately. The neutron bomb, that storm had passed by the time I arrived at NATO.

Q: How did you find the Ministerial meetings when they came about? Was this like a predictable earthquake twice a year? Were they taken in stride pretty well?

CELLA: A hell of a lot of work went into preparing for them, but that's probably as it should be. In general, they all had been choreographed before and most of the issues had been sorted out. The basic outline of the communiqué had been worked out before the Ministers actually met. I think they served a worthwhile purpose, and at times they could be quite interesting but again one was rarely surprised.

I will tell you one Ministerial story which might be worth making note of. It's instructive at several levels. It may have been the most free-form in the sense of a spontaneous discussion Ministerial that I attended. It was my very first and it was in the first week of December 1978. Carter was in the White House. Carter, of course, had made human rights a cornerstone of American foreign-policy which I'm not sure was a wise thing to do. The problem with making human rights a prominent pivot point of American diplomacy is that invariably you're going to be selective which means hypocritical. In the fall of 1978 political advisers from the military commands were brought back to Washington. Because NATO political section head was called the POLAD, the POLAD received an invitation to this meeting back in Washington which was a three-day affair. Very well organized, designed to brief everybody or brief the POLADs of whom there were about six or seven; NATO plus various military commands around the world on the principles of Carter foreign and defense policy. The deputy assistant secretary, I think his name was Mark Schneider in the Bureau of Human Rights was the briefer on human rights. He was very articulate guy and went on at some length outlining the Carter Administration's philosophy with regard to human rights. The presentation probably took about a half an hour. He invited questions. I asked the second question which turned out to be the last question. I said, "Thank you very much for this enlightening presentation,

informative presentation. My question is, how does all this apply to Palestinians on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?" Of course, it didn't apply to them. He had a fair amount of difficulty. I can't remember the answer I got, but there wasn't an answer. That ended the meeting. Suddenly he had to go on urgent business elsewhere. My point here is if you're going to put human rights up front, you almost get bound to run into inconsistencies. People who don't agree with your emphasis on human rights will take note of it. I used the example of the West Bank and Gaza. It's a perfect example. Everybody in the rest of the world realizes how hypocritical we are on this point, but you could've used the example of Chile, any number of places.

Well, back to the December 1978 NATO Ministerial. In those days the ministerial took place in two sections. One section consisted of a specific agenda where various decisions had to be taken at Ministerial level; various things had to be approved. Then there was something called the Restricted Session. The Restricted Sessions was restricted to the Ministers plus three. It would normally be a Minister, the Ambassador to NATO, the political director from the foreign ministry and a note taker, usually another fairly senior person. The notion of the Restricted Session grew out of the idea that NATO Ministerials had become too formulaic, too scripted, too confining and there wasn't really a free flow of exchange of ideas from which all might benefit. The way to encourage such a free exchange would be to restrict the number of people in the room. The idea being that the Ministers would be more inclined to express themselves before a more limited audience than before a packed house, as it were. The headline in the International Herald Tribune on the second day of the Ministerial Restricted Session refuted the last, the next to last item. The Ministerial meeting invariably took place on the second day of what was a one and a half day meeting, one full day plus a half day. It usually took place in the morning of the half day. The headline in the International Herald Tribune had to do with Sharansky and Orlovski, the two Soviet Jewish dissidents. I can't remember whether they were being released or being locked up. Anyway, that was the headline. Secretary of State Vance didn't come to the Ministerial, because I think he had to go to Hodding Carter's wedding so he sent his deputy, Warren Christopher, to the meeting. He sends Warren Christopher to the meeting. Now all the Allies knew that Vance was not showing up, was not for reasons of state but social convenience. That's the way we do things. Even a nice polite guy like Cy Vance when it comes to Allied sensitivities, you don't really need to pay much attention to those, do you?

The first guy to speak up at the ministerial session is the Greek. I think he was an Acting Foreign Minister, anyway he was the Greek representative. He said that speaking as a former political prisoner, which he had been under the colonels in Greece so he had pretty good credentials, I would like to note the pitfalls in creating what one might call human rights celebrities. The problem is that this will usually benefit celebrities to the detriment of the thousands of faceless human rights victims. His message was, I care as much about human rights as anybody, but based on experience one should tread carefully in dealing with the subject in a public international context. Every Ambassador or the next 12 Ministers all took a broad swipe at U.S. human rights policy. It was pretty remarkable. In fact, it may have been the most remarkable exchange I sat in on all my time dealing with NATO, both in the MBFR context and at NATO headquarters. The

next-to-last Minister to speak was the British Foreign Secretary David Owen. He proceeds to in essence, staunchly defend the U.S. approach to human rights. He himself was something of an idealist.

After the meeting concluded to his great credit Deputy Secretary Christopher had some time to kill before he had to catch his flight back to Washington. He assembled those of us on the U.S. NATO delegation who worked hard on the meeting, the half dozen of us who had been principally involved in logistics and the substance of the meeting. He had a meeting in the conference room at the U.S. mission headquarters in which he talked a bit about the mood in Washington, the Administration's plans, his vision to the future. Then he asked if any of us had any questions. I asked the second question. I asked Mr. Christopher what he made of the heavy preoccupation with human rights during that morning's Restricted Session. He said, "Well, it just goes to show you that whatever was on the headline of that day's newspaper has a tendency to dominate any conversation." That was his explanation. Then he asked me what I made of it. I said, "Well, given the super polite vernacular that's usually used in NATO deliberation, I found it remarkable." I said that I had never heard such sharp criticism coming from virtually all the Allies addressed at the United States. I had never heard such sharp criticism addressed at any Ally. They have ways of expressing displeasure and unhappiness, but by NATO standards you understand the minuets that are regularly conducted around here. What you witnessed was profound misgivings about the U.S. approach to human rights. To which Warren Christopher responded – I didn't mince my words, I think I retained a proper air of respect but I felt extra strongly that he ought to understand this as something that needs to be addressed. He said, "Well, I think that just shows you that one sort of hears things depending upon how one's personal approach is to a certain issue." In effect he was saying that I probably heard that because I was expecting to hear that.

Well, I wasn't expecting to hear it, because things like that just weren't done and I wasn't expecting to hear it because we had other really big issues cooking. This was in the early days of the nuclear modernization issue, the so-called intermediate nuclear force modernization issue, a number of topics that one could address. To have this two and a half hour meeting that was focused almost exclusively on human rights and so strikingly critical of the naïveté of the U.S. approach was quite remarkable. Anyhow, about three days or four days later thumbing through the U.S. Information Service Wireless File, the Wireless File being a compilation of various media reports of interest to our NATO Mission circulated every weekday morning by the Public Affairs Section in the Mission. I'm thumbing through my morning's copy, and I come across the transcript of Barbara Walters doing a televised tour of the White House with the Carters. Normally, I would not read the transcript. Barbara Walters is considered by some ill-informed people to be one of the sharpest interviewers on U.S. television, very prominent on ABC. She would do sort of specials from time to time drawing upon her expertise at interviewing. This was a pre-Christmas special featuring Jimmy Carter and his wife touring the White House with Barbara. And along with the tour, this is the blue room and this and that, Barbara would interject various questions. I don't know why I read the interview; I would not normally read a Barbara Walters' interview, but this one I happened to start reading. She says to President Carter fairly early on that she has heard that some of the Allies are

very unhappy with the approach the Carter Administration was taking to the question of human rights. Carter's response is “Well, I don't know where you might have heard that but on the contrary we enjoy broad-based support among for example, our NATO allies. In fact, just the other day in an important NATO meeting in Brussels, we received wide Allied endorsement of our human rights policy.”

And again I tell that tale because that's also instructive of how things can go haywire within our government. I'm sure that Christopher did a personal report to Carter in which he gave his impressions of this NATO ministerial meeting and talked about how human rights would be the topic de jure, and who knows what he put in the report. Assuming Carter read it correctly, whatever went into Deputy Secretary Christopher's report conveyed to the President the impression that NATO Ministers warmly embraced his human rights policy. All my talk about human rights, I’m not endorsing it one way or the other, just recounting. I've said though the misgiving I personally have over the way one goes about human rights because inevitably one becomes blank.

Q: What was the impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the crisis in Iran over hostages on NATO? I realize this must have had some impact. And then go on to the SS-20 crisis and the situation. You had two jobs and talk about what the next job was.

CELLA: You suggested that we begin today by examining the impact on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of three events; the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the SS-20 nuclear missile issue.

Before touching on those, let me just add a post script to what I had said previously about my relationship with Ambassador Jonathan Dean. As I came away from our last session it crossed my mind there was one point I would like to make. I think I talked a bit about the perils of working for the man, but there was one from my perspective, tremendous advantage in being associated with him and that he was an extremely precise thinker and extremely precise with the use of words. I always thought of myself as being fairly competent with the English language and a pretty good writer, but I really learned from Jock how to be precise. It is something that helped me a lot personally improving my own communications abilities, but also served me well in supervising others in later years. I am certainly grateful that I had the opportunity to profit from Jock Dean's enormous capabilities.

With regard to the embassy hostage crisis and the Iranian storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran taking a number of embassy staff hostage, that was a subject on which we consulted at NATO. We kept other NATO countries via the consultative mechanism at NATO headquarters apprised of our analysis of the situation. I don't think it ever became a NATO matter per se. One thing it was out of area, and we’ll come back to the out of area issue when we talk about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. So I sensed among the Allies a fair amount of sympathy but a decided tendency to view the issue as a bilateral matter. On the part of individuals who had some area expertise there was a certain feeling that there was great sympathy for the hostages themselves but perhaps a feeling that the overall situation in Iran was something that U.S. policy had helped to bring about so in

that sense the U.S. itself was somewhat responsible for the dilemma in which it found itself in regard to embassy staff who were being held in Tehran.

Afghanistan was a different matter. Here the Soviets were the key actors. Afghanistan too was out of area for the North Atlantic Treaty which brought the Alliance into being and specified very carefully the geographic limits of the applicability of the treaty which required all others to come to the aid of an any individual signatory who might be subject to aggression. Afghanistan lay well outside the NATO area, but the Alliance recognized it could not be indifferent to Soviet presence in that country particularly if it was viewed as a Soviet thrust southward to the sea. If the invasion of Afghanistan was viewed in the context of Soviet activities in for instance, the Horn of Africa or in southern Yemen, one could theorize that the Soviets were looking to establish a power presence in that part of the world with the attendant risk posed to the reliability and the continuity of that area's oil lifeline to the West. The Alliance could not ignore the Afghanistan situation. It led to intense discussion on how to deal with out of area problems, how should the Alliance respond to problems that clearly posed a threat to the interests of the Allies but lay beyond the purview of the treaty itself. Again there was an intense discussion. I think some of the allies were perhaps less energized by the situation than others but, in general, I would have to say the Alliance recognized that this was a problem and searched mightily for ways to address it but never during my time were they able to reach agreement on a really coherent out of area strategy, a really effective mechanism for responding to out of area problems.

My own personal belief is that a major obstacle to getting the other Allies to sign on to U.S. efforts to develop the kind of mechanism I just referred to was an unwillingness to become associated with U.S. policy in the Middle East generally, with which the Allies profoundly disagreed, i.e., even in those days, the late 1970s or early 1980s, was viewed by our allies as a policy overly influenced by Israel and the Israelis. The other allies were very loath to become viewed, especially in the Middle East, through a lens similar to which that the United States was increasingly being viewed. That is, as being willing to tilt decidedly on the side of the Israelis in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Q: As we speak today, NATO is in charge of operations in Afghanistan. Obviously, the world has changed, but it does show where things have changed.

CELLA: Absolutely. My view is, however, that NATO with the widely perceived disappearance of the old Soviet threat, those who favor the alliance are desperately in search of a mission to justify the existence of the Alliance. I'm not sure at the end of the day the NATO presence in Afghanistan will have in fact done overall the Alliance a hell of a lot of good. It depends on how things work out, but one could conceive of public opinion turning against the NATO presence in Afghanistan and reviving the old argument that NATO is actually a puppet that existed to do the U. S. bidding.

Q: Did we see, the thinkers you included, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as being in a way, a diminution of the threat to the West because of its armed forces were engaged out there?

CELLA: Well, as it turned out I think that was clearly the case. At the time as I referred to earlier some analysts viewed the Soviet movement into Afghanistan as an effort to outflank the West to gain or to try and gain a grip on the West's oil jugular. Afghanistan was not principally viewed as a benefit at the time, and the reasons for their move in there; the most nefarious one was the one I just stated, as part of a larger plot. Another possibility was an ideological one, that the Soviets simply couldn't stand to see the failure of a communist regime, that the doctrinaire communists in Moscow for ideological reasons found this totally unacceptable and therefore regardless of the cost backed this move. The flip side of that argument would be from a strategic point of view the Soviets could not allow a potentially, very unfriendly regime to establish itself on their southern border.

Q: Were we looking at the Soviet system at that time and seeing it increasingly run by a geriatric Politburo and was there a concern that it might make decisions based on old men who maybe had lost touch with reality and kept both sides, the East and the West, going at each other?

CELLA: I wouldn't be surprised if some specialists, and I'm far from a Soviet specialist, debated that possibility, entertained that possibility. I don't recall it figuring prominently in NATO deliberations on Soviet policy and intentions. I'm sure people talked about that, but I don't recall it being a major feature of NATO's concern. NATO's concern was just a generalized concern that had been around for many decades. No matter who was in charge or what their age, you had this huge military regime on the one side and this rather significant geographic disadvantage on the other side so that was a problem in and of itself to worry about without trying to analyze or psychoanalyze an aging Soviet leadership.

The reverse of that when Gorbachev came along I said to myself as I said in presentations that I would make about East-West relations and about the Alliance, the reverse concern now is that we have a young dynamic guy to deal with. Those old guys, who were stuck in their old ways of thinking, were sort of predictable. Now we've got this new guy, a guy with some eminent PR skills, conspicuously absent in previous Soviet leaders.

The Soviet threat has always been NATO’s secret glue. On the surface we talk about common ideals, common devotion to democracy and that sort of thing. That's what really bound us together. No, what bound us all together was the Soviet threat that scared the bejesus out of a lot of people who wouldn't necessarily be enthusiastic about an alliance with the United States. It was the Soviet threat that gave the glue that held NATO together, the viscosity. With Gorbachev there was a good chance that he would diminish that viscosity without diminishing the threat. As it turns out it would appear that he did both.

Q: You were in NATO from when to when?

CELLA: I got there the summer of 1978 and left in the summer of 1984. For the first two years, ‘78 to ‘80 I was the number two person in the political section at the U.S. Mission to NATO. The last four years I was the deputy assistant secretary general for political affairs on the NATO international staff.

Q: During that time how did we view Berlin? It seemed like for our lifetime the place where the war was going to start was here. Had things settled down so that this was really off the board?

CELLA: It was never I don't think totally off the board. There was not a great deal of concern and indeed there was in every NATO ministerial communiqué the obligatory reference to German reunification and the Berlin issue but by the time I had gotten there that had become more a ritual and almost, derision is the wrong word, kind of an inside joke. Here comes the obligatory reunification paragraph in the ministerial communiqué. I would say that German issues were not a matter of huge concern at the NATO. I said to myself we should really ask ourselves when we would see this obligatory German reunification mentioned in a NATO ministerial committee, do we really want a reunified Germany? I was pretty convinced the Dutch didn't want that. I thought the U.S. would do well to study with some care the implications of a reunified Germany for U.S. interests. Of course, anyone who would suggest that would do so at his distinct peril because it was complete heresy. I could analyze German reunification. As you know, I'm part German and have relatives that live there to this day. I could analyze it from both a pro and con prospective. It had become a ritualized matter I would say.

Q: How about the SS-20? How serious was this, how did we see it at the time?

CELLA: The SS-20, it's a complicated issue; they're many viewpoints. I only have one, my own but it is far from complete. I can remember when German Chancellor Schmidt gave his presentation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the IISS in London, I believe he gave a presentation in November of 1977. This was in the context of the negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitations that limited Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals through bilateral agreement. Schmidt is certainly a thinker. The guy I think who wrote that part of his presentation was a fellow by the name of Kristof Bertram who went on to become head of IISS. He remains a gifted strategic thinker.

The notion was this. If you have parity at the strategic extremes, any imbalance internally becomes more problematic. That is to say, if the U.S. and the Soviets reached strategic equilibrium vis-à-vis intercontinental nuclear capabilities, but between them there is a nuclear imbalance in weapons of a lesser range, the temptation for the side holding that advantage to use those weapons becomes greater because they feel the threat to their homeland from the United States has been removed. Specifically the SS-20 the Soviet weapons is what we’re talking about and we want to analyze this as the Soviets might see it. Chancellor Schmidt's fear was that with the Soviets having essentially neutralized the nuclear threat from the United States, with the Soviets holding a huge advantage over NATO's other nuclear powers, one of whom was not within by then within the formal

defense establishment i.e., France, the other nuclear power NATO had, the UK, even the combined French-U. K. force would be no match for the Soviet force. You have the U.S. forces taken out of the equation. Meanwhile, and here comes the SS-20, the Soviets introduced new modernized nuclear weapons that could be used within the European theater. Not that they would necessarily use them, but this would provide a source of leverage over the Europeans. Something had to be done to counter that threat. NATO had to modernize its nuclear forces to counter the modernization of the Soviet nuclear forces on the Warsaw pact side in order to maintain stability across the board both at the extremes the U.S. and the Soviet Union and inside the those extremes, i.e. the European Theater.

Schmidt gives a speech and says what I have just said at great length only in a much more coherent, cogent way that with a nuclear balance at the strategic level in place it will be all the more important not to allow any strategic imbalance at the theater level to develop. I remember reading Schmidt's presentation I think in a daily wireless file and I underlined that part. I said, OK, we've got a problem here. Initially, the impetus of counting the SS-20 which was a modernized nuclear forces came from the Europeans, many of whom were very uneasy about SALT anyway and the way the Soviets comported themselves, on the one hand constantly picking on issues that were neuralgic to the Europeans and many saw on the U.S. side a Kissinger who was all too willing to make concessions to the Soviets at the expense of the Europeans. Or as I sometimes would put it, it was fine with Europeans so long as there was going to be the Soviet Union and U.S. fighting a nuclear war over their heads, no problem with nuclear weapons, but once the notion that, hey, we might be involved with nuclear weapons on our soil, both offensively and as a target, then all of a sudden they had nuclear allergy.

I think our first reaction to the problem raised by Schmidt was that there's nothing to worry about, because his argument could be viewed, quite correctly, as an anti-SALT argument. SALT was by no means a done deal politically in this country. SALT had its opponents, Scoop Jackson to name one of the more powerful, more notable ones in the U.S. Senate. The Europeans finally persuaded us that, yes, this should be addressed. There were probably people in the Pentagon who were happy to address this problem, who wanted to modernize NATO's tactical nuclear forces, forces with less than strategic range capability.

I thought at the time that the U.S. made a big mistake in not highlighting the fact that our response with regard to modernizing NATO's theater nuclear forces was prompted by European concern. NATO's nuclear modernization quickly became something driven by the U.S., which made it easier for opponents of NATO's nuclear modernization to rally their forces because there is always lots of latent anti-Americanism. We put ourselves in a situation, and I think maybe we wanted to, maybe there were reasons why we wanted to do that. I couldn't think of any and I'm not aware of any. As I saw it, it was good old U.S. arrogance coming to the fore. Okay, you want to modernize? Do you want to count the SS 20? We'll count the SS 20, but we'll run the show; we took over the issue. Again, I could be convinced otherwise but to this day, I saw no advantage in our allowing this to become viewed as a U.S. initiative, a dangerous U.S. initiative as viewed in some

quarters. Instead of saying, God dammit, we are responding to European concerns. We are not talking about defending Trenton, we are talking about protecting Bremen, and by God, it was a European who thought of the idea in the first place. We didn't do that. With the passage of time as the internal debate, internal discussion within NATO intensified, this was an issue that frequently pitted one or another European against the United States, again, I believe needlessly. But we never moved in the direction we thought from the outset we should have moved. Fine, we'll do it. It does make military sense to do it, but we're doing it in response to the European invitation not at U.S. insistence.

Q: That brings us to the time you were assistant secretary within NATO. You became a NATO official as opposed to an American official.

CELLA: Yes, I did. One other point if I may, to be made on the SS-20 question.

When NATO finally decided in 1979 to move forward with the so-called double track decision, I thought another mistake was made in allowing it to become a double track decision. By double track, the idea was that NATO would yes, go forward with modernization, but at the same time pursue a negotiating track with the Soviets in the hope of getting an agreement which would obviate the need for tactical nuclear modernization. So at the ministerial meeting that approved the decision to modernize nuclear weapons, the U.S. Secretary of State was also commissioned to go to Moscow and offer a negotiation to the Soviets. I thought here the mistake was either modernization made sense in military terms or it didn't. Either it was something that NATO had to do for its own prudent protection, or it was unnecessary. To say we're going to modernize, but we really want, please help us, hold my coat, but don't hold my coat. We'd much rather have a negotiation and that's fine to want to have a negotiation, but to make modernization lean against an arms control negotiation rather than stand upright on its own merits as a prudent military move from the outset made modernization which one could argue with something that the U.S. needed because of geographic disadvantages I referred to earlier in the European theater, that NATO needed, instead of just finding its own right to make it hostage to an arms control negotiation gave the Soviets, in essence, veto power over whether we'd modernize or not. It gave the Soviets control of the situation which I think was a mistake. They could blow hot and cold, they could play European public opinion and it gave them a say in NATO's own military organization.

Q: Was there much debate on these issues? How did the four-year assignment as a NATO official as opposed to an American official come about and what did it mean to you?

CELLA: It gave me four basically great years, in many ways the four best years I spent in the Foreign Service. I was more or less thoroughly outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of State. It came about the way things like personnel assignments frequently come about. For years the Political Division of NATO had as the number two a U.S. Foreign Service Officer who was an Assistant Secretary General of Political Affairs which is the third ranking position in the Alliance. There's the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary General, you had five Assistant Secretaries, the Assistant Secretary

General of whom the Political Affairs Assistant Secretary-General was sort of primus inter pares, NATO being a military alliance but under political control so the third ranking position in the pecking order is the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs who had been, as far back as I can recall at the time, had been a German. I'm not sure that was always the case, and as far back as I can recall his number two had been an American. I completed my first two years at NATO at the same time that the American who had been the Deputy Assistant Secretary General was due to complete his tour in that position.

Q: Who was that?

CELLA: Lucian Heikler was his name, good guy. He was my predecessor on the international staff. I was in line, at least on paper, to become the political advisor, the head of the political section of USNATO, which satisfied me very much. The man in that position was forced to retire because of age, and he had a time in class problem as well. I can't remember if he had been promoted he could've stayed on. Norm Wilson had to leave, and so the position immediately above me in the political section of the U.S. mission was becoming vacant.

Meanwhile, Elliott Richardson who had been our special negotiator for law of the sea matters had a political officer on his staff who was looking for a job and he wound up getting the position of political adviser at NATO. I think, I'm pretty sure, because Tap Bennett, our Ambassador who was quite a pleasant man but was very good at self-appreciation, did that as a favor to Elliott Richardson as a way to strengthen Tap's own position in Elliott's good graces. So I was clearly gypped. I worked hard for years two years propping up the guy who was supposedly my supervisor, and I was told that's why I was being sent there. Here, I'm aced out by another perfectly good fellow, a perfectly fine officer. Meanwhile, there are several candidates who had been nominated to replace Lucian Heikler on the international staff who were turned down by, I think, the Secretary General. In essence they didn't turn them down but they said we want more candidates.

One day Mike Glitman, the NATO DCM comes running into my office. He says, "Glenn, can I get a copy of your CV?" I said, "No, I don't think so." He said, "Can you put one together?" They didn't force me, they didn't put a gun to my head to nominate me as the possible replacement for Lucian Heikler. I think the reason they did that was they had some conscience problems about screwing me. There was no reason I should not have moved up to be head of the political section and a pretty prestigious position, whereas the NATO international staff, who gives a damn about that? From the career point of view it's not hari kari, but it's not too far removed. From the point of view of career advancement if you asked any Foreign Service Officer, would you rather be the number two guy in the Political Affairs Division of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the number one guy in the Political Section of the U.S. mission, a class one mission to NATO, why they would take the latter. Anyhow, I whipped up a CV, my curriculum vitae, and from that day forward I always kept one current.

I go up and he said, “Sure, fine.” I worked under Lucian as the U.S. representative on the political committee which he chaired. I knew him quite well, a good guy, and I talked to him bit about the job. Then I'm up to be interviewed by the Secretary General who at the time was Joseph Luns and his chef d’cabinet, Paul van Kampen. Paul van Kampen was a little bit overweight for the job but about the right size to be a jockey. He was a really feisty guy known to be very, very difficult to deal with. I think van Kampen was probably the guy who put the kibosh on the two or three previous candidates for this position. So I’m sent up to see van Kampen. From a previous time working for the CNO I had met van Kampen on a visit to NATO Headquarters and so I knew a bit about him and what he was like. He was a Dutch fellow. He had an interesting personal background. I gathered he lived a sort of an Ann Frank type existence during the Second World War, a Jew who was hidden away in the Netherlands. Anyway, I knew him from back when I was still working for the CNO and then got to renew his acquaintance when I moved to the U.S. mission to NATO. I got along with van Kampen. I knew that the type of guy he was, and the fact that I had worked for Admiral Zumwalt, that sort of impressed him and, Zumwalt had a close relationship with Luns. I had no problem getting a thumbs-up from van Kampen.

So then I go in and see the Secretary-General, Joseph Luns whom I also knew both from being there at NATO headquarters but prior to that when I worked for the CNO. He said, "Mr. Cella, I have no doubt you're well-qualified for this position, and I would be happy to I think to have you with us. I only have one question. As I understand it, you have very ably represented the U.S. point of view on the NATO political committee. You obviously know U.S. positions on the issues in detail. Do you think you could move one chair over from your current position as the U.S. representative to the chairmanship responsible for the workings of the committee as a whole without having your prior experience, your prior knowledge of U.S. desires interfere with your role as an evenhanded chairman?"

I said, "Mr. Secretary-General, you're quite right. I do know what U. S. instructions are on issues before the Alliance quite well. It's my job. I can tell you in response to your question that many times I would have been delighted to violate those instructions. I don't think my U.S. citizenship and prior experience will unduly influence me in the proper discharge of my duties as someone in the service of all 15 members of the NATO Alliance.”

So a week later I moved over and replaced Lucian Heikler. The official title of the position when I took it was Deputy to the Assistant Secretary General. Fairly early at the first opportunity I don't know if they were rewriting an organizational manual or whatever, I took out the to and made it Deputy Assistant Secretary General. Van Kampen objected strongly to this because this removal as he saw it and as I intended it elevated the prestige of the position.

Q: Oh, absolutely. One is sort of a staff job and the other is a person who stands on his own.

CELLA: Van Kampen fought like hell to keep the to in there, and I made it clear to him that really it logically didn't make any sense because in fact, when the assistant secretary general was away, I was the one who took his place. I was clearly the number two in succession, and that's traditionally what a deputy is and we don't need the "to" in there. I won that. We got rid of the "to".

Q: You were there from when to when?

CELLA: On the international staff from the summer of 1980 until the summer of 1984.

Q: How did you find the different perspective? In the first place, did you begin to look a little differently at the American delegation or enjoy being an outsider?

CELLA: Well, by that time, by the time I moved to the international staff I had been doing multi-lateral diplomacy for five years, and I had a pretty good sense of how we did things which were all too frequently in a ham-handed fashion. Moving over to the international staff I didn't find that particularly a source of new insights in how the U.S. did business in a multilateral context. What I did discover, not to my surprise, but was confirmed to me, every other delegation made far more use of their nationals on the international staff than the U.S. did. Some delegations would go to the point of almost abusing the insights that were available through fellow nationals on the international staff. There was an exception here and there. There were a couple people during my time who didn't quite fit into this mold but, in general, the U.S. made no use of me. If I wanted to be a willing dupe of the United States, I would have to have done so entirely of my own volition and as a volunteer rather than as a recruit.

Q: Was this essentially a bureaucratic, out of sight, out of mind? Or was it just we don't need you?

CELLA: Well, probably a little bit of both. This isn't quite directly related to what you just asked me but it is of a piece with the subject. I've already said that unquestionably being head of the Political Section at the U.S. Mission to NATO as opposed to being the Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs on the NATO international staff, the former was to be, that was the Golden Apple. The other position was perhaps a cherry with a worm in it. But if you think about it, about the State Department in general, I have often felt that the State Department folks didn't really understand bureaucratic power and how to exercise it. If your objective is to become U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, that's one thing. But if your objective is to influence the way the Alliance deals with important issues, would you rather be the U.S. representative on the committee or the chairman of the committee? Who has more power? If it's done right, I would say and obviously I'm prejudiced here, the chairman. The chairman decides whom to call on or which nation to call, the order in which people speak at a meeting can often be important. The chairman provides the overall context of the meeting, introduces the subject. Again, he has to do so in an impartial way but if you're reasonably adept at words, and you can speak French as well as English which is important, the chairman can have an awfully lot of influence on how a meeting goes. If we are talking about a special meeting, he can decide when to call

the meeting, they're just any number of what might be called administrative trivia which really can influence the course of the discussion. I had a reputation I think, of being extremely impartial, but I think also wielded a fair amount of influence on how things turned out on various issues of some significance. That position was a tremendous one and a source of a fair amount of enjoyment along with a bit of frustration here and there. I think the U.S. mentality was that we don't really need anybody else, including our own people. We are going to do it and we'll do it our way. I think a certain price was paid for that.

Q: How would the Secretary-General use you? How were agendas set? How did this work?

CELLA: The Secretary-General first of all for Joe Luns some of the things I was just saying about the United States applied to Joseph Luns. He had been Dutch Foreign Minister, a very tall man. He liked to say he was the only European official who could look Charles de Gaulle straight in the eye. He was an interesting guy. He felt the important stuff he could do on his own. He really didn't need anybody. You didn't spend a lot of time with Joseph Luns discussing the implications of rioting in Kosovo. To the extent there was anything worth knowing about the subject he would already know about it.

The Political Affairs Division was about a 110 people. It had a political section, an economic section, a public affairs section, a press office. NATO has a calendar that is fairly predictable. There's a whole bunch of committees, there is a political committee, there is an economic committee, there was a consultant group on public affairs, public information policy. Many of the decisions taken by the lower level committees were referred to North Atlantic Council, the group of permanent representatives or ambassadors, for a final decision. The Secretary-General would chair the ambassadorial meetings which normally took place once a week except during the summer and the year-end holidays.

The Political Affairs Section would be responsible for providing the speaking brief for the Secretary-General to introduce the various subjects along with background papers explaining the issues and problems. We generated a lot of paper. Well, with Luns, you didn't need to produce a lot of paper. He didn't particularly want a lot of paper, but we would produce what my division was responsible for producing material to support him and his conduct of the affairs at the Ambassadorial Council, the North Atlantic Council.

On the public information side, one of the services we provided for the Secretary-General was to provide him with speeches. He gave a lot of speeches, a speechwriter would prepare talking points. Most of this was actually done within the Political Affairs Division, the speech writing and press talking points. I had been there maybe three or four days, and I had been out of the office and actually was going to the bathroom and returned to find my Anglo-Indian secretary Geraldine, rather agitated saying, “Napoleon wants to see you right away." That was one of the nicknames for van Kampen who is of relatively limited stature and has kind of an officious or imperial manner about him,

“wants to see you immediately.” I said, “Fine.” So I walk down the hall and through the double doors into the Secretary-General’s suite and van Kampen's office. “I understand you want to see me.” "Yes. Where have you been? I need to know where you are at all times. It's a very important position. The secretary didn't know where you were." I said, "Well, Mr. van Kampen, even if you knew where I was, it wouldn't have done you any good unless you had previously had installed in men's room stalls telephones because I was taking a shit, so that's where I was."

I knew van Kampen well enough to know this was a test. He was a little bit like Joe Sisco who is a much taller man who I worked for some years before. If he could bully you, he would. If he couldn't, he would stop because he had enough other targets. Why bother pushing against resistance? This was my test. I never had another problem with him; I passed it perfectly.

The reason he wanted to see me was Luns was going to give a speech, I can't remember where. He had to give a speech someplace and the Political Affairs Division had produced one. I was just coming on board so I don't think it was reviewed at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. I produced a speech in the Political Affairs Section which van Kampen didn't like. And he said, “This is unacceptable.” I don't remember the theme, but I remember it wasn't a particularly good speech. It was written in English by a non-native English speaker. Well, do we consider Canadians native English speakers? I didn't say that. It was a speech whose writer was not particularly gifted, a perfectly intelligent fellow but not particularly gifted at producing text for oral communication. So I said to van Kampen, I agreed with him. It's not particularly good. I'll rewrite it. Maybe I'll take it home tonight and rewrite it and get it back to you in the morning. The event was only a couple of days away. He said, “I don’t want you to have to do it. You’ve got the staff. You don't have to do it.” One of the great things about being in a European diplomatic context is that diplomats are considered to be rather exalted beings and not required to work especially hard at least that’s the way some Europeans look upon it. Over at the U.S. mission you had to work 12 hours a day. If you put in more than eight on the international side well, you would be considered eligible for commitment.

Q: I remember in Germany as a Vice Consul that German employees would look at us officers when we would sit down and say oh, well, I'll type it out. In those days if you would type something out, this was not something that a diplomat did.

CELLA: Van Kaplan says, “You've got your staff over there. Provide some supervision. You don't have to write it.” “No, no. I'd be pleased to write it.” He looked at me like I was crazy. “Why would you want to take on that task particularly when it involved working some extra hours?” I said, “Look, if Glenn Cella says something, who gives a damn? If Joseph Luns says something, people might care. I'm delighted to write speeches for Joseph Luns.” For the next four years I was the principal speechwriter for the Secretary-General.

As a result, I made the front page of the Washington Post, made the op ed page of the International Herald Tribune. Joseph Luns did, but they were my words. Not that they

were necessarily great words, but I wrote them and Luns never changed them. He sometimes would not look at a speech text until he actually delivered it. When he was giving a particularly significant presentation, something I thought was significant I would take underlined text and hand them to my press contacts and say, “I think these are a couple of points that are really worth emphasis. I know the Secretary-General is particularly interested in these." The reason I did that was because on, although Luns was a pretty fair linguist, he had kind of a muffled voice. I don’t want to say he had a speech defect, but he had a way of speaking that wasn't always perfectly clear. That may be because he was using something other than his native language. Maybe in Dutch he was perfectly clear but frequently he would read my text, clearly not familiar with it. He would put the emphasis in the wrong place, the articulation, or the substantive emphasis, the things I wanted to emphasize, he would fly by and then he would emphasize something else. So to make sure my work was not entirely in vain I got in the habit of giving text to my press contacts, underlined text.

Q: It's always been unclear to me and many others that you think of NATO as having so many divisions getting ready to fight the Soviets. But you have this political organization. What was its importance? Was this a substitute for what later became the European Union or what?

CELLA: NATO was a defense alliance, but first and foremost it's a political alliance, an alliance among nation states and national governments, not among national militaries. The function of the political side is to provide guidance to the military. The military arm could not do things on its own volition. I mean it could design a field exercise or something like that, but if you're ever going to deploy NATO forces in anger which did not happen in my time but has happened since in the former Yugoslavia and now in Afghanistan, that's done under the direction of the political side of the house. The political Secretary-General outranks the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, the military chief of the Alliance and so the political side of NATO exists the way in a sense the political side in this country exists vis-à-vis the military and vis-à-vis the defense establishment. They provide the overall political control for military activities conducted by the military component. The military at NATO, the military people who served at NATO headquarters, were fond of emphasizing and in many ways over emphasizing that they served very much under the control of their political masters. I sometimes think that the military guys liked to emphasize political masters almost with a vengeance suggesting if it was up to us we would be firm and robust but we can't be because our political masters won't let us.

Q: How did you find the Secretary-General? He must have been in a constant state of going around. How many countries are there? 15?

CELLA: During my time we added the 16th. Spain joined.

Q: He must've spent an awfully lot of time running around to different countries to sound them out or inform them or what have you.

CELLA: A fair amount. The Secretary-General serves at the pleasure of the 15 or 16 political masters. He did not have constitutionally a lot of power in his own right. What he had was power conferred on him by national governments to perform certain tasks. Depending on who the Secretary-General is and how he conducts himself, he can acquire a certain amount of power just by virtue of his prominence. As you mentioned the Secretary-General traveled fairly frequently within the Alliance for one reason or another. During my time Luns had a watching brief on Cyprus. That was the one substantive issue the Secretary-General was systematically involved. He would periodically consult with the Greeks and the Turks with regard to the problem of Cyprus and try to keep that under control because of the potential of having two NATO allies physically at their throats which they had been at the time of the 1974 Turkish incursion. He would consult periodically and I think make an annual report to the Council on Cyprus, although I may not be right about that. He was not regularly called upon by the governments to perform specific diplomatic tasks.

I think in Luns's case by the time I went to work for him he had become something of a controversial figure. He was very unpopular in the Netherlands, his home country where I suppose he was viewed as too hard line, too much of a cold warrior. He got to be Secretary-General basically because nobody else wanted the job. As I recall the story at a 1971 ministerial meeting he was attending as the Dutch Foreign Minister they were looking for a successor Secretary-General and Luns put up his hand and said, “Well, I'll take it.” He volunteered and whether they wanted him or not, which is not uncommon in NATO behavior, nobody had the gumption to say, “Wait a second. Not so fast.” I guess I gathered there was relief that now we've got somebody. So he became Secretary-General. It was hardly by acclamation. He was a very blunt guy, A lot of Europeans thought he was in the hip pocket of the Americans and he was indeed very much a cold warrior. I knew him pretty well and always had a lot of respect for him. He did operate above the crowd but you could talk to him. He was genuinely devoted to the Alliance; he was friendly to the Americans because he saw the Americans as being absolutely key. He did not have a particularly high regard for the Europeans in general when it came to providing a robust front to the Soviets.

I remember saying to him one day, I think this was in the context of what we were talking about earlier, the SS-20 issue and nuclear modernization issues. I was in his office one day he said, “You know, you Americans, Mr. Cella, think we Europeans are pygmies and you're right. We are pygmies but remember, you made us so.” Luns was pro-American because he understood the signal importance of the U.S. contribution to the Alliance, on the other hand, resentful of the United States because of their role in decolonization. I think he was saying you know, in the right kind of world there would still be a Dutch flag flying over Jakarta.

Meanwhile, the U.S. never made much use of Luns’s basic friendship for our country. We would run around to see him when something had to be done urgently, when we wanted something, a meeting to be called, or whatever on an urgent instructions from Washington. In general, cultivating him. U.S. officials didn't ignore him, they were courteous and respectful to him, but I felt that Luns could have been used much more

effectively as a helpful advocate for U.S. positions. I'm not saying he could have been compromised, but I am saying he could have been cultivated and taken into our confidence a little bit more.

Q: How did you find these meetings? Was it every year or every six months or so?

CELLA: The defense ministers met regularly, every six months and the foreign ministers met regularly every six months. The ministers' meeting, the foreign ministers' meeting would be held in Brussels at NATO headquarters in December and at an allied city in the spring, in May or June. It might be Brussels, they'd meet in Ankara on a rotating basis. The foreign ministers got together for two days or a day and a half every six months.

Q: The foreign ministers were your bag, weren't they? The defense ministers were some body else's?

CELLA: We had a defense planning division that looked after the organization for their meetings.

Q: How did you find the foreign ministerial meetings?

CELLA: I referred in an earlier session to the one where Warren Christopher represented the U.S. when I was still at the U.S. mission and where the U.S. was, I thought, fairly bluntly chastised by all except the British Foreign Minister for our position on human rights, putting so much emphasis on human rights and the way we put the emphasis on it. Warren Christopher was sitting in for Secretary Vance and reported back apparently to Jimmy Carter that the Allies really loved our position on human rights. I guess you get the ministers together and get those egos in the room these events can be dangerous. They've got to be sort of watched over with some care.

The level of discourse during much of the meetings, much of the content of any of the ministerial meetings was choreographed, prepared in advance. They would then simply rubberstamp decisions that were even been taken. That was the right way to do things, it was a very orderly and efficient way to do things. You would see much of the meeting would be pretty pro forma. There were various extent attempts to encourage freer exchange, freer dialogue among the ministers with varying degrees of success. Occasionally exchanges would be interesting, but frequently they were rather disappointing. They were set pieces. Even in a so-called restricted session there were after all 50 or 60 other people in the room. That somehow would greatly inhibit, naturally inhibit, the discussion. I think they were worth doing. Even if the meetings themselves were not terribly scintillating, they served as a focal point to channel the energies of the Alliance into addressing issues that had to be addressed and agreed upon by the Allies. The build up to the ministerial meetings served a worthwhile purpose in providing direction to the energies being expended by people on the national delegations and on the international staff.

I'll tell you one meeting story. You mentioned Reagan. This was a NATO Heads of State meeting held in Bonn in 1982. It was Reagan's first trip over, it might have been his first trip abroad. Anyway his first trip within a NATO context. As part of the buildup, the White House sent over an advance team. The NATO delegation set up a working lunch for the advance team to brief them on various aspects pertinent to Reagan's participation in a NATO heads of state meeting. Michael Deaver was there and I think Meese was there and I think James Baker was there, five or six people at this working lunch. I was invited to brief the visitors on the workings of the International Staff, the role it played, its authority, the limits of its authority. As I recall that luncheon meeting was preceded by a discussion and after lunch a discussion, it probably went on for two hours or so. The staffers from Washington struck me as being pretty indifferent to what was being said.

They were poker-faced and asked maybe zero questions; anyway, they didn't ask a lot of questions. It was kind of a strange meeting. It was almost as if one were dealing with Eskimos. The time finally comes for the meeting in Bonn, and they have a restricted session which meant the principal plus three people of his choice which automatically would be the President or the Secretary of State or the Foreign Minister, the Ambassador, the head of the national delegation of NATO and usually the political director, the number two or three guy in the Foreign Ministry. For most countries that's a fourth person in the meeting.

The meeting was in Bonn on a campus-like setting. I think it was a government establishment, it was a pleasant enough place, a relatively small conference room and it's laid out having the principal and the number two at the head table and two seats behind. I was there as one of the four NATO international staff which is the Secretary-General and his deputy and the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs. I was there as the notetaker. I was the fourth person on the NATO side.

The U.S. delegation comes in and they don't come with four. They come with I don't know eight or nine; Meese, Deaver, a whole crowd of people. Where the hell are you going to sit? You had to scurry around and get some extra chairs and the NATO International Staff section was next to the U.S. delegation. When they come in they expand, and I think Deaver took my seat. I wound up over in the British delegation on a chair that had been added to their group seated behind Margaret Thatcher. It didn't make any difference where I was going to sit because I was going to take notes, and if I had something I had to say to the Secretary-General, I could always get up and get over to him. Everybody else sticks to the rules.

Here's Reagan, he's got the nuclear modernization debate going on. Even though this is now quite a while after he had taken office there were still concerns about just exactly about what does this guy portend and was he going to cause a dustup with the Soviet Union unnecessarily? So there was a lot of interest in what the President was going to say at this meeting. The meeting begins. I can't remember who the lead speaker was. Then Reagan started to speak. He was using talking points and was speaking from a text, and he gives a pretty good pretty damn good presentation, not overly long, says the right things about the Alliance and its importance to the United States and our devotion to

consulting with our allies and our eagerness to promote peace in every way we can. It was a pretty good presentation. I breathed a sigh of relief as a U.S. citizen. Here our worst fears were not realized. Far from it. So it goes around and everybody has his say and there is no real discussion. You asked earlier about the quality of the meetings, but some of the presentations were pretty good. I remember Trudeau spoke last, Pierre Trudeau the Prime Minister of Canada. I had the impression that he was pretty satisfied with his overall qualities. He had a certain air of superiority, of justified superiority that he projected. He, in effect said, "Well, you know, I've been around these things more than most of you other guys," gals because Thatcher was there. I remember being impressed by Thatcher as being someone you wouldn't want to run into in a dark alley, a real hammer. And Trudeau says, "This is just the usual BS. Everybody's set pieces and I don't know if I got anything out of this at all." And I'm thinking to myself well, Trudeau, you're the experienced hand. Why didn't you speak first and break the mold and be stimulating and intellectually challenging? Trudeau has his vent.

And Reagan asks to speak again, and then proceeds to speak with what I presume to be a stump speech that he gave in Orange County where he went on about you know, we mustn't give the communists the rope with which to hang us. It wasn't terrible, but it was a pretty hard-line presentation, more appropriate again to Orange County, California than to Bonn, Germany. It was a U.S. style stump speech for essentially U.S. style conservative audience. He didn't go on forever and was about maybe a 15 minute presentation. About five minutes into it from my vantage point across the room directly opposite me is Chancellor Schmidt seated next to the German NATO Ambassador and I knew the NATO Ambassador pretty well. We had quite a cordial relationship. I see Schmidt lean over. About two minutes into Reagan's second turn at the microphone Schmidt looks up at the ceiling, brings his head back down, turns and whispers something to his Ambassador and the Ambassador whispers something back. Reagan finishes his presentation; Luns calls the meeting to a close.

That evening there was a very pleasant cruise on the Rhine organized by the German government for the senior staff of the various delegations. I go aboard the river steamer, and there right near the point where I board the ship is standing the German Ambassador and Chancellor Schmidt. The German Ambassador says, "Oh, Mr. Cella, how good you could join us, good to see you, your team did its usual excellent job in helping us prepare for this meeting and I want to introduce you to the Chancellor." He introduced Chancellor Schmidt and exchanged a couple of words and I move on.

Later in the evening I had the opportunity to have a few more words with the German Ambassador, only alone this time. First of all I thanked him for making sure I was on the guest list for what was a delightful evening, which it was. I said, "Let me ask you one question. I hope you won't consider me a bit too brash in doing so. I noticed this afternoon when President Reagan was in the middle of his second presentation you had an exchange with the Chancellor. I really would love to know what he said to you and what you said to him." The Ambassador said, "Well, I have no problem discussing this with you. He leaned over and said to me, "What do I do now?" And I said back to him, "Absolutely nothing." That's my NATO heads of state story.

When I was on the international staff we had a ministerial meeting in Rome. The Italian Foreign Minister gave a dinner at a Villa Madonna and built, as the story goes I recall for one of the Italian Popes for a favorite mistress, anyway, a wonderful 16th-century building on a hill commanding a lovely view of Rome. The dining room was decorated with frescoes by Rafael, just a spectacular place. Again, this is a one plus three invitation. They have a table with a set up as a "U". Across the top is the head table the Secretary-General and the ministers and down each leg there are three places set out for the various national delegations and the international staff. I was there. The room was superb. Beautifully set up. The U.S. shows up with like six or seven people instead of three in addition to the Secretary. Where we going to put these people? We had to have this Assistant Secretary and that Assistant Secretary, you know, the usual story had to be in the room. So we wound up eating with those of us who were seated down the legs or the arms of the "U", eating our this wonderful meal cheek by jowl, cramped, our elbows touching our companions' elbows because we had to squeeze in on each side four or five extra seats to make room for the Americans. It can be a very humbling experience to be a representative of the U.S. government or in any way associated with it.

Q: We were talking about your time with NATO. I was wondering if you could talk about what were the major issues during this 1980 to 1984 period that you had to deal with? You mentioned that Cyprus was there, but how did you deal with Cyprus? The other thing is could you talk about the various delegations, particularly the French were a part of this, and I was wondering how they fit into the political side and not on the military side of the situation, but also the Turks and the Greeks. Was there any contact at that time with the Warsaw Pact? Was there any effort to meet something? And any other issues that you might think of.

CELLA: I've already said a fair amount about several of the principal issues during my time. One, nuclear force modernization and two, the tense out of area discussions, NATO's out of area responsibilities which was inspired by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There are others to talk about. Those are two of the main ones.

Q: Let's talk about some of the issues. How about Cyprus during the time you were there? That, of course, brings the Greeks and the Turks into the issue.

CELLA: Cyprus was not an especially active issue, at least at NATO headquarters during my time. We monitored developments there. The Secretary-General had a watching brief and was required to report, I forget if it was annually or every six months on developments impacting the situation on the divided island of Cyprus. He himself personally had as part of a watching brief, had some contacts with senior Greek and Turkish officials. It was not an issue that I was ever really directly involved in. During my time there really wasn't much going on with regard to the Greeks and Turks in general at NATO. Occasionally, there would be a problem. It frequently depended upon personalities more than anything else. Some Greeks were more interested in provoking disputes and making complaints. The Turks, in general, tended to be much more relaxed

about the situation and responded I thought, with great dignity to the occasional Greek provocation.

Their ambassador during my time, Ambassador Rosman Oche, was an extremely accomplished diplomat. My sense, and I knew him pretty well, was that he frequently was not as vigorous as Ankara might have wanted him to be in carrying out his instructions about protesting this naval maneuver or that airspace incursion or what have you. He tended to be as moderate as he could be within his instructions. I found him a man of great forbearance. He certainly had a lot of intellectual skill. I believe it was in his judgment that it made no sense to have needless dustups with the Greeks and that was a posture that I agreed with and sympathized with very much.

On the Greek side again, it was a matter of personalities. In general, their representatives at NATO headquarters conducted themselves rather well. Some did a better job than others. Part of the time Papandreou was the Prime Minister in Athens.

As I recall Andreas was far more agreeable than George but maybe I'm wrong. There was a NATO ministerial meeting maybe in 1981. Andreas was there and he tied the meeting up in knots. I can't remember what the issue was. It was certainly trivial in the grand scheme of things, but it was terribly important to Andreas. I can remember he prolonged the meeting. It was probably a communiqué issue. It took a very long time to finally shut him up and satisfy him. As I recall they had to come back and have a nocturnal meeting after dinner to finally finish the issue. By and large in unkind moments I might be tempted to say a pox on both houses; by and large the Turks were far more statesmanlike than the Greeks.

Q: it was a little bit like the state household acquiring as they did in the 1970s, Katzenjammer kid, the quarreling kids. It was quite a shock to the European system to all of a sudden find these so-called allies, particularly the Greeks because the Turks didn't really care that much about it. They had other fish to fry.

CELLA: Again, I found the Turks much easier to deal with. I had on my staff in the Division of Political Affairs an extremely able Turkish diplomat who was one of the best diplomats I've ever met. He went on subsequently to become Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister and eventually Ambassador to Iran. I lost track of him there. He was just terrific. I discussed Greek-Turkish issues with him a number of times. His approach was rather balanced and he was kind of the antithesis of the stereotype of the Turk, the madman with the handlebar mustache and a scimitar.

With respect to the Turks, I would encourage their delegation, again I was on the international staff, without much success I must say, to be more assertive in talking about the Middle East and what was going on in the Middle East. For example, we would begin our Political Committee meetings with an exchange of views on political subjects where various national representatives would report on matters of general interest to the Alliance. In particular, after the invasion of Afghanistan I did my best to encourage the Turkish delegation to say more about the Middle East because I found them pretty well

informed on what was going on, who was doing what. In my judgment they had things to say that were worth saying, again they were fairly unassertive.

I was also looking for ways to involve the Turks more broadly in the Alliance as a way of tying them to the West, because I thought at the time and this was 26 years ago, that it was still very much in play which way Turkey would wind up being oriented. It was a rather schizophrenic situation where the educated, pro-Western Turks leaning one-way and the bulk of the population perhaps agnostic on the issue or if anything, prone to leaning toward the East; not the East as in the Soviet Union, I'm talking about the East as in the Arab world, the Islamic world. Of course, that raised another separate issue and that is the relatively uneasy relationship because of the Ottoman heritage between Turkey and the rest of the Middle East. I was always looking for ways to try and tie the Turks to the West with only very, very modest success. As we sit here today, Turkey is far less pro-Western than it was in the good old days when they had the Soviet threat on their border. I think the future direction of Turkey remains extremely uncertain, perhaps more uncertain today than was the case 20 or 25 years ago.

Q: Were you in one of your two seats in the NATO apparatus when Spain came in?

CELLA: Yes, I was involved fairly closely with Spanish entry. The bilateral and Spanish ambassador in Brussels was very pro-NATO and very eager to get Spain into NATO. I got to know him fairly well. As a matter of fact, we had a number of discussions. He would come by to see me periodically to talk about ways of easing Spanish entry, encouraging Spanish entry. When the admission of Spain was finally fait accompli I headed up the team that briefed Spanish officials on the political side of NATO, how it functioned, the role of the national delegation, the role of the international staff, the political calendar of the Alliance. I got to know rather well a couple of Spanish officials including who were not part of the liaison team on the other side including one who became their first Ambassador to NATO, a very accomplished fellow by the name of Xavier Perez. With regard to Spanish entry, I can't remember, there was a certain conditionality to it. One of the problems was Gibraltar. We worked around Gibraltar and how to handle that, but conditionality bothered me a bit. I thought one conditional member i.e. France was enough and that new members should sign up four-square for all of their Alliance obligations. Spain was finally admitted, and I guess they hadn't been members too terribly long before I left NATO headquarters. Following their admission, they were represented by Ambassador Perez who was extremely able and things went quite smoothly.

Q: Well, I would think that Spain particularly after the absence of Franco and its' going through several political developments, came in rather easily, didn't they? I mean it was ready to come in.

CELLA: Well, by the time of their entry, the government in power was very much for entry. I think by the time it finally happened it died down to the extent that it wasn't an internal issue in Spain. One observation and that is the Pyrenees really do wall off Spain.

Spain has a different way of looking at things than most other Europeans. In many ways their orientation is sort of south rather than north or west.

Q: Was there any problem with Portugal? I think Portugal being an early member of NATO and all but basically it preferred to be in NATO, I would think that they would be a little bit jealous or a little put off by all of a sudden having the colossus to the east coming in and becoming an equal member.

CELLA: I don't recall that being manifested to any degree at NATO headquarters. During my time in general the Portuguese delegation including at the very head was represented by a rather able diplomats. The one country that I recall that more clearly manifested some misgivings was Italy. There I'm pretty sure the main concern was that Italy very much prized its position as the bulwark of NATO's southern flank and saw Spain as to some degree a geographic rival in that respect and also potentially I presume a political rival. A lot of the byplay concerning Spanish entry took place in capitals bilaterally. Those discussions would then manifest themselves in behavior at NATO, but I don't recall a lot of internal dialogue at NATO headquarters surrounding Spain's entry. I think that the Secretary-General supported Spain's entry and I think NATO delegations per se were supportive of Spanish entry. Misgivings such as there were, were more likely to be played out in capitals and through bilateral or perhaps multilateral contacts that were not within the formal NATO context.

Q: Talk about the French role when you got on the International Staff. How did France play the game?

CELLA: Here again, as is so often the case, from my perspective it was a question of personalities. I begin with a little story. When I first came to NATO as part of the U.S. Mission, one of my jobs was to represent the United States on the Political Committee. The French representative was a very bright guy and we got along quite well. As I recall he was the son of a French colonial service official and he had spent a lot of time in Morocco. I had lived in Morocco and when I would see him on social occasions we would frequently talk about Morocco and that gave us a common subject. In the Political Committee itself, he could be quite disagreeable. He would forge or defend or assert the French position with a vengeance, frequently tying the committee up in knots. I don't like to spend any more time, and this sounds funny for somebody who spent nine years in multilateral diplomacy, but I don't like to spend much time in meetings as is absolutely necessary and I certainly pride myself on doing my most utmost to avoid meetings that aren't necessary. Anyway, the Political Committee was a necessary event, once a week on Tuesdays. Early on I looked for ways to give him a hard time. I was not rude, but I would say I was disagreeably firm on certain issues.

One day he called me up and asked to come and see me and I said, “By all means.” He said, "Mr. Cella, you seem to go out of your way to give me a hard time in the Political Committee." I said, "Well, you're an astute fellow. That's absolutely correct. That's because you seem to go out of your way to give the Political Committee a hard time generally. Until you modify your behavior, I intend to keep my foot on your neck." I

went on to say that I understand we all have our instructions, and we are all charged with defending national positions, but it also seems to me that we are all Allied colleagues and we should not, unless it's absolutely necessary, allow the pursuit of our national instructions to needlessly complicate the workings of the Alliance in general.

After that little discussion his behavior changed. The rest of the Political Committee commented on this, it was a matter of some discussion. What's happened to him all of a sudden? Personally, people more or less liked him, he was a pretty likable guy. I think he was still the French representative on the Political Committee when I moved over to the International Staff and became Chairman of the Committee. I guess I had been Chairman for about a year when he was being transferred. Well, as the Chairman of the Political Committee it was traditional to say a few words when a national member departed. The senior national representative of the committee would say something, some parting words and it was always the role of the Chairman of the Committee to say a few words. I can remember saying how am I going to handle it when he finally leaves because I made a point of trying to accentuate the positive on such occasions. Well, although he had improved considerably, he still was the biggest pain in the neck on the Committee. So how am I going to handle tossing the verbal bouquet without being overly hypocritical? To my great relief when he was finally transferred he was transferred to Moscow. I was able to conclude by expressing the wish that in Moscow he would reprove to be as formidable an adversary as he had proved to be an ally.

The French at NATO, there was sort of a community quality to them, to their behavior. It was absolutely in their interest to have military matters considered by the political side of the house. They were quite eager to follow the path. I think I mentioned except the example of air defense. The political side of NATO would get involved in air defense issues that would normally be left entirely to the military side. How does one explain this? One explains it by looking at a map and knowing the French air defense without taking into consideration surrounding countries didn't make a lot of sense, particularly in a supersonic age, so we could talk about air defense. So that's one aspect of the committee like quality.

One item I would like to emphasize here is that the comportment of the French delegation in general was very much colored by the Ambassador. During my time there were three separate ambassadors. The first one I encountered a dyspeptic, a very disagreeable man who was a real pain in the neck. He was replaced by a true gentleman, a very bright guy who was agreeable on all levels and made the minimum of difficulties for the alliance. He in turn was replaced by a guy who officially was very disagreeable so we’re back to a disagreeable but personally quite nice guy. I got along with him on a personal level quite well. It was almost as if the Quai d’Orsay alternated, hot and cold, sweet and sour who would head up their delegation. Watching all of this for six years, it struck me that the basic instructions were always the same; it was the way they were carried out that made the difference. There were some French officials who enjoyed being more difficult as opposed to others who preferred to accentuate the similarities and harmonies rather than discord and disagreement.

Overall I would say, on balance the French were pretty damned irritating allies but I think they contributed a great deal, I think they were clearly worth the trouble geographically there's no question about it. They contributed in ways that aren't necessarily always recognized. For example, during the height of the nuclear modernization debate, nuclear forces were an issue in every NATO member state except France. The nuclear allergy had spread throughout Western Europe but never seemed to affect France. I think the reason was the French viewed their nuclear forces as there to defend France and French interests whereas the rest of the Alliance were suspicious that maybe the U.S. forces might be used in ways that they wouldn't necessarily endorse and could make them a target for unhappy events which absent those U.S. nuclear forces they wouldn't be. The French helped me by indirection introduce a little bit of stability or sanity into the nuclear debate within Europe.

Another point I would make about the French is that they were bound to be difficult under the best of circumstances because of a structural imperfection in the Alliance. By that I mean the fact that it is supposedly a bilingual Alliance. Everything has to be in both English and French. All meetings have to be interpreted at least in those two languages. All documents prepared by the International Staff as opposed national delegations had to be prepared in both English and French, all communiqués both in English and French, paper circulated by national delegations had to be circulated in either English or French. If you only had English, things would've been a lot simpler from an administrative or logistical point of view. It also would have avoided a lot of problems that arose from the great pride that French take in their language. There would be ridiculous discussions based on linguistic differences. There would be occasionally rather absurd problems created when a NATO international delegation document appeared in English before it appeared in French.

I can remember when I was on the International Staff one of my jobs was to work with NATO Executive Secretary and a native French speaker to conform the English language text with the French language text of the final communiqué issued at the end of the semiannual ministerial meeting or the heads of state meeting, which happened during my time in Bonn. It was our job to make sure the language really conformed. During meetings we would take our notes very carefully and right afterwards we would compare notes so that the communiqué could be issued just as soon as possible. As a result the three or four of us involved in this conforming operation were the first ones to have the agreed final text in our hands. The American Secretary of State always had a press conference at the end of the ministerial meeting and was usually in a rush to get out of town. I talked earlier about how, in general, the U.S. national delegation made the least effort of any of the other national delegations to exploit their entrée into the International Staff through their nationals. One time that they regularly called upon me, and the one time which I regularly, I suppose, violated my operational mandate was to make sure that I placed in the hands of the American DCM, a copy of the minutes that were being agreed to of the English language text of what would be the final communiqué before it had been printed and distributed. I always had good relations with the several DCM's I dealt with during my time at the International Staff, and I would always say now, don't tell anybody you got this. What the DCM would do would be take the communiqué and brief the

Secretary of State on the final communiqué, if there were any issues, what the agreed wording was prior to his press conference. On one occasion I think, I think Haig was the secretary who said, "It says right here in the final communiqué: and he reads from the paper that he can't possibly have. My heart didn't drop. I figured this could be a problem but who cares? I can manage it. For some reason, maybe nobody picked up on it, it was never raised. How did he have this document? The adventures of having a bilingual alliance, there were more than there would be if you only had a single language. NATO since it originally had its headquarters based on French soil, it was inevitable that the French would be co-equal with English within the Alliance. It created enormous problems and expense. Of course, the European Union for them working in all different languages is absolutely a horrendous problem.

Q: During the time you were there you had the NATO political side. What were some of the major issues that your side of things was dealing with?

CELLA: We had Poland and the reassertion of Communist authority, the declaration of martial law happened in December of 1980.

Q: Was that seen at the time by NATO as being the best of the bad situation? In other words, it was either that or the Soviets coming in or was it seen that way?

CELLA: As the situation evolved there was some hope that Solidarity and their associates would somehow get away with institutionalizing political liberalization within Poland. They had made a fair amount of headway and the Soviets hadn't done anything. The Soviets had their problems in Afghanistan. You had a Polish Pope exerting authority within Poland. You had something that hadn't existed during the earlier major Polish uprising and that is cooperation between the unions, the intellectuals and the students. It was much more, Solidarity was a rather well chosen term whereas the previous major eruption in Poland some years earlier was a worker-led demonstration or worker-led movement that at least to some degree of my understanding is the intellectuals rather disdained. This time around you had rather broad support within Poland reinforced by the influence of the Polish Pope, not that he was out there in the streets waving any banners but just his existence I think, had a psychological impact on the Poles in terms of restoring or expanding their national self-confidence. I think that up until the time of martial law there was watchful waiting within NATO, speaking with respect to the atmosphere at NATO headquarters in Brussels, obviously influenced by analyses being made in capitals. As time passed there was hope that a more liberal political regime in Poland would become pretty much a fixture. I would say that from the time that Solidarity became clearly a serious movement within Poland through the declaration of martial law the mood within NATO was kind of a watchful waiting, always allowing for the possibility that the Soviets really couldn't tolerate this. Again with the passage of time, there was some hope that there wouldn't be intervention. The declaration of martial law was in December of 1981. Arguments were being made all these things were changing in general between East and West and the Soviets really would not want to replay 1956. But martial law was declared and declared relatively without much warning.

The actual declaration took place within a very short period after it was signed, signs of tension really rising. It's almost a stealth event.

In NATO one reaction was to call an emergency meeting of foreign ministers to decide how the Alliance should react to martial law. This is something we couldn't just allow to pass unnoticed. I can recall on a Saturday before the ministerial meeting took place on Sunday, this would have been three or four days after the declaration or a week after the declaration of martial law, I chaired a meeting of delegation number twos, something called the Special Political Committee made up of the number two official in each of the national delegations. Or in the case of the U.S, the number three, the fellow that headed the Political Section. I said that the issue before the house was how big a corner do we want to paint ourselves into. By that I meant if we put down a bunch of conditions which aren't fulfilled, we're not going to look too hot. Everybody was in favor of very stiff, stern reaction. Great, but let's bear in mind whatever we do we're probably going to paint ourselves into a corner so it's kind of leave it as big as we can. I also said that I thought we ought to be able to do this in the course of the day. By that I meant before the sun went down. Of course, the sun went down fairly early at that time of the year in Belgium. So I chaired.

We came out with a pretty good communiqué. It had three main conditions. I can't recall what they were. As I recall none of them were really lived up to and we learned to live with martial law regime in Poland. Indeed the regime itself was not as harsh or repressive as it might have been and indeed some of the forces that I talked about earlier that had been unleashed within Poland acted as a certain counterweight to what Jaruzelski could do. And eventually he disappeared from the scene.

Q: Did you find? Was there a lot of sharing, were you acting as a super body in sharing of intelligence and all? Was that done somewhere else? I mean, political intelligence?

CELLA: I think much of what we did in the political community did involve political intelligence. I said a moment ago that the meetings traditionally began with an exchange on political subjects. Various national delegations would report on the results of their foreign minister's travels to China or developments in Kosovo, whatever. Some of this was an analysis that I guess you could get based on open source news reports, but a lot of it was reporting on discussions, confidential diplomatic or intergovernmental discussions between the allies and other governments outside the Alliance. Our Ambassador in Sofia reports the pro-Soviet attitude of the population remains undiminished despite what's happening in Poland. Reports were shared by one and all and I would say clearly the most sensitive material was not regularly shared but on the other hand what was shared was not junk. The quality was fairly high. And as members of the national delegations or the chairman of the committee could propose let's say in two weeks time we should have an exchange on the Soviet activities in Central Africa. Frequently, there were directed exchanges which literally spanned the globe, mainly having to do with the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and with the People's Republic of China.

Q: Now, in a way what you are dealing with in NATO would not overlap much, I don't know whether it was the European Community at the time or the European Union because they were inward looking and we weren't talking about developments in Germany for example, West Germany or in Italy or anything like that. Or were you?

CELLA: Again, this is in its early stages, but some of us had a concern that European political cooperation to some degree wore down the consultative process at NATO. During my time at NATO the European Community was still basically involved with economic issues but were building toward a developing political cooperation in the early 80's within the European community context. There was increasing sharing and inevitably to some degree coordination of member state approaches to political issues. There was beginning to be something of an overlap. It had not yet moved to the point where there was a rivalry and whether it ever did move to that point I don't know. That's beyond the range of my personal experience. There was concern that political operation, the impetus of political cooperation within what was to become the European Union would water down NATO's political role which further raised the concern, is this something the Europeans would want to do absent an independent European military capability? Of course we saw evolving European defense cooperation. The European Union never raised its own army. The issue was would an evolving, competitive political consultative arrangement among Europeans negatively influence or impact on U.S. devotion to the defense of Europe?

Q: You mentioned the French moved air defense into the political area. How did the military council and the political council intermesh? Did military considerations intrude into your deliberations?

CELLA: Oh, yes, very definitely. At NATO headquarters every delegation had a military staff that paralleled the political staff. Every delegation except Iceland and France had a representative that sat on something called the Military Committee, which paralleled in the military sphere the kind of consultative and coordinating work that went on the political side. Apart from that you had at most about 20 miles or so down the road from Brussels the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Command of Europe. He was involved with might what might be called boots on the ground questions. Military planning and that sort of thing whereas at NATO headquarters the military side did not work on the development of active defense planning, the deployment of which forces where to manage what contingency. But they were involved in what we call the military aspects of political issues. For example, arms control, the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations that were going on in Vienna where I'd been previously was very much an active subject on the military side of the house. There was interplay between the military and the political side. The military side had an MBFR committee where civilians were invited to sit. In the Political Committee there was at all our meetings a military representative. During my time, or during most of my time when I was chairman of the committee, we had a very good American colonel who regularly sat in on our meetings and would frequently report on information that had come down through the military channel that he thought would be of political interest to the national delegations in the Political Committee.

You asked earlier about intelligence. On the military side there was an active sharing of what might be called "pure intelligence", classic intelligence as opposed to political, diplomatic intelligence. Forces have been redeployed to the Caspian; the Northern Fleet is unusually active, things of that nature. In planning the approach to the MBFR negotiations obviously the military was deeply involved in at NATO headquarters. Also you had the parallel negotiation of the so-called CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a process that was evolving and which involved military issues from the onset, rules on the notification of maneuvers to the signatory nations of the Helsinki Final Act. By the early '80s within the context of CSCE something that was also provided for in the Final Act began to mature and evolve and that was development of so-called confidence building measures. I already mentioned notification of maneuvers which was a confidence building measure, a way of telling would-be adversaries well, this is what we're going to be doing but don't be worried, it's a routine exercise, here's its purpose, here's its duration and who is going to be involved in it. That sort of passive process began to evolve into active consideration into what we called active confidence building measures which would place actual limits on exercises and disposition of forces and that sort of thing. There was a whole range of proposals in this regard that were intended to build up confidence between East and West that various activities on either side were indeed benign and should not provoke undue alarm on the other side. The Western position within CSCE on such matters was coordinated within NATO under political supervision but with the active involvement, totally necessary involvement, of the military side.

Q: The French military my understanding is has always been were pretty much involved with NATO. When I was in Naples as Consul General Admiral Crowe was the CINCSOUTH. It was 1980 or '81 or so. He was saying the French had pretty good cooperation with the NATO forces. There must've been actually a rather strong French military presence there, wasn't there or not?

CELLA: At NATO headquarters? No. Not particularly numerous. I had no professional dealings with a French uniformed officer during my time there. They had an observer on the Military Committee that would observe the delegation but how active were they were on issues of interest? I'm sure they were quite active. They were not very much in evidence, but it is my understanding based on what various military people have told me over the years the French indeed were quite cooperative including bilaterally with the U.S.. U.S. Marines exercise at least once a year on the ground in the south of France. From the French point of view it was in their interest to be cooperative.

Q: Well, I mean it was a political move that but not some military.

CELLA: Well, there was a security component to it. I think one of the things that motivated him was he wanted a certain amount of defensive action because one he didn't think France could count on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and two, he couldn't count on the military side always behaving in ways that conformed with French interest. And then of course, you had the French being the French.

Q: During this time was the Political Committee casting a nervous eye over toward Yugoslavia? Yugoslavia hadn't broken up and all this came later, but it was considered one of those places that like Berlin where something could blow apart and it might bring the Soviets in.

CELLA: I mentioned possibly several times that Kosovo was an area that we were keeping an eye on. I think it was in the late 1970s when the Albanians in Kosovo were again asserting themselves with some determination. As I recall Tito was obliged to make some fairly significant concessions to the Albanians.

Q: Almost an autonomy thing which he had done in other parts of Yugoslavia.

CELLA: Certainly Kosovo was an active subject during some of my time at NATO. We did keep something of a watch on Yugoslavia in general. For example, NATO had various exercises, some desk top exercises, some involving actual forces in the field, and for some of these exercises it was the job of the NATO international staff on the political side to write the political lead in to a crisis situation. One of the favorite ways of creating an East-West crisis was a Soviet move to thwart an assertive, an even more assertive independent Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was very much on the minds of people at NATO. I think when Tito passed and Yugoslavia didn't break apart fairly quickly there was a relaxation of concern based on a feeling I think we shared with the Yugoslavs themselves that having survived the passing of Tito without breaking apart, this means that there is a substantial realization on the part of Yugoslavs in general, Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, Slovenians etc. that, as the old saying goes, we really are better off hanging together than hanging separately. People tended to relax.

I went to Yugoslavia in the fall of 1986 or the spring of 1987 and traveled from one end of the country to the other including a fair amount of travel overland. I did not speak any of the local languages but between English, German and French to some degree I was able to do fairly well. I came away saying this reminds me a lot of Lebanon. Everybody's got a gun. There really are deeper historic ethnic divisions and tensions. It's okay as long as they don't start shooting but once they start shooting, it’s not going to stop for a while.

Back to your question in my time in the early ‘80s, NATO kept an eye on Yugoslavia. If Tito dies, does it fall apart?

Q: What about Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact? Was there a contingency plan for all of a sudden the Poles, and the Czechs and the Hungarians and all will say, screw this, because we all knew there was no love lost with the Soviets. There might be a significant uprising. Did we have the morning after plan or a plan B?

CELLA: They may have. I was not involved in creating some. One example though that could be cited in this regard is Poland where we really did have something happen. By the time martial law was declared people saw this as less and less likely, but never ruled it out. But there was discussion, what if it does happen? In the end we issued our

declaration on Poland which stipulated certain things. I need to go back and reread the communiqué which I drafted, which I led, to recall what it was that we said that the new government could or couldn't do. Obviously, there was an appeal for the return to true civilian authority at the earliest possible moment. There were certain conditions put on how we would deal with the martial law regime and regularly developing political scenarios for potential crises as part of the NATO exercise agenda, or exercise regiment. Why? We regularly included unrest in Eastern Europe as likely to provoking something which could lead to armed confrontation. I think as a subject nobody really wanted to talk about in great detail. I think perhaps there might have been a hangover from Hungary.

Q: Hungary in 1956.

CELLA: Hungary in 1956 and why spend a lot of time planning for something in the end we're not going to do anything about? Why therefore run the risk of needlessly exposing the essentially feckless underbelly of the NATO structure? One time I suggested a NATO bumper sticker which would read NATO, our strongest reed. I'm a great believer in NATO but it has its limitations, in part I must say because of an absence of vigorous U.S. leadership. We tended to take account of NATO after the fact. We tended to take account of NATO when we need them, much like we treat the United Nations. Secretary-General Luns said to me one day, "Mr. Cella, I know you Americans think we Europeans act like pygmies and we do. Don't forget you made us pygmies."

Q: In 1986 you left NATO. Whither?

CELLA: 1984. By then Secretary General Luns had retired. There had been some agitation for Luns' retirement for some time to get rid of Luns. He was now in his early 70s. The NATO ambassadors would meet every Tuesday for lunch on a rotating basis hosted by one ambassador or another. These were supposedly informal off the record meetings and this was a device created to promote informal, frank open exchanges in a semi-private circumstance. This was also supposedly a place where you wouldn't transact business, real business. You can talk about things, but you wouldn't take decisions. By the time I got there this institution of the ambassadors' lunch, Tuesday lunch, had gotten in the habit of taking decisions on various things because NATO ambassadors were not always fully qualified as note takers or not always fully qualified in the English or French language. It was a bit of a Rashomon operation. One murder and four accounts of what actually happened. It was always great fun. I thought this Tuesday luncheon must have been a Russian or Soviet invention, because it created a little bit of, a modest amount, of chaos within the Alliance as people tried to figure out what was actually agreed to over lunch.

One day out of the blue, Joseph Luns announced at the luncheon that he was going to step down as NATO Secretary-General. I suppose there was a great sigh of relief, at least in some quarters. Word quickly spread even though this is confidential. This was one of the characteristics of these luncheons was that they were supposedly highly confidential. Word spread that the Secretary-General is leaving. It turns out the chap that I mentioned in one of our session in our previous sessions, Paul van Kampen, another Dutchman, and

I can't remember the detail but it was somehow financially advantageous for him. He had been at NATO for a long time when he was there before Luns on the NATO international staff. It would be financially advantageous for him to retire by a certain date. For reasons perhaps best understood by Freud, van Kampen didn't want to leave and be replaced while Luns was still there. Van Kampen began agitating for Luns to retire with Luns saying, “You know, Mr. Secretary-General.” I don't know the arguments he used but apparently, on this particular Tuesday he had succeeded in convincing the Secretary-General to retire or that he should leave his post.

The next morning I went over to see the Secretary-General in connection with that morning's meeting of NATO ambassadors, the regular Wednesday meeting of the North Atlantic Council and he said to me, “You know, Mr. Cella, yesterday I announced that I would be retiring from NATO.” I said, "Well, Mr. Secretary-General I have in fact to be honest heard that and I wasn't sure if it was accurate or not but if it was true it is news that I would receive with great regret." I was quite sincere about it. I had a lot of respect for him, and as I have noted several times, we got along quite well. He said, "You think I can withdraw my announcement?” By the next morning he was having regrets, and he's asking my opinion as to whether he can back away from this. I said I didn't see how he could do so with grace and with maintaining his self-respect, but I said, “I will think about it, if I can come up with a stratagem for gracefully withdrawing your announcement, I’ll be happy to let you know but I doubt I will be successful." I was not.

He eventually left and the former British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington was selected as his successor. Lord Carrington was quite a different personality. He brought with him his own Chef d’Cabinet, a relatively senior British diplomat. I was involved in briefing the two of them again on the political side of the international staff and what they could expect. I can recall going over to see Lord Carrington and his new Chef d’Cabinet with my boss, the Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs. Before we went over I said to my boss who was German, a career diplomat, "It's very clear that Carrington is going to be quite an activist and much more inclined to take the lead in discussions at the Alliance rather than Luns’ style who more or less followed the discussion. Unless the subject was really important to him he really wouldn't have much to say. We’ve got this activist Carrington and his Chef d’Cabinet, clearly also an activist and it was already clear that there would be demands on or be inclined to put demands on the Political Affairs Division when Luns hadn't placed there.” Before we went over to this meeting I said to my boss, "You know, we ought to educate Lord Carrington right off the bat to the limitations of the International Staff, at least that part which falls within our purview to head off what could be big headaches down the road." My boss was a very cautious guy, wasn’t sure this was such a great thing to do. As I treated all my supervisors personally with a fair amount of respect, but I think this is really important and if you don't want to say anything about it, I've got to tell you, I shall.

So we go over, here's what we do, here is how we do it. Gorbachev had just given a fairly significant or what appeared to have been to be a fairly significant speech a day or so earlier. Now moving into the era of glasnost and perestroika and what have you. Anyway, he’d given a speech. Lord Carrington asked could the Political Division quickly if he

asked provide him with an expert analysis of the text? My boss didn't know quite how to handle that. He kind of hemmed and hawed and I piped up and said, "Well, Lord Carrington, as a matter of fact as it so happens we could meet such a request today and the reason we could," I said, "I have on my staff a fellow countryman of yours, a British career Soviet expert whom I had known previously been working for me in the Political Affairs Division so we have a resident fellow countryman of yours, a Soviet analyst who is quite well versed in the Soviet Union. So if we take that example, the answer is yes. We don't have that kind of capability in general. But you have to remember, Sir, you're the Secretary-General. You're not a Foreign Secretary, you're the Secretary-General. You don't have, you have your own opinions, certainly and use them when you can to guide the alliance and the direction you think it should go but in general, what you think doesn't count, to put it in the bluntest terms. Alliance policy is developed essentially, on the least common denominator basis among what all, by this time, 16 members states think. Typically, we would invite analyses from capitals, put them together and produce some kind of an agreed international staff document, but this obviously would not happen overnight. But again, for you to perform your function which is to promote consultation and to facilitate coordination, but not to in that sense you develop policy at the guts of the policy, that's something that's determined by the member states that you serve. So the International Staff does not have the kind of capability that a Foreign Ministry would have nor does it need to have that kind of capability for reasons I just stated. With that said, if you want to strengthen the ability of the International Staff to provide its own independent political analysis then you've got to change the way people are appointed to the International Staff and you've got to put more emphasis on competence rather than national origin. In my judgment that would be almost impossible to do, probably is impossible to do, but as I just said, it doesn't make any difference."

And in that regard, I'll tell one little story. There is a committee called the Establishment Committee which passed on senior appointments or relatively senior appointments, I'd say from the grade of maybe, lieutenant colonel on up or GS14. The Establishment Committee consisted of the five Assistant Secretaries General, the Deputy Secretary-General, the Secretary-General's Chef d'Cabinet Mr. van Kampen and a NATO senior sort of chief of personnel. What the Committee would do would be to review the files of finalists for various appointments on the International Staff with a view to making a final recommendation to the Secretary-General. When my boss, the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs was absent, I would represent him on the Establishment Committee. One day in that capacity we have before us several candidates for a technical post, a military post that had to do with runway design at NATO airbases. We had a lieutenant colonel, we had a couple American candidates. I forget the nationalities of the others, there were two other candidates. Of the four of them one of the two Americans actually has experience in the mechanics of the designing runways for combat aircraft, but he didn't speak French. The fiction was you had to be on the International Staff basically competent in either French or English and fluent in the other language. This fellow was an American-born army officer who had a French surname. In his application statement he acknowledged he did not speak French but given his background one of the attractions to the job was the opportunity for him to learn French. Indeed, he had already started studying on his own and intended to apply himself

diligently to acquire as it is possible basic competence in French. The other American candidate didn't have French either and didn't make such a compelling statement. The other candidates from the record had at least passable English and French so the time came to pass on these guys.

Van Kampen spoke first. This is what I wanted. I positioned myself to be the last speaker. Van Kampen says, "Put the knock on the Americans. Once again we have the Americans providing candidates who are not linguistically qualified. They always do this with great regularity blah, blah, blah." So he came down on the side of one of the non-American candidates. I can't remember the other members, what they had to say. When my turn comes I say, "Well, I share Mr. van Kampen's belief that a NATO civil servant should be competent in French and English. I also deplore the frequent deficiencies of my own countrymen in this regard but," I said, "in this case we're talking about runways. For airplanes. Kind of mundane, but fairly important piece of infrastructure. I would submit that if I were up in an airplane and the pilot notified me we're about to land on the runway designed by the Holy Ghost, competent in every language known to man but with no experience in runway design or we're about to go on a runway designed by a deaf mute who is the world's best runway designer but literally speaks no language, I know which one I would choose. With that in mind, I submit that the American maintenance guy is the guy we ought to give the job to." And he got the job.

Q: In 1984 where did you go?

CELLA: We'll talk a little more about how I ended up at NATO and as it turned out, I didn't have to go anywhere. Of all the eight or 10 senior international staff officials that Carrington interviewed when he first arrived, I think there were two of us that were invited to stay on, that he told he definitely wanted to stay on. The State Department thought I had to leave. Well, I think Lord Carrington would have won that battle if they had decided to enlist him in it. For a bunch of reasons I left in 1984 and wound up as Director of the Office of Western European and Canadian Affairs in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Q: You have something to say about NATO before we move on?

CELLA: A couple of things which I don't believe we touched upon. One concerns an issue of some significance and the other one concerns an impression of the United States as manifested by our allies. With regard to the issue I neglected to mention the Strategic Defense Initiative or the so-called Star Wars program which was announced by the Reagan administration right in the midst of what was probably the major issue of my time in NATO and that is the modernization of the alliance's intermediate range nuclear forces.

Q: It was really the response to the SS-20.

CELLA: We did go over that. There had been a feeling if you had parity at the strategic level between the United States and the Soviet Union, you could not afford to have an

internal imbalance, that is to say among nuclear forces with less than intercontinental strategic range. This was a notion originally articulated by German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. It quickly became a U.S. initiative. It always occurred to me we should have done a better job of making clear that the nuclear modernization was being done basically at the request of the Europeans. It was not a wholly owned American project being foisted on our unwilling allies. Within Western Europe we have a lot of turmoil around nuclear weapons, and we are trying to convince publics of modernization is a good thing and indeed a stabilizing factor in nuclear weapons and indeed provided a deterrent which while you couldn't prove it, had arguably been instrumental in sparing for a half-century Europe the kind of wars that had ravaged it twice in the previous half-century of the 20th century. So essentially, the United States was saying hey, nuclear weapons are good and then-President Reagan out of the blue, talks about a Strategic Defense Initiative, a system that will provide an effective shield against nuclear weapons, and he puts it in the context of ridding the world of the scourge of nuclear weapons. So there is a bit of a cognitive dissidence here that on the one hand we are arguing that nuclear weapons are good for you and on the other hand, we are arguing that this is a deadly menace that must be if at all possible purged from the global landscape. It was unfortunate that SDI was quickly, perhaps inevitably, labeled Star Wars, which conjured up, particularly in Europe, all kinds of unhelpful images. I think it was a mistake on the part of the United States not to have acted quickly to make clear that Star Wars was at the very least a gross misnomer in reference to SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative.

SDI made the Europeans rather nervous; the fact we came up with that out of the blue without any sort of preparatory work did not help matters. Also the Europeans were uncomfortable with the notion of pushbutton war in space. The Europeans tend to have a lot less confidence than we Americans in technology as a means of curing all of mankind’s ills. But the strategic defense initiative made them a little bit nervous. The way it was publicly managed wasn't particularly helpful. The U.S. did manage to buy off the Europeans to some degree by doling out a fair amount of SDI development and research money to various European individuals and entities. I think that approach did help to dampen resistance in Europe to do the idea.

The other thing that I wanted to record today is illustrative of some of the things we have just talked about concerns the approach of the Reagan administration to arms control. When NATO took to the decision to modernize certain of its nuclear forces it was part of what came to be known, a dual track decision. In parallel with it was an arms-control initiative; yes, we would modernize but we would all also offer the Soviet Union an attractive negotiating vehicle to obviate the need for either side to have these sorts of weapons. The dual track approach was dictated by politics in Europe, a feeling among European political leaders that they had to also prove their arms control bona fides as a necessary precondition for public acceptance of military modernization. It occurred to me that psychologically that was a mistake, but here perhaps I'm being too much of a dreamer, not sufficiently realistic. It seemed to me that nuclear modernization should have been sold to European publics on its own merits. For good and proper deterrence and defense reasons NATO needed to modernize its nuclear forces to keep pace with

what was going on on the other side, which is not to say you couldn't say at the same time we would be happy to seek an arms-control solution.

But to make the modernization initiative lean against an arms-control initiative struck me as a relatively weak approach to the problem and gave the Soviet Union in effect a de facto opening for controlling the pace on the defense side, what NATO should do with its own defense interests. I'm saying that it gave the Soviet Union an opportunity to use an arms-control negotiation sort of sine die. An endless arms control negotiation as a way to interfere and gum up the nuclear modernization works.

The Europeans were terribly concerned that the Reagan Administration would not be sufficiently devoted to arms-control. I can recall Reagan's first head of the Arms Control Disarmament Agency, Eugene Rostow coming over to Brussels to address the North Atlantic Council, the Council of NATO ambassadors shortly after his nomination to share with them his and the administration's philosophy in regard to arms-control. He gave an extremely hard-line speech. He was, among other things a charter member of the Committee on the Present Danger which was organized in the mid to late 70s by a group of very conservative, today we might call the neoconservative folks, who felt it felt that the Carter Administration was not sufficiently robust in countering the Soviet menace and felt that the Carter Administration was too eager to negotiate with the Soviets perhaps at our peril, at our longer-term disadvantage.

Anyway, Rostow comes over and I'm sitting there behind the Secretary-General, I can't remember, perhaps I was sitting at the table. I had a seat at the table whenever my boss was not there. Anyway, I'm in the room and Rostow by the way is a very agreeable pleasant enough guy personally gives this very hard-line speech. I'm saying to myself I wonder how this is going to go down. Well, it went down extremely well. The reason being the Allies were so nervous or some of the allies were so nervous that the Reagan administration would have absolutely no interest in arms-control that they come over and just have a high-level official, an American official mutter the term arms-control occasioned a great sigh of relief on the European part which indicates as is often the case it's not exactly what you say. It's who's saying it and when he saying it.

Q: When you were there in NATO you were sitting around people plugged into military and scientific possibilities. How did the strategic SDI go over and Reagan apparently hauled this out of a hat. Wouldn't it be wonderful if we could blast all missiles aimed at us out of the sky, and you know, we're now talking what, 30 more years later and it's still not close to being a particularly effective system.

CELLA: I personally was then and am now skeptical. In my public appearances when I would address the subject I would say that we can't afford to ignore research which might lead to some sort of a breakthrough. I did not go around preaching the gospel of SDI by any means. The Europeans were certainly hugely skeptical. They tend not to worship quite as feverishly as Americans do before the God of technology. Also there was some concern I think among defense thinkers in Europe that were SDI to really work it might make a nuclear war more likely on one hand, on the other hand it might act as a

decoupling of the U.S. deterrent from the defense of Europe. There was always a concern about keeping the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent strongly coupled to the defense and security of Europe. As I said, that's where the INF issue originally came from, the European fear that strategic parity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would leave the Europeans unacceptably exposed to the Soviet military threat. Similarly, with SDI if it really worked and provided a true sanctuary for the United States would that in turn not tend to leave the Europeans in the lurch? Well, we have tried to counter that by saying we would extend the coverage of SDI by offering it to the Soviet Union which struck me as kind of bizarre. But in the great scheme of things it's not the most bizarre initiative I ever saw with the U.S. government to take.

The Europeans did not have any particular confidence that this whole thing would work. I sat through several briefings including two given by the Air Force General who is the original head of the Pentagon's office for SDI, done in the great Pentagon way with all kinds of spectacular visuals and charts and graphs. But these briefings were not especially convincing that the technology existed to enable you to really do this effectively, assuming you wanted to do it in the first place.

Q: Let's move to INR. You went to INR when and you were there from when to when?

CELLA: I went to INR in 1984. I had been at NATO for nine years. The personnel people in the State Department were telling me that it was time for me to leave NATO but the new Secretary-General Lord Carrington was making it clear that he would be very happy to have me stay on. I thought that in any struggle between the personnel people in the State Department and Lord Carrington, Carrington would probably win. In many ways I would've been quite happy to stay on. I really like what I was doing, I had a good staff. One of the great things about serving as a diplomat in a European milieu is that Europeans consider, unlike Americans, that diplomacy is a true and somewhat distinguished profession and one was treated with great deference. I didn't have to spend time writing up endless cables reporting on meetings, I didn't have to worry about all sorts of protocol events. My life, my professional life, was devoted almost entirely to use that wonderful term to substance or to managing things. I didn't have to put up with a lot of the BS that my most of my colleagues had to put up with including my colleagues who were in the bilateral mission to NATO. So I was really enjoying life, but there were a couple of compelling personal factors which made me decide, yes, it probably was time to leave NATO, to go home where my youngest daughter was about to start college and her older sister had been sent away to college. Upon reflection I said well, I think the next time one of my children goes to college, I'm going to be closer at least for the first year or two when they start out so that was one reason why I reluctantly planned to go home. Also, my mother-in-law was fairly ill and I felt that we should be closer to her at that time. So for a whole bunch of reasons, none of which included the dictate of the State Department personnel folks, I had decided to throw in the NATO towel and head back to the U.S.

Sometime before I left NATO the one and only time in my career I was approached with regard to ambassadorial appointment. I got a call from a senior person in the Bureau of

Personnel who asked me if I would be interested in having my name included on a list to go to the White House for the next ambassador to Iceland, if I would be the career person on the list. I said, "Yes by all means. That would suit me fine, please do that." I was pretty confident that nothing would come of it, but I was interested in Iceland going back to my days with Zumwalt. I traveled to Iceland several times and knew of number of Icelanders. It's kind of a strange place but for me Iceland was an interesting place. I found the people agreeable and I enjoyed eating the seafood and an occasional shot of Black Death, which is the Icelandic equivalent of aquavit. So my name did to go to the White House, but the appointment went to a chap by the name of Nick Rooney. Nick Rooney was also a quite agreeable man; he had been the Chief of Protocol or Deputy Chief of Protocol. Nick had had a few dollars, and he enjoyed fishing in Iceland. Iceland has terrific salmon fishing and it costs a fortune to get a license to fish for the salmon. Anyway, on his own dime would go up there I guess it once a year to fish. Now he had an opportunity to go on the house as it were. He was very happy to go to Iceland, and since his relationship with Ronald Reagan was a lot stronger than mine, he somehow won out. I guess all of this happened about a year before I actually left NATO.

When the time came and I was actually going, I was asked if I would be interested in being the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe, joining the National Intelligence Council. That would've been a pretty good, pretty interesting job and one that I was interested in, but it occurred to me, here the cowardly side of me is coming out, I didn't want a clear CIA link on my resume. I was thinking about future employment, and this is still a time when there was in some quarters some sensitivity to an overt CIA affiliation so I passed on that opportunity. I think I had a good shot at getting that job. There are a couple of Office Director positions in European Affairs, but I did not have the true European pedigree, true EUR pedigree, so whether I could've landed a decent job in that Bureau I have no idea because I didn't attempt to. Instead there was an opening coming up in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research as Director of the Office of Western European and Canadian Affairs and this was still a time where was a lot going on trans-Atlanticly and within Europe, I felt that based on my previous nine years experience I had a pretty good feel for various trends within Europe and between the Europeans and the United States. The INR position also appealed to me because I wouldn't have to worry about writing toasts for state dinners. I could really concentrate on important subjects although from a career point of view there is no doubt that as with my NATO international staff assignment I was opting for a relatively low prestige position. It frequently struck me that particularly in the State Department people had trouble distinguishing between prestige and power and if there was a competition prestige generally won out whereas throughout my career I was always more interested in being in positions where I could do interesting work and where maybe every now and then I might have a chance to assert some influence on how this country conducts its foreign affairs. So I happily went off to INR.

Q: You were there from 1984 to when?

CELLA: To '86. Two years.

Q: Talk about the role of INR in this '84 to '86 period you saw within the realm of foreign affairs and what you were doing on issues.

CELLA: It's become kind of a popular jargon these days to talk truth to power. INR is the one place in the State Department where people should be able to think clearly about the issues, to make clear analyses based on available information and from those analyses arrive at the best possible, the most accurate deductions, all free from any need to pay obedience to the political orthodoxy of the time. That the desk officer in the Middle East bureau who thinks that our policy is in the Middle East is absolutely cuckoo and writes a memo to that effect, if he doesn't get fired on the spot you can at least be certain that it is never going to reach the Secretary of State or even come close. In INR again you don't have to take account of the political niceties. You look at the facts and that's the way it should work. During my time, I must say, it's basically the way it did work. At least, I never felt constrained in that the products with regard to the content of the products coming out of my office beyond being satisfied that the analysis was the best one to do based on the facts, pure and simple.

The only time that there was ever any pressure put on me, pressure is not the right word, to do anything to suit some bias was when [July 1985] the French sunk a Greenpeace boat in New Zealand, a boat that had been sent out to monitor the nuclear tests in the Pacific. The Rainbow Warrior. They sent the Rainbow Warrior down, I guess it was in Auckland. Anyway, it was in New Zealand so the Director of INR at the time [Morton Abramowitz] said to me that he would like my office to do a piece prompted by this event showing how it might bring the French government down. I said, "Well, one, that's not going to happen. If they were brought down by it it wouldn't be because of they sunk the Greenpeace boat but because of the incompetence that allowed them to get caught, in effect, in the act." I mean, they weren't physically caught, but it was very clear the French had a role.

Q: A couple of special force agents.

CELLA: I can't remember, maybe they did. Again, we're talking over 20 years ago. It was clearly pinned on the French. Whether they got a culprit or two or not, I don't recall. Well then that's the incompetence part. If this did bring the French government down which it's not going to do, it will be on grounds of incompetence, not on grounds of sinking a boat belonging to an anti-nuclear movement. As a matter of fact the French were actually relatively fond of their nuclear weapons. I said to the Director, "If you want, we can write the piece but you'll have to sign it because I'm sure not going to sign it. I'm not going to allow my analysts to sign it." He backed off and in two years as I recall, that's the only time I received any direction from on high as to the conclusion that one should draw from a particular event or series of events.

A couple of months later I was on a speaking tour in Europe. I had an appearance at the University of Bordeaux. Afterwards I went off to a very, very pleasant country restaurant outside Bordeaux with a faculty member, the head of the political science faculty of the University of Bordeaux and a local newspaper reporter, maybe the foreign affairs editor

from the local paper. Anyway, at lunch I told them the story. Both of them broke up into some uproarious laughter. They weren't drunk, but they just found this whole notion so Saturday Night Live type proportion. There was a person killed. The Rainbow Warrior was sailing under the Dutch flag, I think. Anyway, one of these, either the editor or the professor in the midst of his laughter said, "And the guy who died wasn't even Dutch. He was Portuguese." They laughed even more.

Meanwhile, at this time Bill Casey, was head of the CIA and he had Gates as his number two or else the senior guy for analysis. [Deputy Director for Intelligence to April 1986] The stuff coming out of the CIA was clearly depending upon the area -- two that come to mind are the Soviet Union and Central America -- colored by a political point of view. A friend of mine at the time working as a senior defense guy on the International Security Council staff said that by and large the INR product was considered superior to the CIA stuff by knowledgeable people got to look at both. We used to do in INR, curious though it was, a sort of a companion piece to the President's Daily Brief done by the CIA. A friend of mine said that on a regular basis INR was far superior. I think we saw that in the weapons of mass distraction baloney before the Iraq war.

Q: It strikes me and I have to state bias. I was in INR way back in the late 1960s. One of the things in INR is that unlike the CIA, where they've got more people doing what one person does in the State Department or the equivalent. But also they don't have any particular stake in it whereas people in INR are talking to the Desk, I mean they are very close to the policy. They understand what the situation is. It's not sort of a beautifully crafted piece of intelligence gone through a lot of filters. I mean, it's rather immediate and sort of nitty-gritty.

CELLA: Yes, INR has in my judgment, a number of advantages including the first one you just cited; it is relatively small and so the trick is to recruit good people. If you've got good people then you don't need layers and layers of them. One or two will suffice if you have good people, but too many layers that may negate the advantages of having knowledgeable folks. INR is relatively small so it can act react relatively quickly. You don't have to get 10 million clearances before the piece goes forward.

Another advantage of INR is that you have alluded to is that it's composed of professional analysts who spend their whole career as intelligence analysts but also a fair number of people, as with the case with you and me, who are practitioners from the field who have practical experience dealing with foreign governments and observing on the ground developments abroad and their impact locally and regionally and in some cases, perhaps globally. So you have a good counterweight to any risk of an ivory tower syndrome breaking out. I think the INR model is a good one. In the lead up to the Iraq war based on what I've read it proved itself to be quite good. This analyst, Gregory Tilman, I saw him on television a couple of times; I think maybe he might have resigned in protest, but he called it right.

Q: How did you view, obviously you were getting the input from the Pentagon and the CIA and other places, how did you and your colleagues in the European area view the input that you were getting from them?

CELLA: I had had exposure to various non-State Department elements of the Intelligence Community in various places over the entire course of my career. After a brief stint in congressional relations way back, I began my State Department service with a year in INR and then I went on to be a Staff Assistant to the first head of the Bureau of Political Military Affairs. So, almost throughout my entire time in the State Department, I was exposed to members of the intelligence community and the things that they produced. Also when I was on the Israeli desk I had very close interaction, particularly with the CIA, but also with DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) and the various service intelligence components.

How did I view what they produced? Over three decades there are bound to be high points, low points and that sort of thing. Speaking, in general, the U.S. Intelligence Community, both at home and abroad is way too big, has too many components. To a large degree it was my sense that quantity counted over quality, in many cases. A lot of CIA reporting I got over the years was terrible. I have a lot of respect for the CIA people. I have good friends who made their careers there. I at one point considered signing up for the CIA. The station chief in Alexandria, Egypt early on tried to recruit me based on an argument that I was sort of sympathetic to that the CIA would be much more appreciative of my talents that the State Department ever would be. Inclinations I had which might strike fear into the hearts of a good State Department person who be just the sorts of inclinations that would make a good intelligence officer. Again, the community is too big, too much emphasis on quantity rather than quality, too much copying. I sometimes think the Army Attaché in the Embassy is copying what the CIA element at the Embassy is producing which in turn is pilfering material from the Political Section of the Embassy. Publish or perish may be okay in the academic setting, but in the world of intelligence it's not a particularly good principle to operate on. It's good to get it out there, otherwise keep quiet for fear of burying good things in this great mass of material.

To the extent that I can recall really profiting from one or another of the military intelligence components or from the CIA it tended to be in technical areas where I really didn't have any personal expertise, no background experience against which to measure events and developments and gauge their import or lack of import. So I found that it was very helpful to for me when I was on the Israeli desk to discuss with an Air Force intelligence officer who happened to be quite good why it didn't make any sense to put J-79 engines into the Mirage III aircraft. He said that it's like taking a Cadillac engine and putting it in a Volkswagen.

All we want, and I can't remember the number, but I think it was like 60 or 70 J-79 jet engines and a J-79 engine is the engine used to power the F-4 Phantom fighter jet which at that time was our top weapon system of its kind. So why do they want these engines? It all preceded my time in the desk and had already happened when I arrived at the desk and here I did cover that fairly shortly thereafter started working on proving that the Israelis

behind our backs were intent upon developing an indigenous capability to produce their own high-performance fighter aircraft. They said at the time they wanted a J-79 to retrofit as I recall the Mirage III jets. Prior to 1967 the French had been the principal arms supplier to the Israelis and the Israeli Air Force, one of its main components was the Mirage and I believe they were Mirage IIIs. The cover story was that they wanted these aircraft engines to retrofit them. I'm talking to this Air Force guy about it, and he explains why it was crazy. But of course, Israel being Israel, even in those days even in 1970, 1971 never mind today, we did not have a very well-developed tendency to question what they were doing and why and how this meshed with U.S. interests. So this is one example of ways in which other elements of the intelligence community were beneficial to the work I was doing or helping me to understand matters of interest to me technically.

I thought in terms of pure political analysis the State Department INR in general far superior to any other element in the intelligence community. I admit this is based to some degree on institutional bias, and it's not to say that everything that everybody else was worthless and is not to say that there wasn't a mountain of things that I was totally unaware of what that were tremendously valuable being cranked out by the CIA.

Q: The CIA produces essentially secret material for which it pays money. I mean, it's a product which it buys and may give an undue weight to the product that it has paid good money for or gotten by secret means whereas in looking at almost any society your overt sources are probably a preponderance of the most valuable to figure out whither a country or what it's going to do. Do you think that is a factor?

CELLA: Absolutely. In regard to your first point about the CIA paying for this stuff, that's on the collection side. On the analysis side their analyses are not dictated solely by the agency's own collection. They have the same access as the INR analysts.

Q: But they have bought it.

CELLA: Sure. So that gives you some proprietary interest in giving it priority place in your own mental construct of whatever it is you're trying to analyze and draw some conclusions about. Open source regardless of whether the material comes from a key to sound intelligence analysis like I suppose sound analysis of an electrocardiogram is the expertise, the capability of the individual making the analysis. You've got to have good people doing the analyzing.

There's an outfit that started up, I can't remember the name of it, it's been quite a few years. I think it's in Northern Virginia which my understanding is doing quite well, selling analyses based on open source material and particularly with the Internet now. But, even back in the antediluvian days when I was in the intelligence business, open source, if I had to pick among all sources and you only got one, I would say I'd go with open source. This of course, is before death of newspapers although they haven't died in Europe yet completely. If you have some knowledge of the area if you had some personal exposure to the mentality of whatever area you are looking at and some feel for the culture why you can figure out an awfully lot from open sources. I know you have

cautioned me by indirection not to jump back but when I was working on the my paper on the Israeli plane and tank production I got a tremendous amount of stuff out of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service material, a tremendous amount. I don't know if they still produce it, but that was very valuable. I would find there in my files I would probably have at least as much unclassified FBIS material as classified material from other sources. I would find in statements picked up in FBIS Israeli military people were saying things publicly that would've been with us said privately. If you knew what you were looking for, and in this case I'm looking for hints that they're working toward this indigenous production capability, they weren't all over FBIS every day but I would say not a week or certainly not a month would go by without something significant popping up there that would say clinch my suspicions on various points. I think we ignore open source material at our peril just as the fact that it's clandestinely gathered material by definition has to be more valuable or more definitive. That's a dangerous notion just as the crazy notion that Stansfield Turner entertained in what went a long way toward wrecking the CIA, the belief that we could rely on so-called national technical means. Satellites would tell us all we needed to know, and we really didn't need agents on the ground with the attendant risk of them engaging in politically embarrassing activities.

Q: You are dealing with European affairs and this would apply to any intelligence agency. Was there a chance for people who are dealing with Europe to sit around over a glass of, I suppose for Europe, wine or beer? To kick ideas around or was this really something between one analyst who would think this up and depend particularly on the personality and the thought process of the analyst or was there more collective effort to say, okay, where we going in Europe? And get people together?

CELLA: I don't think we had an every three o'clock, or at three o'clock every Wednesday and do something like that but at least with my group I think that that sort of thing happened just as a natural part of the discussions. I personally hate meetings and always have. We would have, I think three times a week, maybe daily, morning meeting with the Director. We had a daily meet with the analysts who would come to my office. We'd go around the room and ask. Any analysts would say well here's what's happening with my country. Sometimes nothing happened. The events of the last 24 hours would be laid out, and if we saw something that was a pattern, maybe it's the British election and Kinnick gave a speech in Liverpool last night in which he said thus and so about nuclear weapons. That might lead to the question is he changing his position and if so why? What impact might this have on the election, would this have impact on other countries and the German analyst and French analyst and the Benelux analyst could speak up. We did not just daily so-called current intelligence and not just analysis of events of the day that might fit in some kind of broader pattern such as to say an election campaign. We produced broader written documents that looked at issues in some depth and from a variety of perspectives.

We talked earlier about European attitudes toward SDI. We did a long paper. I have to say we were really lucky that I had excellent analysts working for me, a collection of different personalities, but each one in his or her own way really good, really had a lot of strength. I had a senior guy who was not an intelligence analyst, he had been a senior

Foreign Service Officer and prior to that had been a New York Times newspaper guy in Europe, a guy by the name of Art Olson who had a tremendous breadth of experience in Europe. He was a great sounding board when he came to doing the sort of thing that you just inquired about, broader discussions about where we might be headed. We did a paper in which Art was a major contributor on European attitudes toward the Strategic Defense Initiative which said things that I doubt other people could have said.

I talked earlier about having some exercise in power. Sitting in INR, you got no power; you're just there putting out these papers. Well, depending upon what you say in those papers it might exert some influence. It was fun. I was in a geographic bureau or in the European Bureau and I'm talking about the European attitudes toward SDI, it would be hard for me to say what we said in our INR paper which we did in sort of an artful way, but we essentially said SDI makes the Europeans nervous, they don't trust technology, they think the Americans put too much trust in technology, they remain very concerned about the Reagan Administration and they're extremely troubled on the one hand that SDI may cost a hell of a lot of money, provoke a lot of trouble and not work or on the other hand, it might work and that might be bad too for European interest. We were able to say SDI was a cuckoo idea that's doing us a hell of a lot of damage in Europe. If you're the Deputy Assistant Secretary in EUR, you cannot say that.

I had good relations with people in EUR Bureau but I did not spend personally a lot of time dealing with people in the Bureau. I left my analysts free as they pleased to interact with folks in the Bureau but I didn't go out of my way to create problems for them. I saw our role to call it the way we saw it, to make sure that we could back up our call with available facts. We did a shorter essay called a back of the book. Every day INR would produce a morning brief which consisted of two single spaced pages, the first three pages were individual items, usually no more than three sentences with a comment. You can't do this comment. He continues to dig his hole deeper or whatever. And then there would be the back of the book piece, so-called, which consisted of a one-page essay. All elements of INR would contribute potential items for the front of the book, short items and also potential items back the book essays. There was an editor who set up in the director's office whose job it was to cull the various pieces to decide what should be included and to prioritize the pieces.

We did one on the transfer of technology and the European attitude toward the U.S. approach toward the transfer of technology. We're talking about the Reagan Administration; we're talking about Richard Perle over at the Department of Defense, a guy who actually hated the Europeans, particularly the Germans. You know, he's got a nice country house in France, he enjoys the French cuisine. I knew him going back long before he arrived in the Reagan Administration as a guy who didn't like Europeans because they didn't support Israel sufficiently, to put it very bluntly. He sat over there as is an Assistant Secretary of Defense. I could be wrong, I think he was prime instigator, he certainly went along with it, of a move to restrict foreign access to U.S. technology including attendance at seminars run by essentially private organizations. Perle played a role in putting up all these roadblocks to make it difficult for the Europeans to get a hold of some of the stuff. I'm not saying he dismantled U.S.- European technology

relationship, but what I am saying is that he and others in the Reagan Pentagon tightened the screws on access to symposia and that sort of thing for non-Americans. Well, the Israelis had no problem getting into these meetings but the Europeans were finding the doors closed to them on many occasions. This was really agitating them, bothering them. So we did a piece on how resentment was growing in Europe at what was viewed as overly restrictive U.S. policies with regard to European access to leading edge American technological thinking. We went on to say what that this could imply in the broader scheme of transatlantic relations. At the time Secretary Shultz was, I think, on vacation or out on the West Coast. He read this piece and he went back to European Bureau and asked if it was true. The European Bureau was furious at us in INR for having produced this without checking with them. I allowed as how I didn't feel there was any obligation to check with them but perhaps we should have done that. They're upset because this was the first that Schulz hears of this. We are saying this is a potentially significant irritant in U.S.- European relations so Schulz goes to the European Bureau and says, "Well, is this true?" The European Bureau didn't like our saying that, because it creates this problem. It's not the merits that count, it's the façade, the appearance that counts.

They are annoyed that in effect we had done something we should have done all along. I mean, their own comportment should have alerted people higher up that this was an issue. It was an issue that made the front page of The New York Times and a lot of important things never make the front page of The New York Times, occasionally because The New York Times doesn't want them to be on their front page. I said to the European Bureau, "If this isn't so, poke holes in it. Feel free, fire away." Well, they couldn't rebut it. They had to go back to Shultz and say this is a problem. Whether that ever lead to any kind of remedial action or not, I don't recall.

Another essay we did again, you made a mistake asking this question so you know I give you long answers. I worked with two of my analysts, my principal analyst from Germany and my principal analyst from the UK on what became a fairly lengthy piece called Anti-Americanism in Europe. We're talking 1984 to 1985, a fair amount of anti-Americanism in Europe. We did about a 12 page analysis of how serious is this phenomenon, what is provoking it, what might it lead to and we pointed out the differences in various countries, that sort of thing. We did an unclassified version which made the Washington Post Outlook section front page, above the fold and the classified version earned us a cash award for best essay of its kind of the year.

Q: How do these articles, since I assume these were all classified articles, become unclassified?

CELLA: The anti-Americanism one. I was at a Carnegie event and had a conversation with Jodie Allen who was then the editor or the deputy editor of the Outlook section. I don't know how we got onto anti-Americanism in Europe but it came up that we had done, my office had done some work on this subject, and largely it was unclassified. It seems to me that there was a little bit that was classified. I wanted it to be unclassified. Anyway, we produced an unclassified version, and she said, "Well, I'd like to take a look at it." And I said, "No problem. It's unclassified." She got all excited and said we'd like

to publish this and came after me. You know when they want something, it's funny. You try and try to get things published in the newspaper, it's like you're invisible except when they want it, they come after you. Jody Allen came to my house to get a final marked up version. The discussion took place on a Tuesday, the following Sunday we are in the Outlook section of The Washington Post.

Q: You left there in 1986. Wither?

CELLA: I knew that going to INR as opposed to pursuing some other opportunities, was not a particularly good career move. I had made a mistake after some roadblocks earlier in my career getting promoted too fast so that I had made the old Class One Minister Counselor in 1983. I had five years to get promoted or to get a limited career extension.

Before I left Brussels, and I think perhaps is worth talking about a bit, Ambassador Roy Atherton who was then the Director General of the Foreign Service called me up. I had known him from my days in the Near East Bureau. He called me up in Brussels and asked me if I'd be interested in becoming the new head of the Commissioning and Tenure Board. By now the Foreign Service personnel system in its endless march toward idiocy had instituted, I can't remember, this probably happened back in the seventies sometime, had this idea of a Commissioning and Tenure Board which would review the files of junior officers with less than five years of service with a view to recommending either that they be tenured, that is guaranteed another 15 years or whatever of the Foreign Service, or that they be terminated. The board is composed of I think, five members, either five or seven. Roy Atherton calls me up and says, "I'd like you to take over this position." I knew for sure it would be a thankless task. I have a hard enough time putting up with the work I have to do without taking on additional work. But I said yes, I mean, I wasn't going to say no. One because I liked Ambassador Atherton. But two despite all my skepticism and some might say cynicism about the Foreign Service, I continue to believe it is extremely important arm of the government. I saw having a say on those officers who were retained and those who were let go as pretty important as to the future of the Foreign Service. So I said yes out of that idealistic notion.

And I said yes for a selfish reason. The selfish reason was this; being chairperson of the Commissioning and Tenure Board I would have access legitimately to the filed of every Junior Officer in the Foreign Service. This could come in handy in recruiting people to work for me. And that was exactly my thinking. I went on to accept this position and held it for two years. Interestingly enough the two people on the selfish side that I tried to recruit, one was a very bright guy, was a Columbia University graduate whom I had known a bit at NATO when he was out there as a summer intern. He impressed me as really quite a bright guy and surprisingly enough could write fairly well. He got in the Foreign Service. He wound up in the visa section and I knew him. He was coming up for reassignment and he had or we had a slot that he could've filled. The other person I tried to recruit and here I don't remember the details, was a young woman and whatever was in her background she had the kind of expertise that I was looking for another slot coming open in my office in INR. In both cases when I went after these people they had left the Foreign Service. The guy resigned out of the visa mill of London. I guess he just, you

know. You don't really want to put talented people in the visa section in London unless you explain to them that this is isn't going to be their whole life and some good could be gained from doing this kind of work.

It's funny, I remember when I was in the A-100 course or afterwards I guess, that they don't really teach people when they come in. We shun consular assignments. It's not the prestige thing, back to prestige and power. You want a consular assignment because that's the only time a junior officer, truly junior officer, can make a decision that matters, in some cases it's a matter of life and death. As a visa officer I changed, I know I changed, lives of some people.

Anyway, why he resigned I don't know. But he's gone. And the lady was gone too. So my selfish motive in the end did not produce anything. But reading through all these files one of the things it did do for me was make it a little more palatable to get kicked out of the Foreign Service. One of the main reasons why I left the Foreign Service, besides being obliged to leave, was I was really depressed at looking through the files of the all these junior officers. It wasn't necessarily their fault. It was what the system had become. I can remember about this time, it might've been the Director General of the Foreign Service, a senior personnel guy was quoted in a Washington Post article in which the basic thrust of the article was that the Foreign Service was not attracting the kind of talent it used to and the State Department guy gives a great answer. “No. We still get 10,000 applicants a year for a hundred spots” or whatever it is. We're talking numbers here, quantity rather than quality. He says it's as competitive as it ever was. Still all kinds of people are dying to get in, many more than we can let in. Of course, that's great, assuming that 10,000 you’re getting in 1985 are the same 10,000 we were getting in 1965. Well, they weren't the same 10, 000; they weren’t coming from the same places.

I can recall about this time lecturing at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service to graduate students and at the end of my presentation we would do questions and answers. And at the very end I would say well now if you have no more questions I have one for you. How many of you plan to take the Foreign Service exam? I can remember in one class one hand goes up. These are graduate students at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, a prime traditional source for the former Foreign Service. They didn’t even bother to take the frickin exam, except one woman puts her hand up but then she quickly points out that she's doing so not because she was interested in the Foreign Service but for the experience. She thought it would be an interesting experience. I read through all these files and say, “Jesus, I don't really want these folks working for me.” That’s engaging typically in exaggeration. There are plenty of worthy people but it was clear that they were not the same as the group that I started out with. The system did this to them. The Foreign Service had become a much less attractive place and the same people weren't going for career there in the 1980s that had been in the 1960s and before. Also the system had gotten so screwed up. The word was out to graduate students at Georgetown that you didn't want to work the State Department if you didn't have to. I talked earlier about my theory of counter-management. A good example, by putting in all these thresholds, cones, out of cone assignments, this, that, that these people spent an awful lot of time worrying about their career and what the next step is going to be.

Q: Rather than just taking the job and doing a good job.

CELLA: Yes. And the system forced them to do that. You have to bid and the system is still corrupt. They put in the bid system to fool people into thinking that the guys with the inside track don't get the plum jobs the way they have always done. It's still the same, and I'm sure it's the same today. But by putting all these and taking essentially a small group of people and basically quite a bright group of people and introducing all these personnel gimmicks and wrinkles is just bad across the board. It produces an awfully lot of people who are kind of, I'm all right, Jack. We used to call them suicide statements where in their annual evaluation they would write in their own words about what they had done. So many of them were just depressingly preoccupied with where they wanted to be 10 years down the road as opposed to the actual work.

Q: You did this for two years.

CELLA: I finished my tour in INR from '84 to '86. I would've been happy to have stayed there longer. I was essentially forced out, behind my back the way those things are. My immediate superior, the Deputy Director, basically hated Foreign Service Officers and he was all for the civil service people.

Q: Who is this?

Cello: Well, he went on to be really famous, Dick Clark. Richard Clark, whom I had known back in my MBFR days. He was behind my back, referring to me as a burnt out case. I was older than I wanted to be, but I don't think I was particularly burnt out. I still don't think I'm burnt out, but you can be the judge of that. He was saying snide things behind my back. Clark doesn't realize of course, but hey, I've got friends, and my analysts tended to like me because I treated them well, I treated them like human beings. I did my best to reward them, get them promoted and that sort of thing. So I pretty much knew what was going on through people who would come and tell me things that I needed to know. I think number one he personally had an animus for Foreign Service Officers in general, although he had friends in the Foreign Service Officers to the extent he had friends. Friends in italics.

So I think he wanted me out of there which didn't cause me to lose sleep, but I would've been happy to stay. I really liked what I was doing, and I was pretty proud of what we have accomplished, I mean, making the front page of the Outlook section. We have called every single election of any significance in Western Europe and Canada absolutely right, including picking upsets. I take credit for that only in one instance. I come back from Portugal and I was convinced that Soares was going to win. My analyst didn't think so and it was the only time I imposed my judgment on my analysts. My office had real really good analysts who knew their countries. We had just a damn good record on things you can prove. If you say so and so is going to win that election and so-and-so loses, well you are wrong but if they win, you're right and that's provable, not a value judgment. I think that the INR Director, Mort Abramowitz who I had been known for a long time, felt

a little pang of conscience. He at the last minute made a strenuous effort to place me on the Policy Planning staff as the European guy, or the NATO guy. I can't remember whether it was the security slot or more of the geographic slot, but it was the Policy Planning staff which would have pleased me too, because again, no protocol, no toasts to write and you supposedly just think about the issues. But the position fell through. I was interviewed by the head of the Policy Planning staff and he told me well I, I had the job. At the end it wasn't funded, and so I wound up going off to predecessor of the Foreign Service Institute in Roslyn, Virginia.

Q: Okay, you went to Roslyn. Well, to FSI. What were you doing?

CELLA: I was a Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs.

Q: This was a special thing that was created I think, during Steve Low's time, was it?

CELLA: He didn't create it, I don't believe, but he was the director around the time it was created. Maybe the guy who thought it up I think, was John McDonald. He had been in the economic section in Cairo when I was in Alexandria years before. It's now-defunct. It could have served here to very good purposes but again, the State Department didn't know what to do with it.

In December, 1986 I completed two years as Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for Western Europe and Canada in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department. I had been quite happy in that position. I enjoyed, the subject matter was interesting, I had fortunately a good staff, and it was a subject matter with which because of my background I was quite familiar and at home. I recall with some pride that my recollection is that during those two years we called every single election of significance in our area of responsibility correctly including some upsets. We did that because we had people who really had a good feel for the situation.

Apropos of my INR experience and all the discussion more recently that has taken place with regard to the intelligence community and its shortcomings etc., I think based on my time and based on my understanding of the INR's performance, for example, during the run up to the our current adventure in Iraq that they did quite good. The Bureau performed quite well. I think one of the secrets of its success was that it is relatively small so you didn't have confusion over who had authority to do what. You didn't have people getting in each other's way, and the individual portfolios were fairly well-designed. Two, in general, INR Directors again, I say in general, were relatively free from domestic political pressures, and the third point is that there was an interesting admixture in INR. You had people sitting such as myself who were practicing Foreign Service Officers who had actually lived abroad for extended periods of time and you had career civil service analysts who had may or may not had been abroad. In most cases, I guess they had been abroad but not actually lived abroad for any extended length of time in an official capacity but who really knew their countries or their regions. They spent years and years devoting themselves getting to know just about everything that was worth knowing about again, a particular country or region. So you had an atmosphere in which someone with a

huge academic background could have his ideas tested against someone who had practical experience on the ground in the country or the region and vice versa. Those of us who might be called practitioners had a chance to interact or were obliged to interact with people who frequently knew a lot more about places where we had lived in terms of history and the economies etc., had a broad academic, in-depth academic knowledge of countries in which we had actually lived that far exceeded what we had acquired while living there. On the other hand, we had actually lived there and in analyzing for example, the Nazi heritage in Germany. I can see where one could be extremely competent academically in discussing that but it wouldn't be quite the same as someone who had been in Germany, who had spoken in German with Germans who had lived through the Nazi experience and heard their stories in terms of what the day-to-day realities were and could observe the extent to which the realities of the past influenced the realities of the present.

Q: You mentioned something about being proud of how you were able to call the elections the benchmark of the political section. You've got an election coming up in country X. Who's going to win? In the long run from a practical point of view, that's playing the reporter. The real job would be if A party wins, this is the implication; if B party wins, these are the implications on our foreign policy. Who wins or not, is sort of the frosting on the cake if you call it right because really you should be ready for which ever does but to tell what does this mean for us?

CELLA: Well, we would in general do that. If we wrote a piece of election analysis, we would certainly include some sort of prognosis as to the implications for U.S. interests. I agree. Somebody could be fantastic at taking polls and interpreting the results of polls but absolutely useless in terms of the practicalities or the implications of this. So it for one, I called it right, hooray. Fine. That's half the job. You're quite right, the other half in some ways the riskier half, I think we did that in general.

Q: Maybe we talked about this before, but you had Canada. It's always very tricky to figure out wither Canada. You know, talking about Québec. Did we have a plan Z if Québec secedes, what does this mean? Or is this almost a no-no because if you have the damn thing will probably leak and if it leaks, it will get to the Canadian press and then the fat is in the fire.

CELLA: During my time in INR which is to say 1984 through the midyear of 1986 things were relatively quiet or quite quiet on the Québec Libre front. There was not a lot of agitation going on in those years for a separate Québec political entity. Whether or not we had a plan, that's probably not something that INR would be involved in. I was not aware of the existence of such a plan. I would hope we would have had a plan but based on my general knowledge of the State Department I tend to doubt it for among other things the reason that you just cited. I did a cable, was the principal author of the cable on NATO, suggesting that we ought to analyze Soviet bona fides across the board with regard to arms control which would seem to me to be a normal pretty normal, natural thing to do, and we were chastised for fear that even a hint that the Soviets were not were not genuinely honest interlocutors in our arms control negotiations would upset the SALT

applecart on Capitol Hill. Literally, the question that was put to us, well, what if this leaks? And of course, my answer was, unfortunately since I would be embarrassed to have to confess that we had taken so long to get around to what I thought was a pretty obvious analysis to make.

Canada, I've always had a certain interest in and fondness for Canadians. One aspect of the Québec issue which has always puzzled me just a little bit is here we have right next door, slap up next to us, an example of how divisive language can be in a political context. And the same time we will agitate, there are politicians who will agitate and agitate with some success and agitate with a great deal of determination in trying to get Spanish equal footing with English in certain parts of the country. Based on my observations in Canada of what language can do to a country, and for sure, based on living in Belgium, truly bilingual and actually a trilingual country, I have seen how destructive linguistic differences can be on the body politic. I understand the need to respect other cultures, and I understand that it's basically a positive thing for people to take pride in their heritage. I don't understand any move to encourage giving another language, Spanish or Swahili or whatever language, equal footing with English in this country. One of the secrets of this country's success in the past has been the English language. Language in this country has up until fairly recently, been a unifier. In Canada it is a divider, in Belgium it is a divider. Why we would want, given these examples, to go down that same path really puzzles me.

Q: Let's move on. In 1986 where did you go?

CELLA: I would have been happy to have stayed in INR. I can't prove this, but I believe I was, in effect, eased out. That is to say, I was there for two years assignment; two years expired and there was no effort to sign me up for another year which I would have been happy had that happened. I did not lobby for that either partly because I suspected that I was being eased out. The Deputy INR Director that had direct purview over my office was someone who I suspect didn't particularly care for Foreign Service Officers. I suspect that he didn't particularly care for me specifically partly because of my penchant for not gilding lilies and for saying what I thought was correct and accurate as opposed to what I thought other people wanted to hear. In any case, I was not invited to reenlist.

I think at one minute until midnight, which is to say after it was already clear that I was going and my successor had been appointed or selected, the Director of INR had some pangs of conscience, suspecting perhaps I had been treated shabbily which in a way I had been. I don't know exactly how it happened but he wound up promoting me to Richard Solomon who was then head of the Policy Planning staff as a candidate for a new position on the Policy Planning staff, concentrating on NATO and NATO type issues. Dick Solomon interviewed me. We got along fine and I said, “Yes, that something I would certainly be interested in doing." Again, I like the idea of being as free as possible from the toils of the bureaucracy and had the luxury of spending most of my time on concentrating on the substance of issues. In the end the job fell through because they didn't get funding for the position. There I was adrift in the summer of 1986.

I'm trying to remember his name, but a fellow in senior personnel who was sort of responsible. He was a very decent guy and he called me up one day and said, “You know, they can use somebody like you right away at something called the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs." The Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs had been established, I'm not sure exactly when, but I think only couple of years earlier meaning in the early 1980s. One of the persons and possibly the prime mover in the establishment of the Center was a Foreign Service Officer by the name of John MacDonald whom I had known casually when I was in Alexandria in the early 1960s and he was the Economic Counselor at the Embassy in Cairo.

The idea of the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs was to have a place where relatively senior, relatively experienced or actually very experienced officers could go and draw upon their expertise to think about various issues in perhaps non-conventional ways and ways that for say, domestic political reasons you weren't allowed to think about in a standard line position. It was also a place where, quite frankly, you could just dump senior Foreign Service Officers who had not been able to come up with another assignment but for one reason or another couldn’t be put out on the street so you could put them over at the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs. It was also a place where ambassadorial nominees could wait out their confirmations or ambassadorial nominees who would run into trouble or failed to get confirmed could be parked until something else can be found for them. It served a variety of purposes, but its main purpose as I saw it was o establish a place where people who had genuine, solid background could draw upon that background to study, research, write about, conduct seminars on current or potentially future diplomatic problems or international security problems.

I was asked if I would be interested in going. I said yes I would. The then Director of the Center and we got along fine, and he was desperate to get someone to organize a seminar on any subject that had to do with NATO and a substantial military component. He was a bit desperate because as I recall or I know this enterprise is being funded by the NSA, the National Security Agency. I think the Center had already gotten the money and I think for fiscal reasons this program had to be completed by the first of October. Here we were the first of August or so and the Director had nothing in hand. He was happy to have me.

I was basically happy to go there. It was sort of a place where I would be free to do a lot of things including figuring out what I was going to do when I got out of the Foreign Service because by 1986 I had at most three years to run before I would be forced out under the brilliant Foreign Service personnel system. I had made the mistake of being promoted too young so at what I thought was the height of my powers I would be obliged to leave the Foreign Service unless I got something called a limited career extension. It was highly unlikely although my performance evaluations were okay that INR was going to lead for an extension and for sure not sitting on the shelf at the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs which by the way was located in the predecessor building to this complex where we are seated today. We had a suite of offices in the Foreign Service Institute in Roslyn.

I knew that wasn't going to get me limited career extension so in effect I committed career hari-kari. I had decided by 1986 that I really didn't want to stay in the Foreign Service. I had just spent two years as the chairperson of the chair of the Commissioning and Tenure Board which passed on the retention or rejection of junior Foreign Service Officers. I had read the file of, as of spring of 1986, every Junior Officer in the Foreign Service and I was frankly rather depressed but not surprised at what I thought was a genuine general decline in the quality of the young Foreign Service Officers. I wasn't so sure that I wanted to be in a position of having to supervise the type of people that we were recruiting. Certainly there were many fine people being recruited. But, in general there was sort of a mentality among junior Foreign Service Officers which the system had forced upon them if they didn't already entertain it that is to think in terms of their own careers almost to the exclusion of the mission at hand and its furtherance. I was not content with the type of people I thought I might have to be supervising, the type of people I thought I'd likely get under my supervision.

I was also fairly disenchanted with the Foreign Service as an organization, State Department management, a whole bunch of institutional things I didn't particularly care for and here I want to make it very clear that I was not bitter or a malcontent. I had had a really good run and was then and remain now 20 years later, pretty content with what I had done and the opportunities afforded me to live in interesting places and be involved with interesting people and with interesting issues. So I have no personal complaints. It was disillusionment I suppose. There's a great phrase about how you really can't become truly disillusioned until you understood truly how the State Department personnel system worked. Well, I had a good window on the State Department personnel system for the past two years.

The third point was not being independently wealthy I couldn’t just go off with my Foreign Service annuity. I would have to do something with my life after the Foreign Service. I said well the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs offered me an excellent opportunity to reflect on precisely what it was I wanted to do and perhaps make some contacts that might facilitate my ability to do whatever it was I decided I wanted to do post Foreign Service.

So I went off generally content to the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs. I got about a month to organize a seminar given now it's early August and we had to organize, conduct and analyze the results of the seminar by the first of October. The topic I picked and the Director of the Center was very content with it was to really examine the pros and cons of high technology as a means of limiting NATO’s conventional imbalance vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact. The conventional imbalance, the conventional military imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact had been a problem throughout the life of the Alliance and how to go about fixing it. How to increase the Western defense effort? They were a budget questions, forever a problem within the Alliance. Who was doing what, who was literally carrying their fair share of the defense burden. There were all kinds of stratagems devised to try to get the Alliance individually and collectively to boost spending on conventional forces to a sufficient degree that NATO would have a convincing conventional deterrent without having to rely upon nuclear weapons or early

use of nuclear weapons for a Warsaw Pact, i.e. Soviet advance through the Fulda Gap and across through the English Channel.

One of the stratagems conceived of was to take NATO's, basically the U.S. but not exclusively the U.S., obvious technological advantages and through high-tech, to use the vernacular, to come up with weapon systems and related systems that were sufficiently superior to anything that the Warsaw Pact could field that despite the insoluble manpower deficiency that we would have a truly convincing deterrent.

Q: I might point out that 1986 was just about the time when the computer had really come of age. It had been around for a while, but I mean, particularly in the West it was really becoming part of our life.

CELLA: That's quite right. The significance of the development of the computer, I guess has been fully appreciated by some people, but I've never seen anything laid out on the impact of information technology across the board. There have been lots of treatises and plenty of practical applications of sophisticated information technology to the development of military systems. For example, I can remember thinking at the time and certainly by the early 1980s when I, as I frequently did in those days, would give a presentation to various groups on East-West relations and the military balance etc. I would point out that the computer and satellite television presented real problems for the Soviet Union. One of the key things, and I'm not an expert in such matters so this is just my final analysis may be worth very little, it struck me that to maintain a Communist regime or any totalitarian regime it is very important to have a monopoly on information. In classic Communist takeovers or attempted takeovers one of the ministries they would go after would be the Ministry of Education. I said to myself this is going to be a real problem for the Soviet regime to on the one hand maintain the kind of control over information that is crucial to their endurance without on the other hand risk falling terribly behind the West in technology which would introduce an external vulnerability that would be very unwelcome. They had a choice between an internal vulnerability or an external vulnerability. My reading of Gorbachev, to this day I don't see him as a great liberal, but I think he tried to cut that knot.

Q: I was really talking about not so much the Internet communication, but the ability to manipulate machines and all the technology. It was no longer just playing you might say, just how many tanks if you've got, the capability of tanks and airplanes and missiles and everything else was really moving ahead. This was a real revolution because of the computer.

CELLA: A term applied I believe to the concepts you just laid out is force multipliers. While you may not increase your aggregate number of tanks you substantially enhance your ability to deploy those tanks in ways that make them most effective because you've got a full spectrum picture of the battlefield. You can make decisions or machines can make decisions for you very, very quickly and very precisely. This presents a potentially decisive battlefield advantage.

So we did the seminar on using high-tech, and we examined the Soviet approach to technology as well. I was lucky in that I was able to recruit really good speakers and it was just a one-day program. It was packed with a lot of worthwhile, valid insights. We had a segment where I brought in Leonard Sullivan who had been Assistant Secretary of Defense. He was a very creative guy, and as a result he had some problems as Assistant Secretary of Defense. He gave a terrific presentation on using low-tech, really low-tech to make up for the conventional imbalance. He had a bunch of drawings. It almost looked like he had engaged Rube Goldberg for assistance. He had slides or schematics and he gave about a 45 minute presentation which among other things as I recall he theorized that Volkswagens could be used, plain old Volkswagens, very effectively to create problems for Soviet tank advance. The thought was to concentrate the Volkswagens at choke points on the Autobahn in areas where tanks would come up to a couple of Volkswagens and because it's raining, is not particularly easy to go around them and it's sufficient numbers of them that you couldn't just roll all over them. I'm not doing his idea justice, but he had a bunch of notions on how one could use not only existing technology, but very basic existing technology. If applied creatively, it could really do some surprising things.

I remember I brought in a chap by the name of Chris Donnelly who was a fairly young Englishman who had done a lot of academic work on the Soviet Union and was very, very knowledgeable about the Soviet military. He gave quite an interesting presentation on the Soviet approach which was low-tech. Why low-tech? He talked about how they dislike to have complicated weapon systems; they wanted things that were easy to repair even by relatively uneducated, relatively raw military recruits. He provided very a worthwhile counter to the American tendency to put too much faith in technology thinking that technology will do, will solve all the problems.

But at the end of the day and of course, now this is 20 years ago, I think the broad conclusions that we arrived at was that yes, high technology or Western technological advantages offered some promising avenues that were actually already being pursued to enhance NATO's conventional military capabilities vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact. These avenue should be pursued, but on the other hand, technology in and of itself was not a panacea. To think that we could solve things through technology at lower cost, that we can solve our problems and challenges that way was probably inaccurate. Yes, continue to take advantage of technology but be mindful of its limitations and, in any case, continue to make the necessary effort to maintain robust conventional capability. Technology did not mean you could cut budgets. In fact, it might well mean, and I think has meant, you're going to spend a hell of a lot more money. There was general agreement, not universal, but general agreement among the participants in the audience that technology was just one component of conventional defense, and that to look upon look upon it as an inexpensive magic bullet, which is the way some defense contractors would like you to look at it, would be misleading and possibly dangerous.

Q: This was during 1986 you are really talking about the last gasp of the end of an era, the two mighty forces facing each other, weren't you? I mean, because three years later that all had come apart.

CELLA: Yes, it did all come apart. And it's unfortunate in my judgment, that we in the West and particularly in the United States did not do a better job of thinking through the implications of the old scheme of things, the old changing so dramatically, the intellectual construct which we had used for nearly 50 years, for 40 years, to think about East-West security issues was now out the window. I wish we had spent a little bit more time reflecting on what that really would mean for the future rather than celebrating our triumph in the present. I personally was concerned about the day after the magic brew of Soviet hostility and antagonism toward the West, once that disappeared or appeared to disappear what would come next? I was concerned that there would be a little too much sighing of relief and self-congratulation and not enough of reflecting upon the fact that this new state of affairs could carry with it also new and potentially very serious threats complications for our security and how should they be managed? In this new world where you could not count on getting support from almost anything provided you can package it as part of the broad Soviet effort to undermine the threat in the West.

Q: Last night I was looking at a documentary showing a small coastal German submarine crew working away in the Baltic. I kind of wondered that's all very nice. Germans have this great U-boat tradition but what the hell could you use it for these days? The thing couldn't be used anywhere but in the Baltic and along the Norwegian coast. I was just thinking, training in that? It's terrible to give up you know, for a military force to give up U-boats but what are you going to use them for? They don't have particular long-range.

CELLA: Well, one permanent use for Baltic and coastal submarines or any other military system is the construction of same, makes the people who are doing the building happy, provides jobs.

Q: We're doing that now.

CELLA: Of course, the fact is the existing military industrial complex in the late 1980s or early 1990s was not really challenged. There were a lot of people in defense industries who were worried about what would happen. For a couple of years and I think is still going on to some degree there was a fair amount of effort put into defense conversion. What do you do when you no longer have to make coastal submarines? What else can you make? There was concern. As it turned out based on my impression which could be inaccurate, that concern was misplaced because one, by then the military industrial complex about which General Eisenhower famously, and eight years belatedly, warned in his farewell address. It was so dug into the broader U.S. economy and so entrenched on Capitol Hill and had done such a good job of building localized parochial cases for this factory or that factory, this assembly line or that assembly line, that there never was any so-called peace dividend. Defense budgets have done nothing but go up in the last 15 to 20 years.

Q: After doing this study in the first place, were there any repercussions? You think it added anything?

CELLA: We had a fairly high quality audience drawn from various sectors of the government and from the intelligence community and academia. I would think it was highly likely that some of the thought spread abroad on that occasion did take root and have some kind of influence. We did not produce a revolutionary, landmark study that captured headlines in The New York Times. That was not our purpose. As I saw that particular seminar the role was to contribute to the thinking on the subject among people who had some influence over it who were involved with it. I know people went away saying very good things about the experience. It got very high marks.

Also NATO related done probably in 1987 or early 1988 had to do with the future of the Alliance and, in general, nuclear weapons. One of the speakers was my last boss at NATO, my last big boss at NATO, Lord Carrington. I got him to generously agree to speak. The former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe General Bernard Rogers was another one of the speakers. I think, in introducing Lord Carrington I made some sort of arch comment about the State Department and I said, "Well, Lord Carrington, glad to have you here. I know you will contribute greatly to what I anticipate will be a very stimulating day and although I'm sorry to say, the Foreign Service Institute is part of the Department of State you will note the Potomac River separates us and therefore we have at least a shot of having a stimulating thought-provoking program." Afterwards the then head of the Foreign Service Institute let my director, the Director of the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs did not particularly appreciate Cella's performance.

Q: What were you doing then? I mean you had this press conference on technology. Did you find yourself basically in the conference mode? Was this sort of your slice of the pie?

CELLA: No, I was there as a senior fellow. I did not have a job description. I was free to involve myself or was asked to be involved in a whole variety of activities at the Center. I'll run through some of the things that I did. My primary pre-occupation was of course, figuring out my future, so I spent a fair amount of time engaged in activities relating to what would happen when the day came when I was kicked out the door. I organized several seminars in the almost three years I spent at the Center.

Q: This would have been 1986 to 1989?

CELLA: Yes. Again, my time ran out in May of 1989. I also participated in various games we would organize at the Center. We had at that time a very competent Foreign Service Officer who was very interested in game theory and using it as a tool in the process of developing policy. And so we did games which I was involved in. We did one on the subject I just mentioned concerning which I did a broader seminar was a game on NATO and nuclear weapons specifically focused on what would happen if we had just come through the nuclear modernization struggles within the Alliance in which we introduced modern modernized Pershing missiles and nuclear capable Cruise missiles. That was an issue which was initially the source of a fair amount of political turmoil. If things stayed as they were, it was not inconceivable that the day would come we would have to modernize yet again, and how would that be handled? So that was sort of the

focus of a smaller game but it had the future of the Alliance maintaining its defense capability and what are some of the issues that would have to be confronted?

We did another game in probably 1987 or ‘88 which was highly predictive of the Gulf War a couple of years later. These games are usually one day in duration, and I was not a prime organizer; my role was to advise on issues that should be written into the game. I occasionally played the role of, I’ve forgotten the technical term, but the guy who as the game progresses if things are going slow or off the track, getting things back on the track or reinvigorating the discussion or if they weren’t getting around to issues we wanted to explore make sure those issues were in place, like a referee I guess or an umpire.

The participants would come from a variety of sources. These games were frequently as I recall classified although usually at a fairly low level. I’m trying to remember whether we brought in outside outsiders, academic experts or think tank personnel. I think, the games were almost exclusively, or exclusively U.S. government folks. But it was interesting, and what we did at the end of a particular game we would write up a two-page summary which was submitted to the Secretary of State. Of all the agencies that we dealt with, to get people to come and play in the game and these are games that are meant to serve, broadly put, diplomatic purpose, the hardest agency to recruit from was the State Department. To get a State Department person in who is really up to what we were getting from other agencies in terms of experience and responsibility was very, very difficult and usually the State Department participant or participants would be the least active around the table even when we were talking about things that were clearly mainly within the purview of the State Department. Whatever happened to these two-page summaries that we sent to the Secretary of State, I have no idea. We did one on the Gulf War where I can't remember, it was clearer than the predictions of most of Nostradamus’ predictions. We said that we ought to be thinking about a shooting war in the Gulf in a relatively near future; we just explored the implications, the price of oil and that sort of thing. Again, this is the State Department. The State Department writ large, as opposed to the Center was not particularly involved in these games or enthusiastic about them, and I'm told, the Policy Planning staff was very unhappy about this particular operation and the fact that we had a direct pipe to the Secretary of State with our conclusions. They were unhappy about it because presumably this is the type of thing that they should be doing which was absolutely correct except they weren't doing it.

Again I so often I think back, or at the time I’m amused that here's the Department of State, a very big bureaucracy that somehow does not know how to equip itself with a mechanism for thinking about the future free from the pressures of coping with the present. Sure, to some degree in a very humble way the game and to some degree the seminar functions of the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs were competitive with the Policy Planning staff. But in fact, they weren't because there was no competition. What we were doing was filling a gap that was there to be filled.

Q: My impression is the Policy Planning staff for the most part was a place where the Secretary of State puts people who write speeches for him or her. It’s just not used as you

might say George Kennan conceived of it, as thinking about the future and how things might come out and what we should be doing diplomatically wise.

CELLA: That's my impression too. My one opportunity to go to work on the Policy Planning staff did not come to pass. Nor did a suggestion that I made to the Director General of the Foreign Service when I was head of the Commissioning and Tenure Board that there ought to be somebody on the Policy Planning staff with personnel knowledge and a lot of field knowledge to provide personnel recommendations based on future policy issues, one of disciplines that people should be trained in. We've now got very few people who can speak Arabic particularly well. It wouldn't have required a genius in the mid-1980s to say that we ought to really beef up our Arabic studies program and really beef up our cadre of truly competent Arabic language officers.

Q: Which is very hard. You can train up to a certain point but then you have to rely on almost natural talent.

CELLA: Well, you have to, it requires natural ability, but again these are the kinds of issues that you think about. I said to the Director General, I advance this as something I find almost self evident as being worth doing, and I'd be happy to do it but I'm not doing it to create a job for myself but I would've been happy to do. Sure. Take what you just said which is perfectly true. When I came in the Foreign Service and I suspect when you came in the Foreign Service, in my case it was an eight week A-100 basic course for Foreign Service officers. In the course of those eight weeks or fairly early on in those eight weeks, we took a language aptitude test. As I recall, the language was Kurdish that was used. Well, why give that test after people are already in the Foreign Service? Why not give it before people are in the Foreign Service and use that as part of the determination of who you're going to let into the Foreign Service? I'm not saying you give that test from day one, but once you've got people? I don't know how the system works these days, but in my time during the oral examination phase as part of the portfolio that the people who finally decide who to admit and not admit, part of the portfolio before them would include that person's language aptitude. I'm not saying that you had to have across the board high language aptitude, but you want a fair number of people thrown in with a mix with a high language ability aptitude. One of the problems with high language aptitude exhibit a, in that regard is that frequently people who are really good at languages tend to be kind of intellectually a little bit different in the way they look at things than other people. Language aptitude co-relates with mathematical aptitude and musical aptitude, good chess players. Good chess players are not necessarily noted as scintillating conversationalists or endearing personalities, but it should be a factor. And also not necessarily all potential language geniuses, but people who have reasonable capability. You want a few geniuses to train or maybe more than a few in the really hard languages. That should be part of the recruitment process.

To finish on the Policy Planning staff -- I have observed their work to some degree but I don't have personal experience there -- my sense is precisely what you just said. Among other things these days the principle function would be writing speeches. Also frequently people who were chosen to be head of the Policy Planning staff are the sorts of people

who want to be in on the action otherwise they feel neglected. That's precisely the wrong person to have as head of the organization. As we all know, the Turks are quite correct that a dead fish rots from the head down. The people on the Policy Planning staff, which I suppose it comes and goes, but I've always considered a fairly prestigious place to be are also folks who want their names out front. They're looking for their next assignment; they want to be active in the clearance process. If I was put in charge of Policy Planning staff, I'd say we don't clear anything. We are here to maintain close liaison with the various bureaus on selected issues, but we are here to provide a repository of independent thought with no policymaking responsibility. We plan, we don't make, and that would be my approach and it's not an attractive approach. As the military would say, it's not a career enhancing approach. How do you get ahead? You get ahead by make a name for yourself. How do you make a name for yourself? By having your name on cables and all over the place. You don't make a name for yourself stroking your chin in a dimly lit room wondering about where the United States is going to be 10 years from now and if it doesn't look like we're going to make it be in a good spot, how to avoid getting there.

Q: One of the things you asked me about what did I observe during doing these oral histories and one of the things that has bothered me is there is a tendency for more, let's say we have an active situation you know, a crisis. All of a sudden the operators who probably know about the situation, say in Iran, are pushed aside by the people who know how to operate within the Washington complex and Congress and the executive corridors of the Department of State or Defense. We push aside the experts. What happened in Iraq is typical of what happens. You move away from the experts into the operators who know how to operate the system, that is the bureaucratic system as opposed to have the knowledge of the culture or the geography of something and so you have a bunch of essentially amateurs activists running something. This is certainly true in Iraq which has led to a great disaster.

CELLA: Of course, I agree across the board. I was against the Gulf War, the so-called successful, the good, war. I was against that. I said the implications of getting involved there, down the road did not strike me as particularly promising. I said if you want to go to the Gulf War I would consider doing so with two provisos. One, revamp the national energy policy or find a national energy policy that makes some sense in terms of reducing our reliance on imported energy, and two, do something really serious to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli problem. You have to resolve that. Failing on those two counts, then no matter how it turned out the Gulf War would prove to be a prelude to more serious problems. Therefore, as I saw it, it was not worth sacrificing one drop of U.S. blood or anybody else's blood in an enterprise that may yield a short-term benefits but lead to long-term difficulties.

Before even the current war, I knew no one, absolutely no one who had any knowledge of the region and who did not have clearly a separate agenda who thought it would be anything but a disaster. The idea that we would be greeted with candy and roses, that might have worked, might have but there is no chance it is really going to happen. It was beyond our ability to do the sorts of things that would have been required. Sure, lots of people would be happy to see as there and get rid of Saddam but we would have to

quickly install some kind of successor mechanism to maintain security above all. Failing that then the sectarian tensions bubbling beneath the surface brutally contained by Saddam Hussein in many ways were bound to bubble to the surface fairly quickly. In my judgment it would have been impossible. Clearly, we were not making adequate preparations for this contingency. All the people I knew including two of my colleagues who had had personal dealings with Saddam Hussein, and everyone I talked to said this is craziness. I'm reminded here, I guess it was during my time on the Israeli desk that I developed a phrase. Expertise is the enemy of policy.

Q: What were you looking at doing, I mean you were saying you know, you were at the FSI working on this as a senior fellow. What did you see for the future for yourself?

CELLA: I wasn't determined to become rich late in life, although I would've happily done so. Money was not a controlling factor, but I wanted something with decent remuneration where I could draw upon my experience and interests to make some sort of contribution. What I found was not having the title Ambassador was a very big handicap in my job search. There were a couple of jobs I competed for where I was passed over in favor of someone who had the title of Ambassador. For example, there was a position as a kind of an adviser to a large corporation, mainly on the Middle East about which I knew a fair amount. In the end I lost out to another Foreign Service officer whom I had known personally and who was a perfectly good fellow but had virtually no Middle East background but he was an ambassador. My sense during what was an extended though not terribly energetic job search was that private industry can be at least as obtuse as the Department of State and maybe more so. Frequently they were more interested in the prestige that went with having an ambassador on the corporate masthead than they were in having someone who could really given sound insights not readily available elsewhere.

Concerning the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs which I believe is now defunct; I thought it was an excellent concept which the State Department was unable to make proper use of. One of the things it could've done and did do was function the way the Policy Planning staff was supposed to function but very quickly ceased to function in actually drawing upon past experience to try to anticipate bumps in the road that might be coming up in future and how best to minimize, if not entirely eliminate those bumps. The State Department and this is understandable, I suppose, tends to be bound up with putting out today's fire, dealing with whatever happens to be in today's headlines. It doesn't spend a lot of time thinking about tomorrow nor does it reward or cultivate people who are good at thinking about tomorrow. The Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs being out of the main line of policy development and implementation offered a haven, offered a place where experienced people could reflect, absent the daily day-to-day pressure of the policy making process and absent the pressure to conform with the standing orders of the day, with the preferences of the existing administration. I find too often that the political preferences of the administration determine our policies exclusive of the practical impact those policies are likely to have.

For very understandable reasons people were reluctant to put up their hands and say hey, wait a second, you've got this all wrong. I feel rather strongly about that, perhaps because

a prime example has been our policy in the Middle East for the last 50 years or so. I watched a number of people whom I otherwise respected who go along with wrongheaded policies in the Middle East, for example, in arming Israel to the teeth the argument would be a secure Israel would be more likely to make peace with the Arab neighbors than an insecure Israel. One could easily argue that you make Israel so secure it never has to make peace with its neighbors. You can argue that it's precisely the opposite effect. The political preference was to go along with the desires of the Israeli government and that has grown stronger and stronger over the years. In my time, the '60s and early '70s, it didn't hold the whip hand. The Israeli preferences did not hold the whip hand over U.S. policy that it has since acquired, thanks in large measure or thanks at least in part to its alliance in the late '70s with Christian fundamentalists who have such a strong voice in American politics these days. It was too easy to go along, and in the case of Israel, to go along with a policy that was fundamentally wrongheaded. When I worked in the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs I think virtually everyone at the so-called working level saw that our policies were crazy, were self-defeating and above all not only bad for the United States but bad ultimately for Israel. But people in the policy positions found it easy to go along with political preferences because they could construct arguments such as the one I provided you; giving Israel a bunch more F-4's in the early '70s would make it more likely for the Israelis to reach reasonable compromise on issues with its neighbors.

The Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs on the other hand, provided a place where more or less penalty free you could think through the issues, develop prescriptions for dealing with them immune from the political preferences of the day. That strikes me as potentially a tremendous resource, but again one that was never, in my judgment, properly taken advantage of.

Q: Did you see anybody tackling this Israeli one? I think, almost everybody who's looked at the issue immune from either ethnic bias, religious bias or in political bias, just looked at it in a straightforward manner would agree with much of what you've said, but was anybody doing that at the Center or was this again, a subject that spoke too much of a minefield that it just wasn't worth trying to deal with?

CELLA: There was nothing that I was aware of that would have prevented someone from getting into those questions. It was not on my agenda. I was there at a time when my credentials as a Middle East specialist were substantially out of date. I was there mainly to work on security issues, issues having to do with NATO political and military matters. I think that if one had proposed a seminar or a conference on the Middle East problem that probably would have gone through without any great difficulty. We did during my time one war game or one game, a political-military game involving the Gulf and that was the closest we came to anything serious with a Middle East flavor that I can recall. I think I noted that the game we did on the Gulf, I was involved helping as kind of an adviser on the scenario, was fairly predictive of what came to pass some years later in the first Gulf War. We noted that the Gulf was an area of potential serious instability, we noted that Iraq had not given up on Kuwait and indeed you could make an argument that if Basra, Baghdad and Mosul belonged in Iraq, why Kuwait should have belonged in

Iraq. The Iraqis had been on record for quite some time dating back to the time of Kuwaiti independence that that was a rather strongly held belief on their part.

Q: You were there until when?

CELLA: I went there in late summer of 1986 and left in late spring of 1989.

Q: And then what?

CELLA: Out the door.

Q: So you retired. How did you feel about the experience? You've had some very interesting stuff, but it didn't sound like you kind of got your reward. How did you feel about that?

CELLA: Let me just say a few more words about what I did while I was at the Center in addition to actually organizing seminars and games and helping out on seminars and games organized by other people. I did a fair amount of public speaking and lecturing including at the Washington semester series program at the American University, some of whose current students I know have been here under your tutelage. I had the opportunity to travel a fair amount; I made presentations at North Atlantic Assembly meetings. These are meetings that take place twice a year of parliamentarians from all NATO member states. I participated in the Soviet Union in a three or four day arms-control seminar organized by the United Nations with the Soviets acting as hosts. So in my three years at the Center I would say, I had a fairly varied experience and one that was fairly enriching.

Q: How receptive did you find the Foreign Service Institute and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center to this organization that was sort of grafted onto it?

CELLA: I noted neither a great deal of interest nor any obstruction. I don't know, we just sort of existed in our own little world. I think there's no point in being too interested in the Center. There's nothing to gain from it. Since the State Department was fairly indifferent to our existence there was no reason for the Foreign Service management structure to be concerned about us too much one way or the other. I do recall that one of the programs that I organized which included an appearance by the man was briefly my boss during the end of my time in NATO, Lord Carrington. There was a program on the future of the Atlantic Alliance and he kindly agreed to participate in it. Steve Low, Ambassador Low, who was then the Director of the Foreign Service Institute came to the part of the seminar that included the presentation by Lord Carrington. Apparently going back to Ambassador Low's involvement with Southern Rhodesia he was acquainted with Lord Carrington and so he came mainly on a personal basis. That was the only time I could recall in my three years seeing the Director of the Institute at any one of our programs. They may have come to lots of them. I was not involved in every single one, but that was the only time I can recall and it wasn't because of great interest in the Center, it was a personal deal between Ambassador Low and Lord Carrington. His only comment

which he passed down through our director had nothing to do with the quality of program but indicated a degree of unhappiness with some perhaps mildly impertinent remarks I may have made about the Department of State in my introduction of Lord Carrington. He didn't appreciate, I can't remember what I had to say but I guess he could've taken as uncomplimentary something like, even though we're part of the State Department we really do encourage free discussion here and therefore Lord Carrington we look forward to having you you're very frank views on the subject at hand. I saw no big interest from any outsider. There was no career advantage to be gained, one way or the other. There was no career advantage in being any part of the Center. There was no career advantage in trying to promote the Center's work, if anything we were perhaps seen as unwelcome competitors by the folks who were doing the serious work.

Q: It's one of the great tragedies. It's often said the State Department is less than the sum of its parts. There's a tremendous amount of expertise and experience here and they're really very thoughtful people, but it's the political masters and even below the political masters you might say the top expertise people get involved in the political process.

CELLA: Well, by the time I had any experience on the Israeli desk in the early '70s, and I think even before that I coined the phrase; expertise is the enemy of policy. I meant that very seriously and I would often use that term ever since I coined it. One of the problems that you confront is a conflict between conforming to the political desires of an administration and advancing one's career. You really don't get very far in the State Department; you probably don't get very far at Consolidated Edison or IBM either by trying to swim against the tide. The problem is that if Con Edison or IBM fails in its mission stockholders will be hurt and some high paid executives won't get their bonuses but over the long haul the core interests of the company aren't going to suffer. Whereas in the area of foreign-policy you make some serious mistakes or a serious mistake the core interest of the country is likely to suffer and can suffer for a long, long time thereafter. So the corporate pressures to conform can be very, very dangerous in the State Department. I think the State Department ought to make a point of doing everything it can to minimize those pressures because the subject matter is just too damn important. Now, the State Department to convince itself that indeed it was not totally hostile to nonconformist views, established several awards, senior-level, mid-level and junior level awards for creative dissent to show that indeed we, the Department, was not totally inhospitable to such things.

One year I was nominated for the mid-level annual award which was named after Ambassador Rifkin whom I had the pleasure of knowing briefly while he was Ambassador in Africa. Unbeknownst to me, and I must say to my pride, two of my colleagues nominated me for the award for mid-level creative dissent. They nominated me for the work I had done on the Israeli desk and particularly having to do with trying to uncover, or uncovering Israeli plans to build high performance aircraft and a battle tank and to try and point out the pitfalls of our getting deeply involved in those projects. That was the core around which my nomination as I recall was drafted. My nomination was drafted in a way that was quite complimentary to me and characterized me as someone who did not go out of his way to pick fights or to gum up the works but on matters of

principle could be pretty much counted upon to stick to his guns regardless of pressure from above to renounce his convictions. Anyway, my nomination had to do with our military relationship with the State of Israel. There were several other nominees. I lost by one vote and the winner that year is a dear friend of mine, a fellow who I replaced in Oran, Algeria, Ed Peck, who was a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the time. He was nominated for his success in abolishing the state-defense joint caption on cables. It seemed to me that while that was, I guess, a bureaucratic triumph of enormous proportions that abolishing the state-defense caption on cables was wasn't quite the same as pointing out the pitfalls of the United States getting involved in massive transfers of its most sensitive military technology to Israel and putting Israel in the major end item military manufacturing business.

There was a nice lunch and at the luncheon Ambassador Rifkin was represented by his widow. She was seated at the head table, and she had somebody come over and tell me, invite me forward. She said she wanted a word with me, she wanted to meet me. She was very gracious, and she said I just wanted you to know that I thought you were easily the best qualified person for the award named after my husband. Your behavior as described in your nomination suggested rather unusual daring and daring in behalf of the overall well-being of our country. I just want you to know that you had my vote, and I'm sorry you didn't win the award. But, of course, she had nothing to do with the Department of State. If you're known to be someone who is able to, who's reasonably articulate and courageous or foolhardy, I'm not sure which, enough to voice views contrary to perceived wisdom, you are not necessarily sought out for the plum assignments that are necessary to have a truly "successful" career.

Q: How did you feel about leaving?

CELLA: The thought I had at the time, and it has stayed with me ever since, is that the major regret I had was that I did not regret more leaving an organization that I had devoted 29 years of my life to. This could sound like sour grapes, but in my mind it's anything but. Overall, I had a very good time in the Foreign Service. I enjoyed all of my assignments, at least to the extent that was not clear it involved people I happened to be working with for. I remember a veteran Foreign Service wife once said to me very early in my career, "There are no hardship posts; there are hardship people, however." And that was indeed my experience. I served at least two posts for a total of almost 5 years that were considered I think 20% hardship differential, and there certainly were limitations but the posts themselves were fine. On the other hand, the people I had to work under weren't always fine. In general, once I figured out how the system worked, I decided my number one priority, after having had experience with two rather poor supervisors in a row, was that I would do my utmost to work only for people who I wanted to work for and ideally to avoid working for anyone, if possible. So a lot of the time I spent in the Foreign Service I pretty much was on my own -- as a language student, operating the NASA space mobile, as Principal Officer in Oran, even as Political Military Affairs Officer on the Israeli Desk, I was in many ways my own boss. I had a good supervisor who trusted my knowledge of the subject matter and pretty much gave me free rein to manage affairs as I saw fit. I always kept them informed, of course. During my four years

on the NATO International Staff the State Department couldn't have cared less about me, and then I had a rather senior position. I had many, many responsibilities that had to be filled but I pretty much wrote my own ticket in that job. Then two years in INR again, out of the policy mainstream and therefore out of the main promotion line, I was pretty much free to run my office as I thought best.

But the organization itself, by 1989, the Foreign Service had already been in the process of transition for some time. It was an organization that no longer held terrific attraction for me, the types of people that we were recruiting, the whole procedure, the personnel procedure, the cone system, and having an out of cone assignment or an out of area assignment. We made personnel structure so complex, without really curing any of the corruption. The best assignments continue to go to the best connected people regardless of their qualifications. The fact that I had become pretty fluent in Arabic for example, didn't do my career in ounce of good. I mean, nobody ever came to me and said, oh, I understand you are well connected with the ruling family in Bahrain or you know the President of Algeria. How would you like to be chief of mission in one of those places?

Again, I could sound like sour grapes, but it's not because I made my own bed. I knew what I was doing when I was doing it. I saw that you really had three Foreign Services. Foreign Service number one were the appointees and the ones who were on the inside almost from the start, the ones who would get to be the Staff Assistant to the Assistant Secretary and then the Special Assistant to the Undersecretary, frequently did not serve a great deal of time abroad and if they were abroad, often they were in fairly well-perfumed spots, not invariably but that was fairly frequently the case. Then there was the great unwashed, and this of course, has changed from when I came in in 1960 the notion pretty much was that you go where the personnel Lords send you; you don't raise a peep about it. You didn't have tandem assignments and all sorts of things. If they needed you in Upper Volta, that's where you went, by God.

And then there was the third Foreign Service which I put myself in which was the Foreign Service populated by people who understood how the system worked and understood the price of success, which isn't to say that there aren't plenty of people who go to the top of the Foreign Service who aren't terrific people and very deserving. But I also know a lot of people who've gone to the very top who weren't such terrific people. What they were terrific at was pleasing their boss at anyone else's expense as need be to advance their own career. There were too many of those that floated to the top when you have a Secretary of State like Kissinger, why that's bound to be the way it worked. That was a game that constitutionally I was incapable of playing. I didn't want to play, I didn't play and so it I got in essence, more than I deserved. I made it to Minister Counselor and to some degree, I'm surprised that that ever happened.

Q: You're talking to another Minister Counselor, former Minister Counselor. I sort of played the game as a Consular Officer. The trouble is looking at it I'm not overly impressed by people who were Ambassadors that they made that much difference. It gives them a title. But that's it in many cases. There are times when they are around that they can push buttons and get things done but few.

CELLA: Are you referring to the authority of the Ambassador to really make decisions?

Q: Also, at critical places, most of times there is nothing particularly critically going on.

CELLA: That's fortunately, I think, fortunately true, I believe, and this goes back at least to the Kennedy Administration if not before. We have watered down the stock of the Ambassador by in Kennedy's case the use of Special Envoys. So if you have a Special Envoy to go and sort out a problem and country X or between country X and country Y by definition that makes the envoy in that country or those countries not so special.

Q: Roosevelt used them too.

CELLA: And China, of course, an excellent example. The who lost China business, which I know had a lot to do with his Special Envoy, General Hurley. I know the Special Envoy has been around for a long, long time, but I think it's become more over the years has been used more and more to the ultimate disadvantage of the career officer in place. It's always puzzled me a little bit. I can understand why political appointees or political officeholders have trouble fully trusting the Foreign Service. After all we are the Foreign Service which means there is something distinctly foreign about us and foreign things frequently put off people who are unfamiliar with the individual, the program, or whatever. So you want to have someone you really do trust and who has your political interests at heart and here I come down to the conflict between national interests and political interests. I'm not saying they do this consciously that is to say, defy the national interests, but I think, in general, presidents convince themselves that their political interests and their national interests are really one and the same when, in fact, they frequently aren't. And the Foreign Service Officer, as I always envisioned them, as I envisioned myself is there to serve the political authority, but in the final analysis your number one responsibility is to serve the national good. And that occasionally can mean bucking the tide and the people who do that for understandable reasons can be rather unpopular. So I can see why a President would rather, particularly when it comes to a delicate matter, turn to somebody who he trusts totally politically, underline the word politically, as in domestic politics.

On the other hand, you may be sacrificing some expertise, and again, expertise is the enemy of policy. It should be the other way around. Expertise is the friend of policy; it's the handmaiden of policy. With all that said, with my understanding why political officeholders might want to operate outside the career Foreign Service, I counter that with the thought, really, isn't there at least counter-vailing advantage in building up the man on the ground, and building up the ambassador in place as someone who does have the confidence of the President and access to the Oval Office. That multiplies twenty-fold, forty-fold your real connections around the world and by implication, your influence. I mean, if an ambassador sees something that has to be done and goes in to see the Prime Minister you'd better stop doing this or you better start doing this. And if the Prime Minister thinks that guy is speaking for the President he's going to pay a lot more attention to what the individual has to say. But if, as is I think frequently the case, the

Prime Minister feels ah, I don't have to pay much attention to him because I've got this other channel to the President or I can speak to so-and-so so I can go around the ambassador.

I can remember in the early days of his Administration of President Kennedy coming over to talk to senior officials at the State Department. Office Director on up, I suppose. His speech, I thought, was pretty insulting to the career Foreign Service, but they lapped it up and he made the point remember, when you're assigned to a country, that country has its own embassy here in Washington. They don't need two. The old localitis charge, which I think is largely a totally bogus charge.

Q: Briefly, what have you done since you retired? You retired in?

CELLA: In May of 1989. I did not get, as I knew I wouldn't, a limited career extension so my time ran out. I think I could have hung on until June or July of 1989 but I left in early May. Well, one of the great personal advantages of being at the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs is that gave me some time to make contacts and shop around pursuant to follow-on employment after my Foreign Service days were over. I didn't strenuously pursue job opportunities because fairly early on I decided that ideally, as was the case in the Foreign Service, I would like to be my own boss rather than work for somebody else. I didn't want -- having gotten out of one fairly large bureaucracy -- to become entangled in another one. Over the years I have seen enough of the private sector to suspect that it really overall was not much better and probably not nearly as good as the Department of State. That's really saying something.

There were a few positions that I did go after or that I was asked if I would be interested in them that ran counter to my plan. One in particular, a rather large company with extensive activities in North Africa and the Middle East was looking for somebody to be senior adviser to the president, and I thought I was well qualified and the position interested me but with one huge disadvantage. It meant that I would have to live in Texas. I'm not sure I could have overcome that in the final analysis. Again, not unlike the State Department mentality in a way, I finally lost out on that position to somebody who had the title of Ambassador who did not have my language background or my area experience, but who had the title of Ambassador. Actually, what the president of the company was probably looking for was a poodle and trenchant advice. He wanted to have somebody he could trot out. That could be very unfair; I don't know that to be the case. All I know is that was one corporate position in which I had the greatest interest.

I was also approached about becoming Director of the Conference Board which surprised me a little bit because I didn't have any particular economic background. That would have meant moving to New York. Although the salary was fairly substantial I felt it would not be enough to live properly in New York and I didn't want to have to face a long commute. Those are two possible positions that I recall. There were a couple of others.

I thought, ideally, I would work for myself and not necessarily as a consultant. I knew that particularly without the ambassadorial title to get you in the door it could be not necessarily an attractive existence. I'm referring here to the fact that as far as I can tell, most consultants spend about 90% of their time drumming up business as opposed to doing actual consulting.

So what happened? Well, during my time at the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs one of the things I did on a regular basis was to talk to students in the area studies section of the Foreign Service Institute and talk to them specifically about NATO and the European Union, multilateral transatlantic institutions and European institutions. The then head of the European area studies section discovered because of my background I knew a fair amount about the domestic politics of most of the NATO countries. This didn't happen weekly, but it did happen regularly. If one or another of the lecturers didn't show up, I would be called on, on short notice to go down and give a presentation on German security policy or the Northern Island question, a whole range of topics some of which I was better qualified to address than others, but all of which I could say at least a few reasonably intelligent words about. So that led to my developing a relationship to the European Area Studies program. I proposed some changes involving instituting a new program and I nominate myself to direct that program.

There was no dedicated Benelux, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, area studies segment. What happened was, as I recall people who were going to Holland or going to the Netherlands and were studying Dutch would be absorbed into the German area studies segment. Those who were bound for Belgium would wind up in the French area studies program. Those who are going to Luxembourg I'm not sure where they wound up. In any case, there were very many of them. There was also nothing in place to address NATO, the European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation, all these transatlantic or European-based multilateral institutions.

So I suggested that what they should consider doing is putting together a program for the Benelux and dealing with multilateral institutions. I developed a 22-hour presentation, a 40-hour curriculum for such a program. I instituted it actually before I left the State Department. Once I left the State Department I received remuneration for it. I thought we had a pretty good program going. I said to the area studies director, “Look, I'm making this part of my post-State Department livelihood so how strong a guarantee can you give me that this program will be in place for some time?” He said, “Oh well, absolutely. It fills a real need, you’re doing a great job. You can count on having this program as long as you’re interested in pursuing it.” So that was one part of my post-State Department life.

The second part, a friend of mine was general consul to a trade association, the American Institute for Shippers Association based here in Washington and the general counsel is a guy I went back a long way with. We had played high school basketball together; we went to the same college and I’d stayed in touch ever since we both graduated. The trade association was made up of people in the transportation business, transportation of freight as opposed to people, mainly domestically but also internationally. My lawyer friend

saw, and I agreed with him, that the future of the trade association, the future of its membership, had to get more involved internationally. I was brought in as part of his effort to inspire the trade membership to be more active in pursuing opportunities abroad as part of a longer-term growth and survival strategy. So that was another part-time arrangement.

I also negotiated two contracts, one with SAIC, Science Applications International and the other one with BDM which I believe is no longer active but was back in the late ‘80s or the early ‘90s still one of the most prominent of the so-called beltway bandits. Both SAIC and BDM recruited me because they were bidding on contracts where some special clearances I had acquired and still held would be necessary. They would have to produce people with these clearances because of the subject matter they would be working on, relatively specialized clearances. Well with BDM I had written into the contract that they had to pay me the equivalent of three months per year whether I did in a consulting for them or not. The reason I had that put in was so that I would have some guarantee when I left the State Department. I was not independently wealthy and although my annuity would be pretty good, I still had personal responsibilities et cetera which demanded that I have some additional income stream. I knew I had a guarantee from the trade association. I knew I had written into my BDM contract a three month guarantee that would at least get me through the first year, and I had a pledge from the Foreign Service Institute that they would in effect retain my services for the equivalent of a third of the year or a quarter of a year. So of the four quarters, three quarters of which I thought were fairly well guaranteed. I had that in place when I went out the door.

People are surprised when I mention it but it's absolutely true, and I have a copy of the contract at home. BDM did indeed guarantee me the equivalent of a quarter of a year consulting fees regardless of whether I did five minutes with them or not. In the end a couple of things happened. Not long after my departure from the State Department and the Foreign Service the Berlin Wall came down. With that part of my well laid plans turned out to be a house of cards and came down as well. Neither SAIC nor BDM got the business that they had recruited me for. In the case of BDM I did not exercise my contract option, because I had a lot of respect for the fellow who recruited me. It occurred to me that while I could use the money it would not look too hot for him if he had to answer to his boss, hey, how did you give this guy this unprecedented written guarantee? So there goes two of the four legs off my post-State Department table.

A few months later after the fall of the Berlin Wall I was told that my Benelux course was being eliminated so there went a third leg. I said, "Wait a minute. You told me, I know you couldn't give me 100% assurance, but it sounds like your assurance wasn't worth anything at all. I was told when the Berlin Wall came down Secretary Baker put out the word that they were to go full bore on developing people for assignment to Eastern Europe. FSI had to beef up its Eastern European studies program and in order to do that it had to take resources from the Western European studies program and because I was the last one in that door, I was first one out. And so that was the end of that.

I argued at the time that I wasn't sure that Eastern Europe would immediately be hospitable to a flood of American officials. I wasn't sure such a flood would necessarily have a major impact on the immediate course of events in that part of the world whereas I argued that our Western European relations would remain very important for as far as far as one could see fundamentally to overall U.S. interests. I also argued that absent the ability to posit a cohesive Warsaw Pact threat, that was the magic glue frequently in our dealings with Western Europeans, that our relations with Western Europe were bound to become somewhat more complex. Western Europe would not become any less important but dealing with Western Europe could be somewhat more difficult and call out for all the more subtlety in how we approached our friends and allies. Of course, this was an argument from self-interest to a large degree; I was saying it didn't make sense to carve away at Western Europe prematurely in order to future strengthen our machinery for dealing with Eastern Europe.

Q: What did you get involved with?

CELLA: My consulting contracts are gone; my Foreign Service Institute niche is gone. I continued to for quite a period of time give lectures at the Foreign Service Institute before various groups on all sorts of topics. I continued to get some outside speaking engagements for a while after my departure from the State Department, but I concentrated mainly on my trade association work which was not terribly lucrative because trade associations just didn't have a lot of money, but it was for me rather instructive and sort of fun. It gave me an office which I still have, in fact, I still do some work with the trade association at the downtown office at M and Connecticut, a rather nice location and a nice base of operations. I did a fair amount of traveling on trade association business which introduced me to parts of the country that I'd never personally experienced before. The trade association work itself, there's a certain art to running a trade association so it presented something of an intellectual challenge. I learned a lot about the transportation business. I got a fairly good look inside corporate America. In connection with organizing the trade association's annual meeting, I got to meet a lot of interesting people in the form of speakers I would recruit, and still do, to appear at the annual meeting. I have not thrived post-State Department, but I haven't gone hungry either and I've had a fairly interesting time. I found my State Department experience stood me in good stead on a number of accounts including negotiating a consulting contract with BDM.

I found at the time that I was being ready for pasture, there seemed to be a mentality among Foreign Service people, what can I do in the outside world? A group of individuals who are not particularly modest about most things tend to be rather modest when it came to the utility to people who are not engaged in the business of diplomacy or developing government policy. Just the skills that the average Foreign Service Officer has to acquire in the process of moving a family from one country to another to another, those kinds of skills have a world of applications no matter what your line of work. I don't think anyone need be apologetic in seeking post-State Department, post-Foreign Service employment by the fact that I've just been a Foreign Service Officer for the last three decades. I found an awfully lot of people who were fearful of the outside world.

Q: I'm looking at the time, and I think this is probably a good place to stop. And I want to thank you very much.

End of interview

[Glenn Cella died February 6, 2013]