

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR ANGIER BIDDLE DUKE

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INTERVIEW

Q: Angie, do you think you might tell us something about your childhood and background?

DUKE: I was born in 1915 in New York City. My father died when I was seven years old; my mother remarried and we moved to Long Island where I went to school and grew up. And at the age of twelve prior to my 13th birthday I went off to St. Paul's School in Concord, New Hampshire where I stayed for six years. I then went to Yale University. During the summers we would visit my mother's brother, Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, who was Minister to Norway and subsequently Ambassador to Poland. (He was later our wartime Ambassador to the governments-in-exile in London. He died in 1962 when serving as Ambassador to Spain.)

Q: Could you tell us a little about your education?

DUKE: I regret to say I left Yale in my Junior year, always intending to come back, but the war intervened and one thing led to another, and I never did graduate. I did go to service schools and graduated from Officer Candidate School at Camp Lee, Virginia, and I feel that life has given me a pretty good education. Although I regret not getting my degree, I take inordinate pride in the honorary degrees that have been given me.

Q: I gather that what attracted you to the foreign affairs field was the contact you had with your early mentors?

DUKE: Yes, it was the inspiration and examples of my uncle who was serving in the embassies in Europe; my education in "pre-diplomatic studies" at Yale, my world-wide travels, and of course my own experience during the war in North Africa, England, France and Germany. All that gave me a great feeling for service abroad.

Q: Could you tell us a bit about your career in the way of a brief overall summary?

DUKE: I was appointed a Foreign Service Reserve Officer, Class Four in 1949 and served with that rank as a secretary and consul in the embassies in Buenos Aires and Madrid. My career was changed through an extraordinary circumstance when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee came to Spain in 1952 to negotiate the base agreement. I was made the control officer. The Senators maintained that they were so satisfied by the work that I was doing for them that I was offered the post of Ambassador to El Salvador; so I left the FSR ranks and became a political appointee of Harry Truman for about 13 months. And during the Eisenhower administration I was the president of the International Rescue Committee, the largest non-sectarian refugee organization in the world. In 1960 I joined JFK's campaign and was appointed Chief of Protocol when he became President. I stayed on for a year under LBJ who sent me to Spain in 1965 where I remained for three years. He recalled me to be Chief of Protocol again for six months and then appointed me to Denmark. My candidate, Hubert Humphrey, lost the election so I was out the following June, 1969. President Carter appointed me as Ambassador to Morocco in 1979 where I served until early 1981.

Q: Perhaps you would like to begin by giving something about your experiences in your first two posts, in Argentina and Spain?

DUKE: I would like to emphasize, John, that I had close working experience with all sections of the embassy in Buenos Aires. I was named staff aide to Ambassador Griffis in Argentina and Special Assistant to the Ambassador while in Spain. I interacted with USIA, the Political Section, the CIA, and all elements from the top to bottom which gave me a really significant opportunity to be substantively involved in the work of the Foreign Service and with the officers of the Foreign Service. This gave me a point of view of the Service that I think is somewhat unique, and certainly stood me in tremendously good stead when I had the opportunity to have missions of my own.

Q: We might perhaps at this point move on to your period as Ambassador to El Salvador; could you describe the political and economic conditions in the country when you arrived?

DUKE: I had already had the experience of working at top levels in two large and active posts "and I hit the ground running." The president of Salvador at that time was General Osorio who was the undisputed leader of the military, which maintained an uneasy but working alliance with the so-called oligarchy, the land-owning, coffee-growing class. This kept the country on, let us say, a politically peaceful and economically productive course but one that was stratified dangerously in terms of class structure. There was very little opportunity for social mobility or economic flexibility. Therefore our Point Four program was important. It was oriented towards widening credit for small business and to purchase family plots for farmers and coffee growers. And I think we were beginning to be successful. Salvador had a one crop economy, coffee; and they began to expand from the export of raw bulk to process coffee and to the building of a decaffeinated coffee

plant and the packaging of coffee products. I think that if that AID policy had been continued and if it had been combined with social reform, I think Salvador would have developed more peacefully, social progress could have been instituted and the events of 1980-81 could have been avoided or at least moderated.

Q: What do you attribute the fact that the social reforms were not implemented?

DUKE: It was a wretched structuring of society, the alliance between the landowners and the army. Higher education fell into the hands of the University of El Salvador which in time became radicalized and the students' Marxist ideas became infectious. The increasingly detached policy of the Catholic Church and liberation theology also began to take hold and I think that the growing political agitation and mounting interest in social change and Marxist promises did build on the evident injustices of society. In those eight years after Harry Truman I believe that the seeds of discontent were successfully sown making inevitable the reform and revolutionary movement that started in 1980.

Q: How would you assess President Osorio as a man and as a leader?

DUKE: Osorio was not a charismatic leader; he was a shrewd, smart career army officer who knew how to get along. He was an amiable man, and although not a brilliant leader, he conveyed a sense that sound change was desirable and eventually inevitable. Progress was being made during his presidency.

Q: Was there any possibility for you to be in touch with any opposition elements?

DUKE: The opposition was not particularly in evidence. While there may have been conspiratorial opposition, I really cannot recall any overt surfacing. There were liberal elements in the country. You may recall that this was the time Arbenz was coming into the fore and becoming a leader in Guatemala. The social democratic ideas of Arbenz were spilling across the borders and inciting hopes for change in the rest of Central America. Salvador was not immune to that, and there were some particularly bright and intelligent leaders on the moderate left, some of whom occupied cabinet positions under Osorio, who tried to accommodate to this movement.

Q: Did you feel that US policy during the years you were there was basically sound or would you have felt that changes would have been preferable?

DUKE: I thought that our AID program was pushing the country along and that the country was evolving and there were changes taking place. But when the administration changed, John Foster Dulles obviously had much more interest in the East-West relationship than he did in Latin America. I don't think our policy was changed; it simply fell into total neglect and the AID programs dried up. This made inevitable some policy change and that change took the form of maintaining the status quo in Latin America while the administration settled in to structuring the policies of the Cold War.

Q: Were there any other significant events and developments during your tenure as Ambassador that you feel noteworthy and could comment on?

DUKE: The most noteworthy was when President Osorio met with President Arbenz at the Salvadoran border. He took me along with him for that meeting, and the President of Guatemala was accompanied by the US Ambassador accredited to him, Ambassador Schoenfeld. Nothing particularly important transpired; I think that Osorio wanted to come to an understanding with his colleague across the border and work out a relationship that would be acceptable to the United States, Arbenz was deposed not long after I left El Salvador.

Q: Moving on to your responsibilities as Chief of Protocol. How would you describe the overall responsibilities and duties of a Chief of Protocol?

DUKE: The Chief of Protocol is stage manager for the conduct of foreign relations, it is a very fascinating and time and energy consuming position. A great deal depends on the individual in charge as to just how important it is. JFK was really very interested in the potential of the post. First of all he felt that as President he should project the image of authority and maturity; he was very sensitive about his youthfulness and his age. He wished me to project the dignity and gravity of ceremonial occasions. Thus he was very interested in the forms of international relations. He once asked me to devise a means of his meeting the democratic leaders of the hemisphere in a way that would differentiate them from dictators, those who were not elected. I came up with the idea that in Washington every Chief of State or Head of Government should be treated exactly the same for obvious official and state reasons. However, after the visit was officially over, the President would fly democratically elected leaders to his father's home in Palm Beach and spend an evening with them in an informal atmosphere and thus give a special mark of recognition and an added measure of personal hospitality to his democratic colleagues. He liked the idea and asked me to put my proposal on paper and send it over to the Department, which I did. My friend Tom Mann shot it down, saying it would endanger relations with the other leaders in the hemisphere and I must say he made a persuasive case. I tell that story to let you know how much importance Kennedy put on form and ceremony.

I was particularly interested in personalities and so was he. He asked me to send him a memo on anything out of the ordinary or any observations I could make after I had traveled with the Chiefs of State, the Heads of Government, after a state or official visit.

I must add that this was an extraordinary time in world history. The colonial world was exploding into independence and we had 33 new Heads of State and Heads of Government visit him in 1962. All the brand new African states were demanding recognition and there were remarkable pressures on Protocol and the State Department and our government to accommodate a great flood of ceremonial visitors. Very few of them had had any substantive relationships with us. It was an extraordinary experience.

Q: You must indeed have had occasion to deal with numerous heads of state and government during your tour as Chief of Protocol. I assume in some cases you probably noticed the reaction of the leaders to our own President and our President's attitude, are there any cases that you would care to comment on?

DUKE: Yes, I would like to say something about the chemistry between leaders. President Johnson was always drawn and attracted to those who had been elected. I remember his great affection and interest in Prime Minister Harold Wilson of the United Kingdom and his stiffness and lack of communication with those who inherited power, such as the Shah. Yes, the role of personality and the role of chemistry in human relations is evident at the highest level. I can recall the rather disappointing meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and President Kennedy. JFK was a great admirer of Nehru but Nehru in turn did not reciprocate warmly. He had sort of an arrogant, Oxford Blue, anti-colonialist attitude of an Indian intellectual towards a young country and its leader. And he acted rather bored during the whole interview with President Kennedy which seemed to put our President off. It was quite noticeable. Then I can recall another time the Prime Minister of Canada came to visit JFK, this was the first visitor from across a border, in March of 1961, and I could feel the coldness between the two of them.

Q: This was John Diefenbaker?

DUKE: John Diefenbaker. He had been a great friend of Eisenhower's. When I picked him up at the Canadian embassy he questioned me quite closely during the drive to the White House as to what kind of a person President Kennedy was. He suggested that, "He will hold it against me that Ike and I were great golfing buddies." I of course replied, "Not at all," but when we got into the Oval Office the conversation was difficult; and to break the ice, the President said, "Mr. Prime Minister, I would like to show you something." He led him over to the french window looking out on the rose garden and pointed to marks in the parquet floor saying, "those are the holes that Ike made when he wore his golf shoes into the office so that in between appointments he could pitch balls on the south lawn." It was a nice story, but instead of putting Diefenbaker at ease, it made him more nervous. He was even sweating, uncomfortable with the thrust of that story which brought in his friendship with President Eisenhower. Those are illustrations of what I call the chemistry between leaders.

Q: You mentioned the Shah a minute ago. Would you care to comment further on the reactions that you saw during any visits that the Shah may have made?

DUKE: Yes, the Shah's relationship with the President and Mrs. Kennedy was very cordial and very agreeable. I can't say that there were any real problems on any of the Shah's visits, other than those caused by Iranian student protestors. Let me take this opportunity to differentiate between those leaders who inherit their position and those people who shoot their way to power and those who are elected to office. In the case of Marshal Tito, for example, who fought his way to his country's leadership, he conducted himself very differently from royalty, who are inclined to be deferential and somewhat

uncertain of themselves in dealing with true leaders. I always found elected leaders far more sure of themselves than the other two. Those who arrived by force of arms were always looking for legitimacy and for respect. This applied to Marshal Tito and in a certain measure to the Shah. I would put the Shah somewhere in between those who inherited political power and those who fought their way to it. But I do feel there are different vibes between the three types.

Q: Before moving on to your tour of duty in Spain, are there any final comments you would care to make about your responsibilities in Protocol and what could be made of that job if a person made the most out of it?

DUKE: I emphasize again that Protocol is what you can make of it. I think the position is a tremendous opportunity for Foreign Service Officers. I also think a good spot for a Foreign Service Officer is to be Deputy Chief of Protocol. The opportunity to assist the geographic bureaus and the desks when one of the leaders in their area is a White House guest is really most valuable. A Foreign Service Officer in Protocol could assess the leadership capabilities first hand and be in a position to report on much of the substance exchanged. JFK always asked me to write him a memo on what my impressions were of these leaders. On occasion I did so, but I didn't have time to in many cases and I now regret that very much. I think that my service in Protocol in many ways was the most interesting period of my own life. Although I enjoyed being Chief of Mission in four important embassies, I think that the experience of being at the center of the interaction of power between the White House, the State Department and Congress was heady stuff. I was able to take part in the interplay of national and world personalities and forces at first hand, and in retrospect, this was more absorbing than any other experience that I have had.

Q: During this whole period, Dean Rusk was our Secretary of State and George Ball and Averell Harriman were at the State Department. They must all have participated in many of the White House functions. Do you have any particular recollection of any differences or ways in which these American leaders of ours in the State Department functioned, or dealt with foreign leaders?

DUKE: Dean Rusk was deeply interested in the personalities of foreign leaders in a very serious, profound way. The White House staff was always denigrating Dean Rusk and that didn't make his job easier; but he had an unflappable, olympian nature and he would take all these slings and arrows in stride. To me he was a marvelous, great statesman and superb in that respect. I will say that George Ball, the Under Secretary of State, also played a tremendous role. For example, when Dean Rusk was flying to Japan, and President Kennedy was assassinated, Ball as Acting Secretary of State gave immediate direction to orchestrating and managing the international repercussions, and I conferred with him well into the night on developing policies regarding bringing delegations of world leaders to the funeral.

Q: General De Gaulle, of course, came to that funeral, do you recall any particular reactions between Johnson and De Gaulle?

DUKE: Johnson, of course, was very sensitive and susceptible to the aura of power and prestige surrounding the presence of General De Gaulle. The French President sought him out at the reception at the State Department after Mrs. Kennedy's reception at the White House and the two of them embraced each other. During the day of the President's funeral there had been several rumors of assassination attempts on De Gaulle's life. I was in the East Room in the White House before the funeral cortege went to St. Matthew's Cathedral. A security man came up to me and said there might be an assassination attempt on De Gaulle as we walked the streets of Washington. I took the message to Mac Bundy, who had a good relationship with De Gaulle, and I asked Mac if he would pass the word on to the French President and invite him to ride to the Cathedral in an official car. President De Gaulle replied by asking, "Where is Mrs. Kennedy going to be in the procession?" Bundy had to say that she would be on foot at the head, and the President terminated the conversation by insisting on taking his place and walking as planned.

Q: I was working as an assistant to Dean Rusk at the time and at the reception I noticed that General De Gaulle spoke for a few minutes alone with Johnson. I presume that they must have used English as Johnson certainly did not speak French?

DUKE: I never heard De Gaulle speak English, and I never heard Johnson attempt French--I think that what happened was that De Gaulle understood English, and that they made themselves understand each other. Ambassador Herve Alphand was also present and it seems to me he assisted them in communicating. I did happen to notice that the Kings of Norway, Sweden and Denmark were standing nearby and did not participate in their conversation.

Q: I noted that just after De Gaulle came in, Johnson stepped away from the receiving line and stood with General De Gaulle for at least two minutes in which they were obviously talking.

Moving on to your tour in Spain, you indicated your two main problems that you dealt with were the succession problem and US military presence. Would you care to comment on them?

DUKE: Yes, the item that was uppermost in everyone's mind was how Generalissimo Franco was going to arrange his succession. It was important that the embassy should be in contact with those who would inherit power and also those who would lead the opposition. I made it my policy to try to meet as many elements on the political scene as possible. This caused some problems. My old friend Antonio Garrigues came around one morning informally for coffee and to let me know that in his opinion I should not prejudice my otherwise good relations with the Franco government by fraternizing with opposition leaders. I thanked him for his interest and concern, and assured him I would, of course, accede to his government's request in that regard. However, I never heard anything further from official sources. That made me understand how unhappy the

government was with my opposition contacts but was not willing to prohibit them. So I went on doing it. I would have lunch with opposition figures at their residence or Bill Walker, my DCM, would give a luncheon at his house and I would attend. We would thus have an opportunity to exchange ideas about the future of Spain. In brief, we kept in touch with the opposition, and I also kept in touch with the members of the royal family such as Don Juan. He was living in exile in Portugal and on visits to our embassy in Lisbon I periodically sought him out to get his ideas on how the monarchy would play its role in the post-Franco period. And then whenever the young Juan Carlos, who had been named by the Generalissimo as the Prince of Spain, came to be generally accepted as the successor to Franco, I would call on him every month or two. So in that way it was quite possible to be on top of the situation. It was, I think, ill fortune for me that Franco didn't die when I was serving there. I would have loved to handle the succession for the American government; but that was not to be.

My other preoccupation was the American military presence. The bases agreement was scheduled to be renegotiated in 1965. I was very disheartened when late in January of that year President Johnson called me to come back "to be at his side" (as he put it) when he ran for reelection. His telephone call from the White House came during a dinner for American newspaper correspondents who were stationed in Madrid. I was totally surprised by his words but there was nothing I could say in reply other than: "Mr. President, I am in the middle of preparing for the base negotiations and I need time to disengage myself from the process," and he said, "How much time do you need?" I said, "Give me until April 1st," to which he replied, "I'll see you on April 1st."

I came home just before April 1st, on the last day of March and my wife and I were looking at the 8 o'clock broadcast speech of the President when he stated that he was not going to run.

I was very disappointed to be pulled out of the embassy in Spain before we got into the heart of the military negotiations. The base agreements were the most pressing problem we had in Spain. The opposition felt that the US military presence was an index of our support for Franco. The one serious mistake that had been made when we negotiated our agreement in 1952 was to place our major air base at Torrejon. To have such a large American presence so near to the Spanish capital was bound to make trouble and I am surprised in retrospect that it remained as a US base as long as it did. My job, of course, was to make it as palatable as possible.

Q: Angie, you had occasion to deal with General Franco; would you care to give us an assessment of the man and the leader as you saw him?

DUKE: Franco was a very surprising personality. He stands in sharp contrast to other more charismatic Mediterranean dictators. He was short, fat, bald and unprepossessing in appearance. He was very formal, official, even cold in manner. When I went to say goodbye on my farewell call he did not permit me to bring an interpreter or note-taker. We spent a whole half hour alone together and we discussed in detail and at some length

the problems in relations between our two countries. He was a career officer, a functionary and bureaucrat, and obviously had great intelligence and shrewdness, but certainly he was not electrifying to be with. When I told him my views on the US presence in Torrejon he wouldn't reply to me. I have read the account of his meeting with Hitler at the Pyrenees and how Hitler was exasperated with his uncommunicative manner. Well I had been there a few years and was used to his manner but wish to emphasize that I found him a most difficult personality.

Q: In retrospect, would you say that American relations with Spain were good at the time, and how would you say the future would lead American relations to be?

DUKE: There is no doubt but that Americans are held in warm regard. For one thing we are far away from the old, historic rivalries and conflicts that have marred Spain's relationships with England and France. We come into the orbit of the Spanish with an almost unmarked slate. Strangely they feel closer to Germany more than to any other European power. The German Federal Republic today and Spain are very close to each other. We are, because of our distance, and because we admire them as a people, our relations with Spaniards are quite good. However, the memories of the Spanish-American War are much more vivid to the Spanish people than they are to us. The fact that Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines are gone due to our intervention has lived on in many peoples' minds. The identification of the American government with the Franco government is also a source of friction. But this is counterbalanced by the admiration for our form of government and ideals; and on the whole our relations were good. They admired John F. Kennedy, for example. I learned this first-hand on an official visit to the ancient University of Salamanca. This was one of the very few times that I had a disagreeable reception during my entire time of service in Spain. When I was introduced, the students banged their desks and shuffled their feet and made it impossible for me to speak. Mind you, this was in a so-called police state. I waited for quite a long time, and the way I handled it was to bellow at the top of my voice, "John F. Kennedy, John F. Kennedy," and at that the audience of several hundred young people fell silent.

Q: Would you care to comment on your contacts with Juan Carlos?

DUKE: When you asked me to speak about Franco I haven't been very complimentary. That does not mean that I did not respect the Generalissimo; I respected him very much, and I respected the nature of his power and the importance he had for US-Spanish relations; and I made it my policy to get along with him. But I had a very different, very warm relationship with Don Juan Carlos of Spain. I would call on him at the Zarzuela Palace and we would have coffee alone, the two of us. He would talk to me very frankly about the relationship between himself and Franco and the relationship between himself and his father Don Juan. He would sometimes touch on his own vision of the future. He could be quite amusing and personal. Franco treated him like a school boy and often put him to various tests. One morning, on one of our regular visits, he told me he had just been through quite an experience. It was a Friday and the day on which he was scheduled for his weekly meeting with the Chief of State. On this occasion (just a few hours

previous) he was met by an El Pardo palace functionary who escorted him to an unfamiliar reception room. As two huge doors were thrown open, the Prince was told, "His Excellency the Generalissimo has requested that you preside in his place at the cabinet meeting today." Juan Carlos told me he took his seat and asked for the agenda. It went off quite well, but it was the type of thing that Franco would pull on him, testing him for his ability to handle himself.

Q: Moving on to your tour in Copenhagen, I assume that the role of Denmark in NATO was central to US concerns at the time.

DUKE: Yes. It was an interesting contrast to come from an isolated state to one that belonged to the European Community and the Western Alliance. Denmark was a member of the Common Market and of NATO and therefore I found myself in the mainstream of life in Europe. For me there were few problems about Denmark and the Common Market; and the Danish role in NATO was always a very minimal, marginal, one. While I was there I tried to have the Danes play a larger role in the common defense of Europe. For example, I tried to get the Danish fighter pilots to adapt their planes to carry marine mines. The geopolitical position of Denmark is such that in an emergency those mines could be dropped in the Skagerrak between the Baltic Sea and the North Sea which would effectively bottle up at least 40% of the Soviet fleet for up to several weeks. This was a brilliant idea and could put Denmark in a very important strategic position; but the Foreign Minister sat on it almost at once, saying it was unthinkable to so provoke the Soviet Union. I was respectful of their stand but critical of their unwillingness to live up to the implications of their alliance. That was what I was trying to do and I must report failure.

Q: Could you comment on contacts with the King and leaders of the country at the time?

DUKE: I presented my credentials to King Christian, who was a ceremonial figure with whom I did not otherwise connect much. I should emphasize that Americans were not very popular at the time because of the war in Vietnam.

The point of my story is that we had demonstrations against us, particularly when Vice President Humphrey was visiting me. I also had problems in meeting students at the universities in Copenhagen and Odense; they were hostile.

*Q: Moving on to Morocco. We'll cover that on the other side of the tape.
Would you describe the political and economic conditions when you arrived?*

DUKE: To go back a bit, John, from 1969 to 1979 I was out of government, working in the private sector in England and then as New York City Commissioner of Public Events (Chief of Protocol) in Mayor Beame's administration. In 1979, as President of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, a non-governmental agency, I was in my office at the Waldorf-Astoria when Cy Vance called me from the State Department to say that there was a problem with King Hassan II and would I accept an appointment to

be Ambassador to Morocco. It seems there had been a difficulty between the King and Ambassador Parker; Hassan would not receive him. They knew that I had had a good relationship with King Hassan dating back to my Protocol days and that I had kept up that relationship. I was really thrilled to be asked to come back into the State Department and, after consulting with my wife, said "Yes." The problem with my predecessor, Richard Parker, I soon found, was that he was an Arabist, spoke perfect Arabic, but he had also been stationed in Rabat some years before when a coup against the King had taken place. There were vague rumors circulating that the American Embassy, when Parker was then DCM, was in some way aware of the coup plot beforehand. It was also held against him that he had been Ambassador to Algiers previously and thus came from the "enemy camp". Just because of the eccentricity of the Chief of State this very able Foreign Service Officer had to leave. Due to that I was called into the breach and I resumed my relationship with Hassan to get things going again.

Immediately after arrival in December 1979 I was plunged into the arms sale issue and the related question of Morocco's war against the Polisarios in the western Sahara. I got into the first series of conversations with the King when I presented my credentials and I told him quite frankly that the conditions under which Congress would release arms for sale to the Moroccan military were tied to Moroccan willingness to negotiate with the Polisarios. As these monthly and sometimes weekly conversations with the King wore on, he began to take the position that indeed de facto negotiations were going on. In January 1980 he told me categorically that one of his most trusted and closest councilors was at that very moment meeting with high leadership elements of the rebel forces in Geneva. My cabled account of this assertion prompted my recall to Washington for consultation. I met with Secretary Vance, Walter Stoessel, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the relevant Assistant Secretary and Bureau Chief. They encouraged me to confer with key members of Congress, who turned out to be Senators Javits and Stone, and Congressman Solarz, among others. The upshot of all this was to take the King at his word and in return relax the arms sale ban. When General Haig succeeded Cy Vance in January 1981, I requested permission to stay on until the first arms delivery was made; and I was asked to do so. Accordingly I did not resign and leave my post until the first fighter plane was delivered in late March. Subsequently the new administration completely abolished the condition on arms sales.

When I retired from Morocco in 1981 I organized the Moroccan American Foundation, went on the board of The American Legation Museum in Tangier and have returned for royal weddings and the King's birthday ceremonies.

Since 1981 I have been active as Chairman of the United States-Japan Foundation (until 1986) and as Chancellor of Long Island University at Southampton, N.Y. I helped organize and am currently the Vice Chairman of the Council of American Ambassadors. I have served as an Official US Government Observer of the elections in El Salvador. As a member of the Foreign Service Association I maintain an active interest in and support for the Foreign Service of the United States.

End of interview