The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR PETER W. GALBRAITH

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date: March 19, 1999

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INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview was not edited by Ambassador Galbraith.]

Q: Today is March 19, 1999. This is an interview with Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith, that's G-A-L-B-R-A-I-T-H. The interview is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Well, to begin with, could you tell me where you were born and then let's talk about your family and growing up?

GALBRAITH: Okay. I was born December 31, 1950 at the Boston Lying-in Hospital in Boston. My parents are John Kenneth Galbraith, that's my father and Katherine Atwater Galbraith is my mother. My father was born in Canada and grew up there on a farm and came to the United States in 1929. He had gotten his degree at the Ontario Agricultural College in agricultural economics. He went to the University of California at Berkeley and had cultural economics and quickly finished up his Ph.D. in 1933 when the Roosevelt administration came in and there were all of a sudden jobs. He came to Washington and went through the security clearance. At the time that would have consisted of going up and seeing the postmaster general Jim Farley who didn't ask if he was an American citizen because he wasn't, but only if he was a democrat, which he said he was. He served in the Roosevelt administration and was eventually in charge of the office of price administration and then fired, an economist, noted writer and adviser to democratic presidents and presidential candidates. His other government experience was being U.S. ambassador to India from 1961 to '63.

Q: He's written a book, Ambassador's?

GALBRAITH: Ambassador's Journal, which was published in 1968.

Q: It's an excellent book. Your father is of course extremely well known and a very influential man.

GALBRAITH: Also very influential, however, is my mother.

Q: That's what I was going to say. I mean I want to go to the source of power.

GALBRAITH: My great grandfather, her grandfather, Wilbur Olin Atwater, was a noted American scientist at Wesleyan University and he actually was the person who invented the calorie, but wait, not invented the calorie, invented the calorimeter, the ability to measure the calorie. My grandfather Atwater was a lawyer, he died, all my grandparents died before I was born and my mother was the eldest of three children born in 1918. She had a scholarship at Smith and studied French and German literature. She spent her junior year abroad in Germany at the beginning of the Nazi period and she has many wonderful stories including being in the same women's dormitory as Unity Mitford when Adolf Hitler would come and call.

Q: So, these are the famous British Mitford sisters?

GALBRAITH: Exactly.

Q: Jessica, Unity. Unity was the Nazi one, wasn't she?

GALBRAITH: She had had apparently a romantic relationship with Hitler and opposed the war between Germany and England, but I don't think she was a Nazi and she put a bullet in her head and lived for a long time in a semi comatose state. Anyhow, my parents met at Harvard where my father was an instructor and my mother was working toward her Ph.D. as was typical in those days, didn't get.

Q: What was her Ph.D. in?

GALBRAITH: It was going to be in, it was in comparative literature, comparing a French and German writer, I'm not sure which ones. So, she's been the companion, support of my father for now I guess they've been married more than 60 years.

Q: Do you have brothers or sisters?

GALBRAITH: I have two brothers. One who was born in 1941 and who is a lawyer here in Washington, a partner at Williams and Connolly and a brother who is a year younger who is a professor of economics at the University of Texas at the LBJ School and who worked here in Washington as the staff director of a Congressional Committee.

Q: Can you talk a bit about home life and you know, I mean, here you've had two sort of intellectual powerhouses, what was it like at home, particularly when you were a small kid?

GALBRAITH: Well, it was a very stable upbringing. My parents lived in the same house that they still live in. They bought it in Cambridge three days after I was born, a big brick house. The household had a stream of political figures, Roy Jenkins of Britain; various Americans, Adlai Stevenson, John F. Kennedy and that would have been when I was little. Then of course the generations that followed in the '60s and '70s, Pat Moynihan and later generations. Almost invariably the discussions, the dinner table discussions dealt with public affairs, politics, and international affairs. I don't think it ever occurred to me that people wouldn't talk about such things at dinner. My parents were fairly traditional and their children were not always at the dinner table. There's a wonderful housekeeper named Mrs. Wilson who has been with them for 40 years and so, often, particularly when I was in single digits, we'd eat at a separate table and keep out of the way.

Q: Where did you go to school, talk about grammar school?

GALBRAITH: The first school that I went to was in Geneva. It was a French school. My father had a grant to write a book, which became the Affluent Society, a book that made

him well known. The school was not an entirely successful venture. I remember my mother being called to get me back out of school because I had bitten the teacher because she had insisted on speaking French which I didn't understand. After that I went to a German school in Gstaad because they had moved from Geneva to Gstaad and began at the Shady Hills School in Cambridge which I went to from kindergarten through the ninth grade with the exception of two years in India and half a year in Switzerland.

Q: Tell me about the Shady Hills School. I mean the type of education you were getting there and what you liked to read and do.

GALBRAITH: Shady Hills was and is a fairly progressive grade school, a private school, a lot of attention for the students. A style of education based on asking questions not memorization which stressed academic quality. Each grade was organized around the central subject. So, second grade I think it was the American Indians and in the fourth grade it was the Greeks. The students would study the history of the people being studied in central subject. When it was the Greeks, we'd read some Greek plays and then do some enactment of Greek plays and that kind of thing.

Q: Did it take, I mean for you?

GALBRAITH: I went through it, I was certainly far from the best student and far from the worst. I can't say that it changed my life, but then I didn't know any other life.

Q: I mean in a way it's an unfair question, but I'm just saying, sometimes a person can rebel against any form of education, a particular one it sounds like a very healthy way of getting kids into things.

GALBRAITH: It was a healthy way. I went through the system without being remarkable either as a rebel or as a scholar.

Q: How about reading, early on and sort of through the elementary school, were you a reader?

GALBRAITH: Not a great reader, some of my earlier things that I remember reading. I had a history of France, a very thick book, written for children that fascinated me and another one of England. I think that that was one of the things that sort of veered me off into a life in international affairs. I also collected stamps and I had stamps that had been collected by my grandfather Atwater, my mother's father and certainly through the stamps and stamp books, they were a window to the history of our century and even a little bit of the previous one. I remember vividly that the German stamps going from Weimar to the Nazis, Weimar with the great inflation that the stamps would get millions and millions of marks over stamps and then the Nazi stamps with different pictures of Hitler and Spain and the arrival of Franco again on the stamps. Stamps at the time of the Russian revolution with the czarist regime, the pre-communist Kerensky era, from the Caucuses when these states were briefly independent after 1918, the emergence of Czechoslovakia.

All of that I sort of followed and learned through stamp collecting, so that was something from my childhood, another influence.

Q: How about, was Harvard sort of the predominant force industry or whatever you want to call it in Cambridge at the school for the rest of the kids?

GALBRAITH: Well, at Shady Hills yes, the Harvard community and associated activity and the children of Boston lawyers, but it was definitely an upper crust professional university clientele and it was coed, but in those days basically all white.

Q: Well, you got out of there, you started high school when?

GALBRAITH: I started high school in 10th grade in 1966. Shady Hills went from kindergarten through ninth grade.

Q: At a certain point your father was off in India, wasn't he?

GALBRAITH: That was when I was in the 5th and 6th grades and I went to the American International School in New Delhi which when I arrived was in army barracks and then moved into a wonderful new campus which is where it is still housed. The new campus had three different buildings for the lower school, one to four, the middle school, five to eight, and the high school, nine through twelve. My class, sixth grade, planted eucalyptus trees. When I went to work for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee I dealt extensively with South Asia and went back many times and I remember marveling how big those eucalyptus trees had become.

Q: Did you get much of a feel for India?

GALBRAITH: It was a wonderful time to be an ambassador and to be the child of an ambassador. U.S. relations with India were very good and the kind of bureaucratic regulations that so inhibit our life as diplomats now were not really in place. My father believed in traveling all over the country, something that I adopted when I was in Croatia, and my younger brother and I would go off quite often. He had three planes at his disposal. Each of the services had their own aircraft and sometimes the planes would just take us. Now you couldn't even send the official car to do that. I remember going up to Kashmir in the summers, vacationing on houseboats, visiting with Karan Singh who was later ambassador to Washington. We fished for carp that seemed to be several feet long off of a palace that he had in an island in the middle of the lake and going trout fishing again in Kashmir, Karan Singh playing chess. That's where I learned about the fool's mate when he checkmated me in four moves. We went trekking with ponies up to the Khyber Pass. It was a wonderful time. I had an extraordinary range of animals as pets. The Delhi Zoo gave us two leopards, one we sent to the National Zoo and one we kept until it got to be of a certain size and sunk it's claws into my mother's wool skirt and she had to step out of the wool skirt. The next day the leopard went back to the zoo. Peacocks, horses, deer, lots of parrots and parakeets.

Q: Did you have any contact with Indian kids?

GALBRAITH: Unlike the current situation, there were Indian children at the school. This was something Mrs. Gandhi put an end to in the '70s I think, but at that time I think maybe a third of the student body were Indians. So, yes, I had contact with Indian children.

Q: This was the time, too when we were supporting the Indians against the Chinese invasion, too. It was a golden period I guess.

GALBRAITH: It was exactly that.

Q: You were obviously pretty young, but were you at your school at New Delhi and at home and all caught up in sort of the mystique of President Kennedy and all that or did you find, I mean were you off to one side, what were you picking up at home and all that?

GALBRAITH: Of course, living in India through most of the Kennedy administration, people I got to know or see were the Indian leaders, so I remember a number of times going over to Nehru's house and seeing him. He had tigers. I'd take my brother out to see the tigers. He had a glove that he'd use and put on to pet them. Indira Gandhi was his hostess. In fact there's a picture of me at the opening of the new residence in New Delhi which my father named Roosevelt House descending the stairs, my mother is escorting Nehru down the stairs, I'm escorting Indira Gandhi and behind is Rajiv Gandhi, a teenager at the time.

Q: A dynasty.

GALBRAITH: My recalled exposure to the Kennedy years was of course when Mrs. Kennedy came and visited India and that was a very exciting event for the embassy and for the Indians. Huge numbers of people turned out to see her and she was very gracious and a lovely person. We traveled on a special train with her to the Taj Mahal and at the Taj Mahal. Jamie, my younger brother put himself up next to Mrs. Gandhi. To be honest, my real interest in politics began probably on the day that Kennedy was killed.

Q: Were you in India at that time?

GALBRAITH: No, we were back home. It was a very eerie day actually. I was in the seventh grade and I was having lunch at the school. We had tables and served lunches. There was another fellow who was in eighth or ninth grade. We were just sort of going back and forth, showing our knowledge of naming who's who in the cabinet and who's the postmaster general, who's the secretary of state and so on. I believe I said, who's the president and he said, "Oh, it's John F. Kennedy." I said, "No, no, it's Lyndon Johnson. Kennedy is dead, got killed." That was an hour before it actually happened and although I didn't find out until about 3:00. We were rehearsing for a Thanksgiving and the teacher,

said, "As you may have heard from the shouting in the halls, President Kennedy was shot and killed." It was such a shock that I can remember it as if it were yesterday and then taking the trackless trolleys back home and of course, this had been Kennedy's congressional district and the flags at half staff which I had never remembered before. People had put his pictures in the windows, the bars closed, black crepe and my mother coming home sitting on the steps just in tears.

Q: You went to high school where?

GALBRAITH: I spent a year at a prep school in New Hampshire called the Phillips Exeter Academy, which I absolutely despised. This was 1966, '67. It was an all male school with an extraordinarily rigid set of rules most of which were incredibly petty enforced by what I thought was a rather petty faculty although it had and maybe still has a reputation for being very good academically. Anyhow, it was a totally miserable year. I spent much of it writing. My parents had two children in the 1940s, '41 and '43. The boy who was born in 1943 died in 1950 of leukemia and then they had two more. So, we were if you will, the second generation. I think they had it very much in mind that we'd reach high school, ship us off to boarding school and they could go be in Switzerland for half a year. I was thwarting this and writing to them five page letters on how dreadful I thought Exeter was and eventually they relented. I went to a school in Boston called the Commonwealth School which was a coed school of about 120 founded by Charles Merrill of Merrill Lynch, a Merrill Lynch heir. Of all the educational institutions I've known it's the one I have the strongest feelings for. It's a wonderful place. First rate teachers.

Q: What were you doing there, particularly things that stand out, courses, reading, activities?

GALBRAITH: There were several courses that stood out. In eleventh grade, an absolutely wonderful course taught by a guy named Bill Link on American history. It was one of the things that sparked my interest in history and in the world. There was also perhaps the most influential English course by Charles Chatfield. He taught me how to write, taught me that words have meaning, to pay attention to what the meaning is. He introduced me to poetry in a way that I could appreciate it. Poetry was always of course part of the curriculum, but something to be endured. He made it alive. Then in twelfth grade, there was a course in modern European history. The other courses there that were very important to me were in art, particularly print making and at that time I did quite a bit of printmaking. That lay the basis for another of my, not that I have any talent, but it's an abiding interest and a great source of pleasure, art and museums.

Q: Were you able to stop at the museums in the various activities in Boston?

GALBRAITH: We went fairly often to the Museum of Fine Arts. When I was at Shady Hills we used to have music programs that would go over to the Isabella Stuart Gardener Museum. I despised music. I had no talent for it either. Couldn't read it, couldn't sing and

that gave me a strong aversion to the Isabella Stuart Gardener Museum which I only got over when I was at Harvard and went back and visited the courtyard. I could see how lovely it was and that it was not necessary to be singing the chorus of the Pirates of Penzance.

The other thing that happened that was actually very significant in this period was I began to travel. When I was at Exeter I studied French which I had had from the fifth grade on and also Russian. After that year at Exeter in 1967 I spent eight weeks on a trip called the European Travel Camp in France and it was a wonderful time traveling around in a group which we're supposed to speak French all the time which of course we didn't. It was a mixed group with a lot of lovely girls. So, we wanted to speak French to them. I did develop my French and I enjoyed traveling, trying different foods and seeing different sights. Then after my junior year, eleventh grade year at the Commonwealth, I did something that also very profoundly affected my life. There was a man named Alexander Lipson who was a professor I think of mathematics or maybe it was philosophy at MIT. He organized something called pioneer travel, which took groups of college students to the Soviet Union and to the Balkans. In 1968 he added a small group of high school students. I was one of seven. Our group went to the Soviet Union. We flew into Paris, we rented three VW buses and drove from Paris through Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and then through Brest, Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow, Novgorod, Leningrad, back to Moscow. I flew out to Central Asia for eight days. I went to Tashkent, Bukhara, drove the Georgia military highway out through Moldavia and Romania and it was a wonderful experience. We stayed in campgrounds for a dollar a night. We had a ration of a dollar a day to buy food. The diet the entire summer consisted of very fatty Soviet sausages, black bread and for drink, these drinks you'd get from the soft machines. Very unhygienic. One had a different image of the Soviet Union there. The soft drink machines, far from being unhygienic ways to drink flavored water, represented, if you will, an achievement of socialism; obviously the universal health care, everybody was healthy, no diseases were going to be spread. It did, the trip did, well, several things happened. We spent eight days in the north of Romania in Moldova and Transylvania and we visited the monasteries with the Hungarian communities in Transylvania. When we took the train to Budapest, we got to the border. It was about 20 minutes before the conductor came in and said, "As you may have noticed from the Czechs who are crying in the next car, the Soviet Union and the allies have invaded Czechoslovakia."

Q: Oh, yes, this was.

GALBRAITH: August 21, 1968 and when we got to the border they were not allowing any Westerners to cross over into Hungary. So, we tried every way we could to get in and then we staged our own protest. We wrote free Czechoslovakia on the train. Eventually they locked us on the train and went back to Romania. We traveled 18 hours to Bucharest. We refused to pay for the ticket and all the Romanians crowded into our compartment to talk to us. They told the conductor that we shouldn't pay since it wasn't our fault. We got to Bucharest the day before the national holiday; the army was setting up field stations to evacuate the city in case the Russians invaded which they thought

might happen. Mimi and I went over to the Soviet Embassy and delivered my first diplomatic protest. We wrote it up in Russian protesting the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and knocked on the door and a man came to it and said, what is it. We said, we want to give you this and he said, what is it? We said it's a protest over the invasion of Czechoslovak. He looked at us and said, into the trash. We went to the American Embassy and talked to the Marine, the first time we'd gone to the American Embassy for help. He seemed totally oblivious as to what was going on, but was really stunned that we had drunk unpasteurized milk which was not exactly what we were worried about. Eventually of course the Soviets didn't invade and eventually we did get to Hungary where Mimi ran off with a couple of Hungarian rock stars and finally got on the train to Austria, just one minute before it left, just as our Hungarian visas were expiring. It was a great adventure. Again, it had a number of effects. It further heightened my interest in travel and finding out about other cultures and getting off the beaten path. Remember this was 1968 when basically most Americans traveled to Western Europe. Now everybody goes to the world, but that wasn't the case then.

Q: It certainly wasn't.

GALBRAITH: It was also a kind of travel. There were tours of the Soviet Union, but those were all in what were hilariously called luxurious hotels. This was a way to really meet Russians. It also very much shaped my view of communism which I suppose it made me into an anti, a liberal anti-communist which distinguished me from many others of my generation and to some degree my parents' generation who, while they were not communists, they were not pro-communists, they didn't see it. I mean I could see the evils of this system and its inefficiencies, the oppression of people. They weren't prisons the way some of the anti-communist literature at the time portrayed it. There was something fundamentally wrong in the way that it didn't serve people and the way it denied basic freedoms.

Q: Going around, did you find people in the various countries including the Soviet Union trying to talk to you and trying to find out where you were from and that sort of thing?

GALBRAITH: They were very curious and very interested in talking. In 1971 I went back, my colleague, my best friend at Commonwealth who also was my college roommate at Harvard is Polish and in '71 he and I went back to Poland and that year I traveled through Hungary and through Czechoslovakia and Poland and in East Germany. There I had endless arguments particularly in Poland with Poles about Vietnam. I was opposed to the Vietnam War and they were all in favor of it. They were saying, of course, you've got to fight the communists. All these places the people were very interested in talking to Americans. In the Soviet Union, by and large, people took the party line and they were not dissidents. Elsewhere people felt quite free to express their views. Yet, there were also people in the Soviet Union who spoke of things that I really didn't understand at the time. They spoke of cult of the personality and I mean, of course, I knew about Stalin's rule, but not the scope of it at the time. It was certainly an eye opening experience.

Q: Was it foreordained that Harvard was in the future for you?

GALBRAITH: It wasn't ordained. I went through the routine of looking at a number of schools, but in the end I decided that this was not a place where I should make an active rebellion.

Q: You entered Harvard when?

GALBRAITH: 1969.

Q: '69 and you were there until?

GALBRAITH: 1973.

Q: '73. What was Harvard like in '69 because this was right in the middle of the anti-war business and all that? I mean did you find that this was sort of the leitmotif or whatever it is of whatever was going on?

GALBRAITH: It was the leitmotif of what was going on. The year before had been the year of the strike and the takeover of University Hall and the students then being thrown out by the Cambridge police. Since I was living in Cambridge at the time I'd actually gone into University Hall, not to join the protest, but just to see what was going on and then left. I was only there for a few minutes. I wasn't there late that night when the police busted it. Harvard was in a time of very intense political activity over the war and some uncertainty about what universities were going to be like. People thought that they might be taken over by the radicals, that it might be a time where serious academic study wouldn't be possible. My freshman year, there was a big anti-war demonstration and as people marched back to Cambridge, some group broke off and staged a riot in Harvard Square and smashed windows and looted and set fire to the kiosk in the center of the square. I remember being on top of the dormitory. It was a very surreal scene to see the kiosk burning and smell the tear gas mixed with marijuana. It was an odd time. Well, it was also the beginning of the social revolution, which was often understated. In early 1968 or something, the New York Times had a front page story of how some young woman at Barnard College was living with her boyfriend at Columbia and that was front page news. By the time I graduated that was quite normal and it has continued to be the norm to the present time. Most people, couples, live together before they get married – if they get married. When I arrived at Harvard, for my freshman year, the beginning of it, there were curfews for the women at Radcliff and there were hours when men could not have women in their rooms. The first week they abolished the curfews for the women and they abolished the prohibition against men being in women's rooms for certain hours. The prohibitions remained for the men so, in theory, if you spent the night with your girlfriend at Radcliff, that was okay, but if she spent the night with you, you could get thrown out. Halfway through the freshman year, they installed coed living. So, lots of things changed very quickly.

I had lots of political battles then. I was strongly opposed to the war, but I was also opposed to the SDSers.

Q: You might explain what the SDSers are.

GALBRAITH: SDS were the Students for a Democratic Society and they were Marxists.

Q: Hardly democratic.

GALBRAITH: That's right and they sought the revolutionary overthrow of American society and I always felt that their agenda in fact was to continue the war in Vietnam on the theory that the worse it gets the better it is. They appeared at the time to be the largest political group on campus. I don't think that they actually were, but they were the most vocal, they were the best organized. They were scornful of those of us who wanted to work through the democratic processes and through electoral politics to try and end the war.

Q: Were there sort of counter SDS organizations or since these were organized and shouted the most, the rest of the people sort of kept quiet and went their own way?

GALBRAITH: It was hard to have a counter SDS organization since we shared the goal, at least the stated goal, of ending the war. The Harvard Radcliff Indochina Teaching Committee, this was the main electoral politics anti-war group. I had some run-ins with SDS. A very fringe group called the Young Americans for Freedom wanted to organize a rally or teach-in at Sanders Hall and the SDSers were determined to disrupt it. We felt that that would only play into the hands of the Nixon administration which was running the 1970 elections against students. So, I was part of a group that sought to defend the right of the Young Americans for Freedom to have their teach-in even though I disagreed vehemently with the position that they had and that led to conflict with SDS.

Q: Did all of this spill over into the academic side?

GALBRAITH: In 1970 it did very much because, well, in '69 to '70 people took time off to participate in anti-war demonstrations and that was the floor of many of my classmates' concerns. In the spring of 1970, Nixon invaded Cambodia and that produced massive protests and a few days after this protest began, four students were killed at Kent State and another at Jackson State in Mississippi.

Q: In Ohio, yes.

GALBRAITH: Cambodia and these killings lead to a nationwide student strike, which lead to the cancellation of exams including at Harvard.

Q: How did that work out? I mean did everybody get a credit?

GALBRAITH: In several cases it spared me from a rather undistinguished fray. This was my freshman year and I hadn't applied myself necessarily with all of my intellectual resources, but in the end everybody got a credit.

Q: Were you beginning to feel the change in the attitude of the faculty towards grades and all. I mean basically we're talking about the escalation of grades. I know today at my old college I think something like 80 percent of those graduating graduate with honors.

GALBRAITH: Sort of like writing EERs.

Q: Yes, efficiency reports, very much so. A lot of it started then that allow people to stay in college rather than being drafted. Was this at all apparent to you?

GALBRAITH: No. It may have been apparent to others who were wiser or more perceptive than I, but it wasn't apparent to me. I took courses on the theory that graduate schools and so on would know that this course was a tougher course and therefore a B in this course would count as much as an A in others. I don't know where I got that foolish idea from. I think I believed the official propaganda.

Q: It sounds like a career counselor looking at you and lying through his or her teeth.

GALBRAITH: Right, exactly. What was true for many of my classmates is that people did not feel the same career pressure that kids feel today or felt even a few years later. There was an idea that you could do whatever you wanted to do and you didn't need to decide. It may be a rather dangerous idea, but that's what was out there. Of course there were people who did a lot of planning for their career, but they did it all in secret. You didn't tell somebody you were applying to business school and I must say I remember how shocked I was that a couple of my classmates were in fact going to go to business school. They definitely hadn't told anybody.

Q: What about government service, was this considered really bad form now?

GALBRAITH: Yes. I think government service had a low, well, you were thought of as compromising or collaborating with the Nixon administration which many people felt was a very evil administration waging an unjust war in Vietnam and opposed to civil liberties at home. So, I think it's fair to say I did not seriously consider entering the Foreign Service largely because I felt that I would therefore be supporting an administration and policies with which I didn't agree. Had it been a different time that certainly was a career option I would have considered and maybe to some degree I'm sorry I didn't.

Q: Obviously we've got the SDS which is quite pushy which is essentially Marxist, but here you'd come out of this long tour of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and seen this is a lousy system and was there any attempt either in your mind or at the campus to

say, yes, we hate this war in Vietnam and therefore, that Ho Chi Minh is right and the communist system is not so bad, not your part, but others were they, you might say a pro-communist line or was it just against the war and greater implications were sort of not there?

GALBRAITH: Most people, most students were simply against the war and had no interest or affection for any of the Marxist groups or the radicalism that was being put forward by SDS and by some of the faculty, but the most vocal elements on campus which did have significant support were Marxists. But the Soviet Union had very little appeal to these people. It really wasn't a subject of discussion and nor was Eastern Europe. Yes, it was never an ideal, nor was it vilified, it was just there. They looked for models; they looked for Third World liberation movements where people of color would be liberating themselves. I don't think they were attracted to any of the existing communist states because their shortcomings were so clear. I suppose the more popular of the communist states would have included Cuba, Vietnam and Laos, but what it really went to was a more romantic idea of the Third World liberation movement.

Q: How much do you feel, I mean, I've heard the chargé say well, here is a whole student protest which was violent and vehement and all that, but as soon as the draft went off and the students were no longer under the gun it sort of petered out.

GALBRAITH: Well, that is true, but what also is true is that when the draft ended the war ended too. It wasn't just the end of the draft; it was the end of the war that took the wind out of the protest movement. It had become a spent force even before 1973 which was when the draft finally ended. It was most intense in 1969, 1970, and it peaked then and I think lost ground steadily after that.

Q: What about civil rights? The great days of the civil rights movements were in the '60s, but it certainly was not a completed agenda. Had civil rights come in at all, I'm talking about the African Americans.

GALBRAITH: Civil rights was much more of an issue for me when I was in high school, Commonwealth School, which to Charles Merrill's credit made an effort from its founding in the late 1950s to recruit minority students at a time when other prep schools didn't. My classmates and I spent a lot of time talking about race and talking with the black students about it. It was much less of an issue at Harvard. We were very vocal on the war and by then also there were significant numbers of black students and they were trying to define their own roles. This was actually a time of black separation and so many of the black students rejected their white classmates. They sat with each other at the dining room tables. They spoke of black power and held themselves apart. The predominant mood among the white students was to say, well, if that's what they want to do given all that they have suffered, it's their right to do that.

Q: What about just plain academics of Harvard? After you went through your preliminary course, what were you majoring in?

GALBRAITH: I majored in history and wrote my thesis in diplomatic history. I wrote it about American public opinion between September 11 and December 11, 1941 with regard to gong to war against Germany. September 11 being the date the undeclared war between U.S. and Germany began with the American navy tracking German submarines so the British destroyers could sink them. That day I think was when the German submarine fired on an American ship. Roosevelt used that as the pretext for a shoot to kill order. Of course December 11 being the day the U.S. declared war on Germany.

Q: Did Germany declare war on the United States?

GALBRAITH: They did on December 10th. We declared war on the 11th.

Q: I was in Italy and I always used to remind my Italian colleagues when we talked about the war, you know, you declared war on us first.

GALBRAITH: I was looking at to what extent did the American public support Roosevelt's interventionist policies and what I concluded was that the isolationist cause was dead by the fall of 1941. The American public was overwhelmingly in favor of intervening to stop the Nazis in Europe. The only recalcitrant institution was the congress and even their isolationism was eroding. I sought to answer this little footnote question which is why did Hitler declare war on the United States when he could have let things be and the United States would have concentrated on Japan. Germany could have completed its conquest of the Soviet Union and possibly won the war except for Hitler's foolish declaration of war on the United States. I came to the conclusion that it didn't make any difference. Roosevelt was determined to fight a Germany first strategy. The only reason he didn't declare war on Germany on December 8th was that the magic intercepts had led him to believe that Germany would in fact declare war on the United States. If Germany hadn't he would have gone ahead and asked for a declaration of war and the public and congress would have supported it.

Q: Yes, because one often thinks if one is playing around with the idea that there is that, what if Hitler hadn't declared war and just let it go.

GALBRAITH: I looked at that, that was what got me into this whole thing and I concluded that it's a nice thing to think about, but in reality it made no difference.

Q: Was Henry Kissinger at all a name during the time you were at the college?

GALBRAITH: Well, he had left actually before I arrived at Harvard to join the Nixon administration and he was very much a name. He was the Darth Vader of the university community.

Q: What were you getting from your father and mother?

GALBRAITH: Of course my father was very much opposed to the war. He had campaigned for Gene McCarthy and really helped create the McCarthy campaign and then in '71 and '72 he was a strong supporter of George McGovern. He, however, liked Kissinger and wanted to maintain dialogue with him. My father and I used to have huge arguments about Kissinger. I considered him hopelessly compromised for having ordered the invasion of Cambodia and undertaken the events that in fact led to the destruction of that country. The political differences – it's hard to describe the intensity they had to an audience today.

Q: I think everyone was much more assured of their position. It's damn hard to have an assured position on the former Yugoslavia or Haiti or some of these other places.

GALBRAITH: Even if you've lived there for five years.

Q: It just isn't that simple. Of course, there's also the arrogance of youth, too.

GALBRAITH: There's that.

Q: This was a particularly important time in the sort of the student movement and the youth was considered to have found the ultimate truth even by newspapers and the media and all that. It was an interesting period.

GALBRAITH: I don't think that I or my friends felt that we'd had the ultimate truth, but we certainly saw the war as the ultimate moral issue and that killing thousands of Vietnamese on behalf of the South Vietnamese government was just wrong.

Q: What were you pointed towards, you were doing history, I mean what were you thinking about?

GALBRAITH: I didn't really know, but if pressed I would have said an academic career and getting a Ph.D. in history and then in fact after Harvard I went to Oxford and began a program which leads to a doctorate in history. The course work I enjoyed, but when it came time to start to write the dissertation I decided that what posterity didn't know about the subject, it could remain happily ignorant thereof.

Q: You went to Oxford when?

GALBRAITH: '73 to '75. So about four years after Bill Clinton which is why I ended up as ambassador to Croatia rather than someplace grander.

Q: Was it a Rhodes scholarship or was it a regular one?

GALBRAITH: It was a very elite scholarship known as a Galbraith scholarship.

Q: Oh, yes. Well, tell me how did you in '73, how did you find the Oxford system when

you went there as compared to coming out of Harvard?

GALBRAITH: I thought the student body was not as dynamic or as experienced as the Harvard student body, but the pace of life there is infinitely, was vastly more enjoyable. Oxford is a beautiful place. It's located among some of the wealthiest country in the world and the style of the university which involves weekly meetings with one's tutor or advisor, discussion, is very agreeable. The terms lasted eight weeks followed by six weeks of vacation, which was time to travel. It made for a very pleasant lifestyle.

Q: As you started looking at this, what were you looking at, what area of history?

GALBRAITH: Again, modern diplomatic history and I studied modern Germany, modern France and the dissertation topic that I started on concerned Anglo-American diplomacy relating to the French fleet in the Western hemisphere after the fall of France in June, 1940. A part of the French fleet that was in Martinique.

Q: Was it the Jeanne de Arc or something that carrier that was sitting there?

GALBRAITH: Yes. It was an interesting question because of course the British had attacked the French fleet at Oran, sunk it. On the other hand, the United States maintained diplomatic relations with Vichy. So, with whoever controlled these Caribbean Islands, what would be the connection with the fleet that was there. I didn't get very far into it. I probably would still be working on the dissertation now.

Q: I read a book not too long ago of somebody who explored the French situation during the war as far as including the fleet and all that, it was interesting, but not terribly, it was a sideshow. Because we're doing diplomatic history right here. What did you find the state of the art interest in diplomatic history was at Oxford? I mean, was it a topic of great interest or was this just too modern? Was there much interest in diplomatic history as opposed to the great books?

GALBRAITH: Oh sure. There were plenty of people interested in diplomatic history, modern European history and international relations. Of course, there is not a fine line between the beginning of contemporary international relations and the end of diplomatic history.

Q: Did you find the same though rather pronounced divide between "political science" and "history" that we seem to have in the United States?

GALBRAITH: It may have been less. After my first year I switched out of history and I got a second B.A., which became an M.A. in politics and economics and I did it in a year and normally it takes two. I discovered that enough of the material I had covered in my study of history including the first year at Oxford would count toward papers in the politics area. Two of the politics papers were, one was international relations since 1945 and another was international relations between the wars. So, there was, it may be that

there was less of a line at Oxford than in an American university. I never had much use for political theory, but I've never known my colleagues who've studied government to ever be able to apply the theory to any of their work in government. Whereas I found that my knowledge of history was extraordinarily valuable in my discussions within my own government and with foreign officials. The ability to relate a current event to some historical event if you raise it up in a discussion within the State Department generally, it leaves everybody very impressed with your substantive expertise and then they pay much greater attention to the following point. If you, however, began by saying, well, as John Rawls said in his causal theory of justice, x, y and z, people would look at you as if you were strange. If I could talk about King Alexander and the behavior of the Yugoslav dynasty in the 1930s and make some connection there, that sounds really good.

Q: Yes, well this is American I think. For one thing.

GALBRAITH: It works as far as I'm concerned in my dealings with the British and the French and everybody else.

Q: Often one thinks of the French getting caught up in thesis and antithesis and synthesis, of the Cartesian logic and all that. Theory just has always struck me as being not even very interesting. Did you have any feel for how the United States is viewed? I mean this is '73 to '75, it was a difficult time. We were getting out of Vietnam, Watergate was hurting us, I mean these were not our golden years. Did you see any reflection of that while you were looking at the British scene from the university?

GALBRAITH: I saw many reflections of it. Although it was also a time of great weakness on the part of the Europeans. These were the years of the oil embargo and long gas lines.

Q: The '73 Yom Kippur War.

GALBRAITH: '73 was the Yom Kippur War and in parts of Europe there were driveless Sundays. You couldn't use your car. Gas prices increased dramatically. This was also combined in Britain with a coal miners' strike. The Heath Government turned out the lights in Piccadilly, Central London, and Soho; and there was a train strike. There was a three-day workweek.

Q: Watergate was not a major concern.

GALBRAITH: Of course it quite often led the news and I watched, followed the Watergate events with immense satisfaction. I never agreed with Gerald Ford that the long national nightmare was over. As far as I was concerned, my dream outcome had occurred. The son of a bitch had gone in disgrace. There was no political figure that I thought less of in my life and still think less of than Richard Nixon. Before I went to Oxford I studied German for a summer in Monterey, California, at Monterey Institute for Foreign Studies and then went to East Germany and traveled around there. I arrived in Dresden on the day the Yom Kippur War began and the woman who ran the youth hostel

where I stayed, was quite convinced there was going to be a third world war. I didn't share her alarm, but she may have been more right than I in being afraid.

Q: What about this, you know, two years at Oxford? Were you picking up the class battle or whatever you want to call it, labor versus conservative, you're talking about the coal miners' strike. This was a time of considerable militancy, which was going to be taken care of later by Margaret Thatcher. At that time, how did you feel about this? Labor versus the Tories was really quite a different battle than we had in the United States. Your father was a seminal figure in helping people to understand these economic issues.

GALBRAITH: Yes, it's actually the opposite of what it is now in Britain. At that time the Conservative Party was the more moderate party and Ed Heath was the leader, he was a, if you will, a Rockefeller Republican and an establishment type. Margaret Thatcher was I think the education minister in his cabinet, but one of the radicals, but a minority position. I remember the chant about her Thatcher, Thatcher, milked stature because she eliminated the milk that was given out at recess at British schools, whereas the labor party, although Harold Wilson was again more of a centrist figure, but the real strength was with the radicals. Tony Benn and the miners' union. The trade union movement. I went to the labor party conference and saw some of this confrontation. Before the 1974 elections E.J. Dionne who was at Oxford with me, a fellow named Bud Sheppard and a British fellow named Brian Morgan, British and Canadian, we spent about ten days traveling around Britain by train going to different constituencies, watching this election unfold.

Q: I suppose all good things come to an end, was the Galbraith scholarship beginning to run out and it was time to get out and get to work?

GALBRAITH: Yes. I applied for academic jobs. My girlfriend and I wanted to live in Vermont where my parents had a home and I was a voting resident. So, I applied to some colleges there. One of them, Windham College, in Putney, offered me a job. I had applied to the history department. They offered me a job in the economics department. I didn't actually have any economics background, but I guess they concluded that knowledge of the subject was hereditary. I really had a moment of conscience whether to accept it or not, but I knew enough economics to know that this was the only job offer I had so I accepted. It turned out I was a great star at the college. I began as an instructor. Within a year I was made chairman of the social sciences division at which point I shifted my course load away from economics to history and international relations. As my career went up the college's fortunes declined and after the end of four years it went bankrupt.

Q: Were you there four years?

GALBRAITH: I was there four years.

Q: This would be what '75 to?

GALBRAITH: ‘75 to December of ‘78.

Q: What was the philosophy behind Windham College?

GALBRAITH: It was founded by a guy named Walter Hendricks who had taught out in Illinois in the 1930s and ‘40s, but decided wisely that Vermont was a much prettier and nicer place and since there were no colleges in Windham County that he would found one. So, he founded Marlboro College in 1949 as a small liberal arts on the Oxford model where there would be tutorials and Marlboro developed a clientele and it began to thrive and it promptly threw Walter Hendricks out. So, he then went a few miles away to Putney and founded Windham College where he began on the same philosophy and it began to grow whereupon he was promptly thrown out.

Q: What was the problem with him? Was he just a good founder and a lousy administrator?

GALBRAITH: I met him; he was still alive when I was at the college, but he was very old. I don’t know what the issue was, but anyhow Windham College was taken over by Eugene Winslow. He built it up and he got a $10 million loan from the department of education in the early ‘60s under these great society programs. That was a lot of money back then.

Q: Oh, yes.

GALBRAITH: With it he built a campus. In fact the architect for the campus was Edward Durell Stone. Now Stone had designed the campus, it was off the shelf, it had been designed for another school that had rejected it. So, it had a lot of flat roofs which were not exactly suitable to Vermont, but it had this lovely campus and the student body grew to be almost 1,000 and it was fully accredited. At its heyday it was a school in the same league, but a little bit behind in qualities, as some of the smaller schools in the western part of Massachusetts, Smith, Williams, Mount Holyoke category, but Winslow was thrown out. He was replaced by Harrison Symmes who had been ambassador to Jordan.

Q: Yes, I’ve interviewed Harry.

GALBRAITH: He was the president when I was hired and it has to be said a rather disastrous president and although the school’s problems were structural, they used the September tuition to pay the previous year’s debt, which means that to run for the oncoming year they had to get loans and that worked. It was sort of like what was going on in Albania. That worked as long as the enrollment increased, but with the end of the Vietnam War and the recession of the late ‘70s, enrollments began to decline. Eventually the school ran out of money and it contracted from 700 students to about 300. Most of the faculty were dismissed. This happened in my first year and because I was young and dynamic and probably cheap compared to my senior colleagues I was one of the people who was kept on. Harrison resigned and there was a succession of presidents and so the

whole place eventually collapsed.

Q: How did you find the students there?

GALBRAITH: The sole criteria for admission to Windham College was an ability to pay. So, they were, well, I wouldn't say uneven quality, there were a few good ones, but most of them were pretty bad. I enjoyed teaching. I loved living in Vermont.

Q: Oh, yes.

GALBRAITH: One of the early issues as the chairman of the social sciences division, I sat on the academic council and dealt with the hiring and firing and tenure and one of the early issues was whether John Irving, the author, deserved tenure. The English department was strongly opposed to it because he hadn't written anything of an academic quality. I thought a guy who had written some novels that people had read deserved tenure, but I lost. Then the next year he published The World According to Garp, and he made rather more money than the college did. It was a funny place. A lot of hippies around. Our most famous graduate was Claudine Schneider who became a congresswoman from Rhode Island. I ran into her once and said, oh, a little before I had been there in 1970 and the Windham students were famous for having run a free farm in which they did all the planting of crops in the nude and that sort of thing. I suppose the principal crop was marijuana. Anyway, I ran into Claudine and I said, oh, we have something in common, I taught at Windham College when you were a student here. I think she was afraid I might have remembered her from there because she turned around and sort of went in the other direction. This was not a discussion that she wanted to have. In fact, she was there before I was there.

Q: So, we're up to '78.

GALBRAITH: Well, there are some other significant things. I was quite involved in Vermont politics. In 1970 I worked for Phil Hoff who was the first democratic governor ever of the state of Vermont. A very attractive guy. It turned out he was alcoholic.

Q: I think he may have been a classmate of mine in college. I went to Williams and I think he did if I recall.

GALBRAITH: That's quite possible. He turned around the state of Vermont and made the modern Democratic Party there. He started the environmental movement. He changed the legislature from one representative from one town to one-man, one vote. It was very significant accomplishments, but with this unfortunate flaw. Anyhow, he ran for the senate and I worked full time for his campaign. It was very disappointing when he lost.

Q: Can you talk a little bit about Vermont politics in 1970, what does one do in Vermont, what were some of the, what were you doing working on his campaign, what were some of the currents in Vermont?

GALBRAITH: Well, I was actually living in what was called the red house which was rented from Windham College although I did not at that point know that I would have an association right next to this free farm that I just described, but what we did was typical campaign stuff. Organized events for the candidate, including fund raising events, canvassed, went door to door, distributed literature. I got to know the local media in Windham County, the people on the town and county committees. I think then the next year when I was old enough to vote and the voting age was lowered and I was made the chairman of the town's democratic committee in my home town of Townshend and in '72 I was a delegate to the democratic national convention for George McGovern. When I came to Windham College I then ran Mo Udall's campaign for president in the state and was again a delegate and he did very well in Vermont, one of his best states. He was the top vote getter in the state among candidates for the national delegates and led his delegation down at the convention and Carter got the nomination. Then I was chairman of the Vermont state democratic committee from 1977 to 1979.

Q: I would have thought that Vermont politics, Vermont seems so different the way they come out at things from their neighbor, New Hampshire. Why?

GALBRAITH: Well, Vermont during my life it's evolved from being a rock-ribbed Republican state to being one of the most democratic states in the country. Even when it was Republican, it has always been quite liberal. George Aiken was the governor in the 1930s and he strongly supported Roosevelt's New Deal, which is one reason why the Republicans there supported the New Deal. The Republicans could still carry Vermont and there were state programs of assistance that did things that the federal programs did that Roosevelt had set up. Aiken began the modern environmental movement and in the '60s I think Vermonters became concerned about the environment and wanting to preserve this very beautiful state. It always had taxes, it always had a relatively high level of services, so it did not attract people who were simply trying to escape taxes and who didn't want any services as New Hampshire did.

Anyhow, George Aiken represented a lot of Republicans who were liberal Republican party people and that has largely vanished. They favored taking care of the poor; they favored spending money for education which none of these newcomers from New Hampshire favor. When I was state democratic chairman, Vermont politics revolved around taxes. The Republican governor Dick Snelling wanted to cut the income tax and I opposed it because that would disproportionately favor the wealthy. That was one issue. There was quite a degree of consensus about environmental issues. Basically whatever protected the environment, both parties were in favor. In the end I did not like the partisan side of politics, particularly being a state chairman and that's a job which is almost all politics and no substance. The part of government I like is the substance, not the politics. I've thought about running for office, but in the end I came down to work for the senate foreign relations committee, a job I thought I would have for six months or a year and go back to Vermont. But, of course, like many people I got Potomac fever and ended up staying 14 years.

Q: You left this job in politics. Was this intruding on your Windham business?

GALBRAITH: No, the position of state chairman was an unpaid volunteer position and it didn't conflict with Windham College, which anyhow was in a rapid decline. In the fall of '78 the school opened with no money and I strongly opposed its opening. I was on the finance council because there wasn't any money and I felt it would be a fraud to collect tuition from students if you couldn't deliver a full semester, but apparently the school decided otherwise. I resigned from the financial council and after one month it ran out of money and they tried to persuade the faculty to teach their students one day a week which I agreed to do, but I was very annoyed. Then came one of the great frauds. There was an article about how the school was closing and a guy in Pennsylvania read it and he came up to Windham College and he said, oh, I just couldn't bear the thought of this beautiful school closing. I want to help you. So, the administration said, well, how? He said, well, I can get you foreign students and the school said, we don't have enough time and he said, well, I can get them immediately. You pay me $40,000 and I'll produce 150 students and the school said, well, we're broke, we don't have $40,000 and he said, oh, no, I didn't mean up front. You pay me when I produce the students; all I need is for you to sign some letters of admission and to fill out the.

Q: The I-20 form.

GALBRAITH: The I-20 form. The school said, fine and 150 students, we'll give you 150 of the forms. He said, well, yes, but really I'll probably need some extras. So, the poor registrar, a very simple Vermont woman, Lucy Smith, stayed all night and signed 800 of these forms whereupon this guy, I think his name was Golanis, took an airplane and flew to, where would you go in the fall of 1978? Tehran. Where the revolution was gathering steam and of course, every wealthy person wanted to get their kids out of Tehran. So, he sold these, he didn't give a damn about whether the students came to Windham College, he sold these forms for between $500 and $1,000 each and eventually a stream of students began to show up in Brattleboro who thought they were going to the famous American medical school of Windham College or Windham College with its Olympic class swimming pool and its American championship swimming team and all these things which were blatantly untrue. The college instead of dealing with it, had a system by which they sent somebody down to the bus station and grabbed these students, brought them to the bursar's office, forced them to pay the tuition before they then told them anything about the college. Now, I didn't find this out right away because I had disassociated myself from college activities because I had objected to the opening of the semester. I eventually began to realize what was going on and so I organized my colleagues in the social sciences department to resign over this incredible criminal fraud and we did. Our resignations then brought down the college and it closed its doors within a week. This guy Golanis was then subsequently indicted, convicted and went to jail.

Q: Up at Putney, Vermont, too. I mean.

GALBRAITH: It was quite an extraordinary experience. Also in this period, just for the record, in 1971, I had become involved with a classmate of mine at Harvard named Anne O'Leary who is the daughter of an army colonel.

Q: I thought for a minute you were going to say Timothy O'Leary.

GALBRAITH: No, no, daughter of an army colonel, so a military brat, traced back to Boston Irish. We lived together at Harvard and then she came to Oxford with me and in November of '75 we had gotten married. We lived for a while in my parents' 200-year-old farmhouse one winter. We moved around to various houses, house-sitting and so on with a menagerie that at one point consisted of four horses, a golden retriever and many cats. In '77 we bought a house in Vermont which I still own with 64 acres. In June of '78 we had a baby boy who now, this year, will be 21.

Q: Just to put at the end of this so we'll know where to pick it up. We've gotten up to about what '79? Windham College has gone down the drain.

GALBRAITH: Yes, December of '78.

Q: So, what were you thinking of doing?

GALBRAITH: I didn't know. I did talk to AID about possibly coming down there. My brother was working for Henry Royce who was the chairman of the banking committee in the House. Frank Church was just becoming chairman of the foreign relations committee in the Senate. As a result there was going to be a significant turnover in the staff. So Jamie had a friend, John Holum, who is now the head of ACDA, who was going to go into the Carter administration. He had been working for McGovern, so Holum was helpful in terms of getting me connected to the foreign relations committee. My brother Jamie was helpful and George McGovern whose delegate I had been was helpful and in May of '79 I began work on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Q: Okay, well, we'll pick it up then.

GALBRAITH: Okay.

Q: Great.

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Today is August 11, 1999. Peter, in 1979 you're going on the foreign relations committee. The date is kind of important because '79 was such an important year. What day did you get onto the foreign relations committee?

GALBRAITH: May 8th, 1979.

Q: When you went on the foreign relations committee, did you have an expertise at that time? Were you considered to be an expert on an area or were you sort of a general handyman?

GALBRAITH: The committee was not particularly well run. This was the two years of Church's chairmanship and I think people had great hope for the committee under Church. It had been probably the most prestigious committee in the congress under Fulbright and Fulbright had lost in 1974. For four years there was John Sparkman who was a long time senator from Alabama, actually been Stevenson's vice presidential candidate in 1952. At this stage Sparkman was thought of as approaching senility. I don't know if this was true, but this is what people said and which expressed itself in a number of ways as he had a tendency to grope women in the elevators. He retired in '78 and in came Frank Church, an energetic senator from Idaho, liberal, internationalist. He had in his office the desk of William Borah, the very famous senator from Idaho. That was his own desk and Church hired a staff director named William Bader to recruit an energetic staff and sweep away those who had worked for Sparkman. Well, the results were not very good because it turned out that all the people that he wanted to get rid of had years of accumulated leave which had to come out of the budget and many of the new people didn't know very much about how the congress worked. I didn't come in as one of Bader's recruitees, but in the manner I described before, more or less promoted by George McGovern and also by my brother who was a very influential staff person with Henry Royce who had become chairman of the house banking committee, but well connected with the senate. All this is by way of saying that when I came on there were not, it was not a sentiment of specific assignments for me. I had thought I would be working on European and East European issues which was the expertise that I had up to that point although to be honest I don't know if I was particularly expert at it.

As it turned out, I was more or less left to make my own way and I began to work on humanitarian issues, refugee issues. The first thing that I began to focus on was the plight of the boat people who were coming out of Vietnam, as well as what was going on in Cambodia where there was a massive famine in the wake of the expulsion of the Khmer Rouge. In the beginning period of '79 and '80 I was pretty marginal. Well, Church was the chairman, the number two democrat was Claiborne Pell and the Church staff didn't think all that well of Pell, they thought he was eccentric. They thought he had a peculiar set of issues, like Law of the Sea, that they didn't think were cutting edge issues. So, they didn't pay a lot of attention to him, but of course I was willing to help anybody who wanted me to help. Pell's foreign policy guy, Jerry Christiansen, recruited me to do some stuff for him and the first thing I did was his speech on the refugee crisis. I wrote the speech for Pell and went onto the floor of the senate with him as he delivered it. Now, Pell is a wonderful man. I think he was one of the great senators of our time. If you measure a senator not by the amount of times they are on television or by how often they are talked about as a potential presidential candidate, but for their legislative achievements, Pell has had a record of legislative achievement both in foreign policy and domestic policy. He was notable for an area of education in the Pell grants that I think very few senators rival. In any event, he knew in a very quiet and effective way how to

push his legislative agenda along and was very much open to ideas of his staff which made him wonderful to work for. He also was an absolutely terrible speaker. Senator Ribicoff once told me that Claiborne Pell is by far the worst speaker he had ever encountered in congress and I think that's a fair point. I always said that if I ever wrote a speech for Pell that he had a penchant for the quotable, mainly if there was a quotable line in the speech, that would be the only line that he would strike from the draft. Or if you could persuade him to deliver it, he would feel so uncomfortable about it that he would mumble his way through it. Anyhow, so I wrote this speech for Pell and he delivered it and in the speech I spoke of the emaciated children of Cambodia with swollen stomachs, reddened hair and matchstick limbs. Javits was on the floor and I guess it must have struck him that here was Pell actually articulating something that he could understand. Pell hadn't mumbled through the speech and of course being in favor of starving children was not a highly controversial position. So Javits began to talk about Pell's speech and quoted back how Senator Pell said children with swollen stomachs and matchstick limbs and we've got to do something and Senator Pell's leadership this or that. I think Pell was kind of surprised that one of his speeches had gotten noticed and so in that way I got noticed. To jump a little bit ahead of the story, in 1980, Church lost and not only did Church lose, but the democrats lost control of the senate which nobody expected and so Pell became the top democrat on the committee and he decided he wanted to keep me. By order of seniority certainly I would not have been somebody who would have been kept, but he and his foreign policy fellow, Jerry Christiansen, who became the staff director, they were both fans and so that's how I happened to stay on the committee as we made the transition from being the majority staff to the minority staff. Now, coming back to the issues that I worked on. From '79 on I did refugee issues. In '79 I wrote two bits of legislation actually that were fairly significant. I wrote a McGovern amendment, an amendment which McGovern did which permitted the transfer of money from one foreign assistance account to another to help people inside Cambodia and who were facing starvation inside Cambodia. There were numerous legislative prohibitions against help to Cambodia as a communist country and at this time the Cold War debate was heating up internally in the United States. The SALT II Treaty was before the committee and not going anyplace. There was a great deal of opposition to the Soviet Union and Vietnam for the invasion of Cambodia. So, there wasn't a general predisposition to want to be helpful. Anyway, I crafted an amendment that basically waived the legislative restrictions on assistance to Cambodia for McGovern. It also helped push the administration to try and do more, in part by signaling that congress would be a partner and a supporter, not an opponent.

The other thing I did was to specifically authorize the assistance to Cambodia and this was a kind of funny amendment. I drafted it. I think it was section 495E of the Foreign Assistance Act is what I called it. I had talked to Kennedy's staff guy in the immigration subcommittee who was very interested in refugees and I'd gotten him interested in it and I'd given him a copy of the thing I had drafted. In the office I was in, nearby there was an intern who was working for Danforth and so I also gave him a copy of this same language and Danforth went ahead and offered it before Kennedy. Jerry Tasker was a little amused and said, you know, Kennedy was going to do this, but then Danforth did exactly the

same thing; I don't know how he found out about this. I didn't quite have the courage to admit that I'd given my legislative language to two different senators which at the time I didn't fully understand it was not how it was done, but nobody caught onto my mistake.

Q: Well, when you're drafting legislation, this is a legal thing and I imagine the language is in a way almost exotic, isn't it? It's case specific for dealing with a law in the senate. Did you get any help or did you just sit down and write up what you wanted?

GALBRAITH: No, I didn't get help because I sat and I read the legislation on foreign assistance. I would later read the State Department authorization legislation and I realized that it was no mystery about writing good laws. In fact, I believed that I was much better able to accomplish precisely what I wanted to accomplish if I myself wrote the law rather than turning it over to somebody else because I could use my words to shape the goal that I wanted or the senator wanted. I simply came to this by reading the laws and seeing that in fact it wasn't hard. You didn't need to use a lot of legal mumbo jumbo. There were many people, almost all members of congress, none of them I think had ever actually written a law. They don't imagine that they can do it. It's also true that the substantive staff on the whole tend to think that they can't write the laws and they defer to the legislative legal counsel. The trouble with the legal counsel is quite often they don't, they are not going to put the language into the law to accomplish precisely what you want to accomplish. I also felt that it was very good if the legislation was clear and understandable rather than having the bill be something that was oblique that could not be penetrated either by the executive branch when it became law or by senators in the course of the debate. I liked having something that when somebody said to me, well, what's in this, what can it do? I can actually show them the language and that they could understand it. So, yes, I began almost from the beginning of my career with the foreign relations committee to write the legislation that I worked on myself. I suppose that of the 1,200 pages of law that govern the foreign relations of the United States, that was the Foreign Assistance Act, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, the Fulbright Act and so on, that as of today maybe 50 to 100 pages of it are my prose. I'm not saying that I've written by any means the most significant laws, but there's a lot of it that I myself wrote.

Another thing about it is that the senators tended to be very open to ideas from the staff. They're very busy; they have many other things on their plate. Essentially they are voting, making decisions, so by and large they did not concern themselves with the content of the ideas. You develop relationships with them. I would go, for example, to Senator Glenn and talk to him and to Carl Ford who was his assistant about some ideas on nuclear non-proliferation in India, dealing with India and Pakistan. Certainly neither of them ever looked at the specifics of what I was proposing or how I was proposing to work it; it was simply sufficient for me to say I think we ought to be linking our arms sales to Pakistan and our assistance to Pakistan complying with certain non-proliferation standards. Once they had accepted that idea, it was completely up to me to write the relevant legislation, to write the arguments being made in support of it. Once it was adopted to write the committee report that would set out the legislative history or to negotiate it to be on the floor of the senate and to negotiate any changes that people might want to make, to

negotiate the language with the House staff in the preconference which settled the more than 150 issues in disagreement. The preconference would settle 147 of them and even would work out the compromises on the three where the two parties were at loggerheads, but you had to get the members to talk it through. They realized they were at odds and then they would instruct the staff to come up with something. In any event, one of the wonderful things about being in the foreign relations committee was that you could sit at all stages of the process and therefore control the product and do the things that I or the senators were particularly interested in seeing accomplished, make sure it actually happened.

The other thing, the other wonderful thing about being on the foreign relations committee is that after a while the senators got to know you and their foreign policy staff got to know you and as they felt comfortable with you they would be very receptive to your ideas. As I've already described, they also would not tend to change them very much. The other point is if you were effective at this, you knew which senator would agree to which idea, which side would be willing to carry a particular amendment or a particular proposal and you knew you could learn the arguments that would sell to that particular sender. In the early '80s I did a huge amount of legislative work on USIA. Much of it was seeking to block Charlie Wick from turning USIA over to essentially being something to propagate extreme right wing views. In this battle I had two senators who were interested. One was Claiborne Pell, by this stage the ranking democrat on the committee, who had a deep commitment to the goals of USIA particularly to the education exchange programs. He believed in education; he believed in the concept of mutual understanding. He believed in a big presence overseas. The other person that I worked with closely was Edward Zorinsky who was a senator from Nebraska who had been a Republican through his career even as mayor of Omaha. The Republicans said he couldn't run for the senate on their ticket, so he switched to the democrats and got himself elected. In every regard, he was a conservative Republican except with a democratic label. I could take the proposals to him dealing with USIA, a proposal which I had taken to Pell and said that what Reagan and Wick are doing on ideological grounds is wrong. The Fulbright program funds should not be used for purposes like funding the Young Americans for Freedom or to go to bring foreigners to go to Jerry Falwell's liberty college for instruction in moral purity. I could go to Zorinsky making the argument that these programs are wasting money that should be going to Nebraska farmers, officially conservative argument. Well, after a while you knew exactly which argument to make to which senator to promote what one's ideas were and again by and large senators and members of congress, they just don't have the time to focus on the specifics within their areas of interest. They know that they're in favor of arms control, they're against good relations with the Soviet Union, but it's very hard for them to get down to the legislative level, so they are very receptive to ideas from people that they trust. I also became very proficient in rendering things in the voice of the senator that I was working for with which is another part of being effective within the committee.

Q: Would you expand on that? Would you study how they spoke or what their concerns were?

GALBRAITH: One lived in close proximity with the senators, you watch them in the committee. The senators sat up on the horseshoe dais of the foreign relations committee and the staff sat behind them and you chatted as the witnesses testified. When people came to see them on office calls, often the staff would sit with them and then either before or after discuss what the visitor had wanted, how to handle the request, come over and brief them. I managed the committee's main legislation throughout the 1980s, the foreign relations authorization legislation for the democratic side which was the minority from '81 to '86 and then the majority from '86 through 1990. This legislation would be on the floor between five and 12 days. It would begin at 10:00 or noon and would continue sometimes to 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning. You literally sat right on the floor of the senate at one of the desks in the front. In the evening hours where the senators didn't have a lot else to do, a lot of time you got to know them and on the floor you watched what they're doing. Then later in my career I began to travel with the senators quite a bit, and when they're traveling it's also a very good time to get to know them. Mostly, it's a matter of listening to what they have to say, listening to what issues, knowing that somebody, if you could present an issue that is a fiscally conservative one, if you can present some conservative idea as a waste of money, but a guy like Senator Zorinsky would be responsive and similarly if you were talking with somebody like Senator Pell to present the idea as a way to protect the Fulbright program to promote goals that he believes in like arms control or international environmental protection, that would be another way to accomplish something.

Q: I would imagine there would be a great deal of diplomacy in dealing with other members of the Senate staff all over, individual senator's staff and so on, because a lot of egos are involved. When you say the senators are busy, they have general things they're interested in, but the staff has often rather specific things they're interested in... As the new kid on the block or even the old kid on the block, you'd have problems dealing with just egos and personal issues.

GALBRAITH: Absolutely. There were enormous egos among the staff and it did require a lot of diplomacy. I know that I was not always effective at it. In fact it required a mixture of skills with some of the staff particularly on your own side. It required a lot of tact and making sure that you were solicitous of their concerns and that things they wanted in the bill got in to the extent it was possible to accommodate them. You consulted and you had to be very careful with those who were proprietary about issues. There was a man named Robert Dockery, who worked for Senator Dodd, who believed that anything in the Western Hemisphere was his domain and that nobody else should become involved. Fortunately, my rule was if it takes less than eight hours to fly there, I'm not particularly interested. I actually had some run-ins with him, but other people who were deeply interested in Central America had a lot of run-ins with Dockery. On the other hand, at times it requires an exercise of power. If you have the votes, you can make clear to the other side that you have the votes and you're just going to go ahead and you're not going to waste a lot of time in pointless negotiation. I handled the foreign relations authorization bill which was a State Department/USIA bill, but more importantly, it was a vehicle to accomplish other foreign policy goals. It was a bill that

was passed every two years and so other issues were attached to the bill. I had a colleague, Jerry Conley, who handled the foreign assistance bill, but he could never get that bill through. I think part of the problem is that his tendency was to want to conciliate everybody. It ended up making a lot of concessions to the Republicans, to Senator Helms and never getting anything in return because Helms was never going to allow a foreign assistance bill to be approved. I felt that as a matter of style on the one hand it requires diplomacy and on the other hand it requires knowing when to use force, when to make clear you have the votes. It also certainly requires an ability to work with the other side and to recognize where your issues are congruent. In the late 1980s, I was deeply concerned about what Iraq was doing to the Kurds, a policy of genocide. I put together a coalition of Pell, Al Gore, whose interest was in chemical weapons, Robert Byrd because I was able to get to his staff guy, Proxmire and Jesse Helms. In fact was able to use Jesse Helms in a way that very effectively thwarted both the Reagan administration and the Bush administration as well as Bob Dole on this issue.

Q: What was the issue essentially?

GALBRAITH: The issue was whether to impose sanctions on Iraq because of its conduct, because of its mistreatment of the Kurds. When we get up to that part of it I'll describe it in actually considerably greater detail. Just to go back to get the chronology right. In the summer of '79 I worked on these two Cambodia issues, the McGovern proposal and later what became Danforth and both of them became law. I worked with Pell on writing the speech that I described on refugee issues and I also did some stuff on the United Nations and international environmental issues, international organizations, international environmental issues, these were keen Pell interests. In April of 1980 I made my first trip, a staff trip for the committee, something that I myself ginned up. I spent about two weeks in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. I actually spent a week in Laos, which was fun. This was four years after the communists had taken over. We had once had a huge embassy in Laos; at this point it was down to about six or seven people on this vast compound. No visitors came there. The diplomatic community was very small. The Laotians, however, for whatever reason let me travel out of Vientiane. I made one road trip up one of the highways, I'd have to check for the precise details, but also I was able to rent an AN-2, a Soviet designed biplane and fly up to Xiangkhoang in the Plain of Jars. I always said I was the first American to go to the Plain of Jars in five years and the first to go and come back in ten years which was the significant number. Some pilots had been shot down there, but nobody had actually come back in more than ten years. I crossed the border into the Khmer Rouge patrolled areas of Cambodia and did a report that advocated more humanitarian assistance. In the fall of 1980 there was a tradition that two members of congress join the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations. In odd numbered years it was the House's turn to have the two members of congress, always a democrat and a Republican. In even numbered years it was senators, generally senators not up for reelection. When it was the senate's return, it was the senate foreign relations committee from which senators were chosen. Then there was one staff person sent up to staff the two senators, a democrat and a Republican. Well, Paul Tsongas became the democratic senator and Javits became the Republican senator. This was curious, because, in fact, Javits was up for reelection

and he lost his primary to Alfonse D'Amato and still ran on the liberal ticket. Neither of them actually showed up. Well, Tsongas showed up for one day, but I spent the entire fall up at the United Nations. They had rented two apartments in the Waldorf Towers for the senators and after about three weeks I decided it was silly to leave them vacant so I moved into the one for Javits who in any event has an apartment in New York. It was a wonderful luxury, two bedrooms, three baths, 23rd floor of the Waldorf Towers. I participated in the activities of the U.S. Mission. I met people in the delegates lounge and attended committee meetings. It was a very useful exposure to international organizations as well as to a whole group of young democrats from other countries many of whom now have very prominent leadership positions. As a result of that and as a result of the work that I'd done with Pell, when the democrats lost control of the senate I was one of the people that was kept on. It was essentially a two-thirds reduction of the democratic staff, but I survived. Then in 1981 I did a portfolio of international organizations refugees. Since those were included in the State Department authorization bill I ended up being given the portfolio of the person who handled the State Department authorization bill which became known as the foreign relations authorization bill as well as international environmental issues. Then because I had lived in India as a child and had been interested in Pakistan particularly because my closest friend was Benazir Bhutto, or one of my closest friends and her father has recently been executed. I was the person assigned then to handle the Near Eastern South Asia subcommittee. I was also assigned to handle human rights. Bill Ashworth who had previously been on the committee staff and had gone into the Carter administration eventually being the counselor at ACDA came back and he did the arms control issues. He also took out the Arab/Israel issues from the Near Eastern South Asia portfolio, so I didn't have the Arab/Israel issues which turned out to be a blessing. The maximum influence of the staff is on the issues that the senators are less informed about and have less rigid positions. On Arab/Israel issues it clearly was understood that any deviation from the orthodoxy of unlimited support for our only democratic and reliable ally in the Middle East, i.e., Israel, was not something that any senator would wish to contemplate and not something that any staff person could recommend. Any recommendation for some change in the laws or a suggestion of maybe some pro-Israel piece of legislation that might be modified, that would be completely unwelcome and if you made such a proposal chances are that you would not be listened to on other things. If not, the suggestion might be that perhaps your portfolio should be changed. So, on that issue, the staff had absolutely no influence. On the other hand, on issues of South Asia where there are not significant constituencies interested and were not exactly the focal point of political issues, the staff and I because I handled it had a quite a lot of influence.

Q: What about Afghanistan at this time? This would seem to be of considerable importance.

GALBRAITH: Well, let me get to that and answer your question. Just to describe the arrangements. On the minority I think there were something like eight or nine staff people. I described my portfolios. Ashworth did Arabs, Israel and arms control. A guy named Jerry Conley did foreign assistance. We had somebody who did Western

Hemisphere. Somebody did African correspondence reflecting the view that Africa was not important at all and so that should be left to the person who was going to handle the committee's correspondence, a really onerous task of answering letters all day. There was somebody who did Europe and somebody, John Rich, did Europe. Carl Ford, who later became a national intelligence officer in the CIA in the Far East worked essentially for John Glenn. As I say, I began with what was thought of as a fairly low prestige portfolio, South Asia, which nobody cared very much about, North Africa and the State Department authorization bill which was not thought of as very glamorous, UN, human rights, international and environmental issues. Precisely because they were not so glamorous, they provided significant opportunities for influence. For the first four years, from '81 to '84, Charles Percy was the chairman. He had kept on one of the democratic, Church staff people, Dave Kinney, to be his own fellow to work on the State Department bill, my counterpart. Dave and I had very good personal relations. So, we simply put the bill together. Dave by and large agreed with most of the initiatives that I wanted to put into the bill. He often couldn't propose them himself, but he could go to Percy and say, well, Pell really wants this in the bill. Percy wanted to maintain good relations with his ranking minority member and he liked Pell personally. Probably he agreed with the point being made that if it was something that was going to cause the Reagan administration discomfort, he was glad to see it accomplished. He couldn't personally do it and was therefore glad to see that it had come from Pell or the democrats and Dave as I say was himself personally 100 percent disposed to the ideas that I brought in. They got adopted. Since, as I said, Percy was never able to pass a foreign aid bill, the State bill became the vehicle for having real accomplishments. Since I handled it with Dave it became actually a very influential piece of legislation to handle although I'm not sure that this was widely noticed either by the senators or by my staff colleagues. I'll describe in a minute some of the more significant legislation and how it came about, but you did ask about Afghanistan.

Because an issue is important to the country doesn't necessarily make it an important issue for the congress. The issues that are important for the congress are the ones where it has some control and those are issues where there's a treaty which of course has to be ratified by the senate and by the foreign relations committee who handles that first or where money needs to be expended or arms sales carried out. There the committee can attach conditions as I will describe on what was done on Pakistan. In the case of Afghanistan, this was a covert program, it was presented to the intelligence committee, which approved it, but it was completely uncontroversial. Everybody wanted to support the Afghan resistance and their heroic struggle against the Soviets. Even those liberals that were in favor of better relations with the Soviet Union, who wanted to retain the arms control treaties, found that this was an issue where they could take an anti-Soviet posture and thus have credentials as a realist, as a tough guy. Then, having demonstrated their tough guy credentials, they could then turn around and oppose aid to the contras in Nicaragua or be in favor of arms control treaties with the Soviet Union. So, given that it was not controversial, there was not a lot of congressional influence on Afghanistan in the early '80s. That began to change around '85 when Senator DeConcini and Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire began to push for arming the Afghans with stingers. This

helped change the course of the war and they were eventually able to get the administration to adopt their recommendations.

I played the game on Afghanistan. I sold senators on resolutions that supported the Afghan freedom fighters. When I wrote a report on India or Pakistan, I would stress how whatever objective I was really after would help accomplish U.S. policy goals in terms of support for the Afghan resistance. I mean I certainly did think the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was wrong. I felt that we should help the resistance. I also was opposed to cutting off our relations with the Soviet Union over the issue and certainly cutting off support for arms control agreements which I felt were very much in our interests as well as in the Soviet interests. I played the tactical game as well and used my tough guy credentials on Afghanistan to promote my pro-human rights, pro-nuclear non-proliferation agenda with regard to Pakistan.

Perhaps I could take a minute and illustrate sort of the ways in which I had influence on the legislative process. In 1982, I went out to Nairobi to attend a meeting of the Untied Nations Environment Program. It was called the United Nations Environment Program, a Session of a Special Character and it was the tenth anniversary of the Stockholm Conference that had set up the United Nations Environment Program. In fact I hadn't even thought about going, but one of the House staffers had called me and said it would be really important if somebody from the senate went. So, I went to Pell, who was interested in international environmental issues and he agreed, yes, why don't you go. It would be important to have somebody there. So, I went out. We were a congressional staff in the role of observers, although curious that I got into the wrong line when I got my credentials, so I actually got a delegate badge, which gave me greater access. We would meet with the U.S. delegation and the U.S. delegation was a three headed thing, headed by Anne Gorsuch who was the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and one of the most completely anti-environment people you can imagine. Allen Hill, who was the chairman of the Council of Environmental Equality, my House friend described him as a overgrown frat man from Fresno State. He wasn't serious. James Buckley, the former senator from New York who was now the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Technology and Science. Jim Buckley actually believed in the environment. He, although conservative, came out of that older tradition going back to Teddy Roosevelt whereas Gorsuch was very much anti-environment. Well, the U.S. had arrived with a statement which simply restated in a rather tepid way longstanding U.S. environmental principles. It had nothing new except for one point that Jim Buckley had gotten into the text which said that the United States favored protecting biological diversity, favored protecting species from extermination. Buckley, then having gotten that into the text, left early to go to Nairobi, but stopping at a number of African countries on the way. Once he had left Washington, Anne Gorsuch got together the cabinet counsel, natural resources cabinet counsel which included Jim Watt, the Secretary of Interior. They took out of the U.S. position support for protecting biological diversity. They took it out so late that, in fact, the version of the speech had been sent around the world by USIA with this in it. Well, when I got to Nairobi, the NGOs were up in arms about this – the environmental NGOs who had their own side meetings at these conferences. I thought it

was all pretty outrageous and debate waged within the delegation. Jim Buckley arrived late and wasn't able to prevail, but when I got back I decided, well, here's an opportunity to do something about it.

We were considering a markup of the foreign assistance bill. So, I went to Hans Binnendijk, who was Percy's man, and also had worked for Church. He was handling the foreign assistance bill and I said, "Hans, Percy's up for election in 1984. Wouldn't it be good for him to have some pro-environment initiative to report back to his constituents?" Hans said, "Yes." I said, "Well, Hans, I've drafted this legislation. It makes it a matter of U.S. policy to protect biological diversity. It authorizes and directs AID to provide assistance: to protect endangered species by helping enact and enforce anti-poaching laws by creating wildlife parks and wildlife and plant reserves and also directing funds for the study of the environment of biological diversity particularly tropical environments. It called for a U.S. government-wide strategy of biological diversity listing all the agencies that would be involved and directed by and headed by AID. Hans looked at it. Now he knew nothing of any of the controversies, but it made sense. He was in environmental issues, so he said, yes, Percy will co-sponsor that. So, this then became a Pell-Percy amendment and it was put into the foreign assistance bill. The foreign assistance bill didn't pass that year. These bills are done every congress, so once every two years. The next year when I was doing my foreign relations authorization bill I put this in along with a program to, I called it the international environmental protection act of 1983 and also included USIA funding for exchange programs in the areas of environmental protection and it became law. So, it cut the Gordian knot of this policy fight between Gorsuch and Buckley. Furthermore, it didn't include any money, but I was able to persuade Pell to pressure the new head of AID, Peter McPherson, to do something on this. The upshot is that since this became law in 1983, about a billion dollars has been spent to help countries protect biological diversity. Because of this law there are hundreds if not thousands of species that have been studied and who have been saved from extinction. In any event, it's of course not a very dramatic piece of legislation, but in terms of actually having a real impact it illustrates how if you control the agenda. If you control the bill, if you can decide what's going to go into the bill, you can really accomplish something.

Q: I take it that Gorsuch... This thing sort of came out of left field and so they were unable to gain support. It's sort of hard to be against this.

GALBRAITH: That's right. First, it was something approved by Pell and Percy and before there was any input or knowledge about it from the administration. Second, it was done in the foreign relations committee rather than in the environment committee where there would have been staff who would have been more sensitive to the concerns of the anti-environmental right. After all, the Republicans ran the senate at this time and certainly they would have been in touch with Gorsuch and Jim Watt, but it never occurred to Hans that there was any domestic political interest in this issue at all. Of course, I didn't tell him this. I just said, hey, this is a great initiative, it's non-controversial. Environmentalists will love you for it. Then once it was done, the administration was faced with a different choice. Did they bother to oppose it? Well, in the foreign aid bill

and then later in the state bill they had many issues of contention. Why engage in a fight over biological diversity when in fact the administration itself was divided and when, as you say, once this comes out in the public eye, it's very hard to be against it. They lost. They didn't have any opportunity to engage on this issue.

It's sort of a little sidebar, a funny story about it. When this was first proposed, Pell made the case and he simply read the talking points that I had prepared for him and he didn't get very deeply into the issue. I just told him that this was a good idea and he agreed. So, he read through them about the importance of protecting biological diversity and how many species were disappearing from the face of the earth and so on. Percy, who also didn't know anything about it, agreed and said how glad he was to co-sponsor it. He had some statement that maybe I prepared for him, I can't remember. So, the committee all approved it and Paul Tsongas, a senator from Massachusetts, a sort of junior member, said, hey, Clay, did you clear that with Jesse Helms? Jesse, isn't the moral majority going to get after you in favor of biological diversity? At that day, at that time, the term was a new one and so you could make that kind of joke that maybe this was something involving bizarre sexual behavior. After the committee had approved all these amendments, then the staff would merge them into the bill. The staff always had authority to make technical corrections. Rather than just made a technical correction, I changed the title which had been approved by the committee from biological diversity to endangered species just so to avoid any controversy or suggestion that this was something a little peculiar. So, there it is. You can look it up, Section 119, Endangered Species.

Q: When you were doing the State Department authorization bill, did you find this as a means of bringing the State Department along into what might be sort of doing things that they were reluctant to do, but the Senate wanted them to do?

GALBRAITH: Sure. They needed the bill and it was a vehicle to attach additional legislation on it. I used that vehicle all the time. From 1987 on into the '87 and the '88 cycle and the '89 and '90 cycle, I actually wrote the bill in its entirety and basically by myself. I put a lot of stuff in there that I thought ought to be accomplished.

Q: There's been the charge that as time has moved on the Congress has become more and more a micromanager saying, "Thou shalt take care of left handed orphans in Patagonia" or something like that. Did you find yourself while you were doing, one, getting involved in this micromanaging and two, were we putting things in because of pressure from other members of the committee or the staff?

GALBRAITH: I tried to the extent possible to resist other peoples' micromanagement while promoting the ideas that I thought should go forward that I didn't feel were micromanagement, but fair enough, somebody else might say that it was micromanagement. I tried very hard, but I also think that the bills that I worked on have not become what they've become today, which is our Christmas trees with every little quirky idea included in them. I tried very hard and of course Pell and other senators, other democrat senators were supporters, to resist the umpteen efforts to link, to put conditions

on U.S. assistance to the United Nations either to condition it on budgetary reform, on the reduction of the U.S. assessment. There were also countless efforts to condition it on the UN not taking an anti-Israel stance. My argument, which was also Pell's argument, is that we have a treaty obligation to pay UN dues and that this should not be linked to something else. These days it's entirely caught up in an unrelated issue of abortion, which is silly and very destructive. I tried to resist that. Some places where it wasn't resistible I was able to maneuver around and avoid some of the damage. Illustration, in 1981, Israel attacked Iraq's nuclear reactor in Osirak and destroyed it. As a result of that, the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency suspended Israel's participation. AIPAC [American Israeli Public Affairs Committee] was evolving into a very right-wing organization at this point in time and was very anti-UN because they saw the UN as being the tool of the non-aligned, the Arabs, and the communists to beat up on Israel. It wasn't really the fault of the UN, it was the fault of the countries of the world. They had a very anti-UN bias, plus, frankly, they wanted to get lots of legislation through so they could go back to their members and say we got 28 pro-Israel pieces of legislation. We really bashed the UN and then more money comes into AIPAC. Members of congress would play this game. They all loved championing some piece of legislation proposed by AIPAC. So, there were always a series of people who wanted to offer pro-Israel amendments that if they became law restrict our participation in the United Nations.

An amendment came forward to the State bill that would prohibit the United States from paying any money to any organization, to the United Nations or any specialized agency. Sorry, to the United Nations or any of its sister agencies. Yes, UNESCO was one, the Food and Agricultural Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization. Israel's membership was suspended. This was a response to the fact that the IAEA had suspended Israel's membership. I felt that one organization that we should not want to suspend our payments to was the IAEA. If your goal is to protect Israel and indeed the United States from the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons, then you want the IAEA to be very active in carrying out inspections. I felt it was a very counterproductive move to limit the effectiveness of the IAEA by having something in law that would cut off funding if Israel's membership was suspended. Indeed, I felt it was a situation in which an enemy of Israel that might wish to develop nuclear weapons to attack Israel would have a very simple strategy. Let's move forward, let's push for Israel's expulsion from the IAEA. The U.S. will cut off funding for inspections. The IAEA will not be able to carry out its inspections budget and we will be able to cheat on our nuclear facilities diverting them to develop a nuclear weapon whose target is in fact Israel. I felt that the approach was counterproductive even on its own terms. I realized that if I crafted the legislation to say that funds will be cut off to any organization which suspends or expels it, any United Nations organization or specialized agency of the United Nations which expels Israel, expels or suspends Israel's participation, that that choice of words, United Nations, or any of its specialized agencies did not in fact include the International Atomic Energy Agency which is not a specialized agency, but an affiliated agency. So, I crafted it that way and in fact, that restriction went into place, but it did not affect the IAEA and nobody really noticed.

Q: How about when you were working on authorizations? Obviously the Department of State and other agencies, USIA and so on, had a great stake in this. How did you work with them?

GALBRAITH: I worked closely with them. Most of the things that I was seeking to accomplish, and also obviously the members with whom I was working, were things that the working level people in these agencies supported. Some of the biggest battles were over USIA. Some of them were budgetary. David Stockman in 1981 told all the agencies that they had to take a 12 percent program cut and Charlie Wick, head of USIA, chose to take all 12 percent out of the exchange program. So, he was going to eliminate the Humphrey program. He was going to cut the international visitor program back 67 percent. He was going to cut the Fulbright program back, the academic exchange programs by 50 percent. This was something that Pell thought was outrageous. The academic community got energized and so when it came time to do that State Department authorization bill, I worked on an amendment for Pell that proposed a quadrupling of the exchange programs. The Administration cut proposed a 50 percent cut. All of a sudden in the authorization we were proposing a quadrupling. When Pell announced it, he said he wanted a ten times increase. I think in the bill that passed the committee, it was a quadrupling between 1981 and 1984. When we finally got to conference, you know, I compromised for a double which was a great triumph. Not only that, but as the price of reducing it from quadrupling to a doubling, I insisted that the increase actually be earmarked and the House people agreed. So, this became law, but this is in fact an example of something that was supported by the working level people at USIA, even by Marila Dexhiemer who was the person handling congressional relations. Similarly, USIA, Charlie Wick began to use the Fulbright funding for bizarre extreme right wing causes. He gave money to the Young Americans for Freedom for a grant program to bring European journalists to the United States. The program was so biased and so extreme right wing that the journalists staged a sit-in in the office of Gil Robinson who is the Deputy Director of USIA insisting that they get a more balanced program.

In another case they gave a grant to a man to teach the spokesman of foreign leaders how to handle the American media. The leaders that they chose were Baby Doc Duvalier and Roberto D'Aubuisson of El Salvador who was the fellow charged with running the death squads. The president of Guatemala, this was at the time of an awful and murderous civil strife in Guatemala, the Argentine junta and the idea was that all of these people would come, these official spokesmen would come to this $200,000 program in the United States and they would be taught how to handle the American media so that their dictator leaders would get a better image. Even worse, the person who got the grant was the registered foreign agent for Baby Doc Duvalier for handling Baby Doc Duvalier's public relations in the U.S.

Q: You're talking about the ruler of Haiti?

GALBRAITH: Yes, the brutal dictator of Haiti, Jean Claude Duvalier who was called Baby Doc. So, imagine that. Jean Claude Duvalier's public affairs agent is being paid by

Duvalier to improve his reputation in the U.S. and getting money from USIA to do essentially the same thing. Well, because of this, all this was outrageous. I got Zorinsky, or I wrote poor Zorinsky some very tough letters and in addition, put into what worked with Claudia Ingram who was working for Lowell Weicker on the appropriations side. Claudia and I cooked up an amendment, which she snuck into the appropriations bill, that cut off all discretionary funding at USIA. The only people who were funded under the grants program was the regular Fulbright program and certain specified organizations who were traditionally funded. So, they had no discretion at all. Then, eventually, in 1983 I wrote a charter for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs specifying it had to maintain the highest academic standards. It had to maintain its non-political character and in fact it created a wall around the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs insulating it from the more political pressures in USIA and in fact permitting the president to transfer that bureau out of USIA if he wanted. All these initiatives were opposed by Charlie Wick who was smart enough to see the writing on the wall and acquiesce, but strongly supported by people at the working level of USIA. As a result of doing it, I developed relationships with those people who then would feed me stuff about what was going on in the agency.

I had a lot of fun in the 1980s working with USIA. Charlie Wick at one point brought Judy Siegel to negotiate with me on behalf of the agency. He said, "I'm bringing Judy Siegel. You should know that her husband is Mark Siegel. He's a prominent democrat. She's going to negotiate on behalf of the agency." Well, that was terrific. Judy and I became good friends. We worked out guidelines for grants consistent with the charter. I agreed that we would allow USIA to do discretionary funding of grants, release this legislative restriction that Senator Weicker had put in at Claudia's behest, but on the condition that all grants be sent to the foreign relations committee two weeks before they're actually given with the understanding that if Pell objected, i.e., if I objected, that they would not be funded. So, for some years, I actually controlled all grants that USIA made. Again, on the working level, I think people were much happier to have me supervising this than they were to have Charlie Wick and the 60 far right politicos that he brought into the agency. In fact, I think over the six or seven years I objected only to one or two grants because the fact that I was seeing them and I could object served as a deterrent to those that really didn't meet the criteria.

Q: Wick had very close relations with President Reagan. Was he able to use that or did Reagan have either the interest or the ability to change things in Congress?

GALBRAITH: Wick's strategy with this was basically one of seduction. He sort of invited me to the White House for a number of events and opportunities to be with Reagan in fairly large groups, not one on one. Eventually he realized that it made absolutely no difference. I wasn't going to change my views on anything substantive. Even if Reagan had become involved personally we were not going to change our position. It wasn't the sort of issue that Reagan was going to spend a lot of capital on. We were talking in terms of inappropriate grants. It was five or ten million dollars a year although it had the potential to pollute the entire Fulbright program. The Fulbright

program began to be seen not as a prestigious exchange of scholars, but rather as a way to advocate short-term U.S. policy goals, i.e., the deployment of nuclear armed missiles to Europe or support for the Contras in South America. Then of course, serious scholars wouldn't participate in the program. Either serious American scholars or serious foreign scholars and then if it doesn't attract high quality participants, then it's not worth doing. So, there was a real issue and that's why I wrote the charter in 1983 and put it into the law and it's a sufficient part of the laws that govern USIA.

Q: Were there any such issues with the Department of State during this time?

GALBRAITH: Personally, I was much more focused on USIA. By and large I tried to accommodate the State Department. Some of the other staffers would try to micromanage and I would try to support the State Department. Some of the big issues concerned budget and I would draw up the budget figures for the Department and sometimes we wouldn't find as much as the Department wanted. Partly that was a means to pressure them on some issues and partly it was to make a point that the Reagan administration, having enacted these irresponsible tax cuts, couldn't be selective in what spending it wanted. It had to expect that if it was going to cut taxes and have these monster deficits, that it would have to pay a price and in general the democrats didn't want to allow the spending cuts just to be on Reagan's terms on the social programs. So, they tried to hold the line on defense which was hard, but to cut back State was somewhat easier since the State Department doesn't have a big constituency and this was a way to pressure the administration to be more open to more responsible fiscal policies. I played my part in that. In fact it was a strategy I pushed. On the whole I regret it. To some degree here Pell and I were. He would have been at odds. He went along with the strategy, but his basic instinct was to say the State Department needs more money; I want to help the State Department and I think, as I look back on it, that would have been a better approach. We didn't get much mileage out of holding the line on State Department spending increases. The Secretaries of State, Haig and Shultz, weren't prepared to spend a lot of capital on their budgets. They were interested in other issues and so these spending restrictions hurt U.S. foreign policy.

There are a couple of things that I think are worth discussing. One is the origins of the so-called Pressler amendment on Pakistan. This was an amendment that I wrote, initially in 1984 for Cranston and Glenn, and it cut off assistance to Pakistan and arms sales to Pakistan. No assistance shall be provided to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold to Pakistan in any fiscal year unless the president shall in that fiscal year have certified that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosives device, is not developing a nuclear explosives device and is not acquiring equipment or technology for a nuclear explosives device. That amendment was adopted in '84 in the committee markup unanimously. The administration was caught sleeping. They made clear they would block the bill if that it was in it and so Hans Binnendijk came up with a substitute which was virtually identical with what I had written except it was all the language up until and including the first test, namely, no assistance would be provided, no military equipment or technology shall be sold unless and until the president has certified that

Pakistan does not possess nuclear explosives device. It dropped the other two tests, namely that it's not developing it or that it is not acquiring technology and material. That was the substitute. It defeated my stronger measure although it was also my language precisely. That was adopted and I wrote the committee report. I called it the Pressler Amendment, although it was actually Percy, Mathias and Pressler. I called it the Pressler Amendment because I thought it would annoy Hans the most because Pressler was not a highly regarded senator.

But the bill didn't actually become law, but since it had been adopted by the committee, I was able to persuade Hans to offer it again in '85 and it did become law. I mention it because the Pressler Amendment actually is one of the rare cases where congressional initiative really dominated U.S. foreign policy toward a region. The nuclear restrictions contained in that legislation shaped U.S. policy to Pakistan in the 1980s, 1990s even until today. So, that's one story in more detail. The other that we certainly should talk about more is the sanctions on Iraq in 1988.

Q: We'll talk about the sanctions. I'd also like to ask how settling things in conference committees worked, the horse trading, some insight into that and also the role of Jesse Helms. We're still on the Reagan period. Also, ambassadorial appointments: if this came in and if this became very political. These are things to talk about next time.

GALBRAITH: Well, I was involved also in two nominations both of which were defeated by, this was the time the Republicans controlled the committee. One was Ernest Lefever to be the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights in 1981. I staffed the opposition to him and the other was of Leslie Lenkowsky who was nominated to be Deputy Director of USIA. I staffed that and actually set up the questioning in which he got caught in an inconsistency. I can describe that. Those are interesting because at the time it represented the third and fourth time in the nearly 200 year history of the United States that the foreign relations committee had rejected nominees.

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Q: Today is October 6, 1999. Peter, let's talk first about sanctions on Iraq. I wonder if you could fill in the personal on this. Why were there sanctions and why were we doing it and how did this work within the Senate?

GALBRAITH: Okay. I suppose my own involvement in this issue went back to November of 1979 sharing an office with Graham Bannerman. Graham, who was doing the Middle East committee, had gotten word that American diplomats had been taken hostage in Tehran, that the embassy had been taken over, this was the second time. Of course, that eventually evolved into the dominant story of the next year. Graham was one of the few people who actually knew, although he didn't tell me, that some of our diplomats had taken refuge in the Canadian Embassy. He had worked in the State Department and had had access to the Secretary's morning brief where that information was contained, but he didn't even tell his boss. As that became the dominant issue I began

to become more interested in the issue of Iran and Iraq, and particularly, when September 4, 1980 the Iraqis launched an attack on the Iranians. At that time, the dominant reaction on the Hill and elsewhere to the Iran and Iraq War was a plague on both your houses. I suppose the way some like Pat Buchanan would view the war between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as maybe they'll destroy each other. I must say in retrospect, I think that that attitude was a great mistake, but that was the attitude at the time. The Iran and Iraq War became certainly the bloodiest conflict of its time; one of the bloodiest conflicts of the second half of the 20th Century. It was really a replay of World War I where you had static fronts and extraordinarily high casualties as the Iranians tried to break the static fronts. In the early period they used human wave techniques, young boys who were chained together who would walk across mine fields to clear them, holding plastic keys that were supposed to give them an instant entry into paradise. Incidentally, I'll come to this later, in 1987 I had occasion to visit a POW camp in Iraq where Iranian POWs were held including a children's camp where some of the young human wave mine sweepers who failed in that duty and had survived. It was a devastating conflict and to continue the World War I comparison, in 1983 the Iraqis began to use chemical weapons against the Iranians. In fact, this was the first violation of the 1925 Geneva protocol which prohibited the use of chemical weapons in international conflict and no state had done so until the Iraqis began it in 1983.

From 1981 on I'd begun to work on the Near East and South Asia. In 1984 Graham Bannerman with Percy and Mathias had decided they wanted to go through the Persian Gulf into Iraq. The rule was that they had to have somebody accompany. Anytime the majority traveled, they had to have somebody from the minority along and so I was asked to go which I happily did. I was very interested in seeing what was going on. We flew into Baghdad, I guess into Saddam Hussein Airport. We were met there by a local Kurdish employee of the embassy who had actually ended up spending many years in prison being abused by the regime. Then I met up with David Newton who was the head of the interests section. When we normalized relations in November of 1984 he became ambassador. I think it was around July 4th, 1984 and David had just arrived. So David, Graham, Cass and I got a couple of vehicles and after some appointments in Baghdad we headed north. Actually in Baghdad it was very interesting. One of the appointments was Taha Yassin Ramadan who was the number two man in the regime. It was an absolutely extraordinary office that this man had, everything in white. White leather, alabaster lighters and this was sort of a bullet shaped man, looking a bit like Mel Laird, bald, dressed in army fatigues with a pistol on his, hip in a holster. I think someplace there was a white handled gun around and it was typical of the regime, which is evidence of lots of spending and no taste. He was just a thug. So, that was one of our appointments. Then we headed north to Mosul. Absolutely wonderful, fascinating trip, incredibly hot. Went to Nineveh and Nimrud and Hatra, the sights of ancient Iraqi civilizations. Basically no other visitors. We stayed in Baghdad in the Sheraton Hotel, which was a white building, artificial waterfall, lots of weddings. The pool scene was quite extraordinary as well with young European women topless around the pool. Not exactly what you'd expect to see in an Islamic country. It's sort of one of the many signs of the weirdness of Iraq. There was not a lot of sign of the war in Mosul, but on the way back, we took the road further to the

east and stopped in Erbil. This is a principal city in Kurdistan and is now the capital of the Kurdish autonomous region. At that time there was a cease-fire between the Iraqi government and some of the Kurdish rebels. There was a contact that Bill Eagleton, the previous head of the interests section, had. Bill was extraordinarily knowledgeable about the Kurds and about Kurdish rugs, which he collected. He had a man he dealt with, a sheik. We called on this sheik and he then abruptly invited us to head into the mountains. We went to a resort area and then to other places. We saw Kurdish guerrillas with their baggy pants with automatic weapons, assault rifles and I think RPGs [rocket propelled grenade launchers] on the backs of open pickups going back and forth. Again, this was an introduction to me to the area. I became very interested and certainly felt I wanted to know a lot more about what was going on. This was sort of an anomalous region – given how authoritarian Iraq was that here in a place like Shaqlawah they were somehow co-existing, these seemingly independent armed groups. Also there were goods that were smuggled in from Iran, which also seemed strange given that the Iran and Iraq War was waging just a few miles from Shaqlawah. Went back to Baghdad and saw the foreign minister. He played Iraq as a moderate card and could be a constructive partner for the United States. As I recall Ramadan referred to Israel as the Zionist entity whereas the foreign minister referred to Israel and talked about the possibilities for peace if certain conditions were met. My two colleagues, Graham and Cass, came away very impressed and favorable to the Iraqi position and to what the foreign minister was saying. I had asked about the use of chemical weapons, which was denied and my colleagues were forced to admit that at least on that point he had lied. I had a feeling he was lying on other things as well. In traveling around Iraq, I had been amazed at the cult of the personality to Saddam Hussein, the pictures of Saddam Hussein everywhere, pictures of Saddam Hussein as a military commander, sometimes with a round steel helmet, sometimes dressed in Kurdish attire, as an aviator, posters everywhere. And then the statues and monuments to him.

On a subsequent trip in ‘87 I went to the tomb of the unknown soldier in Baghdad. It was a sculpture or a monument. It looked like you walked up some steps and there was the top of what was meant to represent a palm tree. Above it was something that, a shield that was falling down. It made the whole thing look like the half-opened lid of a garbage can. Then right through was cellulite material, or clear plastic material you could look through and there was a coffin of an unknown soldier with flowers on it. In this case the only flowers interestingly were plastic roses. Underneath the monument were 144 pictures; every single one of them of Saddam Hussein. So, after the ‘84 trip I wrote some of the report in which I made fun of the regime and its cult of a personality. My colleagues censored it, so that was left out.

Q: Did you get any feel on that trip and the one before of the divisions within the Kurdish side? This is something we tend to talk to the Kurds and yet every time you touch the Kurds they’re sort of like quick silver. They split apart.

GALBRAITH: Well, no, not then. That was the ‘84 trip. The ‘87 trip was much more significant and let me, I’ll try to be a little briefer.

Q: That's all right. It gives a feel for the time. That's important.

GALBRAITH: In the fall of 1986 it was reported that the United States had sold arms to Iran in exchange for trying to secure the release of Americans held hostage in Lebanon. Also in that fall the democrats won back control of the senate with 55 seats and so Claiborne Pell became the new chairman of the senate foreign relations committee. The very first senate hearings that we decided on was to have hearings on Ronald Reagan's strategic initiative toward Iran. Did it make sense to sell arms to Khomeini? I have to tell you that this was almost entirely a political exercise. Already the press was focusing on the diversion of arms to the Contras, but we wanted to focus solely on the issue of was it good foreign policy to sell arms to Iran and Ronald Reagan's strategic initiative, did it make sense? So, we held a series of five or six hearings on it. Every witness testified that it was the stupidest idea they'd ever heard of including George Shultz the Secretary of State.

One of the concerns that I'd had, which I got Pell to articulate, was that by selling arms to Iran we might in fact contribute to the defeat of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War and upset the balance in the Gulf. Nizar Hamdoon, the Iraqi ambassador to the United States, a very successful ambassador who had made many friends here, observed these hearings. He was there and he had an aide there and felt that the hearings were very favorable toward Iraq and identified me as being the person responsible. In fact, he misunderstood. The hearings were basically about the stupidity of Reagan's policy. Ambassador Hamdoon then let me know that if I wished to visit Iraq he would arrange for me to go anyplace. I guess in early September I decided that's when I would go. Hamdoon had gone back to be a deputy foreign minister and he was true to his word. I said that I wanted to go to one of the principal cities of Kurdistan. So, he arranged the necessary permissions. Let's see. Now, what I did not know is that the Iraqis had already begun the campaign which involved the systematic destruction of all Kurdish villages. I'm sure they did not want to have westerners going to Kurdistan, basically nobody had gotten permission to go into those areas. But as one of those wonderful things that can happen in totalitarian countries is the Deputy Foreign Ministers gets to sign the requisite permission. He's a Deputy Prime Minister and that trumps anything that the security or military side of the House might have to deal with, so in fact there was a permission for me to go make this trip. Again, I was unaware of what was happening on the ground and of the sensitivity or mechanics of it. About the 3rd of September, I flew into Kuwait and was met by Haywood Rankin who was a political counselor in the embassy in Baghdad who had driven down in a Ford Bronco. Haywood and I then embarked from Kuwait heading up to Basra. We got to the border at Safwan and we were greeted by the governor of Basra province, the admiral in charge of the Iraqi navy, and the head of customs for the country as well as a very articulate young man from the foreign ministry, protocol, part of the foreign ministry. I felt that this was a lot of rank to greet me. It became apparent why as the man from protocol of the foreign ministry greeted me, "Greetings senator, we would like to welcome you to Iraq. We have arranged a very important program for you to show you the heroic struggle of the Iraqi people who desire only the best possible relations with

the United States against the Iranian aggressors" and so on. This was one of those moments of truth. Should I enlighten him that I was not a senator, but only a staff person? If I did that then it might jeopardize the program that had been arranged since they had arranged this for this important senator from the foreign relations committee. On the other hand it was always bad to go someplace under false pretenses. In the end I decided it was above my pay grade to take this kind of decision, so I let things proceed as they were. It involved some awkward moments as the man from the foreign ministry rode with me from the border into Basra and asked questions like, well, now, what state is it that you're from? I would say Vermont. Well, how did you do in your last election. I'd say, well, of course I'm a democrat and the democrat won. Artful ways to avoid directly lying. In any event we went into Basra. It was the heaviest day of shelling of the city. The entire Iran-Iraq War, the city was completely deserted. Everybody was inside. Everything sandbagged. We went to the navy club on the water, large plate glass windows. Out of the windows you could see the wisteria of a cargo boat that had been sunk on the first days of the war in 1980. Out the windows there were these crushed cars and the admiral said, oh, yes, we had a shell land there two days ago. They offered me the seat with my back to the glass window and I declined that. As we were sitting down beginning our meal all of a sudden there is a loud explosion and as I am halfway down to the floor I'm looking up and seeing everybody calmly eating. We saw children who had actually been hit by shells. All this time there were taxis with coffins on top wrapped in the Iraqi flag. This was how they would bring back the bodies from the front. In Najaf there was a huge metropolis of burials, a certain number of the military going on all the time. Into Baghdad and then I must say the only thing that happened is there were no significant appointments in Baghdad, but then set off a couple of days later.

Q: While you were in Baghdad, I assume you were talking to the embassy?

GALBRAITH: Oh, yes, to the embassy.

Q: What were they giving you?

GALBRAITH: There was a certain pessimism about Iraq's position at this stage. This was really the high water point of the Iranian counter offensive. David Newton was at the end of his tenure. He was negative on the regime, but, again, concerned about the country's survival. He also told me that he had had some idea of the arms going to Iran, especially when a plane had crashed a few years earlier flying arms in to Iran. He had certainly been in a very difficult position. Anyhow, after a couple days in Baghdad, again without any, I mean I saw various people in the Iraqi government, but not the level I had in '84. Haywood and I set out in early morning, I could give you the date, it would have been around September 7th or 8th, for Sulaimaniya. We had a dust storm so visibility was very bad. We headed up a road that went through Baqubah, then got up to Jalula which is the last Arab town before entering the Kurdish regions. At Jalula, the Iraqis said, well, you can't go forward. Then they began to examine our commission. When they began to realize they had to let us go forward they said we had to have an armed escort. We got the armed escort and it was quite spooky. It was trucks fore and aft, soldiers in full battle

dress, helmets, anti-aircraft guns mounted on the trucks and let our Ford Bronco in between. We went forward with this escort and got to the first Kurdish town and it wasn't there. There was rubble on one side of the road and on the other side of the road there were buildings that were in the process of being demolished and there was a bulldozer there. Nothing was working on this particular day and this was the pattern as we continued. We saw village after village was demolished, was abandoned, was being demolished. Eventually we saw areas of construction and these were so-called victory cities laid out on a grid pattern clearly on flat places where the regime could keep an eye on the population. Really de facto concentration camps. We would sort of go about 20 miles from one checkpoint to another and then we'd wait two or three hours for a new escort at the checkpoint. We'd watch the Iraqi soldiers at the checkpoint; they were very nervous. They harassed Kurds as they tried to pass and referred to them in derogatory ways. They called them the Ali Babas. There seemed to be a system of bribes for people who passed through the checkpoints. In fact when we got up to where there was a very big and important dam, the road was simply closed. It was 3:00, so we couldn't make it on to Sulaimaniya. What should have been about a four or five hour drive, we'd already spent seven or eight getting there and we couldn't go forward. So, initially, they took us to a police station, as foul a place as I've ever been. I thought, God, I would hate to spend the night here and then eventually to some prefabricated buildings that belonged to a Brazilian construction company that had worked on the dam. It was only the next day that we were able to get back to Sulaimaniya. As we got closer to Sulaimaniya the destruction of villages was more complete. In places they had also cut down the fruit trees, destroyed graveyards and when we got to Sulaimaniya they took us straight to a Bulgarian tobacco company which had some contract. The Bulgarians sure didn't know what to do with these two Americans and they called the police and at this point we simply decided that we'd leave and we went and toured the market. At one point I nearly got arrested for taking some pictures even though the people said I could take pictures and so we left Sulaimaniya. Everywhere we saw the same pattern of destruction. Then eventually we got back to Baghdad.

When I came out I had been a bit shaken by this destruction, trying to figure it out. So, when I wrote the report in '87, which was published, I included a description of the destruction of the villages in the north as well as an assessment that Iraq could lose the Iran-Iraq War. The report got some press coverage, particularly the assessment that Iraq might lose, but a guy read it and was very interested that somebody had noticed the destruction of these Kurdish villages. He was an Iraqi Shiite very much opposed to Saddam Hussein. He drew the report to the attention of one of two main Kurdish leaders and, in April of 1988, this leader came to the U.S. and got in touch with me. This began a relationship with the Kurds. I mean, again, he was incredibly grateful that somebody had noticed this destruction of rural life in Kurdistan.

On March 16th, 1988 the Iraqis bombed a Kurdish city; 5,000 people dead. In April I worked on a resolution that Mitchell had offered.

Q: George Mitchell?

GALBRAITH: George Mitchell, not yet the majority leader, but a democrat senator from Maine, condemning the use of chemical weapons. I remember the State Department had wanted it to be bounced, condemning equally Iraqi and Iranian use of chemical weapons. I spent some time with Mitchell's staff person saying no, that's not right. The Iranians certainly had used chemical weapons, but their use of the weapons was legal. It is legal to use them if the other side uses them under the Geneva protocol. The Department, at that time, under Abraham Sofaer in the legal advisor's office, their dominant view was the hell with international law, every exercise was a propaganda exercise and since we didn't like the Iranians and since they wanted to recover from their embarrassment of having sold the arms to Iran this was the kind of position they took.

In September of 1988 I was in Vermont. It was Labor Day and I went down to Newfane, a town about eight miles from my parents' home and got the New York Times and started reading it. There in the New York Times was an account of refugees coming across the border into Turkey saying that they had been attacked by chemical weapons. These were refugees from Iraq, Kurdish refugees. I read that story and something just struck and clicked inside me. I put it together with what I had seen the previous year about the destruction, the previous year, namely the destruction of the Kurdish villages as well as the documentation that the Kurds had said some 3,000 villages that they knew had been destroyed. My conclusion is that what Saddam Hussein had embarked upon was a campaign of genocide against the Kurds. That his goal was to settle the Kurdish issue once and for all by exterminating as many Kurds as possible so that he was going to destroy all their villages, that he was going to relocate people into concentration camps and that he was going to use chemical weapons against those that wouldn't be relocated and that as this process went forward that the measures were likely to become more extreme. Frankly, I made an analogy in my mind to Hitler's approach to the Jews which of course began with wearing the star of David and prohibiting people from shopping in Jewish stores and the laws against mixed marriages, moving the Jews out of their professions and ultimately ending up with a final solution. It seemed to me that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was well on its way toward a final solution of the Kurdish problem. Also, what I had seen from those trips to Iraq in '84 and '87 had left me with no doubt that this was a regime that was sufficiently brutal to do it. So, it was a judgment I made about the character of the regime, the brutality of the regime combined with what I had actually seen it doing in terms of the destruction of the villages and then what I knew to be true which was that they had used chemical weapons against the Iranians, they had used them against the Kurds, and now you had a use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in northern Iraq along the Iraq Turkey border which was occurring after the Iran-Iraq War was over. The Iran-Iraq War had ended on August 20th. These attacks, it turned out, had begun on August 25th.

I went the next day to Washington and talked to Jerry Christiansen the staff director and with Senator Pell and I said, "Look, what I believe is going on is genocide against the Kurds and we've got to do something to save them." Of course, the question was what? I said, "Well, how about sanctions against Iraq? If we could introduce sanctions against

Iraq even introducing them, maybe it will catch Iraq's attention, catch other peoples' attention and maybe they will reconsider." Pell and Christiansen agreed and there was a meeting of the committee coming up. We couldn't put it on the agenda for that meeting, but it would be an occasion for Pell to get Helms to cosponsor. The idea was to get the two of them and that's a pretty broad part of the spectrum. I had a short amount of time to prepare the bill. I wrote legislation that described what Iraq had done to the Kurds. It was a series of findings of what was happening to the Kurds, building the case that what was going on was genocide. Then I put every sanction that I could think of in the bill, specifically banning the importation of Iraqi oil. Actually I had no idea how much Iraqi oil we were importing. So, one sanction was banning the importation of Iraqi oil. The next sanction was to ban the provision of any credits to Iraq. We were providing at that point $500 million a year.

Then, because the meeting was about to come up with the committee, I was in some panic as to what to call it. So I said to Mary Beth, my secretary, my style was to dictate to her, she typed on the computer, "Mary Beth, what should we call this?" She sort of drew a blank. I said, "Okay, we'll call it the Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988." I rushed it down to Pell and showed it to him, gave a copy to him to give to Helms. I gave a copy to Pell's staff director. Pell showed it to Helms. Helms checked with his staff and agreed to cosponsor. Then I called Leon Fuerth in Gore's office. Gore had been very interested in chemical weapons and we got Gore to cosponsor. I called Dick Dimata who worked for Robert C. Byrd the majority leader and he agreed to cosponsor. One of the things I put into the bill was the section praising Turkey for its role in receiving Kurdish refugees. This deserved praise because Turkey has had such a hostile feud with the Kurds, but this time they actually let them into Turkey and were helping them. I did that for tactical reasons because Byrd's son-in-law was Turkish and so he's a great defender of Turkey. Dick Dimata took his credit. He said, well, look I think we can get this through the senate. What we'll do is talk to the floor people. So, I talked to the staff. There's a staff that the leader has on the floor. I talked to Marty and he said, look there's a way you can do this. If you introduce it, have it held at the desk rather than referred to committee. Then we will adjourn the senate and after the senate has been adjourned, it begins a new legislative day and we'll call it off. We can then take it off the calendar. It's a parliamentary device; it was obscure rules that at that stage although I'd been working for the senate for nine years, I didn't know about it, very rarely used. I think we introduced the bill on a Wednesday and then the following Friday they adjourned the senate that night and maybe you had to have two legislative day layovers and they adjourned it on Thursday and on Friday called it up. It was hotlined which was to say that the phone calls were made to all 100 senators asking if they objected. Of course when the bill was described as the prevention of genocide act of 1988 intended to punish Iraq for use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, nobody was gong to object. In fairness nobody read the bill and it was brought up and I gave a tough statement for Pell to read which he did and Helms read a statement on the floor and then it passed on a voice vote. That was a great tactical mistake actually. We should have had a roll call vote. It would have been 100 to nothing. Pell totally disliked forcing his colleagues to vote when there was no issue. Now, other senators would do this all the time, but of course the vote meant a senator would have to

walk 15 minutes from his office over to vote and go back. As it was, Pete Wilson, who had no such qualms, had some other meaningless resolution that he forced everybody to vote on that day, so there should have been a vote on the Prevention of Genocide Act for reasons that you will see, but there wasn't. It passed unanimously. I had meanwhile said to Pell, I think, the previous day, I said, "Look, it looks like we're going to get this passed. Now I should go out and prove the case. I need to go out there and prove that Iraq has been using chemical weapons. I propose to go out and lead a foreign relations committee delegation. Nobody from the Republican side wanted to go, but I got a young staffer on the committee named Chris Van Hollen whose was born in Karachi. His father had been American ambassador to Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

Q: Yes, I think he's been interviewed.

GALBRAITH: Yes. The son is now a Maryland state senator and I'm sure will do higher things. I got Chris and so he made the arrangements. The bill passed on the Friday and I think the following day, Saturday, we got on a plane and flew to Ankara and on to Diyarbakir. We were met by Robert Finn who was a political officer and spoke fluent Turkish and a rather eccentric character in some ways who later became a DCM in Zagreb. From there we had a van, a driver. The driver was a local employee, a Kurdish employee from the American Consulate. We set out to the first of the refugees who had been moved from the border to a camp near Diyarbakir. The technique that we developed as we went to see them was first we would find the camp leaders and they would describe what would happen and we would ask them to show us. We had a very detailed topographic map to show us where the villages were that the chemical weapons had been used. They would say what had happened and then we would ask them to bring us witnesses and they would. Then we would go out and talk to people at random, again asking people to identify where the attacks had taken place on this topographic map. What we found even in that first camp was virtually everybody was a witness to the chemical weapons. The stories were very consistent. The Iraqis had come over either with jet airplanes or helicopters. Each of these, whether helicopters or planes, dropped three or four bombs. They had not had loud explosions and then there had been distinctive smells, rotten onions, burnt almonds and then people had simply died. People had run to water and died.

The other thing about the population was that they looked like they were in shock. There was such a lack of emotion as they told these stories. We went on from Diyarbakir down to the Iraq-Turkey border where there were other refugees. Then we went along the Iraq-Turkey border along a dirt road with very high mountains beyond. We found a valley full of people who literally had just come over from Iraq with no shelter whatsoever. It must have been about 8,000 or 9,000 feet high. There was snow up there. They were just over the rocks and there were donkeys wandering around. It looked like a scene out of Cecil B. DeMille of this encampment. Hereto, you'd get very precise stories of the people again able to identify their villages on the map. What we found is that as people fled they had scattered in different directions so people in for example, this high valley from a village that had been attacked had roughly the same account as the people at Diyarbakir had had

even though Diyarbakir was now 100 miles away. So, the accounts matched up. We continued all the way along the border to the Iranian border at Yuksekova. I talked to people, there's a camp at Yuksekova, but down to Semdinli right at the corner where Iraq and Iran and Turkey come together. Again the accounts were very similar.

At one point actually, just before we got to the refugees in the high mountain valley or plateau, it was a dirt road. We had been on a dirt road for 50 or 60 miles and it was becoming dark. So we turned our van off the road and bounced across the rocks to where some Turkish Kurds seemed to have a small village and they welcomed us. We were kind of the guests of Allah. It almost seemed like it was the first time a wheeled vehicle had come to the village. There were no sanitary facilities in the village whatsoever, not even an outhouse. People slept, there were some stone buildings, but people slept outside on carpets made by the village women and there was some kind of cloth partition, the women slept on one side and the men on the other. As we arrived the village women were cooking over an open fire and making bread in the manner that they must have been making bread for the last thousand years. Above the village you could see the campfires of the Iraqi soldiers. So, they gave us what they had. They were beekeepers and so we had honey and onions, an odd combination and bread and that's all they had. They were very hospitable. The only sign of modernity in this village was a single wire of electricity had come to the village because the Prime Minister had promised to electrify every village in Turkey. There was in this open-air area covered by grape leaves, there was one light bulb and also a 27" television set. As we ate this food, cooked as it had been in the style from time immoral, we did watch television. To be precise, Archie Bunker, <u>All in the Family</u> in Turkish.

Q: For the reader some time later, this was sort of a situation comedy, a very American style comedy.

GALBRAITH: That's right, from the 1960s or '70s. It was very funny. The contrast between the Middle Ages and the 21st Century couldn't have been more marked. The other thing in talking to these people that was interesting was that they had described that their bees were dying. They attributed the death of their bees to the fact that they, of course bees didn't know where the international border was. They would cross into Iraq and would have picked up the chemical weapons and were dying. In addition to all these interviews, I went out and gathered bee corpses which I put into plastic bags to bring back to get analyzed. One other experience on this trip. At one point along the border, some Iraqi soldiers came across the border and started talking to us. They were not too threatening. You could see behind them burning villages and the smoke from a village just on the other side of the little river that made the border. Anyhow, we went back and we drove up to where an air force plane was supposed to pick us up. It had broken down so we had to drive across Turkey. We got to Ankara late about 10:00 or 11:00 on Friday. It occurred to me that if I was going to bring these dead bees back I'd better get permission from the U.S. Department of Agriculture because of course you can't bring agricultural products in the U.S. I called the staff director Jerry Christiansen, got him about 4:00 Washington time, explained the situation and asked if he would get the

permission. He called the Department of Agriculture. Well, I can tell you at 4:00 on Friday there are not many employees in the Department of Agriculture. So, the person he reached was the secretary of agriculture himself and got the permission. The next day we flew into Dulles and for the first and only time in my life I checked yes on that box; are you bringing in any agricultural products. Of course I was referred to the agricultural inspector whose eyes lit up at the thought that he actually had something to do. I then said, I think there's a memo about this because we have permission to bring in these bee corpses. He said, oh, yes, I think so, let me check. You guys with the CIA? I said, no, no, senate foreign relations committee. He said, oh yes, I understand. That he thought was our cover. I brought in the bees.

I have to tell you that on the plane back I began to have some doubts about my bee evidence because I read in the International Herald Tribune about a mite, a bee mite that was killing the bees of Europe. I turned the bees over to the CIA which analyzed them and found no evidence that they had died of chemical weapons. For many, many months bee corpses remained in the refrigerator of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee disgusting those who left their lunches there. That was the bee story. Nonetheless, the evidence that we had, the eyewitness evidence was overwhelming. We wrote the report on the plane and we got it printed and published within a couple of days. It had major coverage in the press, but while we had been away the lobbyists had all noticed what was in the bill. I had more calls, I think, than I'd ever had, about 60 or 70 calls from different lobbyists. One of them from the Rice Millers Association. I have to tell you that, being a New Englander, I didn't know that rice grew in the United States. I thought it grew in places like Thailand. It turns out it's very important in Arkansas.

Q: Oh, yes.

GALBRAITH: About a quarter of Arkansas' exports went to Iraq. So, there were calls from the Arkansas senators and Louisiana. In fact a very tearful young man, a staffer who worked for John Breaux accused me of committing genocide against the Louisiana farmers. Everybody was calling me out.

Q: Also, in California, because Louisiana, Arkansas and California are the big rice producers. The ambassadors to Thailand I've interviewed will tell you, because they always get sideways with that.

GALBRAITH: Well, I'd gotten sideways because the Prevention of Genocide Act of course cut off the credits and without credits you can't export the rice. It turned out that that provision I'd put in there requiring anything that required an export license virtually, I didn't realize this, all exports require licenses. Well, needless to say there was a huge business coalition that opposed all aspects of the bill. As the House considered it, they considered a very weak version of it and so we then had to go to conference. Conferences take place if the bills that are passed by the House and Senate have different versions. It's considered in a House-Senate conference where the differences are worked out. Now, in theory, that is by senators and House members. In fact almost all the issues were resolved

by the staff members. The staff conference did not go well in part because I made some mistakes. The House Foreign Affairs Committee had at that time about four or five times as many staff people as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and in my judgment they were all significantly underemployed. So, about ten or eleven of them came to the staff conference and I alone came from the senate side, which meant of course that I had full plenipotentiary power on behalf of the senate. On the other hand, psychologically it wasn't good because I didn't have anybody else to make the argument and it looked like it was just my pet issue against their position. It got very contentious and I might have handled their views with more tact. I think they kind of knew that I thought they were underemployed and so we really couldn't reach agreement. They wanted to water down the bill to a ridiculous extent and insisted that the House is just not going to consider anything that went much beyond what the House had already passed. So, that broke off. We made a couple of attempts.

Then on September 30, 1988, as the foreign aid appropriations was being considered there were some amendments of disagreement in the conference report for the foreign aid appropriations. An amendment in disagreement is itself amendable. So, I got Pell and Helms to offer the senate version. I proposed to offer a watered down senate version, but which went beyond the House version. Helms wanted to offer the full Senate version because he was very strong, I guess, and so I worked out a script in which they initially offered the full senate version and then a substitute, a watered down version which I described or which Pell described as I'd written the statement as a compromise. Well, I had meant it as a compromise in the sense that it was halfway between the House and senate positions. The senate had had four major sanctions. This had two major sanctions. The House had had one not very important sanction. That passed. The House side managed to kill it through a parliamentary device. I had hoped that I could force the House to vote on it because I figured that once people had to vote on this issue that they would vote in favor of sanctions because how could you vote against something called the Prevention of Genocide Act? How could you vote against punishing Iraq for murdering innocent people, but the House was able to kill it with a parliamentary device. It caused even further resentment because I'd described it as a compromise and they felt that I misrepresented their position because they hadn't agreed to it. I'd only meant compromise in that it was less than the full senate position.

I then found another strategy, which was to attach the bill to the Technical Corrections Act which was going to be the last bill of the session. There had been a big tax reform bill in 1987 and as is the case with any big tax reform bill there are all sorts of odds and ends, mistakes that have to be corrected, so it was a must pass bill and it was a good vehicle to add the Iraq sanctions to it. I was able to work out a compromise with the House, mostly it was on their terms. Pell was able to call the chairman of the house banking committee who was also from Rhode Island, Ferdinand St. German, and got him to agree to a banking sanction so it had something a little stronger than the weak House bill. Got it into the Technical Corrections Act and then the question was would it stand up in conference because it was in the senate version of technical corrections, not in the House version. Eventually it was agreed that it would stay in there. At 5:00 in the morning on October

21st, I got a call from a friend who worked on the House Ways and Means Committee. He said Fascell, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, had asked that it be taken out of the Technical Corrections Act. I called Fascell's staff guy, Bob Boyer, he said, no, no, we haven't done it. He lied, just flat out lied to me. One of the few times that actually happened when I worked for the congress, somebody just flat out lied. In fact it had been taken out because Fascell and Boyer hoped to force Helms. They wanted to attach it to another bill that was a very minor bill, but they were frustrated that Helms had blocked the passage of foreign aid bills and they wanted to get some minor bill through. They figured if they could attach Iraq's sanctions to that they could force Helms to go along with it. Well, Helms had a staffer named Tom Boney whom we used to call Bonehead, I think, without really consulting Helms, was very keen that the House bill include a provision that would have gotten rid of diplomatic immunity which the House wasn't prepared to do and of course the administration wasn't prepared to go along with. Without getting his way on diplomatic immunity, he wasn't going to let the House bill with Iraq sanctions through the senate and in the mess at the end of the session, the thing died. I thought it was a tragedy. I feel that had we actually taken a tough stand when Iraq was using chemical weapons against its own people, had we actually done anything, maybe Saddam would not have thought he could get away with the invasion of Kuwait. This whole debate had a huge impact in Iraq. First, from the moment that the senate passed the bill, it produced the biggest anti-American demonstrations in Baghdad since the 1967 war. Secondly, Iraq immediately stopped the use of chemical weapons. It never again used chemical weapons. Finally, because the sanctions involved opposition to loans to Iraq, it shook Iraq's credit rating while the bill was pending and a banker, the Iraqi opposition figure is a banker, tells me that it probably shook Iraq's credit rating even more fundamentally because people began to look at Iraq and say, this is a country that owed a hundred billion dollars after the Iran-and Iraq War. Could this country really pay, was it a reliable place to make loans? Of course, Iraq needed to roll over its loans so it could get new loans to pay off the old loans. Because of this whole controversy, it made it very hard for Iraq to get new money. In that sense this whole controversy may have been a factor in driving Saddam Hussein to take the steps that he took in 1990 in terms of the invasion of Kuwait.

Q: Here is something pretty blatant. Basically people are opposed until all of a sudden they find out their financial ox is being gored. Was this being picked up by the press particularly in foreign countries such as Germany, France and Great Britain? They had a rather lucrative trade with Iraq.

GALBRAITH: This whole debate, yes, it was covered in European countries, in the Arab press, and to some degree in the American press.

Q: Today you can through the magic of the Internet. You could probably get some movement going about this. Was there anything in those days – any organizations or anything else – picking this up?

GALBRAITH: There was no parallel action by any of these other countries. I think they

looked on it with interest, but there was no parallel campaign.

Q: Was this one of these things where the United States and Pell's initiative was sort of out in front, but nobody else was picking it up?

GALBRAITH: That's right.

Q: How about the State Department?

GALBRAITH: It's very interesting. The State Department condemned strongly Iraq's use of chemical weapons, but then opposed the sanctions legislation. So, the extent of the Reagan administration opposition of the use of chemical weapons was purely rhetorical. Now, George Shultz to his credit absolutely reamed out one of the Iraqi visitors who came through at that point. I think it was the Iraqi foreign minister, Tariq Aziz. Shultz just reamed him out on the use of chemical weapons, but didn't do anything. The message that Saddam Hussein got, was yes, if you commit gross behavior that is a gross violation of international law, that repels the civilized world. You'll be denounced, but that doesn't mean you'll face any real action. In fact, look at what happened when the U.S. congress considered real action, a special interest intervened to save Iraq. The Reagan administration intervened to save Iraq because the Reagan administration lobbied very strongly against our bill and nothing will happen. I think he concluded 20 months later as he contemplated invading Kuwait, hey, yes, there will be rhetorical opposition, I'll be denounced, but nothing actually will be done about it. I think I consider the U.S. policy toward Iraq at that time to be appeasement and the inevitable consequence of appeasement is that it encourages further bad behavior.

Q: Well, in talking to people like Arkansas or Louisiana rice people, did you find any feeling about the issue except for the fact that it was money?

GALBRAITH: No, no, their interest was that their product be exempt from the sanctions. It was straight and simple. Of course they advanced all the standard arguments, unilateral sanctions don't make any sense, somebody else will be able to supply, will just replace us. In fact these unilateral sanctions worried the hell out of the Iraqis so it did make a difference.

Q: Well, then, moving on to another side, you're talking about ambassadorial appointments. There were two that were... One was Lefever and then there was one that wasn't ambassadorial, but it was...

GALBRAITH: Neither Lefever nor Lenkowsky were ambassadorial. Let me, there's more to the Iraq story, if I may.

Q: Okay, yes, please.

GALBRAITH: Okay, '88, the thing closes. '89 we decide that our tactic will be a little

different. We'll try to have a generic bill on the use of chemical weapons, namely automatic sanctions against any country that uses chemical weapons. I crafted an initial version of it, but it then fell on a guy named Bill Ashworth a colleague who handled arms control issues. I must say that he pursued the whole thing in a rather lackluster fashion. In the spring of 1990, Saddam Hussein gave his very bellicose speech saying that if Israel attacked Iraq, Iraq will burn up half of Israel with fire. This lead Alfonse D'Amato to revive the idea of imposing sanctions on Iraq essentially for pro-Israel reasons. I was out having lunch one day when I got an urgent call from Jerry Christiansen. Where are you? Pell needs you. D'Amato has offered sanctions bills on the floor of the senate. You need to go there. So, I rushed over to the floor, found D'Amato's staff guy and sat down with him, read the bill and I said, look I've had a lot of experience with this issue and I can tell you that the way you've structured the sanctions it will run into parliamentary problems in the House and in fact they won't take it up. So, he calls over D'Amato and he says, boss, we've got a problem. Peter here, can explain it. So, I explain the problem to him. He said, well, can you fix it? I said certainly. I dictated a new bill which I called the Iraq International Law Compliance Act which I named in honor of Pat Moynihan who had just written a book on international law and I'd done a lot of traveling with Moynihan. So, I listened to the book in its evolution. Moynihan was on the floor. I got him to co-sponsor it along with Pell. D'Amato offered it and Bob Dole made clear that if it was adopted, that whatever bill it was going to be attached to, he would filibuster. So, we couldn't offer it, it couldn't be offered on that bill and in fact at various times, in essence Dole threatened to filibuster.

Q: What was Dole's position on it?

GALBRAITH: Dole's position was to oppose anything that would cut off agricultural credits to Iraq. That's what the Iraq International Law and Compliance Act did, it cut off agricultural credits, it cut off Ex-Im bank credits. It cut off sale of items on the munitions control list. It wasn't as sweeping as the original Prevention of Genocide Act, but it was tough. At the end of July the farm bill came up. I went over to Helms' staff guy. I said, "Darryl, suppose Pell and Helms offer this to the farm bill?" Darryl looked at me and said, "You're evil" with a big smile and than we agreed on what would be our strategy because of course that was a bill that Dole couldn't oppose. He needed the farm bill. We got Senator Kassebaum on board.

Q: Nancy Kassebaum?

GALBRAITH: The senator from Kansas.

Q: From Kansas, yes.

GALBRAITH: She was very good. She got on the floor and she said, "I'm from Kansas. I represent the wheat farmers. We don't like agricultural sanctions, but there are some times where the fate of innocent children is at stake, that we just have to sacrifice our interests and I think I can explain this back to people back in Kansas." So, she and Dole

were on opposite sides. On the critical vote, it was about 60-40 in favor of the Iraq International Law Compliance Act being adopted on the critical vote and then on final passage it was 88 to 12. Dole was one of the 12 to oppose sanctions on Iraq to the bitter end. That was the 25th of July, that was the last act. Of course the 2nd of August was the invasion of Kuwait and then, of course, we got sanctions passed very easily, but that was like closing the barn door after the cow had left.

I was the staff person for the senate on the Persian Gulf crisis, which put me in an odd position, because I actually was much more militant on the subject of Iraq because I'd seen what the Saddam Hussein regime had done. But the people I worked for were those who had opposed the use of force. This came out in a number of ways. In September, there were two congressional delegations that flew off to Saudi Arabia. I was on the senate one, there were just 14 senators, bipartisan. We were briefed by General Schwarzkopf. We took three different military aircraft to go up to the front in 120 degree weather. We went on to Bahrain and ate with the emir. We saw King Fahd in Jeddah and Mubarak in Alexandria and Sheik Said of the UAE in Abu Dhabi all in three days. It was exhausting. On the way back I wrote a report for the senators which was supportive of the troops and the deployment. Basically I said we shouldn't stop until we accomplish our objective which would include the protection of the Kurds and the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. I thought I had done something very brilliant which was actually to write a 14 page report on the flight on the way home. When the democratic senators read it they said, no way are we going to go that far. We'll just have a one-page report describing what we did. So, that's what we did. The trip was amusing in some ways. We went to see King Fahd and as we drove up to his palace, I was standing next to Moynihan, or sitting next to him, we were on a bus. Moynihan and I were sitting together and we walked in together and Moynihan began to critique the King's palace. The gates, the fence, that's Buckingham Palace, Versailles, Dulles Airport inside, that's Morocco, a mogul water course and then we went into the King's audience hall and there were 14 senators and 30 members of congress on folding chairs and we all sat looking at the King. The King sat out there with the two senate leaders, Pell and Helms, and the two House leaders which were Bob Michel and Dick Gephardt, I guess. The King went on and on at some length, but what was striking as you looked at it was that above the King on either side were two paintings of Alpine scenes. One was of a chalet in the mountains with rather ghastly colors and the other was of a Swiss or Austrian in lederhosen with one of those long horns. As we walked out, Moynihan said to me, "I can now tell you I can now go back and tell my friends that I have better paintings in my living room than the King of Saudi Arabia."

Q: That sounds like good solid PX art.

GALBRAITH: It was. Go ahead.

Q: Maybe you're coming to this, but there was that vote on what to do about Iraq. This was around Christmastime or something.

GALBRAITH: It was in January.

Q: I mean this was a very critical one and a lot of people really to me surprisingly weren't coming out the way I thought they should.

GALBRAITH: Yes, the troop deployments, well, at first we got all through this period there were daily briefings where Cheney and Powell would come up to brief.

Q: Your talking about Colin Powell and.

GALBRAITH: Defense Secretary Dick Cheney.

Q: Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, yes.

GALBRAITH: Often they would tell us much less than what was on CNN. Then at the end of October they doubled the deployments to Saudi Arabia and it became clear that we were going to go to war. So, Pell wanted to have a series of hearings, which I organized to highlight the case against the war. One of the funnier moments in those came when James Baker testified and Sarbanes was being very effective in questioning him. Pell tended to be a real stickler for procedure. Every senator had ten minutes and Sarbanes' time was expiring but I could see that he was scoring points. So, I signaled to the clerk don't ring the bell. Sarbanes' ten minutes went on and Pell was kind of looking and Baker was looking like when is this going to stop. The people behind Baker were kind of going ding, ding, ding. I was saying, stop, hold the bell, so Sarbanes went on for about 15 or 20 minutes making his points. Then we came to crafting the legislation. Frankly, I felt very strongly that the foreign relations committee ought to mark up a bill authorizing the use of force, but Pell wasn't prepared to fight for the jurisdiction of the committee. There were two alternatives being routed. One was a Republican alternative authorizing the use of force and one was a democratic one which authorized the continuation of the deployment and sanctions, but did not authorize the use of force. I was involved in sort of representing Pell on the foreign relations committee, but in meetings Sam Nunn frankly the action went to them.

There was then one of the most impressive debates I've seen in the congress on the floor of the senate. Everybody spoke and then they voted. It was the only occasion I ever was at where the vote was in, occurred where all the senators were seated and the roll was called and everybody stood up and cast their vote. The only other time I've seen it was the impeachment vote. The vote was 52 to 47 in favor of the Republican resolution authorizing the use of force and against the democrat resolution. It was close. It really would have been 52 to 48 because Cranston would have voted with the democratic position. He wasn't there because he was being treated for prostate cancer. I think the democrats made a mistake; their sort of reflexive stand against the use of force failed really to appreciate the menace posed by Saddam Hussein.

Q: Well, I mean, here you are, you've seen what this man was doing and to my mind, a

vital interest in seeing some guy take over a major source of oil. The democrats are not necessarily a peace party. In fact most wars are done by democrats, I mean why did they get off on this?

GALBRAITH: Well, first, I mean there was genuine concern about the casualties that would be involved. Moynihan proposed that his main reason was hostility toward Kuwait. He remembered the Kuwaitis from his time as ambassador to the UN. He considered them to be one of the most reflexively anti-American, pro-Soviet in terms of their positions with the UN, obnoxious, going out of their way to stick it to the United States. So, there were a variety of reasons. Remember that nobody expected that this would be accomplished in a few weeks with a couple hundred dead. We sent hospital ships, 10,000 body bags shipped out. It was a very serious discussion. Also the democratic position was not to oppose the use of force. It was to oppose the use of force now. It was in favor of allowing sanctions more time to work, but the democratic resolution left open the door to the future use of force. There was just an opposition to doing it now. Practically I think that wasn't possible because you couldn't sustain the force deployment without using force, but.

Q: Where was Pell coming and any of your colleagues coming from? Were they sort of getting into the argument?

GALBRAITH: No, I mean, although I favored a more militant position I executed enthusiastically on behalf of the position of the people who had hired me and after all I hadn't been elected to anything. I found in my career with the foreign relations committee enormous scope to accomplish things that I believed in, enormous scope to get my ideas put forward, but the price of that is that when the people who hire you and who were elected by the people of the United States want to do something, you've got to do it and I understood that. I didn't feel so strongly about it that I should have resigned. I let people know my views of Iraq, but their positions were made up so my job was to make the best case possible. I worked very hard making the best case against the use of force possible because that's what they wanted. That was my job.

Q: To continue on particularly on the Kurdish side, did you get involved or the senate get involved with support for the Kurds at the end of the Gulf War?

GALBRAITH: Yes. Just after the invasion of Kuwait I got a call from a Kurd leader who was in Damascus, saying, Peter do you think I should come to the United States? I said, well, if there was ever a time when there would be interest in the Kurds it's now. So, he came and I tried to help him see people in the administration, but they refused to see him. They were concerned that seeing a Kurdish leader might upset Turkey as they put together the coalition. He came; I organized a conference. That was in August; he didn't see many. He met with the editorial board of the Washington Post and flew up to New England to see Pell and Kerry and that sort of thing. Then, I'm fast forwarding from August of 1990 to February of 1991, I organized a conference held in the foreign relations committee room for the 27th of February on the Kurdish question. The evening of that

day we were at a dinner and word came that the war was imminent. Soon the 100-hour ground war was over. At that time I had a long talk with one of the Kurds who indicated that he was going to go back to northern Iraq and suggested that I should come. The Kurd uprising had not yet begun, but clearly this was anticipated. I also tried to get him into to see people in the administration.

I called the NSC and tried to speak to Richard Haass, got his deputy Sandy Charles and she was just furious. "You have no business maintaining these contacts. You're undermining our policy. You're trying to conduct a separate foreign policy." I said, "Well, I thought our policy was to get rid of this regime in Iraq." She said, "No, no our policy is to get rid of Saddam Hussein, not his regime." A comment that struck me as being like saying our policy is to get rid of Hitler, but not the Nazi party. The NSC refused to see the Kurds. In fact they refused to see anybody in the Iraqi opposition. I also tried the State Department and had gotten the cold shoulder. However I think maybe it was the 28th of February, we were holding a hearing on human rights treaties, and Dick Shifter the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights came up to testify. So, Pell asked him, "Are you refusing to see the Iraqi opposition, are you refusing to see the Kurds? He said, "No, no, there's no policy like that." "Will you agree to see them?" "Yes, I will." Pell said, "Peter tells me that the State Department is refusing to see them and that you're refusing to see them." "Oh, no, that's a misunderstanding. Peter and I will work it out later." All this is on public record. So, I work it out and theoretically he's going to see them the next day. The next day they go over to the State Department. Shifter refuses to see them. They're met by some low level aide in the lobby of the State Department and taken to the coffee shop across the street and have a conversation. They feel they are very badly treated at which point someone says to me, "Look, I got an invitation from President Ozal of Turkey to go to Turkey, should I go?" I said, "Hell, yes." The whole reason for not seeing them is that the Turks would be upset and here the Turks are now proposing to see them. It was amazing how out of touch the policy was at that point in time.

There is a longer story and I'd like to do it next time because I've got to go.

Q: All right, fine. Well, we'll pick this up late.

GALBRAITH: Let me say, for the end of the tape, where we are. We're in March 1, 1991 and what I will describe is a trip I took in the middle of March to Kuwait and then crossing into northern Iraq at the end of March just as the Kurdish uprising was ending, the contacts I had with the Kurdish leaders there, the publicizing of the Kurdish uprising, the humanitarian consequences and the efforts to bring about the intervention to save the Kurds.

Q: Great and I also wanted to say I want to talk about.

GALBRAITH: Sorry, and one other thing then we'll move on to discuss, the last element of this which is the capture of the 18 tons of Iraqi secret police documents which they

agreed to turn over to me in September of '91 which I brought out in March of '92 and it became the files of the foreign relations committee and are the main evidence for a war crimes case against Saddam Hussein.

Q: Great and I just wanted to say we'll talk about ambassadorial and other approvals or disapprovals.

GALBRAITH: Yes, we'll cover the Lefever case, the Lenkowsky case, neither of which were ambassadorial and then the non-proliferation issue and hopefully get onto Croatia at some point.

Q: Okay.

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Today is November 2, 1999. Peter, March '91. You wanted to talk about your trip to Kuwait, Iraq, etc.

GALBRAITH: I decided that I should go out to the Near East and do a study for the committee on the situation after the Gulf War. We had a recess coming up and so I arranged to make a trip. Pell and Helms approved and at the last minute a junior colleague who was working outside of my office, George Pickard, asked if he could come along. On the whole I preferred to travel on my own because it gave me much greater flexibility, but George was a very solid person and I could see some advantage in having him along so I agreed to take him. We went first to Dhahran because we wanted to go to Kuwait. The State Department was eager to help us go to Kuwait, but the Defense Department didn't want any visitors to Kuwait and they weren't going to fly us in on military aircraft. So, what we had to do was to fly to Dhahran and go with a State Department officer, David Beam, a junior officer who was stationed there. We drove up to Kuwait City. It turned out to be a fascinating trip. The first day we drove up to a Saudi town that had been attacked a month before and there was lots of evidence of fighting there. We then crossed into Kuwait. The road had been chopped up by the Iraqis and mined. There were abandoned tanks and as we headed up toward the city the sky became completely black from the oil fires that were burning. We passed the utterly ruined remains of this huge oil refinery, which was named after one of the emirs although the road sign that it had named it after Saddam Hussein. We got up to Kuwait City where there was no electricity and we stayed in the Hilton, no running water. They gave you a bottle to use for bodily functions. The Iraqis had looted all the locks on the doors, but the American embassy had taken over a corner under the Marine guard. We surveyed the damage to Kuwait, talked to Kuwaitis; the emir had not come back. The government really wasn't functioning. Probably the more interesting conversations were with Skip Gnehm who had just returned and come back as the American ambassador. My real interest was on the uprising that was going on in southern Iraq and northern Iraq. On my way out I'd been contacted by a group of Shiites, Iraqi Shiites who flew to Frankfurt to meet me in transit. They saw that the uprising was collapsing. They were desperate, absolutely desperate for assistance. Of

course I was very keen to get American assistance for the uprising. When I was in Kuwait City I talked to journalists from the New York Times and others who had been up into southern Iraq and gave me a picture of what was going on with the uprising. We went first to a refugee camp on the Kuwaiti side of the border. There were all sorts of extraneous people who had been in Iraq and had come out, third country nationals, Shiites. One of the most memorable events occurred there. A Humvee came into the refugee camp.

Q: A Humvee being?

GALBRAITH: The modern version of the Jeep and there were two American soldiers in it. They asked me if there was a doctor in the camp. I said I didn't know and sent them on, but then I thought I better find out what's going on. I followed the Humvee and discovered that there had been a mine explosion and some children had been injured. I hadn't heard the explosion, but George had. While there was no doctor in the camp, there was a second or third year Kuwaiti medical student who was volunteering. So, I said, we must go and see what's happened, see if you can be helpful. He said, no, no, I can't do that. I can't leave the camp and besides this is across the border in Iraq. So, I more or less forced him into our vehicle and we followed around to where this explosion had taken place and it was on a road that went from Kuwait into Iraq. It was a side road in Iraq and at this stage the injured children had been removed except for one boy who I estimated to be about 14. There was an American medic, red-haired young man with a pen light who was looking in the boy's eyes and they weren't blinking. The boy didn't look badly damaged, but there were big gaping wounds on his knees and in fact he was dead. While we were there, first the boy's father came by, again, unaware that the boy had been killed. He saw his son and broke down and more memorably the mother came by, again unaware, and she looked at and saw her son and started to pull off her hair, rip off her clothes, but the words out of her mouth or the first words out of her mouth were Saddam did this. She was an Iraqi Shiite. What actually happened is that these children had been crossing a field. They had been gathering tomatoes. They were desperate and poor and hungry and were gathering tomatoes and they had stepped on unexploded munition. In fact it was not an Iraqi mine, it was American unexploded ordinance, but the impulse of this Iraqi woman to blame Saddam Hussein was just vivid.

At another point we went down to the oil fields and saw the spot where commandos had come in and turned the taps to stop the flow of oil into the Persian Gulf, but also there were huge fires that had been set up there. I think the whole place had been bombed as well. As I recall and I may not remember this very well, initially we'd been there trying to bomb the pumping stations and eventually some commandos had gone in. It was said to be Kuwaiti freedom fighters I believe to turn the taps.

Q: This is because the Iraqis when they got desperate did everything they could to cause an ecological disaster. Pumping oil right into the Persian Gulf, setting fire.

GALBRAITH: Exactly. Setting fire to hundreds of oil fields.

Q: Yes.

GALBRAITH: I remember walking across this scarred, fire scarred earth and there was a part of a human skull, not much left of it, a small chunk of skull and other very burned bones. Some unlucky person who had been there when the bombs had set off the fire. There were also wandering around starving horses and it was a very bleak landscape. We saw Red Adair's team.

Q: He was a firefighter.

GALBRAITH: Texas oil fire fighter. They were trying to cap the first of the several hundred wells that were either ignited or spouting oil. This was not a fire, but simply one that was spewing oil at very high pressure. It was thought it was going to take years to put out all these oil field fires. In fact they did it in several months so the damage ended up being a lot less than it was feared it would be. It was quite amazing. Everything was oil splattered. All the vehicles got oil splattered. Driving back I stopped and took a picture of a road sign that was pitch black. It was in the middle of a sunny day, but these oil fires were just so intense it made it look like night. Of course, unlike night where headlights can penetrate, in this nightmare headlights couldn't penetrate. Other places, too, I saw the trashed airport, burned out British Airways plane. It landed on the night of August 2nd, 1990 and the Iraqis had already taken the airfield. The passengers were held hostage for several weeks. I visited with some of the Kuwaiti dissidents who had stayed through the Iraqi occupation and who were hoping now that there would be reforms. We saw very well-built fire stations from which all the vehicles had been looted by the Iraqis. We went up the so-called mile of death where the column of fleeing Iraqis had fled out of Kuwait City. The column had been attacked by American tanks and aircraft, turning into a terrible carnage. That was an important factor to George Bush's decision to prematurely end the war fearing that there would be lots of bad press with these kinds of shootups of fleeing Iraqis. In fact the mile of death was much less than what it had appeared to the press. What had actually happened was the allied forces had shot up the lead vehicles of the convoy, but most of the other vehicles were not shot up. At this point they had been pushed to the side of the road, they had been stopped, and the occupants had all fled. There were a few corpses around and that sort of thing. Of course all the Kuwaiti governmental buildings had been destroyed. I saw the national museum, which had been completely looted. The national assembly building had been looted and it was all completely gratuitous. There were pictures of Saddam Hussein that had been erected, which of course had become target practice after the liberation. We saw places where the Iraqis had tortured Kuwaitis and there were torture instruments of peppers that were put into peoples' skin and saws to cut people. It's hard to know how much of that was propaganda and how much of it was real.

Q: But you did certainly have the feeling that the Iraqis were beastly?

GALBRAITH: They'd certainly been beastly to Kuwait. They had looted in a very very

systematic way. The destruction of the Kuwaiti museum and its governmental buildings was gratuitous. Destruction of the oil fields was gratuitous. I felt sorry for the people who had gone through it. Of course in other ways they suffered. Kuwait had spent a lot of money on greening up the city. After all, this is desert and of course during the occupation nothing got watered and so all the greenery had died and had to be replaced. In the end it was thought that it would be $100 billion to repair. Then U.S. army corps of engineers came in and did these repairs and I think the final bill turned out to be under $10 billion. Of course as an American, I'm interested in business. I wondered why this was the one time the U.S. army corps of engineers had decided to come in under the estimate. Even so it was a very devastated place. I also had a talk with the UN secretary general's special representative. He had a very grim picture. He'd been into Iraq and had a very grim picture of what had happened there and described it as going back to the Middle Ages. In fact, that turned out to be vastly overblown. After Kuwait we went to Riyadh. I saw some of the Saudis, the most interesting conversation was with Turki Al Faisal, Prince Turki, who was the head of the Saudi intelligence. In the discussion I had with him was about support for the uprising in Iraq. He was very interested in my assessment of the Iraqi opposition, of the Kurdish groups and the Shiite groups. So he said, and I know this is true from the Kurdish side, they didn't have their own contacts with them. So, I gave him my appraisal which was that the Kurds certainly in their hearts would like to be independent, but recognized that it was unrealistic, that they would play roles as part of a united Iraq, but they were moderate in their politics, that they would have a moderating influence on the politics of Iraq and that they were realistic that their agenda was limited to autonomy.

On the Shiites I gave my judgment that they were not likely to come under Iranian domination, that the ones I had met had made a point of this and that they, too, should be supportive. Prince Turki said that the Saudi government was not concerned that the Shiite government in Iraq might be spread over to the eastern province where Saudi Arabia's oil is and which has a Shiite majority. He said that that was not a concern and he was very interested in my suggestions about how the uprising might be helped. I had a number of suggestions, which included use of allied assets to attack the Iraqi forces that were trying to put down the uprising. It could have been very easily done and, secondly, over the long term that we should support the uprising, the rebels, in a material way. I had the idea that we could take captured Iraqi military equipment and give it to the uprising and in particular to the Kurds in the north. My argument was that this was equipment that they would be familiar with. There would be at least arguably no issue of violating a UN arms embargo or running some kind of improper covert activity. You could simply make the case that in giving the Kurdish insurgents captured Iraqi military equipment, you were simply returning to Iraq equipment that belonged to Iraq – admittedly not the same Iraqis, but who is to say that the Kurdish insurgents were any less legitimate than Saddam Hussein. In fact, I would argue they were much more legitimate.

Anyhow, Prince Turki was very interested in ideas about how the uprising could be helped. He saw the uprising as a positive event. I would say his reaction was definitely one of curiously and interest. I recount the story because later the administration

advanced the argument that one of the reasons it didn't help the uprising in March of 1991 was that the Saudis would have objected; the Saudis and the Turks, our allies would have objected. I don't think that was the case. From Saudi Arabia, George and I flew to Damascus where we met with Ambassador Ed Djerejian whom I've known for many years. We met with medium level Syrian officials, some ministers, but not with the minister of foreign affairs, but the one for industry. I had told George that I intended to go into northern Iraq, but that he was not welcome to come. I excluded him for several reasons. It was his first trip with the committee. I knew that it was a very dangerous place to go and I didn't want to put my colleague at peril. I knew, like any professional, if I went to he would feel obliged to go. I didn't feel that he had enough knowledge of the risks and it was unfair to put him in a position where he had a choice. I excluded him and this was a long-standing plan and he was going to fly to Egypt and catch up with me in Israel.

We spent I think a day or a day and a half in Damascus and on the Good Friday evening, Kathy Algrowni, the political counselor, had a dinner for us and for foreign diplomats and we had a lively discussion of the situation. I remember the political counselor from the Yugoslav embassy was there and I made a joke to him saying, "Well, Yugoslav embassy, do you really represent a country? Now, is there still a country called Yugoslavia?" This was before the war had broken out. I must say I had paid almost no attention on the events unfolding in Yugoslavia.

It had seemed to me, and I think unwisely, that Kuwait and southern Iraq was a higher priority. But, I'd also talked to ABC News in Washington. They had arranged for me to meet up with Tony Touma who was the ABC News stringer in Damascus. Stringer is wrong; fixer. So, he ran the bureau which was in a Sheraton Hotel which was where George and I were staying. He was also a fixer for Newsweek and a number of other institutions and said by some also to be a real employee of the Syrian Secret Services. Anyhow, there were news crews in northern Iraq reporting on the uprising. There was a shuttle service that went from the border on the Tigris to Damascus carrying film out that was shot inside. Charlie Glass was the ABC reporter inside. So, it was arranged that after my dinner I would get into one of their cars and go to the border. Rod Nordland of Newsweek who was also going in the car and for some reason everybody had felt very secretive about my going. So I wasn't going to say who I was or who I was going with, so I don't know if Rod Nordland perhaps thought he was going with some CIA agent. In any event, there was a Kurdish medical student who was going to be my guide. He was escorting me there from Damascus. After dinner, about midnight, I got in the car and drove all night to Qamishli, which is in eastern Syria, the major city there were the UK had a headquarters. I met with some people in headquarters there and went on to Mayadin, even closer to the Iraqi border where we waited for some hours. I actually went off to somebody's house and took a nap. There the Kurds took note of the red bag I had with my change of clothes in it as well as I think a red parka and they quickly reattired me in an olive army jacket and put my red bag into a grain bag. From Mayadin we went toward the border. I guess it was in Mayadin that we stopped, or perhaps it was a smaller town even closer to the border, we stopped and called on the local Syrian Secret Police.

Of course the Syrian Secret Police had a very sinister reputation and here we were in a small room with a picture of their president. My Kurdish escorts exchanged some words and then we proceeded to roll out across this single lane road and fairly deserted countryside to a very short stretch of the Tigris River that bordered between Syria and Iraq. This was the only part of the Syrian Iraqi border which was controlled by the Kurds. As we were rolling out of this town toward the border all of a sudden from behind came a vehicle with flashing lights. I kind of thought, what's going on here? They stopped us and pulled us over and proceeded to give me some sandwiches and Coke. They felt I needed some food for the trip. It was hot meat in Syrian pita bread. Anyhow, we got to the bluffs that overlooked the Tigris, changed into four wheel drive vehicles and bounced a few miles down along the side of the river to the crossing point. The crossing point consisted of a house of some sort that Kurds were using as a headquarters on the Syrian side on the top of the bluff. You would descend down to the river and a canoe would come over with a motor on it and pick you up and cross. On the other side there was a sandbagged position, some vehicles and a lot of gravel, with a gravelly riverbed. As I sat on the Syrian side I watched mortars land on the Iraqi side. I must say I think at this point I was so tired I really didn't think about what I was going to do. The Kurds had said you shouldn't worry about it. This is from an Iraqi position over at Faysh Khabur, we're going to take it out tonight. I just went with them. Went down the bank and got into the canoe, crossed the river, raced to the vehicles and drove off. The leader went by the title of Dr. Karim, his name was Abdul Karim. He said, okay, now we're out of range. We continued along this road and at one point it was all dug out because it wasn't paved. We wound our way through the dirt. I realize now that there was quite some discussion before we did it. It was because the dirt area was mined. It was through the minefield we would go.

Got to Zakho, which is a major Kurdish town on the border with Turkey. The bridge to Turkey over the Khabur River had been blown up and the Kurds were pushing dirt to try and fill in the span that had been blown up. It turned out that the Iraqis had put explosives all over the bridge. You could see where the wires and so on were and it had been struck by lightening and that had dropped the bridge. Into Zakho, which was a fascinating place because there was a rally in the Town Square and people were talking politics, a real sense of liberation, signs in Kurdish and in English, we liberated Kurdistan. We went off to some commander's house and had a long discussion of the situation. Then about 4:00 or 5:00 we headed south on the road to Duhok which is a larger city in Kurdistan about 20 or 25 miles south of Zakho and where the Kurdish leader Talabani was waiting for me. As we headed down to Duhok I couldn't help but notice that all the traffic was coming the other way. Not only was all the traffic coming the other way, but the vehicles were just packed with people. They had all their furniture and so on tied on to the tops of the roofs. This probably should have clued me and tipped me off that maybe this wasn't the best place to go. As we got toward Duhok, a city which had about 350,000 people was completely dark, no electricity. At one point I asked Dr. Karim, what's this light in the air and he looked quite panicky and said phosphorous and then charged off as fast as he could behind a bluff. At the time I had thought the Iraqis were launching incendiary shells into the city, that's what the phosphorous was. Now I realize that these were probably tracers and what he was afraid of was that if a tracer explosive has landed then the next

thing that happened would be the follow-on artillery shot. Anyhow there was the sound of constant thunder into Duhok as it was being shelled. We went up to some building, school or something, entered it, and inside Talabani was meeting with something like 80 notables from Duhok. Initially I wasn't going to go into the meeting, but the Kurds insisted. I entered and Talabani was presiding and he offered me his chair at the head of the meeting which I declined, but he then had me sit next to him. Then they asked me to say a few words.

I recalled Kurdish attachment to the Treaty of Sevres, the failed Treaty of Versailles with Turkey which in the Kurdish view promised them independence. I noted that it was an American President, Wilson, who had articulated the right of self-determination that was embodied in the Treaty of Sevres, and was negotiated as part of the Versailles package. Tragically, the Kurds had not achieved their dream of independence, but for the first time in their history they now controlled the territory and I was very pleased to be speaking to them as the first U.S. government official to set foot on Kurdish territory governed by the Kurds themselves. I had little idea how short-lived Kurdish control of Duhok was going to be. The discussion was very interesting. There were people who advocated vengeance against the Iraqis for what they had done because the Kurds had captured a number of Iraqis. Talabani insisted that due process of law would have to be followed and there should be trials. There shouldn't be any arbitrary killings and that sort of thing. There was a discussion of ethnic minorities, the Syrians and others. Talabani urged that their rights be respected. There was a discussion about economic issues, payments. Meanwhile the constant sound of the thunder of shells. From there we then adjourned to the home of Lizginn Hamzani a *jash* leader. Now the *jash* were the Kurds who collaborated with Saddam Hussein and the term *jash* means little donkey. The Kurdish revolution had been made earlier, the beginning of March, when the *jash* had abandoned Saddam and joined the Kurdish uprising. Now he was entertaining Talabani and a number of other of these Kurdish leaders at dinner. Talabani's wife, Hero, was there, the only woman as I recall. As is typical in this part of the world, we sat around for a very long period of time talking before dinner. Then came this extraordinary dinner of lamb and rice, and baked bread, fish, and chicken. In Kurdish fashion, we stood at the table and ate with our hands. We'd finished and then came in the next shift to eat and then the next shift ending up with the ordinary guerrillas. The opulence of the food was very much at variance with the general poverty of the Kurdish people who had endured the sanctions and the war as well as the genocidal campaign that preceded the invasion of Kuwait.

Talabani and I had long conversations about what the Kurds should do. Saddam had sent out peace feelers and the question was should they negotiate with Saddam. Talabani's view was that if there is hope for outside assistance we will not negotiate, but if we are on our own we cannot refuse to negotiate. So, I didn't feel I could give them any great advice because the United States was doing nothing to help the uprising. Of course, I'd hoped to make an issue of this and persuade the congress to go on record in support of the uprising and to authorize financial and arms assistance, military assistance to the uprising, but that was only in the future and it wasn't clear how long the uprising would continue. The previous day Kirkuk, which is the most important of the Kurdish cities, had already fallen

east of where we were. In any event this was a lively discussion. One of the other sidebars was a Syrian leader who was at this meeting. He had a Syrian cap and he had said that the Syrians in Duhok had reopened a 5th Century church which had been closed by Saddam Hussein. They, too, had a great sense of liberation and he wanted me to come to the eastern mass at midnight. Well, as the shelling continued and intensified, the mass kept getting put off and then all of a sudden abruptly, I think about 2:00 in the morning, we left the house although the plan had been to stay there for the night. The conclusion was that it was not safe. We drove to some other place in Duhok to somebody's else house where Talabani and I and his wife, Hero, and I guess a few of the others spent the night. Out of concern for my safety, they didn't want me on the upper floors so they brought down a bed and put it in the living room. I remember falling asleep by persuading myself that the shelling was thunderstorms. Because it was now quite late, we were going to sleep late and leave around 9:00 the next morning. At 6:15 one of these Kurdish leaders woke me up very politely and said, "Are you ready to leave?" In a tone of voice that I knew instantly I had to be ready to leave and indeed I was within about a minute. We milled outside in the morning. All I could hear was the artillery, but I was taking video. I had just gotten a video camera, this was the second video tape I'd shot and as I was looking at the tape afterwards there were all these other early spring sounds of birds and song, but that's not what I heard then. We left the city. I must say we milled around outside for a very long time and I was quite nervous because there was a big gasoline truck there and I was afraid that if a shell hit that we would all be incinerated.

About 30 minutes later, a quarter of seven, we left. We drove through the city of Duhok, which was completely shuttered, but people were streaming out of the city on foot and some in vehicles, trucks, pickup trucks with people, packed full of people standing there. Cars with the trunks open and people sitting in the trunks. Lots of people on foot. We continued up toward Sarsang, where Saddam Hussein had a big palace, but before then we stopped at another place whose name I can't tell you now, but between Duhok and Sarsang where there were a series of palaces. We looked at some that were supposedly built for King Hussein of Jordan. Then we went on to Sarsang where we stopped at one of Saddam's palaces, a major one and went inside. It had been trashed by the Kurds. It was not hugely extravagant and the style is lots of modern Italian tiles and large bathtubs and that sort of thing. Nothing I thought extraordinarily regal – sort of characteristic Middle East mediocre taste, affluent Middle East mediocre taste. What was extraordinary was that hundreds of acres around it had been fenced in. It had its own lake, it had its own orchards, so that the security side of it was something.

After visiting that, we went on to Amadiya, an absolutely wonderful ancient city on top of its own cliff. In fact it's like a tabletop mountain actually. This went back 1500 years. There, after a quick visit to the city, Talabani and I went our separate ways. He was heading off toward the Iranian border and I needed to go back to the Syrian border. We had had more discussion about policy issues. As we separated our vehicles, they lifted up the tarp that had been in the back of the vehicle I'd been driving. We were driving in captured Iraqi army Land Cruisers. In fact, the one I'd been driving had three bullet holes in the driver's side and the way they did the ignition was by hotwiring. So, I had a sense

of what might have happened to the guy who had originally been driving the vehicle. But, anyhow, they pulled up the tarp and it turned out under the tarp where I had casually thrown my bag were all these anti-tank mines. They sort of were tossing those out to one of the other vehicles that was heading toward the Iranian border. We then set off on a northerly road from Amadiya to Zakho. Here the refugees were beginning to arrive and set up camp. We stopped and visited with some of them. Children were laying out sheets for picnics and so on. You had fruit trees in bloom. It was very idyllic. These were people who had fled with their lives and didn't know what was going to happen. Then at one point we turned on a road to the north up toward the Turkish border into the high mountains and there people were finding shelter in caves. We stopped to talk to one family who had a daughter who was deformed. They claimed that that was the result of chemical weapons attacks, impossible to know. People had no idea of what was going to happen to them.

As we came back down toward Zakho, we stopped at one of these victory cities. Saddam Hussein had, after destroying the villages of Kurdistan, relocated people into victory cities which were really kind of concentration camps. In fact we stopped at two of them. One a little hillier while the other one was flat. At the one in the flat area, people had no food. They were gathering water from a single pump. The administration, party headquarters, police headquarters, that was all gone. At one point I stopped and talked to men who had a big sack of grain. They said it was poisoned corn intended to kill vermin and they were going to wash off the poison and then try and eat it. I looked carefully at the children. There were no significant signs of malnutrition at this stage, but also, no real signs of food reserves of any kind. It was something I was very concerned about. Got back to Zakho and unlike the day before in Zakho you could hear the artillery and at this point I realized that Duhok had fallen. In fact it had fallen within an hour or two of when Talabani and I had left. It was quite a narrow escape. They had also taken the main town between Zakho and Duhok. I had the impression that the Kurds would be able to hold on to Duhok for a time because there was quite a big mountain behind the city. As it turned out Duhok, Zakho fell the next day. In fact the Kurds really were not capable of putting up any resistance to the Iraqi army, but that I didn't realize.

In Zakho Dr. Karim departed as my escort. A guy named Louie, who had been with us, was going to take me to the border. But first, this being Kurds, we had to go someplace and have a meal – a very generous luncheon of meat and some kind of potatoes and that kind of thing, my Easter luncheon. Then we headed toward the border. Initially they were going to wait for night on the theory that that would be safer, but for some reason they decided that no, they would go now. As we headed toward the border, we stopped several times to talk to other people. There were spirited exchanges and I kept asking, well, what is he saying? So, anyhow, we were driving towards the border, stopping, having exchanges. I'm asking what's going on here? My guide is saying, no, no, it's all fine. There is a truck with a lot of western journalists on it that stops there. They're waiting apparently for nightfall. We continue. At one point he stops the car and says, we better get out because in this car we can be seen and they can shoot at us. If we walk we'll be less targets. He says, if you hear a boom, you get down like this, but don't go here or here

because of the mines. So, we start walking. At which point a pickup truck comes by and the driver says, "Get in, get in." I said, "What do you mean get in? You said it was dangerous." He said, "Oh, that other driver, he was a coward." I said, "I'm a coward, too." Anyhow we race at about 60 miles an hour a couple miles down to the gravel crossing point. Mortars are coming in. We run across the gravel, a mortar lands, we hit the dirt, get up again and finally I dove into an area that was sandbagged. There is a whole group of people standing there amidst the sandbagged area. I suppose half the size of this room.

Q: This is a very small office.

GALBRAITH: I did have my camera and when the shells would come in, well I'd dive down, but afterwards take the pictures with the video camera. Eventually we persuaded the boat man who was on the Syrian side to come over. He didn't want to come, but he did. We raced onto the boat and set across the bay. The Iraqis shot a mortar that landed near us as we were crossing. We got to the other side. I went up the bank. At the top there was a Syrian soldier who examined my papers and there was a woman who had gotten medical treatment who was shaking with fear at the thought of going back as a Kurd. As it turned out, I was the last person to cross to Syria because the next time the boat attempted to cross a sniper shot and killed the boat man. Anyhow I made my way back to the PUK headquarters. They proposed that I spend the night and fly to Damascus the next morning. I decided that I didn't want to do that. I just wanted to get back to Damascus as quickly as possible. They got me a taxi that drove across Syria to Palmyra to spend the night. I then got on the radio to the American Embassy and they were going to send a car to Palmyra to pick me up. They made a reservation at a hotel there. This was one of the more surreal experiences of my life. I arrived in Palmyra at 4:00 in the morning at this tourist hotel. I walked in and there was this rotund Syrian behind the desk with a red fez on his head. I say, "The name's Galbraith. I have a reservation made by the American Embassy." He looks at me and he says, "Sorry, sir, but we're full." I said, "Well, I have a reservation. It was made by the American Embassy. They said it was fine." "Well, I'm sorry sir, I just can't help you. We're full." I said, "What do you mean you're full? I'm dead tired. I've driven all night. I need a room." "Sorry, sir, we're full." Then I looked behind him and there were the boxes with the keys and there was a key in every single box. So, I knew that there was almost no tourism because tourists had all canceled because of the war. I said, "What do you mean you're full? There are keys in every single box there." He looked at me and he said, "Sir, do you know what day it is?" I said, "What do you mean what day it is? I just want a room." He said, "It's April 1st. April Fool's Day." I was the only guest in the hotel.

The next day the embassy sent a car up and I went back to Damascus. I wandered down to talk to Tony Touma the ABC stringer. Before I went down I put the video tape from my trip, because I had filmed a huge part of what I described to you, into my pocket and went down to see Tony Touma. I thanked him for his help in arranging for me to get there and I was describing what had happened and I think I mentioned that I had taken some video and so on. There were two technicians from ABC listening and one of them said, "Well,

could we look at that tape?" I said, "Why, sure." So, I gave them the tape and they put it up on their machine and started to look at it and comment on the poor quality of my camera work. Then they said, we'd like to send this back to New York, do you mind? I said, no, certainly not. Of course, their correspondent Charlie Glass was incommunicado in eastern Kurdistan. I was basically the only westerner who had been in western Kurdistan. As it turned out the last person to get out because as I pointed out the boat man had been killed. They sent the film back to New York and Tony Touma, being enterprising, I think he probably got a cut for every interview he arranged. He wanted me to do an interview with ABC radio, but there was an ironclad rule in the committee that staff were not to be quoted. I declined, besides I hadn't told the committee I was going to go into northern Iraq and so I would prefer if they found out from me in my report rather than in the news.

I then went off to have dinner with Tony Touma and several others at a lovely French restaurant. There was a woman, a Palestinian I think, who started to give these denunciations of things in Damascus that seemed most indiscreet. One of the differences between Syria and Iraq was that in Iraq had she said these things she would have been hauled off right away and killed whereas I think nothing happened to her in Damascus. I intended to drink the bottle of wine before me, but after the first glass the phone rang and it was Peter Jennings in New York. He said they wanted to use my film for the ABC evening news and would I do an interview. Well, this posed a dilemma since there was the committee rule, but I decided that if you are going to break the rules it's always better to break them on something big than something small and I would accept it. The principal reason is that this really was an opportunity to describe the terrible humanitarian catastrophe that I had witnessed in northern Iraq with tens of thousands of refugees fleeing the cities. This was what was on my film – people setting up camp in high mountains. Although they looked fairly normal then, it was clear to me that as the weather turned their conditions would greatly deteriorate. I said, yes, I would do it. I did the interview with Peter. I described the humanitarian situation, how desperate it was, but my prescriptions as to what should be done were not really all that good because even then I didn't understand how rapid the collapse of the Kurdish cause had been. I knew Duhok had fallen and I knew Kirkuk had fallen, but I didn't know that everything was collapsing as indeed it was.

I still recommended at that point that there be military assistance to the Kurds, which could never have arrived in time to help them. In any event, I did that interview and went back to the hotel and was sound asleep. Nightline called at about 3:00 in the morning and asked if I would narrate my film because they wanted to show the film on Nightline. So, I incoherently narrated it to them, not knowing what part of the film they would use. I hung up and I realized that I'd done a terrible job so I called them back. I sat down and I thought about what was on the film and wrote it out and then called them back with a narration. They ran about five minutes of it. That really was where I began to effectively describe the humanitarian catastrophe focused on the refugees fleeing and what this meant.

Tony Touma was very concerned that the ABC correspondent would be now fleeing to Turkey and if he did that the Turks might not let them in or they might shoot. So, I asked if I could help and I agreed to help. I placed a call to Mort Abramowitz who was our ambassador to Turkey. I called Mort and I described the position of Charlie Glass, and it turned out Jonathan Randall and a number of other journalists, and asked that he do something. I also told him that he had tens of thousands of Kurds coming to Turkey and that something had better be done. To his credit he immediately dispatched an embassy team down there so that we were not caught unprepared. He had people there to greet the very first people who came across and to start reporting about the humanitarian catastrophe. I wrote a fax to George Mitchell, the Senate Majority Leader and to Pat Moynihan describing what was going on and the urgent need for intervention. By the 2nd of April they'd all crystallized. I realized that the Kurdish insurrection was over and what a humanitarian catastrophe it was. I described what I'd seen and what I thought was going to happen and how there were millions of people whose lives were in peril. Then I also put that in a cable back to the State Department. I must say I'm not sure it received a lot of attention because since I'd done it in a fax to Mitchell and to Moynihan I couldn't send it classified. I had to send it unclassified. Unclassified cables don't get noticed at all.

Then I had some meetings with the Syrians and continued on my itinerary to go to Jordan. I was going to leave for Jordan at about 6:00 AM. At about 4:00 AM CNN called and said they'd finally gotten some film out of northern Iraq. They didn't have any way to change it from the format of the camera to a format where they could transmit it. So, they wanted to borrow my little super eight video camera. I said, "Well, I'd love to lend it to you, but I'm leaving in an hour for Jordan and I just can't leave it with you, I can't lend it to you." I negotiated the sale of my camera to CNN so that they could transpose their film from one format to another. I was enough of an economist to realize that I had a seller's market. I went on to Jordan. I was just transiting Jordan to Israel and crossed on into Israel to the American Colony Hotel in Jerusalem where Nightline called and asked if I would be on the show. This was several days after my film was shown and I agreed at this point. Pell was in Albania which had been a lifelong ambition of his to go there, monitoring the elections, along with the staff director Jerry Christiansen. I knew that the ability to find and control me was somewhat limited.

Q: Teacher's away.

GALBRAITH: Exactly. So, I agreed to do Nightline. I was driven to the studio and was on TV with George Will and Alfonse D'Amato as well as the president of Turkey. He wasn't live. They did an interview with him where he was urging intervention as I had several days earlier and D'Amato was very supportive of me. George Will had a pathetic argument against doing anything, He said look at the language that we're using, it's so extreme. I said simply, here's what's happening to the Kurdish people. There are more than a million people at risk of losing their lives. I've seen them. This is what I saw. Our president has compared Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler. I wonder how the American people feel with a new Holocaust taking place in the Middle East at the very time that American troops are on Iraqi soil. Of all the television shows I've done in my life, that

was the show that evoked the strongest public response. I got several hundred letters from people who said, when you said that you spoke for America. You know, I've never been so proud of a public official as when I heard you say those words. It was very interesting that there was in the public a sense that we couldn't just walk away from the plight of the Kurds from something that we ourselves had created. I mean, we'd called for the uprising, Bush had called for an uprising twice. On February 15, the uprising was a result of the defeat that we administered to the Iraqis and then it clearly would have been immoral to have just walked away.

Also, in Jerusalem, I got a call from The New Republic asking me to do a piece which I did and it was on the cover. When I flew back to Washington, they had somebody meet me at the airport and pick it up. They took it and quickly put it into print and got it on the cover the next day. When I got to my office Jerry Christiansen's staff director was now back. He had heard that The New Republic had asked me to do this and he said, "I want you to withdraw it." I simply refused. It was an interesting aftermath because from my colleagues on the foreign relations committee there was a lot of resentment. I had broken the rules. The staff were simply not meant to be seen, were not meant to be quoted, but the senators who didn't feel threatened by this behavior, gave me enormous support. Pell, said, no, I don't have a problem. I understand they should go ahead and publish this. Other senators came up to me and expressed appreciation. I think a great deal of it was that the democrats felt very intimidated by the fact that they had opposed the authorizing of the Gulf War and now they were reluctant to criticize the aftermath. Yet they were very happy to have somebody willing to criticize the aftermath and since I'd actually been in Iraq with the uprising I had credibility. Anyhow, I would say of all the things that I've done in my public career I'm probably most proud of that particular set of events because I think I did sound the warning about a terrible catastrophe that threatened three million people. I think that the fact that I was able not only to do the initial reporting on it, but unlike a journalist, I was able to comment, to draw in the starkest way the moral consequences and our moral responsibility. A journalist can't say that the United States is being indifferent to a holocaust, but I could. So, I think I contributed to the public pressure on Bush to intervene as he did in the second week of April to create a safe area that protected the Kurds. Ultimately, it was the spark for the second Kurdish revolution which began in late April of '91 and continued through the fall of '91 in which the Kurds took over for the second time the Iraqi Kurdish territory with the exception of Kirkuk. They took back Erbil and Sulaimaniya for example in September of '91. The safe area recovered Amadiya, Duhok and Zakho, in fact the very places that I had been.

Q: April of which year?

GALBRAITH: '91. So, just a month later the safe area had been created and three senators, Exon, Robb and Levin went out to look at it. I went too. We left on a Thursday and went back on Sunday, having visited Kuwait and northern Iraq. In Kuwait, interestingly, we went up to Safwan, the place where that Iraqi boy had died. I saw the same medic and I tried to remind him of the incident. He didn't even remember. I guess he'd seen so much suffering. In northern Iraq I saw the people who a month earlier I'd

seen on the Iraqi side of the border. Now, I saw on the Turkish side of the border on the mountainsides where there were these incredibly miserable camps, rain soaked. We went to the hospital where there were badly malnourished children. Some of them were not going to make it, acute diarrhea, some of them hooked up to primitive IVs and beyond the hospital was a graveyard.

Q: When you were in Kuwait did the subject of nerve gas come up?

GALBRAITH: No, it did not.

Q: Biological?

GALBRAITH: No, none of that came up. I previously had of course documented the use of the chemical gas against the Kurds in 1998, but no, it didn't come up at all.

Q: How about the missing Kuwaitis?

GALBRAITH: That was a significant issue. We talked to the Kuwaitis about it.

Q: About 5,000 or something like that.

GALBRAITH: Yes, but this was just weeks after the end of the war, a week or ten days and there was no information. Things were still quite confused. The other issue that I looked at there were the Palestinians who were being treated very brutally by the Kuwaiti freedom fighters. I'm not sure that they had done much to help liberate Kuwait, although we had made a show of letting them be the ones to enter Kuwait City, but they were certainly making a show of how well they could beat up on the undefended Palestinians who were being abducted. Men were being abducted and simply disappearing. Other Palestinians were being evicted and there were long queues. They were lining up to get meager food assistance. This was a very frightened community.

Q: On the other side the Palestinians had supported Saddam Hussein. I mean many are probably neutral, but I mean Palestinians were jumping up and down about Saddam Hussein.

GALBRAITH: Well, the PLO had supported the Iraqis and the Palestinians had been collaborators in Kuwait. In fact, because the Kuwaitis were basically lazy, they had left a lot of their critical tasks including the financial management of Kuwaiti banks to the Palestinians who then turned these assets over to the Iraqis. Nonetheless, that was no justification for the retaliation which largely was against innocent Palestinian civilians and also people at a much lower economic and social status than those Palestinians who had been the collaborators.

Q: Well, this of course, we're seeing this in Kosovo against probably the elderly Serbs who were just there. In your dealings with this did you run across a rather significant

fault line within the Department of State's structure. Turkey is in the European Bureau since 1974. Iraq and Iran and Syria and all are in the Near Eastern Bureau. Did that appear at all or was that sort of within your purview?

GALBRAITH: No, it wasn't an issue that affected me. Of course I wasn't working for the State Department, but for the foreign relations committee and I interacted with the Near East Bureau and dealt with this as an Iraq problem and I didn't interact with the European Bureau, but with the Ambassador to Turkey, Morton Abramowitz.

Let me go to the next significant episode which is the documents which I think I can tell you more quickly than what I've recounted to you so far. When I was there in March of '91 with Talabani that night in Duhok, one of the things that he told me was that his party the PUK had captured huge numbers of Iraqi documents. When the uprising had taken place in early March the Kurds had quickly seized the cities of Sulaimaniya, Duhok, Zakho, Shaqlawah, and Kirkuk. In each of these cities were the headquarters of the secret police, and other intelligence agencies of the army and of the Baath party. By and large the takeover had been quick and the Iraqis had had no time to dispose of the files or to remove them. So, these had fallen into Kurdish hands. In the case of some of these files, particularly those from Sulaimaniya and Shaqlawah and Kirkuk, the PUK had transported them out of the cities and into the hills. In March Talabani had mentioned it, but because things were so chaotic the issue that I was focused on in my conversations with him was whether he would be negotiating with Saddam Hussein and how the United States can help the uprising. We were simply watching events unfold including the Iraqi onslaught. We really didn't discuss this at any great length. However, in September of '91 I returned for about ten days to go into northern Iraq. Operation Provide Comfort was well underway. I was helicoptered to a resort near Zakho I think. A big feast with Talabani and the American colonel, Richard Mapp, who became a folk hero among the Kurds. A big banquet and then we helicoptered over to a landing place east of Shaqlawah in northeastern Kurdistan. From there I went with Talabani and his convoy to Shaqlawah where I stayed with him in the house that he had for three or four days. While there he told me that they still had these documents. I said to him, "Look, if these documents, if they remain in northern Iraq they almost certainly will be captured again by the Iraqis. This is great evidence of the terrible crimes that have been committed against the Kurdish people. We ought to get them out of northern Iraq to where they can be kept more safely and also where they can be exploited for war crimes and be evidence." Talabani is actually a wonderful man. He's smart and taught himself to speak quite good English. He immediately understood my point and he said, "Yes, but I have some conditions. I will not give this to the U.S. government because I do not trust the U.S. government after what Bush did to us, encouraging the uprising and then not helping us, but I will give it to you personally." So, we negotiated. He would give these documents to me personally. Anyhow we negotiated and we agreed that the documents would be given to me but they would remain the property of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the political party.

Also, living with him was this boy. He told an extraordinary tale. He was part of a large group of Kurds, a systematic deportation of Kurds who were relocated from Kurdistan to

the south of Iraq. When he had gotten to the south of Iraq, they had been offloaded on buses. There had been several stops where they got refreshments. They'd been on the bus for 24 hours, 36 hours, but toward the end of the journey they had gotten some water. Then they'd been blindfolded and then driven some distance, an hour or two, offloaded and he had lifted up his blindfold and had seen all these corpses in ditches. The Iraqis started shooting and he had fallen into the pit and then was shot a couple of times in the back, but obviously not so seriously. The Iraqis had left and darkness had fallen. The Iraqis had left; there was a girl there. He had talked to the girl, asked her to flee. She was too frightened to flee. He had fled and he had been found by a Shiite family who had taken care of him and nursed him back to health, somehow arranged clandestine medical care. After the uprising, he had been able to get back to northern Iraq. Anyhow, it was an extraordinary tale and evidence of the one part of the situation that was not really known before 1991 which was the systematic executions of large numbers of Kurds. Most of the atrocities of Saddam Hussein we knew before the invasion of Kuwait. We knew that he had used chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians. We knew about the use of chemical weapons after the Iran and Iraq War. We knew about the systematic destruction of all the villages of Kurdistan. I had seen and written about that, but also it would have been evident from overhead satellite photography and so on. We knew about the relocation of people to concentration camps. We knew about the destruction of the symbols of monuments of Kurdish culture, the graveyards, the mosques. I think that there was not known evidence of the deportations to the south which turned out to be systematic killings of tens of thousands of people and this boy was one of the few survivors of this.

I came back to the United States and began to work on how to get the documents transported out. Talabani had 14 tons of them. I wrote letters under Pell's signature to the Department of Defense asking if they would transport it. I worked with Leon Fuerth who was Gore's foreign policy advisor to get Gore to weigh in which he did very strongly. Eventually, after many months of bureaucratic delay and dealing with extraneous issues which I found very frustrating because I was afraid that the documents might be lost, the Pentagon agreed that they would transport them out. There were complications. For example, where they would be awaiting storage. There was a small military MCC, military coordination counsel in Zakho. Would they be willing to take custody of these documents? Would there be a terrorist threat to them if they had the documents? Every issue you can imagine. Eventually an agreement was reached that they would take them out. So, I went back in March of 1992 to secure the final arrangements with Talabani, and to see if another source wouldn't be prepared to give his documents because he had a collection as well. It turns out 4 tons, a much smaller amount. I'd also had a Nightline crew while I was making a documentary about all this. I worked out the details. I went up to the mountains with Talabani's nephew and saw where they were stored right on the Iranian border. In this case, some were in Shaqlawah in the secret police headquarters, which the Kurds now control. Those were fairly orderly. The ones up in the mountains were in a very leaky building. A lot of the documents were wet. They were stuffed into grain sacks and ammunition crates. They were quite something. There were film archives. There were pictures of Senators Dole and Simpson visiting northern Iraq that had been

cut up. There were pictures of David Newton, our previous ambassador in some kind of social group, clearly pictures taken clandestinely, but nothing incriminating. The files at Shaqlawah that I examined, the files of executions of the group of 67 shepherds and the files were quite something. It began, it was in a sort of crumbling yellow folder out of construction paper. The first file was an inquiry from some commander who had captured these shepherds, what should I do with them. The reply was to treat them in accordance and here I don't remember the precise wording, but the idea is this. Treat them in accordance with paragraph five of the Baath party decree of such and such date, a message back, they have been disposed of in accordance with paragraph five and that this followed with 67 death certificates followed by receipts for family members claiming some of the bodies. There was just tons of stuff like this.

I got the Kurds to box up the first two boxes which I then transported back to Zakho and delivered to the U.S. military and in fact I guess helicoptered out with me out of northern Iraq. No, I didn't, sorry, I just delivered it to the embassy safe and eventually all the documents were transported to a warehouse near Zakho guarded by Kurds who were being paid for it by the MCC. Then about three weeks later they were taken by helicopter and flown out on a C5A to the United States. The issue then came of what to do with them. There were several options. The human rights watch was going to do research with them so perhaps they could have custody, but they really didn't have the space nor the security. I talked to Gore and Leon Fuerth and he was an overseer at Harvard in essence of the functional program of a trustee. So, he had the idea that they could go to Harvard which has a literary studies institute. Then I got a call from a very embarrassed Dan Steiner who was the legal counsel at Harvard saying, "Well, we're not really very comfortable with the idea of having these documents." It became clear that he was afraid that if Harvard had them they would become subject of a terrorist attack, maybe the Iraqis would blow them up, so he didn't want to tell Gore this, he wanted to work it quietly with me that they wouldn't take it. That was the end of the Harvard option.

I went over to the Library of Congress and had a meeting there, a human rights watch was there, discussing this whole issue when I realized that what I could do is simply by FIAA make these the files of the foreign relations committee. Then the National Archives would have to take them because they have to take the files of committees. So, that's what I did. I declared them to be the files of the foreign relations committee just like any of the files in my own safe in my own file cabinets in my office of the committee. The archives were forced to take them. They did a good job. They constructed a special room. We got a million dollar appropriation to have all of these documents photographed and put onto CD-ROM with a brief English language cover sheet describing which each of the documents were. There are now 178 CD-ROMs. They're now being used for research into Iraqi war crimes. It is the largest collection of documents of war crimes of genocide captured since the Second World War.

Q: That's great.

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Q: Today is October 24, 2001. We have had a hiatus of two years. Peter is back from Indonesia.

GALBRAITH: East Timor.

Q: East Timor.

GALBRAITH: We have to be politically correct, don't we?

Q: Absolutely.

GALBRAITH: Neither back from Yugoslavia nor back from Indonesia.

Q: So, you wanted to talk a little more about the September '91 trip. I realize it's a little hard to reconstruct what you said and what you didn't say. So, if there, I mean we can always, you know after the document is typed up, we should go back to that and see what's missing. You mentioned about confirmation, which confirmation was this?

GALBRAITH: Well, let me say a few things more about the September '91 trip. I think I already described how I got hold of these 14 tons of captured Iraqi documents.

The other evidence of genocide beyond the documents of course was the systematic destruction of thousands of villages. I suppose I saw at least 1,000 of them traveling around, as well as small towns. I went into both Erbil, which is the main Kurdish city aside from Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya on that trip. In order to go into these I had to cross Iraqi lines. It was a curious situation because the Iraqis were surrounding the cities. But in the inside of the cities the Kurdish guerrillas were essentially in control. They had a modus vivendi, a very narrow one, a very, not narrow, but very tentative one with the Iraqis. Anyhow, it was a joint checkpoint manned by the Kurds and the Iraqi army. So, I would, to go into Erbil dressed up as a Kurd, baggy pants and cummerbund and so on and went in with a car full of Kurdish guerrillas who were known to the Iraqis so they didn't inspect carefully including a fairly prominent leader. We went through the checkpoint and went around Erbil. I describe it to people. It's like the bar scene out of Star Wars because there were all these odd characters and on one side of the street there were Iraqi soldiers and on the other side there were Kurdish guerillas. Periodically I'd come with the Kurds and they'd say, you want to talk to an Iraqi soldier so we basically captured the soldier for a little while and asked him some questions. It gave a very good picture of what had happened at the end of the Gulf War which is basically around December of 1990, January of 1991. Iraqi troops on the frontline, which were heavily Shiites and heavily Kurds, basically had gotten leave to go home and wisely hadn't gone back to the army. It's quite likely that although this is anecdotal, I think it was essentially correct that when we did invade Kuwait in February of '91 we were kicking in an empty door. There were not all that many Iraqi troops there. The other evidence I had for that was it was a rather small number of people who reported deaths. Very many reported deaths in the campaign

targeted on the Kurds, which included the poison gas, but not many people reported deaths of soldiers who would have been conscripts.

Coming out of Erbil we had an incident which some people later said that Talabani had staged for my benefit, but I'm not sure that that's true. In fact, I suspect it wasn't. There had been a clash and the Iraqi soldiers were all lining the road with their guns pointed at us. We drove by without incident. At the checkpoint the Kurds had captured the Iraqi soldiers and there was one very terrified sergeant whose hands were tied behind his back. I tried to be sure that no harm was going to come to him and I don't think any did. Eventually an Iraqi officer showed up and negotiated his release. Going into Sulaimaniya, I didn't go in a disguise even though the Iraqis were surrounding it. We went around Sulaimaniya and went to the secret police headquarters. That was very chilling. There were underground prison cells, hooks where people were tortured, wires where people got electric shock and then a trailer, a couple of trailers with women's clothing, children's clothing. This was described as the raping room where the women would be raped and often they made videotapes. Now the Kurds captured a number of the Iraqi videotapes of executions. At this time I also saw one of a torture, although it was a little bit of beating, it was a testing of some kind of truth drug. The rape videos they said were destroyed, but the execution videos were chilling enough. In the case of the guy who was tortured, it was kind of an interesting thing, but again this was a truth serum, but then when he didn't respond because he was drugged in the video, they beat him up a bit and slapped him around. Later, I was walking on the street and I saw the man who had survived and was definitely in a better frame of mind than he had been in the video. I guess I spent ten days in northern Iraq at that time and of course it was fascinating. It was also the first time I met Barzani who is the other main Kurdish leader, up in a place called Rawanduz in the northeast corner. I also went up on that trip to the far northeast corner, the highest point in Iraq. It was a fascinating era going back in time to the traditional construction of the Kurdish villages and shepherds with their black wool tents. Again, an area that had been destroyed, but now where people were rebuilding. I think one of the oddest moments was sitting around in a typical, I would call it an outdoor living room where they had carpets on the floor and chairs all around the carpets at the edge and covered with grape leaves having dinner. One of the chief's men was listening to the BBC on short wave and I overheard the report. I went over to listen and it was a wonderful statement from the Soviet foreign ministry saying, henceforth, relations between the Soviet Union, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia would be on the same basis as the Soviet Union had with other independent sovereign states. Here we are in the northeast corner of Iraq, the far remotest place in the world and picking up this momentous event. Anyhow, that was a brief summary of that trip.

Q: All right. Well, you mentioned military cooperation, I mean at the end of the last time you mentioned some type of cooperation?

GALBRAITH: In Iraq?

Q: Well, maybe after this trip.

GALBRAITH: Well, there were a couple of elements to this. When I made the trip in March of '91 during the uprising, I had been very interested in what the United States could do to support the Kurdish uprising and prevent Iraq from retaking the area. I was also very much focused on the humanitarian situation, the suffering of the people. That uprising had been crushed, but in April, Provide Comfort had started. Initially the idea was to deliver food, but nobody would go back as long as the Iraqis controlled it. So, the U.S. military created a triangle from Zakho to Duhok to Amadiya, in which they said the Iraqis could be present but only with 50 policemen with identity cards. A very clever thing. Of course, no Iraqi policeman would ever show up with an identity card and be only one of 50. I mean you couldn't have a bigger sign saying kill me. That area automatically became independent in April of '91 and then the rebellion spread in September. Through the summer there was another uprising that took over the center of the main city, Sulaimaniya and Irbil which I already described in July. In September when I was there the Iraqis were in the process of pulling out from around the cities. Irbil was still surrounded, but when I went into Sulaimaniya I was there just as the Iraqis were pulling out. In fact at one point as they were pulling out east of the city I got out of the car and started taking pictures of them. One of the Kurds noticed a guy getting a finger on a machine gun and they just fanned out so that if the guy pulled the gun, then the Iraqi troops would be gunned down, so nothing happened.

I was interested then in how we could support the Kurds. Now here we are 2001 and for ten years de facto an independent Kurdish state. It seemed to me then and I think it's still true now that there are some ways that we could do it. First, I was interested that we make our military protection more explicit. We've put in a no fly zone, but it isn't just by flying that the Iraqis have access to the area, but the greater danger is a ground invasion, tanks and troops. Now, I wanted then and still want to see a more explicit commitment that we will stop a ground invasion. We can do that with air assets, but not just with air assets. So, it seemed to me that that required that we enhance the self-defense capacity of the Kurds and that would include training and providing arms. In particular I think what I was interested in was not anti-aircraft weapons because that would be foolish if you're in the area. You don't want anybody on the ground to have any anti-aircraft capability, but anti-tank missiles. I think that anti-tank missiles would have been an important element of enabling the Kurds to defend themselves combined with an explicit guarantee from the air. These were ideas that I discussed with Talabani and brought back to discuss with the senators. There wasn't much interest in it from the Bush administration. Early in the Clinton administration I made my last trip to northern Iraq in April of '93. I went then and saw Martin Indyk who was the NSC official responsible for the Near East. I outlined all of this to him along with a plan to provide equipment for an oil refinery for the Kurds to operate in northern Iraq near Taq Taq which is a village a little bit about six miles from Koy Sanjaq, a larger city. There were a series of wells that the Iraqis had drilled and several of them were capable of producing oil, but the Kurds had no way of refining it, so I was wondering if we couldn't provide a mobile refinery. It would have been about a million dollars and that would have made the Kurds much less dependent on trade with Iraq for their oil. This was never done unfortunately, but eventually the Kurds were able

one way or the other or develop on their own this kind of refining technology. Not surprisingly, they were able to do it alone, after Iraq was a major oil producing country and there was presumably a lot of expertise. That was the essence of the military cooperation.

Q: Well, while you were working and looking at that, there must have been the Turkish factor involved I mean from our point of view because at that time was the sort of the dirty war with Turkey going on with the Kurdish Marxists, the KK?

GALBRAITH: The PKK.

Q: The PKK. Was that going on at that time?

GALBRAITH: It certainly was. One of the important elements to this story which I think was very much not appreciated by the Bush administration at least in early 1991 is that there were very strong differences among the different Kurdish parties depending on which country they were in. Sometimes unfortunately also within a particular country, but the Iraqi Kurds were not sympathetic to the PKK for two reasons. First, a very practical reason which is that they depended on Turkey for their lifeline. The no fly zone was forced by planes out of Incirlik, Turkey. The American forces that were in northern Iraq came there from Turkey. Their connection was back with Turkey. The Kurds also had economic connections to Turkey. Their main source of revenue was smuggled oil or smuggled refined gasoline and diesel into Turkey that went through northern Iraq. What happened is that this is refined in al Mawsil (Mosul) in the government controlled territory, passed through Turkish Kurdish controlled territory and into Turkey. The Kurds extracted a very large tax. This was ostensibly legal under the sanctions regime because the Turkish trucks were delivering food and humanitarian supplies to Iraq. That was permitted, but the economics of it were interesting. In fact, they got paid almost nothing for this food and humanitarian goods, nor were they interested in being paid. What they were really interested in was delivering the food and then they had these large thousand gallons or maybe several thousand-gallon tanks built in to the bottom of the trucks. They would fill those up with gasoline, I think at about one cent a gallon. Again, these prices reflecting the fact that gasoline in Iraq was pegged at the dinar official rate and the real rate was many thousand times less. So, they paid about one cent a gallon. They'd fill up these tanks and then they'd come back to Turkey and they could sell it for $2.00 a gallon. They could make quite a large profit, $2,000 or $4,000 a trip and that would more than pay for the cost of the food that they delivered. The Kurds would have a significant tax on all of this. The PKK was a radical group, ostensibly Marxist, I'm not sure what that really means, now or even then, but it was very anti-American. So, the PKK had supported Saddam against the United States and had condemned the Iraqi Kurds for staging the uprising. From the point of view of the Iraqi Kurds the PKK, a radical Turkish Kurdish party, were the enemy. Saddam had been funding the PKK as a tool against Turkey. So, the Turks I think basically understood this game and realized that the Iraqi Kurds could be their ally. There was another factor in this equation which was the role of the president of Turkey. As he often said with pride, his grandmother was Kurdish. He was actually, I

think, quite sympathetic to the Kurdish cause. He was the one who pushed in early April of 1991 for the allied intervention when the Kurds were dying on the mountains. It was quite a reversal of Turkish policy and John Major of Great Britain then got on board and George Bush was the most reluctant. The Turkish President had met with Talabani and he also lifted many of the restrictions on, for example, use of Kurdish language in Turkey.

I was involved in this a little bit. One of the things I had done for the foreign relations committee, in a supplemental State Department authorization bill in 1990, just before the invasion of Kuwait, I had mandated that the Voice of America had to have a service in Kurdish. I think it had to broadcast at least an hour a day, maybe a couple hours a day. That was a mandate in the bill and it became law. The Turks wanted to see me to talk about it because the Turkish foreign ministry were quite upset. Now, of course, my target was not the Kurds of Turkey, but the Kurds of northern Iraq. We had a discussion; they expressed their views. I said, well, not only do I not agree with you, but there's nothing I can do about it; it's a done deal. There was an interesting little aside about that VOA Kurdish service. For ten years I handled the State Department bill which was an enormous source of influence within the committee because I wrote the basic draft. At least I wrote it when Pell was chairman. This would have been the bill which was brought up in '87 and the next one that was brought up in '89. I worked very collaboratively with my Republican counterpart, a guy named Dave Keeney, on the bills that we worked for Percy when it came up in '81 and '83. So, basically whatever ideas I had I could put into that bill. Of course, I would have to send a memo to Pell and say here's what I have put into the bill, do you agree and if there was something he wanted taken out, of course, I'd have to take it out. He was the senator and I was the staffer, but in fact he went along with everything I think I put into the bill. At least I can't think of anything where he didn't. So, I had put into the bill this Voice of America Kurdish service and Senator Lugar was sitting flipping through the bill at the committee room. He said, "I move to take out this VOA Kurdish service for the bill. Here's my amendment, it's to strike it. I don't see why this committee should do whatever Peter Galbraith wants, whatever Peter Galbraith tries to sneak into a bill." It was one of the deeply satisfying moments of my career when the senate foreign relations committee voted 10-4 in favor of the Kurdish service, i.e., affirming that they would support whatever Peter Galbraith had wanted to sneak into the bill. This must have been in June of 1990 and just a few months later of course came the invasion of Kuwait and all this became totally noncontroversial.

Q: At the time before the invasion of Kuwait, were there any other friends of the Kurds within the foreign relations complex?

GALBRAITH: Well, of course, Senator Pell with whom I worked and who became personally very engaged on this issue. Senator Gore was a co-sponsor of the Prevention of Genocide Act, which I'm sure I described earlier. The reason he was so supportive was his concern about chemical weapons and the concern of Leon Fuerth who was his foreign policy aide. On the Kurds themselves, there was a woman named Jane Mathias who worked for Senator Wendell Ford who was from Kentucky and a Democratic whip. She had a personal connection with the Kurds though at this point I can't remember quite

what it was. There were some others who were interested and frankly there were other people who once I explained the issue to them were supportive. Ben Gilman who later was a senior Republican on the house foreign affairs committee, later chairman of the house international relations committee, he was also sympathetic and in fact worked very hard to try to get the Prevention of Genocide Act passed by the House at the very end of 1988.

Q: Well, then, you mentioned also about a confirmation?

GALBRAITH: Well, there were two confirmation battles in which I was involved. One of the sources of power of the senate foreign relations committee is its ability to confirm nominees. This is an issue on which I would have to say my views have evolved since then although I think in this case we were right. The two cases I've mentioned to you, we were right. The first was of a man named Ernest Lefever who was nominated by Reagan in 1981 to be the assistant secretary of State for human rights and the second was a man named Leslie Lenkowsky who was nominated by Reagan in 1984 to be the deputy director of the USIA. Both nominations were defeated by the Republic controlled senate foreign relations committee. So, in order for them to be defeated, they obviously had significant Republic votes to oppose them in addition to all of the Democrats. They were I believe the third and fourth time the committee had actually in its history going back almost 150 years or more had actually voted down the nominees. That's become more common since.

The case of Lefever, Ronald Reagan in the campaign had been a major critic of Jimmy Carter's human rights policy. So he'd said, basically we shouldn't have a human rights policy, we should focus on terrorism. I think this refrain was taken up by Al Haig in a big way. Lefever had written very critically of the idea that we should have a human rights policy. Jeane Kirkpatrick, who is a protégé of Lefever's, had written a famous article called Dictatorships and Double Standards. Her argument was that if we focused on the human rights violations of right wing regimes like the Junta in Argentina or Pinochet, we could undermine them and they would be replaced by communist regimes. It was much better to have right wing regimes, which she described as authoritarian, because they were capable of change for the better. Once you got a communist regime it was totalitarian and you could never change it; I mean that was permanent. Communism was a permanent state of affairs. Of course it turned out eight years later her whole argument was dead wrong, but Lefever was the leading proponent of that. While he was prepared to criticize human rights violations by the Soviet Union, he felt that we should not criticize Pinochet or the South African government.

Q: What was his background, do you recall?

GALBRAITH: He was the head of a think tank called the Ethics and Public Policy Center. I think he had a religious background actually. It was a very nasty confirmation fight in many ways. I was the principal staff person on it. I remember the meeting with the human rights groups at the offices of the Washington office on Latin America. They

were all opposed to it. I didn't believe it was possible to defeat him initially because I'd seen that the committee hadn't had any stomach for taking on nominations opposing President Reagan. Particularly the Latin American types were very much opposed to him. I remember at that meeting I was a little shocked by one person who said, well, Ernie's crazy and he's a very tense guy and if you put enough pressure on him maybe he'll jump out a window and commit suicide. I kind of wanted to wash my hands, I didn't like that.

Q: On the attitude, was there a certain amount of policy, but also at getting at Reagan and all that sort of thing, too do you think?

GALBRAITH: Well, it certainly was that the policy was the driving thing, but in order to defeat a nomination it had to have a personal element. I think the senators were not prepared to defeat a nomination on policy grounds alone. I think that probably my contribution was to provide a part of the personal element on it. A part that I think I can defend is that he was basically caught in being untruthful with the committee. I always say to people that, well, if you'll forgive this slightly crude metaphor, the rule wasn't, I didn't say it, the staff would commonly say that you could get confirmed unless you were caught in bed, unless you violated the live boy or dead girl rule, namely being caught in bed with a live boy or a dead girl. Other than that, the only other thing that could defeat you would be lying to the committee because senators really were offended if they didn't feel the truth had been told. In this case one of the issues that arose on the Lefever nomination is that, well, the Ethics and Public Policy Center was essentially a shoestring operation. One of the great left wing campaigns was against the Nestle Company for selling infant formula in developing countries. The basic idea that went on is that Nestle would hand out formula to mothers after the babies were born, the mothers would use the formula because it was western and modern. That would take them for a month by which time their breast milk had dried up and then they would have to continue to buy the formula and of course they didn't have enough money to do it so they would dilute the formula with water. Even mixing the formula was a problem because they didn't have sterile water. They didn't have a way to make it, they couldn't afford it, so they would dilute it and the babies would be malnourished. There was a whole campaign against this. There was a man named Herman Nickel who was later ambassador to South Africa. He an article for Fortune in which he described this whole campaign against Nestle and then laid out his version of the facts saying Nestle was being unfairly targeted. The article was really nasty about the campaigners against Nestle. Lefever then took the Herman Nickel article and circulated it as part of a mailing from the Ethics and Public Policy Center saying this is an example of what left wing extremists are doing and that sort of thing. He was then asked whether he had received any money from the Nestle Corporation and he had denied it. I then investigated further and discovered that he had gotten money from a lawyer named Thomas Ward who represented the Nestle Corporation so it was clear that the money had been funneled from the Nestle Corporation through this lawyer Ward to Lefever and Lefever clearly knew it. I designed a series of questions for Senator Dodd in which we got him to state his denial very clearly and then ask him about Ward and whether he was aware of Ward's connections with Nestle. At one point the poor man, Lefever, got up and ran out of the room. I mean in many ways it was a shot in the dark on

my part. I wasn't sure that there was this Ward Nestle connection, but I suspected it. It turned out it was right and I think it was that lack of candor that made it possible for several of the Democratic senators who were reluctant to oppose any presidential nominee and for Senator Percy and Senator Mathias and several of the other Republicans to oppose Lefever. I guess he was opposed by all the Democrats and a majority of the Republicans.

There were a couple of other aspects of the investigation that I really didn't like. Lefever's family had been Quakers. He'd been a pacifist in the Second World War even as he had gone from sort of liberal pacifism to right wing conservatism. His brothers remain Quaker pacifists and they came forward to say that Lefever was a racist. They testified in a secret session or they wrote, I can't remember now. We had a closed session with Lefever in which he was asked about his brother's comments. This was something really that Percy had raised and Percy's staff got Chuck Burke. Again, I felt very uncomfortable because after all I mean, you know, the testimony of one's brothers about the family feuds. There was another issue of whether one of the secretaries in the ethics and public policy issue or employees had alleged sexual harassment. Again, some of these outside lobbying groups, you know, they were really excited and they had wanted us to pursue it. Chuck Burke and I pursued it a little bit, but trying to find out all this stuff represents what are so-called politics of personal destruction. Again, I'm sure that it was the right thing to defeat Lefever, What he represented ideologically in terms of human rights was contrary to where the country was. The Reagan administration after his defeat recognized that human rights would be a useful tool to its larger foreign policy agenda. They recognized that they weren't going to be credible raising only human rights violations in the Soviet Union if they weren't also prepared to talk about them elsewhere. Elliott Abrams replaced Lefever and I think did a good job, notwithstanding his subsequent history on Iran Contra. Again, I think it was fair game to go after Lefever on his connections with Nestle and the fact that he wasn't candid about it, but this other stuff, his brothers, I didn't like.

Q: This sort of thing does crop up.

GALBRAITH: Well, it was uncommon then and it is very much more common now. That bothers me. When I say it's common now I mean I have the experience of being on the other side in 1996. There were three congressional investigations of the Clinton administration's decision not to object to the flow of Iranian arms and arms from other countries to the Bosnians. As the time comes I'll tell the story in obviously much greater detail. Newt Gingrich set up a special subcommittee, gave it a million dollar budget and it was headed by Henry Hyde. Hyde's investigators went around and they interviewed my secretary under oath, or my former secretary. They asked her questions about a woman that I was supposedly dating, in fact I had dated. Now, it had in my view absolutely no relevance to the issue at hand or to my conduct as an ambassador. I was single, the woman was single, we were both adults. She was American, she didn't work for the U.S. government. I mean she wasn't an intern. I mean, it was none of their God damn business, but they were looking for something. That kind of thing, I think, has really gone too far, it

has no place. Even back on the Lefever nomination, I felt uncomfortable with the personal elements of it.

The other nomination that was defeated was Leslie Lenkowsky. Again Percy was still chairman. It was a majority Republican committee. Lenkowsky was a very, very arrogant, very right wing ideologue and neoconservative who had been chosen to be deputy director to Charlie Wick at USIA. This is 1984 and there are just all sorts of things that had been going on. USIA had taken the Fulbright money, educational exchange money and given it to right wing groups. I'd investigated all of this and I had great fun with it working with Senator Zorinsky who was a very conservative Democratic senator from Nebraska. The guy had been a Republican all his life and had switched to become a Democrat only when he wanted to run for the senate. He loved it because it was a waste of taxpayers' money that could be going to the farmers of Nebraska. I'd write letters for him about the shenanigans at USIA and I'd always talk about wasting taxpayers' money that could be going for the farmers of Nebraska. At the committee staffing you were effective, basically, when you knew what button to push. With Zorinsky it was money. The same issue with Pell. I'd talk about how it was corrupting the Fulbright program because he was very committed to the Fulbright program. Anyhow, in the years before this nomination, USIA had given money to the Young Americans for Freedom and a variety of other groups. Once they'd taken exchange people to Liberty College where Jerry Falwell was to educate them, the same Jerry Falwell who thinks that the terrorist attacks on the United States were justified as God punishing the U.S. for allowing abortion. Anyhow, after the Falwell trip, some of these journalists who were participating in the program had staged a sit-in at USIA saying they weren't going to do anything more on the program and that some of them had been to Cuba and they said this was even worse than the program that Castro had put together. Then there had been a scandal called Kittygate, which I called Kittygate. That became the name in which Wick had used the intern program at USIA and he'd given summer internships to the children and relatives of administration officials. So, Bud McFarlane had two nieces and a daughter and Cap Weinberger, Jr. The only legitimate employee was Barbara Haig, the Secretary of State's daughter, who is quite a nice woman and who survived the Kittygate scandal. I exposed this and Zorinsky wrote a letter questioning the employment and how these people were hired. USIA's response was to fire them all. There had been 68 interns chosen through this political process. He fired 67 of them. The only one he didn't fire incidentally was one that I had gotten hired. It was purely a political appointee on behest of Pell, but the woman was blind. Since she was blind she had a disability that allowed an exemption from the competitive process. These were a lot of the shenanigans.

This is leading up to the Lenkowsky nomination. He actually got a recess appointment and this was for the confirmation. It emerged that USIA had had a black list of people who were not allowed to be speakers. The black list had a funny origin. There were press stories. I was asked to investigate it with Dave Keaney who was the Republican staffer, but who was actually a Democrat. I learned that the black list had actually begun in 1981 when USIA had asked my brother, who is an economist, to go to Japan to explain Reaganomics. My brother was a huge critic of Reaganomics and he told USIA this. I

think the reporting cables said that he had explained Reaganomics and then he had trashed it, but that he had done a fair job in saying what it was. Anyhow, this had caused outrage on the part of Wick, that, or maybe not Wick, but somebody in the higher ups. Why would they send somebody who had been critical. So, USIA began to keep a list of people who were not supposed to go and that list included – it didn't include my father, it didn't include my brother who had caused it – Walter Cronkite and Maya Angelou and so on.

Q: Was this sort of almost a government bureaucratic response to "cover your ass" as opposed to some political goal?

GALBRAITH: Well, I think that's right actually and this was. Lenkowsky was then tagged with having not ordered the list.

Q: Lenkowsky had been what? This is his interim.

GALBRAITH: He was a recess appointee from I think the end of 1983 after Gil Robinson was fired over some of these earlier scandals, the Kittygate scandal. He had been the first deputy director. Lenkowsky then came in as a recess appointee and he certainly had made use of this black list. Every time the speakers were proposed, he would review them, he would question people. He questioned sending Maya Angelou.

Q: Maya Angelou being a well-known African American.

GALBRAITH: Exactly, exactly. He always said I didn't keep the list, I didn't know about it. On the other hand, the way he responded, for example, he was quoted as saying, this list was kept by mindless gnomes in the bureaucracy. Well, the people who had been working on the program had felt that they had been intimidated and of course they didn't appreciate being called mindless gnomes. I think it reflected his arrogance. In the end, certainly, the black list issue hurt him, but once again what defeated him was a lack of candor. Again, I was the one who sort of sleuthed it out and designed the questions that caught him in the trap. He had made a courtesy call on Senator Zorinsky. He had said that he intended to fire Scott Thompson who was the associate director for programs at USIA also a presidential appointee and who was also a right winger. Scott Thompson at this point was basically feeding stuff to us because he wanted us to defeat Lenkowsky. There certainly was an intramural fight within the agency. Basically, I had a series of questions for Zorinsky. The first question was, did you say, sorry, do you intend to fire Scott Thompson. Well, he basically fell into the trap. He said that no, he didn't intend to fire Scott Thompson. He then denied that he'd ever said that he would fire Scott Thompson. Then Zorinsky said, well, did you, he then turned to me and said, "Well, did Mr. Lenkowsky say that he was going to fire Scott Thompson" and I said, "Well, yes." To Fowler, he said yes. Harvey whose job was to get Lenkowsky confirmed was in an awkward situation, but he remembered the conversation vividly as well and so he said, "Well, I don't think, senator I don't think Lenkowsky, Mr. Lenkowsky used that word fire." Zorinsky said, "Well, what word did he use?" Harvey had to say, "Well, I think it

was get rid of." Whereupon Zorinsky said, "Well, I guess that's two fires and one get rid of." Then Pell said, "Excuse me, but have you been honest with the committee?" Lenkowsky said, well, Senator, blah, blah. Sarbanes jumped in and said now for the purpose of a candid answer to Senator Pell whereupon Lenkowsky said one of the great lines which was, "I'm prepared to stand by what I meant to say." All this under oath and that basically killed the nomination.

Q: We're moving back to the September '91 trip. What were you doing after that?

GALBRAITH: Well, to finish the Kurdish episode very briefly. I did make another trip there in April of '92 with a crew from ABC Nightline and they made a documentary about the genocide in Kurdistan. I collected the documents and we went to the places where they were stored, the secret police station at Shaqlawah and a place way up on the Iranian border called Mawat where they were all stuffed into feed bags, grain bags and ammunition boxes. Then we went to the city where poison gas had been used in March of '88 and which had been blown up after the Iraqis had taken it in '89, and we wandered around among the ruins.

Then I made a further trip in April of '93 basically to introduce my successor on the committee staff, George Pickart to the Kurds and to try and get four tons of documents. Pell was reelected in 1990 and he knew it was going to be his last term and basically he decided he wanted a somewhat less active role. So, he decided that he would delegate the two main bills of the committee, the foreign aid bill and the State Department authorization bill to the respective subcommittee chairmen. I think foreign aid was Paul Sarbanes and the State Department, the senator in charge of international operations would have been John Kerry. The State Department authorization was a major part of my portfolio and so the question then was what would happen to me. I think it's fair to say at this point that in the hierarchy of the committee I was the star and so people certainly wanted to accommodate me. So, a new job was invented which was a job I mean in some ways the most wonderful job description you could have. My job was to do whatever I wanted to do, basically to focus on hot spots in the world. Now, this change took place after the 1990 elections. Of course, the hot spot in 1991 was precisely my regional area anyhow mainly the Persian Gulf/Iraq. Practically it made no difference for the first six months in 1991, but by the summer of '91, well I was still doing a lot of work on Iraq and the Kurds. I was also beginning to think about what other areas I should be focusing on. Maybe it was October of '91, I saw an item in the Washington Times in which the President of Yugoslavia was coming to the foreign relations committee and described how the Serbs were using poison gas against Croatia. Tuđman, who is now the president of Croatia, was a member of the rotating presidency of Yugoslavia. For the second half of 1991 it was Croatia's turn, but the president of the country, his loyalty was to Croatia, which had declared it's independence from Yugoslavia and which was a victim of a war. I saw this item and I thought well, you know, since I'm the resident expert on Capitol Hill on the consequences of the use of chemical weapons on civilians, I should go to this coffee he was going to have with the committee. The staff member who handles the region attends the coffee. Michelle Maynard who was handling Europe would be

attending the hearing. So, I told Jerry Christiansen the staff director I intended to go and of course that was fine and I basically had carte blanche or maybe it was Sandy Mason who was a great friend of mine who did protocol for the committee. I went to the coffee. I hadn't followed what was going on in Yugoslavia more than reading the papers, but the first thing that happened was the Yugoslav chargé asked if he could attend the coffee. Now, it was sort of an absolute rule that if you have the head of state of a country that the ambassador would attend the coffee, but I recognized that there might be some sensitivity here. So I asked one of the president's aides and he said, "Absolutely not, that Chetnik bastard, he can't attend." A Chetnik being a derogatory term for a Serb.

Q: Guerrilla forces during World War One.

GALBRAITH: Yes. I was a little surprised, but okay. We then had the coffee. The next thing that happened was that two House members showed up: Dana Rohrabacher, a very right wing congressman from California and Helen Delich Bentley, a congresswoman from Maryland who I didn't realize at the time because I didn't know much about the region. Bentley is a Serbian-American and, of course, would have put you off. They just came uninvited. It was the first time I'd ever seen that after 12 years with the foreign relations committee. Pell was presiding. The President gave his speech. It covered all the horrible things being done to Croatia and why it was justified in being independent. Rohrabacher proceeded to interrupt him and Pell said, "Well, congressman, don't you think we should let the president finish?" That shut Rohrabacher up. The President finished and I think it was Pell who said, "Well, you mentioned this business of chemical weapons or in the paper you were quoted as saying this, but you haven't said anything about it." He announced he was coming to talk about chemical weapons and never mentioned them. So, the President then said, "Well, I didn't want to disturb the committee, but I have pictures." He threw all these pictures on the center of the table. "You can look at them, but they're very disturbing." Bentley then asked some question. She began by saying, "Your history of Yugoslavia is very different from the one I learned." She began on how Yugoslavia was a voluntary union of the Slovenians, the Croats and the Serbs. I must say it was all arguments that I have heard a thousand times since, but this was the first time. Whereupon the President then turned to her and said, "Well, you're just repeating the communist line," which I thought was surely the first time that right wing Republican Helen Delich Bentley had been called a communist. Then things were heating up.

Somebody else then asked about the President and his alleged anti-Semitism whereupon the man next to me stood up and proceeded to give a defense of his role as a partisan in the Second World War. Pell sort of cut him off and said, "And who are you?" He said, "I am the interpreter and what the president should have said was..."

Q: Welcome to the Balkans.

GALBRAITH: Meanwhile I picked up these pictures of poison gas victims and they were about 40 pictures of the same five corpses. Now I'm not saying I'm a great expert on

what chemical weapons victims look like, but enough to know that all these corpses had holes in them and by and large chemical weapons don't make holes. They were awful looking corpses, but they clearly had met their ends not by chemical weapons. Anyhow, I have to say that after that event I was kind of hooked. I thought what is this crazy place? I better learn more about what's going on there.

Q: This was when?

GALBRAITH: I would have to go back and look, but I think it must be October of '91.

Q: Had there been much, had the foreign relations committee gotten involved at all with the Balkans at this point?

GALBRAITH: Well, the chairman of the European subcommittee had been very interested. He had held hearings that I think I was almost unaware of that Jamie Rubin who had been his staff guy working on the committee had organized. They were called, in March of '91, civil war in Yugoslavia or Yugoslavia possible civil war. This had caused the Yugoslav Embassy to object and to say no, no, no such thing, no possible civil war in Yugoslavia. Pell had been very interested too. When I was in northern Iraq during the uprising in March of 1991, Pell had been making a trip through Yugoslavia and Albania.

So Pell had been very interested and I think others were, but it really was not big on my radar screen. During that trip into northern Iraq during the uprising, the political officer in Damascus, had hosted a dinner for me and George Pickart. One of the guests was the political officer from the Yugoslav Embassy. I had kind of joked with him: Oh, Yugoslavia, do you really represent a country? This was March of '91 and he had been very uncomfortable at my teasing and so I had cut it out. Many years later I met the same political officer who was a Croat although I hadn't realized it at the time. He had resigned from the Yugoslav diplomatic service and I think was now the number two in London. That was one of my early contacts.

Q: I was surprised at this meeting that you didn't have people from Ohio and Chicago because my time in dealing with Yugoslavia back in the '60s, Yugoslavia, the Croatians in Chicago and in Cleveland and other places, Slovenia and others, just absolutely.

GALBRAITH: Slovenia, I think.

Q: Yes, but I mean you have a very strong and very public community supporting basic Croatia which is somewhat like the Slovenians do.

GALBRAITH: Yes, they certainly were present and they were lobbying and in the year following I encountered both the Croatians and the Slovenians and they may have testified at this hearing that Jamie Rubin put together on civil war in Yugoslavia, but again I wasn't involved in that. Obviously, my involvement at a dinner with diplomats in Damascus, I mean, they weren't going to be there and ethnic groups would not be present

at the visit of a head of state to the foreign relations committee, but yes, they were factors in this period for sure.

Q: You know when you're looking around for a place and you notice you skipped the so-called Middle East thing which is really the Palestinian and Israel thing, was this considered in a way it was so political that it wasn't much room to maneuver or what?

GALBRAITH: Well, I'd had for many years with the committee two responsibilities as I said. One was the foreign relations authorization legislation. State and USIA and the other was the Near East and South Asia. I had worked extensively on South Asia, Persian Gulf, Iraq and a little bit on North Africa. A colleague of mine who did arms control, Bill Ashworth, had the Arab-Israeli account. Although maybe at this point the Arab-Israeli account had come my way, I stayed away from it for a very simple reason. If the matter were the Kurds, if the matter were sanctions against Iraq, if the matter was Pakistan, whether it was human rights, democracy or nuclear non-proliferation. If you had an idea, you could take it to a senator, they would be interested. They were not interested in any ideas about the Arab-Israeli, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. They had their opinions, they had their views, there was a lot of politics to it as you might imagine and certainly trying to come up with any kind of program or way forward was not going to be welcome. It was a pointless exercise except to sit and write statements that would be purely political. I wasn't interested although I did make several trips to Israel and to Jordan and to Egypt and talked to people. I went around with our consul general in Jerusalem to some of the settlements, I think actually on this '91 trip, the same trip that I was in northern Iraq during the uprising, but it was not a focus because I didn't think I could make a contribution.

Q: You know, something just occurred to me, right now I'm in the process of interviewing Joe Wilson, who was our chargé in Iraq after the Iraqis invaded Kuwait.

GALBRAITH: I know Joe.

Q: Our chargé in Iraq for something like six months before Desert Shield turned into Desert Storm and he got out. Something that I realized in talking to him, he was left there for something like six months and I think the only person to really come in and visit from Washington was sort of a roving psychiatrist, a doctor to see how everybody was. In other words, at least, he remembers there weren't people from the staff and all that going out to him. This would be the time from August, was it '90 until he left in December of '90.

GALBRAITH: Yes, there would be no possibility of staff going to Iraq in that time. It was subject to UN sanctions. The diplomats were basically being held hostage there. They couldn't go in or out.

Q: But you were having a certain number you know, I mean sometimes visits could have been arranged I think. I mean you had Ramsey Clark going in and Jesse Jackson and the

usual suspects.

GALBRAITH: We were U.S. government employees; we were not in the category of Ramsey Clark or Jesse Jackson. First, in my case the Iraqis would never have welcomed me because they considered me enemy number one after the things I'd done on behalf of the Kurds. In fact after my report on the 1988 gassing of the Kurds, they pointed out that I had defamed Iraq and the president and this was to our embassy in Baghdad and that the penalty for that was very severe. So, it would not have been realistic for me to contemplate going into any part of Iraq under Saddam Hussein's control. Secondly, no senators or congressmen would have wanted their staff to go in there. The State Department would have opposed it rightly, they would have seen it as a complication at an extremely delicate time as they were trying to get Iraq to pull out of Kuwait and avoid possibly the use of force. The staff people would have been potential hostages. What surprises me is that Wilson said that even a doctor came in. I had the impression that nobody could go in and that the diplomats were sort of de facto hostages.

Q: He said a doctor did come in who was able to do stuff, medicine and all that because they had an awful lot of Americans who were around there and we filled their thing, but you had the feeling that he had his staff when it got down to very small they weren't sure they were going to make it, you know, survive. I mean it was very difficult.

GALBRAITH: Right. I mean he was quoted as saying that he was at ground zero, felt like a big bull's eye. I mean the last thing the State Department would want is for any extraneous visitors to come in especially ones that they had to worry about. There's no way that any responsible member of congress would go or allow his or her staff to go.

Q: With Yugoslavia, when you thought this would be an interesting place, had you picked up the animosities between the various groups.

GALBRAITH: I thought this was an intriguing, weird, place. It seemed this was a place one really had to look into. No, I had no real connection to former Yugoslavia. My initial area of interest in the world had been the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. My college roommate had been Polish. In '71 I'd spent a summer in Warsaw. I'd been to all the east European countries except Albania and Bulgaria. I had studied Russian for three years. Yugoslavia had not entered into the area of interest because it seemed too Western. It didn't have the same issues at least in my thinking that communist bloc countries had. I remember in 1990 I'd been an observer at both the East German elections in March of 1990 and at the Hungarian elections a week later. I remember talking to a person who was going off to Croatia for the elections. I was sort of thinking, oh, are there elections in Yugoslavia? In retrospect, I think that this was a part of why the crisis evolved as it did because the place didn't loom large. The expertise was limited. There wasn't a more general expertise. There were regional experts, but that was it and a lot of those regional experts were very influenced by their own encounters with Yugoslavia, which all too often were Belgrade centered.

Q: Very much so.

GALBRAITH: Yes. In the end I think one of the advantages I had as an ambassador was I really approached it free from any of these prejudices. I didn't have any emotional attachment to any side in the conflict and I was learning about it as I went along in the year before I became an ambassador there.

Q: You were an ambassador there from when to when?

GALBRAITH: From June 26, '93 until January 3rd, '98.

Q: Well, what were you doing in the '91 to '93 period?

GALBRAITH: I think I described my initial encounter which was at this really crazy coffee. Then there was a hearing on the war in Croatia, the crisis in Yugoslavia. I remember Ralph Johnson was testifying. He was the DAS who was in EUR who was handling it and Richard Johnson was also there who was the desk officer. As I was trying to understand the conflict, the question occurred to me: were the borders of Croatia and Slovenia, historic borders or were they administrative borders constructed by the communists? If they were historic borders and these countries became independent, well, then there would be a case for them having these borders. But if they were simply administrative lines drawn by the communists without any demographic historical connection, then the case for revising them might be more valid. So I wrote out this question and I think Pell asked it. What was interesting was that neither Ralph Johnson nor Richard Johnson knew the answer. I thought that was a bit shocking. As it turned out the borders of the republics were historic borders.

Q: That's what I would think.

GALBRAITH: At some point in November, 1991, I decided I better go and look at this conflict. I put in to make a trip and then I had the idea that I would take Jamie Rubin as kind of a junior staff guy to accompany me. There was actually a very funny byplay. Jamie worked with a man named John Ritch who was later ambassador to the UN in Vienna under Clinton from '94 to 2001. He managed to be ambassador longer than just about anybody. John was a very senior, longtime staff person on the foreign relations committee. He had a kind of sardonic sense of humor. It was for John to decide whether Jamie could go with me or not and so John gave Jamie a quiz. He said, "Okay, Jamie, name the republics of the Yugoslavia and their capitals." Jamie couldn't name Bosnia Herzegovina. Of course he later made his reputation on the issue, but that was sort of what people knew back then. I faxed a letter to Warren Zimmerman from Pell outlining this trip.

Q: Warren was our ambassador to?

GALBRAITH: Warren was our ambassador to Yugoslavia. Then you put in the standard

trip request through the State Department. The State Department came back, I think it was Dean Curran saying much too dangerous a trip, we can't possibly support it. I remember my secretary, Mary Beth, who was very nervous about my propensity to go to places where I might get shot wrote a big letter to me, PAY ATTENTION TO THIS MAN. Meanwhile, Warren Zimmerman replied to Pell saying, Galbraith most welcome. We'd really love to have him. Obviously, I took the Zimmerman answer rather than the Departmental answer. So, Jamie and I flew to Graz in Austria. There we were met by P.J. Nichols who was the economics officer in Belgrade and a very fine Foreign Service Officer. The last time I encountered him he was the consul general in Munich. We went down to Slovenia and met with various officials there. It snowed. I certainly remember at the border taking pictures of a brand new sign Republika Slovenia. We had some good discussions with the Slovenians in early December of '91. They were de facto independent. We went on to Zagreb and had a very good, very interesting meeting with Mike Einik who was the consul general.

What was interesting to me was Mike was just in open dissent against U.S. policy and against the line out of Belgrade and he wasn't shy about it. Frankly, this was the first issue, maybe the only issue of the many that I've encountered where people within the Foreign Service were so openly in disagreement and so open about expressing their disagreement. It really tore people apart the way nothing else did. I encountered dissent when I was part of the U.S. Delegation to the UN and John Willett was a political officer there. This was 1980. He sent a dissent cable opposing our decision to support the Khmer Rouge for the Cambodia seat, the credentials committee. Interestingly, nobody resigned or, so far as I know, even made a dissent cable over our Iraq policy, the appeasement policy toward Saddam or the Kurdish crisis. But in the case of Yugoslavia, there were lots of people in '92 and '93, four or five resignations, but Mike was certainly a very open dissenter.

I also saw Tuđman, met him for the first time on that trip. It was quite a normal discussion. This was up at what had been an old Tito residence. Tito had residences in all the capitals and many other places, a modern building, reasonably modern with wonderful grounds and Tuđman of course was appealing for American support. I don't remember precisely what he said, but I'm pretty sure I could reconstruct because I've heard it 100 times after I became ambassador to Croatia. The only tense moment in the thing was when Jamie Rubin – Jamie and I had agreed that he would do it – asked him about the allegations that he was anti-Semitic. He asked about comments he had made in the campaign I think saying, thank God that my wife is neither a Serb nor a Jew, and there he had gotten quite tense and vehement in his denial.

We did go down to Karlovac and Turan, which were right on the front line. That was really interesting. When I came to Croatia on this trip, and I say this to really my regret and shame, I failed to appreciate how significant this war was. In part I know exactly the reason. I was very colored by my experience in Iraq; having been with the Kurds and having seen the massive destruction that Saddam had done and also in Kuwait. In Europe of 1991, it just didn't seem possible that you were having that kind of real war being

fought in Europe. I went down to Karlovac on the front line in early December of '91. I could see shattered buildings, bullet marks all over the place, tank shells fired through buildings and I went to a bridge. There were ECMM, the European Community Monitoring Mission, you know, white suits. The Croatian government took us down in a Mercedes and I had the right front seat. It wasn't probably the smartest place to be riding shotgun up to the front lines. There was some kind of cease-fire at the moment. Of course, as I understood later, that really meant nothing and any time somebody could have opened fire on us. To my mind I saw this as fighting along a line and yes, okay, here was the front line and there was fighting, but it was skirmishing of paramilitaries or troops. The Croatian army, at that point hard to think of it as an army, more as just another paramilitary unit. I went to the hospital in Karlovac, and all the patients were underground. I certainly remember the day vividly, but I didn't come away thinking that this was the kind of catastrophe that of course it was. We went on from Zagreb to Belgrade.

Q: How could you get across?

GALBRAITH: We took a train up to Vienna and then flew from Vienna to Belgrade. There were still flights into Belgrade. There were lots of other oddities. I think you could get 30 percent more Yugoslav dinars in Croatia than we could in Belgrade. One could make money transporting the dinar back and forth between the two places. Of course there were no telephone connections between the two. We took the train and then we flew into Belgrade. Later trips we'd drive from Croatia to Hungary and then go driving because already sanctions were in effect. I didn't see Milosevic on that trip, but saw the foreign minister. We went for a day trip in the morning and flew out at night into Sarajevo. That was very illuminating. I went with Henry Kelly; a wonderful man who really knew Bosnia. In the day we went around and we saw everybody from the government. Now, to be honest about it, Bosnia was one of a number of stops we made on the trip. All these figures became kind of world known figures, but at the time they were simply local government officials within a disintegrating Yugoslavia. That year I made 12 different trips for the committee across the ocean, so this was another stop. It was interesting. The economic situation was obviously desperate. Very little traffic because there was no fuel. The fighting in Croatia had cut off the pipeline. A sense of impending disaster and a sense of being on a run-away train that was going to crash and there wasn't a thing you could do about it.

Q: Well, did you have any of the feeling that was fairly strong at the time of the Europeans saying, we can take care of this, this is a European issue, and James Baker saying, we don't have a dog in that fight. I mean this whole idea that maybe this is not the time for America to get involved in everything and the Europeans say they can handle it, well let them handle it. Was that at all the spirit at this time?

GALBRAITH: That certainly wasn't my view. I could see an impending disaster, but it wasn't clear to me exactly what you do about it. You could see an impending disaster, but you also might hope that it won't actually take place. The trip was an enormous education

for me and I made three other trips in 1992. I wish that I had written down and done a report on everything that I had seen there. It would have been quite prophetic, but I didn't know the area. I didn't have the confidence to just go ahead with it. When I got back, I talked a great deal about it, but other things came up and there was of course the ebb and flow of activity.

Q: Well, I thought this probably is a good place to stop now. We'll pick this up. We've already talked about your initial trip to Yugoslavia in '91.

GALBRAITH: It's probably worth saying something more about the other republics. I went to Kosovo, Montenegro.

Q: Yes, and what you were getting say from Warren Zimmerman as opposed to what you'd been hearing in Zagreb from our consul general there and we'll pick it up there and talk about the development of things. Great.

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Today is November 5, 2001. Peter, we're still back in '91. You were making this initial trip to Yugoslavia. We talked about what you were getting in Zagreb, but do you want to talk about what you were getting from the other places that you dropped by?

GALBRAITH: Yes, the itinerary started in Slovenia as I've said, on to Zagreb, down to Karlovac on the front line, and then by train to Vienna and from there flew down to Belgrade; Belgrade down to Sarajevo, back to Belgrade, then drove down to Kosovo on to Skopje and then again back to Belgrade and finally a flight to the capital of Montenegro. That was followed by a trip down to the coast. There was a local cease-fire, so Jamie Rubin and I went into Dubrovnik. About a week later came the St. Nicholas Day bombardment, the most shocking of the bombardments of the city. In Belgrade on this trip we saw many officials including the foreign minister. I think there were several impressions. One was a sense of confusion and despair. I think the great discussion I had with Warren Zimmerman was about the wisdom of, the debate was whether the Europeans should go ahead and recognize or the Germans recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia or whether that was going to be a good idea. Warren very strongly resisted it. Mike Einik, the consul general in Zagreb had been in favor of it.

I guess I was also impressed with the real lack of strategy, lack of consistency, the unimpressiveness of the opposition with the exceptions of the human rights people. The end of the Soviet Union was also going on. Just these momentous events a bit overshadowing what was going on in the former Yugoslavia. We had discussed the economic situation with the economic people a lot of it seems very relevant now looking back at some of the reforms and then the impact of the breakup.

Q: Was there hope that economic reforms might help tie these groups together, maybe not as it was, but at least act as a unifying factor of some sort at that time?

GALBRAITH: By then it was too late. I guess we really were in a situation where nobody knew quite what to do. I don't think anybody thought that the country could be held together. Slovenia, Croatia already de facto independent. There had been this very nasty war in Croatia, in fact it was still going on. There was no clear path as to what would happen with regard to the other republics, the occupied territories of Croatia. Great apprehension about what might happen in the coming months. At that time part of me thought or hoped that the worst was already behind us – although in Sarajevo, going around, one could certainly see what was going to happen. I pointed out there were long lines for petrol in Belgrade. There were no lines for petrol in Sarajevo because there wasn't any petrol available at all. Now this was before the war hit Bosnia. It was a dark, cold, gray city with Yugoslav army vehicles being the only vehicles moving around, apartment buildings without heat and a great sense of impending disaster and yet one wasn't sure that the impending disaster was going to happen. I mean they kind of hoped that the worst was over. Bosnians appealed for the UN to stay, to deploy troops to Bosnia to try and prevent a war from breaking out there. The Serbs had already seized their position and declared a separate autonomous Serbian republic in large parts of the country, but the massive ethnic cleansing had not at that point yet begun. I think even at that point it wasn't possible to travel over land for example from Sarajevo. Just to continue with brief impressions in Kosovo, I met with the both the Serb leadership and the leader of the LDK, the Albanian nonviolent political movement. I was very impressed with him, a very low-key, but courageous man, a striking appearance with a scarf around his neck, describing both what had happened to the Kosovars over the previous ten years and a very elaborate resistance strategy that created parallel Albanian institutions of government, Albanian schools, Albanian hospitals. To me it was interesting that we could actually meet with him in offices that were very close to the stadium. We stayed in the Grand Hotel and the Grand Hotel, the lobby was straight out of some kind of World War II movie.

All sorts of Serbian secret police types. There was a casino. It was very funny. Jamie Rubin was playing blackjack at the casino and the woman there who was quite striking kept paying him on ties which is not what the dealer is supposed to do in blackjack, just the other way. Locks didn't work on the rooms, a seedy and awful place. We had a very nice meeting with the President. They were to say describing their movement toward independence and their desire that it be nonviolent and for ten years they did manage to be the one republic to avoid a war. There was a large bust of a horse with eight pieces and if you took out one, a three-dimensional puzzle, wooden horse, if you took out one piece the whole thing collapsed and Yugoslavia was a bit like that. If you took out one piece, Slovenia, even though it wasn't the most critical piece, it collapsed because what had been a balance between Serbs on the one hand and Croats and Slovenians on the other which had therefore enabled Bosnia to be part of it without being dominated by Serbs or Croats and enabled Montenegro and Macedonia to be part of it. Without Slovenia, Croatia wouldn't have remained because it was going to be dominated by Serbia. Without Croatia, then the other parts were either just going to be subsidiaries or something. It was nothing more than greater Serbia or independent. So, once Slovenia left, the whole thing

fell apart.

Clearly Milosevic was prepared to have Slovenia leave because he then anticipated that without Slovenia the math would work in his favor. Red Yugoslavia if you recall had this rotating presidency, eight members, one from each of the republics and one from the two autonomous regions. Milosevic already controlled four votes. Take out Slovenia, there were only three so the votes would be four to three. The others understood that as well and that's why they didn't want to remain.

Q: He had Greece sitting to the south which did not like the thought of the name Macedonia, this had been going on I recall back in the '60s. You had Bulgaria, which was looking at Macedonia as really being theirs, and then you had Albania. I mean we've already talked about the Serbs, but you had Albania, which I don't know if there was a movement toward a greater Albania, but I mean, I can't think of a country in a more difficult situation.

GALBRAITH: We certainly were aware of all these elements. Again I think the primary focus of what Jamie and I were talking to him about was related to Serbia and the problem of Yugoslavia. Others there including the very junior American officer who later became my political chief in Zagreb who talked more about these other issues. I think the Greece issue was a large one although I think it loomed even larger when I made a trip there in October of '92, then went on to Greece as well. Certainly that was discussed. I have to tell you my own view of that list to be completely sympathetic with the Macedonians. The Greek position was completely absurd and explained why paranoid is in fact a Greek word. In October of '92, I went to the Greek foreign ministry. I think it was the number three person in the foreign ministry was showing pictures to myself and this other junior colleague, Michelle Maynard, who was accompanying me on that trip, of the outrages of the Macedonians and these consisted of eight by ten glossies a bit like that scene from Alice's Restaurant, the film of the garbage dump in Sturbridge, Massachusetts. But, eight by ten glossies of a little torn poster on the side of a building, garage, showing a greater map of greater Macedonia extending down to encompass Thessaloniki in the Khalkidhiki Peninsula. See, look, this is proof of the danger, if we let Macedonia have this name, of the claim they're going to make. I looked at the picture and I looked at the cars. It was a garage. I said, "That car has, those aren't Macedonian license plates. Aren't they German?" This deputy foreign minister said, "Well, yes." I said, "Well, was this picture taken in Germany?" He said, "Yes." I said, "So, some poster on some wall in Germany is the cause of your fear of Macedonia?" He also said, "Well, let me show you something else." He brought out a T-shirt and the T-shirt had a map of Macedonia with the white tower in Thessaloniki, which is a symbol of Greek Macedonia. I bit my tongue to say, cool, where can I get one of those? Finally I did say to him, "Well, I'm clearly going to have to go back to the senate and report to them that it makes no sense for us to continue to provide military assistance to Greece." "What?" he said. I said, "Well, we've provided billions of dollars over the years, we've sold you our most sophisticated aircraft, F-16s and so on, you're a member of NATO, you're a country of 12 million and yet you're telling me in spite of all that, you're seriously endangered by a

country of two million that has one twentieth of the per capita GNP as you have and that has no army, no air force and no military to speak of. Obviously all of this money that we've spent on Greece hasn't done any good." Of course, that was totally an idle comment because no politician in the senate was going to want to hear anything critical of Greece.

Q: Well, this is Greece. You know, I spent four years there. Paranoia is a legitimate Greek word.

GALBRAITH: That was fascinating.

Q: What were you picking up in Montenegro?

GALBRAITH: Just jumping around. There was one incident in Kosovo. We went to see the head of the Kosovo autonomist province who was a Serb who gave a very lengthy, he had television cameras, a lengthy attack on the Albanians and on the Bosnians and the Croatians. Then having done this all for the television cameras, he said, "Well, shall we turn them off and have a real discussion?" I said, "Well, I think maybe if you have them on probably they should be there for my reply." I went through a number of points making clear that I wasn't in a position to represent the administration, but I could say something about where the United States was coming from. We didn't agree with this tirade that he'd presented. It was worth doing because some of this was carried into Sarajevo, on TV Sarajevo, I think it was TV 5 which was the only independent television station in the former Yugoslavia, but which was seen throughout Serbia at that time. With regard to Montenegro, it was actually an extraordinarily scheduled day that began at 6:00 in the morning and went to God knows what time. I think we had 30 appointments including probably 20 of them with the 20 different political parties including the Reds, the Whites, the Greens, the Blues, the Yellows. The question was whether there was any desire for independence in Montenegro at that time. Clearly some people wanted it. It seemed that it was a minority viewpoint. It didn't seem imminent. I think there was a referendum in Montenegro which voted against independence, voted to make it part of Yugoslavia. There was strong fear on the part of some of the Montenegro human rights activists including the publisher of the Monitor which was an independent publication and whose office I think had been attacked in the weeks before we had gone over to see him. USIA was in fact doing a very good job in terms of trying to provide access to impendent information and to support these independent groups just as they were in Sarajevo.

Q: Just quickly back to Kosovo, were you getting accounts of any nastiness the Serbs were inflicting on the Kosovars?

GALBRAITH: Well, at that time the Kosovars were being repressed, but they were not being massacred. This was six or seven years before the events that sparked the Kosovo war. The KLA did not exist.

Q: Kosovo?

GALBRAITH: Kosovo Liberation Army.

Q: Were the people you met aware of the politics of the American relationship between the president and particularly the senate?

GALBRAITH: No, well, maybe some were, but that wasn't the big issue. The big issue actually was the rift between the United States and the Europeans in which it was seen that the Germans were driving the Europeans to take a pro-Croatian, pro-recognition stance and that the United States was strongly resistant. The Croatians were being very open and forthcoming because they wanted us to be more sympathetic to the idea of recognition which Jamie and I were. We came out completely in favor of recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and the Serbs were very open because they wanted to maintain, they considered that the U.S. was more pro-Serbian than anybody else. I mean, more pro-Serb and more important that it be pro-Serb. This was significant in one thing that was quite remarkable that it happened which is that the Yugoslav army, the JNA, arranged a cease-fire that enabled Jamie and I to go to Dubrovnik. This was something that Jamie was absolutely adamant that we should do. I was not so enthusiastic having had more than my share of, shall we say, excitement or military action the previous spring in northern Iraq. I wasn't particularly looking to places where I could get myself hurt.

Q: Could you explain what was happening at that time?

GALBRAITH: In Dubrovnik? Yes. This was around, I think December 18th and I think December 6th and 7th was St. Nicholas Day and there had been massive shelling of the old city in Dubrovnik. Dubrovnik had been besieged since September I think, a siege that lasted until the end of 1991 in its active phase and then in a less militarily aggressive phase until May of '92 when the Yugoslav forces withdrew. But the Yugoslav forces and Montenegrin territorial forces had seized all the territory around the city of Dubrovnik. For example, Slano and the villages there many of which they just devastated, just blown up everything, fortunately not Sveti, which is another jewel in the area. The situation of Dubrovnik was quite remarkable because, of course, it's a beautiful city as anybody whose been there knows, with these extraordinary walls, but the Serbs were right on the hills above the city and they could shoot down straight down on the old city. Serbs, it actually was the Yugoslav army.

Q: Watching this on TV and all, it seemed to be gratuitous in a way.

GALBRAITH: I think it was, it's hard to understand Dubrovnik. Part of the logic behind the attacks in Karlovac and Western Slavonia was that these were areas that had Serb populations, that the populations needed to be protected and that if Croatia was going to leave Yugoslavia, it could do so, but not with the areas that had a Serb population. Dubrovnik, however, and that whole area of the coast had no significant Serbian population. No doubt if you thought of a Serbia minus Croatia from a geographic point of

view given the shape of Croatia which is like a boomerang and essentially is nothing more than the coast line particularly down near Dubrovnik. In fact at one point, the distance from a little bit to the west and north to Dubrovnik, I mean just in the Dubrovnik area, it's 900 meters from the sea to the border with Bosnia. No doubt I think the Serbs had in mind that they would simply seize the coast and not have his new Yugoslavia, his new greater Serbia, be this large country minus 900 meters of waterfront. I think that must have been the plan, but the response of the international community which was of course slow, as well as the Croatian resistance made that plan unachievable. Some of it must have just been plain looting and vengeance. On a later trip with Senator Moynihan in September of '92, we went to a place called Slano, a very pretty town on a three quarters moon bay which had been completely destroyed. The hotel had been burned down, every house had been burned and every place. This fellow named Marco Grandoff had written his name. He was in Montenegro. Everybody, the people in the village or town knew him. Apparently he had worked as a waiter in the hotel and who knows what the story was, some kind of resentment. He'd been the Montenegro waiter working in this Croatian hotel that he'd been in an inferior position or perhaps a belief that the breakup of Yugoslavia was going to cost him and his colleagues from the hinterland of Montenegro their jobs. The level of the destruction was shocking and it did seem gratuitous.

There was one kind of funny incident there. I had been handling all of the media because inevitably wherever we went to places there would be local cameras. Senator Biden had given Rubin very strict instructions that he was to stay out of the media, this was part of the general rule, that staff of the committees were not to be visible. I think Jamie chaffed under the fact that I ended up talking to the cameras all the time. So, in Dubrovnik, he went and gave his little speech to the cameras making the point that I've just made to you, the correct point that unlike other parts of the former Yugoslavia, there was not even the justification in Dubrovnik of a Serbian population. The way he said it wasn't very tactful, and it sounded like he was also possibly justifying the attacks on other parts of the former Yugoslavia. This required both P.J. Nichols the Foreign Service officer with us and myself to do some clean up. I'm pleased to report that Jamie Rubin's media skills have improved considerably since his press conference in Dubrovnik in December of 1991.

Q: He later was a spokesperson for the State Department.

GALBRAITH: Right, he was the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and spokesperson for Madeleine Albright.

Q: Well, then you came back from this. I mean, again the purpose of this was just to take a look at what the situation was and report back to the senate or was there more?

GALBRAITH: This was part of the new assignment that I had that I think I described previously which was gone from my regional responsibilities, which was to look at the hot spots of the world and inform the senators, inform independent policy recommendations, legislative recommendations. However, when I came back, first it wasn't clear to me what we should do and second I didn't feel at that stage that I knew

enough to write a comprehensive report. I think one of the most damaging things that goes on as you have people fly into an area, they make a quick trip and then they make some kind of comprehensive analysis. Now if there had been some legislative issue I would not have hesitated to do that, but there was no pressing need to write up a report that would support some legislative position or promote some legislative angle. As I really didn't have enough of a feel of the situation, I didn't write a report that was published as was had been for example the case for each of my trips into Iraq and for the work I'd done in India and Pakistan. This initial trip certainly was a huge education and I talked to Senator Pell and Biden and others about some of the impressions that I had. I would say mostly it was in the form of an education which turned out to be very useful as events unfolded.

Q: Well, then what was the next stage in this interest in Yugoslavia?

GALBRAITH: This trip was December of 1991. In 1992 I've said I crossed the ocean 24 times. The Pacific two times and the Atlantic, 22 times. So, it was a year of constant activity. A lot of it still related to Iraq, but the next time that Yugoslavia came into my horizon, it was in April when Bosnia declared itself independent and immediately the Yugoslav armed forces and the Bosnia Serbs began attacking Sarajevo. Like everybody else I was horrified and transfixed by these stories that were coming out of Sarajevo. In those early days there were any number of stories and some that I remember most vivid was an evacuation of babies and small children including some that were mentally handicapped. A bus drove out of the city and Serb snipers fired on it and killed several of the children. The parents had been left behind, but mothers and fathers had wanted their babies to go to safety. Of course they hadn't been able to guarantee safety. I felt that this was sort of a crystallizing event in the siege of Sarajevo and I became persuaded that the United States should take military action. I wrote such a statement at a hearing in I think it was early May that Senator Pell gave advocating air strikes on the cowards as I called them who were sitting in the hills and lobbying artillery down on defenseless civilians in Sarajevo. I remember Senator Lugar looking at astonishment at Senator Pell as he uttered these words because Lugar was one of the hawks on Bosnia, but he couldn't quite imagine Pell, who was basically a dove in his approach and very restrained, to be so militant. In fairness, it has to be said that for the rest of the time that I worked for him, Senator Pell tried to back away from that position where I had staked him.

The first Sunday of August Roy Gutman wrote a page one story in Newsday about the camps in Bosnia. That Monday, the spokesman for the State Department Richard Boucher said yes, the United States could confirm that Roy Gutman's story was correct, that we knew about these concentration camps. I remember that Monday and Newsday was not something we regularly received in the foreign relations committee, but we got photocopies faxed in and they were circulated around and then came the Boucher statement. That Tuesday, Tom Niles the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, was testifying before the House foreign affairs committee as I recall and he said, "No, we cannot confirm that the atrocities alleged by Newsday are taking place. We don't have any information. We don't have the information. We're not saying it isn't taking place,

we don't have that information." Well, to me this was a pretty outrageous flip flop by the administration and it was obvious why the flip-flop had taken place. You had a story on a Sunday that alleged that Nazi style atrocities were taking place in Europe. One year after the end of the Soviet Union, two or three years after the Cold War in this new international order. It's confirmed that the State Department spokesman says, "Yes, we knew about it. We have this information." That begged the obvious question, which was: you knew that Nazi-style atrocities were taking place? You knew that genocide was taking place and you did nothing, you didn't even say anything about it? So, then, of course, the next question which was even more difficult for the Bush administration which at this point was in a lot of political trouble, was what are you going to do about it? Obviously that then led to the decision on the Tuesday to backtrack to say we don't have information, we can't confirm this. I thought when I saw the backtrack, well, here's an opportunity to do exactly what I'd done in 1988 with regard to the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds. Go out and document it. But that mission in '88 had eliminated any argument about whether Iraq had been gassing the Kurds and they had clear and convincing proof. I figured I could go out to Croatia, possibly Bosnia, and find from refugees clear and convincing proof that the camps existed and that atrocities were taking place. I wrote it up in a memo and I gave it to Jerry Christiansen who approved and I took it over to Pell who was on the floor of the Senate. He read it and he said, "Well, you know, I don't like staff traveling when the Senate is in session." Traditionally the travel time was when the Senate was in recess. Let me think about it, let's do it later. He's a wonderful man, he never wanted to say no directly. I understood that was enough, okay, well, he's the boss. About two hours later he called me to say he'd thought about it and he thought I should go.

I recruited Michelle Maynard who was sitting outside my office. She and a fellow named George Pickart were working on correspondence with the committee, a thankless job. George was working on Middle East issues and South Asia and he had accompanied me for much of that March, April trip to the Near East in '91, but not into northern Iraq. Later he actually became Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia. Michelle had gone from being a legislative correspondent to working on European issues. She'd done a lot of work on Yugoslavia, so I asked her if she would come and she readily agreed. We took off within a matter of a few days for Zagreb. We saw the Croatian foreign minister. I asked him what evidence the Croatians had on all of this and then went out to a camp in Slovenia where refugees from Bosnia were. The thought was to find people who had been in the camps. Indeed, when we got there we did find several people who had been in the camps. I remember most vividly a woman who described human cockfights, in which the Serbs had pulled men out, and forced them to fight each other with their fists until one killed the other. If they didn't fight sufficiently hard then they killed the one who didn't fight sufficiently hard. She'd had to cook and clean up. She was 38 years old and looked like she was 60. I'm sure it wasn't just the few weeks in the camps, but the kind of hard life in Bosnia, the rural life in Bosnia. She just cried as she told this story.

What was apparent was that something else was going on which was much larger than the camps and that was the systematic expulsion of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats from

huge areas of Bosnia. It sort of led me to think about the way in which we respond to these kinds of situations. Sometimes the focus on one part of the problem serves to obscure another part, which may be even a greater part of the problem. The focus on Sarajevo and the shelling of Sarajevo made people think that Sarajevo was the entire problem in Bosnia and they didn't really focus and missed the camps. Then the camps when they came out shocked everybody, but what they were missing is that this was part of something much larger. The systematic ethnic cleansing of upwards of a million Bosnian Muslims and hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Croats. While we found several people who had been in the camps, everybody had witnessed the ethnic cleansing and there were horrific stories being told about the ethnic cleansing. A woman describing the massacre of her parents before her eyes and what was striking to me about these stories was so often they knew the person who was doing it. We went to Osijek, a town on the front line, which had been shelled. We met with refugees who were living in wooden shacks just off the main road. I think it was the road to the airport in Zagreb.

I was going to go down to Sarajevo. Tony Land who was the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) worker had arranged it. He was a very large man and very adamant that I should go to see first hand. I was very apprehensive about doing that. The city was under quite heavy bombardment and it was very dangerous, but I'd gotten my flak jacket and my pass on the UN plane. By the time I got back to my hotel, I was staying at the Intercon, there was a message to call urgently Senator Pell. I called him and he said, "Well, I've heard from Tom Niles the Assistant Secretary and they would very much prefer that you not go. I'm going to leave it up to you, use your judgment, but I would prefer you didn't go." So, I agreed I wouldn't go. It turned out that this had all been orchestrated by Ron Neitzke who was the consul general who had replaced Mike Einik and was soon to become the chargé d'affaires when we established diplomatic relations with Croatia and later was my DCM. He had just arrived and it has to be said this was the one-week in the entire time of his service in Zagreb that he supported U.S. policy. So, he had gotten back to the Department and got what my plans were and had gotten it up to Niles who had called Pell. He had very much regretted that he had done this and in the ensuing three years that he was there, being two where he was my deputy, he worked very hard to get everybody into Sarajevo if possible. So, what typically would happen during our time is that a member of congress or a staff person, or almost anybody, including people from the executive branch, they would go to the State Department, could they go to the Defense Department about getting on a flight to Sarajevo. The answer would be absolutely not, it's against U.S. policy to do that. They'd go to the State Department, absolutely not, we aren't going to help you, it's against U.S. policy for people to go in. They would arrive in Zagreb on their trip disappointed that they hadn't been able to go into Sarajevo. They'd talk to us and we'd arrange it. It has to be said that we did this for a countless number of people and not once, not once did the State Department or the Pentagon ever challenge us. So, the only person that Ron ever blocked from going was me at that particular time, but I did go a few months later.

Q: Well, while you were in Croatia looking at the atrocities that were coming out from Bosnia on the Serb side, were you looking to see if there was a counterpart going on by

the Croatians?

GALBRAITH: No and for the simple reason that at that time, there was not. The Muslim war had not started. This was August of '92. The Bosnians and the Croats were allies, the Muslims and the Croats against the Serbs.

Q: The Krajina and all that pretty safely in Serb hands?

GALBRAITH: That's right.

Q: So, the Croats really didn't have their hands on anybody?

GALBRAITH: That's right. People raised the issue of why didn't we protest against Croatia human rights violations which was constantly raised during my time as ambassador. I had to point out that certainly I was under no illusions about the character of Tuđman, but until 1995 he didn't have his hands on anybody. After he got his hands on people he demonstrated his character, and at that point I protested in the most vehement way possible. My personal relations with him went from being extremely good to being extremely bad.

Q: So, at this time how had the reports come out prior to your going down and talking to people in these refugee camps?

GALBRAITH: Well, reports had come out prior to Roy Gutman and there were a few others, The Guardian was another one, had essentially been from Sarajevo including television images that CNN was translating and they were very powerful. John Burns of the New York Times, Glen Harden of the Washington Post. There were a number of people in there telling what was going on in Sarajevo, but in terms of the broader picture of the camps or of the ethnic cleansing, that story wasn't told. The camp stories came from Roy Gutman and it's what won him rightly the Pulitzer Prize.

Michelle and I also went to Serbia and went to one of the camps that was in Serbia just across the border with Bosnia. The people in the camps had moved on and were in Serbia proper. The camp was not a concentration camp, it was a refugee camp and the Serbian government or the Yugoslav government were reasonable hosts to these people. Although I remember most of the people had been evacuated from this particular camp by the time we'd gotten there. But I remember this sort of old couple who had no place to go and these very vacant stares of people whose entire lives had been destroyed. I suppose they had a very short time to live and people spoke of being able to see from Serbia across the river into Bosnia to see their homes and to see their homes burning.

I think the Bosnian government had a list of 105 alleged camps that we were using, the list the Bosnian government had provided. We'd gotten the list of the camps of 105 camps and we'd tried to track those down. We came back writing a report on the plane describing what we saw as happening in Bosnia Herzegovina along with graphic accounts

from the refugees. We called it the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia Herzegovina which I'm sure is the first time the term ethnic cleansing appeared in a U.S. government publication to describe what was going on. It may have been the first time it was introduced into the broader currency. The report also criticized U.S. inaction in the face of what was going on. It got a certain amount of publicity, which is of course one of the goals of these reports.

Q: Was our consul general in Zagreb, I mean they were sort of on the ground, had they been going out and making reports and making these contacts or had they been either kept from them or not doing it?

GALBRAITH: At this stage they were not doing it, they hadn't started doing it, but they were later to have large numbers of people out there in part in response to our report and all this other publicity. They deployed people there to start collecting information.

Q: What was the effect when you got back?

GALBRAITH: As I said, we quickly got it printed and got it released to the press, got some coverage, circulated in the Senate. I think it had several impacts. At this time everybody was looking at Bosnia, so this was one of a number of things that moved us beyond the question of whether these atrocities were taking place, whether perhaps genocide was taking place to a recognition that well, there continued to be a debate about whether it was genocide. It was certainly a recognition that serious atrocities were taking place and so the debate moved from not what was going on to what should be done about it. I think that was one contribution. The second contribution I think was to move beyond the focus on the shelling of Sarajevo and the camps to recognizing that this was part of something broader known as ethnic cleansing.

Q: Well, when you came back was there a change within the Senate about how they were looking on this? In other words, moving from gee the Europeans have got a problem, what are we going to do?

GALBRAITH: Yes, this was happening. It was happening in part because Bosnia was entering into the American election campaign as well. Clinton this time had criticized the Bush administration for being inactive in the face of genocide and had said that he thought that he would use air strikes. Then Biden, I think, had legislation to provide military assistance to the Bosnian government if the arms embargo was lifted. There also was increasing pressure to lift the arms embargo.

Q: How about Pell, was he changing?

GALBRAITH: Well, Pell had already staked out a pretty strong position at the beginning, so he was focusing on the human rights violations and I think much less prescriptive. I think to be honest he was uncomfortable with the prescription that I had written for him and that he had read and adopted as his own. I didn't make him speak those words, but I

think he was uncomfortable with that position and so he didn't want to emphasize it.

Q: Were you seeing developing a sort of an underground within, not just the setup in the State Department elsewhere about you know, enough is enough, we've got to do something? Particularly I think it's sort of the thing that usually develops at the junior level versus at the very senior level all their policy considerations, etc., etc. which can almost stifle anything.

GALBRAITH: I would think that I was a part of a cadre of people who were on the Hill and in the State Department who were developing such an underground movement. This became more pronounced the next, well, I'm trying to think, maybe the first of the resignations took place already in 1992 and then more took place in 1993.

Q: These were resignations of people in the State Department?

GALBRAITH: Of State Department, essentially junior officers.

Q: State Department, mid-level.

GALBRAITH: Junior, mid-level officers.

Q: Junior mid-level officers who were processing the reports that were coming.

GALBRAITH: That's right.

Q: Well, then what happened in your perspective, what did you do after this?

GALBRAITH: See this was August, 1992. This issue was on the radar screen in September as well and then in October I decided to take another long trip again with Michelle Maynard to all the Balkan countries. Frankly, at this point I had in mind that the Bush administration was going to lose and, therefore, it would be also useful to take a comprehensive look and be able to provide something for the Clinton administration, the incoming Clinton administration as part of the transition. The trip started in Croatia, then drove through Croatia up to Budapest down to Belgrade. At this point Serbia was under sanctions. We didn't go to Bosnia, we just went to Belgrade, Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania and Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece. I think that encompasses the itinerary. Jamie Rubin also was along for part of it. So, I saw the Croatian government people. The war was a major focus, but there were certainly larger issues in the Balkans. This was the first time I'd met Milosevic in his palace. I remember well that here was a man who spoke flawless English, accented, but flawless English, who was very defensive, denied any responsibility for the events in Bosnia and insisted that there were completely separate. I mean insisted on all the fictions that he himself had created, that the Bosnian Serb army was a separate army, that it was not under his control, that consisted of Serbs who were from Bosnia which was true of course. They arranged, however, for all the Bosnian Serbs who had been in the Yugoslav army to be physically in Bosnia when it was dissolved and

they inherited all the weapons. He professed to be appalled at all the atrocities and said he was doing what he could to get people released from the camps. He argued the Serbian cause, he argued the injustice of sanctions. He didn't come across as a threatening figure. I have been in meetings with people where I have felt threatened. He didn't come across that way. He came across as glib, defensive and self-centered. He was like somebody who has a job who has been accused of wrongdoing and is just constantly trying to defend themselves, to demonstrate that they are right. He didn't come across as a master strategist, he didn't come across as an ideologue. He wanted to demonstrate that he was right, that he wasn't involved. He was not in my view in any way an impressive personality.

The Kosovo situation was essentially unchanged from what it had been in December of '91. We drove up to Lake Ohrid and down into Albania. I'd been there in December of '91 on that first trip. The contrast I must say in the ten months was striking. In December of '91 there was no traffic at all. In the north there were people who had been out lighting a fire under a tractor trying to heat up the diesel to get it going and in their bare feet with children with bare feet with water pulled by the well. It was a scene that reminded me of being in Bangladesh except in Bangladesh you had many vehicles around and in rural Albania you didn't.

Q: I want to go back to Macedonia. You talked about were the Greeks getting more aggressive about keeping Macedonia down and out?

GALBRAITH: They were, yes, and they had imposed a blockade on Macedonia, which was causing enormous economic suffering. Macedonia was the one place that had been spared the war and we feared it would become embroiled in the war. So, that was a huge matter of concern.

Q: Well, coming from the political atmosphere of the Senate and I say I served four years as consul general in Athens I got a little taste of this. The Greek lobby is strong in the American political spectrum. Was there a feeling we couldn't do anything, I mean, we sort of had to let the Greeks have their temper tantrum and do whatever they wanted without stopping it?

GALBRAITH: That certainly was not my view. My view was that we should do something about it. The Greek position on this was so completely irrational and very dangerous because Macedonia represented no threat whatsoever to Greece. Yet by keeping Macedonia out of the UN, by keeping it impoverished, made it a target for Serbian aggression, for internal instability which was just in nobody's interest. I felt that Greece was being reckless to what were important interests of the United States as well as Europe. Of course I was also struck by the fact that the European community was so weak that it couldn't actually do something about the Greek behavior.

Q: Well, the European community was making noises about here is something, I'm talking about the whole Yugoslav thing, this is something we can take care of. It's a

European matter and the whole idea was at last we can get together and the United States can stay out while we'll solve this European problem. Were you getting any feel that this was going anywhere as you talked around to the people in the Balkans or elsewhere or from our embassies?

GALBRAITH: That really was the attitude in 1991. By '92 there was a sense that the U.S. did need to be more active or involved. The issue was becoming the extent to which the U.S. would be involved, what we would be doing, that was discussed everywhere.

Q: Did you have any contact with whatever amounted to the Clinton foreign policy cadre that was getting ready about what was going to happen?

GALBRAITH: I shared with them of course our report on the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia Herzegovina. What was more relevant was the work I'd done on Iraq. I was in touch with Leon Fuerth who was the foreign policy staffer in the Senate for Al Gore and later was Gore's National Security Advisor as Vice President. Gore gave a speech which Leon had written on Iraq. I think that the work that I had done on Iraq helped diffuse that as an issue that Bush could use against Clinton and Gore. The fact that Bush was vulnerable because of opposition to sanctions against Saddam, that certainly made it hard to argue that the democrats were weaklings on the Gulf War. Even more importantly I think the work I did in March and April of '91 highlighted the fact that the administration lost the opportunity to get rid of Saddam, that it had betrayed the uprising. That made it hard to use Iraq as an issue because the question then was why didn't you get rid of Saddam when you had a chance? So, I did have some discussions with the Clinton campaign on that issue and a little bit on Bosnia, but not really very much.

Q: Well, then as the calendar moves on.

GALBRAITH: You know, I misspoke. Because there were four trips in this period, three in rather short time periods, but also in that October trip I did go to Bosnia, not to Sarajevo, but to Banja Luka which was Serb-held. That left a huge impression on me. First, driving from Zagreb through the Serb-held parts of Western Slavonia and into Bosnia again you could see the consequences of ethnic cleansing. Homes were just destroyed by artillery, by tank fire and arson. I was in a UN vehicle waving the three finger salute, the Serbian salute, to being in Banja Luka which was just a weird place. There were checkpoints to keep the Muslim population from leaving and on the streets going back and forth were these hard faced men with long beards, Chetniks, looking like the Chetniks in the Second World War with rifles on their shoulders. At the same time the Muslim population in the city couldn't leave because of the Chechens and yet not overtly terrorized. I talked to some teenage girls, Muslim girls, who were saying, well, life is normal. They were behaving at that point like teenage girls and yet the news was so obviously around them it was in the streets, it was at those checkpoints. In the coming years almost all of them would have been ethnically cleansed. It reminded me of those girls in the Diary of Anne Frank, which includes these accounts of ordinary girlish things as well as of the horrors. Of all the places in the world that I'd been, Banja Luka in

October of 1992 had more of a feel of pure evil than any place I'd been.

Q: Had they blown up the mosque at that time?

GALBRAITH: They had not blown it up although it was closed. So, I could only see it from the outside.

Q: It's an ancient mosque.

GALBRAITH: With beautiful arabesque stone inside, which I of course didn't get into see. Years later I went back and stood and it became later a parking lot, but you could see the outline of the mosque on the ground. The bulk of the Serb population became quite angry when I started taking pictures. Why are you taking pictures of this? The obvious reason. But, then I went up to Manjaca, which was the largest of the prison camps in the hills above Banja Luka. It was surrounded by barbed wire. It reminded me of going into Auschwitz. It was these cowsheds and I think there were three of them. Inside one that I went into there were six rows of men all with shaved heads lying on gray blankets that had been provided by the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), stacked like sardines. I mean it was unbelievable.

Q: How did you get in?

GALBRAITH: Roy Gutman actually had told me I had to go there. I'd gotten UNHCR to agree and the office of foreign disaster assistance. Tom Brennan accompanied me. They helped arrange it. I guess it was principally through UNHCR and through contacts that Roy Gutman had suggested. The Bosnian Serb commander was there. There was a Muslim man who had been an officer, perhaps a general or a colonel, with a shaved head. He pointed to the Bosnian Serb general and said he was that man's commanding officer. Scenes of men outside being forced to run in sort of a half pace that prisoners are sometimes forced to do. Trying to talk to some of these prisoners who were so clearly intimidated, I mean they weren't going to say anything. I'd ask how are conditions and they would say all right. Finally I said, well, where did you come from? I knew that many had come from much worse places and one had come from one of the worst camps and I said, well, how are things there. He looked at me with kind of with both sadness and despair and perhaps a bit of contempt and he said, what do you think? It wasn't possible to have real discussions, but I didn't need to. I mean just looking at it was sufficient. The trip to Banja Luka was very formative and it is one of the things that I shared with Dick Holbrooke who went a little bit later to Banja Luka. He never made it to into the camps, but he had the identical reaction which is in his book and which we also talked about in those years. I think this very much influenced something that we will talk about later which was a decision on whether or not to allow the Croatians to take Banja Luka in April of 1995.

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Today is in November 19, 2001. Peter, in November of '92, you went on a trip with Senator Patrick Moynihan, is that right?

GALBRAITH: I did.

Q: What was that all about and what happened?

GALBRAITH: The dominant person in Senator Moynihan's life is his wife, Liz, who is one of these extraordinary people who are behind the scenes, but have enormous influence and is a completely wonderful person. Moynihan himself is a well known public figure, and I think he would never emerge from his home if it weren't for Liz who gets him out to do things. I should say we've known the Moynihans for many years. They lived on the same street in Cambridge, Massachusetts, as my parents.

Q: Both your father and he were sort of on the economic circuit. He was sort of a socialist.

GALBRAITH: Socialist, but they're both on the Harvard faculty and they both lived on Frances Avenue which is a rather small street in Cambridge. Nixon appointed Moynihan as Ambassador to India in 1974 where of course my father had served. My mother had gone to India and had fallen in live with it and has gone back as often as she could. When Liz had come by to talk about India, my mother had told her how wonderful it is and how much she would like it. My mother always recounts going out there after about a year and Liz saying, "Kitty you're wrong, I just hate it." But in fact by the time the tenure had come to an end Liz loved India and was very sorry to leave it. Pat was then appointed ambassador to the United Nations, and Liz did research into the moguls.

Q: You might explain the moguls being a Mongolian origin tribe weren't they?

GALBRAITH: Or Central Asian.

Q: Central Asian, yes.

GALBRAITH: They brought Islam into India invading from Kabul. I've made a number of trips with them over the years including a couple to India. One after he'd been reelected to the Senate in 1989. Both are very close friends of mine as they had been earlier with my parents and are still. We went off. We were all going to India and this would be just after the elections.

Q: November.

GALBRAITH: November of 1992. Anyhow, then we were all going to go on to Israel, which is an important place for a New York Senator to stop. Moynihan calls me in my office at the foreign relations committee and he says, "Do you think we should go and listen to the sound, to the thunder of the guns? What do you think about going to

Sarajevo?" I wasn't exactly enthusiastic since I'd just come back from the Balkans in October and I'd made three trips in the previous ten months and it was dangerous. The city was being shelled, but I was hardly in a position to say no if the Senator wanted to go. So, I said, well, I think that's a fine idea and it would certainly help to see what's going on firsthand. I then arranged a trip that involved going from Frankfurt to Sarajevo, to Zagreb, the relief shuttle to Sarajevo, back to Zagreb. I proposed that we go down to Dubrovnik and to Mostar where there had been recent fighting in Dubrovnik where the Serbs had recently evacuated. We had a very pleasant week in India. Liz almost refused to speak to me this entire time thinking that I was the one who had induced her husband to undertake this very dangerous trip to Sarajevo.

Anyhow, we flew to Frankfurt and then I think, contrary to our expectation, we were taken over to where there were C-130 flights. There was a C-130 flight, West Virginia Air National Guard, going to Sarajevo. I think we thought we were supposed to go to Zagreb. So, we said, fine, we'll take that one to Sarajevo. The Defense Department had been opposed to our making the trip to Sarajevo, because they didn't want to have VIPs stuck there and then have to go and rescue them. That was one reason, although my deputy Ron Neitzke also believed that it was because they didn't want people to see how bad things were in Sarajevo and therefore be a lobby for intervention. We have previously discussed how my own trip to Sarajevo in August had been blocked by Tom Niles the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe. Anyhow, we got on the plane and as we were coming into approach the pilot announced, no, no, we weren't going to Sarajevo, we were going to Zagreb. Moynihan believes that in fact the pilot was ordered to go to Zagreb because somebody higher on the chain of command discovered that he was carrying a Senator to Sarajevo. Anyhow, we got to Zagreb. Neitzke then arranged for us to fly on the Canadian relief flight the next morning. We took off at 6:00 AM to be on the first flight. We were just going to make a day trip and flew down toward Sarajevo and it was all in the clouds as it typically was at that time of year so we had to land, wait a little while and made another attempt, couldn't get in, came back and then we got on a British C-130 that had more sophisticated gear and we finally got in. I remember the planes landed very quickly. They offloaded. They never shut down their engines and I paused to take a picture of all of this and was sharply reprimanded by one of the military.

Q: Yes, you said you were taken in the.

GALBRAITH: Ukrainian APC.

Q: That's armored personnel carrier.

GALBRAITH: Right, which was highly cramped. This made a big impression on Moynihan that he should be in something so small.

Q: It's a Soviet.

GALBRAITH: A Soviet armored personnel carrier and we went to the presidency where

we saw the president. Things were really battened down. You could hear the shelling. There was a place where shrapnel had come through the window and damaged the room and someone could have been killed there and I suppose with bad luck we could have been as well. We had a very good conversation with him and then went over to see a general.

Q: Well, when you were talking to the President, here you had a Senator from the United States. What was his pitch? What was he after?

GALBRAITH: Oh, there was only issue: he was desperate for American intervention in the form of lifting the arms embargo, assisting the Bosnians and hoping that Moynihan would be sending a message to president-elect Clinton about what U.S. policy ought to be. We then went over to the headquarters of the European commander there, a French general. We had a very brief meeting because he was rushing to go off someplace else. He briefed us on the situation. I remember asking him what would be the reaction if the U.S. were to lift the arms embargo. He said, well, we just need, just give us enough time to get everybody out of here before you do that. We then had dinner with a colonel from the Royal Horse Artillery, a Scottish colonel I think. Every Frenchman has his chef. It was really quite a good meal with a slightly disconcerting fact that there was a point where an anti-aircraft round had come right through the walls of the dining room so it took away some of your enjoyment, but it was a fine meal of pasta and good Bordeaux. Then Moynihan and I slept in his office.

Q: I wonder if you could explain on the tape here what the embargo was and how did it impact on the situation.

GALBRAITH: In September of 1991, September 13th to be precise, the Security Council had imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia as it then was. That was interpreted to apply to all the countries that emerged from Yugoslavia and whose independence was recognized either at the end of 1991 or 1992. The arms embargo actually had been supported by the Yugoslav government, which was dominated by Serbia, because in fact Yugoslavia was a very well armed country. It had, I think, the fourth largest army in Europe at one time. It had its own indigenous arms manufacturer and so the Serbs had a virtually unlimited supply of weaponry. The Croatians and the Bosnians had virtually none. So the arms embargo, which the Western countries understood as a means to stop the combatants from fighting, in fact served to freeze the vast military advantage of the aggressor, that is Serbia and Yugoslavia, over the newly independent countries of Croatia and Bosnia and of the Bosnian Serbs over the Bosnian Muslims. So, the major policy issue over what to do about Bosnia was whether the United States should lift the arms embargo and this, of course, is what the Bosnian Muslims wanted. This is what the Bosnian president raised.

Q: Why would the French general say, well, if you do that, let me get all the UN troops the hell out of here?

GALBRAITH: The UN troops were in there with a mandate to use all necessary means to secure the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the people of Sarajevo. Later, I think, in early '93, they got a mandate to protect certain so-called safe areas of which the enclaves of Sarajevo, Bihać, Srebrenica and others were safe areas. These areas where they were supposed to deliver humanitarian supplies were surrounded by the Serbs and under constant attack. This was the mission of the UN peacekeepers, who were wearing blue berets or blue helmets, and in vehicles painted white to demonstrate their neutrality. The concern was that if the arms were going to be delivered to the Bosnia Muslims, that the Serbs would retaliate by attacking the UN and that the UN wouldn't have the means to defend themselves. Not only would the UN not have the means to defend themselves, but they hadn't signed up for that mission. So, this was the reason for the French general's response.

The next morning it was foggy which meant that it was possible to go out and see something of Sarajevo. The fog meant that the snipers in the hills around Sarajevo couldn't find their targets. Moynihan was particularly eager to go and see the spot where the 20th Century had begun, where Gavrilo Princip had shot and killed the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. That was right on the river in a place that was exposed to potential sniper fire, again not such a factor because of the fog in the morning. So, we went this time, not in an APC, but in an armored vehicle that UNHCR had. Anyhow, we went down to where the Archduke had stood and walked to the edge to the intersection with the road along the Miljacka River and at the corner where the shots had been fired. There had been, when I had been there the previous December, bronzed casts of the footsteps of Princip and a plaque, but these now had been removed because Princip was no longer a hero in new Sarajevo. Anyhow, we had with us a press corps including some Western press and some Bosnian press. We were dressed in flak jackets and helmets, but Moynihan wouldn't wear his helmet, so if the Senator wouldn't wear his helmet I figured I couldn't wear mine. We were accompanied by a gentleman from the Bosnian foreign ministry who was just wearing a suit and who later went on to be ambassador to Turkey. He was showing us around and describing the events that had happened. Of course both Moynihan and I were struck by the fact that here we were in our flak helmets, flak jackets, we'd been issued helmets, and here was this poor man, Bosnian, who was acting as our tour guide with no protection at all.

The other thing that happened was Moynihan then proceeded to give one of his history lectures in describing the actual events of the assassination of the Archduke which was quite an amusing account. The journalists began to start walking backwards, getting further and further. I was watching this bizarre behavior of the journalists. After all, Moynihan's visit was big news. It was in the New York Times and the Washington Post and on the wires and so on, and there they were backing away, they too wearing their flak jackets and their helmets with their blood type. I look up in the hills from this spot and realized that I can see the sun and the big outline of the hills and of course my next thought is the snipers on the hills will be able to see our vague outlines. So, I look at Blaine Harden of the Washington Post and I say, "We really shouldn't be here should we" sort of moving backwards. "No." I said, "Senator, you shouldn't be standing where you're

standing" whereupon Moynihan sort of looked up perhaps a little annoyed at being interrupted in his history lecture to the Bosnian foreign ministry man, but wandered off. That then was the lead item in the Washington Post the next day with the aide ordering Moynihan to move and I must say that rehabilitated me with Liz Moynihan. All of which was terribly important as I will explain.

Anyhow, we spent the day in Sarajevo, and went back to Zagreb. We had dinner with Neitzke, the chargé. Neitzke made an impassioned appeal to Moynihan for a more aggressive policy and denounced the immorality of the current U.S. policy. Then we went out to Potoci and Mostar, seeing Muslim refugees in Potoci. This was a Croat controlled area. Then we crossed the old bridge in Mostar which was at this point a rather sad sight. All the other bridges across the Neretva River had been destroyed. This is the old Ottoman Bridge.

Q: Yes, a beautiful bridge with a little teahouse at either end.

GALBRAITH: Built in the early 1500s, one of the monuments of Ottoman architecture, but at this point there were tires hanging on its side to try and protect it from shells and wood on top. The bridge would be destroyed by Croatian mortars a year later, a year after this event.

Q: Before you were taking Moynihan to see what the Serbs were doing to the Bosnians; but going to Mostar, I mean, was this his first feel for what the Croatians essentially were doing to the Bosnians and vice versa?

GALBRAITH: The Croat-Muslim war had not actually begun at this point. Things were quite tense in Mostar, but the damage to the bridge at this point, and the damage to Mostar, came from Serbs not from the fighting between the Muslims and the Croats. There was a lot of damage. There was damage in the Catholic side of town, too, including a destroyed church, and there was something that we had seen in Sarajevo, which is parks converted into graveyards. We went to Lion Park at Sarajevo, which again left a big impression, not far from the Olympic stadium. There were the Olympic skating rinks and the Olympic stadium and then the Lion Park is right there because it has an Austro-Hungarian lion. They had already begun to convert it to a cemetery, and what left an impression on Moynihan were the grave diggers. By this point it was becoming a sunny November day and they were waiting for their next victims. The shells had knocked the ears off the lions. This was 1992, the grave markers were wood and with metal letters. They'd run out of the number two of the metal letters because so many people had of course had died in '92. Anyhow, eventually they filled up Lion Park and they moved the graves across the street by the stadium and the skating rink.

All night while we were there the shelling continued and it was certainly one of the heaviest points of the siege of Sarajevo. Mostar was tense. We went on a tour in a place called Slano, which had just been evacuated a few months before and everything had been blown up. The fellow who had done it, a guy named Marco Grandoff, had written

his name every place in the town so they certainly knew who to blame in Slano though there were many questions about who Marco Grandoff was. Many of the people in the village believed he had been a waiter from Montenegro and had been aggrieved at his treatment by the haughtier Croats. I think that story is a reflection of how personal some part of this violence really was. Dubrovnik showed the damages from shelling. Of course it was never destroyed or even remotely destroyed. It had thick walls and they withstood bombardment for centuries and they withstood this bombardment.

Before I had gone, of course, there had been the American elections. Immediately after the elections, I had been called by Brian Atwood who was in charge of the State Department transition. He asked if I wanted to go into the administration and I had said, yes, I did. Then he had said, "Well, what is it that you would like to do? Please send us a list of what you'd like to do." To me this was a slightly odd way of going about it. The better way being to decide who you wanted to do what, but naturally I prepared my list which really focused on some Washington positions: the Assistant Secretary for South Asia which was a position that I basically created with Steve Solarz, the Assistant Secretary for the Near East, the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, the family seat of the ambassador to India. I was traveling for a couple of weeks with Moynihan, with plenty of opportunities to discuss this and he was very supportive of me. Also, during this time while we were away, the president-elect appointed Lloyd Bentsen to be the Secretary of the Treasury. Moynihan went from being number two on the Finance Committee to being the chairman. Since much of the Clinton agenda went through the Finance Committee, particularly the proposals to balance the budget and later health care, he was somebody that Clinton would want to make happy. Unfortunately, the Clintons failed miserably at that although I think it's also Moynihan's nature to be a great contrarian, so it's not clear to me whether they could ever have made him happy. He was an opponent of Carter when Carter was in. He was sort of considered the darling of the neo-conservative movement, but when Reagan came in he was an opponent of Reagan and became one of the most consistently liberal members of the Senate. But, he came back.

Q: When he came back did his stand, perceptions about Bosnia change at all or what did he bring back with him?

GALBRAITH: It was very interesting. While he was there, he basically argued against intervention at least in the discussion among ourselves and I'd seen him do this many times. He made the case against intervention, you know, why should we do this. There were some things that impressed him particularly, one of them was the high quality of the housing in Bosnia and Croatia, so that this was not a poor country in his view. This was quite a well-off country. Something that I think in some ways made him feel he had less reason to intervene. He sort of played in his mind between the idea of we should intervene and the idea that you know, resources ought to be spent on fixing houses in Arkansas or New York, not in Bosnia. When he came back his mind was formed fully, it was quite clear, and he became one of the principal hawks on the issue. Although I also think that to some degree this reflected our own relationship in that we were and are close friends. I had been advocating the hawkish positions, so I'm sure we reinforced each

other on this point.

He wrote a report for the president-elect about the trip, warning him that Bosnia had potential to really entangle his administration and therefore urging action to solve it. In some ways if you look at Holbrooke's book you'll see Holbrooke also went out at this time and wrote a memo which also was ignored. I think the president told Moynihan he had read the memo, but then had no comment on the substance of what Moynihan had to say. Anyhow, Moynihan, based on his own initiative, also made some very strong recommendations that I ought to be part of the administration. I was also supported by the Chairman of the foreign relations committee, Senator Claiborne Pell for whom I worked of course, who raised it on a number of occasions, including directly with Gore when he was presiding over the Senate. Gore of course knew me as well. I didn't hear anything and finally I figured well, I will go off and do something else, so I went off on a foreign relations committee trip to look at peacekeeping that took me around the world. When I got to Israel I was staying with a friend who was a journalist there and she called and said that there had been a call for me advising that I was going to be ambassador to Croatia.

Q: So, that's where you heard?

GALBRAITH: Yes. This had come from Moynihan. He and Liz had been with the president at a retreat and the president said, "Oh, you should know I'm going to appoint Peter Galbraith ambassador to Croatia." So, that's how the appointment came about. When I got back to Washington I did what I was told to do which was to call the State Department Croatia desk and begin the process of briefing.

The briefing period was very short. I did go over to FSI and I guess spent about a month studying Croatian although since I was still working for the foreign relations committee I was not the most diligent of students I'm sorry to say. Then came the ambassadorial seminar, which is the two-week course to prepare ambassadors to go out. The security clearance was done very rapidly. I already had of course a security clearance with the foreign relations committee and the administration actually pushed to get me done quickly because they wanted to get me out. I guess it turned out I had a rather clean life. I only had two problems. One was that I had truthfully said that I'd never smoked marijuana. Since I'd graduated college in 1973, the FBI was dubious about that and I realized of course it would have been much better off to have lied and said yes I did, but it just happened to be the truth. The agent, also, since I was divorced, had decided that maybe I was gay and that had to be checked out, but maybe this was just vicarious interest on his part. Anyhow, the whole thing was done very quickly. The papers then came up from the White House. This is the formal nomination. I was notified immediately in my office at the foreign relations committee when they arrived. So I called the Chairman, Senator Pell, and asked if he'd be wiling to hold a hearing soon since they were eager to get me out and since I was eager to get out. So, he agreed that we would hold the hearing the next day.

Now, there's a six-day rule, which says that a nomination has to layover for six days. I

was in touch with Helms who said, well, I don't waive this rule for nominees, but I'll make an exception in your case. The hearing was scheduled for the next day. It was in S-116, the small room in the Capitol, not the formal hearing room. Pell chaired, Helms was there, Lugar and Jeffords who was the Senator from Vermont, which is my own state, and a huge number of staff. I think Pell didn't have any questions. Helms announced that he had 200 questions, that the staff had prepared 200 questions, but then he said, I've decided we won't ask them for you. His standard technique for harassing nominees was to give them 200 questions to answer for the record and then to keep going back and so he was very pleasant. Lugar gave a statement denouncing the Clinton administration's policy toward Bosnia and its failure to act. This was now June of '93, and he said, "But, I won't ask you to respond because I know what you think." He knew I probably agreed with a number of his points. So that was the nomination process. It was approved. That was one day. The day after, it was approved by the committee and sent to the floor of the Senate. I think it went to the floor of the Senate on a Thursday and the following Tuesday I was confirmed.

This all occurred during my ambassadorial seminar so I missed the last part of it because I was actually getting ready to go. I was confirmed on a Tuesday and the following Thursday I had my swearing in which Al Gore did, a ceremony of about 20 people in the Executive Office Building. My parents were there, my son held the bible and two days after that I was off to Croatia.

Q: Well, when you went out what was the status of our relations with Croatia? You went out there when in '93, this would be?

GALBRAITH: I arrived June 26th of '93, which was a Saturday.

Q: What was the status of our relations at that point?

GALBRAITH: I think the status of the relations was cool on both sides for a variety of reasons. First, on the Croatian side, they had believed that the United States was the country that had been the most reluctant about Croatia's independence. I think Croatians wished that the Bush administration had done more to support Croatia during the 1991 war. Also there was some lingering resentment that while the European Union recognized Croatia in January of 1992, except for Germany which had already done so in December of '91, the United States waited until April of 1992. There was also concern that the United States hadn't sent an ambassador from when it established diplomatic relations until I arrived in June, 1993.

Q: So, you were the first?

GALBRAITH: I was the first. On the other hand, things were getting pretty desperate for the Croatians. One-third of the country was occupied by rebel Serbs who were backed by Belgrade and there seemed to be no prospect of recovering that territory. It actually bifurcated the country so that there was no land link between the main part of Croatia,

Zagreb down to the coast between that part of Croatia and the Dalmatia coast, Split and Dubrovnik. Furthermore, Serbs had destroyed some of the key infrastructure, electric lines, and destroyed a lake where power was generated. Split, the second largest city, was without power for 20 out of 24 hours a day. This was a place whose economy was heavily dependent on tourists, and there wasn't a single tourist. Things were looking quite bleak for Croatia when I arrived. I think they had given up on the idea that the European Union could help them and so they looked to the United States. They believed that if the U.S. had the right policy then the U.S. had the power to help them. While relations were cool, and the Croatians felt that the Americans had not done enough for them, on the other hand there was no hostility because they couldn't afford to antagonize the United States. On the American side, Tuđman had never been very popular, never been popular at all with the State Department or with the Bush administration or with the Clinton administration and he never was. He was viewed as a person of authoritarian instincts, anti-Semitic.

Q: He made a remark I believe.

GALBRAITH: In his election campaign, he had said, thank God my wife is neither a Jew nor a Serb. He had written a treatise about the number of dead in World War II in a notorious concentration camp run by the Croatian fascists who were allies of Hitler. He downplayed the number of dead. The Serbs said it was a half a million and Tuđman I think argued that it was 40,000. All of this made him not very popular and he was in his personal style very unlovable. In addition, a conflict had broken out since the beginning of the year between the Muslims and the Croats and there had been in April a massacre of 150 civilians in central Bosnia where bodies were burned – men, women and children. There were other atrocities taking place. So, the State Department, in fact, was increasingly hostile toward Croatia and it was the concern of Steve Walker, the Croatia desk officer, and some others that if I didn't get out quickly the decision would be made not to send an ambassador at all. That was something that led me to push for the fastest possible confirmation, then get the swearing in as quickly as possible, and to leave two days after the swearing in or the day after.

Q: Did you find in this really short time that you were dealing with the State Department, dealing with the Balkans, was it ribboned by dissent by what we were doing, you know at the desk officer and below?

GALBRAITH: It certainly was. There was a lot of angst about the whole thing. There had already been several resignations. I think within six weeks of my getting out there, Steve Walker, the desk officer, would himself resign in protest over the policy. People and at the senior levels, Steve Oxman, Sandy Vershbow, Terry Snell who was the office director for the Office of East European Affairs. There was a sense that they didn't know, they didn't know what to do. I think that was very demoralizing. There were also some significant bureaucratic problems. One of them was how the State Department structured its handling of this. As you know, the bureaus and in this case the European Bureau, are divided up into a number of offices which generally cover several countries and then

those offices have desk officers for each country. Of course, if the country is large, there may be quite a number of people sitting at the desk. In the case of the European Bureau one of these offices was the office for Eastern Europe. Now, as a bureaucratic structure that made sense in 1988, when there were six countries in Eastern Europe. But by 1993 those six European countries had become 15 with the break up of Yugoslavia into five separate countries and the break up of Czechoslovakia into two. Then came the addition to Eastern Europe of the Baltics, since politically they could no longer be in the Soviet Union office and they were also independent countries. So, the office director, Terry Snell, was overwhelmed by too many countries in his purview. Added to that was the fact that within those 15 countries were Bosnia and Croatia, that is to say Europe's biggest war since the Second World War. So, that structure I think was demoralizing to the people who worked there. It certainly was frustrating to me and it made it hard to get the kind of attention and focus on the issues that were required.

Q: Well, then, did you go out with a message in your portfolio as you went out there or what?

GALBRAITH: This was the damnedest thing. I went out with no instructions at all.

Q: The first ambassador to, you know, we're talking about a very crucial point. Was this State Department, was this the Clinton administration or is it just?

GALBRAITH: I'm not sure I can say why this was so.

Zagreb was the diplomatic hub within the former Yugoslavia and certainly for a variety of reasons. First, Belgrade, which of course had been the largest embassy, was drawn down. I think it still had more people than Zagreb when I arrived, but they were under travel restrictions. We were engaged in a visa war with Yugoslavia because we weren't accepting their diplomats as diplomats in the United States because we didn't recognize the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a successor to Yugoslavia. Then there was no ambassador in Belgrade anymore since we didn't recognize the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In Sarajevo we had Ambassador Victor Jackovich who had just been confirmed when I'd got out, but there was no embassy. He had almost no staff and they wouldn't let him go, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) wouldn't let him go to Bosnia because it was too dangerous. Zagreb was the only mission there that was able to operate freely. It was also the place where, in addition to our work on Croatia, we had the responsibility for all the humanitarian activities in Bosnia which was carried out by AID and by the disaster assistance relief agencies. Further, one part of Bosnia to which you could get easy access was from Croatia – that is to the Croat held areas in Bosnia and from there to the Bosnian government held territory, at least some of it for example heading up to Tuzla. So, for all those reasons, here was a post that was at the center of the crisis, It was the number one crisis the Clinton administration was facing and, as you point out, or as your question illustrates, the first ambassador goes out without any instructions.

Reasons. I think there are several. First, the speed by which I went out. People were not focused on writing a set of instructions. Second, and probably more importantly, the administration really didn't know what it wanted done and most of all it wished the problem would go away so that it could focus on its domestic agenda. June 26th was when I arrived. It was a month after Secretary Christopher had made a trip to Europe to round up support for the Clinton administration's preferred policy option of lifting the arms embargo and striking the Bosnian Serbs. Christopher made that case so weakly and so poorly that there was a real sense that he had gone there not to advance that argument, but to hear why it shouldn't be done. In any event, this was something of a handicap not having any mandate beyond that which Steve Walker the desk officer had provided in the form of the comments that I was to make to Tuđman on presenting my credentials. Steve actually wrote up an extremely good statement with clear support by the United States for the territorial integrity of Croatia within its internationally recognized boundaries, as well as calling on the Croatians to support the territorial integrity of Bosnia Herzegovina.

Q: Well, now was anybody within the State Department or anywhere else, I mean, as you've described yourself, in the Senate you were somewhat of a loose cannon, that may not be the right word, but you were a self-operator. You initiate things. If you're not given very strict guidance, you take off. Was anybody saying to you, now Peter, cool it or something like that or was there any concern in this?

GALBRAITH: You raise a good question and the answer is no. I certainly had the reputation, I wouldn't say loose cannon, but we'll do with self-operator, self-starter.

Q: All right, okay.

GALBRAITH: I think people who knew me well, know that I'm a pretty strong-willed person. One of the consequences in Washington of punching above your weight, meaning accomplishing more than is appropriate for your position, is that some people say oh, he's really effective and others say, well, he's a loose cannon or a maverick or not quite reliable. So, certainly, one of the consequences of the fact that I was effective at the Foreign Relations Committee and accomplished a lot is that others thought this is a potential maverick and we have to be concerned about him. I would have welcomed clear instructions and, of course, I would have followed those instructions. Indeed, at every stage in my tenure I was very conscious of what U.S. policy was, and if I wanted to communicate something that differed I tried to get permission to do so, tried to get the policy guidance changed. I certainly never did anything that wasn't U.S. policy and for a very simple reason. You take an oath to carry out your office, and the job of being an ambassador is to follow the instructions you have, to carry out the policy that you're given. That's different from being on the Hill. On the Hill, your job is to work on legislation and to represent the senators. If you can get a senator to agree to your position, then you are serving his or her interests. Again, that is different from an ambassador because, well, the same point applies and you can try and change your instructions, but you certainly shouldn't operate freelance. You also do a great disservice to your to any cause that you might wish to advance. If I had communicated to the Croatians or the

Bosnians that which I thought ought to happen or that which I thought should be U.S. policy, I won't have made it U.S. policy. I will simply have misinformed them and they might take some action that would be harmful to them and harmful to the things that I wanted to accomplish. Being a maverick as an ambassador makes no sense and I understood that from day one. Nonetheless, again given the reputation that I might have had, I was surprised that nobody gave me any guidance about how active I should be, what was expected of me. Should I focus on reporting, should I focus on commercial issues, should I take a high profile in the country, a medium profile, low profile, whatever, nothing. In the absence of such guidance, I concluded that it was up to me to decide. I did not conclude that the absence of guidance on that point means that I should do nothing at all. In the absence of guidance I felt it was up to me to decide how to represent U.S. policy.

Q: On your arrival you must have been hit by the press, you know, you say, okay, we're starting this whole new relationship, what are we, I mean, you know the media and all this, I mean you can't just duck. I mean there you are.

GALBRAITH: Yes. Well, first, I arrived on the 26th, presented my credentials to Tuđman on the 28th of June, two days. The 504th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. We had a very good conversation following the presentation of credentials and indeed it was noted how much time we actually spent talking by all commentators. He had given his historical view of Croatia as the Eastern edge of Western civilization. The struggle of civilizations that it represented in the Balkans. From Steve Walker's talking points, I made this clear statement of support for Croatia's territorial integrity which he had noticed and appreciated, which I don't think had been articulated previously in U.S. policy. He was very interested in how the new administration perceived Croatia, and perceived the situation in Bosnia. It was a sign that Tuđman for his many flaws was something of a strategist. He was interested in the context. The situation in Croatia as I think I was describing earlier was one of quiet desperation. One-third of the country was occupied by the Serbs with a UN peacekeeping presence in that area, the region which extended to the coast near Zadar, again cutting Zagreb off from Split. In addition, there were some 200,000 Bosnian refugees in Croatia, an enormous burden on the social services of the country. Beyond that, the war was going poorly for the Croats who were quite outnumbered. Croatia, because of its involvement in Bosnia, was feeling increased pressure from the international community, risking increased isolation. Yet Croatia didn't feel it could withdraw from Bosnia because if it did withdraw, the Croats would do even worse. They didn't have the possibility of preserving the status quo. The economy was in terrible shape. Virtually all the tourist resources of the former Yugoslavia were on the Dalmatian coast and there were no tourists. There were a small number in the North, but that was it. Certainly not in Dalmatia or Dubrovnik.

All this actually created an opportunity which I was eager and able to exploit. In this I was helped by my very aggressive public affairs officer, Susan Hovanec, who was certainly somebody who believed that there can never be enough publicity. She measured her success by the number of times I was on television or in the newspapers and she made

sure that was a very large number. I decided that the first trip I wanted to make was to repeat the trip I had made in August of '92 and go revisit the refugee populations from Bosnia. This was the trip from which I'd done the report on ethnic cleansing. I would go to Slovenia and to Osijek right on the front line and I wanted to do it very quickly. My idea was basically to signal the United States' concern for humanitarian issues. Ron Neitzke, who had been the chargé the previous years and was now the deputy chief of mission, proposed that I should also go to Vukovar, the Danubian city that had been seized by the Serbs after an 88 day siege in November 1991. He arranged with the UN for them to come and pick me up in Osijek and to take me to Vukovar. So, I made the trip. Susan rounded up a lot of Croatian media, Croatia television cameras. There were some Americans who accompanied, notably Roy Gutman of Newsday. He had won the Pulitzer Prize for exposing the genocide the year before and had helped me a lot. We went to Osijek and met with the governor and the mayor and the next day we crossed into Vukovar, toured the city. We got a briefing from the UN and did a windshield tour of this utterly devastated city. It looked like something out of Berlin in 1945, every building pounded away by artillery. One thing that really struck was the twinkle of lights in some of the apartment blocks because whole apartments were missing and there were holes in these communist era apartment blocks and yet people were living in them. It just seemed almost impossible to imagine. I didn't talk to any of the local Serbs.

Q: Now Vukovar was under Serbian control?

GALBRAITH: Under Serbian control. It had been taken by the Yugoslav army in 1991 and it was the great symbol of Croatian suffering. The city had and still has enormous emotional power for the Croatians and the siege of Vukovar was their Alamo. This was their heroic stand. Then when the city fell it was sort of the story of the heroic defenders who had held out against all odds. Then the survivors, including wounded soldiers who were in the hospital, about 400 people in all, were removed from the hospital and taken to a warehouse. They were beaten and then taken in trucks to a farm, shot and buried with the garbage. There were many who disappeared from Vukovar, a lot of whom were unearthed years later from the mass grave.

Q: How did you get in?

GALBRAITH: Well, the UN was there under the Vance plan; the UN had peacekeepers in the Serb-held territories. They were called UN protected areas. The Vance plan was meant to have a process by which these territories would be returned, reintegrated into Croatia, but the Serb population refused. The Serb leaders refused to cooperate, the warlords. So, the UN, in fact, facilitated a frozen situation there. It was part of what kept the status quo. The UN was able to arrange for me to cross the lines although they were very nervous about my being there. When I was driving around the city we did it at great speed and with a convoy of modest security. They must have had permission from the local Serbs to permit me to go. They had some reason to want to have relations with the American ambassador. Of course, they would not allow any Croat press in there. When I came out, Susan Hovanec had arranged a press conference and the first question I got

was, “Mr. Ambassador, why did you go to Vukovar?” I said, “Well, I went to Vukovar, Croatia, because I’m the ambassador to Croatia.” Well, needless to say, this comment was sort of page one banner headlines in all the Croatian press. The idea that here was this man newly arrived as the first American ambassador. The first thing he does is go to the city which is the symbol of our suffering, and he comes out and he states clearly: this is part of Croatia and the reason he went there is that he’s the ambassador to Croatia.

In the ensuing weeks I would walk down streets in different towns and women would come up and kiss me. It really had a big impact. Unfortunately most of them were grandmothers, but anyhow. For lots of reasons that summer we repeated the formula, traveling around always with a large entourage from Croatia television and the Croatian media and the occasional Western journalist. We went down to Split, or up to Zadar, to the front lines in Croatia. We went to places that were considered dangerous. We visited with refugees, visited with local officials, expressed sympathy, expressed support and in the process did two things. First, became personal and very well known in Croatia and secondly, built up a reservoir of good will which, as Brian Atwood observed years later, he said, “You built up this reservoir of good will that you could draw down in your tenure.” In fact, I did draw it down after 1995, extensively, in defense of Serbian rights once the Croatians had retaken the disputed areas. But I don’t think I could have had the influence I had if I hadn’t actually created the persona, traveled around the country, managed to identify myself as a friend of Croatia personally, that the new administration was different, that American stood for Croatia’s territorial integrity.

Q: Were you getting any reflections from the Croatian community, particularly in Chicago. I mean some who tend to ultra nationalistic and all through congress or anything. I mean were they a factor?

GALBRAITH: Not very much.

Q: Because earlier on they were a very definite factor in our policy. Maybe they’d gotten older or times had passed them by and all.

GALBRAITH: The Croatian American community, the principal places that they came from were Pittsburgh, Ohio, much less Chicago actually, and Southern California. There are several organizations, all of whom were supportive of Croatia’s independence, but many were not very supportive of President Tuđman. In fact, the leader of the largest of them would make it a point when he saw me to say, “I saw Tuđman and I told him, Mr. President, you have to understand we are Americans first before we are Croatian-Americans. Our loyalty is to the United States and don’t think that you can use us to promote Croatia’s interest. We wish Croatia well, but our loyalty is to the United States.” Interestingly, Tuđman treated the Croatian-Americans differently than he treated the Croatians in Canada or in Australia. In those countries he expected that the first loyalty of the Croatians should be to Croatia and he encouraged Croats in Canada and in Australia to come back to Croatia. He passed a law of return like the one in Israel and it gave them automatic citizenship. He wanted them to come after ‘95 after they’d retaken the Serb

held area of the country. He wanted them to come and settle in Serb homes. He never made comparable appeals to the American Croatians, partially I think because he knew the Croatian-American community wouldn't be as receptive. Secondly, I think because he didn't want to antagonize the United States or the Clinton administration.

Two reasons that the Croatian-American community I think was less receptive: first, I think our country does a better job of assimilation than the Canadians or the Australians. Secondly, the Croatian-American community in the United States is much older than the one in Canada or Australia. The United States group came at the end of the 19th Century, the first decades of the 20th Century, along with many in the interwar period and after the Second World War, but the initial immigration was early. In the case of the Canadians and particularly the Australians, the Croatians were people who had supported the fascists or who had left when the fascist regime had fallen, who had fled the communists so they had quite a different mentality.

Q: Were you seeing or getting any reflections of apologies for what the Croatians under the fascist regime did in World War Two to the Serbs?

GALBRAITH: This was a significant and constant issue. There were efforts to rehabilitate the fascists, some of which were carried out by Tuđman's government and to diminish the partisan contribution. Schools, for example, were named after a Croatian poet who had been a minister in the fascist government and that offended a lot of anti-fascists. Tuđman wanted to get rid of the communist-era names of streets and public buildings, but many of them were associated with the partisan movement. Although I think his motives were largely against the communist association, it appeared as if he were diminishing Croatia's partisan movement. For example, he renamed a principal square in Zagreb after a Croatian king of medieval, early medieval times. It had been called the Square of the Anti-Fascist Heroes. It offended a lot of people that he had changed that name and people who were anti-fascist continued to call it by the old name. In some parts of Croatia, not so much in Zagreb, but in some places on the coast and on the islands, for example on the island of Vis in the town of Komiža, people smashed the anti-fascist monuments, the monuments to the partisans. In some places like Komiža they put up new monuments to those who had died in the homeland war, meaning those who died fighting for the fascists, the fascist Croatia. Interestingly, the village that I sighted this monument in, Komiža, was one that had the highest immigration to the United States. So, I guess that some of this came from Americans who had come either themselves or the children of people who had come after the Second World War.

Q: Komiža played a rather important role I think during World War Two as far as the staging point for the supplying of Tito's partisans and all that.

GALBRAITH: It did, yes. I think it's where George McGovern came down when his plane was shot down or had a crash landing.

Q: In the first few months you were making your visits. In the first place what was the

reading you were getting, your personal one and from your staff and others you were talking to about Tuđman. Was he a man we could do business with or was he a man we had to watch, I mean what were you thinking?

GALBRAITH: Both. A man we should watch and a man I felt we could do business with. Neither the staff nor any of the other sources that we had had much feel for him. Neitzke, the chargé who now was DCM, had met with him a number of times, but not much more frequently than other members of the diplomatic community. The other staff many of them were new, so they hadn't had that much dealing with him. When I was in Zagreb in 1991, December of '91 when Mike Einik was there as consul general, there were five Americans there. Even the year before, the embassy had 10 or 15. When I arrived it was around 20. By the time I left it was probably closer to 60 or 70 Americans and then 120 Croatian employees. It was really in a process of being set up and it had some pretty significant growth. I was convinced that you didn't need to like Tuđman to be able to do business with him. Even more importantly, my fundamental conviction was that the only way out of the Croatia Bosnia wars was through Croatia. We had to get Croatia build an alliance between Croatia and the Bosnian Muslims. We had to get Croatia to be as much as possible willing to promote or implement American policy goals. When I arrived I would say that the balance of policy in the United States favored the alternative approach namely that to treat Tuđman as another dictator, as a bloodthirsty Balkan pro-tyrant eager to carve up Bosnia and therefore to be treated the same way, to have sanctions imposed on him and interestingly that came from two different camps. It came from the Yugoslav camp in the State Department, in the policy circles. These were people who knew the old Yugoslavia, who loved the old Yugoslavia and felt that it had an important role in the Cold War. They regretted its breakup, and felt that sanctions on Serbia were justified, but that Tuđman was also responsible for the breakup. Therefore, Croatia was responsible for the breakup, and they resented the fact that Croatia had declared its independence. So, there was that impulse to have sanctions. Certainly, I think was the anti-Croatian sentiment that was a factor in the Bush administration where Larry Eagleburger and Brent Scowcroft had served in Belgrade and where the people working on the staff level were also people who had this experience in Belgrade.

Q: I was part of this, I was rather astounded at how pro-Serbian some of my colleagues had become and this was when things were getting very nasty in Bosnia, but they were still excusing the Serbs. It was long-term localitis or something.

GALBRAITH: Well, there was that element which to some degree came from the self-styled realists in the U.S. foreign policy apparatus and from the foreign policy establishment. On the other side there was this desire to impose sanctions on Croatia from those who were the idealists and who had taken up the cause of Bosnia. These were my friends, my allies, where I was coming from, who saw Bosnia as I saw it – primarily as a moral issue that would define Europe in the 1990s. They believed that what was at stake was not just this small country in Europe, but some principles. The principles related to how you respond to aggression, how you respond to genocide, how you respond to crimes against humanity. A group of us who had no particular connection to Yugoslavia, no

attachment, no real knowledge, but that group, too, was by July of 1993 looking to impose sanctions on Croatia. So, in some sense I had to deal with the effort to isolate Croatia that came from the establishment group, from the Yugoslav hands, and from the idealists who were concerned, and the Bosnia hands. In order to be credible in opposing that, I had to demonstrate that there was another alternative, that Croatia could be turned around, that the sanctions likely wouldn't work because it would leave us with no alternative. This was of course one of the great potential disasters here. Sanctions on Serbia, you have sanctions on Croatia, the Bosnian Muslims, who were the people we all wanted to help, are completely surrounded. How do you get any aid in, how do you get any assistance? So, on one hand I had to demonstrate that Croatia was capable of doing better; two, I had to demonstrate that sanctions would be harmful; three, I had to be damn sure that I wasn't seen as an apologist for Croatia. The moment I began to excuse Croatian actions or to deny that they were taking place, then the immediate response would be that Galbraith has gone local, clientitis, let's just miss what he has to say.

Q: This happens again and again in the State Department because they look at ambassadors and if they all of a sudden go that way, they become completely ineffective at least as far as Washington is concerned.

GALBRAITH: This was my number one concern. It came up very early. Neitzke had taken the cables that were written by people including by the disaster assistant relief team, the DART, the people who went into Bosnia. He would rewrite them at great length, delaying them for going out for days and would take out the criticisms of Croatia, or many of them, would tone it down. I think he did this for two reasons. First, I think he felt that Croatia was not as bad as Serbia. I think he was reacting to the old establishment, the Yugoslav hand phenomena. He didn't want to give them ammunition. I think he was concerned also that by reporting lots of bad things that the Croatians were doing, this might lead to sanctions on Croatia which would have the disastrous results that both he and I agreed they would be. My view was the opposite. My tactical approach was the opposite. I figured the more critical my cables were of Croatia, the more credibility I would have in Washington in making the case against sanctions on Croatia. In other words, I could go in there and say I'm not apologizing for Tuđman, you've heard what I've had to say about him, you've heard what reporting we've done, nonetheless I can tell you, as a tough-minded person taking on the Croatians, that this approach of sanctions will do more harm than good. So right away the issue was joined about how much to edit the cables, particularly from the disaster assistance relief team. I said no editing on the facts. You guys report what you see in Bosnia; you report what the Bosnian Croats are doing. We're not going to take any of that out of the cable. Now, there may be some editing for style and so on, but I want the reporting as you see it. This, incidentally, turned out to be very good for morale because this was at a time when people were resigning left and right when they felt that the policy was immoral. They felt that they were cogs in a machine that was standing by while atrocities and genocide were being committed. That was affecting not only Washington, but our embassy. By having our embassy from the start reporting the facts, highlighting the atrocities as we saw them, not mincing words, all of us could feel we were making a contribution. The situation was better off for our being

there; we were not cogs set in a different policy, but we were trying to do what we could to improve the policy by providing better reporting. I also realized that it would be deeply demoralizing for the staff to have an ambassador that they saw as an apologist for Tuđman.

Q: This has happened in other embassies when you get this toning down of things. When you arrived there, what were sort of the issues that you had to deal with?

GALBRAITH: There were two issues at the beginning of my time. The first issue was the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Bosnia and particularly in Sarajevo. The second issue was the Muslim Croat war in both its humanitarian and political dimensions. I focused on very little else in my first months there in terms of policy. Obviously I was doing these other things, going around the country, meeting people, seeing what the conditions were like and attempting to develop a rapport and to promote or build up morale. The first issue was joined in a kind of interesting way, that is the Sarajevo issue. The first week I was there, Tim Knight, the head of the DART team, came out of Sarajevo. He wrote a cable about what was going on in Sarajevo and it was really devastating. The Serbs had turned off the utilities and this meant that, among other things, water was not functioning. There wasn't much water pressure, so people were getting water from the river or from puddles. Without water, of course, the toilets weren't working and this meant that sewage, human waste, was seeping out in the ground water. Furthermore, because the gas had been turned off, people were unable to take sanitary measures like boil the water and so there was, Tim felt, a huge risk of epidemic. So, he made this report. Ron Neitzke added to it: this is an urgent action cable and proposed some specific actions on the humanitarian side including acquiring iodine pills for purifying the water and some other things. He made the point that something needed to be done about the situation in Sarajevo. I looked at the cable and I did a little bit of editing. Tim had told me of a joke that was circulated in Sarajevo and the joke went as follows: What's the difference between Auschwitz and Sarajevo? Answer: At least at Auschwitz they had gas. I debated with myself as to whether to include that in the cable or not since, well, there were a lot of people frankly who don't like comparisons with the Holocaust. They feel that that is such a unique event and second, there's always, there's a lot of sensitivity about anything that smacks of a joke in relation to what happened at Auschwitz of course. Nonetheless, I also realized that if I put that joke in there the cable would be read. So, I put it as the first thing and indeed the cable was read. It came into the Op Center and was marked all the way up to the Secretary. It went to the President who read it and was so upset that this led him to order consultation with NATO to get the first Sarajevo ultimatum which is more or less forgotten. It was an ultimatum to the Serbs in July of 1993 to turn on the utilities in Sarajevo or to face consequences. Interestingly, well, the cable was also leaked to the Washington Post where it appeared on page one as part of the story. It was leaked by a guy named Tom Brennan who worked for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance who had actually accompanied me to Banja Luka and into the prison camp which I was describing last time. It was unclassified because the work that was done by the DART team was done in a space that was not secure. If the space is not secure then you can't do any classified work there. Besides, the DART team were

U.S. government contractors, they weren't U.S. government employees. Frankly, there was nothing in the cable that needed to be classified anyhow. Well, after I'd been there about two or three weeks I got a call from Peter Tarnoff on the secure phone. His question to me was, "Peter, why did you send that cable unclassified?" I was sort of taken aback. "What are you talking about?" Then he went on to discuss this cable. "Well, frankly, I hadn't even thought about it." So, I gave the explanation and then they had a second critique about a lunch I had with the foreign minister. I had noted he had talked about Croatia's deep commitment to human rights and I had rather carefully expressed appreciation for his stated commitment to human rights and rather carefully worded this: "I see you, you praised Croatia's human rights record. Well, no, you didn't, is this correct the way you put it that you stated?" I said, "Yes." He said, "Oh, well, I guess that's no problem." I said, "Peter, now on the subject of that cable about the situation in Sarajevo, what are we going to do about it?" "Got to go, got to go." So, it was a classic case of form over substance. They were concerned that, well, it was obviously not critical of them, but something that was going to force them to act had gotten in the newspapers and so they wanted to fire some shots back over my bow.

Q: This of course is a classic case. I mean you were trying to prod the Washington group no matter what the issue is to do something and how do you gain attention and all and often it's to write something in vivid form that gets circulated around.

GALBRAITH: Oh, yes. Of course the danger of anything circulated, it would also leak although again this was unclassified. The assumption was that I had of course sent it unclassified intentionally so that it would leak. The reality of course is just the opposite. You send something unclassified, often it's never read at all.

Q: Because it doesn't have that pizzazz.

GALBRAITH: That's right.

Q: Top Secret, Eyes-Only or something like that. Well, when you're dealing with the Croatian government, was Tuđman the be-all or end-all or were there other people that you could talk to better or who were influential?

GALBRAITH: I developed at the time I was there four close contacts and they were more or less the end-all and be-all. Obviously I met many more people and worked with many more people, but the way the Croatian government actually operated in terms of these war and peace issues, there were four people that mattered and they were his defense minister, the foreign minister, and in a somewhat a lesser role, his national security advisor and other times chief of staff. I developed probably the closest genuine friendships with (inaudible) and (inaudible); those friendships remained throughout my entire tenure. With Tuđman we had very friendly relations up until the summer of '95, late summer and then it deteriorated sharply in '96. Tuđman imagined that the sympathy and support that I was expressing towards Croatia translated into a friendship for him personally. Then when I began to criticize Croatia for its own human rights violations after it took the Serb area,

he was incapable of separating the state from himself. So, the criticisms of Croatia were criticisms of him, which, of course, were aimed at him, but he couldn't disagree agreeably. These were interesting characters.

First I think a word on Tuđman. Let me give you some sketches of these characters. Tuđman, I considered to be an extremely principled man. The trouble was that his principles came from the 19th Century, not the 20th. Many of them were wrong or unacceptable, but he had a comprehensive system of beliefs about which he did not waiver at all. In some ways it was very difficult for him to engage in any guile whatsoever because his beliefs would always come through. Of course, I eventually began to be able to read him extremely well. He was in my view incapable of guile because his beliefs just came through. He was in his '70s. As a young man he'd been a partisan in the Second World War as he'd fought on Tito's side against the Croatian fascists. He had risen in the ranks, become one of Tito's youngest generals. He had gone on to do academic study at the university in Zagreb and written his Ph.D. I think in 1963. At this point he basically broke with Tito and became a Croatian nationalist. His Ph.D. was in history. He imagined himself to be a great historian and a great scholar and a real intellectual. In fact, he really had an Austro-Hungarian 19th Century mindset. He was very rigid. He believed that there were great forces of history. He also believed in the manifest destiny of Croatia. He believed, and he studied the maps, and what territory was Croatia and he had this vision of Croatia within its current boundaries, but also extending into Bosnia. He believed in greater Croatia meaning that he basically felt that about half of Bosnia really belonged to Croatia, not only Herzegovina which is almost entirely a Croat area, but central Bosnia, Sarajevo possibly, and Banja Luka which is the principal Serb town. He was always careful to point out to me that Banja Luka always looked to Zagreb, not to Belgrade. Sometimes he had a slight sense of humor and would sort of chuckle at his own jokes. When he got angry or disagreed his face just showed it. He'd clinch his fists and his teeth, that's how you could really tell how an explosion was coming. When he got angry, he often, would focus at the first thing that came into his head. Sometimes it wasn't the main point at all.

He had a great sense of his own importance. He subscribed to the notion of the congress of Vienna, to the sovereign equality of states, and therefore, he was equal to any other leader in the world including those of very large countries. Any act of lese-majeste was something that he did not appreciate. He took over one of Tito's old palaces on top of a hill, one of the hills behind Zagreb, which had several hundred acres, gardens. He used that as his presidential office which he furnished with Austro-Hungarian gold gilded furniture, wonderful oriental rugs. One of my favorite Persian rugs of animals devouring each other which I thought was really quite appropriate for the Balkans, but I'd never seen a rug quite like that. Meetings with him had a set formula. You'd come in and he would be at the end where you are. He'd come and sit on the couch. The primary guest would have the number one position. The juices would be served and then coffee. He was completely punctual, disliked it intensely when people were late – as Holbrooke invariably was. He was an interesting character. He liked to go down to Brijuni which had been Tito's summer resort. Tito spent much of the last part of his life there. He stayed on

the main island of Brijuni in one of the guest villas that Tito had built. The first time I went down to Brijuni which was in September of '93 I stayed in one of the guest villas. He went and got me a bottle of wine, from Tito's collection, from the year I was born. This was apparently a Tito tradition, which he was simply continuing. Tito would give guests a bottle of wine from the year they were born. Pamela Harriman describes being with Tito when he opened up a bottle of wine from the year Averell Harriman was born which was the year before Tito was born. They were both in their '80s then. I can only imagine how vinegary the wine was. It's not as if Brijuni produced brilliant wines. There were peacocks inside in the summer outside the presidential palace in Zagreb wandering around. He designed the uniforms for the guards, like Nixon when he had uniforms for the Secret Service.

Q: Like something out of an operetta.

GALBRAITH: It was operatic, these red and white uniforms that the presidential guards had, all of which now has been abolished. Some of the other things were aspects of what he did when his character were better. He was very keen on Croatian national symbols. He had lots of people in their folk costumes appear with their traditional weapons as parts of guards and it was charming and perhaps a revival of old tradition. There was some promotion of Croatian theater and arts. Some of it again had comic opera qualities to it, but others were better than that. I think one of the funnier episodes with him was on his 75th birthday, which was in May of '97. There was a special performance in the Zagreb Opera House, a lovely building, a similar design to the Vienna Opera House. The permanent five ambassadors plus Germany were invited. Even though I was the longest serving ambassador at that time, I wasn't the smartest because none of the others came with their wives. They somehow figured out what was going on. I came with my wife – we were not tool long married – and it was a play in Tuđman's honor of the 1,000 years of Croatian history. Different Croatian poets and historical figures of the previous 1,000 years spoke in anticipation of Tuđman arriving on the scene. Then the last 20 minutes they rolled out about 20 different television sets and had Tuđman's speeches. I titled the cable on the event, Ruritania Redux or something. This was the character. I said of Tuđman that he believed in greater great Croatia. I think he was the only Croat who believed in that.

The defense minister, Gojko Šušak, was from Herzegovina and he believed in little great Croatia meaning Croatia within its existing borders plus Herzegovina. and I think he might have been willing to compromise even some on Herzegovina as long as it included Široko Brijeg where he was from. He was quite a fascinating character. He was the youngest of 15 children of his mother. He was born posthumously after his father had died in May of 1945. His father had been murdered, killed by the partisans in February of 1945, because the family had supported the Croatian fascist regime. His oldest brother was captured in Zagreb when the fascist regime fell on May 8th of 1945 and was thrown out of a window and killed. Šušak was as tough as nails, grew up in Herzegovina. He declined to be drafted into the Yugoslav army, escaped walking across the border. In 1962, he made his way to Canada where he went to work and founded a pizza business

and so he became known, I never called him this, but Holbrooke and others used to refer to him as the pizza man. He was quite a successful businessman. Šušak was a great tennis player, and this was and this is where he bonded with people. He had a very rigid schedule for playing tennis. It was Saturday mornings and Wednesday nights from nine until midnight or something. I once played with him, I'm terrible at tennis. Needless to say, we lost. He was very competitive. The wonderful thing of course about him was that he understood North America and he could talk to Americans in our own language, in our own idiom. He understood what we were concerned about even if he was extremely nationalist or right wing. I think many people would say he was the most far right person in the government. On the issue of Herzegovina, when it came to Canadian politics, for example, he actually supported the liberals. He was a chain smoker and a heavy coffee drinker. Often he was seen to be in great pain which he thought was from his back. Eventually Holbrooke got him to go to get a medical exam in Europe and they found that he had lung cancer. Then he was operated on in the United States and died in early 1998 of lung cancer. Almost certainly had he lived he would have been indicted by the Hague war crimes tribunal. We spent lots of time together. We often had meals.

Q: You had two major issues, one was?

GALBRAITH: Sarajevo.

Q: Sarajevo and we really haven't gotten into that yet.

GALBRAITH: And the Muslim Croat war.

Q: And the Muslim Croat war, but we're talking, you mentioned you had four contacts.

GALBRAITH: Yes, I described Tuđman and Šušak. Granić, the foreign minister, for next time, and the chief of staff and national security advisor.

Q: When you first arrived what was the role of the German embassy. Because they were sort of instrumental in getting Croatia recognized and then also the British and many others were involved in that.

GALBRAITH: Yes, I'll be happy to talk about all those things of course.

Q: Then as developments go on. Great.

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Okay, today is January 10, 2002. Peter, well, let's continue. You were talking about Granić?

GALBRAITH: Mate Granić, he was the foreign minister of Croatia from 1993. I think actually he took office about a month before I arrived and he continued in the capacity

until January of 2000 when he ran for president of Croatia to succeed Tuđman who had died in December of 1999. He ended up finishing third in a three-man race. Granić was a medical doctor, approximately my age, maybe a year or two older, a kidney specialist actually, who had gone into politics only with the independence of Croatia. He had served as minister for refugee affairs where he had met Dick Holbrooke, in 1992. He was a very low-key, extremely nice man. He spoke good English, but not the fluent English that defense minister Šušak spoke. I suppose he was my most frequent contact. Somewhat later the foreign ministry moved from a location on the hill in the old town to the park where the embassy was located. I could literally just walk around the park and he and I would do this all the time. Granić was clearly more liberal than Tuđman. He did not share Tuđman's ambitions for a greater Croatia at the expense of Bosnia. Tuđman was basically the only Croatian leader who believed in greater great Croatia that is believed in the partition of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia and basically he would have drawn a north south line down the middle of Bosnia. He would annex to Croatia almost purely Croat areas of Herzegovina, but then leave the rest of Bosnia to whatever scheme. Granić by contrast didn't favor a greater Croatia in his personal views. He believed Croatia ought to stay within its internationally recognized boundaries, both as a tactical matter and I think as a matter of conviction. He came from the Dalmatia Coast from the town called Baška Voda near Makarska. He prided himself on his connection with the sea and particularly on the fact that he could hold his breath longer than anybody. The people of Dalmatia considered those of Herzegovina to be backward, reactionary, unenlightened. Indeed Herzegovina was the center of the Croatian fascist movement during the Second World War. So, Granić was a different personality from Tuđman by background.

Granić also had a kind of interesting relationship with Šušak. He would refer to the defense minister as the boss, but there was chemistry between the two of them. They used to play tennis together. I never had the sense that Šušak had a personally close relationship with Granić and yet Granić did have influence with him. When Granić committed himself to do something he generally could get Šušak to do this and this was most dramatic when we were trying to negotiate into the 1994 Muslim Croat war as I will discuss with you later. Granić didn't fully trust Tuđman and his circle. On a couple of occasions, when there was a sensitive conversation, he would turn up CNN in his office or he would talk in a very low voice or otherwise indicate that he was concerned that his own office was being bugged. In spite of that, and in spite of the obvious concerns that he had, he was influential.

Q: Did you have a feeling that he was both influential, but also, trying to put a more positive face on this government of Tuđman which really didn't come out you know, I mean, when one looked at it at all closely, the public felt it wasn't, Tuđman didn't say the right things.

GALBRAITH: There is no question that Mate Granić was the more presentable face of the Tuđman government, but that also reflected a reality which is that he was a genuinely a more presentable and decent and liberal person. I often said this at the time. My final major contact was Hrvoje Šarinić. He came from Rijeka adjacent to the Istrian Peninsula.

Rijeka was a social democratic stronghold the place that Tuđman's party did least well. Šarinić himself had been in exile and had spent much of his life in France. He spoke English with a very pronounced French accent. I never quite got the full story from him, but I think that his father was involved with the fascists in the Second World War, perhaps as some kind of local official, and may have been punished for having had those connections. Again, I'm not entirely sure of those facts, but it was alluded to and I suppose he was in his '60s. So, if you look at those four contacts it's kind of an interesting mix.

Q: What was Šarinić's role?

GALBRAITH: He was the at various times the national security advisor to Tuđman and his chief of staff. When he was the chief of staff he had an office on the same level as Tuđman's private office in this villa at the top of the hills behind Zagreb that had been a Tito villa. So, if Tuđman had had Tito's bedroom suite, Šarinić had the second as an office, Šarinić had the sort of the second suite. If you look at the four of them, it's kind of interesting. Granić and Tuđman had stayed in Croatia. Tuđman, of course, having been a dissident in the later Tito period and imprisoned, Granić essentially non-political. Šarinić and Šušak both having been abroad and both having connections to the Croatian fascist movement. Tuđman having been a partisan and the group also coming from four different areas of Croatia. Tuđman from the Zagoria the region around Zagreb the kind of heartland, Šarinić from the Rijeka near the edge of the Istrian Peninsula, Granić from Dalmatia and Šušak from Herzegovina.

They were collectively I think a very solid national security team and they served Croatia well in terms of being effective. I mean one can disagree with the direction it took or wanted to take, and of course I did. But I think Tuđman was an effective leader. He had a commanding presence. He set the agenda. He made the decisions. His decisions were largely respected yet he had a wide enough circle of people that could actually carry out decisions. These were people who had an independent existence who could talk to him and to whom he delegated autonomy. He would delegate the business of negotiating with the United States, negotiating peace agreements to Granić. Granić would check with Tuđman, but Granić felt able to enter into commitments and with the sufficient understanding of where Tuđman would come out, that he could speak to Tuđman. Incidentally, there was also a reasonably talented group of people on the economic side of the house as well.

When I arrived Croatia was in a real strategic bind. A third of its territory was occupied by rebel Serbs. There seemed to be no prospect of regaining that territory. In Bosnia, the Bosnian Croats were in a war with the Muslims who had been their allies the previous year. A lot of people missed this, including in Washington, but the Bosnian Croats were losing. So, Croatia was having to put more and more of its own troops into Bosnia to help the Bosnian Croats and yet by so doing they were risking having the United States and other countries take action against Croatia including sanctions. In short, they risked becoming more isolated, more like Serbia. While Serbia always had the option which

Milosevic eventually exercised of giving up the territory of Bosnia and Croatia, withdrawing; then there was still Serbia, Croatia couldn't do that because it would still have the problem of Croatian territory being occupied by Serbia. They were in a bind. Another contrast is that in Serbia the Serbs saw themselves as victims. The war of the Bosnian Serbs was reasonably popular.

By contrast, the Croatia war in Bosnia was unpopular with the Croatian public. By and large the Croatian public did not agree with the idea of a greater Croatia, either the big Croatia or the little greater Croatia. The political opposition was more liberal, more internationalist, more respecting of Bosnia sovereignty than Tuđman. So, Tuđman represented the right wing of the spectrum. That too put Croatia in a dilemma. Not only was its side losing in Bosnia not only with a third of its territory occupied by rebel Serbs, but the government's policies were being attacked by the opposition and were increasingly unpopular. When I arrived I quickly saw that there were a couple of things to focus on. I tended to focus on relatively few issues and to some degree give much less attention than one would in more normal circumstances to the full range of issues that an ambassador should be concerned with.

For example from the beginning I told Tom Mittnacht who was the economics officer that the overwhelming interest was in ending the war. If one was to create an environment in Croatia conducive for American business investment, the war had to end first. Therefore, he, Tom, was going to work largely on political issues, not economic issues. Like so many of the people on the staff, he adapted and made a very good contribution. I think he actually enjoyed the different kind of work.

Anyhow, the first couple of issues that I was focused on were Sarajevo and the Muslim-Croat war. I got there and was confronted with the dramatically deteriorating humanitarian situation in Sarajevo. Although there was an ambassador to Bosnia, there was no embassy in Bosnia, so, effectively, much of the Bosnia operations for the United States in the period '93 to '95, but particularly '93 to '94 were run out of the embassy in Zagreb. We had responsibility for all consular affairs relating to Bosnia. We had responsibility for refugee programs. There were a large number of refugees who were being taken care of in Croatia who wanted to come to the United States. We did the basic liaison with the American journalists. The way you got into Bosnia was through Zagreb and many of them were based in Zagreb. The United Nations mission to Bosnia was headquartered in Zagreb, and the UN of course was interacting with the various parties in Bosnia. So, if we wanted to interact with the parties we often had to do it through the UN because there was no U.S. mission in Bosnia. The U.S. humanitarian relief team, disaster assistance relief team for the entire former Yugoslavia was based in our embassy in Zagreb. Bosnian government officials, when they got out of Bosnia, they did so out of Sarajevo. They did so on UN airplanes that flew to Zagreb so they would always spend a day in Zagreb at least before they went in or when they went out and almost always I would see them. Typically, I mean, my most regular contact among the Bosnians was the foreign minister and then the Prime Minister, Haris Silajdžić, who became a very close friend.

Q: Were we keeping book on what was happening for a future war crimes trial?

GALBRAITH: Yes, we were, yes. The more immediate problem was that it was going to increase the pressure for sanctions on Croatia and also make it less likely to have an end to the war. As long as this war continued the plight of the Bosnian Muslims of course was much worse. They were fighting two enemies at once. The previous Muslim-Croat alliance had been unable together to stand up against the Serb military action. To me this process had a number of stages: first, to end the Croat atrocities against the Muslims; second, to end the Muslim-Croat war; third, to get an alliance between the Muslims and the Croats; fourth, to assist that alliance in resisting Serbian aggression and possibly rolling back Serbian gains. If you got the Serbian military position either stabilized or some of the gains reversed, you could get to a peace settlement. This would be based on internationally accepted principles specifically preserving the integrity of Bosnia Herzegovina and, secondly, the right of refugees to return to their homes and to live there securely. The two essential conditions in my view for peace. Or, in the alternative, ultimately you could see a complete Serbian defeat and a legitimate government of Bosnia would be in charge, but the prospect for any settlement was remote as long as the Muslim-Croat war continued.

Q: Where was the Muslim-Croat war going on?

GALBRAITH: It was going on in several places. It was going on in Herzegovina and where Bosnia meets with Herzegovina. It was also going on in central Bosnia, the Lašva Valley where by summer, fall of '93 and going to winter of '93 the Croatians were losing ground. There were also Croatian advances elsewhere and in the territory the Croatians held they were brutally ethnically cleansing the Muslim population.

Q: In what form?

GALBRAITH: Well, they would go into Muslim villages or the Muslim part of villages, the mixed villages. They would shell the villages, they would burn houses, execute people. In April, 1993, there had been a massacre in which more than 100 civilians were murdered, including children, women burned in their homes. One of the women who survived the attack describes covering up her small child's eyes so that the child wouldn't see that the man who was killing them was a neighbor. That was the nature of it. In addition, in the summer of '93, the Bosnian Croats had rounded up and placed in prison camps Bosnian Muslim men and some women. Many of these men had fought in the HPO, that is with the Bosnian-Croat military, but were no longer considered trustworthy after the Muslim-Croat war had broken out. Some of those camps had quite appalling conditions. Those camps became the initial focus of our activity and what I did was to try to get people into the camps. I pushed Granić to agree to let our people in. When they got in I would use the information they obtained to complain about the conditions in the camps and to try and force the Croatian government to take action to release the Bosnian Muslim prisoners and to close down the camps. That strategy was successful. Here

Granić was a major ally. I mean he didn't like the camps. He knew the damage they were doing to Croatia's reputation. He prided himself on his previous work as the minister for refugees who had taken care of all the Bosnian Muslim refugees in '92 as a humanitarian. I think he was a humanitarian. So, he and I became allies. He would assist us in getting access to the camps. He welcomed the complaints that I would make and the threats that had been contained in official demarches because then he could go to his boss and say, "you've got to take action to close the camps, otherwise we're going to face sanctions from the Americans."

Q: What support were you getting from the State Department and other parts of our government?

GALBRAITH: At the working level, from the desk, from people in INR, from the office director level and so on, lots of support. They were excited that somebody in the administration was doing something. At the higher levels I think there wasn't much awareness of what was going on. I think they were focused on the impossibility of doing anything in Bosnia. They were so focused on what was happening in Sarajevo. They saw the Serbian-Muslim war, the larger Muslim-Croat war. These humanitarian issues and the conditions of the camps were not a big part of the equation except as they provided ammunition for people who just wanted to impose sanctions on Croatia. As I said, all bad news was unwelcome. Also, Steve Oxman was the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe. He was a political appointee who had served in policy planning in the Carter administration, and he was one of the most hopeless and incompetent figures.

Q: Just out of his league? Was this a routine sort of political appointment?

GALBRAITH: Completely out of his league. He had a lot of experience, but he was more academic. He didn't know how to run things. Then the structure of the bureau wasn't working. Steve had no idea that it wasn't working. It was totally nonfunctional and Steve Oxman didn't have a clue. He was Assistant Secretary for nearly a year and in that year he never visited Bosnia, Croatia or Serbia – the number one issue on his plate and he never went there nor did any deputy assistant secretary come out. I think the highest level visit we had was an office director, maybe a deputy office director. I used to refer to the bureau in those days as the home alone bureau, which to some degree suited me fine. I had strong support from the desk, which generated demarches. Those were helpful to me because I could take them to the Croatians to push them to take action: first to end atrocities in Bosnia, second to end the Muslim-Croat war.

Q: Well, did you get the feeling that Clinton and his National Security Advisor, Tony Lake, just wanted it to go away?

GALBRAITH: Well, in the 1992 campaign, Clinton had sharply criticized the Bush administration for inaction in the face of genocide. I don't think, however, the Balkans were a personal priority for Tony Lake or for Warren Christopher. I guess here I'd say this is where personalities matter. If there had been a different selection for Secretary of State

or National Security Advisor maybe there would have been more oomph behind it. For Warren Christopher, it seemed to me that his priority was the unfinished business in the Middle East. He wanted to pick up where he had left off in 1981. Tony Lake had a global agenda. Russian loomed large on his agenda, but when he got away from the main strategic issues like Russia and China, he was interested in the developing world. He had a particular interest in Africa and then problems like Haiti loomed large on his radar screen.

Second, and most important, what was possible in '91 and '92 was no longer possible in '93. Once the UN had deployed extensively to Bosnia, it wasn't possible easily to do the lift and strike policy – lift the arms embargo and strike at the Serbs forces attacking Bosnia cities for a number of reasons. First, the European allies would object because they actually had troops on the ground. Their concern, which I think was well founded, was that if NATO were striking at the Serbs or arming the Bosnians, these UN peacekeepers would no longer be seen as neutral. The way the Serbs would get back at them would be to strike them, to attack them.

Second, even if you cared about the humanitarian issues in Bosnia, there was a danger: before the weapons that could come in from lifting the arms embargo would be effective, the Serb forces would throw everything they could to grab as much territory as possible. They would try to take the enclaves as in fact they did in '95 and maybe even Sarajevo might have fallen before an effective lift policy could have been implemented. Finally, because the Europeans were there, if we were to lift and strike unilaterally, U.S. forces would have to extract the European peacekeepers. That would have had Clinton deploying U.S. military into the middle of a hot war where everybody was saying Bosnia, the former Yugoslavia, is a death trap, the Serb forces or fighters are all ten feet tall. Clinton came in with very lousy relations with the military. They didn't trust him. They didn't feel that he understood them. They felt he was a draft dodger. So, he was reluctant to deploy military forces against the advice of Colin Powell and the other military commanders. So, all in all, I think it was understandable why the administration couldn't implement what they had proposed to do in the campaign. The other major element in this picture was the Muslim-Croat war. Because of the Muslim-Croat war there was no access to the government-controlled part of Bosnia. The only way you could reach Sarajevo and central Bosnia was through Serbia. Obviously you couldn't do that or go through Croatia as long as there was a Muslim-Croat war.

Q: How were you all seeing UN action in that area in Bosnia?

GALBRAITH: The United Nations?

Q: Yes.

GALBRAITH: My view was that the United Nations did heroic work. You had lightly armed peacekeepers employed in the middle of a war. Quite a number got killed. They did manage to facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and kept the

airport open for much of the time. During the Muslim-Croat war they facilitated access of convoys through Croatia territory to central Bosnia. But, it was a very difficult mission. The resources were inadequate to it and the leadership was appalled with that. This certainly included the special representative of the secretary general, a Japanese official who had been reasonably successful in the Cambodian operation. He was a career UN person, but he could not understand that Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslavia, was not a traditional UN peacekeeper task. So, he imagined that the United Nations had to be neutral. In fact, the UN wasn't neutral. The UN had clearly identified an oppressor and had imposed sanctions on the oppressor. The UN's unwillingness to authorize the use of force, even when NATO was ready to use force, was the darkest day. I think everybody bears responsibility for that, including the United States. The UN leadership failed to authorize military action when it was requested by the Dutch commander. Then, of course, the Dutch behaved poorly, not putting up any resistance and then being very meek as the Serbs separated the men from the women and sent the men to their deaths. There were many shortcomings to the UN.

Q: As you were watching these developments, what was happening in the international community in Zagreb? I'm thinking about the German and the British missions there, too. Were they taking any part?

GALBRAITH: I think one of the great myths of the former Yugoslavia was that the Germans were the major power. That wasn't true. German influence was a fraction of ours. They did not have a very dynamic ambassador and their embassy was smaller than ours. They didn't have the staff. Partly it was the constraints of the EU system. The totality of the European presence was less than the sum of its parts. The Germans had done what the Croatians had wanted in '91. They had secured international recognition, but the Germans didn't have either the will or the military resources that the United States did. So, when the Croatians looked for somebody to rescue them, they knew that that rescuer wouldn't be Germany. They knew the only country that was capable of rescuing them was the United States. That led, to what I at the time referred to as the voice of God phenomena. Whenever I would go to see Granić and read demarches some of which had very strong language, complaining about Croatian behavior, he never got angry. The response was always, "Oh, yes, well, we recognize that there are problems. We're trying to correct them. We just haven't been able to do so. We'll try to do better." It wasn't necessarily that they agreed with what I had to say. They did not want to antagonize the one country that could make their situation impossible by supporting sanctions. They also didn't want to alienate the one country whose active involvement in trying to get a solution could rescue them. So, it was something like the voice of God. You may not agree with the instructions that God is giving you, but you don't argue back. You say, oh, yes, I'll try to reform. The mind wants to do what you say, but you know the temptations of the flesh. It was that kind of phenomenon in those years.

Q: Did you get any sampling when you first arrived of the European attitude. The EU attitude that you Americans stand aside, this is a European problem and we'll take care of it or had that dissipated by that time?

GALBRAITH: That was gone, that was 1992. '91, in fact even more '91. I think the Europeans were really very happy to have an American ambassador in Zagreb, to have that voice in the diplomatic community. Eventually, I think they may have come to feel that we were playing too large a role, that we were, acting too much on our own and became envious of our access and of our clout.

Q: With the EU system, there is no way for them to take off and do much was there?

GALBRAITH: That was exactly right.

Q: You had the Bosnian Muslim war going on, but you also had the siege of Sarajevo going on at the same time which was essentially Serbian versus Bosnian. One of the imperatives was what are we going to do about these poor Bosnians who don't have military supplies. The Serbs, you know, we put the sanctions on, but the Serbs had more guns than they needed and more ammunition than they needed and so it was very one-sided. Was there any effort made to do something to help the Muslims while you were there?

GALBRAITH: Well, there were many people who believed that the arms embargo, which was UN resolution 713 passed in September of 1991, was a bad policy or even immoral. The government of Yugoslavia, which was dominated by Serbia at that time and I guess it still is, basically welcomed 713. The idea behind 713 is that there's a war, you don't allow arms to go in, but of course the Yugoslav army, the Serbian army, had all the weapons. So, the effect of 713 was to freeze their advantage leaving the Slovenians the Croatians, and the Bosnians largely unarmed. All of these countries, Slovenians, the Croatians in Bosnia began a process of smuggling weapons in ever larger numbers. Mostly these were weapons that they acquired on the black market from Eastern Europeans and Russia. When the Muslim-Croat war broke out in the end of '92, the Croatians were able to block weapons going to the Bosnians and the Bosnians were effectively surrounded. This was another urgent issue in the Muslim-Croat war. Ending it would enable the Bosnians to gain access to weapons and to enhance their ability to defend themselves.

Q: We're up to the point where Sarajevo is under siege and you're sort of a center for humanitarian efforts there and you have the Muslim-Croat war. So, what happened?

GALBRAITH: There were a number of steps as I've already indicated. Part of it was working through Granić who welcomed our firsthand reports of what was going on inside the camps, firsthand reports on the atrocities because then he could use them to push for policy change. In July I guess it must have been toward the middle or end of July.

Q: July of which year?

GALBRAITH: '93. My first month there. I got word that the leader of the Bosnian Croats wanted to see me in Split on the Dalmatia Coast. So, I went and saw him. We met at the

Croatian naval headquarters in Split. He had followed carefully my public statements, which had been very supportive of Croatia's territorial integrity. That statement had captured public imagination. People were very excited that an American diplomat, that in fact any westerner, was taking the time to go to the front lines to see how people were suffering. It was being sympathetic, which it was easy to be. So the Bosnian Croat imagined that I would be sympathetic to his cause. It was quite an interesting meeting. It lasted for two to three hours. He began by saying how wonderful I was. Finally there was an ambassador who understood the Croatian cause. Then he wanted to explain the entire justice of the Bosnian Croat cause and how they had a right to have their own republic carved out of Bosnia and so on. I let him go on for about an hour. Then I said, well, now, let me say a few things. We support the territorial integrity of Bosnia Herzegovina as a single country. We do not support Bosnian Croatia to be a separate republic and, furthermore, your behavior is atrocious. You're holding more than 5,000 Muslims as prisoners. I've had people in those camps. We know what's happening. Here's what's happening. This behavior is beyond the pale of the civilized world. Frankly, it could constitute war crimes and we're going to hold you liable. He was really taken aback and shocked. The meeting ended conclusively. The next day he called me to say that they were going to release 5,000 prisoners and they did. By the end of that summer we got all the prisoners released.

Q: Where did they go?

GALBRAITH: Some came to Croatia as refugees, others went to Muslim controlled parts of Bosnia.

Q: Well, I take it that there was this difference between the Herzegovina Croatians and the rest of Croatia. So, if you were a Muslim refugee, if you get away from these, essentially from the hillbillies, down to the cultivated fields and all, you were probably all right.

GALBRAITH: Oh, for sure, yes. Once you got to Croatia and you became a registered refugee in Croatia you were fine.

Q: Muslim, or what, it didn't make any difference?

GALBRAITH: Beg your pardon?

Q: If you were a Muslim, it didn't make any difference?

GALBRAITH: You did much better if you were a Croat, but I mean if you were a Muslim, if you had relatives to stay with as many did, you could go there. Many of them had weekend houses on the Croatian coast. If you didn't have any of those connections, there were refugee camps you could go to. These were not closed camps, these were places people lived and they could go back and forth. They were in Slovenia and on the coast.

Q: Well, then how did things develop?

GALBRAITH: Well, in September of ’93, the Croatians called me, the German ambassador and the Turkish ambassador and he announced a surprise. The Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims had agreed to form a federation and that that federation would be confederated with Croatia. So, this then was the key to ending the Muslim-Croat war. I then hosted a series of dinners at my house night after night. This would be a few days later, between Granić and Haris Silajdžić who I think was still foreign minister, but just about to become prime minister or maybe already prime minister of Bosnia to try and implement this agreement. The trouble was that during the day, in the Croatian foreign ministry, the delegation for Bosnia and the delegation for Croatia would get together and they would try to work out some of the details and they couldn’t reach an agreement. Then I would have them at dinner. The two ministers basically could reach some agreement in principal and I would press them to do this and talk through the details. Then the next day when their staffs began to work at it, it kind of would fall apart. Then there was a massacre again of Muslims by the Bosnian Croats and the Muslims were very upset by that understandably. They blamed the Croatians of Croatia and that helped poison the atmosphere.

The real importance of all of this exercise was that it showed what was possible. There were a series of peace plans for Bosnia put forward by Cyrus Vance, the former American Secretary of State who was the UN mediator and, initially, David Owen who represented the European Union, the UN and the European Union, the chairman of something called the International Conference for the Former Yugoslavia. This was the umbrella organization to try and bring peace and which was operating, I guess in ‘91, ‘92 and ‘93 and it wound up in ‘95, but it played a role in the ultimate peace settlement. At this time these were the two mediators. Vance had withdrawn in ‘93 and he’d been replaced by Norwegian foreign minister and former defense minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg. At that point Owen then had become the dominant partner which was a very unfortunate thing. It was the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. The Vance-Owen plan had envisioned that Bosnia would become divided into ten different cantons on the Swiss model, some with a Serbian majority, some with a Croat majority and some with a Muslim majority. The Owen-Stoltenberg plan envisioned that Bosnia would consist of three republics: a Serbian republic, a Muslim republic and a Croat republic. The Muslim-Croat war, basically one of its origins was the desire of the Croats to seize and ethnically cleanse the territory on the map that was allocated to the Croat republic. Although the Croats were 17 percent of the population, actually probably less, the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans gave them about 30 percent of Bosnia. The Serbs got 49 percent and the Muslims got the rest, 21 percent even they were 44 percent of the population. So, that basically the Croats were trying to bring the Owen-Stoltenberg plan into reality by seizing the territory on the map. This was one of the triggers of the Muslim-Croat war.

What this surprise in September and in these subsequent meetings with Silajdžić and Granić at my house indicated is that that formula, which was a formula for war, could be

overturned. The Croats were prepared to give up on the idea of a separate Croat republic, agree to the federation with the Muslims. I cabled all this back in a NODIS (no distribution) cable to the State Department.

Q: When you say a confederation with the Muslims, you're talking about within the Bosnian confines?

GALBRAITH: A federation of the Muslims and the Croats within the borders of the internationally recognized state of Bosnia Herzegovina.

Q: Yes, we're not talking about Croatia itself.

GALBRAITH: In a confederal relationship with Croatia, whatever that meant. I can tell you that that formula was the basis of the final peace settlement of Dayton. Dayton has a two entity settlement: the Muslim-Croat federation and the Serbian republic within a single Bosnia Herzegovina. Each state, each entity, that is the Muslim Croat federation on the one hand, the Serbian republic on the other having the right to have special links with neighboring states, i.e., the federation with Croatia, the Serbian republic of Bosnia being able to have special links with Serbia. Now, fortunately, in the time since all this emerged in '93 and even since it was agreed in Dayton in '95, those special links, the importance of them had much diminished. The Croatians said, we aren't really interested in special links with the federation. We want measures that unite the two parts of Bosnia and these special links are less important to the new Serbian government as well. At the time, this linkage to Croatia was a key element of the package. Much of our diplomacy from '93 on was to emphasize the part we liked – the federation – and to de-emphasize the confederation.

Q: When you heard this what was the initial reaction?

GALBRAITH: The German ambassador, well, all three of us were very positive about it. I thought it was quite a dramatic breakthrough. I had questions as to whether it would actually be achieved: maybe I was not as skeptical as I should have been. I was only at the beginning of my experience in the Balkans where grand statements and proposals are put forward and then nothing actually is done. Again, what was critical about that meeting was that it provided a road map as to how to go forward.

Just before this in early September Tuđman invited me to come down to Brijuni, a group of about 16 islands in Archipelago off the coast of Istria. Tito had had his own personal residence there and toward the end of his life he spent about half of his time.

Q: Any leader who went to Yugoslavia usually ended up in Brijuni.

GALBRAITH: That's exactly right. A beautiful place, I mean the main island is manicured lawns, cedar trees. Tito had his own private zoo. Foreign leaders knew particularly to come and bring in exotic animals. By the time I was there, there were only

aging elephants left or whatever, giraffes. There were lots of deer, and off of Brijuni, big grand Brijuni, was a little island where Tito had his own private house. It was a stone house. Tuđman took me over there on a number of occasions. It was very interesting to see the decor in the Tito house. I described it as gift dictator decor. So, he had one room done in wood paneling. It was Indonesian wood, the national symbol, a gift of Sukarno. There were dead leopards, you know, their skulls with the mouths open. That was from various African leaders. All the gifts were the decor. I also noted that the expense of the gift was inversely related to the wealth of the country and its degree of democracy. He had a picture or photographs of Canada autographed by Pierre Trudeau and a whole room of furniture from some poor country. Anyhow, I went down there for the first time in September. Tuđman didn't stay in Tito's villa. He stayed in what had been one of Tito's guesthouses on the main island. I spent a lot of time talking to Tuđman one on one. What was very interesting about it is that some of his key people particularly who had been his allies, but who were about to break with him, came to me and said, he won't listen to us, you've got to talk to him about Bosnia. I spent many hours with him basically explaining that the United States would insist that Croatia respect the international borders of Bosnia. Croatia had to respect it as a separate country and ultimately convincing him that if he were to accept this, that the United States could become a partner of Croatia. We could support Croatia's integration into the West and that we would support Croatia's desire to get to recover its national territory. During the summer of '93, at some point, I was seeing him twice a day. I think this persuaded him that he could make at least a tactical decision to give up on the idea of a separate Croat republic in Bosnia, to give up on carving up Bosnia at least for the time being. There would be significant benefits the main one being this partnership with the United States. That's basically what began to fall in place in the autumn of '93.

Q: Did the State Department play much of a role in this?

GALBRAITH: Well, by this time they were beginning to play a larger role. Reggie Bartholomew had been named the special envoy for Bosnia. I think it was started in the Clinton administration, he had accomplished nothing, and he had been nominated ambassador to Italy. Chuck Redman, who had been the press spokesman in the Reagan period and ambassador to Sweden, was named the special envoy and at this point, he was sort of reading into the issue. After I sent the cable in about the Tuđman proposal for the federation and confederation, this grabbed his imagination.

Q: Redman's?

GALBRAITH: Redman's. He decided to come out. He and I spent time talking about it and we went up to see Tuđman and talked through these issues. This was really the beginning of the State Department engagement on a path that ultimately led to the solution two years later. Redman also recognized that Oxman was a very weak person. He felt confident to take over the policy, to deal directly with Warren Christopher. I think that put things on track. Christopher worried that the U.S. might be getting too involved. At the same time, I was doing a large number of things including hosting these Silajdžić-

Granić meetings, pushing the idea of a federation, seeking movement. Redman would be on the phone with Christopher who would be worrying about us sending a signal of too much closeness. I was reporting every one of my meetings, but the cables from the ambassador, the reports on these negotiations, basically weren't being read. So, while Christopher was worried about us not getting too involved, in fact I was going ahead and doing things. To be honest, the reports weren't being read and so nobody told me not to do it.

Q: Well, how long did this negotiation period last?

GALBRAITH: It was about three or four days at the end of September and then October, November, December, it became a matter of increasing pressure on the Croatians to give up on the idea of a separate republic. I mean Tuđman had put this idea on the table in September, but then began to fall off of it. I guess I was away in October and I came back to do things like pack up my house and all the kinds of business that you need to do if you're going to move abroad for an unspecified period of time. Came back in November. Again went down to Brijuni along with a diplomatic corps, Tuđman's. He invited the entire diplomatic corps down to pick oranges on Bonga, his Tito island, which was given to orphans, war orphans. It was also an occasion for me and this time I enlisted the Vatican, the nuncio and the German ambassador. We sort of did a little three on one with Tuđman to try and push it more along this line.

In January of '94 there was another very important meeting. The Bosnian, it turned out that the Bosnian Croats were not really united. The Herzegovinians had one line under Mate Boban, these were the extreme nationalists. There were other Bosnian Croats who had a different perspective particularly those from a region in the north of Bosnia just across the Sava River from Croatia who realized that in the partition, if Bosnia was partitioned, they were never going to recover the area that had been taken over by the Serbs. So, they were much more interested in a unified Bosnia and then there were the Sarajevo Croats and some of the central Bosnia Croats who also were interested in a multiethnic solution because they felt they would have no role in Sarajevo if there was a partition. Sarajevo wasn't going to be part of any Croat republic and that there would be isolated pockets that couldn't long survive in central Bosnia.

There were two councils, one of the Posavina Croats and another of all the Bosnian Croats but in Sarajevo and they came up with a plan, which they brought to me, the Posavina Croats brought it first which involved creating cantons. They had maps of the cantons. Some Muslim, some Croat and some mixed cantons, half Muslim, half Croat. They had a map. So, this was a way to make more concrete the idea of the federation of the Muslim Croat federation. The parts of Bosnia that were in the federation were those parts that under the 1991 census either Muslims or Croats had been a plurality. So, it was about 60 percent of Bosnia. It was a very sensible solution. Redman, I sent a cable in and sent the map in and Redman I think also, liked this map very much.

A second thing that happened that was a major focus of my effort from September of '91

on was to get rid of Mate Boban as the leader of the Bosnian Croats. I didn't like him much. He was a squat man, very unpolished, aggressive and very, very rigid, very ideological. It was clear and also he was much hated by the Muslims who blamed him, rightly, for the atrocities. I could also detect that Tuđman was beginning to see him as a liability. So, I figured I would do everything I could to make that liability part of the equation higher. In September of '91 I was interviewed by the BBC.

Q: In '91?

GALBRAITH: I said '91, '93. I'm getting tired, sorry, September of '93. I was interviewed by the BBC and basically said that Mate Boban might be guilty of war crimes. Interestingly, and this to me was a signal of where things were going, the Croatian press which was most of it was government controlled, ran my comments on page one. That was to me a signal that they really were receptive to pressure to get rid of Boban. Boban, incidentally, called me up and said that after what I'd said, he was no longer going to be my friend which I didn't think was one of life's great losses. I kept pressing Granić and Tuđman that he had to go, that he was responsible for the atrocities and then in January, no in December Granić called me and said do you think I could get a visa for Boban to go to the United States. That put me on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand it was a major goal of mine to get rid of him.

Q: To get rid of him, yes.

GALBRAITH: On the other hand, it was a question of whether the United States should be admitting people who we thought might be war criminals. I talked this over with Dennis Hearne at the consul and we agreed that we wouldn't give him a visa, but beyond that we entered him into the system as somebody to be rejected with a coding for war criminals. I didn't give, I took my time getting back to Granić and eventually I told him that we couldn't accept him. Then in January Granić called me over and explained that Boban was going to be going on a long vacation. He was replaced by a lawyer named Krešimir Zubak as the head of the Bosnian Croats and frankly that changed the dynamic and made possible the next stage, which was the negotiations to actually form the federation. Here Redman basically came up with a plan although I had a certain amount of input particularly on the issue of what incentives Croatia would need to accept the plan. Redman came, I think it was on Thursday, the 17th of February of '94. We went up to see Tuđman and he laid out a U.S. plan which was that if Croatia would accept a federation in Bosnia of Muslims and Croats then the United States would provide all sorts of benefits to Croatia including Croatia integration into the West. Tuđman sort of looked at Redman and said I accept your proposal and went on at some length. Then he said, "I accept your proposal except for one thing. If the Serbs have their own republic, then the Croats have to have their own republic." Well, it was like saying, I'll take all the benefits, but I won't pay any of the price. Redman was quite dispirited and I said to him, he had to go to Athens to brief the European Union. So, I said, "Don't come back. Let's wait and see." I went to Granić and talked to him privately and told him how upset we were with Tuđman's reaction. He said, "Just wait." Over the weekend he worked on Tuđman, got

him to turn around and when Redman came back the following Tuesday, Tuđman had accepted.

The other thing that had happened. There are two other elements to this story I need to bring into it. At the beginning of February, we had given the Croatians I guess it was a presidential statement in the Security Council, given the Croatians two weeks to withdraw their troops from Bosnia, otherwise they would risk sanctions. So, they were operating on a two-week deadline. On this I guess it was the same Thursday that Redman presented the plan. I had a speech scheduled. It was the second major speech I was giving in Croatia. The first one basically was the usual diplomatic niceties. This one I was determined to use the occasion to explain our policy, to explain the deal, to explain the consequences for Croatia if it didn't cooperate and I did that. I think the speech got huge coverage and caused a lot of shock and it was that Friday that Tuđman ordered Granić to call me in to complain about the speech. I used the occasion then to say, yes, but what about Tuđman's response to our proposal. He said, "Don't worry about the complaint of the speech. We know who is Peter Galbraith, but you wait over the weekend and I'll get Tuđman turned around." Then he got Tuđman turned around.

Q: Well, now what was happening I mean this is one part of the equation, but the other part of the equation was the Serbs, wasn't it, you know what they were doing. Did we see that if we got the Croatians in line that the Serbs would necessarily follow or not?

GALBRAITH: What the important thing was that unless we got the Croatians in line, it wasn't even worth talking about the Serbian part of the process and that was to me that was one of the breakthroughs in terms of U.S. policy in the summer and fall of '93 was to get Washington to understand that this was a two step process. That Croatia was the swing country in the equation. It was the key. You may not like it, but it was the key to the peace. The first step then was to end the Muslim Croat war, to get that alliance set, then you'd be in a stronger position to deal with the Serbs. I think Redman was going to Belgrade and he was going probably to see Karadzic up in Pale, but he too understood that the main action was to end the Muslim Croat war first.

Q: Do you think that as this was going on, I mean this is you know, you've got Muslims, Croats, Serbs and all, I mean something that you were learning on the ground, but that within the Clinton administration were there people who were beginning to understand this, our top man for sort of Eastern European affairs or Soviet affairs was Strobe Talbott. I mean do you think he and Christopher and Clinton and all, did they really understand the factors there?

GALBRAITH: Well, first, I don't think at this stage that Talbott was much involved. I think he was still the Russia person or maybe he was just becoming the Deputy Secretary of State. Christopher, you know, basically at this stage everybody still wants a hand's off approach although Christopher was becoming more engaged. He is talking regularly to Redman and he does authorize Redman to invite the Bosnians and the Croatians and the Bosnian Croats to Washington to negotiate about a federation. That's what happened and

the upshot is on the first of March 1994 agreement is reached after three days of shuttle, of proximity talks, in different rooms on the first floor of the State Department, there's a room for the Bosnians and a room for the Croatians which the Bosnian Croats shared. Basically we would go back and forth between the two rooms.

Q: Did you get called into this?

GALBRAITH: Yes, I participated.

Q: How did you find the atmosphere among the apparatchiks? I'm not trying to use the term in a derogative way, but those that were dealing with this in Washington, I mean, did they have any feel for the personalities?

GALBRAITH: No, I think a very little feel for the personalities, but Redman had a good feel for the personalities and the desk officer did, but unlike the Dayton operation, it was a very small number of people involved, Chuck Redman and his assistant and basically the people from the desk.

Q: Well, in a way when the Croatians and Bosnians arrived they were ready for a deal?

GALBRAITH: That's essentially right. The groundwork had been laid. I mean the critical variable was Tuđman's willingness to give up on the separate Croat republic and related to that was getting rid of Mate Boban, different leadership. Once those things happened, yes, things were ready for a deal.

Q: Okay, I think this is probably a good place to stop. We're getting both tired, it's 4:20 in the afternoon and we're talking about what March 1st or so, 1994?

GALBRAITH: March 1st, 1994, I think would be the next big thing to talk about is in fact the issue of the arms, the no instructions policy decision in terms of arms flow to the Bosnians.

Q: But to explain here where we were, March 1st, the Bosnians and the Croats in Washington came to a- (end of tape)

Peter, we're to, we have, an accord has been reached between the Bosnians and the Croatians, is that right?

GALBRAITH: That's right.

Q: So, what are we up to now?

GALBRAITH: Well, it's the beginning of March 1994 and the accord that was reached was the Washington Agreement. Its real effect was to end the Muslim Croat war and it did so by creating a federation, a single unit within Bosnia of Croats and Muslims which

was called the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that in turn consisted of cantons. Some were Muslim majority cantons, some were Croat majority cantons and some were mixed cantons. The territory of the federation was all territory in Bosnia where Muslims or Croats were a plurality. It was about 58 percent of the territory of Bosnia, but at this point in time the Serbs who were not part of this polled 70 percent of the territory. Furthermore, the Croats although they signed on to the federation and I think Zubak sincerely believed in it, that is the chief Bosnian Croat negotiator, much of the Croat leadership does not accept it and Tuđman is very unenthusiastic in terms of creating genuine joint political structures, but in terms of the more immediate objective of ending the war, the effect was immediate. I remember an account relayed to me by a friend, a journalist named Samantha Power taking place up in I think near Duboi, in the Maglav pocket where at the, this was an area that was surrounded on three sides by Serbs and the Muslims were at the top of the, were at the top of the salient and the Bosnian Croats completely cut them off from access to anyplace else. Once this agreement was initialed on the first of March she recounted Croat soldiers throwing hand grenades at the Muslim soldiers with cigarettes attached and the pins not pulled meaning that the Muslim soldiers were able to have the hand grenades as weapons against the Serbs and the practical effect of the Washington agreement then was to create an alliance, an alliance between the Bosnian Muslims and the legal government in Sarajevo, the Bosnian Croats whose military force, the HBO, was more or less entirely controlled from Zagreb by the Croatian defense ministry and Croatia itself. Within a relatively short period of time, that is between March 1st, 1994 and October 1995, that alliance had so changed the military situation on the ground in Bosnia that peace was possible. So, the events that led to Dayton really date back to our ability to push the Croatians to end the Muslim Croat war to end the atrocities, to get rid of Boban, to form this alliance.

Q: Was this, I mean, was this foreseen? Was this, how were you and others dealing with it from the American side, saw this thing going with the idea eventually if we get this war over, then we can take care of the Serbs?

GALBRAITH: I don't think it certainly, I didn't see it, I didn't, I wasn't able to foresee what would happen or what would happen in a relatively short period of time. What was clear to me was that, it was that as long as the Muslim Croat war continued, as long as Croatia became increasingly isolated from the West and from the international community, that it was going to be hopeless to find any solution to Bosnia and we would perhaps face a problem like the Middle East; a crisis that would go on for 50 years. I also certainly saw that ending the Muslim Croat war, rebuilding this alliance would be the best way to deal with some of the humanitarian and moral issues that were created by the war. The fact that people were being attacked, they were being denied by the UN arms embargo, the means to defend themselves, the UN was ineffective in protecting safe areas, that this provided an alternative. So, I think we did see this as an important step in the right direction as important to the goal of enabling the Muslims to defend themselves and something that would increase the negotiating leverage with the Serbs.

Q: How did this play, I mean, say the two sides really stopped fighting quite quickly. I

mean it ended that for a while.

GALBRAITH: Well, what was remarkable wasn't that it was quick, is that it was immediate and it ended completely and permanently. I think the next instance of fighting was in September or October of 1995 when Bosnian government forces killed three Bosnian Croat soldiers in what was, well, it was certainly, it was an unfortunate incident. It was not something I think planned by strategists in, Bosnian strategists or Croatian strategists and it was a one-time incident.

Q: What about Mostar where some of the nastiest stuff had been going on?

GALBRAITH: It stopped. It stopped immediately and that was what was so remarkable about it. What I had dealt with for the first nine months that I was in Croatia was incessantly problems from Mostar where the Croats in West Mostar were shelling the Bosnian Muslims in East Mostar in the old town where they completely destroyed the old town which had just been repaired by UNESCO at great cost and the Aga Khan Foundation a few years before. Of course they destroyed the most famous landmark in Bosnia, perhaps in Yugoslavia, the old bridge in Mostar. I remember I crossed that in 1992 with Senator Moynihan and it was a sad sight. It had rubber tires hanging off of it to try and protect it from Serbian shelling and a wooden cover, but in this case it was completely destroyed.

Q: Now, what was going on in Zagreb on the Croatian side? Were they saying, okay, I mean you say there was some reluctance of the members of the government, but were they seeing this as an opportunity, I mean what were you getting from them?

GALBRAITH: Different things. Tuđman clearly didn't like the idea as I had described earlier when the proposal was put forward to him on the 17th of March he had turned it down. That was the Thursday, it was only on the subsequent Monday when faced with the prospect of an explicit warning of isolation and of sanctions that he changed course. There was no change of heart. On the other hand, the man who went to Washington for the negotiations, Mate Granić, the foreign minister, he, I think he genuinely supported the federation. He was a much more moderate figure. He was a urologist who hadn't had very much involvement in politics until the change from the communist system, who had risen quickly and only become foreign minister in June of '93 and yet although not seemingly not part of Tuđman's inner circle, at least not having a personal chemistry with him, he clearly was able to persuade Tuđman of the necessity of doing things and he was able to negotiate competently, not to feel that he had to refer everything back to Tuđman, but to negotiate and make commitments and then he would check them out with Tuđman in the evening, but it seemed that Tuđman backed him up in the calls he made. He was a very comfortable and effective negotiator. Šušak the defense minister who was the third really critical person in all of this, he was a Herzegovina. Well, Tuđman favored the great greater Croatia, meaning to divide Bosnia in half and Croatia take half Šušak was primarily interested that first that his own hometown of Široki Brijeg might be part of Croatia and beyond that the surrounding Herzegovinian regions which were 90 percent

Croat. He was more willing for tactical reasons to support the federation. He saw, he was a great benefit to U.S. involvement. I think he believed that some of the things that would follow would be important to his goal, which was to make Croatia as Western as possible and an important part of the Transatlantic system. This was a man who had gone to Canada in the early 1960s and had become a successful businessman of pizza parlors and was very fluent in English. More than that he had a real understanding of North American politics. He was also prepared to be supportive of the federation even though in some ways he was quite an ardent nationalist and certainly an apologist and a political ally of some of the Herzegovinians who committed some of the worst atrocities against the Muslims.

Q: Were we keeping book on who was doing atrocities for a day of reckoning later on? I mean were we sort of to ourselves?

GALBRAITH: We were keeping book, not only for ourselves, but for the international criminal tribunal in the former Yugoslavia. We would and this was something that the embassy was doing. I had people regularly going out and interviewing refugees documenting what was going on, collecting names and we would send those reports in to the State Department. Some of them anyhow would be turned over to the tribunal.

Q: Well, now were there people in the Croatian, particularly in the military, but also in the civilian side who were rubbing their hands and saying, okay, we've gotten rid of this problem with the Muslims, now we've got our ducks in line, let's go, as far as the Serbs are concerned.

GALBRAITH: No. I don't think that was the case certainly in March of '94. I think the Croatians in the end they, at that point, they didn't know how Serbia would react and also, I think that they had a sense of their own weakness. So, Šušak, the defense minister, was prepared to spend the time building up the Croatian forces, which he did.

Q: Now, just timing, now the Serbs still have the Krajina at this time?

GALBRAITH: That's right. They did not lose. Their first territorial loss was May 1, '95 when the Serbs took Western Slavonia which was a small territory.

Q: When the Croatians took that.

GALBRAITH: Sorry, when the Croatians took Western Slavonia and then the so-called sector west, UN protected areas, sector west. Then it was in the beginning of August of '95 that the Croatians took the Krajina.

Q: Well, what was happening between the Washington accords and the Croatian counter offensive?

GALBRAITH: A number of things happened. First, I should say it took me some time to

get back to Zagreb having gone to a chiefs of mission conference in Warsaw to which I was a last minute addition on the grounds that now that Croatia had taken these positive steps it would be appropriate for me to participate in discussions about what steps the United States might take to promote democracy and economic reform in the former communist world. I got back to Zagreb and then almost immediately left with Tuđman in his airplane for the formal signing of the Washington agreement, which was about the 21st of March in the presence of Tuđman, Izetbegović and Zubak. I guess Silajdžić came to Washington, yes Silajdžić came to Washington. There was a formal signing ceremony and then Tuđman had a one on one with the president, not a one on one, he had a meeting with the president in the Oval Office. I was there then.

On the plane over Tuđman had asked if I would agree to join in a Russian initiative aimed at getting a cease fire between Croatia and the Krajina Serbs. After we had pulled off the Washington agreement, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Vitaly Churkin, attempted to do something on his own to establish Russia's role. He had actually gone to Pale where the Bosnian Serbs had their headquarters and had a very testy exchange with them, but he had also gotten the Krajina Serbs to agree to come to Zagreb to participate in negotiations for a cease-fire. So, I went with Tuđman, in fact it was really an exhausting period of time. He had asked would I join as a, in these negotiations with Churkin as a mediator because he didn't trust the Russians and he wanted to have the American connection. There were also European Union and United Nations representatives, co-sponsoring the talks. The EU representative was the German ambassador named Geert Ahrens and the UN was a Norwegian named Kai Eide.

Following the meeting with the president, we flew back to and I guess a meeting the next day with Larry Summers, we flew back to Zagreb arriving at 6:00 in the morning and I immediately went to the Russian embassy to begin this mediation effort which lasted all through the night. Then as I recall, I'm going to have to check this, it went through the night and then we resumed on March 30th and 31st again in the Russian embassy. Basically one of the roles I played was to formulate, was to formulate one of the key compromises that made the cease-fire possible. The issue was the, the UN had done a lot of work, they'd gotten the maps and certainly they'd done the overwhelming part of the work. They'd gotten the maps, they'd gotten the two sides to agree where all the positions were, but Tuđman wanted a preamble to the agreement that stated that this was all in Croatia. Obviously the Krajina Serbs who maintained that they were a separate country were not prepared to agree to that and so what I did was to go up and see Tuđman late on one of the nights and get him to agree that that wasn't necessary. When that was done then it was possible to get a cease-fire which was signed at about 4:00 in the morning I think on the 31st of March. So, essentially as I recall there were two all night sessions. That then led to something that become known as the Z-4 process. Zagreb 4 and then later shortened to Z-4 which was the Russians, the Americans, the European Union and the UN sponsoring talks between Knin which was the capital of the Krajina Serbs and Zagreb.

At the beginning we envisioned this as a three-stage process. The first stage being the

cease-fire. The second stage being economic and confidence building measures, that was cooperation between the two sides across the cease-fire line and then the third stage being a political settlement. After the cease fire we proposed that there be economic talks and the Krajina Serbs said we want to hold this in our territory and they invited the Croatians and us to come down to Plitvice Lakes, a national park in fact one of the most prominent tourist sights of Yugoslavia? You've been there, huh?

Q: Beautiful.

GALBRAITH: So, at this point nobody is going, it's under Serb control. It's agreed and the Serb, one of the Serb delegation leaders, Jovanović, I think he was the foreign minister of the Republika Srpska Krajina. He said to Charnick, the Croatian negotiator, he said, "You, we had our journalist here" because they had two journalists, "we'd like to invite your journalist to come down to the Plitvice." I take it back, I think Charnick said that, we had your journalist here, we'd like to have our journalist come down and Jovanović replied, "Of course, in fact I was going to propose that." So, we set I think for April 13th a meeting in Plitvice whereupon the Krajina Serbs said, "We only had two journalists up at the Zagreb talks and therefore you can only bring two journalists down to Plitvice for the talks." Well, the fact is the Serbs only had had two journalists at the Zagreb talks because that's probably how many journals the Krajina Serbs had. This was, Knin was the capital of a self-styled country that didn't have a daily newspaper. The Croatians said, that's unacceptable. So, we talked to the Croatians and we got them to agree that they would have only five journalists go down. I think it was two from Croatian television, one from Croatian radio, one from the Croatian news agency and one from one of the daily newspapers. Then I went down to Knin to talk to and it was the first trip I'd made there to Milan Martić, who is the president, self-styled president of the Republika Srpska Krajina, the Krajina Republic and his colleagues and also to try and work this out, completely without success. The end result was that the talks were scuttled and they in fact didn't resume until the autumn at which point the Croatians were getting much more belligerent.

Q: The fact that the talks didn't work were really digging in of heels in the Krajina Serbs?

GALBRAITH: Yes. I mean what became apparent in dealing with them was that they were terribly disunited. The president was a former policeman of, not a very high rank as a policeman and even lower intelligence, a relatively young man in his forties, but very, with blinders on, very rigid. I think in part because his brain worked so slowly, he really, he was afraid, he was unwilling to do much of anything. There was a prime minister, a guy named Boris Mikelić, who had owned a or been the manager of a meat packing plant in Petrinja which was a town that the Serbs had taken in '91 but it was right on the confrontation line. His plant was more or less on the confrontation line. I think his primary interest was in getting payoffs as well as perhaps getting his plant to start working again and making more money. He was a man who had clearly eaten a little too much of his own product. He sauced patty sausages and sort of, his clothes were all a

little too small and that was the prime minister. Then there was Milan Babić who was the Foreign Minister who had, who was the one from Knin, he was a dentist. I think he was the one politician who actually had genuine support. He was sort of a baby-faced man in his thirties. He headed the largest party in the Krajina Serb parliament and almost certainly he had run against Martić for the presidency in early '94 and in the first round I think he had gotten 47 percent of the vote and Martić had gotten 20 percent of the vote and somehow in the second round Martić won. Clearly it was a rigged result and it was Milosevic who was widely thought to have and his services to have arranged this result. So, Martić was the being the foreign minister, he had the popular support, but he was he didn't have the military force to exercise power. Well, it was clear that none of these guys could get along with each other. They all had different agendas and they were all afraid of being seen as having done more than, having gotten out too far in front and that paralyzed their negotiating efforts continually.

I think the last trip I made down there just to illustrate this. I'd gone to see Babić again who was the Foreign Minister before seeing Martić. Martić then sent a message to me in the midst of my meeting with Babić saying he wasn't going to see me because I'd had the wrong protocol to go see the Foreign Minister before seeing the president. Well, I mean, the UN of course had arranged the program, but beyond that there was a kind of absurdity for an ambassador, that the ambassador sees the foreign minister, he has offended the president, but it just showed how disunited they were and how little they had a sense of how to do things or even how little a sense they had of the impression that they would be making on the outside world.

The meeting with Martić was interesting. It was in early April. He began the meeting by saying the most deadly words you could ever hear on the Balkans and certainly from a Serb which were, "Mr. Ambassador, before we begin, let me tell you a little bit about the history of this part of the world." You know that you will get a lecture on everything since the battle of Kosovo on.

Q: 1389.

GALBRAITH: Exactly, but worse the next words out of his mouth were "In the year 700 comma." Now it has to be said to his credit he got to the two genocides against the Serbs in the 20th Century in about five minutes. The other interesting thing about it was that this was shortly after the NATO air strikes on Serbian positions, actually I think it was mostly an empty Serbian tank near Goražde. All the local population was up in arms about this and we had a joint press conference I think at the beginning and before we had our private discussions and there was somebody from Chicago who claimed to be from the Serbian Democratic Party of Chicago which for a moment I thought it was the Democratic Party, but I realized in a second the it was of course the Karadzic Party. I hadn't realized Karadzic had a party in Chicago, so he had some very contentious questions and I turned to Martić and I said, "I don't think the Serbian Democratic Party of Chicago is a journalist, is a press outlet." Martić was quite gracious. He said, "Oh, the American ambassador has come here on a mission of peace" and we moved on although I

had responded to one earlier question by defending the air strikes and saying they were entirely justified and if the Serbs kept up their behavior there would be more.

Anyhow, all these negotiations, we were unable to salvage the meeting at Plitvice. We couldn't get another meeting organized and that whole process of confidence building measures looked like it wasn't going to work and so I decided and got the EU representative, Ambassador Ahrens and the Russian Ambassador, Leonid Kerestedzhiyants, who had taken over from Churkin, I'd gotten them to agree that we would try, we'd pass over the second stage and we'd start to work on the third stage, that is trying to find a political solution. In September and October of 1994 we met daily or very regularly at the UN headquarters and on occasion at my residence to thrash out a political plan for the Krajina that became known as the Z-4 plan. The group became known as the, it was the Zagreb four because it was four Zagreb based ambassadors and that was shortened to Z and the Z-4 plan basically, the basic idea of it was that in those areas of Serb occupied Croatia, where the Serbs had had a majority in the 1991 census, specific and this meant much, but not all the Krajina. They would have a self-governing area. In fact the autonomy that we proposed was very extensive. They would have their own president. They would have their own parliament. They would have their own taxing powers. They would have their own expenditures. There would be no authority to tax from Zagreb. Of course, no obligation from Zagreb to spend either. They would have their own police would be responsible to their local parliament. There would be no Croatian police there. The Croatian army wouldn't go there except the Croatian army could go in a ten-kilometer band along the international border with Bosnia. They could have their own flag. The number of Croatian institutions present would be limited to things like the post office. Very great autonomy. Then in the case of Eastern Slavonia which did not have a Serb majority, but where there was a substantial Serbian population, we took the provisions from the Croatian constitution that dealt with minority rights and we said that there would be I think a five year transitional period before this territory would be reintegrated into Croatia. That then became what we hoped would be the document that would the subject of negotiation between Zagreb and Knin. I'll come back to that. We didn't present that until January of '95 though. Let me go back to '94.

So, on the one hand there was the tract of negotiating, of turning to trying to deal with the problems of Krajina, the U.S. participating, negotiating a cease-fire, trying to work out economic and confidence building measures and then a political settlement. The other tract dealt with Bosnia and this came to be what was certainly the most controversial part of my tenure, mainly the arms for Bosnia issue. As a result of the Washington agreement, the Bosnian government went to the Croatian government and basically said a number of countries have offered to provide weapons to us. The only way they can reach us of course is through Croatia. At this time there were no airports under Bosnian government control. Would you please let these weapons transit Croatia to come to Bosnia? The Croatians basically talked to the Bosnians and they had an arrangement in which the Croatians would take a cut, a third, of the number of weapons that were being shipped in this way, but the Croatians wanted to know what the attitude of the United States would be. Now, as you know since September of 1991 under UN Security Council Resolution

713 there was a UN arms embargo against any arms to any of the republics of the former Yugoslavia. So, Croatia wanted to be sure that if the United States agreed, sorry, wanted to be sure that if they agreed, Croatia wanted to be sure that if Croatia agreed to permit arms from other countries to transit its territory to Bosnia that this would not complicate their relationship with the United States.

Q: And could we have this arms embargo in the whole place was their announced policy?

GALBRAITH: Well, there was a UN Security Council resolution that had been approved by the Bush administration. In fact it was the announced policy of the Clinton administration to seek repeal of that arms embargo.

Q: So, there was a little wiggle room?

GALBRAITH: Yes. The fact that the Clinton administration didn't like the arms embargo, but on the other hand, it was something passed by the Security Council and the Clinton administration I think rightly, was not willing ourselves to unilaterally violate the arms embargo. In part because the most important part of this equation was the economic sanctions on Serbia which were UN sanctions and if we violated the arms embargo with regard to Bosnia or Croatia by providing our own weapons, then Russia and other countries who didn't like the economic embargo on Serbia, would have a very good argument as to why they could violate that. It was the sanctions on Serbia that was the cornerstone. That was the source of the pressure on Serbia to withdraw its support for the Bosnian Serbs. That was the key variable. The administration was not in favor of unilateral lift. I was not in favor of unilateral lift. The Deputy Chief of Mission, Ron Neitzke, and I discussed and basically, he put forward the idea that perhaps there should be a U.S. covert program to supply arms to the Bosnians. Something that I was not very enthusiastic about because I thought first there are very few things that are covert that are likely to stay covert. So, I thought there was an excellent chance that if we undertook this it would emerge that we were doing it and then we would be in the position of violating a UN arms embargo, violating the Security Council resolution and I didn't think we should be in that position.

On the other hand, what the Croatians were talking about doing did not involve the United States breaking the arms embargo. It involved Croatia and Bosnia breaking the arms embargo. Now, Tuđman decided that he wanted to know what the U.S. position was and so he sent word that at a meeting, I think it was April 28th. I'll have to check these dates precisely, but that at a meeting on April 20, anyhow it was a Saturday, that he would ask me what was the position of the United States if Croatia permitted arms to go across its territory to Bosnia and in particularly if those arms came from Iran. Naturally, I cabled for instructions. I also sent a NODIS cable, that's no distribution cable, expressing my views and my view was that we should give a non-responsive response. That is to say, we should not tell the Croatians no, but that by not responding to their question, they would understand that we were not objecting to their violation of the arms embargo and the arms would flow.

I also was on the phone to, the secure phone to a variety of people including Sandy Vershbow who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and Peter Tarnoff who was the Under Secretary of State. I did not receive an answer in those phone conversations and I didn't receive an answer by cable, however, on the Saturday morning of this meeting with Tuđman, Vershbow called and he said, "You have no instructions." Now, because I'd been on the phone the previous days and what I'd been getting from Washington is we don't have an answer for you, we can't tell you yet, I interpreted his statement which was over a nonsecure line to mean that Washington hasn't made up its mind yet. You don't have any instructions. So, that evening I went up and saw Tuđman and he posed the question. I said, "I'm sorry. I don't have any instructions or Washington hasn't gotten me an answer."

Q: Let me stop here.

GALBRAITH: Chuck Redman was coming the next day. He was again, the special envoy for the former Yugoslavia and the principal architect, the principal negotiator of the Washington Agreement. I'd raised this issue with him and he didn't have an answer. However, while he and I were in the living room of the residence, Jane Hall of the National Security Council staff called on a different matter. What had happened was that a Croatian ammunition dump had exploded and it caused a huge fire. It spread, unexploded ordinance all over the place right by Zagreb and we were trying to, the Defense Attaché, Rick Herrick, and I were trying to arrange U.S. assistance to come in and assist the Croatians in cleaning up what was a catastrophic explosions that threatened life and limb. Jane and I talked about that and then I explained the dilemma. You know, why can't I get an answer to my question. We're going to be seeing Tuđman in an hour. She put me on the phone with Jenonne Walker who was the Senior Director for Europe at the National Security Council. Jenonne said, "No, your instructions are to tell Tuđman you have no instructions" and Tony said that with a smile and a raised eyebrow.

Q: Tony Lake?

GALBRAITH: Tony Lake, the National Security Advisor. At this point I realized that a final decision has been made and that I had in fact the instructions I wanted. That the "No instructions" was not that Washington hadn't made up its mind, it was Washington was giving a non-responsive response. So, Redman and I go up and we see Tuđman and Tuđman asked the question and I say, "Mr. President, I have no instructions and to pay attention to what I am **not** saying." Actually Tuđman doesn't get that. He's invited Redman and me to dinner; his office is on the second story of this villa that had belonged to Tito in Pantovčak with a large park around it with great views of Zagreb. So, as we're going downstairs, he pulls Redman aside and he says, "What's all this about?" Redman says, "We don't want to be the ones to object." Tuđman finally gets it. We have a dinner, the subject is not discussed. We discuss other things like the federation, the beauty of the Croatian islands. Tuđman's secretary was there. I was sitting next to her opposite Tuđman. Tuđman was telling Redman about how many islands they had. He said, "Oh,

we have 1,500 islands, but some of them are under water at high tide." I turned to his secretary and I said, "Those are the ones that you guys want to give to the Muslims" whereupon she says to Tuđman, "Mr. President. Did you hear what the ambassador said?" It teaches you not to make snide asides. So, she recounted to Tuđman what I had said. It didn't do any damage, but anyhow it was all kind of amusing.

The end of the story, about a week later the arms begin to flow. Now, how did this become a big issue? That's a very interesting story. I had actually been on holiday in Italy with my son in the beginning or I guess after April 13th for about ten days. It was during this time that the Deputy, DCM Neitzke, had gotten, he had heard from Granić about this question and when I got back I guess I was informed by the Defense Minister Šušak about the question would be asked. In addition, Miroslav Tuđman, who was Tuđman's son and he was the head of the Croatian intelligence service, had talked to the station chief and while the DCM had deferred the question to me the station chief who was relatively young, quite inexperienced, he had taken it upon himself to answer the question. What he told Tuđman, Jr. was "it is U.S. policy to support the arms embargo and we believe other countries should support the arms embargo, too." So, when I arrived back, I was quite appalled at that because I believed that first that that was not U.S. policy under the Clinton administration, second, that this was such an important question that it ought to be decided by the highest levels in Washington which is why I had sent a cable to Washington saying this question will be posed. I told the station chief to tell Tuđman, Jr. that the issue was being reviewed by Washington. He refused to do it. I then got my answer. I delivered it to Tuđman in the manner that I've already descried. After the meeting with Tuđman, incidentally I should say that the decision about this although I didn't know it until much later was actually made by President Clinton. Lake raised it with President Clinton on Air Force One flying back from Richard Nixon's funeral. So, it was a presidential decision. Now, all I knew was that it was an authoritative decision.

Anyhow, after my meeting with Tuđman, I told the station chief what had happened and that this was the policy. He didn't believe me. He then sent an inquiry back to the CIA headquarters. Woolsey was the DCI. Woolsey then got in touch with Strobe Talbott and he said to Strobe, "Has there been any change in our policy with regard to the arms embargo?" Strobe who frankly was a little too cute by 50 percent said, "no there's been no change." Meaning that since Clinton took office it has been our policy not not to want to see the arms embargo enforced. Woolsey believed that no change meant the policy was the same as in the Bush administration when they were enforcing the embargo. So, the message came back to the station chief that no there's been no change in the policy. He interpreted that to mean that therefore, I was running a rogue operation. Then his imagination began to run away with him. I had gone to the Eid celebrations at the Zagreb mosque in February.

Q: It's a Muslim holy day, the end of Ramadan.

GALBRAITH: The end of Ramadan. It was 8:00 in the morning with a group of people who I met and shook hands with. Frankly an hour after the meeting I probably couldn't

have told you quite who I'd met. We had Fantas and some cakes.

Q: A diet drink, I mean an orange drink.

GALBRAITH: Orange drink and some cakes, sweet cakes, baklava or something and you know, exchanged pleasantries. Anyhow the station chief believed at that meeting that somehow I had said something more and the head of the Islamic community in Zagreb was there. He believed that. In fact I don't think he was, a guy named Omar _____. Anyhow, as I say, his imagination began to run riot and so over the ensuing months he began to send cables back which I didn't see with all sorts of imaginations about activities that I might be engaged in and also not resisting the temptation to make personal comments about me and others including comments about a woman I was dating who I will point out for the record here. I wasn't married at the time. She wasn't married. She was American, not Croatian. She didn't work for the U.S. government and she was not an intern. But, it seemed to be his business or he thought it was his business. Ultimately this became an issue two years later, well, in September of that year Holbrooke came out and he went and met with Šušak, the Defense Minister, he and I alone. I had persuaded, well I should say that he was nominated in I don't know in April or when his name emerged in May I had sent him a message in May of '94 saying you should come out to Croatia. He had called me back at 6:00 in the morning from Chicago where he was with Helmut Kohl. He was the ambassador of Germany to watch the World Cup game. To say no I've already talked with the State Department. They don't think it's a good idea for me to come to Croatia or Bosnia until I'm confirmed, but why don't you come up to Germany and talk to me. So, I went up and saw him at the beginning of July. One of the ideas that I had was that we should go to other countries that might be willing to provide arms to the Bosnians or money and basically say to them, we do not object if **you** decide to violate the arms embargo by assisting the Bosnian Muslims or we do not object if you decide to provide money. After all money was basically as good as arms because they could buy things on the black market.

Holbrooke liked this idea and at this meeting with Šušak he outlined the idea. He said this has not been approved by the U.S. government. This is my idea. It is not a covert program. It has nothing to do with the CIA. In fact it was not a covert program. A covert program, a covert action is when the U.S. does something and wishes to conceal its role. Here somebody else was doing something and our role was simply to encourage them to do it. That is a diplomatic action not a covert action. Well, Holbrooke perhaps didn't realize and if I'd known what he was going to do maybe I would have told him, but maybe I wouldn't have been clever to think of it either. That Šušak's wife, Georgia, was the number two in the Croatian intelligence service and she then told the station chief about the Holbrooke conversation. Well, of course, this really riled up his imagination now that it was Holbrooke and Galbraith who were running a covert action. This got back to Tony Lake who was a bureaucratic rival of Holbrooke's. They had been close friends for many years, but they had drifted apart and in fact Holbrooke believed that Lake had kept him from getting the jobs he originally had wanted.

Q: They were part of that little Mafia who'd taken Vietnamese together and gone to Vietnam early on.

GALBRAITH: That's right, they had begun their diplomatic careers as junior Foreign Service officers in Vietnam. They'd been close friends, but had drifted apart. Lake had become the National Security Advisor and Holbrooke had wanted to be Deputy Secretary of State and basically he hadn't gotten anything. I think he blamed Lake. Lake and this is Holbrooke's telling of it saw this, saw it as an opportunity to get Holbrooke and referred it to the intelligence oversight board an entity which I hadn't heard of, but which sits in the White House and does investigations. One of the things it does is to be sure that the intelligence community or everybody else is behaving as they should. I must say I only found out about this in '95 when I was back in January and all of a sudden this was on my schedule to go see Anthony Harrington, a Washington attorney and head of the intelligence oversight board. Holbrooke who I guess knew this was coming up wanted to see my schedule. He said, "Do you know what this is about?" and explained it. Well, anyhow, I went to see Harrington and I explained the story. I didn't know what the station chief had done at this point in time, but I explained the facts and so on. They wrote a report and they basically said everything was done correctly. There was no covert action. This is fine. That's '95.

A year later in '96 the report is leaked to the Los Angeles Times. The Republicans think, now two years after the event the Republicans think that they have discovered the Democratic equivalent of Iran Contra. Why? Because the word Iran appears here. Now, how is this similar to Iran Contra? Iran Contra was where Ronald Reagan sold arms to our enemy, Iran, in the hopes of securing the release of hostages, American hostages held in Lebanon, and diverted the proceeds to illegally fund the Contras. In this case our enemy, Iran, was supplying arms, we had simply had a single conversation saying, we didn't object if our enemy Iran supplied weapons to our friend Bosnia. In the Reagan case the net result of all of this was to make Iran more powerful militarily. In our case our decision to say nothing in response to a Croatian question reduced the number of weapons that our enemy had and increased the number of weapons that our friend had, but again, the word Iran appeared and so Bob Dole called for the foreign relations committee and the intelligence committee to investigate. He was of course running for president in '96. Newt Gingrich not to be outdone by Bob Dole established a subcommittee with a million-dollar budget under Henry Hyde to launch a special investigation. When I came to Washington to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee, that was the first trip to Senate Intelligence Committee, the CIA had done its typical thing which is that when anything comes up it immediately does a dump of every document that it has on its intelligence oversight committees where the State Department tends to defend its documents and prerogatives much more closely. So, there was some sense that since all this had been to the intelligence committees, I also want to get to see it and thus I went to and was able to read about all these communications from the station chief which again were about me, but also about other people in the embassy. It created a rather disagreeable period of time for about six months, but in the end all turned out well. That is the story of that particular controversy.

Q: Well, I'm interested in the station chief, one refusing to do what you told him to do which is you know, I mean, that would normally, how could he refuse?

GALBRAITH: Well, he said bluntly to me that he didn't believe, I mean the first time he said that he didn't believe the policy was under review and therefore that he had correctly stated what he thought the situation was to Tuđman, Jr. and the second time after the president's decision and after I'd explained it to Tuđman, Sr. his argument, he said I want to see this in writing. Now these instructions had been conveyed orally and indeed I'd hoped to get them in writing, but Washington for understandable reasons didn't want to put them in writing.

Q: This is the wink and the nod type.

GALBRAITH: Well, it wasn't a wink and a nod, but it was, I mean we simply didn't. I mean what factually happened is that we didn't answer the Croatians' question and they understood that to mean, as we intended, that we don't object. Now, at that point I could have made an issue of it and said either you do this or I'm sending you home which would have been a reasonable thing to do under some circumstances, but frankly you know, I knew what the consequences of that would be which is that it would have made this whole issue into a huge controversy and nobody in Washington would have appreciated me doing that. They would have felt that I wasn't a team player. Since they wouldn't put it in writing the instructions to me, you know, I obviously understood that this was a very sensitive matter. Since within a week it was clear that the Croatians had got the message from me and that what he told Tuđman's son was irrelevant. There was nothing further for me to do. Frankly, at that point I thought the whole thing was over.

Q: Well, I mean did you find, this raises another question, did you find the CIA particularly relevant to you when you were there? I mean were they giving you good stuff, what was your impression?

GALBRAITH: Well, without going into too much detail, some of the material was extremely helpful, notably intercepts. Although a lot of that was collected by the Croatians. Overhead intelligence was a very limited utility in part because they weren't focused on that so much in that part of the world and in part what was going on is not things that you could see from satellites. You know, you can see the location of missiles from satellites, but even if you can pick small groups of men, you cannot determine their murderous intent with a satellite. We were very weak in my view on our human intelligence, that is the spies. I suppose I shouldn't say more about that, but frankly a major source of intelligence came from the Croatian service. The trouble with having this rather inexperienced station chief was that he just accepted everything that they said as true and since his standing depended on how much intelligence he could generate and since there was a growing interest in intelligence from the Bosnians, this material he would transmit with great authority which meant that Tuđman and Tuđman's son as some of the most right wing people in the Croatian administration were basically able to use

this channel to get their side across without any filter and that was a significant problem for me and for Holbrooke and for some of the others. The other result of this is that on a number of things that the agency or the station chief simply got it wrong. For example, because Tuđman was his source, Tuđman, Jr., he was adamant to Redman and to me that the Croatians would not accept a proposal for a Muslim Croat federation; they wouldn't accept it. The strategy we were putting forward wouldn't work. Of course they did accept it.

There were some other deficiencies. The CIA came up with an assessment that the Krajina Serb military would be a formidable adversary to the Croatians and that it would not be an easy campaign to retake the Krajina. They never actually went to the Krajina. They never saw it and frankly what always struck me every time I went down there and I did a regular shuttle, was there were no people in the Krajina and in fact often I would go by helicopter and from the helicopter just looking out I wouldn't see any military positions of Krajina Serbs and when I drove there was no sign of anybody on the Serbian side of the front line. They had very long lines to defend. So, I came to the conclusion that they would have a hard time defending the territory, but I had these assessments which indicated just the opposite from people again who had never been there and never looked, but looked at the units that were on paper, looked at the equipment that they had on paper, made certain judgments.

Q: Let's talk about what happened. You gave the non-answer to the Croatian government. The answer was eventually that we weren't going to make it, do what you want on this. We're not going to stand in your way. How did this play out?

GALBRAITH: Within as I say within a week or two in May, Iranian 747 cargo planes were landing at the airport on Kirk Island loaded with weapons and these were offloaded. The Croatians took a third and the other two-thirds went to the Bosnians. But, beyond that I think there were other channels. The Croatians were busy arming, buying from countries of the former Soviet bloc and of the former Soviet Union. Šušak and I once had a talk about this. He basically said, hey, I said, you must be paying a premium for this stuff since you're having to buy it on the black market. He said, no, in fact, we get it for less than the list price. There was just an enormous glut of Soviet weapons. The irony is that the country that was most adamant in insisting that the arms embargo stay was Russia, which was also the country, whose nationals were most busy violating the arms embargo.

The Croatians got some very sophisticated stuff. I went to a military parade, I guess it was '95. They had very elaborate anti-aircraft SA-300s, I think. I mean it was quite elaborate. They started with two MIG-21s and I don't know eventually they ended up with about 12 or 14. The defense minister kept teasing me. He said, "Well you know we have a mommy MIG." I said, "Where would you get them?" He said, "Well, we have a mommy MIG and a daddy MIG and we're having baby MIGs."

Q: Well, then what happened on the ground then, some dates, while you were there? You

were there until when?

GALBRAITH: In Croatia?

Q: Yes.

GALBRAITH: Until January of '98.

Q: In the first place, you had two things happening at this time. You had the Croatia.

GALBRAITH: I wish it were only two.

Q: Well, but on the military side, you had the Croatians new army developing an army which they really hadn't had as much as the Serbs had and you had the Bosnians army. When did this begin to have an effect?

GALBRAITH: Yes. Okay. Basically from May of '94 the weapons are flowing to the Bosnian government. Of course all through this period they're flowing to the Croatians. Incidentally when the Croatians asked us the question should we permit weapons to go through Croatia to Bosnia, even if we'd told them that they should respect the arms embargo they would of course had no intention of respecting it with regard to Croatia, so. The other thing that was occupying my attention enormously in '94 is the Croatia peace process. I already described the negotiations leading to the cease-fire. I described the origin of the Z-4 plan. We presented the Z-4 plan to Tuđman and Martić on the 30th of January, 1995. It was something very carefully scripted. I'd become identified with this in Tuđman's mind because I talked to him more about it. He hated the plan. He was not really prepared to concede that much autonomy to the Krajina Serbs. So, I had the French ambassador who represented the president of the European Union make the presentation. In this sense it expanded because of European Union politics from more than four to about six. I had him make the presentation and then the Russian to Martić. Tuđman took the plan and I mean he just hated it. He could barely agree to look at it. He looked at the first words, which referred to an agreement between Croatia and the Krajina region I forget the exact terminology. He said, "There is no Krajina. This is an obsolete word. This is meaningless." He denied the existence, the basic concept, but he agreed, gritting his teeth he agreed that he would negotiate on the basis of the plan, but not that he was accepting the plan. Martić went down to see him. The Russian ambassador presented the document and he wouldn't touch it. It was like somebody, it was a horseshoe table and the Russian, he was sitting at the head of it, the Russian was sitting to his right. The Russian tried to hand it to him. It was like he was handing him a pile of dog crap. He said, "I'm not going to accept this plan. We haven't had any part in formulating it. Furthermore, the Croatians are threatening us." The Croatians had said they were going to force the UN to leave Croatia. "I'm not prepared to receive this plan until Croatia withdraws its threats and we know the UN is going to be here" and then he went on. He said, "How can you expect us to look at and accept a plan that I haven't read." I quickly picked it up off the table and said, "Well, here, read it, read it." But he wouldn't touch it.

Frankly at that point the negotiations came to a grinding halt. We were really at an impasse. We were at an impasse in terms that made the Krajina Serbs look like they were the people who were refusing to negotiate. The reality was that Tuđman wasn't going to accept this plan either, but he was smart enough to take it off the table. He was smart enough to say even though he didn't want to that he was prepared to negotiate on the basis of it.

There was another thing that had happened, well, two other things, well, a number of other things I think that are worth mentioning in '94. At the last minute in I guess October, David Owen, who was the EU mediator and Thorvald Stoltenberg was the UN mediator, they came into the Z-4 process and sort of bumped into staff positions the Geert Ahrens, the EU rep and Kai Eide, the UN rep and were able to broker an economic and confidence building agreement. That agreement provided a number of things. It provided that the Croatians would return some generating poles to a utility I think in Dinkovatz that the Serbs had. These were things that had been sent to be repaired and hadn't been sent back. They put in the agreement by the Serbs to open the gas pipeline that went from Rijeka to Zagreb in east, which ran through Serb-held territory. That included an agreement by the Serbs to open the autoput, the four-lane highway that went through part of Western Slavonia. David Owen was so keen on this that he actually went out of his way to sabotage parts of the Z-4 plan. He tried to get the Russians to withdraw their backing of it. His basic argument was that Eastern Slavonia which under our plan because it was not a Serb majority area, but a Croat plurality area, it was going to be returned to Croatia, that that area should not be considered part of the plan, it should be left separate. The reason that he was doing that was that he actually personally wanted to get territorial exchanges. He hoped that Croatia would be persuaded to give up the Baranja region to Serbia. This is the area in the east that is north of the Drava River and which had a significant Hungarian population. He also wanted Croatia to cede land to Bosnia north of the Sava by Brčko so that there would be a corridor so the Serbs could have a corridor through there and then Brčko could then be perhaps linked to the federation. Frankly some of these ideas actually had appeal to Tuđman. I knew that they were completely unacceptable politically in Croatia. Tuđman might have had the illusion that he could agree to territorial swaps, but the Croatian parliament wasn't going to agree to that. The Croatian public wasn't going to accept that. Frankly I thought it was a very bad idea for the United States to accept that. The only solution had to be based on recognition of the, on the successor states of the former Yugoslavia having been internationally recognized and accepted as members of the UN, maintaining their territorial integrity because once you open the idea to any changes in borders, then you would be in a situation where basically those that wanted to divide up Bosnia, namely Serbia and Croatia might be able to do that. The way you stop that is to never open the door on that. So, I thought Owen's tactics were incredibly dangerous.

He went to Moscow and he tried to get the Russians to agree that Eastern Slavonia not be part of the Z-4 plan and to overrule their ambassador, Kerestedzhiyants, who was a very good partner of mine and a complete collaborator. The Russians wouldn't do it, which was very interesting. The notion that the Russian position was entirely pro-Serb. It may

have been at the macro level, but it was still a sufficiently professional foreign ministry that they were going to listen to their ambassador and take his recommendations at heart. He was able to outmaneuver David Owen who wanted to take a more pro-Serb position than they were taking. Anyhow, Owen also got his. He, and Stoltenberg contributed, were able to delay the preparations of the Z-4 plan, so it wasn't presented until the 30th of January, '95. At the beginning of January '95 the Croatians announced that they would not extend the UN mandate beyond the 31st of March which basically was a signal that the UN would have to leave Croatia, leave the occupied areas and then Croatia would presumably be prepared to take military action. This was something that was completely, you know, had everybody in Europe and in Washington up in arms and panic.

Q: At this point, Serbia occupied almost a third of Croatia in the Vukovar area and all that?

GALBRAITH: The Serb occupied territories were Baranja, which is north of Vukovar, Vukovar and the surrounding area of Eastern Slavonia. Territorially that was probably about 4 percent of Croatia. But they also held Western Slavonia which may have been another 4 percent and the Krajina which is this region in the west of Croatia west of Bosnia so if you will, north of Bihać and west of Bihać touching practically to the sea. That would be about 23 percent of Croatia's territory.

Q: So, you come out close to a third?

GALBRAITH: Yes.

Q: So, I mean was this sort of sitting and rankling all the time? I mean was this something like Alsace Lorraine with France, they were going to get back theirs?

GALBRAITH: Oh, yes, there was no question that Croatia intended to take this back. It was more than Alsace Lorraine in the sense that first this, I mean it was a larger percentage of Croatia's landmass. Second, the local, the Croatian population in these areas had been brutally expelled in '91. A number of people had been killed. The homes of the Croats had been burned and tank shells fired through them. They had been looted. There was this lobby of dispossessed people and it basically bisected the country. In fact when I arrived in Croatia, there was no land route between Zagreb and Split. It was between the capital and the second or third largest city in the country. With that whole region, all of Dalmatia was cut off by land from the rest of Croatia. So, this was not something that they were going to accept permanently. I don't think August 1995 was the point at which Tuđman planned to take it. He took advantage of Serbian actions and errors.

But, let me sort of make one point about the Z-4 process and I may come back to it later, but Owen's delays, David Owen's delays pushed the presentation of the plan from November-December to January and I think having to present it after the Croatians had said they wouldn't renew the UN mandate really killed it as a meaningful, as a document

that could have provided the basis for a meaningful political settlement.

Okay. The events that led to war. I tend to date this from what I call the first Bihać crisis, which was the 9th and 10th of November, 1994. In fact, I was down in Lovran which is near Opatija on the Istrian Peninsula when I got a call from the foreign minister, Granić, asking if I would come back to see him and Šušak immediately. I think they were going to send a helicopter, but the clouds between the coast and Zagreb were such that it couldn't fly so instead I raced back with a police escort making it in a couple of hours. I met with Granić and Šušak and I think the defense minister. Basically they said, we intend to take military action to relieve the siege of Bihać. Bihać was part of Bosnia. It had 160,000 people in the northwest of the country. It was completely surrounded on the south and east by Bosnian Serbs and on the north and west by Croatian Serbs, by the Republika Srpska Krajina. The military commander there was fifth corps, a guy named Dudaković, General Atif Dudaković, had in September of '94 launched a military offensive first against a breakaway Muslim leader named Fikret Abdić, who had allied himself with the Croatian Serbs driving Abdić quarters out of Bihać. They eventually took refuge between the Croatian frontline and the Serbian frontline in an utterly destroyed place called Trn. Then he had launched an attack south of outer Bihać, basically trying to break the siege against the Bosnian Serbs that had made some considerable headway. In October the Bosnian Serbs had counter attacked and in November the Croatian Serbs had attacked, maybe even October, October or November, along with the Abdić supporters and had come around the 9th of November the Bihać pocket was much shrunk and there was a lot of concern that it might fall. Now, from Croatia's point of view that was completely unacceptable strategically because what it would mean is there would be a single western Serb state from Brčko, from the Posavina corridor practically to the coast. A solid block as opposed to the current situation which in essence that the western Serb territory had this big donut hole of Bihać. Of course, if you eliminate the donut hole there are no internal lines, you are able to redeploy your forces against both the Bosnian government and against Croatia.

The second Croatian concern is that if Bihać fell there would be an enormous humanitarian crisis, 160,000 Muslim refugees and where would they all end up? Well, where so many of the other Muslim refugees had ended up, mainly in Croatia. So, Gojko Šušak and Granić in this meeting outlined a plan for a surgical strike through a place called Slunj which would relieve the siege of Bihać and enable weapons to be provided to Bihać and maybe military forces and so on. I didn't believe that they would do a surgical strike. I thought that they would probably end up taking the Krajina. I called Holbrooke and woke him up. It was his routine to wake me up, so I took some pleasure.

Q: Holbrooke was ambassador?

GALBRAITH: Assistant, not the State, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. I explained the situation and told him that in my view we should, well, I should tell you. What Šušak and Granić wanted was an assurance that the United States would block sanctions being imposed on Croatia if Croatia took military action. Basically they were

looking for a green light from us once again. My view was that we should in fact tell the Croatians that we would block sanctions. Why? Well, I had legal humanitarian and strategic reasons. Legally, some of the attacks on Bihać, which was in Bosnia, were emanating from Croatian territory; Croatian Serb held territory, but nonetheless part of Croatia. The UN was unable to stop attacks from this territory onto the territory of a sovereign state. Arguably Croatia would even have a legal obligation to stop attacks from its territory onto the territory of the neighboring state. It was the Croatian Serbs who were crossing the international boundary. If NATO or the UN were unwilling to stop those attacks, then I didn't see how we could object as a legal or moral matter if Croatia were willing to do it. While we might not want the Croatians to do something that would widen the war, it did seem to me that they had a strong legal argument for what they were doing.

The second reason that I was in favor of letting the Croatians know that we would block sanctions which again would be interpreted as a green light, is my fear that Bihać was going to fall and that you would have a humanitarian catastrophe with 160,000 people. Finally from a strategic point of view I thought that the fall of Bihać would be a catastrophic blow to the Bosnian government. I mean I bought the Croatian argument that the creation of a western Serb state would be a very bad strategic development in the conflict. I made these arguments to Holbrooke who got quite angry with me. He said nobody in Washington wants to hear this kind of analysis. You'll lose your credibility. You'll be thought of as a hawk. Don't say anything further. I think that he was concerned that a U.S. role in seeking to widen the war would do great damage to the European alliance perhaps at a time that they were turning to a, relations with the allies were strained and also he had another agenda which included NATO enlargement. I, as was typical, ignored his advice. I put this into a cable. The response I got was to tell Tuđman, it was a demarche for Tuđman, to tell him under no circumstances would we support widening the war. We wouldn't support a military campaign to relieve the siege of Bihać.

I went to deliver the demarche and Granić and Šušak were present. I must say it was quite something because Tuđman turned to them and listening to my demarche which said, you know, warned about the dangers of a wider war and it could go into an unforeseen direction. He turned to them and said, that's exactly what I think. So, it was clear that that was one of the few times that I'd seen that Šušak and Granić had gotten together and they didn't actually have Tuđman on board. I could understand that. I mean Tuđman; neither Granić nor Šušak had any military experience whereas Tuđman had been a general under Tito. He had been a partisan in the Second World War. He did appreciate some of the dangers of war. He was not a bloodthirsty character.

In any event.

Q: Was the fact that he had been a partisan, Bihać was where the partisan movement technically started, wasn't it November or something? I can't remember. Bihać was I guess where the five fires were and all that. So, it was sort of a partisan holy sight.

GALBRAITH: Well, Granić and Šušak were wanting to rescue Bihać and Tuđman was saying don't do it, it's too risky. So, I don't think that would have been a connection. I think Tuđman simply was cautious about committing military force to risky campaigns. But, anyhow, so the Croatians didn't take military action at that time. As it turned out the Serbian offensive against Bihać subsided and things settled back into a more normal situation.

Q: Were arms moving in to Bihać and all this and the Bosnians at this point?

GALBRAITH: Well, it was completely surrounded so it was very difficult. There were flights by helicopter from a Croatian helicopter field near Zagreb called Luka or something like that. I'd have to look at the map and see. They had Russian pilots. These guys would ferry this stuff in. On one occasion one of the pilots was shot down. A flight carrying Ljubijankic who was the Bosnian foreign minister who after Silajdžić had become prime minister. He was also from Bihać. Then the flights were suspended for a while. Yes, they flew in. Šušak told me that the Russian helicopter pilots would get really drunk and make these flights.

Q: But basically Bihać held?

GALBRAITH: At that time, yes.

Q: At that time. So, how did things develop?

GALBRAITH: Well, there are many aspects to this story, but just to stay on this particular threat, in May of 1995, let me sort of back up to the Krajina campaign and all what happened there. I guess I should go with the Croatian decision mentioned earlier that they were not going to let the UNPROFOR renew its mandate at the end of March of 1995. That engendered I happened to be in Washington and this was I guess the one time I attended a deputy's committee meeting in this crisis. It was very interesting. Holbrooke was representing state and he brought me along to sit in the back and talk in case the issue of the Croatian action came up. DOD was, and Walt Slocum were really pressing Holbrooke. They'd wanted him to prepare some paper that, research paper, a strategy paper that Holbrooke had no intention of producing. So, Slocum kept pushing him on it and Holbrooke kept resisting. Finally Holbrooke turned to me to say to talk to and try to change the subject to the Croatian decision not to extend UNPROFOR. Everybody was really wringing their hands. They thought this was going to lead to a much wider war. The meeting had already been quite tense over this issue and the whole Bosnia paper, which Holbrooke just saw as a waste of time. I had thought about it and I had four or five points of ways in which we might approach the crisis caused by the Croatian decision not to extend the mandate so I outlined my four or five points. Everybody in the room looked visibly relieved. They immediately adopted those points as policy. I then briefed the Bosnia people of the various embassies in Washington, the main European embassies and this then they circulated back to their capitals. This became known as the Galbraith Plan leaked to the British press by somebody in the FCL. In fact it eventually provided the

basis under which the Croatians agreed to extend the UN mandate.

Having extended the mandate, it was a little more complicated than that. The plan was the basis, but it had required a couple of Holbrooke trips, a lot of jawboning and then Tuđman had gone to the UN and I went with him to the UN social summit in Copenhagen and there we met with Gore and Albright and Holbrooke. It was prescripted. Tuđman made the necessary concessions to Gore. He could say that the had done something at the request of the vice president and the Croatians agreed to extend, well, they agreed to a new UN mandate with a different name and some other things. However, they were fundamentally dissatisfied because they had wanted to force the issue with the Krajina Serbs. Nothing had happened. That was as I say it must have been in late March. At the end of April.

Q: This is '95?

GALBRAITH: 95. At the end of April there was a killing of a Serb who had used the highway to go out of the Western Slavonia enclave into Croatia proper. There was a rest area just, I guess just before you entered on the east side of the enclave. Serbs and Croats would meet there and families would get together. It was quite funny. I mean I was there at one point and there was a young Serbian man and he had a Croat wife. So, we were talking and he said that he hadn't seen his in-laws and his wife hadn't seen her parents in four years, since '91. I said, well, why don't you call them? He said, well, I have no way of calling. I said, well, there's a phone booth. He said, I don't have any Croatian money. I said, well, use my cell phone. So, he then called his relatives, in-laws and they had quite a conversation. I think they arranged to meet, but this kind of thing was going on. Of course, I considered this highway to be very important because it was breaking down the barriers between the Croats and the Serbs. After all, these people had lived together. They knew each other. They were developing contacts, but one of the things that happened is that one of the Serbs who came to it and a Croat who had a grievance against him or he felt he had committed some crime, came and met and killed the Serb at this spot. Not while I was there, but at a separate time. The Serbs then responded by closing down the highway. The Croatians then used the excuse of the Serb closure to move militarily to open the highway and coincidentally to take the Western Slavonia enclave. This in fact was the first that they did this on the first of May and it was the first major loss of territory by the Serbs.

Two other things about it are noteworthy. First, there was virtually no Serbian military resistance and no response either from Mladic and the Bosnian Serbs or from Milosevic. So, I think at that point the Croatians understood that they could take the Krajina.

Q: Was the analysis that the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbs proper because Krajina was beyond their pale or their metal border or whatever it was?

GALBRAITH: Well, at this stage because of the pressure of sanctions, I think Milosevic wanted a settlement and he wanted and there were parts of the territory he knew he

couldn't hold onto or Serbia couldn't hold onto and the Krajina was clearly one. Croatia was becoming too strong. For him, the only way to do it was to deploy the Yugoslav army to Krajina and that would of course have provoked a major reaction from Europe and the United States. All the efforts to partially lift sanctions and so on would have come to an end. Even then he might not have prevailed. So, clearly he had decided to write off the Krajina. And, Mladic and the Bosnian Serbs I think were just not, they weren't prepared to invest their resources in the Krajina because if they did it would leave an enormous opening for the Bosnian government to use. The political pressure on the Serbs was increasing, particularly on the Bosnian Serbs was increasing. I think for all of those reasons it wasn't, neither the Bosnian Serbs nor the Yugoslavia Serbia were going to come to the aid of the Croatian Serbs. I think the Croatian Serbs; the Western Slavonia experience got the Croatian Serbs to see that clearly, so it enabled Croatia to see that clearly.

The second point about it is that it had a population of about 14,000 I think. Some 11,000 fled, but 3,000 remained and they remained in the _____ area where there was a Serb leader, a guy named _____ who was a moderate and who had resisted and I think for a while been imprisoned by Martić and the hardliners in the Krajina Serbs. So, he mobilized his community, as many as he could who stayed to begin to cooperate with the Croatian authorities. There was also a very good and moderate Croatian put in charge of the area. They began to work together. Then we got involved and we, the embassy, because our interest was in restoring the multiethnic area, so we wanted the Western Slavonia Serbs to stay. We provided aid and we supported employment projects for the Serbs. We got lawyers to help the population, get the Croatia citizenship papers and deal with all the protective property rights, all those sorts of things. The point is that not only did some Serbs stay, but the Croatian treatment of them was reasonably good. So, the real nightmare scenario in which the Croatians would behave as beastly as the Serbs had behaved hadn't taken place on a large scale there. That in turn could make one somewhat more sanguine about the humanitarian consequences of Croatian military action to retake the Krajina. Unfortunately, as it turned out, the Croatians were not very well behaved.

Anyhow, that was the beginning of May, so it was the first major Serb defeat. In the middle of May, the Serbian shelling of Sarajevo had become more intense. There had been a cease-fire between December and May 1st and then it had been breaking down very much in April. Mid-May the shelling had become fairly heavy and so Michael Smith, the UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo ordered air strikes on Serb ammunition depots near Pale. The Serbs responded by seizing UN personnel as hostages and chaining them to strategic sites. The UN then, General Janvier, who was the UN force commander for all of UNPROFOR based in Zagreb basically met with Mladic, the Bosnian Serb commander, in June and they cut a deal in which the UN agreed not to have more air strikes against the Serbs and all the hostages were released.

Mladic I think at this point saw the handwriting on the wall. Specifically, that the U.S. was becoming more aggressive, more assertive and that pressure was building in the congress for unilateral lifting of the arms embargo and the training and equipping of

Bosnians and unilateral air strikes if necessary. I think basically Mladic decided that the summer of '95 was when he had to win the war and the way he wanted to win the war was to clean up the enclaves, particularly those in the east, Srebrenica, Žepa , Goražde.

Q: Maybe this is a good place to stop.

GALBRAITH: Okay.

Q: So, we'll pick this up the next time, we're talking about the early summer of '95 when Mladic has seen that the U.S. may start to intervene in one way or the other on the side of the Bosnians. This is when he is ready to clean up the enclaves of Srebrenica and all that. Then we'll pick it up at that point.

GALBRAITH: Excellent.

Q: Great.

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Today is the 4th of March, 2002. Peter, as we go into this I particularly wanted to make sure we focus on your perception of this and your experience in dealing with this situation that came. Were there indicators that the Serbs were really going to clean up these things? I mean were you picking up things that they were going, these enclaves like Srebrenica and Goražde and other places?

GALBRAITH: There was some intelligence, but it really lacked clarity. Things had been building to a head. There had been a cease-fire that Carter had helped mediate in December of '94. Well, I think it began on the first of January and it lasted four months, so it ended at the end of April. Already it was breaking down in April and the airport in Sarajevo was closed. I remember talking with Tone who was my girlfriend at the time and now my wife and she'd been in Sarajevo in April and her view was that the Serb forces were, (she worked for the UN), that they were seeking to cut the city in two.

Q: You were saying that your future wife was working with the UN. I mean she was getting information. What was our intelligence like? I mean did you feel was there a pretty good flow because this would have struck me as a pretty easy, this was not a very disciplined crew on any side. I would think it would be pretty easy to penetrate and get stuff and all that or not.

GALBRAITH: Well, as is generally true of intelligence, most of the intelligence information you get is not through the intelligence services, but from the conversations that we have with principals, that diplomats have, the local press, what the UN is picking up, the reports of their people. So, there are lots of different sources of this material, as is clear at the Milosevic trial. The Croatians also were getting or intercepting conversations between Milosevic in Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb army and among the Bosnian Serb

army commanders as well as the politicians. We saw a lot of that stuff. With that said, there were a couple of events that took place. As the Serb forces began to encroach on Sarajevo in April of '95, I began to lobby and others for a robust response because it was violating the agreement that Churkin had negotiated the year before that had created a safe area around Sarajevo. Finally the UN had turned the key to permit NATO air strikes. Those NATO air strikes had in turn led the Bosnian Serbs to take UN personnel as hostages. I must say this was one of the more absurd things that happened because obviously what the UN ought to have done is that knowing that there were going to be NATO air strikes which the UN did know because they had to approve them. They should have before the strikes took place withdraw all their personnel from Bosnian Serb areas because these people were potential hostages. Indeed I had conversations with Yasushi Akashi, a Japanese career UN official who was the SRG, the Special Representative to the Secretary General and the head of the UNPROFOR mission about this. I warned him about the danger for hostages and his reply was well, we have to be neutral and what about our mission. Well, the whole point because the people were for example guarding heavy weapon storage sites outside of Sarajevo and what was happening was that the Serbs were actually firing their weapons from the heavy weapon storage sites into Sarajevo. So, I said, well, what's the point of having them there. Well, what about the mandate he replied. Anyhow, these people were all taken hostage and there was a prolonged and very demoralizing period which ended up with the French military commander who was in charge of UNPROFOR agreeing with Mladic in effect that there would be no more air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. That set of events began to set in motion the congressional action to lift the arms embargo. I mean it was already underway, but the hostage taking and the fact that NATO, the UN was forced to back down that NATO air strikes seemed to be off the table basically was the beginning of the series of events which made it look like the U.S. would have to deploy forces to extract the UN mission.

Q: Well, now, what was your role in this, I mean Sarajevo was this part of your beat?

GALBRAITH: No, there was an embassy in Sarajevo, but the UN headquarters was in Zagreb so I interacted with the UN officials. In the early period of my tenure until, well, until really early '95 we had no functioning embassy in Sarajevo. The ambassador Jackovich was in Vienna and he would only very infrequently get permission to go into Sarajevo. We had consular responsibility for Bosnia and all the Bosnian politicians passed through Zagreb on their way in and out to Sarajevo. So, I was constantly involved with it for all these reasons. Frankly, I was also Holbrooke's primary interlocutor among American diplomats in the region. We had a reasonably good relationship. He would be on the phone all the time and we would be strategizing together.

Q: Yes, well, now, was it, you and others who were dealing with this reach the conclusion that it was going to take American force to do it? I mean did you pretty well by this time written the UN off as an ineffective force?

GALBRAITH: Yes, for sure. In fact in May after the hostage taking I went up to

Budapest for Holbrooke's wedding to Kati Marton and he was on the phone almost like a madman advocating bombing and I shared his views that military action needed to be taken.

Q: Well, now where there other voices within sort of a government representation in that area who were saying let's not do this?

GALBRAITH: No, well, in the Balkans I think the diplomats present, there were three embassies, Zagreb, Sarajevo and Belgrade. Certainly Sarajevo and Zagreb were strongly in favor of military action. The chargé in Belgrade, Rudy Perina, was a very good man and he may have been, he didn't weigh in either way. His British colleague was an apologist for Milosevic, but Rudy was pretty solid in terms of his understanding of the situation. The problem had been from the military and particularly from Snuffy Smith who was the commander at AF South.

Q: He was an admiral?

GALBRAITH: Admiral, yes, in Naples. From some of the people in SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), Chuck Boyd, although I think he was gone by this time, who their basic argument had been that air power wouldn't work because there are no forces on the ground, but in fact, there were forces on the ground, but they just ignored. Their view was, they assumed there had to be American forces on the ground or allied forces on the ground. In fact, when we finally did get to bombing the Croatian and Bosnian forces did just fine.

Q: Well, then what happened, you know, the trigger is cocked, the gun is loaded and the Serbs were ready to go after the enclaves. This would have been about when?

GALBRAITH: Well, the fall of Srebrenica was in July. I'm actually equipped with some notes this time. Yes. I actually was back in the United States. I must have left on July 5th or 6th just after the July 4th party and was there for about two weeks and was there at the time that Srebrenica fell. I think that certainly the fall of Srebrenica caught me by surprise and I think it caught others by surprise including the UN. People saw the, the trouble was the difficulty in distinguishing the assault on Srebrenica, you know whether this was yet another squeeze of the enclave as opposed to an all out effort to take it. Also, frankly, I think I imagined that the enclave would put up more resistance than it did.

Q: Was this from either the Dutch protective troops or from the Bosniaks themselves?

GALBRAITH: It was from the Dutch and I also would have thought from the Bosniaks.

Q: When you got back, I mean, I can't remember Srebrenica happened at one point and then what happened? I mean did the other ones fall in time, did Goražde?

GALBRAITH: No, Goražde didn't fall, Žepa did. I was in Vermont on holiday for about

a week with my family and parents. Then I went down to Washington and met with this would have been, well, I was in Vermont when Srebrenica actually fell and I talked a number of times to Holbrooke about it, but without any real conclusion as to what could be done. I was concerned about Žepa, which was another enclave in the east bordering Serbia, and fearful of what might happen there. I mean it was clear that that was the next target. Also, I was concerned about Bihać, which was the big enclave in the west surrounded on the one side by Bosnia and on the south and east by Bosnia. On the north and west by Croatia… and that had 160,000 people, so it was four times larger than Srebrenica so I was very concerned about that. Holbrooke had arranged for me to come up and see Christopher. I mean he knew that I was a dissident on a lot of this policy. So, I went up and saw him. I made a pitch about Žepa and in general, an argument against the policy that seemed to be in play, which was to offer Milosevic relief from sanctions in exchange for concessions that I didn't feel were real concessions. I wanted to make a case against that and a case that we shouldn't write off Žepa because we would be consigning its population to a terrible fate.

I returned, it must have been around the 19th of July and shortly thereafter Tune who had been down in Tuzla interviewing survivors from Srebrenica because the population, the children and women of Srebrenica had been bussed from Srebrenica to Tuzla and they were all camping out in the airfield there. UN human rights workers were interviewing them. She wasn't actually doing the interviews, but she was listening to interviews being conducted by Peggy Hicks and Grace Khan two Americans who worked for the UN. There was a man who had arrived just arrived and had been very intent on telling the story. Now the two UN officials or staff didn't speak Bosnian, but my wife Tune does, she wasn't yet my wife. So, she could detect a real sense of urgency by the way he was speaking, the language he was using. Also, he kept other people were since he was a new arrival, women were wanting to know, have you seen my husband, have you seen my son and he was putting them off. He had a very, you know, there are things I just have to say. I have to explain what happened. He then gave a detailed account of what had happened to him of how he had been brought to a stadium, how Mladic had taunted the group of men he was with and how they had been taken to Bratunac and the group had been shot and he had of course had not been killed. He, I think a bullet had grazed his forehead so it had produced a lot of blood without killing him and then when the executioners took a break he had managed to escape and walked through the woods to Tuzla.

The thing was as Tune was observing this; the UN staff were just taking it down as if it were another one in a long series of stories. They had done a lot of interviews with women who had been on the bus who had described Serbs seizing their money, young girls taken off and disappeared, presumably raped, you know, groups of men, bodies by the roadside and so on. What they hadn't seemed to grasp was that this man's account really was evidence as to what had happened to the missing men. Now, I had frankly had had no doubt, but from the start that the missing men had been murdered because I don't think you have 7,000 people just go missing. But, I needed, I mean, one needed some evidence of that. I mean I had pointed this out in cables. This account seemed to provide a pretty clear evidence as to where the missing…

Q: Yes, so you had come back and you were talking to Christopher. Did you, the policy which seemed to be at that time to be what, of, were we doing anything or just being passive?

GALBRAITH: I think there was great uncertainty as to what to do. There was a lot of passivity and just I would just say uncertainty or confusion. Nobody had any good ideas except Holbrooke who was repeating a mantra of we should be bombing, but that was not immediately acceptable to or thought of as realistic by Christopher and some of the others at that time. I think there was a lot of frustration on the part of the people who were working this issue, Holbrooke, Bob Frasure, myself and I think probably the Secretary was pretty unhappy as well. I had some very specific policy ideas one of which was that we should be, we should be actively encouraging other countries to and particularly Muslim countries to provide weapons to the Bosnians, not doing it ourselves, but making clear that we wouldn't object if they did it. Again, I was very concerned that in the statements we made because NATO was moving to draw the line to protect Goražde that we not implicitly write off Žepa or Bihać.

Q: Were you getting anything from your contacts who were back in the States in the Senate, any of your either staff members or Senators saying, well, we just don't want to get involved in this thing?

GALBRAITH: Well, on the contrary, at that point, people were basically wishing to lift the arms embargo and to end the UN presence and come to the aid of the Bosnians. So, that was where congressional sentiment was at that point in time. Not send in U.S. troops, but provide arms and enable the Bosnians to defend themselves.

Q: What was your, how were your suggestions received by Christopher and others?

GALBRAITH: Christopher listened on the issue of letting, of sort of signaling to other countries we wouldn't object if they provided additional assistance or military assistance to the Bosnians. His response was, well, it may come to a covert program, although I would not have considered this a covert program. There wasn't any real response on the issue of Žepa. When I got back to Zagreb and I heard this story that I've just recounted, one of the things that and I put all of this in a cable to Christopher, a NODIS, and I said, this is a reason to try to save Žepa. This is what's happened to the men and boys of Srebrenica and this is what has happened to all of those who have disappeared. The same fate awaits those in Žepa. Unfortunately, Žepa fell within a few days of my sending the cable. It did have an immediate impact in that it, Holbrooke took the cable to Christopher and put it in his hands and he said, "Chris, this is the human side of what has happened." In other words, this man's account which I had put in the cable. Christopher then dispatched John Shattuck to come out and report on what he, on what had happened in Srebrenica and the human rights violations that had taken place there.

The other thing is thanks to this man's report, the survivor's report; he gave very precise

details about where the killings took place. The CIA was then able to go back and look at overhead satellite and aircraft pictures, looking at those specific places on those days and were able to find the bodies. People have the idea that because we have extensive satellite coverage of an area that we see everything, but of course that's not the case. We're quite good at locating missile silos, but to find evidence of bodies, that's something you've got 10,000 pictures of Bosnia on a particular day, it's not something you're going to find unless you know where to look for them. Having located those pictures then Albright was able to use them at the United Nations.

Q: So, then what happened, I mean at Žepa*, what happened?*

GALBRAITH: At Žepa?

Q: Žepa*, yes.*

GALBRAITH: Well, it fell around the 26th or 27th of July. Many of the men., and I think much of the population, because they'd seen what had happened at Srebrenica were able to escape either through the woods to government controlled territories or across the river to Serbia where they were interred.

Q: Were the Croats playing any role in this time?

GALBRAITH: They were getting increasingly nervous about what was happening in Bihać. This really was the turning point of the war. It was in many ways a replay of what had happened in November of '94. The Croatian Serbs were pushing in from the north and from the west and the Bosnian Serbs were pushing in from the east and the south. There had been in around July, I'll tell you precisely, around July 21st there was a meeting in London which produced of NATO, a London declaration which basically drew the line at Bihać, drew the line at Goražde which was another of the enclaves and said that NATO would use force to protect Goražde, but what was therefore not said was also significant, mainly Bihać and Žepa. That day I was with Tuđman at Brijuni, this island off the coast of Istria which had been much favored by Tito at a villa that Tuđman used for holiday with Demirel the Turkish president and when the word of the London declaration came in, the Turks were quite contemptuous and saying openly, well, where's Bihać, where's the reference to Bihać?

At this time the Croatians were figuring out what they were going to do. From a strategic point of view they did not want to have Bihać fall because that would have created a single western Serbian state stretching from Brčko almost to the Adriatic including both the Bosnian, the western half of the Bosnian Serb territory and the Croatian Serb territory. They also didn't want to see you know, 100,000 or so new refugees come into Croatia, which had already had well more than a million refugees pass through it in the course of the war. The Croatians were contemplating using, taking military action to relieve the siege of Bihać, but also I think using it as a pretext to take the Serb held Krajina region of Croatia. In this period from the 20th of July until maybe, well for the week or ten days

that followed, the Croatians basically were feeling us out to determine what our attitude would be if they took military action to retake the Krajina. They were also smart enough to realize that what Mladic had done in Srebrenica, the attacks on Bihać, the fear that Bihać would be another Srebrenica gave them a pretty, a pretty good reason, a ready made excuse to take military action and that even if the general policy of the United States in the west was to impose widening the war under these circumstances, the west could hardly blame Croatia.

Q: Were you observing the development of an effective Croatian military?

GALBRAITH: Yes. I think the Croatians had during the time I had been there been steadily rearming or arming themselves. They really didn't have a military before. They had been acquiring things on the black and gray markets particularly Soviet equipment. Šušak once told me that they were able to acquire stuff for less than the market price because the world was so awash with these weapons. Some came from East Germany, but much of it came I think from the former Soviet Union, maybe Russia itself. Šušak made clear they dealt with a lot of very unsavory characters. They got some pretty sophisticated equipment. Croatia had inherited two MIG, early model MIGs.

Q: 21 or 23?

GALBRAITH: 21 or 19.

Q: 23 or 19?

GALBRAITH: Yes. When it became independent, but by '95 it had a dozen or so. Šušak used to joke that they had started out with two MIGs and they had had baby MIGs, but these were obviously smuggled. They were also able to acquire SA-300 anti-aircraft missile system and a lot of artillery and other weapons. All that had been going on. I think in the operation they undertook in May of '95 they had demonstrated their military effectiveness when they had taken Western Slavonia. What they were concerned about, I don't think they doubted their ability to take the Krajina. I think they were concerned at the international response. They didn't want to be blamed for widening the war. They didn't want to be blamed; after all it was a UN mission in the Krajina whose job was to maintain a cease-fire between Croatia and the rebel Serbs. They didn't want to be seen as directly doing something contrary to that mission.

Q: Were they beginning to lay down markers that unless you do this or something we're not going to stand by and see Bihać go under?

GALBRAITH: That's what they were saying to me. Now, what I wanted for the policy was that we in fact would stand aside, that we wouldn't tell them no because I thought it would be a disaster if Bihać fell and I put that into the cables that I sent. I also went on the, well, after this dinner on the 21st down in Brijuni Tuđman had the aspect of a man who had actually wrestled with a big decision and made it. Šušak at that time told me that

Croatia intended to take military action. I reported that in a cable I dictated the next day and I basically said we have two options. We could do nothing in which case the fall of Bihać could create 160,000 new refugees and strike a further blow at the credibility of the UN, or we could promise the Croatians that if they exercise restraint that we would oppose sanctions- further sanctions relief on Serbia, and any sanctions on Croatia. I also argued, perhaps not entirely convinced that it was right, that the Croatians would not be responsive to a threat of further action. I then went down on that day which was the 22nd to Split for a rather extraordinary meeting that took place at the villa Dalmatia, just a little north of Split on the Adriatic in which Tuđman, Granić, Šušak, Červenko who was the Croatian military chief of staff were there with the Bosnian government, Izetbegović, Sacirbey was the foreign minister, Silajdžić, the prime minister Zubak who was the head of the federation, Delić who was the military commander plus lots of other military from both sides. The two militaries had sessions in which they engaged in very detailed planning for a joint strategy and the basis of that strategy was that Croatia would move up the Livno Valley which was a valley parallel, in Bosnia, parallel to the Croatian coast, parallel to the Croatian-Bosnian border. Basically they would get up until they were opposite Knin, the capital of the Croatian Serb self-declared republic. It would at that point they would have cut Serbs, Knin's supply lines and be in a position to attack it from the east.

It was also a political dimension to it which is that the Bosnian government and here was something where I had urged that this be done in my informal discussions particularly with, as usual, it was Petar Sarcevic, the Croatian ambassador to the U.S. at this point one of the key foreign policy advisors to Tuđman, was that the joint communiqué include a Bosnian request for Croatian assistance. That would give a legal basis for any Croatian military action as well as a signal that this was a real alliance. Indeed then, in the next few days, this military action took place and they did move up behind Knin. It also became clear that the arguments that I advanced earlier had been accepted namely that we should not, that we would not put ourselves in the position of objecting to Croatian military action to alleviate the siege of Bihać. At that point on the 25th I got a demarche which read "with the Serbs attacking Bihać enclave from Croatian territory and Sarajevo requesting your assistance, we cannot dispute you right to intervene militarily to repel the Serbs," but with suitable warnings about not mistreating the civilian population or UN personnel.

Q: Did you have the feeling at this time that the Croats had learned the lesson that you don't go after prisoners of war and commit genocide and all that, that this was counterproductive. I mean this was not a good tactic. Do you think this had penetrated them by this point?

GALBRAITH: Yes, I think they were aware of it unfortunately, as we'll see, in a few weeks they seemed to have forgotten that lesson. They did themselves a lot of damage, but yes, I think they were very conscious of the advantages that they had by virtue of not engaging in atrocities. As they moved up the Livno Valley for example, Croatian television was very careful to show the Orthodox churches being intact, indeed protected

by Croatian troops and kind of making a point that this was different than how the Serbs had treated Catholic churches or mosques.

Q: How about, had the Serbs, the Bosnian Serbs moved what amounted to mainline troops from eastern, their eastern areas towards the Krajina or were they relying on the troops that were there?

GALBRAITH: They were relying on the troops that were there and this was I think this was part of their problem. Mladic I think wanted to clean up the enclaves to the extent possible and I think he was personally obsessed with Srebrenica and devoted a lot of force there and a lot of force to the killing. The result was those forces were not able to be quickly redeployed when the threat from the east, when the threat began to materialize from the Croatians in the west. I think in this regard he was a rather poor general.

Q: Because also the troops in the west, the Serbian troops in the west, really hadn't been what you'd say bloodied in the way that the ones in the east. The east had been doing all the fighting and the ones in the west hadn't been doing it. Correct me if I'm wrong.

GALBRAITH: No, I think that's essentially right although I wouldn't say massacring 7,000 unarmed people is really a lot of fighting.

Q: Yes.

GALBRAITH: The Bosnian Serbs basically engaged in no serious military engagements until the summer of '95. What they did was ethnic cleansing which essentially was attacks on defenseless populations. Their assaults on Sarajevo were largely standoff assaults from the hills lobbing artillery and heavy weapons down on the city. They did have I guess close in combat with Bosnian government forces for example trying to push out of Sarajevo advancing up the hills and they'd had some fighting in the west in '94 when Dudaković's fifth corps had pushed out of Bihać and made some significant progress.

Q: Well, then what happened? You know, I mean, we've moved up to when the Croatians are ready to go. I mean had there been, were you watching significant or getting any information on significant troop movement?

GALBRAITH: Well, we had lots of information because the Croatians were, I was talking to them everyday and they were telling me what they were planning to do. Šušak had told me that the military campaign would begin on the first of August. Something that in fact had not been shared with a lot of people in his own government, _____ for one didn't know. He was talking to Bob Frasure in Washington and telling Frasure that it wasn't true.

Q: Well, was there a concern as they were doing this that the eastern front between Serbia proper and Croatia by this time was under a cease fire, wasn't it?

GALBRAITH: It was.

Q: Was there concern that if they did something here this might stir up the Yugoslav Serbs?

GALBRAITH: Or Yugoslavia to intervene in the east? Indeed there was evidence. I think Červenko the Croatian chief of the military staff told me that the Yugoslavs were bringing bridging equipment into sector east. Nonetheless, Tuđman discounted the thought that there would be significant attacks from sector east. I think he believed that Milosevic was not going to do anything to help the Krajina Serbs and I think that he believed that there would be no attacks from sector east. I think his primary concern was with the reaction of the United States. Now, does that indicate that he had some kind of deal with Milosevic about this? I think that's possible.

Q: Then how did things develop? Were you getting from the States, from the Department of State in Washington, tell them to stop this, don't do this or anything like that?

GALBRAITH: On the contrary. This demarche that I just described to you on the 25th of July basically said we accept, given that the Bosnians have asked for your assistance and given the attacks that are being made by the Bosnian Serbs, we understand that you have to take military action. Now, for example, it included a line in there. We appreciate the close consultation with your government in the past week as well as your willingness to expend blood and treasure to help defend the Bosnians. I think with that kind of response then the Croatians moved in that last week of July you know, they sort of firmed up the decision that Tuđman I think had made on or about the 22nd of July to go ahead with military action. I had actually sent a message making the point that while the Croatian military action against Krajina was likely to involve lots of refugees that that was less bad than having 40,000 something like 40,000 men massacred if the same ratios prevailed as in Srebrenica. As we got toward the end of July there were many signs of the impending military action for example calls for blood donors. We had kept some of the local staff, were drafted, the railroad down at Karlovac was closed presumably to facilitate troop movements. That kind of situation.

At the very end, I also had the idea, toward the end of July, that we should try to make one last effort to revive this peace process between Zagreb and the Krajina Serbs. I had the thought that we should invite both Zagreb and Knin to meet on an American warship in the Adriatic. I think the warship idea was quickly shot down by Holbrooke who thought it would just be too difficult bureaucratically to get that agreed, but he did agree that I should undertake a mediation effort which I, so I then asked Akashi to take a message down to Babić who I thought was the most reasonable of the three leaders of the Krajina area to propose a meeting. Akashi was initially very reluctant to do that. He said that the peace process was Stoltenberg's business, he didn't want to get into that. A very bureaucratic response. I said, "For Christ's sake, Yasushi, there's going to be a war in a couple of days and Stoltenberg isn't around, we've got to do something." Then he was

just going to carry a sealed note. I said, "No, you're going to have to make a case that this should take place." Reluctantly he agreed to do so. Babić basically said the Krajina Serbs were very negative toward me, but that he would be willing to meet me in Belgrade. I then got on the phone with Belgrade, our chargé to find out if that was okay.

Q: Who was our chargé again?

GALBRAITH: Rudy Perina.

Q: How do you spell that?

GALBRAITH: P-E-R-I-N-A.

Q: Okay.

GALBRAITH: He said, indeed, fine. Holbrooke, actually as I was talking to him, Holbrooke was calling me and learned that I was talking to Perina because the only way you could talk to Belgrade was through the Ops Center, so he joined the conversation. He agreed I should go to Belgrade, but then the next day I think he had basically reconsidered. I think the reason he reconsidered.

Q: This was Babić?

GALBRAITH: Not Babić, Holbrooke reconsidered.

Q: Oh, Holbrooke.

GALBRAITH: Is because I think Frasure prevailed upon him that we shouldn't be trying any peace initiatives at the last minute, that finally the bureaucracy in Washington had agreed not to block further military action. They had agreed that Croatian military action could be a good thing and that if this decision which had been a hard pressed one to get through the deputies and the principals, if it were reversed, that the opportunity might be lost. The Bosnia peace process really depended on what Frasure later told me was "a fundamental reshuffle of the deck." He didn't tell me that at the time. Therefore, any mediation effort that I undertook would not be helpful, so I think that's the reason Holbrooke decided the next day that I shouldn't go to Belgrade. Then he said to me, he said, I had also agreed or asked to go down and see Tuđman and I had some instructions for that meeting in Brijuni on the Monday. Let me just get the dates for all this. I got an instruction to go see Tuđman. Yes, and this I think reflected some of the confusion in Washington. The message of the 25th I had read some points in it where we had expressed our appreciation of Croatia's willingness to spend blood and treasure. Then on the 29th came a message, which came out of a deputy's committee meeting that Croatia should withhold military action and warning of the risks of military action. I noted in the journal I kept at the time that some of these points were a bit silly, that the Croatian have obviously assessed the risks of intervention and their prospects for success "in the

mountainous area of Krajina" which was something I was supposed to warn them about. I cite that because when I actually delivered this, Tuđman later pulled out the piece of paper in a BBC interview for the BBC show, The Death of Yugoslavia, and he laughed. He said, "This is what the American ambassador told me. Ha ha ha." But just for the record, I also thought it was silly and I think I said it in a cable to Washington that I thought these warnings were silly, but sometimes you have to do silly things for your country.

Q: True.

GALBRAITH: Anyhow, the second message was on the 29th and I guess it was also that day that I asked Akashi to see if whether it would be useful to have a last minute mediation effort. Akashi came back on the 30th from Knin reporting that the Krajina Serbs had made real progress and that Martic, the self-styled president, had agreed to meet a number of Tuđman's demands. That turned out to be rather typical of an Akashi report which is that a great deal in the telling of it, but not a lot of substance once you've seen it in black and white and Tuđman totally rejected it. It was at that time then on the 30th that I got word that Babić would be willing to meet me in Belgrade. That was his proposal. It was on the 30th then that Holbrooke approved going to Belgrade. On the 31st Holbrooke basically reconsidered, skeptical that any good will come again for what I think what lay behind it although I didn't know it at the time was the argument that it was basically a bureaucratic argument, keeping the administration on board in favor of allowing the Croatians to go ahead was a very difficult decision that was hard to hold and perhaps that second demarche that I read to you was evidence that it was hard to hold.

On the first I went down. So, Holbrooke basically said the compromise we left it, since I'd argued hard that we should try this last effort for peace, the compromise Holbrooke said, was well, if Tuđman agrees you should go to Belgrade, you should go. So, I went down and saw Tuđman on the first of August and it was I must say it was quite a kind of a somber trip. I went in Tuđman's plane, helicopter, from his villa in above Zagreb down to a villa he had in Brijuni. The only other person on the plane was Professor ____ who was the translator. Got down there and it was all business. Usually Brijuni with Tuđman was a fairly relaxed place, but Tuđman was cocky. I read him the final demarche emphasized strongly, the main point of which was you should not interpret that you have a green light from us. On the other hand, we understand the reasons why you are doing this.

Q: We're both shrugging.

GALBRAITH: Yes. I emphasized what was in the demarche, but I said it perhaps more strongly the importance of avoiding attacks on civilians and on UN personnel. Then I told Tuđman about the fact that Babić had wanted to see me and proposed that I see him in Belgrade. Tuđman said, "Well, oh, that would be interesting. But, don't wait until Thursday, you should see him right away." I understood the message there.

Q: What day of the week was this?

GALBRAITH: This would be Monday that I saw Tuđman. Incidentally, Tuđman also discounted the concern about FRY intervention from Serbia itself. He said the Serbs were in a daze after the campaign in the Livno Valley in Bosnia and he just didn't think that was going to happen. I got Akashi then to get the word to Babić as to whether he could meet me on the Tuesday, the next day. He was out of town and he didn't get back until about 1:00 in the morning. The only plane was a UN plane to Belgrade and that was leaving at 9:00. I only got word at about 8:00 that yes, indeed he would see me and the only plane going was at 9:00 and it was about an hour to the airport, but I managed to make the flight, get dressed and get to the airport. I flew to Belgrade. I think that was then the first of August, sorry second of August. I spent the day in Belgrade sort of looking around and noticing how devastating the sanctions were particularly on petroleum. At 8:00 Babić showed up at the embassy and he and I met alone. I had a note taker. He was alone and I had a note taker and an interpreter. I basically outlined what they had to do if they wanted to avoid being destroyed, that was to withdraw immediately from Bihać, accept the UN monitoring on their borders, open a pipeline through sector north, open the start discussions on opening the railroad and most importantly, accept a political settlement within Croatia. Babić was very interesting. He began by saying I can understand why the Croatians are going to attack us. I cannot understand what our own leadership is doing. He was obviously appalled that they had attacked into Bihać and realized the risk that had brought on the Krajina Serbs. He also apologized for the behavior of Martic in January when he had refused to take the Z-4 plan off the table, refused to accept the plan and how could he have behaved that way when the ambassadors of the United States, Russia, of France, Britain, not it wasn't Britain, France, Italy and so on. So, we had a very good discussion and basically he accepted all of Tuđman's conditions including agreed to accept that there would be a political settlement on the basis of Krajina being within Croatia. We worked out a language. He said I can't say that publicly. I said, well, all right, suppose you say publicly that you'll agree to negotiate on the basis of the Z-4 plan, but that privately I can convey to Tuđman that you've agreed that there will be a settlement, that within Croatia and that it will involve much less autonomy than the Z-4 plan and he agreed.

I then flew back. I got a special plane from the UN to come back on August 3rd. In the morning Rudy Perina and I worked on getting demarches to Milosevic and Tuđman to support this deal with Babić. Milosevic wouldn't see Perina and indeed he had refused to see Babić, which I think, was a pretty clear sign, well, was a clear sign that he had written off the Krajina Serbs, possibly further evidence of the deal with Tuđman. When I got back to Zagreb the demarche that I had to give that Washington had written for me to give to Tuđman was ridiculously weak. Basically it said we can understand that, for example, it said, we understand that Knin's attentions must be measured by actions, not words. We urge you to evaluate the Serb reaction carefully and to explore fully the possible opening for diplomatic resolution of the conflict. Well, this wasn't exactly what I wanted which was to say that this provided a basis for a settlement and that you should hold off on military action a few days to see if the Serbs actually carried through. I placed

a number of calls. I called Bob Frasure who was busy. He said that the deputies would take up this question at 5:00 Washington time. (End of tape)

I called Tarnoff who was the acting Secretary, I guess Christopher was in Vietnam and I pointed out that the war in Croatia would be a terrible tragedy, that it would lead to the departure of 100,000 Serbs. It would create an ethnically pure Croatia and therefore would undermine our goal of multi-ethnicity in the Balkans and that the population was a rather simple form population of the Krajina shouldn't be punished for their leaders. So, his suggestion was that I use my 5:45 meeting with Tuđman to find out from Tuđman if he planned to launch the war tomorrow. Then perhaps I could get back to him after I heard that from Tuđman so the deputies could consider the response which of course was also ridiculous because we knew that Tuđman was going to launch the war the next day. We'd been told this. It was just a delaying tactic.

Q: One question, you were on this with Babić. Did you feel he carried any, I mean was he the decision maker or was he just a person who you know, the most well meaning of a triumvirate or the equivalent thereof?

GALBRAITH: He was the most well meaning of a triumvirate and he was certainly no saint himself. I don't know whether he would have been able to deliver or not. That's a completely open question. My point simply was that it was worth waiting a few days to find out. I wasn't saying that…. The case I was making was for a few days delay, not that the Croatians shouldn't move, but that we should wait and see if there was some basis for a peaceful settlement.

Q: Was the delay to the benefit of the Krajina Serbs to dig in and all that?

GALBRAITH: No. I mean they had no capability to dig in. It made no military difference whatsoever. After all, I mean, I was the person who two weeks earlier had been advocating the position that the U.S. government adopted, mainly that we would not object to the Croatia military action. It's just that by the end of July the situation on the ground had begun to change. The Serbs, the position of Bihać had gotten much stronger. It was no longer in imminent danger of falling and the question was could we get an agreement in which the Serbs would withdraw from Bihać, the Croatian Serbs and in which they would in turn enter into a process which they understood would have the result of peaceful reintegration into Croatia. I thought it was worth a couple of days to find out. In fact the agreement I had with Babić involved some very concrete steps that he and a Krajina Serb delegation in Geneva was supposed to take, that there was a meeting on the third of August in Geneva between a Krajina Serb delegation and a Croatian delegation which the Croatians deliberately had at a rather low level.

In any event, I did get Chris Hill who was the office director to agree that I could toughen up my talking points. I had a huge problem. Tarnoff had wanted some, wanted me to fax them on a classified fax and just couldn't get the classified fax to work. Eventually I was able to get them to agree to delete some of the weak stuff and to make it somewhat

stronger, although not strong enough to stop the Croatians.

I went up to see Tuđman at 5:45. He was in a very good mood. He listened to my urging that there be, that they consider the peace process. He then said, well, at 6:00 I've got a meeting with the National Security Council. We're going to make the decision about proceeding with the military operation and indeed that was the decision they made. I was in an awkward and I knew that so we had, I mean basically he had listened to what I had to say, but had no intention of acting on it.

There was a huge amount of international and local press around all looking for news. So, I met with them outside of Tuđman's office. There was a stakeout. I had to choose my words very carefully. On the one hand I felt an obligation to Babić to say that we had reached an agreement and to say what the agreement was. On the other hand, I knew that the Croatians hadn't accepted it and there was going to be a war. So, I outlined what the points of agreement were, I think the five points that Babić had agreed to. I then offered my own view that I thought Babić had essentially met Tuđman's conditions, that there should be time to see if the Serbs implemented and that in my view there was no reason for war at the present time. Unfortunately, well, that comment was interpreted to mean that there wasn't going to be a war. Even though in fact I called in Jim Rupert of the Washington Post, Ray Bonner of the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times reporter. I couldn't come out and say there's going to be military action tomorrow, but they would ask me questions like, are you optimistic and I would say, not at all. Nonetheless, the New York Times had a page one story about this brilliant diplomatic move that had prevented a war or to be precise it was a page one story about this, in the early bull dog edition about this brilliant diplomatic coup that had prevented a war. In the later editions it was about how the Croatians had moved militarily in spite of the efforts of the United States and what a slap it was at the United States that they had done this in spite of their urging. Ray Bonner later told me, he said that it was my fault, you tried to warn me, I just didn't pay attention. It was my fault. That didn't stop him a year later from writing a profile of me saying that I had boldly proclaimed that there wasn't going to be a war and then it had turned around that there was, but anyhow.

About 10:00 I was asked if I would come up and see Šarinić, the president's chief of staff, Hrvoje Šarinić. I came up and the appointment was set for 11:30. When I arrived the British ambassador was leaving. I and the German went in and he gave me a letter to President Clinton and he gave the German a letter for Chancellor Kohl from Tuđman in which Tuđman explained the reasons for the military action. Šarinić and I had quite a short debate for the next 45 minutes. He said, our people won't allow, our people won't allow us not to act and I tried to point out that the Serbs were Croatian people as well, were Croatian citizens as well, but obviously I made no headway. So, military action began at about 4:30 the next morning. Actually I learned later that there were Croatian forces that had already penetrated the day before, that is on the 3rd of August. It began at 4:30 in the morning and it was over in about four days.

Q: What was the analysis of why the Krajina Serbs did so poorly?

GALBRAITH: I wasn't, I was not at all surprised because I had been traveling regularly to Knin, both by car and by air and whenever I'd cross the frontline I couldn't help but notice that there was just nobody there. I mean there were Serbs at the checkpoints, but not very many and then you know, looking from the air there were no dug in positions, no discernible population and indeed they had 180,000 people and a huge line to defend with very limited forces. Those who hadn't been there and I would include the analysts from the intelligence community I think vastly overrated their strength because they hadn't really seen it. Second, they didn't have any assistance from the Bosnian Serbs. They didn't have any assistance from Serbia itself. Third, they chose not to fight. They organized an evacuation of the entire population and that's exactly what took place.

Q: Was there any, was the evacuation, I mean as this military four day campaign went through, I mean it was obvious I assume by the first day or two that this was going to be a walkover in other words and what are you going to do about the refugees? Was that your problem or was that the people in Bosnia's problem?

GALBRAITH: Well, the population, most of it left crossing from Serb controlled parts of Croatia, Krajina, into Serb controlled parts of Bosnia. There were scenes of tens of thousands of people on the roads. There were about 40,000 people that were trapped around Topusko by the Croatian forces. Topusko being a town in the northern part of the Krajina and Šušak, the Croatian defense minister, asked if I would help arrange a cease fire that would enable these people to, it was military forces and civilians that would enable these people to be evacuated. Washington didn't want any U.S. role in any of this and they didn't want any help, didn't want me to help on arranging the cease fire either.

Q: What would be the reason for that?

GALBRAITH: I think it was you know the same kind of ambivalence of what the policy was between those who saw that the Croatian military actually was going to be a key to changing the map at a possible settlement and those who were very nervous about anything that widened the war. Now, basically the argument had been won by Bob Frasure by those who wanted a reshuffle of the deck and those who wanted the Croatian military action to go forward, but I think Frasure and others were sufficiently nervous about the other camp that, that the other camp didn't want any U.S. fingerprints on anything, that even an involvement in arranging a cease fire might suggest that the U.S. had some greater role with regard to the Croatian offensive and they didn't want that optic.

Q: We're talking about a domestic political consideration at this point?

GALBRAITH: I wouldn't say it was domestic political in the sense that it, it was within among different factions within the administration and just a general anxiety about what it is we were doing.

Q: How did the conquering of the Krajina go? I mean we must have been looking at it very closely to try to make sure that the Croats didn't do what the Serbs were doing.

GALBRAITH: Yes, we did, unfortunately. They didn't do what the Serbs had done in the sense that they allowed the population to leave. Basically virtually the entire population left before the Croatians took over the territory, but when the Croatians took over the territory, they secured the territory, set up checkpoints and that sort of thing. Then they allowed paramilitaries; gangs and I think even some of the military themselves to systematically burn all the Serbian homes so that the populations who had left would have no opportunity to come back. Their homes were burned, their possessions were looted, their animals were stolen or killed. So, within a short period of time the Krajina was just a wasteland. In '91 the Serbs had expelled the Croats and destroyed their homes, burned them and fired tank rounds through them, stolen their possessions, killed their animals. In '95 the Croatians did the same thing to the Serbs. The result was there were no, in many places, there were no buildings left standing. It was the classic example of Mahatma Gandhi's adage that an eye for an eye leaves everybody blind. This wasn't just spontaneous anger. This was a conscious policy decision to allow this to happen or to facilitate it happening. It is something for which I'm pretty sure Tuđman would have been indicted by the Hague Tribunal had he lived. I mean I know because I was interviewed by them in October of '99 on this point and on the Croatian commander responsibility for what happened. One of the Croatian generals who was in charge of this has been indicted and he's a fugitive. He hasn't surrendered.

There was an incident with these 40,000 people who were trapped in Topusko. On the third day of the offensive, I went down to Petrinja, which was one of the major towns. It had fallen that morning and I went a couple of hours later. It was very interesting to see. It was a bright August day and it was clear that the Serbian defenders had left very suddenly. In the ice cream shop, the ice cream was still there, but it had melted. In the town hall there was a huge pile, a huge delivery of bread and the Croatian government had already moved in, literally it was a Croatian municipal government had moved in to replace the Serbian municipal government, two or three hours after the taking of the town. I asked them, I said, well, did you bring the bread? They said, no, that was delivered to the Serbs in the morning. There was like a picnic table laid out with food and all of a sudden abandoned. There was a child's bike lying on its side and some flowers and a shell. Who knows what happened there? The shell mark. This is also where one of the Danish peacekeepers was killed by the Croatian although in circumstances where the Serbs had taken into their position. Then the guy had stuck his head out to communicate to his captain and when he stuck his head out he had been shot by a Croatian. Then the next day I went down to a place to Sisak and saw hundreds of people who had been prisoners who had been taken prisoner by the Croatians and they were really stragglers. It was a sad lot of people. They were men who were really focused on what had happened to their animals and who would milk the cow and who would feed the horse and that kind of thing. I guess they were really being held until everybody had time to loot all their property. Perhaps they realized that and they were very depressed. They certainly weren't much in the way of prisoners of war. I'm not a terribly fit person, but I could have taken

on the whole army, the whole room of men there single-handedly because of their physical condition. That night or that day an agreement was reached between the Croatians and the UN and these 40,000 trapped people in Topusko that they could pass through the Croatian lines with their possessions and the soldiers with their sidearms and travel on the main highway to Serbia or to sector east that is the eastern part of Croatia that was occupied. The first of these refugee convoys left in the evening. I should get the date. I think it would be the 7th of August. No, sorry I guess it was the 9th of August. As they passed through Sisak a Croatian mob formed and began to attack the refugees. I had already been in Sisak maybe a couple of hours before this took place. I didn't know of it until the next morning when Doug Davidson put an AP story on my desk which described the attack on these refugees and it described the mob throwing bricks through their car windows and a new mother plucking shards of glass out of her baby's blanket. I just was really offended. So, I called up Šarinić and I read him the story and told him that this was completely unacceptable and I began to get worked up and I told him that in a normal democratic country the minister of interior would have resigned or been fired by now.

I had a 12:30 appointment to see Tuđman and so I went up to see him to deliver yet another demarche, this one urging respect of the refugees and also the military restraint in Bosnia. That's a separate issue I'll touch on, but I read the demarche to Tuđman. I was quite angry and then I read him the AP story and then I having liked my lines so much with Šarinić I repeated it. I said, in a normal democratic country the minister of interior should have resigned or been fired by now. Tuđman just went ballistic. He said how hard he was trying to avoid these incidents and all the terrible things that had been done to Croats, all this kind of stuff. So, I said, well, if you're not going to protect the Serbs, then I'm going to have to do something about it. I'll have to go down myself. I realized that once those words had escaped my lips that I probably would have to go do it. So, I got Doug Davidson the PAO and gathered all the press that was around and there was a lot and we went down to Petrinja again where the convoy was. This was in military controlled territory. I had to pass from Petrinja to Sisak where the mob had attacked. Then I thought, well, if I just drive in this convoy with the American flag flying maybe it would provide some protection. The convoy, the refugee column was stopped and I went and talked to various people and gave out water and food and that kind of thing. I got talking to a man on a tractor from Karlovac. He had been a garbage collector. He had recognized me from Croatian TV and in the trailer he had his wife a little three year old boy and a very pretty seven year old girl, something like that, 11 years old maybe. Anyhow so I decided instead of riding in the car I'd ride on the tractor, or the trailer of the tractor. So, I got on and it was quite something. As we got to Petrinja, it was just the hatred on the faces of the Croats and anger. Then people would see me and say, oh, Peter, Galbraith, and I'd wave and their faces would turn to smiles and then they would I think a minute after I passed they said, what is he doing here. But, overall the gesture, the fact that I'd gone had good affect because Tuđman had, you know the last thing he could afford was for something to happen to the American ambassador indeed in my presence. So, there were policemen every 15 yards and the whole convoy got through without any difficulty. Croatian TV though, it didn't show it that night because I think they had to figure out how to portray me, but a few nights later they ran about 10 minutes of me on

the tractor including the point when I was waving my finger at some Croats who were shouting obscenities at the Serbs and probably was something that did permanent damage to my relations with Tuđman.

Q: How did you feel by this time about Tuđman? I mean was he seeing you as the perfect way to get what he wanted? I mean did he feel you were not on his side or not acting the way an ambassador should?

GALBRAITH: I guess from Tuđman's point of view perhaps I became a kind of Frankenstein monster. All the things that, all the "undiplomatic behavior" that I had done earlier that he had liked now he didn't like it. Yet since he had so endorsed it before he was in a position, you know, it made it hard for him to say that I shouldn't do it or even to complain about it now. That is in the early period of my tenure I had gone to Vukovar dramatically stated that this was part of Croatia even though it was Serb occupied. I had traveled along the front lines. I had you know, visited the Croatians whose homes had been destroyed, gone to hospitals, publicly talked with the Croatian military, publicly stood at the edge of the Croatian occupied territory and proclaimed the unity of Croatia and he loved all of this. I think he began to realize that the high profile that I had and indeed the popularity was a two edged sword and now he was seeing the other side of that sword. As far as I was concerned of course, my position and the U.S. position was perfectly consistent. We were opposed to human rights violations when they were inflicted on Croatians and we were equally opposed to them when Croatians inflicted them on others. It just happened that in the first two years '93 to '95 the Croatians were not much in a position to do the inflicting. They were only in a position to be in a position of the victims.

Q: How did you find, I mean you're taking this high profile and all. Did you find that you were having problems with support back in Washington or with the press or something because you know the nail, which sticks out, sticks out gets hammered. I was wondering if you felt that the people at the State Department were beginning to feel well, this guy's really on his own or doing something. Were you getting to feel any problems with this?

GALBRAITH: I mean I'm sure that not everybody was happy about all of this. On the other hand, I chose my battles carefully and a high profile action in defense of refugees of essentially defenseless people is nothing that anybody can complain about on paper or even orally so they might mutter about it. I'm sure there were people who thought I was grandstanding, but they couldn't complain about the substance of it. I think there were people who were unhappy about my role and the visibility in the last minute peace initiative with Babić. On the other hand, I mean that was really a product of confused and uncertain policy making in Washington. If in fact the desire was for the Croatians to go ahead the very simple solution would have been to say don't propose a meeting with the Krajina Serbs, don't accept Babić's alternative proposal to meet in Belgrade. I felt that once I had started on something and once I had gone as in the Babić thing, once I had gotten a commitment from him and once I had said that I would try to use that commitment to head off military action I had an obligation to carry through, a moral

obligation at least. None of this was really capable of being done quietly. That wasn't how any of the parties operated in this conflict. So, once I'd met with Babić that was known and also to some degree I would be betraying him in the hope of peace if I didn't make some statement to the effect that an agreement had been reached and this agreement ought to be a basis for a pause to see if it would be implemented. Again, the other thing is in some ways I think U.S. policy makers found some of this useful. Christopher, for example, in Vietnam was asked about the Croatian military offensive said that his attitude was the same as that of our ambassador in Croatia who had acted on behalf of the U.S. and had left no stone unturned in the search for a peaceful settlement. Holbrooke and for that matter I were able to use the tractor ride as a sign for the Serbs as a sign that we were not one sided, that we were concerned about Serbian suffering and human rights of Serbs, that it wasn't just a concern for the Bosnian Muslims for example.

Q: Now, what about the diplomatic side. I'm thinking of the British, the Germans and the French in Croatia. What were they up to during this crisis?

GALBRAITH: They basically were supportive of what we were doing. I briefed the German ambassador on the various demarches. He had been down at Brijuni with me for this dinner with Tuđman. They were not as active, but they were not giving any contrary position. Essentially the British and the French had a very low profile.

Q: Well, it sounds like this whole thing started that you Americans stay out, this is a European affair, kind of like the fall of Yugoslavia and all the stuff that happened and we Europeans can take care of it and we were delighted. But it sounds like by this time that all the fire, was this Europe as a whole sort of a spent force or not?

GALBRAITH: I think these months beginning in July of '95 through, to December of '95 would probably be the low point of Europe as a political force certainly in the Balkans. Once we moved to peace implementation in Bosnia and as we moved onto Kosovo, Europe again has become much more of a force.

Q: So, we now reach where the Krajina has reverted back to Croatia essentially I mean after 400 years, I mean into real Croatian occupation, hasn't it?

GALBRAITH: That's right. Well, it was always legally part of the Republic of Croatia in Yugoslavia and it was part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, but at this point now it is no longer a Serbian majority region. In fact it's largely depopulated. Tuđman proclaims that the Serbs are *optonzi* meaning they have opted out of being Croatian, they can't be Croatian citizens. He initially issues a decree, I don't think this was passed by the parliament that gave the Serbs 30 days to return home and reclaim their property or the property would be confiscated and belong to the state. As I said in this period everything was burned. Of course there was no possibility that the Serbs could return. It wasn't going to be saved, their homes were burned and the Croatian authorities wouldn't let them back. I, early on you know, began to raise these issues both with Washington and with the Croatians telling them that as far as, that we expect that they treat all their citizens

equally, that the Serbs were citizens of Croatia, that they had the right to return and that they couldn't confiscate their property. In the initial period, August, September, October, and Washington didn't disagree and it was certainly consistent with U.S. policy, but this wasn't much of a priority, however, in the next couple of years this became the major tenant of our relationship with Croatia was our insistence on the right of ethnic Serbs including the right of Serbs from the Krajina to return home.

Q: Was this a, I mean was this one of the things that we said, but we didn't think was going to happen, was this just to be consistent? What was the possibility of this happening?

GALBRAITH: Of course, it has happened now. I mean at least it is happening. When I first began saying it in August of '95 I don't think anybody in Washington was much thinking about it. I guess I said it because I thought it was right because it offended me greatly that Tuđman thought he could just disown people who are Croatian citizens. It offended me that this; his racist ideas of ethnically pure populations might prevail. I also thought it was bad for Croatia the country. I mean, if this kind of approach prevailed in which Croatia would become ethnically homogeneous, ethnically pure, it wouldn't auger well for Croatia evolving into the kind of tolerant, pluralist society that might then be eligible to join the European union and then become part of a greater community. Countries that wish to purge unwanted populations generally are not tolerant. Tolerance is the cornerstone of democracy. So, these were all elements of my thinking, but there was also the fact that there was still the problem of Eastern Slavonia, this Serb held area about 4 percent of the territory in Croatia that had not been taken back in August and which still needed to be resolved. There was an area that had been, had a slight Croatian plurality in 1991 before the war broke out. The Serbs had expelled.

Q: where was this located?

GALBRAITH: It is the far east of Croatia. It consists of three distinct geographic areas. Baranja which is bordered on the east by the Danube and on the south by the Drava which had been part of Hungary until the end of the Second World War. In other words, it had been part of Hungary even after the First World War and had been attached to Croatia in 1945 and had a significant Hungarian population. Then south of the Drava was Eastern Slavonia which was a mixed Croat Serb area, but the Croats had I think a slight plurality and then Western Syrmia around Ilok which is the part of Croatia again along the Danube which juts the furthest into Serbia. It was also this whole area was a mosaic in addition to the Hungarians in Baranja, there were Slovaks who were in Ilok and across the river in Serbia in Bačka Palanka. Czechs, Romani, quite a number of different groups in this region. Anyhow, as I said, it had been taken over by the Serbs in '91 in the bloodiest incident of the Croatian war, which was the siege of Vukovar. Vukovar is the main town in Eastern Slavonia. It had been a beautiful Baroque city, shelled for more than 80 days, destroyed and then when the Serbs took it, they drove out the population and the men who had been in the hospital, the wounded, they took out and shot them. One of the first and worst atrocities of the war. In any event, obviously Croatia wanted to get Eastern

Slavonia back and unlike Krajina; there really was no claim for special self-government in this region because it was not a Serb majority area. It was clear that this issue had to be resolved or there could be another conflict over it. It was at the beginning, well, I should back up and say in the middle of August began the Holbrooke peace shuttle. That was based on the Lake plan which had come up as Operation Storm as the Croatian military offensive was unfolding. Eastern Slavonia was one of the points in the Lake plan mainly that there should be a peaceful settlement providing for the return of Eastern Slavonians to Croatia. Holbrooke at the beginning of the shuttle tended to dismiss Eastern Slavonia. I mean he was really focused on getting a solution in Bosnia and one of the longest discussions we've had. I mean a month long, two month long discussions was my argument to him that could get the Bosnia peace plan without Eastern Slavonia. He believed that it was just a separate problem. He might be able to solve Bosnia and then basically he was prepared to leave Tuđman on his own to deal with Eastern Slavonia. My point to him was the Croatians are in a position to veto any Bosnia settlement unless they get what they want in Eastern Slavonia. The Croatians are not going to sit aside and see all the sanctions on Serbia lifted because of a settlement in Bosnia without there also being a settlement in Croatia and that they have the power to block a settlement in Bosnia because they control what the Bosnia Croats do. Eventually Dick came around to that view and so Eastern Slavonia was solved. It was solved on November 12, nine days before Dayton.

There was one issue that I referred to earlier that I think I need to come back to which was after Operation Storm, the offensive to take the Krajina the Croatians continued into Bosnia. Šušak came to me and said we had a discussion and basically he was trying to find out what I thought about the ongoing military action in Bosnia and I made the point well, the whole reason is that we wanted to see a change in Bosnia so basically we welcomed your actions in support of the Bosnian government in Bosnia. He said, well, I hear that from you, but I'm hearing something different from our people in Washington. It turned out that in fact the State Department was putting out a different line based on a decision at the deputies committee which was that we wanted the Croatian military action as this whole Lake peace initiative, Lake and then later Holbrooke peace initiative began. Well, this was actually the period before Holbrooke before the handoff to Holbrooke, so while Lake was going around to European capitals selling the plan. I got a demarche asking me to raise this with the Croatian government to tell them to stop. I sent a reclama objecting pointing out that already there had been great suffering as a result of the Croatian military offensive. Why would we want it to stop now that it was actually beginning to liberate Bosnian territory where when our objective was in fact to shake up the map of Bosnia and hopefully pave a way to peace? I also pointed out that they were on the verge of taking Prijedor, which is the site of some of the worst ethnic cleansing of the entire war of course, committed by Bosnian Serbs against Muslims. I described it as being the Auschwitz of Bosnia. In the end my objections were not heeded by Lake and so I of course delivered the demarche as instructed. Later when Holbrooke took over he began to realize and he says this in his book that the Croatian and Bosnian military campaigns in late August, September of '95 were helpful to the peace process principally because the peace process was based on the idea that the territory would be divided 51

percent for the Muslim Croat Federation and 49 percent for the Serbs and it was much easier to get the Serbs to accept 49 percent when they held 45 percent as was the case by mid-October than it was when they held 70 percent as was the case in July. When you hold 45 percent, 49 percent looks much more appealing.

Q: Around this time did the bombing start?

GALBRAITH: Well, on the 28th of August, I think there actually before we get to that, it's probably worth a word about the beginning of the Holbrooke mission. Holbrooke came out on the 14th of August to Split where he was going to go to Sarajevo to make the first presentation of the plan. So, I flew down to Split to meet him and the party there was Bob Frasure, Joe Kruzel who was the deputy assistant secretary from the Department of Defense, Wesley Clark and Nelson Drew of the National Security Council staff. I put them up actually not in Split, but in this wonderful 15th Century castle in Marina. It wasn't quite a successful choice because there's only one pay phone and the cell phone coverage didn't extend there. Whenever they were sort of constantly on the one phone to Washington. You can imagine Dick Holbrooke without a phone, but we did have a dinner outside the hotel, scampi and Pristina type of finger mussel and we went over the peace plan. I mean I had some real concerns about what was in the plan. One of them was the notion that Goražde should be.

Q: Srebrenica.

GALBRAITH: It's not a Srebrenica, it's a separate enclave about 20 miles away, 25 miles away that that should be turned over to the Serbs. The Pentagon basically had wanted before it was going to deploy; it had wanted the map of Bosnia to be as compact as possible. I thought there were a number of, that was one major concern and more generally the plan involved lots of incentives and punishments to the parties. If the Bosnian Serbs were to accept the plan and if the, yes, the Bosnian government accepts the plan and the Serbs don't, then we'll lift the arms embargo and arm and strike. If the Serbs accept and the Bosnian government doesn't, then we will basically lift the arms embargo and walk away. In my view part of the problem is that the problem was a military one, not just, it needed a military solution, not just a diplomatic one, therefore, as I reviewed to Holbrooke that we ought to be encouraging pending offensives in the Prijedor area. I also strongly objected to the Goražde language because basically I pointed out to Holbrooke that this is a place where Bosnian Muslims live and now you would be you know, we'd be in a position of advocating a plan that would be tantamount to ethnic cleansing. I thought that was completely unacceptable. He said, well, Izetbegović has agreed that the enclave should be given up. I said, well, it doesn't matter. The question is will the people of Goražde agree. I must say, one of the more impressive things about Holbrooke is that afterwards is that he said., the paper was laid out with the points of the Clinton plan. Clinton had personally endorsed it. On my other point, he said, well, about the military issue, he said, that's decided. Clinton has made the changes, but on the Goražde issue he said, I have enough flexibility and he just took it out of the plan. He never raised it with anybody.

The next day, the 15th, the delegation left early to go to Sarajevo and I went down to Imotski which was the hometown of Miomir Žužul but before I left it was Assumption Day, a big Catholic holiday, we got word that the helicopter couldn't fly into Sarajevo because of the rainy weather. So, they came back to Split and I invited them to go down and join me in Imotski saying it would be a chance to talk to Žužul and Granić. Holbrooke and Clark traveled in my car. We get there. There was an outdoor mass cathedral of about 25,000 people. They recognized me. I think this was the one environment where I was more recognizable than anybody else, so there was lots of applause and so on. Frasure is muttering, "Galbraith, more popular than Christ." We get up to the front and Clark is standing next to me, the cameras are on and Clark says, he's very nervous, "Is it okay for me to be on the cameras?" I couldn't resist. I pointed to the bishop and I said, "Wes, it's okay to be on the camera and if you want to swap hats with that guy, that's okay, too." We then had lunch and Holbrooke got a chance to present the plan to Granić and Žužul which was key that he presented it to them before he presented it to Tuđman because they were then able to work on Tuđman and so Holbrooke kept referring to the fog as the fortuitous fog because he got to make this presentation. Sacirbey then came over, Igman, Holbrooke made his presentation to Sacirbey on the plane sitting on the plane on the ground at the airport. Sacirbey, the Bosnian foreign minister was there in jeans, but taking very careful notes, asking lots of very good questions. Very serious, often he came across as a rather sort of flip personality, but this time he was very focused and good. What Holbrooke's big concern was on that day and particularly from Sacirbey's reaction is that the Bosnians might be more attracted by the failure scenario than by the success. In short, that they may wish that the peace process not work that the Bosnian Serbs do not accept the plan and then they would get military support from the United States and that was one of the concerns.

The next day, the 16th, we went up to see Tuđman. That was really, that was an astounding performance on his part. He sort of, Holbrooke presented the plan and Tuđman basically said that he agreed with all that, then he proceeded to trash the Muslims, trash the federation of the Muslim Croat Federation and the idea of a continuing Bosnian state. One point he said, in English, he usually spoke only in Croatian. There would only be one-way translation with him, so he would listen to you in English, that would never been translated because he understood English very well. He could speak it also very well, but he didn't like to speak it. He would speak in Croatian. Of course, as a technique this gave him quite an advantage.

Q: Oh yes, he would have time to sit back and listen.

GALBRAITH: Yes, he would have time to think about what he was going to say next while he was being translated whereas we didn't have the same advantage, but anyhow. At one point in the conversation, he said in English, "Bosnia will continue first state for now." Then he proceeded to give his big sweep of history about the Islamic threat extending from Kosovo and Sandžak and Bosnia and Croatia was doing the west a favor with its civilizing mission. Then he went on to talk about things that he previously denied

talking about like trading Banja Luka for Tuzla and it was clear to me that while having triumphed, all his old prejudices were out. He just couldn't contain himself. He was at the moment of glory and he thought he could dictate the terms and those terms involved what he always wanted which was to divide Bosnia down the middle. I sent Dick a note saying that we couldn't let all this pass and that this was unacceptable. He wrote me back a note that said, I agree, not now, not here, not yet. I also sent Frasure a note. I said, congratulations, here's your fundamental reshuffle of the deck. Bob sent back a kind of funny note. He said, I'm quite sure Tuđman just came to these conclusions in the last couple of weeks in his long and interesting life. This was where Frasure sent Holbrooke a note which he said, this is our, we hired this guy to be our junkyard dog, no time to go squeamish now. We met with Granić and Žužul in the afternoon. Frasure, Kruzel and I and Drew did and Granić talked about Eastern Slavonia. They were at pains to point out that Tuđman's views on Bosnia, I think they were pretty appalled, were his own, he wasn't speaking for Croatia. We also had a discussion about Eastern Slavonia. That night we had dinner at the residence, Tune and I and she sat next to Nelson Drew and Bob Frasure and opposite Kruzel, Joe Kruzel and she said, you know, afterwards, she said, she's a Norwegian and sort of academic and very skeptical about the U.S. and about diplomats and so on. She said, you know, I'm so impressed because they genuinely seem to want to help. Then they wanted to know things and they genuinely seemed to want to help. That was the 16th. The next day they resumed their trip to Sarajevo and couldn't be on the helicopter across. I guess they went from there to Belgrade those couple of days later. They went from there to Belgrade and then they came back to Split to go to Sarajevo. Jeff Hovanec, one of the embassy staff was there. He was escorting them. I guess he was going from the. I was just trying to put the sequence of events straight, but all of it was quite inauspicious. Jeff who worked in the embassy, a political officer, and was serving as control officer for the Holbrooke team was driving in one of our cars and it flipped over and fortunately he wasn't hurt, but he bumped his head. Then they all took off to I guess the helicopter to the base of Mt. Igman and of course, the story is well known, but Holbrooke and Clark went in the APC, no in the Humvee and the rest of the delegation went in a French APC, which on a turn in the mountain slipped off the road and tumbled over many times. There was ammunition in it and it began to ignite and three of them were killed. In fact the very three that my wife had been talking to: Kruzel, Drew and Frasure. As it was Tune and I were going to take a few days holiday. We were going to rent a yacht from Dubrovnik, which one could do complete with captain at very low prices. In fact, all the yachts had been pulled out of Dubrovnik except for the one we were going to rent because the city was being shelled. It's a bit odd to go on your holiday someplace where you start being shelled, but it was beautiful, a beautiful city. It was August and we were actually, we had flown into Split and we hadn't seen the party that morning, but we were driving down the coast and Jeff called me on the cell phone and asked if I would go to a land line, so I went to a land line. He explained what had happened. So of course I turned around and went up to Split.

Q: I think this is probably a good place to stop because we're moving on. So, we'll pick this up the next time. You've just heard about the death of Frasure and the others. You were driving down the Croatian coast and you were called and so you had to go back

and we'll pick it up at that point.

GALBRAITH: Fine.

Q: Great.

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Q: Today is the 11th of March, 2002. Peter, so we know where you were. I mean you got the word about the tragic deaths of our negotiators, but I mean, what did this mean to you? I'm speaking personally, but job wise, too.

GALBRAITH: Well, it was a personal, well, I'd come to know Bob Frasure over the previous year and some months and he was somebody who was readily accessible, very funny, very sardonic sense of humor, who was respected by everybody who worked with him. Joe Kruzel I didn't know as well, but I'd worked with him as we'd established working groups with the Croatian ministry of defense and Nelson Drew I'd only met at my house a few nights before, but he'd certainly impressed Tune who had talked to him at great length with the fact that he genuinely seemed to want to know what was the right thing to do, the way he went about trying to collect information. Actually at that point we only knew that Frasure and Drew were dead. Kruzel had been injured, but by the time we got up to Split, Rosemarie Pauli, Holbrooke's assistant told me that indeed Kruzel had died as well.

Q: Then what sort of, did this set anything back, or what did it do?

GALBRAITH: Most immediately it set things back in the sense that the shuttle mission was put on hold and a new team had to be reconstituted. Holbrooke and Wes Clark and Rosemarie went back with the, on their plane with the bodies of the fallen colleagues and also with the two State Department officers, Dan Gerstein who was, not State Department officers, but with Dan Gerstein who was a lieutenant colonel who was a military assistant to Clark and who had survived and been in the APC and Pete Hargreaves the security officer, the RSO from Sarajevo. They came back. I think the accident served to solidify Holbrooke's determination. I think it got President Clinton more personally engaged. He came back from holiday in Wyoming for a memorial service that was at Fort Meyer and then there was a meeting with a new team just after the service. I wasn't there. I had stayed in Croatia throughout. I guess professionally I mean the loss of Bob Frasure was a real one. We'd had a very good working relationship over the year plus that he had been the special mediator envoy for Bosnia and he was replaced by Chris Hill who had been the office director for South Central Europe and Chris had a more abrasive personality. He gave more of the impression of a young man in a hurry whereas Bob was more relaxed and I'd had a good working relationship with him, so I think there was in addition to the personal loss, there was a professional loss.

Q: Time wise, I mean what was happening? I mean in Sarajevo, how did things develop

there?

GALBRAITH: Basically in the second half of August and beginning, well, no, second half of August, the Croatian army was moving. It had taken the former Serb-held Krajina and was moving into Bosnia and was making progress. There were instructions that I was asked to carry out to tell the Croatians to stop on the grounds that one shouldn't be negotiating, shouldn't be having military actions while negotiating peace. These were instructions that I thought were ridiculous and I tried to get them changed. The reason I thought they were ridiculous it was in fact the changing situation on the ground that was going to create the opportunity for peace, but it was hard to get focus on that in this particular time period. Lake still had a big say in the process. Holbrooke didn't have the kind of bureaucratic or personal support that he was going to get later in the process and certainly that he had after it was over. Actually Holbrooke and I had a conversation in Split in the VIP lounge as the arrangements were being made for the transfer of the bodies on the helicopters to the plane and I think before he went off to talk to the press. He was very negative about the peace plan that he'd been asked to present and he'd said that Bob Frasure was negative about it. I was very negative about it. In the end I think it was Holbrooke's achievement that he was able to take that plan which had been crafted by the NSC and by Lake and to make something out of it that in many ways was quite different from what that plan originally entailed.

Q: Well, when you think, just to get a feel for this. The NSC, Tony Lake, what was there, was it just that they were out of touch or did they have a certain, their own agenda, what was the feeling that you all had?

GALBRAITH: This was a process that involved endless concession to accommodate different bureaucratic interests in Washington and in an environment where basically the policy had been in shambles that summer notably with the fall of Srebrenica. It was my impression that while they would work up all these plans and proposals that made everybody happy or would be a satisfactory compromise to the different interagency actors, they became increasingly divorced from the reality in the Balkans. What the plan that Lake came up with the seven points involved complicated, it first involved a number of, it had a number of different elements for a peace plan, the 51 49 territorial split. It involved that the Bosnian government giving up Goražde an element that I talked about last week, which Holbrooke took out. It had a reference to a settlement of Eastern Slavonia based on the Z-4 plan that is the Croatian peace plan that I'd been working on the previous year. Then an elaborate system of incentives depending on how the different parties would respond. If the Bosnians were cooperative and the Serbs were not, then there would be a lifting of the arms embargo training and equipping of the Bosnian government. If the Bosnians were not cooperative then the arms embargo would be lifted and the UN forces would simply leave. There were a lot of different permutations to it. It also depended in my view too much on a vision of Milosevic as a reasonable actor who, it skirted the fact that he was responsible for all that had happened, or for so much of what had happened. What was the great success was not this plan. The great success was the fact that what happened in August and September when the military situation on the

ground changed so that by time the cease fire went into effect in early October the Bosnian government and the Croatians, the Bosnians and the Croatians controlled something on the order of 57 percent of Bosnia and it was a lot easier to get Serbs to agree to take 49 percent when in fact they actually held 43 percent than it was to get them to accept 49 percent when they actually held 70 percent.

Q: I've heard people say one of the things was you couldn't do anything with air power alone and then people would at that point point to Bosnia so you didn't have an army on the field. They said you really did, you had the Croatian army. I mean were you working to cause restraints? They were going after Bihać weren't they?

GALBRAITH: Well, this debate was certainly one that I had with Snuffy Smith the NATO commander in AF SOUTH and with Chuck Boyd who was in CINCEUR. That was their argument, air power wouldn't work. Those of us who were advocating air strikes ignored the fact that there wasn't an army on the ground and precisely the argument that I made in returning is yes, there is an army, it's not American, it's not NATO, it's the Croatian army and also the Bosnian army. As to restraint, we basically had told the Croatians that we would not object if Croatia moved military to take the Croatian territory; Serb held Croatian territory that was between government territory and Bihać. In other words, we wouldn't object if Croatia took military action against the Krajina that resulted in breaking the siege of Bihać. The issue was Croatian, further Croatian military action in central Bosnia of the Livno Valley. Taking places like Jajce which they did. Then possibly going on would they take Manjača and Banja Luka.

Q: What was the Bosnian army? Was the Bosnian army beginning to take shape and was it becoming a real factor. How did you see it?

GALBRAITH: It was a real factor, but it was definitely less strong than the Croatian army and much less capable of concerted of extending itself of moving and holding territory. The Bosnian army basically had been a defensive army. It wasn't particularly mobile. It didn't have a lot of equipment. It didn't have a lot of heavy weapons. One of the things that I'd worked on was to encourage in cooperation between the Bosnian and the Croatian armies in the summer of '95 and the conversations I had with Croatian defense minister Šušak in these periods was to make sure that the Croatians would support the Bosnians, particularly providing artillery support.

Q: Did the fact that Milosevic had made no move to help the Krajina when it was threatened, did that have any effect on the Bosnian Serbs' morale, efficiency or anything else? I mean at that time were you seeing a message had been delivered that Milosevic was cutting his losses?

GALBRAITH: I think that probably they did take that message. Beyond that the Bosnian Serb army basically had never been tested in battle against another organized military force. I mean it had proven that it was quite capable of moving into villages and towns and organizing mass killings.

Q: The Serbian army?

GALBRAITH: Bosnian Serbian army, yes. Mass killings, rapes, expelling people, but an army that engages in that kind of behavior I never thought was likely to be a very efficient fighting force and they certainly proved that they were not. One of the other events that took place was on August 28th when a shell landed in Sarajevo, one mortar near the covered market and killed something on the order of 30 people and that then led NATO to the UN to turn the key and NATO to begin the air strikes and these air strikes were not sort of one off, they were sustained. They went on for three weeks and it was during those three weeks basically because the Bosnian Serbs had to keep their heads down because their communications were being destroyed because their command-and-control was being destroyed. The Croatian army and to a lesser extent the Bosnian army was able to roll over essentially undefended territory in the western part of Bosnia.

Q: Was this decision, what brought about this, from your perspective, I mean there had been lots of massacres and everything else. Why was this market mortar so important? It was, but why?

GALBRAITH: The previous market mortar had led to the ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of the heavy weapons in February of '94 and warning that there would be military action if another such attack took place. Fundamentally this came after Srebrenica. It came after the humiliation of the UN in May where hostages had been taken. It came at a time where UN troops had been withdrawn from all the safe areas. It came after the London declaration, which had put the Serbs on notice of a more forceful response to such attacks. So, I think it wasn't surprising. I mean people were really looking for an opportunity to pay these guys back for what had happened in Srebrenica. Again, I would give Holbrooke and his team credit for keeping Washington's feet to the fire, as for keeping the military campaign going. They recognized or they came to recognize that this was actually going to be useful.

Q: Were you getting any pressure prior to this from the Croatians? Why don't you guys use your air power and do stuff?

GALBRAITH: No. The attitude of the Croatians certainly at this stage was that they could do everything they needed on their own. In some ways they were becoming quite arrogant. Even before they didn't lecture us or push the way the Bosnians did.

Q: Did you have the feeling that I mean obviously every country or group has its own agenda and there was a certain feeling that things were not going their way and that we would just muck things up as far as they were concerned because we might make them concede things that they could grab. Did you feel that sort of a big land grab was in the works?

GALBRAITH: I think more than anything they wanted to be seen as our partner. They

wanted to be our ally in the region. Tuđman often spoke of the Bosnians being a cross that he would bear on behalf of the west meaning in particular on behalf of the United States. Yes, I think the Croatians were also engaged in a land grab. One of the things that concerned me enormously is that the territory that was being taken in Bosnia was mostly being taken by the Croatian army and it was mostly areas that the Croatians that were Croatian interest territory. I was afraid that we would end up with a situation in which the Croats in Croatia would have 30 percent or 40 percent of Bosnia. The Serbs would have 40 percent and the Bosniaks would have 20 percent. It's one reason that I strongly objected to instructions that called for an end to the military action because I felt that it was important that the Bosnians have an opportunity to take some of the places that had been majority Muslim and that were of very significant psychological importance to them partly places like Sanski Most, and Prijedor. I also was afraid that if Croatia got too much of a land grab in Bosnia that Tuđman would never give it up. If it was, I felt he was a pragmatic character so that he wasn't going to make a big stand over something relatively small so that if it was shall we say 25 percent Croatian and 25 percent Bosnian and that needed to be adjusted to make it 28 percent Bosnian and 22 percent Croatian I thought he would do that. What I was more concerned with again was that if he got his hands on all the territory that he thought should be part of greater Croatia having achieved this dream that it might be very hard to get him to pull back the fingers that were grasping to this dream.

Q: While all this was going on from the very beginning, were you ever thinking or were people around you saying, what the hell are we trying to do to create this Bosnia Herzegovina? Why not have a greater Croatia and a greater Serbia and let the Muslims and the Bosniaks I mean because in a way an awful lot was being made for a relatively small group of people within the greater Yugoslavia to create a place for them.

GALBRAITH: That discussion never took place within the embassy. It never took place among the people in the administration who were really working the issue full time. I think we were all fully committed to the idea of preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state within its international boundaries. I think there were a number of reasons for it. First, and I give you my reasons, but I think they were shared. First, Bosnia Herzegovina had become an independent state. It had been internationally recognized. It was a member of the United Nations. It would do great damage to the kind of world system that we believed in. It would do great damage to the post-World-War-Two system if neighboring states were able to get away with, were able to succeed at gobbling up the territory or part of the territory of a state that was a member of the UN and in fact if you think about it, since 1945 that basically has not happened. States have been unable to occupy and successfully annex territory that belonged to- (end of tape)

Q: One is continuing today in Israel.

GALBRAITH: That's the obvious counter example. The first point I make it is virtually the only one and second legally, the territory in question wasn't actually recognized as part of other UN members. In other words, Egypt was administering the Gaza Strip; it

wasn't part of Egypt. Jordan was administering the West Bank; it wasn't part of Jordan. The one territory that does belong to another state is the Golan. Certainly Israel's annexation has not been recognized by anyone. That was one reason.

The second reason is that what took place in Bosnia was not the result of choice by the people of Bosnia, it was the result of ethnic cleansing and genocide. It was the product of horrific crimes. While I can accept a right of self-determination, I cannot accept the right that a group within a country or a group backed in this case by a foreign country, by Serbia, can come in and kill, expel the previous inhabitants and then declare that they have a right of self-determination. That's just morally reprehensible. I think that this judgment was shared by all of us who were working on this issue. One of the arguments that I had with David Owen in the year and a half previous when we were working on various peace initiatives, not always in parallel was that he constantly wanted to redraw the boundaries of these countries and I thought that set a very dangerous precedent. For example, I think he contributed significantly to the demise of the Z-4 plan, the Croatia peace plan, because he wanted, he didn't want Eastern Slavonia to be part of it because he hoped that he could engage in a territorial exchange relating to Eastern Slavonia. He had ideas to solve the problem of Brčko in the northeast of Bosnia by granting the Serbs a corridor through Gurnia, which is on the north side of the Sava in which Croatia would give up territory. At one point he actually was proposing that that territory not go to Bosnia or to the Bosnian Serbs, but to Serbia itself because the Bosnia Serbs were being uncooperative. I think our position, which was to insist on the existing borders, was much sounder. It provided the basis for a settlement that ultimately everybody was prepared to accept. If we had ever begun to open the question, reopen the question or open the question or borders, we would really have opened a Pandora's box. Incidentally, Tuđman was prepared to do territorial exchanges. He was actually I think prepared to give up Croatian territory. Repeatedly he would tell me with regard to Prevlaka, which is the southern tip of Croatia that juts into Kotor Bay where Yugoslavia had its navy that he was prepared to, he wanted to know whether. He constantly was asking me whether NATO and the United States cared if Croatia held on to this territory. I think he wanted, kept wanting me to say that this was strategic valuable territory because it controlled the access to the bay where the Yugoslav navy was. I declined to do so. It was clear that he was also trying to, you know, he was considering whether he should trade this territory or give it up in some kind of deal with Serbia.

Q: Did you get any feel for, it wasn't your territory, but you were obviously intermittently involved with it, Izetbegović's role and how he was at this particular time?

GALBRAITH: Well, I saw a lot of Izetbegović as well. I saw him at Sarajevo. I saw him; I could see him when he came through Zagreb. I would see him at international events. I mean I always thought of him as being, I mean he certainly was different from Milosevic and Tuđman. Those were the two nationalists. Izetbegović was a much gentler person. He didn't have all the, he didn't have the forceful personality of Milosevic or Tuđman. In that sense some of the other Bosnian leaders were more attractive leaders. Notably Silajdžić, the prime minister who was probably the Bosnian leader with whom I was the

closest. I think Izetbegović was fundamentally a decent man. He was more capable of being intimidated. It was interesting to see the different styles that Holbrooke used with these three different leaders Milosevic, Tuđman and Izetbegović. With **Milosevic** it was a mixture of camaraderie, New York street talk, playing on Milosevic's nostalgia about his banker days, you know, playing to the fact that Milosevic spoke fluent English, he liked to use terms like "bullsheet" combined with some threats and tough talk. With Tuđman, Holbrooke always played to his vanity. Basically he'd come in and say, "Oh, I've just been talking to Milosevic and I've been talking to that Izetbegović" as if Izetbegović was a kind of inferior creature, "but you, President Tuđman, you're the visionary here, you're the, can I get your thoughts as a great strategist and historian on the problem?" It worked and Tuđman would eat it up.

I think the funniest thing was Holbrooke and I had talked at some length about who should represent Croatia in Dayton. I had given him my assessment based on what I'd seen in previous negotiations including the Washington agreement that ended the Muslim Croat war was that Granić, although the foreign minister, although seemingly mild mannered, really was a capable negotiator and the way the Tuđman government worked was that Granić could operate quite independently and could make deals, he had a good sense of where Tuđman was and basically Tuđman would back him up. So, on the other hand Granić had a lot more progressive views and was a lot easier to deal with. I said to Holbrooke, basically Granić is the man that you want at the head of the delegation in Dayton, not Tuđman. Granić and Šušak, the defense minister. Holbrooke agreed with that, but how do you accomplish that? So, basically he came to Tuđman and he said, "Oh, great President Tuđman, we're going to have this conference in Dayton. We'd like you to be there at the opening and we'd like you to be there when we need you, but I know how busy you are and what other important jobs you have, so we wouldn't expect you to have to stay the whole time. Unlike that you know, unsaid, but implicit unlike that Izetbegović and Milosevic who are kind of below your level and will have to be there." So, he was flattered at being at this higher level when in fact of course the whole plan was for him not to be there the whole time. With Izetbegović , Holbrooke could be more threatening and Izetbegović was a more vulnerable character and people would yell at him and he would be taken aback by it.

Q: In a way did you feel that one had to be careful with Izetbegović because it was easier to pick on him and as a negotiator you don't want to just go after the soft target?

GALBRAITH: Well, I think a lot of people thought that. I mean I again, of all the three the one I liked the most was Izetbegović and I was most sympathetic to the Bosnian cause. Basically I viewed Izetbegović favorably. I was understanding of the enormous pressures he was working with and the weakness of the hand that he had so I guess some of the other people were more looked down on more, but not me. The Bosnians were quite divided. They didn't have and this was a handicap. They didn't have the sort of vision and clear lines of leadership that existed in Croatia. Without a doubt the best led of these three countries was Croatia. This doesn't mean that I like where Tuđman was leading Croatia, but as a leader he was by far the best in the sense that he had a vision, he

knew where he wanted to go, he recruited capable people in whom he had confidence and he let them carry out the work and they did so more or less within his general direction. Milosevic was also I think not a particularly good leader. He had a handful of people, was sort of chums, he had to make every decision. I think and he didn't, he had no vision. His decisions were not particularly orderly.

Q: When the air strikes came in about three weeks, did you get involved with the Croatians asking them where we should be putting our bombs or was this a complete bypass?

GALBRAITH: The bombing was in Bosnia and we had, there were predetermined target sets so no, I didn't ask the Croatians where we should be bombing and nor did they have any input nor do I think they would have had any, nor would they have had anything particular to add at that point, too. In time now these target sets were developed from all sources and the Croatians provided lots and lots of intelligence to us.

Q: The bombing went on for about three weeks and what happened?

GALBRAITH: Several things happened. First, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to end the siege of Sarajevo. They agreed to withdraw their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo. They did withdraw their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo and those were the major achievements in the ending of the siege. Holbrooke moved quickly at the end of this siege to try to make the point that it was over. He had wanted me to; this was on the 20th of September, to organize delivery of goods to Sarajevo and not just humanitarian goods, but commercial goods. I think around September 25th I flew into Sarajevo with Brian Atwood the administrator of AID. Part of this effort was to try and get the city back to normal as quickly as possible.

Q: The Dayton peace process, how was it viewed from Zagreb?

GALBRAITH: There really were two tracks to what was going on and in which I had a role. The first track was the Bosnian peace process which was what Holbrooke was doing. That involved these triangular missions of Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Zagreb and perhaps in some ways the main action was Belgrade. I mean getting, that more time was spent with Milosevic than with Tuđman by a huge margin because that's where the concessions need to be made. Zagreb was more of a center in terms because the UN was headquartered there. In the early days of the war that's where the media was, but I guess the media at this stage was as much in Belgrade and perhaps even more in Sarajevo.

The second track was one for which I was principally responsible which was to negotiate a peace agreement between Zagreb and the rebel Serbs or the local Serbs who had 4 percent of Croatia in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Slavonia that is the far east of the country, Vukovar. So, in this period, I would find myself on my own shuttle between Zagreb and Erdut which is a little village outside of Vukovar were I would meet with the local Serbs, and then participating with Holbrooke in his shuttle whenever he

came to town, which was two or three times a week.

Q: How did you see the role on this thing? Was it the Croatians were I mean what sort of role in the Dayton thing did you see them playing? I mean it's three sides, well, it's the United States, and then it's four sided.

GALBRAITH: The Croatian role at Dayton in the period leading up to Dayton, at Dayton was the and indeed the whole two years, was important because it was the swing role. They were the ones who were capable of making things happen. By the time we were getting to Dayton they were also looking like the big winners. On the one hand, that made them more confident, made it in some ways they could be relied on to be more responsible. On the other hand, they were the least willing to compromise on matters of their own vital interests.

Q: I mean while these things were going on sort of in this compound in Dayton, Ohio, were you getting cables saying why don't you tell Tuđman to tell his people this or that?

GALBRAITH: The timing I think and perhaps a word about that. The shuttle began on the 14th of August and then the accident I think was like the 18th or 19th of August and it resumed around maybe the beginning of September. It was the beginning of September.

Q: This was '95?

GALBRAITH: '95.

Q: 95, yes.

GALBRAITH: There was basically eight weeks of shuttle diplomacy. Holbrooke flying from Sarajevo, Belgrade, Zagreb. Dayton then began on the first of November and went for 21 days. A great deal of what was accomplished in Dayton had actually been accomplished before then. The first of these was a meeting in early September in Geneva with the foreign ministers, Milutinović of Yugoslavia, Sacirbey of Bosnia and Granić of Croatia at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in which they agreed to some fairly far reaching basic principles. One of which was everybody agreed that Bosnia Herzegovina would continue as a single state. Second, that it would have two entities. One being the Republika Srpska which was the first time that name was recognized and the other being the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that there be common institutions and so on. Then those were elaborated in a meeting in New York on the 25th of September with further agreed principles. There was a process that was laying down a lot of the stuff that was being elaborated at Dayton.

Now, I think I should say something about the Croatia peace process. First a word on the Croatia peace process. At the end of August I got word from Babić, who is the more moderate of the Krajina Serb troika, saying that he would be interested in seeing me, that I suggested we meet in Eastern Slavonia. The Eastern Slavonian Serbs however, sent

back word saying Ambassador Galbraith is welcome anytime to Eastern Slavonia, but not for the purposes of meeting Babić who is not welcome here. They also no longer referred to themselves as the Republika Srpska Krajina, but instead as the municipality of Vukovar, as their regional government, I forget now exactly what term they used. I had consulted with the others in the Z3 process and with the Croatians. The others in the Z-4 process, who were at this point were Z3 and also with the Croatians. Basically they made it clear, the Croatians made it clear that they were not interested in this international mediation process. They wanted a U.S. mediation. So, on the 5th of September I went out and I met with the leadership of the local Serbs and basically told them that if there was going to be a peace settlement it would have to be a settlement within Croatia. They said what they wanted was a blue zone or a UN administration for five years followed by a referendum without ever being clear what the referendum was on. It was obvious to me that the Croatians would never accept a referendum and that then began a process of negotiation. A week later I went out and met with a smaller group including Milan Milutinović who was the head of this delegation and at the press conference that we had afterwards he said, well, there are two options. One option is that there be a UN blue zone for five years and then a referendum and then the other option would be that we would have a peace settlement within Croatia. We'd prefer the blue zone, but we're prepared to be open to consider both options. That to me was a critical admission that they were prepared to contemplate being part of Croatia.

There were some bumps in this process. One of them was I had the idea that I would work off of the Z-4 plan because the Z-4 plan had a chapter that related to Eastern Slavonia which basically would have granted it, which would have reintegrated fully into Croatia over a UN administered transition period. Reintegrated it because our position in drawing up the Z-4 plan was self-government only went to those areas that had had a Serb majority in 1991 in Eastern Slavonia had to have a Croat plurality. But, that the Serbs would also have certain provisions for autonomy as provided for in the Croatian constitution. Now those provisions of the Croatian constitution had been related to what Croatia had been prepared to offer the Krajina. It involved a transfer then on the theory that if Eastern Slavonia had a Serb majority or those parts of it, those municipalities that had Serb majority then they ought to get the same level of autonomy. It was a fairly small amount of autonomy. It wasn't as if they had their own parliament or anything like that, but they got some control over education and culture and that kind of thing. The interesting thing was at this stage was that Šarinić who was the lead Croatian negotiator, the president's chief of staff, he, the Croatians rejected applying the provisions of their own constitution. My basic view in September was tough, we'll just jam this down the throats of the Croatians and that we would present a plan that was based on the Croatian constitution and again the chapters of the Z-4 plan. I think I made a considerable mistake on a couple of grounds. First, it turned out that Holbrooke and the administration was not nearly as willing to play tough with the Croatians as I was. They didn't have the same calculation that I did which is that the Croatians, that if we pressured the Croatians enough they would concede. This was understandable. Their primary focus was on Bosnia.

Second, I think it may have been unnecessary to have had made the references to the Croatian constitution and to the international peace plan, the international peace plan basically had gone by the boards with the Serbian takeover of the Krajina. While there were parts of it relevant to Eastern Slavonia, they had not been the primary focus of discussion when the plan was on the table. Secondly, the whole plan had been I think quite discredited in Croatian eyes.

Then the third point about the Croatian constitution I think I insisted on this formula. Well, the reason I went with it initially was because I thought surely the Croatians won't have any problem accepting provisions of their own constitution. Initially when I had drawn up this approach I had drawn it up not making reference to the Croatian constitution to make those autonomy provisions more attractive to the Serbs. I thought I could say to the Serbs, "Look, here are autonomy provisions I'm prepared to try to get for you" and that they would be impressed. In fact they were impressed without ever having to tell them that those were already there in the Croatian constitution. So, I was very surprised when the rejection came from the Croatian side and not the Serbian side. At that point I think my own stubbornness kicked in. My thought was, how can these bastards reject the terms of their own constitution? Basically two things happened. First, the Croatians then decided that they would move off of having me as the mediator and go back to having Thorvald Stoltenberg the UN mediator and Stoltenberg had felt shut out of the game. He was eager to get back in even if it was destructive of the U.S. led mediation process. I learned that Šarinić was working with Stoltenberg to set up a meeting at the end of September in Beli Manastir, that is in Serb-held territory where Šarinić was going to come and present the Croatian peace plan which basically told the Serbs, you will be part of Croatia and tough. I could see that this was going to set off a disaster that is that Šarinić would come out and tell the Serbs, basically you don't have any choice, surrender to us. The Serbs would come back and say and our plan is that there is a UN administration for five years and a referendum, which is going to be completely unacceptable to the Croatians. I thought then the Croatians would say, well, we did everything we could for peace. We offered our plan, the negotiations broke down, the Serbs weren't serious and this would give them the pretext to take the Eastern Slavonia militarily as they had taken the Krajina. I thought Stoltenberg was setting himself up for disaster. I went over and had breakfast with him at the Intercon and I made this case and I must say to his credit he immediately recognized the potential disaster. So, he agreed to postpone the Beli Manastir meeting, but in order to get him to do that I had to invite him to join my mediation effort, something that Holbrooke criticized me for doing, but anyhow.

Šarinić was furious that the meeting was postpone which really confirmed for me the idea that he had wanted to use it as an occasion to deliver an ultimatum rather than begin negotiations. It turned out that the partnership with Stoltenberg was very good. Stoltenberg didn't have a lot of specific ideas on the content of the peace agreement. So, he left all of that to me and he left to me virtually all of the negotiating. He would come in as kind of the wise man almost as if he wasn't on the same side as me which of course he was, but as if he were some independent older, wise negotiator having heard all of this,

he'd say, well, to the Serbs, well, I've listened to what Ambassador Galbraith has had to say and I've listened to what you've had to say and I've thought a lot about it and on the whole I think you should consider Ambassador Galbraith's points. Of course these were points that Stoltenberg and I had worked up together. It worked with the Serbs.

At the end of September, another person, another thing that happened was the British Ambassador Gavin Hewitt came to see me and he said, "Look."

Q: This was the British ambassador?

GALBRAITH: In Croatia.

Q: In Croatia, yes.

GALBRAITH: "Šarinić is very upset about your proposed comprehensive plan, that is the one which used the Croatian constitution and the Z-4 plan. He says that if you go forward they'll take military action. I think you should back off of this and just try and get agreement on some basic principles." Initially I resisted that advice again because I thought they ought to be able to accept their own constitution. That was the route I ultimately went down. On October 3rd we went out to Erdut. Jeff Hovanec, who worked for me, had prepared some basic principles, ten principles. I'd reworked some of them, particularly strengthening language on human rights and basically in sort of two, in proximity talks with the Serbs and the Croatians, not face to face negotiations, but meeting with the delegations separately, got them to agree to the principles. The Croatians wanted one more, which we got so ultimately the list of basic agreed principles was 11. Those principles provided that there would be a transition period under UN administration for the area. They provided that all persons who had been displaced from the region would have the right to return home, meaning that Croats who had been driven out could come back. It provided that all persons who were in the region, i.e., Serbs from other parts of Croatia would have the right to return to their homes in other parts of Croatia and to recover their property. It provided that all citizens of the region would be treated on a nondiscriminatory basis. Again, that anybody who had property would get the property back or compensation if it couldn't be returned. It provided that Croatian institutions such as banks and post offices would be reestablished during the transitional period. It provided that there be an ethnically police force and finally it provided that there would be local elections before the end of the transitional period. Both sides accepted it and that was in fact formal acceptance by the Serbs that they would be reintegrated into Croatia. It was a huge breakthrough.

Holbrooke was in Belgrade. I think it caught him and Milosevic by surprise. Over the ensuing months, Milosevic held back on the finalization of an agreement because I think he wanted to use Eastern Slavonia for more leverage, but the fact is that when a final agreement was concluded on the 12th of November it was virtually identical to these agreed basic principles, although in the ensuing month I tried a number of different formulae to elaborate them and to make it more detailed without any success. So the final

agreement was basically the same one that was negotiated on October 3rd.

There was an amusing incident in all this. When I was doing the shuttle to Eastern Slavonia, to Erdut, basically what I'd do I'd fly out either in a UN helicopter or the Croats loaned one of their government Learjets so we'd fly from Zagreb from the airfield in Osijek and then be met by UN vehicles and cross through the checkpoints and go into Serb territory and go to the headquarters to this little villa in Erdut. A very lovely little Eastern Slavonian villa. When I did that I then was unreachable because the cell phones didn't work and there were no telephone lines between Serbia and Croatia and this was connected to the Serbian phone system. At one point when I was there Holbrooke had wanted to reach me. This was in September and he had been unable to reach me. So, Wes Clark had offered to provide me with a team of, an army team with all these satellite communications so that people could reach me. I had this team and it was deployed outside of the villa and it was never used because Holbrooke basically knew nothing about the content of Eastern Slavonia negotiations nor did anybody in Washington. So, there was really nobody to talk to about any of the content points. Having this team impressed the hell out of the Serbs because it exemplified the power of the United States. Periodically, they had a tent and so on, so periodically I'd go out and I'd talk to the communicators and sort of go into the tent as if I was using the phone even though I wasn't. The one time I did use it was on October 3rd when we had concluded this agreement. I thought well this is good news, I'll call Holbrooke. I got him on the plane as he was flying to see Milosevic. He was thinking of the moves ahead. So, he said, "Well, are you going to announce this?" I said, "Yes, the press is here." He began to go into how it wouldn't be a good idea to have a press conference. Well, the reality of the situation was there was nothing I could do about that. First Stoltenberg wasn't going to take his instructions from Holbrooke. I couldn't get Stoltenberg not to hold the press conference. The Serbs and the Croats wanted the press conference. I had to arrange in mid-conversation with the communicators to disconnect. It was simply because, it was too complicated to explain it to work the whole thing out and there was no way I could avoid. I didn't want to get an instruction not to have a press conference because I couldn't carry out that instruction. I mean I could not participate, but that would only make things worse.

Q: Well, this is interesting, I mean this is a significant slice of territory that we're talking about.

GALBRAITH: Oh, yes.

Q: But it sounds like you were almost completely off the Washington radar which of course is a delight because my experience in the lowly position of a consular officer, you never ask Washington for advice unless you want a delay and if you're willing to accept something that you really can't live with. You have to be very careful about this.

GALBRAITH: Well, that was exactly right. I described this as the phenomena, the shadow of the bright light. The shadow of the spotlight. Everyone was focused on Bosnia

at this stage. It was the number one foreign policy issue of the United States in the fall of 1995 and so in the Pentagon, in the NSC, in State, people were looking at what Holbrooke was doing with a microscope and the joint chiefs. Now, State wasn't a problem because that was Holbrooke's turf and he had that under control, but he certainly had rivals and people that didn't trust him in NSC and in the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs. His genius was to bring that team together which he had described at the beginning of this process on August 14th when we'd had this dinner that I described in Castija in Marina at the castle. That team wasn't his team; they were there to spy on him, that's how he put it. He converted that team into extensions of his personality and they were able to help him get confidence of the other elements in the bureaucracy and in some ways and also he didn't report in writing. So, in some ways he avoided the micromanaging. I avoided it because obviously the same people in our government who work on Bosnia on a policy level were those that work on Croatia. They were all focused on Bosnia and therefore, none of them aside from the Croatia desk officer who I had recruited, who was on my side, there was nobody who had any independent thought on Croatia. As I say, it's kind of the spotlight effect. When you're just out of the spotlight it's very dark or it's dark at least in relative terms. So, I never got aid. In this whole process there wasn't a substantive word from anybody in Washington in the substance of what went into the Eastern Slavonia peace agreement. Now, we had some discussions on how to factor this into the overall peace initiative, but you know, as to what words might be in that agreement, what guarantees, policy decisions that I kept insisting on like the right of all Croatian citizens to return to anyplace in Croatia, the right of people to recover their property, no input at all.

The agreement on October 3rd was 11 points; the final agreement was 14 points. Of the 14 points, seven of them related to human rights, principally for ethnic Serbs in Croatia and it has to be said that neither the Serbs nor the Croatians ever asked for any of those points. Those were simply things that I insisted had to be part of the agreement.

Q: You know, when you were getting into this, I think we covered it before, but by this time had the Croatians gotten their act together? Were there nasty concentration camps or were they treating Serbs as prisoners of war in normal terms?

GALBRAITH: Basically the Krajina population, the Krajina Serb population had all fled and there were very few of them who had been captured and I think they had allowed almost all of those to go to Serbia or Bosnia. There were not Croatian run camps being held by Serbs in which Serbs were held.

Q: You didn't have the Croatian equivalent of Arcon and that kind of thing, a sort of criminal militia groups going out and doing things?

GALBRAITH: There was some of that. Whoever had been burning the Krajina clearly there were paramilitary groups, but the Arcon equivalents within Croatia had basically been in '91 when they had engaged in some massacres of Serbs and also there were Bosnian Croats paramilitary/criminal gangs that were doing things more in Bosnia than in

Serb-held, than in Croatian territory that had been recovered from the Serbs. Arcon, however, was present in Eastern Slavonia. For example, we came across the line and then drove through fields and then vineyards to go to this little villa in Erdut. We would be on the main road that would go to I guess to Vukovar and we would take a left at the Arcon's gas station and whorehouse. We'd just be a mile up the road from that.

Q: Well, after these agreements had been reached, these essentially were put together into what was called the Dayton Package?

GALBRAITH: No. This was the Erdut agreement and it was separate from Dayton. Dayton concerned only Bosnia. Erdut concerned Croatia. It was done November 12th; Dayton was done November 21st. The Erdut agreement was important for a number of other reasons that I think are worth mentioning. First, it represented the first time that territory in the former Yugoslavia was going to change hands or change ethnic control peacefully. Second, the basic concept of the agreement was to integrate people and that since it was separate it was different from Dayton which created these two ethnic federal entities of Bosnia. In Eastern Slavonia our goal was to create conditions in which the Serb population in Eastern Slavonia could remain and the Croat population that had been expelled in '91 by the Serbs could return. In short, our agreement, the Erdut Agreement sought to restore the multiethnic character of an area. If it succeeded it would represent in fact the first reversal of ethnic cleansing, and in fact it did succeed, and it has succeeded. There was a two-year UN transitional administration. At the end of this, this came under full Croatian control, basically all the Serbs who were from Eastern Slavonia originally, virtually all of them stayed and some of the Croats have returned, and it is part of Croatia and administered.

Q: What about all the houses and churches that got blown up and all that? Was that included in the agreement for something to be done or was that done on the side?

GALBRAITH: It didn't actually require a specific mention in the agreement because well, and many other things didn't need specific mention in the agreement because the agreement was providing that the territory would return to Croatia and when it did return to Croatia then of course one knew that the Croatian government would be in a position to rebuild and restore these churches. It wasn't something that you could ask the Serb authorities to do during the transitional period for two reasons. One is they would say that they had no responsibility for the destruction of the churches, that was basically done by paramilitaries and people like Arcon and there might be some truth to it. Second, they had no resources. Some of the reconstruction of churches actually took place during the period of the UN administration.

Q: Was there your agreement came first and then the Dayton one came later.

GALBRAITH: Yes.

Q: Was there any discrepancy or did one screw up the other or did they completely

complement each other? How did they fit? I mean it's different, apples, oranges, but at the same time, it's all part of the process.

GALBRAITH: It is part of the process and there was no conflict between the two agreements and indeed they were essential, it was essential. Eastern Slavonia was a necessary precondition to Dayton. In that, without an agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Tuđman would not have allowed an agreement to be reached on Bosnia because he knew that with an agreement on Bosnia sanctions would be lifted on Serbia and that would eliminate the leverage that he had to ever recover Eastern Slavonia. So, he was always going to hold Bosnia hostage to Eastern Slavonia. That was the point I have to say at the beginning of the shuttle Holbrooke didn't realize it. It took him a while. He imagined basically that we could have a peace process that would go on for however long, maybe never conclude on Eastern Slavonia and then meanwhile we would get a deal on Bosnia. One of the arguments I had with him, procedural arguments was just on that point. I kept insisting, "Dick you can't get a deal on Bosnia until you deal with Eastern Slavonia." I think he ultimately came around to that view.

Now, Eastern Slavonia as I said, the basic deal was reached on October 3rd, it was signed on November 12th and the reason that nothing happened, that it took so long in-between was that Milosevic basically decided he didn't want a settlement that soon. He wanted to have this as something additional to use in Dayton. On the first day of Dayton, there was a meeting that dealt with Eastern Slavonia and it was at, it was very interesting. It was at the, at a guest house outside of the enclosed area, not far from the officers' club and it was set for 4:00. It was Tuđman, Milosevic, Warren Christopher hosting. Tuđman arrives at 4:00 and Chris, Secretary Christopher greets him and shakes hands warmly and asks him what he would like to drink. He says, "What will you have?" Christopher says, "Well, I'll have some wine if you have it." So, they both agreed to have some wine. Šušak is there and Granić. Milosevic shows up 35 minutes late. His first meeting with the American Secretary of State at Dayton and first meeting with Tuđman in years. He's also obviously been drinking. He asks for a glass of red wine and then the corporal who's serving is constantly refilling his glass. Milosevic then when the subject of Eastern Slavonia comes up, Christopher asks me to explain where we are in the negotiations. I start to give an answer and Milosevic says, "Oh, these are details." The essential question is I guess then Tuđman says, "Yes, but the essential question is whether you're prepared to recognize this as part of Croatia." Milosevic then comes back and he begins to insist on this idea of a referendum. Tuđman tells him a referendum is out of the question and Milosevic says, "No, I can understand why you're saying that. Your generals are making you say that." At which point Šušak jumps in, the defense minister and says to Tuđman, he says, "Mr. President, this is your policy. It's not what your generals are telling you." Milosevic looks at Šušak and says, "So, Šušak, what are you, a general?" Then finally he says, Milosevic says, "Oh, okay, I understand this. You can't have a referendum; there won't be a referendum." Thus, it was, you know, this stumbling block was eliminated. It was really quite remarkable. Christopher and Tuđman left and I stayed and talked to Milosevic for another hour during which time my time was over and he left I then asked the corporal how much red wine had been consumed. Nearly two bottles, all of it by

Milosevic in this two-hour meeting. It was quite amazing.

Q: Milosevic seemed to have the ability to get to a certain point where he is quite willing to give away a lot of things that were not going through, he was not a careful negotiator.

GALBRAITH: Not at all, not at all.

Q: I mean, which is not, I'm not putting that in a pejorative term, I mean sometimes a careful negotiator can get too caught up in bargaining things. Did you get the feeling he was giving things away in order to really clear away the underbrush, he saw where he wanted to go and he was doing it or was this sort of a spur of the moment thing?

GALBRAITH: It's hard to say. Frankly, there was no chance at this stage in the game that he was going to hold onto anything in Eastern Slavonia. There was no chance that Tuđman would ever agree to a referendum. In reality he didn't give away anything by saying, okay, no referendum. On the other hand, that was his sole negotiating leverage. I suppose the, what was impressive was the sort of casual way he went about this. I mean I very much had the impression that this was the product of a guy who had been drinking all afternoon. Although the other side of that coin is again that this was also something that was inevitably it would have to come to. In much the same way that he told the Bosnians. No, no, you people, okay, I agree to a united Sarajevo. You people have really fought for this. You've suffered and thus casually wiping out something that the Serbs had maintained, carried out four years of war to get which was to have a Serbian Sarajevo by partitioning of the city. On the other hand, I doubt if we would have gotten a Dayton peace agreement if there was an insistence on partitioning Sarajevo.

Q: When you were talking to Christopher, did you find much interest on his part on the Eastern Slavonia thing or was this, again did you find that everybody was really focused on Bosnia?

GALBRAITH: I think Christopher was more interested in it, but I mean he was Secretary of State so he couldn't possibly know any of the details of it. The upshot of this meeting was an agreement that Milosevic and Tuđman would ask Stoltenberg and myself to go back to Eastern Slavonia and resume our mediation. Holbrooke having decided that Stoltenberg should come to Dayton since Eastern Slavonia was being discussed. He was actually when this meeting took place on his way on an airplane into Dayton. Holbrooke I had drafted a statement in which the two presidents requested that Stoltenberg and I return to Eastern Slavonia to resume our mediation efforts and so they then initialed it and I think Stoltenberg arrived at about 6:00 p.m. and at about 10:00 p.m. we were flying back on Tuđman's plane, poor man. This was leading to your question, which was.

Q: Well, I was just wondering, I was just asking about Christopher's.

GALBRAITH: Yes, that's what I was getting to. So, Stoltenberg and I left that night as I recall, however, Eastern Slavonia was discussed about a week later at Dayton. The issue

being the one thing that we hadn't settled on October 3rd was the length of the transition period. The Serbs had initially wanted five years. The Croatians of course initially had not wanted a transition period. They had agreed there would be a transition period, but they wanted it to be short, to be one year. There was this last issue then that in Dayton where Tuđman and Milosevic were apart on the, now, I wasn't there, whether it should be one year or two years and Christopher fashioned a compromise in which it was going to be one year but could be extended for another year if either party so requested and the security council agreed for up to another year. Chris Hill describes this in which Hill basically is offering to write this all out and Holbrooke is saying no, no, no, because Holbrooke wanted Christopher to get into the negotiations and to feel that he himself had made a personal contribution. In fact, it wasn't really that big a deal. It was obvious that it was going to be one or two years and formulation like this was fairly obvious, but it gave Christopher a sense that he had actually come up with an original idea and done something.

Q: After the agreement was signed and all, did you feel that you had any problems other than from the NSC or State or Defense or anything like this or was this so far off the radar by this time?

GALBRAITH: There was a funny element to this which is that Holbrooke had told Tuđman that he wanted to have American troops in Eastern Slavonia, but this was before Dayton. The NSC and the Pentagon basically said that's a bridge too far. We're going to have a hard enough time trying to get this agreement on troops into Bosnia and then have to explain what is Eastern Slavonia and why we have troops there, no, that can't be done. Holbrooke came up with the idea that we would tell Tuđman that we would have an American retired general be the administrator of Eastern Slavonia because Tuđman basically so admired generals and American generals and of course had thought highly because he had had this contract with MPRI and admired what they were doing and Tuđman himself had been a general. Holbrooke called me up and asked me to go out and see Tuđman and to give him the resume of a three star, retired three star general who was going to be the administrator and then to explain to Tuđman that I had, that Holbrooke had delivered on his promise, he hadn't delivered troops, but he had delivered on his promise for an American general. So, I dutifully went up and made this briefing and Tuđman was you know, he didn't react particularly, but you know, I guess he was happy.

Holbrooke then calls me up the following Monday and says basically, we've got a problem. General so-and-so has thought about it over the weekend and he doesn't, he's talked it over with his wife and he's called back and said he doesn't want to do it. You go figure out how to handle Tuđman. Well, needless to say, I did not immediately make an appointment to go see him. The next day Holbrooke called me up and he said, do you know Jacques Klein? I said, well, I've met him. Jack was a Foreign Service officer who had been the political advisor to CINCEUR, no to EUCOM in Stuttgart. Holbrooke said, well, I think he's crazy, but he's an air force reserve two star and I think you know, you'll just have to make the best of it. So, I went up and told Tuđman that we'd thought about it and we'd come up with somebody even better instead of a retired three star, we had an

active two star air force general who is also one of our great diplomats. Jacques Klein came out and he was the administrator. He was born in Alsace, a big guy, you know, bon vivant, fondness of good wine and cigars and good food, great raconteur and he and Tuđman hit it off perfectly and I think Tuđman felt he was really talking to somebody who was his equal. The Serbs loved him because they felt he was their protector. He knew how to behave like a dictator and a viceroy and he did brilliantly. The story about how he got the job is very funny because basically his career was at a dead end.

Q: I remember meeting him at the Pentagon and he was one of those political advisors who you know, go nowhere.

GALBRAITH: Yes. He'd been a POLAD. He was in the inspector corps and what was he, minister counselor maybe. But, clearly about to TIC out.

Q: Time in class.

GALBRAITH: Time in class, but Holbrooke had known him when he was ambassador to Bonn and Jacques had been the POLAD and Jacques was on his schedule. It happened that when he was on his schedule during this two week period that Jacques was on official duty, was on air force duty. So, he showed up in his air force uniform with the two stars. Holbrooke was thinking about who he is going to send to Eastern Slavonia and sees Jacques and it just goes through his head, you, Eastern Slavonia. Again, it was a perfect fit. Jacques did a terrific job and it made his career. He went on from there to be the deputy high rep in Bosnia. Now he is the SRSG, Special Representative to the Secretary General in Bosnia. He was offered an ambassadorship.

Q: Did you have any problems with him? I mean he's in your territory.

GALBRAITH: Everybody imagined we could, we would because of course, you know people, well. Everybody imagined that our personalities would clash, but, no. I think I mean I recognized from the start that if this agreement, that if the Erdut agreement was going to work it required a strong UN administrator and having an American there who was going to be the dictator of the region was exactly what was called for. I didn't want to be the dictator of the region, so I was fully prepared to support him. I mean, I considered the Erdut agreement to be my real legacy for my time in Croatia, so I didn't want to undercut the guy who was responsible for its implementation. I think Jacques was a little nervous about me at the beginning. One of the features of the Erdut agreement was that there was a guarantee commission of U.S. and European Union and Russia, a couple of other countries, Canada, Norway that was supposed to go up and monitor implementation. The Serbs attached a lot of importance to it because this was going to be a guarantee of their right to stay and that the Croatians would attack.

Q: You're talking about the Serb population?

GALBRAITH: Of Eastern Slavonia, right and the Serb leaders. Jack on the other hand

didn't particularly want this article 11 commission to come into being because he was afraid he might be second-guessing what he was doing, but we worked it out. The commission did come into agreement. Jack we'd go out and fly out. He'd provide briefings and then he'd helicopter us around or bus us around and show us what great things were going on and all the wonderful things he had done, so it worked out fine.

Q: I think this is probably a good place to stop. We'll pick this up the next time, the Erdut agreement. How do you spell that?

GALBRAITH: E-R-D-U-T.

Q: Agreement has been signed and it is being implemented by Jacques Klein and you've talked about your relationship with him, the Dayton Accords have been assigned, have been signed. So, we'll pick it up at that point.

GALBRAITH: Okay.

Q: That really brings us to well, the end of '95, doesn't it?

GALBRAITH: Yes.

Q: Yes. Great.

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Okay, today is the 11th of September, 2002. Peter, what did you do from here on?

GALBRAITH: Okay, well, we're beginning with the new year in January of 1996 and the first thing that happens is the large number of visitors that are coming to support the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement. I calculated that in a, I think it was in a one year period, but most of it in the three months from December 1st of 1995 through the first couple of months of 1996 we had at our small embassy we had one hundred members of congress, we had the president, we had the Secretary of State, we had the secretary of Defense, we had the secretary of, the two secretaries of commerce, one of whom died, we had the director of central intelligence. So, these months a period that really began with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement for the next year.

Q: You were there for how long?

GALBRAITH: I left Croatia on the 3rd of January, 1998.

Q: 19?

GALBRAITH: 1998.

Q: '98, yes. Talk first about it happened in your territory, you had the Secretary of Commerce Brown and his plane went down. What did that do to you?

GALBRAITH: I'll say a little bit about what was going on. We had all these visits. I must say when I had done my ambassadorial seminar there was a discussion of what happens if you have the president come visit and how that can turn an embassy upside down. It was a briefing that I completely turned out since it seemed so improbable that the president of the United States would ever come to Croatia in the middle of the war and under Franjo Tuđman and indeed for the first year of my tenure the highest level visitor we had was an office director I think and I think that was the highest level visitor that had ever come, an American visitor that had ever come to independent Croatia. There were members of congress, but from the executive branch.

Again with the peace implementation, President Clinton was going to make a very fast trip in January to Bosnia, Hungary and stop off in Croatia and see President Tuđman. I had wanted him to stay a little bit longer because I thought that he would get a very, I knew he would get a very warm reception from the Croatian people. At that point in time there was no country in the world that was as pro-American as Croatia with the sense that the United States had stood by Croatia and had helped bring about what was from the Croatian point of view a successful outcome to the war. Needless to say, feelings in Bosnia were more mixed with the Serbs not as happy. I think politics was also a little bit in my mind with the notion that it certainly wouldn't hurt President Clinton's standing with the Croatian Americans who are located in some key states for him to be well received. The other side of that coin which I understood very well was first that the president had a very tight schedule, there were security concerns and he didn't want to be seen in too close an embrace of an odious leader like Franjo Tuđman. In any event, the visit was an airport stop and in some ways the elements of the visit were very interesting. The White House advance chief was a guy named Redmond Walsh who is one of the more laid back individuals I ever encountered and he behaved nothing like a White House advance man. He was very polite, never placed demands on anything. The Croatians offered to close the airport when Clinton arrived and he said, oh, well, it's not necessary, we'll just have a little part of the airport. So, finally, I turned to him and took him aside and said, "Redman, you're really doing great damage to the reputation of the United States. Everybody expects that when the president comes, we make the world stop, that we boss everybody around. You've got to be a little more demanding." I was joking, but not entirely joking.

Anyhow, what also happened was that the weather cut short the president's visit to Bosnia, so he came earlier than anticipated, but it was a successful meeting in the evening in Zagreb. The Croatians had taken the VIP rooms at the airport, which were done in what I call Yugo-communist style, which was sort of a 1970s dark wood and lots of brown colors and a ghastly chandelier. They had transformed it into a room, several rooms out of the Hapsburg Empire with furniture from the museums and paintings on the walls from the museums in Zagreb. Clinton had a reasonably, I mean it was a fairly straightforward exchange with Tuđman. He was very tired. They had a one on one and then he left.

We had Christopher come, I think that was January, Christopher in February again the message to reinforce the Dayton Peace Agreement. Then with the idea of producing tangible results. We wanted to convey the impression that peace was going to bring economic benefits. The decision was made that the Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown should come with a delegation from the various U.S. agencies that handled economic matters along with businessmen. Interestingly, his advance team was the most demanding of all. It was the antithesis of President Clinton's. There was a young man at the head of it named Morris Reed who I'm afraid we'll probably hear from again in politics, although I hope not. He came into my office and we chatted about what Ron Brown might do. There was a scheduling problem, which was to be, the visit was coming up just before Good Friday and the Easter holiday. Ron Brown had promised that he'd be back with his family for Easter Sunday and I think Ambassador Swanee Hunt wanted to do something for him and he promised to do something in Vienna on the Friday or Saturday, I think it was the Saturday and the visit to Bosnia was going to be on the Tuesday or Wednesday, so the question was how to fill in the time. So, I suggested on that Good Friday that he go to Dubrovnik. Now, Morris Reed had never heard of Dubrovnik. I showed him, I had on my coffee table in my office a picture book, a wonderful Croatian picture book of Dubrovnik and I showed him the picture book. He looked at it and then he was concerned that it might look like a junket and he wanted to protect his boss. I said, no, first that this was at the edge of what had been a war zone, but that really there would be a great economic boost to Dubrovnik and if the U.S. secretary of commerce went there, it would give a morale boost to the city. It had suffered a lot and it wanted to get its tourism on and going again and given that Ron Brown had this hole in his schedule, this would be an excellent way to fill it. In any event, Ron Brown's schedule got turned around and instead of going to Dubrovnik on the Friday and maybe doing the other part of the trip on the Thursday, on Wednesday, Thursday, he was going to come in earlier. I think it was a, come in on Monday night, no Tuesday night and then do the trip through Bosnia on the Wednesday and continue on to Dubrovnik that Wednesday, be there overnight and then come up to Zagreb and meet with President Tuđman on the Thursday. Apparently Ron Brown, when he heard about Dubrovnik and the possibility of going there, he really wanted to go. This was a complicated itinerary, which he was going to be in and out of Croatia a number of times. In fact on the night he arrived, he flew into Zagreb on a small U.S. government plane, a very small jet, four people to join up with the 707 that was going to take him on the trip to Bosnia. I went out and greeted him as I did with most visitors. We drove in to the airport together. I gave him a few key points that needed to be made on terms of U.S. policy for Croatia stressing that Croatia was not adhering to its obligations to treat its Serbian citizens on an equal basis with the Croatian citizens, and that Croatia needed to be a country that respected human rights if it was going to get the economic benefits.

I then went up to the control room just to see how things were and had a nice, Chuck Meissner who was the Assistant Secretary to Commerce for International Affairs and who had been a staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I'd known about Chuck Meissner, one of the legendary figures from the staff, but this was the first time that I'd met him. He gave me a copy of Ron Brown's speech which Morris Reed who had

been somehow unwilling to share, the speech that Ron Brown was going to give in Dubrovnik the next day and I read that in my car on the way back to my residence and called Chuck. I said it was fine, I may have had a small suggestion or two. The control room was a lively place, lots of activity. I remember seeing the Croatian woman who had served as the translator for me on a number of occasions and who was going on this trip to be the translator. She was a little bewildered as to why she was going. In other circumstances I might myself have wanted to go on the trip because it would have been quite a convenient way to go from Zagreb to Dubrovnik. It would have given me a chance to go to Sarajevo to see what the latest developments were, to see what was going on in Tuzla and then arrive with the Commerce Secretary in Dubrovnik. However, my fiancé, now my wife, was staying with me and we didn't have a lot of time together and she wasn't feeling well. I never raised the issue. The plane was full. There might not have been space and I did tell Ron Brown, if you don't mind I won't see you off tomorrow morning, but I'll see you in Dubrovnik.

The next day the weather was not very good and I went down in President Tuđman's plane with his cabinet, he wasn't there, in the Challenger to Dubrovnik with the prime minister, the Croatian ambassador to the United States went as usual, the economic minister, a number of other cabinet ministers for this great event. As we approached Dubrovnik there was zero visibility. I knew the pilot of the plane fairly well because he had flown me and Thorvald Stoltenberg a lot when we had gone from Zagreb out to Osijek to do the negotiations in the Erdut agreement and I'd flow with Tuđman to the United States on other occasions. We came in and we couldn't find the runway and we veered to the right over the sea. I turned to- (end of tape)

Okay, first I should say as we were coming in through this bad weather, there was the kind of gallows humor that sometimes exists among passengers on a plane when it is very turbulent and as usual the Croatian ambassador to the United States was making jokes and I was teasing him. I was asking whether Tuđman would be more upset at losing his plane or losing his cabinet. Then I looked over to the prime minister who was sitting opposite me and I could see that he was very nervous. I also knew that he was a pilot. So, this affected my thinking. When we couldn't find the runway the first time, as we were circling back around I said to him. I said, "Zlatko, look there's no point in attempting a landing in this weather because we'll get on the ground at some risk, but there's no way that the U.S. air force is going to land this VIP plane if the weather conditions aren't safe. So, we'll be there and Ron Brown will go to Split. We shouldn't do it." By the time this whole exchange had been completed and we in fact were on approach and we landed. We then stayed on the plane. It was raining ferociously. We stayed on the plane awhile because there was no way to, we didn't want to get wet and we were waiting for the Ron Brown plane to land. We then got off; there were umbrellas and so on. I should explain that the Dubrovnik airport had been destroyed, it had been taken over by the Montenegrins in 1991 and been looted and destroyed and it was only partially rebuilt at this point. One of the things they didn't have was the instruments for an instrument landing. Anyhow, we went inside the terminal where there was a table set up with food and I think there were some girls dressed in traditional outfits to make an offering to Ron

Brown. All the local dignitaries were there; the Croatian cabinet was there. Everybody wanted to make an impression. Chris Hedges was there from the New York Times purely by coincidence. He wasn't covering this, but he'd been in Bosnia, Mostar I guess, and he'd come out and he was going to take the Croatia airlines flight from Dubrovnik to Zagreb, but that had been canceled. All the commercial flights had been canceled because of the weather.

In any event, at 3:25 Mateša took me aside and he said, "Ron Brown's plane, we've lost radio contact with Ron Brown's plane and it's disappeared from the radar." I had this total reaction of disbelief. I mean I knew what this meant, but it just, it just didn't seem possible. Airplane crashes are something you read about, but they're so rare most people, thank God never experience them. So, I looked at him and I said, "Zlatko, is this serious?" I mean I knew it was. He said, "Yes. What can I do for you?" I said, "Well, I better make some calls." I didn't want to do it on the mobile phone because they could be monitored. So, we went back to Tuđman's plane, the Challenger and I called the OP Center and asked to speak with the secretary or the most senior person who was available. It turned out to be Peter Tarnoff and I told him that we'd lost radio contact and it had disappeared from the radar screen. We then immediately, the Croatians immediately began to mobilize for a search. I got on the phone to try to get U.S. forces involved in the search and rescue. We had a report that a French I-4 helicopter had seen the plane in the water and bodies floating. It turned out that about 6:00 I think we'd gone into Dubrovnik and actually left the airport, but the plane was found on a mountain near the airport now known as St. John the Baptist. What had happened was a local man had heard the noise of the plane flying overhead and thought this was very unusual that he hadn't seen anything and then the clouds had lifted and you could see the plane wreckage and he didn't, in fact he didn't have a phone. So, he had had to walk down to find a phone and the rescuers came up. The Croatians did what they could. There was one stewardess who was alive in the back of the plane, a military officer, Sergeant Kelly, but she died being transported to the hospital in Dubrovnik. I went up that night in the rain with the prime minister to the crash site as it was getting dark and in the end it was clear that it would be quite difficult to get up to the top of the mountain and I didn't want our VIP delegation to interfere with the rescue effort so I said, no, we won't go now. There's nothing that we can do.

The next morning, the White House had wanted me to do some television shows. So, I think I did the Today Show and of course I had to be very careful and simply say that the weather was terrible and that the plane wasn't where it should have been, fairly obvious. We went up the mountain and the engine was in one place and the tail was reasonably intact and over the top of the mountain were just pieces of wreckage, burned parts and bodies. There wasn't anything to do I mean that could be done for anybody. I went down the mountain. As we went down I slipped and fell off the side of the mountain and ended up upside down in a tree. Fortunately I was only scratched up and not injured. I could have been. I think later that day I went back to Zagreb and then came down as the bodies were brought off the mountain and identified them. On Good Friday, which was a beautiful day, it was the day Ron Brown was originally thought to go to Dubrovnik, I flew down with Tuđman and we each gave speeches. It was one of the more difficult speeches

I've ever done. I wrote it myself as I did almost all my speeches. I wanted to find some words to give meaning to the sacrifice that these people had made. It was Good Friday, sort of commonplace, biblical passage. Blessed are the peace makers, that they should be called the children of God and how these people had died on a mission of peace to try and make a better place for the people of the region. Then the bodies went in two large, they all went in one C5A, there was a second one as backup for reasons that weren't clear with me, but that one did make the Atlantic crossing. I didn't go with it although, as usual, the Croatian ambassador was there.

There was an investigation, a very extensive investigation and the determination of the cause of the crash was that, well, the first underlying cause was that they had no business flying into Dubrovnik. Dubrovnik was operating on visual flight rules for U.S. VIP aircraft and the instrument landing system had been destroyed and the weather didn't justify coming on visual flight rules. I learned a lot about aviation and flight instruments through this experience, but there were beacons that the pilots used to determine the course. Normally, for these beacons you should have two receivers and then you can line up on the two points and find a rooting, but because this is a system that isn't used much the aircraft itself actually only had one receiver and so the pilot had to switch back and forth to triangulate, but the manual said you weren't supposed to do that. They got the bearing and they simply entered it wrong by 10 degrees and that took them into the mountain rather than into the airport.

The other thing I learned was that our VIP aircraft, airport VIP aircraft far from being super safe, don't meet the same standards as the terms of equipment that they have for safety features as commercial airliners. Notably there was no black box.

Q: Oh boy, well, after this what were these people doing? I mean you get a lot of people to come in and take a look. Were the Dayton Accords were they taking place within Croatia or was it actually outside of Croatia?

GALBRAITH: Before I answer that.

Q: Well, now I'm just wondering I mean you had people coming in to look at how the Dayton Accords were going.

GALBRAITH: The Dayton Accords were of course in Bosnia.

Q: Yes, that's what I mean.

GALBRAITH: But the people who were coming were either members of congress who were coming to examine how it was going and most of them, as is the case with members of congress on these issues had predetermined positions. So, they were looking for ammunition to be for or against the Dayton implementation and the sending of the American forces. The people from the executive branch were coming principally to reinforce the implementation of the Dayton Accords and that meant. Obviously it meant

talking to the various sides in Bosnia, but since the war in Bosnia was not an internal civil war, but one that was directed significantly from the outside from Serbia and also from Zagreb it meant talking to Tuđman to try to get him to use his control. I don't say influence, his control over the Bosnian Croats to produce certain results. Tuđman of course would say that he didn't control and that was a sham, but that was the basic message. Tuđman you need to do more to make Dayton successful, to strengthen the Muslim Croat federation which was one of the two entities along with the Republika Srpska and part of Dayton.

Q: As you were looking at this did you see this Muslim Croatian thing a viable coalition?

GALBRAITH: Well, the Federation had been created in 1994 and it was as I think I said earlier on this interview process, at least I should have said, it was the turning point in the war. What had existed in 1993 was this three-sided war and in fact where at times the Croatians would actually rent tanks and shells from the Serbs to use against the Muslims even though the Croatians and the Serbs were also enemies. As long as it was a three-sided war, it was hopeless. So, the Muslim Croat Federation was the cornerstone or first for our strategy to end the war, that is developing an alliance between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and then that alliance being aligned with Croatia. I always thought of the Washington agreement that established the Muslim Croat Federation as a peace treaty dressed up as a system of government. So, by that standard as a peace treaty to end the Muslim Croat war it was 100 percent successful. As an alliance, it was 100 percent successful or 80 percent successful, but as a government for this 51 percent of Bosnia, it was certainly in '94 5 percent successful, but in order to have a durable peace we needed to translate that from 5 percent to 70 percent successful to make the Federation an effective government so that you know, Bosnia could get beyond the war phase and into the process of reconstruction and yet that was the focus.

Q: Now, was there as your focus, I mean there had to be a time I guess where you wanted to get Croatia or Zagreb from controlling the Croatians in Bosnia so that they were acting on their own. Were we trying to sever the ties?

GALBRAITH: I think in truth we were a little schizophrenic on that point. One the one hand we definitely wanted to sever those ties because the Bosnian Croats were citizens of Bosnia, not of Croatia or at least in our view they shouldn't be citizens of Croatia and they should play a role in the government of the Federation where they had an outsized role compared to their population. They were one quarter as numerous as the Muslims and yet they had a nearly equal power sharing arrangement. Croatia gave these people Croatian citizenship. Tuđman allowed them to come in fact encouraged them to come and settle the Krajina region from which the Serbs had departed because he wanted to make it impossible for this to become a Serbian area again to settle it with Croats. Of course the result was that these people then began to acquire, the Bosnian Croats began to acquire multiple houses. They had some in Herzegovina or central Bosnia, then they would get a house in Krajina that had belonged to a Serb and the husband might have one house, the wife might have another, the father would have one and each of his sons would have a

house. Undoubtedly there was also significant corruption in all of this. There were many signs that Croatia did not respect Bosnia as a separate state. The Croatian banks operated in the Croat parts of Bosnia. The Croatian Kuna was used as the currency in the Croat controlled parts of Bosnia. In 1997 Tuđman ran for reelection and his slogan was, what was it, Our Country, Our President, and they had the Tuđman billboards all up in Bosnia. Our joke was right president, wrong country.

Q: Well, now, did you get involved, I'm not clear where did the first division in our heavy tank troops and all come through? Did they go through Croatia in order to get to Bosnia or do they come through Serbia?

GALBRAITH: No, nothing came through Serbia, so they came through Croatia in very difficult weather conditions.

Q: Yes, I recall, they had a hell of a time getting over the what was it the Sava?

GALBRAITH: The Sava.

Q: The Sava.

GALBRAITH: Yes. The Sava was very flooded at that time of year. In fact there were some disastrous moments when they set up a whole tent city in the flood plane and then it was flooded a few days later.

Q: Was that a problem getting the troops through there?

GALBRAITH: It was a logistical problem, in part all the bridges had been blown up so they had to create a bailey bridge to get across.

Q: Did the Croatian government and the people welcome this?

GALBRAITH: The Croatian government was very cooperative. They more or less turned over the railroad systems that came from Hungary down through Croatia to the U.S. They accepted that the American troops were going to chew up a lot of roads with the heavy equipment and they accepted that the U.S. was stationed with guards who were not entirely sensitive to local sensitivities at the bridges and key points. I mean the Croatians on this kind of thing always behaved well.

Q: Well, then what were the developments after we lost this plane?

GALBRAITH: Well, I think the thing that took much of my time in 1996 was the investigation into the 1994 decision of President Clinton which I carried out not to object to the flow of arms across Croatia to the Bosnians including arms from Iran and specifically, when Tuđman had asked whether the United States, what the United States' view was of a Bosnian request to prevent arms, Iranian arms to flow across Croatia. In

April of 1994 my instructions were to say I had no instructions. We discussed the facts of this on a previous tape, but what had happened was that after that decision that frankly I had argued very strongly that we should give a non-responsive response, that we should not be in the position of objecting to the flow of arms to the Bosnians, that first no other UN security council resolution was being respected, therefore, for us to enforce the arms embargo for that to be the one to be respected, would have only a devastating effect on the people who were on the legitimate government of Bosnia Herzegovina, the people who were the principle victims of the war. I didn't, I never favored a covert U.S. program to aid the Bosnians because I thought the United States itself should not be in the position of violating UN security council resolutions and also because I was concerned that if we violated the security council resolutions then we would undermine other resolutions that were important particularly the sanctions resolutions on Serbia and for that matter sanction relations on Iraq. I didn't see that we had an obligation to get everybody else to honor the embargo. We should honor it ourselves, but if others were prepared to violate it, we didn't need to be the policemen on it and in fact we should simply not object. That was the decision that President Clinton took and although as I think I said before, I think president Tuđman himself was kind of hoping we would say no because he never liked the Muslim Croat Federation. He in fact permitted the arms to flow and I think it helped turned the tide. In fact when I was in Sarajevo in August or July of 2001, I saw President Izetbegović, ex-president Izetbegović, he said that this was the turning point in the war.

In any event, after the decision had been taken in April of '94 after I'd conveyed it to President Tuđman, the arms began to flow and I frankly didn't think that much more about it. However, in September of 1994 Dick Holbrooke who had just been named the Assistant Secretary of State came out on a look see visit and I'd gone up in July of '94 to see him in Berlin after he'd been named, but before he'd been confirmed, I'm sorry in Bonn, after he'd been named, but before he'd been confirmed. I had told him at that time about our decision not to object to the flow of arms to the Bosnians. I had been concerned that the arms that were going were coming from the Iranians and I was also concerned that the Bosnians weren't getting enough arms.

My basic idea was that we should send a message to other countries, that we would not object if they were willing to provide arms to the Bosnians. I believed that you know, countries like Pakistan, Malaysia, Turkey were in fact prepared to provide arms and in fact several of them Malaysia and Turkey were doing so perhaps on a more limited scale. Holbrooke liked this idea and when he came in September he talked to the Croatian defense minister Šušak and told him about this idea and Dick was really focused on the domestic politics of the United States U.S. law. He said this is not going to be a covert action. It has nothing to do with the CIA. Indeed it wasn't a covert action. It was simply a diplomatic message that we will not object if you provide the arms. So, Dick was completely right.

Unfortunately, and I'm not sure Dick realized this at the time, Tuđman's wife, Georgia, was the number two in the Croatian intelligence service. Tuđman's son, Miro, was the number one guy and of course they were in a, they cooperated with our intelligence

services including the ones we had in country. So, this conversation was reported back to the U.S. intelligence services and it came to Tony Lake who believed that perhaps Holbrooke had become a rather bitter rival of Holbrooke's, he believed that Tony Lake was in fact. I'm sorry Tony Lake believed that Holbrooke was trying to orchestrate a possibly illegal covert action. Lake seizing on this report that Holbrooke had had a conversation with Šušak and had said the CIA shouldn't be involved asked the intelligence oversight board to investigate. To be honest at that point I hadn't even heard of the intelligence oversight board, which sits in the Old Executive Office Building. When I came to Washington of January of '95 it was on my schedule and Holbrooke said, do you know what this is and explained what was going on. Well, I went and talked to them and they interviewed lots of other people and they concluded that the United States had behaved correctly. They said there was some confusion in the execution as indeed there had been, but that there was no covert action. It was a perfectly correct diplomatic decision and for us first the Holbrooke plan had never been implemented. That is the idea of going to other countries and say we don't object, the Holbrooke plan, one that I had suggested.

Q: So your view was almost completely passive.

GALBRAITH: My view was. The Holbrooke plan was essentially passive. It would be to go to other countries saying we do not object if you violate the arms embargo. That had been my suggestion. This is what he talked to Šušak, the Croatian defense minister in September of '94 and it is what I had talked to him about, was my idea that I had proposed to him in July of '94. Christopher had rejected that idea, so even that had never been done. The only thing that actually had ever been done was my telling Šušak that I had no instructions on the, as to how to answer his question which was what is the attitude of the United States if Croatia permits arms to cross Croatian territory to go to the Bosnian government. I said, Mr. President, I have no instructions and when he didn't get it I said and pay attention to what I didn't say. Eventually they got the message, we are not objecting. That is the sum of what happened. The intelligence oversight board looked into all of this. They concluded there had been no covert action, that everybody had behaved correctly and that this was a perfectly legitimate policy decision. End of the story or so we thought. Well, a year later a guy named, a reported named Jim Risen of the Los Angeles Times gets hold of all this and the secret report of the intelligence oversight board and so he is calling around to do interviews. When he called Zagreb basically I am unwilling to talk to him very much. I do talk to him but only in very general terms. I talked to Chuck Redman who was the ambassador to Germany who had been involved in this and who was retiring so I figured he could talk more safely than I could. I guess he talked and filled him in, Risen in to some degree. On the day that Tuđman and I went down to see Dubrovnik, to see the coffins with the 35 passengers sent off or 33 were sent to the States, two were Croatian. On that day, the Los Angeles Times ran this story and I read it. Tuđman had it and gave me a copy and I read it. This then led Bob Dole to call for an investigation and in fact his call for the investigation was the brainchild of his foreign policy aide Mira Baratta who had been a good friend of mine and who had frequently stayed with me in Zagreb. She was a Croatian American, but very much against the

Tuđman government, very sympathetic to the Bosnian cause. In fact her grandfather had frozen to death in Sarajevo in an old peoples' home in 1993 at age one hundred during the siege because there wasn't any gas. Anyhow, Mira called for this investigation as to whether, and Dole was running for president, and she was hoping she had discovered the Democrat version of the Iran Contra scandal, although the only common element was the word Iran. In this case again it was simply a statement, a decision not to respond to a Croatian country and the result was that arms went from our enemy, Iran, to our friend, Bosnia. The Iran Contra scandal we were actively shipping arms to the Iranians, to our enemy, arming our enemy. Again in this case we'd done nothing, so very different, but she thought she had found a hot political issue. She asked the senate, so Dole asked in his letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee to look into this.

Not to be outdone, Newt Gingrich decided he wanted to have an investigation in the House of Representatives. He chose Henry Hyde. He asked, he didn't have any faith in Bill Gilman who was the chairman of the House International Relations Committee. They set up a special committee under Henry Hyde and they gave it a one million dollar budget or nine hundred ninety-five thousand dollars. They wanted the figure to be just a little bit less than a million dollars. Well, on the Senate side the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee decided to do nothing. Foreign Relations there were people there who knew me well and I think were very sympathetic. Armed Services decided to do nothing. The Senate Intelligence Committee under Arlen Specter had a couple of, had some hearings. I testified in secret before the committee. At the end of the process they came up with a report which they issued a week after the election, the '96 election. They basically said the policy was a success. Several members tried to suggest that maybe our decision had gone into the gray area between traditional diplomacy and covert action, which I must say, was an absurd position because again there was no action. We didn't facilitate the flow of arms. We didn't provide arms. All we did was to say we didn't object. I think their argument basically was if the subject was arms and if the conversation is secret that maybe that was something that was no longer traditional diplomacy again on the base of a position that would be difficult to justify.

The Hyde committee, however, at having gotten a million dollars, nine hundred ninety-five thousand dollars, then had to have an investigation although I think it was very clear that there was in fact nothing to investigate. Backing up I should say even before the Hyde committee got started, the House International Relations Committee under Gilman who felt he'd been cut out by Newt Gingrich decided to hold his own hearings. That was the only hearing before which I ever testified publicly. Redman and I testified. I prepared a statement and which I explained what we had done and I noted that as a result of what we had done the Bosnian government had survived. It had gained strength, that this led directly to the military victories in 1995, which in turn had made possible the Dayton Agreement, which in turn had had the paradoxical effect of diminishing, paradoxical from the Iranian point of view. Or maybe I use the word perverse, the perverse effect from the Iranian point of view of diminishing Iranian influence. Why? Because one of the conditions of the Dayton Treaty was that all foreign forces had to leave except for those

there under IFOR and so the Bosnian government had expelled most of the Iranians and many of the other foreigners who were present there and basically IFOR rounded up and help force out almost all the rest. The irony was that our decision to permit the arms to flow to the Bosnians and Iranian arms to go to the Bosnians had served to diminish Iranian influence and when the press wrote about that hearing, it was a big story, that was the headline.

Now, one of the things that happened and it's an interesting way in which our government works, is that the congressional committees asked for documents. The CIA immediately gathered up every document it had and dumped it on its two intelligence oversight committees, whereas State Department was much more circumspect about the things in which they would be willing to turn over. In those documents that they turned over was the back channel traffic from the station chief in Zagreb. He believed, he had not, he could not believe that President Clinton had taken the decision that he'd taken. He was convinced that I'd been running some kind of rogue operation. I mean to describe exactly what happened and here I'm not disclosing anything classified because it's all in the reports. Going back to 1994. Over the Easter holidays in 1994 I had spent a week with my son in Italy. While I was away the foreign minister had told the DCM Neitzke and Šušak had indicated I think to the defense attaché or maybe that I would be asked again I would be asked a question what by Tuđman what would be the attitude of the United States if we respond to a Bosnian request for arms to cross our territory? When I got to Zagreb I gathered the core country team together and the station chief. The station chief informed me that he had informed Miro Tuđman who was the head of the Croatian intelligence service that he had actually answered the question, that he had told him U.S. policy is to respect the arms embargo. We expect you to respect the arms embargo. Well, I know that wasn't U.S. policy and so I told him, I said, you know, please tell Tuđman, Jr. that the issue has not been decided yet, we don't have an answer. He refused. I then got the answer. I delivered the new instruction statement to Tuđman. I then, I was concerned that Tuđman might be hearing a different message from his son and Tuđman was the kind, you know, he didn't understand how democracy worked, so they tended to believe that, well, yes that was the president of the United States and there was the ambassador, but there were also the people who really ran the country, the CIA and the military. I said, I explained to the station chief what had happened, what my instructions were and asked him to make sure that Tuđman, Jr. understood what the outcome had been.

Q: Can we stop here?

GALBRAITH: Again he refused and he sent a cable back to the CIA, which I never saw. Now of course like most ambassadors I had standing instructions that I want to see all messages that go out of this embassy including from the station and the only thing that could be exempted were the things that related to sources and methods. I didn't want to see that, nor was I entitled to see that. Again, there was a channel if you thought somebody was committing a crime. If they thought I was committing a crime, then I could see that, but he sent a message back, which I never saw which said, you know, this is what Galbraith says is the policy. Is this the policy?

James Woolsey, the head of the CIA, then met with Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State, and Woolsey said, “Has there been any change in U.S. policy towards the arms embargo?” Talbott said, “No, there has not.” Woolsey believed that the U.S. policy was the same as it had been in the Bush administration namely that we enforce, that we respected the embargo and we expected others to respect it. Strobe believed that the current policy was that we were not enforcing the arms embargo, that we were not insisting that we opposed it, Clinton opposed it and we were not insisting that other countries follow it. Frankly, I fault Strobe a bit on this. I think he should have explained what the policy was, but that was the exchange. So, Woolsey was left thinking that there’s something funny going on in Zagreb. The ambassador is telling the Croatian president that we don’t object to the flow of arms and yet I’m hearing from the State Department that we do object. Strobe believed that he had told Woolsey and cleared this up and that Woolsey understood that we were not objecting. The station chief hears back of course that there has been no change in policy. He believes that I’m running some kind of unauthorized operation and he then gets into a conspiracy mindset and looks for all sorts of signs that I’m running an unauthorized operation. He then proceeds to put in a variety of comments about me and a few about some other people in the embassy including comments about my personal life, which I will state for the record.

At the time I was single and dating adult women who were Americans and not employees of the U.S. government, not my subordinates, but that didn’t stop him from making various comments. In fact he was repeatedly told by Nora Slatkin who was the chief of staff to the director of central intelligence that he shouldn’t be making those comments because all these documents could be turned over to the intelligence committees. Well, they were turned over to the intelligence committees and one of the agreements was that I got to read them before I testified. So, I went over to the CIA. There was a room with a very long table piled up with documents and this was of course done to make it hard for me to actually see everything. I began to read through them and I was shocked at what was going on. I was shocked that there was this reporting that had been going on inside the embassy. I was shocked that the CIA had not followed its procedures. If they believed there was a crime then they were obliged to notify the Justice Department and then the Justice Department would then investigate. They never notified the Justice Department. If they had notified the Justice Department, then the Justice Department would have I presume checked with the State Department and would have discovered that there was nothing illegal going on and that would have been the end of the story and the CIA would have understood it. They didn’t do that. They didn’t follow their internal procedures and again there was this pile of material and speculation and conspiracy theories along as I say with some personal covets. I was shocked and I must say pretty outraged by the whole thing.

This material then became the grist of Henry Hyde’s investigation. He actually had his investigators asking questions of my secretary, Charlotte Stockman, and of the station chief who happily provided the information. You know, even about the women I was dating.

Q: This by the way is Henry Hyde who as a youthful indiscretion at the age of 40 something fathered an illegitimate child, but anyway.

GALBRAITH: That's exactly right. This was Henry Hyde who two years later was launching this great moral crusade against the president of the United States over the president's supposed sexual misconduct. I mean I'm one of those people I don't care what he does in the Oval Office. I mean, what he does in his personal life is between him and his wife and I care just what kind of president he is. In any event, so this was Hyde and his investigation and needless to say it was a very unpleasant experience and they came to Zagreb, his team of investigators. I think I did a four or five hour deposition. They deposed everybody else. Then they presented a report. Actually there were two reports. One was the Hyde report and the other was by Lee Hamilton. The Hamilton report was very, very factual. The Hyde report having found no wrongdoing, having basically encountered a policy that worked seized upon one small contradiction, one small contradiction, yes, which was this. Back in April of 1994, when I had learned that Tuđman was going to ask this question, I had gotten on the secure phone to talk to people in Washington to urge the policy outcome I wanted. Again, basically that we'd tell Tuđman that we don't object or we just don't respond to his question. In talking to Sandy Vershbow who was then the deputy assistant Secretary of State, he and others Peter Tarnoff basically were telling me Washington has not made up its mind. We're trying to figure out what to do. I think it was a Saturday, very early like 6:00 in the morning, Sandy Vershbow called me at my home. He wasn't on a secure phone. He knew I was going to be seeing Tuđman that day and he said to me, "We don't' have any instructions for you" or "You have no instructions." I did not understand that what he was telling me is that was the answer. In fact it was the answer I wanted. I merely put it in the context of my conversations over the previous days which was that Washington hadn't made up its mind and frankly that was the common problem I had because nobody liked the Bosnia issue. They weren't facing up to the issues on hand, so it was quite often important issues kept being put off and it was 6:00 in the morning. I didn't get it. Again, there was no secure phone in my residence. Vershbow I guess was home and he placed the call. When I saw Tuđman that night I assumed that I hadn't gotten an answer. So, when Tuđman asked me the question, I said, "Mr. President, look I just don't have an answer for you yet."

I had called Chuck Redman who was the special envoy and asked him to come to Zagreb. He came the next day and we had dinner with Tuđman. I was explaining to Chuck at my residence the frustration I had when Jane Hall who was I guess the deputy to Jenonne Walker who was the Director for European Affairs at NSC. Jane called to deal with a particular problem, the Croatians had had an arsenal explode and ammunition had gone and weapons had gone everyplace. This was near Zagreb and several Croatian military had been killed and anyhow they wanted some help from the Americans, people who were experts in unexploded ordinance to come help clean up. The defense attaché thought this was a great idea, so did I, that we could provide some help. Jane Hall called to talk about that. I think I expressed to her my frustration at not having an answer and she put Jenonne Walker on the line and Jenonne said, "What's the matter with you? Don't you

understand?" I mean, these weren't her exact words, but it was something like this. I said, "Well, why can't you make up your mind?" She said, "No, no. Tony said that Peter is to tell Tuđman he has no, that Peter has no instructions and Tony said it with a smile and a raised eyebrow." I got it. The message was that no instructions was my instruction, it was the instruction I wanted. The smile and the raised eyebrow led me to understand that that was my instruction. It was a very memorable statement for me, not because it indicated any shenanigans, it indicated that a decision had been made. I did a memo for the files and I recorded all of this.

One of the unfortunate things that happened although I recorded it correctly, I had my deputy look at the memo and he interpreted the smile and the raised eyebrow as a wink and a nod. He told the station chief who reported that back. The suggestion was somehow that I'd given Tuđman a wink and a nod. Anyhow, when they interviewed Jenonne Walker and Tony Lake, Jenonne Walker had not remembered telling me about the smile and the raised eyebrow and Tony Lake had denied smiling or raising his eyebrow. He said he hadn't remembered. Now, I will tell you. In 1996 I wouldn't have remembered this conversation either. The reason I know is that I made of memorandum of record of it the next day. That's why I remembered it, but also, the smile and the raised eyebrow were significant to me because it was a sign of a final decision. It wasn't significant to them. Anyhow, this was the contradiction and the conclusion that the Hyde democrats, the Hyde Republicans, the Republican side this Hyde committee had reached was that possibly, possibly somebody was lying, somebody committed perjury and they weren't sure who it was. Whether it was Peter Galbraith or Tony Lake and Jenonne Walker, or Strobe Talbott, so they referred everybody that they'd investigated to the Justice Department which so far as I know never did anything on it. They released their report the week before the election announcing they'd made these referrals to the Justice Department. In fact at the press conference, Hyde was pressed on it as to whether he thought anything criminal had taken place and he couldn't bring himself to say that so even he didn't stand behind their letter of referral. And of course it had no impact on the election whatsoever. The irony was the next year Lake was nominated to head the CIA and this became the major issue against him. The Republicans who perhaps just before the election had wanted to portray me as the Oliver North of the Clinton administration all of a sudden a couple of months later decided that I was really the honest person and Tony Lake was the one who had lied because it suited their purposes. I think the people basically were trying to undo the results of the election by using the investigation process. This was really in my view the greatest abuse of it. Through 1996 it certainly caused me a lot of grief. I think a word about the Los Angeles Times gives an interesting insight into journalism and I must say a lack of professionalism in it.

Jim Risen having gotten the one story imagined that he could get the Pulitzer Prize for exposing all of this, so he kept writing stories hyping the scandal, the so-called scandal through 1996. Of course no other newspapers ever picked it up as a story. Then the Republicans on the Hyde committee leaked their report, which had these allegations to Risen. Now there was also a democratic report, which completely refuted all that, and you know, basically said, these small contradictions weren't contradictions. They've

explained as much as I've explained them to you. In any event, so Risen runs a story saying hundreds of pages of secret documents reveal that the Clinton administration including Ambassador Galbraith were much more deeply involved than previously reported. I called up the Los Angeles Times, Doyle McManus, and I said to him, I said, "You know, this is bullshit. I don't mind that you make these allegations, but you have an obligation to let your readers know that these hundreds of pages of classified documents were the Republican report and then they can make their own judgments and you ought to have told them that there was a Democratic report which made exactly the opposite point." McManus said, "Well, you have a point here, but we didn't want to compromise the people who have given us the report, the Republicans who had given us the report." That's how I know that they leaked it, he told me they leaked it. I said, "That's fine, but I know where it came from. Anybody in the administration knows what these hundreds of pages of classified documents are. You better believe we're going to be investigating how it leaked. So, you haven't protected your sources. The only harm you've done, is to fool your readers." He said, "Yes, the problem is Lee Hamilton isn't as casual with national secrets as the Republicans were." Then they promised to write another story, which they did some time later, which simply repeated all the allegations. It was really an eye opening experience about the press.

Q: Did this thing sort of hang around? Was it picked up in Croatia?

GALBRAITH: Of course, the Croatian press followed this with great interest. It didn't do any damage, however. I mean I did a number of interviews on it and explained the kinds of things I'd explained in my congressional testimony. Naturally I declined to talk about the internal relations within the embassy or between the State Department and the CIA.

Q: Couldn't you get rid of your station chief?

GALBRAITH: This was a dilemma and of course many people said that's what you have to do. Needless to say, our relations were not warm and fuzzy after all this came out. I think this came up in May of, I guess I saw his back channel traffic in May of '96. His tour of duty was ending in July and I mean frankly I would have loved to have sent him home with a big boot in the derriere, but that would only complicate my own situation and since there were many of these congressional investigators who were, who wanted to get the Clinton administration, and therefore he was their hero. It looked like I was sacking a whistle blower, so I wasn't going to buy any more trouble for the administration or for myself. Frankly, there were larger institutional issues that I raised and the State Department tried to raise, but never, I don't think the State Department, well the State Department didn't get too far for some other interesting reasons, which I'll tell you.

The institutional issue is this. If in fact the station chief is reporting on conversations within the embassy and on what people are doing within the embassy, then an ambassador dealing with the kind of difficult problems that I'm dealing with will not bring in the station chief. You aren't going to have a candid discussion of what your options are with somebody who is going to be reporting back in a way that you don't

know what's being said. I could even have lived with his reporting back if I could have added my own comments to it. If I could have set the record straight, but I had no idea it was taking place. He was violating my instructions. In those circumstances an ambassador gets into these kinds of difficult situations. Yes, he'll have the station chief come in. The station chief can provide the intelligence, but he would be foolish to share anything back with the station chief. That is a terrible situation to be in because an embassy works well when all of its elements are working closely together. I think it's a significant institutional problem, which has not been solved.

There was an effort to try and solve it led by Jennifer Simms who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for INR. The CIA I think realized that they had done something wrong and so John Deutch who had become the director had come out to Zagreb in July of 1996 to make peace. He came to the embassy and people were quite upset by all of this and so there was a meeting with the American staff and he insisted that there were no issues to be dealt with. I mean my point had been that we needed to go back and look through the record and that people about whom comments were made in these files that they should see what was said about them and Deutch basically said, no, we've got to move on and forget about all of that. My secretary actually she posed a question to him that stumped him. She said, "When you got all this reporting, what did you do with it? Didn't anybody there say there's something wrong with doing this? Didn't anybody there say it had to stop?" The issue in terms of the embassy staff wasn't really resolved. Then Deutch held this dinner. His idea of how to solve the problem was to have a dinner for all the Americans at the Sheraton Hotel in Zagreb. They took over a ballroom, cocktails and dinner. Deutch was at one table with my wife at his right and the defense attaché next to him at that table. I was with his new wife, Pat Walsh. I'd just gotten married, I don't know, eight days before and he'd recently been married. Anyhow, well, Deutch sits down and he says to the waiter, "Vodka martini and keep them coming." They kept coming. He then got up to give a speech and the speech talked about all the beautiful women who were the officers working for the American Embassy or their wives. Frankly it was a rather inappropriate speech for 1996. I mean that just isn't the kind of thing you do. So, I got up and made a speech and said nice things about Deutch and his wife, but I said, "I'll stay away from talking about the beauty of the women here. I don't want to do anything that might be inappropriate or politically incorrect or illegal. I'm having enough difficulties; I don't want to add to them." Several of the wives were not American and two of them were journalists. I don't know who did this, but it was obvious that in a room with one hundred people and in this sort of atmosphere that these kinds of comments weren't going to be kept secret. There was an item in El Camin that reported and that twisted this and reported Deutch's comments and my own, but which were totally out of context and made kind of the point that there was great acrimony for the whole thing. When Deutch saw that item he then sort of refused to work with the State Department to try and solve the underlying problem. I will say my wife didn't look at him very kindly because as he got up to leave, he got up very abruptly. You know, time to go, got up and knocked over his glass of red wine all over her and she was wearing a brand new light yellow suit and never recovered. In my manner, which is always to avoid conflicts over small things, I never sent him the bill.

I'll tell you one other thing that really surprised me from that. As you know from the State Department, we don't get to entertain Americans. Anytime I have an All-American event, which I did frequently because after all I had these delegations that would come in, Holbrooke and company, and we'd have dinner and we'd sit and talk about our strategy. I paid for that myself. Here's the CIA which apparently has unlimited amounts of money to throw these. I mean this event must have cost $20,000 or $30,000, a big party.

Q: Oh, boy. Peter, it probably might not be a bad time to stop.

GALBRAITH: Oh, I agree.

Q: Where do we go from here now?

GALBRAITH: We have fortunately, I think we're, well, there are some more things to talk about in 1996. In particular, I think we need to talk about the effort to get U.S. policy straight on the return of ethnic Serbs to Croatia, that is to say this was something that we wanted to have take place. I need to talk about Deutch's visit with Tuđman on that very subject where he got the policy wrong and took some undoing and how we eventually got Tuđman to agree that all Croatian Serbs were entitled to return and to recover their property. I think we need to talk about Tuđman's illness and then 1997. Then we can go on to East Timor.

Q: Okay. 1990... You left when?

GALBRAITH: January 3rd, 1998.

Q: '98. Okay. Great.

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Okay, today is the 1st of October, 2002. Peter first, talk about the issue of getting Serbs back into Croatia. I mean in the first place, was this one of these things that we thought would make sense, but in practical terms it would be stupid for a Serb to go back to Croatia or was there, was it more than sort of a theoretical Washington policy?

GALBRAITH: Frankly, at the beginning, Washington didn't focus on it at all. This became my personal issue. I raised it from the start after the Serb population left in August of 1995. Tuđman initially had said that the Serbs were *optonzi*, they had opted out of Croatia and unless they came back within 30 days they would lose all of their property and their citizenship. Of course they didn't have Croatian documents. There was a war on. There was no way they could return and coincidentally the Croatian military and police were busy burning all their homes in Krajina. On the other hand, Washington wasn't prepared to engage on Croatia human rights issues in August of 1995 because Holbrooke, as was I, both of us, were agreed on this, we were looking for the Croatian

offensive to continue in Bosnia to defeat Mladic and the Bosnian Serbs. Lake who was opposed to that offensive, however, wanted Croatia to play a role in the peace process and felt that criticisms of Tuđman might be counterproductive. I must say I never thought that criticizing Tuđman would be counterproductive, and I don't think it was. I mean I had a sense of him that he wouldn't necessarily respond to our criticism, but that he viewed us as extremely powerful. Therefore, no matter how much we antagonized him, nonetheless he would be responsive to what we wanted or what he perceived that we really wanted. On this point while Washington wasn't initially engaged, the European ambassadors in Zagreb were, with the exception of the Austrian, who was an ethnic Croat and who thought that it was a good idea that the Serbs had left. The others basically agreed and we were able to put enough pressure on Tuđman in August of 1995 that extended the period of time from one month to three months to which Serbs could return and recover their property and become Croatian citizens.

I have to say in August I had a really shocking conversation with Miomir Žužul, who was one of Tuđman's closest advisors and the Croatian ambassador to the United States, a key player, who I always considered to be a reasonably enlightened person who was absolutely adamant that the Serbs would not return. Tuđman had always spoken favorably of the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s, something that cost immense human suffering. From my point of view the idea of creating an ethnically homogeneous state was unacceptable. I mean that went against what being an American was and we are a multi-ethnic state. Beyond that, what I saw was really that this was a contest about whether Croatia would be an ethnically homogenous state, basically, all that went with it, the associated baggage, intolerant, intolerant not only with regard to minorities but that same kind of intolerance that was reflected in Tuđman with regard to political opposition, criticism of free media, all of that. So, that I felt that getting Croatia to commit to treating its Serbian citizens fairly, to allowing the people, the Serbs who have lived in Croatia in 1991, to return was also not just about ethnic harmony in Croatia, it wasn't just about having a multiethnic state, but it was about the character of Croatia itself, that is whether it could really be moderate, modern, tolerant and therefore a truly democratic country. If you say was it a Washington policy, an unrealistic Washington policy, I would say on the contrary, probably what drove the policy in Washington was the field and I'll take credit for this having been very persistent from August of 1995 until I left on this issue.

Q: Were you getting two things that seem to follow suffering, I mean three things. The Turkish Greek thing having served in Greece, that worked, I mean it kept the problems from getting worse. Sudeten-Deutsch getting kicked out of this Sudetenland after World War Two and the Poles, I mean the Germans, getting out of sort of East Prussia and all that. I mean these things stopped certain problems of continuing harassment and things of that nature.

GALBRAITH: You have made just the argument that Tuđman made. My counter to him was so, the Greeks and the Turks settled everything in 1923 and there haven't been any problems since the two of them since?

Q: No, no.

GALBRAITH: The fact is that these countries have been at each other's throats for 75 years. So, I don't see how anybody can say what happened in '23 was a success. Both of these countries used what happened in 1923 to define themselves as ethnically homogenous, ethnically pure states. In Turkey this definition of being a Turk has been a major impediment to Turkey becoming a bona fide democracy. It has huge ramifications that I've been dealing with professionally that relate to the Kurdish question. The same point I would say applies to Greece which is the laggard on democracy in Europe, at least in the European Union which has been intolerant to its Slavic minority, partly because it has, and I would say the '23 population exchange was part of this, defined itself not just as a geographic entity, but as this country of the Greeks in which there really is not space for others. That was really what Tuđman wanted to do for Croatia. He wanted to define it as a country of the Croats where there wasn't space for others at least for large minorities. He was very happy about the Italians and the Jews and he treated them very well because there were so few of them and, therefore, a window dressing of the kind of tolerance.

I don't think that creating an ethnically homogenous Croatia or allowing Tuđman to create an ethnically homogenous Croatia was or is going to be a source of stability. Incidentally, well, I think most of the Serbs from the Krajina will not want to return. The fact that if they are denied the right to return they will be a lobby with a grievance in Serbia that will work against better relations between Serbia and Croatia. In addition, allowing Croatia to get away with stripping citizenship of its Serbian citizens would have a profound effect on Bosnia where we were trying to reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing.

Q: How did this come out? I mean you were working on this, what were the results?

GALBRAITH: Again, it was a theme that I sounded in my meetings with Tuđman, with Granić, with Šušak, with the main figures in the Croatian government in public statements. Points that I made in cables back to Washington and points that I tried to work into, the talking points of the various official visitors that came through. In the period from November from December of '95 through March of '96 we had many, many visitors as I pointed out, the president and Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Commerce. This was something that I tried to work into their talking points, not always with success because again, and certainly on something like the president's talking points, those were very much done obviously by the White House, and Holbrooke was the major influence. Over time I think people began to take up my point and one of the people actually who was most helpful to this was Madeleine Albright who had come a couple of times to Croatia, been out to Eastern Slavonia, who had sponsored in the UN the UN resolution that established UNTAES and who also disliked Tuđman. She understood what the issue was. She was supportive and she pushed it particularly after she became Secretary of State in 1997, which is perhaps counterintuitive considering that she was a Czech and exactly this issue arose on the Sudeten Germans. Incidentally, the

Sudeten issue remains a source of friction between Germany and the Czech Republic.

Q: By the time you left, how had this issue evolved?

GALBRAITH: I said that the one sort of person who was most unhelpful was John Deutch who in the meetings with Tuđman down in Brijuni had basically gone and taken exactly the contrary position and suggested to Tuđman that it was fine if he didn't allow the Serbs back, that he shouldn't have any interest in it. I was outraged. Certainly that went against official policy, it just reflected his views. The unfortunate thing about it was that Tuđman tended, because of his authoritarian background, he tended to think that in addition to Bill Clinton and Peter Galbraith who was Bill Clinton's representative, there were the people who really ran the United States government, mainly the CIA and the military. So, the kind of messages that were received from the CIA were things that led him to believe that there were contrary views in the U.S. government and that those views were a matter of great importance, although in fact Deutch was not particularly an important player on these issues.

Q: By this point did you have a new station chief or were you still dealing with the same station chief?

GALBRAITH: No, there was a new station chief.

Q: Good relations at that point?

GALBRAITH: I suppose one can't talk too much about this.

Q: I'm just talking about the personal relations.

GALBRAITH: They deliberately chose one of their more obstreperous characters and in the end I think we had an okay relationship.

Q: I was just wondering.

GALBRAITH: It was widely said to be an in your face appointment.

Q: Well, that's usually what happens.

GALBRAITH: He was there for a year and then replaced by somebody who was much nicer.

Q: I was just wondering, Deutch comes in, the head of the CIA, and gives sort of the wrong policy signal. Did that mean, did you have any idea, was the station then following Deutch or following policy? You know, in the informal, but extremely important contacts with the Croatian government?

GALBRAITH: The previous station chief basically had an acute case of clientitis and he worked, as I pointed out, with the head of the Croatian service, Tuđman's son Miro Tuđman, a very nasty right wing piece of work who now heads a splinter party from Tuđman's HDZ, a far right version of Tuđman's HDZ and unfortunately, they tended to take whatever Tuđman, Jr. said as the gospel truth, leading the agency to get a number of things wrong, including a belief, for example, Tuđman would not respond favorably for a proposal for a Muslim Croat Federation in '94. I remember quite a confrontation when I said to him, well, I won't say his name, but I said, "Did it ever occur to you that they might lie to you?" "They wouldn't lie to me." Of course he immediately took it back and had to recognize that yes, they might. I was concerned that the wrong messages were going in that channel. Frankly I thought Deutch was sufficiently undisciplined, what he said was not reflecting the views of the station, but just his own kind of casual view of the situation.

Anyhow, coming back to the issue of getting the policy right. In '97 Bill Richardson came out. He was the ambassador to the UN and he didn't know a lot about the issue, but he said to me, "Look I'm here to be helpful to you. What is it that I can do?" I said, "Bill, the thing you can be most helpful on is to push Tuđman to agree to the return of the Serbs." We were in Brijuni and Richardson said to him, "Look, Mr. President, you've got to give me something here." It was great; he was a pure politician. "You've got to give me something here. I need to have something that we can announce." I said, "We need to say something about the return of the Serbs." Tuđman said something and then Richardson said, "Well, Peter is what he said okay?" I said, "No, the statement needs to say this. He needs to say that all the Serbs that were from Croatia may return and are eligible for citizenship and get their property back." Richardson said, "Will you say that?" Tuđman kind of reluctantly agreed. Then Tuđman wanted to put it off. Richardson said, "No, no, we've got to do it now." I wrote out the statement that had been worked on and that was what I think it was Richardson announced as he came out of the meeting, but as to what Tuđman had agreed. It really, it was a nice relationship. I mean Richardson brought in the clout, he brought in the political side of it, but on the substance he deferred to the expert and he made sure that the statement was the one that I wanted. That really did get the commitment that we needed.

The other thing that happened as I said Albright was very helpful. She came as Secretary of State in May of 1997. First, Granić went to see her I think it was in earlier May of '97. I remember there was a I think it was a trip that was at the time of, well, it was earlier May and I flew with Granić. What happened was that day that we flew to Washington for the meeting with Albright four returnees to Kostajnica which was a town in Krajina which was on the border with Bosnia on the northern border of Bosnia just a little bit to the east of Bihać on the Una River, there were four returnees. They had been attacked and their property had been burned and I think one of the men had been beaten up. It was a bad incident. The embassy had a human rights officer, I think Martha Patterson it was. She wasn't the human rights officer, but I think it was she who had gone down. She wrote up a cable which Robert the DCM had sent in after I'd left. That had arrived overnight as Granić and I were flying to the United States. Albright decided to use this incident to

really hammer the Croatians and again it was a very good way to underscore the point that the Serbs ought to be allowed to return and to recover their property. Unfortunately it did some damage to my relations with Granić because Granić was completely surprised. He hadn't known about the incident and he assumed that I did and that I'd flown back to him and not said anything. In fact I hadn't known about the incident either although I did see the cables in the morning in the State Department before the meeting. Albright then came to Croatia later in May and she wanted to go down to Kostajnica and I'd gone down between my return to Washington and her arrival. Interestingly the families that had been attacked, they were returnees, people who had left with the Serb exodus in '95, but in fact there was only one Serb. How was it, it was a Serbian man who had a Muslim wife and then it was a Croat, a Muslim man with a Croat wife. Anyhow, but these were all people who had stayed in the Krajina after the Serbs had taken over and left in the exodus in August of '95. I'd gone down and visited and seen what had happened, seen where they were attacked, where their property had been destroyed. Albright came down. We did a very private session with the family which Jamie Rubin, Jamie Rubin I think had insisted on her going there.

Q: He was her press officer.

GALBRAITH: Her press guy, the assistant secretary for public affairs. As I say, she came out of the session with the family and she said as we got into the car, she said, "I hate these things." I think she had a sense that she was, you know, it was a manipulated kind of event and the media wasn't in the private meeting, but the, I mean, you know, it's the nature of the process. There was a larger point to be made. Inevitably it was somewhat exploitive of the family and that's what she the families what she was reacting to. Then we off to a burned house and there was a press conference there. She was with Jure Radic, who was the minister for reconstruction and she just, Jamie Rubin had planted the question what do you think of all this. She used it as an occasion to say how disgusted she was by what had happened and how the house had been, where these returnees were going to go had been burned. She pointed to Radic and said, you should be ashamed of yourself. Meanwhile, Granić, the foreign minister, was sort of turning away. He had a coat on and a hat. He was sort of looking just completely the other direction not wishing to be part of that picture holding his hat in his hand as Radic tried to explain what was going on, but Radic was basically set up. Then it just perhaps to continue quite a tense meeting with Tuđman that she'd had. Again, I think this was before the Richardson visit so Tuđman had not yet conceded the right of all Serbs to return or that they would be protected.

Q: Well, I was just wondering, you know, I mean you can make these pronouncements like we have on civil rights in the United States which is going back a long way. I mean you can make these and this becomes policy, but how well do you deliver and you know you're particularly when you get down to peoples' feelings, it takes, you know, the guys who hang around the gas station on the corner may decide the hell, we don't want any more Serbs in here. They can make real trouble. I mean it doesn't have to be government policy. Can you deliver?

GALBRAITH: That's a very good question. It strikes me that the first step toward getting a change in facts on the ground is to change the official policy to change the norms. As long as the government is saying that these people are not entitled to Croatian citizenship that they cannot return, they are not going to be able to return. So, the first step to reestablishing the multiethnic character of this place is for the government to say they are entitled to return. Now, I knew that Tuđman never wanted them to return, no matter what we forced him to say, we really forced him to do it. Changing the norms was a first step and what happened, what has happened subsequently in the January 2000 parliamentary elections which took place a month after Tuđman died and in the presidential election of January 2000 because particularly in the presidential election the three candidates for president: Stjepan Mesić who ultimately won, Dražen Budiša who represents the liberal party and who was a nationalist, and Granić who had been nominated by Tuđman's party and then ran as an independent. They all competed as to who would do the most to facilitate the return of ethnic Serbs. The guy who said he would do the most message is the guy who won, not because the Croatian people had decided they wanted the Serbs back, but because we had worked with the Europeans to make it clear that Croatia's commitment to multiethnicity and to the return of the Serbs was a precondition to Croatia entry into NATO and the European Union. Since the Croatian public wanted to enter into NATO and the European Union they voted for the parties that were going to do the most to return ethnic Serbs. The current government has been providing financial incentives for Serbs to return home. Again, not that many have returned, but at least this issue has been removed as a sense of grievance between Serbia and Croatia. A government that is willing to commit on civil rights issues has also turned out not surprisingly to be more tolerant on political democracy issues. Incidental roughly similar to what has happened in the Unites States. Civil rights in America also has led America to become a more liberal and democratic place for white people. Well, that's what's happened in Croatia. I think the judgment call that we made beginning in '95 has turned out to be correct.

Q: You mentioned Tuđman's illness. Did that manifest itself; he died in cancer in 2000?

GALBRAITH: '99. December of '99.

Q: I remember it being reported, but did this become a factor while you were there?

GALBRAITH: It was a very significant factor in the latter part of my tenure. In I guess something like November of '96, October or November, Robert Finn came to see me and he said, "Something's going on because all of Tuđman's close cronies were coming to get American visas." It was one of the ways in which we monitored what was going on. He speculated that Tuđman was ill. He turned out to be right. Tuđman went to the United States to Walter Reed, something that we had arranged, the embassy had arranged, but well it didn't in fact, it was the product of something that had been arranged for Šušak who had chronic back problems and Holbrooke had arranged for him to get medical treatment and that medical treatment it turned out that it wasn't really a back problem, he had cancer. Then he'd gotten treated in the United States and he felt quite satisfied about

it. Well, Tuđman went secretly to the United States, so secretly that Žužul, the ambassador, didn't know. Then it was leaked. The diagnosis was leaked which was inexcusable.

Q: Absolutely.

GALBRAITH: Tuđman was not an admirable figure, but he was the guest of the United States and he had the same right of privacy that other patients have.

Q: Sounds like there was an orderly with a Serb background or something like that.

GALBRAITH: Who knows what happened. Well, I can speculate, but probably shouldn't. In any event, a couple of things. It turned out the diagnosis was wrong. I mean the diagnosis was that he had a few months to live and in fact he lived another three years. He also of course wasn't going to come to the United States for anymore medical treatment, so he went and got medical treatment with French doctors. It may be that the French doctors did something that prolonged his life. I know I got calls from one other person on behalf of another person who desperately wanted to know who Tuđman's doctors were because he had the same kind of cancer. He sadly of course died of it. I went to Tuđman's funeral, which was being boycotted by the United States, but at that point I was a professor at the War College and a private citizen and I happened to be in Venice when he died, so I went over. I was told by one of the ambassadors there, I think it was the British ambassador that Tuđman had actually not died of cancer, but that he had had some other problems, treatable problems, that he had delayed getting treatment for because he wanted to go see the Pope. He had an audience with the Pope and he just held off and held off and then he saw the Pope and then it was not the national day, this was November. It was a day to lay a wreath in honor of those who had died in the war, the equivalent of Veterans Day.

Q: The 29th?

GALBRAITH: No, I think it was probably the 11th of November.

Q: The 29th of November was the Yugoslav.

GALBRAITH: Well, that definitely would not have been a day that they would have honored, but this could have been the 11th of November, it was some day where we went up to, I mean I went up when I was there to Medvedgrad which was an old site that had been reconstructed, not accurately, but by the first DCM Ron Neitzke referred to it as a Croatian Disneyland. Then there was an altar at the homeland and there was a wreath laying and an eternal flame. Anyhow, Tuđman wanted to do that ceremony. So, he had gone to see the Pope. He resisted getting treatment until he had done that ceremony and then he went under treatment and had whatever emergency treatment needed to occur and he never recovered, never regained consciousness. It might be said that the Pope killed Tuđman. In any event, he certainly lasted a lot longer than we expected.

Q: While you were there, I don't know if I've ever asked this question before, but what was the role of the church, the Catholic church because during World War Two and prior to World War Two we both know the Catholic church was kind of vicious as far as its authority and racism and the whole thing. Was the church holding back did you feel or were they involved?

GALBRAITH: The church is a huge influence in Croatia and Tuđman naturally tried to use the church to win support for his government as had the Ustashi. The church, the Catholic Church was also targeted in the Serb-held areas. In fact every Catholic church in the Serb-held areas was destroyed except for the one at Ilok, blown up, used for target practice and so on. When the Croatians took over the territory they destroyed some, but not all of the Orthodox churches. They definitely did better on this than the Serbs had done. I mean I remember the first trips I made there before I was ambassador I was really shocked that churches had become such targets. I had thought that these were God's houses, house of God and that even if you were Orthodox, to destroy a Catholic church and vice versa. They were still Christian churches, but that wasn't how people looked at it there.

I also remember the first courtesy call I'd made on Cardinal Kuharić who as the bishop of Zagreb and the senior figure in the Croatians' church, quite an elderly man in the palace in Zagreb. I asked about the role that the church might play in terms of reconciliation and I was very surprised at the response. He said that the problem with the Serbs is that virtually none of them had been baptized and that they had no values and that lay at the root of the problem. I was surprised. It didn't immediately strike me that that was a basis for, you know, I had hoped the church would play a role in fostering in rejecting the violence, but that kind of stereotypical, what I thought sounded like a stereotyping of the Serbs didn't seem very promising.

I had other encounters with the church before I was ambassador. One of the more interesting was to visit the Catholic bishop and the Orthodox bishop in Banja Luka. The Orthodox bishop I remember meeting extremely well for the fact that it was 8:00 in the morning and this was in October of '92. When I arrived there was a table with quite a number of people who were attending and before each person there was a water glass full of scotch and a water glass full of slivovitz. It did strike me that that was a bit heavy going for 8:00 in the morning. The Catholic priest, the Catholic bishop Komarica I think his name was, the meeting was more a description of the horrors that were being inflicted on the Croatian community, which were indeed true. In general, I was disappointed in the church. I never figured out how to have a dialogue with them on these issues. I wished that they had played a better role in reconciliation.

Q: Did you have the feeling that they recognized the church's really pernicious role during just before and through World War Two?

GALBRAITH: Not at all. The church didn't recognize it. The Pope didn't recognize it

and the Croatian government didn't recognize it. In fact, when Pope John Paul II came to Croatia he went and prayed at the grave of Cardinal Stepinac who was the leader of the church during the Ustasha period. What Pope John Paul II focused on as to Croatians was of course Stepinac's resistance after the war to Tito and to the communists and to his trial. There is a movement to get him beatified and made into a saint. There was a major effort. I think his tomb is a venerated place that was fixed up in the cathedral post under the Tuđman government whereas and with regard to the Ustashi, they tend to focus on what Stepinac did toward the end of the Ustasha period when he greeted Pavlovic into the church on Easter to get the traditional offerings of bread and salt and allegedly said thou shalt not kill, but ignored his earlier involvement, his earlier support of the Ustashi regime and frankly there's been a lot of sweeping under the rug, the role of the Franciscan priests in Herzegovina.

Q: And Glina.

GALBRAITH: And Glina, the massacres of the Serbs, absolutely.

Q: Yes. So, really we move into really what 1997 was the last year you were there?

GALBRAITH: That's right.

Q: You've talked about Madeleine Albright coming. How about as things began, your term began to wind down. How did you see things moving?

GALBRAITH: It was a long haul. It was four and a half years and very eventful. I had a, I left with a sense that things were heading in the right direction. I mean I knew that Tuđman and what he stood for was a transitory phenomenon, that nobody in Croatia basically nobody subscribed to his view of the great greater Croatia that is dividing Bosnia in half. It was very much a minority that subscribed to the Šušak view of a small greater Croatia, that is taking over Herzegovina. That the opposition was more tolerant, more democratic and I thought it likely that they would win at the next opportunity, that there was a significant level of dissatisfaction with what the HDZ was doing with the corruption and with the failure to deliver economically. I felt that we had been effective in forging a consensus with the Europeans on Croatia democracy issues. Sometimes it was frustrating. One of the things that I lobbied against and again Washington agreed and took action had to do with Croatia's admission to the council of Europe. I felt that Croatia should not be admitted to the council of Europe until it met certain conditions. Our representative in Strasbourg lobbied on this point, a guy who sort of tends the council of Europe as an observer, of course we aren't members. The Europeans in the end laid down I think 40 conditions for Croatia to enter which ranged again from the return of Serbs to a free press and so on. The frustrating part was that Croatia didn't meet any of those terms and they still admitted them. The argument was that Croatia, if they admit Russia, how could they exclude Croatia and they would have more influence on Croatia if it was in than if it was out. Those might be valid arguments, but if you're going to do that then you don't first lay down conditions. But in the end I felt that we had gotten European seized

on these issues and that largely there was a consensus about where Croatia should go.

Q: Did you find any divergence between say Britain, Germany and France?

GALBRAITH: No, I think there was a pretty good consensus. The view from the outside was the Germans were the major players in Croatia and that they were more sympathetic to the Croatian government. It wasn't true that they were more sympathetic, at least in this period. They were at the very beginning.

Q: Germany was.

GALBRAITH: Yes. They definitely were not the big players. I mean we were the big players. That was clear from '93 on. The Germans they were supportive of our policy. The other thing that was a major focus of my attention in '96 and '97 was the implementation of the Erdut Agreement. One of the provisions of the Erdut Agreement, which the Serbs had wanted, created an international commission that was to monitor. They'd wanted guarantees. So, my idea was to, I couldn't put in specific guarantees for them into the agreement of Serbian rights, but what I sold them on was there should be an international commission that would monitor the implementation of the agreement. They agreed that that met their request for guarantees. Then the problem was in part of '96 was that we didn't appoint the commission. Jacques Klein the transitional administrator didn't want it because he felt it might be looking over his shoulder, but the Serbs really insisted on it. So, we formed the commission that consisted of the ambassadors who were from the European Union plus Norway since Stoltenberg had been my co-mediator and Canada since they wanted something to do. That was the commission plus Russia of course. We made period trips to Eastern Slavonia to monitor the progress of the agreement. The critical test for the success of the agreement came in April of '97 which was the elections that were held in Eastern Slavonia, local elections. Jacques Klein very rightly made it a condition of the Serbs being able to vote in the elections, that they should take out Croatian citizenship. The number of people getting Croatian documents was very small in '96 and early '97 and then the Serb political leadership took the decision that they would contest the elections. So, they all took out Croatian citizenship and the population took out Croatian citizenship. Those elections produced I think of the 27 municipalities in Eastern Slavonia it was roughly that, 14 had Serb majority, 13 had Croat majorities, or maybe it was the other way around and Vukovar had a slight Croat majority because the people who had been driven of course were able to vote there. In the end these municipalities had to work together and the process of election was the key to the process of integration. I had a number of public meetings in Eastern Slavonia explaining the agreement, advocating tolerance. I found myself often feeling like I was a preacher and citing the bible, citing Woodrow Wilson and the bible as I advocated tolerance. In the end that agreement was a success. I came back on the 15th of January '98 when the turnover took place. In other words when Croatia assumed full authority over the region and the fact is that Croatia did take over full control of the region and the Serbian population that was from the region almost all remained.

Q: Did you get involved with I'm not sure of the timing, but Bill Walker's operation?

GALBRAITH: Bill Walker in, well this.

Q: In Vukovar.

GALBRAITH: Right. Bill Walker was Jacques Klein's successor. I think Bill was only there for about six months. Kline came in January of '96 and was there until the summer of '97 when Madeleine moved him to be deputy in Sarajevo. A very mistaken move; Jacques was perfect in Eastern Slavonia. He was admired by Tuđman who thought of Jack as a fellow general. He was admired by the local Serbs who admired his sort of decisive style and his swagger. It fitted him that it was a place where he could do all his speaking and the audience would listen. He was less effective in the role of deputy in Sarajevo. Madeleine wanted a strong personality to pursue Bosnia implementation, but I don't think it really worked out that well. Bill Walker was frankly less forceful and less effective than Jacques in Eastern Slavonia. He wasn't a general. He couldn't in the time he was there develop the persona that Klein had gotten.

Q: Did you have the feeling, you had been there for four and a half years and you mentioned preaching. I mean you were having to carry difficult messages and tell people what to do and you know, you were acting like a nag in a way. I mean this was our policy in trying to get the Croats to enter the society of Europe or something. Did you find did you have the feeling toward the end that you were beginning to run out of tolerance for doing this and they needed somebody new or not?

GALBRAITH: Well, I certainly began to feel that I was becoming a nag and a scold and that I would get up before audiences and that what immediately would come out would be the criticisms. Yes, I felt personally, I felt that that you know it's beginning to sound like a broken record and it had a little edge in the way I sounded. Also, I didn't feel I was connecting well with my audiences at times. I mean of course it was a message that they didn't want to hear. But I couldn't go out and deliver the chamber of commerce type speech. First, it isn't in my nature to give that kind of a speech. Second, always it came back to these things and I think that was a, it would have been better had I given a few more chamber of commerce type speeches, you know, how wonderful Croatia is, how wonderful America is, how wonderful it will be with our two countries working together and left off some of these things, but that wasn't the mode that I was in. So, yes, I feel that my effectiveness probably diminished some in '97.

On the other hand, I had developed over the four and a half years an enormous, a very big reserve of good will both for myself and for the United States and lots and lots of Croatians did feel that the United States had saved the country. They did appreciate what we had done in terms of negotiating the Erdut Agreement. They gave me a lot of credit for the U.S. policy and U.S. actions, maybe not of it deserved, but nonetheless that was how it was. That was capital that I could and did use. Brian Atwood came in and he observed.

Q: The head of AID.

GALBRAITH: The head of AID. How I developed all this capital and now he said, and you're really planning to spend it all before you leave, aren't you? Although when I left, I mean it was a huge press coverage in the Croatian press of my departure and they also did a poll of who were the most popular people in Croatia. When I left I was the fourth most popular person in the country. There was a nun and a sports figure who were in the first and second places and third place was Tuđman and I was in fourth place, ahead of all the other politicians. With an 80 percent or something approval rating, I was pretty. So, I felt good about that.

Q: How did you find your relations with Washington? Did that change or did you find that you were, that you had good support from Washington or were you sort of at odds?

GALBRAITH: Over this whole period?

Q: Yes, well, I mean towards the end and also the whole period.

GALBRAITH: It varied greatly during this period. At the beginning there was no question but that Christopher and people around him saw me as an outsider, a maverick and also they didn't like Croatia. That was complicated I think by the incident that I explained of the cable that the dark team cable which I'd sent unclassified which had gotten in the press and they assumed that I'd done this intentionally to embarrass the administration. When the Z-4 process was underway and Holbrooke was in place in the period leading up to Dayton I think I had the strongest support from Washington that I could hope for. It was a very good relationship. I would have screaming fights with Holbrooke sometimes, but we spoke two or three times a day and he was very helpful, very engaged on the issues.

On the policy post Dayton, to some degree I was not much of a player on Bosnia implementation particularly after Holbrooke left. I mean Bosnia, a huge bureaucracy sprung up in Sarajevo and in Washington to handle Bosnia and to push the parties toward implementation. My role simply became less and I think the last really big thing I did was when Silajdžić announced he was resigning as prime minister and Holbrooke didn't want him to resign. This was I think January of '96 and he tasked me to go to Sarajevo and talk to Silajdžić and I did. I was unable to persuade Silajdžić to change his mind, but Holbrooke thought it was worth the effort.

On the Croatia issues in '96 and '97 I got support. I didn't, I had good relations. I didn't always feel like I was an insider. There's no doubt that this whole business with the Bosnia arms investigation. That sort of thing isn't always very helpful.

Q: When you got back, you got back when?

GALBRAITH: January of '98. No, sorry, actually I took about six weeks and so I got back in February of '98.

Q: Did you find people were interested in what you were doing in debriefing or did you just sort of come back and thanks a lot and on your way or something?

GALBRAITH: No, I think, thanks a lot and you're on your way. I think when you wrap up an assignment like that, you wrap it up and it was definitely my view that the book should be closed. It was in somebody else's hands. I didn't want to be convincing from the sidelines. I don't like the view from the stands, either you're on the field or you go off and do something else.

Q: Except one of the problems often in the State Department I find and this is true in a lot of other fields and endeavors is that there's a tendency when somebody comes back, I mean, they get engrossed in a problem, there isn't much effort on the part of those who are going to continue to deal with it to milk them of everything they know in order to make their job better.

GALBRAITH: That's true and my successor Bill Montgomery never even had a conversation with me.

Q: Yes. Ships that pass in the night kind of.

GALBRAITH: I mean he never called me, never wanted my views either on policy or embassy personnel, nothing. Not, I mean, I thought it was a bit surprising, but it was really up to him.

Q: Well, this is the theme that I've heard again and again.

GALBRAITH: That's why it was my view to close the chapter and probably more than most ambassadors I could have been a problem because I really did have a profile in Croatia that no other ambassador had and no successor is ever likely to come close because of the circumstances.

Q: Well, then I think this is probably a good place to stop.

GALBRAITH: Okay.

Q: We'll pick this up the next time you came back in '98 and you went to, actually we then begin to coincide with our earlier interviews where you were teaching national defense university and then you went off to East Timor and you want to cover East Timor. Maybe we'll touch a little on the national Defense University and right now we're interviewing in the national Defense University and you're back again.

GALBRAITH: Right.

Q: Okay, great. (End of tape)

Peter, we can cover the National Defense University at the end altogether, but how did this East Timor business, I mean what happened?

GALBRAITH: The larger background I think you know. East Timor had been a Portuguese colony for about 500 years almost entirely neglected by the Portuguese. Then on December 7, 1975 just as Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger lifted off out of Jakarta, Indonesia invaded and took it over. The Indonesians Imagined that their takeover would be something like the Indian takeover a decade earlier of Goa, but it wasn't. I suppose for a variety of reasons. One was that the Indonesians were extraordinarily brutal when they landed. They had paratroopers come in. Some of them died in accidents and they just took it out on the local population. In fact, when I was there I heard countless just appalling stories of what happened in the very first days. They rounded up the population of Dili and sort of selected some of the elite and marched them to the edge of Dili wharf and shot them one by one. One of the people shot was the wife of the president of the self-proclaimed Democratic Republic of East Timor. She was in her 20s and had a baby in her arms. The baby, ultimately there was bargaining and they decided not to shoot the baby and the baby is now a young man who is a member of the parliament of East Timor. Anyhow, it was appalling behavior when they took it over. Also I think the world was less tolerant by '75 of this kind of action. East Timorese didn't accept the Indonesian takeover as the Goans did accept the Indian takeover. Anyhow, there were the East Timorese, FRETILIN and the military on Falintil waged an extraordinary conflict with no outside support for many years. So, from '75 to '78 they held much of the center of the island and then were able to wager guerrilla war, more or less continually until '99. Low level, but they also had a clandestine movement in the urban areas. In 1998 Suharto was overthrown, his successor, Habibie , a kind of a curious story. Prime Minister Howard had sent him a letter urging dialogue.

Q: You're talking about Australia.

GALBRAITH: Australia. Urging dialogue with the East Timorese on a possibly autonomy solution and Habibie resented that letter. He went and held a press conference and he said, "We are going to offer the East Timorese autonomy and if they don't want it, if they don't go for our autonomy proposal, they can be independent." The UN which had been brokering rather fruitless between Portugal which retained having the role of the colonial power and Indonesia immediately jumped in on the basis of this Habibie statement on the 5th of May 1999 an accord was brokered in which a referendum would held on the Indonesian autonomy proposal and with the agreement that if the autonomy was rejected then East Timor could be independent. There is a lesson in this whole story because for years the Indonesians had been telling the world how much they had done for the East Timorese, how many roads they'd built, how many schools they'd built, how many teachers they'd trained. Actually all of it was true. The untrue part was that they had won the hearts and minds of the Timorese people, that hadn't happened, but telling the

world how much they had done for them and how much the East Timorese loved them, the Indonesians fell victim to their own propaganda. It is a lesson that the first victim of propaganda is most often the person who propagates it.

Q: The Sandinistas fell into the same trap.

GALBRAITH: Perhaps, I don't know the Nicaragua situation. Believing that they were going to win they allowed the referendum to proceed. I think that some of the Indonesian military began to realize that things weren't maybe going to go their way, or the way they thought, so there was a lot of intimidation. Imagine their surprise when they discovered that in fact the vote was 79.5 percent for independence and just 20 percent in favor of remaining part of Indonesia. Incidentally had the elections been genuinely free almost certainly it would have been 90 percent for their own independence.

Well, the Indonesians responded with a, by going on a rampage. The vote by the militias that they had set up, these were East Timorese militias, pro-Indonesians Timorese militias, young thugs and the Indonesian military itself and I suppose a month in September of 1999 every public building in East Timor was destroyed. About 70 percent to 80 percent of the physical structures in East Timor were destroyed. 350,000 East Timorese fled or were forced to leave to West Timor in Indonesia, so just about well, 40 percent of the population actually was driven out of the country and probably about 1,000 people were killed. Interestingly, given the scale of the physical destruction, the death toll was not as high as it might have been. The physical destruction was complete. In this environment the United Nations stepped in and President Clinton played an absolutely key role. There was an APEC meeting in Wellington, New Zealand. What Clinton did was he got Habibie to request UN intervention to help restore law and order, a military intervention. That intervention then came in the form of a resolution that authorized a coalition of the willing and that coalition of the willing became known as INTERFET, the International Forces of East Timor. It was led by Australia. It deployed in I guess late September.

Q: September of '99.

GALBRAITH: September of '99 and within a week the disorder had, a week or two, they had in fact restored order. Then on October 24th the Indonesian parliament met. It repealed the annexation of East Timor and at that time the UN Security Council Resolution 1272 was adopted in which the United Nations was assigned full executive legislative and judicial authority for East Timor. This was the most; this was the United Nations mission with the broadest mandate of any United Nations mission in history. I'm not sure there will ever be one like it again. Virtually all other UN missions come into being to implement some kind of peace agreement and that peace agreement is the road map for how the United Nations mission will operate. So, in Eastern Slavonia, UNTRA, United Nations Transitional Administration Eastern Slavonia had a lot of authority in the two years. Jacques Klein was the dictator of Eastern Slavonia, as I used to call him, but what he actually did was very much circumscribed by the Erdut Agreement. It was spelled

out in the Erdut Agreement, the peace agreement between Croatia and the rebel Serbs. Well, in the case of east Timor there wasn't any road map, there wasn't any peace agreement. The UN had full authority with the only provision of the mandate was the goal was to prepare East Timor for independence, but in terms of what kind of system of government it would have, would it be presidential, would it be parliamentary, what law it would have, would it be common law system, would it be a civil law system in terms of whether the applicable law would be Portuguese, would it be Indonesian? Indonesian because that was the immediate past law Portuguese because that was the last lawful authority in East Timor since the Indonesian occupation was illegal. What would be the government departments? Who would be the civil servants? All of this was not specified. There was no road map.

Now, to head the mission Kofi Anan selected Sergio Vieira de Mello, a Brazilian who had begun his career at the UN with UNHCR. He had been the first SRSG, Special Representative Secretary of the General and head of mission in Kosovo. Undoubtedly he would have been the best man to run the Kosovo mission, but he was a Brazilian and the Europeans wanted a European and so Bernard Kouchner, a French minister was chosen to replace Sergio. He was also absolutely ideal for East Timor. Of course as a Brazilian he spoke Portuguese. He is a very charming personality, absolutely masterful diplomat who, I mean I watched him in action over the 18 months I was there and he could persuade almost anybody to do something, to make a commitment and he was never confrontational, always reasoned with people, but just enormous persuasive powers. He asked me. I had met him in Croatia in Zagreb where he was the head of civil affairs for the United Nations, for the United Nations, UNPROFOR, the UN Mission in Croatia and Bosnia. We had worked particularly closely together in August of 1994 to deal with the Bihać crisis. This was when the Abdić refugees from Bihać were defeated by Dudaković. They had come into Krajina, the Serb-controlled Krajina. Some of them were caught between the front lines in a place called Turan and Sergio and I had gone down to Bihać and we negotiated an agreement which was to permit these refugees to return and the ways in which they would be protected. The agreement was a considerable negotiating success. Unfortunately, nobody returned under the agreement, but nonetheless Sergio and I worked together, well, worked there well together and I think he had seen something of my abilities as a negotiator.

In any event, he asked if I would come out to East Timor as the head of the Office of Political Affairs and the UN then decided while they had originally had an idea of having separate offices of political affairs and constitutional affairs and electoral affairs, they decided after I was chosen to consolidate that. So I became the director for political, constitutional and electoral affairs. The senior leadership of the mission were about four or five people. It was myself; it was Sergio of course as the transitional administrator and special representative to the secretary general. It was a wonderful French prefect named Jean-Christian Cady who was Sergio's deputy and responsible for governments and public administration. Then there was the military component as well as a chief of staff, a Malaysian named, the former ambassador to Vietnam named Parameswaran, known as Param and finally a Japanese who headed the humanitarian component.

Now, the mission was set up as a traditional UN mission in which there were three pillars. I think this really copied Kosovo. There was a humanitarian pillar, which was headed by the Japanese. It was a governments and public administration pillar, which was headed by Cady, the Frenchman and the military component which was headed by a Filipino, Jaime de Los Santos. In February of 2000 the UN peacekeeping force took over from INTERFET. INTERFET had been led by Peter Cosgrove and the Australians. It became apparent right at the beginning to me that in fact neither the humanitarian component nor the military component would be a major focus of the mission. Both were important and the military, there were about 10,000 peacekeeping troops, was essential to providing security, but there were no there were no significant military changes. There were a few problems and I ended up dealing with the political side of those, but basically once the Indonesians were gone, the area, the country became stable. The military was deployed along the border to deter Indonesian insurgence and we did have a problem with those in the spring and summer of 2000, but not a serious problem. Otherwise there was basically stability in the country. Similarly the humanitarian issues quickly faded from the top of the agenda. Why? Because in fact East Timor is small, 800,000 people. The UN was able to get UNHCR able to get emergency food and shelter to the half more than half of the population that had been displaced, but it's a relatively small place geographically, although very mountainous, it was possible to get shelter to everybody. It was possible to get emergency food rations to everybody.

Q: Where it was, it's basically warm and fertile.

GALBRAITH: Exactly. That was just the point that I was going to make. Plus, unlike Kosovo, East Timor has a very forgiving climate. It is fertile and people there were very poor. While they had lost their homes, it didn't require a lot to restore them to the standard of living to the very low standard of living they had previously had. So, the humanitarian component quickly accomplished its core mission. It remained, but it didn't involve issues that the mission as a whole had to address. It wasn't, we had daily staff meetings and we didn't spent a lot of time on either the military issues or on the humanitarian issues. The crux of the problem was how to govern the country and what kind of institutions to create that might be left for the future and how this should be done.

Initially when Sergio arrived, he arrived in early November. I arrived incidentally in the middle of January. He took a number of steps. Regulation One and the UN legislated by issuing regulations, but these were laws and they remain the laws of East Timor. Regulation One established that the applicable law in East Timor would be the law that existed on the 24th of October 1999 namely Indonesian law, except the Indonesian law frozen as it was on October 24th, 1999 except the provisions that violated human rights or which were contrary to the mission of UNTAR, the United Nations Transitional Administration, to East Timor were voided. Actually we didn't know what those provisions were, but that at least gave a legal basis if something came up we could void a provision that violated human rights.

The second decision he took in Regulation Two was to establish a national consultative council which consisted of, four internationals and there were going to be eleven East Timorese, it ended up only being ten. Seven of the ten East Timorese represented the CNRT which was the umbrella group of those who favored independence and four were to represent I guess it was seven from the CNRT, one from the church and three from the pro-Indonesia parties.

Q: Roughly you're shadowing the vote.

GALBRAITH: Yes, and in fact, Xanana Gusmão who is the very charismatic East Timorese guerilla leader who had been in prison in Indonesia for seven years from '92 to '99. He was captured in '92. He was the one who "I'm going to be generous, there should be an extra one for the pro-independence forces." I meant the pro-Indonesia forces. As it happened that third seat was never filled and the reason it was never filled is that one of the pro-Indonesia parties refused to participate. Two of the pro-Indonesia parties did participate and actually it helped the reconciliation process a lot. Part of my time was to try to get the third one to agree to designate somebody to participate in the National Consultative Council. Sergio put even more effort into that. It was not successful. In the end it didn't matter much.

This was the institution, which would advise the UN mission, which would represent the local voices. The four international members incidentally were Sergio who chaired it, Cady, the Frenchman who was his deputy, Takahashi the Japanese, and a woman named Sidney Jones who was the head of the human rights unit. It was formed before I got there. In any event Sergio wanted to have a woman on it although logically the head of the political operation should have been on it, but I didn't mind. As it worked operationally, however, the National Consultative Council became less and less effective as an institution. The reason was this. The UN came in and it deployed a lot of staff from all over the world into different departments and immediately it set out creating new law, new regulations. There was a lot, a huge amount of things to be done. Initially this was all coordinated out of the office of the principal legal advisor and a young German, thirty-five year old German municipal judge named Hansjoerg Strohmeyer who, a brilliant guy who had been transferred to work at OCHA, a part of the UN that deals with humanitarian affairs. Then Sergio had brought him to East Timor. Hansjoerg would draw up in his team of very young lawyers, would draw up these regulations which might be proposed by different departments of the UN whether it dealt with agriculture or creating the court system, the judiciary or eventually establishing a system of taxation or finance currency, all the kinds of decisions that had to be dealt with by a government. This arrangement which then the legal department would prepare regulations which would be submitted to the National Consultative Council began to frustrate the East Timorese because although the title of the NCC was consultative, the way Sergio operated is that he only acted if they agreed. In fact, he insisted that there be a consensus, that everybody on the council agree. The Timorese, however, as I said became frustrated because regulations would be presented to them. It would be explained it's absolutely urgent that we have this regulation on taxes otherwise there will be no money of the government and we won't be

able to pay the teachers. So, you've got to decide it today. The regulation would be 30 pages thick and these leaders, resistance leaders, who after all had virtually no experience in government, they'd been either abroad in exile, or a few of them had been in the hills fighting or, like Gusmão, in prison. They'd look at it and they wouldn't have any idea, so they didn't actually have effective control over the process. Yes, they could have voted no, but it was explained that if they voted no, the schools would shut down or whatever, the power system would shut down and the decision had to be made today.

In fairness, I would say that it is true that the staff working on some of these regulations would work with their counterparts. They would be assigned counterparts with the CNRT, the Timorese umbrella resistance movement. But those Timorese counterparts never communicated up to the leaders. Incidentally within the CNRT, the CNRT was a coalition of political parties only one of which actually had a lot of support, FRETILIN, which had only one seat on the CNRT, and the others didn't have much support, so there was an inherent tension there as well. In any event, come May, Sergio is getting the level of East Timorese criticism is getting to be very high, that the UN is arrogant, that it is not properly consulting, that the Timorese are not involved and Sergio comes into my office and he's very frustrated. His chief of staff, this Malaysian, Param, was supposed to draw up a strategic plan, but he hadn't gotten around to doing it. In any event, his idea of a strategic plan was to go around to the different parts of the UN mission and then ask everybody what they were doing, how long it would take and then that became the plan. So, Sergio asked if I could do something about this, if I could offer some thoughts.

I did two things. First, I moved a group of the senior staff that I trusted up to Baucau for a couple of days. We had a retreat to talk it through. Then I came back and I drew up a very simple plan. First, I reduced the number of tasks that the UN *needed* to do to six. We can't do, I mean we can't do sixty or eighty different things. It may be useful for us to get sports facilities built and to have cultural programs, but it's not something that *has* to be accomplished before East Timor can become independent. I mean we can do it, but it's not simply that absolutely something that has to be accomplished. What is it that needs absolutely to be accomplished? Basically the things, the six things that needed to be accomplished was to address the humanitarian emergency. We couldn't leave, turn things over if people were starving. But actually that had already begun. Second, we needed to have military security and again, that had pretty much had already begun. Third, we needed to get essential services functioning by which it was limited to education, health care, electric power generation. Fourth, I have to go back and look at my list, but the other really key one was there needed to be a system for political transition. In other words, a mechanism by which the Timorese would choose their own leaders and decide on their own future form of government.

Then I came up with a proposal which was that since the current institution of Sergio as the absolute dictator supported by national consultative council which was a sort of legislature, but without any ability to actually review legislation wasn't working. We needed a new system. I proposed that we transfer power from Sergio to an executive cabinet and I had in mind that the British cabinet in the nineteenth century, not the current

system which was basically presidential in the form of a prime minister, but a cabinet of colleagues. I proposed that there be a majority of East Timorese. But when the East Timorese looked at the proposal, they said, no, we want to make it half East Timorese, half-international. So, the decision was to form a cabinet of eight members. Then the cabinet any regulation after it had been approved by the cabinet would go to a national council, an appointed parliament which would review the proposal. This interim government would last however long, probably a year and then it would be followed by elections. The elections would be for a constituent assembly. The constituent assembly then would write the constitution. I'll say a little bit more about the constituent assembly. In any event, this was the proposal. Sergio agreed. There was a big conference that the CNRT had organized outside of Dili including people from abroad and I gave the keynote speech in which I outlined this proposal. It was meant to be a basis for discussion. The conference considered it. They liked the idea and then Sergio gave the concluding speech in which he then endorsed this proposal. It went into effect on the fifteenth of July. I had set that as the date to have it go into effect. Nobody thought it could be done because the UN hadn't done anything on time, but I got it done by the fourteenth. What was required, it was required for two regulations to be passed by the National Consultative Council, one establishing a cabinet, second establishing the national council, this appointed parliament and then actually selecting the cabinet members. The cabinet members were selected and sworn in on the fourteenth of July and they consisted of four international members and four East Timorese and I was one of the four international cabinet members. So, my portfolio, it was called political affairs, but in fact I handled the foreign affairs for East Timor as well as the domestic political transition, the constitutional issues.

Let me see. I then spent a year in this role as a cabinet minister of East Timor and I must say it was one of the most interesting years of my life.

Q: Before we get to that, while you were doing this, did you run across the problem of the United Nations, you know, it's a well established bureaucracy. I would think that you would by changing rules and doing things that you might be breaking rice bowls and going, I mean your whole crew, you know, you would run across real opposition within the bureaucracy of the UN.

GALBRAITH: Well, a very good question. Part of my strategy was in fact cut the bureaucracy in New York out of the process. I figured that this would best be accomplished by the establishment of a cabinet, which was one reason I wanted a majority East Timorese cabinet was this which would be the actual decision making body with regard to policy, with regard to regulations. That would make it much harder for the UN in New York to pick over what we were doing because we would be able to say to them, well the cabinet has decided, not the United Nations mission, but the cabinet has decided. Part of the intellectual structure that I put forward was to divide what was going on into two things. There would be the UN mission UNTAET whose job it would be to manage the UN staff which would handle the security, the military side which would help support the government. Then there would be something called the transitional government of East Timor, which would be the government of the country. It wouldn't be

UN; it would be East Timorese although it would be staffed by certain UN personnel. So, I had in mind a very sharp division. I have to say many of the UN people and some of the East Timorese had a hard time getting their head around this. Sergio understood about ninety percent of it, but not one hundred percent. Nonetheless, I think that was the basic division and it did serve to cut the UN out of the process. I didn't say this, but one of the, one of the big problems that we would have in the first six months is that we would prepare, regulations would be prepared, they would be coordinated among the different UN departments that were running the country. They would be coordinated with the East Timorese on the lower level. Those guys generally would not be coordinating with the leaders who actually had the votes of the National Consultative Council, but then it would have to be sent to New York where it would be viewed by the Office of the Legal Advisor in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations which might have their own input on it. The process could take forever and rarely were the suggestions from New York; they tended to nitpick about the smallest things. New York had a hard time understanding that UNTAET was the government of a country, not a UN mission. Basically we had to operate like a government and that means making decisions reasonably quickly, handling big policy questions and operating autonomously within the country.

Now, within this regard, we were helped immeasurably by two things. First, Sergio de Mello who was a UN insider, was the ultimate UN insider, so he was able to smooth the way with New York, with his colleagues in the top leadership in New York. Second, they trusted him, so they were less inclined to second guess him than for example, I mean, Bernard Kouchner who was in Kosovo, had a much greater problem with New York second guessing him because he was not a man of the UN system. The other point is that East Timor was not controversial. Most UN missions are controversial. Kosovo for example. There was a fundamental division between the United States and its western allies which basically believed that Kosovo should be independent and Russia which maintains that Kosovo is still part of Serbia and therefore, any action that the administrator in Kosovo took that might tend toward independence would run into Russian objections. Anticipating those Russian objections the Department of Peacekeeping Operations would be constantly raising concerns. We didn't have that problem, but there was the natural instinct from New York.

Q: Oh, yes, a bureaucracy is a bureaucracy.

GALBRAITH: But, but, I must say, when we made this transition to the cabinet and we were able to say to them, oh, that's the government of East Timor doing it, they accepted it and the interference became absolutely minimal. There was no cabinet decision that was significantly held up and none that was reversed by New York, reversed or changed by New York.

Q: Did you get hit with an awful lot of non-governmental organizations there? They have their own bureaucracy which can you know for getting emergency aid to a place quickly, it works well, but I was thinking of a situation of more development would be difficult.

GALBRAITH: Completely, there were a lot of non-governmental organizations and they were more of an issue for the people who were working the substantive departments, people who were dealing with housing, distribution of food aid, reconstruction, economic development. There was also the World Bank, the IMF, the host, the United Nations development program, UNHCR, all these humanitarian agencies and international organizations, non-government organizations. There were political non-governmental organizations of the National Democratic Institute, the Republican Institute of International affairs, two American ones, but there were European and others and then a large number of visitors. This was a fact of life. Mostly they did good work, but sometimes things were complicated.

For example, all these organizations had their ideas of how things should be done and they wanted typically to promote the best international practice. Well, if we tried to apply best international practices in East Timor, the entire budget of the country would be consumed on a relatively limited number of activities. It simply wasn't possible. There was a lot of desire to do social engineering, which I resisted. I mean I found myself in the ironic position of since I'm politically rather liberal of being often the most conservative person in the cabinet. But, to illustrate the kinds of issues that would arise. For example, we had a discussion of prison systems. The New Zealanders were helping to design the prison system and they were staffing it. UNICEF weighed in because it was concerned about juvenile justice. The human rights weighed in because they wanted to make sure that everybody got the right to a lawyer and that nobody could be held in detention for more than seventy-two hours and all this stuff. Well, great stuff in theory, but the practical problem was there were like twenty lawyers in East Timor and they were not of a very high standard. The last place you'd want to get into trouble was East Timor and have to depend on an East Timorese defender, East Timorese judge or an East Timorese prosecutor or at least circa 2000 and 2001 because these people had gone to Indonesian law schools, and that standard I think was rather low, and many of them hadn't done particularly well in them, and they'd just done this as an undergraduate course or a partial one. Of course the number was very small for the size of the country. The result was that for example the right to counsel. Some people would get a lawyer, but others would languish in prison for months because so many of the resources were devoted to getting public defenders for a few people. Others never got processed. In the case of juvenile justice, UNICEF was taking a view that juveniles needed to have their own facilities, juvenile meaning anybody under 18. There shouldn't be any punishment for juveniles; the goal should be rehabilitation and all that. The latest in thinking on juvenile justice. If you couldn't do that you should release the juveniles. Well, the reality was that some of the worst killers and the violence were juveniles. The violence that took place in September of '99 and there was still a gang problem, so we couldn't release the people. We didn't have the money to create a separate juvenile facility. We didn't have the money for rehabilitation or education or everything that UNICEF had wanted. If we had done all the things that everybody wanted us to do on a criminal justice system, the cost would have exceed $45 million I calculated, $45 million being the entire budget of the government of East Timor for everything education, health, roads, communication and so on. This was the kind of problem that we were up against.

Q: Well, now, if you want, I mean, okay here you are kind of as foreign minister and other stuff. What were you doing?

GALBRAITH: Let me give a few examples. One of the big issues that I worried about and that held my portfolio was the transition. How do we go from where we are to an independent country? There were many different ideas about this. Some people thought that there should be, we should have a constitutional commission perhaps East Timorese, but also, international experts and that should draw up a constitution. Some suggested that I should draw up the constitution or I should hire experts to draw up the constitution and that's the way it should be drawn up. There was a suggestion that we should draw up a temporary constitution that elected government on the basis of that and then that government could possibly come up with a permanent constitution. I rejected all those proposals. I considered it absolutely fundamental that the decision on the future of East Timor should be made by the East Timorese themselves, that it shouldn't be made by the United Nations, it shouldn't be made by international experts, that a constitution that the East Timorese wrote for themselves might not be the best constitution according to some legal scholar, but it would be their own. They would have a sense of ownership. After all a constitution, if it isn't followed, it's only a piece of paper. I happen to think that the American constitution is flawed in many ways. It's an eighteenth Century document. This is the twenty-first Century. Some of the ideas clearly violate democratic principles such as...
[END OF TAPE]

Q: You were saying one man?

GALBRAITH: One man, one vote. When my state of Vermont has the same voting power as California, you know, that's a flaw at least by modern standards, but the genius of the U.S. constitution is that everyone accepts it, it's respected, it works. My feeling was that rather than a brilliant document; it should be a document written by the East Timorese themselves. I thought that the way you get there is by the simplest way possible and that in my view is the election of a constituent assembly. So, I came up with a system that we would elect a constituent assembly on the basis of proportional representation for a part of it. It ended up having eighty-eight seats, seventy-five elected on the basis of proportional representation in which there was no threshold. So, if you got one seventy-fifth of the vote you got to go into the parliament. My idea there was to make the parliament as representative as possible of the different views in the country. It was also dictated by a recognition that FRETILIN, the dominant party was going to win a huge majority and I wanted a system that would minimize, that would not give it any more votes than its actual percentage. Obviously if we had a single member district approach, FRETILIN would have gotten one hundred percent of the seats. As it was, FRETILIN got fifty-nine percent of the vote which translated I think into fifty-five seats. I take it back. It got about fifty-nine percent of the vote which translated into forty, well, I'll tell you, forty-three seats out of the seventy-five, forty-three seats out of the seventy-five.

In addition, there were thirteen districts, administrative districts in East Timor and because East Timor has like forty different languages and some of the languages are completely different in origin as well as different ethnic groups, I thought it was important to represent these regions and particularly to let the people in the east who were of quite different origin from most of the Timorese spoke a different language that they should be represented, which a proportional representation system might not allow. In addition in the west there was an enclave called Oecusse, which was geographically separated from the rest of East Timor. It was in West Timor and those people felt very isolated so I wanted to make sure that Oecusse in the west and Lospalos in the east had a voice in the constituent assembly. So, I created 13 single member districts, one for each district.

In any event, this was a system that made sure that the constituent assembly was as representative as possible and then in terms of the mandate for the constituent assembly I wanted to make sure that there was as little requirement as possible. In other words, that the East Timorese could shape whatever universe they wanted. If they wanted a monarchy, they could have a monarchy; they could choose what human rights would be protected. I had confidence they would come up with a democratic system. I might have thought different if I didn't think they would come up with a democratic system, but not something that we would impose.

There were a couple of controversial issues here. First, the CNRT wanted a requirement that members of the constituent assembly declare that they respected the results of the popular consultation of the thirtieth of August, 1999. That is the vote that gave East Timor its independence. I resisted it strongly, any requirement that a candidate swear to a particular point of view. My view was that if somebody wanted to run on the idea that East Timor should rejoin Indonesia, that would be their democratic right to do so. That should not be excluded. Again, I might have thought different if I'd thought there was a real threat there, but I didn't think anybody would run on that basis. In fact, nobody ran on a pro-Indonesia basis, but I didn't want the election tainted by the idea that we had excluded that point of view. I didn't want us to be criticized in Indonesia and I thought this, what happens in East Timor isn't so important about East Timor which is a small place, but it's establishing global norms. It's saying something about how we're going to run the world in the twenty-first century, and it's about the UN. I wanted the standard to be the most democratic possible, and so I didn't want any point of view excluded. In the end I worked out something, a compromise, which the CNRT and the East Timorese leaders all agreed which is that we would describe the election as an election for a constituent assembly to write a constitution for an independent and democratic East Timor. That was true, that was descriptive. No candidate had to sign up to any particular position to run and that principle was preserved.

The second issue was kind of an interesting one, which had to do with these NGOs. I should say the process by which the transition took place is that the cabinet considered. So, the second issue relates to these, sorry, I was explaining the procedure. Establishing the constituent assembly was done by a regulation. Like all regulations it had to be

approved by the cabinet and approved by the national council, this appointed parliament. I will add parenthetically actually I preferred that the regulation not go through the cabinet and appointed parliament on the grounds that the UN itself should decree a level playing field and while we could entrust East Timorese that we had appointed to running the day to day affairs of the country, our cabinet was not elected, so it should not be making decisions about the future of the country. On this point the East Timorese insisted that they should vote on it and it should go through this appointed cabinet. When I realized that I could get what I wanted by having a vote I went with that route. In any event, I got the regulation through the cabinet fine in the manner that I wanted and with this compromise describing it as an election for a parliament of the constituent assembly to write a constitution for an independent and democratic East Timor.

In the national council this appointed parliament, some of the women's groups wanted to amend the election for a constituent assembly to establish a quota for women. That is that one-third of the, no, not one-third, that thirty percent of the seats would be for women and they proposed that each party would have to put on their party lists women in every third position. Well, I mean I only speak personally; I don't like the idea of quotas. I think on an election people ought to have a right to vote for whoever they wanted. If they want to vote for one hundred percent women, that's fine, if they want to vote for one hundred percent men, that's fine. What I particularly objected to was that the UN would be telling the Timorese how to organize their first parliament. If the East Timorese decided in their constituent assembly that they wanted one-third of the seats in their future parliaments to be held by women, that was their decision, but the decisions on the future of the governments of East Timorese, ought not to be made by internationals, it ought to be made by the East Timorese themselves.

Here I had an ally in a woman named Carina Perelli who was the head of the UN electoral unit in New York, but who also opposed, she was Uruguayan and she was quite a feisty character. She opposed quotas on principal. In the end the quotas were defeated by the national council because there were thirteen women members of this appointed national council and twenty male members. The thirteen women members voted twelve to one against the quotas while the twenty male members voted ten to nine against, so it was defeated by the women. It ended up making me very unpopular with UNIFEM and many of the women's groups there, but that gives you another example. The end result thought was that we got a regulation for a completely democratic election, for a constituent assembly that had a mandate to write whatever kind of constitution they wanted. As it was they came up I think with a reasonably good constitution. Basically it was a constitution that FRETILIN had put together some years ago, but that's fine. They won the election; they get to do the constitution. One thing that I insisted on was that the constitution had to be adopted by a super majority, sixty votes and FRETILIN was able to achieve the sixty by making alliance with one of the smaller parties. That was one part, major part of my work, was doing this political transition.

In terms of how the cabinet worked, my office, we put together a cabinet manual, which we borrowed from New Zealand. New Zealand had its cabinet manual on the Internet, so

we adapted it. The cabinet met every Wednesday at 10:00 a.m. The reason we picked that time was to make Jean Cady, the French guy who had been the head of the government's public administration and who believed he was losing the authority by the creation of this cabinet to make him happy because he said, "The French cabinet always meets at 10:00 on Wednesdays." I said, "Fine, we'll have our cabinet meet at 10:00 on Wednesdays." In any event, I created a cabinet secretariat. Before every cabinet meeting papers would be prepared on the issues to be decided by a minister, a cabinet member would present the issue, that the cabinet papers could be not more than three pages, they had a standard format, recommendation, reason background, reasons for the recommendation, legislative implications, financial implications, public consultation, likely public reaction, public controversy. We would have good discussion of issues and we approached things in a very orderly manner. The important point about this system was that it was a real education for the East Timorese cabinet members. Education as to how the institution would work, how to do an orderly decision making process. It had an impact on the larger bureaucracy, which started out being all international, but internationals were recruiting and training East Timorese and people would say, oh, we have to get this paper ready for cabinet. As I said, it had the beneficial effect of shutting out New York as well largely.

One of the great, really fun things about being in the cabinet was the nature of the decisions we had to make. Normally in government, you make decisions just at the margin. Should we lower or raise the income tax rate, should we lower the income tax rate from thirty-seven percent to thirty-four percent, that kind of decision. Well, when we talked about taxes it was, should we have taxes, if so, what taxes should we have? If we have an income tax, should there be personal exemptions, that is exemptions for the size of a family? We had great debates on these questions. Typically the sharpest divide in the cabinet was between myself and the finance minister who was also an international, he was a Canadian named Mike Francino from the IMF and he came up with a lot of economic orthodoxy that I objected to. So, I fought him on, he had initially proposed a flat tax and I said it should be a graduated tax. He didn't want to have personal exemptions. I said it's ridiculous that a single person making $100 a month should pay twenty percent of their income as should a family with ten children. I mean and the East Timorese would join in these debates, but again, they saw how the dialogue took place. International cabinet members were always however careful never to take the decision that the East Timorese agreed to, so it never happened that the international cabinet members were on one side and the East Timorese on the other. That was a very important point.

Some of the big issues. Budget. The IMF really had a, it wanted to impose very tight fiscal discipline on East Timor which I thought was unrealistic because in fact East Timor was going to have much higher revenues in the future from oil and I thought it makes no sense to starve the current generation or deprive them of education, that was the real issue, was education, if in the future years East Timor would be able to afford on a recurring basis more money on education. So, I and the East Timorese cabinet ministers, we came up with a common position, we increased the budget I think by $10 million which is a very big increase to go principally for education. As I said we had a discussion

on taxes, we established an army for East Timor, an East Timor defense force. We did create, reopen the Dili University which the finance minister was very much opposed to and I which thought was a mistake because I didn't think East Timor could afford it, but the East Timorese minister responsible for social affairs wanted it. He was a priest, and so we kind of went along even though we thought it was not a wise use of money. These were the kinds of issues that came before the cabinet. Cabinet ministers then would go down to the national council and testify on their proposals and the national council would debate them. Rarely would they amend them, but on occasion they rejected some of our proposals. All of this I think was a very good education in democracy. The beauty of the system also was that we gave to the East Timorese those portfolios that had most of the government employees. Social affairs, which was education, health, labor. That was this priest, Father Filomeno Jacob. Infrastructure, a guy named João Carrascalão who was the head of UDT one of the lesser parties, he was in charge of infrastructure which was the power system, roads, the port. Economic affairs was Mari Alkatiri who was my closest friend there. He was the FRETILIN leader, he is now the prime minister and he had natural resources and tourism and other economic issues. District administration was Ana Pessoa also from FRETILIN. She was responsible for the local administration of the thirteen districts.

In short, and this is where almost all the government employees were. I mean I had no, I mean my department had about thirty people and they were actually almost all internationals. It was then up to these ministers to decide how fast to bring in East Timorese into positions of responsibility in their ministries. We had programs to recruit people and to train them, but in the early part of the mission, East Timorese said even only after we had only been there a couple of months, said, you're going too slowly. You aren't bringing enough East Timorese in. Well, once they became ministers, they had to choose. They had to choose between delivering services efficiently to their constituents which meant having more internationals in senior positions and on the one hand and Timorizing their departments, hiring Timorese who however had less experience and were less qualified and therefore diminishing the quality of services. It was up to them to make the balancing act. Some of them would complain. Well, the UN isn't doing anything or you're not doing enough for Timorization. I would say, well, you're in charge of the department, hire more Timorese and then they would back off. It was an idea to transfer responsibility and I think it worked, it worked very well.

Just I mean there were many issues to deal with. One of the things that I was most proud of in my tenure there, actually this took place a little bit before I became a cabinet minister, but I did write regulations in that early period and I created the national parks of East Timor. I had traveled around the island, which was very beautiful although with a lot of environmental problems, notably deforestation. It goes from obviously sea level to 3,000 meters. There are a couple of offshore islands, one of which Jaco Island was completely uninhabited, and there were a few wonderful rain forests right on the ocean side and then some forests up in the mountains. I was concerned that these would all be spoiled if we didn't protect them. It was a completely open area; there was no applicable law. Developers, outsiders were looking for a fast buck and so on. So, I wrote a regulation

that protected every, all the areas above 2,000 meters, the various mountain peaks as well as some of the nice beaches that I knew about, this little offshore island, Jaco Island. I created a list of endangered species that were protected, such as crocodiles, which were sacred in East Timor according to local culture, marsupials of which they have some, and then gave an authority to the head of government to put others on the list and protected the coral which was spectacular. Anyhow, it was kind of a fun thing. In typical UN fashion, the environmental unit objected to my regulation on the grounds that I was political affairs and I shouldn't be doing that. I realized if I wanted for them to do it, it would never get done, so I went ahead and got it done and got it through the National Consultative Council. About six months later they came and said, "You know, you were right," and they made good use of the regulations to protect some of these assets.

The other big project that I did and we can talk about it now or later was negotiating the Timor Sea Treaty.

Q: Why don't we talk about it?

GALBRAITH: Okay. This actually is one of the most interesting and complicated things that I've done and from an international law point of view it makes for a fascinating case. Between Australia and East Timor are some very significant oil and gas resources in the Timor Sea. In 1972 Australia and Indonesia negotiated a seabed boundary which was basically, well I should back up and say, Australia is a very old continent, so that it has a very large continental shelf which is related to its age. It extends out some 350 miles and then there's a trench and then you come to the Indonesia Archipelago which of course East Timor is geographically part of the Indonesian Archipelago. Australia maintained that the seabed boundary should be in the middle of the trench, the trench being just offshore of the Indonesian Archipelago and the Indonesians compromised with the Australians in 1972 placing the seabed boundary at that point where the trench begins so the trench all belonged to Indonesia, but the shelf would belong to Australia. They had to leave a little space where East Timor was, that was Portuguese territory and that space opposite Portuguese Timor became known as the Timor Gap. The Australians asked the Portuguese to continue the line and the Portuguese said, no, they said, "First, we believe East Timor and Australia are on the same continental shelf," that is to say the drop off is really on the north side of East Timor, and "secondly, the correct rule when countries are less than 400 miles apart is that each country gets 200 miles and if they overlap you draw a line at the midpoint." The Australians refused, but when the Australians took over East Timor, sorry when the Indonesians took over East Timor, the Australians were supportive of the Indonesian takeover in part because they hoped that Indonesia would connect the line. Well, that didn't happen.

First, Australia couldn't recognize the East Timorese takeover; the Indonesian takeover of East Timor very quickly because the Indonesians had been so bloody about it and Australian public opinion wouldn't go along. So, Australia didn't recognize the takeover until 1981. Then when it started negotiations on a maritime boundary concerning East Timor, the Indonesians said, no, we're not going to agree to connect the lines. We think

we got screwed. We think it should be at the midpoint. In other words, they took the same position as the Portuguese. Well, this went back and forth until 1989 when they came to a compromise and the compromise was that in the area between the midpoint that was the Indonesian position and the middle of the trench which was the Australian claim, there would be joint development. There would be an international organization created, an Australian Indonesian joint authority. It would administer this area and all the revenue would be divided up equally, 50-50. Indeed development began and a consortium led by Phillips Petroleum, developed a small field called Elang-Kakatua that when we arrived was producing about $1 million a month for the two governments, for East Timor that was a lot of money. There was a large field that had been discovered called Bayu-Undan which had about three trillion cubic feet of gas, but very wet gas, a lot of condensate and so would be worth over 20 years $4 or $5 billion which would amount to $200 million a year, a huge sum for East Timor whose per capita GNP, whose GNP was about $200 million and whose government budget was as we saw $45 million, so it had the possibility of quadrupling if it all came to East Timor, quadrupling the country's GNP, quadrupling the country's budget and doubling its GNP, big resource. However, the Australians when the UN moved in said, oh, we have this treaty, it's a model of how countries work together, a joint development and we would like to propose that the UN step into the shoes of Indonesia, that you appoint a UN member on the joint authority and then when East Timor becomes independent they can continue this treaty. They can have the benefit of what we negotiated in Indonesia.

Well, Sergio de Mello, the transitional administrator, smelled a rat. This was one of the reasons he wanted me to come and the first conversation I had with his chief of staff, Fabrizio Hochschild, he said, you know, there's something wrong here and Sergio wants you to handle it. That was one major reason I decided to come because it seemed so interesting. Indonesia had no choice but to accept this 50-50 arrangement because Indonesia could not go to the International Court of Justice to get a maritime delimitation. Why not? Because if it went to the International Court of Justice, Portugal would get in and say Indonesia doesn't have any claim to East Timor. Then the thing that Indonesia feared the most might happen, which is that the ruling about the illegality of Indonesia's occupation. East Timor, though, as an independent country clearly could go to the International Court of Justice and there would be no doubt about its ability to advance this claim. My research quickly convinced me that Australia did not have a legal case. It might have been true in the 1950s that each state was entitled to a continental shelf, but clearly by the seventies, the law favored the midpoint and that principal was enshrined in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

Nonetheless, the Australians had really rushed things and the UN without any independent evaluation had agreed that for the duration of the UN mandate the UN would step into the shoes of Indonesia, but that this would be without prejudice as to what East Timorese did after they became independent and if the East Timorese want to negotiate a treaty, a new treaty, they could. Well, when I arrived, I thought two things. First, that I wanted to be the representative of this joint authority, not because I particularly wanted to administer this oil province, but because the joint authority actually had a big pot of

money for administration. I figured if I'm going to conduct treaty negotiations, I'm going to need to hire my own independent advice and I'm not going to be able to get that money from the UN. I'm also going to need money to travel. If I have to go through the UN system, I'll never get it. I persuaded Sergio to appoint me as the representative.

The second thing I realized was that our leverage, East Timor's leverage was the greatest if we negotiated the new treaty before independence than waiting until after independence. Why? Because first, the United Nations working with the East Timorese would have more bargaining power than little East Timor against big Australia and after independence, East Timor will be much more dependent on Australia than before independence. Secondly, if nothing was in place on the date of independence, there wasn't a new treaty, then East Timor would be faced with the choice of either continuing the old treaty which might give some presumption in favor of Australia's claim to something more than a midpoint or refusing to continue it in which case it would be a legal vacuum just at the point that significant production was coming on stream. I also calculated that the deadline of independence would be something that could force the Australians to make concessions. So, a month after I arrived I went down to Adelaide with Mari Alkatiri who was the FRETILIN leader and who the CNRT had designated to be my, the East Timorese that would work with me and over time he and I developed a good friendship, a good partnership. We really worked well together. I went down to Downer and I said, "Look, we have continued this treaty until independence, but as of the date of independence, under no circumstances will East Timor continue this treaty, the Indonesia Australia treaty was considered illegal, Indonesia had no basis for negotiating about this area, Australia has no claim, we would like to have a maritime boundary, we would like to have it at the midpoint." Downer was actually quite, as it turns out, quite offended and he began to fixate upon me as the evil person.

Q: Downer's position?

GALBRAITH: Is the Australian foreign minister, Alexander Downer, a man, a rather obnoxious man. Sergio Vieira de Mello couldn't stand him. In fact when it came time to actually sign the new treaty which we did on July 5, 2001, Sergio refused to, insisted that I would host the dinner for the foreign minister and Sergio not only didn't, wouldn't host it, but didn't come. He refused to come, but anyhow Downer was obnoxious and not very smart.

The Australians initially tried to stonewall. Their theory again was if they could stretch it out they would be negotiating not with the UN, not with an obnoxious American, but with the East Timorese and also that the temporary, after independent, East Timor could temporarily continue the old treaty. As long as, they always preferred the old treaty as long as that continue temporarily, they had no incentive to renegotiate. Eventually I forced them to start some negotiations in October of 2000. It was a complete impasse. They imagined that what we would do would be to simply look at the Australia Indonesia treaty, and every place it said Indonesia we'd substitute East Timor. They were prepared to agree that that revenue split would be instead of fifty-fifty that sixty-five percent would

go to East Timor and thirty-five percent for Australia. I made it clear that we were not prepared to look at the old treaty, that as far as we were concerned it didn't even exist. It was illegal. Why would be look at something that was illegal?

Furthermore, I'd been educated by the Norwegians who provided help and technical assistance to me to understand that I didn't want to have joint administration. I wanted to have East Timorese control over this area and certainly the ability of East Timor to tax the area and to impose its own taxes. Well, this was quite an impasse. We got Sergio proposed to the Australians, the Australians were very upset and Sergio had a visit to Australia. He met with Howard who was very upset about it and he then proposed that we have some informal talks. So, I had some informal talks, Mari Alkatiri and I in Singapore and with the Australians headed by a man named Michael Potts and we actually made a lot of progress. My basic offer to them was look we won't pursue a maritime boundary in port on these negotiations as long as we get the same economic benefit and you want the law that applies there to be our law.

Those talks concluded in December of 2000 whereupon the Australians changed their entire negotiating team. They went back on everything that had been tentatively agreed. Admittedly it was ad referendum, but they pretended that it didn't even happen and they started with a brand new negotiator, a guy named David Ritchie in April in Melbourne and he simply was back to right to the beginning. At that point I then as it turned out I had an invitation to speak to the Australian producers of petroleum energy to be the keynote speaker at this big energy conference which was in Hobart. So, I persuaded Mari to come with me so there would be an East Timorese presence, but I was going to be the bad guy. We agreed what I'd say in the speech. What I said was I went through the history of East Timor and why the East Timorese consider why Australia's decision to recognize the Indonesian occupation in light of the terrible atrocities, how offended the East Timorese and hurt they were by it. Then I said basically East Timor has law on its side, here's our legal case. If there is no agreement, then I'm sorry to say, that there won't be further investment in this area. The area will be closed for business. That panicked the Australian government because one of the key investment decisions was coming up in July of 2001, which was to build a pipeline to the northern territory of Australia. There was an election coming up in the northern territory of Australia, which had always been held by the conservative coalition. The chief minister, who was an incredibly stupid man named Dennis Burke, had made this bringing gas ashore in the Timor Sea a key to his reelection campaign. I had pointed out in my speech in Hobart among other things that I had found some statistics or my staff had that said that the processing of the gas, nothing to do with the royalties which we were trying to get, the processing if it came ashore in Australia would add $1,000 to the income of every resident of the northern territory. So, there was going to be a huge economic boom there. What I said in the speech is that isn't going to happen unless there is a treaty that we can accept.

Well, this produced a flurry of denunciations. The Australian government, which had already tried to get me, removed by going to, to block the negotiations by going to the United Nations. They went to the United Nations. They went to the U.S. government,

which was now in the hands of Republicans, so not friends of mine. They went to the Japanese who came and told me about it with great amusement, to the British, to the French, all to protest against me and to try and get me fired. Well, it was a stupid tactic. Naturally I told the East Timorese what had happened. It was a stupid tactic because it only reinforced the East Timorese view that the position I was taking was correct if it was causing the Australians to be that upset. Furthermore, had they succeeded, then the East Timorese would never have had confidence in a successor. They certainly wouldn't have capitulated. That wasn't in their character.

In the end the Australians gave way. We got our main objective, which was our ability to tax the area as we saw fit. It was our ability to have predominant control. We didn't get one hundred percent control, but it would be administered on a day to day basis by the East Timor Department of Mines or the department that was responsible for petroleum. We got ninety percent of the revenues, so we had taken it from a fifty-fifty split to a ninety-ten in favor of East Timor. That then was signed in Dili on the 5th of July 2001. Mari Alkatiri and I signed for East Timor and Downer and the minister for industries, Nick Mention, signed for Australia. So far as I know, I think this was the first time in history that the United Nations has ever negotiated a bilateral treaty on behalf of a country.

Q: Using your sort of portfolio as a foreign affairs person, what were relations with Indonesia during this time?

GALBRAITH: That was another major project that I undertook which was to try to negotiate the normalization of relations with Indonesia. That was something I started actually from the moment I arrived. I arrived around the 20th of January and in a couple of days I went with Sergio to West Timor and to Jakarta to propose that there be a series of talks. There was a huge number of issues that from the slip that needed to be resolved ranging from getting records that Indonesia might have. There were no, there was not a single government record when the UN arrived in East Timor. Everything had been burned or taken away. There wasn't a single government employee when the UN arrived, not one East Timorese, not one policeman, not one teacher, not one civil servant. The contents of the Dili Museum had been looted and taken away, so there were just lots of things that had to be done like trying to get records back. Issues of who would pay the pensions of the 30,000 East Timorese who worked as Indonesian civil servants. There were 2,000 East Timorese students that were attending schools in Indonesia, universities, you know, who would pay their tuition or would they be treated like Indonesian students or would they have to pay a much higher foreign student rate? There were issues of well, of Indonesian property in East Timor. There were issues of who would pay for the destruction Indonesian liability for the destruction. There was also the need to negotiate a corridor between Oecusse this enclave in West Timor and the rest of East Timor, so- (end of tape)

So, there were lots of issues to be resolved. In addition, Sergio was very interested in the process of reconciliation. I said that something like 350,000 of East Timor, 800,000

people had fled in September of '99. There were still about 110,000 in West Timor in the beginning of 2000. We wanted to get as many of those back as possible. A lot had not gone voluntarily, had been forced to go. They were being terrorized in the camps by local militia and that was always a threat for us because these would also be places where the militia could recruit people to infiltrate. Negotiating with the Indonesians, there were some very good people I dealt with. Sudjadnan, who was the head of international organizations was my main partner who is now the ambassador to Canberra. Hassan Wirajuda, who is now the foreign minister, but had become the deputy, the political director, he was my negotiating partner in the later part of the negotiation dealt with Alwi Shihab the foreign minister and with Gus Dur, the president. Incidentally the one person who would never see us was Megawati, who was then vice president and is now the president.

The trouble was we sometimes I felt dealing with the Indonesian government was like Chauncey Gardner in the movie Being There, especially post-war. They would sort of say strange things and they would agree to things and nothing would happen. They were very pleasant, very amiable, but nothing there. I realized this early on when Gus Dur the president, Abdurrahman Wahid, was a wonderful man, blind, been a liberal religious leader. He'd actually only gotten 12 percent of the vote in the election, but Suharto's party, Golkar, combined with the military decided they wanted him rather than Megawati who had actually won the, gotten the most votes. So, he became the president and he had a great deal of what he believed in was reconciliation. He was very generous, spoke fluent English and so one of the, we invited him to come to East Timor. He was very keen to come. The visit was set for February 29th, 2000. It hadn't occurred to anybody in the UN that something substantive should happen, but I felt it was very important, so I negotiated a joint communiqué which involved a whole lot of substantive commitments that the Indonesians were going to make. I could tell even in the process of those negotiations, which were with Sudjadnan that there were some problems, because at one point I said I'd seen Gus Dur with Sergio. I said to Sudjadnan and his deputy Hassan, I said, "But, your president has agreed to this." I think Marty said, "Well, you have to understand that in our country what our president says, well, you know, that just might not be, that might not be what we do." I happen to know in the United States that that's also true, but nobody in the State Department would ever say it, at least not to a foreigner. In the end we got this terrific joint communiqué and unfortunately the Indonesians only implemented a part of it. Actually Gus Dur's visit was quite amazing. As I said, it was February 29th and in the month of February we'd had the president of Portugal and Kofi Anan the Secretary General of the United Nations come. Well, there was only a small crowd for the president of Portugal. The first visit by a Portuguese head of state and he insisted on giving his speech in Portuguese without a translator either into Bahasa Indonesia which most people understood or the local language, Tetum, which about 70 percent spoke. The Portuguese said, "You know these Timorese should have to know Portuguese." Well, the fact was it was only about 5 percent of the population knew Portuguese and that was the older people. Nobody listened much to his speech. Kofi Anan's speech, it was a larger crowd. It was completely passive even as he had moving lines about the sacrifices that the East Timorese had made and all their suffering and their

heroism. The only thing that happened was he said, "And the world community has pledged $450 million in reconstruction assistance." That was the one line the crowd applauded. I thought it was very practical. When Gus Dur came, the president of Indonesia, the country that had six months before just trashed everything in East Timor there was this huge crowd and it was very friendly and I sort of thought about how could this be because obviously there was no desire to be part of Indonesia. I realized that for most of these people the president of Portugal, that meant nothing, the Secretary General of the United Nations, that meant nothing, but they knew that the president of Indonesia, that's an important person. I think among the more sophisticated people they knew that Gus Dur had been sympathetic to the East Timorese cause. Xanana Gusmão, I mean, actually it was very funny. I'd worked out the itinerary which was he was going to come and have meetings at the government building and then go to, I persuaded him to go to the Santa Cruz cemetery where there had been a massacre of about 500,000 East Timorese in 1992 to lay a wreath. I mean I had my Willy Brandt in Warsaw. He agreed to do that, but then I'd said to him, you know, across the street there is this Indonesian cemetery so you could also go there, military cemetery. So, it worked out kind of nicely. Then I'd negotiated the opening of an Indonesian mission so that he was going to go and cut the ribbon and that was his program. Of course the UN security people and the military people wanted to have a completely low-key visit. They obviously thought that the president of Indonesia coming, this was a recipe for disaster.

About 10:00 the night before he was gong to arrive, Sergio calls and he says, "Peter, look I've just been with Xanana and Xanana has invited the people of Dili to come greet Gus Dur so there's gong to be a huge crowd." I sort of said, "Oh, my God." Sergio said, "No, no, you know I trust Xanana. I think he has good judgment." In fact Xanana had been in prison for most of the last seven years. I mean for all the previous seven years. "I think he has good judgment," Sergio said, "go seek Mike Smith who is the deputy force commander and see if we can work out the arrangements." Well, as I said, there was a huge crowd. Xanana got up on the stage and he was chanting. "Viva Indonesia, viva Gus Dur, viva Timor-Leste," you know, East Timor. It was really a wonderful moment. As I said, the later negotiations and particularly as Gus Dur's government began to lose support, it became more difficult. It was difficult in the sense that almost nothing was accomplished. That was the difficulty. Gus Dur, just watching him on the visit and in other meetings was interesting. One of the scenes I remember most vividly was there was an East Timor resistance leader who had, what was his name, David George, George David, who had been murdered, disappeared and I presume murdered. His family, it was a popular case, what had happened to him. His family was there and they had gotten a small number of people to try and disrupt the meeting to raise the case. So, Xanana had said we're meeting in the government building. Xanana had said to Gus Dur, he said, "Excuse me, I've got to go out and try and solve this problem." Gus Dur said, "Well, no, bring them to me. I'll talk to them." Xanana brought his widow and some male relative and it was quite a sight. There was the president of Indonesia sitting in the chair and there was this man holding his hat and a woman, very timid and they'd been outside chanting, but once they got inside they were timid and they were, they explained what had happened and they wanted to know where the grave was. Gus Dur said, "Well, we'll look

into it. I don't know if I can help you, but I'll try." It diffused the event.

Other times though he could be very strange. One meeting we had he told a joke about Lee Kuan Yew and at another time he came up with the idea that the best thing that could be done about these militias in West Timor was to show them blue movies which I thought was an odd prescription from a Muslim cleric.

Q: You left there when?

GALBRAITH: July 2001, just following the signing of the new Timor Sea Treaty.

Q: Did the entire UN mission warn us about that?

GALBRAITH: No, no. I mean for me my wife and children were in Norway and my children were four and three. I originally had agreed to go for six months, I'd stayed 18 months. I loved it, but I just couldn't stay longer. It seemed like a nice break. First, getting the Timor Sea Treaty, that was my major achievement. It was something that doubled the gross national product of the country. Furthermore, the elections were going to be held on the 30th of August. I had done my job. I'd put in place the mechanism for holding the elections. What I'd also worked out was after the elections, a new government would be appointed, a new cabinet and it would be all East Timorese because it would be based on elections. So, if you will the transition had gone from phase one, which was the UN was running things with the Timorese, a mixed UN Timorese legislation body to the middle period where there was a transitional government mixed UN, East Timorese, cabinet ministers and an all Timorese appointed legislature to the third phase which was going to be an elective East Timorese constitute assembly and a cabinet with the chief minister which would reflect the party that won the elections. Like the other internationals I was going to lose my position as a cabinet minister. Of course there would have been things still to do, but I felt that that was a nice time to leave. Also, I mean I did feel that the writing of the constitution should be left to the East Timorese and so if I believed that as I did then my staying around as the constitutional person… well, it would have meant I would have been constantly having to restrain my role and frankly as you might have guessed after 17 tapes restraining myself is not, not one of my better qualities. For all those reasons, it seemed like a good time to leave, but I must say the main consideration was family.

Q: Just to sort of end this up, sort of, you left Croatia and you went to the National Defense University. Is that right?

GALBRAITH: That's right.

Q: And you're back, you're doing this right here. This is the old War College at Fort McNair. Could you just to polish this up, explain what you've been doing both before and after?

GALBRAITH: Well, I've been teaching. This is an institution that has, the student body are colonels and lieutenant colonels or the equivalent navy captains and commanders. It is the highest level of professional military education that we have. A year long masters program, teach grand strategy and I've been teaching in three of the core courses at various times the three years I've been here, I've been teaching the introduction to national security strategy. I've been teaching in the course on how the U.S. government really works called the emergency process, but it's how the U.S. government really works and what they didn't teach you in high school civics. Then of course the course on foreign policy on what U.S. foreign policy is. It's a change of pace. It's interesting for me to have a job that starts at 8:00 and well, actually could finish at 1:00 in the afternoon as compared to the 8:00 to 1:00's that I've had where the 1:00 was not in the afternoon, but in the morning. I enjoy it and certainly these are the best possible students you can find. It's a break. We'll see if whether it's what I do or whether I come back into government and do something else. Naturally, like lots of people in Washington who have held jobs at the center of things I ended up doing a lot of pontificating. I realized during the Kosovo thing, well I didn't realize it, but somebody said I'd done like 180 television appearances and it sort of confirmed that which I always thought which is that those who talk the most have the least influence.

Q: Yes. Okay, Peter, well we'll end at this. Great.

GALBRAITH: Okay.

End of interview