

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training  
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

**MORTON R. DWORKEN, JR.**

*Interviewed by: Ambassador (ret.) Raymond Ewing*  
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## INTERVIEW

*Q: Mort, it’s good to have this opportunity to talk with you and find out about your Foreign Service career. As a starting point, I would like to get you to talk a little about*

*your early days and how you came to take the Foreign Service written examination. I see you went to Yale University, but I suspect something happened before that.*

DWORKEN: Well, that's true. As with many of my Foreign Service colleagues at that time, I was interested from a very early age in international affairs and current events -- I guess mainly derived from my parents who were also interested in and kept up with current affairs. I also remember in high school in the southeastern suburbs of Cleveland, Ohio, being introduced to a lot of current events issues by the librarian at my high school, who was also in charge of a small world affairs unit at the school. During the course of my high school education, there was a model U.N. activity in the Cleveland metropolitan area, organized I think every two years. The librarian (Miss Edith Miller) got several of us interested in that, and we took on the affairs of whichever country we were assigned. I was the leader of that group at one point and was selected to be one of the presiding officers of the mock U.N. General Assembly when it met in the metropolitan area. That's just a little bit of my current events background.

I was under the mistaken impression then that the State Department not only was the preeminent foreign affairs agency of the U.S. Government but also made all U.S. foreign policy -- to which I wanted to make a contribution. I eventually learned the reality, but even so, as I went through Yale, I had already pointed myself toward a career in the Foreign Service. I started at Yale as a chemistry major, coming out of the advanced placement science and math courses that were supported by the National Defense Education Act in the post-Sputnik era in American high schools. I had an outstanding physics, chemistry, and math educational background and much support from teachers. But when I got to Yale, it wasn't long before I encountered history studies, original source material, politics, and political science. So, even though I was in a special Directed Studies program that had pointed me toward science affairs with a large dose of the humanities, I ended up changing my major early in my undergraduate career to international relations and political science.

*Q: What year did you graduate from high school?*

DWORKEN: I graduated from Orange High School in 1962 and from Yale in 1966 with a Bachelor's Degree, a B.A.

*Q: Let me just ask you another question about growing up in the Cleveland area. You mentioned your parents were interested in international matters and current events. Did they have a particular interest in the world or an experience they shared with you, or was it more just general informed college educated people of the time?*

DWORKEN: Partly the latter, but my father had served in the naval reserve and been activated during World War II. He was a gunnery instructor at Anacostia naval station, which is why I was born in the District of Columbia. He also had two cruises overseas both around the Indian Ocean; he was a gunnery officer on a converted merchant ship that was armed and part of a convoy. I never got enough information from him to know



many of the details, although he had a couple of anecdotes he would tell about stopping in various ports on the east coast of Africa.

*Q: This was during the Second World War?*

DWORKEN: Yes. My parents were both fairly well traveled, around the Caribbean and parts of Latin America and to Europe. And as I went through my Foreign Service career, my parents made a point of visiting every one of my posts except for the first one, Vietnam. And after my father died, my mother carried on the tradition; she is still alive today.

*Q: Okay, let's talk a little bit more about your time at Yale. This of course was the beginning of the Vietnam period that you were at Yale. Were you involved in other topics or activities that were related to the war or other things that were going on besides your studies in political science?*

DWORKEN: I was a member of the Yale Political Union, which was very active in presenting and debating issues like the Vietnam War and a whole range of other things. One influential voice then was the conservative intellectual William F. Buckley, Jr. who spoke to us many times, since the Political Union was in some measure at least his creature. I can remember one time he talked us out of extending an invitation to Gus Hall, the head of the Communist Party in the United States; he spoke to the Union and convinced it that it was important to deprive Gus Hall of the imprimatur of being invited formally to speak to the University. Bill Buckley was a very persuasive speaker, and he persuaded me, I regret to say, on that occasion.

You asked about Vietnam, and yes, it was a very salient issue during my time there. For me the most formative set of discussions about Vietnam revolved around Professor Brad Westerfield, who was teaching American Foreign Policy at that time. While the readings he gave us were across the whole spectrum of opinion pro and con the Vietnam War and American engagement in Southeast Asia and all that, as well as more broadly, I found myself responding in agreement to his presentation that this was a war we should fight. I believed that this was an enemy that needed to be opposed, that it was an aggression by North Vietnam supported by the Soviet Union, and that it needed to be resisted. He took us through the ins and outs of early policy formulation in the late 1950's and early 1960's, very current. There was a general lack of support for the administration's efforts on campus, but 1962 to 1966 in fact were still early days for the U.S. in that war. Around the time I was part way through graduate school, my approach to Vietnam was changing. The Tet Offensive didn't hit until 1968, and it was influential. I started out in favor of our involvement, and then became much more skeptical of the effort.

*Q: Let me ask one other question. Was Yale always sort of in your future? A fine university; you want to say anything about why you went to Yale?*

DWORKEN: In part, I went to Yale because they accepted me early. I later found out that one of the factors that helped me get admission was that Yale was seeking a broader

geographic distribution for its entering class. I was second in my high school class. Of the approximately 100 in my graduating senior class, only three of us went out of state to school.

*Q: To college?*

DWORKEN: To college. And the rest either went to in-state schools or went off to in-state employment of one form or another. My father took me on the classic tour of colleges, and we went to a variety of large and small New England schools, mainly Ivy League, but I also looked at universities in the Midwest, in Michigan, at Northwestern and Ohio State as well. But during that tour of New England when we got to New Haven and I was to visit Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth, Princeton, and Columbia, Yale effectively responded almost immediately after the interview and accepted me; they said if I'd apply, they'd accept me. In the final analysis, Harvard put me on a waiting list, Yale carried through with their acceptance, and I took that. I think if I had been accepted into Harvard, I would have gone, but that didn't turn out. My father was an undergraduate at Western Reserve University and went to Harvard Law School, so there was a Harvard connection, but it didn't turn out that way for me. Yale was a fine and most enjoyable time.

*Q: Okay, besides the Political Union and your classes and studies, is there anything else you'd like to say about your time in New Haven?*

DWORKEN: Well, I had two extracurricular activities, one related to the University at large and one related to my residential college, which was Davenport. In Davenport there was a set of intramural sports and associated with that was a little college newspaper, more like a newsletter, called *The Felon's Head*.

*Q: The what?*

DWORKEN: *The Felon's Head*, felon being a criminal. The symbol of it was a felon with a noose around his neck. I never could quite discern what the history was for that. I became the editor, but it never had more content than newsletter-type activities and intramural sports and so on, but it was great fun; and I did play on the residential college's volleyball team as part of intramural athletics. As for university-wide activity, I found essentially that I could really have only one extracurricular activity in addition to my studies, and that was singing. I was in the Freshman Glee Club and the junior varsity glee club called the Apollo Glee Club, for two years, and then I made the premier organization, the Yale Glee Club in my senior year; that was great fun. I never traveled overseas with the Glee Club, because it was not a year they traveled, unfortunately. But with the all three glee clubs we went around the eastern United States and the Midwest with great regularity, lots of singing and lots of socializing.

*Q: Okay, good. So from Yale, did you go to graduate school? At what point did you take the Foreign Service written examination?*

DWORKEN: I took the Foreign Service written during my senior year at Yale. Having majored in political science and international relations with a fair amount of American history, constitutional issues, and a broad range of arts and science courses turned out to be fine preparation for the Foreign Service exam of that day. I took it in the first week of December.

*Q: 1965 was it?*

DWORKEN: Yes, 1965. And I got through that and also passed through the oral process, for which I had to go to New York City, as well as the medical and security checks.

*Q: While you were still at Yale?*

DWORKEN: Yes. I ended up being accepted into the Service, sworn in, but not offered a place however, and instead put on leave without pay, because I said that I wanted to go on to something else first— at that point I had two ideas in mind: one was the Peace Corps, and the other was graduate school. I applied to the Peace Corps; I was accepted and tentatively assigned to Niger as a volunteer on a peanut cooperative some distance outside of the capital of Niamey. On the other track, I applied to several graduate schools, I don't remember all now, but I recall Syracuse's Maxwell School, Tufts' Fletcher School, Columbia, and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies here in Washington. SAIS was the only one I got into, and the more I looked at the two possibilities, the more I decided I wanted to go to graduate school. So I declined the Peace Corps, accepted SAIS, and staved off the Foreign Service, but I was maintained on the register with the idea I would be offered an appointment when I came out of graduate school.

*Q: Sworn in, but you didn't actually enter into the initial training or do anything other than be on the rolls?*

DWORKEN: Right, but my service computation date started then, in April of 1967, although there was no pay involved with it. I don't know how much longer they did that kind of thing, because at the same time, I later learned, the Foreign Service was under great pressure to provide warm bodies to Vietnam for the civilian part of the pacification effort.

*Q: Was the military draft an issue for you at that time after you finished college?*

DWORKEN: The draft loomed very large for me, but not personally and directly until I was about to leave graduate school. I had a deferment while I was in college, and that carried through graduate school. I don't recall it being a factor in choosing the Peace Corps vs. graduate school. I do remember that when I was about to leave graduate school and enter the Foreign Service, my draft board reclassified me as draftable (1A). I appealed that on the basis of my intended occupation as a Foreign Service officer, and they turned down my appeal in writing, and then I asked for an interview.

I went back to my home in Cleveland, got a haircut, put on a coat and tie, everything I could think of to impress upon them my seriousness as a Foreign Service officer. This was a much more serious examination than my oral examination for the Foreign Service, and one that would not be giving me hypothetical situations and asking me to respond. In that oral exam, I can remember a pitcher of water and a glass on the tiny little table they gave me that was on a lower level than the table that the three examiners sat at. I was so thirsty during the whole interview, but there was no way I was going to pour myself a glass of water, because the glass was empty. I knew I would pour the pitcher of water all over the table, because I was shaking so much. (Laughter)

This Selective Service Board interview was even worse than that. On going into the room, I was startled to discover that one of the three members was a chemical engineer who honed in on the fact that I had changed my major from chemistry to something very, very in the political, international realm. He challenged me, why would you ever do that? Another member of the board took me through what it was that was going to happen to me in the Foreign Service. I said that it was likely that I was going to be assigned to Vietnam, since we had been told that all males who were unmarried and had no prior military service were liable to be sent there. This board member questioned why State Department training took more time than military training.

I persuaded them in the final analysis to give me an occupational deferment from the draft, but they later set down conditions. I can't recall them being in writing, but they made it very clear that they would give me the deferment provided I did in fact go to Vietnam, that I served in Vietnam for longer than a military soldier would, in other words more than 12 months (or as we learned to say, 364 days and a wake-up), and that I was not stationed in Saigon in the "fleshpots" -- where there was too much pleasure and not enough pain, I guess. Those all turned out to be conditions that were easy to meet, because there turned out to be three of us in my entering class who were assigned to the pacification program in Vietnam, it was an 18-month tour of duty, and the likelihood was very high of my being stationed outside of Saigon, so there I was: Deferred.

*Q: Deferred from military service?*

A: Only if I went down this particular path.

*Q: Now, the role of the Department of State in all of this was nothing, nil?*

DWORKEN: They certified that I was in fact a bona fide employee of the United States State Department and that was all. When I was ordered to Vietnam, I made a copy of the orders and sent them to the Selective Service Board in Cleveland, and that was the end of that. I think I had to continue notifying them of where I was and what my changes of address were, and I had to get my military boss in Vietnam to sign a letter to the local Board certifying that I was in fact still working in Vietnam, but I never was questioned by them after that.

*Q: Okay. Of course there were many of our colleagues, or future colleagues, in that period that did have to serve, who didn't get a deferment to get out of it.*

DWORKEN: Right. Some went because they were drafted; some volunteered; and some went into the Foreign Service and were sent to Vietnam in a variety of different capacities. My entering class was the last class during that war that had only some (four, in fact) sent to Vietnam, either to the Embassy or the CORDS pacification effort, while many others received 'ordinary' assignments. The next class had all received letters that said that they had a place in the Foreign Service so long as they agreed that their first assignment would be to Vietnam, and if they agreed to that, then they could enter the Service.

*Q: Let's go back just a minute to your time at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington. How long were you there, was it a two-year program?*

DWORKEN: I was there for two years; it was a two-year Master's program. I did not conclude all of the course work for a Master's. Those courses that I was not attracted to, I did not find enough incentive to complete. They were mainly in the international economics area; my various courses in international security policy, American and Soviet foreign policy and internal politics, and African affairs were wonderful, and I enjoyed them and all the activities that went along with them.

*Q: Did you have a scholarship while you were there?*

DWORKEN: No, my family paid for all my way through Yale and Johns Hopkins. I was paid a little bit for working in the SAIS library.

*Q: And, when you didn't complete all the courses and you didn't receive the Master's degree, you left a little bit early to join the Foreign Service?*

DWORKEN: No, I stayed the full two years and later in my career, when SAIS created a one-year Master's in Public Policy, I approached them and said, by the way, remember I had those three incomplete courses? I'd like to find some way to retake them now as a part of the new Master's Program if I could, and they said, no, thank you very much, those incompletes had been converted into failures. So I never did get back there to complete the degree work, in part because I had already gotten into the Foreign Service and while I would have entered at a slightly higher rank had I achieved a Master's degree, it didn't weigh very heavily in my mind at the time.

I enjoyed being in the Washington area then much more than I would have predicted, because of the whole range of political and cultural activities that were going on. I was much more confined to academic studies at Yale, coming out of a public high school into the midst of a lot of people who were much more worldly wise and much more seriously educated at prep schools. I felt underdone and challenged and probably worked more of a grinding schedule at Yale than I did at Johns Hopkins. There also was the negative

incentive of already having early acceptance into the Foreign Service, which took a little bit of my edge off of focusing on academic matters. That's not to say there weren't classes that weren't first-rate; some were fantastic. I had professors such as Robert Osgood, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, and Herbert Dinerstein, and there were several officers of various departments of the U.S. government, who taught and guest lectured.

*Q: Who?*

DWORKEN: One I particularly recall was William Luers, who came and taught Soviet Internal Politics, and I did an intensive project for him on the Doctors' Plot under Stalin and Beria. Another was Bill Foltz on African affairs. Those kinds of activities were very interesting, and the team of Robert Osgood, Robert Tucker, and the almost impenetrable George Liska teaching various aspects of National Security Policy and American Foreign Policy was tremendously stimulating. Economics, on the other hand, did not interest me the same way. The other former official who was there was Francis Wilcox, who had come out of a United Nations experience, been assistant secretary for international organizations. All told, I've never regretted the decision to go to graduate school or wondered much what a career that started with the Peace Corps would have been like.

*Q: You might well have ended up in the same place (laughter).*

DWORKEN: Yes, exactly, maybe with a gap of a year or two. SAIS' presence in Washington rather than at the main Baltimore campus and its ability to mix the academic of political science and international relations with the practical in very real ways, plus the involvement of foreigners in the student body and in the broader diplomatic community in Washington -- it all made for an exciting time. I marched on the Pentagon in 1968; that's another story from graduate school time. I was worried about that, because....

*Q: You were a State Department employee.*

DWORKEN: I was in prospect, in any event. I can still recall when we, however many thousands we were, marched across Memorial Bridge. There was a helicopter with its side door completely open and a camera on a tripod visible in the interior compartment aimed at this crowd. I had this kind of paranoid view that some picture of me was going to be computer matched, and my invitation to join the Foreign Service would be gone, but that never came to pass.

*Q: In those days, it probably would have been difficult just to do that kind of thing (laughter).*

DWORKEN: These days, it would be much more possible.

*Q: I think you mentioned before that your view of the Vietnam War changed, at least to some degree, during this period. Obviously if you marched on the Pentagon, that*

*reflected a shift from previous support; do you want to say anything about that in that period?*

DWORKEN: It did reflect a shift. It wasn't a complete shift, because I still was on balance supportive of the effort, and I thought it was important to carry it through. If I jumped forward to the post-Vietnam era, that's probably the piece of it that stayed in my mind, that having committed ourselves, there was a taking on of responsibilities that we should have performed in a better way. But at that time, I can remember shifting enough to be anti-war in conversations and questions and the constant discussion of Vietnam, because by that time it was the subject. I was probably more focused on NATO-Warsaw Pact strategic military relations and arms control kinds of things in academic terms, but the war was the number one issue. I found repeatedly, whenever I encountered someone who had more experience than I, that person would say something along the lines of, "Have you been there, do you know what you're talking about?" And my answer of course was, "No. I've been in school all this time, and what I know is what I've heard and read." But it began to take hold in me that I did want to go there and see for myself, and I carried those ambivalences and excuses over there. It wasn't just Vietnam; I ended up going to Laos next, so I had four years of war, 18 months in a province of Vietnam and two and a half years in the capital of Laos.

*Q: Okay. Unless there is something else you want us to say about your period at SAIS, maybe we should talk about your coming into the A-100 class at the Foreign Service Institute, when was that?*

DWORKEN: It was in the summer of 1968, and of course the Vietnam issue was uppermost. I'm told by colleagues who saw me at the assignment session at the end, when many of us had our parents with us, that I appeared to them to be dumbstruck when I was in fact assigned to Vietnam, to the CORDS program, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, the AID piece of it. (I was detailed to AID and assigned to MACV/CORDS.) I guess I was shocked, because I still believed that this wouldn't actually happen.

*Q: Even though there had been a lot of preamble?*

DWORKEN: Yes. And I can remember as part of our class activities, we had a couple of meetings with Director General John Steeves. I can remember a session where we went over and over with him the fact that some of us did not want to go.

*Q: To Vietnam?*

DWORKEN: To Vietnam. And I can remember asking him, even though I had the ambivalence that I mentioned to you earlier about wanting to go and experience it, but not being sold on the activity. I can remember asking him, "Why is it that the Foreign Service didn't give officers a choice?" And I can remember him just looking up from his chair and saying to me and to those of us who had concerns, "But you do have a choice, you have a choice every day, you can go where we send you or you can leave." His

presentation stuck with me to this day, and of course, it has become salient again with Foreign Service Officers being assigned to serve in the pacification efforts, the provincial reconstruction efforts, and the embassies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

*Q: In all of these oral histories that have been done over the years, there has been a lot of discussion about the A-100 class. I don't think you need to particularly go over that, unless there is something special you want to say about your experience in those 10 weeks. Did you have a foreign language when you entered the Foreign Service?*

DWORKEN: I had French, to some degree. I had taken some at Yale and had spent a summer on a traineeship with a construction company in Toulouse. I think I took a year and a half, maybe two years at SAIS. I passed the French requirement for the Master's program.

*Q: And you passed the Foreign Service language requirement after entering in French?*

DWORKEN: Yes, I did. The course work in the A-100 class at that time led directly into another two weeks of consular training as well; it was pretty standard at that time that the two were combined. Not all of us obviously went off to do consular work. There was, I should mention, a fourth officer who was sent to Vietnam as a Vice Consul to the embassy in Saigon. There were 3 of us detailed to AID for field work in CORDS.

*Q: So after you finished the A-100 class, you went into what was probably then called the Vietnam Training Center and learned Vietnamese?*

DWORKEN: Yes.

*Q: For six months or more?*

DWORKEN: I did the whole 48 weeks of language training at the Vietnam Training Center in Arlington Towers in Rosslyn, just above the garages. That was quite a program. It was mixed military and civilian, inter-agency, primarily a language program, but there were also course work and instructors from area studies and country studies, culture, and music. We also did weapons familiarization across Key Bridge in Georgetown at the old car barns in the basement of the D.C. Transit Building. I don't even know if the building is still there.

*Q: I think the building is there; I'm sure the firing range is not.*

DWORKEN: I think it's part of Georgetown now, isn't it? I think they've taken over a lot there.

*Q: Georgetown University?*



DWORKEN: Yes, for some kind of community center and food court. In the basement were firing ranges, where we became familiar with M-16s, shot guns, pistols, and various other kinds of individual weapons. And we also had time at Fort Bragg in North Carolina.

*Q: How long were you down there?*

DWORKEN: Less than a week. We learned about counterinsurgency from the military's point of view, at the J.F.K. Special Warfare School. I later took a foreign internal defense correspondence course from there. We talked with Green Berets, learned about various aspects of their training, and watched field displays, but the bulk of our training was in Arlington Towers and, as I said, the bulk of it was language studies.

They had an intriguing approach to learning a language. I had a very high language aptitude that placed me in the top cluster of students. We were divided by our aptitudes to begin with, and then thereafter, we were divided by achievement, tested on a regular basis. We stayed together as a group (the three, four, five, six of us students), and the teachers rotated around. Every six weeks, they would give an examination; if you passed the exam, whatever the cutoff level was, you stayed in the language course, and if you failed the exam, you went to Vietnam.

It was a wonderful incentive to do well enough to stay above whatever that cutoff line was. Even with my high language aptitude, I was by that time not all that interested in going quickly to Vietnam. I had another one of these attitude changes, and my position in the pecking order of classes plummeted step by step, until I needed to stay just above the line each six weeks; I succeeded in doing so until I finished the whole course.

*Q: If you'd done even better, if you'd excelled in the six week progress checks, that would have shown too much commitment or enthusiasm for what you were going to get into?*

DWORKEN: I don't know, I think I learned there was a certain measure of effort that needed to be done and that was sufficient, and I just went to that level. You're right, there wasn't any great prize for being outstanding. I later learned that there was a cost of sorts, or depending on your point of view, a benefit: the more foreign language fluency you had, the more employable and professionally competent you were.

*Q: More effective?*

DWORKEN: Yes, I did find that when I did get to Vietnam, I spoke well enough and more importantly, I understood well enough so that I turned out to be, of the civilians on the Provincial Advisory Team I went to, the most fluent. And so there were lots of occasions in which I interpreted for the province senior advisor, or at least I was present and able to tell him whether he was getting the full translation from whoever the interpreter was. I couldn't interpret myself, I wasn't that good, but I was good enough to monitor and to understand the stream of thought. I actually wished then that I'd had even more language training.

*Q: But on the FSI scale, where were you when you finished training, do you remember, two or two/three?*

DWORKEN: It must have been two in speaking, two-plus in reading. It was a hard, tonal language. I think I tested higher than that in both speaking and reading when I had been in Vietnam for a while.

It was funny, when I got to Vietnam, to find out that the Vietnamese I spoke was not just South Vietnamese, which is what we were taught, but it was even more particular. I was told that I sounded like a woman from a particular part of Saigon, called Cho Lon, which was the area of the big PX and commissary. In fact, I had been taught mainly by women who had come from that area and who had met American military officers, married them, come back to the United States, and become instructors at the training center. They had passed to me a way of speaking, forming phrases and sentences, and a vocabulary that indicated to South Vietnamese people exactly where I came from, or where they thought I did.

*Q: In this period of training, 1968 to 1969, the Vietnam war was becoming even more controversial in the United States and American political life in Washington as well. To what extent were you and the other students hooked up in that, or were you kind of in your own little cocoon, your own little world, learning the language and something about the culture, or did the controversy about the war creep into the learning program?*

DWORKEN: Oh, it definitely crept in, more than crept in. We were all residents of D.C., and we would have to have gone deaf and dumb not to register it. And over time, it probably crept into the way I approached my language studies, becoming more negative. I think the more I studied the history and realized that there were lost opportunities in and after World War II, and that we had under Kennedy interfered so much in their internal affairs with coups and secret efforts to influence people, the more my attitude turned negative toward our overall war effort. That's a side of history that was pretty well known at that time.

I guess over the course of my training for Vietnam, I became less and less positive about what we were engaged in as a nation, but I still had this feeling that I wanted to be a part of it, wanted to experience it, to see it for myself, and so I tried to keep enough of an open mind.

*Q: To what extent were you at the Vietnam Training Center involved in other things that were going on at the State Department, or were you pretty much doing your training and very much interested and engaged in what was happening in Vietnam?*

DWORKEN: I wasn't engaged in the State Department very much at all. We were, as you know, physically separate, and we effectively were not part of the bureaucratic structure in any particular way; people came to us and lectured and went away. I don't recall very much in any way visiting State, though I do recall between the A-100 course and the consular course and the beginning of the Vietnam Training Center that I had

several weeks in the Department. I went in to the East Asian and Pacific Bureau, where I was an assistant to the staff aide, helping to run papers hither and yon, and if I'm not mistaken, the great crisis in Europe in August 1968 was Czechoslovakia, and a Bundy was in the White House and a Bundy was in the State Department.

*Q: In the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.*

DWORKEN: Right, I think he was Assistant Secretary, and I can remember taking to him packages that I had assembled of telegrams and intelligence reports and papers from the Operations Center and reports off the various telecommunications machines. But other than that experience before Vietnam training started, I don't recall any interaction with the State Department.

*Q: And, how about the rest of the Foreign Service Institute? Not really, you were a large but very separate –*

DWORKEN: Because we were physically in another building, I can't recall any FSI connection to the Vietnam Training Center. We were FSI/Vietnam Training Center, but we could easily have been 50 miles away from FSI.

*Q: And in the period that you were there, there were considerable numbers of military or Defense Department personnel doing the same training?*

DWORKEN: Yes, and as I later learned, the advisory teams at district and province level in Vietnam and in the four corps areas were very integrated and mixed.

*Q: Integrated from different agencies?*

DWORKEN: Yes, the State Department, USAID, the U.S. Information Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency all had representatives in those language sections, I believe. They were mixed in amongst us and there were all ranks. Anyone headed for the pacification effort from colonel on down, all officers and the civilian equivalents in those other agencies and departments were all mixed together. It was great. Those were connections we kept while we were in Vietnam together, and some of them continued afterwards, and it was very good team-building.

*Q: Okay, so eventually you finished the Vietnam training center and went to Vietnam.*

DWORKEN: Not directly, because part of the training involved stopping in Taipei for a week at the International Rice Institute (or something named like that), where they were developing new kinds of irradiated rice. Before the days, I guess, when people were concerned about genetically modifying foods, cloning animals, and such, this rice was being developed in Taipei, and AID had a big piece of that research effort. The new rice, on the one hand, was supposed to be more resistant to all kinds of diseases and insects and, on the other hand, was supposed to be able to produce a higher yield. And part of

AID's programming in South Vietnam was to improve rice production and everything that went along with it, so we were introduced to that.

So, young suburban boy that I was, with no rural experience whatsoever, I was sent to be a New Life Development Officer, as they called it, which was essentially a local development type of job, part of which involved encouraging the use of this new rice.

*Q: And did just the officers who were to be local development officers stop at the Rice Institute or lots of other people as well, and was the reason you went there to learn about the rice and its uses or was it more of a broader training than that?*

DWORKEN: No, most of us prospective civilian advisors stopped there, and it was mainly about the rice. I can remember seeing some cultural things related to Taiwan and visiting museums, and there was some team-building as well, but I think we were all bound for provinces and districts, in village, hamlet and town development-type jobs, and so this was considered a piece of it. We didn't have any military guys with us, we didn't have any intelligence people, I think it was just AID and State Foreign Service types that did it. The only other group that was there, I think we came across them once, were students in a long-term Chinese language program. The second year is done in Taichung, and we were somehow part of that from an administrative point of view, so we came in contact with some of those students.

*Q: Yes, that's at the other end of Taiwan, I think.*

DWORKEN: I don't think we ever went to the school, but we did come across students and administrative people, and then we flew to Saigon.

*Q: Okay, when was it that you got to Saigon, to Vietnam? It was 1969?*

DWORKEN: It was 1969, the fall of 1969, late summer.

*Q: And you spent your days in Saigon or what?*

DWORKEN: We spent the bulk of our time connected to MACV (mack-vee), the military assistance command in Vietnam, of which CORDS was a piece called MACV/CORDS, or MACCORDS, Military Assistance Command Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

*Q: Actually you knew what CORDS stood for, I'm glad. So, say it again.*

DWORKEN: Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. The 'Civil Operations' part of it goes without saying, especially since it is currently understood in the context of Iraq and Afghanistan. But the 'Revolutionary Development' term was a replacement for an earlier term, 'rural development,' and in effect was taken from the Vietnamese government, which had a specific program by that name. Now, whether we encouraged the Vietnamese to call what they wanted us to do 'revolutionary

development' or not, I don't know. But we were supporting the government of South Vietnam's development effort. There was a military four-star general in charge of MACV, and one of the deputies was a civilian deputy commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam for CORDS, or DEPCORDS for short. That was Ambassador Robert Komer at the start. Later, it was Ambassador William Colby during my time.

I can't recall for certain whether we got our specific province and district assignments from CORDS Headquarters in Saigon, but I think that was the case. But we did spend some time in AID Headquarters in Saigon (now known as Ho Chi Minh City), some time in MACV military headquarters there, and time in the embassy as well.

*Q: Now were you, you say "we," there were several of you that were part of the class, a group that had come out of the Vietnam Training Center together?*

DWORKEN: Yes. Some of us were in the same numbered CORDS class; I think it was CORDS XIII. But there were also people who joined up with us so that we were all arriving in Vietnam at that point.

*Q: But all of you were really coming out of the Vietnam Training Center?*

DWORKEN: Yes. And we had specific training in what for me turned out to be a province advisory team job, and others had specific district advisory team jobs, and we also had training on internal political reporting, from a fellow named Cal Mehlert, who was in the internal part of the political section in the embassy in Saigon.

*Q: Where was that training done?*

DWORKEN: This was in Saigon in the embassy. They taught us what they wanted and made it clear that they wanted it from us directly, not through the CORDS hierarchy. It was straight political reporting, with an emphasis on biographic reporting, reports about the province and senior people in the governmental and social structure of the province or district that they were interested in.

*Q: About how long did you stay in Saigon?*

DWORKEN: About a week.

*Q: And then you went to your province.*

DWORKEN: Yes.

*Q: Which was?*

DWORKEN: Phuoc Long. The name of the province is usually the name of the capital city of the province, unless the locals use another name. Many people knew the name of

the province and the capital city that I went to as Song Be, since the Be River ran around the edges of the province capital city and through a significant part of the province. Many Vietnamese called it Song Be Province rather than Phuoc Long.

*Q: And where was this province in relationship to Saigon?*

DWORKEN: I would say almost due north from Saigon about 100 miles, up near the Cambodian border at the southern end of the central highlands, but not in the military region that contained most of the central highlands. Vietnam was divided into four military regions from the demilitarized zone south, and I was in the northernmost corner of III, up against the bottom end of the central highlands and the Cambodian border.

*Q: What was the terrain like?*

DWORKEN: Not highland. There were some karst formations, limestone, that were sizeable in the northeastern part of the province as it abutted the central highlands, but it really was lowland and primarily covered with forest and jungle. There were some plateaus and some deep ravines and so on, and there was one mountain that was very prominent right on the edge of the province capital called Nui (mountain) Ba Ra. There was also a similar mountain in Tay Ninh Province called Nui Ba Den; they were sister mountains, and there were no other mountains like them, cone-shaped rising out of upland plateaus.

*Q: And the river you mentioned, the Be River that went around the capital city of Phuoc Long?*

DWORKEN: Yes, it curved around the capital city. The city itself was on a raised plateau, so there were edges and if you went over the edge, you were down in the river. It wasn't fortified, but it was defensible, and I recall, perhaps imperfectly, that the local airstrip was one of the streets in that part of the city. An airplane could run right along the edge of this plateau. [When I returned as a tourist in 2009, the topography of the area had been changed by a major dam on the Be River that created a large lake east of the city and Ba Ra Mountain and that altered the river's course away from the capital city.]

*Q: Roughly what was the population when you were there?*

DWORKEN: The whole province numbered just over 40,000, and the main concentration (including the province capital and one district) had approximately 25,000, if I recall correctly.

*Q: It was that small?*

DWORKEN: I remember it being much smaller, but I checked my records and those were the numbers then. The province was the largest in land area of South Vietnam but the smallest in population. The people were clustered by that point in the war around the capital city plus a nearby district capital and the three outlying district capitals. They

were all in little ‘islands’ that the government controlled with villages and hamlets nestled for security right up against them, and the rest of the province was very sparsely populated and owned by the bad guys.

*Q: Viet Cong?*

DWORKEN: Viet Cong for the most part, although North Vietnamese main force units were periodically, and later regularly, present in or moving through the province. The province was essentially one large set of infiltration routes south to the areas of Saigon and the regional capital of Bien Hoa. Those same units were much in the American news for battles in Tay Ninh and Binh Long provinces, which were our neighbors to the west in Military Region III.

There were French rubber plantations in outlying areas of my province, and when we flew over, you could see the straight rows of rubber trees, but it had been several years since anyone had been, on the government side, working those plantations. And that was all considered “Indian country.”

*Q: What was that region called that you were part of?*

DWORKEN: It was just called MR III. (The military called it III CTZ or Third Corps Tactical Zone.) Bien Hoa was the headquarters for that. Saigon was in effect surrounded by Military Region III, and Bien Hoa was where we took our military and civilian instructions from, we Americans and the Vietnamese as well, because we were co-located and functioning inside their structure to a large degree. Ambassador Charlie Whitehouse was the senior civilian deputy in MR III (the Deputy for CORDS or DEPCORDS), later succeeded by Ambassador Funkhouser.

*Q: You arrived there in late summer, early fall of 1969. Why don't you describe what the situation was? What did you find when you got to Phuoc Long, what did you do? Give us the setting.*

DWORKEN: Well, our primary responsibility was to serve as advisors. We were a provincial advisory team, and the individuals whom we were advising were in the province government, from the province chief, who was a Vietnamese Army lieutenant colonel, on down. The U.S. had a parallel structure in Advisory Team 67, and we were headed by a U. S. Army lieutenant colonel. (It was Bob Hayden, as I recall, for most of my time, an artillery officer. Artillery was an important part of our military presence there.) I should add that in addition to the advisory team structure that I mentioned and a U. S. artillery unit that was specifically associated with a similar Vietnamese unit in the province capital, we had a brigade of the U.S. First Air Cavalry Division present in the province. It was in the nearby district that I described to you earlier (called Phuoc Binh), and it also had a very large airfield on a Fire Support Base called “Buttons,” so there was a constant flow of aircraft in and out, and there were helicopters, helicopter gunships, and medevac helicopters based at that brigade headquarters.

We had those substantial American military forces very close to us, and in addition the Special Forces operated in the province, for two reasons: one, because of that North Vietnamese and Viet Cong presence I mentioned earlier, and second, because we were up against the Cambodian border. They were using, as I later found out, their bases in the province to operate cross-border. There were many things I didn't know about our military activities in and from the province, until I was posted to Laos and was exposed more to the region-wide military, intelligence, and counterinsurgency effort that the whole U.S. government was involved in. I had a much more informed decision-making role there.

*Q: In Laos?*

DWORKEN: Yes. In Vietnam, I was quite a junior officer, pretty much in the dark. For example, whenever I was given information from an intelligence report about anything going on in the province, I was told it was from URSes or 'usually reliable sources,' and if I ever asked what a URS was, I was told that wasn't any of my business. When I was in Laos, I was much more aware of who or what those sources were. For example, the Special Forces teams were in each of the outlying districts, with a B Team in the province capital area and A Teams out in the field. There was all this military activity, including combat patrolling, nightly artillery fire, and distant air strikes that we could hear or feel, and there was a significant amount of military attention paid to securing the province's single land route south to Bien Hoa and Saigon. We civilians in the advisory team did not go on military operations and never used that road connection beyond the close-in district capital. When we left the province capital to visit the outlying districts or go to headquarters to our south, we always moved by helicopter or small aircraft, because the roads between the province capital, outlying district capitals and points south were just not safe.

*Q: So what did you do and how were you able to do it?*

DWORKEN: It was very difficult to move around, and that's why I described that environment first; we were constrained and constricted by a whole variety of things, besides being culturally different and not speaking the language that fluently. Security was a big concern. Another was the disinclination of our Vietnamese counterparts to venture out much.

Our advisory team was focused on development and local security programs that the provincial government was tasked with performing. There was a whole range of things involved in development that we focused on, all the way from what now goes under the term good governance to agricultural production. We supported structures of government down to the lowest level of the hamlet and supported those activities that provided services from the national government to the people, such as providing local security and training security forces that were locally raised and locally equipped and that belonged to the villages and hamlets. That included the police but also a more substantial military activity involved with guarding the villages and hamlets, local self-defense forces backed by provincial military forces. And there was also a program to encourage those who had



gone over to the other side to come back, to bring their families back with them, and to support those people. And there was another program to take care of refugees from the rest of the province who had come in previous years and had clustered around those islands of government control that I mentioned earlier. This was designed to house and feed them, and to help their efforts to grow crops that would both support them and would eventually enable them to enter into the larger economy of the province.

That whole range of development activity was performed with the idea of not doing it ourselves but encouraging, prodding, guiding, and supporting the Vietnamese government officers, who for the most part were also military, into doing it themselves. The chief for development in the province was, I believe, a Vietnamese captain, and he and I were called 'counterparts.' I had lots of resources, including a civic action platoon that was under my guidance (not my command, of course), but I could guide it to work in a particular hamlet or particular village on a particular project, such as digging a well, putting up small school or medical structures, or rebuilding a hamlet, a bridge, a pathway, or whatever.

I had an imprest fund that was always replenished whenever it got low; it had several thousand dollars in Vietnamese piastres (dong) in it. We civilian members of the province advisory team had under our control stocks of bulgur wheat and cooking oil that could be provided. These were usually used by individuals or sold on the market to get resources to invest in other food that might be more likely to be used. I had irradiated rice seed to provide, as well as metal roofing, reinforcement bars, and bags of cement that we could provide for small-sized development projects like schools, clinics and so forth.

*Q: Were you the first Foreign Service Officer, State Department member of this particular province advisory team, or had somebody been there before you that you'd taken over from?*

DWORKEN: I must have had a predecessor in terms of having someone on the team providing development advice, but I don't remember knowing who it was, and it may have simply been an additional duty of others. I know I had a successor, but I don't recall meeting that individual either. There should have been handoffs, although that didn't happen with any regularity. We civilians were there for at least 18 months, six months longer than the military were there, in some cases it was longer than the Vietnamese military in that structure were there. There was more continuity in our small group of civilians.

*Q: When you say a small group of civilians as part of this larger team, how many American civilians?*

DWORKEN: The larger part of the team was composed of around two-plus dozen military. The civilians were led by Tom Wajda from State (and later, Ed Tolle from USAID) who was the deputy province senior advisor. We had a Chieu Hoi advisor (that was the 'Open Arms' program to get the enemy to come back from the other side), a public safety (police) advisor, a community development advisor, and a refugee advisor -

- all from AID -- plus a couple of NGO people working on agriculture, refugees, and health and a couple of civilians who worked for military intelligence, but ostensibly worked for me on education, youth, and sports. That was about it. I was the Assistant Senior Advisor for New Life Development, the second-ranking civilian. Oh, we also got a civilian administrative officer from AID after I'd been there a while.

*Q: So how many?*

DWORKEN: Depending how you count, approximately ten. We were one of the smaller province advisory teams, and as I mentioned, there wasn't much population in the province, and the terrain mainly belonged to the enemy and was the responsibility of the U.S. military, not the advisory team as such. And from the Vietnamese government point of view, the province was not a high-priority problem. Mind you, at the end when South Vietnam fell, the province was the first province to fall to the North Vietnamese, because it effectively was a southern terminus of the Ho Chi Minh Trail after it had passed through southern Laos, the panhandle, and down through the eastern part of Cambodia.

The first province that the enemy conquered was the one I had worked in. At the time of that collapse, I heard that one village chief, with whom I had spent some time on various self-development projects, had been part of what was called the VCI (Viet Cong Infrastructure) all along -- for years, he had been playing a double game. This single village and its seven hamlets had been the total government-led presence closest to the Cambodian border.

*Q: And you never suspected that?*

DWORKEN: Never. I guess I had generalized suspicions about all kinds of things, but nothing specific, not at all.

*Q: Did you travel frequently to the other districts; you say there were three outlying districts?*

DWORKEN: I made several visits to them.

*Q: And were there district advisory teams in each of those?*

DWORKEN: There were. They were all military members and pretty small in numbers; there were no civilian advisors there, again a reflection of the security situation. I think there were Special Forces A teams as well in each of the three outlying districts. To go back into the history of the war, the southernmost of those district towns, at Dong Xoai, was largely over run in 1965 in a major battle that I was told was the basis for the movie, "The Green Berets." The other big incident was an attack on the province capital's joint tactical operations center in early 1969 during which the American province senior advisor and others were killed.

*Q: Before you were there.*

DWORKEN: Well before I got there. So, we went out to district capitals and the associated villages, my Vietnamese counterpart and I, and whoever else on the team needed to go on that particular visit. And I can remember in Duc Phong to the east eating food I don't ever intend to eat again, which was, I think, a great honor to be served. How shall I describe it? It was a duck that had all the feathers plucked off. It had been diced into the smallest possible pieces, bones, innards and everything, and then it was put into a kind of casserole and cooked for us. It was very crunchy to eat.

We civilians were not issued with arms, but as I mentioned earlier, we were basically familiar with individual weapons from the time we had at the Vietnam Training Center. We all felt we needed to be armed when we were outside the province capital and the adjacent district, particularly when we had to fly in helicopters over enemy-held territory, so we all made individual arrangements with military friends to get weapons that were no longer on property books. I was one of those who did that.

I found that we had advisory team things that were desired by the guys in the brigade of the air cavalry at the base near Phuoc Binh. One of those things was hot showers. And another was access to commissary goods, in this particular case, cases of frozen steaks. I should explain: The military members of the advisory team had a mess hall supplied through the military supply chain; we civilians could use that if we wanted to. But, their living compound and ours, while side by side, were not the same, and there was a fence between us. Mind you, we had an outer perimeter that encircled both of us and we had bunkers we could take refuge in if need be. However, our living and working spaces were not integrated.

We preferred our own small civilian mess, so we could have local-style food from time to time, and we contributed money to its operation, if I remember correctly, and also paid our own Vietnamese cook. With those funds, we went to the commissary in Saigon and bought supplies every couple of weeks (not our staples, because those were obtained locally or from the military, but fresh meat, frozen meat, some fresh vegetables, as well as canned goods and a variety of frozen foods and luxuries like ice cream and so on). And like in later diplomatic posts where being a nonprofessional courier got you out of a remote, isolated place into 'civilization,' the opportunity to take the "commissary run" to Saigon was something valuable that was rotated amongst us. We would fly down on a small Air America plane, a Pilatus Porter, which was the only civilian U. S. air service that came up there; the rest were all military controlled. One of us flew down to Bien Hoa, the regional capital, where we had made an arrangement with one of the staff to provide us with an International Harvester 'scout' vehicle. We would drive down the main highway to Saigon, spend the night in a hotel there, which was a great luxury, see a little bit of the downtown that evening, and then first thing in the morning, go out to the commissary in Cho Lon, where we'd buy a lot of frozen beef and chicken to last for a couple of weeks plus all the canned goods and Vietnamese produce (fresh, but all packaged). Most everything like that was frozen rock solid and crammed into this vehicle for a quick trip up the road back to Bien Hoa. We made sure to buy a couple of cases of beer that we provided to Air America staff to compensate them for making these

additional flights for us, threw everything into the back of the airplane and flew right back to Song Be. The guys would be out at the runway in their vehicles, so we could get all this by then slightly melted stuff into the freezers in our compound.

I ended up trading several hot showers and cases of those steaks (that I bought) for a 38 caliber pistol, and the belt and ammunition to go with it, and an M-16, which I later discovered was actually made up of scrounged parts from several M-16s. None of these weapons was on anybody's property books, but we all felt it was better to have them for defense of our place or to take with us on helicopter rides in case we went down between districts. Most of us made a point of not wearing or carrying weaponry when we were in our advisory roles on the ground with people who were not armed; if they were armed, then we would take our weapons with us, and we practiced with the weapons from time to time. There were two attacks on the advisory compound, both mortar attacks. I don't think there was any evidence there was a ground attack associated with those attacks, but we never knew whether or not that would be the case.

*Q: Were there casualties?*

DWORKEN: No, no one was killed; I vaguely recall there may have been minor injuries from one attack. There was some warning, and we were able to take cover in the bunkers. Our living quarters were not fortified. Some of us were in trailers, single or sharing; some of us were in the two prefabs that were divided into single bedrooms, each with a shower, toilet, and sink.

There was one very large incident which may have been an enemy attack, or I should say that we all thought it was, even the province senior advisor, the artillery lieutenant colonel. It was an attack on the ammunition for that combined artillery unit I mentioned earlier, and it set off the ammunition, so it was hard to tell from then on who was firing at whom, because all of this Vietnamese and American ammunition was 'cooking off,' and there were casualties from that. The U.S. province senior advisor awarded several medals after that night. It later turned out that somebody claimed that it wasn't really an enemy action, that it had been badly stored ammunition, so it was caused by friendly action, and the medals were supposedly not merited. That resulted in a visit by a Washington Post reporter who wrote about it, and there was a great fuss over that. I don't think anybody had a medal taken away, but it did not help the lieutenant colonel's career.

*Q: We've talked about your assignment as development advisor with the CORDS Pacification Program in Phuoc Long province in South Vietnam from 1969 to 1971. What else should we say about that assignment?*

DWORKEN: Well, there are a couple of things I would like to mention, about projects and activities that went on. One of the development activities I spent a significant amount of time and effort on, which was essentially part of that range of development activities I mentioned earlier, was specifically focused on the Montagnard tribe that was in the province. As with most of the central highlands and areas connected through the central highlands like the province I was in, there were Montagnard people, mountain people as

they were called. They were not derived from the Viet Chinese invasion that occurred many hundreds of years before that pushed the people up into the highlands from the more coastal areas. The Montagnards were ethnically different -- more, if you will, indigenous to the area; noticeably discriminated against; less well off than the lowland Vietnamese; and more primitive in many respects.

There was in the province a small group of Catholic sisters that worked with the tribe, or the remains of the tribe, called the Stieng. [I checked in 2009, and there is still writing about them; they are in the country and also part of the refugee flow that has come and settled in the U.S.] But they were very primitive, and by comparison even with Vietnamese who had been rural and far away from Saigon and Bien Hoa for generations, still much less well off. The Sisters were trying to give them economic opportunities, and they had already started in their own very rudimentary way to take what was a Stieng custom of growing rattan and had tried to turn it into furniture that could lift the economic well-being of this tribe. Fashioning rattan is a very difficult process, because it grows essentially straight and it needs to be bent, held, formed, and tied together in structures, and it also has to be treated so it doesn't fracture and destroy itself in very short order. They were doing all this by hand, and they were fashioning little side tables, little chairs, stools, and various things like that as well as very decorative things. They were also using rattan as the structure for some of their buildings.

There were more developed rattan-producing activities in other provinces, but they might as well have been in another world, because there were no safe roads, as I mentioned, to get product to market, and there certainly were no means by which the Stieng could go and get equipment. I was able through my AID connection to other province advisory teams to locate rattan-bending machinery up north in the second military region, up in Da Nang. So I flew up there and arranged for the shipment on U.S. military aircraft of rattan furniture-making machinery, and by the end of my tour, that machinery had arrived, and the Sisters were very pleased and were beginning to install and use it. I never stayed long enough to see the production stage, so I don't know whether the Sisters did accomplish that to benefit the Stieng. They were in an unsafe area and yet seemed to be safe.

*Q: They were Vietnamese?*

DWORKEN: Mostly, although I think there was one European woman there. It was a longstanding presence, but I never learned very much about them. They were dedicated to those people, and those people were dedicated to them. That tribe was also active in the local self-defense force that I spoke about earlier, so they were potentially a target, and they did have some bad incidents where they were attacked. They acquitted themselves quite well, the Sisters stayed safe, and hopefully this industry in some degree or another is still going.

*Q: And you paid for the machinery out of the funds that were available to you for provincial development?*

DWORKEN: Yes, and for the transportation, which was the other part of it, and for some supplies and oil that would hopefully keep it going for a while. The other thing that I should mention is that there was an effort to evaluate our progress. It was called the HES or Hamlet Evaluation System. It was a computer-generated listing of every village and every hamlet in every corner of South Vietnam, and we had our province's portion of it. It was an American project to get some numerical way of measuring progress or the lack thereof from a range of objectively observable situations. For example: Do the police sleep at night in the hamlet, yes or no? Of course, that required observation. Some of us advisors at province and the districts were from time to time obliged to make those observations, or when the situation wasn't secure enough, to take the word of the provincial and district government officials and other Vietnamese personnel who were there. In other words, there was a mix of not quite good data and reliable data that went into this. Every hamlet came out with a letter grade A through E (or F?), and there was a metric then to judge whether your pacification effort was making progress or not. Now this was formulated and assigned from on high; it wasn't adjustable by us. We had to make our local situations fit the criteria.

*Q: And you would be the one to do that for your province?*

DWORKEN: Yes, I was responsible for gathering the data and making the initial evaluation, but I recollect that the province senior advisor and his deputy were the final say on what the American evaluation would be. It was also a way of indirectly rating our counterparts, because this was our tool, but judging, in effect, their job performance. There have been many criticisms of that system, but it did gather data on a fairly regular basis.

*Q: Once a month or something like that?*

DWORKEN: I'm not sure, but it was frequent enough so that you could get snapshots, compare one to the other, and come to conclusions about the situation and needed assistance and training. I don't remember any earthshaking rises or falls in the HES evaluation for our province, but I think we were on a slow upward climb with lots of reverses, mainly dependent on the flow of enemy forces; at least it seemed that way at the time. When there were many North Vietnamese units in or moving through the province, when there was fighting and hamlets were being attacked, then obviously the security situation component of the HES and all the other associated pieces would go down. I think we had both ups and downs.

I should mention one other thing. While the battle during Tet of 1968 was the great shocking event internationally and in the United States, every Tet after that was a concern to us advisors. In addition to my South Vietnamese government counterpart (the head of development on the province chief's staff), I also had a local national Vietnamese employee named Muon who was my interpreter/translator and general guide and arranger, from the local community. He was with me or in my office every day, one way or another. He came to me before Tet of 1970 and suggested that it would be a good time to go on vacation.

*Q: That you go on vacation?*

DWORKEN: Yes. Of course, I didn't keep that to myself. It wasn't clear whether the threat was personal or more generalized, since all of us advisors were out and about, and we were vulnerable to targeting. I took advantage of that and traveled on leave to places I thought I would never see again. I went to Bangkok, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Siem Reap (where Angkor Wat is), and to what was then called Sihanoukville, on the coast, with its port and unfinished hotel. Wonderful time.

There was a mortar attack on the advisory team compound and the province chief's compound while I was away. As I said, nothing on the ground, as far as we could discern, but that was good information he provided.

*Q: Good time to be away.*

DWORKEN: Yes, very much so.

*Q: Say a little bit more about your relationship with your counterparts, there must have been several in the 18 months you were there. Was the Vietnamese army involved with development?*

DWORKEN: Yes. The officers that I worked with were all from outside the province. Mr. Muon, who I mentioned earlier, was the head local national employee for me, and we had two Vietnamese women who worked in the office as well, in clerical positions. You might wonder what clerical work was going on and that gets me to the response to your question.

With my counterpart, a Vietnamese army captain, we were obliged together to produce English and Vietnamese versions of a province development plan, an American overlay on the French colonial practice of planning. It was a very intensive planning process, with a national plan, a regional plan, and a provincial plan. And we built from scratch the first provincial development plan for that in Phuoc Long Province. He had sections to write, the American advisors had sections to write, we each had to translate and conform the two language versions. We collaborated over many working hours in each other's offices on goals and objectives, what kind of inputs we would have, and all the other considerations. We produced something that was over an inch thick, with enough charts and graphs and what have you, and it was approved by the province senior advisor, the American lieutenant colonel, and the Vietnamese province chief, whose name was Luu Yem. In retrospect, it was more of a bureaucratic tool than a specific action plan that anyone followed up on.

Luu Yem was part Chinese. I understood that his family was in business, all in his wife's name, something to do with motorcycles, a Vespa agency in Saigon, and what have you. I don't know how much farther he got in the Vietnamese military; I believe he came out in the refugee exodus in 1975. We had a relationship that was more official than anything

else. I was invited to the province chief's home on a few occasions, but I think I was there more as a Vietnamese-speaking American in the company of more senior Americans. I never went to my main counterpart's home; I was never invited. Nor did I ever visit my senior local's home, although I do recall a picnic at one point with our Vietnamese civilian staff.

We had visits from Ambassadors Whitehouse and later Funkhouser; those were the CORDS senior officers in MR III. I later worked for Ambassador Whitehouse in Laos; he was a great guy who I think is still around, but I'm not sure.

*Q: I think he might have passed away.*

DWORKEN: That's a shame. I went to those occasional senior U.S. officer visits to the province chief's house, so I had a fair amount of contact with the province chief in his area, but not much contact with other province officers than the development chief's staff and the development chief himself.

*Q: You mentioned before there'd been little training when you first arrived in Saigon with the embassy in terms of reporting. How much political, biographical reporting did you do for the embassy? How much contact did you have with the embassy over the 18 months?*

DWORKEN: Very infrequent. I had a little with the embassy, particularly with Hawthorne ('Hawk') Mills, who later figured in my work as well in Athens when he was DCM. Hawk was the Mission Coordinator in Saigon, a one-of-a-kind job as a super-executive officer underneath the two ambassadors in charge. I was invited to come down at one point to compete to be Ambassador Sam Berger's staff assistant. I didn't get the job, but that was one time in the embassy. There were a couple of other times that I passed through Saigon and stopped in the political section, like when I went on that R&R leave I mentioned to you. I also went on an R&R trip to Hong Kong and another R&R to Sydney, Australia, so each of those times I was down in Saigon. The commissary runs did not provide much time for embassy contact, but I would make a point of stopping in to see Hawk and the internal unit of the political section when possible.

There were occasional bits and pieces that I picked up, biographics, information or evaluations of developments from this far-off province that had very little to do with Saigon. I gloried in the fact that we weren't anywhere near a flagpole. I didn't want to have all that much to do with Saigon, and there wasn't all that much reaching out on their part, either. There was one personal moment, when my parents decided they weren't hearing from me and called the State Department Operations Center. The next thing I knew, I had this radio telegram from the Embassy personnel officer saying –

*Q: Keep in touch! (Laughter)*



DWORKEN: Yes. That was a little embarrassing. I didn't write home as much as I probably should have, feeling it was enough to do the work from dawn to well past dusk. And a lot of it I didn't want to recapture on paper.

*Q: I would suggest that we stop at this point, and when we start again, I would like for you to look back over the whole period and think of what it was like at the beginning and what it was like at the end and evaluate your impact or what, if anything, transpired in that longer period that we talked about. Does that sound okay, or is there anything else you wanted to be sure to say today?*

DWORKEN: No. I will try and crystallize my views of that Vietnam period. The Laos period, I think we can do separately.

*Q: Okay, it's now the 28<sup>th</sup> of March 2008. When we finished last time, we had almost completed our conversation about your assignment to the CORDS program in Phuoc Long Province, and I think you wanted to summarize a little bit your overall feelings about that assignment and what your view of Vietnam was when you left in 1971.*

DWORKEN: Right, it was in the spring of 1971, and of course it's important to put one in that time frame, when the war was still going on and had several more years to run. I guess, as I look back at that time, I can recall a belief that what we were doing there was worth doing. It didn't seem futile at the time, just hard, even though futility, I think, has entered into the views of many since then. There were all kinds of difficulties, obviously, with security; there was some lack of popular support for the government structure that we were supporting, advising, and assisting; there were signs of corruption; there were signs of duplicity on the part of the people; and there was not, if you will, a national movement or resistance in the same strength and character that the North Vietnamese and their allies, the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, brought to the struggle. But as I say, it seemed doable.

General Abrams had come on board and had instituted a counter-insurgency strategy that did make a lot more sense than the strategy that General Westmoreland had been following. The CORDS effort was central to General Abrams's strategy, and we thought, those of us on the team, that there were signs of possibility and success. We undervalued, I think, the lack of support we had from the States, from the American people and the Congress; we undervalued the importance of that in terms of where things would be going. And we also, in a sense, lost sight of the power of the idea that the North Vietnamese and their allies in the South were putting forward, the idea of the unity of Vietnam and the exclusion of foreigners. That goes back to what I said earlier, when we talked about mistakes and the strategic errors we made, right after World War II in our dealings with Ho Chi Minh and with the French. There's a saying in Vietnam that when the elephants fight, it's the grass that gets damaged.

*Q: Trampled.*

DWORKEN: Yes. I know I left Vietnam with the feeling that we'd done a lot of trampling, no question about that. I also believed that by our involvement and actions, we had caused people who would normally have avoided the conflict to choose sides, that we'd been a catalyst to that choosing, and having done that, we had taken on obligations to the people who had chosen our side.

Now this is hindsight, of course, but the manner of our leaving a conflict like that is very important, and the manner of our going from Vietnam was flawed under President Ford and the Congress of that time. It was not part of any strategic plan, if you will. I have been troubled by that ever since. I'm still conflicted by it. I don't think in the final analysis that the United States should have been committed to Vietnam, but having been there, I wish that we had stayed with it in a more consistent manner. There's no question in hindsight that the manner in which South Vietnam fell to the North Vietnamese was a reflection of our past strategic errors and misjudgments. I don't have any hesitancy in saying that. I just wish that we had, as a nation, followed through more on our commitments as we were withdrawing, as we were in the process of Vietnamization over the course of the next several years after I left in 1971. Enough said on that.

In hindsight as well, I am afraid that we put all the whole-of-government experience and doctrine aside after the war and then unfortunately had to re-learn those lessons later when we fought in Afghanistan and Iraq.

*Q: Okay. So that completed your assignment in South Vietnam. You went then, I believe, to the embassy in Vientiane, Laos. How did that assignment come about? Did you have some additional training before you actually went there? Tell us what you did there.*

DWORKEN: Well, the short answer on training is that I had none; it was a direct transfer. The position did not require a foreign language, though I did have some French. The ambassador there, G. McMurtrie Godley, better known as "Mac" Godley, was looking for a replacement for an officer he had on his staff who was his special assistant for political-military affairs. He asked "Hawk" Mills, the Mission Coordinator in the embassy in Saigon, for a recommendation, and I was recommended and got the job. It turned out to be a much more responsible job than one would have expected a junior officer who'd only had one tour of duty to have. It meant that I left the detail to AID and returned to the Foreign Service. For the first time, I was sent to an embassy, but it was unlike any other embassy job I had ever heard of (or seen since) in the Foreign Service. I was not just to be the Special Assistant for Political-Military Affairs but, more simply put, I was to be known as 'the bombing officer.' All the training for it was on the job.

I was not the first bombing officer. Ed Archer had done that for William Sullivan when he was ambassador, and I think he had carried over with Godley. I know I had at least one successor, Maury Gralnek, so I think there were in total three, or at most four, of us -- one at a time. David Pabst substituted when I went on leave. (I think there was also someone similar in the embassy in Phnom Penh at a later stage, when our air force (USAF) started operating over eastern Cambodia.)

[In 1982, Jerry Doolittle, who had been part of USIS in Laos when I was there, published a novel entitled, "The Bombing Officer." It was based on this type of work but was highly fictionalized.]

In Laos, Monteagle ("Monty") Stearns was deputy chief of mission at the time. Stearns and Godley had worked together in the Congo, and my relationship with Stearns affected my Foreign Service career at later points.

Anyway, the job of bombing officer was one I really wasn't prepared for.

*Q: Did you understand that was going to be the job when you were identified by Mills to Ambassador Godley?*

DWORKEN: Yes, I did. I don't think I understood all the ramifications of it or the intensity of it, but I did know it involved almost direct support to combat operations. I had already become intrigued by the mix of political and military personnel and activity even before my time in Vietnam, but certainly in the training for, and my experience in, Vietnam, the slot in Laos fit right in.

*Q: Would you talk, perhaps not in full detail but at least a little, about what you did and how you did it?*

DWORKEN: Sure, I'd be happy to.

As the bombing officer, I was obliged to act any time of the day or night when the USAF sought permission to perform airstrikes in Laos, and I had several tools for that. But first, let me explain that the whole structure of the American military effort by the air force in Laos was subordinate to their activities in Vietnam. In that sense, the war in Laos was secondary to Vietnam in terms of the resources the U.S. government put in and in terms of the public attention paid to it.

There were no U.S. troops on the ground in Laos as such, although there were U.S. soldiers on the ground in Laos from time to time, and there was U.S. military involvement. This involvement was masked to one degree or another, because of the Geneva Accords that we did not wish to tear completely asunder. At the direct request of the government, the prime minister and the king of Laos, we performed our assistance and support activities in, and associated with, Laos in a manner that did not bear military identification.

So there was that kind of stricture, and also a kind of priority ordering of our activities in Indochina. But nonetheless, there was keen interest on the part of our military in the field in Vietnam to block and deter as much North Vietnamese activity as possible, much of which went through Laos, specifically southern Laos or the eastern part of Laos, to get from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. This infiltration of men and material on the so-called 'Ho Chi Minh Trail' was under a constant bombing campaign, particularly in

southern Laos (called “Steel Tiger” in military terminology). There were areas in eastern Steel Tiger that were, to use the common term, “free fire zones.”

*Q: Free fire zones?*

DWORKEN: Yes. This meant that the USAF could perform any bombing there that it saw fit. I should say that rules of engagement (ROE) governed USAF activities throughout Southeast Asia, particularly with regard to Laos. The American Embassy in Laos and my predecessor and I were specifically engaged in maintaining that body of rules of engagement, updating it, overseeing its implementation, calling to account those who possibly committed violations, and seeking administrative or other actions against particular pilots and air crews that did not perform according to the rules.

All of this overseeing and enforcement that I did was on behalf of the ambassador, who was charged by the U.S. government with those responsibilities as well as with providing support to the Royal Laotian Government and to our broader U.S. military and government effort in Indochina. This was a pretty massive activity, as you can imagine, with a lot of controversy in its later years as to whether it was effective or not, and whether it was done properly, proportionately and as carefully as it ought to have been done, and whether it inordinately caused refugees or civilian casualties.

There was a comparable set of rules of engagement for USAF activity in the rest of Laos, which was less constant than the activity directly against the North Vietnamese infiltration and supply activities in the eastern part of southern Laos. That involved support to Laotian troops, whether they were part of the Royal Laotian Army or part of the irregular forces that were put together by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Lao and Thai governments primarily in the northern part of Laos, which in Air Force terms was called “Barrel Roll.” Much more sensitivity was attached to activities in Barrel Roll and in the western part of Steel Tiger, because those were the much more inhabited areas that had not been engaged in conflict as intensely as the eastern part of Steel Tiger had for years beforehand.

In northern Laos, there was much more of a necessity to be attentive to protecting friendly forces from being bombed mistakenly by USAF, and we made a significant effort to protect civilians, supporters of the government, suspected POW camps, cultural sites like the historic Plain of Jars, temples, villages, and hamlets. In the far north of Laos, we also refrained from approaching the Chinese border or striking a road that Chinese crews were building from China toward the royal capital of Laos, Luang Prabang, with unclear intentions, since we didn’t want to get involved in military action against China. We also placed a buffer zone around the so-called capital of the Laotian communists at Sam Neua in northeastern Laos near North Vietnam that restricted the military activity that could be performed.

That’s the framework of what I worked on. I had a little office in the Ambassador and DCM’s office suite, part of which was a normal office and part of which was behind a vault door. In that vault, I had maps of the whole country covering the walls, very

detailed maps as current as we could make them. I also had equipment to look at detailed aerial photography in stereo, so I could see things on the ground in 3-D, and I also had the assistance of a U.S. Air Force NCO. (I never felt the need to ask for more assistance.) Together, he and I went through every day's report; every aircraft that dropped any ordnance anywhere in Laos had to file an operational report. Those reports flooded into the Air Attaché's office and then were brought to me in the embassy, or I went to the AIRA office to look at them. We were told what kinds of bombs were dropped, the exact locations, the time, the reason(s), and the results, if any were observed. We took care, the Air Force NCO and I, to check as many of them as we could reasonably be expected to check to ensure that they adhered to the ROE. We didn't always succeed in checking everything, and we didn't require post-strike photos for every strike, due to the press of other work, but we sure tried to keep track of a reasonable number.

*Q: Much of what you did was after the fact, after the bombing strikes had taken place based on intelligence where the targets were selected; you weren't involved in selecting the targets?*

DWORKEN: Actually, I was involved in that, too, to some degree.

*Q: Okay.*

DWORKEN: As the USAF became more involved in supporting the Laotian forces, both the CIA-supported forces in the northern central part of Laos and also in the south, and also the regular Laotian armed forces, the embassy became more involved. By the embassy, I mean the CIA station's paramilitary support office as well as the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission, the Air Attaché (mainly), the Army Attaché, and the intelligence staffs that supported them. More air support was being provided to Laotian forces, and we collectively did select targets. When the strikes were to involve B-52s (or toward the end of the war, F-111s or massed A-7s) in northern Laos, we took these proposals for strike validation to the Ambassador, or in his absence, the DCM, and explained our rationale, and then submitted those requests to higher military authority. The northern Laos B-52 strikes required validation by the Embassy, concurrence by various military headquarters, and approval by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Most of this was done in military channels, although some was sent for information to the State Department. As the Ambassador's agent, my responsibility was twofold: (1) to watch over and be involved in the targeting process to see it was proper; (2) to see that it conformed to the rules of engagement that we were charged with enforcing. There were coordination meetings with Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and 7th Air Force, headquartered in Saigon. Because these were military assets being deployed over the whole Southeast Asian theater, and the portion that went to support friendly forces in Laos would not be going to support American and South Vietnamese forces on the ground, these decisions were closely followed by our senior military commanders.

One of the things we had to be certain that we coordinated properly was to ensure that the small teams that our mission had performing reconnaissance and other ground actions,

unbeknownst to the larger friendly military forces, were protected from U.S. airstrikes. The CIA had a significant number of small non-U.S. teams operating in enemy territory in parts of Laos that were in what I earlier called free fire zones, known in ROE terms as Special Arc Light Operating Areas or SALOAs. ('Arc light' was the nickname for B-52 strikes.) In addition, a military 'studies and observations group' (MACSOG) in Saigon, run by Colonel Sadler, was in reality a Special Forces activity that operated cross-border. A lot has been written about that since then, but at the time it was highly secret. There were coordination meetings on a regular basis that CIA paramilitary staff and I attended in Saigon, or sometimes in Bangkok or at a base at Nakhon Phanom (NKP), that was in northeastern Thailand and from which a lot of special operations aircraft flew. So there were activities originated by others that occurred in Laos and therefore fell under the ROE and activities originated by members of the American Embassy Operations Group in Vientiane that I helped staff. I also participated in the coordination of support and activities between our forces in Vietnam and the Embassy in Vientiane.

*Q: To what extent was their coordination with the government of Laos, and were you involved in any of that, if it took place?*

DWORKEN: These activities were generally coordinated, as far as I knew, with the highest levels of the Lao government, often with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and with senior Lao officers, by senior Embassy officers, but not by me. I had very little contact with the Lao government or military. I had some occasional contact with the leaders of particular forces, mainly those supported by the CIA in northern Laos headquartered in Long Tieng, the base for General Vang Pao, who was the leader of the irregular forces. My work was almost exclusively with Americans. I had no diplomatic responsibilities in Vientiane, although occasionally I would meet foreign diplomats socially or professionally. I worked very long hours and a lot of my days involved simply work, eat, sleep and go back to work again.

I spent a lot of time with air attaché personnel, who were in charge of the 'Raven' (U.S.) forward air controllers that were based in-country and also had communications gear that enabled contact with USAF airborne command and control aircraft that were orbiting over northern Laos and southern Laos, Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger. When particular forward air controllers (Ravens or others from out-of-country) who were controlling strike aircraft had targets that needed to be approved or validated, that is were not in already-approved areas or situations, then the Embassy needed to be contacted in real time. The Ambassador in Vientiane was the validation authority, and the normal channel to him was via the AIRA and me. In many instances, the ambassador had already delegated to me the authority to validate or deny permission for airstrikes, which I invariably did in consultation with AIRA personnel. So I was in a constant operational loop that was driven very much by the dynamics of the various battles that were going on.

I had another responsibility that took up part of each working day, which was that I was a member of what was called the Operations Group. We didn't have a country team as such; instead we had an operations group, because it was very much an embassy of

operational entities. It was not a traditional embassy. Support for military activities was, for much of my tour of duty, the primary, if not the only, activity that seemed to be going on. There was of course activity by the political section, the Ambassador, and the DCM especially later in my tour as negotiations began for ending the war, as well as public diplomacy and substantial USAID development work, but when I started the job, it was military activities and support for military activities seemingly across the board. Looking back, it was not a normal embassy, but a distorted one where the war effort and support for military and paramilitary activities seemed all-encompassing. I was the youngest member of the Ops Group, and that was quite an experience, with a lot of responsibility for decision-making and sometimes life-or-death kinds of decisions. It was also my responsibility to keep a checklist of actions that had been directed by the Ambassador. I was kind of an executive secretary, which gave me the task of going around to parts of the U.S. Mission in Vientiane to follow up on those taskings.

I also had the responsibility of preparing a daily situation report to the State Department, summarizing the military activity for the previous 24 hours to give them and those other parts of the U.S. government that read embassy sitreps the picture that the Ambassador had of how the military activities of the previous day had gone. There was other reporting I did, such as periodic reports of mission military personnel strength and of each casualty involving Americans belonging to the mission, whether civilian or military. I also prepared bomb damage assessment reports following B-52 strikes in northern Laos for transmission in Top Secret Specat [special category] Exclusive channels because of their sensitivity.

*Q: This was the period 1971 to 1973 and, as you say, toward the end of that period, negotiations began; I would like to talk a little more about that, to the extent that you were involved. But let me ask one other question, to what extent was this highly classified activity becoming public knowledge, and to what extent did you get involved in dealing with either the American press in terms of the controversy or the local authorities in Laos? You said before that you had very little to do with the government of Laos, that continued all the way through; there must have been times where something would get into the press or hit the fan, so to speak. Did you hope that someone else would deal with that, or did you have to get involved?*

DWORKEN: Well, as far as the press was concerned, I essentially avoided them, because I really didn't have anything about my activities that I could talk about. Whenever I was approached, and there were a couple of times, I referred them to the U.S. Information Service people who were at the Embassy. You are right; there was periodically significant public attention. Questions about how many official Americans were actually in-country, how many had become casualties, what was the CIA and the U.S. military doing, were there Thai units in-country, and a lot about bombing, refugees, etc. There had been a series of Congressional hearings, before I got there, that Ambassador Sullivan and previous attachés had been involved in. There were no hearings that I recall that involved the sitting Ambassador, Mac Godley, but there were a few Congressional visits. I remember Ohio's Senator Saxby, who was generally supportive of the effort, and I was a control officer for part of that. There weren't that many members that came, although I

do recall a tense visit by Congressman McCloskey, who openly criticized the war, the bombing, and the actions of the U.S. Mission.

The most important visit we had, from my perspective, was from two Senate staffers, Jim Lowenstein and Dick Moose, a famous pair who both went on to greater responsibilities in the State Department and in the diplomatic and international financial worlds after that. Lowenstein and Moose were sent out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), and they made two visits to Laos in the time I was there. It was through their visits that a significant amount of American military activity in the sky over Laos and American government activity on the ground in Laos and from Thailand into Laos was exposed, first in classified form to the SFRC and then to the public. This caused a great deal of consternation, because as I mentioned earlier, many aspects of U.S. activity in Laos was secret at the request of the Laotian government and at the request and insistence of several parts of the U.S. government.

It's not that the Congress was unaware of what was going on. There was a lot of "holier than thou," "my goodness why didn't you tell me," "this is horrible" position-taking after things became broadly public. But my understanding is that there were fairly full briefings of the appropriate leaders of Congress and the appropriate committee staffs and members, along with a lot of other information already out there.

Nonetheless, for Lowenstein and Moose nothing, so far as I was concerned, was held back. I was under instructions to answer every one of their questions and just keep track of everything that was told to them. I was the control officer for their visit and arranged much of their activities, except those that involved the diplomatic corps in Vientiane or the Lao government authorities they may have contacted. They produced two staff reports that were highly classified, top secret in one instance and, I think, compartmented in the other in their first drafts, and then there were portions redacted in Washington and eventually there were unclassified versions of their reports that became public. It was through one of their visits that the fact became public that we were employing B-52 aircraft to strike in northern Laos. These were in support of General Vang Pao's forces, who were under attack, not just by Laotian communist units but by main North Vietnamese forces in regimental size, to the point where friendly forces were overrun or greatly threatened. That those aircraft were being employed in that part of Laos and that close to China had not been publicly known; I think that probably was the biggest single activity revealed by Lowenstein and Moose. They also wrote about how the ROE were developed and enforced, how refugees were assisted, and how Lao forces were trained and supported. They asked and were told.

I should explain that a lot of the effort exerted in Laos was essentially designed to support our activities in Vietnam, though some of it, I expect, would have been performed for humanitarian purposes. The example I just mentioned of main force North Vietnamese army units fighting in northern Laos is something that normally one would not have expected to occur. But the willingness of the various Laotian forces to resist Laotian communist activities drew those main force North Vietnamese forces into northern Laos in ways that prevented them from flowing south to fight American forces in South



Vietnam. In a crass sense, we were involved in the shedding of Laotian blood to save American lives. That's something we were always aware of; we viewed the activities in Laos as of a piece with those in Vietnam, even though frankly neither the Thai who were in support nor the Lao themselves necessarily viewed it the same way. They also fought against communist forces for their own strategic and defensive reasons. It all depends on where you're from and where you sit, I guess.

*Q: All this heavy responsibility that you had, as you say, was intense, active, and demanding; did it sometimes happen in the middle of the night, too, so you'd have to go back into the embassy, to go out? You wouldn't have a cell phone probably, but you were in effect on-call all the time?*

DWORKEN: I had a "brick" radio (named for its size) issued to me, and there were lots of times when I was called. There were times when I knew things were going to be potentially happening, and I would arrange to be present at an operations center located in the office of the military attachés. There were many unusual aspects of our activities in Laos, and one of them was that there was not a normal Defense Attaché Office; instead, it was a construct called a JANAF, which stands for Joint Army, Navy, and Air Force office. Our Naval Attaché captain was actually in Bangkok and not as involved as the other service heads, but the Army and Air Force Attachés, both colonels, had significant operational responsibility. They were not classic Defense Intelligence Agency officers in any sense of the word.

While the Army Attaché had a small advisory element working with the Royal Laotian Army, the Air Attaché had operators, forward air controllers (FACs) who spotted and marked targets for fighter-bomber aircraft every day, flying very small, single-engine planes. But they weren't USAF officers at the time, they were part of a special clandestine project ("404") assigned to USAID, I think to its Requirements Office, a logistics entity. These FACs had call signs that were Raven 2, Raven 4, and so on. The Ravens, as they were called, lived in a building right near my house. Many of those late-night activities involved going with the Ravens who weren't in the air or up-country into the Air Attaché operations area. We could be in contact from there with the airborne battlefield command, control, and communications aircraft, the C-130s known as the ABCCC or "A-B-triple C," that our Air Force flew over northern and southern Laos every minute of every day to control air activity. That enabled us to provide real-time validations (or non-validations) for strikes in support of Laotian forces. There was a lot of late-night activity.

*Q: To what extent were you given guidance and direction from the Ambassador and the DCM and then implemented it, and to what extent did you need to go back and check with them on specific targeting requirements and so on, hourly, daily? Or did things settle into a sort of routine that they were confident with what you were doing, you reported daily to the Department, and they saw those daily situation reports? How was the interaction with those senior officers in the embassy?*

DWORKEN: Mac Godley was very much a hands-on leader. He ran that Operations Group very skillfully, very forcefully. There was no question that he was attentive to details when necessary and in charge of all U.S. government activities in Laos. There wasn't any question about chief of mission authority being respected in full. Unlike the many-headed organization in Vietnam, there was one chief in Laos. In that sense, the Embassy -- its elements -- and the Ambassador ran the war. I cannot remember a single time when a B-52 strike proposal for northern Laos was forwarded to military authorities as an Embassy-approved request that did not first go to the Ambassador or in his absence, the DCM, initially Monty Stearns. He always wanted to know not only why those targets were being proposed, he also wanted to know that the ROE in terms of civilians and friendly forces and so on were being followed; and he looked to me for that assurance. He also wanted to know what the strike results were on the ground; he was keenly interested in their effectiveness. [See also John Gunther Dean's book, Danger Zones.]

I think he clearly knew they were sensitive in political as well as military terms. There were times when he took several of us with him up at night in the Air Attaché aircraft, which was an old military C-47 (the civilian equivalent is the DC-3 "Goony Bird"). We could fly off to the side and watch B-52 strikes that we had requested, and we counted the secondary explosions, if any, that occurred when those bombs hit ammunition and other explosives. It was my job to go back to the embassy and write up the Specat Exclusive reporting telegram for the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the military commanders in Saigon and Hawaii, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the commanders of the 8th Air Force in Guam that had sent the B-52s, the 7th Air Force in Saigon, and the 7/13th Air Force in northern Thailand at Udorn Air Force Base, the one that directly supported activities in northern Laos. I wrote many of those telegrams, and we would report that the Ambassador and his team were up there and watched the strike go in.

There were times I went to his house or chased him down at other diplomatic functions, usually with the Director of Operations from the Air Attaché's office or the Air Attaché himself. We would pull the Ambassador out from wherever he was and take him into a side room, give him a briefing, roll out maps, and show him where things were happening and what we were proposing, get his approval or disapproval, and go back and implement his instructions. While we were delegated the authority to make some decisions ourselves, given past experience, there was no question that we were operating with the full instructions and confidence of the Ambassador. On those times we couldn't reach him or the DCM, because time was too short, he backed us up every time.

Monty Stearns was the DCM for much of the time I was there; and he too was directly involved not just only in the ambassador's absence. We normally went to him first, unless the situation was urgent. Monty was succeeded by John Gunther Dean, who was also involved in that period. There was also a time when Dean was Chargé between Godley and his successor, Charlie Whitehouse, the same Whitehouse who had been the head of the CORDS region in which I had worked in Vietnam.

It was when John Dean was DCM that he nominated me for the Harriman Award. He said while it wasn't necessarily dissent in the traditional definition of the term, he thought that my activities -- in enforcing the ROE and seeking to call to account those who had authorized bombings or the use of particular kinds of bombs that were not permitted in a particular area, bringing those questions up, and making the USAF provide pre-strike photographs of targets they wished to have validated and post-strike photographs where I was concerned that the ROE might have been violated -- all that fit into the definition of the Harriman Award. He said it would also, even if I never got anything from it, be in the file in case I ever needed to demonstrate that I had performed in the proper manner. I was very appreciative of his doing that.

*Q: You didn't get the award, but it stayed in your file?*

DWORKEN: Yes, that is correct.

*Q: Did that kind of calling to account happen pretty often, where either something was done wrong, or they didn't follow the procedures?*

DWORKEN: It didn't happen very often, but it did happen. And there were mistakes; I made mistakes, and so did USAF -- inadvertently. I know I validated an area I thought was "inactive," the term used when there were structures still standing, but so far as I and others could determine, there were no current inhabitants. There was visible military activity in and around the structures, but no evidence from photography and other reporting that there were civilians still living there, but it turned out there were, and they were killed in the strike. That one I remember very vividly, because it was in the western part of southern Laos near the Bolaven Plateau. That was a mistake in validation on my part.

There were incidents where boats were struck on the Mekong River, they were not in Laos but were in Thai or Cambodian waters when attacking them was not allowed, even though I believe they were militarily valid targets. There were a few times when ordnance was not approved for a particular area, but it was used, such as cluster bomb units, known as CBU munitions, or white phosphorous, which was controlled and for use only in some areas and not allowed to be released in others. Sometimes bombs that were targeted on a validated area fell outside of the area, and post-strike photography showed that the strike had gone in the wrong place. But remarkably, considering how much bombing occurred, how many airstrikes occurred, how many different kinds of aircraft and subordinate units were involved, and how inaccurate USAF guidance systems were compared to the present days, I was gratified how few mistakes we detected. Moreover, there was not any detection of intentional violations, as far as I can recall, bearing in mind, of course, that devious minds could imagine that violators would falsify their after-action reports.

The 7th and 7/13th Air Force Headquarters, I am sure, didn't like getting messages from the Embassy saying, 'Go look again at this strike that occurred four days ago; we want to see aerial photographs after that strike to be certain that the bombs were delivered in the

right place.’ I am also sure they didn’t like putting together validation request packages where first they would have to fly a reconnaissance mission over a targeted area to support a request that it be approved for a period of time inside of a specific box around that area. I’m certain they didn’t like having such an area begin to look like a piece of Swiss cheese, because our examination of it showed structures with paths that were worn and other signs of cultivation and such that would lead me to believe they were still inhabited areas. So, while the area could be struck with certain kinds of bombs, they had to draw 500-meter circles of no-strike around each one of those structures, which would sometimes make it militarily impossible to perform the bombing they wanted to do. I think on the whole it was an efficient way to try to insure that proportionate and discriminate military force was applied; it just wasn’t successful in terms of stopping all enemy activity and winning the war.

*Q: Okay. Do you want to say anything more about your assignment to Vientiane, Laos, from 1971 to 1973?*

DWORKEN: I could tell you a couple of anecdotes that might be of interest. One of my rare diplomatic engagements was with the Canadian colonel who was assigned to the International Control Commission, a creature of the Geneva Accords.

*Q: What year were the Geneva Accords?*

DWORKEN: 1954, I believe, and another set of agreements in 1962. The agreements set up a tripartite control and supervision commission for Laos composed of Poland, India, and Canada.

*Q: The chair was India?*

DWORKEN: Poland was a representative of the communist Warsaw Pact, Canada was a representative of NATO, and India was not aligned, so I think India was the chair.

The ICC was one of the few open channels at that time to communicate with the authorities in Hanoi, because the ICC had its own aircraft, support structure, staff, and the right to fly into North Vietnam, Laos, and South Vietnam at times of its own choosing. The Canadian on the ICC had a close, albeit proper, relationship with officers in the Embassy, and we wanted to do him a favor. It was decided to show him some American military activities that he would not otherwise see and to offer him a trip to an aircraft carrier afloat in Yankee Station off the coast of Vietnam whose aircraft were part of the strike effort against North Vietnamese targets in Indochina. I became his escort officer, so I went with him to the “John F. Kennedy.” That was a real eye opener: That was the first time either of us had landed on or taken off from a carrier. We observed night flight operations, and we were well-received guests of the captain.

As you might imagine, we had high-level visitors from time to time from the U.S. government. A lot of working level-people obviously came in-country, and there was a lot of aircraft traffic between Udorn, our support base, and Vientiane. In fact, the best-

known one-star general who was in charge of the U.S. military support activity based in Udorn was a fellow named Jack Vessey, who later became Chief of Staff of the Army and then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Jack's title was Deputy Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group to Thailand, but he had very little to do with Thailand and everything to do with Laotian matters. However, he wasn't allowed to stay overnight in Laos because of the Accords and our desire to have uniformed U.S. military not apparently be in-country. But he would come up nearly every day to be present for our Operations Group meeting, since he was the Mission's senior military officer.

Admiral McCain, the Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. Pacific forces, would come to visit the region, and we got him up to Vientiane. On one occasion, he brought his wife and her sister. Also, I remember when he was being briefed inside a secure, non-smoking area, he kept a cigar in its cellophane wrapper but in his mouth, and he chewed the cigar to shreds. It was funny, when Admiral McCain came, about six hours in advance of his arrival, all of our telephones would suddenly work better than they had ever worked before, and our telegraphic communications became first grade, because of course he was the war commander for the whole Pacific theater, and his people ensured that we had the best service possible; then about two hours after he left, that quality of communications would disappear.

That happened also when Kissinger visited. A young fellow by the name of John Negroponte accompanied him, en route to Hanoi through Vientiane, and I remember getting to see the inside of the specially equipped aircraft. That's the first time that I met John; what I recall most about him is how tired his work for Kissinger seemed to make him.

*Q: He was National Security Adviser then?*

DWORKEN: Yes.

*Q: And he went to Hanoi from Vientiane?*

DWORKEN: Yes, in February 1973, after the Paris peace accords were signed in January.

*Q: Did other people make that trip that you were involved with?*

DWORKEN: No, though I have a vague recollection of participating in some of the briefings then. As for the ICC aircraft, there were occasionally journalists who went on it to Hanoi. We were very attentive to those journalists who, of course, had all kinds of observations and interview transcripts that we were interested in.

*Q: How far is Udorn, Thailand, from Vientiane?*

DWORKEN: It's across the Mekong River and a bit south. There was no bridge across the Mekong at that time.

*Q: So I guess he would come...?*

DWORKEN: Vessey flew. There was also something called the 4802nd Joint Liaison Detachment, which was the CIA support apparatus, also in Thailand, and there was a lot of supporting air traffic back and forth.

*Q: Okay, anything else about Vientiane or Laos you want to talk about today?*

DWORKEN: Another thing I should mention is that as the negotiations went on and resulted in a ceasefire agreement with respect to Laos in 1973, we assured the Laotian government that should the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao break the agreement, we would come to their aid. There were at least two instances that I recall before I left, and there may have been others afterwards but I'm not sure, where Laotian communist forces supported by North Vietnamese troops did not observe the cease-fire and continued or opened an offensive in the northern part of Laos. One involved the area around Tha Vieng, near the Plain of Jars, after the enemy had seized it. We went to Washington to request airstrikes against those forces. They were approved by the President, and B-52s and other aircraft struck. I was very pleased by that, because I thought it showed that we were prepared to back up our word to support those who had been with us in resisting aggression, and it was militarily effective, too. It did for the moment cause the enemy to stop, withdraw, and regroup. My successor would know better than I, but I don't think we ever did that again at least to that degree, and it saddened me that we didn't. And eventually the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao took over Laos.

*Q: Did the Embassy recommend other strikes that were turned down by Washington?*

DWORKEN: During my time I don't recall that, but I can recall successful Congressional efforts to set financial limits on the amount of aid that could be provided to Laos and to bar U.S. military or paramilitary activity there. It was very clear Congress would not provide funds for that kind of military activity to that degree in the future. So in a sense, like I mentioned before in Vietnam, we let some people down. We did receive a significant number of refugees, and Vang Pao and many of his people are in the United States now.

*Q: Continuing and moving toward the conclusion of your assignment to Vientiane from 1971 to 1973.*

DWORKEN: The only other thing I wanted to mention, and I'm not sure of the timing, concerned Mac Godley, the ambassador whom I had great respect for both as a person and as a professional Foreign Service Officer, and who I thought was first rate. I was very pleased when he was nominated by the President to become Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. I thought that was a fitting end to his tour of duty in Laos. But that became one of the few times, if ever, that the Senate voted to disapprove the nomination of a professional FSO at the assistant secretary level. It did so in large

measure as a reflection of their unhappiness with the whole war in Indochina and particularly with the war in Laos. I think in part they weren't happy with the secrecy of the effort, but in large measure, it seemed that they were unhappy with the zeal with which Ambassador Godley had carried out the instructions of our government. The involvement and engagement that I described to you earlier, that I found so positive in his leadership of the country team operations group, seemed to be a giant negative in the view of the Senate Foreign Relation Committee. 'Do whatever, but never perform such activities with visible zeal, for it might be held against you,' was the lesson that seemed to come out of that event. He would go on to become an ambassador again, this time to Lebanon, but I think the rejection was a great discouragement to him and to those of us who had worked for him. Enough said.

*Q: Where did you go next when you left Laos in 1973, and how did that assignment come about?*

DWORKEN: While I was in Indochina, I met a fellow named Tom Pickering who was a deputy in the Political-Military Directorate (as I think it was called then) of the State Department in Washington. He made trips to Vietnam and Laos as part of the Vietnamization Program of the U.S. government, involving the turning over of equipment to and the training of the Vietnamese so they could stand on their own, or so we hoped. Those programs were called "Enhance" and "Enhance Plus." I met him on one of his trips, and he asked me to come back and work for the Director of Political-Military Affairs. I agreed to do so.

There were different terms for the entity, because at one point it had been an office under the undersecretary for political affairs, then it became a directorate, and eventually it became a bureau; it became a bureau headed by a director and then a bureau headed by an assistant secretary, once that was approved by Congress. I came back to be the entity's staff aide, the lowest-ranking person in the front office, a paper- and task-pusher. Whenever anybody saw me coming, they knew it wasn't good news, either something done unsatisfactorily or some new task to perform.

*Q: Or both. (Laughter)*

DWORKEN: Or both, all at the same time. Seymour Weiss was the head, and there were other deputies, namely, Leon Sloss in the arms control and disarmament area, Tom Stern in the more classic regional affairs area, and Tom Pickering, who as principal deputy watched over all of that.

That was the time of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the setting up of the air bridge to provide American military supplies and material support to Israel. That meant negotiating with the many countries along that route from whom we needed overflight and landing clearances, and negotiating with our allies for the removal of equipment that was stockpiled in various places. That was a good introduction to the political-military track that I had identified for myself from my earlier jobs.

*Q: It was also your first Washington assignment, so it was a good way to learn about overall workings of the Department, the role of the 7<sup>th</sup> Floor, and so on.*

DWORKEN: Exactly that. It became clear to me very early on. I was first the PM staff aide and David Passage was the special assistant; then David moved to one of the offices in the Bureau, International Security Operations, and I moved up to be special assistant. I discovered at that time and in the little bit of internal State Department training I had before I actually took over as special assistant, that there is a network of special assistants throughout the building and frankly throughout Washington. And as far as we were concerned, we ‘ran’ the government, because our bosses were all overworked, and there was no way they could pay attention to everything they needed to pay attention to. We were the filters through which most things got to them and the gatekeepers in many respects for proposals, ideas, paper, and people. I know bosses don’t like to be controlled by their assistants, but there was clearly a network of assistants that was at work.

One of the things that David Passage arranged when I first came to the PM Directorate was for me to start work in the Executive Secretariat.

*Q: Of the Department?*

DWORKEN: Yes. It was an informal arrangement that PM had with what was then called S/S, the secretariat in the Secretary’s office. I worked a week and a half or two weeks in the operations center, where I stood watches and got a feel for how that activity worked, the pulse and routine of it. Then I worked on the ‘line,’ the staff secretariat, where they moved paper in both directions, upward with recommendations and downward with directions, guidance, and decisions. And I had a lot of interaction when I was staff aide and then special assistant with all those same people, including the deputy executive secretaries who were in the front office of the Executive Secretary.

*Q: How long did you spend on the line in S/S?*

DWORKEN: I think all totaled, in the Ops Center and on the line, it was about a month. It was not a full tour by any stretch of the imagination, but I recall having a full week on the line during which they were preparing for a trip by the Secretary, so I learned all of that from the receiving end, if you will, before I then went into the Bureau and became one of the senders.

*Q: It’s an interesting idea; I don’t think I realized that that was done. I’ve done that kind of work on trips, but I never worked at all on the 7<sup>th</sup> Floor in any capacity.*

DWORKEN: It was tremendously useful familiarization. And of course I had never worked in the Department at all, so it was great that Pickering and Passage came up with this little on-the-job training so that when I came to PM, I felt prepared. I did not feel prepared at all for the many arcane bits and pieces of Political-Military Affairs substance, however. I had a sense of security systems, and I had a sense of, obviously from my time in Laos and Vietnam, of military activities and the diplomatic and political connectors. I



did not have much of an idea of the arcana of arms control, disarmament, and verification, nor had I much knowledge at that time about policy planning or strategic approaches. I did not know any of the more detailed matters related to security assistance or munitions control activities, all of which were in the political-military cluster at the time. I got a lot of that later, though.

*Q: Lots of Foreign Service people in this Oral History Program talked about their experiences as Staff Aide. I don't know if there's anything more you particularly want to say about that, or we could move on to your next assignment also in the Political-Military Bureau.*

DWORKEN: Well, the only thing I will mention is that both with Sey Weiss and with his successor, George Vest, I learned how important their access was to the principal officers of the Department. I saw that there were times when Sey Weiss, especially, was tremendously frustrated both by his inability to get Henry Kissinger's attention or to influence regional bureau assistant secretaries. That won't be new to anyone who reads this, but it was my first lesson in that. I can cite examples, but I don't think there is any need to, it's manifestly clear even today.

After about a year in the front office at PM, I again followed David Passage down into the office of International Security Operations, which was headed by a civil servant, Jock Stoddart, and his deputy, a Navy captain named Jack Dewinter. That office was involved in the political and diplomatic aspects of U.S. military operations and activities around the world. This was a seminal job for me, and it turned out to be a topic that kept me occupied for much of the rest of my career. I was fascinated by it and convinced of the importance of both (a) getting it right and (b) encouraging as much as possible the meshing of military, diplomatic, and political activities together in the belief that it was best for the U.S. government and best for the United States overseas.

This particular job was to be the person who connected to the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Bureau. But there weren't enough of us, so we each had one regional bureau and also had another area. I had the Indian Ocean region and the parts of the Middle East that the waters of the Indian Ocean washed as well as the eastern parts of Africa and parts of what is now the South and Central Asian Bureau. I became in effect the Diego Garcia Desk Officer and built up my expertise on that British island in the middle of the northern Indian Ocean, a small part of the Chagos Archipelago.

*Q: Did you ever go there?*

DWORKEN: No. I had one opportunity to go, and I can't remember what came up, but I couldn't go. We would have had to fly via the base in Thailand, through which maritime patrol and supply aircraft flew westward. Another fellow went instead, which was unfortunate, but he brought me back a special T-shirt that I still have.

*Q: Be sure to get a postcard.*

DWORKEN: Yeah.

*Q: Okay, anything else you want to say about your assignment to ISO 1974 to 1975?*

DWORKEN: I should mention that Diego Garcia then was already occupied by the U.S. military with something called an austere military communications facility. My responsibility in the year-plus was to support legislation to upgrade it from austere to limited, to help get the diplomatic approvals from the British government, and to work both inside the Department and also on Capitol Hill with the authorizing and appropriating committees for military construction funds and the foreign affairs committees for their oversight of activities overseas. This was a many-faceted effort and one that put me in contact with a lot of people in several regional bureaus and with several in the Pentagon as well. The whole topic of operating rights, bases, and facilities and the negotiation for those rights that I pursued in the rest of my career had their start in PM/ISO at that time.

The office was also involved with negotiating agreements with the Russians on incidents at sea and another set of agreements on the stationing of nuclear weapons overseas. I also became familiar with those. I learned about multilateral diplomacy and all the questions related to the Indian Ocean zone of peace idea that involved the United Nations and various countries and peace movements. I also had responsibilities for base rights and facilities negotiations from the political-military aspect with respect to the Philippines, New Zealand, and Australia.

There was a lot of engagement with intelligence and research people with respect to the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and in parts of various littoral countries and Somalia. It was during my time in ISO that the United States decided for the first time, I think, to send an aircraft carrier battle group into the Persian Gulf. We participated in a lot of work on what was then called Southwest Asia (Iran and Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf). This was my first taste of strategic planning and its political-military underpinnings. All in all, it was quite an experience; and as I said, one that shaped where I was headed in the future.

*Q: Well, so far in terms of your career progression, there's much more continuity than one often finds. Okay, anything else you want to say about your assignment to the Political-Military Bureau in Washington.*

DWORKEN: No, I don't think so.

*Q: Where did you go from there, and how did that come about?*

DWORKEN: Well, it came about from another connection in the past, I guess. Monty Stearns was in the East Asia Bureau as one of the deputy assistant secretaries when I was in the Office of International Security Operations and involved in the pol-mil aspects of that bureau, so I saw him regularly. He asked me to come out to Greece where he had been assigned but hadn't yet gone.

*Q: What was his position in Athens?*

DWORKEN: In Athens, he went initially as DCM. I'm not absolutely certain whether he was sent out after Ambassador Tasca had left.

*Q: Wasn't it Kubisch?*

DWORKEN: Kubisch came later. It was Tasca who had been ambassador. Then there was a time when Monty was chargé, and there was some indication (an implied promise from Kissinger?) that he was going to be named ambassador, and then he wasn't.

*Q: He had the Greek language that he spoke from a previous assignment, didn't he?*

DWORKEN: He had fluent Greek, he had been there before, and he had established a range of relationships with many influential people.

*Q: Then Kubisch came.*

DWORKEN: Then Kubisch became ambassador.

*Q: I would recall that it was 1975.*

DWORKEN: Kubisch was there when I got there in the summer of 1976, but Monty's request for me to come started me into language training in 1975.

*Q: And you did a full year, 44 weeks of language training?*

DWORKEN: I can't remember exactly how long the course was under the famous Takis Sapountzis. That was quite a course, very intensive, a small group.

*Q: That was your first language training at FSI?*

DWORKEN: Yes, at the new FSI proper, though I had had Vietnamese at Arlington Towers, the FSI Vietnam Training Center over the garage. That was my second hard language, I guess is the best way to put it. I tested initially at two-plus, three-plus, and later advanced the spoken skill to three-plus. When I got to Athens, I was minimally professionally fluent in a hard language, which was good.

The other good thing out of that was that, during the course of the language training, I quit smoking, which was a great trial. At least one of the other students (Carl Sharek of USIA) was a smoker, and my instructor was a smoker, but after a while they would go outside the class, so I was able to get through.

I learned a lot about Greek culture as well, some of it applicable when I got there and some not.

*Q: You went to be special assistant for political-military affairs at the Embassy in Athens, which was exactly the same title you had in Laos, but I'm sure the responsibilities and the challenges were very different.*

*Today's the 25<sup>th</sup> of April, 2008. Why don't you first say a word or two about the position in the embassy, who you reported to, and then maybe talk a little bit about the broad context in which you found yourself when you got to Athens in 1976?*

DWORKEN: That's right, the winter of 1976 -- a depressing time, since it was the one-year anniversary of the killing of the CIA station chief, Dick Welch, by the indigenous terrorist group called November 17.

The position was directly subordinate to the front office. I was outside the other sections of the embassy, located directly across the hall from DCM Monteagle Stearns, who was my immediate supervisor. The tradition of having this political-military office separate from the political section, outside the various military offices that were associated with or part of the embassy, and working directly for the front office was not one that started with my incumbency, but went back a while. At an earlier time, it had been a counselor-level job, but was no longer. When I arrived, it was a fairly junior one. This was my third assignment overseas, and I had been in the Service less than 10 years at that time.

The responsibilities of the office were arguably part of the Greek and American governments' interaction daily and had tremendous salience for the Greek-American relationship, so it's understandable that the front office, the DCM and the ambassador, wanted to have direct and immediate contact with it. From time to time when I was in the office, I did have another officer work for me at least part time, covering some routine parts of the work, but essentially I was alone in the office. I had no secretarial help, so I had to go on bended knee to the DCM's secretary or the ambassador's secretary or into the political section to find assistance of a clerical nature, to get my phone answered when I wasn't in the office, and to get substitute officers to stand in for me when I was not in the embassy.

*Q: And you were interacting outside the embassy on a constant basis with the U.S. military in Greece, so how did you do that? Did you do it with everybody, or was there a point of contact established by the military command structure?*

DWORKEN: It depended on the subject matter, frankly. There was a joint U.S. military assistance group in Greece, a JUSMAG, and there was a two-star Army general who was in charge of that. He was the senior military officer, ran a large organization that had been in Greece for years, and was a senior advisor to the ambassador and DCM on a whole range of military matters. There was also a Defense Attaché Office that had the more traditional attaché-type responsibilities; however, in Greece one always had to add an extra increment of non-traditional activity, and there was that as well.

In addition, there were U.S. forces in Greece. In the Athens metropolitan area, the 7602nd Airbase Group and its commander were at Hellenikon, on a military base alongside the major civilian airport. There were other American base commanders at Iraklion and Souda on Crete, and in Marathon at Nea Makri. I had contacts with that whole range of Americans. I had more contacts with Americans probably than with Greek officers and officials. I had little direct contact with the Greek military, except in the context of the base negotiations, which involved significant contacts with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense officers, and then to a lesser degree diplomats from the more traditional Americas Desk and Directors General on various matters.

I guess that describes it. I didn't necessarily go through any one in particular. I could deal on my own and did so with the Chief of the MAAG and his senior officers, with the Defense Attaché and the various service attachés and directly with the airbase group commander and his staff, or with the naval communications station personnel at Nea Makri, and the heads of the other two major bases as well.

*Q: The latter two being on Crete, which of course was located some distance away.*

DWORKEN: The head of the airbase group, a USAF colonel, had a different set of military chain of command bosses than the chief of the MAG did. The colonel at the airbase had certain views of his areas of responsibility, which easily could overlap and conflict with the two-star general who had a different set of military bosses and was also more directly responsive to the ambassador. They were both members of the large country team, as was the Defense Attaché. I saw them all on a regular basis.

*Q: As were you?*

DWORKEN: As was I, correct. That was another advantage of being in this separate office, working for the front office. It was actually set up for bureaucratic conflict, with separate military bosses, civilian bosses, and sometimes both for the same person at different times, wearing different hats. The chief of the MAG wore several hats; some had him responding to the ambassador, some to the Secretary of Defense, some to the regional military commander in Germany. There was also a range of relationships with other service-specific or activity-specific military commands in the European or Mediterranean region, all of which made the structure fraught with conflict.

*Q: Checks and balances?*

DWORKEN: Yes, and thereby a significant advantage if people could work together and get along. To a large measure, people did, even though they may have seen a particular piece of the relationship pie at different angles, different advantages and disadvantages, but involving the same course of action.

*Q: Not to oversimplify too much, but I assume that in terms of the substantive part of your job, the content, there were probably two main areas: one was dealing with problems, issues that had a political content that had the potential for being damaging in*

*terms of relations between the United States and Greece, and the other probably more in terms of the context, the negotiating of a new framework or changes in the arrangements that existed. Is that a fair characterization of the job and if so, maybe we could dispense with the first the problems, the flash fires, rather quickly and move on to the second?*

DWORKEN: That's fair in part, but it leaves out some of the additional complexities, because there was not only a range of things connected to the bilateral relationship, there was also a range of multilateral issues centered around NATO and also the Western European Union.

*Q: Particularly with regard to Turkey?*

DWORKEN: Yes, but also including Cyprus and southern Balkan neighbors of northern Greece, not to mention the presence of the Russians in the waters around Greece. So, there were those complexities. I think you are right to separate it out, certainly in the bilateral relationship.

The base negotiations for me loomed larger, because of an agreement Kissinger and Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios had reached the spring before I arrived that summer; we can go into that in more detail if you like. There was also a whole range of more than just housekeeping issues; I don't want to diminish this. There were thousands of American military, some permanently stationed in Greece at any one of those four major facilities I mentioned. But there were also a dozen communication sites and other facilities around the country, plus there was a steady flow, when the political situation allowed for it, of exercising troops, overflying air forces, visiting ships, and transiting flights that especially involved Hellenikon. There were also reconnaissance flights based out of Hellenikon on a daily or weekly basis and activities involving the British sovereign base areas on Cyprus.

There were frequently issues related to activities ranging from sensitive flight clearances to the most mundane rules for a member of the force or the civilian component to drive an automobile and have it protected from domestic terrorists.

*Q: Not to mention abuses of the Status of Forces Agreement...*

DWORKEN: Taxes, import fees, and reselling things without paying those fees on the market, for example.

*Q: Well, if we make it too complicated, it sounds kind of mind-boggling, so why don't we kind of hone in on one of these areas? Let's talk about the setting in which you found yourself in the summer of 1976, the last year of the Ford Administration. You mentioned there had been important Foreign Minister-level discussions that preceded your visit there that kind of set the stage. Do you want to talk some about that to start with and then maybe we can move back to some of these other things a little bit later?*

DWORKEN: Okay. That makes sense, because it was really the central task that I was given by the Ambassador and DCM, to be in charge of the base negotiations working group. The senior Washington-based person in the group was Don Majors from DOD/ISA, who was an Air Force colonel, later retired and rehired as a Defense Department civilian.

*Q: Continued to do his job?*

DWORKEN: To do the same job and exactly the same work. He was the International Security Affairs person in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who followed military/political matters in that part of the world and therefore he was involved in the Turkish base negotiations, too, which were going on at the same time as Greek base negotiations. He was also involved in defense activities in the Mediterranean and in the southern Balkans and in Cyprus as well, so his fingerprints were on a lot. There was also a military lawyer on the team, if not two, and a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then there were people added and subtracted from time to time. But along with me, we were the core of the working group.

*Q: There was no State Department-based representative on the working group?*

DWORKEN: That's right, although from time to time a member of the Southern European Affairs Office (EUR/SE) and a lawyer from the State Department political-military legal office (L/PM) and possibly at one point the PM Bureau itself had sent someone out. The Defense Department representatives from Washington always outnumbered State Department representatives, and I think we never had more than one State Department representative at any one time. And of course, I was not a State Department representative so much as I was the ambassador and DCM's representative and the chair of the working group. The ambassador was head of delegation. We can go into that one later.

*Q: Yes, let's do that. Let me ask you about the working group. You were the chair of the U.S. working group, or was this a bi-national?*

DWORKEN: I was the chair of the U.S. side of the working group.

*Q: Okay, in other words there was a Greek counterpart?*

DWORKEN: There was a Greek counterpart by the name of Christos Macheritsas.

*Q: From the Ministry of?*

DWORKEN: He was a lawyer by training from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was a career officer, now deceased. He had been doing essentially legal affairs, but he also had a known political loyalty to the New Democracy party. It had come to power with the return of democracy in 1974, the fall of the junta, and the bringing back of Karamanlis to

be the Prime Minister. It was that return and Karamanlis's call for a renegotiation of the whole political-military relationship that in essence set things in motion.

*Q: With the United States?*

DWORKEN: Yes, and with NATO. The withdrawal of Greece from what was called the military wing -- or military leg, arm, or side, depending on whose terminology you use -- of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Those two steps: calling into question the whole legal underpinning for our military presence in Greece, our military relationship with and our bilateral usage of Greek territory and facilities, Greek bases, for allied military purposes. On the face of it, this was because the United States had to one degree or another supported the military dictatorship during the time that he was in exile. So he set in motion a renegotiation of a new set of documents to capture a new relationship; it wasn't that he wanted no relationship, he just wanted one that, frankly, was not only more modern but demonstrated to all concerned, both domestic and foreign, that Greece was in fact a true and sovereign democratic nation.

He sought to control what NATO might seek to do in and from a given facility, how it related to what Turkey (also a member of NATO and a direct neighbor of Greece) might seek to do as a potential aggressor against Greece and antagonistic toward Greece. The Greeks were concerned about how Turkey might take advantage of a particular facility or operating right or activity that America might be performing in Greece or Hungary, for example, and then lastly, there was a certain competitive interaction between the two base negotiations. There was a whole different dynamic in Turkey, as we negotiated with them, and the fact of the matter is that if you looked at it from the outside, you would see there were two base negotiations going on at the same time with some of the same Americans involved in both. The Turkish and Greek negotiators wanted intensely to know what each other was agreeing to with the Americans, so there was that dynamic in play as well. Early in 1976, this dynamic became very public very quickly, when an agreement was announced between the United States and Turkey while the U.S.-Greek negotiations were still mired in all kinds of minutiae and detail and really hadn't made much progress at all.

*Q: And that was before you came to Athens?*

DWORKEN: Exactly. And that Greek diplomatic explosion, if you will, at not only a solution to the U.S. military relationship with Turkey, but the development of a new form of agreement, all became an issue. The Turkish agreement included not only defense cooperation but also economic cooperation. 'Economic' was in terms of provisions for Turkish defense industries and American defense industries to interrelate in any joint venture in a much more fruitful way. There was also the provision of a significant amount of economic support funds and an agreed specific amount of military assistance, both grant and credit facilities, FMS and MAP I think they were called at the time, Military Assistance Program grant funds or Foreign Military Sales credits and guarantees. And it was that \$1 billion of military aid that was contained in the U.S.-Turkish agreement over



the course of the four years of initial validity that set off a firestorm in the U.S.-Greek relationship in the early part of 1976 continuing into the spring.

*Q: And led to?*

DWORKEN: And led to what was called the Framework Agreement. But before that could be accomplished, there were high-level talks between Assistant Secretary Arthur Hartman and I'm not sure whom. His counterpart was somebody subordinate to Dimitrios Bitsios who was the Greek Foreign Minister at the time. They did preparatory work both in Athens and in Washington.

*Q: I want to say it was John Tzounis, who I think at the time was ...*

DWORKEN: ...the Director General of Political Affairs. Under John Tzounis was not only the American affairs section of the Foreign Ministry but also the Turkey, Cyprus, and NATO sections that covered all of the issues related to Turkey and Greece, including Aegean sea and air space and the conflicts over Cyprus. I believe all of that was under his position, so that would make sense.

Eventually there was a very short text agreed with some gaps in it, and one of the main gaps was filling in a dollar amount for four years' worth of assistance to Greece. At the time, I think I must have been pulled out of Greek language class to help on the margins of the Hartman-Bitsios talks in Washington, preparatory to Bitsios going to see Kissinger, and then I helped afterwards to incorporate the agreed language into the document. I can remember working on the press release containing this less-than-a-page document called the Framework Agreement, the *plaisio* in Greek. It decreed that there could be no more American bases in Greece, which on the face of it was quite a shocking statement; in fact, it was a reflection of that assertion of sovereignty that I mentioned earlier. There would be granted, by Greece, facilities for the Americans to have on Greek bases, and those facilities could take the form of something concrete like a building or a runway, or an operating right or an overflight, but nonetheless all Greek in authorization. It would all be under a Greek base commander, and a Greek flag would be flown on each of the bases; those symbols were extremely important to the Karamanlis government.

My understanding was that these points had been, for the most part, negotiated beforehand. They were in line with what the U. S. government was prepared to do, so they were not revolutionary, but of course, Greeks and Americans hadn't seen any outcome from previous U.S.-Greek base negotiations, so this was all quite new. That still left the negotiation of the dollar amount. I can recall being told there had been a lot of work done, and I saw evidence of it afterwards. The two sides had estimated and projected what would be Greek defense needs and what portion of those ought to be met by the U.S. government. There never was any question that there would be military assistance from the United States to Greece, although there was a question about economic funds, because Turkey was in much more dire economic straits than Greece was. Turkey was much farther from membership in the EU (and still is), and Greece was intensely negotiating that relationship at the time.

*Q: Still, Greece had been through the junta military period, and was only two years out of that.*

DWORKEN: That's true, and there was a clear need for aid. The junta had mismanaged a whole range of things, the economy, government, and military affairs being three of the primary ones, and there was a lot of negative impact on Greece in the short term. But it was clear Greece was going to be coming out of this economic unhappiness; nonetheless there was economic money included in their overall agreement. I don't think it was in the Framework Agreement. Nonetheless, this estimate of what was projected for military aid was pretty much in line with figures that had already been in existence and estimates that had been programmed that had already been done by our military in conjunction with the Greek military.

The \$1 billion for four years for Turkey was also justifiable in terms of defense needs and projections of past and future requirements. Nonetheless the \$1 billion was a big number, so big it just captured every headline and everybody's attention, so all that other stuff I mentioned before, except the fact that the bases would be Greek, was essentially ignored, while everyone focused on the aid number. The number for Greece was something Kissinger and Bitsios were clearly going to decide themselves; staff work at whatever senior level wasn't going to make it happen. My understanding is that the Greeks came not only with their draft text of the Framework Agreement but also with a suggested number. Their number was \$800 million; Kissinger offered \$600 million, and they split the difference. The result was a perhaps overgenerous approximation for Greece, but nevertheless, thus was born a \$700 million to \$1 billion or 7 to 10 ratio that, as you know, lived well beyond the first four years of the two agreements.

*Q: Does it still live today?*

DWORKEN: In some people's minds, although not as intact. It was hard and concrete for a matter of moments in 1976, and it bedeviled not only the two relationships or the trilateral relationship, but it also bedeviled the American government's relationship with Congress, with the authorizing and appropriating committees, with particular Senators and Congressmen, and with parts of the Greek and Turkish governments who adopted it as a God-given right and entitlement that no one could ever, for whatever logical reason, trifle with. It came to symbolize much: not to go into too much detail, but there is at least a page and a half in a Congressional staff report that enshrines that ratio as the sole indicator of the bounds necessary to be maintained between Greece and Turkey so that war would not break out between those two allied yet conflicting neighbors. It was an important agreement that Kissinger reached.

*Q: It really was important and very appropriate, too, that you brought some light on how that developed and its significance. Why don't we move back to your role in the working group to implement the Framework Agreement on the military facility side? We'll pick the story up when you got to Greece, which was a few months after this had happened.*

DWORKEN: The agreement was in April 1976, and I got there in the summer. After the Framework Agreement, it was clear that there needed to be a complex of documents reached with Greece that were equivalent to the Turkish Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) package.

*Q: The Turkish Agreement was much more elaborate and detailed than the one-page Bitsios-Kissinger agreement?*

DWORKEN: In fact, there was quite an elaborate set of Turkish documents and that was the format we used. We would have intense meetings in Athens at the working group level and perhaps one or two plenary sessions in Athens where heads of the U.S. and Greek delegations...

*Q: Meaning the ambassador and ...?*

DWORKEN: Our ambassador and his Greek counterpart, a fellow named Kalogeras.

*Q: And your ambassador in the summer of 1976 was?*

DWORKEN: Jack Kubisch. So there would be that and there would be additional working group meetings, another round would perhaps be in Washington at the working group level and some Greeks at the working group level would travel to Washington. I would go to Washington as well. It would be a much larger State Department and Defense Department panoply of people for those, because they took place in Washington.

*Q: But you would still be the co-chair of it?*

DWORKEN: Yes. The bulk of the working group meetings were, however, held in Athens. It was, I think, wisely structured that way.

The dynamic of the working group was that it was very hard to get it to have results in Washington and it was very hard to do that in Athens either, if the base commanders on the American side and the other U.S. military people in the embassy were allowed to have anything to do with the base negotiations. This was because, not unsurprisingly, each base commander had at least a dozen 'pet rocks' of things that either needed to be safeguarded and couldn't possibly be negotiated, or things that needed to be obtained in the negotiations or American national interests would in their view be completely destroyed. And there were all these zero-sum equations that were always floating around and arguably people closest to the matters at issue were the hardest to have at the table.

There was an equivalent problem on the Greek side. The Greeks did not want senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs people present, nor did they want anyone from the Prime Minister's office and definitely not the Greek base commander or the Greek military, except for those who were already part of the small working group and therefore able to contemplate actually reaching an agreement with the Americans. There was still an antagonism on the part of Greeks that needed to be overcome.

There were internal governmental politics on both sides, and we found that the only solution was to keep politics as much as possible out of the working group and to keep the people who represented these various factions on both sides away as well. And that extended outside Greece for the Americans; it extended to the military chain of command, to the regional bosses of each of the U.S. base commanders, and to the Navy, the Air Force and the Army which ran the various bits and pieces of the U.S. military presence in Greece, and to their immediate bosses in Washington as well.

It quickly became apparent that Don Majors was quite skilled at maneuvering through this Washington thicket, so much so that when he came out to Athens with the Washington team and negotiated various matters, he structured the reporting. I may have done much of the reporting, but I followed structures that Don Majors set up. When I raised issues that he believed ought not to be flagged to Washington, they would come out of the reporting cable. He might carry them back with him in his own private notes to resolve somewhere in Washington, but they would not be in the official reporting cable, just to mention one little dynamic.

The other dynamic, which most impressed me, was the ability of this small Defense team to write its own instructions, and I mean U.S. government instructions, because they had to be cleared by State and cleared usually by an NSC staff member as well. They would then be sent out to Athens either just before the team arrived or just as they arrived. It was the pressure of the next round and the imminent arrival of the Washington team that got these instructions released from Washington, and they would all come in a flood to Athens. This team would then, in league with me and a couple of others, implement those instructions, would write the reports and seek new guidance from Washington. That Washington team would then go back to Washington and give new guidance on the stuff they had just sent back to Washington.

It was sometimes a wonder to behold. And if anyone goes back into it in that much detail, I'm sure the record will show it was a very masterful set of hands at work. But it seemed to be as the senior people wanted, and the end point was to be an agreement that met basic American national security interests and actually basic American national interests, because the relationship with Greece was that important.

*Q: Always being mindful that whatever was agreed with Greece became a model or checkpoint, if you will, for whatever was going on with Turkey.*

DWORKEN: Exactly. And even more broadly. The model was composed of an umbrella agreement, a separate agreement for status of forces and for each category of military facility and military activity, all elaborated, plus a defense industrial annex because of this new economic portion to the agreement, plus military aid and assistance in sufficient number and scope and so on. Not only was it a Greece-Turkey dynamic with each setting the model for the other, but also, since it contained this multi-year assistance commitment, the document no longer was simply an executive agreement in American terms. It needed to have monies authorized and appropriated by both Houses of Congress,

by appropriators as well as authorizers, and not just Defense but also Foreign Affairs committee people. Congress normally does not make a multi-year commitment; it certainly didn't at that time, although now I gather there are more creative ways to go about authorizations.

This was totally new. It was not a treaty, it was an executive agreement with a well-established Congressional path. It contained a multi-year assistance commitment that required an authorization and an appropriation, which in turn would live for the four-year period of the financial commitment. Otherwise, neither the Turkish nor the Greek governments would in fact ratify it on their side. While the American government treated it as an executive agreement -- not in itself requiring ratification just informing of the Congress under the Case Act -- both Turkey and Greece saw it, if you will, as the ultimate, and therefore it was in their terms (each different of course) to be dealt with as if it were a treaty.

*Q: Anything else about the agreement?*

DWORKEN: Yes. I did leave one thing out of this Kissinger-Bitsios agreement by focusing too much on the military and aid aspects. There was also an implied U.S. security commitment in the Kissinger-Bitsios agreement.

It was not in any sense of the word a complete and explicit one, as in the North Atlantic Treaty that we were all signatories of. Greece had not renounced the treaty when it had taken itself out of the military structure of NATO. This was the commitment that overrode everything else. However, there was (and to some degree, still is) enough tension between Greece and Turkey for Greece to believe there were threats that it needed the United States to acknowledge and potentially take action about. So there was an implied commitment not only to maintain the military balance in the region to that 7 to 10 ratio but also to safeguard Greece. It was implied so as not to insult the Turks or upset the North Atlantic Treaty arrangements that were already in effect; that implication was an additional reason why both our House and Senate needed to be fully involved in the approval of the agreement. And that also meant, finally, that Turkey and Greece, were aware of the dynamics in our own Congress and in fact the dynamics inside our own government. They knew that the administration not only preferred, but was probably obliged, to have both agreements in hand or at the same stage of agreement before seizing the U.S. Congress formally with the need to authorize the monies for both.

*Q: Maybe we should note here that in this period, in 1976, because of the events of Cyprus there was a Congressionally imposed or mandated embargo on security assistance to Turkey, and that Turkey very much wanted to have Congress approve and implement the \$1 billion four-year commitment. This was seen, I think, at the time as a way of getting beyond the embargo and getting committed to security assistance. Greece wanted the \$700 million but also, it realized that if both agreements were implemented, the military assistance from the United States would begin flowing to Turkey again and they obviously...?*

DWORKEN: ...didn't want that to happen. It would raise potential threat scenarios against Greece that they didn't want to contemplate. I don't think they firmly and fixedly focused on the fact that they had control over, or an element of control over when the Administration would take the Turkish DECA to Congress to get that \$1 billion embargo-breaking assistance started, but it's clear even to a dull-witted officer like yours truly that this was one of their motivations. It was also clear, very shortly into the process, that we could mine away all we wanted to at the various seams of potential agreement on a particular operating right or a particular facility, but that at a more senior level in the Greek government, they were going to go very, very slowly. They knew that every explainable slowness on their part, from a substantive point of view, also had the added effect of retarding assistance to Turkey. And like many things Greek-Turkish, that was a zero-sum game in their eyes as well.

*Q: Let me back up for a minute and ask you about something you alluded to before, and maybe this is the time to talk about it a little bit, or you may want to wait until later. You had pointed out that Ambassador Kubisch was the head of the United States side of the negotiation, and you were the head of, in effect, the working-level group on the U.S. side. In lots of other instances and later cases and in Greece as well, a special negotiator was dispatched from Washington rather than the Chief of Mission present in the capital, do you have any discussion about that, about why that was done at the time?*

DWORKEN: There was a lot of discussion about it. It's something I noted when I looked at other oral history interviews, that figured in other base negotiations as well. It's one of those things, I think, coming from my political-military background, that I had accepted in my own mind the idea that these negotiations ought to be done by outsiders, by special negotiators who were Washington driven, Washington supported, and Washington governed, if you will. Because that way, the global aspects that we talked about, this interplay of how what we agree with one country finds itself suddenly in another base negotiations, because we just agreed to it with one country. And there's simply too much for any one country team, which is by definition more parochially oriented, to be aware of. So I came to the embassy in Athens with that viewpoint, which I of course immediately changed when I discovered that the embassy was of a different mind. I also had a different role to play at that point, to represent that embassy's point of view, given the composition of the little working group.

Jack Kubisch had a fascinating view, in my mind, because he was conflicted. Let me explain. He argued against having the negotiator role assigned to the American ambassador in any given country. He said that one could foresee crunch points in negotiations. When the two heads of delegation were in the foreign capital, he envisioned, for example, a moment when the Greek head of delegation, a senior official but not with ministerial rank, and the American ambassador as head of the American delegation could be in a situation that did not reflect the actual authorities of the two. If things ever came to the point where the USG needed to apply pressure to influence the senior-most levels of the Greek government to accept an American position, then the situation would be unbalanced..

To put it another way, picture that there's the personal representative of the U.S. President seated on a small chair alongside his counterpart in the negotiations, a senior official of the other government, but both subordinate in appearance to that foreign government's cabinet minister, prime minister, or president whom they are meeting with. Jack Kubisch did not want to subject himself or the USG to that, and yet he knew that given all the issues that we were negotiating about, that this negotiation was central to the future of the whole relationship that he was charged by the President with making come out right. Therefore, he was not about to allow an outside-based special negotiator to have this negotiation off on the side somewhere. It was so central to his responsibilities that he knew he had to lead and direct it. In addition, as I think I mentioned to you earlier, he was very much a detail person, so he was involved in the details of these negotiations. I can still remember his blue felt tip pen markings on drafts of particular negotiation reports and recommendations for the positions the U.S. government should take in a succeeding round of negotiations and so on; he was very aware of what was going on.

So he squared the circle by saying he would be the head of delegation, but his DCM would be the day-to-day equivalent to the Greek senior official who headed their delegation. Thus, if that scenario I described earlier ever happened, and the two sides had to go to the Prime Minister to get a particular position resolved, it would be the DCM that would be sitting next to that Greek senior official. Jack Kubisch as the President's personal representative would swoop in from the side and influence the Prime Minister to tell that cabinet minister what the American side really needed to have done. It was an interesting way of putting the two things together.

*Q: But to me it is also interesting, what you say about Ambassador Kubisch's very detailed interest in the substance, the progress of the negotiations, that he was very much engaged, even with the DCM, Monty Stearns, heading the delegation. He wasn't just kind of sitting back.*

DWORKEN: No, he wasn't at all. Now that is not to take anything away from Monty; he was in fact the person we went to as a small working group for guidance. It was Monty who approved most of the telegrams, except for the crucial ones. In, how shall I put this, the day-to-day workings, it was Monty who carried most of the senior water around inside the Greek government; I got to be note taker from time to time, but I was clearly at the working level. From my point of view, the Greeks I dealt with were more senior than I was. In their hierarchy, they had some weight; in our hierarchy, in terms of where I had just come from in the State Department, I didn't have much weight at all. I was like a desk officer, and they were much, much senior. So we relied, all of us did, including the Americans who were sent out from Washington, on Monty as the Number 2 in the embassy, clearly with the full faith and confidence of the ambassador, as the actual head of delegation. We relied on Monty to cut in at that level above the Greek side's working group but below the highest level.

*Q: How important was his prior experience in Greece, his knowledge of Greek? You know, he was really a Greek hand, an expert, in all of this. Did he use Greek in the meetings you were at with him or was it more his personal stature, position, background?*

DWORKEN: He was very well and favorably known. I don't recall a door not open to him, no matter how technical the issue might have been. And he had a way of capturing the Greek point of view and identifying the similarities and differences with the American position and fitting them together in ways that could be presented back to the Greeks as something that was clearly in their interest and clearly in ours, too. So he was able to identify mutual interests in a way that, had he not been so very well known and so experienced in Greece, I don't think he could have accomplished.

In addition, there were times when we prepared him, or he prepared himself, and he went and negotiated by himself without anyone from the working group along. And those one-on-one meetings with the head of the Greek delegation sometimes opened up whole new possibilities for resolving an issue of difference. That's both a plus and a minus. The plus was that we made progress at the time and moved ahead, the minus was that usually something was being compromised. So those whose 'pet rocks' were being compromised or dealt with, without their being present or without a report that they were confident fully reflected what had gone on inside that closed meeting, had concerns. There was some disgruntlement about what had transpired.

*Q: And that in turn led, presumably at the working group level, to efforts either to define it, refine it further or, I suppose, in some cases to roll back what had been...?*

DWORKEN: There was a little rolling back, yes. We talked about it later in terms of why the whole agreement didn't actually come to pass and why it would have to be dealt with in subsequent years. It's very clear to me that what in the final analysis was negotiated -- first by Monty and then by his successor, Hawk Mills, who as Chargé finally in mid-1977 initialed the umbrella agreement and some of the pieces that were under that umbrella -- contained more for the Greeks than the American government later was prepared to accept. [See also Hawthorne Mills' book, *The Time of My Life*.]

It's not that we initialed an agreement on our own. There was a firm and clear instruction from Washington to do it. Monty knew the range of possibility. He drove pieces of the negotiation inside that range to the point where we got agreement on some things, and then his successor finished that job, all under Washington's instructions. But there were specific arrangements related to specific facilities which were much more tolerant and sensitive to Greek concerns than under the earlier agreement regime. For example, there was the Greek concern that we were spying on Greece from an American military base on Crete, and the resultant issue of how one goes about demonstrating to the Greeks that that was not the case. Those new agreed arrangements were subsequently hauled back in by later American administrations. So, the Greeks had a better deal arguably, early on, than what finally came to pass. But that's a view from many years later.

*Q: Okay, well, I guess the question for me now is how best to move forward in our conversation. This is, you know, the time when we're having an election in the United States in November 1976; Carter is elected. Do you want to talk about maybe where things stood at the end of your first six month's efforts along these lines or maybe how*



*things looked when Carter came in in January 1977? What would make the most sense of where to go from here?*

DWORKEN: I think I can address that, but perhaps only generally. I can recall the shock of the Turkish Agreement before I got there and the ramifications of that. I can also recall the new Carter Administration sending out very senior emissaries to the region.

*Q: Very soon?*

DWORKEN: Very soon afterwards. Clark Clifford, I can't tell you when Clifford came...

*Q: I think it was before the end of February 1977.*

DWORKEN: Yeah, so that was within weeks of his taking power.

*Q: Well, it would have been within six weeks.*

DWORKEN: And setting in motion the things I talked about. Arguably the Greeks would have continued to seek their positions, and we probably would not have made as much progress in negotiations, if it had not been for a very high indication of interest on the part of the U.S. government in having these matters resolved. Also it became clear fairly early on that the Carter Administration wanted the embargo against Turkey lifted. That is probably too strong, but I believe they saw that it was not as productive as some arguably would have liked. In fact, they came to see it as counterproductive.

*Q: Another way to put it is that the Carter Administration, despite its initial leanings...*

DWORKEN: .True, because there was great joy in Greece.

*Q: And Cyprus?*

DWORKEN: And in Cyprus.

*Q: The church bells rang...?*

DWORKEN: Right.

*Q: ...At the election of Jimmy Carter. But after the Clifford mission, I think they saw a need to restore a healthy U.S. relationship with Turkey.*

DWORKEN: Fair enough.

*Q: Initially they saw the way to do that was by the implementation of the defense and economic cooperation agreement, the \$1 billion of assistance, to get that approved by*

*Congress, and at the same time to do something at the \$700 million level with Greece. To do that, they needed a full Greek agreement package.*

DWORKEN: They needed to get Greece caught up with where the Turkish agreement was.

*Q: And I think that was kind of the direction for much of 1977.*

DWORKEN: It's not that they lessened any of their attention or effort in terms of Cyprus.

*Q: No.*

DWORKEN: Because that focus persisted over time.

*Q: Very much so. But to make progress in Cyprus, they felt they needed to do these other things as well, at the same time, or perhaps prior to really being able to accomplish much in regard to Cyprus. That's how I remember it.*

DWORKEN: Yes, that's true.

*Q: It was only after a subsequent Carter Administration decision was taken in 1978 to seek the Congressional lifting of the embargo that they really focused on the embargo as opposed to using an indirect way. Looking at your notes, why don't you talk about what you want to talk about now, and I'll stop talking about what I remember.*

DWORKEN: Well, it's important if you remind me of these things, because there was a series of high-level visits from Washington to the region. People charged ahead either with a focus on Cyprus matters or on finding a way through the complex of American-Greek, American-Turkish, Turkish-NATO, and Greek-NATO issues, some of which I mentioned earlier, which frankly bedeviled the relationship. I can't remember a week ever going by when I didn't as a part of my political-military duties delve into that comparatively arcane subject matter.

I thought I was already in the arcane when I was dealing with some of the more detailed issues of immunities and privileges, taxes and charges and whatnot, for our military facilities. For all that, I had to learn much more about Greek domestic law than I ever thought I would have to pay attention to, including trying to assert our jurisdiction rights for military Americans who were involved in mostly minor traffic accidents.

Remarkably, some of these cases seemed to threaten the prospect of a break in our bilateral relationship. All these issues were vested with much apparent importance by the Greeks. They were intensely aware that there were elements of their sovereignty that, thanks to agreements made in the immediate aftermath of World War II and their own civil war, had been ceded under duress to the United States and the Alliance -- at least from their point of view, that's how it looked.

*Q: At this time that you were in the working group working out these new detailed provisions, implementing the Foreign Ministry-level Framework Agreement, what was governing the U.S. military in Greece? Were these old agreements still in force?*

DWORKEN: Yes. These other agreements dated back to the early and mid-1950s. They were done under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty but were very much reflective of a Greece coming out of not only World War II devastation but also that of the civil war that followed. They were very much reliant on American military and economic assistance -- for security purposes facing Soviet and Warsaw Pact threats, but also for a whole range of economic needs. So there was established in that period, not just for Greece but I would say for all the recipient European countries, something that looked in the 1970s to be unbalanced. The Americans had rights, privileges, and exemptions from Greek law. There was a bilateral status of forces agreement which took the NATO status of forces agreement and made it more in America's favor -- again this imbalance I'm talking about.

*Q: When was that?*

DWORKEN: I think it was 1956. Those documents were all still in force. When the working group first met, one of the things we did was determine that at least from the Greek side, they didn't know and couldn't find in their files all of the agreements that we Americans were asserting to them were in force and effect. So there was a great gathering of bits of paper and sharing between the two sides. The Americans had many more agreement texts with the Greeks than the current group seemed to be aware of.

*Q: That was partly because of the military government interlude?*

DWORKEN: Partly. I think in point of fact, things were agreed less than fully and formally. Something might have been agreed in the pre-junta time with a particular piece of the Greek government of the day and was never taken to their Parliament, but it had force and effect in Greek law, and it was flagged from time to time, but it was never fully informed and advertised throughout the whole government. So there were bits and pieces of that, and there was also the normal accumulation of ad hoc technical arrangements which either the Greek or American side had memorialized in one form or another, but that had never risen to the level of governments actually being aware of them. All of that needed to be sorted through.

In the midst of all of that, Greek relations with NATO were pretty awful, in large measure because of the triangular relationship with Turkey. And since NATO works on consensus, and NATO in many respects had programs and activities that it wanted to pursue with respect to Turkey, Greek officials found very quickly that they could interpose objections into those activities and tie NATO up into incredible knots. For example, there were disputes over funding for infrastructure projects, exercises, flight activities (or information about flight activities), or communication policy. It went to every extreme that you can imagine. At one point, I thought that mid-level officers in Greece who were assigned to NATO (which was definitely a ticket they needed to have

punched if they were going to move up in their own hierarchy), moved up quicker if they were able to point out that they had blocked something that Turkey was pursuing in NATO.

*Q: Stood up for Greek interests?*

DWORKEN: That's what they called it. There were some Turks that did the same, but it was essentially a Greek behavior that I was most aware of. And that just continued, so that succeeding SACEURs (Supreme Allied Commander Europe, an American four-star general or admiral) and others who were involved in senior positions in NATO, found themselves tied up in incredible knots. This was true whether they were on the southern flank of NATO and headquartered in Naples or living in Germany or Belgium. This was also the case within the political and foreign policy apparatus of NATO as well. It was always in a very arcane way, always involving something that needed footnote after footnote to demonstrate Greek independence from NATO or American pressure, but which also needed further explanations, because most people don't come in contact with those kinds of issues on a regular basis.

From my Athens vantage point, I learned more about the inner-workings of NATO, how the International Civil Aviation Organization regulates flight information on aircraft passing from region to region, the law of the sea, territorial seas, international waters and air space, and discontinuities between them during my time there than I had ever encountered before. I know other Americans who had the same experience. None of these issues was easy; all of them seemed to be tied up very artfully by antagonistic Greeks and Turks into incredible knots that it would always take someone senior to cut through.

*Q: So, were you the person, the officer in Embassy Athens who tried to do that on the multilateral side?*

DWORKEN: Yes, in the sense of trying to understand and to explain them to others in the embassy. I became a kind of resident expert. I remember a paper written for the IISS in London on the issues in the Aegean, NATO-related, bilateral, law of the sea, or whatever, which I found tremendously helpful. It was 75 or 80 pages with detailed footnotes that referred to treaties that went back into the mists of time. There was that whole congeries of issues that NATO had to worry about to some degree, which bedeviled the relationships between Greece and Turkey, but also relations with the United States, because they encapsulated aspects of that same threat situation that we talked about earlier, where Greece felt threatened by Turkey.

*Q: Just as an aside, when Clark Clifford prepared to undertake his mission very early in the Carter Administration, he came to the State Department for a series of briefings on every aspect that he would be getting into in the bilateral relationship with Greece and Turkey, the Cyprus issue, the Aegean, and all these issues you were just talking about. The young officer in our office together with, I think, an attorney from the legal advisor's office, who briefed Clark Clifford was a young officer named Ron Neumann, who has gone on to a lot of other things. He still remembers that now.*

DWORKEN: I don't see how it could be anything but burned into his brain; they're certainly still burned into mine. But you know, we smiled about it, and I knew to keep our own sanity, we made light of it during the time, but there were occasions when the two countries nearly came to blows over these issues. Where the operating rights that one or the other was asserting came down to whether pilots would fire weapons at each other over the Aegean. I guess it is natural, when there are conflicts of interest like that, that they test each other, so there were flights over territory and sailings into territorial waters. And there were military aircraft that were scrambled in response to information received or actual planes in the air, and there were questions about what was seen on radar screens. Plus, in the oil exploration area, there was a sailing of a seismic research ship.

*Q: But it was Turkish, wasn't it?*

DWORKEN: A Turkish ship by the name of "Sismik" -- an appropriate name.

I remember especially what Towny Friedman in the Embassy political section said about that aspect. We all recalled that there was an extensive oil field in Romania, called Ploesti, that was famous in World War II for having been bombed repeatedly. If one looks geologically at that area, you can't help but imagine there might well be south of that area -- since the same geologic characteristics apply -- somewhere in the Aegean, especially in the northern part, huge deposits of oil. This would raise concerns for Turkey and Greece. Towny Friedman was fond of saying that, so far as he could tell, given the behavior to date by Greeks and Turks, the only thing that he was able to say with any certainty was that there were vast deposits of national prestige under the bottom of the Aegean. There was an interest in exploring to see whether there was oil there, so the Turks put a ship in the international waters of the Aegean, but their definition of international waters was not what the Greeks would define as international waters. And there was also the question of whether they were going to perform seismic research by coming into physical contact with the bottom of the sea, which raised another set of law of the sea issues.

*Q: And all of this happened when you were in Athens in the 1976, maybe 1977, period?*

DWORKEN: Yes. While the base negotiations to put right the American political/military relationship were ongoing and the Turkish relationship was as we described it, there were many NATO concerns as well. The issues seemed usually to be started by the Turks in one form or another, but very quickly the Greeks reacted to assert their rights or to call attention to perceived injustices being done to them by the Turks. The Greeks would work to involve NATO and the United States in those issues. From the Greek point of view, it was to stop Turkey from doing things it shouldn't do or to get Turkey to undo what it had in Greece's view wrongly done earlier.

So there were always these issues -- one aspect or another and oftentimes several of them -- raised at the highest levels of the U.S. government. They came up at ministerial meetings every six months, summit meetings of NATO every year or two, and in all the

routine, periodic meetings that happen around those larger, more important meetings. They always colored what was on the agenda. It was very difficult, even if one could strip away much of the emotion and distrust from the Greek and Turkish positions; there wasn't any near-term prospect that we were going to find any one of those issues solved. So it became a multi-sided, Rubik's cube-like, management issue for the leaders of Turkey, Greece, and NATO, both civilian and military, as well as the leaders of the U.S.

I mention the NATO military, specifically because there were periodic efforts by senior NATO military officers, either in Naples or in other headquarters to resolve on a practical, rational, and reasonable basis, what could be termed military-technical issues. What quickly became apparent was that nothing was solely rational, reasonable, or military-technical. Nonetheless, it served American government purposes (and I think both Greek and Turkish government purposes at times) and it certainly served NATO purposes to try and find military-technical resolutions of what were fundamentally foreign policy and political problems of the first order. There was a lot of work done on that score by the SACEURs of that time and the commanders in chief of allied forces southern Europe in Naples. The names of Admiral Crowe, and Generals Haig and Rogers come to mind, plus that of a Colonel named Papageorge (Haig's assistant), who spent innumerable hours and eventually, I think in 1981, after my time in Greece but during my time as senior Greek Desk Officer the two years immediately following, put some solutions together.

*Q: Let me just mention two things. One, Townsend Friedman, who you quoted with regard to national prestige in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey, at the time wasn't he a political officer?*

DWORKEN: Yes, he was number three in the political section. George Barbis was the head of the section, Bill Shepherd was his deputy, with Towny, Greg Matson, and Terry Grant there as well.

*Q: Secondly, who was the officer covering the Middle East at that time? I'll think of his name later.*

*Let me ask you a question. These issues were of high importance to our government, to the Greek government, and certainly to the Turkish government as well, and there were a lot of things going on, you were busy all the time dealing with all these balls that were flying around, the Rubik's cube you mentioned. Did you have any time for any fun or could you relax? I think you met your wife somewhere along the line there?*

DWORKEN: Yes. That probably, all other things being equal, was one of the most significant things about Athens, other than the heavy amount of work.

And I did meet my wife, Anna Todd, at a diplomatic cocktail party there. The best diplomatic cocktail party I'd ever been to, even though I remember hardly anything of it, because I was so struck by her. The cocktail party was arranged by my part-time assistant,, Paul Redmond, who since has risen to great prominence in national security

affairs. At that time he assisted me in handling those day-to-day military problems, such as assertions of jurisdiction and military automobile traffic accident reports that required some knowledge of consular affairs but also involved embassy assertions of diplomatic immunities and privileges under the SOFA. As part of his job, he hosted consular officers from other embassies accredited to the government in Athens, and also included me as his boss.

Anna was the number two of a two-person embassy that New Zealand had in Athens. It was a regional embassy that covered all, I think, of the eastern Mediterranean, including Jordan and Cyprus, a total of seven countries, I think. She was deputy chief of mission, and many times chargé, since there were only the two officers. Later, when they got a trade commissioner, she was one of three. I found out later that we had actually shared a big circular table at an earlier British ambassador's function, but I hadn't noticed her at the time. I certainly did on this evening.

*Q: When was that?*

DWORKEN: We met in March of 1979.

*Q: Oh, so this was a little later, you had already been working hard for two years?*

DWORKEN: Yes.

*Q: Doing other things and not paying attention?*

DWORKEN: Almost three years.

*Q: She had to have been there all the time.*

DWORKEN: She got there in 1977, the year after I did. We had a very good relationship and really enjoyed Greece. We traveled in the Balkans together. Later we traveled overland through northern Greece and Thrace, across to Istanbul, to Ankara and Cappadocia, and then to the Aegean coast. We took a ferry to one of the Greek Islands, to Samos I think, and then another ferry back to Athens. This was in her car with Greek diplomatic plates on it. I remember thinking that we were going to be in trouble in Turkey, because I had taken on board so much of the Greek concerns, which some call paranoia, about Turkey. As it turned out, there were no problems as such, although we were followed at times, and Turkish hospitality was so overwhelming that we had a friendly, comfortable time in Turkey. Whenever I traveled in Greece and demonstrated the most rudimentary awareness of the Greek language -- and actually I had much more than a rudimentary awareness, but that's all I was going to demonstrate -- I was immediately overwhelmed by tirades of anti-Americanism.

Without question, except in the most official and formal circumstances, I was told about the sins of Americans with regard to the military dictatorship and Cyprus. So most of the time, when Anna and I traveled around Greece, and we did a fair amount, I was the silent

accompanier of a woman from New Zealand. Greek memories of New Zealand, going back to World War II, were tremendously favorable, as were Greek memories of Americans in World War II -- but those had been overrun by memories of more recent events. The memories of New Zealand were growing fainter with the passage of time, but if you encountered anyone of a certain age, they could recall New Zealand soldiers that their village had protected, that the British had sent a submarine to rescue, or whatever. They were great stories. So, that was fun. We also climbed Mt. Olympus together with other U.S. embassy members, organized by Peter and Marilyn Schoettle. And all together, we had a great time.

*Q: Did you get married there?*

DWORKEN: We did not get married in Greece, because we were of different faiths, and it was not possible for persons of different religions to marry. They did not have civil marriage then. That changed some years later. When my tour was over, we went through New Zealand on the way back to the States and were married in New Zealand.

*Q: Well, let's stop on that nice Greece note, and we'll continue it next time. ...*

*Mort, you were about to complete the process of getting married to an alien spouse.*

DWORKEN: Well, there's a special process in the regulations that required me to notify the Department of State that I intended to marry an alien spouse, or an alien who was an employee of a foreign government. And those two considerations together made for a complexity in the process. I was required to give them at least 120 days notice, so they in turn could inform and counsel me as to any possible ramifications for the continuation of my career and my security clearance. Mind you now, New Zealand was a treaty ally of the United States, so this struck us as rather strange. Nonetheless, we went through the process, and we came down to the last week of the 120 days with no reply from the Department, so we had some concern whether we were going to hear anything at all.

Eventually we were able to get permission to proceed. Everything was in order and we could go ahead, but before that time, there was the possibility that I would lose my security clearance, that I would have to return immediately to Washington, and that I would be placed in a job that had no classified material associated with it. They needed to decide, since my wife was an employee of a foreign government, whether this would lead to complications later; they counseled me that it might have a negative effect on my future career.

As it turned out my wife, who was in the New Zealand Foreign Service, was already intending to resign; she had examined the prospects for the kinds of positions she could have in the New Zealand service. She reached her own independent decision to resign. So, in the final analysis, questions never arose. It turned out that for couples in similar situations who came along later, exceptions were made. They were allowed to be married, and to maintain a security clearance, and the spouse could also work for a



foreign government. Canada immediately leaps to mind, and I think there were other examples as well.

*Q: I know of such a case involving Pakistan.*

DWORKEN: This was a difficult time in one respect, because we were conflicted about careers. Later my wife took the American Foreign Service exam, passed it, and was twice offered a position in an American Foreign Service entering classes. Both times, there was the immediate prospect that we would be separated, assigned to different posts, or that we would go overseas together but I wouldn't have a job in a particular post, or that we would be there for different tours of duty, so that our career together would be discombobulated one way or another. Of course, by that time we'd started a family, so those considerations led my wife to decide not to pick up either of those two offers of a position in the Foreign Service. That is something I personally regret, that she was not able to pursue a career in her own foreign service or in ours. When we were next assigned overseas, she was expeditiously naturalized as an American citizen, and we proceeded through the rest of our career together.

*Q: And the rest of your marriage?*

DWORKEN: And the rest of our marriage.

*Q: I will also just note that I was in the Human Resources or the Personnel Office in the late 1980s and certainly in that period, things were very different than they had been in the late 1970s, the period you are talking about. There were sometimes difficulties that we as personnel managers tried to be as accommodating as possible for, what we called tandem assignments, where there were two members of the Foreign Service to be assigned together. We had a pretty good track record of doing that, although obviously it was easier when they were both junior officers or both more or less at the same grade level, but it caused problems sometimes. There certainly were some instances where one member of a couple needed to take leave without pay or simply did not have an assignment, or in other cases they had to have separate assignments, hopefully not too far apart geographically.*

DWORKEN: Well, we weighed those possibilities and looked at the map of options and in each case, we came to the conclusion that we wanted to stay together and to proceed to a post together, and that led to the results I mentioned earlier.

*Q: Okay, why don't we finish up your time as Political-Military Affairs Officer in the Embassy in Athens, which was from 1976 to 1980, and maybe begin talking also about your next assignment as Senior Desk Officer for Greek Affairs in the European Bureau from 1980 to 1982? I think we talked a little about negotiating the defense cooperation agreement, maybe you want to say a few more words about that or maybe kind of wrap up your time in Athens and begin moving into the Desk responsibilities for Greece?*

DWORKEN: I think we can essentially wrap it up. The base negotiations were not wrapped up by the end of my assignment in Greece. This was because the initialed but unsigned agreement was intrinsically not just a foreign affairs issue between the United States and Greece, as I mentioned earlier, but they also involved relationships with NATO, Turkey, and Cyprus and also regional security affairs and international legal issues all bound up into it as well. But as it turned out, domestic political issues were more important than any of those, at least for that time.

*Q: In Greece or the United States, or both?*

DWORKEN: In Greece. There was always an interaction between domestic issues in the United States and domestic issues in Greece. You'd mentioned earlier, for example, the pleasure that Greece expressed about the election of Carter in 1976.

The Greek domestic political scene was quite contested, and there was on the scene a man by the name of Andreas Papandreou, who during my time in Greece was frequently in the public eye, frequently criticizing the Karamanlis government and frequently criticizing the United States. He was a spell-binding orator. FSI had taught me enough Greek, so that when I went and heard him speak in Constitution Square in downtown Athens, it was amazing. I had never heard anyone like that; I'd never seen anyone speak from a balcony in that manner, with a spellbound audience as far as the eye could see, thousands of people filling that square.

I left Greece shortly thereafter to become the Greek Desk Officer. It seemed like the natural transition for me. I remember bidding on the job and getting it, and I don't remember a great deal of interest on my part in doing anything else at that time nor any great difficulty in getting the job. I came back, after our stop in New Zealand to get married, to Washington in the fall of 1980, having not accomplished the one primary objective of my Athens job, which was to complete the agreement.

*Q: So you came back to Washington, so you could finish it from the Washington end?*

DWORKEN: And that in a sense is what preoccupied me. There were two officers on the Greek desk, I was the senior and Eleanor Raven Hamilton was the junior officer. And I was preoccupied with the political-military relationship, in the broader sense, involving NATO, the Aegean, relations with Turkey, and all that, but primarily focused on continuing to press for a Greek-American defense and economic cooperation agreement to parallel the Turkish one. The link between the two agreements had been to a certain extent broken, because aid had again begun to be furnished to Turkey, the embargo had begun to be lifted, a partial lifting. There was as a consequence a great deal of concern on the part of many Greeks, Cypriots, Greek-Americans, and Cypriot-Americans that the embargo lifting process should go as slowly as possible and have as many conditions attached to it as possible. This was so that Greek security was protected and so that a resolution of the Cyprus issue was accomplished in what they viewed as the right manner. There was a continuing effort on that score as well. Nonetheless, my focus was

the base negotiation itself, in an effort to get a parallel agreement like we talked about earlier, to get it accomplished, and to get the two agreements put before Congress.

*Q: Papandreou, who you mentioned was elected at some point, became Prime Minister; this was back when you were in Washington, I think?*

DWORKEN: Right, that was the other...

*Q: That changed things?*

DWORKEN: That was the other primary attention point, if you will. We began to see that while our eyes were still focused on the bases agreement, that Papandreou was likely to run a very strong campaign and very possibly would be elected.

Under Ed Dillery's leadership, we prepared for that on the desk. There had been previous instances where we had been accused of favoritism for one side in Greek domestic politics, in fact one can refer back even to situations before the military dictatorship took over. We were adamant on the Desk and in the office and the European Bureau that we would not show favoritism this time around, and we really didn't find any objection to this in the wider U.S. government. In the event that Papandreou won, we decided that we would be as warm and welcoming to his Prime Ministership as we would be to his opponent, the incumbent Prime Minister, George Rallis, if he were to win. And so we formulated two scenarios, depending on who was the victor. We drafted two sets of congratulatory messages from the President. We had two sets of talking points for the White House and the State Department spokesmen. We had two sets of instructions for the ambassador in Athens and so on. We fully pre-cleared all of this ahead of time. We did not want to wait until the election results were known before things were geared up.

There was great worry in some parts of the U.S. government about what Papandreou would do on coming to power. There was great concern that the rhetoric, the anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-capitalist rhetoric if you will, that Papandreou had used in the election campaign, would in fact be implemented in every respect and that the United States would find its core interests in the region damaged irrevocably. There was another school of thought that power moderates radical leaders, and that the responsibilities of power would win out, and we would find that although difficult to deal with, he was nonetheless someone we could deal with. As it turned out, I think it was much more the latter than the former. The dire predictions of some didn't come to pass and in the bureaucratic sense in formulating our approach to a possible Papandreou victory, those who held those dire views did not succeed in stopping us from turning the page and opening the door to Papandreou.

*Q: That approach that you just described was accepted, was advocated by the American ambassador in Athens and the embassy, or was it a tension with you and the State Department in Washington?*

DWORKEN: On that point, I don't remember any differences with the Embassy in Athens. I think there were different views in Washington; I remember different predictions as to what the outcome of the election would be.

To return to the base negotiations for a moment, we thought before the election that we had one last opportunity with the Rallis government, the successor to Karamanlis.

*Q: Who had become the President?*

DWORKEN: Karamanlis moved up to be President, and Rallis, who had been Foreign Minister for some period of time, then became Prime Minister, and Evangelos Averoff stayed as Defense Minister. He was also a key factor in this issue. We put together a substantially improved package of excess defense articles, assistance monies, and most particularly, a squadron of used F-4 aircraft. Mind you, such aircraft had already been provided under the same excess rules to Turkey, but nonetheless we were able to put together an equivalent package of what we called "sweeteners" for one last push on the base negotiation issue. And we thought we also had put together a series of compromises on the various remaining language issues involved, whether they concerned the status of forces or other issues regarding the four main bases. It turned out that -- from the point of view of Rallis -- to conclude an agreement within weeks if not months of the election, even though it had long been in negotiations, would not be seen as a victory for Rallis in domestic political terms. Rather, it would be exactly what Papandreou would need to convince critical and cynical Greek voters that it was exactly the wrong move for the Greek nation.

And so, Rallis decided not to conclude the agreement, rather than to act in what I think he and Averoff understood in the larger sense would be in Greece's national interest, because it was a very attractive package we were offering. And as I mentioned earlier, we never brought ourselves again to make as many concessions in the details of the defense agreement, and I think Averoff especially had a sense of that; but nonetheless, at the time, nothing we did was sufficient given the domestic political concerns that Rallis had. He then went on to lose the election. So a door closed in a sense and never really opened again in the same way. We went on to establish a relationship with Papandreou that was rocky and difficult, no question about that, but that eventually led to an agreement. Wonder of wonders, after further negotiation, Papandreou signed a bases agreement with the United States.

*Q: While you were still on the Desk or was that later?*

DWORKEN: That was later. That was with special negotiators later, Ambassadors later, and certainly, Desk Officers later.

*Q: Okay, what else do you want to say about your time, either to finish up in Athens or about the Greek Desk?*

DWORKEN: I think that's about it. There were other issues and concerns we focused a lot on. One was the annual human rights reports, which especially dealt with issues of the Turkish minority, the Muslim minority as they called them, in Greece, and the Greek Orthodox minority who lived in Turkey, and treatment of each by the government at the time. There were continual issues arising over the Aegean, and there were questions of great moment actually in Turkish history, with Prime Minister Ozal and the military who had taken over in 1980.

*Q: September.*

DWORKEN: So that was all going on at the time, but I was essentially focused on the Greek piece of it. We were always on the screen, it seemed to me, in regards to Congress, and we were always on the screen in the White House and many times on the screen in the Defense Department and high levels of the State Department. So it was never dull on the Greek Desk.

*Q: Of course, you were there for the election of Ronald Reagan and the beginning of his administration and the first year of that, the Secretary of State was Alexander Haig who had a particular background and interest in Greece. Were you involved with him at all or did you see that at the Desk Officer level?*

DWORKEN: Well, I did a bit because I got to go to the various ministerial-level and higher-level meetings as note taker. I went up to New York for the General Assembly meetings. Haig would have meetings with the two Foreign Ministers, and I'd get to sit in on the Greek one, head down madly taking notes, not a participant and not much able even to look around. That was my ticket into the room, to take notes. Haig, of course, had come out of being Supreme Allied Commander and had tried several times to put together solutions to Greek and Turkish issues that would allow NATO issues to move forward; he had not succeeded. And it was Bernard Rogers, his successor, who eventually put together the deal that brought Greece back into the military side of NATO.

*Q: I seem to remember that in the early days of the Haig period at the State Department, this would have been early 1981, he hosted a lunch or maybe a dinner, for Averoff, the Greek Defense Minister who he had known. It was sort of one of those things that seemed a little odd that early, but it meant something to him, and he wanted to do it. He did it, and it was very nice. I don't remember much more about it than that.*

DWORKEN: Nor do I, but I do remember Averoff's trip to the United States.

*Q: He was, I think then, in opposition, or no longer in government maybe. Is that possible, or had he done a book?*

DWORKEN: Yes, I think he was opposition leader and had written a book.

*Q: Alright, anything else about Greece? You do other things later, but you never quite work on Greece again, I think, is that right?*

DWORKEN: That's true. I come back later to work on Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus together, and I served in Turkey as well. But I never worked solely on Greece again. Although there were times later, when it seemed like I was again a Greek desk officer, for better or for worse.

It was an interesting time then because, for the first time in my career, I'd focused on bilateral and multilateral issues related to a particular country both from the field point of view and the Washington point of view. I had begun to get a sense of how larger American national interests, such as alliance unity, regional stability, and relations with the Soviet Union, played out in a particular part of the world and how that larger framework impacted on how the United States viewed issues related to a particular country. And I guess for the first time in the round in my career, I also had the opportunity to weigh the relative importance of U.S. military activities, forces overseas, bases, facilities, and operating rights. I saw that it was not universally accepted in the U.S. government that something the Defense Department proposed was considered to be in the national interest. I began to see that there was almost a constant competition of pulling and hauling, of shoving and disagreeing, before finally reaching agreement under that larger framework of alliance unity or U.S. national interest.

For example, in Athens, Ambassador Robert McCloskey, in the latter part of the base negotiations, had a highly questioning approach as to what the U.S. Defense Department wanted to continue to dispose of in Greece. He would ask whether in fact a particular facility had any relationship with U.S. national security at all or whether it was just operating on the basis of inertia, that is, that they just had it before and wanted to have it again. For example, did they want to continue to fly reconnaissance aircraft, intercept signals, transmit information, store munitions and material for readiness purposes, have hilltop communication sites, exercise in particular areas, all of that? McCloskey was a much more questioning ambassador than his predecessor, Jack Kubisch, at least so far as I knew, which perturbed the Defense Department representatives in Athens greatly.

And I saw that play out in Washington as well, when there was a debate over whether we should be offering as much to the Greeks as we in the State Department believed would be necessary to get an agreement, which, mind you, we failed to get. The larger questions about the work, the particular facilities, whether the United States should in fact work as hard as it had been working to preserve facilities and operating rights was also a question; what could be sacrificed, or negotiated away, that might make the eventual agreement more attainable in the first instance? And second, what would make our continued operating activities easier to sustain into the medium and longer term, because they would be less of a burden on the host country? That set of issues I found I came back to several more times in my career.

*Q: Do you want to say anything further about the role, tensions with other agencies and other parts of the State Department about any of these things, either in your experience on the Desk or in Athens, or was the main focus with the Defense Department as far as you were concerned?*

DWORKEN: The Defense Department was not a monolith, there were Air Force interests and there were Navy interests, those were the two main ones, but the Army also had a comparatively minor role to play in Greece -- and a much stronger role in Turkey. And the intelligence community had interests as well as the work of the various defense facilities that were involved in collection. Some of the facilities served a bilateral purpose only, and some served a NATO purpose. The NATO office in State's European Bureau had a different view of the relative worth of the facilities; for them, the base at Souda Bay with its cluster of NATO facilities was key. That incidentally is the only one of the four main facilities in Greece then that I believe to this day still functions as a U.S. (and NATO) facility.

*Q: Souda Bay?*

DWORKEN: Souda Bay. An air base, for allied naval air as well as air forces from time to time, with NATO missile firing training facilities, NATO mine maintenance and storage facilities, and U.S. Navy deep water port facilities. These were all on the island of Crete, along with the Air Force intelligence facility at Iraklion, Crete. On the mainland were the NATO communications station at Nea Makri near Marathon and the Air Force facility at Hellenikon Air Base, co-located with the civilian air field outside of Athens. Those are all gone, I believe, as are most of the hilltop communication sites and many of the storage facilities and smaller military facilities around the country. And looking back on that now, they were already in the main on the way out, partly because of technological improvements, and partly because the activities they supported simply didn't need to be performed at the level of intensity that they were at that time. Satellites were a great 'remover' of ground facilities, both from a communications point of view and from an intelligence collection point of view. Aircraft had longer legs, strike aircraft no longer needed to be supported in the same way, and ships could stay at sea longer and had other possibilities, but not all that was in view to us in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

*Q: And certainly also not in view was that, within ten years or so, the end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union.*

DWORKEN: Exactly.

*Q: Okay, let me ask you one more time in a different way: as far as the Department of State was concerned, the European Bureau could pretty much shape and determine -- taking in account both the bilateral relationship with Greece and the NATO connection you mentioned, the NATO office -- an approach toward Greece? Or did the Political-Military (PM) Bureau or other bureaus get quite involved on occasion?*

DWORKEN: Others were never quite as involved as the European Bureau, which pretty much had central control. As I mentioned earlier, when it concerned sweeteners and quids for particular parts of the negotiation, other parts of the Department came into play like the PM Bureau. There was always the concern on the part of PM that whatever was

done with respect to Greece would have a ripple effect, first and foremost with Turkey and that bilateral negotiation, but also with other countries. Spain and Portugal negotiations were looming, and then the East Asian Bureau had its own base negotiations to pursue, and there were the beginnings of talks about bases in Southwest Asia and the east coast of Africa, and all of that as well. It was clear that there was a base negotiation process that would always involve the U.S. government with one country or another, as these things played out at the time. So it was clear that there were precedents being set by what we were trying to negotiate with Greece, and PM and the Policy Planning staff had officers that followed it closely. However, except for the formalities of forwarding a decision memorandum that had to have both PM and legal clearances, the agreement was essentially something formulated in and driven by the European Bureau, whether it was the assistant secretary, a deputy assistant secretary, or a special negotiator responsible to the assistant secretary.

*Q: Was a special negotiator appointed to negotiate with Greece on the defense side while you were on the Desk or did that come a little later?*

DWORKEN: I think it must have been while I was on the Desk when Reg Bartholomew came on board as special negotiator, either just before or just after he became Special Cyprus Coordinator.

*Q: I just don't remember. It must have been toward the end of your time.*

DWORKEN: David Jones, who was Cyprus Desk Officer while I was there, began working for Reg.

*Q: And you were maybe less involved at that point with him?*

DWORKEN: I think I was on the way out at that time.

*Q: You mentioned Ambassador Kubisch and Ambassador McCloskey and the roles they played with respect to you and the negotiation of the Defense and Economic Cooperation agreement. A new ambassador went to Athens while you were on the Desk, I believe; do you want to say something about him? Monteagle ("Monty") Stearns, he must have gone in 1981.*

DWORKEN: You know, you're right. I had put that farther on. It was Monty who sealed the deal with Papandreou, right?

*Q: I think so. I don't know if he has done his own oral history. Why don't we say just a few words about his relationship with Papandreou and maybe his role as you prepared him?*

DWORKEN: I also don't know if he has done his oral history, but the only one posted on the web site is Toni's, his wife's interview. They had a long relationship with Andreas Papandreou and his father, George, from their earlier times in Greece when she was the



daughter of the American ambassador to Greece and he was a young officer in USIA, I believe.

*Q: Oh, I think he was in the embassy. Toni's father was James Riddleberger, and I think that they had even an earlier connection with Papandreou, when he was at the University of California; maybe not.*

DWORKEN: I'm not sure.

*Q: Of course, Papandreou's wife at the time was an American citizen, and I think they knew her and were fairly good friends.*

DWORKEN: I've got to look at that more carefully, since I'm not sure I recall the timing for Monty coming on board. I don't recall anything in particular in the way of difficulties or issues in fact, because of that previous history you mentioned and his previous most recent relationship with Greece while in the American Embassy and the immediate aftermath of the return of democracy in the mid-1970's...

*Q: He was not there when you were in the embassy in Athens, was he at all? Wasn't he the DCM?*

DWORKEN: He was at the start of my tour in 1976.

*Q: At the beginning. And you made mention of that before?*

DWORKEN: Yes. And then Hawk Mills replaced him, and he returned to Washington. I don't remember any issues at all. I remember it being very smooth for Monty.

*Q: Well, he certainly was well known to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and he had served previously as an ambassador in Africa, in Cote d'Ivoire. And he was certainly well connected to some degree with the Greek-American members of Congress, they knew him well.*

DWORKEN: Yes, there was that group of Sarbanes, Tsongas, Brademas, and Rosenthal in the Senate and the House.

*Q: Okay, anything else about Greece? Probably not.*

DWORKEN: No. I think that's it.

*Q: That's a lot.*

DWORKEN: Yes.

*Q: Okay. Where did you go next in 1982 when you finished your time as Senior Desk Officer for Greek Affairs?*

DWORKEN: I was fortunate enough to be selected for a Congressional Fellowship, a training assignment. There were two kinds of fellowships, and initially I didn't know which one I was going to get or whether I would have a choice in the matter. One was set up under the American Political Science Association which involved some introductory schooling, including about Congressional affairs and their relationship to foreign policy, and then two relatively short, around four months each, assignments, one on the Senate side and one on the House side. You had to find the offices by going around and convincing them to take you on. And the other was a year-long fellowship without initial training in the office of a Congressman or Senator and that was called a Pearson Fellowship, part of a program set up by Senator Pearson, I believe; that was the one I preferred to try for. And frankly I can only remember interviewing in one office and being accepted there. That was the end of it; I got that job.

It was with a Congressman by the name of Dante Fascell, who was a representative from the southern part of Florida, the south part of Miami itself plus some suburban areas connected to it. This was at a time when the Democrats were in power -- so Clem Zablocki was the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Fascell was the next person behind him. Bloomfield was the ranking Republican on the committee.

*Q: And Fascell also chaired a subcommittee or two.*

DWORKEN: Fascell had two subcommittees. One focused on arms control, disarmament, and particular military-type issues, and the other -- of much more importance to the State Department -- was called International Operations. That was the subcommittee that started the authorization bill on its long legislative process. That bill contained the budget for the State Department and for foreign assistance as well. Those two things had to go to other subcommittees and the full committee and then on through the tortuous law-making process, but nonetheless being first gave him tremendous power for maneuvering and riding herd on at least the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency parts of the foreign affairs process.

*Q: And USAID?*

DWORKEN: Yes, AID, too, but to a lesser extent. Responsibility for that part of foreign affairs seemed to be spread around more to the regionally focused subcommittees. I was not the first Pearson Fellow in that office, or the last; there's a whole collection of people that have gone through the Foreign Service and stopped off in Dante Fascell's office.

I didn't know much about Congress, so this job broadened me. I knew what I knew based on my work on the Greek Desk. That was the only relationship I'd had with particular staffers, and they were focused on Greek-Cypriot and Greek-Turkish types of issues. There was, as I mentioned, an aid relationship to the base negotiations, so there was also a group of staffers on the appropriations side that I had dealt with.

I didn't realize how important Fascell was until I got up on the Hill. He was a very outward-looking Congressman, not at all parochial. He had been raised in the New York City area; his parents had lived there, and like many east coasters, they migrated to Florida. He was a worldly-wise Democrat who in many of his domestic policies was very liberal in today's terms. His foreign policy approach to things was a little bit more to the center, and some would probably argue it was right of center. He was a very strong friend of Israel, and a very strong friend of anti-Castro Cuban-Americans. He was a very strong opponent of the Soviet Union, but he also was a very practical minded person who saw the Soviet Union in the round rather than just as an enemy. He focused a lot on human rights and those parts of the Helsinki Agreement negotiating process that related to human rights and on individual liberties both domestically in the United States and abroad with respect to the Soviet Union. He was one of the fathers of the Helsinki Commission on Capitol Hill and a great supporter of it; he was a member of it, actually I think he was one of the co-chairs of it, he and Lee Hamilton and some others, I think. And he'd been around for quite a while. I think by the time I came along, he'd had 14 terms, so he'd had 28 years there. That was a tremendous amount of seniority, so he was number two on the committee and had two subcommittee chairmanships. He had salted his people around town, both in think tanks and in various staffs on Capitol Hill -- the Helsinki Commission staff, the subcommittee staffs, the full committee staffs. I was in his personal office which, at first blush, I thought was not a good idea, because I was still focused on foreign affairs and I thought that I should be doing foreign affairs kinds of things.

*Q: Answering letters from constituents.*

DWORKEN: Right. The really good thing about a Congressional Fellowship was that it exposed me to a whole range of concerns that I really had paid no attention to and really didn't know much about. And I started out just as you mentioned: drafting what would turn out after various iterations to be form-letter responses to constituents who would write in on a whole range of things, some of which had to do with foreign affairs and some that had absolutely nothing to do with foreign affairs. Each letter required a certain amount of research; I found that what I needed in that congressional office was about an inch deep of expertise across just about every topic you can imagine.. I also found, for the first time and almost for the last time in my foreign service career, that every phone call I ever made anywhere in the U.S. Government got answered almost immediately. Every time I sent a question, I got an answer. "The Congressman wants...", or "the Chairman wants...", turned out to be magic words in recognition of his power and influence around town.

*Q: And this was during the Reagan Administration?*

DWORKEN: Yes, which meant that some of his foreign policy views were right in line with the Administration, and some of his domestic policy views were about 180 degrees out from anything the Reagan Administration would come up with. Fascell was not in league with the way the Reagan Administration went about doing some of its foreign policy activities and dealt with certain people and countries that later turned out to be

improprieties and illegalities. He was a strong but conciliatory and collegial person with both strength and cordiality evident nearly all of the time. And he did not believe in those who used only strength and were rude, strong, and overly secretive, or did not take into account the personal angles of things; he didn't have much time for people like that. But he did have a strategic view of the world, and it came out in many different ways.

One of the ways I'd like to mention is that he was one of the fathers of the National Endowment for Democracy, the NED. In fact, his legislative skills, I'm convinced, there may be other fathers of the NED around, but I think he was one of the keys to making it happen. He put together in his coalition-building way a collection of American business people in the Chamber of Commerce area, American labor people in the AFL/CIO who had an international bent, and people from both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. He built the structure that was able to house all of them and focus their energies on international affairs and the promotion of democracy, human rights, and good governance. And it's a body, as you well know, that is still working today to promote those same things. It's funded every year by government but also monies from those four collections of American activity.

In his office, I had more specific responsibilities during the course of the year. I also worked on very specific things, some related to the overall Foreign Assistance Act and others specifically related to El Salvador. Fascell was a supporter of the general activity of the Reagan Administration in Central America, but a critic of how it seemed to be coddling the right wing and all of the depredations of human rights fostered by that approach. He was especially concerned about the contras. So he asked another staffer, a legal advisor, and me to draft legislation that would put restrictions on the Administration's ability to dispose of assistance monies to El Salvador in support of those activities. He in general supported them, but he wanted to be sure they were doing good, particularly with respect to land reform. He wanted to see that we were not helping an oligarchy to take and keep land from the peasantry. He wanted the land reform program, which was already in motion, to be funded in a way that progress received more money, thus creating a positive incentive. This effort was secret from the Administration, until it was introduced in committee. I believe it made it in one form or another into what the House dealt with on the floor, but since there was no Foreign Assistance Authorization Act that year, the provision was never enacted into law. When a continuing resolution was put together for the appropriation, that particular provision, I don't think, was picked up.

I remember around that time that, without my knowing it, I'd crossed from being viewed as an Administration 'spy' in the Congressman's office to being considered loyal and trusted. And I realized later that there were those in the State Department that thought I'd crossed at that point from being loyal to disloyal to State. There's no way to operate in an environment like that without becoming a part of your environment; otherwise, you don't accomplish anything. I think that those who took the view that I was being disloyal to the State Department were in the minority and short-sighted; I was bringing to bear my foreign affairs expertise, such as it was, to do the job that I was assigned to do by my boss at the time, the Congressman. It's the same kind of issue with Foreign Service

Officers who work in other parts of the U.S. government on detail, it's a question of proving your loyalty to your current boss.

*Q: What extent did you feel that you had a personal relationship with Congressman Fascell? You know, did you see him regularly? He had a lot of other staff people and those committee staffs with each of the subcommittees and so on.*

DWORKEN: I thought I had a personal relationship with him. He asked me to join him for various meetings, including when the AHEPA President, who happened to be a Floridian, would call him. I recall him saying to others that I had just come from six years of working on Greece. He also on his own asked me to come with him down to Miami, where I met his family and stayed with him for over a week during the campaign.

*Q: Did you write any speeches for him?*

DWORKEN: I wasn't allowed to provide any direct political support. During campaign events, he mainly would kind of show me off, and then I would get into the background as quickly as possible, ensuring that no one had secretly stuffed election pamphlets in my pocket. I did help write some of his talking points that had a foreign affairs cast to them. He sent me a second time to Miami, to a conference related to Caribbean affairs where I represented him. He always had time for me, he was a great walk-around kind of boss, he always stopped at everybody's desk; he did not sit in his office and expect everybody to come to him. That campaign trip in Florida was a real eye opener. He took me around just about everywhere each day with him, and there were a couple of instances of smoke-filled rooms that he decided I shouldn't go into, since they were just too political and private. One of them I recall was when he went to a hospital and met with Cuban-American doctors. That week was very instructive, since it was a campaign and since it was the first time in years that I think he had an opponent of any merit whatsoever. His opponent was someone who possibly had more name recognition than he did in some respects, a newscaster from the Washington area who had moved to Florida and then to Miami where he had for several years been on the news all the time. And for the first time in a long time, Fascell was actually challenged.

The other main lesson I brought away was how a member of Congress suffered an incredible drain of his creative energies and time. Mind you, this was a guy who'd been around for 14 terms at that point and had dealt with a lot of very important national security issues, and yet a large measure of each of his days -- and I especially saw this when I was down there with him but it was also true in Washington -- was focused on fundraising. Because of his opponent's challenge, he was obliged to spend hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dollars, what today would be millions of dollars, on television and radio advertisements. He didn't have that money, and he had to raise it. He raised it by going up to New York City and various other cities on the East Coast and by spending a lot more time in Miami fundraising, not doing a Congressman's work, in my view. It really distorted just about everything that went on, from what I could see, and it bent the personal staff in his office toward fundraising and away from the business of legislation

and taking care of constituents and other requirements. It was a real eye opener to see that.

*Q: Did you do any international or foreign travel with Congressman Fascell?*

DWORKEN: No, I don't think he did any during the time that I was there.

*Q: Okay, anything else about that period as a Pearson Congressional Fellow?*

DWORKEN: Well, just to note one other thing. We started a family in Washington at that time. It was good to still be here, even though my wife and I were looking forward to going off on another foreign assignment, but by that time we had one child, which was very good.

*Q: So, after two-plus years in Washington and one child, you did go abroad in 1983. Where did you go and how did that assignment come to be?*

DWORKEN: I went to an island nation in the South Pacific called Papua New Guinea; actually it's half an island, the other half of the island is part of Indonesia. Before that, the western half had been Dutch. I went as deputy chief of mission. I had looked for the job for two reasons. One, I wanted to go to the South Pacific, since I'd come to have family roots in the South Pacific and was already interested in that part of the world. I was attracted to the idea that it was a small island nation that had a political-military relationship with us, and there were close allies nearby, so it was an area that I could conceivably specialize in. And also, from a career point of view, there were hardly any other DCM-ships at the rank of FSO-01. In fact I think this was the only one on the bid list, and I wanted to try my hand at senior management. The only way to do that and be overseas and not simply be head of a section in a relatively small embassy was to be a DCM. That was the only one I could bid on, so I did; and I got it.

*Q: And who was the ambassador to Papua New Guinea when you went in 1983?*

DWORKEN: Virginia Schafer was the ambassador when I got there, and then there was a period of about five and one-half months after she left when I was chargé, and then the next ambassador was Paul Gardner. They were both career officers.

*Q: This was a pretty small embassy.*

DWORKEN: A tiny embassy. It was not an immensely significant country to the U.S.

*Q: DCM Papua New Guinea, a tiny embassy. Well, why don't you maybe talk a little about what if any interests or issues there were, what you did, and anything else that may be of interest in this context?*

DWORKEN: Well, I'll say right at the start that the New Guinea area, the South Pacific if you will, had a crucial importance to the United States during World War II. From the

point of view of Australia and New Zealand, that is their neighborhood. Both countries were then close treaty allies, which meant that by extension there were U.S. national interests involved in the region. I learned that there were other U.S. interests as well, related to the region's plethora of natural resources, keeping the Soviets out, and keeping the mainland Chinese influence as low as possible plus our multilateral diplomacy interests.

But there was one thing I should say by way of introduction, which was that I had come out of an environment, including the year on Capitol Hill, where things related to Greece had formed a large and intense part of my working environment, for more than six years. In that environment, the United States was central to host-nation perceptions of what caused things to happen or not happen.

*Q: That might be the resolution of some of those issues.*

DWORKEN: Exactly. And lo and behold, in Port Moresby, that was not the case. As I quickly found out, it was the Australians, the former colonial power in Papua New Guinea, who were not only credited or blamed for every bad or good thing that went on, they were also by far the largest presence, both official and non-official. Their citizens were widely present there, with economic and social dealings and a full relationship. So when storms hit, it was the Australians' fault, not the Americans. It was a nice position to be in, except for one small point, which was that the Australians were a bit suspicious of the United States, thinking that we were trying in some ways to supplant them from their primary role. At least they thought that on occasions. But most of the time, it was a very cooperative relationship. The United States was not the first thought of every PNG citizen, and we had not committed any near-term sins to replace the warmer view of the United States that most Papua New Guineans had of us, based on the World War II experience. That, all in all, was a very good thing.

As I said, Port Moresby was a small embassy. It was situated in what was a relatively large and well-populated island, the eastern half of New Guinea island, , unlike the rest of the South Pacific island nations that, for the most part, were much smaller and more spread out across the South Pacific. And the Port Moresby embassy was also accredited to the governments of Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (which was called New Hebrides before it became independent). Having no representation on either of those two island nations in their capital city, I was not only the DCM in the embassy in Papua New Guinea, I was also a frequent traveler to Solomon Islands and the highest ranking American official permitted by the Government of Vanuatu to visit there.

Vanuatu was a strange case. Port Vila, the capital, if you look back at the history, had both British and French colonial influence. These two strains formed what historians have called a condominium, but many thought it was more like a pandemonium, because they ended up having two of everything: two different foreign languages, two different legal systems, two different social traditions, two different ways of organizing police forces, two bodies of law -- it was a confusion in colonial times. As an independent country, they decided that the great powers were the evils of the earth, and so they

wanted nothing to do with either. So both were kept at arm's length, and there were no embassies from the United States or the Soviet Union allowed in those countries. Ambassadors from those two countries were not able to go there or to present credentials.

*Q: But if they were unable to present credentials, were they accredited?*

DWORKEN: No. But they had relations on a kind of ad hoc case-by-case basis with both countries and their embassies. So I, as a DCM, could go there and during the course of my two years in Moresby, I visited Vila I think maybe a half-dozen times, and the ambassador never went. After I left Port Moresby, things warmed up a bit, and I think Paul Gardner at some point late in his tenure was able to go.

*Q: And present credentials?*

DWORKEN: I'm not sure whether he ever presented credentials or whether that was his successor, but I think now it is much easier than it once was. Nonetheless, we still don't have an embassy there; it's just too small a country for that kind of things in these days.

*Q: What interests did we have when you were there on these half-dozen visits?*

DWORKEN: We were in a relationship-building mode, so we began to encourage exchanges sponsored by U.S. Information Service, and I think we might have had our first Fulbrighter ever from Vanuatu during my time. We also tried to do a little bit of military training mainly by our Coast Guard with their Coast Guard, not in Vanuatu itself, but by sending a couple of people to Hawaii and San Diego, if I recall. And there were annual meetings arranged under the Pacific Command. CINCPAC in Hawaii would bring together senior logistics officers from the armies or security forces of the many countries of the Asia-Pacific region, in one case, or management people in another, and sometimes commanders and deputy commanders. It was an outreach effort on the part of the military that we in the embassy thought was a good way to try and provide a large umbrella under which people could get together or not as they saw fit. I think we worked very hard and finally got one representative from Vanuatu to go up to Hawaii for one of those annual meetings.

We focused in a like manner on Solomon Islands but in a somewhat more intensive way. I think Vanuatu had about 150,000 people and Solomons was about twice that number. The Solomons was more open to the outside world in trading relationships. We had a very positive and long relationship with Solomon Islands dating back to the battles at Bloody Ridge near Honiara and Guadalcanal during WWII. And there were American companies that were interested in exploiting the timber, mining, and fisheries resources there. I'll come back to fisheries; that was an issue of great dispute. And so under IMET we formulated the first security force training for them, Coast Guard as well, and some of the same exchanges, both military and USIS. That's essentially the rationale for those trips. I made many more trips to Solomons than I did to Vanuatu.



*Q: In the case of the Solomon Islands, the ambassador was accredited and did that periodically also?*

DWORKEN: He did. The combination of Ambassadorial and DCM visits was substantial for Solomon Islands. And in each case, whether it was the two of us alternating to the Solomons or yours truly going to Vanuatu, we called on the other half dozen or so embassy representatives that were resident and made the rounds of senior officials.

I never met with Walter Lini, the Prime Minister of Vanuatu, although I tried. I got to see people in his office but never him; part of their arm's-length approach to the superpowers, I guess. But I did have time on occasion, although it was very difficult to arrange, with the foreign minister and police commissioner and the lot. In Solomons, it was a broader relationship, including both the government and opposition.

*Q: Talk about the logistics of that just for a minute. How would you actually arrange appointments on Vanuatu or Solomons for that matter, since you didn't have anybody resident? Would just have to call up the office and say: I'm the American deputy chief of mission and can I come see you next week?*

DWORKEN: You raise an interesting point. This is almost going to sound like it is almost out of the Stone Age. Phones didn't work very well and phone calls were really a problem; they didn't fit with the island culture at all, and there weren't that many of them. But they did have commercial telex machines. So we sent a lot of telexes back and forth. In fact, we delivered talking points by telex. That meant totally redoing whatever had come in from Washington, retyping it, even though we had the beginnings of the Wang word processors and we were getting things by some limited form of email. And of course, with the different formats, it all had to be looked at before it was sent commercially. We had a commercial telex in the embassy so we could do that sort of thing, but I can remember that we usually did not get acknowledgements; you might hear that a message had been seen, but you might never get an answer.

And it became very difficult when you had operational kinds of things, like a trainee who needed to have a certain packet of information and to do certain things in order to get travel orders and the ticket to go to San Diego. Things had to be done weeks and weeks in advance. It was very cumbersome. And appointments were obtained by formal diplomatic notes via telex. Each and every appointment had to be specified; if you didn't specify it, you couldn't ad hoc it after you got there. They were developing countries, and they emphasized formality in ways that surprised us, so we had to adapt.

*Q: Both members of the United Nations?*

DWORKEN: Yes. And therein lay another of America's important interests in the area. They were friends; they were fundamentally friendly with the external power, the Pacific neighbor to the north, and also with Australia and New Zealand.

*Q: The Pacific power to the north?*

DWORKEN: Meaning us, sorry; to the northeast I guess.

*Q: I was wondering if you meant Japan.*

DWORKEN: No. But the South Pacific was a ground for competition, if you will, by other outside powers. And there were a lot of UN General Assembly votes to be had down there. I was dismayed that we didn't have our flag planted in more places and that there seemed to be a constant pressure to have even fewer of our flags there, rather than to expand and have a consular office in Honiara, the capital of Solomon Islands, or to endeavor to find some way to have a presence in Vanuatu. Proposals we made to that effect were always blocked in Washington.

*Q: For cost reasons?*

DWORKEN: It was always a cost-benefit judgment that they were not of much benefit and could easily be covered from Port Moresby. Well, it was physically difficult to cover them from Port Moresby, and a physical presence on the ground would have been worth much. I have an incident that I can talk about later, concerning Solomon Islands and the fisheries issue, that makes that clear.

But when I say an area for competition, I mean that this was also a time when China and Taiwan were arguing over who should have relationships. China was seated in the UN, but Taiwan was active diplomatically. The Republic of China, as it was called, acted not only diplomatically but economically throughout the region, as it has been and still is in other parts of the world. It sought diplomatic and economic relations to the exclusion of the mainland Chinese. And the PRC reciprocated, so there was a little contest. We had a stake in the outcome of that, and so did the Soviet Union. In addition, for a number of powers, including regional ones, the South Pacific was a good place for intelligence collection so, for example, there were trawlers from the Soviet Union. There were also international economic concerns, such as the exploitation of various minerals, gold, copper, oil and gas, hardwood timber, and fisheries. There were fishing fleets from Japan, Taiwan, China, the Soviet Union, and America.

*Q: Why don't you talk a little bit more about fisheries and the issue you mentioned that came up while you were there?*

DWORKEN: It was a longstanding issue, one that Ambassador Virginia Shafer actually had kept pretty much to herself as her portfolio. It related to fisheries negotiations. It arose from a difference of interpretation of exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and the rules governing resources in and under the water.

From the point of view of all the South Pacific nations, including our allies Australia and New Zealand, the island nations themselves owned and controlled all the fisheries, all of the fish that swam in that extended zone beyond their territorial seas. That was not our view, and I don't think we're any closer to agreement on the underlying legal principle

today. If the fish were what is called "highly migratory species" – I don't know why that term stayed in my head all these years – to wit, tuna, and they went from one zone to another in international waters over hundreds of miles of sea space, then the U.S. believed they were not the resource of any particular country.

So our American-flag fishing vessels could fish for those fish in international waters wherever they wanted, even inside an EEZ of another country, because it wasn't their territory, and we didn't have to ask permission. The idea that we would ever have to ask permission and pay a fishing license fee for each EEZ that this U.S.-flag fishing vessel went into was something Washington, mainly Congress, would not contemplate. There was an act of Congress (a) to lay out the view I just described and (b) to protect fishermen who might be caught, held, charged, or whatever by foreign countries that were illegally in our view claiming these rights. It was called the Fishermen's Protective Act, I think, that said fishermen acting under the legal view I just mentioned and fined would be recompensed by the U.S. Treasury for any monies they were charged or costs they incurred. Now, they paid a small percentage of their profits into a fund for that kind of reimbursement, but I don't think it ever covered the charges that were levied on it.

While I was Chargé, this issue exploded. It had not occurred in quite the same way before, although there'd been problems with PNG previously and Ambassador Shafer had helped negotiate our way out of that; but she had departed post, and I was Chargé, about to embark on one of my scheduled visits to Solomon Islands. As such, I had increased the level of the people I was calling on and included Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni, known privately by us and the Australians as 'Solo.' He was an erratic prime minister, to say the least, when he was sober and more erratic when he was not sober. He was in the latter condition many times, may he rest in peace.

In any event, an American-flagged fishing boat from the west coast of the U.S. named "Jeanette Diana" was spotted fishing inside the Solomon Islands EEZ by the lone Solomon Islands patrol boat. This Solomon Islands boat apparently warned the "Jeanette Diana" to leave or pay the required fishing fees, and the "Jeanette Diana" apparently went away but immediately came back and took up fishing again. It was doing quite well when the patrol boat arrested it and hauled it back to Honiara, the capital city. (Later, Australia formulated a program to provide patrol boats to the many South Pacific nations so they could better enforce rules in their EEZs, noticeably a different tack than the U.S. took.)

Well, this triggered a great crisis, because not only did it signal a major disagreement but it also meant according to U.S. law that all exports from Solomon Islands were automatically going to be embargoed as far as the U.S. was concerned. All well and good, I guess, since there wasn't a tremendous amount of trade, but it obviously would have had some impact. But it also meant that American Samoa, which had a cannery which was processing Solomon Islands fish, would be harmed as well. So not only was there a looming embargo that might easily cross over into foreign assistance, there also was an American crew that had been arrested, plus an American-flagged vessel and its catch that had been seized.

So there I was, about to embark on what was supposed to be an ordinary trip to pay my calls and suddenly, after informing the Department of these events, I was encumbered by Washington with instructions about what I should be telling the Solomon Islanders about the ramifications of what they had done. Moreover, I was to say that the easy way out of all this was for the Solomon Islands government to let the boat and crew sail on their way, while our two governments would continue to discuss our legal disagreements. That was the gist of my talking points.

*Q: And all of this you learned about from Washington because the crew of the fishing vessel couldn't have really communicated with Palm Beach or San Diego and then in turn Washington?*

DWORKEN: We heard pretty quickly also from the Australians in Honiara and their officials were informing Washington, too. All this was going on at the same time, but you are right, Washington gave us instructions as to what we should lay out for the Solomon Islanders. The how was left up to me and essentially, since I was already about to visit, I thought it best to deliver this distasteful message in person and not by telex, which would have been our normal approach to these kinds of things.

To get to Solomon Islands, you have to stop over night in a place called Kieta on the island of Bougainville, where a giant copper mine was located. Bougainville is a part of Papua New Guinea in what is called the North Solomons. (Arguably it should have been part of Solomon Islands at independence, since its people are different from PNGers, which has led to an independence movement, etc.) In any event, I asked through the Foreign Ministry for some additional appointments in Honiara that were specifically related to fishery issues, and then I set off on my trip. That night in the motel in Kieta, I got a series of phone calls from my friend, the Australian High Commissioner in Honiara, describing to me the situation there and how officials there were stoking themselves up with anti-American feeling.

*Q: For your arrival?*

DWORKEN: Yes. And he was able to learn -- in these island nations, they always seemed to have much better information than we did about what was truly in people's minds or about to happen -- that Police Commissioner Fred Soaki had been ordered by the prime minister to arrest me on arrival at the airport and not let me leave the airport building until he could put me on the next plane out. (I think there was only one plane a day out.) Fred, may he rest in peace, was one of my primary contacts whom I considered a friend, and we'd been working on training programs for months before then for some of his staff.

Well, this was something, needless to say, that the Chargé of the United States of America did not want to happen, and yet I thought it was important that I try to go on to Honiara, because all of this would be better discussed face to face. Yet this environment was getting worse by the hour. I didn't sleep much that night, given the seriousness of the situation and the time differences between the South Pacific and Washington. I spent a

significant amount of time on the phone with my political officer in Moresby and through him and directly back to the State Department in Washington. My purpose was to discuss whether they wanted to change my instructions and how they wanted me to proceed.

It was our mutual judgment that it would be a mistake for me to continue on. Initially, I wanted to proceed, but the last call I'd gotten from the Australian High Commissioner, shortly, before I could get on the morning plane to go to Honiara, made it very clear that Fred Soaki did not want to carry out what his prime minister had ordered him to do. He had told the Australians however that he would carry out those orders, and he hoped that would dissuade me from coming and compelling him to act. I just couldn't see how the U.S. Chargé could be in effect arrested or thrown out of the country; there was no good to come from that. So the conclusion was that I should return to Port Moresby, which I did, and we immediately began negotiating for a consular officer to go over there.

*Q: To check on the condition of the crew?*

DWORKEN: Ostensibly for the protection and welfare of the American citizens. No politics, no threats, no embargos looming, no explanations, nothing about international law and all of that, just simply to care for the Americans who were being held. Now they were all held in a luxury hotel, and they were all fine, as we eventually found out. There really wasn't any concern on that score, but I just wanted to get someone there who could begin the dialog that I had hoped to begin myself to resolve the situation. But we had no one there.

It was a major negotiation to get a vice consul there, but we eventually did, a fellow named Peter Kaestner who is still in the Foreign Service, a consular officer and a bird watcher of great note, world acclaim. I think he's one of the top ten bird watchers in the world in terms of birds sighted and places visited. In any event, Peter was young, our only consular officer, and he was perfect for the job. And we eventually got the prime minister and his people to calm down enough to allow Peter to come over and begin to set up what turned out to be an office in Honiara. I think it's been closed, opened, and maybe closed again since then, but in any event, we got the crew out. We eventually got the ship and the net returned; this was a multi-million dollar vessel and the net itself was worth over a million dollars. The catch was confiscated, needless to say. That part the Solomon Islands government insisted on. There never was an embargo instituted, because the helpful work of the Australians and New Zealanders around the margins of this dispute, along with the rest of the South Pacific nations, created a requirement for us all to get together and talk over the situation. In the aftermath of this incident and in the context of the South Pacific Forum, a negotiation was begun which resulted in a regional fisheries agreement. U.S. fishermen agreed to pay fees to a multinational organization named the Forum Fisheries Agency for permission to fish in multiple EEZs so long as they adhered to regulations about size of catch and so on.

*Q: Okay, I think we should stop there and when we continue, there may be some last words about Port Moresby and then we can go on to your next assignment.*

*We're talking about your assignment to Ankara, Turkey as Counselor for Political-Military Affairs, 1985-1988, and you just finished discussing your assignment as DCM in Papua New Guinea.*

DWORKEN: My next assignment was a direct transfer from Port Moresby to the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Turkey, where I was to be the head of the Political-Military Affairs Section. Again, this followed a career track that had a significant portion dedicated to political-military affairs, the activities of U.S. forces overseas and their political ramifications.

*Q: Another aspect of your career track was Southeast Europe, since you had been in the Office of Southern European Affairs in the State Department, and you had been in basically the same or a similar job in the Embassy in Athens. I think you ought to talk first about two things, the context of U.S.-Turkey political-military relations in the period you were there, and then perhaps also compare and contrast your job in Ankara with that in Athens.*

DWORKEN: Well, taking the second part first, in Athens, I was the only full-time officer working on political-military affairs, and there was a base negotiation under way that was fraught with all kinds of foreign and domestic policy issues, especially as far as the Greeks were concerned.

In Ankara, it was in fact a large section of the embassy headed by a counselor, and there were at least two other officers, so it was almost three times as big on that score alone. We had our own secretary. There was the similarity that it was separate from the Political Section, which was also headed by a counselor in Ankara (and, for that matter, in Athens). For pretty much the same reason that the political-military relationship was deemed to be of such central importance to the overall American relationship with Turkey, the ambassador and the DCM wanted to have a particular section of the embassy dedicated to it and responsive directly to their guidance. And unlike with Greece, where we were in effect creating basing agreements in a modern form, in Turkey the issue then was the renegotiation of the defense and economic cooperation agreement (DECA) which had been concluded earlier. In fact, it had been concluded while I had been in Greece, and since that time, it had entered into force, but it was now up for possible renegotiation and that was the activity I spent the bulk of my time focused on.

*Q: And were those negotiations already started, already underway when you got there or did they commence while you were there?*

DWORKEN: I recall they were already underway, although they were clearly at the beginning.

*Q: And what did the negotiator do?*

DWORKEN: I had the same role as I had in Athens. I was the head of the American side of the working group, and my counterpart was a fellow named Ergun Pelit, who was in

the Americas Section in the Foreign Ministry. There was a small team of Turkish foreign affairs and defense officials and there was a small team of Americans augmented from Washington, and I had essentially the same role as I had in Greece, although on a significantly larger scale. The DECA with Turkey was a larger agreement in many respects, for example, in terms of the number of American forces in country and the fact that they were so active there. Turkey's relationship with NATO was much healthier and robust than Greece's. Our aid program was much more significant, both in the economic support area as well as in military assistance in all its various forms. Our training programs were larger, and our interactions were much fuller than they were with Greece in many respects, although not all. Some of our activities were dependent upon Turkey's geographical position or a particular cooperative activity on which we agreed, so our presence in Turkey sometimes loomed larger in Greece's perception than the reverse.

The other thing to say was that Turkey was just coming out of a period of great domestic turmoil, with right versus left violence in the country. In fact, recalling back when my wife and I traveled from Greece to Turkey, there were parts of Turkey we went through in the central area Konya, for example, where we felt quite insecure and where it was said that violence could come about without any warning. There were also terror attacks in Turkey. We should probably talk more about that later, since one of them focused very specifically on me and my family. That in a sense was a different situation than Greece, where there also were such threats, but this was a very particular, pointed one. In Turkey, there was more than one terrorist threat, and they had claimed, as in Greece, American lives.

The negotiations I can go on to describe, if you like.

*Q: Yes, why don't you continue?*

DWORKEN: The organization of the negotiating team had many of the same aspects as that with Greece, but it took on a much more high-level and formal nature. In many respects, the chief negotiator for the American side was Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, based obviously in Washington and therefore only occasionally and periodically available to negotiate in Ankara. The American ambassador was not in that sense the Head of Delegation.

*Q: As he had been in Greece?*

DWORKEN: Yes, essentially. So there was a special negotiator in these base negotiations. There were also other members of the delegation that came out from Washington; in this case, one I recall was Colonel Mike McNamara, who worked for Richard Perle.

As an aside, my impressions of Perle were quite positive; he had quite a reputation. I'd met him earlier, when he had been working for Senator Jackson, but I really didn't get to know him until this period of time. Unlike some of the more negative aspects of his reputation, in this case he was really quite focused, clearly a friend of Turkish-American

relations, and prepared to implement American policy interests to the fullest extent that he could get Turkish agreement for them. He also was prepared to carry Turkish water back to Washington, not only inside the Executive Branch but also on Capitol Hill. The latter was to such an extent that he was able to arm himself with several sweeteners that directly responded to Turkish concerns. He did not deploy any of them to begin with; he kept them in reserve and very skillfully used them at the highest levels of the Turkish government, with the chief and deputy chief of Turkish general staff and the head of their plans and policy branch. Those two generals and admiral were very influential in base negotiations. Perle also dealt directly as well with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and most significantly with Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, who had a background as an economic technocrat who had helped stabilize the country as the military returned power to the civilians. May he rest in peace.

*Q: For those occasional visits to high officials, did he take you along for those sessions?*

DWORKEN: Yes, McNamara and I usually went as note takers. It helped maintain my status and working relationship with the Turks, so I saw his productive style first-hand. As I say, Richard was a very effective proponent of improving Turkish-American relations. During the course of the negotiations, he was able to secure the operating rights that we were interested in for another period of time, to protect the status of forces arrangements that had previously been negotiated, and generally to settle most of the concerns that had been raised by the Turkish side. These were across the whole range of our operational, communications, intelligence collection, and other special activities that we performed in or from Turkey. And in the process, he was also able to satisfy Turkish interests for broader and deeper economic and political relationships.

One outgrowth of this successful negotiation -- which was concluded while my posting in Ankara was ongoing, which again is a contrast to what occurred in Athens -- was a joint venture arrangement for a concrete contribution of parts manufactured by the Turks to F-16 production in the U.S. and eventually acquisition by the Turks of F-16 aircraft. That joint venture constituted significant defense industry cooperation, and it was facilitated by Assistant Secretary Perle.

He was also able to get something near and dear to Turgut Ozal's heart, which was an entry for Turkish textiles into the heavily protected American market. Ozal wanted to push for economic advantages for Turkey and also for significantly expanded economic development inside Turkey, and Perle was able to go all the way to the U.S. President to secure a special exception to existing quotas for Turkey.

There were also various trade and defense industry provisions that had not previously been applied to Turkey that he was able to secure. So he was instrumental in mobilizing other parts of the U.S. government, too. He deployed these tactics very smartly in the negotiations, at times of his own choosing, and in the final analysis, this skill resulted in success.



He also hoped to promote closer defense cooperation at the policy level with the formation of the High Level Defense Group. It should not have been surprising that this HLDG resulted in, wonder of wonders, periodic travel by an assistant secretary of defense by the name of Richard Perle to Turkey as delegation head. The HLDG talks alternated between the U.S. and Turkey. This deepening of the consultative relationship was something that stood us in good stead in years hence. With all the subsequent ups and downs in the relationship, the HLDG still continues, and I understand it is complemented with political-level discussions.

One final thing that Perle also instituted shows how important it was to have a senior American official focused on improving the relationship. I recall that there were very few Senators and Congressmen and their staffers who had any awareness of Turkey, contrary to their sometimes adversaries in the U.S. domestic arena. Greece and Cyprus had deep relationships with a whole variety of people on Capitol Hill. Perle set out to change that balance, and as part of his trips to Turkey, first during negotiations and later as delegation head to the HLDG, he would invite several congressional staffers along each time. I guess, harkening back to his days on Capitol Hill, that he realized how important staff was to the formation of views by very busy members of the House and Senate, so he'd make a point of bringing along different key staffers, almost always people who had never visited Turkey. And he would ensure not only that they were hosted well by the American official community in Turkey, but he would also work with the Turks to ensure they had their own separate program. This would include Turkish general staff helicopters and what have you, so they were given VIP treatment by the Turks as well, who saw this as the beginning of a small Turkey-friendly lobby. Perle was key in creating that whole apparatus. I don't know if that is still going on, but it certainly was effective in raising consciousness and increasing positive attitudes toward the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

*Q: I guess a related question I would have is, to what extent in all of these negotiations and efforts to build a better U.S.-Turkish defense-economic relationship were Perle and you, or anybody else, paying attention to what was happening with Greece at the same time?*

DWORKEN: Good point. There was keen awareness of that, because of course Greece was also in Perle's portfolio in DOD. (The same was true for Don Majors and Mike McNamara from that OSD/ISA office.) And in the State Department, officers concerned with Greece and Turkey were together in the office of Southern European Affairs. And Turks and Americans who worked in Turkey were very aware that attention was being paid to the interplay between the two countries, the rivalries, the antagonisms, and the longstanding concerns each had for the other. I shouldn't put those in the past tense, they are in the present, still there, although attenuated to some significant degree now. Of course, I also had in my own mind from my time in Greece a distinct awareness of how the base negotiations in Turkey had, in effect, completely overturned the base negotiations in Greece. We had had to start again from scratch after the Turkish DECA was signed. The interplay between the two continued to affect the negotiations.

By this time in Turkey, if I'm not mistaken, there had been an agreement with Greece that had been signed under then Prime Minister Papandreou, but it also had a five- or four-year term and was liable to be at any time put under renegotiation by the Greeks. That meant there was much more awareness by our two embassies of what was going on in negotiations in the other country and, of course, in Washington as well. There was also much more awareness of the need to maintain a military balance in terms of military assistance, although it was never the Administration's policy to propose adherence to that arithmetic seven-to-ten ratio. Nonetheless, Congress each year would make sure that the military assistance numbers came out in that ratio, even if the proposal was not submitted in that way. In fact, each year the Administration proposed slightly more for Turkey (a) to maintain its principle that such things ought not be done by ratios and (b) to demonstrate that it believed the Turkish-American defense relationship merited additional resources because of its strategic importance. Specifics included its border with Russia, its provision of eastern-flank protection to NATO, and its geographic presence in the Middle East. The eastern Mediterranean region taken as a whole argued in strategic terms for that kind of approach.

*Q: Plus a much larger military structure.*

DWORKEN: Exactly. It made a much larger contribution to the common defense, whether in terms of land forces or its growing air force.

*Q: To what extent were you also concerned with other NATO allies, or were you much more focused on the bilateral relationship, with an awareness of the Greek dimension?*

DWORKEN: I was, to some degree, aware of the interplay with NATO allies; that was part of my portfolio. It was still to a large degree a difficult item, because Greece and Turkey were still at loggerheads. I'm trying to remember if Greece by that time had re-entered the military wing of NATO; I'm not certain, since this was 1985 to 1988 and I'm not clear, but there were still issues whether that formal relationship had changed or not.

I was not at that time very focused on, and only vaguely aware of, Turkey-Europe and the growing issue of membership in the EU; but I was aware of it. I was of the belief then, as I am now, that Turkey inside the EU was a smarter outcome than Turkey outside. The more I learned about Turkey and its secular yet Muslim nature, and thus its possibilities as an alternative model to more radical approaches to Muslim leadership in countries to the East, such as Iran, the more I was convinced of the importance of a healthy Turkey. This meant a healthy relationship not only between the U.S. and Turkey but also between Turkey and other EU members.

*Q: Let me ask you a bureaucratic or functional question. You talked about your relationship with Assistant Secretary Richard Perle and his role as special negotiator for basically the whole defense relationship, which was also economic in many ways as well. How about your relationship with your immediate supervisors, the DCM and the ambassador? To what extent were you a free agent, or did you kind of make sure they were aware of what was going on with Perle, or how did all that interplay take place?*

DWORKEN: The ambassador at the time was Robert Strausz-Hupé, a man for whom I had great respect, who had already made his name as a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Pennsylvania and published several books on that score. An elderly gentleman, he'd already been ambassador to Sri Lanka, Belgium, Sweden, and NATO. He had created for himself another career by entering diplomacy at a very high level, and he succeeded in being appointed as ambassador to Turkey. He was well respected by the Turks. I must add, though, looking back, that he was not the greatest public diplomatist and rarely performed that function, which is increasingly important. It probably would have been better to have had more of a public presence at that time. Lacking that skill hampered to some degree his effectiveness across the board. But he was able to have access at the highest civilian and military levels when he needed and sought it. He was involved in the base negotiations, but nowhere to the degree, again comparing my time in Athens with Ankara, that the Chiefs of Mission were involved in Athens.

I think he thought he was getting in me a more senior officer as his counselor for political-military affairs. Because he knew I had been a DCM, I think he believed I was already a senior Foreign Service Officer; that didn't happen until later in my career. I think I fulfilled his expectations in terms of the substance of the work. I was his political-military advisor inside the embassy, although there was also a defense attaché and his office, a station that was involved in political-military affairs, and a two-star Army general in charge of the military aid group, a very large and effective military assistance and advisory group. That two-star general was, I believe, the closest advisor to the ambassador on a whole range of political-military and strategic affairs. Mind you, the ambassador believed he was his own best strategic and foreign policy advisor.

The ambassador was a bit distant from the day-to-day operations of the embassy and from the day-to-day negotiations that I was concerned with as well. He was involved when key American interests were in play, however. When actions at the Ambassadorial level were called for, he performed them. He was not always present, however, when the effective base negotiator, Richard Perle, met with the prime minister, the foreign minister, or with Ambassador Kandemir, who was the senior Turkish diplomat in charge of negotiations for their side. Kandemir was Perle's counterpart. He later went on to be an undersecretary and also ambassador to the U.S. Sukru Elekdag, who had also been a head of the Turkish negotiating team back when the DECA was first negotiated, also went on to become a Turkish ambassador to the U.S.

*Q: He probably was ambassador to the United States during this period?*

DWORKEN: I believe so, because I can remember coming in contact with him when the Turkish team would visit the U.S. for a round of negotiations. I would come back to Washington for that, and I remember seeing him then and also when he visited Ankara from time to time for updates on his instructions.

The U.S. DCMs were different. When I first arrived, it was Frank Trinko. He had a very light supervisory hand; he was not very keenly engaged in the negotiations.

*Q: He'd previously been political counselor?*

DWORKEN: Not that I knew of. He was DCM when I got there. And then later in my time there, Bill Rope was the DCM. He was more involved and engaged in negotiations from a supervisory point of view, although not directly involved in the negotiations, which were still pretty much delegated to my section and me. I had a wonderful section. It included, for example, Jim Jeffrey as my deputy. He was just nominated to be the ambassador to Turkey. He has had an illustrious career.

*Q: He was a deputy in Baghdad, too?*

DWORKEN: Yes, and he was previously ambassador in Albania. He's also been senior adviser to the Secretary on Iraq, principal deputy assistant secretary for the Near East Bureau, and deputy national security adviser under Steve Hadley. Now it looks like he is going to be off to Turkey in the near future. When I got to Ankara, the pol-mil section was already his second assignment in Turkey. He'd already been, if I'm not mistaken, in Adana in the Consulate.

*Q: Okay. Let me ask you one other broad question. You'd mentioned Prime Minister Turgut Ozal. The Turkish military took over and ruled the government of Turkey in September 1980, but by 1985, they had given back power and allowed civilians in. One of their great decisions was to bring Ozal into the position of Economic Coordinator and then Ozal continued to implement an economic reform program when he was Prime Minister, as you said. How would you judge the relationship between the Turkish military and Ozal and the government at the time? Was the Turkish military still very much in control and in charge or had things begun to change?*

DWORKEN: The Turkish military was, and in many respects still is, in control. It's a very strong institution. I was actually quite impressed by it. It has a good, positive history of standing side-by-side with the U.S. in the post-World War II period, and here I am remembering very positive experiences in Korea (whatever less than positive relationships one might recall from earlier times). The Turkish military in Turkey had a very positive aura about it. It has a constitutional role as the protector of the nation, a secular nation, and thus protector of that aspect of nationhood dating back to the days of Atatürk.

It also -- to a very large measure then, and I'm not sure whether it's still true, but I suspect it is -- was the single national socializing institution in the country. It obliged peasants from far eastern, underdeveloped Turkey, who had never seen the Aegean Sea, let alone the Mediterranean, Istanbul, or the western, more cosmopolitan parts of the country, to become aware of the breadth, depth, and extent of Turkey, by stationing them in other places. The Ministry of the Interior, the Jandarma, and all those other institutions of government that had people in far flung parts of the country pretty much kept people in

those areas and did not move them around as much as the military did. It was the sole national institution and as such, had tremendous influence. So its legal, almost juridical importance and its political and social importance meant that it had a tremendous amount of power and influence, hierarchically residing in the hands of a chief and deputy chief of general staff.

There is no question that Ozal paid attention to them. In large measure, he was their creature in the early days. He was beginning, when I was there, to assert his own stature as a national institution, first as prime minister and then as president. He was part Kurdish, may he rest in peace. One of the sadder things is that he is not still alive, because I think he would have continued that progression of democratization and inclusive national identification, including in the great southeast of the country where many Turkish Kurds lived. He began, I remember, in the late 1980's, a range of development projects focused on the southeast, such as hydroelectric and other activities related to increasing possibilities there. He realized that discontent there couldn't be dealt with only with the military instrument. He was a much more broadminded person than previous prime ministers in many respects and would have been good for Turkey had he stayed longer on the scene.

*Q: You mentioned early on the terrorist situation, domestic unrest, and more specifically some terrorist threats against you and your family. Do you want to talk about that a little bit more?*

DWORKEN: To set the larger context, Turkey in the northwest of the Middle East had its share of domestic terrorist groups. The societal troubles of the late 1970's drove the military, or opened the door for the military, depending on your point of view, to take power in 1980 when confronted with great unrest involving terror groups of the left and right. You also have the fact that some Americans, military in particular, were targeted by those terror groups. In addition, there were international terror groups that had connections into Turkey, into both the domestic rightist and leftist groups. These were still active to one degree or another even in the mid-1980's, although quite suppressed by a very effective Turkish security system. This was also the time of the beginning, or rather, an intensification, of a Kurdish insurgency that had not loomed as large as it would in the 1990's, but it was operating in southeast Turkey to a very noticeable degree, such that the region was declared a security zone and in large measure, no tourist travel occurred there.

An additional terrorist threat came from the Middle East; I guess I shouldn't name the particular country, since the information could still be classified, but a neighbor of Turkey, let's just leave it at that. There was a Turkish group that, it later turned out, had been contracted to prepare files on possible American targets. That group chose as its main method of operation to surveil the entrance to the American military facility in the Ankara area, Balgat Air Station. It was an air station without an airfield and the site of the commissary, the PX, the American School, and a whole variety of other support activities for the large American military presence in the Ankara area. Embassy people had access to it as well. This group apparently began to build surveillance files on those people and

their spouses by following them from the gates of the facility back to their homes and wherever they went around town.

I'm not sure of the numbers, but at least one of those terrorists was arrested by Turkish authorities and, in the process of interrogating him, it turned out that when he was shown a series of photographs, he picked my wife's photograph out as one of the people the group had already begun surveilling. This obviously caught people's attention, and American security people were involved. The initial reaction was that I should take my family and go. I went to the head of the intelligence staff in the embassy for advice on what he thought I should do. He laid out for me that the Turks had proceeded much further and had, to their satisfaction and that of their American counterparts, wrapped up the whole small group that was doing the surveillance. They had determined that none of the files the group was in the process of putting together had in fact left their hands; they had been contracted to prepare these things, but they hadn't gotten to the point where they were ready to send them back to the group with which they had contracted. So Turkish security believed there was no longer a clear and serious threat, although there was still a possibility that initial information had been passed along.

When the information first came to our attention, and for about three weeks, I had an embassy armored car and driver and bodyguard assigned, and my movements were all controlled and had to be arranged ahead of time, in case any surveillance continued. Given that the identifying information was about where we lived, where we went, what car we drove, etc., the conclusion was that we could stay at post if we wanted to (we did), but we had to move. When we made that decision, we moved very quickly; I think it was within three days. These actions were deemed sufficient to disrupt any targeting. It turned out that nothing further happened; however, it did mean that we had to move homes yet again, because we went from where we had been living to a place we could only live in for a few months. That first move occurred right at Christmas time, and we had to move again six months later.

*Q: All in Ankara?*

DWORKEN: Yes. And we ended up in the fourth place we lived in during our posting there; that's not the normal pattern. It turned out all right, but it was a challenging time, the first time I had ever been personally under threat. I'd been in dangerous situations in Viet Nam and a couple of times in Laos, and there were general terrorist threats in Greece, but this was the first time I had it pointed right at my wife and then at me.

I should mention as an aside that our first place we lived in was not the place we moved from because of the terrorist threat; our first home was in one of the secondary buildings on the embassy compound in two adjacent, one-bedroom temporary visitors' apartments. This was because the residence we were supposed to go into, where the counselors for political and political-military affairs had traditionally each shared a wonderful villa (a floor to each), had been appropriated by the DCM. He had decided, just before my family and I arrived at post, to take over that building, both floors of it, convert it all into a DCM residence. The political counselor and his family were obliged to move out. I believe it's

still being used as the DCM residence, having been modified into a single-family home. So we were in temporary housing for several months, until another place was identified for us. It was that other place that the terrorists in effect drove us out of.

*Q: I think that Frank Trinko, maybe not immediately prior to being DCM but some years previously, had been political counselor and may well have lived in that building.*

DWORKEN: I'm not aware of that.

*Q: Okay, that was certainly a difficult and challenging period for you and your family. I can understand that.*

*Let me ask you a general question about your role and relationship with the U.S. military in Turkey. Incirlik Air Base obviously was very important, and there are other facilities, installations in the country. To what extent did you have to get involved in problems related to them, or was that done more by the joint military assistance group headed by the two-star general? What would you say about all that? Did you need to travel to Incirlik quite often?*

DWORKEN: I didn't have to do as much of that as I did in Greece. There was a certain amount that still required the use of diplomatic notes, for example, to assert U.S. jurisdiction when there were criminal matters. Those things still flowed through my section to the Foreign Ministry, as they did in Greece. They were much more routine in Turkey. There were still issues related to the air bases that rose to a political level; for example, there were labor problems, problems with taxes on various military imports, and questions of military operating rights and the use of practice bombing ranges.

The fact that we had active air force elements at Incirlik, both rotational combat aircraft from Torrejon in Spain and also a variety of carrier-based and land-based aircraft that wanted to use the broad expanse of Turkey for practice, meant there was a whole range of issues related to ranges. There was a new, instrumented range that the Turks wanted to build or expand in the Konya area in central Turkey that we wanted to use, but there were concerns about the effects on the local populace and whether we would be using the base in a way that excluded the Turkish air force. There were also issues related to the frequency of flights, their diplomatic clearances, and their destinations (whether they were going on to other countries to the east or southeast).

So you are right to bring that up. There was a whole range of issues, as there always are between a host government and the U.S. military who are guests of that country. I personally didn't have as much to do with that on a daily basis as I did in Greece, so I didn't need to go to as many of the U.S. facilities on a regular basis. I visited Incirlik a couple of times and also went to the intelligence collection facility that I believe is not operating any longer up on the Black Sea, and the other facilities in and around the Istanbul area and the Sea of Marmara, in western Turkey, and also down on the Mediterranean coast. The Turks were very good about making those places accessible. They were also very good about taking Richard Perle around to see places, and I went

with him on several occasions. I also remember a visit from Congressman Steve Solarz, who was considered a friend of Turkey on Capitol Hill, one of the few. He visited Turkey frequently, impressed as he was by the strategic importance of the country. On one trip, the Turkish General Staff made available a senior officer and a helicopter to take Solarz out east to places he'd never been before (nor had I at that point).

*Q: You were able to go along?*

DWORKEN: Yes, I went with him. We went to Kars and Erzurum; we even went to Ani, which was on military exclusion lists at that time. It's one of the old former capitals of the Armenian population, right up against the border with present-day Armenia, which is why it was a military exclusion zone, and we were able to be tourists for part of the day there.

*Q: Because those were the days of the Soviet Union?*

DWORKEN: Exactly, and one of the stops Steve Solarz wanted was to see the Russian border. So we went, flying along the border to just outside the exclusion zone, what's now the border with Georgia, but at that time it was with the Soviet Union. We flew up to a point on the coast of the Black Sea where you could land. There was a small Turkish community named Sarp, mainly a military outpost, it seemed, and just across the border was a small Russian military outpost with a large picture of Lenin displayed on the side of the watch tower. It had fences, wire, and an exclusion zone on either side. When you looked at the side of the Turkish watchtower, there was a picture of Ataturk, and the two portraits faced each other across the divide.

I mentioned to Steve Solarz that the then-Secretary General of NATO had made a similar trip several months previously and had actually swum in the Black Sea there. Solarz immediately said he wanted to do the same, and the Turkish military escort scrambled around and found him a bathing suit and took him down to the beach. Off he went into the Black Sea, so that he could say to the Secretary General -- it was Carrington at the time, wasn't it? -- that he'd also as a great supporter of NATO and Turkey swum in the waters of the Black Sea right on the border with Russia. I took pictures of Steve. I developed my prints later and sent him a complimentary set of pictures.

I mentioned traveling with Solarz and with the Turkish military, but my family and I also did a lot of traveling. It was a wonderful post for that. Turkey is fascinating, as a crossroads of many cultures and civilizations dating back thousands of years, and much of it was much less developed at that time in terms of archeological sites. In other words, you could simply walk around and see archeological rubble and beautiful architecture. It was all very accessible, whether on the coast of the Black Sea or the archeologically developed Aegean and Mediterranean coasts, but also inland, for example, the Hittite civilization and a whole variety of others.

We were the only American family in the embassy that had a Turkish-made car. Everybody else brought cars from the States, because of the large American presence and



ability to support American vehicles. There were lots of Turks that were able to maintain those cars in and around the American military bases and the Ankara area, but once you got outside of those, it was 'catch as catch can' for getting cars repaired. Fiat had a plant in Turkey that assembled or produced various Turkish versions of Fiat. We decided to purchase a station wagon. I knew it was the first such purchase in some time, because no one in the embassy knew how to process the tax-free paperwork.

In any event, we took our two young kids, my wife and I, and tried to travel as much as we could. You could get to the Black Sea, Mediterranean or Aegean coast and back in a long weekend, and with a few more days, you could really do a great deal of travel. The roads were good, service for the car was good, and Turks are very hospitable people. In Turkey, I did not have the same problem I mentioned concerning Greece, where every time I spoke Greek, I was overwhelmed with Greek unhappiness with current American actions related to Cyprus and the military dictatorship. In Turkey, I spoke very little Turkish, and my wife spoke only a little bit more, so we were not burdened with Turkish complaints about U.S. policy. We felt safe almost all the time. A lot of personal travel made this mid-1980s assignment even more enjoyable.

*Q: I assume you did not go back to Greece while you were in Turkey?*

DWORKEN: No, we didn't, except for a trip to Mytilini and a transit stop in Athens. I may have been in Athens at other times on business, because I did make periodic trips to the NATO Headquarters of the Commander in Chief Southern Europe in Naples or to Stuttgart to EUCOM.

*Q: Were you involved at all in any tensions between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean or anything else?*

DWORKEN: I was involved. That was another piece of the political-military affairs portfolio. We were involved with allegations of Turkish aircraft intercepting or interfering with Greek aircraft or vice-versa as well as issues related to claimed territorial air and sea space and alleged violations of the NATO alliance relationship spirit. By that, I mean where infrastructure funds and other activities that related to Turkey were blocked by Greece or vice versa. That conflict was still going on.

I don't remember any specific incidents as such, but generally we did go into the Foreign Ministry and attempt to ascertain what they believed had gone on. We did not have in most instances enough information of our own to be certain as to what had occurred. I don't remember any oil exploration conflicts at that time, as there were earlier with the Sismik survey ship.

*Q: And the dispute over an island was later?*

DWORKEN: Yes, I missed out on that completely.

*Q: You probably didn't miss anything. (laughter)*

DWORKEN: As you well know, the issue was still there when I became Director of Southern Europe, following on from you and Ed Dillery. The issues were still there, and we're still making efforts to encourage resolution.

*Q: Was there still a NATO command or sub-command in Izmir in this period?*

DWORKEN: COMLANDSOUTHEAST was the one, and I am pretty sure it had gone by that time.

*Q: You talked generally about many of the Turkish neighbors, but perhaps I should ask you about Cyprus. Did you visit northern Cyprus or get involved at all with things related to Cyprus and the Turkish military presence there?*

DWORKEN: To a certain extent, yes. My trips there had been earlier, from Greece, and my one trip to northern Cyprus had been also from Greece through the Republic of Cyprus. I did not go from Turkey. It's not possible to go directly to the north, and I did not want to be part of the issue of Americans going from Turkey to northern Cyprus, which did come up in a couple of cases.

*Q: In what way did it come up? Did people sort of go in an unauthorized fashion or did the ambassador have a position on whether Americans officially or privately could issue travel to northern Cyprus?*

DWORKEN: My memory's a little hazy, but I believe the issue arose a couple of times with respect to American military people, mainly based at Incirlik or at Iskenderun. They were very near to Cyprus, and there were very cheap travel packages offered by a Turkish tourist agency that American military travelers took advantage of, traveling on their American passports and off duty. Even so, it was not something in Greek eyes or the eyes of the Republic of Cyprus eyes that was to be permitted. I believe the ambassador eventually directed that no one would do that, because of the international ramifications, which upset the Turkish government.

*Q: I think he may have done it earlier as well, but perhaps people needed a reminder?*

DWORKEN: I am not sure that I recalled that correctly.

*Q: Well, my recollection or understanding was that, when he first went to Turkey in 1981, four years or so before you got there, he made it known that there should be no travel to northern Cyprus from Turkey by either embassy or U.S. military, either officially or privately. How he did that and how explicit it was, I don't know. But I think not too much of it was going on in the period I was in Cyprus, from 1981 to 1984. I somewhat regretted that, because I had a little bit different attitude than he did, which was a little surprising; I thought there was nothing particularly wrong with people traveling privately, as long as they were not coming to do business on Cyprus or in an official capacity but were coming for a holiday vacation trip. I didn't see anything wrong, as long as they did not try to*

*enter the Republic or the Greek-Cypriot area and just stayed to the north in the Turkish-Cypriot area. But it was one of those issues that never really came to the fore, as far as I was concerned, but that was my general attitude at the time and that was before you were in Ankara, so that is why I said he may have had to remind or reissue.*

DWORKEN: It must have been a reminder, a formal instruction.

*Q: When I was in Cyprus, I was aware of military people from Incirlik, once in a while, who were in the north, and as I say, it didn't particularly concern me, as long as those conditions were satisfied.*

DWORKEN: In the political-military section, we also paid attention to the Turkish military contingent on Cyprus and endeavored to keep track of numbers, armaments, and that kind of thing, just as a general rule, as part of our watching brief for the Turkish-American political-military relationship. I don't recall any particular issues then, other than their continued presence on the island in numbers much larger than people thought should be there. That came up during my time.

*Q: I suspect you had trouble getting very precise numbers.*

DWORKEN: It was very vague and not something we could directly figure out. It was not something the Turkish general staff made readily available either.

*Q: Yes, it was Americans on occasion who gave the impression that perhaps there was more of a presence than was really the case, to create a certain fear factor.*

DWORKEN: You know, your question about the Turkish military reminded me of another issue that we spent some time on -- trying to observe the make-up and power of the military. In my office, my colleagues were Turkish-language officers. While the negotiations I carried on were in English, and the people I spoke to had very good English, my staff also used their Turkish language capability to become better acquainted with the military. Below the senior-most levels of the military, English was not widely or well known. Many officers who sought advancement would seek tours at NATO headquarters in Western Europe or in Turkey itself and would pick up English as a matter of course, but other than that, there wasn't all that much English-language speaking ability. One of the issues then, which persists, was the whole question of military influence on the politics of the country and also the question of what we learned was labeled the 'deep state.'

*Q: The 'deep state'?*

DWORKEN: Yes. The 'deep state' was the concept that there was a very amorphous group, both military and civilian, that was said to be acting as if it were in charge of Turkey, guiding and preserving the secularist, Atatürkist approach to religion, politics, culture, and education, and thereby guarding the secularism of the state against what was believed to be increasing inroads by Islamists. There was allegedly also, in a more

conspiratorial conjecture, a secret grouping aimed to preserve those in power and influence in business and industry, and there were questions about whether the military was a part of this alleged subterranean, authoritative grouping, or whether it also included professors at universities and some number of journalists. The idea was that just about every segment of society had individuals who were working to keep things as they were and not allow them to be destabilized. An even more conspiratorial interpretation was that there were criminal elements involved as well. And periodically, one would see mention of this interpretation in the media, and then it would fade away.

We were interested in understanding conceptually what that meant for Turkey's future. So we worked on learning about that and did some analytical political reporting. You can see that kind of issue talked about even today, in terms of the party that is now in power and the efforts to block it by parts of the judiciary, the state prosecutor's office, and the military. There were periodically dismissals of military field- and middle-grade officers because they had allegedly become 'non-secular' or demonstrated one way or another that they were 'religious.' That caught our attention, and we thought it needed to be tracked. So we were not purely focused on the military, we were political-military in the truest sense of the term. Mainly, however, we did not get into reporting on domestic politics.

*Q: That was for the political section?*

DWORKEN: Yes. And we rarely handled Congressional delegations either, unless they were focused on political-military or NATO issues.

*Q: Do you want to talk a little bit in a broad way about the extent you were involved in the whole question of assistance and training and all of that, or was that pretty much done by somebody else?*

DWORKEN: It was largely done by the JUSMATT, the military assistance and advisory group, which had tremendous relationships and access to the Turkish General Staff at the highest levels. It was recognized as the entity that had control of the assistance program, unlike the greatly frustrated defense attaché who didn't have control of much of anything, except an occasional exchange visit or scholarship to a service school. The group had its own legal and training sections, and they were fully involved. The two-star general that ran that show was under Chief of Mission authority and was very collaborative with the embassy. They saw my section as kind of an entrée into the other parts of the embassy, and we in turn were the check-off point for major military assistance programs, training programs, and so on. We were involved with a lot of their activities and they, in some of ours, including one of their colonels being on the small working group that I led in the base negotiations. But we didn't formulate any particular assistance or training program.

*Q: Okay. Is there anything else you want to say about your assignment in Ankara?*

DWORKEN: Not that comes to mind, unless something comes up in yours.

*Q: No, I think we covered most of things that I think would be of interest. Well, you finished your assignment to Turkey in 1988, where did you go from there?*

DWORKEN: I came back to the U.S. to work in the Political-Military Bureau, wonder of wonders. I came back to be an office director in an office whose name has since disappeared. It had a long, illustrious history as the Office of Security Assistance and Sales or PM/SAS. But Security Assistance and Sales became Defense Relations and Security Assistance, and I'm not sure what it's called now; I think it's RSAT for Regional Security and Arms Transfers or something like that.

In any event, it was the office in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs that had policy responsibility for global U.S. security assistance and military sales programs. There were implementing agencies in DOD and the military services, but for policy, it was the State Department and the Secretary of State, and his/her delegate, the Undersecretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology (the name was changed later) who had the authority to decide allocations of security assistance money globally. And this office in the Political-Military Bureau was his/her staff, along with the Undersecretary's staff, for that worldwide allocation. In my office, we were also involved in preparing and presenting the annual Administration request to Congress for grant money and credits for military sales and economic support (even though the last program was implemented by USAID) as well as the international military education and training account. And we were also responsible for the policy aspects -- not the licensing, which was in another part of PM -- of the sales of major military equipment items and high technology to foreign militaries.

*Q: So, all of that involved a fair amount of negotiation, both in terms of the proposal to the Congress and the negotiations that preceded it inside the State Department?*

DWORKEN: Interminable negotiations.

*Q: Which other aspects of the elements of the Executive Branch were involved? The Office of Management and Budget?*

DWORKEN: Yes.

*Q: Were you involved in the Congressional presentation and all of that?*

DWORKEN: Yes. When the formal presentations are made, the overall budget is presented by the Secretary and then the regional assistant secretaries are responsible for handling each of the subcommittees. The staffing for that was in each regional bureau, but we prepared the underpinnings. We were also involved in the legislation. There had been for years apparently no foreign assistance authorizing legislation, since Congress had found itself unable to do that. They also had not recently reauthorized and updated the Export Control Act, which governed sales and technology transfers. So what was happening then was that there would be an appropriations bill, and somewhere in there would be an authorization section. That would be it. Over the years, there had been a

pent-up demand for changes to policy, procedure, and practice in the authorization legislation.

During my tenure as office director, we not only had the Congressional presentation documents for the annual foreign assistance budget to prepare, a part of which was security assistance, but we were also involved in the interagency effort to put together a draft bill for a new authorization. That never came to pass in my time, but we went through the whole interagency drafting process. That was an agony -- the internal fights, the battle over limited resources. We faced a tremendous number of earmarks that reduced our flexibility, both expected earmarks from Congress and earmarks that were the result of lobbying inside the State Department or between State and Defense.

*Q: You were Director of this office from 1988 to 1990, so you were there for the 1988 election of George H.W. Bush and then the first year or so of the new Administration. Were there significant changes in that period or pretty much as you just described it? Was that the way it continued, with no new authorizing legislation, as they had in the previous period?*

DWORKEN: The push for authorizing legislation was something that the new Administration brought in, and that was good. I know we didn't get a bill while I was there, but I don't know whether it happened the year after, I'm just not sure. There was also a specific effort by the new Administration to attack earmarks, because frankly, when they are all added up, beginning with Israel and Egypt and moving down the line, so that once you've covered...

*Q: Turkey?*

DWORKEN: Turkey was one of the larger programs, but Pakistan was another, and there were earmarks from the Administration's internal process, call them earmarks or not. When combined with those that were otherwise accepted and known to be coming from Congress, I think we were down to only somewhere between six and nine percent of the security assistance project that was disposable...

*Q: Discretionary?*

DWORKEN: Discretionary, yes, and that small proportion was unacceptable. There were efforts to change that, and they were largely unsuccessful.

*Q: How big was your office, roughly?*

DWORKEN: I remember about a dozen to a dozen and a half officers. I had three deputies, so it was a big office. I had a military officer, a Foreign Service Officer, and a civil servant as my three deputies.

*Q: And there were some other military officers on detail in the office as well, probably?*

DWORKEN: Yes, we had a mix of Defense exchange officers, Foreign Service Officers, and at least one other civil servant on the staff. For the most part, they were organized regionally, so that they could relate to a particular regional bureau. And interestingly enough, every base negotiation worldwide, particularly the ones I had been involved in, in Greece and in Turkey, but elsewhere as well, had a military assistance component to them -- rent of a sort, indicating that the host country was not persuaded that the bases alone were sufficiently in their own national interest. As we discussed earlier, that military assistance component was becoming more integral to base negotiations and formally part of its documentation. My office was involved in those as well. These individual officers related directly to country desk officers in the regional bureaus.

A large amount of my time was spent in the care and feeding of the undersecretary and his immediate staff and the PM assistant secretary and his deputies. But also, across the river at the Pentagon were the DOD policy offices (International Security Policy and International Security Affairs) that had regional responsibilities worldwide and also the Defense Security Assistance Agency, DSAA -- which is now the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DSCA -- which was the equivalent of my office, but much larger. It managed and implemented the foreign military assistance, sales, and training programs, which they did very well, though they thought they should be setting policy as well. So there was a lot of negotiation and collaboration with them, and we appeared together from time to time on the Hill.

*Q: Who was the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs at the time?*

DWORKEN: That was Allen Holmes when I started and Dick Clarke when I ended.

*Q: And the undersecretary?*

DWORKEN: I don't recall whether it was Reginald Bartholomew the whole time, but it certainly was toward the end of my office directorship. (I think it was Ed Derwinski before that.) I then went on to work for Bartholomew; which was Dick Clarke's effort to have me be part of the undersecretary's staff.

*Q: Because he thought with your background, loyalty, and experience, you would be able to keep him informed or make sure he was going in the right direction or whatever?*

DWORKEN: All of the above. I think he recommended me because he believed it would be both helpful to Reg but also very helpful to himself to have me up there.

*Q: Okay, anything more we should say about either your time in PM? If not, then maybe we ought to talk about your time as executive assistant to the undersecretary of state for international security affairs, which I guess was the title at the time you were there, and that was Ambassador Reg Bartholomew.*

DWORKEN: While I was there, we got it changed to that shorter, more general wording. In large measure, with Bartholomew in the office, more so than his predecessors, it was

more accurate than simply 'security assistance, science, and technology affairs.' It in fact had expanded into large parts of the PM Bureau's portfolios and others as well and was overseeing both regional security and arms control and disarmament. Undersecretary Bartholomew had a significant role in various arms control negotiations, including dealings with NATO allies on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and a range of other things. So the old title didn't accurately reflect the range of international security affairs in which he was involved and which his successors would likely be involved in. Secretary Baker agreed. The title change required changes to internal regulations and to the law.

As his executive assistant, my job was to run his office and its staff and to be his executive officer. I worked on the title change, too. Occasionally, I had some substantive issue to deal with, at his request, but I was primarily the supervisor of the eight to ten officers who had substantive portfolios, and I drafted their efficiency reports for his signature.

*Q: In the immediate office?*

DWORKEN: Yes. There were some officers who focused on regional security affairs, arms control and disarmament, high-tech and weapons trade and export controls, U.S. activities in space, and security assistance plus all the other pieces of the Foreign Assistance Act that related to assistance programs.

*Q: And as executive assistant, you probably were also very much involved with your counterparts in the Secretary's and deputy secretary's offices?*

DWORKEN: Very much so. And I represented Reg Bartholomew on several occasions at senior staff meetings, including those with the Secretary and deputy secretary when the undersecretary couldn't attend. So I took on his persona to a degree.

*Q: You were not the acting undersecretary though?*

DWORKEN: No. But there were occasions when I could sign for him, for example, things that he specifically delegated to me. I was not in the line of authority as such, and there were other things for which we had to find another principal to sign in his absence.

*Q: What Bureaus reported to the undersecretary? The PM Bureau?*

DWORKEN: Yes, the whole PM Bureau, before it was broken into its three parts. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in some respects reported to him, as it related to the strategic arms and force reduction negotiations that I mentioned earlier. The Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Bureau reported to him on the scientific part, which included space, NASA, and technological cooperative activities on the international level. He worked very closely with the undersecretary for political affairs and the counselor's office, because of the interrelationships of arms control and European affairs. All the regional bureaus interacted with him, because he held signature



authority over the allocations of security assistance funds. Those are the main ones I can recall, plus a lot of collaboration with the Legislative Affairs Bureau and Policy Planning because of his briefing and testimony responsibilities. He also supervised a small strategic trade staff that focused on technology controls.

*Q: Had you worked with Ambassador Bartholomew before, or was this the first time?*

DWORKEN: I had when he had been a special negotiator working on the Greek base negotiations and when, if I'm not mistaken, special Cyprus coordinator in 1981-1982. So we'd known each other. I'd also known his Exec, John Hawes, whom I replaced. John went on to be the head of our delegation to the Open Skies negotiations.

*Q: Okay, anything else we should say about that job, that assignment?*

DWORKEN: I guess the only other thing to say is that I was on the seventh floor during the time of the first Iraq War. I spent a lot of time, as you can imagine, representing the undersecretary in senior staff meetings, because he was involved in the political-military aspects of both our activities in theater and also our approaches to the UN Security Council. There was a lot of work with John Bolton and John Wolf who led the International Organizations Bureau.

*Q: Okay, anything else?*

DWORKEN: I can't think of anything else, although I could add that the position I occupied meant that I was included in what was then the Department's continuity of government program, so I was briefed and participated in a few out-of-town exercises as a member of one of the teams.

*Q: Well, your next assignment was as political counselor in Canberra, Australia, quite a change, although maybe there was something similar there. I see you supervised a seven-person political section, and you were there from 1991 to 1995, so they were the days of the end of the first Bush Administration and the beginning of the Clinton Administration.*

DWORKEN: Yes. I was the head of the political section under two ambassadors. One was a businessman, Mel Sembler from Florida, a very influential Republican national committeeman and fundraiser for Republican candidates who is also a friend of the Bush family, and then Ed Perkins, toward the tail end of my time in Australia, who was a career Foreign Service Officer and formerly Director General.

*Q: Ambassador Sembler had served previously in another embassy, I think?*

DWORKEN: No, Australia was his first ambassadorship, but subsequently under Bush 43, he served as ambassador to Italy. So he had two ambassadorships, you are right, but Australia was the first. There was a controversy that involved him when he was nominated. He and two other ambassador nominees who were large contributors to the Republican Party were hauled up before Senator Sarbanes and became the object of

Doonesbury cartoons about their buying ambassadorships for \$150,000 each without knowing anything about the country. But I should quickly rise to Sembler's defense. I can't say anything about the other two, since I don't know them or how they did, but Sembler was a success in private business as a real estate developer. He had his own large, well-financed company and was part of what I learned in college could be called the attentive public. In other words, he was an informed citizen who was very smart and successful in his chosen field. And he brought great skills to this job. He used his professional staff and frequently discussed issues with us, and he was very good at mastering talking points and presenting them persuasively. He was very active in the embassy and outside as a public diplomatist, so I'm very high on him. He was one of the best, if not the best, non-career political ambassadors that I ever worked for.

*Q: It's good that he was around to listen and was considerate and serious about his responsibilities, it sounds like.*

DWORKEN: I'd interviewed with him near Washington, when he was back on one of his visits, but I should tell you the story of my first office call on him in Australia.

He sat me down, and the first thing he said to me was that I was going to be the control officer for President Bush's visit to Australia, which incidentally shows the level of Sembler's influence, that he was able to get the President to consider coming to Australia which is not a country that all Presidents visit. So, that was my first task, and I think it was going to happen soon after I arrived toward the end of the summer. I think the President was scheduled to come in September. As it turned out, the President had to delay his visit until just before New Year's Eve because of legislative business in the U.S. You may recall that visit, when it actually occurred, was the reverse of the schedule that had been set up for September; he was to go to other Far East countries and end up in Australia before returning to the US. But in late December, he came to Australia first and then went to Japan, where he promptly threw up in the lap of the Japanese prime minister, which was captured on NHK video and shown throughout the world as one of the more embarrassing moments in Bush 41's presidency.

*Q: You assume whatever stomach bug he had on that occasion he acquired in Japan rather than in Australia?*

DWORKEN: Yes, I felt it was both fast acquired and fast acting, because he was healthy all through Australia. But that's what for many people put the whole visit on the map. That was quite a first task the ambassador gave me.

*Q: Was that your first presidential visit?*

DWORKEN: Yes. I've had others since then, especially when I was in London, where it seemed like everyone who was anyone came every year. To be named control officer for a visit that didn't just include the capital city of Canberra but also two other cities, Sydney first and Melbourne after, was a massive undertaking. So, as you can imagine, that was the primary focus of the first part of my assignment in Australia.

There were all kinds of things that I'd heard about but had never encountered before, as far as presidential visits were concerned, such as the large number of military aircraft, carrying a complete vehicular, helicopter, communications, emergency medical, and support structure. I think we had ten large C-5s and C-141s in advance of the visit, and then his limousines had to leap frog among those three cities that I mentioned and then go on to Japan. All the helicopters had to be offloaded from the larger aircraft, put together, and used and then repacked and deployed to the next place. We had three mini-control rooms for the three cities, and multiple events in each city, both public and private.

I should mention one other thing, because I remember making a note of it. Preparing for the visit did a lot of damage to working relationships with Australians, both public and private. For all the good that the visit did engender, and I think it was demonstratively a net positive, I remember two things that grated. One was the perennial argument over whether our Secret Service would be able to be armed or not and all that entailed in terms of relations with the local security forces. Australia has a state structure plus a federal structure, and in all those different levels, there was always someone bent out of shape, no matter what we asked for. The second thing was how unprofessional were the very junior people who were deployed by the White House in various advance capacities. They were in their 20's, had never been on foreign trips before, and thought that since Australians spoke English, it was okay to come winging half way around the world and just kind of demand things, which they did a lot of. But the Secret Service by contrast was very professional. They were intent on their purpose of protection, but they were politely disposed. They understood the difficulties, and they were much more mature. When they said 'yes' to a proposal, it happened, and when they said 'no,' that was the end of it, it just stopped. They were very decisive.

I also remember one instance of damage we did of a physical nature. We took over the best hotel in Canberra, the Hyatt, and promptly determined, I'm not quite sure how, that their telephone system was not good. So, we installed our own, drilled holes in the walls, tore up floors, and put cabling this place and that. We paid for repairs, and I've seen the hotel since then and it was back in beautiful shape again, but the initial impression was ghastly and arrogant.

There was one momentous event that occurred between the scheduled visit in September and the actual visit in late December. The Prime Minister of Australia was unseated, or as I think it is more accurately put, was politically stabbed in the back by Treasurer Paul Keating. Prime Minister Bob Hawke had come up through a labor union background, with wide experience in the politics of Asia and the Pacific. He had a relationship with people of President George H. W. Bush's generation that went back many, many years. They themselves were well acquainted, and Bush wanted to come and see his old friend, Bob Hawke, and wife Hazel in Australia and pay his respects for all the close allied military and political relationships between the two countries. But domestic politics overtook Bob Hawke. Keating failed the first time when he tried to unseat Hawke but succeeded in mid-December of 1991. He did it ten days before Bush was due to arrive, which surprised just about everybody. We understood that there were machinations going

on, but I can't say that we predicted it until we knew there was an actual caucus vote about to occur, and then it became clear that Hawke was really deeply in trouble.

After Keating was successful in ousting Hawke as leader of the Australian Labor Party, then of course he became prime minister, the host of the POTUS visit. This was incomprehensible to those 20-somethings in the White House who couldn't understand it at all; they asked, how do you have a change of prime minister in a democracy without having an election? Well, we replied, there was an election; it was inside the party caucus, and that was all that was necessary except for a pro forma vote in the House of Representatives. So we spent many hours, my Political Section and I, on the phone explaining to the White House visit staff and other folks in Washington why the change occurred, what it meant, and so on, including why it was in fact democratic -- quite a lesson in cross-cultural communications.

*Q: Did former Prime Minister Hawke then have a role in the visit? Did President Bush see him?*

DWORKEN: He did, but everything that had been arranged had to be overturned. Everything that had already been scheduled, of course, now had Paul Keating as prime minister in the chair. The formal call of the president on the prime minister, the dinner in the prime minister's residence, and all that all involved Paul Keating. So we had to arrange a special meeting for Bob and Hazel Hawke, ex-Prime Minister Hawke, to call on the president who was staying at the ambassador's residence on the embassy grounds. I think it was an afternoon coffee that went on for a very long time, totally private, without note takers or anything like that, a bittersweet kind of thing.

*Q: Were you note taker for some of these that did take place, the official meetings?*

DWORKEN: I was the note taker for some of the larger meetings, as best I can recall, including with the Australian Cabinet and the foreign and defense ministers, but not the more private ones.

*Q: Well, it must have been quite a presidential visit, not only did you have all of the vehicles, air planes, and Secret Service which always occurs, but you had to keep tearing up the schedule and moving it from September to December, with a new prime minister, it required a lot of flexibility, I guess, adjusting the plan.*

DWORKEN: There was never a dull moment. We, fortunately of course, had consulates general in Sydney and Melbourne, so they had teams of people working on those two pieces of the visit as well.

*Q: Did you go to those?*

DWORKEN: I went to both of those, and I went there several times. I moved around with the advance teams frequently and then during the visit, of course, I was part of the party that moved just ahead to each of the other two stops. The President and his party spent

New Year's Eve in Sydney at the Governor General's house and at the Prime Minister's residence, both of which have beautiful views of Sydney Harbor Bridge. It was lit up with fireworks for New Year's Eve. It all made for a very successful turn into the New Year of 1992.

*Q: Okay. What else did you do as head of the political section? Presumably, you were involved with representations and reporting, and you were there close to four years?*

DWORKEN: Yes, it was four years. I worked on a variety of issues; you could superficially look from outside and think that the relationship was all fine and sweet, and everything went along tremendously well. In large measure, that was true, but there was a range of issues. I could tick off some of them.

Australia was an ally of ours in the first Gulf War and had aircraft and ships involved in that. And also, after the first Gulf War, their ships patrolled in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf as well. That was the latest hallmark of what was very, very close defense and intelligence cooperation that dated back to World War II. In fact, Australia has been with us in every foreign conflict we've had in the post-World War II period. The intelligence cooperation has been particularly close. We have major facilities there, one in the center of the country at Pine Gap (a satellite control ground station) and another at Woomera, which in the early days was a test range for combined British-American-Australian missile testing activities, but subsequently was also another facility. Pine Gap and Woomera were authorized under defense and intelligence agreements that I worked on back in my earlier days in the Political-Military Bureau, so I was very familiar with their status and operations. I was also involved in some of the government-to-government dealings related to both of them and to their eventual consolidation. They are both at the same facility now. Australia was particularly well situated geographically for satellite ground station control and communication.

*Q: Also, wasn't there an accord with NASA and the space program?*

DWORKEN: There was a NASA facility just outside of Canberra at Brindabella Mountain, which was part of the space communications system, and Australia was one of the emergency recovery locations for possible use by our manned space flights. They've continued that scientific relationship in addition to the intelligence relationship. There was also a facility that was derived from projected closures in Hong Kong, which was relocated to the west coast of Australia at Geraldton. Australia demonstrated there, as it had with Pine Gap, Woomera, and the deep space communication facility at Tidbinbilla, their willingness to put up hundreds of millions of dollars plus the substantial manpower required to be an active, major partner and shareholder, if you will. The close defense, scientific, and intelligence relationship that they and the British, the Canadians and, to a lesser degree but still significantly, the New Zealanders shared with the United States grew out of the World War II experience. Defense cooperation also included a whole range of weapon sales and high-tech collaborations, airborne early warning, F-18 aircraft, and other aircraft for reconnaissance and resupply.

All of that led to and built upon a close military-to-military relationship. There was a personnel exchange program that involved dozens if not hundreds on an annual basis between our two countries that continues to this day. It's a very intimate and mutually beneficial relationship that we have in those areas. The political section was responsible for the government-to-government parts of that relationship, since there was no separate political-military section. My natural predilection for that kind of activity led me to involve myself in it a lot.

There were also annual talks with the United States under the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-U.S.) Treaty, but since New Zealand's treaty relationship was suspended in 1985, the annual consultations became known as AUSMINs (Australia-U.S. ministerial meetings). We had those on an annual basis with ministerial representatives of Defense and State on our side, and Defense and Foreign Affairs on the Australian side, meeting alternately in Australia and the U.S. Warren Christopher led one of the delegations. I particularly remember that one.

Those annual meetings were quite comprehensive in covering the foreign and defense policies of the United States and Australia, including the whole gamut of issues and concerns of our two countries in multilateral diplomacy and also bilateral issues. One of the main issues that came up repeatedly but was rarely given frank voice, so far as I knew, was concern that the left of the Labor Party, if you will, was interested in distancing itself from the United States in order to ingratiate itself with Asia. The idea amongst some Australian intellectuals was that you could only pay attention to one, you couldn't do both; our point of view was that, if you absolutely believed you had to choose one to the exclusion of the other, you should choose the United States. Many of the economic and political ties that were then increasing, however, were between Australia and the Asian mainland and Southeast Asia, its neighbors to the North. Certainly, its economic relationships were that way.

There was thus friction that built up as some American officials began to detect on the part of Prime Minister Paul Keating, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, and others a desire to get closer to Asia and to distance themselves from the United States. I think that was an exaggerated perception on the part of those Americans. Our political section, the ambassador, and the DCM were constantly trying to persuade Australians that this was an important misperception and that there was a trans-Pacific relationship that was as important, if not more important, so they should do and could be seen doing both. But we also had a secondary role of persuading doubters in the U.S. government that the Australians could walk and chew gum at the same time, that they could have relationships with the United States that were deep and enduring while improving their relationships with Southeast Asia, Japan, and China. I think we were pretty successful in that, but there probably were, even at the end of our time there, still doubters in the American government. This came up, therefore, in some fashion in every ministerial encounter. Of course, this circumstance was exacerbated by Australian rhetoric, which would repeatedly appear to diminish the relationship with the United States in order to seek specific influence with countries in Asia.

*Q: Okay. And I assume you spent a lot of time not only with people in the government but with the parliamentary opposition as well as the factions within the labor government throughout the period you were there?*

DWORKEN: Yes. There was an election after Keating ousted Hawke, and the liberals and nationals who were combined in a more conservative opposition coalition attempted to unseat Keating. They were led by John Hewson, who was the head of the Liberal Party, old-fashioned liberal, I guess, is the way to put that. Tim Fischer was the head of the National Party, more of a farmer-oriented party. Fischer was a Vietnam vet, exceptionally tall, and wore a very big hat. And he was a friend of the United States in many respects. Their Vietnam veterans had the same negative treatment that ours did in terms of their welcome back home. I can remember later in the 1990's, when I was in New Zealand, Fischer led a group of Australian Vietnam vets in a parade in New Zealand that was joined by New Zealand Vietnam vets. They were just beginning to get the recognition that they had not gotten when they came home a generation earlier.

I mention Tim Fischer, because that part of the agricultural-based body politic in Australia was deeply unhappy with the United States. I'm speaking here of grain farmers, especially wheat, and ranchers who raised beef. Such exports were Australia's trading lifeblood, and they met tremendous barriers in the United States. There was an export enhancement program that was designed to promote American wheat overseas and so everywhere Australia wanted to export wheat, they discovered that American exported wheat was in competition. That was a central part of the American relationship with Australia that found its way into those AUSMIN talks annually, and into every conversation from the ambassador on down that we had with Australian officials or people in private life. I can remember my first courtesy calls on Parliament Hill, walking in and being absolutely clubbed around both sides of my head about an issue that, frankly, I knew next to nothing about. I quickly learned a great deal about wheat, export enhancement, dairy products, American-farmed salmon that we wanted to export to Australia, chickens, and a whole lot about beef quotas -- issues that I gather are still around in some form.

So I worked with the opposition, and my section and I worked with members of the governing Australian Labor Party, too. They were always approachable, mind you, and there was no difficulty. Obviously, we had no language problems. We had different points of view on a lot of things, and they were not shy about raising them privately and publicly.

I should mention a couple of mechanisms that were used in the broader relationship with the United States, both of which, to Ambassador Sembler's credit, were given great impetus by him. In one case, he was a founding member of the Australian-American Leadership Dialogue; it's an institution that he was instrumental in helping set up.

*Q: While he was ambassador?*

DWORKEN: Yes. It benefited from his close personal relationships with the President and with General Scowcroft, who was national security advisor at the time. Phil Scanlon had the idea for the Leadership Dialogue; he was an Australian businessman who also had an academic connection, but Sembler was the one who mentioned it to the President, and Scowcroft got it accepted to the extent of having senior American officials willing to participate in such a dialogue on a regular basis. But it was broader than just officials, both young and old, and involved media, academics, and governing and opposition party people. So it was across the whole spectrum of, I'll use that same term again, the attentive public, including private industry in both countries. This is a dialogue that continues to this day on an annual basis with meetings in alternating countries for several days at a time, with fellowships and grants and other subsidiary meetings as well. This was started, nurtured, and expanded by Sembler in his time in Australia.

*Q: And you helped set it up?*

DWORKEN: I was, in effect, Sembler's executive assistant for part of that, to the extent there was U.S. government involvement and promotion of it. Phil Lader was also very involved; he was famous for founding and convening 'big-think' meetings that the Clintons attended, Renaissance Weekends I think they were called. He became ambassador to the United Kingdom. I served there initially under Phil Lader.

*Q: Later (laughter).*

DWORKEN: Lader later (laughter). But Phil Lader was in Australia at the time and was also an early part of this Leadership Dialogue. He was the vice chancellor of Bond University in Queensland, the first private university established in Australia, before going into the Clinton White House; he was obviously a great fundraiser and networker at that time, and he's continued to be that as well.

*Q: And at that time, he was Australian?*

DWORKEN: He was American.

*Q: So he had originally come from the United States?*

DWORKEN: Yes. There was a whole variety of Australian politicians involved in the dialogue from both parties. Senator Steve Loosley was an active member, he was the head of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. Kim Beazley, who was minister of defense and later a leader of the Labor Party and who ran twice but failed to make prime minister in subsequent years, was also a participant. A young man named Kevin Rudd was also part of that Leadership Dialogue, I believe; at that time, he was a diplomat, an expert in China, a Chinese language speaker who was on detail from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and working with the Queensland state government. Of course, he's now prime minister. This Leadership Dialogue has those kinds of connections throughout the political culture, if you will, of Australia.



*Q: And a comparable level of interest and participation from the United States?*

DWORKEN: Very much so. Provosts, presidents of universities, some of our more senior political commentators. I could name a few, but I'll leave those names out. Deputy Secretary Armitage participated recently, as did various cabinet-level officials.

There's one other official but not just governmental set of relationships with the United States that I should mention. That's called the Coral Sea Commemorative Association. The Battle of the Coral Sea in 1942 was, from the Australian point of view, a seminal event in World War II. It was the naval battle that stopped the southern penetration by Japanese forces and in effect safeguarded both Australia and New Zealand. America focuses more on the Battle of Midway a few months later, which was a decisive battle for the whole war, but from Australia's point of view, the slightly earlier Battle of the Coral Sea, when American and Australian ships and airplanes prevented movement southward, was locally decisive. The Japanese clearly intended to take over all of New Guinea and also to move south to Australia and New Zealand. That was the foundation, if you will, in blood, of the modern relationship between Australia and the United States.

And yet, as businessmen, movers, and shakers in Australia were slowly becoming aware in the early 1990's, those generations and the memory of that seminal moment really were passing by. In an effort to awaken the consciousness of younger people about the importance of the relationship, they began every year not just to commemorate the battle but also to have outreach activities, including videos, online expositions, speakers, and all that to push knowledge of it out to all of the schools, city councils, and so on. There were events scheduled every year to commemorate the May 1942 battle anniversary, and the U.S. had been sending representatives. Ambassador Sembler was able to get the highest-level representation that I think has ever happened for the commemoration -- Vice President Cheney one year, the Secretary of the Navy for another, and Secretary of Education Lamar Alexander for a third. (Earlier, when Alexander stopped being Governor of Tennessee in 1987, he had traveled all over Australia on a sabbatical for several months with his family and had written a book about it.)

*Q: Cheney was not Vice President at the time, was he?*

DWORKEN: No, he was Secretary of Defense at the time. You are absolutely right (laughter), funny how the current title takes over.

Those visits, we ensured in the embassy, had as much publicity as possible, not only in the capital city but in as many other places throughout Australia that we could schedule, usually a whole week of visits. We tried, and succeeded in most instances, to get ship visits arranged by CINCPAC Fleet plus aircraft visits and other major military activities at the same time, so that we could make as big a deal of it as possible in as many different places and to have as large a public diplomacy impact as possible.

*Q: Australia is a big country. Canberra is relatively small, it's the capital city, a little like Washington. Did you travel a lot routinely or did you travel mostly in connection with these various events, visits?*

DWORKEN: Mostly in connection with events. I did do some military-related travel to defense facilities in the center of the country and to Sydney and Melbourne. And I made a range of speeches to various world affairs groups and defense schools. But I made it a practice primarily of sending out my people, the more junior officers, and to make sure they got out and around. We had a range of responsibilities, such as human rights and domestic politics, which was a very active arena. But we did have four constituent posts in Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, and a very small post in Brisbane, Queensland, that was mistakenly closed.

*Q: While you were there?*

DWORKEN: Yes. That was one of the less satisfactory aspects of Warren Christopher's tenure as Secretary, the closing of small posts. We should never have hauled the flag down in Brisbane, even if it meant keeping one itinerant officer occasionally there, but that's what we did. I never got to Perth, because of that supervisory practice of sending my people. Human rights reports required that we keep in touch with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs, both minority groups that were mistreated in the past and were seeking redress of grievances. There also were boat people in Australia that had come from Southeast Asia and China, and had come ashore in the north and northwest of Australia and were interned in camps at Port Hedland. So I sent one of my officers out there. I never got to visit Perth or Port Hedland or places like that, but I did get up to Darwin and down to Melbourne, Tasmania, and Adelaide.

With my family, we traveled a great deal privately, mainly in New South Wales, but also Queensland, Victoria, Tasmania, and the Alice Springs area. Both of our boys were very active in scouting and sports -- athletics, soccer, rugby league, rugby union, and baseball -- so we had a lot of weekend activities as well. Schools were great, and life in Australia was great from a family point of view.

Canberra, as you mentioned, was a small, attractive city, kind of a one-and-one-half-horse town; the one horse was the government, and the half horse was Australian National University. There weren't that many lobbyists, think tanks, or much big-city life. If you wanted Greek food at 2:00 A.M. you had to be in Sydney or Melbourne. Now, Canberra has changed a lot. They've become more culturally active, and always have had a range of excellent museums. But the city really was smallish, formed in the same way as Washington, D.C., because neither Sydney nor Melbourne could agree that the other would be the capital, so they found a place about four and one-half hours from Sydney and about eight hours from Melbourne that was in the hinterland as a compromise. They had an American architect as the city planner, Walter Burley Griffin from Chicago. He designed a central lake by damming up the river. It developed as a city of interlocking neighborhoods around this lake, all of which were really more like suburbs. Although it

has expanded now to the point where there are big clusters of population as satellites out from the center, it's still small by comparison to Sydney, Melbourne, or Brisbane.

*Q: You talked about Ambassador Sembler; do you want to say a few words about Ambassador Perkins? I don't know how long he was there, but as you said, he was a career Foreign Service Officer.*

DWORKEN: Well, if I recall, when the Clinton Administration arrived, they were very abrupt in the way they changed out people. In my opinion, they badly treated Mel Sembler, who asked to stay on a few weeks after the inauguration, in order to do what is traditional in Australia, which is to say farewell to each of the premiers, who are like our Governors, in the various states and territories of the Commonwealth of Australia. And the word came back, not only no, but hell no; I don't know exactly what the words were but that was the gist. So he was gone right after the inauguration. Of course, it is natural that a political ambassador is usually changed by a new administration, but that was a bit more severe than it needed to be.

And there was some period of time before Ed Perkins arrived, so I guess half my tour would have been under Perkins and less than half under Sembler. Ed Perkins is a consummate professional. He brought a very quiet but persuasive approach to things, whether it was speaking publicly or privately. He's a man that has great gravitas in the way he carries himself and in the way he deals with issues. The Australians found it a great change from Sembler and the Bush Administration, but they adjusted to it without any difficulty. They knew he was a very senior career officer, which was a demonstration of continued closeness between our two countries. I remember that Perkins raised the consciousness of the embassy on a whole range of management issues.

*Q: He had previously been Director General and Director of Human Resources at the State Department.*

DWORKEN: Exactly, and he brought an awareness of the importance of personnel policies. He shook up the embassy to a very healthy degree. As the new man, he asked a lot of questions about why we had the policies and approaches we had. In many respects, he continued those but added his own personal touch. I remember a very significant one. He asked why there were no Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander employees as locally engaged staff at the embassy. And the answers, which will be familiar to you, Ray, were that there is no one qualified or they hadn't sought such a job. Well, guess what? That wasn't a sufficient reply. We developed our own embassy affirmative action program and a whole range of outreach efforts. That came just at a time when Australia was beginning to focus itself on the misdeeds of the past and the need to make both emotional and practical amends, because these people were Australian before Europeans came to Australia. As the original people of the country, they were no less Australian. They were not unpatriotic in their approach to things; they just frankly had been actively left out.

In most other countries, the indigenous people also didn't have treaties with the Europeans who arrived, or with the British Crown or anything, so there was a move to

have a treaty. There were also all sorts of social questions; there were actually great human rights questions about the present-day treatment of Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders in custody. They had a massively higher suicide rate than did incarcerated white Australians. They also had a higher incarceration rate. Ambassador Perkins made a point of connecting what the embassy was saying and doing with this growing attentiveness inside the Australian body politic. It was a very positive set of activities. I can't say whether we ever recruited an Aboriginal person to be a member of the embassy staff, but I know we reached out to universities and other bodies.

We also had a lot of dealings with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, which was set up to handle a whole range of domestic activities. I can remember my section and I were personally involved in something that grew out of increased race and history consciousness in the United States. There was a famous Aboriginal person who died in the United States and whose remains had stayed there. Those remains were repatriated during the time I was stationed in Australia, and I was part of arranging and receiving them and giving them their proper due. I give Ed Perkins a lot of credit for that.

There was also one other piece of Foreign Service history. Ambassador Perkins was the first director general of the Foreign Service to be named ambassador to Australia but not the last. He started a succession. He was succeeded by Genta Holmes as ambassador to Australia, and she had just been director general. The next ambassador was Skip Gnehm, and he was also director general and then ambassador to Australia.

*Q: Okay, anything else we should say about your time in Australia from 1991 to 1995?*

DWORKEN: Yes, a couple more small points.

One, the ambassador to Australia was also the ambassador to Nauru, which was a small island mainly composed of bat guano...

*Q: ...and a few people? (laughter)*

DWORKEN: Yes, sorry. And a lot of phosphate, in other words. There was a connection between Nauru and Australia. In fact many Nauruans lived in Australia. It made absolutely no sense from the American view that this tiny South Pacific island nation should be under the purview of the American ambassador to Australia when there were three other Ambassadors in the South Pacific, all of whom had more island connections in their accreditations. You remember that the chief of mission in Papua New Guinea was also accredited to Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, but the ambassador in Fiji had half a dozen different island nations.

It was during my time that we proposed and had it accepted that Nauru would shift to the ambassador in Fiji, which made perfectly good sense in our view, since we had neither the money nor the intrinsic capability to cover the island nation.

*Q: Did you travel to Nauru?*

DWORKEN: No, I never got there.

*Q: Did the ambassador get to present credentials?*

DWORKEN: He did. I believe he went once, and then one of the officers in my section, the most junior officer, was assigned Nauru. I think he made one or two visits there. Massively expensive from an embassy budget point of view, so it was very wise to shift that off. I was happy to have that done.

The other thing I guess I should mention of a more general nature is about the Australian-American relationship. There were many Americans -- I guess myself included, to start with anyway -- that had this superficial view that Aussies were just like Yanks: they think like us and act like us, and we are probably the two peoples that are closest in our social and world outlooks. This in part comes from the fact that Australia is a continent the size of the continental United States, give or take, and that it was originally occupied by aboriginal peoples and then occupied by European whites who came from far away, and they developed their country the way we developed our country.

But there are some real differences. For one thing, much of the wide center of their country is essentially not inhabited, nor arable, nor livable, so the great population bulk is near to the coasts. Secondly, it was only when England was not able to send convicts to the United States that she shipped convicts off to Australia. There is that connection, but it also means that their outside population and development came later in Western history than ours did. But more importantly, they were largely peopled by convicts and exiles to begin with, and we were not, and there was a great spirit of individualism in the way that America and Americans developed as they expanded westward in what became the United States.

In Australia, not as much. There wasn't that great movement into the hinterlands and increasing waves of population. But there also was no great spirit of individualism; they grew up dependent upon each other to a much larger degree with a less hospitable area in many respects and much more removed from European civilization. And they developed a dependency on each other and what's come to be known as mateship; they were mates of each other. They and their politics grew up in more of what we would call a socialist environment, and they had a different view of both their own societal development and their relationship to the rest of the region. So while there are great similarities, some superficial and some deeper, there are also differences.

Their foreign policy in modern times was more designed to integrate them into the region that they lived in, with less of the exceptionalism that the United States grew up with. They had more of a multilateralist, integrationist approach to things. For all their European culture, they were less American probably and more what Western Europe has come to be in the post World War II period. Still, it was a very close country to the United States but much more multilateralist in its approach to things and much less

unilateralist than we have turned out to be. That's my little soliloquy about Australian-American relations.

*Q: Well, it also is a good way to end that discussion of your assignment as Political Counselor in Canberra. Is there anything else that we should say and if not, where did you go next and how did that come about?*

DWORKEN: Well, I hadn't expected that next posting to come about. As I mentioned earlier, my wife is a New Zealand-American, and I had also had a hankering to be posted to New Zealand – in fact, I had earlier competed for the DCMship in Wellington and had lost out to someone else.

*Q: Before you went to Australia?*

DWORKEN: Yes. Australia was my second best choice, if you will, but it turned out to be a fantastic assignment, and I'm really happy that I got it; it is definitely in the positive column. And when the end of my tour in Australia was approaching, I looked again at New Zealand, but the position was occupied and wasn't coming open in the right sequence. My bids were focused on a range of things, mainly overseas, and I centered on political counselor to Jakarta. I was paneled into that job preceded by language studies. Had I gone to Indonesia, it would have been during a presidential election that was the center of a lot of attention. (This would have meant a spike in Washington's attention -- as in Australia when Keating ousted Hawke and then defeated John Hewson. Political sections really come alive when there is a national election in a country Washington has an interest in.)

How shall I put this? The ambassador in New Zealand became 'disenchanted' with his DCM and sent her home abruptly; this should have been a signal to me, but I saw it as an opportunity. I bid on the job and since we'd periodically gone over to New Zealand from Australia for family visits, I went over for one and it just happened to involve going into the embassy and meeting the ambassador. I also had an interview with him at his residence with his wife. (He later sent his wife home, too; he married another woman, but that's another story.) And the ambassador selected me as his new DCM.

*Q: This was ambassador who?*

DWORKEN: Josiah Beeman, may he rest in peace, who was a political appointee. He'd been a California Democratic Party political operative. He'd also been in Washington as a lobbyist for democrats interested in the state of California. I think he had a labor union connection as well; he also was a lay leader of his church and involved in Northern Ireland peace talks through that. All in all, a very politically savvy individual who, through his political connections and in the substance of his work in Washington earlier with the Democratic Party, had been nominated and confirmed as ambassador to New Zealand. He selected me as his deputy, so I broke the other assignment.

*Q: Before you started language training?*

DWORKEN: Before I started language training, we were direct transferred from Australia to New Zealand.

*Q: You had mentioned 1995?*

DWORKEN: In July 1995. A little story: The staff at the American Embassy in Canberra did not know how to get me, my family, our household effects, and our car from Australia to New Zealand because in their recollection, no one had ever gone from Australia to New Zealand in a direct posting. I was setting a new pattern. We ended up putting our household effects in one part of a shipping container and our car in another part of the same container and sending it to Sydney and by ship to New Zealand.

*Q: Well, why don't you talk a little bit about your experience there, particularly in the initial period? I think you mentioned a little bit about the context and Ambassador Beeman, but maybe you want to talk a little bit more about that and what you did there. Generally we know what DCMs do, but what was particular about that assignment?*

DWORKEN: Well, from an internal embassy point of view, I guess what was most particular was that, although it was a comparatively small embassy, it was newly designated as a 'special embassy program' post, a SEP post, so my time there was a time of adjusting to that. There were some things that had already been decided by the ambassador and had occurred, but there were also other transformations to the staffing and the workload that occurred during my time there. It was becoming even smaller because the State Department was under pressure from Congress to reduce operations and maintenance costs. As part of that, there was an effort to cut back a number of posts overseas.

My understanding was that the Secretary decided that in order to prove his mettle, he would go one better than Congress and show the Senators and Congressmen who were interested in cutbacks that he could really take a hard look at things and cut even more. We were under tremendous pressure in New Zealand to reduce. We were given a quota that effectively was a cut of 20 to 25 percent, which Washington thought was most easily accomplished by closing our constituent post completely. That was the Consulate General in Auckland, the largest city in New Zealand and very much the gateway to the rest of the country for trade and finance, culture, media, travel, and tourism. It had the largest American citizen presence in the country.

So we were struggling with that reduction. Ambassador Beeman had decided that we should try to keep Auckland open, a stance I very much agreed with, since we did not want to be party to hauling down the U.S. flag in Auckland. However, we still had this quota of cuts to reach and so we appealed to the East Asia-Pacific Bureau in Washington. They turned out to be unsympathetic to our argument that the cuts ought to be somewhere else. When that failed, we had to take the cuts internally. We cut Auckland from a consulate general to a consulate and stripped staff there down to essentially the consular function. Some staff took over non-consular activities as additional duties, and there was

a contract arrangement made to cover commercial services. But more importantly, we closed all other consular activities in the rest of the country. Auckland became a concentrated consular operation for the whole of New Zealand, both the northern and the southern islands.

*Q: So the Consular Section of the embassy in Wellington was...?*

DWORKEN: ...closed; it was the only way to reduce enough American and Foreign Service National positions to keep Auckland open. The embassy also cut back: the protocol assistant was fired, various other locally engaged staff were cut back, USIS was made smaller. We closed the Consular Agency in Christchurch, our only embassy representation on the South Island of New Zealand. I'm emphasizing North Island and South Island, because what we are really talking about after these changes was servicing American citizen concerns countrywide from the other end of the country, from the northern end of the North Island. There was a large American presence in Christchurch, and there still is, in support of our activities in Antarctica; then it was the U.S. Navy and now it is the National Science Foundation. I can talk more about that, because that was transformed as well during my time.

This downsizing was a major change. The embassy had also lost its Marine guard detachment before I arrived, which was a great blow to morale. It greatly increased the average age of embassy staff when the Marines left, and the loss of the Marine house negatively impacted morale-building activities.

*Q: We might just note that the Secretary of State in this period was Warren Christopher, and of course Madeline Albright came in also, I guess, while you were in New Zealand.*

DWORKEN: That's right, Albright came later, but it was Christopher's directive in effect that we were carrying out.

*Q: Let me just ask you: in general, with the consolidation of the passport functions to Auckland and the 20% downsizing that occurred and so on, would you say there was a significant loss in service to the public, both the American and New Zealand customers, or was it basically that Auckland could continue to provide that kind of service that was necessary and expected under the law?*

DWORKEN: In a minimalist sort of way, a reduced Auckland was able to fulfill all that was needed to cover the whole country from one place. We learned a great deal about how to communicate quickly back and forth with courier pouches and commercial arrangements, and we instituted a lot more in the way of outreach activities to make sure people knew that the services were available, just at the other end of the country. But when personal visa interviews became more of a requirement, those people were forced to travel, so we learned a whole new way of making appointments ahead of time and confirming and keeping those appointments. There were some admirable efficiencies that were imposed and learned, so in the final analysis that was probably a good thing. But the reduction in the presence of Americans at least in the capital city of Wellington, who



were therefore able more easily to get to the South Island, meant that the emergency response time to get a trained consular officer on scene went way up. It took much longer, and prison visits and such were therefore much more difficult. The regular outreach activities of an embassy and its constituent post -- I guess that's the thing that got hurt the most. We simply were more stretched and less able to be out there doing the persuading, the representing, the public diplomacy, the influencing that we're paid to do. We had to cross-train officers to have consular-like responsibility, all our duty officers had that added burden. It couldn't be deferred to someone at the other end of the country in emergency circumstances. So there were adjustments and, I guess, on balance, they were worth doing, but the process was incredibly trying.

*Q: Okay, do you want to talk about the responsibilities not only for New Zealand but for some other countries or do you want to talk about Antarctica or other issues?*

DWORKEN: Well, I should mention one other thing in the special embassy program, which is that it did relieve us of workload in terms of some of the routine reporting. We also had no station, we had a tiny USIS, and our externally available library resources under the previous method of operation of USIS overseas had been reduced to an in-house resource center that could be contacted from outside. That outreach activity was repurposed and that area was reduced. Without Marine guards, we had a "lock and leave" embassy, so we had additional security requirements laid on American officers and American staff along with more complications about getting in and out of facilities, especially after duty hours.

There were also small things that I think reduced our prestige and presence. One of the good things about those routine report burdens that were lifted from us was that they required people in the embassy to get out and gather information and to base their influence activities on some of the information and contacts built up over time, and there was less of that. We were smaller, so we ended up being inside the embassy more. I found myself even more embassy bound, although naturally the DCM is more of an in-house manager and the ambassador is more of a public diplomatist and outreach person. There were other small things. The residence I lived in was no longer going to be, after my departure, an official residence, so there would no longer be 'official residence expenses.' Those were cut back during my time there, which reduced representational activities. My predecessor had a car and driver, and I did not; there were all kinds of little economies imposed on us that had their plusses and minuses -- enough on that I guess.

*Q: That's great. I don't know the current status of this special embassy program but at a certain point, I think early on, maybe even before the period you are talking about, I think one of the characteristics of a small (special) embassy post was that it had no DCM position or that the political officer or whoever, the admin officer, would also be the DCM. Was that ever considered?*

DWORKEN: I'm not sure that was ever considered. What we did have was a combined political-economic section where we had one counselor for political and economic affairs and a combined section. All the officers in the section had a mix of domestic and foreign

policy political and economic aspects to their portfolios. Actually that leads to one of the activities that we all concentrated on in the economic area.

New Zealand had only recently opened itself up to trade, in a fantastic way really, and had opened its eyes to the world, reduced its tariff barriers, and expanded its export activities. It always was an exporting country of agricultural products, but more recently they had gotten into international financial activities and had become in their own small way a catalyst for a whole range of very positive economic and financial activities. When they opened up themselves, privatized state-run activities, and became a welcoming recipient of foreign investment, they were minded to be very active in the international economic arena, and they took on a lot of responsibilities to lead trade liberalization efforts.

*Q: Globally.*

DWORKEN: Globally and regionally. They also, of course, were focused largely on getting agricultural subsidies reduced, so they could further expand their market penetration but also so they could encourage less-developed countries to expand their agricultural production and thereby raise their standard of living. It was both high-minded and very locally oriented. We worked very closely with them. The United States was also quite interested in liberalized trade globally and regionally. They saw the Asia-Pacific economic cooperation – I hesitate here, because there never was another word after APEC. There were just the four letters of an acronym in pursuit of a noun. APEC was a meeting, an assembly, or a grouping, but it was not an organization. We ended up using the term, ‘forum.’ I recall Ambassador Mel Sembler, who had been present for APEC’s creation in Australia, saying that the great success of that first set of meetings -- here he would shake his head in wonderment, coming from the business community -- in fact, the only success of those first meetings was that they agreed to meet again. As it turned out, that was important.

APEC has become not only an economic engine for a whole range of development, liberalization, and other activities of an economic nature, but it has provided a venue, and this may be its greatest accomplishment, for meetings on the side that have focused on issues of political, military, and strategic importance in the Asia-Pacific. These were not so much under the cover of an economic topic but around the margins of serious economic discussions with great impact on people’s lives. Such things as the activities in Cambodia for a peaceful settlement of that conflict and then in later years the conflict in the South Pacific related to the rebellion in Bougainville, as well as much larger issues related to Japan, China, and Korea have all been dealt with in one degree or another on the margin of these meetings. APEC has also become, along with the ASEAN regional security forum, woven into standard parts of the annual calendar of meetings of leaders and ministers, even though there still is not an APEC organization as such. That’s the hope, anyway.

In the embassy, we were specifically engaged in preparing for all those APEC meetings, working very closely with NSC and East Asia Bureau staff. New Zealand was, as was

Australia, very mindful of the fact that neither of them alone, nor both of them together (because they had their own special economic relationship), would necessarily have enough weight inside APEC or in Uruguay Round or World Trade Organization (WTO) talks to get anything that they wanted done. But if they could pull the United States out of wherever its current position of opposition or passivity happened to be, and bring us closer to their position, then they would have real weight. There were times they saw it in their interest to do that, and there were also times when we saw it in our interest to pull together. And sometimes, they led and we followed, so there was and still is substantial collaboration focused on trade liberalization.

We did not have ministerial meetings hosted in New Zealand during my time. Having enjoyed so much being control officer for the President's visit to Australia, as we talked about earlier, I was happy to miss out on Bill Clinton's visit to New Zealand -- great success though it was.

*Q: It was after your time?*

DWORKEN: It was after I left, in 1999, and I left in 1998.

*Q: And one presidential visit was probably enough in any career.*

DWORKEN: I agree.

*Q: Military sales were something else you got involved with more bilaterally?*

DWORKEN: Yes, it was bilateral. It is something that I guess still rankles with me, and it still rankles with some New Zealanders that a particular sale didn't actually occur.

If you recall when Pakistan violated American law related to nuclear weapons, testing, and all of that, the United States was in the process of arranging the sale of F-16 aircraft. They had not been delivered, and the sale was frozen. Those aircraft were sequestered in the expectation that they would eventually go to Pakistan, which had already paid several hundreds of millions of dollars from their own funds and from American foreign military sales credit. It was a contractual Gordian knot that left us with a political problem with Pakistan.

Well, after many years, the United States and Pakistan both concluded that the sale was never going to be fully accomplished. They weren't going to stop their nuclear weapons activity, and we simply could not legally ship the aircraft to them. We did not want to repay Pakistan and still keep the aircraft committed to them, so we worked out a deal between ourselves and Pakistan, so my understanding goes, that relieved each of us of the obligations to the other. They did get enough of their monies back so that they were content, and we retained possession of the aircraft.

By this time, F-16s had been further developed into Cs and Ds, and I think Es and Fs were on the drawing board, so these A and B aircraft were not top of the line fighter-

bombers. However, they were still active in the NATO inventory, and they were in brand new condition, so they had a full life ahead of them. When I was chargé, we made an offer to New Zealand. I remember personally going to the secretary of defense and the chief of the air force to offer these aircraft at 'bargain basement' prices, brand new with all equipment, spare parts, and servicing -- the whole package, if you will. New Zealand had A-4 aircraft, modernized over the years but so old they were really good for training and exercises and that was beginning to be about it, but certainly not capable enough to be deployed and survive in a modern air defense environment. New Zealand was very interested in acquiring those F-16 aircraft, and effectively the government agreed to purchase them, subject of course to decisions by their parliament.

Even with a troubled U.S.-New Zealand military relationship dating back more than a decade, related to policy differences toward nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships (an issue that other oral histories have covered to a great degree), we were prepared at that time to offer them these front-line aircraft. They expressed strong interest and began to marshal the political effort necessary to get it through their parliament. However, the National Party in power was facing an election, and there was the real possibility that they would not survive or that it would be a near run thing with the Labor Party. The purchase of these aircraft became an issue, so it was taken out of the run-up to the election, if you will, and given to a select committee for study. And the committee did a long and detailed study which came down to an 'on the one hand, on the other hand' kind of result that raised enough doubt about the purchase that, when Labor did win the election, the new government shelved the aircraft transaction and instituted a new strategic study of defense policy.

As I say, it still rankles that the change of government in New Zealand and the resultant change of defense policy indicated the absence of a desire to quicken again the alliance relationship and have New Zealand be a visible contributor to that alliance. The decision not to do any of that and instead choose a different direction was the death knell for this particular sale. I was sorry to see that happen, because I had hoped it would be a catalyst for another approach to our broad defense and security relationship that I believed would be in both countries' interests.

*Q: You mentioned that U.S.-New Zealand defense relations have been the subject of many oral history interviews, the problem relating to nuclear ship visits and nuclear weapons. Do you want to say maybe just a few words about the state of defense relations in the period you were there? Did you have a defense attaché, were you doing things together, or was not much happening at all?*

DWORKEN: We did have a defense attaché, a Navy captain, and one senior enlisted person in a very small defense attaché office, constrained in many of the normal attaché things that it could do. These were constraints on interaction that went back to the military rupture in 1984. We did have military-security and intelligence-sharing relationships with New Zealand, some that had persisted over time and some of an ad hoc nature that grew over the period that I was in New Zealand. A few of us in the embassy had political-military responsibilities. The ambassador was obviously the leader. I was

involved to some degree, and so were the head of the political-economic section and the defense attaché.

When Prime Minister Jim Bolger approached the election earlier in 1990, his judgment was that, while the National Party position was that the alliance relationship with America should be made right again, and that meant decisive steps in the nuclear area, he needed first to be sure that he got elected. The way to ensure that was to change the National Party position from what I just described to one that was accepting of the codification in law of the anti-nuclear policy. So he agreed to change National Party policy, and we believed he felt constrained by that change. When Jenny Shipley took over from him as party leader and prime minister in 1997, that policy remained in place. Then she lost the 1999 election to Helen Clark of Labor, who is currently prime minister and very strongly in favor of maintaining the anti-nuclear policy, so there has been to date no major policy or legal change.

What we sought in the embassy was to take advantage of a changed circumstance brought about by President Bush (41). He had ordered all nuclear weapons off all surface ships, including aircraft carriers, as U.S. declaratory policy. However, he kept the 'neither-confirm-nor-deny' policy as to whether any specific ship, aircraft carrier, or attack submarine at any particular moment carried nuclear weapons, and he reserved the right to put the weaponry back on board such ships or boats should national exigencies and the strategic situation require. Nonetheless, it became common knowledge very quickly that not only could you look up in Jane's which ships were nuclear powered (that was not a secret), you could also conclude, if you wished to, that there were no nuclear weapons on board a given ship at a given time. This was because, over time, the Chief of Naval Operations had testified in public before Congress and stated that generally there were no nuclear weapons on board surface ships.

Unfortunately, the New Zealand government could not bring itself to allow a conventionally powered ship to enter New Zealand waters or a New Zealand port without first asking whether nuclear weapons were on board, in order to determine affirmatively it complied with New Zealand law. They could not, like other countries, draw on public U.S. statements and tell themselves the answer to that question without asking us. The answer they would get from us then wouldn't be satisfactory. Other countries could ask themselves that question, tell themselves the answer, and live with it and thus allow the ship, aircraft carrier, or attack submarine -- on the surface, of course -- to come visit.

Instead, we tried to shape the environment for a more receptive approach through public diplomacy and private conversations. The ambassador was very much out there speaking about the safety record of our navy and our declared policy. We were hopeful that we were moving closer on that particular aspect of it. We had absolutely no hope of getting the government formally to overturn the anti-nuclear law, since the attitude was so demonstratively engrained in New Zealand's national identity. Its self-projection to the world of what it was and what it stood for meant that there wasn't any hope on that score. We realized that we would never meet the top-line requirements of those in Washington

who remembered how they felt sorely done by New Zealand in 1984 when the government publicly rejected a U.S. ship visit request.

Meanwhile New Zealand, on its own and also with our encouragement, was very active on the international scene; it had troops deployed well over the horizon into places like the conflict in the Balkans. It had joined in proportionately many peacekeeping efforts for a small military force from a country of three million people. They had sent a major combatant ship, one of the only three they had, to the multilateral force that patrolled in the Arabian Sea and the northwestern Indian Ocean. They were regular participants in a whole range of collaborative activities. They had active maritime patrol aircraft. They had weapon systems that involved our two countries. Also, the intelligence relationship, both from a defense point of view and from an intelligence community point of view, had been maintained over the course of the previous difficulties. They were granted more access to particular tactically related intelligence when they had forces deployed in a particular area, although when they rotated their troops out from a particular activity, that window closed again.

So, the relationship had its ad hoc, case-by-case aspects. Nonetheless, it was very close. New Zealand has remained one of our closest political-military partners, if you will. And that incrementally improved over time, as we in the embassy made our arguments and as CINCPAC weighed in from Hawaii, showing how from a practical point of view a closer relationship made sense. That in turn led to higher-ranking visits, such as those by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Director of the National Security Agency. There were other high-level visits, such as the U.S. Trade Representative for ministerial meetings and Congressional delegations. Many of them focused on security and economic issues, such as trade policy and our import restrictions on sheep meat, dairy products, and beef, plus other trade issues that bedeviled our two countries. The quickening set of visits led Prime Minister Bolger to pay an official call on the President in the White House and host a subsequent visit by President Clinton. So, the relationship had been steadily improving and that continued to today, but the nuclear policy has remained an impediment to the full re-establishment of the closest military and intelligence relationships.

*Q: You mentioned being chargé a couple of times, was that an important part of your assignment the three years you were there, or did that happen infrequently?*

DWORKEN: It happened infrequently. The ambassador did travel around the country, so I was in charge while he was somewhere in the country but not formally chargé. He traveled outside a bit: he went back to Washington for consultations and a surgical procedure, and he was also accredited to Niue and Cook Islands, so he made trips there.

*Q: Did you go there or get involved much with that?*

DWORKEN: Niue, no; Cooks, I did go. I went once to join the U.S.-based delegation to post-South Pacific Forum talks, combined with a short vacation. And I also went to focus

on a particular money-laundering issue. But no, there wasn't all that much opportunity to be chargé.

*Q: How about Antarctica?*

DWORKEN: That was a special plus about duty in New Zealand. I think I was aware beforehand that there was something called Operation Deep Freeze, but I never realized how much America had invested in the South Pole Station, the station on McMurdo Sound, and the whole range of scientific and strategic activities in which we engaged in Antarctica. It has become even more important these days. Some of the best data about global warming is from the pristine environment in Antarctica. New Zealand had its own station also in McMurdo Sound that they supported as well; they were one of the major participants in Antarctica exploration. That whole U.S. activity was supported from a base alongside the airport in Christchurch, in the middle of the South Island. The practice was that every year the ambassador to New Zealand gets two seats on the various scheduled military aircraft that go down to McMurdo and the South Pole as a perk and to recognize that the ambassador had general influence over that activity. I got one of those seats once, and the PAO and I went down together.

I should explain: During the winter, there are very few people at McMurdo and even fewer in South Pole Station, but in the Antarctic summer (beginning late in our calendar year and ending in February or early March), there are hundreds and hundreds of scientific and support personnel who flood down to Antarctica. Most of that goes through Christchurch. Most of the aircraft pass through Christchurch as well, because it is a seven-and-a-half or eight-hour flight by C-130 to get there; these are special C-130s that have skis on them. While there is a Coast Guard icebreaker that goes down once a year, and there is a military contracted naval ship that brings heavy cargo in after that icebreaker arrives, a lot of the cargo work is done by aircraft. At that time, they were C-141s, the big cargo aircraft, and a lot of C-130s. C-141s could land on a giant ice runway, but the C-130s had to go down first in order to arrange things for those larger flights. There were only two squadrons (I think) of C-130s in the U.S. inventory that had skis and extreme cold weather experience; one was part of the New York Air National Guard, and the other was part of the U.S. Navy out of the U.S. west coast. The New York unit supported Arctic activities, and the Navy aircraft supported Antarctica. The Navy concluded this was uneconomic, and in one of their downsizing and reapportionment operations, they decided to give up this specialty aircraft. Mind you, these specially built C-130s were equipped with skis that had wheels embedded through them, and each ski cost over \$1 million. They break from time to time, so it was a big investment. That changeover from the Navy to the National Science Foundation, along with all of its associated personnel and equipment, and a new contract with the New York Air National Guard to cover both the Arctic and Antarctica led to a massive change in our footprint in Christchurch. This was a downsizing, again, money saving in one sense but also expense shifting.

*Q: That happened while you were there?*

DWORKEN: Yes. Part of the reason the PAO and I went on that orientation trip was to gather information that we could use to describe the changes to the New Zealand government and public. We were concerned that there would be all this employee turbulence, downsizing, and shifting around. We also gave advice on how to make that appear as smooth as possible. In the event, it was a very smooth transition, one of the smoothest I've ever seen for that kind of multifaceted change.

A couple of things about Antarctica: It was an amazing trip to an amazing place, and the people who are down there are very special in their willingness to be in this small isolated community. They seemed to have tremendously high morale, very much mission oriented, both civilian and military, and very much imbued with the idea that they are in an environment that needs protection. The emphasis on protection of that environment was fantastic. Things in that cold an environment last forever, because it is an icebox even in the summertime. A generation ago, we just threw everything away or buried it in the ice, so there were still things there from the original explorations, like the original huts and their contents that Scott and others had set up. Now, there is a great recycling effort. I had never seen so much care taken to divide cardboard from regular paper, to divide colored glass from white glass, to divide plastics refuse into different categories, and to separate all that, package and preserve it, and then ship it out.

The South Pole Station, which is mainly a dome partially buried in the snow and ice, was beginning to fail. It started out sitting on top and over time, it had become partially buried and encrusted with ice and snow. It was also deemed insufficient for the exploration and scientific work projected to be done there. So there were initial plans, which later came to pass, for building a new station up on stilts above the ice. Whatever snow that blew against it then would go under and around it rather than pile up.

We stood at the actual South Pole as well as the VIP South Pole for photos. The latter is a candy stripe thing which is right next to the runway, so you can land right alongside it. The C-130 has to keep at least one of its engines running at all times so the oil and petrol don't freeze up. You run out of the back of the C-130, run over to the ceremonial candy stripe South Pole, get your picture taken, and run back into the airplane, because they don't stay around very long. We spent the better part of a day there.

*Q: The better part of the day at the South Pole Station?*

DWORKEN: Yes. Our aircraft left, and another one came in and picked us up later, after briefings and a tour inside the dome. That was fascinating. We also spent, I think, four nights, maybe five nights at McMurdo, including some time with the New Zealanders at their separate station there.

*Q: In terms of the American station at McMurdo Sound, there's a big contract support operation in addition to the scientists, and at the time you were there, the military operators of aircraft were going back and forth, correct?*



DWORKEN: That's correct. There was a large contingent of electricians, construction people, cooks and librarians, but there was also significant clerical and laboratory support to the scientists, and a significant number of scientists. There also were helicopter pilots and crews to get around. We went on a helicopter trip into the Dry Valleys, where we spent part of a day with a scientist. There is no snow there, and living things freeze over and then thaw, but the valleys are dry. There also were experiments planned and underway in terms of drilling, measuring ice cores, and looking at the statistics on warming. There was also an effort to determine the rate of change of the ice pack. That's how they know where to put the marker for the actual South Pole, since the marker pole moves during the course of every given year. They have to retrieve it and put it in a different place because the ice pack moves.

*Q: What about American tourism, was that going on during the period you were there?*

DWORKEN: Yes, but it wasn't launched from New Zealand; it was from Chile. But I also recall there was in Wellington a New Zealand-led annual effort to reach an agreement with the Brits, Americans, Chileans, and a few others on the numbers of tourists and tour boats that would come during a given time, in an effort to maintain the Antarctica ecology. As I mentioned, everything is preserved there, but things are very fragile. You can still see those huts of the earlier explorers. Shackleton's hut, for example, has sealskins on it and in the summer, you can see moisture pooling as the skins begin to thaw, but then they freeze over again. I guess over time they will deteriorate. It has been since the early 1900s, almost a century now, and inside those huts are the original glass jars with the snap tops on them and the little rubber ring sealants. The labels can still be read, but they are fading now.

*Q: There is an Antarctic treaty or convention going back to the 1950s, I think. Were you involved in any aspect of that or do they have annual meetings?*

DWORKEN: New Zealand hosted one treaty session while I was there. There is a periodic review of the Antarctic Treaty, which set up a non-exploitative regime for at least 50 years, and there were a variety of treaty regulatory types of activities. There was a strong multinational effort to keep Antarctica separate and "preserved." Some countries could no longer pay the high cost for exploration, and closed their stations, but most countries involved in scientific activity are continuing. Because of its polar situation, with an ozone hole generally above, it was open for all kinds of scientific research and measurement that cannot be performed anywhere else in the world. We saw the various sensing arrays that are placed out on the ice. I know from my earlier days in political-military affairs about the impact of solar flares on international communications, both civilian and military, and that we are observing this activity very closely.

*Q: Okay. Anything else you want to say about your time as DCM in Wellington?*

DWORKEN: When I was mentioning earlier the countries the ambassador was accredited to, I omitted by mistake Samoa. We did have a small one person, one officer post in Apia, Samoa. It is now called Samoa, and was formerly Western Samoa.

*Q: And the one person post in Apia reported to the ambassador?*

DWORKEN: Well, yes, but also reported to the DCM, I guess, since I wrote his efficiency report.

*Q: Did you go there?*

DWORKEN: No.

*Q: Did he come to you ever?*

DWORKEN: He did; he came a couple of times. This was another case when the ambassador made the site visit. This was another example demonstrating that Ambassador Beeman was a very controlling ambassador, almost emasculating in many respects, and he made those visits, I didn't. There weren't big issues related to Samoa that I can recall. Whenever you have one officer or a very small post (I think he had locally engaged staff part time), there were housekeeping and administrative issues that would take as much as 40-60% of an individual's day. He was quite involved with the dilapidated state of the housing and office spaces and whether resources could be put toward something new. I think we were on the verge by the end of my tour of getting more money for improvements to the housing and office spaces, but any more than that, I frankly cannot recall.

*Q: In your notes, that I am looking at, you mentioned -- changing the subject -- encouraged settlement of the secessionist dispute of Papua New Guinea. Is that something you did because you had served there previously or was that because New Zealand was quite involved, or what was that all about?*

DWORKEN: I think it was mainly because New Zealand was involved, but I had background in it and an affinity for that kind of issue, plus I knew some of the New Zealanders involved in the peace talks from my earlier time in PNG. Bougainville was a geographic part of the Solomon Islands chain, with different people from Papua New Guinea's 'mainland,' and yet in colonial times they were put together. The Bougainvillians were on separate islands, with a great copper mine resource and a significant port. They had all the complaints of a minority group that thought they were being disadvantaged and in effect they sought to secede from PNG. The New Zealanders, because they had no previous colonial connections like Australia or Great Britain, were able to offer themselves up as honest brokers. They exercised great diplomatic skill and took advantage of a moment in the secession when the violence had begun to subside -- primarily because Bougainvillian women had told their men to stop the killing after many years -- to invite the parties to come to New Zealand and negotiate. The resultant agreement kept Bougainville inside PNG but gave it greater autonomy, more economic benefits, and other incentives, some of which still have not been fulfilled. That whole negotiation process was something that I watched and encouraged from afar on behalf of

the U.S. government as one of my responsibilities. We were not parties to the negotiation in any sense, but we were very much in favor of it.

*Q: Okay, anything else?*

DWORKEN: Yeah, I'm afraid there are a couple of other things I should mention.

*Q: Sure.*

DWORKEN: Another one of my activities as DCM was to be a member of the U.S.-New Zealand Educational Foundation Board of Directors, the Fulbright activity. These activities have just celebrated their 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary. They were one of the first participants and have been very active for such a small country, with hundreds of alumni exchanged in each direction. Even with their older connections to Great Britain and the Rhodes scholarship program, the Fulbright program has great prestige in New Zealand. The PAO and I were members of the Board, and the ambassador was an honorary co-chair along with the New Zealand prime minister. There were other Board members from the Foreign Ministry and the Education Ministry, along with a number of New Zealand and American business people and representatives of cultural and educational activities. The Board was an effective public-private partnership, able to attract needed funding from the private sector as government funds shrank. It was for me a wonderful experience; it was the first time I had been that closely engaged with the program. I've continued to be a minor supporter at least from afar since then. The New Zealand Embassy here just commemorated the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of these bilateral exchanges, and former Prime Minister Jim Bolger was the keynote speaker. Harriet Fulbright, Senator Fulbright's wife, participated. She made a visit to New Zealand while I was there to celebrate the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the program -- another sign of the significance of New Zealand's participation.

I would also like to add a personal note: In my view, New Zealand is one big small town, and there are many ways of getting to know people. New Zealanders are an open people for Americans, and we share a common language obviously and fundamental values, and although we've had our issues, those all rest on a very close friendship. But New Zealand is the only place I have ever been where they have been so open and friendly. I mentioned earlier in our discussions that my wife is a New Zealander, now a New Zealand-American, and I must tell you that New Zealand is the only place I have walked down the street and had people say hello...

*Q: ...To you or to her?*

DWORKEN: To her; they were complete strangers to me. I don't know how else to describe it other than to say it is small enough so that people seem to know each other throughout the country. It was a great family post for us. It was an opportunity for both of our children to connect with all their aunts, uncles, and cousins. I have more family in New Zealand now than I do in the United States, so that was very good. In addition, my wife worked while she was in New Zealand. I should have also mentioned, when we

were talking about Australia, that she worked there as well; she worked at each of our posts on contract and PIT work.

*Q: When you say she worked in New Zealand, in the embassy or outside?*

DWORKEN: In New Zealand, where you'll remember we had no consular section in our embassy, she was a locally engaged visa officer for the Australian High Commission. She also did some work on a personal services contract for the sole administrative officer. Actually, part of the reason for that contract work was that the ambassador had abolished the Community Liaison Officer position. Not only to save a slot and money, but because he had determined that it was a waste of time and an interference to have a spouse of one of the American employees go around from time to time and talk to employees and family members. I was never able to get it re-established; it was a great negative for morale inside the embassy and in the larger American community. My wife picked up some of the CLO-type activities on contract, which the ambassador permitted grudgingly. My wife had been the CLO for two years in Canberra, and she'd done lots of volunteer work both there and in previous assignments, so it was a very familiar role for her. She also volunteered in schools and the community. I wanted to say a little about that as a personal footnote.

*Q: I'm glad you did. So in 1998, where did you go next?*

DWORKEN: In 1998, we returned to Washington. We'd been away for seven years. I went to work for Marc Grossman, who was then Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, as his Director for Southern European Affairs. That is an office you are very familiar with, having been one of my predecessors. It has the three countries of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus but not the rest of the Balkans; that was in another office dealing with what was called South Central Europe. We can talk about what is southern and what is not; it was more Southeastern Europe than anything else, since it did not include Italy or any of the other Mediterranean littoral countries, but it was several hands full of work, as you well know.

*Q: Who was the deputy assistant secretary of State that you worked for in addition to Marc Grossman as assistant secretary?*

DWORKEN: Jim Gaston was the deputy assistant secretary at the time. That was steady through the whole two years I was office director from 1998 to 2000. Marc Grossman was there for most of that period and then was replaced by Jim Dobbins.

*Q: Well, what issues do you want particularly to talk about that you were involved with as Director of Southern European Affairs in the two years. There were some Aegean differences between Greece and Turkey in that period, almost a war as I recall. Isn't that when that happened?*

DWORKEN: No, it was actually after the 'almost-war' when I was there. I was still blissfully in the South Pacific then.

*Q: You had nothing to do with the 'almost-war'?*

DWORKEN: And remind me of the name of the tiny rock?

*Q: I think it was Imia.*

DWORKEN: No, I missed out on that, but the ripples and reverberations of it were still there. Marc Grossman was a special kind of Assistant Secretary. He had a previous history with issues in the Aegean.

*Q: Why don't you say what that was? He'd been ambassador to Turkey?*

DWORKEN: Yes, he'd been ambassador to Turkey.

*Q: And previously DCM to Turkey also.*

DWORKEN: Yes, he'd been both before he was assistant secretary. He took a special interest in Southern European Affairs because of his previous interest and activities in the area. And he very much wanted to encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes, so he was more activist in grappling with the issues to see if resolutions, if not complete solutions, could be found.

*Q: Even issues that had been too hard in the past or not directly engaging U.S. interests, perhaps?*

DWORKEN: Yeah, I think that's the case. Some would argue that some of those ought to have been left alone to fester. I think it was Marc's view that festering was not in America's interest. I pretty much agreed, and we had a fairly elaborate set of objectives which involved both trying to help deal with Greek-Turkish issues, the Aegean being the primary one, but also to help deal with the issues of Cyprus and Turkey's further integration into the West, particularly into the EU. This was all with the idea of improving America's relations with all three countries. All of those wrapped together formed the core of things I became involved in during that two-year period, but they also kept Marc quite busy. He took a particular interest in them; he left the day-to-day office activities to me supervised by Jim Gaston. But his door was always open to those issues and importantly, there wasn't a staff meeting or a session with him that I attended that didn't have an aspect related to Greece-Turkey-Cyprus, as far as I could tell. And it seemed that whenever I failed to bring up some development in the morning staff meeting, because I didn't think I should bother him with it, he would remind me of it and instruct us in some detail as to what he either wanted written or done.

I should say we had, I thought, a fantastic crew of ambassadors in the three embassies: Mark Parris in Ankara (and then a bit of Bob Pearson), Nick Burns in Athens, and Ken Brill and Don Bandler in Nicosia. They were all familiar with Washington, all professional, all focused not only on the State Department's way of operating as such but

also on the ways of the National Security Council. And all, how shall I say it, were very activist, goal oriented, and energetic, so I never felt that I had to do much prodding from the Washington end. They had great access around Washington both overseas and on consultations. They took guidance well, and they rarely disagreed with it -- they almost always were involved in the shaping of their own guidance. They were so proactive that they knew what was coming up; they knew how to focus all of us in the office, from desk officers upward, on the things that were most important to them.

*Q: Yourself and your deputy?*

DWORKEN: My deputy, Dana Bauer, plus two officers each on Greece, ...

*Q: ...Turkey, and Cyprus.*

DWORKEN: In an earlier time, there had been an Aegean Special Projects Officer. We didn't have that. We just had two officers for each country.

*Q: Well, you have set the scene very well, I think, and there obviously was a lot of Congressional, White House, and political interest group interest in all of what was going on in that part of the world and what the United States was thinking about. As well, other diplomatic embassies would be coming in to see you all the time, I'm sure.*

DWORKEN: Certain embassies. Such as the Finns or whichever had the EU Presidency, plus the western European embassies, and the British, very much so. The focus for the British was at a higher level in the State Department normally, involving the Special Cyprus Coordinator and the Special Presidential Envoy for Cyprus.

*Q: Why don't you say a word about those two special positions and how you interacted with them?*

DWORKEN: Well, they weren't in my office as such, although my desk officers provided primary staff work for the Special Cyprus Coordinator, Tom Miller and then Tom Weston.

*Q: They were both in the State Department?*

DWORKEN: Yes, but in separate offices. In both cases, they had their own personal assistants, but they used the Cyprus desk officers in effect as their substantive staff.

*Q: And they were considered higher than the European Bureau?*

DWORKEN: Well, I think the answer to that is yes and no. Primarily, the coordinator was part of the Bureau. They had their own channel, if they wished to use it, to the Special Presidential Envoy, who was the creature of the National Security Adviser.

*Q: And who was that?*

DWORKEN: In my time, that was Richard Holbrooke and later, Alfred Moses.

*Q: Who had been ambassador to Romania.*

DWORKEN: Yes.

*Q: And an influential political person.*

DWORKEN: Both were. They very much had their own relationships to Congress. Arguably, the positions of Special Presidential Envoy for Cyprus and Special Cyprus Coordinator were both creatures of Congress, and of particular interest to parts of the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations committees of the Senate and the House. They were partly set up by the State Department and partly set up by Congressional pressure focused on the Cyprus issues. But the Special Cyprus Coordinator for day-to-day activities was inside the State Department and inside the European Bureau.

*Q: I think another way to put it is that the Special Cyprus Coordinator in the State Department was a full-time position, and that the Special Presidential Envoy, Richard Holbrooke and then Al Moses, did other things as well that had nothing to do with Cyprus, nearly nothing to do with the government.*

DWORKEN: That's very true. And the Envoy did not work out of the Department every day. Of course, both Tom Miller and Tom Weston were Senior Foreign Service Officers who had already had full careers at senior levels, and they were focused full time on the Cyprus issue. They and their relationship each with the Special Presidential Envoy is something I really was not privy to. There were times I went along to meetings. There were occasions I got into the meeting because I was the volunteer note taker -- that kind of thing. I rarely had substantive contacts with them on Cyprus. My desk officers were very good at keeping me informed, and frankly, that's all I felt was necessary. Their supervisor with respect to the Cyprus issue was in each case the Special Cyprus Coordinator. They staffed his meetings, took care of his substantive reporting, and traveled with him overseas. I can recall attending meetings in the Department and other places in Washington with Mr. Rauf Denktash, the head of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

*Q: The Turkish Cypriot leader.*

DWORKEN: Yes, the Turkish Cypriot leader, to be more precise, or to be as precise but more correct. (laughter)

*Q: So, you were comfortable with your relationship with the Special Presidential Envoy and with the Special Cyprus Coordinator. Would you say that the assistant secretary and his deputies were also comfortable with that arrangement, or was that putting sort of a special burden on you to make sure that they knew what going on? You were briefed, and you probably had to make sure they were briefed as well?*

DWORKEN: I did, and we did our best in the office to keep the deputy assistant secretary informed, but as you alluded earlier, I think there was a time when the deputy assistant secretary was also the special Cyprus coordinator. That was not the case for my time. Then, these were two distinct individuals, by substance and by temperament. The coordinator worked for the assistant secretary and did not report to him through the deputy assistant secretary. The deputy assistant secretary was dependent on me and my officers to be kept informed. He didn't really have much, if any, responsibility for Cyprus as such. I don't think he dealt substantively with those issues, unless they crossed over into U.S. relations with Turkey and Greece, which they often do of course by their very nature.

*Q: The deputies worked more in the management area.*

DWORKEN: There was some of that as well. He supervised other offices of the Bureau as well. We took up a lot of his time, I know, but he had other responsibilities which were sufficient unto the day. When the Assistant Secretary was not available, normally Tony Wayne, the principal deputy, was the Acting Assistant Secretary. So again, the Special Cyprus Coordinators dealt with the front of the front office. When they sent memoranda to the Seventh Floor, I believe it was from them and the Assistant Secretary paired.

*Q: Okay, what else do you want to talk about?*

DWORKEN: Substance?

*Q: Substance, yes.*

DWORKEN: The focus was on getting the intercommunal talks restarted. For anyone who has been involved with the Cyprus problem, this is something that they heard many times. It is an all-consuming issue, if one lets it be. There was a great deal of effort to get that to happen. One of the other crucial factors that led to energy being devoted to restarting talks was the push by Turkey and by those supportive of Turkey to be invited to begin discussions about negotiations to become a member of the European Union. And I mention those many different steps because we were very attentive to the EU process. The Turks were already associated with the EU and had been placed on the path to eventual membership. But nothing concrete had really started in terms of talks about the negotiations, and it was during this period of time that Mark Parris from Ankara and Marc Grossman from the State Department pushed very strongly on the Europeans to get an invitation extended. That led to a great deal of work with the Europeans, such as political director talks and other lower-level talks as we encouraged them to move forward.

*Q: Was there a particular point where the U.S. government decided that it was in the United States' interest to see Turkey be a member of the European Union and that we should encourage that even though obviously we weren't a member ourselves? When we encouraged our European allies and friends to invite Turkey to become a member, was*



*that a decision that was taken or was it kind of a Marc Grossman/Mark Parris kind of move that didn't find any opposition, so they kind of pushed it forward?*

DWORKEN: I don't remember anything in the way of a formal National Security Study Memorandum or Presidential decision, but I do recall very close work with the NSC staff, the deputy national security adviser, and officials including the Secretary of State being supportive of all that. I don't recall any major opposition or even minor opposition. The question really was how much pressure we ourselves would see fit to put privately and possibly publicly on the Turks to get them to modify their positions on various domestic and foreign policies to encourage the Europeans.

*Q: Including on Cyprus?*

DWORKEN: Yes, and that is why I bring this up in this context. The Cyprus issue was of major importance to Europeans who were potentially supportive of Turkey becoming a member. There were countries that were not even likely to be supportive, and France was one of those, but we worked with them, too. We believed it was in our national interest to encourage Turkey to shape its application in a way that would meet EU concerns. We thought that it was in U.S. interests to encourage the West to be more receptive to Turkey, in part so that its alternative could be a model of a different path than the more radical path of a country like Iran. We hoped that the Turkish model of working with the West would be attractive to other countries.

*Q: A lot has gone on since then, and while Turkey may move perhaps in that direction, I don't think we need to get into all that.*

DWORKEN: Yes, there were many zigs and zags. The only event I would mention was that the Turks did get the EU invitation to open negotiations.

*Q: While you were there?*

DWORKEN: Yes.

*Q: The first invitation?*

DWORKEN: The first invitation, the first of many steps in the process which is, as you said, still ongoing. Eric Edelman was our ambassador in Helsinki then.

*Q: And later in Turkey.*

DWORKEN: Yes, but it was in Helsinki -- Finland being the host for the summit meeting of the EU leaders -- that they extended the invitation to Turkey. The Turkish Prime Minister then flew up to Helsinki to accept. Many phone calls, outstanding work by Eric Edelman to push this ball finally across the goal line.

*Q: And how significant was that, the U.S. role, did it make the difference, or was it helpful, or is it hard to say?*

DWORKEN: It's hard for me to get into the minds of the Europeans, because I was quite removed. I was listening in some of the times when Marc Grossman was on the phone with Eric; that was the closest I got in that respect. But my sense then and since is that we provided a level of assurance to Europeans by being as strongly supportive as we were of Turkey. I think it helped a couple of the wavering countries to be publicly positive about Turkey, as did our intense work on getting Cyprus negotiations restarted. Other work we had done in Greek-Turkish relations also helped. I think the most decisive thing, however, was the change in the Greek approach, Greece being in the EU.

*Q: What did that change?*

DWORKEN: Well, that takes us back to 'earthquake diplomacy.'

*Q: Which was when you were there?*

DWORKEN: Yes, it was a stunning set of developments, brought about first by an act of God but also by acts of men, two remarkable men, Ismail Cem, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, and George Papandreou, who at that time was Foreign Minister of Greece. There was a massive earthquake in Turkey, to make a long story short, to which the Greeks provided some assistance, both in terms of search teams and then relief supplies; and the Turks were receptive to it. And remarkably, this help was the catalyst for a tremendous outpouring of popular support for Greeks and Turks on a personal level in ways that, in recent years, as you know, was unknown since relations between the two countries were strained in one way or another.

You mentioned earlier they had almost gone to war over a tiny 'rocklet' in the Aegean, but that was just one more symbol of the frictions that had come up in almost every respect in almost every issue the countries had dealt with. Subsequent to that, there was an earthquake in Greece, and the Turks reciprocated. The two Foreign Ministers effectively seized on these events and the positive feeling they invoked, and they began again to have bilateral talks. They set up a very elaborate structure of committees and subcommittees, which in some respects floundered quickly on the same rock-hard contrary positions that talks in the past had floundered on, but in other ways, they built, step by step, better relations across a whole range of areas. These included tourist traffic, flights of aircraft, the sailing of commercial ships, joint activities, and most importantly in this context, the EU membership application invitation. Greece said it wanted Turkey in. Now, what it said privately was probably somewhat akin to what Lyndon Johnson said about his enemies, which was that he'd rather have them inside the tent than outside.

*Q: Going in the other direction.*

DWORKEN: Yes. It was partly that, but I think there was more to it than that. Greece, in effect, offered Turkey her facilitation and help on the road to the EU and also lobbied for

the invitation to Turkey. I think wiser Greeks saw this as a way to shape and constrain Turkey's potential threats to Greek security. But as I said, it was also a very strategic move by both Foreign Ministers. They gained great public support and praise throughout the parts of the world that paid attention to Greek-Turkish affairs. I can remember going to New York City, as we did every Fall for the U.N. General Assembly and all the various bilateral meetings, including the Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot ones with the U.S. Secretary of State, and others. There also was a special dinner I got to attend where both Cem and Papandreou were named 'men of the year' and given awards and great praise.

*Q: Let me ask you one detailed question and one general question, which will probably be better for next time. The detailed question is to come back to the structure of the Office of Southern European Affairs, when the Secretary of State during this period was Madeleine Albright. How much other Seventh Floor interest was there in Greece-Turkey-Cyprus? Was there somebody else you guys reported to or worked closely with, or just various people depending on the issue and so on? Because at other times, as you know, there has been somebody else designated, a senior State Department type to be kind of the person who watches that part of the world.*

DWORKEN: Yes, I can especially remember Matt Nimetz, the Counselor, earlier.

*Q: And he was later Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance.*

DWORKEN: Yes, but I don't recall there being any designated person at that time. I remember a lot of communication directly between Grossman and Albright.

*Q: And she participated in many meetings.*

DWORKEN: She apparently was the one who drove those meetings, and the Bureau sought to have her drive the meetings in New York, for example. We kept the Deputy Secretary and others informed. The special effort I headed to try and work with the two countries on Aegean differences was something that we reported on directly to the Secretary. We'll talk more about that later, but I bring that up now, because reports on that went to Albright.

*Q: The other issue I'm interested in, and it may not have happened in the period you were there, is the whole question of Cyprus becoming a member of the European Union and the extent to which the U.S. supported that. Is that something that happened while you were there or later?*

DWORKEN: That was later. We had the standard line, which was that Cyprus has its invitation to apply, because I think they had already expressed themselves and they'd already been put on the path. We had already pronounced ourselves supportive, and that's kind of all I recall that we did.

*Q: We didn't say at that time, it would be a really good idea if there's a settlement of the Cyprus problem?*

DWORKEN: Well, I know the Special Cyprus Coordinator and others said that; I don't think we said that publicly very much. We know the Europeans said that a lot to Turkey and laid it out as a condition for Turkey. I frankly don't recall how the EU dealt with it for Cyprus, but for Turkey it was: 'you can't come in until you do not have conflicts with your neighbors.' The idea was to create incentives for all the parties to take steps.

*Q: That's still the position of the European Union?*

DWORKEN: Yes. It's a logical one, and it led to pressure on Turkey to push the Turkish-Cypriots to re-enter serious negotiations.

Q: Okay, I think there were a few more matters you wanted to mention.

DWORKEN: Well, one of the things I wanted to mention related to what I earlier called Marc Grossman's activist approach. What I wanted to sketch out was that Marc was not only working officially and publicly to encourage better relations between Greece and Turkey, but he was also working quietly. There were some efforts he had underway that I think planted seeds for the future, even if they didn't themselves bring anything to resolution during the two years I was there.

One concerned the differences in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey over claimed territorial sea and continental shelf and the related issue of the air space over the territorial sea. These differences have long bedeviled relationships between the two countries and militaries. They still today are not resolved definitively, although both sides would claim that they have the bulk of precedent and international law or practice behind them, and so the issues are in fact resolved. The 'solutions' are not, however, mutually agreed. Marc set up a small team effort and asked me to lead it. Two other individuals joined me: one from the Office of the Legal Advisor, a skilled law of the sea expert, and the other, a savvy geographer from the Geographer's Office. The three of us put together exemplar maps of possible ways of dealing with the various differences, but I won't go into the details or name my two teammates or our interlocutors, since the effort, I think, has remained out of the public eye.

We worked quietly with both sides, in both capitals and elsewhere. It was a very slow, painstaking process of describing our own credentials, interests, and concerns and convincing each side of the bona fides of our talks with the other, so that each was persuaded that we did have the attention of people of consequence. I think essentially we helped plant seeds about the possibilities, should the two sides ever come to the conclusion that they did want actually to negotiate those issues. I expect that if they do ever engage beyond the periodic working groups that I think were set up around the millennium and thereafter, if they do want to enter into concrete negotiations, then the work we did will have helped. But as I say, it never did come to any obvious conclusion during my tenure.

*Q: Let me just ask one question. Did you ever meet jointly with Greek and Turkish officials, or do you know if they actually met with each other to discuss these things, or was it more like seeds for the future?*

DWORKEN: We never met jointly with the two. We told each whom we had met with on the other side and explained their serious responses, but we never were able to put our interlocutors on the two sides together. I was never certain that they wanted that to happen, except on terms that they controlled.

There were two other instances of quiet efforts led by Marc that I should just mention.

One relates to Turkish-Armenian relations. He pushed very strongly and privately for a kind of a 'Track Two' approach to the issues relating to establishing the historical record around the massacre of Armenians in the early 20th century. He quietly asked David Phillips, a conflict-resolution expert and academic to help lay the ground for possible reconciliation. Marc sought to encourage a Track Two effort that would get Armenian and Turkish scholars together to work toward an agreement about what would be mutually acceptable and legitimate avenues for study and research and in the gathering of materials.

*Q: So this was with academics in the Turkish-Armenian Diaspora rather than officials from the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia?*

DWORKEN: Right, it was outside government channels, but obviously on both sides were academics and scholars who had governmental connections and were interested in that issue.

*Q: Well, I think there has been progress or at least some meetings, discussions, and contacts in subsequent years.*

DWORKEN: Right, but a tamping down of some of the tensions involved, not a resolution of the issue.

Another similar quiet effort, because public and open would have damaged if not destroyed it, was our strong encouragement of Turkish governmental and religious authorities to pay more attention to, and be more open to resolution of, issues concerning the Greek Orthodox Patriarchy in Istanbul. They had encountered a whole range of difficulties over the years. Again, there have been some steps made, but that issue also continues to bedevil the Greek-Turkish relationship.

Those were three things I wanted to mention in that area. I could just tick off just a couple of others.

*Q: Sure, why don't you mention them?*

DWORKEN: These were arguably outside normal Greek-Turkish-Cypriot relationships but were still very important to the way each country saw its place in the region and its relations with the others.

One concerned Turkish pursuit of the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party -- known then as the PKK, although it has taken on others names since then, and a designated terrorist organization. Ocalan, the leader of that group, was in Syria hiding out but active in his own circles, and the Turks persuaded the Syrians to push him out of Syria. This led to a long chase, involving many countries, and eventually the result was that the Turks were able to capture him in a third country, Kenya, and bring him back to Turkey in 1999. He was brought to trial and is still in prison today.

*Q: How much of that were you involved with at that particular time or are you describing something that happened afterwards?*

DWORKEN: No, I'm describing something that happened during that period of time. Our office had mainly a watching brief, if you will, but we also had a part in the political effort to encourage an environment in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East that was inhospitable to the PKK and Ocalan. We saw our interests as coinciding with the Turks on that score.

There were other activities involving allegations that American military assistance equipment provided to Greece was in Cyprus in contravention of agreements that we had with the Greek government as to the purposes of our providing that equipment in the first place.

*Q: Not to mention the Turkish equipment we also provided that was found in Cyprus earlier.*

DWORKEN: Right. There was Congressional interest on both sides of this particular issue. As best as I can recall, we were not seized during my tenure with the presence of American-provided equipment in Turkish hands on Cyprus, although we did some work to check that the equipment the Turks had there at that time was not American-provided.

In the Greek instance, it was in fact American-provided equipment. That issue was resolved. The Greek government finally recognized it, when we pointed it out, and withdrew the particular equipment. We were involved in persuading them to comply and then reporting to Congress on having succeeded.

There were also issues related to military sales and human rights focused on Turkey. For example, the Turkish gendarmerie wished to acquire crowd-control armored cars from us, and we ended up arranging a series of restrictions that were, finally, acceptable to the Turks and that we were able to see our way clear to impose and enforce. These restrictions would demonstratively keep those vehicles out of the hands of the particular police units that had previously been accused of violating the human rights of demonstrators and citizens in Turkey. We were able to proceed with a very important sale

demonstrating support both for law enforcement in Turkey and for proper actions by those forces.

Another issue like that related to Black Hawk helicopters that the European and PM bureaus wanted to see sold to the Turkish armed forces, but which the human rights bureau in the Department did not. We believed such a sale would properly support activities by the Turkish military against PKK terrorist activity in the southeast. Opponents of the sale thought this advanced equipment could lead to increased civilian casualties and misuse and spark a wider conflict. The effort to make that sale became frozen and grew into a significant bilateral issue. There were concerns that a denial would damage other productive relationships with Turkey. With the change of assistant secretaries and the arrival of Jim Dobbins, this issue became one of those on a short list of efforts he wanted to make to resolve long-standing issues. He took this one on and was able to use his back-channel contacts to get final approval by the National Security Adviser and the President.

*Q: Let me ask several general questions about the differences between Assistant Secretary Marc Grossman and new Assistant Secretary Jim Dobbins, when you were handling Greece-Turkey-Cyprus. Marc Grossman had a very strong background and served as an ambassador to Turkey and that was his second time in Turkey. From what you said before, not only did he have a lot of energy and intellectual analytical ability, but he also had a lot of knowledge of the details. Jim Dobbins to my knowledge did not have that background, although he certainly was very active, very energetic, and very smart as well, but without particular experience with those three countries. Did that make a difference as far as you were concerned or not really?*

DWORKEN: It did make a difference. You are right about both men bringing a great amount of energy and bureaucratic smarts to the conjuncture of issues related to Greek-Turkey-Cyprus, but Dobbins did not bring personal knowledge to the degree and depth that Grossman had acquired over the years. Dobbins seemed to know the issues more from the NATO alliance and western capitals point of view. They were equally aware of the importance of the triangular relationship and stability in the region, in terms of alliance-wide politics, and also recognized the importance of the region -- especially Turkey -- in the broader Middle East and on the alliance's southern flank, not to mention the former Soviet Union. Dobbins brought, if I could hazard a guess, more of an ability to navigate Washington's bureaucratic channels especially with relation to the National Security Council structure dealing with these particular issues. He also, because he knew less about the detail of it, seemed to rely more on my office for staff work, if you will. So we felt marginally more utilized in terms of providing expertise under Dobbins than we did under Grossman, because Grossman brought so much of that knowledge himself to the game. That's not a criticism of Grossman; it is just an observation of the difference between the two.

*Q: Well, I think that is an interesting observation and certainly one I'm not surprised at. Is there anything else that you want to say about your time in Southern European Affairs, or is this a time to ask where did you go from there? What was your next assignment?*

DWORKEN: My next assignment, which turned out to be the last.

*Q: Before you retired?*

DWORKEN: Yes, before I was retired (laughter). It was to London as head of the political section. Titles in London are quite inflated, because it is such a large embassy; I was the Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs.

*Q: And this was from 2000 to 2003.*

DWORKEN: Yes. I had a lot of competition for that job, I should mention. But all of the competitors wanted to be deputy chiefs of mission somewhere or other, many of them in the European region, and their candidacies for this position fell away. I had already been a DCM twice, and I decided I did not want to be a DCM a third time.

*Q: And you liked the idea of being in London?*

DWORKEN: Very much. I know that with this London job, I effectively put together four English-language-speaking posts in a row. That was not my intention when I set out on the string, but putting together Canberra, Wellington, Washington, and London turned out to be professionally very satisfying, although perhaps not particularly career enhancing. Being number three in the embassy there was not a disadvantage either, whether the ambassador was active or inactive, and I had one of each as chief of mission during that period of time. Moreover, there was a lot of great substance to work on.

*Q: Why don't you say who the ambassadors were, maybe who the DCMs were first, and then maybe talk just a little about the structure? How big was the section that you were head of?*

DWORKEN: The DCM during my whole time there was Glyn Davies, an outstanding Foreign Service Officer, perfect for the job because of his temperament and his substantive expertise. He had been, for example, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. He also was a great public diplomatist going back to his time as spokesman and before. He really came into his own in London where, under the less active of the two ambassadors, he effectively was the spokesman for the embassy on many occasions and the projector of American positions during a very sensitive and somewhat difficult time in British-American relations.

*Q: Who was the less active ambassador, was that the first ambassador or the second?*

DWORKEN: The second. I'll start with the first. I mentioned him much earlier in this oral history, a fellow named Phil Lader, a close friend of the Clintons who had been the leader over many years of Renaissance Weekends. He made his name both in the U.S. and Australia. He is a networker par excellence and very much a master of talking points. He could deliver the message without appearing to be delivering talking points, unlike



our current President [Bush (43)], whom you can almost see reciting the points. Lader also knew how to establish a public persona and did so in the U.K. to great advantage. He reached out to people of all walks of life; he had a very elaborate system of keeping track of contacts so that he didn't slight any segment of society. And he also established a presence on the public scene in the U.K. by being outdoors, hiking the length and breadth of the country, in segments obviously, and announcing where he was and what he'd just accomplished, getting all kinds of press coverage both locally and nationally. It's very impressive what he did.

*Q: Now, you came to London presumably the summer of 2000 just before the U.S. election, the contested election that went on for much longer than usual.*

DWORKEN: Yes. We had an elaborate, well-attended election night event at the embassy, and we had people staying there until very early in the morning, but they left before it was finally decided.

*Q: Ambassador Lader had already been there for two or three years, and he stayed into 2001.*

DWORKEN: He did. He left early in the new administration; they cleaned house.

*Q: So you really weren't there with him too long.*

DWORKEN: No, only about a half year plus. Then there was a gap, and I guess it was the summer of 2001 that Will Farish came on board. He was a personal friend of the President; in fact Bush 43 reportedly called him "uncle," even though he wasn't actually. Bush 41, when he first entered senior public servant life, put his assets into a blind trust, and Will Farish, I understand, was the manager of that trust. A Texan, he had worked in finance and also bought a horse farm in Kentucky, where he was a leading breeder of horses. He became chairman of Churchill Downs and was quite well known in horse breeding and horse racing circles, and he maintained his friendship with the Bush family; it was his house in Florida at which the Bushes vacationed. Farish reportedly provided one of the famous dogs of Bush 43 as a family gift. They were obviously quite close. Farish tells the story that he was in fact to have been named ambassador to London in an earlier time, during Bush 41's administration, but family issues had come up and it had been deferred.

*Q: That also might in part, I think, have had to do with Bush 41's defeat in the 1992 election.*

DWORKEN: Possibly, I really never tracked it down to that degree. The other feature I should mention is that Farish was a friend of Queen Elizabeth II.

*Q: From some previous time?*

DWORKEN: From his horse-breeding time. In fact she and Prince Phillip had stayed at the Farish residence in Kentucky. They had a mutual interest in horse breeding. Enough said on that score. But Farish was the antithesis of Lader in terms of public diplomacy. He was a very pleasant, smart, well-spoken person to talk with, but to be charitable, he did not appear comfortable in public settings. Very shortly after his arrival, in effect his first encounters with the public, were the events of 9/11. It was necessary to have a public face of America and to have a public reception by the American representative in London of the various expressions of condolences and sympathy that poured in from all parts of the U.K. in a very public way. Farish was never comfortable with that and did it as little as possible. He considered himself more of an insider, but frankly, I do not believe he dealt very much with the government on the inside either, so far as I could discern. He left not only that public diplomacy effort but also most of the day-to-day important private and diplomatic efforts to others, primarily to the DCM but also the heads of the political and economic sections and other senior officers.

*Q: And was that also true as far as the inner workings, the reporting tasks of the embassy? Ambassador Farish wasn't very much engaged in that either?*

DWORKEN: Not very much. I mean, the DCM was very, very careful to include the ambassador on anything of consequence, both on internal management and external affairs, as were we all. And when we absolutely needed the ambassador's presence to make a demarche, he made very few, but when we needed him, we went to him and he agreed. There was no discernible effort on his part, however, to run on his own, unlike Lader who did a lot on his own.

*Q: Okay, so how big was your section?*

DWORKEN: It was a giant embassy, over 700 employees with more than 30 departments and agencies of the U.S. government represented. It seemed like everyone needed to have a person in London, if not a whole team. My section was comparatively large, the largest political section that I'd ever been acquainted with. It was around a dozen people, involved in a whole range of political and political-military affairs, both internal political and foreign policy. They were all very talented, hard-working, and effective. Britain is active around the world and clearly continues to be so and as our closest ally, we have a very intimate relationship on many, many issues. They also have deep and broad connections to the U.S., including political party connections. We organized ourselves in the section so that each officer had two clusters of issues. In the foreign policy arena, some were geographically oriented (we had a Middle East watcher and an Africa watcher, dating back to colonial times, I guess) and we also had functional issue clusters related to NATO and other security activities. In addition to that external affairs responsibility, each officer had some form of internal political responsibility; some were connected with Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland, and others dealt with particular domestic political parties that formed a very active segment of our outreach and persuasion efforts. My deputy and I also arranged for some to have supervisory responsibilities in the section.

*Q: Was there a separate political-military section?*

DWORKEN: No, there wasn't; those matters were handled inside the political section. We had people who did NATO political-military work and others who connected with the British armed forces, or dealt with intelligence community activities, non-proliferation, or counter-terrorism.

*Q: Okay, do you want to talk about some particular aspects of your three years there, now that we've talked about the context and structure?*

DWORKEN: Well, the biggest issue turned out to be the Iraq war and the lead up to it. It's well known about Britain's key role with the U.S. in support of the Bush administration's efforts on that score. I should mention, by way of generalization, that the British government prides itself on its connectivity to our government. Unlike with some other U.S. embassies in other parts of the world where much official American business is done through it, with Her Majesty's government, that was not the case. From the highest down to the seeming lowest levels in the British government, they were tied into the American government. There were explicit counterpart relationships established, where each side could pick up the phone and simply call the other; messages were exchanged, visits were arranged, policy ramifications were discussed, and policy decisions were made and implemented. The embassy in many respects played catch up just to keep itself informed. We had to struggle (I'm sure this was not just during my tenure but was true before) to find a role, because the communication linkages were so well established and worked so well. Be it Secretary of State and Foreign Secretary, Secretary of Defense and Minister of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chief of the Defense Staff, President and Prime Minister, Vice President and Prime Minister, or National Security Adviser and Diplomatic Adviser to the Prime Minister, they were all clued in and keyed in.

*Q: And further down as well?*

DWORKEN: Much further down, sometimes to individual desk officers. The penetration of assistant secretaries and deputy assistant secretary-level people, not just on the foreign affairs side, but also in health, education, transportation, and a whole range of things.

*Q: So that immediately raises the question, what did the embassy see as its role and contribution? I mean, it was not just trying to keep informed? It was more than that, I'm sure.*

DWORKEN: You're right, there were two things we were trying to do. One was mainly in the foreign policy arena, which for many people in the State Department is crucial, but there was also a wider U.S. government constituency, and that was to share U.S. policy approaches and positions and to add value by being a check on the accuracy of what was being transmitted via those already established communication channels. Our effort there was to detect and close the substantive loops that were naturally opened up when things were done as secretly as they were done in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and in the

lead up first to the war in Afghanistan and then setting out on the path to war in Iraq. There were senior people, and I know you won't be shocked to hear this, in the State Department, up to and including the secretary and deputy secretary, who seemed not to be aware of the communications between the prime minister and president and the diplomatic adviser to the prime minister and the national security adviser.

We were able to cut ourselves into that, in large measure because the Brits wanted us to act in that way. They detected differences in the Administration almost as they arose, and they wanted to ensure that their views and approach were accurately relayed and portrayed, and that what they heard back from their American interlocutors through separate channels was accurate. The embassy was able to do a lot of that on a very confidential basis. When there were British concerns about American courses of action, for example, our targeted classified e-mail channel (the material was too sensitive for front-channel cables) was especially active. Both the DCM and I -- and to a much larger degree, my deputy (Alex Karagiannis and then Charlie Skinner) -- worked with senior, knowledgeable officers in No. 10, Ministry of Defense, and Foreign Office to ensure that the concerned assistant secretaries, and the Secretary, deputy, and senior people on the Secretary's staff, were aware of what the Brits were telling us and what we had learned. We also worked to keep senior State officers informed of developments between our two intelligence communities as best we could discern them. That was one kind of added value we provided.

The other related to covering the domestic politics of Great Britain. This involved work with members of Parliament; I did a lot of that, and the people in my section, including an excellent Foreign Service National, did as well. There were also a lot of events we went to, or hosted and arranged, and activities we attended. We made a point of going to political party conferences, and we began to host events at those conferences, to give the U.S. some prominence and to help us project our policies. Spring and Fall party conferences are a time when members of Parliament are much more approachable, especially the Fall ones, unlike when they are busy in the Houses of Commons and Lords. We put a lot of effort into that, showing up and defending the U.S. position.

We had a very substantial 'political' outreach effort, and we expanded it in the lead-up to the Iraq war, when the closeness of the relationship between Tony Blair and the President and the prospect of war were issues. There was not unity inside his cabinet, his party, or his government, and there certainly were not uniformly supportive views in the public at large or the other political parties (although the Tories were largely more supportive). We had teams organized in the embassy -- public affairs, political, economic, mixed teams with defense personnel, too -- for different audiences. We worked with think tanks, and we took advantage of specialists and knowledgeable people both in and out of government who were visiting to help in this effort as well. It was a hard sell, especially to the general public. (I should note here that I later regretted not voicing, at least privately, my concern about what seemed to be our overselling of the evidence to justify the war, but I was okay with the effort and the intent, partly because my position required that stance and, besides, I believed the basic prewar intelligence and policy analyses.)

So, those were the two main areas of effort. When necessary, we used that privately arranged set of channels with senior UK government people to put back into their thinking American views. We were a parallel for use by American officials, but I think on the whole, we were probably used by the British more than we were used by the Americans, who chose to deal in those already established ways.

*Q: You mentioned the use of the telephone, probably e-mail...?*

DWORKEN: I sure hope those e-mails have been kept, because they were the only record for much of that privacy channel.

*Q: To what extent did American senior people come to London without the embassy being involved? Did that happen sometimes?*

DWORKEN: I don't think so, at least not to an appreciable degree. There were a couple of instances where people of prominence in the U.S., who were advising the Administration, were in London on their own. There were also sometimes DOD efforts and later U.S. government official efforts to meet with the large Iraqi exile community. We supported but were not fully privy to those visits, and I suspect there may have been visits that were not known to us in the lead up to the war. That was an elaborate effort that essentially came to not very much, in our analysis.

*Q: The large exile presence in London from virtually the whole world, not to mention a very broad and deep diplomatic presence there, must have further challenged your political section at times, correct?*

DWORKEN: It was a very 'target-rich' environment, with first-rate think tanks like the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) plus the London School of Economics, Oxford and Cambridge universities and their various societies and associations, and a whole range of study center and foreign policy associations, and so on. There also was the broadest diplomatic community that you can imagine. We had close relations with the Turkish and Cypriot embassies and the Turkish representative from Northern Cyprus, just to give you one small piece, but also with many of the Middle East embassies. There were royals from the Middle East plus many Middle Easterners who spent the hottest part of their summers in London to shop and enjoy somewhat cooler weather. There was a large African population, a significant Caribbean and South American population, and Asians from every walk of life and every possible flavor of influence and opinion. There was also a tremendously active media environment ranging from the richness of the BBC down to the 'yellow-est' of tabloid journalism, not to mention large and influential cultural and financial communities.

All of these made for probably the most stimulating environment I've ever been in with respect to people who are attentive to foreign policy issues. The combination of 9/11 and subsequent counter-terrorism efforts, plus the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which we

were so closely allied with the Brits and into which she put so many of her own soldiers, meant that not a day went by when issues of the relationship weren't in the forefront.

*Q: Okay, do you want to talk any further about anything specific that you were involved with? I see that you coordinated U.S. participation and arrangements for the 9/11 Memorial Service at St. Paul's Cathedral.*

DWORKEN: Yes, that was a special story I would like to mention. September 11, 2001 was a Tuesday and sometime late on Wednesday, we heard from the Archbishop of Canterbury that, because of their identification with America as a victim of this horrible attack, and because there were a significant number of British citizens killed in the attack, we received word they wished to hold a memorial service at St. Paul's Cathedral. The Queen, Prince Philip, and Prince Charles had already made it clear that they would attend, as well as the prime minister, and they wanted us to participate in the organization of it and include a selection of American officials and citizens from the greater London area. You can imagine all the other activities we were involved in at that time, ranging from establishing connections between American and British government officials on issues related to the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to receiving publicly the massive demonstrations of support with crowds already gathering in Grosvenor Square right outside the embassy, raising additional security concerns. I also recall that Embassy staff and family members volunteered to respond to more than 30,000 (I think) expressions of concern and condolence from the U.K. public in the following weeks.

With the ambassador and the DCM focused, if you will, both on the public face of the embassy and the private work that needed to be done to connect with Washington, I was tasked to head the embassy team that put our contribution together. Between Wednesday late and the service on Friday, we worked around the clock to gather a selection of American business and financial leaders, American citizens, and representatives from various associations around the U.K. We also recommended elements for some of the order of service and the remarks, and we arranged transportation for American participants and access through the various added security elements.

At the time, my mother-in-law was visiting from New Zealand. She was quite concerned about the situation and the threat, as were many, but she did have the opportunity to attend the special service at St. Paul's with my wife in the American Embassy contingent and to see the Queen.

I do want to mention another anecdote related to Richard Haass, an official visitor who was then Director of Policy Planning in the State Department and was stranded in London; he was the highest-ranking American visitor that we had on hand at that moment. He had, as an additional portfolio, Northern Ireland affairs and the intense interest that the American government and people took in issues there, so he was consulting both on that and on the broader issues that Secretary Powell had him examining. Before 9/11, I remember accompanying him to an appointment with British officials and telling him in the car on the way that I had just seen a brief intelligence report that Massoud had reportedly been killed in Afghanistan. I recall recognizing that

this was important information but not knowing much about why. Richard's face turned pale, and he said something about how significant this was, but I frankly didn't fully understand what he meant. Of course, I did later. [We later learned that this was an act by Al Qaeda to decapitate part of its Afghan opposition.]

Haass was effectively stranded in the UK, because planes were not flying across the Atlantic, even though British officers had tried to fly across and had gotten part way to the U.S. and been turned back by uninformed flight security people who probably should have let the plane through. In any event, he wanted to return as soon as possible to meet with the Secretary. In the interim, we arranged for him to be in the front row at St. Paul's Cathedral, just along from the Prime Minister and American ambassador. At the last moment, word came on Friday morning that United Airlines was beginning to resume flying back to the States, and Haass decided that he should get back, and so off he went straight to the airport and Washington.

That left a gaping hole in the front row of seats of St. Paul's Cathedral. I consulted quickly with the ambassador and DCM, and since we could come up with no single replacement American VIP that we wanted to lift out of our very carefully arranged seating order, I took that seat in the front row. And lo and behold, BBC television having covered this service and broadcast it worldwide, I found later that my image was beamed around the world. It was when we were all standing and singing a hymn, and the camera panned across the Royal Family and then across the aisle at the front, catching first the Prime Minister and the ambassador plus wives and then, just before it moved back again, it caught me. So I heard from relatives and acquaintances in New Zealand and Australia that they saw me. That was my one 'moment of fame.'

*Q: Well, what else in London should we be talking about?*

DWORKEN: I did mention visitors, but I should make a point of how much of an inundation there is of visitors to London. It is by far, and we kept careful track, the most heavily visited place where there is an American embassy. All those linkages and connections I mentioned earlier meant that every one of those individuals visited, passed through, or consulted in London en route to just about everywhere. So we had people ranging from the most junior embassy officer assigned to Nairobi say passing through for consultations and requiring a schedule to be arranged, all the way up to and including the President, frequently.

I thought I'd had the last of presidential visits in Australia and conveniently missed the work of the presidential visit to New Zealand, and it never occurred to me until I got to London that I'd get to work on multiple visits of the President, the Secretary, and just about every other cabinet officer you could think of. They never visited Europe without passing through London, it seemed, and en route to all other parts of the world, they still passed through London. We also had to arrange supplemental schedules for the whole raft of people who accompanied the principal. I should also mention that there was Congressional delegation after delegation that always seemed either to start in London or

rest and recuperate in London on their way home. We also marked several trade promotion visits by governors, including Jeb Bush, I recall. He came when I was chargé.

It was the first time I worked in an embassy that had a section dedicated to handling visitors. We even had standard practices that for any other embassy in the world would be foolishness. For example, we didn't go out to the airport and meet anyone below the rank of undersecretary. If you were an assistant secretary and visited anywhere else in the world, the embassy would probably fall all over itself to receive you. In Papua New Guinea, we had one assistant secretary visit, and we thought we were blessed with a visit from one of the most important persons in the world. In London, for an assistant secretary, we sometimes just left their schedule at a hotel and on occasion, we would accompany them. There were so many visitors, there was no other way we could function.

*Q: You referred to the visit with Governor Jeb Bush of Florida when you were chargé, and I guess my question is, how often as the third-ranking officer in the embassy did you serve as in-charge of the embassy? Was that just occasional or happen very often?*

DWORKEN: I was frequently acting as deputy chief of mission, because I was in the Senior Foreign Service and higher ranked than the other senior officers in the embassy. Also, frankly, I had an outstanding relationship with the DCM. He relied on me, and so I did a lot of work as acting DCM. I was chargé a few times, but when the ambassador was not present, the DCM was, mostly. I mentioned that Ambassador Farish was less active than Ambassador Lader in the public diplomacy and representational areas. That meant that a lot of activities in a very active environment were delegated and, if the DCM couldn't handle them all or didn't choose to, many of them fell to me and other embassy seniors. There were many times I represented the ambassador at very visible events, such as the anniversaries of the Battle of Hastings and the signing of the Magna Carta, the Lord Mayor's parade and other functions, etc.

One I especially enjoyed was traveling to Stratford-on-Avon for the annual celebration and commemoration of Shakespeare's birthday. It involved not only a parade and attending a Shakespearean play, but also having dinner with the Lord Mayor. I went there with my wife, and we were involved along with one of the embassy cultural affairs officers in dedicating a sculpture in a sculpture garden behind one of the houses that Shakespeare lived in. The sculptor was Greg Wyatt, whom you may know as the sculptor of that eagle that has its wings upraised in one of the interior courtyards at the State Department. We helped officiate at that and made remarks.

There were several occasions like that, where we were well received by local communities and presented both an official and a personal face on American representation. Being chargé or acting deputy chief of mission in the London embassy was probably the time when I had the most people under at least my general supervision, although the time when I had the most responsibility I think probably goes back to Vietnam and Laos.



*Q: Your first assignment?*

DWORKEN: My first two assignments, when in the Laos case, there were life and death decisions. But I think my whole Foreign Service experience had prepared me for the more public activities in which I engaged in London, the speeches and participation in think tank events and presentations to various defense academies and also to the general public. And my organizational skills came to the fore not only in the St. Paul's Cathedral ceremony but also in many other embassy events like those in support of the visiting President. We seemed always to have the control officer for the President's visits in the political section.

*Q: Not necessarily you, though?*

DWORKEN: No, I learned long ago that kind of control officer responsibility should be delegated and supervised, rather than have it on my own shoulders, as it was in Australia. I spread that responsibility around inside the section the best I could, as I also did for the organizing of events for the political party conferences. I traveled less than my staff members did; I made a point of that, because it was important to get them out of the office. I also tried to spread those responsibilities into other sections of the embassy. It seemed everyone thought the political section did such a good job that we had an inordinate share, even when the subject matter seemed to be more on defense, economics, drug eradication, or whatever.

*Q: Okay, anything else you want to say about your time in London?*

DWORKEN: Well, the only other thing I should mention that was of note, and I'm sure this is the case for every Foreign Service Officer who serves in London, is that it is an amazing place. Even when there are differences of view over very significant issues, like war and peace, personal relations with the citizens of the United Kingdom are good. We Americans have basically a grand connection with Britain, and we derive much pleasure from royal events, both watching them and attending them. As an embassy member, we were in a rotation to go to the annual diplomatic dinner and the annual garden party, both of those in Buckingham Palace. My wife and I got to go. We also were there at the time of the 50th anniversary of Queen Elizabeth's coronation, which led on to a whole range of activities, some of which we were able to attend. We were also able to attend the lying in state and the memorial service when the Queen Mother died. There were also annual commemorations of historic battles and wreath-layings.

I also got to accompany the new American ambassador as he presented credentials. The palace sent two horse drawn carriages to pick up Ambassador and Mrs. Farish and I think it was six of us senior embassy officers. We had to rent morning coats for the event. The streets were closed off; the two royal carriages went around Grosvenor Square and pulled up in front of the embassy (this was before 9/11, when you could come right to the front of the embassy). We mounted those carriages and were taken to Buckingham Palace, ushered in, and presented to the Queen. We'd been trained ahead of time on how many steps to take forward, when the doors would open, when we put out our hand to her, and

how many sentences we were allowed to exchange with her, and all that. She asked each of us what we did, I think, and to my reply that I observed and reported on domestic political affairs, she commented that must be interesting, with a smile. It was great fun.

I should also mention another royal event, almost by way of conclusion. When our older son was visiting us from Cornell and our younger son was still with us and attending the American School of London, the four of us went to Ascot for the special day of racing. We three men rented the whole morning coat outfit plus top hats, and with my wife, we all drove out to Ascot, enjoyed a formal picnic with colleagues, and were part of the royal festivities of that day. I have this wonderful picture of the three of us in top hats.

*Q: But she had a hat on too, I assume?*

DWORKEN: Yes, but not a top hat, rather a lovely large hat, as did all the women who were there. It was great fun to rub shoulders with that kind of thing; I don't think I'd want to do it every day.

*Q: Well, that was a good assignment for you, Mort. I can tell it was sort of a fun one in many ways and also brought together, as you said, a lot of your previous experience, expertise, and skill for you to be part of a very large organization but also doing important work. I congratulate you on it.*

DWORKEN: Thank you.

*Q: Anything else you want to say, as you are looking back over how many years?*

DWORKEN: Thirty-five-plus years of active duty, from mid-1968 to mid-2003.

*Q: Do you want to say a few words, either about general reflections on that or about what you did after you retired?*

DWORKEN: I did give some thought to that upon retirement. The State Department has an excellent transition center and series of transition courses, albeit truncated somewhat by Jesse Helms' successful effort to cut the previous 90 days of pay down to 60 days before we go off into our next life. This great program of reorienting oneself to post-Foreign Service life, whether it is full or semi-retirement or full-time work in another area, has a job search component and is also oriented on confronting the psychological changes. Being inside State is different from the outside world, even though we may not think that while we are inside. This program helped me make the difficult mental transitions.

I left the Foreign Service not because I wanted to leave it, but because the up-or-out system required it. I had risen to the level of minister counselor and had reached the end of 14 years of tenure in the Senior Foreign Service. To stay on and compete for another promotion, I would have needed to have been an assistant secretary or a chief of mission -- i.e., a Presidential appointee. While the Foreign Service itself was a presidential

appointment, it was by list and not by individual. Having to leave rankled a bit, because as I think you can tell, I really enjoyed the work I was doing, thought it was important, and wanted to continue it.

I had a couple of times made a run at an ambassadorship; actually, it was three times when I thought that the opportunity opened up. The first time was earlier in my career, when there was an offer to be the bureau candidate for a small post in the Pacific. We looked very seriously at it, my wife and I, and we concluded that since there was no good schooling whatsoever on that island, we would be forced to have both of our young boys at a private school in Hawaii. There were, I think, only two airplane connections a week to Hawaii, so it was a break up of our family and a creation of a kind of unnatural remoteness that we didn't want, and it led me to turn that down. There is no doubt in my mind that, had I been the bureau candidate, it would have been tantamount to getting the position.

That was an opportunity not taken, but not one I greatly regretted, because we made a logical decision. The other two times I competed for such a position, as a senior, I came in second and was not selected; I was not the bureau candidate, but I was on their short list that went to the D Committee.

Every Foreign Service Officer wants eventually to become an ambassador, or so we all thought. I did. I had the opportunity during several of my later posts to be acting as ambassador, and personally, I think that I would have been good at it -- but that's enough on the regret side. I think I had a great career, even though I never had my own post.

As for the quality of my supervisors, arguably I had one less-than-wonderful one, but other than that, I had a series of ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission who were first rate and almost across-the-board, a joy to work for. To work on important issues, to make what I think were significant contributions to policy formulation and implementation and, in the later parts in my career, to work on the public diplomacy and private persuasion aspects of American foreign policy and representation overseas were great honors. I still maintain my interest in foreign affairs, needless to say, and my connections with the State Department are ongoing.

*Q: Well, let me just say at this point, how much I have enjoyed this interview and these conversations we have had over the past four months or so. I think you would have been a great chief of mission or ambassador, I think you had a really fine career, and I can certainly tell from our conversations how much you enjoyed it and how much you contributed. For me, it has been an honor and pleasure to talk with you about it. I sense your enthusiasm, joy, and satisfaction from what you did and where you were. I know you continue to be interested in the foreign affairs field; I am glad you are, and I think there will be many opportunities for you ahead.*

*I would just say that with regard to the chief of mission selection process, it is very kind of hit and miss, and it has a lot to do with timing and other circumstances that are not terribly objective or fully measured. So, I think the fact that it didn't work for you was too*

*bad, but you really did a lot. I am glad to have filled in many of the details that escape me over the last years, because we worked together for one brief period, and I was aware of you doing other things but certainly not to the extent that you were involved in some really interesting places and things.*

DWORKEN: Well, thank you, Ray, that is very nice of you to say.

I should recall for the record that one of the things I didn't mention earlier that went on during my directorship of Southern European affairs was work on finally getting an agreed new status of forces agreement (a SOFA) between Greece and the United States. That is something I understand you worked on at an earlier time, or at least were prepared to work on as head of delegation had it been a propitious moment for that; however, that propitious moment didn't come until I guess almost ten years later.

*Q: I guess my involvement that you mentioned was in 1984 or 1985.*

DWORKEN: And this was in the late 1990's, nearly 15 years later that the new SOFA was finally done. It shows you the continuity especially related to matters in Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus.

*Q: Well, certainly continuity, but you have to seize the moment, and sometimes when the moment isn't there, there isn't much you can do except ride it out and wait for a better moment.*

DWORKEN: There is a Foreign Service skill in that, too: to know when those moments are and how to ride it out.

I should mention a little bit about what I did after retirement. I thought I would do some part-time work, probably related to the State Department. As part of my networking in State looking for that work, I went back one of my 'home' bureaus, the Political-Military Bureau. When I stopped by there, they had just been informed of the departure of another retiree from a job in Tampa, Florida; the fellow's name was Kent Weidemann, who had been ambassador to Phnom Penh and who, upon retirement, first had gone to Ft. Bragg in North Carolina, but then down to Tampa to work for the Special Operations Command.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, that command had been given a whole range of counter-terrorism responsibilities to add to those it already had. They needed foreign policy-type advice to a greater degree than they, or any other major military command, had had from the existing political advisers provided by the State Department. In fact, they needed additional officers so badly that when they had gone to the State Department, sought additional officers, and the Department said it didn't have enough officers and positions to provide more, the command had gone out and contracted for them. It was one of those contract positions that had suddenly become vacant because of an illness in Kent's family.

I didn't know much about living in Florida or much about the job, but my wife and I did go down for an interview. I was very much attracted to the job. They were setting up at that time a larger interagency contingent than they had ever had before, which meant letting other agency personnel into what was a quite closed and secretive approach to activities that Special Operations Forces participate in. Their general nature was to coordinate with as few parts of the U.S. government as possible and only in very narrow ways. But with their new set of missions and the new responsibilities given to them by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and the President, they had quickly seen the need for connectivity with the FBI, Treasury, CIA, State, AID, and others, much more so than they had ever accomplished before. It looked interesting, and Anna and I ended up moving to Tampa and working on a contract basis for a company that provided me to the command.

I worked in the Center for Special Operations as they took on their new responsibilities to formulate global plans and to synchronize the counter-terrorism activities of other Department of Defense elements, essentially outside of the war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan in the rest of the world. This entailed a tremendous coordinating responsibility with various civilian agencies as well as American embassies and other military entities in countries with which we were not at war, where U.S. military activities are not as open, clear, and free as in war zones, but are bound up in all the complexities of operating in a foreign environment. I found in my new job that the State Department and other parts of the U.S. government weren't all that receptive to coordination on these kinds of military activities and the military also had a lot to learn about being more open and willing to coordinate with the civilian parts of government. So there was much fertile ground for my efforts to build linkages and collaboration in both directions. I mainly worked with and through the counter-terrorism people in the State Department, but I also worked a bit long distance with selected embassies overseas and also with the department's regional bureaus in Washington.

*Q: This work concerned training, possible exercises, things like that, which needed to be arranged and prepared for?*

DWORKEN: Yes, and also the acquisition of information about the environment in which the American military might operate, and where possible the shaping of that environment. The responsibility for strategic and operational planning that the command had thrust on it was global in nature, and I helped develop what has since become the Department of Defense's global plan for combating terrorism, which is the DOD contribution to the national implementation plan for countering terrorism as directed by the President. That plan is a mix of military and civilian activities, with both elements taking on terrorist networks, sometimes with military instruments, seeking to destroy and disrupt, but also with the more indirect types of activities to build the capacities and capabilities of host countries through training and assisting, helping support moderate voices, humanitarian assistance, and a whole range of programs. We also prepared for the possibility of actually operating as a deployed staff against terrorist elements outside of the two war theaters.

I was very impressed with the caliber of the military officers and senior enlisted with whom I worked. Members of the Special Operations Forces are by their very nature more mature, more worldly wise, and more sensitive to the kinds of issues that arise in a foreign environment than regular military members. So, all in all, the three-plus years I spent in Tampa were a continuation of the kind of work I'd done at the start of my career in Vietnam, with the added expertise and range of contacts that I had gathered over the years. I hope I made a contribution in helping shape the military activities of the future, much in line with Secretary Gates' pleas to Congress and the rest of the Administration that these activities should not simply be military efforts. He made it clear that we are going to need multi-year and hopefully multi-pronged efforts to combat those negatives of terrorism and the circumstances and situations that foster terrorists.

*Q: Is there a State Department officer assigned now as such a political officer to the Special Operations Command, or is it still being handled by a contract arrangement with a retired person?*

DWORKEN: The answer is yes to both questions. There was always an active duty officer assigned as the political adviser to the 4-star commander. In addition, during my tenure, I and others were finally able to persuade the Department to find an officer, lower ranking than the position called for, but nonetheless an active duty Foreign Service Officer, to do the kind of work I was doing in the Center for Special Operations for its 3-star director. The work related to both strategic and operational planning and nurturing the linkages that I mentioned. Moreover, the command also continued for some time to have a retired senior Foreign Service Officer on contract as well, though I gather that was later deemed too expensive and ended. There has also been an expansion: The Diplomatic Security Bureau of the State Department has an officer there now, and AID has a position there as well. Treasury does not yet, so that's still a contract retiree. CIA has several, and there may well be others from other parts of the U.S. government.

In addition, during my tenure there, we were able to get a uniformed officer placed in the State Department in addition to the State-Defense Exchange people, a full colonel from Special Operations Command itself. There are now two officers there, and there may well be three, one in the PM Bureau, one in the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator's office, and hopefully the third one in the Intelligence and Research Bureau, or maybe one of the geographic bureaus, as a supplement to the already existing linkages. The salience and importance of counter-terrorism activities and their coordination requires it, in my view. The interagency approach has exploded in that sense, all to the good in my view.

*Q: Well, why don't we stop here, Mort, and let me say thank you very much. I am sure you will have an opportunity to review and edit this in the weeks ahead.*

DWORKEN: I look forward to that, and I thank you very much, Ray, for the time we have spent together.

*End of interview.*