The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

JANE MILLER FLOYD

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the 6th of December 2004. This is an interview with Jane Miller Floyd. This is being done on behalf of the Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training. And I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Was Floyd your maiden name?

FLOYD: No. Floyd is my married name. Miller is my maiden name.

Q: Could you tell me when and where you were born and a little about your family?

FLOYD: I was born in Spokane, Washington on the 1st of November 1954. I'm the second of five children. My parents were Wilmot and Patricia Miller. Patricia was from Everett, Washington, although she was actually born in North Dakota. Wilmot was born and raised in Seattle, Washington, one of seven children. And while all of his siblings stayed in Seattle, he decided to get out of town and went to Spokane, all of 300 miles away. My siblings continue to reside on the West Coast. One remains in Spokane. Others are in Kent, Washington, Lemoore, which is outside of Fresno, California, and Moscow, Idaho.

Q: Well let's take the Miller side of the family first. Where did the Millers come from?

FLOYD: Northern Europe. Alsace-Lorraine, Ireland, a very mixed bag.

Q: Do you know sort of who came over sort of got your clan going in the States and from where?

FLOYD: Not with any degree of specificity. I know that both of my father's parents were native born Americans. They were not the immigrant generation. But how far back we have to go to find it, I don't know.

Q: Now well now, on your father's side, what were your grandparents? Were they from the . . .

FLOYD: Pacific Northwest, yes. My grandfather, Vincent E. Miller, was a longtime insurance and real estate person in the Seattle area.

Q: Your father, what sort of business was he in?

FLOYD: He was in the savings and loan business. Worked for Lincoln Savings and Loan, which then became Lincoln Mutual Savings, for his entire career. He was trained as a lawyer, never practiced.

Q: Did he go to university?

FLOYD: Yep. He went to Washington State University, although it was then Washington State College. Lifetime Cougar fan. He got his law degree from Gonzaga University in Spokane.

Q: On your mother's side, what was your mother's maiden name.

FLOYD: My mother's maiden name was Topp, although she is the closest immigrant. Her grandmother was the one who immigrated to the United States from Sweden. When my children ask of their ethnic identity, the largest dollop of blood they have is Swedish.

Q: And did her family come to the Northwest?

FLOYD: No. As I said, my mother was born in North Dakota. My mother's family emigrated from Sweden to North Dakota to join the huge Scandinavian population there. That was where my grandmother was born, where my mother was born. I would be hard pressed to give you the exact date when they moved to Everett, but it would be late-20s.

Q: Well how Scandinavian was your upbringing, or was it?

FLOYD: Oh, mostly holiday celebrations. Saint Lucia Day.

Q: Saint Lucia Day. Did you wear the crown?

FLOYD: Oh I never did. But we certainly decorated with Saint Lucia. And julekacke and every known Swedish pastry confection, all of which contain way too much sugar and way too much butter. But boy, they were good.

Q: You grew up basically in Spokane?

FLOYD: Except for a brief stay in Seattle as an infant, I didn't leave Spokane until I went to college.

Q: What was Spokane like from your memory?

FLOYD: A delightful place to grow up but a horrible place to be a teenager or young adult.

Q: Why is that?

FLOYD: Very small. Very insular.

Q: In elementary school, how did you find the schooling? The reading? And what did you do?

FLOYD: I had the advantage of a great deal of parental attention and probably good genes. I was always a very good student. And so school was a pleasure. Back in the days when it was one through eight in one school, and so a very community-based set up. It was a parochial school, Sacred Heart.

Q: So you grew up Catholic, is that correct?

FLOYD: That is correct.

Q: How about in elementary school, were you taught by nuns?

FLOYD: Absolutely.

Q: How was it?

FLOYD: It was only much later, sixth, seventh and eighth, when there was an increase in laity among the teacher.

Q: How did you find the nuns?

FLOYD: As varied as any other group of people. I have the benefit, if you will, of my oldest aunt was a religious, a Madame of the Sacred Heart, and so I knew nuns as aunts and as teachers and as basketball players. Also the nasty ones. Pretty much the same balance you would find any group of people.

Q: How about, particularly at the elementary level, were you a reader or not?

FLOYD: Oh absolutely.

Q: Do you recall any books or series that you particularly enjoyed?

FLOYD: Nancy Drew, Hardy Boys, and there was a group called the Happy Hollisters that my parents signed up for. They were children's mysteries and consumed within days of arrival. Probably ordered for my older brother but quickly passed down.

Q: How about at the family table? Was there much conversation at all?

FLOYD: With five children, there was always . . . I don't know if it was conversation or noise, but there was certainly talking.

Q: Did you get any feel for your family's sort of political interests or not? Or was there much interest?

FLOYD: It was clear that my father was a life-long Democrat and active in the local political party. My mother was a life-long volunteer. Worked in a number of community areas, and so it was a pretty, I guess, socially engaged, liberal discussion.

Q: Did you get any feel while you were growing up in Spokane about the outside world?

FLOYD: No. The outside world was going to Canada for hockey games. Maybe going three hundred miles across the state for holidays with relatives in Seattle and Everett. But passports, outside world, very little. My father did not speak of his time in military service during World War II. My mother's family spoke of their life in Sweden only as in "they left." So world view was school, city, maybe state, but beyond that it was a very distant horizon.

Q: Was Seattle sort of the sin city where . . . ?

FLOYD: Absolutely, the wet sin city.

Q: My daughter lives in Seattle.

FLOYD: One of my great heresies in my family was going to the University of Washington. Both my parents, all my siblings, all my siblings' spouses, had gone to Washington State. I went to the University of Washington, which is almost like converting to another faith.

FLOYD: How about high school? What sort of things were you engaged in there?

FLOYD: I went to Holy Name Academy, which was an all-girls high school, so there were no competitive sports, but played basketball and badminton intramural, participated in the debate team, officer in the pep squad and the student government, you know.

Q: How about academic? What sort of things did you find of particular interest?

FLOYD: Again, I was a good student. Graduated second in the class. So took most of everything but also looked for all the opportunities to study history.

Q: Any particular area of history?

FLOYD: It was a time in which Spokane - I can't say how broad it was – was discovering that history was beyond European history. So it was fun when they introduced into the curriculum a non-Western civilization course. That was fun.

Q: What about the ethnic mix around there? Was there much of one?

FLOYD: No.

Q: A few Norwegians or something?

FLOYD: If you were looking for someone to pick on, it was Native Americans, it was Mormons, but the Irish, Jewish, black options were not visible.

Q: How about fruit pickers and stuff like this? I mean, you know, the people from Mexico?

FLOYD: Not visible at all. Partly because I was an urban folk and partly because the agricultural community around Spokane tends to be more orchards – you're getting out into the apple area, or if you go south, you are into the wheat farmers – and for who, at least then, migrant workers were not an issue.

Q: Did you get any feel for that culture? Cause it's a big agricultural area.

FLOYD: No. It is. But it was not a part of my life. Later – what would be later? – late high school, early college, in part as the U.S. government began to re-examine its treatment of Japanese minorities during World War II, you just heard and read more about the Asian minorities in Washington State. Clearly, it was a bigger issue on the coast, in the Seattle area, than it was in Spokane. But it still came up.

Q: Did the Cold War intrude?

FLOYD: Only in the sense that I learned how to hide under my desk in first or second grade in air raid drills.

Q: Yes, I think is probably the unifying experience of most American kids of that era. When it came time for going on to higher education, what caused you to turn towards the University of Washington in Seattle.

FLOYD: It was specifically their Russian language department. Someplace along the line I got bit by the bug that I wasn't going to spend the rest of my life in Spokane and about the furthest away you could get – at least at that time, because there were not transportation links to the eastern part of the Soviet Union – I guess about the furthest away you could get was Russia, or the Soviet Union. Or China. And I probably recognized the limits of my brain cells in terms of learning a tonal language. So I chose the University of Washington. They had a very robust, a very active Russian language program and Washington State, which was the only other option ever presented to me, the year I graduated from high school had seventeen people graduate from their foreign language department, meaning all the languages that they taught. The University of Washington had about two hundred and fifty in their Russian department.

Q: Well had you had any feel at all for Russian prior to that?

FLOYD: No. I have only a limited idea of where it came out of. If I had to guess, I would say it was probably a backlash to the highly Western European-centric education world that I had seen so far.

Q: Growing up in parochial schools, had you gotten a good dose of Latin?

FLOYD: Yes. I took three years of Latin in high school.

Q: Which in a way is good preparation, but particularly for Russian which – I don't know what you call it – its endings are important.

FLOYD: It's a declined and conjugated language. So that, at least when someone tells you that the adjectives have to match in number, gender, and case, you say okay, without having to scratch your head as to what that means.

Q: You were at the University of Washington from when to when?

FLOYD: Entered the fall of 1973 and graduated December of 76.

Q: What was the University of Washington like?

FLOYD: Huge. It's the sixth largest city in the State of Washington. Thirty-thousand undergraduates. But the Russian language department was home from day one, and that provided a human-sized community to deal with. The university also ran something called the Russian House, which was a residential program with on-site two elderly – or mature, depending on your point of view – a Russian couple lived there so that Russian was the language that was spoken day-to-day.

Q: What did you see was the genesis of the Russian department at Washington?

FLOYD: Well, not only just academically, but there was a growing range of contacts out in the Pacific, be it fisheries research, be it military-to-military contacts, dealing with incidents at sea, there was just the beginning of that outreach. Russian ships came to the Port of Seattle and we would all trek down and drink with them. It's amazing how your language ability improves with vodka. The University of Washington was one of the recruiting sites for the United States Information Agency for exhibit guides for their cultural exhibits going to the Soviet Union, so there were always a lot of kids coming out of school to do that. The University also ran an excellent exchange program, care of the Council of International Educational Exchange.

Q: Did the faculty have any thrust? I mean, where were they coming from?

FLOYD: I eventually learned that they reflected very much the multiple waves of Russian immigration that had taken place. The folks whose families had come with the revolution, the folks who had come after the war, the folks who had come during the sixties, in term of the opening up, the trickling of people that came out when dissidents

and folks started to be kicked out rather than killed. And then a healthy chunk of the Jewish immigration, which had begun. And they each came with their own attitudes towards Russia as a nation and the Soviet Union as a country and government.

Q: I got a bit of that. I'm a graduate of the Army Language School back in 1951, where we had everything from the nephew of the Czar on up the line for that period of time, which was hard Cold War.

FLOYD: And would likely – depending on where their family had been on the social milieu of imperial Russia – I could see some interesting challenges between the Kerensky folks and the nobility folks.

Q: Oh yes. And we were, you know, getting people who had gotten out right after World War II also.

FLOYD: Oh, and they were very, very different.

Q: Did somebody tell you what this was all about? Where these people were coming from, or were you picking this up by osmosis?

FLOYD: Yes. Clearly osmosis helped. But also some exceedingly good – I'm going to call them American, but I mean that to say not Russian émigrés – scholars who could walk you through the waves and the various characteristics of them.

Q: Because I'm sure the ones that were picking the language could be extremely dogmatic. There's nothing like a Slav who knows what . . .

FLOYD: It was most amusing when you would get them in social settings and, just as liquor makes language capability grow, it also releases any limitations one might find on social graces.

Q: How was the Cold War played out? Because during this time, 73 to 76, what was happening on the Cold War?

FLOYD: One could argue that there was a certain increase in contacts, certainly commercial. Arms control agreements were being negotiated left and right.

Q: This was Nixon and detente, I guess.

FLOYD: Made my first trip to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1975, so that that degree of academic exchange was alive and well. Circumscribed, controlled, all those sorts of limits, but it took place nonetheless.

Q: What was your impression of the Soviet Union when you got there in 75?

FLOYD: I was quickly glad I was an American and knew I was going home. It was the summer of the Soyuz-Apollo joint space flight, and it was a bit amusing that the day of the launch all of the American students were herded into the dean's office to watch this launch, which for the Russians was the first time they had ever seen a live launch, and for jaded American college students it was the 937th one that was available to us, so we were incredibly blasé, while our Russian teachers and the administration in the university were like little kids. It was an interesting lesson in what you are exposed to affecting your attitude.

Q: Did you feel under controls when you were in the Soviet Union?

FLOYD: Oh, absolutely. Probably until the late 80s if not the early 90s, it was palpable. You could see your tails, the restrictions on travel in terms of trying to get through airports or even get tickets. They knew exactly where you were. You had to assume, and probably with validity, that rooms were bugged. Clearly phones were.

Q: Talking about this time as a student over there, did you get many opportunities to sit around the kitchen table and, you know, talk.

FLOYD: Students are students. You'll find each other. I'd only had two years of Russian so the conversation was obviously limited, but certainly. Because so many students had gone from the University of Washington, there was a certain degree of passing along contacts.

Q: What other courses were you taking? Were you getting a strong dose of international affairs?

FLOYD: It was a Russian language and literature degree which required not only the university's normal math, sciences, but also an appropriate amount of literature and a broader view of history.

Q: What about, looking beyond the Soviet Union, did you find that Seattle and the university was more of a place to pick up international events?

FLOYD: Oh absolutely. Not only international events, but cultural events, from the city of Seattle to what was available on campus it was ample. Art, ballet, orchestras, all of that sort of opportunity.

Q: Did you have any idea what you were going to do with all of this?

FLOYD: Yes and no. I did not know probably until graduation whether it was going to be in government or in the commercial sphere. Finished up quickly so that I could take a job with the United States Information Agency.

Q: You were there for three years, right?

FLOYD: Three and a half. Took a job with the United States Information Agency as an exhibit guide, again going back to the former Soviet Union.

Q: You did this when?

FLOYD: Most of 77.

Q: How did that prepare you for this?

FLOYD: They bring you to Washington for two weeks and some of it is language preparation, depending on what the exhibit is on. Part of it is the substance of what you are going to do. The exhibit I was on was about American photography, so they took us up to New York and took us to the International Museum of Photography and we had professional photographers along with us. We went to their studios to see their work.

Q: Well I must say, I can't think of a more fascinating thing to get involved.

FLOYD: I think the U.S. government was wise for its own internal purposes. At the time, there was no Peace Corps operation in the former Soviet Union, but the exhibits became a very fertile breeding ground for future diplomats, just as a lot of Africanists have some experience with Peace Corps, or Latin America folks. It is statistically improbable the number of folks that came out of exhibits and went into the Foreign Service.

Q: Where did the exhibit go and what was your impression of some of the areas?

FLOYD: We went to three cities. Ufa, which is out in the Ural Mountains.

Q: What's the name?

FLOYD: U-F-A, ufa. Which we often joked that "Ufa was too far."

Q: Did it stand for something?

FLOYD: No, that's the name. Then we went to Novosibirsk, which means new Siberia, which is out in the middle of Siberia. And then our last city was Moscow.

Q: What was some of your experiences in doing this? I would imagine that this would really attract an awful lot of people.

FLOYD: We had about twelve to fifteen thousand visitors a day, which was a major affront to your olfactory senses, but also just fascinating to see the curiosity of these folks. The actual photography equipment, the photographs, were a tool. We could have had rocks. I think the real interest was in actually seeing Americans. Had incredible incidences of where – when we were in Ufa you would have people come up and say thank you, thank you, thank you, thank you, thank you. And it turned out that what they

wanted to thank you for was that their family had survived on American spam through World War II.

As in any country, it was very interesting to get outside of the capital. Ufa is a reasonably good sized regional city. About four-hundred thousand people. But so distant from Moscow. There were any number of people who had never seen a real live American before. And the questions were – it was amazing how many of the questions were about prices. How much does bread cost? How much does a car cost? And just trying to convey to people the diversity of America, that I can't tell you how much a loaf of bread costs. Are we talking Wonder bread or gourmet wheat tops? Because for them, whether it was in Moscow or in Madagan, there were three different kinds of bread, and they were the same prices, regardless of where.

Q: I can remember when I was in Belgrade passing on to my Soviet colleagues elderly Sears and Roebucks catalogues. Well they just thought this was the greatest thing in the world.

FLOYD: Years later, when we were living in Siberia doing arms control, we had Sears and Penney catalogs, that's the way we kept the kids clothed. And one of the things people wanted to know was who could order from that catalog. There was a presumption that it was because I was a government employee that I had so much variety. And trying to tell them that anybody who had money, was one of those little things that just didn't fit in their gear case.

Q: Did you find that you were – particularly after hours – were the KGB types running herd on you and all? Or were there just too many of you?

FLOYD: Oh, they ran herd on us. And you could so clearly figure out who they were because the KGB had to import them to take care of us. They too were strangers. And the people you would meet locally would say "Who's that? He must be with you." "Yeah, he's with me, but he's not with us." So they did a very thorough job of following us. The concern was clearly always more for any Russian that would be prepared to talk to you. Worst case scenario for us was that we would be on the next plane out.

Q: How about the older generation? Did you find that there was a lot of interest there, or was it mainly younger people?

FLOYD: There were different interests. The younger people, for better or for worse, wanted something. They wanted your jeans, they wanted your magazines, they wanted something. The older generation really wanted to talk and in many ways were more interesting because they were more philosophical.

Q: This was the period of détente and you mentioned the Soyuz mission, the American-Soviet joint mission and all that. I mean it was a period of some optimism, I think. Were you picking this up from the Soviet people?

FLOYD: They were so glad to have us around. They loved the contact with the outside world. They would search out any example of previous contact. They loved it.

Q: Did you get a chance to get out and around at all?

FLOYD: While the exhibit shipped from one city to the next, because we only had single entry visas, we had to remain within the former Soviet Union, and it gave us a chance to play tourist. Between Ufa and Novosibirsk, I went back to Leningrad, went off to Estonia and then took the trans-Siberian railroad from Moscow to Novosibirsk.

Q: Despite the difficulties and all, were you sort of falling in love with the Soviet studies and . . .

FLOYD: Oh sure. Oh absolutely.

Q: I probably shouldn't use the term Soviet anymore, because it was Russian.

FLOYD: Yes and no. One of the most fascinating parts about it is those people who grew up only knowing Soviet-ness. And that wasn't all bad, the commonality, the pride – coming out of World War II – pride in the space program. Pride in the ability to – by hook or crook, it wasn't all voluntary – unite a country as large as the former Soviet Union. So I would decline to say that Soviet is an inappropriate or no-longer-in-use adjective. It has its own place in history.

Q: As I'm doing this oral history program, I started out in the 80s and all, and we're getting close to the point where I'll have to ask somebody "Could you explain what you mean by Soviet?"

FLOYD: Well to a certain degree you can just look at the kernels of the discussion between "Is it Saint Petersburg or Leningrad?"

Q: Did you get any feel at that time for the ethnic differences. Did you get a feel for the differences?

FLOYD: In any economy of scarcity, which is what the Soviet Union was, you always look for somebody to blame, somebody to be beneath you. And in the former Soviet Union, it was definitely their Central Asian colleagues, who they called yellow and who they hated, beat up, looked down on. They wanted to compare it to our black ethnic issues at the time, but it was so much more visceral. With rare exception, I believe there are probably few Americans who would characterize our ethnic minorities using animal pronouns or animal allusions, but that . . .

Q: Black monkeys or something.

FLOYD: It's rare. You could find somebody.

Q: I got this from Ethiopian students who came out of Bulgaria in the 60s who were called (Bulgarian term, black monkeys.

FLOYD: Which is not to say that we didn't and don't have our issues, which is not to say that we've got it down perfectly, but it is the rare . . . The worst American racist is going to tell you about minorities' superior sports ability or they're not as smart or shouldn't get into university, but there's still a human equivalency. The Soviets' jokes, the allusions, were definitely to the animal kingdom.

Q: Of course the government wasn't really making much effort, as we've made a lot of effort.

FLOYD: The Soviet Government did try to use ethnicity too. They preserved symbols of ethnic identity and ethnic pride. Would have Uzbek days at the central exhibit location where they would allow Uzbek caps to be sold in markets, but very falsely. We always used to think it was sort of like Disneyland. The Russian word is "pokazuka."

Q: Did you get any feel for the American foreign policy or Foreign Service apparatus?

FLOYD: Less so in Ufa and Novosibirsk, but when we got to Moscow and we were in contact with the embassy - the embassy people came out to the exhibit, they invited us to the embassy for events. I would say that was my first robust exposure to the day to day life of diplomats. And I came back and took the Foreign Service exam.

Q: You examined it and found it pleasing?

FLOYD: Absolutely. Just the thought that the U.S. government would pay me to go and do stuff that as a student I had paid for myself was very attractive.

Q: So you took the Foreign Service exam in what, 77 or 78?

FLOYD: I had taken it in the fall of 76 before I graduated from college. And when I came back after the exhibit in the fall of 77 to start graduate school, I took it again.

Q: And the first time did you pass the written but not the oral, is that the case?

FLOYD: That's correct.

Q: Let's take the first time, what sort of questions? Do you remember any of the questions that were asked?

FLOYD: Not specifics. But I remember the most challenging ones being the ones where it would be the cause of X is, and then they would have A, B and C. And the answers were A and B but not C, A and C but not B, and go through the list and you would say "Well, it's A and B." But A and B was not one of the options and so you had to figure out if you were wrong or which one or . . .

Q: Well how about on the oral exam? Do you recall any of the questions from that?

FLOYD: No. I just remember being horrendously uncomfortable. I remember it being three older men. From the get-go it was an unpleasant experience.

Q: I know. I was one of those people who was giving the exam around that time. We tried to make it nice.

FLOYD: It was funny because I took that oral exam in the summer of 79, the summer between my two years in graduate school. And I was working as an intern on the Soviet desk at the State Department. So all my colleagues had talked to me and tried to prep me for this, and when I came back and had to tell them that I had failed, I was disappointed, and so were they. But I had another candidacy running and was successful in that one.

Q: When you were interning on the Soviet desk, what sort of things were you handling?

FLOYD: I worked in the exchanges office and dealt with visa matters for Soviets coming to the United States as exchange students.

Q: What was the feeling about – I've heard people that were involved with that say that the Soviets were sending 40 year old scientists to the United States and we were sending Byzantine scholars to the Soviet Union. They were interested in science and we were interested in orthography or something like that. But was there a sort of general feeling of what the hell?

FLOYD: Yes. Exactly. Because the scientists did not spend all day in the lab. Had to go to Giant at some point to realize that food was available and that anybody could walk into the store. And that the American orthographer also sat around and drank tea with people talking about their lives. It's one of the reasons that those things came under the category of cultural exchange. If one looked at it narrowly in terms of the development of specific subject matter expertise, probably the Soviets got more than we did. But the collapse of the Berlin Wall would indicate that we actually won that one.

Q: Yeah. I mean, as an exchange program over all, it has been such a tremendous success and I think it is not given the credit that is should be by the powers that be.

FLOYD: I suspect that it will get more attention as we look ahead to what is likely to be our needed course of action in dealing with other worlds and cultures that have been not part of our day to day operations, specifically the Arabic and Islamic world. We need the same type of long term commitment, the same strategic view to be able to say not how many scientists versus how many literature professors we exchange. It's going to take that degree of time to appreciate the complexity and the resources.

Q: Well then, on your second exam, do you recall anything from the oral exam.

FLOYD: No. It was just as they introduced the all day long assessment. So in that one the greatest coaching that anyone gave me was to, during the in-box portion, make sure you read the whole in-box rather than one-off it from the top, because sometimes the missing American turns up as an arrest case deeper down, or the need to deliver something upcountry coincided with a leave request from an FSN to go home upcountry.

Q: So you came in when?

FLOYD: February of 80.

Q: Was this as a Foreign Service officer or Foreign Service information officer?

FLOYD: Foreign Service officer.

Q: At that time, did you have to designate what field you wanted to be in?

FLOYD: You were offered a position based upon cones.

Q: What cone did you choose?

FLOYD: Political.

Q: So you came in in 1980. What was your basic officer class like?

FLOYD: Probably average age somewhere between 28 and 30. An amazing number of people with advanced degrees and some work experience. Very limited military experience, which of course would have reflected the times.

Q: Did you get any feel for the changing gender role in the Foreign Service?

FLOYD: There was a pretty good gender mix. But my personal experience with the changing foreign service attitude towards that was one of the women I worked with on the exchange desk had recently re-entered the foreign service. She had been a Foreign Service officer and had the audacity to get married, and they kicked her out. And then – somebody would have to remind me, 72, 75? – they said, oops, we blew that and went right back out and offered to reinstate her and she came back in.

Q: Who was that?

FLOYD: Pat Hughes.

Q: Were you pretty well concentrated on the Soviet thing or were you trying to get some experience outside of the Soviet Union?

FLOYD: Oh, I was more than happy to explore that. However, the Soviet desk called me the day after I told them that I had made it into an A-100 class and said "Do you want to

go to Moscow?" I said yes. And even though Moscow did not appear on the open assignments bid list – surprise - and even though they did not like sending unmarried officers to Moscow, they didn't really like sending first tour officers to Moscow, I was in Moscow by June.

Q: Did you have a mentor or a couple of mentors?

FLOYD: Absolutely.

Q: Who were they?

FLOYD: Jack Matlock, Sherrod McCall, more recently John Tefft.

Q: How did you find the A-100 course?

FLOYD: I don't know whether I was simply so excited finally to be in the Foreign Service or what. There was way too much time at old FSI sitting and listening to people talk and still at that time the delightful multi-hour discussion of when you bend the corner of your business card as to whether or not you have actually seen somebody or if you just left it at their calling card. Some of the political stuff was considerably overblown for a changing diplomatic world.

Q: I have to say that I had all that and I came in in 55. And I don't think we ever paid much attention to the card business, except if you were there you tried to see everybody, which wasn't a bad idea.

FLOYD: I never served in Paris or Rome or London or Brussels or someplace where that might have been the standard.

Q: To me it was something kind of funny.

FLOYD: In Moscow it was much more important that your card be bilingual than anything else.

Q: You went to Moscow and you were there from when to when?

FLOYD: First time was 80 to 82, as a foreign service officer, which was already my third time.

Q: In Moscow, this was after the Afghan invasion in 79.

FLOYD: This was the summer that we didn't show up at the Olympics.

Q: So what was the situation when you got there?

FLOYD: We were not well liked. The Olympics was a really strange set up. There was some advantage to being a junior officer because the embassy was under instructions to not provide senior level representation at events, which was just fine for the junior officers. It was amazing, the Soviet Government's ability to control its population and the general functioning of the capital city. Sending kids and criminals and drunks out of the city. In the case of drunks and criminals, they took them out about a hundred miles and dumped them, figuring that by the time they walked back, the Olympics would be over.

Q: Were you all, you know, finding out where they went and reporting on that?

FLOYD: That it happened. We didn't want to share that experience.

Q: What type of job did you have? Did you have a multitude of jobs?

FLOYD: Yes. I was a junior officer rotational position. I served in the consular section, in American citizen services, doing a lot of work involving dead Americans, lost or hurt Americans – because Americans certainly still came to the Olympics. Also did two curious other programs. There were two Soviet medical programs, one dealing with retinitis pigmentosa the other one dealing with spinal cord injuries, in which the Soviets were well ahead of us. And we had many Americans who wanted to take advantage of that. The other group of people I worked with was an office at the Department of Justice that looked for war criminals.

Q: On the Americans and the people that dropped dead or had problems, how were the Soviets? I mean the Soviets were pretty pissed.

FLOYD: I don't think any amount of Soviet-ism would ever be able to totally conquer Russian hospitality. When Americans died in the former Soviet Union, the government had a very efficient system. They knew our requirements in terms of documentation. The Americans who came to the Soviet Union for medical treatment obviously gave them a bit of a propaganda boost, gave them some money, so they were treated reasonably well. We always had to warn people who came for such treatment that Soviet medical facilities did not provide adequate support to patients. That you could not come and be admitted and left alone. You were going to need somebody to feed you and bathe you. The nursing care was not that present. Even despite the American boycott of the Olympics, on a person to person, level the Soviets greeted any guest fairly well.

Q: How did you find the embassy, your working environment and all, when you first got there?

FLOYD: During the early 80s, there was still enough of a siege mentality that it was a very close knit group of folks. Because people could not work on the economy, spouses were all throughout the embassy and that had the great advantage of providing immediate cross-cutting of section isolation. You may have a boss, but his wife works in GSO or someplace so that there was good circulation. This was still the era when they would turn off the hot water for a month in the summer and we would have shower parties because

different people at different times were without hot water. So you would quite casually bop over to somebody else's apartment with your towel because they had hot water and you didn't. I went from the consular section to working as the ambassador's staff aide and therefore came into contact with everybody over all sorts of things.

Q: Who was the ambassador when you were there?

FLOYD: Jack Matlock was the charge for the majority of my time as the staff assistant. Ambassador Tom Watson was confirmed and came into country towards the end of that.

Q: How did you find Ambassador Watson?

FLOYD: Very interesting character, very savvy person. Willing to listen and follow suggestions from his staff. Only ever once saw him get excited and that was when his and America's humanity was challenged by a not very pleasant individual who we all had to deal with anyway. And he dealt with him as many of us would have wished to have dealt with him ourselves.

Q: Who was that?

FLOYD: An American. A person by the name of Abe Stolar who had gone to the former Soviet Union in the 1930s, had been a bit of a Tokyo Rose on Radio Moscow. He retained his American citizenship, passed it along to his children, and primarily used it to come to diplomatic flea markets. But was quite happy to otherwise bash the United States.

Q: I can't remember where – was it Sergeant Lake?

FLOYD: Lonetree.

Q: Had that experience happened?

FLOYD: Later.

Q: So it wasn't during that period. So the embassy was able to use Foreign Service nationals?

FLOYD: Oh, by the truckload.

Q: How did one deal with it? I mean the security requirements?

FLOYD: You dealt with them as humans, minimizing social contact, focus on day-to-day operations and assume that anything and everything that you told them was recorded.

Q: Well at a certain point one makes the calculation of "what the hell difference does it make?"

FLOYD: Exactly. If you are talking to the driver who takes you to the MFA for a meeting, you just tell him when and where you need to be, you don't discuss what your talking points are going to be with the driver. When you need opera tickets, you go get them from an FSN. Does that mean that the FSN knows you are going to be going to the opera? Yes. So. It was a balancing act, particularly for those like the consular section or GSO who had a lot of FSN assistance. You became conscious of the limits to your relationship. And in subsequent years when you dealt with more normal FSN relationships, either in other counties or as the Soviet Union evolved, you recognized the falseness, the strained nature of it.

Q: Were there any demonstrations during this period you were there?

FLOYD: I have difficulty saying whether it was during this tour or other tours, but there were always periodically organized demonstrations against the United States. I've got to believe that there was a demonstration sometime that summer over the American boycott of the Olympics. I can't put my finger on one. I can't say how many. But every so often you would have a group of 30 or 40 jump off of a government bus in front of the embassy, do their thing, have the American media show up, and they'd get back on the bus and go their way.

Q: Did you find - both by the time you were on the desk and when you went out to Moscow - any feeling one way or the other about our boycotting the Olympics because of the Afghan business?

FLOYD: Depended whether you talked to someone officially or . . .

Q: I'm thinking of informally, within the embassy.

FLOYD: I think the greatest regret that people voiced was that the U.S. Government enforced the boycott, meaning what the government chose to do was the government's business, but to impose that political will on athletes – it was that connection. Not that the U.S. Government was opposed to the invasion of Afghanistan. That was understood. That was no problem. The greatest hostility came from the Americans who came and the rare American athlete who remembered his British grandmother and participated on the British team.

Q: Well looking at it, it probably wasn't one of our greater moments.

FLOYD: Most Russians are amazingly apolitical. Whether it has been beaten into them or scared out of them, I don't know. But they are much more interested in the day-to-day survival issues.

Q: Was there a change in political life, living conditions and all, between the time you were with USIA and when you went back?

FLOYD: Clearly my living conditions were a totally different order of magnitude, going from Soviet hotels to embassy housing was amazing. The Russian difference was less palpable. They were going through their own bit of questioning. Brezhnev's health was in decline. It was the time of stagnations to a great extent.

Q: Did you have much contact, going over to the ministry of foreign affairs? Did you get much contact, as a junior officer, with the Soviet foreign affairs apparatus?

FLOYD: Yes. Clearly the Consular Administration purely for my work. But as the ambassador's staff assistant, I would go with him for some of his meetings. As the protocol assistant, would go for formal diplomatic document exchanges.

Q: How did you find Jack Matlock? I knew him before and . . .

FLOYD: He had been director of the Soviet desk when I was an intern, and then was out there as the charge. For any number of reasons, probably many of which I never knew and wouldn't understand, we didn't have an ambassador for a significant amount of time in that period and he was there as the charge.

Q: Were there any major incidents when you were in Moscow during this time? Between the United States and the Soviet Union?

FLOYD: KL 007 was later. Invasion of Afghanistan was before I got there.

Q: Was there any feeling at the time you were there that Afghanistan was going to be firmly in the Soviet camp, or was there a feeling that maybe things aren't going so well for the Soviets?

FLOYD: Remember this was very, very early days. So officially it was their right to do, that if they had been invited in, they were helping, all of that line. For the general population the only concern was, "Don't send my son."

Q: Was the embassy, Tom Watson, Matlock and all, was there talk about this aging gerontocracy?

FLOYD: Oh constantly. We quickly went from Brezhnev to Chernenko to Andropov. It became the "who died today?" period. It was clear, from looking at May Day or Revolution Day line ups on the mausoleum, these guys were decrepit.

Q: There must have been a lot of speculation of who was going to come out on top in the long run?

FLOYD: Oh, absolutely. Again, as it panned out, there weren't many options out there. The Central Committee of the Communist Party was very much internally controlled. This was not a "riotous people in the street" turnover.

Q: You said you got assigned there despite the concerns about single officers, women officers, very junior officers. Did you have any attempts at compromise or difficulty because you fit into all three categories?

FLOYD: Whether through proper maintenance of security standards or naiveté, it never got far enough that I would identify it as such.

Q: Naiveté really is very useful many times.

FLOYD: If you went to a reception and the American jazz quartet was there and their local escort said "Well gee, we are having an after party, why don't you come and join us?" You made sure that it was a group thing. When you got the note that said "Meet me out back," you gave it to the RSO. I suspect that some of these might have been approaches that would have led down that path, but you just don't start and you don't get in trouble. It tends to be after a couple of feeders, after a couple of lures. The first approach usually isn't the killer.

Q: How are living conditions?

FLOYD: I started out living in a one bedroom apartment off campus, which also had twelve or fifteen other American diplomats there, recently renovated by some Austrians. Very pleasant. Commute was okay because the Soviets had not yet discovered private vehicle ownership, so we were pretty much the only cars on the road. When I became the ambassador's staff aide, they moved me into Spaso House, the ambassador's residence. Because Jack Matlock was only the charge, he chose not to live in the ambassador's residence, so it was me and an ancient Chinese butler who were the only ones living in this mansion, which was a bit spooky. But the ambassador's cook loved me. So when I would come home late, even though I had my own kitchen, there would usually be dinner waiting for me. That was very pleasant.

We didn't let go of the ambassador's staff because you still needed to dust for receptions. So they just also dusted my apartment. That was pleasant enough. When I rotated out of that position to the political section, I went back out to an off campus apartment in an older building. It was a little more awkward. The Soviet apartments usually were, because we would take one or two of them and your kitchen would be at one end and your dining room at the other. No one designed them. You took what you could get.

Q: When you were in the political section, what piece of the pie were you given?

FLOYD: I did protocol and internal political reporting.

Q: What sort of things were we looking at internal-wise?

FLOYD: Reaction to Afghanistan. Did a lot of the biographic who's in, who's out, regional party secretaries.

Q: Was Gorbachev a name at that time?

FLOYD: No. Not in the early 80s. Might have been to somebody in the central committee, but it was not on the embassy's radar. Yeltsin was for his role in Moscow.

Q: How was Yeltsin perceived at that time?

FLOYD: My memory capacity is not yet honed enough to tell you when it was then, when it was later, and when it is now. My memories of Yeltsin's image were simply as an efficient administrator who was building like mad in Moscow.

Q: One of the greatest, I won't call it an intelligence blunder, but here we had the best and the brightest concentrated and looking at the Soviet Union and yet they weren't predicting the collapse? Were you part of the looking? Were we seeing what we thought we should see?

FLOYD: I would have told you that the Soviet Union was headed for more internal independence. That the republics would be able to have more control, particularly over their economy. That the centralized nature of planning was in collapse. I would never, ever had predicted that it would literally fall into pieces. The Ukrainians today are challenged today by the question whether they can make it in an international economy dominated by globalization and competition. It was no easier at that point, and we are talking about the early 80s, we're talking before glasnost.

Q: How was your Russian?

FLOYD: I got up to 4+/4.

Q: So basically you were very comfortable.

FLOYD: Yes. I can do pretty much anything in Russian I can do in English. I can't discuss quantum physics in either.

Q: Well, we'll keep away from that subject. My favorite of course. When you left there, you left there in 82?

FLOYD: Came back and worked for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Q: Doing what?

FLOYD: Southeast Europe, specifically the fun little ones that not a lot of people cared about, the Albanians, the Bulgarians. Did back up the primary analyst on Poland, which was very fascinating because, of course, this was early active Solidarity times.

Q: You did this from 82 to . . . ?

FLOYD: 85.

Q: That's quite a long stretch there.

FLOYD: I did take two months off, three months off, to have a child.

Q: Did you get married?

FLOYD: Yes. In Moscow a Seabee came to fix my shredder and, as they say, the rest is history.

Q: Seabee is . . .

FLOYD: Naval construction engineer. The State Department contracts with the US Navy because however brilliant Foreign Service officers are, we couldn't change a starter on a fluorescent tube if you paid us a million dollars. Nor could we un-jam shredders when we tried to put too much in it. So the Seabees provided the building maintenance, particularly in those areas where you really didn't want Russians changing light bulbs.

Q: By the time you were getting married, how did you view life beyond that? I mean the navy and . . .

FLOYD: Oh we talked a long time about how we were going to manage to do two fairly mobile careers and recognized that we were probably going to have to make choices that optimal career enhancing would sometimes give way to family. And we did do a couple separate assignments.

Q: How did the navy treat this?

FLOYD: The military deeply respects its spouses, but as adjuncts. That spouses would have independent needs or desires – it does not figure highly into their calculations.

Q: Well, just to get a feel for things, what was the background of your husband?

FLOYD: He had been in the Navy for ten years when I met him. Comes from northern Mississippi. Spent a very mobile time. The Seabees tend to go where things needed to get fixed. The Naval Support Unit, which was in the State Department, his first assignment was to go off and re-fit the embassy in Pakistan after it had been burned in 79. He was a steelworker and ironworker by training, so if you need your vault re-leaded or air-conditioning ducts installed, they would send him all over the place.

Q: Was he in Washington when you went to Washington?

FLOYD: No. When I went to Washington, he was in Tokyo.

Q: In INR, I take it Albania was just, what, two hours a week or something like that?

FLOYD: I once got a comment in my evaluation that I was very good at making silk purses out of sow's ears. That I took the charge of research more important than intelligence because you are correct, the collection on those countries was minimal. Bulgaria was slightly more interesting because this was after the attack on the Pope. And so Bulgaria's relationship – their special services – it led to the opportunity to write on Bulgaria's ethnic issues and what that might mean for their future and particularly their relationships with their neighbors. That then expanded into ethnic research in Albania. I was totally amused ten years later when somebody decided we actually needed to know something about Albania and I could actually tell them what Tosks and Ghegs were. So it was a . . .

Q: Are these two different tribes?

FLOYD: The north and south.

Q: Are both mountain tribes?

FLOYD: Oh, too long ago.

Q: I used to know too. I was a Yugoslav hand.

FLOYD: Very good.

Q: What was behind the attempt to assassinate the Pope? A Turk coming out of Bulgaria going after the Polish Pope in Rome.

FLOYD: I don't know that we have ever truly gotten down to that, and then the question of why he did it or why he was put up to do it are probably different. And motivations tend to be multifaceted and not singular.

Q: Were we seeing Bulgaria as being a complete tool of the Soviet Union?

FLOYD: At that time, absolutely. The sixteenth republic.

Q: Were you picking up anything from Romania, or was that somebody else's?

FLOYD: The interesting comparison was actually with Romania, which at that time was deeply under Ceausescu's thumb. And the control there was so much more oppressive, and it had effects on the economy as well. Bulgaria was figuring out that they sort of liked some of this western currency and if all that it meant was that they had to take British pounds and let Londoners sit on their beaches, go for it. That was in stark contrast with Romania where you were greeted at the airport by AK-47 carrying soldiers who, if you are only in transit, won't let you off the plane.

Q: I was just talking with somebody who's first experience abroad was landing in Romania. At that time, it was not pleasant.

FLOYD: No. This is not "Welcome to Romania." By that token, when the British tourists went home from Bulgaria, they left the Daily Telegraph and they left the Punch and Judy. So Bulgaria was starting to open up, but slowly and driven by economics.

Q: What were you doing regarding Poland?

FLOYD: I was the backup, and so it was a matter of when the primary was gone or when it got really busy. When you found a dead priest in a trunk or when you had negotiations to reopen steel mills, that sort of thing. Or it was that he would do the long pieces and I would do the daily blurbs.

Q: Were we at that time looking at Poland and saying "You know, here is a major chink in the armor"?

FLOYD: Yes.

Q: Were we looking at "When are the Soviets going to drop the shoe and invade?"

FLOYD: Remember that we had gotten to that extent in 81. That was the Christmas that we thought that the Soviets might actually provide military assistance when Jaruzelski declared martial law. So we were totally cognizant that that was certainly an option. That it did not happen was one more of those indicators that something was going on.

Q: I imagine obviously that because of what you were dealing with in INR, that people were keeping a close eye on events in the Soviet Union.

FLOYD: Oh sure. It was the office around the corner.

Q: Was there a feeling that things were beginning to change there, or not yet?

FLOYD: I was not as intimately involved, but certainly it was clear simply because of the changes at the top. You've got Andropov comes in and bans liquor. No chance there. They went through three, four folks in the course of three or four years.

Q: Brezhnev, Chernenko, Andropov and then I guess Gorbachev.

FLOYD: So it was quite a – not turbulent in the sense that the system was under internal attack, but it was certainly more instability in the leadership than Soviet governance had ever faced. And just re-issuing all the orders allowed for in and out changes that had an effect.

Q: Yeah. I think it was about that time or slightly thereafter when somebody said to Reagan "Why don't you have closer relations with the Soviet leaders?" He said "Well they keep dying on me."

FLOYD: Well that would be true.

Q: You were there until 85?

FLOYD: And then I went back to the Soviet Union.

Q: Did you feel that by this time you were part of the Eastern European, particularly Soviet, clique?

FLOYD: Oh absolutely. To the extend that when I went back to the former Soviet Union - so much for open assignments - I put in one bid on my bid list. It was out of cone and out of grade, and I got it.

Q: What was that?

FLOYD: GSO in Leningrad.

Q: GSO in the Soviet Union?

FLOYD: Yes. The US Navy had assigned my husband back to the Naval Support Unit and he was sent to Leningrad. And I said if you don't send me and let me work, I will go on leave without pay.

Q: Were you getting a feeling by this time that there was a change in the Soviet hands? I mean we had had this thing – goes back to George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, Tommy Thompson and all that. I mean this is an elite of an elite.

FLOYD: I remember that Ambassador Bohlen's daughter worked with me on the Soviet desk. Avis was in multilateral affairs. So there is a certain passing from generation to generation.

Q: I'm interviewing Avis. I've been doing that. I'm going back to her I think it's next week.

FLOYD: There was not so much a change, but I would just say it was more preparation of the next generation. There were certainly some folks – I point to Sherrod McCall – as a tremendous example of someone who was conscious of needing to develop the next generation of American diplomats and Soviet experts.

Q: Did you feel yourself part of an elite?

FLOYD: The Soviet desk, the Soviet specialists in the State Department, particularly back then, were into and of themselves. May have been technically part of the European bureau, but couldn't have convinced them of that.

Q: You all knew each other. Looking at this later, was there almost too much group think, do you think? I keep asking questions of people who served in the Soviet Union trying to unwrap the puzzle, what happened that we didn't see the collapse of the authority there?

FLOYD: I think you would probably have better luck if you talked to a sociologist, not even a political scientist. Humans tend to identify patterns in predictability. The type of break that happened in part was only possible in a country like the Soviet Union because the change was not societal, it was not that deep. When you've got one, two, three, four, five percent in the party who constitute the ruling class, you really only have to convince them. And they were not the ones that were immediately accessible. And I would suggest they didn't know themselves exactly where they were taking this.

Q: Oh quite obviously Gorbachev had no conception of what he would bring about.

FLOYD: And it was the strangest little things that convinced me that something was really going to happen. When we left Leningrad in 87, we had a going away party. During my tour there, we had gone through the tit for tat of kicking Russian diplomats out of the UN and they kicked some of our guys out and then they ended up pulling all of the FSNs. So as the GSO I had learned to do a whole bunch of new things I never thought I was going to have to do and came in contact with a lot more Soviet officials than normally was the case. Meaning we had to deliver our own invitations, so ran into an awful lot of door keepers. We had to go pick up our own shipments. So ran into customs officials and port officials. And when we left, the consul general had a farewell reception and we sent out invitations to all the officials we came into contact with. And they showed up, and they showed up with spouses. It was the first time that I knew of that Soviet officials had been able to make a social decision based entirely on their own concerns. It was so strange to see, primarily wives, coming out of the woodwork, and to see a real cross section, a real mix, of Soviet officials. They usually came in blocks. It was the first time I ever saw them act as individuals, not on instructions. They were allowed to engage in normal human relations without direction, and that was revolutionary.

Q: You were in Leningrad from 85 to 87. I think this might be a good place to stop. And I'll put at the end where we'll pick it up. We'll talk about your time as a GSO in Leningrad. 85 to 87.

Q: Today is the 16th of December 2004. You were in Leningrad 85 to 87. What was the status of American relations with the Soviets?

FLOYD: As with any good relationship, it had its ups and downs. The most notable series of events was the cascading expulsion of diplomatic employees. It began with U.S. objection to the size of the Soviet, Ukrainian and Belarusian missions to the UN. We

asked them to reduce the size. They did not. Therefore the State Department declared a number of them PNG and asked them to leave the United States.

In retaliation for that, the Soviets designated a smaller number of American diplomats in the former Soviet Union as PNG and they left. Then we kicked a few more out from the UN. And in the interesting twist, the Soviets next action was the withdrawal all Soviet local employees. Because the Soviet government is who provided our FSNs, they were able in one fell swoop, in one sweet evening, to cause all of our FSNs to cease working for the consulate, and the embassy for that matter.

Q: Hadn't some of this taken place anyway because of the Sergeant Lonetree business?

FLOYD: It is highly likely that that was mixed up in there someplace and certainly the mission in the Soviet Union had re-looked its security requirements. But what the Soviets did was took away drivers and cooks, and translators and ticket arrangers. They took everybody.

Q: How did we respond to that?

FLOYD: We initially had a remarkable group of people who pitched in and did an amazing number of things, including consul generals who shoveled snow from their own residence steps. But what we eventually did was went to an American contractor, PAE, Pacific Architects and Engineers, to provide us with support personnel. For years it had been clear that X Americans, one American, could do the work of four FSNs, or that sort of proportion. And that was somewhat the rate with which we were able to get the money to then hire cleared American contractors to do those jobs. It took several months – I would have to go back and check. I'm going to say six to eight months. – before the first PAE employee got to Leningrad.

Q: Who was the consul general when you got there?

FLOYD: Ed Hurwitz was the consul general for the vast majority of my time. Charlie McGee was there initially, but Ed was there for the majority.

Q: How did you find, the tit for tat thing through the UN and all, was at the upper level. But down at the Leningrad level, how . . .?

FLOYD: At the level of our employees, when they were finally allowed by the Soviet government to come back to the consulate to pick up the things they had left in their desks – their sewing kits, their shoes – they were in tears. They were traumatized by this level of petty reciprocity. Retaliation is how they saw it, primarily.

Q: Irrespective of work, it must have developed a sort of bitterness on the part of our American employees to the Soviet authorities.

FLOYD: Certainly to the Soviet authorities. We totally recognized that the decision to leave their employment had nothing to do with the individuals. I would have loved to have been a fly on the wall of the discussions as to what the Soviets were going to lose in intelligence access to us. But the decision was made to simply totally inconvenience us. Because the bad guy was the Soviet state – fairly large, fairly amorphous – what I found it created was an incredible camaraderie among the folks at the consulate. It was no longer send the driver to deliver invitations or pick up milk orders from Helsinki, it was okay everybody, we are all in this together and we are all going to take turns. And that's what happened.

Q: Well I would assume that being GSO, which you had never done before, had you?

FLOYD: That is correct. I'm a political officer.

Q: The GSO is the gopher, the person that does everything, and you must have become the key person in the consulate.

FLOYD: That is overstating it because I may have been the telephone person, but it was the whole group that made things happen. I may have posted the list of who is going to do the mail run, but I didn't have to do it all. Amazing cooperation from everyone. Our Marine detachment probably gets the most credit because they had been restricted, in terms of the jobs that they could take within the consulate, within any diplomatic entity, simply because the Marine Corps was worried about them being used as manual labor. And so they stepped up very nicely. Also tremendously easing my burden was the fact that a key partner for any GSO in the former Soviet Union was the Seabee folks that were around – the mechanical skills, their ability to do so many of the jobs that FSNs had done on the technical side. I had the tremendous advantage of being married to that Seabee and therefore the advantage of encouraging his cooperation. That was also aided clearly by the fact that the embassy, recognizing that certain tasks you could ask for volunteers for, but some had to be paid for, made funds available so that we could hire folks who were willing to do it – to paint apartments during staff transfers, to do some of the after hours work that simply had to be done. So it was a combination of the embassy was willing to fund, organizations willing to release their employees to do things outside of their job descriptions, and then simply amazing cooperation from a team.

Q: How about on the Soviet side, the people that handle the housing and all that? Were they sticking it to you, or were they completely out of the picture at this point?

FLOYD: The Soviet organizations within the Soviet structure, for example the Main Directorate for Servicing Consular Institutions, continued to do its job as before. The difference was that there was no one in the consulate as an intermediary, so that Americans had to go and directly do things. I had a funny advantage in that for a couple of months that I had been on leave without pay waiting for tour timing to mesh, I was at the consulate on my husband's orders. During that down time, I asked for and received permission from the person I was going to replace – the GSO who was in place – for me to hang around with the FSNs. So I had gone on the customs run. I had schmoozed with

the Soviet officials. I had gone on invitation deliver rounds. So I knew the backdoors. I knew the secretaries. I knew what our FSNs did when they left the consulate. I knew where our FSN plumber kept parts because I had sat down in the basement and had tea with him. So we used to laugh and say that it couldn't have happened at a better time in the sense that we had an American with a fair amount of exposure with what our GSO FSNs did.

Q: Did the other foreign consulates there give a hand?

FLOYD: No. Nor did we ask them to particularly. It was not unhelpful, it was just that we never identified what they could have done. We couldn't have subcontracted their Soviet employees. The Soviet government wouldn't let us use them. And we weren't going to ask the German guards to come over and shovel our snow.

Q: There was no possibility of hiring any Russian off the street?

FLOYD: Absolutely not.

Q: Were there any problems in your work? What sort of things were you doing with the Soviet authorities?

FLOYD: As you put it out, GSO keeps the water flowing, the lights on. Housing was a big issue, meaning everything from where you put people, how you move them in and out, customs lists when they were coming, packing lists when they were going, repainting apartments between occupants, airplane tickets for R&R, telexing Helsinki for milk and broccoli. Lots of time paying utility bills. Fixing hot water heaters at the consul general's residence when they blow valves in the middle of the night.

Q: At the Leningrad level there wasn't harassment? It was business as usual?

FLOYD: As I said, as soon as we reached Soviet officials in their roles within Soviet organizations, things were just fine. When you got to the customs depot at the airport to send out somebody's air freight, they were not obnoxious. Towards the end of our tour in Leningrad, I was pregnant. And when I would show up with air freight shipments and noticeably pregnant, I actually got a fair amount of attention. And the first time I tried to drive a 26 foot step van through the archway of the 18th century building that the consulate was located in, even the militia guards out front were prepared to give me a little coaching as I maneuvered that monster.

Q: 85 to 87, things were happening in the Soviet Union.

FLOYD: Absolutely.

Q: I realize that you were busy with the water heaters, but you must have been picking up quite a bit of stuff.

FLOYD: Also because I was a political cone officer – one of the people PNG'd from Leningrad was our political officer. That meant that it gave me the opportunity to pick up some of that work as well. Notably, with some of the refuseniks who were in Leningrad, which was a great source of rumor and general public information. And, as you point out, as part of the changes within the Soviet government, from glasnost to perestroika, they were increasingly getting exit permission so that they felt more free about talking about a number of things because they knew they were getting out.

Q: What were you picking up from you contacts about – was there a change in the Soviet system? Were you seeing that coming? First place, where was Gorbachev at this point?

FLOYD: This is embarrassing. I have trouble remembering exactly when he came into the general secretary position. He was there probably for most of that time period.

Q: You were beginning to feel the . . .

FLOYD: Absolutely.

Q: This is an Earth change, wasn't it?

FLOYD: Leningrad was always a very culturally active location. Not in terms of quantity, but in terms of quality, our interaction with the cultural elite was probably higher, conceivably in part because our contact with the political elite was less because they were in Moscow. One of the events that we sponsored at this time was the visit of Vladimir Horowitz, who came to perform at the Leningrad Philharmonic. And that was a major cultural experience in which we found tickets actually available to the public instead of being solely under the control of the political or party elite. We saw a greater willingness to allow student exchanges of what we thought might have been questioned in the past. Things as simple as Americans of Russian heritage were allowed on some of the exchanges with greater frequency than in the past. Less following, less harassment. Still there, but it was more monitoring than intrusive.

Q: Were you able to get into some of the traditional way of Russian life? The sitting around a kitchen table and talking?

FLOYD: Much more so with the refuseniks, who had much less to lose. Most Russians were very confused. They did not know what was going on. They had seen lightening up decades earlier and then the clampdown. So they were a little leery. I think we discussed the last time we spoke the event that told me that this was going to work, which was our farewell gathering when people actually got to make their own choices. They got to decide something as mundane as a social appearance without having to clear it with somebody. And they got to act as individually responsible professionals, which for most was quite amazing.

It was the next wave – I would say – from the late 80s up to the 90s, which really broke down that barrier of access and personal revelation beyond the small slice of Soviets that had rejected their system earlier. We spent hours with refuseniks.

As a digression, you keep referring to the Lonetree events. In fact, it was in a subsequent time back in the former Soviet Union when my husband – being an active duty military person – had to go to Frankfurt to have a lie detector test relative to his activities. One of the questions that was difficult for him – actually difficult for the questioner – was "have you ever been alone with a Russian woman?" And he would fairly directly say "yes," because while I was in the living room drinking tea with the men discussing exit visas and political issues, he was in the kitchen with the lady of the house discussing eggs and teapots and . . . which was a reflection of job responsibilities and vocabulary. But for better or for worse, the good guys from NCIS just couldn't grasp that a military person might be married to a political officer whose job was contact with Russians. But that's just one of the delightful twists of American security cultures coming into contact with each other.

Q: In the Leningrad context, who were those refuseniks? Were they mostly Russian Jews?

FLOYD: Almost exclusively.

Q: What was the motivation? What were they saying? Why were they the refuseniks and not some others?

FLOYD: Many of them were very bright and very ambitious and the mere fact that one line in their Soviet passport said they were Jewish created incredible barriers to their professional and personal lives: where they could work, what they could do, where they could live.

Q: This is sort of ingrained in the system?

FLOYD: Absolutely.

Q: Were they talking about going to Israel or were they talking about the United States?

FLOYD: United States from day one. They all knew how to bail out of the processing train, usually in Rome, and run to the US.

Q: Israel was not really the . . .

FLOYD: For a very, very few of them. For the Sharanskis, yes. But for the vast majority of people that we dealt with, it was the United States. In part, mind you, because even before the mid to late 80s, there had been a trickle of departures and many of them had ended up in the United States, not unlike Irish or Swedish or any other stream of immigration. They were going to folks that they knew.

Q: Oh yeah. On the side, were you getting anything about Israel? How did they feel about Israel?

FLOYD: The vast majority of the refuseniks who we dealt with were not deeply religious. And it is my belief that they were uncomfortable about the need to exhibit a greater foundation in their religion if they were going to successfully live in Israel.

Q: How Jewish were they, would you say?

FLOYD: The best comparison that I can come up with is to parallel their degree of belief, identity and practice to what is fairly frequently seen in many other religions. The average American Lutheran goes to church on Christmas and Easter, knows what a crucifix looks like, has some idea what a Madonna is, but if you asked them to discuss in great detail the difference between Lutheran, Methodist, Episcopalian and probably even Catholic, they'd be hard pressed to distinguish with much degree of specificity, particularly on a theological line.

Q: How about with the Russian Leningraders? Did you have much chance to talk with them?

FLOYD: Clearly the FSNs. Clearly the folks in the neighborhood stores where we always shopped. But never with the sense that they were revealing their souls.

Q: I was talking about whether you were picking up any feeling towards the refusniks.

FLOYD: Varied. There were those who would joke that they wish they were Jewish because at least they would then have a chance of getting out. There were others, particularly in Leningrad, who saw them as traitors for wanting to leave the motherland. Some Jews took the same approach towards refusniks. Stay here and make it better. Don't leave.

Q: Well what constitutes a refusenik?

FLOYD: Someone who had applied to emigrate from the former Soviet Union and had been refused exit permission.

Q: And what were we doing about it? What was being done about?

FLOYD: Every time we had human rights or immigration discussions, we provided lists of people who we knew that had legitimate places to go – that was one of the Soviet's frequent statements, "We can't let them go, they would be lost because there is no country that wants them." So we would constantly give them lists of people for whom we had issued entry documents, but they couldn't get out because they lacked exit documents.

Q: Was anything happening?

FLOYD: Trickles, all throughout the 80s. It opened up more once you got into 86, and by 87 a lot of the old backup was breaking through. The big flood didn't come until 88 or 89.

Q: Was there a change in the attitude of Soviet officials? Were they more forthcoming, or not?

FLOYD: Up until our departure, I would not say that I would characterize Russian officials as notably, totally opening up. If you take it from a totally closed, totally controlled, only if I'm told to, only if I'm authorized to attitude, to a total independent, empowered professional, they were probably about, maybe a third of the way. You would get a couple occasions when a couple officials would actually lean forward. But it was certainly not on their shoulders. It was still "let me check." It was still "I'll have to get permission." It was still "we're not cleared to do that."

Q: Were you picking up any reflections of ethnic divisions? I realize you are off in Leningrad, but still.

FLOYD: Well Leningrad has always been the touching off point for a lot of – even Soviet – relations with people of the far north. It's where their biggest institution is for that study. It's what took us out to Yakutsk to look at permafrost with the US Army Corps of Engineers. There are tremendous ethnic divisions in Russia today and in the former Soviet Union. The major distinction that you usually find in Leningrad is between ethnic Russians and the Balts. There are not many central Asians, who are the scapegoats for every Russian.

Q: Was Leningrad our window on the Baltic states?

FLOYD: Yes. Pretty much.

Q: Could you get over there?

FLOYD: You could drive to Estonia. You could drive to Tallinn.

Q: Was there a growing international community in Leningrad at this time?

FLOYD: There has always been a huge Finnish presence. And the consulate took huge advantage of that. Our moving company was Finnish. They were our shipping company. They were our source of paint and light bulbs and water fixtures. But they were well and thoroughly there. Germans were present a little more. It's a port. It's a big shipping center for most of northern Russia, northern Soviet Union.

Q: As a political officer, were you getting feelings about the Soviet economy and how it produced and all? Because I think this is the big thing that, in a way, the intelligence people felt that the Soviet Union would hold together forever and all – and it seemed to be that economics . . .

FLOYD: I would take it the other way and say that the Soviet economy was not going to be able to maintain its hypocrisy and continue to function either in terms of developing its military or – and here's where the falseness was displayed – in its relations in an increasingly globalized world. If they were going to depend on American wheat imports, if they were going to depend on American drill bit imports, they had to more closely approach Western accountability standards, from the beginning of the plan to its execution. The falseness of the Soviet system is what killed it.

Q: I mean, we are sitting here and you have a laptop computer sitting on the table there. The computer was just coming into its own at that point.

FLOYD: Including in the consulate.

Q: Yeah. State Department does not reflect the cutting edge of technology. Did you get any feeling that to Soviets were beginning to fall behind in this very important aspect . . .?

FLOYD: Absolutely. Telephones alone were going to bring it down. Not only did they not feel empowered in terms of policy to communicate with each other, they could not mechanically communicate with each other.

Q: So by the time you left there in 87, what was you feeling about things?

FLOYD: It was clear that the Soviet Union had turned a corner, that things were going to change, led in my opinion by economic changes, which I argued and in hindsight I don't think I would have seen it differently, even then, that while the Soviet Union might engage in more economic autonomy for its subdivisions, I couldn't imagine it breaking into the pieces that it has. I could not imagine Latvia wanting to try and stand up against Germany in North Sea area economic competition. I could not conceive of the Uzbeks breaking away to the extent that they were willing to stand up to China on their own. And in the end, they still retain a tight link to Moscow. But I didn't see that degree of breakup coming.

Q: What about the Finnish role there? Was there irredentism in Finland about Karelia?

FLOYD: No. I perhaps did not meet enough drunk Finns to get that to come out, but while they would talk about what went on in Vyborg, when it was Finnish, or show you where the line used to be, whether it was history, whether it was the degree of corruption – and I mean that both in terms of environment and development, and mental corruption – that had taken place in those areas, I never heard a Finn say that they wanted it back.

Q: Was Finland the place you went to get some fresh air?

FLOYD: And give birth. Yes, Finland was certainly the consulate's window on the world. It is where we went for medical and dental care. It is where we ordered a huge amount of our fresh food supplies. It is where we ordered a tremendous amount of local support material. Literally light bulbs.

Q: I remember seeing in Kyrgyzstan about ten years later where people were selling used light bulbs – I mean these were light bulbs that didn't work any more.

FLOYD: No, but you get your old light bulb, you go to work, you put the dead light bulb in, take the good one home, and the next day turn to your boss and say "My light went out." And make the boss replace it.

Q: Yeah.

FLOYD: The fact that such simple service items were not available. And also the mentality that said you can steal from your boss. That you have to go through these kinds of machinations to live your daily life. You can't run a modern economy on that level.

Q: Then in 87, here you are with a husband and a baby. Two babies, were they twins?

FLOYD: No, no, no. We went to Leningrad with a child. Our first child was born in September of 84. And then our second child was born in October of 87 and we came home in December of 87.

Q: Who took care of the kids?

FLOYD: A series of Finnish – actually my sister went with me for the first six months, and then we had some Finnish nannies. And in the end, we had a Russian nanny who was pulled when the FSNs got pulled and – you asked about assistance – the German consulate had, literally a kindergarten – not so much educational but in the German sense, a kindergarten, and they opened it up to us. So every morning I hauled two kids over to the German consulate. When I first went back to work after Patrick was born, my boss was an absolute delight. Patrick was born on the 20th of October and I went back to work on the 4th of November, but he had taken a shipping crate and put padding and blankets in it and set it in my office so I could bring Patrick to work. He had taken one of our child carriers and had it appropriately screened so I could take Patrick into any area of the consulate. It was a matter of "he was desperate and I was willing." So Patrick went to work early on.

Q: Had a badge?

FLOYD: Well, the chances of him wandering off were pretty slim, so he didn't need to be badged.

Q: 87, where?

FLOYD: Came back to the States. I was on maternity leave for two months. And went to work for the Bureau of Human Rights, for Ambassador Schifter.

Q: And you were with human rights, was this still 87?

FLOYD: No. I didn't start there until February of 88.

Q: And you were there how long?

FLOYD: Nine months.

Q: Another baby?

FLOYD: No. No, no, no. They sent me back to the Soviet Union.

Q: Okay. You say nine months . . .

FLOYD: I know. We were home for nine months because by . . . (conversation interrupted).

Q: Well in the 88, 89, nine month period, what were you doing in the bureau of human rights?

FLOYD: I was doing what was called multilateral organization support. The big one obviously was the International Committee for the Red Cross. I also, despite my best efforts, could not get out of the Russian/Soviet spiral. Ambassador Schifter had a very active dialogue with some of the folks in the former Soviet Union. Frequent trips, delegations, and I found myself being asked to support that effort as well. I found out more about American juvenile death penalty details that I would have ever thought I needed to know. But juvenile death penalty and American Indian rights were what they (the Soviets) always came back to us with whenever we would criticize any of their human rights practices.

Q: Well what about our juvenile death penalty?

FLOYD: At that time I had two very young children and it really scared me to think that there were 16, 17 year olds out there who would plot and brutally murder multiple people. We were talking a dozen cases, maybe. And in each one of them – this was not vehicular homicide. This was not a drunken frat party. This was lying in wait, duct taping them, dozens of screw driver stab wounds to kill the neighbor lady. They were some pretty depressing cases.

Q: We would document these to go back . . .

FLOYD: Yes. We would go over to the Department of Justice and the Solicitor General would help us with the court records on these folks. A huge proportion of them were seventeen and a half years old. By the time you got to seventeen years old, sixteen years old, they were onesies and twosies. So I felt pretty comfortable as an American and as a mother that these people were – they took adult like decisions and actions and were justifiably tried as adults. The nature of the crime in the state where they were judged

certainly met the standards for the death penalty. Then you'd give them the whole line of – none of them were still teenagers. Our appeal process is such that it takes five to ten years -- so we would always point that out as well -- where Soviet justice had the advantage of being swift, and uncontested.

Q: What about the Indian side?

FLOYD: It doesn't take much for most Americans to realize that some of the actions and policies that we engaged in -- certainly in the past, and even today -- take health standards on American Indian reservations, are not wonderful. But then we would always point out that they don't have to stay there. We don't have internal travel controls. The Soviets would point out the amount of money that they'd given to the Uzbek cultural center. And we would say, well, there's a lot of tax breaks for Indian tribes. It would be interesting to see what the conversation would be like today. In the late 80s, Indian gambling, Indian casinos had not really taken off. And it was just as the Alaskan oil revenues were coming on line that have strong benefits for some of the Native Alaskans.

Q: I noticed in films and when I've talked to people that one thing the Soviets did do is plop cultural centers down in the middle of the Gobi desert and elsewhere.

FLOYD: And one can argue, and I believe, that that was in order to control the expression of that cultural identity. Keep it in a box.

Q: What were you doing? Sort of digesting and putting this together to feed to our people in Moscow?

FLOYD: The Soviet stuff was trip preparation, research material development. The multilateral side tended to be preparation for various meetings. It was not my direct responsibility, but I assisted in preparations for the United Nations Conference on Human Rights and any requests or actions we had with them.

Q: Did you get the OECD type . . .

FLOYD: Only tangentially. It was handled in my office, but it was not my mandate, not my bailiwick.

Q: Did you pick up any impression of the International Red Cross and its effectiveness?

FLOYD: I found it a fascinatingly bureaucratic and political organization. Very stuck on a 18th and 19th century model of warfare and its roles. Any meeting you went to, you got to listen to the rules of war and the Geneva Conventions and they intentionally pulled away a bit from some of the more political human rights.

Q: Did you also get any feeling for the role of Dick Schifter and the Bureau of Human Rights within the department? It has waxed and waned.

FLOYD: I wasn't operating on that level of the bureau. Ambassador Schifter was certainly a very active person and it appeared to me that his relationship with the seventh floor was strong. They certainly tasked him and sent him off on a variety of missions.

Q: Then nine months later, after your period of gestation in the bureau of human rights, you are off to Moscow?

FLOYD: No. To Ulan Ude, out in Siberia. To implement the INF treaty – the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty. One of those delightful bureaucratic twists and turns, I was assigned to the Department of Defense's On-Site Inspection Agency. It was an organization that was literally just standing up. And they wanted to assign State Department and DOD folks to be diplomatic escorts at the two points of entry. Well, one was Moscow. That was easy, you had the embassy. But the eastern one was harder to staff.

The treaty was set up that you declared a random inspection at the point of entry and the host government had X hours for this kind and X hours for that kind of inspection. Well if you were sitting in Moscow and wanted to inspect Sarawak, you could not, even if they instantly put you on the airplane, you couldn't get there within the time frame. So we created an eastern entry point. It was supposed to be in Irkutsk, which is a real live city. But their airport was undergoing capital repairs and couldn't handle C-131s. So the nearest available useable airport was Ulan Ude.

Q: Can you spell that and explain where it is?

FLOYD: Ulan Ude is two words. U-L-A-N U-D-E. Ulan being Mongolian for red. And Ude being the river that flows through the city. And I'm sure it has a meaning, but we never found it out. It is a hundred plus miles east of Lake Baikal and about a hundred and fifty miles north of Mongolia. It is slam in the middle of what would be called eastern Siberia. It is also the headquarters for the eastern Siberian military district and therefore had always been a closed city. But it did have a good sized airport, including a military alternative, which was one of our requirements knowing that things happen at airports. And so the Soviets, who wanted INF to work, said okay, you can base your operations in Ulan Ude.

Q: You were there for how long?

FLOYD: We were there from September of 88 until December of 89 and then we were pulled back to Moscow. We then periodically went out to Ulan Ude until summer of 90.

Q: You say we. Now what was your husband doing there?

FLOYD: My husband was the Department of Defense representative.

Q: Sounds like somebody was cooperating there.

FLOYD: It was serendipitous. The State Department wanted to send a rep. DOD wanted to send a rep. They wanted to send married people, coming out of Lonetree.

Q: Keep from messing around.

FLOYD: Yes. And they didn't want to send a whole troop. So with some creative networking, they found the Floyds, who had just come out of Leningrad, and we were willing to go. It did ruffle a lot of feathers. My husband is reasonably convinced it is the reason he never again got promoted. It certainly got me a reputation among Soviet hands for being brave, creative and probably a little crazy. But I don't think the personnel system liked that either. My CDO went bananas because they had to break my assignment to Human Rights. And in order to not have to do all the full advertising and recruitment and make some other provisions, they actually had to direct my assignment. Not with my opposition, but with Human Right's opposition. So they had to do a directed assignment and my CDO was not at all happy at having to do that paperwork.

Q: What was the situation in Ulan Ude? I mean, this is not a name that reverberates in the corridors of diplomacy.

FLOYD: It does not. The U.S. Government had been making due with TDY folks out there. I went out and met them prior to actually being transferred out there. We looked around the city for where a family with two kids could conceivably live. We drafted charts of hotel room reconfigurations. We looked at a couple Soviet apartments. And said, "it's not going to work." So the local official who was technically a deputy minister on the Buryat Council of Ministers took us over to the communist party guesthouse and said "Would this half of the house work for you?" And with some tolerance on everybody's part, it turned out to be a pretty nice setup. We had a two room, bath, vestibule type setup that had a door that we could lock, and that was our space. And then we used the guesthouse's kitchen. In fact we restocked it with a washer and a dryer and a freezer and a side-by-side refrigerator, and shelves and cupboards, all of which came in from Yokota Air Force Base.

Q: I assume that the communist party headquarters was delighted to have . . .

FLOYD: Absolutely, because I know that that equipment was not pulled out after we left. We were the only folks that they kept there permanently. When we left, the US representation went back to a TDY status. Partly because of where the treaty was and I also would hazard a guess partly because they couldn't find anybody adventurousness enough to do so.

Q: What about living there?

FLOYD: It was the perfect time to be there in the sense that the Soviet Union still existed, which meant that there was still fairly strong central control. And the Soviets wanted the INF treaty to work. And therefore, when we identified a legitimate living need, they made it happen. On the other hand, perestroika was well and fully in place. And

everybody talked to us and we talked to everybody. The actual workload was less than fifty-percent actually engaged in the INF Treaty. A goodly part of the reason for having someone there permanently was to convey the image to the Soviets that we were prepared to inspect at any time. The INF Treaty provides for twelve spot inspections a year, across the entire country, which would say if half went to Moscow and half went to Ulan Ude, it would still only be six a year. So our work was not heavy day-to-day, but what we were was the presence. The Soviets could never be sure when we might inspect.

There was also routine inspections through Ulan Ude because of where the Soviets destroyed their missiles. They launched to destroy. And those were planned, those were advertised. So essentially every morning we got up and we called Moscow and said "Is there a plane coming tomorrow?" And 200 days out of the year, they said "No." So we hung up and we were done with INF for 24 hours. But it could be Saturday, it could be Sunday. The rest of the time we did public diplomacy. We did outreach. We were there.

Q: Let's talk about the public diplomacy. Were you called up on to speak at schools?

FLOYD: Yes. I did a weekly lecture at the local pedagogical institute, so I figure that had corrupted an entire generation of teachers in Siberia. We also did spot lectures at other educational institutions and appeared at cultural events.

Q: Were you getting good questions from the audiences?

FLOYD: Of course it crossed the whole range. The most thoughtful ones were the comparative ones. You always had somebody who asked you the nice hostile ones. But one of the advantages of being an American is that you don't always have to agree with your government. You can argue their position and then you can say "But not all Americans agree," and go down that path too. And just that fact – whatever the issue – that you as a U.S. government representative could present both sides as valid was . . . You could see these gears going "Oh, that hurts."

Q: Were they reveling in the fact that they could get up and ask questions?

FLOYD: Yes. And when it was a larger group, particularly at schools, they tended to ask more logical, policy, history type questions. When it was smaller groups, or social groups, it was all about American life. And so many of them reminded me of questions that we had gotten on United States Information Agency exhibits. "How much?"

One of the advantages of living at this guesthouse was that the maids at the guesthouse also cleaned up our spaces, which was nice. And the first time one of them saw a J.C. Penney catalogue, her first question was "Who can order from here?" Because the assumption was "Do you have this because you are a government employee? Do you have this because you are a diplomat?" "No. I have this because I have dollars."

Q: Who were the people? Were these transplanted Russians?

FLOYD: They were all sorts of folks. One of the big historical sites out there was from when there were a lot of Decembrists that were exiled out there in the 1800s. An amazing number of current residents were folks who had come out to Siberia in their youths to help build the trans-Siberian railroad and stayed. Most of them fell in love with the adventure, the distance, the cowboy mentality.

Q: Like Wyoming and Idaho, or something like that.

FLOYD: And there's an indigenous population, the Buryats.

Q: How were they treated?

FLOYD: Not well.

Q: Were they essentially an Asian group?

FLOYD: Yes. They are kin to the Mongolians. In fact the languages are mutually understandable.

Q: How about the local authorities? Were they concerned about you?

FLOYD: It was the next step in being convinced that things would never go back to being as controlled as they had been. We always joked that because Ulan Ude had been a closed city, they had never been on distribution for those memos from Moscow about how to be obnoxious to foreigners. And instead, their very human Siberian warmth came out. All we had to do was mention that we might sort of like to try and do something, and they would make it happen. They set our kids up in nursery school. They got my husband into a gym. I said that I like to swim and they set me up at the airplane factory to use their swimming pool. And of course, because I was the beloved foreigner, they had to do it during the executives' hour. So I'm swimming with the director. I remember the locker room conversations with his wife.

You talked about did we ever have a chance to sit down and drink a lot of tea. In Ulan Ude I drank enough tea to float Noah's ark. In part because we had time. In part because that was a lot of what I could do. I went to English language classes and competitions, and Veterans day celebrations. And we were on the podium for the May Day parade. And all of the holidays, they thought we were pretty cool.

Q: What about the inspections?

FLOYD: We were the diplomatic air crew escorts. So our job was, when this 141 flies in, make sure that . . .

Q: C-141 is a large transport plane.

FLOYD: It's a large cargo plane coming in from the American air force base in Yokota, Japan. American air crews, an interagency group of American inspectors. We made sure that the plane was taken care of. We made sure that the crew was taken care of. We made sure that the inspectors had what they needed in Ulan Ude. And then we put them on Soviet military aircraft with Soviet escorts and they went off. We were babysitters. We did not do the inspections.

Q: Did you get any feel for the hand of Moscow there, our embassy?

FLOYD: That's who I called once a day. That was it. They were helpful, in the sense that we had to do our own accounting. I mean, we had to do all the paperwork for paying the rent. For buying the garage, for some really funny stuff. Whenever we sent in these papers, I'd say "I've done this to the best of my ability. If I've violated some rule or regulation, tell me. Or, you can always send me to Siberia."

Q: Did you ever feel the fine hand of our intelligence services wanting to know what was going on there?

FLOYD: I wouldn't even characterize it as intelligence services. I would characterize it as the role of an American diplomat. My collection was all entirely open, from local newspapers, from local officials. While we were there, the Soviet Union had one of its first multi-candidate local elections. We talked to a number of the candidates. We went to polling places on election day. I had no classified reporting capability, so everything that I wrote back to Moscow was all unclassified. But this was a time when, for the first time, the embassy had incredible access to developments outside of Moscow and Leningrad.

Q: Was the view of America different from the middle of Siberia?

FLOYD: Oh, very much so. Because there had been so little contact with America. They knew America from those very few films that the Soviets would allow to be shown. And then they knew it from Soviet propaganda. I was always amazed at the Soviets' ability to read into second and third level effects. They would watch some horrendous movie about gang warfare in the United States - the Soviet Government let it in to show how violent, disturbed and dysfunctional American society was. But what the Soviet viewing audience would see would be the latest models of cars or that even that the crack junkie was wearing Levi jeans, which was the ultimate status symbol. They were so used to being lied to by their government.

The biggest problem was when what was shown was right. They had all along assumed that if their government said white, it was black. And if the government said black, then it was white. They were so imbued with hypocrisy that they assumed that that was the way everything worked.

Q: The old story is that at one point right after World War II - showing how awful things were - that the movie the Grapes of Wrath was shown and many of the Russians said

"Look, their driving Model T Fords." It looks pretty rickety, but these are people who were able to move around in cars.

FLOYD: That they had a car, that they were able to move, and that there were government officials nominally trying to help in some minimal way. And honestly, without a bribe. So as I say, those secondary messages were sometimes pretty amazing.

Q: Was there any opening up of American movies, American TV or anything like that?

FLOYD: No. The Soviet media system was still highly government controlled and, quite frankly, from talking to my cultural affairs people back in Moscow, it was often a matter of money. They would acquire pirated material. But what you did start to see more series that the Soviets were able to buy from other countries. Cheap series.

Q: Well there was this Mexican serial. Was that going at that time, of the little girl who came from the small pueblo in Mexico? I was there some years later just for a short time, but this was hot stuff.

FLOYD: I watched much more of the news programs and not many of the serials. But that would have been the type of program that they acquired.

Q: Were you getting any reflections of dislike of Moscow and central command?

FLOYD: Always. But I know of few organizations that haven't hated the home office.

Q: He's the son of a bitch from out of town, you know. But anyway, so you were . . .

FLOYD: Wherever you go. If you are in a school system, it's always the superintendent's fault. If you are in a military system, it's always the generals. Same in Siberia. It's always Moscow.

Q: You mentioned an airplane factory and all, is this a military airplane?

FLOYD: Yes.

Q: Did that cause problems?

FLOYD: Apparently not, because they let me drive out there. They gave me the ID badge to get past the guard. Now, I didn't go wandering around. I did not abuse the hospitality that they had extended to me.

Q: By the way, did our inspectors find any hot stuff?

FLOYD: No.

Q: I suppose we had that place covered and they had us covered with satellite pictures and all that.

FLOYD: The treaty was successfully implemented.

Q: The feeling was one of cooperation?

FLOYD: Yes. Keeping people sticking to the rules – the funny one was that the inspectors were not allowed to carry personal cameras. Well every single group wanted a picture of themselves in Ulan Ude. One of its claims to fame is having the largest bust of Lenin. So they all wanted to go down to the main square and get their picture taken with Dead Fred the Head Red. But they were not allowed by the treaty to have a camera. But we were, so we took more pictures in front of that stupid statue. So the Soviets made them stick with the requirements of the treaty, but also provided all of the requirements of the treaty.

Q: How efficient did you find the airport personnel when dealing with them?

FLOYD: Spooky. One of the facts of Soviet air control operations is that they give you altitude from landing and not from sea level. And Ulan Ude is at about five thousand feet. So that the air controllers would tell our guys in the 141 to descend to 10,000 feet. Well they would descend to 10,000 feet above sea lever, which was only 5,000 feet above the city. So our big green "crocodile" frequently came in very low. And when they would come out of the clouds, you could hear the crew over the tower going "------." So we briefed crews with the initial factoid that Ulan Ude is at about 5,000 feet above sea level and you will be given instructions relative to landing height, not sea level. So they'll land you safe, but you will have varying impressions of the height they think you think you are at.

Q: Sounds like fun. What about refueling and that sort of thing?

FLOYD: They were very good. We demanded a different standard of safety and performance, notably no smoking around fuel trucks. But they caught on that that was what they were expected to do. They were very respectful of our requests for operational safety. "You have to stand back this far. We need these kind of barriers." And for the Floyd family, we were also exceedingly appreciative of their understanding that in addition to the provisions of the treaty, these flights supported the Floyd family. So that when the cases of diapers and the cases of water and, closer to the 4th of July, when the multiple watermelons and cases of beer for the 4th of July party came off, we made provisions for a local customs official to be there and properly clear them.

Q: Did you throw a 4th of July party?

FLOYD: We had a wonderful 4th of July party.

Q: How did that go?

FLOYD: It was seventh heaven. It was amazing because we invited the full range of people that we came into contact with. We invited the general who was head of the operation. We invited the little lady from the hotel next door who gave my kids haircuts and wouldn't take money for it. We invited nursery school teachers, theater directors, customs officials, all of the military guys who worked at the airport, everybody at the airport, from the airport director to the fueling guys. And you could see them having some difficulty with the democracy of that collection. They loved our beer. When they found out that we didn't have any vodka, they went out and got some and brought it in. So we had a lot of really happy people. But it was a great success.

Q: By this time the video tape business was going. Were you able to get U.S. programs?

FLOYD: We lived on video tapes. We had regular mail service on the 141 that came it. And so our family could send us tapes. We could order tapes. We re-taped over them and sent tapes out to convince the grandparents that their grandkids were still alive.

Q: Would you have people over to see things?

FLOYD: Oh yeah. The other big parties that we had were Thanksgivings.

Q: Were you getting any reflection of people wondering what the hell was going on back on Moscow? I mean Gorbachev was doing his thing and this was such a revolution, really, that it must have made local people both happy, but pretty uncomfortable. I mean, they'd been used to one thing . . .

FLOYD: Exactly. And holding in their background the fact that one part of their heritage was exile. They were nervous about what was coming. Excited, but still a little antsy. The first round of elections, there were a few sort-of-independent candidates who didn't do very well, but they don't do well in our country. It was the folks who came with organizations – labor unions, communist party – that won. They are the ones who had name recognition. No overwhelming amateur observations of ballot box stuffing. But the first time you do anything, you tend to lean towards the familiar.

Q: Did you have visitors from our embassy?

FLOYD: Yes. They came out regularly to exchange paperwork, to make sure we hadn't gone native. They also came out and physically stayed in our apartment so that things like, I could go to Moscow for pre-natal care. That we always had the post manned. Even when we knew there wasn't going to be an inspection, you still kept somebody there to present the ability to receive an inspection.

Q: Where was the decision made to inspect? Do you know?

FLOYD: I was never involved in that decision. But my guess is that some of those other national technical means revealed an unusual movement of trucks, or a build up of

personnel, or some sort of indicator. And then my guess is that every now and then somebody just went . . . .

Q: Flipped a coin.

FLOYD: Flipped a coin.

Q: I'm sure. That's the way you do it. At this point, was there any feeling of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union?

FLOYD: No. It was a pretty good time. The tension for most Russians was internal and it was uncertainty. Not civil war type tension, but just "I think I like it, but where are we going and what else is going to change?"

Q: We're talking about seventy years of one type of rule.

FLOYD: It was uncertainty, and that meant that most of the focus was internal.

Q: Well then, you had another child. You were a real producer, weren't you? How many children do you have?

FLOYD: We have three. That was the end. I got my girl and I stopped. It was one of my frequent lecture topics because people always asked me how I could be a mother and work and all this sort of stuff. And I talked about being able to make choices and having a supportive husband, and having an economy that was developed enough to provide me disposable diapers.

Q: This is probably a good place to stop.

FLOYD: Sure. I do need to get into . . .

Q: Okay. And so we will pick this up next time. You left there when?

FLOYD: We left in December, supposedly on R&R. But our daughter was born on the 10th of January. So we came to Washington State, stayed for Christmas, had the baby, and then my husband and older son went back to Moscow in early February and the baby and our youngest son and I followed later in February.

Q: So we'll be talking about February of 90 and we'll talk about your time – you were in Moscow for how long then?

FLOYD: Again, just from February until that summer. June, July maybe. July I think. Normal summer turnover.

Q: Okay, we'll pick it up there.

Q: This is tape three, side one with Jane Floyd. And we are not sure what we have covered, so we are . . . You came back from Ulan Ude, you went to Moscow and you were there for . . . ?

FLOYD: Approximately nine months. Most of 1990.

Q: We may not have covered that. We'll have to check on that next time. We'll start here in late 1990 when we're talking about you being with regional political-military affairs.

FLOYD: For Europe.

Q: For Europe. And you were there from late 90 until . . . ?

FLOYD: From the 90 turnover season to the 92 turnover season. A regular two year tour.

Q: What were your responsibilities?

FLOYD: Initially it had a lot to do with ESDI, which is the European Security and Defense Identity. And later I became responsible for all of the alphabet soup of various arms control negotiations, from Open Skies, which was a derivative of the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations, to the chemical weapons treaty as well as the biological weapons convention.

Q: This was a whole new era, wasn't it? I've talked to people who have been involved in negotiations for eras, practically. I'm working with Avis Bohlen right now. And so much of this, quite frankly, just seems to be time to go to Switzerland and sit around the table and drink chocolate, or something.

FLOYD: It was certainly a very great change. The most significant change was obviously the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Where the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty was initially negotiated essentially between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, by the early 90s there was no Warsaw Pact. And therefore it was NATO negotiating with a whole range of new countries. It required a re-thinking of where did Europe end and Asia begin. What did you do with Kazakhstan? And it was fascinating to observe the dynamics of a previously unified position, usually articulated out of Moscow, shifting to the countries of Eastern Europe having their own opinions and their own concerns.

The Open Skies treaty was a confidence building measure which allowed countries to over-fly each other, take pictures, and share those pictures to increase their confidence that other countries were not shifting military forces or building new tank battalions. Prior to the early 90s, it had been a negotiation of NATO over-flying Warsaw Pact countries. After that it became a question of Poland wanting to over-fly Russia and Romania wanting to over-fly Hungary. We had struggled for a while with Turkey wanting to over-fly Greece within the NATO context. And with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact it became considerably more complex, but slightly amusing to watch how

positions were developed in terms of the United States consulting with key allies and then NATO and then taking it to the open negotiations.

Q: I go back, when I came in the Foreign Service in 55, Eisenhower was proposing this over-flight. Later we took care of that by using the U-2.

FLOYD: But that served U.S. purposes. We had matured to the broader realization that it was more than just the U.S. who had to be confident. We were not prepared to share our satellite photography and therefore we had to devise a way to share the confidence.

Q: Let's talk about this. What role did you have in this extremely complex who was going to fly what where?

FLOYD: Ambassador John Hawes was the head of our delegation and together with the Political-Military Affairs Bureau we shared what we called reporting and guidance responsibility, meaning that we were the folks who had to take all the notes and send the daily telegram off to Washington saying "Here's what was discussed. Here are the questions that we need answered. Please respond before opening of business tomorrow."

When we shifted off, meaning one of us was in Vienna and one of us was in D.C. – when you shifted off these responsibilities – then you became the individual who had to draft the guidance cable and get it cleared in Washington and send it back. It meant spending two, three, four weeks in Vienna at a time, but swapping out with colleagues from the PM bureau, so you weren't there forever.

Q: Let's take some of these issues. How did the Russians respond to Poland wanting to fly over their [airspace]?

FLOYD: It required a re-look of the matrix of what country could fly over what country how many times. Because the discussion had been going on so long, many countries had come close to already establishing the number of flights, and it simply came down to re-allocating those flights. Because the information was going to be shared and because the concerns tended to be common, NATO was willing to give up some of its flight privileges in order to allow the Eastern European countries to meet their perceived need to be the actual flier of these missions.

Q: For example, were the Poles serious about wanting to go over Russia?

FLOYD: Absolutely. Remember we were less than a decade out of the imposition of martial law and the fear of Soviet invasion.

Q: And how about the Russians? Because most of this was really directed against Russia, wasn't it?

FLOYD: It certainly was that. And the United States I would credit with going out of its way to try and not make it seem so. You couldn't avoid it, but it meant the United States

asking for a quota to over-fly Canada. Using one of our allowed flights to over-fly an ally in order to demonstrate that the true purpose of the treaty was indeed to build confidence and trust.

Q: How did the Canadians react?

FLOYD: The United States is reasonably good about consulting its allies and it was not news to the Canadians.

Q: I'm an old Greek hand, served in Greece for four years. What about the Turkish-Greek thing?

FLOYD: It was an interesting dynamic within NATO and it continues to be so today. But because those discussions took place initially within ever smaller groups, you resolved your differences such that when it became a public discussion, there wasn't the wrangling. You could sense in body language the discomfort and the "Yeah, you rolled us on that one." But they were able to see the overarching goals of the negotiation. And as member of NATO, they knew that they had to be good members. That they might have to take what they might not otherwise like.

Q: Did the various countries have the equipment to do these?

FLOYD: There was a tremendous amount of negotiations over what would be the standards of equipment. They were obviously well below what the U.S. or the Soviet Union was capable of doing. But it was specifically pitched so that a variety of nations could participate. What was your forward looking infrared radar aperture. I learned more about overhead photography and radar than I probably ever need to know. But that was a concern because you were going to be flying equipment with observers . . . you'll have to read the treaty, but it's a pretty ornate . . . that the country that is being over-flown gets to have an observer on the aircraft that is over-flying it so that the country that is being over-flown would know exactly what equipment was being used, obviously exposing that equipment and its capabilities to exposure. So the U.S. was concerned about technology exposure, but the treaty was pitched adequately low that even our technology transfer people could agree.

Q: In other words, if we did it with observers, we used type C equipment.

FLOYD: No, the treaty provided for a given level. Now, it did not affect or in any way regulate what countries could do on their own. It regulated what they could do under the auspices of Open Skies.

Q: I would think this would call for a tremendous almost air-controller apparatus somewhere.

FLOYD: We are not talking about thousands of flights a year. We are talking about hundreds of flights a year. And you have to file appropriate flight plans, give appropriate

warning. The theory was that you could give a country two or three days warning, and if what you were looking for was massed tank formations, they weren't going to be able to move them in three days. So if you really had a concern, you were going to be able to find it.

Q: What about countries such as the close ends of the Soviet Union like Byelorussia and Ukraine.

FLOYD: They got their own delegations. They got their own quotas. They got their own equipment if they wish to use it.

Q: Basically the smaller countries would be not trying to fly over the United States, were they?

FLOYD: There was minimal interest in flying over the United States.

Q: Except for going to the _____ or the equivalent thereof.

FLOYD: No. As I said, it was a confidence building measure and there were few countries in NATO or the former Warsaw Pact that truly thought that the United States was going to launch an imminent invasion, particularly from the United States. Remember, they could still fly over Germany if they were concerned that our bases there were doing something funny.

Q: How did our military respond to all this sort of thing?

FLOYD: They appreciated the value. They were mostly edgy about the commitment of equipment, the commitment of aircraft to fly these missions which, because they had other demands on them, they didn't see Open Skies as a primary higher-end use of that equipment. But again, because we were talking dozens and not hundreds of flights, it was a consideration but it certainly was not a barrier to acceptance.

Q: Was it the feeling of "Okay, you all get this, but we're not going to bother with it" or did we feel we had to?

FLOYD: One of the hallmarks of U.S. negotiations is we only negotiate what we intend to fulfill. And therefore in signing the treaty we made the commitment to have that type of equipment and personnel available when needed. And we did and got StratCom (Strategic Command), today there's an Open Skies aircraft sitting out there ready to go if somebody wants to fly.

Q: Have you followed that at all?

FLOYD: Only minimally.

Q: I was wondering if anybody has done anything.

FLOYD: My understanding from random little snippets in the Post and from folks who have flown the missions is, it happens.

Q: Are they finding things they shouldn't find?

FLOYD: No. As Ambassador Bohlen has told you, it is a different era. Security and cooperation in Europe has moved to the economic fields. Poland's concern about a Lithuanian invasion is reasonably low now that they are all members of NATO. Russia is probably more concerned about McDonald's invading.

Q: It's interesting. Well how about some of the other negotiations, the chemical stuff? I think an awful lot of this would be to get rid of the damn stuff, wouldn't it?

FLOYD: One of the greatest challenges in both the chemical and biological weapons convention was the fact that your greatest concern is dual use equipment. There is simply a lot of stuff – as we found out post 9/11, from crop dusters to how you immunize chickens – that requires the same type of equipment that you can use to poison a battlefield, attack an opponent. So while yes, the desire is to destroy Sarin gas. The fact of the matter is that you often have more control or concern about the equipment involved in doing so, the technology rather than the actual supplies.

Q: Were there attempts to limit the technology?

FLOYD: There are any number of subsidiary elements in both the chemical and biological weapons treaty. When you go to the Missile Technology Control Regime, it is as stated, all about the technology.

Q: I would think that on the chemical and biological thing, you would certainly find the major countries all on the same boat trying to do something because there's a real concern about it getting into other hands.

FLOYD: It was apparent even in the early 90s that the concern was shifting from state-on-state major adversary risks to the others. Where Germany is fairly open about access to plants and places that would control that type of equipment, Romania's ability to control it is limited. Little country X's desire to obtain it – Iran, Iraq. You are correct that the growing concern is less the major powers and much more so what their commercial sector might be willing to do for purely financial gain towards those countries who are less concerned were international opinion or stature.

Q: Speaking of that, one of the themes that goes through when we start talking about limitations and various things is the commercial factor in regards to the French and Germans, and Russians too. We try to sit on things and they essentially – if there's a buck to be made, they go after it. I'm probably being unfair, but . . .

FLOYD: I would say that's probably unfair particularly because a number of those European entities can often have a relationship with American entities. If the American company is banned from doing something it is unfortunate the frequency with which they will turn to one of their European subsidiaries or partners to do the same thing.

Q: So we're talking about the dynamics of capitalism working . . .

FLOYD: And pots and kettles calling each other black. There's a lot of ability to point out the foibles of commercialism.

Q: Were these things that cropped up – I mean the commercial aspect – during your negotiations?

FLOYD: It made for very interesting negotiations because while the United States Government was prepared to agree to X, Y or Z, we then had to turn to American industry and ask was it possible, what effect it would have on the commercial sector. So it was one of the first times that I had ever been in an arms control negotiating facet where you not only had to coordinate the U.S. position between the Department of State, Department of Treasury and the Department of Commerce, you also had to get the American chemical industry or American agricultural industry to say "Yes, we can live with this."

Q: How did you find them as being partners with the negotiations?

FLOYD: Reasonable. They recognized that they were dealing with an American strategic desire to accomplish something. The question was mostly how would it impact their operations and what could be done to make it still conceivable. They have their own industrial secrets. We talk about Open Skies and technology transfer, they have their own industrial secrets. They don't want the French Department of Agriculture seeing how we get so much meat out of our chickens. It was just an interesting addition to the complexity of international relations.

Q: I guess it was the late 80s or thereabout when we were very concerned about propeller technology. I guess a Swedish firm was getting our propeller technology for submarines.

FLOYD: That was well out of my can, but . . .

Q: Are we still concerned about passing on . . . ?

FLOYD: We are still concerned today about technology transfer.

Q: Do we have controls?

FLOYD: Oh absolutely. Regulated both by the Department of State and by the Department of Commerce.

Q: Did you find that we were working in pretty close cooperation with the British?

FLOYD: Yes. Most of these conventions, most of these regimes are as broad as possible, if nothing else so we can wag our fingers at people. And in recognition of – as we discussed before – that many large companies these days are registered in various places for various subdivisions. You have to get the Bahamas to join our convention because otherwise although its manufactured in country X and the headquarters are in country X, if you place your order by fax to a hotel room on the Bahamas, that's the government whose export control regulations pertain.

Q: You must have been loaded with experts on various things, weren't you?

FLOYD: Absolutely.

Q: As these negotiations proceeded, I would imagine that the expert cadre became a big profession.

FLOYD: It's always been a major part of the U.S. Government, the expertise that we can bring to bear. Someone needs to know what can you see with a three meter SAR (synthetic aperture radar).

Q: What role were you playing?

FLOYD: At that point primarily scribe; some policy suggestions. A wise delegation does not simply report back to Washington and then throw their hands up in the air. They report back to Washington what was discussed and suggest that progress could be made if the U.S. position included X,Y and Z. Washington has to give you that guidance, but it's amazingly more productive if you ask for the guidance that you think will work.

Q: Well did you find by this time, when we're doing this in the early 90s, the communications – I'm thinking of telephone, fax and things like this – had these things matured enough? Or had e-mail come in?

FLOYD: E-mail I do not remember being generally available out of the delegation in Vienna. Because most of the discussion and certainly the guidance was classified, phones were limited to STUs, which we had available, but we were negotiating in a palace in downtown Vienna and the STU set up was . . .

Q: STU means . . . ?

FLOYD: Secure Telephone Unit. And then they became STEs. Whatever. It was available. So that was only for items that you needed to get a response on immediately. Because otherwise our guidance and actions had to be coordinated and you couldn't do that by secure telephone.

Q: So, how did you communicate?

FLOYD: Cable. You spent all day the Hofburg Palace and you went back to the embassy or the delegation – we worked out of both the American embassy in Vienna as well as the CSCE, Conference for Security Cooperation in Europe, office, both of which had appropriate facilities. And you would go back and you would type of the reporting cable and the request for guidance and send it out at ten, eleven o'clock at night and be back in the embassy at seven o'clock in the morning to make sure you got your answer.

Q: Were there any negotiations that were particularly difficult?

FLOYD: The difficulty was the complexity of the subject matter and the number of participants. I never saw anybody yelling at anybody. No one was pounding shoes on the desk. It was interesting to see how positions were developed, meaning that the U.S. got its guidance, then we talked to key allies, then we talked to the NATO caucus, and then we went into negotiations. So that by the time you got the broadest spectrum a lot of the interventions were predictable.

Q: It's sort of funny, when you have things like the Greek-Turks, the Hungarians-Romanians . . .

FLOYD: German-Poles, German-French.

Q: All of these groups, all of who have their own baggage, including ours. I would think you would be stuck listening to diatribes about the Armenian massacre or something.

FLOYD: There were lots of long conversations. There was a lot of rehashing of history. And you end up settling for the lowest common denominator. But because you are talking about confidence building, if you can even agree on that denominator, you are making progress.

Q: Did you feel that you were developing group think, all of you together?

FLOYD: What do you mean by group think?

Q: In other words, all of you together working on these things, that after a while you began to see things from everybody's point of view and you were able to reach consensus much better than if new teams came in all the time.

FLOYD: Not specifically, because most nations, most delegations, stuck to very predictable positions. What was needed was to find out what they could accept, what was that lowest common denominator, and then try to ratchet it up that one little step.

Q: How about the Stans, the Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union? How did they fit into this?

FLOYD: That was one of those wonderful questions because it also impacted on the initial CFE treaty in terms of what constituted a flank anymore. I cannot remember the specifics of how it worked out, but they were included. The Conference on Confidence and Security Building in Europe became the Organization – the OSCE – and subsequently took on a huge role in the Balkans. But it was an organization that had grown well beyond what would appear to be the definition of its name. It had Japanese observers.

Q: I know I went to one election in Bosnia as an observer and we had a whole group of Japanese there.

FLOYD: Under the OSCE.

Q: All under the OSCE.

FLOYD: I would take that as a victory. Having a forum, although criticized as a gabfest, very much like the Helsinki human rights convention. For years it was a very frustrating forum to simply rehash old positions. Yet the very fact that they existed and had habitual contact relationships and a semi-agreed set of terms to disagree on, but it meant that when there was an opening, they were amazingly able to rise to the occasion and take on new roles.

Q: Was there concern that the CSCE and then OSCE was developing too much of a bureaucracy? When I think of the European Union, which may sink because of its bureaucracy.

FLOYD: It never purported to being as executive as the European Union. Neither CSCE nor OSCE ever presumed to have any governance role. It was always a voluntary organization of consensus. It did not impose taxes. It did not impose internal regulations. It provided election monitors.

Q: Actually, this must have been kind of fun, wasn't it?

FLOYD: It meant for a lot of travel at a time when my husband was assigned to the Navy Yard in Philadelphia. So it put a certain degree of stress on the family. But it was certainly a very interesting time to see the impact of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and all of its follow-on in terms of independence in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

Q: Well this of course was what so many of us had been working at for so many years.

FLOYD: Absolutely.

Q: Well, when you left in 92 in your two year tour, I guess you felt quite a bit of progress had been made.

FLOYD: It was very heartening. It was amazing in the sociological sense of watching NATO, which had won – if you will – when it lost the overarching, defining "other" of the Warsaw Pact, it was interesting to see NATO then go into a certain re-examination of its role and, like an organization, that can be difficult when you have to define yourself internally instead of as opposed to an outside factor.

Q: Were you seeing in Washington a beginning of questioning what are we doing involved in Europe and all that? Or was there pretty much consensus?

FLOYD: Certainly the people that I worked with, the overarching principle was that the U.S. is inextricably linked with Europe, commercially, politically, security-wise. There was no other way. Now, admittedly I'm working within the European Bureau, which would have a certain default position towards that.

Q: Within the European bureau, did you get any feeling that there was the old hands who had been fighting the Battle of Berlin for fifty years or so, about how far you can lower tailgates and all that? In other words, old timers who weren't really used to a fast moving pace?

FLOYD: I did not see that so much as the European Bureau trying to figure out what to call its former Soviet Union offices as Russia struggled with its own name and everyone else tried to figure out . . . The Soviet desk could no longer be, so who did you include in it and what did you do about the new countries and where did you put them? Look back at what we used to call the office of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia. It couldn't just be Eastern Europe because Yugoslavia was not Eastern Europe. It had to have its own little letter in that title. And then trying to figure out what to do with the old SOV, it took a decade before you got the Russia desk. There was the CIS, the Commonwealth of Independent States, then the former Soviet Union. It was an interesting vocabulary challenge and that reflected itself of course within the Bureau of European Affairs because the Soviet desk had been so large, so removed from any of the other issues that the European bureau dealt with. Now to have them see a new set of relationships was a challenge.

Q: In 92 you moved. What did you do?

FLOYD: I took an assignment with the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, which was a six-month bridge assignment before starting French language training before going out to the embassy in Suva, Fiji.

Q: What was your bridge assignment?

FLOYD: It was primarily to deal with the human rights report of – I'm going to say nine, but it always felt like 800 – the nine countries that were handled by the Pacific Islands Affairs desk. And anything else that came up, from when prime ministers came to visit and you needed more escorts, when you needed any number of things. It was a Y tour, meaning I did not actually have a designated position. All the other desk officers

remained in place, so I was an extra. I was a designated hitter who could be sent in as needed.

Q: Then you took French.

FLOYD: Then I took French for six months.

Q: What were you taking French to go to Suva for?

FLOYD: Because the embassy in Suva has consular and political reporting responsibilities for the French territories in the South Pacific, meaning New Caledonia and French Polynesia.

Q: You did that from when to when?

FLOYD: I was in Fiji from 93 to 96. Summer of 93 to summer of 96.

Q: Now what happened family-wise?

FLOYD: We all went to Fiji. My husband retired from the Navy in the spring of 93 with the singular request that we go someplace that he didn't have to wear long underwear, and we ended up in the South Pacific.

Q: How'd you break out of the Russian orbit?

FLOYD: It was very intentional. One of the advantages of the Foreign Service is that they do ask you to be multi-faceted. And I convinced the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs that I had enough learning capacity that I could bring some of my knowledge of Russia's own ethnic challenges to the ethnic challenges in the South Pacific, specifically Fiji which had already had one coup over ethnic conflicts. And they paneled me.

Q: Okay. This would be 93 to 96. Explain. What was the situation at first when you went out there in Fiji and then I know New Caledonia is always having problems.

FLOYD: They all have their specific challenges. And the Embassy in Fiji is also accredited to Tonga, which is a monarchy trying to figure out how to work in a world of democracy. We were accredited to Nauru, which is trying to figure out how not to be abused by slim and slimy entrepreneurs who . . .

Q: It's just a pile of bird dung, isn't it?

FLOYD: That is correct. Hottest place I have ever been. Then you've got countries like Tuvalu, which global warming could conceivably wipe out, seeing that the highest point in the country is about two feet above high tide.

Q: Maybe we ought to take each one at a time. While you were there, what was the situation in Fiji?

FLOYD: It was actually a fairly hopeful time. For much of it, they had agreed to a constitutional review and had set a committee under the auspices of an eminent British jurist to try and re-craft a new constitution for Fiji which would figure out a way to give the Indo-Fijians adequate representation and yet assuage the ethnic Fijian concern that they were losing their country. Some very good discussions. Some very good engagement. Appeared to be moving in a hopeful way. So I left fairly happy. During that three years, the saddest thing that happened was the former president, a gentleman by the name of Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau passed away. And it was very interesting to see the ornateness of his funeral arrangements and the inauguration of a new president in a skirt and sandals.

Q: Let's talk about Fiji. The ethnic – I think it was the native Fijians and then the Indians who had been brought there as laborers, wasn't it?

FLOYD: That is the major distinction. There is a growing Chinese presence. Since independence they have divided themselves into ethnic Fijians, Indo-Fijians and "others." Seats in the parliament were divvied up by those distinctions. They paralleled religious divisions. They paralleled economic divisions. Paralleled geographic, occupational divisions. A pretty complex situation.

Q: Having both Indians and Chinese on a small island. These are two very strong entrepreneurial groups.

FLOYD: And that was the challenge. The "others" and the Indo-Fijians were the economically successful outward face of Fiji. The ethnic Fijians maintain political power but were challenged to get that economic power. Partly because the majority lived in small isolated villages and had subsistence lifestyles. They were not predominately urban. They were not predominately commercial agricultural workers. They owned the land, but it was the Indo-Fijians who ran the cane farms.

Q: I spent a week in Pohnpei, which is different, but at the same time, seeing the Federated States of Micronesia. It was one of the saddest places I've been because it looked like it was living off of essentially subsistence. They had given up their fishing. I mean there was nothing there except for Uncle Sam handing out checks.

FLOYD: One of the interesting elements of Fiji is that the dependency relationship, such as it exists, for Fiji is with Australia. The inheritance of a British Commonwealth. It meant that the United States was not seen as the big brother. It meant that we were actually seen quite nicely as an honest broker and sort of an ideal. We had more issues with immigration. Fiji is the single largest, by percentage, participant in the diversity lottery program. Everybody wants out.

Q: Where do they go?

FLOYD: West Coast. Lots in California. Huge Tongan population in Utah. The Mormons have made their connection. It is exceedingly interesting to see the population flows.

Q: Well these are big people, aren't they?

FLOYD: I was going to say, ten years ago if you looked at the NFL rosters there were no islander names. And now you get a whole bunch of them. We used to joke that every landscaper in California was probably a Pacific Islander because they could lift trees single-handedly.

Q: What did they do, outside of the ones that ended up in the National Football League?

FLOYD: Sugar cane growing is a major economic factor. It was dependent on European Union and U.S. sugar quotas, or in the case of the EU, as sugar subsidy. They had a significant pine export, a wood export capability. They were part of the 1970s tuna treaty with the US, which was the only U.S. subsidy, if you will, which was greatly reduced by that time because the United States no longer needed to keep its access to these countries vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, which was the genesis of the tuna treaty. So those are the major exports. And the tourist industry.

Q: How was that doing?

FLOYD: It had rebounded from the coups of the late 80s. It had recovered from a cyclone by the name of Kina that came through before we got there. But every time there was any agitation, primarily by ethnic Fijians, you saw an instant impact, particularly on the Australian market.

Q: These coups were what?

FLOYD: Almost the stuff of the mouse that roars. In the first one, an army colonel walked into the parliament unarmed and said "We're taking over. Everybody get in the buses. We are taking you to the government guest house to hold you." I mean, that was their hostage taking idea, send them to the government guest house. And he set up another government. Literally not a shot was fired. There were weapons visible, but never used.

Q: And then what happened?

FLOYD: You probably have to be more of a Pacific Island scholar than I am. I always saw it as a desperate inferiority complex where the ethnic Fijians thought they could not compete. The Indo-Fijians seemed to be primarily interested in getting along – living. Even during the coup era, immediately after the coup, there were Indo-Fijians who joined the government, because what they wanted to do was live in peace. There were an isolated number of ethnic Fijians who found that challenging. Who saw the inevitable takeover of economic power over political power.

And I also think they saw two other elements which challenged them. One was that the best and the brightest of ethnic Fijians beat feet. They did not stay and re-energize Fiji. There was also an increasing inter-marriage trend. Not huge. But enough so that those who by their own legal definition of ethnic Fijian was reducing. And because the Indo-Fijian definition was somewhat broader, that number stayed solid and the "other" percentage was growing by leaps and bounds. And the "others" were the most energetic, the most globalized.

Q: These were mostly Chinese, were they?

FLOYD: A real mix is the issue. It was Australians who had taken on Fijian citizenship. It was French folks who wanted to live in the South Pacific but not in the French territories. It was American entrepreneurs who had taken on Fijian citizenship. And it was anyone, any ethnic Fijian, who had married one of those folks because when you married one of those folks you lost your ethnic Fijian purity, which of course as an American who comes from a culture where on St. Patrick's Day everyone is Irish and on Chinese New Year everyone is Chinese and you loudly proclaim . . . (turn over tape) Our definition of ethnicity is first off voluntary, self-selected and quite fungible.

Q: Yes. I play the German card, the Spanish card and the Irish card depending on the audience.

FLOYD: It was one of those mindset elements. And then the fact that what political party you would likely belong to, what parliamentary seat you could compete for, was based on that, was a dissonant note in an American's thinking.

Q: Was there something about the Fijian culture that impeded them? I think in some of the other islands, particularly up in Micronesia, where they have this, if you get a store you use the store to give away stuff to your friends and make yourself broke but you made a lot of friends. In other words, it didn't have much to do with accumulation. It was mainly to pass on gifts.

FLOYD: Ethnic Fijian society is communal. What one person has, everyone had. And it works when you have to worry about getting eighteen people out with a fish net in order to feed a village. It doesn't work very well in a globalized, commercialized society. So yes, on a different scale but with some similarities, just as Islam is trying to figure out its role in the 21st century, ethnic Fijians face the same challenge of how much of their traditional and cultural identity would be lost if they sought to compete, or if they sought to exist – because competition is primarily for sports for them. It does require a mind-set change and there is a legitimate concern that in adopting other standards you lose something of your identity. And that is a challenge that most – the Catholic church in the United States has certainly faced it. Women have gone through it tremendously in the United States since the 70s. What do you give up? What do you get? How do you maintain? There is no singular answer and therefore I believe you tend to get irritated towards anybody who is the other. The human difficulty of questioning yourself gets

translated into "Why are you making me do this? You are the bad person. All of my frustration and challenges must be your fault."

Q: We had an embassy in Suva.

FLOYD: We did.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

FLOYD: That was one of the greater challenges. In the general slowness with which the Clinton administration staffed some of the embassies, we went two and a half out of my three years there without an ambassador. We had an outstanding DCM, charge, Michael Marine, who was just tremendous. Went on to be DCM in Beijing. Is now our ambassador in Vietnam and was just a tremendous, tremendous person.

Q: What was your job?

FLOYD: I was the political/economic officer. The number two. So I got to play DCM a lot. And when Michael was out of the country, I got my first chance to be a charge, flag and all.

Q: What were our main concerns?

FLOYD: Domestically it was to monitor their development of a constitution and political system which conformed to international standards of human rights. On the economic front it was to open the markets to U.S. goods. Chickens being the very specific one that we beat our head against the wall forever and then we finally got frozen chickens in. The competition there was, interestingly enough, not so much specifically against the Fijian market but against the Australian market. The Australians had helped them set up their import-export system which favored imports from Australia – logically enough – and so it was beating down two sets of concerns. But we did that.

Q: I would think the Australians would be playing a major hand there.

FLOYD: Tremendous. Their aid programs were ten times the size of USAID. We did have a Peace Corps contingent there. Both of those operations, AID and Peace Corps, "graduated" Fiji at the very end of my tenure, which was not the happiest moment in our bilateral relationship. But that's life.

Q: What was the Peace Corps doing?

FLOYD: Primarily teaching English, also small business.

Q: How did they fit in the scheme of things?

FLOYD: Well and favorably known. Loved by the folks because they lived in the villages, lived in the communities. They were well taken care of. It was a good setup. Now whether Fiji needed them more than Rwanda, somebody else can decide that.

Q: You were saying, by the time you left it wasn't the happiest of times in our relations?

FLOYD: Well, the Fijians were very disappointed to lose an AID mission. Were very disappointed to lose Peace Corps volunteers. But could understand that the United States couldn't do everything everywhere. So you got constant reminders and constant question of was the United States losing interest in the South Pacific. Is the embassy going to close?

Q: Was Fiji a contributor to peace keepers?

FLOYD: Huge.

Q: Yeah. That was a big source of national pride.

FLOYD: Income. Both. And, I would argue, a major social safety valve in terms of getting large numbers of young ethnic Fijian males filled with testosterone out of the country. It also hopefully in some ways demonstrated to them the futility of ethnic/religious/racial hatreds, because primarily they served in the UN force in Lebanon and got to see the Israeli-Palestinian divisions in their face every day.

Q: How did you find the men were trained?

FLOYD: There were three Fijian battalions. One was preparing, one had just come back, and one was there. They had virtually no domestic role. It wasn't a draft. It was a volunteer army. So folks stayed in.

Q: I assume that you were going about your business and keeping contact with all the different groups there?

FLOYD: Very intentionally. Very deliberately. Very obviously.

Q: How did the native Fijians respond to our interest?

FLOYD: All of the major ethnic groups saw the United States as an ideal. Therefore they were very interested in having the United States on their side. Never got any pushback in terms of the U.S. was interfering in Fiji's internal affairs to discuss the challenges of democracy and multi-ethnicity.

Q: Was Islam taking any role there?

FLOYD: Only very miniscule. Only about ten percent of the Indo-Fijian population was Muslim. No particular role at that time in terms of concerns with Islamic fundamentalism.

Q: How about the island countries surrounding it? I imagine they must have been fighting each other all of the time. But was there much . . .

FLOYD: It was harder to get to each other. Most of the Fijians fought among themselves. There were huge clan federation rivalries. You would even see it on rugby teams.

Q: Did the Indian government have interest there or not?

FLOYD: No. Because the Indo-Fijian population in Fiji had immigrated in the mid to late 1800s, there was miniscule involvement from the Indian government.

Q: It wasn't a continuing migration.

FLOYD: No.

Q: Were Indo-Fijians going to find a nice bride?

FLOYD: No. Because Indian society, at least at the time that these guys immigrated, said that once you left the mother country you lost all ties, all concerns. There was not even much travel back and forth. The greater identity for most of the Indo-Fijians was with other immigrant Indo-Fijian populations. They would come to the Caribbean where there was also a chunk of Indo-immigrants.

Q: Did you feel that the coup business had sort of gone out of style?

FLOYD: Yes. When the good George Speight and company went back to coup-ing, I was disappointed. I thought that the constitutional review process had taken care of most of that. And it probably did take care of most of that. Speight's rag tag band of discontents was clearly not overwhelmingly large, but still totally disruptive. It put Fiji back on the coup list – those countries ineligible for US assistance because of coups.

Q: What has happened since then?

FLOYD: I have followed it only as much as the Washington Post gives. Speight has gone on trial, been convicted, he's in jail. Fiji is trying to recover, once again.

Q: The French side. What islands or countries comprised the French islands?

FLOYD: French Polynesia, New Caledonia were the ones that we visited. There's another one out there that I can't even think of right now. There was a third territory that we never went to because it was so small. . . .

Q: What was happening in New Caledonia?

FLOYD: There were independence movements in both countries. France had tried to negotiate agreements with the various local political entities. France wanted out and – in

my opinion – the islanders were trying to make them pay for it. Because they faced the same economic challenges, they needed economic support from the motherland. In French Polynesian it was slightly different because there was a significantly larger French population. In New Caledonia, the French were primarily the administrative class.

Q: How did you find dealing with them?

FLOYD: A pain in the tush. They did object to America putting its nose into what they saw as an internal matter. Whenever we traveled, we had to ask our embassy in Paris to get permission for the travel from the French Foreign Ministry. And they followed me. I'm not sure if they thought I was giving money to people or what.

Q: Do you think this was just colonials out there, the last vestige of the French empire.

FLOYD: Absolutely. A huge number of retired French military who went out there on a tour and have now retired from the French military with the exact same retirement salary that they would have gotten in Paris, which in New Caledonia makes you a king. Decent weather. Lots of gambling. Pleasant enough local population. Food, drink, women, sunshine.

Q: Sounds good to me.

FLOYD: What's to mind here, and for me the funny one was because of the flight schedules – primarily the flights in both those areas are oriented towards the tourist market, not trans-island. When you went, you had to stay a week. Gee darn. So I would always have a weekend in Tahiti. Did a lot of scuba diving on the weekend. In fact, had one amazing trip to New Caledonia because the local scuba divers discovered – well they knew that there were several American planes sunk off of Noumea, where we had a training base. But a local scuba diving club scuba diving club swimming around one of them discovered some bones. The United States is very committed to returning the remains of American service members and so the central laboratory . . .

Q: This is the one in . . .

FLOYD: Hawaii. Sent a good sized delegation out and spent a week investigating this site. And because they needed a diplomatic presence who spoke French and had a C license for scuba diving, I got to go and my basic job was to sit there in about 40 feet of water and watch them work, which checking out the lobsters and the fish and everything else. I got paid to scuba dive.

Q: Did you find a difference between the political situation in Tahiti?

FLOYD: Yes. The folks in Tahiti were considerably more laid back. Had not engaged in the types of violence that had been seen in New Caledonia. They are also a much more spread out, much more assimilated group of folks. Also much more dependent on the tourist industry which requires a good image.

Q: Well they've had demonstrations from time to time.

FLOYD: Yes. But New Caledonia has had a couple murders and a lot of burning of stores.

Q: What were American interests in Tahiti and New Caledonia?

FLOYD: There are enough American citizens in French Polynesia that they want us to open a consulate. So we've got a lot of American citizen interest, registering births, marriages. American commercial interests from tourist companies to folks engaged in the pearl industry, food imports. And then just the general human rights, independence interest. We are talking two to three trips a year. You can gauge just how interested we are.

Q: What about the Japanese? I'm thinking fishing and all this. Is this a concern?

FLOYD: Not in the South Pacific anymore. They've been too fished out for mass commercial interest. And it's far away from Japan. Much more significant is the Japanese honeymoon tourist industry.

Q: Oahu gets them and Guam gets them. It's a big business, isn't it?

FLOYD: Absolutely. Huge business.

Q: I think it's the only time Japanese couples hold hands. After that they go back to their traditional the guy goes to the office and the woman stays at home.

FLOYD: I have such limited experience in Japan that I have not made that observation.

Q: I'm no authority on it. As far as Washington goes, did you feel that you had descended below the radar?

FLOYD: Absolutely. You're dealing with a bureau that also has to worry about China and Japan and Korea, and opening up in Vietnam. And you want them to pay attention to your garment quota or your chickens. In some ways it was very nice and in other ways, obviously, it was a challenge.

Q: Well then in 96 you left your island paradise.

FLOYD: I left the South Pacific and headed to the North Pacific.

Q: Where did you go?

FLOYD: Vladivostok.

Q: Oh my God. You went to Vladivostok and you were there from what, 96 to when?

FLOYD: 98. It was a direct transfer.

Q: What do we have in Vladivostok?

FLOYD: A consulate general.

Q: You know, I talked to somebody at an oral history I did who was in Vladivostok during World War II.

FLOYD: Lend lease? Big lend lease port.

Q: It was very difficult. We were sending all that stuff in and his whole group, they were followed everywhere and kept under very tight wrap. How did you find things when you went there?

FLOYD: The American presence was the least of their concerns. They were in the midst, and remain embroiled in, silly, silly political infighting between the mayor and the governor in that area. Every single element within our consular district, which was two-thirds the size of the United States, was desperately trying to get Moscow's assistance economically because they were such artificial entities economically.

The consulate was pretty much the end of the earth, but we managed to bring in people who enjoy that and we had, I think, a really good group of folks. It meant that we reached out for a lot of support from distant or perhaps non-traditional partners. We were very close with our NGOs. Many of them were operating on USAID contracts but we brought them into the country team essentially. Excellent relations with the U.S. 7th fleet. [the U.S. Pacific Fleet] was a huge supporter for us. It created delightful bureaucratic disconnects within the U.S. government because, of course, the consulate reported to the embassy in Moscow which was part of the European Bureau, yet our primary partner was out of the Pacific, so that we got to straddle those two worlds.

Q: Now what was your job?

FLOYD: I was the consul general?

Q: What did you have under you?

FLOYD: A political officer, admin officer, GSO, consular setup. We activated a Marine detachment because we had some cousins. But we were technically an unclassified post. Had a Department of Agriculture FSN and a very busy USIA press and culture section.

Q: What was the political situation? Essentially you were dealing with Siberia, weren't you?

FLOYD: No. Siberia was not in our consular district. Siberia ends at Chita and Chita was part of Moscow's consular district. We had the Russian Far East. Yakutsk you can debate, but that would be closest thing to Siberia. We were in Siberia when we were in Ulan Ude, but the Pacific coast of Russia is not Siberia.

Q: Well then what was the political situation there?

FLOYD: Somewhere between desperate and on the verge of collapse.

Q: Was Vladivostok the center?

FLOYD: Oh no. Khabarovsk, which was about 500 miles north, was another major center. In fact, the U.S. went through lots of discussion as to where the consulate should be. In fact, your interviewees' previous existence in Vladivostok was one of the elements that pushed the consulate to Vladivostok. Khabarovsk had been an open city during the Soviet era and so there was more familiarity with an international operation. There were better airline connections. There were other consulates. The Chinese Consulate had been there throughout that time. There were some valid reasons for looking at Khabarovsk and it was where I made a trip to probably once a month. We had established a Russian-American business center in Khabarovsk, which did an awful lot of representational work for us and served as sort of a focal point for a lot of our issues. The other major city that we dealt a lot with was Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on the island of Sakhalin and that was because of the involvement of American gas and oil companies with the development of energy resources.

Q: On the political side, were we following this closely?

FLOYD: We were following it as an interesting information point in Russia's overall development. How were they developing local government? Exceedingly poorly. How was the rule of law? Tax systems? Human rights? Labor situation? Investment environment for American companies? You could use your local vignettes to constantly hammer home the point that Moscow was a totally unique and inconsistent example of what was happening in Russia. The absence of functioning governance meant that the mafia rules.

Q: I would think that this would be an extremely unfertile ground for American investment.

FLOYD: It was very interesting to see who did invest. And that was primarily folks in export industries and folks whose investment was mobile. Meaning that they would provide fishing trawlers with the provision that those trawlers never entered a Russian port. Because on those occasions when Americans invested in capital goods in the Russian Far East, all too often within about six months their Russian partners had figured out a way to write them out of the business and confiscate, essentially, that capital investment. The tax structure was insane and because foreign companies were used to, or

excepted that paying taxes was part of being a corporate citizen, they were extorted for absolutely insane amounts.

Q: What would you tell, I mean, I come in as a business person. Normally you try to have a certain amount of loyalty to where you are, but . . .

FLOYD: We told businessmen to be very, very careful. To go in with their eyes wide open. To go in with either a very short term or a very long term perspective. It was not a normal investment environment. But many people were driven by adventure, by ethnic ties, by huge dollar signs in their eyes.

What business development did take place was primarily under the auspices of something called the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, which was an informal set-up chaired by Vice President Gore and Mr. Chernomyrdin to encourage economic activities. It had a subsection which was called – huge long name – U.S. West Coast-Russian Far East Working Group, that brought together the governors of Alaska, Washington, Oregon and California with their counterparts along the Russian Far East to talk about customs regulations, to talk about port fees, to talk about business exchanges. It was another one of those gab fests, but having seen the success of things like OSCE, I thought it was a marvelous idea.

And because the governors on a reciprocal basis hosted these biannual meetings, it meant that the governor of Alaska got to Yakutsk, and the governor of Magadan got to Portland. I'm a big fan of cultural exchange and information exchange. I think over the long run that will help.

Q: You mentioned NGOs. What were the NGOs doing?

FLOYD: The vast majority of them were either into business education or a lot of them were dealing with nascent Russian NGOs, we called it civil society. Women's groups, students' groups, labor groups. Tried to help them get set up and function as a vital voice in any civil society.

Q: Was anything happening?

FLOYD: A huge amount in my opinion. It is amazing what one ten-thousand dollar computer desktop publishing grant can do to spread information.

Q: Were you seeing in the time you were there the development of a skeleton civil society?

FLOYD: Yes. They had elections. They had campaigns. There was some sense that you had to respond to a domestic constituency. But it was still at a very low level. There was still no overarching structure that supported governance. It was unclear what the relationship was with Moscow. It was unclear what the cities' relationships were with the governors. It was unclear what the university's relationship was with the mayor. It was all old boys. It was all behind the scenes networks. And that affected tax collection and road

repairs. We told everybody who asked that the greatest security concern in Vladivostok is driving. The mayor and the governor control different switches on the electrical grid and at different times they would turn them off and you would have no power, including power to the street and traffic lights.

Q: With all this, were the NGOs going out and essentially saying "We got to do it better." Was there a new generation coming up and saying "Screw all this nonsense."

FLOYD: "Show us how to do better." We also had fifty Peace Corps members out there.

Q: Were you seeing any inroads into the old boys system.

FLOYD: Inching. The trouble was if you got large enough, the tax collector came out after you. Or the mafia came after you and wanted their cut in protection.

Q: You mentioned fleet visits. Were there quite a few fleet visits?

FLOYD: We were exceedingly fortunate in that we arrived in the summer of the 300th anniversary of the Russian Pacific Fleet. So we were visited by the USS Blue Ridge, which is the flag ship of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, as well as by Admiral Clemens, who was the commander of the seventh fleet, and Admiral Prueher, who was CINCPAC, all within the first three months of my time in country. We subsequently had ship visits by the USS Bellau Wood and the USS Blue Ridge came back a second time, which was very fortunate for me. We got them to time their visit to the Fourth of July because my entire staff lived in hotel rooms and we did not really have any appropriate representational space. So both years that I was there, we held our Fourth of July reception on board the USS Blue Ridge.

Q: I've seen pictures – as a kid I lived in Annapolis and so I know naval ships – and seen pictures of that rusting fleet. Magnificent ships and just rusting away.

FLOYD: I looked out on them every day. The Consulate was on the hills of Vladivostok just above Pacific Fleet headquarters. The first year we were there we had the last of what was called "Cooperation from the Sea" joint exercises. We simulated a natural disaster that would require assistance from the sea. And U.S. and Russian marines and sailors participated in the exercises. After that, it should have been that the Russian Pacific Fleet went to someplace in the United States for a reciprocal exercise. They couldn't afford the fuel to get there. So the only other exercise we did was with the U.S. Coast Guard and the Japanese Self Defense Force with the Russian Pacific Fleet and the Ministry of Extreme Circumstances.

Q: Was the Russian navy essentially non-existent at that point? Did they put ships out?

FLOYD: After fish and timber, the largest export from the Russian Far East was scrap metal, primarily military equipment. But that said, the Russian Pacific ballistic missile fleet was as valid a threat as ever. Not as potent, but as valid.

Q: What were they doing?

FLOYD: The submarines? Patrolling.

Q: It was the submarines?

FLOYD: Surface ships were in port. The only active Russian government fleet was that run by the KGB in their new responsibilities for border security, both poachers and general coast guard type functions. Much smaller ships.

Q: Did you have in your consular district the Amur River?

FLOYD: Between China and Russia?

Q: Yeah. What was happening? It was about twenty or thirty years before that they had a battle going on?

FLOYD: Yes. And most Russians, particularly in the Russian Far East, will tell you that their greatest threat is economic intrusion from China. Huge numbers. Estimated five to ten million Chinese guest workers run what limited agriculture there is in the Russian Far East. They even call their food market the Chinese market. The difference between economic development on the south side of the Amur as opposed to the north side is excruciating for the Russians.

Every Russian political figure I ever talked to would talk about their nightmare scenario that some morning every Chinese in the three provinces that border the Russian Far East would simply wake up and decide to walk north. There are approximately 110 million Chinese in those three provinces. The Russian Far East total – a land mass about two-thirds the size of the United States – is about 2.5 million. If those Chinese just walked – I mean no weapons, no military – just walked, they would take over. Which is one of the reasons that the Russians in the Russian Far East are so loyal, dependent, subservient to Moscow because they cannot provide for their international relations. They need the Russian connection.

Q: Is there any residue of people from the Gulags and all that? Are a lot of the population descended from it?

FLOYD: Enough. Fascinating ethnic setup. It is one of those places where the Slavic elements, the Russians and the Ukraines, get along well because they were thrust into difficult circumstances together. It was one of the most successful areas of Stalin's ethnic cleansing. Total deportation of all of the local Koreans and Chinese in the late 20s. The prison population or the exile population is apparent, but people don't talk about it.

Q: Are any gulags still in existence?

FLOYD: No. To my knowledge Camps 35 and 36 are the only remaining prisons that we consider political and they are in European Russia. Now you can go up to Madagan and go to the gulag museum. They are slowly coming to grips with what that means. You get a lot more people who are descendents of the gulag administration than of the actual prisoners, who died. So the questioning of is there any valid reason for most of Madagan and Kamchatka to exist except as a prison.

Q: What about Sakhalin? How important was this?

FLOYD: Hugely important. It is a multi-million dollar U.S. investment for a potentially multi-billion dollar profit.

Q: In what?

FLOYD: Oil and gas.

Q: How are we working with the Russians on this?

FLOYD: It is a fascinating set up and illustrative of the challenges of the various levels of government in Russia. Primarily the development is taking place on separate, unique, distinct agreements between the United States Government and the Russian Government in terms of the conditions under which these companies will operate. Their liability to taxes. Their coverage by local laws.

Q: So they just sort of set them aside.

FLOYD: Absolutely. And obviously that irritates the local governor and folks. The local populations want folks to bring this oil and gas onto Sakhalin island for processing and/or shipment to current processing capabilities on the mainland, or what they call the mainland in Khabarovsk. But the American companies don't want to do that because they don't want it to ever get into Russia proper. They are planning to pump it directly into ships. Because if it comes onto Russia, they don't know if they will ever recoup that. The largest impact to date has simply been the presence of Americans. They built an entirely new, really cool, Western class hotel on the island to accommodate their employees. Exxon/Mobile is building a village, they estimate for between four and six hundred employees, with schools, housing, dining facilities, medical setup. And I can guarantee you that some of those oil workers will marry Russians and we will get to deal with a lot of citizenship questions. And they will get in fights and they will – yeah, it will be a major American presence.

Q: Did the question of what they call the Northern Islands come up?

FLOYD: The Northern Territories.

Q: This is Japan. To me, it was the greatest boon that we were handed by the Soviets and Russians, by so irritating the Japanese on this that there was no possibility of the Japanese making nice to the Soviets.

FLOYD: They are little rocks. It is a larger bone of contention with the Japanese-Russian relationship. The American position on it is so clear, so consistent and so out of our hands that it comes up, but it is not seen as ours to resolve. It does present an advantage for American businessmen in that the Russians are irritated to heck by the Japanese and the feeling is mutual. So the preference is to deal with American business folk. And mind you, we discussed this earlier in regards to the Stans. Russians are among the most prejudiced people I have ever met and the disdain with which they look upon Asian ethnicity is appalling. It is just unbelievable.

Q: What about the North Koreans?

FLOYD: Very interesting. We estimate they've probably got a couple thousand guest workers, primarily in the timber industry. There is a large and active South Korean consulate who keeps an eye on them. While we were there, one of our South Korean colleagues was murdered, presumably by the North Koreans for being too interested in what they were doing.

Q: But there wasn't any flow over the boarder of refugees and that sort of thing?

FLOYD: The Russians will send back, period.

Q: How about missionaries?

FLOYD: One of the banes of my existence.

Q: I go back to 1910 where at American consulate Seoul – this was 1910 – where a zealous missionary had a tree which had been declared a national treasury – it was an animate society and they used to hang prayers from the tree. And he thought this was anathema and he had it chopped down. And of course there was terrible outrage and our consulate at the time said "You know, I have much more sympathy for Pontius Pilot now that I had before."

FLOYD: None of the missionaries in the Russian Far East were quite that stupid or aggressive. But the Russian Orthodox Church is so disappointing in having suffered for decades under Soviet oppression, their response to democracy was "Okay, now we are the only religion." The Russian law on religions identifies five – I can't remember what they call them – "native" religions: Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism. And nothing else. Everything else is considered a sect. And the Russian Orthodox Church hates them. Goes after them in cahoots with tax collectors. We had one pastor who kept getting blocked just in terms of getting registered as a foreigner legally residing in Russia. And it was all instigated by the Russian Orthodox Church.

Q: It really doesn't fit the mold of what we think of churches being.

FLOYD: We talked about the challenge of democracy and having to give before you get. But the Russian Orthodox Church was faced with the obtuseness. For them, religious freedom meant freedom for them and them only.

Q: Well the Greek constitution declares that the Greek Orthodox religion is the only religion there and that proselytizing is forbidden. It's in the constitution. So, how did you deal with local authorities? Did they give you a rough time?

FLOYD: No. They generally speaking loved us. We were symbols of Russia's greatness in the sense that Russia liked dealing with the superpower. And by our presence, it meant that the United States (end tape, change tape).

Q: This is tape four, side one, with Jane Floyd. Yes.

FLOYD: The Russians very much liked having an American presence because it meant that they were valid partners for America.

Q: Normally the Foreign Service is probably not the greatest example of American religious representation. I mean, as a group we . . .

FLOYD: There were no Muslims. There were no Buddhists.

Q: But also we tend to be a little uncomfortable dealing with people who are devoted to religion and all, as a group.

FLOYD: Yes. We have a great deal of respect for religion and that means all religion. We probably distance ourselves a little from those we consider fanatics. In Vladivostok we had a Christian service on Sunday mornings. There weren't enough of us to have any one faith. And if we had a visiting preacher from any known faith we would invite them to lead the service. Both the Protestant and the Catholic folks from Moscow would come out from Moscow occasionally and visit us. But otherwise it was a very eclectic mix of folks who got together in the antechamber – actually it used to be a chapel – of the old Catholic church that the Soviet Government had turned into a book depository. But there were a very few, a handful, three, four, five, Russians who spoke English well enough to appreciate, I wouldn't call it a service – a prayer meeting? – that we had on Sunday mornings. But in terms of the Orthodox Church or our missionaries, you are correct that the Foreign Service attracts proselytizers, but not to a given religious faith.

Q: How did you find the hand of our embassy in Moscow rested on you?

FLOYD: Not bad at all. Only two or three major visits. The major connection was by either me going to Moscow or by this time we had limited e-mail capability. And because all of our operations were unclassified we could deal a lot with faxes, with telephone calls. The curious factor was that because the consulate had to deal with all of the various

sections of Moscow, we probably knew more people in Moscow than the people in Moscow knew. When I would go back for consultations, I would of course take my stack of, here's the travel vouchers for travel and here's the personnel actions for personnel and here's some hand written reports that we couldn't send out because we thought some of the material might be classified for the political section and here's this . . . And as you would go around or as you would sit in the cafeteria at lunch, you would be saying hi to people from all different sections and yet the Moscow embassy people you were sitting with had no idea who those guys were. They would say "Are they from Vladivostok too?" Uh, no, they're from your GSO section. So it was funny to see how incredibly huge and impersonal the embassy in Moscow had become.

Q: In 98 you left?

FLOYD: I did.

Q: This *must have been a very satisfying time, wasn't it?*

FLOYD: It was a very good tour. We enjoyed it. Can complain immensely about the living conditions but overall it was enjoyable, productive.

Q: Living conditions, were you in a hotel too?

FLOYD: Oh yeah.

Q: Everyone was in a hotel. Was there any effort to build housing for us?

FLOYD: There was, but the legal situation in Vladivostok does not make land acquisition or contract finalization very easy. We could never satisfy FBO that someone could sell us some property with appropriate legal guarantees as to their right to sell us that property. We never could get an American contractor to fulfill the obligations that they took on by bidding on a contract to build. So the corollary to that was that the utility situation in Vladivostok itself meant that living on the economy was not viable. My administrative officer disparaged the long commute from the hotel where we lived and decided he would put up with a city apartment. Well, the second month that he went without water, not just hot water, but water – no flush, no brush – we went through the hassle of getting Moscow to authorize the installation of a 500 gallon tank in his second bedroom.

Q: My God.

FLOYD: Yeah.

Q: Well, then we pick this up the next time in 1998, whither?

FLOYD: Came back to the States and came right down here.

Q: What, the National Defense University? For a year?

FLOYD: For a year.

Q: Okay, we'll pick it up then.

(Transcriber's Note: At this point the quality of the recording declines and it becomes difficult to understand what the parties are saying.)

Q: Today is March 2nd 2005 and we're at 1998 and you have left the paradise of Vladivostok and you are off to the National War College. This is a year's training.

FLOYD: The picky people will tell you it's professional education, not training.

Q: Alright. Whatever you were doing. Let's talk about it.

FLOYD: Lots of reading, lots of writing.

Q: How did you find your group that you were dealing with?

FLOYD: Loved it. Several hundred folks divided into seminars of about fifteen to twenty people. Cross-section of the U.S. Government as well as including international fellows. Wonderful times. Wonderful opportunity.

Q: What was your particular seminar like? I mean your group.

FLOYD: My seminar had civilians, military, had civilian employees of military agencies, had an international fellow from Abu Dhabi. Good gender cross-section. Good reserve and active-duty cross-section. Clearly a lot of deliberate planning went into making sure we were as varied as possible.

Q: Were you able to put your experience, particularly in the Soviet Union and Russia, to good use . . . were you a good resource?

FLOYD: In terms of a historical resource, I suppose I served some benefit. I found the year particularly useful precisely because so much had changed in Russia. My academic study of the former Soviet Union was definitely of the Cold War variety. My knowledge of contemporary Russia was operational, was governmental, was not of the academic level. And so I found my year there at the War College particularly valuable for the opportunity to re-look at some of those security questions which I had not studied in this new and entirely different security atmosphere.

Q: Let's talk a bit about that. I mean, you were getting both the military perspective but also some academics come in and lecture to you. What was your impression – this was 98 and 99 – of whither Russia and what they were doing both militarily and politically, and economically?

FLOYD: I think you hit it on the economic element. In 98/99 the focus was truly on could Russia's economy survive the transition. We had gotten over the immediate concern about would Russia collapse, would they go into a military dictatorship, would they be militarily aggressive, what were they going to try and do and they had not yet gotten into the concerns of would democracy be able to survive that we are seeing today in 2005. The central government had not yet quite stepped up and consolidated its control. There was still a lot of agitation in the remote areas. Still a lot of "What are we going to do?"

Q: Was there much focus on peace keeping at this time.

FLOYD: A tremendous amount. The term was still military operations other than war. Lots of discussion of stability operations. A lot of my colleagues, particularly the active duty folks, had done time in the Balkans and had experience, with all the ups and downs and sideways of that. There was a growing interest with how does the U.S. Government deal with complex contingencies short of war. This was not the venue for making decisions, but certainly the venue for some very interesting discussions and for creating the networks and contacts and knowledge about other people's operations that hopefully has done us all well.

Q: What was your impression of how the military – I'm talking about the American military – was looking at this kind of thing? Towards the end of the Clinton administration. Whither the military?

FLOYD: There was a fair amount of discussion. I suspect you would find it in any given period. There are always questions. The big issue was, as you said, stability operations and peacekeeping. What is the role of the military? We had lots of folks who were concerned about terminology differences, that were concerned about chains of command, that were concerned about who supports whom. So it was a very healthy discussion. Even what criticism there was was couched usually in terms of something of a joke and more recognizing that political decisions did impact sometimes on pure military efficiency.

Q: Was there a feeling – particularly after the Bosnian incident – we should have gone in earlier?

FLOYD: I can't say that that particular discussion came up. It was more how we conducted ourselves once we were there. Different rules of engagement for different groups, the role of NATO, the role of other countries.

Q: Well what was the feeling about the United Nations as a peace keeping entity?

FLOYD: Given the Balkan experience, it was not a high point. It was not an entity that was going to be looked to. NATO's performance was rated somewhat higher. But the bugbear of course was the expansion of NATO that was going on. When you talked about NATO, that was the greater discussion topic.

Q: In your personal view, you've been involved in security affairs and Russian affairs for a long time, what was your feeling about NATO expansion? I mean, one of the great debates was, particularly those who have been dealing with the Russians, you don't want to upset the Russians by allowing these other countries in. Others say "Look, they've got a right, they've got to come in. How did you fall into this?

FLOYD: I thought we did a very good job. It was a time of incredible weakness on the part of the Russian state and yet we treated them as a valid partner in international security and bent over pretty far to convince them that NATO – particularly in the late 90s – was never designed to be an aggressor organization. It had always been defensive. Our willingness to negotiate, essentially, with the Russians over the joint council, over the four "no's" – no permanently stationed troops, no new bases, no nukes and one more I've forgotten But I think we managed to recognize Russian sensitivities and I suspect that our very willingness to engage them in discussing gave them at least enough pride to not feel threatened by the expansion. By the time we got to last year's expansion of all the smaller countries further into Eastern Europe, the whole world situation was different.

Q: One of the things that I've noticed as I've interviewed people and been dealing with this has been the growing convergence of the thought of the foreign service and the American military on things. I think in Iraq they were both pretty well agreed how things that should have been done which weren't done, and all that. At one point, military thought and State Department thought were really quite different. I'm talking about on a professional level. Did you see a joint-ness of looking at the world?

FLOYD: My particular perspective has always been that it has to be joint. And that has been reflected in my career choices. I went from the War College to an exchange tour in the Pentagon. The folks that choose to go to National War College or any sort of senior service school, particularly from the civilian agencies, are those who have an interest in better interaction across the tools of American statecraft. By this time, many of the active duty military people had been through the Balkans or had been through some sort of opportunity to work with other agencies. I almost hope it is not a homogenization of the attitude so much as it is a realization that each agency brings certain strengths and certain advantages to the fight, and we are all better off if we know how to use those.

Q: Well you finished in 1999. Whither?

FLOYD: I went on to an exchange tour in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, specifically European affairs as the country director for the Baltics. And then bounced around a couple of other countries in the inevitable bureaucratic organization. I did Poland for a great deal of it. I did Slovenia for some of it.

Q: You did this from when to when?

FLOYD: From June of 99 to July of 2001.

Q: Could you explain a little of the structure there?

FLOYD: The Secretary of Defense has a number of undersecretaries, for acquisitions, for all sorts of things. One of them – at that time – was for policy, whose underlings were organized both functionally and geographically. I was in the sub-office that looked at European policy which was itself divided into European policy and NATO policy. The European side was the office that took care of bilateral relations. The NATO policy folks did the care and feeding of U.S. military representation at NATO.

Q: Lets talk first about the Baltics. What were your prime concerns or interests?

FLOYD: They were centered around a program that NATO had developed called the "Membership Action Plan" which was sort of like a baby defense review, which is what members go through with NATO. It was an effort to work with the Baltics nations, all of the aspirant nations, to help them develop their military capabilities and their military structures such that they were compatible with NATO in their drive to become members of NATO. It had to do with civil-military relations, with security clearance processes, with interoperability issues, both in terms of doctrine and equipment. Sort of a real quick school for being a NATO member.

Q: I would think that, particularly as these countries came in, and most of them had relatively small military programs, that what would make sense for the Baltics would be to have very good coastal defense troops. In other words, something on which they could concentrate and become real experts on rather than just being a duplicate of everybody else.

FLOYD: They were faced with the conundrum of wanting to be a valued member of NATO, which required that they develop some niche capability that was deployable. At the same time, their overwhelming national security concern remained Russia. And that required a territorial defense with mass civil engagement capability. The two required different training, required different approaches, and they did not have the resources to do both well. So it was a challenge for them to decide where their ultimate security lay. Was it in making sure that every single farmer had a rifle and could at least harass the Russians until NATO showed up to help? Or was it in being able to provide thirteen chemical detection troops to NATO when it deployed to Iraq?

Q: How did they come out? Or did they while you were there?

FLOYD: They were still struggling. They will continue to struggle. It's going to take several generations of interaction with Russia to reduce that sense of threat. How long did it take Germany to not worry about defending the Fulda Gap? So it will take some time. It will also take some time for them to be comfortable within NATO as well, in terms of being the trip wire should something unconceivable happen in Russia that they would actually be invaded.

Q: Were we sending training people over or were we turning this over more to other people in NATO?

FLOYD: Particularly in the Baltics, there was a very active core nation group called Balt-Sea, which was the Baltic Security Assistance Coordination Group, that involved not only NATO members but non-NATO members such as Sweden and Finland, who were very actively engaged in helping the Baltics develop their defense capabilities. They funded something called Baltron – the Baltic squadron - the three nations had a common coastal naval concern. There was also something called Balt-net, which gave them a common airspace operating system, which of course was valuable for the Finns, valuable for NATO as well. They also sponsored a Baltic Defense College and a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BaltBat).

The underlying purpose for security assistance is that it helps your own country as well. What was particularly valuable was that the whole effort was to get these folks to work together. To recognize that they each could not do any of these things independently. The Baltic battalion - BaltBat, for example. None of them had adequate ground forces to actually deploy a battalion, but on a rotating basis among them they could do so. And they did, both in the Baltics and in Iraq. We provided bullets for exercises and trainers for trainers. Lots of English language training. A lot of very basic support. Uniform sets. Lots of excessive defense property in terms of vehicles.

Q: At that time and looking at this particular phase of things, what was your impression of how the three Baltic states were working together?

FLOYD: Like brothers.

Q: I'm not sure that's the best term to use.

FLOYD: It was pretty active. As long as they were faced with an outside other – usually Russia, or it could come from NATO – they were prepared to work together. But obviously, they recognized that every single radio that went to Estonia wasn't going to Lithuania. And every single visitor that went to Latvia was one that wasn't going to Lithuania. They were siblings in that sense. So you needed to balance things. And we had lots of fun trying to balance every U.S. security assistance program to reflect that. We always had to have the why. If somebody got one more IMET (International Military Education and Training) program money than someone else, you always had to say "Well, they had one-percent more armored people" or . . . You had to have an explanation because they compared notes down to the bullet.

Q: I would think this would be – particularly in terms of former Soviet sensitivities – they were aware of these things. I have talked to so many people who dealt with the Greek-Turkish equation. And this of course was not of the same caliber, but still, it required thinking about the sensitivities.

FLOYD: The Department of Defense was doing a fairly good job with it well before I arrived. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is dominated by civilians while the Joint Staff is dominated by the uniformed services. But they each have representatives of the

other group and the vast majority of these programs have all along engaged the country team. Which means that the ambassador as well as the State Department at large is engaged in the question. They appear in Mission Performance Plans. The State Department has a voice in security assistance plans. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and IMET funds technically come out of the State Department budget. So if you've got the check book, you've got some oversight. Although they are implemented by a Department of Defense agency and the Department of Defense has a voice in it, the ultimate money comes out of State budget which means that you get a lot of State input.

Q: In the Baltics you've got this peculiar little hunk of territory which is Russian territory. How are the Russians behaving, not really there but elsewhere in the area? Is it a problem or not?

FLOYD: Yes, Kaliningrad is a problem. More so than the military presence which hangs over, it is the economic and social impact. Unfortunately, one of the greatest exports from Kaliningrad is disease. Huge problem with AIDS. Not a lot of economy. Most of what they can provide is services.

Q: Are these Russian women or from elsewhere? It's a port for trafficking maybe?

FLOYD: I can't speak to what it is right now, but prior to EU membership, the borders between Lithuania and Kaliningrad and Kaliningrad and Poland were fairly open. Working the weaknesses of the respective export regimes of those three entities meant there was some really screwy black market back-and-forth. Cigarettes, labor, liquor, some other stuff. And among the labor were prostitutes and or those willing to engage in sex for money without great concern about health. Tuberculosis was the other disease that was coming out of there.

Q: Was Kaliningrad sort of the poor man's Thailand or something?

FLOYD: To a certain degree. It was always – my husband would probably shoot me – but navy towns tend to be a little raucous to start with and then you have an essentially collapsed health care system and a collapsed economy. It causes what might otherwise have been mellower problems to be more diffuse. Prostitution, drugs, health deterioration, black market. There's a cycle of socioeconomic collapse there.

Q: We - and I guess I'm referring to the West - having this running sore there, were we trying to do something about this?

FLOYD: Yes. We were certainly engaged. I think the Russians themselves didn't know what to do with Kaliningrad.

Q: Did it really make any sense militarily or is it just a place where they have some . . . ?

FLOYD: There wasn't much military there. There wasn't much functioning military there.

Q: How about after NATO membership for Poland. I mean, when one thinks of Poland, it's been around a long time and it's a big country. How are they doing?

FLOYD: I think they are doing marvelously well. They have tremendous issues to deal with, especially the change from a socialist support structure to one of capitalism. Yes, we can get ahead under the capitalist system, but a lot more people fall through the cracks. And the less strong tend to suffer initially. And they are still trying to cope with that.

What was particularly wonderful in all of these countries was that unlike much of the rest of the world which tends to blame its problems on someone else – former colonial masters, current globalization, it's always somebody else that's causing it – these folks almost relished their problems because they were *their* problems. They had had enough of a big brother helping them. And they did not want another big brother to come in and solve all their problems. Help, advise, console, yes. But they recognized in the end that the decisions were theirs, that the responsibility was theirs. And they were so proud to be independent that they wanted to do it on their own.

Q: What was the impression that you were getting from where you were working of their military at that time?

FLOYD: Poland's military was, is, and I think will be very soon probably the number four in NATO, after the U.S., U.K. and France. The Germans have somewhat thrown up their hands, I'm sorry. The Italians do pretty well in certain areas. But the Poles are really stepping up. They have enough population to actually man a reasonable force. They are so happy to be part of NATO that they are more open to some of the differences, such as things like out of area service. And their populace has shown that they are major international democratic supporters and are willing to sacrifice.

Q: You were there during the election, the election of 2000. Was there concern in our military one way or the other?

FLOYD: The Polish Defense Minister was in Washington for an official visit in early November and the day after our election was the day of his press conference with Secretary Cohen. And one of the American reporters – knowing the Polish visitor – asked the Secretary was he nervous, what was the military's sense of not having a President. The Secretary said "I don't know about you, but I'm still serving President Clinton. We have a president." And the entire audience sort of went "oh." So it was a very wise comment to remind people that the democratic process was well in hand and there was not a lack of control. There were full mechanisms for ensuring appropriate performance. I would like to give him credit for thinking of it off hand, but I sort of suspect maybe somebody came up with it earlier.

Q: After this two years doing this, were there any particular issues that you particularly engaged with during this time?

FLOYD: The whole question of NATO membership was the singular way to define the effort and that was focused as I said on the Membership Action Plan which had specific areas that we checked up on. They were sort of like report cards.

Q: From your contact with members of the civilian and military in the pentagon, what was the feeling about this singular expansion?

FLOYD: It was the question of did the political value of having NATO being a more inclusive organization counter the predictable military inefficiency of trying to make decisions in NATO, let alone establish a command and control organization with either 19 or 20 states or an expending NATO. And the uniformed military fully recognized that it was going to be the U.S. Government's political masters who made that decision.

Q: How about the reaction of the Russians during this time? Were you involved at all in monitoring or getting through your friends how they were dealing with this?

FLOYD: At that period of time, Russians were consumed with economic stress and the expansion of NATO posed no threat, or quite frankly any influence on their lives.

Q: In 2001 whither?

FLOYD: I went back to mother State. I went back to become the Director of the Current Intelligence Staff in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Q: And you did that from when to when?

FLOYD: I did that from July of 2001 to sometime in the fall of 2003. And the reason for the fuzzy date is that there was a goodly period of time from about September to November when I had two hats. When I was transitioning from Director of Current Intelligence Staff to Special Advisor for the TIPOFF program.

Q: Well let's talk about this time before you moved over. What were you dealing with?

FLOYD: The Current Intelligence Staff at the State Department is a 24/7 operation. It is part of the intelligence community that provides instantaneous intelligence support to the Secretary and senior policy makers. Meaning we are the city desk, the folks who get all of the traffic and try to determine what needs to go and where it needs to go.

Q: Now Colin Powell was by this time the secretary of state. What was your impression of how INR and the operation you were doing rank – I mean you had the CNAA. I had talked to Phyllis Oakley who was the head of INR during Iraq and when Albright was secretary of state. And she was told at one point that she no longer needed to brief the secretary because the secretary was being briefed by CIA. You know, it sends shivers of horror up and down one's . . . And I was just wondering how did things stand when you . . . ?

FLOYD: I never personally briefed the Secretary and never heard that type of report coming out of Carl Ford, who was our Assistant Secretary. We were given the impression by handwritten notes that would come out of the Secretary's office that we assumed to be true that we offered the Secretary two particular advantages. One was that INR reports directly to the secretary and not to a regional or other functional bureau. I think the secretary said that we were able to be contrarian a lot. The other advantage that we offered the Secretary is that the CIA has tended to focus on the immediate hot issues where the Secretary of State's interest must remain global at all times. The CIA had not show a particular interest in AIDS in Africa, NAFTA implementation, development of the Indonesian military. It had focused much more on the headlines. Where the Secretary because his fiefdom is global and constant really does need a broader sense of the intelligence that is available.

Q: Did you feel any particular growing pains with a new administration coming in or not?

FLOYD: The administration was well in place by the time I arrived so I did not see any of that transition.

Q: You say things got fuzzy and you began to move onto something called "TIPOFF." What was that?

FLOYD: INR ran and maintained a database of known or suspected foreign terrorists for the Bureau of Consular Affairs in order to provide consular officers with some sort of access to intelligence information that might influence their decisions on visas. This came out of the blind sheik and the first World Trade Center bombing. It was a relatively complex operation by which the intelligence community allowed the State Department to release some sensitive but unclassified data (a name, a date of birth, a nationality and a passport number if we knew it) in such a way that consular officers could do a preliminary check and determine whether to request a security advisory opinion before they could issue a visa.

The information in TIPOFF was placed in CLASS, which is the Consular Bureau's lookout system, in a double blind fashion so that the intelligence community was happy with the intelligence that was posted. But that still allowed consular officers and their foreign national folks access to that information in some way. Now CLASS has got visa overstayers, child abductors, common criminals . . . It was set up in such a way that the intelligence community was confident that its sources and methods were not compromised. That was quite an achievement.

Q: Oh I'm sure. Because this has always been one of the great problems. I speak as a consular officer. You are held accountable for information which you never receive.

FLOYD: We also figured out a way to share that information with the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) knowing that some countries' citizens don't need visas to enter the US. But a huge chunk of our names were of Irish origin. U.K. citizens don't need visas to come into the United States. Their very first contact with immigration is at

the border so we figured out a way to make that information available to all immigration officers. We also figured out a way to share it with Canadians. Again, protecting our northern border. Prior to the Sydney Olympics, we had figured out a way to share it with the Australians for their security.

Q: What was your role?

FLOYD: I was Carl Ford's Special Advisor for TIPOFF. I was the day-to-day operational manager. He created the position in part because post-9/11 there was considerable stress on the system in the sense that both the development of information and the processing of information. And not too long into that tenure – in fact, after President Bush's State of the Union address in February of 2004 – we shifted to high gear in terms of setting up a Terrorist Threat Integration Center with TIPOFF as one of the primary tools. So we had to jump into not only day-to-day operations but the future consideration of what it might look like.

Q: Was there a concern that we were both protecting ourselves and shooting ourselves in the foot as regarding visas of Middle Easterners?

FLOYD: I didn't come into direct contact with that question. But just as a professional, absolutely. As a good consular officer, who do you let in? Is it worth it to the American university to have an out of state tuition payer? Is it worth it to America's policy at large to have that person go back home exposed to the United States and what it means? How do you deny medical care to somebody? Virtually every American has immigrated one way or another. Is it really evil if we let in Tongans to run the landscaping companies in California when they send home tremendous amounts of money to their families? You are damned if you do and you are damned if you don't. (End of tape. Turns tape over.)

Q: We were just going through an intelligence improvement program – you know, sort of the 9/11 Commission and all. But how did you find the FBI and CIA - because this would be the main source of our information about who can take a visa and who can't – were they sharing or was this a problem?

FLOYD: We got significant information from all of the members of the intelligence community. There were some issues on timeliness. There were some issues of "did we really get it all?" That's inevitable. Information sharing with the FBI was a challenge on two levels. Their IT capability shortcomings are well known.

Q: IT being?

FLOYD: Information technology. They have a problem with what they could physically take from us. The other issue was prior to 9/11 they were highly focused on law enforcement. And therefore they only wanted information which was prosecutable. They wanted information which had the appropriate chain of evidence. They wanted information which was releasable and presentable in court. And our database, TIPOFF, said it was "known or suspected." And they didn't want suspected. They wanted known.

And they only wanted known if they could use the evidence in court. And the intelligence community will not make it available. So that as long as they were focused on "If I get a hit on a name in TIPOFF, can I arrest the guy?" And we kept saying "No, because you can't use my evidence in court and I can't tell you whether or not it's otherwise available and provable."

The standards for arrest are higher than the standards for visa deniability. So it was both mechanical and either policy or mission depending on how you want to define it. The information that we had was not what they could use at the time. After 9/11, after the Patriot Act, after several other things, their focus went more towards prevention, more towards operating outside of the narrowly defined law enforcement prosecutable realm.

Q: The war in Iraq, did that have an effect on what you all were doing?

FLOYD: No. It is conceivable after I had left, that once we invaded Iraq and had access to the materials that were captured by American forces, there may have been additional information. But I was not there at the time. It had no impact while I was there.

Q: Where did you go then after this?

FLOYD: I went to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in July of 2003.

Q: And you were doing that until when?

FLOYD: Until I retired.

Q: And when did you retire?

FLOYD: September of 04.

Q: What were you doing in political-military affairs?

FLOYD: I was the Director for Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping.

Q: Wow. In the first place, when we talk about peacekeeping, did that involve Iraq? Or was that considered purely a war thing and somebody else had that?

FLOYD: My office was not engaged in Iraq discussions. We did peacekeeping only when it was outside of the UN context. And the interest of the Bush administration in contingency planning and in peacekeeping was such that towards the end of my tenure Assistant Secretary Bloomfield re-organized the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and that office no longer exists. I was the last director.

Q: Let's talk about this. What was the policy concern? What were the pros and cons? What was the issue?

FLOYD: Take your pick. There has always been a certain reluctance in a lot of administrations to plan for war. It was seen as a presumption that that was where you were headed. That we have war plans for invading Canada or that we have war plans for defending against an attack from Mexico seems humorous, but when you then start getting into more sensitive areas, the fact that the U.S. Government – any entity in the U.S. Government - is planning for a war sometimes strikes folks as inappropriate.

Q: And it also gets out of control.

FLOYD: It gets out of the U.S. Government and therefore becomes a presumption that is our policy. It has always been a challenge for our military compatriots. There is also the issue of the challenge of contingency planning. When you do not control the battle space, some in State are reluctant to plan because you never have enough information to truly plan ahead. You can plan on the margins. The fact that the Bush administration did not renew a Clinton era Presidential Decision Document on contingency planning undercut the effort to enforce it or to give structure to the process, so that it had fallen into a fair amount of disuse. The NSC, the White House, did not apparently see a great deal of usefulness in it.

Q: While you were there, were there any areas that went up in smoke that you were looking at?

FLOYD: We did operational efforts, for example, in Liberia during that crisis. We did some work on Nepal. We did a great deal of work with the Colombians on their contingency plan called Plan Colombia. We did some work with the Afghans looking at Provincial Reconstruction Teams. And we did a lot of after-action reports on the first Gulf War as well as some historical engagement on the Balkans. We also worked with other bureaus developing the CIA/G-8 initiative on constabulary forces that became the GPOI – Global Peace Operations Initiative – that came out of the Sea Island G-8 summit. That was part of our peacekeeping hat.

Q: Were you looking at what had happened in Rwanda and all or contingency of Hutu versus Tutsi going after each other again?

FLOYD: No.

Q: How about Haiti? Was this something that was kind of a constant problem?

FLOYD: One element of our work was trying to develop generic pol/mil plans. What are the elements of most any crisis? And we certainly drew on Haiti and lessons learned there in developing this framework. But with the demise of the office due to the demise in interest, that effort has fizzled.

Q: What was the feeling about the demise in interest? Was this a mistake or regret?

FLOYD: Regret, probably. You have to understand that we had gathered together a group of people who believed strongly in contingency planning, who believed strongly in the value of interagency joint-ness. So there was a bit of disappointment but also a recognition that the State Department serves the President and if that was not a priority, when you have limited resources, you have got to adjust resources to where they are seen as most valuable.

Q: You mentioned Colombia. What were we thinking about in Colombia?

FLOYD: We were working with the Colombians on their own plan for how to attack their insurgencies and their drug problems on a interagency basis. They recognized that they had to get their justice department in line with their military, in line with our assistance, in line with AID's economic assistance so that it all worked together.

Q: Were you able to have joint meetings with Colombian military and all?

FLOYD: Yes.

Q: How forthcoming were they, did you find?

FLOYD: Adequately. They were the ones who came up with the Plan Colombia first and so they were clearly committed to doing their best.

Q: Well then you retired in 2004. And now we are talking here at the National Defense University. What have you been doing since you retired?

FLOYD: I was picked up on an OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) contract. The Under Secretary for Readiness and Training has adopted an initiative for transforming training within DOD. My particular mandate is to look at training for interagency, intergovernmental and multinational missions, precisely the type of peacekeeping, stability ops that I have looked at for most of my life.

The immediate task is to make sure that adequate information on what others do is available to DOD folks so that they know who to turn to when their task is done. I cite the example of interviewing U.S. military forces in Baghdad who were frustrated when the commander's emergency funds that they had been using to clean up schools, dig wells, provide support to hospitals were running out, you would ask them had they talked to AID about continuing the support and a number of them had no idea what AID was other than associating it with HIV.

So we are asking our military forces to engage in many new activities and in much smaller, or further down units. You used to only need to train your Army colonels and Navy captains in how to engage with civilian agencies because we operated as brigades or divisions. But now you've got fairly junior officers in PRTs in Afghanistan who need to know that the military cannot train police but that the Department of Justice has a program to help with rule of law, so rather than ask one question and get a "no," they've

got some information about who else is out there that might be able to contribute to the U.S. mission even if they are not specifically within the DOD mission.

So right now we are still trying to develop the information necessary to be taught. And then we will move on to how do we teach this and more importantly how do we make it available to someone not necessarily in a classroom environment. The ultimate curriculum goal is information available across an individual's career as well as constantly available probably online through distributed learning.

Q: Well, okay, I think this is the end.

FLOYD: That's today. That was the conference we had last week. That's what I'm trying to clean up from now.

Q: Alright. Well this has been enjoyable.

End of interview