The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

HARVEY FELDMAN

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INTERIVEW

Q: *Let's start out by asking for a brief review of your early life.*

FELDMAN: I was born in New York City on June 25, 1931. I attended New York City public schools and then the University of Chicago. I got a BA in liberal arts from Chicago in 1951. I floated through graduate school in medieval history and even attended a few months of law school. Finally, I joined an interdisciplinary program on Far Eastern civilization; that got me an MA in 1954. It was a two year program that included Chinese language, literature, philosophy, relations between the U.S. and China and Japan, East Asian geography, political science, etc.

One day I was in a bookstore in downtown Chicago; I was reaching for a book on Burma; someone was reaching for the same book at about the same time. We bumped into each other; he asked me whether I was a student of Burma. I saw I had a mild interest in that country and area. He said that he had just returned from there - very proudly. When I asked how he had gotten there, he told me he was a Foreign Service officer - even more proudly.

That led to a conversation about the Foreign Service. It sounded interesting; so I asked how one became a Foreign Service officer. He told me that you had to take an exam given once a year in December; if you passed it, you would be called in for an oral interview; if you passed that, you would be given a commission as a Foreign Service officer. I asked how one applied and he told me.

So I wrote a letter and in the fullness of time took the exam and passed it. I had never expected to join the Foreign Service, but once having passed the written, I went on to the orals. I went to Washington at my own expense. At that time, candidates had to arrange their own travel and accommodations - this was 1954. I remember that I stayed in a rooming house called the "Allen Lee" - probably at the corner of G and 20th or 21st or 22nd. You have to remember that I really didn't care whether I was going to join the Foreign Service or not; my plans at the time were to get a Ph.D. in Chinese studies from the University of Chicago. I do remember that my panel was chaired by someone with the wonderful name of Cromwell T. Riches. I thought that that was a perfect name for a Foreign service officer. The first question that I was asked was whether "Red China" should be recognized. I thought about an answer for a bit. I decided to tell the panel what I really thought. So I said it that I thought it should be recognized. Several of the panel members became very upset with my answer. They wanted to know why I thought we should recognize that country. I pointed out that the Chinese were fighting us in Korea, but that no one seemed to know why they had done so. I suggested that it would be preferable to able to talk to them directly to try to understand their motivations, rather than to guess what they might be willing or wanting to do. So we got into a good discussion, which seemed to flow pretty

smoothly for the rest of my time. Eventually, the examination ended and I was asked to wait outside the room for a few minutes. After about 15 or 20 minutes, Mr. Riches emerged and told me that I had passed, although he said "There were some committee members who did not like the way you slouched in your chair. I thought for sure that the issue of "Red China" would be the problem; I was quite surprised by the comment about my demeanor.

Q: *I had a similar experience. What happened after that?*

FELDMAN: This all took place in the Spring of 1954. I got my MA in June. The Department told me that it might be a year before I was commissioned. There was a personnel "freeze" at the time while everyone was being recleared - consequence of the McCarthy period. The head of Security at the time was R.W. Scott McLeod. I remember that name. So all intake of new officers had to be stopped while this reclearance process was under way.

After having received my MA, I decided to move forward to try to get a Ph.D. I didn't know whether I would ever get into the Foreign Service. It turned out that I had a major disagreement with the Chairman of the Chinese Language and Literature Department at Chicago - a professor named Herlee Glessner Creel. His specialty was early archaic China and especially interpreting oracle bones, which are inside tortoise shells, which were used for divination - one would carve on them in ancient Chinese characters questions like, "If the King goes hunting today, will he be successful?" Then the questioner would throw the shell on a fire and the results would be interpreted by the cracks in the shell. Creel was famous for a book that he had written called "The Birth of China."

So Creel was indeed a great scholar in oracle bones and in trying to decide what the culture of ancient China might have been. He wanted me to join him in his research since I was the departmental fellow who was going to be working directly with him for my Ph.D. I didn't think that this was the most interesting avenue to pursue. I told Creel that I really wanted to work on 19th Century treaty ports in China. That turned into something of a dust-up. This all took place early in the fall of 1954.

About this time, I got a phone from the Department of State asking me how soon I could be available to enter the Service. I said: "How about in two weeks?" That was too quick for them, but the caller said he would be back in touch with me. I should mention that at the time, I was married with one little child about a year old. We were living in a small, rented apartment. No one had told me that when you went overseas your furniture would accompany at Department expense. So we sold our furniture and waited for the call from the Department. And we waited; and we waited. We went from early October to mid- November waiting for that call.

The call came and I was asked to report for duty immediately. I was informed that

my first assignment would be Hong Kong as a Refugee Relief Program investigator. I said "Okay." A couple of weeks later, at the end of November 1954, I found myself in a 19th Century Treaty port called Hong Kong.

When I arrived, to my great delight, I was told that I would not be a Refugee Relief Program investigator, but rather that I would be a Vice Consul - the passport officer.

Q: *Let's go back in the story. Did you ever stop in Washington on your way to the Far East?*

FELDMAN: I did; I had a one week program for secretaries and clerk typists. During the course of this orientation, one of our lecturers asked whether there were any Vice Consuls in the class. I raised my hand; I was the only one. All the rest were staff personnel. The lecturer expressed some surprise. After that one week, I was given airline tickets for my wife, my son and myself. We flew on a Boeing Stratocruiser - the one with the sort of belly lounge. We had bunks; my wife and son were in a lower bunk and I was in the upper. We took off from Washington; it was an incredible flight. From Washington, we flew to Pittsburgh, then Chicago, Minneapolis, Portland - or somewhere on the West Coast - someplace in Alaska, and finally Misawa (Japan). Unfortunately, my son got real air sick and threw up all over my wife. When we debarked in Misawa, she got off wearing a bathrobe. When the plane was cleaned, we got on board again and flew to Tokyo where we got off again. We stayed there for a day in a hotel. Then we reboarded, flew from Tokyo to Okinawa, then to Taipei and on to Hong Kong. The whole trip took about two and a half days.

Q: A ship would have been better!

FELDMAN: Indeed it would have been. But the Department was in a great hurry to get me to Hong Kong, because slow visa issuance to refugees was becoming a congressional concern.

Q: *Did you any feeling for what a Consulate General was like? How it was organized?*

FELDMAN: I had no idea. I didn't know what to expect. I was simply delighted to be going to a 19th Century Treaty Port which was after all what I wanted to study. I guess first posts are always very special and Hong Kong will always be very dear to me. In those days, Hong Kong was one of the most delightful cities in the world. The population was about a million. The tallest building in town was probably 16 stories high. The air was clear - no smog. When one swam at night, the water was phosphorescent. It was beautiful. There were wild monkeys and deer on the island. It was truly like being in heaven.

The only problem was that when we arrived we were put up in a "leave" flat - a

CG rented apartment that happened to be vacant because the tenant was on leave. This was the beginning of December. Now I was just 23 years old, first time out of the U.S. with a wife and one year old child. We were essentially left to our own devices in this apartment on the Peak - No 9, Coombe Road. We had no idea how we would survive - where to get groceries, etc. No one told us anything - no welcome wagon.

Fortunately, there was an American family in the same apartment house - Robert and Meg Aylward. There were experienced hands and had been in the FS for at least a dozen years. The first thing they did was to lend us a crib for Ross Christopher - who is now 45. They gave us the phone number of something called the "Welcome Company" - a grocery store which delivered on the Peak. We could order everything by phone, which we did. Pretty soon, we settled in another apartment because the tenant of the one we occupied returned from leave. We moved to a place in Kowloon - 222 Prince Edward Road. Living in Kowloon was like living in the Bronx - only Chinese. It was a horrible place - far worst than the student housing at the University of Chicago. It was later condemned as unsanitary by the U.S. Public Health Service.

So I made my views known to the administrative officer; I just wasn't going to live there. I complained loudly and strongly enough that I was told that I had a housing allowance and could go to rent a place. We looked and found a place that we liked, which was within our housing allowance. We had no furniture, but it turned out that our allowance included an amount that could be used to rent furniture. We did that; we rented a little two bedroom flat in Repulse Bay - five minute walk to the beach. We rented furniture and it was like being in heaven. It felt as if we were living out in the country. We listened to the cry of barking deer at night and sat on our balcony and watched the stars. There were all sorts of wild birds that I had never seen before. Carol and Ross Christopher could go to the beach at Repulse Bay every day. We had lovely neighbors. It was great.

Q: Probably the best housing you ever had in your career.

FELDMAN: I had better housing later, but there was something very, very special about that apartment in Repulse Bay. As a matter of fact, there was something special about going to Hong Kong as a very young officer, with a wife and year old son. It turned out that for Ross Christopher, his first language actually was Cantonese, which he learned from a Cantonese amah whom we hired shortly after our arrival - English was his second. We also hired her husband who was a cook from Shanghai. I think that illustrates better than words what prices were like in Hong Kong in those days. There, I was - a brand new Vice Consul - starting out at the magnificent salary of $4,200 per annum - something like that - we had a great apartment and for $50 per month were able to engage the services of a fantastic cook and a Cantonese amah.

My wife, Carol, would toddle off with Christopher almost every day to the beach;

I was picked up by car and driven to the Consulate General - 26 Garden Road - where it is still today, although it has been remodeled a couple of times since. I was lucky enough to live along Island Road; some people lived as far as Stanley which was way beyond Repulse Bay. So the person who lived the furthest out drove a car - an office station wagon - along Island Road and picked up other members of the CG and took us to the office building.

Q: *How did you get around when you weren't picked up by your colleagues?*

FELDMAN: By bus. It was an easy way to get around.

Q: *When you got to the CG, what kind of orientation did you get?*

FELDMAN: None. I was in the Passport section; I was given a number of cases to review. These were primarily cases of Chinese who were claiming American citizenship because their parents had either been born in the U.S. or had emigrated and become U.S. citizens. There was a considerable amount of fraud in Chinese immigration. I was to review the cases, interview to applicant and forward a recommendation to the Department on whether it was a legitimate case or not. I did that for about my first three months; I actually got a commendation from the Department for a judgement that I had made on a particular case - I don't remember anything about the case except that I got a commendation. I do remember that my judgement on this case was to grant the passport.

I think it is worth remembering the mind-set of the times. A large number of people doing visa and passport work had a definite bias against issuing either visas or passports. They wanted to keep the foreigners out of the U.S. at all costs - everyone is a fraud; all visas applicants will overstay; all passport applications are fraudulent - the slots on the waiting list are sold. The theory was that a grown male would have been let into the U.S. - around the beginning of the century or at least before WWI before the various exclusion acts went into effect; he would settle down in the U.S. and return to China every couple of years; when he re-entered the U.S., he would be asked by the INS officer whether he had children in China. The answer would invariably be "Yes;" for every nine months he spent in China, he would have a child - or if he had been in China for less than nine months he would say that his wife was pregnant. That was called "creating slots" - i.e. making someone, presumably his child - eligible for an American passport. These "slots" then stimulated a thriving business because they were sold; the necessary documentation was then provided which allowed other people to enter the U.S. illegally. This was the nexus of Chinese immigration into the U.S. The vice consul's job was to pass judgement on whether the application was legitimate or fraudulent.

On the basis of my work in the Passport section, I was moved into the Visa section which was considered to have more responsibility because it was the area which attracted the greatest fraud temptation. In the Visa section, the attitude was,

as I said, that anyone going to the U.S. would try to stay and therefore should be kept out entirely. I didn't quite take that attitude. I generally tried to figure out whether there was some reasonable basis for issuing the visa. The cases I was given, at least at the beginning, were those of wives and children of American citizens. They were not to hard to figure out.

Later, when I was assigned to non-immigrant cases, that was a bit more difficult. As it happened, one day I got a call from the Consul General - Everett Drumright. He was from Oklahoma. He said that I had turned down an application from the child of one of his friends. He asked me to reconsider and issue the visa. I argued with the CG over the phone. I must say that I don't remember now whether I did issue that visa; I just remember having the argument with the CG - everyone thought I was crazy to do so.

As it happened, a few weeks later, a circular instruction came from the Department saying that all posts should have a program for rotating junior officers through the various sections, so that they would not be stuck in one job for their whole tour. In particular, the circular emphasized that it would be very useful to transfer officers from consular work into political or economic work. Very shortly thereafter, I got a call from the CG's secretary asking whether I would be interested in working in the political section. I was delighted; in retrospect, I think the reason I was offered this opportunity is because I was the only vice consul's name known to Drumright.

So I joined the political section; I think I was the sixth American officer in the section. It was headed by an FSO-3 - Larue (Larry) Lutkins - an old style Foreign Service officer. His deputy was Bill Magistretti. These people seemed to me to be like semi-gods. They knew some Chinese, although not as much as I did. Magistretti was a Japanese language officer, but his Chinese was not great. One interesting aspect was that all of the other five officers spent all of their time on mainland China matters. I, as the most junior member, became the Hong Kong-Macao reporting officer. That meant that all of the others did their analysis based on what was printed by communist China's newspapers - particularly the "Peking's Peoples Daily" and "Gulangming" and other newspapers. Occasionally, as a treat, they were allowed to go to the railroad station to interview recent arrivals from the mainland.

This seemed incredibly dull work to me. I was delighted with my assignment, in part, because I got to travel with the CG. When he went to call on the Governor, for example. I was the note-taker. I got to interview senior members of the Hong Kong government - all on my own. Once every six weeks or so, I would go on my own on the ferry to Macao where I would meet with the Governor and other interesting personalities. I could tell stories about Macao forever. That was just a marvelous experience. It was one of the best assignments I ever had in 32 years in the Foreign Service; it was truly a delight.

Q: *Before we hear the stories, tell me what you produced?*

FELDMAN: In those days, it was despatches and airgrams; occasionally, I would draft a telegram. There was also the WEEKA - a weekly summary of events and analyses. Having just left the University of Chicago, I was used to doing research; that was second nature to me and I think I was pretty good at it. I produced a large number of fairly lengthy despatches. Some one recently called to my attention one that I had drafted in 1956 on Triad Societies in Hong Kong. The Triads were the Chinese versions of the Mafia. I wrote a major analysis of the Triads which apparently became well known in the Department. I drafted other messages on various topics; in general I reported on what was going on in Hong Kong.

Q: *Did you get any commendations for that?*

FELDMAN: I don't remember, but I did get promoted in 1956. That was considered pretty rapid.

Q: *How about Macao? How was that?*

FELDMAN: Macao was a little sleepy Portuguese enclave, sort of a museum-like depositary of Portuguese hopes for an empire. Macao, something like Hong Kong, was full of the zaniest characters that one could imagine. The "dictator" of Macao, the man who ran Macao, was Pedro Jose Lobo. When I knew him, he was probably in his late 50s; he had been a foundling who was discovered on the porch of a house occupied by a Portuguese Army captain in Timor. The Captain was later transferred to Macao; Pedro was raised there in a series of Catholic schools. When he was old enough he became an apprentice in a local bank - the Banco Nacional Untra-marino. Pedro was a person of innate skill and cleverness; he rose in the ranks. In the 1930s, the Governor of Macao was looking for some one to take over the opium monopoly - which was legal at the time. The previous incumbent had exceeded the allowed limits of "skimming." The job went to Pedro.

I heard all of these storied from Pedro himself because we became very friendly over the course of two years. Pedro "skimmed" the opium trade enough to accumulate enough wealth, but stayed within allowable bounds. With his income, he bought other monopolies in Macao - the water works; the salt monopoly, the tobacco monopoly and ultimately he bought Macao's sole radio station - Radio Villa Verda.

When WWII came along, Pedro was nominated by the Portuguese to negotiate with the Japanese. He was successful; he managed to buy the Japanese off so that Macao was never occupied. It was during this period that he became enormously wealthy by buying Hong Kong dollars at discount; he then just hoarded them, probably in his garage. On the side, he and his Chinese gangster partner, Y.C. Leung, ran an air-rescue service for downed allied airmen. He assumed that the

allies would win in the end and would feel some kind of obligation to him. He was of course right in his bet. After the end of the war, Y.C. was duly decorated by the British - an MBE, I think. Both accumulated great wealth and lived happily ever after.

One of Pedro's most charming characteristics was that he composed music. He did this without being able to play any instrument. He had a musical "secretary;" when he was in the mood he would hum a tune and the secretary would transcribe it into notes. After it was orchestrated it would be played for the private entertainment of his guests and then later played on his radio station. He composed all sorts of music, including a five act opera based on the founding of Macao; it was called "Avanti Lusitania." Before I was transferred to Japan, as a sign of affection, Pedro presented me with his collected works on 78 rpm records; they must have weighed fifty pounds at least. Unfortunately, it was so heavy that we left the collection behind in our apartment in Repulse Bay when we left Hong Kong in 1957.

That station was used for other purposes as well. Pedro became a gold smuggler. He would buy gold at one price in China or the Philippines or Hong Kong, wherever it was cheap, and then flown by his private plane to India and sold there by his agents. It was what today might be called "arbitrage." That added to his wealth.

There was of course an official government in Macao run by the Portuguese, but Pedro was the power. He was the Minister of Economic Affairs working theoretically for Portuguese governor - whom I would see periodically. There was a senate - "the Leal Senado" (the loyal senate).

We didn't have much of an interest in Macao, except insofar as it was suspected to be a way station of the heroin trade route out of Southeast Asia. I don't think it was, but there were American officials who were very suspicions. Macao was involved in so many other things that it probably didn't have time for heroin.

It was a very corrupt place. One of my earliest experiences there - on my first trip there, I think - I was approached by a cop who offered to sell me his service revolver.

Q: *Back to Hong Kong. What were the domestic policies there?*

FELDMAN: In those days, Hong Kong was a very tightly run ship. The governor was Sir Alexander Grantham, who was, until the last governor, probably the most famous Hong Kong governor, although even more famous at the time was Sir John Copperthwaite, the Financial Secretary. It was he who laid the foundation for Hong Kong's great prosperity. He was a disciple of Ludwig Von Mises and the Chicago school of economics - although Sir John would never have called it that. Both he and Chicago supported minimal government, minimal interference,

minimal taxation*, laissez faire*. It worked very well.

Copperthwaite was once asked why he did not collect more detailed business statistics. He asked: "Why would I want them? I have no intention of using them." Up to today, Copperthwait's *laissez faire* philosophy ruled in Honk Kong to the point where it became clearly the freest colony in the world. Hong Kong's economic development is a marvel since the territory is essentially a rock across a narrow channel from Kowloon, a peninsula. The city couldn't feed itself; it couldn't even provide its own drinking water. When I first arrived in Hong Kong, we were allowed to open the tap for drinking water for a half-an-hour each day. By the time, I left, we were allowed to open the tap for an hour every third day because water was so scarce. It wasn't until the 1960s, when Hong Kong concluded a deal with mainland China to import water, that there was potable water every day.

But this shortage made very little dent in the fascination of the place. It was the most delightful place. Hong Kong was full of the wildest and most improbable characters who had come from China to get away from the Communists. So the city was filled with Chinese, Americans, British and White Russians. Among the Chinese the most prominent were the Shanghai manufacturers. The city was enormously lively; everybody had a story and they were all fascinating.

Q: *Were there any signs at the time about the possible relationships between Hong Kong and the mainland?*

FELDMAN: No. In fact relationships were tense. The feeling was that the Chinese might invade at any time. In the 1950s, no one in Hong King was really sure how long the territory would survive as an independent entity. Some thought it might last until the 1960s; others were even more pessimistic than that. So there was a sense of contrived gaiety about life in Hong Kong.

Q: *I assume that there were informal contacts with the mainland Chinese?*

FELDMAN: I don't know that in fact there were. The police were pretty strong; the British Army had a garrison there. So I don't think there was very much smuggling. In those days, the U.S. had an embargo against Chinese goods. So one of the CG's principal occupations was to verify the origin of goods being exported to the U.S. from Hong Kong. That function and the consular services were really the bread and butter of the CG. Honk Kong is a major port; we provided shipping and seamen services. In fact, for a brief period, I was the shipment and seamen officer; that was a sort of delight. I had two locals employees working for me - actually I worked for them. Between the two, they had more than 50 years of U.S. government service; I had maybe fourteen months. George Efrimou came from Qingdao; when we evacuated that town, he was not able to join the evacuees. Later, a U.S. Navy destroyer was sent to Qingdao to pick up Efrimou and his family - that is the way the old Foreign

Service used to work; it hasn't worked like that for a long time.

Q: *How big was the consul general at the time?*

FELDMAN: I would guess 50 or 60 people. It was a pretty big post, although nothing compared to today when we have probably 300 or more employees there. I think it is still our largest CG in the world.

Q: I know that it and Jerusalem have an independent status. Both are headed by officers with the rank of Chief of Mission.

FELDMAN: Right. In my days, Drumright had the personal rank of ambassador.

Q: *Of course, in those days there was no U.S. ambassador in China. Theoretically, Hong Kong was a UK dependency, but I gather we didn't do much business through London.*

FELDMAN: We never communicated with London. It did get carbon copies of what we sent to the Department, but we never communicated through London the way messages from a normal CG go through an embassy on the way to Washington. We were quite independent.

Q: *How long were you in the political section?*

FELDMAN: I was there from sometime in 1955 until I transferred in the summer of 1957 - almost two years. It was a great time; I enjoyed it enormously.

Q: *Thank goodness, you had that argument with the Consul General. How were your relationships with Drumright after you transferred to the political section?*

FELDMAN: Actually, we got along very well. As I said, I became the notetaker for his meetings with Hong Kong's government. Drumright was very wealthy. He came from a town in Oklahoma named after one of his predecessors. The family owned oil wells. One day he asked me what clubs I belonged to. I must have looked at him blankly because he repeated the question. I told him that I didn't belong to any clubs. He said, "Well, join some!!" That I did; I joined the Foreign Correspondents club and the Yacht Club. In fact, I am still a member of the Royal Hong Kong Yacht Club because when I left in 1957, one could purchase a permanent lifetime membership which was valid while you were not in Hong Kong - a non-resident member. The price was 100 Hong Kong dollars. My membership reflects this; it reads "F07."

Q: I *assume that means you were the seventh non-residential member.*

FELDMAN: Correct. So I had a very merry time in Hong Kong. In those days, Hong Kong had a population of about 1 million. The cream of society was about

10,000 people - Chinese and British and a few others. You could get to know them quite quickly. Having a grand official position, "American Vice Consul," gave one all kinds of entree - never mind that a vice consul was at the bottom of the totem pole. Nevertheless, I was an official representative of the U.S. Government and that was worth a lot. We made many friends, many of whom we still have. One of my closest friends in those days was a Chinese named Bobby Ho. He was the grandson of the first Chinese to be knighted - Sir Robert Ho Tung. His father was a general, who had attended Sandhurst. He had some bad experiences with British racism and renounced his British citizenship and became a Chinese Nationalist general - General Hosailai. He was the Quartermaster General of the Chinese Nationalist Army during WWII. After the war he represented the Republic of China on the UN Military Affairs Commission. He was one of the Chinese representatives at the Japanese surrender on the battleship "Missouri." His son became my very good friend.

Bobby went to Hamilton College in New York and the University of Pittsburgh. Later he joined the family newspaper in Hong Kong - "The Hong Kong Commercial Daily." He was also active in insurance and real estate and other ventures. He is now retired and lives in Vancouver. He left Hong Kong shortly after the British signed the agreement on the return of Hong Kong to China.

Q: *What things led to your next assignment?*

FELDMAN: I knew some Chinese, although I must say that which I learned at the University of Chicago was classical Chinese, which is of little practical use today. I decided that I had enough Chinese for a while and thought that it would be very useful to study Japanese. So I applied for Japanese language training and the Department agreed with the stipulation that I first serve a tour in Japan - to see whether I really wanted to specialize in Japan.

So I was assigned as economic officer and vice consul in Yokohama. We sailed from Hong Kong - I think it was on the "President Wilson" - up to Yokohama on the way to the U.S. for our home leave. When we got to Yokohama, the Consul General - Lionel M. Summers - got on board because he too was returning to the U.S. for home leave. Naturally, I introduced myself as his new economic officer. During the course of the voyage, Summers asked whether my wife and I played "Scrabble." In fact, Carol and I were sort of "Scrabble" demons. So I said that indeed we did play the game. That began a series of "Scrabble" games between the Summers and the Feldmans.

We made the mistake of beating them very badly several nights in a row. That ended the "Scrabble" games. When I got to Washington, I was informed that my assignment had been changed. I was no longer going to Yokohama, but rather to Tokyo as a visa officer. I protested, but I was told that it was an "appropriate" assignment. There is a marvelous line in American literature from a short story by Ring Lardner called "Alibi Ike." It goes: "Shut up, he explained." That is what

Personnel said to me.

After home leave in Chicago, we sailed to Japan - I think it was the "President Hoover" - and reported for duty at our embassy in Tokyo as a vice consul and visa officer. I went to work for a Virginia Ellis, who was in charge of the visa section. We became rather friendly; in fact, one afternoon during a cocktail hour, Virginia remarked that if she had full powers, she would never issue a visa to a Chinese, or a Japanese, or a Jew or an Italian - and maybe a Greek as well. I pointed out that I was Jewish. Her response was: "Present company excepted." But these comments represented her attitude toward visa work.

One of the matters which took up much of my time in Tokyo was the pre-clearance of Japanese brides of GIs. In those days, if a member of the U.S. military wanted to marry a foreigner, he had to get military permission to marry. Before that permission was granted, the fiancee had to fill out an application which was sent to a visa officer to review whether there were any grounds for ineligibility. There often were because many of these hopeful brides were found in brothels by a GI. There was a prohibition - in law - at the time against issuing visas to women who had been prostitutes. Later on, a waiver of ineligibility was adopted, but in 1957 no such waiver existed and those women were ineligible.

There were an awful lot of women who were ineligible. After the waiver came into effect, we could deem the applicant to have participated in prostitution, but that fact could be waived, allowing the GI to marry the foreigner.

The most interesting visa case I had in my tour did not deal with a Japanese bride, but something that grew out of Chinese history. You may have heard of the "May 4th" movement. In 1919, on that day, there were huge student demonstrations in Peking occasioned by the Minister - Tsao Rulin - responsible for mining. He had been accused of having received bribes from the Japanese who were interested in a "sweetheart" deal on some important coal mines in northern China - the Kailan mines. This set off a series of student demonstrations protesting the deal with the Japanese, the Vesailles Treaty, which confirmed foreign "concessions" in China, China's weakness, and foreign pressure. The "May Fourth Movement" remains a watershed in Chinese history. One day, a visa application was given to me; it was from a father of an American citizen - Tsao Rulin. Tsao had lived in Japan after he left China in the 1920s. During the war, he lived as a house guest of Shigeru Yoshida who was later to become a Prime Minister. Tsao had several children; one, a daughter, after the war married an American soldier, moved to the U.S. and became an American citizen. She later petitioned for her father to come to the U.S.

When the visa application came to me, I saw no reason to turn it down. He hadn't committed any crime under American law. He was one of the most notorious figures in contemporary Chinese history, but I didn't see any part of the law that might lead me to reject the application.

I had had a similar case in Hong Kong - that is, one involving a famous historical figure. One of the visa cases I had there was from a Chinese citizen who was using the name De Vee Sing. I didn't recognize the name in the Shanghai dialect, but when I saw the Chinese characters, I knew that the applicant was Tu Yueh-sheng, who had been the head of the "Green Gang "in Shanghai in the 1920s. That gang was notorious for prostitution, drugs, protection rackets, etc. In this case, I was delighted to refuse this application.

Q: *There were no repercussions?*

FELDMAN: No repercussions.

Q: *What were the arrangements when you arrived in Tokyo? Had there been any improvement from what you experienced when you arrived in Hong Kong?*

FELDMAN: By this time, I was an "old" hand in the Foreign Service. I had served one tour. I knew consular work. I didn't need a whole lot of schooling. I moved into the Nonomiya apartments. You arrived sometime after I did and we had adjacent offices. That was the beginning of a friendship that has lasted some 42 years. You and we lived in the same apartment buildings; our children grew up together. I think you were the first to describe those apartments as "shabby genteel."

Q: *Did you see any improvement in the care and feeding of FS personnel from that which experienced in Hong Kong?*

FELDMAN: None that I remember. You must remember that when I joined the Foreign Service, I didn't have the foggiest notion of what it would be like and therefore had no expectations. I was just coming out of graduate school and I would be paid $4,200 - that was an incredible sum of money - especially how far it went in Hong Kong.

I don't remember what my salary was while in Tokyo - probably $1,000 more. I had been promoted to FSO-6 on the new pay scale. I was one of the FSO-6s who had to go back to FSO-7 and then I was promoted back to FSO-6.

Q: When you first came into the FS, I think there was a budgetary freeze. No one was allowed to travel. So when I got to Tokyo in May 1955, I was very envious of your situation because you had been assigned overseas as a Junior Officer.

FELDMAN: You have to remember that I went overseas as part of the Refugee Relief Program. I don't know what would have happened if I had been treated as any other junior officer. In any case, I was very lucky.

Q: *What did you think of the Embassy?*

FELDMAN: It was very, very different from the Hong Kong CG. I had thought that the Consulate General was very formal, but I found it nothing compared to the Tokyo Embassy. This was a real proper embassy. I guess when I got there, John Allison was our Ambassador, but he left shortly thereafter and was replaced by Douglas MacArthur II who was married to Laura Barkley MacArthur, the daughter of Alben Barkley, the former Vice President and Senate Majority Leader. They were a very formal couple.

I remember that very early in my tour, I was assigned to "door" duty at the Residence. I had to stand at the entrance to welcome the guests to the evening festivities. I had to say "Good evening, I am Mr. Feldman of the Embassy. May I escort you in?" You asked their names and then took them to the receiving line and introduced them to the first person there. On my first "door" duty, I was there together with another consular officer, Bill Boswell, who I think was the head of the Passport Section at the time. As I stood there, a very tall red-haired gentleman and his wife walked up to the door; I met them and said, "Good evening; I am Mr. Feldman of the Embassy. May I show in?" The gentleman said, "I know my way" and walked right by me. Boswell turned to me and asked whether I was a joker. I asked him whether that was not what I was supposed to do. Bill then pointed out to me that that was the DCM - Outerbridge Horsey and his wife. I had never met the DCM.

You asked what arrangements had been made for my arrival. Later I learned that according to Embassy procedures, all new officers were supposed to be shown around and introduced and allowed to call on the Ambassador and the DCM. Nothing like that happened to me. We were met at the airport, taken to the apartment and left then to our own devices.

Q: *You were then transferred to Nagoya.*

FELDMAN: Nagoya was established as a consulate when the U.S. Fifth Air Force had its headquarters there. That created a major consular workload. By the time I got there in 1958, the Fifth Air Force had departed and the base was Japan Air Force Self-Defense Force base. So the consular work had diminished considerably. Economic work was increasing because Nagoya was the home of Toyota, Brothers Sewing Machines and Noritake, China. But I was a consular officer; so I had a fair amount of spare time on my hands. I used it mostly to study Japanese and to tour around the approximate 13 prefectures in our consular district. I would hit the road with one of my Japanese local employees; we stayed in ryokans. I could go for a week at a time without speaking English. So my Japanese got very, very good even though I had not gone to Japanese language school.

My second son, Peter, was born in Nagoya, shortly after a typhoon. The other notable event was the arrival of an American aircraft carrier to help in providing

humanitarian assistance after a very destructive typhoon and storm surge which flooded lower Nagoya. I was asked to go to the carrier to coordinate; I was picked up by plane from Nagoya airport and brought to the carrier where we made an arrested landing - my first and only experience with that kind of landing. I still remember vibrating like a rubber band for quite a while after that landing.

Q: *I envy you for that. I would have loved to do that at least once.*

FELDMAN: My boss in Nagoya was Joe Donelan. That was his first overseas post. He had served in the Department in various administrative jobs. For promotional reasons, it was decided that he needed a field assignment; so he was sent as Principal Officer to Nagoya. A very delightful guy.

But nothing very much happened in Nagoya. In 1960, I was transferred back to the Department to serve on the Japan desk. I guess the principal thing that happened in Nagoya was the birth of my second son, Peter.

Q: *Did you ever have language training? What are your views on the efficacies of such training?*

FELDMAN: Other than the hour-a-day course, I never had Japanese language training, but as I said I learned on the job. Later I had Chinese language training. I always thought that the Japanese language course material, which was prepared by Eleanor Jordan, was much superior to any of the Chinese material I used. Although Japanese is intrinsically a much more difficult language than Chinese because Japanese grammar is so complicated, nevertheless I think I learned Japanese more readily than Chinese despite the fact that I studied Chinese full-time. Maybe that just showed that I had an affinity for Japanese, but I did learn it better. When I was tested upon my return to Washington for my Japanese language fluency, I was given a 3 on the speaking test. Up to that point, I was the only officer who had reached that level of proficiency without having studied the language formally. I was very proud of that.

Q: *I recognize how well you did because I had the same experience in Kobe, but I never reached a 3 level.*

FELDMAN: I may have had more time to study than you did. What really helped me were the field trips that I would take when I would go off with a local employee to the various prefectures. Then we did not speak much English for a week at a time.

Q: *Before we leave your Japan tour, what are your feelings about the differences between Japanese and Chinese people?*

FELDMAN: They are completely different. For example, although the Japanese language uses Chinese characters as one of their three writing systems, the fact is

that the languages are entirely different. Japanese is a polysyllabic agglutinative of language with a highly complex grammar - e.g. adjectives have tenses. Chinese is monosyllabic, not agglutinative, and had practically no grammar at all. As you might expect, people who grow up with these different languages think completely differently; their social systems are very different. There is no similarity between the two.

Japanese and Chinese may physically resemble each other, but so do Americans and Turks. But in both cases, the people are completely different. What motivates one will not motivate the other and vice versa. There is just no similarity between the Japanese and the Chinese.

Q: *Might that lead you to believe that close relationships between the countries is not likely to ever happen?*

FELDMAN: I wouldn't necessarily reach that conclusion because just as I was able to learn enough about Japanese and Chinese culture to be able to act in either culture, establishing rapport with both and able to negotiate with both as I did later in my career, so a Chinese or Japanese can also. That is what diplomats do. I guess one of the things diplomats have to do is to take themselves outside the boundaries of their own culture and learn how to operate across cross-cultural divides. American diplomats do that; Russian diplomats do that and so do Chinese and Japanese diplomats.

I left Japan on the day - June 16 - that Prime Minister Kishi had to resign after the security treaty fiasco. You remember, the Japanese left-wing staged massive demonstrations against Kishi, against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and the anticipated visit of President Eisenhower. So Kishi felt he had to resign. But I used to joke and tell people that when Kishi heard that I was leaving, he was heart broken and resigned.

Q: *Now let's move to your Washington assignment.*

FELDMAN: I was assigned to Japanese desk, as the most junior officer. It was not a very large staff. My boss was Dick Sneider - a marvelous Foreign Service officer, an expert on Japan and Korea. His deputy was Kingdon Swayne whose Japanese was excellent; he had been the Consul in Sapporo. Roy Haverkamp was also on the staff and then there was me. It was a good crew; we did a lot of good, useful work. I arrived in 1960 just before the election and was there when Kennedy became President. Sneider had friends in the upper reaches of the group around Kennedy. He was a marvelous bureaucratic operator. We worked it out so that the then Japanese Prime Minister became the first foreign Prime Minister to make an official visit to Washington. That made the Japanese feel very good and elevated the prestige of the Japan desk.

I worked on the desk for two years, but I must confess that I don't remember

much about it. Except I do remember that when the Japanese Prime Minister came, he insisted on calling on Joseph Kennedy, the President's father. He assumed that Joe Kennedy was the real power in the U.S. government. Dick Sneider was replaced after a while by Robert Fearey, with whom I did not get along very well. So I was delighted when I was selected to go to Chinese language school.

Q: Let's go back a second. What can you tell us about the Prime minister's visit?

FELDMAN: One thing I remember about that was the discussion about the exchange of gifts and the toasts. For some reason, I was chosen to write President Kennedy's toasts and the welcoming speech. As I mentioned, I had a degree in classical Chinese so that I knew some of the "tag" phrases that were loved by both the Chinese and the Japanese. I worked these old proverbs into the text because I knew that the Japanese would recognize their origins and meaning. I had read Japanese texts extensively as well and that enabled me to stick in all sorts of quotations and references. That was fun; that was the first time I had ever heard the president of the United States pronounce my words. That was a special thrill.

Q: I gather that in this period, in the aftermath of the security treaty imbroglio, Japanese-American relationships were rather quiescent? What was your area of responsibility on the desk?

FELDMAN: I frankly don't remember much; I was doing primarily political work. In the aftermath of the security treaty crisis, it was, as you suggest, a rather quiet time. We did not try to push the Japanese to do much of anything. The trade problems that erupted later, which still plague the relationship today, did not exist at the time. Our concerns were principally about security in East Asia and that is what we worked on. There was a growing push in Japan for the return of Okinawa which was the beginning of the reversion process.

Q: Let's talk a little about the Chinese language training.

FELDMAN: It began with approximately nine months of training at the Foreign Service Institute which was then located in a revamped parking garage under Arlington Towers. Our teachers were Miss Oyang and Mr. Li Mi. After that period, I went to the FSI field language school in Taiwan for another 15 months. The school was in Taichung, a city in central Taiwan. It was then a pretty rural environment; I don't know what the population was then. I would guess a couple of hundred thousands which for Chinese cities makes it only a village.

We rented a house; houses were sort of passed on from student to student. It was on Gold Mountain Street which was surrounded by rice paddy fields. I still remember that every couple of weeks or so, the farmers would dump night soil on the paddy fields around the house. The odor was just awful. Taichung was in the part of Taiwan which has a year round hot climate. Nevertheless, we had to close

all the windows and tried to breath as shallowly as we could. We had no air conditioning. The Department did not provide it.

Q: What was the school like? How many students?

FELDMAN: I guess that we had ten or twelve students. Harry Britain, a USIA officer, was there. Don Ferguson, an FSO, was there. Harry Thayer who later became the director of the office of Chinese affairs and after that, ambassador to Singapore and later director of the American Institute in Taiwan, was a student. Roger Sullivan, who became a deputy assistant secretary in EA/P and later was an NSC staff member, was there. Peter Colm, Bill Durker - who quit early on and last I heard was a professor of Southeast Asian history at Penn State.

It was a good group of people. We had some good teachers, several of whom were Manchu from Peking - now Beijing. They spoke a kind of Beijing slang and that is what they taught us. They also taught more formal Mandarin, but we learned a lot of Beijing slang because that was what these teachers spoke. I can still amuse Chinese by inserting some Beijing slang - circa 1945-1950 - into a conversation; that always get a laugh.

Q: In Hong Kong, we used Cantonese. I remember you saying that we really didn't do anything in Cantonese. Was Mandarin that different?

FELDMAN: Mandarin is a totally different language. Mandarin is as different from Cantonese as for example, German is from Swedish. In fact, it is probably more dissimilar than that. We speak in terms of Chinese dialects; in fact there are four major Chinese languages - not dialects, but distinct languages. Each of these four languages has its own dialects. The Chinese language that I learned was Mandarin, which is probably spoken by more Chinese than any of the other languages. The other three languages are the Shanghai language - sometimes called "Wu," Cantonese which in Chinese is called "Yush," Min, which comes in two major languages - "Minan" spoken in the south and "Minpei" spoken in the north. There are several million people who speak those languages; the language spoken in Taiwan is actually "Minan." So there all these different languages - all distinct and very, very different from each other.

Q: But if you speak Mandarin, can you get along everywhere in China?

FELDMAN: Not necessarily. You can get by in most of China, but there are places where you would not be understood. These languages are not mutually intelligible. You have to learn them as separate languages the way a Frenchman learns Portuguese. Very often, when Chinese from different provinces speak, they will draw Chinese characters on their hands to aid intelligibility.

Q: But if you would learn only one Chinese language, it would be Mandarin?

FELDMAN: Yes because that is the official language of China. But if you wanted to live in Hing Kong, for example, you certainly want to learn Cantonese because a lot of the natives don't speak Mandarin. - all they speak is Cantonese. In fact, some will speak Cantonese and English and not Mandarin. There are very few who can speak both Cantonese and Mandarin and practically none who speak only Mandarin unless they are very recent refugees from China. Similarly, if you visited Singapore, you would have to know Hokkien, which is a variation of "Min."

Q; How did "Min" get from Fujien to Singapore?

FELDMAN: Fujien is on the coast and people emigrated from there to other South Asia countries.

Q: What was your evaluation of the program after you finished learning the Chinese language?

FELDMAN: Chinese ought to be an easy language to learn. But as I said before, the teaching material was not terribly good. I was not impressed by that material as I had been by the Japanese teaching material. The Chinese texts were unnecessarily complicated.

There was another difference. I had never really learned to read Japanese, but had to spend a lot of time learning how to read Chinese. Chinese is easy to speak, but very difficult to read because it is ideographic. All one can do is to memorize characters, which have multiple meanings. They work in sets because in Mandarin there are only 600 sounds you can make. So you have to have combination of characters - each character is only one syllable. But because there are so many words which sound the same - so many homonyms in Mandarin - it becomes very difficult to work with it. You spend a lot of time memorizing; we had to memorize something like 20 characters each day. So at the end of the two years, you are able to read not only all of the newspapers, but also diplomatic notes. In fact, I could even write a diplomatic note. I could do simultaneous translations, because we had a special course for that.

But these are skills that evaporate very, very quickly if you don't keep them up. For about three months after graduation from the school, I could do simultaneous translations, but not after that. I could only do consecutive translations after that. As I said, I could translate diplomatic notes; in fact, I did that on my next assignment which was with the embassy in Taipei. But once you stop doing that, you also forget because Chinese diplomatic notes are written in even more stilted form than those written in English.

Q: So you were then assigned to Taipei. Was the move easy?

FELDMAN: The move was easy. It was essentially pack up and move from

Taichung to Taipei - a distance of approximately 100 miles. The family - my wife Carol and our two children - moved up to Taipei. We had a very lovely house with a red moon gate in an alley off Renai Lu - "renai" means "loving humanity." It was a very pretty house.

I was assigned as the political-military officer in the embassy, at a time when a "Status of Forces" (SOFA) agreement was being negotiated. That was an interesting assignment, which I enjoyed. My boss was Robert Lindquist - the head of the political section. He wasn't particularly attractive, either as a person or as an officer. I was negotiating with Frederick F. Chien-Chien Fu - who was then the junior officer in the North American affairs bureau in the Foreign Ministry. He later became foreign minister; he also served in Washington as the director of Taiwan's unofficial office and later became chairman of the Commission of the Economic Planning and Development; he also served as Speaker of the National Assembly. He is now the president of the Control Yuan, which in Taiwan is a combination of our General Accounting Office and a government wide Inspector General.

Fred and I did the basic work negotiating this "Status of Forces" agreement. Our respective bosses - Lindquist and Tsai Wei-ping - took credit for it. But still it was a very interesting assignment.

Q: What was the involvement of the respective military?

FELDMAN: I chaired a U.S. drafting committee which included the legal officer of the Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) in Taiwan as well as the legal officer of the Taiwan Defense Command. In those days we had a very elaborate military structure in Taiwan. The MAAG was involved in providing military assistance and training. Then there was the Taiwan Defense Command because under the Mutual Defense Treaty that we had with the Republic of China we basically assumed responsibility for defending Taiwan from the People's Republic of China (PRC). We had several military bases on the island; we had an air base in Tainan; we had a major air base outside of Taichung. We had the 13th Air Force located on Taiwan. We had naval bases in Kaohsiung, in Tsoying and in Chilung. We patrolled the Taiwan Straits with ships from the Seventh Fleet. They would come in and out of Taiwan ports. U.S. aircraft would patrol the Straits. There were a lot of joint planning and many joint exercises.

In terms of drafting the agreement, naturally the military had a very large input.

Q: Had there not been any "Status of Forces" agreement before that?

FELDMAN: No.

Q: How long had the U.S. military been on the island?

FELDMAN: The U.S. military came in right after the Korean War. So there had been about 10 years without agreement. Basically, what had happened was that in January, 1950, President Truman had said that we would not get involved with Taiwan and that we were out of the Chinese civil war and would stay out. But then on June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. One of the first things that happened after that was that Truman interposed the Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland because it appeared at the time that the North Korean invasion might herald a total attempt by the communist world to take aggressive action in the Far East, including an invasion of Taiwan. General MacArthur had argued very strongly that the PRC must not be allowed to control Taiwan. So the Seventh Fleet was ordered into the Straits. By the end of 1950 and the beginning of 1951, we began the negotiations for a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with Taiwan. The senior U.S. negotiator was John Foster Dulles who became secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration. I believe that the MDT was actually signed in 1953.

Q: How come it took so long to think about a SOFA?

FELDMAN: The ROC was pleased to have us on the island under any guise that it wasn't until much later that it began to think about such matters of whether its courts shouldn't have jurisdiction over crimes committed by GIs etc. At the beginning, the ROC was so overjoyed to have an American military presence on the island - so happy to have American troops to protect them from the PRC - that it didn't raise any of the issues for many, many years.

Q: When did your assignment to the embassy start?

FELDMAN: It started in 1963. The negotiations had already been underway for a few months by the time I got to the embassy. So I was very close to the beginning of the process. I did not get to complete the negotiations because I was transferred to Hong Kong in 1965. By that time, we had just about finished the draft treaty.

Q: Were the problems created by our military presence make the negotiations difficult?

FELDMAN: You must understand the Chinese view of themselves. As far as the negotiations were concerned, there was an awful lot of nationalist fervor on the ROC side. They still regarded themselves as the sole legitimate government of all of China. They were very careful to assert themselves in every possible way. So the negotiations were not the easiest, but they were not that difficult because we always had the trump card of withdrawal from the island if the ROC made things too difficult - which if course was the last thing they wanted. So on any issues that were crucial to us, we got our way.

Q: How about the internal politics on Taiwan at the time?

FELDMAN: Taiwan at the time had pretty much a one party dictatorship - quite stern at that. The Kuomintang (KMT) - the Nationalists party - was the only legal party other than a few tame offshoots. The island was under martial law. The Taiwan Garrison Command, which was responsible for the enforcement of the martial law, could essentially do what it wanted. Although there was a sign at the airport which said "Welcome to Taiwan: the home of free China," Taiwan could not be considered "free." It was a one party dictatorship. It had been called a "soft" authoritarianism; it actually became that some years later. Under Chiang Kai-shek, who was in charge at the time, it was a fairly hard authoritarian regime; it was not "bloody" minded - it didn't kill opponents - at least not very often. There were a lot of political prisoners kept on a place called "Green Island." There were few executions and those were people whom the regime had reason to believe that they were PRC spies.

Q: What about the indigenous Taiwanese? Were they even in sight?

FELDMAN: Of course there were in sight. They were 85% of the population. Although my official dealings were with the government, of course, and particularly with the North American Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, I and most of my colleagues in the embassy felt considerable sympathy for the ordinary Taiwanese.

Essentially, the "mainlanders" (that is the people who had come from the mainland with Chiang Kai-shek after they lost the civil war) - the 15% of Taiwan's population - ran the Taiwan government. They staffed nearly all of the positions. All the senior military positions in the military were occupied by "mainlanders." Only the draftees were Taiwanese. indigenous.

The Taiwanese ran the economy. Taiwan was just beginning to change from a wholly agrarian society into one built on light industry. What had happened was that the Nationalist had pushed through land reform. This was billed as one of their greatest democratic innovations. It was that, but a major reason for land reform was to break the power of the wealthy Taiwanese land owners. That is what happened, but unlike the mainland, where the land owners were executed, the Nationalist bought off the Taiwan land owners. They gave them government bonds and shares of government-owned corporations. So, in fact, the Nationalists transformed the Taiwanese land-owning gentry into a Taiwanese entrepreneurial class. These were the people that were the pioneers in the industrialization of Taiwan. Initially, they focused in textile production and other exportable items using the resources they had received from the government.

That is the origin of Taiwan's transformation from an agrarian society to a light industrial production nation. By the time I left in 1965 - the same year during which we ceased economic assistance to the ROC (it was "graduated) - this transformation was well established, after only four or five years. Another thing happening was the return of students from American universities and graduate

schools. They transferred both government and economy.

Q: Is that because most of the "mainlanders" were of bureaucratic inclination - not entrepreneurs - or was there some other reasons?

FELDMAN: Most of them were government officials and military officers. The "mainland" entrepreneurial class had come to Hong Kong, not Taiwan. They developed Hong Kong as light industry exporting base. Within the cadre of the government bureaucrats that fled to Taiwan were people who did become involved in economic issues because the Nationalist government, when in power on the mainland, had operated banks and some industries. They transferred those skills to Taiwan and replicated what they had done on the mainland. The government established banks on the island; it founded the China Steel corporation, China Petroleum, Taiwan Sugar and something called Taiwan Tobacco and Alcohol Monopoly corporation which made beer and cigarettes. So some of the bureaucrats also became economic powerhouses.

Q: Was there a conflict between government owned industry and privately held industry?

FELDMAN: Not much. The government part of the economic sector is just beginning to fade out starting a couple of years ago as the government began to privatize the major government corporations. There are still many that are still government controlled. Many will continue to be quasi-government controlled. For example, in the telecommunications industry, the government will continue to control a 30-40% interest in China Telecom.

Q: Did the land owning class have an affinity for business?

FELDMAN: What happened was that it sent its children off to be educated in the U.S., as did the "mainland" government bureaucrats. Pretty soon, these students returned from Wharton, Harvard, MIT etc with MBAs or other degrees. That started the second transformation of Taiwan's industry from a mainly import-substitution one to an export driven powerhouse. I am now talking about the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Q: On the political side, did you in the early 1960s, observe a Taiwan independence movement?

FELDMAN: The Taiwan independence movement existed primarily outside of Taiwan because anyone on the island suspected of being associated with it was subject to arrest and imprisonment on Green Island as a political dissident. There was a Taiwan independence movement ("TIM") and something called "World United Formosans for Independence ("Wufi"). "Wufi" was mostly a U.S. based organization and TIM existed mostly in Japan.

Q: There was no pretense of democracy?

FELDMAN: There was a pretense of democracy. There were local elections - village and county - but there always was a question of who could enter the race. Essentially, only KMT members and independents approved by the KMT, could get on the ballot. The elections tended to be pretty much rigged.

The parliament is called the "Legislative Yuan." Most of seats in that body were held by those who had been elected on the mainland in 1947. As I said, the government in Taiwan still considered itself to be the government of all China; so I would be invited to have tea with the "Senator from Chingdao" or another town or province on the mainland. This was 1964. But Chinese live a long time. What would happen is that if the representative from Chingdao died, the person who had been the runner-up, if still living and on Taiwan, would take that seat. That is the way things were done until much, much later in the 1980s.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

FELDMAN: Our ambassador when I was at the language school was Everett Drumright, who had been my CG [consul general] in Hong Kong. By the time I joined the embassy, the ambassador was a former admiral, Jerauld Wright. In between, Alan Kirk had served as ambassador; he was also a former admiral and had been appointed by President Kennedy - and FSO Roger Kirk's father. Kirk ran afoul of Chiang Kai Shek who refused to receive him; so in the end the U.S. government had no choice but to remove Kirk and replace him with Wright.

Q: How large was the embassy?

FELDMAN: I really don't know. The political section had about five people; the economic section about the same. The consular section was somewhat larger - six or seven. There was a fairly large CIA station, headed by Ray Cline. Then there was the MAAG, and AID mission until it was phased out.

Ray Cline had the closest relationship with the ROC government. He had a particularly close relationship with Chiang Ching-kuo, the "Gimo's" son and heir, who became president in 1975. Jerauld Wright never seemed to do very much or be around very much. Essentially he would go to the officers' club and drink with his old Navy buddies. He was not much of a presence in the embassy. Ralph Clough, the DCM, pretty well ran things. Ralph now teaches at SAIS.

Q: Besides the Status of Forces agreement, were there any other major issues between the two governments? They undoubtedly encouraged us to keep our hard line on the PRC.

FELDMAN: They did. They also periodically would stage a commando raid on the China coast. Usually, their commandos would be entirely wiped out, but the

ROC always claimed major success. They had troops on off-shore islands - Matsu and Quemoy - and a number of smaller islands. We kept trying during my tour to convince the ROC to withdraw from these islands. They did from the smaller islands and they reduced the number of the troops on the two main ones. But in fact, there are garrisons on Matsu and Quemoy still today.

Q: Are there any other comments on your Taiwan tour that you would like to make?

FELDMAN: There is one other item I might mention. In 1965, there was a tie vote in the UN on the "important question" resolution. This declared that any change in deciding who would represent China was to be considered an "important question." The movement to admit the PRC had started earlier and build up to the tie vote in 1965. But the great "Cultural Revolution" took place in 1966 - the era of great madness on the mainland. At that point, China seemed to be in such disarray - chaotic and insane - that the votes in support of seating it in the UN dropped precipitously.

Q: Was diplomatic representation in Taiwan at that point affected by some countries which recognized the PRC?

FELDMAN: Yes. For example, there was never a British embassy in Taiwan. They had a consulate in Tanshui (Tamsui), which was a little town about 20-30 minute drive from Taipei on the seacoast. That consulate had been there for about a century. The British were one of the first to recognize the PRC and never established an embassy in Taiwan, primarily to protect their interests in Hong Kong. Also the Labor Party was in power in 1949; it may have felt some affinity with the Chinese communists.

Q: The British have always been in the forefront of accepting the fait accompli and accepting de facto situations.

FELDMAN: I guess that is right. But in the Chinese situation, the British had had some bad experiences with the Nationalists going back to the general strikes of the 1920s which spread to Hong Kong. The strikes took place in major cities, like Canton, Shanghai and Hong King. So the British never really liked the Nationalists from that time on.

Q: How about some of other allies, like the French?

FELDMAN: De Gaulle changed French policy in 1965 after the tie vote in the UN. He shifted recognition from ROC to the PRC. The French left Taiwan that year and that was the first major defection. The ROC in those days had its own version of the Hallstein doctrine; that is if a country recognized the PRC, the ROC would break relationship with that country. Twenty years later, the ROC was not so picky; it was glad to have relations with any one that would do so. But in the

early 1960s, it still maintained that countries could have relationship with the ROC or the PRC, but not both.

The French broke their relationship, but no others did, again because the "Cultural Revolution" on the mainland gave everybody pause, particularly when the Red Guards surrounded foreign legations and even assaulted some of them. So no one was going to establish a mission in Beijing. The "Cultural Revolution" started in 1966, after I had left Taiwan. I was by then in Hong Kong which became a locus of the "Cultural Revolution."

Q: So after your tour in Taiwan, you were appointed to a position in Hong Kong. How did that come about?

FELDMAN: I mentioned that Hong Kong was our first post and one is usually in love with his or her first post. My wife, Carol, wanted desperately to get back to Hong Kong. In those days, there were discussions of a unified Foreign Service encompassing both State and USIA personnel. Volunteers from USIA were solicited to take State Department assignments and vice versa. I volunteered on the understanding that I would be assigned to Hong Kong. And that is what happened in 1966.

We had home leave in 1965 and at the beginning of 1966, I was assigned to USIS-Hong Kong. It as a very mixed experience. It was a tour of five years which combined great difficulties and sadness and some elation as well.

I was first assigned as "book publications" officer. The PAO, Ken Boyle, had been a classmate at the Taichung language school. His wife, Betsy, had been the linguist at Taichung. But I was assigned to work for someone whose name I have forgotten. I was the junior publications officer and he was the senior book officer. In those days, we were actually writing books and commissioning books from others. It was part of the anti-PRC propaganda effort by USIS-Hong Kong.

I didn't fit into this program terribly well. I did write a book, after a contract with a Brit named George Patterson fell apart. It was to be a book on border conflicts between the PRC and the USSR. He turned in a manuscript which was pretty much unusable. I had to re-write the whole book. It was entitled "The Unquiet Frontier." Patterson's name was kept on it, but I actually wrote it.

But I didn't get along with my boss and he gave me a terrible efficiency rating. It was sufficiently bad so that I ended up in the lowest 5-10% of my class - for the first time ever. I received a warning letter. I was obviously very unhappy. Ken Boyle reassigned me to be the Press Officer, which suited me very well. I enjoyed that assignment.

Shortly thereafter, Ken Boyle was replaced by Sandy Marlowe. Sandy and I got along splendidly. We just had a great relationship - almost like a father-son

relationship. He was considerably older and was on his last assignment prior to retirement. He had no China experience; his last post had been in Germany - I think he was the PAO (or deputy PAO) in Bonn. We got along like gang-busters. I was the Press Officer during the Vietnam war. There were approximately 110 correspondents residing in Hong Kong. Some of them would dart off to cover the war on the ground. Others covered Vietnam from Hong Kong from their hotel rooms.

Sandy was a real "Vietnam hawk." I was not much of a "hawk"; in fact I was not a "hawk" at all. I enjoyed dealing with the press; it was great fun. I became a sort of "big wheel" in the foreign correspondents community.

Q: What did the Press Officer do?

FELDMAN: The Press Officer issues press releases, but most of his time is taken up by fielding questions from the local and the foreign press. There was also a lot of "schmoozing." I would go out and have lunch with Chinese editors or western foreign correspondents. I had a wide circle of friends and I really enjoyed being the Press Officer.

My Book Officer job lasted about nine months - or a year. In 1967, I became the Press Officer and did that for about a year.

Q: Let me interrupt for one moment. In the posts in which I have served, the Press Officer was a pseudo member of the political section because so much information comes to that section. Did you have responsibility as being the spokesman on Hong Kong matters?

FELDMAN: I was the spokesman, but our Consul General, Ed Rice, essentially believed that if you saw the name "American Consulate General" in a local newspaper, it indicated that the Press Officer was not doing his job. As far as he was concerned, the Press Officer's primary responsibility was to keep the American Consulate General out of the press. I thought that was rather difficult to do. Whether his policy was good or bad, was immaterial. The world does not work that way. Ed would inevitably be upset and I was the one who would get angry telephone calls, but there was nothing I or anyone else could do about the press.

But I did have a lot fun in many ways. I might just relate one story as an illustration. Congressman Passman came to Hong Kong. He was a powerful member of the House Appropriations Committee. For some inexplicit reason, I was assigned to take Passman to Macao. His excuse for going there was that we had a refugee operation run by the Catholic Relief organization and funded by the U.S. What he really wanted to do was to look for a Chinese prostitute. To do so in Hong Kong would have run the risk of discovery; Macao was much safer. So to cover his real purpose, he also visited the refugee center.

When we got back to Hong Kong on a Friday evening, he wanted to hold a press conference the next day. He didn't care about the local press; he wanted the American correspondents. To hold such a conference on a Saturday morning, was just not realistic - they were just not going to attend a Saturday press conference for Passman or almost anyone else. So I phoned around to some of my friends. I got the local representative of Bulova Watch Company, who happened to be from Boston. So he came under the guise of being the correspondent for the "Boston Globe." I got other friends also to attend and to play the role of correspondents and introduced them as representing one or another American newspaper. They were great; they gloated in their newfound glory. They asked question after question. I must say they were tougher and more interesting than the regular working correspondents. At the end of the conference, Passman wiped his sweat from his brow and said to me: "That was a great press conference and you said it wouldn't happen!"

Another story concerned the time that Richard Nixon came through on his way to Vietnam. This took place in February, 1967. The presidential campaign - for the party nomination - had already started. Ed Rice, who was an old China hand, despised Nixon; he was not going to have anything to do with him. So he sent me to the airport to meet him - former Vice President and senator. I went to the airport and met Nixon. I had been clever enough to burrow the Rolls Royce from the Mandarin Hotel to take us from the airport. That put me in his good graces. He was staying at the Mandarin, so to get that service was no great feat, but I am very glad that we did that.

He liked being taken to the hotel in the Rolls Royce. He was accompanied by Ray Price who was his speech writer. Nixon stayed for a couple of days. He left on a Sunday. I asked the Mandarin to make the Rolls available again. We went to the airport. Nixon was supposed to fly on an Air France flight to Saigon. It was supposed to leave around 9:30 a.m. We got to the airport at about 8:30 and went to the VIP lounge. We were then told that the flight was delayed for about a half-hour or an hour at the most. Nixon turned to me and opined that we would not leave before noon. When I asked him why he thought that, he said:" If anything bad can happen to me, it will."

The three of us set in the VIP lounge and waited. Nixon was right; the plane did not leave until noon or even later. Every once in a while we would walk around the airport which on a Sunday morning was essentially dead - even the shops were closed. So there was really nothing to do, but sit in the VIP lounge and chat. He asked me a number of questions about China after he found out that I knew something about it. Then I asked him questions about American politics. I began by asking who the Republican nominee would be in 1968. He assured me that he would be it. I told him that there were a lot of people betting on George Romney. He answered by asking me whether I had ever heard Romney make a speech. Nixon thought he was hopeless and would never get the nomination. Then I asked

about Nelson Rockefeller who was also in the running. Nixon said the Republican Party would never nominate Rockefeller.

Then I asked who his running mate would be if got the nomination. He hadn't really decided, but he was looking for a governor who had a reputation of being more liberal than he was. In fact, Agnew at the time was considered to be a fairly liberal governor of Maryland. Then I asked who the Democratic nominee was going to be and he was certain it would be Lyndon Johnson and that his running mate would be Bobby Kennedy. I was surprised because it was well known that the two hated each other. Nixon pointed out that they needed each other. Furthermore, he though that Robert Kennedy could on an actuarial basis assume that he would inherit the office. Lyndon had had a heart attack and other physical problems.

I said: "Let's assume that you and liberal governor run against Johnson and Kennedy. Who wins?" Nixon said: "Johnson will win." I then asked why under those circumstances he was willing to go through the agonies of another campaign. He then noted that in politics you could never be sure what might happen - Johnson might break a leg. And in a way that's exactly what happened, with LBJ choosing not to run.

Q: That was very interesting and revealing. What other impressions did you have of Nixon?

FELDMAN: He was the most pessimistic person I have encountered. He truly believed that nothing good could ever happen to him. There was an obvious paranoid overtone to his comments. He believed that he was constantly followed by a dark cloud like Joe Bfstplk in the Al Capp cartoon. I mentioned that the other day to someone who I thought was of an age to have read Al Capp. Never heard of him!

But that was truly the way Nixon saw himself. There was this dark cloud that followed him wherever he went. But he was smart. He would discuss American politics in great detail; he was a brilliant speaker. It was fascinating to spend several hours with him. I have always regretted that I did not immediately upon my return from the airport sit down at a typewriter to record all of my recollections of that morning.

Q: Let me ask you about your house during your second Hong Kong tour.

FELDMAN: It was a lovely house. When we returned to Hong Kong in 1965, we were told that the second floor of a two apartment house might be available, but we might have to wait a bit because the tenant, the Agricultural Attache, would be moving out in about a month. We looked at the quarters; they were absolutely marvelous. It had three bedrooms, three baths, a large living and dining rooms, nice kitchen, but what attracted us the most was that the house was on a little rise

in the Stanley area - in the back of Hong Kong. It was on Stanley Mound Road - "Mound" because it was smaller than a hill, but elevated nevertheless. It was elevated enough so that with the gorgeous wrap-around veranda that the apartment had, we could see both bays - Stanley is a peninsula and we could see the waters on either side.

That was truly marvelous. I would come home from work in the evening and I could see fishing boats on the water, even in the dark when they turned their lights on to attract the fish. I would sit on the veranda with a drink and watch for a long time those lights bobbing on the bays. It was quite beautiful. There was also a very large garden and for the first time in my life I tried hard at gardening, which I've come to love in retirement.

But I should add that something very sad happened in Hong Kong. My first marriage came apart. Carol had been a ballet dancer before we were married and before we joined the Foreign Service. She loved to dance, but she couldn't perform as the wife of Foreign Service officer, in light of our constant moves. She would get started with a teacher or by forming a troop, but it became increasingly difficult as we got older - in our thirties. Physically, it just became too tough. She became very depressed. There was even an automobile accident which just might have been a suicide attempt. By the end of the second Hong Kong tour, she had decided that the Foreign Service life was not for her. When we returned to Washington for my next assignment, we separated and subsequently divorced. That was very sad, particularly because we had two children - Ross Christopher and Peter Dylan. Although both were away at school, it was tough on both, particularly on Peter. It had a major and harmful effect on his life.

Q: That really illustrates the difficulties of Foreign Service life, especially in the days when the spouses wanted to have their own careers. These days, many do that, but not in the 1960s.

FELDMAN: These days, the Foreign Service is a bit better, although it is still tough for parents. In the old days, the officer's efficiency report very often commented on the spouse and her suitability for Foreign service life. It was particularly difficult for a spouse interested in the creative arts. Within that category, I suspect it is particularly difficult for a dancer because of the physical demands.

Q: I think you are right because not all posts offer opportunities for a dancer. Let us go to the next assignment.

FELDMAN: I was assigned to Washington in the Office of UN Political Affairs. I was to work particularly on the question of Chinese representation in the UN. This was 1970 when the U.S. was still supporting the membership of the ROC on Taiwan and trying to keep the PRC out of the UN. The tactics that we used was our insistence that the representation issue was "important question." We would

lobby our friends and allies each year to support our position that the issue of which of the two governments would represent China in the UN was an "important question" within the meaning of the Charter. The Charter stipulated that an "important question" required the approval of two-thirds of the UN General Assembly members.

I should mentioned that the ROC even in 1970 still claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all of China, just as the PRC made the same claim. In both cases, all of China included Taiwan, as the PRC still claims today. The ROC no longer makes that claim; it restricts its sovereignty to the territory it actually governs - Taiwan and some islands.

My responsibility in 1970 was to organize support for our "important question" position; we did that through representations in various capitals, using demarches. Then I was to go to New York to coordinate strategies.

It quickly became apparent that our policy was receiving less and less support. The number of countries that were switching recognition from the ROC to the PRC was growing each year. By 1970, a majority of UN members recognized the PRC; that made it even more important that we stick to the "important question" position which required the two-third majority. It was also clear that the day when we could not muster a two-third majority was rapidly approaching. So I began to write a series of internal memoranda addressed to other members of the Bureau of International Organizations (IO), suggesting that we switch to a policy of dual representation. In fact, we would say that both the ROC and the PRC should be both represented in the UN.

In 1970, my suggestion was flatly rejected. We held to our usual position that year, although several of our allies, like Belgium and Canada, urged that we switch to dual representation. We didn't and we won very narrowly. Our weak position became even clearer as we entered the spring of 1971; it was by then certain that unless we changed our policy, we would be outvoted in the next General Assembly session.

The NSC asked us to study the question - a National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) - which we did. We provided the options: a) we could continue our past policy and probably lose (that might have been ok because we would have gone down fighting); b) try something new like dual representations. In our view, these were the only two options; there were not the expected "three options." It was either sticking to our position and being out-voted, or try dual representation. There might have been a variant, which Kissinger might have liked, which was to follow the old policy, but not to try too hard. Unbeknown to us, while we were writing the NSSM, Kissinger was already working on the details of his "secret" trip to China to be worked out through the good offices of Pakistan.

When we had finished the study, we sent it to the White House. Our recommendation was for option "b" - dual representation. We made a strong case for that course saying that both governments should be seated pending some final resolution of the two governments' dispute - e.g. reunification of China. We cited the example of what had been done for North and South Korea, and East and West Germany. We believed that these models could replicated in the China situation and that we could muster enough support in the UN to pass our resolution of dual representation.

We waited for an answer. We waited, and waited and waited. Finally in early July 1971, I asked permission from the head of IO-UNP, Jack Armitage, to take some leave. He approved my request because nothing seemed to be happening on the question of China representation. I went to Chincoteague with the family. One day as I was sitting in the kitchen of our cottage, I heard on the radio that Henry Kissinger had been in Beijing and that Nixon would be going to China the following year. I was absolutely flabbergasted and shocked and wondered what would happen to our UN policy.

I hurried back to Washington. Still we had no answer from the White House. Instead we were told that the president was going to send a special envoy to Taiwan to see Chiang Kai-shek to discuss with him the dual representation policy and to hopefully get his agreement. Robert Murphy, the former ambassador, was chosen for this task. He was very distinguished and crusty. Murphy went, only to be told by Chiang Kai-shek that he would rather be a piece of broken jade lying smashed on the floor than a whole tile on a roof. Murphy said that he agreed with the Generalissimo's position. So instead of giving an objective analysis of the situation, Murphy basically bolstered Chiang Kai-shek's belief that if the U.S. worked hard enough, the ROC position would win again.

It was fairly clear that regardless of how hard the U.S. might work for the "important question" resolution, it would not win enough support. But we were still stymied at the end of July. If we were going to be successful in selling the dual representation proposal, we had to start very quickly, making demarches through out the world. It wasn't until sometime in early August that we got the go ahead from the White House to start the process to gaining support for dual representation in the General Assembly. We raised the question of what was to be done in the Security Council - who would get the China seat there? We were bound to be asked that. The answer was that we would cross that bridge when we come to it. That was not enough guidance; we had to know what we would say to countries who wanted to know what would happen in the Security Council. The answer came back that the Security Council would decide on its own membership. We then noted that we would have to vote on the question; what would be our position? The NSC told us to say that we had not yet made up our minds.

It was also unclear whether the ROC would help us in our efforts. That they didn't

have too many friends, but they had some.

Q: I would like to make a point at this juncture. The timing of all actions on China representation hinge on the meeting of the General Assembly which starts in early September.

FELDMAN: That is right. The General Assembly convenes on the third Tuesday or Wednesday in September each year. So here we were in August, without clear directions. We were prohibited from saying anything definitive about our future position in the Security Council. It was unclear whether the ROC would help us in our efforts, but we were told to proceed.

So we did. A task force was formed under the chairmanship of Martin Hertz, the deputy assistant secretary in IO. He was nominally in charge, but the actual day to day operations of the task force was my responsibility together with Linwood Starbird, another FSO and a Chinese language officer, who at the time was working on the ROC desk in Bureau of East Asian Affairs (EA). I was also helped from time to time by Tom Shoesmith, who was the country director for ROC affairs - later ambassador to New Zealand. But essentially Starbird and I did all the work; we were the ones who held the meetings with representatives from just about every embassy in Washington. We were trying to explain our policy.

Basically the issue was framed not as the expulsion of a member (ROC) and the admittance of a new member (PRC). The question for years had been framed as "How is China to be represented in the UN?." In earlier reiterations, the next question would have been "Is it to be represented by the ROC or the PRC?" In 1971, we reframed the issue to "China exists in two parts: one government in Taiwan, one on the mainland. Each of these parts should be represented in the UN, until some resolution of the status of the two was found." We used, as I said earlier, the East-West Germany model.

That is what we explained. The immediate question asked us was what position would we take on China's Security Council seat. Our answer was that the Council would have to decide its own membership and we would make our decision when the issue was to be discussed in the SC. It wasn't until the General assembly had already convened in September, that we were finally allowed - by the White House - to say that the SC would decide the issue of representation, but that we felt that the PRC should properly occupy the SC seat. That made our sales job a little easier.

Then there were technical questions such as "Should we do the "important question" resolution again or should the GA just vote on the two competing resolutions - i.e. the Albanian resolution which called for the expulsion from the UN of the "representatives of Chang Kai-shek" - it did use the term "The Republic of China" - or the U.S. and others resolution, which called for the seating of both the PRC and the ROC. We finally took the position that the issue

should remain an “important question.”

Then came the issue what would happen after the passage of the “important resolution.” Was it advantageous to take up the Albanian resolution first and have it fail to gain support of two-thirds of the UN membership which make the passage of our resolution much easier? Or should our resolution come first and hopefully gain the two-thirds majority? We consulted with most of the governments in the world; I was working around the clock and so was Starbird. These were heady days for a mid career FSO (I think I was an FSO 3 at the time.) My home phone was linked by the White House Communications Agency (WHCA) so that I could receive directly calls from all over the world at all times of the night - and I got lots of those. This was great stuff for an FSO who had not too long before been placed in the lowest 5% of his class. I was giving daily instructions to our representative in New York; his name was George Bush. I used to say :”George, we would like you to do this or that” or “George, please go see so and so.”

One day, towards the end of September, John Holdridge, a member of Kissinger’s NSC, asked me to have lunch with him. This was very unusual; I had never been invited by Holdridge, whom I had known for years, to break bread with him. So we met in a little sandwich shop near the old Executive Office. He wanted to know when I thought that the vote on dual representation would come up. It is always difficult to figure out what the GA’s schedule might be, but I said that if I had to guess, I would say the first or second week in November. I later learned that Kissinger decided to make his second visit to Beijing sometime late in the first week or early in the second week in November. It was announced that he would be there at the time; it was exactly when the UN vote on dual representation took place.

We lost on the “important question” issue by 55 countries in favor, 59 opposed, 15 abstained. If we could have switched two voted from the “opposed” column to the “in favor” one, there would have been a tied vote which under the UN rules would have given the victory to the proponents. We came that close even with Kissinger in Beijing negotiating with Zhou En-lai. Someone asked me later what it was like to live through these days. I said that it was like being in a race with the coach having instructed you not to leave the starting line even while the other runners were off. Then when the others had taken a good lead, the coach allowed his runner to go. Strangely enough the late starter caught up and in fact even took a slight lead when the coach called the runner to the sidelines and instructed him to put on a weight belt. Again, the late starter catches up again, only to have the coach stop him to add more weight to the belt. That was about the way our UN process went. I think that except for Kissinger’s visit, we would have won the “important question” issue and then we could have won on the dual representation question.

People have asked me that if we had won on these two questions, would the PRC

have joined the UN? - it had in fact rejected our compromise. If they had not joined, the issue of UN representation would have been left unresolved. My answer was that even under those circumstances, a lot would have been resolved. We would have made it clear that U.S. policy was to have relations with both PRC and the ROC. That would have had a major effect on what our situation is today - which I will discuss later. We recognize the PRC, but not the government on Taiwan. We refuse to recognize Taiwan as a state - as it is. So had we won on dual representation, history would have been far different. I think that ultimately, had we insisted on dual representation, the PRC would have joined the UN just as we had East and West Germany and North and South Korea. But that is not what happened.

Q: Let me go back in the story to the time when you made your initial recommendation. What were the internal dynamics in the Department when you went to the NSC with your recommendation for dual UN membership? What did EA think of it?

FELDMAN: EA at the time was headed by Marshal Green; his senior deputy was Winthrop Brown. They weren't completely sold on the idea, but they didn't oppose it. They were guardedly in favor of dual representation. Later, after we had permission to proceed with that proposal, I toured a number of countries in the company of that very elegant and distinguished FSO, Winthrop Brown. In those days, a deputy assistant secretary of State was a mighty and powerful figure. A DAS was a very senior officer and probably had served as ambassador once or twice, as Brown had - not like today when a DAS tends to be a 32 year old refugee from Capitol Hill or a White House intern.

There was opposition to the proposal primarily from Louise McNutt in EA. She was the daughter of a former secretary of the interior and governor of the Philippines. Louise felt very strongly that this was a terrible thing to do to an old ally - the ROC. I could not persuade her that the proposal was not an insult to the ROC; we were trying to preserve a place for it in the UN.

Q: I just want to note for the record here that Louise McNutt was a relic of earlier days when Ruth Bacon was around. She was there when I first came into EA which was then headed by Walter Robertson. I thought then the first priority in EA was to keep mainland China out of the UN. That explains McNutt's position.

FELDMAN: We used to joke that the role of Ruth Bacon and Louise McNutt was not only to keep China out of the UN, but to keep it out of everything including the International Jock-strap Convention, had there been such a thing.

The other bitter opponent was Jay Long, a colleague in IO in the same office that I was in (UNP). His position was more nuanced. Jay simply felt that it was unbecoming to switch from complete support of the ROC; he wanted the U.S. to continue its old policy and if that meant a loss in the UN, so be it.

Those were the two principal voices in opposition. Louise fortunately could not persuade the assistant secretary or his deputy to oppose the proposal; neither could Jay Long persuade the IO leadership - Martin Hertz or Sam De Palma, the assistant secretary.

Q: What were the repercussions after the vote?

FELDMAN: On the day when our position on the "important question" was defeated, the ROC delegation announced it was withdrawing from the General Assembly. This was a typical Chinese ploy - "you can't fire us; we quit." But that didn't stop the GA from approving the Albanian resolution - by a very large majority (something like 75 in favor and 30 opposed). The technicalities of this outcome were interesting. A vote in the GA applies only to the GA; it does not apply to any other UN body, except those which are essentially sub-groups of the GA - certain committees and commissions. All the UN specialized agencies are independent of the GA. So what happened thereafter, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim - of odious memory - sent out a memorandum to all of the specialized agencies summarizing the actions of the GA and requesting that each of the specialized agencies consider whether they wished to follow suit. Just about all of these agencies, over the period of the following two years, did oust the ROC except two: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund - both only loosely related to the UN. These financial institutions use weighted voting; i.e. the number of votes depend on the amount of the contributions. The U.S. today has 17% of the vote; I think in the 1970s, we had 20%. For the next nine years, the ROC remained a member of these two financial institutions even though it was no longer a member of the GA or the Security Council or any of the specialized agencies.

Q: What about relations between IO and the UN mission? What was your view from Washington?

FELDMAN: During the CHIREP debate, there were no problems. At the conclusion of the 1970 GA, I had been asked whether I would take an assignment to our UN mission because it was clear that there would be a major battle in China representation in the following meeting. I had first agreed, but then I had to change my mind because it was during this time that Carol and I were going through marriage counseling in the hopes of saving our marriage. I just couldn't go to New York. I was asked to find someone who could fill the China portfolio in our UN mission. I asked Harry Thayer, a distinguished FSO, a Chinese language officer - he was a fellow student at the Taichung school. Harry did go and joined the political section. We worked very closely in the following twelve months and we never had any problems - unlike what I saw later when I was one of the ambassadors in New York. We worked very cooperatively. George Bush was an easy person to work with. He never took umbrage at the fact that a mid-career FSO was in effect giving him his instructions each day. So I had a very

good relationship with our UN mission.

Q: Then what was your next assignment?

FELDMAN: As soon as the vote had taken place in the UN, I was assigned to a working group which dealt with President Nixon's February 1972 visit to China. I was asked to write the background papers on U.S. relations with the ROC. I was hoping I would be invited to go on the trip. The Secretary of State was William Rogers, a very nice guy, who I would have to say understood almost nothing about China and our policy. He had, as is well known, been cut entirely out of the action by Henry Kissinger.

Rogers was going to go on the trip as was Marshall Green. As a member of the working group, I had to brief Rogers on the situation and what issues might arise in Beijing. Alexis Johnson, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, was also one of the briefers as was Al Jenkins, the director of the Office of Mainland Communist Affairs - i.e. the China desk. Marshall Green briefed A/SO. I was obviously the most junior member of this group. Rogers would postulate different scenarios - "If they say this, can I say that?" It was a total clanger. Johnson would sort of hem and haw as did Jenkins. Marshall would sort of dodge the question. So it was left to me to tell Rogers that his answer was not quite appropriate; he then wanted to know what was wrong with his answer. So I would try to explain while the others would just sit and nod. But I was left exposed as the "expert." In the end, I was cut from the list of the people who would go to Beijing. The special working group disbanded at the end of January.

Q: What happened next?

FELDMAN: In 1972, I was invited to join the Policy Planning Staff (S/SP) to be the China expert. I accepted and stayed there for about one year until early 1973. Then I was assigned as political counselor in our mission to Taiwan.

Q: What was the role of S/SP in 1972?

FELDMAN: The role of S/SP depends on who the secretary is and who the director of the staff is. In my time, we did very little policy planning. This was the grand era of quantification. I forget what silly acronyms we gave to these exercises, but we had to assign numerical values to everything the Department did. We had to break down all the embassies' tasks and assign numerical values to them. Somehow, we were supposed to make these numbers add up to something meaningful, but I have yet to understand what they were supposed to do. That was what S/SP was deeply involved in 1972. It also wrote speeches for the secretary. It didn't do much else.

This was not my cup of tea. I was never a math major. I participated fitfully in the number exercise and occasionally I would even have a chance to write some

policy papers on U.S. relations with China and Taiwan. This did not happen to often.

Sometimes I would get dragged off to a meeting in some other part of the world. In late 1971, I remember Bill Cargo, the director, took me to a NATO planners' meeting because one of the subjects to be discussed was China. That meeting took place in Germany. It was my first time in Germany - or Europe for that matter. We were taken to a castle (a Schloss) somewhere down the Rhine. This did not look like a Disney version of a castle; it looked more like a large house. It had belonged to the Hohenzollern family - the home of the former rulers of Germany. It was a very pleasant sojourn.

This was during the days of the Bader-Meinhoff gang and the "Red Army faction." So we had a tight security process to protect all of these NATO planners. There were a lot of hard-looking Germans with crew cuts walking around carrying briefcases with one hand stuck inside them. I kept on thinking how strange this situation was; under other circumstances, I, as an American Jew, would not have been guarded by some German security types. But it was fun. I remember that at lunch and dinner each table had a pitcher of local wine. That was great.

Q: How did your assignment to Taiwan come about?

FELDMAN: Bill Gleysteen, to whom I use to call the "finest Foreign Service officer of his generation" was the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in Taiwan. (In 1973, we still had an embassy in Taipei.) He asked that I be assigned to Taipei as political counselor. I was delighted with the assignment; my marriage was over and I was divorced. In fact, during my S/P days I was living in a basement apartment in Adams-Morgan - I referred to it is as my "cave." I was just scraping by since most of my income went to my ex-wife. I also was paying for private school for my two children. So I was happy to get an overseas assignment where my housing would be provided by the government.

I was very happy to work with Bill. The ambassador was Walter McConaughy, who was a strange person. He had been involved with China for many, many years. He had begun as a junior FSO in China in the 1930s. He had worked in many consulates in China. During the war, he remained in the Service and held a number of different jobs. After the war, he became director of the Office of Chinese Affairs. So he had been involved with China for about 40 years; he never learned a word of Chinese. I referred to Chiang Kai-shek as "Chee-Ang." McConaughy was from Alabama and that didn't help his pronunciation. The basic Chinese "thank you" (Hsieh-hsieh) would be pronounced as "Chi-Chi." That was somewhat disconcerting when one realized that he had been working in the Chinese vineyards for 40 years.

He was on old line FSO. At this point, he was not too deeply involved; Gleysteen

ran the show - fortunately. I had a strange political section. The best officer - Joe Lake - in the section was also the most junior. Much later, he became the DCM in Bulgaria, ambassador to Mongolia and then Albania. He retired about a year ago after a stint as "Diplomat In Residence" at the University of Texas at Austin.

Joe was the most junior and most valuable member of the staff. My deputy was not much good; I had a integrated "spook" - CIA man who had a marvelous gift of gab, but never did any work. Whenever I would ask him to do something, he would say that he would love to do that, but that he was really tied down by his other job. I said I understood; one day, the CIA station chief came to me to say that I had to stop loading his man down with so much work; he was so busy that he couldn't do any of the CIA work. I don't think I ever learned what this officer was doing, but he was a "good old boy" from Arkansas; he taught me how to hot-wire a car.

Q: What were the issues at the embassy at the time?

FELDMAN: President Nixon had been to Beijing; the Shanghai communique had been signed and issued. The key phrase in that was that the U.S. recognized that the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits agreed that there was only one China of which Taiwan was one part and that the U.S. did not contest this conclusion.

By 1973, 18 months after the presidential visit, after several Kissinger's visits to the mainland and after the PRC's entrance into the UN, most countries had switched from Taipei to Beijing. Only a few continued their formal relations with the ROC. Those that had established relations with the PRC had recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of all of China, including Taiwan. The PRC insisted that this phraseology be included in all recognition communiques.

What the embassy was doing was essentially trying to get the people on Taiwan used to the idea that the day was coming when "we would complete normalization." - a euphemism that indicated that we would switch recognition ourselves from Taipei to Beijing. That was U.S. policy. An illustration of the consequences of this policy was the departure of the 13th Air Force which moved its headquarters from Taiwan to the Philippines.

When I arrived in Taiwan, we had major Air Force units on the islands. By the end of 1973, they were gone. We had a large MAAG in 1972 - something like 6000 officers and men - ; by the end of 1973 it was down to 2000 and declining. We had nuclear weapons on Taiwan which were stored on an Air Force base in the south. By the end of 1973 or the beginning of 1974, I was assigned to oversee their removal and their return to U.S. territory - probably to Hawaii.

So it was quite clear that we were reducing our presence on Taiwan in major ways. We had established a liaison office on Beijing; we had appointed David

Bruce, a senior and distinguished diplomat, to head that office; he was followed by George Bush. So I thought it was quite clear that had "Watergate" not intervened, normalization would have been completed by the end of Nixon's second term. There was no doubt that that was what was going to happen. So part of the embassy's task was to prepare the people of Taiwan prepared for that day.

Q: How did they take to our efforts?

FELDMAN: We had go through a funny dance. Every time we would hint that "normalization" was coming, the government would issue a statement denying that such action would ever take place. So we had a push-pull situation with us saying that it was going to happen and the ROC denying it. The result was confusion for which both the ROC and we paid a price during the Carter administration when we did break relations with the ROC, because the people in Taiwan were not sufficiently prepared for this break - nor were we, I should say.

Walter McConaughy was replaced in the spring of 1974 by Leonard Unger who had been our excellent ambassador in Thailand. He did a very good job in Taiwan.

I had a very good time at the embassy. I was in Taiwan as a bachelor. I had remembered Taiwan as a straight-laced society of the 1960s, when I first served there. By the 1970s, it was different standard. I was having a marvelous time dating Chinese women or expatiate foreigners. Ultimately, at a volleyball game, one Saturday afternoon at a home of a friend, Tony Tidei (which sounds like "today," which in Chinese is Jintien; so he was known as Tony Jintien)... He had a house in Tanshui, a suburb of Taipei. We had constructed a volleyball court and a swimming pool on his property. For the swimming pool, we dug a monster ditch and lined with a tarp and filled it with a hose. It was a primitive swimming pool, but it felt good after a hot day at volleyball.

One day, I met an American graduate school, Laurie Sherman, who had received her BA in Chinese studies from Cornell University. She was in Taiwan working on her Chinese language at a local Chinese teachers college. We dated a couple of times. During one volley ball game, she sprained her ankle severely. So I took her to a hospital and that was the beginning of an increasing friendship and she ultimately moved in with me. Not only was that acceptable in Taiwan, but even the Foreign Service accepted it. Not many objected to the fact that we were "living in sin." I would take Laurie to embassy parties and dinners; no one said anything about it and it worked our very well. In 1975, when I was transferred to Washington, we got married.

Q: What was embassy life like after all of the other missions were closed?

FELDMAN: We never had that much to do with other missions. So we may have missed them, but we were certainly not lonely. Also, by 1973, there weren't that

many left. Fortunately, for the political, economic and commercial sections, our focus was all on the Chinese of Taiwan. We just didn't spend much time with other missions. We spent a certain amount of time with other U.S. government employees, such as the MAAG, the Taiwan Defense Command, which still existed, but most of our time was devoted to the local people.

The local people could be divided broadly into two groups: The Taiwanese and the mainlanders. The Taiwanese were descendants of Chinese who had immigrated to Taiwan in the 17th and 18th centuries - and a few in the 19th century. But most of their ancestors had come to the island between roughly 1640 and 1820.

The mainlanders were those who had followed Chiang Kai-Shek to Taiwan in 1948 and 1949 after the Nationalists lost the civil war.

This different ancestry resulted in a division of labor. The mainlanders ran the government and occupied the higher positions in the military and security services; the Taiwanese ran the economy.

That had occurred in a strange historical process. The Chinese Nationalist took over the island after WWII when General MacArthur authorized Chiang Kai-Shek to accept the surrender of Japanese troops on Taiwan. Taiwan had been ceded to Japan by the Chinese empire after the Chinese lost the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 (under the Treaty of Shimonoseki). This treaty stipulated that Taiwan was ceded "irrevocably" by the empire of China to the empire of Japan. Thereafter, it was ruled as a Japanese territory in the same way that Hawaii and Alaska were U.S. territories.

After WWII, Nationalist troops accepted the Japanese surrender and were warmly welcomed for the most part by the people of Taiwan. That warm welcome did not last very long because the Chinese troops behaved very badly - plunder, rape, robbery. There were a series of incidents culminating in the February 28 incident of 1947. That incident started when some Chinese Nationalist troops roughed up some Taiwanese street hawkers. A crowd gathered, surrounded the troops and roughed them up. That started communal fighting. Ultimately, the Nationalist garrison was reinforced with more troops from the mainland. A large number of Taiwanese were arrested and shot.

As may have guessed, there was a certain amount of bitterness between the two people. During the communal fighting, about 10,000 Taiwanese were massacred, including intellectuals, middle class, etc. When Chiang Kai-Shek arrived in Taiwan, he and his government tried to smooth things over. One of the actions the government took was land reform. It hoped that through this, the allegiance of the small farmer could be enlisted. At the same time, land reform would have broken the power of the land magnets. It worked very effectively. The government did not confiscate the land, but actually purchased it from the owners using

government bonds and in some cases, stock in government corporations.

We have always referred to Taiwan as having a "free economy," in fact it was not. It was at best a mixed economy with major government corporations in many sectors. For example, there was a Taiwan Power - government owned - the only electric utility on the island. As I mentioned earlier, there was a Taiwan Sugar monopoly, China Petroleum, the Taiwan Wine and Tobacco Monopoly corporation; some banks were government owned. So many land owners were paid in shares in these government monopolies making them sort of joint public-private enterprises - with the major stockholder always being the government.

This government action created a Taiwanese entrepreneurial class which over time used its investments wisely and created the entrepreneurial economy of the island, leading to the division of labor I mentioned earlier, which by 1973 was quite evident. A principal function of the embassy was monitoring Taiwanese-mainlanders relations. Of course, that was not that easy since in the political section we only had one officer who spoke Taiwanese. As I said, 85% of the population of the island is Taiwanese, who spoke their language either as their first or only one. The American Embassy, in its political section, had just one officer who spoke the native language. As a matter of fact, he was the only officer in the entire embassy who spoke Taiwanese.

Q: I am kind of surprised that we had any officers who spoke Taiwanese. How did that happen?

FELDMAN: Earlier wisdom had decided that some officers should be trained in Taiwanese. I might mention that we never had trained anyone in Cantonese despite our large presence in Hong Kong - the world's largest consulate. I mentioned earlier that Cantonese is Hong Kong's principal language. Until sometime in the 1970s, we never trained any officers in Cantonese; we taught them Mandarin, which was not spoken in Hong Kong. That is the State Department's logic. It is part of the Department's drive for irrelevance.

So we had the one officer who spoke Taiwanese. He was very proud of that fact, but he was thoroughly lazy; he never did a lick of work. That was too bad.

Q: Was there any unrest while you served in Taiwan?

FELDMAN: Yes, but sub-rosa. It didn't really boil over. No political parties were allowed on the island except for the Chinese Nationalist Part (the KMT). Taiwan was under martial law which was enforced by the Taiwan Garrison Command General Headquarters. Chiang Kai-Shek was president and there was no question he would remain so until his death. His son, Chiang Ching-kuo, was the deputy prime minister who ran the day-to-day operations of the government.

His other son, Chiang Wai-kuo, had a leading role in the military. He had been

trained in a German military academy in the 1930s. He had been commissioned as a second lieutenant in the *Wehrmacht* and had taken part in the invasion of Poland. He was then called back to China.

The Chiangs ran a pretty tight ship. The press was totally fettered; all the media was captive. There were only three TV stations: one was owned by the national government, one was owned by the provincial government and one was owned by the Chinese Nationalist Party. There was press censorship. Taiwan had all of the attributes of an authoritarian martial law state. It may not have been as harsh as the regime on the mainland. A friend of mine described the Taiwan situation as "soft totalitarianism". People were not usually assassinated; there were midnight knocks on doors resulting in time in jail, but you weren't killed. The prisons were not harsh; they were far better than the dungeons on the mainland. Political prisoners were not mingled with murderers so that they weren't beaten bloody. Nor was a political prisoner put in the same cell as inmate with tuberculosis, as was the case on the mainland. There were political prisoners on Taiwan; as I said, they were usually sent to Green Island - not hard, but jail.

Q: Did the embassy ever get into trouble dealing with the Taiwanese?

FELDMAN: Oh, yes. We usually dealt with rich Taiwanese businessmen; that was ok with the government. If we dealt with known dissidents, the government would complain. Very often, I or Bill Gleysteen would be summoned to the Foreign Ministry to hear their complaint about this or that officer having been seen in the company of some notorious "criminal element" - i.e. political dissident. We did of course see some of those dissidents; we did not regard them as "criminal elements." In the pursuit of our mandate to report on political developments on the island, we felt we had to speak to a wide variety of political opinions.

Q: How would you characterize our relationship with the government at this time?

FELDMAN: By this time, the UN action that I described earlier had already taken place. They could see that "normalization" with the PRC was moving forward. We had pulled the nuclear weapons off the island; our military presence was being diminished. It was fairly clear what was happening. So our relations were rather touchy. The ROC was highly suspicious. Human rights was not yet a major part of our foreign policy, but every once in a while we would mention to the ROC that we considered the arrest of people just because they held views contrary to those of the government or the KMT as not "comporting with the traditions of free China."

Q: Was there anyone in the government who could foresee the day when more Taiwanese would participate in the discussions of their future?

FELDMAN: There were people in the government who knew that that would have to happen. One of the principal people who recognized the future was Chiang Ching-kuo. That is a whole story in itself. In fact a friend of mine, Jay Taylor, former FSO, has written a book on Chiang Ching-kuo; I saw the manuscript which was 850 pages long. It is being published by Harvard University Press and will be out by the end of this year. It is a marvelous book. I want to talk at great length later about Chiang Ching-kuo because he more than anyone else laid the foundation for the democratization of Taiwan.

Chung Ching-kuo had come to the conclusion sometime in the 1970s that the Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist Party) could not be the kind of Leninist vanguard party that it had been. Had it done so, it would have atrophied and withered. He thought that the KMT had to become a majority party which meant that it would have to be a Taiwanese party to reflect the population on the island. So he began to bring Taiwanese into the party, promoting them to positions of responsibility. His senior assistant in this process was Li Huan. Together the two worked assiduously to identify promising Taiwanese, one of whom was Lee Teng-hui, the former president of Taiwan. Lee had studied in Japan at the University of Kyoto. When he returned, he finished college after the war at National Taiwan University. He did graduate work in the U.S. at Cornell. Then he went to work for the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. This was a joint ROC-U.S. commission. Eventually, he became one of the senior staff members; he was then identified as a "comer" by CCK and Li Huan. He became Minister without Portfolio; later was appointed as mayor of Taipei and subsequently governor of Taiwan. Then in 1986, when CCK became president, he made Lee his vice president. In those days, the president and vice president of the ROC were not elected by popular vote; they were elected by the National Assembly. Lee was not the only Taiwanese that CCK promoted; he brought a whole bunch into the KMT and the government and indeed increasingly into the military - which previously had been the exclusive preserve of the mainlanders.

As time passed, CCK, finding himself growing old and more infirm, came to the conclusion that his legacy would have to be a democratic system in Taiwan. He wasn't going to move very rapidly toward this goal, but he wanted to get there step-by-step. So in the middle 1980s, he began tolerating - not encouraging - opposition political activity. Opposition parties were still banned on Taiwan which was still under martial law. But opposition elements were allowed to contest elections as independents. These people became to be known as the Tang Wai literally "those outside the party." They could not organize officially as a party, but they did form an association of like-minded political figures. They first tackled local elections. Then came the question of the Legislative Yuan - the Parliament. This legislature was essentially the one that had been elected in 1947. The same people occupied the seats; for those who had died, the runner-up in that 1947 election took the seat - or the runner-up-runner-up, etc. As I mentioned earlier, the Taiwan legislature was still one that represented cities and provinces of the mainland. It was very strange.

The government started a system of supplementary parliamentary elections to increase the number of Taiwanese in the national legislature. But the "old thieves" were still in majority collecting their pay-checks. Most of them were old and feeble and very few would show up for the parliamentary sessions. In October 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo, in an interview with Meg Greenfield of the Washington Post, said that martial law would be ended by the end of the following year. And it was. He died in January 1988. He had been very ill having suffered from diabetes and insomnia; he was growing blind; so that in the last few years of his life he was in very bad health. But his mind was still sharp. He basically planned the step-by-step procedure transforming Taiwan from an authoritarian one-party dictatorship to a full fledged democracy that it is today.

As I suggested earlier, CCK had chosen Lee Teng-hui as his vice president and heir. I wonder if he knew that Lee in his youth, as a student, had been a member of the Communist party. But then so had Ching-kuo himself, who had been sent to Moscow for education in the 1920s. Lee carried the reforms forward, but the guiding spirit and the inspiration was clearly Ching-kuo. He had come to the conclusion that democratization was the only way which would allow Taiwan to survive. It had not only to liberalize its own internal political processes, but had to be a model for the mainland. Ching-kuo was not a Taiwanese patriot; he was not Taiwanese at all. He was a Chinese patriot. He did not believe in dictatorships - at least in theory. He did like to run the country as he saw fit, but he also saw himself and his legacy as the leader that transformed first Taiwan and then subsequently all of China to a more democratic system. He hoped that Taiwan was to be the model which the mainland would emulate.

He knew all the mainland leaders. He and Deng Xiaoping had been students together at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. So he knew the entire communist leadership, as well as the Soviet Union leadership. He had negotiated with Stalin on behalf of his father. He felt very strongly that communism in China had to be replaced by a more democratic system. I don't think he thought that China would become anything like the U.S.; his idea of democracy was much closer to that of Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore, but he wanted to end KMT dictatorship on Taiwan, as well as communist dictatorship on the mainland.

Q: Did he want reunification?

FELDMAN: Absolutely, but under his version of a democratic system. He was a very remarkable man. He was a skilled politician, far smarter than his father, who was best known for his stubbornness. His father regarded himself as the heir to the long line of Chinese emperors. Ching-kuo was sent to the Soviet Union in his youth and had worked there in an automobile factory. He never saw himself as an emperor of China. When he returned to China in 1937, he immediately started cooperatives. He later he was assigned to administer provinces under his father and was quite successful for the most part - to the degree he was given any

flexibility. We in the U.S. government did not foresee CCK as the herald of a more democratic ROC. But that was in fact what he became. He worked at it and left it as his legacy which was continued by Lee Teng-hui, who was a very idiosyncratic person - to some degree, more autocratic than Ching-kuo. Lee is a deeply religious Presbyterian who believes that God selected him to be the president and who talks to him. Ching-kuo never believed that God had selected him. He was far too skeptical and pragmatic for that. He was not a "true believer." He had been disowned by his father for many years and isolated in the Soviet Union. He married a Russian woman. So he was totally different from his father. He had a much appreciation of the world than his father did and I think he also understood the world better than Lee Teng-hui. CCK was not self-righteous; Lee is. He certainly did not believe that he was God's anointed. He had an idea of what ought to be and that was his goal.

Chiang Ching-kuo was a very fascinating character. There is an absolutely marvelous biography which I read in manuscript which is to be published at the end of this year. It was written by Jay Taylor, a former FSO. He is a Chinese language officer; he did a lot of interviewing and had access to a lot of personal papers. It is a throughly marvelous book.

Q: What did CCK think of the U.S.?

FELDMAN: He regarded the U.S. as Taiwan's protector, preceptor, and model and Taiwan's great problem. I think he probably sympathized with that marvelous saying of Benito Suarez: "Alas, poor Mexico, so far from God; so near the United States." CCK had to depend on the U.S., but the U.S. was on occasions not dependable. Our withdrawal from Vietnam was deeply disturbing as was the way we treated Taiwan during the Nixon-Kissinger years and the Carter-Brzezinski years. It was shameful; no question about that. But CCK was stuck with us and there wasn't much he could do about it.

Q: After Taiwan, where were you assigned?

FELDMAN: I was assigned to Bulgaria. One day, I got a telephone call in Taipei from Personnel asking me whether I wanted to be "GLOPed" to Bulgaria. You may remember that when Kissinger became secretary of state, he decided that the Foreign Service had become too inbred and over-specialized and instructed his under-secretary for management, Larry Eagleburger, to start a "global outlook program" ("GLOP"). That is to say, Kissinger did not want officers to spend all of their time in one world region; he wanted "out of area" tours.

By this time, I had been assigned exclusively to the Far East - Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan for almost 20 years. So I was asked whether I wanted to go to Bulgaria for my "out of area" assignment. Martin Hertz was then our ambassador in Bulgaria; I had worked for him in IO, as I mentioned. He requested that I be assigned to Sofia as his DCM. That served the purpose of giving me a "global"

outlook while at the same time allowing me to become a DCM. I was delighted under those circumstances to go to Bulgaria.

In January 1975, I was transferred from Taipei to Sofia - the assignment to be effective after six months of Bulgarian language training in Washington. I reported to Washington and sent a telegram to Laurie, whom I was planning to marry. I asked her to come to join me in the language class. It was a unique marriage proposal, but she came to Washington and we started language training together.

We had an absolutely awful teacher who knew nothing about language teaching. But both Laurie and I had been through language training - she had studied Chinese at Cornell University and I both Chinese and Japanese. So both of us knew how one learns a foreign language; we sort of taught out instructor how to teach us. Laurie has a great ear for languages; she picked it up very quickly.

So six months later, Laurie and I - a happily married couple - landed in Sofia. It was an interesting transition from twenty years in East Asia to Eastern Europe. Interestingly enough, I found myself completely at home. I was probably a 2 plus in speaking and reading; Laurie was probably close to a 3/3. Early on, Laurie found herself seated next to the Bulgarian Chief of Protocol, Dr. Zhibrov, at some official dinner. He had just returned from a tour as ambassador in India. He spoke excellent English. During their conversation, he asked my wife what she intended to do during her time in Bulgaria. She told him that she would really like to study at the University of Sofia, but she thought that the government would not permit it. This was 1975 when Bulgaria was one of the most Stalinist states in Eastern Europe. The country was filled with billboards saying “Eternal Friendship between the USSR and Bulgaria.” In fact, the USSR was just called the “Union” as some referred to the U.S. as the “States.” The chief of protocol showed some surprise and said that if she could pass the entrance exam, of course she could be admitted to the university.

So Laurie, in her inimitable way, asked where she could take the entrance exam. He told her that he would arrange it for her. I should note that Dr Zhibrov - who actually was a medical doctor - was married to a film director. When he was ambassador in New Delhi, she was not allowed to work and took her frustrations out on him. So he was sensitive to these feminist issues.

A week went by and we didn’t hear anything; two weeks went by and we didn’t hear anything. Finally, I got the ambassador’s permission - he thought the whole process amusing - to send an informal query to the Foreign Ministry, quoting Zhibrov and asking where Mrs. Feldman might go to take her entrance exam to “Universitat Kliment Ohridski: St. Clement of Ohrid” (a lake in what is now Macedonia) was a saint and one of the great cultural saints of mediaeval Bulgaria; the University was named after him. In due course, we received a reply suggesting that if Mrs. Feldman would present herself at the University on a

certain date and time, she could be administered the entrance examination. So Laurie did that and she creamed the exam; it was no problem. She was a whiz at languages; she had to take the exam in Bulgarian, which didn't throw Laurie at all; she expected that. She essentially took the exam that is normally given to Bulgarian high school graduates. So she had no problem with that.

So the Bulgarians, who might have surprised by Laurie's proficiency, had no choice except to let her into University. It was clear after about six months that she was way beyond the undergraduate level; she was allowed to work for a degree called "Kandidat," which is somewhere between a U.S. MA and a Ph.D. - pretty close to the latter. She had to take this degree in Bulgarian history - that was the only thing the authorities would allow. I had persuaded Laurie to find additional data on the case of Ellen Stone, who had been an American missionary in the early 1900s. She worked in what is now southern Bulgaria and in Macedonia, the former Yugoslav republic, which was then part of the Ottoman empire. American missionaries had only recently been admitted to Bulgaria, but were under strict prohibition to preach to Muslims. They could only preach to Christians. So the missionaries, when they entered a village, immediately took a religious census to insure that they would not preach to the Muslims. Interestingly enough, these censuses still exist and are kept at American Farm School, which is just outside Thessaloniki in northern Greece. These censuses show dramatically that the overwhelming majority of this area counted themselves as members of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.

This was very significant and the Bulgarians loved it when Laurie announced her findings. That was because the Serbs had been trying to establish that the Macedonians weren't ethnic Bulgarians. At the embassy, one of the better locals, after learning that Laurie was a candidate for this advanced degree, told Laurie that she knew where the unpublished diary of one of the leaders of the gang that kidnapped Ellen Stone in 1901, could be found. Ellen Stone, while traveling in that part of the Ottoman Empire had been kidnapped by what today would be known as "Freedom Fighters." These were Bulgarians who were fighting against the Turks. Bulgaria had been freed from the Ottoman empire as result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1876-77. But what was freed was a truncated version compared to the present. For example, the southern part of today's Bulgaria was not part of the new state of 1877; that remained part of the Ottoman empire.

So these "freedom fighters" (or "brigands," as the Turks called them), led by Yanni Sandanski, a great legend and hero, were fighting to liberate that part which remained in the Ottoman empire, so that they could join Bulgaria. They had a co-leader, Christo Chernopayef. As I said, they kidnapped Ellen Stone and held her for ransom; they would have used the proceeds for arm purchases. The mores of the time dictated that they could not kidnap a sole woman; so they took along one of her Bible students, Katarina Tsilka. Unbeknownst to the kidnappers, Tsilka, who was married to an Albanian - also a Bible student - was three months pregnant. The kidnappers fled from place to place in the mountains with these

women, just one step ahead of the Turkish police.

The diaries that our embassy employee found were those of Christo Chernopayef, which had never been published. They contained lots of new material about the kidnaping and the subsequent drama. They included a description of the birth of Tsilka's baby, up in the high mountains, while the ransom negotiations were going on. There is a description of a charming scene when each of these mustachioed brigands, with their cross bands of cartridges, gave the new baby whatever they had available. One gave his tobacco pouch, one gave a knife, another his spare pair of shoes. It was a very touching human interest story.

I should mention that the baby, after her rough start, grew up and married the American consul in Tirana. That woman's daughter was still living in Miami a couple of years ago. We were in contact with her.

Laurie wrote up this piece of history. It was published by the "The Fatherland Front Press." Laurie became a minor celebrity in Bulgaria.

As I said, Laurie started at the University. As a student, the Bulgarians could not prevent her from contact with her fellow students and faculty members. This was a contact which in little Stalinist Bulgaria, was denied to almost every diplomat, including the Soviets and other Eastern block representatives. But we had students and professors in and out of our house all the time. So shortly, we had a range of contacts in Bulgaria which was the envy of all other diplomats. In addition, I became very friendly with the chief of security for the Foreign Ministry, Georgi Darnyanov. That started because our embassy in Sofia was on one of the major boulevards in the center of the city - Boulevard Stamboliski. The USIS Cultural Center was also right there, as part of the embassy.

That Center was not used very much. The Bulgarian police stood in front, so that anyone who entered the Center was recorded - probably photographed from across the street. As the newly arrived DCM (all newly arrived try to sweep up the "mess" left by their predecessors), I decided that we should do something more with the Cultural Center which was moribund. The embassy was on the U.S. military film circuit which delivered 16 mm films to various U.S. establishments from Germany. So we used to get the American movies, fairly recent ones at that, which we used for our own entertainment. I suggested that we should have showings in the Cultural Center, inviting some Bulgarians to join us.

I think we started with Elia Kazan's "America, America," but I am not positive about that. We sent out circulars inviting selected Bulgarians to come to see the movie on a Friday night. That resulted in an invitation from the Foreign Office's chief of security - the equivalent of a major in the Bulgarian secret service - to come to see him, which I did. He informed me that we were doing a terrible thing because all sorts of "hooligans" and other suspects would come to the Cultural Center and make disturbances; that was very bad. He asked that we cancel our

plans.

It seemed to me that this was a veiled warning that if we proceeded we could expect “hooligans” and other provocations; so I came to the conclusion that this was probably not a wise move. I said that we would cancel the event. The chief of security breathed a great sigh of relief because he obviously had looked upon his task as a tough assignment. It did give me the opportunity to have a bit of conversation with him. He said that the opportunities to see such films were rare. I told him that by sheer accident, I did have a film which I was going to show at my residence that week-end - it was a cowboy film with John Wayne. He looked eager and finally agreed to come. That was the beginning of a beautiful and close friendship. We were so close that the two families that once Georgi’s wife became really ill and was taken to the hospital, Laurie went to their house and cooked meals for Georgi and his two children.

We traveled together. There were parts of Bulgaria that were closed to all foreign diplomats. There are other parts that were closed only to Western diplomats. I had a humongous Chevrolet - that was my official car. I think it was originally built for an American police force; so it was not a standard Chevrolet. It was gorgeous. Georgi loved to ride in that Chevrolet. So on some weekends, he would ask me whether I was free to travel to some interesting places in the “Zabrenena zona” (that was the zone that was closed to all diplomats, even the Soviets). We drove here and there, being watched by police who were mystified by what a car with diplomatic plates was doing in this restricted area. Georgi would hold his ID card out of the window and the police would salute and we would proceed. It was quite amazing.

On some of those weekends, Georgi said that he could not join me, but he would send me to meet some of his friends - many of them high party functionaries living in the provinces. It was a very useful friendship, which combined with Laurie’s contacts, made our tour a thoroughly delightful experience. I reached the point where I decided that in fact I had wasted twenty years of my life in East Asia; I could have served that time in Eastern Europe; it was much more fun.

I learned that Bulgaria was one of the most intensively pro-American countries I had ever seen. At that time, for about thirty years, the government had been telling its people that America was the antithesis of everything Bulgaria stood for. But people always seemed to say that they wanted to be more like Americans. We could travel anywhere and as soon as people found out that we were Americans, they became very hospitable; there was nothing they wouldn’t do for us. Once we were staying at the dacha of a friend, who was a travel writer. He was unique among Bulgarian travel writers because he had been to both the North and South Poles. He was probably the only member of the Bulgarian communist party with an autographed photograph of Barry Goldwater. This happened because while he was in the South Pole, staying at the Soviet station there, Goldwater visited the facility. Of course, that meant that all of the people at the Soviet station were

invited to visit the American station at McMurdle Sound. So my friend got this autographed picture.

We were at this dacha. On a Sunday morning, my host discovered that he was out of eggs. We all got into his car to go to the village to buy some eggs. When we reached the town, we found that there was a wedding in progress. That required my friend to introduce Laurie and me to the bride and groom. Once they found out that we were Americans we were requested to join the happy couple and sit with the wedding party at the table of honor. Four or five hours later, we managed to push ourselves away from the festivities. That is just one illustration of how an American was received in Bulgaria.

Q: Did you ever get movies to be shown at the Cultural Center?

FELDMAN: No. What we did instead was to show the movies at home and invite Bulgarians to watch them there. That seemed acceptable to the authorities - perhaps because we often had the Foreign Office security chief there. We never made it a public spectacle, which made it easier for the authorities to swallow.

Q: What was the embassy like in Sofia?

FELDMAN: The embassy was small. It was a very confining existence for most of the staff. Those who suffered the most were probably the Marine Guards - young men of 19 or 20 who were instructed not to travel around, not to "fraternize " - no contact with Bulgarians. So there was a somewhat incestuous life among the foreign staffs. Since these fellows were Marines, diplomats didn't have much to do with them. That left them with a very small community of foreign secretaries and clerks, which were rather few. So the Marines would periodically get into trouble. One of my assignments as DCM was to get them out of trouble. I remember once I was asked to call the Austrian chancery; I was confronted by a very irate ambassador who informed me that his secretary had been assaulted by an American secretary in the Chancery building. The Marines lived on the top floor of the Chancery building. Apparently, one of the Marines was having an affair simultaneously with an American secretary and an Austrian secretary; the two confronted each other on the stairway of the American chancery where the American took a swing at the Austrian.

In fact, we had another problem when it turned out that the wife of the gunnery sergeant was having an affair with another Marine. That was tough to handle.

The embassy functioned reasonably well. It was a collection of some odd-balls. The senior military attaché was a "geographic bachelor" - his wife and family had stayed in the States. When he formed an attachment with one of the secretaries in our embassy, I heaved a great sigh of relief because that kept him out of trouble. That was fine.

Later, we had a real problem with a USIS secretary who used to make obscene phone calls. This was a woman in her early 50s who used to phone the Marines describing in great detail the various intimate things she would like them to do to her and what she might do to them. We had to ship her home.

One day, my secretary came to me to inform me that she was having an affair with a Bulgarian engineer. It seemed that in her previous post, Addis Ababa. She belonged to a bridge circle which included that Bulgarian. Somehow, after her transfer to Sofia as the DCM's secretary, the engineer showed up one day - what a surprise!!!. One thing led to another and an affair was begun. She had the brains and the guts to tell me about it before things really got out of hand. He had never had asked her for documents, but she was afraid that that day might soon come, which led to her confession.

So we had lots of internal embassy problems. Externally, we had no real problem with the Bulgarian government. We were on the opposites sides of the ideological divide; they were strong members of the Warsaw Pact, but we got along alright.

All the NATO countries had representation in Sofia. So a sort of NATO group had sprung up with a rotating chairman on a monthly basis. They met at the chair's residence. In addition, the Indians and the Pakistanis had missions; the Chinese were there, but we never saw them. I had most contacts with the Brazilians, the Pakistanis, the Italians, the British and the Dutch only because I had developed some personal relationships wit them. The foreign circle was relatively closed. We never saw much of the Soviets or of any of the other Warsaw Pact members. Once, at a reception, I remember getting into a conversation with a gentleman who turned out to be the Cuban ambassador. When he found out that I was an American official, he turned on his heels and walked away. Maybe I should not have talked to him in the first place, but the Department rules were cockamamy and certainly to be ignored.

During one of my periods as chargé d'affaires, the Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, came to Bulgaria. It was my duty to escort him on his call on the President of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, known familiarly as Bai Tosho, a nickname for Todor, with the Turkish honorific - bay. Zhivkov played the role of a wily peasant, ala Khrushchev, with zest; in fact he was a very sharp and shrewd guy. In fact, he was the only person still alive who had attended Stalin's 75th birthday party and those of all of his successors up to Gorbachev. He was a real survivor. He knew when to tighten the screws and when to loosen them. He also was rather funny. So I walked in with Butz and were seated; you may recall that Butz himself was somewhat of a joker - he had to resign as secretary of agriculture because of a rather crude joke. Butz started the conversation with some very serious remarks about how Bulgaria and the United States - two countries with an agricultural surplus - had the duty to feed the rest of the world. Zhivkov listened, but his eyes were glazing over. Finally, he interrupted and said, "Mr. Minister, may I interrupt you?" When Butz nodded agreement, Zhivkov added, "I have just

returned from the 25th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. I heard a very amusing joke there, which I would like to tell you. It goes like this: how long will communism survive?" Butz looked at me; I shrugged my shoulders. He said that he didn't know. Zhivkov slapped his leg and said: "As long as America sells grain!"

I might mention that today, April 23, 1999, I am going to have lunch with the current president of Bulgaria, Peter Stoyanov. I will tell him that he is the second president with whom I have lunched. I could go on about Zhivkov and his daughter, Ludmilla, for a long time. She was a rather strikingly attractive, but strange woman. She had spent a fair amount of time in India and was a devout student of various kinds of Indian mysticisms. She opened a yoga institute in Bulgaria.

I also learned from her, while sitting next to her at various dinners, that she was a fervent believer in the lost continent of Atlantis - and other esoterica. The Zhivkovs were a strange but interesting family. Zhivkov survived the transition from Bulgarian communism to whatever followed - not quite democracy, not quite capitalism, but it certainly not communism or socialism. Ludmilla by this point was dead; she had died officially from a heart attack, but the Bulgarians generally believed that she was assassinated at the order of the USSR leadership. Ludmilla, in addition to her Shirley McLain-like new age weirdness, was a fervent Bulgarian nationalist. She was the Minister of Culture for a while; during her tour, she propagandized and propagated a very strong reverence for ancient Bulgarian culture. Many believed that her attitude offended the Soviet Union and she was actually poisoned.

After Zhivkov was kicked out of office, he went to live with his grand-daughter - his only grandchild. He died just a couple of years ago - 1996 or 1997 - in late eighties or early nineties. He had begun his career as a printer and later became an official of the printers' union. Then, according to the communist hagiography, he became an underground fighter during WWII - I don't know whether that is a fact.

I should also mention that Bulgaria, although an ally of Germany in WWII, never exported any of its Jewish population. At the end of WWII, Bulgaria had a greater Jewish population than it had at the beginning of the war. By now, most of them have left; after the war, they were permitted by the Bulgarian government to emigrate to Israel. Most of them took advantage of this opportunity. At least a couple of years ago, there were Bulgarian daily newspapers in Israel. The wife of Yitzhak Shamir, the former prime minister, was Bulgarian. There are a number of very prominent Bulgarian-born or descendants in universities and in politics in Israel.

Let me tell you a bit about how the Bulgarians managed to save the Jews. Toward the end of 1943, the Germans began to put enormous pressure on the Bulgarian

government to export the Bulgarian Jews to concentration camps in Poland and other places. Basically, the Bulgarians said that they would work on it and managed to fumble enough not to get anything done. There is a common belief in Bulgaria that King Boris died in a plane crash on his return to Sofia in 1944, but that in fact, he died up in the air when his oxygen was cut off. The Royalists, who still have a party in Bulgaria, and many others believe that the King, in a conversation with Hitler, absolutely refused to permit the export of Bulgarian Jews.

There is a museum in Sofia called "The Museum on the Salvation of Bulgarian Jews." There have been books written about this bit of history, which is quite remarkable. At Yad Vashem in Jerusalem there are a number of remembrances of the policy of the Bulgarian government in protecting its Jewish citizens. This a story that is not often heard. But also have to say, to be even handed, that this policy only held for Bulgarian Jews. During WWII, Bulgarian troops occupied part of Yugoslavia and there Jews were sent to concentration camps.

Q: Tell us a little more about what else you did in Bulgaria.

FELDMAN: I did a lot of traveling. One time, I went to northern Bulgaria to spend a week-end with a local party first secretary from that particular region - another visit arranged by my friend Georgi. As I was driven around by this official in his official Volga, we passed a village where all the houses were painted blue. This was very strange because Bulgarian houses were always painted white. I asked why these houses were blue. The response was: "Gypsies." I asked whether we could stop and take a look; I had never seen a Gypsy village. The official tried to discourage me, but I persisted. So we stopped and walked through the village on unpaved and muddy roads; the houses were decrepit. Children were running around with bare feet and running noses - a typical Third World scene. I asked my host why the conditions were so poor. He told me that they liked to live this way. I then asked what schools the children attended; they had their own schools, which they preferred - said my host. The responses from my host reminded me very much of what a local official might have said if we had been traveling through the backwaters of Mississippi observing the black Americans living there. The official slogan of Bulgaria at the time was "all for humanity." But what I saw in the Gypsy village certainly departed from that ideal. In fact, Bulgarians, like most nationalities, I guess, fear and despise gypsies.

Q: Did we do anything with Bulgaria during this period?

FELDMAN: Not really. We were just there. Our military attaches would be running up and down the roads of Bulgaria, looking for military convoys. They would write down the license numbers of the vehicles - if they could get close enough - and which way the convoys were headed. They would attempt to photograph airfields, railroad crossings and anything else they considered of "vital" importance.

Occasionally, we had discussions with the Bulgarians about human rights cases. I spent a lot of time on family reunification cases. Many Bulgarians had relatives in the States; a lot had lived in the U.S. and had earned pensions while working there. In their old age, they returned to Bulgaria. So we had a lot of Social Security and Railroad Retirement cases; people living off these retirement benefits in Bulgaria.

Once, Laurie and I were hiking in the mountains of southern Bulgaria, we came across an old shepherd; he stopped us and asked whether we were Americans. When he found out, he switched to English and told us that he had worked for the Ford Company at River Rouge during WWII, building tanks. He retired soon after the end of the war and came to live in Bulgaria, tending sheep.

Q: This was you first exposure to being a DCM and a chargé. Any thoughts about that experience?

FELDMAN: The role of the DCM, as all people who have served as such know, is the worst job in the Foreign Service. You are responsible for everything but you have absolutely no authority for anything. Martin Hertz, the ambassador, was not an easy person to get along with. I was one of the few people who did, at least to any appreciable extent. Even I was driven to distraction from time to time, if not by Martin, then by his wife Elizabeth, who was of an Austrian old and proud family - a fact that she would never anyone forget.

Martin would at times come up with some scheme which I regarded as purely make-work. He would always begin such a conversation with is pet phrase:" On the principle that the ambassador does nothing, but makes plans and strategies for his DCM to implement, I would like to..." It used to drive me absolutely crazy because most of his ideas were truly make-work and not worth any time or effort. Once Martin received an intelligence tip through our station chief from another intelligence service; the tip was that the Bulgarians had somehow placed not just a listening device - we assumed that they were everywhere - but a camera in the wall of his office which covered everything that went on in his office 24 hours per day. Why Martin would be disturbed by this, I never figured out; as far as I know, he didn't do anything strange or weird. But this rumor really bothered him. So I was instructed to do something about it.

One night, our security officer, the station chief and I got up a 2 o'clock in the morning and we drove to the chancery. There we picked up some sledge hammers which we had carefully secreted the afternoon before. We attacked the wall where the camera was allegedly lodged. We didn't find any camera, but we did see a wire, which we immediately cut - and the embassy's telex went dead. After we repaired the wire, we had to get a mason in to close the wall, being watched very carefully by the security officer. Martin was not entirely satisfied with our efforts, but recognized that there wasn't much he could do about it.

Q: How about the role of the chargé? Was it fun?

FELDMAN: Oh, yes. I looked forward to being chargé. I enjoyed Bulgaria. I had a great time; Laurie had even a better time. Of all of my Foreign Service posts - except my first tour in Hong Kong - this is the one I liked the most. We were very sad when we had to leave. Laurie had gotten her "Kandidat" degree - at Kliment Ohridski, after finishing her dissertation on Ellen Stone. We were having a wonderful time and I would have cheerfully stayed. Martin had left and I was the charge' for about three months. At stage, unfortunately, I was informed that I would be transferred back to Washington - "position not yet decided." I was told that a new DCM would arrive in about two weeks. That was too bad, but that is the service.

Q: What about your children? *What happened to them while you were in Sofia?*

FELDMAN: At this stage, Ross Christopher was already in his early twenties and Peter was in boarding school. So neither of children lived with us and, in fact, they never visited Bulgaria.

I should end this chapter in my career by noting that after 20 years working on Chinese affairs, I had numerous Chinese acquaintances, but no real friends. After two just two years in Bulgaria, we had scores of Bulgarian friends. Those that are still living are still friends today. In that connection, I might complete the story of Danyanov. He had been the first of his peasant family to go to school. He always thanked the Bulgarian Communist Party for that. He liked America and Americans, but he loved the Soviet Union and the Bulgarian Communist Party. What he wanted more than anything else was to be an ambassador. He spoke French and what he really wanted was to be Bulgarian ambassador to Haiti so that he could be in the Western Hemisphere. After I left Bulgaria, I used to correspond with Georgi. It turned out that he did become an ambassador, but it was to Laos - a small embassy of three or four people. He absolutely hated it. He also became seriously ill. Unbeknownst to him, he had diabetes and it got very bad while he was in Laos. He was mis-diagnosed by the doctor at the Soviet Embassy. The end result was that his left leg had to be imputed below the knee. The operation took place in a Thai hospital in Bangkok. The American Ambassador in Laos arranged for Georgi to have a prosthesis and physical therapy at an American military hospital in Thailand. That did it; if before he liked America, now he fell in love with it. If we had asked him today to jump into Kosovo, he probably would have just asked, "When?"

I have another Bulgarian story I would like to relate. One of the marvelous characters that we knew in Bulgaria was a guy who was the head of the Agricultural Producers Cooperative in the mountains of southern Bulgaria in a town called Bansko - which is well known to Bulgarians because it had been the base from which people like Sandanski attacked the Ottoman Turks. Kolyo (the

nickname for Nicolai) had been the mayor of Bansko for a number of years and now was the head of the Cooperative. We had met him through Georgi. We spent a memorable weekend with Kolyo. We got to Bansko on a Saturday just in time for lunch. We began about 12:30 or 1 p.m. and left the table about midnight. In between, we - six or seven - finished a bottle of cognac that I had brought, we finished six bottles of wine and a bottle of Cuban rum that Georgi had brought. We ate and ate and ate. We told stories, we sang; it was a day that will live in memory forever.

The next day, with splitting headaches, we wobbled away about mid-morning to Bansko where Kolyo took us to the local museum. There we saw the photographs of all of the partisans who fought the Turks. He pointed to one mustachioed fighter and said that that had been his grand-father who was a staunch communist. The picture was probably taken in the late 1880s. I suggested that his great-grandfather was not likely to have been a communist since there had not been a Bulgarian Communist Party until the 20th Century. Kolyo replied that I was "like all of the other idiots;" I didn't understand anything. "He fought the Turks, didn't he? He fought the landlords, didn't he? So he was a communist!"

Kolyo also told me a story about the time he had been summoned to Sofia to attend a conference on nutrition; i.e. to be told what the latest word was that his Cooperative was to follow. When he got there, he listened to these "idiots" talk for hour after hour. Finally he could not stand it anymore and stood up and said, "Comrades, you are talking about nutrition and you know nothing about nutrition. Let me tell you about nutrition. What is important is cement. What has cement to do with nutrition? I will tell you. If I can't get cement, I can't build shelters for my shepherds; if I don't build those shelters you aren't going to get any God-damned yogurt. Now do you understand?" That was typical.

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Q: So then you were transferred to Washington?

FELDMAN: At the end of summer of 1977, having been in Sofia for just two years, I was transferred to Washington as director of the Office of the Republic of China Affairs. I had been specifically requested for this position by the man who had been my DCM in Taipei, Bill Gleysteen, whom I mentioned earlier. As I said, I think Gleysteen was the finest Foreign Service Officer of his generation. Bill was then the senior deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs (EA). The assistant secretary was Richard C. Holbrooke. That was a very interesting assignment. It was in this period that we completed the "normalization" process and created the new institutions that now regulate America's relations with Taiwan and with the PRC.

On my first day on the job - very shortly after Labor Day, 1977 - I was called to Holbrooke's office, where I met him for the first time. I was informed that my

principal task was to create a way of maintaining all the necessary U.S. relationships with the ROC, without having any official U.S. representation on Taiwan. Subsequently, I learned that the reason for this was that in August, 1977, Secretary Cyrus Vance had been in Beijing and had told China's "maximum" leader, Deng Xiaoping, that the Carter administration was prepared to move rapidly toward "full normalization" of relations. That meant the recognition of the PRC as the sole government of China. But Vance added that the complexity of our relations with the ROC meant that we would have to maintain a small office - e.g. a liaison office or a consulate or something like that.

Deng immediately denounced this. He called for the "record of conversation" between President Ford and himself, along with Secretary Henry Kissinger, which had taken place in 1975. He asked someone to read to Vance in English the section of the Chinese transcript in which President Ford had promised that upon normalization of relationship between Washington and Beijing, the U.S. would have no official representation of any kind on Taiwan. So that was the reason for the marching orders I got from Holbrooke. I was told that I had six weeks to come up with a scheme; I was further told that I should not consult any one at all - not even a lawyer. I was to do this all by myself.

So in between handling the normal tasks of a country director, dealing with a country which was an active trading partner for the U.S., where we had a significant number of U.S. military (a large MAAG) and a large CIA station and a sizeable consular work-load, I had to come up with this scheme.

I did come up with something. The Japanese when they had derecognized Taiwan and had recognized the PRC, had established a small "unofficial" office, called the Japan Interchange Association on Taiwan. So I took that as a model and modified it in recognition of our much more complex relationships. The three or four person office that the Japanese had would not be nearly enough for our workload. Sometimes people have told me that all I did was copy the Japanese; that was not quite correct.

I designed an non-profit organization, chartered somewhere in the U.S., that would have a Board of Directors, appointed by the secretary of state - and who could also be removed by the secretary - funded as a line item in the State Department budget. It would be staffed by government employees - primarily Foreign Service officers - who for the period of service in this new entity, which I called "The American Institution," would nominally be on leave-of-absence from their agencies. I divided the "Institution" into various sections taking the basic template of an embassy, but changed the names of the sections to give it a somewhat different character. For example, the political section became the general affairs section; the economic section became the commercial and business section; the USIS became the cultural and information section; and so on.

I assumed that we would continue military sales. U.S. laws requires that when you

sell military end -use items to another country, we have to have some kind of military presence there to monitor the use of these items. I therefore maintained a MAAG, but gave it a different name.

So within about a month after my conversation with Holbrooke, working at night and on week-ends and during the few minutes available during the day, I wrote a about 20 page description of the new entity and how it would function. I gave it to Holbrooke who patted me on the back and said that this was fine. I didn't hear another word about it for a long time.

My principal problems in trying to manage our relationship with Taiwan, were threefold: 1) economic and trade where we had a substantial trade deficit (I think we were doing annually about $40 billion worth of total trade with Taiwan and our deficit was running $15-17 billion per annum). So I had to plea with the ROC to buy more U.S. goods. I remember particularly that at one point Taiwan's flag carrier, China Airlines, was trying to decide whether to buy DC-10s or a Airbuses. I lobbied very hard for the DC-10 which they finally bought. Shortly after that, there was a series of crashes of DC-10s around the world which made me feel somewhat queasy, after the hard twist I had applied to China Airlines.

That was one area of difficulty. Another concerned the stream of CIA reports about ROC's attempts to develop nuclear weapons. This was done secretly at a facility called the Cheng Shan Institute. We had tackled this issue once before; we had told the ROC that they had to discontinue all of their efforts in the nuclear area. It promised it would, but we later found that the program had restarted. My deputy, David Brown, was particularly knowledgeable in this matter. We tightened the screws very hard on the ROC; we threatened all kinds of dire consequences if the program was not terminated.

One of our threats fell in the area of arms sales, which we used as a club in the nuclear arms issue. I think that the promised squeeze in this area was one of the principal reasons for the dismantling of the project. In general, arms sales was a problem because it was quite clear that there had been a pattern built up in the Kissinger era which continued under the Carter administration. This pattern called for the denial of any arms and military supplies to Taiwan that the administration believed would offend or create problems with the PRC. This was another example of the State Department's pension for premature capitulation, especially when it came to dealing with Beijing. Bureaucrats would sit down and decide for themselves if an action might offend Beijing; that would put an end to any proposal that ran into such guesswork. We didn't hold consultations with the PRC; this was only an intuitive feeling that the PRC would react negatively to a particular action. In the case of arms to Taiwan, this meant that the ROC Air Force was stuck with the F-104G (the Lockheed "Starfighter" which the Germans had called the "Widow Maker") and the F-5E and F.

The F-104G plane had been designed in the early 1950s; in fact, I was vice consul

in Nagoya in 1958 when the Japanese made their first buy of this plane. It was a fine plane for its time; it had very good speed, but it was not maneuverable and it had no all-weather capability. The F-5 was a very nifty light-weight fighter, also of the 1950s era. It was very short range and also did not have all weather or night capability.. Neither of these planes could fire a stand-off missile. Both would have to come close to their target before firing and engage in a "dog fight." They had a fairly rudimentary capability of firing a "Sidewinder;" the ROC pilots had to climb on the enemy's aircraft tail; then the missile could be fired once it had accessed the heat of the enemy's plane exhaust. The version available to U.S. pilots enabled them to fire the "Sidewinder" from anywhere around the enemy plane; it was "smart" enough to hit the enemy from any angle.

So the ROC did not have an all weather fighter capability; it could not fire a "stand-off missile" and had a rather crude version of a "Sidewinder." Yet its principal defense need was in the air, over the Taiwan Straits and perhaps even over Taiwan itself. To break the bureaucrats' mindset on such issues was a real task. Even simple kinds of arms, such as a long range/slant range reconnaissance camera, was a fight. The ROC had been asking for such devices for many, many years; for one reason or another, the Department kept denying the request. This made no sense at all. Without such a camera to do aerial reconnaissance, you had to fly over what it was you were reconnoitering in order to get pictures. With a slant angle camera, the ROC pilots could remain over the Straits. So there was an awful amount of nonsense in our arms sales policy to the ROC. The assumption in much of the bureaucracy was that whatever the ROC wanted, it probably should not get. This was the mind-set that I found when I became country director.

When I discussed my role as chief of the political section in our embassy in Taipei, I mentioned the draw-down of American forces and the reduction of installations on the island. This process was still continuing when I became country director for the ROC. At this point the Taiwan Defense Command - the entity responsible for defending the island against attack - was down to a handful of people.

As I suggested before, the Carter administration maintained the policy of getting "into bed" with the PRC. The one major difference between the Kissinger approach and the Brzezinski one to the U.S.-PRC relations, was that Kissinger saw this issue as part of a global strategy. Brzezinski was really interested in some form of military-to-military relationship even though the PRC was militarily rather weak. But I don't think that Brzezinski ever saw this deficiency; he thought in terms of PRC military forces on Soviet borders actually distracting the USSR. He foresaw a far closer military-to-military relationship than anyone else had or did. So the question of arms supplies to Taiwan was even a more fraught problem as far as he was concerned. Brzezinski put all kinds of pressure on the State Department to simply deny whatever it was that the ROC wanted, unless it was something like rifles and hand grenades.

This raised another interesting conundrum. The ROC at this time was still an authoritarian dictatorship, with all of the attributes to such a regime - political prisoners, government controlled press, etc. That ran directly against the Carter administration's human rights policy. So from that point of view, even the rifles and hand grenades should not have been approved even if Brzezinski was prepared to allow it. I should note that, although Taiwan was undoubtedly an authoritarian regime, the PRC was a totalitarian state, under repression far worst than Taiwan, but the Carter administration never took notice of their violation of human rights.

One of the black marks against President Carter personally, as well as the entire administration, was his failure to do anything about the case of Wei Ching-sheng. He was one of the people who had put up posters during the "democracy wall" of Europe, which had been put up in Beijing. He was the one that called for a fifth "Modernization", in addition to the four that Deng had proposed. That fifth would have been democracy for China. Wei, who was an electrician, but not the descendant of a working class family - his parents were members of the senior cadre of the Communist Party - was tried, convicted of sedition for daring to suggest that democracy was necessary for China, and was sentenced to fourteen years in prison. The Carter administration was almost silent on this obvious violation of human rights. It said nothing when Wei was arrested; it issued a very weak statement when he was sentenced expressing regrets that Wei was given such a long prison term. No regrets about the conviction.

So as far as human rights were concerned the Carter administration took an entirely different track when it came to the situations in Taipei and Beijing.

Q: How did the criticism of the human rights policy manifest itself?

FELDMAN: It provided "excuses" - I use that term deliberatively - for not supplying defensive arms that Taiwan needed so that a military balance of some sort could be maintained in the Taiwan Straits. I call it an "excuse" because the real reason why these arms sales were not approved was because the Carter administration was concerned about upsetting the relationship with the PRC that Brzezinski had considered so important.

Q: What were the violations the ROC was accused of?

FELDMAN: It was political prisoners, repression of attempts to develop an opposition party, control of the media, although I must point out that the press on Taiwan was freer than that on the mainland. While the ROC owned one newspaper, there about twenty others that the government did not own. These papers operated on a self-censorship basis rather than pre-censorship. Basically, there were well-known parameters and as long as the media did not criticize the Chiang family, as long as there was no call for Taiwan independence, as long there was no protest against media control, the press could say almost anything it

wanted to say. The media could certainly criticize the government's economic policy, it could criticize foreign policy; those subjects were not off-limits. So the Taiwan press was far less tightly controlled than that on the mainland, but the Carter administration never raised a peep on what was happening in the PRC.

One can work this arms sales-human rights nexus in a totally different way. I got very friendly with the head of the ROC military purchasing mission in Washington, General Wen Hai-hsiung (known usually as Pat Wen.) He had graduated from Virginia Military Institute - as had his father who had also been a general in the Nationalist army. Pat had been a military assistant for Chiang Ching-kuo who by now was the president of the ROC. He had in fact a direct line to Chiang. So I would tell Pat, whenever there was a violation of human rights, that here was little or no chance of the U.S. approving whatever arms sales was being considered at the moment. It would have been foolish for me even to try to get approval if some dissident had just been arrested or if there had been any other violation of human rights. Pat would immediately report this back to Chiang Ching-kuo and others in Taipei; sometimes the arrested person would be released and I could then submit my memorandum requesting approval of the arms sale under consideration at the time. It was through this kind of process that I managed to get the slant camera approved as well as some of the other more minor systems and supplies. And of course, several people who might have been in serious trouble were released.

The big issue, as I mentioned earlier, was the fighter plane. The ROC wanted F-16s, which had been brought on line earlier on the decade. It was the hottest plane in the U.S. Air Force inventory. I knew they would not get the F-16. Northrop was the builder of the F-5; so I met with its representatives. I asked Northrop what could be done to give the F-5 an all weather capability and to give it the avionics so that stand-off missile could be fired from the plane. The Northrop folk thought about my questions and came back telling me these features could be added without too much difficulty. It would replace the present two engines with a more advanced GE engine. The one to be used in the next U.S. fighter model - the F-18. It would require a slight enlargement and reconfiguration of the fuselage, but that was doable. Then the wings would have to be strengthened and given different hard points; the new avionics could be added and so could the new missilery. In fact, the new F-5 could be given the features that the ROC found lacking in the standard model. I asked whether the new design would still make the plane look like an F-5 so that it could be still sold as such a plane and be designated as an F-5G. Northrop saw no problem with that; the F-5E and F which were being sold looked different from the original A and B models.

I began a major drive to have the Department approve the F-5G. At the same time, I also pushed for better command and control facilities and equipment for the ROC Navy and for a more advanced missile - the "Harpoon" - which was an anti-ship missile which could be fired from shore or a ship. These three end-use items became the center of the arms sales package that I was preparing for White

House approval. This was an exception to the normal arms sales approval process; in the case of sales to the ROC, all had to be approved by the White House.

The first battle was to obtain approval from my colleagues in the Department. There were a number of offices, including the PRC desk, which wanted to oppose sales of the magnitude I had in mind. I worked very hard on my friend Harry Thayer, then the PRC country director. I finally managed to get his concurrence. Then I had to convince Roger Sullivan, the deputy assistant secretary in charge of the Northeast Asia area. He finally also agreed. Holbrooke was prepared to submit the memorandum.

Then I had to tackle the toughest problem of all: Michael Oxenberg, the NSC staffer responsible for China affairs. It took me a long time to persuade Oxenberg just to allow this proposal to go the president. He could have just returned the memorandum to the Department saying that the proposals were not consistent with U.S. policy. I suggested that if he disagreed with our recommendations, he could say so in his transmittal note to the president, but at least we should give the president an opportunity to make a decision.

I finally got the package approved by State, in a big high level meeting. I was not present at that meeting but I was briefed and read the minutes. Vance and Brown, the secretary of Defense, chaired this meeting. Les Gelb, the director of the Bureau of Politico-Military affairs, and Dick Holbrooke attended. The decision of this meeting was that the memorandum could be forwarded to the White House. It then landed on the NSC's doorsteps. One of the NSC staff members was Jessica Tuchman Matthews, daughter of the famous author, Barbara Tuchman. Jessica is now the president of the Carnegie Endowment Institute. She added a memorandum of her own to my package opposing the sale of the F-5G. She called it a violation of presidential policy as the development of a new weapon system for export-only since it was a plane that the U.S. Air Force was not planning to buy. That was a violation of Carter's policy. The U.S. Air Force was not going to buy this or any version of the F-5 was that it was inferior to the F-16. Of course that was exactly the reason why we had recommended the sale. The F-16 would certainly not be approved, so it had to be a less capable plane. And if it was, USAF would not buy it. Catch 22.

The memorandum came back for the president disapproving the sale of the airplane and the sale of the "Harpoon." There was also a note from the president suggesting that we suggest to the ROC that it initiate discussion with Israel on the possible purchase of the Kfir, which was a modified version of an F-4 - a 1960s design. In any case, the Israelis were not going to sell any major weapons systems to the ROC because they were working very hard on improving relations with the PRC. So there was no way the presidential suggestion would fly. Carter did approve some of the more minor parts of the package, but the major items were turned down.

The memorandum had been sent to the White House sometime in June, 1978. It had taken me almost a year to get to that stage. It sat in the White House until the end of August; I think it was in early September when it came back with Carter's decisions. That was a real heart-breaker. After my tour as director of the ROC desk, the issue arose again during the Reagan administration. In January 1982, the advanced fighter proposal again was turned down because of fears of the PRC reaction. Instead, the ROC was given a co-production agreement to manufacture more F-5s (which they were already doing) and was told that the U.S. would assist them in designing a fighter plane of their own. Thus was born the Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF). The ROC has in fact produced a couple of hundred of these planes. It is a greatly inferior airplane. For example it did not have an all weather capability and had some other major deficiencies. It is not much of a weapon.

Q: Is that what they are using today?

FELDMAN: No. The situation finally reached the point at which the discrepancy was so great that people at last began to see that this weakness was tempting the PRC to begin an air campaign over the Straits. So the question re-emerged in the Bush administration. At that point, the choice was either an F-16 or an even more advanced plane. Matters came to a head in 1992; shortly before the Republican Convention, at which Bush was to be nominated as a candidate for president for a second term. General Dynamics informed the White House that if there were not be any approval of the sale of F-16s to the ROC, it would have to close the production line in Texas, where the F-16s were built. GD said it would close the line in June - the convention was scheduled for July; at the same time the company was going to buy ads in Texas newspapers explaining why it was taking such action. That gave the White House some pause and later in June, 1992 it announced it was considering an F-16s sale to the ROC. The production line was not shut down.

I should note however that the F-16s approved for Taiwan was not the latest version of the aircraft, but an earlier version called F-16 A&B. What the ROC finally got was an F- 16A&B with an advanced package which brought it close to an F-16C&D, but allowed the administration to say it was an inferior model. The game goes on.

Let me go back to 1978 and talk about what else was going on. My memorandum on the establishment of new institutions to carry on ROC-U.S. relationships had gone to Holbrooke, as I have mentioned, in October 1977. There was nothing going on the "normalization" front. My work consisted of the usual duties of a country director. I traveled to Taiwan a couple of times - 1977 and 1978. I had the usual conversation with the government and the embassy. But nothing seemed to be moving on getting U.S.-ROC relations on sounder footing.

There were a couple of other things going on. For one, the Panama Canal Treaty

was being renegotiated and secondly, the Middle East problems loomed large. It is very difficult for any administration to handle one major foreign policy challenge at any one time, much less two. It didn't have time for anything else, including "normalization." I think that in September the Panama Canal Treaty was ratified by the Senate; at the same time, Camp David took place. With these two triumphs behind him President Carter turned his attention to the China issues. I think that is probably one of the reasons why the F-5 proposal got turned down. I learned later that in September, 1978 negotiations toward "normalization" re-started in Beijing.

On December 15, 1978 I arrived at the office around 8 a.m. - my usual time. As I began to pour myself a cup of coffee, I was summoned to Holbrooke's office. I was told to call Ambassador Unger in Taipei and instruct him to seek an immediate appointment with President Chiang Ching-kuo in order to inform him that around 9 p.m. in the evening (our time) the U.S. president was going to announce that negotiations on "normalization" had been concluded and that the U.S. on January 1, 1979 would de-recognize the ROC and would recognize the PRC as the sole legal government of China.

I had some inkling that something was going on because starting sometime in September, under instructions from Secretary Vance, I and the legal advisor, Herb Hansell, went to New York secretly once every couple of weeks to discuss the terms of "normalization" with Herbert Brownell, who had been a close advisor to Thomas Dewey. He was a well known Republican lawyer; the Attorney General under Eisenhower. Vance thought that if a prominent Republican would testify on behalf of the administration's China policy following "normalization"and the various actions that followed it, the storm against the policy might be abated. He had talked privately to Brownell and had found that he was sympathetic. That led to Vance's instructions to consult with Brownell on aspects of what later became the "Taiwan Relations Act," including my ideas about the American Institute on Taiwan. Hansell and I held three or four consultations with Brownell from September to December. He was generally in agreement with our proposals.

That was not a surprise to me. What was the surprise came when Holbrooke told me that the president would be announcing that night - December 15, 1978 - that negotiations had been completed and that we would be de-recognizing Taiwan on January 1, 1979. Previously, Ambassador Unger and I had argued very strongly, with Holbrooke and others, that we would have to give Chiang Ching-kuo at least two weeks' notice so that he could prepare his people for the bad news. He had to have at least that much time to convince his people that the sky was not about to fall and we had to have the time to explore with the ROC what institutions and structures would be established to continue a relationship and how they would work.

Instead, I was told that there would be no advance notice, no discussion of alternatives, but we would be making a public statement of our position, giving

Taiwan a two weeks' public notice before de-recognition. That was hardly what Unger and I had argued for. As soon as I left Holbrooke's office, Roger Sullivan and I got on the telephone to try to get in touch with Unger. This was about 9:30 a.m. our time which would have been about 9:30 p.m. in Taiwan. Unger, who had always been very careful to let his staff know where he was going to be, on this day had not told the Marine Guard where he was to be found. The duty officer had no idea where the ambassador was. Later, Unger insisted that he had left word where he could be found, but that some snafu must have happened in the embassy. I don't know what the truth was, but in any case we could not talk to ambassador.

In fact, Unger was at a dinner dance at the American University Club; that was not a private affair nor was there any reason for the staff not to know. When he returned to the residence at about 11 p.m., he was found by Mark Platt, the political counselor. We talked to him on the phone and asked him to get in touch with Taiwan's president to alert him to Carter's announcement. Unger's first question was :"What happened to the two week's notice?" He was told by Sullivan the same thing that I had gotten from Holbrooke, namely that we were giving a two weeks' notice; it was just not secret.

Furthermore, the "normalization" and de-recognition communique declared that the U.S. acknowledged the PRC's claim that there was only one China of which Taiwan was a part. This has been greatly misunderstood especially by successor administrations. When the U.S. said that it acknowledged the PRC's position, it did not say that it accepted it. Those are two entirely different policy expressions. An acknowledgment of the PRC position was a polite way of saying :"We hear you; we understand that this what you claim. We will not contradict it, but we make no statement on our own position." The usual way this U.S. statement would be translated into Chinese was to use the three character phrase "renshr dao" ("we acknowledge") The PRC tried to pull a fast one; in their Chinese version of our communique, they used a two character phrase cheng ren (or "recognized"). This a phrase that is used when speaking of a recognition of a government. When the two character phrase appeared in the PRC text, the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing should have immediately expressed its disapproval of the PRC text. The head of that Office was Leonard Woodcock, formerly of the United Automobile Workers' Union. The DCM, J. Stapleton Roy, at the embassy at the time was someone who had been born in China, had grown up in China and was therefore bilingual; he had served in Chinese language positions for most of his career. He was completely aware of the difference between the two phrases. Roy should have immediately pointed out that the PRC had mis-translated the American text, but I am firmly convinced that because he was so keen to achieve "normalization," he did not point out this very important mistranslation. So the official Chinese text of the communique included the phrase cheng ren ("recognized"). This has created no end of mischief in the PRC-U.S. relationship because in effect the two versions of the same communique say different things. The Chinese version uses the word "recognition" of the PRC claim of one China,

whereas the English version says “the U.S. acknowledges the PRC contention.”

As time went on, even the word “acknowledges” has been misinterpreted by spokespersons of various administrations, including the present one. The Clinton administration has said from time to time that the U.S. has “accepted” the PRC view that Taiwan is a part of China. In fact, officially, the U.S. has never “accepted” the PRC view; we have only “acknowledged” it.

Unger tried to get in touch with the Foreign Ministry’s duty officer immediately. That took a while, but he finally got to him, he told the officer that as a matter for great urgency he had to see President Chiang. Ching-kuo suffered from insomnia. In fact, he was not in the best of health - he was diabetic, etc. No one wanted to really wake him up if he fell asleep. So Unger had some difficulties conniving the president’s staff that he really needed to be awakened to get the U.S. announcement. Finally, about 2:30 a.m., Unger got to see the Taiwanese president. He told him that in approximately seven hours, President Carter would be announcing “normalization” with the PRC and the de-recognition of Taiwan. It was an awful way to treat a loyal ally, as the ROC had been.

For example, when Nixon and Kissinger had negotiated their deal with the Vietnamese in Paris, which theoretically was supposed to end the war, we had stated that on a date certain, there would be a cut-off of arms to the South Vietnamese. We then turned to the ROC and asked it to give all the arms it had to Saigon. The ROC agreed and they sent practically all of their F-5s (which we later replaced.) But the ROC did not argue with our request; it did what had been asked of it. It fully cooperated; so our de-recognition action and the way it was done was hardly acceptable. It was pretty bad; no question about it.

A political storm broke out in the U.S. as well. There were many people in Congress that were furious with the Carter administration. One of them Senator Dick Stone (D-FL). He had in the past been consistent in his objection to “normalization.” As a Democrat, it was thought that he should have supported the administration. If Democrats were going to criticize “normalization” that was not a good omen. Holbrooke instructed me on Saturday morning - December 16, 1978 - to rush to Miami to try to placate Stone. I left on Sunday morning; I was met at the Miami airport by my father and step-mother - she recently had a hip operation and was therefore walking with a walker, while my father used a cane. They drove me to the downtown Miami hotel where I was to lunch with Dick Stone and his wife, Marlene. So I walked in very slowly followed by my parents. The Stones were waiting for me. He looked up at me and said, ”Where did you find these people? In central casting?” I then introduced my father and step-mother. Stone wanted to known in what condominium they lived. He was told that it was “Jade Winds.” Stone, of course, said that that was his favorite condo in all Miami. My father suggested that it should be because he (my father) “had gotten all of the tenants to vote for you in the last election.”

Q: That is very funny. You obviously carried out your mission better than Holbrooke could have expected.

FELDMAN: Right. I think that was a very amusing story.

In any case, it was not surprising that the ROC reacted very badly. It was a bitter pill to swallow and we didn't force it down their throats in the most understanding way. The ROC was angry and felt that it had been treated very badly. It was deeply concerned about the future. There was immediate capital flight; the stock market crashed; the real estate market crashed. The economy nosedived - all because the Carter administration had mishandled the process.

A few days afterwards, the Carter administration decided that it would have to send a special emissary to tell Chiang and the ROC that the world had not come to an end. It was decided that Warren Christopher, the deputy secretary of state, and Roger Sullivan would go to Taiwan for consultations. I argued very strongly against this action. I thought it was a grave mistake; the ROC was so ferociously angry that Christopher would not get a good reception. I thought a far better idea would have been to invite the ROC to send a high level delegation to Washington for discussions. I was over-ruled; Christopher and Sullivan left for Taipei. On the ride in from the airport to the embassy, they were assaulted by mobs. The car was stopped and pelted with eggs and other debris; the car was rocked and mobs shouted at its occupants. I am told that it was a very frightening experience. That demonstration was undoubtedly organized by the Taiwan Garrison Command - no demonstration would have been possible on Taiwan without government approval - if not active participation. But it reflected general public sentiment.

The discussions were not fruitful, to put it mildly. In the end, without admitting as much, the administration followed my advice by inviting an ROC emissary to Washington for negotiations. Taiwan sent the senior vice minister for foreign affairs, Yang Hsi-kun, a wonderful gentleman. We negotiated with him the arrangements which essentially still govern today's relationships between the ROC and the U.S. The ROC efforts at this juncture were motivated largely by the desire to deal with the panic that had erupted on Taiwan with the economic consequences that I mentioned earlier. The way the Chiang administration felt it could deal with the situation was by continuing to assert that despite the shift in diplomatic relations, there was still an official relationship between the U.S. and the ROC.

Yang Hsi-kun's marching orders were to somehow get us to say that whatever was being said about the new relationship, there remained some official connection. We, on the other hand, were aiming to get the ROC to accept the new situation - e.g deal with the U.S. through the American Institute on Taiwan (the new name for my American Institution proposal) - by establishing a parallel institution in Washington. The relationship after January 1, would have to be conducted through these two nominally unofficial organizations. At the same

time, we were negotiating on such things as the continuing of treaties and agreements, continuation of arms sales, enriched uranium fuel for their nuclear power reactors, etc. Under our arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), after the ROC's expulsion from the UN, it was only the U.S. which could sell enriched uranium to Taiwan because IAEA inspectors were technically not allowed to inspect atomic energy installations in non-UN member states. Somehow, we worked out a new arrangement with the IAEA which allowed us to include IAEA inspectors in U.S. delegations which periodically went to Taiwan to inspect the ROC's nuclear power plants. That was how an international inspection regime was maintained allowing the ROC to claim that it was still under an IAEA regime. But this convoluted scheme allowed only the U.S. to sell the enriched uranium and U.S. law allowed such sales only to "friendly" governments.

U.S. law allowed arms and military supplies to be sold only to "friendly" states. There were similar restrictions in respect to Ex-Im Bank loans, to Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) guarantees and other U.S. government programs. The problem was of course that we had just de-recognized the ROC; legally, we did not recognize it as a government nor Taiwan as a separate nation. We decided that these anomalies had to be fixed by new legislation, which became known as the "Taiwan Relations Act." I mentioned earlier our conversation with Herbert Brownell on this issue. Now the challenge was to convince the ROC that these problems could and would be taken care of in the legislation.

The sticking point was whether the relationship had "qualities of officiality," which was what Yang Hsi-kun's orders were to insist upon. We could not accept such a formulation because we had promised the PRC that we would not have any official relationship with Taiwan. I should point out that the PRC would not accept "normalization"if in addition to de-recognizing the ROC, we did not also agreed to three demands: 1) that we would withdraw all American forces from Taiwan; 2) that we would withdraw all official governmental institutions from Taiwan and 3) and that would abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The Carter agreed to demands (1) and (2), but said that the U.S. could not abrogate the treaty. We would terminate the Defense Treaty in accordance with its provisions - i.e. giving one year's notice. And that is what we did; on January 1, 1979, we informed the ROC that we no longer recognized it and that we were withdrawing from the Mutual Defense Treaty in a year's time. When Deng Xiaoping heard this, he swallowed hard and pointed out the obvious - our defense treaty would remain in effect until December 31, 1979. We told him that there was no other way out. He demanded that for that year we would not approve any new arms transfers or sales. We accepted that compromise. So in 1979, we had a defense treaty with an entity which we did not recognize and we would not sell or transfer any new arms. Thereafter, we would sell arms to a government we did not recognize. That was "creative" diplomacy or complete idiocy - I don't know

which is the most apt description.

We convinced Yang Hsi-kun that we would take necessary measures to take care of government loans and to continue our sales of enriched uranium. We also promised to sell arms after the expiration of the Mutual Defense Treaty. That left the question of "officiality." We argued about this over and over again; at one point I said to Yang - privately in the corridor - that he and the ROC could say whatever it wished about our relationships; we could not control that. We had to say that there was no "official" relationship. I also told him that if the ROC insisted on defining its representation in Washington as "official," U.S. government officials could not talk to it. But if the Taiwanese institution were deemed to be "unofficial", we could of course have discussions with its staff.

It was on this basis that we eventually came to an agreement. Each side said what it wanted to say. The other question that had to be resolved was the question of names. We asked what the ROC would call its "unofficial" office in Washington. They said that since we were calling our entity "The American Institute in Taiwan", they would call their institution "The Republic of China Institute in America." We had to say that that would not work; we could not deal with any entity with the name "Republic of China" in it. We suggested that they use the name "Taiwan" as in "The Taiwan Institute in America." That was not acceptable to the ROC which said that it represented the Republic of China, not Taiwan. We discussed this matter at great length. Finally, the ROC delegation, in the corridor again, asked for our suggestion. I had a brain-storm. I said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a good model; the division that handled U.S. relations was called the "North American Affairs" bureau, not "American Affairs." So I suggested that the institute be called something like "The Institute for North American Affairs." I noted that it could even be headquartered in Canada. The ROC delegation took my suggestions half-way; it finally called its institution "The Coordinating Council for North American Affairs."

Subsequently, I and my colleagues were blamed for the ROC's decision. They said that we had given them the name for their entity; we allegedly had insisted on the phraseology "Coordinating Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA)." So we forced on them a very unwieldy name. I had to repeat that the decision was the ROC's, not mine. I did admit that I suggested a name or two, but the final name was their invention. Much later, the ROC obtained our permission to rename the Institute as "The Taipei Economic and Cultural Relations Organization (TECRO)," which is the current appellation. The ROC saw that as a great advance and improvement over CCNAA. When the announcement was made, I commented that I thought their entity represented a country and not just a city.

I might mention that starting in mid-December, 1978, Hodding Carter would have me brief the press from time to time on the negotiations, the new arrangements and what might happen. At one of those briefings I was asked by Lester

Kinsolving, a well known correspondent, the following question :" You have said that on January 1, 1979 we would not longer recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan and that we would then recognize the People's Republic of China in Beijing. I note that that when it is here 11:59 p.m. on December 31, 1978, it is already 11:59 a.m. of January 1, 1979 in Beijing. Does that mean that for that 12 hour period, we recognize the PRC in Beijing and the ROC in Taipei simultaneously?" I looked at Carter and asked whether I could go off-the-record. Carter agreed. So I said: "Kinsolving, it beats the shit out of me!" This became known as the "Feldman exception."

While these negotiations were going on, our embassy in Taiwan was in limbo. It had ceased to be an embassy on January 1, 1979. Leonard Unger, our last ambassador, left Taiwan on January 19, 1979. So the embassy was in a nebulous state. Bill Brown or Mark Pratt should be asked how that felt. That situation continued for more than 3 months (January 1-April 10). Then the Taiwan Relations Act was passed by Congress; that converted our representation from an embassy to AIT. That allowed the Executive Branch to pay its employees in Taiwan; for the three months period, there was a hiatus during which we could not make major expenditures; e.g. rent on embassy housing. We had to persuade the ROC, whose housing we were occupying and whom we had just mortified, to let our people remain in their quarters without due compensation being paid. There were other U.S. debts that had to be left unpaid for this three months' period. We also had to obtain ROC permission to allow our people to drive in cars displaying diplomatic tags, etc.

It was a totally weird situation. Until the necessary legislation was passed the situation of our people in Taiwan was pretty bad.

Q: No diplomatic immunity?

FELDMAN: Technically, they did not have diplomatic immunity. In fact, we did work out an arrangement which allowed their personnel in the U.S. to keep their diplomatic immunity and our people in Taiwan were treated the same way.

Let me now turn to the Taiwan Relations Act. I mentioned earlier I had done some initial work on designing the entity that would represent us in Taipei after "normalization" with the PRC. That became the American Institute in Taiwan. I also mentioned that my proposal laid fallow waiting for something to happen, but that in the meantime we were consulting secretly with Herb Brownell on the possible shape of the new legislation. When Carter announced "normalization", no draft legislation actually existed. We had some ideas, some which had been written down in memoranda by me to Hansell and some which had been generated within the Legal Advisor's Office by Lee Marks, who was the senior deputy to the legal advisor. But we did not have even a draft of a legislative package.

So the first thing that had to happen after the Carter announcement was to draft the necessary legislation which would allow us to maintain contact with Taiwan, albeit on an "unofficial" basis. There were some 60 agreements between the U.S. and the ROC dealing with mutual defense, double taxation, commercial arrangements, airline arrangements, etc. The question was what would happen to these agreements following "normalization". As the prospects for "normalization" had improved over years, legal scholars had written all kinds of papers. For example, Jerry Cohen, a friend, made the rather absurd argument that following "normalization" all treaties and agreements the U.S. had with the ROC would cease to apply to the ROC but would instead apply to the PRC. I teased Jerry about this position which I considered ill founded. For example, did he mean that we would automatically have a mutual defense treaty with the PRC? Other scholars had postulated that all agreements would lapse with our de-recognition of the ROC. We didn't want them to lapse. In the end, we said that they would continue in force unless amended. No one objected. No court case challenging this view ever took place.

The next question was whether our position on these agreements could be supported under international law. To test that, some one would have had to sue the U.S. By whom and where would this suit be filed? Lee Marks and I had written a memorandum on this issue which became the basis for the provisions included in the Taiwan Relations Act.

Furthermore, we were the only country that was able to sell to Taiwan enriched uranium fuel, as I mentioned earlier. I have described the arrangements we finally developed to enable the IAEA inspectors to participate in an inspection regime. Our legislation had to amend U.S. law which limited sale of uranium to "friendly states." Same went for arms sales. The Taiwan Relations Act stipulates that "for all purposes, including actions in any court of the United States, the Congress approves the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agreements, including multi-lateral conventions, entered into by the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979." That was based on our draft.

We also put into our draft that "nothing in this Act nor the facts of the President's action in extending recognition to the People's Republic of China, the absence of diplomatic relations between the people on Taiwan and the United States or the lack of recognition by the United States and attending circumstances there to, shall be construed in any administrative or judicial proceeding as the basis for any United States government agency, commission or department to make a finding of fact or determination of law under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 in order to deny an export license application or to revoke an existing export license for nuclear exports to Taiwan."

We did something similar in regard to arms sales. In fact, we included a general catch-all phrase which in the section on definitions said, " The term Taiwan

includes, as the context may require, the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and other entities and associations created or organized under laws applying on those islands and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979 and any successor governing authority including political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities thereof."

These omnibus authorities which would come into effect upon passage of the legislation and would allow the U.S. to maintain the treaties and agreements in effect between the U.S. and the ROC prior to January 1, 1979. We also added language which said that for the purposes of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, Taiwan would be considered separately from the PRC. But what our draft did not include was anything about a security commitment to Taiwan on our part nor did it spell out in law our intention to continue to sell arms and military equipment to Taiwan.

We sent to Congress our draft legislation, which we called the "Omnibus Taiwan Act" - or something innocuous like that. It was drafted essentially in the legal advisor's office, by a committee co-chaired by Lee Marks and myself. Our draft was sent to Congress about the middle of January. In the meantime, the ROC government had been talking with its congressional friends, including Senators Stone and Goldwater (along with Terry Emerson, his staff aide), Congressman Lester Wolfe, who chaired the East Asia sub- committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and others. Some of these conversations took place directly between the ROC representatives and the members of Congress, but more often it was done through intermediaries, like Ray Cline whom I mentioned earlier. Ray had also been director of INR in the Department; he had been a national intelligence officer and had been a senior CIA officer. At this time, he had his own consulting firm. I am sure that there were others as well. This group of congressmen were considering all sorts of amendments to our draft legislation. When our package landed in Congress, it was firmly denounced - Congress was still angry with the Carter administration for the way it handled "normalization" particularly the way it handled the Dole-Stone amendment. That amendment was attached to the State Department authorization bill of August, 1978. It said essentially that any alterations in the status of U.S.-ROC relations "shall be" a matter of prior consultation with the Congress. Carter ignored this entirely, even though it was in an Act of Congress, that he had signed. That was one of the reasons why Congress was particularly angry.

Congress took our draft and began to add to it. In effect, it created, by legislation action, a treaty between the U.S. and the ROC. In a very clever way, amendments were added that we should always be aware of. They defined the parameters of the three cornered relationship - the U.S., the ROC and the PRC. In the section called "Findings and Declaration of Policy," Congress said, " It is the policy of the United States to declare (that) the peace and stability in the area are in the political, security and economic interests of the United States and are matters of

international concern." That phrase "international concern" is very important because the PRC had and continues to argue that whatever it does with regard to Taiwan is a matter of China's domestic policy. Congress refuted that argument in 1979 by saying that it was an international concern.

Furthermore, the bill says :" To make clear that the United States' decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests on the expectations that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means. To consider that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." The language "threat to the space and security" is taken directly from Chapter VII of the United Nations' Charter, and applied to the area. It provides a justification for taking action to halt aggression.

It goes on to say :"To provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the social or the economic system of the people on Taiwan." I have heard Kurt Campbell, the present deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, cite that portion of the Taiwan Relations Act as requiring the maintenance of the forces that we now have in the Pacific area. I had never heard that theory before from any senior official in either Defense or State. Note the use of the phrase "the people on Taiwan." This is a phrase that was inserted in the omnibus bill by Chas Freeman. Chas took the position that if we said "the people <u>of</u> Taiwan" that implied that Taiwan was a state. So we should not use that phraseology. Of course we would not use the words "the people (or government) of the Republic of China;"so Chas came up with the final wording. Roger Sullivan and Dick Holbrooke approved.

This history came back in a rather amusing fashion during the hearings on the Taiwan Relations Act. Senator Stone asked Herb Hansell, the legal advisor, who was testifying on the bill, who the people on Taiwan were - "why was that phrase used? If we are selling or leasing a destroyer to the people <u>on</u> Taiwan, who are we selling or leasing it to? Is it the chamber of commerce? Is it six or seven people on the street? Who are the people on Taiwan?" Hansell stumbled and hemmed and hawed and was finally forced to admit that the phrase at least included the governing authorities on Taiwan. I always thought it was a dumb phrase; it was one of the egregious interventions that really accomplished nothing, but held us up to a certain amount of ridicule. It is a prime case of an FSO employing the strategy of preemptive capitulation.

Let me talk about some of the other key aspects of the Act that were inserted by Congress. For example, "Nothing in this Act shall contravene the interests of the United States in human rights, especially with the human rights of all of the approximately 18 million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby

reaffirmed as objectives of the United States."

Then there is a section called "The Implementation of U.S. Policy in Regard to Taiwan"(Section III). This is particularly important and says :"In furtherance of the policy set forth in Section II of this Act, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a self-defense capability." That language was not in the Department's draft, but was added by Congress. What Congress was concerned about was that the Carter administration and succeeding administrations would in effect negotiate with the PRC what might or might not be sold to Taiwan. In fact, the PRC has on many occasions attempted to insert itself into such negotiations. The law says :"The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantities of such defense articles and services based solely on their judgement of the needs of Taiwan in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress." (That was the message to keep the PRC out of the arms sales to Taiwan). Furthermore, the Act says: "The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine in accordance with Constitutional processes appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger." What is interesting here is that successive administrations have never informed the Congress of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan, not even when the Clinton administration sent two carrier task forces to the Taiwan Straits area in March, 1996 because of the direct threat to Taiwan by Chinese missile tests which had missiles landing within fifteen to twenty miles of Taiwan's ports. The Clinton administration did not state that there was any danger to the security of Taiwan because it did not want Congress involved.

I could go on and on. The key is that the Act shows what Congress was thinking. It was writing a treaty, as I suggested earlier. It was delineating the parameters that would limit the future relationship of the U.S. to the PRC on actions that the latter might take against Taiwan. This was especially necessary at the time because Brzezinski's view (as well as Michel Oxenberg and many others) was that Taiwan was really of secondary importance to the U.S. and its future was not really of no concern to us. In fact, the best thing that could happen, in their view, was a Taiwan acceptance of PRC terms for reunification - a rather cavalier dismissal of the fate of 18 or 19 million people. I always viewed this position as a kind of racism that we would not be concerned with the fate of these 18-19 million people at a time when the U.S. was making strong representations to the USSR with regard to human rights in its own country, its treatment of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, etc. The Carter administration showed great concern for the fate of Europeans and Soviets, but didn't seem to give a damn for the orientals who lived in Taiwan. I found it offensive and essentially racist.

Q: Tell us a little about the dynamics of sending the draft legislation to Congress? I assume that there was a debate about that in the State Department. Who were the major players in Congress?

FELDMAN: The key Congressional members were: in the Senate: Alan Cranston, who was I believe the Democratic whip; Edward Kennedy another good Democrat; Claiborne Pell, later the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee; Bob Dole, the Republican minority leader; Barry Goldwater; Jake Javits, a delightful senator from New York and the ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee. He was also the major player; Cranston and Javits in fact managed the legislation in the Senate. Frank Church, who chaired the Foreign Relations Committee, basically ceded to Cranston and Javits. I think the latter was the key senator in the passage of the Act.

On the House side, Clem Zablocki, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, was a major player as was Lester Wolff, the chairman of the Asian sub-committee, who became the floor manager for the bill. Also Dante Fascell, the next ranking Democrat on the Committee; Ed Derwinski, a Republican, played a key role. I should note that the Democrats were trying to pass a bill against the Administration, allowing the Republicans essentially to watch from the side lines.

There were some key staffers who were very active: Chris Nelson and Jim Przstup, of Wolff's staff - the latter is now professor at the National Defense University; before that he was the director of Asian studies at the Heritage Foundation and earlier a member of the Department's Policy Planning staff during the Bush administration. Nelson now writes a newsletter on Washington politics for a number of clients - particularly Japanese. Jon Holstein was also a player; he also was a member of Wolff's staff; he now works with Wolff in his consulting business. Goldwater's staffer, Terry Emerson, was also deeply involved and helpful.

Interestingly enough, the State Department nominated two people to represent it in the negotiations leading up to the passage of the legislation. One was Jim Michel, the deputy legal advisor; he later went to AID and then became our ambassador to Guatemala. I was the other Departmental representative. If Brzezinski and Oxenberg had followed our negotiations very closely, they would have yanked me out, torn the epaulets off my shoulders and broken my sword across their knees. Essentially, I was agreeing with the language that the Congress was drafting which I don't think was really what the White House wanted. Jim would usually defer to me but he did question on occasions whether certain words would really be acceptable to the Administration. I would assure him that it might be a hard sell, but that I thought it would be approved. In fact, Brzezinski and Oxenberg - and to some degree even Holbrooke - were horrified when they saw the final product, but by then it was too late.

The PRC was furious and denounced the bill as it was being written. President Carter threatened to veto the legislation, but the Congress passed it overwhelmingly - something like 350 for and 50 against in the House and 85 to 2 in the Senate. It was obvious that any veto would be over-ridden. On the tenth or twelfth of April 1979, the Act was signed into law.

Ever since, there has been a great tension between what the Act specifies and the three communiques signed by three Presidents and the PRC. The first was the Shanghai communique of February, 1972; the second was the "recognition" communiqué of January 1, 1979; and the third was signed on August 17, 1982 by President Reagan. These documents are basically at odds with the Taiwan Relations Act. Successive administrations have maintained that their policy towards the PRC was based on the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, but this is somewhere between difficult and impossible because of the inherent contradictions in the documents.

This is most manifest when you watch the present administration - Clinton's. For example, look at the three "nos" that Clinton enunciated before a Chinese audience in Shanghai in June, 1998. He said that U.S. policy was to support the "one China" concept; that we would not support Taiwan independence; and that we would not support Taiwan's efforts to enter any international organization that requires statehood as a basis for membership. The White House have argued that this is just a continuation of past policy. It is right in part, but only in part. The Reagan communique says that the U.S. would follow the "one China" policy, not a "two China" policy - Taiwan and the PRC - and would not support Taiwan's independence. But it doesn't say anything about Taiwan's membership in international organizations.

Let me read what the Taiwan Relations Act says on this issue. In Section 4 (d) Congress wrote :"Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization." At the time this was written, the ROC was a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It had continued this membership for all the years following its expulsion from the General Assembly, making the point that a country did not have to a GA member or indeed the UN to be a Bank or IMF member. It had continued this membership primarily because it had the support of the U.S., which in light of the weighted voting system, gave the U.S. a great percentage of the votes. I think in those years our vote equaled 20% of the total - now it is down to 17%. It was in the year following "normalization," when we ceased supporting the ROC's membership, that Taiwan was expelled from the international financial institutions.

The language in the Act is written in negative terms, but it has to mean that Congress considered that Taiwan was fully qualified to be a member of all

international organizations. That should have been U.S. law. But the policy of the Clinton administration runs completely contrary to the law of the land. Furthermore, the Act says in many points that as far as U.S. law is concerned the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized as the ROC before January 1, 1978, shall be considered as a government of a nation. So in law the government on Taiwan is considered to be the government of a state. That raises the question on what basis can the Clinton administration follow its policy? It can because the Executive Branch does what it wants to do, but it is in direct contradiction with the Taiwan Relations Act. So we have a basic conflict between the communiques and the Act; it has been left to each administration and each Congress to deal with these contradictions. I submit that one of the reasons why such a situation exists - i.e. the conflict between administration policy and congressional sentiment criticizing U.S. China policies as expressed in the Taiwan Relations Act and resolutions approved by lopsided margins - is because of the disconnect between the law and the communiques. The tendencies of administrations after January 1, 1979 has been to conclude that the relationship with the PRC is so supremely important that the law has to be ignored. You can also see that theory at work in the way the administration ignores laws applying sanctions to missile sales by the PRC.

Q: What was the reaction of the ROC to the passage of the Act?

FELDMAN: Interestingly enough, it considered the Act to be totally inadequate because it did not restore an official relationship between it and the U.S. That was the initial reaction. As time went by, it grew to love the Act to the point when five-ten years ago, it began to suggest to countries that broke relations with it and established relationships with the PRC many years earlier that they adopt legislation and institutions similar to what the U.S. had done. We are now in May 1999 and last month we celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act with praise heaped upon it by the ROC and all commentators, including President Carter who visited Taiwan at the end of March of this year during which time he took credit for the Act - despite the fact that he had 20 years earlier threatened to veto it.

Q: What about the PRC?

FELDMAN: It still damns it as a direct contradiction of the communiques as it describes as the sworn word of the U.S. Of course, it doesn't make any difference how many times the situation is explained to it, it doesn't quite sink in that a communique is a statement of administration policy, whereas the Taiwan Relations Act is the law of the land.

Q: What about implementation? What happened after the Act was passed?

FELDMAN: It has been spasmodically implemented. As I pointed out, administrations completely ignored the legal requirements of the law as it applied

to the ROC's membership in international organizations.

We had after the passage of the Act final negotiations with the ROC on the establishment of the new institutions required to conduct bilateral business. Sometime in early February, we concluded these negotiations with the ROC agreeing to establish the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, but we could not proceed in establishing the AIT until the TRA was passed in mid-April. Then we could formalize the transition of an embassy to the AIT. In February, I think, our staff moved out of the embassy compound to what had been the MAAG and the CIA (called something like the Naval Auxiliary Communications Center) compounds - a symbolic gesture to show that our embassy had ceased to function. We had not made any changes in personnel by this time; after AIT was established the Department selected Chuck Cross to head it up - he had retired from the Foreign Service sometime in 1971 after he had completed his tour as ambassador to Singapore. David Dean became the head of AIT's Washington office. Finally, the staff was paid.

Q: Did the staff just continue, although in a new status? Did you and your staff just moved over to the AIT?

FELDMAN: No, we stayed in the Department. The Office of Republic of China Affairs was folded into the Office of Regional Affairs and thereby ceased to exist as a separate directorate. It was renamed some thing like the Taiwan Coordination Staff. I had argued very strongly against Chas Freeman whose proposal was to fold the ROC office into the Office of Chinese Affairs. I won that argument and therefore I and my staff became part of the Regional Affairs Office in EA. I stayed on briefly; it was made eminently clear that in the interest of smoothing relations within the Executive Branch and to give further indication of our break with Taiwan, I should move on.

I was assigned to the Senior Seminar, but at the same time, Warren Christopher, the deputy secretary, called me to his office to ask what onward assignment I would like. I told him that I had been assigned to the Senior Seminar, but that I also knew that the post of ambassador to Papua New Guinea (PNG) was coming open and that I would like to be considered for that job. Christopher said that he thought I would be better off going to the Senior Seminar; he didn't think I really would like to be ambassador in Papua New Guinea, which was quite primitive. My answer was that in fact that was what attracted me to that country; I always had an amateurish interest in anthropology and I thought I really would enjoy that assignment. Christopher agreed to place my name in nomination, even though he had these reservations. It turned out that Christopher was absolutely right and I was absolutely wrong.

While waiting for my nomination to be processed, I occupied office space in the Regional Affairs Office. It took a long time before my name was submitted to Congress-White House vetting, security clearance, etc. I also took a lot of leave. I

tried very hard to refrain from giving advice. The nomination finally got through the process just in time to be submitted before a summer Senate recess - it was sent up in June and was not acted upon until September. The hearing was held shortly after Labor Day; it was chaired by Frank Church. All the members of the Foreign Relations Committee were all there, only because Tom Watson, former head of IBM, was being considered as ambassador to the Soviet Union at the same hearing. The hearing lasted probably an hour and a quarter of which an full hour was devoted to Tom Watson. He was sponsored by Senator Pat Moynihan. Senator after Senator exulted Watson's virtues - and IBM's. Finally, they turned to me to ask two or three questions of no particular note or interest. The only notable remark was Senator Pell's who urged me not to have the Papua New Guineas like me so much that they would eat me. That, as might be expected, caused some consternation in PNG.

I also remember one Senator coming up to me after the hearing and told me that he had appreciated all the work I had done on the Taiwan Relations Act. That Senator was Jesse Helms. I was confirmed right after the hearings.

By the end of September, 1979 I was in PNG.

Q: Let us move on to that new phase of your career.

FELDMAN: En route to PNG, I asked to stop in Australia for consultations because Australia was still the major power in the region. In fact, I think the reason we had opened an embassy in Port Moresby was that Australia asked us to do so. I went to Canberra where I met Andrew Peacock, the Foreign Minister, who is now the Australian ambassador in the U.S. He was fond of purple shirts with white cuffs and collars. The name and the attire suited each other very well.

I flew from Sydney to Port Moresby on a Saturday. I put on my ambassadorial suit - pinstriped dark blue suit. When I landed on the tarmac, I found that there was no jetway. You got off the plane and walked from the plane to the terminal - a distance of 250-300 feet. By the time I had walked that stretch, I had soaked through my shirt and jacket - it was very, very hot in Port Moresby. I was not used to that much heat; I don't think I ever felt so uncomfortable in my life.

Papua New Guinea is a very Christian country. It is evident when you notice that every session of Parliament opens with the Lord's Prayer, which in pidgin, of the three main languages, reads like this: Pap bilong Al, you stop on top. Name belong you i mus kamup hol. The other sign that it is a deeply religious country is that at least in Port Moresby it rains only between Christmas and Easter. There is no rain in any other season. There is however an iron sun in a clear blue sky making the temperature on the ground always in the 90s when it is not in the 100s. The humidity is in the 50s. People say that when it is dry like that one does not feel the heat. That is partially true because when it is in the 100s with a humidity in the 50s, it doesn't feel a degree over 99.

So I had sweated through all of my clothing and was ushered into the VIP lounge, which was fully air-conditioned. That sent me shivering in my sodden suit. I was greeted by the chief of protocol, the dean of the diplomatic corps - the British High Commissioner - and by Tim Hamilton, my DCM, and by the embassy's administrative officer. We sat there making small talk, until I was informed that my baggage had been cleared through customs and had been loaded in the ambassadorial limousine. I was then free to depart. Escorted by my greeting group, I went out to the limousine, which as an Australian Ford Falcon. I climbed in and Bem, the embassy's chauffeur, turned the starter key and the motor groaned and groaned, but would not start. I should add that I noticed that Bem was barefooted. Finally, it didn't even groan; it died completely as I was sitting waving goodbye to the receiving group. The administrative officer ran to Budget-Rent-a-Car and rented the largest - indeed the only - vehicle available which was a Datsun 210 - a two door car. The luggage was crammed into the trunk, into the front seat and some of it in the back seat. I got in as best I could and waved goodbye again. The Datsun did start and we drove to the ambassador's residence.

That residence was reached by a very steep road which had a right angle turn. When we got to the turn, the Datsun also died. So I walked the last fifty yards to the residence. There I was greeted by the single household servant, Kisani; he ushered me into the residence, which was a rather unusual structure. It was actually dumbbell shaped. There was a large round building which was the residence proper; then you got to a covered walkway which led to a much smaller round structure which was guest house. The roof was conical; it had been build to sort of replicate a hut that might be found in the highlands of PNG. The major difference was that the wall and the roof were not of thatch as one would find in the highland. In the residence, the wall was made of glass - not windows which could be opened. There were some very tiny windows at the bottom of the walls. The floors were bare cement because my predecessor, Mary Olmsted, had owned the rugs and had taken them with her. She had been first our consul-general and then ambassador.

I entered and discovered to my horror that it was not air conditioned. There was a revolving table fan sitting on a coffee table; that was the sole air conditioning in the 95 degree heat. Mary had also taken most of the furniture which was hers. What was left was mostly rattan - of the kind we used to refer to in Taiwan as "early Chiang Kai-shek." So I sat in a rattan chair sweltering in his beehive hut with the glass walls radiating waves of heat at me, with the one little fan doing its best. I didn't know whether to laugh or cry. In fact, my first thought was to find a telephone to call Dick Holbrooke to tell him that I had made a terrible mistake and that I wanted to be relieved immediately.

Q: I gather that you arrived without your wife.

FELDMAN: Fortunately, Laurie was not with me. That was my second thought

because had she been there we would have been on the first plane out of PNG. As I was sitting bemoaning my fate, the DCM and administrative officer drove up. They welcomed me again. I asked where the air conditioning was. I was told that Ambassador Olmsted did not approve of air conditioning. She thought it was bad for you and furthermore it drew a distinction between the way Americans lived and the way the Papua New Guineans lived. I asked whether their residences were air-conditioned. They assured me that, of course, they were!

I then asked about the rugs. That is when I found out that Mary had taken them and most of the furniture. But they did say that they had stocked the refrigerator with what I might need during the rest of the week-end. They parted, saying they would see me at the office on Monday. So there I was: all alone with a car at the bottom of the driveway. I was in a sweat box completely lost about what I should do.

The clincher came a few minutes later when Kisani came in to inform me - in his halting English - that Ambassador Olmsted had been in the habit of giving him a daily lesson in English. He asked what time I thought might be convenient for such a lesson. I explained, as politely as I could, that I did not believe that I had been sent by my president in order to teach English - to Kisani or anyone else. I suggested that he get his lesson elsewhere; I suggested rather strongly that he had better do so if he wanted to continue his employment.

Fortunately, at this point, the phone rang. On the flight from Sydney, I had sat next to an executive of Air New Guinea - the airline we were flying. He was a white Rhodesian, who had left the country, as many others did, when it achieved its independence and became Zimbabwe. He went to Australia and ended up subsequently in Port Moresby where he joined Air New Guinea. He called me and asked whether I was busy in the afternoon. I told him that I thought I would just have a collapse - or something like that. He suggested that we go swimming instead. He said he would be by whenever I was ready. I said I was ready and the sooner he could get me, the better. I ran upstairs, pealed off my sodden clothes and put on a bathing suit and a tee shirt; I grabbed a towel, fund some flip-flops and went to spend the rest of the day with my traveling companion and his friends.

It was there that I first learned that three Australians equaled one case of beer. We drove about an hour to a beach, where we sat around, taking a dip every once in a while. We drank a lot of beer, told a lot of stories. They invited me to join them for dinner that evening which I readily accepted. We went off to a club called Aviat and had dinner. That was my first day in Papua New Guinea!

Q: I hope things improved as time went by. Did the situation change?

FELDMAN: On Monday, I went to the embassy. By this time the Ford Falcon had been “repaired;” it failed many times subsequently and ultimately I was able

to persuade the powers-to-be to let me get rid off it and get a Holden - an Australian Chevy - instead. That was a great improvement.

The first thing I did was to ask the administrative officer to come to see me. I asked him the name of the main air-conditioning firm in PNG. It turned out that it was not an American firm; it was Daikin, a Japanese firm. I was told that it was the biggest and the best. I told the administrative officer that I wanted to go there right away. We went and spoke to a neat Australian who was the general manager. I explained my problem. He said he had been to the residence and knew it well. He recommended a "split" system which had the compressor outside and the air flowed through tubes to fan units inside the house. He thought that with two compressors he could cool the whole house easily. The guest house was then provided window units. So that is what we did and within four days, the residence was fully air-conditioned; in fact, it could be really cold. I loved it.

The next thing I did was to go with the administrative officer to the local carpet merchant. I wanted carpets, but I recognized that the administrative officer might have some problem paying for all these improvements. I told him that he had to find some way to pay for these purchases because I just wasn't going to live in the conditions that I found the residence. So we bought a wall-to-wall carpet which were installed in about a month. For both the carpet and the furniture we had to get Foreign Buildings Office (FBO) approval, but the furniture was a different challenge because it had to be delivered from the U.S. We ordered and waited for arrivals which spread out over some time. I think we waited for three months for the living room furniture; the dining room table came later - without chairs; the box spring and mattress came without the bed frame; so we slept on the box spring and mattress for a while. So it was probably six-eight months before the residence was made livable. However, once the air-conditioning was installed, I could tolerate all the other deprivations. I am glad we got that much done before Laurie arrived which was about two months later. We were still living with the rattan furniture and the old creaking bed with sagging mattress, but it was certainly far better than what I had found on that fateful arrival day.

Q: How was Kisani?

FELDMAN: He vacillated between a disaster and generally tolerable. It turned out that essentially he couldn't cook at all. Ambassador Olmsted had taught him one or two dishes; he could make an omelette, for example, and he could make sandwiches. He could also pour dry cereal into a bowl and bring it to the dining room table. That was about the extent of his culinary talents. But we found that essentially, there were no cooks to be found in PNG. We assumed that within the Chinese community, there must have been a cook or two. Wrong; there wasn't. The Chinese who lived in PNG were all businessmen. We tried a couple of retired PNG defense force cooks; they were pretty awful. Ultimately, we accepted our fate; if we entertained, we would have it catered usually by a hotel kitchen. That was no great cooking, but restaurants were willing to provide the service. There

really wasn't a decent restaurant in the country. But it was tolerable and it was what the local people were used to. When we didn't have a party, either Laurie or I cooked. The same thing might have happened if we had a small party; this particularly true if a number of embassy staff were invited; the wives would help out and bring some food. I would say that our embassy was a sort of "mom and pop" operation.

We had nine Americans on the staff, including myself. In contrast, the Australian High Commission had about 70-75 Australians. So we had a very small operation. Tim Hamilton, whom I had picked to be the DCM, turned out to be somewhat of a disappointment. He was not a take-charge kind of guy. I thought a DCM should be something like what I was to Martin Herz - someone who would run the embassy. Hamilton was not the right guy for the job. The administrative officer was pretty good. He sort of looked like an unmade bed - overweight, mussed hair, shirttails hanging out. But he was very good - creative, which was an essential requirement for PNG. He had a delightful wife. He had served in the consulate general in Tangier. One day, he walked into the major hotel there and had seen an absolutely stunning woman behind the reception desk. He courted and married her. She was an Arab Muslim, stuck in Port Moresby, but she was delightful and the kind of person who could adjust to almost any surrounding. She was a source of cheer and joy for the whole embassy.

The consular officer and the communicator were a tandem couple. We had no political officer; we did have an economic officer, Ira Wolf, who was a Japanese language officer who was later assigned to Tokyo and subsequently was detailed to work for Senator Rockefeller (Democrat, West Virginia). He then left the Foreign Service and went to work for Kodak in Tokyo; then he joined the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Office, before returning to Kodak. He was a very talented officer - outstanding. Now he's a senior staffer to Senator Max Baucus.

Q: How many other embassies were in Port Moresby?

FELDMAN: We had the British High Commission, the Australian High Commission, the New Zealand High Commission, a French embassy, a Chinese embassy, the Solomon Island High Commission, the Fiji High Commission and a Korean embassy. Very small diplomatic corps. I didn't really spend much time with them; they were not particularly interesting except for the Australian and the New Zealander. Since the PNG was in their area they sent good people. The British High Commissioner was on his last assignment before retirement; same for the French, who had come to PNG after being a vice consul somewhere. It was not a sterling group.

Q: What interests did the U.S. have in PNG?

FELDMAN: At this stage, very few. Our principal interest I think was the three

thousand missionaries who lived in PNG.

Q: tell us a little about the PNG government.

FELDMAN: The problem with PNG and its independence was that the Papua New Guineans had no experience with running any kind of enterprise. Thee wasn't even a public school system until after WWII. The University was not founded until the beginning of the 1970s. I think that the first graduating class was in 1973 or 1974 or perhaps even 1975. Education had been essentially in the hands of missionaries; what education was available was a hit or miss proposition - there weren't many schools. So there was no educated cadre when independence came along. When I served in PNG, the average education of the parliament members was probably three or four years of primary school. Members of the cabinet had commonly one or two years of high school - always in missionary schools, which varied widely in performance.

So there wasn't much one could do or say under the circumstances. They had tremendous problems. Under Australian rule, PNG had been a free immigration zone. All of the functioning positions in the government were held by Australians up until about 1970. Even the electrician or the plumber who worked in one's house were Australian as were the attendants at gas pumps. The Papuan New Guineas were household help, restaurant waiters, cooks and bottle watchers and outside of towns, subsistence farmers. The principal crops were palm oil, cocoa and coffee. Especially after WWII, coffee became a path to wealth for many of highland clans.

The highlands were quite primitive. In fact there were portions which had been "discovered" only in the 1930s. Yet it was the highlands of New Guinea, PNG's main island, where the major portion of the population lived. There were some other islands that part of PNG, the largest of which was Bougainville which was named after the French explorer Philip du Bougainville. Some of the other islands were New Ireland and New Britain - the latter being probably the most prosperous part of PNG. Also there was Manus and the northern part of the Solomon Islands. Manus was where anthropologist Margaret Meade had done her major work "Growing up in New Guinea," following her first book "Coming to Age in Samoa." I might just mention that Meade is not very highly regarded in Manus; she never shared any of her royalties from her books with the natives and the Manusians felt that she owed them - big time.

The Papua New Guineans have a keen sense of what is owed to them. Many years after WWII, while I was ambassador, I happened to make a trip to a small island near Manus. I was shown around by one of the chiefs; we came to a strip of crumbling concrete which had been built by the U.S. Army Air Force as an airstrip which cut right across the island. The chief pointed out that this had been a major air strip in WWII; he said that two fighter planes could take off simultaneously. So, he said this strip had been very important to the Americans.

When I said I could imagine that, he pointed out that we had never paid his people anything for it!

I should mention something about the law of unintended consequences - Australian colonialism division. When Gough Whitlam and the Australian Labor Party took over in 1974 or 1975 - the first Labor government in a long time - it decided that Australia should not remain a colonial power. That meant giving Papua New Guinea its independence as quickly as possible. It pushed PNG into independence far more quickly than it could really absorb it and even before the PNG leaders wanted it. To say that they were unprepared is to put it mildly. The Papua New Guineans were unprepared in several ways. For one, the Australians had left an enormous infrastructure of government service. At independence and even when I was there, one of every four Papua New Guineans who were wage earners worked for the government. Government "mandarins" - i.e. public servants with an inflated sense of importance - were entitled to all sorts of benefits including for example, "home leave"every two years. What the PNG had done was to copy exactly what benefits had been extended to Australians during the colonial period. Where did the Papua New Guineans go for "home leave?" Nevertheless, they got two months of "home leave" every two years at full pay and they could go wherever they wished. So we would find PNGers going to Australia or the U.S. or Europe for "home leave." Of course, that program was enormously expensive. So the cost of running the government was huge particularly in an underdeveloped country.

There were other matters that were the heritage of Australian colonialism - in strange, sometimes wonderful, sometimes awful ways. The ruling Australian Labor Party, with the best of motives, decided that they should institute an urban minimum wage policy. They set that wage at a level which during my tour was the equivalent of $45 per week - or roughly $200 per month. That essentially barred anyone from building an export industry in PNG, which is often the path that underdeveloped countries take to increase their GDP - especially in textiles. From there, they worked their way up the economic ladder. But that was not possible because that minimum wage made PNG exports completely uncompetitive. Productivity was low - much lower that Indonesia where the average monthly wage might have been $50 per month.

The result of this minimum wage policy was large unemployment. In my days in Port Moresby, the unemployment level was about 40% of adult males. The situation was similar in other major cities. The consequence, not surprisingly, was crime and urban gangs. The unemployment also spawned major corruption.

The Australians also dictated prohibition. That mean that a Papua New Guinean could not buy alcoholic beverages or receive alcoholic beverages. One consequence was that the Papua New Guineans came to equate the ability to drink alcoholic beverages with political power. The Australians had the political power and the Papua New Guineans had prohibition. The Australians were well known

for their drinking consumption - beer and even harder liquor. The Papua New Guineans who lived near Australians would see drunken Australians.

Papua New Guinean women saw that Australian women drank. They also saw that Australian women had far fewer children than they had. That brought them to the conclusion that alcohol must be some kind of contraceptive. So when independence came and prohibition was lifted, PNG went on an unbelievable drinking spree. It lasted for weeks and weeks. Not surprisingly, the birth rate increased. In any case, beer became institutionalized in PNG; prior to "freedom" bride price was paid in what was called a "Kina" shell or pigs or sacks of rice, etc. But post-independence, the currency of choice was beer. When I was there, approximately 10% of GDP came from the sale of beer. There were a lot of people who were drunk for most of their time.

Another PNG fact was that it was and had been a country without refrigeration - despite its climate. So things spoiled very quickly which meant for example, that at harvest time, if someone roasted a pig, the whole thing had to be eaten essentially in one sitting. If you had a case of beer, you drank it all. The concept of leaving something for tomorrow just didn't exist because the concern for spoilage.

Q: Did they make their own beer?

FELDMAN: The major brewery was the South Pacific Company - a joint venture of Tiger, a Singapore company and Fosters, the Australian beer maker. Later San Miguel, a Philippine company, tried to establish itself in PNG, but it couldn't crack the market. I knew the San Miguel manager - Phil Telesco, an American, born in the Philippines. He told me that he couldn't get more that 5% of the market despite all their advertisement and promotion efforts. He asked why this ceiling existed and was told that his beer just didn't taste as good as South Pacific's beer. So he had SP's analyzed and found that it contained a little bit of formaldehyde which gave the drinker a headache. The Papua New Guineans assumed that if one didn't get a headache after drinking, the beer did not contain any alcohol. Since San Miguel did not give the drinker a headache, it could not have been real beer!

Q: Let's get back to the highlands.

FELDMAN: The highlands was a broad mountainous area, topped by an all year snow- capped peak called Wilhelm (named after the former Kaiser) despite the fact that it is only 8 degrees off the Equator. It is about 18,000 feet high. The highlands themselves are 3,000-8,000 feet high. There are deeply cut valleys, roaring rivers and many fertile fields. The geography cuts the area up into small pieces so that there are net-works of small villages in the highland, each populated by 50-200 people. There are a lot of these small villages. The total population on PNG when I was there was about three million of whom at least one million lived

in the highlands. One found pockets in the highland which were simply unaccessible until the 1930s when air travel became possible. A former PNG foreign minister wrote his autobiography which he called " Ten Thousand Years in One Lifetime." He recounted how he as a child of 6 or 7 had seen a wheel for the very first time - on an airplane. So there was a major disconnect between how the highlanders and the urban dwellers had lived in PNG, even as recently as the 1930s.

The highlands were an interesting place, populated by clans, many of which were in a state of perpetual warfare. Warfare in the highlands was a little different from our perception of that word. It was probably very similar to what one might have found in Europe 3000-4000 years ago. There weren't any mass confrontations; there would be raiding parties that would hide in the bush and wait until the males of the village, which was to be attacked, had left to go off to their daytime work - hunting or forest clearing, etc. Then the party would swoop down on the village, burn the huts, carry off the pigs and occasionally, although not very often, rape a woman.

Another fighting method was to attack in the early hours of the morning - 4 or 5 a.m., just as people were getting up. They would surprise their enemies and set the huts on fire. They would also kill the villagers who were being attacked by throwing spears at them. This was a rare incident, but did happen from time to time.

Much later, after I had left the Service, I returned on a business trip. I read an article in the Port Moresby newspaper - *The Post Courier* - that some of the highland clans were then renting helicopters to spy out the terrain of their hereditary enemies and then would attack them with spears and bows and arrows. The use of modern weapons was not acceptable - there was no credit to be gained by shooting an enemy - but the use of helicopters for scouting purposes was acceptable.

Q: How about languages on PNG?

FELDMAN: There were a number used because the area was so cut up both because of the many islands that belonged to PNG and because on the main island there were those separations that I have described. Linguists have said that there are seven hundred distinct languages spoken in PNG. I have that a little hard to believe, but there are certainly a great number. That resulted in the development of two kinds of pidgin. One was pidgin English which after independence they called by a fancier name Neo-Melanesian, so named by an Australian linguist. Then there was a Papuan pidgin which was spoken along the southern coast. Almost all people could speak pidgin. The constitution, which was a lengthy and very detailed piece of work which tried to cover all subjects - something like 105 pages - specified that PNG was a Christian country and that every session of parliament should start with the Lord's Prayer. I gave it once already.

I do remember when Prince Charles' engagement to Lady Diana was announced the local pidgin language newspaper ran a picture of her with the following caption: numba one pikannini bilong Missus Kween, beling Englan, Prins Chals, ba, maritim dispela yongpela switpela Mari. Name belong clopela Mari i Ledi Diana. Ledi Diana got 19 Crismus. Prins Chals got 32 Cristmus. Mamma Kwin tokout long dispela noos long las wik. ("The oldest child of the Queen of England, Prince Charles, will marry this sweet young woman named Lady Diana who is 19 years old. The Queen Mother announced this news item last week"). I never became fluent in pidgin, but I could understand it pretty well. It is a language that has only about 1600 words in its vocabulary, so it can be mastered without too much trouble.

The government which was in charge at the time of my arrival was headed Prime Minister Michael Sumari, who later became a KCMG (Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St George). We have remained friends for many years. Later, after my departure, we went on a speaking tour together in the U.S. Sumari had been a radio announcer on the north coast in Wewak, his native city. He therefore had a known voice and was easily elected the first chief minister before independence after which he became prime minister. Michael was pretty good; I think he was probably the last honest prime minister of PNG. Those who followed him were increasingly corrupt. Michael was followed by Sir Julius Chan, who was the son of an overseas Chinese father and a native mother. He was from New Ireland. I think the political situation deteriorated after Michael.

Julius had been the finance minister in Sumari's cabinet, based on the wide spread belief in PNG that if you were of Chinese stock you must be good at finances and mathematics. I once overhead a very amusing conversation at a party between a senior government official, a native and an overseas Chinese resident. The cabinet officer asked why it was that the Chinese were so proficient with money and numbers; the answer was that in a Chinese family, the major subject for dinner discussion was interests rates. I have no way to vouch for the accuracy of that observation, but it was interesting. Of course, a PNG native who was raised in the highlands would not have had a family dinner table. There the men lived in a long house, by themselves. The women lived in round, beehive huts; young male children lived with their mothers until they were 11 or 12. Then they were circumcised and then moved into a long house. So the cabinet official probably never had a family dinner table to sit around to discuss interest rates or anything else.

In some of these villages, the children are not circumcised, but rather scarified - the young person is stretched out on a board, little cuts are made on his back, leaving lifelong scars. I have never understood exactly what it is that is put in each cut. Is something that makes a raised welt. That leaves the boy with what looks like corrugated backs, which are called appropriately called "Crocodile Skin." I guess that the idea is to make the males as brave and as fierce as

crocodiles are supposed to be.

Q: What was the role of the Australians by the time you got there?

FELDMAN: The Australians were the principal support for the government. They provided one-third of the budget with direct untied budgetary support. Year after year, both while I was there and since, the Australians have tried to negotiate a reduction in this budgetary support formula, to that the Papua New Guineans could be weaned away from this handout and begin to live within their own means. Not much has happened on this front; twenty years after my tour in PNG, I think that the Australians have reduced their contributions from one-third of the budget to 20%-23% of the budget. But they are still supporting PNG.

The Australian High Commission had seventy people on its staff, as I said before. Some were rather weird. I remember one of the staff - the equivalent of what we would call a political counselor - who when hosting a party, would greet his guests wearing a dress and make-up. Periodically, he would name the members of the cabinet with whom he had slept. I used to complain to the High Commissioner that his staff had an unfair advantage over our staff with this guy!

The Australians also did a lot of training, particularly army and police. The army at the time was headed by Brigadier Ted Diro, who was very suave, gregarious and good looking. He had attended schools in Australia and England; he looked and comported himself as a brigadier should - a handle bar mustache, impeccably groomed. Later we found out that he was on the payroll of Indonesia, which is right next door. While I was in PNG, there was a perpetual concern that one day the Indonesians would just march in and occupy PNG so that the whole chain of islands would be theirs. When it was found out that Diro had been an Indonesian agent for many years, it came as a great shock. It was part of the increasing corruption that went on in PNG.

Q: What was the Papua New Guineans' attitude towards Indonesians?

FELDMAN: They cared in the same sense as the West Irian Liberation Movement (OPM), a Melanesian racial group, cared about Indonesian. They were not like Indonesians at all. The West Papuans were the same kinds of people, with the same clan structure and habits and mores, as the Papua New Guineans who lived right across the border. The two peoples had a great deal of affinity for each other. For a long time OPM used the border area, including the PNG side, as a sort of a safe haven, from which they attacked the Indonesian military garrisons and police. There was an OPM office, devoted primarily to issuing propaganda, in Port Moresby.

In 1980 or 1981, an agreement was reached between Indonesia and PNG. The OPM office in Port Moresby was closed. The PNG military attempted to deny the use of PNG territory to the OPM. The uprising sort of withered and died away

after that. The area along the border was really wild and incredible - as most of PNG is. For example, Port Moresby exists in a rain shadow; there is absolutely no rain between Easter and Christmas. It was said that because PNG was a Christian country, it rained between Christmas and Easter - 10-15 inches per annum. But it was very dry; brush-fires cropped up all the time. By the West Irian border, it rained 600 inches per annum. Once I flew once to an area called Oktedi ("*OK"* meaning "river" in the local dialect.) A discovery had been made in this border region of a large copper and gold deposit. PNG also operated the world's largest open-cut copper mine on the island of Bougainville. The mine on the border was opened and worked. An American company, in a joint venture with an Australian company, was trying to develop the mine. It flew me to the area from Port Moresby in a Beechcraft *Baron*, a two engine plane. We flew to Daru, which was the capital of the western province. It is essentially a couple of houses and some huts on a mud flat, near the mouth of the Fly River - aptly named, I would say. From there we flew in a single engine Cessna to land at Oktedi. Just as we were approaching the landing strip at Oktedi, the engine failed. Fortunately, we had a terrific pilot - a Papua New Guinean. He made a dead stick landing on the runway and saved out lives.

We later discovered that the engine failed because the oil pan had not been filled for a long time and therefore the engine had simply run out of oil. We stayed on Oktedi for a couple of days until another plane could reach us. It rained and rained and rained; I didn't see how the mine could be worked in that kind of weather. But they did until a typical PNG series of events took place. There is no law of eminent domain in PNG; it was forbidden by their constitution. Land was and is owned by the traditional land owner, which means that almost every village owns the land it is on and the hunting preserves near by and any other land it could claim as "traditionally" owned. The mine operators would have to deal with each individual village or groups of villages who owned land which they needed for a right-of-way. They would have to pay for the land as well as the road construction. Furthermore, the operators wanted to use the Fly River for transportation, but had to negotiate a right-of-way at the point on the river when they had to move their copper and gold inland. These villages behaved like the "Robber Barons" along the Rhine River; they exacted a toll every few miles along the river. It is this kind of approach to land which has discouraged investors from trying to develop PNG. Most of the villages operate in a completely democratic fashion. Every adult male has to agree with a proposition; in some villages, it is the adult females that all have to agree. One "no" vote kills the proposition.

Rabaul is the capital of New Britain. It is the most prosperous part of PNG. For years, people had been trying to extend the runway at Rabaul airport, which only existed because the Japanese had build it during WWII. Otherwise, it would have never been built; the Japanese didn't really care about PNG's mores and habits and culture; they just built the runway - as we must have done in similar circumstances. But because the tribes around it would not approve the extension of the runway, no jet aircraft could land at Rabaul - I am not referring to large

airplanes like a 747 or a 707, but rather planes like a fifty seat Fokker - a turbo-jet. Only propeller driven planes could land at Rabaul. It was weird. That was typical of PNG; progress was very hard to come by.

Q: Did we have any issues with the PNG while you were ambassador?

FELDMAN: We did, but let me just add one more anecdote. Shortly after I arrived, I was told it was time to present my credentials to the Governor General, who had the marvelous name of Sir Tory Locoloco. Tory had been a high school teacher before becoming Governor General; he was one of the most educated in PNG. As I said earlier, the average educational level of the cabinet members was two years of high school and of parliamentarians was four or five years of elementary school. The Australians had not built a public educational system until sometime in the 1950s. Prior to that, education was left to the missionaries who if they didn't develop a school in a particular village or area would leave the indigenous people entirely unschooled. The University was established in 1972-73 - another heritage of Australian colonialism.

I was told that I was expected to dress appropriately - a dark blue suit, shirt and tie. Furthermore, a limousine would be sent to fetch me. At the appointed time, an elegant Daimler drew up in front of the embassy. I entered and was driven to the Governor General's residence. I was introduced to Sir Tory Locoloco, who was wearing shorts and a shirt torn on one shoulder. He was also drunk, even though it was only 10 a.m. I gave my brief speech on how happy I was to be in PNG; I then handed the recall letter of my predecessor and my own letter of credence. Then Tory gave his own welcoming speech, slurring something like this: "Mr. Ambassador, I want you to know that although we are a dark-skinned people, we are not like Africans. Oh, no. We are a happy people. Mr. Ambassador, you must understand that we are not like African people. We are a very happy people! Thank you."

Q: What about the presentation of your credentials for Solomon Islands?

FELDMAN: I was concurrently ambassador to the PNG and Solomon Islands. About a week or two after the Port Moresby presentation, I went to Guadalcanal, the main island which is the home of the capital, Honiara. I landed at Henderson field, named after a Marine flier who was shot down during WWII. In the VIP room at the terminal, his picture is prominently displayed. On the beach areas on Guadalcanal, there are signs which mark the spots of the various engagements undertaken by the Americans in their invasion of the island, then occupied by the Japanese. The major battles sites are all marked out. The Solomon Islanders are very proud of their efforts to assist the U.S. Marines - and later the Army which replaced the Marines.

After landing, I was taken to my hotel, named the Mendana. It was a charming hotel with a huge veranda looking out on Iron Bottom Bay, which is named that

because of the large number of sunken ship that rest on the bottom of the Bay. The rooms were like those one might find at a Motel 6, but the gorgeous veranda made it quite enticing. The food was very good; there were flowers all over; it made for a very happy stay.

I was to present my credentials to the Governor General. I promptly blotted my copy book. I had found out that one major occupation in these places was to take photographs. On the evening I arrived, the sunset was just magnificent, but it wasn't framed quite right from the veranda. The Mendana adjoined the grounds of the residence of the Governor General. So I climbed over the fence with my camera and found a suitable spot for a pictures, which I still have at home. After taking the pictures, I hopped over the fence to the hotel.

The next day I went to present my credentials. He greeted me and said that he was now welcoming officially, since I had been an unofficial guest the night before. So I apologized profusely, but it was not a wise way to start a relationship.

I found it very interesting to compare the Solomon Islanders and the Papua New Guineans. In PNG, when the nationals - that is the term they use for themselves - got drunk, which was frequently, they started fighting. In Solomon, when the indigenous got drunk, which was less frequent, they went to sleep. I attribute that to the principal difference between British and Australian colonialism. Honiara is a town of about 20,000 people during the week; on week-ends the population would drop to 10-12 thousand because people would return to their native villages. The islands were pretty much unspoiled; there was very little economic activity. There were some sugar plantations and they raised some palm oil and cocoa; no coffee because there were no highlands. The total population on the islands was less than 400,000 people. There were a lot of islands and some were just incredibly beautiful.

Q: What about the government?

FELDMAN: It was British style, with the civil servants much better trained and better educated than PNG. The British had developed a public school system; they were far better colonialists than the Australians. The Australians tended to view PNG as the northern frontier; PNG was the equivalent of Dodge city of 1875. The British, on the other hand, were experts at running colonies and did that well. So Solomon was far better administered by people who were much better educated than their PNG counterparts. The government functioned with very little corruption. I think Solomon Islands are a very neat little place.

The problem was that they had no resources, except fish and the cocoa, sugar and palm oil. It got some international assistance, some from the Asia Development Bank (ADB). But most of the population are subsistence farmers and I am afraid that is all they ever going to be. For procurements that take cash, they basically have to depend on hand-outs from the outside world - from Britain, the UNDP,

UNICEF, the ADB and other UN agencies. There were and are a lot of Peace Corps variants - ours, the Japanese, the Australians, the New Zealanders, the Canadians, the Germans, the French. The same thing is true for the PNG. One of things we did while I was there was to sign an agreement which would allow a U.S. Peace Corps contingent into the country.

We were fortunate to have a very good Peace Corps director. One of the first things she did was to decide that all the various efforts needed some coordination. She started the first weekly coordination meeting attended by all foreign government contingents working in the PNG. They talked about what they were doing so that their efforts could complement each other rather than over-lap.

Q: What was your impression of the PC efforts both in the PNG and Solomon?

FELDMAN: It is hard to say. They did good work, but they worked at the margins. The problems of development in places like PNG or Solomons are so deep seeded - endemic alcoholism; a clan dominated society which requires 100% agreement, as I explained before; the wontok tradition, which means if anyone acquires a certain amount of wealth, by custom, they have to share it with all their relatives. So a surplus can never be accumulated which could be invested in some productive enterprise. Occasionally, some one in the highlands, after a good year growing cocoa and coffee, would accumulate enough money which he used to buy some equipment - before the wontoks descended on him. That increased his productivity, but didn't happen often.

So the international Peace Corps-like efforts were really limited in what they could achieve. In Solomons, the challenge was a little different - the wontok system did not exist and there was no endemic warfare as took place in PNG's highlands. But it lacked resources. There are essentially no basic cash crops on Solomon Islands, except those I mentioned earlier. So there wasn't very much one could do. A PC volunteer could teach English or help develop a rudimentary health system in villages. At my insistence, the PC and the AID contractors on the islands focused on bringing water to villages that didn't have any. This was quite successful. We did this using easily maintainable pumps and PVC pipes. That was our major contribution to PNG's development.

Q: Did you have any problems with the semi-independent status of the Peace Corps?

FELDMAN: I didn't have any problems because I didn't try to run it. We would meet periodically and talked about what the development priorities should be. The Peace Corps director would tell me that he had people who were skilled in certain areas, but who might not be competent in some priority area. So she was limited in some respects by the skills of her volunteers. We would then agree on what the priorities would be within the Peace Corps' capabilities. That worked out reasonably well and I had no problems with the Peace Corps.

Q: You were going to mention your destroyer friend.

FELDMAN: This was an matter of just getting around. I should mention that PNG, if placed on a map of Europe, it would cover an area from Spain to Poland. It is a huge expanse of islands - and mostly water. I think in this huge area, there may have been as much as 10,000 miles of roads. So we had to use the air to get around. There are 19 provinces in PNG; every one had a bishop and every bishop had a plane. I learned from the start that the way to visit the country was to call the local Catholic bishop and say :"My Lord Bishop, I was planning to visit your area." The bishop would invariably welcome me and ask me to stay with him. I would thank him for his hospitality and then ask him whether he could send his plane to pick me up. That is how I got around the country - in addition to being efficient, it also saved our travel budget, which was very limited in any case.

My favorite flight was made when Dick Holbrooke, the assistant secretary for Asia and Pacific Affairs, came to visit PNG. Dick wanted to see the country and particularly Sepik River area, which was famous for its carvings. So I called the bishop of Wewak and asked him to send his plane, which was a Dornier spotter plane - a plane that Australian troops had captured from Rommel's forces in the desert of North Africa during WWII. It had a huge wing-spread and a huge bubble canopy that could seat four people. Unfortunately, the plane could not fly from Wewak over the mountains to get to Port Moresby. We took a commercial plane into Wewak and then got into the bishop's Dornier to fly into the hinterlands. The plane flew 600-700 feet above the ground at about 85-90 miles an hour. So we had a marvelous view of the countryside. Holbrooke was just enchanted. After we landed, we got on a boat and leisurely sailed down the Sepik; it was a great trip.

I should mention another air-trip that I also took with Holbrooke on that visit. I think I mentioned that my wife Laurie had arrived two or three months after my arrival. She had managed to become the PNG representative for an AID contractor, The Foundation for the People of the South Pacific. As the representative, she traveled throughout the country starting village self-help projects, chiefly for women - e.g. chicken incubators, pigs, etc. She also subsidized vocational training in elementary and high schools. So she was frequently on the road - she had a much bigger travel budget than I had and didn't have to depend on bishops or the planes of the MAF (the Protestant equivalent called the "Missionary Air Fellowship"). While Holbrooke was in PNG, I borrowed a Beechcraft King-air from my next door neighbor, the ambassador to Indonesia. Technically, we were supposed to share that plane - I could have it one month out of the year. In any case, we took the plane, which was flown by a couple of air force pilots, and headed for New Ireland because the then foreign minister, Noel Levy, was from there. At the time, he was home campaigning for his parliamentary seat in an upcoming election in his district. Just before we left, I got a call from the permanent secretary of the foreign ministry, asking whether he might be able to come along to Rabaul. I told him that that would be fine; we

would stop there on the way to New Ireland. Then he asked whether he could bring some one with him. That made me wonder and I asked who it was that he wanted to bring. It turned out that the extra passenger was a “native healer” who was to attend to his very ill brother who was not improving under the care of a western-educated doctor. As a last resort, he wanted to try the “native healer” who was quite famous in PNG. I said, “okay.” So we took off with Holbrooke, my wife, the permanent secretary, the “native healer” and myself. We dropped the two off at Rabaul and then went on to New Ireland.

When we arrived, Holbrooke of course was the first to deplane. He was welcomed by the foreign minister and the governor of New Ireland. Then I came down the plank and got a greeting. The Laurie followed and she was really welcomed; they were truly delighted to see her again. Her program was funding the entire vocational training program in the province’s high school. Holbrooke turned to me and said, ”I am so glad that we made you the ambassador here!” After a few weeks I called the permanent secretary and asked him about his brother. I was told that he was completely cured. I asked what had happened and was told that the “native healer” ran his hands up his brother’s back and discovered that some how two wooden screws had gotten into his kidneys; once he had removed them, the brother got much better. PNG was that kind of place!

Now let me go to your question about the destroyer. Sometime in 1980, the U.S. Navy had sailed a task force - cruiser with destroyer escorts - right through Solomon Islands. They hadn’t asked for permission to do so; they had not even given notice; the navy had just proceeded. A helicopter had been launched from the cruiser which had buzzed the local school and frightened the children. I assume that because that because islanders didn’t wear much clothing, some pilot decided to take a close look at some topless teachers. Not surprisingly, the Solomon Islands government was aghast and protested strongly. I was summoned to Honiara to receive the protests. The Solomon were really angry and made their views known in Washington as well.

This happened just a few weeks before the Solomon’s national day. I sent a message to CINCPAC suggesting that it sent a ship and a band to honor the national day and thereby try to atone somewhat for the unfortunate actions of its task force. I received a message saying that CINCPAC did not have a band it could despatch, but that it could send one of its most modern destroyers which they would open to the public. It would also put on shore a working party to fix up anything that needed to be fixed - playgrounds, schools, buildings, etc. I sent a message to the governor general making this offer; it was readily accepted.

So everything was arranged including my boarding the ship at Port Moresby to be ferried to Solomons. The ship was the “USS Kincaid” - at the time, one of the most modern destroyers in the fleet. Laurie and I boarded, as did Laurie’s parents who were visiting at the time. I should mention that my father-in-law, Bernie Sherman, had been a navy corpsman during the Korean war. He was proud of his

service and fascinated by navy things. I don't think Bernie ever took me seriously as a son-in-law until I was piped aboard the "USS Kincaid" - with all the ceremony that the navy gives to a VIP. The captain gave up his cabin for Laurie's and my use; that also impressed Bernie greatly. We were on board for about two days until we got to Honiara, where the ship made a major impression; it was the largest ship that had docked in that harbor in a long time. It anchored right off the Mandana Hotel; it was just delightful. The sailors went ashore, fixed up some playgrounds, re-roofed some buildings. They were welcome guests at the national day ceremonies. Everybody had a marvelous time and we atoned for our sins.

Q: Any other comments you want to make about PNG and Solomon Islands?

FELDMAN: There is one other matter that I should mention. Both the Papua New Guineans and the Solomon Islanders were inherently fond of the U.S.; they had fond memorist of WWII. They regarded themselves as long time allies of the U.S. In fact, one of the reasons the Solomon Islanders were so upset by what our navy did was that they felt a very close relationship to the U.S.; they had, as I mentioned, preserved an impeccable and visible record of our battle for Solomons. Sometime veterans would come on sentimental journeys; they would be guided up to "Bloody Ridge," shown where the U.S. and Japanese forces had been, etc. The PNG regarded itself as well as having been a U.S. ally.

Part of the heritage of WWII was cargo cults. They were still very big even when I was in PNG. In most of the local religions in PNG, what ever existed in the physical world had been made by their ancestors in the spiritual world; their ancestors were viewed as very beneficent spirits who had sent the things in the material world - the fish, the coconut palms, the betle palms. All that was productive had been put on earth by the ancestors. But all of sudden, the Australians arrived on the scene, with all the goods contained in cargo crates that had never been seen before - everything from desks and chairs and table lamps to power and gas stations. It had all come by ship. There seemed no connection between the manufacturing of a car in a factory and the car that was off-loaded from the ship.

The first thought was that the Australian ancestors were far more powerful than the Papua New Guineans' ones. The PNGers thought that was a very unhappy conclusion, but one that had to be accepted. The next thought was that that was not the case; it was decided that the PNG ancestors were just as powerful as the Australians and that what was being off-loaded had in fact been made by the Papua New Guinean ancestors. The Australians were just powerful magicians who had found a way to divert the cargo to themselves. It had always been intended for the PNG, but had been diverted to Australia. That led to the thought that it was essential to find the magic spell that would allow the cargo to flow to PNG directly. There were a lot of shamans who would announce that they knew the magic formula. All the Papua New Guineans had to do was to pay the shaman and he would reveal the magic formula. Some didn't demand money; they just

wanted obedience. That started the cargo cults.

There was another variety of cargo cults, which people watched what the Australians did and then emulated them. The Australians sat in offices, moving pieces of paper around on their desks and they barked instructions on telephones. Some shamans would therefore have their tribe build a desk and a chair and a wooden telephone and they would imitate the Australian office worker. None of their efforts however brought them the cargo. Then came WWII. That brought American ships to PNG; they also unloaded cargo. Some of the American crew members and troops were black. That complicated the challenge because it was not only white folk that had cargo, but blacks as well. That gave even greater impetus to finding out how PNG might get its own cargo.

There was a cult called John Frum that grew up after WWII. The Americans after the war had just abandoned all the things they had brought with them and left them in PNG. So the new cult focused on bringing the Americans back with their cargo, so that could also be given away. In New Hanover, another PNG island, the natives despaired of ever learning the formula - or ever getting it right. They decided that what was needed was an American magician. They sent a cable to the U.S. government sometime in the 1970s offering to buy Lyndon Johnson. They had collected $10,000 and were prepared to pay that for LBJ so that he would come to PNG to make cargo. By the time, I got to PNG, there were only vestiges of these cults; they were dying out. Actually, the Papua New Guineans discovered a new way of getting the cargo. They filled out grant forms. They would get a grant from AID or the Peace Corps or the Australians, or the British or the Japanese and used it to buy a cargo. That was a sort of a cult; eventually the aid givers became a little more sophisticated and began to turn down some of the more imaginative schemes that the Papua New Guineans had dreamed up, which was essentially to get money which would then go for who knows what. By the time my wife arrived, "The Foundation for the People of the South Pacific" had chosen village women as their primary target group because they were least likely to just abscond with the grants. It was also a way of enhancing the women's status since finally they were able to own something in their own right - the pigs and chickens and the money they got from raising them.

I should add one thought, although this came to me from someone else and I cannot vouch for its accuracy. When the missionaries came to PNG at the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th, they began to translate the Bible into local languages. That was very difficult because there were not entirely satisfactory translations for many phrases. One in particular, I was told, was "beast of burden." The largest native animal found in PNG was a pig. That is hardly descriptive of "beast of burden." So the missionaries used the word "wife" to portray a "beast of burden." That tells you something about what the position of women had been in PNG.

Q: Why did you leave Papua New Guinea?

FELDMAN: The problem of being the American ambassador in PNG with a total staff of 9 Americans and 15 locals is that there was very little to do. It was pretty boring. My principal concern was keeping my staff sane and not going crazy from boredom. That was not easy. We had a tandem couple, the consular and administrative officer were wife and husband; he bought himself a broken down bi-plane that he began to fix. Years and years ago, when Art Hummel was in Burma, I asked him once what he did to while away his time. He said he had found an old Jaguar that he restored. In our case, the administrative officer went one better; he went to work on an old bi-plane. I think he enjoyed it; at least it gave him something to do.

The only interesting thing to do in PNG was to travel. I must have visited all the 19 provinces at least once and often more. Laurie, as I said, had a large travel budget and many times I just went along with her - on her budget, saving money for travel for the staff. One day, while back in the States on consultations, I was wondering around the halls of the Department and bumped into an old friend, Nick Platt. He was then the senior deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau for International Organizations (IO). He asked me whether I would like an interview with Jeane Kirkpatrick for a job on her UN staff. By this time, the Stone Age primitive and penis gourd in feathers had become rather stale. So I said to Nick that I would be happy to have the interview.

So the meeting was arranged and at the appointed time I presented myself at Ambassador Kirkpatrick's suite. Just as I was entering the suite, a woman came out of an inner office and addressed two or three young men standing there by saying :"No, no, no. I absolutely refuse. I will not wear this thing. Take it away!" Then she noticed me and asked: "Are you Ambassador Feldman?" I said, "Yes, ma'am." She then turned to the men and said, "This ambassador has waited a long time to see me and I will see him now and I will not bother with this." I was then ushered into the office where she asked me to take a seat.

She looked at me and said, "You are probably wondering what this is all about." I nodded and she continued, "They have a bullet-proof raincoat that they want me to wear. It is very heavy and very uncomfortable. As you heard me, I will not wear it." Then there was a long pause; I was wondering what I should say. Then she continued: "I guess I was pretty rough on them, wasn't I?" I admitted that she had come on a little strong. Then she asked me what I thought. I hemmed and hawed a little bit and then suggested that she just might want to try the coat or at least have them carry it behind her, so that if needed she could put it on immediately. So she then went to the door and said, "Come back and I'll try on your damn raincoat!" As far as I know, she never wore it.

Jeane and I got along famously in the interview and she asked whether I wanted to go to work for her. I said that I would like that, but that I would be interested in knowing what job she had in mind. She said that there were two possibilities: one

was in New York at the UN Mission as a sort of DCM and the other was in Washington to run her office there - since she was a cabinet officer she had her own office in Washington. I told her that I wasn't quite sure; the idea of being a DCM again after being an ambassador wasn't terribly appealing. What I didn't understand was that when Kirkpatrick referred to DCM she was talking about an ambassador in charge of running the Mission. I told her that I would prefer the job in Washington. She said she would try to work it out.

I should mention that during my interview I remembered that she just had recently fired Marshall Brement, a former ambassador. I asked her what had happened. She told me not to worry about him; she would see to it that he got a very good job. I said that I really wasn't interested in her qualities of mercy, but that I didn't want to make the same mistake. She told me that he kept implying and occasionally saying, "Little lady, with my brains and your fame, we will go far!" That sounded exactly like Marshall.

I returned to PNG and about two or three months later I got a call from Personnel asking me whether I would accept the job of chief of Kirkpatrick's Washington office. I said I would. So a few months later we returned to Washington and I started that job. The job in New York went to Bill Sherman who had been the DCM in Tokyo. He was a great Foreign Service officer and one of the nicest people I had ever met.

I said my goodbyes to everyone in PNG. Laurie got very lucky. One day while we were still in PNG we received a phone call from someone who was staying at the local Travel-Lodge; it turned out to be I.M. Pei, the famous architect. He was there with Nicholas Salgo, a friend. The two of them had just returned from a trip on the Sepik River and were very ill - intestinal problems. They asked whether I could recommend a doctor. There weren't really very many good doctors, but there was a WHO doctor who I thought would know something about such diseases. He was my secretary's boyfriend. She was an unusual person who could write with both hands. Occasionally she could even do that simultaneously. It was truly amazing to watch. So the WHO doctor dispensed the appropriate medicine to the two men and their spouses. Salgo gave me his calling card; he was at the time the chairman of the board of the Watergate Corporation. He had put that complex together. So Laurie and I got a junior suite at the Watergate Hotel when we came back. Furthermore, we were invited to a couple of events at the Watergate. At one of them, we met Sidney Dickstein, who was the lead partner at a major Washington law firm - Dickstein, Shapiro and Morin. He asked what we were going to do and I explained what my new job was going to be. Laurie said that she hoped to go to law school, but unfortunately the application period for Georgetown had closed. It would not accept her application. She added that a couple of years earlier she had been accepted by the Cornell Law School after getting some humongous score on the LSAT. Dickstein said that he happened to be on the board of directors of Georgetown and would see what could be done. A week or so later, Laurie was enrolled.

Q: Tell us a little bit about your job working for Jeane Kirkpatrick?

FELDMAN: The trouble with the Washington office job was that it was a non-job. In theory, I was supposed to represent her at Washington meetings that were on issues of interest to her. In reality, that happened to be impossible. Jeane liked to play her cards close to her chest; typically, she would come from New York, I would go to the airport to meet her with a car, we would go to whatever meeting she was supposed to attend - sometime I would be invited to join her, most often I would just sit in the car waiting her to come out of the meeting. Then we would drive off to somewhere else. Sometimes she would fill me in on the meeting she had just attended, sometimes she was so busy getting ready for the next meeting that she didn't have time to review the last one. In short, it became impossible to represent her views in any meaningful way.

Most of the time, I couldn't reach her on the phone in New York. She was just too busy. Furthermore, the phone was not secure. I didn't want to go down the hall to use a secure phone. So the assignment became rather difficult. The only interesting time was during the General Assembly meetings when Jeane would invite me to join her delegation in New York. Then I would represent the U.S. either in the 3rd Committee (human rights) or in the 4th Committee (decolonization). But even there I was sort of a fifth wheel in the sense that during the normal course of a year, there were people on the U.S. delegation that followed these subjects closely and did represent the U.S. in those committees. For example, Carl Gershmin, now the president of the National Endowment for Democracy, was really the 3rd Committee expert; there was also an expert on the 4th Committee. So I was mostly a fill-in. Occasionally, the UN Secretary General would convene an ad hoc committee and Jeane would ask me to represent her on that. She was really very kind; she knew that I was unhappy and bored.

She encouraged me to travel. Apparently the UN delegation had an adequate travel budget in those days. So if there was a UN meeting that I wanted to attend, I pretty much got to go. I did a lot of those. Jeane would also stick me on delegations which she thought needed the attention of an experienced hand along the political appointees who made up the delegation. That was pretty entertaining; I got to go the annual meetings of the commission "On the Status of Women"which met in Vienna. That became one of my favorite places. I got to go the "Human Rights" commission meetings in Geneva, which was not one of my favorite cities because, at least in those days, met from the last week in January to the first or second week in March. That was a perfectly awful time of year in Geneva - fog, rain, cold. The *per diem* was never sufficient to pay for a room in a decent hotel or to buy a decent meal.

So time dragged. Occasionally, I would accompany Jeane on one of her trips. On one memorable occasion, we went to Israel and Egypt, which included a side tour to Luxor and the Valley of Kings. We went on a major trip through East Asia in

1983, I think. We went to China - Beijing, Shanghai, Suchow - and to the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. There was an absolutely marvelous moment in the Philippines when Marcos, the dictator, arranged a formal dinner in Jeane's honor at the presidential palace. I remember it well because I had the opportunity to dance with Imelda. The after-dinner toast by Jeane was one of the things I will always remember.

There had been some recent by-elections in the Philippines for their Congress. Interestingly enough, a close crony of Marcos, and a cabinet member had actually been defeated. So Jeane began her toast by saying that the essence of democracy was that one did not always get to win; sometimes one loses. In a democracy, the voice of the people is accepted and the loser steps down. She said that she was delighted to see that is what recently had happened in the Philippines - not that she was happy that the crony had been defeated, but that she was encouraged because he had accepted the people's decision. Then she went on to say that she was reminded of a story about Benjamin Franklin and the ending of the drafting session of the U.S. Constitution. Franklin was asked by the woman after the session ended what kind of government the drafters had given the U.S. He said, "A democracy, ma'am, if you can keep it." Jeane said that that was the essence of democracy; it was necessary for every generation to keep it. To enounce these words in front of Ferdinand Marcos in that palace, I thought was one of most remarkable occurrences I had ever witnessed. I don't know how many people know this story, but I have always thought that her words were among the best she ever spoke.

From the Philippines, we went to Singapore. Among other things, we had a session with Lee Kwan Yew. It was supposed to last for a half an hour; it turned out to be a meeting of an hour and twenty minutes, with Lee, as was his want, talking most of the time. As we were leaving, I said to Jeane: "That man is marvelous. He should be secretary of state." She gave me a withering look and said: "He should be president."

I always tried to get Jeane to tell me what she thought of Ronald Reagan, but she never would. She always changed the subject. I don't know whether that was significant.

Q: What were your impressions of the relationships between the UN Mission and the Department?

FELDMAN: I think there are always tensions between these two entities. It is sort of institutionalized by the fact that presidents usually, starting with John F. Kennedy, have designated the ambassador to the UN - our permanent representative - as a cabinet member. That puts the permanent representative in a rather awkward position in his or her relationship with the Department. Theoretically, the assistant secretary for IO gives directions to our UN mission, but it is not possible for any assistant secretary to give directions to a cabinet

officer. That was certainly Jeane's view; she was not going to take directions from a mere assistant secretary. This organizational arrangement led to a very acrimonious relationship between Elliot Abrams, the assistant secretary, and her. Actually, Abrams was the son-in-law of Jeane's very good friend, Norman Pod Horerz. The two of them used to be on very good terms. But no sooner had Abrams decided that he would give instructions to Kirkpatrick, the friendship came to an end. When Greg Newell, who was in his early thirties, became the assistant secretary for IO, tried to do the same, he ran into the same resistance. Jeane was not going to take directions from any thirtyish person, even if he was an assistant secretary.

Jeane's relationship with Alexander Haig was also acrimonious, to say the least. They despised each other. Jeane did not get along terribly well with George Bush, the then vice president. She thought he was a rather "dim bulb." She did not suffer "dim bulbs" gladly and usually manages to let them know her views. I should mention that this was also my view of Bush, with whom I worked with while working on the issue of dual China representation, which I described earlier.

She got along reasonably well with George Shultz. They were not big buddies, but at least there was not a constant battle as there had been between her and Haig.

Q: How did that relationship effect your relationships with the bureaus in the Department?

FELDMAN: It placed me in a very anomalous position. As far as the Department's bureaus were concerned, I was Kirkpatrick's spy. It was well known that she was not getting along with the secretary of state (when it was Haig) or the IO assistant secretary. So I was generally regarded as an interloper by my colleagues in the Department, while the people that Jeane had hired for the UN Mission looked upon me with some suspicion because I was a State Department member. I was in a position to be regarded with deep suspicion by both sides.

I should mention some of the people on Jeane's staff. She had Chuck Lichtenstein, who was the alternate permanent representative, with the rank of ambassador. Chuck was Jeane's long time friend who had been involved in Republican politics going back to the Nixon days. He was involved in the first Nixon presidential campaign in 1960. He worked for Goldwater in 1964. Chuck and I became very close friends. Our politics were totally dissimilar; he was a very conservative, right wing Republican; however, he was very charming and did not regard people with views opposed to his as traitors. He is willing to discuss the differences and does not despise those who may disagree. He has a marvelous gift of gab. As I said, we became very good friends.

She also had working for her Jose Sorzano, who had come to the United States as

a refugee from Cuba. He put himself through school and ended up teaching at Georgetown University where he met Jeane. When she was appointed permanent representative, she brought Jose along with her to New York. He was also an ambassador. His wife Shannon became the Mission's administrative officer. I must say that I did not get along well with either of them; most of the permanent staff had problems with them.

The deputy permanent representative after Marshall Brement was Ken Adelman. Ken is a very interesting and amusing guy; he is one of the members of the "Baker Street irregulars" - the group that venerates Sherlock Holmes and which has memorized most of the Conan Doyle books. Ken was a little strange in many ways. He was an eccentric at times; let's say he was a very unusual deputy permanent representative. His presence created some problems which were ultimately resolved when he left to become the head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA.) - a job that Jeane got for him. Adelman was replaced with Sorzano, unfortunately for me.

She also hired Alan Keyes, who had been a mid-career Foreign Service officer. She had met Alan before her appointment as permanent representative in India while she was there on a USIA speaking tour. Keyes was her control officer. He was a very conservative African American and a very good talker - he gives a very fireish speech. She wanted to appoint Keyes as the U.S. ambassador to ECOSOC. The Department said that a mid-career officer could not be appointed as ambassador. It said that if he resigned from the Foreign Service, then he could be considered for an ambassadorship - as a political appointee. And that is exactly what happened. I give Alan credit; he leaped into the unknown; when he resigned he had no assurance that the White House would in fact nominate him as an ambassador or that he would be confirmed. The odds were in his favor and it did happen as planned.

That was the team plus Carl Gershmin as the counselor of the Mission and Alan Gerson, who acted as Jeane's personal lawyer. There were government lawyers on the Mission staff, appointed by the Department's legal advisor, but she didn't trust them. She wanted her own lawyer; she thought that the two lawyers assigned to the Mission, who had been there for a long time, were too liberal and probably too tainted by having been at the UN for so long. Gerson shared many of her very conservative beliefs. He had an office in Washington as well as New York and would travel back and forth. His office in Washington as a matter of fact adjoined mine. I always found him a very amusing person with whom I had many congenial conversations.

I continued in this anomalous position when Chuck Lichtenstein decided that he had enough of New York - he never really liked the UN. Among other things, he was well known for one speech he gave to spoke UN ambassadors who had come to him to complain about the treatment they and their staffs were receiving at the hands of New York City and the U.S. He told them that if they were that unhappy,

they were welcome to leave and take the UN with them; he would wish them a fond adieu when they sailed into the sunset of New York harbor. This would have been geographically somewhat difficult since it literally would have had them sail up the Hudson, but the message was clear and that did not endear him to his UN colleagues. In any case, he got fed up and decided to resign at the end of 1983 or the beginning of 1984. He returned to Washington.

Jeane then asked me whether I would like to take Chuck's job. I readily accepted and moved to New York in the spring of 1984 to be the alternative permanent representative with the rank of ambassador. So I found myself in New York and took to it as a duck would take to water. I found that I had a real flair for the kind of multi-lateral diplomacy - if that is what you want to call it - that was practiced at the UN. Jeane had given me a terrific insight; she came to believe that the UN did not require multilateral diplomacy, as NATO might, but is in fact a legislature - particularly the General assembly. It operates like a legislature - like the Maryland State Assembly. It had political parties - or blocs - with strange names - e.g. the Organization of African Unity, the Islamic Conference States, West European and Others (to which we belonged). Sometimes there are odd over-arching political blocs like the Non-aligned Movement which is a super coalition of Third World blocs. These parties or blocs operate in the time-honored legislative practice of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." I quickly learned that the way to get things done was to practice that kind of diplomacy.

Jeane gave me multiple tasks. Chuck Lichtenstein had represented the U.S. in the Special Political Committee which deals primarily with disarmament issues. I didn't do that; rather I went to work on the 4th Committee (decolonization) and host country relations, which Chuck had done. This was the venue were all other UN missions had an opportunity to vent their frustrations with New York City and the U.S. I was also put in charge of the day-to-day operations of the Mission. I enjoyed all of these tasks. I was able in my relations with other missions - other than the small band of our friends - to play "good cop" against the "bad cops" - people like Sorzano and to some extent, Kirkpatrick herself.

I should mention that by 1984, Sorzano was the deputy permanent representative and Richard Schifter had joined the Mission as the deputy representative; Keyes was the ambassador to ECOSOC and I was the alternative representative. All of these people were in the habit of lecturing and indeed scolding the other missions. I listened politely. I should note that when a country is attacked in the UN, it has the "right of reply." Some of my American ambassadorial colleagues would attend some committee meeting or a plenary session and during the course of their remarks, would say something nasty about another country or groups of countries or missions. At the conclusion of their remarks, they would leave the meeting. That was simply bad form because then they could not hear the "right of reply." This habit was often noted and particularly in the case of Schifter who did make negative comments about other countries or leaders. I often stayed and listened to the "right of reply" which was not directed towards me, but towards one of my

colleagues who had left the room. That won me some friends.

I also became friendly with the city commissioner in charge of parking spaces. He could designate certain spots for "Diplomatic Use Only" on streets near and around foreign missions. So I could try to placate the other UN missions with those kinds of benefits. But most importantly, when I had to say something important, pointed, condign, or occasionally even mean, I emphasized that my points were not personal; I was never attacking the representative of a country; my remarks were directly exclusively toward that country's policies. That went over well and pretty soon I made some of the most amazing friends. I could be in a "Host Country Relations" committee to hear the Libyan representative give a very bitter diatribe against our treatment of its mission. They had purchased some property in Englewood, NJ and we had so limited their travel distances so that they could not use their property. So I listened to this diatribe; just by accident, the Libyan and I had arranged a lunch date for that day. So after he finished his vituperation and I had my "right of reply", the two of us walked arm-in-arm off to lunch much to the amazement of all who had heard the exchanges in the committee. That behavior is also noted and wins a lot of friends.

In a very short time, I was able to get the support of this committee for policies and actions it had rejected before. I was able to assemble a coalition which was able to defeat one of the innumerable resolutions attacking the U.S. and Israel for one "misdeed" or another. Once I even managed to defeat a resolution that simply attacked Israel and not the U.S. That was unheard of because resolution that attacked Israel would invariably sail through with enormous support. So during my time as alternative representative, I became the one in the U.S. mission who could sway his committee and the General Assembly. From time to time, for example, Alan Keyes would ask me to join him on some effort in which he was involved and to help him assemble a coalition which would give him a majority for whichever side of the resolution he was pushing.

Q: What about the other U.S. ambassadors at the U.S. mission?

FELDMAN: Certainly Sorzano never asked for my help. Jeane was very supportive and complimentary. She once told me that when she offered me the job, she had not anticipated how well I would perform - a somewhat strange compliment. But I was good at it.

Richard Schifter was a rather stiff and formal person. After he came to New York to become the deputy representative, he asked me what I allowed my secretary to call me; e.g. did I insist that I be addressed as "Ambassador Feldman" or "Mr. Ambassador" or what? I said he called me "Harvey" and when I told him that, he was in a state of shock. His jaw literally dropped at the thought that a secretary would address an ambassador by his or her first name. He was the one who developed a system of grading other UN missions on the basis of how often they had supported us, or had voted against us. I thought that was pretty silly and

feckless. But what made it even more egregious is that Schifter would tell other missions how they ranked on our list. Of course, that sort of behavior made my job easier because these missions would complain to me and I would listen sympathetically and calm them down.

The most fun I had, besides my coalition building efforts during the General Assembly, was during the pre-GA consultations with other UN missions. The five U.S. ambassadors would sort of divide the world and would go off like traveling salesmen with our sample briefcases filled with draft resolutions to consult with various countries about issues likely to arise during the up-coming GA meeting. I was assigned to East Asia, for obvious reasons; for unknown reasons, I was also assigned to the Caribbean countries. This practice had started even before I was assigned to New York; so every summer I would travel around the Caribbean at government expense. I went everywhere; I went St. Vincent, the Grenadines, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Dominica. That last one was interesting because in those days the prime minister was Eugenia Charles - later Dame Eugenia Charles. She was a close friend of Jeane's; so each time I went to the Caribbean I was supposed to stop off in Dominica. Laurie went with me on many of these trips. One time, after arrival in Dominica and my interview with Eugenia Charles, she asked me whether I had any plans for lunch. I told her that my wife was waiting for me at the hotel; she thought that was fine and that we would go pick her up and have lunch at her residence where she intended to make the lunch for us. We got into her limousine, drove to the hotel, picked up Laurie, drove to the residence where she cooked lunch. Unfortunately, she cooked what is locally called "mountain chicken" which are really frogs. Tried as I might, I just couldn't get it down even if the meal had been cooked by a prime minister!

I also represented the U.S. in the Trusteeship Council. To participate in that adequately, I thought I should visit all the little pieces of the earth which designated as "trusteeships." Most of the territories were under U.S. jurisdiction and mostly in the Pacific. So I went to all these places, including Saipan and Guam.

Q: What were the dynamics of the relationships between the political appointees and the career staff?

FELDMAN: For the most part, the relationships were not very good. As I mentioned before, the administrative officer did not have a good relationships with her staff. She had a short fuse and was given to chewing people out - loudly - in front of others. That of course did not endear her to her staff. Her husband, Jose, had much the same attitude. Both of them came into government when Reagan became president as part of the "Reagan revolution." So they were deeply suspicious of those they called "careerists." They used to talk among themselves as "not being captured" by the "building" - the State Department - or its career people.

On the substantive side, people like Jose Sorzano were not going to trust the work that the professional staff would prepare. The notes or documents prepared by that staff were viewed with great suspicions. A lot of mistakes were made because the political appointees ignored the advice of the professionals. Schifter was much better because he was very formal and a lawyer by training; he would prepare very meticulously for any undertaking in which he participated and that meant that he did rely on the work of his staff. Keyes was also given to mistrust and to berating his staff loudly in public. The UN mission was not a happy team.

The political counselor did get along with Jeane and Sorzano. He did that by accommodating to their views. The best work, I think, was done by Sally Grooms, the second person in the political section - later Sally Cowal, after her marriage, who then became our ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago. Sally was an officer on loan to the Department from USIA. She had had a long a good career in USIA. She was terrific. There were some good officers in the economic section also.

Q: Was Herb Reese there?

FELDMAN: Yes, he was. Herb retired while Jeane was the permanent representative. He was never really replaced. Other people were assigned from the legal advisor's office. One of them had been in the mission for a long time and was responsible for Security Council matters; he had a great store of knowledge. Jeane relied on Gerson, as I said, most lf the time. I had no role in Security Council matters; Jeane handled that primarily by herself.

Q: do you have any general thoughts about the UN and multi-lateral diplomacy?

FELDMAN: People have strange ideas about the UN. The public is disillusioned with the UN because it had started with wrong assumptions about the UN. It thought, thanks to propaganda perpetrated for many years, that the UN was the world's collection of great minds that would meet to reach pure and disinterested solutions to the world's problems. As Jeane pointed out and as I said earlier, the General Assembly is not that at all. It is a legislature which is political and operates on political processes. To some degree, that is also true of the World Court. Jeane was once asked whether the International Court of Justice was a apolitical body. She said that it was as apolitical as the process by which the judges are selected - a completely political process.

The General Assembly is politics. The Security Council is a little bit different. It has of course its political aspects, but it has a special mandate for maintaining international peace and security. The decisions of the GA are not international law; the decisions of the SC are. In addition to the GA and the SC, there is a whole constellation of UN bodies which do a lot of good work - the World Health Organization (WHO), under whose guidance small-pox has been eliminated from the world; the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has done some very good work - and at time has failed in part because it is always grievously under-

funded by the world. The basic institutions that run the world - the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Telecommunications Union, the Postal Union, the International Maritime Commission, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the World Meteorological Association - are absolutely required for running the world's business.

Q: If the UN didn't have them, some one would have to invent them.

FELDMAN: Right. We should always remember that these are the organizations that are the bread and butter of the UN - not the GA. Imagine what would happen if there were not International Civil Aviation Organization. These organizations are absolutely essential.

Q; What about the UN Development Program (UNDP)?

FELDMAN: The UNDP has had good years and bad years. A lot of problems for organizations like the UNDP, as well as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, is the hardening of institutional arteries. All have staff members who have been in the organizations for decades and after a while do not do much more beyond filling a chair and desk. Many of the UN bodies are staffed on the basis of a quota system; i.e. each country has to represented and the majority of the staff do not come from the major industrial countries. In my lighter moments, I used to say that the UN civil service existed to ease the unemployment problem of the Asian sub-continent; many of the international civil servants turned out to be Indian or Pakistani or Bangladeshi or Sri Lankan. They are disproportionally represented in the UN staff. I mentioned that I represented the U.S. in Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). We tried desperately to get more employees from the South Pacific into the ESCAP staff; that was fought tooth and nails by the ESCAP Secretariat which was located in Bangkok and headed by an Indian.

I was enjoying myself enormously in New York. I regarded myself as an inter-face between the staff and some of the more intemperate people in the ambassadorial suite. I managed to get considerable support for our initiatives, not only in the General Assembly, but in the various committee and commissions where I worked. Then early in 1985, Jeane announced that she was resigning. She was replaced by Vernon Walters. He came in with his own staff sometime in May or June - Herb Okun as the deputy Permanent representative, Joseph Verner Reed (from the Citicorp family) as deputy rep, Pat Byrne, a Foreign Service officer who was going to be ECOSOC ambassador and a friend of Walters from CIA days who was to replace me. I was told that there was no room for me.

So I was told that I was out, but as an act of kindness, I could stay on through the next General Assembly meeting as sort of special advisor. I accepted that, but I was told that would be the end of my service with the UN Mission. Actually, what the new group used me for was as a trainer for the new crew. Most of them didn't

have a clue. It was an interesting learning experience; I did not come away with very high regards for the Walters' team. I worked through the General Assembly; I continued to win lots of votes and got good things done to the degree I could.

On January 6, 1986, I retired from the Foreign Service. I had been offered a Limited Career extension which would have allowed me to continue. I was asked whether I would allow my name to be put on a list for the ambassadorship to Burma. I declined. I was then invited by Alan Keyes, then the assistant secretary for IO, to be his senior deputy. I turned that down as well. I decided that after 33 years in the Foreign Service the time had come to retire. In part, my decision was due to the fact that Laurie had graduated *magna cum laude* from Georgetown Law School. She had been hired by a New York law firm - Paul, Weiss, Rifkin, Wharton & Garrison as an associate. She was not about to go to Rangoon and didn't really want to return to Washington. Since there wasn't a job in New York anymore, I decided that the best move would be to retire.

Shortly after retirement, I became vice president at a think tank in New York which worked on arms control and disarmament issues - the Institute for East-West Security Studies. I worked there for about a year; my principal job was supposed to be the administrator of the Institute. The trouble was that the president, John Mroz (Slavic for "frost" and therefore known as Jack Frost) who was a terrific fund raiser and a great idea man, was also a great spender. My job was to try to get the Institute to live within its budget; I did that as best I could. I also put on a conference for them - one in Milan, which was great fun, and one in Talloires, France, which was even greater fun. I think by the end of the tour of 18 months, I actually got the Institute to live within its means, mostly by saying "no" to one Mroz project or another, which did not endear me to him. Once we were in the black, I was told that my services were no longer required. That was the end of that.

At the same time, I was approached by a Taiwan newspaper - the China Times - and was asked whether I would be interested in becoming a special correspondent for it. I asked what my duties would be. I was told that the China Times would deposit $1,000 every month in our checking account; in return they ask that I write two articles each month. I said that I thought I could manage that. That was the beginning of an eleven year career as a special correspondent for the China Times. We had a very happy relationship. Over time, the number of columns that I wrote were increased from two to three; in fact, I became a regular columnist. My compensation was increased accordingly. I covered the American Republican and Democratic nominating conventions in 1988 and in 1992 and in 1996. During the Gulf War, I had to file almost daily for a while, then weekly. After the war ended, the Times sent me on a marvelous trip. I went to Cairo, Riyadh, and Jerusalem to talk to people. That was fascinating.

Riyadh was the most fascinating. Chas Freeman was our ambassador; he was an old friend and colleague from China days, though we don't always agree. He

introduced me to various influential people. I remember calling on a member of the Royal Family at the Foreign Ministry. I asked him what role he thought Saudi Arabia could play in the new world order that President Bush had called for, particularly in promoting peace and justice in the Middle East. He asked me whether I was thinking of Saudi's relationship with Israel. I thought that one of the issues in which I was interested.

The Prince said that he needed to explain Saudi's fragile position. Saudi could certainly not be the first to recognize Israel; in fact, it couldn't even be the second or the third. But Saudi would be the first to enter into commercial joint ventures with Israeli companies.

I had a conversation at a dinner party that Chas took me with him. I was seated next to another senior government official. I had learned that King Fahd was the "guardian of the two holy places". I mentioned that and asked whether anyone had ever given thought, in this new era, of His Majesty becoming the guardian of a third holy place. He asked whether I was referring to Jerusalem. I said "yes" and that I was particularly thinking of the Al Aksa Mosque. I thought that the Israelis might well like that idea. He told me that the Saudis had enough trouble guarding the two sites for which it presently was responsible; they did not need a third!

I worked for the China Times for 11 years, as I have said, until last year. I also taught at New York University, where for a while, I had the exalted title of "Adjunct Professor of International Relations." I taught graduate seminars on international relations. Then, in late 1988 or the beginning of 1989, I was hired by the American Jewish Committee, as director of international relations. I did for a little more than a year and found it very interesting. In 1990, Laurie and I decided to return to Washington together with our new child who was born on the eighth day of the eighth month of 1988.

By the time he was two years old, we came to the realization that raising a child in Greenwich Village where we were living was not the best of ideas. Laurie had been offered a job in the Department's legal office and so we moved back to Washington. I continued to write for the China Times; I also joined a small consulting firm which had been founded by a group of retired Foreign Service officers called "Global Business Access." I worked there for a while although none of us were ever quite clear whether the firm was a hobby or a business. It never quite took off, but also did not quite fail. It still exists, although in an attenuated form.

In 1996, I was invited by the Heritage Foundation to become a senior fellow at its Asian Study Center. That is a part-time job. I arrange luncheon meetings with speakers, put on seminars; we just finished a whole day - from 9 a.m. to 10 p.m. - major conference at the Washington Hilton to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. During that day, we had four panels; three senators - Helms, Murkowski and Rockefeller - addressed the group; it was

attended by a number of representatives. It was a pretty good conference.

That sums up my career.

Q: A pretty good, I would say. Thanks very much for giving us this time.

End of interview