

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Program
Foreign Assistance Series

DIRK W. DIJKERMAN

*Interviewed by: Carol Peasley
Initial interview date: December 8, 2022
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This oral history transcription was made possible through support provided by U.S. Agency for International Development, under terms of Fixed Amount Award No. 7200AA21FA00043. The opinions expressed herein are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development or the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.

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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is December 8, 2022, and this is Carol Peasley, and this is interview number one with Dirk Dijkerman. And Dirk, we're really pleased to have this chance to interview you. And maybe we could start with you by talking a little bit about when and where you were born and a bit about your early childhood and your family.

Childhood, Family, Education, and Early Background

DJIKERMAN: I was born in Indonesia in the city of Bandung, in 1954. Both my parents were also born in Indonesia. My father had a Dutch mother and father, and my mother had a Dutch father and an Indonesian mother. My parents met after World War II in Indonesia. My father had gone back to Indonesia from Europe after World War II as an under-age Dutch soldier because it was the fastest way to get there to find his parents. My father's parents and half-brother and most of my mother's father's and brothers had been released from the Japanese concentration camps in Indonesia at war's end.

Q: But your father had left Indonesia?

DJIKERMAN: He was in Holland in a boarding school when World War II broke out.

Q: Ah, okay.

DJIKERMAN: He and the other students were sent away from the boarding school when the Germans came. He wound up staying with a family who had boarded his mother, who had been a schoolteacher in Friesland. So, when World War II ended, he was still

underage, but they let him enlist because he spoke multiple Indonesian languages, Bahasa, Sudanese, Javanese, and obviously Dutch. So, he became an interpreter for the Dutch military action to prevent the independence of Indonesia from Holland.

Q: So, he was recruited by the Dutch army then?

DJIKERMAN: He volunteered, but they were certainly pleased to have him and other Dutch boys who had been stuck in Europe during the war and who now wanted to get back to Indonesia to find their parents and siblings.

Q: Yeah, he volunteered and returned to Indonesia

DJIKERMAN: Yes.

Q: But he was, as a kid then, he was living in occupied Holland because the Germans had occupied—

DJIKERMAN: Yes. And he was still underage after the war ended. But he and a lot of his friends who had parents in Indonesia volunteered because that was the only way to get back to find them. Anyway, my father was wounded in action and, as he was recovering, met my mother. That's how they got started in Indonesia. Before they married, my mother insisted my father get a college degree. They went to Holland, and he graduated from college. Afterwards, they moved back to Indonesia, and he became a manager of plantations.

Later, when Sukarno took over and became very anti-Dutch, my parents and I were expelled from Indonesia. My parents were accused of being Dutch spies, which they were not. My father was a plantation manager (his father and my mother's father owned plantations for tea and rubber). So, we were kicked out on forty-eight hours' notice and took the boat back to Holland. At that point in time, which was the mid-late fifties, they started looking for where to settle. Australia basically said my father could come but drop the mulattos -- meaning my mother and me. In South Africa, my mother and I were classified "colored." When my father got off the boat to visit Cape Town through the whites only door, my mother decided this was not a country for them. Once back in Holland, they also experienced quite a bit of discrimination.

Q: Before we go on, just a second, because you said briefly, and I just want to—because I think it must have been incredibly significant that you mother's family, they were in camps during—they were—

DJIKERMAN: Yes. My mother's father and my mother's brothers were in the concentration camps. My mother's mother and a couple of the sisters were permitted to stay out of the camps because they were viewed as mulatto and female. They weren't really viewed by the Japanese as Dutch.

Q: Ah, I see.

DJIKERMAN: Also, my Indonesian grandmother paid the Japanese off with gold. During the war my grandmother used to snip off pieces of gold from her bracelets to

bribe the Japanese. The Japanese let them live in their house and made them knit socks. But her brothers and her father were put in the camps. From this experience, my mother gave me as “insurance for very bad times” 24 karat gold snake arm bands—even though we lived in the States.

Q: Okay, so they really—they felt World War II considerably. And I’m sorry, and then so they arrived—

DJIKERMAN: In Holland.

Q: In Holland and found discrimination there as well?

DJIKERMAN: Yes. They had trouble renting an apartment. My mother and I have darker skin. Apparently, I was in fights in school and was picked on by teachers. The net result was my parents decided to immigrate to the United States. President Eisenhower had a special program for people who were kicked out of Indonesia. I think it was something like twenty-five thousand, either families or people, could come to the United States if sponsored. We were sponsored by a Presbyterian church in Oil City, Pennsylvania. We arrived November 26, 1959, in Newark – Thanksgiving Day. Newark because Ellis Island had been closed in 1954. My Immigration and Naturalization Service Stamp in my Dutch Passport says, New York New York. I still have that passport.

Q: And then what happened, what kind of options were there for you, a plantation manager and—

DJIKERMAN: The church found a job for him working in a large greenhouse. Later he moved to New Jersey to get a better job. There he managed an apartment complex and later he became the sextant of a good-sized church with some 24 acres. He worked there until he retired.

Q: So this was in New Jersey? Pennsylvania?

DJIKERMAN: Moorestown, New Jersey.

Q: Okay. So, you spent your childhood then in New Jersey?

DJIKERMAN: For the most part, yes. I think we spent a year and a half in Oil City, Pennsylvania, with the people who sponsored us. Then the rest in south New Jersey until I left New Jersey for college.

Q: In South Jersey, okay. And was your mother, did she work at all when she came to the States or did she—

DJIKERMAN: Yes. She wound up working for Western Union as one of the people who takes your messages when you called in to send a telegram. She did that until she retired.

Q: Okay. So, did you go to public schools in New Jersey?

DJIKERMAN: Yes. I did most of my education in the same school system in Moorestown, New Jersey, which is near Cherry Hill and Camden – not Morristown, which is near Princeton.

Q: So, you're in high school. I assume you were a brilliant student. How much English did you speak when you arrived? Did you speak English or—

DJIKERMAN: No. I learned English in primary school when I arrived. They just threw me in. My parents made two decisions. One was that they didn't want to raise me in one of these enclaves of former Dutch and Indonesians who had come to the States. They wanted me to be totally immersed in living in the States and becoming an American. And two, we kept speaking Dutch at home.

Q: Were there any special programs for kids in schools in those days for immigrant kids, or did you just—

DJIKERMAN: No. I don't recall my parents ever mentioning that. I also don't recall there being other immigrants in Oil City, Pennsylvania, at that point in time.

Q: (Laughs) Okay. I guess kids adapt quickly and learn quickly.

DJIKERMAN: Yes. Kids adapt.

Q: Okay. So, when you then move off to New Jersey and you're in high school. I assume you must have been a very good student in high school.

DJIKERMAN: No. I certainly wasn't at the top of the class. I'd say in the top quarter or so at best.

Q: Okay. Did you—when you started looking for college did you know what you wanted to do or have any idea of what you wanted your future career to be?

DJIKERMAN: No. I had very little idea at that point. My parents had no sense of how to guide me in the U.S. college search. I had expressed an interest in aeronautical engineering, so I applied to the University of Michigan for aeronautical engineering because I liked flying and airplanes. I was in the Civil Air Patrol. I received early acceptance by U of M. So, my parents introduced me to other adults who worked in engineering. They told me that I better really like physics. However, during my senior year, I had an unpleasant experience with physics and the teacher. So, I decided that I did not want to go to the University of Michigan and become an aeronautical engineer. I went

to my backup choice, which I had selected based on where my friends were applying. I thought I had applied to the University of Pennsylvania, but it turned out that I had applied to the Pennsylvania State University (PSU). We were sitting in a classroom at school when a friend looked at my acceptance letter and pointed out that I was not going to UP, short for University of Pennsylvania, but PSU, short for The Pennsylvania State University. Given that I didn't want to become an aeronautical engineer and my high school year was ending, I went to PSU with no clue about what I was going to do.

Q: And no friends either.

DIJKERMAN: And no idea what I'd gotten into. My parents supported my choice given that my mother insisted I go to college. Even at that time, made me promise I would continue to get a doctorate. So, I went to PSU. As a freshman, for some reason, I became very involved in student government. I became the student representative on the faculty tenure committee. I did so in part because there were a lot of classmates who were Vietnam vets. They became friends and provided me with a very different appreciation of how things worked and instilled a responsibility to get involved and think more broadly. For example, they said to read *Fire in the Lake*, a book about Vietnam's history, and other books. I learned a lot about their experiences overseas and saw how much it had impacted their lives, both for good and bad. They were fundamentally different from the other students at Penn State. I enjoyed my time with them. Perhaps I should note here that a good number of the freshmen (recent high school graduates) asked me if I was an Eskimo. Given my "tan," I guess they viewed me as being somehow different. In fairness to them, I had worked as a head lifeguard at a private club in New Jersey prior to going to college and was quite tanned.

Q: And you ended up studying agricultural economics, is that correct? Does that kind of evolve out of this?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. It was partly thinking about my father having a knack for agriculture. But I chose agricultural economics as opposed to agronomy because I have a brown thumb. Also, at PSU, agricultural economics is directly linked with rural sociology. I really liked the sociology aspect. But I also figured out early on that if I wanted to eat, I could not major in sociology. So, my major became agricultural economics and rural sociology.

Q: And did you do geographic area studies as well, and if so, did you sort of specialize in Southeast Asia, given your interest with friends that served in Vietnam and others?

DIJKERMAN: No. I didn't start specializing in that way until I went to graduate school. At the undergraduate level my counselor drove me to be expansive. So even though I was in the agricultural economics and rural sociology department, he told me to get enrolled in the honors program in the economics department, take courses in engineering so I could do linear programming and get an appreciation for data and applied mathematics.

He also had me take rural sociology courses because he felt that while the numbers are

good, one must also understand people and culture to try to get a rounded sense of why things were happening. For example, I wound up going to Northern Pennsylvania to work in a rural bank for a semester. There I did repossessions, loan originations, and everything else in the bank to get a grounded feel of community. While there, I was asked to become the secretary for the school board because I knew Robert's Rules of Order. Part of the reason was that one of the required courses in my department was on Robert's Rules of Order. I was young but viewed by the folks there as qualified to be the secretary to keep everybody straight. That was the orientation of the undergraduate agricultural economics

program at Penn State. I would almost say it was very vocationally oriented, grounded in numbers and culture.

Q: Yeah, well. At this point, were you at all thinking about international development as a possible career?

DIJKERMAN: No, I wasn't really thinking that far ahead. What started me thinking differently was an experience with Purina, the large US agricultural processing company. I was selected by my department to meet with Purina to be interviewed for a summer internship program and the prospect of a job upon graduation. It was a wake-up call for me. The lead representative from Purina asked me, "Are you off of a farm?" I said, "No." He said, "Okay. We're not interested in you." He didn't talk to me for the rest of the dinner and evening. What he wanted was somebody from rural America off a farm, period. All others were not qualified. I left with the sense that I was not going to be very competitive with American agricultural companies. My counselor told me to ignore the experience and focus on other opportunities. I had taken computer programming courses and wound up getting a summer job at the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to computerize data and data analysis systems at USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) in its Oilseeds and Products Division. When I went back to college for my final year, I received job offers to go back and work there. I decided that I really didn't want to do that and become a statistician or programmer. I decided to go to graduate school because I didn't like the options that were being presented to me as a non-rural, non-American, non-farm boy. So, I applied to Stanford and Cornell for their international agricultural economics and rural sociology programs.

Q: And you ended up going to Cornell I believe.

DIJKERMAN: Cornell, yes.

Q: Which had a huge program in international agricultural economics?

DIJKERMAN: Exactly. At Cornell, there were a lot of Indonesians; probably twenty or thirty across different departments. Most were in their forties or older, senior government and university officials, and all getting advanced degrees. They very quickly found out that I was born in Indonesia and kind of adopted me. A number of departments at Cornell did work in Indonesia on rural sociology, agricultural economics, population studies and so forth. Being in this environment again increased my sensitivity to what was happening around the world. However, I was not aware of the U.S. government's role in

international development. Most of my US friends were returned Peace Corps Volunteers. Cornell had a very active international development community.

Q: Yeah, there's a great temptation to ask if you knew X, Y and Z, but I won't do that. I'll wait until the recording's over.

But you said that you'd been adopted by the Indonesians who were there, so was your research then Indonesia-focused or Southeast Asia-focused? Did you have to do research, thesis, and paper?

DIJKERMAN: Well, I did a research paper in Cornell's Population Studies Department on transmigration in Indonesia (e.g., the government organized movement of people from populated islands to those that were less populated). From that work, my Indonesian colleagues started making noises about sending me to Indonesia, to do further research and so forth. But I concluded that all of them, like I mentioned, were older than I was, they would likely become my future mentors and guardians. For some reason, I decided I wanted independence from that. Consequently, I changed advisors to one who specialized in Latin America. I went to Guatemala to do a transmigration study. This was the late 1970s and Guatemala was looking to encroach on what is now Belize. The thinking was to do the same types of organized movement of peoples that Indonesia had done to populate its outer islands. I learned Spanish, went to Guatemala, and very quickly discovered that this effort was supported very aggressively by the military there. They apparently found out about me somehow and met me. They gave me special access to flights and so forth. I did not want to be associated with that. I called my advisor, noting that I did not want to be working with the Guatemalan military. We agreed to change my thesis focus when I returned to school.

Q: So, what did you finally end up doing?

DIJKERMAN: When I got back to Cornell, my Indonesian friends introduced me to a visiting professor who was married to an Indonesian woman. He had done his Ph.D. on different castes of farmers in India. They proposed to me that if I became his teaching assistant, he would give me his database to use on any thesis topic I choose. This would save me time (e.g., no field research, no data collection, clean data set, no fundraising, etc.). I could also do a quantitative thesis to further shorten the time I would need to invest. I took them up on the offer. I wrote my master's thesis on whether farmers from different castes displayed different farming efficiencies in the Tamil Nadu state in India.

Q: Was there, you can't leave me hanging, was there an influence?

DIJKERMAN: The wealthy, higher caste farmers were no more efficient than the poor, lower caste farmers. The higher caste farmers just had access to more capital, which enabled them to grow more absolutely, and thus sell more and be more successful.

Q: Okay. Depended more on assets than caste.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. As I neared the end of my master's degree, I was approached by a headhunter to be interviewed by AT&T. I accepted the job offer. Then, my future colleagues took me around to show me where they lived in north New Jersey. It felt like everyone was already married, had two kids, a two-car garage, a dog, and lived in suburbia USA. I concluded I was not ready for that kind of life. When I returned to Cornell, a friend of mine said, "Well, why don't you apply to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)?" So, I did. USAID told me the process would take months. So, I accepted an offer from the Economics Department at Cornell to teach a macroeconomics course for a semester. I then obtained a delayed start date from AT&T. So, I taught macroeconomics at the economics department for a semester while finishing the edits on my master's thesis. Then USAID hired me.

Q: Was this as a direct hire AID employee?

USAID – Hired as International Development Intern - 1979

DIJKERMAN: I was. I came in as an International Development Intern (IDI). The joke back then was that we were IDIOTs, for International Development Interns – Overseas Trainees.

Q: Came in as an IDI. Okay. Was it a class of IDIs in 1979 at that point?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. I forget how many were in my class. Perhaps fifteen. Everybody in my class except for Helen Gunther (whose father had been in USAID) and myself had been in the Peace Corps. All of us had master's degrees. Not sure why I was hired. I spent two summers working for USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) but no recent overseas experience.

Q: (Laughs) Right.

DIJKERMAN: Perhaps from my resume, they concluded I have lived in a foreign culture my entire life as I was not born American. Hence, I could deal with foreign cultures. The challenges of living and working in foreign cultures was a topic I recall being asked about multiple times during the interview process.

Q: Oh, by the way, when did you become an American citizen? Was it when you were a kid or later?

DIJKERMAN: My parents went through the whole naturalization process. I forget how many years it takes. But yes, I became a naturalized citizen after, what is it, six years.

Q: So, all of you went through it, your mother, your father, and you went through it at the same time.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: Okay.

DIJKERMAN: I keep a photo of my naturalization paper on my phone, believe it or not.

Q: Yeah. These days that's probably a good idea.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: So, you came in as an IDI. Did you know where you'd be going, or was it sight unseen and just hoping for the best?

DIJKERMAN: Sight unseen. When I started in the Africa Bureau, John Koehring and Haven North wanted somebody who had a quantitative background to do a study on how to increase food aid to Africa. They felt Africa wasn't getting its fair share. They put me to work with a former congressional staffer, Paul Russell, to see if there was a justifiable analysis and argument that could be to get more food aid for Africa. Rather than rotate

around to different offices as the IDI program required, I stayed in the same place and developed the analysis. John and Haven argued that I was working with multiple offices in doing my work, so I did not need to do formal rotations. The IDI program manager, Shirley Marino, accepted that.

Q: From Washington, doing that?

DIJKERMAN: From Washington. John Koehring was the Director of Development Planning in the Africa Bureau and Haven North was the DAA (Deputy Assistant Administrator) for Africa and then became the Acting AA (Assistant Administrator) for a long time.

So, Haven and John were the people I worked for. Vernon Walters was Deputy Assistant Secretary on the State Department side. I also worked with him. He too was very supportive.

Q: Okay. And how long did you stay in Washington before going overseas? Was it about a year then?

DIJKERMAN: They kept me in Washington for longer than the IDI program plans as Haven, John and others wanted me to see through the effort to its conclusion. Based on our work, we did succeed in increasing food aid – Titles I, II and III – to Africa by quite a bit. I think it was roughly a hundred million. The analysis I did drew from work Joe Wheeler had commissioned when he was Deputy Administrator. I quantified the quantity and type of food aid needed by a country, how well that country managed its fiscal affairs (as a proxy for its ability to manage and allow the effective utilization of food aid), its overall development need (i.e., absolute, and relative need), its political commitment to development, and its importance to the United States. Data on the last three indicators came directly from Joe Wheeler's work. For the other indicators, I selected them from other sources and hired a summer intern to help assemble the data.

Q: You were doing the analytic work for this; did you get involved in any meetings or interagency or—

DIJKERMAN: Absolutely.

Q: —to help make the final decisions?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. We went to the White House, met lobbyists Paul knew from his time on the Hill, and went to the Hill. We met with multiple other bureaus. What I learned was that a good, strong analysis is all well and good, but one really benefits from an extra push.

What we observed, thanks to Paul Russell with his background on the Hill, was that the head of the Food for Peace (FFP) Office was a woman and an active mentor of the FFP woman who was managing the Africa portfolio. The FFP head also had staff managing other regions whom she did not view favorably. We, with a couple of others outside of AID, decided that the best way to get the new money for Africa was to take it away from Asia and a couple of the other regions and have it allocated to Africa. It wouldn't require

a new Congressional appropriation as the likelihood of increasing the food aid budget was viewed as very low. So, we supported the FFP person for Africa with the analysis and arguments on why the food aid should be shifted from specific countries, mostly in Asia, to Africa. The lobbyists, people at the White House and Hill made supportive interventions to the head of FFP, citing our analysis and how they were swayed that a correction needed to be made in the allocation of food aid. It worked and I learned early on that data and analysis is great, but other things are really important to get across the goal line.

Q: That's an important lesson to learn as an IDI.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. When I finished that, I was assigned to the Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA) as an agricultural economist. But before I left Washington, the IDI program coordinator met with me to inform me of a request from the USAID mission in Indonesia. The Mission was looking for an agricultural economist with rural sociology skills, who'd done work on transmigration, and so forth. It was my resumé and my Indonesian friends were trying to get me transferred to Indonesia. I was given the choice to go to Indonesia or stay in the Africa Bureau. I chose to stay with the Africa Bureau. So, that's how I wound up going to Africa.

REDSO/ESA, Agricultural Economist, 1979 - 1983

Q: Fantastic. That was very good fortune for the Africa bureau. So, you arrived in Nairobi in probably 1980 or something like that?

DIJKERMAN: Very late '79.

Q: And are you with a team of economists and ag economists?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. Ray Love was the REDSO/ESA Director and his wife, Mary Love, was the Executive Officer for the USAID Mission to Kenya, which also supported REDSO/ESA. They were very helpful in making sure that I had a formal IDI rotation. I started in the REDSO Analysis Division, but I worked all the divisions as well as the USAID Mission to Kenya. I worked on many teams in different roles. They also kept me traveling quite a bit.

Q: Did you, in supporting missions, travel around to different AID missions in the region?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. My first year, in terms of calendar days, I was traveling over 70 percent of the time. The second year I almost reached 80 percent. We used to have two diplomatic passports so REDSO could get the next visa while one was out on the road. REDSO kept us moving. As I was single, it didn't matter to me where I was.

Q: Does this mean they didn't have to give you a house to live in? (Laughs)

DIJKERMAN: I didn't unpack my things for the first year.

Q: Yeah, wow.

DIJKERMAN: But it was a great experience. I had a lot of experience compressed into a short amount of time. As you know, when you're on a TDY (Temporary Duty) work assignment, you work intensely with a lot of people on a lot of different assignments, and a lot of responsibility is tossed your way.

Q: And you were doing some work with Food Aid as well, is that correct?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. I became an adjunct member of the Food Aid Division in REDSO. One time I was in Malawi and the U.S. government decided that it needed to reward Tanzania for kicking out Idi Amin from Uganda. The only resource they said they could find was food aid. So, the US gave some \$8 million worth of food aid. Because the other Food Aid Division members were all busy, they sent me to Tanzania to design and negotiate the food aid program, and then establish an office in the USAID Mission to Tanzania to manage the food aid program. For this task, I left the task I was on in Zambia and flew straight to Tanzania. This happened a number of times during my time in REDSO. In one case, the Government of Madagascar diverted their national carrier to pick us up in Nairobi to fly us down there to put together a program at the end of the fiscal year.

Q: Certainly into the eighties, the Africa bureau was trying to do more policy-based work. Were you involved with that? And I assume from the analytic side you probably were.

DIJKERMAN: There were several efforts. One effort was to increase Title III food aid programs which were more directed to support significant policy reforms. They sent me

to Somalia to see if a Title III program made sense there. The answer was no. I made the same conclusion in several other countries.

Q: Yes, it was probably premature for it at that point, yeah.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: Yeah. Were there any programs or anything particularly noteworthy during that period that you'd like to highlight? Anything that became particularly important later in your development career? Anything that you really learned a lot from?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. I considered myself to have been extremely fortunate in working for very good bosses. I'll give you a couple examples. I went to Zambia to put together a program that was a payoff to Zambia for its "frontline" against Rhodesia and South Africa. For the program, we were to import raw materials to make fertilizer in a plant built by the Germans. I was sent out on a team where I was the economist. And I did the economic analysis and concluded there are real issues here. The team leader disagreed and said it was a great project because they were selling the fertilizer made at the German

plant and making money. I noted that the USAID project paper design process, even if it was a politically justified program, required an economic analysis. My analysis showed that we were shipping inputs to manufacture a costly fertilizer made in a very sophisticated, high-cost plant, which was then sold at a significant loss. One could get a greater quality of fertilizer out to farmers at a lower sale price if the US provided fertilizer directly rather than the inputs to produce it in Zambia. Well, my economic analysis was cut out of the document. When I found out, I told him and the mission director in Zambia at the time, to take my name off the project paper. If something does not make good economic sense, at least acknowledge it and do not paper over it. When I did this, I did not think anything of it. The Economic Support Fund proposal went to Washington for review. I then found out that the USAID Chief Economist, John Wilhelm, got up in senior staff and said there are serious issues when one of his economists has his name taken off a program proposal paper. The USAID Administrator then put the entire Zambia project on freeze, sent a team from Washington to Zambia, including Larry Sayers and sent me back with a couple of other REDSO staff, including Stuart Callison, another economist, to look at the project and entire program. REDSO Director Ray Love was supportive, as was Larry Sayers and others. We reviewed the project in question and the overall program and made changes. What gave me comfort was that I could say something, and I was fortunate to have supportive leadership that seemed to feel I was not an idiot, and it was worth going back to look at what was happening.

Q: But it became a better program.

DIJKERMAN: It became a better program in that by sending the final product to Zambia there was more fertilizer to be sold at lower prices. Later we argued for changes in the composition of food aid being sent to Zambia – sending more and cheaper maize which was more likely to be consumed by those in need than sending a smaller quantity of higher-priced rice, which was largely consumed by Zambia’s wealthy. The US rice exporters were displeased, but USAID leadership was supportive of our arguments and allowed our recommendations to be partially implemented.

My last example is from Rwanda. USAID created a parastatal (a quasi-government company) in Rwanda to buy beans at harvest time and then sell them during the hungry season. In theory, it was to help raise prices for farmers at harvest and help lower prices for consumers during the hungry season. The USAID Rwanda Director asked me if the project should be extended. This was pre-computers, so I went in, collected data, and developed different likely scenarios. I found that nine out of ten scenarios the parastatal would lose money. The records of the parastatal backed up my conclusions -- it lost money most years and overall. Upon further analysis by a bean expert we had brought in, we found that the longer the beans were stored, the harder they became, thus requiring a much longer time to cook. Poor people notice if it takes significantly more effort and cost to cook them and avoided buying the parastatal’s beans. From my work, confirmed by the parastatal’s records, the only time the parastatal made a profit was when there was a food crisis somewhere in the region and some donor bought the beans. Basically, the donor bought the beans the locals declined to buy. I recommended that we let the project close, even though it had been extended several times. The project manager strongly disagreed

with my analysis, but my Team Leader, Jim Graham, and the USAID Mission Director Gene Chiavaroli supported my recommendation. We then met with the Rwandan Government and laid out the analysis and data. We also showed them that their national policy of setting bean prices was not having any impact either. They listened, asked questions, and left. Shortly thereafter, they agreed to let the project close as scheduled and shut down the parastatal. They also said they were changing their bean price policy to be a “suggested” price, not a fixed price. I again was comforted by the fact that I had a very supportive project paper team leader and mission director. So, I’ve been very fortunate with the people that I had to work for.

Q: Yeah, those are great examples of early in the career seeing that analytic work does make a difference. Since some of those things were political, did you have any involvement with the State Department in any of those countries during those examples?

DIJKERMAN: I did. In most cases they deferred to our conclusions. But there were exceptions. When I was first sent to Zambia in early 1980, the USAID Representative had not yet arrived. I thus became the acting Rep. It was a time when there was a food crisis in Zambia. I was called into the Ambassador Frank Wisner’s office, with the Deputy Chief of Mission, Wes Egan, and the Political/Economic Counselor John Blaney. They wanted me to send a cable arguing the food emergency was so dire that the food should be airlifted to Zambia. After a back and forth in the Embassy’s secure facility (where the Ambassador sat quietly), I declined to do so and laid out why my experience

with food aid suggested the airlift idea was a non-starter. The meeting ended. We both went through our respective back channels to Washington. The airlift idea died.

Q: Interesting. Wow, I must say, what an extraordinary first assignment with AID, some great experiences, and the opportunity to work with some great people, especially in your Zambia example. The names you’re citing are well known.

DIJKERMAN: Oh, they’re great people.

Q: They’re really strong people, and obviously you learned a lot in those situations.

So, you were there for two—

DIJKERMAN: I was in REDSO for four years.

While there I met my to-be wife. She decided that she wanted to return to the US and obtain a master’s degree in business (MBA).

Q: Was she working in the region?

DIJKERMAN: She was working in the Catholic Relief Services regional office.

Q: Okay.

DIJKERMAN: I told her that I would go back with her and go to graduate school. I noted that I would apply to only one school because I wanted to be able to leave campus in two

years since her MBA program was a two-year program. I applied to Cornell and received an assistantship for my PhD. My mother was extremely happy. My wife was happy. She got into Cornell business school. We both went to Cornell.

Leave of Absence 1983 - 1985

Q: Did you take a leave of absence from AID, or did you resign?

DIJKERMAN: Well, this is interesting. I told AID that I was going to go back to school. And they said, Okay. So, then, they shipped my stuff back. But I didn't resign, and I never recall requesting a leave of absence. During my first year at Cornell, I received a notice from USAID stating I was on a year's leave of absence, and I had been promoted. A year later, I received another notice that I'd been assigned to Malawi.

I went to Washington and met with Ray Love. At this point, he was the acting Administrator for Africa. I laid out that the school would let me leave after the second year if I passed all my Ph.D. qualifier exams, and I would write my dissertation away from campus. I asked him if he would have quit after his first year at Harvard for his MBA (he had gone there). He asked the USAID Africa Bureau personnel office to extend my leave of absence. As I was finishing up my second year, I had passed the qualifiers and had drafted a proposal for a quantitative PhD focusing on U.S. agriculture. However, my wife told me about Uma Lele, at the World Bank, who was proposing to study the impact of agricultural investment by donors in Africa as compared to their impact on agricultural development in India. I called Uma Lele and suggested I could help. She flew me down to Washington and noted that the six major donors to Africa already had signed on to fund the study, but the US had not. She said if I could get USAID to sign on, I would be hired. I went to the Africa Bureau, and I talked to Gerry Cashin, Jerry Wolgin, Larry Sayers, and others. I suggested that the study was going to happen, and USAID's assistance would be examined with or without their support. If they financially supported the study, then there at least would be someone on the study team (me) who understood USAID and various pressures it operates under. USAID joined the study. And I got more time on my leave of absence.

Q: So, you got another year to do that.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: Were you still in AID—but you then went to work for the bank for a year or so?

DIJKERMAN: I was a contractor for the World Bank, but I was on-leave from AID.

Q: Leave from AID, okay.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. I looked at investments by the USAID in Malawi, Tanzania, and Kenya from 1950 to mid-eighties in four areas - agricultural colleges, agricultural research, seed multiplication, and infrastructure. With everyone's approval, my research became my PhD. Dissertation. At the end of that year, I was offered a full-time job at the World Bank in their research department. I decided I didn't want to become a researcher.

At the same time, John Koehring (the same boss from my intern days) had become the Mission Director in Sudan and selected me to come work for him.

AID/W/Africa Bureau, Office of Development Planning, 1985 - 1987

Before I went to Sudan, I worked in Africa Bureau Development Planning for John Patterson (the same one from Zambia) for several months. I was in Jerry Wolgin's office when John Koehring sent in the Project Identification Document (PID) proposing a seed multiplication project in Sudan. It was passed to me for review. One of the subject areas I looked at in my World Bank work (and dissertation) was the success of seed multiplication projects in Africa, and what were some of the conditions that led to success or failure.

I did a rather lengthy analysis. I concluded that what was being proposed in Sudan faced too many negative features and unknowns to conclude it had even a small chance of working. This caused a little bit of a stir as I did not know that very few PIDs were ever turned down in Washington. We had the first review and then the final review. You might have been around at that point in time.

Q: Yes, I was around, I think so.

DIJKERMAN: Okay. So, after the preliminary PID meeting where I presented a number of unknowns and issues, several other USAID people approached me to fill in some of the gaps. Everything they provided reinforced my arguments. I became more confident that the PID had real issues. And so, at the second and final PID review meeting, it was turned down.

Q: But you weren't on the Sudan staff at this point.

DIJKERMAN: No. I still was working for John Patterson in AFR/DP. It was before I went out to Sudan.

Q: Okay, right.

DIJKERMAN: And again, AFR/DP Director John Patterson was supportive throughout, saying that my analysis should get a hearing.

The cable went back to USAID/Sudan and John Koehring noting the proposal had not been approved. About the same point in time, I was asked if I could put together a policy reform program in Tanzania. It was one of those new policy reform-based instruments. From my World Bank time and work on Tanzania, I called up the minister of transport and proposed a program. If the Government of Tanzania reduced barriers to the movement of goods throughout the country, then USAID would offer Tanzania fifteen million bucks to buy spare parts for all the Caterpillar equipment in the country. The local Caterpillar dealers would pay for the spare parts in local currency, which the Ministry of Transport and USAID would then use to get rural road construction and maintenance going again, including payments to local communities to maintain the roads. We agreed and USAID sent me to Tanzania to design the program. On the way back to Washington, I flew via Sudan to see John Koehring to ask if he still wanted me in Sudan. He said yes.

By the way, the policy reform program for Tanzania received an additional supplement after it was reviewed in Washington. Thereafter, I went out to Sudan.

USAID/Sudan, Economist, 1987 - 1990

Q: This was Sudan shortly after the drought in the early to mid-eighties. There was a drought with huge amounts of aid, including the Live Aid concerts?

DIJKERMAN: Right.

Q: This must have been towards the very end of the AID program in Sudan, right, because I'd forgotten we even still had a program in Sudan at that point.

DIJKERMAN: Oh, at that point the program was huge. We had about eight floors out of eleven in a building.

Q: Really?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. We were still doing a lot of food emergency activities as well as other programs. I was the economist in the program office. Sid Chernoff was my boss. Fritz Gilbert was the deputy and John Koehring was the director. The day I arrived, John Koehring called me into his office with Fritz and directed me to redesign the seed multiplication project with the staff from the Project Design Office. One of my other tasks in the Program Office was to manage the millions in Sudanese currency that had been generated from the sale of commodities brought into Sudan and sold.

Q: Right. And it was mostly an ESF (Economic Support Fund) program, as I recall.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, and interestingly, one of the uses of the local currency was to fund USAID's operating expenses in Sudan. In fact, a majority of our OE (Operating Expenses) budget was financed with Sudanese Pounds given back to us by the Government of Sudan. We had to work on that release every year.

Now, to bring closure to the seed multiplication project. After a year Fritz chaired a meeting on the seed multiplication project. I argued that having been on the ground for a year, I felt no project had a chance of success in the current climate in Sudan. I told them why this idea would not work and that I was not smart enough to figure out how to make it work. The meeting ended (John Koehring was not at the meeting) and a new PID was not developed. I thought that was the end of it. But when I returned from home leave several months later, the deputy program officer, not my boss who was also on leave, transferred several millions of Sudanese pounds to Pioneer Seeds, an American company to do the project. So, it was not in USAID's books.

Q: By the private sector to do it.

DIJKERMAN: By the private sector with the local currency in the joint Sudan-USAID account.

Q: Using local currency, right?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. I found out about it because my Ministry of Finance counterpart called me to report that some millions of Sudanese pounds had been withdrawn and wanted to know why. So, I tracked down what happened. First, it made the USAID relationship with the Ministry of Finance touchy.

Q: Right.

DIJKERMAN: And second, the Pioneer seed project failed in relatively short order.

Q: And so, they didn't coordinate with the ministry at all before shipping, giving the money over.

DIJKERMAN: No.

Q: Wow.

DIJKERMAN: What helped salvage our relationship with the Ministry of Finance was my colleague in USAID, Brian DiSilva. He had very deep personal connections in Sudan. I had also hired a respected Sudanese man from the Ministry of Finance. He had to leave his Sudanese Government position because there was a purge of Coptics. He was a deputy assistant secretary in the Ministry of Finance before they pushed him out. I believe, because of these two colleagues, and other actions we had taken together with the folks in the Ministry of Finance in the past, the Sudanese decided to move past this matter.

Q: Who was the president or prime minister of Sudan then? Was it—

DIJKERMAN: El-Bashir. I think by then, we went through one unsuccessful coup attempt and then a successful one by him.

Q: Okay. But it sounds like you enjoyed working with your Sudanese counterparts.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. They were extremely smart. They were able to compartmentalize political and religious ideologies with what we're trying to do to develop Sudan.

Q: Was the civil war with the south going on?

DIJKERMAN: It had already percolated up.

When I was there the government went into the USAID compound, took our equipment, and killed some of our staff watching the USAID Juba compound.

Q: So, USAID had a compound in Juba.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. We still had road grading equipment and things like that down there. We had about three people, I recall, protecting USAID's assets.

Q: As I recall, AID had done a lot of big infrastructure work in Sudan as well.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: Because years later, I think we must have done something with the railroad because years later the Sudanese ambassador came to see me in Washington. They were looking for spare parts, actually, and at that point we didn't have much of a relationship with the government of Sudan, but it was quite interesting.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, General Electric locomotives.

Q: Yes. So, did you have to do analysis on those programs as well, or were you mostly agriculture?

DIJKERMAN: I did. The two really, really big things that I worked on that one was looking at Jazeera, the big irrigation scheme and how we could make it more responsive to international market forces. Even though it was a controlled economy, there was room to make it more responsive. We worked on that a lot with the World Bank. The other thing that we worked on was looking at increasing the efficiency of the railway system. They had thousands of staff more than they needed to run the railway system. We were trying to figure out with the World Bank how we could make it a little bit more efficient and not have it be such a big loss leader. The politics proved to be too much to overcome.

Q: Did you have much involvement with the embassy during that period you were in Sudan?

DIJKERMAN: Yes, quite a bit. They were very supportive. In one case, we were negotiating a wheat food aid program. I knew that in our Mission we had a couple of government informants on staff. So, when the negotiations started, I asked the Embassy to withhold all cables concerning food aid and our negotiating instruction cables from Washington. Normally, they are classified up to the "Sensitive but Unclassified" level so the Sudanese could see them. I requested that all the cables be withheld, and I would decide which ones to release to C&R, the Mission's correspondence and records people. And so, I and my colleague from USDA, Brian D'Silva, started feeding the two Sudanese staff who were Sudanese informants all the constraints on our negotiating ability. At that point in time the USDA instruction was that we had to receive local currency from the Government of Sudan. Typically, the instruction directs the amount of local currency to be obtained using the official exchange rate. At that time, the Sudanese pound official rate was around two Sudanese pounds per US dollar. If it was a \$10 million program, we were to collect some twenty million Sudanese pounds. That was the bit of information I did not want out there. I went to the US ambassador, James Cheek, with Rich Machmer, USAID Director at the time, with a proposal. The unofficial, black market exchange rate was about twenty-five Sudanese pounds to the dollar. The Minister of Finance was a former banker and a very strong Islamist. He was also quite sharp and quick. The Ambassador proposed that we three meet the Minister at the edge of a meeting and I outline the deal. The US would provide X thousand metric tons of wheat and in return, the Government of Sudan would give the US Y million Sudanese Pounds. The expectation was that he would quickly calculate the implied cost for him. As he also was buying wheat on the international market, we knew he was paying for that wheat at a Sudanese Pound to dollar rate closer to 20 than the official, wholly unrealistic rate of

some two Sudanese Pounds per dollar. Our proposal had a Sudanese Pound to dollar exchange of around 14 Sudanese Pounds per dollar. Standing there, he quickly figured out this was a good deal for him. He turned to his adjunct and directed him then and there to make it happen. We made it happen. The Sudanese informants on our staff did not interfere, as their superiors had blessed the deal. At this time in Sudan with the rapid swing towards fundamentalism, it was not wise to question higher ups, particularly not the Minister of Finance. To sign the final agreement, Brian and I actually went to the building where those in power were cloistered in one of their high-level meetings. With this deal, Washington – which was operating on the official exchange rate -- was very pleased. It amounted to roughly an additional \$6 million in local currency. And a part of that local currency would be used to run the USAID mission, saving USAID operating expense dollars that would not have to be converted at the unrealistic official exchange rate. This action was written up in my annual evaluation, and I think, helped me get promoted.

Q: Right.

DIJKERMAN: The Embassy and USAID had a good relationship in part because Ambassador Cheek and Rick Machmer, who was the Director, had a very good relationship. As a result, we were able to do things like this.

Q: Yeah, that sounds fantastic. So, you were in multiple positions while you were there. You went out at the economist and then you went into the program office and—

DIJKERMAN: Yes. I first went to Sudan as the Mission Economist, then as we were shutting down the Mission, I became the acting program officer and later the acting Deputy.

Q: Yeah, so you were there when it was shutting down.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: What was the trigger to shut it down?

DIJKERMAN: I think that I'm going to get the timing wrong here because around this time things were very tense with Libya, and I think the US shot down several planes. There also was a very large contingent of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) living in Khartoum. Things were just very tense. Actually, I sent my wife and kids back to the States some six months before the decision was made to shut down. It just felt very bad.

I had already been assigned and needed to get to language training. The Director tried to extend me. I did stay for a while longer but left before the evacuation.

Q: Okay. And your onward assignment was to Rwanda, is that correct?

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: But before we leave Sudan, it was closing, but you weren't one of the last people to leave.

DIJKERMAN: No.

Q: Okay. And as I recall, or do you recall, even after we had left, we maintained a small office there that must have been local currency funded and there was a woman who lived there, an American woman who lived in Khartoum.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, Jackie Poole.

Q: Right, so, that was being put in place as part of the departure planning?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. There were a couple of others that were local hires. What was left of USAID was moved into the embassy for security reasons and cost reasons.

Q: Okay. I remember because it was always on the books that there was still this person there and we were in there. I think her presence was quite helpful when AID went back into Sudan years later, which is an interesting model that AID might want to think about when they close and reopen missions.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: Okay. Well, why don't we do Rwanda now, and so, you're leaving Sudan, your family's been evacuated earlier or is gone already. By this time, you have two children, I think.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, we had two kids by then.

Q: And your wife, was she working for Deloitte then still or was she—?

DIJKERMAN: When we first went to Sudan she worked for Deloitte. Deloitte had a correspondent partner in Sudan. She helped them expand their business. She was an “honorary male” so she could go to the parties and sit in the same room with the men. She wound up being hired away by the World Bank.

Q: Right. Just generally on donor coordination, I assume that the British probably had a significant presence there as well, or were there other donors that did? Or was it primarily USAID and the World Bank?

DIJKERMAN: In Sudan, we had a large donor group that met regularly. Because USAID had the technical capacity on-the-ground in Sudan, the group often assigned us tasks. So, when we were having all these food crises and humanitarian crises, we were trying to get the Sudanese government to allow humanitarian assistance to come in at a different exchange rate than the unrealistic official exchange rate. The UN negotiated an agreement in principle with the Sudanese government to a more preferential rate – still not a realistic rate but better than the official rate all the donors and UN were using. So, the UN and donors agreed that USAID, which meant me, would go to the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank to work out the details on how this would work.

Q: Right, because of the donors, we had the most analytic capacity in the field.

DIJKERMAN: Absolutely. And I would say we have a lot of analytical capacity, including very high-quality Sudanese staff.

Q: Yes.

DIJKERMAN: As you know, Brian D'Silva was a great asset. I had a really strong support network of Sudanese behind me to make sure I didn't get snookered.

Q: Yes. It was interesting, before the bank decentralized, which they did a bit over the years, I think AID missions were often sort of an in-country analytic branch of the World Bank. Bank missions used to visit AID offices often to get the latest information.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: Okay. So, you're leaving Sudan. How did Rwanda happen as an assignment? Did you bid on multiple posts or did the bureau kind of say we'd like you to go to Rwanda?

DIJKERMAN: Well, John Patterson, the former Director in Zambia and then Development Planning in Africa Bureau in Washington, was now in the Philippines as a deputy director or associate director and asked me to come to manage what was going to be a new base access agreement program. However, my wife said she wanted to choose where we would go for her career. She chose Rwanda as she had worked there earlier and felt she could get a job with the World Bank to work on privatization. Thus, I bid on Rwanda.

USAID/Rwanda, Program Officer and Acting Mission Director, 1991 - 1994

Q: And so, this was 1991, and so, you were going in as the program officer then.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, Program Office and de facto deputy as there was no formal deputy mission director.

My wife got hired by the Rwandan government to work on the privatization of their telecoms system on a World Bank-funded project. So, it worked out for both of us.

Q: Okay. Good. Talk a little bit about the program. You got there in 1991, just a couple of years before everything fell apart, so what was the focus of the program?

DIJKERMAN: It had three pillars – population, economic development, and democracy and governance. From the money perspective, the biggest part of the program was family planning. As the head of budget in Africa Bureau Development Planning, Jim Govan, used to tell us, Rwanda is not a high political priority so it will get a lot of the money we need to absorb somewhere and not get much of the scarce economic and democracy funds. Rwanda, however, was allocated special funds for the policy change program. I was pulled out of the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) to go to Rwanda and design it before starting my tour.

Q: And who was the mission director then?

DIJKERMAN: Jim Graham. My team lead from earlier when we were both in REDSO/ESA and worked on shutting down the Rwandan parastatal. Shortly thereafter, Jim was assigned to Morocco and Gary Nelson was the next Director.

I went out there, designed, negotiated, and signed the special policy reform program. It was approved in Washington and I returned to FSI.

Q: But by the time you arrived, the tension had already increased?

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: Okay. Could you talk a little bit about the FSN (Foreign Service National) staff that was there? Was it a mix of ethnic backgrounds in the staff or was it sort of representative of the country or was it dominated by one group or another?

DIJKERMAN: It was representative of the country. Most staff would be classified as Hutu, and the minority were the Tutsi. But what was interesting was that the FSNs repeatedly voted in a Tutsi as the FSN representative to mission management.

I often spent time talking in our little cafeteria or taking them for beers after work to try to get a sense of Rwandan history. I wanted to get a sense of why there were tensions beyond what I'd read in books. I describe Rwanda as being like Japan. Everything on the surface looks smooth, but that doesn't mean crazy things aren't going on underneath the water. The longer I was in Rwanda, the tensions became palpable. Stated mildly, there were very strong dislikes stemming from long-held grievances. I remember a lunch one time with the UN peacekeepers. They felt Rwanda was very similar to Kosovo. They said in Kosovo, people they'd talk to were describing injustices and events as if they took place yesterday, but they actually took place fifty, seventy-five, a hundred years ago. These events remained so present in their minds, they were just as angry now as maybe their ancestors were fifty or a hundred years ago. The UN folks described it as if the people weren't living in the present, they weren't seeing the present. Their view captured how Rwanda felt to them and to me. When all Rwandans – Tutsi, Hutu, or mixed -- talked about the injustices, their emotions were like the events had happened yesterday. And their emotions were very strong.

Q: Yes. When you were working on program design and strategy and how programs would operate, did you, as a backdrop to that, were you thinking about the divisions in society and how all of that related to the programs that you were designing? Was it a conscious feature at all in the program?

DIJKERMAN: It was a very conscious feature. It was at a point in time in the Africa bureau where we had "management contracts" between the Bureau and Mission. When we -- Gary Nelson and I -- presented our strategy, we drafted a management contract and asked for more money for democracy and governance programs given the political and societal tensions. We asked for more money for economic growth because we highlighted the seriousness of the economic issues. We had brought out geographers, nowadays you'd call them climatologists and sociologists/anthropologists, to examine Rwanda's situation. The research found that some 70 percent of rural parents, both fathers and mothers and interviewed separately, felt their children could not have a future livelihood on the farm because the remaining plots were too small to subdivide anymore. The kids felt the same

way – they had no future in farming. We had started small business incubators, vocational training programs, partnered with other donors as we felt we had to do something to

address the employment situation because of the sense of hopelessness the lack of job opportunities was creating. Our family planning program was very successful. We were just reaching the demographic inflection point and could see the contraceptive adoption rating zooming upwards. Well, the response to our requests in Washington was muted at best. The Africa Bureau and the Democracy/Governance folks noted economic growth and D/G monies were tight and the dire situation in Rwanda didn't look like the money would lead to success stories. I remember Jerry Wolgin telling me that Missions normally present strategies that outline how "we're going to reach Nirvana at the end of the day." Gary Nelson and I, he continued, had presented a strategy noting the uncertainties about reaching Nirvana given the magnitude of the issues outlined. We told Washington the rivers were running brown because of so much topsoil erosion. We told them we had very high unemployment. We told them that census estimates (we worked with the US Census Bureau on this) suggested serious emigration from Rwanda was already taking place. The data suggested Rwanda was missing some two million people. We told them that Rwanda was a society under tremendous pressure. Gerry Wolgin and Jim Govan raised the view in the Bureau reviews, "Why should we put any money in?" Our final argument was that Rwanda was a fishbowl for Africa and was further along than other countries in facing all these pressures. I recall Gary Nelson concluding, "Don't you want to put money in to see if we can help relieve some of these pressures?" I remember Jerry and Jim Govan citing our honesty, but the Bureau and USAID had to show results. In the end, we were allocated less Democracy/Governance and Economic Growth money.

But the real kicker was that before Gary and I left Washington to return to Rwanda, I was given a heads-up that I was being reassigned – force-placed – immediately to Kazakhstan as the Program Officer. The former Soviet Union states program needed staff, and by implication, Rwanda wasn't that important. According to Barbara Turner, who was senior in that bureau, the Mission Director and Project Officer, whom I had worked with in Uganda and Sudan, respectively, had requested me. I won't tell you who gave me the heads-up.

Q: Right, Craig Buck.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. Craig Buck and Ed Burgles, from Sudan, respectively. Barbara Turner told me it was a done deal. So, I put in writing that, unless the Agency could show me that there was no one else in the agency who also had lived in a state of civil war in Sudan for three years plus another year and a half of civil war in Rwanda, I'd rather stay in Rwanda. I also told them that a close friend of mine, Chevron's finance director managing Kazakhstan, told me that they were not living there because the chemical and radiation levels were so high. Chevron had him and his family based in London and hired Eastern Europeans to work and live there rather than American staff. Another friend of mine at the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) gave me the same advice.

Q: Yes. So, there was a lot of turmoil.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: So, you didn't go, you were staying in Rwanda.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: The plane was shot down, was that April of—

DIJKERMAN: It was April 6th.

Q: April of 1994.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: Carrying the president of the country, right?

DIJKERMAN: Yes, and the President of Burundi, among others. At that time, Gary Nelson had already been “ticked out” of USAID during the period when USAID political leadership decided they wanted to clean house at the senior levels. USAID leadership terminated those who had been on limited career extensions because they had not been promoted.

Q: Right, Gary was not there when it happened; you were acting mission director.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, I had been the acting director of USAID/Rwanda for a while.

Q: Right, because they were not extending time and class.

DIJKERMAN: Right. Also, the person who had been assigned as Director to Rwanda didn't want to come. I don't know why.

Q: Okay. So, it was a relatively small mission in terms of the number of Americans, is that correct? There were eight, ten, twelve.

DIJKERMAN: There were nine Direct Hire Americans and a Centers for Disease Control member on the Mission rolls plus all the FSNs, and then all our contractors and NGO partners.

Q: Okay. So, you're acting mission director, the plane goes down in the evening, as I recall.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: Can you walk us through what happened? Were you notified right away or what happened at post?

DIJKERMAN: Well, yes. Well, let me take a half step back.

Q: Okay.

DIJKERMAN: Things were tremendously tense. My wife had previously organized a trip for the dependents to go to Nairobi for a week and blow off steam then come back. And prior to the plane going down my wife again went to Nairobi with my son. She was out of town, and I had my daughter with me. Things had been so tense that the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, and I got together and drew straws right around Easter time to see who could go away for the weekend and decompress. The DCM and I got the straw to go out of town. Several of us went into the DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the DCM went down to Burundi. The Ambassador, Ed Rawson, stayed home. Before I left, I gave him a cable for him to approve and send. It basically laid out the case for the Africa bureau to deallocate funds from Rwanda. Our ability to implement anything has slowed to almost a stop. All our partners -- including Government of Rwanda counterparts -- and implementers were telling us that things were not going well.

Contractors were leaving with their families, and so forth. Around this time, the African Bureau had allocated us another tranche of Economic Support Fund money for another policy reform program. This was to be a follow-on to the one I had designed earlier, which had been judged by Washington as successful. My Rwandan counterparts in the ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs advised me to cancel the follow-on program discussions as no policy reform program would work in the current political climate. I had already turned that money back to the Bureau. The cable now argued that the Africa Bureau should reallocate our annual budget elsewhere because the money we had on hand would last us another 40-plus months given our reduced rate of program implementation. The entire program was grinding to a standstill.

Q: Everything was slowing down, okay.

DIJKERMAN: So, I wrote this cable, gave it to him and I went on leave. Before I left, he called me saying he had already agreed to give back the policy reform money, but that he would sit on this cable until I returned and met. That cable was never sent because the plane got shot down before we met.

Q: So, it was, there were no surprises when it happened?

DIJKERMAN: Oh, there were still very many surprises to come. There was no surprise from our perspective that our program was collapsing. Every political party was trying to use their ministry as a piggy bank for their purposes. Everything totally jammed up.

Months later, back in Washington I was told that because the US Embassy in Rwanda did not have the high level, secure communications equipment, all the other things that other folks were seeing back in Washington, at the United Nations or in our Department of Defense were not shared. We reported things to Washington, but never received feedback. I remember the World Bank asked me to be on one of their analytical teams and we did a budget review. I found evidence of Rwandan Government imports from Egypt that were way out of proportion to need, like 30,000 machetes, and bills for Rwandan military planes flying up to Egypt, and other items. I raised that up to the Ambassador to raise with Washington, but all that information disappeared in the ether.

We knew things were very bad. Heck, we as the Embassy emergency action committee closed down the Peace Corps program and sent all the volunteers home. Nevertheless, one of us had a clue that there was going to be a “genocide.” I recall the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa stating later that none of us had previous experience with two presidents being killed at once and a genocide, so it was difficult to say with certainty that it was coming. Knowing things are very bad and making program adjustments, like closing Peace Corps, letting contractors leave early, and giving money back to Washington, and knowing a genocide is about to happen are two very different things.

Q: I mean, the fact when you said you went over for Easter. You went down to Goma over to the Congo.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: So, you presumably did that by road, and so you felt secure enough in the country that you could do that.

DIJKERMAN: We did that by road. Our group, however, included the head of the American School (I was the chairman of the board of the American School), who grew up in Goma and spoke the local dialects language as well as one of my project managers, who also grew up around Goma where his father was a missionary. Finally, we had a nanny with us whose brother was a bigwig central government figure in Goma. Yes, things were tense. We had to talk our way across the border, but we felt we had connections and language. Talks with the Border guards established our bona fide and we got in and out with minimal disruption.

Q: Right, okay. So, were you back in the country when the airplane went down or were you—

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: Okay. So, it was right after Easter; then, that the—

DIJKERMAN: Right, it happened, I think, on a Tuesday, so we got back like Monday, Monday night. I hadn’t talked to the Ambassador yet about the cable before all hell broke loose.

Q: Right. So, were you notified after the plane went down that this had happened and were you all put on alert ?

DIJKERMAN: For the first number of hours while the telephone connections still worked. We were able to talk to one another. I also was able to call my wife in Nairobi and told her I don’t know what all happened here, but it’s not good here. If we lose touch, I would meet her and my son at our house in Pennsylvania.

Q: Okay.

DIJKERMAN: That was always our plan, if we get separated, we’ll just make our way out and we’ll meet in Pennsylvania.

Q: When did the evacuation happen, when did you get the order? The plane went down at night and then—

DIJKERMAN: The plane went down at night. We had one American communications officer who got to the Embassy and stayed there. Each house had a generator, which we would run a little bit during the day so as not to attract too much attention. Both the electricity and phone lines went down early on. Until they went down, I was calling several of my Foreign National Staff (FSN) to find out what was happening at their locations. From very early on, most of the phones were not being answered.

We benefited from the fact that Rwandans seemed to believe that all Americans had guns. They were not seeking us out. I kid you not. They think we're all gun happy toting people. My Zairean neighbor was drawn out and killed in the street. I had people coming over the fence at night all shot up and bandaged. I gave them medical supplies and sent them on their way.

Q: That night, the night that the plane went down.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, and the following days and nights.

Q: But you knew all hell was breaking loose.

DIJKERMAN: All hell was breaking loose.

There was a Rwandan military guy, probably about 400, 500 yards on one side of us, and there was a religious vocational school on the other side of my house. The RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) used that as a base to fire at a Rwandan military guy's house. Our house was partially in the crossfire. We had bullets fly over the house and come through the windows until the Rwandan military guy's house went silent. I put my daughter downstairs in our basement on a mattress.

We would communicate on the radio about what was going on. And then, I would talk with the Ambassador. Later we learned that the DCM was in that hostage situation with our regional refugee coordinator from Nairobi, Linda Thomas-Greenfield. They thought she was the Rwandan vice president and were close to killing her before they figured out they were Americans.

Q: I never heard that.

DIJKERMAN: Oh yes. Linda Thomas-Greenfield had a rough time in Rwanda. The Ambassador, Embassy communicator, and others would talk in relay with the Department of Defense's European Command, UCOMM, which had responsibility for Africa in those days. In this relay fashion, we talked about what to do. And since our communications equipment was not up to standard, the conversations were kind of stilted. We collectively concluded that we couldn't go out through the airport due to the heavy fighting there. We decided to drive south to Burundi. Through our radio network, I received information from my contractors in Butare, which is the largest city down south, that the road was open. Our military then conveyed that going south was a good idea, but that we should leave soon as it looked like things might not stay that way.

Q: Yeah.

DIJKERMAN: We got the message and organized three convoys. I gave my daughter and dog to some very close friends. I organized the first convoy and put my Agricultural Officer in-charge of leading it. Then I went to the USAID Mission.

Q: And this was sort of on Tuesday or Wednesday by this time?

DIJKERMAN: Probably Friday, but I am not sure.

I radioed my Executive Officer and said we had to get the personnel files, other key documents, and lock the Mission down the best we can. He lived just one street down from the office. He came up. I had to go all the way across town. To do so, I put a big American flag on the top of my car. I had to go through multiple barriers to get to the office building. I still have the flag and it still gets me emotional when I see it.

I got through. In French, I noted that I was an American. I probably developed a Southern accent to really emphasize how much of an American I was.

Q: (Laughs)

DIJKERMAN: I was not a comfortable puppy but looking back I do not recall thinking twice about going to the office. We got to the office building. We took all the distributor caps off the cars; we took all the keys. We loaded up the lease and personnel files and put them in my car. I burned other documents I thought might be useful to someone seeking to identify who worked at USAID.

Q: Yeah.

DIJKERMAN: At that point, I didn't know that we had one staff member who was one of the organizers of the genocide.

Then I went to the American Club where I worked with the Embassy to drive around town with a missionary to pick up other Rwandans with US Passports and other American missionary people who were scattered around Kigali. These folks had no other way of getting to the rendezvous point. That was not particularly pleasant either. As others were listening on the American radio channels, other nationalities also showed up at the American Club. When it was time to go to Burundi, I led the convoy with a Rwandan military officer that the Embassy had organized to help get us to the edge of town. I led multi-car, multinational convey through the roadblocks, explaining to the people at the roadblocks, who were civilians with guns, hand grenades, etc., that I had Rwandans in my convoy, but because they were parents of Rwandan children who were born in the U.S., they were Americans under my protection. I also told them I had the authority of the acting Rwandan president and military. The military guy in my car never said a word and only looked straight forward. I also had several German and Belgians who had married Rwandans in the convoy. I'd explain at the roadblocks that X Rwandan woman must come because her husband's German and she's now German. I dropped the military guy off at the edge of town and left.

Q: Right, right.

DIJKERMAN: So, yeah, so we got out of town. And we got, we made it down toward Burundi. That's a whole other fiasco story, but we got there.

Q: Were you able to communicate with the FSN staff at all, or how did that work?

DIJKERMAN: My ability to communicate with the FSN staff died the moment the telephone system died. I had talked to a couple of FSN staff who said they knew that a couple of others had been killed already. We lost total communication because the phone systems were down. The FSNs did not have radios.

Q: Right, so there was no way to be in touch?

DIJKERMAN: No. The US military attaché from Nairobi was in Kigali when the plane was shot down. He was the negotiator between the Rwandan government -- the new government because the president was on the plane that was shot down -- and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The negotiated settlement was that we could leave, but no Rwandans could leave with us, period. The exception we received was if they're U.S. citizens or their children were U.S. citizens, they could come out with us.

Q: So, you went south, you went into Burundi. Is that where you ended up?

DIJKERMAN: We did.

Q: Then you went on to Bujumbura and—

DIJKERMAN: Well on the way down we met the U.S. security officer from Embassy Bujumbura. He told us that the border was closed and told us to find a place to stay for the night. I had about fifty-plus cars with three to four people per car. Some of the missionaries came up and told me they had a compound about ten kilometers off the road, some about twenty kilometers before the border. They said we could go there and circle the cars. I agreed. When we get there, the compound is filled with banana trees and no fencing or anything. You couldn't even see from one side to the other. I couldn't see all the vehicles with me. I concluded this was an absolute mess up. There was no way to make it secure. Then, a German came up to me and said he heard on his shortwave radio that the other American convoy that left before us was still at the border being processed. So, I decided we were going for the border after all. It was dark, but we left for the border.

After about five minutes, I went around a corner and two of my tires popped. Villagers had put out spikes that popped my tires and blocked the convoy. They thought we were there to kill them or whatever. I spoke to them, saying I had the authority of the president and so forth. I basically built on a tactic that rural Rwandans are quite fearful of the government. I pulled the village chief to me, opened the car door and I said, "Get in the car, all of you get in the car, I'm going to drive you down to the border so you can see that I have the authority to be here, these are all my people, you can't touch them. You're going to find out that you're dead wrong. The village leaders, there were about six or eight of them, huddled and decided to let us go. As I had two flat tires, they also helped

push my vehicle to the side of the road. I told the car behind me to lead the convoy to the border. As the cars were passing by one driver informed me a car broke down back a way. I asked the villagers to get the tires off that car and put them on mine. They and the car's occupants helped change the tires. By then our convoy had been gone for a while. I decided to follow the convoy rather than lead them to pick up any other stragglers. I hadn't thought about that possibility earlier.

At the border, which was still open, still slowly processing folks from the earlier convoy. I did my "authority" routine again, stating it was too late and we'd send back the information later. I made sure everyone went through the border post and then stayed at the back of the convoy again. As we were approaching Bujumbura, we were fired upon, and the convoy stopped. My lead car had radioed me to tell me what was going on. As I went to the front of the convoy, several UN forces came up the road. It turned out, they had fired at the rebels in Burundi to clear the road. They had received a request from U.S. European Command (UCOMM) to meet us and escort us to Bujumbura. UCOMM had taken over part of the airport and were to fly us out tomorrow. The UN then escorted us to town. We put most of the people at a couple of hotels. I worked with USAID Burundi Director Myron Golden and Embassy staff to figure out the details. The Embassy there had done a lot of good prep work for our arrival. We met everybody in the hotel lobby, we signed over all their vehicles and went to the airport. We were flown to Nairobi.

Q: And they had a military plane that came in to take you out?

DIJKERMAN: Yes, UCOMM took over a section of the airport, but had no authority from the Burundians to leave the airport – hence the UN peacekeepers meeting us on the road. They flew us out on the big U.S. military cargo planes and did so with our pets.

Q: With the pets.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. We had negotiated that with UCOMM before our departure from Kigali.

Q: And where did you fly to?

DIJKERMAN: Nairobi.

Q: So, you then connected with your wife and son in Nairobi.

DIJKERMAN: In Nairobi, yes. She was in Nairobi working with the U.S. military, USAID, and Embassy teams there. Earlier, the idea was they would fly out to Kigali and pick people up at their houses. She told them their maps were out of date, that X was not a road but a dirt path, and so forth. Art Fell, the Deputy of REDSO/ESA brought her to these planning meetings. From these discussions plus the other info collected by other means resulted in the recommendation that we evacuate by road to Burundi.

Q: How long did you stay in Nairobi? And then, you all evacuated to the U.S., is that correct?

DIJKERMAN: We were in Nairobi maybe two, three days, and then we flew back to the U.S.

Q: Then that was on commercial aircraft?

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: Okay. And so, everyone was evacuated and all the program implementers and all that, the contractors and everyone?

DIJKERMAN: All the program implementers that wanted to leave, left. Some of our program implementers were missionaries and they decided to stay. It was their choice. But all our non-missionary program implementers had come out with us. All the other nationalities had the same deal to fly to Nairobi if they wanted, they just had to pay for it.

Q: Okay.

DIJKERMAN: None were FSN, either from USAID or the Embassy.

Q: So, you all evacuated. You ultimately come back to Washington. Did you retain your identity as a mission operating out of Washington or did everyone begin to disband? I mean, how did that work?

DIJKERMAN: I don't recall who suggested it, but I retained all the authorities as the Mission Director and set up our mission in exile in another State Department building – to maintain a degree of physical separation from the Africa Bureau. I continued to sign documents and launched the process to shut and/or modify projects. We started contacting the embassies in the region, started raising money and sending it out to our staff when they came in. We continued to operate as a mission until I rotated to my next assignment.

I think that worked well.

Q: Right.

DIJKERMAN: My counterpart in your office, because you were the Acting Assistant Administrator for Africa, was Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa Gary Bombardier. He was the former Hill staffer who helped support the Development Fund for Africa.

Q: Yeah, he was the DAA for East Africa. So, you said on—did FSN staff, did they begin to get in touch with the mission in exile and how did that work, how did that happen?

DIJKERMAN: Before USAID went back into Rwanda, the FSNs who got out of Rwanda to Uganda and Burundi contacted embassies and the AID missions, who put them in contact with us. We organized for them to get paid their USAID salaries through the USAID offices there and sent extra funds we collected amongst ourselves.

Q: Okay. So, you were doing all that. And then, closing down projects as well. I believe I vaguely recall that you were asked to also write up some pieces. I think Brian Atwood maybe asked you to do some introspective thinking about the program. Was that correct?

DIJKERMAN: Well, he called a big meeting with me, with Larry Garber, and I brought some other mission folks as well. I didn't write up anything. I wrote memos and I basically kept every document in a master notebook. I kept a copy and still have it. I also was the lead interface with the NSC (National Security Council) and Department of Defense on the Rwanda response operations. That's where I got to know Susan Rice.

Q: Yeah, right.

DIJKERMAN: She was a junior officer and Don Steinburg was the head of Africa at the National Security Council at that point.

We started, like you see nowadays for emergencies, one-page summaries of all the things we're doing and who's doing what, contact points, etc. I started those for Rwanda. We—the Mission—would update them every two days before every meeting.

We'd have every agency's contact point and phone number on the bottom. In this way, all felt their equities were being presented and protected. If any questions arose, one could go right to the source. We as the mission in exile did a lot of this type of backstopping. I sat in on the meetings with the Department of State, Department of Defense, UN, and several others as we all worked to figure out what to do next.

Q: Right, because then it became a massive humanitarian effort for the people who'd fled Rwanda then.

DIJKERMAN: Right.

We closed several projects, like the democracy and governance project with the World Resources Institute, WRI. For a few projects that were more economically oriented or health oriented, we rewrote the terms of the contract or grant to allow them to work in the refugee camps as the camps were not in Rwanda. We gave them the authorization to do that if they wanted to do so. Most took us up on the offer.

Q: Yeah, okay, okay. So, you were attending NSC meetings. I know that it was very controversial about if and when the word "genocide" would be used. Do you recall discussions about that?

DIJKERMAN: Brian used the word at American University (AU). He did not ask for my opinion, nor if I recall, ask anyone in the Administration for permission to say "genocide" at AU.

Q: I think he was the first to use the word, I believe.

DIJKERMAN: As I was the point person for the mission in exile, I was shown a lot of materials. Later they came back and said I shouldn't have seen them because I did not have the right level of security clearance. It did give me a glimpse of how much more information was out there than we in Rwanda knew about.

Q: Yeah, right.

DIJKERMAN: As an interesting side note, later I taught at the National War College and one of my students was the Rwandan colonel who was the interface between General Dallaire head of UN Peacekeeping Operation in Rwanda and leader of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and now-President Paul Kagame.

I also had two other US military guys in my classes, one who went into Rwanda before USAID went back in. The other guy had been tasked by the US Army Rangers to study the dynamics of the information flows that were or were not available in Washington and the field. These three individuals filled in a lot for me about how much we in the field did not know about what was going on but was known in Washington and at the United Nations. The lack of action by those in Washington and New York who had much more information than we in the field reveals that those with more information did not see the genocide coming either. I note that because we who were in Rwanda at the time have often been accused of being blind to what was happening. We knew there were serious issues and we reported all we saw to Washington. No one that I am aware of predicted the genocide and raised the warning up the flagpole.

Q: Right. I know that there also were some controversies and Bob Gersony had gone in. That may have been before. Had he gone in before the genocide?

DIJKERMAN: I don't believe so, but I am not sure.

Q: He was looking at the tensions that were between the forces coming down from Uganda and in Rwanda itself. But he had raised concerns about human rights abuses on the other side of the table as well. Were you involved in any of the discussions about that, which I know became very controversial within the government as well?

DIJKERMAN: When we did our strategy, we brought out two other political scientists who had specialized in Rwanda. They both identified the tensions and their deep-seated roots. I remember a meeting with the American community, the Ambassador before David Rawson. This was a year-plus before the genocide started. A person got up and stated that both sides are doing very bad things and the French were really enabling this government. She wanted to know why the US wasn't calling the French out for their enabling actions that were making tensions worse. The Ambassador very simply stated that the US relationship with France was much more important than what's happening here in Rwanda. Hence, there was no criticism of France's actions.

And pretty much, I remember the town hall conversation ending there. When the next Ambassador, David Rawson, came in, he would take me to meetings with government officials. He was more aggressive in stating our concerns. In fact, he even told me he was borderline exceeding his authority. Nevertheless, both of us left all the meetings with the feeling that we did not make any dent in their views or positions.

Q: Yeah.

DIJKERMAN: The Rwandans were on another planet. The Rwandans met with us out of courtesy. We did not know the full extent of the path they were on.

Q: Well, a tragic situation to have lived through and to have been an important part of.

How long was the mission in exile? I went on a trip just as the mission was reopening. Tony Lake made a trip to and stopped in Kigali, and I was an AID person on the trip, and we went by the office and there were a couple of people who were there starting to re-open it.

DIJKERMAN: I left being the Mission Director in exile after September.

Q: Yes, I think my visit may have been in October. DIJKERMAN: Yeah, because I rotated off in late-September. *Q: Okay.*

DIJKERMAN: Yes, and I went to the Asia Near East bureau to become the Director of Strategic Planning and Analysis. USAID was merging the Asia and Near East Bureaus, and I was tasked with combining four offices – two strategic planning and two technical offices from the two bureaus – into one new office.

Q: I remember we made a decision in the Africa bureau to combine the Burundi and Rwanda missions and have Myron Goldman be the mission director for both and go back and forth. It didn't work, so I'm hoping you forewarned us that it was a bad idea. Did we discuss that with you at all before?

DIJKERMAN: No, that all happened after I had left. I'd heard about it. My personal philosophy has long been that when you change jobs, you leave the last one behind. The people now responsible must make decisions and don't need any second guessing from those who recently left—unless one is asked back or asked for their opinion.

Q: (Laughs) Right.

DIJKERMAN: I stayed away and was very absorbed with the other task Administrator Brian Atwood put me in charge of -- developing a new strategy system that all the bureaus in AID would use. Up until that point, bureaus could do what they wanted. The Asia Bureau had no system at all, leaving it to the discretion of its Mission Directors.

Q: Right, we won't go into that yet, I think. I'm just wondering if there are any final thoughts on the Rwanda experience and then maybe we can close up for today.

DIJKERMAN: Well, after the genocide, some of our Rwanda staff started an orphans' fund with the embassy. I've met with the daughter of the Rwandan program officer here in Phoenix. I had a long, long lunch with them, talking about their father and things like that. I still don't know what I could have done it differently – supporting the FSNs at the start of the genocide.

Q: Yeah, right.

DIJKERMAN: It was made absolutely clear to us that the negotiated settlement between the US point person, the Rwandan government and Kagame's folks that only Americans and other foreigners could leave town. I do not know if the issue of our or the Embassy FSNs were part of the negotiations but given the clear message that no Rwandans could come out with our conveys. I suspect it was part of the discussions.

But I think a few of the FSNs probably harbor anger and disappointment that we left them behind.

So, to this day, I'm not sure what I or the Ambassador or Embassy could have done differently.

Q: Right.

DIJKERMAN: It was a busy time. I feel like I probably didn't sleep for three or four days with all the communications and various other happenings. For example, at night people came into the yard. So, I'm not going to say I was the clearest thinker in the world.

Q: Right. No, and many of them, when the mission reopened, did return to the office, including Bonaventure Niyibizi whose oral history interview I did. You know, he ended up as a minister in the new government, did he not?

DIJKERMAN: Yes, I wrote Bonaventure's letter of recommendation to President Kagame in English. Once Bonaventure escaped with his family to Uganda, we regained contact. As I had met Kagame at a couple of meetings around Africa, I thought it might help. I don't know if it did, but he got the job. I'm literally godfather to his oldest son, who's now in Dallas, and we still get together. I also sponsored him and his family for US citizenship. They're now on that path.

Q: Bonaventure's? Not Kagame.

DIJKERMAN: No, no, not Kagame, Bonaventure.

Q: Right, I knew that Bonaventure had a son in Dallas. Oh, that's great, that's wonderful. I'd urge anyone reading your oral history to read Bonaventure's as well because he makes, I think, some important recommendations. He also understood the complexity and the difficulties of the situation.

DIJKERMAN: I remember when we were in our mission in exile in Washington, somebody from Kigali called to convey, "We got him. We killed Bonaventure and his entire family."

Q: Wow.

DIJKERMAN: Obviously and luckily that didn't happen. There was animosity there, and frankly, that animosity continues until today. Bonaventure has received direct threats (e.g., "we killed your mother, and we'll get you" right after the killers confessed and were forgiven in one the Rwandan traditional Gacaca courts.) It is one of the reasons I sponsored him and his family for citizenship.

And then, our health FSN guy was on the list of fifty most wanted for organizing and executing the genocide. He escaped to Congo-Brazzaville.

Q: And is he still there?

DIJKERMAN: He's now off the map somewhere, but periodically contacts our USDH Health Officer at the time, Bill Martin.

Q: Well, a difficult experience, but obviously one that profoundly affected a lot of people. I'm going to suggest we stop for now. I'm going to turn the recording—

Q: Good Morning. This is December 15, 2022, and this is interview number two with Dirk Dijkerman.

So, Dirk, when we last spoke, we were finishing up the discussion of Rwanda. We'd covered the program, evacuation, and then the work that was being done in

Washington with the mission in exile. And you were then asked, I believe, to head off to the Asia Near East bureau. Was this on your initiative or?

AID/W, Asia NearEast Bureau, Office Director and DAA, 1994 - 1998

DIJKERMAN: No, they approached me. My wife and I decided that we didn't want to go overseas right away again given that we had spent three years with civil unrest and coups in Sudan and then Rwanda. We had enough stress as a family. We decided that we wanted to stay in the States for a rotation. AFR/DAA Gary Bombardier asked if I wanted to go to West Africa and work with Fritz Gilbert in the regional office. I declined. I was still working on Rwanda as the Mission Director in exile, so I didn't think about my next assignment as we were closing and redirecting projects and taking part in the interagency meetings. Then I was approached by Sidney Chernenkoff and Lee Ann Ross, both of whom I worked for and with. Sid was now an office director in the Southeast Asia Bureau and Lee Ann was a deputy office director in another one. They told me that Asia and Near East Bureaus were being merged and they were looking for someone to head up the new combined Development Planning and Technical Support Office -- combining four offices into one. They had proposed me to their front office as a candidate and asked if I would be willing to be interviewed by the Assistant Administrator (AA). Sid said he'd like to work with me again and Lee Ann said she would become head of the technical staff division in the new office if I came. So, I said why not try. The AA Margaret Carpenter, and Deputy AAs Linda Morse and George Laudato interviewed me.

Q: And just for the record, Margaret Carpenter was the assistant administrator and Linda Morris was the deputy assistant administrator.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, yes, that's right, right. The three of them talked to me. And they had an agenda for me. They said, "We don't have any common procedures in the bureau. We have no standard way of doing a strategy, we are an extremely decentralized bureau, and we want to start getting some structure around what people are doing and how we're budgeting," et cetera. "So, if you come, we want you to start figuring out how to get some structure around what's going on because we have some missions that have strategies, other missions don't." We want you to come up with a structure for the bureau.

Q: Some of the countries had substantial ESF money and others were DA funded, did that add to the complexity of not having strategies and not having common programs, do you think?

DIJKERMAN: No. They characterized it as just more the cultural behavior of the bureaus. Like the Latin America bureau has a culture, as you know, Terry Brown, when he was in Latin America, he developed a strategy development process to have consistent way of Missions putting together strategies, reviewing them, funding them, and so forth. The Africa bureau had its process. The E&E bureau had everything controlled in Washington by the special coordinator. The Asia and Near East bureaus were just two very big separate entities with separate cultures. They felt there was no way of getting a handle on everything without a structure enabling a coherent picture of what the new bureau was working towards.

Q: Okay.

DIJKERMAN: So, I started as director of the strategy, project and technical services office. I first met Frank Young, who was the new head of budget in the Bureau. He'd come out of Bangladesh. He and I started working on a way of coming up with a structure for doing strategies, reviewing them, and funding them. Quite quickly, we started having our staff work together. We decided to have them review the strategies, and funding requests together, and make joint recommendations to Frank and I. As this started, we realized we needed the Bureau Human Resources folks involved at the outset as well. So, we brought in the HR office director, Roberta Gray, into all our discussions. We three worked as one - as we propose decisions on program funding, it will also be directly linked to staffing and the operating expense budget (OE). It was a threefold decision merged into one. It was no longer sequential or separate. We were all working together on that.

Q: And you would have had part of that budget allocation process dealing with the central earmarks that the agency received.

DIJKERMAN: Absolutely.

Q: And making sure the earmarks and strategy matched up.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, the big thing people told us was different was having the HR, budget, and technical staff working together. We encouraged our three staffs to identify opportunities to work across sectors to look at a multi-sector approach and propose the least disruptive ways to absorb earmarks. We were trying to break down the stovepipes. We also invited the Global Bureau to attend our meetings so we could link up with their efforts. The head of the Global Bureau and Deputy Assistant Administrator said we were the only ones inviting them in early in the process.

Q: Ann Van Dusen.

DIJKERMAN: Ann Van Dusen, yes, was the Deputy. I think William Colby's wife was the AA at the time.

Q: Sally Shelton.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. So that's how we started doing the program development strategy review and budget and staff and OE allocation process. It was all kind of integrated and people could kind of see that. We had the technical people making the arguments on behalf of the missions, how they saw the missions fitting together, how they saw the sectors fitting together within the mission strategy and what results might be able to be achieved. We had the urban development people working with the environmental people, proposing how we can pool these two sources of funds and earmarks together to have an impact on the greening of the cities and reducing electric demand, et cetera. We liked it.

After finishing up the budget process and making the final presentations to Administrator Brian Atwood and Assistant Administrator for Resources, Larry Byrne, Brian summed it up by saying they were very pleased how we integrated everything but unfortunately didn't have flexibility to reward us very much for what we'd done.

What happened next was Brian Atwood and Larry said they wanted to have a common strategic planning process, budgeting, staffing and performance process across the agency." I was tasked to head up the Agency's strategic planning working group.

Q: Was that part of the broader reengineering effort that Larry Byrne launched with Brian?

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Other people were put in charge of the "R4" process (results reporting and resource request document). Brian and Larry said they wanted me to take the principles that we'd developed in the Bureau and develop a strategic planning process for the agency as a whole. I go, "Oh, great."

Q: You're making friends.

DIJKERMAN: Yeah, not. We worked towards that end. I say that "worked towards" because to the extent that we could integrate staffing and resources and OE and budget allocation was basically blocked by Larry Byrne. He wasn't going to give up his control over the Management Bureau and all his levers of power. So, we focused where we could on how we could come up with a more streamlined way of putting together strategies. For one, shorter documents. Some missions had 700-page strategies. In coming up with our proposal, I drew in folks from different regions. Michelle Adams-Matteson came over from the Africa Bureau. She was fantastic. We got our strategy process approved. Then the agency also started implementing that thing called the R4.

Q: And that was reporting on budget requests and reporting results?

DIJKERMAN: The "R4" was the Results Reporting and Resource Request. On the strategy side, we focused the process on defining and linking strategic objectives with the resource requests. We didn't focus on how the budget request and results reporting and reviews would all come together. We talked to that team, but it was the separate Agency team which had the responsibility of pulling the R4 together. Around that time, Linda

Morris, who was the DAA, went out to India as Director. Margaret Carpenter and Brian Atwood made me the DAA to replace her. I kept working on the strategy stuff.

Q: Right, so you continued working on this but from a perch further up?

DIJKERMAN: From a higher perch. And I think at some point in time Margaret Carpenter and George Laudato both left. Then Terry Brown came in as one of the DAAs, and the lawyer who was in, who now lives in Southern France who was one of my predecessors at OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development).

Q: Kelly Kammerer.

DIJKERMAN: Kelly Kammerer, right. Kelly became the acting AA. And so, we worked together for a while. As the Agency was going through the first cycle of strategies and R4s, I remember the R4 process was turning into an absolute mess. I remember one R4 from Latin America came in with something like 800 pages and hundreds of indicators. It was beyond ridiculous and totally unwieldy. In contrast, when we developed the Agency strategy guidance, we had a page constraint—30 pages only.

AID/W, Policy, Program and Coordination Bureau, DAA, 1999 - 2000

Then, I don't know what happened first or second, but I woke up one day and Brian Atwood had transferred me to become the DAA in PCC.

Q: PPC was Policy, Planning and Coordination Bureau.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. There was little central policy, planning and coordination and Brian had just brought in somebody from the outside, Tom Fox, to head it up.

Larry Garber was the other DAA in PPC. So, when he transferred me over, he said, "Okay, congratulations, Dirk. You're going to PPC." I remember this quite clearly because the senior management review group had made the proposal that I go to long-term training at the State Department.

Q: Probably the Senior Seminar probably.

DIJKERMAN: Yeah, right. I was at the Senior Management Group meeting representing the Asia and Near East Bureau, and they were making their recommendations to Brian. When it came to me, Brian said, "Well, it's not going to happen. Dirk already has a PhD; he doesn't need to go. In fact, he's going to PPC." That's when I found out. He finished by saying my top priority was to fix the R4 process.

Q: To clean it up.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, and also to work on the poor relationship the Agency had on the budgeting and appropriations process with the Hill, particularly Charlie Flickner, Head Clerk for the House Appropriations Committee on Foreign Aid. After assembling an interagency team, we came up with a revised R4 process. What I proposed was a much shorter R4 where each mission could only have two pages per Strategic Objective. The additional new feature was that those two pages would form the basis of the resource

request for a country in the annual Congressional Presentation (CP). By linking the R4 and CP work, we would reduce the effort to create the Congressional Presentation. I had spent much time on the Hill working this out with the House Appropriations Committee, preparing samples drafted by regional bureau staff, getting Hill feedback on what would work for them (and us), etc.

As you can imagine, I was more than moderately unpopular with the technical folks who said it was impossible to write up the annual results for a strategic objective in two pages. My argument back to Brian, when he called me into his office with the other AAs, was, “The last time I checked, every time I must draft a decision memo for the President of the United States, I’m limited to two pages, ten pitch courier (a big print), and somehow, we’re always able to do it. The R4 should be an exercise of focusing in on the essentials. People can’t process much information. When one gets 600 pages, one is overwhelmed and probably won’t read it. So, Brian stuck with my recommendation. We launched the revised R4 process. What Missions sent it for each strategic objective became the basis for the Congressional Presentation, edited by the changes decided in Washington (in consultation with the missions). I negotiated this all with Charlie Flickner on the House side. He was the ranking clerk for the House Appropriations Committee. On the Senate side it was a lady who’s, I forget the name, but she’s the Senate—

Q: Robin Cleveland?

DIJKERMAN: Yes, Robin Cleveland. She deferred to Charlie (“Whatever Charlie says, I’m going to accept.”). I also dealt with Mark Kirk, who worked under Charlie and who later became a senator.

And a couple others that were part of the core negotiating group for their side. And I think every now and then maybe some of the Senate staffers came in. I basically would go up there with notebooks containing the drafts, we’d go through them, they’d make suggestions, I would note them down, I said I’d take them back. We’d work it through and then I would record all the changes that we’d agreed, and I would send them an email about it, and then I would put all that stuff in the notebook for our next meeting. And so, that process went on within the agency and outside until we reached an agreement.

We sent up the revised congressional presentation based on this new R4 results reporting format and budgeting request format. I remember clearly, I was at FEI (Federal Executive Institute) when I got a call one morning from Brian Atwood, Jill Buckley, Tom Fox and a number of other people, saying that Congressman Jim Kolbe called about the budget presentation and was raising issues. I forget exactly what it was, but they called me to ask what we should do. I said, “Tell Kolbe thank you very much for his comments, and that we have been consulting very closely with his staff over the last several months. The staff all have notebooks with all the details in them, all the agreements we reached, all the accommodations we worked through, and we’ll continue to work with them to keep this process moving. We appreciate having been able to work together on this new process.” I assume Brian called Kolbey back because shortly thereafter, Kolbe released the budget. It was the quickest release of the budget and specific holds on the appropriation allocations in many years. It normally takes five-seven months to get it all released.

So, that was my first year and a half in PPC. And then, Brian Atwood left and then J. Brady Anderson came in as Administrator.

Another task that I was responsible for was producing the first Agency-wide performance report under the Government Performance and Results Act, GPRA. I assembled the team within PPC and representatives in the other bureaus. I remember being called in by J. Brady Anderson's chief-of-staff. She said, "Look, we don't want USAID to come in number one and we don't want to come in as number twenty-one." There were twenty-one agencies and departments that had to produce a GPRA report for the first time. So, I stressed to the people who were doing the work, "just put it out there like it is... we're not going to put lipstick on a pig... if it's a pig, so be it... development is not easy stuff."

Q: Yeah.

DIJKERMAN: After the reports were all submitted, the Mercatus Center at George Mason University did an evaluation of all the first-ever GPRA reports. Our USAID report was ranked number one.

Q: Oh, very good. That Government Performance Review report probably built on stuff that came out of the R4s, is that correct?

DIJKERMAN: Absolutely. Because we had all the information, we'd go back to missions if we decided to include a more detailed "highlights" story, but we had the core of the information already. Before the report was issued, Jeffery Rush, USAID IG (Inspector General) and he kept saying all this performance reporting stuff that AID is doing is very poor quality, unreliable, no good, it's not even worth the paper it's written on.

Jeff Rush set up a big meeting with Brian Atwood, before Brian left, to hand over the audit report saying the data and information are bad. I had already gone through country-level audit reports on which his summary was based – I remember one from Poland and one from India (Linda Morris was the mission director in India). In the meeting, I said, "Let's go through some of these things that you're saying are bad and unreliable." I don't remember the exact example in India, but it was something like they were saying, "Well, we think we can achieve this," but it was X percent increase in something. But we achieved the target plus 10 percent. So, instead of a 30 percent increase, they got like a 33 or 34 percent increase. Jeff Rush's audit report argued that was a bad result because the prediction was too far off from the actual result. I again argued that "this is development; not putting Lego blocks together that fit or don't fit... there's a lot of uncertainty that goes on here." The other example I brought up that the IG classified as an absolute disaster, was our support for creating new NGOs to build up civil society in Poland. The Mission had targeted supporting some 5,000 NGOs. But after a year and a half they found out that three times had benefited from our programs training, funding and/or technical assistance. The IG argued it was bad management and the data was very off. I argued that we've never worked in an environment like Eastern Europe before and we're all learning as we go. By any measure, the Poland Mission was doing better than we thought and we ought to celebrate that. I don't think we ought to slap their hands and say their results are unreliable. I remember at that point after my

Poland example, Jeffrey Rush and staff got up and left the meeting - literally. A clipping I kept from the *Washington Post* was ten rules of operating in Washington from Al Kamen. I pulled it out and I said, "It's rule number eight. If you can't counter an argument at a meeting, get up and leave." The other rules were similarly cute, like, "do not lie, cheat, or steal, unnecessarily."

So, when the Mercatus Center of George Mason University report came out, the IG and I were called up to the Hill by the Committee overseeing the GPRA. It was literally, "We want you both up here." So, I went up with IG staff (Jeff didn't come). We went up there and the committee staffers started by stating they read all the audit reports saying USAID has no standards and no way of knowing what's going on. Then they noted that this independent Republican-oriented organization has just rated USAID the best GPRA performance report in the entire U.S. government. They turned to the IG and asked, "Would you care to explain?" When I was asked to speak, my tack was pretty much the same ("This is a difficult business, etc."). Shortly thereafter, Jeff Rush got caught using USAID funds for business class travel. He was moved from USAID and our issues with the IG seemed to melt away.

Q: Right. It was a stressful period in general, the late nineties.

During this period, Senator Helms was trying to push for a merger of the State Department, AID into the State Department.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: And I'm wondering if, since you were dealing so much with the Hill on these performance issues, did that come up at all in the deliberations you were having?

DIJKERMAN: Actually, I was quite heavily involved. This was still during Atwood's time at USAID. The way I got involved was more on the resource side and the planning side. So, with Brian's encouragement we tried to articulate where we were very different from the Department of State. I spent a lot of time researching work Ted Morris had done on trying to limit the amount of integration of State and AID to reflect the fact that we have very different operating cultures, and we just view the world differently and we manage very, very differently in terms of outcomes. In my efforts, I found Hill and OMB (Office of Management and Budget) sympathetic. The real rub was the State Department said ESF is our money. But USAID, as implementer, has a role to play. So, one of the things I worked on very closely with OMB and the Hill vis-à-vis State was to try to clarify how we would together with State allocate ESF. We did not want to give up our role in ESF in ensuring we would try to have decent programs. We acknowledged ESF had an important political element in the allocation process.

Q: When you're saying allocation, you mean program, not the country allocations. Because the State Department would determine the country allocations, is that correct?

DIJKERMAN: They would determine the country allocations, but we would be involved in the programming and some on the program level sides. We were able to get that memo developed, signed and agreed to—Madeleine Albright was still the secretary of state at that point in time—because of the support from OMB and Hill.

Q: And that Hill support and OMB support probably made a huge difference in the final decisions that were made.

DIJKERMAN: No question.

Q: Yeah, okay.

DIJKERMAN: At that point we were already on a back foot with the Helms-Biden Bill which placed USAID underneath State. It also removed USAID's right to submit its budget directly to OMB. USAID's budget now had to go through and be submitted as part of the Department of State budget. USAID lost its budget independence with the Helms-Biden Bill.

Q: Let me just ask a couple of general questions about that whole period. The work on developing new strategies and performance reporting and budgeting and all of that was part of the overall reengineering effort, do you have any other observations about how the reengineering process took place, and/or at the same time was the new management system being developed which was to integrate the data across budgeting and procurement and all of that together, which turned out not to work the way it was anticipated. But I was wondering if you were involved at all or had any observations on any of those, because they were the things that caused so many people who were in Washington in that period to age many years.

DIJKERMAN: I had a lot of difficulty with the new management systems because of the approach taken by Larry Byrne. The fundamental problem, and I remember having conversations with Dick McCall, USAID the chief-of-staff, was that it was not really integrated, unlike what we did in the Asia-Near East Bureau. The various agency-wide efforts were like ships passing in the night. Whatever was happening with the new management systems, only a few knew what was going on. Thus, the supposed integration of the various functions that they said they liked in the ANE bureau weren't happening at the agency level. Larry Byrne had walls between all the things that he wanted to control. There were no meaningful links being made to make things work. When I did the R4 modification process and linked it with the congressional presentation, I had representatives from every bureau in my meetings and we would work things out.

Sometimes, I would sometimes have to say, "Okay, we're going to go this way. If you have a problem, have your boss call me." All the bureaus knew exactly what we were doing. The drafting of the R4s, the samples for the Hill, all was done by the bureaus, not by PPC. They were intimately involved in pulling the process together.

Q: Right.

DIJKERMAN: But there was no interaction between us and the new management system. We told Larry's folks what we were doing, but it was not a two-way street.

Q: Right. I think that's fair, there wasn't enough consultation with people who did the work.

DIJKERMAN: Yeah, we who had to live with it.

Q: Also, one other big thing happened during this period and I am wondering whether you had any involvement, the RIF (Reduction in Force). There was a DAA task force that was kind of overseeing it, and I don't recall if you were on that task force or not

DIJKERMAN: I was not involved in that at all. I wasn't party to any of that. At that point in time, I was still just the director of planning and analysis in the Asia and Near East Bureau.

Q: Okay, If I can go back to the time in the Asia Near East bureau, if, given your economics background, you could talk a bit about the Asian financial crisis. I recall, there was a lot of controversy about the Indonesia program and the difficulty they had getting economic growth money. They couldn't get the money they needed and wanted. I'm wondering if you recall any of that or whether you were involved.

DIJKERMAN: Well, when the Asian financial crisis hit, I was the DAA already. Even though Brian and Larry Byrne and Brian Atwood liked what we were doing, it didn't translate into their actions. We were not getting any transparency on how or why those budget allocations were being made. As I learned later, there are still many things taking place above my pay grade. Decisions taken above the level of DAAs that you just swallow. The allocation process by the Management Bureau was a real black box. I would say, "Well, given the way the earmarks fall out, you guys must eat all this stuff.

But there was no real explanation.

Q: Right.

DIJKERMAN: Much later, I had the opportunity to raise this general issue with then Senators Biden (right before he was announced as Obama's choice Vice President) and Lugar. I was asked to serve on their Policy Advisory Group (with USAID approval as government officials are not normally allowed to serve on these Congressional-created groups). I used the case of Indonesia, a country that has done extremely well economically over the previous twenty, thirty years in terms of lifting many millions of Indonesians out of poverty. I noted they were going through a lot of change, and we were directing a lot of our interventions through Non-Governmental Organizations. In fact, 60-70 percent of the program was going through Non-Governmental Organizations. But our funds were increasingly limited to some environmental and largely population monies. I said USAID is being asked to support democracy in Indonesia, but almost all I am given is family planning money for an already highly successful program. However, the problems are over here and there. We work with this lack of match between the type of money and the nature of the problem, yet we're dinged when things don't go well. I also gave them a current example. Nigeria was opening as a democracy. We were blasted for giving Nigeria an extra \$10 million population money as a reward. I said that was the only free money we had at that time given all the appropriations, earmarks, and directives constraints we were operating under.

Congratulations, you're becoming a democracy. Here are more condoms and family planning money. It was just one of those situations.

Q: Yes. Someday there needs to be a whole book written about earmarks and the effects.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: So you were in Washington basically from 1994 until 2000 in multiple jobs.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: At some point did you begin to think you wanted to go back overseas and how did that process work?

DIJKERMAN: Yes, we wanted to go back overseas. And the answer that I kept getting was no. Tom Fox, my boss in PPC, helped me out. I pleaded with him to get me out of Washington before the political transition. They're extremely draining processes. He said, "You can leave slightly before me or slightly after me, but I'll agree if you hang on for another X number of months, we'll get you back overseas." That's what we worked out.

Q: Good. And so, the Africa bureau was successful in wooing you back, is that correct?

DIJKERMAN: Not a difficult sell. Vivian Derrick oversaw the Africa bureau at that time and Keith Brown had come out of REDSO to be a DAA in Africa. Apparently, the guy who replaced Keith wasn't working out well. So AFR approached Tom to see if I'd be willing to be the REDSO Director. I said yes and he released me.

Q: Okay, so you then, so you went off before the election to the regional office in Nairobi that covered East and Southern Africa.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

REDSO/ESA, Mission Director, 2000 - 2001

Q: And at that time the mission provided support services to a lot of large, full missions, but then you also had responsibility for several other missions that either didn't have resident staff or very little resident staff.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. We were responsible for the programs in Djibouti, Sudan, Burundi, and Somalia and supported all the other ones.

Q: Okay.

DIJKERMAN: When I went out there, the first set of tasks assigned to me was to put together strategies for REDSO, Somalia and Sudan. Things had fallen behind under the previous management.

Q: And at this point in Sudan was there anyone there? There was a PSC in—

DIJKERMAN: Jackie Poole, based in Khartoum. I think we also had one or two Sudanese working with her. We had no US technical staff there.

Q: So, what was the focus of what we were doing in Sudan? Was it mostly relief work?

DIJKERMAN: Yes, emergency relief. It was seeing if we could get something going in Southern Sudan.

Q: Did you have to travel to either Sudan or Somalia?

DIJKERMAN: I didn't go. Rather, one of the first things I did was with Johnnie Carson, who was the ambassador in Nairobi. I asked him if I could meet with him regularly, just as if he was my ambassador. Even though I was a regional program, I did this because he cast a large shadow and was in the know of what's happening around the region. I would discuss my plans with him on what we were thinking of in Sudan, Somalia and so forth. I'd get his guidance. It worked well. When the other agencies would come to Nairobi, then they would come see me so we could kind of coordinate our thinking about what was going on and what we were seeing on the ground. I did a lot of coordination work in Nairobi, but I did not go to either country. We also wanted to keep the numbers very small because both countries were not safe. In Sudan the government was indiscriminately pushing out low-tech oil drum bomb barrels from the back of its planes. Somalia was just a wild, wild west.

Q: Right. At some point the State Department had special ambassadors for these countries that were located in Nairobi, but that was probably not the case then.

DIJKERMAN: That started a little bit later. On our part, we would organize meetings and a State Department employee would be the liaison, but not at the level of an ambassador or a person with a full-fledged title. Steve Schwartz, for example, was a political officer in Nairobi for the Department of State. As a political officer, he had Somalia as part of his portfolio. He later was formally appointed as the US Representative to Somalia.

Q: Okay. And Johnnie Carson had gone to Nairobi, he had been the deputy assistant secretary for Africa, so he was familiar with all those issues too.

DIJKERMAN: Exactly. Hence my reason for meeting with him regularly. He was fully aware of what REDSO was doing in these countries.

Q: Okay. One of the things that Brian Atwood had started was the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative. Even though there had been a change of administration, I suspect the initiative by name probably stopped being used, but I suspect some of the principles were still being followed. Is that correct?

DIJKERMAN: Well, for the new REDSO strategy, one of the topics I asked about was the Initiative. We were trying to figure out what value added the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative was providing after a number of years operating. All the feedback from the staff and mission directors was that it was another layer of reporting and burdening and not helping anymore. As part of the REDSO strategy, I made the suggestion, supported by others, that the operating principles of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative had been fully integrated into all the programs and we no longer needed to continue the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative as a separate initiative. We called it a success and dropped the specific reporting requirements for it. By the way, I used the same tactic later in South Africa to stop the work associated with the Gore-Mbeki Initiative. There the South Africans were even asking me how we could end it.

Q: Yeah. And part of the issue with GHAI was also to try to expand the roles of some of the regional African organizations in both conflict prevention and conflict management.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: Including IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), which is based somewhere difficult, I think.

DIJKERMAN: Well, there were several organizations that we were trying to build up. One was the Geospatial Organization in Nairobi, and IGAD was in Djibouti.

Q: Okay.

DIJKERMAN: And I would go up to Djibouti to meet with them to assess potential and capabilities, and so forth.

Q: Okay. Did you end up getting resources for regional programs that you managed out of REDSO?

DIJKERMAN: We did. Part of the funds were the REDSO budget, and we also had country budgets, like for Sudan. We managed all the pots.

We also had Food for Peace in REDSO. At that point in time Greg Gottlieb was the Food for Peace head. Way back in Sudan, I hired him as a PSC, well as his wife. We worked quite well together. So, there was a lot of integration between his staff and our staff on trips, responsibilities, and in keeping the numbers down in terms of who went where.

Q: Yeah. By the time you got to Nairobi, this was four years after the embassy bombing, is that about right? Was that in '96 or '97? I can't remember.

DIJKERMAN: You know, I can't remember that.

Q: It was several years.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: But the embassy was no longer sharing space with you, were they?

DIJKERMAN: No, no. We were out on the road to Nanyuki. We had a place out there.

Q: Were relations good with the embassy, with the regional office and the bilateral missions? Were you co-located with the bilateral?

DIJKERMAN: We were co-located with the bilateral mission, and Dwight Al Smith was their program officer. He had worked for me in Rwanda. I forget who the director was at one point, but we had worked well together. In terms of the embassy, my primary relationship was with Ambassador Johnnie Carson and his deputy, because almost all the others were Kenya-focused. That was our relationship with the embassy, and I didn't get involved in the USAID bilateral stuff happening in Kenya unless there was a REDSO role, such as contracting, and so forth.

Q: Did you share any staff with the bilateral mission?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. We shared the Executive Office, and REDSO provided contract and accounting services. To clarify, we provided support through the whole REDSO scheduling conference where we mapped out the needs of all the missions in East and Southern Africa for the fiscal year. Included were the services of contract officers, procurement officers, legal, project design officers, and REDSO technical staff.

Q: Okay. I know that you didn't stay in Nairobi as long as you wanted, and I know it was a very tragic circumstance. Let's move onto South Africa or whatever you would like to do on this.

DIJKERMAN: It was a very unfortunate time. For me, leading REDSO was special as I started out in REDSO as my first overseas post. Because I'd been there earlier, my learning curve was low.

Q: Right. That's an important point. I think there's probably great value to AID assigning people as mission directors to posts that they'd served at as more junior officers for that very reason.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. When I left, I went back to Washington and the new Administrator, Andrew Natsios, put me to work on transition matters.

Q: You tried to avoid that transition stuff.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. As soon as I got back, he gave me a slate of things that he wanted to do with emergency assistance and reducing the number of offices that had become part of the administrator's office. I worked with the Women in Development office, with the Food for Peace folks, with the other folks, and a lot of the interest groups with equities in those offices. We were able to streamline the Administrator's office and place functions with line bureaus. I spent a fair amount of time doing that. I also recall being appointed to lead the Senior Foreign Service promotion panels. During this time, I was approached by the Deputy from South Africa proposing I consider taking the Director position in South Africa.

Q: Harry Reynolds.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. Harry Reynolds said the current Director, Stacy Rhodes, wanted me to become the next mission director in South Africa. They were persistent. I talked to my family about it and said yes. I was assigned shortly thereafter.

Q: And that was in 2001?

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: And at that point—Mbeki was president by that time, right? Nelson Mandela was ex-president at that point, so you go in and it's a significant mission with a lot of people and doing a lot of important work.

USAID/South Africa, Mission Director, 2001 - 2004

DIJKERMAN: Yes. When I arrived, Stacy was still there. He told me why he wanted me to come. He said he'd been following me and concluded that I didn't change things that were working but focused on what needed fixing. He concluded by saying I'd figure out which was which in South Africa. I thought that was a real compliment because Stacy had a huge presence in USAID.

Q: Well, that's very good. What were those parts that were going so well that you continued to strengthen, improve the results from? Or if you want to start with the other end, what was not going well that you had to fix?

DIJKERMAN: Well, there wasn't a lot of integration between democracy-governance and the housing folks. Having come out of Washington, I could see a strong movement towards agriculture and economic growth, and against urbanization. The housing program, although successful, would become a target. One of the things I started encouraging was to get the democracy and governance folks, who were quite scattered programmatically, to start working more closely with the housing folks who were doing a lot of things with various ministries in urban areas, such as improving electricity, improving water, improving privatizations of corporations, public companies, and but most importantly, working to improve local government through improved budgeting planning and operations. In essence, they were doing local governance. As we would support a new water system, our housing office would also work with local government to improve management. I encouraged the democracy/governance folks to work more closely with the housing office, with the long-term intent to merge the two. The two offices later merged.

Another real opportunity was in agriculture. I took the head of the housing office and made him the head of agriculture. To him, the agricultural folks and our lawyer, Karl Fickenscher, I said take opportunities to fund activities with the Development Credit Authority (DCA). This is something I'd worked on multiple years earlier when I was in PPC. DCA was USAID's Mike Kitay's brainchild. He, I and others got the Hill to authorize it. There was a real opportunity, given the strength of South Africa's financial system, to leverage financing in private sector areas. DCA used the strength of the U.S. government credit to get more investment into sectors with South Africa's private investors. Even though the housing guy was not an agriculturalist, he had a very strong staff and they worked well. I encouraged our lawyer, Karl Fickenscher, to work with all the offices, but primarily agriculture and education and the economics office to come up with development credit authority projects. We were able to leverage millions of dollars. Karl was a great asset.

The health office was working quite well. The other thing that we focused on was cleaning up the backlog of the leftovers from the whole apartheid programming period. We still had hundreds of small grants that had not been closed out. We worked to decommit monies and reprogram for other areas -- within the original purposes of the appropriated funds. It was through this effort, I talked to my counterparts in the South African government about the Gore-Mbeki Initiative.

Q: Right, which would have ended because it was a new administration?

DIJKERMAN: Well, it was still alive, they were still having two meetings annually. Even more so than the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, it had become a humongous layer of bureaucracy. No one in the Embassy, South African Government or Mission liked it. I proposed to our ambassador that we declare a success and end it.

The ambassador talked to State's Assistant Secretary for Africa, who then called his South African counterpart. We all got together down in Constantia down near Cape Town for a celebratory meeting to end the Gore-Mbeki Initiative.

Q: Very good.

It did do some good. But it had gotten to a point where it was a very burden.

Q: Right. Although I will ask, because part of what it did was provide resources to domestic U.S. agencies to do work in South Africa, like, you know, EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) and Interior. Were they unhappy that the commission faded away? Or did they put other pressure on you to provide money?

DIJKERMAN: The short answer is not a peep. I remember raising this with the US Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), Tommy Thompson. Although a beneficiary of the Gore-Mbeki Initiative, he told me the amount of USAID money was insignificant when compared to the amount he was putting into South Africa.

Q: Mm-hm, okay.

DIJKERMAN: The rest of the conversation I had with him focused on HHS giving grants with little documentation. One \$30 million research grant was only a couple of pages with all the applicable US Government regulations just referenced in an annex. The ministries would come to me and complain how USAID was much more bureaucratic than HHS. Tommy Thompson smiled and noted HHS wasn't going to change because all this stuff HHS does overseas is "not even one tenth of 1 percent, and we're never going to get audited."

Q: Although that does remind me that PEPFAR (United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) was established at this time. I believe South Africa was one of the original target fourteen countries, I believe.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: So, do you—were you very much involved in those early days of PEPFAR and how it was organized and if you could talk a little bit about that?

DIJKERMAN: Absolutely. Well, as soon as we saw that PEPFAR was going to happen, my Deputy and I got together with my contract, procurement officer, controller, health leads and my lawyer. Celeste Fulgham was my contract officer, Karl Fickenscher was still my lawyer. My deputy was a very experienced health officer, Elieen Oldwine. I had a very strong team. So, we sat and put our heads together, and we basically concluded that we had all the assets and authorities to design and negotiate agreements without having any money on hand whereas most U.S. departments and agencies, like HHS and

Department of Defense (DOD) and can't go very far in their procurement processes unless they have the money in the bank. USAID can. With this idea, we proposed to the ambassador and the other agencies that AID would become the focal point for requesting all and processing AIDS proposals for all the departments and agencies. We would work together to define what each agency wanted to see come in as proposals. Then USAID would manage the proposal reviews with the USAID and other agency technical staff.

DOD, HHS, CDC (Centers for Disease Control) folks would be members on the evaluation teams with USAID folks. We would allocate the proposal to different US agencies where they fit best. This also encouraged collaboration. One great proposal came in from the South African Defense Forces – DOD's partner. We would use PEPFAR money to fund it but decided that HHS would manage it.

We proposed starting the process immediately and lining up all the agreements ready to sign the moment PEPFAR was authorized, and funds distributed. We got the USAID contracts office in Washington to agree to modify the structure of the evaluation panels because we were no longer dominated by AID people. My ambassador organized a teleconference with the head of PEPFAR at that point in time—

Q: Randall Tobias.

DIJKERMAN: Randy Tobias, yes. Anyway, we had a telecom meeting with him. We had all the other agencies in the room. They had already obtained agreement from their

respective heads in Washington that AID could be the lead for processing everything (because they were still going to get the money at the end of the day). PEPFAR at that point was still very new, but Randy Tobias said, "Go for it." I had also talked to one of his contract staff in Washington, who had been one of my mission directors in Asia earlier to prep Tobias.

We launched the interagency process. On the day PEPFAR was approved we were ready to sign some \$350 million worth of grants across six, seven agencies with I don't know how many implementers we had. We had universities, we had private, we had clinics, we had this, we had that. We had DOD with SANDF (South African National Defense Force), we had CDC, we had you name it. But we did it all through the AID authorities that we were able to modify to allow the other agencies to work with us to do what they couldn't do. At the end of the day, they still obligated their projects through their systems, but we saved much time on the preparation side. So, yes, we were involved in PEPFAR.

As a result of that, Tobias decided to hold his first PEPFAR conference in South Africa. We and others raised issues with how PEPFAR was being managed. For example, Tobias announced that we'd only get one year of funding at a time. I wrote up a lengthy email and I shared it with my other PEPFAR countries, who agreed with it. I sent it to my former colleague in his office, Ken Schofield. There were about, I think there were about six or seven big issues on programming and management that we had problems with. We had the meeting in South Africa. At the meeting, Tobias announced he would hire a chief operating officer to fix the problems. He asked if I would be the chief operating officer for PEPFAR, and I said, "No." I said no because a number of the bad ideas were coming

from one of his deputies who was a political appointee with very close ties to the White House and President. I felt that if I went, I was not going to have much standing to change things.

Q: Yeah.

DIJKERMAN: Then things changed for me. My wife had an opportunity to lead the buy out of her consulting division from Deloitte Touche. She went back to be the CEO of the new company. My son graduated high school and was leaving for college. And my daughter, who was in high school, asked if I could guarantee she could graduate from high school in South Africa. At that point in time, a very good friend of mine who was the mission director in Jordan was rotated out one year before his daughter graduated from high school. I won't tell you the woman's name who was in charge of HR, but she said, "No guarantees." So, I told my daughter, no.

My daughter decided she didn't want to risk having to transfer her senior year of high school and decided to go with mom to the States. Within a very short period of time, I went from having a family to being alone. And then, I learned that my father had serious Alzheimer's and was deteriorating.

Q: You lost your whole family.

DIJKERMAN: In addition to all this, I was asked if I could come back to Washington to work in the humanitarian assistance bureau to focus on Sudan. The now-Administrator Andrew Natsios and I first interacted way back when I was in Sudan, and he was head of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. We did a couple of special initiatives for him. Then, Frank Young, who worked with me in the Asia and Near East Bureau called to say he had recommended me to teach at the Department of Defense's National War College. He felt I'd be a good replacement for him as he was rotating back out as Mission Director. When I went back to see my dad, I decided I needed to leave South Africa early.

Washington let me curtail. Interestingly, USAID had already picked somebody to go teach at the War College. The War College, however, made an extra appeal to have me come as well. USAID agreed, so that year we had two instructors at the War College. I declined the other job offers, including one again from PEPFAR.

Q: Before we leave South Africa, can I ask you just one other question? You talked about PEPFAR, which was really very interesting. During this period there was so much controversy within South Africa with President Mbeki's views about HIV and all of that. Did you have any involvement with any of his people in meetings on HIV-related matters? If so, could relate any of that, because it must have been an extremely difficult issue to have to manage domestically in South Africa.

DIJKERMAN: I never met with Mbeki, but I did meet and work with several of his ministers. And you're right, there was a tremendous amount of controversy with, particularly the minister of health. One of the things we did through our education programs was to fund very successful young children and teenagers targeted television programs. This included *Sesame Street* for South African and education programs for adolescent teenagers. When PEPFAR kicked off, I challenged everybody in the mission

to think how they could address the AIDS issue in South Africa. One of my South African staff said she raised my challenge at one of the *Sesame Street* program review meetings. They proposed an HIV-AIDS positive Muppet would be a good example of how all can live with AIDS and live with someone who has AIDS.

I literally said, “Sold!” We put in \$500,000. With our commitment, other funds came from the South African parastatals and private sector -- South Africa Airways, the insurance companies, South Africa broadcasting, et cetera. They all were already good partners with us on the existing shows. Then I talked to the minister of education. We had a better working relationship with him than the minister of health. He noted AIDS is a big issue for education and kids, and said let’s do it. Given the Minister of Education was a real Apartheid stalwart, his support protected us from any issues the Minister of Health might have raised. Kami, our HIV-AIDS positive Muppet, was introduced to South Africa. Look her up on-line. Kami dolls were produced and handed out at AIDS testing sites. The head of UNICEF asked if Kami could become a UNICEF goodwill ambassador. South Africans and we said yes.

Q: Yeah, it was probably Ann Venneman, I think.

DIJKERMAN: I believe so. However, we did run into trouble in the States. Whoopi Goldberg talked about Kami on her show and said something like “This is a great thing for America.” Immediately, six or seven Southern congressmen call up the State Department and AID saying that Kami was not an appropriate use of U.S. government funds, and this Muppet would pollute the minds of American children. Luckily, I was in Washington when this issue broke. Between *Sesame Street* Children’s Workshop legislative folks, the USAID Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA) folks (Betty Cook and Barbara Bennett, and Dottie Rayburn) and I talking to the relevant Congressional staffers, we finally got a statement issued by this group of congressmen saying to the effect that Kami is for Africans that are dying of AIDS, and not for us so that’s okay. We were also told Kami better never come to the United States. It was a fire drill for about two-three days until it calmed down.

Q: Did you ever understand why the minister of health and Mbeki had the views they did?

DIJKERMAN: No.

Q: I just wondered if your own FSN staff might have understood—

DIJKERMAN: No. No, because you know, at one point she said there are magic potatoes to eat to solve the problem. Another one was magic beans. Another one was, you know, it’s a Western creation.

Q: Okay.

DIJKERMAN: But we did have pushbacks from South African political leaders to PEPFAR.

Q: Right. They did or didn’t want South Africa to be one of the fourteen?

DIJKERMAN: They were okay with that. Their issue was that we had not consulted sufficiently with them before designing and announcing it and that it smacked of a big rich country again telling poor ones what is going to happen to them. My answer was, “Yeah, you’re right. There wasn’t much consultation with us either. It all happened back in Washington. So here we are. The question is do we want to work together and take advantage of it or not? After a bit more time, we all agreed to use PEPFAR to our advantage for priorities to be developed in South Africa.

Q: Okay. So, it was always there. Thanks very much. Okay, now to go back to 2004, you go off to the faculty of the War College at the National Defense University, and so you’re teaching, you teach there for two years, and what are you teaching and—

National War College Faculty, 2004 - 2006

DIJKERMAN: Well, they really wanted me to focus on helping the military understand what it was like to work with not only AID, but the whole international NGO community. They don’t understand us well at all. I had Chris Milligan and Tom Stahl – both of whom had served in Iraq - as USAID students. I used them to put together presentations on how we operate and how we do business. For many of the military guys, including the military guys from other nations, it was pretty mind blowing. For them, if you don’t have a top-secret clearance, SCI clearance, they feel they can’t talk to you. They were surprised that 80-plus percent of our staff are foreign nationals working alongside us in our buildings. I designed a course with another military guy where we brought in NGOs and United Nations folks to talk with the military guys. They generally were shocked about how little money we had appropriated to us and how few people we had “deployed” around the world. Their interest in learning more about us had been sparked by their interactions with USAID and others in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Q: Right. Because at this point in time probably most of the students had just served in either Afghanistan or Iraq. Most of them had just come out of a warzone?

DIJKERMAN: The percentage was high, well over 50 percent.

I’d say most were very impressed with what USAID, other donors and the NGOs were doing. Chris Milligan was a rock star to them. Tom Stahl was too. That he spoke the language and worked in a very rough area without a US military presence blew their minds. In comparison, they lived in a bubble and went out of the bubble with guns. It was a very receptive environment to fall into as USAID folks.

Q: Mm-hm, yeah, I’m sure it was a lot of fun.

DIJKERMAN: It was. The other reasons I agreed to teach was it gave me time to go see my father, to be back with my family, and to study China with all the China experts there. I’ve always had a strong interest in understanding China better.

Q: Very good. Now, I know they do foreign trips, do they not? Did you participate in those foreign trips, or did you go anywhere particularly interesting?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. I participated and helped design a trip with the students in the first year. We went to Ghana, Nigeria and Togo. Once again, it was a real eye opener for almost every one of them and me. I had two from DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) and NSA (National Security Agency), all senior people (GS-15), and then a mixture of the military folks, all Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel. We had about eleven people that we went with. And I had a wingman who was in the military.

Q: Okay. So, you did that for two years.

State Department/Foreign Assistance Bureau (F), Chief Operating Officer, 2006 - 2008

DIJKERMAN: Actually, one and a half. As the second year started a couple of things happened. One, my dad passed away. Two, I got a call from Randy Tobias to interview me to be the first COO (Chief Operating Officer) for foreign aid and heading up a new office in State, called "F." Secretary Condoleezza Rice was going to announce the creation of this new function. Tobias was to be the head of that office as Deputy Secretary of State and the new Administrator of USAID (also a Deputy Secretary of State rank) – dual-hatted. He said he had talked to Natsios and others and wanted to talk about how this new role and function might work. It was for me, in a way, the integration of what Brian Atwood said he wanted to do but it didn't happen. More importantly, it was a chance to get USAID back at the table in managing its budget. In fact, F was also going to be managing State's foreign aid budget. This would essentially undo what

Helms-Biden took away from USAID – direct access to OMB and the White House in budget negotiations. I asked about Condoleezza Rice's views on this effort as I wanted to know if we'd have "top cover" from her. I remember the opposition from USAID staff to doing things differently.

He said yes and relayed several examples. Condoleezza Rice was pressed on what the US was doing in democracy. Apparently, she committed to getting an answer the next day.

But apparently it took AID, the State Department, and the others about three months to serve up what apparently was a very squishy answer. She found the effort and answer unacceptable, which is when she approached Tobias to take over USAID and manage all the foreign aid managed by State and USAID. She wanted the entire process tightened up and the linkages on what we were funding for what results clearer.

The other example came from key Hill staff who matter. They didn't like the fact that a mission director used health money to build a road. When they found out it was a road, the Mission had told them the road allowed people to get to the health clinic therefore health money was used. The Hill staff disagreed. Health money is for health services. If money is needed for a road, ask for money for roads. We can go around on whether what the staffers say is true. But what is not in doubt is people on the Hill were increasingly and regularly frustrated with what USAID would say it was doing but not have confidence in what USAID was actually doing with the money. Right or wrong, that was a major perception. Finally, the pace at which the Hill was releasing the holds on funds was becoming slower and slower as more and more questions on what the monies were

being used for were being asked. Tobias selected me to be the COO and I left the War College immediately.

Q: Okay. So, the F Bureau was created within the State Department. And the head of the F bureau was Randall Tobias, and you were the COO.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: And he was the USAID administrator.

DIJKERMAN: Right.

Q: And the deputy secretary of state.

DIJKERMAN: Correct. Right.

Q: And so, was there anybody on the operating level above you? Or were you—

DIJKERMAN: No.

Q: You were running the F bureau.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. In terms of the organizational chart there was nobody above me but Randall Tobias. However, he had a couple of special assistants that had their own views. They were from elsewhere. There was a fair amount of tension between us for most of the time that I was in F, which was, I think, for about three years.

Q: So, you had to create F then? Were you given an organization chart, or did you have to decide what it was going to look like?

DIJKERMAN: I had to create it. The first thing I did was I went to see the senior people in PPC. For example, I went to see Jim Painter because PPC at that point managed the USAID budget. Thus, Jim Painter managed the budget process. And then, I went to see the people in charge of some of the development planning functions. Charlie North was in-charge of the development planning and policy. And I talked to a lot of people in other parts of the agency. We came up with an org chart. For example, I put Jim Painter in as a DAA in F. He'd never been made a DAA for all the mechanics and actions needed to implement the budget. I put in a technical capacity cone for software and internet. I also recruited people with programmatic and technical skills from the Department of State, largely folks recommended to me by their bosses and folks from USAID.

One of the first things we did was go to what we do with the money. People do projects for various reasons. We also felt that the technical people in the U.S. government have a sense of what works best in democracy and governance, in education, in health, and so forth. So, we put it back on the technical people in the Department of State (where they existed) and in USAID to come up with Results Frameworks for their sector. We asked the democracy folks, what do you do best, where do you think we ought to be putting our money, what leads to meaningful results, what priorities should be considered, and what don't we do well at all. I go back to what I found doing my dissertation. USAID did various seed multiplication projects, but most were a disaster and many of the mistakes

were repeated over again. Livestock projects were a disaster in Africa back in the sixties, yet we continued to repeat the same project in different countries with the same result. If we don't do it well, don't invest in it. So, now we had the technical global bureaus leading the effort with the technical folks working in regional bureaus to come up with results frameworks for their areas of expertise, focusing on where we can get results. If a mission wants to go outside of that, they'll have to give more justification. For the democracy and governance work, we made the DAAs for D/G in USAID and State co-leads to develop and agree on their frameworks and get them back to us by X date. We also told them to start coming up with performance measures that would capture progress in their area. The work on performance indicators went slower than coming up with the results framework.

Then another big change happened. When we laid out our proposal to Tobias for managing the entire process, it was based on modifying and using the PEPFAR software. We were going to have the same number of test countries in the first year as the PEPFAR software was designed to handle. PEPFAR had how many countries that were priorities?

Q: Fourteen initially.

DIJKERMAN: We proposed to do this in the fourteen countries with the largest assistance programs. After Randall Tobias briefed Condoleezza Rice on our plans, she decided that we want to do it for everyone – all the countries and bureaus in Washington. Basically, roll it out for everyone because she wanted to have an immediate impact on the budget. Allowing for a test year would lose a whole budget cycle. The risks were raised, but the decision was to do it all now.

We went from having a piece of software, which we knew worked for fourteen countries, into which we could integrate all the stuff that all these working teams were coming up with, to going worldwide for all Washington – USAID and State -- and field operating units. I lost a few hairs that day because the images of Larry Byrne and the new management system burst into my mind.

Q: Right.

DIJKERMAN: We had no idea whether the software designed for fourteen countries could manage what turned out to be 161 operating units worldwide. We had to start prioritizing where we put our assets in terms of moving the needed actions along. We focused on integrating results frameworks into the software and launched a team to modify the PEPFAR system to accommodate 160-plus operating units. Then we had to organize training sessions worldwide 160. It was a real challenge. We got the basics in place. We got the software system up and running.

Q: And just to clarify. I'm just making something up, but democracy, governance programming, it would say election observations or something. And then, if Condoleezza Rice asked, "How many places are we doing election observing?" that would be triggered by those elements in a results framework, and you could say exactly how much money was going for it.

DIJKERMAN: Exactly. A Mission could say we're putting in \$30 million into education in Afghanistan, but the stated purpose was counterterrorism by creating alternatives to the religious schools and allowing girls to be educated. Here, we would likely recommend using ESF funding rather than DA funding given the wider set of acceptable outcomes for ESF than DA. And in this manner, we could see what being done on the education front but capturing why we were doing it, i.e., counterterrorism to push back on fundamentalism. It was clearer what was happening and if the right types of funds were being used vis-à-vis Congress's expectations on why they gave us the money. What was lagging were the performance measurements to go with what was being funded.

Q: Right.

DIJKERMAN: We did, we went from fourteen to 160 or whatnot and did it all within a couple months. I lost a lot of hair and other things.

Q: And just on the organization again, you said that Jim Painter was in a senior job overseeing the budget.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: There were several other people from AID who also seconded. So, you had State officers leading some teams and AID officers leading some other teams?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. I recruited about, well, about eighty, I'd say about eighty people came over from PPC and AID, most of them from PPC. There were some people that didn't want to come over. I let them stay. Mike Crosswell, for example, who I've known for years, didn't want to come. I really worked on him because I'd worked with him a lot when I was in PPC before, and he has a lot of good ideas and observations. Most of the PPC folks came. On the State side I went out and I recruited people. People who were office directors or people who were ready to go out to be principal officers or DCMs to come in. In F, we were in charge of looking at "drugs and thugs." Hence, I brought in people who worked in that bureau, INL (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs). Anne Patterson was the assistant secretary for INL at the time. I asked her for staff that she'll have confidence in so we can have fair hearings about her budget. She provided me with a guy who later went out as Ambassador to Yemen.

Q: So, you probably had some people from PRM as well.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: Was PEPFAR also part of this, or was PEPFAR separate?

DIJKERMAN: No. PEPFAR was separate as it had a separate appropriation. We touched on PEPFAR, but they were not part of the budget process. When we redesigned the software, we built it so that we could include other agencies and departments in that to come up with a more comprehensive picture. As you know, USAID has always been responsible for reporting the entirety of U.S. government foreign assistance to OECD, and that was done by PPC. It took a PPC person all year pulling the information together

from all these agencies and then reporting it to OECD. Our new system would make it easier.

Q: Is that what was in the old, what was called the Green Book?

DIJKERMAN: He would pull stuff from the Green Book but elsewhere as well.

Q: Okay.

DIJKERMAN: I had a team of software engineers to begin the redesign for a proper system that could manage what had come at us.

The other thing that I did, again going back to the R4 process, was to better link all the steps and uses of that information in the program review, budget planning and allocation process. The R4 information was now to be entered in fields, in a format ready for the budget review step, and then ready, with edits, to create the budget request to OMB, and then directly the Congressional Presentation. The software's design managed it all for us. It had spaces for text, which were limited in length, tables, and so forth – all the information needed for the review and budget development process. When operating units submitted their document electronically, we could edit it based on the outcome of Washington reviews. Operating Units would see immediately all changes – very transparent. Then we extract the information directly into the budget request to OMB and later into the congressional presentation. We didn't have any wasted time there. The production of the CP became a more fluid operation managed all by F.

The other thing we did was modify AID accounting structure to build the results frameworks directly into the accounting system and linked to the types of funds appropriated. Because we allocate our money by all these accounts and we now know which results were associated with which appropriations. We basically integrated the results structure into the accounting system. This did several things. One, it simplified the work for the accountants. Two, it made tracking results and money easier. Three, it would make it very difficult for the next administration to roll back away from the results framework structure because it was integrated throughout the entire process.

We faced challenges the first year due to software stress, but we survived and got the budget to the Hill on time and complete. Then I got a call from the secretary's office, Brian Gunderson was her chief-of-staff. He said here's the guy who caused the question on democracy and governance. He's going to ask you questions and you answer them." So, I was in front of my computer, and he'd say, "Okay, how much are we spending on democracy and governance?" So, I said, "This is the total." "Who's doing it?" I said, "This is the breakout." "What are we doing?" "This is the breakdown." "What specifically are we doing in Colombia?" "This, this, and this." "What results are we trying to achieve there?" "That, that and that." "Oh, okay."

Then I started getting calls from Tim Rieser, a long-time and key Senate Appropriations staffer, who'd say, "Okay, what's going on in democracy in Colombia?" I said, "Well, this is the latest results report that we have on those activities. These are the implementing organizations. This is what they're trying to do. I'll send it to you." Click, it went to him by email. "Well, how much have they spent?" Click. "How much have they budgeted for

the next couple years?” I’d send the table of the request. It depends on what you guys give us. We got to allocate it out with all the earmarks. “And where are we right now?” Click, this is their performance report.” “Okay, thanks.” I got calls from others as well.

Later these calls would go to the F staff or regional bureaus managing the programs. All bureaus had read access to the F system.

With the entire budget fully computerized and linked across countries, regions, types of monies, it made it a lot easier to manage the earmarks. With Jim Painter and company, we’d allocate the earmarks and directives where we could and then we would see where there were problems and go back to the Hill.

I remember Nisha Desai, chief clerk on the House Appropriations Sub-Committee on foreign aid called me. She said her boss said we needed to put more money in India for education because a couple of senators visited her, and they didn’t like the fact that we had proposed a cut to the education budget for India. I said let me look at where we could take the money from. I sent her back a spreadsheet and noted which countries had big pipelines (unspent funds from previous appropriations) and noted that is where we could take the money with the least negative impact on the ongoing programs. All the big pipelines in education money were in African countries. I also showed where we didn’t have big pipelines. Basically, good fiscal management suggests one takes the money from those that have big pipelines. She had it all there in front of her in a spreadsheet we quickly produced. We answered a few more questions. In the end, we did take the money from Africa, but we moved less to India than the Senators wanted. It was a Washington solution – everyone got some of what they wanted. We got a resolution and got funding released from a hold. The new software budget, planning and reporting system made resolving issues with the Hill, as well as with other interested parties (OMB, White House, parts of State, other agencies, etc.) much faster. Like the Hill, OMB really liked the system. In our first year, we were able to allocate out the appropriations with all the earmarks and get Hill agreement to release the funds a lot earlier than in the previous several years.

Q: I mean, this all sounds really very good, and yet—

DIJKERMAN: Yes, people in USAID and State hated it.

Q: I know people hated it. Yes, I know.

DIJKERMAN: And that’s an understatement.

Q: How come everyone hated it? I mean, I was always under the impression, because I had left, that it was requiring more work from everyone. And what you described sounds like it was relatively streamlined.

DIJKERMAN: It changed things. For example, in the first year, I was often visited by Ambassadors who said F cut our budget. I would turn to my computer, and show them what they submitted, then I would show them what their regional bureau did to their budget request (not F), and then I would show them if there were any other adjustments because of earmarks, etc. I also showed them they could monitor the process of their

request, how their bureau modified it, Secretary approved changes, etc. – all from their office. Our process took take-away a regional bureau’s ability to blame F for a tough budget decision. They had to deal with the angry Ambassadors directly. Remember, F would give the regional bureaus a number into which they had to fit their request; a number that the Secretary of State had approved (very few argued back). The regional bureaus had to make budget decisions and now had to own up to their decisions directly to the Ambassadors – our tables and software clearly showed each step in the decision-making process. We liked the system’s transparency, others much less so. Others wanted more space for X or Y. Others felt the software was a pain, which it was in year one. By year two, we rolled out new software. I am sure there are other reasons. Others didn’t like the fact that they had to communicate more of their plans with State and ambassadors.

One vignette on how many—not all—USAID folks didn’t like the changes. After Obama’s election victory, I attended a meeting where people were saying they were going to get rid of the F system when the new folks come in. Interestingly, at that meeting there were congressional and OMB staffers. None of them spoke up to say get rid of this. They just sat and smiled. From their perspective, the F system was able to give them the types of information they needed quickly. By the way, the bureau DPs also had and did use the system to answer questions from the Hill and elsewhere since the system was accessible to all of them.

Q: Right.

DIJKERMAN: So, there were a lot fewer changes to the F system as a result of the change to the Obama Administration. Just another vignette. I was at some meeting with Andrew Natsios, Peter McPherson and Brian Atwood. These three former USAID Administrators cornered me about the system. I recall saying to Natsios that in his day, when he said he was doing \$800 million in agriculture, he really didn’t know what he was funding. I said the same thing to Brian about his democracy programs and relayed Secretary Rice’s experience of not really knowing what was happening in democracy or its funds. I noted they didn’t know because everybody had their own definitions of what they were doing. There was no way to really confidently or easily aggregate it. Just because somebody in a mission said it was agriculture, you didn’t really know what was being funded. They kind of acknowledged this, and concluded we needed to have a longer conversation.

And I guess I still feel that if we are learning from what we’re doing and we know there are certain things that we don’t do well, then Washington ought to say I don’t think so without a much closer review. In our budget discussions, we had a lot more debates and we made modifications because we had more technical people in the room saying, “You know, that really hasn’t worked here, here and here, why do you think it’s going to work there now?” And then, if they didn’t have a good answer they said, “Well, you know we’ll let you experiment but we’re not going to give you the full amount.” So, there was a bit more give and take. But as you know, having been in the field, the field doesn’t like being second guessed. And that is another part of why people don’t like the change.

Part of it may have been the workload in year one. Although when I was on the receiving end of the R4 and the other processes in South Africa and REDSO, it never seemed like a burden – particularly when compared to PEPFAR. The huge burden in South Africa was PEPFAR. PEPFAR was demanding more and more and more information every year. Whereas we had constrained the R4 and made it easy to manipulate the information, PEPFAR asked for more and more each year. The health office absolutely hated it.

Q: Mm-hm, right.

DIJKERMAN: The F process did force people to write more concisely. But you're absolutely right, there were those who hated it. In my experience, the budget and resource offices in the bureaus tended to like it. They were also the ones who used it the most to answer Congressional questions, etc.

Q: One of these PEPFAR requirements was these country operational plans that they had to do every year. You didn't have anything like that that you were requiring, or did you?

DIJKERMAN: No. We did not. After I left USAID started going back to something like that. They wanted more details in Washington. We focused on the strategy and the approval of the strategy, and then the funding would flow from that. And then, the congressional presentation results would be affirmation that you're on the right track. So, we didn't have more detailed implementation plans for the strategies.

Q: Okay. That was something that AID could do itself if and when it wanted to.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, and AID stepped into that and it was an additional layer of work. *Q: Okay.*

DIJKERMAN: I'm not saying what we did in F was perfect. Given how many things we had to do at once -- get the office set up, set up the process, modify the software, train folks, develop the budget, get it approved with the Administration, and submit it to Congress on time, we sacrificed on the quality of results data. We didn't devote as much attention to that, and we didn't devote as much attention to that middle layer of the tactics and how they were implemented. We felt if missions reported results against their strategic plan (which contained elements of how it would be implemented/achieved), we could back off on getting that detail annually. A number of years after I left, USAID moved back to getting more of that when they started country strategic assistance plans or something like that.

Q: Yeah.

DIJKERMAN: Susan Reichle would know more about that.

Q: Now, since you had worked at PPC, then the USAID policy bureau, and obviously PPC had an impact on how USAID itself both develops and implements policy. When AID lost that capacity with the creation of the F bureau, do you have any thoughts about what USAID gave up or ceded to the State Department regarding this policy function? I mean, was that anything you had thoughts about?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. One of the arguments that no one seemed to accept – except the people that came over from PPC to the F Bureau -- was that in terms of a policy function USAID gave up nothing. In fact, we gained a tremendous amount. Remember, the Helms-Biden legislation made State Department the boss of AID and our budget had to go through State. USAID had lost the right to submit and negotiate its budget directly with OMB or the White House. Who had control over USAID policy? The AID Administrator who, oh, was also the head of F. We lost nothing on policy.

Q: Right.

DIJKERMAN: And who did Condoleezza Rice give responsibility to for putting together the entire foreign assistance budget – State and USAID? The head of USAID. With F, USAID was back in charge of its budget process. There were pieces to manage, such as programs for refugees, drugs and thugs, assistance to the Defense Department, but USAID was fundamentally in charge of the budget process. We had gotten back what we lost. People didn't seem to accept that. With F, USAID was in the meetings with Condoleezza Rice and OMB when we were hashing out who gets what. USAID did well based on the arguments we put forward. Where appropriate, we also argued for more money for State programs.

In the first year of the F process, Tobias asked me if we were allocating our assistance in a rational, fair manner. I said probably not. Program monies do not match up where we allocate staff and OE, nor are they necessarily consistent with larger US objectives. We give more staff to Latin America than Africa. Africa gets huge earmarks, but not the staff to manage them. Asia and Latin America have a lot of staff but not much money. He asked what we might do about it. I proposed the same type of analysis I did when I started out in the Africa Bureau years ago. This time, I put Charlie North, who was the USAID person to lead the process (adapted a framework that a former AID deputy administrator Joe Wheeler developed). Tobias asked Secretary Rice if she liked the idea and she said yes, go for it.

Cutting to the quick, the Secretary approved moving a big chunk of program money to Africa as well as more staff and OE. We, USAID, oversaw the programming budget. We reallocated it on development criteria but clearly considering that we're part of the U.S. government.

But we—USAID was in charge of the resource allocation process during the time I was in F. And I know a number of State staff felt like USAID was in-charge.

Q: Well, that's important to have documented— because there are two ways to look at it.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: One that AID actually

DIJKERMAN: Lost power, yes.

Q: Yes, but AID in many ways gained power but was housed over in the State Department.

DIJKERMAN: Correct. And I think on balance more people felt AID lost power than gained power, and my ability to persuade people was very limited.

Q: Yeah, right.

DIJKERMAN: But people like Jim Painter would know we had a much bigger voice at the budget table than we had previously under the Helms-Biden change.

Q: Did F's prominence continue after Tobias left and Henrietta Fore replaced him?

DIJKERMAN: It was even better with Fore. We'll surely get to that later. When Tobias left, I offered to leave as well. Before Henrietta was appointed, the Deputy Secretary of State, Thomas Pickering, was put in charge of F. At that time, I had just gone through a big USAID IG review to see whether F violated U.S. government best practices on how to develop a new computer system. Fortunately, the GAO (U.S. Government Accountability Office) inserted itself into that review and took over the investigation. What they concluded was the best practices were not followed, but the requirements at the outset were changed and expanded in a very short amount of time by senior management. They concluded that senior leadership had decided to do much more than was originally designed. In essence, the system worked with issues year one and by year two a better software system was in place.

This IG-GAO review had just finished when Pickering called me. He told me Tobias was terminated by Rice, he was to be the acting head of F as deputy secretary, and I was to continue my job. I would sign all the papers that Tobias would sign and put my signature right underneath Pickering's name. He said if I didn't sign, he wouldn't sign. So, that was it until Henreitta came on-board.

I also later learned there was a lot of palace intrigue going on as others were trying to take over F. I found out later that several of the State Department people in F and around the State Department had gone to Pickering's office and said to leave me in charge, not these other people.

Q: Interesting.

DIJKERMAN: F kept running. It proved helpful having the State Department people in F and having relations in the building. And so, we operated that way. I would sign and then Pickering would sign.

When Henrietta came, she observed State people felt like AID people took over, but saw F was mostly AID. Henrietta then announced that Rich Green, from the Department of State, was going to come in as a new special assistant to her and I was still going to be the COO. She asked me to stay. I agreed to stay for one more year if she'd assign me to Paris as the US Representative to the Development Assistance Committee at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). She said yes.

Q: Oh, you are a good negotiator.

DIJKERMAN: So, I stayed. I worked with Rich. It was great working with Rich. The State Department felt that they now had somebody who could more fully understand their equities. It didn't change anything. Rich and I were both at the table. We'd go up to the Hill together, we spent time in OMB together. Rich was State Department, but he argued for the AID stuff just as effectively as if he was an AID person. And we still did well in the negotiations with OMB, White House and Hill, because we had the numbers to back up what we were doing and why we needed it. He and I worked closely until I left for Paris.

She also concluded USAID staffing levels had suffered over the previous years. So, with Jim Kunder and F, we did analyses of budgets and staffing needed. Jim Kunder as deputy administrator was the lead.

Q: To get a really large increase in OE to be able to do the new entry program?

DIJKERMAN: This effort, again, showed me how effective USAID was being inside the State Department, running the budget, having the numbers, having the details. I believe Henreitta even presented her expanded staff proposal to the President with Condoleezza's support. I thought USAID did well, notwithstanding the fact that I was not able to convince very many people of that.

Q: Yeah, that's very important—thank you, very much, Dirk. Well, I'm going to suggest we stop now and I'm going to turn the recording off.

Q: It's December 21, 2022, and this is interview number three with Dirk Dijkerman. Dirk, when we finished last time, you spoke about setting up the F bureau within the State Department and the complexity of that process and the good things and some of the challenges. And I wonder if with the change of administration and the long delay in getting an AID administrator approved by Congress, by the time the AID administrator was designated both deputy secretary positions had been filled, so the AID administrator was no longer double hatted and therefore no longer had responsibility for the F bureau. Is that the way it worked out or how did you see it?

DIJKERMAN: The timing is a little bit foggy as to when Raj Shah was appointed the AID administrator.

Q: It was about a year into the administration.

DIJKERMAN: Okay. At the change of administration, Hillary Clinton came in as Secretary of State and Alonzo Fulgham was made acting USAID Administrator. Hillary then made Jack Lew the second deputy secretary of state in charge of resources for both State and F, hence in charge of F.

Q: Yeah, right.

AID/W, Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, Acting Assistant Administrator, 2009 - 2010

DIJKERMAN: Well, at the change of administration, Henrietta proposed to the Obama transition staff that I should run the DCHA Bureau, which included Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (including food aid) as acting assistant administrator until the political was appointed. Anyway, I went to Paris in the first week of January and got a call to come back to assume the position. I spent about four days in Paris before I came back.

Q: When you left Paris did you think you were just coming back temporarily to help fill slots until political appointees were named?

DIJKERMAN: Temporarily.

Q: So, the Paris job wasn't taken away from you, it was just delayed?

DIJKERMAN: That's right.

So at the beginning I was the acting AA, and then I forget how long it takes before you can't be an acting AA anymore, then I was the senior DAA or whatever the law demands.

So, I stayed there for a while. That's where I got to know Jack Lew from the meetings that we would have on budget, programming, etc.

Q: Were you replaced as COO of the F Bureau?

DIJKERMAN: I don't know if they made Wade Warren the COO or left him as something else.

Q: But he was a senior person though in—

DIJKERMAN: He was the senior USAID person in F, next to Jim Painter.

Q: Okay, so there was still a very heavy USAID presence in the F bureau.

DIJKERMAN: Oh, yes, at least three-quarters of the people in F were still AID people.

Q: Okay. And did Jack Lew ever talk to you about how and why F was set up, or was he interested in the history of it all?

DIJKERMAN: No, I don't recall having such a discussion. I interacted on specific issues of why we don't do more of X or Y and updated him on how things had changed since his last time in an administration. He was very keen on understanding all that had changed. I recall he generally took our recommendations.

Q: Okay. And the person who came up to head up DCHA had been at Mercy Corps, and she came in—

DIJKERMAN: Yes, Nancy Lindborg.

Q: Did you stay on for any length of time after she came?

DIJKERMAN: Well, it was almost 11 months before Nancy was confirmed. Several big events took place during that period. First, Secretary Clinton started this whole big push about an integrated 3D development strategy to integrate diplomacy, defense, and development.

Q: Yes, right.

DIJKERMAN: As part of that effort, Eric Schwartz, the political appointee in charge of PRM at State made a play to get OFDA (Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance) moved to his bureau in State.

So, I had to work to stop that. I was ultimately successful when I got my hands on a White House decision memo from President Clinton's days that reaffirmed that State would focus on refugees (i.e., people who crossed borders) and USAID would focus on displaced people (i.e., people who were displaced internally in their country). Our lawyer, Bob Lester, dug it up. Of real interest was the drafter of that memo all those years ago was none other than Eric Schwartz. When I confronted him with this, he just smiled, and the issue melted away. There were a couple of other actions he took to undermine us, but I got our political appointees to talk things up with their friends at State to undermine the validity of Eric's comments. Sarah Mendelson, a DAA in my bureau, was very helpful and effective in this regard. She later became an ambassador at one of the UN agencies.

Q: Now, was this prior to the QDDR (Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review) starting, or was this part of the QDDR?

DIJKERMAN: It was part of that whole process.

After four or five months, my wife let me know she didn't move to Paris with me for me then to live in the States. So, I asked Raj Shah, now USAID Administrator if I could leave. He said I could if I found an acceptable replacement. I identified Susan Reichle, Director in Colombia. She left there early so I went back to Paris.

Q: Okay.

DIJKERMAN: Then in late summer, Jack Lew came out to OECD as the head of the US delegation for the annual ministerial. He expressed surprise in seeing me and asked why I was in Paris. I told him that OECD was my actual assignment, and I was only temporarily in DCHA. Later, a State colleague who was in the car with Jack came to tell me that Jack did not think it was appropriate that I was assigned to Paris as there were "more important jobs out there to be filled."

Shortly after that, I was asked to go to Pakistan to put together the civilian assistance strategy to complement what was happening on the military side as well as to look at how the mission was performing. I had worked previously with Ambassador Anne Patterson when she was head of INL, and I was the COO for F. She approved of me coming. I think Richard Holbrooke was already involved as Clinton's Special Envoy for Afghanistan and

Pakistan. I went out, put a strategy together with the staff. I recall Jim Bever, DAA for these countries, really liked what we had put together.

Q: Was Holbrooke part of the meetings that you were in in Pakistan?

DIJKERMAN: No.

Q: And you didn't have to come back to Washington and defend it to—

DIJKERMAN: No. The State Department said they would handle it with Jim Bever. I said fine, I'm back to Paris.

Q: Right. Go ahead. I'm waiting for when people are going to start talking about pulling you out after Jack Lew's comment.

DIJKERMAN: Okay, I was in Washington for some stuff and Raj mentioned to me that he was giving a big speech that weekend. That Friday night, I flew back to Paris.

Saturday morning, I had emails from all over the place. One of the things Raj announced was that USAID shouldn't senior people in places like Paris and Brussels and those offices would be closed. Then, I got a phone call asking me, I forget who it was, asking me if I would go out to Pakistan as the mission director and that Holbrooke was supportive. At that point, I recall, he had rejected Walter North. I countered that I had not spent much time in Paris and OECD noted I had only spent about a month or two in Paris since arriving and wasn't doing my representation job.

Under a bit of pressure, I agreed to go to Pakistan for one year. I came back to Washington to prepare for my transfer. Then two things happened. First, I got a call from Anne Patterson saying Holbrooke had told her I was coming for two years. Second, my mother took a serious turn for the worse health-wise. I had to put her in assisted living as she wasn't doing well. So, I called Raj, and I said I can't go to Pakistan anymore. I'm an only child and I can't manage a program as complex as Pakistan and deal with the issues arising from my mother's deteriorating health from 5,000 miles away. He said he'd agree if I would fill in as the head of DCHA again so Susan Reichle could create his new policy office. I would only need to stay until Nancy Lindborg was approved by the Senate. I accepted. So, Susan Reichle went to set up the new PPC, it's now called PPA or something.

Q: PPL.

DIJKERMAN: I went back to DCHA for the second time. Skipping the other issues during this period, several months later Nancy Lindborg was approved out of the Senate at the same time as Don Steinberg as Deputy Administrator.

Q: Was OTI (Office of Transition Initiatives) also part of DCHA?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. Yes.

Q: And the State Department; didn't they want to take OTI?

DIJKERMAN: Yes, Carlos Pascual wanted to take OTI and put it into his office of stabilization. It was less of an issue for me as Carlos did not make very many allies in the State Department. He was proposing to be the lead in crisis countries and was viewed by the State regional bureaus as trying to take over their role. Our USAID philosophy, which I agree with, is that if there's a problem in a region, then you might set up a special task force to address the problem in the initial period, but at a certain point in time you need to integrate that task force into the management of the regional bureau. Ultimately, they should assume responsibility because it's their backyard. By the way, this is what I did later when I was the USAID Ebola coordinator. When things stabilized, I transitioned the Ebola Secretariat's responsibilities to the Africa bureau. That was not the direction that Carlos seemed to be going with his Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction. In the end, OTI did not move. Carlos's office was pretty much emasculated by the happenings within State, and he left.

Q: Okay.

DIJKERMAN: Also, when I was the acting AA for DCHA, Sudan blew up when the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir was indicted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. In response he kicked out CARE, Mercy Corps and Save the Children. This gutted the multi-donor program in the Darfur area as our three NGOs were the biggest players. A bit later, the Obama appointed Special Envoy for Sudan, Scott Gration asked if I would go to Sudan and work out the details on getting our NGOs back in. He had obtained an agreement in principle from the Government of Sudan to find a solution.

Q: To Khartoum?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. Khartoum. The first thing I did is I had our staff organize a meeting under the Canadian auspices as we, the US, weren't seen as popular in Sudan. We talked in New York with all the other donors including the UN agencies about the issues and pathways forward. Armed with their support, I directed the three NGOs to send with me a senior level person who can make decisions and communicate with the home offices. Our "team" went out to Sudan. I also had a lawyer come up from REDSO in Nairobi. We made a proposal to use the Sudanese law called "doing business as," DBA. We have the same law in the US. In this solution, the NGOs would rename themselves as something else, and they would be doing business as this new entity even though they were the same old ones. The Sudanese lead negotiator, who also had been indicted by The Hague at the same time as al-Bashir, said it was not possible to do DBA in Sudan. So, I trooped out the lawyer to provide case history in Sudan where it had been done. He ended the meeting there. The next day he called and said I would have to negotiate directly at the President's Palace. I went to the palace. With al-Bashir's representative, we came up with a different solution. In essence, Mercy Corps UK would assume responsibility for Mercy Corps U.S. operations, Save the Children UK for Save US and so forth. The NGOs agreed and we all left. This took two weeks of back and forth. I told the NGOs to be aggressive in implementation as the Sudanese would fight implementation every step of the way. That was from my earlier experience in Sudan on the exchange rate negotiation. In the end, we were able to keep the emergency relief program going. In my view, a possible international headline grabbing disaster was averted.

Q: Well, absolutely, and obviously very important work and lucky that you were there in the acting capacity because you had done so much work in Sudan and knew it.

DIJKERMAN: Fast forward. Nancy Lindborg, the new political head of DCHA was also head of Mercy Corps when I worked on the Sudan issue. Then, Nancy asked me to stay on at DCHA as her deputy. I declined to go back to Paris to work on the donor negotiations to update the Paris Declaration on development assistance.

U.S. Permanent Representative to the OECD/DAC, 2009 - 2012

Also, around this time, Hillary Clinton's transition coordinator, Margaret Carpenter, who was the former AA for the Asia Near East bureau called me about taking over the Chair of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at OECD.

Q: Right, because the U.S. had chaired it one point—

DIJKERMAN: The US created the DAC way back when and used to chair it all the time. We voluntarily opened the chair to others several years ago. She asked if it would be a good idea to have Brian Atwood come out to be the new chair of the DAC. I said absolutely and worked to get his name formally announced before the current chair had made his intentions about running again known. When we formally announced Brian as a candidate, the delegates almost immediately and unanimously supported him. The DAC chair at the time decided not to run again. Our preemptive action worked out quite well. And Brian came out—

Q: And he was the chair of the Development Assistance Committee—

DIJKERMAN: Correct.

Q: —and you were the U.S. government person on the Development Assistance Committee.

DIJKERMAN: Correct.

Q: So, you were representing the U.S. government.

DIJKERMAN: Correct.

Q: And even though Raj had made this speech that he was getting rid of these positions, I assume that Brian must have convinced him that the U.S. government position needed to be retained at the DAC?

DIJKERMAN: Yes, at least for the Paris Declaration follow-on negotiations.

There was also another reason that involved Clinton. I had started working with the Nordic ambassadors to propose changing the overall mandate of OECD. Our proposal was to allow the non-development OECD committees to allocate resources to share the lessons on policy, reforms, what works, what doesn't from OECD member countries with developing countries who wanted to learn from OECD experiences. Basically, we wanted to open all the accumulated knowledge OECD to those who were interested. Non-OECD

members are already invited to OECD, but they tend to be important countries, like China, Turkey and not small developing countries, for example, Ghana, Rwanda, and the like.

Q: So, it was a matter of sharing information, it wasn't changing the membership of the OECD, or was it?

DIJKERMAN: Correct. Sharing information; not changing the membership of OECD. If countries wanted to join, that's a different process. What we were arguing was there are a lot of policy lessons directly applicable to the situations faced in developing countries.

And OECD should be willing to share them with those countries willing to learn. As an experiment, we proposed a new office to be created in the OECD department responsible for negotiating international taxation agreements. That office would offer technical assistance to developing countries on how to do taxation better based on the lessons from OECD. I went to various USAID bureaus, including Africa, Latin America, and Global bureaus, and raised a couple hundred thousand dollars. With money from the Nordics and Swiss, we all went to the Secretary General of OECD. He said he'd match what we put up and we launched the program. We got experts from OECD and member governments to go to developing countries and start working with them and sharing lessons on what tax breaks work well, which ones don't.

Q: So, in a sense this was internationalizing what our Department of Treasury does. They have an Office of Technical Assistance within the U.S. Treasury Department, so it's a little bit like that, but using international—?

DIJKERMAN: It's a little bit like that, but our new office had the tremendous advantage over Treasury in that the lessons were the lessons distilled from all the OECD member countries, not just the US.

Q: Yes, it was much better, yes.

DIJKERMAN: And it was a neutral party in doing this. For example, Rwanda asked for a review and these experts concluded that Rwanda was giving away the equivalent of 3 percent of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in tax breaks to companies. But the OECD experience showed that the companies getting the breaks were not the type of companies that needed the breaks to make their investment decision a go. Rwanda was giving away tax breaks while getting little benefit. We did the same type of analysis in Ghana. I wound up going to Ghana to work with the Ministry of Finance multiple times even though I was the USAID representative. We used these experiences to organize a meeting in South Africa. There we shared what we learned in Ghana, Rwanda, and Colombia (another team went there), other OECD lessons. At the meeting, tax representatives from these countries and other developing countries talked directly with international business representatives on respective priorities and the impact of different tax policies.

As this was looking like a real success, the Nordics, Switzerland and I decided to elevate this "model" at the upcoming OECD Ministerial to make opening OECD to interested developing countries part of the OECD mandate. I drafted a cable from the US Ambassador to OECD to Clinton proposing that Secretary Clinton make this her proposal

to the forthcoming OECD Minister's Council meeting she was to chair. Clinton's office liked it and thus Raj Shah agreed. I had to be there to help push this along as well.

Q: That was a much broader focus than what the Development Assistance Committee normally does. Did other representatives of the DAC, were they also enthusiastic about this?

DIJKERMAN: Yes, they got behind it. It was something that started to snowball. By the ministerial, we had a full proposal on the table agreed to by all the OECD ambassadors ready for approval when the ministers came to town. As you know, in these organizations it's got to be approved well before it goes for the final stamp of Ministerial approval. Brian Atwood helped mightily with this as well. The change in the OECD mandate was approved with Clinton as OECD ministerial chair, and Raj Shah was present.

Then I focused on the negotiations to update the Paris Declaration, which later became the international agreement endorsed by some 100 countries at Busan, South Korea. As part of this process, I was selected to be one of the "developed country negotiators" to work with selected developing country representatives. I was a lead on looking at developing country procurement and finance systems to see how they needed to be improved so that donors could use their procurement, auditing and so forth systems. I think Brian Atwood probably suggested to Raj Shad to let me finish this work at OECD as me leaving OECD did not come up for a while. Well, Busan happened, and we had a follow-on to the Paris Declaration that all could work within.

Afterwards, I started getting pressure to move on to be the Director in either Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Egypt. So, I started putting out feelers about leaving AID. The OECD Secretary General's office proposed I become a special senior advisor to help implement the new OECD mandate across the organization. I would be in the Development Cooperation Directorate but be a floating senior advisor. I accepted. I kind of felt I had already served in tough places and someone else could step forward.

Q: Okay. So, that would then become an OECD employee.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, I kept our USAID lawyers informed of all my inquiries and actions so I could switch in a way that would avoid a conflict of interest and still work with the US on issues. I left USAID and became an OECD employee.

Q: So, you retired from AID in 2012.

DIJKERMAN: Right.

Q: Before we leave that and go off to the other OECD work, the work on the host country financial systems and strengthening was important. Could you talk a little bit more about that. And, at the same time, AID was looking at all of these issues as part of USAID forward. Did AID consult with you at all or were they on their own kind of tangent because they were very compliance focused.

DIJKERMAN: I consulted some with USAID on this and even attended meetings USAID organized in Washington. I feel like OECD was making a bit more progress with the

World Bank and some of the smaller donors. The changes we could get approved by everybody in Busan were, in my view, rather modest but steps forward. It was kind of that unwritten rule in Washington – “one can agree to the new ideas in principle but fight implementation every step of the way.”

Q: Right, going back to principle three.

DIJKERMAN: Back to the rules of working in Washington.

Q: Did the DAC, did people talk very openly about the whole issue of risk and the willingness to accept risk or not accept risk?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. And the unwillingness to accept risk, not unlike what we face in USAID.

Let’s be honest. It’s not without justification. As a Mission Director, I was the one to accept the risk. When I proposed doing Kami when I was in South Africa. I told my ambassador who said keep him informed but don’t involve him. I called the AA for Africa, who was the—I forget what her name is—

Q: Oh, Connie Newman.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, Connie Newman. She basically said it’s my call, keep her informed, but it’s your thing. This is different than when I was at F. There, I knew I had the full support of Secretary Condoleezza Rice. She wanted to see these changes and was involved in the big decisions. It is easier to take on a tough project when you have “top cover.”

Q: Right. So, you went off then, you retired from AID.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Retire from USAID in 2012 – Join OECD as Special Advisor, 2012 - 2014

Q: Went back to the States, came back a week later and started working for OECD—

DIJKERMAN: OECD.

Q: —directly, and that was really to help implement the kind of changes, strategic changes that the organization was trying to affect.

DIJKERMAN: Right. And we came up with a new implementation strategy for the OECD. An interesting follow-on note about our tax and development program we launched as the model for the new OECD mandate and strategy. It was so successful. I’m proud of the part I played. So, I went back to Washington and asked for more money for this program. I was flatly turned down by the guy who headed the Global Bureau. I was told it was not part of Raj Shah’s efforts to focus and concentrate USAID’s portfolio. I left and then the Brits came forward and put up £20 million for multiple years. Then the IMF came and said it wanted to take the entire program and staff and incorporate it into the IMF.

Q: So, you provided information, presumably technical assistance, best practices, but also created a forum for dialogue within that country that would, in fact, assure that, you know, reforms could be implemented if you were adopted?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. This program organized a meeting in Washington where interested developing countries came, as did the UK, the World Bank, the IMF and various international Chambers of Commerce. The talks were very specific as taxation experts were there. By the time I left OECD, the IMF was really working hard to take over this program.

Q: OECD, right, although in some sense IMF was always supposed to play that role a little bit.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: So, if they took it over, I hope they are doing it better than they did in the past.

DIJKERMAN: In fact, international agreements on transfer pricing, export credit programs, and taxation agreements that bind most countries together are all negotiated at the OECD. So, the OECD taxation department is the real locus of activity. For example, China wasn't part of the formal trade credits agreement developed at OECD, but it generally abides by them because if they didn't, all gloves come off and a race to the bottom occurs and costs all countries, including China more. Again, the international system isn't perfect, but the OECD has a real comparative advantage and reputational dominance in terms of specifics of taxation, how to do it. Getting OECD countries' taxation departments to work with the developing countries' taxation departments was a step forward.

Q: When you went over to the OECD, did USAID ever send someone to replace you as the U.S. person at the Development Assistance Committee?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. A lot of the people in AID, including Deputy Administrator Don Steinberg didn't think it was a good idea to not have a U.S. presence at the OECD. The way forward was to downgrade the position to a non-senior management group (SMG) assignment. Thus, filling this position never made it up to the front office, like all other SMG decisions—

Q: Okay, that's right. Those were PPL positions, I think.

DIJKERMAN: Right.

Q: Yes, that was a brilliant stroke.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. So, that's what they did for a couple of years. I think it's now been elevated back up again to an SMG (Senior Management Group) position.

Q: Yeah.

DIJKERMAN: After somebody left—

Q: Looking at your CV, one of the things that you did while in your OECD capacity, which is also something that is done by the Development Assistance Committee, so I suspect this was done in conjunction with them, and that was a review of the Dutch aid program.

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: And I'm wondering if you could talk a little bit about those donor reviews and how you see them and how valuable they are and how helpful they are.

DIJKERMAN: It's part of the OECD process where we members self-evaluate with the support of OECD technical staff. The quality of the process and review are limited, in my view, by the receptivity of the country being reviewed. If the country is open to trying to get some lessons and get honest insights and feedback on what they're doing, what could be done differently, the process can be very fruitful. Useful recommendations—tweaked with the country beforehand to make them understandable and more palatable to the home audience—work well. These reviews are not gotcha exercises.

And as we're reviewing, we identify possible recommendations. Where there is a willingness, we go in-depth. What would be feasible? What approaches have worked with other skeptical parliaments? What might we get out of it? When one has this type of interaction between reviewers and reviewees, then the review process could be productive. In other cases, the reviewed country sees it as an OECD requirement to get through and move on.

Q: So, they can be very useful and very helpful but only if the—

DIJKERMAN: The reviewed wants to make of it.

Q: Was the U.S. ever reviewed while you were at the DAC or at OECD?

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: (Laughs) Do you have any comments on that?

DIJKERMAN: No.

Q: Was it a good review? Okay. I won't persist. No editorializing. There are other things. What was it like working for the OECD versus being a U.S. representative at the DAC? Did you feel a difference in the work environment and what you were able to do and how you were able to do it?

DIJKERMAN: Well, I didn't really feel a difference. I was invited into discussions by governments and agencies who did not seem to care which hat I was wearing. In Ghana, I was working with the Ministry of Finance as the US Delegate to the DAC and as an OECD employee. It didn't seem to matter. As a Special Advisor at OECD, it didn't seem to bother the other committees or member representatives. They just wanted to know what it would mean for them and how things could be done without compromising their other mandates. As I was finishing up my second year, I was asked if I would take over the statistics branch in the Development Cooperation Directorate to lead the effort to

“update” or modify the definition of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). I declined as I promised my wife that I would retire by sixty.

Q: Okay, so it was about two years working for OECD directly.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, I worked for them for exactly two years.

Q: Okay. And you promised that you would retire the second time?

DIJKERMAN: Right.

Q: So, did you leave Paris?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. And the other thing my wife wanted to do is move back to the States to be somewhat closer to the kids.

We moved straight to Arizona. And then, I think it was probably about August or September, Nancy Lindborg called me to see if I would replace her as the USAID Ebola coordinator. She was leaving DCHA to head the U.S. Institute for Peace. Raj had accepted me as the replacement for her. I said I would do that for six months. So, then I came back to Washington and did that.

USAID Ebola Coordinator – Retired Annuitant, 2014 - 2015

Q: And you had mentioned earlier that this was a centralized function although you did over time move it over to the regional bureau.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, absolutely.

Q: Were there issues in doing that? Were there people who resisted moving the responsibility?

DIJKERMAN: No. You know, it was funny. When I came in, I think they might have brought me back in as a retired annuitant. Because they gave me the rank of a DAA.

Q: Okay.

DIJKERMAN: As soon as I got to Washington, I had to go to the NSC meetings to replace Nancy. I know there was an issue from people, whether they were inside of AID or outside of AID, about me going to these meetings. They didn't want me at the meetings and said I lacked Top Secret SCI clearance.

At the time, Susan Rice was now the National Security Advisor, and the woman who became the AID administrator for a while, she's now at one—

Q: Gayle Smith.

DIJKERMAN: Gayle Smith was the NSC person covering USAID and other foreign assistance.

Gayle told me that, upon hearing this issue, Susan Rice invoked her authority and said I had clearance for all meetings, including those with Obama. No more issues and USAID started to process to update my expired clearances.

Q: Because—let me just step backwards because USAID was named as the coordinator for this governmental response, correct?

DIJKERMAN: Yes, Gayle names USAID as the lead for the intergovernmental response in Africa. In three primary countries plus the other countries in Africa where there were spillover effects. In the beginning, there was nobody fully in charge of the interagency effort until Obama put Ron Klain in as the Ebola czar above everybody, including all the NSC offices who had equities in the Ebola issue. Ron's gravitas came from the fact that he was appointed by the President. For example, Tony Fauci for National Institutes of Health (NHI) and other senior folks would be at the meetings and all the departments involved in the effort in the US and overseas would be at the meetings.

Q: Indeed.

DIJKERMAN: One of the things that I took over was managing the relationship with CDC. We had CDC people working in AID in the crisis response center. In the field, however, the CDC had their own team separate from the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). We had CDC and other agency people rotating in and out of our response center, supporting field operations. Tom Frieden, CDC Director, seemed to feel that CDC should have been in-charge, but did not directly challenge the NSC decision to put USAID in the lead. After all, USAID had all the long-standing contacts and relationships with the UN organizations, other donors, non-governmental organizations, and governments in the region. CDC staff in the response center were great. They worked well as part of the larger interagency team working on Ebola.

When I took over, I also took control of the special Ebola appropriation budget. Using DCHA and other staff on the Ebola Secretariat, I laid out how we were going to review progress, assess budget requests, and allocate funds. Based on our decisions, I would direct F to release "\$x" to Mission "y", etc., which was kind of funny. I am not sure I had authority to do so, but F was supportive and executed the movement of funds. By now, AID had started the process of doing what F did, then submitting it to F. Folks told me they now had double the meetings – one set of budget reviews just within AID then one set with F.

As part of our Ebola review process, we had operating units draft two-page summaries of what they were doing, what monies were being spent, what

results we're getting, where we were headed and what they needed. From the reviews, we allocated the money. From our first program review, we could see the positive impact everyone's assistance was having on the outbreak. We identified that we were going to have like \$600, \$800 million left-over beyond requirements. My State Department Ebola counterpart (he used to be Ambassador in Uganda, Don Brown, I think), Jeremy Konyndyk, who was the OFDA head, and I proposed to tell Congress we likely had more money than we needed. There were some who suggested no. I recall pulling our data

from the F system showing these countries were not using the money they're getting through the regular budget and had huge pipelines. We're already making investments to strengthen the ministries and to manage these outbreaks in the future. Those in the Administration finally approved our written testimony. Ambassador Brown, Jeremy and I testified to the committee and made the point about excess monies. One can find our hearing and testimony. It's online.

Q: They must have been shocked.

DIJKERMAN: Well, several of the House members expressed skepticism. Nothing happened at Congress regarding the excess funds, until the follow-on health crisis of Zika hit. Then Congress quickly authorized USAID to use the left-over Ebola funds to respond to Zika. As the money had already been appropriated, the USAID response to Zika took off fast.

Q: Right. So, just apply it to another public health emergency?

DIJKERMAN: And that's exactly what happened. With their approval the money went to Zika.

Q. Did you ever travel out to the region—

DIJKERMAN: Yes. I went out right at the beginning of my time in Washington. I went with an Assistant Secretary of Defense for special operations or something like that, an assistant deputy secretary from HHS, and Linda Thomas-Greenfield, who was Assistant Secretary for Africa at the time. We flew out to Liberia on a DOD plane, spent three days there, and then we flew back. I also went to other meetings in New York and in Brussels.

Q: How did you coordinate with the missions? Were they—did they have responsibility for doing the work on the ground or—

DIJKERMAN: Yes. And the Missions were part of our program and budget reviews too.

Q: —both the missions and presumably CDC had a huge responsibility?

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: And didn't the military also do some, build some things that ended up—

DIJKERMAN: Yes. They were contracted through OFDA/OTI (Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance/Office of Transition Initiatives), but primarily OFDA, to build temporary treatment sites, moving commodities and training. They could not directly interface with anybody who had any likelihood of any possibility of Ebola. Not one US military person contracted Ebola during their assignments there. The Department of Defense was also present at all the NSC meetings on Ebola. Interestingly, one of the back benchers in these meetings was one of my students from my War College days. He was now a flag officer. He and I would chat back channel on issues to understand and line up USAID and DOD positions. This proved instrumental on several occasions.

I had weekly phone calls with the three mission directors. Depending on the call agenda, I would have Africa bureau, representatives from OFDA, and others as needed.

Sometimes I would also sit on the phone calls with OFDA field staff. As OFDA managed its programs, I focused on how mission and OFDA programs interacted. As we reoriented several bilateral Mission health programs to build up capacities in the ministry of health. However, in one country we concluded the procurement agency was too corrupt, so we used our procurement authorities in both the Mission and OFDA to get the job done.

Q: Yeah. And the three countries were Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea?

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: And were there differences in the capabilities of the three countries?

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: Do you recall that you had to tailor things quite differently to them?

DIJKERMAN: Yes, it was not only capabilities. For Liberia, the United States was agreed to be the lead bilateral donor by everyone. In Sierra Leone, the Brits were the lead. In Guinea, the French led.

So, in Sierra Leone and Guinea, we would fill in behind the Brits and the French. The UN had a special operation for Ebola that we all coordinated with.

Q: But as you said earlier, it was quite successful and seemed to get control of the epidemic very—relatively quickly.

DIJKERMAN: Well, not to make comments about how COVID was managed, but one key in West Africa was consistent messaging from the leadership of the countries down to the village level. Not everyone listened, but the messages were consistent and clear. And as we learned more and the response to Ebola evolved, the messaging evolved to keep people updated. It worked. People largely listened to their leaders. We worked with the religious leaders, Christian, Catholic, non-Catholic, Muslim. We had some that didn't want to work with the national governments and donors, but the vast majority did. The West Africans changed their behavior and that had a huge impact on reducing the spread of Ebola.

Q: Yes. How did the U.S. Government handle it with American staff? Did the USAID missions remain in place? Were there evacuations? Do you recall? Or were there discussions about how to handle it just even in terms of staff care and all of that?

DIJKERMAN: I don't remember the details. We kept our Embassies open as well as the Missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Guinea was served out of the Mission in Sierra Leone. My impression is that we did not have significant problems recruiting people to go. USAID staff tend to rush towards things rather than run away.

Q: Right, I was just curious. So, you did that for about six months?

DIJKERMAN: Exactly six months, yeah. So, after things started calming down, I had the secretariat lay out a transition plan to disband the secretariat and have the Africa bureau take over. We worked closely with the Africa Bureau to do the hand-off and developed a notebook documenting the Secretariat's work processes and decisions.

Q: Right. Within your secretariat did you have a number of people who were seconded to work with you in that secretariat?

DIJKERMAN: All were.

Q: All of them were seconded.

DIJKERMAN: Every one of them.

Q: How did that affect your team? How big was your team?

DIJKERMAN: At one point, I had about twelve or fourteen people. They were all amazing, smart, hard workers. They really made me feel good about USAID's future as all had been with USAID for less than five or six years. They rotated in for a couple of months at a time.

They came from all the bureaus. I often had to fight to get a person released to the Secretariat because their home office didn't want to let them go. I basically told the Secretariat staff that I'd been out of AID for a while. So, as they were to rotate off, they were to recommend who should replace them and do the job well. This worked very well. I wasted no time looking for people. They would say bring in X as she is really good, but her boss will resist. I would make noise and get them released. All the people that I "recruited" were identified by the secretariat staff as someone they strongly recommended.

Q: Yeah, no, that sounds great. Did you determine when your time was up or did—

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: So, you were able to determine, say, it can now go over to the Africa bureau and someone else should take over?

DIJKERMAN: No one in the Administrator's Office or anywhere gave me any pushback on anything. No one questioned my decisions on budget allocations. F and the AID budget office were helpful. In fact, I took someone from the AID budget office to work on the Secretariat to be the interface with F and AID budget offices. Nobody questioned me. The whole Ebola program review process was accepted by all, e.g., no one questioned it. Everybody could attend and every operating unit got the review and made the requests. We had a light review process. It was two pages per operating unit, period. DCHA managed it for me because I had a few DCHA people come in. So, within the secretariat it was very non-stressful. It was very supportive. Outside of USAID there was a lot of stress, a lot of issues, and the like. Most of it stopped with me because I was the one who had to go to those interagency meetings.

Q: So, you were the one who had to deal with that, and that was dealt with at the NSC then?

DIJKERMAN: Yes. There was a lot of NSC infighting, squabbling and typical stuff like that. But having the Ebola Czar still made the interagency effort the best I had ever experienced. My State Department counterpart also agrees with this assessment. We recommended it as a best practice for future crises that required a full-throated interagency response.

Q: Just before we leave this, I'm just curious, because it was so successful, whether there were any sort of technical, substantive disagreements about how to approach the response? Or was there really a consensus quite early on as to what needed to be done and therefore, that it was easier to move forward?

DIJKERMAN: Well, in the first months of Ebola there were a lot of “discussions.” I wasn’t there.

By the time I arrived, there were still big issues outstanding. One was how to monitor our performance and report the status of the response to the President. I inherited the fight on how to monitor performance and design the dashboard for the president. CDC head Tom Frieden only wanted the total number of cases reported, which means you have a perpetually increasing line. We at USAID argued knowing the total is fine, but one really wants to monitor the rate of change. Are the daily numbers of new cases increasing or decreasing? If one only reports the total number, one will not see what’s happening. We fought Tom (not CDC staff) on that and finally Ron Klain settled it by reporting both. This was the only right decision.

Then, we argued about every performance measure, each indicator to use, and the standard to be used to declare it “red,” “green,” or “yellow” for performance. We did well on this because the CDC people in the response center were working with our people, trying to come up with the proposals. When Tom pushed back, I’d have strong arguments from the USAID and CDC staff as to why our recommendation was the better way to go.

When neither of us would back down, Ron Klain, the czar and non-health person lawyer, had to decide. My recollection is more times than not it came out the way it should. As the response started showing results, the issues dropped. We had other issues with CDC but will leave that to another forum. When a program succeeds, everybody’s happy and focuses on other things.

Q: You thought that was positive?

DIJKERMAN: Yes, Ron Klain worked his tail off. I believe he worked twenty hours a day as he had no staff. I think he didn’t want more people to keep it simple. When you have two agencies disagreeing at the NSC, someone has to break the tie? One can let other long-standing interagency processes work it out, or it can be done quickly with a czar that even sits above the various NSC offices. When the interagency team made presentations to Obama, it was Susan Rice who would ask Ron to make the presentation. When President Obama asked questions, he’d call on whomever. At these meetings, all were well behaved.

Q: Yeah, right. Anything else on the Ebola task force that you want to mention? Other than that, you deserve congratulations for having led a very successful effort.

DIJKERMAN: Many in the interagency felt it was the best interagency process we'd ever been a part of. Gail Smith, later USAID Administrator launched the effort to assess the Ebola effort and make recommendations for future Administrations. One of the outcomes was the NSC established an office for emerging or future health crises. Indeed, we all felt that there will be a next Ebola crisis which could be more complex and deadly than Ebola. Ebola was transmitted by touch; a future virus could be transmitted by air. This would be more difficult to combat. Under Trump, John Bolton as NSC Advisor, shut down that office. We'll never know how the US response to COVID could have been. I do recall one of the priorities that the office was tasked to work on is how to preposition more ventilators, respirators and other kinds of things needed in the COVID outbreak. As my time was ending, I tried to launch a review of how USAID did. I got real pushback from DCHA on having an independent evaluation. And I don't think anything happened once the Secretariat functions went to the Africa bureau. I'm pretty sure the AID evaluation effort died when I left.

Q: So, you don't think the evaluation was ever done?

DIJKERMAN: I do not. I had identified Johns Hopkins University as they have a real capacity in health. I even said in my testimony on the Hill that I was pushing for an independent evaluation of what worked and what didn't work in AID, and I wanted to have a research institute do it that was self-confident and had reputational gravitas to speak truth to USAID.

Q: We'll note this to ask other people when they're interviewed, people who worked on the Ebola we'll ask about that.

DIJKERMAN: Yeah. There were some internal evaluations done, but I think this was an opportunity to get some outside eyes on it, to have a lot of credibility and experience.

Q: Yeah. There always seems to be a reluctance to do that and then, also, a hesitancy to look at them when the next emergency starts. It always seems hard to learn.

DIJKERMAN: You know who told me that? Janet Ballantyne. She professes USAID says it wants to learn, but when push comes to shove, they don't want to know. The political appointees often don't want to know because it might constrain their choices on where they put money, and the staff often don't want to know.

Q: Yes, right. Interesting point and I should add that Janet, when she was mission director in Russia, put in place a contract with a group to do evaluations of multiple programs so that they really became experts in looking at what was working, what was not working, and generalizing and making good recommendations. It is surely an important part of what AID should be doing.

Looking at your CV there's something else that jumped out at me and that was you were on the advisory board of the Korean International Cooperation Agency?

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Q: AID in many countries, as it phases out, has worked to help those countries develop their own assistance programs. Was this an early stage of the Korean program? Or, had it started much earlier?

DIJKERMAN: It is kind of interesting how this happened. And this is my interpretation of events. In Korea, they have two branches of government that do foreign aid -- the Ministry of Finance and the Korean International Cooperation Agency, KOICA. I was selected by KOICA to be on their advisory group. I think this resulted from my role as US negotiator on Busan Agreement. After Busan, I was asked to present at a conference in Korea. I was on stage with some 500 people in the audience and it was opened for Q&A. One guy got up and asserted Busan is worthless in a multi-minute speech. I recall my response being along the lines of that it might be true, but neither he, nor Korea as a donor, nor I, representing the U.S., should be the ones to judge whether the Busan agreement is worth it or not. It was endorsed by many more developing countries than donors. And if the developing countries didn't think it was worth a try, they wouldn't have endorsed it. I concluded by stating that the developing countries said this is worth it. I later learned that guy was from the Ministry of Finance, and they were opposed to Busan, which was hosted by KOICA. In contrast, the KOICA leadership loved my comments. And these two have internal battles. They try to—

Q: Does the ministry of finance do loans and the other do technical assistance?

DIJKERMAN: Loans and investments, yeah.

Q: Okay, so it's a little bit like Japan in that way. I think Japan is broken into JICA and—

DIJKERMAN: Yes.

Shortly after the conference, KOICA asked me to be their advisory committee for a two-year period.

Q: Okay, so it was more that you were available when they had questions and stuff.

DIJKERMAN: Yes. And then, when they came to Paris, we would meet. I was in Paris but now as an OECD employee. We'd still meet.

Q: Just out of curiosity, did any of them ever mention what USAID had done in Korea?

DIJKERMAN: Oh, absolutely. Korea remains thankful for the US assistance program and very proud of what they did with all the assistance and how they built on it.

Q: Yeah. Okay, I was just curious although they were all too young to have observed it themselves.

DIJKERMAN: No, Koreans describe Korea as a success story of foreign assistance. They see part of their development assistance program as a way of paying it forward.

Q: Right. Okay. So, when you left from the Ebola task force and you returned back to Arizona and you've done various kinds of consulting work and stuff since, and I know you're active in the community—

DIJKERMAN: Yes. No, I've done stuff, but I'm slowing down a little bit. I think I did USAID senior foreign service promotion panels two times.

Q: Okay.

DIJKERMAN: Yes, the Senior Foreign Service threshold panels and promotions within the Senior Foreign Service. Last year I was asked by the outgoing secretary of state to serve on an arbitration review board (ARB) for the USDA local employee that was killed in Tijuana. Somebody in the State Department who knew me from Henrietta's days suggested they put me on this ARB because of my knowledge of AID and State and programs and agriculture. That was some four months of work. Our last act was briefing Secretary Blinken and staff.

Q: Okay. So, you're keeping busy.

Before we wrap up, I'm just wondering any final concluding thoughts you have looking back on your career? And then a question, whether you would recommend a career with USAID to young folks who are interested in international affairs?

DIJKERMAN: Well, one, when I look back at my career, I cannot help but marvel how lucky I was in terms of the bosses that I had. Even if a boss above them wasn't very good or limited in ability, I was able to work for people who were encouraging, supportive, and in tough situations were helpful in making sure that I got a fair hearing and whatever else throughout my career. And I think that maybe that's the nature of AID and its relatively small size. Like Stacy Rhodes coming out of nowhere and saying, "Hey, I want you to replace me in South Africa." I never knew Stacy Rhodes before then, but I knew his reputation. I think there's a camaraderie in AID and we're lucky. I'll give you another example. I had Elizabeth Warfield work for me, and she came and said, "Well, I might work for you, but I want to interview you first." I said, "Fine." So, she interviewed me and concluded that I was the type of boss she could work for. I said, "Okay, great." Later, Stacy Rhodes called me and said, "Hey, did Liz Warfield come see you? I told her she should go work for you, but she said she's got to interview you first." I said, "She did and she's going to come." He says, "Oh, she's great." But you know, it's that kind of support. People like Janet Ballantyne, I think, provided a lot of insight and support. Tom Fox, was a very smart political appointee deeply committed to development and fairness. Natsios always listened as did Brian Atwood. I used to disagree with them, but they never held it against me. I consider myself extremely fortunate in that regard.

Q: Yeah, yeah. Indeed. No, that's a nice testament to a career. Well, I'm going to suggest that we stop for now. I'm going to turn off the recording.

End of interview