The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

THOMAS P. H. DUNLOP

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Initial interview date: July 12, 1996

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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is July 12, 1996. This is an interview with Harry Dunlop, a retired Foreign Service Officer. Harry, you've got a number of initials.

DUNLOP: Well, the real name that I was born with was Thomas P. H. Dunlop. Mercifully, I have been called "Harry" for most of my adult life.

Q: All right. I might say that Harry Dunlop and I are old friends. We go way back. In fact, we took Serbo-Croatian together at the Foreign Service Institute [FSI] back in 1961-1962. We'll come to that later. This interview is being conducted on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Harry, could you tell me something about where and when you were born and something about your parents?

DUNLOP: Sure. I was born in Washington, D. C., on June 12, 1934. Actually, not too many people that I've met can make that statement. My father's family lived in Chevy Chase, MD, and my mother's family, in North Carolina. They met and married, separated, and then were divorced shortly after my birth. She returned to North Carolina, to Asheville, in the western part of the state, where I was raised. So my family ties are really in North Carolina, for the most part. However, my parents' separation was relatively amicable. I visited my father up here in Washington frequently enough.

Q: What did your father do?

DUNLOP: Well, to be frank with you, my father really didn't have a career. He flitted from one thing to another. One of the reasons that my mother was very unhappy with him was that he did not seem to "get his teeth into anything." He is now dead, as is my mother. He remarried a very nice lady who is still living in Bethesda. I see her frequently. My father did not have any children by his second marriage. I had one brother, George, who unfortunately died of emphysema at age 51. He and I grew up in North Carolina as children of a single parent, our mother. She was a very diligent lady. At a time when there weren't very many single parents around, she chose not to remarry. She worked out a career for herself as a kindergarten proprietor/owner/teacher and did that for many years in Asheville, North Carolina.

Q: What was Asheville like when you were growing up there? I always think of Thomas Wolfe when I hear that name.

DUNLOP: Well, he was certainly Asheville's most famous son, unless you call Charley Justice [football player at the University of North Carolina and then in the National Football League] Asheville's most famous son.

Asheville was a small town. The advocates in the city were always predicting that it would explode in size and become a great megalopolis. Fortunately for Asheville, it did not. It had a population of about 55,000 people when I was growing up. It probably has about 75,000 now. It is the "service area" for western North Carolina, which is a much larger area.

I think that what's important about Asheville, among other things, is...

Q: I'm talking about when you were growing up.

DUNLOP: Yes, when I was growing up. Asheville was not an "old southern city." It only became really connected with the outside world in a meaningful way when the railroad was put through in the 1880's. In fact, "John Henry Steel Drivin' Man" was said to have been written by people working on the railroad tunnels that had to be built to reach the...

Q: You mean, "John Henry's Body."

DUNLOP: "John Henry's Body." What did I say?

Q: You said, "John Brown's Body." The song was...

DUNLOP: "John Henry Was a Steel Driving Man." Asheville was a town without an old southern tradition. There were some old southern families that had wandered up there. These people would remind you regularly of their southern background. However, a lot of people moved into Asheville from the Middle West. The climate was excellent. People retired there, and then the word spread. So it probably was more cosmopolitan than most southern towns at the time.

My family was definitely "middle class" and, perhaps, economically at the lower end of the "middle class." However, Mother was a very popular person, and so we were invited to a lot of parties at the country clubs, though we could never afford to join them.

Q: I think that there was probably more social "mingling" in those days because there really wasn't a tremendous, economic disparity between middle class families.

DUNLOP: Well, we drove Plymouth automobiles. The parents of friends of mine drove Buick's and so forth. I don't think that Asheville was a town that was terribly divided by social class. The Black population was small and did not prosper. They were a very poor

"underclass." Only about 10-12 percent of the city was Black, unlike a lot of other southern cities. You did not see very much of them when you drove around the town.

Asheville had a lively, intellectual life. There was a visiting cultural program every summer. It was a "tourist" city. That was the way that we were able to finance some of the cultural events in the city. I grew up, having an opportunity to see some ballet and to hear some first class opera and classical music.

Q: What about schooling?

DUNLOP: I went to a boarding school. Education was always a big thing in my family. My mother's father had been a professor, and one of her brothers was a professor at the University of Texas. She went into education as a kindergarten teacher and valued education a lot. So we were lucky enough to be able to get a scholarship to Asheville School for Boys, which was right on the outskirts of the city. I might as well have been on the moon, though. I was a little bit worried about that. I felt that I might be considered a "Mama's boy," but she left me alone out there.

It was a very good school, academically, for the intellectual life that was to follow, insofar as there was one. We did not have enough money to go outside the state for college. So I spent a great two years at the University of North Carolina [at Chapel Hill], which was fun.

Q: When did you enter the University of North Carolina?

DUNLOP: I was in the class of 1956 which, I guess, meant that I entered the university in the fall of 1952. I had a good, academic record and was well prepared for college at the Asheville School for Boys. The rigors of life at the University of North Carolina were not as great then as they have subsequently become. I finished most of my undergraduate work by the end of my sophomore year [1951], having gone to a couple of summer school sessions. People assumed that I would go on to law school. I didn't particularly feel that that was what I wanted to do.

At Asheville School for Boys I had had a teacher, a Yale alumnus who had always been disappointed that I hadn't gone on to Yale. He thought that I should have done that. With his help we were able to arrange for a "work scholarship" for two years at Yale. So I transferred to Yale in my junior year and graduated from there in 1956, with an undergraduate degree in international relations.

Q: Can you talk a little bit about the thrust of the teaching, both at the University of North Carolina in the field of international relations and then at Yale? Can you compare and contrast the two experiences?

DUNLOP: In general the academic standards at Yale were much stricter than they were at the University of North Carolina. At Yale they expected a lot more from the students.

You had to read and write a lot more. What you did and produced was more rigorously examined. I hadn't been working hard for an international relations degree at the University of North Carolina.

However, I had one very fortuitous and, for me, happy encounter at North Carolina. At one of the summer school sessions I took international law. There was a German named Ernst Frankel, "Herr Professor Doktor Ernst Frankel." He was a refugee from the Germany of the 1930's and was very much interested in reestablishing or, perhaps, introducing some of the American and British international relations and social studies into the German school system after World War II. While he became an American citizen, he reestablished contact with Germany and particularly the University of Berlin. He encouraged me to apply for a Fulbright Scholarship. Others at Yale also did this, and I was able to obtain such a scholarship. That was one thing that North Carolina gave me. I don't know what would have happened, had I not had that opportunity and encouragement to get a Fulbright Scholarship.

Q: During this time, when you were studying international relations, did you learn anything about the Foreign Service?

DUNLOP: At some point, yes, though I can't identify it. Perhaps this happened a little bit earlier than I might remember specifically, because there were some retired Foreign Service people in Asheville, with whom my mother was acquainted. I remember some occasions when we visited them and maybe had lunch with some of these people. I'm sure that the subject of entering the Foreign Service was mentioned. However, I cannot identify or recall specifically when I said to myself, "Hey, that's something that I want to consider seriously."

By the time I was in my junior year at Yale [1955-1956], I had been drawn to consider the Foreign Service as a career, however that had happened.

Q: Did you get any encouragement from Yale to consider the Foreign Service?

DUNLOP: Yes, generally speaking. The international relations faculty at Yale was headed by Arnold Wolfers, who was a great disciple of Hans Morgenthau. Maybe "disciple" isn't the right word, but they were of much the same mind. We used Morgenthau's textbooks. Morgenthau, of course, was at the University of Chicago. At least, I believe that he was still at the University of Chicago in those days when Wolfers was head of the International Relations Department at Yale.

I can't recall any sort of "key" conversation at Yale, but a lot of my fellow students were aware of and thinking about the Foreign Service. I began to think about it, too, and was very much attracted to it. After all, the "Cold War" had a rather romantic ring to it for a young southern male.

Q: So in 1956 you graduated from Yale and took up your Fulbright Scholarship?

DUNLOP: I graduated from Yale in 1956 and also took the Foreign Service exam. I took this exam, along with a Graduate Record exam for the Law School. I still had an open mind about what I wanted to do. It wasn't really clear to me what my preference would be.

I also talked to a CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] recruiter at Yale. One of the very senior faculty members asked me over for a sherry one night. [Laughter] That is literally what happened!

Q: I know. I went through that at Williams College.

DUNLOP: He asked me if I had ever considered the field of intelligence. I thought to myself, "No, what's that?" No, actually, I knew more than that. He was a wonderful man, whom I knew and respected. If he said that I should take a shot at it, the very fact that he was personally the kind of man that he was made me decide to do that, too. So I took an exam for the CIA. I also had a commitment to serve for three years in the Air Force, as I had been in the Air Force ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps] at Yale. And I applied for the Fulbright Scholarship. So all of those things were "on the table." There was the prospect of service in the US Air Force; the Fulbright Scholarship, which would delay anything that I did; I had a growing interest in foreign affairs; and then there were the other two possibilities, that is, service with the CIA and the State Department.

Q: So what happened?

DUNLOP: Well, I took the Foreign Service exam and passed. I took the oral exam and passed it. During the oral exam they had asked me what my plans were. After they told me that I had passed it, I told them that I had a commitment to serve in the military. They understood that. I also said that I had the offer of a Fulbright Scholarship, which I wanted to take. Fortuitously, I had a lot of luck at that time. This was a time when the Foreign Service wasn't taking in very many junior officers. So they were very happy to postpone my appointment as a Foreign Service Officer to a later date. So they said, "Let's see, that's one year under the Fulbright Scholarship and three years in the Air Force. How would you like to be on the list to be brought into the Foreign Service in 1960?" That was just fine with me.

The Air Force was also perfectly prepared to postpone for one year my date for going on active duty while I took up the Fulbright Scholarship. So I really "lucked out."

Q: Let's talk about the oral exam for the State Department first. Can you remember anything about it, just to get a feel for what you went through?

DUNLOP: Well, I remember that I had a feeling of great trepidation. I had never taken an examination like that before. A little later on, I went through something similar with the

CIA, but the Foreign Service oral exam was the first experience of this kind which I had had.

For the Foreign Service oral I believe that there were five people in the room when I came in. They looked "ancient" to me. They looked like Methuselahs. Several of them had mustaches and white hair. They looked like what I expected of them. They were very courteous and formal. There was certainly a lot of formality in this exam. They didn't say anything like, "Take off your coat, sit down, and have a drink, Harry." They asked a lot of questions about my motivation, why I wanted to enter the Foreign Service. I had rather expected to be examined on how many tributaries does the Amazon River have or what's the principal export of Chile. Or they might ask me what I considered the five most important, diplomatic events of the 19th century. Maybe there were a few questions like that, interleaved in, but there was not so much focus on that as on why I wanted to be a Foreign Service Officer, what I had done to prepare myself for that, and how serious was I. They wanted to know what my other employment options were and what did I think would happen to me in the Foreign Service if I joined it. Did I expect to get rich, did I expect to become an Ambassador in a couple of years, and did I expect to have a big house with a wide veranda and big fans turning overhead, with gin and tonics served every afternoon at 5:00 PM? They asked just what was in my mental image of the Foreign Service.

Q: Where did you go for your Fulbright Scholarship?

DUNLOP: I went to Berlin and to Germany, which was something that Professor Frankel urged me to do. What Frankel, in fact, told me was that if "we" at the Higher School of Politics associated with the Free University of Berlin should get an inquiry from the Fulbright people about me, they would say, "Yes, he will be admitted." So that was a great incentive for me to say that that was where I wanted to go. Of course, I had told the Fulbright people all of this. I'm sure that that also helped them to make a decision.

I must say that Fulbright Scholarships weren't all that hard to get in those days. I don't know how many Fulbright scholars may have been in Germany when I was there. There may have been 150 or so.

Q: So you were in Germany from 1956 to...?

DUNLOP: Yes, I was there for the academic year 1956-1957.

Q: For one thing it must have been a rather exciting time. I was in the Consulate General in Frankfurt at the time, figuring out how to get American citizens out of Germany, if we went to war as a result of the Hungarian uprising of October, 1956.

DUNLOP: I did something very foolish on the night of the great confrontation between the students and the East German authorities in 1956. You may have had me on your list

of people to get out of some place in East Germany. It's amusing, and I won't take too much time with it, but it was foolish and typical of young students at the time.

Q: Could you explain a bit about what happened?

DUNLOP: Well, I had gotten to Berlin on about October 10, 1956. The big events in Hungary had taken place at the end of October, 1956, and then spilled over into the first week of November. The Soviet "re-invasion" of Hungary took place on the night of November 5, 1956 and was public knowledge. Everybody knew that was happening. There was a vast demonstration in West Berlin. Willy Brandt was the Acting Mayor of West Berlin. I guess that there was a vacancy in the office of Mayor. He hadn't yet become Mayor of Berlin as such. He delivered a very emotional address to a great crowd in West Berlin that evening. Many students from the Free University, including myself, had gone to hear his speech. Torches were being passed out, and it was all very exciting. Huge Hungarian flags had been draped across the front of the Rathaus Schöneberg (City Hall) Mayor's Office in West Berlin. These flags all had the communist symbol actually cut out of the middle.

I was with friends whom I had just met. One of them was somewhat older than I and spoke better German. He and I decided that we would go over to East Berlin after this rally to see what was happening there. We supposedly had unhindered access to East Berlin. We were American citizens, and the East German police at border checkpoints were supposed to let us through without any questioning. We were supposed to be able to roam around East Berlin as we wanted to, as long as we behaved ourselves. Of course, in practice, on a night like this, it was not the wisest thing to do. We entered East Berlin and decided fairly quickly that it looked pretty grim. There were a lot of police on the streets and so forth. We walked back down Unter den Linden--about two kilometers--toward the Brandenburg Gate, at Pariserplatz, which was one of the border crossing checkpoints and through which we normally would return to West Berlin.

We had taken the U-Bahn [subway] over to East Berlin. We got out, looked around, and decided that this wasn't much "fun." By then we were about two kilometers on the eastern side of the border between East and West Berlin. We were on the Unter den Linden and started walking back toward the West. We were not aware that the crowd, which had been excited by this speech by Willy Brandt and was otherwise angered, upset, and very combative, had gathered at the Brandenburger Tor [Brandenburg Gate] at the end of Unter den Linden. They were throwing rocks at the East German police stations. Here we were, walking up behind the police. Well, it was "bad" to be there, but it was "good" for us because all of the attention of the East German police was focused away from us.

We realized very late on this particular occasion that we had passed about two cordons of East German police. In fact, there were Soviet armored personnel carriers in the streets. We were wearing raincoats and were carrying briefcases. We looked sort of nondescript. We decided to try to walk right on through Checkpoint Charlie into Pariserplatz in West Berlin. By God, we did it! I suspect that if any German police had turned around and

looked at us hard, they would have stopped us. Then you would have gotten the message that, somehow or other, some Fulbright "idiots" screwed up and were being held in East Berlin on grounds of espionage. I suppose that we could have been charged with checking on the defenses of the German Democratic Republic.

However, we got back into West Berlin. It was a pretty dumb thing to do, and I vowed to myself never to be quite that dumb again. I don't know that I ever was.

Q: What did you get out of the Free University of Berlin?

DUNLOP: I learned a lot of German, which was all to the good. I made some good friends. I had my first experience in living abroad, which was all to the good. I more or less had to fend for myself. There weren't any big, "mother hens" around to take care of me. I had to find my own apartment and get my own ID cards. Of course, in the Germany of those days I was all alone in dealing with this bureaucratic process. I had to sign up for my classes and find out where they were. In fact, they were all scattered throughout the city.

As far as the academic work was concerned, I focused on modern German history. I was only there for two semesters. I only had a chance, I think, to take six or seven classes. The first couple of months were pretty much a waste, because of the language barrier. They did not produce any syllabuses which I could take home and read. At least, I didn't discover that they had them until later on, when I found that I could, in fact, purchase course syllabuses. Of course, this was what the German students had all done.

Academically, it was interesting to me to hear Germans begin to talk about the recent past in Germany. This was in 1956, only 11 years after the Battle of Berlin, the rape of the city, the horrors of the destruction of Dresden, and all of that. The Germans were struggling to come to grips with these events. I think that they did so in a responsible kind of way. I took a course which particularly impressed me in this connection, called, "The German Resistance Movement." There was such a movement, although perhaps the principal fact to remember about the German resistance movement was that it failed to overthrow the Hitler regime.

There were two professors who came in and lectured to us on this subject. I think that they presented the German Resistance Movement as, perhaps, more of a factor than it really was. However, perhaps that is natural. It's a little like a Southerner talking about the military side of the American Civil War. Well, the Confederates fought very well in many battles, but, guess what, "We lost." However, all of this was very interesting. I would say that it matured me in a very useful way. I think that any student going abroad, unless he encounters some kind of personal "disaster" or unfortunate event, is going to come away as a more mature person, more aware of other cultures. It left me with an enduring interest in Central Europe.

Q: Did you have much contact with German students there? What was...

DUNLOP: That's interesting, of course, because one of the great traps is that, mainly because of the language barrier but because of some cultural reasons also, you find yourself beginning to associate mainly with other foreign students and especially with Americans. I certainly did a lot of that. I think that there was some uneasiness and some feeling of "guilt" among some of us for doing so. We made extra efforts to make German friends in the university where we were studying, since it was a German university. The purpose was to break out of the "foreign student" circle. Was I totally successful? No, I wasn't.

I spent a lot of time with the foreign students. I had two girlfriends, one of whom was German and the other one was an American. That determines a lot of what you're going to do. My two girlfriends were quite different. I enjoyed the friendship with both of them, so that I think very kindly of them both.

I knew American students who did less than I did in that regard. I knew some that did more. I guess that I was in the middle of that spectrum.

Q: Did you find differences in attitude among the Germans that you knew than you would have found, say, at Yale?

DUNLOP: Well, there were a lot of differences toward study, which was one of the things that surprised me. There was no rigorous process of evaluating students as they went through the university, until they reached their final year. This reflects the traditional, European university system. If you're going on to a university, they go through this strict, "lycee" system, where students are held to a high standard. They are reviewed and tested and have to write papers and all of that stuff. When they get to the university, that system sort of disappears. You have something called a "student book." The professor is supposed to sign it at the end of each class. Depending on the kind of class that it is, there may be no paper to prepare, and there may be no real interaction between you and the professor. In that sense, it can be a very automatic process.

I remember thinking that I didn't know what it would be like when I got to the end of the process. You were supposed to have all of this knowledge and then you went through a series of oral examinations, which were quite rigorous. I thought that the American university system was better. That is one aspect that was different in the German universities. It is, of course, dangerous to make generalizations about national character. However, some of the things that I might have expected to find in Germany were due to the fact that other people had noted them. They existed. The Germans are a very thorough and meticulous group of people. They tend to do things "by the numbers."

At the time I was there, Berlin was still very much a "destroyed city." The "economic miracle" of West Germany had not quite touched West Berlin. However, the Germans were very stoic about dealing with their terribly cramped housing conditions. For example, this German girl that I dated for a while lived under really "bad" conditions.

You would hope that you or your daughter would never have to live that way. For example, she had no hot and cold, running water. It was just one of those little things.

I liked the Germans. Not every German, but I liked a lot of them because I really thought that you got pretty much what you saw. They were not devious people. If they liked you, you could pretty well find that out. They might be a little bit stiff and formal at first. If they had a racial prejudice, as many of them still did, that would come out pretty quickly. If you wanted to discard a relationship because somebody said, "Well, why do you let the Niggers get away with such things in the States," you might say, "Well, what the hell, I'm not going to bother with this person." Anyhow, the beer was good. [Laughter] The Germans have a sense of relaxation that is fun, too. The great example of that, of course, is the "Oktoberfest." This may be a little more popular in southern than in northern Germany. However, when a German wants to go out and have a good time, he can probably manage to do that easily.

Q: Perhaps I should say that "Oktoberfest" was the only time in my life when a girl pinched my behind. [Laughter] It was somebody that I didn't know. She just reached down and pinched! [Laughter]

DUNLOP: These are things that you remember.

Q: So you completed your Fulbright Scholarship in 1957 and then went on active duty in the Air Force.

DUNLOP: Yes, they gave me an assignment right back to Europe. I was back in the States less than one month. This European assignment in the Air Force was a remarkable time. It was very fortuitous. I had so much good luck, it needn't have happened that way. I got a telegram assigning me to a place, Laon, which I couldn't even find on a map. I didn't even know what country it was in.

I finally made a phone call to the Air Force personnel people in Washington. They told me that Laon was in France. They said that if I got a map of France, I would find out where it was.

So I was sent to France, where I spent about 18 months, and then about 12 months back in West Germany. Then I was given an "early release" from service. In 1960 the Air Force was cutting back on personnel, and I came back to the States and was discharged there. Then I joined the Foreign Service.

Q: What were you doing, what was your specialty in the Air Force?

DUNLOP: I had an intelligence specialty. My MOS [Military Operational Specialty] number was in intelligence. Perhaps it was good luck, but perhaps the Air Force was looking at my language background and the fact that I had majored in international relations.

My first job was quite different from my second job. I really did two different things. I was first assigned to an airfield to a Bomber Wing that flew the twin-engined "Canberra" jet bombers. It was operational and had a combat role if a war had begun in Western Europe. Our Wing was not in training. It was supposed to be operationally "ready." The Wing maintained a very rigorous training schedule. The intelligence function which I handled was what they called "combat intelligence." This involved maintaining such things as "target folders." Before any pilot took off in his aircraft, he was given a "target folder," which told him all of the essentials which he needed to know to fly his mission. This included maps and radio direction finding details. It also included, although this was not my business to put in there, what was known about the "enemy" defenses. In other words, where the anti-aircraft and fighter defenses were. I was expected to "brief" the aircrews periodically. We had "tests," when they were "tested" on these things. We had Air Force aircraft recognition problems, with these neat little black, plastic models of "enemy" aircraft, especially MiG-15 fighter aircraft.

The aircrews were made up of nice folks. I liked working with them. They had a big job to do. They were nice to me as a relatively "brash" Second Lieutenant, not really dry behind the ears. This made my job a lot easier.

Q: What was the feeling about the Soviet threat, particularly from your vantage point?

DUNLOP: Well, we felt that it was real. I think that these aircrews knew that they were unlikely to return from their first missions. They were very much aware that if a war began, it was going to be terrible, particularly for the Western Alliance. The Air Force was going to do its job as best it could.

We had a problem with atomic weapons. This was a Wing whose mission was to deliver atomic weapons on specific targets which were mainly airfields and communications facilities related to the infrastructure of Soviet installations in Central Europe. Because of the French refusal to allow atomic weapons storage on their territory, our aircraft had to fly somewhere else to pick the weapons up. I guess that I won't say where that was, although the Soviets knew. Right now that's still a classified secret. They would have to fly somewhere else, get their weapons, and then fly their combat missions. That would have allowed a lot of time for the Soviets to work "Holy Hell" in Western Europe. Certainly, the airfield that we were at would not be there for our aircraft to come back to.

There was a real feeling that the situation was going to be "bad," if war with the Soviet Union broke out. This wasn't something which was whipped up in some sort of artificial fashion. We knew the Soviet order of battle. We knew how many aircraft they had and where they were, where their missile defenses were, and so forth. Some Soviet missiles were coming off the production line at the time. They were early models, but there were some.

It was our job to "attrit" the overwhelming ground force that the Soviets had, but it was going to be tough.

Q: What was your second job?

DUNLOP: The Air Force decommissioned the "Canberra" twin-engined jet bombers from the active duty inventory. Therefore, the Wing I was serving with was deactivated. Those of us who were in Europe and still had time to go on a European tour were reassigned in Europe. To my great good fortune, I was assigned to Headquarters, US Air Forces Europe. At that time it was located at Ramstein Air Force Base in West Germany. I was again assigned to intelligence but doing "headquarters stuff," preparing briefing books for the general officers there, etc.

We also maintained what was called a "24 Hour Warning and Indications Watch." This was a system which the US instituted after Pearl Harbor [in 1941]. It was a joint services operation to provide just what it said, early indications of a surprise attack. This was, perhaps, even more important as the Soviet capability to deliver nuclear weapons became greater. That was our job, and it was fun to do. We also had a lot of "shift work" to do. However, I really look back on those duties as involving wonderful times. I made a lot of good friends. This was a job which we thought was worth doing. We had some help from older, more experienced people to get us through situations where we didn't know what to do. People were very helpful to me.

Q: Then you left the Air Force in 1960?

DUNLOP: Yes. I was sent back to the United States in 1960. A letter awaited me to report one month later, in April, 1960, to the Department of State in Washington to attend the A-100 Basic Officers Course at the Foreign Service Institute [FSI].

Q: So you came into the Foreign Service in April, 1960. Could you talk a little bit about the A- 100 course, the introductory course for junior officers? Could you discuss the people attending it at that time, how it worked, the preparations you had to make, and maybe your outlook at the time?

DUNLOP: We had 26 officers in our class. I think that I am correct in saying that, at that time, we were generally a little bit younger and a little bit less well-equipped with graduate degrees or work experience than may have been the case later on. We had only one Ph. D. in the class, a man named Harry Thayer, who had done his Ph. D. dissertation in Japanese studies. We all regarded him with great awe. We only had one woman, which is far from what would be the case now. I think that we may have had five or six married officers. Anne Pinkney, our only woman officer, was not married. The rest of us were bachelors.

Most of us had had military service, which might not be the case today. However, we didn't have much else to offer, and that fit me. I was pretty typical in that regard. I didn't

have a master's degree. I had, perhaps, a year of graduate study, but it hadn't resulted in any formal degree. I had had 2 ½ years of military service. The geographic dispersion of our class was from right across the country. There was no particular pattern of school background. If people think that the Foreign Service of 1960 still reflected an "Eastern elitist" outlook, I think that this was not true, at least as far as my class was concerned. I had graduated from Yale, but I had spent only two years there and considered myself a "North Carolina boy."

Q: One of the things that I have often noted in these interviews is that there is a common view that too many people in the Foreign Service came from Yale and that the Department of State wasn't getting the right "geographic spread." However, as a practical measure, at least up until relatively recent times, people entering the Foreign Service came from all over. Many of them came from families where the parents hadn't gone to college, my own included. They came from other places but went to Yale, Harvard, or wherever because these were people who were inspired to seek greater, intellectual stimulation. In many ways, you had to go to schools like that to get the best education. It didn't indicate that it involved either a "social" or an "Eastern" bias. That's just the way things were.

DUNLOP: Well, I was one of those guys who wound up at Yale for some of those reasons. However, I know that I was the only Yale man in that particular group of 26 officers, 25 males and one female. Yale at that time was not "coed." We had a lot of people from universities in California, including two people from the University of California at Berkeley and two from somewhere else. I forget the exact names of the schools. Well, Stanford University was one of them. We had an officer from the University of Texas. There were a couple of officers from the University of Michigan. I don't have a good feel for the actual dispersion because I no longer have their names available. However, I know that it was a pretty representative group of people. There were no Blacks in the class. There were Black officers in the Foreign Service, and I roomed with one shortly after I left the Foreign Service Institute. He was in the next FSI A-100 class.

Q: What did you learn from that class? What was your impression of the Foreign Service from what you were hearing?

DUNLOP: I don't think that we all learned a lot about the Foreign Service in the A-100 class. If so, I can't remember it. [Laughter] There wasn't any "pass" or "fail" in the course. There was a graduation ceremony at the end of the course, including a "valedictory talk" given to us by Theodore Achilles, a senior officer who later became a Career Ambassador. He seemed to be a wonderfully pleasant and friendly man. I remember only one thing that he said, which was, "I want you young people to know that you have not signed an unbreakable contract with the people of the United States, in Congress assembled. I hope that the terms of your service will continue to improve throughout your career, as they have improved throughout mine. However, you serve at the pleasure of the

people. They can pay you more or less. They can do anything that they want to do." And I remembered that. [Laughter]

Generally speaking, the terms of service have improved during my career, but this is not something which the younger officers now entering should expect to "demand" or "require." Their option is to quit.

Q: Did you have any country where you wanted to go or anything that you wanted to do at the time you graduated from the FSI?

DUNLOP: I had just come out of this experience with the Air Force in Europe and in Germany. The Cold War was very much in my mind. I had been in Berlin. I had been in the Air Force, and the Soviet military threat was very apparent. I wanted to stay in that area of service. I had very little interest in, say, Latin America, where I had never lived or traveled. I didn't know anything at all about Asia.

My hope was to return eventually to Germany. German was the one foreign language that I felt comfortable in. I think that, without exception, for the rest of my 34 years in the Foreign Service, I applied for a German posting at every opportunity but never got one.

Q: What assignment did you get when you graduated from the FSI?

DUNLOP: I was a very unhappy camper. When we all went and saw our postings listed there, I learned that I was assigned to Washington. I didn't want to be assigned to Washington, for crying out loud! I was assigned to Personnel!
Q: Oh, God!

DUNLOP: It was the last place that I wanted to be. All of my other friends in the FSI class were being assigned to Frankfurt, Tegucigalpa, and places like that. I just wanted to go away and hide.

Sandy Peaslee, a middle grade officer who was the very pleasant and helpful "mother hen" of the FSI class, perhaps he was called its Director, kept assuring me that I had one of the "plum" assignments. This was because Washington Personnel could pick the people assigned there, that I was "in" with the system, and that I could influence the rest of my career. There may have been some truth to that, but it certainly was hard for me to accept.

I went into Personnel in the section handling Washington assignments. [Laughter] Well, somebody has to do it. Later, I was given responsibility for at least the initial screening and selection of Foreign Service Staff personnel for the Benelux countries [Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg], Switzerland, and Italy. I did learn something useful there about how the personnel system worked. No question about that. Officer selection was going on all around me, and I understood something about that.

Q: Personnel assignments is a very good place to learn the system. I did it later on, and you "dine" on it for the rest of your career.

DUNLOP: But I didn't welcome it at the time. I had a perfectly pleasant working experience. This was supposed to be a two year tour. As this time came to an end and my ongoing assignment was coming up, I was able to find out what was coming next a little easier than some people. It's not true that assignments are "hidden" somewhere in some little vault and then taken out and shown to a few. They're all available, now even more so than then. I was certainly able to identify where the opportunities for assignment were, and they looked pretty good.

I was able to get an assignment to Yugoslavia via Serbo-Croatian language training. I had paid one short visit to Yugoslavia during my student days in West Germany. At the time I thought that Yugoslavia was a country deeply involved in the Cold War and on the cutting edge of European developments. I wasn't averse to learning a Slavic language. I thought that one Slavic language was not unlike another, which was absolutely true. Had I ever had the opportunity to serve in the Soviet Union or Poland and had been sent to study Russian or Polish, my having studied Serbo-Croatian would have helped a lot.

Q: If we may return to talking about your assignment to Personnel, you were working mainly with Foreign Service Staff positions?

DUNLOP: At the time these included mainly Foreign Service secretaries and communicators.

Q: What was your impression of the people involved in these assignments? Were there problems in trying to get Foreign Service posts staffed with people in these categories?

DUNLOP: That's an interesting question. One thing that struck me right away was that of the four countries involved, five, if you consider Luxembourg a "country," as it surely is, the place that we had the hardest time keeping staff was Switzerland. This was particularly the case with secretaries. They might go there, thinking that this was a wonderful assignment, a clean, safe country with Alps and skiing. However, they found an assignment there very cold and lonely. Since they were not necessarily in the Foreign Service for "career" reasons but rather to earn a living, travel abroad, and make friends, they found the loneliness very difficult to deal with. At least that's what I concluded after a time.

People, and especially Foreign Service secretaries, frequently contacted the Department, wanting to "break" their assignments in Switzerland. That is, they wanted to leave Switzerland early. In the case of people who had been in the Foreign Service for a little while and who had served in other countries but knew people who had served in Switzerland, you would contact them and say that you had a wonderful assignment for them in, say, Berne. There would be a long silence. Arranging for staff assignments to Switzerland was difficult. I don't think that living conditions were difficult in

Switzerland. People just found that it was hard to get to know people, harder than they had hoped it would be. There wasn't a large, foreign community. I guess that the Embassy was fairly busy, but loneliness was a problem.

Otherwise, I think that the Foreign Service has always been blessed with good secretaries. The secretaries, who were mainly women in those days, although there are more men now, were very competent and hard working people. We didn't have too many problems like alcoholism, unexpected pregnancies, or things like that which required people to leave. Occasionally, there would be cases of illness, but no more than any other segment of the population. The people who wanted to leave Switzerland would just say, "I'm sick of this place! I'm tired of it. I can't do this any more." And we would have to deal with it.

Q: Let's talk about your Serbian-Croatian language training. For the record, Harry and I went through this at the same time. It was a fairly intimate period of a year. I would like to have your impression of it and the people who were also taking the course with you.

DUNLOP: We had a really good group, present company excluded, at least me. They were really an unusually bright group of people. Other members of the class included Larry Eagleburger [later Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Secretary of State]; David Anderson [who also became an Ambassador to Yugoslavia later on]; Jim Lowenstein, who later became Ambassador to Luxembourg; Stu Kennedy, who became the most distinguished consular officer in the Foreign Service [Laughter]; and Harry Dunlop, who just "soldiered on." [Laughter]

Q: You left out Dick Johnson.

DUNLOP: Was he in the class? I don't think that he was in the class.

Q: Yes, he was.

DUNLOP: OKAY, Dick Johnson. Anyway, they were a bunch of good people. I enjoyed them. The training was unusual and different for me. I think that it was different for everybody. This was the first time I had gone through Foreign Service language training. Serbian is certainly a language which is quite different from English, German, or French, to which I had some exposure. Perhaps it is more like Latin. During my school days I had fiercely resisted absorbing any Latin. Serbian is highly inflected.

The training procedure used was the "audio-lingual training method." This system was developed during World War II, partly at Yale in the Institute of Far Eastern Languages and Linguistics, but at other places as well. Like Indiana, for Slavic languages. I think that it is a good method. It has now been modified a lot. I had no quarrel with the methodology. We had two teachers, Mr. Jankovic and Mr. Popovic, who were quite different. I felt that Jankovic was an excellent teacher. I thought that Popovic was a terrible teacher.

Q: Yes, I agree.

DUNLOP: I think that this was the general view in our class. We had a supervising linguist who didn't do much supervising, Charley Sheehan. There was a good syllabus or whatever you call it, perhaps conversation book. It has been improved since then. I learned a good deal of Serbian and I think that we all did. Stu, what would be your evaluation of the teaching at the FSI at that time?

Q: I think that the teaching, particularly by Popovic, was of uneven quality. You remember that, at one point, we had a near "revolt." I think that Larry Eagleburger, later to be the first Foreign Service Officer to be Secretary of State, led our group in protesting that we did not want to have Popovic the whole time. Aside from the language teaching, and I think that this is something that will come up later during your career, it really only dawned on me many, many years later that the principal problem was the exposure to Popovic. He had been a Royal Serbian Army officer. His descriptions of executions and of the Serbs gave me an insight into a Serb mentality that you didn't particularly get at the Embassy. After knowing this guy, I could understand the horror stories that we have been hearing out of Serbia, literally today, as they exhume graves.

DUNLOP: That's true.

Q: I got this impression from Popovic who, in many ways, was a nice enough man, but absolutely "impossible" as far as nationalism was concerned.

DUNLOP: This pair, Jankovic and Popovic, were very interesting people. They were both from the same town, had married sisters...

Q: They came from the town of Sabac.

DUNLOP: Sabac. They had married sisters, they had opened a law practice together, they had served in the same cavalry regiment, or whatever it was, in the Royal Yugoslav Army, which was mainly a Serbian army. Together, they had bought the first automobile in their hometown, Sabats. As you remember, they were very different. Jankovic was a gentle man, a gentleman in every sense of that word, including both the literal and social sense.

In many ways he was a man whose life had been destroyed by World War II. He had barely escaped with his family from Communist Yugoslavia. He came to the FSI determined to do the very best that he could do to make a new life in the United States. So what did he do? He became a language teacher. He took it seriously.

Popovic's life had been affected in exactly the same way. However, his attitude toward the world was sort of, "screw you." Being a "rough edged" man, all of these things that you mentioned came out very easily, regarding his absolutely and blindly one-sided view of history and of the world that he lived in. He made very little contribution to the class

because he wasn't interested in the class. He was teaching there because he had to do something to support himself. At least that was my view of him.

Jankovic and Popovic lived in the same house. Can you imagine that?

Q: Yes. [Laughter] As you were going through the class, what was your impression of Yugoslavia? Could you explain the general view of Yugoslavia at the time?

DUNLOP: Well, when I came to the class, I knew intellectually and academically very little about Yugoslavia. However, I began to read into its background, as we all did. As I said earlier, I had taken one trip to Yugoslavia in the spring of 1957. I had a little extra time during the spring break at my university in Berlin. I went alone by train down to Belgrade and returned to Berlin.

My mental image of Yugoslavia then was of a poor, poor country, with a heavy police presence on the streets. The people that I met just casually in trains and public places were very reluctant to talk to me. There was an oppressive air about the country. None of this impression came from any contacts with the Embassy or other places. I did not have the view of Yugoslavia which, I think, some people had who had never even walked around the streets of Belgrade. That is, this sort of joyous, new socialist approach which was going to carve out a new way toward the future. This, of course, is the way that the Yugoslav Government and Marshal Tito wanted to present it.

At FSI, I got a big dose of Serbian nationalism, and despite the excesses of it, I came to believe that the Serbs had been badly treated by history. I didn't have a very good feeling about the Croatians, having spent 10 months listening to graphic descriptions of eyeballs in jars on the desks of Ustashi officers [the Ustashi were supporters of Croat nationalism].

Q: We also heard about genocide in Serbia.

DUNLOP: Remember the burning of the church at Glina? I think that I came away from the class pretty well equipped to speak Serbian, but with the "area" lectures a lot of the "hagiography" of Tito was contained in those area studies classes. That is, the Fitzroy Maclean [British officer assigned to Yugoslavia for liaison purposes with Tito during World War II] view that Tito was the lone "good guy" in the Balkans. The guy who had finally triumphed over adversity because he was a man of vision, a great leader, and a man of great dignity who would then go on to do great things for his people.

Some of that view is true, but a lot of it isn't true. However, I think that I came away from this initial trip to Yugoslavia with much of that. I had to "unlearn" this. The degree to which I had to "unlearn" it came later on.

Q: Our class graduated when, in 1962?

DUNLOP: Yes. Remember that I was dropped from the class in March, 1962, because the Department closed the Consulate in Sarajevo, thereby eliminating one slot to which a Serbian-Croatian language officer could have been assigned for the following year. I don't know whether the personnel people drew straws or what, but I was the man who was told that I would have to wait a year before going to Yugoslavia.

What I resented about that was being taken out of the language class at that point. I was still scheduled to go to Yugoslavia eventually, and I was in the last two months of the class, when, I thought, the class time would be the most profitable to my knowledge of the language. I never understood why that was done.

Q: Where did you go?

DUNLOP: The Department had to find some place for me, so they "stashed" me in one of the worst places I ever worked in the Department. In fact, I can hardly describe it as "working." It was an office in the "E" Bureau [Bureau of Economic Affairs], preparing for the next round of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations. Maybe there are some economists who will listen to this and who will think that that would have been a wonderful place. But I didn't. They really didn't have a lot of work for me to do in that office. Later I got a useful assignment out of it, but that was just a "holding" place. The personnel people said, "Look, we're sorry about this unusual event. Assignment cycles begin in August, and this is March. Go over to the E Bureau and see if you can help them out." Well, I don't think that there was that much for me to do there, at the time.

Then, in the summer of 1962 I was assigned as a Staff Assistant in the office of Jeffrey Kitchen, the then Director of "Pol-Mil" [the Office of Political-Military Affairs]. That was the office which was going to be deeply involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis. So I was a Staff Assistant at the time and in a fairly high level office, on the Sixth Floor of the Department. It's the only time that I had such an assignment. It was probably the most pleasant circumstances that I could think of for working in such a job.

I can look back on other people that I know and other Staff Assistants I have seen in other jobs in the Department. I think that I would not have enjoyed any of them as much as I did this particular job.

Q: You were in Political-Military Affairs from 1962 to 1963?

DUNLOP: I would say from August or early September, 1962, until the next assignment cycle in June, 1963, when I was sent, in fact, to Yugoslavia.

Q: What was "Pol-Mil" doing in those days?

DUNLOP: The man who had responsibility for it at the most senior, or "Seventh Floor" level in the Department for the relationship with the Pentagon and for all of those

enormously complex and sometimes contentious issues related to that was U. Alexis Johnson [Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs]. His office symbol was "G." Johnson was an extremely able officer. There were plenty of good officers around, but he was certainly one of the top people. He was a man to whom then Secretary of State Rusk looked to "go into the ring" with the "military tigers," carrying his chair and a very short whip and trying to make sure that State Department interests were represented.

Johnson needed help in this regard and so set up a sub-office called "PM" [Office of Political-Military Affairs]. So the office I went to was "G/PM." He picked another, very able man to head that office, Jeffrey Kitchen. Jeff Kitchen had had a lot of experience in Turkey and the Middle East. He also had a broad knowledge of our military establishment.

There were three Staff Assistants in that office. One of them was Winston Lord, who later on became and is now Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The third Staff Assistant, and a very able man, was Abe Ashkenazi. The three of us had the usual "dog's body" stuff [errand running] to do. However, there were also interesting things to do. We would come in early, sort out the overnight cables, keep Kitchen's appointment books, run errands as directed, and make sure that the agendas for meetings were distributed, properly recorded, and so forth. That is typical of what Staff Assistants do.

We also had some very able people working in that office in substantive jobs. For example, guys like Colonel "Robby" Robinson and George Newman. Sey Weiss was there for a while. He left to go to ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]. I think that he came to G/PM from ACDA and then went back there.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the most interesting thing that happened during my time in G/PM.

Q: You were there during that time. Can you elaborate on that a little?

DUNLOP: Well, from my worm's eye view, President Kennedy, I think, was briefed on the photographs taken by U-2 surveillance aircraft of Soviet missiles in Cuba on October 14, 1962. There had previously been some intimations of real problems with Cuba prior to that, including the prediction by Admiral Raburn at CIA that the Soviets were going to deploy missiles to Cuba. This was not the general view in the US Government.

Anyway, by October 14, 1962, President Kennedy knew that he had a real problem. He went "public" with this problem on October 22, 1962, with his speech. During the 10 days intervening they set up what was called, the "Executive Committee" or "EXCOM." This was a committee whose very existence was highly confidential. Its existence was not in any way known to the public. George Newman, who was the Deputy Director of PM under Jeff Kitchen, was assigned to EXCOM. Kitchen was out of the country, traveling on NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] business, which made up a large chunk of the office responsibility.

I knew nothing about this. Access to this information, including even the existence of EXCOM, was strictly controlled. In fact, there was what was called a "BIGOT" list of people who were given access to the information that this crisis was building. The Department got the name for such a list from the British. Inclusion of officers on this list was very strictly limited. I don't know who else in G/PM, other than George Newman, was on it. October 22, 1962, fell on a Monday. On the previous Friday afternoon, October 19, 1962, I was called into Newman's office and told that I was to go out and meet Jeff Kitchen at the airport. I was told to take a particular, locked briefcase and tell him to open it and read its contents on the way in to the Department from the airport, because Kitchen would have to attend a very important meeting right afterwards. George Newman was handing me the briefcase and then said, "Hey, I can't do this. You're not on the list." My thought was, "What list?" Then George said, "Oh hell, you'd better be added to this. We're going to need some help over this weekend. We have to expand this access list." He then put me on the "BIGOT" List. He warned me of the horrible things that would happen if I divulged any information about the "BIGOT" List. I signed my name. Then Newman said, "There's a big missile crisis. You'll find out about it when you get back from the airport. Just take this briefcase to Jeff Kitchen and tell him that he's to read the contents and be aware of the situation." So that's how I got on the list, somewhat fortuitously, although they might have put me on later.

The principals were beginning to sleep in their offices. What they needed were people to sleep in the office, go and get coffee for them, process messages, and man the telephones at night. So that's what I did for the next two and one-half days. I had no substantive role at all but was aware of what was going on.

Q: What was the atmosphere in the State Department at that point, from what you could gather?

DUNLOP: You know, I never felt, as some people have later written about this period, and you read it in the memoirs of the time, that the likelihood of war was anywhere near 50 percent. I felt that we had such overwhelming power to deploy against Cuba. This was not where the Soviets wanted to fight us. This was not where they wanted to challenge us. That was just a personal feeling. I know that there were some people who were very frightened around the country, after the President's speech. The ships carrying the Soviet missiles were still proceeding toward Cuba after we had told them to return to the Soviet Union. I knew that the situation was serious but I didn't think that this was where "Armageddon" was going to happen.

Q: Particularly with your experience, having been on the "front line" in France and Germany, if you're the Soviets and have decided to fight a war, you don't announce it in advance.

DUNLOP: Yes, they had lost the "element of surprise." What we had feared in Europe when I was there in the Air Force, was that there might be some crisis over Berlin which

would lead to war. The Soviets would establish some kind of pretext. Then they would hope that they could obliterate the Western defenses, go before History, and say, "Well, it wasn't our fault." That would have been hard and maybe impossible to do. Let's hope that it would have been impossible to do. However, they wouldn't have attempted to do it by deploying missiles to Cuba, 8,000 miles from the Soviet Union or whatever the hell the distance is.

I know that people in the country were very worried but I don't think that the guys working in G/PM were very worried. They were concerned, yes. We had people in G/PM like Alex Akalovsky, who was a specialist in Russian affairs. I should have mentioned him earlier. At least so far as Jeff Kitchen and Alexis Johnson were concerned, Alex's job was to give preliminary appreciations of what the Khrushchev letters sent to President Kennedy really meant.

There was an FBIS [Foreign Broadcast Information Service] teletype machine down the hall from my office. FBIS listens overtly to what the Russians say over Radio Moscow, translate the more interesting portions, and then distribute these translations throughout the US Government. This teletype machine carried these FBIS translations of Russian language press material. Of course, FBIS had all of their Russian language translators working at this time. One of my "heavy" duties was to make sure that when that teletype machine started clacking, I would go down and check what was coming in. It would have been nice if the FBIS teletype machine had been a little closer to my office. I had to make sure that the material on this teletype machine was pulled promptly from it and taken in to Alex. He would look at them. Since he had a Russian background, he had read practically everything that Khrushchev is known to have written. He had this material in his mental "data bank," and it was his job to analyze the Khrushchev correspondence. I don't think that Alex ever thought that we were going to war with the Soviet Union.

Q: Were there any other developments in connection with the Cuban Missile Crisis that you saw at that time?

DUNLOP: I remember an amusing anecdote. At least it was amusing to me. It wasn't amusing to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. His book of memoirs has now been published, and I've looked at it. It's a pretty self-serving "rewrite" of history, but it's well presented. I can recommend it from the standpoint of giving some insight into the situation. At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 he had only recently arrived in Washington.

The scenario worked out for Monday, October 22, was that President Kennedy would address the nation at 7:00 PM. One of the things that G/PM did, with me serving in a very junior capacity, was to prepare messages to every United States Embassy abroad, giving them instructions on what to do upon receiving an "initiate" message. The "initiate" message instructed them to see an official the highest level they could find of their respective host governments, preferably the Chief of State, and deliver to them our view of this situation. These messages were "pre-positioned", they were sent out early, "Eyes Only for the Ambassador" and so forth. The Ambassador was told to get this message

ready in whatever format was appropriate for that particular time and place. The Ambassador or Chargé d'Affaires was instructed to make an appointment for this call at whatever time was appropriate, any time between 9:00 AM to 2:00 AM, depending on the time zone. This is not always very easy for an Ambassador to do. When he received the "initiate" message, this meant that he was to deliver the text of the message which he had already received.

I had the job of carrying that "Go" (that's what we called it) or "Initiate" message to the Department of State Communications Center, which was not very far away from my office. I was told to tell them, "Now, send it!"

The other thing that I knew of or had some personal knowledge of was that Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin was called in to see Secretary of State Rusk at 6:00 PM on the afternoon of October 22, 1962, in advance of the President's speech. He was to be given a tongue lashing, told that President Kennedy was going to speak to the nation, and then sent home. I don't know whether he was given an advanced text of the speech or not. Dobrynin probably mentions that in his memoirs.

By the time Ambassador Dobrynin arrived at the Department of State, there were huge expectations that something very dramatic was about to happen, because of the announcement that President Kennedy was going to speak to the nation that evening. I don't know how many "leaks" there were that the President's speech dealt with Cuba but I suspect that there were at least some. The Diplomatic Entrance to the Department on C St., N. W., was jammed with photographers and newspapermen, all jostling for position. Secretary Rusk or somebody else made the decision to let the journalists come up to his office area on the Seventh Floor. Then they shoved Dobrynin out the door of Rusk's office, rather than allowing him to use the Secretary's private elevator and get down to the basement of the Department and escape this crowd of journalists.

So Ambassador Dobrynin, in effect, was just thrown to the ravening wolves of the press. I was up there on the Seventh Floor at the time. I had no particular duty. I had already handed in my "Go" message to the Communications Center. I was just standing there at the back of this crowd of journalists, marveling at the utter lack of civility and decorum of the US press corps, when Ambassador Dobrynin came out of Secretary Rusk's office, looking rather white-faced. The press "pounced" on him. Of course, he didn't say anything. He literally had to fight his way through the crowd, to the Seventh Floor elevator.

One other vignette in connection with that, and I don't mean it in any, negative way, was that Clement Conger was the custodian of the Seventh Floor antiquities. He was originally a Foreign Service Officer who, by that time, may have resigned and taken up a Civil Service appointment. He was very good at his job. He was the person who solicited gifts to the very nice, formal reception rooms of the Department. However, Conger was standing there, watching the journalists stand on "his" 17th or 18th century desk. He was

just wringing his hands. I've never seen anybody "wring his hands," but Conger did so. He was saying, "They can't do this, they can't do this." [Laughter] Well, they did it.

Q: The State Department really didn't have the equipment at that time for what we now call the Operations Center.

DUNLOP: I don't remember when the Operations Center was set up, but it must have been about that time.

Q: I think that it must have been about that time.

DUNLOP: There was no Operations Center operated on a 24 hour a day basis at that time. Things were handled more on an ad hoc basis. I think that that was the genesis of what we now know as the Operations Center. If there had been an Operations Center, there would have been a room assigned to the EXCOM people there. I don't remember exactly when the Operations Center system was established.

Q: Was there anything else, other than that, which you would like to mention in connection with your assignment to PM?

DUNLOP: Well, the office had all kinds of things to handle with NATO and with Japan and South Korea. The Korean War was over, but there was a new government in South Korea. We had had a lot of trouble early on with the Park Chung Hee government. I wouldn't say that this was ever a trouble free relationship. Our relations with South Korea have always been somewhat tense, to at least some degree.

However, to return to the impact on me of this time in PM, I got a look early on in my career at the complexities of our relationship with the US military establishment. It may sound rather pompous, but I think that I came to the conclusion at some point that it dawned on me that these "fights" between the military and the civilians, which were not uncommon and which, at times, were more bitter than others, were not just because individuals were fighting over "turf." These were institutions with somewhat different functions. Of course, both the military and the civilians were promoting what they saw as the national interests of the United States. The pressures on them to do their jobs, with the instruments available to them, inevitably produced clashes, although not in all cases and not every time.

I think I came away with an appreciation that these fights should not be regarded as struggles between personalities but rather between institutions. Both are necessary to the promotion of the national interest. Both of them have their own, competent people trying to get the job done. To the degree that they can cooperate, coordinate, and tell each other what they are doing early on, this is a good thing. I think that I carried this realization through with me during the rest of my career, which did have something to do with other government agencies, particularly in the latter stages of it, when there were some important political and military aspects to it. I think that I benefitted from that experience.

Q: I also think that almost all of us in our generation had had some military service. You were much more senior to me when I was in the military. I was an Airman First Class [like a Private First Class] after four years in the military. However, at least we had served in the military and knew that these were "real people" who had a real job. We were a bit better able to understand how things looked on the "other side of the hill."

DUNLOP: I think that we've lost a bit of that now.

Q: Compared to people now in the Foreign Service who may have grown up with an attitude of, if not contempt for the military, at least a lack of understanding of what they do. There tends to be a view that the military are not "real people."

DUNLOP: The image of the Air Force tends to be that they have $1200 toilet seats than it is that they include people who are doing their jobs. If they don't do their jobs well, we might all have been in very great difficulty.

Q: As you saw it at that time, could you talk a bit about the group of officers who were staff aides, whom you met in the course of your duties? Staff aides are often a "breeding ground" for bigger and better things in the Foreign Service. Did you have any impression of staff aides as a group?

DUNLOP: There were three staff aides in G/PM at this time. I was one of them. I recognize that there is truth in what you said but I did not have a series of assignments like this. Being a staff aide is often a springboard for more senior assignments, but I don't think that it worked that way for me.

Abe Ashkenazi left the Foreign Service after a while and went to work for an oil company. I think that Winston Lord is rather typical of "career staff aides" in this regard. Winston was bright, personable, and well-connected. Of course, to his great advantage, he had some family money. [His mother was one of the principal owners of the department store, Lord and Taylor.] He went in and out of the US Government service, more or less of his own will. I'm sure that there were some times when he wished that he was in the service and other times when he wished that he was not, when he was in.

Not because my service was so bad in G/PM, but I never wanted to be a staff aide again, ever. I never wanted to be a person whose responsibility was to help somebody else do his or her job. I wanted a job to do and to do it myself. As I came in and out of the Department during the rest of my career, I learned how the system works. Staff aides are necessary, but they sometimes tend to think or equate their job to "real" jobs. And the job of a staff aide is not a "real" job. I believe that there is too much of the personal "panache" that seems to be attached to jobs on the Seventh Floor of the State Department, no matter who's in them, without regard to what those jobs are. Perhaps I'm not explaining this very well. However, I don't think that the Department is well served when promotions are unduly influenced by Seventh Floor activity at the staff aide level. I think that promotions

have been and still are unduly influenced by service in such positions. I think that promotions should be more influenced by what people do, both in the field and in jobs in the Department which are not "staff jobs" but "line jobs." I think that how you handle "line jobs" should get you promoted, not how you handle "staff jobs." I'm not sure that that has been the case. In fact, I'm quite sure that it hasn't.

Q: One last question on this time when you were in Washington. Could you talk a bit about your impression of the Kennedy administration which came into office during this time?

DUNLOP: I was a true "acolyte" of President John F. Kennedy. I thought that he was just great. I was so impressed with his inaugural speech in January, 1961. I saw that as reflecting what I wanted to be able to do in my own career. I had a lot of youthful enthusiasm and very little youthful cynicism, perhaps too little. I didn't know about his sex life then. Maybe I would have cared and maybe not. I remember that I was very disappointed about the way he handled the "Bay of Pigs" crisis of 1961 [the abortive "invasion" of Cuba and the attempted overthrow of Fidel Castro]. I was aware of some of the criticism of that issue. I regarded that that was sort of "on this hand," but I was still very much "on the other hand." I deeply regretted his death. I felt that that was a terrible loss to the country. It may not have been, but I thought that it was.

I wasn't very well positioned in G/PM to know much about the policy side of our government's operations during the Kennedy administration. The one thing I did have some insight on, a small window on, was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Of course, that was well handled. So I gave him credit for handling that. He was the President and he received good advice, which he took. There may have been some advice that he should have taken but didn't. However, I'm not sure what that might have been.

I wasn't involved at all in that agonizing time that the Department goes through, whenever there is a new President. That is, the "Transition Team" coming in and moving all of the furniture around. I suppose that in a system like the one we have now, that is sort of inevitable.

I admired Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, and I still do. I think that Rusk was not just a "blind, little puppet," marching to the tune of his President. He was a very thoughtful and deeply emotional man about his work. He truly believed in what he was doing. He felt that the world was a dangerous place for America. He felt that there were hard things to do but which needed to be done, and risks to be taken. I admired that and still do.

Bobby Kennedy was somebody whom a lot of junior people, contemporaries of mine, admired. I didn't like him very much. I also ran into Ted Kennedy [now Senator Kennedy, Democrat, MA] at an early stage. He was being petulant and hard to deal with. That put me off Ted Kennedy. From what little opportunity I had to observe them, my admiration for the Kennedy's did not necessarily extend to either Bobby or Teddy. However, I felt that Jack Kennedy could do no wrong. He was the President.

Q: When did you go out to Yugoslavia? Could you give me the inclusive dates of your service there?

DUNLOP: Yes. I served at the Embassy in Belgrade from March, 1963, to June or July, 1965. I wanted to get out of Washington as soon as I possibly could, and March, 1963 was the earliest that I could manage.

I was assigned to the Political Section in Belgrade and served there for one and one-quarter years. You would remember, perhaps, that I served for a time under you in the Consular Section. I think that I spent perhaps a year in the Consular Section.

Q: You had had a little "glimpse" of Yugoslavia in 1957 when you went down from Berlin, where you were attending the Free University there. When you went to Yugoslavia in 1963, what was your impression of the country? Also, what was your initial impression of the Embassy? We're talking about the situation in March, 1963.

DUNLOP: I had had a sort of depressing look at Yugoslavia in 1957. It was early spring. Anybody who's been there knows that Belgrade is not all that attractive a city. It is heavily polluted with coal smoke, the people look rather dour, and, as I said, were rather hesitant to strike up any kind of useful conversation. Well, I was there for only three days in the spring of 1957. Anyhow, that was my impression.

I came back in March, 1963, the same month during which I had visited Belgrade the first time. Belgrade looked the same! [Laughter] The police state regime which Tito had clamped on the country had relaxed a little by the time you and I got there, but not all of that much. Rankovic, who was Tito's top policeman, was still very much the number three, if not number two man then in power. From all of the information available to us, Tito looked to Rankovic to enable him to do pretty much what he wanted to do and when he wanted to do it to anyone. Certainly, Tito did nothing to counter this view.

There was a police state atmosphere. I certainly did not find Yugoslavia a place where people were looking very optimistically toward any change in the system. Things had been that way for 18 years when I got there, since 1945, in other words.

A lot of my impressions, I think, in a situation like mine, came from the local employees of the Embassy. The Foreign Service Nationals in the Embassy in Belgrade in 1963 were basically people who had been educated before World War II, who had come from "bourgeois" or, perhaps, upper middle class families, and whose whole family fortunes and prospects had been destroyed by the communist takeover. They were bitterly anti-communist, or at least pretended to be bitterly anti-communist, and there may have been a few "pretenders." However, the vast majority of the Foreign Service Nationals reflected that view of the world which people in the Balkans often have, that it's a pretty hard place to live. They seemed to feel that there wasn't much to be expected in the way of good things. Since they were at the bottom of the food chain there, they were not happy

campers. Some of them may have had sunny dispositions, but their circumstances were not very good.

My first job in the Political Section put me in close contact with a lot of them in the Translation Service of the Embassy.

Q: Could you explain what the Joint Translation Service was?
DUNLOP: My first job in the Political Section was the one which the "new boy on the block" always got, to be the American editor and supervisor of an operation that translated the local press on a daily basis, six times a week, from Serbian into English. This service was run in conjunction with the British Embassy, which also assigned a junior officer as their contribution to this effort. Costs of putting out the translations were shared between the British and American Embassies. The work was actually done in the American Embassy. I think that we had 11 or 12 Foreign Service National employees in the Translation Unit at that time.

There was a Yugoslav supervisor, a wonderful man whom I got to know well and like. He was older than the people whom he supervised. His job was to come in each morning, look at all of the newspapers available for that day, and then pick out the most important articles. He and the other translators would then begin to translate these selected articles into English. By the time the American and the British supervisors would arrive in the office, the translators would have made their own decisions on which articles to translate, but they would then check this with the American or British supervisor. If we agreed, which we often did, they would go ahead and complete the immediately most important articles, which would then be typed on stencils, proof read by the American and/or the British supervisor, and reproduced. Those were the days when stencils were on green or greenish-blue paper which spread ink all over the place. It would usually be about 6:45 AM that we would start reading the stencils. It was an onerous task. The translators would then complete the early part of their job, which was to translate at least the headlines of the most important articles. We weren't supposed to summarize anything but we would forward portions of some of the more important articles to members of the Embassy staff.

Then they translated longer articles, "think pieces" which had been printed earlier and which they were in the process of translating. They would go back to jobs like that when the more pressing translations were completed. Those longer articles which they finished were then appended to this daily document. By the time I left the Political Section, we were putting out 35 to 40 legal size pages or more of translations, every day. These stencils had to be quickly read and then printed rapidly. The copies of the translations were then distributed to the Embassy. One of the reasons why this job was important was the lack of diplomatic contact with the local Yugoslav community. The Yugoslav police were determined to minimize such contacts, and they were successful in this regard. Ordinary Yugoslavs were afraid to maintain anything like the relationships which you would find in other, non-police states. So the Survey of the Yugoslav Press which was produced by this Joint Translation Service provided a significant proportion of the information available to the Embassy.

One of the amusing aspects, at least at the time, although it was not always a happy factor in our lives, was that George Kennan was the American Ambassador to Yugoslavia. As anyone who knows anything about Ambassador Kennan knows, he is a beautiful writer who cares deeply about the English language. We were producing this Survey of the Yugoslav Press under considerable time stress. Remember that these translations had been produced by non native speakers of English, and the stencils containing the translations were then corrected by an American and/or British supervisor, blearily looking at this material by the dim light of early morning.

We made lots of errors, which George Kennan found very painful. After all, it was "his" Embassy, and this product was coming out under his general imprimatur. It seemed that his patience would usually last for about 10 days. He would read this stuff for about 10 days, his irritation level would flow over, and he would send back down to the Political Counselor, my boss, some comment like, "Do we HAVE to make this mistake eight times?" I would come into the Embassy staff meeting, having produced this stuff, and these comments would all come shuttling down the chute to me.

Now this job would be over by about 10:00 AM. The rest of my time I would spend on whatever was left to do in the Political Section, until I went to work for you in the Consular Section.

Q: Let's talk a bit about the Yugoslav press. What was gleaned from these translations? It was "boiler plate," turgid prose. Communist prose has to be seen to be believed. With luck the reader of these memoirs will never have to read or see this stuff.

DUNLOP: That's true. I guess that the best thing that could be said about the Yugoslav press was that it was one means by which the Yugoslav communists talked to each other. It was one way that the man out in Sabats or Skopje, picking up his copy of "Borba" [Struggle], would know what the government wanted him to understand, the official view on a given event.

Let's take an international event, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, for example. I was not in Yugoslavia during the Cuban Missile Crisis but I can imagine that it was of great interest to people all over the country to know to what degree the government wanted them to know about the Cuban Missile Crisis. After all, they had some access to other information. They could listen to the BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation] and the VOA [Voice of America]. However, they had no access to other papers. No foreign newspapers were available. Well, maybe the "Herald Tribune" was available, three days late, or something like that. The communist press was one way that communists communicated with each other, so it was one way that we could tell what they wanted the world to learn what they thought. So that wasn't useless. That had a use.

Sometimes there were debates in the Yugoslav press. Within limits, the government would allow such discussions. The ideological czar at the time, Edvard Kardelj, would

allow a debate to emerge about some issue, in somewhat the same way that people "leak" stories in the US or "run things up the flagpole" and see what the reaction is out in the country. We were not all that prescient at that time in identifying these debates. However, over time you got more skillful at it. We got to be something like "Kremlinologists", that is what some people did. They could become "Kardeljologists" or "Borbaologists" by looking at these press reports. They did provide some insight into the way that new things might be "coming down the pike." I'll give you one example of this.

Were you still there in the Embassy in Belgrade in 1965?

Q: Yes. I was there until 1967.

DUNLOP: Then you were there when the "reforma" were announced and when Rankovic fell from power. I left Yugoslavia before that happened. In fact, I was not in the Political Section for the run-up to these developments before I left. I was in the Consular Section. However, I imagine that at some point before these rather dramatic changes were made public by Tito, there was some intimation of them in the press and in the party theoretical journals. It was not all daily newspapers that we read. We read "Kommunist," a magazine which was the voice of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia which spoke to the party from Belgrade, as well as other theoretical journals.

I suspect, though I cannot remember the precise time and date this happened, and I may not even have been in the country when it did happen, that the Embassy began to sense that there was some "tremor" underneath the volcano. One way to sense such a development was to read and reflect on articles in theoretical publications. There were other ways to do that, but this was certainly one way to do it.

Q: How about on international events? During the time that we were in Yugoslavia, Africa was very much a subject of attention on the world scene, although the normal Yugoslav couldn't have cared less about it. References to Africa were one way that they could show that they were "at one" with the international communist movement.

DUNLOP: I think that that is certainly true. Tito had seized for himself an international role far beyond what Yugoslavia could normally be expected to play, as a state with a population of whatever number of million people, important though it was in the total, European context. I think that when historians come to write about Tito, they will kind of marvel at this. They will ask themselves, "How did he do that? How did he become one of the five leaders who sponsored the Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in 1955?" The five national leaders included Nasser of Egypt, Nehru of India, Sukarno of Indonesia, Tito of Yugoslavia, and there was a fifth one, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. They met at Bandung, in Indonesia, and pronounced this "Third Way", supposedly not communist, not capitalist, but something which they called a non-aligned way. Tito was very good at inserting himself into that leadership.

Later on the non-aligned countries had regular conferences and issued "position papers" and communiques of all sorts about all kinds of matters.

For four or five years, starting in the mid 1950's, the United States and the Soviet Union had been involved in very difficult negotiations over a nuclear test ban treaty. At various points the US and the Soviet Union were not too far apart but then the differences seemed to grow, and so forth. However, in 1962, just before your and my arrival in Yugoslavia, the US and the Soviet Union had reached a self-imposed, generally agreed upon "moratorium" on atmospheric nuclear tests. This was not the result of a treaty, but was the result of a public understanding that, at least for the time being, we and they would not conduct large nuclear tests in the atmosphere.
In 1962 Tito hosted the Non-Aligned Conference, which appeared to be a big deal, attended by all of these high "Mukity Mucks." Some not so high "Mukity Mucks" came charging into Belgrade to present themselves to the world as parts of this "new way." For reasons that, certainly, I don't understand, Khrushchev chose this time to break the moratorium on nuclear testing with the largest ever hydrogen bomb explosion. It was several times larger than the largest bomb that we had ever exploded. Furthermore, the Soviets exploded this bomb in the Arctic, an area which they had not previously used for nuclear testing. This raised all kinds of questions of nuclear fallout and pollution.

However, the Non Aligned Countries didn't open their mouths about this. They expressed no criticism whatsoever of the Soviet explosion. This absolutely infuriated Secretary of State Dean Rusk, President John F. Kennedy, and the whole Washington establishment. This cast a shadow over our relations with Yugoslavia during all the years that I was there. It was Tito's choice not to refer to the nuclear explosion. He didn't have to ignore that. Tito could have spoken out if he had wished. However, he wasn't going to do it as the only non-aligned leader to do so, and none of the others chose to say anything about this Soviet nuclear explosion. We thought that Tito should have made a statement, but he didn't do it. This really annoyed our people back in Washington.

Q: What type of work were you doing in the Political Section beside editing the work of the Joint Translation Service?

DUNLOP: Well, there wasn't a lot of substantive, Political Section work to do. That was for three reasons. One was that the section was, frankly, over staffed for the work to be done. We had the Political Counselor, Alex Johnpoll. The deputy chief of the Political Section was Dick Johnson. Then there were also Dudley Miller, Jim Lowenstein, David Anderson, and me. That's six people in the Political Section. Access to information in Yugoslavia was very limited and the ability to go out and do reporting on youth and subjects like that was virtually non-existent. Leaving me out of it, there was an awful lot of talent in that group of five officers whom I have just mentioned. They were all fighting over a very small "pile of bones" to report on. Added to that was the personality of the Political Counselor, with whom I did not get along very well. He was very possessive and grabby. He did not share reporting responsibility with the other people in the Political Section. In fact, if I was unhappy about that situation, this was only a shadow of the

feelings of disaffection felt by Dudley Miller, Dick Johnson, Jim Lowenstein, and David Anderson.

I did a hell of a lot of things beside run the translation service. There are always all kinds of errands to be run. I would take diplomatic notes over to the Foreign Ministry, attend public meetings and take notes, all of that stuff. As far as responsibility for reporting was concerned, I dealt with youth, sports, and whatever junior officers did. I would look for opportunities to say something useful about that in the reporting stream, but there really wasn't much for me to report on.

I traveled a lot. That was fun.

Q: I was going to ask about that. I remember that we took a very interesting trip to an area which is now the "hot spot" of the world, that is, Bosnia, including all of the places which have become names known for horrors of one sort or another during the recent conflict in Yugoslavia. Could you talk a bit about your impressions of traveling around Yugoslavia, how you did it and what you were getting out of it?

DUNLOP: One of the things that the Embassy did very well was to recognize the benefit of official travel by Embassy officers. Since some of us were under-employed, this was a very good way to spend some time. Even if we had been fully employed, it still would have been a good way to spend some of our time. Sometimes in Embassies it's hard to find time to get out of the capital city. I'm sure that the Consular Section never found itself looking for extra work. In the case of the Political Section, our officers were always encouraged to travel. Most of them did so because they were not only encouraged to travel but they liked doing it.

We traveled in pairs, which was a good idea for lots of reasons, one of which was the very mundane reason that it's very dangerous to drive around that country. It's always safer to have two people in a car than one. There was also the security aspect. The Yugoslavs kept Embassy personnel under fairly tight surveillance. Sometimes this surveillance was aggressive, although most times it was not. Having two Embassy officers traveling together was always a good idea under those circumstances. The security police might want to stage a provocation. That is, they might want to allege that something happened when it hadn't or try to make something happen which would not ordinarily have happened. The object might be to put an Embassy officer in a compromising situation and embarrass the Embassy publicly. Or the object might be to put pressure on the individual officer concerned or attempt to blackmail him. In such a case having two officers traveling together was always better than having one officer traveling alone.
So we would travel paired up. Sometimes Consular Officers like you and I would travel together. Sometimes it would be an Economic Officer like Ed Siegal and I who would travel together. Sometimes it would be another Political Officer who would travel with me. However, the idea was to take about 7-10 days and work out an itinerary through a very interesting part of the country. In the case of the trip to Bosnia which you and I took,

it involved going to Bosnia and Croatia and then returning to Belgrade, I guess. We went to Slurj, I believe. I remember that we were there on the evening of All Saints Day [November 1]. We saw people going to the cemeteries on All Saints Day.

Q: We also saw an ammunition factory. The Foreign Ministry used to schedule these visits. We went to a cellulose factory, remember that? All of a sudden, half way through, we were meeting with people who wouldn't talk to us. I couldn't understand it. There was barbed wire strung around it. I said to myself, "What the hell, a cellulose factory? These people make paper, Kleenex, or something like that." Then, all of a sudden, it dawned on me half way through the visit, "Good God! This is where they make explosives!"

DUNLOP: Well, you had to get permission in advance for these visits. You had to ask for and get permission for the proposed travel from the Protocol Office in the Foreign Ministry. This meant that you were dealing with the security people [UDBA]. They would give you permission to visit these places. You could usually go to most of the places you wanted to see, because after a while you tended to avoid asking for permission to visit places which the Yugoslav authorities were less likely to approve. So, rather than have a proposed trip disapproved and then resubmitting a list of other places to visit, which was just a waste of time, you would propose visiting the places which they were more likely to approve. This included visiting factories, which was always fun to do, especially if the people in the factories were proud of what they did, like cutting logs or something like that. You might not know how logs were cut in Yugoslavia. That was fun.

During the trip you would visit the local authorities, the "Opstina" people. This would include the Mayor of the town and his deputy, or somebody that he would designate. Sometimes we visited youth organizations or met with labor union people. We would visit a factory or two. In the meantime, we would see the countryside and get the opportunity to interact with people in cafes, restaurants, and in informal meetings where, perhaps, it was a little easier to get the conversation going. In fact, it was usually quite a lot easier out in the countryside to talk to people than in Belgrade, although sometimes it was possible to do so even in Belgrade.

I don't remember. Did we ever notice any surveillance on that trip we took?

Q: Not really. We were always very careful and made a point, as I'm sure you did, too, in your travels of stopping and asking a local policeman where such and such a place was. We would say, "We're from the American Embassy and we're going there. Could you tell us how to get there?" We asked for directions even if we knew how to get there. We could see the policeman hustling back to his telephone call box. It made things simpler so that we weren't confusing anybody.

DUNLOP: Although there were some exceptions, the roads were usually at least passable. We used to take a four-wheel-drive vehicle. Sometimes that was useful, sometimes not. It was nice to know that you had that kind of vehicle. These vehicles were big, black...

Q: I think they were called "Travelall's" or "Carryall's". They were built by General Motors...

DUNLOP: They had very strong, steel springs. You would really get bounced around. The roads were often dusty and rough, so the actual travel was sometimes something of a chore. However, the countryside was gorgeous. In those days and, to some degree, now, too, I think, the villages you drove through, unless it was in a war-torn area, would be very interesting. The Muslim villages would look very "Muslim." Not only would there be a mosque but there would be people wearing traditional Muslim clothing. In a Serbian village it was the same way. You could find out, perhaps, from Embassy people who had traveled there earlier that the market day there was, say, on Thursday. These were always great days to visit a place.

Market day would be a time when the farmers in the area would come into the village from miles and miles around. Sometimes, they would stay overnight, with their donkeys and carts. They would set up their stalls and sell their produce. The girls would usually be dressed in all their finery, because that would usually be a "bride barter" day. It was absolutely fun.

There would be good food and good wine in the countryside. I never got used to being offered "slivovitz" and being expected to drink it at 8:00 AM.

Q: I know. You had to have three glasses, by custom, because you can't just "walk on two legs," as they used to say.

DUNLOP: Of all the "going native" things that I liked in Yugoslavia, the least attractive was drinking slivovitz. I do not like that stuff.

Q: I don't like it, either. I used to receive gifts, which I would put behind the couch in my office. When I left Yugoslavia, I gave these bottles of slivovitz to the Embassy caretaker. He was delighted. I had accumulated gallons of slivovitz behind the couch.

DUNLOP: Slivovitz is a plum brandy. At times it was highly alcoholic. At other times it was only moderately alcoholic. It never had just a little alcohol in it. It was the custom to serve it to visitors as a courtesy. There were lots of little customs like that which were observed very strictly, and, I'm sure, still are. In the course of a trip like that, if you had a meeting at 8:00 AM, you would go into a room at the office of the person you were calling on. On the table would be glasses of mineral water. They would offer you coffee and then, after you had perhaps gotten your coffee and mineral water settled in your stomach, and thought that you were home free, out would come the bottle of slivovitz!

Q: Sometimes, you would make two to three such calls in the morning. There would be no calls in the afternoon!

DUNLOP: It was fun to do. We would always go back and write a trip report, which would include what we had observed and a summary of anything interesting which people had said, which occasionally happened. Most of the time the people we met were very cautious about what they said to us. Nevertheless, it was a way to get your "feet on the ground," literally. It was very interesting out in the countryside. You would travel, of course, I made this trip to Bosnia with you. I also traveled to Montenegro, up into the Voivodina [near the Hungarian-Yugoslav border], in fact, everywhere I could go in the country.

Q: Harry, I can remember our trying to explain our involvement in the Vietnam War, I think, to Communist Party officials who seemed to be genuinely interested in the subject. It was amusing because both of us later on ended up serving in Vietnam. We would just quote from the guidance papers which we had received.

DUNLOP: You know, one of the things that always happened in these meetings is that there would be two Yugoslavs there. This was because, like us, they didn't want to be "compromised." There would always be someone there to listen. At times, although this depended on the circumstances, there would be three Yugoslavs there. There would be someone sitting in a corner, taking notes on the conversation. You could pretty well tell that he was a security agent.

They had to go through a certain ritual with us. They had to make a few "bows" to the current Communist Party line. If it was a day to "bash America" on Vietnam, they would just have to do that. Now, whether they believed the line, or cared that much about it was another matter. Some probably did believe the party line, although some probably didn't. One thing that I admired about the Yugoslav people in the countryside, and I think that you may agree with this, is that when they could be friendly to us, they really were genuinely friendly. Usually, a certain level of friendship and openness was possible out in the countryside. They really and basically liked Americans. If they didn't have a cousin in Gary, Indiana, they had a close neighbor who had a cousin in Gary. The cousin in Gary would write to them and say, "The US has a lot of trouble, but I tell you what: come on over!" [Laughter] So they had the impression that America and Americans were generous and friendly. And we were.

How many times people would volunteer their thanks for our help during the period 1948-1952, when they knew that, whatever bad things had happened under Tito, another whole set of equally bad or worse things was looming up if the Russians ever marched into Yugoslavia. They would make remarks about the "Truman eggs." Remember "Truman eggs" "Trumanova Jeje?" Those were powdered eggs we sent to Yugoslavia in times of destitution.

Q: Would you talk about the feelings of Yugoslavs toward their fellow Slavs, the Soviets, the Russians?

DUNLOP: I never found any Yugoslavs who had anything more than a lot of fear of the Soviets. Now, there is a long tradition in Serbia of looking fondly at their fellow Orthodox Slavs in Moscow. Although history doesn't support this, there is the sort of myth that, whenever Serbia gets into trouble, the Russians can be counted on to come to their help. The Russians didn't help the Serbs at the time of the Congress of Berlin [1875] and at a lot of other times. However, there was this sort of feeling that the Slavs were "brethren together." There has been some Pan-Slav feeling stimulated out of Moscow which has often found some resonance in Belgrade.

Certainly, Belgrade was conquered by the Soviet Army in 1944 and, in effect, raped. That's what the Yugoslavs I met remembered. Since the Yugoslavs had gone through a horrible experience during World War II, there was fear of another war, fear of civil war, fear of being helpless pawns of the great powers. I don't think that most Yugoslavs thought that the next catastrophe that descended on them was going to be started by the Americans. However, Tito tried to make sure that everybody believed that. It was in Tito's interest that the Yugoslav people believed that they faced a great threat and that Tito was going to manage the situation satisfactorily. That was always a great asset to him.

Q: During your time at the Embassy in Belgrade, with the trips throughout the country and your work on the Joint Translation Service, and even including your work in the Consular Section, by the time by the time you left Yugoslavia did you have any feeling for the ethnic animosities and "whither Yugoslavia"?

DUNLOP: Yes, I did, although all of us who knew Yugoslavia are horrified at what has recently happened to the country. I don't think that this is hard to understand. We can get into this later on, no doubt, but I don't think that the horrors in Bosnia were inevitable.

Q: We're talking about Yugoslavia during the 1990's.

DUNLOP: Yes. However, I think that we believed that these horrors were possible. I think that Popovic and Jankovic, our two Serbian teachers at the FSI, left with us a strong view of Serbian nationalism, a feeling that the Serbs had never been able to get anything easily. I remember one of the words that Jankovic used. Perhaps Popovic would have used it, too. Jankovic would say, "You know, no matter what else you can say about the Balkans, under the Turks we all suffered. Under the Austrians and the Magyars, and under the Hungarians in particular, the Croatians certainly had their problems. But it was Serbia that took the lead. The Serbs created the Yugoslav state." They would say that the other ethnic groups didn't do that. So they would conclude that, "We Serbs deserve credit for that. But we've never gotten credit for it." That's what the Serbs feel.
I think that when I was in Yugoslavia, I was aware of that feeling. Certainly, when I later came back to serve in Zagreb [in Croatia], I saw the opposite side of that coin. I remember being appalled at the Serbian contempt for the Albanians, the "shiptars" (name for Albanians, pejorative when used by Serbs) . The Kosovo "shiptars" came to Belgrade to clean the streets, and so forth. Then I would talk to our Albanian acquaintances in the club, whom I met.

Q: "Smiley" and "Happy."

DUNLOP: Yeah, the two brothers who made awfully good drinks down in the bar. After a while I was Treasurer of the club, so I actually wrote out their paychecks. I remember that this gave me more time to talk to "Smiley," who was the older one. He once told me, "You know, Mr. Dunlop, there are only two places in Yugoslavia where I feel comfortable. One is in my home in Pec, in Kosovo, and the other one is right here in this club. I can't walk out this door and not feel that people hate me." He was absolutely right about that. The Serbs both hated and loathed the Albanians. That contempt, plus hatred, is a poisonous mix. That leads to genocide. That's terrible stuff.

Q: I recall that I was the head of the Embassy Commissary at one point. We wanted, I think, to get "Smiley" a driver's license. We had to pay for him to go down to Skopje, in Kosovo, to take the driver's test, because no "shiptar" could pass a driver's test in Belgrade.

DUNLOP: Well, they could tell you many stories like that, most of which have some truth to them. A disturbing number of them would be all true.

I think that there were two impressions that I brought away from that first tour of duty in Belgrade. There was this intense dislike of other Yugoslavs by the Serbs. I remember another saying which I kept hearing. "Wherever there is a Serbian house, there is Serbia." By that they meant that the Serbs had a Serbian state and a Serbian body politic, which formed a single unit. History had denied to the Serbs the rights which it had given to everybody else. In fact, history hadn't given this right to everybody else, because there are lots of places where a given people have no state. Look at the Kurds in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran, I guess throughout the Middle East, for crying out loud. However, the Serbs had this feeling that they were a uniquely persecuted nation, much put upon by history. They felt that they had not been allowed to live under their own leaders. A lot of them were not. Of course, in Serbia itself they could. But they were talking about the Serbs in Croatia whom we know about now. They are called the "Krajina Serbs." There are other names for various areas out there. Or take the Bosnian Serbs.

So when all of this started all over again in 1989, I thought to myself, "Oh, my God!" Whether you are comfortable with this feeling or not, whether you consider that the Serb complaints are justified or not, certainly this is not a complaint that justified what they wound up doing. However, that feeling is there, and it has to be accommodated in some way to make it possible for this situation to be "managed." To manage this situation, you have to understand the deepest felt needs of the various players. There are the Croatians with their feelings, the Serbs with their feelings, and the Muslims, of course, with theirs.

I think that it was those two things, the way the Serbs regard the Albanians and my distaste for that attitude and this sense that the Serbs have a feeling of identity with each

other and with a history that is still not complete. This is perhaps best expressed in the view which I mentioned before: "Wherever there is a Serbian house, there is Serbia."

Q: I think that we'll stop after we finish the section on Yugoslavia. I would just like to talk a bit about the time that you served in the Consular Section, when I was chief of that Section. What were you doing there and what were you getting out of that?

DUNLOP: I think that there were only two of us in the section, weren't there? Therefore, what you didn't do, I did. We were not compartmentalized into handling immigrant and non-immigrant visas and then American services. I have some very good memories from that time, one of which was that it was a very pleasant experience to learn a lot from you. I came into the Consular Section with only a very basic, short course in Consular Affairs. I think that covered three weeks, or something like that. I basically had to learn all of that stuff over again.

I remember a couple of impressions that stayed with me. One of them is that, in those days, the "preference" waiting list for Yugoslavia was something horrible like 12 years. That meant that, if a family member or some other Yugoslav, didn't matter whether he was a Serbian, Croatian, or whatever, was eligible to come to the United States because of whatever set of circumstances of family status which, under our laws, allowed him to become eligible, he still had 12 years to wait. This amounted to a lifetime for most of these people.

That situation generated pressure within the waiting line. It led people to falsify their applications so that they could get into the United States under other terms and then stay on, because they had preferential status. We had to turn those folks back if they came into our office and lied. That made them forever ineligible to receive an American visa, if we could document this sufficiently or assert it. I just felt that this was a terrible situation. It had to be done, because it was what the immigration law said. I was so glad when the law was later changed, although I don't know exactly how it works now. However, at least this meant that there wasn't so much pressure on these people to come in with very cleverly constructed "stories." Sometimes they were not so cleverly constructed, but they were all in great danger of losing the opportunity ever to come to the United States. That was one thing that I remember.

I remember feeling very uneasy about making some of those judgments, but that's human nature, and you had to make those judgments. The judgment would be that this person lied, based on your understanding of how the whole culture worked. For example, there was a Macedonian woman who would come in to apply for a non-immigrant visa to visit an aunt in the United States. The "aunt" was probably a 22-year-old woman. Well, the chances were that she was going to marry someone she had never met. Or she had met him already but they couldn't arrange the marriage "deal" in time. He had to go back to the United States before his visa or re-entry permit expired. Now they had to arrange how many cows and pigs and what portion of a plum orchard in Yugoslavia would be

transferred. Now she was going to go to the United States to complete the deal. It was kind of stressful to handle cases like that.

The other thing I remember is a couple of welfare cases involving American citizens. Remember that terrible automobile accident out on the Novi Sad highway?

Q: Yes.

DUNLOP: There was one person, an American, killed. It happened at Christmas time, and the body was sent back to the United States. I remember that I had several things to handle. You probably talked to the families, mostly on the phone. I would visit the hospital and get some word from the doctor. Then I went out to Novi Sad. There were two young men there, when this terrible accident occurred just before Christmas. One of the passengers had severe damage to his head. The other one was killed. The body was out in Novi Sad. So one of my jobs was to go out to Novi Sad and help make the arrangements to ship the body back to the US, which was fairly straightforward but kind of gruesome. In fact, we didn't do this very often.

I remember bringing the bloody clothes of the dead man back to Belgrade. They just handed them to me. I wasn't prepared for this. They said, "Come back tomorrow" for the bloody clothes. They gave me a bundle of clothes, tied up in rope and soaked in dried blood. So I brought the clothes back to the Embassy and put them in a corner of the basement garage of the office. Every time I would go down there, I would see the bundle of bloody clothes, just sitting there.

Among the other things that I had to do was to witness, sign, and certify whatever that air waybill was. That was to be attached to the coffin or the shipping container when it was sent back to the US. My certification was that this is, in fact, the body of a deceased American citizen. In this case the body would not fit into the container, which was too short. I said, "Well, what happens now?" They told me, "This happens lots of times. We just break the legs." [Laughter] So I guess that's what they did. Did I ever tell you that?

Q: No, I don't think so. Maybe you did.

DUNLOP: I don't know whether I told you that or whether I just wanted to bury that story so deep in my memory. They weren't going to open the coffin. They rarely open a coffin. The man's face was totally disfigured as a result of the accident.

Anyway, I can remember some of these things, which are very typical of what a Consular Officer does. I also remember going to the airport to meet the family of the deceased man. They flew out to Yugoslavia on about December 27, after we received the good news of one young man's recovery, following our hearing about the death of the other young man. That wasn't so bad, because I had some good news to tell them. I think that you met the family at the hospital.

Q: This is the lot of a Foreign Service Officer, often having to deal with a very difficult situation.

DUNLOP: Then there was the occasional American citizen, a kind of lost "waif," usually during the summer. We had no official, approved allotment of US Government funds to help these people. The Embassy had a fund which you managed and for which we collected money every so often. We'd go around to the Embassy community with our hands out. Did the Commissary or anybody else make a regular contribution to this fund?

Q: They did. We tried to be reimbursed for what we spent out of these funds. However, by the time the lost "waifs" got back to the United States, they usually were not very obliging about paying up.

DUNLOP: This would be essentially for a one-way ticket to the US plus enough additional money to buy meals for a day?

Q: Yes.

DUNLOP: I remember one young woman who said that she had been assaulted on the highway. It didn't look as this had happened. She didn't look very haggard when she came into the Embassy. We wouldn't have treated her any differently if we really suspected that her story was false.

Q: I think that this case involved a truck driver. Wasn't she hitch hiking?

DUNLOP: She could well have been. However, if I remember correctly, her demeanor was not that of someone who had just a hard and very harrowing experience. Her expression suggested that she was thinking, "I wonder if this story is going to work." [Laughter]

Q: Yes.

DUNLOP: Well, as I recall, a similar story worked for her in Athens. Maybe she thought that it would work in Belgrade.

Q: There were an awful lot of judgments made on whether people were "playing a game with us." We had a lot of games played on us, too. This was an era of the "footloose and fancy free" young American. Just the beginning of the "wanderjahr" of many American young people who would come into the Embassy with a "hard luck" story like this.

DUNLOP: I had another experience of that nature, which was a little bit different. It was very much a reflection of that age when I got to the Consulate in Zagreb a few years later. Maybe I could talk about that.

Q: OKAY.

DUNLOP: I thought that we had a very busy Consular Section in Belgrade. We had a lot to do. Later on there was some question about the buying and selling of influence among the local staff. I wasn't aware of it at the time. Were you there when it happened?

Q: There was a great deal of concern about it. I had always been concerned about this possibility but couldn't prove anything about it. One morning I came into the office, and Mme. Zhukov, a very proper, Russian lady who had been the "doyenne" of the staff of the Consular Section, died. I was thinking, "Good God, who's going to replace her?" I went off to view the body, as one did. I came back to the office and had to settle with the young or not so young ladies of the Consular Section as to who was going to replace her.

Then out came the story, "Oh, Mme. Zhukov has been playing fast and loose." The women in the Consular Section said that Mme. Zhukov would tell a well qualified, visa applicant with no apparent problem at all that, "You've got a real problem here. Maybe you ought to see a lawyer." The applicant would reply, "Well, whom should I see?" She would say, "Why don't you see Gospodin Mr. X," who was a friend of hers. There would be that type of thing.

DUNLOP: She suggested that the applicant had a visa problem, when there wasn't anything that needed fixing. Let me add one other thing. You were asking me about my impressions of Yugoslavia. Here is another, strong recollection. That is, the impact on people of a police state. A lot of this, though not all of it, is derived from my experience with the local staff of the Embassy in Belgrade.

Let's take it for granted that people from the Balkans are "worst case" folks. They tend to see things and sometimes people in the worst light. They are very suspicious of being manipulated. They are likely to promote themselves by telling tales on other people. So these very human failings may be as great or greater in a place like the Embassy in Belgrade, as any place else. Then you add on top of that a police state, which does, in fact, recruit people to "tell" on other people. In fact, it coerces people to do things against their will. For example, a loyal employee of the Embassy may be coerced to give information or try to steal information about these foreign, capitalist diplomats, who are enemies of the people's socialist state. Then the situation is compounded. The Yugoslav Government doesn't have to do a lot to disrupt and to divide people under those circumstances or to see that happen, if they think that it's in their interests.

In fact, the secret police can call somebody in and interrogate them. Then they can let it be known to other people that they've done that. How can that person say that he or she has never, in fact, entered into some compromising arrangement with the secret police? This is a kind of poison that seeps into personal relationships, even more so than would otherwise be the case.

I remember, and this was also true up in Zagreb later on. In fact, it was true to a somewhat lesser degree in Belgrade 12 years later, when I came back to Yugoslavia. It is

a very nasty thing that happens almost immediately when you get that situation where the government has the power to do with people as it wishes. People begin to believe that they have done things.

Q: OKAY, Harry, let's stop at this point. We'll pick it up next time when you were leaving Belgrade in 1965.

DUNLOP: Yes, the Embassy received one of those circular messages stating that anybody who wanted to volunteer for Vietnamese language training was welcome to do so. I wanted to study Vietnamese and so left Belgrade in June, 1965.

Q: All right. We'll pick it up there.

Q: This is July 19, 1995. We are continuing the interview with Harry Dunlop. Harry, let's talk about the Vietnamese language training. Tell me how and where this training was conducted at that time, and so forth.

DUNLOP: At that time the Department was still teaching Vietnamese at the Foreign Service Institute in the small group format that developed after World War II in the 1950's. I had already experienced this kind of language training with you in the Serbo-Croatian language class. The Vietnamese language training took place in the "old" FSI building, which now has returned to its former status as a garage in an apartment complex in downtown Rosslyn, VA [Arlington Towers].

The vast expansion in Vietnamese language and area training, which took place later on, had not yet occurred when I studied Vietnamese. I can't remember if we had two or three groups studying Vietnamese at that time. There were four students in a class. There were at least two such classes, there may have been three of them. It was the traditional, audio-visual method of teaching, using the FSI methodology, with much "one on one" memorization, repetition, and the use of tapes.

The primary teacher, who was superb, was named Mr. Quang. We had a linguist who worked on the Chinese language, named Charles Sheehan. He was a legendary, happy, party guy. He left the instruction pretty much to Mr. Quang, which was probably a good thing, because Mr. Quang knew what he was doing.

Q: Could you describe some of the other officers who were going through this training at that time?

DUNLOP: You know, it's a terrible thing to admit this, but I have drawn a "blank" on that subject. I can remember every one of us in the Serbo-Croatian class, who sat around a table with you for a full year. I may remember the members of the Vietnamese class later on.

Q: What did you think that you were going to be assigned to?

DUNLOP: That is a very good question. I think that I had the good sense to know that I didn't have a clue about it. [Laughter] At least, I think that that's what I told myself at the time. I remember telling myself that and I hope that I told myself that. For me the Vietnamese language class was going to be a totally new experience. A lot of things that I had done had been new experiences, but not quite so different as in this case. Asia was a totally unknown part of the world to me. I had done little study and reading about Asia. I knew only what the "Reader's Digest" and the "National Geographic," as well as what the news media were saying about the Vietnam War. I had the view that we had gone to fight in Vietnam for a good cause. I would have been hard put to define the cause in other than the broadest of terms, such as "containing communism." I thought that communism was bad. To contain it was not only a good but also a necessary thing to do. I felt that this was being done in a difficult and perhaps dangerous environment. I don't remember thinking of myself as any kind of "noble crusader," like Shane, riding into town to fix some problem. I hope I didn't think that way.

Q: From the professional side, did you feel that this was regarded as a good move by our colleagues in the Foreign Service?

DUNLOP: I think that the young Foreign Service Officers in my class who were studying the Vietnamese language, and I may remember their names soon, had very few reservations about whether this was the right thing to do for our country. Some of us may have had some reservations about whether it was a good thing for us to do, personally. However, we were all "volunteers" at this time. Any such thoughts were probably overlaid by other motives. I am sure that most of us were unmarried, at that time. That was not true with later Vietnamese language students.

So family concerns would have been minimal, although my mother didn't want me to study Vietnamese. However, this was not something that I would lay awake at night worrying about, although she probably did. I think that we all had come into the Foreign Service during the administration of President Kennedy. I believe that I mentioned earlier how motivated I was by the idealism of that time. I think that there was a strong element of that idealism in us. I think that there was also a feeling of "adventure." I remember thinking of that a little bit. This kind of assignment was going to be a very new thing for me to do. There would be challenges, and I might find out something about myself that I would hope I would like when I found out about it.

Q: How did you study Vietnamese? I took a couple of weeks of Vietnamese language training. I was horrified with the tonal aspect of the language. I couldn't tell a word with one tone from a word pronounced in the same way but with a different tone. Both words mean different things.
DUNLOP: That was certainly a problem for me, too. I had a real concern about the tonal aspect of Vietnamese, while not understanding what that actually was. I am a very "unmusical" person. I mean, I enjoy music enormously. Last night I was at a seminar on Brahms and Schöneberg and so forth, because I love to listen to them. However, playing

an instrument or singing is a disaster for me. Speaking Vietnamese is really a "performance" for me. You have to get up there and do it.

After I had been in South Vietnam for a little while, I don't think that that concern remained. In your case you only studied Vietnamese for a few weeks, and it's not fair to you or anybody to study it for such a short time. However, I think that, once you've studied Vietnamese for a little while, remembering the tones becomes more a matter of memorization than anything else. You have to remember what tone to use. The reproduction of the tone ceases to be a problem. The same sound means different things with different tones. The single syllable sound, "Ma," is a classic example. It means "ghost," "horse," or "mountain," depending on the tone. Does the high, rising tone mean "mountain"? No, it's probably the level tone.

We had excellent teachers. They knew how to "ease" us into Vietnamese as best we could be eased into it. There were some Foreign Service Officers who became superb Vietnamese language officers. But they would have been superb language officers in any language. I certainly was not one of them.

Q: When did you go out to Vietnam?

DUNLOP: I went out in June, 1966.

Q: You were there from June, 1966, to when?

DUNLOP: I was there from 1966 to 1969. The tours for unmarried officers were 18 months long. You had the option to ask for a second tour. Some of us did and some didn't. I did, so I served two tours, back to back, unaccompanied, 18 month tours in Vietnam. In other words, 36 months in all.

Q: So you went there in...

DUNLOP: In June, 1966, and left there in June, 1969.

Q: What job did you have when you went out to the Embassy in Saigon?

DUNLOP: I was assigned, and I've always been grateful for this, to the Provincial Reporting Unit in the Political Section. There is an interesting story about that, and I think that it would be told in pretty much the same way by others. Henry Cabot Lodge was Ambassador to South Vietnam twice. He was still Ambassador when I arrived in Saigon in June, 1966. Whatever else Henry Cabot Lodge was, I think that he had some very strong qualities as Ambassador. He was certainly a man who could be fooled once, but not twice. If he was caught by surprise three times, he really didn't want to do that again. He had been in South Vietnam through coups d'etat and times when he had been briefed by the intelligence community and particularly by the military about things which were going to happen. Then he found out that they weren't going that way. He wanted a group

of Vietnamese language officers who would be responsive to his direction who could report from the field, directly to him. He felt a need for such a direct channel because he did not trust the reporting from MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam], which had advisors all over the country. They reported through military channels to MACV Headquarters in Saigon. Then MACV Headquarters shared with the Embassy what it felt the Embassy needed to know.

CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] reporting, at that time, I believe, was also mainly focused on what was going on in the "big picture politics" of Saigon. However, Buddhist monks had burned themselves on the streets, the Consulate in Hue was sacked [by a Buddhist mob], and coups d'etat were springing up from nowhere in the woodwork, as it were. So Ambassador Lodge insisted on having a Provincial Reporting Unit established of Vietnamese language speaking Foreign Service Officers.

Q: Harry, who was the chief of the Provincial Reporting Unit?

DUNLOP: The Provincial Reporting Unit was headed by a wonderfully effective Foreign Service Officer, a good supervisor, and substantively very strong person named Dick Teare, Richard W. Teare. I learned an enormous amount about political reporting from Dick Teare. During my previous assignments, although I may have been in a Political Section in Belgrade, I really hadn't done so much traditional political reporting work. In Belgrade there were too many able Political Officers doing it in too confined a sphere of activity. So I really hadn't had much of an opportunity to do much political reporting. Now I had the opportunity and had a wonderful teacher.

Each officer assigned to the Provincial Reporting Unit was given a group of provinces to follow. South Vietnam was divided into 44 provinces and six of what they called "autonomous cities," like Saigon, Dalat, Da Nang, and others. Each of these provinces and cities were administered either by a Province Chief or a Mayor, under the Vietnamese system. The provincial borders were clearly marked on a map, and lines of authority usually didn't cross those provincial borders. Later on, these divisions became blurred but, at the time I arrived in South Vietnam, this was still very much a "vertical system." The Province Chief reported to the Corps Commander, and we'll talk about that in a second. And so the line went, right straight up to Saigon.

Each Provincial Reporter was usually assigned a group of seven or eight, contiguous provinces. In my case it was the provinces of the "Upper Mekong Delta" area South of Saigon. That is the upper part of the Mekong Delta, where it bulges out into a sort of circular area. I had eight provinces to follow, starting just South of Saigon, going down to the Mekong River, then stretched out along the Mekong River on both sides of it. I was supposed to get to know this "Upper Mekong Delta" area as well as I possibly could. I was expected to spend at least 40 percent of my time out in those eight provinces, getting to know people, including Province Chiefs and other Vietnamese officials and American advisors in that area. My job was to establish a friendly and, hopefully, productive relationship with these people, though this was not always easy.

Here I was, an officer coming out of Saigon, asking questions, and then going away. I suppose that, at times, I must have looked like a "spy."

Q: You were the "son of a bitch" from out of town.

DUNLOP: Well, you could be. Even though you take a couple of bottles of Scotch whisky along with you to "present" to people, it didn't overcome all of that suspicion. So that called for one side of the political reporting skills which you had to bring to bear. It wasn't just being buddy buddy with these people. It involved psyching out what approach would establish the kind of confidence that you weren't going to do him in. On the other hand, in some cases what you said was going to get back to senior officers back in Saigon, and maybe even in Washington, about the situation, which may have been different from what these senior officers were reporting. That's why we were supposed to be out there. So this was the "circle" that you had to "square."

It was not always easy, but usually there were ways to get around it. If you couldn't find one person to talk to, you would find somebody else. Later on, when the political situation evolved to the point where there were elections, both for a Constituent Assembly and then for a National Assembly, little political parties, and sometimes not so little ones, would spring up. Keeping in touch with them was one of the traditional tasks of a Political Officer. The job was to go out and find out who was doing what on the political scene. The other side of it, and perhaps it was more important, always involved your impression of the security situation as a political reporting officer. Remember, you had spent six weeks out of the last six months, in Kien Hoa Province, for example. We wanted to know how well we were doing in that area. Although this was very "intuitive" reporting, it was always thought of as very useful back in Saigon.

Q: For one thing, I think that the American military officers assigned to these provinces was sort of "graded" on his particular area as "safer" or not, or "doing better" or not. There was a tendency to "fudge" the reporting. You were going out there without any program responsibility. If things were going badly, OKAY, that's what you reported that you had seen.

DUNLOP: Well, I think that what you said about the military officers assigned in the provinces was also true of civilian "program officers" out there. For example, AID [Agency for International Development] had a program officer in these provinces. Let's take a big program, which was always important and a subject of controversy because of the corruption which inherent in the activity. Let's talk about "refugee relief." This AID officer was providing refugees with rice and housing materials to build or rebuild their homes. There was always going to be an opportunity for local officials to rip this material off and sell it on the black market. The AID program officer's job was to get the houses up and the people fed, with the cooperation of authorities who may have been taking a cut. How he reported that and what he did with that, human nature being what it was, he

might not have been quite as frank in reporting how much was being ripped off than others might do who didn't have this program responsibility.

Q: When did you arrive in South Vietnam in 1966?

DUNLOP: On a hot day in June. [Laughter] I remember the heat, as you said.
Q: Well, you met my plane in February, 1969. It was hot then, too! Anyway, Harry, what was the situation in June, 1966, as you saw it, and what were you being told? Also, what was the situation in South Vietnam as a whole and then in your particular area?

DUNLOP: Well, when I stepped off the plane and onto the ground in June, 1966, I was somewhat bewildered. My knowledge of Vietnamese wasn't yet up to speed, and it took me some time to get the view that I now have. However, looking back on it and drawing on whatever else I knew or had experienced at that time, and also by drawing on hindsight, I would say that in June, 1966 the Thieu-Ky Government or, rather, the Ky-Thieu Government at that time, had been in power for some months, after another one of those seemingly endless coups d'etat. We didn't know that this process would be "endless" at that time. It happened to be the last, military coup that took place in South Vietnam before the country fell to the communists in April, 1975. There were no attempted coups d'etat after that.

One of the objectives of the Political Section was "coup alert" reporting. We really didn't know that there was not going to be any other coup d'etat. A look at recent history in South Vietnam would have suggested to any observer that it was quite likely that there would be another coup d'etat.

This was a time when the political instability which followed the overthrow of the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem, appeared to be still very much to be expected.

Q: Diem was killed...

DUNLOP: In November, 1963. So this was three years after that, a period when there were revolving door governments in Saigon. Prior to March, 1965, the American presence in South Vietnam had been mainly in the advisory and support functions. After that point the American presence changed to an actual, combat role. By the time I arrived in Saigon in June, 1966, the American combat presence was beginning to be felt.

At the time there were still areas of very predominantly Viet Cong influence, which the American forces had yet to penetrate. There were also significant areas where American forces had begun to penetrate and where the security situation, in its broadest terms, was beginning to improve. In late 1964 and early 1965, and this is drawing on hindsight and things I learned after I arrived in Saigon, the South Vietnamese Army had essentially been defeated by the Viet Cong. North Vietnam introduced regular, combat forces into South Vietnam, mainly up in the northern part of South Vietnam closest to North Vietnam, during this period of time. The North Vietnamese thought that they were headed

toward a complete victory. In my view, at least, it was the intervention of American combat forces in the spring of 1965 which prevented a communist victory from happening. However, the South Vietnamese military capability had not recovered to any significant degree. The South Vietnamese Armed Forces were still pretty feckless. There were exceptions to that in certain units, certain provinces, and certain areas. However, generally speaking, the South Vietnamese Armed Forces looked at this American military presence with a combination of "Thank God!" and, "Now let them do it." That also was not so evident to those on the ground at the time, but I think that it was true, looking back on it.

The situation which I stepped into when I arrived was one where a beaten South Vietnamese Army had been rescued by the Americans. In various places this was beginning to be significantly apparent. In other places, this was less so. What I experienced during my three years in South Vietnam was more and more of the American presence. When I left South Vietnam in late 1969, I think that the American forces were at their greatest strength, about 550,000 troops.

Certainly, the Nixon administration had announced its policy of a slow but steady "drawdown" of American forces, but it hadn't progressed very far. If you were to take a look back, as we are now doing, at the eight provinces that I had to deal with, two of them had never been subject to strong Viet Cong influence. That was just my good luck. I could always find two provinces about which I could say wonderful things regarding the security situation. Those provinces were An Giang and Chan Doc, which were in the upper part of the Mekong River Delta, toward the Cambodian border, along that gorgeous, huge Mekong River.

Why had they been and were they to continue to be so secure? This was because they were provinces controlled by the Hoa Hao sect, a Buddhist sect. We could talk a lot about the Hoa Hao, because it was my job to learn something about them, which I did. Essentially, they were a kind of puritanical or perhaps "reformist" Buddhist sect. They emerged during the French colonial period but did not have any kind of French sponsorship. The French always looked at them as very suspect. Members of the Hoa Hao sect were Vietnamese who wanted to do things in a different way. They did not approve of the lack of political involvement of the Buddhist church, as they saw it. This would not have endeared them to the French, who would have been perfectly happy to see a quiescent Buddhist church from the political point of view.

The Hoa Hao were also unhappy with what they considered the self-serving character of the Buddhist hierarchy, which was very much involved in its own conspiratorial, bureaucratic infighting. The Hoa Hao were different people. They said, "Let's have a church where everybody can have access to God. You don't need a large hierarchy. We will have our priests and administrators out there, to the degree that is necessary, to provide a place for worship. But that's about all." A Hoa Hao Buddhist monk keeps a building intact. There is incense there to burn and an altar to direct his prayers to. He will provide good advice to people if they ask him. However, he's not an intermediary with

God. The Hoa Hao "convert" who joins that church can, in effect, converse directly with his God, without any "layering" of intermediaries.

The Hoa Hao movement became quite popular in these two provinces. I'm not sure why it didn't spread further. That's a good question which scholars could investigate some day. Certainly, in these two provinces, which were heavily populated and very prosperous, the Hoa Hao hierarchy and this way of approaching religion had established itself and become very predominant.

The Vietnamese communists made a terrible mistake in dealing with the Hoa Hao. In the years immediately following 1945, they tried to "co-opt" the Hoa Hao movement. The chief "saint" of Hoa Haoism told them, "No," and they killed him. That was one of the grave errors that the communists made, because this act automatically turned the whole sect into very strong, anti-communists. If they found that somebody was a communist, they killed him. No question. So there weren't very many communists in these two provinces.

I'd be very interested in knowing what the VC [Viet Cong, Vietnamese Communists] did with the Hoa Hao areas after the collapse of the Saigon Government in 1975. I've never seen anything written about it. Of course, the North Vietnamese Government was strongly determined to "crush" any dissent in South Vietnam. How did they go about it, how successful were they, and what resistance did they find? I have seen no reporting on this subject.

Anyhow, those were two of "my" provinces. It was fun to go down there.

Q: Were you able to talk to the Hoa Hao? How receptive were they?

DUNLOP: They were very receptive. Of course, they identified us with the anti-communist side of things, naturally enough. They were very worried that the Saigon Government was going to be unable to resist the communists. So that was one aspect that made access to the Hoa Hao good for us.

Once the political situation allowed it, the Hoa Hao also became active in Saigon politics. They elected members of the National Assembly, and we had contact with them there.

Q: You have been speaking of this admirable group. At the same time there was a Buddhist hierarchy in Saigon and elsewhere, which was much more "political" and "self-serving," or however you want to describe them. I would assume that the Buddhist hierarchy would have the ear of the Embassy to some extent, because, obviously, we were trying to "reach out" to all non-communist groups. Did you find yourself sometimes serving, within the Embassy staff, as a kind of "spokesman" for the Hoa Hao? Did you find yourself saying, "Don't let these 'slick' Buddhist monks..."

DUNLOP: You mean the Buddhist monks from the An Quang pagoda. Well, that's a good question. I never thought of my role in that way. Later on I became much more involved with the "city slicker" Buddhists. I thought that the Hoa Hao had a certain "country bumpkin" character. The Hoa Hao sect was out in the country, and Thich Tri Quang [a leading Buddhist monk in the An Quang pagoda group] was in Saigon. Tri Quang was the "symbol" of the politically active Buddhists.

There are a couple of things to say about that as far as the Hoa Hao are concerned. First, the politically most active Buddhists were not in the Mekong Delta area. They were in Central Vietnam, in Hue, Da Nang, along the coast, and in Saigon. For some reason or other those who were further South were never terribly responsive to the leadership of the more prominent figures at the An Quang Pagoda. That was certainly not true in Central Vietnam.

In Central Vietnam you could find traces of the influence of the An Quang Pagoda, as I found out later on when I did some reporting in, say, Nha Trang, or Binh Dinh province. By golly, those supporters of the An Quang Pagoda were very much aware of what was going on in Saigon. They had read the latest bulletins or statements, whatever they were, issued by the An Quang Pagoda. The foreign press tended to represent the outlook of the leaders of the An Quang Pagoda as if it were the outlook of all Buddhists.

Many Buddhists in the southern part of South Vietnam were not Hoa Hao supporters and were not Cambodian Buddhists. The Cambodian Buddhists came from another, large element of the population. They followed a different discipline of Buddhism, which came from Cambodia into Vietnam. The Cambodian Buddhists were much more politically quiescent. I don't think that I ever had to represent the Hoa Hao in a way which would amount to portraying them as opposed to Buddhists sympathetic to the views of the An Quang Pagoda leaders. I think that I performed a useful role in identifying the Hoa Hao group for the senior officers of the Embassy who, perhaps, would never have gotten to know them. So these senior officers had some idea, personally, of a group which was not insignificant, but was located in a limited area of the country.

Regarding "advocacy" on behalf of this or that group of Vietnamese, there weren't any "pro An Quang Pagoda" voices inside the Embassy. [Laughter] You know, Tri Quang had been given asylum in the Embassy. He might have been killed, had he been arrested during a major confrontation with the Saigon Government.

[FYI: In fact, Tri Quang was picked up by Vietnamese Special Forces personnel acting on the order of the Saigon Government under President Diem in August or September, 1963, in an obvious attempt to bring an end to the more or less non-stop anti-government demonstrations then under way at the An Quang and certain other pagodas. President Diem, supported by his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, ordered the Vietnamese Special Forces to "raid" the more activist of the Buddhist pagodas and arrest everybody in them. About 20 pagodas out of the total of about 5,000 pagodas in South Vietnam, were raided, and Tri Quang, among others, was picked up. He was briefly interrogated and then released by

the South Vietnamese Police, who obviously did not realize who he was. He knew that this was a mistake on the part of the police and he was afraid that the authorities would learn of their mistake, pick him up again, and, perhaps, kill him. When he arrived at the Embassy at night, he applied to the Marine Guard for asylum. The Marine Guard referred the matter to the Embassy Duty Officer, who made the first decision to give him asylum. Ambassador Lodge confirmed the decision to give him asylum on the following day and reported the matter to the Department. When this became known in Washington, it caused a considerable uproar, as the United States normally does not grant asylum to anyone, unless they are in immediate danger of death from an armed mob. Tri Quang was under no such pressure from a mob, but an "order" from Washington to release Tri Quang would have meant directly challenging the position of Ambassador Lodge. President Kennedy appreciated that it was unwise to do this, as he and Lodge had been political opponents in Massachusetts. So Tri Quang was given asylum for about six weeks or so in the office of Jim Rosenthal, one of our Vietnamese language officers, on the second floor (third floor, American style) at the Embassy. Tri Quang's presence quickly became known to the Diem Government, but he was allowed to stay in Jim's office at the Embassy for about six weeks before the Diem Government was overthrown on November 2, 1963, and Diem and Nhu were killed. Tri Quang then left the Embassy and resumed living at the An Quang Pagoda. [End FYI]

Tri Quang never seemed to show any particular gratitude to the Embassy for having saved his butt.

Q: So the Buddhist hierarchy was not on our "pampered" list.

DUNLOP: Oh, they sacked the Consulate up in Hue. There was no reason to do that. It was to demonstrate their power. They wanted to show the rest of the Vietnamese how strong they were. From that point of view, "sacking" the Consulate was probably a good thing to do. It certainly didn't endear them to the Embassy. [FYI: Incidentally, when the Buddhist mob sacked the Consulate in Hue, the building was empty. Tom Corcoran, the Consul, had anticipated this action and moved everyone to Da Nang, where he reopened the Consulate. END FYI]

I had some dealings with the An Quang people later on. We can talk about that when I get to my second tour in Saigon. I'll share my impressions of him in that context in greater detail than now. Like any group of human beings, there were people in the An Quang Pagoda group who were very "self-serving" in the sense that they were opportunistically looking for power and influence. If kicking the American "butt" was the way to get it, fine. If, by sidling up to the Americans, they could enhance their power and influence, they would do that. There also were some earnest and decent Vietnamese who saw their country being wracked by war. They were trying to find some way to use their Buddhist affiliation to be helpful. Anyway, I never found any of them, although maybe some of them may have fooled me, who really wanted the Viet Cong to win.

Q: Sticking strictly to the Hoa Hao group, were we doing much in the way of providing them with aid or assistance?

DUNLOP: Well, because there was no large, refugee population and conditions were relatively "happy" in the Hoa Hao area, we didn't have a large aid effort. However, we did have the usual AID provincial assistance. I never saw the figures on amounts involved and never thought to look at them in comparison to other provinces. However, I hope that we were smart enough not to give them disproportionately large amounts of aid, just because it was easy to do. I hope we spent the money elsewhere, where it was needed and, perhaps, more difficult to spend effectively.

We had a very conventional provincial structure in the two provinces where there were large numbers of Hoa Hao. We had an Information Officer, whose job was basically to help the province insofar as they needed it and would accept it for "psychological warfare" efforts, although not all of it was probably, technically "psychological warfare." We certainly had an AID [Agency for International Development] officer whose job it was to dispense aid. We had our AID Public Safety Advisers who were almost totally useless there because they were not needed, although they were a part of the standard, organizational structure. We also had a CIA Base in these provinces.

Now part of the Hoa Hao area abutted the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. The Hoa Hao also straddled the Mekong River. The Mekong River was sensitive for many reasons, among which was the fact that, after the South China Sea was pretty much closed by us to waterborne infiltration of communist personnel and supplies, this was an area where the Viet Cong could and did "infiltrate" personnel and supplies from Cambodia into Vietnam. They put these supplies and personnel into sampans, which hid them very well, because the Mekong River was swarming with sampans. So the security side along that river was important, and we finally put armed river patrol boats in there to help the Vietnamese armed forces, who did not have much of a waterborne capability to monitor that traffic.

I went on two operational missions there with the river patrol boats that were being deployed there along the Mekong River. Perhaps I should explain that. It was an interesting aspect of my experience in Vietnam.

Q: Let me stop for just a second.

Q: Perhaps we could continue with your description of operations on the Mekong River in South Vietnam.

DUNLOP: I would like to comment on operations on the Mekong River, which was always of concern. First of all, it's a huge river system, composed really of two branches of the great Mekong: the Can Tho and the Bassac. Secondly, these two rivers are connected and interconnected throughout much of their length..

Q: The river is called the Mekong...

DUNLOP: By the time it reaches Vietnam it has divided into two rivers, beginning right about the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. Each of these two rivers looks like about 10 Potomac Rivers together. Much of the commerce of the area moves up and down the river, of course. It's a powerful economic factor. Because it's so big and because there's always so much traffic on it, it was one way in which the North Vietnamese communists could gain access further and further South, into Cambodia. They could bring in supplies and personnel down the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" in North Vietnam and Laos and then ship them into South Vietnam.

I can't give you the exact time but I believe that it was probably the winter of 1966-1967 or, perhaps, the spring of 1967, when the U.S. Navy was ordered to operate on the Mekong River with a newly-developed type of river patrol boat. They were called "Patrol Boat, River" or PBR. They looked something like World War II torpedo boats, but they had a different role. For one thing, they were intended for use in fresh water and therefore had a very shallow draft. Secondly, they used a newly developed water turbine engine which drew in water from near the bow and pushed it out from the stern. They developed high speeds and were highly maneuverable. They were designed for river warfare on the Mekong River and so were armored and had lots of guns on them. These guns were more or less in the category of "small arms," but they had a lot of guns on board. They had .50 caliber and .30 caliber machine guns and grenade launchers. They carried a crew of five and up.

The U.S. Navy set up a PBR base in Vinh Long province, next to the provincial capital of Chao Doc Province, which, in turn at that time, was next to An Giang province. Vinh Long province was not completely dominated by the Hoa Hao. It had some Hoa Hao supporters in it, but they were not the majority of the people. The purpose of the river boats was to assist the Vietnamese National Police. At that time the Vietnamese National Police had responsibility for security on the Mekong River. They had a few police boats, but they were really very ineffectual, and were probably subject to being "bought off" by the Vietnamese communists, anyway.

So here came the Americans, who said to themselves, "We're going to 'fix' this situation, huh?" Well, they were good guys, wonderful guys. I got to know the U.S. Navy people down there very well. They were very sensitive to the fact that this was going to be the first time that armed, American forces would be on the Mekong River, that most of the traffic on the river was totally "legitimate," and that only a fraction of the boat people were composed of communists. However, the U.S. Navy people knew that it was important to try to figure out how to tell the difference.

The U.S. Navy developed some rather sophisticated operational orders about how they would conduct their operations after the evening curfew. We decided that there was nothing that we could do during the day. There was just too much traffic on the river.

However, we thought that the Navy patrols could help to enforce a curfew at night. One could argue, as I heard it argued, "Well, if you have a curfew, it will be 100% effective because the communists won't come down at night. They'll just come down during the day." Anyway, the idea was to start off with a curfew at night.

So the provincial authorities in the provinces along the Mekong River, under orders from the Vietnamese Government in Saigon, proclaimed a curfew on the river after something like 8:00 PM. Vietnamese boats were ordered off the river. Anybody who was on the river at night wasn't to be "sunk" but was subject to being stopped and subjected to a rigorous search. This meant boarding such boats. The U.S. Navy PBR's were going to help with this effort. To start off with, the U.S. Navy members of the PBR crews realized that no U.S. Navy officer or crewman spoke Vietnamese. This enormously complicated their task. Also, there was a question of Vietnamese sovereignty. It may not have been appreciated in the U.S. that the Vietnamese Government always considered itself a sovereign government. Some of the American opponents of our policies in Vietnam, such as Prof. George Kahin of Cornell University, used to say that the Republic of Vietnam "did not have the least attribute of sovereignty." This was an extremist view, of course. In fact, it had virtually every aspect of sovereignty. The South Vietnamese Government was always very sensitive to things which impinged, particularly publicly, on its sovereignty. This was about as public an infringement as you could get. This would be like having Vietnamese cops down on Ward Circle, in the District of Columbia, directing traffic, this might be seen as suggesting that we weren’t capable of directing traffic on Ward Circle.

So then the idea was to put a Vietnamese policeman who could speak English on each PBR. This was a good idea. In fact, I promoted this idea to some degree, although I don't think that I was a key figure in getting it adopted. I certainly supported it and made sure that the Ambassador knew about it and that he understood why it could be important. So they did this. Then the question that came up was, "How was this working?" The U.S. Navy said that it was "wonderful." I had some doubts, so I was asked, and I would have done so, anyway and made it a part of my business in any case, to find out how well this system was working.

Well, one way to find out was to go out on some of these PBR patrols. These were "combat" missions, and we weren't supposed to go on "combat" missions. I asked a couple of "what if" questions of my boss, Dick Teare, back in the Embassy: "What if one of us went out on a PBR?" We knew what the rules were. However, I figured that I should go out on a PBR and see what happened. I should explain at this point that Brian Kirkpatrick, a very capable officer who went through Vietnamese language training with me and who spoke Vietnamese quite well, was covering other Mekong Delta provinces. We decided that for this particular operation of going on the PBR that there should be two of us, so each of us could tell his version of events. It's a little bit like going into a bordello to check on the health of the prostitutes. It's good to have somebody with you to confirm your story. That's one reason why you might want to go into the bordello. There were some funny jokes about it.

Anyway, Brian Kirkpatrick and I both went down to the PBR base in Vinh Long and asked the Lieutenant Commander in charge of these operations, whom we got to know very well, to let us go on two or three PBR operations. He said, "Do I have to tell anybody?" I said, "No." He asked again, "Are you sure?" I said, "Yes." So we went on two PBR operations. They were wonderful experiences, though a little bit scary, because the job was not just to stay on the main channel of the Mekong River but to go up some canals leading away from it. One side of the river was a lot more secure than the other, so we went up the canals on the less secure side. The PBR's did get into some firefights, and some people were wounded. However, not on the early patrols that we went on. Our job was to sit there, like a fly on a wall. So there were two extra guys on a boat that was supposed to have a crew of five or so people. Our job was to watch what happened when the PBR pulled up to a sampan on the river or canal. Maybe you might say that this was useless, because the Navy wouldn't behave improperly when we were around. I didn't think that way. I thought that they would do pretty much what they normally did, anyway.

So we went out on the river. On the first night we intercepted three boats and stopped them. Two of them were on the river and claimed that they simply had not known about the curfew. They said, "Curfew? What curfew?" Well, they seemed to be legitimate. At least, if the persons on the two sampans were not legitimate, at least their cargo was. There was nothing in their cargo of any interest to us. The third boat, interestingly enough, was carrying a badly wounded, Vietnamese woman across the river to a hospital. She was from the "bad" security side of the river. There had been some fighting over there. Her family rented a sampan and was taking her across the river to the hospital. Of course, that seemed OK.

I went back to the Embassy and said, "Look, better to have a Vietnamese policeman on the PBR than not. The U.S. Navy PBR crew seems to know what they are doing."

Q: Were you or others getting reports about Viet Cong supplies and personnel coming into South Vietnam on the Mekong River?

DUNLOP: Oh, yes. Lots of them. In fact, the Vietnamese Police would intercept some of this traffic. Usually, they did not discover this on the water. It had been "offloaded" and moved away some distance from the river bank. They had their intelligence agents, who would report something like, "If you happen to stop in such and such a hamlet and look into the third sampan on the left, you'll find some mortar shells in there."

Whether this effort had any significant effect, I don't know. It was like a lot of the things that we did. It probably had some effect.

Q: What about some of the other areas that you say were affected by communist activity?

DUNLOP: One of the areas involved was the two provinces just South of Saigon, on National Route 4, Long An and Dinh Tuong provinces. Both of these provinces were areas where the Viet Cong were conducting a lot of operations and had been of high

security concern to the Vietnamese Government. This was partly because, if the communists ever "cut" Route 4, it would cut off the supply of rice to Saigon. The rivers run East-West. Route 4 ran North-South. There might have been other ways to get the rice into Saigon from the producing areas farther South, but rice is a heavy and bulky commodity to transport. Rice was the absolutely crucial food for that part of the world. There were other things as well: fish and pigs, for example. The Mekong Delta produced huge numbers of pigs and amounts of rice. The Mekong Delta was so fertile. Stu, you've flown over it, I'm sure. It's so gorgeous and so fertile. They say that, if you drop a lead pencil there, three things happen. First, a tree will grow [from the wood], a rubber tree will grow [from the eraser on the tip], and a lead tree will grow [from the lead]. [Laughter] So it was important to keep that route open. Long An and Dinh Tuong were both provinces where there were some "bad" areas, particularly to the West of Route 4, which abutted on the famous "Plain of Reeds." The Plain of Reeds was an area which the French had never gotten around to draining and turning into a fertile area to raise crops.

This area remained largely swampy. It was not heavily populated and was a significant Viet Cong "base" for operations against Route 4, the rest of the Mekong Delta, and Saigon itself. It was not all of that far from Saigon.

So I was assigned Long An and Dinh Tuong provinces. Long An had long been the subject for special projects, such as Operation "Sunrise," or the construction of strategic hamlets. All of these bright ideas had failed, not so much because they weren't any good, though some were not as good as others, but because of the way they were implemented. The South Vietnamese Government wasn't doing things the right way.

Long An province was the first place that the United States Government, in its wisdom, decided to deploy U.S. combat forces in IV Corps, other than the river patrol boats which I have mentioned and which did not involve large numbers of troops. I spent a lot of time arguing against this deployment, which I likened to "shoveling sand into a strong wind." I said this to anybody who would listen, and to many people who didn't want to listen. Well, that's not quite true. People listened politely. The U.S. military listened politely, they always listened politely. I said that it seemed to me, in my "wisdom," that the place for American combat forces was up in the highlands of Central Vietnam, up in I Corps, the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, up there where there were regular, North Vietnamese Army units which had been operating there since 1965. I said that another, suitable area for the operations of U.S. forces was along the "bad" coastal provinces, such as Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai, but not in the Mekong Delta. For operations in the Mekong Delta, the Vietnamese forces could handle them with our help and if they handled them in the right way.

But, no, we decided to put in our heavy military units in the Mekong Delta area. We wound up having the "atomic cannon" in Dinh Tuong province!

Q: Are you kidding?

DUNLOP: I am not kidding. This was a 280 mm cannon which could fire nuclear rounds. To me that was a supreme symbol of idiocy. We had this damn gun and wanted to deploy it. So we deployed it.

Q: What was it used for? Did it ever fire?

DUNLOP: It was deployed to fire into Kien Tuong province, where the swampy communist base areas were. But bombardment of these areas could have easily been handled by B-52 aircraft, and was bombed on various occasions.

One of the little figures that I got was that this gun had such a muzzle velocity that, when it was fired, it would tear the tin plate roofs off Vietnamese houses half a mile away.

Q: I remember nuclear artillery when I was in Germany. They had to clear the traffic to move it around. It would fire a shell, perhaps, about 25 miles away, or something like that.

DUNLOP: Those guns may have some use, particularly for firing nuclear weapons in a special, tactical situation. However, this was not one of the first things that we should have been doing. It was one of the latter idiocies that we did. And I don't think that everything that the U.S. military did in Vietnam was either useless or idiotic.

However, I lost the argument, if anybody even noticed that it had been made. Actually, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker was very much against the deployment of this nuclear artillery piece.

Q: Where did the pressure come from for bringing this equipment to South Vietnam?

DUNLOP: It was a curious situation. You know, the South Vietnamese were basically concerned about the security of Saigon. The cannon was deployed in the southern area around Saigon. Route 4 went straight through the middle of Long An and Dinh Tuong provinces. On the right hand side of Route 4, which, if you were going South, would mean to the West of the road, the security situation was "dicey." The Viet Cong had a readily accessible base area not far from the Vietnamese border with Cambodia. That was the swampy area in Kien Tuong we have mentioned previously. At that time this base area was to be the southern terminus of the "Ho Chi Minh Trail." It hadn't quite gotten that far yet, but the trail was about to be completed to that point.

This had long been an area where the Viet Cong had found refuge. They had base camps, hospitals, and so forth there. It was a threat to Saigon and to the heavily populated area along Route 4. That was it. As long as we didn't think that the 7th ARVN [Armee du Vietnam, Vietnamese Army] Division was up to defending this area, and the provincial authorities seemed to be competent or incompetent, in varying degrees, here came the Americans who said that they would solve the problem for the Vietnamese.

At one time we had two whole divisions or major elements of two whole divisions in the Mekong River Delta Area. We mainly had deployed to the Mekong Delta the U.S. 9th Infantry Division, plus one brigade from another U.S. division, probably from an Airborne Division. Imagine, deploying an Airborne Division in the Mekong Delta area! Anyway, we did it.

The First Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division was the first major unit to be deployed to the Mekong Delta area. I still had my responsibilities in Long An province. After having argued against deploying this brigade in there, I made it my business to do a really thorough job, as best I could, in reporting on the impact of this deployment. In other words, how the Vietnamese population view it, how the American troops behaved, and what impact they had on the situation, once they got in there.

I spent a lot of time during the latter half of the time that I was following developments in those seven provinces South of Saigon, worrying about the heavy American troop presence in Long An and Dinh Tuong provinces. Since these two provinces were close to Saigon, it was relatively easy for me to get down there. I probably exceeded our 40 percent "target" of travel outside of Saigon by quite a lot during those days. Nobody ever kept close track of how much time I spent down there.

Q: The main idea was to get you out of town.

DUNLOP: Right. To get out of town, and then come back to Saigon, write up my account of my trip, and talk to people in the Embassy. I would also do some shopping at the Commissary and plan the next trip. Planning the next trip was something of a problem for a while, because I had to go and "bum" rides in helicopters and so forth. Later on Air America [an air transportation company wholly owned by the CIA] developed something close to a scheduled flight system. They had regular courier flights to some places. You could even reserve space on these flights. You would go out to Saigon airport, sign a "chit," and got a ticket! However, in the early days, shortly after I arrived in Saigon, you went out to Tan Son Nhut airport and stood there at the Operations Desk until a flight going to where you wanted to go became available. Or, if there was no flight going to where you wanted to go but could get you relatively closer to your final destination, you might take the alternative and then try to fly on to your ultimate objective. So a lot of time was spent in making travel arrangements.

Long An and Dinh Tuong were a focus of a lot of my attention during the latter part of my first tour in South Vietnam, when the American forces were deployed there. I remember traveling a lot. I remember one conversation, because it was encouraging. Not all of the things that I heard about the American troops were "bad," and here is one of the more positive stories. It is rather typical of what provincial reporters did, me and others. In Long An, near the U.S. 9th division base, there was a little Vietnamese Buddhist pagoda, not a Hoa Hao or Cao Dai pagoda, off one of the roads that I often drove on. To get there, you turned East off Route 4, going toward where the U.S. Army encampment

was. I had long thought about stopping off there and talking to the local bonze (Buddhist priest). On this particular day, that is what I did. I had enough time to do it.

Q: What is a "bonze"?

DUNLOP: A "bonze" is a Buddhist priest or monk. I don't know where the word comes from. [Webster's Unabridged Dictionary says that it is a French word derived from the Portuguese word, "bonzo," defined as a Japanese or Chinese Buddhist monk.] However, the chief bonze would have one or two people working with him. They had very nice, though modest living quarters. These little Buddhist pagodas were often well maintained. They would have things like carp and lily ponds, and always a bell. You were always received with exquisite courtesy. They really didn't know who the hell you were. However, Vietnamese bonzes were genuinely hospitable. You would be given a cup of tea and maybe some cake.

Anyhow, I remember the conversation on this particular occasion. This bonze was a very interesting man. I often stopped in to see him later on, because I had gotten to know him. I would bring him little presents from Saigon, and so forth. Even in our first conversation it turned out that he had been there for 25 years! He wasn't very young. I introduced myself. He nodded politely. He asked me if I wanted to speak French. I said that, if he could stand my "bad Vietnamese," why not try that. So this conversation was conducted in Vietnamese.

In due course I asked him about the American soldiers at the 9th Division encampment and what people thought about that. Without hesitating at all, he said, "Let me explain something to you. Your forces have moved into the same cantonment, the same barracks, which the Senegalese troops from the French Union forces occupied when the French were here." He said this, suggesting that this was supposed to enlighten me a lot. In fact, it began to enlighten me a little bit. The Senegalese were black African troops in the French Army. They weren't in the Foreign Legion but they served all over the French Empire. They were renowned as tough fighters. The Senegalese were rough soldiers, big and black. They include some of the tallest people in West Africa. I asked what conclusions I should draw from that comment. He said, "Your soldiers are not like the Senegalese. They are different." I thought to myself, "I'm glad of that, I think." He said, "There are a lot of blacks in your Army, aren't there?" I said, "Yes." He said, "But they're not like the Senegalese." I didn't go into any great detail on what the Senegalese who had been stationed at that encampment actually did. However, this was a favorable comparison.

I said, "Surely, the people must have some concern, since many Americans are so black and may look like the Senegalese from a distance. This must raise some apprehensions." He said, "Oh, yes, of course. However, we Vietnamese know how to distinguish people from people. There are always good people and there are always bad people. We try not to draw conclusions without knowing which is which." I believe that what he said was true, and it was one of the times when this view was articulated for me by a Vietnamese. I

think that this was not an untypical point of view and attitude. This is one of the reasons why I grew to like and respect the Vietnamese as much as I did. I think that, no matter how badly we foreigners look, how badly we smell, and how clumsily we act, we're still going to be viewed as members of the human race.

Q: How well equipped and prepared do you think that the 9th Division was to fight the war in Vietnam? I'm not necessarily talking about equipment so much as attitude and so forth. You had been in Vietnam for a while, by this time.

DUNLOP: What was usually the case, when an American unit would first move into some place in Vietnam, is that they would be extremely well briefed. The commanders, the officers, and the soldiers would be well briefed. They would be made to understand as well as they could be made to understand that they were "guests" in the country, that not all "slopes" were enemies, and all that good stuff.

Q: "Slopes" is a term used for people whose eyes have a different shape and who may be Asians.

DUNLOP: The term "Gooks" comes from our experience during the Korean War. The word for Korean in the Korean language is "Hankuk." So when Koreans might tell an American, "Me Hankuk," he was a "gook." This effort to brief the troops and to sensitize, if you can, this gigantic, military machine just didn't have much staying power. The replacements for the troops initially deployed weren't briefed. That was also of interest, politically and from a security point of view.

For example, the Americans did not understand that Cambodians and Vietnamese are ethnically totally different. They look different from each other. The Cambodian and Vietnamese languages have no relationship to each other. The Cambodian variety of Buddhism, and, perhaps, the Cambodians are even more active in their religion than the Vietnamese are, is called "Hinayana" [Lesser Vehicle] or "Theravada" Buddhism. I'm not sure that I can tell you much about what the differences are between "Hinayana" and "Mahayana" [Greater Vehicle], the Buddhist faith which the Vietnamese practice. "Mahayana" Buddhism developed in China and came South with the Vietnamese. "Hinayana" Buddhism came into China from India "Mahayana" around through Tibet or somehow up North. It took a northern route. "Hinayana" Buddhism went due East from India, through Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia. There are differences between the two variants in doctrine, and Buddhist recognize these differences. However, Buddha is Buddha, and he is considered wonderful for both of the followers of these variants, but they have different ways of going about things.

For example, Tri Quang and his Vietnamese followers adopted the brownish general garb of a Mahayana or Vietnamese Buddhist. Monks' robes in Cambodia are always saffron yellow in color. That is a very superficial view. The Cambodian Buddhists do much more singing or chanting, which is wonderful to hear. The Cambodian Buddhists have choirs. There is something of that in the Mahayana Buddhist faith, but it is not such a feature of

their ceremonies. It is very attractive to go into a Cambodian Buddhist temple and hear them say, "Oh, you must hear our choir." And they will trot it out. Then 10 people will sit down, of course, always men and often young, and chant beautifully, in an a cappella way. It's something like Gregorian chant.

The southern provinces of South Vietnam were entirely inhabited by Cambodians at one time, because the Cambodians were there before the Vietnamese came. The Vietnamese invaded the Mekong Delta from the North. They pushed the Cambodians out of this territory. Of course, they don't like each other. There is an ancient tradition of dislike for each other. The Cambodian Buddhists were stranded in southern Vietnam and live as if they were in an enclave. They are cut off now by a sea of Vietnamese who swept on through the Mekong Delta. The Hinayana Buddhists in southern Vietnam now have very little contact with Cambodia. At various times during the Vietnam War some Americans had some ideas about recruiting some of the Hinayana Buddhists for use as mercenaries in the fighting in Cambodia. It didn't work out very well. The terms "Khmer Serai" or "Khmer Krom" [Cambodians from the far southern area of Vietnam] were used to describe Cambodians recruited for this effort. I know very little about all of that but I don't think that it worked very well.

The Cambodians living in South Vietnam basically wanted to duck out of the way of the fighting. They considered this a Vietnamese war. It turned out that for them a Vietnamese is a Vietnamese, and the color of his politics didn't much matter. They figured that they were going to get the short end of the stick, no matter how it turned out. I don't think that the Cambodians living in South Vietnam ever gave any comfort to the Vietnamese communists. They certainly didn't cooperate more than they had to with the GVN [Government of South Vietnam]. They just wanted to cultivate their own garden. Unfortunately, life in the world didn't exactly allow them to do that. The Cambodians living in South Vietnam were always very hospitable to us. I think that it's just part of their culture. They may have been even better disposed toward us than they may have been otherwise. The Cambodians always looked at the French as their "protectors" from the Vietnamese. Maybe they felt that some day we might play that same role for them. I don't think that we ever saw ourselves in that role.

It was the French who drew the border that separated Vietnam from Cambodia. It was the French who said to the Vietnamese, "Stay on your side of the border." Of course, the Vietnamese generally did this until 1971 [the time of the Vietnamese-American "incursion" into Cambodia]. [FYI: Prince Sihanouk would never agree with this statement. During the period from 1958 to 1965 he regularly claimed that the South Vietnamese continued to "invade" Cambodia, although he made no mention of the substantial sales of rice and other resources which he made to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese installations in the border area. He and his wife, Princess Monique, personally profited from the sale of these supplies to the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. END FYI] The Khmer say that in 1976 the Vietnamese continued their "rapacious" incursions into Khmer territory.

Q: Let's cover the period prior to the communist "Tet" offensive against South Vietnam in January, 1968. Prior to this time, what was your impression and what were you reporting back to Washington on the strength and capabilities of the Viet Cong? Was that in opposition, say, to what we were getting from our other sources?

DUNLOP: A good question. I have an anecdote to tell on this subject. I was due for home leave in January, 1968. I wanted to take my home leave, and the Department knew that I was coming back to Saigon for a second tour. I was asked to stop being a Provincial Reporter and to come back to Saigon and head the Provincial Reporting Unit. I had come up to Saigon, I guess, in about September, 1968, leaving "my" provinces to somebody else. The chief of the Provincial Reporting Unit was supposed to continue to travel a bit and "keep his hand in," as it were. However, he would go to all of the Staff Meetings and had administrative responsibilities, which were more burdensome than for the Provincial Reporters. So I began to attend the Thursday morning meetings of the Mission Council in my exalted, new capacity as chief of the Provincial Reporting Unit. I think that there was a more restricted meeting of this kind on Tuesdays.

The Mission Council was composed of the senior officers of the Mission, meeting under the direction of the Ambassador, to discuss and coordinate reporting and policy matters of general interest. We always started out with a military briefing. I was due to go on home leave on January 23, 1968. I had a plane ticket for the last flight out of Saigon on the afternoon of January 23, 1968. I had absolutely no intention of attending the Mission Council meeting on that morning. I considered myself on leave as of midnight the night before. However, lo and behold, something came up on the agenda for the Staff Meeting, and my boss asked me to be there for the Mission Council meeting. So I packed my bags and got ready so that I could leave shortly after that meeting.

So I went to the Mission Council meeting on January 23, 1968. I think that this was five days before the "Tet" offensive began. The commander of the U.S. 25th Division was present at the meeting. I've forgotten his name. Anyhow, the 25th Division was stationed due North and West of Saigon. That was the division under whose headquarters the great Viet Cong "tunnel complex" was built near Cu Chi [Binh Duong Province] which the Vietnamese communists now take great pleasure in bringing American tourists to Vietnam to see. The comic strip, "Doonesbury," by Gary Trudeau, has mentioned this during the last few weeks. The commanding general was at the Mission Council meeting and gave us a briefing. Much of the discussion was over what kind of "alert posture" we should have and what kind of "alert posture" we should urge the Vietnamese Government to adopt over the "Tet" period [Vietnamese New Year's holiday], because "Tet" was coming up in about five days, on January 28 and 29.

I remember that Mission Council meeting fairly clearly. First, a couple of general statements. There was a lot of information about something "big" coming down the pike. The question was whether it would be concentrated in one place. The intelligence dilemma at that time, as I recall it, that we had a base in western Quang Tri province near the Laotian border [Khe Sanh], concerning which we often heard reports. There was a lot

of attention devoted to this base. It was being supplied by air, and a lot of people were saying that it was like the siege of Dien Bien Phu [the French base in Lai Chau province near the Laotian border which was overwhelmed and captured by the North Vietnamese in May, 1954]. The North Vietnamese Army had thrown two regular divisions against Khe Sanh. Although it was holding well, and all of that, there was always a worry about whether they would throw three divisions against it, seeking the gargantuan political victory which Dien Bien Phu had been for them.

Some people said that these indications of a "big attack" were centered on the attack on Khe Sanh. None wanted another "Dien Bien Phu" victory for the communists to boast about. Some people said that all these other reports of something "big" coming up were intended to divert our attention from Khe Sanh. Other people said that Khe Sanh could hold out anyway. The reports of attacks elsewhere had to be taken very seriously. A course of action was discussed at that meeting which was later made into a decision, following those and other discussions. It was decided that U.S. forces in I Corps, where Khe Sanh was, would go on "increased alert" over the Tet holidays. It was also decided that we would urge the South Vietnamese NOT to have their usual stand down from operations over the Tet holidays. I believe that that was done, and I believe that in I Corps the South Vietnamese did not have their usual holiday stand down.

I left Saigon on the afternoon of January 23, 1968, and was not there during the Tet offensive period, which began at about midnight January 28. So I have no stories about the Tet attack on the Embassy to tell, although I learned at second hand about what had happened after I returned from home leave.

The American forces canceled their planned stand down in I Corps for the Tet period. However, I understand that the Vietnamese forces did stand down elsewhere in South Vietnam, with unfortunate results, particularly in towns like Hue. The whole town was taken by the North Vietnamese. The U.S. didn't have any military forces in Hue [Thua Thien province]. The cities of Nha Trang and Da Nang, where we had forces, were not taken by the communists, but they were attacked. In Saigon, where we had forces, the city wasn't taken, although the Embassy was attacked and there was heavy fighting on the southern edge of Cholon, the sister city to Saigon. The North Vietnamese deployed a larger military force in the southern part of South Vietnam than ever before, and their Viet Cong auxiliaries were able to do quite a lot of damage for a short period of time. So that's what I remember. I remember the Mission Council meeting at which these issues were being discussed. I remember concern being expressed and a decision to keep the U.S. forces on alert status throughout South Vietnam.

So I caught my plane and learned about the Tet offensive when I was staying in a friend's cottage in the Cascade Mountains. He came up to the cabin at about 5:00 AM, holding a transistor radio which had very poor reception. He said, "The communists have attacked and taken the Embassy in Saigon!"

Q: Of course, they hadn't. They didn't get into the main building, although they got into one of the annexes where the Consular Section was located.

DUNLOP: I'll tell you one story, which I believe is true. First of all, E. Allen Wendt was the Embassy Duty Officer on the night of the attack on the Embassy.

Q: I am interviewing him now.

DUNLOP: OK. He will tell you that the communist sapper squad didn't get into the Embassy. He was lying on the floor and had an open telephone line back to Washington. Have you talked to him about this? He was talking to Phil Habib, then Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs.

Q: He mentioned this incident, though he didn't mention talking to Phil Habib. He mentioned that he had Washington on the line.

DUNLOP: Then if it wasn't Phil Habib that he was talking to, it was somebody else. He was telling Washington that the Embassy had not been taken. AP [Associated Press] was reporting that it had been. The Department actually "patched" the AP Bureau Chief in Washington, D. C., to talk to Allen Wendt. I may have this wrong.
Q: I'll go back and ask him about this.

DUNLOP: Go ahead. I've been dining off this story since then. I understood that Phil Habib was on the phone in the Department. He got so teed off, if that's the polite word; it's probably an understatement, that the AP was getting the story wrong. He had arranged for the AP Bureau Chief in Washington to get patched into the phone to talk to Allen Wendt, the Embassy duty officer in Saigon. Wendt said that the Embassy had not been taken, although it was still under attack, and the garden surrounding it had not yet been cleared of communist sappers. Wendt said, "Well, I'm inside the Embassy, and you ought to believe me." The AP Bureau Chief said that, "My guys are outside the Embassy, and I believe them."

Q: Well, I'll check on that with Allen Wendt. What were your impression of the strength of the Viet Cong? Going back to the time just before the "Tet" offensive, when you left Saigon on home leave, by this time you were in charge of the Provincial Reporting Unit.

DUNLOP: I had had a lot of experience. That's a legitimate question. I'll tell you what I felt. I was very upset, and most of the Provincial Reporting Officers were upset with General Westmoreland's claims of victory in a triumphal march through the U.S. when he went back in November, 1967. He addressed Congress. He told them all of those splendid things about the American soldiers, which I didn't object to. Mostly, they did their job and did it as well as they were allowed to do it. However, his story that we had secured a triumph of "good" over "evil" and that South Vietnam had already been "secured" just wasn't true. It hadn't been "secured." At that time none of us could say, "We're going to pay a triple price for claims like this, because the 'Tet' offensive is going to make this

claim look even more feckless and stupid." We thought that this claim was feckless and stupid enough because the situation simply did not merit that kind of claim, although we could not prove it. We were still involved in fighting a very difficult fight.

It is true that some fundamentally "good things" had happened. If the war didn't have two sides, political and military, we would have won the military side a long time before. However, there was also the political side of things. One aspect was establishing the framework of a representative government. Later on it was my job to report directly on the National Assembly and on what was going on in the overall, political structure of the country. Clearly, progress had been made away from the unstable, ineffective, and heavy handed rule of President Ngo Dinh Diem and those who followed him. President Nguyen van Thieu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky were no angels, but they had some legitimacy in the eyes of a lot of Vietnamese, because they had subjected themselves to a reasonably open, electoral process.

We haven't talked about the elections, but we had a lot to do with observing them. This was very much a part of my job. Elections were held in September, 1966, for the Constituent Assembly, which was then to debate and adopt a new Constitution. Then, in September, 1967, elections were held to choose a new National Assembly, which would then ratify the Constitution. Although South Vietnam was no Jeffersonian democracy, we saw some significant improvement.

However, on the military side, the presence and activities of the North Vietnamese Army [PAVN, or People's Army of Vietnam] were greater than ever. They were introducing artillery, which they had never had before. There was a long way to go, militarily.

Q: What about the elections? What were your observations concerning them?

DUNLOP: I felt that they had been well conducted and were basically as portrayed by the U.S. and Vietnamese Governments as representing something that the Vietnamese wanted to do and did do, despite Viet Cong attempts to disrupt them. Over time the elections had the desired effect, although they did not have a perfect, immediate effect.

I observed both of these elections. While the elections campaigns were going on, they had the highest priority that the Political Section had, as is usually the case in most Embassies. Both the Internal Political Unit and the Provincial Reporting Unit were reporting on the campaign, from their respective viewpoints. I felt that the elections which the Provincial Reporting Officers and I observed were handled very well. There were some attempts made by the communists to disrupt them. Although the Viet Cong threatened "total disruption" of the elections, I think that they backed off because they realized that they didn't have the power to do it. A "failed" attempt to disrupt the elections, to the extent that they had probably hoped to accomplish, would be worse for them than an erratic and inconclusive effort. Making the threats, then seeing the elections held, and then saying that it didn't matter would only reflect negatively on their power. We never received any documentation of this apparent communist decision to let the

elections go forward, although maybe someone has it now. I think that this is what happened.

The Constituent Assembly elections of 1966 were real elections, they were really fought, and there was determined campaigning. There were candidates in the Hoa Hao area of the southern part of South Vietnam. There were campaigns in the Hoa Hao and mixed Hoa Hao and other areas, which had every aspect of a genuine campaign for the attention of the people. The vote was essentially unfettered, and the people voted in large numbers. They were not "herded" to the polls. Maybe the people did not have huge expectations for automatic and instantaneous improvements in their daily lives, but they certainly didn't think that the elections would hurt their interests.

Q: What was your impression during the period prior to the "Tet" offensive of the rather "fancy" infrastructure on the U.S. side of "CORDS" [Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support] and the "HES" program [Hamlet Evaluation System], which sought to identify which hamlets were free of communist influence and which ones were not? Particularly when Robert McNamara was Secretary of Defense, and this was later carried on by his successors. There was a very fancy attempt to develop a numerical system for determining how we were doing. In a way, the Provincial Reporting Unit was designed to take an "outsider's" view of this. How did you feel about this?

DUNLOP: Well, I'm not exactly sure about the timing here. I think that the "CORDS" and "HES" systems were developed after the Tet offensive. Some improved coordination of the civilian effort in the provinces was badly needed. So the development of the "CORDS" structure was badly needed. Until then, each of the agencies contributing funds for political, economic and social development in South Vietnam, including CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], with its Station in Saigon and its people running around the provinces; AID [Agency for International Development], with its program people moving around the provinces; USIA [United States Information Agency], with its information assistance programs and its people moving around in the provinces; and the District Advisers, who were U.S. military officers but had the key U.S. relationship with the Vietnamese District Chief, who was also a military officer, all of them reported through different channels. The District Adviser reported to MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam]; the USIA adviser reported to the head of USIS [United States Information Service] in Saigon, Barry Zorthian; the CIA people reported back to the Chief of Station in Saigon, whoever he was; and the AID people reported back to whoever was the AID Mission Director in Saigon, whoever he was, he may have been Ted Mann, although I am not sure of this.

Robert Komer [Deputy Chief of MACV for CORDS affairs], a hard-driving, bureaucratically smart, and very effective leader, was charged with putting this all together. I've just been running across this period in the FOIA program [Freedom of Information Act], our declassification of documents activity. That effort was badly needed. When you had an effective leader like John Paul Vann, whom I can also talk

about from personal experience, to head the CORDS operation in III Corps, where I was stationed, that organization was badly needed and was very helpful.

I think that the other side that you are talking about was an elaborate system called HES [Hamlet Evaluation Survey]. Each U.S. District Adviser, with the assistance of other people in his area, was supposed to "rate," on a scale of 1 to 5, I think, the security situation in each hamlet in a definable, geographic area of his district. Everybody had a map, with all of the hamlets drawn on it. Some of the hamlets had virtually no people in them because they had fled and become refugees. Some of the hamlets had huge numbers of people in them. But the District Advisers had a map, and they were supposed to "color" the map and send it in to Saigon. It would then be computerized in CORDS, coordinated, and compared with the map of the previous month, because this was a monthly report. [FYI: I recall a MACV District Adviser refer to these figures as "WEG", "Wild Eyed Guesses." Obviously, their quality and reliability varied widely. END FYI]

I remember a briefing session which, I think, took place after the Tet offensive of 1968. I had come back to Saigon in March of 1968, although it could have been prior to this time. There was a man named George Carver, a Vietnam analyst from CIA, who came out to tell us about this bright idea which was going to be implemented. We had several Provincial Reporting Officers attending this briefing, myself, and lots of other people. I remember making two very disparaging remarks about this system. One of them was, "And what else is the District Adviser going to do that month? Where is he going to find time to handle this extremely time-consuming effort?" There was a list of about 40 criteria, each of which had to be applied to each hamlet. Perhaps each criterion, on its own, had some relevance.

Q: Wasn't one of them, "Can you safely sleep in the hamlet?"

DUNLOP: That criterion alone might have been enough. But, no, that wasn't it. I forget what some of the other criteria were. Sure, there were at least 25 criteria. However, if you had 200 hamlets in your District, you had to multiply, say, 25 criteria times 200 hamlets. That makes 5,000 individual decisions. Then you had to add them up, multiply them, and divide them, apply a dose of something or other, and then color a map! To me, it was foolish, from the standpoint of time consumed, if nothing else.

At the same meeting I also asked, "What is to keep this system from being subject to the same, personal bias that affects every other rating system? What is inherent in this numerical system that is different from any other system, such as simply asking the man to give you his rating of each hamlet?" I said, "Go ahead and rate each hamlet, but leave out all of this other stuff." I was given a fishy stare. It may sound self serving, but I can remember those two comments.

Later on, and I have to be honest about this, it was kind of neat to have these maps available for briefing purposes. [Laughter] However, I think that what happened was that, after the HES system was in place for a while, the Provincial Reporting Officers who

were knowledgeable, and they were very knowledgeable after they had visited a given province on several occasions, could look at what a hamlet map for such a province said, and give a pretty good evaluation of it. That, in and of itself, was not bad. At least it allowed us to see whether CORDS was being pretty honest or whether they were "winging" it [guessing]. Or, worse, deliberately distorting it.

So we looked at the HES maps and, in fact, read them with great interest. We looked at them to see if there was information there that we didn't know about, and there sometimes was. Or, if there were areas which we felt that we knew pretty much about, we looked to see how well the views of the MACV District Advisers corresponded with what we knew and believed. This would then tell us that our judgment coincided with theirs, coming through totally different channels, and maybe was right. Or, the HES maps were wrong. Naturally, we would always feel that "they" were wrong, not that "we" were wrong.

Inside the Political Section we insisted on evaluating the HES system every so often. Sometimes we did that every month. I don't know whether I instituted that or whether Al Francis instituted that. I guess that we made this evaluation on a province by province basis. We would occasionally prepare a memorandum for the Ambassador, which shows how far up the line it would go, attaching the ratings for each province. I think that there were three colors in use in the HES. "Uninhabited" by either side and "uncontested," white; blue was for hamlets controlled by the government side; red was for areas controlled by the communist side; yellow was for "contested" areas. Thus, we would prepare memoranda or think pieces for given provinces.

Do I think that HES was a good system? No. Did it take up too much time for too little a result? Yes. Was it of no use at all? No, it was of some use, but not, perhaps, in the way its creators had devised it.

Q: Let's go back chronologically. You were in the U.S. during the first wave of the Tet offensive. What did you bring back to the Embassy in terms of the impact of the "Tet" offensive on U.S. public opinion?

DUNLOP: That is also interesting. I left the U.S. in 1966, following Vietnamese language training, for assignment to the Embassy in Saigon. You asked me how the Vietnamese language training had worked out. I had some "ups" and "downs" not unknown to other bachelors at that time. For a while, it impacted on my study time, but I managed to do enough to do all right in terms of learning to speak Vietnamese. This is very relevant to your question. I had a very nice girl friend in Washington, a pretty girl whom I really liked and perhaps could have gone on and married. I had met her in 1965 and made a major pitch for her attentions. She came up to Washington for a visit. We had been corresponding, and there were all kinds of hopeful things I saw in the future. I arranged to meet her and asked her for a date. She said that she had to meet some family members and was very reluctant to pin down any exact time. Finally, I arranged to see her, for breakfast, for heaven's sake.

Howard Johnson's hotel and restaurant is on Virginia Avenue, across the street from the Watergate Complex. Here I was, with all of my expectations, having breakfast with this gorgeous woman. She unloaded on me about Vietnam and called me a fascist! She then sent me packing, as they say. That was a shock for me.

When I went on home leave in early 1968, I didn't have time to do any of that stuff. However, I was not wholly unprepared for the lack of understanding and even hostility that I began to sense. On a very personal note, my mother was a very intelligent, sophisticated, college-educated woman. She made her own life, started up her own business, traveled abroad, and spoke at least one foreign language. She very much believed in American involvement abroad and in her sons' doing their duty in serving their country. She had sent off one son to the Marine Corps during the Korean War with great anguish, but he didn't wind up in Korea, thank God! She certainly approved of my serving in the Air Force and then in the Foreign Service. However, she had been totally and utterly convinced by Walter Cronkite, the CBS TV commentator, despite all of my efforts, that our policies in Vietnam were wrong. I didn't realize that I was competing with Walter Cronkite for the attention of this major figure in my life.

Q: Walter Cronkite was the most prestigious TV News commentators in the late 1960's.

DUNLOP: He is a man who happily admits and claims to be among the very first national opinion makers to conclude that the Vietnam War was unwinnable and, secondly, that it was "wrong" to pursue it.

I had taken a lot of time and trouble, it was no real burden to me, but in the course of my travels, knowing of my mother's great interest in her son, to take a lot of pictures. I thought of how I was going to convey to her some idea of this very strange place, Vietnam. Well, the Chinese say that a picture is worth 10,000 words, but I wrote little captions on them. These included pictures of old men sitting, perhaps, alongside a Buddhist temple. Or fascinating scenes in Vietnamese markets. Or American soldiers, tanks, and airplanes. I am sure that I sent her some pictures taken from helicopters. You could see an air strike going on over in the distance. I tried to give her the whole picture through little things. This was all a drop in the bucket. Walter Cronkite won this contest for the heart and mind of my beloved mother, hands down.

When I came back to Saigon, I knew that we were in trouble at home and that the war was rapidly losing the support which I felt, as a democratic American, that we needed to have. But we were going to have to stick it out over the long haul. I was very concerned about that.

Q: What was your impression of how Embassy personnel felt during this time after the Tet offensive? Actually, when you returned to the Embassy in June, 1968, was there still fighting in Saigon?

DUNLOP: Yes, we actually had something called "Tet Two" [also called the "May" offensive in Vietnamese]. When did you get to Saigon?

Q: I didn't get there until early February, 1969.

DUNLOP: So a whole year after this. Well, the first attacks in Saigon in January-February, 1968, had been very limited in scope, although the attack on the Embassy compound got all of this publicity of which we have spoken. The enemy had put together about four commando or "sapper" teams, these superbly briefed teams which had carefully prepared models of various cities.

One of these teams was sent against the Embassy; another one against the Vietnamese Prime Minister's residence, which wasn't too far away; against a radio station; and one at Tan Son Nhut, more for diversion than anything else, trying to reach the flight line. There was much heavier fighting in the rest of the country. When I returned to Saigon, in March, 1968, having left on January 23, 1968, all of the holes in the Embassy had been patched up. There was more security in the Embassy, lots more. In fact, I have an anecdote to tell about that. Saigon looked about the same. There wasn't much difference.

However, in May, 1968, the Vietnamese Communists made a great error. They attacked Saigon again, this time using "main force" units. That's when heavy fighting took place in the Saigon area. I was there for all of that. Cholon, which is a mostly Chinese district just South and East of the main center of Saigon, was heavily infiltrated, and there was fighting around the airport at Tan Son Nhut. The communists suffered huge casualties, but we inflicted a number of civilian casualties as well. The fighting was in built-up areas, and civilian casualties were just unavoidable. Then the communists began to fire rockets and shells against the city.

I don't think that anybody in the Embassy held the view that the Tet offensive was a watershed event and that the communists were unbeatable. There had been a lot of fighting, and the communists had taken a lot of casualties. We knew fairly well that the communists had taken very heavy casualties in places like Hue, and now were taking them around Saigon. I don't think that there was a big change in the Embassy's view of what was going to happen, except personally, for me, because I had just come back from the States. I had this strong, sinking feeling about domestic support for our efforts in the war in the U.S.

Regarding the anecdote about security, when I came back to the Embassy after having been away on home leave, my office in my exalted position as chief of the Provincial Reporting Unit occupied a corner office of the second floor. It had two windows, overlooking the main, vehicle gate of the Embassy. There was a tree outside, and I could look through the slotted cover of the Embassy facade to see the tree. When I came in to the Embassy, I arrived early, at about 6:30 AM, because I knew that there was a lot of work to do. Perhaps I still had "jet lag" or something like that. There was an Airborne paratrooper sitting in my office with his feet on my desk, which I didn't mind, and with

his helmet down over his face. He was sort of dozing. He had been deployed to the Embassy to beef up its internal security and was still there. These troops were pulled away after a while.

I walked into my office, and he said, "Oh, my God! Sorry, sir!" I said, "Relax, everything is perfectly fine." He had a little less comfortable place to doze out in the hall. I said, "I'll just clean off my desk," and I reached for a couple of things. He said, "God, don't touch those, sir!" It turned out that they were triggers for "Claymore" anti-personnel mines and were still alive.

Q: Oh, my God! [Laughter]

DUNLOP: Because my office faced the gateway out of the Embassy property, we had about four Claymore mines just inside the gate. Nobody had defused them and picked them up as yet. [Laughter] I said, "Son, just disconnect those Claymores," or something pompous like that. I said, "That will be just fine. I'm going to get a cup of coffee and will be back in an hour."

The Embassy's morale was good all through this time. I think that we all had enough to do, and this was one of the reasons why. If you get bored, you begin to think about things, and maybe you get discouraged. We all had contact with a lot of Vietnamese who were splendid people and really were committed to keeping their country out of the clutches of this bunch of old, genocidal leaders up in Hanoi. They were grateful for American help, although they were somewhat disparaging about the way we did this and were sometimes resentful about the behavior of our troops. We didn't have any illusions about the effectiveness of the GVN provincial governments, which varied, depending on the personality of the province chief. We knew that some of them were corrupt--that is, corrupt at a level which really impacted on the government's ability to govern. I think that there was an attitude in the Embassy that this was Asia and that we paid for things that you shouldn't have to pay for. The American view is that you shouldn't pay for things that ought to be yours because the government owes it to you to provide them, and you don't owe the government for them.

This view was acceptable up to a certain limit, and everybody had their own idea of what the "acceptable" level of payoffs should be. My own view was that about 20 percent payoffs, the people grumbled, but were not particularly upset. When 25 percent payoffs were required of the people more then grumbled, they were upset. When the payoff figure reached 40 percent--as it did on occasion--the people were mad as hell, and they might be prepared to do something about it. For example, they might toss a grenade against somebody else's front porch. Some province chiefs were "40 percenters." Some were "10 percenters." They got paid almost nothing for risking their butt. So "10 percent" didn't always look so unreasonable.

We had a bunch of young officers in the Embassy whom I was proud to be associated with, then and since. I think that any feeling that "This is the only war we've got, so we've

got to go out and show our manhood in it" had worn off pretty quickly. It didn't wear off on everybody, but it did on most of us. We knew that we had a job to do and that it was a good job. We had responsibilities and we were listened to. We had no illusions that if we said, "Don't send the 9th U.S. Division to Long An province," we were going to "win." However, at least we had an opportunity to "say our say." I remember that I did one report on Binh Dinh province, which was in II Corps, along the coast. There was a Province Chief there who was really bad. He was, probably, about a "45 percenter," according to my own scale which I mentioned previously. The situation was worse because he was colluding with the South Korean forces stationed there, who were probably about "60 percenters." I went up there with Jim Mack, one of the Provincial Reporters, because there had been some queries as a result of a Congressional visit, or something like that.

We had no inhibitions about reporting anything. Nobody ever told us, "Oh, don't say those things. You can't do anything about them. A report like that will just be misused back in Washington."

Q: You didn't have that feeling?

DUNLOP: Not at that time. Later, the South Vietnamese Government came to detest the Paris Accords [signed on January 30, 1973]. Most South Vietnamese officials came to accept what President Thieu said, that the Paris Accords were "the first drop of poison." We can talk about that a little bit later. Embassy reports of that nature, that is, opposition by the South Vietnamese to the Paris Accords, was not welcome in Washington. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wanted to get his Nobel Peace Prize for the Paris Accords, which he had the major role in negotiating.

Q: We've been talking pretty much about the period after the Tet offensive of January, 1968, and feelings in the Embassy at that time. How did this affect your role?

DUNLOP: The guys I dealt with in Saigon, that is, my colleagues in the Political Section, and not just the Provincial Reporting Officers, were really a great bunch of people. There was a large number of them and a chance for a lot of good ones to be there. It was really one of the very best groups of Foreign Service Officers that I ever worked with. We had great leadership.

First of all, we had Phil Habib as the Political Counselor, who was inspirational, if somewhat intimidating. Then we had his replacement who was not intimidating but very good with his troops, John Archer Calhoun, who was also Political Counselor. Embassy officers had the greatest respect and, later on, real affection for Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. After you had been around him for a while, Bunker was so clearly a man of integrity that, if he thought that something was a good thing to do, and right and proper for the United States to spend its treasure and, to some degree, the lives of some of its young people, that was very helpful. If you had any doubts about the situation, you could express your doubts about it. We had a couple of people come out to the Embassy who didn't like to fly in helicopters and didn't like to be shot at. They left fairly quickly. I think

that I'm fair in saying that most of the people assigned to the Embassy believed that the war, at least at this stage, was the "right war, in the right place, at the right time."

A lot of us had doubts about the way we went about prosecuting the war. One of my earliest doubts was about the deployment of those heavy U.S. combat units to the Mekong Delta, which I mentioned previously. I thought that this was really stupid. However, you could always express yourself. As I've said so many times here, Ambassador Bunker made a point of seeing the Provincial Reporting Officers at dinner about once a month. There would be a lovely dinner over at his residence. He would not make this a "debriefing session" but would make it an opportunity to get to know the Provincial Reporters and to let them say whatever was on their minds. This was always a very nice dinner. People could bring up anything that they wanted to. Ours was a well-run Embassy staffed with people who were well-motivated, at least at this time.

Q: Did you become involved with the press, and could you talk about the American media and its coverage of the war? For many people this was as important as American troop involvement, because the American media set the standards for what we were doing and what we...

DUNLOP: Walter Cronkite was reading what other people wrote before he made up his mind. That's for sure. Well, I came away from Vietnam with a lot of contempt for the American press. As I look back on this experience, I don't think that my attitude was all of that unjustified. Since then, as a general statement, I have somewhat modified my views, as I think I should have. In Vietnam, I ran into American journalists in increasing numbers. They weren't so much out in the provinces, although they went with American combat troops, give them credit for that. They went up where the heavy fighting was going on in the A Shau Valley [in I Corps], which was a bad scene.

The more I got to know some of them over time, and sometimes socialized with them, the less I thought of them. Some of them were personable and bright, like David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan. No flies on those guys. I think that, particularly after the Tet offensive, following which I spent another year and a half there and spent more of it in Saigon, where I was more likely to run into them and did run into them, I began to develop the feeling that they were really there to "punch their ticket" and were competing with each other to find things that buttressed the view that this was the "wrong war, in the wrong place, and at the wrong time." I was very unhappy with them collectively and, in some cases, individually.

Remember Fox Butterfield? He was one of those I saw. I remember where I saw him. This would have been after the signature of the Paris Accords in 1973.

Q: This would be a matter for comment later on.

DUNLOP: OK. As of 1968 I had not had that much contact with the American press. I had just come back to Saigon from home leave, and they were swarming in Vietnam like

bees around a hive. I saw a few in the Mekong Delta area but not very many of them and not often. At this point, other than the impact that Walter Cronkite had on my mother (who revered him), I don't think that I had a particularly negative view of the American press. I developed it later, but I did develop it. I came to regard them with a lot of disdain.

Q: During this time after the Tet offensive in 1968, what was your impression of the operations and reporting of the CIA?

DUNLOP: I can say almost nothing about that. But that's also what I can say about CIA operations as they affected what I did throughout my career. I've thought about this quite a bit lately, now that my active duty career is over. I can't think of any time when what the CIA told me at any place where I served abroad or wrote about something at any place where I served abroad which made a decisive impact on how I viewed a given situation.

Q: In other words, are you saying that what the CIA was reporting was already in accord with the thrust of what you knew?

DUNLOP: Let's take the Buddhists in Saigon. The CIA Station had been all over the Buddhists during the early period of Buddhist unrest in Saigon, beginning in 1963. Later on, there was supposedly a "compact," which was signed in blood or something, in the "dark of the moon" and with knives and skulls on the table, that they would "lay off" the Buddhists in the An Quang Pagoda. So the Political Section theoretically had unfettered access to the An Quang people. This "agreement" didn't make any difference, as far as I could tell. If the CIA Station had some brilliant insights, I think that we would have been smart enough to have reported them. Certainly, this was true of the provinces. Whatever else the CIA people were doing in the provinces, they weren't competing with our Provincial Reporting Officers reporting on the security situation, on the impact of American troops on local politics, or on how politicians were trying to influence events in Saigon. They just didn't do it. I think that we would have seen it.

They did a lot on North Vietnam, which they should have been doing. They had some bright analysts. Frank Snepp was one of them who comes to mind. Their analysts were accessible to us, and we enjoyed talking to them. We were not in competition with them, and that was fine. How much they got right and how much they got wrong, I guess it worked both ways. That is true of all of us.

When I was down in the provinces, there was a CIA "Station" house in each of the province capitals there, usually called "the Embassy house," which somewhat irritated us. It would be a nice house, with a compound and walls around it, sometimes with barbed wire. You could go over there, maybe get the American Province Senior Adviser to take you over there and introduce you. You would be welcomed politely. They would open up a can of beer, talk a while, and then you would leave. I don't remember learning anything. I don't remember their being very interested in what I knew. They had something else going on which, whatever it was, didn't seem to make any difference to anybody. I didn't

come into a Province Team there and find them seething with anger at the local "Station," like someone saying, "You know what those guys did yesterday?"

They must have been in touch with the Vietnamese intelligence people. We know that, later on, under the "Phoenix Program," there was a major effort made to identify or "turn" communist cadres. However, whatever effort the South Vietnamese Government was making to identify, root out, or otherwise destroy the VC infrastructure, that must have been the CIA's principal effort. How successful they were, I don't know. Later on, I heard that the "Phoenix Program" under Colby was coordinated more effectively and made some contribution to our overall effort. However, I don't have personal knowledge of that program.

Q: What were the major developments, as you saw them, during the time between when you returned to Saigon in March, 1968, and, when did you leave Saigon?

DUNLOP: I left in June, 1969.

Q: What was the major development during that tour of duty?

DUNLOP: The major development in my life is that I became engaged to be married. [Laughter]

Q: Yes, I remember. I went to your engagement party.

DUNLOP: Do you remember that a rocket hit a building about 200 meters from my engagement party at the home of Galen Stone [chief of the Political Section at the time]?

Q: That was on the first night that I was in Saigon. We were driving there. I heard this tremendous explosion but noticed that nobody seemed to be paying attention. I thought that this was like some British movie called something like, "Stiff Upper Lip." I thought that this happened all the time. I was a new boy on the block and I wasn't going to say anything. But I thought, "Good God!"

DUNLOP: Well, let me think about it that way. I never thought to compartmentalize my time in Vietnam in this fashion. Let me just think out loud a bit.

The peace talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris began during this period [March, 1968, to June, 1969].
Q: At first they were "talks about talks."

DUNLOP: Yes. Do you remember that resident Johnson made his announcement on March 31, 1968, that he would not be a candidate for re-election? This seemed to catch everybody by surprise.

Q: I was in the U.S. at the time.

DUNLOP: Shortly thereafter, we set up a specialized Mission in Paris, and "talks about talks" began, with very grudging GVN [Government of Vietnam] participation.

Where I worked in the Political Section, we were not privy to any of the traffic that came into the Embassy about negotiations with Hanoi. [FYI: I believe that at least Ambassador Bunker, Arch Calhoun, the Political Counselor, and Roger Kirk, the chief of the External Unit of the Political Section, saw most of the traffic the Embassy received on this subject. Probably, Galen Stone, the chief of the Political Section and Roger's supervisor, also saw the traffic. END FYI] I never saw any of this material, which was all in "special communications channels." "CHEROKEE" was one of the codeword compartments used for such material. There were other communications channels in addition to that.

I think that we had the best feel for how the South Vietnamese government people were reacting to what they were reading in the press about the meetings. The reactions were not good, to put it mildly. GVN representatives, of course, participated in most if not all of the meetings with the North Vietnamese, and the GVN Foreign Ministry would have known of the substance of most of the meetings. (Not the very, very secret Kissinger-Tho talks.) In my own case this GVN reaction was interacting with my own negative feelings about support for the war on the home front in the U.S. I had experienced this reaction during the Tet offensive period, when I was on home leave in the U.S. and which I had brought back with me to Saigon. You could see in the eyes of the Vietnamese a look of skepticism and internal questioning about what the Americans were going to do in the negotiations with the North Vietnamese. This questioning attitude had not yet reached any substantial proportions, but I remember it as being one of the things that struck me. I'll tell you when this attitude first began to appear in significant measure.

President Johnson had announced that he would open talks in Paris with the North Vietnamese under certain conditions. He said that he would reduce the bombing of North Vietnam, and so forth. One of the conditions he mentioned was that the shelling and rocketing of Saigon would have to stop. As you well know, this didn't stop, and Johnson didn't do anything about it. This was a very visible, audible, and personally apparent way in which the Americans were saying two things, that is, talking out of both sides of our mouths. Nobody has ever accused the South Vietnamese of being stupid in such matters, and particularly on issues of such importance to themselves. So, as this year and a half went by, I had this sense that there was a doubt in the minds of the South Vietnamese about our continuing commitment to their defense against communist aggression. Perhaps this did not make so much difference at that time. However, when I came back to the Embassy later [in September, 1972], it made a big difference.

Q: Are you describing your views in retrospect or were you reporting this?

DUNLOP: This is not totally in retrospect, particularly the views expressed by South Vietnamese who asked for my opinion on this issue.

Q: This was being relayed back to the Department in Embassy reporting?

DUNLOP: We weren't being given very good ammunition to answer such inquiries. The President had said one thing and then did another. He made a statement about the continued shelling of Saigon and then he didn't do anything about it.

Q: Did you ever raise this question with Ambassador Bunker?

DUNLOP: Oh, there was a lot of talk around the Embassy, both with him and with our supervisors. I mean, everybody felt this way. I'm sure that Ambassador Bunker felt this way.

I've read some of Ambassador Bunker's reporting from this time but I don't remember having read anything on this subject. However...

Q: Of course, this was very much a political decision made by President Lyndon Johnson.

DUNLOP: And by the Secretary of Defense at the time, Clark Clifford. I'll tell you another feeling that I had. The security situation is a generalized term which I use for the "balance of power" in any given province. Communist forces increasingly consisted of regular North Vietnamese Army units, against the combined U.S. and GVN forces.

During this time the "balance of power" began increasingly to improve in our favor.

Q: During the 18 months that I spent in Saigon from 1969 to the middle of 1970, I felt that the situation was not bad at all.

DUNLOP: Things were improving. We now know, although we knew some of this at the time, that the North Vietnamese took tremendous losses during the Tet period of 1968. However, the South Vietnamese communists, or the Viet Cong, took much heavier losses. There were always these two elements: the Viet Cong "local" battalions and the North Vietnamese Army. The North Vietnamese Army was a very effective fighting force. The Viet Cong were unpredictable. Sometimes they were much better than at other times. But the Viet Cong were "committed." The North Vietnamese leaders threw the Viet Cong into this "meat grinder" against the U.S. forces at the height of their strength and, to some degree, a GVN Army that was beginning to show some improved capabilities. It got much better later on.

One of the results of the very heavy casualties suffered by the communist forces, of which I was not so aware until later on, was that the North Vietnamese leaders couldn't find replacements in the South to make up for Viet Cong losses. So they increasingly sent North Vietnamese units down into South Vietnam. This exacerbated the deep animosity between North and South Vietnamese. For example, it made it less and less easy for the North Vietnamese sergeant in command of a battalion or company of South Vietnamese

communists from the Mekong Delta area to represent himself as standing for the interests of the local people, who were southerners. This is what happened.

So the situation in South Vietnam did get better. Clearly, we in the Embassy were all teed off at the rocketing of Saigon. We were pleased, though, that you could begin to drive to Dalat [a once popular resort in the mountains North of Saigon] or to Vung Tau [formerly Cap St. Jacques, a popular beach area Southeast of Saigon]. Route 15 opened up.

Q: I remember driving down there to the beach.

DUNLOP: This was not something that you could have done a year before.

Q: Did you note a difference in the mood of Embassy personnel or anything like that, between the election of President Nixon in November, 1968, and the time you left Saigon in 1969? You arrived back in Saigon in March, 1968. [FYI: The following section should be reviewed carefully, because it seems to confuse the presidential elections of 1968, when Vice President Humphrey ran against Nixon, and the presidential elections of 1972, when Senator McGovern ran against President Nixon. Harry was in Saigon during both election campaigns, but the choices were different. I have taken the liberty of trying to "fix up" this section, to make it more coherent, but I suggest that Harry review it carefully. END FYI]

DUNLOP: Yes, we did, because one of the things that bothered us was the prospective candidacy of Senator McGovern on the Democratic ticket in the presidential elections of 1972.

Q: Who?

DUNLOP: Wasn't it McGovern who ran against Nixon in 1972?

Q: Yes.

DUNLOP: Some of the Embassy officers were Democrats, some were Republicans. However, I think that McGovern was viewed by most of us as a feckless disaster.

Q: God, I voted for Nixon.

DUNLOP: Well, I also voted for Nixon. I recall that we saw the election on TV and heard the results on the radio. Remember that there is a 13 hour difference between Saigon and Washington time. We heard the results around a swimming pool at the residence of Arch Calhoun, the Political Counselor [on Tu Xuong St.]. We all trotted over to Arch's house to listen to the results of the presidential election of 1968 on a short wave radio. Or maybe AFVN, Armed Forces Radio, Vietnam, carried it. I remember that everybody around that pool was really very pleased.

What did Nixon do, early on, which impacted on the situation? He announced a very reasonable program of "Vietnamization" of the war. I don't think that he announced this right away, and it wasn't part of his campaign. However, the actual Vietnamization program, drawing down steadily but surely the American combat presence in South Vietnam and replacing them with revitalized, rearmed, and effectively led South Vietnamese troops under South Vietnamese political leadership. This was something that we all welcomed. We all applauded this. Most of us felt that the U.S. had been too much involved in the war, although I imagine that nobody would have minded another division or two of U.S. troops right at the time of the Tet offensive in 1968!

Generally, the view of Americans bulldozing a position, where a backhoe would have been better, was a matter of concern to us. I think that there were a lot of people in the Embassy who were in favor of Nixon's policies, if not pro-Nixon himself. Of course, I left Saigon only five or six months after Nixon's first inauguration in January, 1969. Not much had been done by Nixon in this short period of time to implement the Vietnamization program. The South Vietnamese welcomed it, with this reservation. They wanted to be sure that Vietnamization was not just a cover up for our bailing out of South Vietnam. Well, four years later, in 1973, we were still there. Then we did bail out at the end of April, 1975.

Ambassador Bunker's slogan began to be, and I don't recall when he began to repeat this point, although, at the end of his time in Saigon it was very much his view, "Long haul, low cost." In other words, reduce the cost to the American taxpayer and reduce American casualties to the minimum. However, he did not believe that we could leave South Vietnam any time soon.

My own, personal, view is that had we been able to sustain that policy, South Vietnam would still be an independent country, and the North Vietnamese would still be limited to North Vietnam. Lots of people wouldn't have died in the intervening years. That's my view, it is one of the great "what ifs" of history.

Q: Let's leave it at this point. We'll pick it up next time, unless there is something else that you want to go over.

DUNLOP: Happy to do it.

Q: So we're talking about June, 1969, when you left Vietnam, and we'll pick it up at that point.

DUNLOP: All right. I look forward to it.

Q: Today is August 2, 1996. OK, Harry, we're picking up this narrative when you left Saigon in June, 1969.

DUNLOP: Again, I welcome this opportunity which you're giving to me. In the interim between leaving Saigon in June, 1969, and my assignment to Zagreb, Yugoslavia, in July, 1969, I was married. That is not necessarily a key element in these recollections, but I had a happy tour in Zagreb. I was the number two person in a small Consulate. I think that at most we had 10 Americans assigned there. We had consular responsibility for two of the six constituent republics of Yugoslavia: Slovenia and Croatia.

Q: You were there from when to when?

DUNLOP: From June, 1969, to June, 1972. This was a really interesting and key time. I think that we understood that to some degree, although perhaps not as much as I now look back on it.

My wife Betty and I got to Zagreb in June, 1969, which was four years after President Tito had instituted what he called "the reforms." I think that there was some tendency to put quotes around the term, "the reforms," but I think that they were really solid changes in how business was done. They were not just cosmetic reforms. They were mainly in the economic area, but there were some on the political side. Tito had very publicly dismissed his much-feared, if not to say "hated" chief of the Secret Services, Alexander Rankovic, in 1965. Police pressure on the population diminished. The fact that Yugoslavia was a totalitarian state, marked by the power of the police over people's lives, did not change in essence. It was not a "state of law." It was a state of one-party law. On the other hand, the manifestation of that was less.

The Yugoslav people could begin to travel abroad and had less difficulty getting passports. They were permitted to form companies and to enter into joint ventures with foreign companies, although the laws on joint ventures were not very permissive. There were a lot of things about that which made that kind of arrangement unattractive to foreign companies. There was no great flood of foreign investment. Nevertheless, there was some, and that marked a big change. The most important single thing that Tito did between 1965 and 1969 was to devolve economic decision making from the central government and structures which had been in place in Belgrade since World War II to the capitals of the constituent republics. In our case, this meant Zagreb [Croatia] and Ljubljana [Slovenia].

This change was real. Tito had been unhappy with the economic performance of Yugoslavia, as well he should have been. Yugoslavia's so-called "Special Road to Communism" was not producing the "bottom line" results that he thought it should and could have done. So he listened to the advice of people who said, "Look, this top-heavy bureaucracy in Belgrade is not what we need. Let's dismantle that. Let's really give economic decision making authority, in significant measure, to the six Republics out there." And that was done. What I think that Tito did not anticipate, and those around him either didn't tell him or didn't know, either, is that it is very difficult to give away some economic decision making power without putting at risk your political decision making power.

When I got to Zagreb in 1969, this process of devolution of authority was picking up momentum, on the political side as well as on the economic side. The political process of devolution was, it turned out, unacceptable to Tito. But that was not apparent at all at that time. There was a cadre of able, younger people at middle and upper middle levels of the communist parties in the republics who were really ready, willing, and eager to take this authority and to "run with it." In Croatia the names of the two people most associated with that were a man by the name of Mika Tripolo and a woman by the name of Savka Dapcevic Kuchar. In Slovenia there was a group of such people, but the most prominent was a man named Stanic Kuvete. There were people like this down in Belgrade in the Communist Party of Serbia, Latinka(?) Perovic, for example. There were some of them down in Macedonia in the Macedonian Communist Party. They weren't too evident in Bosnia or in Montenegro. However, there was enough going on in Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia to give a distinctly different cast to the political environment in which the country was operating.

During the first two years that I was in Zagreb, 1969-1970 and 1970-1971, this momentum, which was well under way when I got there, continued. For the first time that I was aware of, anywhere in the world, although there may have been instances that I am not aware of, a Communist Party political leadership became a popular political leadership. Dapcevic Kuchar and Mika Tripolo became popular figures. I can remember as a Political Officer, though I was also doing other things too in the Consulate in Zagreb, standing there in what they called then the "Trg Republik, the Republican Square, the main square in downtown Zagreb, for one of these ritualistic, pro forma celebrations of something like "Republican Day" or "Liberation Day." The tradition was, in these circumstances, to close down the factories and shops, and herd all of the people into the streets. The people were usually happy enough to get out of a day's work, although not particularly happy to be standing around listening to endless speeches. Before the "reforms," the people would stand there stoically, listening to these speeches and checking their watches. At least, figuratively speaking, they hoped that the speeches would end in time for them to go out and do some shopping, take a walk, or do something like that.

That had been the pattern. I remember that it was probably in the spring of 1970, though it could have been in the spring of 1971, when one of those events was being held. On this occasion Savka Dapcevic Kuchar was going to speak. They had a big platform built down at the Trg Republik, and many of the good people of Zagreb had been mustered. There may have been 250,000 to 300,000 people there. This time the atmosphere was different. There was electricity in the air. The flag of the Republic of Croatia was distinctive. Each republic had its own arrangement of horizontal bars of red, white, and blue. I remember that in the Consulate we had developed the practice of beginning to count the number of flags. The Croatian flag far outnumbered the Yugoslav flag, with the red star in the middle. It was still illegal to fly the old, Croatian coat of arms in the middle of the flag.

Q: That's the one with the "checkerboard" in the center...

DUNLOP: The "checkerboard." It looks like a Purina dog chow box. It had the three crowns under the old, Austrian structure of political divisions which made up Croatia in those days. The Croatian flag was very much in evidence. As usual in the case of these events, that crowd had to stand around and wait for the principal speaker, who was to be Dapcevic Kuchar, while somebody tried to "warm up" the crowd. Finally, they began to boo and hiss him. He was somebody, perhaps a deputy party chairman from somewhere. The crowd started shouting, "Savka, Savka, Savka." They wanted Savka Dapcevic Kuchar to show up on the podium. She was pretty good looking. She wasn't a "stunning beauty," but she was young, which was a change from the previous leadership, she had red hair, probably a little bit "enhanced", and she had a nice kind of smile. People never called her "brilliant," but she was certainly politically astute.

I was standing close enough to see her walk out on that stage. The crowd exploded. She didn't know what to do! This was the first time that this had happened. Of course, it doesn't take too many "nanoseconds" for politicians to adjust to that, and this was a fun time for her. All of us in the Consulate thought that this public support for reforms in the Croatian communist party was a good thing. In the Embassy they paid less attention to it. We thought that this was a reflection of change in a good direction, a change in which the people's will, as it were, was beginning to be listened to and responded to.

What did the people of Croatia want? They wanted identity, they wanted to be thought of as Croatians, not Yugoslavs, they wanted control over their tourism earnings. They had the biggest chunk of the Adriatic Coast of Yugoslavia. They had made all of these Austrian schillings, Swedish kroner, and, above all, German Deutsche Marks, which were pouring in down there from tourist spending. They wanted what they regarded as a "fair cut," which would probably have amounted to most of it. They wanted to be able to decide that, if they needed a new railroad or new highway, they could allocate their own resources and not have to go to Belgrade, hat in hand. We couldn't see anything particularly wrong with those desires. The same thing was happening in Slovenia, and not much less in the Serbian and in the Macedonian Communist Party.

Q: Just to get a feel for this, what did the Consulate staff consist of?

DUNLOP: Well, we had a Consul General. When I was there, I served under two very nice guys, who changed in the middle of my tour. I was the number two guy in the Consulate. I had to do all of the operational political reporting, or, at least, to be responsible for it. I also did a lot of economic and commercial reporting. Any trade delegations which came our way were the responsibility of the Consulate, i. e., me. We had a big trade fair, the Zagreb Trade Fair, each fall, which, I think, was the biggest one in Yugoslavia. Certainly, it was the oldest one and probably the one with the most Western participation. The U.S. had a pavilion. We had to assist either the Department of Commerce or USIA [United States Information Agency], whichever was the action agency back in Washington, to set up and operate the U.S. Pavilion.

We had a fair number of trade delegations. This idea of "joint ventures" had attracted some attention among American businessmen. They were beginning to poke around in Croatia to see what the possibilities were. So we had the economic, political, and commercial function all wrapped up in me. I had one Junior Officer there, who was assigned to the Political-Economic Section of the Consulate, so to speak. He was my assistant. Then there was the Consular Section, with one assistant. That makes five officers. On the administrative side we had one officer who handled the administrative work. That makes six. USIS [United States Information Service] initially had three officers there. Later on, they added one officer, because we opened a Consulate in Ljubljana, Slovenia. USIS had a secretary, and the Consulate had a secretary. That added up to 10 Americans assigned to the Consulate in Zagreb. USIS opened an office in Ljubljana and got a third person assigned.

Of course, the administrative people were responsible for hiring and paying our Foreign Service National [FSN] employees. I think that we had about 35 FSN's at the Consulate in Zagreb. We had a good staff of FSN employees in Zagreb. As in the case of the Embassy in Belgrade, they were perhaps somewhat older than we would have liked, but they were quite energetic and willing to take some initiative on their own and do some things that were important. I had a good economic and commercial FSN, a man named Georges Njers. He was a Yugoslav of Hungarian origin. We also had a couple of Slovenes in the Consulate in Zagreb. The rest were Croatians, except that our chief driver and general handyman was an Albanian.

Q: Let me stop here for a moment.

Q: Regarding your relations with the Embassy, you know I spent five years in the Embassy in Belgrade. At the time I used to say that the Serbs had spent 500 years under the Turkish yoke. After all of that the Serbian response, if something didn't work, was to blame the Turks. They have somehow come out of that. Did you notice a difference in viewpoint? How were the Consulate's relations with the Ambassador and other senior Embassy officers in Belgrade?

DUNLOP: Yes, that's very worthwhile talking about. I'm glad that you asked me. Like you, I had had a total immersion in "Serbdom." Our language instructors at the Foreign Service Institute were both Serbs, as you recall. I understand that this is no longer the case, and properly so. I had spent my two and a half years in the Embassy in Belgrade [1963-1965] almost exclusively in contact with Serbs. I didn't travel very much in the other parts of the Yugoslav republic, except to Bosnia and, maybe, to Macedonia. However, I certainly had not lived or been in contact with the people of the other republics.

Up in Croatia, I learned of the existence of the historical memory, although not at first hand, thank God. I learned of the atrocities committed by the "Ustashi," the fascist goon squads that the Croatians employed, especially during the early years of World War II. These were horrendous atrocities which took place against the Serbs. So I didn't arrive in Croatia with any pro-Croatian point of view. You know, intellectually we tell ourselves that we are very "objective." It is a very human thing, if you are sensitive to what people are really thinking and feeling, to try to understand the situation in which you live and to try, as it were, to get inside other people's skins. That's what Foreign Service Officers are supposed to do. There comes a time when you begin to understand why the local people think and act as they do. I suppose that that realization can "color" your objectivity to some degree, although we all try not to do that.

There was a difference between the viewpoints of the Embassy and the Consulate in Zagreb on the political issue between Zagreb and Ljubljana, on the one hand, and the central Communist Party leadership on the other. Here I am not referring to the leadership of the Serbian Communist Party, but to that of the central Communist Party in Belgrade. This issue began to get sharper and sharper over the years that I was in Zagreb. To some extent the Embassy tended to dismiss, or so we thought, the importance of what was happening, politically, in Croatia and in Slovenia. In the Consulate in Zagreb we said that, "These are real people, with goals and objectives which they are working hard at. So we need to pay attention to that." Perhaps, in this connection, I am somewhat gilding the clarity with which we expressed ourselves. However, the Embassy's view tended to be, "Well, that is the view of the 'boondocks,'", that is, of the sticks. That's Croatia, and Croatians always bitch and moan about the Serbs. This is all in the realm of domestic politics. It may be interesting but it's not all that important.

This difference was particularly reflected after Malcolm Toon replaced Bill Leonhart as Ambassador to Yugoslavia. Bill Leonhart was the Ambassador when I arrived in Zagreb. Malcolm Toon replaced him about half way through my tour [about in 1970]. Ambassador Toon was an old Russian hand and had broad experience with the old style, communist governments and ways of doing things. Although I may be doing Ambassador Toon a disservice, I don't think that he had quite understood the diversity of Yugoslavia, at least by the time I left Zagreb. He stayed on beyond the period of my service in Zagreb, and perhaps I'm not doing him justice by saying that. However, I think that we in the Consulate in Zagreb felt that the Embassy tended not to pay enough attention to what we were reporting was going on up in Slovenia and Croatia.

That's a comment on the professional side of things. I think that, when you have Consulates and Embassies in a given country, that's not uncommon.

Q: That's like the people in our Embassy in Rome, tending to dismiss the views of the people in the "Mezzogiorno" in Italy [southern Italy].

DUNLOP: Well, in a way, I think that that's healthy. You get two different points of view. That is one reason why I regret the closing of Consulates, to get onto a broader

issue. I think that the United States Government is doing itself a real disservice, in the most classical sense, in being "penny wise and pound foolish" in closing Consulates. You need that diversity of insight that comes from the Consulates. You don't need to say that everything that the Consulates say is "right" or "correct." Obviously, that's not true. You need to have something against which to bounce off the collective view of the Embassy.

Q: Did this divergence of opinion, I think that "clash" is the wrong word, between the Embassy and the Consulate in Zagreb ever reach the point where there was a serious difference?

DUNLOP: Yes, there was. As we got further into the three-year period that we are discussing [1969-1972], political tensions between the Central Government in Belgrade, on the one hand, and Croatia and Slovenia, on the other, became more apparent. What the Croatian and Slovenian leaderships were doing came under severe attack in the "conservative" Communist Party press and among "old line thinkers" back in Belgrade. What was unclear at the time, although we in the Consulate in Zagreb thought that it WAS clear, was whether Tito was fully aware of these developments. We thought that Tito was fully aware of these developments and was not unhappy that they were taking place. He gave every indication of support for the new, young, energetic, and pushy party leaders in Slovenia, Croatia, and Belgrade. It turned out that, if that had been true for a while, he later changed his mind. He finally came down like a ton of bricks on the Croatians and Slovenians in northern Yugoslavia. Before that happened, there was an attempt by the Embassy to interdict Consulate Zagreb reporting, in the sense that we were instructed to send our airgrams and telegrams through the Embassy in Belgrade, for clearance before they were sent on to the Department.

There is a Foreign Service Regulation in 3 FAM [Volume 3, Foreign Affairs Manual] which states that that is not to be done. Orme Wilson, who at that time was Consul General in Zagreb, really hit the ceiling over this issue. So did I. He went down to Belgrade, clutching 3 FAM (whatever the paragraph), and made a very strong pitch about this. This did not improve people's personal attitudes. There was some friction. However, we were 420 km away from Belgrade. The road was a difficult one, with a lot of potholes in it. We still had a lot of autonomy. However, there was this sense in the Embassy in Belgrade that the folks up in the Consulate in Zagreb are saying that the political situation in Croatia is much more "tense, important, and significant" for the future of the country than the Embassy thought it was. They said that it was an irritant to the Embassy to have its views be reported to the Department in Washington and then have this somewhat different, or differently shaded view, also reported to Washington by the Consulate in Zagreb.

Something else was going on there, and I am not sure how much I know about it, or, perhaps even whether we should talk much about it here. There was a tremendous personality conflict going on in the Embassy in Belgrade for part of this time, between the Ambassador, in this case Bill Leonhart, and his DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission], Tom Enders.

Q: Tell me what you were hearing about this.

DUNLOP: Well, this is one of those legendary personal Foreign Service disputes, soaked in animosity and later on in malevolence, that should never happen between grown people or responsible officers of any organization. I don't care whether this involves a School Board or whatever other type of organization. However, Leonhart and Enders allowed themselves to get involved in a most horrendous personal cat and dog fight. It cost both of them their jobs in Belgrade and it may have, and probably did, cost Bill Leonhart any other chance of becoming an Ambassador again.

I got this all second or third hand (thank God!), but the dispute between them was, apparently, totally personal. A little bit of it we in the Consulate in Zagreb experienced personally, and I can tell you how it looked up there. Because of the distance between Zagreb and Belgrade, this is what friends of mine and Betty's would tell us was going on in Belgrade. Within a few weeks of Enders' arrival, he took some action, or was considered by Ambassador Leonhart as taking some action, to "undermine" the Ambassador's authority. Ambassador Leonhart became very upset about this and gave Enders a public "dressing down" at an Embassy Staff Meeting. Enders told Ambassador Leonhart to "go take a flying leap"! So things went from bad to worse from that point on.

Q: What did the wives of Ambassador Leonhart and Enders think of this?

DUNLOP: Tom Enders' wife is originally Italian, named Gaetana Enders, I guess, who also has a kind of legendary reputation around the Foreign Service as not the kind of person that you want your boss' wife to be. She was reportedly interfering, domineering, and all the rest. Mary Leonhart, on the other hand, was a real "sweetie." In my view and, I think, that of a lot of other people, out of these four people, Ambassador and Mrs. Leonhart, on the one hand, and Tom and Gaetana Enders, on the other, only one of them acted like an adult, human being. That was Mary Leonhart.

I got this anecdote from one of my friends, whom I believe. One day, at the height of this horrible animosity, Gaetana Enders telephoned the wife of my friend at home. My friend was at work at the Embassy. His wife answered the phone. Mrs. Enders said, "This is Gaetana Enders. Is this Mrs. So-and-So? (I won't give her name.) She said, "Yes, it is, Mrs. Enders. What can I do for you?" Mrs. Enders said, "I understand that your husband is being rather "ambiguous" in this situation. That won't do, you know. That will not do. I want you to understand, and I hope that you can make your husband understand this: Bill Leonhart is through in the Foreign Service. His career is over. It's done. My husband has a long and distinguished career ahead of him in the Foreign Service. He will remain an influence in the Foreign Service, as long as your husband is a Foreign Service Officer. Please reflect on that and make sure that your husband fully understands that." Then she hung up. A situation like that cannot get any worse.

Anyway, that situation did not help matters in the relationship between the Embassy in Belgrade and the Consulate in Zagreb. I wasn't really the top leader of the Consulate in Zagreb. I was just another guy working in the trenches. This struggle was between Consul General Orme Wilson in Zagreb and the Embassy in Belgrade. Orme never really told me this, but I'm sure that at one point or another each side (Ambassador Leonhart and DCM Tom Enders) must have asked him what side he was on. [Laughter]

Q: Oh, God! Were there any further developments? At some point a difference like this usually brings the Inspection Corps to intervene. Somebody comes and takes a look.

DUNLOP: Again, I'd have to say with great pleasure that we were physically a long way from Belgrade and tried to stay out of that situation. If I had been in the Embassy in Belgrade, I would have known more of the details of the upshot of all this. However, I don't remember any intervention by the Inspector. I recall that I was told that at one Staff Meeting held at the Embassy, some time into this horrible mess, Ambassador Leonhart told Enders that he had to leave the country in 48 hours. He told him that for the first time, at a Staff Meeting in public. Enders left and, very shortly thereafter, Ambassador Bill Leonhart also left. He wound up at the National War College as the Diplomatic Adviser, where he was probably very good.

Leonhart and Enders were both brilliant officers. No one has ever suggested that, out of each other's sight, they weren't perfectly and even extraordinarily effective people. There were some other allegations about weaknesses in Leonhart's performance which were not related to this dispute, but which Enders tried to use against him. Let's say that it was an allegation that Leonhart drank too much. I have seen Ambassador Leonhart perhaps four sheets to the wind. However, people can drink a lot and still do a pretty good job in the office.

Anyway, this conflict obviously didn't escape the attention of the Department. However, whatever the mechanics of Enders' having been publicly dismissed from the Embassy in Belgrade and sent home, and then Ambassador Leonhart's departure shortly thereafter and then retirement, there was a long period when the DCM was in charge. There was no Ambassador waiting in the wings, as it were. Malcolm Toon did not come out as Ambassador to Yugoslavia for four or five months.

Q: Who was the DCM and later the Chargé d'Affaires?

DUNLOP: Ooh. Who was the long-suffering DCM? Robert Clayton Mudd was the Political Counselor, but I have a mental block on the name of the DCM. I'll remember it after a bit. I don't remember his name right now.

I wouldn't say that the tension between the Embassy in Belgrade and the Consulate in Zagreb ever reached crisis proportions. However, Orme Wilson was really steaming when the Embassy told him that they would have to review our reporting before it went on to Washington. This actually didn't happen until after Ambassador Toon arrived, which was

well after the Leonhart-Toon debacle. The strictures on Consulate reporting was Toon's doing, not Leonhart's.

Q: Tell me. Can you talk about getting around in Croatia and Slovenia on your various trips? Can you also discuss your access to various organizations, both private and public in Yugoslavia?

DUNLOP: The difference between Croatia and Slovenia was significant. The difference between these two republics and the rest of Yugoslavia was also significant. In terms of ease of getting around physically, the roads in Croatia and Slovenia were better than elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Trains tended to run on time. There were more hotels that were "bearable," and fewer rest rooms that were not, speaking in comparative terms of the facilities in the southern and eastern parts of Yugoslavia. So travel was easier.

Access was also easier. That may not have been the case before the "reforms" introduced by Tito in 1965. Both Croatia and Slovenia had a reputation for local security services which were very tough on diplomats, until the time that Rankovic was dismissed. I think that there was a logical reason for that. Those were the two parts of the country that the central government in Belgrade worried most about. It realized that the level of disaffection was probably highest in those areas and wanted to isolate diplomats as much as possible. By the time I got there [in 1969] that was all over, with the exception of one or two incidents, when we could tell that we were subject to surveillance. Every time that Betty and I overnighted in a little resort area, Prizren, and we may have done this three or four times, we were always assigned the same room, whether we gave them advance notice or not. This room must have been electronically monitored [bugged]. It was a nice little area, half way between Zagreb and Split. If you wanted to go down to the coast but couldn't leave Zagreb until after work, you could get to Prizren easily, break your journey there, and all of that.

People in Croatia wanted to talk to Americans. I'm not saying that they wanted to talk to Americans and welcome them in a personal sense much more in Croatia or Slovenia than in Serbia. I think that, given the same opportunity, that was also true in Serbia. However, the Croatians and Slovenes certainly felt less constrained than I remembered from four years before in Serbia. Much of this probably was due to the fact that Croatia and Slovenia had a Western tradition. However, a lot of it, I think, was due to the fact that the police were no longer making it clear that our people were engaged in unwelcome and potentially dangerous activity.

There was also a big difference between Slovenia and Croatia. Slovenia was really a "Westernized" part of Yugoslavia. There were still some very "Balkan" elements about parts of Croatia, although it had also been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and had experienced all of the trials and tribulations of the Reformation, the Counter Reformation, the Enlightenment, and all of that. There were still some areas where Croatia was pretty primitive, and people looked at the world through "Balkan" eyes. However, that was not true in Slovenia. The Slovenes were very sophisticated people. They had one of the

highest literacy rates of any country in all of Europe, much less Yugoslavia. They were very proud of their literary and artistic traditions. Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, is a lovely little city which had been maintained more nicely than some. There was a lot of access to Slovenes. In Slovenia people were particularly aggressive in the economic field. They really had carved out a different relationship with the rest of the country, pretty early on. The "Reforms" brought in by Tito in 1965 helped this situation. The political leadership of Stane Kavere helped to implement these reforms, but the Slovenes were going to do that, anyway.

Of course, as you know now, the Slovenes were the first and only republic to break away with relative ease from the old Yugoslavia in 1991 or 1992, I guess. We always liked to go up to Ljubljana because it was a little bit different. The restaurants were a little different, the scenery was different, and it was just fun to go up there. People seemed genuinely happy to see us.

Q: Harry, what was your impression of the leadership qualities of these two figures?

DUNLOP: I was impressed with them. I was particularly impressed with Stane Kavete, but also with Tripolo. Tripolo had a wonderful, popular touch. I guess that some politicians are born with that, and some are not. Tripolo rarely made a misstep in public. He loved student agitation in the universities. This was, after all, about the same time as the 1968 problems with university students up in Paris and, of course, the turmoil in the American universities.

Some of that kind of ferment was also going on all over Yugoslavia. I am sure that there were some young folks who were also active in that way in the universities in Ljubljana [Slovenia], and Zagreb [Croatia]. Those were the two main universities in those cities. These young people would have liked to have created the same degree of turmoil and chaos as existed in Paris. They never quite succeeded but they were able to cause some difficulties. I remember that there was a student strike in Ljubljana which went on for quite a while.

Kavete and Tripolo knew how to walk into the middle of a situation of turmoil and get the student leaders to sit down, reason with them as intelligent equals, and defuse some of the tension. These leaders were people who did not owe their positions of influence in the Communist Party to their activities during World War II. Some of them were old enough to have been active during the war, but as very young folks. They may have been committed "Partizans" and done brave things as children or near children but that wasn't how they earned their "stars," their "stripes," their "spurs," or whatever. Their achievements had come from their own ability and energy, their political acumen, and their ability to see that a change was needed. And they tried to effect that change.

They were an impressive bunch. I didn't personally know leaders like them in Belgrade at all, but there were some down there. I'm not talking now about the overall structure of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia but of the Communist Party of the Serbian Republic. It

had Tomsic and Perovic, folks like that in it. I think that they would have been capable of successfully carrying the Communist Party through the death of Tito and the transition process to new leadership that followed it. But they were purged, and no one was there to do that after Tito's death.

The older Communist Party leaders who were given that task obviously failed at it. These other, younger leaders of whom I speak might have done better. In fact, I am quite sure that they would have done better.

Q: What was your impression at this time, 1969 to 1972, of Tito's "grasp" on the direction of events? How did you see this in the Embassy?

DUNLOP: I can tell you what I personally did. I had come away from my assignment to the Embassy in Belgrade [1963-1965], not in opposition to our policy toward Yugoslavia, because I thought that our policy of support for Tito was the correct one. It had proven its worth, and I still think that. However, there tended to be a tendency in the Embassy to blur over Tito's deficiencies. I saw no reason why, among ourselves, we didn't look at those inadequacies a little more objectively. However, I think that this may be an American trait. We tend to deal with some people who may have some unpleasant sides to them. We tend not to think or talk about those faults.

However, when I returned to Yugoslavia for my assignment to the Consulate General in Zagreb [1969-1972], I began to see this situation from another perspective. As I assessed it, Tito was just not paying much attention to the overall situation in any detail but just acted as the "spiritual guide" behind Yugoslav Government policy. However, for the first and only time in my career I became a real "admirer" of Tito, because I mistakenly thought he would permit the younger generation of party reformers to work their will. How wrong I was!

For example, Tito would come up to Zagreb to take a look at the situation as a sort of "stern uncle." He would walk around and inspect the troops. Savka and Mika would trail along in his wake, attentive to his every word and gesture. He would be seen in earnest discussions with them at meetings. He would give little speeches and let little remarks sort of drop off casually, as he was wont to do, in the hearing of the press. These were obviously well planned. They were little "sound bites." It all seemed to me to be very supportive of his general stance.

Once in a while he would say, "Now, we've got to watch this. This is still Yugoslavia. You owe an obligation to help the less fortunate, underdeveloped areas. We can't let you keep all the money that you earn. After all, it's the Yugoslav state which allows you to earn money, and it's the Communist Party, in its benevolence, that is still in charge of things around here." I really felt that he was very supportive, and wisely supportive, of the evolution which was taking place within the party framework but which was definitely a "modernizing" element.

However, on December 12, 1971, to my utter astonishment, Tito convened, initially a secret, and later on a public meeting of the Communist Party Presidium [top leadership], or whatever it was called at the time. The meeting was held at Tito's hunting lodge Karageordevo, in Voivodina. He exploded with wrath at the Communist Party reform leaders. They were not just from Croatia but also from Slovenia and Belgrade. He conducted one of those sessions where people were called on to confess their sins and faults. The "sins and faults" mainly involved nationalism. This was what people were being accused of. That is, of being Croatians first, Yugoslavs second, and Communist Party members last.

In my view there was no reason why they couldn't be all three, and I felt that this was a balancing act which they were successfully performing in Slovenia and Croatia, at least. At some point Tito decided that they were not doing this successfully. The mystery to me, as somebody who was interested in what was going on in Yugoslavia, was why did Tito change his mind. There was no significant series of events that had escalated "national euphoria," the phrase which was then coined to describe this alleged wild-eyed nationalism which would allegedly lead eventually to communal clashes and perhaps even bloodshed.

The conservatives in the Communist Party, both in the central party and the Communist parties of both Croatia and Slovenia, had begun to spread rumors about actual communal clashes. So far as we could find out in the Consulate General in Zagreb, and we made it our business to try very hard to look into these charges, there was no substance to any of the more lurid of these accounts. There were stories about police stations burned down, people assassinated, and so forth. Serbs allegedly had been subjected once again to "Ustashi" [Croatian fascist] terror down in Lika, the area of Croatia where the Serbs were in the majority. We found no evidence of that.

Tito didn't seem to believe that that was happening, either. However, something happened, at least in his mind, to make him "purge" the Croatian and Slovenian Communist Party leadership. It was a brutal purge. He didn't have anybody shot, but the purge went down at least to the second level of the Croatian and Slovenian Communist Parties. By the time this purge was over, at least 2,000 Croatian Communist Party officials in Croatia had been dismissed from their party positions or responsibilities, as well as any other jobs they may have had. The Director of the Zagreb Fair, a personal acquaintance of mine, was dismissed from this job, for example.

The process of constructive modernization, as I saw it, was brought to a screeching halt. This happened in 1971, just before the Christmas and New Year's holidays period. This was just nine years before Tito's death in 1980. Nothing important happened in the country during these intervening nine years to re-start some fashion of bringing younger people into more senior positions. This was to prove a tragedy for Yugoslavia.

Q: What was the reaction of the Director of the Zagreb Fair to all of this? Obviously, you people in the Consulate in Zagreb were casting your nets wide to determine what had

happened to these 2,000 people. These were obviously leaders. That is a huge number of people anywhere, particularly in a small environment, such as Croatia.

DUNLOP: I can't dredge up the name of a man I was talking to. He was the equivalent of the Director of the Zagreb Chamber of Commerce, but they used a different name for it. We had a lot of dealings with him for commercial and economic reasons. I remember his talking to me very sadly, when I went over to see him. I called up first to see whether it would be a problem for him to see me. I asked whether there was any reason why I should not come and see him. He said, "No." So I went over and saw him. He said, "You know, Yugoslavia has a curse derived from 500 years under the Turks!" [Laughter] What he meant, of course, was that Croatia had a curse of 50+ years under the Serbs.

Q: For somebody who doesn't understand this, as I alluded to at the beginning of this interview, both Harry and I had an extensive exposure to the Serbian way of looking at things. When anything bad happened, it was the 500 years under the Turks which was the cause. This even applied to the situation when the elevators in buildings didn't work. People would say, "Well, we were 500 years under the Turks." We always thought of this as happening in Serbia, because that's where the Turks had been. The Austrians occupied Croatia. This was a curious reflection.

DUNLOP: What he was doing was using the old practice of the Croatians of blaming the people who lived to the East and South of them. The Croatians thought that these people to their East and South really weren't part of Europe or of the West. They felt that they didn't think as the Croatians did. They felt that the less the Croatians had to do with them, the better. Of course, this culminated in more recent events in a tragic way.

I still firmly believe that the intercommunal conflicts in Yugoslavia could have been resolved without all of this current bloodshed in the 1990s. I think that one of the reasons why they were not was the purging of these modernizers by Tito in 1971. At that point I came to the conclusion that Tito had made the greatest single political mistake he could possibly make. That is, he not only failed to provide for his own succession, but he also beheaded those who could have modernized and Westernized the party after his death. I still think so.

Q: I would like to turn to another aspect of your view of the "nationalities question" during the time you were in Zagreb. However, before I get to that, could you tell me whether there was any reflection in the work of the Consulate in Zagreb of the rather affluent Croatian community in the United States? I am particularly thinking of Croatians in California in the construction and building trades. Did you find that these Croatians had any impact at all on what you were doing?

DUNLOP: That was one constant concern that we had. This was not just a concern of the Consulate's but also of the Embassy in Belgrade. That is, the relationship to Communist Yugoslavia of the Serbian and Croatian communities and, to a lesser degree, because

there were fewer people involved, of the Slovenian and Macedonian communities in the U.S.

I think that it is fair to say that there was almost no "pro-Tito" faction of any significance in any of those communities. They all detested Tito and all of his works. However, there was somewhat more of an acceptance the reality of Tito in some of these communities than in others. The Croatians were much more active and, in some cases, violent. While I was in Zagreb, there were incidents in the United States where the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigations] uncovered "extortion rings." For example, Croatian businessmen who were doing well in the United States would be visited by some young man who would say that he represented the "Fatherland." He would say to the businessman, "You haven't made your contribution lately." Threats would follow. I think that there were actually cases of bombs and violence used, and maybe even a murder or two. An incident in New Jersey comes to mind.

We also had even more violent, anti-Tito Croatian activity centered in Europe. There doesn't seem to have been too much connection between the European and the American versions of Croatian violence. There could have been, but we didn't know about it.

We in Zagreb had one rather personal involvement with this. Before I get into the anecdotal side of this, I recall that the U.S. Government was always being pressured as hard as the Yugoslav Government could manage to "suppress" these anti-Tito and anti-Yugoslav emigres in the U.S. As far as the Yugoslav Government was concerned, they were all "traitors" and should be treated as such. If the U.S. Government wanted good relations with Yugoslavia, we had to treat these "traitors" as the Yugoslav Government wanted them to be treated. Well, of course, American citizens and legal residents of the U.S. have rights of free speech under the First Amendment to the Constitution. So that was an area of significant tension between the U.S. and Yugoslav Governments. I was personally very sympathetic to some of the things that the Yugoslav Government wanted us to do. For example, there was a man named Ante Pavelic, who had been Minister of the Interior under the Ustashi, fascist government during World War II. He was directly responsible and involved in some of the most atrocious events of those times. He had made his way to the United States under false pretenses. He was given a passport by the Vatican which issued passports to a lot of people like him. He went to Argentina, established a new identity, and then came to the United States, where he became a prosperous used car dealer in Southern California, before he was uncovered and identified. The Yugoslav Government wanted to have him extradited as a war criminal. There were judges in Southern California who didn't want to send anybody back to a communist country in those days, and they didn't. I thought that that attitude was wrong and that Pavelic should have been returned to Yugoslavia and subjected to a hopefully fair trial before he was hanged! He was certainly guilty of significant offenses.

At other times the Yugoslav Government was very heavy handed in what they insisted that we do. We were always concerned about the counter measures which the Yugoslav Government might take. The Yugoslav secret service operated on American soil to

defend their country, in their view. I don't know whether any of that became public knowledge, but they certainly had a little war going on in Europe. There were cases of people who were shot down in the streets. A Yugoslav air transport aircraft was blown up, with heavy loss of life. The Croatian emigre community claimed to be responsible for this.

Q: Were there attacks up in Sweden when you were in Zagreb?

DUNLOP: Some of that happened, and there was a TWA [Trans World Airlines] aircraft hijacked which circled Charles De Gaulle Airport in Paris for a couple of hours while Croatian emigres on board broadcast their Croatian nationalist message.

The incident which my wife Betty and I became involved in occurred on one nice day in early spring. I was in my office at the Consulate. I guess that my boss was called by the Foreign Ministry of the Croatian Government and informed that they had a big problem. Would we please come over, and they would tell us about it. My boss asked me to see to it, and I did. The big problem turned out to involve two American girls in their late 'teens or early 20's. One was about 19 and the other was about 21. I've forgotten their names now. They had been contacted, recruited, or may have volunteered to undertake certain Croatian nationalist activities. They were contacted by young Croatians in Vienna who were reportedly involved in various improper activities. One of the girls became the lover of one of these guys. He persuaded the two girls to undertake a "mission" on behalf of these Croatian nationalists. The mission involved was doomed, so far as the girls were concerned. He gave them some leaflets with some very violent calls to the Croatian people to rise up and overthrow their oppressors.
They gave these two girls a satchel full of these leaflets and put them on a train from Vienna to Zagreb, with instructions to go up to the observation platform in the tallest building in the city and throw these leaflets out. They did this and were picked up almost immediately. [Laughter]

Q: I have to laugh. I assume that these girls were not of Yugoslav extraction? They were just...

DUNLOP: They looked and talked as American as apple pie, eighth generation WASP's [White Anglo-Saxon Protestants]. I don't know what their actual ethnic makeup was, but, no, they had no previous connection with Yugoslavia before this incident. The Yugoslav authorities in Zagreb were absolutely furious about this. They threatened to put these girls into prison on one of their lovely resort prison islands and keep them there for the rest of their lives.

We were confronted with a situation in which two American citizens deserved the protection of the United States Government, at least to a certain degree. They had committed an act that would be a crime in most countries, though perhaps not punishable by life imprisonment in a concentration camp, but it was nonetheless a crime. What would it be in the United States? Perhaps "incitement to riot," or something like that.

Maybe it would be regarded as a misdemeanor offense, punishable by a fine of $200 and 10 days in prison.

Anyway, the Croatians also had a dilemma. The more they made a "cause celebre" out of this, the more publicity they gave this incident. That is, this incident was evidence that there were Croatians who really hated that government and were actively involved against it. I guess that this is the dilemma which governments under that kind of pressure face. The Croatian authorities eventually brought the two girls to trial and sentenced them to the amount of time that they had already spent in jail awaiting trial, imposed some kind of a lifetime "ban" against returning to Yugoslavia, and then remanded them to Betty's and my custody. This is because their sentence was subject to automatic appeal. Until that process was completed, they could not leave the country but did not have to stay in jail. So these two girls came and lived in the nice little house that we had in Zagreb for about eight to 10 days. The weather was good, there was a lot of sun, and these young women went out and got a good tan. I felt that they were rather intelligent. They certainly were no problem to have around the breakfast table.

Betty and I gave them hell for being stupid and ignorant. We really did. We pointed out that they had their whole lifetimes in front of them and had had a narrow escape. These questions were beyond their understanding. We said that there were two sides to every issue. Certainly, there were some things that the Yugoslav Government could be criticized for, but you can't go into another country and start a revolution and not expect to pay a heavy penalty if you're caught. All of that stuff.

Well, finally the time came when we could take them to the Zagreb train station. I think that I repeated my lecture on their behavior for the "nth" time in the car going to the train station. They went back to Vienna.

Then, about eight months later they tried to come back to Croatia! The Yugoslavs caught them at the border and turned them away.

Q: Did they have more leaflets?

DUNLOP: I don't know. Maybe they had more messages to carry into Croatia. Anyway, these young women obviously had not learned their lesson. So that was the story.

Q: What happened to them after that?

DUNLOP: Well, I lost track of them. We didn't expect to get Christmas cards from these girls. However, we hoped that we had convinced them that there were better ways to spend their back packing time in Europe. I guess we underestimated the power of love, or something.

The degree to which foreign influence or the emigre or anti-Yugoslav influence was alleged to have insinuated itself into the Croatian leadership was also one of the charges

brought by Tito against Savka, Mika, and the others at the Karageordevo "purge" meeting in 1971. Tito said that they had allowed these emigre "enemies," these "fascists," to take advantage of them. He said that if they didn't know it, they should have known it.

There was no evidence of that at all that we ever heard about in the Consulate in Zagreb. I can only guess that, maybe, and I can only guess about this, at some point there were people around Tito who saw the political leadership in Croatia as becoming more and more self-confident. They may have felt threatened by it and may even have fabricated some of these accusations and passed them on to Tito. Unless he really believed the worst of these accusations, I don't know why he would have acted as he did.

Q: It almost sounds like some kind of "Iago" [from Shakespeare's "Othello"] was sitting at his ear, whispering these accusations.

DUNLOP: That's an analogy that I never thought of, but they might have said, "My God, she's a beautiful woman, sir. She's very attractive, sir, and very desirable, sir."

Well, it was sad. This happened at Christmas time of 1971. We were scheduled to be transferred from Zagreb to an onward assignment in 1972. It made the last six months of our time in Zagreb much less happy, professionally. Personally, we didn't have any difficulties.

Q: Did you ever run across Franjo Tudjman when you were in Zagreb? He is now the President of Croatia and perhaps may be having a completely benign influence on what has happened. There may be some raised eyebrows about this, but as President of Croatia he has been known to be virulently nationalistic. Did he ever appear on the public scene during your time in Zagreb?

DUNLOP: Yes, I remember when he reappeared on the scene in Croatia, but not as a key member of the Croatian Communist Party leadership. What had happened to him was that he had gotten "crosswise" with the Communist Party over some probably Croatian issue, though what it was, I don't know.

Way back in the 1960's, before I got to Zagreb, he had actually spent a couple of years in prison. He was a military officer and, I think, was a general. He was court martialed, stripped of his rank, and sent away to prison. He had come out of prison and was writing columns for a periodical with a political voice, published by the "Matica Hrvatska". This organization's newspaper eventually expressed a spectrum of political beliefs. Some of them were pretty radical and nationalist. Tudjman wrote a column in this paper. I can remember asking around who this guy was. I was answered by a combination of shrugs and eyes to the ceiling, suggesting that "Franjo was up to the same old thing again." He certainly was not an influential figure in Croatia in those days. He certainly is now.

Q: I think that a major subject of speculation for all of us who served in Yugoslavia was what would happen after Tito died or left the scene. We wondered how Yugoslavia would

hold together after Tito. Would the various nationalities or ethnic groups exercise a centrifugal influence? What impression did you take away from Zagreb?

DUNLOP: In 1972?

Q: Yes.

DUNLOP: OK, because I came back to Yugoslavia later on and have had some other exposure to the country. I guess that my views have evolved a little bit. I don't think that I now have the same view I had when I was in Zagreb. I think that when I was in Zagreb, I felt that there were reasons which supported Tito's policies. This was when the Soviet Union was still a major, looming factor in everybody's mind, and not just that of the Yugoslavs, no matter what their national or ethnic group.

Q: Oh, yes.

DUNLOP: I think that one of the great assets which Tito had in holding the country together was the Soviet "threat" and his image as someone who could "handle" the Russians, or the Soviets. I think that, when I left Zagreb, I felt that the Soviet "threat" was a unifying force. Maybe this was not the best way to hold the country together, but nevertheless it was a real, centripetal force.

I felt that there were some major intercommunal issues that needed to be resolved. I felt that they were on the way to some kind of satisfactory resolution before the meeting at Karageordevo in 1971 and which obviously congealed after that meeting. At some point these issues would have to be faced. I am not absolutely certain that I felt like this when I left Zagreb, but this is the way I think now. I think that the beginnings of this view had formed in my mind.

It seems to me now that the Serbs and the Croatians each had a non-negotiable demand, but they were not totally incompatible. Their differences could have been resolved or met with some ingenuity and some political skill. The Croatians were dead set on independence, on the recognition of a sovereign, Croatian state. That view was never articulated by the Savka and Tripolo leadership, but it was quite implicit in what they were doing and in the direction in which they were going.

On the other hand the Serbs, with their history and myth, or ethnic mythology, of being "persecuted" whenever they were not in full control of Yugoslavia. They insisted on a system which would protect themselves from the "persecutions" which they felt that they had suffered under the Turks, under the Austrians in Bosnia, and then under the Croatians, whenever the Croatians had a chance to get at them, as was the case during World War II.

A resolution of these differences was not going to be easy, since the various ethnic groups lived as intermingled as they did. However, it seemed to me that with imagination and

skill there was some way that that could be done. There would have to be the "reality" of Croatian independence and the "mythology" of some sort of Serbian influence that would overcome this Serb feeling of insecurity. This might have required population transfers. I mean by that, voluntary and protected population transfers.

In 1992 I had come to the conclusion that the United States should support a policy that would say to any person resident in the former Yugoslavia, except Slovenia, which had now gone its own way, "There's going to be a sovereign Croatia and a sovereign Serbia. There will be a line drawn which will delineate the border between those two states. If you live on the 'wrong' side of that border, from your point of view, you're going to have 10 years to make up your mind to move. If, at any time during that 10 years, during which time your rights will be protected by some international guarantee, you decide to move, you will be assisted to move. You will be helped to move in a dignified way to the part of the country where you wish to live. If, on the other hand, you find it tolerable to remain where you are, at the end of that 10-year period, you will become a citizen of that country. You won't have to give up your ethnic rights, which will be protected in credible fashion. However, you will be expected to be a loyal, productive, and contributing member of that nation. If you are a Serb in what is defined as Croatia at the end of that 10-year period, you will be expected to meet all of the obligations of a Croatian citizen living in Serbia at the same time."

In my mind, at least, as of 1972 the United States was not at the point of articulating the concept of "population transfers." However, I did believe that the Croatians were dead set on independence, as were the Slovenians. Some way was eventually going to have to be found to let that happen, with some solution to the sense of insecurity that this outcome would bring to the Serbs living in Croatia or Slovenia.

Q: I think that you mentioned something, and you may have mentioned it in the first part of this interview, when we began to talk about Yugoslavia, that as far as the United States is concerned, the Soviet threat to Yugoslavia was such that if there was instability in Yugoslavia, it might trigger Soviet adventurism. This could mean war. So that, in many respects, Yugoslavia and Berlin were the two points where there was a chance of instability...

DUNLOP: They were potential "flash points," yes.

Q: For that reason we had a real stake in wanting to see Yugoslavia hang together. Of course, the Yugoslavs probably felt the same way.

DUNLOP: I agree with that. I supported that policy at the time. There was indeed a general consensus in the U.S. for this policy, with the exception of some extremist émigré circles. It was institutionalized, so to speak, and every American official who ever spoke publicly on Yugoslavia for 30 years would express the view that, "We support the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Yugoslavia." That meant, "Soviets, keep out!" We made that point clearly through aid, both military and economic, during

the 1950's, and through diplomatic and other ways in the 1960's and 1970's. I knew of no one who expected the Soviets to go away at any particular time. I knew of nobody who anticipated anything like the developments of the late 1980's and 1990's. The policy we had toward Yugoslavia from 1950 to, say, 1985 was an appropriate, entirely serviceable policy. However, I believe that we held onto this policy after it was no longer serviceable.

Q: Well, where did you go in 1972, after leaving Zagreb?

DUNLOP: After 1972 I returned to Saigon. I had a telephone call in the spring of 1972 from somebody I knew in Vietnamese affairs who asked if I would be willing to return to Vietnam. I thought about that a lot. I had spent three years there, from 1966 to 1969. This was now 1972, and did I want to go back to Saigon?

In 1972 the Vietnam War was still going on. Vietnamization had largely been completed. At the time I got the phone call, there was a very large North Vietnamese offensive under way, the so-called "Easter offensive" of that year. It didn't look as if the negotiations in Paris over the next three years would be any more successful than they had been during the previous four years. However, the major consideration for me involved my family. I had gotten married since I had left Vietnam, and we had one child. But I was told that the policy allowed me to take my wife and child back to Vietnam, so I decided to go. My wife, Betty, a Foreign Service secretary whom I met in Saigon was very supportive.

The job I was offered was also a good one. It was to be in the Internal Unit of the Political Section, a job for which I felt well qualified. So with very little transition I went from Zagreb to Saigon, with some home leave in between. I arrived back in Saigon in July, 1972.

Q: You were in Saigon this time from when to when?

DUNLOP: July, 1972, to, I guess, June, 1974. That tour spanned the signing and implementation, as far as you could use that word, of the Paris Accords on Vietnam signed in January, 1973.

Q: When you returned to Saigon, could you describe first how the Embassy was, how your job was, the Ambassador, and so forth?

DUNLOP: The Ambassador was still Ellsworth Bunker. By then he was about to complete his fourth year in Vietnam.

The Political Section had been reorganized, to the degree that the Provincial Reporting Unit had been eliminated. I had been involved in this unit, both as a provincial reporter and as its head during my previous tour in Saigon. There now were Internal and External Units, as well as a very large Political-Military Unit. The Political Section was set up along the conventional lines of most Embassies.

I heard that the Provincial Reporting Unit had been abolished because Ambassador Bunker had become upset at some of the younger officers who were assigned to it in the 1970- 1972 time period. These were officers who had come into the Foreign Service during the 1960's. They were full of the "piss and vinegar" of that generation. They were skeptical and even defiant of authority. I think that Ambassador Bunker thought that they were whippersnappers and "know-it-all's." Anyway, I'm not sure of everything that happened, but Ambassador Bunker had become convinced that the Provincial Reporting Unit was not worth the money that we were spending on it. So he dissolved the Provincial Reporting Unit.

Some of the former Provincial Reporting Officers were still in Saigon when I got there in 1972. Two of them, in particular, had been reassigned to the Internal Unit, where I was also assigned. I got to know them very quickly when I got there. They still had a lot of the resentful attitude which had offended Ambassador Bunker.

Q: They probably resented everything. It was an "odd" period of time. Foreign Service Officers from our generation generally accepted the fact that we were representatives of the U.S. Government and that there were limits to expressing our own views publicly on how the world was.

DUNLOP: Well, these two guys did not endear themselves to me when I heard them sneering at me as a "true believer" in our policies in Vietnam. I was not unhappy about the comment that I was a "true believer." However, the sneering tone was not so acceptable.

Q: As far as "sneering" was concerned, when I think of it, this was a tone of voice which you hear from some commentators who are still around, 20 years later.

DUNLOP: Well, I think I can say that both of these guys, and I know one of them better than the other, since our careers have been parallel to some extent, have now undergone that "transformation" that they used to talk about. You know, they say that you have no heart if you're not a rebel in your 20's and 30's and you have no brain if you're not a conservative by your 40's.

When I returned to the Embassy in Saigon in 1972, the Mission was run by some very "tough" officers. I think that Martin Herz had left...

Q: And I think that Galen Stone was chief of the Political Section.

DUNLOP: Galen Stone was there. I had known him before. Then Josiah Bennett took over as Political Counselor. He was an old-line, "China hand." Bunker was still the Ambassador. The Political Section was still doing a lot of the things that it had done in the way of provincial reporting. I must say that I was glad to see that. I would have tried to re-institute some of it, had such reporting totally disappeared. There was still a lot of

travel into the provinces, although this travel was no longer institutionalized into a separate, Provincial Reporting Unit.

When I first returned to Saigon, my responsibilities involved covering the Buddhists and all other religious groups, including the Catholics, the Hoa Hao, and the Cao Dai. I also covered the Chams, insofar as they played a role, and they played a small role in a couple of provinces. I also followed developments among the "Montagnards" [ethnic peoples, especially on the high plateau of Central Vietnam]. That's when I got to go up there and drink their locally-made, fermented rice wine through a straw. I also followed National Assembly developments, beginning with the Senate, or upper house. Later on, somebody else took over following developments in the Senate. At the time the Republic of Vietnam had a bicameral legislature. So I had those responsibilities, as well as some supervisory duties.

I did the usual things that you do when you get to a post. You read what went on before. Much of it was very familiar to me. I tried not to let too much of what I had experienced before influence the way I saw things. I tried to look at everything from a fresh point of view, which is very difficult to do.

When I arrived in Saigon in July, 1972, the "Easter Offensive" by the North Vietnamese had about run its course. This was the first time that the North Vietnamese employed regular battalions with full armor and artillery support. This offensive had been defeated, without any American ground force involvement. There was a lot of American air and naval bombardment support.

However, this was war of the kind that you were familiar with from World War II or even World War I. Certain parts of the country, particularly "I Corps" [the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, organized into Military Region I], when you rode North from Da Nang to Hue and, even more so, from Hue to Quang Tri, which I had an opportunity to fly over not too long after I got there, was littered with recently burnt out armored vehicles. This was something that you might see in movies about German Gen Erwin Rommel in the North African campaign of World War II. I think that most Americans still don't think of this stage of the Vietnam War in that way.

This combat was the result of an effort by the North Vietnamese Army [People's Army of Vietnam--PAVN] to "close the book" on the Vietnam War without a negotiated settlement. They wanted one more crack, using military means, before they tried to get in the back door, through a settlement which they might be able to manipulate. Perhaps we didn't fully understand that at the time, although maybe some people did.

This North Vietnamese effort failed, and they suffered terrible casualties before they gave up on it. There had also been heavy casualties on the South Vietnamese side. The South Vietnamese Army [Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, RVNAF] had fought very creditably in some respects. In other respects, less so, although this was also true of the North Vietnamese.

There were times when North Vietnamese units did not perform at the high level that we were accustomed to, because they usually were militarily very efficient. Some North Vietnamese units had simply "broken." We had taken a lot of North Vietnamese prisoners. Some of the North Vietnamese armored troops had simply "quit." They were out there, a naval bombardment came in like holy hell, and they jumped out of their tanks and ran over to the South Vietnamese forces with their arms up. That kind of thing had happened, too.

The government led by President Nguyen van Thieu, which was much reviled in the American press, was somewhat more efficient and functioned somewhat better than it had when I was previously in Saigon. I don't think that it was any more "impressive" or any more "repressive" than it had been previously. It still had an authoritarian approach to the opposition, particularly on the Left. There was very little of this leftist opposition, but there was some. The South Vietnamese Government was still throwing people into jail for activities regarded as "subversive," which the American Left regarded as activities by "heroic, nationalist defenders of truth and justice." However, there weren't too many such cases.

Q: This was still during the "high noon" of the first Nixon administration. Kissinger was still very much involved at this point.
DUNLOP: He was still the chief negotiator in Paris as National Security Adviser, when I arrived back in Saigon in July, 1972.

Q: Was there any "tension" between the reporting that we were doing and what was happening in Vietnam and how it was received and used in Washington?

DUNLOP: Yes, there was. I'll give you a couple of examples in which I was involved, but there were certainly others as well. After the North Vietnamese "Easter Offensive" of 1972 had been repulsed, I think that President Thieu claimed that every inch of soil lost to the North Vietnamese by their offensive had been regained. This was not true, because there were parts of South Vietnam which were never regained from the North Vietnamese. However, almost all of the ground lost had been regained by September 6, 1972. The reason for relating it to that date was either that it was the anniversary of his election as President in 1967 or the anniversary of the promulgation of the constitution.

Anyway, there was a period of about three months between September and December, 1972, in any case, well into the winter, when we in the Embassy, at least at my level, were not aware of anything approaching a "breakthrough" in the Paris peace negotiations with the North Vietnamese. Then, all of a sudden, in October, 1972, I guess it was, the "word" was out that the negotiations were very close to completion in Paris.

Keep the sequence of events in mind. I'm doing this for my own sake, as much as for anything else. The Accord on Vietnam was signed after the "Christmas bombing" of Hanoi and Haiphong in December, 1972. I think that the Accord was signed on January

28, 1973. The "word" about an imminent "breakthrough" in the negotiations would have reached us on about October 28, 1972. The three month period between the end of October, 1972, and the end of January, 1973, when the Accord on Vietnam was signed, was a period of increasing apprehension on the official South Vietnamese side and, to some significant degree, on the side of South Vietnamese public opinion. It was feared that the Accord on Vietnam would deal a fatal blow to the prospects for the survival of the Republic of Vietnam.

This pessimistic opinion grew very rapidly in South Vietnam. It was reflected in the Saigon press and in what individual South Vietnamese would say to us, at a time when those of us in the Embassy at our levels did not know anything about what was going on. We could not understand what it was that these South Vietnamese contacts of ours were worried about. We certainly knew that they were getting very worried. Were they simply worried that the Americans had grown tired of the war and were going ahead with the negotiation of an accord with North Vietnam? Or did these South Vietnamese figures know something that we didn't know? I think that it was partly the latter, because President Thieu had been informed of the shape of what this final agreement was going to be. He didn't like it one bit. I think that this attitude, these concerns, and this resistance of his were leaked by Independence Palace [the residence of the President of the Republic of Vietnam] to the Vietnamese press. We were seeing that before we saw anything that gave us a clue as to why these South Vietnamese were so upset.

I'm not necessarily blaming the State Department system for not telling us what was going on in Paris. However, it made reporting difficult. I remember that. I would be puzzled at the virulence of some of the anti-Kissinger material which began to appear in the South Vietnamese press.

This is what gave rise to my first getting my wrist "slapped." We thought that it was pretty interesting when Kissinger began to be portrayed in these really wretched, sometimes scatological and very pornographic cartoons. We assembled a package of these cartoons, appropriately translated, and sent them back to the Department. We said that this kind of material doesn't reflect what everybody is thinking in Saigon but a lot of people read these newspapers, and the Department ought to know about this. We were very quickly told that this kind of material was not welcome and we were asked not to send such material in to the Department. Now, that's pretty minor, but that was evidently considered a case of "lese majeste" [something close to high treason]. It was nowhere like reporting that the South Vietnamese were happy with everything in South Vietnam, and the U.S. Government should go ahead and sign the Accord on Vietnam and saying that we would get no flack from the South Vietnamese. We were never told to do that. We were able to report this concern we had noted among the South Vietnamese. The Department just didn't want to see the cartoons about Kissinger, although I am sure that they were a source of some hilarity around the Department of State. Some of these cartoons were just incredibly bad.

There was a period of time when some of our provincial reporting on corruption involved some of President Thieu's principal supporters, and particularly Gen Dan Van Quang. You may remember that name. He became the "overlord" of the Mekong River Delta area. This area was THE most prosperous and populous part of the country. It provided enormous opportunities for taking "cuts" of rice shipments to Saigon. Gen Quang was corrupt down to his toenails. There was lots of evidence for that, although maybe not all of the evidence would have stood up in court. However, we had officers in Can Tho [Phong Dinh Province], which was the largest city in the Mekong Delta and the capital of IV Corps [Military Region 4], who reported some of these things. Through the Internal Reporting Unit we thought this was pretty interesting stuff to send on to the Department.

Josiah Bennett, the Political Counselor, became uneasy at this kind of reporting. I had a lot of fights with him about this. It was not something that was very pleasant, although he was a very pleasant man, individually. I guess that he felt that warts were not to be focused on. I don't think that we were unduly focusing on them. It was a matter of degree. I felt that there was some good reporting coming out of the Mekong Delta area and I think that we basically did what we had to do. However, to me there was an unnecessary degree of arguing which had to go on before some of these good reports could go out. I ought to add that Ambassador Bunker never stood in the way of honest political reporting

The Thieu Government was corrupt. There's no question about that. It was corrupt, but the degree to which that had an impact on events is another matter, because a certain level of corruption was very common in South Vietnam. Today the Vietnamese Communist Government is very corrupt. If you want to get something done in Saigon, or Ho Chi Minh City these days, you have to find out how to get the right people paid off. When corruption reaches a politically damaging level, this is a matter for useful debate and inquiry. We used to have a lot of that debate and inquiry. I think that it had gone over the level where it became politically damaging in the Mekong Delta area.

Q: This raises one of the standard questions that face any Foreign Service Officer. If you see corruption and criminal influence, as I saw in Naples with the Camorra [similar to the Mafia]. It was there, it was endemic to the system. However, if you report it, it can sometimes take on an overtone of suggesting, "To hell with this country. This place is corrupt or criminal, and we just won't deal with it." Or it may lead to complete dismissal of the society. This is true again and again. It's like talking about Senator Kennedy or President Kennedy coming out of the "corrupt" Massachusetts Democratic Party system. Yes, corruption was there as part of the process. However, describing it can sometimes take on an overtone that really inhibits our dealing with the practicalities of the situation.

DUNLOP: I think that's certainly true. I think that Americans tend to be a little bit hypocritical, although I'm not sure that that's the word. "Sanctimonious" comes to mind, although I'm not sure that that's the right word, either.

Q: It's "within the ballpark" of those words.

DUNLOP: It's a little like dealing with people like Tito of Yugoslavia, as I was saying earlier. There is the view in the Foreign Service that, if we have to deal with somebody who can be called "corrupt," for God's sake don't report anything "bad" about him because we have this conscience and we don't want to have...

Q: It's not only that. We know that we can report such matters in what we might regard as "balanced" fashion. However, the report goes back to Washington. If there's anything "juicy," it will end up on the desk of a Senator, a Congressman, or of a journalist, all of whom are either out to titillate an audience or grab attention at the time. This can have profound effects. We have this problem.

DUNLOP: That is true, and I must say that, to give the Josiah Bennett's of this world full credit, they are well aware of this. And, of course, South Vietnam was a classic case of corruption. There was a whole constituency in the United States looking for ways to say, "I told you so." They felt that the Vietnam War was the "wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time." Then a provincial reporter would come back to Saigon and say, "You know, people I know and really respect down here in Can Tho are sick at heart about what's going on down there. They are really disgusted."

There was a case of a Province Chief in the Mekong Delta area who resigned from office, which was almost unheard of. He was one of the "good guys" who said, "Well, 20% corruption is all right, but 40% corruption, no. That's too much." If you report that back to Washington, it gets into Walter Cronkite's Evening News broadcast [on CBS TV], which was already a powerful influence on my mother, as I mentioned before. He was, perhaps, the dominant influence on her, as far as the Vietnam War was concerned. Yes, it is a dilemma.

I don't feel too badly about how we handled the reporting on corruption there. I think that we managed to do what was necessary. If anybody back in the policymaking world wanted to understand the degree to which the South Vietnamese Government was functioning efficiently, as well as where it was not functioning efficiently, if they were willing to do the hard work of reading all of the reporting, they would have been pretty well served.

Our main question should have been, "Is the South Vietnamese Government going to be able to function sufficiently well that it will survive?" My answer to myself to that question was always, "Yes, it is, but we will have to support it for a long time." Just as we did in South Korea. I would have to say, "Yes, we could have done that." One of the motivations of the South Vietnamese for doing that is that they just detested North Vietnam. They didn't want the North Vietnamese to come down and interfere in their affairs. Thich Tri Quang, the Buddhist thorn in everybody's side, didn't want North Vietnam to win the war. He may have contributed to North Vietnam's winning the war, but this wasn't his objective. His objective was to get a Catholic President [Ngo Dinh Diem] out of Independence Palace! He succeeded in doing that, at least in part.

Q: How did you find the "religious factor" operating during this 1972-1974 period?

DUNLOP: Personally, I had a very fortunate relationship with Monsignor Nguyen van Binh, the Catholic Archbishop of Saigon. He suffered horribly after the communists took over South Vietnam. I think that he may have been made a Cardinal "in pectore" [appointed secretly by the Pope, without a public announcement].

That was part of my job. I would go over and see him. He was a wonderful man, of compassion and erudition, gentleness, humanity, and all of the things that you would like to think that a Prince of the Church is. He would talk to me about whatever I wanted to talk about, which was how things are going, there had been such a pro-Catholic President [Ngo Dinh Diem]. I would ask, "What does this mean?" If I remember his point of view correctly, he would say, "The Vietnamese people have had sufficient experience with religious extremism so that they have discarded it. There are no longer 'extreme' Buddhists who matter. There are no longer 'extreme' Catholics who matter. There no longer are Hoa Hao or Cao Dai supporters who think that they can run everything within sight, without regard to anybody else. We have passed beyond that point. The chapter has been closed on religion as a powerful, political influence wielded by some people to the detriment of others."

I accepted his view after thinking about it and talking to other people. I would go over to the An Quang Pagoda to see Thich Tri Quang but wasn't received by him. He didn't want to see Americans at that point. However, he designated somebody to speak for the Vien Hoa Dao [Buddhist Institute], that influential portion of the Buddhist community. Those Buddhists were no longer seeking the kind of power that I think they felt was within their grasp in 1963-1966. They were certainly vocal when they didn't like something and they were going to protect their own interests, as in the case of the Buddhist University. They wanted to make sure that the government, as a secular power, didn't try to tell them how to run their university. They were no longer trying to determine who was going to be the political chief of the state, or who was not going to be chief of state. They might well have liked doing that, but they came to realize those were unrealistic goals.

Religious dissonance in that regard still existed, as well as dissidence, to some degree. However, it did not have the power, and certainly did not seem to have a potential for powerfully influencing the course of political events, during the 1972-1974 time frame, as it seemed to have had some 10 years earlier.

Q: How did you see the political-military relationship within the U.S. Mission? I mean political- military reporting and...

DUNLOP: I think that it was pretty smooth and I think that we have to credit Ambassador Bunker for that. Bunker had seen two commanders of MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] come and go. He had seen Gen Westmoreland and Gen Abrams. He was excellent at handling that relationship. If the two top people in the U.S. Mission understand where the other one is coming from and accord him the "space" that he needs

to get his job done, and are willing to work together on a reasonably agreed, common purpose, then that filters down to lower levels. I was never involved directly in political-military relationships with MACV in Vietnam, as I certainly was later on in South Korea. So I can't say too much personally about this.

During my second tour of duty in Saigon, as of January 28, 1973, the American forces were given three months to leave South Vietnam. This involved all combat and operational forces. They did that. By March 28, 1973, they were all gone from South Vietnam. The people who were helping to maintain the aircraft of the Vietnamese Air Force on the flight line were all gone. The only military elements left in the U.S. Mission were the Marine Security Guards [a detachment of about 200 Marines] and a DAO [Defense Attaché Office], with about 50 military personnel assigned and attached to the Embassy. The DAO's main job was to funnel the large amounts of military assistance that we had going to the South Vietnamese.

Q: From the ripples that were coming out of Washington what was your personal feeling about the peace efforts and what we were doing in this regard?

DUNLOP: You're speaking of the period before--during the run-up to--the Paris Accords, and the period which followed the Accords. I was increasingly unhappy with the trend of the situation. The more I got to understand the process, which included reading the Accords on Vietnam and then reading how the U.S. interpreted them, I could see why the South Vietnamese authorities were concerned about how things were going. Of course, we were reporting, word for word, what President Thieu was saying about it. Thieu gave a major speech in December, 1972, known as the "poison cup" speech. In it he said to the South Vietnamese people, "I am in a terrible situation here. I have been offered a 'poisoned cup,' but I have been offered the opportunity to drink it, one drop at a time." That analogy seemed to make sense to me.

Of course, earlier on, during the first six months of application of the Accords on Vietnam [January-July, 1973] the true horror of the Watergate Affair had not fully manifested itself. Ambassador Bunker adopted quite a positive attitude on the Accords. Part of this was probably due to his intent, as our leader, to present a positive, confident face on the situation. We still saw Ambassador Bunker a lot, even though we were not provincial reporters. However, he always made every effort to talk to his working level staff. He always said, in those early days of the application of the accords, "This is a long haul at a low cost." He felt that President Nixon had found the right solution for the future. He said that we would be in South Vietnam for a long time and that we had reduced the cost to a tolerable level. He would use the analogy of South Korea. He would say, "What makes you think that the South Koreans were better able to run their lives in 1953-1954 than the South Vietnamese are now?" He would add, "We have to keep the bad guys out and give the South Vietnamese time."

I guess that I was willing to accept that. However, I also began to see that the fact that we had declared a peace seemed to suggest that it was necessarily going to be so. We could

not criticize the Accords on Vietnam. Washington did not want to hear any criticism of them.

For example, the ICCS [International Commission of Control and Supervision] was deployed in South Vietnam. This was one of those international teams that the United States is so fond of. Look at Bosnia. These teams descend on chaotic situations with clipboards to take notes and see how things are going. The theory seems to be that people will see them standing around with their clipboards and will alter their behavior in a positive direction, because they are being watched.

The ICCS was a failure. It was a total failure, almost from the beginning. Canada was one of the four countries participating in the ICCS. Members of the ICCS included Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland. The Canadians tried to make the Accords on Vietnam work and succeeded in doing so in terms of a few pieces of it. However, the most you could say was that the Poles and the Hungarians were never functional members of the ICCS. The worst that you could say is that they deliberately set out to sabotage the Accords on Vietnam. The Canadians soon saw the futility of it all and cleared out.

The ICCS was reported to the American people as a major component of the Accords which were going to bring peace to Vietnam. The theory was that this whole thing was going to work, but nobody in Washington was facing up to how it was functioning. This was very disturbing.

Q: You know, at one time the international press was covering and talking about all of the "horrors" of the war. Had the press lost interest in what was happening in terms of the implementation of the Accords on Vietnam? Some people think that the press was at least partly responsible for how things turned out in South Vietnam. Did you find that the press did a good job of reporting on the failure of the ICCS?

DUNLOP: I'm trying to remember about press reporting on the ICCS. If we couldn't get that story back to Washington, certainly since we thought that it was a "bad" story, it would have been newsworthy, and the press would have reported this. I can't remember that. I have no recollection of what the press was saying about the ICCS or of thinking that if somebody says that, then it will be read, since the Embassy reporting on the ICCS wasn't particularly welcome in Washington. I don't recall any particularly better attitude on the part of the press toward the American effort in Vietnam as a whole. The journalists whom I came in contact with during the 1972-1974 period still dripped with contempt for the official American effort in Vietnam. They not only believed that it was the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time, but they seemed glad that this was so. I bitterly resented that attitude when I encountered it.

If we were going to have a failure in Vietnam, and it was always possible that we would have a failure, OK, well that's that. However, in my view, to rejoice over your country's failure was just an unacceptable personal attitude. I couldn't stand it. And, of course, at

that point we hadn't totally failed, though we seemed to be on the road to failure. We hadn't gotten there yet.

Q: Did you find any change in the contribution and role of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and what they were doing? Did you get much from them in the way of reporting?

DUNLOP: I think that I said in discussing my earlier tour in Saigon that I never knew much about what they were doing. They didn't cross my path very much. During my second tour [1972-1974] I think that I probably had more contact with them on the analytical side. I had a slightly higher position in terms of my level in the Political Section. I'll give you an example of that.

Toward the end of my second tour in Saigon [1972-1974] and after the Accords on Vietnam had been in place for a year, we had seen the collapse of the ICCS and the resumption of this relentless buildup by the North Vietnamese. They began to pave parts of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, put steel-truss bridges on it, and installed an eight-inch pipeline or something like that to bring fuel down to South Vietnam to supply the trucks that were going to drive over the improved bridges and macadamized roads. I had a strong feeling, shared by Harry Sizer, a Political Officer in the Internal Unit of the Political Section, that North Vietnam was not going to wait very long before they brought the hammer down on South Vietnam. Remember, this was after the Accords were signed in January, 1973. The North Vietnamese saw the weaknesses in South Vietnam after the American withdrawal. They also saw that the ICCS was not going to be around to notice what they were doing in any meaningful way.

The North Vietnamese were also looking at the U.S. domestic scene. By this time the Watergate affair had begun to influence their thinking in a most important way. They saw that the Nixon administration was increasingly crippled by the Watergate controversy. There were a lot of smart guys in Hanoi.

I advocated, and finally got approval for compiling an Airgram, a "think piece" on the intentions of the North Vietnamese. I got seven people in the Mission to contribute to it, including myself, of course, as one of them. Another of the contributors was Harry Sizer, the other Political Officer in the Internal Affairs Unit. Another contributor was Frank Snepp, the chief CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] analyst on North Vietnam at the time, who later wrote the book, "Decent Interval." An officer in the DAO [Defense Attaché Office] also contributed to it. We arranged to have a couple of other people contribute who were well known in the Embassy as North Vietnam watchers. We wrote seven, separate pieces to address the question of whether we thought that North Vietnam would launch a full-scale offensive within the next six months in an attempt to end the war. This six months period we addressed ended on June 30, 1974. The Airgram finally went out to the Department of State in January, 1974, so this analysis covered the period from January to June, 1974. I felt very strongly that somebody ought to be saying something

about this. Maybe it was being said elsewhere, but I didn't know it. I was really delighted that that Airgram went out. Not everybody agreed with it, but at least I had my say.

I found that Airgram last week in the documentation that we were going over as a part of the declassification program in the Department, the so-called Freedom of Information program. It was kind of fun to see it in the files of the Department and to recall what it had said. Five of the seven contributors to this Airgram said, "No, there won't be a North Vietnamese general offensive during the next six months" that is, before June 30, 1974. Two of us, Harry Sizer and I, said, "Yes, there will be a North Vietnamese general offensive within the next six months." In that sense Harry Sizer and I were wrong, (by about a month) and the other five were right. However, only two of the seven contributors said that the North Vietnamese would not conduct a general offensive at any foreseeable time. Of course, the five of us who said that the North Vietnamese would attack, but only differing on the time frame, were right in that regard. So, if it cared, Washington could have known that 5 of 7 analysts in Saigon were predicting a major NVA offensive.

Frank Snepp, who wrote the book, "Decent Interval," and who took credit for having foreseen the North Vietnamese general offensive, was one of those who said the North Vietnamese wouldn't attack. He said that they were too much involved in the reconstruction of North Vietnam, they had taken too many casualties, and all of the efforts going on along the Ho Chi Minh Trail were preparatory and contingency efforts. He felt that they were not going to attack, in any near time-frame.

That kind of analytical reporting, with the implications for policy in it, is among the hardest things that the Foreign Service has to do. This is partly because of time. You are always reporting the "here and now." We had to report on the ICCS, on what the Vietnamese Senate was saying about the Paris Accords, on President Thieu's most recent speech. That's why I remember that Airgram so well and for many years afterwards, because it was sent to the Department. I was very pleased that it was submitted, because it was not an easy thing to do.

Q: Now regarding reporting on the ICCS. Was this a "touchy" issue?

DUNLOP: Yes, it was, although a lot of great reporting was done, and I've seen some of that recently. In anticipation of the signature of the Paris Accords on Vietnam, the Department prepared a list of 100 Foreign Service Officers who had formerly served in South Vietnam and asked them to accept short assignments back to that country for periods of up to six months of TDY [Temporary Duty]. The idea was that they would go back into areas that they may have been familiar with. The purpose was to track what was going on. When this program was announced at a staff meeting, I thought that this was going to create chaos. These officers would hardly have gotten off the airplane in Saigon and unpacked their bags before it would be time for them to return to their posts of assignment. The arrangement was that they would not be replaced in their posts of assignment and would have their TDY time in Vietnam added to their tours of duty wherever they were assigned in the world. Actually, these FSO's came out and by and

large did a super job. About 44 FSO's were initially assigned back to Vietnam. Of these, about 10 were assigned to the Embassy, and eight more were assigned to each of our Consulates General in Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho. There were two other groups of FSO's who returned to Vietnam later on for similar periods of TDY.

For example, Dick Teare and Jim Mack were among those who returned to Vietnam in the first group. John Helble and Steve Johnson came back to organize U.S. Mission support for the ICCS. (John Helble has commented extensively on this period in another interview in this Foreign Service Oral History.) Jim Mack was one of the officers who went back up to Nha Trang, where he had previously served. Dick Teare initially served in Bien Hoa and later in Saigon. We had a special unit in the Political Section set up under FSO Roger Kirk, a superb senior officer, now retired. He was very valuable in commenting on ICCS reporting. He ought to write a book about it. Maybe he has. These guys did wonderful reporting on the Indonesians and the Canadians in the ICCS, who were trying, at least. The Poles and Hungarians did what they could to sabotage the effort, and we learned of this, too.

Later on, the Iranians replaced the Canadians. The Canadians saw this developing chaos in the ICCS and bailed out. This made the Department of State furious, but I understand the Canadian decision. The Canadians said that this was not only a catastrophe in the making but was a catastrophe actually happening. They said that they didn't want to be part of any sham. So we persuaded the Iranians to replace the Canadians on the ICCS.

Q: What was the reaction to the developments within the ICCS? I assume that we were reporting what was coming out. Did you feel any inhibitions on reporting on this?

DUNLOP: Well, the reporting on the ICCS went to the Department. I've seen the results of it, much or even all of which I saw at the time. No, I don't think that there were any inhibitions on reporting on it. However, I don't think that anybody in Washington wanted to pay any attention to it in any policy sense, because it was on failure and Kissinger and Nixon were committed to making the Accords a success.

You would have to talk to specific people in this area. Retired Ambassador Bob Miller would be a good person to talk to on Vietnam in general. Bob, I believe, was the head of the Vietnam Task Force in the Department during this time. Bob was a very well informed, balanced guy who would have welcomed the challenge of reporting on the implementation of the Paris Accords, "warts and all." He saw these reports and probably experienced a lot of frustration in trying to get them factored into policy thinking.

However, who was making policy on Vietnam? Wasn't the whole process getting out of control in Washington? The ability of anybody in Washington to do anything about Vietnam was diminishing day by day.

Q: Did you understand what was happening in connection with the Watergate affair at that time?

DUNLOP: Well, I think not at first, at least. In the 1972 presidential elections, President Nixon [the Republican candidate] triumphed over Senator McGovern [the Democratic candidate]. A lot of us in the Embassy in Saigon were really glad about that.

Q: I think that most of us probably "leaned" toward the Democrats. However, I voted for President Nixon.

DUNLOP: Well, those were the times which made you change your outlook. Personally, I also voted for Nixon. I think that most people that I knew voted for Nixon. I think that that is probably true but I really have no basis for saying that. I just believe this was the case.

The period between the presidential elections in November, 1972, to Nixon's resignation from the presidency in August, 1974, was about 21 months. Nixon resigned from the presidency after I returned to Washington. I think that the Watergate affair must have become increasingly a weight on our minds. Especially in the spring of 1974, when our support--logistical support--for the RVN was being slashed in Congress and Nixon was more and more helpless. We came to believe, as I've said before, that the North Vietnamese must be licking their chops, as indeed they were.

Ambassador Bunker, of course, kept a stiff upper lip. Then, of course, he was replaced during that period of time by Ambassador Graham Martin, who was going to play the role of Horatio at the bridge.

Q: Were you in Saigon when Ambassador Martin took over?

DUNLOP: Yes.

Q: Had you heard about Ambassador Martin before he arrived in Saigon? When did he arrive in Saigon?
DUNLOP: I'm pretty vague on that, but he probably arrived in the spring or summer of 1973. I think that he had been Ambassador to Vietnam for a year when I left Saigon in 1974. Then he continued for another eight months or so before the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam. I was working for a superb officer, FSO Al Francis, who had worked with Ambassador Martin in Bangkok. So my views of Martin before he arrived in Saigon were largely framed by what Al Francis told me. Al used words and terms like "formidable," "steel-trap mind," "miracle worker," a "consumate bureaucratic infighter," "ruthless with people that he felt were under-achievers," and "dedicated" to describe Martin.

Q: Yes, but he also was not "negative."

DUNLOP: No. Not "negative" in the sense of "small minded," "mean," "malicious," or "nasty." Ambassador Bunker had this old-school, Vermont, gentlemanly aura about him,

which was all reflective of who he was. I'm sure that Ambassador Bunker could get mad as hell. I'm told that he could tell dirty jokes, although I can't imagine that! Somebody told me the other day, "Boy, did you ever hear Ambassador Bunker tell all those dirty jokes?"

Q: I can't imagine.

DUNLOP: I said, "No, I never heard him tell dirty jokes." My friend said, "Well, he was good at it." I said, "Well, I missed it." That's one thing that I missed in my Vietnam experience.

Graham Martin was a street smart, North Carolina guy who came up in the WPA [Works Progress Administration, a creation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the 1930's]. He was something like President Lyndon Johnson. Lyndon Johnson also came to Washington to serve in the WPA. Martin and Johnson had learned all of the tricks of bureaucratic street fighting.

Then Martin had gone on to have a very distinguished career. He had been Ambassador to Italy and Thailand, where Al Francis worked for him. That was when we were basing B-52 intercontinental bombers in Thailand, under agreements reached with the Thai Government. This was an unheard of concession by a Thai Government. Over the centuries it had been known for keeping foreigners out of its affairs.

Well, Martin arrived in Saigon with this reputation. Al Francis was one of the officers in the Mission whom Martin trusted. Because Al liked and trusted me, I guess he gave me a good reference to Martin because I saw Ambassador Martin quite a lot. Martin would call me up. It was always quite a jolt when I would get a phone call, saying that Ambassador Martin would like to see me. I would go up to his office. He would have some question about reporting and all of that. As I saw him, Ambassador Martin was never a mean spirited man. He never seemed to take pleasure in demeaning people, which is sometimes done by people holding great power and authority. He wasn't a "warm, fuzzy", he was a "cool, prickly" type of person. I was always glad when he called me but also kind of glad when I got back to my office and that nothing had gone wrong in my meeting with Ambassador Martin.

Ambassador Martin was very interested in the reporting of the warts. That is, bad things happening. This is not the image that he may have with many people. For example, the disastrous failure of the ICCS. The Vietnamese commander of IV Corps [that is, the area South of Saigon], as I mentioned before, was corrupt to his toenails, to a point where this situation was actually impacting on the ability of the Vietnamese Government to function in that area.

During those months FSO Ken Quinn produced a very interesting series of reports. I think that they impressed Ambassador Martin. They certainly impressed me. Quinn was a colleague of ours who has gone on to be the Director of the Executive Secretariat [S/S] of

the Department. Ken was a relatively junior officer in those days down in the Mekong Delta area. Ken began to interview refugees who at that time had begun to stream over the border from Cambodia into South Vietnam. They were telling utterly horrendous tales of slaughter that were so far beyond what anybody had heard previously that he encountered a rather incredulous audience for his reports. However, Ken was meticulous. He took time to cross-check these reports.

These reports turned out to be the first accounts of Khmer Rouge slaughters. The Vietnamese had a word for them. They called these incidents pick axe murders, because pick axes were used to kill people. These murders were mainly directed against Buddhist temples and priests at that time. At least, they were one of their earliest targets. These Khmer Rouge units would come into a village and slaughter the Buddhist priests in front of the horrified eyes of the village populace, who would then think that maybe this was not a good place to live in.

Ambassador Martin was very supportive of that kind of reporting. If that was what was happening, it was what he wanted to hear about. Of course, I guess that he felt that these reports might help him back in Washington. Ambassador Martin had lost a son in South Vietnam. Whether he was his only son or not, I don't know. Martin had other children. The loss of his son was something that affected Ambassador Martin very deeply. I would expect that to be true of most people.

Some people have said that the death of his son gave Ambassador Martin an ideological commitment to success in South Vietnam. He may have thought, "My son will not have died in vain." This may have kept Ambassador Martin on that bridge which he was defending almost alone at the end [in 1975]. He is said by many people to have stayed in Saigon longer than he should have. I was not in Saigon at the end, so I simply cannot speak to that point. I knew people who would say that and I knew people who would say something else. I had left Saigon in June, 1974, some 10 months before the final collapse in April, 1975. Ambassador Martin was certainly determined to do everything that he could to keep intact the commitment to South Vietnam which the United States had made. He failed in this effort. The North Vietnamese knew it. When they became convinced of it, they came down on South Vietnam like wolves on the fold.

Q: When did you leave Saigon?

DUNLOP: I left Saigon in June, 1974. I always seemed to make June my departure or arrival month. I guess that that's the way the Foreign Service works.

Q: So you left in June, 1974.

DUNLOP: I left with two children. I arrived with one child and left with one more.

Q: Now, when you left Vietnam, from your point of view where did you think that South Vietnam was headed?

DUNLOP: I was very pessimistic. I had participated in writing this Airgram on future prospects a few months before, to which I have already referred. My contribution to it had said that North Vietnam was acutely aware of the increasing debility of the Nixon administration in the United States and showed every sign of preparing to exploit it, as soon as they had the right number of tanks and 130 mm artillery pieces in place. After September, 1973, the United States was prohibited under the Case-Church amendment to a Defense Department appropriation bill from using our armed forces in combat in Southeast Asia. Even more, we seemed unable to do something to replenish the supplies and thereby the morale of the South Vietnamese Army. By that time we had ample reports that the South Vietnamese Army was beginning to understand what was in store for them and what they had to face without what they had known before in terms of American support. At least, American support at the level of what had been provided at the time of the North Vietnamese Easter offensive in 1972. Nothing that I learned when I got back to Washington convinced me to the contrary.

Q: Let's stop at this point. You left Saigon in June, 1974. What was your next assignment?

DUNLOP: My next assignment was to the Romanian desk. I became the Country Officer for Romania in the Office of Eastern European Affairs, in Washington.

Q: All right. We'll pick it up next time at that point.

Q: Today is August 23, 1996. Harry, you were country desk officer for Romania from when to when?

DUNLOP: For two years, from the summer of 1974 to the summer of 1976.

Q: Obviously, you'd been away from Eastern European affairs for some time. When you arrived on the Romanian desk and read and talked yourself into the job, how did you see the situation? What were your getting from what other people reported on the situation in Romania and American relations with Romania?

DUNLOP: This was an interesting time to be dealing with Romania, because Romania was high on the list of priorities in Eastern Europe of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and of President Nixon. This was the time when President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger had proclaimed the policy of "differentiation." This meant treating each of the Eastern European "satellites" of the Soviet Union, not simply as a function of their being "satellites" but in terms of their behavior regarding specific policies and situations.

Very early on, in our dealings with the Eastern European countries, our relations with Poland, for example, had assumed a separate character. I understand that that was due, at least to some extent, to the very active participation and activity of the Polish community in the United States. The Polish community in the United States was extremely well organized. It was apparently not split into factions, as were so many of other immigrant

communities in the United States. The Polish community had a lot of representation in Congress. Their view had always been that Poland should not be treated as just an extension of the Soviet Union, however bad Poland's government was and however miserably it had treated its people. They felt that Poland was still Poland, and the United States should look at it as such.

For a variety of reasons, I think most of them good reasons, we had done that. However, for the rest of the Eastern European bloc, and here, of course, we're talking about East Germany [the German Democratic Republic], Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Albania was a special case, almost from the beginning. Until President Nixon assumed office, we had tended to treat these Eastern European countries as members of the Warsaw Pact and as countries in which Soviet influence was predominant. We looked at them through that perspective only.

President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger had a different view of these Eastern European countries. They were looking for ways to exploit what they believed must be differences between these countries and the Soviet Union. They found that opportunity in Romania. So, after Poland, Romania was sort of a "show case" of "differentiation." That made the Romanian desk an interesting assignment.

Q: Later on things fell apart in Romania and were put back together on a different basis. However, during your time on the Romanian desk President Ceausescu, the dictator of Romania, was certainly portrayed as a pretty nasty and evil person. When you arrived on the Romanian desk, what kind of reporting were you getting about him?

DUNLOP: Ceausescu was a thoroughly miserable human being. His wife and his son were just as bad. It was a terrible family despotism. Ceausescu was extremely autocratic and suspicious. He treated his subordinates in much the same way that Stalin did. He watched them like a hawk. Any time that anyone showed signs of having an independent power base, he would bring them down. The Romanian secret police, called the "Securitate," was as ever-present and obnoxious as the secret police anywhere else in the Soviet orbit. I think that these were all things that were clearly understood in Washington. However, it was Ceausescu's behavior in the foreign policy field which distinguished him from other Eastern European leaders. For example, Ceausescu never allowed Soviet soldiers to be stationed in Romania. This was not because the Soviets were happy not to have them there. They would have preferred to have Soviet forces in Romania, at least to secure lines of communication to their forces in Hungary. However, Ceausescu argued that Romanian national sovereignty and national interest would not permit allowing Soviet forces to be stationed in Romania. He also did not allow Romanian soldiers to participate in Warsaw Pact exercises outside of Romania. This created a situation in which, seen from the purely military balance of power, Romania was, perhaps, more of a "minus" factor for the Soviet Union's military presence in Central Europe than a "plus." That was something that we wanted to promote.

Ceausescu also recognized Israel early on, the only Eastern European state to do so. Ceausescu adopted a relatively favorable policy toward Jewish emigration, which occupied a lot of our time and attention. Romanian policy in this regard was very selfish and self-centered. Basically, Ceausescu "sold" Jewish people to Israel, as he "sold" German nationals or people with a German, ethnic background to the West Germans. However, he at least allowed them to leave Romania. This made our relationship with Romania very high on the list of priorities for the leadership of the Jewish community in the United States.

We had a "waiver" under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment for Romania alone, I think, among the other Eastern European countries. On further reflection, I guess that Poland had the same waiver. We used to refer to it as the "Jackson" amendment more than anything else, as I recall it. The waiver of Romania under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment made it possible to pass legislation extending "Most Favored Nation" [MFN] trading status to Romania. This waiver made it possible for us to certify that there was an improvement taking place in Romania's treatment of emigration. Every year we had to do a "body count," if you will, or a "head count" of emigration. Charts were kept. We were continually making representations to the Romanians that, if they wanted to keep their "MFN" status, we would have to certify by June 30, under this law, if I'm not mistaken, that Romania continued to make progress on emigration. We told them that we were looking at the statistics on emigration. If they weren't good enough, we would urge them to be more flexible.

So we had this policy of "differentiation." I was just a cog in all of that, but I had an interesting place to observe it.

Q: Was the idea implicit that we didn't want to jeopardize Romanian behavior by offering military assistance, or anything like that?

DUNLOP: I don't think that we ever seriously considered developing any kind of surreptitious military relationship with Romania or intelligence exchange, although I'll talk about one thing that happened. It didn't go quite that far, although it was in that general area. We didn't go into any kind of strategic planning with Romania. We didn't try to make them a "closet" member of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. I don't think that we felt we could do that without the Soviets knowing about it. I was of the opinion, anyway, that Ceausescu was sufficiently obnoxious to the Russians that they must have been keeping a "black book" on him and some day, if they got around to it or if they saw the opportunity, he would pay the price for his behavior toward Moscow. I don't think that we wanted to push that situation further than it would allow.

However, in such things as cultural and scientific exchanges we managed to reach an agreement with the Romanians, although I'm not sure that it was ever implemented, that would have permitted Westinghouse to build a nuclear power plant in Romania as an example of peaceful uses of nuclear power. We were very interested in that. We helped

the Romanians in some other scientific ways that we felt were not necessarily going to contribute to their military power. We tried to help them get coal from the US

Just before I had arrived on the Romanian desk in 1974, Romania had had a very bad series of floods. I guess that they were due to an early melt of the snows in the mountains, or something like that. When I came to the Romanian desk, we had just started discussing a relatively sophisticated flood warning system with the Romanians. I don't think that it would really have been all of that sophisticated, but we had an idea of setting up some kind of computerized and automated water level monitoring system.

The one area where we engaged in some security cooperation with Romania involved one of the less agreeable things that I did as a country desk officer. This involved airline safety, and particularly security measures aimed at preventing hijackings of aircraft. The 1970's were a period of very frequent hijackings. The Romanians had a national airline called "TAROM" [Romanian Air Transportation Company]. I don't remember ever hearing about a Romanian airliner being hijacked, although aircraft of other countries, including American aircraft, were hijacked. The Romanians wanted to send a group of airline and airport security people to the United States to consult with us and pick up whatever they could to help them. We agreed to consult with them.

I remember arranging the program for these Romanian officials. There were four or five people involved in this group, including a couple of generals. We got in touch with the US Secret Service in making these arrangements. The Secret Service was helpful in arranging for some time to brief the Romanians in an UNCLASSIFIED way about some of the things that we were doing regarding "high tech" detection of bombs and so forth. Also, we dealt with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] and the US Marshals program. At that time armed, US marshals were riding in civilian clothes on a random basis on American airlines. Their task was to deter hijacking. They had developed a variety of pistol ammunition which was more like a little shotgun shell than anything else. If it was fired inside an airplane at somebody, it would certainly be very discouraging to them but was not supposed to go through the frame of the aircraft and be destructive. So we showed the Romanians that kind of equipment.

What I didn't like about this was that the security officers who came off the Romanian aircraft were all "knuckle draggers." They were all real thugs. It was personally distasteful to me to deal with them. However, I did, and, I suppose, there was an American interest served in doing so. I learned one thing. If you want to put a bomb in a locker at Washington National Airport, don't put it at ground level. Put it in an upper level locker, because the "sniffer" dogs will not climb ladders and sniff the upper level lockers. [Laughter]

Q: Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State at this time. This was one of the areas where he was following his grand, global scheme of exploiting weaknesses in the Soviet Bloc. Were all of you under pressure to come up with "positive actions" to make the Romanians happy with our relationship with them?

DUNLOP: The answer is "Yes." However, on the other side of that coin the Ambassador to Romania at that time was Harry Barnes. He was, perhaps, one of the most distinguished career Ambassadors that we have had. Harry Barnes was a whole library of ideas and energy, although, clearly, the people on the Seventh Floor [where the offices of the Secretary of State and of his principal assistants were located] who were looking out for Secretary Kissinger's policies on Romania would also have been looking for a lot of things to consider. In any case, Harry Barnes provided lots of ideas.

As I look back on it, I didn't disagree with this policy of "differentiation" toward the countries of Eastern Europe. I think that this was the right policy, although we had to swallow some of our gorge in dealing with these thugs. However, we also pushed the door of our relationship with Romania unnaturally wide open. There were things going on which were uncomfortable to us, to the degree that, after Kissinger left office as Secretary of State, the door swung partly closed, at least to some extent. While I don't think that we ever totally abandoned the policy of "differentiation" with regard to Romania, I don't think that it received the same emphasis or policy priority after Kissinger left office as Secretary of State.

Kissinger made Helmut Sonnenfeldt, an old associate of his from the NSC [National Security Council], the Counselor of the Department of State during this period of time. He then told Helmut Sonnenfeldt to be his watchdog for "differentiation." That was one of Sonnenfeldt's specially assigned tasks. What that meant for us was that we had to deal with another layer in the bureaucracy up above us. I always had to clear everything with Sonnenfeldt's office. This, of course, would not have been a natural way of doing business for a country desk officer in the Office of Eastern European Affairs.

This worked very much to the detriment of the influence of the DAS, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, who was at least nominally in charge of Eastern European Affairs and who should, in fact, have been our immediate, operational boss. Instead, the DAS found himself bypassed frequently, which made him unhappy. Perhaps it was not appropriate, bureaucratically. There was another channel of authority, the "real" channel of authority, which was not what it looked like on paper, and that ran from Sonnenfeldt's office to mine. Usually, this is not a good idea, although in this case I think that this system worked pretty well. I tried to ease the EUR front office irritation and insecurity where I could. I don't think that policy implementation was particularly hampered by it, but it was an irritant and one of the many reasons why Kissinger's stewardship of the Department of State was so deeply resented by so many people. This was just a small part of it, but it was one which I observed.

I was always able to deal pretty well with Sonnenfeldt's office because the guy in his office who was concerned with Romanian affairs was a good friend of mine, and we just worked things out. However, it didn't make my bosses in EE [Office of Eastern European Affairs] or the DAS for EE very happy. I had no choice. I would get a call from

Sonnenfeldt's office and would be told to come up and talk about something. I couldn't say "No."

Q: What were you getting in the way of reporting from the Embassy in Romania?

DUNLOP: Well, Harry Barnes was a very effective Ambassador, in many ways. Among other things, he was a great motivator of his staff. He had a DCM named Dick Viets, who was also high on my list of capable and effective officers. He was also a very nice person to deal with. I think that the Embassy in Bucharest did a lot of good reporting. As I say, there were no illusions about how nasty the Ceausescu Government was. There was no attempt made to dilute the reporting on the Romanian Government's worst aspects or somehow to compartmentalize it. I remember on one occasion that black students at the University of Bucharest rioted. The Romanian police came in and just beat the hell out of about 50 of them. Four or five of them died as a consequence. This was generally applauded, all over Bucharest, because these students were very unpopular. It was a terribly nasty mess. These students had no redress whatsoever. Their Embassy representatives, the Nigerians or whoever it was, could go in and complain to the Romanians but they would just be shoved out the door without even a shot of "svica," which is, I think, the Romanian equivalent of "slivovitz" [plum brandy], the typical Serbian firewater..

We got good reporting out of the Embassy in Bucharest. One other thing happened at that time. I don't know how common it was elsewhere, but the practice of reporting via "Official-Informal" telegrams between the country officer in the Department and the DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] was introduced at that time. It was a marvelous way of communicating between the Department and the Embassy without having to clear messages and go through that very elaborate process. It was clearly understood that whatever I said to the DCM, the DCM in no way would take as an instruction from the Department. Anything that the DCM said to me in one of these telegrams would in no way substitute for the Embassy's reporting in the official channel. These exchanges were very helpful, and they became frequent, on an almost twice-weekly basis. At times these messages involved nothing more than sending along corridor gossip, that is, things that were not offensive to the system but which helped the Embassy to understand how things were going in Washington.

Q: This was institutionalized?

DUNLOP: Yes, it was in EE. As I say, I can't say whether this procedure was all of that new or all that widely utilized elsewhere. However, we used it a lot. Dick Viets made very clear to me how useful he thought it was. Of course, all of this reporting was seen by my immediate boss, Nick Andrews. In fact, S/S [the Executive Secretariat of the Department] saw these telegrams too. S/S could take these messages anywhere in the Department that they wanted to. This was always a source of some irritation at the desk level. We didn't see why S/S--theoretically a non-policy office--should be reading our Official-Informal mail. However, I saw no problem with Nick Andrews reading it. In fact, these messages sometimes were a way of telling Nick Andrews what I wanted him to

know in a way that he would have to pay a little attention to. It wasn't all of that one-sided in terms of giving the Embassy information. It allowed me to say things that I really believed. Not that I wouldn't have said them elsewhere, but now he knew that the Embassy knew this, too.

Q: Did you have any high level visits while you were on the desk?

DUNLOP: Well, we had some. That was one of the things that Ambassador Harry Barnes was always pushing. He always wanted to have senior Romanian officials go to the United States. However, there was a down side to that. We didn't have American officials to reciprocate for these visits, for one thing. Visits like these are always very high profile matters, particularly for the press in those countries, which report everything that is said and every bite of food and drink that such official visitors consume. On the desk we tended not to be too happy about these visits, but Harry Barnes was always coming up with bright ideas about these visits.

Almost the last thing that I did on the Romanian desk was in this connection. There was a man called Stefan Andrei, who at various times had been Romanian Foreign Minister and Director of Foreign Affairs of the Romanian Communist Party. That wasn't his title, although that is what he was, in fact. On two or three occasions he had been a kind of "Special Privy Counselor" to President Ceausescu. He was a much admired man for his intelligence. He was very outspoken at times, even in public, about the Soviets. He obviously detested them and thought that he did himself some good with Ceausescu to dump on the Soviets occasionally. He let us know, I'm sure also for his own, self-serving reasons, how much he detested the Soviets.

Ambassador Harry Barnes wanted to have him invited to the United States, but who would be his "counterpart" [host]? At the time this was done, Andrei was in the Communist Party side of the government apparatus. He didn't have a "state" function. There was much "to-ing" and "fro-ing" to see who was going to be his host in the United States. Incidentally, his host was going to be reimbursed from representational funds for the "hosting" part of the visit.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, the Counselor of the Department of State, was eventually stuck with the job of being Andrei's official host in the United States. The position of Counselor of the Department of State was not like that of an Assistant Secretary of State, but this issue could be "fudged" a little bit. So Sonnenfeldt did this job. He called me up to his office to discuss the schedule. He had various suggestions for the schedule. He told me that the visit had to go absolutely correctly, or I might find myself assigned to "Lower Slobbovia" [a mythical, backward country from the comic strip, "Li'l Abner"]. Sonnenfeldt could be curt and intimidating at times, as on this occasion. Generally, I got on well with him. So I worked very hard on preparing the schedule, although I probably would have worked very hard on it anyway.

One of the things that Andrei's people said that he wanted to do was to become acquainted with "folk culture" in the United States. Well, in Eastern Europe "folk culture" is a big thing. It really exists, and you knew where to go to see it. There would be dance groups available and people in costumes to meet the visitor's planes. But what is "folk culture" in the United States? We're kind of a multicultural society. I scurried around and looked at all of the different performances that were going to be going on in Washington, DC, during the period of Andrei's visit. There was a "country and Western" singer. I always forget his name, but he was a very popular man, he was a fixture on "Hee Haw" and later in his life did car TV commercials. He was going to be appearing at Wolf Trap [a cultural center West of Washington, near Dulles Airport]. I hope that I can recall his name. The name of Roy Acuff comes to mind, but that was not the name of this man.

Anyway, we got Mrs. Shouse at Wolf Trap involved. Some of those who read or listen to this interview may recognize her name. She is--or was--the great, moving spirit behind Wolf Trap. She agreed to host a little event during the intermission of the program there which Andrei would attend. This was a mini-coup of sorts for me, or so I thought. We laid all of this on. We kept telling Sonnenfeldt's office what we were doing. I was very proud of having found something like this. So the program was all "locked in," and Andrei's plane was virtually in the air. Then I got a phone call from Sonnenfeldt who said, "God damn it, Dunlop, what have you gotten me into? I hate country music." [Laughter] I told him, "Mr. Sonnenfeldt, I can't change anything at this point." So he went. He sounds like a very grumpy and mean person, but he really isn't. I always got along with him pretty well. He would let you know if he was unhappy. He just didn't look forward to an evening of country music.

Q: This sounds like something that happened when I was Consul General in Naples. The Political Officer there lined up a luncheon at an eel raising farm that he thought would be great! Eels are not my favorite food.

DUNLOP: Well, the things we have to do for our country. Anyway, the Andrei visit went off well. We had another official visit which absolutely terrified the Embassy in Bucharest. "Niki" Ceausescu was the son of President Ceausescu...

Q: And a really nasty person.

DUNLOP: He was a terrible man. Later on, he was accused of having raped and sexually tormented, in a masochistic way, a lovely, young Romanian gymnast, who had won everybody's hearts here in the United States. Later on she defected from Romania and became an American citizen. Her name was Nadia Comenici.

Q: She was an actress, not a ballerina.

DUNLOP: This all came out later on, after she defected. She was very graphic about how Niki Ceausescu burned her with cigarettes and things like that. It was terrible. One thing that made my life a little easier on the desk was that we had a very, very competent

Romanian Ambassador to work with. His name was Corneliu Bogdan, and he had been Ambassador to the United States for a long time. He went on to have an interesting life after he had been Romanian Ambassador here in Washington. He never became Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, but he was a very senior man. I think that he had his picture on the cover of "Newsweek" magazine, or something like that. He was considered a "good" Eastern European Ambassador. He was a very able man who had a terrible job to do, representing a terrible government. He did this job very well.

The one time that I saw Boydan flustered was when he came in to see the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. I was there, taking notes. He told us that Niki Ceausescu was coming to the United States. He didn't have to plead with us for help because we were all prepared to do what we could. He filled us in on some of the details of what Niki liked to do at night, which was to go out, get drunk, and get laid. He had a terrible temper and beat up on people when drunk, which was a lot of the time. Keeping Niki Ceausescu out of jail threatened to be a major proposition here. However, we worked with SY [Office of Security in the Department of State] on Niki Ceausescu's program. SY would notify the police in the various cities Niki would be visiting. The Ambassador knew he was coming to the US to do nothing but "play around" with American prostitutes. He wanted to go to Las Vegas, Nevada, and places like that.

We managed to get the Office of Diplomatic Security in the State Department involved in setting up the program. Our people in this office usually did not provide any kind of escort for a family member of a prominent foreign personality like that, in this case the son of a chief of state. However, they made an exception in this case. So far as I know, and I'm sure that I would have known, Niki Ceausescu got through the visit and out of the US without any particular trouble. This was a very perilous time for Ambassador Bogdan. Had anything gone seriously wrong with this visit, the Ambassador would have suffered for it in a major way.

Q: We mentioned "cultural exchanges." Could people get out of Romania?

DUNLOP: They sent their "folk dance" groups, of which they were justifiably proud, to various countries. I'm sure that they came to the US I don't think that Romania has been a bastion or fount of great cultural achievement throughout its history. They are very proud of their "folk culture," which is colorful and noteworthy.

Q: There's a wonderful "folk museum" in Bucharest, at which all of the different types of housing that they have are on display.

DUNLOP: They have that and they also have a number of beautiful and quite interesting monasteries up in the mountains. I visited some of them during my one trip to Bucharest. They are something like what the Serbs have in Yugoslavia, down in Kosovo and the Sanjak areas. However, I can't think of any outstanding cultural groups like those the Russians have, classical ballet and so forth.

Q: Was there anyone in Congress or in one of the exile groups outside of Congress, sort of "beating up" on the State Department for having a "close relationship" with this nasty regime?

DUNLOP: Well, one of the groups that could have given us a hard time would have been anyone belonging to or subject to the influence of the Jewish community in the United States. Romania had a long history of violent anti-Semitism, just like Poland, Slovakia, the Ukraine, and Russia itself. The Romanian Orthodox Church doesn't have a very good record in that regard. However, because of the way that we were dealing with Romania, people from groups like the Council of Presidents of Jewish Organizations, whose head was then Hyman Bookbinder, a very distinguished American, kept an eagle eye on the Department of State, but they didn't have much to criticize.

They thought, and they were right, that we were trying hard to create conditions to keep emigration levels up. The Romanians were letting enough people out, particularly Jews, to keep us satisfied but holding enough people back so that we would have to "pay" some kind of price for it. We both understood the "rules of that game."

We instituted a new system while I was there, one that I was very proud of. I thought that this system made sense, both from a bureaucratic and a human rights point of view. I say, "We instituted this system." I mean that I was in the Department at the time and encouraged this. The INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice in the US] agreed to let the Embassy in Bucharest issue what, in effect, was a "temporary" immigration visa, which the Romanians would recognize. It would be valid only for travel, in this case, to Rome, where the INS Office there would "reprocess" the person. This was called "Third Country Processing." INS had to give up some of its "sovereignty" to do this. You can understand how hard it was for the INS to do that. The Romanians also had to accept a kind of immigration examination in their own country, which most countries never like, and not just the Romanians.

This arrangement was negotiated by a lot of people. I had only a very minor role in it, although I certainly applauded and pushed it and was very happy when it was implemented. It was in place for about the last year of my two years on the Romanian desk. The time it took to process someone whom the Romanians were willing to let out of Romania and that we were willing to let into the United States took something like six to nine months under this arrangement, rather than the more normal 18 to 30 months. So the processing operation mechanically improved, and that was reflected in the figures of Romanians moving to the United States.

The criticism of our policy toward Romania always came from people like Amnesty International. They were never satisfied. Of course, they never should be satisfied. I am not making a critical remark about them. However, when you consider a government like that of Romania under Ceausescu, Amnesty International had no trouble finding things to criticize. They had no trouble finding it possible to tell the United States Government that it wasn't doing enough about human rights abuses in Romania.

Q: What was your impression of the work of our Embassy in Bucharest? Could the officers assigned get out and around the country?

DUNLOP: They were very constrained. Foreign Service National [locally-hired, foreign national] employees of the Embassy were under particular pressure. This was one of the things that really got to Ambassador Harry Barnes when he was in Romania. This applied to other members of the Embassy staff as well. When you work with people and get to know them, but realize that in their daily lives their association with you is a big risk and danger for them, as the case was in Romania for a long time and was the case also in Belgrade and up to the very end in some Eastern European countries, it was a strain. Ambassador Barnes tried to figure out all kinds of ways to get the police to lift a little of that pressure on our Foreign Service National employees. However, I don't think that he ever succeeded in this connection.

Our Embassy people could travel in Romania, with permission from the Romanian government. There were no "closed areas" where they could not travel, as was the case in the Soviet Union. I think that in the Soviet Union our Embassy staff was confined to an area within a 25 mile radius of Moscow unless special permission was requested and granted. In the case of Romania, Embassy officers had to get permission to travel from the Office of Protocol in the Romanian Foreign Ministry, and there was a lot of surveillance while they traveled. Romania is a beautiful country. We had no other post in Romania but Bucharest. Personnel assigned there were always encouraged to travel by our Embassy. They did. There was a little house up in the hills North of Bucharest which the Embassy had rented and which Embassy officers could visit on a reservation basis. This made it possible for them to get out of Bucharest. During the years between World Wars I and II Bucharest was described as the "Paris of the Balkans." However, it was certainly a depressing place during my one visit there.

Q: So you left the Romanian desk in 1976. Where did you go next?

DUNLOP: I had a two-year tour on the desk, which was more or less "standard" at the time, out of a four-year commitment to Washington. I was then assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon. The bureaucratic title for the area I worked in was ISA, or International Security Affairs, because it was the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. This is the Pentagon's "little State Department." I was assigned to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs [PM] in the Department of State, which had direct liaison responsibility with ISA in the Pentagon. PM sent me over to ISA on a "detail" for two years.

I wound up in ISA in the Office of European and NATO Affairs under a wonderful Air Force Major General named Bohlen. Everybody liked and respected him. He had an enormous capacity for work. People in the State Department work hard, but Maj Gen Bohlen was among the hardest workers that I have ever known. I had a couple of specific

jobs to do there, but before I talk about that, I might say something about this kind of a "detail," at least from my experience.

From a Foreign Service career perspective this kind of assignment has been very controversial. There are some people who believe that it is a real "dead end," even though you may be assigned to interesting work that, in every way, should enhance your career because it gives you a broad experience. You have contact with the military at a higher level which gives you some insight into how policy is made and how the two great institutions concerned with defense and foreign policy interact, and all of that good stuff. A lot of people, and probably the majority of Foreign Service Officers would say, including those who had this kind of experience and those who haven't had it, "Well, it won't do your career any good. It will be like spending two years in a 'black hole,' because nobody will ever pay any attention to the ER's written on you."

Q: "ER's" are efficiency reports written on you.

DUNLOP: They won't understand them and won't know how to read them. Given this highly competitive system that we're in, accepting such an assignment may not be such a good idea. I heard all of those arguments before I accepted this job in ISA. I went over to the Pentagon with some trepidation, hoping that it wouldn't turn out as many Foreign Service Officers said it would do. I can't sit here now and say that it did my career any good. I don't think that my career suffered, either. I think that it was kind of a "wash." However, I had a good time, learned a lot, and I think that it helped me in my next, following assignments, at least the assignment I had in South Korea. It gave me exposure to a lot of flag rank officers [generals or admirals], whom I had to deal with extensively later on in South Korea. On the whole, it was helpful to have had this assignment. I benefitted a lot from that, although I will not say that I could come down "hard" on either side of that argument about whether a "detail" to a military service is career enhancing or not.

Q: What were the major things that you were dealing with during this period from 1976 to 1978?

DUNLOP: The Carter administration had just come into office. President Carter had made a lot of sweeping pronouncements, as many presidential candidates do during the election campaign. Unlike some candidates, President Carter seemed determined to carry them all out. This caused a lot of friction in various places.

Incidentally, I was not detailed to ISA as a representative of the Department of State. I was sent over there to do anything that they wanted me to do, but to work for them, in their office. So I didn't have any liaison responsibilities. They looked at my resume or whatever they had been given, gave me an interview, and then gave me three things to do during the two years I spent there.

The most interesting and, in some ways, the most controversial or problematic, of my assignments was that I was to join the team promoting the sale of the Airborne Warning and Control System, the AWACS, to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] as a joint NATO project. It was called "NATO AWACS." The Airborne Warning and Control System is a Boeing 707 aircraft with a giant radar dome on top of it. It was just coming into service in the US Air Force in the mid 1970's. Once the AWACS aircraft was aloft, it provided a miraculously expanded view of air traffic for 250 kilometers in any direction. This provided information in greater detail and was more reliable regarding weather and terrain than anything heretofore available. It was very flexible since all of this equipment was mounted on an aircraft flying at a speed of about 400 miles an hour. It was a remarkable system.

The task of our team was to persuade NATO, as a collective entity of 16 member countries, to fund the purchase of 21 AWACS aircraft. The aircraft would be manned jointly, with crews made up of personnel from the various NATO member countries. It would be owned jointly and flown under the control of the NATO commander known as SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe].

This system was totally unique. It was very difficult to handle, bureaucratically, it was expensive, and there was a lot of resistance to it in the armies and navies of our European allies. This was not because they didn't like the system but because it was going to take money away from them. It was going to be an air force investment. So there was a lot of politics going on. ISA and Boeing Aircraft represented the US interests in the joint effort that was trying to make this proposal happen. I had a particular role on that effort, and that was interesting.

I also was given another role which was interesting but nowhere nearly as demanding in terms of time or effort. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] had just been completed in Helsinki [Finland]. Its conclusions contained some military and some non- military provisions. The military provisions were to promote mutual disarmament in terms of conventional weapons. There were provisions in the conference conclusions on "confidence building measures," that is, measures to reduce mutual suspicion re surprise attack, etc. There was also a group of measures that were non military and which, over time, were supposed to enhance gradually the civil and human rights of the people of Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, the Pentagon did not have a huge share or interest in that. However, because CSCE produced a single document, even though it contained different provisions, the Pentagon had to have somebody to "monitor" that. To keep the top Pentagon officials informed and to ensure that they would much more readily become aware of and have a greater opportunity to make a policy input into the military "confidence building measures," they still wanted to know what was going on elsewhere. So I had that "watching brief" as well. I was the only one doing that at the time. This meant that I had to get in touch with the State Department people who were interested in this and make sure that they knew what was going on. Actually, I received information copies of major cable and memorandum traffic. Occasionally, I would be called upon to brief senior Pentagon officials on these matters.

The third thing that I was asked to do was really anything else that they assigned to me. So I had a whole bunch of little things under this category. For example, the US Navy wanted to send a cruiser armed with missiles through the Dardanelles Straits. They were just aching, just dying to do this. They wanted to do this so badly that they were just salivating about it. However, the Montreux Convention [of 1935], to which we were a party, had very strict limits on the kinds of ships that could sail through the Dardanelles. The convention states that three days' notification has to be provided for the proposed passage of all military vessels through the Dardanelles. It also states that battleships cannot pass through the straits, nor can cruisers with guns of more than a certain caliber. Those definitions were all stated in conventional naval artillery terms, such as "11 inch guns." In fact, I think that one of the limits was "11 inch guns." Well, what does a guided missile cruiser have? It doesn't have any guns greater than six or eight inch caliber. However, it carries missiles that may be much greater. So there was a fuss about whether the US Navy was going to be able to sail one of its missile cruisers through the Dardanelles Straits. Finally, I think that we just decided to send one of the missile cruisers through the straits. We persuaded the Turks to let us do it and, sure enough, a couple of months later the Soviets sailed a ship that was sort of like our cruiser through the straits, and we couldn't protest.

Those were the things that I dealt with over at the Pentagon. I worked directly for Maj Gen Bohlen, really, although there was a "project manager" for each one of these projects. I had a lot of operational responsibilities to other people. However, I got an insight into ISA and how it functions. It also gave me an insight into NATO, which I had never had any previous knowledge of. I even had occasion to go to SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters, Atlantic Powers, Europe] meetings on two occasions.

I think that that was a very good tour of duty. I had no prejudice against the military at all. I had had a very good period of military service of my own. I got to know a lot of generals and other senior folks in the Pentagon. I got to know them on a personal basis, which was very helpful when I dealt with their counterparts later on in South Korea. I didn't have to break any new ground, in that sense.

Q: I know that during this time when you were in Washington, the fall of South Vietnam took place in 1975. Did you get any reflection on that when you were on this detail in the Pentagon? Did our military wonder what it was going to do?

DUNLOP: Well, Gen Schwarzkopf [former theater commander during the Gulf War of 1990- 1991] has written his book. He was the victor in the Gulf War. He is among those who think that we won the Gulf War, and I happen to be one of those who also think that we won it. He has also written a lot about his own turmoil during the Vietnam War years. He had served in Vietnam and saw the Army in particular, but the US military more generally, denigrated by the American public. Among a lot of good, dedicated officers of our various services there was a certain sense of hopelessness, a lack of direction, and a lack of a rudder, of not knowing exactly how to "put things together."

He writes very graphically about his assignment to an armored division in Germany and the disruption and chaos that he found when he got there. That wasn't evident at the Pentagon. That kind of thing wasn't going on. Pentagon officers were just as shocked and felt just as disheartened over our Vietnam debacle as anybody else. However, their operational responsibilities were different. They weren't trying to motivate men or figure out how to deal with drug abuse in the barracks. Although some of these officers in the Pentagon may have had that overall responsibility, it wasn't part of the daily duties of the officers in my area. If they had that responsibility, they wouldn't have been any more disheartened and shocked than I was.

The Pentagon impressed me in a number of ways. First of all, it's huge and its responsibilities are as large as the building, and that's saying a hell of a lot. The amount of money, material, and lives which these people throw around is extraordinary. The amount of work demanded of people assigned to the Pentagon is also extraordinary. I don't suggest that things are that much different than in the State Department. No one should ever think that a tour in the military at the higher levels is a "posh" job, because these officers work 12, 13, and 14 hours a day. There isn't any respite.
I didn't see much inter-service rivalry. I was interested to perceive what I could of that. Obviously, there is some rivalry. I think that I saw more inter-service rivalry in the NATO countries than in the US because of the in-fighting over the allocation of money for AWACS. The money was going to have to come out of somebody's hide. The Army and Navy, say, of Belgium or of Italy, were not very happy about that.

Incidentally, we sold the AWACS project to NATO. It is now a functioning system. There are a great many people in the United States, as well as in the European countries, including our military, who were opposed to it. No matter how good a system it is and how rational the approach to it, they thought that it would never work out. There was the question of how to insure the airplane, for one thing, if there was no single, sovereign owner. Other matters included what kind of uniform would the crew wear, how would the aircraft be registered, and so forth. But all of these problems were solved. Actually, I've never seen an AWACS aircraft. Some day I'd like to touch one. [Laughter]

Q: Then in 1978, Harry, you left your "detail" to the Pentagon and went to South Korea? Is that right?

DUNLOP: No, I went back to serve at the Embassy in Belgrade. That was my final assignment to Yugoslavia. I've been back on visits since then, but that was my final tour of duty in Yugoslavia. It was my next Yugoslav experience.
Q: You were in Belgrade from 1978 until when?

DUNLOP: 1982. I spent four years there as Political Counselor, the most responsible job I'd had in the Foreign Service up until that point. I looked forward to working in a country which I thought I knew well and would get to know better. The Ambassador there was really kind of a legend in the Foreign Service, Larry Eagleburger. I was flattered that

Larry accepted me in Belgrade. He could have said, "No." However, I'd always thought well of him and still do. I've differed with him recently about some Yugoslav issues but I still have a great deal of admiration and respect for him.

By the time I went to Yugoslavia in 1978 we had three children, one of whom was seriously handicapped. She was retarded. We also brought a dog, a cat, 17 pieces of luggage. So, with this menagerie, off we went to Belgrade.

Q: What was the situation in Belgrade when you arrived there in 1978?

DUNLOP: On the surface, I think, it looked very familiar. I remember having the feeling that I was seeing an old movie again. Actually, I felt that we were living through the same experience. The frames were a little slower, as these familiar sights came in review.

Belgrade had not changed. The atmosphere of the city had not changed very much. I think that my first impressions were always useful in these matters. I remember thinking, "'Plus ca change,' but not much longer, because Tito couldn't live all of that much longer."

Q: How old was Tito when you arrived in Belgrade in 1978?

DUNLOP: Tito was still in power and still active. Although periodically there would be rumors about his health, those rumors had been spread since the 1960's. He was a man in his 80's. He was variously believed to have been born in 1896 or 1898 and was now getting up into his early 80's. He was as vigorous or was portrayed as being as vigorous as ever. The creaking political system that he had put in place [in 1945] was still functioning as he had intended it to function, with him as the capstone of the structure.

I had left Yugoslavia in 1972, very depressed over the crackdown on Communist Party liberals in Croatia and Slovenia which Tito instituted, as I think I mentioned. This had taken place just a few months before I left. I felt that that was a grave error and an unnecessary infliction of pain on individuals that I knew and liked. Also, this crackdown was a serious, political error by Tito who thereby cut off a whole generation of new, young modernizers who certainly could have been extremely valuable in the transition after his death. However, the emotions created by that crackdown had subsided by 1978. Police pressure on the people was certainly very strong at the time I left Zagreb, having been reimposed at the time of this crackdown. However, this pressure had been reduced to a low level by the time I arrived in Belgrade in 1978. People were still traveling. The Americans in the Embassy were, perhaps, less under surveillance in 1978 than we had been, certainly at the end of my tour in Zagreb six years earlier [in 1972].

Even though local Communist Party leaders who had been vocal promoters of liberalization and modernization of the system were in political exile, there was still strong, nationalist pressures in the Communist Party leadership in each of the republics, and particularly in Croatia and Slovenia. I had to get reacquainted with that situation. I was in the Embassy in Belgrade and relying on the Consulate in Zagreb, but the

Consulate there seemed well up on things. So it didn't take too long to adjust to changes in the situation.

The Embassy was still in the same, creaky old building, which had gotten worse by now. Of all of the Embassy buildings that I have worked in, Belgrade was the worst. Of all of the Embassy buildings that I have visited, Belgrade was the next "worst." I think that the Embassy building in Moscow was the worst of all. And the Embassy building in Belgrade got worse during the four years that I was there [1978-1982]. The working conditions there were increasingly bad.

Q: How did you find dealing with the Yugoslav Government?

DUNLOP: We mostly dealt with the Yugoslav Foreign Office. The Yugoslav Foreign Office was well staffed with competent people who, generally speaking, were on the "up and up." That is, if they could avoid lying to you, they would do so. I think that they recognized that diplomacy flourishes where there is a certain level of human trust and understanding between individuals.

Our relationships with Yugoslavia on various issues had, perhaps, become a little less contentious. For example, let's talk about Yugoslavia's leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement. Since the late 1950's, Tito had prided himself on being one of the major leaders of the non-aligned world. He had been one of the co-chairmen of the famous meeting in Bandung [Indonesia, in 1955], along with Nasser, Nehru, and Sukarno. Who was the other one?

Q: Kwame Nkrumah.

DUNLOP: Nkrumah. That meeting laid down the five principles of peaceful co-existence. They then held a series of non-aligned conferences, every other year. These were very elaborate, showcases for these chiefs of state. Tito was always and very visibly strutting his stuff at these meetings. We had a lot of arguments in the 1950's, and particularly in the 1960's, with Tito about issues which were very important to us.

However, by the 1970's Tito was in a contest with Fidel Castro for leadership of the non-aligned movement. Castro's own, very considerable ego was competing with Tito's for a leadership role in the non-aligned movement. Not only was it fun to watch, but we had somebody to cheer for! [Laughter] So the non-aligned Movement was not as much of a problem for us as it had been at certain times in the past.

The Yugoslav emigre community in the United States, particularly the "nasties" and especially the Croatian "nasties," had actually committed some murders and blown up some airplanes in Europe, although they never blew up any in the US They hijacked some airplanes and committed some internecine murders in the United States, mainly involving extortion schemes involving money and that kind of thing. However, this kind of activity

seemed to be at a low level. They were not the threat that they had seemed to be in the past.

President Carter paid attention to Tito. Carter instituted a series of letters, some of which, I thought, were overly obsequious or sugary. They would contain phrases like, "...relying on your great experience..." They would contain an invitation that Tito "enlighten" President Carter. I like to see chiefs of state writing letters, for a couple of reasons. These letters shouldn't be too frequent, but these exchanges make sure that they are read by everybody at the court. If a chief of state holds a given view, by God other people are going to hear about it. I think that exchanges of this kind can be useful, but I thought that the Carter letters to Tito were a little too saccharine. However, Tito liked them. They smoothed his feathers and so may have served President Carter's purpose.

Another circumstance, I think, made our relationship with the Yugoslav Government better, and I'll speak very frankly about this because I think that it was important. Larry Eagleburger had replaced a man named Laurence Silberman as Ambassador to Yugoslavia. Silberman had been a disaster.

Q: He was a...

DUNLOP: He was a political appointee selected by the administration of President Ford.

Q: He's now a judge.

DUNLOP: He's now a judge here in the Washington area. He's a very conservative, right wing person who has made such sweeping pronouncements as that, "The State Department should be abolished! If that is not done, all Foreign Service Officers should be shot!" Ambassador Silberman was detested by the Yugoslavs, because he made public knowledge of his dislike of Tito and of the Yugoslavs. As Larry Eagleburger said happily to almost anybody, "I've got the easiest act in the world to follow out here." Silberman had come, done his "thing," and gone. Thank God, I didn't experience this from having had to live with Ambassador Silberman or serve on his staff. However, to do him justice, about 15 percent of the people in the Embassy who had worked with him liked him a lot. That left a lot of people who didn't think much of him.

So irritants causing frictions that got us cross-wise with the Yugoslavs were not very prominent during those last two years of Tito's life [1978-1980]. Tito died in June, 1980, about halfway through my tour of duty in Belgrade. I think that I arrived in Belgrade in July, 1978.

Yugoslav-Soviet relations were always important to us, as they were to the Yugoslavs. Generally speaking, during these four years [1978-1982] the Yugoslavs showed as much concern about Soviet adventurism and hard-nosed policies as we could have reasonably expected them to show re Afghanistan, for example. We didn't feel that the Yugoslavs were being either unwary or, even worse, tending to collude with the Russians. This was

the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which began in December, 1979, with the coup d'etat in Kabul and all of that.

The Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, whose name escapes me now, was a complete boor. He represented all of the worst of the old Soviet diplomacy. I think that the Yugoslavs viewed the Soviets as dangerous and a threat to them, but the Yugoslavs were also becoming sort of contemptuous of the Soviets.

At that time, you know, we still had that image of the Soviet Army as being a massive machine which, perhaps, would not act with great precision but which was capable of exerting enormous pressure on any battlefront, anywhere in the world. The Soviet Army could bring to bear all of the superior armor and artillery which it had. Its first line aircraft might be flown a little less skillfully than aircraft in other countries, but, by God, there would be a lot of them right over your head. By the time of my tour in Belgrade, 1978-1982, the Yugoslavs had, perhaps, developed a little more realistic view of the Soviets. They weren't so concerned about the danger of provoking the Soviets.

We managed to get the agreement of our NATO allies to deploy "Pershing" [surface to surface] missiles in Europe during this period of time. This was a very controversial issue for some of these European countries. It was a controversial issue back in the United States as well. However, Helmut Schmidt, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, was very helpful to us in that regard. I remember one Yugoslav telling Ambassador Eagleburger that the Russians would not "permit" the deployment of "Pershing" missiles in Western Europe. So Ambassador Eagleburger replied, "Well, what in the hell are the Soviets going to do about it?" The Yugoslav said, "Well, they'll find some way to make you sorry that you did this." Well, we did it, and the Soviets didn't do anything about this deployment.

We had a pretty good commercial relationship with Yugoslavia at this time. The boycotts of Yugoslav goods and the agitation about Yugoslav civil and human rights had died out to some extent in the United States. American labor unions had been very anti-Yugoslav during the 1950's and 1960's. By the late 1970's they had become less so.

A Westinghouse nuclear power plant was in the final stages of construction up in Croatia. Making arrangements for its construction had involved a very difficult negotiation, and there were always commercial frictions over that plant. However, this problem was confined to the commercial area.

Q: Perhaps we should go back into your period on the Romanian desk in the State Department [1974-1976] and talk a little about that.

DUNLOP: There were two things which I did not mention before and will now. I spoke of Ambassador Harry Barnes with admiration and even affection, although we didn't spend that much time together. Ambassador Barnes went on to have a brilliant career as Ambassador to Chile and India. He was also Director General of the Foreign Service. I

don't think that I've ever heard anyone say anything bad about him, except that he exhausts you and wears you out by the energy that he exudes. In fact, he thinks that everybody else is thinking, talking, and doing things as fast as he does. We mere mortals may not be capable of this.

Ambassador Barnes suffered a personal tragedy when he was in Romania. His wife was seduced by a Romanian security agent who was placed on the Embassy staff as a driver. I say "seduced." In fact, I don't know who "seduced" whom and I don't care. However, this clandestine relationship evolved. She was having an affair with an agent of a hostile security service. I don't know what the particular consequences of this matter were for Harry Barnes, personally. However, it ruined his marriage when it became known. I don't believe that any prosecution was ever instituted against Mrs. Barnes. However, it was a tragic and sad thing.

This is another commentary on security services like those of Romania. Perhaps they felt that they could somehow profit enormously out of this kind of relationship. I guess that this is what clandestine intelligence services, by their very nature, think that they can do. It might have been to their benefit, although I do not know. What it meant was to make an eternal enemy of Ambassador Harry Barnes, a man who was trying to be a friend of Romania.

Q: You referred also to the Romanian Ambassador in Washington during the time that you were on the Romanian desk.

DUNLOP: Yes. However, first, let me mention one other thing as an illustration of the intensity of the surveillance of our Embassy in Bucharest by the Romanian security people. President Ceausescu's security people also managed to get hold of one of Ambassador Barnes' cordovan leather shoes. They put a transmitter into the heel of the shoe. That particular shoe is on display at the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] museum of "dirty tricks." I've seen it out there.

I mentioned that the Romanian Ambassador in Washington was an effective person. His name, as I said, was Corneliu Bogdan. He had been in the United States about six years when I came onto the Romanian desk, and he was still there when I left that job. That meant that he had spent seven to nine years as Ambassador to the United States by the time I left Washington. Ambassador Bogdan had made a good impression in Washington. Perhaps he didn't have a very difficult act to follow, because I suspect that his predecessors had been pretty much nonentities or perhaps worse. Bogdan was personable, interested in the United States, and presented a difficult case as well as any lawyer could do. The difficult case was representing his country which was under a man like President Ceausescu. Bogdan had an attractive daughter, whom I met, who was a student at George Washington University in Washington. She met and fell in love with a young American there, and her feelings were reciprocated. I don't need to imagine what consternation this caused for Ambassador Bogdan and his wife, when they realized that their daughter was contemplating or asserting her intention to marry an American, as well as what this might

mean personally for Ambassador Bogdan's career and, perhaps, even worse than that. I don't need to imagine that anguish because he told us about it.

Normally, we wouldn't have heard of anything like this, but the young man came to the Department of State to say that he thought that his fiancee, or the person he wanted to marry, might be forcibly taken back to Romania. She was afraid of being forcibly drugged or something like that, perhaps even by her own father or mother, I guess. He wanted us to "stop that." He said that he was going to go to the American press and to Congress. In fact, he first went to see a Congressman, who then called us. The Congressman very sensibly told us, "Look, I don't think that this young man ought to be making all of this public fuss about this." He asked us what we thought. We agreed with the Congressman. The Romanians were likely to put her on the plane that much sooner, if that is what they intended to do. We said, "Let us talk to this young man."

So we talked to him quietly, not in public, and promised him what help we could. He turned out to be very intelligent. He was just angry and afraid for the woman he loved. One day I received a request from Ambassador Bogdan through one of his Embassy officers, to meet him at a restaurant. This was very unusual, because of our respective levels. I was not the person he usually dealt with in the State Department, although he knew me well.

However, I met him at a restaurant. He said that he knew that the American student at George Washington University had told the Ambassador's daughter, who, in turn, had told her father that the young man had been to the State Department. He knew that we were aware of this situation and he said that he would like to share with us some of his thinking on this matter. Ambassador Bogdan told me, "I don't need to pretend to you or to try and hide from you how much of a blow this has been to me and my wife, and particularly my wife. My wife is in a real panic. She thinks that this means the end of my career and maybe that I'll wind up in jail in Romania. I don't think that it's quite like that, but who knows? This is a very serious matter. My wife is even more upset about this than I am. We've both talked to our daughter, and she seems determined to go through with this, even though she is aware of the possible consequences for her mother and father."

Ambassador Bogdan continued, "Her mother wants her to go back to Romania as soon as we can arrange it. This would be a final separation for the two young people, and the young man would never get a visa to go to Romania. She would never be allowed to leave Romania. That's my wife's solution. That's not my solution. Here is what I have proposed. I persuaded my wife and my daughter to accept this and I just wanted you to know about it. We persuaded our daughter to return to Romania and stay there for a year. She can write to this young man and talk to him on the telephone but she is not to see him for a year. If, after a year, she still wants to marry him, she will have my blessing and support. I don't expect you to do anything about this. I don't think that there will be any trouble. She's agreed to return to Romania. What I would like you to do is to persuade the young man that I am acting in good faith, because I can't persuade him of this. The young man doesn't believe me."

My reaction to these comments by Ambassador Bogdan, as I think would be the reaction of any other human being, was great admiration for his having handled the matter this way. He was doing this totally out of channels, he was doing it out of his Embassy where he might be bugged, and through me personally rather than officially where I might feel obliged to write a memorandum of conversation which large numbers of State Department officers might read. He was appealing to me in a very dignified way for help in a most excruciatingly difficult situation. It seemed to me that he was handling this matter as well as he possibly could.

So I talked to the young man. First of all, I talked to him on the phone. Then I saw him personally. I said that nobody could guarantee the future. I said that one of the things that could very well happen is that she could fall out of love with him. That happens, at times, after a year's separation. That was probably what the young woman's mother and father were hoping would happen. I said that I believed that Ambassador Bogdan was sincere in what he told me, because as a human being, I had sat across the table from him and listened to him speak.

So the young man basically agreed to this suggestion. After a year, he went to Bucharest. They saw each other and decided that they were still in love with each other. He brought her back to the United States, they were married, and, I hope, they'll live happily ever after. Not many marriages in the 1970's are that way, but I hope that one was. I thought that that was a good story and so I told it. Also, Ambassador Bogdan is now dead.

To finish the story of Ambassador Bogdan, he went back to Romania as Director for American Affairs in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was not as senior a job as he might have expected to have had probably because of this incident involving his daughter. I think that in those European bureaucracies, and even in ours, something better would have been offered to him, with broader implications than even the very important position of Director for American Affairs in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In any case he returned to Romania in about 1978 or 1979, served for two or three years in the Foreign Ministry, and then retired, apparently with no adverse consequences to himself from this incident, apart from not getting promotions. However, later, when President Ceausescu was pushed from power and then shot [in 1989], the new Romanian Government in that confused and very difficult and dangerous time called Bogdan back in to be, in effect, their acting Foreign Minister. I had heard this story but not the rest of it, which I do not know. He had been living in some comfort somewhere outside of Bucharest. He came into Bucharest, took a room in one of the big hotels there, and worked out of the hotel in the midst of all of that chaos. He subsequently died, apparently of a heart attack. At least it was announced that he had died of a heart attack. In Romania, who knows what the real truth was?

I remember reading about it in the Washington press. It made the headlines here because Corneliu Bogdan had been Ambassador. Everybody was reading about events in Romania, which were of interest, but here was this man who had been Romanian

Ambassador in Washington and was called back to serve as Foreign Minister. And now he was reported dead. I was very sorry to hear that.

Q: Harry, before we come to Tito's death, there are two dramatic or traumatic things that happened in late 1979. First, could we discuss the overthrow of the Shah in Iran in December, 1979, which didn't have all that much of an impact on Yugoslavia. However, in the United States we were terribly concerned because we had some 54 Embassy hostages taken in Tehran. We were making representations almost everywhere about this. I assume that you received instructions to make representations in Belgrade also. How did that work out?

DUNLOP: I have some recollection of that. I think that you're right in the sense that the Yugoslav-Iranian connection was not all of that close. Certainly, it had not been when the Shah was in power in Iran. I remember what we wanted to do and I talked about this and how we would go about doing this in a bureaucratic way. For example, how could we determine whether the new, Iranian Government, whatever that was, had any meaningful relationship or communications with the Yugoslav Government? If there were any such relationship, we would have made whatever kind of appeals we might have thought effective to the Yugoslavs to intercede on our behalf. I'm sure that we did the same thing with many other governments. What we found out was that the Yugoslavs had nobody who could effectively present their own views in Tehran, let alone ours. So Belgrade was not a channel for attempting to reach the Ayatollah Khomeini, the leading power figure in Iran.

When I was in Belgrade, the first Yugoslav Ambassador to Tehran was appointed. His name was Dizdarevic. There were about five Dizdarevic brothers in a clan which had joined Tito's "partisans." They were Muslims who fought for the partisans in Bosnia. They thereby ensured themselves of various lucrative jobs as commissars and other officials of the "partizan" regime after it took power in Bosnia. I think that the Yugoslav Ambassador to Iran was named Rafiz Dizdarevic. The Yugoslav Government had picked him because of his Muslim background. I remember a couple of Yugoslavs "dying" with laughter, saying, "Boy, somebody thinks that he's really being clever, sending a man named Rafiz Dizdarevic to Tehran because he had a Muslim father. In fact, Rafiz Dizdarevic ordered his Muslim father to be shot! [Laughter] Jesu Christus Maria [the equivalent of the aspiration, 'Jesus, Mary, and Joseph,' among American Catholics]! I don't know whether that's true or not, but that was the street talk in Belgrade. Plenty of partisans ordered members of their families to be shot in 1945 and the following years.

Milovan Djilas [former Vice President of Yugoslavia who later had a "falling out" with Tito] wrote very frankly about this in his famous memoirs. Anyway, the Yugoslavs were just trying to get somebody into Tehran, and they decided to send Rafiz Dizdarevic there. However, by the time that Dizdarevic had settled down in Tehran and was in touch with the new, revolutionary Iranian Government, the US hostages had been released.

Q: Well, the other event that happened close to the same time, as you said before, around Christmas time, 1979, was that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The Soviets essentially overthrew a "Soviet type" government that was in trouble and installed a new one instead. This was a kind of implementation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" [i. e., the Soviets would take action to prevent any change in orientation of a government once it was clearly favorable to the Soviets].

DUNLOP: Yes.

Q: I was thinking of the Yugoslav Government looking at this invasion of Afghanistan. Yugoslavia had a leader [Tito] who was pretty much on his way out of authority [due to age and various infirmities]. How did the Yugoslavs look upon the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?

DUNLOP: I think that the Yugoslavs were very, very concerned, for precisely those reasons. Of course, they weren't going to say much about that in public, but we heard enough of it in private and from other people, so that we were fairly sure that they were concerned because of this precedent. Of course, there was the Czech precedent before that [the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968] and the Hungarian precedent [the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956] even before that.

However, at the same time this Yugoslav concern was coupled with a sort of contemptuous attitude toward the Soviets, at least in the military and outer space areas. By now [1979] the US had pretty much overtaken the Soviets in terms of outer space research, and the Yugoslavs accepted that we had done that by this time. We had caught up with the Soviets and passed them. That made an impact on the Yugoslavs. They didn't look at the Soviet Union any longer as the "wave of the future" in terms of technology and military affairs. Nevertheless, the Yugoslavs were worried about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I'll tell you an anecdote which is worth telling, which illustrates the Yugoslav reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and is a direct consequence of it. It affected my own personal life.

Every year since Tito took office as President of Yugoslavia, and including the fall of 1979, Tito gave a reception for the Diplomatic Corps accredited to Belgrade. It was called the "Diplomatski Lov"; "Diplomatic Hunt". This annual event had acquired a certain amount of notoriety. One year, when I was not in Belgrade, the Austrian Ambassador shot and killed the French Ambassador, or vice versa, in an accident which occurred during the hunt organized for the Diplomatic Corps.

Q: Hunting was not necessarily a sport which a lot of Ambassadors indulged in any more. In the old days the nobility, from whose ranks many Ambassadors were drawn, all knew how to handle guns. Now you had people who, for virtually the first time, were handling guns!

DUNLOP: I don't have any personal experience of this, but I was told that in the "old days" [presumably before World War I] and before this incident involving the French and Austrian Ambassadors, it was really expected that all of the diplomats at these hunts would carry a gun. Whether you wanted to do it or not, that involved getting up early enough in the morning and going to some pre-selected spot where these helpless flocks of geese, pigs, or other game would be driven in front of the diplomats, who were supposed to mow them down. Actually, this was pretty much a command performance. All of the Chiefs of Mission from the various countries accredited to the Yugoslav Government were supposed to be present for the hunt. By 1979--and after that tragic accident--the Chiefs of Mission were given a choice. They had a choice. They virtually had to attend, but they could either hunt or not.

For my sins I was Chargé d'Affaires at the time that the "Diplomatski Lov" was held. I was duly invited and was asked to mark on a form application whether I would or would not hunt. I checked "will not hunt" and got another communication telling me what I was supposed to do. This involved getting up a little bit later in the morning and joining others to "view the hunt." That is, "Tito's kill," the pile of steaming dead animals allegedly shot by Tito himself. God! Then we were invited to attend a huge breakfast. I must admit that I was looking forward to that! I would also meet Tito. I had been in his presence. For example, I had been at the "White Palace" [presidential residence in Belgrade] for a couple of state receptions but I never really met Tito.

So I went and did all of those things that I was expected to do. On the way back to Belgrade we were on a train. The Yugoslav protocol officers sat various diplomats next to each other. They just made seat assignments in little compartments on a European type train. They would say, for example, "You are in Car 3, Seat 15." I was seated next to the Afghan Chargé d'Affaires, whom I had never met. I had seen him but never said a word to him previously. This was just prior to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets, when the Afghan Government which the Soviets overthrew was not a very "liberal" government, either. We were not on such happy terms with the Afghans. I had known Adolph "Spike" Dubs, who had been Political Counselor during an earlier assignment in Belgrade and who was killed in Afghanistan, with the collusion, if not instigation of the Afghan Government and so forth. So I was not enthusiastic about anybody with any particularly close ties to the Afghan Government. However, I was stuck for several hours in the railroad compartment with the Afghan Chargé. I didn't feel like being particularly friendly toward him. I felt like taking a nap, actually, which I may even have done. The Afghan Chargé turned out to be quite pleasant and, even though we didn't talk one word about politics, "Spike" Dubs, or anything about the then current, pro-communist, Afghan Government, he had a deck of cards. He asked if I wanted to play cards. I said, "No, thanks." Then he said, "Can I show you some card tricks?" What could I say? I said, "Yes," and he showed me about 40 card tricks. He knew a real array of card tricks.

Well, I got off the train, collected my two pheasants, which were a kind of "gift" to me from the hunt, took them home, and tried them out. I thought no more about it until about two days after Christmas, [1979], after the coup d'etat had taken place in Kabul,

Afghanistan. My door bell rang, and who appeared on my doorstep but the Afghan Chargé d'Affaires! It was on a Saturday or Sunday, it was snowing, there was some snow on the ground, and here was this man all bundled up. He was undoubtedly the Afghan Chargé. I invited him to come into my house. He shook his finger negatively and gestured to me to come out of the house. He made it clear that he didn't want to go into my house. I thought, "Oh, oh, here we go!" He said, very politely, "I'm going to impose something on you but you may say at any time that you do not wish to continue this conversation. I will never tell anybody about it, will go away, and you'll never see me again or hear anything about it."

The Afghan Chargé said, "My name is So-and-so. You remember me from the train. I'm the man with the card tricks. Well, I want to 'pull off' another magic trick. I want to go to the United States and fight the communists. I'm asking for your help." Well, I wasn't quite prepared for this. However, it had happened, and there I was, wondering what would happen next. I think that I said, "Do you mind if I go inside my house and put on my boots," or something inane like that, since we were standing out in the snow.

Anyway, we started a conversation, and I was quickly convinced of his bona fides. He had a story to tell which was, roughly, as follows. He had joined the Afghan Foreign Service as one of its very first, professional officers, for the Afghan Government under the King of Afghanistan, even before the Soviets overthrew the government and seized power. It was the government of Babrak Kamal, or something like that. He said that he had served in the Afghan Foreign Service for 10 years, no matter what the political complexion of the government. He said that he thought that it was important to set a standard of professional skill in the diplomatic service which would eventually be of great use to his country. However, he could not stomach what had just happened in Afghanistan, the blatant Soviet intervention. He wanted to find a way to fight against the communists in Afghanistan. He said that he thought that the Americans were the best people to turn to and so was turning to me. The reason that he was concerned was that he had also been told that two "goons" [Afghan Government security thugs] would come to Belgrade in the next month. He had received a letter of recall and had about four weeks left in Yugoslavia. He didn't call these people "goons," but he was sure that they would inventory the Afghan Embassy's funds and so forth, find them wanting, and send him back to be prosecuted and maybe shot, because he was clearly politically unacceptable to the new Afghan Government.

He said that he had a limited time during which he had to get out of Belgrade. He had a wife and small child. He said that she was terrified of having alleged financial irregularities in the handling of Embassy funds "discovered" and being kidnaped.

My first suggestion was, "Why don't you go to the Yugoslav Government with this story, tell them that you have been ordered back to Afghanistan, and that this is the reason that you are leaving your government's service." I suggested that he should then go to an American Embassy in either Vienna or Rome to process his visa to go to the United States. I would make sure that they knew that he was coming. I said, "Why ask me for

help here?" He answered, "My wife is terrified. She thinks that the Yugoslavs are all communists, and all communists will work together." I said, "Well, you don't have to tell the Yugoslavs anything. Just go to the Austrian Embassy and get a visa." He said, "There will be a Yugoslav employee of the Austrian Embassy in charge of issuing visas, right?" I said, "Probably." He said, "Well, my wife is terrified of that. So I can't get an Austrian visa. How can I get across the border into Austria? I don't have an Austrian visa in my passport. I would be going with my wife and child, and some luggage. How should I best do that?"

Of course, I had no expertise in such matters as how to cross international borders under false pretenses. However, I felt that this was a worthy cause. So, without going into details, we did work out a way by which he could get to Vienna. From Vienna he got to Rome, where he was "processed" by the INS [US Immigration and Naturalization Service] office in the American Embassy there. The last time I heard from him was when I received a card from him when he got to somewhere in Kansas. His sponsor was a Presbyterian Church in some small town like Fort Something-or-Other in Kansas. Perhaps I should have tried harder to keep in touch with him, as I developed a real affection for him after a while. He was a very decent man. He wrote me a letter, very carefully spelled out in English, saying that everybody there had been so nice and gentle to himself and his family. He thanked me for my assistance. I suspect all he found in Kansas that was familiar for him was snow and wind.

So that's a little anecdote about the Afghan invasion. We also knew that the Yugoslavs were very unhappy at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They regarded this as a sign of Soviet willingness to use their military forces in an act of blatant aggression.

Q: Even in the confines of the Embassy secure "conference room," was anybody at the Embassy talking about what would happen if the Soviets moved against Yugoslavia? I'm not talking about "war plans." I'm talking about what you, the Ambassador, and other senior members of the Embassy thought that we could do in such a case.

DUNLOP: We had three areas of concern. One was the obvious and always present "Emergency Evacuation" [E&E] plan. This plan is always supposed to be high up on an Ambassador's priority list and usually, I think, is. We had a very interesting kind of commentary from the US military in Europe on the E&E plan. To me this was the first time that our military had ever done this. Let me explain this a bit.

The commander of US forces in Europe wears at least two "hats." He is the commander of SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe] as the NATO Supreme Commander, SACEUR. He is a four-star general. Gen Al Haig held this position, among others, and Gen Galvin has just completed his tour of duty in this position. He sits in Brussels with his NATO "hat" on and is Supreme Commander, Allied Forces, Europe [SACEUR]. He is also commander of all American forces in Europe as Commander in Chief of US Forces in Europe [CINCEUR]. In that latter capacity he has "US only" responsibilities. For example, he and his staff assist in making arrangements for the

emergency evacuation of Embassy personnel and other US nationals whenever necessary and wherever his authority runs. His authority includes Yugoslavia, in his capacity as CINCEUR.

At this time the POLAD [Political Adviser] to CINCEUR was a Foreign Service Officer named Al Francis, whom I had met, liked, and respected very much in Vietnam. Al wanted CINCEUR's responsibility for emergency escape and evacuation in his area of responsibility to be reflected in some detailed operational planning and some particularly useful, personal contacts. So Al Francis toured all of the posts for which CINCEUR had emergency escape and evacuation responsibilities. He didn't get to all of these posts, because CINCEUR's authority went all the way to South Africa and South Asia. However, Al visited all of our Balkan posts, including Yugoslavia.

He brought with him a standard form, which we filled out, containing our own E&E plan but also things which we went out and surveyed, like the closest helicopter landing pad to the American School in Belgrade. I thought that it was a very good idea to think seriously in those terms. Incidentally, there was no helicopter landing pad near the American School! [Laughter] But we did that kind of planning, anyway.

Plans of that kind always receive additional attention when tensions in the area increase. However, they were already receiving added attention, to some degree, because of Al Francis' interest on behalf of CINCEUR.

Then there was actual "war planning." The Embassy in Belgrade had little to do with that. However, under Ambassador Eagleburger we instituted something which the Yugoslavs had resisted. We arranged to increase the number of US Navy ship visits to Yugoslav ports. The US Navy never has enough ports for such visits to allow its crews to get off their ships. That is, to escape the confines of their ships and have a run ashore. The Navy is always looking for ports to make ship calls. The sailors know that, if they misbehave ashore on their first visit, they're not going to be able to go ashore again while assigned to the Mediterranean area. The Navy really puts a lot of effort into making sure that these port visits are agreeable for the people being visited, as well as for the crews of the ships involved. The Navy does a superb job in handling these visits. I have no criticism of these arrangements. You can't keep every sailor's pants zipped, but my goodness, the Navy does a good job of handling these visits.

We knew that if, for example, we had a US Navy cruiser visiting the port of Split, Yugoslavia, the people of that town would just swarm onto it and love it. The sailors would behave themselves, would have money to spend, and it would be a good thing. So we increased US Navy port visits.

The Yugoslavs had made an agreement with the Soviets which we didn't like much, to overhaul a couple of old, combatant vessels down at one of the underused, Yugoslav shipyards. I think that it was Kotor [a port in Montenegro]. We didn't like that because we didn't think that it fit in with the idea of non-alignment, which Yugoslavia proclaimed so

stridently. We saw a difference between recreational visit for American sailors and logistical support for the Soviet Navy. Ambassador Eagleburger said, "Well, if you're going to do that, so are we." After much pushing and tugging the Yugoslavs said, "All right, where are your old minesweepers?" The US Navy didn't want any part of this! We didn't have any old minesweepers, although the Navy saw the utility of the principle, allowing ships repaired in Yugoslavia.

However, we increased our "presence" in Yugoslav ports to some degree through more ship visits. We also had an unfortunate overflight of Yugoslav territory by US fighter aircraft by error, but that was all handled all right.

From the political point of view I don't think that we ever felt that the temperature had risen to the point where the Yugoslavs must have felt that it had, say, in 1956, at the time of the Hungarian uprising or the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact nations in 1968.

Q: You're talking about the suppression of the Hungarian uprising or the invasion of Czechoslovakia under the "Brezhnev Doctrine" to put an end to the "Prague Spring" in 1968.

DUNLOP: I think that one of the most important things for which we were responsible was making sure that we had the right lines of communications at the "right" levels into the Yugoslav Government. If the situation began to look as if a Soviet military move was under way in Yugoslavia, we would have had to try to figure out how to communicate with the Yugoslav military people. The way you do that is to tell the political authorities that you think that that time has come. You don't let the US military attaché go over to the Protocol Office and say that it's time for a four-star general to visit Yugoslavia and talk to the Yugoslavs about arranging to supply Yugoslav with 155 mm howitzers. We never came close to that point at that time.

I remember, though, trying to figure out, and I think that we did figure out, to what degree the Yugoslavs were in touch with the new, revolutionary government in Tehran. It turned out that they were no more in contact with the new Iranian authorities than anybody else.

Q: Let's move into 1980 and Tito's slowly, laboriously, and painfully passing from the scene. Could you discuss that?

DUNLOP: I think that Tito was variously believed to be 84 or 85 as the new year of 1980 approached. He held the annual Diplomatic Hunt, which was one of his last such public events, if not the last in late autumn 1979. His practice at Christmas and New Year's had always been to stage a kind of "state procession," like Queen Victoria or Queen Elizabeth, visiting one of the major areas of the United Kingdom. Tito would visit one of the [seven constituent] republics of Yugoslavia, hold forth there, and give a New Year's Eve party, which would be afforded extensive, televised coverage. He could be seen as the benign, smiling, "playful" leader that he sometimes probably was.

In 1980 I believe that he was going to do that in Slovenia at Christmas time. He went to Slovenia, but events didn't take place quite that way. Just at that time rumors began to spread that he was ill, and that's why there hadn't been a lot of television coverage of gala parties and receptions, toasts, speeches of thanks, and so forth. In fact, he had fallen seriously ill. Apparently, he had periodically had a kind of thrombotic condition in his lower left leg. This had been adequately treated in various ways, using blood thinners and whatever else is usually done. However, this time this condition came on him again and put him to bed. The authorities tried to hide this condition. They put him in the clinic at Ljubljana, probably the best medical facility in the country, where he eventually died.

About two weeks after he was hospitalized, they finally announced that he was ill. Within a relatively short time the pronouncements on his illness and the events surrounding them indicated that this was a life threatening condition. I guess that the Yugoslav authorities did what they might have been expected to do. They made a big show of calling in medical experts from all over the world. They got Doctor DeBakey from Dallas, TX. DeBakey was then prominently known in Europe because of heart transplants. They got a comparably famous or internationally well-known Soviet physician in. They got Swiss and French doctors. The regional medical officer whom we had on our staff in the Embassy in Belgrade had a lot of contacts among the Belgrade medical community. He was able to keep us pretty well abreast of the situation, or at least of the informed gossip about it. The doctors weren't being told any more than the public was, but they had a better way of judging what a medical communique really meant. I remember the doctor saying at the Embassy staff meeting, when he gave us the latest "poop" about Tito's condition, that it was a real error that the Yugoslav Government had made when they decided to treat Tito by committee. He said that this was inviting the worst. He said that Tito would be much better off if he would just check himself into a US Clinic under the name of "Joe Broz" and say, "Here I am. Please treat me." He could leave it to them to decide what doctor would be in charge of his treatment.

However, of course, they didn't do this. They had this process going on where a medical board would meet and issue official communiques. This went on for six months, during which time part of his leg was amputated. That may have prolonged his life a little bit. He died in May or June, 1980. His birthday was always celebrated on May 25. I'm not sure whether he died just before or just after his birthday.

His funeral was a major event. The decision always has to be made as to who will represent a given government at the funeral of a chief of state. I'm sure that we can all remember President Charles De Gaulle, walking with great dignity behind the caisson carrying President John F. Kennedy's body. As Tito was a chief of state for 50 years, during which he carved out for himself a place in history, a lot of countries sent their chiefs of state. The Germans sent Helmut Schmidt, who was Federal Chancellor at that time. Other countries sent people of lesser rank. We sent President Jimmy Carter's mother, Lillian Carter, and Vice President Walter Mondale. There was some consternation over that. I'm sure that "Ms Lillian" was a grand lady. She had been in the

Peace Corps in India. However, there was some consternation over that. I think that it was more of a tempest in a teapot than anything else.

Among other things, within three weeks of Tito's funeral we were able to announce a state visit to the new, Yugoslav Government by President Carter which had sort of been under consideration for some time. It would take place later in 1980. That was helpful.

Tito's funeral was a very impressive event. There was a lot of real public shock and some real sorrow. I always felt that the foreign, and particularly the American, press exaggerated the sorrow part. I always thought that Americans in general exaggerated the degree to which Tito had won the "affection" of his people. He had certainly won their respect and their fear. Certainly, there was a mixture of emotions in the feelings of ordinary Yugoslavs for him. Huge crowds attended the public ceremonies. The funeral was held in Belgrade. If I can say this without sounding too foolish, the Serbs respect death and visibly show their respect for death. Death is an important event. It is not something that you kind of avoid talking about until it happens. Then, when it happens, you don't talk about it for very long. In Serbia death is a "big deal." I guess that I am not expressing this very well, but the crowds that turned out were respecting death, as well as Tito, the individual who had died.

One of the more important questions about the funeral was what role would Mrs. Tito play. Mrs. Tito was still Mrs. Tito but had been in internal political exile...

Q: This was Jovanka...

DUNLOP: Jovanka Broz. The lady who had been Tito's wife of record for many years, since shortly after World War II. In fact, she had fallen out of favor for reasons that were obscure and remained obscure. I think that we have already discussed that a little bit. She may have allowed herself to get too closely involved in some of the discussions regarding the fate of Yugoslavia after Tito's death with people from her part of Yugoslavia, Lika. This is a Croatian-Serbian area known as the Krajina [in western Bosnia], where Lika Serbs live. She came to the funeral, acted with great dignity, and was allowed to place a wreath on his coffin.

After he was buried, his tomb was quickly turned into a pilgrimage site for visitors. Every schoolchild, certainly in Belgrade and in many other cities over the intervening years, was bussed up there to walk around his tomb. We were all kind of interested in how well that would be done. People's tastes in these things vary. However, the tomb isn't too garish. His remains lie in a room filled with flowers. People come into the room at one end and walk a half circle around his remains and go out the other end. There is a very handsome, marble slab there with a simple inscription. Such visits were still going on when I left Yugoslavia in 1982. I am told that the tomb has now been closed. People are not now being bussed and trucked up to visit his tomb.

Q: This was a much discussed subject when I was in Yugoslavia. You and I were in Yugoslavia back in the 1960's, and a popular subject of conversation was, "After Tito, what?" Particularly when he was under medical treatment, what was the talk, speculation, or planning at the American Embassy on what would happen after the death of Tito?

DUNLOP: Larry Eagleburger was still Ambassador when Tito died. He was replaced by David Anderson later in the summer of 1980. Before Tito died, but not long before then, and, I think, after we had learned of his final illness, Ambassador Eagleburger tasked us all, although we would have volunteered to do this anyway, with writing an analysis on "Whither Yugoslavia?" This would have been one of the 40 or 50 such pieces produced in the previous 40 or 50 years.

I remember this analysis quite well. Tito's death would obviously be an important report. We all tried to sort of "see the end" of this particular tunnel. At least, we wanted to know if there was any light there, at the end of the tunnel. I remember the broad outlines of this report. I don't think that there was a lot of controversy over it in the US Mission. People who had thought about this matter were all given an opportunity at least to talk their way through it. I think that I was the principal drafting officer. Ambassador Eagleburger, of course, edited it very substantially, as he would do with such an important report. It went out under his personal name.

I think that I can remember its main points. It said that it would be a mistake to expect any turmoil or any economic or political instability in Yugoslavia for the next several years, and perhaps as long as the following five years. The machinery which Tito had put in place would probably "creak along" at least that long. I remember that we finally got the word "creak along" into the report. However, in no way could Yugoslavia, as it then existed, survive over the long run. There had to be a fundamental change in the way Yugoslavia was governed. At this point [just after Tito's death in 1980] it was important to identify the people who would be competent to make those changes smoothly and without turmoil and conflict. The possibility of the dissolution of Yugoslavia certainly would raise itself eventually, after the next five years or so. The Embassy expressed the hope that the emerging Yugoslav leadership would find ways to prevent turmoil and conflict from happening. I hope that I am not being too self-serving in recalling this report that way, but that's pretty well what we said, and that's not too far from what happened.

For five years or so Yugoslavia did "creak along," and then it began to come apart. By 1987, I guess, Milovan Milosevic had already made or was about to make his move in Serbia. By 1988 he had made it, and God help Yugoslavia!

There certainly was no feeling that the Soviets were going to be able to do anything. In fact, we always said, and I think rightly so, that one of the strongest, cohesive factors in Yugoslavia was fear of the Soviets. The Soviets had just demonstrated how totally reckless and brutal they could be in intervening in another country, Afghanistan. This was very fresh in the memory of the Yugoslavs. We felt that this would be one of the factors

that would tend to hold Yugoslavia together, at least for a while. We used the terms "centrifugal" and "centripetal" to describe the various tendencies in post-Tito Yugoslavia. We listed some "centrifugal" factors and some "centripetal" factors. Fear of the Soviets was a strong centrifugal force. As the Soviet Union began to disintegrate in the late 1980's, so did fear of it.

Q: Even when we were in Yugoslavia in the 1960's, this was always the situation. At that point, anyway, I don't think that we were really talking about the horrendous dissolution of Yugoslavia which has taken place more recently. However, we considered that it was really the threat from the Soviet Union which was keeping the lid on the "box" that was Yugoslavia.

DUNLOP: Some people said that if Tito didn't have the Soviet threat to deal with, he would have to invent it. As it turned out, he didn't have to invent it, because it was there and, at various times, it was quite real.

In the Embassy we always tried to "inventory" people and their influence. That's an important thing for an Embassy to do. In a country like Yugoslavia there's a limited number of people who have power and a discernibly limited number of people who are at least at the second level of power. You need to know their names and how they are spelled. After that this process is less clear. You try to inventory those people, their abilities, their orientation, and whether they are "modernizers" or not. We just didn't find very many "modernizers" at the very top of the Yugoslav Government. One of them was a Montenegrin named Bactar(?) Muzsov, who was recently almost killed by a bomb. He survived from those years. He was Prime Minister, President, or senior political figure in the new Macedonia. He was one of the people who, we said, has some of the attributes that it's going to take to get through the troubled times that probably lie somewhere around five years into the future. However, there weren't too many others that you could name. And none of the Croatians. I remember looking at the Croatians we listed, with whom I was familiar to some extent, or thought I was a few years before. They were all the people whom at one time we were glad to see out of power, because they were not really future leaders. But now they were all back in power, put there by Tito after the 1971 purges.

Q: Yugoslavs are basically a talented people for whom one can have quite a high regard. They certainly had a reputation for an absolutely first rate Foreign Service. How did the Yugoslavs end up with such a mediocre political leadership?

DUNLOP: I think that that's what Tito was doing. When Tito saw the faces of the bright, young folks appearing, especially a whole bunch of them at once, which he saw in 1970 and 1971, in the Serbian state leadership and Communist Party, in the state leadership and Communist Party of Croatia, and in the state and Communist Party leadership of Slovenia and Macedonia, he knocked them down. He would not tolerate their emergence into power for reasons which were probably partly personal and partly reflected his style of governing. Perhaps this attitude is endemic in an authoritarian leadership.

You've heard the old joke, which has been told about many places. I'll just repeat it here. Somebody may ask, "Why did they let this happen?" They answer this with the story of the scorpion and the tortoise by the side of a river. Fire is burning up to the banks, and they've got to get across the river. The scorpion and the tortoise were bargaining. The scorpion said, "If you don't take me across the river, I'll sting you, and we'll both die." The tortoise says, "If I don't take you across the river, we'll both die." The scorpion says, "Why don't you let me ride on your back, and we'll both live?" So the scorpion gets on the back of the tortoise. The tortoise swims out on the river. When they are half way across, the scorpion stings the tortoise, and they are about to die. The tortoise says, "Why did you do that?" The scorpion answers, "It's the Balkans." [Laughter]

Q: I've heard this as pertaining to the Middle East, with the scorpion and the tortoise crossing the Nile River.

Harry, obviously, we're looking at the Yugoslav situation from the perspective of 1996. You were the Political Counselor in the Embassy in Belgrade, 1978-1982. Were you able to travel out of Belgrade and sound out the ethnic groups that made up Yugoslavia at that time?

DUNLOP: Yes. I think that collectively the Embassy did that. We had a lot more access as Tito's power waned during his last six months of life. One of the things that we were looking for were security crackdowns. It was reported by some European foreign correspondents that it was inevitable that the Yugoslav Government would become increasingly nervous as the Old Man's death approached. They speculated that the Yugoslav Government would start cracking down in various ways. There would be arrests of people who were critical of the government. There would be harassment of people aimed at limiting contact with foreigners. However, that did not happen.

We had a lot of access. Perhaps I should mention here one of the things I should have said earlier, when you asked how things were different in 1978, compared to the early 1970's. I said that some of the atmosphere of tension I had experienced in Zagreb some six years before had disappeared. Generally speaking, access to people was easier, and the press was able to say more about real events, in realistic terms, than it was before. There was less of this patina of "This is the best of all possible socialist worlds" which had previously seemed to cover everything. You had to scrape that away to get down to what was going on in the way of issues and confrontations in the country. It was easier to report and to get out into the country.

I had a couple of younger officers in the Political Section in Belgrade whom I regarded as brilliant and still do. They were really doing remarkable things, such as establishing contact with people at the university level, for example, in student committees and so forth. We had never been able to establish contact with such people before. Even though these people might have wanted to talk to us, they wouldn't have done so. The police would have made it uncomfortable for them if they had dared to talk to us.

For example, in the period shortly after Tito's death [in May, 1980], I will mention something which still has its implications for the present. In the spring of 1981, following Tito's death, there was a surge of the recurrent political tensions in Kosovo. I say "resurgence" of tensions because this had periodically happened over the years. There had been such a resurgence in 1968, just before I returned to Yugoslavia. There certainly had been a lot of difficulty in imposing Communist Party rule in Kosovo during the period 1945-1948. Here we were in 1981. There were student strikes and obviously a factional struggle going on within the Communist Party of Kosovo. To remind those who listen to or read these comments, the Kosovo is that portion of southern Yugoslavia very largely inhabited by Albanians. Kosovo is also the heart of the old, medieval Serbian state. It's the place where four or five of the great Serbian Orthodox monasteries are located which the Serbs look at with great reverence and awe. These monasteries are identified with the Serbs and give them a sense of national identity. The monasteries are, indeed, marvelous to see. Kosovo is where the Serbs place the mythological beginning of their historic, modern struggle against the Turks, who beat them at the Battle of Kosovo. It is in a fashion the Serbs "Jerusalem."

The population profile in Kosovo at that time [1981] was about 75 percent Albanian and maybe 25 percent Serb. It is now [1996] over 90 percent Albanian. There was then a resurgence of political instability in Kosovo, generated by Albanians wanting more say over what the government does and the emergence of friction with the Serbs over that. There was rioting at the university, which spread into the streets. Tanks were sent down there. There were rumors of massacres and large numbers of people killed.

The Embassy in Belgrade was very much interested in this, and we sent a couple of our officers down there. They actually observed some of this violence and were able to report on it. Other embassies did the same. The Italian Embassy sent some people down to Kosovo. The Greek Embassy was always interested in what was going on in Kosovo. Then the Protocol people in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry called us up and told us that Kosovo was "closed" to visitors and that we couldn't go down there. Correspondents were being told that they couldn't go there.

What did the people of Kosovo do? They came up to Belgrade to see the press and came to our Embassy to see us. These were the same people that we would have been talking to, had we gone down there. They were able to come up to Belgrade. Police controls were not in place to prevent that, so we had access to them. Kosovo was the place where the most friction existed during the last two years of my tour in Belgrade [1978-1982]. The Yugoslav Government actually sent front line troops into Kosovo. They didn't want to do this. They wanted to use their militia and their riot police. However, they didn't have enough of them, so they shipped front line troops down to Kosovo in large numbers. They found that they had to put a tank battalion or two in the streets of Pristina [capital of the Republic of Kosovo]. There were some pretty horrendous pictures taken by civilians with video cameras which were available then. There is nothing quite so impressive as a tank, slithering from side to side down a street that's narrow enough and has parked cars on both sides of it. It's kind of a "dodge 'em cars" exercise, with high stakes.

We knew pretty well what was going on down there. We knew that the Serbian response, or the Yugoslav Government response, was as it almost always has been with the Albanians, to give minimal lip service to negotiations and then hit them just as hard as they could along the bridge of the nose, as it were, with the largest piece of lumber, so to speak, that they could find handy. If necessary, hit them again. That's what they did in 1981.

As far as Croatia and Slovenia were concerned, the Consulate in Zagreb was directly responsible for reporting out of there. I traveled up there. I remember a couple of conversations I had in Slovenia, which confirmed what was so evidently going to be the case or was moving in that direction. In most instances the Slovenians had already made their own little world up there. They were the ones paying lip service to Belgrade. They kept their eyes fixed very firmly and pragmatically on what was good for Slovenia. To the degree that they had to pay money into the Yugoslav Treasury which went for developing the less developed parts of the country, they would do it as long as it was necessary to keep a large group of Slovenians employed in the federal government in Belgrade. They would do that, but those Slovenians would get on a train every Friday and go back to Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia. This was called "The White Train." By the time it got to Ljubljana they were a rather drunk group of Slovenians. [Laughter]

The Slovenes started an airline, in competition with "JAT," Yugoslav Air Transport, the national airline. JAT was then kind of a reserve wing of the Air Transport Command of the Yugoslav Air Force. Its head was an active duty Yugoslav general. Its pilots were all qualified officers in the Air Force reserve. There is no reason why that shouldn't have been the case, actually, but you would think that that would make JAT the "government" airline, by God, and the Slovenes wouldn't have a prayer of being able to compete with it. But they did! I forget the name of the Slovenian airline, but they got it up and running. This was before all of the turmoil of the late 1980's. The Slovenes went out, leased some airplanes, and hired pilots. Of course, JAT didn't like it, but in the post-Tito era it wasn't able to stop it.

In late 1980, just about at the mid point of my last tour in Belgrade, David Anderson replaced Larry Eagleburger as Ambassador to Yugoslavia. As you will recall, Stu, David was in the same Serbo-Croatian language class as Eagleburger, you, and I. He was an excellent officer who had had a lot of experience serving in Germany. He was a very good man to serve under. I was very happy to see him come in. Eagleburger went back to Washington to be Assistant Secretary for European Affairs and then Under Secretary for Political Affairs. After that, he retired from the Foreign Service and went off to make money with former Secretary Henry Kissinger's consultancy firm in New York.
Q: By this time Tito was dead. You were reporting and looking at things from this perspective. You didn't mention Bosnia Herzegovina, which later became the "cockpit" of everything. Was Bosnia of particular concern at that time or was your attention pretty much focused on the other areas?

DUNLOP: One of the things I believed, and which doesn't necessarily seem to be everybody's belief who has a hand in Yugoslav affairs here in Washington, is that Bosnia doesn't exist as a separate Bosnia entity. What goes on in Bosnia is a function of what goes on in Croatia and Serbia. The Muslim community in Bosnia does, of course, exist, has a right to and should be able to express its own political will and desires through some form of really representative government, with full, civil safeguards. However, there never has been a Bosnian state since at least the 11th or 12th century. Bosnia had no national identity as such throughout the long years of Turkish occupation, and it's my view it does not today.

The Croatians and the Serbs in Bosnia had preserved their respective national identities. When it comes to "push and shove," as it frequently does in Bosnia, it's a matter of Croatians shoving Serbs, or vice versa, and the Muslims sort of get in the way. That may sound very dismissive of what a lot of Americans may think of these days as the "noble" and deserving, Muslim population of Sarajevo and the surrounding areas. The Bosnian Muslims have a government and should be allowed to run that country as the government, is the prevailing view.

I think that people dealing with Yugoslavia during the early 1980's, trying to project their views into the future, if they had anticipated the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and I think that they might well have done so, or if they wanted to project a scenario including the dissolution of Yugoslavia, never would have said that there will emerge an independent, Bosnian state. They would always have seen Bosnia as being carved up between Serbia and Croatia. They probably would have guessed that, given their wishes, the Muslims would choose to go with a Croatian side. With good leadership the Croatians could make that a tolerable choice for the Muslims in Bosnia. I still think that this could have happened, and I emphasize the word "could."

It seems to me that it was never likely that, of their own free will, the Muslims would opt for inclusion in a Serbian state. There are historic reasons for this, but they stretch right into the 20th century, and they are even stronger now. The friction between Muslim and Serb has always been greater than between Muslim and Croat.

Q: During World War II the Muslims and the Croats sort of ganged up on the Serbs.

DUNLOP: That's right. And the Germans were able to recruit a very substantial number of Muslims into what they called the "SS Hundjar Division", which had just about the same record of treating civilian populations as every other armed unit that marched through Bosnia. "Hundjar" is the Turkish word for the curved scimitar the Turks used to have. So the translation into English of the "Hundjar Division" is the "Scimitar Division." Their shoulder patch, which I've seen, is green (the Muslim color), with a silver scimitar, dripping with blood! [Laughter]

Q: Did those two "stalwarts" of progressive democracy, Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic, cross your sights at all while you were in Yugoslavia?

DUNLOP: No, not really. I think that you asked me about Tudjman during my first tour in Croatia. The answer is "Yes," but only in a peripheral kind of way. He wrote some columns in a nationalist publication, "Matica Hrvatska" about how Croatia's rights were not being fully respected. There was also a "Matica Srbska," but "Matica Hrvatska" was an organization originally designed to promote the Croatian variation of the Serbo-Croatian language. People find this very difficult to translate into English. One of the translations for "Matica" is "Queen Bee," but that's absolutely the wrong translation in this case. "Heart" might be another translation, although the word doesn't literally have that meaning. I like the word "Hearth." However, it means generally the "place of the keepers of the embers of the fire" of Croatiandom. This weekly magazine, "Matica Hrvatska," made interesting reading. I certainly read that publication, cover to cover. It had columns by people like Tudjman in it.

By 1978, when I returned to Yugoslavia as Political Counselor in the Embassy in Belgrade, Tudjman had been in prison. I don't know whether he had been imprisoned as a direct result of Tito's crackdown in the early 1970's, but he certainly had been one of the targets of the crackdown. He had never held a position in the Communist Party of Croatia or the Croatian Government of that era. He was never a member of the liberal element in Croatia, either. "Liberal" is a convenient word to call it, although not everybody who was in it was a "liberal." However, he was not in the group led by Dapcevic, Tripolo, and in Slovenia, Kavcic. Tudjman was writing these rather long and sometimes dull discussions of what the next target for the Croatian nationalists should be and whether the ethnic composition of the police force is the same as the village they live in. That was one of his arguments. If you have a village where 17% of the population is Serb, there should only be 17% Serb policemen. That was the kind of thing he was saying. "Affirmative action," but typically Balkan, in reverse.

Slobodan Milosevic was simply off the radar scope and out of mind. The man who was his protégé, who is credited with having nurtured him politically inside the Communist Party of Serbia, was, in fact, one of the old "war horses" of the Serbian Communist Party. He was quite visible. I'm trying to remember his name. "Stankovic" comes to mind. He had a big head with white hair. I can't remember. Apparently, at that time Milosevic was one of his up and coming, young protégés. However, we never heard of him, and I'm sure that the Ambassador never met Milosevic.

Q: You still had a year and a half or so to go with the new Yugoslav Government after the death of Tito in 1980. How did you view the new government and how did you find dealing with it? There was a rotation of personalities...

DUNLOP: Well, the old government had had its "creaky" joints, and so did the new government. They had the same, terribly elaborate system. There was a "rotating" presidency among nine men which changed every six months. They were elected every three years, or something like that. There were a couple of "co-opted" members, like the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, as well as a couple of other people. It was a very

clumsy arrangement. They were supposed to reach decisions by consensus, like the Politburo of the Communist Party. In fact, the Politburo never worked that way. It always wound up with about three people having real powers of decision. There were nine members of the governing committee, one of whom served as president for six months, then being replaced by another committee member. However, when it came to "collective decisions," it was very difficult to get nine people to agree. Anyway, this was the system, which was pretty "creaky." And the persons were also "creaky"--aged remnants of the Partizan days, for the most part.

Our main dealings with the Yugoslav Government, other than to observe what it did, were with the Foreign Ministry, which was still staffed by the same, competent people. They were sometimes irritating, but they were competent people. We had known them all along. There were a couple of younger people in the Foreign Ministry. I remember having some conversations with them that were encouraging.

On instructions from the Department of State I once went in to talk to the man who was dealing with the "Non-Aligned Movement" on some issue that was coming up. We wanted to have our views on this issue registered with the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry. He had this big map, which had also been published in the press, called "The World of Non-Alignment." All of the non-aligned world was in red, like the old maps of the British Empire. Here were all of these countries around the world in red, including Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was a little pimple at the top of this map, with huge countries scattered all around. Its population was of course tiny,
compared to some of the others.

I couldn't resist the temptation to say to this guy, "You know, I've always admired you people. How did this little country [Yugoslavia], which is basically Caucasian, have all of this influence with these huge, other countries, which are basically not Caucasian. How long do you think this situation will last?" He said, "Until Tito dies. It may outlast him, but not much longer." I saw that as kind of an opening and said, "Well, look, I'm not telling you that your foreign policy is misdirected," nor is it what I tried to imply to him. I said, "However, what about a redirection of your energy and priorities? You people spend so much time and money on the non-aligned. You have this big battle with Castro, on which we wish you well. But why do this?" He said, "Only Tito could have explained that." So, yes, there were some people who knew that this orientation toward the non-aligned world was kind of a reflection of Tito's own personality. This "fixation" on the non-aligned needed adjusting. You won't hear a Yugoslav voice in the non-aligned movement now. Well, maybe they do have membership in the non-aligned movement, but this was a phenomenon of the Cold War, I guess, as, perhaps, history will say.

Q: You left Belgrade in 1982. From your perspective at that time, where was Yugoslavia headed?

DUNLOP: Well, I would have said pretty much what we said a couple of years earlier. The existing system didn't look as if it was under any threat of an immediate demise.

However, the whole structure had to be readjusted eventually to meet two major, political criteria, as well as some further rationalization on the economic front.

The old Yugoslav Government had tried to accomplish a number of disparate things. I think that this reflected one of Tito's failures to understand and was one of his political errors. He really thought, back through the period from 1965 to 1970, that he could devolve all of this economic decision making power to the various republics that make up Yugoslavia and still keep the political decision making power. He didn't see what tensions that would create. He didn't appreciate that eventually decision making on both political and economic issues would have to be in the same place. The "mirage" of this separation of economic and political decision making was something which the new Yugoslav Government was trying to prolong. That is, they evidently thought that they could let these governments in Zagreb [for Croatia] and Ljubljana [for Slovenia], as well as Belgrade for the Serbs, run their own economic affairs but still be subordinate in important, fundamental, political ways to a group of aged leaders in Belgrade.

I did not think that that was going to work over the long run. I thought that that situation would have to be changed to accommodate two, really fundamental needs. One was that both the Slovenes and the Croatians were going to insist on becoming independent states. They would achieve this goal some time, some how, and in some way. At the same time the Serbs would insist on some kind of guarantee for the safety of Serbs living in Croatia and Slovenia. Whether this concern was justified or not, the Serbs would not trust themselves to somebody else's governance, unless some very imaginative things were done to reassure them.

I used to make this a comparison and I still think that it's valid. The Serbs had to retain their "myth" of a Greater Serbia, but it was an important "myth." The Serbs needed to know that other Serbs were "safe." That is, Serbs in their houses, where they lived, were "safe." I think that that could have been arranged and accomplished, either with people staying in the same places where they lived or by means of some carefully guaranteed and supervised population transfer over time. Now, of course, it's impossible to think of that, at least for the foreseeable future.

I think that we all knew that change was in the air. We hoped that it would come without a catastrophic breakdown and didn't believe that such a catastrophe was inevitable. However, the Yugoslav leadership would have to face some really hard dilemmas and make some extremely hard choices, which they weren't doing at that time. They were just sort of going along until they couldn't go along any more. Nothing was in place to "rein in" Milosevic [of Serbia] or Tudjman [of Croatia].

Q: Let's stop at this point. Where did you go after leaving Belgrade in 1982?

DUNLOP: I couldn't get an onward assignment and so I was "rusticated" to the Senior Seminar on Foreign Policy in the Department of State.

Q: All right, we'll pick it up there. One other question, did you have any state visits when you were in Belgrade this time?

DUNLOP: Yes. President Carter came.

Q: Let's talk about that next time.

Q: Today is August 30, 1996. Harry, let's talk about the preparations made for the visit by President Carter. In fact, was this the first visit by an American President to Yugoslavia?

DUNLOP: No. I had the experience of being involved in a visit by President Nixon in Zagreb. We were, of course, a small post, and President Nixon only spent a few hours there. The Nixon visit took place in 1969, I believe. I learned something about the impact of a presidential visit on a Foreign Service post, which is, of course, enormous.

I remember one anecdote from this visit which might be of some interest. There was a change in the schedule. The presidential party spent much of a day in Zagreb, because of the weather. The motorcade, which was to take the party to a helicopter pad, had to be reorganized. I was the officer assigned for that "event." There is an officer assigned for each of the events during a Presidential stopover. This event involved the luncheon being given by the Croatian Government for President Nixon in the old town part of Zagreb, which is rather congested, with narrow streets and so forth. It is rather attractive but not appropriate for automobile motorcades.

The whole thing got totally messed up. Assignments of given individuals to vehicles were made and changed. There was a lot of chaos. All of these automobile engines were running in a small square there. Finally, the vehicles went off with or without the right people. There was a haze of exhaust smoke across this square. As I gazed across the now empty square, holding my briefcase, I saw the towering 6'4" figure of our Secretary of State, William Rogers, standing on the curb. I was certain that he had been left behind.

I trotted across the square, wondering what to do now. I then saw standing beside Secretary Rogers the much shorter, 5'7" figure of Mirko Tepovac, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, who had extracted Secretary Rogers from all of this chaos and said, "You don't want to do any of that, do you, Bill? Why don't you come and visit a nice art gallery and an artist whom I know?" The only other person aware of where Secretary Rogers was at that time was Secretary Rogers' personal bodyguard from the Office of Diplomatic Security in the Department of State. The bodyguard was absolutely apoplectic, and his radio wouldn't work! I, on the other hand, was vastly relieved.

Anyway, President Carter came to Belgrade in 1980, not long after Tito's funeral. He had sent his mother, Lillian Carter, to be his personal representative at Tito's funeral, a decision by President Carter which a lot of people thought was not too good. I think that the Yugoslavs took this fairly well, but a lot of chiefs of state and chiefs of government

went to Tito's funeral, and, although President Carter couldn't come, sending his mother didn't exactly resonate too well. However, President Carter came to visit Yugoslavia soon after the Tito funeral and made a good impression.

The Carter visit was like other presidential visits. It was preceded by several "advance" visits to Yugoslavia, as always, by various planning groups. There is always the White House Communications Agency advance party. Then are the Secret Service advance people. There is the President's own White House advance people. If the Secretary of State travels with the President, there is the advance party from the Executive Secretariat of the State Department. Sometimes there are "pre-advance" and "pre-pre- advance" groups. That is a tremendous burden, both for the host government, as well as the Foreign Service post concerned. Even in the best of circumstances, it's a burden. Frictions emerge as the White House people insist that things have to be done precisely this way and no other way. The host government may have other ideas. After all, they think that they are "in charge," in their own country, but they are not.

The Carter visit, which lasted two days, went well. Carter had done his homework, as I suspect that he usually did. He had read his "briefing books" and was well prepared. He made a generally good impression, both on the Yugoslav authorities in the successor government to Tito and, so far as we could tell, the general populace of Belgrade. Americans are pretty popular in places like Belgrade. Carter comported himself well, as did his wife Rosalynn, who had a bad cold. I admired her for soldiering on, when she obviously did not feel very comfortable. There were no untoward events associated with that particular visit, as I have heard of in presidential visits to some other places. There was nothing more than the usual friction when these two bureaucracies come in contact with one another, each one thinking that they have to arrange things exactly their way.

Q: After Yugoslavia you went to the Senior Seminar. When were you there?

DUNLOP: 1982-1983. An academic year. It started on September 1, 1982, and it ended in late May or June, 1983. It was a wonderful experience. If one had to be "rusticated", that was the kind of rusticity one should have.

Q: Could you talk a little bit about what you think you got out of it and maybe a few of the things that you did?

DUNLOP: Well, the purpose of the Senior Seminar is to give senior officers, who are primarily, although not entirely, from the State Department and who are presumably going on to other positions of responsibility, an opportunity to take a "sabbatical year," largely away from the field of foreign affairs, looking at the country you represent overseas. It has its own internal administrator machinery and its own internal arrangements. Members of the Senior Seminar look at the cultural side of things at some length. That's what I did. It gave me a chance to go to places that I would probably never have visited, talk to and listen to people with specialized knowledge and sometimes with a considerable breadth of knowledge. We talked about areas where they felt America was

doing well and was not doing so well. We touched on many, major problems, including racial, immigration, and social issues, such as drugs. We looked at the matter of the declining inner cities which, by that time, had become a very major problem.

The Senior Seminar is "home ported," so to speak, in the Foreign Service Institute, with a senior officer of the State Department acting as its chairman for a year or maybe two. It also travels. It spends about 25-35% of the time traveling. We went to places like Boston, MA; Atlanta, GA; Seattle, WA; New Orleans, LA; and Chicago, IL. The second half of the seminar began to return us to the security side of our work. There is a significant, military component in the program. After we had done a lot of the "other" kinds of things, they began to insert in the program visits to US military bases and discussions of military issues. For example, we went to Ft. Campbell, KY, to visit the 101st Airborne Assault Division. That division was used for a lot of experimentation in the US Army's way of doing things. The Army was doing things with that division which hadn't been done before, particularly in the way it moves to, on, and behind the battlefield. We watched some of the training exercises involved in that. We were "strafed" by A-10 attack bombers and things like that. It was a lot of fun. The people who run that seminar do a very good job.

I guess that everyone was selected because it was thought that they had a lot of further, useful work to do. In the case of some of the members of the seminar, like me, this course coincided with difficulty in finding ongoing assignments. Several of the people in the class had been in the same position that I was in. They arrived in the class, not knowing what their onward assignment would be afterwards.

Q: You left the Senior Seminar in...

DUNLOP: 1983.

Q: Where did you go then?

DUNLOP: I was assigned to the Embassy in Seoul as Political Counselor. I had had no previous experience with South Korea and knew very little about it. It turned out to be a fascinating time. I spent most of the rest of my career dealing with Korean affairs, one way or the other.

Q: Korea is a fairly complex place, and a very sensitive one. The Political Counselor is the person who looks at the political environment, which is a difficult one. You really weren't an "East Asian hand," apart from your time in Vietnam.

DUNLOP: I wasn't really any kind of "hand." I had experience in Europe and in Vietnam.

Q: Anyone who would look at your career might say that you were a "Balkan hand," or something like that. Did you have any feel for why you were assigned to the Embassy in Seoul?

DUNLOP: You know, the personnel processes in the Department, even for those of us who have survived many years of them, are still something of a mystery. At least they are to me. I can only say that I had obviously done well enough. I must have done well in Belgrade and had a good "corridor" reputation. Larry Eagleburger, who had been Ambassador to Yugoslavia when I was Political Counselor there, was the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs at that time, I believe. He had gone back from Belgrade to be Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. Then he was lifted one level up to the Seventh Floor [where the offices of the Secretary of State and of his principal advisers are] as Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs. I have no sense that Eagleburger played any kind of role as a "patron" in this assignment. His name was never mentioned to me, and I never called him and told him that I had a problem with an ongoing assignment. I always found it very difficult to lobby for positions in that way. I probably didn't do it well enough during my career. I might have had a few more years if I had. But no. The short answer, which I probably should have given you in the first place, is that I really don't know why I was assigned to Seoul as Political Counselor.

Q: You served in South Korea from when to when?

DUNLOP: From 1983 to 1987, and then I returned to the Department as Korean Country Director.

Q: From 1983 to 1987. Korea was not your "area." That is, Northeast Asia, but particularly Korea. How did you prepare yourself before you went out and, before you went out, what did you see would be your major responsibility?

DUNLOP: Well, those are good questions. I was told of my assignment to Seoul while I was in Mexico City with the Senior Seminar. I received a phone call from Personnel. That was in March, 1983, so I had three months to prepare to leave for Korea. I think I was told that I had to be there by July 4, 1983, in time for the Embassy reception! [Laughter] I don't know what contribution I could have made to putting the reception on, but they wanted me in Seoul by July 4, if possible.

That precluded any serious language study. However, I persuaded the Department to give me some "survival Korean" training, at 7:00 AM each day, before the Senior Seminar program for the day began at 8:00 AM. So I did that for a couple of months. It took me a little while to persuade the FSI [Foreign Service Institute] to do that. They had to find money to cover this training. I think that I had a pretty persuasive case. I must say that, in retrospect, while that training in Korean was useful, it wasn't anything like enough. I never felt that I could speak Korean, even though I also took the 100 Hour Course that was available at post.

Q: In the range of languages that the Department teaches, I think that Korean ranks up among the hardest...

DUNLOP: That's right. It's one of four languages that the Department teaches for two years in the regular course at the FSI [Foreign Service Institute]. The second year is spent in Korea, putting one's language training to use. The other three, really "hard" languages include Arabic. I think that the training is given in Tunisia, Chinese (in Taipei), Japanese (in Kobe), and Korean (in Seoul) are the other three "hard" language overseas FSI branches.
I felt very uneasy about not knowing how to speak Korean. This was going to be the first place that I would receive a US Government paycheck for working where I did not feel that I had at least some ability to speak the local language. I had had some French and some German when the US Air Force was paying me to work in those two countries. Then I had studied Serbo-Croatian before going to Yugoslavia, and I had studied Vietnamese before going to Saigon. Here was a country, Korea, where I was not going to be able to speak Korean. The position of Political Counselor in the Embassy in Seoul was not "language designated." That is, service in that position did not require that you know how to speak Korean.

After I got to Seoul, I realized that there were some excellent Korean language officers in the Political Section. All but two of the officer positions in the Political Section, including my position, were "language designated." I made it a point to try hard and succeeded, although it was not so easy as you might think, in getting the Political Counselor's position "language designated." Since it takes two years to prepare an officer for a "language designated" position in Korea...

Q: And a senior officer, too.

DUNLOP: And a senior officer, too. The "language designation" did not apply to my successor as Political Counselor. It happened with my successor's successor. All of the Political Counselors in Seoul since then, and I think that I know all of them, have had the full, two-year course in Korean. If they haven't, they should have.

South Korea is an interesting country from the language point of view, in that the "elite" in the country speak English pretty well. We have had this long and intimate association with South Korea since the 1950's, and Koreans, insofar as they look outwards for anything, including security and economic assistance, markets, travel, immigration, tend to look to the United States. America has been, by far, the most important country to them. English is taught widely in South Korea. Certainly, almost all of the bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry and in other, senior positions in the South Korean Government speak English, although this is not totally true. Even so, it's much better to be able to speak the language yourself. As you well know, the ability to communicate directly with people and to hear what they're saying to each other in their own tongue is very important. I could not do that.

Q: What did you feel were the main concerns that you would have, as you got ready to go to South Korea?

DUNLOP: I asked David Lambertson that same question. Dave is an old friend from my Vietnam days who was then the Korean Country Director. His answer, and he was quite right in this, was that there were three things to be concerned about. After I had been there for a little while, I understood that they were the most important issues that I would have to concern myself with.

One was the relations between the Embassy and the US military command. It is a very senior command in the American military establishment and it is always held by a four-star general. Sometimes the commander of the US military command in South Korea goes on to be Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Two of them at least have done that. The command itself does not have a large number of people assigned to it, but the American commander of US troops is also the "Combined Forces Commander" and so has direct, operational command of a significant element of the South Korean military establishment.

So the "Combined Forces Command" is an integrated command, unlike NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. The different elements of NATO come together under an integrated command only when war starts. The "Combined Forces Command" is an ongoing, every day activity. Forces in it practice together and have exercises of one kind or another constantly. It "interfaces" with the South Korean military at many levels and in very important ways.

At the time I arrived in Seoul in 1983 the South Korean military had been running the country, in effect, since 1960. South Korean military generals, Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan had seized power on two separate occasions. Chun Doo Hwan was the President of the Republic of Korea when I arrived there. The South Korean military was very important, and there were significant political, as well as security implications in our relationship with the South Korean military.

So Dave Lambertson told me, "You will be the operationally responsible person for the political-military relationship. The Ambassador's relations with the US commander are extremely important. You have to foster that relationship and to make sure that your staff gets to know and to be respected by the US military in South Korea. They will respect you," David said, "if you know your job, if you know what their job is, and if you respect them." That was absolutely true. Therefore, I arrived in Seoul knowing that one of my important responsibilities was going to be the political-military relationship with the US military. Secondly, Chun Doo Hwan had seized power in a coup d'etat in December, 1979. People had been killed in the course of this seizure of power. He therefore was an "unlawful" ruler if you look at it from the viewpoint of many South Koreans. He had forced the adoption of a new constitution and an election on the country and had himself elected for seven years. He had promised to step aside at the end of the seven years, and this was a constant theme in all of his public pronouncements which dealt with that issue. He would say, "I'm here for seven years. I will stay for seven years and will go at the end of seven years." Dave Lambertson said, "Make sure that he does that." [Laughter] So it was very important to get Chun out of power!

It was Dave Lambertson's view, and it quickly became my view also, that if Chun sought to perpetuate himself in power, as Park Chung Hee had done, this would be a very serious detriment to our relationship with South Korea. It was already difficult to deal with the South Koreans. It had always been very difficult to deal with them going back to when Syngman Rhee was President. He was a very difficult man. Park Chung Hee had been a very difficult ally. The relationship with Chun Doo Hwan was also very difficult. To have Chun perpetuate himself in power, as Park Chung Hee did, would be to give those people in the United States who thought our relationship with South Korea was the "wrong" relationship to start with, a very strong argument in their support.

Our policy was that the relationship with the Republic of Korea was very important, no matter who the President of South Korea was. Dave Lambertson and I felt this, the President felt this, and the Ambassador believed in it. Therefore, we had to do what we could to minimize the domestic threats in the US to our established policy. Part of that picture involved the domestic threat, that is, the pressures on the Reagan administration either to sever our relationship with the Republic of Korea, pull our troops out of South Korea, or at least significantly cut back on our military presence in that country. There was also the perception by some people in the US that we were the sole support for Chun Doo Hwan. This was an incorrect perception but, nevertheless, this view was widely held in the United States, especially on the Left and among human rights activists.

So that was the other side to this situation. That is, the human rights or civil liberties side. There were other considerations, but the principal criticism of our relationship with the Republic of Korea came not only from the Left in the United States but also from some groups which take an active interest in civil rights and human liberties. Goodness knows, there are a lot of them. These groups were very vocal in their criticism of the Chun Doo Hwan regime. Insofar as they perceived the US Government to be indifferent to that issue, they were also critical of us.

The personality of "Dixie" Walker, the Ambassador, played something of a role in this. "Dixie" was not a career Foreign Service Officer. He was the first Ambassador to the Republic of Korea since we established diplomatic relations in 1948 who was not a career Foreign Service Officer. He was a Republican academic with very strong credentials in Asia, particularly in Northeast Asia. Chinese was his first foreign language, he spoke adequate Japanese, he had lived, done research, and published in both China and Japan, and he knew Korea as a function of his knowledge of Japan.

However, "Dixie" was a political appointee. He had also been active in the Republican Party in the US as a consultant for the Reagan campaign, for example. After his election, President Reagan appointed "Dixie" Walker as a political Ambassador to Seoul. Reagan, of course, was hated by the Left in the US and despised by many people for what they perceived to be his indifference to the human rights and civil liberties side of our policies. The Left leaped ferociously on "Dixie" as a man who had obviously been sent to South Korea to placate and prop up this absolutist dictator, the "despicable" despot Chun Doo

Hwan. In fact, for his part "Dixie" also hated Chun Doo Hwan and hated everything that he stood for. I used to call "Dixie" a "closet liberal," which he didn't like to be called. He really was. He just didn't like Senator Jesse Helms [Republican, North Carolina] at all. So he really resented this criticism that he supported Chun Doo Hwan.

Anyway, Dave Lambertson briefed me on all of this. It turned out that "Dixie" and I developed a very warm personal relationship. I felt a lot of affection for him as well as a lot of respect, and still do. He did a very good job as Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. However, I was told that "Dixie" was terribly sensitive about this criticism of him on the human rights side. Dave said that I would find "Dixie" genuinely and personally interested in the human rights issue. However, since we didn't run South Korea, there were going to be a lot of abuses and other things going on that would subject "Dixie" personally and the Embassy collectively to criticism. Dave warned me about that.

So we had these two components to be concerned about: the political-military relationship and the human rights and civil liberties side of the picture. The third major, "big picture" issue that Dave Lambertson discussed with me, and there were other, ongoing practical and operational matters, of course, was North Korea.

Insofar as we did any observation of, reporting on, and predicting developments in North Korea, this would be the responsibility of the Political Section. Dave Lambertson told me, which was very true, that we had almost no intelligence sources inside North Korea. CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency [KCIA] were virtually helpless in collecting political intelligence on North Korea. They had been defeated at every point in every effort to develop sources in North Korea. Without exception, they had been unable to get intelligence agents into North Korea. We had no human intelligence, or "Humint," sources in North Korea. The only North Koreans that we could talk to were those who voluntarily defected, and there were surprisingly few of those. This was unlike the case, for example, with the Soviet Union, where there was a steady flow of defectors. North Korea was so hermetically closed that people just did not have the opportunity either to learn about the outside world or to have the opportunity to establish contact with the outside world. Therefore, our intelligence on North Korea was almost non-existent, except for "technical means" of intelligence collection, and that means overhead photography and, to some degree, that collected by electronic means.

Q: Listening in on radio transmissions.

DUNLOP: Satellites could also collect information, but we didn't devote a lot of satellite time to North Korea. One of the things that I found out when I got to Seoul was how little satellite or "imagery" time was devoted to North Korea. I always complained about this. The intelligence chief for the US command, during most of my time in Seoul, was Frank Church, a very nice and competent Air Force Major General. He went from Korea to be head of the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]. I would lament over this situation. Gen Church would say that he was trying hard to get more satellite time on North Korea. However, the available time was being devoted to other places, like the Middle East, the

Caucasus Mountains, or missile bases in Kazakhstan. The SR-71 [supersonic reconnaissance aircraft] flew missions about four times a week.

Q: The SR-71, or "Blackbird..."

DUNLOP: It was a tremendous aircraft. It flew at tremendous speed, in excess of 1800 mph. It could take photographs. One of the problems with a plane that flies that fast is getting a camera to take pictures that fast. However, it had the necessary cameras to do that. It had that technology. The U-2 [an overhead reconnaissance aircraft originally developed in the mid 1950's] was also available to us. I think that I can say, without spilling any beans, that as a matter of policy we did not overfly North Korea, although the North Koreans constantly accused us of overflying their territory. In fact, we never overflew North Korea. We never came close enough so that there was any legitimate reason to suspect that we might have made a navigational error and overflew North Korea by mistake. The flight paths for the SR-71 and U-2 flights were very carefully drawn. In fact, the tracks were always taken physically to the Embassy by Maj Gen Frank Church and shown to me and to "Dixie" Walker, the Ambassador, if he had the time to review them. We would approve the tracks every month for these two types of flights. Sometimes they would reverse course, sometimes they would fly at different times during the day, and sometimes the flights would be at different altitudes and speeds. However, the actual, physical track of the aircraft was always "cleared" with the Embassy. I think that we can say "cleared." We may have said, "No, don't do that" on a couple of occasions. Rarely.

North Korea was the third major issue involved in my duties in Seoul which Dave Lambertson discussed with me. Because we knew so little about it, our ability to predict what the North Koreans might do in terms of military activities, sabotage, or terrorism was very limited.

We knew that North Korea [the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] was implacably hostile to South Korea and to us. If there ever was a case on this earth when a country was our enemy, it was and is North Korea. North Korea has an enormous military capability that is deployed extremely close to the border between North and South Korea, which is called the "Demilitarized Zone," or the DMZ. So Dave Lambertson said, "You've got that problem." There were various subsets of that problem. One of them is the paranoia of South Korea regarding North Korea. The fact is that the South Koreans might overreact some day to some accident that happens in North Korea and get us involved in military action, in a war, or in some crisis, which neither side intended to happen.

For example, if there were an incident along the DMZ, the South Koreans might, in good faith, interpret it differently from the real situation. This was the case, for example, with the first stages of a putative "surprise attack." A "surprise attack" was one of our preoccupations, as well as obtaining warning of a "surprise attack." Most of those reconnaissance and intelligence collection flights were directed at military targets in

North Korea, in an effort to give us reassurance that they weren't coming South, the fearful words "Here they come!"

The military situation on the Korean peninsula was always tense. If anything, it became tenser during the four years that I was there. North Korea's military dispositions became ever more threatening. That is, North Korea was clearly repositioning its forces, which required an enormous amount of energy and effort. A lot of these North Koreans were moved from one underground facility to another underground facility. Through photography we were able eventually to discover what was going on, in the physical sense, of where these forces were. The repositioning of these North Korean forces inexorably moved them closer to the border and gave us less and less time to react in the event of an attack.

Q: Before you went to Korea, what estimate were you getting of what the likely outcome would be, if a North Korean attack took place?

DUNLOP: Well, you would hear different answers to that. The US military would always tell you that we could "contain" a North Korean attack. I think that that is sort of the way that they are. I found very few US military officers who doubted that we could "contain" a North Korean attack. I had a different view from them in answer to your question, because I had a different view on how the North Koreans might fight a war against South Korea and what their objectives might be.

The US military view was that if the North Koreans attacked South, they would do what they did in 1950. The North Koreans would come across the DMZ on a broad front and in as much mass as they could deploy. And that attack would be really "massive." The North Koreans would come down the West Coast, the Center, and the East Coast of the Korean Peninsula. Of course, Seoul lies near the West Coast, 40 miles South of the DMZ. The US military said that the North Koreans would probably bypass Seoul, because their real objective had to be quickly to seize Pusan, the southernmost port of South Korea. This would be to prevent us from retreating to the South, establishing a perimeter, and reinforcing again, as we did in 1950. So the US military saw North Korea looking at a possible war in the 1980's as if it would be like the war which began in 1950. That is, a war for Pusan, essentially, aimed at getting the Americans off the Korean Peninsula.

Well, the North Koreans might think differently. I had another view of that. However, when the US military looked at this question, they said that the North Koreans couldn't repeat what they did in 1950. They could cause a lot of havoc, inflict a lot of casualties, smash through the defensive lines around the Demilitarized Zone, etc, but they couldn't get all the way to Pusan before we "obliterated" them. That was a very confident point of view. I don't know what the South Korean military thought about that, but that was the basis of the war planning in the US military command in South Korea.

By the time I arrived in South Korea in 1983, we had about 42,000-43,000 troops there. By the time I left in 1987, I think that we had about 38,000 troops there. That was not a

significant change. Our forces weren't there to "fight the war" on the Korean Peninsula. They were there to be a guarantee to the South Koreans that we would fight and bring other forces to South Korea from the United States to help them fight the war on the peninsula, along with them. They were a guarantee that North Korea could not invade South Korea without meeting American forces and engaging us in hostilities. The US battle plans were focused on reinforcing our troops from outside of South Korea. Every year there used to be a very large defense exercise called "Team Spirit," in which this operationally difficult logistical process involving repositioning American forces from Okinawa, from Hawaii, and even as far away as from Ft. Lewis in the State of Washington was practiced. Holding this exercise was an important thing to do, because it was not easy to do. The US military rotates people in and out of positions every couple of years, much as the Foreign Service does. Every year about one-third of the officers and men participating in "Team Spirit" were doing this for the first time. So this was an important way that we practiced reinforcing South Korea, in order to defend South Korea. Not in order to attack North Korea.

Every year North Korea cried and screamed about this "aggressive" preparation for the invasion of the North, as they called it. I regret to say that there were leftists in the US who echoed this ridiculous assertion. It was not this. Team Spirit was a demonstration of our intention and our ability to reinforce the defensive battle in South Korea.

Where I differed with our military colleagues and probably still do, as I doubt that they have changed their view, is that North Korea might consider another strategy as worth the candle. That would not go for Pusan but to go for Seoul, seize Seoul, where one-third of the whole population of South Korea lives, cross the Han River, which flows through the middle of Seoul, which is the first major physical barrier to an invasion of South Korea, and then hold 14-15 million South Koreans hostage there. They could tell the South Koreans, "We have to talk about this situation, but the Americans have to leave the Korean Peninsula." This strategy, if successful, would destroy the South Korean Government, probably to a greater extent than the North Koreans did in 1950. It could have presented whatever was left in South Korea, after this massive psychological, political, and military defeat involving losing Seoul and 14-15 million people, with a decision which would force them to negotiate with North Korea, at an enormous disadvantage. At that point, we would also be in an excruciating military and political vice. That was my personal nightmare.

People might say, "Well, what about the nuclear weapons?" That is precisely why North Korea now has developed a nuclear weapons program, to deter us from using nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. People say, "Why on earth does North Korea want nuclear weapons? What are they going to do? They throw one nuclear weapon at us, and we'll 'incinerate' all of North Korea. We'll burn it to a crisp." We probably would. However, the North Koreans wouldn't have to use nuclear weapons. Just by having them, they might well believe they would deter us from using our nuclear weapons. They would be holding Seoul as a nuclear hostage.

To me, that is an alternative strategy which explains why the North Koreans have a nuclear weapons program and why they are constantly repositioning their forces to gain surprise. An attack of this kind would have to be done quickly and massively before we could resupply and reinforce South Korea. This may be one reason why the American confidence that we could resupply South Korea could be irrelevant. However, I could never persuade my American military friends that this alternative scenario should be taken seriously. Hopefully, we'll never find out whether this is the case. But I still have these grave concerns.

Q: Was there a feeling at that time [1983-1987] that the relative efficiency of North Korea was improving, in terms of equipment and so forth? We're talking about North Korea now when, obviously, it's a decaying force. Also, what about the efficiency of the South Korean armed forces?

DUNLOP: I think that the US military probably had a healthy respect for both North and South Korean armed forces. I accepted their judgment in that regard. For example, I didn't try to second guess them about the effectiveness of the South Korean military. For economic and budgetary reasons the South Korean military had not gone as heavily into armor and artillery as we thought they should have. Partly also they believed that we could and would resupply them quickly in the event of an emergency. The South Korean Army was still overwhelmingly an infantry force. That was the US military judgment, whenever their advice was sought, and their counsel was often sought, they would advise the South Koreans to improve the balance between armor, artillery, and infantry to the advantage of the armor and artillery.

The North Koreans had long since made their army into a force which was "heavy" in armor and artillery. The North Korean military forces were enormously and heavily mechanized. Again, this applies particularly to those units closest to the front line. The North Koreans had first line equipment. They had the same basic armor and artillery that the Soviet Union forces had, but without the same rocket capability. The Soviets had developed and deployed various types of rockets for battlefield use. They called these rocket forces, Katushas. That is a generic term used now for many different kinds of such rockets. The North Korean artillery and armor, obtained from the Soviets, was perhaps not composed of as advanced versions of this kind of equipment. However, Soviet armor has always been good, going all the way back to the old T-34 tanks of World War II. The North Koreans have the equivalent of about the T-62, Soviet-made tank. This tank has a 105 mm gun on it. If effectively commanded and used, it is a formidable, battlefield weapon. I forget what the proportion was, but the North Koreans had about 8-10 heavy tanks to every heavy tank the South Koreans had on the Korean Peninsula. Our force--the II Infantry Division--had some add-ons of armor and artillery, but is insignificant by contrast to either North or South.

So the North Koreans had a formidable force. The record of both North and South Koreans in combat, when they were well supplied and commanded by competent officers, was well demonstrated during both World War II and the Korean War. They were very

good. The South Koreans were very good in Vietnam, for that matter. So I think that both sides in Korea would have fought very well and tenaciously, had war broken out again on the Korean Peninsula.

Perhaps I should mention another geo-strategic factor which enormously complicates our military situation. As I mentioned, Seoul with its 14-15 million people lies 40 km south of the DMZ, about as far as Dulles airport is from the White House. Seoul today lies within rocket range of its enemy. If the North so chose--and why shouldn't they so choose?--the North could lob a couple of hundred rockets into Seoul at the very onset of an attack. If those rockets were to release some evil-looking smoke, and North Korean radio and agents spread the word of a poison gas attack--well, the likelihood of panic is dreadfully real. Imagine the populace north of the Han River trying to force their way across the Han River bridge, perhaps as the ROK army was dynamiting them...

Q: When you arrived in South Korea in 1983, could you describe how you saw the Embassy and the relationships within it?

DUNLOP: The first thing I saw was very indicative and very positive. Ambassador "Dixie" Walker came out to the airport to meet me, which he did not have to do. I was the Political Counselor, not his DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission]. He might have gone to the airport to meet the DCM. "Dixie" Walker is a warm and caring human being. He demonstrated this in all of his relations with his staff. If somebody made him mad, he might have gotten mad at them. However, basically, he was a very good man and a nice guy. When I saw him at the end of the airport passenger exit, I almost fell over, because it was such a surprise, but a very pleasant surprise.

"Dixie" had a very able DCM, who knew South Korea well. He had spent a lot of time there. One day Dave Lambertson, the Country Director for Korea in the Department, told me that this guy was a good Political Officer who knew South Korean matters well. Dave warned me against getting upset when he "gets into your knickers." Well, I never had any problem in that regard.

Q: Who was this DCM?

DUNLOP: I have a block on his name but I'll remember it in a few seconds. He went on to be Ambassador to New Zealand and Malaysia.

Q: Paul Cleveland.

DUNLOP: Paul Cleveland, yes. He was a big guy who looked just like John Wayne, the movie actor. He was genial and smart. He did not always show the best of judgment in his personal life, but that's another story. I think that I was fortunate or just smart enough to know that Paul was a resource to make use of. I was the new guy on the block in the Embassy in Seoul. It wouldn't have done me any good to tell Paul Cleveland that he didn't know what was going on in South Korea.

Q: He had been Political Counselor in Seoul when I was there in the Embassy.

DUNLOP: He had also been Country Director in the Department of State, or at least one of the desk officers. Paul was a hard charging, hard working, basically very effective person. He showed a lot of interest in the Political Section. After we got to know each other, we developed a good working relationship.

I had a good staff in the Political Section. In terms of language qualifications, they got better while I was there, not that I had anything to do with it. A couple of Political Officers left Seoul who never quite made it "over the language hump" and never became good Korean speakers. A couple of Political Officers came out to replace them who really spoke Korean well.

I had a good deputy chief of the Political Section, Dave Engel, who was later on replaced by David Pierce. The Section was functioning smoothly when I got there. I didn't have any overlap with my predecessor, David Blakemore, who went back to Washington to be the Korea Country Officer. There weren't a lot of things broken that had to be fixed. I didn't have to do much fixing in the Political Section. It was a very hard-working bunch of officers. This was a good thing, because we had a lot of work to do.

Q: What about contacts? How did you go about establishing contacts, and where were the contacts?

DUNLOP: That was not difficult, even, as I say, without my being able to speak Korean. Most South Koreans, whether in the opposition, the government, or those sort of on the sidelines, wanted to be in contact with the Embassy. There was a very vocal and active opposition which included all kinds of groups of people. The South Korean Government generally didn't discourage this kind of contact, although once in a while there would be some kind of feeble effort by some idiot in the South Korean security services to hamper the establishment of contacts. I say some idiot, because these efforts never succeeded and were never a major problem. An 'idiot' of this kind might try to tell some politically active dissident not to talk to people in the American Embassy. These dissidents would always come to us and say, "Here I am, bravely talking to the Americans." We could and did bitch back to the South Koreans about such ham-handed efforts to discourage our making contacts. We tried to ensure that this would not further complicate the life of the oppositionist involved.

Whatever the South Korean security authorities thought about our contacts with the opposition or whatever they might have liked to have done to limit such contacts, they didn't handle this successfully. For example, I quickly got to know Kim Yong Sam, who is now the President of Korea. At the time he was a prominent opposition leader. That is the only chief of state who, I could say, I was ever on a first name and friendly basis with. I drank a lot of his scotch whisky, ate a lot of his food, and listened to him. He was very

articulate and loquacious. He would hold forth literally for hours and hours on all manner of subjects.

Our principal contacts on the civilian side, of course, were with people from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministry was staffed with some superb people. They were absolutely first class people. If anything, they were better than the people in the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who were pretty good themselves. Taking a job in the South Korean civil service was a high prestige matter for university students.

There was a "pecking order" among the ministries, as, I understand, there is in Japan. All of these ministries gave very tough exams, but they could choose among the very top people. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and probably the Ministry of Finance, as in Japan, and later on the Ministry of Foreign Trade, were the three "premier" ministries in the South Korean Government.

Something which Dave Lambertson didn't say to me, although he would have said it a year or two later to somebody going out to the Embassy in Seoul, was that there would be a fourth issue of continuing concern to the Embassy. Perhaps a Political Officer wouldn't be quite so much involved with it, but it would still have very broad implications for the Korean-American relationship. That was the area of trade and commerce. South Korea was already in the take off stage of economic development. I knew that it was already an Asian "tiger," but it was a comparatively little tiger. The principal trading partner of South Korea was, guess who? The United States. It was evolving from a relationship in which we had been the country whose trade balance was a matter of concern for them to being a country whose trade balance we worried about. That question became an increasing preoccupation for the Embassy during my tour in Seoul. Although I was not directly involved in that area, or had responsibility therefor, trade and commercial questions sometimes had political implications. We certainly had a lot to be interested in, and that was something for us to watch.

Q: How did you find that Americans were viewed by influential groups in South Korea at that time? Things had begun to change.

DUNLOP: About half way through my tour in South Korea [1983-1987] I suggested to DCM Paul Cleveland that we do an analytical, "think piece" on anti-Americanism. Paul was a little leery about this, more because of the title than because of the substance of the issue. Perhaps he had a little more political sensitivity than I did on how this subject might echo around, back in Washington. We finally did this piece. I don't recall whether "anti-Americanism" was in the subject line or not. I think it was.

The reason that we did this piece was that there were a lot of manifestations of it among the university students. We didn't understand why this was the case. I think that, to some degree, that is still true. I don't think that I can say with total confidence exactly why some of those students barricaded themselves at Yonsei University in July, 1996. They had to be winkled out by the police. They were basically espousing the North Korean

"line" on reunification and blaming the United States for preventing this. This was one of the underlying themes of the student protest movement.

However, this attitude existed, and as the Chun regime drew to the close of its seven-year term, which was to end in 1988, student protests became more and more violent. Normally, the kind of protests the students engaged in only rarely attracted much public support. However, during my last months in South Korea, they did. We were very much engaged in trying to figure out "why," as well as what we could do to alleviate this feeling. We tried to find genuine things we did that were real irritants in the Korean-American relationship.

One of the things that we constantly looked at was the American military presence, including how American soldiers behaved off base and their interaction with the Korean people. I want to give full credit to the senior staff of the US military in South Korea for being very much concerned about this. Well, you were Consul General in Seoul and you know the kinds of things involved. You were also Consul General in Naples. Sailors come ashore and raise hell, sometimes. However, the things that US soldiers did in South Korea which seemed to irritate people were far less serious than what they actually did. It was more a matter of their just being there. I think that it's unpleasant but it's also fair to say that there is a strong, xenophobic, ethnocentric, and racist component in the Korean psychology. They really think that there is something special about the blood that flows in Korean veins. They think it is "better." To have Americans, foreigners, sitting around in the center of their cities is just an irritant in and of itself, no matter how much they may or may not behave like Boy Scouts when they go off base on leave.

So we looked at our troop presence all of the time. Some of my most interesting conversations with senior US military officers reflected this concern. I give them real credit for trying to deal with this problem. I think that they were as successful as they could have been in handling this problem. I don't think that we have anything particularly to be ashamed about regarding the conduct of our soldiers, most of whom behave themselves, although some of course don't.

However, there was one major irritant which I do criticize the US military for in South Korea. I also criticize the State Department, not so much for "playing along" with the US military but for failing to be strong enough to win the argument with the US military. I refer to the matter of the relocation of the military headquarters of the US forces from the center of Seoul. The US HQ base is called "Yongsan." It's a big base, with a golf course on it. The South Koreans have built through highways which come up to the 13th tee, where they have to stop because they can't build the highway from the 13th tee across to the other side.

In Tokyo in 1964 we moved all of our people out of Tokyo. This was called the "Kansai" relocation plan. We did this for the same reasons then that we should have done it at least 20 years later in South Korea.

Q: When land prices were still within reason.

DUNLOP: The South Koreans offered to build us a brand spanking new headquarters complex, including a golf course. There was even some thought given to making it a 36-hole golf course, if we would just get the hell out of downtown Seoul and move where they had already moved their own South Korean military headquarters. One argument the US military always use is that they have to be near their local counterparts. Well, their South Korean counterparts had left downtown Seoul. They were down near Caejon, which is about 60 miles South of Seoul. This is the one area where I really had arguments with the US military, and I think that I made myself somewhat unpleasant, because I really felt very strongly about this. However, the US military was very adamant about that. They did not want to make that move. They weren't entirely honest with us when they told us that they were willing to do so, but...

Q: Why wouldn't the US military move out of downtown Seoul? They were on the "wrong" [northern] side of the Han River, if you wanted...
DUNLOP: That was another reason to move. What the hell do you think would happen to those bridges over the Han River during the first hours of a possible North Korean attack? I think that there are some issues for bureaucracies that are "sacred." I think that that golf course, that golf club, and being right across the street from the Itaewon shopping area were, somehow, "sacred," that's all. They just weren't going to move. The US military still has that space. They still have it to this day. The South Korean Army headquarters is gone south, as it should have, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff then left, the South Korean Navy and Air Force left Seoul a long time ago. The South Korean Army Headquarters and their Joint Chiefs of Staff office were still in downtown Seoul when I arrived there in 1983. They are both gone from there now. They have all gone down to the new, military complex near Taejon, which they were willing to give us land adjacent to, so that we could build a new headquarters down in Taejon. We should have.

Well, that was the one aspect of our relationship with the US military where I felt that I "failed." I failed to persuade my Ambassador and my employer, the Department of State, to be tough enough on this issue. Ambassador "Dixie" Walker would go right up to the well, and then not drink the water. I know why. He knew this was a sensitive issue with the US military, and he regarded his relationship with the command as more important than moving our military command out of Seoul. If he had to cave on this issue in order to keep a smooth, easy, and friendly working relationship with the senior US military commanders out at Yongsan, he would go up to that point but not beyond it. However, I would have gone beyond that point and I don't think that there would have been any irreparable damage done to our relationship with the US military command. This was the right thing to do, and we didn't do it.

That's only a partial answer to your question. I'm not sure that I have the full answer to it. Let me talk about anti-Americanism in another way and place it in another context. It is true that there is a lot of anti-American feeling in South Korea. I think that some of it is racially and ethnocentrically motivated. Some of it is motivated by some things that we

should have done but didn't do, like move out of downtown Seoul. However, it doesn't matter very much. It's not all that important a political factor. Five years after the university students rioted and threw stones against the South Korean Government and shouted anti-American slogans, they peacefully took their examinations and are now in the Korean civil service. Or, if they are smart, they have been "snapped up" by Sam Sung, Gold Star, or other large companies and are following along in their fathers' and mothers' track. There is not a politically effective, organized, anti-American element, such as there was in France, for example.

Q: There is no intellectual group in South Korea, sitting around on the Left Bank or the Right Bank of the Han River, smoking cigarettes, writing books, and things like that.

DUNLOP: Most of these students are in their early 20's, have hair down to their shoulders, and are sort of going through a "rite of passage." This is another way of "guessing" what is going on, because I admit that I can't understand it.

Q: That's the closest that I can come to it. One can understand the "racial" motivation of this attitude. For example, I think that a very good indicator is that, for centuries, there has been a Chinese component in Korea which has never been absorbed. It sort of sits there like an undigested "lump." It's not very big, and it just doesn't go anywhere.

DUNLOP: I think that it's fair to say, and I've said this several times to people who know China well. They all agree with me, after thinking about it for a minute. I don't believe that there's another example of a country which is physically contiguous to "Han China" that does not have large Chinese elements in the population doing things like running the rice mills in South Vietnam, building cities like Penang in Malaysia and Singapore, or owning fishing islands off the coast of other countries. Korea was the "hermit kingdom" for a reason. The Koreans were squeezed in there between Japan and China. They had had difficult and unpleasant relationships with both of those countries. When the Yi dynasty became dominant in Korea, when China was reducing its foreign involvements, and when Japan had become a closed kingdom, the Yi dynasty in the early 17th century chose that time to seal off Korea.

So North and South Korea became the "hermit kingdom." For 250 years, woe betide a Portuguese (or any other) sailor washed ashore on a Korean island. He was promptly executed. It was against Korean law and was a capital offense to have any contact at all with a foreigner, except to kill him. You were permitted to do that. And that system worked for a long time.

Q: This isn't my time, but I can't resist giving a fiscal manifestation of this, which became clear to me in the course of consular work in South Korea. One of the things that we used to do, and maybe we still do, is that in the course of processing someone for a visa, we have a blood test made. We used to do this all over the world, or we were doing it. I was told by people who do this that Korea is very "difficult." In other countries there is always such a mixture of blood types and so forth. It is quite easy to come up with an

identification of blood types. However, Korean blood was always so "uniform" that you just didn't have those other variations. You couldn't come up with differences that you could find in other places. When you say, "it's in the Korean blood," in fact it IS in the blood.

DUNLOP: As you know, and as anybody knows who has had anything to do with Korea, there are very few, family names. There are 12 major family names. About 90% of all Koreans are named "Park," or "O" or "Yi," or another of these twelve names. There are 12 of those names. That's another reflection of how conscious Koreans are of their history.

One of the nice, bright, "fun" people to be with in the South Korean Foreign Ministry once came over to my house for lunch. For some reason or other the conversation took a personal turn. I told him that my father's family had lived for many generations in one place, in one house, here in the Washington, DC, area. He asked, "How many generations was that?" I said, "Well, if I could claim to have lived there, and I visited there many times, it would have been seven generations, but I am not sure that I can claim to have lived there." I was sort of visiting my father, who lived there, and so there were six generations, plus me and my brother. I said, "Well, how about yourself?" His name was "O." He said, "Let me think. We have a written record for 15 generations. However, we have an 'oral' record for another 15 generations." [Laughter] I thought, "My God, he goes back to Methuselah, or something like that!" I don't think that his family could really have records going back for 30 generations. I don't know how far back you can go. 30 generations takes you back to the Stone Age or something like that. So he was exaggerating that, but he probably wasn't exaggerating the 15 generations in the written record. He probably could go somewhere and find some scroll that had the family history going back at least 15 generations.

Q: One of the things that Foreign Service Officers are, or should be, renowned for, and particularly Political Officers, is knowing where the power is in a given society.

DUNLOP: That's what we're supposed to do.

Q: What do you feel were your particular targets in South Korea and why?

DUNLOP: Of those who wielded power, it was the South Korean military, under a civilian President, who had "civilianized" himself after seizing power as a military officer. These were the most important, single element in making decisions in the country. Korea itself is a highly hierarchical society. It's a little bit like an army in that respect. There have only been four Presidents since the end of World War II. That is, Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, and now Kim Yong Sam. I suspect, although I don't have any personal knowledge of it, that President Kim Yong Sam also runs his government on a very rigid, hierarchical system. He gives orders and doesn't consult others very much. That's how he ran his opposition party before taking office. He probably has his favorites who are his instruments for doing his will. Woe betide you if you "cross" one of them in the wrong way. So there is the South Korean military and its

"civilianized" leadership at the top. In fact, the "civilianized," military leaders didn't much use the title of "General," although they were career military officers, in every other respect. Chun, of course, was at the top in this regard.

There was a handful, later a double handful, and later a bushel and a peck full of industrial leaders, the so-called leaders of the "Chebol", which is the Korean word for "large, industrial organizations." Those people clearly had a great deal to say about who would be wielding political power. Any President in South Korea, up to Kim Yong Sam, and we may find out that it hasn't been so different with Kim Yong Sam, is co-opted by the "Chebol" to some degree. Politics in South Korea is an enormously expensive business. I was always surprised when the figures were quoted to me of what it cost, for example, a member of the National Assembly to run for office. The figure was in the millions of dollars! Now you can say that that is true in the United States. However, I was always surprised that it was that way in South Korea and that the figures were so large.

The South Korean military and the "Chebol" were the two major elements of power. I must say that we didn't do very well in establishing contact with the "Chebol." Ambassador "Dixie" Walker had a couple of good contacts through Korean Air, Hyundai, and, perhaps, Gold Star. The leaders of those three large business firms were among people that he saw. However, it seemed to me that these contacts were more on a "social basis" than on a basis that would be very productive for us to get to know who was really the most influential.

For example, as we came to the end of President Chun's term of office of seven years, one of the things that I always wanted "Dixie" to tell me was who his friends in these large business firms said that they wanted to have as the next President of the Republic of Korea. What did "Sammy" from Sam Sung have to say? What did "Charley" from Korean Air have to say? "Dixie" would say, "Well, they don't talk about that very much." So we didn't find out very much about that. The Agency [Central Intelligence Agency] was useless in all of that.

Q: I was going to ask about the role of the American CIA, because South Korea has often been known as a "CIA country."
DUNLOP: When Gen Park Chung Hee took power by a coup d'etat in 1961, I guess, a very short time after Syngman Rhee had been forced out of power and a very ineffective group of civilians was in office as an interim, caretaker government, the South Koreans did not have their own CIA in any meaningful way. I can say this because people who were there at the time have told me this, but I can't point to any written record. I can't find it in any of the declassified material which has been released. I might also say that we had bad relations with Park Chung Hee at the beginning, as we had bad relations with Chun Doo Hwan at the beginning. We didn't like Park Chung Hee's coup and we didn't like Chun Doo Hwan's coup, either. However, it soon became apparent, in any event, that Park Chung Hee was going to be the ruler of the country. If we were going to have any relationship with the South Korean Government, it would have to be with Park Chung Hee's government. One of the things which, I think, was deliberately done to develop a

closer relationship with Park Chung Hee was to persuade him that the Americans could organize a "CIA" for him that would be useful to him. So the Korean CIA, the KCIA, came into being in the 1960's, to all intents and purposes as a modern state security service.

I do not know whether our CIA people felt that they could "construct" a CIA for Park Chung Hee like our CIA, whose writ would only begin at the borders of the country. If they thought this, they were very naive. It didn't work out this way, of course. The KCIA has always been an instrument of political control in South Korea, as well as an organ for population surveillance and control. At times it has been an instrument of terror or near terror, although it has probably not been as bad as might be thought in some circles in the United States.

The KCIA does not operate primarily as an intelligence collection agency working against North Korea, for example. Yes, it has that function, just like our CIA. It has failed in that function. It has on occasion operated against anti-government Koreans abroad.

However, the KCIA became a significant instrument for President Park Chung Hee. When you asked me to list the "sources of power" in South Korea, I didn't mention the KCIA, because it is essentially an instrument of the South Korean Government and is very responsive to the President of South Korea. So there is not much point in singling it out, unless it plays a separate role. I'm not aware that it has ever played such a separate role. Now, maybe that is something that we don't know.

When the KCIA came into being, it was under the close supervision and guidance of the United States. At least the guidance of the United States. "Supervision," perhaps, is the wrong word. A lot of training was provided to it in making audio intercepts, telephone "taps," and other, relatively modern things like secret writing. I don't know what all our CIA trained the KCIA in, but they trained them in a lot. Therefore, the CIA Station Chief in Seoul has traditionally had a very close working relationship with his South Korean counterpart in the KCIA. South Korea is one of those countries where CIA operations are "declared." That is, the Chief of Station is officially known to the South Korean Government. His relationship is supposedly on an official, agency to agency basis.

That degree of intimacy or close relationship, if you will, that marked the first years of the Park Chung Hee regime and the formation of the KCIA, which was handled by Kim Jong Pil, has eroded since then, to some degree. In fact, by the time I arrived in South Korea in 1983, the relationship with the KCIA was not all of that close. The CIA Chiefs of Station always claimed to be very close to their counterparts in the KCIA, but I think that that relationship was under the control of the South Korean side. Certainly, the degree of intimacy was under South Korean control. As in so many countries, where I had to deal with internal affairs and the "locus of power," the CIA Station wasn't very helpful. Perhaps they tried in good faith to be of help, and I liked the people whom I knew and worked with there in the CIA Station in South Korea. However, I cannot look back now on the four years I spent in South Korea [1983-1987] and say, "There was one time there

when the Chief of Station told me something that was really important and which we wouldn't have known otherwise or couldn't have figured out otherwise."

KCIA operations against the civilian population of South Korea were very much like those of the Japanese police, although the South Koreans never admit that they have learned anything from the Japanese. The very "un-American" component of that attitude is that they believe that they are responsible for knowing what everybody is up to, all of the time, whether people are politically active or not. So the policeman on the beat is supposed to know all of the households on his beat. They have these "police boxes" on every other street corner.

If a South Korean individual get involved politically in a way that the government doesn't like, they will watch him carefully. At some point he will get a phone call from somebody whom he may or may not know, who will say that he would like to talk with this person. He will introduce himself as a representative of the South Korean security services. He will say, "We're aware of what you're doing and we think that you're doing too much of it. Wouldn't it be better for you and your family to stop?" That kind of thing is very alien and distasteful to us, but it's very much the way the South Koreans operate. I suspect that it will take a long time for that attitude to change. They would say that that is acting like a "good steward," with a place for everything and everything in its place.

Q: What about your relationships with "dissenters" and the opposition? How did you handle these and to what extent did they have any effect?

DUNLOP: We had a lot of contact with the opposition. I mentioned Kim Yong Sam. During my four years in South Korea the two most prominent members of the opposition, and the ones best known outside of South Korea, were Kim Yong Sam and Kim Dae Jung. They were very different people, from different parts of the country. They thoroughly detest each other, so there is very little cooperation between them.

When I arrived in South Korea in 1983, Kim Dae Jung was in exile in the United States. He had been sentenced to death after the Kwangju incident of May, 1980. Part of the "deal" in regularizing our relationship with the South Korean Government, which was very much disliked by us and with which we had very little contact at that time in the early days after the coup d'etat, was that if we let that relationship to assume a more normal posture, Kim Dae Jung would be released from jail. His death sentence would be commuted, and he would be allowed to go wherever he wanted. Of course, he wanted to go to the United States, where he was supported by various elements on the Left. He was very much a "guru" [leader] of the opposition and very much a pet of the American civil liberties lobby, if you will, or at least those taking an interest in the South Korean side of it.

On the other hand Kim Yong Sam was in South Korea. He too had been in and out of jail a number of times. He was out of jail when I went to South Korea in 1983 and never went back into jail. One of my jobs was to get to know Kim Yong Sam. As I said, I got to

know him quite well. I saw him frequently, usually in a social setting. However, clearly, our relationship was a business one--he to influence us, if he could, we to learn as much as possible about him and his activities.

What kind of "business" was the South Korean opposition doing with us? Mainly telling us what they were up to, or what they wanted us to believe they were up to, and hoping that we would like it. They were very critical in public of the United States' supposed "support" of Chun and all his dictatorial ways. However, in private they really knew what the situation was, that is, that we didn't have any control over Chun's actions in the field of civil liberties. Where we could influence the situation, we did so in a way that the South Korean opposition would approve. That is, liberalizing the political system and making the South Korean opposition's role in it more important and easy. On a personal basis, they were always happy to see us.
Some efforts were made by the South Korean police at various times to "control" our access to the opposition at the very top. That is, to Kim Yong Sam. However, that never worked. We were always able to contact the opposition. When Kim Dae Jung returned from the United States to South Korea, an "arrangement" was made with Kim. This arrangement with Kim Dae Jung was made by a very bright guy in the KCIA, whom I knew quite well. This KCIA official went to the States and struck a deal with Kim Dae Jung in 1956, I believe, and later told me about it. Actually, we got this information from different sources, but I was one of them. Under this arrangement, Kim Dae Jung would be allowed to come back to South Korea if he would promise the South Korean Government that he would do nothing to stimulate the violent activities of the students. That is, Kim Dae Jung would not promote any further violence.

Under this arrangement, Kim Dae Jung could say anything that he wanted, although at first he was kind of restricted or under a form of house arrest, but that was kind of a joke. In effect, he held court in his house, so it was not really house arrest. There was freedom of access to Kim Dae Jung by anybody who wanted to go out there, including American journalists, who visited him fairly frequently. For a while, he actually liked the idea of being under house arrest. I once told him that, and he gave me a very sour look. I said, "It's not all bad that you're here under this so-called 'house arrest.' This gives you a kind of status."

However, once Kim Dae Jung came back to South Korea, we had access to him, and I was the guy who handled that. The Ambassador was a little too high-ranking, and Paul Cleveland, the DCM, didn't want to do it. I was the Political Counselor. Everybody in the South Korean Government accepted that this was my job, so I did it. Of course, I enjoyed meeting with Kim Dae Jung. It was a lot of fun and great stuff to be doing.

I must say that the day when Kim Dae Jung returned to South Korea was one of the worst days that I ever spent in the Foreign Service. It is worth recounting this in some detail.

Q: I was wondering about this, but go ahead.

DUNLOP: His return was much heralded in advance. There were all kinds of stories about "He's coming, he's coming." He came back to South Korea on a Korean Air aircraft, accompanied by some Americans. There were two Members of Congress with him, a Congressman named Feighan and another Congressman from New Jersey, who has acquired some notoriety. Now I remember, he was Congressman Torricelli [Democrat, New Jersey].

The two Congressmen were a sort of "honor guard" for Kim Dae Jung's return to South Korea. Also with him was the lady who had been the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights under President Carter...

Q: Patt Derian.

DUNLOP: Patt Derian. Mary, of the rock concert group, "Peter, Paul, and Mary..."

Q: They were a political "protest group" from the 1960's.

DUNLOP: She had continued her activities in that direction. There were also a couple of other strap hangers from the very vocal group in the United States who made a living out of criticizing American policies in South Korea for supporting "dictatorship," and all of that.

Why did they feel that they should come back to South Korea with Kim Dae Jung? Well, they persuaded themselves that Kim Dae Jung's life was in danger, just as the man who had been shot down on the tarmac in Manila...

Q: Senator Benigno Aquino, who was assassinated...

DUNLOP: As he deplaned, right. Well, perhaps you could say for the really naive among them that that may have been a real concern. However, for anyone who knew anything about South Korea, the safest person in the whole Korean Peninsula was Kim Dae Jung as he got off the airplane.

However, there was a very loud backfire and a great commotion at the airport in Seoul...

Q: Was it an automobile or something like that?

DUNLOP: I'll tell you about it. We knew that there was a potential for a problem because we thought that Kim Dae Jung wanted turmoil at the airport. We knew, from talking to his supporters, that a great crowd was going to assemble at the airport. We also knew that, "Hell, no, they weren't," because the South Korean Government was going to keep them away. There was going to be a modest little deplaning ceremony, Kim Dae Jung would pass through customs and immigration formalities, and then he would be taken in a car to his home. There already was an element of confrontation at the airport. Particularly after talking to Kim Dae Jung's supporters, we had every reason to think that this airport

confrontation was not undesired by these people. If there wasn't a confrontation, they appeared determined to make one. Well, we thought that this wasn't a good idea, with the Congressmen coming on that airplane and a lot of "pushing and shoving" going on around this. So we said, "Let's see what we can do to prevent that."

We talked with both Kim Dae Jung's supporters, who were awaiting the return of their "hero," with the South Korean security people, and with an officer from the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs at great length on this. I was kind of the point man, along with a couple of my Political Officers.

The officer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Park Chung Woo, who is now the Ambassador to the United States, is a wonderful man. He quickly understood that turmoil at the airport would be bad for everybody, including his relationship with us and our relationship with the South Koreans. We devised an elaborate "Fail Safe" plan, which nevertheless failed at almost every step. It involved having somebody from the group of Americans who were to accompany Kim Dae Jung fly out to South Korea in advance, because the State Department was talking with these people. This person would go over the game plan for the arrival. Then he would go to Tokyo, get on the plane with Kim Dae Jung and the others, and explain the "game plan" to the others, because they were in different parts of the US and couldn't get together.

So what was the "game plan"? The plan was that the South Korean Government would send a team of customs and immigration inspectors, from these two different services, onto the plane, process Kim Dae Jung's documents on the plane, and then take him directly to a car, which would take him home. Anybody on the American side who wanted to could go with Kim Dae Jung. However, they would have to go through customs and immigration in the airport terminal first. A government vehicle would be provided for them, too. They wouldn't be getting a South Korean police escort. In other words, the government was going to facilitate Kim Dae Jung's arrival in Seoul in this perfectly reasonable way. If these Americans just understood that, they would understand what happened when Kim Dae Jung, and his wife, who was with him, would be separated from these Americans at the terminal because the South Korean authorities insisted, for sovereignty reasons, on treating their citizen--Kim--differently from the way they treated these Americans.

I don't know how many times I explained this to this very nice but rather vague and unsophisticated woman from the group who came out to Seoul ahead of time. Then she flew back to Tokyo and got on Kim Dae Jung's plane. At the last minute the South Korean authorities decided that they had better have a Korean Foreign Service Officer on Kim Dae Jung's plane from Tokyo who could help. So the South Koreans included someone from their Embassy in Tokyo on Kim Dae Jung's plane.

The plane was due in Seoul at about 12:00 noon. We had two Korean-speaking Embassy officers, Dave Engel and Kim Quinones, very level-headed people who had permission to go through the police cordon to the place in the "Arrivals Area" where the passengers

from Kim Dae Jung's plane would be coming through. They would be there to welcome the Congressmen and explain once again anything that was still unexplained.

Well, Park Chung Woo, the officer from the South Korean Foreign Ministry, and I were uneasy. We had a bad feelings about this. All these plans had been made, including getting someone on the plane in Tokyo; having the procedure explained; separating Kim Dae Jung and his wife from his American "escorts," if only for a short time; and having Dave Engel and Kim Quinones there at the Seoul airport to explain what was going on and allay any fears. So Park Chung Woo decided that he and I should be together some place. So we decided that the best place to meet was at lunchtime, and I invited him over to my house for lunch. Dave Engel and Kim Quinones would keep us informed by telephone.

We got the phone call all right. It was from Patt Derian, who was screaming, "They're beating us up! They're beating us up!" In fact, Patt Derian had made herself so obnoxious that the South Korean police had thrown her up a downward-moving escalator, or down an upward-moving escalator! This is too long a story. Kim Dae Jung had refused to be separated from his American "escorts." He had refused to be processed on the airplane by South Korean customs and immigration officers. He had insulted them both, in Korean, as we later found out, by calling them something like, "Filthy, mangy curs of Chun Doo Hwan." He said, "You will not touch my passport," deliberately provoking them. They took him physically but not violently into an elevator, holding him by the elbows and moving him and his wife down to that damned car.

Meanwhile, the American escorts started screaming, yelling, pushing, and trying to get into the elevator. They were pushed back, to the point where Patt Derian had her unwanted trip the wrong way on the escalator. There was total chaos. The press was at a distance, with their telescopic lenses and all of that. All of this was to the total delight of some of the Americans in the escort party, who wanted this to happen. Of course, Kim Dae Jung wanted it, too, and had deliberately provoked it, to make the Korean government look as bad as possible, at least on TV. I do not say that the South Korean police acted with their usual discretion and gentleness in all this, but nobody was hurt. However, in their own view, the American escorts were abused.

Ambassador "Dixie" Walker had arranged to meet the American escorts at their hotel at 5:00 PM. They came into the room where the meeting was to take place, and these people were all really ready for him. They more or less sprang at his throat. "Dixie" didn't handle this situation very well. He didn't like these people any more than he liked the Jesse Helms's [Republican Senator from North Carolina] of this world. That showed. Anyway, it was a bad day at Black Rock, for me at least.

Congressmen Feighan and Torricelli came to breakfast at the Ambassador's the next day. They were a little bit sheepish about all of this in my opinion, but not enough. [Laughter] We had to do a long series of cables on this, because this was all played up by the press.

There were headlines like, "American Congressmen Beaten Senseless in Confrontation with South Korean Security 'Goons.'"

Well, there were all kinds of South Korean opposition people. There were other oppositionists like Kim Dae Jung and his supporters and Kim Yong Sam. They all wanted the ear of the Americans, so we didn't lack for opportunities to talk to them.

Q: As you were looking at this situation, did you consider that, of the two South Korean opposition leaders, you had more or less "written off" Kim Dae Jung as a serious leader or not?

DUNLOP: I wouldn't quite put it like that. However, I certainly came to the conclusion that Kim Dae Jung was the less likely of those two opposition leaders to have a political future after Chun left office. Chun was in office as President of the Republic of Korea through November, 1987. It did not seem possible that either Kim would be allowed to run for a major office with any chance of winning.

I didn't know Kim Dae Jung before this incident at the airport, because he wasn't in South Korea. After he came back to South Korea, I got to know him better. I felt that Kim Yong Sam was far and away the "savvier" politician, mainly because Kim Dae Jung didn't know how to rid himself of this picture which people had of him as a kind of Count or Duke of Kwangju. That is, a man who was associated inseparably with Kwangju Province. Kwangju is only one of the five great areas of South Korea. It is the least prosperous and does not have the most voters. Kim Dae Jung never learned how to speak as a national politician. This was an error for him. Kim Yong Sam was also identified with the Southeastern area of South Korea. He came from around Taegu, from Kyongsong Namdo, in Kyongsong Province. However, he was able to project a broader view of himself. So people from Kyongsong northwards or from around Seoul or down in Pusan were better able to think of Kim Yong Sam as representing them, whereas Kim Dae Jung always looked like "that guy from Kwangju."

There were a couple of other things which acted as a "plus" for Kim Yong Sam and as a "minus" for Kim Dae Jung. All politicians are egomaniacs, to some degree. Kim Yong Sam is less of an egomaniac in this respect than Kim Dae Jung. Kim Dae Jung was, perhaps, the most egocentric person that I've ever dealt with over any period of time in this type of situation. Everything that went on around Kim Dae Jung was like a medieval court. This was something which seemed totally to have escaped his Leftist admirers in the United States. He made enemies, even in a country which understands that politicians are egocentric people operating under a hierarchical system. Kim Dae Jung may not even have known how many enemies he was making, but in fact he was making enemies all the time, simply by acting like, say, the Duke of Bedford at the time of Elizabeth I of England. This just wasn't appropriate. The South Korean political system was modernizing. It was the last thing to modernize in the country. The economic system, water systems, and electricity systems had all entered the 20th century, while politics, at least during the Syngman Rhee era, was unchanged. Syngman Rhee was a feudal

politician. Kim Dae Jung also could not play any other role than that. Kim Yong Sam knew how to play a more modern politician's role, and that's why he's President of the Republic of Korea today.

I personally didn't like Kim Dae Jung, because he lied to me about a dozen times. I don't remember any time that Kim Yong Sam lied to me. I mean, he wouldn't tell me "the whole truth and nothing but the truth." He would change his mind or do something differently, but I never thought that this was a case of deliberate deception. Kim Dae Jung would lie like a trooper if he thought that it was to his tactical advantage. However, whatever tactical advantage he gained by this behavior, in the long run it wasn't a plus for him. So I thought that Kim Dae Jung would not become a politician at the national level, because he didn't know how to behave as a national politician.

Q: You mentioned Kwangju Province. The suppression of political activity there in 1980 still surfaces from time to time. How was this issue and the alleged American role in it "playing" at that time? Could you explain what the Kwangju incident was?

DUNLOP: As I said, Kim Dae Jung is from Kwangju Province. He is the "Prince of Kwangju." If the people of Kwangju had anything to say about it, he would be elected "President for Life." In fact, the people of Kwangju haven't had any say about it, but they have protested many, many times on behalf of Kim Dae Jung and against the South Korean Government. Not necessarily always on behalf of Kim Dae Jung but for other Kwangju leaders or in support of other things that have occurred. The people of Kwangju regard themselves as living in the province most ignored by people in power in Seoul. They believe that their province gets less of the development "pie." They think that their province is more deserving but receives less in the way of whatever goodies the South Korean Government has to hand out. So there is resentment against the central government in Kwangju Province, which is the political base of Kim Dae Jung.

Kim Dae Jung had been a Kwangju politician who opposed the Park Chung Hee government over the years. The Park Chung Hee government and the KCIA [Korean CIA] in about 1974, although I am not absolutely sure of the year, arranged to have Kim Dae Jung kidnaped, while he was in Japan. I've heard Kim Dae Jung tell this story, which is probably true. According to him, a KCIA kidnap squad grabbed him, drugged him, put him in a bag, and placed him on a fishing boat to take him, as he believes, out to sea where he would allegedly be dropped over the side. (In another interview in the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program former Ambassador Dan O'Donohue has described this incident in detail.)

The CIA Chief of Station in Seoul at that time was Don Gregg, who has since become an Ambassador to South Korea. He replaced Jim Lilley as Ambassador, who is another former CIA officer. At the time of the kidnaping of Kim Dae Jung, Phil Habib was the Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. Gregg told Habib that he had learned about the kidnaping from somebody in the KCIA, and the American Government went bananas to try and save Kim Dae Jung's life. There was shouting and screaming, and Ambassador

Habib got in touch with South Korean President Park Chung Hee literally in the middle of the night. Kim Dae Jung believes that those representations saved his life. He says that he was bound and gagged on the fishing boat. His story is, and for all that I know, it's true, that a plane flew over the fishing boat and dropped a message to the people on the boat. He claims that he heard them talking about this message. Although Kim Dae Jung never saw the message, he heard that it said, "Don't throw him overboard. Bring him back. The Americans are mad about this incident." I am not sure how this message was conveyed or whether the KCIA kidnap squad ever intended to drop Kim Dae Jung over the side or not. In any case, Kim Dae Jung was returned to prison by the Park Chung Hee Government. He was subsequently let out. This is all relevant to the Kwangju incident, although perhaps it doesn't appear that it is.

Kim Dae Jung is grateful to the Americans for saving his life. Many years later, when Gregg had been nominated as Ambassador, he told Ambassador Gregg, and I saw the letter, "So glad that you are coming out here. I'm looking forward to meeting you. I want to thank you personally for the role which you and your government played in saving my life." So Kim Dae Jung was allowed out of prison when Park Chung Hee was assassinated on about November 27, 1979, not long before Christmas that year. Kim Dae Jung thought, and perhaps there is some reason to support this, that the death of Park Chung Hee and his replacement by a military junta which promised, as most juntas do, free elections and a reinstallation of democratic rule, would give him, Kim Dae Jung, an opportunity really to begin to have a chance to play a role in elections. So Kim Dae Jung immediately went into action. Same thing with Kim Yong Sam.

There were demonstrations in Kwangju Province in support of Kim Dae Jung's reemergence as a political figure following the death of Park Chung Hee. On December 12, 1979, Chun Doo Hwan, Ruh Tae Woo and another group of generals from Chun's class at the Korean Military Academy, the famous "11th Class," took power in a violent coup d'etat. Several people were killed in Seoul, and this is the event for which Chun has recently been tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. By May, 1980, it had become apparent to any observer who understood what the signals were, that the military junta had no intention of allowing a democratic, political process to emerge. Chun was going to be "chosen" in some farcical election process, perhaps to be "President for Life," just as Park Chung Hee had been.

Beginning on May 19, 1980, there were violent anti-Chun demonstrations in Kwangju Province. Chun sent in South Korean Special Forces personnel who acted with particular brutality, not only against the demonstrators but also against the civilian population of Kwangju City. For seven days Kwangju City was in turmoil. It didn't take the Special Forces troops very long to beat the people off the street. However, a number of people holed up in the City Hall. There had already been bloodshed. Reportedly, as many as 200 people had been killed by May 21.

The American role in all of this was "zero." We didn't know in advance that this act of repression was going to take place. When we heard what was happening, Gen John

Wickham, the commander of US forces in South Korea, and Ambassador Bill Gleysteen personally and through various members of their staffs in contact with the South Koreans urged them and plead with them to remove the South Korean Special Forces from Kwangju, since they were behaving so badly. They urged the South Koreans, "Do not storm the City Hall and kill everybody in it. Try and negotiate a solution and use other troops to do that." The Republic of Korea 20th Division was then sent down to Kwangju City to replace the Special Forces detachment. The 20th Division was normally under the South Korean Combined Forces Command but it was removed from this command for this operation. A message was sent from the South Korean Army to Gen Wickham saying, "We are exercising the authority that we have under the agreement. Arrangements have been made to remove this division from the Combined Forces Command and place it solely under South Korean Government control. It will be returned to the Combined Forces Command as soon as the situation in Kwangju permits."

The 20th Division went down to Kwangju and replaced the Special Forces detachment. In fact, it acted in a much more "proper" role. Eventually, the City Hall in Kwangju City was taken back from the insurgents, as they were then called, I guess rightly so, with some violence but without the excessive force and the bloodshed that would probably have attended this operation, had it been carried out by the Special Forces detachment.

Throughout all of this our role was to urge the South Korean Government to act with the greatest degree of circumspection possible. However, there was a widespread perception that we had approved of the whole course of action in Kwangju. This perception was deliberately spread by President Chun. He had leaflets distributed, and I've seen copies of them, which said, "The American forces in the Republic of Korea call on you (that is, the "insurgents") to surrender immediately." There were references to an impending North Korean attack, attributed to the Americans, in those leaflets. This was a total fabrication which was deeply resented by Gen. John Wickham and Ambassador Bill Gleysteen, with whom I have talked at great length regarding this incident. This was bitterly resented and was more than an irritant. It was an obstacle to normal relationships with the Chun regime as long as the Carter administration was in office. During this time we did not have a normal relationship with the Chun Government, and this was not restored until President Reagan entered office in January, 1981.
When I arrived in South Korea in 1983, the Kwangju incident was a relatively recent memory, as it had taken place only three years previously. This incident was part of the rhetoric of the Left in the United States about the "brutal dictator," Chun, and the alleged role of the United States in this incident. The Kwangju incident was also raised in the streets of South Korea, when the students demonstrated against the Chun Doo Hwan Government.

My personal involvement with the Kwangju incident was limited to learning about it in a rather superficial way before I arrived in South Korea. I observed this component as an element in the student protests, but not much more than that. On May 25, 1985, I was having lunch in the Seoul Plaza Hotel, not far from our USIS [United States Information

Service] building when the phone rang. This was a lunch which I periodically had with diplomatic colleagues. On this occasion I was the host.

The waiters called me over to the phone. My secretary was on the line. She very properly told me that something was going on over at the USIS building and suggested that I go over there and see what it was. I excused myself, asked my Japanese colleague to "pick up the tab," and I would pay him back later.

So I walked over to the USIS office, which was only a short distance from the hotel. The USIS office was on the ground floor of the building, which also housed the USIS Library on the second floor. 73 Korean students had forced their way into the Library and barricaded themselves there. They demanded that Ambassador "Dixie" Walker come immediately and speak to them. I walked in there to face some unknown faces behind a barricade of bookshelves piled up at the doorway. As I noted before, I did not speak Korean, although I wished very much that I could do so. Not only just to talk but to listen to what the students had to say to each other.

The students had handed in a list of five written demands. The first was that Ambassador "Dixie" Walker come to the USIS Library and personally apologize for the "slaughter" of an alleged 2500 people in Kwangju. The other demands concerned matters like the removal of American nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula and our immediately ensuring the peaceful reunification of Korea by withdrawing our troops from the South Korea. There were "simple" little demands like that.

Q: "Easy" to resolve.

DUNLOP: Yes. I was so grateful that they went "right to the bone" of US- South Korean relations. Well, we finally got an interpreter there, who turned out to be incompetent. We had to change interpreters at least once. However, since I was the first American Embassy officer on the scene, I became the negotiator with the students. It took us three days to get them out of the USIS Library. These were three, very tension-filled days. First of all, they were on a hunger strike. Secondly, they threatened to burn the building down. They said that they had "Molotov cocktails" and other incendiary devices, which the students often carried around. They used to throw these things. Fortunately, they were usually filled with kerosene, not with gasoline. That's why fewer people were hurt in these incidents than you might have expected. Once in a while they used gasoline, and a couple of students burned themselves to death, since they just did not know how to handle the stuff.

We didn't know whether they had gasoline and we didn't know whether they were serious about the threat to burn down the building. However, we had no alternative but to take them seriously.

So for three days they stayed in the USIS Library. This incident began at noon on a Thursday, and the students left Sunday noon. These were three rather intense days. I spent a total of about 22 or 23 hours actually talking or negotiating with them, if you can call it

"negotiating." We identified their leaders. Actually, they identified themselves. One of my jobs was to find out whether these were the real leaders of the group. Apparently, they were. The students were led by a committee of five persons, five young Korean males. There were also a couple of females in the group. They immediately draped the inside of the picture type windows which faced out on the street with banners detailing their demands. The press, of course, flocked around. The South Korean Police secured the area, thereby disrupting downtown traffic.

We had a table brought up to the barricade at the door and persuaded the Korean students to remove the barricade and sit at the other side of the table. They more or less did this, although they kept part of the barricade in place, in the form of heavy bookcases which were close by. I guess they thought that we were going to rush them. The interpreter and I sat on "our" side of the table, and we started to talk. I did not relish the prospect of suddenly being yanked over the table and becoming a hostage, so a Marine stood directly behind me with a guy on my left.

Fairly early on we were able to dispose of all of the demands except the "apology" for the Kwangju incident. We told them that these other demands were ridiculous, particularly the "demand" about the reunification of Korea. I pointed out to them that their demands for reunification, the removal of nuclear weapons, and the evacuation of American forces from South Korea might make good rhetoric on the campuses, but we could not talk about them. We agreed to talk about the Kwangju incident.

There were those in the Embassy and back in Washington, when they got their fingers in the "pie," who didn't want to talk about anything with the students. In reply to these views, I said, well, the only other thing that we could do is just to tell them to leave the USIS Library. What if they don't? My view was that we could talk about Kwangju because we had a good case. I didn't know as much about the Kwangju incident then as I do now. I figured that I knew people who did. There was one person in particular in the American Mission who had been present in Korea at the time and knew a lot about what the military relationship had been between the US and the South Koreans. He had a pretty good grasp of the sequence of events. We brought this man over. He actually was the civilian adviser to the CINC [Commander in Chief, US Command], a position which he had held for many years. He was a civil servant, an employee of the Department of the Army, and an excellent man who knew Korea and spoke Korean. I told him that I was glad that I didn't have to pay him. I told him that he should have been a Political Officer in the Embassy. He said, "Don't tell the military that, because they are paying me, and this is not what I'm supposed to be doing."

Q: Who was this?

DUNLOP: I've got a block on his name.

Q: We'll fill his name in later.

DUNLOP: I hope so. I think that he's still there in South Korea. If so, I hope that the Embassy is using him and his knowledge, for he's a real gold mine of information. His job in South Korea was to advise the CINC on the political leanings of the South Korean officers who were dealing with him. He was sort of a walking biographic library on these various South Korean officers. It was a very important thing to do, and it was smart of the US military to pay him to do that. I'm not sure that the Embassy would ever have gotten around to doing that or could have done it. And the CIA "Station" was totally out of the picture.

He came over to the Embassy and told me a lot about Kwangju, and I got him to talk directly to the student leaders. We would begin all of these discussion sessions with my reminding them that they were illegally in the USIS Library building, that they had damaged US Government property, that they were young people acting irresponsibly, and that they should leave immediately. I made the same points at the end of the discussions.

However, after a while the discussions focused on Kwangju. It was difficult to know to what degree they believed what we were saying. They never admitted that they believed it. We made our case as quietly, calmly, and logically as we possibly could. They listened and, after about three days, they finally left. It was a great moment for me when they left. And they left without being hurt in any way.

The South Korean Police wanted to smash the windows and drag these students out. We, of course, would not permit that, as this was diplomatic property. Having young Koreans beaten up by South Korean Police on our property was just impossible to contemplate. There were some people who said, "Well, then let's get the Marine Guards into this and get rid of these students." This raised the same problem, though perhaps slightly less of a problem than if they were removed by South Korean Police or military. The way we wanted to do it was to talk them out of there.

Of course, by their occupation of the USIS Library, they were achieving one of their purposes. Perhaps this was the only purpose that they could have realistically achieved and was the most important. That is, to get publicity for their views. Every minute that they had those banners up in the windows, and they would take them down and put them back up later, they were achieving one of their purposes. It looked as if these banners were printed on sheets which they had brought with them. We never figured out where they got that stuff. Of course, they had "cased" the building before. After all, the USIS Library was open to the public.

Several issues arose about crisis management which might be worth talking about, because this was a crisis. There were 73 lives at stake. I don't think that any of the Americans in the USIS building would have been hurt, had the building started to burn, although some of us might have been.
I think that we did the right thing in having one principal negotiator. (Bernie Lavin, the USIS chief, was also heavily involved and a great help.) I got very tired throughout this period. Paul Cleveland, the DCM, would periodically ask me if I didn't want someone to

spell me. However, I think that consistency in our approach to the students was very important. At times I just had to stop and say, "All right, that's enough for today." Then I would go off and lie down and rest.

Interpretation is also very important. We had a really bad interpreter at first. One of the problems in dealing with Koreans is this emphasis on politeness. The first interpreter was doing two things that were terribly wrong. He was using denigrating terminology which I was not using for him, I was the Political Counselor dealing with these "riffraff" from off the streets. That was absolutely wrong. The interpreter should have said in Korean exactly what I said in English, but it was very hard for him to do that. The second thing that he did was the exact opposite. He would not interpret into Korean some of the "tough things" that I wanted to say, such as, "You young people are acting irresponsibly." He would use the vocabulary of address that was denigrating to them, but he couldn't bring himself to say the things that I wanted to say to them.

Of course, you can't carry on a discourse as if it were a one way street, when I was telling them to leave. There had to be something else in the discussion. The "something else" was the Kwangju incident.

We had these long discussions about Kwangju, with me doing my bit about denouncing their behavior and ending it that way. Between times I would discuss the Kwangju incident and answer their questions. Of course, they were abysmally ignorant about what had actually happened in Kwangju. For them this was just a symbol, and the figure of 2,500 deaths was a figure that they had picked up. In fact, the South Korean opposition to the government usually used the figure of 2,000 deaths in Kwangju, and the students "tacked" 500 more deaths on to it. They were even more aggressive in this respect, or whatever the word should be.

They finally left the USIS Library. We had allowed them to express their views to us on a range of issues. Then we allowed one of the students to come out of the barricaded area and meet with a designated pool reporter from the press. The students said that they wanted to talk directly to the press. Then the student representative went back in. They sang some of their student, revolutionary songs and then filed out and boarded police buses, which were waiting to take them away. Of course, the South Korean Police were going to arrest them. From the start they knew that they would eventually be arrested, if they didn't burn themselves alive first. We also made it clear to the South Korean Police that we were going to follow the treatment of the students very closely. We said that we expected that there would be no physical mistreatment or beatings of these young people. There were none, as far as we know, and I think we knew.

A couple of points about crisis management. The question arose about food. They arrived at the USIS Library on an advertised hunger strike. In my view, they had chosen to use food as a weapon, if you will. I thought that it was legitimate for us to use food as a weapon also, if we could figure out how to do it. We asked the Department to ask CIA, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigations], the ATF [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearms], or whatever agency had experience with hostage negotiations whether we should give these young people food when they got really hungry. We never got an answer, which I thought was disgraceful. The answer might have been, "We don't have a clue" as to whether giving them food would be a good or bad thing. I began to be concerned because I thought that the tone of their voices was getting ragged. But silence was unacceptable to me. Well, they were hungry. They actually didn't eat anything. They had access to the water fountains and the toilets, and we made sure that those continued to function. Some of our people said at the beginning, "Turn those off." Well, we could have turned them off but didn't. We got absolutely no help from Washington on such issues.

The next thing that I wanted to do is that I wanted somebody with the necessary skills to "bug" that room and tell me what the students were saying to each other. Would you believe that I was told that we don't have that capability?

Q: With all of that fancy, CIA equipment and the equipment which military counterintelligence has?

DUNLOP: Nobody did it. I wanted somebody to tape the conversations between the students and listen to it. I didn't want to have them transcribed but I wanted someone to listen and tell me what they were saying to each other. We never got that, and I thought that this was also disgraceful.

However, the protestors finally left. Everybody was very happy at the way that this crisis had been handled, because nobody was hurt and, I guess, God was good to us at that time.

Q: Perhaps we can talk about some other things in South Korea. One issue was the KAL [Korean Air Lines] plane shot down during your time there.

DUNLOP: Yes.

Q: Another issue is what kind of pressure were we putting on the Chun Government to leave office during your time in South Korea? Other questions might be human rights and other aspects of our relations with South Korea, including, perhaps, the role of the Christian missionaries. This was, perhaps, no longer so important.

DUNLOP: I think that it was important.

Q: Please deal with that. Was there any Japanese activities from a political point of view during your time in South Korea? There is always an uneasy relationship between Koreans and Japanese. How about the South Korean reaction to developments in China and also in the Soviet Union? There's quite a bit to cover. So we can pick it up next time.

Q: Today is September 16, 1996. We have the shooting down of the KAL aircraft by the Soviets, the departure from office of Chun and concern that he would not leave office,

human rights, and relations between South Korea and Japan, China, and the Soviet Union.

DUNLOP: Yes, other things may come to mind as we go over this list. Let me start with the shoot down by the Soviets of KAL Flight 007. This was a scheduled Boeing 747 flight from New York to Seoul via Detroit and Anchorage, operated by Korean Air Lines. It left Anchorage for a non-stop flight to South Korea, which took it on a long, over-water, southeastwards course which was not very well covered by navigational aids. For some time, through the ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization], whose headquarters are in Ottawa, Canada, we had been trying to arrange for various places around the world to be better covered with navigational aids. That is, radar stations that would track flights, give positional information, and so forth. The area where this flight took place was an "uncovered area." The flight path took the aircraft over the Pacific Ocean, near Soviet territory. The Soviets had not been cooperative in agreeing to install navigational aids. The flight path was along the coast of Siberia, which includes the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kuril Islands.

KAL Flight 007 took off from Anchorage, bound for Seoul, on September 1, 1983. I had only been at the Embassy in Seoul for a couple of months. One of the passengers was Congressman Larry McDonald. KAL Flight 015, which took off from Anchorage only 15 minutes ahead of Flight 007, was carrying Senator Jesse Helms [Republican, North Carolina], his wife, and a member of the Senator's staff. I'm not sure why KAL scheduled two flights along the same route that were to arrive in Seoul at about the same time. They probably started from different places.

In any event, since there was a Congressman on Flight 007 and a Senator on Flight 015, Ambassador "Dixie" Walker and I went to the Seoul airport, each to meet a different flight. We drove out to the airport together, but there was another car that was to take me home if Flight 007, which I was to meet, was delayed. This flight was due 15 minutes after Senator Helms and his party arrived on Flight 015.

As we know, Flight 015 landed on time, the Senator and his party were greeted by Ambassador Walker, who then took them into Seoul to the Hilton Hotel, where a large, security-oriented international conference was being held. Senator Helms was to be one of the key speakers at that conference to represent the tough Cold-war warrior face he assumed. He was going to be in Seoul for two nights and the better part of three days.

I stayed on to meet Congressman Larry McDonald in Flight 007 which, of course, never arrived at Kimpo Airport in Seoul. I knew the South Korean officials in the little protocol office there who could give me flight information, because I had been out there to meet people at various times. They were able to tell me pretty quickly that there was almost no likelihood of Flight 007 arriving at Kimpo Airport. Either this flight had "diverted" somewhere, had crashed, or something like that. So I left the airport and went back to the Embassy, which was a good 45-minute drive from the airport in normal traffic. At times this trip took a little longer. I called Ambassador Walker at the Hilton Hotel and told him

what was happening. I also told him that there were beginning to be reports, both on the radio and directly to the Embassy, indicating that that airplane may have crashed. Of course, that later turned out to be true. It was certainly intercepted by a Soviet fighter aircraft, as it was way off course.

We learned this information in "bits and pieces," of course. We were being kept as well informed as anybody could have been. It was several hours after Flight 007 was due in Seoul before the information was enough to report to the South Koreans and then to the public that the plane had not only been intercepted over Soviet airspace but shot down.

Q: I suppose that this was information from our intercept stations.

DUNLOP: This has now been published. It was obtained from the radio intercept stations which we maintain by remote control, interestingly enough, on Hokkaido Island, the northernmost of the main islands of Japan.

Q: The radio intercept station was at Wakkanai.

DUNLOP: These radio intercept station were targeted on Soviet air activity, including both air defense as well as commercial air activity. What was being said over the air was being tape recorded. However, it was not immediately listened to. There was no live person listening to the Soviet transmissions. It was not clear and never, perhaps, has never been made sufficiently clear to the public, who always like to suspect some kind of "complicity" or something of that kind involved in these things. However, there was no live Japanese, Korean, or American person listening to these tapes.

However, once we realized that something bad had happened in the area, the tapes were recovered, played back, interpreted, and made available to the senior people in the governments concerned. What was on those tapes has now been totally released to the public. In fact, a little bit later they were played up at the UN. They were the normal kind of traffic conversation that you would hear between a fighter pilot sent up to intercept an aircraft and his ground "controller." It ends with those famous words, "The target is destroyed." We didn't know all of that at this time. It was a very confusing time. Since so much of the information was extremely sensitive and classified, I became the courier going back and forth to the Hilton Hotel where the Ambassador and Senator Helms were with these bits and pieces of information. It became very clear that the plane had been destroyed and that there were probably no survivors. For a while we hoped that KAL Flight 007 had been forced down and that it landed safely in Soviet territory. We hoped that the Soviets were not saying so because they couldn't figure out what to say. In fact, that was not the case. The plane was shot down, and everyone aboard was killed.

There was some interesting fallout to this. Of course, this incident tremendously concerned the Korean public, which is very nervous, living so close to North Korea. There was concern that this was a sign of a deliberate escalation of tensions with the communists in northeast Asia. For that matter, it also concerned us, although I think that

we were far more prepared to accept that this was just a case of Soviet stupidity and brutality, rather than anything part of some larger malevolent scheme.

Particularly interesting to me was the reaction of our "Cold War" Senator, Senator Jesse Helms. I got over to the Hilton Hotel on one of my courier runs at about 6:00 PM. I was waiting to go in to talk to Ambassador Walker. He was in the room with Senator Helms. They were having a talk while I was waiting out in the hall. His staff aide came up to me and said rather brusquely, "Well, what have you done about the Senator's flight?" I thought that he was talking about the Senator's reservation for his ongoing travel two days hence. We had taken his tickets and confirmed his reservations on an ongoing flight. I hadn't done that personally, but I started by being reassuring and said to the young staffer, "We have a very efficient, Korean national employee at the Embassy who always takes care of these things. I always check on it."

The Senator's staffer said, "No, you don't understand. The Senator is leaving South Korea tonight. This was an assassination attempt directed at him! He's leaving in an Air Force airplane with a fighter escort at midnight." I was floored. I didn't know anything about this. Senator Helms was totally convinced that he was the Soviets' target and they had just shot down the wrong airplane.

Well, this generated a lot of confusion and a lot of problems because, while Ambassador Walker was trying very hard to persuade Senator Helms to change his mind, he also told me to get Lt. Gen. John Pickett, the Commanding General of the 7th Air Force, tell him the situation, and ask him to "lay on" this extraordinary request. I went back home because the telephone situation was better from my home in reaching the command post where I thought that I could find Gen. Pickett. And the telephone situation WAS much better. In fact, the telephone Gods were generous that evening. At about 7:00 PM I got Gen. John Pickett on the phone. We were on a first name basis. He is a wonderful and very capable man. I said, "John, this is the one call that you did not want to receive at 7:00 PM tonight. I've got to tell you that we've got Senator Helms who is insisting that this tragedy involving the KAL flight was personally directed at him. He thinks that his life is in danger, and he is insisting that the US Air Force, and that is you, John, fly him out of here tonight with a fighter escort."

A long silence ensued. I felt so embarrassed for myself as an American and as an Embassy officer to have to convey this message. I was also embarrassed for Gen Pickett, because it might be enormously difficult to lay on something like this with only five or six hours' warning. Finally, I broke this long silence and said, "John, look, I'm not asking you to tell me that you can or can't do this. What I want you to authorize me to do is to go back to Ambassador Walker and Senator Helms and say, 'The United States Air Force will do everything in its power to accomplish this rather difficult task.' That's all I need from you now." He said, "Sure, Harry, go ahead." So that's what I did, while Gen. Pickett was scrambling around to find aircraft, including fighters and everything else late in the evening.

I went back over to the Hilton Hotel and duly reported that the Air Force would do everything that it possibly could. Ambassador "Dixie" Walker tried to be a soothing and calming voice. He was also pointing out to the Senator how this would be received by the South Korean Government and public.

One of those little "light bulbs" went on in my mind. I guess that's what Political Officers are supposed to do. I began to think about the press. I went over to this not very pleasant staffer of Senator Helms and said, "Incidentally, while we're thinking about all of these other things, I'd like some instructions on what to tell the press."

Q: I suppose that you did this in a certain, inwardly rejoicing way.

DUNLOP: I don't remember what I was thinking. However, I saw what looked like a startled look on this guy's face. He said, "Well, we don't have to talk to the press." I pointed out to him that this was "the most important story in the world at the moment." Newsmen were flying in to Kimpo Airport in Seoul. We already had about eight requests for interviews with Senator Helms. I said that he didn't have to say anything but I wondered whether the Senator would want to ignore the press. Those who were unfriendly to him who might put a bad spin on this story. He looked sort of thunderstruck. It had not occurred to this guy...

Q: You're from North Carolina yourself, aren't you, Harry?

DUNLOP: Yes. Anyway, there were some huddles, consultations, and so forth. I don't know what this aspect played in the Senator's decision not to leave Seoul that night. He changed his mind. So then I was able to phone Gen. John Pickett and say, "This is the best call that you could expect to receive this evening. Senator Helms has decided to stay in Seoul tonight." By God, Gen. Pickett had made the arrangements! He had earmarked a T-37 [small, twin-engined passenger jet] flown in from some place like Kadena Airport in Okinawa. He already had the fighters there and he was going to ensure that the fighters would be visible to the Senator.

Q: Fly under one wing of the T-37, then fly under the other wing. [Laughter].

DUNLOP: But it turned out that we didn't have to put the Air Force through that, other than what we'd already put them through. The T-37 had already flown in from Okinawa. The Air Force should have sent Senator Helms a bill for the travel of one airplane to Seoul to pick up the Senator. That would be about $1.0 million or $550,000, or something like that.

Anyway, that was one aspect of the story of KAL Flight 007. There were some others, though, that were interesting. Every time a crisis happened involving the communists in North Korea we in the Embassy and the US Government had a lot of hand holding to do with the South Korean authorities. We did not have a relationship with the South Koreans that made us totally confident that they wouldn't do something not only weird but,

perhaps, dangerous, if they felt themselves under threat. We were not totally confident that they would consult with us and would take our advice which, I am sure, was given to them many times, to act in a "restrained" way, to think twice, and to avoid doing anything which could make a bad situation worse.

Q: I might point out that this goes back to the very earliest times. Our principal concern prior to June 25, 1950 [date of the beginning of the North Korean attack on South Korea], was that President Syngman Rhee might order his forces to attack North Korea. That's one reason why we kept our armed forces in South Korea.

DUNLOP: In 1953, Syngman Rhee was absolutely determined to sabotage the armistice agreement. As you may remember, his last, desperate effort to sabotage the armistice agreement of 1953 was to release all of those tens of thousands of North Korean POW's [Prisoners of War]. Under the armistice agreement their status was being reviewed as to whether they wanted to return to North Korea or not. I know for a fact that we had contingency plans to unseat President Syngman Rhee and replace him as President of the Republic of Korea, had he persisted in his refusal to abide by the provisions of the armistice agreement. Like the North Koreans, Rhee never accepted the division of the Korean Peninsula. However, it wasn't always a matter of our trying to restrain the crazy South Koreans. They were faced with a lot of provocation from North Korea. There were many assassination attempts against President Park and Chun. In fact, another assassination attempt was to take place in Rangoon, Burma, a few months later, which we can talk about briefly. So there were reasons for the South Koreans being "antsy" and for us being concerned that they would do something that, in our view, they shouldn't do. Among other things, we spent a lot of time telling the South Koreans that the evidence was pretty conclusive that the shooting down of the KAL aircraft was not deliberately planned, although deliberately. Now the evidence is even more conclusive, because the Soviet pilot has now written his own story, and he affirms that the shooting down of the KAL 747 aircraft was not "deliberate," in the sense that it was planned. It was just an idiotic "botch up" on the Soviet side, further complicated by their general brutality and callousness toward life. There was a direct order to destroy the aircraft even though the evidence known to the Soviet high command was overwhelmingly that it was a passenger aircraft.

Q: There had also been a case of a KAL plane landing in the Soviet Union. One wonders about the competence of KAL pilots.

DUNLOP: I'm not familiar with the details of that. It happened long before I was ever involved in anything having to do with Korea. As I understand it, this involved a KAL flight over the North Pole which lost its way. Its magnetic compass "blew up" or something like that. It turned South and flew well into Soviet air space [in fact, 1500 miles!]. That plane was actually fired on and forced to land on a frozen lake. It's a miracle that there weren't a lot of casualties. A couple of holes appeared in the wing of this KAL aircraft, which convinced the pilot to land on this frozen lake. I believe that it was in European Russia.

Q: I think that it was near Archangel, or something like that.

DUNLOP: There was always a lot of tension in South Korea. Maybe the South Koreans themselves are just "high voltage" people, and I tend to think that they are. However, the continued division of the Korean Peninsula, the presence of huge, armed forces there, and the proximity to China and the Soviet Union left a lot of tension in the air.

We managed to convince the South Korean leaders, or at least the ones that counted, that there was no great "plot" involved in the shooting down of KAL Flight 007. However, three months later, when the Rangoon tragedy took place, some of the South Koreans told us, "Well, you tell us that this wasn't somebody's big plan, but here are two incidents within three months of each other. They sure look as if they might be connected." Well, they weren't connected, but this coincidence presented us with some difficulties in discussions with the South Koreans.

Q: What did you, as a Political Officer, do on the shooting down of KAL Flight 007?

DUNLOP: I was involved in trying to reassure the South Koreans. My usual counterpart was the Director of American Affairs at the Foreign Ministry. He didn't have as much to do with this incident as the South Korean military. We quickly got our people in the Combined Command talking to their contacts among the South Korean generals, giving them what intelligence we had on this matter. We have an intelligence exchange arrangement with the South Koreans which permits us to give highly sensitive, intercept type information to the South Koreans. They were well informed people. Once they saw the data, I think that this led to a relaxation of the tension that they had originally felt. However, the tension went right back up to the "danger level" when this incident occurred in Rangoon. After this incident we sent a US plane with escorts to bring President Chun back to South Korea.

Q: Could you explain what happened in Rangoon?

DUNLOP: Chun was on one of his fairly rare trips abroad. He didn't travel much outside of South Korea. On this occasion, he took a trip through Southeast Asia, including a stop in Rangoon. At Rangoon, I'm told, there is a marvelous, ancient Buddhist pagoda, the Shwedagon. I haven't seen it, though I've seen pictures of it. Visitors are often taken there and shown this great jewel of the Buddhist culture and faith. A visit to the Shwedagon was on the schedule for Chun, who was traveling with virtually his entire cabinet, including the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister. Afterwards, when we looked at the list of people who were traveling with President Chun, we wondered why so many of the senior officials of the South Korean Government were included. He had almost all of his more important cabinet ministers with him.

In Rangoon, among other things, they were scheduled to appear at a ceremony where, I guess, some prayers would be chanted. They would do what faithful Buddhists do at a

Buddhist shrine. And Chun was a Buddhist. There were a lot of photographers and people from the Protocol Divisions of the Burmese and South Korean Foreign Ministries. Chun was a few minutes late. Everybody else had assembled on a special platform at the Shwedagon Pagoda. Chun was about four blocks away in a car, making his way toward the Pagoda. Suddenly, two "Claymore" type mines were detonated which swept the whole area with a kind of shrapnel near the special platform where the South Korean cabinet ministers were sitting or standing. The mines killed 11 South Koreans, including the Foreign Minister, who was a great personal friend of Ambassador Walker. I had not gotten to know him very well by that time. About seven Burmese officials were also killed. There were 18 people dead and 30 wounded, or something like that. Chun, of course, was not among them.

Within about 24 hours the Burmese had run to ground the four-person assassination team, capturing two and killing two of them. The two people the Burmese captured were badly wounded, but the Burmese were able to get from them the details of how they landed in Rangoon. They arrived in Rangoon on a North Korean freighter, disguised as seamen, carrying their explosives, hand grenades, and pistols to defend themselves or commit suicide. They had cyanide tablets, and so forth. They made their way to the Shwedagon Pagoda. They had been trained to recognize the layout of the Pagoda. They very efficiently placed the explosives there. One of them was actually sitting within the Pagoda area, though out of the range of the explosion, waiting for the time when Chun's car would arrive. I think that the Burmese Protocol people came up in a big car, and this North Korean sapper thought that this was Chun. He waited three or four minutes and then pushed the button, causing the explosion.

There was no doubt that the North Korean intelligence service had planned this attempted assassination of Chun. Later on, there was the explosion of a bomb over the Andaman Sea on KA Flight 069 in 1987. That was another incident that helped to remind the South Koreans of how brutal and fanatic the North Koreans are. Maybe I can talk about that in connection with the Rangoon incident, though it happened several years later. I don't think that this will confuse us as far as the chronology is concerned.

1987 was the year before 1988. 1988 was the year that South Korea was to host the Olympics, the "Seoul Olympics." The South Koreans had done an awful lot to prepare for the Olympic Games. It was really remarkable what they did, when they learned that they were to host the games. They built a whole, new sports complex and a "Metro" system to service the site. They put in highways where highways had never been. They did a great many things. They were looking forward to this very much as signifying the entry of South Korea onto the world stage. And this is what it was. It was, in fact, well carried out. They accomplished that.

Naturally, in North Korea this event was viewed as help to their deadly enemies in South Korea. We were very much concerned that the North Koreans would undertake, not just one or two attacks, but perhaps a whole campaign of terror to try to disrupt the Olympic Games.

In preparation for the Seoul Olympics, we and the South Koreans worked very closely together. I must say that the Japanese also helped a great deal. Whatever else happened in that Korean-Japanese relationship, which is still very uneasy and troubled, the Japanese were completely cooperative in connection with the Seoul Olympics. They provided a lot of security help. Almost all of the travelers from the West going to South Korea, traveled via Japan. So the Japanese set up some very elaborate and, apparently, very effective security arrangements.

The Seoul Olympics took place in August, 1988. In November, 1987, a scheduled Korean Air airliner, flying East from the Persian Gulf and bound for Bangkok and Seoul, disappeared over the Andaman Sea, just South of Burma. I think that something like 280 people were on board, or something like that. All of them were killed. (After the KAL 007 shoot down, the name of the airline was changed from "Korean Air Lines (KAL) to "Korean Air" (KA).

By then I had returned to the United States and was Country Director for Korean Affairs. I was at home. This incident occurred on a Saturday evening, Washington time. Incidents of this kind, with great predictability, seem to take place on weekends. I was called from the South Korean Embassy with the news of a KA airplane that was reported as "missing," at that point. They hadn't even found pieces of it in the water, though they later found some of them. The South Korean Embassy officer who called me was absolutely sure that it had been a bomb. I thought that it was extremely premature to come to that conclusion. Planes disappear from the skies for other reasons. He wanted me to alert the American intelligence community to obtain any information that they might have on what was going on. That was reasonable enough. So I called the Operations Center in the State Department and let them do that. That's their job. They called me back a couple of hours later and said that they had very little information regarding this aircraft, except for press reports that it was missing. None of the American intelligence agencies had any direct information on it that seemed to be related. I relayed this to the Korean Embassy.

The full story of what happened to that airplane did not come out until the two people who had placed the bomb in an overhead compartment in Bahrain and then left the aircraft were captured. It is a fantastic, fascinating story. One of them committed suicide. The other one was prevented from committing suicide, a young Korean woman named Miss Kim. Miss Kim did not succeed in committing suicide. She became sick after biting into a cyanide pill, but not did not die, and there was no damage to her brain. She was taken back to Seoul. Over a period of weeks and months she told her story to her South Korean interrogators. It was a remarkable story of precise training, over a period of years, to become a terrorist. It went "wrong" simply because her escape route from the terminal had not been properly planned. Everything was planned up to the point of getting the bomb on the airplane and getting the two North Korean terrorists off the plane. This all went like "clockwork." Then, their escape routes from the airport did not work out, and they were caught.

She told her story of having been recruited as a bright young graduate of the North Korean school system. She was told what an honor it was to work for the Korean fatherland and the reunification of her people. She was told that her mission was to be the first in a series of missions. This was the curious, scary part, but there were other, scary parts of this story. The missions were designed to "destroy the Seoul Olympics," and, in the course of destroying the Olympic Games, set in train a series of events which would bring down the South Korean Government, expose the Americans as the weak, imperialist manipulators that they are, and lead eventually to the reunification of Korea. What more glorious task did this young woman have to devote her life to but this?

She was sent to Macao for training in the Chinese language, because her "cover story" was that she was to be Chinese. She apparently was a brilliant student of languages. Very few adults can learn to speak a new language without an accent. While she probably had an accent, that probably could have been explained by saying that she was from Macao, where a special kind of Chinese is spoken. She spent a couple of years in Macao, studying Chinese. She went back to Pyongyang, North Korea, where she was then indoctrinated in the use of explosives in a bottle looking like a bottle of cognac. She was introduced to an older man, who was to be her partner in this venture. She was then drilled on how she was to get to Baghdad, where she was to board a flight to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

For this operation their route led from Pyongyang to Moscow, Budapest, Belgrade, and then on to Baghdad, where they boarded the Korean Air Lines flight. They left the plane in Bahrain, having placed the explosives in the overhead luggage compartment. The plane on which they were supposed to leave Bahrain stopped at Qatar, where they did not plan on stopping. A "hold" had been placed on flights to Qatar coming from Bahrain. The authorities in Qatar were very smart. They had been told to interview all of the people who had left Bahrain and see whether they would reveal anything. Not only did they interview these passengers. They detained them, so that their onward flight left Qatar without them. They had a "backup" ticket which they used in an effort to "switch" identities. They switched the ticket, but the passport was being held by the Qatari authorities.

So there was a "mismatch" between tickets and passports, and they were held. The woman and her companion were seated in a holding room in the airport at Qatar by the airport security people. There was a Qatari policewoman sitting between the two North Koreans. There was another security officer on the other side of the man. The North Korean man asked if he could smoke. The Qatari security officer said, "Yes." So the North Korean man reached into his pocket and pulled out a package of regular cigarettes. The North Korean girl asked, "May I smoke, too?" The Arab policewoman said, "Yes." So the North Korean girl took a cigarette and the North Korean man took a cigarette, each of which had a cyanide pill in it. Rather than biting these pills simultaneously, the North Korean man bit first and went into convulsions. Apparently, this happened "bang," just like that. He started to convulse with the cigarette hanging out of his mouth. Rather than be distracted by looking to her left, the Arab policewoman looked to her right, saw the

cigarette going into the North Korean girl's mouth, and hit her arm. The North Korean girl bit the pill but only got a tiny amount of cyanide. So the North Korean girl survived.

One aspect of the fallout from all this was that if we hadn't been doing everything we could to help the South Koreans in the security field, this added the last bit of incentive, if anything remained to be added. After the North Korean girl was brought to Seoul, we heard through the South Korean intelligence services that she was likely to do a full "conversion" from allegiance to North Korea to allegiance to South Korea and tell all. We wanted to be very sure that we and the South Koreans could convincingly assert that she had not been coerced into a confession. That is, that she was not tortured. We explained to the South Koreans how very important this confession was to be but we also said that it would not be credible unless we had access to her. The South Koreans did not want her to have access to anybody. However, we fought hard with the South Koreans for a couple of days, knowing that time was not going to be very good to us in this matter. We finally did get access to her, were able to interview her, and were able to convince ourselves that the reason she had made this conversion was simply that, like many Orientals, she gave everything to one particular cause. When she found out that the North Korean cause was flawed, when she found out that life in Seoul was not as it had been described to her and that people in South Korea were not clothed in tatters or were hungry and starving, she made her conversion. She was also no doubt in terrible fear of torture and death, and this had its effect. But in this case I was convinced that the primary cause of her conversion was her appreciation that she was not tortured and killed. You can find many similar conversions among Japanese POWs in WWI, similarly indoctrinated to anticipate torture and death.

For me that was certainly a very instructive insight into the degree to which the North Koreans were willing to go in pursuing their objectives. Why wasn't there any follow on campaign to disrupt the Olympic Games? I think that her confession may have played a role. The North Koreans knew that there was no way that they could do this without its becoming known that they did it. It would be more of a risk to the North Koreans than it was worth. So if there were other plans to disrupt the Seoul Olympics, so far as I know, none was ever carried out. Not that we relaxed our guard.

Q: Let's go back to the incident at the Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon. This was an incident of tremendous importance. If nothing else, no political leader, including Chun, could "take that" philosophically and not consider retaliation against North Korea. Tell me what the Embassy in Seoul, and particularly you, did when the news of this tragedy in Rangoon came.

DUNLOP: The first thing we did was to try to be helpful in the pragmatic sense. We sent two airplanes to Rangoon, one of them carrying some US security officers to help the Burmese Government with the investigation. They arrived on the plane that was to take President Chun back to Seoul. We also deployed an AWACS aircraft out of Diego Garcia [island in the middle of the Indian Ocean] and sent some fighter escorts with it.

Q: An "AWACS" is a flying radar plane [Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft].

DUNLOP: A very effective platform for a sophisticated air surveillance radar which could show us what threats might be in the vicinity of this plane. We also flew a hospital plane to Rangoon and medevaced the South Korean Minister of Defense and some others to the hospital at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. The claymore mine attack at the Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon took place on a Sunday morning. We later learned that when the US Air Force plane carrying President Chun landed in Seoul at 3:00 or 4:00 AM on the Monday morning, Chun convened at Kimpo Airport in Seoul a meeting of the remaining members of his cabinet and the deputy ministers who were going to take the places of those who had been killed or injured.

I am told that there were eight or 10 people in the room at the airport. They were all trying to show President Chun how "outraged" they were and how "macho" they were. They were all giving him ideas about what to do. One person suggested that South Korea could send a bomber strike at Pyongyang, North Korea, and bomb the house of the President of North Korea. Others suggested other possible courses of action. President Chun reportedly said just about four or five things at that meeting. First of all, he said, "I'm going to make all of these decisions. Nobody is to do anything. And in particular," pointing to these people who had been so outspoken, "you guys are going to stand down until I tell you what to do. I'm going to take my time and get some sleep. I'm going to talk to some people." Of course, they knew that he was going to talk to the Americans.

We had a letter to him from President Reagan. You asked what I did. I was always kind of the "fixer" in these kinds of things. I informed the Foreign Ministry that Ambassador Walker would like to deliver a letter of condolences, sympathy, and support to President Chun. We arranged a meeting for about 2:00 PM that Monday afternoon. As always, Ambassador Walker went over alone. Chun did not want other Americans attending his meetings with the American Ambassador, and particularly other Americans who spoke Korean. One of my professional criticisms of Ambassador "Dixie" Walker, much as I admired him in many respects, is that he always rolled over for this. He let the Koreans do the interpreting. He had no record of this meeting other than what he could remember of what happened. There was no confirmation, and that was unwise and unprofessional. He shouldn't have done this. I told him this any number of time, but he never changed.

"Dixie" came back from this meeting with Chun saying that Chun was calm, rational, and composed. Chun was clearly fatigued to an extreme degree, very weary. However, "Dixie" saw no sign of mental stress or anything that would have affected his judgment. I might add that "Dixie" was not a great admirer of Chun. "Dixie" didn't think that Chun "hung the moon up in the sky" by any means. He had a lot of respect for him as a smart man, and I think that we all agreed with that. Anyway, "Dixie" came away from this meeting with Chun thinking that Chun had a lot of reserve strength.

As I recall, we did not have to do much more than say what was in that letter from President Reagan to President Chun. The letter more or less said, "I know how deeply you are enraged, horror-stricken, and saddened by this assault on yourself and your colleagues. We stand with you, but let's talk before doing anything." I don't think that we ever did much more than that. President Chun took a trip to visit his soldiers on Tuesday, the next day, and flew to all of the major South Korean commands. He said a few words to his troops. They were basically the kinds of things that we hoped that he would say. He told the soldiers that they were strong. He reminded them of what their duties were in the face of this threat, which had been made so manifest. He expressed his confidence in them. That was sort of a trip to hold the hands of the South Korean soldiers. We reported all of that.

One of the things that always happens when incidents like this occur, like the explosion in Rangoon, the "shoot down" of KAL Flight 007, the Chinese torpedo boats, or whatever, Washington always gets very, very nervous. People like "Dixie" and me start getting phone calls. One of the things that we were trying to do was to find out what was happening on the South Korean side and also to calm down the nervous Nellies back in Washington. We tried to tell the people in Washington that we didn't think that the world was coming to an end because of this incident. I suppose that after this an even harder job that we had was to convince Washington that Chun was as rational and unbelligerent as he seemed to be. Because, as you reflected, and I did, too, how can a politician fail to say, "We've got to do SOMETHING." He wisely didn't do anything, actually.

Q: Well, in a way, there are only a couple of things that I can think of, in retrospect. One thing is the involvement of Buddhism, because of the desecration of the Shwedagon Pagoda. The other thing is that he didn't have to worry as much about being under any kind of political pressure as somebody might feel who had come to power by more democratic means.

DUNLOP: Yes. He really did not have much concern about public opinion and the National Assembly that his successors have had since the democratization of the political process in South Korea. On the other hand, this kind of political pressure was not totally absent.

One of the things that a leader like that has to do is to watch his own military. They have real clout. If they think that he is being "weak" and "namby pamby," this might be an excuse for some very energetic and ambitious person to say, "Well, we can do this job better than he can." Chun was a very reserved and inward looking man. He never took a great many people into his confidence. He wasn't a back slapper. He wasn't a very congenial, convivial person. Like all Koreans, he had to go through this routine of having drinking parties with his close associates. However, even they would say that Chun was not a lot of fun. However, he made quite important decisions at times, and this was one of them.

Q: Let's finish up on the Seoul Olympics. Did anything else happen during the Olympic Games that...

DUNLOP: I think that there were no other disruptive events during the Olympic Games that could be attributed to somebody deliberately trying to upset things. We had our "Delta Force." As you know, this is our quick reaction, anti-terrorism unit. We had a detachment from this force come to South Korea and help to train the South Koreans. A detachment from "Delta Force" came out several times. The colonel in command of this detachment would usually check in with the Embassy.

I remember one amusing thing that he said to me about this. On the third such trip I asked the colonel how things were going and were the South Koreans amenable to his instructions. He said, "You know, physically and talent-wise, they've got everything. They can do anything that other human beings can do. They can run up or down buildings forwards or backwards and that kind of stuff. They can board boats going 50 miles an hour from little boats. We've had some trouble convincing them to be precise in the use of their weapons and to exercise restraint. I think that we can say that they're beyond the 'spray and slay' stage." [Laughter] I would like to think that the rescuers who might come to help me some day are past the "spray and slay" stage.

The Seoul Olympics were a great success for the South Koreans. There were lots of anecdotes about them, none of which particularly deserves recording. The South Koreans did a good job. I was not there for it. I thought that I might try to "boondoggle" my way out there, but the Embassy was under a tremendous amount of stress just handling the American Olympian contingent. I would say one thing. I got to know some of the people who represent our Olympic movement, and some of them are absolutely arrogant, egocentric, and very difficult people to deal with. I mean that they are concerned about petty things, like demanding suites with a "hot tub" and things like that. I'm not talking about the athletes. I'm talking about the administrators in the American Olympic Committee and all of their "hangers on." They can be real pains to deal with. The Embassy didn't need me hanging around, so I did not go.

Q: What about the problems of having the press all over the place? When the press got there, and the American press in particular, I imagine that they were always looking for a story to make the South Koreans look bad. They did that at the Atlanta Olympics in 1996. This is just what the press does.

DUNLOP: NBC [National Broadcasting Company] had the coverage. The South Koreans didn't like the coverage. We had complaints from them. NBC, like any American network, put on a lot of "background" stuff about Korea. Of course, what they did was to oversimplify things. Although there are a lot of things in Korean history that are not particularly admirable, on the human rights side, for example, this was probably more than the South Korean authorities wanted to see dredged up from the past and, maybe, the not so distant past. However, there were no big problems.

I remember one example of cultural insensitivity. There was a Korean boxer who was thought likely to take one of the medals and, perhaps, win the gold medal. He was in one of the middle weight areas. He was really beaten and committed a foul in the process, which counts a lot in the Olympics. You get points, and the foul involves subtracting points from the total. He lost. He refused to leave the ring. After the celebration of his opponent's victory, he slumped down in the middle of the ring.

However, the cameramen didn't turn off the lights. The cameras were still on him. He presented a picture of utter dejection. People came up and tapped him on the shoulder, but he just sat there. The commentators began to laugh at him. He stayed there in the center of the ring for about an hour. They would keep cutting back to show him. They would say, "Oh, he's still there." I thought that this was just perfectly without any shred of taste. What was happening to that young man was that his whole life was in ruins. He had lived to be an Olympic boxer. He was a hero in his hometown. He had a salary. He had preferment. He had goodies which were otherwise probably unthinkable for his family. He had the responsibility for keeping all of that going. It was all gone. He knew that they would set the dogs on him in his home village. He would be pelted with stones when he got back there. I think that it was a particularly bad case of insensitivity.

I must say that an American sports columnist, Tony Kornheiser, wrote a good story about it. Some Korean told him what was going on, and Kornheiser wrote a nice piece on this incident. I wrote to Kornheiser and said that this was just a pebble on the beach, but it was nice to see that somebody had taken the trouble to report what was really going on, in a cultural sense.

Q: Harry, let's talk about the pressures on you while you were in South Korea, dealing with Chun and trying to get him to democratize the regime.

DUNLOP: Chun was a man who seized power illegally and who, in the process, was responsible for the deaths of at least half a dozen people. We know now, eight years since he left office, that he has been tried by a South Korean court, convicted, and sentenced to death for those crimes. He almost certainly will not suffer the death penalty.

However, the coup d'etat of December 12, [1979], was a brutal military takeover of the government, as military takeovers often are. He enjoyed absolutely no popular support in the country. His support was in the South Korean military. South Korean politics are very volatile. In the National Assembly, for example, people make extreme statements and throw things around, and things like that. There is very little tradition of give and take and compromise anywhere in this system. Certainly, the two parties in opposition to Chun were, in turn, run by autocrats, who were every bit as dictatorial toward their subordinates and party associates as Chun was toward his cabinet. So there was a lot going on in South Korea which bore no resemblance to a modern, political system.

By the mid-1980's South Korea had modernized its institutions in almost every important respect, with the exception of its political system. This system was run very much as the

"Yi" Dynasty kings had done it, as Syngman Rhee ran it, and as Park Chung Hee ran it. Things were done by fiat. The opposition was watched closely by the police and curbed. Succeeding governments did the same thing in various ways. Once in a while, some of the opposition figures were curbed by being beaten up, usually by the police. However, the opposition was more generally curbed by letting opposition figures know that they were under close surveillance. They were told that there were certain limits beyond which they would not be allowed to go, they were harassed in various ways, tax agents would visit them, and such things.

When the Reagan administration entered office in the United States in January, 1981, just over a year had passed since the coup by which Chun seized power. Our relations with President Chun during the last few months of the Carter administration mostly during 1980 had been frigid and extremely cold. There was only very minimum contact maintained. This was limited to what had to be done to keep the South Korean-United States alliance intact, and not much more.

So the Reagan administration was faced with the question of what we were going to do about Chun and our relationship with South Korea. At this time we had 43,000 US soldiers in South Korea. South Korea was a growing, economic power in the Far East. What were we going to do about it? The decision was made that we were going to work with President Chun, but we would do what we could to ensure that Chun kept the promise that he had made when he was "elected" in a sham election in 1980 to leave office as President at the end of his seven year term. We would do our best to make sure that that happened and that he stepped down at the end of the seven year term. Our principal objective in the interim, the specific, political objective, was to moderate Chun's human rights behavior where we could. However, we wanted to keep in mind that the object was to get him out of the presidency in 1987 at the end of the term to which he was supposedly elected.

New presidential elections were supposed to be held in South Korea in the fall of 1987. I arrived in Seoul in the summer of 1983, so I was there during the runup to those elections of 1987. I went back to Washington during the last couple of months of Chun's seven year term and continued to deal with Korean affairs in the Department of State.

One of the issues that we had to deal with all of the time, from the beginning and right through the end of Chun's regime, was what sort of contact the Embassy should have with the two, leading members of the opposition, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Yong Sam, who is now the President of the Republic of Korea. The two Kim's were not friends. They were rivals. They were both harsh critics of Chun. Each of them had a particular following. Kim Dae Jung's following was mainly limited to the Kwangju area of South Korea, and among the Kwangju folk who had immigrated to Korea. One of his problems was that he was never able to overcome the fact that he was a politician with a "regional" base of support. The other Kim, Kim Yong Sam, eventually became President essentially by making compromises with the ruling party. He was "co-opted" by the party which Chun left behind when he left office.

In any event I was the principal Embassy contact with both of the Kim's. Well, more specifically, Kim Dae Jung was not in the country when I arrived in South Korea in 1983. However, I was the principal contact with the "other" Kim, Kim Yong Sam. My Political Officers would associate with the subordinates of the two Kim's, their deputies, and section chiefs in their respective parties.

We never had trouble arranging for South Korean opposition figures to talk to us. Nor did the South Korean government ever effectively seek to prevent that connection, although some high government officials didn't like it. Only once did they really try to "get me" personally. There was one whispering campaign which the KCIA [Korean Central Intelligence Agency] spread, involving false statements and lies that I beat my wife and that I showed up drunk at the office every day. However, that campaign petered out very quickly. They must have realized that it wasn't going to get them anywhere and was going to create problems for them.

Q: How did the existence of this "whispering campaign" get back to you? Were we able to work through our CIA Station to get the KCIA to cut out this campaign?

DUNLOP: Yes, we tried that. However, I would have to say that in South Korea, as well as in other countries where we have Embassies, in the areas I was dealing with, which included the internal, political structure of the country and the political-military relationship, the CIA Station contributed very little. The one time I personally ever asked them to do something was when I asked them to put a listening device into that room where the South Korean students were when they occupied the USIS Library. I think that I mentioned that previously. They apparently just didn't care or were unable to do it. A listening device would have been a great help to me and possibly would have been decisive in how we handled this incident. We muddled through without it but we could have used that help.

Otherwise, the people in the CIA Station were nice to deal with. They were intelligent and they understood a lot about what was going on in the country. They were always useful people to bounce ideas off. However, as far as practical actions to further our policies, I was not aware of any.

The following is just one anecdote, but perhaps this was one thing that I can say that the Political Section did, and I had a personal hand in it. There was one, very vocal, younger opposition leader who was also not a part of the political parties of either Kim Dae Jung or Kim Yong Sam. This younger man had led some student demonstrations and had written some articles in the newspapers. We established contact with him. In fact, our Political Officers tried to maintain a fair amount of contact with him. He seemed amenable to this but was not very friendly toward us. He thought that we were a "malign" influence in South Korea and that we were part of the support system for Chun. He didn't think that was a good idea. I invited him to my house once and had some conversation with him.

It wasn't too long after that that he was arrested. He was very, very badly treated by the police. We learned of that from his friends and from his wife. This was a specific instance involving someone who had been in touch with the Embassy, although not in any kind of illegal fashion. He was given the full treatment by the KCIA. I personally made 11 representations on his behalf. Unfortunately, I began these representations after the fact. He had been under this pressure for quite a while, a matter of days, but it must have seemed like an eternity to him. The KCIA finally let up on the pressure on him. I don't know whether it was because we were on to them or what. However, this was a very sad and nasty situation. Our representations may have had some effect or they may not have. This is an example of the kinds of things that the South Korean police could do when they wanted to.

Kun Hwoo Park, the Director of American Affairs in the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and now the South Korean Ambassador to the US, was a man of very great substance and charm. He knew his job and he did it well. Like all Directors of American Affairs, he came to be seen by other elements in the South Korean government as a spokesman for the Americans. We would go and bitch to him about something, and he would have to carry this water for us around the South Korean Government. So Directors of American Affairs in the South Koran Foreign Ministry don't have too long a "shelf life." However, they are usually rewarded for having been Director of American Affairs. They get a good, overseas posting, and that's eventually what happened to Kun.

Toward the end of his term as Director of American Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was a major "leak" of information on the North Korean nuclear weapons program. While the information leaked was true, we had every reason to believe that the South Koreans who leaked the information were trying to force our hand in dealing with it, involving ways that we didn't want to use in handling it, including perhaps even a preemptive strike against the North Korean facilities where nuclear weapons were being developed. The example of the nuclear reactor in Iraq, which the Israelis had successfully attacked, was very much on everybody's mind.

Q: The Israelis had made a preemptive strike against an Iraqi nuclear facility during that same era.

DUNLOP: Yes. So we decided to make a major issue of this leak. The Ambassador and everybody got involved in this matter. We made very strong representations to the South Korean Government, stressing that this kind of activity was absolutely unacceptable to us. We said that if, in fact, the South Koreans could not handle this kind of information in confidence, we were going to stop providing it to them. The implication clearly was, "And then where will you be," so to speak?

Anyway, these representations got back to the KCIA which, as we later found out, had been responsible for the leak. To deflect attention from themselves, they "elected" the Director of American Affairs in the South Korean Foreign Ministry, Kun Hwoo Park as

the "fall guy." They went to his office, beat him physically, manacled him and took him out the front door of the Foreign Ministry. They threw him into the back of a van and took him to the basement of KCIA headquarters. There they stripped him of all of his clothes, gave him a rough prison uniform with a stenciled mark on it and said, "You are no longer Mr. Park, Director of American Affairs. You are Prisoner No. 156783 until we decide differently." Then they closed the door of his cell and turned off the lights. They kept him there for 24 hours. I saw him two days after that and found that he was a shaken man.

This was absolutely despicable behavior. We came down on the KCIA like a ton of bricks. The thing which I think that those who read or hear these comments must understand is that, short of severing our relationship with the South Korean Government, which is vital to the United States for a lot of reasons, there are limits to which we can "force" a government not to do this kind of thing to its own people. That is, short of deposing the South Korean Government or breaking off our relations with it, there just aren't a lot of fine gradations in this kind of situation.

One of our biggest arguments with the South Koreans was always that we had to go every year to Congress to approve the military budget and keep our forces in South Korea. If enough incidents of this kind accumulated, South Korea would not get the support that it needed in Congress, and we would not help them get such support. We would say that, but sometimes we weren't able to convey enough conviction to make a difference.

President Chun Doo Hwan was faced with either living up to his promise to leave office after his seven year term was over and not running again, or changing his mind. He never said that he would change his mind. However, we knew, as the end of his term drew nearer, that this temptation must have been on his mind. At one point he had designated a successor, a man named Rho Tae Woo, who did, in fact, succeed him. However, the question was whether Chun would be satisfied with just having No as his nominee and willing collaborator as President of South Korea, or whether he, himself, would choose to stay on as President. There are not too many instances of dictators living up to promises like that. I guess that there are some, but not too many.

The last month that I spent in Seoul was June, 1987, before returning to the United States on transfer to the Department of State. It was a month in which No was nominated as the candidate of the ruling party, the party of Chun, for the presidency. It was the month when the opposition, and this now spread beyond just the students, conducted a very violent series of anti-government riots, not only in Seoul but also in other cities, notably in Pusan, the leading port city.

Every spring, if you will, there were riots to commemorate the Kwangju incident in 1980, when government soldiers killed a couple of hundred protestors. That incident took place at the end of May, 1980, so from then on the end of May and June was always a time when students would riot to commemorate the Kwangju incident. Previously, these riots were violent, troublesome, and "scary," if you were near one of them. You could smell

whiffs of tear gas, if you got nothing more than that. Riots would take place whenever anything seriously threatened the government's control over the country, but usually they were just confined to students. Although there may have been some sympathy among the broader population, usually the students would wear out their welcome after a few days of rioting. The shopkeepers didn't want to keep their shops boarded up, and vendors didn't want to have to stop selling their merchandise. So the students never really got much beyond the point of rioting.

It was a different situation in June, 1987. Not only were the students in full cry, but there was evidence that doubts about Chun's departure were beginning to be reflected in a political way in public support for the students. The demonstrations lasted much longer than they usually did, and they became increasingly widespread. As I said, they extended beyond Seoul to Pusan, Taegu, and other places, such as Kwangju itself.

The point was reached when it became very worrisome to us in the Embassy that this was the kind of situation that would give Chun the excuse for proclaiming martial law. If he declared martial law and sent the troops out into the streets, it would be a sign that he was going to stay in power and was going to use the Army to make this possible. This would have been a disaster for the political future of South Korea. It could even have meant civil war, because it wasn't at all clear that all of the soldiers would follow Chun. Certainly, there would be a lot of terrible things happening in Seoul, including the effect on the summer Olympic Games, which were due to be held in Seoul next year. This had been regarded as a time when Chun could step aside and let something different begin to happen on the political scene. It looked as if all of this might come unglued.

The Embassy, of course, was in touch with Washington. Our Ambassador at the time was Jim Lilley, who was on the secure phone to Washington a number of times in this connection. Ambassador Lilley had replaced Ambassador "Dixie" Walker in 1986. Washington finally told us that President Reagan was going to write a letter to Chun. It would be a strongly worded letter urging Chun to keep his promise to step down as President of South Korea and do nothing so rash and foolish as declaring martial law and canceling the elections of 1987.

We knew that this letter from President Reagan to President Chun was coming to us. We didn't know when it would be received. The bureaucracy takes a little time to get out a message like this. On Wednesday night, June 17, 1987, I received a call from Washington that the letter had finally been cleared by the White House. The cabled text would be received by the Embassy in a couple of hours, some time on Wednesday night, our time. I remember the date because Friday was June 19, 1987. Ambassador Lilley had taken a trip to visit some of our cultural offices out in the countryside, which he had never previously visited. This trip had been postponed several times. Ambassador Lilley thought that it would be a good time to do this. So Ambassador Lilley was not physically in Seoul. I was Acting DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] and, in effect, was in charge of the Embassy.

I contacted Ambassador Lilley and told him that the letter from President Reagan to President Chun was on the way and would be available on the following morning. I said that I would make an appointment for Ambassador Lilley to call on President Chun on the afternoon of Thursday, June 18. I knew that it would take Ambassador Lilley a few hours to get back to Seoul and that he would like to read the letter from President Reagan before delivering it. I suggested making the appointment for any time after 2:00 PM on June 18. Ambassador Lilley said, "OKAY." I started calling right away to make the appointment. All that I could do, given the time of day, was to leave a message that an appointment with President Chun was urgently needed and that Ambassador Lilley was coming back to Seoul to pick up the letter from President Reagan which he wanted to deliver personally to President Chun.

On the next morning, June 18, I called the Foreign Ministry and was told that President Chun would not receive Ambassador Lilley. At this time Ambassador Jim Lilley was driving back to Seoul, while I was sitting in my office talking to this nice man from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was telling me that President Chun would not receive Ambassador Lilley. I said, "But that cannot be! This is a personal letter from my President to your President, to be delivered by my President's personal representative, who is also under instructions to have a few additional words to say." I said, "Your President simply cannot refuse to see my Ambassador in this connection." The Ministry representative said, "Oh, yes, he can refuse to receive the Ambassador." I then escalated the level of my representations to the Ministry a little bit, as I was effectively in charge of the Embassy. I couldn't go too far up, as I was just Acting DCM.

I had a horrible feeling that President Chun had already made up his mind and that he didn't want to receive the letter in person. I was told, "You can just drop the letter in the mail or slip it under the door. We'll see that President Chun gets it." Well, I think that this was the only time that I really lost my temper in dealing with an official of a foreign government. I was sitting in the office. A lot of my Political Officers were running in and out. This was a terribly busy time. We had gas masks in the office. The Political Officers would take them with them when they went out into the streets. It was just a very hectic time. We also had a portable radio there because we were listening to the military security people, who also were concerned about where the demonstrations were taking place. Usually, nobody paid any attention to me. Who was I, just there on the phone. All of a sudden, the whole room went quiet, and everybody was looking at me. I was shouting into the phone and saying, "I want the name of the South Korean official who has taken it on himself to make this decision. I don't believe that President Chun has made this decision. I will not accept that your President has made it. I don't think that he would be that stupid to make it! He couldn't have made it. God damn it, I want to know the name of the person who made that decision right now!" And so on and so forth.

The South Korean official to whom I was talking said, "Harry, quiet down, quiet down." Well, I was desperate. Anyway, Ambassador Lilley came in about an hour later. I said, "Jim, you're going to have to take it from here. I've done everything that I can." Then the phone rang. It was the Foreign Minister speaking on behalf of President Chun. He said,

"The President can't see Ambassador Lilley today, June 18. Would tomorrow, June 19 be all right?" Little did we know that tomorrow would be almost too late, because right about this time President Chun had decided to declare martial law. As we learned later, that Thursday night was a terrible night of rioting. A South Korean soldier was killed. He wasn't shot but he fell off an overpass, or something like that. At this time there were remarkably few deaths. There were some injuries in these violent encounters from flying rocks and so forth. That was one of them. Our Consul in Pusan talked to the Pusan Police chief that night. The Police chief said that his police were too tired to go on. He said that he needed soldiers to help maintain order. He said that he had called Seoul to ask for some soldiers. This was not martial law. He said he just needed some soldiers. So, probably late on Thursday night, June 18, President Chun made the decision to proclaim martial law.

The appointment for Ambassador Lilley was set for 2:00 PM on the afternoon of Friday, June 19. Ambassador Lilley had the letter and went over to call on President Chun. At about noon on June 19, just an hour or two before he went in to see President Chun, there was an announcement over the radio that the Prime Minister would address the nation at midnight on that day. This seemed like an ominous time to do things, but this was the announcement. I thought "My God, this means that martial law is about to be declared." We did not get good, advance intelligence on this decision. Our military and our CIA people couldn't tell us what was going on in President Chun's mind or what he was discussing with his top lieutenants.

Later on, we learned a lot about what had gone on that day. By that time we had President Reagan's letter, and a great deal of rioting was going on. Ken Quinones, our Consul in Pusan, had called us with this story to which I have referred about the Police Chief in Pusan who had called for military help from the central government in Seoul to maintain order. We were really worried and concerned about the situation. The more we thought about it the more concerned we were about the possible consequences of martial law and the more disastrous it sounded to us. Then there was this ominous announcement of a midnight speech to the nation by the Prime Minister.

Anyway, Ambassador Lilley went over to call on President Chun on the afternoon of June 19. I did not go with him. No American went with him. President Chun still kept to his practice of seeing the American Ambassador alone. Ambassador Lilley spent two hours over at the Presidential Palace [Blue House], where both the office and residence of the President of South Korea were located. The Ambassador came back to the Embassy at 4:40 PM. He sat down at his desk and described what had happened to all of us, who were standing there, breathless with anticipation. We knew what was in the letter from President Reagan, which was strongly worded. The letter had told President Chun that he, President Reagan, had been President of the US for seven years in difficult times and knew what the stresses of making decisions were, but that there were a few times which were "defining moments," and so forth. This was one of them, and President Reagan wanted President Chon to know that the Korean-American alliance would be under

severe strain if the political process broke down and if the presidential elections were canceled.

Anyway, Ambassador Lilley told us that, for the first time in his year of experience in South Korea, during which he had seen President Chun eight or 10 times, probably, President Chun did most of the listening. Chun usually liked to dominate the conversation. He would read the letter, if that were involved, and then talk about it. This time Chun did most of the listening. Ambassador Lilley said "I couldn't have been more explicit about what our concerns were. I asked him about the Prime Minister's speech. I told him that if the Prime Minister announced that martial law was about to be proclaimed, it would be a disaster for South Korea and for our relationship. We hoped that this would not be the case."

Some time around 5:30 or 6:30 PM it was announced on the radio that the Prime Minister's speech had been canceled. Later on we learned that it had been late in the evening of the Thursday or early on Friday morning that President Chun, who had long been toying with the idea of declaring martial law, had decided to do it. He told the Prime Minister to prepare a declaration of martial law for delivery over the radio at midnight on June 19. Then President Chun had reluctantly decided to receive the American Ambassador. We also learned that there were a lot of people, including some of his top military leaders, who were telling President Chun the same thing that Ambassador Lilley told him. So I am not trying to portray this as an intervention by Washington that suddenly turned things around. We will never know for sure--my best estimate is that most of the pressures on Chun were to reverse his decision, including ours, and that added up to more than he could withstand.

Chun was not a stupid man. He was a very intelligent man. I think that he would not have made the decision to declare martial law lightly, under any circumstances. It would not have been based on an "impulse" on his part. After the Rangoon and other incidents we had often seen how Chun held up well under stress. However, he appears to have made a clear decision to cancel the elections of 1987, blaming it on the opposition for reckless violence and emphasizing that security must be maintained. In fact, Chun was not losing control of the country. There was no justification for canceling the elections which would have been accepted. The electricity was not interrupted, and no one died on hospital operating tables. The water supply flowed normally. Anyhow, President Chun shouldn't have made this martial law decision. Ultimately, he decided not to declare martial law and cancel the elections of 1987. Well, we'll never know, unless President Chun writes his memoirs and we can believe them, what combination of circumstances led him to change his mind. Surely, Ambassador Lilley's intervention with the Reagan letter played a role. I think that if there is anything in my career which I can look back on and say that it might have had an impact of historical significance, my part in that incident, little that it was, including losing my temper on the telephone, might have been such an event.

There were a lot of other incidents that were interesting, and some of them were important. However, this was probably the one time during my career when a nexus of

events came together, in which I was directly involved, that may have made more than just a temporary difference.

About five days later, on June 24, 1987, Chun delivered a speech in which he said, "I will not wait until after the elections. I am now relinquishing the Chief Executive's authority to my cabinet ministers." I was about to leave South Korea. I was supposed to leave on June 27 or 28.

This announcement was the result of the huge "loss of face" for Chun which his reversal on June 19 inflicted on him. Once he had decided to back down on his decision to declare martial law and to cancel the elections, he had, in effect, cut his own throat politically. He recognized that and he delivered a very eloquent speech. He said that he had done everything that he could do, except resign from office. He said that now he was resigning from office. He indicated that it was up to his colleagues in the government. From that point on a real change became evident in the way that South Korea was going to conduct its political life. It is not picture book democracy by any means. The next President, No Tae Woo, who served for five years, had very much of the military cast of mind, but he also had a broader outlook than Chun. For example, No had been chief organizer for the Seoul Olympics. This had been a very broadening experience for him. He had traveled to virtually every capital in the world. He had a very large hand in bringing off that major event.

No was replaced as President by Kim Yong Sam, one of the major opposition figures, "the other Kim." He is also the only chief of state with whom I can say that I am--or was once--on a first name basis. Kim Yong Sam and I must have had 20 meals together, every two or three months. They were always at his expense and they were always excellent meals. I rather liked Kim Yong Sam. He had a Korean nickname of "Stonehead," because he was considered stubborn. I never thought that he was dumb. Some people interpreted "Stonehead" as meaning that he was stupid as well as, perhaps, stubborn. I didn't think so. He is not a brilliant man. He is not a man of great, innovative skills but he is a survivor. He is a decent man with a good sense of humor and a good, pleasant air about him. It never bothered me to go and see him so often.

I didn't have that same rapport with Kim Dae Jung. I always found him much too self-centered a man, even for Korean politics. He lied to me on about four or five occasions. Politicians can lie to you on a couple of occasions, and that may be tolerable. However, four or five occasions is a little too much. So I didn't like Kim Dae Jung but I really did like Kim Yong Sam.

Q: Going back to the period when you were in South Korea. When President Chun made his announcement that he would be leaving the Presidency, you were still Political Counselor, right?

DUNLOP: Yes, but I left South Korea four or five days afterwards.

Q: What was the immediate reaction that you heard?

DUNLOP: Oh, euphoria. It had been very evident that this crisis point had been approaching. This was a good, not a bad outcome of the crisis. At this time I was deep into making my farewell calls. These were also substantive calls. My successor was not at post, and I could not take him around with me. I was talking to the heads of different political parties, factions in the National Assembly, and people in the offices of Kim Dae Jung and Kim Yong Sam. In fact, I also called on Kim Dae Jung and Kim Yong Sam, although I think that I had done that earlier, before this crisis emerged. However, people were just all smiles, including people in the bureaucracy and government. You might think that, although they were working for President Chun, they didn't want to see him hang onto power in this way.

I remember that Ambassador Jim Lilley came back to the Embassy after seeing the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister had mentioned my "vigorous" representations in trying to arrange an appointment for the Ambassador with President Chun. However, he referred to this in a nice way. The Ambassador said, "Well, I wasn't in Seoul and wouldn't know anything about that." He continued, "However, it was very important for me to see President Chun," as, indeed, it was. He said, "We're very grateful to President Chun for receiving me." The Ambassador said some important things at the right time. There was generally a feeling of relief that South Korea had come close to what amounted to a coup d'etat, but now the feeling was that South Korea could continue on the path to democracy. Which has, thank God, actually been the case.

Q: By the way, Harry, going back to President Reagan's letter to President Chun. Obviously, this wasn't just Ronald Reagan looking up at the ceiling of his office and saying, "I'm going to write a letter to the President of South Korea." From your knowledge, what was the process by which this letter was written?

DUNLOP: Well, I certainly had no role in writing it, nor did I have any role in suggesting it, although I enthusiastically endorsed the idea. I don't know who came up with the idea. In recent years Presidents have written lots of letters. So letter writing by Presidents is not as unusual as you might think. There are lots of letters, and they don't get much publicity. Sometimes they do, but I believe that there was one letter which, I don't think, ever got any publicity.

I suppose that either Ambassador Lilley, who was getting increasingly worried about the situation in South Korea, or the Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, more probably, or the Korean desk officer at the time came up with the specific idea of a presidential letter. Once an idea like that is accepted in the Department of State, the usual procedure is that someone, usually the desk officer, actually writes a draft. He then sends it over to an officer on the NSC [National Security Council] staff who deals with Korean affairs. At this time I think that the NSC staffer was still Doug Haas, although I'm not absolutely certain of that. The Korean desk officer in the Department of State probably called him, told him what was going on, and asked him if he thought that this idea "would

fly." Doug Haas probably said, "Yes." If he said "No," the Korean desk officer would probably still have sent a draft over there, even though the chances of its being accepted might not have been very good.

Whoever it was that actually sent the draft letter to the NSC, and it was probably the Country Director for Korea, went in to see Doug Haas, gave him a copy, and then asked him to move it as quickly as possible. In this case there was a delay, and delays are very predictable with this sort of thing. Sometimes letters like this will come back to the Department in 24 hours, sometimes they will take a week. Sometimes, events change and you just don't want a letter or don't want the same kind of letter. I've actually seen letters which were signed and mailed, and then were pulled back, even though they had the full approval of the President. In the interim, something different had happened.

In the declassification business which I've been doing for some time, it seems to me that President Richard Nixon began the practice of often writing letters to foreign chiefs of state on policy matters, more so than his predecessors did. President Kennedy wrote a number of letters, also. I don't think that President Eisenhower was in the letter writing business, although he wrote, or signed, some letters. I don't want to perpetuate the idea that Eisenhower was a "do nothing" President in the foreign affairs field, as some people have suggested. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was his principal adviser on foreign policy matters, but Eisenhower was a very strong influence on foreign affairs, as far as I can tell. I don't think that writing letters to foreign heads of state or government was his strong point. Kennedy began to do it, Nixon did a lot of it, Johnson wrote some letters, and all of the Presidents since then have written letters.

Q: Harry, let's go back to some other issues. You mentioned Chinese "torpedo boats." What were these?

DUNLOP: This was another "Saturday morning" crisis. This happened when I was in Seoul, probably in 1985. I was at home, prior to going to the office, which I always did for a little while. Then my wife and I would take the car, drive out to the Commissary, and do the week's shopping. Then we would come back and spend some time with our children.

On this particular Saturday morning I got a phone call from Yi Song Okay, a very worried man who was then the chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs at the South Korean Foreign Ministry. I knew him but didn't have occasion to deal with him on as regular a basis as much as I did with the Director of the American Affairs Division. He said, "We have a crisis, and it could be a very bad crisis! We don't know all the facts, but I'll tell you what I know." He said, "We have information that a Chinese torpedo boat, one of a flotilla of three, is approaching South Korean waters and is being pursued by the other two boats. It has sent some sort of international distress signal. We think that there may have been some killing or shooting on board the torpedo boat. It appears that somebody is ill or sick, as they have requested medical help by flying an international distress flag.

Our Air Force is now launching F-4 'Phantom' fighters to make sure that the boat is not pursued inside South Korean territorial waters."

I asked: "And what orders do the fighter aircraft have?" Yi Song Okay paused and said: "Well, I believe that they have orders to attack the two other torpedo boats if they enter South Korean territorial waters." All of this was totally new to me. I said to him: "Well, I hope that they don't attack the other torpedo boats."

This was really a fascinating situation. Yi said to me: "Please get a message to the Chinese which will assure them that we will treat the people on that boat strictly according to international law. However, we cannot permit them to be forcibly removed from South Korean waters." I thought to myself: "How can I do that?" I was still at my home in Seoul. There was no phone circuit between Seoul and Beijing. I thought: "Well, how much time do I have?" I realized that I didn't have much time. In fact, I had "minus time." I didn't have time to call the Ambassador or the Department in Washington. These are the two things that you usually do before taking action, so that everybody knows that you have at least "touched base" with senior officers.

So Yi Song Okay hung up. I then called the duty officer at the American Embassy in Tokyo. It was not that he was uncooperative, but it took a long time to give him the bits and pieces of the incident. He asked: "Who is this? Where? About what? Would you repeat that again? Would you give me your name again?" I said that what I really wanted him to do was to call the duty officer in the American Embassy in Beijing, because the Embassy in Tokyo did have telephonic contact with the Embassy in Beijing, and convey this message which I had received from a responsible official in the South Korean Foreign Ministry. "Please give him assurances that whoever was on that Chinese torpedo boat, mutineers or whoever, would be treated strictly in accordance with international law." I think that there was another part to the South Korean message, that is, that there would be no attempt made to exploit the crew of the Chinese torpedo boat for political purposes. However, the South Koreans would see to it that their sovereign, territorial waters, extending 12 miles from the coast, were defended.

So the duty officer at the Embassy in Tokyo wrote all of this down. I asked him: "Would you pass this on to the duty officer at the Embassy in Beijing and then call me back, so I could say that at least the American Embassy in Beijing has received the South Korean message? Then could you ask the Beijing duty officer to call you when the message has been delivered to the Chinese Government? And could you then call me to say that the message has been delivered?" I am sure that on a Saturday the duty officer at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is as hard to reach as in any other capital. Anyhow, the duty officer in our Embassy in Tokyo promised to do all of that, and that is the one thing that we did in all of this. He reached our Embassy in Beijing, which did contact the PRC.

We later heard that the South Korean fighter planes took off, with a full combat load. However, this combat load, whatever it may have been, was inappropriate for attacking ships at sea. I suppose that they would have attacked the other two Chinese torpedo boats,

anyway, at least with their machine guns. We also learned that there had not only been a mutiny but there had been a murder on board the first torpedo boat. The captain of the boat was dead, and a couple of his officers were bleeding on the deck. In the course of this incident I learned the full implications of all of these words in international law, including "barratry," "mutiny," "defection," "murder," and "assault with intent to kill." There were about 18 different aspects of this incident. "Barratry" takes place when the operators of a ship do something to damage the interest of the owners of the ship. So the operators of the ship were mutineers, commitors of barratry, murderers, pirates, defectors, etc.

The torpedo boat pulled into South Korean territorial waters. The other torpedo boats, seeing the South Korean planes above, hove to outside of South Korean territorial waters. Things calmed down at this point. The South Koreans later tried the remaining crew members of the Chinese torpedo boat for murder, mutiny, and barratry. The people in the South Korean Foreign Ministry kept calling me up and saying things like, "What's barratry?" This was just their curiosity. Somebody else was prosecuting them. I said: "I don't know." Then I tried to find out what "barratry" was. The South Koreans, in fact, did what they said they would do. I think that, of the eight or 10 crewmen who were not dead or wounded, about five of them were tried, convicted, and sentenced to terms in a South Korean jail. Two or three of the crewmen were freed and sent back to China. I think that one of the crewmen who was not convicted applied for permission to stay in South Korea.

Q: I assume that the others were returned.

DUNLOP: I guess so, after they were thoroughly interrogated. I think that this incident was worth mentioning, because it seemed typical of things that happened almost every weekend in South Korea, or at least it seemed to me I spent a lot of weekends that way.

The relationship between the Chinese communists and the South Korean Government was a curious one. The mainland Chinese government was considered the chief supporter of the North Koreans. It turned out that was true. The Chinese continued to give military support and vital oil supplies to the North Koreans long after they told us that they had stopped providing such assistance. We were often lied to by the Chinese. I came to distrust what the Chinese would tell me about Korea. I went to Beijing once to talk to them about Korea and came away from that discussion believing that I had been deceived or that they had attempted to deceive me extensively.

On the other hand, the Chinese had a great interest in gaining access to the South Korean market and technology and attracting South Korean investment. So there were these two sides to Chinese policy toward South Korea. The South Koreans didn't seem to know how to exploit this Chinese desire for closer contacts. They would have been delighted to have contact with China. The South Koreans were always ready to recognize "Red" China, to set up air flights, reestablish postal communications, and all of that. When I was in Seoul, the only thing done was that postal and telegraphic connections were established. There

was talk going on during the last year, 1986-1987 of my tour in South Korea about establishing air routes that would cross South Korea directly from Tokyo to Beijing.

The North Koreans were adamantly opposed to airline routes transiting their airspace, so the Chinese wouldn't accept flights transiting South Korean airspace. In those days flights between Beijing and Tokyo had to fly all the way around the Korean peninsula. They had to go down almost to Shanghai and then fly North, either to Beijing or to Tokyo. When I flew from Seoul to Beijing, I had to fly to Tokyo and catch a plane there. In fact, at one point the pilot announced over the loudspeaker that Shanghai was off our left wing, as he made a turn to go North to Beijing. Very little had been accomplished by the time I left Seoul.

By the time I left, Russia and China were very close to establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea, which, obviously, was to the great discomfort of North Korea. Except for the shooting down of the KAL 007 in 1983, the Russians played very little role in what came to our attention, anyway, in Seoul. The Russians were constantly flogging the "treasures" which might literally be unearthed in Siberia if anybody would invest the necessary capital. They were perfectly willing to try to entice South Korean capital into developing Russian natural resources in Siberia, even though there were no diplomatic relations between Russia and South Korea.

Once in a while one of the big, South Korean "Chebol," which is the Korean word for large, multinational corporations, would express an interest in Siberia. They would come in and ask the Ambassador what the Americans thought of that. We would say, "Fine. However, remember a few things about Siberia. It's cold and there is no infrastructure to support a major industrial program. There are few roads and railroads. You would have to deal with one of the world's worst bureaucracies there, and there is no local market. You can't sell anything directly to Siberia. You have to take it all out. So what's going to happen to the South Korean balance of payments from the Russian point of view? You're going to have to figure out some way to pay for what you get. This is harder to do in Siberia than almost anywhere else in the world." Anyway, nothing ever came of that.

The Japanese have long explored and meticulously studied taking the Russians up on this kind of offer, but they've never done anything significant in this connection. They just haven't been able to find a way to make it profitable.

Q: What about human rights? We've touched on human rights in a number of ways. What were we doing in this connection during the time that you were in Seoul?

DUNLOP: Well, I think that I mentioned the fact that we kept contact with Kim Yong Sam and Kim Dae Jung, the opposition leaders, to the discomfort of the South Korean Government, but never to the point they were able or tried very hard to prevent these contacts. I've already described that day when Kim Dae Jung returned to South Korea from exile, when everything went wrong at the airport.

We had a continuing dialogue with the South Korean Government about human rights. I mentioned the young man who came to my house to discuss this matter and later on was tortured. I made 11 representations on his behalf. I kept a list of those efforts because I wanted to be able to tell people like Congressman Torricelli [Democrat, New Jersey, now Senator from New Jersey], who kept accusing the Embassy of "fostering torture and vengeance." He was on the radio today, along with a Congressman named Feighan [Democrat, Ohio], who came back to South Korea with Kim Dae Jung. I kept a record of all this so that, when we talked with them, I could tell them what the Embassy had tried to do for people like that.

I can't say that our representations had more than a marginal effect. What they needed to do in South Korea to improve the human rights situation was to reform the political system. That did not happen until President Chun's speech in 1987, announcing that he was resigning from office. The human rights situation now, along with the general, political situation, is far better. However, we're still dealing with an authoritarian culture where one of the things that the South Korean police do when they pick someone up is to slap him or her around because this individual has disturbed the normal order of events. This individual is seen to have done something which sent out bad vibrations disturbing the harmonious status quo, and he or she shouldn't have done that. In effect, these individuals displeased the person as the chief of state, who has the "mandate of heaven" in the old Chinese sense.

On the other hand, Korea was never a place where people were often stood up against walls and shot, as happens in many places around the world. The mistreatment of people could be severe, but very few people died of it. The death penalty was almost never invoked. A mass murderer who went into a house and killed many people would be sentenced to many years in prison at hard labor, which was very hard, indeed, in South Korea. However, Kim Yong Sam, who was arrested many times, became President of the Republic of Korea. So there has been a big change. I think that we played some role in bringing about this change. I think that South Koreans who go to the United States and study here, as so many of them have done, and then return to Korea and take responsible positions in their government and industry, all know that there is a much better way of conducting the political life of a country than the way it had been done in South Korea. Their experience in the US has had its cumulative effect. I'm not saying that it was any particular policy of the US Government, but the fact is that the US is the place where South Koreans go to study and where they have derived much of their knowledge of the outside world. I think that we gave South Koreans a very clear picture of a political system that has a pretty good record for human rights, whatever else it does well or badly.

Q: Did you have any concerns about the KCIA [Korean CIA] "messing around" in the Korean immigrant community in the United States?

DUNLOP: That used to be a major problem in the 1970's for the US relationship with South Korea when Park Chung Hee was President. I think that when he became President, Chun made a conscious decision that he was going to stop doing that. For one

thing, his early relationship with the US was so bad that I don't think that he wanted anything which he could control, like that sort of thing, to make it any worse.

During the administration of President Park Chung Hee, there was the well known defection of the "military attaché" in the South Korean Embassy in Washington. He was not really a "military attaché" but worked for the KCIA. He was the Chief of Station of the KCIA in the Embassy. Either for money or for whatever reasons he talked freely with people in Congress and elsewhere about what the KCIA had been doing in the US What they had been doing included coercing people in the Korean community in Washington who, they thought, were politically active on the wrong side. The KCIA did things like threatening their families back in South Korea. That was the most common form that this activity took.

However, as I say, I think that President Chun made a conscious decision to stop doing this kind of thing. His first Foreign Minister was a man who had been a great friend of Richard "Dixie" Walker, later US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. The Foreign Minister, Lee Bum Suk, had died on the platform at the Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon, Burma, during the North Korean terrorist attack on the South Korean cabinet. The Foreign Minister told Ambassador Walker at one point, and I think that it was before I went to South Korea, that he had told President Chun that he would take the job of Foreign Minister under several conditions. If Chun wanted him to be Foreign Minister, Chun was going to have to meet these conditions. One of them was that the KCIA would have to get out of the business of dealing directly with Washington. Not only dealing with the emigre South Korean community in semi-covert or clandestine ways, but in trying to run a separate foreign policy with the US CIA in Langley. Chun reportedly said, "OKAY, that's fine with me," according to the Foreign Minister and which "Dixie" recounted to me. Chun is reported to have told the Foreign Minister: "The KCIA only screws it up anyway." So that was not such a major problem in my years. I think it was a conscious decision by Chun to make sure that it would not be a problem.

Q: There is this habit of thinking of the US CIA as being "too closely in bed" with the KCIA. At one point, of course, Richard Lilley had been the Chief of Station in Seoul.

DUNLOP: So had Don Gregg, who had preceded him in that position.

Q: When you were in Seoul, were you disturbed by this relationship between our CIA and the KCIA? How did you feel about it?

DUNLOP: I had mixed emotions about it. I was sorry to see Ambassador "Dixie" Walker leave South Korea, because he was a very nice man and a good Ambassador. When you get a new man at the helm, like Jim Lilley, you never quite know what direction he's going to want to take the "ship of state" and whether he will like the crew that he is going to inherit. However, that would have been true of any new Ambassador. Other than the case of Richard Helms as Ambassador to Iran, this was the first time that I was aware of a former CIA person appointed Ambassador. There may have been some other such

examples, but I was not aware of them. I wondered about that. Some of the junior Political Officers seemed to have a rather acute concern about this. I remember telling them: "Look, let the man stand on his own merits. If he does the job he's supposed to do, we'll have no concern. If he doesn't do the job, I'll bet that it's not because he's a former CIA Chief of Station. It'll be because he doesn't know how to do his job. Then we'll have to help him do his job. Try not to approach him and what he does through this prism of his once having been the Chief of Station here."

I really think that the relationship between the US and South Korea was not affected by that. Ambassador Jim Lilley is an effective man and administrator. I think that he knew that if he was going to run the Embassy efficiently, he would have to be impartial, so to speak, and not show the CIA Station undue favor or allow it to exercise undue influence in the decision making process. He was going to have to treat the CIA Station as it ought to be treated. He did this, as far as I know. During my time in South Korea from 1983 to 1987 we had two good CIA Chiefs of Station. They also knew how to play that particular kind of bureaucratic game to the benefit of the operation of the US Mission as a whole.

When Don Gregg was being briefed to replace Jim Lilley as Ambassador to South Korea, I was in my last months in Washington as Country Director of Korean Affairs. Don had office space in my office. We helped him through various things, which you always have to do with Ambassadors. Don had been Chief of Station in Seoul when Kim Dae Jung had been kidnaped in Japan by the KCIA, back in the 1970's. Phil Habib was the Ambassador to South Korea at the time. Under Phil's direction a major effort was mounted to get the KCIA to let Kim Dae Jung go, or at least to get him back to South Korea alive. I think that I said that Kim Dae Jung wrote Don Gregg a letter thanking him for his efforts. Kim Dae Jung told Don Gregg he could have that letter published if he wanted to. This was one of the nicer things that Kim Dae Jung ever did. That was when Gregg was encountering some really vicious opposition to his appointment. I give Kim credit for that. It was a very nice, decent letter. Kim Dae Jung had much to thank the Americans for, and this incident is very high on my list of those things.

Q: One last question about your time in South Korea. Did the American missionaries play any role in our relations with South Korea? I go back to my time in South Korea in the 1970's when the missionaries were very much tied up with human rights issues.

DUNLOP: Yes, the American missionaries played a significant role in our relations with South Korea. There was a man named Ed Poitras there. He was an intense, middle-aged man who took everything seriously. There were always stories of one kind or another about coercion, threatened coercion, or surveillance. Ed Poitras was very outspoken. Then these allegations began to come very close to him. While I don't think that he was ever called in by the police for interrogation or anything like that, he would come to the Embassy and also write back to his friends in the United States about these incidents. He never felt that we in the Embassy were doing enough on such matters. I don't think that we could ever have satisfied Ed Poitras on those issues. He was in touch with a lot of people in the US He was an earnest, sincere, but rather narrowly focused person. We saw

a lot of him and people like him. At one point we set up a breakfast to talk things over. That was useful.

There was also a "professional Korean Left" in Washington. There was a group of people in Washington who made a career out of following Korean events and criticizing the US Government for what it was or was not doing about them. The other members of the "Korean Left" went back to Washington on the plane with Congressmen Torricelli and Feighan. When you have a man like Poitras in South Korea reporting these "dire" developments and saying that the Embassy, as usual, is "insensitive" to them, this tended to complicate the work of the Embassy in Seoul to some extent. However, as a significant influence, in the sense of the "China Lobby" of the 1940's and 1950's, which, to some degree, was motivated by former missionaries in China, I don't think that the missionaries in Korea made much of an impact on our policies toward South Korea. We tried to be courteous and cooperative with the missionaries in Korea, and their relationships with the Embassy in Seoul seemed to improve a bit, while I was there. I don't think that this was necessarily because of anything we did differently. Maybe it was just that the personalities involved changed to some extent. We had good relations with most of them. Sometimes, as with Ed Poitras, there were considerable friction in dealing with them.

The missionary community is very well established in South Korea. They first arrived in the 1880's, mostly Presbyterians and Methodists. Now, of course, you have missionaries from across the Christian spectrum. There are a couple of long established families, like the Underwood family, who are now in their fourth or fifth generation, living in South Korea. They do useful things. One Underwood is the head of the Seoul Foreign School, and his brother does something else, I forget what.

Q: Well, Harry, let's stop at this point. We'll pick it up the next time when you went back to Washington. You left Seoul in July, 1987, to become Country Director for Korea in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Department of State. You were there for how long?

DUNLOP: For two years, until August, 1989.

Q: Today is October 23, 1996. So, Harry, you left Korea but only in the territorial sense. When did you return to Washington?

DUNLOP: I returned in July, 1987. I replaced David Blakemore, whom, in fact, I had succeeded in Seoul as Political Counselor. So I succeeded him twice in a row. The Korean country desk in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs was always a good job. It was a pretty high profile job because South Korea was an important country, with US troops stationed there, and a lot of political interest too.

Q: When you say "the Korea desk," did that include North Korea?

DUNLOP: Yes. We had an officer assigned whose sole responsibility was North Korea. He reported through me to the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. We covered both North and South Korea. That was another reason why this assignment was an important responsibility because of the threat from North Korea, which I thought then and now was real. I still think today that the threat of renewed hostilities on the Korean peninsula is real. My boss was Bill Clark, a very competent Foreign Service Officer and senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. As it turned out, I did not get along with him very well. However, I had a lot of respect for his skills.

Q: When I was in South Korea, Bill Clark had been Political Counselor in Seoul.

DUNLOP: Yes. Bill was Political Counselor. At another time and in another context he had had another connection with Korea. As I said, he was the Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. At that time the occupant of that position had policy and operational responsibilities for China, Korea, and Japan. He was a very busy man.

At first we worked well together. In fact, I think that we always worked well together. However, there were personal conflicts which I do not wish to go into.

Q: Personalities aside, I think that it is interesting for people who look at this interview to be aware of this relationship. Did your differences with Bill Clark involve a judgment problem?

DUNLOP: We really did not have policy differences. Well, there was one area which I will get into and where I will talk about our differences. We produced a "white paper" on the Kwangju situation in South Korea. This referred to the so-called "Kwangju incident" of 1980, involving the massacre of several hundred South Koreans in the opposition to the then government, that of Chun Doo Hwan.

I had some friction with Bill Clark, not over what the "white paper" was to say but how hard to push to get it through the Washington bureaucracy. Quite frankly, this difference, from my point of view, turned on the fact that Bill was "angling" for the position of Ambassador to India. A new administration, that of President Bush, was in office, and there were a lot of unknown factors on the Seventh Floor of the Department of State where the offices of the Secretary of State and his principal assistants are located. He didn't want to stick his neck out. I thought that he had to, under the circumstances. I thought that he had no option to doing that. I'll talk about that at some length later on, because the Kwangju incident and the preparation of this "white paper" was a considerable part of what I did while I was Country Director for Korea.

Q: To start off, then, let's talk about North Korea first. The period that we're talking about is eight or nine years ago. Was there a feeling then, as there certainly is now, that North Korea, although it had a large army, was beginning to fall apart, as far as its

military capability and everything else were concerned? By this time the Soviet Union was no longer its major patron, and North Korea really didn't have anywhere to go to obtain sophisticated military weapons. How did we feel about North Korea at this time?

DUNLOP: My feeling was evidently very different from those who now work on North Korea in the Department of State. I think that there is now a feeling that changes are being forced on North Korea. Whether the North Koreans like it or not, they are going to be easier to live with, and we can help that process along. This is not a view which I share. I will go into why I don't share this view. I feel that things have not changed very much in North Korea. I think that our intelligence on that country is so bad, while their military capabilities are so great that I am very leery about our current policy toward North Korea. To use a scare word, it is pretty close to appeasement in my view. I am not a fan of that type of approach.

When I came back to Washington in July, 1987, I had several objectives in mind. I had thought them through and may even have made a list, though I didn't hang it over my desk. Achieving these objectives was in addition to all of the routine, day in and day out things at work. I knew what I wanted to accomplish in specific terms. I felt that there was a lack of understanding of the North Korean situation. I believed that there was a developing nuclear capability in North Korea. It did not already exist at that time, but I felt that it was moving fairly quickly and was aimed at us. I felt that this developing, nuclear capability could change some of the thinking in Pyongyang, the capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK], about the risks of going to war. This bothered me a great deal.

Information was coming into the US intelligence system in 1987 of a very scary nature. We were getting overhead photography of a facility in North Korea of which we had been aware for a long time. We had long considered that it was concerned with low level research on nuclear matters. All of a sudden, it began to look very ominous. We could tell from the overhead photography that things were going on at that facility which, we could tell, could be directly related to nuclear weapons research. I figured that, given what we knew about North Korea, this almost certainly involved the development of nuclear weapons.

However, there was no consensus in the intelligence community that North Korea had a nuclear weapons program, let alone what level it had reached. There were differing views. The majority view was more like mine than not. There were some strong dissenters, particularly over in what had been the Atomic Energy Commission and by now was the Department of Energy. The Department of Energy has a responsibility for making a significant input into assessing the levels of nuclear research and development around the world. Their view of North Korea was much more "benign" than that of the rest of the intelligence community.

Q: As you got further into this matter, what was behind this view of the Department of Energy? Were they looking more or less purely at the scientific aspect?

DUNLOP: Yes.

Q: Did the Department of Energy seem to understand what made the North Koreans go?

DUNLOP: Later in my Washington tour I had an opportunity to work on a military estimate of North Korea. We can talk about that. I went over to work at the National Intelligence Council after my tour on the Korean desk. I think that one of the reasons that I was accepted there was that they had two or three intelligence estimates that they were having some trouble with. They were looking for someone with expertise on these matters who could help them with these estimates. I think that I was able to help them.

However, it wasn't until 1990, three years after I returned to Washington, that we had a consensus in the US intelligence community that there was a nuclear weapons development program going on right then in North Korea. There was a difference on how far it had progressed and how long it would be before the North Koreans had a nuclear device that could be exploded. The compromise position reached within the US Government, in the way that such matters are usually handled, was that the North Koreans would probably have the capability to explode a nuclear device by 1995. I felt that they almost had such a capability in 1990 or, at least, would probably have it well before 1995. However, to get the intelligence estimate through the Washington bureaucracy, we had to make compromises, and we "footnoted" that compromise, that is, dissented.

Q: By "footnoting" you meant to say that the Department of State felt that North Korea would have nuclear weapons sooner, rather than later.

DUNLOP: Yes, or something like that. I can talk about the whole, estimative process, as I saw it unfold.

Q: Let's continue on the nuclear weapons question concerning North Korea. Then let's talk about other aspects of North Korea and then go on to South Korea.

DUNLOP: From the fall of 1989 to December 1990, or more than one year, I was assigned to the National Intelligence Council [NIC], which worked for the Director of Central Intelligence in the capacity which he has of overseeing the entire, intelligence operations of the US Government. There were two intelligence estimates being finalized at this time. I was not there for the beginning of this process. I would say that I entered on my duties with the NIC about half way through the drafting process on these two estimates.

The two estimates had been "hung up," partly because there had been personnel changes, partly because there were substantive disagreements over nuclear matters, and perhaps other aspects. I was told to get these two estimates off dead center and to take over responsibility for pushing and goading them through the process. I was pleased to do this.

Both of these intelligence estimates were on the military side, for which, perhaps, I had some relevant experience. I had watched the situation in North Korea unfold and had been responsible for political and, to some extent, certain military activities within the Embassy in Seoul, below the Ambassadorial level. I knew the American military leaders in South Korea quite well and had always been interested in and paid a lot of attention to military issues. So I didn't feel too disadvantaged in this connection.

The two intelligence estimates re Korea fit into each other in a hand in glove way. One concerned the military balance on the Korean peninsula. This is the kind of thing that the intelligence community produces in areas of conflict around the world, usually with the Americans on one side and the "bad guys," real or potential, on the other. Sometimes estimates of this kind concern two or three parties in which we are not directly involved. Of course, in the case of Korea, we were very much involved. This estimate was intended to produce a nice piece of paper with a blue cover on it which policymakers could look at when they were concerned about the security of Northeast Asia. They could see what the best estimate was of the relative strengths of the opposing forces deployed North and South of the 38th parallel.

Along with that and closely related to it was a separate intelligence estimate on "surprise attack" by North Korea on South Korea. One of the great, and perhaps overriding, concerns of military commanders in South Korea has been the geography of the Korean peninsula, which places Seoul and about 15 million of the 45 million or so South Koreans, that is, about one-third of the population of the country, within artillery range of North Korea. Certainly, within tactical rocket range of North Korea. In other words, about 40 km from North Korea. This is about as far as Dulles Airport is from the White House in the District of Columbia. This situation presents a very real military problem to us and the South Koreans. There is almost literally no real estate to trade for time. Everything that we plan on and all of our force dispositions in the Korean peninsula are predicated on the assumption that we are not going to initiate a war and that we're not going to attack the North Koreans first. We have to be prepared for the North Koreans to initiate hostilities.

Q: This really focuses the mind. For every one of us who served in South Korea this is the overriding consideration. "Sudden noises at dawn" are a particular matter of concern.

DUNLOP: Ever since 1976, and I think that there is a reason for choosing 1976, we have been aware of a redeployment and a changing military command structure in North Korea which places their main punch and power increasingly close to the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone which separates North and South Korea]. By 1987, when I arrived back in Washington, and by 1990, when I became involved in this matter of intelligence estimates, the North Koreans had continued this process of redeployment of their forces, to the point where the best estimate was that, at most, we would probably have only between 18 and 36 hours advance notice of an armed attack by North Korea on South

Korea. In fact, it was believed that we might be "lucky" to have 18 hours advance notice. In military terms that is almost nothing. It is like the blink of an eye.
One would hope that things would happen in the weeks and months preceding a possible North Korean attack that would sharpen our senses and make us more wary of developments of a changing political nature and perhaps developments internally in North or South Korea or in the world outside that would make us more and more expectant of an attack. However, perhaps not.

Anyway, this was an important intelligence estimate, as was the strategic balance estimate. We put the two estimates together, and I was quite pleased with the final product. The nuclear chapter of the military estimate still reflected a compromise between different positions. There was a consensus that the North Koreans were working on a nuclear weapons program. On almost the very day that we published this intelligence estimate, which is no reflection on the American intelligence community, we received new evidence of North Korean nuclear weapons development activity. This new evidence put the North Koreans about one year ahead of what even the more pessimistic people had thought. The evidence was that the North Koreans were beginning to test the conventional explosives that you need to surround a nuclear core to optimize the efficiency of the nuclear explosion.

Q: These indications could be identified by people who know what they are talking about.

DUNLOP: Well, some of the testing has to be done, or at least it is much cheaper to do it, in the open. If you try to contain these explosions underground, it becomes much more complex to get the necessary data. What you want is to collect the data in a "real world" environment. Ideally, that would involve a rocket descending on Seoul. So you don't want to have anything in a contained room. You could do it in a contained room, and the North Koreans probably have done it in a contained room.

We actually saw photographs of truck trailers with the electronic gear that would provide the analytical component of these tests. We also saw the craters following the explosions. That moved the timing of the whole program up, so I was really very pleased that we had developed a consensus. I was not totally satisfied that it was as accurate as I would have liked it to be or that it reflected my own views as much as I would want. However, it was a lot better than we had had before.

I think that there were two reasons why this consensus was slow in developing. It seemed to me that the more scientific you are, and, of course, the Department of Energy [DOE] people are the real scientific experts in this matter, the more "culture centric" they are in looking at other people's nuclear programs. Because WE had done things in a certain way, they really didn't think that other people, if they were smart, would try any other way. We always attach enormous importance to safety in our handling of nuclear materials. These scientists just couldn't conceive of a government that would assign people to work on a program whose deaths were absolutely certain after a given period of time. I personally had no difficulty in believing that the North Koreans would do that.

There was an employee of the Department of Energy who came in to lecture in a little program which I was very glad to take. This was called a "Non-Proliferation Seminar," but it was really a seminar about how you make nuclear weapons and, to some degree, how you detect the making of such weapons. The Department of Energy runs this seminar for the rest of the US Government. I had some time available while I waited for additional security clearances before I went out to CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] headquarters in the fall of 1989. I was also allowed to visit Los Alamos, NM, and to the nuclear testing site in Nevada. It was an interesting program, well worth taking.

Anyway, this DOE employee came in to give us a lecture. He was introduced as a man who had been fired from US Government employment in 1978 because he told President Jimmy Carter what Carter didn't want to hear. His story was that he had been a senior civil servant in the Department of Energy, very much involved in the effort to assess the threat of nuclear proliferation and figure out ways to hold it down. President Carter had come in with a sweeping program that he had promised the American people would actually work. This involved limiting the export of nuclear technology and getting other countries to cooperate in this connection. President Carter was convinced that we could "put the clamps down" to a degree that no other country could carry on a nuclear program, if every other country would just do what Jimmy Carter wanted them to do, involving the implementation of very stringent export controls.

This DOE employee thought that this idea was nonsense. He apparently wrote a memorandum, which he held up and showed to us. It described how to make a "quick and dirty nuclear bomb," with easily available, neighborhood resources. He circulated this memorandum around the government. According to this DOE employee, the memorandum came to the disapproving attention of somebody in the Carter administration and so he got into trouble and quit his job or was fired.

His story was, and the way he read it to us from the memorandum, that the machine tools to handle nuclear material were the same required to make an automobile. They have to be adapted to some extent, but they are no more complicated than that. To shield the operation, all you need is a big, swimming pool. In other words, you have to work under water. There are remote controlled tools for working under water. Some people have to go into that water, and those people will eventually or probably die from nuclear radiation. They will probably absorb a sufficiently large nuclear dose that they will become fatally ill after 10 or 20 years or so. However, if you are willing to send people into the water, working with these robotic tools, you can do the work necessary to build a crude but deliverable nuclear weapon that will go off with a very loud bang. He said that it is not all that difficult to extract weapons-grade uranium or plutonium from material assembled for research on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He didn't talk about how the South Africans and Israelis had done this. However, they did it, and I thought then and now that the North Koreans could develop that capability.

That worried me a lot. I think that that was one of the reasons why the American scientific community was a little slow to accept the prospect that the North Koreans could develop nuclear weapons. The risks that the North Korean Government would be willing to take and the short cuts that it would be willing to try to take would be unacceptable in a sophisticated, scientific environment like ours, where they wouldn't do it. So our scientists dismissed the possibility that others might do so.

Q: I'm not sure of the timing. However, at somewhat the same time Iraq was developing an atomic bomb or nuclear capabilities. The Israelis launched a "preemptive strike" on the Iraqi nuclear "research" facility. I'm sure that you can probably figure out the timing, but that must have been around 1982, or something like that. Anyway, as the North Korean nuclear program developed, it's not just that the United States needed to get its "act" together. It was also a matter for the South Koreans to consider. What did they do about this?

DUNLOP: One of the things that bothered me a great deal about the slowness of our preparing these intelligence estimates was that, because of the way that our intelligence systems are integrated, the South Koreans were getting a lot of the raw data on the North Korean program, although what they obtained had not been as thoroughly analyzed as the material we had. The South Koreans kept coming to us and saying, "What do you think about that?" We would say that we did not know what to think about it. I think that that attitude began to generate some significant degree of suspicion on the part of the South Koreans, that we were deliberately hiding from them things that we didn't want them to know. There is enough potential for friction in our relationship with South Korea, anyway, to allow such suspicions to grow. As someone responsible, at least at one level, for the political relationship with South Korea, I felt that that was a bad development from that point of view alone. We not only had to have a clear understanding of what was going on in North Korea. We had to make an assessment and share it with the South Koreans.

We didn't reach a consensus in the intelligence community on the North Korean nuclear program until 1989. Actually, the intelligence estimates were not circulated within the US Government until 1990. I was under the impression that we had such a consensus in 1989. In fact, we didn't have an estimate, but I thought that we had an agreement on the general situation.

Because of this concern of mine, and I think that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bill Clark shared it as well, we then persuaded the intelligence officers to brief the South Koreans on the North Korean program. This position we had then was less than a top level, intelligence assessment, but it was an agreed, inter-agency position. The team that was to brief the South Koreans left Washington for Seoul in the spring of 1989, just before I left the Korean desk. I thought that that was a great success. However, when I got over to the National Intelligence Council at CIA, about five months later, I found that the DOE had "backed off" from the statement and was no longer prepared to support it. So we had to go back and include this statement in the intelligence estimate.

The South Koreans actually knew what we were going to say before we said it. However, I thought that the general line contained in this briefing at least put us in a more acceptable position in terms of the South Koreans than was previously the case. Getting a briefing team to go over to review the matter with the South Koreans was one of the objectives which I had in mind when I returned to the Korean desk in Washington. I wanted to see if we could not push the intelligence community into an agreed position that would reflect the danger of a North Korean nuclear weapons development program which I feared was emerging.

I said earlier that I thought that there were two reasons why we were so slow to develop a consensus on the state of the North Korean nuclear weapons development program. One reason was this scientific reluctance to accept that any other country would develop nuclear weapons in any way other than we had done. The other was a more generalized reason, perhaps based on a misapprehension. I think that this attitude still exists and is not confined to any particular part of the US Government. I know some senior military officers who feel this way, or who don't see it the way that I do. I know some policy people who don't agree with me, either. These people don't see why the North Koreans would want a nuclear weapons program. They say: "Why would they want it? Don't they know that if they set off one bomb, they are going to be 'fried'? Why should they spend all of this time and effort?"

The reason that the North Koreans have, and it is a compelling reason, is that they want nuclear weapons so that we won't use our nuclear weapons against them. They want to neutralize the advantage they consider the South Koreans have in the form of the US as an atomic ally. They want to hold South Korea "hostage" to their nuclear weapons. Therefore, they are thinking of war on the Korean peninsula would be a war using conventional i. e., non nuclear weapons. The North Koreans think that they can win such a war with conventional weapons.

Some people may ask, "How can they think that they can win such a war?" Well, the North Koreans have 1.0 million men under arms. South Korea has 350,000 men under arms. Here is where I got a lot of blank stares and "glazed over" eyes from American military people. The North Koreans could take Seoul and then say, "Let's talk about it. We don't want any more fighting. We don't want any more killing. Of course, if you're going to fight, here are 15 million hostages whom we have in the Seoul area." Some of our military say, "No, the North Koreans have to get to Pusan first. They'll bypass Seoul. Our forces are sufficiently strong that they won't put the effort into taking Seoul. They'll go down and try to take Pusan. They didn't get Pusan in 1950, and that killed them." Well, that might be true if the North Koreans want to drive us into the Yellow Sea. But what about seeing us walk off the Korean peninsula, with our heads hanging? I'm not saying that that's a given or would necessarily be the North Korean war plan. However, by God, if I were in North Korea's position, that's the way that I would be thinking. Very few people think that that is what the North Koreans will do. However, it seems to me that it would be absolutely essential for the North Koreans, from their point of view, to be

able to say to us as their armies approach Seoul "Don't use nuclear weapons against us, because we have nuclear weapons, too."

Q: The Koreans are not a docile people. All of us who know them, in fact, know that their toughness is one of the things that we admire about them. You might think of Syngman Rhee letting the North Korean prisoners of war go in 1953 and so forth. Was there concern that the South Koreans might say: "Well, we don't know what the Americans think about this, but we know what we have to do." We're talking about the possibility that the South Koreans might launch a preemptive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities.

DUNLOP: As the Israelis did attack the Iraqi nuclear facility, a place called, I think, Osiraq. The possibility that the South Koreans might slip the leash and attack North Korea has been a fundamental concern in our relationship with South Korea for a long time. It goes back to the days when Syngman Rhee did everything that he could think of to prevent the US from signing the armistice agreement in Korea in 1953. This included releasing the North Korean prisoners of war which he felt was something that he could do which might disrupt the whole process of bringing a negotiated end to the Korean War. And perhaps it came pretty close to doing just that.

In December, 1967, North Korean saboteurs attacked the "Blue House," the residence of the President of the Republic of Korea. President Park Chung Hee was almost killed on this occasion. Park Chung Hee's wife was assassinated by North Korean agents while sitting in a theater next to her husband in downtown Seoul. The North Korean agent missed Park Chung Hee but hit his wife. These were all times of great tension. It was perhaps not as serious as all of those, but we had those concerns after the bombing incident at the Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon, although that may not have been as serious a crisis. In 1983 Ambassador "Dixie" Walker had a letter to take in to President Chun after the Rangoon bombing, which said: "Let's not do anything rash." In fact, Chun was nowhere close to doing anything like that. Here was a man who had every reason to be enraged, but held himself and others in check.

I think that one of the reasons that South Korea has never initiated an attack against North Korea is that the South Koreans realize that if they didn't first get our approval, our response would be uncertain. However, they didn't consult us in advance about the Kwangju incident, that was internal--nothing to do with the North. They took South Korean forces out from under the Combined Forces Command without prior agreement with the
US and used them to suppress what they called a revolt in Kwangju. This is one example where the South Koreans took unilateral action, knowing that it would really anger the United States. So the South Koreans have done a few things in the past, but starting the Korean War again in a way that would risk the American commitment to them is something which I don't think they would consider doing. Hopefully, they will never do that.

I would like to think that our policy toward North Korea now, which is "talk, talk, bribe, bribe," will work. I have grave doubts about this but I'm not in a position to make a judgment on this. I don't read any of the official papers and I don't associate with any of the Americans who are involved in current policy matters. Many of the Americans concerned with policy toward North Korea are good friends of mine, despite the fact that I disagree so profoundly with them. I find it painful to argue with them and I've quit arguing with them. We are talking about our policy in 1996 toward North Korea, of course.

Q: With further regard to North Korea, you mentioned that in 1976 there was a change there. What sort of developments have you seen over time in North Korea?

DUNLOP: Let me say what I think is the case. I think that the historical record will back me up on this. To some degree, this is my own interpretation of the record, and I'm not sure that you could document this. There was a period between 1975 and 1976, after the American collapse in Vietnam, which the South Koreans witnessed from up close. The South Koreans had grave doubts about the ability of the Americans to sustain our commitments around the world.

During this 1975-1976 period a series of talks was opened between North and South Korea. We were not included in them, though these talks took place with our knowledge and approval. I'm not sure that we were aware of every contact that took place, but the South Koreans basically kept us pretty well informed. There were many such talks, well over a hundred. I think that there was serious thought, in the mind of Park Chung Hee, who was no fool, that if the American commitment was in question, he wanted at least to explore the possibility of some easing of the tension between North and South Korea.

One of the things which, I think, Americans who have dealt with Koreans must try very hard to understand is the concept of Korean ethnicity to Koreans and how painful the division on the Korean peninsula really is. The one propaganda "cut" which the North makes against the South which always has the capacity to inflict pain in the South is: "We don't have any occupation Army in North Korea. We don't have any places where our women's bodies are being abused by savage barbarians. We don't have any Russian officer commanding North Korean troops. We are Koreans. True Koreans would never allow that to happen. Obviously, you people in South Korea aren't really true Koreans." That kind of charge burns like a red hot poker. No less with Park Chung Hee than with any other South Korean.

I think that in 1975 Park Chung Hee felt that the possibility of some kind of improvement in relations between South and North Korea was at least worth exploring, especially as he looked on the Americans in that particular time frame as having demonstrated their unreliability as an ally to South Vietnam. That was when Park Chung Hee also began what he hoped would be a clandestine nuclear weapons research program in South Korea itself. We found out about this clandestine nuclear weapons research program afterwards and we landed on him very hard.

These were important events. Here was Park Chung Hee looking at the Americans with a much less confident eye, impelled, as Koreans are, to think about the reunification of Korea, which was a high, high objective of both North and South Korea. So Park began on a nuclear weapons program of his own and also started talks with the North Koreans. He sent the head of the KCIA, a man named Yi Hoo Rak to Pyongyang to talk to Kim Il Song, the North Korean leader. One of the preconditions for these talks was that Kim Il Song had to admit that he had tried to kill Park Chung Hee and say that he was sorry for this. So Korean "face" would be saved.

Yi Hoo Rak went to Pyongyang and had a long meeting with Kim Il Song. Soon after the meeting began, Kim Il Song told him, "You can leave now." So Yi Hoo Rak went down the hall to the elevator and was literally pressing the elevator button. At least this is the way that Yi Hoo Rak described it later to the Americans. Then Kim Il Song came out of his office and said to Yi Hoo Rak, "I've had second thoughts. Come back here." Kim Il Song said, "You know, that event the attempted assassination of Park Chung Hee was regrettable. Please tell your President that I said it was regrettable." Now that's not exactly a heartfelt apology, but it was enough to keep the talks going.

However, the talks ultimately failed, in 1976. I don't think that this failure was due to Park Chung Hee's being unwilling to go whatever mile was necessary to keep them going. I think that what happened in North Korea was a combination of things, which included the emergence of Kim Jong Pil, the son and prelature successor to Kim Il Song. Kim Jong Il was one of a number of possible successors. I think that you will see at this point how Kim Jong Il began to be treated in North Korea. They began to use "hagiographic" names...

Q: Like "Beloved Leader."

DUNLOP: Kim Jong Il was referred to as "Dear Leader." Kim Il Song was referred to as "Beloved Leader." I used to know these names well, but I am not sure how well I know them now. Kim Jong Il was given some responsibility over defense. I believe that Kim Jong Il's influence was negative. I believe that Kim Jong Il "spiked" whatever thoughts there were in the North Korean hierarchy about exploring the possibility of a real "modus vivendi" with Park Chung Hee on the Korean Peninsula. He put a spoke in the wheel, or whatever the word is.

Also in 1976 the North Koreans began a redeployment of their armed forces toward the border with South Korea. They had always had a formidable military capability up next to the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone], but before 1976 they also had significant elements of their military forces, particularly their armor, dispersed around North Korea.

In addition, they began a process of moving their military forces South and toward the DMZ digging them into tunnels. They were and are the biggest tunnel diggers in the whole universe. Certainly in the world, and probably in the universe. The North Koreans

have spent an enormous amount of energy in putting military installations into the rock underneath the mountains down near the DMZ. This is one of the reasons that we are so concerned about this business of surprise attack, because we can't see what is going on as well as we would like to. Between 1976 and 1987 an enormous amount of redeployment of North Korean military forces took place.

We also acquired and began to use much more sophisticated means of collecting intelligence. I refer in particular to enhanced satellite photography. As I've said before, our intelligence on North Korea has been terrible. It's been terrible from the point of view of intelligence collected by agents. Indeed, I think that I can make the statement here that it is almost non-existent. I know of no useful "human intelligence" (humint) source that either the South Koreans or we have had, inside North Korea, giving us intelligence based on what a human being sees and observes. If we had had such intelligence sources, I was not aware of them. And I think that I would have been aware of them. Certainly, when I worked out at CIA headquarters in Langley, I thought that I had access to any intelligence that anyone could have. It just wasn't there, as far as I was aware.

What we do have is overhead photography. We have photography produced by U-2 and SR-71 aircraft, and now we have satellite photography. That kind of photography does give us some idea of what this tunnel construction by the North Koreans has been. Once the tunnels are completed and the "blast doors" are in place and the tanks rumble in there, we don't know much about them. However, that all began in about 1976. Considering the general poverty of the North Korean economy and the resources available, this tunnel building activity continued at a remarkable pace.

I think that 1976 was kind of a watershed. The North Koreans turned from exploring the possibility of an accommodation with South Korea, under Kim Il Song's direction, toward preparing for Armageddon under the influence of Kim Song Il, in a way that they had not previously done. The nuclear weapons development program is certainly part of this effort. However, I note here that North Korea joined the NPT [Non Proliferation Treaty] in 1986. I was assigned to the Embassy in Seoul at the time. We all felt, "Good heavens! What a great idea!"

The NPT is a treaty signed by or adhered to by a very large number of countries. Countries which subscribe to it promise that they will not develop nuclear weapons and that they will allow the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA, a UN specialized agency with its headquarters in Vienna], which has very competent people, to inspect their nuclear facilities, if any. A signatory country is required to declare its nuclear facilities and anything to do with a nuclear program, including those for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These facilities must be declared to the IAEA and then its inspectors must be allowed to visit them. When North Korea acceded the non-proliferation treaty in 1986, it looked like a possible "breakthrough" in relations. In the Embassy in Seoul we thought that maybe we could lay to rest any concern about North Korea's developing nuclear weapons. Now, in retrospect I believe that they joined the non-proliferation treaty

precisely to mask their nuclear program, not to reveal what it was. They have successfully done that, so far.

The North Koreans create all kinds of bureaucratic delays in implementing the non-proliferation treaty, but they can always say that they have adhered to it. They raise small points like, "This is not quite right, and that is not quite right." They say to the UN inspectors, "Oh, you're an inspector? Who are these inspectors?"

So North Korea, from my standpoint, remains a very, very dangerous tinderbox. At least some people in North Korea might be willing to resume the Korean War under certain circumstances. I don't believe that trying to buy them off will work.

Q: To continue with this discussion of North Korea, during the time that you were Country Director for Korea, how did you view the role of the Soviet Union and of the People's Republic of China?

DUNLOP: Give Deputy Assistant Secretary Bill Clark significant credit for this. Bill Clark came out to South Korea in 1987 in his capacity as Deputy Assistant Secretary. Among other things he did during this visit, he told me that he would like me to be Country Director for Korea. However, he wanted to know whether I would support an initiative that was very much in his mind and he didn't know whether I would support it. Personally, I'm a "hawk" and I come across as a "hawk" on matters like North Korea. I think that that is pretty evident from this interview. Bill Clark wanted to start political talks with North Korea. He wanted to know that his Country Director for Korea was "on board" for this initiative. I guess that he made support for this a "condition of employment." Once he explained this initiative to me, I said that I would support it. I actually thought that it was a worthwhile initiative.

We started these talks. We had to get them started in a way which would not reinforce the always present suspicion on the South Korean side. These were going to be bilateral US-North Korean talks to start with. The idea was that they would become "Four Power Talks" at some point, with the addition of South Korea and China. Perhaps eventually Six-Power talks, adding the USSR and Japan, to ratify a settlement of security issues all over N.E. Asia. At least, this was my vision. The North Koreans were agreeable to the initial proposal for talks, which we made to them through the Chinese. We asked the North Koreans if they would participate in these talks. After we first approached the Chinese, they said that they would be happy to be "facilitators" in these conversations between the US and North Korea if they would initially take place in Beijing.

I took a "fun trip," the only time that I've gone all the way around the world. I went to Moscow and Beijing to carry this message as to what we wanted to do and to explain it to our Embassies in those two capitals, and, to the degree possible, also to the Soviets and to the Chinese.

Q: By the way, what about the South Koreans? Were they informed?

DUNLOP: They were informed at every stage. This was my precondition to taking the job as Country Director for Korean Affairs in the Department of State. If Bill Clark had his precondition--my support for direct talks with North Korea--I had mine . No going behind the backs of the South Koreans. I told Bill Clark that I would be prepared to be the "point man" as far as the Department was concerned. And, of course, our Ambassador to South Korea would always have to be at least as well informed as we were. We would back him on whatever he saw fit to do in Seoul.

The reaction of the South Koreans was always a major concern. In fact, if there had ever been any thought about doing or suggesting this in the past, it probably foundered on the feeling that this would not be acceptable, as far as the South Koreans were concerned. Keep in mind that this was a time of great political change in Seoul. This is the time just before President Chun stepped down from office, which we had always hoped and prayed he would do. We were making a major effort in that connection. I think that we've already talked about the tensions that arose in Seoul, going so far as martial law almost being declared, and then Chun backed off. There was a lot of evidence that the political system in South Korea was going to modernize. In addition to this was the fact that the new President, No Tae Woo, was an unknown quantity and might get "cold feet" on this initiative at the last minute. However, too many South Koreans wanted a change in the political system.

I think that we were favored by that change in the South Korean political system as we moved very cautiously into these talks with North Korea. The successor to Chun was No Tae Woo. While he was a military officer by background, with some dark and shady things in his past, nevertheless he was a pretty sophisticated and cosmopolitan Korean. He had had the primary organizing responsibility for the Seoul Olympics, which still lay a little bit ahead of us at this point. However, No Tae Woo was a man who was sophisticated and accessible to dialogue.

Chun was plenty smart but was a person with a rather narrow focus. His experience with the world outside South Korea was very limited. If he had been dictator and "generalissimo" throughout this process, it might not have gone as smoothly as it did.

Anyhow, I took this trip around the world in February, 1988. I flew to Yugoslavia, Hungary, and then to Moscow. Of course, the American Embassy in each locale set up my program, so that we had talks with the "right" folks. Then I went on to Beijing, where I had very interesting talks there with the "senior Chinese official handling North Korean affairs," at least as the American Embassy in Beijing described him. His name was Tao Bing Hwei. I found a lot of receptivity in Moscow to the idea of direct US talks with the North Koreans. This kind of surprised me. The Soviet officials I talked to said: "You mean that you people are going to do that?" This was as if to say, "How come you got so smart so late?" These Soviet officials were very supportive of the idea, and I don't have any doubt that they were sincere in this respect. The Soviet officials also said: "Look, we don't talk very much to the North Koreans. We'll give this process our blessing, if you

want to put it in those terms, but don't expect us to be very influential with Pyongyang." I think that they were being honest in this respect.

This was not the attitude in Beijing. As I left Beijing, I thought to myself: "Did I just get 'stiffed,' as I thought?" I think that we had been "stiffed."

Q: When you say "stiffed," what do you mean?

DUNLOP: They told us that they were supportive of the idea of direct US talks with North Korea. Again, there was some of this attitude that it had taken us a long time to "get smart," but "better late than never." The Chinese facilitated the mechanics of the talks. It was no big deal for them. We didn't want to have the talks in our Embassy or in the North Korean Embassy, for obvious reasons. We didn't want the North Koreans "bugging" us. Of course, wherever we went in Beijing, the Chinese were going to "bug" the talks. We accepted that. We thought that it would be fine for the Chinese to have access to pretty much everything going on in these talks. They gave us space in a conference room in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. I've forgotten exactly how it was arranged. They gave us interpreter facilities and so forth.

Q: As you were making this trip, with the blessing of Deputy Assistant Secretary Bill Clark, we weren't only just saying, "We're going to talk with the North Koreans." What were we looking for?

DUNLOP: What we told the Russians and the Chinese was the absolute truth as to what we wanted to do. We wanted to establish a political channel of communications with North Korea, for the first time since 1953. It was clear that Kim Il Song, the North Korean leader, wasn't going to live forever. In fact, he lived for a few more years after this, but he wasn't going to live much longer. His potential successor, Kim Jong Il, looked really "bad." This nuclear complication would rapidly be upon us. Political conditions in South Korea were moving in a direction which would support some kind of reopening of the dialogue which had gone on in the 1975-1976 period, when Park Chung Hee was President of South Korea.

We thought, without any great expectations of immediate benefit to ourselves, that we could position ourselves to be in a much better position to talk to the North Koreans in an emergency, if we had a channel which went beyond the already existing, military channel through the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom. This was the only place where we had ever spoken to the North Koreans. The South Koreans had developed their "Red Cross" and other talks in the 1970's, which were all highly political, but those had ended. What had gone on consistently throughout this period and previously were the monthly meetings of the Military Armistice Commission. Sometimes these talks were very formalistic and sterile. Sometimes they were more useful. For example, the North Koreans passed us a few letters while I was in Seoul, through the military command. At one point the North Koreans proposed direct talks between their military commander and

General Bill Livsey Hart, the senior US commander in South Korea. Of course, they did not want any South Koreans participating.

Q: This is the thing about these talks. One of the things that North Korea, publicly at least, always tried to do was to get us talking with them, bypassing the South Koreans. This sounds like...

DUNLOP: Like something that they would jump at, and, in fact, they did jump at it. We just had to make sure that any benefits that the North Koreans thought they might derive from driving wedges between us and the South Koreans in fact didn't happen. I think that we were able to avoid that. These talks were literally about nothing, from the North Korean point of view. We proposed an agenda to them, covering such subjects as "nuclear non proliferation" and North Korea's observing the non proliferation treaty [NPT] which they had signed. We let them understand that if they effectively joined the NPT system, and I think that this was not a bad thing to propose to the North Koreans, this meant that the North Koreans would join the NPT in substance and not just on the surface. If the North Koreans would submit themselves to meaningful controls on nuclear development, we were prepared to say to them what we've now said to them. That is, that we and the South Koreans would help them develop a "peaceful uses of nuclear energy" program. Such a program might well be beyond their capabilities without our help, or at least would be more expensive and so forth.

We thought that this was a reasonable "quid pro quo." There are some people in the Department of State who still think that it is a reasonable "quid pro quo." The problem is that the North Koreans think that they have their "quid" for our "quo." In fact, they haven't given any "quid" for our "quo." However, that was one of the major objectives we had. We wanted to offer them some "carrots" in the peaceful nuclear field before they had the damned capability to build nuclear weapons. In this way the North Koreans might see an advantage in backing off from their nuclear weapons development program.
These talks began in Beijing while I was Country Director for Korea. They were at the Political Counselor level. We put forth substantive agendas. They said that they would take these agendas under consideration but they never agreed to any meaningful talks. So all we had were essentially "talks about talks." I suppose that North Korea was not prepared to abandon its nuclear weapons development program. They saw that that was our objective and were not prepared to get into that kind of discussion until after they had developed a weapon. As I look back on those talks in retrospect, I see that that was probably why this "ploy" failed. Evidently, Kim Jong Il continued to believe that their continuing to develop a nuclear weapons capability was too valuable to throw away. Therefore, they were going to pursue the nuclear program, at least until they had a weapon. In my view they now are doing that, or rather, have achieved that.

Why did the Chinese "stiff" us in the sense that I thought they did? That is, why were they unwilling really to "go to the mat" with the North Koreans on the nuclear issue? I don't know. One would think that a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula would be just as

abhorrent to the Chinese as it would be to us, although the prevailing winds do blow in the "right" direction, from the Chinese point of view.

Q: In other words, the prevailing winds blow from Korea toward Japan and not toward China.

DUNLOP: Yes, toward Japan, toward Georgetown, and toward Arlington County [Laughter]. It's hard to know. Maybe the Chinese discussed nuclear weapons with the North Koreans which they didn't tell us about and which we never learned of. Or perhaps they knew that such an effort would fail and didn't want to put any major effort into it for reasons of "face." As I say, I don't know. Certainly, the Chinese never effectively slowed down the North Korean nuclear program. Indeed, nobody has been able to do that.

Q: Did you get any information from the Chinese regarding what was going on in Pyongyang and all of that?

DUNLOP: The Chinese official to whom I talked in Beijing was a knowledgeable figure named Tao Bing Hwei. The Embassy in Beijing had arranged an appointment with him for me. The Embassy talked to him on nuclear matters. Tao Bing Hwei had fought in the same guerrilla unit and in the same campaign against the Japanese with Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung is now described in his biography as leading a unit which drove the "cowardly" Japanese into the sea during the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945. In fact, this unit had a minor military impact, but Tao and Kim Il Sung were in it. Kim Il Sung had gone to Manchukuo, the Japanese name for Manchuria during the earlier stages of the Sino-Japanese War. He joined with the communists and fought with Chinese Red Army units up in Manchuria. Tao was in one of those Chinese Red Army units. Tao came back to Beijing in 1949 with the triumphant victors in the Chinese civil war. Kim Il Sung was then recruited by the Russians to go back to Pyongyang, North Korea. However, Tao and Kim Il Sung kept this personal relationship.

Whenever Kim Il Sung visited China, which he did on numerous occasions, Tao Bing Hwei was his personal interpreter and escort officer. From the Chinese point of view Tao was the man who saw Kim Il Sung the first thing in the morning and the last thing at night. Tao was given a kind of Confucian, academic title as the "Head of the Institute for the Research of Peace in Northeast Asia," or something like that. He is actually a senior official in the Chinese foreign policy establishment. For this purpose he was actually a fairly interesting person.

Q: Oh, yes!

DUNLOP: I would like to have drunk another 20 cups of tea with him, in addition to the eight or 10 cups of tea that were served out at the meeting. I think that I had two meetings with Tao. I was very impressed with him. He is a very impressive man and is more than just a survivor in the communist elite. We've all met communist survivors who were dull

as ditch water and dumb as could be. Others were brilliant and interesting human beings in their own right. Tao certainly fit into that category.

Tao said all of the "right" things. He downplayed their ability to influence the North Koreans. I think that that was not correct. I think that the Chinese had considerable ability to influence the North Koreans. At least they could have tried a lot harder in this connection than they actually did. It seemed to me that, while Tao wanted to do everything to encourage these talks between North Korea and the United States, he evidently had no intention to commit the Chinese to doing anything in the policy area. He kept saying, "We have very little influence in Pyongyang." He and other Chinese would tell us, "You know, the North Koreans are just as difficult to deal with as your South Koreans." Well, I believe that. However, after all, we have some influence in Seoul. I think that I probably made that comment at some point in the conversation with Tao. We certainly didn't expect that the Chinese would sign anything that I could go back to Seoul with and say definitively that the Chinese were going to help us with the North Koreans.

On the whole, I was pretty cautious in my evaluation of what they were going to do. I don't think that I used the word "stiff" on any piece of paper that I drafted. However, as I look back on it from the perspective of two or three years, I think that that's what happened. The Chinese just said to themselves, "We're not going to spend any political capital on this." Why should they? I can imagine some reason why they should, like avoiding nuclear war. But it was never evident to me that they lifted a finger to help reduce the chances of a war.

Q: Were these talks with the Chinese in Beijing publicized or known generally? What was the public reaction to them?

DUNLOP: We told the North Koreans that we would not hold secret discussions with them. We said that we would respect the confidentiality of anything they said in those meetings which they did not want to make public, that is, we would not go public with such. However, we told the North Koreans that we would inform the South Koreans of everything that went on and would not hide anything from them. We told the North Koreans that if they ever said, "Don't tell the South Koreans about this or that," that would be the end of the talks. We would not conduct ourselves at the meetings with the North Koreans in any other way than the manner which I have described. However, we did say that if they did not want the contents of these meetings to be released publicly, as distinguished from telling the South Koreans, we would respect their wishes in that regard, at least to the degree that they asked us. Basically, this question never came up because we never got into any discussion which really had substantive content.

Yes, we announced that the talks were being held. There was a big flurry of excitement in Washington over them. This was only to be expected. We did everything that we could to say, "Look, this is really just 'batting practice.' We haven't even gone out and exchanged lineups. Take it easy." But the American press, of course, was all excited about this.

There wasn't much to get excited about except that we were talking to the North Koreans. That, in itself was important.

Those talks have now been superseded by very substantive discussions which have taken place since then, and are going on now. They've been promised oil, foodstuffs, and four or five nuclear reactors. Or at least we agreed to ask the South Koreans to build them for them. Those have been very substantive talks. They have taken place in Geneva, New York, and other places.

After a while we were kind of unhappy with the Chinese venue for these talks. I can't remember what it was that made us unhappy about it. I think that, at one point, the North Koreans suggested Kuala Lumpur [Malaysia] as the site for the talks. Just about the time that I left the Korean desk, we may have agreed to a change. We did not want to hold these talks in the United States. The North Koreans always wanted to hold these talks in New York, probably for reasons of convenience. They had their Mission to the UN there. However, then we didn't want to have the talks on American soil. That looked too much like a bilateral negotiation over the heads of the South Koreans. For their part the South Koreans were pretty much agreeable to any place but the United States. Now it appears we've overridden such South Korean objections.

Q: Let's turn to South Korea. Perhaps the subject of North Korea might come back in. You have already talked about South Korea. When you took over Korean affairs in Washington, where did Korea rank from the Washington point of view?

DUNLOP: Well, if you look at Korea from the viewpoint of the Pentagon, it ranked very high. The US military had a "specified commander," a four-star general in command of US forces there. This was obviously one of the more important US military commands. The US military feared that the North Koreans might eventually launch a renewed Korean War, which I also feared. South Korea was where major hostilities could occur. As discussed above, there was a question whether the North Koreans would strike for Pusan first or try to take Seoul, with its 15 million people, as hostages and then sit on it. The US military was always acutely aware of the possibility of a renewal of conflict on the Korean peninsula. Some of the four-star generals who have commanded in South Korea went on to become Chiefs of Staff of the US Army. Examples of this include Generals Vessey and Wickham.

The overall command of US forces in South Korea was a "high profile" job from the Pentagon point of view. So the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (POL-MIL) in the State Department also regarded Korea as a high profile situation. Interestingly enough, for one reason or another, and it may have been just a matter of personalities, POL-MIL did not insert itself in the work of the Korean desk too much, although I would have welcomed their support on certain occasions. However, perhaps I would not have welcomed it on other occasions. Nevertheless, POL-MIL was a bureau that we had to clear telegrams with on most occasions.

In EA/P [Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs], Korea was a relatively small appendage to Japan and China. However, EA/P also realized full well that this was a potential "trouble spot."

Korea was also a pretty high profile country from the viewpoint of Congress. A number of Congressmen were deeply interested in Korea when I was on the Korean desk. Congressman Steve Solarz [Democrat, New York] was perhaps the most prominent among them. I'll say a few words about Stephen Solarz and his staff assistant, Stanley Roth. Korea had "sex appeal" for Congress. A lot of Congressmen had interesting experiences in Korea. Senator Murkeusk of Alaska, for example, was one of those. There was Senator Allen Cranston from California whom I detested so much but who was a very powerful man. He finally quit the Senate in about 1988 under something of a cloud. Congressional delegations tramped through South Korea at a great rate, partly because their wives loved to shop. Itaewon in Seoul was one of the great shopping emporiums of the Far East, at least of the Korean part of it. Congressional interest was partly generated by growing Korean communities in their respective districts. This was especially the case with California, which was why Senator Cranston was on our radar scope so much.

Senator Lugar [Republican, Indiana] was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during part of my time in South Korea. He had a lot of interest in Korea. He was a very good man, very perceptive and helpful. He was as much interested in Korea because of his committee responsibilities. However, he also understood the importance of Northeast Asia to the United States.

At staff meetings in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs I was just one of a number of Country Directors. There was the Country Director for the Philippines, for example, who was very important at that time because that was the period when President Ferdinand Marcos fell from office. We were sort of "getting things on track" in South Korea, whereas in the Philippines the desk officers could see things going "downhill." When things were getting better, nobody spends much time worrying about the country you are concerned with. I had the good fortune to return to Washington at a time when Chun had finally decided to leave office. There was going to be an election which would result in a process of modernization which would go ahead rapidly. That helped matters a lot.

I came back to Washington with several objectives in mind, and I tracked them over my desk. One of these was the North Korean nuclear weapons development program. I thought that we needed to focus much more on this issue. I guess that you could say that I was successful in this effort, although it took several years. I can't say that the policy toward North Korea now reflects many of the things that I would like to see happening.

Another issue was relations with Congress, particularly with Congressman Steve Solarz. Stephen Solarz is no longer in Congress. As a human being, he is certainly one of the brightest people that I ever associated with. He has an extremely quick mind. He is very intense and very abrasive. He was a liberal Democrat from Brooklyn. He had lots of seniority in the House of Representatives and a great interest in foreign affairs. He was

Chairman of the Asian Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. So Asia was his area of particular interest, and he took it very seriously. He made at least one trip to South Korea every year.

These visits were always periods of tension, because Solarz generates tension around him. He was very arrogantly insistent on things being done "his" way. His schedules had to be "just so." He didn't mind insulting Koreans or anybody else if something didn't work out his way. He was a man who came to believe that we were following essentially the right course in Korea. However, he did not begin thinking that way. Like many people in the liberal establishment, he had many suspicions about people serving the Reagan administration. He suspected the Reagan administration of "getting in bed" with dictators around the world, and here was a dictator in the case of Chun in South Korea.

Q: Jeane Kirkpatrick, our Permanent Representative to the UN, discussed this point at some length, although she was really talking in terms of Latin America. She came from a conservative, Democratic background. She went to work for President Reagan as his Ambassador to the UN and said basically that we should support "strong leaders, even if they are 'authoritarian' in outlook."

DUNLOP: Well, Chun's relationship with the Carter administration, of course, was "zero," and deservedly so. Chun had shot his way to power. In his handling of the Kwangju incident Chun had tried to associate us with him so that we would share the blame for his overreaction and the brutality displayed by his own troops.

When the Reagan administration came into office, we had this dilemma which we have repeatedly faced around the world. In this case there was a government in South Korea with an unpleasant person in power. The Chun administration was politically unpopular in the United States and a "nasty guy" from our point of view. However, he was running an important country, where we had significant interests.

When I was on home leave, I would go around and give little talks about South Korea. It was an interesting and useful thing to do, and I was always gratified to find the degree of interest in South Korea that there was in the United States, in places like Milwaukee or Cincinnati. I would start out my presentation by defining what our interests were in South Korea. I would say, and believed very sincerely, that we had fought World War II in Asia, a terribly bloody conflict, in the 1940's to determine, in important ways, what Japan's role was going to be in Asia. I asked whether my listeners thought that Asia should be dominated by an imperialistic, warlike, aggressive, selfish, self-aggrandizing, ethnically exclusivist Japan. Or would it be an area where Japan would play an important and even a major role but in a constructive and peaceful fashion? We fought World War II to make sure which of those Asia's would emerge from it. We won that war and had an enormously successful, post-war policy. This policy ensured that the Asia that we were going to have to deal with, as the Pacific area became more important in the world, would be an Asia which would not be dominated by an imperialistic, aggressive and hostile Japan. Rather, Japan would be a cooperative member of the world community.

I said that that's where South Korea fits in. As long as the US military guarantee of Japan's security is believed by Japan to be effective, that is one of the major foundations of a successful US foreign policy in East Asia. In these circumstances Japan will accept a cooperative role with the United States. However, if Japan ever comes to doubt our intentions, if we are driven militarily out of Northeast Asia, if we ever have to abandon our treaty commitments to Japan, then what we fought for in World War II and thought that we had won would again be in question. The place where that could happen is in Korea. If we are militarily confronted and defeated on the Korean peninsula, Japan will reassess its relationship with the United States. It will have no alternative to do so. We must not allow that to happen. So maybe our stance in South Korea is a "holding action" or maybe it is a "subset" of our policy toward Japan or Northeast Asia, but that is the reality.

We have a document which we sign each year, the communique made public after the meeting between the US Secretary of Defense and the South Korean Minister of Defense. This communique always includes some "sacred language" which is repeated every year, although there are some passages in it which change each year. It contains little segments of prose which have been hammered out and are repeated every year. One of these statements concerns the nuclear commitment of the United States toward the Republic of Korea. This doesn't mean that we have to keep nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. It means that we will consider the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, in the defense of the peninsula. We do not exclude that possibility.

Another passage from the communique includes a little phrase which I think I recall correctly. It states that the independence, self-determination, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea (that is, the area South of the DMZ) [Demilitarized Zone], are vital to the security of Northeast Asia and, in turn, to the United States. That is, we would be willing to go to war in South Korea (a "vital interest"), not just because of Korea but because of its relationship to our interests in Northeast Asia more generally. The South Koreans always want to separate out the phrase, "in turn." They want it linked to the word, "vital," meaning that we will fight in direct defense of South Korea no matter what. However, we use the phrase, "in turn," to relate our commitment to South Korea to the security of Northeast Asia. I believe that this is just as much true today as it has ever been.

Congressman Solarz believed that, too. This is a long digression from our discussion of Solarz, but he believed that. What he did not understand or was very skeptical of was whether, in pursuing that interest which, to him, was very acceptable, we would do enough in the human rights and the civil liberties area to "pressure" Chun. He thought that we could do both things simultaneously. Like many liberals, the more he was involved with foreign affairs, the more realistic he became about what could be achieved. However, he never relinquished the belief that we should always try and try harder to do this. Now, I happen to agree with that view and I think that Ambassador "Dixie" Walker agreed with that. But Stephen Solarz was very skeptical about that at first.

When I arrived in Seoul in 1983, Congressman Solarz had made only one trip to South Korea. This was in 1982, when the Reagan administration was in office, and he and "Dixie" Walker did not hit it off well. "Dixie" Walker, my Ambassador, was no knee jerk conservative by any means. However, he was a Republican and a "political" Republican at that. He was an academic but a "political" Republican. "Dixie" had an acerbic tongue and a good wit. Over the years he had inflicted some "cuts" which were remembered, and I don't think that his relationship with Solarz was ever going to prosper. They were just two different kinds of people. Solarz is a "cold, prickly" type of person, and "Dixie" is a "warm, cuddly" type of person.

They had some real frictions very shortly after I arrived in Seoul. Another Solarz trip to South Korea was announced, and I could see clouds on the horizon. I was always Control Officer for the organizational aspects of every Solarz visit. When Solarz arrived in South Korea, I remember being very impressed with him. I was very impressed with Stanley Roth, his special assistant, who traveled with him. He could be a very helpful intermediary. However, Roth was really agitated, irritated, and frustrated by both "Dixie" Walker and Solarz. They seemed to take pleasure in "going at each other." OKAY, some of that was probably inevitable, but, by God, didn't that get in the way of what they wanted to do? That was the way it was with the Solarz trip to South Korea in 1983. When the 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987 trips took place, each one of these was a little easier, in personal terms, between "Dixie" and Solarz. Each of these trips led to an increasing acceptance by Solarz that we weren't just giving up on the human rights issue but were really trying hard to make progress. It was hard, but we were trying. So Solarz became, perhaps less abrasive. My relationship with Roth survived our bosses' sparring.

One of my objectives when I was transferred back to the Department in 1987 was to keep the relationship between me and Stanley Roth at a level that could be helpful.

Q: I don't think that Stanley Roth was Solarz's staff aide. I think that he was an employee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

DUNLOP: I don't know actually who employed him. I should know it but I don't. I don't know whether he was on Solarz's personal staff or whether he was an employee of the East Asian Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I know that Roth has subsequently held several senior appointments under the Clinton administration in ISA [Internal Security Affairs office in the Department of Defense] and in the National Security Council. So he couldn't have been "just" a member of Solarz's staff. Or, if he started out that way, he acquired another position later on. He is a very bright guy. I would be pleased to see him play an important role in any administration's foreign policy. I think that he has his head screwed on right. Anyway, maintaining a good relationship with Stanley Roth was one of my objectives.

That meant spending some time and hanging around with Stanley Roth and making sure that he knew about things before he read about them in the papers. This was particularly

the case with the North Korean situation. Another consideration was that Solarz was the only Congressman ever to have visited Pyongyang [North Korean capital]. I think that Solarz went to Pyongyang in 1981 or sometime around then. Whatever the North Koreans tried to do to convince him that US policies were wrong and had failed, his trip just convinced him of all of the worst things that he had been told about North Korea. He recognized the worst aspects of the North Korean regime. So I wanted to keep alive the connection which I had developed with Stanley Roth over the years. I think that I succeeded in that.

There was a man on the NSC staff whom I didn't know much about but had heard a lot about, Doug Paal. Under the Reagan and Bush administrations he had the Korean "portfolio." I wanted to make sure that my relationship with him was as good as it could be. I didn't mean that I would go and "sell out the store" when I talked to him. However, I wanted to make sure that he felt comfortable that I was not trying to go behind his back and, more hopefully, he wouldn't be trying to go behind my back. Of course, he was in the administration, not Congress, so it was easier. However, really, the same kind of things have to be done. I think that a Country Director has to be...

Q: Harry, this is a little bit of Washington "trade craft," as they call it. You were in touch with both Roth and Paal, on the staff of Congress and the NSC, respectively. How did you go about keeping them informed and able to understand your position?

DUNLOP: With Paal, there were certain types of messages, certain things that we were doing regarding which we had to get his "clearance." You can get this electronically, because the system was such that S/S [the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State] could "electronically" send to Paal a "drop copy" of a message for his clearance. I don't think that this had been true earlier in Washington. However, there's another way to do that: call him up on the phone, set up an appointment, and take the message over to him. That procedure is time consuming, but it allows direct contact with him. Or you could send the draft to him and then telephone him and ask if he had any objections to it. I could say that if he had some reservations, I would be glad to come over and talk to him about it, if I couldn't talk about it on the telephone. This would involve anything to do with any kind of Presidential visit. It would also involve the visit of any senior Departmental official, such as the Secretary of Defense. It could involve almost anything having to do with the visit of a Congressional Delegation, if it was really important. The NSC needs to know about such things. If we were going to send instructions to the Embassy, the NSC staff wants to know about them before they are sent.

Sometimes it is enough just to send the NSC an info copy of the message. Sometimes you have to get a substantive "clearance." That is, you won't send the message unless the NSC staff agrees with it. You determine the procedure there on a case by case basis. These are the kinds of things which would bring me on the Korean desk, one way or the other, into contact with Doug Paal on a regular basis. There is no such system with Congress. Arrangements are totally "ad hoc," except when you have an Ambassador who is up for confirmation by the Senate. Then you have to pay calls on Senators and go through a

confirmation process. Other than that, I don't know how else you handle it. A wise country desk officer makes sure to keep in touch with key Congressional staff like Roth. I'm not sure that there is a system which institutionalizes the maintenance of such contact.

Q: You were talking about a system. How did you handle arrangements with Roth? What did you do?

DUNLOP: Regarding the North Korean program for developing nuclear weapons and my trip to Moscow and Beijing, I called Stanley Roth and said, "Stanley, guess what? I'm going to be going around the world, the first such trip I've ever made. Do you want to go?" (Ha, ha, ha!) No, he didn't want to go. He couldn't have gone, anyway. I said, "It's going to be cold in Moscow in February anyway, Stanley. If you want to go, I'd be glad to go along with you." Then I told him what I planned to do. After the trip, when I went to see Stanley Roth, Solarz sat in on the discussion. It was very interesting. I remember going over there to one of the House of Representatives buildings.

I also remember telling Bill Clark, the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State of the Bureau of East Asian Affairs and my immediate boss, what I was going to do, so that Bill wouldn't say, "I hear that you were over talking to Solarz yesterday." So there's a lot of that which you instinctively do or don't do. Sometimes you pay a price if you don't do it right. I think that I managed that pretty well.

Bill Clark was very protocol conscious. He was a very bureaucratically "wary" kind of guy. Clark was very interested in his own, bureaucratic status and making sure that he didn't get "blind sided." I was smart enough to know that he had a right to know whether I was going to be talking to Solarz. If Solarz said, "Why are you doing this or that," Clark needed to know in advance that I was seeing Solarz. Sometimes I would be talking to Stanley Roth, and Solarz would walk into his office. I couldn't control that, but I'd always tell Bill Clark about it as soon as I got back. I would say: "Congressman Solarz dropped by when I was talking to Stanley Roth about my trip to Moscow." I think that this is basically a matter of human relations. I didn't usually like to go out to lunch with people. This was busy, expensive, and time consuming. I spent some time in their offices, which was well spent. If they said, "I don't have any time on my schedule this afternoon. How about lunch on Monday?" Of course, I would do that. However, there wasn't too much of that. I didn't encourage practices like that. Obviously, the Bureau of East Asian Affairs had no money to pay for such lunches, so the cost would have been out of my own pocket, unless other arrangements were made or we went "Dutch" [shared the bill]. I would have done that if it had seemed to be the right thing to do.

So those were the two most important, "out of the building" contacts I had. Obviously, we had other contacts over at International Security Affairs (ISA) in the Department of Defense, whatever it was called at different times and under different Secretaries of Defense. This came directly under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). ISA was an important contact point for the Department of State. I can't remember the name of the people over there. There was a Rear Admiral who was in charge of dealing with

Northeast Asian Affairs in ISA. I had worked in ISA and knew, or thought that I knew, what they did there and what was important to them. So I could get along with them.

I don't know whether that is an accepted, bureaucratic practice, that Congressional staffers don't spend their time initiating communications with the Department of State. And the same thing may be true regarding members of the NSC staff. However, the ISA staff would seek us out to spend time with us. They would come over whenever it was appropriate. The Rear Admiral would come over. He was a pretty knowledgeable guy. He would have been more influential than he seemed to be, had he had more "clout." Things might have gone along better, but that's the way the system works. Certainly, he was an important man.

I had a counterpart in CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], in the Directorate of Intelligence [DI]. That is, the analytical people. I cannot remember having had any contact with people in the Directorate of Operations [DO] in CIA when I was on the Korean desk. They supervised the operation of the CIA Station in Seoul, but the Station was not active in the things that I was interested in. The CIA didn't seem to be able to find out anything about North Korea, so we never bothered to ask. They weren't much interested in South Korean domestic politics as far as I could see. If they were, it wasn't in ways that appeared very much on my radar scope, or which bothered us. This is not always the case around the world. There were nice guys in the CIA Station in Seoul. They were intelligent people, and it was interesting and profitable to "bounce" ideas off them. When I was in Seoul, I had cordial relations and frequent personal contact with them. Both Station Chiefs while I was there were top-notch. It's just that they never seemed to have much to offer on issues of direct, critical concern to me. However, in an operational sense I never really felt that CIA personnel were particularly relevant at many of my posts abroad. This was even more the case in Washington.

Q: What about the political situation in South Korea? You were there during a transfer of power and so forth. How did that work out?

DUNLOP: Fortunately for me, when I returned to Washington to work on the Korea desk, the ice was breaking in South Korea. There was going to be a real election which would be really contested. As I watched this process begin, I was convinced that it was for real. One of the things that we had to do was to convince people back in Washington that it was for real.

There was a community of Korea watchers in Washington and elsewhere. Some of the people had already had experience in the US Government. Don Ranard, for example, had been a Foreign Service Officer and a desk officer in the 1970's. He had left the Department after a dispute of some kind and was critical of our policies toward South Korea. He was very skeptical that what we were doing was sensitive enough to the human rights and civil liberties situations. Some of these people, one way or another, had a kind of "vested interest" in the civil liberties situation. I'm not challenging their sincerity in any way. They had some kind of organizational connection. They included some people from

the Methodist Church in Washington and from the National Council of Churches in New York. They were very skeptical, even harshly critical, of the Republican administration in terms of its policies around the world, and particularly in South Korea.

I tried to be responsive to them. I admit that I didn't like some of them personally. Generally speaking, I was often irritated at their attitudes, which I felt were pretty puerile and unsophisticated in some sense. If there hadn't been civil rights abuses in South Korea, these people would have been out of a job. I felt that they were a little bit prejudiced in their view of what was going on in South Korea. Not that there weren't things to criticize.

In addition to dealing with them in Washington I had occasionally run into them when I was in Seoul. Things were demonstrably getting better. However, I felt that it was part of my responsibility to stay in touch with them to the degree that they would be willing to listen to my point of view. I would then be prepared to let them decide whether I was too prejudiced or not. Some of them would never believe anything that I said. They would have to go and see the situation themselves. They would never take anything that the Department of State said. However, I made myself available to them.

The same thing happened in Congress. Congressman Solarz did not have a particularly negative kind of attitude. He understood what the events of June, 1987, meant and that this was not a false spring.

Q: You refer to the events of June, 1987. What does this refer to?

DUNLOP: First was the decision by President Chun not to declare martial law. Then, he went on the radio and said that he was retiring from office as President. He also said that he was turning over political responsibilities for the election to his staff. In effect, he was biting this "bitter apple" or taking this "bitter pill" in public.

I left Seoul only a few days after Chun's speech, within a week or so. I returned to Washington to find big smiles on the faces of those who followed South Korean developments. And rightly so. It had been a "near run thing," on June 19, 1987, when Chun made his decision, ordered his staff to prepare a declaration of martial law, and instructed his Prime Minister to give a midnight speech over the radio announcing it. Then Chun backed off from his decision, which we have talked about. We may not fully know all the aspects of this decision, but we've talked about that event.

From then on it was kind of "downhill sledding" for me. I had good news to convey. I believed that it was true. So we went through a very good time. One of the events that I first had to deal with was the election of October, 1987. There was a lot of interest in it. This was going to be the election which would signal the end of Chun's regime and put somebody else in as President of South Korea. It was pretty clear that the opposition was highly fragmented and did not have the opportunity to do the things that it was able to do later on. It was therefore pretty clear that No Tae Woo, who was Chun's "designated successor," was going to be elected President.

However, the rules had changed. The rules for the elections of the National Assembly, in particular, were going to be important. I felt that they would result in a lot of opposition strength appearing in the Assembly. There always had been some vocal members of the National Assembly, but there was going to be a very significant increase in their number. There was a lot of concern in the US that, perhaps, the elections would be manipulated, so that Chun as "eminence grise" would be seen to be the victor. I didn't believe that very much. I remember that it even got to the point where S/S, the Executive Secretariat of the State Department, insisted on our setting up an "Election Task Force." I thought that that was absolutely unnecessary. I told them that if the Secretary wanted to have someone in the Department who was following the elections campaign to assemble the information coming in from the Embassy and "field" any questions regarding it from the press and public, the Korean desk could take care of it. All the Secretary had to do was to give us a little cubicle up there in the Operations Center and maybe a bed. But no, someone wanted to have an interagency, interdepartmental task force set up. Fortunately, it lasted about 48 hours. This was just wasted motion. We didn't need it.

We wanted to be sure that the presidential and National Assembly elections were properly reported from the Embassy. The Political Section had a good staff there, and there was no reason to think that the reporting would not be good. We felt that the Korean desk could interpret election developments accurately to the public in the United States and that this would not be a difficult job.

The other development, though, which was coming up on the horizon, with a potential for real problems, was security for the Seoul Olympics. The Olympic Games were due to be held in August, 1988. Even before I had left Seoul in July, 1987, we had begun very serious thinking on how to help the South Koreans handle the potential security problem. Security problems could come up from various sources, but the most dangerous one and the one which was the most difficult to predict and to deal with would come from North Korea. The question was whether the North Koreans would allow the Olympic Games to take place on "sacred Korean soil," with all of the publicity and credit which the South Korean Government would garner from it. What would the North Koreans, the sworn enemies of South Korea, do about the Olympic Games and how could we keep them from doing anything about it?

The other security side was the usual problems that might come from dissident students, "nuts," maybe an Arab terrorist organization, or the "Japanese Red Army." They might come to the Olympic Games just to make their presence known.

In the fall of 1987, after the elections had taken place, but not long afterwards, along about Thanksgiving, the North Korean security services put a bomb on Korean Air Flight 069. The plane disappeared with all on board over the Andaman Sea. I discovered at that time, never having known where the Andaman Sea was, that it is part of the Indian Ocean just South of Burma. I remember that I was at home on a Saturday night when I received a phone call from the duty officer at the South Korean Embassy, saying that they had lost

track of a South Korean aircraft and that they feared that it had been brought down by a bomb. Knowing the Korean penchant for paranoia, I said, "Why do you think that?" He said that they just thought that this might be the cause for the aircraft disappearing without a trace.

Well, the South Korean Embassy was right. I had been a little skeptical, I must confess. Certainly, that was a possibility, but there seemed to be other things that happened to airliners beside being blown up by a bomb. What the duty officer essentially wanted me to do on that Saturday evening was to call the State Department Operations Center and ask them to check all of the available sources of information and see if we, the CIA, or the Japanese knew anything about it. He asked that the Operations Center put this incident on their check list so that any duty officers coming to work would look around and see if there was any information available on this missing aircraft. He thought that this might contribute to the sum total of knowledge available on the matter. This seemed like a reasonable request, so we alerted the Operations Center.

Later, we found out that, in fact, the airplane had been destroyed in flight by a bomb placed on board by a North Korean sapper team. [FYI: Harry went into the details of the sapper attack in an earlier part of this interview, though this version seems more complete than the previous one. END FYI] The team which placed the bomb consisted of one man and one woman. They had been sent from Pyongyang through Moscow, to Budapest, to Belgrade, and to Baghdad, where they boarded this Korean Air flight. Incidentally, after Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was shot down by the Soviets, KAL changed its name from Korean Air Lines to Korean Air. So this flight was KA 069, and not KAL 069. It was the same people, same airline, but with a different color scheme and a different logo. They changed it all, because they thought that the initials KAL had brought "bad luck" to the airline.

So the North Korean sappers boarded this KA flight in Baghdad. They carried a bomb, which they had obtained in Belgrade, in a transistor radio, I believe. At one time they had planned to use a bottle of brandy. However, when they got to Belgrade, the bomb handlers and makers who had preceded them to Belgrade were in the North Korean Embassy there. They had discarded the idea of a "bottle bomb" and replaced it with a transistor radio bomb. The North Korean sapper team put this in the overhead compartment and then left the plane, returning to North Korea by another route.

They had an escape route planned which took them to a nearby Emirate on the Persian Gulf. I don't know the geography of the Persian Gulf very well. Perhaps you do. They were going to leave the aircraft in Bahrain and then go to Dubai, where they would change planes and go to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

Q: They could take any of those routes.

DUNLOP: But they were going North, retracing their path. Is Dubai North of Bahrain?

Q: Dubai is South of Bahrain.

DUNLOP: Then the idea was that they were going to get off the plane in Dubai. They had separate tickets and several identities, including several passports. They planned to leave the "holding area" for transit passengers, reboard the aircraft, and go to Dubai. Then in Dubai they would take another aircraft under other identities and go home to a triumphant welcome in North Korea.

Well, nobody had quite figured out what it took to get out of the "holding area" for transit passengers in Dubai. The two North Korean agents were well trained and well versed in everything that they were supposed to do. However, apparently, the passports of the transit passengers were collected in Dubai for international passengers and returned to them when they returned to the plane. Therefore, they had to use their "false" passports to get out of the "holding area." They were able to reboard the aircraft, but this left an anomaly among the passengers who were deplaning, since two of the "deplaning passengers" would have "disappeared," and there would be two new passengers, as far as names went. As soon as the plane disappeared, and the South Koreans asked the Dubai authorities to check the passenger manifest, they found this anomaly. The two North Korean agents were found, sitting in the departure lounge in Bahrain, waiting to get on another plane. If they had been able to do so, they probably would have totally disappeared. However, the Bahrain security authorities asked them to "step this way." The security authorities took the sapper team, consisting of the older man and a younger woman, into a holding area, where they were going to interrogate them. British personnel were directing the Bahraini security services. The Bahraini security people wanted a British security officer present when they interrogated these two agents.

They sat them down on a bench. A Bahraini female security officer was sitting between the two North Korean agents, and a male Bahraini security officer sat on the left of the male North Korean sapper. So you had the female North Korean agent, a female Bahraini security officer, the male North Korean agent, and then a male Bahraini security officer. The male North Korean agent asked the security people if he could smoke. They said, "Yes." He reached into his pocket, pretended that he had no cigarettes, and then asked the female North Korean agent for a cigarette. She said, "Oh, yes. Here, take one." She took out a cigarette, handed it to him, and then started to put another cigarette in her mouth. The male North Korean agent bit down on his cigarette, which contained a vial of cyanide in the filter, I guess. He immediately convulsed and subsequently died. Apparently, cyanide kills you instantly when it gets into your system. The female Bahraini security agent sitting between the two North Korean agents saw with her left eye the male North Korean agent dying. At the same time she saw the female North Korean agent putting a cigarette into her mouth. The female Bahraini security agent moved her right arm violently, knocking the cigarette out of the mouth of the female North Korean agent, but not before she had apparently crushed it in her mouth. Apparently, she imbibed a tiny amount of cyanide, less than a lethal dose, but enough to make her convulse. The male North Korean agent died, but the female agent didn't.

After she recovered, the female North Korean agent was sent to Seoul and turned over to the South Koreans. Eventually, she made a full confession of what she had done, how she got where she got, and what she did. One of our concerns was that, as we shared responsibility with the South Koreans for security at the Seoul Olympic Games and all of that, we had to make very sure that the confession by this female North Korean agent was credible. We wanted to be sure that no coercion was involved in getting this confession from her.

We then went to the CIA in Langley and asked them as a matter of urgency, to contact the South Korean intelligence authorities in Seoul. The female North Korean agent, of course, was under the control of the NSPA, the National Security Policy Agency, which was the current name for the KCIA [Korean Central Intelligence Agency]. I guess that Deputy Assistant Secretary Bill Clark telephoned to somebody in the Directorate of Operations, perhaps one of the Deputy Directors of CIA, who had some operational responsibilities. I didn't have any contact with that side of the CIA. He explained the very great importance that we attached to making sure that the confession of the female North Korean agent did not appear to have been coerced. In fact, this was before she confessed. It was important that her confession not be coerced. The best way that we could make sure that her confession was not coerced was to have access to her as soon as possible, at a very early stage in her interrogation. We didn't want to conduct the interrogation. We just wanted to witness it, so that we could say that "We were there."

After some reluctance the South Koreans agreed. I remember that I asked a South Korean Embassy officer to come in to see me at the State Department. We went over this whole subject in very great detail, so that the South Korean Embassy in Washington, in its reporting, would reinforce what our Embassy in Seoul was saying, and what our CIA Station in Seoul was saying to the NSPA, the current name for the KCIA. That was really my role in this. However, the South Koreans did give us access to her, and we were able to see how the interrogation progressed.

It was one of those cases like the Japanese prisoners of war during World War II. These people came in with a "total mind set" about "good and evil" and the "rightness" of their cause. Any little chink in their intellectual armor tends to bring down the whole structure.

Q: It is amazing because, during World War II, we found that the few Japanese prisoners who were taken by our forces would point out artillery positions and would do anything we asked them to do. They would tell us things that our prisoners of war in Japanese hands would refuse to provide their captors. Our people might surrender, but they weren't going to give away the store.

DUNLOP: To continue with the story, this female North Korean agent, "Miss Kim," turned out to be a woman with an IQ of something like 180. In other words, very highly intelligent. She had very great language abilities. She had been sent to Macau, the Portuguese colony off the coast of China, near Hong Kong, for two years to develop a Cantonese accent in Chinese. That was to be part of her "cover." She would travel as a

"Macau Chinese." Apparently, that didn't make any dent in her view of who she was or what she was doing. She had all kinds of motor skills and was very dexterous. The South Koreans gave her a whole battery of tests, and apparently she scored at the top of all of them. She was also very, very beautiful. She appeared on South Korean television, where she was asked various questions. The South Korean journalists did not want to "share" her with foreign journalists. American journalists from the AP [Associated Press], the "New York Times," and so forth also wanted to ask her questions. We finally arranged for that. Nothing is ever very easy with the South Koreans, but this was done. She received hundreds of invitations and offers of marriage from the South Korean public, after she appeared on television.

It was really scary about this talented young woman because she was so thoroughly programmed. She was just perfect. In fact, she was a walking bomb. They just had to wind her up, set her loose, and off she went to do terrible things.

Security for the Seoul Olympic Games was an important problem which we faced. Miss Kim said in her confession that she had been told by Kim Jong Il, who personally "blessed" her, that her task was the noble work of setting in motion a chain of events which would disrupt the Olympic Games in Seoul. She quoted him as saying that there would be many such efforts, with the net result of disrupting the Olympics, discrediting the government of South Korea, and achieving the "sacred objective" of reunifying Korea. He told her that she was to take the first step toward achieving this. This was something that she could look back on as her contribution to Korea. And, of course, Kim Jong Il said, "If something goes wrong, young lady, you have your cyanide cigarette."

As far as we know and so far as I can recall, there was no other attempt to disrupt the Seoul Olympic Games. I would certainly have known if there had been any other such attempt by the North Koreans to disrupt the Olympics. I can conclude that the most important result of this total fiasco was to prove Kim Jong Il's involvement in this act of assassination and murder. Therefore, to continue with other incidents to disrupt the Seoul Olympics was just too great a risk for the North Koreans to assume. I don't know why they wouldn't have gone ahead with other efforts if this attempt had not failed so completely.

Q: Harry, I propose that we stop at this point, because I know that you have to leave. I want to put at the end here the usual list of things left to discuss at our next session. We've talked about the destruction of the KA flight over the Andaman Sea and the aftermath to that. You've talked about security of the Olympic Games in Seoul as a major concern. Can we talk the next time about the impact of the Olympic Games on our relations with South Korea, how South Korea was perceived, and then how we saw the new government under President No Tae Woo developing, as well as the political side of that? We've already talked about North Korea, and we have covered the concerns about North Korean nuclear weapons development up into the 1990 period, when you were assigned to CIA Headquarters at Langley to help with an estimate there. We don't need to cover that again. We've talked about relations with Congress, and particularly with

former Congressman Stephen Solarz, as well as relations with the NSC. So we'll fill in that area.

DUNLOP: I don't want to dwell on Senator Cranston, but he played a very malign role in connection with South Korea. He came back into the picture from my point of view, because we had to have an Ambassador to South Korea confirmed whom he opposed.

Q: Very good. We'll pick that up later.

Q: Today is November 13, 1996. Harry, let's talk about the Seoul Olympics of 1988. First, how did they go? You know, many countries "vie" to host the Olympic Games, to put on their best face, and show their part of the world. It becomes quite an operation. I've often wondered if the "fuss" is worth the bother. How did the Seoul Olympic Games go, and what was your impression of them?

DUNLOP: As to whether the "fuss" is worth the bother, I think that only the South Koreans can answer that. They put an enormous amount of physical resources and psychic energy into the Olympics. During the four years between South Korea's nomination in 1984 as host for the 1988 Olympics, Seoul was transformed in many ways by the construction of a major "Metro" [subway] system. It was built in an extraordinarily short period of time. Here in Washington it has taken us 20 years to near the completion of construction of 103 miles of subway. The South Koreans built something like 140 miles of subway in four years. They killed some workers in the process by going too fast. They had some collapses and so forth. However, they assimilated that. They built an entirely new Olympic complex for the Seoul Olympic Games. I think that seven new buildings were constructed. Across the Han River, you can see these new buildings from many places in downtown Seoul. They are attractive and, apparently, very efficient sports facilities. They had the "Velocidome," or whatever they call it, for bicycle racing. There was a big stadium constructed, state of the art swimming pools, and all of the rest of it. The major concern we had as the Olympic Games approached was not that the South Koreans were unable to administer or manage such an event, but how "malign" the North Koreans would be and how much they would try and, even worse, possibly succeed in disrupting them. As we said last time, we believe, on very good authority, based on the first person evidence of Miss Kim, one of the North Korean bombers, that one of the major purposes or, perhaps, THE major purpose of bombing KA Flight 069 over the Andaman Sea near Burma in November, 1987, was to start a train of destabilizing terrorist events that would bring about the collapse of the Olympics, at least in the view of the North Koreans. That was intended to cause such a loss of face to the South Korean Government that it, too, would collapse, and the great mass of the Korean people would rise up and unify the country under the banner of the "Great Leader" from Pyongyang, Kim Il Sung.

That seems to have been the motivation for this bomb attack by North Korean sappers against a Korean Air flight. To my knowledge, and I think that I would have known about it, there were no further efforts made by North Korea to disrupt the Seoul Olympics,

either in the months preceding them or in the course of the games themselves. One explanation for that--one that appeals to me--is that the North Koreans may have felt so badly burned when their intentions were very clearly revealed by the "defection" of Miss Kim who had placed the bomb on the airplane that was destroyed. The North Koreans may then have felt that it wasn't worthwhile to continue with other efforts to disrupt the Seoul Olympics. We don't know and we may never know, unless the North Koreans tell us what was in their minds at the time.

The Seoul Olympic Games were a success, from the administrative standpoint or from the sports point of view. We did not hear any sour comments on the games. I remember when the Winter Olympics were held at Lake Placid, NY, and the buses all broke down. There was a lot of fuss about that. The South Koreans handled the Olympics in Seoul very well in an atmosphere of total calm and quiet. There may have been a few student demonstrations which hoped to attract the swarm of international journalists and personages in town. If so, they attracted little attention.

Were the Seoul Olympic Games "worth it"? South Koreans who knew Japan will tell you that the 1966 Olympic Games made a big difference in the way Japan perceived itself and the way that the world perceived Japan. The Japanese became much more self-confident about having put the ravages of World War II behind them, both psychologically and otherwise. After the 1966 Olympics the Japanese went on to become the great giant that they have shown themselves to be. I don't know Japan that well and I don't think that you can point to such a dramatic before and after impression in South Korea. Possibly this is because the changes which people admire in South Korea, including the modernization of South Korean society and the great, economic successes they have achieved were well under way before 1988. By the mid 1980's the one thing that had not been modernized in South Korea was the political system, if I can use that word. At the time the political system was still being run on a "top down," strictly authoritarian style. It had changed very little since the time of Syngman Rhee. It had changed very little from the time of the Japanese occupation. It had changed very little from the "Yi" dynasty which preceded that.

With the departure of Chun changes in the South Korean political system were well under way. Unless there is some catastrophe, I think that this change is now irreversible.

Did the Seoul Olympic Games of 1988 "trigger" that change? No. We don't know precisely what triggered Chun's decision to step down, though we went into it at some length. However, it was probably a combination of self-doubt about whether he could get away with declaring martial law and perpetuating himself in office in the old political system; great pressure from within his own circle of advisers not to try that, including key figures in the South Korean military establishment; and, of course, the effort that we made at the last minute to persuade him not to declare martial law and not to perpetuate himself in office. The major fact, though, is that he didn't do that. By not doing it he reversed a major decision which lost him enormous "face." In any case, Chun's decision to declare martial law and to stay on in office, and then to back off from that decision it

was a tremendous development in a society like South Korea. In effect, Chun was a political eunuch after that. He stepped aside even before he said he would. That is, before the election, turning over the basic running of the country to his ministers.

No Tae Woo, who succeeded Chun as President, was a very different personality. Chun was not only a military and very authoritarian figure but was a very "inner directed" and "inner centered" person. He didn't have any particularly bad personal traits. He wasn't like Idi Amin [of Uganda], doing terrible things in his basement for his own amusement. Chun was an autocratic, an isolated, chilly, and aloof man.

No Tae Woo was not like that. He had had a lot more exposure to the outside world. After his early, military career during the last four years before he became President of South Korea he had been in charge of preparations for the Seoul Olympic Games. This was a major job which required a good sense of "PR" [Public Relations] and a lot of travel around the world. This was a broadening experience which Chun never had. I suppose that, in his heart, No Tae Woo is still more comfortable with a Confucian, authoritarian ruling style than with that of a Jeffersonian democrat, to employ that overused, comparative term. However, as far as we could tell, the way No ran the South Korean Government was substantially different from the practices of Chun Doo Hwan. The National Assembly elections which put the "real opposition" in power, not just the "co-opted opposition" with positions of power in the National Assembly, functioned as the constitution provided. The groups controlling the National Assembly constituted a check on the powers of the President. I don't believe that there were so many instances of human rights violations or serious restrictions on human liberties during the presidency of No Tae Woo.

I was Country Director for Korea only during the first year and a half of so of the No Tae Woo administration. I followed Korean events very carefully after that and still do. I think that South Korea turned a corner with the presidential elections of 1987. I think that South Korea is unlikely to go back to previous practices.

During the administration of No Tae Woo, when I was on the Korean desk, our bilateral relationship with South Korea had a much lower human rights component, whereas during the administration of Chun human rights were a significant component. The issue of human rights was always present in what we were trying to do in South Korea and with the South Koreans. It was much less the case after Chun left power.
Q: Do you recall whether we were trying to "nudge" No Tae Woo to do particular things?

DUNLOP: We had some trading problems. When the South Korean economy became a world scale economy, they tried as long as they could to have the benefits of "Third World" preferences and all of the advantages of being highly competitive on the world market. They tried to do this. By golly, they tried. [Laughter] It wasn't just the Clinton or the Bush administrations that tried to talk them out of it. The Reagan administration also tried. We were constantly engaged in a pulling and tugging game over things like the

issue of intellectual property rights, which is another term for copyrights. Refusing to provide recognition and protection for copyrights is a "soft" way to provide protection to domestic industry. The South Koreans are great imitators and, like the Japanese, are prepared to take the products of other countries and then make them better. Then they sell them back around the world under the label of the original manufacturer, as in the case of "Nike" brand shoes, "Intel" computer chips, and so forth.

I remember an amusing account told me by the IBM representative in Seoul before I left to go back to Washington. It must have been some time in 1987, not long before I left. When he had arrived in South Korea in 1981, his job was to sell IBM equipment to the South Koreans and to watch, like a hawk, to be sure that they didn't "pirate" any of this material. In 1982 my friend had a visit from whomever was the head of IBM at the time. My friend gave the IBM President a kind of "warning" briefing about the South Koreans. He said: "You know, these people are really about to start getting into the computer business, not just as consumers but as producers who are very competitive." This high IBM official almost fired my friend on the spot for making such a stupid statement. He said: "How could you believe that a South Korean could ever get into electronics? Are you serious?" This high IBM official evidently thought to himself: "What are we doing with a man like that in Seoul?" Well, my friend was still laughing about it a few years later. It had been kind of a scary experience to be so severely reprimanded by his boss. He was also wrong.

Other issues between the US and South Korea were in the security field. We had already drawn down our forces on the Korean peninsula to below 40,000. These consisted of one "heavy" [i. e., reinforced] division up on the DMZ, the 2nd Infantry Division, which was strengthened with more armor and more artillery than a standard US infantry division. We had the 7th Air Force, a very small force with its headquarters down in Osan with a couple of airfields. However, they had very advanced aircraft and were capable of being reinforced very quickly.

Q: This is the whole idea. If anything "happens" in the security field in South Korea, we would reinforce them. Air Forces can do that.

DUNLOP: Our whole posture on the Korean peninsula and the reason why the great spring exercise called "Team Spirit" was so important to us was that it was not a "combat" exercise. There were some combat aspects of it. They had tanks out in the field, the Signal Corps set up their field telephones, and trenches were dug. Mostly, though, it was a "reinforcement" exercise. Given the huge turnover in the US military every two years or so, about half of the officers were newly assigned to the 2nd Division, compared to the period of the previous "Team Spirit" exercise. The real purpose of this exercise was to train people in what they would need to do to bring heavy units all the way across the Pacific from places like Okinawa, Hawaii, and Ft. Lewis, WA, and integrate them with forces present in South Korea. The 9th Infantry Division stationed at Ft. Lewis is scheduled to be a "reinforcement" for South Korea and probably still is. Significant elements of the 25th Division on Oahu, Hawaii, were also involved in this exercise, along

with Marine Corps units stationed on Okinawa. Our military needed to practice doing that.

The South Koreans were very concerned when we would say, as we would occasionally do, that for budgetary reasons we were not going to have Exercise Team Spirit this year (or any other year), or because the North Koreans were whining, screaming, or yelling up in North Korea about our alleged "aggressive" intentions. The South Koreans didn't want us to cancel "Team Spirit." In my view they were absolutely right. "Team Spirit" had more than just symbolic value, although it had plenty of that, too. So we had arguments with the South Koreans over "Team Spirit."

Once in a while the US military, on its own, would come up with an idea which the South Koreans didn't like. US military officers would propose cutting back on the resources available to us in South Korea, both in terms of manpower and equipment. One of the things that the Air Force did at the end of my tour there in 1987, and which I was very sorry to see, was to "decommission" the SR-71 aircraft. This is an extremely capable, very fast, high altitude reconnaissance aircraft with super cameras.

Q: It was also called the "Black Bird."

DUNLOP: It flew regular missions all around the perimeter of North Korea from 1983 to 1986, during my assignment to Seoul. Around 7:00 PM you could hear the sonic "boom" as it would pass over Seoul. It was very reassuring.

Q: I remember hearing that.

DUNLOP: The SR-71 was a very expensive aircraft to fly. It had to have special fuels which cost a lot of money. It needed special, "back up" facilities which couldn't be used for anything else. So the US Air Force stood down the SR-71. The South Koreans asked, "Well, what are you putting up in its place?" We answered, "Oh, we have a satellite capability when we need it." Then we got into an argument about how much of our satellite capability would be diverted to replace the SR-71, rather than on just a "contingency" basis, because the SR-71 had been flying regularly.

Other than those issues we had few other really contentious issues with South Korea while I was Country Officer. Our relationship with the South Koreans always had its "rough edges," because what the South Koreans want they go after in a very hard edged way. I suppose we look unreasonable to them at times. However, those frictions are kind of inherent in dealing with them. I am sure that other of their Asian neighbors find them very aggressive and tough in many ways. Perhaps they "push the envelope" farther than they should in their own self interest.

We no longer had major issues of human rights. Had we had them, à la Chun, political pressures in the US might eventually have forced the total withdrawal of our forces from South Korea.

Q: While you're speaking of this, as South Korea was moving toward becoming a democracy, how did you view the two "Kim's" who made up the political opposition? One of the comments frequently made about the South Koreans is: "Are they really up to having a democracy?"

DUNLOP: I know and I'm not sure that I have any terribly good insights into that. Regarding democracy in South Korea, what you see now is what you get. There is a substantial amount of democracy in South Korea. There is real freedom of the press. The newspapers occasionally say scurrilous things about the Americans. They don't suffer any consequences from saying that. For example, they don't have their newsprint allowances cut back, as happens in countries where the governments "control" the press. The South Koreans have almost total freedom of assembly. I can't recall any instances where we as Americans received complaints that the South Koreans did not allow political activity in some provincial city, for example, in the sense that a political meeting or rally had been planned and then was denied a permit by the local authorities. Cases where people had been called in by the police and roughed up seemed to have stopped, although doubtless surveillance of the political opposition continues.

"Corruption," meaning the payment of large sums of money to whoever is in power by others who have other kinds of power, continued. We were quite aware of that. It had taken place under every preceding regime in South Korea. The South Korean economy expanded, and the big companies, known as "Chebols," also grew. These are sort of multinational corporations. I think that the Japanese equivalent is "Daihatsu," although I am not exactly sure. The Chebol's became wealthier and had more money to contribute to the political party in power. Recently, there have been trials in South Korea and convictions of both President No Tae Woo and his predecessor, President Chun, on those grounds. I suspect that this kind of corruption is going on under President Kim Yong Sam as well. His son has been accused of taking bribes. Under Kim Yong Sam the South Koreans may have drawn back a little bit, given the notoriety which his predecessors attracted for corruption. However, that was that people assured themselves of access and influence. It's not totally unlike the way money is used in other countries, but in South Korea it takes place on a larger scale. The South Koreans haven't rid themselves of that characteristic. Call that "undemocratic" if you will. Certainly, a lot of political purists would say that it is a deformation of the political process. On the other hand, we have our own campaign fund raising scandals.

However, this kind of corruption did not ensure that President No Tae Woo could pick his successor, because he tried, and his hand picked successor lost. The man who was elected President was Kim Yong Sam, one of the two "Kim's" that I have spoken of, who, along with Kim Dae Jung, were the real leaders of the vocal opposition to Park Chung Hee in the 1960's and 1970's and to Chun in the 1980's. I got to know both of these Kim's quite well. After his return to South Korea Kim Dae Jung was my contact. We had a lot of discussion in the Embassy, probably in 1986, and especially back in the US, as to what level of contact this highly visible man would have with the Embassy. It was finally

decided that I should be his principal point of contact. Then, on the very last week we were in Seoul, we had a July 4 reception. For the first time Kim Dae Jung was invited to the traditional July 4 reception. That was after President Chun had made his "mea culpa" speech and had withdrawn from office.

I don't know whether I've talked about my personal reactions to the two Kim's. I saw them on a regular basis. I saw Kim Yong Sam more frequently than Kim Dae Jung. I found Kim Yong Sam a much more congenial person than Kim Dae Jung. Both have "huge" ego's. Kim Dae Jung's ego is the larger of the two. I guess that both can prevaricate and tell you less than the whole truth. Certainly, that's true of both of them. However, Kim Dae Jung would blatantly lie, right straight to your face. I found that very difficult to accept. I suppose that I should be more sophisticated than that. However, when I find out that somebody has flat out told me a lie, and knew that he was telling me a lie, it upsets me. So I spent some of my time in South Korea being upset at Kim Dae Jung.

Somehow, Kim Yong Sam never irritated me so much. I had a pretty high opinion of the intelligence of both of them. Kim Yong Sam's critics, and, of course, anybody in a position of power in South Korea is going to catch a lot of snide sniping, call him "Stonehead." They laugh and giggle at that and in that way they suggest that he is less than totally sharp, mentally. If he deserves the nickname "Stonehead," it wasn't for that, it was for being stubborn. Kim Yong Sam was a stubborn man. Maybe that's what they meant. On reflection, though, I think that they meant that he was rather "stupid." They felt that he did "dumb" things because he didn't understand things quickly enough. I don't think that that is the case. I think that both Kim Dae Jung and Kim Yong Sam are very smart people.

Both Kim's are courageous. They battled each other at a time when the odds were very heavily against them. When the odds got better, they kept on battling. They evidently felt that there was no reason not to criticize each other in that sense. One of the problems from which Kim Dae Jung suffered, once he became a legitimate player in South Korean politics, was that he was a regional politician. In fact, in the early days of South Korean history, following the end of World War II, they both were regional politicians. Kim Yong Sam came from down in Taegu. I guess that Kyongsong-namdo is the name of the province. It is in the southeast quadrant of the country. Taegu was the place which had been the capital of the Shilla Dynasty, way back in the Middle Ages. It always had an elite group which could influence things throughout the country.

Kim Dae Jung came from Cholla-namdo, which is the province directly to the West of Chongsam-namdo, in the southwestern quadrant of the country. This is the poorest part of the country. It has often felt itself very misused, neglected, and mishandled by whoever was in power in the center of the country. Cholla folks are joked about by others as "country bumpkins."

Kim Yong Sam came on the scene as a Kyongsong-namdo politician. He attracts big crowds in Taegu and Pusan. Kim Dae Jung comes on the scene as a Cholla-namdo

politician, and the big crowds supporting him are down in Kwangju. Kim Yong Sam overcame that reputation as a regional politician. He stopped drawing so heavily on his background as someone from Kyongsong-namdo province. He began to look out at the other four or five provinces in the country. By the time he was ready to make his bid for the presidency, he was no longer a "regional" politician. Kim Dae Jung never made this transition. He kept his ties to Kwangju, which you can't criticize, and he never sought to portray himself as anything else. Or, if he did, he did it in a clumsy and unconventional fashion. I think that that was why, when the contest between the two of them turned out to be who would be the leading opposition politician and get "real" power, Kim Yong Sam had a big head start.

Q: Harry, what about the role of the students during this "changeover?" One often thinks of the role of the students, no matter what the circumstances, as rising up against the government during the spring of the year. Did you see any difference in the attitude of the students in South Korea at this time?

DUNLOP: As you say, student riots always seem to take place in the spring. They take place at other times, too, if there are reasons for them. However, everybody anticipates that the main riot season is in the spring. When I was in Seoul from 1983 to 1987, these riots were "keyed" to May 17, the anniversary of the Kwangju "uprising" or "massacre." The students would carefully orchestrate an increasing level of confrontations in the streets, which would reach their peak in the week of May 17. When the universities closed in June, the students would go home, and things would quiet down. The students would demonstrate on several themes, but consistently on the Kwangju incident.

Those responsible for the Kwangju incident had not been brought to justice. They still exercised their power to hide what had happened in those bloody days. And the Americans were regarded by the students as complicit in this. So the bundle of Kwangju-related issues was always a stimulus for riots. The students would always make this one of their major points when they were out in the streets. Until Chun left office, commonly-used slogans were, "Down with Chun," "Down with the Dictator Chun," "Down with the American-supported Dictator Chun," "Down with the Military Government," "We, the Elite of This Country, Can No Longer Tolerate the Embarrassment of Being Subject to a Colonel in the Army." In their view, nothing was lower than a colonel in the Army. This was the point of view of the students. I saw one other slogan which said, "It Is No Less a Disgrace to Be Subject to a Government Run by a Colonel Than by a Sergeant." By that they sarcastically pointed out that Park Chung Hee had been a sergeant in the pre-World War II Police or Army. Chun had been a colonel for a long time before he seized power and appointed himself a general. Both socially unacceptable backgrounds to the students.

Then there was the issue of the reunification of Korea. On this subject the student slogans would say: "Reunification Is the Sacred Goal of the Korean People." They felt that anyone who stood in the way of reunification was an enemy of the people. Now, who stood in the way of reunification, according to the students? Well, certainly not the North Koreans. They wanted to reunify the country. The students said that it was the South

Korean Government, under the tutelage of the Americans who, for all of their nefarious reasons, benefit from the division of the country. The students also criticize the Japanese, too, who, of course, want everything "bad" for the Korean people. The Japanese were much more the friends and allies of the Americans, and the Americans were much more their patrons. The Japanese cannot get away with pretending to be for Korea.

So these three issues: down with the dictator Chun, Kwangju, and the reunification of Korea were always present in the student rioting, in varying degrees and at various times. The theme, "Down with Chun" went away when Chun left office. There was a significant decrease in interest in the Kwangju incident after Chun left power, because Chun was regarded as the "murderer" of the people killed at Kwangju.

The reunification issue continues to be a sufficient stimulus for these demonstrations. It seems to me that this was the major motif of the rather severe demonstrations in the spring of 1996. I am not really aware of the exact scope of them. You read only fragmentary reports in the press about those things. Apparently, some of the violence had not been observed over the preceding three or four years. Violence returned to the streets in 1996. When I say "violence," I must add that there is always an element of violence in these demonstrations. There is a sustained confrontation, involving deliberate provocation and taunting of the police with the throwing of fire bombs and bottles of burning gasoline or kerosene [Molotov cocktails], which cause some injuries.

I've seen these demonstrations. I've seen them closer than I ever wanted to be. I was always surprised at the lack of serious injury or death in these demonstrations, because they are terrible to look at. However, they don't usually kill people.

Q: Speaking of the time when you were dealing with demonstrations during your tour of duty in Seoul, how serious did we think they were? Aside from the Kwangju incident and the denunciations of the Chun "dictatorship," here was the elite of the country calling for something which is or should be anathema, as Americans see it. That is, joining up with North Korea.

DUNLOP: Their objective may not have been simply to join with North Korea.

Q: Yet when the students have passed through this particular phase, they become the leaders of South Korea. This pressure for reunification of Korea seems to disappear. How did we look at this?

DUNLOP: I think that that's a very personal thing because I don't think that anybody has a good explanation for this phenomenon. I've never read anything written by a sociologist or political scientist which adequately describes this phenomenon. Apparently, it's very similar to what went on in the 1960's in Japan. The Japanese students were members of the "elite" and often attended Kyoto or Edo University. I may have gotten those names wrong. They were destined to be the CEO's [Chief Executive Officers] of companies like Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. They would go out and try to bring down the Japanese

Government. I don't have a good explanation for this phenomenon in South Korea and Japan, where there can be such a quick turnaround.

I think that we're all familiar with the aphorisms which, I think, probably have a lot of truth to them. Young people have passions and are usually "radical." When they grow older, they become more conservative. You know, they say: "If you're not a liberal when you are under age 30, you don't have a heart. If you're not a conservative by the time you're 40, you don't have a head." Some of that, I'm sure, is true, but it seems rather dramatic...

Q: But on the practical side, how did the Political Section and also the Embassy in general view these developments? Did they see these things as something to be endured, the season, the result of hurricanes, or what?

DUNLOP: At a point about half way through my tour in Seoul, the Political Section wrote two or three airgrams on the general subject of "Anti-Americanism." While I didn't draft all of these, I was the stimulus for having them prepared. I remember that when I presented this project to the DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission], Paul Cleveland, was very skeptical about it. He was not so sure that we really should do this. However, I ultimately persuaded him. I think that he liked the drafts of these reports. In many ways he was very much looking over his shoulder toward Washington and gauging how these reports would be viewed or used back there. He was a politically sensitive bureaucrat in that sense. He came around to see that, if we did this carefully enough, it would be useful.

One of the things that we managed to do in these airgrams was to point out some of the inexplicable nature of this apparently "anti-American" sentiment which we had observed. One of the considerations was: how could it be felt so strongly when the students were in their 20's but there were almost no signs of it when they were in their 30's and 40's? The people in the South Korean Foreign Ministry used to tell me how they had participated in student riots. They were my contemporaries. Then they would laugh and say, "Well, maybe it was a 'rite of passage.'" I think that it probably was. If your elder brother went out and got a badge of honor by being hit by a tear gas canister, maybe you, in turn, would feel the urge to do the same thing.

The conclusions of this series of airgrams, which received some favorable attention in Washington, strangely enough, was that there were reasons for anti-Americanism in South Korea. These reasons may not all have been apparent to Americans, but it was not an illogical and inexplicable phenomenon. The reasons for it went back at least to the Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905. When President Theodore Roosevelt sponsored the Portsmouth [NH] negotiations to bring the Russo-Japanese War to an end, there was a "side agreement" signed, which was known as the Taft-Katsura Agreement. William Howard Taft was then the American Secretary of State. Katsura was the Foreign Minister of Japan. This agreement was contained in a secret, agreed memorandum in which the United States, in effect, approved of Japanese "suzerainty over" Korea, in return for a Japanese disavowal, also in principle, of any aggressive intentions toward the Philippines.

This agreement has been read by some South Koreans as a malicious, malign plot by the Americans to impose Japanese colonial rule at its worst on them. I doubt that Secretary Taft had any real knowledge of Korea or knew much about Japanese administrative practices in Korea, which probably hadn't even developed at that time.

From our point of view the Taft-Katsura agreement was just a way of getting the Japanese not to cause trouble for us in the Philippines in a way that we would both understand, though it was not explicit. We had just taken over the Philippines and still faced an insurgency there which became known as the "War of the Philippine Insurrection." I don't know why we felt that the Japanese might have an interest in making trouble for us in the Philippines.

However, anti-Americanism in South Korea goes back to that, and it's an historic fact, although you can argue with South Koreans that the Taft-Katsura agreement didn't have the explicit, anti-South Korean content alleged or that we were "plotting" to "do them down." I think that we just ignored South Korean interests. That alone is enough to enrage many Koreans.

Q: I've seen references to the Taft-Katsura agreement surface quite recently in the "World Wide Web" in diplomatic history. It's very much that.

DUNLOP: Well, we didn't do anything for the Koreans during the 45 years of Japanese colonial rule in Korea, until the Japanese attacked us in 1941, and then we fought the war elsewhere, which was fully to the Koreans' advantage. If we had ever had to confront the Japanese on Korean soil, it would have been a horrible experience for the Koreans. Syngman Rhee lived in the United States for many years and pleaded for Korean interests at the conference in Paris which produced the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. He went to Paris with the American delegation headed by President Woodrow Wilson. He urged that Korea's interests should be recognized, and so forth. He got a cold shoulder.
At the end of WWII, only a tiny group of Americans even knew where Korea was. They were virtually all connected with Christian missionary activity. One of the things that has worked to our advantage in Korea is the missionary effort, which I am not sure has been duplicated elsewhere in the world. I don't pretend to know what has been the impact of our missionaries in Africa or even in China. However, I suspect that it has been a lot more controversial than missionary activity in Korea. The Christian missionaries who were in Korea were mainly Protestants, either Methodists or Presbyterians. They were obviously highly dedicated to the well being of the Koreans. They often came out to Korea with medical degrees and had prepared themselves for serving the people. While they were in no position to challenge Japanese authority, they were still seen as "friends" of the South Koreans. That has done the
US some good. So I would always throw that into the pot whenever the South Korean students would begin to rant and rave about various things.

Then, of course, something else that the South Korean students would accuse us of is "imposing" Syngman Rhee on them just after World War II. They said that this denied

them the right to run their own affairs through their own representatives who had been democratically elected in village councils and through the free operation of forces which Syngman Rhee ruthlessly suppressed.

Did we impose Syngman Rhee on the South Koreans? I think the word "impose" is wrong. Can it be looked at as a rational basis for understanding why South Koreans looked for reasons to object to the role of the Americans in their history? I think that is a stretched interpretation, but it's a possible one. Certainly, it's one promoted by people who propagate an anti-American point of view. So you've got those reasons: we allegedly "sold them out" to the Japanese when we refused to hear their pleas and when the Japanese administered Korea in an obnoxious fashion. When we did come into the Korean peninsula in 1945, all we did was to impose another feudal dynasty on them, that of Syngman Rhee. What about the good things that we did in South Korea, including sacrificing American blood so that they wouldn't fall under the totally obnoxious and malign rule of North Korea? There were also the enormous amount of economic aid we poured into South Korea, our continuing commitment to their security, and our earnest efforts to promote human rights on the Korean peninsula. These can all be ignored if you want to ignore them. So the students who want to go out and scream about the Americans can do so, because they are human beings and can pick and choose the elements of history that appeal most to them.

I think that, insofar as our view of this phenomenon in the Embassy was concerned, no, student rioting was not a serious, political problem for the United States. Not until June 1987, at least. This was something that we were going to have to live with and to alleviate to the degree that we could. One of the reasons why we prepared this series of airgrams I mentioned previously was the "white paper" on Kwangju which I have already referred to.

Q: We have already covered that.

DUNLOP: It took several more years before it came out, and I think that it had some good effect. I can't say that every South Korean student has read this "white paper" by now and is therefore deeply convinced that the Americans were not only not complicit in the Kwangju incident but were outraged and did what they could to ameliorate the situation. This is a fact.

I think that it is still true that the student demonstrations are not a serious threat to the stability of the South Korean Government in Seoul. If the contrary were true, that would make it of concern to the United States. I don't know enough about what happened in the spring of 1996 to change that judgment. What I do know of what happened in the spring of 1996 sounds more like the one in 1987. The demonstrations in the spring of 1987 were the most serious and widespread. It was that rioting which led Chun to revoke his decision to declare martial law and eventually to withdraw from the presidency. Obviously, the situation in the streets in 1987 was beginning to have a profound, political impact on the South Korean Government. The demonstrations drove Chun from power.

That's what the students will tell you: "We did it!" So they feel that they will keep on doing it, and they have some justification for that claim. You might say, "Well, there are better ways to do it."

Q: The students are a real factor in South Korea at the present time, as opposed to other places where the students don't really have much influence. As you say, the students in South Korea deposed two Presidents.

DUNLOP: Who was the other President, beside Chun?

Q: Syngman Rhee.

DUNLOP: I guess so. I hadn't thought of him. What I've read about that is that the student unrest...

Q: Was significant in bringing about the fall of Syngman Rhee.

DUNLOP: And, of course, for the students who did it they'll always attribute the critical significance to it that they want. I think that the North Koreans have been successful in their propaganda in South Korea in only one respect. They have not been successful in portraying North Korea as a "paradise." What the South Koreans know about North Korea is enough to make almost everybody realize that it's a very tough place to live. What the North Korean have done successfully is carry out a campaign of "negative advertising," like "negative campaigning" in the US They have been able to emphasize the fact that there are no foreign troops in North Korea, no "mixed blood" children running around the streets of North Korean towns, that they are independent and on their own, doing the Korean thing the Korean way, while the people in South Korea are the "slaves" of the Americans. They have convinced many South Koreans that they have allowed the Americans to "defile" South Korean women, and that is a very, very strong theme in all of this. Otherwise, they have convinced many South Koreans that South Korean leaders have "sold" themselves to the interests of the Americans.

I guess that that brings me to another element in the anti-American phenomenon. There is definitely a racist or, if you will, ethnocentric element in the Korean character, North and South. I think that anti-Americanism is very easy to stimulate, simply because Americans and Koreans are racially different. Each regards the other as "inferior" in different ways.

Q: Harry, in the interest of people who will be reading documents in the Department of State and so forth, you raised a question about Paul Cleveland being concerned about the impact of these airgrams on anti-Americanism back in Washington. Using this instance, could you describe why, when you are reporting to the Department, you are not just a reporting officer. You have to bear in mind that when a report goes back to Washington, it could have an impact which might go beyond its impact as information. It may have other consequences which you have to keep in mind. Therefore, anybody who is

looking at the official records of the United States has to keep this factor in mind. I may not be making myself clear.
DUNLOP: Not at all. You are making yourself quite clear. Let me think about the possible rationale which Paul Cleveland might have had for being somewhat hesitant about sending on these airgrams on anti-Americanism in South Korea. To Paul's credit, he agreed to send them on to the Department, despite his reservations.

If I'm not mistaken, these airgrams were sent back to the Department in 1986, which was an election year in the US The office of President was not up for reelection, but all of the members of the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate were up for election or re-election. Looking at the situation in retrospect, I am not suggesting that the Reagan administration was teetering on the edge of a major defeat in the 1986 elections. However, tensions rise on the eve of elections in the US, and nerves get frayed. There had always been opposition in the US, both in Washington and elsewhere, including on some college campuses, to American Government policy toward South Korea.

On the Left, all American administrations were viewed in those post 1970 days as having a "malign" component in their policies. The simplified version of this view was: "Wherever we could find a dictator, we would support him. We haven't met one dictator whom we didn't like and were not prepared to support." South Korea, with its record of authoritarian government and harsh treatment of the opposition, was certainly a target. There was kind of a professional "lobby" which took this point of view. I am not being critical when I speak of a "lobby." However, basically, the members of this "lobby" earned their living in institutes and "think tanks" in Washington which watched for things that they could criticize, write "Op-Ed" pieces about, hold conferences on, and get foundation money to pay their per diem and travel expenses to go to South Korea. I'm not saying that that shouldn't happen. However, this is the background against which we were doing our reporting from Seoul.

Ambassador "Dixie" Walker was the first non-career Ambassador to South Korea since we established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea in 1948. He was a Republican, appointed by a Republican President [Ronald Reagan], though his background was much more academic than it was political. He was prominent enough to be well known around Washington. He had made his enemies in the academic world, talking to people about China and all of that. There were people in the American academic world, in the political world, who were looking for ways and means of getting Ambassador Walker and the Reagan administration.

So I can imagine Paul Cleveland's concern that in this off-year election period we were proposing to send in a series of airgrams which were probably very readable, although off the beaten path, and which might get a wider circulation. The "word" might get around Washington that the American Embassy in Seoul believes that South Koreans "hate us" because our policies are "bad." Paul Cleveland saw a certain danger of that kind of interpretation getting around. Once he saw the airgrams themselves and thought the matter through a little bit, he saw the utility of doing what we were doing, in pointing out

the fact that "anti-Americanism" was not just something which just happened every so often, and the Embassy was looking for something to say because it had an opportunity to address some of those issues, such as the Kwangju incident. So Paul Cleveland allowed the series of airgrams to go on to the Department of State.

I have never been in an Embassy where I felt that the political reporting was seriously distorted for any reason. Neither have I ever been in an Embassy where I thought that all of the political reporting was "perfect" or "good." From time to time I had to fight some battles over reporting. There were relatively bigger battles in South Vietnam, particularly when I had a superior named Martin Herz and another officer named Josiah Bennett, who was a real "nervous Nellie." I had to fight some battles but, generally speaking, I won them.

Q: But these are battles in which you need to weigh the balance of advantage. There is always a decision as to whether to report something back to Washington. You need to consider the possibility that the report will "leak" and end up causing you more grief than you intended.

DUNLOP: I was probably one of the more naive officers in the Foreign Service during my time in South Vietnam, because I only very slowly began to appreciate these considerations. If they had come to my attention, I might have said, "Oh, yeah." I think that my views in this regard developed slowly because I rarely had any real run in's with my superiors. I was also at a low enough level that it would not have been primarily my concern, in any case. When you get to be a DCM or an Ambassador, you have to begin to consider how your "constituencies" back in Washington look at you, partly through the prism of the Embassy's reporting. This is an important consideration. DCM's and Ambassadors wouldn't be human if they didn't want to be seen in a good light. Nor would they be good public servants if they allowed this human instinct to override their responsibilities.

In our reporting we were also trying to persuade other elements in the US Government that our views were "right." I think that this is true of any Foreign Service Mission abroad or of any Country Office in the Department of State. There are only limited resources in the US Government to support foreign policy. If you believe that there is some important issues with your country of assignment, such as maintaining a continued American military presence, which is expensive, you are always concerned about pressing the powers that be sufficiently to get at the public trough and get your interests adequately funded. You are trying to get in there to get at those resources. Other people are also doing that. If the Embassy reports something about corruption in the country you are concerned with or the government to which you are accredited or about anti-Americanism among the students, some people in Washington will say that that's not the program we should be supporting as much as "my program." So let's take, say, 6,000 troops out of South Korea and put them, say, in Norway. That is an oversimplification. There are not only the political pressures which can affect an administration in an election year. If we are not doing the "right" thing in the country about which you are concerned, and your

Embassy says that you are not, this may affect the jockeying for resources within the government.

Q: Harry, you mentioned Allan Cranston, who was a Democratic Senator from California. You said that he was influential during the time that you were dealing with South Korea. Could you explain this further?

DUNLOP: Senator Cranston must have "hated" President Reagan with a passion.

Q: They were both from California.

DUNLOP: Yes. Cranston was also getting to be an old and crabby man by this time. He was a very unpleasant person to be around. Some people whom you don't like very much are not hard to be around. But for me Senator Cranston was very hard to be around. Cranston was a spokesman and a very loud spokesman in Congress for this group which was very critical of South Korea. We were always having to bat back high, inside fast balls from Senator Cranston, or stimulated by Cranston from the academic side. This was where Cranston got his "blows" in most tellingly, although fortunately he wasn't very successful. I had an opportunity to see him throwing those punches during my last months as Country Director for Korea.

Jim Lilley was going to be reassigned in 1989, following the 1988 presidential elections. He had been Ambassador to South Korea for a year or a year and a half, following "Dixie" Walker. He was being assigned by the Bush administration as Ambassador to China. Don Gregg was the nominee to replace Jim Lilley as Ambassador to South Korea. Jim Lilley was a career CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] officer on the clandestine operations side of the agency. So was Don Gregg. Except for the assignment of Richard Helms to be Ambassador to Iran, I don't know any other cases where career "DO" [Directorate of Operations] officers became Ambassadors, though there probably are some. However, Lilley and Gregg were two former DO officers assigned as Ambassador to a very high visibility post, back to back, in this atmosphere of our allegedly coddling dictators.

Fortunately for Don Gregg, good things had already begun to happen in South Korea. That is, Chun had stepped down politically, and some of that pressure had been reduced. However, Senator Cranston set out to derail Don Gregg's nomination as Ambassador to South Korea. He dragged out the nomination for six months. Don Gregg had resigned from the CIA in 1979, about the same time that Jim Lilley resigned. Jim had come back into government service in the Department of State in 1981 or 1982, under the Reagan administration, as a DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary of State] or something like that. Then he worked himself into being appointed Ambassador to South Korea in 1987. In 1989 Lilley was to be recalled and reassigned as Ambassador to China. Meanwhile, Don Gregg, who had been working for Vice President George Bush as Bush's senior foreign policy adviser, was then nominated to replace Jim Lilley as Ambassador to South Korea.

So here were two career CIA officers, although both of them had resigned and been out of CIA for some time. They were scheduled to go to sensitive, important posts.

I guess that Senator Cranston saw this as an opportunity, as ambassadorial appointments often offer, to "embarrass" the Reagan administration. Senator Cranston dug out some stuff about US support for the "contra" activity in Nicaragua which he was trying to pin on President Bush. He was trying to pin it on President Bush through Don Gregg, who personally knew a man named Felix Rodriguez, a CIA agent acting as a direct contact person with the "contras." Gregg knew Rodriguez personally and had seen him in Washington a couple of times during this time. It was Senator Cranston's contention that: a) Rodriguez would have known about all of the alleged, "illegal activities" in support of the contras (shipments of arms to Iran and all of that), and b) would have conveyed all of this information to Gregg, who, in turn, would have conveyed all of it to then Vice President Bush. And Bush's statement that he knew nothing about all of this was, therefore, a lie.

Gregg's contention was that his contacts with Rodriguez were purely social and were not very frequent. He said that Rodriguez may not have known much about alleged illegal activities in support of the contras, anyway. Rodriguez certainly didn't tell Gregg, so he, Gregg, knew nothing about this subject. Therefore, Gregg couldn't have told Bush in any case. So here was a "clash" between Senator Cranston and Gregg. I can't remember all of the tactics that Senator Cranston used to influence the investigation of Don Gregg's background, including subpoenaing then Vice President Bush's and Gregg's personal papers, legal arguments, and all of that. Finally, there were very contentious, public hearings in which Senator Cranston showed himself, to me, as a very bad human being. He was not only malicious in intent but was malicious in style. But Cranston lost! I think that the vote to report out Gregg's nomination to the full Senate was something like nine in favor and six opposed.
There was a great sigh of relief at this outcome. Don Gregg is a very nice man, a warm and charming personality. He proved to be a fine Ambassador. Don has a very lovely wife, and they had a buffet ready at home, to which all of the "workers in the trenches" who had helped Don's confirmation were invited.

Q: What was your role in this process?

DUNLOP: First of all, we gave him office space and secretarial support in our offices in the Department. Desk officers do this for every potential Ambassador who is going through the "vetting" and then the nomination process, followed by confirmation hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. However, there was almost nothing else that we could do to help him with this part of his life. We made sure that he was well informed on all of the strictly South Korean issues that he needed to know about, so he wouldn't be "blind sided" and look like that poor Ambassadorial nominee during the Eisenhower administration who couldn't pronounce the name of the Prime Minister of the country to which he was assigned.

Q: This was a nominee named "Gluck," who couldn't pronounce the name of "Bandaranaike," the Prime Minister of Ceylon at the time.

DUNLOP: I believe that Don Gregg was very honest in denying these allegations of complicity in "lying" about what he told Vice President Bush and, of course, that Vice President Bush had also "lied" about what he knew regarding the contras. I was concerned that Gregg would be so preoccupied with this that he wouldn't prepare himself regarding South Korean issues. We had a lot of material to give him. He appeared to be well acquainted with the issues and could show that he was well informed. He needed to avoid becoming too distracted by the Cranston charges. So we helped him as much as we could. Don Gregg was very appreciative of what we did. I always get Christmas cards from him. I don't know what's happened to him now.

Q: He's still around Washington.

DUNLOP: I've seen him interviewed in some connection. Not quite as often as Jim Lilley, who appears more frequently on TV talk shows.

Q: Harry, after this you left the Korean desk.

DUNLOP: My two-year assignment ended in the summer of 1989. I ran into a major "glitch" in my reassignment, which obviously had a very deleterious impact on my career. I don't know whether that's of interest to you.

Q: Yes, it is. I think that career patterns and how they work out are of interest.

DUNLOP: I of course knew that I was going to be up for reassignment in the summer of 1989. I had known this since the fall of 1988. I wanted to stay in Washington because of the condition of Angela, our daughter, who has a serious medical problem. I made the usual inquiries. I had only been back in Washington for two years, so an overseas assignment wasn't out of the question, but it was something that was not hard to avoid. An overseas assignment would have been an exception to the pattern. Since I didn't want that anyway, it was easy to avoid. However, that narrowed the choices to Washington jobs. I found three or four that I thought would be appropriate, one of which was the INR [Bureau of Intelligence Research] position dealing with Northeast Asia. Another officer, who was about to leave Washington, was the head of analysis for all of Northeast Asia, whatever that office is called.

But what I really wanted to do was to extend in the job I had as Country Director for Korean Affairs. With a new administration coming into office in early 1989, everybody said that nobody could make any decision about such an extension until there was a new Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The new Assistant Secretary would decide whether he wanted to "vet" these desk officer appointments or leave it up to the DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary]. We were also going to have a new DAS, so it was

decided that no major appointments were going to be made regarding the Country Directors in the East Asian area until the new administration came into office.

Q: We're talking about the Bush administration.

DUNLOP: George Bush had just been elected President and would enter office in January, 1989. No decisions on Country Directors would be made until we had a new Assistant Secretary. We knew that we would have a new Assistant Secretary.

I was in something of a dilemma. I went to the assignments people and said: "Of all the jobs available, the one I want most is the one I have now." They said: "That's reasonable, and we would have no objections to that." Then I told them about the problem of not being able to get a "Yes" or "No" on an extension in my current job from the Bureau of East Asian Affairs until some time after the 1988 elections. The assignments people said: "Would this INR job [in charge of research and analysis for Northeast Asia] be OKAY?" I said: "Yes." They said: "We'll just put that down for you. That will be your safety' net assignment. We don't have to make a decision now. This job is in Washington, and we're not under any pressure from INR. We're sure that you would be acceptable to INR. They've already told us that. So we'll put that down at this time." Every so often I would call up the personnel people and check to make sure that my little "safety net" was still in place.

The decision-making process in EA/P [Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs] was vastly prolonged, although I think that the same thing happened in other bureaus during the transition to the Bush administration. Secretary Baker, the Secretary of State designate, was very slow to put his team in place. Or the team was very slow to deal with these kinds of matters. Baker had first intended, it appeared, to ask Ambassador Jim Lilley to be the Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. The rumor went flying around the EA Bureau that the new Assistant Secretary would be Jim Lilley. I thought, "Hot dog! At least I'll get a quick answer to a possible extension as Country Director for Korean Affairs, and probably a favorable answer." I had worked for Lilley in South Korea. We weren't on particularly warm and close, personal terms, but we had gotten along well professionally, and he had given me a good ER [Efficiency Report]. It would cause a lot less trouble extending me in that position, rather than getting used to somebody new. He knew that I wouldn't go behind his back, fight him, or anything like that. He knew that any differences I might have with him would be up front. So I was optimistic.

Then it was announced that Lilley would be the new Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs. Lilley was somewhere else, I don't know where. Anyway, he wasn't in town. I was going to telephone him as soon as he returned at his home phone number, which I knew. Then the announcement was canceled. Something had happened in the chaos that surrounded the Bush administration at this stage, as often happens with incoming administrations. It seemed to me that the incoming Bush administration was more chaotic than usual since this situation impacted on me. So there was a period of several weeks when no new name was announced as the new Assistant Secretary.

Then another name was announced by the new administration, Richard Armitage, a man for whom I had an enormous amount of respect and who knew my work from Korea because he had been head of ISA, International Security Affairs, at the Department of Defense, during the last four years of the Reagan administration. He had visited South Korea twice on these large-scale, defense consultation meetings which we had annually, one year in Washington and one year in Seoul. Incidentally, I hadn't thought of this before, but he was one who really liked those airgrams we had sent in on anti-Americanism in South Korea. He sent a message to Ambassador "Dixie" Walking, saying: "Tell Harry Dunlop that, out of all of my reading this week, those are the only reports that I've liked and enjoyed." I must admit that that was on my mind.

I called him up, because he was still over in his office at the Pentagon. He hadn't left that job yet. I said: "Rich, I hope that I'm not being intrusive on this, but I guess that bureaucrats have to fight for themselves, sometimes. I am due to be reassigned this summer from my current job as Country Director for Korean Affairs unless the new Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs wants me to stay on. That's true of all of us over here in State. I just want you to know that I am very interested in staying in this job and would find it a pleasure and honor to work with you." He said: "Harry, that's great! I can't say anything now because I'm not in a position to do so. However, that's a load off my mind as far as Korea is concerned."

Then Dick Armitage's assignment as Assistant Secretary went down the tube. He ran into some problems with Senator Cranston (my favorite Senator by that time), which were probably not deserved. It's hard for me to think that anything which Senator Cranston did was proper. Anyway, there I was, still in limbo. I began to think: "I am getting out on the 'Limbo' limb. Actually, I got all the way to June, 1989. Looking back on the process, I probably should have opted for that INR job when it was available. However, there still was going to be a new Assistant Secretary. He turned out to be Richard Solomon, who knew nothing about me or about the Department of State. He took the view that he wanted a whole new set of senior officers in the bureau. I don't think that any of the Country Directors in the East Asian and Pacific Affairs area who were up for reassignment were retained. Probably some of those whose terms were not up for reassignment were also replaced.

So I called my CDO [Career Development Officer] and said: "Well, it's time to use my 'safety net' in INR." He said: "OKAY." Then he thumbed through his assignments book and said: "We'll put you before the assignments panel next week. Call me on the following Monday." I called him. He said: "You were 'paneled.' I have a panel notice for this assignment to INR." Then it was a question of when I would show up in INR. I called up the DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Research] and explained why I had not called him before. This was another oversight on my part. I introduced myself and said that I had been 'paneled' for the INR job which so-and-so now had. I said: "No doubt you know that. I am looking forward to this assignment. When do you want me to show up for work? I can hang around here for the rest of the summer, but you can do what you

want." Then followed a long pause. He said: "You know, this is awful! You were 'paneled'? That job was converted to Civil Service status nine months ago." I ask you. Have you ever heard of something like that?

I was floored. It was incomprehensible to me. How could the personnel system screw up that badly? So I had no job. The Deputy Assistant Secretary in INR said: "I guess we owe you one on this." I went to the Career Development Officer. They mumbled and stumbled around and said that it was somebody else's fault, not theirs. I couldn't care less whose fault it was. That left me without a job in July of the year. What INR found for me, and I guess that they kind of "made it up," was a "detail" to CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]. I didn't succeed anybody in this job and I'm not aware that anybody succeeded me. There was a kind of long-standing request from the National Intelligence Council for someone to work in what they called the "Adjunct Group." This was a group of people who worked on national intelligence estimates for overworked National Intelligence Officers who couldn't handle all of their oversight responsibilities. I won't go into the detail of what estimative work required.

So the Department sent me over to the CIA to handle this job. It worked out, in one way, fairly well, but it would have been far better for my career if...

Q: That involved working on the nuclear proliferation issue.

DUNLOP: I worked on three national intelligence estimates. Two were on Korea. Both were on the military side and both involved the nuclear issue. I still had on my mind that something I wanted to get out of the Intelligence Community was a coherent consensus on how bad the situation in North Korea was. There was also a National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia. This estimate had not yet gotten off the ground. This was 1989, the year of Milovan Milosevic's quasi-putsch in Serbia and the year when serious talk began of the possible dissolution of Yugoslavia. Serious work began on the consequences of that possible development for the stability of the Balkans and all kinds of related subjects.

The two Korean estimates concerned the balance of power on the Korean peninsula. This was one of a series of issues which are "re-done" every so often. The Yugoslav estimate dealt with the situation at the time. The two Korean estimates were an updating of two previous estimates which had been done four years before. One concerned the "Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula." It was mainly devoted to what was happening to the military capabilities of North Korea, and how far they had advanced or regressed since the last, previous estimate. The second estimate, which was intimately related to the first one, was, "The Risk of Surprise Attack on the Korean Peninsula." This subject was always of great concern because of the topography of the Korean peninsula and the way North Korean military deployments exploit that topography.

The preparation of the two, Korea-related estimates was already under way. However, they had kind of "bogged down." I went over to CIA and asked what they wanted me to

do. They said: "Well, we need a Yugoslav estimate, but we guess that we can put it off until you finish these two Korean estimates." They gave me a fairly reasonable deadline. I said: "Well, I've never done this kind of work but we'll see what I can do." So I got those two Korean estimates done.

Then I turned to the Yugoslav estimate and worked through that. That pretty much took me through the end of my year's assignment to CIA.

Q: We've talked about the nuclear side of this, but how about the balance of forces on the Korean peninsula?

DUNLOP: The two estimates were very closely related. I think that I may have touched on some aspects of this already. Part of this is based on my own recollections and reflecting back on what was going on in Pyongyang, about which we know so little.

We know that in the early 1970's, some time between 1974 and 1976, President Park Chung Hee of South Korea, despite repeated, personal attacks on him, North Korean raids across the border, and so forth, made an effort to get a political dialogue going with North Korea. He succeeded in arranging for this dialogue, which continued, with interruptions, for about 18 months. This dialogue took place under various guises: for example, the Red Cross talks about family reunification.

Q: I think that we've covered this.

DUNLOP: Right. Those efforts had broken down by late 1975 or early 1976. Just about the same time that we began to hear that the prestige and influence of Kim Jong Il was rising in North Korea. Kim Jong Il was given responsibility for military affairs. I suspect that the tie between the collapse of the "political talks," Kim Jong Il's rise in influence, and a major rearming, reequipping, and redeployment of North Korean forces can't be coincidental. They all happened just about at the same time. The peace talks collapsed, and Kim Jong Il appeared reviewing the troops at the May Day parade. He then began to be referred to as "The Dear Leader" of North Korea. He was clearly being groomed as the successor to Kim Il Song, referred to as "The Great Leader" of North Korea. Then came this major reequipment and redeployment of North Korean forces. We didn't find out about this change in the North Korean forces for a couple of years until we acquired some overhead photographic capability. That happened about 1976 or 1977, just as Jimmy Carter came into office as President. He had promised the American people that he was going to take all of the American forces out of South Korea.

So new intelligence estimates began to appear on President Carter's desk about the significant changes we were now discovering were going on in North Korea, all of them "bad." The Carter people thought that this was all a put on, based, not on sound intelligence but, rather, advocacy intelligence. That is: "No, you can't keep your campaign promise, Mr. President, because we have suddenly found out about these developments." Sometimes, this happens, perhaps because we acquire a capability in place which we

didn't have before. It took two or three years to persuade President Jimmy Carter to back off on his promise to remove American forces from South Korea. During this time North Korea had started its nuclear program, which we have talked about at some length.

The reason that I am going into this is that between, say, 1976 and 1990, when I started... Every one of this series of estimates on the balance of forces in the Korean Peninsula and surprise attack on the Korean Peninsula, which came out periodically, every three or four years, between, say, 1976 and the time I was given the task of supervising the preparation of the 1990 estimates, had all accepted the fact that there had been a significant upgrading of North Korean capabilities. Clearly, the North Koreans were increasing their capabilities for surprise attack by taking units which had traditionally been deployed deep into North Korea, sometimes even around the Yalu River, and bringing them far South. These units were dug in and equipped with very sophisticated weapons, including 130 mm artillery pieces, which we had just become acquainted with, to our sorrow, in Vietnam. The view was that this was the best artillery piece in the world for its purposes. North Korean forces were also equipped with T-62 tanks. Special Forces units were activated, and tunnels were dug under the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone, the effective border between North and South Korea].

So we brought that information, which was increasingly alarming, up to date. We found that the big change between the intelligence estimate which we put on the table in 1990 and the preceding one was that we had acquired a capability to analyze the North Korean command structure through some special intelligence. The North Korean command structure had also been changed. They had abandoned the old, Soviet field army system to something the Germans had used in their panzer offensives in World War II. Going into detail is not necessary here, but that also was deemed by American military experts as a sign that the North Koreans expected the next war to be fought, using "lightning strikes" by their forces. They would need a highly compressed, vertical command structure for Army units instead of the "broader front" type of structure.

We produced those two estimates concerning Korea and then turned to the Yugoslav estimate. I came in late in connection with the preparation of the two Korean estimates. However, I started from scratch with the Yugoslav estimate. I called the first meeting, and so forth.

Q: Could you talk about how we saw Yugoslavia? We're talking about the situation in 1989- 1990.

DUNLOP: This was about the situation in the spring of 1990, the "crisis year" in Yugoslavia. I've just read another book on Yugoslavia. Its author chooses to call 1991 the "crisis year." However, anyone who knew Yugoslavia knew that the crisis was upon us, as far as Yugoslavia was concerned, by 1990. Whether it made any difference to us is another kind of judgment. However, by that point Milosevic had clearly signaled that he was the chosen figure to reestablish "Greater Serbia" after Tito. "Greater Serbia" meant that wherever Serbs live, there is Serbia. This was an all-encompassing, Greater Serbian,

mythologically based idea that no Serb can ever be safe living under the control of anyone else but Serbs.

Milosevic had said this on various occasions and was playing all of the changes on it. He brought forth the "Four S" program, which stood for, "Only unity saves the Serbs." Then he had St. Sava's remains exhumed. Do you remember that?

Q: No, I don't.

DUNLOP: Milosevic had St. Sava's remains carried from one Serbian Orthodox Church to another. They were taken to every Patriarchate, every Diocese in Serbia.

Q: Good God!

DUNLOP: They were reburied in a huge church, St. Sava, built in the middle of Belgrade. It was both interesting and amazing. Then the "Four S" program was reinterpreted to mean: "In St. Sava Is Our Only Salvation."

Q: St. Sava is the patron saint of all Serbs.

DUNLOP: Just as St. George is the patron saint of all of England, or St. Patrick the patron saint of Ireland. And St. Sava of the Serbs. St. Sava was a warrior priest, in his day. He swung the sword very effectively in the name of God, whatever else he did.

Anyway, there was no dissent on this subject. The fact that Tito's Yugoslavia was dead was also clear. Not only was there going to be a Greater Serbia, but there wasn't even going to be any remnant of Tito's Yugoslavia. There was a group of people involved in this subject who were very new to the game that involves Yugoslavia, a group of people with very uneven backgrounds sitting around the table contributing to this estimate. However, I guess that that is true of all countries, as far as real experience is concerned. An agonizing discussion arose over how these changes were to take place. Would there be a bloodbath or could these changes be worked out in a way that avoided a bloodbath? Were there interests that the Serbs and Croats could reconcile? Could they destroy the old Yugoslavia but still keep the old "myth" alive in a way that would satisfy the Croatians' desire for an independent state, which was as strong as that of the Serbs? Was there some way of guaranteeing the safety of the minority groups? You can state the problem in 15 or 15,000 words.

Some of us thought that they could reconcile their conflicting interests. In 1990 I thought that they could. There were some "if's" involved there, and those who conduct our foreign policy don't like "if's." At least, they don't like more than one "if." I can understand this. My starting point was that, first of all, you had to recognize that the old house is gone. Don't try and live in it, because it will catch fire and burn down over your heads. Secondly, the Croats have a legitimate, 1,000 year old yearning for a Croatian state with their own flag. By Golly, one way or the other, they are going to get it. The Serbs have a

1,000 year old "yearning" for a sense of security which they don't think has ever been achieved. The Serbs are going to fight for that.

Now, can these two things be reconciled? I thought that they could be. At that point I did not think that population transfers would be necessary to do it. After the fighting began over Bosnia, I came to the conclusion that population transfers had become inevitable.

My point in the estimate was that, just as communism is dead in Eastern Europe, Titoism is dead in Yugoslavia. There are major interests that could clash and lead to a bloodbath, but this is not necessarily inevitable, if it is recognized by all parties concerned that the other parties also have legitimate interests. Our job should be to identify those interests and analyze how they might work out. We were not supposed to make any policy inputs into this estimate at all, but implicit in that statement is the view that, if outsiders are going to have any influence, it could be in this area. So a "Concert of Europe" or another "Conference of Berlin" might bring these opposing parties together and say: "Look, we'll help you if you will not attack each other."

Anyway, we issued the estimate. I was unhappy with it at the very last moment. Not because of its broader conclusions, which were "OKAY," but because of some of the other statements in it. You know, you get your ego involved. I wanted a chapter on Bosnia, for example. It seemed to me that it was reasonable to have a chapter on Bosnia. Simply for reasons of length, it was decided to take Chapter V [on Bosnia] out, make Chapter VI into Chapter V, and that was the conclusion. That's the way it was, and I got pissed off and rather angry about it. However, the estimate was "on time." I don't know whether it was under budget or not. It immediately got a lot of attention around the Department of State. At least parts of it were leaked to Johnny Apple, the "New York Times" correspondent, who wrote a totally mistaken article about the estimate. If he had really read the estimate and then had written the article, he must be dumber than he is, although I never thought that he was all of that smart.

It was really funny to read that article. It was about an estimate that I thought I knew something about. I was given the usual thanks at the senior officials' meeting which finally "blessed" the estimate, although I felt rather grumpy at the time. I was also feeling grumpy because I had just received my letter from the Director General of the Foreign Service informing me that I was expected to retire from the Foreign Service in one year.

Q: Could you explain what the Director General's letter is?

DUNLOP: Well, every year in September, or at least for the past several years, and this changes quite frequently, certainly for the last seven or eight years, the Boards that meet to consider Senior Officer appointments in the Department make their recommendations to the Director General. If he approves these recommendations, he forwards them to the Secretary of State, who then forwards them to the President. The Boards complete their work during the first eight to 10 days in September of a given year. There is a great effort made to have the Board's recommendations approved by the end of September so that the

Director General can send a letter dated September 30, which is the end of the fiscal year. The letter is addressed: "Dear Colleague." It is a very austere letter. It states that after your years of dedicated service, your employment in the Department will come to an end within 12 months. So at this point I had just received my "September 30 letter."

I still had a couple of months to go over at CIA, doing some wrap-up stuff. However, I asked to leave a month early because I received an attractive offer of a job for the next year, in the "Career Transition Center" in the State Department. The Career Transition Center had been established in the 1980's in one of the State Department's more benign and benevolent moods. It recognized that the Foreign Service was moving rapidly to a military type system whereby an officer could not reasonably expect to spend more than 20-22 years in the service. Some people would spend a longer time than that, but this period of service would apply to most people. People need to be prepared for a "two career" concept of employment. So the Department set up the Career Transition Center to assist people who had made no particular plans for a shorter career and had gone to no universities to get an advanced degree in accounting, business administration, or whatever it is that military officers seem able to do and have done for many years. The Career Transition Center was established to help people find a second career if they wanted it.

This was an assignment which I very much appreciated. It turned out that I was assigned there for longer than one year. That was one of the only places in the Department where I could tell people coming into this program, some of whom were very angry at the Foreign Service and may have been unjustly fired, that at least in our office there was only one agenda. Not two or three agendas but just one. That was to help people. If they didn't want to be helped, they didn't have to be helped. It was not like in MED [Office of Medical Services] where they have a budget for medical evacuations, or something like that.

There were wonderful people in the Career Transition Center. I learned a lot there. I learned what I wanted to do in a second career, if I needed to go into one. I also had some success in helping some people find employment. I can't point to that as the outcome which happened most of the time. Altogether, it was an interesting time. It stretched out into a year and a half.

Q: Just to get a feel for this. You were looking at Foreign Service Officers from your perspective of people who were leaving the Service before they wanted to, while others were leaving when they wanted to. Anyway, you were looking at the "end result" of the Foreign Service career. Could you discuss this in two parts? First, what was your impression of Foreign Service Officers by the time they reached this point? Secondly, where did they seem to go?

DUNLOP: That's a good question, and I had enough time to reach some conclusions about that. I would leave out of consideration junior Foreign Service Officers who were not acquiring "tenure" and who were also eligible for this program. They were really quite different in their attitudes.

The Foreign Service Officers who arrived on the first day generally speaking fell into two categories. One was "mad as a wet hen." They were suspicious, angry, very conflicted, and very stressed out. Some of that was due to the fact that they had just come back from an overseas tour and were going through the whole experience of returning to the United States. In other cases they were there due to family troubles which, all too often, had still not been resolved. There was also the fact that they were enraged at having to restructure their lives from five to 10 years earlier than they ever thought that they would have to do. The other group were more or less resigned. Either they had planned for this, had expected it, or were actually looking forward to what they wanted to do. Or it was just the relief of putting the stress behind them. I think that we all recognize that most active duty Foreign Service jobs have a very high stress component.

After they had been in the Career Transition Center for a while, some of the "angry ones" became reconciled to what had happened. Some of the "angry ones" actually went over to another category of saying, "Wow! We didn't know that all of these opportunities are out there!" Some of the reconciled people also went over to that group. So there were finally three categories. For the "angry ones," they were suspicious of the Center, but that feeling continued on the part of only a few of them. Some of them retained their feeling of anger and betrayal. Betrayal is a good word to use, because they really did think that way.

The "reconciled" ones didn't go in that direction. Some of them became more enthusiastic about "course tracks" to follow. I think that the one thing in common with all of them is that there was a reservoir of intellectual ability and talent that was very impressive. These people had come into the Foreign Service after a rather severe, winnowing out process, including a tough written examination, followed by an oral examination. They had not had narrow minded careers. They had had broad experience. Some of them might not have benefitted from it as much as others, but they had a lot of ability. The one thing they didn't have was another Foreign Service to go to and apply for a job. I used to tell my group of counselees: "You're FSO's, but nobody's recruiting FSO's now, not even in the KGB!"

So they had to stop thinking of themselves as FSO's or former FSO's. They needed to think of themselves as having "x" number of talents. A lot of the effort in this program is to encourage them to do that. Stop thinking of yourself as going to find a job that, somehow or other, will let you continue being an FSO on an honorary kind of basis. There are a few people like this in the various "think tanks," but the number is very small. So think of yourself as a teacher or a worker in an NGO [Non Governmental Organization, such as people who do refugee and relief work abroad]. There are dozens of such organizations headquartered here in the Washington area. None of them pays very well, but some of these former FSO's have some very exciting things to do. If you have really deep language and area experience, you can go out and do that kind of work abroad. Think of yourself as a writer or a reviewer of books. Do you know Sol Schindler? He's made a career out of reviewing books. It's not a very lucrative career, but it's a busy and interesting one. There are a lot of opportunities if people really want a job.

If they really, seriously wanted to go into corporate America, in a 7:30 AM to 7:30 PM, competitive job, which a lot of us FSO retirees in the back of our minds discovered that they didn't want to do that anymore. I am certainly one of those. But if you want one of these pressure packed executive jobs, you have to go through this whole process of resume writing and job search in the corporate world, which is very different from anything you have ever done before. This is hard and frustrating work. It takes up a lot of time, although there is a possibility of success at the end.

At the end of the program we would ask them: "Did the program meet your needs?" At least 80 percent would say: "Yes." That is, with no qualifications. I think that the evaluation of their needs changed during the life of the program. The 20 percent who said that the program hadn't met their needs usually didn't condemn the program particularly. They would say things like: "Well, I guess that I would have to say: 'No.' But then maybe my expectations were unrealistic," or something like that.

There is a statistic out there about how many people are really satisfied with their retirement life. The figure is about 80 percent. I guess that we really mirror that figure at the end of our Foreign Service careers. We gave people a wide opportunity to look into career fields and to assess what they might be good at. We had all of the psychological tests which are done for job placement purposes.

Retired FSO's include a lot of financial planners and people who have gone into tax work. I don't think that you could turn me into one of those people. We also had people who went into teaching, particularly if they had a Ph.D. or were willing to work at a level below that of a "tenured" professor. I am one of those. And there are prestigious foundations. If you've been an Ambassador in a high profile position, you can go out and head the Japan-America Foundation, for example. That's what Bill Gleysteen did. That's an FSO job.

Q: Well, Harry, when did you retire?

DUNLOP: I retired in June, 1993.

Q: Then, rather shortly thereafter, you ended up doing something which was really quite extraordinary.

DUNLOP: Well, it was interesting. I've met a lot of people doing it. I met Vlad Lehovich the other day. He had just come back from Crimea, where he worked for the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]. I used to say, because it made me feel a little bit better about myself and made me feel like "bragging" about it: "Fired on Friday and hired on Monday."

Actually, my commission as a Foreign Service Office expired at midnight on a Friday, June 11, 1993. On Monday, June 13, 1993, I was sworn in as a Civil Service employed

person, a "PIT" or "WAE." I forget what "PIT" means, but "WAE" means, "While actually employed." You're only on the payroll when you actually are working. This allows you to keep your security clearance and to be hired by bureaus of the Department to do different things. I got my "WAE" appointment in the Bureau of Information Management, which runs the Freedom of Information Operations for the Department. This is the single, largest employer of retired FSO's. At one time or another they are likely to have, at least on their list of people eligible to do this work, up to 220 or 225 retirees, not all of them actually working in any given year or any given time. They do, or they used to do, all of the "dog's body work" in responding to Freedom of Information Act referrals or doing what I've done more than anything else, which is called "Systematic Declassification." This involves going back through the records which must be reviewed for declassification because of their age, not because somebody has asked for them. The regulations and the laws provide that documents "x" number of years old must be reviewed, and declassified material from them must be made available to the public.

That's where I was hired and that's where I have spent most of my working time since then, except for the six months that directly followed on that appointment. At my retirement, and because of my Yugoslav background, I had already been recruited by the Bureau of European Affairs to return to Yugoslavia as a member of the Mission of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which had people going into the field in Serbia.
As a "WAE" you can take assignments from many Bureaus.

One of the interesting things about post Cold War developments in Europe is the continued existence of what is now called the Organization of European Security Cooperation [OSCE], rather than the Conference (CSCE). That Organization, which had previously been the Conference, was a purely Cold War phenomenon of the 1970's, as a forum for human rights on political or military intervention between East and West. It didn't exist previously. I think that the reasonable expectation was that when the Cold War ended, it would end, too. However, with all of the turmoil around Europe and in the former Soviet Union, the then CSCE, now the OSCE, carved out another role for itself, called "Preventive Diplomacy." This was supposed to be a function which foresaw or anticipated problems. That is, if the problems are not foreseen before they emerge, at least they are anticipated early enough to allow outside intervention to ameliorate the worst possible consequences of the situation. This means sending OSCE Missions, with the permission of the parties on the ground, to places like where I was sent, to Kosovo, where there is enormous tension between ethnic Serbs and Albanians. The theory was that our just being there and being "watchful" could possibly ameliorate extreme behavior on both sides and, perhaps, buy some time for passions to cool and more rational policies to be implemented.

At the time I went to Kosovo, which, of course, is administratively a constituent part of Serbia, there were other such Missions in Macedonia and in Nagorno-Karabakh [in the Caucusus], which was claimed by both Armenia and Azerbaijan. There were OSCE Missions in Moldova, Estonia, and Tajikistan. Since then other Missions have been sent

to Latvia and to Crimea and to Georgia. As we all know, it was the OSCE that was given a major role on the civilian side in implementing the Dayton Accords on Bosnia. Anyway, so much for the bureaucratic or historical part of it.

Q: These Missions are composed of people of various nationalities.

DUNLOP: Absolutely. The CSCE had 52 members. The governing body of the now-named OSCE is composed of Ambassadors from its members countries in Vienna. They meet in one of those great conference halls in the Hofburg Palace. It's really amazing to see these great chandeliers with all of their imperial trappings and to see this long table at which the Ambassadors of 52 countries sit.

The US was expected mainly to contribute personnel and, to some degree, logistical and financial support. This was certainly the case in Kosovo. Mainly, we have provided money and a few, good people to these Missions. It was my good fortune to be asked to go back to my old "stamping grounds," although I hadn't been in Kosovo since 1982. It was a place which I knew well enough to think that I could be of some use to the OSCE Mission there. I had a very interesting but short stay in Kosovo. The head of our Mission, whose headquarters were in Belgrade, was a marvelous, senior Norwegian diplomat, recently retired, named Bogh [pronounced like "Burg"]. He sent these teams out. I was assigned to a town called Prizren, in Kosovo. The team consisted of two people: an experienced Swiss by the name of Franklin Tavenez and me. I never asked Franklin how he came by his first name, but I wouldn't be surprised if he was named after "Franklin Roosevelt."

We went to Belgrade to arrange for our visas. The situation politically in Serbia had changed significantly since the time that the previous Serbian Government had agreed to this OSCE Mission. The current Serbian Government under Milosevic exerted a malign influence, was very unhappy about the presence of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, and was clearly looking for an excuse to get rid of it. This excuse appeared shortly after I got there, so we only spent five or six weeks in Kosovo, from June 26 or 27 until July 31, 1993. During that time I read and heard a lot about the situation there from Albanians and, to some degree, Serbs. I also had some opportunity to observe the situation. Kosovo is a real mess. The population is approaching 2.5 million. Less than 300,000 of those, or about 12 percent, are ethnic Serbs. The Serbs mainly live in the principal cities, but some of them live in villages, which is one of the really vulnerable aspects of the situation. The Serbs are really isolated in a sea of Albanians.

Even the Serbs in the cities are isolated in a sea of Albanians. If you come across a Serbian village of, maybe, 3,000 Serbs, those people are truly vulnerable. Milosevic has chosen to exploit his position of almost total dominance in Serbia to use an "iron fist" in dealing with the Albanians. One of the unattractive aspects of the Serb political personality is that, more often than not, they'll tell you that that's the only way to deal with Albanians. They evidently feel that there are no alternatives. I've heard Serbs speak as badly about Albanians as I've ever heard any people speak of another. Even supposedly

Westernized and civilized Serbs will say: "Well, maybe what we need are some gas trucks." They will say that kind of thing to you.

Q: This is a reference to what the Germans did to the Jews, gypsies, and others during World War II, although they generally used large, "gas ovens" rather than "gas trucks."

DUNLOP: History there means the period between the 13th or 14th century and the 20th century. It has been marked by hostilities and made worse by Turkish domination and by Serbian stupidity and even brutality. It is a terribly bad situation, with absolutely no imagination being used by the Serbs to deal with it. The Serbs have no policy except to occupy the country with militia [police] and armed force. They hope that they can repress any rebellion.

For the last three or four years the Albanian political leadership in Kosovo has decided to challenge the Serbs, with a non-violent policy of passive resistance, although there is an underlying current of violence. Serbs and Albanians are always knifing each other and shooting each other up. At the "macro" level, the Albanians follow a policy of "passive resistance" against a kind of hopelessly ineffective repression by the Serbs. When the Serbs threw the OSCE Mission out of Kosovo, the Albanian ethnic community living there was very upset. They felt that the world was again "abandoning" Kosovo. They kept using this term, "abandoning." They use the analogy: "You know, we've never been on anybody's radar scope. Nobody was paying any attention to us until you people came, and now you're leaving." Well, I felt the same way about it. That statement was very true. My prediction then was that, without putting it in any particular time frame, because that would be ridiculous until the Serbs change, demographic and other pressures on the Albanians will be heavy. With the "new" Albania just across the border to the West, however disinterested it may be now in challenging the Serbs over Kosovo, that will all change some day. As I see it, the only way that it can change now is for the lid to blow off and a bloodcurdling, Ruanda-like pogrom to occur.

After we were thrown out of Kosovo, well, was it polite or impolite? I didn't find the Serbs to be polite at any time. Anyway, before we were expelled from Kosovo by fiat, I spent a day or two in Belgrade. I went over to the American Embassy. By that time the Ambassador had left, and the Embassy was in the charge of a very good DCM and a very hard-working bunch of people. The Political Section of the Embassy was trying to keep track of all of the political assistance which the Serbs in Serbia were trying to give to the Serbs in Bosnia The evidence was overwhelming that the core of the so-called Bosnian Serb Army was simply the Serbian Army fighting in Bosnia. In the Political Section they were all "hawks." They welcomed a newcomer like me, in this case a retired Foreign Service Officer to whom they could talk. They wanted air strikes and much greater American intervention in Bosnia.

I was neither a hawk nor a dove. Well, I guess that I was a dove. I didn't think that air strikes on Bosnia would do much good. However, we had some pleasant discussions at

the Embassy, and I left them poring over their maps and looking at the latest places where they'd put skulls and crossbones, to designate another massacre. It was really grim.

Q: Harry, what about living in Prizren and how did you get out? If I recall it correctly, it was a rather nice town. Market day was a great occasion. People would come in from the countryside. The women would wear those rather odd outfits which made them look pregnant.

DUNLOP: Well, Prizren is virtually a 100 percent ethnic Albanian town. Not all of the towns in Kosovo are so heavily Albanian. It's right up against the Shar Mountains, which are a dramatic range with the highest peak in Yugoslavia. It was formerly named Mount Tito and has not yet been renamed, as far as I know. [Laughter] Maybe it has been renamed. Nobody knew its new name if it has been renamed. The town had 27 mosques, very Muslim in character, in that peculiarly Albanian fashion. I don't know anybody who's been in the Middle East, but I understand that anyone who has been there would say that these people are Muslims, but they have "peculiar" customs. The men wear a little, white skull cap with great pride. It looks like a Jewish-type "Yarmulke," although it's larger. This cap would fit right on top of their black, curly locks. How it stays on I don't know.

Q: I don't understand that, either, but, anyway, it does.

DUNLOP: It does. It's an absolute badge of being Albanian. The first thing a Serb policeman or irregular of some kind does when he takes young men off a bus to interrogate them is to take this cap off, piss on it, and do other such "nice" things to it. They use it to wipe their behinds and so forth. Anyway, this is a town full of "shiptars" and a few Serbs. "Shiptar" is the Albanian word for Albanians. When spoken by a Serb, "shiptar" is a pejorative term. "Shiptar" is the Albanians' word for themselves. When a Serb says it, the Albanians know that he considers it something "bad."

We lived in an old Turkish house built in 1912. I knew the year because it had a Turkish inscription on it. It was a two-story house with kind of a run-down garden out in back. My Swiss colleague and I had the upstairs floor, and a nice old man lived downstairs. His sister-in-law or some relative came in and cooked for him. We had a contract to rent the room upstairs. There were two large rooms and one small room. The small room, which was on the front or street side of the house, was my bedroom. There was just enough space for a couch and my suitcase. The head of my bed was 30 yards or so from a mosque. The "muezzin's" call for morning prayers was, indeed, the first thing that I heard in the morning. As this was summertime, daylight came very early. I've heard people say that the muezzin's call gets on their nerves. They ask me how I could live so close to a mosque, but I never disliked the sound of the call to morning prayers. It begins something like: "Aaaaaalaaaaaaahu Aaaaakbaaaar!" [God is Great!]. Franklin Tavenez and I used to bet on whether this call to prayer was broadcast from a tape or if the muezzin did it himself. Sometimes, it was hard to tell.

Anyway, our reception by the Albanians was enthusiastic and warm. Obviously, this was self-serving from their point of view. They considered us the only foreigners around them who didn't oppress them. We got to know all of the local dignitaries, who would come around and talk with us. The Serbs regarded this kind of contact with great suspicion. However, they tolerated it because we were there, and part of our mandate said that we could talk freely to anybody. Before we received the expulsion order, the Mission had carved up the two or three districts up there, so that one person would cover one of them and the other would cover the remaining part. It was like being a provincial reporter in Vietnam. We would get to know the mullah's [local religious officials in the towns] and so forth. When problems came up which needed investigation, one of the things that we were supposed to do was to go and report if there was a shooting, a rape, or something like that. Hopefully, we would get the Serbian police officers in the locality to talk to us, which was sometimes possible, but often, not. Sometimes the Serbian police would start off perfectly happily talking to us. Then the phone would ring. They would answer it and come back and shoo us away, because somebody had heard that we were there and objected to it.

Actually, we were under instructions not to do that kind of "aggressive" reporting during my time there, because of this expulsion order which was hanging over our heads. Ambassador Bogh [chief of the OSCE Mission in Belgrade] decided that the information that we could collect in this brief time was not worth the added irritation while we were still trying to negotiate our extension. In any case we could "passively" receive information. People streamed into our house. Often there was a line outside our house of people waiting to see us. We also had an office in downtown Prizren with a telephone, a secretary, and an interpreter.

I think that there was only one incident which occurred while I was in Kosovo on which we tried as best we could to get "hard" facts on. That was a shooting incident which the Serbs alleged involved an ambush of a Serb patrol on the outskirts of Prizren. In fact, I think that I heard some of the firing, although I'm not quite sure of that. However, the incident took place late at night, around 11:00 PM. There was a bar and brothel for the Militia [Serb-controlled police] not far from our house. There were often shooting incidents there and often very drunken and wild behavior by the customers. It was a place where we certainly would not go for a late night drink.

One morning we were told by the Serbs that in an incident which took place the previous night a Serb and an Albanian had been killed. The Serbs had put the "clamps" on the whole area, setting up road blocks and so forth. Had we been in our normal operating mode, we would have driven up to the road blocks, tried to get through them, and go down to the spot where the incident occurred. We would talk to the local people and try to write an objective report on what had happened. That would have been difficult, under the circumstances.

We did that in a couple of other cases. The one that I remember involved "Dervishes" [as in the "whirling Dervishes"]. There was a "Dervish" clan in the area. I don't know too

much about the Dervishes, but at least they are "different." They are Muslims and are supposed to be under the very strict jurisdiction of a Sheik, who controls whom they marry, and all of that. They have a different set of ascetic rules which they follow. If they are "whirling Dervishes," they do the dance. Not all Dervishes are "whirling Dervishes." Anyway the Dervishes came to us one day with a story which I found very interesting.

They don't use the word "mosque" but instead call their holy shrines "Tefiya". These have exactly the same purposes. In this case the Dervish "Tefiya" was next to a lot which they believed that they held title to. It was their graveyard. A Serbian dance hall owner claimed this land and was going to build a dance hall over the graves of these Dervishes. The Dervishes were going to demonstrate about it. They had gone to the police for a demonstration permit. The police threw them out, after roughing them up and humiliating them in the usual way. So we actually did as full a report as we were able to prepare on the incident. Actually, we talked to the Mayor of the village, too. This was the day before our farewell call on him. We went into the Mayor's office. He was known as a "joke," a buffoon. Not all of the Serbian officials were buffoons. Some of them were very good and did an admirable job from our point of view. However, this Mayor was just a figurehead.

At our meeting with the Mayor we told him that we would like to bring up one question in particular. We said that we were sure that he knew about this case. That was the problem with the Dervish Tefiya. We had been told that there was a dispute over a plot of land adjoining the Tefiya, which had been used as a graveyard for the Dervishes. Plans were reportedly going ahead to build a dance hall over the Dervish graves, without any official consideration of the dispute over the land. The Dervishes had told us that they would be willing to abide by any lawful, court decision on the matter. However, until this was done, they didn't like to see construction workers coming in and digging holes in their graveyard. We said that we understood that there was going to be a demonstration.

The Mayor expressed total ignorance of this matter. He said: "What? A demonstration? I'll call my police chief." He then called someone on the phone and, after a brief conversation, said that the police knew nothing about this matter or about any request for a permit to demonstrate. A lie, of course. Obviously, we were ineffective and ineffectual during the five or six weeks that we were in Kosovo, although I think that a case could be made that just being there was better than not being there. However, we were certainly destined to be thrown out of Kosovo, and that's what happened. I landed in Vienna for a happy, four-month period of temporary duty after that, working on Yugoslav matters for our Mission to the OSCE, which needed someone to help. So I was very happy to stay on in Vienna until Christmas. Finally, the "string" ran out, and I came back to Washington, where I have since been working on the "Systematic Declassification" project.

You've been very patient, listening to my recollections. The questions were great. As far as the Foreign Service part of it is concerned, that covers my career.

Q: Thank you very much.

End of interview