

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

ARTHUR R. DAY

Interviewed by: John A. McKesson III
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INTERVIEW

Q: Would you like to start us off by telling a little about your family background and childhood?

DAY: I was born and grew up in Northern New Jersey, just across the river, a commuting suburb of New York. My father was a good part of his life in the cavalry National Guard so I spent a good part of my life on horseback in and around military people and military organizations which in my later life I was rather glad of since in my Foreign Service career I spent quite a bit of time with the military as well.

Before World War II I went to Syracuse University for two years and while there I joined the Naval Air Corps reserve program and in 1943 went on into Naval air training. When I came out of the war in November 1945 I went to Chicago University where you could take a graduate degree without ever actually finishing your undergraduate degree, which was a big attraction at that time when everyone was in a hurry. I spent three years there and emerged with a master's degree in international relations. Along with quite a few of my classmates I went on down in 1949 to join the Foreign Service.

Q: What attracted you to the Foreign Service?

DAY: Two kinds of things. I was interested in foreign affairs; I always had been. I had gone out to Chicago to take the international relations program there with the idea of, vaguely, going into journalism on the international scene. I really pursued that thought through my education, but while I was there I married and we had a child while I was still in school. The practical advantages of the Foreign Service and a regular paying job occurred to me at that time. Many of my friends were doing the same thing and my allegiance was transferred from the more risky career of journalism into government work, partly with the idea of doing it for a couple of years and then switching over. But I became so enthralled with the Foreign Service that I never had any serious thought of leaving it once I entered it.

Q: Could you tell us a little something of your career, how it evolved and what were your main posts?

DAY: My career was really a matter of chance throughout as much as anything else in terms of posts I had. When I went down to Washington after having passed my orals, the Foreign Service was backed up at that point in terms of admissions and I had to wait about a year and a half. I just went job hunting in the department and ended up on the Palestine desk, as it was called in those days, in the Near East Bureau, and I stayed there until I went into the Foreign Service. At that point they were still sending people over to what was then still the occupation of Germany, which was still in effect. A group of us were taken in, given German training and sent in to Germany to be occupation officials. I went in at the tail end of that process, in the early 50's, so I ended up at a consulate with only peripheral occupation duties. I became, in a sense, a German hand, but when my time was finished I was sent by some throw of the dice to Santiago, Chile. It was a post which I enjoyed, but had no connection with what I had been doing before. When I left there my next Foreign Service post was back in Germany. My final Foreign Service post was in the Middle East. These were interspersed with assignments in Washington that generally related to one or the other posts that I had had, and in some cases led to my future posts. While I had an interesting career, and I was certainly in extremely interesting places, especially Berlin and Jerusalem during the times I was there, it was not one of those careers that seems logical and that builds upon its self.

Q: Let's go back to some of these various posts you were at, starting with the beginning of your career in NEA. Do you have any particular overall comments about how this launched you into your connection with the Middle East?

DAY: At that time, in the summer 1949, the Palestine problem, as it was called then, was still very much in the forefront of our concerns in our Middle East policy. So I became very well acquainted with the Arab-Israeli issue and that wove itself throughout my career and I ended my career being a deputy assistant secretary in that same bureau in which I began. There are a lot of constants in the Arab-Israeli problem in all those years and consequently every time I revisited it throughout my career I felt pretty much at home in dealing with it. The Arab manner in dealing with the problem and us did not change; much to the despair of those who wished the Arabs well, they often did so badly in

handling their affairs. And the Israeli manner of dealing with the United States did not change much; they always practiced a very intensive, very aggressive and very effective policy, and the Congressional pressure that we felt in the department throughout was a very important factor, always, in dealing with the Israeli problem. That did not change, it just increased through the years. Aside from that there were many practical changes in the problem which we can come to as we go along, but those constants certainly remained.

Q: As a general thing, Israeli intelligence has always had a great reputation for its outstanding abilities. I assume that you would agree with that statement and did you get the feeling that the Israelis not only were always on top of knowing what was going on in the Middle East and the world but also what the US position was?

DAY: That was their main concern, even at that time. Prior to 1967, of course, we had far less to do with the support of Israel than afterwards. We had not supplied them with any substantial weaponry up to that time. Nevertheless their diplomats tended to know on whose desk at a given time a certain paper was in which they were interested. I remember one of the third secretaries taking me out to lunch and wanting to know on whose desk a certain paper was. I was surprised to know it even existed, but he did. They seemed to have no trouble keeping track of American policy and certainly had little trouble influencing it.

Q: Let's go through your career chronologically, and then come back to the Arab-Israeli issues later. When you were on the Berlin desk, the wall went up about that time, what were your impressions about the way the department was dealing with the crises and did this Berlin crisis bring about any changes in the way things were done?

DAY: Yes. In fact that was one of the most interesting things about that period for me. As you know, just prior to that I had been in S/S (the Executive Secretariat) of the department for a couple of years and consequently had been at the heart, so to speak, of the department's management of its affairs, especially in its management of affairs during non-working hours. In retrospect it was really a 19th century way of proceeding. I can recall being duty officer for the Department as a junior officer in S/S and I would stay on in S/S in the evening and when I was finished with my work around seven or eight o'clock, I would go home. After I was home there was no substantive officer in the department at all, all night long. The watch officer was an officer in the telegram branch who read all the cables coming in. When he saw a telegram that he thought required instant, or very quick action, he would call either me, as the duty officer, or a substantive officer from the bureau concerned, and that that person would come in or I would come in. Unless we did that there was no one there at night or on weekends after the duty staff secured, to deal with whatever may come up.

When Kennedy came in, just at the time I switched from S/S to the Berlin desk, he, partly because of the Berlin crisis, I think, he and his advisors, were appalled by this lackadaisical way of dealing with crisis matters that certainly came up at every hour of the day and night, and impressed with the way the military dealt with them. They had twenty-

four hour military staffs ready to get in touch with any part of the world or deal with whatever might come up. The first thing they did in meeting the Berlin crisis that summer was to set up what was to become the backbone of the department's management of matters of that sort, the Operations Center, and to establish the task force system. As you know, the Operations Center is a center on the seventh floor, that is in business twenty-four hours a day, and has excellent communications world-wide and within Washington. The task force system is a system whereby an *ad hoc* group is set up to deal with breaking crises. This was the case with Berlin. We set up a task force, with a director, Martin Hillenbrand as I remember. We all moved upstairs from our offices to the seventh floor, detached ourselves from everyday concerns, and they moved officers from the Pentagon, which was very much involved, of course, because of our troop presence there in West Germany, and we worked ourselves into a joint staff, in effect. At the same time a counter-part organization was set up, not on a twenty-four hour basis, among the four powers primarily concerned with Germany--ourselves, the French, the British and Germans. That met at the ambassadorial level under Foy Kohler, who was assistant secretary for EUR, virtually every day during the very difficult times and met at staff levels every day during that same period. So the department's way of dealing with problems was really revolutionized, I think, much for the better. It was hard to imagine how in current days we could be dealing with these crises in the manner that the department had employed up to then. There was a good deal of resistance on the part of some old-fashioned diplomats to this militarized way of dealing with things. They also did not like the way of bringing in the military. They felt that the military should not be involved so much in diplomacy. I think I learned that the best way to get the military to go along with what the State Department wanted them to do was to get them involved at the beginning. They then began to accept what the department wanted to do as long as they understood it. But if they felt that we were a bunch of effete diplomats sitting across the river and not paying any attention to what their concerns were, then they had their backs up. The new system worked much better, I thought.

Q: Before moving on to duties in Berlin itself, do you have any other general comment about that early period?

DAY: It is interesting to recall the situation at the time the wall went up. It was in the summer of course, and I came back from vacation the day it went up. I called into the department at once when I arrived home and found no one there; they had all been there and then they had gone home, which is of course what happened in the embassy in Bonn, as you well know, much to my surprise. Then for the next couple of weeks we tried to deal with the problem in the old fashioned way but we had no plans for this particular kind of event and I think that it would not have done much good if we did. At first we in the State Department, especially on the desk level, were outraged and upset by the building of the wall but it became clear as time went by that the White House, while it realized that it was faced with a very serious problem, was not so outraged and upset, it was almost a little relieved because they felt that because of all the ways that that burgeoning crisis--that terrific outflow of East Germans that had been going on during that summer--of all the ways that that could be dealt with by the East, building a wall

was, in a sense, the least aggressive and the least likely to cause an outbreak of war. I think they felt they could manage the problems resulting from the building of a wall and that it was a matter of morale in the West more than anything else. They moved up an American battle group to Berlin and Vice President Johnson went to Berlin and they dealt with it on a morale-boosting basis. At the same time though, it was clear that the Russians were still bent on acquiring control of all of Berlin, and the quadripartite group in Washington, which I mentioned before, began an intensive preparation of plans for almost any contingency that might arise. That was my special job as the Berlin desk officer. We constructed what the military might call a horse blanket, a large chart, listing all the contingencies we could think of and all the various steps to deal it. The book that resulted was more than an inch thick, contained almost innumerable contingencies almost none of which arose in just that form, but the experience that we had had, not only with the other three powers but with all the other elements of the American government, the experience that we had in drawing up the plans became very useful when we went on into the next couple of years when we had to respond to contingencies of a similar kind.

Q: Did you have any reactions or observations to the way that our people behaved at different levels, lower echelon, middle ranks how they covered situations and how they interacted?

DAY: It was interesting because of the number of headquarters, both diplomatic and military, that were involved in handling Berlin. Just to list them because it is interesting how complicated a crisis like that can be. On the diplomatic side, of course, the political side, there was the State Department and the White House in Washington at very high levels, the Secretary of State and President were very actively involved. I went once with Secretary Rusk over to the White House to meet with President Kennedy, and the discussion at times came down to very minor things, how did truck drivers get through on the autobahn from West Germany and return, did they need visas and how did they get visas and things like that. So you had those two levels in Washington. You had the embassy in Bonn, which was very actively involved and you had the State Department mission in Berlin. On the military side, of course the Pentagon in Washington and our task force people, then you had two major headquarters in Europe, very important and very much involved. You had the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, SACEUR, in Paris, who was General Norstad at that time and his headquarters, the army headquarters for Europe in Heidelberg, EUSAREUR, and then the commandant in Berlin, who was a military man. These headquarters were really actively involved--it was in no sense a monitoring game. They were very directly involved and interposed themselves in decision-making. We found that the higher up you went, all the way up to the White House, through both the military and political chains, the more conservative and cautious the advice became and the inclinations were. The lower down, on the contrary, down to the Berlin mission and the Berlin military brigade, that were involved, the more emotional and dramatic side of the problem and in some cases the less cautious one became. This was especially true on the military side.

I had an interesting experience myself in that having been in Washington for a year dealing with problem from there and having been closely connected with the Washington scene and also with Norstad's headquarters in Paris, which was especially interested with the air travel in and out of Berlin, I was very much aware of, and for myself convinced of, the conservative approach. I certainly realized that if the people in Berlin got us out on any limbs by their aggressive or adventurous behavior it was not going to be supported on high.

I went then to Berlin myself, to become head of the political section, fully aware of this set of facts. I found the people there on the ground were not sufficiently aware of them. I was in an awkward spot in a way as the voice of headquarters down on the front lines, which was not always appreciated initially. In the end, I think they learned the hard way it was very costly to get yourself out on a limb in Berlin because you would not be backed up on high. The credibility of the people on the ground became very important. If people in Washington can say when a message in from a field post, "Oh well, those guys are always semi-hysterical out there, we don't need to pay any attention to what they are saying" it just really reduces the value of the people on the front line very considerably. We had a couple of experiences like that which were quite costly and resulted in one case I can think of, from another characteristic of the military--I must say that the military in Berlin were really excellent people, they picked good officers, first class people, the troops in general were well disciplined--but there were some characteristics inherent, I guess, in military organizations, that were a problem. On one occasion I recall a Berlin brigade patrol, a jeep patrol, which during all those years was still allowed to go into East Berlin by the Russians, to patrol around and come back out. After one of these patrols we had a very severe protest by the Russians which said that one of our patrols had badly misbehaved, that it had chased one of their patrols in East Berlin, that it had gone up on sidewalks, that it had seriously jeopardized the lives of civilians in the streets and so on. Our military swore up and down that nothing like that had happened, that "They were just a bunch of Communist liars, and who could trust the Russians" and so on. But it got very serious because Gromyko eventually took it up with Rusk at the Secretary level. We got rockets from Washington wanting to know what in hell happened? It became unhappily clear, once it had reached the higher levels in Washington, that the Russians were 100 percent right and that this detail had done exactly what they said it had done and then it had come back and at some level in the military a lid had been put on, and I like to think that the higher officers did not know that this happened. But it led us on the political side and I know it led Washington, to feel that the word of our own people could not be trusted and we could trust the Russians more, which was a very unhappy thing to have happen. But it can easily happen.

Q: That is remarkable.

DAY: I would like to mention one other kind of thing. The military is a little overzealous at times again I think without realizing the consequences. Shortly after I arrived in Berlin I was given one of my routine chores, to approve fairly regular helicopter flights over East Berlin. I approved a flight. There were certain ground rules, so to speak, which they were

to follow. They were to keep out of trouble. This flight, under instructions I assume, from some military intelligence people, went over East Berlin and having located a shed in which they suspected there were Russian tanks, they flew down at almost rooftop level to look under the lip of the shed to see if there were tanks in there. This was over a Russian military establishment and showed no common sense at all, and when they got back we got another rocket from the Russians saying this time no more helicopter flights over East Berlin. We on the scene were furious over this. The Russians were cutting down on one of our few rights left in East Berlin but in the end they prevailed because our senior officials in Europe and Washington were so upset by the stupidity of this action on our part, by our military, that they had very little sympathy for our concerns and simply would not push the Russians on it. That was, again, all too typical of the kind of problem that we on the political side had to fight constantly with the military side, they feeling, for their part, that sometimes we were too wishy-washy about being tough and standing tall and facing the Russians.

Q: Would you say that things had gotten shaken down and that crisis management in Berlin was well handled on the whole?

DAY: Yes. I do think so. It was very complicated for not only did we have on the American side all of these headquarters, but of course we had the British and French to coordinate with on almost everything of note in Berlin. After I arrived we established a group at my level, I was a deputy political advisor in my first two years in Berlin, and we established a group of political advisors of all three nationalities and we met regularly and became, in a sense, institutionalized and we just fed most of the crises that required tripartite coordination into that group. All of my colleagues were very competent officers and so it worked quite well. The haphazard way of doing things in previous years was much improved. On the military side, the US side, I think it was also much improved during my time, not by virtue of anything I did. The military established an emergency operations center in the basement of the headquarters building. They kept a staff there twenty-four hours a day--quite knowledgeable people who were always the same; it was not the in-and-out plague of military organizations. I remember many, many times in my first year and a half there being called in the middle of the night by the sergeant in charge of the operations center, telling me I had to come in, there was another crisis within Berlin on the access routes. It provided a core from which it was easy to deal with whatever arose. We had communications, scrambled voice communications, throughout Europe and with Washington, we had teletype communications with Heidelberg, so it worked very smoothly--and much too often for my taste--but that was the way Berlin was at the time.

Q: Before moving on, perhaps you might give us some specific instances of some of the problems that occurred during your period of the Berlin crisis.

DAY: The one that comes to mind involves just a brief recounting of another event. Shortly after I got there, almost a year after the wall went up, a young man named Peter Fechter, an East German, was shot down by the East German guards as he was trying to

escape from East Germany, very near checkpoint Charlie, coming into the American sector. There was a great outcry. He was shot down very brutally and allowed to bleed to death right at the foot of the wall, right in the sight and hearing of people on the western side. The western public in West Berlin was outraged and there began a series of riots which primarily targeted the Soviet troops that come over into West Berlin every day to mount guard at the Russian war memorial, which was located in West Berlin. As a result in their attacks on the buses that brought these soldiers over, the Russians began bringing their soldiers over in armored personnel carriers, which we took to be a breach of their rights in West Berlin by sending armored military vehicles into West Berlin. Without going into great detail about it, it resulted in a major confrontation between the Americans, primarily because it was our sector in which they were coming through Checkpoint Charlie, and the Russians. At one point in this confrontation we had denied them to come in through any access point with their armored personnel carriers and we set up patrols of all the possible access points to be sure they didn't.

Q: Arthur, I believe we were cut off in the middle of a sentence.

DAY: I was describing this little crisis that arose at a time of considerable tension in Berlin. One morning I remember I was over visiting with the military liaison mission in Berlin-- which was assigned to the Russian headquarters and went out into East Germany--and I was talking with their chief and was called on the phone by the operations officer from the US Army brigade. He said that on one these access points, which was a bridge, between West Berlin and the East, our patrol, which normally stayed at the western end of the bridge, had been advanced out into the middle of the bridge, I suppose to be in a better position to deal with the Russians if they tried to come across with the armored personnel carriers. The Russians felt that this was a breach of our agreement with them about where to maintain these patrols--which it was--and they had protested vigorously and threatened retaliation and to raise difficulties if we did not pull the patrol back. The US military wanted me to tell them what to do. I had to tell them, "Pull the patrol back" because it was a perfect case where once you got out ahead of what would be tolerated by American policy makers--and that certainly was a breach of procedures in Berlin (those procedures were all that kept us from serious trouble) you simply had to pull in your horns, and I did tell them that and they did pull it back, although there was some grumbling that here was some State Department officer who did not have the guts to toughen their stance in the face of the Russians, but they realized I was right in the end and wished they had not done it. It was the kind of thing that came up not infrequently in Berlin.

There was one other case that came up at the time that I might mention because it relates to the air. I haven't mentioned that. One of my particular jobs was to be the political officer advising the American controller on the Berlin air safety center which monitored the access routes through the air from West Berlin to West Germany and back. We had had a nasty incident in East Germany in which an American Air Force plane had been shot down by a Soviet air plane, the pilots killed, and everyone's nerves were quite edgy about that. One Saturday afternoon we suddenly had word from our controller in the Air

Safety Center that a US Army airplane-- a very rare type of airplane, not Air Force but Army--had filed a flight plan from West Germany to West Berlin and was about to enter the corridors and the Russians were protesting, saying that we did not have any right to fly military aircraft through the corridors, only commercial aircraft. What should we do? Our commandant at the time, aware of all the trouble there had been about this other airplane, wanted us to turn the American plane back, but we felt that we did have a right to have him fly through the corridors and to turn him back once the Russians realized he was coming would have meant, to some extent, knuckling under to the Russians and surrendering some of our rights. We said, "No, he comes through." I was running the little operation since it was on the weekend and my superiors were elsewhere. I simply did not tell the commandant what we were doing and brought the pilot through; he was visited by Soviet fighter planes on the way through, and things were very, very tense, and we made a mistake in the process. It was not costly, but it was a mistake. We were concerned enough about the other incident that we told this pilot of the military aircraft, that if the Russians ordered him to land, he could land to avoid being shot down. They did not so threaten him and the thing did not arise, but immediately afterwards the British and the French both protested to us that we had violated our rights in the corridors by authorizing the pilot to land if threatened. They were right, though I still think I had some reasons for doing it, but that is typical of the kinds of pressures you find yourself under in a situation like that.

Q: Let us move on to an assessment of the political evolution in Berlin itself. That was a period of Brandt's Ostpolitik, how did you see that from Berlin?

DAY: The building of the wall had a very important effect on German policy on the part of Willy Brandt in particular who at that time was the governing mayor in Berlin and had himself been a symbol of the toughest response to the Soviets and a symbol of the hope for reunification of Berlin and all of Germany. He read the American response to the building of the wall quite correctly as being an abandonment really of the concept of reunification, at least for the foreseeable future, and a willingness to abide by a *de facto* division of Germany which would be maintained by the Russians on one side and the allies on the other peacefully and not challenged by either side. Brandt felt that if this was the way the Allies were going to play the game it was time to stop entertaining hopes for reunification and to begin to think about improving the lives of people of the two sides of the wall, but especially on the East side, in what was likely to be a long reality of separation. So he began his *Ostpolitik*. The goal was to put aside the ideological refusals to have any dealings with the East and to begin talking with East Berlin and East Germany to the effect and hope that this would improve the lot of the people behind the curtain and enable the people on the West and on the East to move back and forth to some extent. This policy had been articulated initially for Brandt by Egon Bahr who was his press chief, but also his policy planner, I guess I would say. He is still active in German affairs. Brandt began to put it into effect while he was still mayor.

We in the mission, I certainly myself and I think this was true of my superiors, generally favored this approach. It seemed a logical way to react to the change in position that had

changed so with the building of the wall. While we were not called upon by Brandt to give him active support we certainly would have been in a position to frustrate what he was doing, but we chose not to. We encountered by that the hostility of the American press corps in West Berlin, which I think was a very unfortunate group of journalists, not first class--they tended to be wire service reporters and others, some who had been there since the glory days of the Berlin blockade when everyone knew whose side he was on. They could not tolerate any kind of concessions to the East. They formed a chorus of cold war disappointment with this tendency of the Berlin mission to go along with Brandt's policy. We always had to put up with their carping from the sidelines that we were giving up West Berlin. We even had some people in the mission who were very unhappy with this approach--not the more senior people. There was one man whose name I will not mention, who on one occasion when I was down in the operations center dealing with this question of the Soviet armored cars coming into West Berlin, came down there and harangued me right in front of all the military staff and others, how wrong this was to let the Russians get away with this. I simply had to take him outside and tell him this was the way it was and to forget about it. He was one of those people who could not forget about it and he began to leak to the press and put his own twist to it from his own point of view. Ultimately he was undone because he did not leak to all the press and one of the people he did not include protested to our ambassador in Bonn that this guy was briefing everybody in Berlin but himself. The ambassador gave him 36 hours to get out of town, and we had him out, and it was good riddance. I mention this only to show that there was a real rending and tearing process going on at the time that Brandt begin to steer a new course, which later became thoroughly accepted as the best thing to do, and now, many years later, we see the culmination of that whole process.

It was a fascinating time to be in Berlin. We got to see quite a bit of Brandt, I got to know him moderately well. I admired him very much and thought that he was a very large man and a very broad-scale man and saw the larger picture much sooner than many of his compatriots and much sooner than many of my compatriots, I'm afraid.

Q: What would you say was the general attitude of Berliners throughout this whole period?

DAY: That is a tricky one. I think some of us were trapped a little bit by the contacts we had with a certain element of Berlin, particularly the Berlin press people who tended to still be rather Cold War enthusiasts dating from the blockade period. The deaths of people jumping over the wall and jumping out of buildings after the wall was built became to us the symbol of Berlin and the horror of the wall. We tended to feel that all of West Berlin looked with equal horror on what was going on and were prepared to take risks to resist. We found, I think, from time to time that we were somewhat out ahead of the man in the street. I remember one time I wrote a tough, almost fiery, statement for the commandants to issue after a particularly bad incident at the wall in which an East German was killed, to bring it close to home, and I think it was representative in a sense. It was published in all the papers and I was quite proud of it, thinking that "here the West Berliners will think we are really going to stick up for them". A woman who worked for us at home, who

lived in West Berlin but had come from East Berlin and had family there still, came in one day. She had no idea that I had written the thing, and she had read it and was terrified. She thought that sounded as though there was going to be war, that there was going to be a conflict. The last thing she wanted was any more trouble and I suspect that she spoke for a lot of West Berliners whom we never got to know because they had no outlet for their views. But it sobered me and I felt from then on we should not count on thinking that we were standing up for the Berliners if we were over violent or over aggressive.

Q: Before leaving Berlin, would you like to comment on overall Allied cooperation. Was it on the whole good, or do you have any particular comments?

DAY: It was really excellent I think. The commandants were first class, by and large, on the three sides and their political staffs were very good. I think fortunately on the British and French sides the military had very much less to say on their own national policies about what should be done than was the case on the American side. Since I think their military were, by and large, less sophisticated politically than ours were I think that was a blessing so we dealt mainly with their political people. There were some amusing differences in attitudes. The French could never understand our concern with public opinion at all. The Americans were very sensitive to public opinion in Berlin and elsewhere. Over and over again in our meetings at my level with the French we would put forward some concern with this and the French would say, "Well it is none of the public's business, this is right to do and we should do it." The British were somewhere in between; they understood our point but were a little less concerned about public opinion. But in the end the French would go along; they realized that we felt strongly about some of these things. They had a very fine diplomat named DeNazelle, Count DeNazelle, a very cooperative chap. We got along so well at the personal level with the British and French that policy was no problem.

Q: So I gather that we coordinated our practices vis a vis the Soviets with no problems pretty much. Shall we move on to the Middle East which is of course an area in which you spent a good deal of your career. After Berlin, you went to IO [International Organizations in the Department of State].

DAY: I spent a year at the War College, 1966-1967, which is not worth commenting on; it was somewhat of a disappointment to me. I found kind of an anti-intellectual atmosphere there that I had not expected and it was not nearly as much of an adventure as I had thought although I met some fine people.

Q: That is interesting as it somewhat parallels my own experience.

DAY: It was a disappointment but it was a good unwinding after four very tense years in Berlin. Then I did go to the State Department bureau that handled international organizations and worked in the office of political affairs, UNP, and dealt mainly with the Arab-Israeli problem, this was just after the 1967 war--just weeks after, with the Cyprus problem, which blew up severely at the end of that year, and with a new incarnation of the

Congo problem that came up during those years. I was very busy with serious crises, coming at them from the tangent of the UN. One further thing that amused me to some extent somewhat wryly was that we, we being the American government, were somewhat selective in our use of the UN. For example in connection with the Arab-Israeli problem I spent a great deal of my time trying to keep the UN from becoming involved in it, in particular avoiding problems being taken up in the Security Council because we knew that the weight of the Security Council would be very much against Israel and consequently against us-- but also more practically it would be against what was practical because without the Israeli agreement to a course of action on settlement of the problem there was no possibility of settlement. So I struggled, we all struggled, to keep our Arab friends from bringing things into the Security Council where they would become a source of rhetoric and no action.

On the other hand, the Cyprus problem, when it became serious enough that we were concerned--that was when NATO security was somewhat threatened because the Greeks and the Turks were the opponents in Cyprus and the Soviets began fishing in those troubled waters--we were very anxious for the UN to deal with it. We undertook some important missions ourselves, Cy Vance went out on a shuttle mission, I think at the end of 1967, on the holidays, to the capitals of the countries involved and actually did defuse a crisis, but in the main we were anxious to have the UN handle that one. We did not want to get into it directly because we did not want ourselves and the Russians to be at odds over that.

Q: Do you have any particular comments to make about the Congo problem?

DAY: I don't really remember too much about that. It was, of course, very different from the original Congo problem in which the UN sent a very large force there in Hammarskjold's day. This was the time when Katanga was attempting to become independent. We were very much against that, feeling that it was something that had been cooked up, in part, by Belgium industrialists who wanted to have a part of the Congo they could still run. The secessionists were employing the mercenaries in a very large way and that became the last gasp of large scale mercenary warfare in Africa. At any rate they formed a major part of the problem. You remember at the end of the problem the mercenaries were cornered, I think up in Rwanda, and my last job with Dean Brown, who was in African affairs at the time, was to devise ways of saving them and getting them out through the UN and Red Cross auspices. It worked. Dean Brown was much more involved than I, but I don't remember as vividly as I do the other two cases what the day by day politics were.

Q: Let's move on to the whole issue of the Arab-Israeli problem. I know that you served in Jerusalem; before coming to your tour of duty there do you have any comments to make before we move to there?

DAY: I think we can just pick it up there. I had lost track of the Middle East problem to some extent in that I had been off on other details. I was in arms-control for a couple of years.

Q: That's right, you were in ACDA and arms control. Do you want to say something about that?

DAY: I don't think there was a great deal going on at the time that is worth recounting. Perhaps the most interesting thing was that the organization, the negotiating organization, that I happened to have the most to do with at that point, was called the CCD, the eighteen member, I believe, international negotiating organization that was situated in Geneva.

Q: What did CCD stand for?

DAY: Conference for? No one ever remembered what CCD stood for. It was a subordinate UN body to negotiate arms control on a less than full UN membership basis. It began with fifteen, then moved up to eighteen, then became at some point twenty-one. The interesting thing about it was, I thought, it was under the chairmanship of the US and Soviets and it worked quite well, oddly enough, partially because on arms control, especially at that level (this was not strategic arms control, these were things like the nuclear proliferation treaty which had been negotiated just before I got into that business, the treaty to ban biological weapons, the treaty to ban mass destruction weapons on the seabed) on these somewhat subordinate issues we and the Soviets found ourselves often on the same side as opposed to the Third World non-nuclear powers. Consequently the joint management of that body worked quite well and we, on the American side, and our counterparts on the Russian side, became quite close associates, friends to some extent, people I have followed over the years and met in other places. It showed what we are now seeing on a much larger scale, where the interests are now common, how we and the Soviets could work together quite effectively. They had some first class diplomats, quite as good as we certainly, and they and we together ran a relatively tight ship.

Q: Moving on to Jerusalem, you were consul general there. I gather that was a period when the Israeli government considered Jerusalem its capital and that created a somewhat awkward situation for consuls general. Would you care to comment on that?

DAY: That is certainly true; the Israelis wanted us out of Jerusalem because we were there largely as a symbol of non- acceptance of the claim that this was their capital, even that it belonged to Israel officially and legally. Our embassies, a dozen or so countries in the same situation, were maintained in Tel Aviv and we had consuls general in Jerusalem. All of us had two offices in Jerusalem, in what had prior to 1967 been Israeli Jerusalem on the Jewish side of the city and the other in what had been Arab Jerusalem. That was another burr under the Israeli saddle; they felt we were doing this to emphasize the fact, as we saw it, that Jerusalem was not a single city, that there was an Arab side and an Israeli side. Of course, to a certain extent, that is why we were doing it. We got along

fairly well with the Israeli authorities. Teddy Kollek [the mayor] was a savvy political person and understood the problem. He was a little sarcastic with us from time to time, but on the whole we did not have trouble with the city authorities, in fact we were somewhat grateful for Kollek in one sense. He stood between us and some Israeli national ministries that were located in Jerusalem, which had authorities who would have been much more difficult to deal with--especially the Interior Ministry which was run largely by very conservative orthodox religious Jews and who were really not happy about having Christians in Jerusalem at all, especially consuls general. Kollek understood he had a polyglot city on his hands and if he was going to run it successfully everyone had his niche, and we had ours. In general we got along with Kollek fairly well.

I found some of my colleagues, the other consuls general, to be a little petty at times in their opposition to the Israelis. Some disliked the Israelis and I am afraid some disliked Jews in a more fundamental way. I do not say that in a broadcast way, but there were some who had the problem. Consequently I found myself, from time to time, isolated from them, not going along with what I felt were their more extreme expressions of opposition to the Israeli rule there. I was willing to do that and American policy would not have permitted anything else. We maintained quite firmly our right to be in Jerusalem and to claim that Jerusalem was not legally a part of Israel, but on the other hand the State Department was not going to make any bigger an issue of it than it had to because it certainly was not a thoroughly popular point of view in the Congress of this country where the Israelis had a lot of influence. We got along. It was one of those situations, a little like Berlin, where you arrived at a *modus vivendi* and you parted from it at your peril.

One example I might mention, when I first arrived in Jerusalem I went to pay my call on Teddy Kollek as the mayor of the city and he brought up a problem which had been bothering the Israelis quite a bit. The consuls general, obviously as diplomats do, had from time to time large receptions, national days or other occasions. All of them had two receptions; they invited Israelis to one and Arabs to the other, largely because the Arabs did not want to come where the Israelis were, they did not want to be in a position of accepting the *de facto status quo*; they were very unhappy and they did not want to be put in a position of mixing with the Israelis. When I called on Kollek, he mentioned this and said he would like very much to have receptions in which the two would mix. I told Kollek that I was not there as a missionary, to change peoples' views, I was there as a diplomat and was prepared to accept the way they felt, both the Arabs and the Israelis, about each other. If there were Arabs who were willing to come to receptions where there were Israelis, I had no problem with that and would invite them, but I certainly was not going to put myself in a position of pressuring the Arabs to do this. That was the policy I followed throughout my stay there. There were some Arabs who met Israelis in their own personal lives with no trouble and I had them to receptions and other gatherings where Israelis came, but on the whole I followed the general practice of having most Arabs to separate meetings because simply they would not have come and would have felt aggrieved if I had pressed them to come.

I remember one particular case which impressed me with the depths of feeling on the subject. I got to know quite well the head of the Russian Orthodox Church in Jerusalem--the non- communist Orthodox Church, the one that fled Russia and had its headquarters in the United States, which is why I got to know them quite well. Father Graby--which was the man's name who was the head of the church--would have me quite often to receptions at his place in the old city of Jerusalem quite close to the Holy Sepulcher. I remember one occasion when he had both Israeli officials and Arabs, all of whom I knew, and he also had photographers, as people do at their parties to take pictures of the guests and give them out as souvenirs later. I remember one poor harassed woman, Dora Salah, who was the head of the YWCA....

Q: Arthur, you were telling us about your experiences in Jerusalem, would you continue?

DAY: I was describing this reception at the Russian Orthodox Church in which the Archimandrite had invited both Israelis and Arabs, some Arabs who did not at all care to be associated with Israelis. In this one case, the woman I mentioned, Dora Salah, head of the East Jerusalem YWCA, which was very active in the Palestinian resistance, I remember seeing her at this reception with the haunted, hunted look trying to avoid ever being caught talking to or near an Israeli at a time when the photographer was there so that she would not have her picture taken with an Israeli showing in the same picture because it would have really been awkward for her among her constituency. It was a very telling example for me why it was unfair to put them in that position. I never did; I tried very much to avoid doing that.

Q: Would you care to comment on the relations between the American consuls general in Jerusalem and our embassies and our ambassadors in Tel Aviv?

DAY: That was a very tense relationship, in some ways more than the relationship directly with the Israelis. Only with the ambassadors, the other officers in the embassy were professionals, some of whom were close friends of mine, but both the ambassadors who were there when I was there were very, very pro-Israeli, anti-Arab.

Q: Could you tell us who they were?

DAY: Wally Barbour had been there ten years when I arrived and was there another year or two more before he became too ill and retired. He had become an institution in Israel. They had named schools after him and he was very pro-Israel. As he told me one day, his solution for American foreign policy in the Middle East was to arm the Israelis and forget the Arabs. Let the Israelis take care of the Arabs. He on the other hand was not very active. He was not very well during that period. Consequently I disagreed with him but I had no real run-ins with him. His successor, on the other hand, was a politician from New York named Keating; he had been a senator, and very, very pro-Israeli, as I guess a senator from New York would get to be associating with pro-Israeli groups in his constituency. I did have trouble with him.

I remember one occasion, which was quite embarrassing actually. I had heard from his DCM (his deputy chief of mission) in the embassy that he, the ambassador, had an appointment to come up and see Kollek, the mayor of Jerusalem. [after first saying Berlin rather than Jerusalem] (I am going to make that mistake from time to time having served in two divided cities one after the other it is hard to keep them straight. Both have an east and a west. Interesting though, one city was a city that was psychologically thoroughly united but physically split, Berlin - and Jerusalem when I was there was physically united but psychologically deeply split.) Keating had an appointment with Kollek in Jerusalem and under the rules of the game this was not to be done. The embassy was to deal with the national government and I was to deal with the city government although the Israelis were always trying to water this down. I knew there was no point in my calling Keating about this since he regarded me as pro-Arab and consequently would not have paid any attention to what I would say. So I called Washington and told the desk officer what was going on, and asked him if he could just let Keating know what the rules were so there would not be a struggle here. To my utter dismay, in opening my telegrams the next morning I found a State Department telegram signed by the Secretary of State to Keating saying that they understood he had this meeting with Kollek, that he was not to do that, that was not the way business was conducted and he was to look to me, as the consul general in Jerusalem, for his guidance on how to deal with Jerusalem. I knew that would put Keating in a flaming fury and he would know on the face of it that I had been the one to put the Department up to it. I called Keating on the telephone, there was nothing else to do, and said I was very unhappy with the way things had worked out and the way it had been worded, that I agreed with what it said but I hoped it would not ruin what relationship we had. He was very unhappy, not nasty, about it on the phone. I don't think I ever spoke to him again after that. There was no occasion to; there certainly was no occasion found. I had him to our residence once in Jerusalem thinking he might find it useful to meet some Arab leaders from East Jerusalem and some church people, very substantial people like Pio Laghi, the head of the Roman Catholic church mission in Jerusalem who later went on to become the apostolic delegate in Washington. A very fine Italian. The Ambassador came up with his wife to have dinner with me, but I understand he never really forgave me for it--to face him with actual Arabs was more than he could tolerate. So it was a difficult relationship, but fortunately it really did not affect anything. It just made life a little less pleasant.

There was a constant push in the embassy to become more active in Jerusalem and the West Bank, but Washington was very strong on that and kept them from going off the reservation. So I had no really serious trouble, it was just a friction.

Q: Who were the State Department senior people on the Arab- Israeli problem during that period?

DAY: Roy Atherton was the assistant secretary and Hal Saunders, who later became the assistant secretary, was the deputy who dealt with my area. I can't remember who the desk officer was. There were a series of fairly professional well-acquainted officers dealing directly with the problem. One of the complications was that jurisdictionally, Jerusalem

came under the Israeli desk although my job there was really was entirely with Arabs. My role was to keep in touch with the West Bank leadership and West Bank population primarily and to report what was going on in the West Bank, which from time to time became important. That was of course primarily of interest to people on the Arab desks back in the Department, especially the Jordan desk. Jordan had at one time been in control of the West Bank and the West Bankers were still Jordanians by passport if not actually by loyalties. Actually they detested the Jordanians almost as much as they detested the Israelis.

My jurisdictional managers were not the ones who were most substantially interested in what I was doing, but it did not matter since people in NEA got along very well and there were no brouhahas between the desks.

Q: As you know, the State Department officials have been traditionally accused by the press as being too pro-Arab, at least a certain segment of the press in America. From your vantage point, which seems excellent, in Jerusalem and from your previous experience, would you care to comment on how you assessed the attitudes of the Department senior officers and the desk officers. You have already told us told us the two ambassadors you have served under in Israel were very, very pro-Israeli. How would you assess the evenhandedness or lack of it among our senior personnel in Washington at that time?

DAY: I think the proclivities which you referred to existed back in my previous incarnation in the Middle East; then there was no doubt that the officers in the State Department handling Arab-Israeli affairs, at least up through the office director level, were very pro-Arab. This would have been in 1949-50, in that early period. They were officers who had in their earlier careers been entirely in the Arab context and they knew the Arabs and felt that Israel was a dangerous intrusion into the area from an American political point of view. Although they carried out American policy as it was set out by the American presidents and secretaries, they still wished that we could be more favorable to the Arab side. By the time when I became more directly involved in it when I was in Jerusalem, which was quite a lot later, that was in 1972, well over twenty years had passed, a new generation of officers had come along, like Roy Atherton, and Roy himself was as evenhanded as a human could be about everything. I would say most of his officers were much more cold-bloodily American-policy-oriented and less sentimentally attached to the Arab mystique, which does exist. The orientalist had a kind of attachment towards the Arabs that went beyond policy. They were not so much in evidence as before.

I thought that NEA, that was the bureau that handled this issue in the Department, really was quite objective in its dealings with it, which is not to say, nevertheless, that it was well to the side of the Arabs from most of the American Congress, which was as unevenhanded as you can get. The American Congress was really totally, for the most part, committed to the cause of Israel. Some of the staff people on the Hill, I am convinced, spent most of their time promoting the cause of Israel, which as far as I am concerned is a foreign country. I, and many State Department people also, resented the

fact that these Americans in official positions seemed much more concerned about the fortunes of a foreign country than the fortunes of their own country.

Q: You are talking about the staff on the Hill?

DAY: On the Hill. This led to what I thought was understandable resentment on the part of the State Department on having our policy so strongly effected by forces and people who weren't primarily interested in the success of the American policy but who were primarily interested in the success of Israeli policy. But they understood the name of the game, which was politics when Israel was involved, and they lived with that, as I lived with it, and ceased tilting with windmills.

Q: What would you say was the role of the consul general in terms of policy and practice during your stay there?

DAY: It was in the first instance a symbolic role, to symbolize our unwillingness to accept that Israel had acquired Jerusalem. Beyond that, as I mentioned earlier, we kept in touch with West Bank Arab trends. We were really the principal reporter on Palestinian attitudes, which became at times, and certainly after I left there, became very important to American policy. I think our contribution to American policy was as expert observers of the Palestinian side of the equation. There was no country, no embassy, that had a direct focus on Palestinians. The Jordanian embassy certainly didn't. The king and his government were almost as opposed to Palestinians in some respects as the Israelis were at times. So I was the Palestinian embassy in a certain sense. That is what I tried to be; while not becoming an advocate of the Palestinians, in fact I became rather discouraged in the way that they conducted their affairs and felt always that the best solution for the West Bank was the solution in which it became part of Jordan again, rather than become independent. I was convinced that it would become a very troublesome entity. Nevertheless my role was to deal with and to report on the Palestinians.

Q: When you say the Palestinian embassy you mean the American embassy to the Palestinians?

DAY: That's right.

Q: How would you assess your contacts with the Arabs and the Israelis? Would you have any comments to make on that?

DAY: The Arabs with whom I dealt with in Jerusalem were mostly non-political people; there was not a political hierarchy, of course, on the West Bank. I did deal with mayors of the towns, who were the most senior political people. The well-known mayor of Bethlehem, Freij was the best known in this country, I knew quite well. I knew the mayors of some of the other towns, but beyond that the people involved in politics, so to speak, were lawyers, pharmacists and whatever, teachers and principals of the schools run by the United Nations agency that dealt with Palestinians, so I had a wide and very varied

list of contacts on the Arab side. It was not always easy to keep track of the movements there, because the people who became most influential were people whom we saw very little; they were much more obscure. This became much more true in later years after the uprising there. The people who seemed to become influential were a new generation that shoved aside the people I knew in my day and I think none of us, nobody on the American side, really knew them terribly well.

On the Israeli side, I talked about my relationship with Kollek, which was not bad, but wasn't too warm. I got to know his deputy very well, a man named Meron Benvenisti who was really in charge of Arab affairs for Kollek and later left the Israeli government and became an academic, then in later years ran the West Bank study project in Israel which provided much of the information on which we and the Israelis both assessed West Bank activities. I also happened to know some of the Israeli Foreign Office people whom I had met in my previous incarnations dealing with Israel. Although they were not supposed to be dealing with me officially, I nevertheless kept in touch with them to some extent, including Eppie Evron, who had been ambassador to the United States at one point and now was a senior officer in the Foreign Office. He came to lunch one time, which I am sure was the first time he ever did that. We got along on a personal level and I have no complaints. The military who ran the West Bank were inaccessible to me by their choice. They were not supposed to deal with anybody but the embassy and the embassy would not deal with them, so they were really out of touch with American officialdom, but there again I occasionally met one of their occupation colonels in some Arab mayor's house and got to know him slightly. I never had a contact so that I could call them up on the phone and ask what was going on.

I also knew the Israeli press people who dealt with the West Bank, some of whom were very pro-Palestinian. I knew a few press people who were on the Arab side and kept in touch with them as a diplomat would anywhere.

Q: This was of course the period that Kissinger was active with his shuttle diplomacy. We know that Secretary Kissinger remained very, very involved in this whole issue. What were your general feelings and assessment of this issue, how Kissinger operated and how effective his policies were?

DAY: Of course I got to know Kissinger much better when I became deputy assistant secretary, though I saw him somewhat in Jerusalem. I was in a rather odd position because he was coming to Jerusalem, "my town" so to speak, to meet with the Israelis. He was not coming to Jerusalem as the separate entity that I represented the Americans in, but he was coming there to meet the Israelis. My role was a minimal one, and should have been. The embassy people came up to Jerusalem when he came and took care of him, which was fortunate because it took the whole embassy to do it. I could not have begun to staff it. I used to go, each time he came, over to the King David Hotel where he would arrive and stay, and when he came in the front door, I would be there together with the manager of the King David Hotel. The two of us would rush out and shake his hand. I always thought after that whether he had thought of me as the deputy manager of the King

David Hotel, which I must have looked like, although later on I got to know him. So I had very little substantively to do with him although I thought very highly of what he was trying to do. I thought he was on the right track and that he was being as tough with the Israelis as he was with the Arabs. He established good relations with Arabs that no other American had worked with, Hafez al Assad, the Syrian leader in particular. He put up with a lot from the Israelis. I remember one time--he was not very popular in Israel--on one visit he went through the streets--he was trying to make the Israelis give up the Sinai in a deal with Egypt--and there were signs up "Jew boy, go home!" They felt he was a traitor to the race. At one point, Golda Meir, who was prime minister, and a pretty tough cookie herself, felt she had to speak out to her own people. She said, "Look we have a tendency, we Israelis, to deal with a situation like this, by *ad hominem* means, by attacking the person of the policy, rather than the policy itself. We have to stop that with regard to Kissinger, in particular." It was getting out of hand. He was subjected to really personal abuse, but he persevered. Kissinger was a pretty tough nut and I don't think it got to him too much. He had some very difficult times there and I could tell from dealing with his staff and seeing him, that they were difficult. But I thought that he was on the right track and in general was very successful.

Q: On the basis of your later experience and getting to know him better when you were deputy assistant secretary in NEA, how would you assess his way of operating and his rather high-handed way of dealing with FSOs and others? There has also been the criticism that he tended to by pass certain regular channels in the State Department. Would you care to comment?

DAY: Yes, that is pretty much true. The problem that a lot of outsiders have in coming into government, and I think that he really suffered from paranoia, in that he felt that the Foreign Service establishment in the State Department was constantly trying to undercut and run around him, and lay out their own policies instead of his policies. I think in the main this was not true, at least in the Middle East area it certainly was not true. But it meant that he dealt with policy through a cadre of officers whom he knew personally and whom he felt, as he always put it, "he knows my thinking", which was to him the touchstone of a reliable officer--"he knows my thinking".

When I first was introduced to the Seventh Floor, the Secretary's floor, after having been made a deputy assistant secretary, toward the end of one year--the year 1975--I arrived with a bang because Kissinger in the course of one day, early in the morning, announced that he wanted a speech prepared to make in the UN context about the Palestine problem and he wanted a very difficult and sensitive letter written for him to Rabin, who at that time was prime minister of Israel. This was Saturday, nine or ten o'clock in the morning and he wanted them both that day. I spent a very busy day writing both of these things. I wrote them so fast that the both came out all right as so often happens in these things, and he was happy with the two pieces of paper. That really did it for me. From that time I had no problem being some one whom he considered he could trust, although I was no more trustworthy than other officers. It also had some awkward aspects to it that emerged whenever Atherton, who was assistant secretary, would be away. His immediate deputy,

who took over for him, was not one of the officers for some reason or other--that was Sid Sober, a very fine officer and a fine guy--but for some reason or another he and Kissinger had just not hit it off. When Atherton was away Kissinger would be on the phone to me all the time about things that I did not know anything about, they were in Sober's department and concerned parts of the Middle East that I had no personal dealings with. It just was very awkward for me and certainly an unhappy way of dealing with things for Sober, but there was nothing you could do about it. Kissinger just did things that way.

He also had a kind of manner that tended to rattle you and keep you off balance which I guess it was why he did it. I remember on a number of occasions I would get in quite early in the morning, as one had to do, seven or eight o'clock, he would be on the phone, and the first thing he would do when you came on the phone would be to say, "I suppose that it is too much to expect that you would have read the telegrams this morning." Or, "I suspect it is too much to expect that this State Department organization would have gotten around to getting you the telegrams that came in overnight, inefficient as it is." Of course I had always read the telegrams and the State Department had always gotten them to me, but he had always this kind of approach, which until you got used to it tended to get you a little flustered so that you could not think straight when he got to the point. But then he would come to the point, and he would say that there is a cable in from here or there and this is what I want you to do about it.

I remember one case when there was a cable in from Cairo that the Egyptians were very concerned about an attack from Libya. You remember there was a period during which we thought that Qadhafi was going to attack Egypt. He called me up very early in the morning before my own secretary and staff had arrived and said he was leaving in forty-five minutes to go to Europe and wanted a telegram before he left to go back to Sadat saying that the American government would back him if there was an attack from Qadhafi. He got off the phone and his secretary got on and said "if you want to come up here and dictate it, I know you have no one down there." So I ran upstairs and dictated this thing in a couple of minutes. He sent it out. This is not a good business in that rushed, hurried way, because we offered too much of a security guarantee to Sadat, we never had to pay out, but it was not a thought-through affair. But he tended to operate that way and it was very difficult to say no when he wanted something done. After all, he was the Secretary and one shouldn't say no.

He was a very engaging person, in a way, to deal with, very warm in his praise for things that were well done. Even if a very junior officer down in the ranks sent something up that he thought well done, he would send it back with a note on it, and signed it, saying that he thought it was well done and congratulations, which I have never seen come down from any other Secretary. He was a complex person. I used to travel with him when he went on trips. Wherever the trip was he would take a Near Eastern specialist with him because he dealt with the Near East wherever he was. It was so central with his concerns. I went with him on a couple of trips, one to Latin America and another to Europe. I was told before I went by my colleagues in NEA that if he barked at me or shouted at me or raised hell with me all the time, not to worry, that was a good sign, he was paying

attention to you. What happens is that people he doesn't like, he just ignores completely. But I was happy to be visited by a good deal of abuse and I felt that that probably was a good thing.

In fact he did pay attention to what I told him when he asked for my advice. I wrote cables for him that he signed, and I felt in that sense it was quite possible to do business with him although there were times when, if he got the idea that you were trying to put something over on him, he could be just impossible to deal with. I remember one tongue-lashing I got down in Cancun [Mexico] in a hotel about seven o'clock in the morning. He was still in his pajamas. He called me down. A cable had gone out he had not realized was going out and he said, "NEA is trying to conduct its own policy, this is not my policy. You can understand now why I rely on people like Larry Eagleburger." Eagleburger was the real number two in the Department, although he really was not the official number two. Larry carried out Kissinger's wishes. He knew Kissinger's thinking. He had been with him in the White House beforehand...

Q: Let's say a word about Syria and Kissinger's attitude. I know that many people have felt that Assad was basically a total enemy of ours, yet one has a feeling that Kissinger seemed to feel that one could work with him. What was your assessment of Kissinger's attitude towards Assad and Assad in general?

DAY: Assad was a very tough nut, there is no doubt about it. He was very brutal leader and carried on very brutal policies in his own country in order to stay in power. He was also strongly anti-Israeli and from time to time identified himself with the rejectionists among the Arabs who did not want a peace with Israel. But in the end I think Assad was a very pragmatic leader of his country and felt that there was very little chance in a peace process of getting back the land that he had lost, the Golan heights, very little chance the US would back him getting them back. So from his point of view the peace process held practically no prospects of what from his point of view would be a successful peace. So he wasn't very enthusiastic about getting involved with Israel. On the other hand, he kept his border with Israel under tight control. There was never any violence along that border, except in the actual war that took place in 1973, and he followed a very pragmatic policy with Israel, that was much in the interest of American policy as it played out. It avoided an outbreak of another war.

The best instance of that, I think, was in 1976, after the civil disturbances in Lebanon had been going on for several months and had gotten broader and broader and deeper and deeper and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] had gotten into it. In the spring of that year Assad sent very sizeable Syrian troop units into Lebanon. I remember very well the night that word came from our people in Syria that this was happening. I went down to the Operations Center and Roy Atherton came in and we read the messages and had a meeting immediately to decide what the American response should be. Should we go back to the Syrians to say, "This is impermissible from our point of view" or should we not? I remember the two of us, Atherton and I, getting on the phone to Sisco, who was the next in line, and convincing him that we should not express any opposition outright, that

it might not be such a bad idea to have the Syrians go in. They were actually going in to protect the Christians at that point against the left-wing Moslem forces. With his authority we then called Kissinger and talked to him. At first he said, "Why, he can't do that, that is going into serious trouble." But Atherton did the talking on our side, so to speak, to convince him that Assad had a very cool head and that this might not be bad if we could help manage it so there would not be gratuitous occasion for conflict. Kissinger agreed and we did not attempt to turn the Syrians around.

What we did over the next weeks was to conduct a constant series of negotiations with the Syrians on one hand and the Israelis on the other, who could not speak to each other, to be sure that the Israelis understood what the Syrians were going to do in terms of where they were going to go in Lebanon and what they were going to do there. The Israelis were understandably nervous about having a very big Syrian army come down from the north along the Lebanese border. We would keep the Syrians informed of what the Israeli limit of tolerance was, how close could the Syrian army come to their border before the Israelis would move against it--the so-called "red line" which Rabin drew. It was not just a line physically but had to do with the types of troops that were introduced and how they were used as well as geographic distribution.

We kept the Syrians and Israelis mutually informed and the Syrians played that game meticulously, they never overstepped the line the Israelis laid down and consequently the Israelis too, for a time, came to think that maybe it was a good thing to have the Syrians in there to bring a little order out of what was a very dangerous kind of situation. In the end it did not work that way, but that primarily was not the Syrians' fault. Nobody could have brought it under control. Certainly the Israelis failed when they tried. Assad, you could deal with him that way. If you practiced hard-headed practical diplomacy with him without a lot of cards up your sleeve, but all out in the open so that he could see what you were doing and came to trust your intentions, at least in that specific regard, you could do business with him. Of course, Kissinger worked out an arrangement with him in which he withdrew some troops, the Israelis withdrew some troops on the Golan and established a border which still exists up there. It has been a relatively peaceful border.

Q: I believe that it may have been during service in that the brutal murder of Frank Meloy occurred. Do you have any comments to make on that?

DAY: That was an unhappy series of events. Meloy had gone out there--I had known him slightly before--to be ambassador to Lebanon at a time when Beirut was just a wilderness of cross fire between the various contending factions, a very dangerous place. I had met [Robert O.] Waring [acting deputy] before I left Jerusalem so I knew him as well. Meloy had quite properly stayed holed up in his embassy after he arrived because the fighting was so severe that it was risky to go out. At one point the fighting seemed to have died down and a certain degree of order seemed to have been established in the city. Atherton and I met with Kissinger every day about Lebanon. Kissinger had been very hard to convince that Lebanon was of any concern to him. He saw it as a local battle that had to do with Christians and Moslems in that little country, and it did not concern the

Americans much. He eventually became concerned that it would suck Assad in and cripple him politically for what Kissinger hoped would be another round of peace talks once the elections of 1976 were over, and if Kissinger were still Secretary of State. Kissinger was very concerned about the Lebanese situation blowing up and endangering the peace more broadly, so he did become involved to the extent that Atherton and I met with him almost every day about Lebanon.

On one of these occasions he said, "Well, it is about time Meloy got out and started seeing people, what is the point of having him there if he does not go around and see the government, at least?" So I was instructed to draft a telegram to Meloy telling him it was time for him to get out. I was a little concerned about it, and I am happy about it to this day although it did not help poor Frank any, that I added at the end of the telegram, "of course your personal safety is paramount, if you feel you would be in danger, don't do it." Well Frank read the telegram and felt that the Secretary wanted him to get out, and I guess he felt he could do it without meeting with disaster. As you know, he and Bob Waring were stopped and taken out of the car along with the chauffeur--who was to some extent involved with the people who eventually murdered Meloy--they took them off and murdered them. The press got wind of the fact that he had been ordered by Kissinger to go out on this mission that resulted in his death. There was some initial reaction, that Frank had been sent to his death by this ogre Kissinger. I remember calling up one reporter, she is now I think with the *New York Times*, but at that time she was with Public Radio, Judith Miller, whom I knew slightly, and whom I had talked to about this situation in Lebanon, and I read the telegram over the phone even though it was slightly classified. I read her the final paragraph to prove that we had not sent him to his death, and that it was his judgment that led to his venturing out. That was just one of the many tragic events.

Q: As I recall, wasn't [Ambassador] Dean Brown who was traveling in an armored car for his own protection. Do you think that Frank Meloy could have made that trip in a way he could have been better protected?

DAY: It is possible. He had a follow-car with security people, which in the end did not do him any good. I don't think there was the possibility of an armored car or that it would have done him any good. Dean Brown was at that time in Amman during the active, open warfare between the Jordanian military and the Palestinians. The problem there was simply open warfare, with a stray bullet catching him. In Lebanon the problem was determined efforts to go after you and catch you by one of these bands of brigands that roamed the country. They could have stopped an armored car as well, in fact they did it all the time. I think we have come to see now that in Lebanon there is no really secure way to operate. If they want to get you it is very hard to protect yourself against it. The only solution for us would have been to have better intelligence against it, to know that the chauffeur was going to turn him in, in effect. I think they killed the chauffeur anyway, but that was par for the course in Lebanon. Or just to have him stay in the embassy, there really was not much for him to do even if he went out, the situation was so very much out

of control. It is hard to see how an embassy can function usefully and not endanger itself severely in a situation like that.

Q: What was the final assessment of who was responsible for the murder of Ambassador Meloy and Waring, and do you feel this assessment was correct?

DAY: I don't remember now--this was so long ago, although I went up and testified before a committee in Congress about it. I think they identified a group of Nasserist fighters. Lebanon was divided into innumerable groups, each with its own machine gun and jeep, and a cadre. I think there was a group of Nasserists, small, of no political consequence, but they were terrorists, and they were the ones who did it. I don't remember now why. But I suppose it seemed to them that it served--it is almost like taking scalps to increase their prestige doing something like that.

Q: Moving on to the Carter administration, do you have any general comment on the way the situation was handled?

DAY: It was a case of night and day, really, in terms of forms of management. It was not all to the good, either. It was a little chaotic, the Carter administration. It was a little hard to know who was in charge. In the first few months President Carter made several statements which really rocked the Israelis because he was the first American leader to announce our support for a homeland for the Palestinians and there were other statements that he made that contained catchwords that the Israelis knew meant giving greater credence to the Palestinian cause than we had previously done. They were quite unhappy about it. The State Department, as far as I knew, had no input into that. This was all done in the White House and to some extent by Carter himself, and people whom he knew personally, maybe Brzezinski, but even the staff people in the NSC did not play a role in staffing these things--they seemed to come out of nowhere.

Actually it was kind of exhilarating in a sense in that he seemed to be trying to open up a problem which had been frozen for so long. It seemed for a while that he might do it with his aim to reconvene the Geneva conference, which had been convened briefly in 1973 after the 1973 war and then been suspended while Kissinger conducted his bilateral diplomacy. Carter wanted to reconvene it with the Soviets and have a big peace conference. We really gave it all we could to do it, but it did not work in the end. Although the style was shaky a bit and did not show sufficient concern for American political realities, I think Carter and Vance were very much on the right track, but it was a track that simply was not possible to pursue to the end. The various elements preventing it in the Middle East were then, as now, too great. There was a tendency, particularly on Vance's part, to be too legalistic. He was a lawyer and he put great credence in forms of words and was constantly pouring over formulae to get the Palestinians on board so we could establish relations with them. The handling of the form of words was astute, but the politics of it was not astute. They passed his form of words to the Palestinians through the Saudis because Vance was visiting the Saudis that summer, whereas the Syrians--Assad--thought that he was the channel that should be used, and I think probably rightly so. He

had more stake in the Palestinian problem by far than the Saudis had. Assad simply told the PLO to turn it down. In the end, I think, that that is what happened.

We were frustrated in our effort because we had not dealt with it properly rather than because it was a bad effort. Also I don't think they quite realized what a storm there would have been in this country. We learned when we came back from that trip that if we had ever succeeded, that if the PLO had done what we asked them to do and we had established relations with them, that the Jewish organizations in this country were prepared to pull out all stops to frustrate it. When we finally did establish a relationship with the PLO many years later under Secretary Shultz the Israelis and the Jewish organizations in the country were very much on the defensive about other issues and they could not muster the strength to oppose it, but at that time they could have and that would have been a very serious problem. In the end, as you know, one of the things that did us in when we tried to reconvene the Geneva Conference--I was up here in New York negotiating during the General Assembly of that year with the delegations of the countries that would have gone to the Geneva conference on the Middle East--and it was during that period we issued a joint declaration with the Soviets sort of setting the stage for the Geneva conference to be convened and this aroused the Israelis and the Jewish groups in this country in a very fundamental way and they fought it. In effect we took it back. That showed a very serious absence of political savvy in that they went ahead on the international scene and did not prepare it domestically. Eventually that frustrated their efforts.

Q: Who would you say who was primarily active in setting White House policy in the Middle East under Carter?

DAY: I think Carter was as involved as anybody. He had his own strong feelings. Brzezinski also had definite views. Brzezinski, just before he became NSC advisor, had participated in a Brookings Institute study on the Middle East and had put his name on a proposal they had come out with which actually he followed, to some extent, in a series of steps. So I think he had his say. Vance felt strongly about the Middle East. He did not disagree with what Carter wanted to do, but I had the feeling that he was not one of the principal initiators or originators of policy, at least in those early months.

Q: Arthur, you worked fairly closely with two Secretaries of State. Would you care to comment on them, how they acted in terms of the role the Secretary of State should play? What conclusions did you draw from having seen two persons acting so differently?

DAY: Kissinger, of course, was more than a Secretary of State, because during the years I dealt with him President Ford was president and Ford did not really have any credentials in foreign policy at all whereas Kissinger had been in the White House for many years and had a stature in foreign policy which was unassailable. He really ran foreign policy under Ford. I remember one little incident that illustrated that to me. I was in Moscow with Kissinger and I had prepared a long briefing paper for Ford when he was going to receive the Israeli prime minister. We took it to Moscow simply to work on it. One night

Kissinger talked to me in his room while his noise machine was going, he always turned on a machine which was supposed to foil eavesdroppers, in the way of microphones, and also foiled anybody who was trying to understand what he was trying to say. The thing that was interesting about it, the best I could understand over this loud racket, he said, "We have to prepare a paper for the president which will enable him to be believed by the Israeli," I think it was Rabin. "He has to be credible when he talks to Rabin." It was clear what he was saying that Ford did not have in himself the knowledge or experience to be credible to a professional foreign leader and somehow Kissinger had to pump this into him so that when he went up against Rabin, Rabin would think he knew what he was talking about and that Rabin would believe him and take him seriously. That was Kissinger's role.

It was a very different role that Vance played with Carter. Carter brought Vance into the administration to help him make foreign policy. Carter was a man who had his own views and did not hesitate to get into details, as you know, to his detriment in some ways. Vance was a lawyer and I think he always had in his mind in some ways, being the advocate of his leader, being his lawyer, in dealing with foreign countries. He had no thought, I think, of imposing his own views except in the end, the one that led to his resignation. He felt strongly about the Iranian problem. In terms of personalities in dealing with them, they were also worlds apart. Vance was very much a gentleman and very easy to deal with personally, whereas Kissinger was a very menacing sort of person to deal with. But Kissinger had a much stronger sense of political realities. I remember one time Vance called me up to his office and said, among other things, he thought it might be useful if we worked out with the Israelis a written agreement as to just what American political support, mainly, was to consist of. What were the limits. I was horrified. That was another one of these cases where there was a *modus vivendi* a *modus operandi* which you can never reduce to terms because it would have put the American-Israeli relation in litigation. There would have been unheard of pressures brought to bear by Israel and American groups to get forms of words to get everything Israel wanted. We would have had to fight and it would have been a source of tremendous conflict between us and Israel rather than a source of reassurance to Israel. I did not feel I could talk him out of it and I went down to Atherton and told him what he had said. He went right back up and quickly talked him out of it. It would have a disaster to try it. But it was the way Vance thought as a lawyer, get it down on paper and then we will all know. In politics, as you know, it does not work that way. I think that is a severe limitation that Vance had.

Q: Are there any comments that you would like to make on any part of your career that we did not touch upon? I notice that I did skip over some of your earlier posts. Is there anything you would like to say about your stay in Bremen and Santiago?

DAY: I don't think so. They were very interesting posts, in Bremen I had some occupational duties which were interesting for a junior officer. Among other things I helped to run a fleet of fishing boats, which I won't bore you as to the reasons. I also was a magistrate in the court there for a time. In Santiago I also did financial reporting at a time when Chile was going through a very agonizing period. I initiated Chile's first

request for aid. But these jobs were fairly routine in comparison to the jobs that I did later.

Q: In retrospect, how do you view the Foreign Service as a career? What steps do you feel the United States could take to improve the Foreign Service?

DAY: I thought it was an excellent career for me at the time I went in. My aim was certainly to get overseas as soon as possible and stay as much time abroad as possible because I liked foreign countries and I liked dealing with foreigners on problems. My son is now in the Foreign Service and I think he represents another approach. Many of his friends, as well as he himself, have angled to get into Washington as much as possible because that is where the power is. They are much more oriented to being where the decisions are made than getting out and dealing with the foreign world. I think that is an interesting and, I think, significant generational change. Also I think we were in the Foreign Service in its heyday, much less structured, much less bureaucratized organization than it now is. Now they have all these various levels and hurdles and gates you have to go through to go up through a career. Achieving tenure in effect, then moving on into taking a chance in being a senior officer and if you don't make it you are out, and if you do make it you have a further tenure. It has become terribly complicated and people now, I understand, fight and lobby for posts in a way they never did when I was there, because it is so competitive that if you do not get good posts you can't show how good you are and consequently you don't make it. Whereas in my day I felt that if I did a good job the Foreign Service would take care of me. It would see that I got good posts, that I would not get thrown out, and it worked that way. I think it worked that way for most of us. Now it isn't that way. I think you have to take care of yourself. It is more of a jungle as an organization. There have been many efforts to redo the Foreign Service, again and again, I don't know whether this can be cured. Maybe the Garden of Eden is just no longer the Garden of Eden, it is just a much bigger business than it used to be, the people in it demand more. There is the problem of wives working which was not a problem when I was in. It is probably just a part of the evolution of government service, the military is the same. I know that many military officers say that it just is not fun anymore. It has become so competitive, so structured, so demanding in ways other than pure substance. I am not sure that I would enjoy it nearly so much these days as I would then. I still think that it is a good and worthy career; you just have to put up with a good deal more frustration than you did then.

Q: Thank you Arthur, is there any other comment that you would like to make on this before we end the interview?

DAY: There is one comment which occurred to me when I used to sit up in Kissinger's office in the afternoon at the close of business. I would see on his desk, carefully arranged twenty to thirty thick files of paper waiting for his decision to sign a telegram, to sign a letter, to approve a course of action. It was a staggering burden of work. I remember thinking that when I had been a junior officer I used to think, "Well, let's put together this policy, we think it is a pretty good policy, but let's shoot it up to the Secretary. If he does

not like it he will shoot it down. Let's give him a chance to look at it." I realize how faulty that approach was, which I am sure is the approach to some extent in the lower levels in the Department, and how utterly dependent the Secretary is on the judgment of the people below him, to send him things and to make recommendations to him that are thoroughly worked out, sensible, politically sensible--not grinding private policy axes. He has maybe ten minutes on a very important bit of decision making, a very thick file. He can't possibly go into it in detail, he has to take the judgment of the people below him. I felt then that if only I had realized this as younger officer I might have given a lot more thought to the things that I did. Although I thought I was right about a lot of things, I think I would have been sobered that he was going to have to take my judgment on this move and not have a lot of time to think about it himself.

Q: Thank you very much.

[Note: This is an addendum dictated by Mr. Day after the above interview.]

DAY: There are some comments that I think I would like to add concerning my service in Jerusalem. One of them concerns the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 in which the Egyptians and Syrians attacked the Israelis on both the Egyptian front along the Suez Canal and the Syrian front along the border of the Golan Heights. During the week before the attack there had been rumors of troop movements and activity, especially in the Syrian sector. US military officers had inquired several times of Israeli military intelligence whether these movements did not presage some kind of hostile action by the Arab armies. The Israelis, having been burned by predicting Arab attacks early in the year that did not materialize, dismissed the reports as groundless. Toward the end of the first week of October, though, they were sufficiently concerned that they began to move troops of their own up towards the Golan front with Syria.

My involvement began on the night of October 5th, which was a Friday night and a night on which, at sundown, the very holy observance of Yom Kippur began in Israel. My wife and I were to go out to dinner that night to a staff member's in the Arab side of Jerusalem. In order to avoid driving through Jewish Jerusalem, in which we lived and where the driving of automobiles was virtually prohibited from sundown on that Friday night until sundown on the day following, we had parked the official consulate car on the border of the old city, that is the border of Jewish Jerusalem, which was only about three blocks from our residence. We walked to the car and drove on to the Arab side where the Yom Kippur observance did not apply. Sometime during the meal I was called on the phone and informed that an urgent telegram had arrived for me from Washington-- presumably, although I do not remember the details, an "immediate, night action" which would require my attention at once. I returned alone to the consular office which was in the same building as our residence, leaving my wife at the dinner. My recollection is that I drove back to the edge of Jewish Jerusalem and walked the few blocks on into the very still and quiet Jewish city where there was no traffic in the streets. The Department's message instructed me to go to the headquarters of the UN truce supervision organization, known as UNTSO, which was located on a hilltop just outside the city of Jerusalem in buildings

that the British had once used for their headquarters during the mandate period. I was to tell the UNTSO commander that the US government was concerned that Arab governments might misinterpret Israeli troop movements on the Golan Heights as having hostile intent and might be lead thereby to some response that might precipitate hostilities.

It so happened the UNTSO commander himself, a Finnish general named Enio Silasvuo was away from headquarters that night and acting in his place was the senior American officer assigned to UNTSO headquarters. I got back in my car and headed off for the UNTSO headquarters which required at one point my going into a section of Jewish Jerusalem. I had to get out at one point and remove a barricade that was designed to keep traffic from entering the city and then replace it behind me, driving on through the quiet streets and hoping that none of the more aggressive orthodox Jews, who were inclined to throw rocks at automobiles, even on the ordinary Sabbath day of every week, would see me and react. They apparently did not and after having removed the barricade that let me out of the Jewish community, I proceeded on to UNTSO and delivered my message. The American colonel agreed to convey this through the UNTSO team stationed in Damascus and I returned to Jerusalem in the same manner as before. Ultimately my wife and I concluded the dinner and returned home to bed. We were awakened at an early hour the next morning by an aircraft, a fighter I presume, flying very low over the city. An extraordinary event at any time but especially so on such a holy day as this. When I made my way upstairs to the office and looked at the cable traffic I found that the Israeli government had finally become convinced that an Arab attack was imminent and had ordered military mobilization. Since Jewish Israelis did not have their radios on because of the holy day, the fighter plane pass was intended to alert them that something was afoot and they should turn on the radios to receive the mobilization instructions.

Later that day, it must have been very shortly after two o'clock in the afternoon, I received a phone call from UNTSO telling me that their observers along the Egyptian-Israeli line on the Suez canal had just that minute reported an attack by the Egyptian forces past their observers, their observation points, towards the Israeli lines. I was able to get a flash telegram back to Washington within minutes of this attack having occurred, which was the first time, but not the last by any means, UNTSO's presence along the borders and the good relations that existed between the consulate general and UNTSO headquarters enabled us to report quickly and accurately on the progress of the war. Throughout the next week or two as Syrian and Egyptian armies crossed the Israeli lines and then ultimately were driven back across the lines in the other directions, the UNTSO observers pinned down in their observation posts in the midst of the conflict kept up a stream of reports to the headquarters in Jerusalem about the progress of the war. The consulate forwarded these to Washington as they were received since the reports, especially in the early days of the war, reflected much more serious difficulties for the Israelis than the Israelis were publicly acknowledging. Our reporting was able to keep Washington more accurately informed of the true state of affairs, although I assume the Israeli government was informing our embassy in Tel Aviv a good deal more accurately than their press was informing the public.

The period of the Yom Kippur war in Jerusalem was a strange one. In the first week while no one really questioned whether the Israelis would really be able to defend themselves in the end, the fighting did strike quite close to the Israeli heartland in the north of Israel where the Syrians pressed down from the Golan heights. But there was an almost eerie atmosphere of business as usual at the same time, so swiftly had the war come. On one occasion an American religious tour group wanted to visit the Christian sites on the Sea of Galilee which were only a few miles from heavy fighting and which could conceivably have been overrun had the Syrians been more successful than they turned out to be. The group leader inquired of the consulate general about the situation and was told that this was just not the thing to do at that time. So far as I was aware at the time, he decided to proceed in any case, and disappeared in the direction of the front with his entire tour group. Within the city of Jerusalem there were several hundred American students, some of the Jewish students at Hebrew University, as well a sizeable group of Christian students who were visiting the old city with its Christian sites for a period of study. I was kept busy the first week of the war briefing these students, as best I could, about the security situation and about how it affected them, especially in the case of the Jewish students, giving them assurance that they could pass along to their worried parents at home, that it seemed unlikely that the city of Jerusalem would come under attack. Living in the city was an odd experience in other ways, especially since it was blacked out at night with cars driving through the streets with their headlights dimmed by blue paint or laundry blueing. It so happened that it was a period of full moon and no doubt for the first time in a long, long time, it was possible to see the city from the hills around it with the moonlight shining on its domes and towers without the disturbance of any artificial light. It was a truly beautiful thing to see, although the circumstances were not so benign.

A second set of comments that might be worth making, although not as serious, concern a concert that the Israel philharmonic orchestra gave outdoors in a large square in Bethlehem, known as Manger Square. I do not recall the date, but I believe it was following the Yom Kippur war, and it must have been in the following spring or summer. Teddy Kollek, the mayor of Jerusalem, had apparently induced an American donor to provide a substantial sum of money to hold the concert, the purpose of which was to show the unity between Jerusalem and the Christian Arab town of Bethlehem, a short distance away to the south. As always in this complex occupation situation the effort cut both ways. My wife and I were sitting in the second row of the block of seats in Manger Square facing the Church of the Nativity in front of which the platform had been erected for the Israeli orchestra. The first item of the concert was a Brandenburg concerto, the violin part of which was to be played by a young man who had not too long before arrived as a Jewish immigrant from the Soviet Union. The orchestra had gotten well launched and the violinist was in full cry when suddenly the Arab minaret, in the Square, located just behind the audience, erupted with the recorded call to prayer that the mosques broadcast at regular intervals during the day. The volume had obviously been turned up quite high by the mosque authorities and the sound tore into the fabric of the Brandenburg concerto, somewhat like an iceberg tearing into the hull of the *Titanic*. The orchestra

played gamely on for some seconds, but gradually one instrument after another gave up and before long Zubin Mehta, the conductor, brought it to a halt and all of us waited out the Moslem call to prayer. An Israeli authority told me that they had been well-aware of this possibility, but had thought they had induced the mosque authorities to tone down the sound so as not to create a disturbance, but obviously they had failed. Other cultural and political conflict was evident at the concert as well. We noticed that there was a certain amount of movement to and fro in the row ahead of us where Teddy Kollek sat with the Bethlehem mayor, Elias Freij, and on the following day at a lunch that Kollek gave for the consuls general we learned what had happened. Freij was scheduled to make a brief statement at the concert on the platform which had been erected for the purpose. Over the platform was the emblem of the Israeli orchestra, an unmistakable Jewish symbol, the menorah. It was quite clear to Freij that the TV broadcast of this event would catch him standing in front of the Jewish menorah, a situation which was not at all appealing to him. Kollek told us with some chortling that in order to get Freij's mind off the problem he had gone up along the row in which they had both sat and had brought Mrs. Mehta over to sit next to Freij. Mrs. Mehta was a very attractive woman and Kollek assumed that her beauty would cause Freij to forget about his political sensitivities. In the event, Freij did arise and make the statement, although there was no way of knowing whether Mrs. Mehta's presence had been responsible. As an aside, however, the consuls general were all a little soured by Kollek's obvious glee in how he had manipulated the Arab mayor and it revealed once again one of the less attractive aspects of the Israelis in their dealing with the Arabs--an attitude of condescension and arrogance at times.

End of interview