The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR GREG DELAWIE

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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is February 19, 2019 and we're beginning our interview with Ambassador Greg Delawie. And when and where were you born?

DELAWIE: I was born in San Diego in 1957 and lived in San Diego until I went to college.

Q: Okay. Was San Diego as much a navy town back in the late fifties-sixties as it is now?

DELAWIE: The Navy was certainly very important. You know, it was one of the biggest industries other than tourism. I think it was a much bigger proportion of the economy and the population then than it is now. When I was growing up, San Diego was a medium-sized city. Now of course it's something like the seventh-largest city in the United States. It certainly had a very different feel then than it does today. I mean, traffic has always been a problem in California, even when I was growing up, but it was not— you did not have the multi-hour-long traffic jams or commutes that you have today in San Diego.

Q: So, and the other thing is as you are, you're growing up, um, early sixties. Was it a diverse city even back then?

DELAWIE: It was a diverse place, and there was certainly a lot of poverty. There were a lot of people with South American and Mexican heritage. There were a lot of Spanish speaking people; had I known when I was ten what I was going to do the rest of my life, I

would have learned to speak Spanish. I am embarrassed to be not only from San Diego but also a Foreign Service officer and not be able to speak Spanish.

Q: Is that where your family is from originally?

DELAWIE: My father, Homer Delawie, was from Santa Barbara, California. My grandfather was a baker in Santa Barbara. He came from Pennsylvania, we think, originally. My mother was from Miami, Oklahoma. She was an "Okie". And you know, if you read Steinbeck, you know the story of her family, moving from Oklahoma to California during the Great Depression and the trials and tribulations of just getting to California. But anyway, she wound up in Santa Barbara too, and that's where my parents met and married.

Q: Did she ever tell you stories of what—what the dust bowl was like and why she moved and you know, what happened to her family?

DELAWIE: She did, and not all of them I retain in my memory, unfortunately. She and her two sisters came with her family, drove in a car that broke down multiple times and had multiple flat tires. And I mean, it's like out of Steinbeck. The poverty in Oklahoma was grinding. There was not enough food, basically, because of the depression and the dust bowl. So it was very tough, but they made it to California and probably they lucked into being in a part of California that was not as poor as in *The Grapes of Wrath*. So Santa Barbara is a really, really rich place today. It was not of course then, but it was certainly better off than many other places. That was where they came from.

Q: And how did they meet? What, was your father in the military, or?

DELAWIE: They met in high school, Santa Barbara High School. My father was in the navy, briefly. He enlisted in the navy in 1945, it turns out, and went through basic training in San Diego, where the naval training center used to be. Until maybe 20 years ago, it was still there. He was actually on a ship sailing west when Japan surrendered. He always joked that Hirohito finally knew when to give in when seaman third class Homer Delawie was in the navy and heading his way.

Q: Look out. All right. So was he in long enough to benefit from the GI bill?

DELAWIE: Yes, in fact. And, so as I said, my grandfather, my paternal grandfather was a baker, so that's not a wealthy family. But my father got the GI bill. He banged around on several things after the war, trying to figure out what to do. He worked fighting forest fires, which is always important in California, for a while. And, then he did some other odd jobs and ultimately, wound up taking a—what we used to call an aptitude test, that directed him towards a career in engineering or art. He had no better ideas what to do, so he applied to go to the then-new California Polytechnic Institute in San Louis Obispo to join their first architecture class. So, he went to Cal Poly, which is what it is called. He graduated with a degree in architecture in their first graduating class in architecture in 1951. He then moved to a job in Fresno, working for an architect. Based on his time in

San Diego at the naval training center, he had always wanted to find a way to get there, to live there. But he worked as an architect, a junior architect, mostly drafting stuff, in Fresno for a while. And then ultimately, he got another job in San Diego working for a prominent southern California architect named Lloyd Ruocco. So he moved to San Diego with my mother, and worked, for Ruocco for a year or so.

DELAWIE: Ruocco was a pioneer of what's called the "California modern" style of architecture, which is lots of glass, and what's called post and beam construction. So you see lots of California houses, especially built in the fifties and sixties, that have exposed infrastructure posts and beams holding the roof and then these giant panes of glass to let the outside in. This was before the energy crisis and the climate has always been mild in San Diego anyway, so you could have a giant pane of glass and it didn't cost you a fortune to heat. So anyway, my father worked for Ruocco for a while, and then ultimately established his own architecture practice, and then worked for himself basically for 40 years. The firm he founded, now called just "Delawie," is still going today.

Q: So that's—that's really fantastic that he had the opportunity at a moment when the U.S. was growing enough that he could, probably, reasonably expect to have work because California was certainly growing and the U.S. was growing as well. He limited himself to architecture, or did he also then go into building trades?

DELAWIE: He was an architect. I mean, he was often on site at construction projects he had designed, because that's what architects, at least at that time, did: they supervised construction. They didn't—they didn't tell plumbers what to do. They just made sure that whatever the general contractor was doing was consistent with the concept and plans that they had come up with. So, he was an architect for a long time. He was a very prominent architect in San Diego, and won a lot of awards and became a Fellow of the American Institute of Architects, which is a big deal if you're an architect. He designed a lot of buildings, a lot of public spaces. He went into city planning after a while too, so did both urban planning as well as buildings.

DELAWIE: So, for example, if you've been to San Diego, there's a big park in the middle called Balboa Park; he did a lot of the planning for Balboa Park. There's the Bea Evenson Fountain and a large plaza there that he designed. And the San Diego Zoo; he did several of the exhibits at the San Diego Zoo as well, which is in Balboa Park. This will become very important later on in my story.

Q: Okay. Now what about your mother? Was she working?

DELAWIE: While I was growing up, she was mostly a homemaker. She participated in the League of Women Voters. Then my parents got divorced. She did some jobs for the county of San Diego, kind of human capital jobs or taking care of people jobs. Then she became a writer and was a writer for the last 30 or so years of her life. She focused on California stuff, new age things, and women's issues.

Q: Whereabouts did you live in San Diego? Were you in the center of the city or the suburbs? What was your experience of the city when you were growing up?

DELAWIE: When I was growing up, I lived in the suburbs of San Diego. There's one suburb called Mission Hills where I lived in two houses my father designed. My father then remarried and we moved to a bigger house that could accommodate two families that were merged in Point Loma, which is also a suburb of San Diego, out towards the ocean. I lived in three houses that he had designed. I was born somewhere else, but we moved into the first house shortly after I was born. And in fact, I've got a picture of my mother, my father and me when I was one or so, in the house that we lived in at that time, from *Sunset* magazine, that we actually had reproduced and put up on the wall of the chief of mission residence in Kosovo when I was there.

DELAWIE: So I could point to the picture and say, "oh, this is a house my father designed, but that there is me a few years ago."

Q: So, did you like the houses that he designed?

DELAWIE: Oh, sure. I mean, you grow up with things, you tend to like them. So, I still like modern-style architecture. There are several examples of modern-style architecture, even here in Northern Virginia; not a lot, but they're there, especially in the part of Fairfax County that's kind of just below the beltway from Alexandria. There are several 1950s era neighborhoods there with some decent modern architecture. Of course, modern means 1950s to 60s to me, rather than today.

Q: Okay, now brothers and sisters.

DELAWIE: So I have a sister and a brother. Both younger. And then I've got three stepsisters.

Q: Wow. Okay. So that is pretty reasonable size set of siblings. What ages do they run from, from you?

DELAWIE: Let's see. My brother, who's the youngest, is nine years younger than I am. So that would make him 52, I guess. And everyone else is in between.

Q: So then you went to elementary school and high school in San Diego? What was that like? Were the schools large, small, were they kind of diverse because there were new waves of Spanish speakers coming in, or how would you describe them?

DELAWIE: At the time I didn't know whether they were larger or smaller, they were just the schools I had. They were— I guess today we'd say they were medium size, certainly several hundred kids in each level. I think I had 800 in my high school graduating class. These are all public schools. My elementary school was a neighborhood school, which I could walk to. The junior high school was a bicycle ride away; and I rode the bike and

you know, in San Diego you can ride a bike year round. Maybe five days a year it's raining and you have to find a different way or just get wet. But it was fine.

DELAWIE: So the junior high was four or five miles from our house in the Mission Hills area. And then we moved to Point Loma. My first semester in high school, I was in a school that was a considerable distance away from our house and I rode the bike maybe 10 or 11 miles. Public transit is really not a big deal, or at least at the time, it was not a big deal in southern California. It was the land of the car and there, yes, there were buses, and I did occasionally take the bus to the high school that was 10 or 11 miles away, but mostly I went with the bike because it was faster. I mean, believe it or not. Because on the bus I had to transfer downtown, not in the best area. I liked riding the bike, but it was probably somewhat dangerous, just because of the traffic and everything. But I made it. Then the second semester of my freshman year of high school, I moved to the school that was relatively near to the house.

Q: You could walk to the high school?

DELAWIE: Yes. We just happened to be lucky in where the house was in relation to the school because it served a big area.

Q: Now in high school, were you involved in any extracurricular activities?

DELAWIE: I did a couple of things. I did a lot of community theater. And there was a series of math competitions, you had teams from your school. But, mostly, extracurricular wise, it was the community theater. And so I did acting and technical stuff for shows. In Balboa Park there was what's called the San Diego Junior Theatre, which still exists today, and had been there for decades before I ever got there.

I did various, especially musical, productions, things like *The Wizard of Oz, You're a Good Man, Charlie Brown*, and *Little Mary Sunshine*. It was fun; three of my sisters participated as well. I learned an incredible amount doing theater and I know I would never have been successful in the Foreign Service to the extent that I was without that background.

Q: That's interesting. What specifically did you get from acting that was valuable for you for the Foreign Service?

DELAWIE: Well, you learn to be up on stage with hundreds of people look at you and you learn how to either cope with it or not be bothered by it.

DELAWIE: Look at lists of what are the most stressful situations that normal people face? And there's moving, there's death of a spouse, and there is public speaking. Of course in the Foreign Service public speaking is an essential part of our job. I know lots of people don't like public speaking who were Foreign Service officers, but they do it anyway. But you know, I had never had to face that problem because it didn't bother me, because I grew up doing that. Now, of course it's easier to go up on stage and say the

lines you've learned than to improvise in front of 500 people, which of course you have to do as a Foreign Service officer. But you know, still I think the nerves come from lots of people looking at you and expecting you to do something smart. I just never got those nervous reactions. So theater was a very important experience for me. I did all these plays, mostly musicals although I cannot sing even to this day. But, I did the acting parts okay. And when I got stuck singing on occasion, it was usually with other people around so no one could tell that I couldn't really do that. And then I also learned technical theater skills, doing lighting, lighting design, building sets. I was already pretty comfortable with carpentry because my father was an architect and he always built household stuff for us that I often helped with. Of course building a set is different from building a bookcase or something like that, because the bookcase has to last and the set doesn't. But I really got into lighting design; I designed lights for several shows. And that was a skill I was able to take with me to college. I also got a summer job a couple of years working for the set crew for a semi-professional theater, called the Star Light Opera, which unfortunately doesn't exist anymore. These experiences building sets and moving sets and things like that, ultimately got me a paying job for when I was in college.

Q: We'll get to college. But before that, you had mentioned math in that you competed in it; were there other subjects in high school that sort of began to get you a little bit interested in international relations. Or were there teachers and so on?

DELAWIE: Oh, I promised a story and I didn't deliver, so let me get to that now. So my father was an architect. He worked on the San Diego Zoo. He didn't design the whole zoo since it's been around for a hundred years, but he did several exhibits, elephants, Great Apes, things like that.

Q: And just as a quick aside, there used to be a TV show, about the San Diego Zoo. I don't know if it was a weekly show or it was just periodic, but I used to watch it and you know, as far as I was concerned the San Diego Zoo was the last word in zoos.

Q: You know, you had these genius biologists and zoologists, you know, showing you flamingos and snakes and who knows what all, and of course in that beautiful sunny climate, you know, it was between that and Disneyland that obsessed my eras as an elementary school student. But anyway, go on with your story.

DELAWIE: The host of that show, I think, was a woman named Joan Embry, also known as Miss Zoo. Anyway, so the San Diego Zoo was at least for a while the best zoo in the world. Or certainly they claimed that. And, a lot of people around the world thought that. It had a fair amount money, beautiful climate, lots of good scientists. So anyway, in the 1960s, the city of Tel Aviv, Israel wanted to have a zoo. So, whoever was in charge of this project in Tel Aviv went to the San Diego Zoo because it was the best zoo in the world and said, who can help us design a zoo? And they pointed out my father, Homer Delawie. So my father started going to Israel periodically to work with the city of Tel Aviv on the zoo in the early sixties. It takes a long time to do big projects like this, years typically. So they were going along pretty well with the design. He was working with an

Israeli architect whose name was Igal Elhanani, who was related to the architect that designed areas of the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial, Aryeh Elhanani.

DELAWIE: So they are working together and then 1967 happens and the war starts and okay, the zoo has got to be off the table for a while. Ultimately, things are back to normal in Israel, and they start again working on the zoo project, so my father starts traveling there again, and then in 1970, he's got this trip planned, and he offered to take me along. At this point I am 12. So this was an incredible opportunity. Of course, I'd never been anywhere other than Tijuana outside of the United States. This was before the era of airline deregulation and people just didn't travel nearly as much as we do now.

DELAWIE: So it was an incredibly big deal to be able to travel like that. And so I went with him. It was the spring of 1970. I can hardly imagine doing this with my own children, but my father would go to business meetings in Tel Aviv while I kind of hung around and walked around the city. We stayed in the Hilton in Tel Aviv, and in the snack bar they had this terrific Creme Caramel, which I'd never had before; I still remember it. I would wander around the city and there was this Spring festival called Purim that was going on then. One of the things people did in 1970, at least in Israel, is they bought these plastic little hammers, presumably from China, that had rice or something inside them, so they would make a noise if you hit anything. So I of course bought one too, for a few shekels. You would go around and hit walls or street signs and things like that. I mean, they were small. So anyway, I'm wandering around Israel, and I'm mostly on my own. And I thought it was so neat. We did go together to a few tourist sites like Yad Vashem. All told we were there four or five days or so.

DELAWIE: My father was mostly working. I was mostly wandering around in a foreign city by myself at the age of 12. And of course at the time, very few people spoke English in Israel. But, you know, it worked out fine.

DELAWIE: So we had gone from San Diego to Tel Aviv, halfway around the world. At that time, before airline deregulation, it cost as much to continue going around the world in the same direction as it did to just go straight back to California from the Middle East. So, my father had planned that we would do a little sightseeing as long as we were halfway around the world. So we flew from Israel to Ceylon, now called Sri Lanka, of course. Just to change planes, but that's where El-Al could fly.

DELAWIE: Then we went to Bangkok and we spent several days in Bangkok, which was a real adventure. I wish I remembered it better. Then we went to Hong Kong for a few days and then to Japan. This was at the time of the World's Fair, which was called Expo 70. It was one of the World's Fairs that were held at that time, like the 1964 World's Fair in New York, the Chicago World’s Fair, and Toronto, and things like that. So, it happened to be Japan that time, and it was in the city of Osaka. So we flew to Tokyo, and we got on the bullet train to go to Osaka, which was really neat.

DELAWIE: So we visit the World's Fair, which was fascinating; a completely different world than I had grown up with. And my father actually had kind of a business reason

that he wanted to see some of the exhibits because they were very avant-garde architecture. Typically countries that would pay for their exhibits at these World's Fairs would want to make an impression and they would hire big designers that were kind of on the edge.

DELAWIE: So anyway, it's 1970, and my father was a small businessman from southern California. Who was President then? Richard Nixon, from southern California. My father happened to know the ambassador to the World's Fair; we had ambassadors to World's Fairs at the time. I don't remember his name or what he did, but he must have been some kind of rich guy from southern California whom Nixon appointed, and that my father knew through some committee or commission or something that he had been on. We go to see him, and I started quizzing him; you know, what do you do? What's it like and ultimately I ask him, how'd you get your job?

DELAWIE: He said, well, I got my job because I'm a friend of the president. But I work with these other people who work for the U.S. government, for the U.S. Information Agency. And they're really great people. It's a great job. You get the job by taking a test; you should look into it. Wow. So I decided to take that advice. And so from Japan, we'd come home to California. Interestingly, we get to immigration in San Francisco, and the immigration officer looks at the stamps in the passport. He says, "Oh, you went to Thailand; let me see your yellow card, the health record." And so we have the yellow cards, of course, but there's no cholera vaccination. And he said, "you went to Thailand and you didn't have a cholera vaccination; that was probably a mistake." My father said, "oh well, we didn't know." You know, how do you know at that time, before the Internet? But then the guy says, "well, if you had cholera, you'd already be sick," and lets us through.

DELAWIE: So back in San Diego I went to the San Diego Public Library, which is what we did before the Internet, and I read about the Foreign Service and the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency and I say, gosh, that sounds, that sounds really neat. Wow. I was 12, and I can't really say that I was on a direct line from the age of 12 to today. But certainly, this whole experience was very influential on my decision to join the Foreign Service years later. I can say that almost every day of thirty-five years working for the State Department, I was fulfilling my childhood ambition.

Q: Okay. So just to go back to high school for one more minute. In addition to the regular curriculum, did you also read for pleasure? Were there genres that you particularly liked and did you end up doing world history or the sorts of things you might read if you were interested in international relations?

DELAWIE: When I was in high school at least in southern California, they didn't have all these choices that that kids have today in high school where you can study Poli Sci in high school or international relations or something like that. It was basically you did English, you did math, you did history, you know, and science and a couple of other things. So I was in this thing called an independent study program in high school where it was mostly reading and discussion, at least in the main academic subjects. We covered all

the same stuff as the regular courses did. You did, I think it was junior year, you did American history and then 12th grade you did world history, et cetera. I did take German language throughout high school, which turned out to be pretty helpful later in my life.

DELAWIE: But it was a very general education. I mean, it was probably deeper than what a lot of people got because of this focus on reading and discussion as opposed to anything else. Outside of school, I certainly was a reader, always have been; at that time I was certainly reading mostly science fiction. Heinlein, Asimov, Arthur C. Clarke, Phillip K. Dick. I mean, all those writers that people from my generation mostly know about. So, I can't say I was ever really that interested in reading about foreign policy, foreign affairs, for pleasure. I read them in school basically. I've always been very interested in history, especially European history, but, I didn't do a whole lot of pleasure reading in history.

Q: The only other extracurricular thing that I wanted to check with you on before we sort of move on is did you also work during high school? Where did your jobs in the summer, that sort of thing.

DELAWIE: Over the summer when I was still in high school, I did this junior theater stuff mostly and then when I graduated from high school between senior year and freshman year of college, I worked for money at the light opera company called Starlight Opera Company. That was the building sets, moving sets during plays and things like that that I discussed before.

DELAWIE: So that's mostly what I did. And so no boy scouts or Outward Bound or that sort of thing.

Q: Fine. Now as you're approaching the end of high school, I imagine you and your parents are talking about college. What were you talking about in terms of where you wanted to go? What were your considerations?

DELAWIE: In high school, I took a detour from wanting to go into the Foreign Service, which I had for many years before, to be interested in science, especially physics.

DELAWIE: So when I applied for colleges, I thought I would major in physics. At least that's what I wrote down and I probably even believed it at the time.

DELAWIE: So we were looking for some place that would have good science in the curriculum. So I applied to a bunch of colleges with that thought of studying science, probably physics.

Q: So looking at universities with a physics program, what were you thinking about?

DELAWIE: I ended up, applying to Harvard where I ultimately went, to Stanford, to Berkeley, Princeton, and Pomona.

Q: That would be a California state system college?

DELAWIE: UC Berkeley is state. The Pomona colleges are private. I ended up getting accepted to Harvard, which offered the best financial aid, and we decided that's where I was going to go. So, in 1976, I graduated from high school and did the summer stage crew work. And then in September of '76, I flew from San Diego to Boston, by myself, which was the first time I had flown alone.

DELAWIE: I arrived at the Logan Airport in Boston. And fortunately I had a cousin that lived there and she picked me up and took me to my dorm. I started college as a freshman at Harvard and was living in the Radcliffe Quad. I started basic freshman type classes, English and chemistry and things like that.

Q: Was there much of a culture shock going from warm, sunny to not warm, sunny?.

DELAWIE: Yes, of course. I didn't even have a serious winter jacket until I bought one in Cambridge. It would have made no sense to schlep an expensive one from California and take it to where they were cheap. But, overall, it was an amazing change; there's very different culture in New England compared with southern California, of course. In San Diego at least, you know, anything older than 50 years is kind of historic probably. In Boston of course, a lot of buildings have been around a lot longer than that. So it was a big change. And there was the fact that college was really hard. I know there are a lot of people in the Foreign Service who kind of skated through high school like I did. But in college work is a lot harder. And so that was definitely a shock. You had to study, you had to write serious stuff. Professors had very high expectations. It was certainly a bumpy road for me, the first year I was there.

Q: So as a university, what impressed you about it, in your initial year, other than how much harder it was.

DELAWIE: The other students were really good, really smart; that certainly impressed me. Also, the idea that I had to grow up and do things. Nobody else is going to tell you to get out of bed on time and have breakfast and get out the door; that was a great learning experience. And of course it took a lot longer to get out the door in New England in the winter than it did in southern California; it's not just putting on your shorts and your flip flops. Also, the seriousness of the work; professors expected even freshmen to know, to plan and figure out how they were going to get their work done on their own.

Q: You started in Harvard in '76. Had all of the changes of the college being co-ed and so on been fully digested by then?

DELAWIE: Yes. There was still Radcliffe College as an institution. But women and men attended Harvard University. The classes were together, the housing was co-ed and things like that.

Q: Now most of your time is being taken up by study, but did you do other things? You had all the background of acting and so on. Was there enough time for you to engage in anything else?

DELAWIE: I got together with a group in my dorm, which was called South House (which had hundreds of people, so it was more than a "house.") The Radcliffe Quad was separated from the rest of the college. There's Harvard Yard, which is half a mile away, and where most of the freshmen lived. Before the college went co-ed, the Radcliffe Quad was where all the women had lived, and the Harvard Yard was where the freshman men had lived.

DELAWIE: Now that was mixed, but still, there was not a lot of reason for a lot of people to go to Radcliffe Quad because that was mostly dorms. Classrooms were elsewhere. They built a big library, which was nice, that I ended up working in. But the college wanted to attract people to the Radcliffe Quad. And so I got together with some other students, including a couple of older students and we decided we would put on a play; kind of like Mickey Rooney, Judy Garland: let's do a play. So in my freshman year, we began fundraising because there was no budget for this; we needed money to build sets and for other expenses. We sent letters just like you do today to alumni, and we wound up getting over $1,000, which was a lot of money in 1976, at least for college students. The play was *Little Mary Sunshine*, which was a musical from the ‘60s by a guy named Rick Besoyan. It was satire of operettas. I ended up directing it. One of my roommates was the music director. He was also a freshman and the producer was a sophomore. We recruited people, we had auditions, we got people to be actors and musicians and set builders and things like that.

DELAWIE: And we ended up putting on the play, which did okay. Did not get great reviews in the *Harvard Crimson* because nothing does. But anyway, it went fine and the house was always full. That was my main extracurricular activity my freshman year. So between doing schoolwork and doing the play, that was kind of what I spent most of my time on. I also worked in the cafeteria, which was not fun, especially as I had to get up early in the morning before breakfast for the job.

DELAWIE: The first semester, my freshman year, I worked in the cafeteria three mornings a week. Fortunately, the second semester I got a better job working in the library, where I didn't have to get up at six o'clock in the morning because none of the students were up. So those were the things that occupied my time: the schoolwork, the work for money and then the play.

Q: Did you go home after the end of the freshman year or did you stay in Boston?

DELAWIE: The first year I went home, and I worked again at the light opera company in San Diego. Also in my freshman year, of course, I made friends that I still have to this day, which is a really important part of the college experience. Last month I went to the 60th birthday of one of my college roommates, and I spoke with another on the phone a couple weeks ago. One of the harder things I think in Foreign Service life is maintaining

contact with friends because of course you're overseas so much. But fortunately, with these friends I made freshman year, sometimes I don't see them for five years but nevertheless we pick right up again as if I just saw them yesterday.

Q: Okay. So you went home, worked. And are you still on track for physics by the end of your first year in college?

DELAWIE: By the end of the first year, I am, mostly because I couldn't take physics my freshman year because I did not meet the prerequisites. So sophomore year is when I have this confrontation with reality about whether that's really going to be what I'm studying, or not. And it really gets down to differential calculus. So my sophomore year I take physics, which I could take at that point because I now met the prerequisites. The professor was great, Sidney Coleman, a famous physicist from the 60s. But anyway, it was really, really hard. And then the math, differential equations was incredibly hard and I couldn't take it.

DELAWIE: I had always been good in math up until that point. I had Calculus in high school, but differential equations and multivariate Calculus, I just wiped out on, and the math part of the physics was really hard too, such as calculating orbits, mechanics, et cetera. So I realized physics was not going to be for me. But in my sophomore year, one of the other classes I'm taking is economics, which I had been interested in anyway. So it turns out that I was really interested in economics, and so at the end of my sophomore year, I decided, okay, I will switch my major from physics to economics, which becomes the focus of my academic studies over the rest of my college career. So I took micro, macro, and finance and international economics and other economics classes. Fortunately, I was still okay with the type of Calculus you need for economics. It was the next level up that I couldn't handle. Anyway, I wound up graduating with a degree in economics.

Q: Fascinating. The economics that they were teaching you at Harvard, did it give you enough background for practical use? So in other words, could you leave Harvard with your economics degree and go immediately to work for an international bank or an international economics organization, that sort of thing?

DELAWIE: Yes. I ended up working for the Postal Service as an economist. So microeconomics is of course what the Postal Service did. For the time, from the 70s, it was very traditional. It was well before the kind of behavioral economics stuff that better expresses what people really do as opposed to the traditional kinds of economic models that are based on hypothetical people.

Q: That's precisely what I wanted to ask you.

DELAWIE: A lot of the stuff that we learned was still important, like economic rents. It describes the additional benefit you'd get from paying less than you would have been willing to pay for purchasing a good or service. A lot of that stuff is relevant even today, but nowadays there's more of a real world aspect to economics. Today you don't assume

that marginal cost is everything and you take into account the oligopoly nature of most industries, topics we did not spend so much time on in the 70s. But, it was useful and I was an economic officer for the first half of my Foreign Service career and I never encountered an economic subject that I could not learn about.

Q: The other question about the economics education there is, did it also prepare you to understand markets and dynamics, especially in natural resources and energy, the kinds of things that a typical economics officer needs to be able to follow and analyze effectively?

DELAWIE: Yeah, it was, it was certainly enough. I am not saying being an economics undergraduate trained me perfectly for any particular job in the Foreign Service that I ended up having. But it certainly gave me the foundation to understand everything that I had to do academically or substantively. For example, when I was in Turkey, one of my main contacts was the president of the Central Bank of Turkey. He was a serious economist, with a PhD. I could not begin to understand the stuff that he knew from his academic studies. But I knew enough about how banks work, inflation, monetary policy. All of these things had been covered in my college courses; even though at that point, it had been 15 years since I was in college, I remembered it enough that I could understand what he was saying. We could have reasonable conversations about inflation, which was a big problem in Turkey at the time. Where did it come from? What are you going to do about? What are the challenges? So while he knew a lot more than I did, I could still have a conversation about it and not get lost.

Q: Now in college you didn't take any year off or a semester off to go abroad?

DELAWIE: Interestingly, when I went to my, I think 30th college reunion, the dean of students gave a funny talk about the difference between then and now. He said that now of course Harvard encourages students to try to go abroad for a semester or year. And he continued, "when you were here, of course we didn't do that. And in fact, in most cases, you had to temporarily withdraw from the college in order to do a year abroad, because the thought at that point was, what could you possibly get anywhere else you couldn't get at Harvard?" Now there is a more realistic perspective to try to get some experience in another country. But when I was at Harvard, it was not common.

Q: It's funny. I went to Georgetown and I had the exact same experience. I thought, why would I go abroad when I am getting the best possible education I could possibly get? And if I get in the Foreign Service, they'll send me abroad. I don't need to do that now. Of course I regret it, but, back then, it was, I want the best possible education and there isn't any place that's better than this.

DELAWIE: Well, we were kind of insular back then.

Q: So you get your graduation, you get your degree in economics. What are you thinking of doing now?

DELAWIE: Well once I got out of the physics mode, and interested in economics, I pick up my interest again in the State Department and the Foreign Service. So in economics you had to pass a general exam in the spring of your senior year or they wouldn't let you graduate. So it turns out the economics general exam was the same day as the Foreign Service test was given in Boston. So I wanted to take the Foreign Service test, but I couldn't because at that time it was only given once per year. I couldn't move one, I couldn't move the other. So even though I was interested in the Foreign Service my senior year, I could not actually take any real action at that point. Things worked out for the best ultimately, but I was disappointed at the time. I was interested in the Foreign Service and I knew that the next time, and this would be 1981 at this point, that they offered the Foreign Service exam, I would want to take it.

Q: Did you work throughout college?

DELAWIE: I had started maybe two years before graduation working at the Harvard Medical School for a part time job. I was typing documents into a word processor, a Wang word processor, which was better than a typewriter I guess. I was typing drafts of medical papers for professors and things like that, and also I did data entry into a computer that was called an HP 3000. It was called a minicomputer at the time, although of course it was as big as this room.

DELAWIE: I had connected with this job via one of my college roommates, who also worked in the same office. So for the first six or eight months, I was just doing the data entry and typing. And it was fine. I was working 10 hours a week and I was getting about $5 an hour, which at the time was fine, a good student wage, more than minimum wage. Certainly better than working in the cafeteria and another part time job I had driving the shuttle bus between Harvard and Radcliffe, which I really didn't like, just because the traffic in Cambridge is really bad and it made driving a big bus stressful. And especially in the winter when the snow made the streets about four feet wide.

DELAWIE: So I wanted to get out of that as quickly as I could. And that's when I wound up in the Harvard Medical School. I worked throughout college; I had the cafeteria job, the library, the bus, and then I had the Harvard Medical School. I did have to work to pay for college; it was expensive for my family. So at this medical school job I'm doing the data entry and the typing. The way things worked at that point regarding computers is that there was a computer in one place and you went to the computer to get something out of it.

DELAWIE: So I worked in a computer center that did word processing and data entry for a big chunk of the medical school. For example, the admissions office was one of the clients. And I was typing in for a while the MCAT (medical college admissions test) scores of people that had applied. So at one point the guy who was in charge said there was a problem in which the center was expanding and there was no infrastructure to support the charge backs for the work it was doing. How did offices pay for this service? It was a free good in economic terms for a long time and professors or the admissions office or whatever didn't have to pay for the services.

DELAWIE: So they ended up using a lot of it and there was more work than the center could accommodate. And the boss decides, all right, well we've got to have an internal payment system so we can justify a bigger budget and so the people that use the service can pay for it. I told him that I was taking computer programming classes at college. And he said, well, can you come up with some kind of simple programs so that we can keep track of the work we get, how much time we spend doing it, and things like that. And so since I had just finished doing my second year of computer science classes, not as a major, just one of my distribution requirements, I said I would try.

DELAWIE: I ended up programming, in a computer language called BASIC, a kind of simple accounting system. It kept track of jobs and how much time was spent and enabled this office to charge the other offices of the medical school, the cost of the service that it was providing. So then I went on to do other stuff like that and it was all simple stuff, but nobody else was doing it there. So in the summer I just start working full time for this computer office at Harvard Medical School instead of part time.

DELAWIE: But I had always intended for this computer gig to be temporary. I had graduated from college with a degree in economics, and I had applied for a couple of economics jobs and had not really found anything.

DELAWIE: As I was working, I continued to apply for jobs, mostly in Washington because that was where I wanted to be. I would go to the college career office every week and see what jobs were listed. And ultimately there was one for the U.S. Postal Service, which wanted a junior economist to work for the rates office. This is the office that tried to figure out how much stamps should cost. I applied for the position and was invited to come down for an interview at the Postal Service headquarters in L'Enfant Plaza. Ultimately they offered me the job, which I accepted. So I moved to Arlington.

Q: A quick question here about your job search now. Harvard has one great benefit, which is the gigantic network of alumni. Did you ever call on that sort of network for assistance in looking for jobs and so on?

DELAWIE: No, not much and certainly not like people are encouraged to do today.

Q: Did moving down to Washington present any problems or issues other than the usual ones?

DELAWIE: Not really. I had to move, I had to hire a company to move my stuff and find a place to live, which turned out to be just a few blocks from here: the Buckingham Apartments on Henderson. I found a one-bedroom apartment.

Q: Oh, take one second. The Buckingham apartments, at least in Arlington County, are now considered historic. Because they were postwar and they were purpose-constructed; their facades cannot be changed. That's happened to a few of these smaller postwar garden-style apartments that had been turned into condos and so on. I just mentioned it

because of your background with architecture and I imagine preservation architecture as well at some point.

DELAWIE: Very interesting. My father was very interested in the preservation of early houses in San Diego, he helped move several houses so they could be preserved. There's this whole row of houses in Old Town San Diego that started out somewhere else and were moved somehow, in part due to my father's efforts.

DELAWIE: I think it's clear that something doesn't have to look nice to be historic. I think the Buckingham apartments were an okay place to live. It was fine with me. I wouldn't say they're beautiful from outside or anything, but it makes sense they would be considered historic. We live now in Alexandria near Fairlington, which I guess is not historically designated, but were built in the same period around the war when there was a vast need for labor in the Pentagon and elsewhere in the Washington area, and there was nowhere for people to live. So a lot of these places were built, like the Buckingham, Fairlington, and Shirlington.

Q: So, all right, you're moving to Buckingham. How did you get to work back then?

DELAWIE: The metro had just started, and I lived near Ballston, so I could walk to the station. L'Enfant Plaza where the Postal Service headquarters was, was on the orange line. So that was fine. I did not have a car for the first half year, which turned out to be okay. So I started working at the Postal Service, which was a semigovernmental agency at the time as it is now. There was the postal rate commission, which established how much Postal Services cost, not just stamps for letters, but magazines and packages and other things as well. The goal always was that a service should pay for itself; this was of course always a challenge.

DELAWIE: The Postal Service would have to justify to the postal rate commission how much each service cost so they could charge fees to recover the cost of the service. There was a staff of a dozen or so people and I was of course the most junior one there at the beginning. We analyzed costs, for example, how much it cost to actually move a letter from one place to another. And of course to do that you have to disaggregate all the different costs, like collecting the letter from the mailbox and driving it to the post office. And then it gets driven with a bunch of other letters to a bigger post office. And ultimately it gets aggregated with other stuff. And then it goes from New York to Chicago, even though it might be going to a small town in Illinois.

DELAWIE: It's not a trivial problem. At that time before the Internet, lots of stuff moved in the mail. This was a pure microeconomics issue; this was one of the things I had studied and so I was pretty well prepared for this job. So we would do studies, we would figure out how much different things cost. I ended up spending most of my time working on magazine mailing costs for the two and a half years that I was there. I was working on studies and cost justifications.

Q: Is there a separate magazine rate?

DELAWIE: There is, yes. Magazines typically come from a publisher in a big bundle and then get broken down somewhere, when issues are closer to their destination. So there could be a hundred or a thousand copies of something like *Time* or *Life* that go to one zip code, at which point they are broken down into smaller groups for streets or neighborhoods. Whereas a letter would often arrive as just one thing. So that's why letters cost more than magazines, because they have to be handled individually. Magazines cost less, because there would be 500 that would all go from one place to the other in bulk. So I wrote draft testimony for this Postal Rate Commission, describing studies we conducted and how we did the analysis. I got to travel to a few places. I remember going to St. Louis to visit a post office there and study how postal clerks actually processed magazines; how they came in on one truck and what happened to them at the facility where they were distributed to other trucks and things like that. This was because it was important to know. I mean, you know what the rules are and what the official procedures say, but that's not necessarily what people actually do in the field. Because they may find better ways of doing things. This postal rate commission was an adversarial process where you'd have the people who would have to pay the fee, the *Time* magazines, etc., would argue that really the rate should be lower and for the following good reasons. So you had to have your facts in order to justify that the price you thought was right. I was a junior person, I didn't do testifying myself, but I did draft testimony that was given by more experienced people.

DELAWIE: I got to travel to a few places to visit post offices and figure out what was going on. I was taking notes and coming back to the office and writing them up. It was okay work, it was serious work. It was work that I'd been trained for academically. I didn't really like it that much, but it was professional work that I could not have done without going to college. It was economics and I had to do something. So ultimately I worked at the Postal Service for two and a half years until I joined the Foreign Service.

DELAWIE: So in 1981 spring again rolls around and it is time to finally take the Foreign Service exam. I took the exam at a high school in South Arlington. I rode my bike there since I still didn't have a car. And that was what set me on the path from which I wound up in the Foreign Service.

Q: And that's the written exam, and you pass it.

DELAWIE: I passed it and sometime later I get invited to the oral exam. And that was in Rosslyn; the office of recruitment was there in 1500 North Kent street. Coincidentally, it was the same building where I started the A-100 course a couple of years later.

Q: A question about the experience taking the written. Did you find it, having had your education, particularly hard, or easy?

DELAWIE: I don't remember it that well. I had taken a bunch of those fill in the bubble tests. I was in college in the seventies. You did that all the time. I don't have a particular memory of that different from taking the LSAT or any other similar test.

Q: Fine. And, um, but the orals often stick in the head of prospective Foreign Service officers. Was that an experience that you recall?

DELAWIE: Yes. Just like today, there were different segments of the orals and the two I remember best are the group exercise and the inbox test. In the group exercise everyone's got a project, and you're supposed to present your project; each project has a cost, but the total cost of all the projects added together was more than the money available, and you've got to negotiate a resolution. I had read what I could about the oral exam, but of course, in those days before the Internet I didn't know a lot about how it would actually work.

DELAWIE: But it's obvious to me that my project, whatever it was, was not supposed to win. But I made my little presentation about what it was all about, something that we would call public diplomacy today. And somebody else had a project about feeding devastated people from a monsoon. So anyway, my project is clearly not supposed to win and I decide based probably on nothing in particular at that time, because I just knew so little, that the goal for me was to give it my best shot and then direct my support to one of these other projects that was clearly more important, in the greater scheme of things.

DELAWIE: So that stuck with me. There was another candidate who had a project that was clearly supposed to lose as well, but who had not understood this. For him it was about win, win, win, win for me right now. Now, I had figured this out before I learned things at FSI about cooperation and working together, how to get things done. But anyway, it was clear to me that two of the projects were supposed to win and two of the projects were supposed to lose and mine was one of the losers. The testers had explained to us what the rules were; the goal at the end was to come up with an agreed solution, not to win for your project necessarily. They didn't say it that clearly because they were trying to see if people could figure this stuff out.

DELAWIE: So anyway, I threw my support to the other two projects that were clearly supposed to win. The other person didn't, but somehow we came to a conclusion anyway, because everybody failed if you didn't have a signed paper at the end that said this is what we're going to do with the money. That much of it is what I remember, it was nearly 40 years ago at this point. Then the inbox test. Fortunately there had been a fair amount of description of what it was going to be like, which was good because it was certainly unlike anything I'd ever done before. You had 45 minutes to write a page or so about what you would do with all the problems that were being presented to you.

DELAWIE: Once again it was clear that you could not solve all the problems in the amount of time you had. You couldn't even really understand all the problems in the amount of time that you had to read all this stuff. Because there was a lot of reading given to you. I decided clearly I should prioritize given my role in this scenario and the other hypothetical people that are in scenario; it was clear that I could do some things and there are other people who should do other things. So I ended up drafting this paper saying, I'll ask X to do this and I'll work with Y on that and I'll focus on Z myself.

DELAWIE: I think clearly the intent was to see whether you could figure out whether you had to do everything or not, or whether you could describe working with other people to solve problems. So anyway, I learned at some point that I had passed. I ultimately got on the list, the registrar's list.

Q: When they told you you were on the list, did they give you a notion of how high up and how soon you might be offered a job?

DELAWIE: I don't remember that.

So then the next spring rolls around, I still work in the Postal Service. The Foreign Service exam comes up again and I say, all right, well I'll take it again. Why not?

Q: Because so far you haven't been contacted for a job.

DELAWIE: Right. I think I didn't have a security clearance or a medical at that point. But anyway, I take the exam again, I pass the written exam again and in 1982 at some point I go to the oral exam. I don't remember this one as well, but I do remember one question about a foreign delegation of women coming to the United States and what should I do with them? And at some point the interviewers asked if they should they go to Chicago? I said, "Chicago's a great city." Anyway, the point he was trying to get at, I later figured out was that Jane Byrne was mayor of Chicago at the time. I either didn't know or didn't remember at that time. And so I flubbed that question. I did not pass the second oral exam, which was disappointing of course, but I was still on the list from the first one.

DELAWIE: I don't know if it was because of that question that I didn't pass. But I ultimately got into the Foreign Service based on taking the exam the first time, even though I failed the oral exam the second time.

Q: So it's 1982. Did they offer you the job in your cone?

DELAWIE: I received an offer for management and economics and I decided I would take economics. I started in the Foreign Service on January 3rd, 1983.

Q: This is a good place to break what we'll do in the next session and just follow you into the service and your first tour.

Q: Okay. Today is February 26th and we're resuming our interview with Greg Delawie as he is entering the Foreign Service now. Greg, you mentioned that you had been offered two cones; talk a little bit about how you decided which one to accept.

DELAWIE: I was offered a place as administrative officer and an economic officer. I decided to pick economics. I'd studied economics in college. I was interested in economics. I'd been working as an economist at the time, so, it just seemed like

something I'd be more interested in. So it was for me, it was pretty straight forward and I did not agonize about that at all.

Q: Going into your A-100 class, how large, how would you describe it?

DELAWIE: There were about 30 or 35 people in my A-100 class. We had some mid-level entrants too, which was a program at the time. About a third of the group were women. Otherwise it was not very diverse. We met at FSI which was in Rosslyn on North Kent Street, the same building, it turns out, in which I had taken the Foreign Service oral exam. I thought overall it was pretty good. Many of us didn't know anything about the State Department or the Foreign Service, so they did start with the basics, which was good. And it lasted I think five weeks at that point. Less then than it does now.

DELAWIE: It was a good experience. We did two off sites, which was a good chance to get to know our colleagues. We went to Harper's Ferry for one and Airlie House for the other; the second one, which was an embassy simulation, wound up being canceled halfway through due to a major snow storm coming through in 1983. So instead of staying from Friday to Sunday, we stayed from Friday to Saturday and went home. So we actually missed the major part of the embassy simulation.

Q: As you were looking at your class as they entered, and getting to know them, were you thinking already which ones you thought might go all the way to the senior Foreign Service? Where there some who really impressed you as likely an ambassador?

DELAWIE: I can't say I thought about that. I was just kind of amazed to be in the group myself, and fulfilling my childhood ambition by joining the Foreign Service at all; that was what I was focused on. It was interesting. There was lots to learn. I wanted to make friends with as many of my classmates as I could. And I thought everybody was pretty impressive.

Q: Then the next question is flag day, or when the announcements for postings come, and from among the choices you had, do you recall which one was your top choice?

DELAWIE: I think flag day, which they have now, is terrific. It helps you get excited about your post. We did not do that back in the mid-1980s. Basically you got a call from the career development officer saying this where you're going to go. I spoke some German from high school and college and I had bid on a post in Frankfurt, Germany. It turned out there was only one other person in the class who spoke German and he spoke really good German. So for personnel it was pretty straightforward that they should train up the guy who has some German, and send the other guy somewhere else where he can learn a different language. The CDO told me it was straightforward. Interestingly there was a lot of competition in my class for Equatorial Guinea.

Q: Interesting. Why was that?

DELAWIE: Because it was on the edge of the known world at the time. That was the only place where a Foreign Service officer killed another. So there were only two Foreign Service positions there, the charge and the junior officer. So people who had had Peace Corps experience thought that, wow, that would be fascinating. So there were about four or five people who were really eager to go to Equatorial Guinea and only one got to go.

Q: The one interesting thing aside from its smallness that I recall about Equatorial Guinea is it's the one Spanish speaking post in Africa. Spain had a very tiny toehold there during the colonial era and somehow had hung on long enough for the language to catch on locally.

DELAWIE: So that was one of the other interesting things that stuck out to me about A-100 was the interest in a really, really tough post.

Q: So you are going to Frankfurt; are you going as a consular officer?

DELAWIE: It was a consular-political rotation actually.

Q: But you did get consular training.

DELAWIE: Yes. I did German language at FSI first and then consular training afterwards. So my three years of high school and two years of college German got me about six weeks into the FSI German language course, which was a little depressing, but hey, that's what it did. So I had German training for a few months. That worked out fine; it was extremely well taught. The German teachers were very serious. They were very German. The only odd thing which still affects me today is the German teachers in 1983 were almost all wives of American soldiers who had served in Germany during the Cold War. And most of them moved to the United States in the 1960s.

DELAWIE: So although they did go back on occasion to see their family home, their language was just kind of stuck in that time period they had left. Which I of course didn't know during language school, but as soon as I got to Germany, I realized I could not really speak the same language as my age contemporaries could. In German, like many Indo-European languages there's a formal mode of address, and there's an informal mode. We were told in school that you only needed the informal to address pets, your children and God, and therefore we didn't really spend any time learning it. So I could not really use the informal form in German and everybody who was my age in Germany – about 25 – spoke instantly informal with each other. So that did set me back. And while I did my best to catch up on that, even today, I'm not completely comfortable with the informal, even after another tour there later on.

Q: Just as a quick aside, the same thing's true in Spanish; they really do not teach how to speak in the informal. And of course in Latin America, informal is by far the usual use. You would only use formal in much more restricted circumstances.

DELAWIE: So every once in a while I would interact with children, and it was a little awkward. Once I was in East Berlin visiting a friend at the embassy in East Berlin; I was hanging around outside his apartment building, waiting for him to come out and some children walked up to me; and, there were two of them, which makes it even worse in German since that is yet another form. They asked me if I drank Coca Cola and I said yes; and I said, do you like Coca Cola? They really laughed when I addressed them using the formal form, but I was comfortable with that and I could use it. Plural informal was even harder than singular informal. But other than that, the German class was good and when I got to Germany, I could really speak German. I could work. So that was good.

Q: Okay. And consular training you felt was satisfactory?

DELAWIE: It was fine. I hadn't been out of college that long, and so I was used to learning that kind of material. It was well taught. It was pretty understandable. They had simulations all the time. They had a little jail cell so we could practice going in to interview prisoners. The course was fine and I really learned what I needed to know. Ultimately, I arrived in Frankfurt in the summer sometime in 1983.

DELAWIE: Now when you arrived, is Frankfurt a furnished post? Did you have to find your own housing?

DELAWIE: Frankfurt then and now is a furnished post; there was a big housing compound that belonged to the State Department, but there were tons of U.S. housing in Frankfurt, tied to the big U.S. military presence in Germany; when I arrived there were 350,000 U.S. soldiers in the country. We lived in what's called the Carl Schurz Siedlung, named after a German-American who immigrated to the U.S. in the 19th century and later became a Civil War general, a Senator, and a member of the President's cabinet. All the consulate Americans lived there except for the consul general and the deputy principal officer. There were hundreds of units there due to the large U.S. Government (USG) presence in Frankfurt; not just the traditional consulate functions, but other USG functions that were there due to the presence of the giant Frankfurt airport. Frankfurt was a logistics hub for the State Department and the whole USG at the time. And that role has grown in the interim.

DELAWIE: So you had lots of military, you had the IRS, you had the general accounting office, you had every bit of the U.S. government you can imagine that had any kind of international aspect. They all had one or more people in Frankfurt. They lived there in the Carl Schurz Siedlung with the vice consuls and then they would travel somewhere else to Africa, to South Asia, to elsewhere in Europe to do their jobs. So Frankfurt was their home base.

Q: That's a pretty unique kind of place to live, given the large numbers of Americans. What was it like for socializing, for just living in a city where there's an unusually large number of Americans?

DELAWIE: It was very different from most people's Foreign Service experience because I was surrounded by Americans all the time, at work and at home. So to be in Germany I had to leave the compound, to leave town. And I certainly tried to do that. When I moved to Germany in summer of 1983 that was only the second real time I had been outside the United States, the first time being the around-the-world trip with my father I described earlier. So had I joined the Foreign Service to see the world, to meet foreigners and I wound up in not a little America, but a place with a whole lot of Americans and I had to make an effort to be in Germany. And I did. I made friends with people my age that I connected with via political party groups and artistic groups and things like that. It turned out to be fine, but I think it was more work than a lot of other places where you have no alternative but to make friends with your neighbors and local people because that's all there is there.

Q: From the point of view of work, what was consular work like there? Because I imagine you didn't see that many Germans, but you probably saw a lot of third country nationals and other interesting, unique cases.

DELAWIE: I started in the passport section. Which was not ideal from my standpoint. In fact it was discouraging for a while. There were 350,000 American soldiers in Germany at the time and many of them were there with families and many were having babies. While all the soldiers could travel between the U.S. and Germany on their ID cards, the spouses and the children needed passports. And the passports had to be approved by the American vice consul. So I spent a lot of time doing what's basically clerical work, approving passport applications, which was not really fun. And you couldn't even talk to the clients because they were typically on a base, and the personnel people from the base batched up the applications and made sure the birth certificates were there and things like that, and sent them to the consulate. So, this is the first thing I did in the Foreign Service for nine months or so.

Q: Let me just ask you: the U.S. government has a passport agency that works on passports separate from the State Department in the U.S. if I'm not mistaken, but overseas it's only Foreign Service officers. In other words, the passport agency did not send someone to Frankfurt given the load of work it had to do there?

DELAWIE: Well, the passport agency is a part of the State Department. It's pretty autonomous but it's definitely part of the State Department. Now consular associates can do the passport work, but at the time we didn't have them. There was actually enough work for two vice consuls and a mid-level supervisor just in the passport section in Frankfurt. Every once in a while there was something interesting and you'd get, for example, the father is from American Samoa or something, and the question was, does that count to transmit citizenship to the child? But most of the time it was completely routine. I mean, the parents, at least one of the parents had been born in United States and lived there until joining the service. And then the kid of course is an American citizen. So anything really weird, the personnel people at the American base had already intercepted and flagged to us for special attention. There was also a separate citizen services unit. In many places passport and citizen services staff work in the same unit. But there were

enough Americans wandering around in Germany that they had to have a consul actually for citizen services. So that was my real introduction to real State Department work. It was not great. But I decided, well, I'll get beyond this. The other problem is that I'm dealing mostly with Americans and my German is deteriorating.

Q: I'm sorry, go back one second. So you did the passports, but did you also do American citizen services in addition to the nationality rules?

DELAWIE: Only when the consul was not there, as backup we did American citizen services. Now I did get to visit Americans in jail, which was vaguely interesting. But the main work was doing the passports and consular reports of birth abroad. So I did that for nine months or so and then I moved to the visa section, to do non-immigrant visas, which was a lot more interesting. This was 1984. The Iran hostage crisis was 1979. And we had no embassy in Iran, and the biggest airport in continental Europe was Frankfurt, so that is where many of the Iranian visa applicants went. Germans at that point needed visas; this was before the visa waiver program, but usually you didn't have to interview Germans.

DELAWIE: I mean they would apply on a form that had to be approved by a vice consul, but you know, it's one of these things you spend two seconds looking at the application and if you see nothing weird you approve it and the visa was printed in the passport by one of the FSNs. But the interesting cases were the third country nationals, TCNs we would call them, and the hard ones were the Iranians. This was because, first of all, you didn't speak Iranian and couldn't critically evaluate the documents. You knew it was chaotic in Iran and doubted that many would want to go back there given the choice. But then again, you couldn't have a zero issuance rate either. So it was interesting and hard work making decisions where you never felt you had enough information to really make a decent decision.

Q: So these were Iranians who had either residence or German citizenship at this point?

DELAWIE: No, they just got on an airplane. So they had gotten a German visa because they had to go to Germany, but that was pretty straightforward. If you told the German vice consul in Tehran that you wanted to go to Germany just to get an American visa, they would pretty much give you a visa. And then there were, just as today, lots of other foreigners in the Frankfurt area. And so they would come also, and they were always a little more interesting than the Germans who basically were eligible for visas. So that was interesting, I mean it was a lot more interesting than being in the passport section because I had to make real decisions. I was not always comfortable with exactly how, or do I have the information needed to make the decisions, but at least it was a decision making capacity. Whereas in the passport section it was all completely straightforward. So I did that for nine months. Then I went on the political part of the rotation, which was to be the staff assistant to the consul general.

Q: Just one last question before we leave; was there any sort of general approach or policy regarding, NIVs, nonimmigrant visas for Iranians? I mean, in other words, were you looking for particular concerns or something like that as you were reviewing their

applications? It's still relatively early in the revolution; we have very bad relations. But I guess what I'm wondering is, were there concerns about terrorism that, you know, some of these applicants might be coming to the U.S. to foment, or commit terrorist acts or something like that?

DELAWIE: Certainly there were concerns, but we didn't really have much guidance other than what were the visa rules. So now I'm sure it's much better, more organized. Now we've got far more information in our lookout systems than we did at the time. It was definitely a concern, but how do you know? 20 year old males were obviously the ones to pay attention to, but you have a whole bunch of them and probably not all are terrorists. How do you make a decision? So it was nontrivial.

DELAWIE: My guess is there was a greater risk of them not returning to Iran simply because they want a job in the west, than their being a terrorist.

DELAWIE: So at some points you would make a decision, well, this kid seems really smart and if you just assume, well, no one's going to go back who has a choice. And then you say, well, all right, this kid is just applying for student visa, to go study United States, and is accepted at a traditional school. And you probably say, okay, because how else are you going to make a decision? No one was easy, for example, the mothers of people who were students in the United States would want to go visit them, which was perfectly reasonable. But if their only kid happens to be in the United States, then they have very limited ties to their home country. So are they "214b" and ineligible because they can't demonstrate they're not intending immigrants?

DELAWIE: So there were just no good answers here and you couldn't really deny everybody. You just kind of make your best guess as to who's more likely to go back. If it's a business person with a real business – and how do you know if the documents are true or not? You have no way of knowing because you don't speak Farsi – he is probably more likely to go back than someone who already has a bunch of family in United States and no appreciable ties to Iran.

DELAWIE: Then I go to be the staff assistant for the consul general, which is doing regular staff assistant tasks and some political reporting about what's going on in the Frankfurt consular district.

DELAWIE: I went to speak at various political events, where I talked about the United States for USIS, or went to young people's political party events. So that was kind of fun. I enjoyed that and it got me out of the consulate, which was always good; I have always felt that a day out of the office was a day well spent. It really helped improve my German, too. Now actually being in the NIV section did improve my German as well because there were people that only spoke German that we had to interview; they might have been Iranian or some third country national who spoke German and not English.

DELAWIE: So that helped improve my fluency in German. But then I really used it more being the staff assistant.

Q: Did you get a lot of people of Turkish background in Frankfurt who had been Gastarbeiters [guest workers] for a while and now spoke German?

DELAWIE: Yes, there were a fair number of those. If they were German citizens, they were just as eligible as a native-born German for a visa. But the biggest chunk of Turks, it turns out were not in the Frankfurt consular district. They were in Berlin's and Bonn's districts.

Q: The staff assistant work was, was typical, I imagine, you prepared things as well for the consul general and so on.

DELAWIE: Right. I reviewed speeches, made sure he had all of his papers for meetings and followed up on things that were late from elsewhere. And you know, it was kind of typical staff system. I got to know the consul general, his name was Bill Bodde. He had been ambassador before in Fiji. He was from New York, but, when he spoke English, he didn't really have much of a New York accent, but when he spoke German, he had a really deep New York accent; his German was fluent but with this New York accent, which I thought was kind of funny. He was fun to work with. At the time Frankfurt was the 10th biggest Foreign Service post, because of all these people from the other agencies. And so even though he'd been ambassador in Fiji, that was a small post, he was going into a much bigger post in Frankfurt even with the less impressive title of Consul General. Frankfurt was then and still is today so big that there is a deputy principal officer, kind of like a DCM at an embassy because there was just so much to do to manage all the pieces of the consulate.

Q: But the rotation was as staff assistant not to the political section?

DELAWIE: There was no political section. As staff assistant I was basically the political officer for the consulate, and then the deputy principal officer would spend a third or half of his time on political. Now there are more political and economic officers in the consulate in Frankfurt. But at that time, keep in mind that the capital was in Bonn, which was only an hour and a half on the train from Frankfurt. So a lot of the political work was done by people at the Embassy in Bonn.

Q: But there is one other aspect of being in Frankfurt and in Germany for your first tour, there's this old concept of the German club; did that exist and what was it?

DELAWIE: The German club definitely existed. There was a group of FSOs that basically rotated between the State Department and posts in Germany. If you spoke good German you could basically spend all of your career working on Germany, NATO, and Cold War issues. There were lots of posts in Germany. First of all, there was the embassy in Bonn. There were consulates in Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Hamburg, and Munich. There was the Embassy in East Berlin, the mission in West Berlin. So there were tons of positions for FSOs in Germany. And of course, Germany was on the edge of the Cold War, and if it became a hot war, it would start in Germany. So it was really important to

have a bunch of people who were interested in Germany. At the time that I was there, we had positioned Pershing II intermediate range nuclear missiles in Germany, which was not popular among the Germans. There were always demonstrations about the missiles. It was a pretty tense time until after I left and the INF treaty was negotiated. But, I don't think people understand today how important Germany was at that time; it was really the focus of our foreign policy. Even back to when Kennedy was president, there was the Berlin crisis of 1961 which kind of set the stage for the Cuban missile crisis.

DELAWIE: There were 350,000 American soldiers in Germany and a lot of them were on 24 hour alert. So there was certainly the preparation for war going on all the time and it was very important for the State Department, the U.S. government, to understand what was going on in Germany, what the Germans thought, not just the politicians that we interacted with, but the regular people. So there were a bunch of FSOs in Germany. They spoke pretty good German. So if you were in the German club before the wall fell in 1989, you could expect to go back again, somewhere in Germany or Austria, which was also one of the Cold War interesting places. There were other "clubs"; the Chrysanthemum Club for people who worked on Japan, for example. I don't think these exist anymore. They were never formal organizations, just informal names for groups of people who kept working on the same issues.

Q: Interesting. Okay. So now as you're approaching the end of this tour, your first junior officer tour, where are you thinking of going next?

DELAWIE: I wanted to do work as an econ officer because I was in the Econ cone and I hadn't really done that. So I bid on jobs in the Economic Bureau, EB, in the State Department and overseas. I was constrained because I didn't have any more language training time so I couldn't really go anywhere else that needed language. So there were a couple of non language designated posts abroad I could bid on, but it was pretty apparent I'd be coming back to the United States.

DELAWIE: I should say before I move on that I ended up my tour in Frankfurt in the immigrant visa section, which was very fun, because there you actually got to talk to people. Mostly they were not lying to you because they were eligible to go to the United States, and had lots of documents to prove it.

DELAWIE: But there was still a checklist of things you had to ask, so basically you sat down with people for 15 minutes and you talked with them. They were mostly Germans. And so it was a lot of fun; the kids would usually come too if it was a family. And so I really enjoyed being the immigrant visa vice consul, even though I only did that for four months. I learned a tremendous amount in Frankfurt and while it was not working, I was traveling. Frankfurt had the biggest airport on the continent, the biggest train station on the continent. And every weekend I went somewhere I had never been before. That was a lot of fun.

DELAWIE: You could get to Switzerland on the train, or France. The vice consuls, there were a bunch of them, got together and did trips occasionally; at the time the dollar was

very strong, so you could go to France, which is not so far from Frankfurt. For example, there was a restaurant that the *New York Times* had called the best restaurant in the world, called Auberge de l'Ill in Colmar, just across the border from Germany; the vice consuls went there; the exchange rate was 10 marks to the dollar at that point, I remember. So you could have a meal at this terrific French restaurant for an affordable price on a junior Foreign Service salary. I learned a lot about Europe and traveling in my off hours.

DELAWIE: My next assignment turns out to be in the Economic Bureau in the office of aviation policy. I didn't really know what I was getting in to. This was before email and telephone calls were really expensive to the United States so you didn't know a lot about what you were going to be doing. There were these short one paragraph descriptions about what the job was about, but that was kind of it. So it turns out that what I'm doing as the junior person in the office is working on flight clearance issues and working with private pilots who need to travel abroad and things like that.

DELAWIE: It had to be done, but it wasn't super interesting. I did some speech writing for the DAS. Earlier that summer there had been a TWA flight that was hijacked from Athens to Beirut. It was one of these things where people walk on to a plane with guns and take it over. In the U.S. by then we were used to going through metal detectors and having our stuff x-rayed at the airport, but at that time it didn't happen consistently in some other countries. So after a while Congress passes a law that basically requires that any flight coming into the United States from abroad has to have decent security for passengers before people get on the plane, so you can't hijack a plane headed to the United States as a kind of terrorist attack against the United States. So this is not an issue anybody really worked on. But it's an issue that comes to EB, which did lead aviation negotiations, in conjunction with the Department of Transportation. So this new issue comes up on aviation security, and I said, I'll work on that. I didn't know much about it, but no one else really owned it and I figured I could learn. So for my second year in the office of aviation policy, I focus mostly on doing the background work for concluding executive agreements on aviation security with foreign countries.

Q: Just very quickly an executive agreement, you're talking about something that would be signed by the president but wouldn't be necessarily approved by Congress?

DELAWIE: Executive agreements are not treaties that have to be approved by the Senate. They are concluded by the executive branch at an appropriate level, not necessarily the presidential level. So these agreements were basically annexes to existing aviation treaties; they dealt specifically with aviation security and they would say the countries agreed that there will be X-rays, metal detectors, et cetera. At that time you had to have a treaty to allow an airline to fly from one country to the next. So the treaties already existed, but they mostly didn't cover aviation security because it had not been a real issue until people started hijacking airplanes.

DELAWIE: I never got to travel anywhere, unfortunately to do this work, but I would do the necessary homework, look at the existing treaty, and then figure out how to craft language that covers the security aspect. It was interesting, because every treaty was a

little bit different. So I'd have to talk to lawyers and l learned a lot. For example, how does this language fit with this version of the treaty? Because we had aviation treaties with dozens of countries following a post-World War Two conference in Chicago that set the aviation service paradigm. Some of them had changed and some of them hadn't and they were all a little bit different. So that was really my first time working a lot with lawyers in the State Department. So I got to know a bunch of lawyers and they helped me understand all this stuff and how to craft the right kind of language, modify these agreements, basically to commit other countries to do what we were doing anyway based on our domestic policy to protect passengers from terrorist attacks.

Q: Did the language go all the way down to the type of equipment and the kind of examination that would be required?

DELAWIE: They didn't at that time. Recognize that the treaties at that time had nothing or they had just a sentence in which countries would commit that they'll make sure the flights are safe. Now it's a lot more precise and there's an international organization called ICAO, the international civil aviation organization. It has established security standards and you have to commit to observe the standards. Going from nothing to something was a lot faster than going from nothing to perfect. So we worked on going from nothing to something because we had lots of these agreements. European countries, Asian countries, Latin American countries, we had to work on all of them. So that was pretty interesting. So that was my second assignment; it was realistic and substantive economic work. It turned out to be helpful in the future, since aviation issues arose in some of my future assignments.

Q: The reason I was asking about that level of detail is because eventually you do get into that level of detail and you have to go to talk to industry experts who know exactly what kind of X-ray machines or the best or the acceptable ones, or the exact way that you examine an individual to be sure that they do not have anything strapped to their body and so on. And even that gets down to the detail of negotiation. I did that, that's the only reason I was asking is whether you ended up being pulled into that level of detail. I ended up getting pulled into that level of detail on other things, but all right. You could literally negotiate that, that level of detail.

Q: But it's great that an initial tour introduced you to aviation and that it would be helpful later on. Now in Washington, the other thing is as a second tour junior officer, now you're back in the mothership. You're in the main State Department building. What was that like as an experience with that in any other way helpful for your career? Or were there other things you learned that were valuable as an officer?

DELAWIE: I got to know people in other bureaus. We've got the functional bureaus like EB and the regional bureaus like Europe or Asia. So I learned a lot working with people from other bureaus; that was interesting. It was the first time I'd really been in the State Department continuously. I learned my way around the State Department. This was before we had "wayfinding" and it was really easy to get lost in the State Department

building. So it was a fine experience. I learned a lot and I figure it's another couple of bricks in my education as a Foreign Service officer.

Q: As a junior officer in the department, you were making contacts and so on, networking for your next assignment.

DELAWIE: It turns out my job in EB helped me get my next assignment. I wasn't really active as a networker. I mean I was just making friends and talking to people; I guess that's networking, but that was not the purpose. So my next assignment turned out to be in the Operations Center, which is the State Department's 24 hour duty office. One of the lawyers that I'd worked with on these aviation negotiation issues was good friends with the deputy director of the operations center. He tells her that "Greg's okay".

DELAWIE: I think the deputy director felt that she could trust him, which is always the question about a recommendation. So my next assignment is to be a watch officer in the Operations Center, which is open all the time and deals with routine things when there are no crises and deals with crises when they happen. Most of the time there's no crisis and you kind of fall into a routine and then something bad happens. And then all of a sudden the tempo goes way up and people end up working really hard and trying to solve the crisis or get the right people on the phone to work on issues.

DELAWIE: It was a really interesting year. I was there from ‘87 to ‘88. The main jobs for FSOs were watch officer, editor, and a kind of crisis management support officer. Those were the three jobs for the younger people. You would rotate from one to the other on various days. People were grouped into teams. There were about five senior watch officers who each led a team. And then there were four others on each team, FSOs and specialists. After training, which took a month or so, you would basically be put in the rotation with your team. There were basically three shifts a day: days, evenings, and mids. You would rotate every two days typically; you would do two days, two evenings, two midnights, and then you'd have two or three days off. And then you would start again. Usually you'd be with the same group of people, but of course, people took vacation, or they got sick, and then you'd be with different people. So before long, you got to know everybody else in the op center, which was fun. George Shultz was secretary of state at the time. He would call occasionally and I would pick up the phone sometimes; because one of the things you did was basically serve as the switchboard for the secretary, the deputy and the undersecretaries and they would be looking for each other or somebody else. So one of our jobs was tracking down people these department principals wanted to speak with, and putting them on the phone.

DELAWIE: Shultz was a really nice guy; whenever you called him and bothered him, including at three o'clock in the morning, he would always be such a gentleman; he was a very positive example that a senior leader does not need to be a jerk. It was an interesting time in foreign policy, and it was really cool to know what was going on behind the scenes sometimes. It was also a great job typically because the camaraderie was terrific amongst people. Especially when you're there at three o'clock in the morning and you

have to stay awake somehow and there's nothing going on in the world, you basically talk with your colleagues, which was fun.

DELAWIE: You would get to learn quickly whom you could depend on and whom you couldn't, both in the organization and outside of the State Department, which was handy. But the best thing, and this is the last time I experienced this really, was that when you were on for a shift you arrived 45 minutes before to read in. Then you do your eight hours, and then you leave; there is no way you could work longer than your shift, because the next watch officer needed your desk. You worked for eight hours and 45 minutes and then whatever has been occupying you for your shift becomes somebody else's problem until 24 hours later when you start over again. Sometimes you were sad that you had to leave something that was really interesting and just turn it over to the next person, but most of the time it was great that it's not my problem anymore.

DELAWIE: And for the whole rest of my Foreign Service career, things were always my problem. And they were my problem until they were solved. But in the op center they are only your problem for eight hours and 45 minutes, and that was terrific. I learned so much in that job because you need to read in in less than 45 minutes. You need to be briefed by your predecessor. You need to understand what your predecessor is telling you. You need to learn to brief your successor on the next shift in a short amount of time, as well. All this helps you really learn what are the essentials, what is focus, and to differentiate between what is interesting and what is important.

DELAWIE: And depending on how much time you have, you may skip the interesting but not important stuff. You have to make sure that your successor knows what's important about whatever issue is being managed. All told, it was a great experience. There were some unusual stresses; people got tired typically because of the rotating shifts. I never really got used to the overnight shifts, which was probably okay; you only had to power through them for two nights. Most of the people were young and they could do it. Overall it was a terrific experience. Interesting people wandered into the operations center all the time. The Secretary of State, some of the under secretaries, and the executive secretary would often wind up there on Sunday morning.

DELAWIE: They wanted to know what's going on, so they show up. It was neat that you got to see all these people you read about in the newspaper. Another interesting thing for me was they didn't quite have enough senior watch officers, which are typically senior mid-career people. So they would have one of the watch officers fill in as a senior watch officer after a while. I was picked to be that person my year. So I became what we called the WO/SWO. (Watch officer/ senior watch officer). I would do whatever job had to be done. So sometimes one of the regular senior watch officers was not available or for a particular shift and I would get to do that. But most of the time I would do the regular watch officer/editor shifts.

Q: I just want to interject a comment. I also worked in the operations center and had the exact same experience. I met other people who went from watch officer to sometimes senior watch officer. Every one of them that I met became ambassadors. So I think that

even that early in your career, if the management of the operations center chose you as a part time senior watch officer, that you were probably showing at least some initial talent management and leadership that would indicate you're likely to go on to higher levels based on my experience. And I have no objection. I mean the people that I saw who were in the temporary senior watch officer positions I have great respect for. I thought that all of them deserve that sort of promotion. They were very capable and I didn't feel that I could do it.

Q: I felt that the pressure of that job was a little more than I wanted. I was happy as a watch officer, doing all the watch officer things, but I just really did not want to have to be in the position where I'm going to have to make a decision if I'm going to wake up the executive secretary and the secretary; that was just a little scary for me at the same point in my career. So just as a little comment on being selected for that position. But again, this is just a one year job. You're barely there for a few months before you already have to start thinking about where you're going next.

DELAWIE: There is one anecdote I want to bring up. First of all, you learn a lot when you're put in a new position. Certainly one of the things I learned being senior watch officer was that sometimes the Secretary of State would call and say, "what's going on?" And it was always better to have something to say. So I learned to keep a list of what was going on, even if it wasn't super important. And so I'd be able to say, "well, you know, it's pretty quiet out there, Mr. Secretary, but in Manila this thing happened, and the embassy is on top of it" which was not super important, but it gave me something to say and gave Secretary Shultz the feeling that someone was paying attention to the world. That is a lesson I kept with me until I became DCM, when I also had my ambassador calling from vacation abroad and asking what's going on?

DELAWIE: It's always better to be able to say something right then, rather than "Not much, sir," or "I'll get back to you." One specific crisis really stands out to me in my time there. There are always lots of little crises, but the op center wasn't usually responsible for major crises; usually it would find people who were experts to deal with a big crisis. But once on Sunday morning, during a midnight shift, I happened to be Acting Senior Watch officer and not much was going on. But then all of a sudden the press starts reporting that an Iranian airliner is down over the Persian Gulf. Then the press said it was shot down by an American warship.

DELAWIE: I was in my third tour, an FS-03 or something. And I was the senior State Department officer in the State Department building at four o'clock in the morning on Sunday when this happens. So I convene a conference call with DOD of course. It was very interesting, and of course, the senior officer at DOD at all times is a flag officer, including in the middle of the night. So I was speaking on the secure phone with a general who is in charge of the national military commands center, or NMCC, and ask what is going on. We were getting all these press reports and the NMCC is saying, it can't possibly be true. It's just the Iranians.

DELAWIE: And the way these things work is you only know little scraps of information at a time. So at the beginning you say, okay, well that's what DOD says and they would know if an American ship were involved in something. Then it turns out more scraps come in and more reports and there is some other info that matches the press, then you start to worry that something's really going on. So we have multiple calls with DOD during the course of this early morning. And I remember very vividly yelling at this brigadier general on the phone saying, what the hell is going on? Don't you know what your ships are up to? We've got all of this reporting saying something is going on. And he has nothing to say. But they do take the concern seriously, they start pinging their ships and get more info. This was before a lot of computerization and emails. So, you know, there was the U.S. navy ship that had in fact shot down an airplane, thinking it was a warplane, and had reported to someone what was going on but it had not filtered up to the right place at DOD at the time. And ultimately we kind of figured out what's going on. In the meantime in the op center we were bringing in people to manage the crisis, even though it was five o'clock on a Sunday morning. We tracked down people from the Middle East Bureau, from the economic bureau because it was an airliner, from the consular bureau because there could be American citizens on this plane. And we set up a task force.

Q: Here again, I just want to make a very quick comment. This is one of the responsibilities of the op center, to pull in every single possible State Department individual at the right level when a crisis starts. So that you have the right people talking to each other. And that is a bit of judgment and a bit of knowledge that you do need to acquire while you're in the watch center. And it does distinguish a bit between the more successful officers and the less successful officers, you know, can you keep in your head all of these potentially interested individuals? Because if you forget one, especially if they're a relatively high ranking one, you're going to hear that.

DELAWIE: Absolutely. So, you know, by six o'clock in the morning and we have a whole task force going and it's got people from the Near East Bureau and from the executive secretary and all these other bureaus. And even at that time we still didn't really know exactly what happened, but we had a good idea so we got the people ready to deal with it. By the time I left, it was clear what happened. Why it happened was unknown at that point, although that later became apparent. But we had basically set up the next shift to understand what was going on and to deal with it. For example, you have to worry about the press and other countries that might have citizens on the plane and all these things that we had to think about.

DELAWIE: And at eight o'clock in the morning it became someone else's problem to manage, and we all left, although later than usual because there was so much going on. Of all my experiences in the operations center, that was the night that really stood out; amid the horrific tragedy, I learned a lot. Because, when you see things in a movie it typically presents that people have all this information and they make a good or bad decision based on this perfect info. But it's not that way in real life; more realistic is the movie about the Cuban missile crisis, *Thirteen Days*. The one with the Kennedys who are

trying to figure out if the offer that's being made by the Soviet Union to the Americans is genuine or not.

DELAWIE: They were getting two separate tracks of information and they send someone to try to figure out who knew Khrushchev. It took days to figure out whether they were getting good information. That's really more realistic than the way things are often portrayed; in real life you often just get scraps and you try to figure out, okay, what picture are they trying to paint for me? And sometimes you get the right answer; sometimes you get the wrong answer. That was one of those tremendous lessons that you really have to learn from experience. Because people can describe things to you after an event, and they give it structure and context and it makes sense. But when something like this tragedy happens and you have to make a decision based on these fragmentary things, it's a lot harder; but it is also a tremendous education.

Q: I can't resist, one more very quick aside. Colin Powell wrote a book, not so much of an autobiography as sort of my approach to management and how I manage my way through things. And one of his aphorisms is you have to be able to make decisions with 60% of the information. If you wait longer, you're going to have paralysis by analysis. If you wait less time and don't have at least 60%, you'll be shooting from the hip. And he said this is how I managed and it's very much true of what you're talking about; at some point, all of the pieces of information, you have to put them all together and make some kind of decision because you may never have all the information you want. That is what happens a bit in the operations center when you have to make decisions about whom to bring in, when to wait for the secretary or when to wake the executive secretary, etc. Etc. Which is what makes it a fascinating if a little stressful at times kind of job.

DELAWIE: Right. Moving on, you're right, being in a one year job in the operations center, basically you have to bid on your next assignment as soon as you walk in the door, which was disconcerting. Everybody coped with it somehow. So my next assignment is in the European Bureau and I work in the office that was called Regional Political Economic Affairs. I was a desk officer for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which is an international organization made up of rich countries, that is located in Paris. It coordinates a fair amount of economic policies in the developed world.

Q: And you had that as your sole portfolio. There weren't two officers on the account?

DELAWIE: There were three of us. There was a senior officer and two mid-level officers.

Q: It's a big job; OECD does a lot of things.

DELAWIE: It does, it was interesting. I got to know people at the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve who were of course the specialists on a lot of stuff the OECD worked on. A lot of work was pure economics that could only really be grasped appropriately by people with PhDs in economics. My job was a lot of coordination. I

dealt with the OECD budget and negotiating whether there would be growth or no growth in the budget. At the time, you would always promote zero real growth in budgets of international organizations. I spent a fair amount of my time in that kind of management issue, as desk officer.

DELAWIE: I got to go to Paris basically quarterly to go to meetings on the management and budget issues more than the pure economic stuff. Although I did certainly work on economic issues back home. So I was in that slot for two years and the second year, there was a fair amount of trade work going on in the office.

Q: What two years are these?

DELAWIE: '88 to '90. The office, RPE, was pretty big as it is even today. There were different people doing different things. The same office managed the relationship with the European community. But there was too much trade work for the number of people that were assigned to that.

DELAWIE: Since I had worked on aviation before, I say, Hey, let me help out on the Airbus-Boeing dispute. And the trade team agrees, because they were swamped. Now to be honest, I didn't really have any background in aircraft trade because I worked on aviation services as opposed to trade in airplanes. But anyway, they say, sure, why not? And so I learned about aircraft trade issues, and trade more broadly. So the second year I still did the OECD issues, but that didn't really keep me sufficiently busy, which is why I was looking for additional work. So I become the EUR representative on the aircraft trade dispute, which is managed by the U.S. Trade Rep's office, and which the EB trade office was involved in extensively, along with the Commerce Department. I was probably the junior person on this whole mammoth dispute worth billions and billions of dollars. It was a big dispute between the United States and Europeans because Europeans were subsidizing Airbus aircraft, and Boeing wasn't getting subsidies, which they thought was unfair. That's where I learned trade as a practitioner as opposed to doing international trade in college. So that's where I really started working on trade issues; I did two different assignments in trade after that. And it was all based on learning about trade to work on the U.S.-European dispute on aircraft trade. Once in a while I got to go to Brussels with the gang. But mostly it was going to meetings in Washington and coordinating papers. This was a very high level issue and it was dealt with by DASes and assistant secretaries mostly. So I was drafting or suggesting and working with others, on how we deal with the dispute both in the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), and bilaterally.

DELAWIE: That was really interesting work, and once again, I think it was something I sought because I was bored and didn't really have enough to do, but that became truly influential on what would happen to me in the future. That happened several times during my career.

Q: Okay, so now you've had four years in the department and pretty much going to have to go overseas. Back when you were working in the department in those years there was

sort of a five year rule, which was more or less enforced that you couldn't spend more than five consecutive years in Washington without at least breaking it up once by a foreign tour.

DELAWIE: Right. And the complicating factor then was I got married, to another Foreign Service officer. My wife Vonda was a political officer and I was an econ officer and we of course wanted to be assigned abroad together to the same place. By then we really understood networking and how you really find a job in the Foreign Service. We were pursuing jobs very energetically. We basically bid on jobs anywhere in the world where there were two jobs, including in really tough places. I remember we went to see the Japan desk about bidding on jobs in embassy Tokyo. The country deputy director said, well, you don't have any experience in Japan. We don't know if the Japanese will like you or not, so we're just not willing to invest under these circumstances. Which is not really unreasonable, because you have to go to school for two years to learn to speak Japanese.

DELAWIE: We bid on Bucharest, which was a really horrible place before the fall of the Berlin Wall, and even after for a while. We bid on posts in South Asia, et cetera. We also bid on Turkey. Ultimately we get jobs in Ankara, Turkey.

Q: What posts did we have in Turkey then?

DELAWIE: The embassy in Ankara, the consulate general in Istanbul, and a consulate in Adana, right near the border with Syria basically. Vonda is assigned to the political section, I am assigned to the econ section. But first we have to learn Turkish, which was really challenging. Turkish is a hard language; it is not an Indo-European language. So on the one hand it is very regular and there are only 10 irregular verbs; there's no grammatical gender and all these things that trip you up learning an Indo-European language. But on the other hand, every single word is new. There are no cognates. Even words for new things like computer are different.

DELAWIE: Turkish language instruction was in Rosslyn then; that was before FSI was here in Arlington Hall. So we went to language school for ten months in Rosslyn and Turkish school was okay. I tried to push for more instructor time, not just for me but for the whole group. At the time there was this system where one of the instructors would be working full time on a new language book. I had talked to all the students, and we felt that we all needed more small group instruction to make progress because the language was just so hard. So ultimately we talked the teachers into not devoting one person full time to write the book, but to divide the classes into smaller groups, so all instructors would have student contact each day. That was helpful, and most of us passed. Turkish is a fascinating language, intellectually. It is so logical and so organized. It's like someone must have sat down with a big piece of paper and designed it from scratch, as opposed to English, which just evolved haphazardly.

DELAWIE: So, the summer comes and we go to Turkey, which was a fascinating place. Turkey was having an economic crisis and inflation was 60 or 70% per year. I was the

macro reporting officer, so I always had something interesting to learn and write about. At that time Turks liked Americans. Now unfortunately, they don't like us so much. I think our approval rating in Turkey today is about 9%. But then it was different. This job was my first real economic work abroad; I had done economic work in the department but not in an embassy. So this was a great learning experience.

Q: Before you go on, how large was the econ section and what was your portfolio responsibility?

DELAWIE: There was the counselor with four or five econ officers, although we were short one most of the time I was there. I was doing macroeconomics, the Turkish government budget, inflation, and similar issues; basically my portfolio was understanding the Turkish economy and writing about it. I did reporting and analysis about the Turkish economy in areas that were important to the U.S. I was pretty comfortable with that because I'd studied economics seriously in college. Being an economics grad was crucial, I think, to doing this job. I was dealing with a lot of people, especially in the government, who were serious economists.

DELAWIE: They generally had PhD's in economics, often from major U.S. or European universities. I just had a bachelor's degree. But I understood enough; I could not compete with them in economics, but I certainly understood enough about what they were talking about, to report it adequately. The other part of my portfolio at that point was intellectual property rights, trademarks, copyrights, patents, an issue which is always a challenge in the developing world. And Turkey was known for manufacturing knock offs. So Turkey has this economic crisis. And of course, Turkey borders Iran. It was a really important country to the United States; it borders the Soviet Union at Georgia. So in the United States, people care last a lot about what happens, what's going on there. Was Turkey going to fall apart, which we worried about, because if it was going to fall apart, it was going to fall apart economically; because there then wasn't much risk of a political crisis in Turkey.

DELAWIE: So it turned out people in Washington cared a lot about what I was writing. I had developed this network of contacts, like the president of the central bank, economic advisers to the prime minister and the president, people at the Treasury and the finance ministry and in the private sector. So I made sure we knew what was going on in time to influence things we cared about. I also had an interesting impact that I could not have imagined at the time. One of our FSNs who had been there since the ‘50s retired. I got to pick the new one. We got a lot of good candidates, Turks interviewing to be the econ section FSN. The person I pick later winds up being Minister of Finance in the Turkish government. So, you know, he was good.

DELAWIE: I helped this guy who had no connections. I mean we hired the American way: no nepotism, merit alone. It gave this guy, who had just been a graduate student in economics, a chance to prove himself. He meets lots of people, does good work and later leaves the embassy and goes on to a career as a technocrat and later becomes a minister.

Q: Now when you speak to all of these high level Turkish economists, were you speaking in Turkish or were you speaking in English or a mix?

DELAWIE: For macro it was all English, because all the decision makers were educated in the United Kingdom or the United States. For intellectual property rights there was a lot more Turkish, but my Turkish was never anywhere near as good as my German. Which was a shame because my Turkish certainly deteriorated during the course of my assignment. But I had to do my job, and I wasn't going to make people who were making time for me, suffer with my inadequate command of Turkish.

DELAWIE: We did a lot of economic reporting; this was before the ubiquity of the internet, so what the State Department reported from the embassies was what people knew in Washington. A lot of times I'd get notes from the desk, saying that the NSC called and said thanks so much for your cable on this; that was really neat. And CIA analysts would call me on the phone and say, look we just don't understand this and this and this. Can you send us back something that explains why this is happening? They would call me. And that was cool; I really felt like I had made a contribution.

DELAWIE: For intellectual property rights, we made basically no progress. Certainly not for want of trying, but knock off drugs were a problem, knock off CDs were a problem. But some of the other stuff I got to do was interesting, like visiting factories, that was always good. Opel, part of GM, assembled cars in Turkey, and I got to go to the local factory. Then there's lots of Turkish industry, especially in textiles; textile factories are fascinating to see how the machinery works. It was great to see how so many products were really made; that was the kind of neat Foreign Service stuff that you would not see in most other jobs. Such a variety of things. A car factory, a textile factory, agricultural processing concerns, things like that; I even visited a factory assembling F-16s once.

DELAWIE: In a completely different vein, some American citizens were kidnapped in southeastern Turkey, which at that time the government had only modest control over. And I got to go to watch out in case they were released. I went to Diyarbakir, which was like the wild west of Turkey and a mostly Kurdish area. It was fascinating change; it had been a caravan stop on the Silk Road and there were several old Ottoman buildings including a beautiful old stone Caravanserai that was still a hotel; this is a place where travelers would feed or change their horses en route. The city was fascinating; it was far less developed than Ankara and Western Turkey, which were far more European. Diyarbakir was definitely more Middle Eastern; the city's symbol was the watermelon, in honor of the biggest crop grown there; there was a giant watermelon statue outside the city.

DELAWIE: I was there for about a week because we were hoping Americans would be released near there. The idea was I would be there to assist the released Americans. So I went with one of the FSNs, and we hung around Diyarbakir for a week or so. I would talk to the mayor and the chief of police and people like that, just touching base.

Q: I worked in Romania, there were even caravanserai left in Romania from the silk road. It got that far and then, and exactly as you described in terms of style. And it was basically the end, the very end of the silk road. The Turks were, during the Ottoman Empire, very regular, in the way they did things.

Q: Another interesting thing I worked on this one was related to the Soviet Union falling apart. Armenia, it happens to be, is just on the other side of the border from Turkey. The whole infrastructure and logistics of the Soviet Union was collapsing and it was really hard winter and a really late spring. People were starving to death in Armenia; how do you get there to help? Well, it was really hard to get to Armenia at that time due to poor internal Soviet roads, the mountainous territory, etc. So if you're the United States and you want to get humanitarian assistance there, there are only so many choices. And it turns out that one of those possible choices was Turkey. But of course the Turkey-Armenia relationship had been bad for a hundred years.

DELAWIE: There was no USAID mission in Turkey, but an econ officer followed the assistance account among other things. But she left post, so I got to fill in for that. So I get to negotiate with the Turkish Foreign Ministry about whether we could drive humanitarian assistance across Turkey from a port like Izmir or Adana to Armenia; that was not easy as you might imagine, but we do actually get some shipments of humanitarian assistance and we get them permission to ship aid via truck across Turkey into Armenia. There were all these suspicions about what the Americans were really up to, of course, due to the historical relationship between Turkey and Armenia. It was really hard and it was one of these things where people would present you five obstacles and none of them are real, but you had to knock them down one at a time. So not only would I have to deal with the foreign ministry people who could be persuaded, but there was the customs service and there was the police and the intelligence agencies. All of these agencies, they had concerns that something, they did not know what, but something bad was happening. For example, they asked, what if there was something else in there other than food? And then you say, okay, well look, why don't we make a deal where your customs officers can inspect the food on the ship before it is loaded onto the truck. So while you can come up with a solution to each problem, there are multiple problems.

DELAWIE: You have to cope with them one at a time. But it worked for a while and it worked for long enough. And finally, the weather got better and you could grow food in Armenia, about the same time it just became impossible to get the Turkish government to agree to allow this humanitarian assistance to continue. So we felt really good that we had been able to make a contribution to keeping people from starving to death in Armenia at the right time.

Q: One of the reasons things were so bad in Armenia was in 1988 they had a terrible earthquake, not in the capital, but in the major provincial city. I worked in Armenia 10 years later, after the fall Soviet Union, and the border was closed with Turkey over the Nagorno-Karabakh war and so on. They still had not recovered the level of economic development they had before that earthquake, even though it was in a provincial city and not in sort of the main industrial or agricultural area; it had killed so many people and

destroyed so much commerce within the country and they still had not quite recovered from it 10 years later. And there were still people living in containers from the food aid that had managed to get in from Turkey for the brief time you were able to get it in. It was really that bad.

DELAWIE: It was just fascinating to be there on the edge of the Soviet Union and to see what was going on. One of the other econ officers went up to the Black Sea city of Trabzon, near the border of Georgia, and just chatted with people coming across; she spoke Russian. And so we did reporting that way. It was also interesting to watch us establish embassies in these places. To get to Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan at this time you could either fly from Moscow on a Russian plane that might fall out of the sky at any time or you go with Turkish Airlines on a Boeing plane.

DELAWIE: So, when a State Department delegation was negotiating with these countries about opening embassies and renting property to have an embassy or an ambassador residence or whatever, they mostly went through Turkey to get there. So we would talk with these people every once in a while. I would take them out to dinner when they came to Ankara; usually they would want to talk with the Turkish foreign ministry that was trying to do the same exact thing. It was really fun to talk to these people, especially if you could see them both before and after their trips to Central Asia. When they were on their way from the United States to Turkey they would say that Turkey was making progress but was clearly still a developing country. On the way out, after they had spent a month in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Turkey would seem like Switzerland, because there was running water and safe food to eat. And once we would set up these small Central Asian embassies, you'd see this incredible reporting from them. An FSO named Phil Remmler was the first political officer in Azerbaijan, in Baku, and he wrote many iconic telegrams. Of course, nobody in the U.S. knew anything about Azerbaijan except for a handful of academics. And so what our embassy in Baku reported was the first thing that people knew. Phil would do these incredible political reporting messages and they would start out, "My Beat is Baku."

DELAWIE: There was regular political officer stuff, but then there was background, what the heck is Azerbaijan like? And it was just fascinating. People in these central Asian posts were the first Americans to go there in forever. And it was fascinating to read what they had to say about the people and the unknown places they were dealing with. People who were trying to establish governments for good or bad, in these places that had been under Moscow's thumb some for 70 years.

Q: Today is March 7th, and we're resuming the interview with Greg Delawie as he comes to the end of his tour in Turkey. And remind me, what year was that?

DELAWIE: We left Turkey in the summer of 1994.

Q: Okay. Now as you're getting ready to go, what are you and Vonda thinking? Because as a tandem, you're undoubtedly trying to find a place you can both be in the same country at least, or at least maybe neighboring countries.

DELAWIE: Well, at this particular time, it was pretty straightforward that we were going to go back to Washington. Vonda was pregnant with our first child and it seemed like Washington was the best place to be. In fact, as a tandem couple we never were assigned back-to-back overseas assignments. We always had to go do an assignment in Washington in order to find those two perfect jobs abroad that we wanted for the next assignment. So, that was it. But before I move on, I do want to reflect on the soft power of the United States.

DELAWIE: Towards the end of my assignment I was at a diplomatic reception hosted by another embassy. I was just chatting with other guests, when Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Cetin comes up to me. I was surprised because, although I had been a note taker in meetings with him, I certainly could not say we were friends or even really acquaintances. But he had spotted me across the room and came up to say how sorry was that an American had died in a terrorist event somewhere around the world that day.

DELAWIE: This event was instructive to me regarding the importance, not of me, but of the United States and how much, at the time, Turkish government officials felt a connection with the United States. And when something bad happened to the United States, they wanted to share the grief. Cetin was an important guy, as foreign minister in a big country; I was just a mid-level officer at the embassy and did not normally interact with such senior officials. But I was the one who was there, and he had clearly spotted me, thought "that guy is from the American embassy. I want to pass on my condolences." So he spent a minute or two talking with me. There are so many examples of how we have benefited from soft power over the years, but this is one in which I was personally involved and has stuck with me. It's a shame that today we're giving up soft power voluntarily, even eagerly.

Q: No, absolutely. I had a similar experience in Jamaica where I was a consular officer, and it was the year that the space shuttle exploded; there was an unbelievable outpouring of sympathy. We finally had to create a condolence book in the consular section separate from the one in the embassy because everybody wanted to sign something. There was no question it was sincere. People actually looked stricken and it was very moving.

Q: Well, all right, where in Washington do you end up going?

DELAWIE: My next job was in the economic bureau, in the developed country trade division. But it took me a while to get there because I was assigned to work on a promotion panel over the summer. It was a promotion panel for Office Management Specialists, or OMSes. This was interesting because it was really my first time working on the management side of the Department. It really had an impact on me in the future; not just how would I write better EERs for myself or my colleagues, but it was also the beginning of the way I learned how things really worked in human resources in the State Department.

Q: Good. Take one second to describe how office management specialists are evaluated.

DELAWIE: All Foreign Service employees are evaluated against a set of criteria, such as intellectual skills, management skills, and communication skills. There is an annual evaluation prepared on every Foreign Service employee by his or her supervisor. All these evaluations are put in a file, and every summer the State Department runs promotion panels where everybody's file of evaluations is reviewed; the panel sees not just the most recent annual evaluation, but the evaluations from prior years as well. The panel consists typically of five or six people, and there's always, according to law, one outsider, one non-U.S. government employee. And since the promotion panels are held over the summer, these outsiders are often teachers, who are free over the summer because there's no school going on; we had a teacher on our panel. Anyway, we had hundreds of files to review of Foreign Service OMSes; we probably called them secretaries at the time, but the modern term is Office Management Specialist.

DELAWIE: The first task was to put files into three piles. The first pile is for the people that you're seriously considering are ready for a promotion to the next level. One pile is for people who are really having problems and might need to be fired. And the third is the vast middle, people who are doing a good job but they're not really ready yet for promotion. So to make these piles you have to read all the files, you discuss them as a group, and you do an informal rank ordering. That took a couple of weeks at least. After that is done, you focus on the first pile, of people that do a really good job and are pretty much ready to move up.

Q: Now, very quick interruption here. As you're reading, there are two things that I understand happened. First, they anonymize them, so you don't know who this individual is.

DELAWIE: No, that's not correct. You know the names.

Q: Okay. Then the second thing is you're looking for remarks that are not permitted.

DELAWIE: That's actually the role of the bureau or the post review panel. By the time they actually get to the promotion panel, there should be no inadmissible remarks, which are, for example, references to a person's age, sex, or the school they went to. There is a list of references that are not allowed to be in an EER file, but it is up to the post or bureau panel to control that.

DELAWIE: If it's done right such references never appear before the promotion panels because they're fixed before they ever leave post or leave the bureau. So we had a collegial group of people; our chairman was Ambassador Pete Romero, who had a career focused on western hemisphere issues. We spent a month and a half going through three or four hundred files. So we had hundreds of people and dozens of promotion opportunities; you always have more people that you feel are ready for promotion than promotion opportunities exist.

DELAWIE: That was certainly our case. So we focused on about 50 people in the "ready for promotion" pile. And then we put them in rank order, which is a negotiation because of course, you know, your views of what's important may be different from the person's next to you. There is a voting procedure to use if there are disagreements. After this rank ordering is done, HR tells you how many promotion opportunities you really have, maybe 20 or 25; HR does not tell you that at the beginning. So with the rank ordering and the number of opportunities, you draw a line and people above the line get promoted, and people below the line do not. Sometimes, although I don't recall we did this, when you draw the line, sometimes the panel will take a closer look at the people right around the line, maybe moving one or two, just to make sure, they are still happy with the outcome.

Q: Does the panel then grant meritorious step increases to those who were close but did not make it?

DELAWIE: The rules have changed now; I don't really remember what it was like then; this was 1994. So, then you go back and you look at the people in the left hand stack, the people that are having serious challenges. You must decide whether they need to be considered for "selection out." A promotion panel does not actually select people out; it just puts typically a very small number of people in a pile for a separate panel to review. But that was hard as well, because if you sent someone to this selection out panel you had a hand in possibly firing someone. Not easy. But you know, in any system there's a bell curve of capabilities and there are people at the left end of the bell curve; if your loyalty is to the system, then you need to deal with people who are not performing well.

Q: Just one question. There are many potential reasons why someone might be selected out. Did you, were you the ones who would recommend for selection out due to excessive security violations?

DELAWIE: The selection out decisions were made by separate panel that only deals with that issue, but that's certainly something that would cause us to say, okay, let's consider putting this person in that pile.

Q: I was only curious about that particular thing because over time in the department, they got much more concerned about even security violations where there has been no evidence of compromise, where you left something on your desk, but no one could possibly have seen it. But you still get a security violation.

DELAWIE: Yes. Well, I played a role in that issue much later, which we will come to in a while. The promotion panel was interesting, and very educational, but it meant I got to my next job in September instead of July or August, which had been the original hope, certainly of EB, but also of me too. But you get assigned tasks sometimes and you have to do them. So anyway, I show up in EB and then two weeks later our child was born, so I'm gone again for a couple of weeks. It was kind of a tough start; it was no one's fault. EB didn't blame me, but that was a fact. But finally, I'm working in the division of developed country trade, as the deputy division chief. My main task is to work on trade disputes.

DELAWIE: This is the mid 1990s. Clinton and the Democrats wanted to show that they were tough on trade, so there were a fair number of things that were going on. There was a dispute with Japan about cars and car parts. There was a dispute with Japan about film, Fujifilm versus Kodak Film. It is interesting now to reflect on the effort we put into this dispute twenty years ago now that film has gone the way of buggy whips. This was also the time of the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission with Russia; we worked on that too. This was the time the newish European Union was kind of feeling its way forward as the boss of the trade function in Europe.

DELAWIE: It was the time of some negotiations in the World Trade Organization that I worked on telecommunications services. So there was a lot to do for a small office, there were just maybe six or seven of us. One of the interesting things about trade in the U.S. Government is that the boss of trade is the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, which is a part of the executive office of the president; the State Department has not been the boss of the trade function since changes in the 1960s. But of course USTR does not have any one overseas except for Geneva. So the U.S. embassies abroad are the ones that are delivering trade messages to foreign governments; the Economic Bureau is the liaison between USTR and the embassies. So therefore we did have a role to play, although it was more of a supporting role because the policy was really made by USTR and endorsed by an interagency committee; the State representative was the EB DAS for trade. So we weren't really in charge, but it was nevertheless extremely interesting. For example, for the dispute with Japan over cars and car parts, there was a hearing that we ran; I was a panel member at the hearing. People would come, such as trade associations, affected groups, labor unions, would come and complain that Japan was unfairly subsidizing its auto industry, and that the U.S. was at a disadvantage because of that.

DELAWIE: I also re-engaged on the Airbus trade issue that I had worked on in the European bureau five years before. That was really heating up, especially as Airbus and European governments were working on the idea for the A-380, the biggest commercial airplane ever to be built that was going to be subsidized by five or 10 billion European taxpayer dollars. And Boeing of course, didn't get any subsidies, although the Europeans always claimed that since Boeing made military aircraft that counted a subsidy for civilian aircraft production, which I don't really believe but that is what they said.

Q: I'm just curious about the European decision to go with the huge aircraft. Obviously now in the news they are discussing slowly discontinuing that idea. It obviously did not last as long as they thought it would and the market didn't go in the direction they thought it would for that size. Was there a sense back then that that was what was happening because American aeronautics companies were going with smaller planes?

DELAWIE: There was this tremendous ferment in the aviation sector; in the eighties and nineties, I remember in 1974, the U.S. deregulated civil aviation, and that led to the development of the hub and spoke U.S. domestic aviation system. So if you wanted to go from San Diego to Washington, you had to fly to Los Angeles first and get a big plane

that would fly to New York and you'd get a little plane to go to Washington or something like that.

DELAWIE: That prevailed for a little while, but passengers of course didn't like that because they had to take more planes. So competitive market pressures led to a change, I think during the '90s, (I think; I'm of course an FSO and not a civil aviation guy). But competitive pressures led the airlines to say, "oh, well, maybe this hub and spoke thing isn't really all we thought; while it's good for us, passengers hate it and maybe we better change." So they started to change away from hub and spoke to point to point; although it certainly didn't happen overnight. You have to make plans for airline routes a long time in advance; first you have to make sure there is an airplane available, and they are not cheap. So anyway, this was happening in the United States before it happened in Europe.

DELAWIE: Boeing was thinking of making a plane bigger than the 747; it had concepts, at the same time as Airbus was planning for the A-380. Boeing ultimately decided not to make the big new plane because they didn't see the market for it. Airbus saw the market and wanted the bragging rights of producing the world's largest commercial aircraft. Boeing ultimately decided to focus more on point-to-point aircraft like the 787 and things like that that were more suitable to direct routes: so fliers from San Diego to Washington could get on the plane in San Diego and to straight to Washington. Similarly for international routes like Washington to Berlin or whatever.

Q: I remember being on the NATO desk and just to get to Brussels from Washington, often I would have to go to DC national and go through JFK. I couldn't even go on a non-stop flight from Dulles.

DELAWIE: Fortunately, by the time I was in working on NATO, there was a nonstop flight from Dulles to Brussels.

Q: It did change, but not soon enough for me.

DELAWIE: The Boeing-Airbus dispute was pretty serious. There were WTO cases filed. McDonnell Douglas was having trouble selling commercial aircraft. So that basically left only two big airplane companies in the world, Boeing and Airbus. So everybody was concerned about the European subsidy of Airbus, and what that would mean for Boeing. And would it put U.S. companies, U.S. jobs at risk. Once again, this was a trade issue led by USTR, but since I had some expertise in that issue from my prior assignment in the European Bureau, I felt I had a pretty constructive role to play in the interagency process and on negotiating trips to Brussels and Geneva.

DELAWIE: Then there was the WTO agreement on basic telecommunications, which is services, not phones for example. I got to participate on the other U.S. delegation for that, which involved meetings in Geneva at the World Trade Organization headquarters with Europeans and other countries.

Q: When you say services, do you mean like access to lines?

DELAWIE: The question was whether you could sell services cross-border, like telephone services or data. And whether there would be government regulation of that, which was certainly the European model, or not. And certainly because the U.S. telecommunications companies were very strong at the time, they were interested in less regulation.

DELAWIE: Those were some of the issues I worked on. We were in a little office on the third floor on the D street side of the building just above the D street entrance, which those of us who worked in State Department have not seen in 12 years since it closed for construction.

DELAWIE: It was a good crowd. I got to know a lot of people. I worked on some extracurricular projects as well; the Economic Bureau was working on its unclassified computer network at the time, one of the predecessors to OpenNet, so they had asked a couple of officers to advise on what features it needed to have from a user standpoint and a technology standpoint. I got to know the executive director of EB, whom I would work later with in Rome and HR. So it was an interesting job, although I ended up leaving it after only a year and a half, because my next assignment was going to be at the embassy in Rome, Italy; since I did not speak Italian I would have to come here to FSI around February of 1996 in order to learn Italian.

Q: Okay. What position were you going to have?

DELAWIE: I was going to be the head of the economic section at the embassy in Rome. In Rome, as there was in the other G-7 embassies at the time, there was an economic minister-counselor, who was in charge of not just the state people, but also the other economically related functions. I was to be the economic counselor, who was just in charge of the State Department people working on economic issues.

Q: And what position did Vonda get?

DELAWIE: There are actually three embassies in Rome: the bilateral embassy to Italy, which is where I was going to work; there is the embassy to the Vatican; and then there's the mission to the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, called the "FAO". Vonda got the job being deputy at the mission to the FAO. Believe it or not, and reflecting on this, after many years, it still seems strange: this was not our first choice. We were really interested in going to Kiev; that is what we put our energy into, but we just couldn't make it work; we couldn't get two jobs. So, we took Rome as a second best option, as foolish as that sounds. But we were really interested in going to someplace that at that time was on the fringe and a really interesting, challenging assignment. We saw Italy as being a place you probably couldn't screw things up no matter how badly you did. Not super challenging. But as it happened it turns out that it was a wonderful assignment despite some challenges and we had a great time there.

Q: Now, when did you arrive?

DELAWIE: The summer of 1996.

Q: So it's still the Clinton administration. You're on the economic side. What are the major things you are expecting to focus on? Because you did your consultations before you went out and I'm sure the desk and the assistant secretary gave you a couple of key things you want to be looking at.

DELAWIE: That is true. And actually I had better backtrack for a minute, because one of the trade issues I worked on in the economic bureau was bananas. So the big American banana producers like Dole and Chiquita were feeling competition in Europe from Caribbean bananas; they were a different variety, smaller than Central American bananas marketed by American companies, and they were the mainstays of several Caribbean economies that were overseas territories of EU countries. The Caribbean bananas couldn't really compete with the Central American "dollar" bananas because they were smaller and the labor costs were higher. So the EU imposed trade restrictions on dollar bananas so they were at a disadvantage for importation to Europe in favor of the Caribbean ones. There were a lot of discussions between the United States and the European Union about these, and it was not a simple issue.

DELAWIE: Certainly the American companies wanted us to persuade the Europeans to give dollar bananas free access. The European governments said, well, what should we do with the Caribbean then? Because the competition would wipe out these islands' economies. And don't forget the Caribbean is right near you. If you affect the economic livelihood of the Caribbean, you know what you're going to get in the United States, you're getting more drugs, more immigration, and so on. So while it was probably straightforward that the European Union (EU) was violating a trade commitment it had made because it hadn't reserved the banana market in the GATT, it was not unreasonable either, that doing something would have a negative effect on the United States from a knock on effect of what would happen to Caribbean economies. I don't remember exactly how it worked out, but there were certainly lots of meetings about bananas.

DELAWIE: Getting back to Italy, I did d**é**marches on bananas when I was there as the economic counselor, because that was one of the key U.S.-EU issues. And, working on EU issues, we engaged with the EU directly via our mission in Brussels, called USEU, but typically also with at least the big G-7 embassies in European Union member states, France, UK, Italy, Germany. So, I continued banana work from EB to Rome. But that was not actually the main thing I worked on there. Several issues ended up dominating my time. First of all, I was the boss of several people. We had a pretty big economic section with six or seven Americans and three or four Italian employees, Foreign Service national employees.

Q: As funny as it sounds to argue over bananas, the interesting thing is the role of the State Department in weighing how harshly we want to go after countries we have trade disputes with because of all of the exogenous factors and the other issues that come up when you are negotiating trade; it's never as simple as it sounds.

DELAWIE: Well you always have to keep in mind the law of unintended consequences. If you just look at are the Europeans discriminating against Central American bananas? Absolutely. You know, do they have a reservation on that in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade? No. Well that was pretty straight forward. The problem is, as you say, nothing's ever as simple as it seems. And you know, if you widen the compass just a little bit to say, okay, well what about the Caribbean, which is very important to the United States; you know, these economies depend on banana exports to Europe; what would we do if that were our problem to solve? Our reply was, well that's European problem; they should figure it out. The implication of our position was that the EU should somehow subsidize these economies, which was something we would never do, of course. But it was still an interesting issue.

DELAWIE: Trade always has these difficult things because if you look at carefully, you see challenges. For example, Japanese cars; most of them sold in the United States are made in the United States, with U.S. labor and billions of dollars of investment. They do import parts, typically motors and some other things from Japan. But it's not so simple. Whereas, we had a Ford escort station wagon that we got when we were in Italy. When it arrives, we see there's a "made in Mexico" label. Of course Ford is an American car company; parts of our car were made in the United States, but it was finally assembled in Mexico. Unfortunately a lot of politicians only see the bright line stuff, or their constituents only see the bright light stuff and they reflect that. It turns out things are more complicated than they seem at first glance, certainly in the area of international trade.

Q: Before we had the digression, you were delineating the key topics that you would be following.

DELAWIE: Right. So I was, first of all, I was the boss of the section that had eight or 10 people that depended on me to help them get things done. Although I'd done that in EB it's different abroad where you have more responsibility. So that was my main job. Of the issues that I was personally involved in, there was trade because I knew it best from my prior jobs. There was a big aviation negotiation with Italy during my time there, on what was called an "Open Skies" agreement. I played a big role in that. The open skies agreement basically allowed any American airline to fly to any international airport in Italy and any Italian airline to fly to any international airport in the United States without government economic regulation. There would always be safety and security regulation, but not economic regulation. Before the Open Skies Agreement, if an Italian airline like Alitalia wanted to fly to Washington or Los Angeles or whatever under the old treaty, it had to apply to the Department of Transportation for the route. And then the American carriers that were its competitors could complain about that. So ultimately there would have to be a deal where TWA or something could fly to Naples in exchange for Alitalia flying to Los Angeles. This was the framework from the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation from after WWII. All international aviation treaties were like this until the eighties and nineties. They were focused on protecting airlines, not helping passengers get to where they wanted to go.

DELAWIE: It was very statist, and it was all about protecting your airlines. So the idea of the open skies agreements was that, well, aviation services should be an industry like any other industry in the capitalist economy. And you let the companies do what they want, basically within some guardrails. And that ultimately would just be safety and security, which for the U.S. were managed by the FAA. The United States was pretty bought into this competitive system because we had had civil aviation deregulation starting in 1974 and it worked out pretty well overall because we got all these new airlines like People Express and Southwest and so on. But Europeans had to be sold on it, gradually over the course of several years. The first international Open Skies agreement was with the United Kingdom, I think.

DELAWIE: Over time, we were able to persuade European countries that it would be better for everybody if we just let their airlines fly wherever they wanted and governments got out of the business of saying Alitalia could or could not fly to Los Angeles. So during my time in Rome, that's when we had this major negotiation. And in fact, we did get the Open Skies treaty with Rome. I had a giant role in the negotiating process. There were several sessions over many months, and ultimately I would draw on contacts I had made to promote the deal.

DELAWIE: We haven't talked about in the past, but when you start in a new Foreign Service assignment, your main job is to meet people. And you meet people in the host government and the host industry, other American government people that you want to be able to work with later.

DELAWIE: So when I got to Rome, my colleagues helped craft this gigantic list of people whom I should meet. And of course some of them were in the foreign ministry, in the civil aviation authority, in Alitalia, and so on. So ultimately I participated in the delegation on this treaty negotiation. It was led by someone from the State Department, from the economic bureau. But they had to travel from Washington for meetings, and I was always there in Rome and was able to deliver messages; I would try to negotiate some compromises between big meetings. There was a public diplomacy strategy about this as well. Alitalia was a weak airline economically and the American carriers were relatively strong. So there was resistance coming from Italy for this deal in which a relatively weak Italian industry felt they could not possibly compete with a very strong American industry, which was probably true. But there were other interests even in Italy, certainly the tourism sector, that wanted more Americans to come, absolutely. They wanted these American airlines to be able to fly from everywhere in the United States, and bring more visitors. There were public interest groups that wanted the economic benefit of more flights. So we had a public diplomacy strategy trying to sell this that I worked on as well. So we negotiate off and on for several months, and so we finally get a deal. The delegations initialed the draft text, which is the first step in getting a treaty over the line.

Q: Just a quick question. I had the impression that you're negotiating with Italy, but the Open Skies agreement was for all of Europe, for the EU.

DELAWIE: Not at this time. At this time it was just Italy. Later there was a U.S. - EU Open Skies agreement, which superseded all of the bilateral treaties, but in the '90s, the aviation treaties were all bilateral. This was a legacy of what's called the Chicago Convention from 1945, which basically established parameters for how these things would work. According to the Chicago Convention, there would be bilateral treaties. So ultimately we negotiate an agreement. It's a pretty big deal for the United States. I think it's a good deal for Italy too, although Alitalia probably had a different view. So the draft treaty is initialed, and then the next step is, how do you sign it?

DELAWIE: So this is a treaty, which means it's going to have to go to the Senate for ratification, but it has to be signed first. So there's all this legal stuff that has to happen between when you get the final deal on the initial text of the treaty, and then the lawyers have to look at it and figure out what you missed. So between the initialing and the signing, this legal procedure happens. So the lawyers back in the State Department had come up with a list of issues that had to be worked out. None of these issues affect the major thrust of any of the elements of the deal, but there are a bunch of them and they feel strongly about it. So, I have to go into the foreign ministry and the Civil Aviation Authority and present these textual changes, and persuade the Italian government that it is not really as bad as it seems, although I do present them with three pages of detailed notes on language changes.

DELAWIE: In the meantime, it turns out the Italian transport minister plans to go to the United States, which is both a problem and an opportunity. The opportunity is he's going to see the American secretary of transportation; wouldn't it be great if they could sign the treaty there between them, which would help push it through and publicize it and help grease the skids in the U.S. Senate and things like that. The threat is, if we don't get these language changes done in time, who knows when the next opportunity to sign the deal will occur. I mean, our ambassador in Rome could always sign a treaty, but that would not have nearly the same amount of public impact that two ministers would. So with two weeks before the Italian Minister of transport is going to be in Washington, I go in with this three page list of legal issues.

DELAWIE: Now, fortunately we were able to work through them all, and there was a little bit of negotiation between me and between L, the Legal Bureau and the Italian equivalent that I conducted; L did not get everything they wanted, but they got enough and they were satisfied. We finished this up on Friday and the Italian transport minister is there on Monday, and so he does in fact sign the treaty, which was great. This is 20 years ago at this point, but I still remember because of the amount of effort it took in a very short amount of time to do this diplomatic work. Now, it would've happened someday. But we also had in mind that, since airlines make decisions way in advance, there was a chance at this point that if we get this done in time, the U.S. airlines could program scheduled service for the following summer season, which is when all the money in the airline business is made. So ultimately, it worked out, the deal was signed by the Secretary of Transportation and the Minister of Transportation, and ultimately the treaty gets turned around in the senate pretty quickly, and comes into force. And it is in fact just

in time, and in fact the week after the treaty was attested, which is where the president says, okay, here's the deal, after the Senate has passed it, three U.S. airlines applied for new routes literally within a week for the following summer. The airlines told me that this was at the far end of their ability to make changes, because they have to plan these things so far in advance. Anyway, that was very gratifying. This is one of the things where I would get the ambassador to help and to go see a minister; it was not just me; you go as far as you can and then you bring in the bigger guns when you need help.

DELAWIE: That's the way it works in foreign policy. The issues of dispute during this whole process were not highly technical, so the issues were something you could teach an ambassador, so he could be helpful. This issue was a big learning experience, since this was the first time I really engaged with the press, because we were trying to sell this deal publicly in Italy. I made a couple of mistakes in off the record interviews. But I learned from them.

DELAWIE: Regarding other major issues, there were sanctions on Iran, a perennial; we spent a lot of time regarding Italian business interests in Iran; we didn't like it. Intellectual property rights, a challenge everywhere, even Italy. Patents, trademarks, copyrights.

Q: Was there a particular sector or sectors in intellectual property rights? Was it motion pictures and music?

DELAWIE: I think at the time it was music CDs. They were relatively easy to knock off at the time. And there are all these flea markets in Italy even today, where people would sell knock off CDs. We did a lot of macroeconomic reporting. We had a serious FSO economist doing the macro reporting, the same job I had done in Turkey. At this time the Euro was on the horizon. And the big question in Europe was, would Italy be in the Euro or not? Would unending turbulence in the Italian economy, or the deficits in the budget, keep Italy out of the Euro, because especially Germany felt very strongly about the macro economic significance of government deficits in Italy.

DELAWIE: Of course, Italy had a tremendous government budget deficit, some 200 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). A lot of Germans didn't want Italy in the club. So they would come up with these benchmarks, limiting budget deficits to some percent of GDP and a couple of others. I remember everybody in our northern European embassies was pretty sure Italy couldn't possibly make the benchmarks. It was very interesting to the United States. We got a lot of requests from Washington for ideas on what was going to happen. So we did a fair amount of macroeconomic reporting on this. This was before the Internet, mostly, and most of the news that was interesting to the U.S. Government came from embassies, not from the Wall Street Journal. Italy did of course eventually get over the benchmarks and it's in the Euro today.

Q: A general macroeconomic question about Italy. So much of its economy is in the quote gray market. Its official deficit is some 200% of GDP, but to the extent you could measure the gray market, did that have some effect on how the final decision was made?

Because as I understand it, like a third of the Italian economy is gray market and you know, never enters the tax and audit and so on trails.

DELAWIE: Clearly that was true. Some of the people arguing for Italy's inclusion in the Euro would make that exact argument. Their economy is really far bigger than the government statistics show because of this huge gray market element. And if you include the gray market, then, you know, Italy makes the cut. Of course, every country's got some gray market, even if it's not as big as Italy's, so I didn't think that was a great argument, but certainly there was an element of truth. But the Italian government got really serious, and the parliament got serious about deficit spending. I thought it was a tremendous accomplishment; they took it seriously. The Romano Prodi government took it very seriously. If you read back and look at stuff from the '90s, you always read that Italy had some 50 governments during the post war period, on average one per year. Which of course was true. But the Prodi government lasted years and it was very serious; and Prodi was a serious guy, later was head of the EU.

DELAWIE: I thought they did a really good job in managing this element. There are still Italian economic challenges today, but the question at the time was, are we going to be in Europe or not? Obviously not geographically because they were, but economically. So it was pretty easy to get much of the population behind the government on supporting this, even though there were costs. But everybody wanted to be part of Europe, and that gave the parliament and the government the kind of backing they needed to make some hard decisions. In getting anything done politically where you need popular support, framing the issue the right way is key.

DELAWIE: There was a lot of trouble in the Balkans at the time. This is the nineties, of course. Yugoslavia had started to fall apart early in the '90s, and continued to suffer basically until the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. There were other problems there as well. Albania had started to fall apart too; Enver Hoxha had died, and the country was recovering from communism. Albania had a couple of million people with no experience in the western world; it was the most isolated country in Europe. And people who lived there did not really understand how economies work.

Q: And they start with that Ponzi scheme that impoverishes a huge number of people.

DELAWIE: Exactly. And well, where is Italy? It's right across the Adriatic from Albania. And can you get to Italy from Albania? Absolutely. So there was a migration crisis. Actually there had been a historic Albanian population in Italy called Arbresh for hundreds of years and they still spoke medieval Albanian, so they could even communicate with Albanian Albanians.

DELAWIE: So Albania is falling apart. It's a humanitarian disaster. It's a potential terrorism disaster because the government stops controlling weapons depots. So people wander in and take AK-47s and hand-grenades and things like that from the weapons depots. It is a mess. And of course, Italy cares a lot about it, perhaps mostly because of

the threat of immigration from Albania. So we do a lot of démarching and working with Italy on options. So that was my first exposure to Balkans issues.

Q: Albania was a problem. How did it impact on your work?

DELAWIE: Basically we were dealing in the economic section with the humanitarian crisis issue because the political section would have to deal with the foreign policy aspects. We were coordinating, how do we help from an economic standpoint, from an aid standpoint, basically. So we talked with the foreign ministry and its aid agency section about coordinating efforts in Albania. I think the bigger problem was the political problem and the political section handled that part. But it was interesting and it was the first time I'd really worked on the Balkans, which is mostly why I brought it up.

DELAWIE: I was in Italy for four years. I worked on lots of things. I'm just trying to pick out the most interesting things to talk about. Another big thing we worked on, which seems kind of comical at this point, but we spent so much time on it was the Y2K computer bug problem. We did reporting, we did advocacy. We talked with people in key industries and in the government. Our goal was to energize the Italian government to take the issue seriously so that they would encourage companies. It was a mostly private sector problem because companies had computers. Computers ran elevators or ran airplanes or trains, serious things. Our goal was to persuade the Italian government to energize the private sector and work in the problem in its own computer systems as well.

DELAWIE: There was a Y2K czar for the U.S. government who came out to Italy a couple times and spoke at conferences. This was a tremendous effort in the U.S. government for 1998 and 1999. And it fell to us in the econ section, because it involved numbers somehow, to manage the issue. Zero and one I guess. But, anyway, it was interesting and one of our economic officers was the main person on the issue, but I was very involved as well. So we spent a lot of time on it and we did a lot of telegram reporting on the record about conversations we had, as well as doing analysis about what might happen in Italy. The U.S. government, the intelligence agencies mostly, thought that Italy was going to be a disaster and on January 1, 2000, the country would fall apart because of the bug. We were talking with a lot of experts; of course there were Italian computer experts as well, just as in the United States. Italy is an advanced country, after all. These experts were telling us it's going to be a challenge in some areas, but for the following reasons it's not going to be a horrible disaster. So we were reporting this of course. The way State Department telegrams worked is that you had to say who classified them. I was the head of the section, so most of these cables on Y2K went out saying they were classified by Greg Delawie, economic counselor.

DELAWIE: So this issue is a big deal, one of those two dozen issues that we work on constantly, and it becomes a bigger deal as the end of 1999 approaches. So in the fall of 1999, the new deputy chief of mission had just arrived; his name was William Pope. Shortly after his arrival he gets a call from one of the three-letter agencies back here in Washington saying why is this Greg Delawie saying everything is going to be all right? We know Italy's going to fall apart and you guys have gone native. You have to be more

serious. You have to have disaster plans and you have to work harder on the Italians and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. So the DCM had only arrived a month or two before; so I did not know him well, and of course he did not really know me. He calls me up to his office and asks, why do you think this way? We had a very detailed conversation; I think it was important that I had real facts. I had been working on these issues with the econ officer for over a year. I knew it really well. And as I mentioned earlier, I partly paid my way through college by doing computer programming. So I was completely comfortable with the technical aspects of the issue.

DELAWIE: So I explained to the DCM why I thought what I did and why our analysis was likely to be correct. I guess I was persuasive because the DCM, who didn't really know me, decided, all right, we'll let it ride, and that he would call back these agencies and say chill. So he did. I have always been grateful for the confidence he showed in me during that time. A few days later I wrote the summary of a Y2K reporting cable I said I would send on January 2nd and I gave it to him. Well, of course we kept reporting and advocating with the government, with the industry, and things like that. And, we had a task force on December 31st set up at the embassy that was just Bill, the econ officer, and a couple of FSNs; the plan was they would work through the night and monitor the press and see what happens.

DELAWIE: I felt kind of bad about that, but Bill wanted to do that himself. This was also the turn of the millennium, 2000, so there was a big party, of course, in Rome. So anyway, poor Bill and a couple of FSNs were closeted in the embassy, and all the rest of us at the embassy were on the roof of some building, watching fireworks 365 degrees around, as Italy and Rome celebrated the new millennium. So of course nothing bad happened. There were no disasters. And we did in fact use the draft cable summary I had written in October in our January 2 report on what happened on Italy in the computer field on January 1st, which is nothing important. It was just another day.

Q: Did you get an award for this? Because you're doing something really rather important and you're making an important prediction and a prediction that has application to reach through the entire U.S. government. I would have thought that you might get an award for it.

DELAWIE: Bill, the action officer, got a well-deserved reward; it was mostly his work; I was just the boss supporting him. I got an award for the Open Skies agreement, which was the same general time period. There are only so many awards people can get. But it was one of these tremendous efforts. Now did we make a difference in the year and a half advocating on this? Who knows? You don't know.

DELAWIE: You can't look all the way down that stream of every company and every ministry that you approached. But at least we could feel good that we'd made the prediction correctly. You never know what would have happened otherwise, unfortunately, because the world changed from whatever you did. But it was a really interesting issue to work on, to learn about, and to advocate in favor of the U.S. view.

DELAWIE: In the Foreign Service, you have to advocate for stuff all the time. And some of it you believe in, and other stuff you don't, but you do it anyway because that's the job. But this was pretty straight forward. Who's in favor of the world falling apart? Not me. So it was a good issue to advocate on and it was interesting. It was completely new. Before this came up in the government in 1997, '98, nobody, nobody in the policy world had thought of this as being a problem.

Q: A humorous question. Every country including the U.S. had their nuts saying the world will end at year 2000. Were there any big kind of nutty things in Italy like that? Prophets of doom, and so on?

DELAWIE: Not that I remember.

Q: Well that would be consistent with the Italian national character that, you know, they're not prone to prophets of doom.

DELAWIE: So those are some of the main issues that I remember that we worked on when I was in Italy. I should say a couple of other things. During this time period the U.S. Information Agency was folded into the State Department. It became public diplomacy. Certainly in Rome, as probably in almost all the rest of the embassies around the world this was not so much a big deal because everybody in State and USIA worked together anyway. The DCM had a reception welcoming the PD officers and FSNs into the State Department, which was very nice, I thought. We had a little working group, but the main issues were dealt with by management. How do you combine the budget accounting into the rest of the State Department. From a people standpoint, and getting public diplomacy out the door, and engaging with the press and the cultural issues and things like that, it was not that big a deal in my memory. I did a lot of public diplomacy as one of the policy officers, and I was close friends with the PD officers and there was not a lot of complaining.

DELAWIE: When you look at embassy Rome, you have to comment on it being about the most beautiful embassy in the world. Because it's a palace from the 19th century of Queen Margherita, the widow of the Italian king, that the US government acquired after World War II; it is an incredibly beautiful building. It was decorated for a queen, so there's a main floor where the ambassador and DCM sit called the piano nobile. It has this incredible artwork on the ceiling called chiaroscuro. Like so many buildings in Italy it's just like walking into a museum, just seeing the art, the architecture, decorating the building. The ambassador's office had been the ballroom, the DCM's office was in a dining room or something.

DELAWIE: The compound is in the heart of Rome. So it had been an important place during the age of the Roman Empire. There were archaeological findings there. Every once in a while they would have to do some kind of digging and they would always find something underground. When you're fixing the sewer or something. So there is a crypto portico under part of the GSO section. There's all this art that we bought along with the

building. I heard at one point that Embassy Rome had something like half the value of the State Department art around the world. A lot of that was this one statue by a Michelangelo follower named Giambologna, which had been in the grand entrance of the building. There was this two-level entrance and there were niches up on the second floor, and there were statues in all of them. The story, from well before my time, is, there was some Italian art historian visiting one day and just looking at all the stuff; he says, you know, that one statue there is not like any of these others, which are just knock offs of old Greek statues, which Rome is full of. So he said, you should take that down and get someone to look at it. And the embassy did, and it turned out it was a sculpture by this Giambologna guy who's a renowned Flemish sculptor, a follower of Michelangelo. It turned out to be fabulously valuable.

DELAWIE: It had just been in the niche, where you had to look carefully to see it; how it got there, I don't know. Basically we bought the building with its contents, and the statue was already there. But I think the embassy, the State Department made a really good decision, once they figured out what they had. They took the statue out of the niche where no one could see it, and they had it cleaned up, then placed it in a spot in the entrance that was visible from the outside through the windows. So people walking down the street could look and see in the US embassy this exquisite example of Italian cultural heritage, which I thought was very smart; it was a concrete demonstration that we valued their heritage. Of course, as I said, it happened well before I ever got there. But I think it's a terrific story.

Q: What you say about the architecture even without the art inside, when you go to see the palaces that the wealthy Venice families put together on the mainland, a few miles away from the harbor, even with nothing in them. They're unbelievably beautiful, right? And they're not gigantic either. They're small palaces, but every single staircase, every element is really remarkable.

DELAWIE: It was neat to live in Rome. We lived in a neighborhood called Parioli, which was about a 20 minute walk to the Embassy, or a 20 minute drive. So typically we walked unless it was raining. We were in a real Italian neighborhood, in an apartment, not in a compound. There were challenges during my time there, regarding some interpersonal issues. I was upset about this on occasion for a while. And then I said to myself, well, you know what, when I walk out of the embassy in the evening, I'm in Rome. Let's try to have some perspective here. So I gained perspective and I coped with my challenges and I recognized that I was still in Rome and the challenges ultimately got resolved. My wife and I both extended our assignments to four years and we ended up leaving for Washington in the summer of 2000.

Q: Okay. So today is March 14th. We're resuming our interview with Greg Delawie at the end of his tour in Rome. We are talking about language designated posts and how he was doing with his Italian.

DELAWIE: Over the course of my tour in Rome, my Italian got much better; I had a lot more fluency. No one would confuse me with a native speaker, but I could say pretty much whatever I wanted and be understood. This really came home to me when I was doing a farewell call on a senior official of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, with whom I had a difficult relationship because our countries were in different positions on several issues, and I was always having to go in and make tough démarches on him. And so after four years, I went in to say goodbye to the director general and he asked a hypothetical question, about what would it take for us to agree on X. As in many Indo-European languages, as soon as you get into hypothetical questions, you have to go into the subjunctive mood, which is almost extinct in English. And by that point I was perfectly comfortable using that construct, which is not trivial in Italian because of all the irregular verbs they have. So we talked for a while about this hypothetical and he says, well, Mr. Delawie, I'm not sure that we've agreed about too much during your time here, but I could tell you your Italian is terrific. Theoretically, of course I wish I could have persuaded him to agree to U.S. policy and things, but at least as the second best, it was good to hear that he thought my Italian was better.

Q: Okay. Now you're mentioning that with working with this particular trade ministry official, you have to deliver and explain difficult démarches. Could you give an example of what that was like?

DELAWIE: We had several difficult issues to discuss; there was the airplane issue that I talked about earlier, the Boeing-Airbus dispute. There were bananas. There were aircraft engines. There were all sorts of things where we disagreed with the European Union at this time. And of course we made démarches to at least the big EU countries like Italy about all these things. I learned during my time in Rome that it's my job to deliver a message. It doesn't have to be a message that the recipient is going to like. It's not my job to get them to like the message; it's my job to deliver the message and, if possible, to persuade them to agree with me. Sometimes you're successful, sometimes you're not. I've just been reading Bill Burns' new book, called *The Back Channel*, where he quotes Henry Kissinger along the lines that diplomacy is a practice where you have many small successes. So we talked about bananas of course, constantly, because it was a big US-EU dispute. I would go in and say things like, look, you know, it is obvious that the EU policy is inconsistent with the EU's WTO obligations; Italy has no foreign colonies, no particular ties to the Caribbean; Italy has no vested interest in bananas. But, if the United States brings a WTO case against the EU, first of all, it will win, because the inconsistency is obvious, and secondly, if there's any retaliation authorized by the WTO, you cannot expect that Italy will be left out of that. This is a tough message in diplomacy. It's a threat. You don't use that word but it's clearly a threat.

DELAWIE: I practiced this for the next 20 years of my career as well; when you deliver a message, you don't get angry unless you decide you have to. And then it's a decision, not an emotion. You deliver things very clearly and without emotion, and make sure that the recipient understands the message. But if you are not delivering hard messages, clearly, you're not doing your job. You're not serving the United States, and are not serving the State Department. You're not serving the American people. I think a lot of

people misunderstand what diplomacy is all about. They think it's about being nice to people. No. Diplomacy is about achieving your objectives; your objectives aren't always agreeing with someone. I would frequently, in Italy and in my subsequent assignments, be in a position of having to deliver a tough message.

DELAWIE: You go in, you do your best. You do not get emotional because that would give the recipient a way out of a difficult conversation. You want to have the difficult conversation. You don't want to fly off the handle and then let the recipients say oh well, Delawie's just mad. So, that has always been my system since then. I certainly used it many times; certainly in my last couple of assignments I was "Mr. Difficult Message" most of the time. I think I learned a lot there because this was my first real leadership job abroad in Italy as head of the Econ section.

Q: In the famous "getting to yes", the practice of doing the sometimes difficult things, it sounds like as difficult as the message was, you nevertheless used tools and expressions to demonstrate why the U.S. position would be good for Italy or you anticipated where Italy's positions would reply and you tried to reduce the logic of what their replies would be, for example, in demonstrating that Italy had no colonies, they have no major interests, why are they holding such strong position, et cetera, et cetera. How would the typical reply come back to you after a difficult démarche like this?

DELAWIE: Sometimes they would say they would think about it, basically. Other times they would just say, look, we're supporting France and the UK on bananas because they support us on Parmesan cheese or whatever. In this particular instance, I don't remember the reply; sometimes your effort works, sometimes it doesn't.

Q: Okay. The other really salient thing is how much you learned about leadership and using the tools of diplomacy in this job. Would you say that this experience was useful for you in future jobs when you had even more difficult situations to deal with?

DELAWIE: Absolutely. When I was in Croatia several years later, I was talking about alleged war criminals that needed to be arrested and prosecuted. And that's a whole different level of difficulty than bananas. Bananas was a trade issue; no one lives or dies. But war criminals, it's a lot more salient. I can't live the other life where I didn't do this in Rome, but I can certainly say that having had this experience where I had to deliver difficult messages, even if it was just on bananas or Iran sanctions, it would have been harder for me to do that in my subsequent assignments where I had to talk about life and death issues. You learn constantly being a Foreign Service officer, if you're doing it right – and of course most people are – you're creating experience over the course of your career that you will be applying when you get to more senior levels. You can't expect someone fresh off the visa line to be able to do this type of stuff. But after a couple of assignments, doing progressively harder things, you could do that.

Q: At any time in Rome, since you were mentioning the trade disputes, did you have to deal with Congress as well as the executive in terms of demonstrating that you were doing everything you could to advance the US position?

DELAWIE: We certainly had a lot of CODELs in Italy; for some reason it's a very popular place for CODELs. But other than taking Congresspeople to meetings and meeting them at the airport and taking them on tourism outings and things like that, it was not my role.

Q: Okay, great. All right. So as you're completing then, the tour in Rome, what are you and your spouse thinking about in terms of the next assignment?

DELAWIE: In the meantime we'd had another child. So now we have two children. Halfway through our tour in Rome our son was born while we were on home leave.

DELAWIE: I basically bid on DCM jobs, small post DCM jobs. I had been promoted before I got to Rome to the FS-01 level. And I did not think those were out of reach. It did not work. I did not get any of them. I was on some DCM lists, but I didn't get the jobs. So I wanted to do something different. I was sick of bananas, I was tired of doing econ stuff; it was time to do something else. So I bid on a bunch of different things, many of which I wasn't really qualified for. But I did bid on the career development office in HR, human resources. So, I got the job as a CDO, career development officer, for mid-level economic officers. I mentioned last time that I had done this promotion panel a few years before and I thought it was really interesting experience. So I figured I may as well dip my whole foot into the management side of the State Department for a while, as opposed to just my toe on the promotion panel.

DELAWIE: So we left Rome, and even though we were there for four years, that did not seem like enough time to spend there. But you know, that's the way to Foreign Service is. You have to leave places you like. We moved back to our house in Alexandria, and I started in the CDA mid-level office, HR/CDA/ML.

Q: What position did your wife take?

DELAWIE: This was in 2000. She took the job of deputy director of the Scandinavia/Baltic office in the European Bureau. By this time the Baltic states had declared independence from the Soviet Union, which no longer existed. The office had Scandinavia, Iceland and the Baltic states.

Q: You're starting in the fall of 2000.

DELAWIE: Yes. I was actually not in it very long, but it was an interesting job. I learned a lot. I had about 400 clients, basically all of the FS-02 econ officers. I was there from August to around May of the following year. When I arrived in CDA I didn't know anything about HR stuff other than the little bits you pick up along the way in the Foreign Service.

DELAWIE: So I had a lot to learn, and as I was learning things, I realized that many of the HR things that were useful to me might be useful to my clients as well, even if not in

the same level of detail. So I started an email list of all my clients, and every week or so, I would just send them a note. Such as, this is what's going on in the HR world that you might care about. It became very popular. People liked it a lot. Because it was never too long, maybe just a couple sentences about three or four topics.

DELAWIE: If you care a little bit, read the email. If you care a lot, you ask additional questions.

Q: Could you give an example of the kind of thing that that might be of interest to your 400?

DELAWIE: At the time there was a concern that people were not doing their fair share of time in hardship posts. And one of the collateral responsibilities I had in that office was to be the fair share Guru. They divided up these little issues and gave a couple to each CDO. So I got the fair share thing. There was some discussion within HR about whether the fair share bidding rules were tough enough? Obviously there's a lot of HR you can't talk to everyone about, but there are some things you can talk with people about and you can tell them about things that are under consideration.

DELAWIE: Also, there was a new electronic bid system that was being installed at the time, so this is how it's going to work. Or how do you get copies of your personnel file? Just little things like that. Every week or two I'd send out one of these things to all my clients, and typically I would get a handful of responses, just thanks sometimes, others with questions. This became pretty popular. Then the bidding season started, right around the time I arrived. Bids were due around Columbus Day. I would get tons of questions. How do I do this? Am I competitive for that? Of course, I just got to the office. I didn't really know anything. But you do what FSOs do, you talk to other people, you learn stuff, you try to be helpful as you can. So I learned an awful lot. Now, it's an HR paradigm that you spend 80% of your time on 20% of your people. Because a lot of people get jobs fine; they don't really need you. But there are people that do have problems. Sometimes it's their own problems; like, they can't get along with other people, which is the biggest problem we have in the Foreign Service.

DELAWIE: But other times it's something that came up through no fault of their own, but still it has an impact on them, like a child loses a medical clearance for example. That can end up taking an awful lot of time, especially if the person is already overseas. Certainly the kid has got to come back and probably the employee will want to come back too. How do you deal with that? This type of problem always seems to happen at the wrong time of year when, you know, most jobs are already filled, or maybe even filled for the coming summer as well. So, you end up spending your time helping those people that need help sometimes due to their own problems, and sometimes due to things that just happened to them.

DELAWIE: The next big thing that happens is, after the promotion lists come out in the fall, sometime around Columbus Day, people are wondering why they weren't promoted, so they call their CDO and ask can you look at my file? Can you tell me what you think?

Q: Is there any connection between the CDO and any knowledge gained from the evaluation procedure because, as you mentioned earlier, I thought they're pretty hived off.

DELAWIE: The evaluation procedure, the EER, is managed by a separate HR office, HR/PE, performance evaluation. Typically the CDOs would look at people's EERs only on request of the employee. You couldn't look if the bureau they are bidding on wants to know how are the EERs; the EERs belong to the employee and the promotion panel, no one else. So people did ask, why wasn't I promoted? The easy answer is, well, there are a lot more good people than there are opportunities for promotion, which is the true answer as well. The Foreign Service does not generally recruit poor performers. As I said last time, there is a bell curve and some people certainly do a better job than others, but the standard is pretty high and the peak of that bell curve is way far to the right compared with most other organizations.

DELAWIE: So there are not a lot of really poor performing FSOs. But nevertheless, promotion panels need to pick who theoretically is most likely to serve at the next higher level and do a good job there. People ask their CDOs to look at their EER files and give them advice; now, this is not a straightforward request, because, unlike the promotion panel, the CDO has not read all 400 files, so does not have a standard of comparison. But of course, you want to be as helpful as you can. So I talked with more experienced CDOs and the office director before I started to do this because I wanted to have more than just an opinion; I wanted to at least have an educated opinion. From the advice I got, and used, there were a couple of things that stood out. One is you don't talk about the employee, you talk about the file.

DELAWIE: So you don't say you did a bad job here. You say, look, the file indicates that there was an issue at this point. Now you can say, all right, well what's the difference? Which is a fair question; there's not a practical difference, but it's a lot easier to talk with someone about problems on a piece of paper than problems with them. It's just like regular diplomatic work; you convey the message in a way that is most likely to be received positively. If it's perceived that you're attacking someone, your message is not going to be received really well. So you still have to be a diplomat, even if you're doing just purely internal HR stuff in the State Department. So you talk about the file, you talk about examples of performance in the file.

DELAWIE: I have read a lot of EERs that talk too much about general things, or a person's personality as opposed to what they actually did. You often saw things like, "Ms. X was really good at doing A and B and C" and then it stops there and moves on to some other topic. So I would say, you need to encourage your boss to talk about A; why was it hard? Why did the resolution of A depend on your work? You can't expect that the people on the promotion panel will necessarily know the context to help them understand why this performance was exceptional. Why was it hard to accomplish the goal, and why it was important to the United States?

I mean some of these things should be obvious, but often people don't consider them properly. Of course, most people hate writing EERs; I certainly did. It's kind of a paradox: people both take too much time on them, and don't give them the attention they deserve. Often there aren't the kind of concrete examples about what the employee did, what they actually accomplished. why it was not easy, how it contributed to the United States and the goals of the State Department. This was a great opportunity for me to read a bunch of EERs from people; I saw good; I saw bad. I learned for myself, for the future, how I can most effectively support the people that work for me. So that was interesting.

DELAWIE: I was pretty active in this office, but I still didn't feel like I was always working full time. I knew one of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries (DAS) in HR from my prior assignment; I told her I had some time on my hands, so if there was anything she needed done, let me know. I like to be busy. So I ended up working, from that conversation, on a new award that still exists today called the Director General's Award for Impact and Originality in Reporting. The DG at the time wanted an award for reporting.

Q: Okay. Very quick question on the award. How did it come up? What would, what would you get if you won the award?

DELAWIE: Some money and a certificate, and of course, an indication in your EER file. So the DG wanted to recognize people who did a good job at the core diplomatic functions of reporting and analysis; there are lots of awards for employees, but there was not one for this function. By the time the requirement got to me, the HR leadership had already decided to do this, so I don't know the backstory. But the specific requirements for the award, the nominating process, the FAM citation, et cetera, all had to be figured out. This was new territory for me, so I read all the FAM citations for other awards, and talked with the performance evaluation office that runs awards and did other background research.

DELAWIE: I drafted language describing what the award was really for, the criteria for winning the award, how people would be nominated, all these details. Some were pretty straightforward, to try to match other performance awards like for management officers; others were specific to this particular issue. Putting together the award was not really heavy lifting; it required some detailed work, but not really a lot of time; certainly my clients did not suffer from my being distracted. But this whole process was interesting and also brought me in contact with a lot of other people in the HR bureau. So the next year rolls around, 2001 when the Bush administration comes in, and Marc Grossman leaves as Director General (DG), and Ruth A. Davis is nominated to succeed him. By the spring, the head of the office of policy coordination, HR/PC, had moved on to another assignment unexpectedly, leaving a hole. It was the wrong time of year; basically everybody set for transfer in the summer had already been assigned somewhere and there was really no one available who was unassigned that they wanted for that job.

DELAWIE: Based on my experience working on this little award issue, one of the DASes recommended I be considered for the PC director. So I had an interview with the

incoming principal DAS and incoming DG, and they hired me for the job. Ultimately there was going to be a whole new team of DASes coming to the HR front office, so it was a little unclear exactly what this job was going to focus on, other than its core functions of labor-management relations, congressional and public relations for the HR Bureau and the annual program plan. But it turns out the new team, the Director General and the principal DAS wanted someone to ensure that policy priorities were followed up on and moving ahead smartly. Colin Powell was secretary of state, and he wanted to make fundamental improvements in the way the state Department took care of its people. This was new for the State Department. The DG wanted to be sure that the bureau was responding to both the secretary's desires and its 50,000 employees. Now, of course in the bureau there were staff assistants to follow up on memos and cables, like any other bureau. But the DG wanted someone to pay close attention to the key policy priorities that HR was trying to execute, and to intervene quickly if things started to go wrong. And that turned out to be one of my roles.

Q: Speaking of promotions and so on, this job sounds like an OC job; had you been promoted to OC?

DELAWIE: The policy coordination job was an OC job at the time. I had not been promoted; I was still an FS-01. There was a senior cede. If the director general wants you for a job, it kind of happens, right? For good or for bad. Anyway, it was a small office.

Q: The only other thing I want to ask, is as you go into the job it's a little bit scary when you go in without an absolutely clear set of responsibilities, where there's this notion that you will set to a certain extent your own responsibilities. Did you have any trepidations on that account or did you feel pretty confident you knew how the bureau operated and how much time and attention you would need for each of your follow-up issues?

DELAWIE: It was a little intimidating. But I felt I had instant rapport with the principal DAS, Ruth Whiteside; she promised her support in making me successful, and she delivered multiple times while I was in the office. But remember, I've only been in HR for 10 months at this time. I really only knew the Foreign Service assignments process well. There was a whole other range of State Department issues, including all about the Civil Service, performance evaluation, and discipline and all of these things that I just had basically no experience with. And I was very conscious of that. I think it's important to know what you know, but is more important to know what you don't know and to not freelance about that. So I approached this as a new Foreign Service assignment, like I'm going to a new country. I needed to start meeting people, to figure out what's going on.

DELAWIE: I certainly did that, in the HR bureau, so I spent time meeting with all the HR offices. I took a class here at FSI on Civil Service personnel rules, which I knew nothing about it. It was definitely an education. There were lots of important things going on. One of the big things Colin Powell wanted to do was not just demonstrate the State Department was taking better care of its employees; he wanted to hire a whole bunch more people too. So HR started the diplomatic readiness initiative, DRI, to increase staffing in both the FS and CS, and then they hired an FSO named Niels Marquardt to run

it. Niels assembled a team of people who started to look at all the challenges about hiring Foreign Service officers and Civil Service employees as well. Some of these challenges had never been looked at carefully. At the State Department we're good at making assumptions about stuff without data; and that certainly was the case on hiring issues. Because Niels and his team started to break down every step of the hiring process, from when someone decides he wants to take the Foreign Service exam, what happens next, someone passes the test, goes to the next stage and then gets a conditional offer, then goes to the security clearance, goes to medical clearance and finally walks into the door at A-100. And that's two and a half years typically at this time. So everybody blames Diplomatic Security: it takes forever to do the security clearance, that's the problem. Well that was part of the problem, but after analysis it became apparent that there were a whole bunch of other problems too, including several problems that were within the HR bureau.

DELAWIE: I helped support this team. The DRI was their job mostly, but I helped, because I had to explain it to congress and the press whenever questions came up. It turns out when we really looked at all the steps, there were a lot of things that could be improved. So, they set about improving them, things that were in their control. I helped with things that were not in their control so much. So we really started attacking the hiring problem. The first thing is, what was the budget to advertise for the Foreign Service exam? Powell's jaw hit the floor when he was told it was $75,000 a year, which basically paid for one ad in *the Economist*, and that was it. So he put a lot more money behind this.

DELAWIE: There hadn't been a real recruiting internet site before. We hired consultants. We asked how do we appeal to the type of people we were looking for? How do we get more women, how do we get more minorities? How do we make the Foreign Service look like America? There were some false starts, but there were a lot of positives. When you looked at real data, you could tell where some of the problems were. And there were some hard questions, especially related to the minority recruitment effort; for example, should we put more focus on recruiting at minority-oriented colleges, or at bigger schools that were doing a good job getting minorities in their own doors. This was an important question as we decided where to put diplomats in residence.

DELAWIE: You can deal with these issues once you really understand what they are and what real data shows. But just working from assumptions without analysis based on facts is not a strategy for success. So all of these discussions were going on and I had a part of it all, although it was mostly the DRI crowd. Then we had run up against the money problem. If you want to hire more people, it costs money. Where's the money come from? Well, regarding the State Department budget at this time, we were still in the post-Cold War trough where people said that because the Soviet Union did not exist anymore, the State Department really didn't need as much money because so much of that was spent trying to counter the Soviet Union. Now people were beginning to understand during this timeframe that actually the world became more complex after the Soviet Union collapsed rather than less, so we therefore needed more State Department rather than less. So it wasn't exactly a completely uphill battle; but Powell led this effort to get

another hundred million dollars in the budget to hire more people in the State Department.

Q: Did it become easier to get more money after 9/11?

DELAWIE: I believe it did, but I don't know how much was that and how much was that we have this guy who is respected across the United States as secretary of state. He'd been National Security Advisor, of course for Reagan, as well as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was not just a policy wonk. He was recognized as a leader. He grew up in the army culture; when you read his book, you learn lessons that he learned along the way about how to be a leader. So he was widely respected and he went to Congress and started making the case for more money for the State Department. Of course it was incumbent on the rest of us in the department, to support that and not screw things up and make stupid mistakes that would make the State Department look bad, which we are very, very good at.

DELAWIE: In my office we had some very energetic junior people; I was the only Foreign Service officer, everyone else was a Civil Service employee. One of the things we did was to put together a written version of the case for hiring more people for the State Department. So that was our major chunk of the DRI. Powell wanted more money, not just for hiring people, but for everything. For building new embassies and making them more secure and modernizing passports and all these different things. That was not my problem. My problem was just how do we support the hiring initiative in Congress. And so we ended up doing a little book, called the diplomatic readiness initiative brochure. There were about 24 pages; it described what the State Department was all about, because plenty of people in Congress didn't really understand. Then, what human resources challenges existed, and all the gaps at the embassies because there were not enough people in the State Department. The challenge of getting people ready to fill these jobs, because you can't just send someone, you have to teach them the language, you have to train them, you have to do all these things. So if you've got a hundred jobs to do, you need about 140 people to fill those jobs because of this kind of training float you have to have. That's the way the military does things. We were able to draw on Powell's military experience and that of the people he brought with him like the Undersecretary for Management Grant Green and Deputy Secretary Armitage were also former military people and we were able to draw on their experience regarding how the military manages its people and how can we do it better.

Q: A quick question. As you're describing the process, you're talking mostly about what you need to prove to Congress. Did you need to spend a lot of time also proving it to OMB, to the Executive's decision-makers on how much money each department gets?

DELAWIE: Absolutely. Because OMB controls the budget that's submitted to Congress. And they had always been skeptical about the State Department. So we had to work with the OMB analysts and prove as best we could for something that was going to happen in the future, that we had things under control now, even if we hadn't had them under control in the past. Also, that if we got this extra money, this was how we were going to

spend it. We had to come up with a plan looking one, two years ahead. That was stuff that we had to do in the HR bureau; Powell led the way. But all of us in HR had to follow behind and build up the kind of castle he envisioned. It was tough because the State Department had failed to execute on a lot of things in the past; we had to persuade the OMB that we were different people, and we were going to get this stuff done. We had to approach these conversations like we were démarching a foreign government. As U/S Grant Green said at one point "you just have to see these people every week. Half of success is whether they like you or not."

DELAWIE: So we did that. I had one incredible Civil Service employee named Laura who came in to the State Department as an arms control wonk. Marc Grossman, when he was DG, he brought her into this office; she wanted to do something more concrete. Being a junior arms control wonk was not ideal because all the real decisions were made at a high level. Anyway, she was in the office when I got there; she was very energetic, very tech savvy and good with math as well as policy arguments. Laura was the main person talking with OMB about all these things. She did an incredible job; there was almost no HR budget question she couldn't answer off the top of her head in these meetings. And when she couldn't, she would always get back to them quickly. Because you should never leave something hanging with OMB.

DELAWIE: Then we would talk with congressional committees. That's the way most of our work was done. We didn't talk with Congresspeople so much; we talked with the staffers on the Appropriations Committees and the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Most people in politics and OMB wanted what Powell wanted for the State Department. Not everybody, because some people just didn't want the State Department to spend money. But most people wanted to help Powell be successful. So that wasn't the real problem. Everybody respected him. People wanted him to be able to do a good job and they wanted to support State. The problem was they doubted that we could execute. Because obviously the Secretary of State is not going to personally execute a million little things; he has to rely on a bunch of people. So the difficulty was persuading both OMB and Congress that we could deliver on our promises.

Q: Is there one promise in particular? They kept coming back to and saying, let's see, you didn't do this. Why should we give you more money?

DELAWIE: I don't remember exactly. So we did our little brochure about state HR needs. We posted it on the Internet. We delivered it to every single senator and every congressperson. It's glossy, it looks like a magazine. We wanted to have examples but not a whole lot of prose. We wanted you to be able to turn to page seven and find out something interesting without having to read pages one through six first. So we had lots of nice pictures, people in embassies or in the State Department or whatever. We had call outs, anecdotes, and then of course there were numbers. This is how much money we need and this is what we're going to do with it; because if you're asking for money, you have to put that in there.

DELAWIE: We talked about some of the challenges that we'd have to overcome, but that we were on course. So it was educational, but we wrote it to be read, or at least thumbed through. We didn't try to answer every question because we knew that if people really had questions, they would come to us and we would answer them. The brochure was more of a, why is the State Department important, why is foreign policy important? It takes people to do foreign policy. There is no way to do it without people. We need more people and the world's become more complicated, et cetera. Some of the text came from things that people in the State Department had already written, like what's the mission of the State Department? Other parts consisted of text we created just for this purpose. At this point, the policy planning office was doing a mission statement for the whole State Department, so we put in it. I still remember it. I still think it's a great mission statement; it says something like the State Department's mission is to create a more secure, prosperous, democratic world for the benefit of the United States and the international community. That's basically it. One sentence. I think it was great and I wish that were the Department's mission today.

DELAWIE: So we published the brochure and we distributed it. We received lots of questions. We also received some criticism, like, why are you wasting your money on this? I mean, it didn't cost that much. It was less than 50 grand to produce. If you want to achieve things, you've got to have tools, and this was a key tool. We also felt on pretty firm ground with the brochure because HR had done something similar several years before, when Marc Grossman had been director general. HR had done a little brochure on State Department HR needs, which was good. But once Powell became Secretary of State, the State Department's ambitions moved way up. We were basically asking for a lot more money, $100 million per year for three years, to conduct this diplomatic readiness initiative, a lot of which was for hiring. And ultimately we were successful. We got the money and we hired a thousand people in the early 2000s, about half Foreign Service and half Civil Service.

DELAWIE: In the post 9/11 world, with war going on in Afghanistan and war going on in Iraq, we ended up using up a lot of those new positions. Which on one hand is a shame because the intention all along was to have a training float. But had we not had them, in the first decade of the 2000s, then we would have been in a far worse situation, and would have had giant capability gaps at other embassies due to the resource requirements from South Asia and the Middle East. So I was very satisfied with all of our work on that.

DELAWIE: Another important thing that we did in my office was to deal with the problem of lack of US "locality pay" for FS employees assigned abroad.

DELAWIE: The way the federal government works is part of your salary is based on the expenses of the city you live in. And of course, the salaries for federal employees are higher in New York and San Francisco than they are in Omaha and Poughkeepsie, because the cost of living in the former places is higher. If you want to get good employees in expensive places, you have to pay them higher salaries so they can afford to live there. The problem was that it was a purely domestic system. So when Foreign Service employees were in Washington, they got the Washington locality pay, just like

any other Federal Government employee at that grade. But when they went abroad, they lost locality pay. And in many cases, this was then about a 15% cut in salary.

DELAWIE: And it was projected the cut would become larger because it looked like locality rates were going to go up. So that was a problem. First of all, the Foreign Service employees felt it was unfair that they were taking a pay cut to go abroad. But you know, some people argued they were getting housing when they were assigned abroad, so all came out in the wash. Now, I never felt this was a fair explanation; lots of people have expenses in the United States, even when they are assigned abroad. Perhaps they had a house to maintain or something like that; perhaps the spouse worked when the family was in Washington but could not work when it was overseas. But the housing issue was certainly an argument that some people made, especially some people in Congress who were giving us money. But then there was a more practical problem that this caused; the way federal retirement works is, your retirement pension is based on your highest three years of salary during your career as an employee.

DELAWIE: Typically those were your last three years before retiring. So what would happen is if employees went abroad to work at an embassy or consulate during their last three years, they would get this 15% salary cut, which was one thing, but then their pension would be lower as well. Because an employee's last three years were in almost every case at their highest salary as a federal employee. And if they were abroad the last few years they would be getting a lower salary than in Washington DC. So what's the result of this? People are generally pretty smart. They respond to the economic incentives that are put in place. So what happens? If someone's been working in the Foreign Service for 25 or 30 years, she knows that retirement is coming up.

DELAWIE: You can predict that, because in many cases, you get cut off, you get "TIC'ed out," which means using up your limited years in the Foreign Service, and you have to retire whether you really want to or not. So these people who know they are nearing retirement, who are our most experienced people, our most experienced communications people or security officers or political officers or whatever, with 25, 30 years' experience, the absolute most experienced people we have. And where are they? They are in Washington DC to get locality pay to boost their "high three" for their pensions. Now of course there's a lot of important work to do in the State Department building, but there are also a lot of people in Washington, a lot of people at the State Department. The core mission of the State Department, the Foreign Service, is foreign policy, and that is mostly delivered on the ground in foreign countries by Foreign Service people.

DELAWIE: So what happened was we had this economic incentive for the most experienced people not to be where you need them the most, abroad. They would arrange their assignment patterns to be in Washington so they could be here the last three years before they retired, to get the high three that they needed to get the higher pension. Because it translated pretty well; people are not dumb. And people in Congress would often tell us, well, they're in the Foreign Service, they have to go where you send them, so send them abroad. And we would say it doesn't actually work like that. First of all, you want people to want to be where they're assigned.

DELAWIE: Secondly, it's perfectly easy to arrange your assignment pattern so you go abroad for the years five through four, before retirement, and then they've got the right to serve in Washington for three years; even with a limit on service in Washington, it is easy to arrange your career so you are there your last three years. When Marc Grossman had been DG, he had started to try to build a consensus that we needed to create "virtual locality pay," which would mean that your pension would be based on a Washington salary, even if you were in fact abroad. So during my time in PC, that's what we were looking for. Nowadays you get a lot of locality pay abroad, something like two thirds of it.

DELAWIE: At the time, of course people wanted to get the same salary in Washington as abroad; that would have required a new law passed by Congress and supported by the Administration. But at that point, we were focused on the pension question, which was more politically achievable. How do you keep your most experienced employees abroad for their final years in State Department. The problem that DG Grossman's team ran into was that virtual locality pay violated one of the fundamental principles the office of Personal Management, OPM, had about pensions, which is that your pension should be based on the salary you actually earned. So OPM really didn't like the idea of virtual locality pay. So when the Bush administration comes in with Powell as Secstate, this problem is explained to him.

DELAWIE: He says he will help sell this. The prior Secstate had not been willing. So obviously you're a giant step forward when you've got the Secretary of State wanting what you want. But of course you can't expect the Secstate to do all the work. The Secretary has to set the tone and you have to fill in behind it. So we worked for two years basically with our Congress, with the rest of the administration, to develop and flesh out this virtual locality pay concept. And in fact, it does pass Congress over the opposition of office of personnel management. So we had to be very careful, because the State Department had always felt the administration should speak with one voice, and if an agency owned something that they get the final say.

DELAWIE: Clearly other agencies have never felt this way, but State always did. So we were constantly with the staffers on the appropriations committee, on the Foreign Affairs Committees, to explain the problem, and to make sure they understand it. In the meantime, we're working with OMB and OPM, trying to get them to give us another option on how we can solve this problem other than by virtual locality pay. They were trying to be creative and they came up with some kind of award mechanism, but a 15% pension reduction for the rest of your life was an awful lot of money. So there was no way that an award at retirement is going to be able to make up that difference. So, OMB and OPM, they never bought into VLP. And the State Department could never write down that we wanted VLP because that would be violating the rule that the agency that owns an issue gets the final say on it unless countermanded by above.

DELAWIE: Nevertheless, we made a very good case that this was an issue with significant resource implications for the United States, not having its best people abroad

at the time they were needed most, and ultimately the Congressional staffers wrote into legislation, the virtual locality pay mechanism that we developed. Then of course, VLP had to be paid for; at the time the budget was under "pay go". So anything you write into a budget that costs money has to be paid for somewhere, either by taxes or a reduction in spending. And we came up with a mechanism to pay for it as well. So, during that time FS retirement contributions went up 1%.

DELAWIE: This applied to everyone in the Foreign Service, not just to State, but to Commerce, Ag and USAID as well. VLP was a constant issue during my two years in this office. In subsequent years, Congress agreed to pay a certain percentage of locality pay to people assigned abroad for the salary, not just for their pension. So I feel pretty good that we really helped kick off something that meant treating employees a lot more fairly overall. This experience was really great for me because my bosses said, yes, let's do it; figure it out, Greg, and let us know how we can help. So we were in charge, me and my small team of people; and the key actor, once again on the VLP issue was Laura, a Civil Service employee, not a Foreign Service officer. So we figured it out. We came up with ideas. We found allies with good ideas who would help. I would stop in with the boss on occasion and make sure we were still okay. But then we just kept pushing forward and kept doing our best. We would run into obstacles and then find a way around them. I mean, the OPM opposition was a big obstacle, and that took a long time to find a way around. But ultimately we did. So this was a great experience for me, managing policy in Washington. When you're abroad, you are mostly executing policy; but when you're in Washington, sometimes you get to manage policy.

DELAWIE: This job was a terrific lesson. This whole field was something really new to me. But I spent a lot of time learning; it's just like when I was in Italy, I would go home every night and practice Italian. In HR I would go home and read the FAM, things like that, so I could have enough facts. Because you can make the best argument in the world, but if you don't have the facts to support them, you're not going to get anywhere. And there are always people that know facts and are willing to use them against you. So you have to have command of your facts if you really want to achieve something important.

DELAWIE: There were many other issues as well, but I will just mention a few. Powell wanted a few concrete demonstrations that State had changed and we were taking better care of our employees. And one of the weird things was that Foreign Service officers could gain access to USAA insurance, and Foreign Service specialists could not, because they were not commissioned officers; the specialists had asked if we could fix that. So this was another issue we had to learn about and to discuss with the USAA company's people. Then we had to find a way to make the case that everyone in the Foreign Service should be eligible for USAA. So ultimately we do an action memo with talking points for Colin Powell, and he calls up the head of USAA and says, look, we've been talking with your staff, and now that non-commissioned military officers can gain access to USAA insurance, I really think you need to do the same thing for Foreign Service Specialists. And USAA agreed, but only for State specialists. It took a year or so to have the change announced and implemented, but ultimately it worked out. Once again Powell did the big thing; it was a phone call probably for three minutes. He made the sale, which wouldn't

have happened without him personally; but also it wouldn't have happened if our team had not learned all about this and prepared the groundwork and talking points for him to go in and clinch the deal.

DELAWIE: So he wasn't calling completely out of the blue. The USAA organization knew that we were engaged on this; whether they told their boss, who knows, but certainly their organization did. So that issue was something I feel very good about. I also learned in that office to be very careful about your terminology, so people don't feel left out; don't say Foreign Service officer, unless that's exactly what you mean—don't leave out the specialists inadvertently. And don't say Foreign Service unless that's what you mean—don't leave out the Civil Service inadvertently. And I'm very good at that, even today, I usually talk about Foreign Service employees, that includes the specialists and the generalists. And sometimes I talk about State Department employees to make sure I'm including the Civil Service as well. Because at the beginning of that job, I made the mistake; a lot of people do. You have talked about FSOs, when you're referring to a communications person or a Regional Security Officer, then they feel left out. So you have to show respect to all of your colleagues. And you have to do that by addressing them in an appropriate way.

DELAWIE: There were other little things that were annoyances that the DG wanted me to find a way to deal with. One of these related to laws that allowed employees to see all of the paper files that an agency had about you; a key thing in HR at state was called the personnel audit report, PAR, which was like the State Department computer system's record of your life and assignments and things like that.

DELAWIE: And people wanted to be able to see their PARs, because not infrequently there were important mistakes on them. The system basically had been that, you send a note to your CDO and the CDO prints it out and mails it to you in the mail. Depending on where you were in the world, it could come to you in a week or in three months. So it was very frustrating for people. And we'd started to take heat from outside the State Department about this issue because we were not making it easy for people to see the records that the State Department held about them, which was against the law; the law was not exactly specific, but clearly if you had to wait for three months to see your records, State was not really complying. So we got a committee together, with the executive office of HR, which had computer people and we kind of hashed out a way for people to see their PAR online.

DELAWIE: Now we call it employee profile online. It wasn't really hard, because the information was already stored in a computer system; everybody has a computer at his or her desk. You just had to find a way to get stuff out of the main computer database and display it on someone else's computer halfway around the world. So once the HR computer team realizes that this is something that really has to happen, they came up pretty quickly with an implementation. There were computer security challenges, because one had to make sure that an employee could not view someone else's PAR. But those were overcome able.

DELAWIE: So all I really do is convene a meeting and then follow up. But that was one of the things the DG wanted me to do—to follow up on initiatives. But in this case and several others, all the real work was done by people who knew what they're doing; they came up with the plan, not me. All I did was convene people, but sometimes that's all it takes: all right, let's get together and hash this out and see what we can do. And, so the HR/EX computer team fixed it.

DELAWIE: There were a lot of other annoyances we dealt with in different parts of the State Department. At one point when Bill Burns was assistant secretary for NEA, the Near East Bureau, he came back from a multi week trip to his region and was talking with Colin Powell about what he learned and what he'd done; Powell says, you need to take some time off with your family now that you are done with this trip. Burns says, I can't, it's April so I am working on EERs. So that's how Colin Powell learned about our employee evaluation system, and how lengthy and difficult it was. He calls up the DG right away and says, talk to me about this. And she explains and says it is in fact a burden; so Powell says, figure something out, make it easier, make it less intense work. He has U/S Grant Green give us his evaluation from being a colonel in the Army. And it is in fact one page.

Q: Now there's a tricky aspect to this because the State Department can design something but does have to work at least in part with AFSA, the Foreign Service professional association.

DELAWIE: Absolutely. Basically the way this thing worked is the performance evaluation office had an employee who took a crack at rejiggering the EER form. There was one key thing we knew we had to change; the way the system was at that point, your boss at least theoretically wrote everything about you: this is what Delawie did, and this is why it was important. Two full pages of text. It was very intimidating looking at a blank piece of paper and say, I have to fill these two pages up with stuff about Delawie, even though I would give the boss some suggestions about what to say.

DELAWIE: Now sometimes the employee would write the whole thing himself and the boss would sign it. But anyway, it was a tremendous amount of effort. We knew that the first element to change was, it had to be on the employee to describe what he had actually accomplished. And we did not think that was going to negatively affect FS employees since writing skills are tested on the Foreign Service Exam, so most people can write acceptably. Now you can't have the employee say why her work was good, it has to be up to the boss to say it's good. But certainly the employee can give a descriptive list of accomplishments over the course of the year and in less than one page. So that's the first element we knew we had to change. Then PE focused on how to make the rest of the thing less work and shorter. And they started with six pages and got it down to four pages or something.

DELAWIE: But there are legal requirements for things that have to be on an evaluation, and that takes up an entire page. Those are things like name and grade, who's your boss, what are your duties, and things like that. Since there's a whole page you can't do much

about, that meant you had to work on other things. So they came up with a shorter block for the employee description of accomplishments, a shorter block for the boss to describe how the work was important and whether the employee met goals or not and much shorter block for the boss's boss, the reviewing officer, to explain his or her perspective on the employee's work. This was all just kind of a sketch at this point. Then it's time to go to AFSA because they have a statutory right to participate in discussions about management conditions that affect employees. So now AFSA knew that it had to be shorter because everybody suffered from this. So we did not have to sell to AFSA making the EER shorter and less work. And we didn't really have to sell having the employee write his or her own list of accomplishments.

DELAWIE: But AFSA did have a concern about what's called the area for improvement section, which is now called the Developmental Area. AFSA wanted to get rid of that because the impression from a lot of employees was that it disadvantaged them; for example, if the boss was honest and said, what Delawie needs to work more on is public speaking, the promotion panel will see this and think he can't do public speaking at all, he's not ready for promotion. Now, I don't think that impression was accurate, unless the same problem came up year after year, but that was certainly what a lot of people thought. Another problem with that block was that sometimes the boss would just say something like, Delawie can't suffer fools gladly or some complete throw away. Then the argument always was that if you don't have something real in that area for improvement block, then that calls into question everything else you put in the EER, including whether the employee's really ready for promotion or not.

DELAWIE: Unfortunately, the promotion panel is kind of a black box for most people that they don't understand. And certainly the results are black box. They don't describe why you were promoted and he's not, for example. Anyway, AFSA wanted to get rid of that block and just leave it out. The argument was that if the employee had problems, this could be covered in the boss's evaluation section. But in fact, no one, no one did. People had to really be doing a bad job to get negative comments in the evaluation block. But AFSA was responding to its membership; this is what people wanted; it was not an unreasonable ask. However it turns out that the State Department leadership cared. HR went to the seventh floor and said, this is what the union wants. They have the right to ask. Leadership says no. Who is without need for improving performance in some area? It is not realistic to leave that block off. So my colleague who was chief labor-management negotiator for the Department and I go back to AFSA and say we can't agree to that; let's try to find out other thing that we can agree on. And ultimately, like a lot of things at the State Department, there was some give and take, and we wound up with a form pretty much like the one we have now, that has much shorter blocks and is less effort, especially for the boss because the employee writes basically half of it. So it made a lot of sense.

DELAWIE: Now we were not able to apply it initially to entry-level officers, which I thought was a shame; I always felt why would we hire someone who can't write two-thirds of a page about what they did over a year. If you can't write, that says something about your readiness for promotion too. But anyway, the decision was to phase it in, so

the new form was initially just for FS-03 and above, and the old form was used for another couple of years for entry-level officers and some specialists. This issue was another thing I felt we made a real contribution to; I was someone who had written a bunch of these EERs; I knew exactly how burdensome they were and was really proud to be able to contribute to making life better for everyone by improving the system.

DELAWIE: The toughest issue I had to negotiate with AFSA about involved security violations, which typically happen overseas; when the marine security guard does rounds at night if there's a classified document on your desk, the marine snags it and writes you up for some kind of violation or infraction for not having locked up classified, which is a fundamental responsibility of anyone with a security clearance. And of course, since they are human, almost all Foreign Service employees have received one or more. Now everybody makes mistakes, but there were a couple of notorious incidents that had happened in the security field around this time; one in which someone had allegedly snuck into a 7th-floor office and taken files from the secretariat. I don't know much about that incident and whether it really happened or not, but people talked about it as if it were true. Then there were a couple of other things. These incidents put the focus on the State Department security violation program and the rules. Initially the State Department looked like it was not dealing seriously with security.

DELAWIE: Now, one of the rules of life is if you've got a problem, people will usually let you solve the problem if you try. But if you don't try to solve a problem, other people are perfectly happy to try and solve for it you. The question was, are we going to try to solve the problem ourselves, or are we going to let Congress solve it for us, by passing a law that would be difficult to implement. Because they didn't serve overseas and they didn't know how things worked. They could easily write a law that would tie people's hands and make it very difficult to manage. So it became very important for us to figure out how to solve the problem for the State Department.

DELAWIE: I always liked to start with real data. In the rules for employee evaluations, it says very clearly that if there's a pattern of security incidents by an employee, this has to be mentioned in the EER. There's no wiggle room; it was very clear. So the HR leadership says, okay, look into this, does it really happen? That's the question. So we get lists from Diplomatic Security of people who've got a whole bunch of security violations or infractions; then we get their EERs, which we could do because we were HR. We read the EERs and we found no instances in which someone who had multiple security infractions had had it mentioned in their EER. So that kind of left us in a very difficult situation. We've got a clear rule. The rule is not being implemented. How do you deal with this problem? And then how do you demonstrate to Congress, which cares that you're dealing with a problem. Before I had arrived, HR and DS had developed a point system, whereby when someone gets a security violation, it is charged as 10 points, or an infraction is charged as five points, basically relating to how likely it was that the information was compromised somehow.

DELAWIE: Then the question is, how do you get this reflected in whether someone advances in the Foreign Service or not? Because if someone just can't keep control of

classified information, that person should not be promoted. Of course, that was a policy decision, but it was clear to us, and it was clear to Congress. So, ultimately what I ended up proposing was that we share this security violation scorecard information with promotion panels, which was very controversial. But if you can't count on the boss to do his or her job, how else can you get this important information in front of the promotion panels? So ultimately we came up with a proposal that we just take the DS incident sheet for each employee and give it to the promotion panel along with the EER file. If you didn't have a security violation or infraction, there was no incident sheet about you. So when the promotion panel read your file, they also saw this incident sheet. Now AFSA doesn't like that a bit; which, from an employee standpoint, I kind of understand. But that was not really the question at that point.

DELAWIE: The question at that point was, will the State Department solve the problem, or will Congress solve the problem by writing laws? So I had several difficult conversations with the state vice president of AFSA at the time about this issue. AFSA polled its membership and got mostly negative feedback, by the way. But ultimately, AFSA consented to this plan. And, you know, once again, if you've got to do something hard, you've got to have facts to back up what you are going to do. And since I personally had read these EERs for people with multiple security violations and had seen zero mention of this anywhere, not even in the area for improvement section, it was clear that people were not doing their jobs and we as the State Department would not be doing our job if we did not do something to change the status quo.

DELAWIE: Before we sold this proposal to the seventh floor, I told AFSA I would be happy to consider any other ideas. Unfortunately the other ideas were to reaffirm to the bosses that they had to do their job; which would not be a real change to the status quo, and we were pretty sure that it wouldn't sell on Capitol Hill. So ultimately after numerous meetings and discussions, including hard discussions, AFSA agreed to this. So in 2002 or 2003 these security incident sheets were included in people's EER files.

DELAWIE: One of the important things when you're running a giant bureaucracy like the State Department is you have to make sure that people find out what you're up to that will affect them. So I wrote several cables describing for everybody in the world what the plan was, and why it's going to happen. We knew some people wouldn't like it; but this was the decision of the seventh floor. I always felt what was a really important part of my job in HR was what I call internal public diplomacy, telling the 50,000 employees what HR was up to; State has not always been good at this, unfortunately.

DELAWIE: Anyway, this was interesting and difficult. I was really glad that AFSA decided not to object; arguably the law gave the State Department the ability to do something like this without consent of the union. But had we gone down that path it would have been a challenge and would have risked Congress solving our problem for us by writing a law that would be difficult to manage. So we come up with this plan, we explained it to congressional staffers that care about this; they said, okay, well we'll give you a chance.

DELAWIE: Which was good because one of the things at risk, is called low ranking. Promotion panels divide people into three groups: the big middle group of good people that aren't ready for promotion. Then the tiny part on one side that's probably ready for promotion; and the tiny part on the other side that has real problems. And those people that have real problems can be considered for low ranking. At the time there was no rule that said, how many people actually had to be low ranked. So you could be considered for low ranking and the separate selection out panel would have to decide whether a low-ranked employee could be given another year to improve, or it could say "Time's up! Not meeting the standard, time to leave Foreign Service." But there were no rules saying exactly how many people had to be in the low-ranking basket.

DELAWIE: One of the things staffers were considering on Capitol Hill was imposing a lower limit on low ranking. They would say, well, come on, you can't tell us that you don't have at least 5% poor performers. Let's just make a law that says 5% of every grade and class could be low ranked and fired every year. That would have been really tough for the Foreign Service. Especially since the vast, vast majority do a pretty good job. And many of the people that have problems, have problems because of circumstances that are transitory. Maybe they're sick, they get cancer and maybe they will get over it and do a better job again; maybe their father is dying or something else; these challenges happen to everybody at some point. Most of the people that wind up in this low ranking category are okay and will not be selected out; often they are in fact promoted not too long after they are low ranked.

DELAWIE: Of course, some of them really do need to go. And in fact, every year the State Department does fire people from the Foreign Service, but it's a tiny number of people. And we're also trying to avoid the security issue being used to mandate the percentage of employees who could be low ranked and fired every year.

DELAWIE: Other than these big projects, I did a fair amount of press, when the regular press officer was out. That was a great experience. I learned a lot doing that, just filling in when the press person was on vacation. I learned a lot about labor management relations, as well as other things that were really helpful to me later in my career. I kind of picked up stuff all along the way. And later, no one could snow me about a personnel rule. No one in Washington when I was abroad could say, oh, we can't do that because of this HR rule. I would say, no, no, I know all the HR rules that are important. And once a while I had to go brief the department spokesman about an HR issue that was in the press. All of this helped me learn things that wound up being really valuable in senior assignments as DCM or ambassador. So maybe that's a good place to stop.

Q: Today is March 21st, 2019, we're resuming our interview with Greg Delawie.

DELAWIE: There were just a couple of other things about my time in the human resources bureau I wanted to touch on. First of all, I described the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) which was intended to hire a whole bunch of other people for the State Department. We wanted to use the DRI to make the Foreign Service look more like America, to bring in more minorities, more women, and more people who did not go to

some of the establishment schools, the Harvards and Yales and Stanfords and Berkeleys, things like that. To give these other people from non-traditional recruitment sources a chance to be in the Foreign Service. This is one of those things where we wanted to have a quick impact. We didn't know what the right answer was going to be ahead of time. You talk with people, you talk with specialists, how do you recruit minorities, how do you make women feel more welcome in the Foreign Service, things like that. Everyone's got ideas and opinions, but no-one's got data.

Q: Quick interruption. ADST has been interviewing Foreign Service officers for a little over 30 years and we recently did a demographic study of our own 2200 or 2300 interviewees based on where they went to school, and if they had any Peace Corps or military background. What we found was about one-third of all our interviewees did go to school in or very close to the East Coast – Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the East Coast. Or the West Coast. Then there are a few places like Chicago and so on in the heartland. Relatively fewer in the Great Plains and so on. But really only one-third as a total came from those what you would think of as traditional areas for the Foreign Service. Now granted, it's not a perfect study because it's only the people who have come forward to be interviewed. We didn't have an opportunity to do a random study. But at least it is interesting that the old assumption that the Foreign Service is only these East Coast elites isn't exactly true.

But you're now thinking about how to make it even more representative.

DELAWIE: I think the "male-pale-Yale" deal has been wrong for decades, actually, but it certainly is what a lot of people think, and certainly when you look at minority representation in the Foreign Service it is far lower than the proportion of minorities in the population. So that was one of the things the DRI wanted to try to tackle as we were expanding hiring. As long as you're going to hire 1000 people, let's make an effort to attract more under-represented groups. I talked earlier about having the diplomats in residence at some of the institutions whose job was to help encourage under-represented groups to apply. Then we did more talking, mostly Niels Marquardt and his team in the DRI, about how the big foreign-policy schools train their students to pass the Foreign Service exam. The state universities in the heartland do not. So we figured, "Okay, let's see if we can do something about that." So we put together a couple of presentations on "how do you take the Foreign Service written exam?" It had changed anyway, as part of this. And, "how do you take the Foreign Service oral exam?" So at least people that came to see these presentations would not be going into a black box. They would have an idea of what's going on and would stand a better chance to pass it if it was not a complete bunch of unexpected tasks, which is basically what it was. This is before a lot of the internet chat rooms and Facebook and things like that where today candidates share with each other what's going on – what happened with them at the test, the assessment, and things like that; it did not happen 15 years ago when we were working on this.

The DRI team put together a couple of presentations and then asked how do we find people to give them? I signed up for that, along with several other people. I've always felt the Foreign Service and the State Department has done a lot for me and I wanted to help

build the institution and make sure it is as strong as it can be. I certainly saw this, making the Foreign Service look more like America, to be strengthening our institution. So, I did several of these presentations; I got to travel to Temple University in Philadelphia, went to Lansing, Michigan. I did do one at the Harvard Kennedy School, which is perfectly well represented in the Foreign Service, but they were willing to give us a free room and there are a whole bunch of colleges in Boston. Money was a factor; if they're giving us a free room, that made a difference. But in many places we were able to go give these presentations – open to everybody, any student from any college or anybody that wanted to come, basically – but to do them to make a point at historically black colleges and universities or at a land-grant university or something like that. It was really interesting. I really got to hone my public speaking skills because it was a 90 minute presentation followed by Q&A. We had slides, PowerPoint slides that will be the death of many of us, I know, but we had a PowerPoint presentation and remarks to go along with it. It was very well organized, well done.

Then there were all sorts of interesting questions from students about what happens at the tests. Powell had given us a lot of money to beef up the hiring and advertising and this was part of that. I thought that was very important, and I've been very gratified over the last several years when I've been at various meetings in the State Department, in AFSA, somewhere else, and a Foreign Service officer has come up to me and said "I saw your presentation. You helped me get in the Foreign Service." Which made me feel great. That's what it's all about. I wanted to reflect on that and make a broader point that I think all of us in public service, in the State Department, should feel the obligation to strengthen the institution. There are different ways of doing that, you can serve on a promotion panel or work with the CLO at an event at an embassy or something like that. I think it's really important to strengthen our community and our institution, and it was great to have an opportunity to do that.

The other thing that I wanted to talk about – I was in the PC (Policy Coordination) office in the first Bush term when Colin Powell was secretary of State. One of the things the Office of Management and Budget did – a lot of people forget that office has the management chunk. Not as big as the budget chunk but it's still something and it can be important. In the Bush administration, they wanted to improve the management of the executive branch. So they had a program OMB ran called the president's management agenda. There were meetings every month with the deputy secretaries of all the agencies, and they came up with a list of things they wanted the agencies to do. This was a whole range of things like push authority down, improve IT systems, make annual evaluations more realistic, all of these things. So some of these were in the HR field and some were in other management areas in the State Department. I wound up being in charge of the ones in the HR field. It was kind of arcane and some of the stuff was pretty technical, related to implementation of laws on personnel practices and the government. They figured it out quickly and decided they were going to have a stoplight chart. They would have every agency have 15 or 20 different elements they would have to implement to score a positive score on the agenda, they would do a stoplight chart where you were red, yellow, or green depending on how well you were doing. Red if you didn't do anything on this factor, yellow if you were trying and green if you had solved the factor. Realistic

annual evaluations for example was one, if you were just coasting along on the Civil Service plan for years before, you were red because you weren't working on improving the management of this factor. Yellow if you were coming up with a plan, green if you had actually implemented it. This PMA, president's management agenda, got tied, for the State Department at least, to the Colin Powell effort to increase hiring. We got the first year of hiring money, almost $400,000,000, but it was a three-year plan, a billion dollars all told, and OMB said "Next time, you have to show progress on the PMA or we will not support you for increased hiring." That translated the PMA for us from kind of an arcane bureaucratic exercise into something that was very real. Other agencies didn't have the challenges we did, weren't looking to hire a whole bunch of new people. So it became very important that we pass on all the factors. We had to put together a team in the HR bureau on how to work on some of this stuff. How do you get to green?

It was at this point I realized I didn't know enough about how the Civil Service works, and I came here to the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) to take a class on the Civil Service personnel system, and it was very eye-opening; I learned a lot. It started as many FSI classes do where the instructor says, "Tell me what you want to learn from this course." Which was always frustrating to me in every FSI class I took; of course I wanted to learn about the Civil Service personnel system – that's the title of the course, that's what I want to learn. So we wasted 45 minutes on what we wanted to learn from the course and finally we get to the substance.

We tried to work with OMB, my colleagues and I in my office on what's green? How do you get to green? What do you mean? If you don't know what you're shooting for, you're never going to get it. Improve the annual employee evaluation system – that's insufficiently precise. But as I said last time, there were many in OMB who wanted the State Department to succeed, didn't think it could but wanted it to so we were able to come up with what green really looked like for all of our HR factors, in agreement with OMB.

Q: Can you give one example?

DELAWIE: In the Civil Service, there's the Senior Executive Service (SES), the most senior Civil Service employees. There are a limited number, maybe 150 at State, the equivalent of the Senior Foreign Service in rank and responsibility. They get evaluated every year. For many in the Civil Service, the annual evaluation doesn't really mean a lot because unless they really do a bad job, they are just going to continue in their jobs no matter what their evaluation says. That's different from the Foreign Service, where whether you get promoted or not depends in what's in that annual evaluation. But for the SES, it does mean something because they get performance pay, around a third of them. There is a panel that reviews all the SES annual evaluations and rank-orders people and the top chunk get performance pay, and the rest don't.

The department at the time implemented the government-wide policy on how you do this, which in fact did not really result in a system most people in the SES thought was fair. Basically, what seemed to happen – there were some statistics about this – is that you got

performance pay basically every third year. So by the time three years had rolled around, most of the SES had gotten performance pay. Which sounded kind of egalitarian, but it did not reward the best performers. We needed to come up with a way to more realistically evaluate SES people in the State Department and differentiate between the people who made the biggest contribution from the others. That's one of the concrete example of the work done. Of course, most of the work was done by Civil Service personnel specialists who really understood this, not by me. I do feel I made a big contribution here by helping focus on short-lists of objectives. If you look at the law and regulations, they are really dense and uninviting. We had to come up with a story we could tell OMB in five minutes, this is what we're going to do. Here it is now, here's how we're going to change it, this is why it's going to be better. Three or four bullet points, that was going to be the story. The people who worked on this despite knowing tremendous amounts about how it really worked, had not thought of their job as being salesmen. How do I sell it? So we were able to take pages and pages of dense, uninviting prose and work it down to three or four points, this is what's going to change.

Q: Who approved your final product? The director-general? How high did it have to go to be approved?

DELAWIE: My memory is not great, I think the director-general, but we did have to sell it to OMB.

There were lots of similar examples. It turns out the Foreign Service EER process, not for the last time, became part of this too, although we had other motivations for reforming that—mostly, the secretary of State wanted it to happen. Ultimately we got to green in all the key factors and were able to get OMB support with Congress for more money for the next year. Ultimately, we got four years of DRI, even though three was our initial goal. I feel pretty good about that. We made a real contribution. I was an economic officer, I'd only really done Foreign Service work, this was completely new to me, but I always remember something Marc Grossman who had been my DCM in Ankara had said to me about how to get things done in the State Department, and that was just "Whenever you get 'no', just keep asking questions. Ask questions and find out if the answer is really no, and why is it no." Sometimes you get to a place where the law says something, and "no" really is the answer. But many other times you get to "well, it's too hard" and then you try to figure out, "Why would it be too hard to change this thing?" You just cut away at explanations or excuses until you get to the goal you're trying to achieve. So even though I had no background in personnel or HR stuff and I was in charge of all these HR things, I always knew what I didn't know and I always knew if I kept asking questions of the people who really knew the answers, often I would be able to achieve my objectives, or help them achieve their own objectives. It's a demonstration of how it's not enough to be smart in the Foreign Service; everybody's smart in the Foreign Service. But there's another skill about getting things done in the State Department. Sometimes you don't have to be smart to get things done, you just have to be persistent, and be very reluctant to take no for an answer.

Ultimately, we got an award for all this work from something called the IPMA, the International Public Managers Association, which I was pretty happy with since I was an econ officer getting an award for doing HR stuff. Those were the other things I wanted to mention about my time in the office.

Q: This was clearly a lot of hard work and in a new area you hadn't worked on before. Did it attract you to more personnel management jobs, or did you want to get back to economics?

DELAWIE: I think I mentioned when I was talking about Italy, I was kind of bored with economics. Especially bananas, I was really tired of bananas which I'd done in a couple of jobs. Anyway, it's time for me to figure out what happens next and I'm only halfway through my two-year assignment in the PC office, but I have to bid on my next job. So, I bid on a couple of DCM jobs and ultimately I got picked to be DCM in Zagreb, Croatia.

Q: At this point you'd also been promoted to OC?

DELAWIE: No, I was still a 01.

Q: Because Zagreb I imagine was an OC position? Is that not correct?

DELAWIE: I believe it is now a 01 position; when I went it was OC. I'd gotten a Meritorious Service Increase which at the time gave you the ability to bid across the senior threshold. Anyway, I get picked to be on the short list for the DCM. The to-be ambassador at that point, Ralph Frank, was a senior management officer who'd been ambassador in Katmandu earlier, picked me to be DCM. That happens in the fall of 2002. I finish my HR job in the summer of 2003, and then I have to go to FSI to learn Croatian, a Slavic language, and very tough. Since that time, I have always told young people that if they think they want to learn a foreign language, they need to do it as soon as they can and not wait until they are 45 like I did. I had learned Turkish, which is probably objectively a harder language than Croatian, but I was in my 20s; learning Croatian was one of the hardest things I've ever done. I was never as comfortable in it as I was in any of the other languages I spoke. Either because it's harder or I'm older, or both. So I was here at FSI for 10 months studying Croatian and learning all these Slavic things about verbs that have moods. It was tough. The course was taught well. There were a couple of classes. Everyone in my class was going to Zagreb, so I was in school with a bunch of people who would be working for me, so that was good, I got to know a lot of people that way. Here I was for 10 months learning Croatian. This was at a time – this was partially my fault, FSI was overcrowded at the time because we'd hired all these new people! So there wasn't enough classroom space before the "I" building had been built. So we were double-booked. We had to start school at 8:00; I think it was 8:00 to 1:00, and 1:00 to 6:00. We were the early shift, which was a challenge. My wife and I survived, we passed at the end and prepared to head off to Croatia.

My wife Vonda had been picked to be political counselor at the embassy. This required a set of bureaucratic steps because in the government, you cannot work for a relative. The

ambassador had to agree to supervise the political section; the DCM normally supervises the whole rest of the embassy, but we had to cut out the political section so Vonda could be in charge of it and work for the ambassador rather than for me, which would have been a clear legal violation. That took a while to work out, but it was, then we head off to Croatia.

Q: How large an embassy was it then?

DELAWIE: There were almost 100 Americans, and 250 or so Croatians.

Q: So a good size, actually.

DELAWIE: It was. At the time, there was still a USAID mission, which accounted for a fair chunk of the American population.

We moved into a new embassy building in 2003, before I got there. It was kind of far out. At the time we were acquiring land in the late '90s, we did not have the best relationship with the Croatian government because the boss, the president, Franjo Tudjman, was almost a fascist and we had human rights concerns and rule of law concerns, and we expressed them over the years and then when we wanted to buy pieces of property downtown to build a new embassy, the overseas building operation would do its due-diligence and figure out a piece of land it wanted, at which point it would become unavailable for some unknown reason. Which was a shame, because the piece of land we wound up with was between the city and the airport, but closer to the airport, way out of town. It was literally by a cornfield. It was a good half-hour drive downtown. Which was particularly galling to our local employees because the former embassy, former consulate – this was part of Yugoslavia, there was a consulate in Zagreb – the building was right across the street from the foreign ministry. You could walk to do most of your business from that building. But it was far too small to engage with the Croatian government at the level we wanted because our mission had been "Croatia becomes part of Europe" with all the human rights, democracy standards and things like that, so we needed more people than we could possible fit in this old consulate building. It was good to have a new embassy; the decision at the time, there was some consideration of maintaining the embassy in the building it was in and building an annex somewhere else, but they decided not to do that. So they ended up building the embassy in a village called Buzin, on the airport road.

Q: By the way, the same thing happened in Romania. I don't think it happened because we had relatively bad relations at the time with Romania. I think it happened because we needed all of that extra area for setback from the road. The city was slowly growing out to the airport. It was a long drive in from where our new embassy was, but there was at least the promise that over time the city was going to catch up with us. But it sounds like that's not going to happen in Zagreb.

DELAWIE: Right. It hasn't. I've been since, and there's slightly more development in the direction of our embassy, but not much. The story was always, the city will grow to us. Hasn't happened yet.

So the U.S. government sold our former embassy building in downtown Zagreb to France, which renovated the building – that did take a couple of years, it was pretty bad off at that point, it was used during the Yugoslav era, presumably it had lots of eavesdropping things inside it that the Communist government had planted. France spent a couple of years and renovated the building; beautiful. At one point the French ambassador gave American employees a tour of the embassy, it was funny because everything had changed – some interior walls were the same but most were not, so he walked us around and said [*in French accent*] "Oh, this here, this was your secret room!" Which was funny.

The embassy is located in the 'burbs, basically a half-hour drive to get downtown where the government and private sector and all the people we wanted to engage with were. The building was okay. People thought it looked like a prison because of the high wall; this was before we developed the better fencing system that doesn't look quite so prison-like. So high walls with lights on all the time, it did look prisonish. But it was hard to get people to come to our embassy for public diplomacy, because it was so hard to get there. You had to drive there. There's no public transit really. So you can't get people to come despite the fact there's very nice public diplomacy space in the new building, as there is in all of our new buildings. We have to find places in town to have public diplomacy events. We created an American Corner in a library, which gives us some in-town space, which is good.

The European bureau was very nice to us. They allowed us to hire additional drivers, which was non-trivial at that point because of the budget. And we were one of the first embassies in Europe to get BlackBerries. While for the pol and econ officers, it took half an hour to get to their appointments, at least they were in a car being driven by a driver and had a BlackBerry so they could get something done. Of course, people tried to organize their days so they could spend all morning or afternoon and do a sequence of meetings. Sometimes that was not possible and you ended up killing an hour for one meeting, not counting the time of the meeting, to go there and back. Ultimately, things worked out okay. By the time I was there, there was a democratically elected government so we had much better relations in the summer of 2004 than when we were trying to find a place for the new embassy building.

This was my first big job in the Foreign Service. I'd been in charge of an office at the State Department, I'd been in charge of a section, but being DCM at an important embassy was my first really big job.

Q: What year did you arrive?

DELAWIE: Summer of 2004. I learned a lot of really important lessons from this job.

Q: Quick question. Had Croatia given troops to any of our Middle Eastern or South Asian coalitions – Afghanistan, Iraq and so on?

DELAWIE: They did have some people in Afghanistan, or that were going to Afghanistan. I don't think they were involved in Iraq. In fact, one of my memories from Zagreb is being on a secure phone for days in a row with the department of Defense trying to get up-armored Humvees, two or three, in Afghanistan for the Croatian army to use because they did not have this kind of technology.

Thinking back on the lessons I learned from this, first of all being in charge of a couple of hundred people is challenging. The most important lesson I learned is I did not have to figure out everything for myself. I didn't have to solve every problem myself. I started off a little bit in the wrong direction; when presented with a problem, I started off by saying "why don't we do A, B, or C?" Fortunately there were some very good FSOs and local employees who said, "yeah, it's a problem but why don't we do D, E, or F instead of A, B, or C?" I realized I'd spent most of my career directing people to solve problems my way; there are plenty of other smart people in the embassy, why not let them give their ideas before I say anything. For 15 years I've done that since then. If we have a problem, how do we figure it out, what do you think? I've been pretty good and I hope if you ever talk to people in Pristina or in Berlin who worked with me that you hear the same story I'm telling. Don't go in at the beginning of a problem and tell everyone, "Let's do this." Go in and say "how do we want to work this out" and get everybody's ideas and you try to settle things down, in a guided conversation. That was an important lesson.

It was the first time I worked with USAID, so that was an education. Turkey was a developing country when I was there, but there had been no USAID mission for a long time there. We had a big USAID mission in Croatia because they were committed to modernizing, becoming a capitalist democracy. So I learned a lot working with USAID. I was so impressed with Bill, the mission director. I spent an afternoon just walking around their office, and he introduced me to every single person including their drivers, and had something to say about every single person. He'd been there a couple of years, so he knew everybody – but boy, did it make an impression on me. "This is Slava; she's from here, she does this. Her son is in elementary school." He had something to say about every one of almost 100 people. I said wow, what a great boss this guy is. That really impressed me and stuck with me, that's a management lesson. Not just to be able to know your employees and team but to be able to brag about them to someone else, to know them that well – that was just great.

Then of course it was my first time working directly for an ambassador. I had to learn – I'd known Ralph Frank the ambassador for a couple of years because he was in the HR bureau when I was there, but I had to figure out how he wanted to run things, and what my role would be as basically chief operating officer when he was chief executive officer. That took a while for me to figure out. There was a good course at FSI on how to be a DCM, but you have to figure out what your particular ambassador wants and deliver that. That was an interesting challenge for me to work on.

Q: How did it work? When you figured it out, what were the basic conditions of responsibility for you?

DELAWIE: Ambassador Frank wanted the traditional kind of State Department paradigm where the DCM ran the embassy and the ambassador set the overall direction. He wanted suggestions about what we thought he should do on one issue or another; sometimes he'd agree and sometimes he wouldn't, that's the ambassador's prerogative. So we had a traditional set-up with the exception of the political section, which reported to the ambassador. Which was fine. I never touched money or awards or anything doing with the political section, which would have been a clear violation of the law. But on policy, of course the DCM has to know what pol is doing, is very involved in policy. So we had meetings with the ambassador, me as DCM, Vonda as political counselor, every morning. We'd spend five or 10 minutes talking about what's up, here are the cables that came in overnight, here's what we have to do about them, here's what's in the press we have to deal with, we kind of talked that through; the ambassador would agree or not and point us in a different direction, and we'd go out and get the work done. Most of the traditional reporting cables were signed out by the political section, so I wouldn't touch them. I read them, so I knew what was going on. There were country team meetings every week which included the political section as well as the rest of the embassy. It turned out to be fine, I think. I never heard objections about this supervisory arrangement. I could be involved in the policy, especially econ and stuff that political didn't own, without violating rules or making people feel uncomfortable. Of course, I was able to have friendly relations with all the political officers and political FSNs and things like that like anyone else in the embassy. In the embassy at Zagreb at the time, it was very convenient because the way it worked was there was the ambassador's and DCM's office in one suite, and right next door was the pol and econ sections. I was 15 feet away from the political officers so if something came up, I could ask.

Q: Did you have supervisory role over the econ section, given your background?

DELAWIE: I did, although it did take a while to get that reorganized because it turned out that an office in the State Department had to approve the change. So ultimately, the two econ officers and the econ FSN ended up working directly for the DCM, though I think when I left, it changed back. Which was fine. The econ section chief was a mid-level officer who did a good job, there were two during the time I was there. They didn't require a whole lot of day-to-day instruction; they knew what their job was, we agreed on goals and they mostly did their thing and came to me for steers and direction and problems occasionally.

Q: You mentioned every morning you had the meeting with the ambassador and the pol chief; did that also include the public diplomacy officer?

DELAWIE: There was a separate meeting that included more people in the embassy. There was a press briefing which all the PD officers were at along with as many of the pol and econ section staffers and a couple of others; sometimes management people

came, too. At the time, only about half the FSOs spoke Serbo-Croatian, so the press briefing was the way you found out what was going on if you didn't speak the language. The day would start with the press briefing then move up to the small meeting with the ambassador and pol counselor. Often the press briefing was just a press briefing, but if the ambassador had a question for the PD section, that was a place to get it answered. The PD section would talk about what it was going to do today and the ambassador had the chance to engage if he wanted to. It worked fine. When the new ambassador came a couple of years later, he continued that. It was a good opportunity to have a morning check, the press briefing typically took 15 minutes, and you were out of there. Both ambassadors did speak Serbo-Croatian, but a lot of the FSOs did not.

Q: Let me ask, during the time you were there did you have a VIP visit? The reason I'm asking is the distance of the embassy from the city where most of the activities would take place – did that run smoothly?

DELAWIE: We had assistant secretary visits on occasion, which aren't so hard to run because there's no security involved. The only real VIP we had in my time was the vice president, Cheney, who came for an Adriatic Charter meeting. The Adriatic Charter then as today was kind of a waiting room for NATO, and at the time it was Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, countries trying to get into NATO. The Adriatic Charter was the thing the United States had come up with to encourage them to work together on political-military transformation and modernization of their militaries. There were A3 meetings typically with a cabinet official every year in one place or another, sometimes here in Washington, other times in the region.

This time in spring of 2006, VP Cheney came to Croatia for the meeting. It was in Dubrovnik. This is before *Game of Thrones*, but Dubrovnik was still a very popular and interesting destination, an ancient walled city from Venetian times. We had asked the Croatian government if they would organize an A3 meeting in Dubrovnik, so Cheney would come, and senior officials from Croatia and Albania and Macedonia, too. That was a real challenge, because Dubrovnik was a seven-hour drive from Zagreb (but only a half hour flight). It was an interesting experience. They wanted the DCM to be the control officer for the VP. I ultimately got to live in a hotel in Dubrovnik for a month during the advance, which was interesting. Fortunately, the USAID mission director was used to being acting DCM and was acting for the month I was gone. We got a fob at that time which allowed us to log onto the State Department system from an internet-connected laptop computer anywhere in the world, which all of us have nowadays but in those days was relatively new. So I was in Dubrovnik, but I had a laptop and I was able to check my State Department email and things like that, and I had a BlackBerry, which was only a little bit reliable. So I could stay in touch with the embassy on unclassified stuff; classified stuff of course I couldn't touch because I was not at the embassy.

So I got to live in the Palace Hotel in Dubrovnik, which was very nice. We had to organize transportation from the Palace to the old town because the hotel was not downtown. We moved a big logistics operation from Zagreb to Dubrovnik with a bunch of FSNs and drivers and cars and the management team and it gradually got bigger as the

visit approached. These VIP visits, presidential level visits, are always interesting because the people who staff them for the White House are not regular government employees. They are usually recent college graduates who have a connection to the party in power somehow, often via their parents. They do not get paid a salary. They do get paid per diem. Since they're not being paid a salary, as they're wandering around looking at where might the vice president or president go and what might he do, they figure if they put in half a day, they're done. So we would work in the mornings. I'd travel with the advance team, "Where might the vice president go" because there was the work element in a nice hotel facility where the meeting would actually happen. But then Cheney was going to spend a night there and Mrs. Cheney was coming, too. So we had to figure out, what might he like to see? Dubrovnik is a great historic city with a lot to see and he was going to be here for a night or so. Not only was it kind of a relaxing period where the work happened mostly in the morning, but a lot of work was visiting tourism sites. That was fine.

I did get to do some regular work. I went to see the mayor of Dubrovnik and talked about the impact we'd have, traffic was going to be messed up for 24 hours, but you'll get great exposure because hundreds of reporters will come along for the gig. If you're going to cause something difficult to happen, at least you can tell them about it ahead of time. I knew from earlier in my career, when the president or vice president comes, logistics and the location just become a mess. Ultimately, we went the wrong way up streets and things like that to get the vice president around. But the citizens of Dubrovnik coped with it. The old town part didn't have any cars, because it was an ancient medieval city without roads wide enough for cars (at certain times of day you could bring in small trucks to deliver goods to shops and things like that). We had to organize how to get the VP from the Palace Hotel to the meeting site in another hotel.

That was a fascinating experience. The head of the advance was also not a regular government employee; he had done advances before, but only domestically, not abroad, so he was kind of new and most of his team were 23-year-old recent college graduates without much experience. I certainly had an opportunity to teach these advance people how the world works. There were things we wanted for the meeting. So this was what the sequence of events would look like, what the schedule would look like, we basically controlled all of this. Sometimes, the Croatians would push back, other times they were fine with the things we wanted. One of the things we wanted, we'd gotten instructions from Washington and it's got to happen the way we want, so I went to a meeting with a foreign ministry official who was there with the advance, and we made the case that this was what we want. Later at lunch, the head of the White House advance said, "You were really tough with that guy. Isn't your job to maintain good relations with foreign officials?"

I said, "No, my job is to achieve our objectives! Maintaining good relations with foreign officials can contribute to that, but that is not the job. We were told this is important, it has to happen this way, so I made that very clear." I think I was able to teach this person a fair amount about diplomacy and how the State Department works, so that was interesting.

Q: Where was Croatia in its eventual accession to NATO at this point?

DELAWIE: It was a couple of years away. I think it joined in 2008, or at least got the invitation in 2008.

Q: So it was visible but still in the distance?

DELAWIE: It was. They were making decent progress, and clearly they were – this was a real goal. They wanted to be part of Europe, they wanted to be part of NATO and the EU. NATO at that time came first. If you look back, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary – NATO came first, before the EU. They were doing a lot of work. Translating laws. We drew on the experiences of the other Eastern European countries that had joined NATO a lot. They were making pretty good progress.

Q: Did they have Dayton Agreement requirements to carry out as well?

DELAWIE: They did. I arrived in summer 2004, the war ended in 1995, not that long before. There were really hard feelings against the Serbs, many of whom – ethnic Serbs – lived in Croatia. They still do today, far fewer than when it was Yugoslavia. But there were human rights obligations that we insisted were important, they had to treat people well, deal with refugees, open the door somehow for people to come back to where they came from, which was not so hard in big cities but in the countryside where a lot of the ethnic Serbs lived and their neighbors were Croats, feelings were still really tough. Remember how bloody the war was, and how many people were killed by their neighbors. This was a giant challenge, we spent a lot of time working on. Key political section and USAID goals were related to ethnic reconciliation. There were some criteria along the NATO path that we wanted them to fulfill. It was a challenge. That experience was very relevant to me when I eventually wound up in Kosovo, the other side of a horrific part of the Yugoslav War period.

Q: I'm sure that ultimately the vice president's visit went well. Were there other regional issues besides NATO that you had to get involved in?

DELAWIE: There was a whole basket of issues left over from the Yugoslav war period. The Croatian government had influence over the Bosnian Croats, and so we talked with them about Bosnian Croat issues and tried to get them to persuade the Bosnian Croats to be more forthcoming on one thing or another. We were in touch with our colleagues in Bosnia frequently on the phone, and similarly issues related to Belgrade. The Croatian-Serbian dynamic was not great at the time. In Belgrade, Đinđić the prime minister had been assassinated the year before I got there. Things looked like they were on an uphill path for Serbia then all of a sudden they went back to the status quo ante after he was assassinated. It was certainly a tough period. We often had démarches to make about these issues. Mostly related to Bosnia and Herzegovina, try to improve things there, unfortunately with limited success.

There were issues related to Slovenia. There was a Croatia-Slovenia border dispute which continues to this day, over exactly where the boundary should be because there was a river between the two countries in some places and unfortunately rivers have a bad habit of moving on their own. Our policy at the time and today is that the boundaries of the states that emerged from Yugoslavia should be the same as they were when they were provinces of Yugoslavia. This was a practical decision, it came from something called the Badinter commission that we ended up endorsing basically because if you change things, it just gets too hard. So let's just say, "okay that was the internal boundary during Yugoslavia, and that should still be the boundary today." Unfortunately, the Dragonja River between Croatia and Slovenia hadn't read the Badinter decision, and it moved. So there's an island or two at the mouth of the river on the Adriatic, there were some changes. Croatia and Slovenia could just never really agree where the boundary should be, and it's still an issue in dispute today. The economic practicality is minuscule.

So we worked on things like that. Then we were trying to sell our EU related issues to Croatia. Not that it was part of the EU, but we knew it was headed in that direction and we would try to make démarches on economic and political things that related to Croatia, because it was writing even at this time laws to implement the EU Acquis communautaire and so we would make many EU-related démarches. Those were some of the main issues. The Balkans embassies were pretty tied up with each other. We talked on the phone with counterparts. We had to, we tried to resolve disputes informally without having to involve Washington. Sometimes it worked better than others, but it was fine.

Q: Were there any public diplomacy major issues you had to deal with? There's always nuisances and frictions, but was there a major thing you had to deal with?

DELAWIE: There were two main things. One was left over from the Croatia-Serbia war. There was this PIFWC issue, which was an abbreviation that was common at the time in the foreign policy community, "persons indicted for war crimes." One Croatian general, his name was Ante Gotovina, had fled. He was indicted by the International Criminal Tribune for the Former Yugoslavia which sat in the Hague. He was indicted and it was the obligation of the Croatian government to catch him and turn him over. I spent a lot of time on that – less than on the NATO basket of issues but certainly some on that. Catching him was a NATO obligation from the U.S. standpoint and from many other key NATO countries. They were not willing to move Croatia forward until it had dealt with some of the problems of the war years, and the biggest was making sure Yugoslav war indictees had been presented for trial in the Hague. That was both public and private diplomacy, mostly private but of course we had to explain why we wanted this guy to face trial. He was viewed in Croatia as one of their kind of George-Washington types, because he was a key general in the fight against Serbia. But there were allegations he had command responsibility for horrific war crimes, and there were plenty of war crimes during the Yugoslav war period by both sides.

We had to defend why we wanted this guy arrested publicly, and we had to encourage the Croatian government to put hands on him privately. Ultimately he was arrested (in Spain, it turns out), but based on information the Croatian government had developed. He was

sent to the Hague. Years later, he was acquitted. That was one of the things we had to work on.

One of the other issues, the Bush administration had at the time a policy of concluding what are called Article 98 agreements. This related to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which the U.S. is not a member of. The idea was that under Article 98 of the ICC Convention, countries could agree between each other not to turn over people the ICC had indicted. The details are lost in my mind of the history of this thing. But basically, the Bush administration wanted to conclude Article 98 agreements with most countries where the alleged thought was that American soldiers who had been engaged in some kind of operations abroad might be indicted by the ICC and if it happened to be in a foreign country we would not want that country to turn him over to the ICC. We would deal with it bilaterally somehow, and if the soldier were alleged to have engaged in some kind of war crimes activity then the United States would deal with it in its own military justice system.

We did frequent démarches, discussions with the Croatian government about concluding an Article 98 agreement. We never did, which is the case with most European countries who did not agree to this. It was something we had to do public diplomacy on, and it was very complicated. You had to be very careful about how you approached it so it didn't look like basically we just wanted to make sure no American ever was tried for a crime – which was of course the way it was being portrayed by other people. We had to do remarks about that a fair number of times.

One of the positive things we had to do PD about which was fun – there are a lot of landmines in Croatia, the Yugoslav army placed them mostly though some were placed by the Croat militia as well. We spent a fair amount of money digging them up – which is painstaking, incredibly dangerous work. There are specialists who know how to do this in the safest possible way but even sometimes they are killed doing this. So we spent millions of dollars a year on landmine clearing and UXO, unexploded ordnance clearance. This was something that was really positive to do PD about. The problem was big at the time, but a lot of these were in isolated places where people rarely went. So you'd work with a government, get our specialists from the pol-mil bureau, and figure out where our highest priority was. You never have enough money to do everything, but you got some money and you put it to the highest possible use. That's typically economic sites – tourism sites, agricultural land, Croatia has a big wine industry so how do you make sure the vineyards are cleared? Every year we'd spend several million dollars on landmine clearance. At the end of every project you got to do PD. Typically the ambassador would do it but sometimes I was chargé and I got to do it. That was fun.

First of all, it gets you out of the embassy and I always felt a day out of the embassy is a day well spent. You go to the land where the mines used to be and you get a demonstration by the landmine clearance experts about what they did and how it was hard, which was fascinating. Every time you see this you admire them so much for the hard work they do. Then there's press. Typically, the mayor of the area would talk about what they would do with the land now that they could access it again. Someone from the

interior ministry would be there, and an American embassy official usually the ambassador or DCM. It was an incredible lesson to me, doing these kinds of things, the importance of the effort that we make in the State Department and in the Foreign Service to make sure we are language qualified for the job.

What happened – I saw this several times – we were always the last to speak because we wanted to ensure local ownership. We paid for it, but the city had to help and the government had to help and of course the charity or private sector company that actually did the clearance wanted to talk too, so we were last; that was the paradigm. What would happen is you'd have these people speak in Croatian for the press, because that's their language. The reporters know what's going to happen, they know who's going to speak and in what order. What always happened was the local people speak in their language, and then you'd hear the cameras turn off before my turn. They figured they couldn't be bothered interpreting a speech by an American official. But you could hear them turn back on as soon as I started to speak Croatian. Now, how many times are we going to be in the news talking about landmines? In Croatia, I don't know whether it made the 6:00 news or not, but if you don't speak the language, you don't get that opportunity. I mentioned before, learning Croatian is the hardest thing I've ever done. This type of event demonstrated to me that it was worth the effort. Not just for me but for the United States. Of course, we want to get credit for spending millions of dollars making Croatia a better place, letting them use their own land productively which they couldn't as long as there were landmines on it. So it happened the same way every time; the Croatians speak, you hear the cameras turn off because they're expecting me to speak English, then they turn back on. I always started off with something that could be skipped, to give them time to turn their cameras back on before I went into the substance of the message, the importance to the United States in helping Croatia enjoy their land. That was an interesting experience.

Q: As a DCM, you had a lot of responsibility for general management of the personnel and their morale. How would you handle the difficult situation of giving bad news?

DELAWIE: I've always felt just as when you deliver bad news to governments, always try to treat your own people better than you treat other people you engage with but still to be direct and clear and up front and not let people stew about what may happen to them. First you try to talk the person into what the answer's going to be, and often you're successful at that. But sometimes you're not and you just have to say – this is exactly what I'd say - "I need this. We have only so many resources, I need to apply the resources to A instead of B. I'm sorry, I know that affects you. I appreciate that. If you can think of another way to achieve our goal without these resources, I'm willing to talk about it and brainstorm with you, but I cannot provide you with these resources, because I need them in some other category." It's important to be straight. I had some personnel issues where people were not getting along with each other that I had to deal with. At one point I had to say, "We either work this out or one of you has gotta go." Fortunately in that case, we were able to deconflict it enough that they could continue to work until the end of their assignments. You have to deal with problems. Problems usually do not get better as time passes; usually they get worse. I think we've all heard stories of ineffective

DCMs who would not solve problems, or couldn't figure out how to solve a problem and therefore didn't touch it. I knew that morale at the embassy was my job and I had to keep it up, and if I didn't solve a problem, morale was going to get worse.

Q: Another issue the DCM has a great deal of responsibility for is what had been called the Mission Program Plan (MPP), but was also changing into a new animal. This was the goals of the embassy put into a basic planning structure that theoretically Washington could then look at, measure, and evaluate how well you were doing. How did that play out while you were DCM there?

DELAWIE: I organized several country-team brainstorming sessions. My goal is to always have a small number of goals. A goal you can keep in your head. For Croatia at the time, our goals were pretty straightforward, and you could put them on a napkin if you had to. Croatia gets into NATO; Croatia's ready to get into the European Union; Croatia is reconciled with Serbia. These were not hard to understand. In more developed countries, sometimes it's harder to figure out what your goals are going to be. Things are generally pretty good; you're working on the margins. In Croatia at the time, there was a lot to do and people cared a lot about it. The Cheney visit was an example; you don't usually send the vice president to a country unless you care about the country. Later Bush came after I was gone. There was a lot of interest in Croatia. Our goals were pretty straightforward. So we had brainstorming sessions with the various sections and we were able to hone in on what our main goals should be, and at that point I set up these little goal teams. You have to have goals, but you also have to have specific objectives, and then indicators – were you successful or not? Mostly I was able to engage at the big level, what are the goals going to be? Then committees from the relevant sections would figure out the specific objectives and how to measure success. At the time, because our goals were pretty clear, it wasn't so tough. I had other experiences where it was a lot harder.

Q: As we're approaching the end of this tour, your family adapted well enough? You're part of a tandem couple so your wife was working, but the children adapted – was that all fine?

DELAWIE: The family was fine. The children did pretty well. I had two jobs when I was in Zagreb, at least the first two years. One was being DCM which should be enough for anybody. Then I also had to be chairman of the school board. This was not something that went along with the job necessarily, but the ambassador had called me before I got there and started off the conversation by saying, "You are going to hate me."

I said, "Oh no, Ralph, why is that?"

He said, "The school is going through hard times, there's a real morale challenge, real divisions between teachers and parents. There are management challenges. You need to fix it. You will have to be the chairman of the school board."

At that time at least, for the school in Zagreb the American ambassador was able to appoint the chairman of the school board.

Q: I never had children – however, at every post I ever served, hearing about the problems of the American school and what the DCM had to do with them filtered through the embassy, whether you had kids or not.

DELAWIE: It's one of the most important morale factors at any post. How's the school? There have been posts in really tough places and some were really attractive for people to go to because they had a good school.

Q: How did you resolve it? I guess it took a rather long time, but how did it get resolved?

DELAWIE: We ended up making management changes at the school. It took a while to get there; that was not my first option. The first option was to work with the management and try to heal the divisions. Basically there were divisions; there were staff who were Croatian and staff who were American, and there was a real division between them. Some of the parents sided with one group and some with the other. It was a tough situation. Some of the board members were American and some were other foreign people, maybe one Croatian. I tried to apply Management 101 to the issue to work with the team at the school and try to get them to resolve these divisions. Ultimately, it was not successful and we had to make significant management changes. It was non-trivial.

At the same time we were trying to get a permanent location (it was a leased space). You never knew when the landlord would say "I need it back." We spent a lot of time working on that. It was a big challenge, and I would tell people at the embassy what I was up to. I was as transparent as I could be about the non-personnel stuff related to the school. But a lot of it was personnel stuff, whether this person was meaner to other teachers or not. You couldn't talk about it. You could say stuff that everybody knows, like "There are divisions at the school and we're working on healing them but it's going to be challenging." I think the staff at the embassy really appreciated what I was doing. It was non-trivial. I would do my job all day mostly at the embassy or doing démarches or public speaking, and in the evenings often I had to go to the school for meetings. But ultimately I think things improved to the extent that by my third year, I could hand off the chairmanship to another embassy employee, who did a good job. I didn't have to be in charge of that any more, which was really good from my standpoint. Being DCM is by itself like a 60-hour-a-week job anywhere, certainly it was in Croatia.

Q: As you're approaching the end of the three years, you and your wife have to think about what's coming next. Three years as DCM, different management challenges. What are you guys thinking about as the next place you would like to go?

DELAWIE: One of the big problems in Croatia as in all the Balkans was corruption. After I left, the entire cabinet and prime minister were arrested for corruption. Shows you the degree of the challenge. Of course we did public and private messaging – corruption is bad, you'll never get into Europe if you don't clean up your act. Often the officials say, "yeah yeah, sure, we'll do it, don't worry" and nothing changes.

But sometimes somebody actually does something about it. The city of Zagreb had a power plant that provided electricity. It was built during Yugoslav times and had the best Soviet technology, and was therefore unreliable and risky. Ultimately they decided they needed a new generator, and GE (General Electric) is of course interested in selling them a generator. This a big multi-million dollar generator. We learned about allegations that one of the other competitors had put money on the table with the deciding officials. One of our jobs at an embassy is to support American business and try to level the playing field for them. This is something I did myself with our Foreign Commercial Service officer colleague (at the time Zagreb was an FCS post, I don't think it is any more). We went to see the head of the electric utility and some other officials in the government, and I said "I've heard these allegations. I hope they're not true. We have an American company, very experienced, they'll do the best job in replacing your generator. I need you to confirm to me that they will have an opportunity to bid fairly on this, and you'll make the decision only on price, quality, and terms. I would hate to have to start talking publicly about this issue."

I had several meetings before I employed the threat. It worked. The other competitor, whether it tried to bribe someone or not I was never sure. But GE won the contract, which was great, and they knew I had helped them. In one of these amazing coincidences a year later, Congressman John Mica is visiting Croatia along with some other members of Congress, and they were going to Dubrovnik of course, because that's where you go, not much to see in Zagreb. I was shepherding this CODEL through Dubrovnik, and we had some meetings because Croatian government officials didn't mind coming to Dubrovnik to have meetings with U.S. congresspeople; they liked Dubrovnik, too. So that's what we would do, CODELs would go to Dubrovnik and Croatian government people would fly down from Zagreb. We had done our meetings for the day, and I was shepherding the CODEL through the old town of Dubrovnik, wandering through a pretty city. It turns out, GE was having some kind of team-building meeting in Dubrovnik at the same time. The same people I worked with on the generator project happened to be walking down the Stradun, the main street in Dubrovnik, and they spotted us. They came up to me and said "Great to see you, thank you for all your help!" and Congressman Mica was standing right next to me. Which was a terrific opportunity.

I said, "Congressman, this is what happened, and this is how we were able to help at the embassy. This is one of our main jobs, to support American exports." If I had spent a month stage-managing the event, it could not have gone better. You never expect to see people you meet by chance in the streets, especially in a foreign country, but I did and it was a great opportunity to educate the congresspeople about the work of embassies supporting American exports.

Another interesting thing in Croatia while I was there… In Pearl Harbor of course many people died in the initial Japanese attack. Among the sailors that died, there were immigrants or the children of immigrants who had come to the United States. One happened to be from Yugoslavia; his name was Tomić and he was an engine-room assistant or something like that. He had saved a bunch of lives but died while doing it. I'm sure there are lots of stories like that from Pearl Harbor. Over the years there was an

effort to catch up on honoring people who performed heroically during World War II. One of the efforts involved this guy named Tomić. Ultimately the Defense Department decided this guy did act heroically and deserved the Medal of Honor, which is the highest U.S. decoration. This guy had no descendants, no family in the United States. But he did have a cousin who had moved to live in Croatia. So DOD said we're going to award this guy the Medal of Honor and will give the certificate to his closest relative, who happened to be a citizen of Croatia, also named Tomić, which is a very common name in Croatia. This was a big deal, because there are only a handful of these medals given out every year in the United States. We would have to work through this very carefully and make sure this relative didn't have any spotty background from the Yugoslav War. Fortunately he didn't. So the decision was made that the award would be given to him, so then you worry, when and how?

It turns out that the *Enterprise*, the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in the U.S. Navy, was going to make a port call in Split, the biggest harbor in Croatia, the home of Diocletian during the Roman era. The *Enterprise* is coming, we have this medal to deliver – why don't we do the ceremony on the *Enterprise*?

That is what happened. It took months to prepare. Not only did I get to visit the *Enterprise*, which I'd never been on before (and is now retired), but to see a Medal of Honor ceremony which is very rare. It was a beautiful day in Split. Ambassador Frank was there representing the embassy; I was just kind of tagging along. It was a terrific experience, and we got a lot of public diplomacy benefit out of this. That was not the motivation, the motivation was recognizing heroism. But still tremendous public diplomacy benefit and a demonstration of the U.S. caring so much about this issue that we would come all the way to Croatia to deliver this, and to do it on one of the most impressive ships ever made. It was incredible to visit the *Enterprise*, which had been built in the early '60s, so it needed a lot more people than a modern carrier would – that was before computers. It was a city – 5000 sailors lived and worked on it. We got a tour of the ship, an incredible day.

One more personal anecdote from this assignment. As I said, getting Croatia into NATO was our number one priority at the embassy, so we had a lot of projects about how to make that likely. One of the projects was to make it easier for the Croatian government to learn from the other Eastern European countries that had come in before. What had the obstacles been that they had overcome? At one point we had a delegation of Baltic government officials, from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. It is led by our ambassador to Lithuania, Steve Mull. He comes along with this tripartite group, and they have a lot of nice meetings with Croatian officials and they talk about how the Americans made us do this and that and the other and it was hard but it's worth it in the end. A couple of good days, I spent some time with them as well. Then they went home. But the participation of Steve Mull turns out to be very important for me, but we'll have to get to that next time.

Q: Today is April 2nd; we're resuming our interview with Greg Delawie as he's preparing to depart from his post in Croatia. Greg, to set the stage again, what year is that?

DELAWIE: Summer of 2007 is when I departed Croatia.

Q: What was next for you?

DELAWIE: I really enjoyed being DCM in Zagreb so I naturally bid on other DCM jobs for my onward assignment. I got on a short list or two and I even got to go Warsaw to interview with the ambassador there to be considered for his DCM. That was the first time I'd been to Warsaw, it was fascinating. I did my interview with the ambassador which I thought went fine, then spent the rest of the day looking at Warsaw and seeing the Warsaw Ghetto Museum, which was incredibly dramatic. But I did not get that job; in fact I did not get any DCM job after that. I ended up taking a job in the spring to be director of the economic bureau's office of trade. I had worked in the trade office before as a deputy division chief; I'd worked in the European bureau on trade issues, so for an econ officer, I was pretty much the trade-focused type as opposed to finance-focused, the two major informal divisions econ people find themselves in.

I left Zagreb over the summer after three really interesting years. Things were on the uphill track between the U.S. and Croatia, and it was disappointing to leave because I could see the next year was going to be particularly exciting, but that's the Foreign Service and my time there was up. We moved back to Alexandria where we lived in the Washington area, and became an office director in the economic bureau. Trade is always difficult to work on in the State Department because the department is not in charge of trade; the U.S. trade representative's office is in charge of trade. My earlier assignment in that same office had been interesting but you were always trying to help out somebody else who was supposed to lead on an issue. That hadn't changed much in the intervening 11 years since I'd left the office, but at least I was the boss and tried to pick the interesting things to work on, and to support the other people in the office.

It was an interesting time. The Bush administration was very interested in free trade. We had negotiated free trade agreements with Korea, Peru, and Colombia. That was one of the highest priorities in the office, supporting Senate ratification of these treaties. Which was always going to be questionable. Trade is always a difficult sell to the public because it looks like you're opening the door to foreigners to sell you their stuff; you never think about the fact that you're getting stuff cheaper than you would if it were made in South Carolina or New England or wherever. But you only think about the jobs your purchases are supporting in China or Singapore or whatever, as opposed to jobs that will no longer exist in the United States. It was always going to be a hard sell.

But anyway, that was the job, to promote free trade agreements (FTAs). One of the main things I did was go on speaking tours of the United States to try to sell these deals, which was kind of fun. As I said before, a day out of the office is a day well spent, and that got me out of the department and to different places in the United States that I'd never been to before. It had me interacting with people in the United States more than I had in my prior jobs. We had a team that supported the FTAs that looked for opportunities for me to speak at Rotary clubs or whatever. We put together a PowerPoint presentation slide deck

that I used, and I would go out and speak. I went to several interesting places like South Carolina. Unfortunately I went there in September and went to Michigan in January; should have been the other way around if we had taken the weather into account, but you take the opportunities when you get them. I'd give a presentation and take questions about why trade is good for the United States.

Q: Quick question: how was it determined where you would go? Who made the choices? Why did you decide on particular places?

DELAWIE: To a certain extent we were looking for opportunities. There was an inter-agency team looking for opportunities. Sometimes somebody from Commerce would go, or from USTR, or me – and sometimes somebody from my staff, it wasn't just me. We had a person in my office who was the main FTA salesman; he was very energetic and looked for opportunities. Brief a state legislative committee, things like that. Sometimes we'd get requests and we'd shop them around in the inter-agency team. Sometimes it was luck, who would go out for requests. It was one of these things where we had someone who was good at getting things done, and he would find the opportunities for me. He drafted the presentation and made the slides, and I'd go and do it. Giving the presentation by that point was pretty easy for me, because I had a lot of experience with public speaking. But of course answering the questions that I would get was harder, that required a lot of prep work. You never knew what question you were going to get, you knew you had to be ready to handle hostile questions, and you knew that trade was always going to be controversial in the United States, at least after the '80s.

Q: I imagine Rotary clubs and chambers of commerce were generally friendly audiences. Where did you go where there were unfriendly audiences? I don't mean necessarily unfriendly, but much more skeptical.

DELAWIE: Good question. I don't remember.

Q: In the back of my mind I'm thinking labor groups or universities where students weigh in on trade versus impact on home industry.

DELAWIE: South Carolina was tough; it was a former textile producer which had lost tens of thousands of jobs in the decades after the war. It was a tough audience. Michigan was tough too because of the car issue.

That was interesting. I enjoyed doing that. I was in charge of this medium-sized office in the State Department so of course I spent a lot of time helping the other people in the office get their work done, and advance. That was challenging. I reorganized the office a little bit. It had been two divisions for a long time, one on developing countries, the other on developed. That became less and less relevant over the years, so we made it one office, with officers that did different parts of the world, which made more sense managerially, I felt.

Q: You certainly would know all the economic benefits of this trade pact. Were there also political issues or questions you had to address that were related to the trade agreements?

DELAWIE: A fair amount, especially regarding Colombia and South Korea. Peru was always less controversial. South Korea was controversial because it was clear their auto industry was definitely on the uphill slope and could out-compete Japan and U.S. manufacturers to a certain extent because of their lower labor costs. Colombia was a challenge for a very different reason. Not so much concern about Colombian industry out-competing American industry; Colombia's main export to the United States was cut flowers, which didn't face a lot of U.S. competition for a big chunk of the year.

Colombia was a problem because of drugs. People had gotten stuck in their minds that Colombia was just a drug state, and Medellin was the drug capital of Latin America and Pablo Escobar was the drug kingpin and had exported billions of dollars of narcotics to the United States. All of which was true; however, this was in the past when I was working on this which was 2007, 2008. Colombia had been transformed to a certain extent. It still had challenges with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) which were resolved later. But it was no longer really a narco-state, in my opinion. You would go talk with people and for years, people who lived in Medellin were under constant threat of being killed. By this time, it was like a normal city. They had infrastructure projects, people walked with their children out in the night; it was a pretty safe place for a developing country.

Colombia had changed but the image had not, so selling this FTA – which was an important part of the administration's support for Colombia, giving them better access to the U.S. market – was part of the administration's plan to give Colombians a bigger economic stake in the success of their country and to help direct the energies of Colombians into more honest, non-narcotics-related businesses. For us it was not just an economic issue; there was this vast political context to it. It became part of other Colombia related things that were going on, too. It was a hard sell because the public had in their mind "Colombia, narco-state; why do anything for Colombia?" As I said before people always think of trade agreements as being a concession to the foreign partner; "why do anything good for a foreigner instead of my own country?" is a thought a lot of people had.

It reinforced to me something which I think I said before: once people have in their mind how they characterize a country, it tends to stick there. Before we were going to Croatia, in the run-up to our move, our friends, especially ones outside the foreign policy community, kept asking us what we were going to do with the children. We said we'd take the children with us. They'd say what about the war? We said the war ended in 1995; this is 2004, there's no more war, it's safe. But the last time Croatia had been in the news there was a war, and that's what stuck in people's minds. The last time Colombia had been in the news, it was a narco-state; that's what stuck in people's minds, even if it was a decade or more later. That is hard to fight, impressions like that.

So I worked on that. We had to get Secretary Rice engaged making phone calls to senators and foreign leaders to make deals; that was always interesting. I did that for a while.

Other interesting things for me in that job, a couple of anecdotes. There was a group called the trade policy coordinating committee, TPCC, an inter-agency assistant-secretary level group. Usually our assistant secretary in EB would go, sometimes he'd take me along and sometimes somebody else would go along, depending on the issue. There was going to be a meeting and suddenly, he couldn't go. So I had to go in his place to this assistant-secretary-level meeting, which was fine because by this time I knew my brief on the trade stuff. But it was really interesting because something came up (and I was THE State Department person there) related to the movement of people, which is not an economic bureau issue in the State Department, it's a Consular Affairs issue. Visas is what it was basically about. There were all these other people from other agencies around the table, and I was the only one who had ever issued a visa, of course, and knew the visa law. My knowledge by this point was kind of rusty, 20 years old, but the fundamentals I think I had. So somebody made this proposal that we should do something or other on movement of people. So I had the opportunity to say, "That's not in accordance with the Immigration and Nationality Act; let's think about another way to resolve this problem." I thought that was an interesting opportunity, something the assistant secretary (a political person) would not have known; he'd never been a vice-consul. That's something that really sticks in my mind from that time and I think it also demonstrates how important it is in the Foreign Service to learn everything you can about everything in foreign policy. Pick up stuff along the way; you never know whether it will be useful in the future, but very often it is.

Another interesting anecdote was the Secretary of Commerce, his name was Gutierrez, at the time wanted to know something about NAFTA. He wanted to know it right now. NAFTA was one of the issues my office covered. It was not super-controversial at that point like it is today, but it was one of these ongoing treaties and every once in a while something would come up that had to be managed. There was one person in our office who was the NAFTA expert. So Gutierrez wants to know something about NAFTA right now, and I was the only one available. I grabbed my colleague who understands NAFTA and we walk to the Commerce Department which is on the other side of the White House from the State Department. Along the way, she briefs me about this issue that Gutierrez wanted to know about.

Q: This is a good moment to ask, in your office I imagine you had both Foreign Service and Civil Service officers. Was some of this institutional knowledge with the civil servants, in other words some of the longer-term treaties that have to be monitored, were they given to civil servants? How did you organize that?

DELAWIE: That would have made great sense, but that's not the way it was done. Typically for NAFTA – so many people worked on NAFTA over the years, you could almost always find a Foreign Service officer who worked on NAFTA during negotiations or during confirmation or whatever, so you wouldn't have to get someone fresh off the

boat and teach him or her all about NAFTA. This NAFTA expert in my office was a Foreign Service officer, but she had worked on NAFTA before, I think in Canada. So she really knew what she was talking about and I knew by this point that I could just count on her. But we didn't know exactly what Gutierrez wanted to know about, so we talked about several things on the way. We came up with an outline – this is all while walking to Commerce – and we got to brief Gutierrez. You don't often get to see cabinet members. I don't think at that point I had ever been in a room with Condoleezza Rice who was my own Secretary, and here we got to brief Gutierrez. So that was kind of fun.

There were several other issues that we worked on. There were efforts to provide trade benefits of one kind or another to Afghanistan, Pakistan, the thought being to make it easier for them to export something other than drugs to the United States. This was an all-hands at that time for how to solve the Afghanistan problem. There were lots of different pieces but the economic bureau had a piece, the trade piece. I don't remember it being successful in particular but it was something Secretary Rice cared about.

Then there was the Latin America piece we worked on. The assistant secretary was very interested in having an association of liberal-trade-oriented countries in Latin America, an ad hoc group with meetings, to encourage the countries like Chile, El Salvador, that had reoriented their economies toward the liberal paradigm from the protectionist paradigm most of Latin America had followed for a while, and try to give them some props, positive public diplomacy, some attention from the administration to encourage the path towards liberal trade and things like that. That was interesting to work on. One of my colleagues did most of the work; she spoke Spanish and understood a lot more about Latin America than I did. At one point I did get to go with the assistant secretary on a trip on this, basically the only time I've been to Latin America. We went to Mexico, El Salvador, and Santiago, Chile. I don't think I was more than 24 hours in any of those three places, I don't remember a whole lot but we had good meetings.

There was a fair amount of churn in the bureau while I was there. The deputy assistant secretary left, there was an acting DAS for a long time, then a new deputy assistant secretary came, so I had three bosses over the course of the ten months or so I was there. It was fine. It was not my best assignment. I felt I accomplished some things but it did not compare to other jobs I had as far as being interesting to me. But that's life.

In the spring of 2008 – I'd been there nine months at this point – I get an email from Steve Mull who's the acting assistant secretary in the pol-mil bureau and had been ambassador to Lithuania when the Baltic States delegation had come to Croatia to talk about NATO preparations. Steve had come along and I'd spent some time with him, as well as going to meetings with the Croatian government officials with these Baltic leaders. This was out of the blue; Steve sent me an email saying, "Are you interested in coming to work for me?"

As I said, I was not actually thrilled with the job I was in and I didn't really know Steve Mull but he seemed like a good guy, so I said "Sure, let's talk."

He had been acting assistant secretary of PM, the political-military affairs bureau, since the last summer. There was no assistant secretary at the time. So I go talk to Steve,. There had been someone nominated but he hadn't been confirmed yet. Steve felt he was doing an awful lot of work running the whole bureau with one other DAS, and for the two of them it was too much. PM manages billions of dollars in the arms trade, every year it manages billions of dollars in foreign military assistance, and all of this stuff has to be approved at a very senior level because of the money which was so phenomenal. There weren't enough senior people to get the job done. Steve explains to me he wants me to be a DAS and to be in charge of management of the bureau, a DCM-type role, and the foreign bases part; PM has an office that negotiates for basing arrangements with foreign countries for the U.S. military bases, and runs the foreign political adviser, the POLAD, program. So I would be in charge of this; I'd run the budget for the bureau, and all of these things.

I say, "Why did you think of me?"

He said, "You remember I came to Croatia with a delegation and I thought you did a great job of running the embassy. Your ambassador told me how proud he was that you did all this great work under difficult circumstances. I need someone, and even though we didn't really know each other except for this one engagement, you're the person I thought of." Also, what we talked about during his visit to Croatia was political-military affairs, Croatia's future role in NATO.

I said, "Okay, sure. What do we have to do? I'll take the job."

It turns out DAS jobs have to go through what's called the D Committee, which is the deputy secretary and the under secretaries. The same committee that picks career people to be ambassadors. Steve says, "I'll propose you to the D Committee and we'll see what happens."

This took a while, a couple of months to get this done. The D Committee doesn't meet every day and everybody on it is really busy. So it's hard to get them together. Then there was the awkward fact that I was an economic officer being proposed for a political-military slot. Ultimately, Steve did the formal written request and he engaged orally with the people to explain, "Yeah, he's an econ officer but I've observed him doing pol-mil work myself and he does a good job."

So I get approved in the summer of 2008 and I move to PM in July or so. It turns out that Steve, the acting assistant secretary, had to go deal with an urgent problem somewhere else. The other DAS, Frank, the SES DAS who's been there a while, had to be somewhere else. So my first day in the pol-mil bureau, I was acting assistant secretary of state. Which was intimidating. I've always been self-confident but that's kind of a jump from being an office director to an assistant secretary. Of course, I'm thinking, "Okay, I don't even know where the offices that belong to my bureau are, I hope nothing happens!" But I knew Steve would only be gone for a few days.

Of course, if wishes were fishes… something does happen and there is a problem. An issue had come up on the Friday before I got there on Monday about an arms-trade issue with Israel. I of course had been studying up on PM stuff for months, but it's different reading about something and actually doing it. I get summoned to the under secretary's office; this is my first morning in PM, I am acting assistant secretary, and the under secretary says "What the hell's going on with this deal regarding Israel?"

I said, "First day, sir; I'll find out and call you as soon as I can." It was a challenge, it was sensitive because it was Israel and because it involved arms. It was an issue we could cope with but I had to figure out who was in charge of the issue in the bureau and get the office director to explain exactly what had happened in terms I could comprehend, and I had to go back to the under secretary and say this is what happened, here's what we propose to do about it, what do you think?

That was a good first day. Educational. It demonstrates to me – by this point I've been in the Foreign Service for 25 years, and fortunately I had a lot of context. Not so much political-military context except for the Balkan-NATO issue. But I had a tremendous amount of context about how the State Department works, about foreign policy in general, even Middle East foreign policy which I'd never actually worked on but of course I read a lot over the years. I was able to cope with this. I of course told the under secretary, "I don't know, but I'll figure it out." It would have been foolish to try to explain something of which I had no knowledge, I knew to admit ignorance and promise best efforts. What else can you do? It worked out; I did not get fired on my first day in PM. And Steve Mull came back from wherever he'd gone, and it was a little more the slope of learning that I'd hoped over the next couple of weeks.

Another interesting thing was – a little context. During the Rumsfeld era, Secretary Rumsfeld had wanted to reduce the number of military officers that were assigned outside of the Pentagon. Especially at State. So he had limited the number of exchange-program people to 50, which I believe was a number that came out of the air. The actual number had been a lot higher, more than twice that of military officers assigned to billets working in the department of State or at an embassy. Rumsfeld leaves, Gates comes, Rice is secretary, Gates and Rice have a great relationship, Gates understands the importance of diplomacy and says "I need more State people to help my commands." Rice is fine with that and says, "We could use more military officers at State to work on stuff that's pol-mil stuff where their expertise would make a difference." So they make a deal.

The Pentagon is so big and they have so many people in the military that they can make a personnel decision and implement it relatively quickly. I have so many friends in the military who find out, next week you're being reassigned across the country or halfway around the world; that's the way it works there. They're used to it. State doesn't work like that. We typically know way ahead of time when and where we're going to move; there are exceptions but usually people know. We got this deal with the Pentagon to ramp up the number of State people (FSOs mostly) assigned to military commands and we've got to implement it. How do you do that? You can't just walk over to personnel and say, "Hey I need 50 people." It doesn't work like that. You have to start with the position. So

the foreign policy adviser, known as POLAD, program sits in PM and there's an office that recruits for and assigns FSOs to be POLADs to military commands. Big commands like the European command or Central Command, and smaller things too like U.S. Navy Europe or a Marine Corps command somewhere, things like that. The big ones like POLAD to the chief of staff of the Army or to the chairman of the joint chiefs are typically former ambassadors who have had decades of experience, and that's what we mostly had. Mostly jobs at the FS-1 or above level.

We make this deal with the Pentagon, we're going to have more, we're going to double the number. Well, there are only so many senior officers around and in fact many of the billets the Pentagon wanted Foreign Service advisers in were not three- or four-star billets, they were one-star billets. Special Ops Command, Europe, or something like that. So we could take more junior Foreign Service officers into these jobs. But we had to acquire the jobs first. Before getting a person you had to have a job. It became one of my responsibilities to work with HR and management and everybody to get 50 more slots that we could allocate to the various commands. After you get the slot, then you have to recruit people to fill the slot. This was challenging for a while. My time in HR helped a lot; the question was never is this a good thing because it was recognized that it was a good thing to have State people in these billets and in exchange we got military officers at State to help with military stuff. But, could we execute it? Could we make it happen?

I had to spend a fair amount of time with HR DASes and with others from management to persuade them if we got these billets, we could fill them -

Q: A quick question here. Did this agreement come with an ability to hire additional people in the Foreign Service to fill in behind those who would now be assigned to POLAD positions? Since the Foreign Service is a small organization, 50 people is not a small number. Those are 50 people who will not go to any other positions in embassies or offices.

DELAWIE: No. At that point it was not my job to find people for the Foreign Service! I have a memory that we were hiring again, a net increase in State Department hiring. Maybe not as big as during the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative years, but some net increase. Of course, new hires could not be POLADS; you needed years of experience in the Foreign Service to be effective in those roles.

Anyway, we (PM) won the agreement of the under secretary for management to create all these new jobs, and we got to start filling them. The way that works, you recruit in the fall and people actually show up the following summer. In working on the foreign policy adviser program, it was really interesting. Sometimes I would just call up people out of the blue and say, "Take a look at this job" or things like that. Most of the recruiting was done by the POLAD office staff, but sometimes they needed extra oomph so I provided that. That was interesting.

The single biggest thing that I worked on in PM was – let me back track. After I'd been there a while, the assistant secretary was confirmed by the Senate and came and we had to help him figure out what he wanted to do. He'd go off and do things and several times I was the acting assistant secretary. By this point, at least I had a vague idea of what I was doing. There were occasionally things I would have to do that fit in one of the other DAS's or the assistant secretary's slots, but if I was acting I had to do it. One thing I remember is, PM has to approve licenses for the export of military technology to other countries. At one point, there was something related to Germany and something had to be licensed to some producer in Germany. The office director of the office that does this calls me and says, "This is a sensitive export; it has to be approved at a political level." I said okay. He said, "You're acting assistant secretary today; it's up to you." I said okay, and what's the right answer. He said, "It's Germany so it's probably fine, but you have to make that decision."

I said, "If it's Germany, I'm pretty sure it's fine. Is that the right answer?"

He said, "Yes, that's definitely the right answer."

So I said, "Go for it, and I'll write an email confirming I agree with this." And I did. There were harder things I had to do but making decisions on the spot based on experience was definitely something I had to do.

The biggest single chunk of issues I worked on was piracy off the coast of Somalia. This had become a big problem very quickly. There had always been piracy off the west coast of Africa, Nigeria area, but all of a sudden Somalia had been in such desperate straits for so long at this point (2008-09) that people were getting in little boats with rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47s and were hijacking these gigantic ships and taking them over and holding them hostage until the owner paid them off. This was organized by groups of crooks who were sponsoring this and paying for the boats and guns which were cheap compared with a $150,000,000 tanker or cargo ship. They would speed up to these ships, then climb up ladders and would take over the ships. It just took six or eight people to take over these gigantic ships and hold them hostage. Ultimately the owners would pay (millions of dollars, typically) to get them released.

The Red Sea is a really important path for stuff from China to Europe and the United States; so many ships went through the Red Sea and Suez Canal, so all these ships were going by Somalia. The technology of the pirates, they would steal speed boats and run them off of these bigger boats so they could prowl in the sea for a while and wait until a big ship came along, and try to hijack it. This was a big problem. It was a new problem. In some countries, piracy wasn't even a crime any more, just because it had fallen off of the legal codes because it had been centuries since there was real piracy. Sometimes the country would rescue the ship and catch pirates and then realize they had to prosecute them as if they had been pickpockets or had mugged somebody in the street because that was the only law that would apply. It was a growing problem. It was dramatized in a popular movie about the hijacking of the *Maersk Alabama* which starred Tom Hanks. It was called *Captain Phillips.* It was relatively realistic, the portrayal in the movie was

relatively real to life and ultimately the captain got rescued by the U.S. Navy and the three pirates were killed by Navy snipers on the U.S. ship, commanded interestingly enough by someone I would later work with.

It was a big problem. The international community didn't know how to grapple with it. There was no organization – the International Maritime Organization didn't move fast enough to deal with this. Because shipping, first of all you have to invest years in advance, the way the industry worked was you had time to deal with these problems, you order ships four years ahead so it had very slow decision-making process in organizations that cared about shipping. That was not going to work in dealing with this problem which came up almost out of nowhere and became a big problem and attracted a tremendous amount of press.

Starting in the fall of 2008, PM gets tagged by Rice to be in charge of this issue for State, and figure something out. So, what do we do at the State Department, we talk to other countries; so let's talk with other countries and come up with some ideas. There was a working group with the Pentagon and Coast Guard and the Justice Department and all these things, and we worked to come up with a list of ideas of what we wanted to happen. How do we make it different from now? Clearly protecting ships is an important part of that, and that falls to the Pentagon to worry about. But there are other things, too. Much of this is going on without me because that's not the part of PM I'm in charge of. The PM team and the assistant secretary start working with other agencies to come up with a list of things, come up with a list of seafaring nations that care about this stuff that we can work with and try and develop ideas. There were lots of ideas. How do you make it harder to hijack a ship? Well, it turns out you cannot put guns on a ship, because most countries didn't want ships coming into their ports with guns on them. It's not just like, "Give the crew some AK-47s and you'll be fine"; the ship has to dock somewhere, offload cargo, get new cargo, and that country probably doesn't want foreigners coming in with serious guns. In any case, these ships are highly computerized, their crews are very small – two dozen people maybe. Most of the crew members are from the Philippines, and they signed up to be merchant seamen, they didn't sign up to be military people. Typically, the captain and one or two officers are Americans or Europeans and they're merchant people not military people. The idea of arming them and everything will be fine, that was never going to fly and didn't make any sense, once you learned the facts about the industry.

Think of the way ships were managed at the time. Nobody thought anybody would try to steal a ship. They weren't built to be protected from theft. There are ladders going down the side of the ship to make it easy in docks for people to get on and off the ship, and ladders are there all the time. They're attached, you can't take them up. So that made it easy for pirates, too. They drive up in their speedboats to the ladder and climb the ladder and they've got AK-47s and all of a sudden they're in charge of a $150,000,000 tanker or cargo ship. So, how can we make it harder to hijack a ship? Removing ladders is one of those things but there are other examples of things you can do to make it harder to steal a ship.

Working with the Coast Guard, Pentagon, Justice, we had to figure out whether we still had laws against piracy; had they been revised since 1842? Were they still relevant? Turns out they were, but that was inertia more than anything else. As I said, in a lot of countries piracy had just fallen off the statute books.

Q: At any point in your considerations, did the Law of the Sea or the organization from that become involved?

DELAWIE: No. I never worked on the Law of the Sea; I don't even know where it sits in the State Department, maybe OES (Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and Science)?

Q: Or L (Legal Affairs)?

DELAWIE: So, no.

Anyway, ultimately we work up to having a meeting of seafaring nations. We have a list of things we hope to achieve. It's an ad hoc meeting, not under any organization, just "hey why don't you come." We make a deal with the UN to use their rooms, but it's not a UN organization we're trying to create, it's not under UN auspices, we're just using their room. We get 25 or 30 countries to come and talk about the issue, and we agree on a list of things we will try to do. There's protection of the ships, prevention of hijacking, prosecution of pirates you're able to catch, and things like that. We had pretty good conversations. This is mid-January of 2009.

In the meantime, we had an election in November; Obama was elected. The Republicans were on the way out. So the last big thing the assistant secretary of PM does is this meeting. I go along to New York to lobby and manage and do things to help manage the meeting and talk to participants, but he's of course in charge, he's the boss. As I say, good meeting but that's the end for the Bush administration.

January 20 rolls around, Obama's inaugurated, we get the new team. By this time Steve Mull has been acting under secretary for international security affairs, T, for a while. I see him and ask him, how do you want to handle this?

He said, "You're in charge of piracy Greg. Another DAS will be acting assistant secretary but you're in charge of piracy; figure it out."

Anyway, we of course had a team of career people in PM who have learned all about this. Nobody knew about it, you had to learn. We got some help from HR. I got an FSO who had to be back in Washington unexpectedly, and recruited him to work on piracy. There were several senior Civil Service employees working on this. We had this pirate unit set up in PM to work on all these things. Over the course of the spring, this just dominates my effort. We have meetings in Berlin, Cairo, New York. We try to make progress. In the meantime, there's a new cast of characters, political bosses, coming in. Sometimes they have different ideas. I remember one meeting I was in in Cairo where all of a sudden I had to change my position on one issue based on new instructions while I was there. That

was a little awkward. But sometimes that's the way it is for career Foreign Service officers like me.

I worked very hard with the Pentagon and developed great relationships with their people on this. I got to brief Congress a lot, the foreign affairs and military committees in the House and Senate. Which was interesting, because they had to learn about his stuff, too. None of us knew when we started this much of anything about piracy, and we gradually accreted knowledge as we worked on it, but other people didn't know much about it including our representatives and senators. I briefed them a lot on what we were doing and how we were dealing with this problem. I remember one briefing where the question is, these ships being hijacked are all registered in Panama or Liberia, not in the United States, even if they're owned by American companies. That's the way shipping works. So one congressperson said, "Why not just require all American owned ships to have the American flag, and if pirates see the American flag on the ship, they won't hijack it?"

I said, "Congressman, how you flag the ships is beyond my remit, that's not a PM issue. But I can tell you, pirates attacked a German naval vessel. These people are uneducated; they could not tell a navy ship from a commercial ship. The idea they would recognize the American flag and take a different action because the flag is on a ship isn't going to happen."

Q: Did you have private industry people, transportation and so on, involved? Or was it more something that governments had to figure out and once figured out, bring the private industry in?

DELAWIE: The private industry was definitely involved. The shipping associations. The Coast Guard people knew how ships worked, they were the expertise originally. But you had to bring in the industry people because you had to find out what was realistic. Was it realistic to take these ladders off the sides of ships? You have to get industry to tell you. Are there non-lethal weapons like things that project loud sounds; would that count as a weapon? Would the crews be comfortable using it? There were thoughts about putting American soldiers or Coast Guard people on some of these ships, the American ones at least, to protect them. But no-one wanted to start shooting wars with the pirates. We had to go through all these things with the shipping association people, what is and is not realistic, what do you want? It was a giant effort. A lot of it was done by people that worked for me. Stuff would filter up to me, and probably the bad ideas were eliminated before I ever heard them. Things that kept coming up often like "let's put guns on the ships" kept coming up, almost all from people who had no idea how the shipping industry worked and who was crewing these things. It was fascinating.

It was a difficult time. The *Maersk Alabama* was hijacked in the spring time frame. Then the captain was rescued by the U.S. Navy; that increased the attention on the seventh floor. We got requests for a briefing from Secretary Clinton and then she was satisfied with what we were doing and said, "Keep doing it, do more, and talk about it more publicly."

Q: Can you describe any of the changes that were made to protect against piracy?

DELAWIE: There were straightforward things like making it harder to get on a ship when it's at sea; take off the ladders, put up harder things to get over the perimeter of the ship. Make sure the doors inside can be locked. But these are commercial ships; they are not armored. That's why nobody wanted to start shooting at the pirates if they could avoid it because the pirates could shoot back and the bullets would probably go through the skin of the ship. There were tactical things. There were other things like better coordination. Let's have a better coordination among ships with a task force set up in the region. The ships report in when they enter the danger zone, report out when leaving the danger zone – which is big, unfortunately, the size of Texas. I used that in a congressional briefing once. A congressperson said, "Why can't the Navy just sort this?" and I said, "The area we're talking about is literally the size of Texas. Even if every single U.S. Navy ship was there, you couldn't cover everything." One of the disadvantages of looking at flat maps is vast areas like the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, look pretty small, when really they're pretty darn big. Another key thing to know is that the sea in the region is full of ships and boats, fishing boats, passenger boats, merchant vessels, and the pirate boats are basically indistinguishable from the other boats until the pirates pull out their weapons. So radar can't really be used to identify pirates; you had to catch these guys in the act to know who they were.

Q: All the piracy that was of concern was in that area, east of Africa?

DELAWIE: Right, all off the east and north coasts of Somalia, basically, the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea.

The military sets up an operations center. Here's the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea there. This is the problem area. There's a lot of ocean between here and India. As I said, as the technology of the pirates improved, they would steal bigger ships that could hang out at sea for a while and could run the little pirate ships off of them. The danger zone was pretty darn big.

So you set up a notification system for commercial vessels to notify the regional op center. You have military people from various nations standing by. You have navy ships that could get to some places in the danger zone quickly – but not to all because the territory's so vast. You have surveillance systems and things like that. These were all things we were working on. Some had more to do with the State Department and some more to do with the Pentagon. NATO set up a task force to deal with the issue so there was direct mil-mil coordination between the U.S. and Germany and France, et cetera. We even had coordination with non-NATO allies that had significant naval capabilities, which was interesting and was the first time we'd done a lot of that. Basically joint military ops with non-traditional allies.

It was a fascinating time. I learned a lot. There were meetings that came up all of a sudden. I remember one night, at noon on one day we decided we had to get together with the key countries, Germany, France, the UK, and us on the issue and we needed to

meet on it in person. It had to be in Berlin, was the only place, and I had to be there tomorrow. That type of thing happened a couple of times as we were trying to coordinate this group of 30 countries, but there were only a handful that could make decisions relatively quickly.

Q: Like an executive committee.

DELAWIE: Yeah. Remember this whole group of seafaring nations is not formal, it's show up if you care and we can do something. Consultative group, we called it. CGPCS, Consultative Group for Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.

That was a fascinating time. I got to work on stuff I'd never worked on before, which is always fun and interesting. We ultimately helped accomplish a fair amount – all of us, not just State Department people.

Q: Has piracy actually been reduced as a result of the coordination?

DELAWIE: There are a lot of reasons. I believe, though I left that job partway through this exercise so I kind of lost the thread, unfortunately. There were also legal things we were trying to get, trying to get countries especially in Africa to put piracy in the statute books. Sometimes you'd pick up these pirates and arrest them, and what do you do with them? Some were actually prosecuted in the United States, if there was a nexus to the U.S. But if there was no nexus to the U.S., like no American on the ship and not American owned, then you couldn't prosecute them in the U.S. So I had to learn about that, with the help of the Justice Department. And then, how do you transport the pirates from the navy ship of the U.S. or some other country to somewhere where they could be prosecuted? Lots of issues we had to deal with that were clearly State Department issues and not Pentagon issues. How do you persuade countries to beef up their anti-piracy laws, and then persuade them to take defendants to be prosecuted? Non-trivial, because that costs money. How do you preserve evidence, all these things that I was obviously not a specialist in but we had Justice Department people who worked on those issues who could help us. How could we help Kenya beef up its laws and its ability to prosecute people so we can give these pirates to Kenya, things like that. It was a multi-faceted thing that we had lots of people working on. I and the DAS at the Pentagon were kind of the people in the government in charge of the whole thing.

It was fascinating work. Work I never expected to do. Afterwards, people asked me what I did in PM, I'd talk about piracy and they'd say, "You mean like compact disks or software?"

I'd say, "Well no, actually. Traditional piracy, not intellectual property rights piracy."

And then helping to run the bureau. Finally the acting assistant secretary, the SES DAS, got assigned to Afghanistan, and once again I was acting assistant secretary and the only DAS. I was trying to run the bureau. I was in charge of counter-piracy and had to run the bureau and I was the only DAS-level confirmed person in the bureau. I couldn't do

everything as acting assistant secretary because there is a law that says certain functions of a bureau can only be executed by the confirmed assistant secretary or the principle DAS. There were some things I could not do myself that I had to take up to the under secretary. There was an acting under secretary, Rose Gottemoeller; she was actually the assistant secretary of the arms control bureau. She was about the second State Department person confirmed after Clinton because it was her main job to negotiate the new START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) agreement. As soon as she becomes confirmed assistant secretary she also becomes acting under secretary while we're waiting for the under secretary Ellen Tauscher, a former Congresswoman, to be confirmed. Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller of course is devoting most of her time to the new START agreement, but legally she's the only person who can sign some of these export control licenses that meet certain thresholds and have to be signed by a Senate-confirmed official or that person's deputy. So I had to go and explain these things to Rose and say, "this is the right thing to do because." Of course to do that I had to understand them, so I had to learn about them even though I didn't have the authority to act on them myself.

That was a challenge. Frank the SES DAS understood all this stuff, he'd been there for a long time and it was easy for him. But then he left.

The advantage of all this is I got to know Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller. She negotiated the new START agreement. She did such an incredible job, she impressed me so much that I said someday I want to work for that person again. But I didn't have a whole lot of time to think about it because I was so busy doing these other things I was in charge of at the time.

Another big contribution I made to the bureau I think was to work on morale. It had significant morale challenges. When there was time, and I would love to have just sat on the couch and rested for a little bit, I recognized there were 300 people in the bureau that it was my job to take care of. I would wander around the department, not just main State, some were in annexes as well, and chat with the staff. How're you doing, how's it going? You're doing a terrific job. That kind of thing. I figured, that's my job, I have to do it. I didn't think a whole lot about it at the time, I just did it. But later it came back to me that no-one had done that. So I felt particularly good about that. People work so hard in the State Department, and some of these issues are incredibly complicated, and mostly they get worked out right. By the time it got to me, it seemed like it should have been easy; probably it wasn't easy. It was probably really hard but the team figured it out and came up with the right solution. So I did a fair amount of management by walking around, morale building, just chatting with people.

Q: Is there anything about the inter-agency process other than what you were doing on piracy that's worth noting?

DELAWIE: PM was, still is, the main liaison between the State Department and the Pentagon and there were always things going on. These basing issues I talked about, we had a negotiator, a former ambassador, and a small team of people to renegotiate basing

agreements, SOFAs (status of forces agreements). In Germany it had been around forever and it was fine, but there were others – sometimes, the DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) wanted to put a counter-narcotics airplane in Latin America somewhere, it needed an agreement. It was PM's job to deliver that agreement. We had a team that worked on that.

There were regular meetings the assistant secretaries just had to go to at the time, several a week, if only by dint of being acting assistant secretary you had to go and show up to coordinate within State with the secretary, or with the inter-agency on a variety of issues, some of which by spring I knew about and others I was still uneasy on. It was a giant challenge just because of the lack of senior people to work on these issues. Ultimately, things would get better but there could be no more permanent DASes in my bureau until there was a confirmed assistant secretary. The assistant secretary had to pick the DAS and couldn't before he or she was confirmed by the Senate. There was a lengthy period where I was in charge, the only DAS, there were a couple of SES office directors who were helping make decisions they could, but a lot of it was on me. Then finally someone is nominated to be assistant secretary and is confirmed relatively quickly, but there's this process leading up to nomination. At this point, people are picked informally, they get briefed before they're announced, and then they're announced and you brief them some more, but they cannot act, they cannot do anything. They couldn't hire a secretary, they couldn't do anything until confirmed by the Senate. So we have this new nominee and I brief him on what the bureau's doing and what I'm doing. Finally, he is confirmed.

Like most assistant secretaries, he wants to pick his own team, and I'm not on that team. I was expecting this. I knew I was going to be out of a job – I didn't know when, because I didn't know when this person was going to be confirmed, but he told me I should start looking for another job in the State Department. That's how I phased out of the PM bureau. Assistant Secretary Shapiro was confirmed, and he had a nice farewell for me, and I left.

But during this departure period I was still working on piracy, and I was looking for my next job.

Q: As you were looking for the next posting, were you looking for particular kinds of jobs?

DELAWIE: Well, I was interested – I liked being a DAS, it was a good job, I was interested in being a deputy chief of mission somewhere since I had enjoyed that in Croatia. But something came up, unexpectedly. That turned out to be Berlin. The person who'd been picked to be DCM in Berlin got tagged to be an ambassador in the Balkans. So all of a sudden it's the summer of 2009 and the DCM job is vacant, or will be soon, in Berlin, and the ambassador left at the end of the Bush administration and the existing DCM who was chargé had an onward assignment he had to get to. There was a very compressed period in which they were looking for a DCM for Berlin. Of course, Germany being one of the most important countries in the world, it's important to have good people on the staff there, and they need someone in a hurry. So I find out about this, and I bid on the job. Fortunately, an ambassador has been nominated for Germany, a

political appointee of course, and I make it through the process to be on the short list to be DCM. I interview with the ambassador and he picks me.

At this point it's July. We've got two children.

Q: How old are they now?

DELAWIE: At this point our daughter is 15, our son is 12. School starts in Berlin in the middle of August. My wife and I think, if we're going to disrupt our children's lives by making them move to a foreign country they've never been to, at least we can get them there on the first day of school.

This has all come up so fast. Our medical clearances had all expired, the diplomatic passports had expired. Germany's part of the Schengen arrangement so you need a Schengen visa to go there as a diplomat to be assigned there. It's one of these EU processes that take a while; you have to allow 10 work days to get a Schengen visa. But we have to pick a school, there are two schools in Berlin that the U.S. embassy particularly uses. There's the John F. Kennedy School, of course named after the president, a joint German-American public school created pursuant to a treaty believe it or not. And there's another school called Berlin Brandenburg International School which is private. You have to pick, you have to talk to the parents, but of course I'm going to be the boss of these people. You try to ask questions, "I'm not asking as a boss, I'm asking you as the parent of kids in the school, what do you think?" It was a difficult period. Of course, I hadn't spoken German in 25 years at that point, I managed to come here to FSI for an hour or two a day, three days a week, to talk to German instructors to start to recover my ancient German. Trying to get things ready to move abroad. And all this happens in one month, basically.

Somehow we made it. The former DCM had to leave to go to his onward assignment as a foreign policy advisor, interestingly enough. They brought in a temporary chargé who happened to have been my ambassador in Zagreb, when I ended my assignment there. He was chargé for a few weeks in Berlin after the DCM left. Then Ambassador Murphy, confirmed as ambassador to Germany, shows up in Berlin and takes over, which means the temporary chargé can go, and I show up a week later. The day before school starts.

Just the personal logistics was phenomenal. We did not pack out our house at that point; there was just no way. We did that later, mostly my wife did that later.

We show up in Berlin, take our children to the first day of school.

Q: Which school in the end did you pick?

DELAWIE: The international school. Mostly because it had the international baccalaureate (IB) program which our daughter was interested in. The other school, the Kennedy school, had the advanced placement program, two different things, both fine, but she wanted this IB thing.

I can tell you, it is not ideal for an ambassador and DCM to show up within moments of each other at a new post. I think we handled it well, the ambassador was great, but it was a shock. Mission Germany had 1600 employees and they'd been without an ambassador for seven or eight months at that point, they'd had a chargé for a long time. Working on things, but then they had to adjust to a new ambassador and they had to adjust to a new DCM, too. I'm sure it was a challenge. Ambassador Murphy came in with the idea we needed to rebuild relationships with Germany that had been affected by the dispute over Iraq between the U.S. and Germany. We were not super popular in Germany at the time because of this, the poll of attitudes, "Do you have confidence in the United States?" the numbers for Germany were around 15 percent. The ambassador wanted to reassure Germans that we cared and wanted to work together with Germany. Reassurance required a lot of personal talking, privately, publicly, press. He was out constantly doing stuff. Our numbers really did go up, if you look at that poll about confidence, the next year it was up above 80 percent, the first year of the Obama administration.

Q: That's remarkable; it's rare you can move the needle that quickly.

How was your wife's employment handled?

DELAWIE: She was working at this point in the HR bureau as a career development officer. She had been assigned somewhere else, OES it turns out, to be an office director. But she broke that assignment. She continued to work in HR for a while, while we tried to sort things out. We were expecting she'd have to go on leave-without-pay (LWOP) to join me in Berlin. Ultimately, she managed to work for the ISN bureau, international security and non-proliferation. They offered her a Washington job that she could mostly fulfill from Berlin, running part of a program called export control and border security, EXBS. We had EXBS for a long time in Europe, it does things like train customs officers and provide equipment like X-rays and radiation-detection equipment, and the goal is to build capacity among countries to intercept bad stuff going across borders. Typically, radioactive stuff or terrorist-related stuff. That's what it was oriented towards, not so much towards drugs, that's a different bureau. EXBS is border security. The big fear is radioactive materials would cross a poorly controlled border and be used for terrorist purposes. That's what the program is about. When the Eastern European countries – Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary et cetera – had joined the European Union, Congress had said "You're EU members, let the EU take care of that border security" and told the State Department to get out of that job. So we had reduced significantly our work on the new EU states. It turns out we got new instructions later from Congress that they weren't happy with the job the EU was doing on this, so we had to get back into the game.

It's at that point that Vonda got her – the first of her jobs she got in the State Department cafeteria while chatting with someone she knew in ISN, and he said what are you going to do about Berlin, and she said, "I don't know, maybe leave without pay." And she gets offered a job – how about being the EXBS manager for the new EU member states? "Sure."

It turns out to be six months after I got there that she started on the new job full-time. She's traveling to Germany a lot, it's not ideal but it all works out in the end. So she did that for two and a half of the three years we were in Germany.

Q: So she's based in Washington but travels regularly to Germany?

DELAWIE: The job is a Washington job but she executes it from Berlin. She travels to Washington every two or three months, she's on the computer a lot, but travels a lot in Eastern Europe, which is not so far from Berlin, to do these EXBS programs. It turned out being pretty fun for her, too. The important thing is there's no way she can work in Mission Germany because I'm DCM and there would have been nepotism problems. So she's on a Washington billet. The practical difference is relatively small because she's mostly in Berlin but if she were on a Berlin billet (which would have been impossible) she would have gotten a cost-of-living allowance and all these other things, which she couldn't get. But it's fine because I got them. By this point, everyone in the State Department had these fobs that let you log on to the unclassified system from your laptop, so she did a lot of work at home.

Our house, the DCM house in Berlin, was in Dahlem, a beautiful suburban area of Berlin where the U.S. military used to be when there were 6000 soldiers in Berlin, in that area. It turns out that a chunk of the embassy is still in this area, in what's called the Clay Compound, named after Lucius Clay, the commander of U.S. forces during the Berlin air lift. That's where the consulate is for the embassy and there are other offices there, too. That's four blocks from our house, so when she needs to use the classified system she can get on her bicycle, ride to the Clay Compound, and log on to the classified system there. It was extremely convenient. But most EXBS work is unclassified so she didn't have to do it that often.

That was how we started.

Q: Today is April 12th, we are resuming our interview with Greg Delawie as he begins work as DCM in Berlin.

DELAWIE: Last time I started with our arrival in Berlin and how it was when the Ambassador and DCM arrived within a week of each other, which is not ideal for the embassy. I thought I would pick up by talking a little bit about the job of DCM in Germany. Then I've got several anecdotes that I'll go through.

I should start by pointing out I'm coming from my own prejudices and my thinking that I did a decent job in Berlin; just to put that right on the table. I think the most important thing to recognize about being deputy chief of mission at an embassy, is that the job is to be chief operating officer of the embassy; to make sure everything gets done, to be the intersection of policy and resources, to try to fulfill the ambassador's desires, and to maintain contact with people in Washington who are involved in issues related to the

country. Of course, that is not just the State Department, it's the White House, and the other agencies that play an important role. So Germany, at the time I was there, was a gigantic mission. We had 1600 employees, about six to 700 Americans and the rest mostly Germans; it was deployed across the entire country. Berlin, of course the capital, was where the embassy was, but the biggest post was the consulate in Frankfurt, which is now located in the former 97th general hospital there. It was so big not because we had so many State Department people, but because it was the European headquarters of most U.S. government agencies that have a presence in Europe and in fact, Europe, Africa, and South Asia. So, we would have the internal revenue service, we would have the general accounting office, we would have state communications people that manage the Europe-wide and Africa-wide communications network, all sorts of things were in Frankfurt.

Q: And why Frankfurt, is a Africom there?

DELAWIE: Africom is in Germany, it's in Stuttgart. So, why Frankfurt? For one, we had a lot of real estate in Frankfurt that we inherited from the U.S. army, the U.S. military from the cold war times. Secondly, it's got the biggest airport on the European continent and you can get nonstop from Frankfurt pretty much anywhere in the world. So it's a very convenient location, great logistics. So, the consulate in Frankfurt is actually bigger than the U.S. embassy if you look at headcount. Then there's a decent size consulate in Munich. A consulate in Hamburg that's smaller; and a smaller consulate in Dusseldorf. And the small consulate in Leipzig, which is the only outpost other than the embassy that is in the former East Germany. So, that is the layout.

So being DCM in Germany is supervising of course the rest of the embassy, and supervising all five consulates. It is an executive leadership job; it is a management job; it's a job where you're supposed to get things done. There were some people who were not wild that I was picked to be in this job because I was not in the German club as we talked about last time and had not served in Germany or really even much been in Germany in almost 25 years. But there were Foreign Service Officers in the embassy who knew a whole lot more about Germany than I did. Which was fine; that was their job. It was not my job. Of course, you want the DCM to become an expert on the country, to become an expert on the policy, and to be able to interpret what's going on.

But you don't hire the DCM necessarily because he is already the expert on the country. That's not the DCM's job. There are other jobs in an embassy where that is desirable, of course. So this reflects back to my experience in Croatia as DCM. When I arrived there it was the first time I had set foot in the Balkans. Once again, I was not the expert on Croatia or the Balkans when I arrived, although by the time I left, I knew an awful lot. Likewise, in Berlin I grew in knowledge over the course of my three year assignment, and I think pretty quickly. My German came back, although I had to work on it constantly because it had been almost 25 years since I'd really spoken German.

But it's essential to speak German to work in politics and economics in Germany. I always felt that was very important. Yes, most Germans speak some English because they typically start learning English in the first grade in elementary school, but like

anybody, they're more comfortable speaking their own language and if you are on their turf, then it behooves you to speak to them in their own language. So my German came back; it's not great for public speaking for a while, but I worked on it constantly, reading the papers every single day. I listened to the radio all the time. I always started a conversation in German. A lot of times my interlocutors would continue. Sometimes they would switch to English, which was frustrating, but I went along because it was my job as a diplomat to communicate. And if the person I'm talking to wants to communicate in English well, so be it.

Q: Once again, you've arrived there in summer 2009.

DELAWIE: Yes. Obama had been elected almost a year before. We were on a mission, the ambassador and I, and of course the whole rest of the team, to improve relations between the U.S. and Germany, which had been damaged significantly by the Iraq war experience.

Q: Take a moment to just sum up quickly where Germany was on the whole issue of our presence in Iraq at the time you arrived?

DELAWIE: Germany had never participated in the Iraq expedition. There were NATO missions in Iraq by the time I got there, with German support, because NATO is a consensus organization and everybody has to be in to make a decision. But I don't think there were any Germans soldiers in Iraq during the entire period. The level of trust of Germans in the United States had fallen precipitously since the Iraq experience. It was certainly at a height after 9/11, when people were piling up flowers outside the gates of the U.S. embassy and expressing constant solidarity with the United States, working with the United States to help get us back on our feet. For instance, the only time that NATO article five has been invoked in the history of the Washington treaty was by the United States; when we requested the assistance of our allies, one of the important things that amounted to was that AWACS, airborne warning and control system aircraft, that were owned by NATO, were flown to help protect the United States.

There were German crews on some of these aircraft. Then, as we entered the Iraq adventure confidence in the United States started to go down in Germany. There's a non-governmental organization called the German Marshall fund of the United States, which does a survey of attitudes in the U.S. and Germany every year. Confidence in the United States on this annual survey had plummeted to the 20% range during the last part of the Bush administration. So that was the challenge we were facing. Germans didn't trust the United States to make the right decisions. Our goal was to try to persuade Germans that we were doing the right thing and we would keep our word and things like that. There were so many important things that we were working on with Germany, this was vital, it was not just, Oh, we want to him to like us because it's friendly.

We want Germans and the German government to trust the United States so that we can better achieve our objectives. Germany was deployed in Afghanistan; I think at the time it was the third largest troop contributor in Afghanistan. Germany had key economic

links with Iran and we were trying to squeeze Iran on the nuclear issue; Germany could help an awful lot on that. There was climate change, Germans were key in the global climate discussions; Germans care an awful lot about climate and the government reflects the population's concerns about that. And then some of the key scientists that had been studying climate change happened to be German and work in German institutes, mostly in Potsdam near Berlin.

So all of these things were really important to the Obama administration. Nothing was super bad at that point, except Germans didn't trust us. They were working with us on Iran. They were working with us in Afghanistan, but they didn't trust us and we needed to regain the trust. Of course, the lead person in regaining trust was president Obama, because he was very popular in Europe, certainly in Germany. And on this survey, of the German Marshall fund of the United States, trust in the U.S. went from below 20% to above 90%. So obviously Obama helped and he carried the most water, but we felt it was up to us at the embassy to work on this too. So the ambassador was out all the time. Every night, three events was typical. There were national day receptions. There were rotary clubs. There were German American foundation things. There were speeches. So there was always something to do; he would get invited or we would solicit invitations, to get him out. Because he's a great public speaker, a very compelling person. And we knew that if we would get him in front of people they would respond, probably positively. So he was a pro, he would show up and he'd give remarks and chat with people and everyone thought that, gosh, what a natural diplomat that guy is; and he was really a natural, but there was also an awful lot of prep work for every single one of these events. We basically needed a full time speech writer to prepare remarks for three or more events every single day, or at least every work day since Germans don't like to work so much on weekends. That was complete change from his predecessor.

Q: In talking about the preparations you made for the ambassador, by 2009 embassies have their own website and by 2009 they can also begin putting together other social media sites. Did that begin ramping up in the U.S. embassy in Germany with, with this ambassador?

DELAWIE: It did. I've got an anecdote about that and I'll get to that shortly. Now of course the ambassador's out of the embassy at a lot of public events, and of course he had private meetings too. He met all the ministers within a week or two, the deputy ministers, etc. He is going out a lot. I think I make quite a contribution here because of course he's new to the government. He's never worked at an embassy before. He never worked for the U.S. government. So we meet every single morning and talk about what's going on. We would typically include the political counselor and the economic counselor. Both had terrific experience in Germany. And we included the entry-level officer that was managing all the paper; because every single meeting had a short paper.

Short was the key word here. The ambassador was one of these people who thought if you could not say it in one page, don't bother. So I had to educate the embassy about preparing him for meetings; one of the great temptations in any field when you're briefing someone is to want to say everything you know. Of course, usually that's not what people

need for an effective meeting. They don't need to know everything. It's the political officer's job to know everything. As boss, it's my job to take what I need from you to achieve my objectives. When we started we were getting these three to four page briefing memos for half hour meetings. Clearly the staff was trying to be helpful, but I had to help them readjust and limit the time people spent on these things.

Now unfortunately, sometimes it does take longer to write a short good memo than a long less good memo. But once people got the code, that one page is fine for almost any meeting then they were happier. But it took a while for people to get used to that and for people to focus on what was the important thing. All of these papers would cross my desk in route to the ambassador; in the beginning I was sending a lot of them back. I mean, I rarely actually sent them back. I would always go and talk to the drafter and say what was needed; it's really frustrating to get a note from the boss that you don't really understand. So I would take them back and say, look, what are the three most important things the ambassador needs to say?

That is what needs to be on this memo. Also, what he should watch out for; what might come up that we don't really want to come up, but he's got to be prepared anyway. And what does he say if that happens? The ambassador also really wanted some bio information about people he was meeting; not just what part of Germany he's from and his political history. Also what's something interesting about him, he plays tennis or was in the theater before; something different. That was an adjustment because the new ambassador wanted to be able to connect with people and to begin to form a personal relationship as well as a professional relationship with people.

So for all of these things we had to change the embassy mentality very quickly. It was a little disruptive at the beginning. People were uncertain. They were trying to get used to the new ambassador and the new DCM, which was hard. And then these new people wanted everything different. So we did town hall meetings. I saw people every day. I generally walked to people's offices to talk with them, especially if on an issue of concern so that they wouldn't have to come up to the front office, which while beautiful, was very imposing architecture.

After a couple of months people got used to us. The ambassador understands what he can get from the embassy; he knows whom to ask when he's got a question or a problem. It was always my desire that the ambassador have relationships with all the key people in the embassy, not just through the DCM. I know other people approach that job differently, especially with political ambassadors. I had no ego problems as far as that was concerned besides I had a full time job, managing these 1600 people at the mission.

There were plenty of other people who could tell the ambassador about visas or German politics or commercial affairs or something like that. In the beginning I would sit in on these initial meetings with the section heads, just to see how they approached things and to ask questions about things the ambassador might not know, especially if there might be jargon involved. But after a while I typically did not sit in on informational meetings with the ambassador. I always asked people to back brief me: How did it go? What questions

did the ambassador have, etc. So I would know. But we had plenty of senior people at the mission, all of the section chiefs except me in fact, were minister counselor level people. I was not. Nearly everyone I supervised outranked me theoretically, although that would change during the course of the tour. I knew after a while I could count on people to do the right thing and to give the ambassador reasonable advice.

One of my great lessons from Germany was you could really count on embassy people to do the right thing most of the time. Now, I think I said, when we were talking about my being DCM in Croatia, that I learned I didn't have to solve every problem because there were smart people who would come up with solutions that would be fine. In Germany I really took the next step; in Germany I learned that I did not even have to know about the problem sometimes. If there was a bad problem, it was likely that one of the minister counselors, or a consul general would figure it out, solve it, and tell me about it afterwards. It took a while for me to be okay with that. But you know, you gain trust in people and then you let them do their jobs; you hire people to be smart.

Hopefully you hire people who are smarter than you are to do a better job than you would. So even though the job was much bigger than in Croatia, there was a lot more help. Now every once in a while some gigantic problem would come up and land on my desk; if it came to me without already being solved by a minister counselor, it was a really bad problem.

Q: You said that you would go back to the issue of how the embassy was beginning to use social media and so on.

DELAWIE: Right. The ambassador and I had been there three or four months and then the State Department's undersecretary for public diplomacy, Judith McHale at the time, decided it was time to look at the range of PD across the world and to figure out what our resources were and how to apply them to the best possible end. Which was perfectly reasonable for the new team to want to do. What ended up happening is that they decided that they should spend 30% less in Germany, and apply this, which turned out to be a million plus dollars, elsewhere in the world where there were more challenges, and more money was needed. So, in November 2009, the ambassador gets a call from the undersecretary for public diplomacy saying we needed to come up with a plan for cutting 30% from our PD budget. Now that was a gigantic challenge, because in PD at the time, most of the money of course went to pay salaries for local employees. Some of the money went for programs and things, but people were the biggest category of expenditures.

Q: I'm sorry, very quick here. Did you reply and say you get less when you spent less? Because they always say in Washington to do more with less. Actually having been a public affairs officer I know when you reduce the budget, you get less public affairs. It's, it's that simple. Whether Washington understands it that way or not. I did. Did you push back in in that sense?

DELAWIE: Yes. There was a whole negotiation but it wound up in the same place. The ambassador was a good advocate for us, which I personally appreciated because he was new to the government, new to the State Department. But we basically wound up in the same place where we needed to cut 30% and that money needed to be deployed elsewhere in the world where there were more challenges. And to be honest when it comes up two months later, again, the German Marshall fund of the United States shows that the trust that Germans held for Americans went from the 20% range, to the 90% range, our arguments get harder to make. There are plenty of other countries where the United States was still not popular. It's hard to make an argument that we were desperate for PD money.

In fact, basically our PD budget had just been clicking over since the cold war times, with inflation type increases. Some of the people that we employed had worked at our embassy in East Berlin, our mission West Berlin; we'd had them for a long time. They were great. They were terrific employees and they'd been with us for a long time, but it showed, we hadn't had a lot of adjustments over that time. So we saw immediately that we were likely to lose the fight. We fought the fight anyway. Gradually we let people know in the embassy that this was going on and that we were fighting it. If you valued your colleagues, you had to be honest with them at some point, and tell them their jobs were at risk. And that was really tough. So I did that. Fortunately, the State Department was going to provide us with some time. This was not 30% by tomorrow. It was nothing like that. It was the next fiscal year. So we had some time to work it out. We had some time to come up with a plan. This ended up dominating a lot of my time for six months. We put together a team of the American PD officers, and asked them to come up with some outlines of the plan. We brought in some help from Washington so we could blame people from Washington.

I felt that was really important. We went around and around a couple of times. The initial draft plan came to me. It doesn't have names, but it does have cost centers, this is media, this is libraries, this is employees, things like that. This first version of the plan basically preserves all the employees and gets us near zero on program expenditures; so we could employ people, but we couldn't give them any money to actually do anything. Okay. I appreciated that and maybe we had go through that process to get to the end, but it was apparent that we weren't there yet. You can have the best employees in the world, but if they can't even rent a room to hold a book talk or something like that, what's the point?

But that was the first step; it took a couple of months to get there. But at least we had all the numbers. We knew exactly what the budget was. We knew exactly what we were spending it on today. Then we could work from there. But we had to try again. I decided we'd have an offsite in Hamburg where we had a beautiful consulate that still had room from the cold war days when it had a big visa section. By the time I got to Germany, there were three American officers and maybe ten German employees there. We had an offsite with PD people from the whole mission, including the senior local PD staff.

And this is not a numbers offsite. This is a what is our job, what are we trying to achieve in public diplomacy? It was a day and a half; I think we came up with a pretty good list of

what we wanted to accomplish as public diplomacy professionals. I won't say it was universally agreed, but it was more or less a consensus on a vision. I didn't really have to push a lot; we were all smart people, most of them had worked for the United States government for more than 20 years. And then I got the PAO and the management counselor to take that vision for priorities and try to figure out how to make the dollars match the priorities.

The second version of the plan was pretty good. It did involve laying off local employees. So that was sobering. But I decided to ask for some additional help from Washington to have a set amount of money for outplacement services. We also got the timeline extended a little bit because it turned out of course in Germany there were rules about severance pay. And when you have people that work with you for more than 25 years, severance pay is not inconsequential; so we were able to shift some of that severance pay to additional fiscal years to lessen the impact in any one time. So Washington worked with us. I thought they were great. We did in fact hit that 30% mark, ultimately about a year and a half after the whole thing was started. So now we get back to your question; okay, we have fewer people, one fewer American, a couple fewer Germans. How do we work? How do we achieve our objectives with fewer resources? Of course, it turns out we decided, all right, let's do more Facebook. Let's do more Twitter. Let's beef up the website to get more stuff out there. So we did that. Fortunately, we had several very young German employees who were very tech savvy in the PA section. And we were able to shift them to more electronic engagement, which actually had another benefit.

In the Cold War era, Germans already had an opinion of the United States and weren't going to change it. But the young people, the post Berlin Wall people did not have the attachment to the United States of their elders. So we got our younger public affairs staff working electronically, the way the millennials communicate; that was a benefit that we had not anticipated, but it was clearly important. So we really expanded our Twitter and Facebook and our website. This was before Instagram became so big. So I think we did a pretty good job of using tools to expand our PD impact. It was a little more wholesale as opposed to retail PD; retail is the last few feet, that's an in person interaction.

There had to be less of that because we had fewer people to do it. But there was more wholesale public diplomacy using electronic media; we were still out doing events as well. We were having seminars, we were having American authors come to talk. Those things continued. We used partners more; there are NGOs in Germany that care about U.S. relations, like the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Atlantic Council, the American Academy. So we worked with them to increase public diplomacy impact, not on selling the policy stuff because that had to be the embassy, but on promoting the cultural relationship. That was fine to do that with NGOs. So we were pretty happy with the way it turned out at the end.

A year later, there was a big PD conference in Washington, that undersecretary McHale hosts to take a look at PD around the world, engaging all the PAOs from the whole world. And our PAO was invited to speak about the mission Germany transformation. McHale told me that what we had done had significantly influenced what her office was

doing around the world. So I felt pretty good about that. So that was one of our signature accomplishments, both reorganizing public diplomacy in Germany for the modern era and contributing to State Department public diplomacy ideas overall.

I should talk a little bit about the embassy in Berlin, the new building, which opened in the summer of 2008. The opening ceremony was July 4th, 2008. The location, Pariser Platz, is in downtown Berlin right next door to the Brandenburg gate. It is on land the United States has owned since the 20s, but it was in East Berlin during the Cold War; the land that the embassy is on today was part of the death strip on the East side of the Berlin wall. So we owned it, but we couldn't use it while Berlin was divided. After the Berlin wall fell, the State Department started looking at where to have a new embassy in Berlin, since the Germans decided to move the capital back there from Bonn, where it had been since after World War II. But in the late 1990s, the terrorist attacks in Kenya and Dar es Salaam influenced embassy design around the world.

The existing chancery in East Berlin was tiny compared with the extent of our relationship, because its size had been limited by the East Germans. And so there was a big discussion about a location for a new chancery. There was big interest in the German club and a lot of people in Washington in having it on the location of our pre World War II embassy land. This is the land that had been in the death strip, but it was really too small to house the whole embassy. If we built a building big enough to have most of the embassy people in it, it would be taller than the Brandenburg gate, the symbol of Berlin, which is right next door; we could not overshadow that.

The other problem was the piece of land was really too small to have setback from the street, to give us distance from car bombs. There was a big fight in the State Department, I understand between the people who wanted to see the chancery where it ended up and the security people who said we cannot possibly protect a building right there; cars could get too close. This decision goes all the way up to the secretary of state, Colin Powell, who apparently makes the decision that we would put the embassy back in Pariser Platz, but we're going to make it as safe as we can. So the building is designed, it's redesigned a couple of times. It winds up in Pariser Platz and opens in 2008.

It’s a beautiful building. It's right in the right place. The French embassy is across the street; the British embassy is around the corner and the Russian embassy is down the street a little bit. So all the four powers from the four power agreement are within three blocks of each other. Of course the British and the French embassies are new, like our embassy. The Russian embassy is old, it was the Soviet embassy to East Germany from the old days. Pariser Platz is in the center of Berlin. The United States is right there in the center of Berlin, which is a tremendously positive public diplomacy message. The engineering of the building was very sophisticated. I had on my desk a sample of the window glass, which was about five inches thick; it always amazed visitors.

It was high tech, high strength plastic; the walls were high strength concrete. So the goal of course was to protect people inside from a car bomb. Fortunately, the glass had not been tested, at least not in Pariser Platz. But everybody that walked into my office and

saw this big square of plastic asked about it. And I said, that's that window right there. And they said, it doesn't look so thick on the building. It's just incredible engineering, incredible design. And it's to protect us all and protect you while you're here. Anyway, I think it was the right decision to have the embassy downtown. But there were no other locations downtown that were even possible. This was only possible because we actually owned the land. It was great that the embassy could be there, for Germans to see all the time as they walked through their own city, and that we could be close to the French and the British who also helped protect Germany during the cold war period.

Q: A quick question since you're talking about the topography and the look of central Berlin; how did the Germans end up dealing with the end of the wall? Are there bits that are still left up as memorials? what's the look of it?

DELAWIE: There was tremendous eagerness around 1990 to get rid of the wall and a lot of it was taken down. Then at some point the city said, well, hang on. We have to make sure future people understand what we faced. And so they started to preserve bits of it. There is a park called Bernauer Strasse, which is northeast of the embassy where big sections of the wall have been preserved, with interpretive tablets and videos and things. There are these incredible videos that you can see there. For example, when the wall was starting to be built it wasn't as formidable as it wound up a few years later; it was right in front of some buildings. So there are videos of people climbing out of building windows in the east on sheets tied together to wind up in West Berlin.

The Bernauer Strasse exhibit is extremely impressive. It demonstrates how much people wanted to be free; and they knew in 1961 that they could be on the free side or on the communist side. There are a couple of other shorter sections where the wall still exists in the original place. Also, all throughout Berlin, in the sidewalk or the street there are special paving stones that demonstrate the route of the wall. At the location of Checkpoint Charlie, which was the main crossing between East and West Berlin during the cold war period, there is a replica guard shack of the type U.S. soldiers served in at that time.

So it's easy to learn about the division of Berlin if you want. There are several museums; there is one called the House on Checkpoint Charlie; there's a museum of the DDR, the German Democratic Republic. There's a German history museum. So it's pretty easy today for people to learn facts, the way things worked. These museums are all pretty new, so they're all multiple languages, so tourists can understand them too.

Q: So that is the kind of period that the Germans have put at the end of the sentence of the wall. They've done all of the historical things they think they need to do, to make sure everybody remembers what it was and its significance. Um, and you know, obviously there are already probably a majority of people in Germany alive today who were not alive during that era. And so it's so it isn't right. But the other question, the other general question that I wanted to ask you is, during this time, of course, Germany is providing troops for Afghanistan and opposed to the U.S., presence in Iraq. But what about the

overall issue of Germany's 2% of its GDP on defense and its other military obligations around the world that we talked to them about?

DELAWIE: The NATO 2% guideline has been an issue for a long time in Germany. Germany has spent less than that for a long time including today. And it gets back to a lot, I think the German rejection of their military history, the World War II era; the people were in general, pretty pacifistic. Most of the people were not at all proud of German history in World War II. They didn't want to take any risk of anything like that happening again. If you look at the way the German government is organized, the idea is it would be difficult or impossible for any one person to gain the type of power and authority that Hitler had, under today's German constitution or laws.

Power is diffuse. There's the chancellor, who is the head of government, but the ministers have considerable independent authority. The German States, called Länder, have their own authorities. The police are very dispersed, very localized, and work for the States as opposed to the national government. The military has been underfunded, mostly because the people would rather spend money on other things that are more important to Germans, like social programs, art, and things like that. So certainly the politicians in the Bundestag, the German parliament, are responding to what the people want, which is not to spend a lot of money on a military that might cause trouble. That has been a challenge and it's a challenge today. I think the people who are part of the German army do a good job with the limited resources they have, but they definitely have limited resources.

This challenge is something we talked about when I was there, mostly with the political people because the civil servants understood that they needed more money to fulfill the NATO guideline. It has always been a challenge. It's certainly something that we addressed during the Obama administration. We should not forget that the German deployment in RC North in Afghanistan was significant. It cost them a fortune. That's where they sent their best units. That's where they paid for the equipment of course to work in a very hostile environment, not cheap. That was a key focus of the German military. Of course, that was a small chunk of the whole German military. I think there were 3000 German soldiers in RC North when I was there.

Then there were a couple of peacekeeping humanitarian missions in other parts of the world that the German soldiers were deployed to. I think it's important to point out that the United States has lots of bases in Germany, most of which were from world war II era and the post World War II era. We took over existing German bases which we use almost as if they were our own. We use these bases constantly to protect the United States. There is a former Luftwaffe base north of Munich called Hohenfels where the U.S. army has been doing training since after world war two. It is vast. It includes various types of terrain; we trained there through the cold war and in the post cold war era. We use it to train together with our NATO allies, and did so even before they became NATO Allies, like the Poles and the Hungarians, and the other newly free countries. I went there when I was in Kosovo to see training for the U.S. deployment of our contribution to the NATO Kosovo Force, KFOR. We've got all of these bases in Germany supporting U.S.

activities. When I was in Frankfurt, for my first assignment, of course there were a lot around Frankfurt, many more than there are today.

Most of those had been closed as the number of U.S. soldiers deployed to Germany went from 350,000 when I was there the first time to 30,000 when I was in Berlin. Having these bases of course represents a cost to Germany. They don't collect any taxes, they can't put it to any other use. There's this opportunity cost. I don't know whether you add up all these expenses, you get above 2% or not, but it is not inconsequential. Certainly having these bases in Germany saves the U.S. billions and billions of dollars a year. I think it's important to keep that in mind that Germany, like several other countries in Europe, is contributing this way to protect the United States and NATO.

Q: Along the same lines of security issues, aside from the Middle East, we were also having the issues of the final collapses of the pieces of the former Yugoslavia, in this case, Kosovo. How were the Germans in terms of those policies with regard to ours?

DELAWIE: Most of this happened before I actually got to Germany of course. I think we were pretty tight with Germany, France the UK and Italy on the Balkans disintegration. Germany was the first country to recognize Slovenia as an independent state from Yugoslavia. But I think we were close after that. The same for Croatia, I think, so we were really working together. This was during the first Clinton administration. We were really cooperating. We had found during the first Iraq war period how valuable it was to coordinate with other countries to achieve our objectives. And I think that lesson stuck pretty well by the time the Balkan crisis rolled around. Regarding the Balkans, we've always been very tight with the Quad and the Quint, and that continues to this day. Certainly when I was in Kosovo, I met every week with the ambassadors of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy, along with the EU Special Representative. So it was important to keep that going because you speak louder with multiple voices than you speak with your own voice, even if your voice is that of the United States.

Q: Were there any frictions with regard to relations with Russia?

DELAWIE: Certainly there were a lot of voices in Germany that were more friendly to the Russian point of view than we were. Even though this was the era of the reset of U.S. Russia relations. I think we were pretty clear-eyed in the U.S. government about Putin and Medvedev regarding what Russia was really interested in, and that our relations were always going to be difficult. There were people in Germany, including in the German government, who had a more benign view of the Russian government. I think history has proved that our view was the correct view. There were certainly people in Germany and the German government and influential NGO people who were willing to take at face value some of the things that Russian government officials said; certainly I was never willing to take them at face value.

It didn't divide us in particular; we certainly had a lot of conversations with Germany about Russia and our goals were not that different from the German goals. We wanted Russia to be a normal country, to be a democracy, to be a market oriented economy. This

was also the period of the new START agreement and everybody certainly in Germany wanted some control on nuclear weapons. So we were not really divided, but we certainly had different views from a lot of influential Germans about what Russia was really up to and what it was trying to achieve. I don't think that difference of views included the chancellor; she grew up of course in East Germany, in the communist era.

I think she had a much clearer view of the communist or authoritarian way of looking at things than a lot of Germans who had grown up under American protection. But of course there are plenty of other people in the German government other than chancellor. As I said before, power in Germany is distributed significantly and the chancellor just cannot snap her fingers and get something done in her own government. That's not the way it works.

This was the reset period. We made significant efforts to improve U.S. Russian relations, including in Germany. I remember in May of 2010, it was the 65th anniversary of the end of world war two, which in the United States we say was May 8th, 1945; the Russians say it was May 9th. And that was just because of the time zone difference. In the beginning of May, in 2010 there was an event in Torgau, which is a city in formerly East Germany where the U.S. and Soviet soldiers encountered each other for the first time as the assault of Berlin was beginning. There was a ceremony. The citizens of Torgau have an event to mark this pivotal time at the end of world war II. And they invited us to speak. The ambassador couldn't make it, so I went; there was a phenomenal crowd, hundreds and hundreds of people, mostly Germans of course, but there were also Americans, old American soldiers who were there. There were old Russian soldiers who were there and a few younger Russians as well. It was a great opportunity for us at the embassy to talk about the benefits of U.S. Russian cooperation, because it had worked in world war II. I had, I thought, pretty good remarks. I did not draft them by myself; I had worked on them with our full time speech writer. I thought it was a very impressive event. I was, of course not the only one speaking. There were others as well. But this was part of our effort to contribute to the U.S. Russia reset.

There were other things that we did as well. We tried to do a couple of cooperative programs with the Russian embassy, which was interesting because I got to go into the Russian embassy several times. If you stand on a street called Unter den Linden, which is the main street leading out of the Brandenburg gate, on which the Russian embassy is located, you see this building, and you don't have to know a lot about architecture to figure out it is trying to convey a message. And what that message is, is "we're in charge." So when this was built in the cold war era Russia wanted to make sure the East Germans knew who was in charge and it wasn't the Germans. This massive building with all sorts of Russian symbols on it all over the place continues to this day to be the Russian embassy. It is very impressive in a negative way. It's a demonstration of the power of architecture to convey a message. I will take a quick diversion here because I like architecture.

Consider the building that houses the chancellor's office in Berlin. It was one of the earlier buildings designed for the move of the German government to Berlin; it is entirely

glass on the outside. And there was a message there that the German government wanted to convey to its citizens. The government wanted to emphasize transparency; how could they do so? Well, they could have their building be entirely glass on the outside. This was clearly a very different kind of message than the Soviet message. I thought the chancellery was very effective as a message, even if it took them a while to get the engineering right to keep the rain out.

But anyway, it's a beautiful building and it definitely conveys the message of a democracy. Anyway, if you go in to the Russian embassy, there are lots of big rooms. There are two identical ballrooms, that are vast, could hold a couple thousand people each. They have on the wall a giant hammer and sickle, no longer a symbol of Russia, but I guess they decided to keep it because it was historic. There's a big theater as well, so we organized a couple of events with the Russian embassy. We had an American jazz group that would play with a Russian jazz group. Everybody likes jazz, so that was pretty easy.

We organized this public diplomacy event with the jazz groups for the Russian embassy theater; we each invited lots of people, about 500 guests each. Organizing this of course took a lot of time, especially regarding the post-concert reception, which would have food and wine and be in the Russian embassy. We could not actually hand over cash to the Russians to pay for this, that would be wrong and illegal. But we knew we needed to make the bigger contribution for refreshments since the Russians were providing the venue. So the PD team goes over to work this out with their Russian counterparts.

The Russians are very hard to deal with of course, and we were not getting anywhere and the day of the event is approaching and the logistics, how we are going to get food and drink and guests and everything in are not being worked out. And then finally I realized, the management minister counselor served in Russia several times. She speaks four plus Russian. Why hadn't I put her on this at the beginning? I hadn't because it was a PD event and the PD section usually organized its own events. That made sense in the abstract, but none of the PD FSOs had actually worked in Russia and didn't really understand Russians. The management minister counselor resolved everything in one meeting, in Russian; she was incredibly tough.

The event went off pretty well. There were last minute problems with restaurants, but the management section was on those. This experience was another lesson to me about expanding my aperture of who could do what; just because it's a PD event, don't neglect to take advantage of all of the people that you have who can work things out. The guests were happy; they really enjoyed the party. A lot of Germans got to see the Russian embassy inside, which they mostly hadn't before. So did we. Overall it was a terrific event that was part of the reset. It worked fine. Lasting impact? Probably not, but it's one of those things you do in diplomacy, you try things and sometimes they work; sometimes they don't. And if they work in the short term, they may not work in long term.

DELAWIE: As long as we're talking about Russia, I wanted to jump to another thing that occurs to me. There is a spot along the Fulda Gap, which was between East and West Germany during the cold war, called Point Alpha. It was a slight rise of a hill where you

could see a long way into East Germany. It was a watching post for the U.S. army during the cold war, the first place that we expected to see the Russian tanks heading west towards West Germany. There were 12 soldiers deployed there 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

DELAWIE: There were always a couple of soldiers with binoculars looking east. The people who served there during the cold war were only assigned for a month; if you were there a month, you never had to go back. And why was that? Because the stress was so high. There were alert buttons. And the idea was, if you see something through your binoculars, tanks heading your way, you immediately push the button, which signals a base further west, and then you were probably going to die, because the Russians of course knew what the location was. So it was highly stressful for the soldiers who served there, potentially being right on the front line of the next war, never knowing when that next war was going to start. But knowing you have an incredible responsibility, to warn the U.S. that trouble was on the way and that you would probably not survive that warning.

It was an iconic place for the U.S. army people who had served there, which was a lot, because you only were assigned there once, only for a short period of time; and the cold war lasted decades. So there are thousands of retired American army soldiers who had served there. At some point we have a ceremony. The Germans have made this a historic place with markers and explanatory material, and art. They hold an inauguration of the remodeled site that I get to go to as the embassy person. This was a great experience; Point Alpha was in the middle of nowhere, to the extent that Germany has nowhere, in that it's not close to any big cities, but nevertheless a bunch of retired American soldiers came for this event and of course they were all 60, 70, 80 years old. It was a terrific experience for me talking with them, hearing their stories and what it was like to be there during the cold war.

Q: An economic question. You arrive at the height of the mortgage bust in the United States, the big recession. Did that have an effect on relations with Germany?

DELAWIE: Not so much, but there is a related issue that I was going to get to, which is Greece; the Greek financial crisis. I can divide my policy time in Germany between supporting the German deployment in Afghanistan for the first half, and then the Greek financial crisis for the second. Not to say we didn't do plenty of other things too, but as far as my personal involvement in policy issues, those were the two that I spent the most time on. Making the case for continued German deployment in Afghanistan, that took a lot of time and effort and a lot of work, a lot of talking with parliamentarians, talking with government officials, talking with non-governmental organizations, talking publicly about why it was so important. But that went fine and certainly while I was there, every year, the Bundestag, the German parliament, had to re-up the German deployment, in Afghanistan and needed of course, a majority vote to stay. And they did that every year we were there. The first year we did a lot of explaining. Now maybe they would've made the same decision without us, who knows. But after the first year I was there it became

more normal so I could spend less policy time on that. But the Greek financial crisis though became extremely important, and I have to admit we were less successful on that.

My personal point of view was, okay, Greek officials over the years had lied about how much money they had. That was bad. Absolutely. But there's no way they can pay it back during the crisis. That money just did not exist. Just do the numbers. You didn't even need Excel to figure out, there was no way in a century that Greece would be able to satisfy all of its debts without going back to the preindustrial era. So Germany's got to cut Greece some slack and not just the German government, but the European central bank, which is based in Frankfurt and over which Germany had a lot of influence. I spent a lot of time talking with people about those issues. Now a lot of the real discussion was our treasury official to their treasury official, or our treasury officials to the ECB officials. The treasury department in Washington really did not trust the embassy to understand the issues and to convey our views well, unfortunately. I think that was a mistake, but that's what they thought, clearly.

We continued to try to get German officials to be more helpful to Greece. I think we failed in that unfortunately. There was a lot of right wing propaganda from some German tabloid newspapers about Greece. Every couple of days there'd be a story saying that, for example, an oboe player in the Greek national orchestra could retire on the Greek government pension at the age of 45 because he had a hazardous job. I never found out if that's true or not. And it wasn't relevant, really, because it was propaganda. There was this tremendous anti Southern European prejudice in the right wing in Germany; people who really didn't want Germany to rescue Greece.

Of course Greece was in the EU, in the Euro zone. Germany could not divorce itself from Greece at that point because they were already too much interlinked. It was a tough issue. Fortunately I had done economics earlier in my career, so I didn't really have a problem understanding the problems and the issues. But it was a political issue fundamentally in Germany, not an economic issue. The economics were clear; no way Greece is going to be able to pay this government debt off in the near future. Something's got to happen. Or Greeks are going to move. They could move to anywhere in the EU; they might move to Germany. Is that what you want? I mean, people didn't really want to think of the consequences. So that was tough. And to the extent that the Greek financial crisis stemmed from the worldwide financial crisis in 2008, 2009, it was certainly related.

But as far as the U.S. part of the financial crisis, no, we didn't have anything to do with that in Germany. Certainly several German banks suffered from bad mortgages in the United States that they had bought on the secondary market. But we did not really get involved in that. The U.S. treasury department always felt that they could handle that stuff. Another big lesson from being in Germany, is when people talk to each other, U S government to German government, they would just call their colleagues on phone and they would make promises and sometimes we'd find about them out about them, and sometimes, we wouldn't. Then when something doesn't happen the way it should one side or the other came to us at the embassy and said, well, why didn't they do what they promised?

And we would have to say, well, we didn't know there was a promise. When we know there is a promise, we can help; but you have to tell us what's going on. In smaller embassies or those in countries that are less than headlines than Germany, I don't think you had that type of problem. We didn't have that in Croatia, we didn't have that in Kosovo, but in Germany, such a big, important country, everybody in the U.S. government knew someone in the German government. They'd just pick up the phone. They send emails, they talk to them. It's harder for the embassy to stay on top of things and to manage relations.

Q: I also wanted to ask whether you had any significant consular issues that reached your level?

DELAWIE: There were a couple. I'd have to see if I can depersonalize them. Okay. In Germany, most of the consular work was based in Frankfurt, because of the Frankfurt Airport. There were visas, there were American citizens services, there were prisoners; the biggest concentration of work was in Frankfurt and that's where we had the biggest consular section. We also had a consular section at the embassy, although it was smaller, and a medium sized consular section at the consulate in Munich. When I got to Germany in 2009 the head of the consular section for mission Germany, the minister counselor for consular affairs, was not there; he had gone to serve in Afghanistan. The ranking consular officer was the head of the consular section in Frankfurt.

The head of the consular section in Berlin was a mid-level officer. I did not think it was ideal that the head of the mission Germany consular section was in a different city, but I felt we could live with it. And we did live with it, but it was certainly not ideal. I thought with modern telecommunications, video conferencing, the telephones, and you can push a button and get the head of the consular section in Frankfurt, it's going to be okay. But it turns out it's better to talk to people face to face when you've got a problem. So fortunately the minister counselor comes back after a year or so and everything just becomes better.

I can talk in my office with him and figure things out and deal with problems that way. I learned again that there's a lot of value in face to face communications including with your own colleagues, that's really important. And so the problems in the consular area, which I can't really get into, got a lot better when there was a senior official working in the same city, that I could talk to him about. Even that was never a hundred percent ideal. Because the consular section in Berlin is not actually in the embassy building, but in the suburb of Dahlem, which is where the American forces were during the Cold War. It's in a building called the Clay building, named after Lucius Clay, one of the early commanders of U.S. forces in Berlin.

The Clay building is a half hour drive from embassy. It's in a separate building because the embassy was not big enough to have the consular section that could handle a lot of visa clients, American citizen services clients, etc. So the consular section, unfortunately got left in the suburbs, not ideal for morale, because you really don't want your consular

officers to feel that they're any different from anyone else in the embassy. They're all part of the team. But when they're separate, I think that creates a morale challenge. We did have several other offices at Clay, mostly back office things like the financial part of management, which didn't really need to be downtown that much, but it certainly would have been better to have everybody in the same building in Pariser Platz.

The other advantage of having the minister counselor for consular affairs as a senior official in Berlin is you could draw on that person for other things. At one point, later on, we were working on this project that every embassy has to do every five years about staffing levels. Do I have the right number of people? Could there be more? Should there be less? Someone had been assigned to do this. It winds up on my desk as DCM, the day it is due, it's 60 pages long, and it is not anything that I would have been able to sign. I decided it had to be completely rewritten, but, who can do it?

Well, it turns out who is going to be me and the management minister counselor and the consular minister counselor. The consular MC is going to help because she's a senior officer and really smart. There is a major segment about consular staffing, and of course she's going to do that herself, but she helped on the whole thing. The three of us got together and had a lousy weekend and finished it only a little late; we got an extension from Washington.

Again, it's important for leaders to be able to draw on all the talents of people they have. And to break down these mental barriers you have about who does what or who could do something. This was clearly a management thing. But it was too much just for management to do in the available time. I knew more or less what I wanted, but it takes a while to write 60 pages. So the three of us did it and I asked the consular minister counselor to work on it because I knew she would do a good job, and she was a senior officer and you have to help grow the skills of your senior officers.

I learned so much in Berlin; if I could go back to be DCM in Berlin again, I would do a much better job this time, because I learned so much by making mistakes. We didn't actually have a human resources officer in Berlin for my first year plus. It turned out that was a big disaster. Someone had gone to a priority post somewhere, and the prior team had said, well, Frankfurt is the bigger operation. Let's just have the human resources officers sit in Frankfurt and be in charge of the HR for the whole mission. It turned out that that had been a mistake. Because there's personnel stuff that just has to be done in an embassy. Because the people in Frankfurt can't wander over to the foreign ministry and resolve a problem about a residence visa for a Foreign Service officer, or things like that.

It turned out that one of the management officers at the embassy had to take a lot of her time out to do this HR stuff. Of course she had a full time job in other areas of the management section. People were confused about who would be their personnel person especially if they didn't want to talk with a local employee. And of course, like in most embassies, most of the HR work is done by local employees, but there are some things you don't want to talk with your local employee about. It got confused. We had some EEO issues that slipped through the cracks that I did not know about, until the Office of

the Inspector General (OIG) brought them to my attention, saying they had not been dealt with in the right way; believe me, you do not want to hear about a problem for the first time from the OIG.

And I have to think if there'd been a human resources officer in position in the embassy that those issues would have come to that person who would've said, I have to go to boss about that. We would've been able to get them under control much earlier. There were three EEO issues during my time, which while not horrible, they were bad, and that had to be dealt with; maybe for 1600 employees, that's not such a bad number, but still anything over zero is bad. It was a problem that I didn't know about and I couldn't resolve them until I knew about them. So when I talk with people who are going out to be DCMs and ambassadors, ever since I've been saying, make sure you've got a human resources officer; don't let that position be gapped.

Q: Anyway, what else you got? All right. So we will pause here, but when we resume, we will pick up with a couple of issues. You've identified Wikileaks, some anecdotes from your work as a DCM, including interest in VIP visits, the Munich security conference, making efficient use of representational events, and using your German language and your German language training others. All right. So, we'll stop here and pick up again then at the next session.

Q: Today is May 15th. And we're resuming our interview with Greg Delawie. A few more considerations from his Berlin tour.

DELAWIE: Just a couple of anecdotes to finish up this assignment. Since Germany is so important to the United States and so important in the world, we got a lot of visitors at the Embassy in Berlin. We had CODELs, congressional delegations, all the time that came to see people in the German government. We had ad hoc visitors, administration officials. We had private sector people, who could be interesting and we sometimes roped into PD events. And then there's the Munich security conference, which happens every February in Munich; the MSC is one of the world's biggest foreign policy meetings; it used to be called "Wehrkunde". It typically attracts presidents, prime ministers, and ministers, and is typically attended by either the U.S. secretary of state or the U.S. vice president.

Q: So it's kind of a Davos of security issues. Is it separate from Oberammergau?

DELAWIE: Yes. It started out being focused on European security issues, but it has expanded over the years, to include other world foreign policy issues as well. Typically, you would have senior delegations from China, from Japan, from India, some from Africa would come as well and their issues would be discussed. It's a mammoth event, held in a hotel in downtown Munich that has a pretty big room, but certainly not big enough for all the people that really want to be there, so attendance tends to be limited to a small number of people.

Q: How much of it is covered live by the press?

DELAWIE: There's a lot of the European press there and also sometimes American press. VP Pence was there this February and was quoted in the U.S. newspapers. So it gets a fair amount of press, although to be honest, at least in the United States it's the specialized foreign policy press as opposed to the general press. In Europe it gets a lot more play. First of all, it happens in Europe. Secondly, the European press is more tuned to foreign policy stuff than it is in the United States. So we would always have a big U.S. delegation, including a bunch of senators and Congressman, who were always led by John McCain. We would always have several control officers to take care of these congresspeople and senators. They would have lots of meetings. There is a program on the stage, where the crowd is, that continues from Friday afternoon until Sunday lunchtime.

Some of our delegation typically goes to view the program, but really, it's a meeting place for bilaterals. There are all these little rooms in the hotel that are used for bilaterals. Typically U.S. senior officials, if they do not have a speech on the stage, will spend all of their time in the bilateral rooms meeting with foreign counterparts. Of course, since there are people here from all over the world, it's not just German government officials or media, it could be Chinese officials, or Korean, or whatever. So it was a big event; our consulate in Munich spent months planning it and all logistics; we needed cars, parking space at the airport for the administration plane, for the congressional plane, we needed to get people from the airport into town.

All while all the other dignitaries from all over the world are trying to do the same thing. So it was a tremendous logistics operation. It was the main single event that the Munich Pol/Econ officer spent the most time on. Because that person was usually the control officer for the event. And there was a branch public affairs officer who spent a lot of time working on the press component of the conference and the remarks of our visitors. The Consul general certainly oversaw this. When you've got two dozen administration officials, including the vice president, you've got of course lots of security people and staffers and things like that; it is a gigantic deal. And as a lot of negotiation going on, we had to make sure that U.S. officials got what they wanted out of the meeting.

Which is typically a whole bunch of bilateral meetings with foreign officials. Some of these are arranged ahead of time, although not always completely arranged. For example, there could be a phone call between the secretary of state and some foreign minister, where they agree to meet at the MSC. But that's as far as they get, and then it's up to the consulate in Munich and the control officer and the TDYers from Berlin and elsewhere in Europe to nail things down and say, okay, they all have space at two o'clock on Saturday afternoon and, oh gosh, we have to find a room. The U.S. embassy had always had a couple of rooms at the hotel, but it wasn't always enough. And sometimes you had to borrow from other delegations in order to have meetings.

So it was a gigantic logistical operation. We had a whole bunch of people come from the embassy, from the consulate in Frankfurt, sometimes from embassies elsewhere in Europe to staff this and to take notes for all these meetings and to watch out for the

senators, the Congresspeople and the administration officials. So it's a great event and it's a really efficient way for senior administration officials and politicians to talk with people and to get their messages delivered. A lot of business is happening.

Q: Two questions. One is, for all the worker bees who do this gigantic event every year; there are probably few events this big anywhere else in the world that happen in the year. Is this the kind of thing you get an award for? Because you know, most of the time in an evaluation you're assumed to have total control over logistics and bothering to take time to claim how well you handle logistics is a waste of time in evaluation because you're expected to be able to do that. This is unusual. This is, this is one where you, you actually have to make trades on the fly for top officials, etc.

DELAWIE: That would make perfect sense and probably people get awards for it. I just don't remember.

Q: So. Okay. But then the other question is, in your recollection, were there any big policy outcomes from any of those meetings?

DELAWIE: I recall that some of the final work on the new start agreement was negotiated between the United States and Russia was resolved at the MSC by secretary Clinton and FM Lavrov. I don't remember the details of that. We had the "T" family there to support the secretary of state. I think it was Ellen Tauscher who unfortunately died recently; she was undersecretary for international security affairs at that time. She was a regular at the Munich security conference. Holbrooke came to talk with people from Afghanistan and with other countries about managing the NATO operation in Afghanistan.

I inadvertently wandered into one of his meetings at one point and was politely shooed out. So lots of stuff happened there. Some of it related to what we were doing in Germany, but a lot of it was just about somewhere else in the world and it was merely a convenient location for people to meet. The MSC was always very exciting and you were literally working from 5:00 AM until midnight, three days in a row, just to manage everything. Some of it was completely mundane. Where do we get a room? Other times, a foreign official will only meet with our official if we promise to do something first and you have to work out what that something is and try to make it happen.

We had all of our skills tested at the MSC, practical skills as well as diplomatic skills. I often took advantage of the MSC to deliver démarches, for example because I happened to see the German deputy foreign minister, or whomever, and a relevant cable had come in that day. You can't do much better than that. It was an opportunity to see a lot of people you didn't see very often; that was fun. It was always fun briefing McCain because he was so smart and he knew so very much about European security policy. He would always ask penetrating questions. You would always feel good if you knew the answer and you would feel horrible if you didn't, but he was usually nice anyway. So that's the security conference.

We had a lot of other notable visitors to Germany that we would see; a couple stick in my mind. Henry Kissinger was there once because there was some debate going on about tactical nuclear weapons. So I was at dinner with him at the ambassador's house when the ambassador went off to take a call. Kissinger was quizzing me about what the Germans thought about tactical nuclear weapons, which I thought was fascinating, not a position I ever thought that I would be in. But fortunately I was really up to speed on their policy and what the Germans thought, so I was able to deal with his questions.

We also had nonpolitical people that would show up. Jon Bon Jovi is from New Jersey, which is where our ambassador was from. So he came by, he knew the ambassador from his prior life. We gave him a tour of the embassy. Woody Allen came and we gave him a tour of the embassy too, on a Saturday, just for fun. It was interesting and he seems to be pretty much the same in person as he is in his movies, at least his early movies. Secretary Clinton came five times during the three years that I was there, for business things, the Munich security conference at least once though she had a couple of Afghanistan-related visits.

There was an Afghanistan meeting in Bonn that she came for, which was interesting to me because I took advantage of that trip to Bonn in support of the U.S. delegation to visit the former U.S. Embassy, which I had not been in in 25 years. At that time there was still a tiny embassy presence, part of one of the DOD offices was there with three or four people who supported German defense ministry purchases of American equipment; the German defense ministry remained in Bonn, at least part of it, the procurement part. The former embassy has a beautiful view of the Rhine river because the building sits right on the bank.

But the whole rest of the building had become part of the German agriculture ministry. We had given it up, and the non-U.S. part looked pretty nice because it had been restored. And then our part had not been cleaned very well or had anything done with it since we moved out of there in the mid nineties; it was like a step back in time.

Lots of people came through Germany and we were able to intersect with many of them, which was really fun.

There's some other things I thought I would mention that are just basically interesting. The Wikileaks revelations of alleged State Department cables came out around November of 2010.

We thought it was going to be a disaster. Of course, it pales in comparison to the Snowden thing that happened later. What ended up happening is that the *New York Times*, the German magazine *Der Spiegel*, and the Paris newspaper *Le Monde* all had a quarter million alleged State cables from years past. They were planning to publish stories something like the Monday after Thanksgiving, and were going to ask the administration for comments on the Friday after Thanksgiving. So as not to give anyone a real chance to react to the substance. Then we had to form a task force in the embassy to

look at all these alleged Mission Germany cables that were going to come out and to see what they would mean, for us and for the people we'd been talking to.

Q: Now, that's huge because now you're pulling people out of their regular work and having them reread old cables. How bad an impact was that simply on the operations of the embassy?

DELAWIE: I felt bad that all this stuff was going to come out, including things that had my name on them, from prior assignments sometimes. People were unhappy, but everyone recognized that there was no alternative. We were reading more than 10 years of alleged telegrams. So people had to read back, years back before they'd ever gotten to their job. And maybe the issues that were covered, these cables were no longer relevant and people didn't even know about them. Still, they had to make some kind of decision about, do we warn somebody about this? I made a couple of those calls to people saying your name is going to appear in an alleged State Department cable; I'm really sorry; I wish it hadn't happened, but there you go; I wanted you to know before you read about it or heard about yourself in the newspaper. Government officials were unhappy, but if you look at the alleged cables, a lot of them were just straight reporting of what a foreign official said, which is okay. No one's getting in trouble by saying what their government's position is. But in some cases people talk, gave their personal opinion of things or their political analysis of what might be behind a government position; that could cause them problems. Of course, in Germany we did not have the threats to people's lives that our colleagues at other embassies around the world had to worry about, especially human rights contacts.

A couple of Germans did end up losing their jobs, based on the fact that they had allegedly talked to us and we'd allegedly written about it and it became public. We felt incredibly bad about that. That was a really intense period because there were thousands of cables that had allegedly originated in Berlin. A lot of the cables that went out from the time I got there had at the top "classified by Greg Delawie, DCM," whether I had written them or not. Since I was DCM, I didn't write a whole lot of cables, but I approved a bunch, especially if they were sensitive. There were German government officials who wouldn't talk to me anymore after that because they see Delawie's name at the top of an alleged cable talking about them; I don't care to talk to him anymore. It's a shame. But we survived. We accomplished things, but it was a very tough several month period for the embassy. We had to read all these things, not knowing when or if an alleged cable was going to be published, and to flag the ones that might cause people problems. Of course that took people away from their regular work, and involved a fair amount of overtime for really boring work, sitting at your desk at the computer, reading through these things and trying to pay attention. This was not ideal, especially when the main job of Foreign Service officers is to be out talking with people, not sitting at their desks.

Q: In essence, you had been forced to become FOIA officers in the sense because now you're looking for every single potentially sensitive thing that could come out and you are unable to edit it. You have to deal with it. Wow.

DELAWIE: Agreed. I'll move on. One of the things that you have to do in the Foreign Service, is if you're ambassador or DCM you spend half your time arguing with Washington and then half your time arguing with foreigners. You wish you could spend more time arguing with foreigners and you wouldn't have to try to control Washington. But if you don't do that, things head in the wrong direction. There's one event that I remember that's relevant to this issue. Two German journalists had been arrested in Iran, apparently for just doing their job; the German goal was to get them out, get them free, but it wasn't working. I don't remember how long they were arrested, but it was a while.

Then apparently the German government makes some kind of deal with Iran to free them. The foreign minister flies to Tehran on short notice with a government plane and takes the two journalists back home. And this happened on an American holiday, and there were all sorts of articles in the German press about what did the German foreign minister have to promise, what was the price? This started appearing in the American press as well. We hadn't received a heads up on this, it was not our business, there's no reason for the Germans to have told us. But I was concerned that if Washington thought the German government had paid some price to Iran, then that would be bad for our relations. It was Veterans' Day and the embassy was closed, but I was paying some attention to the press of course; I saw this start to balloon up and realized that when Washington got to work on Tuesday morning, there could be problems and we could get a démarche, "go tell the Germans they shouldn't have done whatever they did" or something like that.

So I tracked down a staffer of the foreign minister whom I knew well; that's one of our main jobs is to know people; I asked if he could tell me what really happened. He invited me to meet him for beer that evening, and said the foreign minister had just asked him to give me a call to tell me what's up. (one of the great advantages of serving in Germany is you can have business meetings accompanied by some of the best beer in the world!) He walked me through what had happened, and said that Germany had promised nothing to Iran except that the foreign minister would go there to pick the journalists up; he denied all the press innuendo that there was a price that was being paid. So it's eight o'clock at night, we finish up, I go to the embassy, and I write an email describing this conversation, emphasizing that the foreign minister wanted us to know that he promised nothing other than to show up. So I sent that back to the desk and to the inter-agency community and the operations center. So it would be the first thing in their email when they got in to work on Tuesday morning after the holiday. At that point we had this new telegram system called Smart, and I wasn't sure I could actually send a telegram myself, without help. I didn't really want to call in someone at 10 o'clock on a holiday to send it out. So I figured email would be good enough and then we'd just follow up with a telegram the next day. Providing that heads up was very helpful; in Washington very senior people had read my email, which I knew because I got a few follow up questions from them.

But there was no panic, there was no anger, and everything ended up going smoothly. Often you have to tell Washington what it wants before it knows it wants it, and then that can avoid problems in the future.

Q: This is a demonstration of one of the skills Foreign Service officers need to learn to bring to the job, which is knowing when you need to pre-alert about something that is going to happen.

DELAWIE: A couple of other little anecdotes. One of the many things I learned from my ambassador, was how to run a productive dinner with a large group of people. He liked to have these dinners with 15 or 20 people so that Washington visitors could meet a bunch of people at one time, or to promote a policy agenda. He was really effective at this, which he called a "single table conversation." First of all, we would prepare for these dinners like for any other meeting, we would have bios of all of the attendees, not just official bios, but additional facts like "plays tennis" or "daughter's an actress" or something like that. We would also have a list of goals for the meal. Sometimes it was a tougher list than others, but there's no point in having an event if you're not going to get something out of it. We would have all of these people around the table, sometimes I'd be there, or the political or PD officer, depending on what the topic was.

The ambassador was very natural about leading people in conversation through the whole dinner. He would introduce the guests from Washington and ask them to say a few words about why they had come. He had the list of everyone at the table in front of him, and over the course of the dinner, he would walk through and make sure every single person was given an opportunity to speak. Sometimes people would volunteer a question or a comment, but if they didn't, he would ask them a leading question, such as, "how can we best help the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan achieve its goals" or something like that. This was spaced out during the meal; if there was actually food on your plate, you talked with the people next to you, but in between courses – and the staff was trained to allow 10 or 15 minutes between each course – we'd go back to the single table conversation. The ambassador would just lead us through, and by the end of the dinner, he'd covered everybody. Every single person at that table had an opportunity to speak, to say something substantive. Usually they would do so, although every once in a while someone would dodge if they were shy or didn't want to talk in front of the crowd. But he set this kind of welcoming sense at the table, that we were all just there to talk and say what we wanted and not worry about it. This was so effective. Henry Kissinger was a guest at one of these things. We had George Shultz at another, Zal Khalizad, who was out of the government at that point but had been ambassador in Afghanistan.

He had come to Berlin to talk with German NGOs about Afghanistan issues. He still cared when he was out of government. We gave him an opportunity to talk about Afghanistan where we could learn something too. So Ambassador Murphy did a great job at this. And I took significant notes during these meals, not just about the substance but also about how this worked. Because I thought it was a great idea; by the middle of my tour, I had really caught on to his method too, which was important because at one point Admiral Stavridis, who at that time was the head of European command, the combatant commander for Europe, was coming to Berlin to meet with the German general staff.

We worked out this dinner for him with a whole bunch of really senior military and political military people. It was a great group; then all of a sudden Ambassador Murphy

had to go back to Washington for a chief of mission meeting that was thrown on at the last possible minute. So I ended up hosting this dinner at the CMR with the ambassador's wife for Stavridis and the German general staff. But fortunately I had paid careful attention during the year and a half or whatever before then. So I could do the single table conversation too, probably not as well as the ambassador could, but I did well enough that everybody was happy and Stavridis thanked me profusely afterwards. So this type of event, using a representational event to achieve policy purposes, is a key Foreign Service skill.

It's hard to learn coming up in the Foreign Service, because usually you don't have 20 people around the table until you're a DCM or ambassador. I had certainly done plenty of dinners as DCM in Croatia or Berlin, but not with that skill. So I kept that in mind over the years and certainly I used the single-table paradigm when I was ambassador in Kosovo, and I think got a lot out of it.

Q: A quick question on the proper use of representation. These dinners were a relatively small representational event where you can get into a bit more detail than let's say a stand up cocktail reception. Did you also try to do the same thing in receptions where you have a list of things you want to get out of this particular reception and you sent people out as worker bees to try to get that information? Or was it too difficult in large reception to be able to do that?

DELAWIE: I've always tried to do this in receptions, at least when I had an idea of who was going to be there. And even when I was a relatively junior economic officer in Turkey, I would always show up for a reception with a list of people I wanted to talk to and then what info I wanted to get. So the goal is to find someone to have a policy discussion with. Now you will not be successful at every reception, especially if it's not your reception, because you don't necessarily know who's going to be there. So if you're going to a national day or something, it might be helpful or it might not be. It could be you just chat with people and don't really achieve any goals other than to convince them you're a nice person. But if it's your reception or an embassy reception, then yes. It's always good to have a list of goals. I always talked with FSOs who were working the reception because you always have embassy people at a reception to talk with their contacts. It helps them to be seen with the ambassador or DCM. It's an opportunity for them to practice their representational skills to make points or to try to learn what's going on. It's harder to use a reception than a dinner because often you'll have four people you want to talk to but it's hard to disengage from one person to talk with another without being awkward.

Q: So just a quick aside; at some receptions you have to be the rescuer of the ambassador or DCM, when one of your contacts has glommed onto them and won't let go.

DELAWIE: That's definitely true. And although I got better at disengaging over the years; it's easier if you know a lot of people, because you can just introduce the person you're talking to, to someone else. Hey, have you met Sally, she does this too, or

something like that. When you are new at a post and don't know too many people that is harder. In desperation you can say, I have to go get something to eat, I'm starving. Once I even said my daughter's calling on the phone, excuse me, which was not true unfortunately.

Q: That falls under the category of diplomatic niceties.

DELAWIE: Right, exactly. But it is important, if you've got a reasonable number of guests, that everyone is able to talk to the ambassador so that they can feel respected. At a 4th of July party, this is never going to happen because you've got hundreds or thousands of people, but at an event at the ambassador's house, that only holds a hundred people, that is probably achievable, with the help of colleagues who are ushering people to and away from the ambassador. Now the other senior people, for example from the German government, their time was limited too, they had been in that situation. They did not try to monopolize the ambassador; but the less experienced people who we invite to solidify ties or demonstrate respect, often don't know how the game is played and they do have to be helped to move, "Why don't we go get you something to drink," or something like that.

Just a couple of other little things I wanted to mention. It turns out that during the guest worker period of the 60s, a whole bunch of Turks and Yugoslavs went to Germany as guest workers to make up for the German labor shortage during their economic miracle. So it turns out that Berlin is one of the biggest Turkish speaking cities in the world, even though it's not in Turkey. We did have an econ officer who actually spoke Turkish from a prior assignment. Then I spoke Turkish. So we got together to engage better with the Turkish community. Because one of the goals during the Obama administration was building interaction with Muslims in Europe.

We had specific goals that we were supposed to achieve just like other European posts, to build bridges and find out what's going on in the community. So I would do some of the engagement with the Turkish business association and cultural association and things like that. I had been out of Turkey fifteen years by then, and my Turkish was not great. So I usually ended up talking with these Turks in German, which was generally fine, but everyone once in a while I'd be invited to a reception and asked to make remarks. I would have two pages of remarks, most of it in German, with one paragraph in Turkish. But we had no Turkish speaking FSN.

But fortunately I still had friends in the embassy in Ankara. So I would send them a paragraph in English and ask them to translate it.

Q: Now that is using networking really well.

DELAWIE: This was five minutes work probably. There would be other speakers of course, the local politicians or something. And I remember this one dinner where there was the city counselor for that part of Berlin, some other politician, and me who were asked to speak. So I said my paragraph in Turkish and everybody stands up and applauds.

The other two people, when they spoke German of course, they didn't get anything like that. And of course, the German politicians were their representatives. I wasn't, I was a foreigner. It was a little weird, but I think I talked before about the importance of foreign language in the Foreign Service. And this anecdote just shows me that when you speak someone else's language, you are demonstrating respect for them. That is a key advantage that the U.S. Foreign Service has over most other Foreign Services in the world because we've put such a high premium on teaching people foreign languages so they can do their jobs.

After several of these things, and the positive impression they made on me, one of the local employees left the PA section; I said, okay, that person's replacement needs to speak Turkish. And I got some resistance from that. But you know, when you're DCM, usually you end up getting what you want. And it was not as if that really limited the number of people who applied for the job; there were tens of thousands of educated Germans with Turkish heritage who could speak Turkish, and many of them had the PD skills we needed too. So they advertise a trilingual job with German, Turkish, English, because most local employees had to speak English. We had a bunch of people apply for the job, but even though the announcement clearly stated that you have to have educated level Turkish as well as German and English, two thirds of the people that applied did not speak Turkish, so it was easy to discard their applications. We wound up with several decent applicants who spoke Turkish and we hired one of them. So finally in the PA section, one of the outreach FSNs was able to work this crowd, and it wouldn't depend on the embassy having a Foreign Service officer who had served in Turkey to do this. I thought that was a contribution I left the embassy with.

We had some issues while I was there with entry-level officers, most of whom would be assigned to Frankfurt to work on visas, sometimes having trouble learning German. Because it turns out German is a pretty hard language. Since I'd learned it starting when I was in high school, it didn't seem so hard to me. But I mean objectively, here at FSI you need 12 more weeks to learn German than to learn Spanish for example, to a working level. Anyway, we had a couple of people who had learned German at FSI but who could not get off language probation, being assigned to Mission Germany. I felt really bad for them because you cannot stay in the Foreign Service unless you pass a language test. There were a couple of issues. What we heard from multiple people was that there were challenges with the German language instruction here; fewer than 60% of the students were achieving their training objectives. Then there were people who could not get the three/three they required in German to get off language probation. This happened several times. Finally I called back to personnel in the State Department, HR, the entry level office, and told them that they really have to stop assigning people, junior officers to German language posts if they did not have a reason to expect that they could learn German. Because it was just, if you have no language learning experience, German is not where you want to start.

So this is just an anecdote, but it showed me there are things only the DCM can care about, because it's no one's job at an embassy to pay attention to how FSI language instruction is going for the language of the host country. But I started seeing patterns, as I

would meet every new employee upon arrival from FSI and hear a lot of thoughts about their German language instruction experience. And I realized that, okay, well it's not the desk; they don't watch this. Their focus is policy. It's not EUR/EX; they're focused on logistics and money and things.

Who's paying attention to language? Well theoretically the people at FSI, but probably not good enough attention. We've gone through waves over the years of problems in different languages, at FSI. And remember during the 90s, in the whole Serbo-Croatian section people were fighting with each other and most ended up getting fired. I realized that someone's going to have to take this on. Recall that we had no HR officer. I finally decide, okay, well I'm going to take it on so I engaged with HR entry level CDA to deal with the problem of sending people with no language experience to German speaking posts. Then I engaged with the Dean of the language school, because when you are DCM in a big post, you can reach to the top, and said we need help. Because we're hearing so many people have problems. Ultimately they came up with a plan which sounded reasonable. But then I left, so I don't know whether it worked or not, but the experience still emphasized to me the importance of solving problems. The importance of owning problems. If you want to be a successful Foreign Service officer and you see an important problem, you cannot assume that someone else is going to solve it.

Q: If you had had an HR officer at post, would that have been something the HR officer would have worked on?

DELAWIE: Probably, yes. I mean I would still have called the dean of the language school myself, but then I would have asked the HR officer to identify someone here in FSI, maybe the language training supervisor, with whom to follow up.

Q: Because really it takes someone from a perspective of policy and management to be able to identify the real specific difficulties that are going on. And especially since you're a German speaker, you would be able to say the students can't handle typical language situations in this situation, that situation, that situation, which FSI should have been training them in. And that those are some of the specific failures. How do you deal with that? And an HR officer probably wouldn't be able to do that by themselves.

DELAWIE: I'm not claiming I did all the work on this; it affected the management section, which supported the project a lot. But they were severely under staffed. I had also called up my counterpart in Vienna, which had a smaller pool of German speaking officers; they had also noticed problems. So we worked together on that a little bit. We even did a survey of all the arriving officers from German language school too. Data is better than anecdotes.

Anyway, problem solving is a key Foreign Service skill. Sometimes you have to identify the problem. Sometimes if you just point it out to someone else, they'll take care of it. And sometimes there's just no one else who is going to do that and then you have to do it yourself if you care about it.

Q: You're coming to the end then of this DCM job in Berlin. Are you thinking about another position? Immediately or one year detail or what's your thought?

DELAWIE: Well, I think I said when was talking about being the DAS in the Political-Military Bureau, I was really impressed with the then acting undersecretary, Rose Gottemoeller, who negotiated the New Start treaty, and who became my boss as soon as she was confirmed as the assistant secretary of the arms control Bureau. She was acting under secretary for international security until Ellen Tauscher was confirmed in that job. Rose had visited Berlin a couple of times because she was working on arms control issues. I always made a point of seeing her, and at one point I said I want to work for you again. So the fall of 2011 rolls around and it's time for me to bid for my onward assignment for summer 2012. I called Rose on the phone and said, do you have a job coming up because I want to work for you? And she said, yes, maybe. It turns out later that one of the DASes in the Arms Control Bureau would be nominated to be ambassador somewhere, although of course Rose couldn't say anything at that point since this info is tightly controlled.

But I know the DAS involved and I understood the code about not discussing potential chief of mission jobs. I happen to be in Washington for the DCM conference; I see the DAS and she makes it clear that she's pretty sure she's going to be leaving, although she has not been announced or nominated for anything at that point. But that gives me comfort, and Rose says, yes, I want you to come to my bureau as DAS. But we can't do anything formal until there is a nomination. So I tell my career development officer that I'm in line for this job, but nothing's going to happen for a while. They do tend to get nervous when clients don't have onward assignments towards the end of their tours.

Q: Because you could, you could end up being at the very end of the bid cycle and something strange happened and the opportunity is no longer there.

DELAWIE: Exactly. If something had come up and she couldn't go then she probably would have stayed in her job. That's the way that works. But at this point I was eligible to retire, which was a safety net. I wanted to work for Rose. I wanted to do something different. And those are things I wanted to do more than anything else. So that was really the only job I was interested in. I didn't even bid on it because you don't bid on DAS jobs. So I had to submit a pro forma bid list of jobs that met the requirements, but that I'm not interested in and probably not qualified for, and HR left me alone. Ultimately, Marcie Ries is nominated to be ambassador to Bulgaria.

Then she is confirmed, in the spring of 2012. I was supposed to leave right after the 4th of July, because my successor Jim Melville was ready to go. HR had been annoying me occasionally, which is their job and it's fine, but, finally someone tells them that, okay, Delawie's in line for this job, and they relax. And even though through 90% of the bid cycle, I have no onward assignment, and even no bids for most of it, they are fine. For deputy assistant secretary jobs you have to be approved by the "D committee," the deputy secretary's committee, which doesn't always happen quickly because it's hard to get all

the undersecretaries in one place at the same time. But ultimately the D committee approves me, so I finally have somewhere to go once my assignment in Germany is over.

The way things are in the Foreign Service is you generally cannot leave before the 4th of July reception, because it's such a big event and so many people come and especially if you are DCM, everybody knows you and you've got to talk with them, especially if you are about to leave, you need to say goodbye. It's a great opportunity to tell them about your successor, who's going to do a wonderful job and please stay in touch with him; things like that.

There were several farewell events for me that were of course, while work, they were fun as well. The ambassador had dinner and the national security advisor came, which was pretty impressive. A lot of my contacts came to a separate reception. I felt that I had a good chance to say goodbye to many people. And then the Fourth of July event rolls around at the American Academy, which is an NGO, in Southwest Berlin, which had a vast lawn which fronted on the Wannsee lake.

For the Fourth of July reception we invited about 3000 people. The ambassador and I spent the first half shaking hands with people that came in, and then we had the program, which included the Marines bringing in the flag with the national Anthem, the remarks by the ambassador and a few other things. I was the MC of the event; I would introduce the Marines, the ambassador, and thank you all for coming, et cetera. I had prepared remarks, but the stage management had gotten messed up and things happened at the wrong times.

So my remarks didn't work anymore; I'm improvising remarks in German, which by then I felt completely comfortable in, despite it being rusty at my arrival three years before. Still, it was a bit intimidating to improvise remarks in a foreign language in front of 3000 people. So what happened is I had to describe what was already happening, rather than introduce things, which my prepared remarks covered. The information officer, who knew what was supposed to happen, comes up to me at the end and says, wow, that's a great job. I didn't know your German was so good. He spoke five/five German. So that was a good compliment.

So my last 4th of July in Berlin was successful, despite German weather. We had lots of people who had a great time. It was a really terrific way to engage contacts and to show them you care about them. Because we could invite people from the customs service that helped move stuff through Germany for us or the press that didn't get to interview the ambassador because they were small regional press. We could invite all these people that we couldn't normally interact with just because there were only so many hours in the day, and show them a great party and a great time, and demonstrate respect.

During my three years, we always had the Fourth at the American Academy. They are now done somewhere else. We had a terrific partnership with the American Academy, which had been set up by Holbrooke. Holbrooke had been ambassador in Bonn. One of the things he did before he left was to help establish this NGO called the American Academy that would work on German American relations in culture. They have fellows

that are typically artists, or novelists or, poets, or historians. The fellows from the U.S. that go there spend several months working at the Academy in the spring and in the fall. It's a nice NGO.

We left Germany and I show up after vacation in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. Where my boss was Rose Gottemoeller, assistant secretary, but also acting under secretary because Ellen Tauscher had left government at that point. Rose told me there are a couple of particular things that she wants me to focus on. One is conventional arms control in Europe. Another is preserving arms control verification capabilities. The third is managing people. Next time we can get into that. That's what I have for now.

Q: Okay. So today is May 23rd and we're resuming our interview with Greg Delawie. Greg, you just completed Berlin?

DELAWIE: Yes. We left Berlin right after the 4th of July reception for home leave in the United States, which for me usually means to go to San Diego. I started in the Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance Bureau (AVC) as a deputy assistant secretary (DAS) in August of 2015. Rose Gottemoeller was the assistant secretary. She was also acting under secretary at that time. Frank Rose was one of the other DASes and Anita Friedt was the principal DAS. So that was the AVC front office. It was the assistant secretary and the three DASes. Since Anita and I had just arrived at basically the same time, there was a reallocation of office responsibilities.

I wound up being in charge of the European security office, which does conventional arms control and NATO arms control. Supervising this office was the main reason I was hired to be in the bureau, because of my extensive European and political military experience. I also got the nuclear risk reduction center, which was set up under an agreement between Reagan and Gorbachev, to make nuclear war less likely; that came after some near misses in the 80s, when there was a risk of misinterpretation about what a missile launch might be; the idea of the NRRC, as we called it, was that, if the United States was going to conduct a test of an intercontinental ballistic missile, which does happen periodically, we would tell the Russians ahead of time via the NRRC, so they would not misinterpret what this missile launch was about.

And likewise the other way. So the NRRC was one of my offices. It's a 24 by seven office that's always sending and receiving messages between the United States and Russia and several other countries. NRCC responsibilities accumulated over the years and it became the official notification channel for the chemical weapons treaty, the open skies treaty, and others. I think there were 15 or 20 different arms control treaties for which the NRRC is the main communication channel between the United States and another country. I also gained responsibility for an office that's mostly scientists, people who are working on the arms control verification challenges of tomorrow.

The idea is, what do you need to start working on today to verify the arms control agreements of the future. Because it takes a long time to do the right science; this team

would work with the national labs on cutting-edge projects in the field. So those are the three offices that I was responsible for. I think it's worth it to reflect just a minute on where this Bureau came from, since many people, even in the State Department, don't know much about it. It had been part of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which had been merged into the State Department, some would say forcibly merged into the State Department, in the 90s. At about the same time USIA was merged into the Department of State. Up until then, from I think the Kennedy administration until the late nineties, ACDA had been an independent agency with a strong dotted line to the State Department, but still an independent agency, if not a cabinet level agency. Much of ACDA became part of the AVC Bureau,

Another big chunk became the International Security and Non-Proliferation Bureau, ISN, whose main focus is non-proliferation. AVC's main focus is arms control. Little bits of ACDA went elsewhere, especially to PM. AVC was a relatively small Bureau. It was a predominantly Civil Service Bureau. A lot of the people in the Bureau had come from ACDA, and were nearing the end of their careers, nearing retirement. So we faced several challenges in the Bureau, one of which was that the merger within the department of state was still a source of some unhappiness, even after 15 years. Then we faced losing a fair amount of expertise as people with really, really specialized skills retired. We had a lot of people who had been air force missileers. When they were talking about missiles and nuclear weapons, they had personal experience working on them. We had scientists with very specialized skills who started out in nuclear chemistry or nuclear physics and then had moved into the arms controls field. Most of these people had started in the 60s or 70s and by 2015, they were pretty much ready to retire; there was just not a pipeline of people to replace them. So that was a management challenge.

In my first meeting with Rose, my boss, she asked me to see if there was any way to put back together the conventional arms control agreement, known as the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, or CFE Treaty, that Russia had basically suspended obligations on in 2007. Which we had attempted to do already once or twice and not gotten to success. That was to be my main task. Another task was maintaining the State Department's ability to verify that arms control partners, mostly Russia, were observing their obligations under arms control agreements, and maintaining the ability of the U.S. government to have what we euphemistically call national technical means, to monitor compliance with arms control agreements. Because even back in the Kennedy days, the U.S. had been unwilling to make an arms control agreement unless it could verify somehow a partner was observing the terms. If you think back in the U.S. - Soviet Union relationship, in that time period and even years after, there were substantial grounds for mistrust that the USSR would do what it promised. So we did not want to make a deal unless we thought our partner was living up to it too. Interestingly, it is the State Department's job in the U.S. government to determine whether an arms control partner is observing the terms of the agreement.

But of course none of these national technical means belongs to the Department of State. They belong to other agencies in the Intel community or the defense department. So the State Department under U.S. law has to make a determination as to whether the partner is

observing the terms of the agreement, but the State Department has to rely on the capabilities of other parts of the U.S. government for the information that it requires to make those determinations. And of course those other parts of the U.S. government have limited budgetary capability. They've got their own priorities, and arms control is not necessarily at the top of the list, depending on what else is going on in the world. So that was a challenge that Rose wanted me to spend a fair amount of time on; how do we make sure we can continue to do that job assigned to the Department of State without a budget of billions of dollars for satellites or other kinds of sensors.

The third area was management. How do we more effectively manage the Bureau so it can do its job and prepare the future. So those were the main things that I was going to be working on, starting with the conventional arms control issue. I think it's important that I disclose here that I was not an arms control expert. I had become a political military affairs guy, even though I started out in economics. But arms control is a very specialized part of political military affairs that I'd never really worked on. We had one or two meetings when I was in Germany with the German government about the CFE treaty and whether we could talk Russia back into it or not, but I didn't really know a whole lot.

So of course I had to educate myself. Fortunately there was a very capable staff in the European security office that had worked on the CFE treaty and the other conventional arms control agreements for years. They helped get me up to speed. Then we had to figure out exactly how to approach the problem of reinvigorating the treaty. How could we persuade Russia to reenter it?

Q: Just a quick question here. Were any of the parts of the CFE treaty still being observed?

DELAWIE: Yes, there were data exchanges that were still being observed, at least by the European and American side. We were operating as if it was still in force; Western and Central European countries were operating as if it were still in force. Russia was not, really. The main Russian argument was that the CFE treaty had been negotiated when Russia was on the ropes, after the breakup of the USSR; it had accepted provisions in the treaty that tied its hands, such as where could it station forces and equipment within its own territory. It was particularly unhappy about the Flank agreement. So it was not going to be easy because clearly Russia felt the treaty as negotiated had disadvantaged it; it would not really want to get back in; it would probably want to have to be some big deal to attract it back in.

It was of course not apparent at the time or even since what that deal might be. Certainly Russia made clear that it would not accept any limitations on positioning forces or equipment within its own territory, limits which we would certainly like a future CFE Treaty to have. Now in anything related to European security, I always felt that it is better to start out by speaking with key European countries. So we traveled to NATO headquarters in Brussels and a few European capitals to ask our partners what they would like to see in a future CFE-like treaty.

We also met with delegations at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna; one of the OSCE's issue baskets is conventional arms control. We wanted to gauge how much interest there was in at least the major European countries. It turns out they were interested in trying to reassemble the CFE treaty somehow, mostly because they wanted some structured way to talk with Russia about conventional military force issues. They wanted to have some idea ahead of time whether Russia might be doing something that would pose a risk or a threat. Some of the confidence building measures in the CFE Treaty had made it less likely there would be an unexpected threat, due to the data and the inspection regimes in the treaty.

We saw that at least among the big four European NATO countries, there was an interest in doing something on conventional arms control. So we came back to Washington and then we had to sell this idea within our own department. The European Bureau was not wild about the idea; they didn't think a deal was possible, so they didn't want to waste staff time on it. We worked through that for a while. In the end, EUR was willing to go along as long as we did most of the work. Then we find the same thing at the national security council staff, which thinks it wouldn't be bad to have a deal, but don't think it can be achieved and it's not worth the effort to try; they thought that there was no bandwidth to accomplish this given the other arms control issues on the plate. So that takes a fair amount of persuasion, some high level meetings with defense and the national security staff. Ultimately we get permission to try to negotiate at NATO principles that might form the basis of a new CFE treaty. All that took a fair amount of time, most of my first several months in the Bureau, perhaps most of the first year.

Q: During that first year, were there any signals at all from Russia that there might be even an interest in this kind of discussion though?

DELAWIE: The position of Russia for most of my three years at AVC had always been, give us something to think about and then we will think about it; we're not going to tell you what this deal might look like; you, the United States, NATO, persuade us that we want this. Every once in a while they would reiterate why they'd suspended their obligations under the CFE treaty, but mostly it was just figure something out and give it to us and then we'll think about it.

In the summer of 13, I get to make a presentation at NATO, on this is what the U.S. thinks, these are the principles that we think might be part of a revised CFE treaty. And I say, let's try and work something out together that would suit all NATO members because it must be a NATO-endorsed treaty. We also want other European States, like Partnership for Peace States, to be able to buy into this too. So it would not be solely a NATO-Russia agreement, which is another complicating factor.

Then it takes another year basically to come to full NATO agreement, or consensus on principles for a new CFE treaty. To get there I went to numerous meetings; I went to Europe a lot to meet with foreign ministry officials from many countries. Usually I tried to do it when officials were going to be at NATO in Brussels or at OSCE in Vienna anyway, to get more bang for the buck. But I did have to travel to the Baltics, to Poland,

to Germany many times, and London to have meetings in EUR capitals. Now, just to cut that part of the story short, because I know there's a limited amount of interest in CFE, when Russia invaded Crimea, that took a whole lot of steam out of the effort.

So a deal between NATO and Russia became very unlikely. Fortunately we were able to gain consensus on this NATO statement of principles. But we all knew that it was going to have to sit on the shelf for a while, maybe a long time, before there was any chance of making a deal with Russia when it was occupying parts of Ukraine. The type of invasion that Russia staged in Crimea was exactly the type of thing that a new conventional arms control treaty was going to try to forestall. It would have provided warnings, it would have provided data if there were significant troop movements and things like that.

So now there is a NATO agreed consensus, which cost me thousands of hours of work, sitting on a shelf in Brussels somewhere at NATO HQ on what a new conventional arms control agreement would look like. Of course that outline was agreed in 2014. So even if we put things back together today, a new deal would have to be different because circumstances changed. But I was pretty pleased at the time. This was my first time doing real multilateral diplomacy; it was a real challenge to get 28 different partners to agree on something, and any one of them can say no, you have to do creative compromising, creative deal making. While I was doing counter piracy in Pol-Mil several years before, our goal wasn't to create a treaty, it was really an action group.

This was a big learning experience for me. Now I have even more respect for our people that worked at the United Nations, where they have to deal with 170 countries at once, many of which are not like-minded at all. Because it was tough enough to deal with 27 other NATO countries, that are far more like-minded than most of the rest of the world is. So CFE follow-on occupied a lot of my time during my three years in AVC.

Another big conventional arms control issue was the Open Skies Treaty. Just to avoid confusion, there are two different and completely unrelated treaties using the title "open skies." The term is applied to civil aviation treaties between the U.S. and other countries that allow airlines to fly between countries without government economic regulation; for example, there is one between the U.S. and European Union that allows any EU airline to fly to any American international airport without USG economic approval, and vice versa for American carriers. I had worked on such a treaty with Italy earlier in my career; the other “open skies treaty” is an arms control agreement that encompasses most of NATO, Russia, and a few other countries. It is an agreement on cooperative aerial monitoring. Basically under this open skies treaty, our country has the ability to overfly a partner country with an airplane that includes cameras and to take pictures of what's going on down below. There are limits to how many flights you could have, to exactly what the cameras can do, and so on. Today I will only talk about the arms control version of the Open Skies Treaty (OST), not the civil aviation version.

The OST was one of the foundational elements of conventional arms control in Europe because it gave, especially our European partners, the ability to at relatively low cost conduct aerial monitoring of Russian military deployments. They can overfly Western

Russia and take pictures of what Russian forces are up to. The plane then goes back home with the film for analysts to review. When the Treaty was negotiated 20 years ago, even up to today, it specified the use of regular film, basically like movie film, despite the fact we have had digital cameras on our phones for years now. So photo analysts, like those portrayed in the film *Thirteen Days* about the Cuban Missile Crisis, figure out what was going on when the pictures were taken. Most of our European partners don't have satellites in orbit that have this capability.

So it was good for them to have this capability to overfly Russia and have their own data about what the heck was going on there. We of course use the treaty too. We have a couple of open skies planes, that are basically 707s that were heavily modified to include the camera and other sensors the treaty allows. The planes are operated by the Air Force and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. There are some capabilities that you can get from open skies that you cannot get from satellites; for example, under certain circumstances the plane can fly under clouds, whereas a satellite view is obscured by clouds.

We always used up all the flights allowed under the treaty; DTRA planned out ahead of time where we'd go to take the most pictures possible in the time allowed. Sometimes we used flights for data collection on areas of interest, which was the principle purpose of the treaty. Other times we used it for signaling purposes, like when Russia began to make trouble in Eastern Ukraine. Ukraine asked us to overfly it under the OST, which we did. One of the key provisions of the treaty is that the country being overflown gets a copy of the film, so this gave Ukraine pictures of Eastern Ukraine it could use for various purposes. Open Skies flights are unclassified, as is the film.

The way it works is, when we overfly Russia, the plane lands there first, without the camera being turned on; in fact, there has to be an external hatch covering the camera lens until the plane lands for the first time. Once our plane lands at the designated airport in Russia, the Russian air force or whatever has people examining it to make sure there's nothing on board that the treaty does not allow. No intelligence collection devices, for example, other than the ones that are allowed in the treaty, like the camera for example. Then the Russian air force people get to fly on our plane with us as it's going over its route over Russia. Then of course they get a copy of the film afterwards and the idea is this is completely unclassified. It's cooperative aerial monitoring. That's why they get to be in our plane when it's over Russia, and we get to be in their plane when they are over the United States.

The photo analysts can get really useful information from this sometimes. Because this is a film camera, the photo analysts that work on this use the same types of light tables that you saw in the *Thirteen Days* film. In fact, I've seen them and they're pretty old. Fortunately DTRA and DOD still employ people that understand how to look at a regular picture, not a computer picture, and learn stuff from it. So that's the way the Open Skies treaty works, more or less. We and our Allies fly over Russia, they fly over the United States and European countries. Every once in a while this gets in the news with a

headline like "Administration allows Russian spy plane to fly over the United States and take pictures."

It is a decades old agreement. The idea originated in the Eisenhower Administration, the treaty was negotiated during the Bush 41 administration and came into force during the Bush 43 administration. It's pretty straightforward. And the main thing to remember is that American technical experts from DTRA are on their plane when they're over the United States. The Russians are on our plane when we're over Russia. We wanted to maintain this, since the open skies treaty is a pillar of conventional arms control, but the 21st century was catching up to us. Russia wanted to get rid of the film camera and replace it with a digital version. The treaty basically put limits on what a camera could do, such as the resolution can only be so much. Of course any modern digital camera is probably going to exceed the resolution of whatever a 1990s-era treaty said.

So it turned out to be very difficult to negotiate this. There were certainly people in the U.S. government who just didn't want it to continue, felt that running the treaty cost us a lot of money that we could use for other things, and did not trust Russia. Even though our DTRA experts get to wander all over the Russian plane before it flies over the United States, some people were not confident that we could find whatever the Russians were trying to hide in the plane. As often happens in the U.S. government, the people who opposed allowing Russia to use a digital camera started putting up all kinds of objections; some of them were reasonable and others were just specious efforts trying to snow policy people with technology. So I had to learn a lot so I could figure out which objections were reasonable and needed to be dealt with, and which were specious. There was a U.S. Government policy decision that the treaty was going to continue and be accommodated to the 21st century, which basically meant that we would have to accept the replacement of the old film cameras with digital cameras; at least one of our NATO Allies also wanted to replace its Open Skies film camera with a digital camera as well, so it was not just the Russians that cared about the issue.

Q: In essence, a better camera but not one as good as on a satellite and so on.

DELAWIE: The treaty has limitations on what kind of resolution the camera could have. Basically the idea is they were trying to replace a Kodak film camera with the same type of digital camera that's on your phone these days. It's bigger, it's better, but it's fundamentally the same as that. It's got a better lens. Because if your phone is at 35,000 feet, you can't take a picture of a military base on the ground and see anything worthwhile. Now the U.S. film camera is almost as big as this room; a lot of it is just the reels of the film, because there have to be hours and hours of film because you get to fly for a couple of days and the film was just running most of the time. In fact one of the challenges for the United States was that Kodak was going to stop making the film for our camera. Anyway, to defend this treaty I had to figure out a way to tell the difference between legitimate objections and dust thrown in the eyes by these opponents in the U.S. government. There was a fair amount of dust. It was really unfortunate. I'd still believed in the one team, one mission theme that Colin Powell always emphasized when he was our secretary of state, and that the U.S. government should work together. And once a

decision is made it's incumbent on career people to implement that decision; unfortunately that doesn't really happen all the time in the government. So some of these people were just trying to snow non-experts with technology gibberish and it was a shame that that was going on.

Q: Was the opposition coming from within the department, from other offices or from other agencies?

DELAWIE: Other agencies. I ended up spending an awful lot of time in my three years in AVC on the open skies treaty basically defending it from opponents within U.S. government; it still exists today.

Q: Did you succeed in the end in changing the cameras to a digital one?

DELAWIE: It was the Russians that had a digital camera. I wanted a digital camera for our plane too of course; the estimates on how much that would cost were unfortunately in the $1 billion range for DOD. Whatever happened with the U.S. plane happened after I left. But we eventually made an agreement to accept the Russian camera. We had to work with the allies because it was mostly their countries the plane would fly over. It would fly over the United States a couple of times a year. But it mostly flew over Europe; every participating country had to offer so many flights per year. I believe we ultimately made a deal that accepted the Russian digital camera.

The risk was always that if we didn't agree, then they would just drop out of that treaty like they did the CFE treaty. And our European partners really wanted to keep the Open Skies Treaty afloat. Because many of them did not have other ways of getting overhead imagery of what was going on in Russia. Ultimately I think it worked out okay; the treaty still exists. And now it is less controversial in the United States. But I had to learn so much about computers and digital photography in order to, as the DAS, stave off these attacks on the treaty; it was almost as hard as learning another language.

We had a couple of great people in the State Department who understood the technology issues over in the Intelligence and Research Bureau. But most of the people that worked in the Arms Control Bureau were policy people, not engineers. So we had to go out and find engineering talent to work on this issue. Fortunately, as I mentioned at the beginning of this, I paid part of my way through college by doing computer programming; technology has never scared me, so I was willing and able to learn about this stuff. It did take a lot of time, but it was essential for doing the job.

Some of the opponents of the treaty in the U.S. government went to congressional staffers to get them spun up about the treaty, always with the thought that the Russians would be flying spy planes over the United States and we couldn't possibly trust them to live within the terms of the treaty. I objected to this for a couple of reasons. First, if Russia did cheat and our DTRA experts found out about it, then that would be really bad for them. And secondly, I knew that the DTRA people who were engineers and who got to crawl over the Russian plane before it did anything in the United States were incredibly talented

people. If it was possible to find something on their plane, I was confident that they would find it, if it was something that was not allowed by the treaty, some kind of collection device. Also, we had to keep in mind the Russians have spy satellites, they over fly the United States, all hours of the day. The main benefit for the United States and for Russia of the Open Skies Treaty is not really the intelligence collection, but the cooperative monitoring aspect. I was always dubious of claims that the Russians could learn stuff from this airplane based on the treaty limits that they couldn't learn some other way.

Q: Once again, just a clarification here, you're talking about a question, a small modification to the treaty from the point of view of the Russians. Were the people who opposed this in the U.S. government also opposed to the entire treaty? In other words, were they saying we should really just, um, give notice and leads to the treaty?

DELAWIE: It was hard for them to say that because there had already been a policy decision that we would try to keep the treaty going. Now certainly there were people that believed that in the U.S. government and some of them just thought, it's not worth the cost, I don't know how many millions of dollars a year to keep the plane and the crew working when they could be doing something else. But it was hard to say that because there was already a policy decision that we keep going, and therefore they had to try to find other ways of derailing the treaty. By about the time I left AVC in 2015, we did get unanimous agreement among the treaty partners, us and the Russians and the Euro's, procedures for using a digital camera. That meant it had to be agreed in the U.S. government as well.

Just to touch on this office of scientists and engineers that I supervised, the Office of Verification and Transparency Technologies. Its job was to look at how technology could support the arms control challenges of the future, especially how to verify future treaties. We had some really talented people who had spent time looking at things like North Korean nuclear explosions, trying to determine whether the bangs were really as big as the North Koreans said, which helps us figure out exactly what kind of bomb they are blowing up.

In the last few years there has been concern about how you would know if someone sneaks a nuclear device into a country; the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation has funded a lot of gate monitors over the years at border crossings between countries to try to detect nuclear materials. These technologies work but they can't see everything, especially if it's hidden in one of a thousand big trucks going through border crossings every day, which is not uncommon.

There are very creative ideas about how you might detect a nuclear device inside a container or truck. One that I learned a little bit about was related to a national lab public paper on the use of cosmic ray muons – don't even ask me what that means – that could detect from the outside of a container or a truck when there might be a nuclear device inside, based on how these cosmic ray muons are scattered. So there was some really

creative science going on in this office that worked with the national labs to look at these types of things.

I have to admit that I had a modest amount of understanding of the science behind what they were doing, depending on the area; but it was fine. Anywhere in a large organization, at some point your ability as boss to understand exactly what your subordinates are doing is going to stop. You do your best to supervise the team and help them do what they're supposed to do and check in as needed. Every once in a while there would be a dispute. And I remember this one dispute over basically a physics issue in which I claim no particular expertise. So the dispute was between two scientists, one in the Department of State, and one at a national lab; it involved money of course, which is why it was important. I basically had to negotiate an agreement between these two scientists, never really understanding exactly what the dispute was about. But I was able to use my diplomacy skills that I had accumulated over the years to ask open-ended questions and try to get people to come together and see there was some compromise that was going to be possible. That was one of the surreal experiences I had negotiating deals on things that I didn't even really understand myself.

Towards the end of my time in AVC we got a new assistant secretary. Rose Gottemoeller is nominated and is ultimately confirmed as under secretary of state for international security. That took a long time because there was significant Republican opposition to her in the Senate. But ultimately she was confirmed, and then that opened the door for a new assistant secretary. Frank Rose was nominated for that. He was one of my colleagues as a DAS in the bureau already. Unfortunately it took a long time for him to be confirmed, once again because of Republican Senate opposition to basically any Obama political appointee. Frank was superbly qualified for that job. He'd been a career employee at the Pentagon and a Capitol Hill staffer before he came to state.

He was really qualified but the Republicans just weren't confirming political appointees, no matter their qualifications. They did continue to confirm career Foreign Service officers for jobs. Ultimately Frank gets confirmed as assistant secretary finally after waiting over a year. He wants to tackle some of these issues I mentioned at the beginning; how do you keep the Bureau going when the biggest chunk of employees is nearing retirement? Of course, he works on policy things too, but wanted to focus a lot on management of the Bureau and to make sure that it had the ability to do what it's supposed to do, today, and in the future. So, we spend a fair amount of time on internal Bureau management. There were people in the Bureau, almost all specialists of one kind or another, who did not have regularly assigned duties; what they did today was what the boss told them to do today, rather than be responsible in the long term for a particular policy issue. So I had a fair amount of experience in managing a bunch of people that I accumulated over the years. Frank was interested in drawing on that. So I came up with some thoughts on creating an ownership culture in the Bureau. Now, this is like management 101, but it had not been really applied in the past.

And basically the idea is that everybody gets to work on a set of issues that that person will own. Of course there are things that no one really wants to do in any organization,

but they have to be done anyway. And you have to recognize that if you are going to give someone something he doesn't really want to do, you've got to make sure you give him something he wants to do. We had a management consultant come in and help all the Bureau offices to organize. What is Jane Smith's job? Describe it. Theoretically, of course, under the Civil Service rules, this should be done for everybody, but in fact, it wasn't, or the work requirements were vague. So we start promoting this ownership culture in the bureau.

They still work for whomever their boss is, who supervises them. But you shouldn't have to go to your boss every day and say, what am I going to do today, boss? That is not a good way to run an organization. Also, newer employees, millennials, want to know what they are expected to do to be successful. And because we were facing a potential retirement wave among Baby Boomers, we wanted to make the bureau work as well as possible to attract junior employees who would develop expertise that we will need in two or three decades. Because the nuclear fraternity, especially in the nuclear part of AVC, you have to know so much. How exactly do nuclear weapons work? That's classified information, of course. But even if you have the clearance, that doesn't mean you really understand all the science and engineering behind it. You have to accumulate that knowledge over time.

And these nuclear weapons, they are delivered somehow, on missiles or airplanes. How do those things work? And we had to have people that understood all that. People were still on that stuff, but they were nearing retirement age and we saw that there was not an obvious way to replace them with people with similar expertise. So we looked at ways we could use the presidential management fellows program that would allow you to bring in people who had just finished graduate education. Of course for some of these very specialized functions we recruited from military people who had worked on the issues. For some roles we needed real science people; it turned out that the Department of Energy had had a program to recruit real scientists for the national labs.

I negotiated a way into that program where they had a very structured, rigorous hiring and training mechanism. I negotiated with DOE to get a couple of slots in their program. So basically we paid the expenses, but they would just fold us into their hiring plan. They were looking for nuclear scientists; so they just added a couple more slots that we would pay for, but they would do all the technical evaluation of skills and abilities. And ultimately, after completing the DOE training program, those individuals would come over to the State Department and become AVC employees. Ultimately we did manage to recruit newer people from a variety of sources and to establish a way to keep doing that in the future. I was laying the groundwork for things what would happen after I was gone. But in the Foreign Service you're always making decisions that will benefit your successor, and you are hoping that your predecessor in your next job had made decisions that would benefit you. We did spend a lot of time on this kind of management issue, preparing the Bureau for the future.

We also tried to change the bureau's focus a little bit in the nuclear area from just being about arms control, to having a broader focus on strategic stability. You do not want

anyone else to have doubt whether they should throw a nuclear weapon your way; it's not just about arms control and counting warheads and what's the deal say? It's also about making sure there is some stability, that you're not putting your potential adversary in a position where he's faced with the decision to use it or lose it. I always felt this was a very important point. This was not really the issue for the three offices that I was responsible for. But it was a policy oriented change that I felt was very significant.

Those were most of the things about AVC that I wanted to talk about. There is a lot of detail. Of course, I don't remember all of it. I think there's a really limited number of people that care about it, so I don't want to go on too much. But I do want to talk a little bit about one of my collateral responsibilities in the Bureau, which was being on the deputy chief mission (DCM) selection committee for HR. So the way that works is there's a DCM committee that Human Resources runs, and it has a representative from each of the undersecretaries. I served on it for two years over my three years in AVC as a representative of Rose. The way the DCM committee works is this: people bid on DCM jobs; the bureaus go through the candidates for these jobs and make short lists of candidates.

Then before the shortlist goes to the ambassador, who ultimately gets to pick who the DCM is going to be, the DCM committee reviews the list and it can add or subtract people. Sometimes you need to subtract someone because they did something really bad in the past that the regional Bureau does know about, but HR knows about it because this person has been disciplined for something and HR has records on that. Sometimes you want to add a person to the short list who had bid on it, but, had not been selected by the Bureau; you do this to give a bureau outsider a chance, someone who shows significant skills, working in another Bureau for example. Basically what happened is in the fall, when most of these decisions are made the DCM committee starts with the biggest posts, such as Tokyo, Berlin, Mexico City, whatever is on the list for that year.

All of these gigantic posts have dozens or a hundred bidders on them. So you've got to go through each of these people, not just on the Bureau short list, but everyone, and look at the bio statement the person submits and the goal statement and things like that that a DCM candidate has to submit. And then the committee hears a presentation from the regional Bureau, typically from the principal DAS, describing why they chose the top five or so candidates for the short list. Once the bureau representative leaves, the DCM committee discusses the short list and decides whether to add or subtract people. Once the DCM committee approves, the list goes to the ambassador, or if there's no ambassador, it goes to the Bureau assistant secretary, who gets to choose who the DCM is going to be from that short list.

Usually the ambassador will choose one of those people; not always; sometimes they don't want any of them. In those rare cases it becomes more complicated for HR. But usually the ambassador would choose one of those people. Then that person is assigned by HR and the next summer goes to post as DCM. The DCM committee also considers principal officer jobs at consulates. Unlike for DCM jobs, for Principal Officers the final choice is up to the DCM committee. The Bureau once again creates a rank-ordered short

list. Usually the Bureau hopes and expects that their number one choice will be endorsed by the DCM committee. And often that happens; not always though, because sometimes you do want to give someone else a chance, a chance they wouldn't otherwise have, because they're just not part of the Bureau.

Or as I said before, there was big problem that a candidate had in the past that the Bureau doesn't know about, but HR does. That is the general process. It involved a fair amount of preparatory work because you get this big binder and there may be hundreds of people who had submitted bidding statements for a variety of jobs. The DCM committee always tried to do the biggest posts first, because that freed the most people up to look for other assignments. As soon as they found out they weren't going to get to be DCM in London next year, they would have to concentrate on another bid, is the idea. So sometimes you would do Dublin early because there were always 70 or 80 candidates bidding to be DCM in Dublin, even though it's a small post; you would clear away a whole bunch of people by deciding it early.

I was always very favorably impressed at how hard everybody worked on the DCM committee. As I said it did take a lot of time and all of the committee people were busy people. They were either a DAS like I was or they were a senior advisor to one of the undersecretaries; everybody had a whole lot of work to do. But they were taking this on as a collateral responsibility. Yes, it was interesting, because personnel is always interesting, but also I really felt a dedication to the mission of the State Department by these people.

They were not picking a job for themselves. They were trying to pick good people to represent the State Department abroad. And to be, especially for DCMs that would work for a political appointee, they were trying to pick people who had unimpeachable records, great substantive skills, good interpersonal skills, to show this political ambassador what the State Department people were really like. It was all really interesting. During the high season we would typically meet every two weeks for three or four hours at a time. There were good discussions. Typically someone around the table would know some of the candidates. But I was also impressed that people weren't trying to push people just because they knew them; because if you have a list of 10 people, you know two of them and you think, okay those two are good.

They're really good. Does that mean you should try and push them onto the short list? Well what about these eight people you don't know? You know, they may be good too. They may be better than the two you know. How do you know? Well you try to deal with it as a process, not as, I happen to know Diane and she would be good, so I want to put her on the list. You have to have objective information and you have to be able to compare it with the other people. So typically people weren't pushing their favorites; I was impressed about that too. The DCM committee was serious. They were tackling this as an institutional challenge, a personnel challenge. So I enjoyed that, even though as a DAS, I rarely got out of a week without 50 or 60 hours of regular work, and this was additional time. But I felt that it really contributed to the mission of the State Department, the Foreign Service, and I wanted to participate.

I forgot to mention in the context of AVC bureau management, I did have an opportunity to recruit some new leadership for some of the Bureau offices. I was really pleased that I was able to recruit a woman to be an office director, for example, in a Bureau that had very few women. Someone with an unimpeachable management record, not in the arms control fraternity or sorority, but her other skills as a boss and a people leader were significant. I really wanted to deal with morale issues and challenges. This was part of the effort to ensure AVC had the skills needed to go in the future. I was particularly pleased that I was able to help put some new leadership in parts of the Bureau and consider that one of my legacy elements.

Moving on now, I thought I'd talk a little bit about how I got to be ambassador in Kosovo; I knew I was going to be nominated for ambassador from the summer of 2014; I did not actually arrive there of course until the summer of '15. And I couldn't even talk about it until March of 2015. The way you get to be picked for ambassadorial jobs in the Department of State, for career people like me, is a Bureau has to nominate you. So you have to have the endorsement of an assistant secretary. It doesn't have to be the assistant secretary in the Bureau where the embassy is located, like the European Bureau or East Asia Bureau or whatever; any assistant secretary gets to nominate people. So that gives a chance for functional Bureau employees to be nominated to ambassador slots. All ambassadors, of course, work for regional bureaus. So I had asked my assistant secretary, who was Rose at the time, to nominate me for several posts in the Balkans. I was pretty sure that the European Bureau was nominating someone else.

But I of course did not know whom. There is an application process and there's a statement you have to write that can't be more than exactly 500 words or something. And you have to solicit recommendations from other people, bosses, subordinates, and peers. HR and the regional Bureaus then crank on all of these things for a while. Ultimately all these nominations go up to what's called the "D committee," the deputy secretary's committee, which is made up of all the Undersecretaries and actually picks people to be nominated and sent to the White House for approval. Of course the regional Bureau has the biggest say because it's their post, but the regional bureaus don't always get who they want.

Anyway so I'm nominated for several jobs, but Kosovo was not one of them. I did not submit a bid on that particular job. So I'm on vacation with my family in Yellowstone National Park. The park is gigantic, of course. And one of the big things about national parks is that they don't typically have cell phone service. So we're in the middle of it, we're looking at Old Faithful and these beautiful geological and natural sites in Yellowstone. At some point we go up a hill and my Blackberry beeps and I get an email saying the acting director general, the head of State Department personnel, wants to talk to you right away.

I tried to call but the cell phone service was not good enough to make a call because all the antennas are outside the park, far away. It was just pure luck that one of the emails came through. Now, when you are an FSO and the director general wants to talk you

urgently, then you try to do that. So we drove up another hill, and found one bar of signal on my Blackberry. I call the DG's office and of course, he's not there right then, but you know, he'll be back in a few moments. So we hang out in the parking lot for one of the sites of Yellowstone that's up a little bit, and the DG calls and says, the D committee is interested in nominating you to be ambassador to Kosovo. I said, Kosovo, that's not one of the countries I pitched in for. He says, yes, I know, but the D committee can nominate anyone for anywhere.

But of course it will not assign you to Kosovo unless you accept. So, he says, the deputy secretary wants to know by Monday (this is Friday) whether you will accept being nominated as chief mission in Kosovo. I had served in the Balkans, I had been DCM in Croatia, but I'd never been to Kosovo. I didn't know a whole lot about it. And I was in the middle of a national park with no internet access. So basically I say, okay, it will take me a couple of days to figure that out. I explained where I was and what I was doing, and that my family and I were on vacation, and that was the priority. So my wife and I discuss it; our son was still in high school at this point. I was pretty sure there was no American-style high school in Kosovo, which turned out to be right. I just didn't know a whole lot about the country.

So the next day we drove out of this beautiful park to a city in Wyoming where I could use the internet; we go to Starbucks, with my laptop that had been in the hotel. I logged onto the internet and downloaded all this reading material about Kosovo from the State Department's website and elsewhere. We did that for an hour or so. I find out as much as I can and just load it on the computer, most of it not read at that point, but just to get something on the computer and then we could drive back to the park and vacation and we could read it in the evening. So I read about Kosovo, and decided it looked interesting.

It looked like a big challenge; it was a medium-sized embassy, with 500 or so people. But it would definitely require us to divide the family, because my daughter was in college and my son was still in high school and so they would both have to be in the Washington area. My wife would have to stay in the Washington area to take care of my son and I have to go off to Kosovo unaccompanied, which we had never had to do in our Foreign Service careers to this time. My wife was retired by this time, but the embassies I had bid on did have high schools.

So we discussed this, my wife and I and the children, in Yellowstone; we decide we could try it out, we can make a go of it. I called back to the State Department on Monday; we were still in Wyoming somewhere. I say, yes, I'd accept. I was still thinking, I had a few more years in the State Department at that point. But if you turn down an offer like that, you're unlikely to get another. I wanted to be a chief of mission. I thought I could do a good job at that; I had done everything I wanted to in the Foreign Service short of that job. So, that's the way it was launched.

Q: At that early point, had you decided which members of your family would accompany you, how you would deal with the issue of education and that kind of thing?

DELAWIE: Well, the only practical way at that point was that my wife and two children stay in Washington. My son has to finish high school. He's not old enough to stay by himself. My daughter is in college. She would be okay. What we hoped we could do is Vonda would travel to Kosovo every couple of months. Then I would come back to the United States. And that in fact is what we did for the three years that I was there.

So this was in June, 2014; I ended up being nominated by President Obama in March of 2015. What happens in the meantime is you have to have an interview with the White House counsel's office in which they ask you all sorts of embarrassing questions. You have to have your finances gone over with a fine-tooth comb by the ethics part of the Legal Bureau. For most career people that is not too tough, but certainly for politicals that can be a lot. And then you have to have your security clearance update. So all of this stuff goes on for months. You don't hear anything for months at a time and then all of a sudden you get a call from somebody saying they need something within an hour. It's this hurry up and wait mentality. But I'm not supposed to tell anyone else what's up.

By this time Rose Gottemoeller is undersecretary; she's on the D Committee and knows I will be nominated. I tell Frank Rose, who's now the assistant secretary, so he knows that I'm likely to leave in the summer. We agree that we should start recruiting a replacement for me, even though my timing is still very uncertain. Because if the Bureau waited until I was nominated or confirmed, it could take months to get a replacement. By summer 2015 I would have been in the arms control bureau for three years. It would be time to leave anyway. I would just take the risk that the Senate might not confirm me; that has certainly happened; Don Lu wound up finally being ambassador to Albania, but was not confirmed for a year and a half after he was nominated. Apparently nothing to do with him; it was all a fight with the administration.

During this particular time, even as a career Foreign Service officer there were no guarantees of confirmation; it just depended on what fights were going on between the administration and the Republicans in the Senate. So anyway, I say Frank, I will leave next summer, confirmed or not, so that you can start to find someone to succeed me as DAS.

I turned in all of my papers, my extensive biography, all my financial stuff, everything. And then months go by and I got nothing from the White House. Finally I was visiting San Diego to see my family in March of 2015, and had no hint that anything was going to happen. I got on the airplane to fly home to Washington. I turned on my phone when we've landed at Dulles and it almost explodes; there were a million emails congratulating me for having been nominated as ambassador to Kosovo. I had no idea that was going to happen that day or even that month. But whatever the White House was doing, it had finished, so it nominated me and a couple of other people on that particular day. So I think we'll stop there for today. And next time we'll talk about getting ready for the ambassador job.

Q: So today is May 28th and we're resuming our interview with Greg Delawie.

DELAWIE: So last time we left off with me being announced as nominee to be ambassador in Kosovo. So what I thought I'd talk about next is getting ready for this job and then transitioning to actually being in the job. So there comes a point in the process of becoming an ambassadorial nominee where people in the U.S. government can know what your destiny is, but it's still not public. So I was able to have a series of meetings in the U.S. government with people in the State Department, the Pentagon, the justice department, et cetera, to prepare for confirmation and starting the position. Since I had no background in Kosovo at all, this was an important education for me.

So I read every book I could get on Amazon.com and out of the library about Kosovo. I found that there were lots of interesting books about the breakup of Yugoslavia, but they all ended in late 1998, which was a shame, since NATO's involvement in Kosovo really started in 1999. There was a book called *A Short History of Kosovo*, which was about a thousand pages long, but it also ended in 1998. So it turns out there are very few books that talk about Kosovo since the war, since the NATO intervention in 1999. But I did as much reading as I could. I talked with people throughout the U.S. government, which was really interesting. It turns out that there are a lot of people who are now mid level and senior people in the U.S. government who worked on Kosovo during the war period and the immediate post war period; there were also 50,000 NATO soldiers there at one point and a big share of them were Americans.

So there's a whole bunch of people in DOD who served in Kosovo with the NATO mission; there were many others elsewhere in the U.S. government because we were trying to support the creation of governing structures in Kosovo in the immediate post-Kosovo-War period. I think it's important to recognize that Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic had fired all of the Kosovo Albanians from the Civil Service in 1989, so there were very few people left in the post-war period who had any experience in governing and running a country. The only people with any authority were people who had served in the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Q: Now, as part of your prep, do you take the local language?

DELAWIE: I had about two weeks, half days of Kosovo Albanian.

At the time I was there was only one Albanian teacher at FSI who was from Kosovo and spoke natively the Northern dialect of Albanian, which is the dialect spoken in Kosovo. So I learned how to pronounce the letters, how to say the words, how to be polite, and things like that. But Albanian is an extraordinarily difficult language. It is an Indo-European language, but it is not related to any other modern language, and it has a lot of idiosyncrasies. The FSI class is full-time, 44 weeks for Albanian. And not everybody passes out of that with the three/three score you need. So, I only got a little bit, but that turned out to be fine.

Because at the embassy, we could hire the best interpreters in the country for what in American terms is a very reasonable salary. So anyway, talking with people in the U.S. government about my future assignment in Kosovo was fascinating because people had

many personal anecdotes about when they were working for the treasury department in Pristina in 2006 or whatever, helping create a central bank. The other thing I was fascinated by was how much affection there was for Kosovo and the people of Kosovo among so many U.S. government officials. We had sent many USG people there during the 2000s to help create governing structures.

A lot of people had made friends with Kosovars. So there was this well of goodwill within the U.S. government, among career people; this was a tremendous benefit to have because you didn't have to explain to a lot of people the whole story because they knew it, they had lived themselves. Once the White House announced on March 5th, 2015 that I would be President Obama's nominee as ambassador to Kosovo, I could ramp up my meetings. I could meet people outside of the government, and I could meet with senators who were interested and who would be voting to confirm me or not.

The preparation process continued for several months. I was still doing my arms control job and I would continue to do that basically through the end of July 2015 because there were things that had to be done. Also, we had no real idea when or even if the Senate would vote to confirm me. Ultimately in May the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) schedules a hearing. The way that works is you prepare written testimony, then you make a shortened version of about five minutes or less of oral testimony.

The written testimony gets submitted to the Senate a couple of days ahead of time, so the staff can look at it and figure out if there are questions they want the senators to ask. We did not have a whole lot of warning exactly when the hearing would be; they seem to schedule these things at the last minute. Regarding the testimony, the desk had helped with some themes about what the State Department had been working on, and what our Kosovo policy should be. I ended up writing my own testimony, however, to put it in my voice. Also, based on all of these meetings I had had over the prior months, I had decided what I wanted to focus on in my testimony, which turned out to be what I would in fact focus on for the three years of my assignment.

I framed our priorities in the testimony around rule of law, economic development, and regional security; these would become my three priorities and our embassy's three priorities for the whole time I was in Kosovo. As I was figuring these out, I talked with lots of people in the U.S. government, but I also talked with my predecessor, Tracey Jacobson, who was ambassador in Kosovo until summer of 2015. She was really terrific; not every ambassador goes out of his or her way to help a successor, but Tracey certainly did, and I really appreciated it. She also connected me with my office management specialist, which is a key appointment in any front office.

So I was able to keep Tracey's OMS for a year, which was really good. It really helped the transition, for both me and the rest of the embassy; she did a wonderful job. There were so many people helping me get ready for this job, it was just incredible. It really reinforced my respect for Foreign and Civil Service employees in the State Department and the whole USG. People really wanted the USG to be successful in Kosovo, and they were helping make sure that I was as well-prepared as possible to achieve this goal.

Q: This seems like a good moment as you're preparing to go out there. What federal agencies are present at the Embassy?

DELAWIE: There was a decent-sized DOD presence there; there was a defense attaché, like almost every embassy in the world has, in our case an air force officer. There was the office of defense cooperation, which worked with the Kosovo security force on training and equipment, like radios and Humvees. There is still today the 4,000-soldier NATO force called KFOR, for Kosovo Force, which has between five and 600 American soldiers as part of it. Those are typically national guard units that have deployed for about a year. They spend a couple months training in Texas and in Germany, then they go to Kosovo and they're there for nine months. The unit that was there the few months before I left was actually from the California National Guard.

A lot of them were from my home town of San Diego, so it was good to have a lot of other San Diegans in Kosovo. Then there was the state partnership program, which we have with most of the newer countries in Eastern Europe. In our case the state partner was Iowa. National Guard soldiers from the state partnership program work with the local security forces to help them develop their skills and training. We had a terrific state partner in Iowa. Major General Tim Orr was the Iowa adjutant general, the head of the Iowa guard. He came to Kosovo a lot, three times a year. It was a particularly great partnership because it expanded beyond the military framework.

The national guard led to sister city relationships between Kosovo cities and Iowa cities. Some of the Iowa universities set up scholarships for Kosovo students. So many Iowans had been to Kosovo over the years during the state partnership program, with the guard or something else that there had developed a tremendous friendship between the Kosovo and Iowa people. In fact, Kosovo ended up opening its only consulate, in Des Moines, which was the first diplomatic representation that Iowa had ever had. So Iowans were really excited about having a consulate. And Kosovo was really excited about having their consul be in Iowa to help manage this relationship. I learned all these things in the several months before my Senate hearing.

So I was in a hearing with some other ambassador candidates from the Balkans and one from Sweden. The hearing itself was pretty normal, pretty non-confrontational, which was good. I got a couple of hard questions, but they weren't meant as confrontational. They were just about problems of violent extremism or why are so many young Kosovars leaving the country to go to Western Europe? That was Senator Murphy who asked that and he had just been to Kosovo, so he knew the answer better than I did. He didn't hold it against me when I didn't do a great job answering that question.

I read my testimony, which I had practiced about a million times before I actually got there and still stumbled on a couple of words. I found the setting kind of intimidating in the Foreign Relations Committee hearing room, but it went fine. Then it was another month or so before the committee voted to move me forward and then the whole Senate voted to confirm me. Once again, no one was expecting the vote, it just happened.

Q: Since you brought it up, one quick question about the, you might call it the brain drain or the town drain out of Kosovo to Europe. I imagine part of it is simply to be able to get jobs to send money back.

DELAWIE: There's a lot of that. There's a giant morale problem in Kosovo among the young people, who see Western Europe on TV, and they think they should be able to live like that too, which is certainly not unfair for them to expect. They see a lot of politicians who are working to line their own pockets instead of to improve things for them. So it's very discouraging. Half the population is under 25, literally half the population. Kosovo is the youngest country in Europe and one of the youngest countries in the world. During the Yugoslav terror era, people were not having children. So once the war was over and Kosovo Albanians felt safe again, they came back from refugee camps in Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro, they would begin having children again.

So there's this tremendous baby bulge, resulting in that very young population. So it's challenging. Of course, unemployment among youth is about 60% in Kosovo, which is really bad. I can get into more about that later. So the Senate foreign relations committee votes me out. The full Senate confirms a list of candidates; our congressional Bureau, H, was not expecting it to happen, but it did. They called me and said, Oh, you're going to be confirmed. And I said, Oh, great. When? They said, no, no, it happened last night. That happened to be the last business day before ambassador school started at FSI. And when Monday rolled around, I was the only one in the class that had actually been confirmed.

Ambassador school lasts a couple of weeks; many of us called it charm school. There was some time off site. The rest was in the department. We had 20 or so people in my ambassadorial seminar. They were mostly career at that point because it was the tail end of the Obama administration. But there were a couple of political nominees, and I thought they were pretty good. I don't have a whole lot of memories of that because we had so many things going on at the same time, getting ready to move, and I was trying to keep a little bit up to date on what was going on in my Bureau, which I hadn't formally left yet. There were a couple of things left to do. I thought it was a pretty good class. Some of the classes consist of material that lawyers make them tell you even though you know it already; but they have to document that they told you you should be ethical and you should treat your staff right. All these things that, you know, anybody in the Foreign Service should know. And they know people should know and I guess they want to make sure they have a record of telling you so they so they can throw you in jail if you foul up.

There was a fair amount of discussion at the class; none of us had been ambassadors before, although a lot of us had been DCMs, so it was new for everybody. Nancy Powell, who had been ambassador numerous times, served as our mentor. There was a lot of discussion about the president's instruction letter, which every ambassador gets from the president; it says, you're in charge, and it's your responsibility to make sure everything goes right, that you implement our policy and you keep everybody safe. Also, that every single U.S. government agency at the embassy works for you. So there was a fair amount of discussion about the letter; do you, once you're at post, do you share this letter with the

country team. Some people thought you should and some people thought you shouldn't. I always felt that if you have to give your country team colleagues a letter from the president to prove you're in charge, then you have already lost the battle.

Having been DCM at two posts where everybody respected the ambassador I never saw anyone question who was in charge. I felt that I would see the same thing. And of course I did.

Q: Oddly enough I recall a number of posts when a new ambassador arrived that we always got a cable of some kind with mission objectives or something that came with a new ambassador. I don't think it was exactly the letter to the ambassador. And that was something that did not happen with your appointment?

DELAWIE: No. I prepared my testimony. I ran it by the desk and the DAS for the Balkans, who was fine with it. It included everything I thought should be my focus. And they were cool. I knew it was consistent with our previous policy. When I ultimately got to post, I said I talked in my testimony about these three things; they are going to be our main focus; of course, we are going to do everything else that any embassy does as well. But our focus will be on rule of law, economic development, and regional security. So anyway, the ambassadorial seminar was pretty good in general, despite them telling us a bunch of things we already knew.

We had presentations from a lot of senior people, including various lawyers of course. Then the next thing that I had to do was to be sworn in. I had asked Rose Gottemoeller, who was under secretary for international security affairs, to swear me in. So I had to do it at a time when she was there. She traveled a lot so that there was some logistics I had to manage there, but we came up with a date when she was going to be in Washington. She agreed to do it. We arranged to do the swearing in in the Burns Auditorium on the 21st street side of the building. We invited a bunch of people who did Kosovo policy throughout the U.S. government, some people from my former life in the State Department; my family of course, from San Diego. It turned out to be a pretty good event. I based my swearing-in remarks on my Senate testimony, to be consistent. I knew there'd be a lot of coverage of what I was saying in Kosovo, so I wanted to set the right tone for my arrival there.

Q: Speaking of your arrival, one more quick question. IIP had been doing introductory videos of ambassadors. Did you do one?

DELAWIE: Yes, we did. And it's still on the State Department internet somewhere. It was about two minutes long; the idea was to give Kosovars a little insight into the person who was coming to the country. We shot that in the flag lobby on the C street side of the State Department. It was the same shot you see on news coverage from the Department. It's a terrific view. I talked about my background in the Balkans, background in the Foreign Service, and how much I was looking forward to come to Kosovo to serve the U.S. government there. So I was sworn in at the end of July. I was going to arrive in

Kosovo around the end of August. My family and I spent a couple of weeks where we traveled to California, to visit family, and I finished up in my old office.

The last thing I did was write employee evaluations, which not the most fun thing you can do in the State Department, but it's an obligation; if you want to be a boss, you have to do right by your staff and complete their evaluations. Then we organize things for the trip to Kosovo. We had decided that my whole family was going to go, all four of us, my wife and two mostly-grown children. So we would arrive together, but then everybody else would come back to Washington. My kids needed to go to school. My wife was working. Of course, the last several days we were packing suitcases.

That's one thing that's less fun than writing employee evaluations, but, we had decided that we would not send household goods until we'd actually been there. Since Vonda was coming back anyway, we would figure out what we really needed in Kosovo and send it later. Ambassadorial houses typically have everything you could possibly need. So really the only things you need to take are your personal things, personal art, clothes, things like that. You don't need to take dishes or anything for a kitchen. We had seen pictures of the house from Tracey, my predecessor, and from the embassy, but it's always hard to visualize what a house is really like even with decent pictures. So we basically went with a bunch of suitcases, late in August.

We go to Dulles, we fly first to Vienna to change planes, then arrive at Pristina airport in Kosovo, which is a nice new airport that had been built in the last few years. I had arranged with the public affairs section that they could film me getting off the plane, although I was little dubious about this. Because of course I expected to be wiped out from jet lag. But they said, look, we'll show you the film. If you don't like it, we won't use it. So that was fine. The PA staff knew ahead of time that they should not show the children. My wife and I were used to being public figures. The children were not and did not want to be. So my wife and I come in first and the filming happens, then the children that come slightly behind and out of view of the cameras. PA got pictures of us showing us coming through the jetway, showing our passports and things like that.

We arrived on a Thursday. We basically went to the house to unpack and to look around. We assigned bedrooms to the children; it's a pretty small house, three bedrooms, two and a half baths. At the time the embassy acquired it, which was two ambassadors before me, it had been even smaller. But Tracey, my predecessor, had lived for almost a year in a TDY apartment on the embassy compound while the house was expanded to three bedrooms and a bigger living room for receptions.

So once again, nothing but praise for Tracey Jacobson, my predecessor as ambassador; she really took one for the team. So that was our first day in Kosovo, pretty low stress. The DCM came over and we talked about what would happen the next day when I would be presenting credentials to the president of Kosovo. In most countries it takes a while for a new ambassador to present credentials, but given the importance to Kosovo of the U.S. relationship, they made sure that that happened right away.

I talked with the DCM about how that was going to work. We agreed on some short remarks. By the way, I'd never met the DCM before, this was the first time, although I had spoken with her on the phone from Washington and exchanged emails. So we planned the day, which was going to be fun. It was a Friday. Basically what happened then is I arrived at the embassy early in the morning. We had a country team meeting, where the senior staff and head of each agency at the mission is represented. I said I was looking forward to working with everyone and that my goal was to help them achieve their goals, and my focus was going to be on rule of law, economic development, and regional security.

Then my family and I go down with a couple of people from the country team to the president's office in downtown Pristina, where I meet the president, Atifete Jahjaga was her name. We met in her office where I presented my credentials. Your credentials come in a big envelope that barely fits in anything. You're not supposed to pack it in your suitcase in case your suitcase is lost. So you're supposed to put it in your carry on. Of course, most carry-ons aren't big enough for that envelope. And by the time you get to your destination, you're so jet-lagged you could easily forget your carry on in the airplane. But fortunately, my wife and children were all focused on remembering them as well. So I give President Jahjaga the credentials from President Obama, then we have private discussion in her office; I said it's wonderful to be here, etc., it was pretty protocolary. But she seemed to be a very nice person. And of course it turns out she was. Then we go outside to the outer office where the press is. The president makes remarks, I make remarks. We take no questions. Then we begin what would be one of my themes during my three years there. That very day USAID was sponsoring a raspberry festival on the main pedestrian zone downtown called Mother Theresa Boulevard, which leads from the president's office down for several blocks.

Raspberries are a crop that USAID introduced to Kosovo a couple of years before. It was one of the most successful aid programs I've ever heard about because it made people literally thousands and thousands of dollars. But we can talk about that later. At the raspberry festival farmers bring their fresh raspberries, raspberry jam, all sorts of products and sell them on this main street in dozens of booths. The president and I walked down this raspberry festival and chatted with the farmers. It was interesting to hear, some of these people are farmers who were growing other crops before raspberries, like wheat. Others were people who had completely different lives and decided to take a crack at being raspberry farmers on the side after being psychologists or teachers or something else before. I was impressed that the president was very outgoing and would talk with everybody.

I was impressed that not only did she speak Albanian, which is her native language, but she clearly spoke very fluent Serbian. So some of these farmers were Kosovo Albanians and others were Kosovo Serbs. It didn't matter to her. She could speak both languages fluently. Our embassy interpreter came with me so that I could have a sense of what was going on. So we will walk down this Boulevard, conclude the raspberry festival, and I say goodbye to the president, and head back to the embassy. That's it for the morning events.

The next major event is a town hall meeting, with Embassy employees. We had a parking lot, which was the only space big enough to have all the employees in one place. It's called the Joe Biden pavilion. Hundreds of people were there. There were about 500 employees at embassy Pristina, about a hundred Americans, about 400 local employees. Most of them of course were there. I gave remarks to the staff saying how much I was looking forward to working with them, that I wanted to help them achieve their goals, and reaffirming the importance of Kosovo to the United States. I thought that went pretty well.

Q: Now a hundred Americans and 400 locals in a country the size of Kosovo seems a bit large.

DELAWIE: It is. But the United States had invested so much in Kosovo over the years. We wanted to make sure that we got a return on that investment. And what did we want? We wanted Kosovo to be a normal country.

There was a big USAID mission with a hundred employees. There were people from justice, from the Pentagon, from all of these different agencies, who were trying to help Kosovo develop its governing structures and its economy. So it is definitely medium-sized embassy in State Department terms. We'd invested a lot over the years and we were determined to keep investing. So that was good. And it required a lot of people to do that. And because Kosovo was always the poorest part of Yugoslavia, we had to do things at the embassy that most other U.S. embassies in the world would just contract out. So all the security guards work for us. Because there were no contractors that we wanted to hire for that job. We had to employ plumbers, we had to employ electricians, all these things, because those were not available on the open market for us to buy those services at the quality level we required.

This is typical of a developing country and as countries become more developed typically an embassy will contract out for some of these services rather than employ them directly, but certainly in Kosovo, that was not possible. So we had to employ all these people ourselves.

So what else happened? The next day was Saturday, a day off. We decided to participate in a public diplomacy event in Peja, which is a big city in Western Kosovo, where there is an animation festival each summer. The PD section had brought one of the writers from the cartoon *The Simpsons*, to speak at the festival.

The Simpsons is very popular among young people, especially. The plan was we would meet the writer and chat with him a bit, listen to his lecture, and then my family would leave the event and do some hiking in the mountains above Peja. It turns out the writer and I had been at the same college at the same time, although we had not known each other; so it was fun to talk about that. We talked about his job as a comedy writer which I thought was interesting. It turns out he was a regular on the PD speakers circuit.

He would go to a lot of countries when his TV show was not in production to give these speeches. He didn't make hardly any money at it, he said, but he really enjoyed traveling and meeting people. He gave his speech to a big audience. There were hundreds of people, mostly young people there; clearly the audience loved his talk. Then we said goodbye and my family and I drove up into the mountains to do some hiking, which is what we enjoyed doing together. And it was a beautiful day in Kosovo. So our first weekend in Kosovo started out well too.

I thought it'd be interesting to talk about the embassy. The embassy structure was basically a bunch of houses with a fence around it. We had opened an office in Pristina in late 1996 before the war and basically expanded the compound over the years by incorporating nearby houses into what ultimately became an embassy. So our embassy when I arrived, and in fact to this day, is a bunch of houses with a fence where most of the agencies are, and three blocks away is the USAID compound, which is also several houses with a fence, although it does have a purpose built building that's part of its compound. It was definitely a unique situation. Some of the USG employees liked it, thought it had character and charm. It was different from every other embassy building they worked in elsewhere in the world. But it was also extremely ill-suited to being an office building. It had not been changed too much over the years.

When we started to build a brand new embassy building in 2015, the State Department decided not to put a lot of investment in the existing compound. Everybody was expecting to move to the new building before too long. That meant that every once in a while the fire alarms would go off for no particular reason or lights would go off for no particular reason, just because they had not been maintained all that well. We had many visitors to the embassy who had served there in the past, 10 or 15 years before. And they would always comment that not much had changed since their tenure.

Q: Were you able to use temporary things like large tents or semi permanent floors for events or anything like that or was it really still not quite that developed?

We were able to use the chief of mission residence, or CMR, for big things like the 4th of July and other events, so we did not have to rent external space, which was good. That meant we could devote our limited resources to other things. We could have very small groups, a dozen people or so, in the embassy, but there were just no rooms that were big enough for more. There was one room at the USAID compound that could hold 60 people that we used occasionally when we needed groups that big. But what we had available were basically a bunch of smallish houses with a fence; it was not designed to be an embassy and therefore it didn't have these facilities that most embassies have and that the new embassy building that's under construction has.

The new building was designed to be an embassy. It's got elevators. Of course, the existing, the old embassy had no elevators, which was a problem when people got hurt. One of the communications people broke her leg skiing, and basically couldn't get to her office for months, because there were stairs involved. The new embassy will meet all the American standards for accessibility.

Q: Oh, so they are building a purpose-built embassy?

DELAWIE: Yes. It's supposed to be done this year. Actually, it was supposed to be done well before I left, but unfortunately it wasn't. I hope it's done in time for them to have the 2019 4th of July reception there. That was always our goal when I was there; that the embassy's going to be finished someday and we'll have the 4th of July reception there to welcome it. The new embassy building was under construction the whole time I was there. I visited every five or six months just to demonstrate interest and to see what was going on. Since my father was an architect, I grew up around buildings under construction. I did enjoy visiting the new embassy compound (NEC) and seeing how it changed over the months as the contractor made progress. It was a disappointment that it wasn't done by the time I left in September of 2018. But that's life.

The old embassy was made up of full houses with kitchens and bathrooms and bedrooms and everything. Most of the kitchens had been taken out; everything was converted to office space, some parts better than others. There were all sorts of steps up and down; to visit anyone you'd have to go up and down steps. We coped. It felt expeditionary, to a certain extent. And certainly when the embassy was created as a branch office, it was expeditionary. But my goal had been that it becomes a regular embassy like every other embassy. I wanted to move further towards regular State Department record keeping and procedures that everyone's supposed to do, but that often aren't really done as carefully in hostile or expeditionary environments.

And certainly that's what Embassy Pristina was; it had developed out of an Embassy Belgrade branch office in 1996, which was followed by the NATO intervention in 1999. There were a couple of challenges when I first got there. There were some security concerns that we had, so we had diplomatic security experts come out from Washington and asked them what we could do since we were going to be there a couple more years at least. The security engineers came up with some good ideas to help protect the compound.

I learned a few things from that visit. I think we all know that Jersey barriers are what's on the side of highways to keep cars from falling off a highway. It turns out there's something that's shaped exactly like that, but it was a lot bigger. And they're called Texas barriers. So we got Texas barriers to put around certain places along the embassy perimeter. I should say, the embassy was in a neighborhood of houses. Our embassy was houses and was surrounded by other houses. So we had no setback from our neighbors. It's very hard to secure a facility like that. But we were able to do a few things like put up these mammoth Texas barriers, which looked ugly admittedly, but we felt that it made us more secure. We put up the ugly green plastic on the fences so that people couldn't see through them. The security engineers I thought did a good job of coming up with really inexpensive ways to improve the security posture of the embassy. Remember the president's letter, he told me that I was personally responsible for the security of every employee in this embassy; I wanted to take that seriously.

Moving on to doing my regular job as ambassador in Pristina. The first thing you do when you arrive in a new post is you meet people, you meet as many people as you can. Whom you meet depends on exactly what your job is.

As ambassador, I had to know a little bit of every category of people. Certainly politicians, other diplomats of course, but also cultural figures, nongovernmental organization people. The embassy team that prepared for my arrival split my days between internal meetings to get to know the team better and external meetings to get to know the contacts. Regarding the internal meetings, having spent 35 years in the Foreign Service, I knew that people could be intimidated by a new ambassador; I did not really want to be an intimidating ambassador; that's not my style. So I wanted to get off on the best foot I could with staff. So I decided that we should just have introductory meetings in their offices rather than mine.

So that would get me out of my office. But it would also allow people to brief me on what their jobs were in their own space, which is probably less intimidating than going to someone else's office. We organized internal meetings with all the different sections. And I met everybody, the Americans and the local employees working on lots of different projects for all USG agencies. I met a bunch of politicians, people like the prime minister, the speaker of the assembly, members of the political parties, parliamentarians, press, nongovernmental organization people.

The first month or so was dominated by a pretty carefully organized plan to make the best use of my time. One of the things that we were going to do was try to meet all the political parties. There was one party that the ambassador had not really been in touch with very much, called the self-determination movement. I discussed it in Washington before I had left; this party had a fairly radical view, they were definitely anti-Serb and there were some challenges that the embassy had seen with them in the past.

But we had decided to expand our parameters to meet with these people too, just like all the other political parties. The idea was that we would have a relationship with any democratically oriented political party in the country. Now we had not got to them by the end of the first month there, but they were on the list. We were still going down this very organized path where I was out of the embassy part of every day meeting people in different walks of life. Then, all of a sudden, around the beginning of October, 2015, in the assembly, which is the Kosovo parliament, while a discussion was going on, several of the MPs released tear gas in the assembly. It turns out that there are these little plastic things that contained tear gas, which were made for police to shoot into a crowd, to disperse the tear gas; they're plastic, they don't hurt you if they hit you. It turns out you can open them with your fingers somehow. So the tear gas comes out and it's as irritating as you might expect; everybody leaves the hall. Several members of parliament had released the gas because they were unhappy with the way things were going.

The Kosovo government doesn't know what to do; it is completely stymied. This is a surprise; these are people with very little political experience because Kosovo had only declared independence in 2008. So nobody really knew what to do. And this political

party, self-determination, with a couple of others, including some people from the Alliance for Kosovo, which is another party, had decided to release the gas because they were trying to provoke some kind of crisis that would lead to elections that they hoped they would win. We were surprised about this like everyone else. This was a Friday evening. So we had an emergency country team meeting Saturday morning trying to figure out what to do.

I had not had a giant public profile at that point. I had been filmed going to a lot of meetings, because they care a lot about what the Americans do in Kosovo. The goal in the first month or so was to learn and meet, rather than to create a giant public profile. So I'd given off the cuff remarks as soon as this happened, condemning the people that released the tear gas in the assembly. We had a country team meeting to talk through what had happened and what we should do about it. We felt that clearly this was a threat to Kosovo's democracy. You should not be able to provoke elections by violence. So we decided we would have to oppose this as much as we could. And of course the U.S. has by far the biggest voice in Kosovo of any other country. So we condemned enthusiastically the tear gas releasers. But it turns out tear gas is released over and over again in ensuing months. It also turns out that no matter what you do, you can't intercept them; these tear gas containers are plastic, so they won't show up on a X-ray or a metal detector because they're not metal; people can sneak them in in their pockets or something. Different people released tear gas at different sessions.

Having experienced it many times, because I was in the assembly building a lot, I can confirm it is extremely irritating. That's the point. It hurts. So when it's released in a room, people leave the room and they don't have much of a choice. These minority political parties are trying to prevent the assembly from meeting. As I said, they're trying to provoke new elections. We as the U.S. government were trying to support the existing Kosovo government because it had been elected pretty democratically, for the Balkans at least. We did not want to sit by the side as Kosovo went down the path of violence provoking elections because we knew exactly what that would mean: there would be more violence by somebody else in the hopes of yet more elections. Since Kosovo was a country that was still learning about democracy, we did not want it to learn the wrong lessons. As I said we had been planning to meet with the self-determination party, but it turns out since they were one of the main instigators of this tear gas campaign, I didn't end up meeting them for a long time. Because at that point, having not met them already, it seemed like it would be an endorsement of violence if I met them.

I have reflected on this decision over the ensuing years, whether that was the right decision or not. Of course you never know what would have happened if you had acted differently. But I'm still comfortable with our position at that point. Although it did in fact take months before the tear gas stopped and things got back to normal in the Assembly.

Q: So did they ever figure out a way to prevent people from carrying in tear gas?

DELAWIE: No. That just would've been impossible. The containers were the size of a half dollar. You would have to do a hand search of people; searching members of parliament would have been tough. What they ultimately did was they installed a big fan in the assembly room; and it could literally clear the hall of tear gas in 15 minutes.

It was very impressive. There was definitely some ingenuity there. It was the assembly staff's idea, and a good one. But the outcome of all this is, although we entered my first month in a very organized, very planned fashion, all of a sudden that planning fell apart. My military friends often say that no plan survives contact with the enemy; but planning is nevertheless vital. Our plan in Pristina did not survive contact with reality, because we had to enter crisis mode and deal with new circumstances to keep Kosovo on the democratic path; to support the people that had been elected democratically to run the country, as they struggled with how to deal with this new reality. So we were in reactive mode for a while before we figured out how we were going to approach things.

So that was the beginning. The other thing that was going on at the beginning was, that we just happened to luck into, was the process for writing the new integrated country strategy, the ICS. This is a planning document that every embassy has to do every three years or so. It's a requirement from the government performance and results act, GPRA. Every agency has to do this kind of planning exercise. In the State Department embassies have an ICS, which contributes to a Bureau strategy, which contributes to the overall State Department strategy. This document succeeded the mission program plan.

The name gets changed every couple of years, but the themes are pretty much the same. The ICS was due at the end of September. I had arrived towards the end of August. And I had reoriented the priorities of the embassy from the prior one. So I had been expecting to be able to work with the country team for a couple months on my three priorities, and figuring out how to articulate them in the State Department planning lingo that was required. It turns out there wasn't a whole lot of time for that just because of the cycle that we were on. But I knew what the priorities were going to be. It was just a matter of explaining them in the right language and then coming up with specific tactics for achieving these goals.

The goals again were rule of law, economic development, and regional security; pretty clear. I wanted there to be three, so I could remember them; three is a good number, which is one of the things I learned at an FSI course called the Foreign Affairs Leadership Seminar a decade before; people can keep three things in mind pretty well, but once you get to four it gets harder. Each of these three things was actually a basket of subsidiary issues; rule of law dealt with corruption, a problem endemic in the Balkans; but in Kosovo especially there are a lot of people in government without much experience running a country. Unfortunately, many people in government think that means they get to enrich themselves and their families rather than the citizens for whom they are working.

There are other rule of law problems as well. One of the challenges that we had was that there were a lot of human rights violations during the Kosovo war. There were a lot of

people that were just murdered, including children. There were a lot of women who were raped as a weapon of war. This was an organized effort primarily by Serbian paramilitaries, exactly the same as in Bosnia a few years before. 10 to 20,000 women were raped, primarily Kosovo Albanians, the majority population. But it was not exclusively the Serbs doing this, some Kosovo Liberation Army personnel committed murders and rapes as well, against both Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians.

One of the challenges was how to deal with this because justice had never been served for most of these perpetrators since 1999. So the U.S. and the European Union had decided that we would create a special war crimes court for the Kosovo war period. Because the mandate of the ICTY, the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ended right around the time the Kosovo war started. We didn't really want to re-up that, so there was no tribunal to deal with the problem of war crimes committed in Kosovo.

Q: And we didn't want to consider the international criminal court.

DELAWIE: I believe that is true, but it was well before my time. Anyway, the EU, mostly, put together a framework for what ended up being called the Kosovo Special Court. It has a more formal name, which is the "Kosovo Relocated Specialist Chambers," but no one called it that. The idea is that there would be judges and prosecutors and that the main prosecutor would be an American, and that the EU would constitute this court and it would indict and prosecute alleged war criminals. So one of our main jobs at the embassy was making sure that this could happen. And this would actually be a Kosovo court and would be created under Kosovo law, in line with the Kosovo constitution. But it took a while to stand up. First of all, the Kosovo law had to be changed.

The constitution had to be amended. And that happened just before I got there. It was a massive lobbying effort led on our side by the DCM who had been chargé for a couple of months. So she knocked heads together and lobbied the parliamentarians to pass this legislation, which they did, barely. Then there had to be a couple of other legal steps; there had to be an agreement with the Netherlands, because that was where the court was going to sit, in the Hague, which is where the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia sat. There were facilities available and there was experience available, in the Hague. And the important thing was that it would be out of Kosovo, because we were all concerned that if the court sat in Kosovo the witnesses could be intimidated or threatened or killed. Some of the problems that you saw from the ICTY cases were that you would have witnesses testify to the prosecutors, before a trial, and by the time they show up at trial, they changed their stories because they'd been gotten to by the defendants; there were some Kosovo cases where that happened as well. So we wanted to make that less likely to happen by having the court far away from Kosovo.

I've gotten off the track. So those are the major rule of law issues: corruption, and the special court.

Q: I just have one question about the special court; what would be the heaviest sentence for those convicted of killings?

DELAWIE: I don't have much specific knowledge here, because when I left Kosovo a lot of things were still in flux. I think sentences were going to be established by the judges. It will be a European court, which means it is unlikely that there would be a life sentence, for example. It would probably be aligned with other European countries and probably the ICTY sentencing procedures, but I don't know that for sure.

The economic development basket related primarily to trying to improve the economy of the country and help jumpstart employment. That was what USAID was mostly about. The other element there related to improving Kosovo's energy security, since all electricity produced in the country came from two Soviet-era coal power plants that were massive polluters, not just carbon dioxide, but particulates and nitrogen oxides as well. The power plants are near Pristina; the air pollution in Pristina rivaled that in New Delhi and Beijing on certain days in the winter. We were trying to help them develop a newer, cleaner power plant; unfortunately the only energy resource Kosovo has is coal—it has the world's fifth largest reserves of coal.

Regional security was the third major issue. That encompassed a couple of things. The most important was the relationship with Serbia and trying to normalize the Kosovo-Serbia relationship. Serbia of course had never recognized Kosovo, which had been part of it before the war. We knew we would spend a lot of time trying to mediate between Kosovo and Serbia. There was not much outcome of that, unfortunately, during my three years. Another part of regional security was the development of a traditional army. Kosovo had a security force that was focused on mostly civil things like disaster relief, bomb disposal, and firefighting. Kosovo wanted to have a regular army like every other country. The United States supported that under certain conditions.

We had to present all this in the integrated country strategy. Fortunately some people from the strategic planning office in the State Department were on a trip to Europe, and came to Kosovo for a couple of days to help us out as we write this thing. These are the same people who will have to approve the thing at the end of the day. We talked through the drafts with them, which saved a lot of time. The only thing which I thought was funny relates to objective number two, economic development. You have to do a one sentence description of what your goal is; we're talking about this with the USAID mission director, the econ officer and these visitors from Washington. I say to the Mission Director, what's your one-sentence goal on development? He says what it is. I said, okay, well we'll just use that for our ICS as well. But the Washington people don't like that, because that's a USAID goal, not a State Department goal.

And I said, well I work for the entire U.S. government; the President made that clear. USAID is part of the USG. So we waste 15 minutes on this. And finally I said, well that's what it's going to be. You know, we're going to send it back that way and if you want to change it, you tell us how.

We had a hundred USAID employees, many of them had been there for more than a decade; if they thought this was the right economic development goal, why would I try to

question that? So that was kind of fun, but I always thought it was a weird issue on which to have to assert Chief of Mission authority. Ultimately we got the ICS written and it was fine with Washington. I reviewed it just before I left post, three years later and I felt that it was still a pretty good description of not only the challenges we were facing but how we approached them. Some embassies don't take these things seriously, which certainly I can understand because life happens and you have to deal with life as it's presented to you, rather than the way you describe it in your plans. But I thought our ICS was good because we had focused on a small number of objectives that were easy to articulate and that were clearly what the country needed. And so we were able to stick with that. Because what the country needed didn't really change over those three years.

I thought I'd talk for a minute more about this electricity problem Kosovo faced. There are only two power plants right next to each other in the entire country. All the electricity Kosovo produced came from those two extremely polluting power plants that broke down frequently due to their age and poor maintenance. USAID estimated that a lack of reliable electricity costs the Kosovo economy something like 300 million euros per year which is more than the total economic assistance that Kosovo receives from all donors combined. So it was a big deal. And the problem was that sometimes the electricity shuts off all of a sudden. Of course that's inconvenient for people who need light, but it's particularly inconvenient for people that have businesses and have production that stops in the middle of nowhere with partially formed things that typically have to be disposed of because the machinery that was producing them stopped unexpectedly.

There were a lot of backup generators to mitigate some of this. But it all cost a lot of money. The other problem for Kosovo is the only fuel it has was coal; and not just coal, the worst possible coal, lignite, called brown coal. There are no other sources of energy available. There are no natural gas pipelines anywhere near Kosovo or even destined to be there soon. The country needed electricity. They had to import it a lot from Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania. Sometimes that was possible. Other times it wasn't; all of Albania's electricity, for example, comes from hydro power. So when there's a drought, or it's dead winter, there's no extra electricity available from Albania.

Imports are not always available from the neighboring countries. So it was a challenge and the U.S. worked on it over the years. The policy that was adopted in the Bush administration, which was continued basically in the Obama administration, is that we would support the development of a new coal power plant in Kosovo. Now a new plant would of course, produce carbon dioxide like any other fossil fuel plant would, but a much lower percentage of carbon dioxide output per watt than the existing plants. And it would meet modern European standards. So this horrible air pollution that Kosovo had in the winter would be cut down with a modern plant that had scrubbers and new technology, a plant that was not from a 1950s Soviet design. So we had supported a coal power plant over the years.

And we're trying to help the Kosovo government bid out for this. Over the years things have gone up and down and there were various companies that were interested in building a new plant, including some European companies like Siemens. But ultimately,

all the other bidders dropped out and there was one American company called Contour Global that was left. It gets the contract. Now this power plant would cost over a billion, basically a billion and a half dollars, which is a lot of money because Kosovo's GDP is only $7 billion. Whoever built this thing had to bring financing along because there was no way Kosovo could pay for this on its own in advance. It had to be whoever builds this thing, they build it and run it for a few years and make back the investment on the electricity charges.

This of course is controversial. Coal is bad because of the global warming challenge. But even during the Obama administration, it was decided that Kosovo was an exception to the anti-coal policy because it was a poor country and there were no other sources of electricity. So it was the only coal project abroad that the administration would support. The World Bank was in this same position for a while and basically the World Bank would have to guarantee a part of the financing, not the whole amount, but a small chunk; the World Bank guarantee of part of the financing would serve as kind of a seal of approval for private financiers to invest in the thing as well.

So for a long time, even though the World bank had a policy decision against supporting coal power projects, it had decided that Kosovo was an exception because there was no other way to get it electricity. There were still a lot of coal power plants being built in the world; for a while China was opening a new coal power plant every week for a couple of years at a time. But the world bank wasn't investing in them, was not supporting them due to global climate change. So this thing went up and down for a long time. You know, we supported it the whole time I was there and there was ultimately a signature of deal with the American company Contour global. As far as I know that the project is still on track, although I don't think you have even a single shovel full of dirt that has been turned over yet. Because these things are immense and they take a lot of time to build, years and years.

But, this was a challenge and there was a lot of opposition domestically in the United States, as well as in Kosovo. And it was one of those things where the people that are opposed to it had no other realistic solutions to offer. There was an environmental NGO in the United States who said they didn't really need another plant; you could just save enough electricity by eliminating waste. Even some engineers who opposed the coal power plant said that was garbage. And then someone else had suggested, after the Tesla company had set up a battery facility in Australia, new South Wales, a multimillion dollar battery/solar system, why not do that for Kosovo as well. The idea that what worked in one of the most highly developed countries in the world would work in Kosovo was, I thought kind of silly. But people didn't want any more coal plants and certainly didn't want the U.S. government to participate in supporting a coal plant. But no one had any other reasonable, realistic option for providing electricity; they just opposed coal and asked why Kosovo really needed electricity anyway. I spent a lot of time on that issue and we as the embassy, mostly the economic officers that worked on it, had saved the project multiple times when things were about to go wrong.

We had to intervene over and over and over again, to rescue the project. And every time there was a new minister of economy, it took him a while to get up to speed on it; this is one of those things like I talked about last week regarding arms control, where you have to know a lot of facts to do something. So both our econ staff and the economy ministry that is in the Kosovo government, they needed to know a lot of things to make this deal. They were making a deal with a giant American company, which could really overmatch them in negotiating talent. So USAID supplied them with contractor expertise, but it turns out there were only three or four people in the Kosovo government who really understood this project enough to make decisions about it.

It was a real challenge, because things would start to go wrong, either legally or politically. Corruption was always a problem, too. The municipalities in the area where the new plant would be were trying to make some extra money off it. So there was always something coming up that would interfere, so our embassy rescued the project over and over again. It is still on track, which I think is a tribute to the talent of the Foreign Service officers and Foreign Service national employees at our embassy who kept this thing going over the years.

One of the newer programs that we have in the U.S. government is called the Millennium Challenge Corporation, MCC. It started in the first George W Bush administration. It had a different paradigm from the USAID style of economic assistance; the goal was to build capacity in the recipient country to conduct its own economic development under very strict supervision from the MCC. The way a country gets MCC money is to compete for it. There was a scorecard, a kind of a stoplight scorecard of categories that a country had to "be green" on a certain percentage of. There were things like maternal health, child vaccination rate, education issues and things like that. Corruption of course, was a category for the scorecard, I think there were 16 categories on the scorecard and the ratings were judged on third party statistics.

So the U.S. government would not decide itself that a country met these criteria, for example, that a country passed the corruption indicator or not. That info would come from Brookings, Heritage, the UN, or something else. A country had to get majority green on this 16 element chart, and also to pass a few mandatory indicators, one of which was anti-corruption. The MCC had been monitoring Kosovo for a while to see whether there might be a deal there, but the corruption indicator was always a roadblock. Then all of a sudden Kosovo passes the corruption indicator, which is kind of a surprise to everyone. I think that one came from the World Bank. This opens the door, which had been shut before, to MCC assistance for Kosovo.

One of the challenges that we faced for the MCC was that some of the statistics that formed this stoplight chart came from the United Nations. Since Kosovo was not a member of the United Nations, the UN did not collect data independently on Kosovo. So before I got there the embassy had worked with the UN Development Program, UNDP, to help them figure out a way to develop independent Kosovo statistics. They did, which was very helpful; crucial even, because even with passing corruption, without those other stoplight blocks filled in, there was no deal for Kosovo. Ultimately an MCC program,

which is called a compact, became a possibility for Kosovo. I became very involved in working with the MCC people in Washington to make this a reality. MCC is not one of those policy things where you can apply pressure to people to get them to do what you want, which is the way many things work in the U.S. government.

This is by design in the MCC; the idea is that the statistics are not manipulatable by policy people like me. But of course there's some judgment that still needs to be applied. And so we started to work carefully with MCC as to whether a deal might be possible; some Kosovo people who understood this issue started to work on them too. And ultimately Kosovo gets approved by the MCC board for what's called an MCC threshold program, which is not a giant amount of money, like some countries have received over the years, in the hundreds of millions of dollars range, but a tens of millions of dollars project. And the idea is a country works on the threshold program for a while and tries to make some difference; then, if the threshold programs are successful, and the country still passes the indicators, maybe in the future it will get the bigger pot of money.

The threshold program would focus on, of course, rule of law, and some economic development issues, mostly in the energy field. One of the weird legacies of communism in Kosovo involves a heating system called district heating, which a lot of places have, including Washington DC, which is where excess steam from a power plant goes under the street via pipes to apartment buildings or commercial buildings, where it's used in radiators to provide heat. Kosovo has got district heating too, from these two horrible power plants I talked about earlier. But because Yugoslavia was a communist country and there was no market really, what happens is funny. The steam runs into apartment buildings and peoples' radiators, but there is no thermostat on the radiator.

The way you control the heat in your apartment is you open the window if it's too hot. So it could be zero degrees outside and you have the windows open because otherwise your apartment is too hot. This of course is an incredible waste. The power plants are inefficient as all get out anyway, and here's some of their output just being wasted through open windows. So the MCC decides we can contribute to a pilot program of retrofitting thermostats on the radiators so that if it gets too hot in an apartment, you just adjust the thermostat down and the steam goes somewhere else instead of your apartment.

There were some government transparency projects that the MCC was implementing as well. Ultimately we got an MCC employee at the embassy, an American and a local employee to help supervise the MCC projects the Kosovo government was implementing. I was very pleased that we at the embassy were able to help the MCC board see the benefit of a Kosovo program. We spent a lot of time on that issue, and it was great to see it be successful.

Q: Today is June 4th, and we are resuming our interview with Greg Delawie, while he is Ambassador in Kosovo.

DELAWIE: I thought I'd start today by speaking about two visits that we had. We had Secretary of State John Kerry and we had Vice President Joe Biden. So we had Kerry at

the end of 2015. We had Biden in the summer of 2016. So looking back at what was going on in the fall of 2015; I talked earlier about the tear gas attacks in parliament that were intended to provoke new elections, which the tear gassers were hoping they would win. They were using two nationalistic themes to try to persuade the population to support them by attacking foreigners.

The first nationalistic theme they were working on involved a completely innocuous border agreement with Montenegro, the country to the immediate west of Kosovo. The agreement had been negotiated the prior spring; the political parties using the tear gas used the excuse that the border deal was a giveaway to Montenegro, although of course it was not. The entire border between Kosovo and Montenegro is mountainous and forested. It has no political value, no economic value. It is beautiful, but there is nothing there that anybody should lose sleep over, much less a government over. But it's easy to get people out on the streets in most countries using the nationalist card, and that was what they were doing.

So, the governing structures were in torment during that whole fall. They were inexperienced. They didn't know what to do. The other thing about this border deal that was important to know was that the European Union had established a list of criteria to give Kosovo citizens the right to travel visa free in the Schengen area in Europe; Kosovo had completed most of those things, most of which were pretty technical. But one of the remaining things on the list was for Kosovo to conclude a border agreement with Montenegro. The EU wanted to be sure there were identifiable boundaries around Kosovo except for Kosovo-Serbia, which they knew would be impossible in the near term. So the border agreement was actually important because the EU had made it clear that there will be no visa-free travel for Kosovo citizens until this border agreement was in force.

Now Kosovo had actually concluded a much more difficult border agreement with Macedonia years before, with a lot of support from the American embassy at the time. That one was tougher because it did involve actual tradeoffs of economically-valuable land. But it had been concluded and it was ratified without too many problems in the Kosovo assembly. So that was the main nationalist card that these tear gassers were using. The other one involved a potential agreement between Kosovo and Serbia that would end the state of tensions between the two countries. Anytime anyone in Kosovo talked about making some kind of deal with Serbia then these nationalists would say they were trying to give up Kosovo's hard won freedom, or give things to Serbia or Serbs who had killed so many people in Kosovo, etc.

So these were the nationalist cards; the country was in turmoil. The leadership was not great, was not proactive about trying to resolve the concerns the tear gassers had provoked in the citizens. So Secretary Kerry decided to come to see if he could help set things back on course. And as traditional in the U.S. government for years, if you go to Kosovo, he had to go to Serbia too; so Kerry would go to Pristina, Kosovo and to Belgrade, Serbia, on the same trip.

Q: Kosovo still had a small Serbian population, but where were the key Serbian religious sites?

DELAWIE: The most important Serbian Orthodox religious sites are in fact in Kosovo, such as the Patriarchate of Pech, which is in the city of Peja/Pech. (At the Embassy we always used both Albanian and Serbian place names when they were different.) The Patriarch, the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, has his seat in Peja/Pech, in Kosovo, although the Patriarch actually hangs out in Serbia, and has for many years. There are also several churches and monasteries in Kosovo that are key sites of the Church. The Kosovo Serb population was around 5% of Kosovo's people. Prior to the war it had been around 15% of the population.

So we get an advance officer from the secretariat staff. Secretary Kerry planned to come with the assistant secretary for European affairs, Victoria Nuland, my boss.

Kerry's schedule ends up getting compressed during the weeks ahead of the trip. This often happens with secretaries of state, so I was not surprised. It turns out he's only going to be able to spend a couple of hours. So, the most realistic way to have these meetings is to have them at the airport so he can fly in, have meetings, and fly out to whatever his next destination is going to be. So I go to the Foreign Office, the prime minister's office, and the president's office and say, look, the secretary is still coming, but he can only be here a couple of hours; is it okay to have meetings at the airport? It turns out that's going to be okay because we're the United States and they just want to see the Secretary of State in their country. So we ended up using the VIP terminal, which is basically the old regular terminal at the airport.

It has some suites for the VIP travelers; not ideal, but it will be okay. And that's where the bilateral meetings are going to be between the secretary and the prime minister and the president. But there needs to be a public event as well, and there's not really any place that's appropriate in the VIP terminal to have a press conference or speech; most of the VIP terminal building was decrepit and had not been used in years. But fortunately there were some really talented young people in the foreign ministry, and in just a couple of days they throw together something in the old arrival hall; basically using drape and stanchions and these big wire hanging devices, they cover up the Yugoslav era terminal walls and make it look like it's all blue drape all the way around.

Now there was just enough room for a hundred people in this area. And, if you didn't know better, you'd think, Oh, this looks pretty nice; but if you move the blue drape it looks like a 1960s era Yugoslav building that had not been maintained at all. I was really impressed, since the Kosovo government was generally not very creative and not very able to get things done. But in this case, a couple of MFA people and a bunch of interns, together with a little help from GSO staff at the embassy really delivered. I thought it was terrific because I should have said the original plan was he comes into town, and he makes remarks in a theater or something more appropriate.

So this was all thrown together in a few days. It turned out very well. The secretary meets the president and the prime minister and the deputy prime minister, who was a Kosovo Serb; he had good meetings, encouraging them to find a way out of this political problem and to make progress for the country. He gave nice public remarks before a crowd of journalists and others. Everybody seemed happy. Toria Nuland, my boss was happy, so I was happy of course. Then Secretary Kerry gets back on his plane and flies off; he had been there two, two and a half hours probably. But the impact was terrific. It persisted. I'd love to say he solved the political problems.

But he did not, they continued for a while longer. This is the Balkans after all. But it was a very positive visit. At the embassy it was a whole team effort; we had a hundred people working on it from different parts of the embassy, taking care of the visitors and doing all the things you have to do, when you have the secretary of state coming, just in case something goes wrong.

The other big visit we had was VP Joe Biden, who had been to Kosovo before in 2009. He came back in 2016; the proximate reason for his return related to the dedication of a road in honor of his son, Beau Biden, who had died a couple of years before.

Beau had served in Kosovo as a civilian with the American contingent of NATO's Kosovo Force, which is based in Camp Bondsteel, near where the road was to be dedicated; it would be called the Beau Biden Highway. This was an idea of the former president of Kosovo, Atifete Jahjaga. She had worked things out with the prime minister's office and with the municipalities nearby. She had proposed naming the road to Vice President Biden during one of her official visits to the United States; the prime minister's office helped nail things down and did all the work regarding signs and a memorial marker and things like that.

This was another great effort. Of course, we had an advance team. They ended up coming a month or two before, and the visit was postponed once or twice. But ultimately it happened in August of 2016. It was an overnight visit, which was a big, big deal for any embassy to host a vice president overnight. Especially in a relatively poor country like Kosovo, without too many hotels. The question was how were we going to take care of all the travelers, the Secret Service and the others that would come with the VP. That was a challenge. And Camp Bondsteel is actually a 45 minute drive away from Pristina, the capital. The secret service decided immediately that they didn't want to try to drive. So it turned out the best way to get there for the vice president was helicopters. We borrowed some helicopters from U.S. forces in Germany so we could get back and forth between Pristina and Bondsteel.

The logistics were very challenging, even more challenging than for the secretary of state because we had so many more people coming with the vice president. So we got help from other embassies, both Americans and local employees, to be control officers. There was really only one hotel in Kosovo that was acceptable to put the vice president in. So we took over most of that hotel. It turned out to be a very good visit with a lot of substance, but also the road dedication ceremony, which was terrific. We lucked out on

the weather too. So basically what we did is there were a couple of substantive meetings, one with the Kosovo president and his staff and one with the prime minister and his staff.

I was the only embassy American that was allowed to join those two meetings, which was terrific for me to see how Biden operated. He was very articulate. He had almost no notes that he was working from, but he ended up talking very substantively about what was going on in Kosovo and what he thought should happen, which was basically that the Kosovo government had to get its act together and start working more for the benefit of the country and exercising more leadership in delivering what the citizens of Kosovo wanted. It was a terrific set of remarks. I took a lot of notes, because it turns out the way vice presidential visits work is that the vice president's staff take the official notes and at the end of the visit, a week or two later, they send back one paragraph saying this is what the meeting was about.

That's what you get. So if the Ambassador isn't taking notes, then nobody including people at the State Department know what really happened. Since I was not supposed to produce the official documentation of these meetings; that is what the vice president's staff produces. You can't take your notes and do anything formal with them. But you can debrief the DCM and the political counselor and your DAS based on them. And there was a lot of interest because the meetings had a lot of content.

The other key element I want to point out regards interpretation. The Kosovo president and the prime minister at the time did not speak fluent English. So these were going to be interpreted meetings. The last time that we had a big visit, before I got there, when Secretary Clinton came at one point, they had brought along an interpreter. Unfortunately the interpreter spoke the wrong kind of Albanian; the kind spoken in Albania, not the kind spoken in Kosovo. I had of course heard the story from the local employees at the embassy. So I wanted to make sure that we had someone who could interpret the language that the president and prime minister would in fact be speaking. So I proposed to the vice president's staff that we use our embassy interpreter, a local employee. Presidential advance worked on that for a while and apparently they found no better options in language services here in Washington. So it turned out our embassy interpreter, a citizen of Kosovo, who was a terrific, terrific interpreter and who always went with me when I was doing things, wound up interpreting for the vice president of the United States. This was a terrific thrill for her, although it made her kind of nervous. She did a great job. There were two very intense, lengthy meetings. We all had the headphones and the microphones that were part of the interpretation system. So she was actually in a different room listening to what the VP or the host government people said, and interpreting from that. After Biden had left, I asked her how it went and what she thought, and she said it was the greatest thrill of her life and thank you so much. But she said, boy, was I nervous. Now, I could hear exactly what she was saying along with the VP and his staff who also had the same headphones and I know it was perfect.

So I felt good, not only that we helped deliver a meeting where people could communicate, but that I was helping one of our key staff members make a terrific contribution and feel good about it. So we started with the substantive meetings. Then we

went to Camp Bondsteel where the highway was to be named and there was a marker with Beau Biden's name. And we had dressed up a parking lot, basically, to use for the VP's public remarks. His very moving remarks started off with his son Beau, who had been there years ago helping to create the country. Then he moved on and talked about policy things. So it was a great PD event that mixed the ceremonial with the policy. I had seen his notes for his remarks and they were relatively short, but he talked for about 25 minutes, mostly ex temp. So I was just very impressed with what he did, and the knowledge he clearly had about what was going on in Kosovo, because a lot of what he said was not in the notes.

I was able to brief VP Biden in the hotel before these meetings started. He clearly paid attention to what I said based on what he said at the private substantive meetings with the president and the PM. I really appreciated that. He asked terrific questions. It was one of the greatest career experiences I had, interacting with the Vice President of the United States. Someone whom I respect tremendously. It was clearly one of the highlights of my entire Foreign Service career.

There are a couple of other things I thought I would mention. One was the problem of countering violent extremism. So Kosovo is a very pro-American country. 80% of people love the United States, according to a global ranking survey; the next country down was like 40% or so who love the U.S. Which is not surprising because we saved a million people from being refugees or dead in 1999. But of course not everybody likes us. And for a while in the early 2010s there were more Kosovo citizens per capita going to the fight in Syria and Iraq than from any other country. Now that's changed over the intervening years. Kosovo is predominantly a Muslim nation, although it's a very different kind of Islam than you would find in say, Saudi Arabia.

But there is certainly a handful of radical imams that are preaching jihad and things like that. It's not legal to do that, and Kosovo has a foundation that's supposed to take care of all the imams and approve their main themes. But it's a poor country, with poor border control and other challenges. And so some people do sneak in from the Middle East and then try to spread Jihad or Wahhabi Islam. So they recruited a couple of hundred people to go fight in Syria to rescue the Muslims from Assad. So these people were problems when this first started happening; the inexperienced Kosovo government came to our embassy and said, what do we do? We have no idea what to do about this problem. Can you help us solve it?

So the embassy, before I got there, worked with the government to draft laws, of course with help from the State Department on this. These laws basically criminalized going abroad, to fight in someone else's war. Now some people did it anyway, and then they came home. And the question is what happens to them? Well, a lot of these people got investigated and arrested and even imprisoned. I talked earlier about the rule of law challenges in Kosovo; it's generally hard for them to put people in prisons, especially those with any political connections, but these people, these jihadis who came home often wound up in prison. Now, because Kosovo is a European country, it has European-style prison sentences.

So these jihadis were going to get out of prison before long. The question was, what are they going to do when they get out? So this was a challenge that the embassy grappled with without decision for a while. And the problem was the correction service was corrupt and we basically did not work with it because we were concerned about U.S. tax dollars going into the pockets of corrupt officials in the correction service. But that was balanced by "what the heck are we going do about these violent offenders who are going to get out in the next year or two, and are going to be a threat to us, the United States and the embassy?" So we had debates inside the embassy. Some people thought, we just can't touch this because the level of corruption is too high. We couldn't risk wasting taxpayer dollars; Congress would come after us. Others were saying, this is a problem it would be irresponsible to ignore.

So this was a contentious debate and I ultimately decided it myself, that we had to find a way to deal with the imprisoned jihadi problem. So we worked with INL, the bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, to identify money and help. And INL was able to come up with a retired prison warden from Washington state who, after he had retired from the state, had worked in Indonesia on this same set of issues, basically violent offenders in jail. INL sent in a couple of teams to talk with the corrections people. Ultimately, we sign a deal, memorandum of understanding with the Kosovo government that we will first of all provide advice to the corrections service.

I sit down with the new prison advisor for the first time and give him the context from my perspective. Corruption is rife within the correction service; politically connected prisoners wander in and out of jail at their own free will. Some of them beat up prison guards and face no consequences. I said we would not have you here, but for the severity of the jihadi prisoner problem. He said he understood completely. So I said, we can't give the corrections service any toys. I don't want any gadgets, any expensive U.S. government funded gadgets to go to them. Let's start with trying to work with people on developing plans to deal with these violent offenders.

I said in the meantime, as you see all these prison wardens and guards and corrections officials with which we have no relationship, I hope you will be able to identify some people that we can work with, some people who might actually have the interests of their country first in their hearts as opposed to their own pockets. And he says, I understand, we'll do that. So he develops over the course of many visits and several months a plan based on his experience and learning lessons from being in Indonesia and having a really tough time there. He develops ways to deal with these violent offenders, how to deal with them while they're still in prison, which is basically you put them all together. Now since the corrections service had no idea what to do with these guys before, they distributed them in various prisons across the country, to separate them from each other. It turns out that's the worst thing you could do, but of course they didn't know that. The best practice is to put them all together and segregate them from the petty thieves and the other offenders that are in prison because you don't want them contaminating the regular crooks.

Our adviser lays on a plan and works with the corrections officials and starts training; he involves local psychologists and social workers. Because you want to talk with these violent offenders. You don't just want to let them out on the street and say goodbye and have a nice life. You want to try to talk them off of their jihadi orientation. So the advisor helped develop training programs, work with psychologists and social workers and established contact with these people. He ultimately did a terrific job on the main objective of developing programs to lower the risk of releasing these violent offenders. And on the second objective, he was able to identify people we could work with. Corrections there is not 100% corrupt; it was just very corrupt and there were decent people who really wanted to do the right thing. People who may not have known how or may have had obstacles placed in their way but they wanted to do the right thing. So over the course of this plan he develops an additional plan for total reform of the corrections service which involves training; it involves working with other donors like the European Union countries; it involves ways to distribute prisoners differently across the prisons in the country. So ultimately the INL team developed this plan and it would cost three or $4 million. To a certain extent here we were lucky; the head of the correction service had retired, so they needed a new guy. So I went to the prime minister and I said, my government is prepared to spend $4 million to improve your correction service, but I'm not going to let that happen unless someone that we feel we can trust is appointed head of the corrections service.

Now this is a job that had always been political patronage. It had also been someone connected with organized crime typically. So this would be a big, a big change, but the prime minister tells me he thinks they can do that. It turns out that one of our partners, the embassy of the United Kingdom, was running a kind of Civil Service hiring program for senior civil servants, where they had a head hunter company from the UK come in to run the whole hiring process; they would evaluate credentials and check references and all these things. And so the government decides, well, we'll use the UK embassy's hiring program, which produces a short list of three theoretically qualified people for whatever job you're working on. And ultimately this process works and the government does pick a decent guy, a police officer, to be head of the correction service.

Without this money on the table, I don't think we would've gotten there, but it was considerable leverage. Everyone knew that correction services was a problem, not just us. Now we wanted to support the correction services as part of our overall policy making; because Kosovo becoming a normal country with rule of law was our number one priority, remember? So it was certainly in line with our desires, but we were able to use this money as leverage to get something else we wanted too.

There were several Kosovo-Serbia issues while I was there. There was a train that the Serbian government had painted up to say Kosovo is Serbia in 40 languages on the outside. Serbia had planned to send the train to Kosovo, to the Kosovo-Serb dominated town of North Mitrovica, as a provocation. For a while, the Kosovo government at the time wasn't so concerned about this plan, because it was clearly something oriented towards the Serbian base; they didn't feel that the majority population of Kosovo Albanians would care because this train was only going to show up in a Kosovo-Serb

dominated part of the country. But anyway, people got more and more worried about it as the day approached. And ultimately the NATO Kosovo Force puts its people on alert, they're afraid of violence from one side or the other, the risk that someone would attack the train or someone would defend the train or something like that.

Of course train day was on a weekend. I was in constant touch with my colleague, the U.S. ambassador to Belgrade; we always worked closely together. He persuades the Serbian government to stop the train before it gets to the Kosovo border, which it does. Now it turns out there were buses at this last Serbian city on the rail road. There were already buses there, even though the train stops "at the last minute." They're ready to bring the passengers from there into Kosovo. So it seemed that the Serbian government never intended to send the train all the way to Kosovo. They just wanted to make a big deal as a provocative effort. But you know, we had no idea at that time; we thought that this train was supposed to come and there might be violence.

This all demonstrated to me the importance of having good relationship with our colleagues in Belgrade; that's certainly something that we kept up the entire time I was ambassador in Pristina. For most of that time Kyle Scott was ambassador in Belgrade. We didn't always agree about everything, but we did always talk things through, which was vital. We were one team, one mission and our goal was that nobody else dies in the Balkans due to inter-ethnic violence.

Another event was the construction in the Kosovo-Serb dominated city of North Mitrovica of a wall, as a provocation, by entities or people probably connected with organized crime. So it was successful as a provocation because the Kosovo Albanian-dominated government was upset about it.

This was just north of the Ibar river near a bridge that the European Union had paid to rebuild. The bridge had been closed for a long time between north and south Mitrovica; there were barricades put up by the Kosovo Serbs to keep people from driving across the bridge. It could still be used as a pedestrian bridge, but not for cars. The EU had reached a deal between Kosovo and Serbia that it would rebuild the bridge if the Kosovo Serbs would allow it to be used again; part of the deal was that the street heading north from the bridge would be pedestrianized so people could not drive on it. The EU had basically finished its work with the bridge and the roundabout at the end, but the Kosovo Serbs still did not agree to allow the bridge to be opened. And then overnight, this wall at the north end appears blocking off the roundabout from the streets heading directly out from the bridge.

This was very provocative; tensions were growing. We talked at the embassy again about what's the meaning of this, what are the risks? And we decided we need to help them get rid of the dumb wall, because it's too provocative and someone might do something stupid that could not be undone. So, the question is what goes in its place? At least ostensibly, the Kosovo Serbs didn't want Kosovo Albanians to drive north from South Mitrovica across the bridge and then wave Albanian flags and things like that. So the question is, what's the situation after the wall comes down? This turns out to be a difficult

negotiation. It is a negotiation that I conduct personally, together with the EU and with colleagues from the embassy, because nobody else had credibility with both sides.

So I meet with the prime minister, other officials, and the mayor of North Mitrovica, who was a Kosovo Serb, and others, like the deputy prime minister who was a Kosovo Serb, and we meet in the PM's office, basically every night for a week, several times until two o'clock in the morning trying to negotiate how to get rid of the wall. It was tough; some nights were better than others. Ultimately what was agreed was that the roundabout at the top of the bridge would be divided from the streets by flower planters and those bollards that go up and down, which will be controlled by the police; so people could still walk from the bridge to the pedestrian zone, but cars coming across the bridge could not jump the curb and drive up into the zone. Now that was the basic deal, but the negotiation was not over.

We had to negotiate exactly how wide the bollard-controlled opening would be in case firetrucks needed to get to this pedestrian zone. So the original deal was drawn by one of our political officers using his children's colored pencils on a piece of paper. We all signed his colored pencil plan symbolizing the deal one of the early nights; the EU had a professional computer rendering made up for the final deal at the end. The EU chargé was there and for a couple of days we had a senior negotiator actually come down from Brussels who helped with the final, final deal. This is the type of negotiation where we meet with the government for a while, then meet with the Kosovo Serbs for a while, then bring them together, and see how far we get. If things are going in the wrong direction, we break again; if things are going in the right direction, we keep on going. It was basically me, the EU rep, and a couple of embassy LES that served as interpreters among English, Albanian, and Serbian; their role was crucial because the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians did not have a language in common. I ended up calling the Speaker of Parliament, who was travelling in the U.S. to gain his acquiescence to the final agreement, which was about the size of the bollard-controlled opening. At the end we made this deal at two o'clock on the final morning, and the wall was gone by two o'clock that afternoon.

Q: This is the kind of thing that is what you would get an award for because you literally took an initiative to prevent an escalation of violence that nobody could predict how badly it would go and I'm getting you used a lot of interesting and sometimes unusual details and judgment in how to bring it all about.

DELAWIE: This was a serious threat. I mean the government was threatening to knock down the wall with tractors and bulldozers. We were concerned that the people doing the actual work might be shot by people unknown. There are plenty of vantage points all around this wall. The reason the wall was built, I believe, was to serve as a provocation to try to generate exactly that. We had worked at the embassy constantly for years to make sure that no one died in inter-ethnic violence. First of course because that's the right thing, but also because when someone dies, then tempers and emotions get much higher. And things get much, much riskier. I thought the wall was built to provoke exactly an

outcome where people would get shot, and that might provoke a bigger reaction from somewhere.

Q: These are the sort of demonstrations of skill and acquired talent that ambassadors and others in the U.S. Foreign Service have to be able demonstrate.

DELAWIE: Of course, you don't get instructions from Washington on this type of thing; there is no FSI course on how to negotiate the removal of a wall in a volatile ethnically-mixed area. It's all based on your experience and your analysis of the situation. Your common sense, your negotiating skill and leverage, and your best analysis of how to get to a positive outcome. I should also return to the difficulty of communications between the Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian communities. If people are younger than 45, they probably don't share a language. So our embassy interpreters were essential to making this conversation happen at all. There are, of course, interpreters in Kosovo who do not work for the U.S. embassy. But it was our interpreters that actually got this done. Most of the LES in our embassy speak both Serbian and Albanian; in fact, for any job in political affairs or public diplomacy, that's a requirement.

So I had our local employees there also until two o'clock in the morning, night after night, helping resolve these things, and everybody trusted them too. So it was not just me as the American ambassador that was trusted, it was the Americans and their team that were trusted.

Moving on, another of the big issues was visa liberalization. Kosovo is the only country in Europe where people need a visa to visit the Schengen zone. The EU had passed visa liberalization for Georgia and Ukraine, the last two others, while I was there. As I said, the EU had made this border agreement with Montenegro an essential element for this visa liberalization. So the problem is the assembly still has to ratify this Montenegro deal. It's a treaty, so it needs a super majority in the Kosovo assembly, needing 80 yes votes out of 120.

The issue kind of dragged on with a lack of leadership, unfortunately for more than two and a half years; the assembly would every once in a while take the treaty up and the opponents would release tear gas, ending the session. The Assembly installed big fans to get the tear gas out quickly, but it certainly still annoyed people. Finally the EU said, look, you're running out of time, and there will be EU parliamentary elections, which have happened now, which will produce a new EU Parliament and a new EU Commission; Kosovo had to get this treaty ratified soonish to allow the then-existing Commission to take the steps necessary to provide visa-free travel for Kosovo citizens. It didn't happen, and the Kosovo government ultimately fell in the spring of 2017.

Kosovo held elections in the summer of 2017. We at the embassy, I thought, did a terrific job of ensuring they were the best elections ever in Kosovo. Our USAID team had contracted with a human rights NGO to hire hundreds of young people to be at the polling places and the vote counting centers to serve as election observers and try to keep the process honest. The EU had election observers there as well. The elections really

reflected the will of the voters. Unfortunately, they did not produce a clear outcome, as often happens. And so ultimately a new government was put together, but it had the bare minimum of seats in the assembly, 61 out of the 120 necessary to form a government. The new prime minister that formed this government was one of the opponents of the border agreement with Montenegro. Nevertheless, he ultimately comes around on the deal and recognizes that there's no other route to visa free travel. Kosovo and Montenegro make an informal deal where if there's some problem with the border line, they'll fix it. Montenegro understood that this border was in a completely uncontroversial area and there was no economic or political rationale for opposing this. I think they were willing to make small adjustments if they were really required, but of course they knew that the deal they made had been right all along. Part of the transformation for the prime minister was making this window dressing deal with Montenegro. So finally his party comes around; so the government needs 80 votes to pass the treaty through the 120 seat assembly. The government has 61 of those votes. It needs more.

That means some of the opposition has to vote for this treaty too. The opposition, some of which had been in the government before, might be willing to go along with this. But we at the embassy have to engage with basically every parliamentarian over the course of a couple of months and try and push them into voting yes on this agreement. It was, once again, a terrific team effort. We got a team of people from the political and the PD sections, the Americans and local employees, to come up with our talking points and strategies. And we basically touch every member of parliament, whether we thought we could get them or not. I do some of that, the FSOs and local employees do more of that.

We had a full time FSO and a full time local employee devoted to the assembly. For months, we worked through this. I strategized with the prime minister, with the speaker, with the president. I talked with the Kosovo Serbs as well, whom we did not really expect to support this in general, but there were a couple of people we thought might be gettable. Then there are other minorities in Kosovo, not just Albanians and Serbs. There's Roma, there's Egyptians, there are Ashkali, and each of these minorities have one or two assembly members as well. So we work with them. A lot of the minorities typically vote with Kosovo Serbs. They speak Serbian mostly as their language. Ultimately we nailed down what we think is going to be the vote, and that the treaty will pass with zero votes to spare.

We get to the assembly on what we expect to be the final day. Tear gas of course is thrown out in the assembly again. So they throw in the towel for that day, but the next day, the assembly reconvenes; people are sick of this whole attack on democracy. So ultimately the assembly does get exactly 80 votes to ratify the border agreement. I felt it was a terrific achievement for our team at the embassy. We worked so hard on it; of course others had worked hard on it as well, especially the EU mission. I've always felt we had more influence as the United States. So that was positive. Now unfortunately, even though Kosovo satisfied this key remaining criterion for EU visa liberalization, it still does not have it today. The EU changed in the interim with all these refugees flowing up from the Middle East.

They were not from Kosovo, but they were foreigners going into the EU. Attitudes in the EU have changed and the idea of more foreign visitors from poor countries is less popular; and the way Schengen works is the ministers of the interior have to agree in a qualified majority to add new countries to the visa-free travel list. So while the European Parliament has voted in favor of visa free travel for Kosovo, the ministers of interior have not agreed yet and there is no telling when or if that might happen. Kosovo certainly had an opportunity back in the fall of 2015 had it passed the deal with Montenegro then it would've received visa-free travel along with Georgia and Ukraine, which probably were tougher sources of illegal migration to Europe than Kosovo was, but it missed the train. I hope it gets visa-free travel someday. Nevertheless, I still feel good that we helped them pass this innocuous agreement with Montenegro.

Another key priority that I've talked about was this war crimes court to deal with alleged war criminals from the Kosovo War period, 1998 to 1989. The court's actual name is the "relocated specialist's chambers," but everybody in Kosovo calls it the Special Court. As I described before, the special court was something that the U.S. and EU worked together on and we persuaded the Kosovo Assembly to pass a constitutional amendment and legislation creating it. Despite being a Kosovo court, it actually sits in the Hague, so it would be harder for defendants to get to the witnesses to threaten or bribe them. Because the court was created under Kosovo law, it could be uncreated under Kosovo law as well. And there was an event.

It was the last work day before Christmas in 2017. Christmas was going to be Monday, so it was Friday, the 22nd of December. We started picking up hints that the assembly was going to vote on a law that would basically eviscerate the special court; but we did not know when. Well, it turns out it's going to be that day. And so it is the Friday before Christmas and a bunch of the American staff had already left for the United States or for Europe, for Christmas vacation. I had given everybody who was still working the afternoon off. Then all of a sudden in the late afternoon the assembly is convening and it's going to vote on this bill, and it will almost certainly pass.

One of the political officers is still around, and a couple of local employees are still around. So we just get in the car and drive from the embassy to the assembly building and start meeting with people. I collar parliamentarians in the lobby, I barge into the office of the speaker of the assembly. I later barge into the office of the president of Kosovo and I tell them all that there will be a serious effect on our relations if they do this. I get responses from some of these people that tell me they are not involved in this effort. I tell them I don't believe them, when they tell me that they don't know anything about it. If I had not been a Foreign Service officer for 35 years, I might have been reluctant to call people liars to their faces; but it didn't bother me a bit at that point. I collar the prime minister on the assembly floor, where I am not supposed to be, and tell him it's a really bad idea.

I called the British ambassador whom I knew was in town; I tell him what's going on. He comes down to the assembly too to join in the lobbying campaign. I tried to reach some of the other EU ambassadors, but most of them have left the country already. Journalists

start collecting in the lobby of the assembly. So I decided this is time for some public diplomacy. I give remarks about the importance of the special court to the United States, that we cared about it, and that this effort to undermine it was a stab in the back to the United States. That had a big effect in Kosovo. And I said our relations will be fundamentally changed if they take this step.

Well finally Washington wakes up at three o'clock in the afternoon Kosovo time. I call back to our deputy assistant secretary, just checking, I want to make sure I'm not off the reservation and our policy is still the same. He says, yes, we still support the special court. I say, I don't know what I have to do, but if you tell me we support the court, and let me use my judgment about what to say publicly and privately I'd appreciate it. He says, we trust you. So those were the instructions I had from Washington: we support the special court and Delawie should figure out how to keep it.

Q: How rare to have that much room to maneuver.

DELAWIE: Yes, but, this is going to happen that day. There was no time, right? I mean, we had used the whole day up until that point to figure out what was going on, to kind of understand who was behind it, what was likely to happen. Explaining that to people who didn't work on this every single day in the level we did would have been hard. I thought it was reasonable that he said, figure it out, Greg, that's your job. I wasn't really expecting different, but several parliamentarians told us, we're hearing the American government wants to get rid of the special court. I didn't believe that, I was sure State would have told me if they changed their position, but I still felt I had to check.

Then the political officer, the political LES, and I just begin meeting with people and heroically improvising. Of course we know everyone in the assembly. It turns out that there are rules that govern the Kosovo assembly; for laws to pass certain things have to happen; they have to be passed out of a committee first. You can't just take something up on the assembly floor. So we figure that the best way is to get to the members of the right committee that would consider it as law, and try to ensure that they don't have a quorum because they can't make a decision if they don't have a quorum. And ultimately we worked all the way through the evening. The political officer and the local employee are talking with people and ultimately we persuade parliamentarians that they should have other things to do rather than show up at that the meeting and there will be no quorum.

Finally, by 10 o'clock at night, the effort is dead for the night. We get together a rump team from the embassy early Saturday morning to figure out what to do next. I meet with additional people from the assembly, including parties that generally oppose things the United States wants, but who were satisfied with the special court, because they thought they knew who was going to be prosecuted. They wanted their political opponents to be prosecuted. We just kept up this effort through the weekend. And by the next business day, which was Tuesday, the effort had flopped. I went to see the prime minister again. He said, you did too good a job. So that effort died for that period and then the assembly went on winter break and the immediate risk was over.

So it was a good example of heroic improvisation and teamwork. I didn't come up with the no quorum idea myself. That was the political officer. We were in the hallway of the assembly building brainstorming what to do and making calls. I called the foreign minister in Africa on the phone. I used my cell phone to make a lot of démarches. Basically what we did was I talked with the political officer and the LES for two minutes, and I say, how about we say this? And they say, no, let's try this instead. That's how we developed the talking points, what we worked out in the hallway, the three of us. It was ultimately a successful effort, but it was the kind of thing where you have to rely on people that have experience, country knowledge, and people knowledge, and use these skills to achieve an American goal.

This is the kind of thing that the Foreign Service is good at, because we have people who have years of experience, and have developed interpersonal skills, political analysis skills, and things like that. Now, let's transition ahead a couple of weeks; the assembly is going to meet again, and we're trying to put a stake through the heart of this effort. Ultimately we decide that I need to give a big speech explaining why we care about the special court. It turns out we get a dozen TV cameras to film me giving this speech, which is our goal. I explained the history of the court, of American support for Kosovo, and said that we understand the war of liberation was tough. But that doesn't mean everybody who participated in it was a good guy. Some people did bad things. And, for Kosovo's future it is important that the people who did bad things face justice, and that the victims deserve justice. So that seems to have ended the problem. This was a terrific effort by the team of people stuck being there between Christmas and New Year's. They achieved a key American goal.

There are just a couple more things to mention. I met weekly with the president, the prime minister and the speaker of the assembly. Most ambassadors do not do this in the countries they are in. But of course the United States has a special place in Kosovo's heart; Kosovars care about what we think and they care about what we say and they're willing to see us to discuss anything. So we would always work at the embassy ahead of these meetings to come up with a list of things for me to raise. Some of them were straightforward where we knew we'd probably get agreement, and others we knew there'd probably be disagreement on.

But I never hesitated to raise anything that I thought we had a disagreement on. Typically over time, sometimes several meetings, we could resolve most of the key issues, although the toughest ones, like this border agreement with Montenegro did in fact take years to resolve. The first year I was there we had these meetings and would record outcomes or what our interlocutors said in occasional cables; for example, if we wrote a cable about Kosovo-Serbia we would use quotes from these meetings and stick them in the cable. But we kept getting questions from Washington about, well, did you do this, did you do that, on one issue or another. I recognized that not all the business that was being transacted was being recorded.

A political officer would accompany me, and take notes, but they didn't always write cables if we felt there was nothing new to report. But finally I decided in the second year

that we needed to write these things up. I knew this would be an effort because it takes a while to write a decent cable. But I decided we had to record these meetings. In any other country, if the ambassador meets the PM or the president it's going to be a cable; I decided we should do that too. We just needed to come up with an efficient way for the political counselor, who usually went along to these meetings, to write them up quickly; a one hour meeting could easily take three or four hours to write up in traditional State Department style.

I didn't really want to wipe out an entire day of the political counselor's time to record these meetings; that would not have been an efficient use of his or her time. So we tried several ways to crack the code on how to do this; ultimately we settled on a report where there would be one or two sentences about what the foreign interlocutor said. And then at the end of the cable we'd say, if you want more, let us know. That solved a lot of problems with our relationship with the desk, which was always good, but they hadn't always known what we were doing, which was the problem. An embassy should tell its desk what it's up to.

We copied other European embassies on these reports. At big meetings of EUR ambassadors, like at European command for example, I would often get questions from my colleagues. Do you really see the president, the prime minister every week? from my colleagues. I said, yes, I do; I don't live in France. So I was surprised at this reaction around Europe among other embassies; Gosh, how do they have such access? Well, if you create a country, you get access. It's just one of those things. So I thought that was interesting.

So the last thing I wanted to mention is where I got to after working on Kosovo for more than three years about how I felt we at the embassy should react to negative things that were going on. Every once in a while someone in or out of the Kosovo government would do something we really didn't like. And the question was always going to be, how do we respond to that?

So the immediate emotional response is just to criticize publicly whatever the slight is about. Especially the new people when they arrived to the pol/econ section, they started off in that mode. All right, this official had done this bad thing, let's just criticize him (because it was always him, not her). But as my tour continued, I tended to focus on exactly what the USG really wanted to achieve in the long run. If you think the problem was all about you, then maybe criticism is appropriate: they did this, it was a slight against us, they should suffer. Well it probably wasn't a slight against us. We interpreted it as a slight against us, but there was probably some other reasons that motivated this issue. It's important to recognize that the goal of the embassy is to achieve its objectives; it is not to exact retribution against someone who offends you no matter how much that's what you want to do. And there were many times that I wanted to exact retribution. But really, you should only do that if you think that will help you achieve your goals; if it won't help you achieve your goals, why would you do that? Especially if exacting retribution will make it harder to achieve your goals.

I said earlier that some people think the job of diplomat is to be liked by everybody. And I said that was not correct, that the job of a diplomat is to achieve goals. So if you exact retribution against someone who commits a slight against you, you have less influence over that person; you have less ability to achieve your goals. Unless you think you can get someone fired, you have to think carefully about exacting retribution. So this is one of those things I think that comes from maturity and experience. But there were many occasions when people in the embassy, including the local employees, were really upset about something that a Kosovo politician had done. And I was too. I think what I brought to that discussion though was okay, whatever we do next has to help put us in a better position to achieve our goals vis-a-vis that politician. What else can we do? We can criticize them privately. I had many private meetings where I was criticizing officials to their face saying, that was a mistake; that was dishonest; I don't believe you. If you want our support in the future, you have to play better.

But there's a big difference between doing that and going public. And when I said on the special court issue that I talked about a few minutes ago, I said to the press that the effort to undermine the special court was a stab in the back, that shocked people because I had never said anything that ferocious in Kosovo before. So maintaining a relatively calm and unargumentative public style for most of my time in Kosovo gave me the opportunity to shock people, which is what I wanted to do in this case. This was thought through, at that particular time. Whereas if I had always been yelling at people publicly, I don't think that would've made the same kind of impression. I think it's important for everyone to keep in mind, not just ambassadors, but everyone at an embassy, how important it is to control your emotions and your emotional responses and to focus on how you're going to best achieve your goals.

Q: Well, as you're now approaching the end of your tour as an ambassador in Kosovo, are you thinking about another tour in the Foreign Service, whether as an ambassador or as a political advisor or else some other job?

I had pretty much decided that I would retire out of Kosovo. Something one of my former Ambassadors had said to me really rang true for me. He basically said, it's the best job I've ever had. This is the time to leave the Foreign Service. Why not leave when you're in the best job you've ever had? That job will be your key memory of the service for the rest of your life. I thought that was a very persuasive argument. So I decided to retire out of Kosovo not too long after I got there. I didn't tell anyone other than the DCM of course, because I did not want to appear to be a lame duck. So I was heading for the exits, although I hope no one noticed, until basically August of 2018 when we announced that I would be departing; a successor had been identified and nominated, at the time, which was good. The new ambassador is Phil Kosnett.

I knew I was going to leave in the fall of 2018 because I wanted to reunite our family. I was concerned for a while as 2018 progressed that a successor had not been nominated. August 2015 is when I arrived. Around August 2018 should be when I depart. Finally Kosnett is announced, he's nominated, in the summer of 2018. That makes it easier for me to put the gears in motion to leave. We had an extremely competent DCM. I knew she

could be chargé d'affairs for as long as necessary. But there is no CDA that has the influence of an ambassador. I had been concerned that if we left Kosovo with a CDA for months, people in Kosovo or in a neighboring country might get up to mischief, which would make it harder for the embassy team.

But once Kosnett's name was public and it was clear that a new ambassador was going to come, that relieved my concern. So I worked with the country team to start a phase out process in August and we came up with a plan for September (I ultimately left September 26th of 2018); the plan included calls on people and visits to places and in speeches, and interviews, with the press. The schedule was just as intense as always. We kept things going literally until my last day, with the kind of ten to 12 hour days that were unfortunately part of being an ambassador.

I have reflected a lot on my time in Kosovo, and what I might have done differently. But, I didn't come to any terrific conclusions. You learn a lot along the way, but you always have to make decisions based on the information that you had at the time you make it. And in foreign policy, that is rarely the perfect amount of information. You always wish you had more idea of what the other person is thinking, but you don't have that. So I was pretty comfortable with everything we did. I was impressed every day at the quality of the team at the embassy, the State Department, the USAID staff, the DOD people, the local employees, the people from other agencies; I am afraid of leaving people out here; we had Peace Corps volunteers that I was just always amazed at what they were willing to sacrifice in the their personal lives to make the world a better place. I had a terrific life as a public servant. I was happy to be able to work for the United States, the people of the United States.

And now that chunk of my life is over. I left Kosovo in September 2018 and I retired from the Foreign Service in November of 2018. So now I am a federal retiree, free to speak my mind about anything for the first time in 35 years. I'm working on what to do next. I'm doing some consulting and go to foreign policy oriented events. But being a public servant for a long time, it's in my blood. I'm looking for some other way to do good going forward; I have not figured out what that's going to be yet. But I will continue to work for the benefit of the people, for the United States.

Q: As you look back, what were the most important influences or preparations you had that served you throughout your career?

DELAWIE: I was really lucky to be involved with some terrific people over the years who served as mentors to me. While I was in the human resources bureau, our principal DAS Ruth Whiteside really helped me figure out what I was doing. Because I did not know a whole lot about human resources. I was new to that field; Ruth had worked for years in various parts of state management. And then she really helped me figure things out.

I talked earlier about Rose Gottemoeller, who was my assistant secretary, then under undersecretary; she was also a terrific mentor. I think you find people that you want to be

like and you try to emulate them as best you can. Sometimes you don't know that something is going to be significant in the future, but it turns out to be. I talked about meeting Steve Mull who was our ambassador in Lithuania when he came to Croatia; he later offered me a job based on meeting me when I was DCM in Zagreb. I didn't know that was going to be an important meeting. So you don't always know what's going to help you out, and chance plays an awfully large role in anyone's success, no matter how much you think it's all about your skill, your preparation, etc. But it's vital to treat everybody well. You've got to recognize that you may be someone's boss one day and she may be your boss another day; you have to treat people up and down and sideways, all the same, with respect. You see a lot of people crash and burn because they just kiss up and kick down.

You also need to have the right mental perspective and a moral compass; that really helps.

Q: Over the years. Now since you've been in the service, how, what are the most important things you've seen change?

DELAWIE: There's been a lot of effort, especially since Secretary Colin Powell tried to make the Foreign Service look more like America. And not just saying that, doing things to make that happen, because that had been a theme for years but was not effective. When Powell got there and he threw a lot of money at the human resources bureau to recruit people, which gave us the ability to reach out beyond the traditional sources of Foreign Service people, which were not just the east coast establishment, no matter what politicians like to say. But there were definitely limited pools that we were drawing from. And there was a big chunk in the middle of the United States that we didn't get a lot of people from. But with money for recruiting, for advertising, for promoting, you know, we could touch people, potential candidates that we could never touch before.

I think that was really important. And you do see a lot more women in leadership positions than you did when I was coming up. You do see more African Americans and Hispanics than we had when I was a young officer. That's great. And you do see people from really different former careers because almost everybody in the Foreign Service comes from some other career. You don't have a whole lot of 22 year olds out of college or 24 year olds out of graduate school. Usually people do something else first. Traditionally we had recovering lawyers as the biggest source of Foreign Service officers, and we still have plenty of those, but now there are people who are teachers or business people or lots of other things. I think that's a really important change. We really are able to draw on the strength of American diversity in a way that we weren't doing before.

Q: A question about officers themselves; over time, how has the officer pool itself changed?

I don't know. But the young people that I was able to work with for the last two tours were just incredible. I can't really imagine that I would've gotten through the hiring

process recently that they went through. So I am confident in the future of the Foreign Service as long as there's decent leadership in the State Department, because the younger people that are coming into the Foreign Service are heads and shoulders above my generation of people. I know they can do great things with the right leadership.

Q: And this is my last question. If you were advising someone today on how to prepare themselves to be Foreign Service officers, what advice would you give?

DELAWIE: Read a lot, not just foreign policy, but a lot of foreign policy and history certainly helps. Become very comfortable interacting with people and disagreeing with people. And try to do something meaningful with your life ahead of the Foreign Service; first of all, this is insurance, because you never know if you're going to pass through that Foreign Service filter. If you have a bad day on the oral assessment, you have no chance for a year. But also, if you are doing something meaningful with your life before the Foreign Service that will help you be a better FSO, it will give you valuable experience. What an individual can do in the Foreign Service is consequential for themselves, for the organization, the State Department, for the United States. So it's better to enter the State Department having tried to do something consequential in some other part of your life too.

Q: All right, well great. Thank you for taking part in the oral history of the foreign affairs oral history program. We'll end the interview here and begin the process of transcription.

DELAWIE: Thank you very much Mark.

End of interview