The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

# AMBASSADOR HARRY JOSEPH GILMORE

*Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy*
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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Relations
Ambassador Martin Hillenbrand
Israel
Economy
Liberalization
Arab-Israel 1967 War
Anti-US demonstrations
Government restrictions
Surveillance and intimidation
Environment
Contacts with Hungarians
Communism
Visa cases (provocations)
Social Security recipients
Austria/Hungary relations
Hungary relations with neighbors
Religion
Soviet Mindszenty concerns
Dr. Ann Laskaris
Elin O'Shaughnessy

State Department: Soviet and Eastern Europe Exchange Staff 1967-1969
Hungarian and Czech accounts
Operations
Scientists and Scholars exchange programs
Effects of Prague Spring
Relations with local Embassies
Director, Boris Klosson

Moscow, Soviet Union: Assistant Cultural Officer 1969-1971
Detailed to USIA
USIA Efficiency reports
Operations
Surveillance
Relations with public
Travel
Scientific exchanges
McKinney Russell
US exchange groups
Cultural nationalism
Music
Ambassador Jacob Beam
Henry Kissinger

United States Military Academy; Political Science Department 1971-1973
Education system

"Communism; Theory and Practice"
Courses of study
Student body
Admiral William James Crowe
Vietnam War
Civil-Military relations in Soviet Union
Army-Navy rivalry
Student evaluation

State Department: Yugoslav Desk Officer 1973-1975
US policy
Non-Alignment
USIA Centers
Extremists
Expatriate communities in US
Croatian press distortions
Congressional interest
FBI
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations act (RICO)
US/Yugoslav relations
Artukovic case
Trieste
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Tito
US/Yugoslav relations
Yugoslav military

Munich, Germany: Political (Internal) Reporting Officer/Liaison 1975-1978
To Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (RFERL)
Board of International Broadcasting
"Neutron Bomb"
German opposition
Soviet Jewish emigration
Operations
Broadcasting guidelines
Olympics
Poland
Pope John Paul II
Eastern Europe
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
US Policy
Franz Joseph Strauss
FO-104 Starfighter bribe issue
Congressional interest
Christian Social Union
Forgery

Christian Social Union
Christian Democratic Union
Hermut Kohl
German politics
French
US military

State Department: Deputy Director, Office of Eastern European And Yugoslav Affairs — 1978-1981
Country responsibilities
US policy
Economic reforms
Personnel
Polish independence
Most Favored Nations treatment
Restrictive emigration policies
Bulgaria
Family reunification
Jaruzelski
Soviets invade Afghanistan
Tito death
Yugoslavia relations

Belgrade, Yugoslavia: Deputy Chief of Mission — 1981-1985
Ambassador David Anderson
Post-Tito leadership
“Greater Serbia”
Vice President George H.W. Bush visit
KAL 007 shootdown
Milovan Dilas
Sarajevo Winter Olympics
Financial difficulties
Mika Planinc
Ethnic divisions
America Center
Raymond Benson
European role
Serbs in Croatia
Andrija Artukovic
Leader contacts
David Anderson
Larry Eagleburger

State Department; Director, Office of Central European Affairs — 1985-1987
Countries
Kurt Waldheim case

Ambassador Ronald Lauder
Austrian Jewish property
Adolph Hitler
Austria's "Free Ride"
Czechoslovakia
Vaclav Havel
Career vs. Political Ambassadors
Swiss
Germany/Quadripartite meetings
Star Wars contracts
German economy
La Belle disco bombing
Rozanne Ridgway
Jewish reparations
Return of Jewish property
German Democratic Republic
Warsaw Pact economic potential
Soviet military production
East Berlin construction
East Germany (GDR) armed forces
GDR economy
Family reunification
Berlin status
Hans Dietrich Genscher
German exports
European Community (EC)
French-German relationship
Aviation
Berlin security
Berlin airlift
Soviet Berlin troops
Helmut Kohl
US Germany policy
Kohl-Reagan relationship

Berlin, Germany: US Minister and Deputy Commander of the American Sector — 1987-1990

Operations
Senat responsibilities and powers
Embassy organization
Police relationship
Igor Machsimichev
Person relations with Allies
Monthly ministerial meetings
Berlin status
Berlin government

Allies Berlin responsibilities
Relation with Allies
Political parties
Gorbachev influence
Erich Honecker
Quadripartite Agreement
German unification
Soviet air presence
Berlin Air Safety Center
Intelligence presence
Relations with Embassy Bonn
George Vest
Public safety
Terrorists
US Libya bombing
German regional travel
Egon Krenz
Leipzig demonstrations
Movement for change
Growing demonstrations
West German police
Soviet police
Talk Team
Opening of Berlin Wall
Coping with GDR citizens
Emotional drams
German Freedom to travel
GDR elections
Social Democratic Party
Unification
Soviets call for Tripartite meeting
Ambassador Walters

Berlin, Germany: Principal Officer, US Embassy Office in Berlin 1990-1991
German states in district
Consolidating East & West Berlin Missions
Personnel changes
Foreign Service nationals
Reporting
First Golf War protests
Christa Wolf
Women's issues
Lee Boem
VIP visitors
Difficulties of East/West amalgamation
President George Bush

Restraints on optimism
East German agriculture
NATO membership
Germany-Poland border
Political Parties
Nuclear weapons
Chancellor Kohl
Foreign Minister Gernscher
Gorbachev
NATO Defense guarantee
Lander governments
East German industry
Stasi (Security) files
Gauk Commission
Unification euphoria

Army War College: Deputy Commander for International Affairs 1991-1992
Student body
International Fellows Program
Operations
Evaluation

Hiatus in Senate Hearings due to change in Administration 1992-1993
Study of Armenian language
Senator Sarbanes
Hearings

United States Ambassador to Armenia 1993-1995
Armenia's emergency humanitarian needs
Armenian history
American Armenian community
Azerbaijan dispute
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
Closed borders
Land-locked Armenia
Security
Shortages
US humanitarian aid
Winter Warmth program
Educated populace
President Levon Ter-Petrossian
Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs)
Medical problems
USAID
Embassy building
Regional history

Turkey-Armenia relations
Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission
Armenian Struggle for the Armed Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (ASALA)
Armenia-Russia relations
Minsk Group
Cease-Fire (1994)
Possibilities of conflict resolution
Minsk Group, CSCE
American envoys for dispute resolution
Regional US ambassadors' meetings
Regional oil exploration
Karabakh settlement issue
Azerbaijanis
Religion
Chechens
American-Armenian Political Organizations
Armenian friends in US Congress
American University of Armenia
Armenian Diaspora
Western noted Armenians

State Department: Foreign Service Institute (FSI); Dean of Area Studies/Dean of School of Professional and Area Studies (name change) 1995-1997
Merger
Senior Seminar
Evaluation

Retirement: 1997
State Department; Caucasus Area Studies
Lecturing

## INTERVIEW

*Q: This is a Foreign Affairs Oral History Program interview with Harry J. Gilmore. This interview is being conducted under the auspices of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. I'm Stu Kennedy. Harry and I are old friends. Harry, let's start at the beginning. When and where were you born? Can you tell me something about your family on both sides?*

GILMORE: Yes. I was born in McKeesport, Pennsylvania on November the 16th, 1937. McKeesport had the nearest hospital to my hometown, Clairton, the coking center for the U.S. Steel Co. It remains U.S. Steel's coking center, by the way. Yes, coke, the byproduct of soft coal, which is used to smelt steel.

*Q: Let's start first on your father's side. Where do the Gilmores come from? Tell me something about the Gilmore family and how they got to there, and your father.*

GILMORE: My father's family was neatly split between English and Welsh ancestry on his father's side and German ancestry on his mother's side. In fact, his mother, Frances Marie Eisner, was the only member of her family – she was the youngest child – born in the United States. The others were born in or near Luxembourg. We're not entirely sure because no one in the family kept records. My father's father was a riverboat carpenter, and his relatives included riverboat captains and engineers. Pittsburgh, of course, is where the Monongahela and the Allegheny rivers join to form the Ohio, and barge and riverboat building were in the Gilmore family tradition on that side. On my mother's side the men were coal miners and later mill workers.

*Q: What did your father do? Where did he go to school?*

GILMORE: My father was one of seven children. He lost his dad when he was nine years old. His mother was a practical nurse and midwife who was determined to keep her family together. My father delivered newspapers and worked after school from junior high on. He never got to go to college, although he was very well self-taught. After high school he worked as a riverboat hand, first as a striker, and then a second engineer on the old coal-fired paddle wheelers. Shortly after he and my mother got married and began to raise a family, she persuaded him to leave the river. So he then turned basically to insurance sales and management of retail sales, in particular janitor supply sales. He changed jobs several times ending up as a representative of an upscale memorial park, a cemetery, selling grave plots and vaults and collecting bad bills. But he worked all of his life.

*Q: And your mother, what's her family background?*

GILMORE: My mother's maiden name was Hall, Emma Elizabeth Hall. But that was a misnomer because her father, Harry Howard Hall, was actually conceived out of wedlock. James Hall was the name of the person who subsequently married his mother and adopted him. Hall is English, so he was raised by an English father and a German-American mother. But actually, he was largely of German ancestry. Bertha Weisgerber was his mother's maiden name. My grandfather was a very powerful influence in my own life. In fact, he and my father were both my male role models. He had been a coal miner. He went to work in the mines near Connellsville, Pennsylvania when he was in sixth grade. Pulled out of school at 12 years old, he worked in the mines 'til his mid-20s. He then went to work at the Carnegie-Illinois Steel plant in Clairton, Pennsylvania where over the next 35 years he worked himself up to being the head foreman for maintenance. He retired at 65 and then took a job at a Pittsburgh hospital as a stationary engineer. He got his stationary engineering license at age 65 by taking a written test. Although the family name was Hall, he was more conscious by far of his German heritage. His wife, Etta Thompson, my maternal grandmother, was another powerful influence in my upbringing. She was basically of Scots, Scotch-Irish, and perhaps some German ancestry. In many ways, they were my second parents. I spent a lot of time in their household as a young child.

*Q: Did your mother go through high school?*

GILMORE: She did, she went through the commercial course at Clairton High School and was one of the top students. After graduation, she worked for a short time, but then married my father. She didn't enter the work force again until her children were all in school, and then had a very nice career. She was an executive secretary in several firms, including a large construction corporation where she became the top executive secretary. Later in life she out-earned my dad.

*Q: Well, tell me about your early years. I guess we're talking about the early 1940s, what was Clairton like?*

GILMORE: My parents stayed in Clairton, Pennsylvania, until much after I graduated from high school, so I had lived in Clairton and until I graduated from high school. It was what we called a mill town. We didn't call the Carnegie-Illinois plant the factory, we called it the mill. The steel mill and the coke works. It also included coke byproduct plant, a small chemical plant called Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corporation, which was located next to the coke works. These plants employed virtually everybody in town, directly or indirectly, although a few men were still miners. Clairton is a very interesting town. Considerable numbers of outside workers were brought in to work in the mills and the mines. For example, a large African-American population from Alabama had been brought up, probably between the First and Second World wars. So the town had a substantial Black population then. Today it has an African-American majority or near majority. It also had a very substantial Italian population, most brought to work in the mines, a combination of the Neapolitan and Sicilian Italians. I grew up on the edge of the Sicilian Italian neighborhood and had many friends in it and consider that a kind of important part of my upbringing. Clairton's coke and steel plants also attracted a number of Eastern European: Hungarians, Czechs, Croats, Slovaks, particularly Slovaks, the Poles, a few Ukrainians. So it was an ethnically mixed town.

I did a paper on Clairton for a political science class in college. Clairton was originally a company town. Much of the first permanent housing was built by Carnegie-Illinois Steel. Clairton's political leaders were of Irish, Scots-Irish, or German-American heritage through World War II. Italian Americans and then African-Americans assumed leadership positions in the 1970s and 1980s.

Clairton was a "safe" Republican town until the steel workers and coal miners were unionized. When Philip Murray unionized the steel workers in 1936-7, the town flipped politically. It became a safe Democrat town and remains so today. Economically, Clairton and its sister Western Pennsylvania steel towns are said today to comprise a "rust belt." Clairton's coke works and byproducts plant continue to operate, but the steel mill has been shuttered for several decades and sits like a huge beached whale on the left bank of the Monongahela River.

*Q: Did you have a congressional representative for a long time from there?*

GILMORE: In a way we did. The late John Murtha, although he technically represented the neighboring Congressional district around Johnstown, Pennsylvania, promoted the economic

interests and personified the values of a majority of Clairtonians: protect U.S. "blue-collar" manufacturing jobs; ensure that Social Security and Medicare are adequately funded; and take good care of veterans. Clairton and its neighboring cities proudly sent their full share and perhaps more of their young people to serve in our armed forces. Although Clairton normally supported Democrats in state and national elections, Eisenhower outpolled Stevenson in 1956 and Governor George Wallace garnered a substantial minority of the vote in the 1968 primary election.

*Q: Wallace being at that time a very strong segregationist, which leads me to the question, during the 1940s, how did the Black community and the immigrant white community and others work together. It would strike me that this would not be a very good mix.*

GILMORE: It became a very volatile mixture. In fact, there was a violent racial clash in Clairton High School in 1970 or 1971, which drew coverage Time magazine. But first let me go back briefly to the 1940s. I was one of the first Clairton children to attend an integrated school from the first through the twelfth grade. My family, including my parents, was pretty strongly prejudiced against blacks. But not my brother or myself. We went to school with blacks from first grade on and became friends. We knew each other by nick names. Clairton's police force was integrated, and by the early 1950s there was at least one black on the city council. A few blacks who were star athletes had gone off to college. In Western Pennsylvania high school football is very popular. Some of our black schoolmates were outstanding football players who won full scholarships to colleges like Penn State, Ohio State and Michigan. But Clairton faced big problems too. One huge problem was who got what jobs in the steel mill and the coke works.

*Q: Well, Pennsylvania, of course, a coal mining area, had a reputation as a great breeding ground for football players.*

GILMORE: Yes. For example, in my senior year Clairton High School's football team won the Western Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association championship in our division. A number of the graduating seniors won college scholarships. Today Clairton continues to be a great breeding ground for football players. Although the Clairton High School's enrollment has dropped dramatically since the 1950s, it football team is ranked 14th in the state of Pennsylvania and Clairton won the championship in its division the past three years running!

But I should return to the violent incident. It was a fight at the high school over interracial dating. Some black fellows, among them star athletes, had been dating white girls, and some of the black girls were quite upset about it. An altercation in the main women's rest room turned violent and spilled out into the corridors where the student body, split along racial lines, joined the fray. More and more students, male and female, became involved and the school authorities, who had lost control, called the Clairton Police. The police force had been integrated for some time, but as the police moved to control the fighting they too split along racial lines and failed to establish control. The school administration called in the Allegheny County Police and also the Pennsylvania State Police. The fighting students were subdued with some difficulty. The school was closed for several days and then reopened under county police supervision.

What had happened in the 15 years since I had graduated from Clairton High? In the face of

tougher environmental standards and lessening demand for steel, the "dinosaur" mills in Clairton and the region had been shuttered. Jobs were eliminated on a grand scale, and very few new ones created. Those families, who could, moved to the suburbs or in many cases to other states. Those who remained were generally the poorer and less educated.

*Q: But for you, let's first look at grammar school. How did you take to school?*

GILMORE: Pretty well after the first grade. I didn't want to go to first grade, I remember that. I remember my uncle would walk me to school and my mother would insist I couldn't come home. Once I got through that I was always a good student and that was prized at home. You got rewards for it, and also if you didn't do well, if the 6-week report card came out and you didn't make the honor roll, you didn't get so many privileges for a while. And also my dad, my mother too, but particularly my dad sat with you if you were doing poorly in spelling or arithmetic or whatever.

*Q: So somebody was watching and mentoring you.*

GILMORE: Yes, it was made clear to me by my parents and my maternal grandparents too, that they hoped, in fact expected, that I would go to college.

*Q: What about reading? Did you turn into a reader early on? Or did that come later?*

GILMORE: I would say I became a pretty heavy reader by junior high school. I was always quick with language and had no trouble with schoolwork. But I don't remember reading much until about then. But I was read to, particularly by my mother. My mother had a very good command of English, my father too. For people with only a high school education they had a very good command of the language.

*Q: I think something is often forgotten about that and earlier generations. They may have been self-taught and not have had quite the same official education, but often, like my parents, they absorbed...they worked at it.*

GILMORE: Yes, exactly. My mother belonged to the Book-of-the-Month Club, I remember. We got Reader's Digest. People scoff at that now, but it's a great teacher's guide, particularly if you are self-taught as a reader. My mother read to us. She read the Bible, she read stories. In fact, I still have the collection of the nine volumes of children's stories that she ordered from a book club. My father was home less. He worked long hours, but it was clear that reading and learning were respected in the household. My grandfather, who as I said went to work in the coal mines in sixth grade, got himself a high school degree at night school in his 40s. He read Time magazine and later Newsweek until the end of his life. He loved to talk about foreign affairs, international affairs, and politics. He'd been a Republican until Herbert Hoover, but in the wake of the Great Depression he became very anti-Hoover, which made him basically a Democrat. And he and my father always talked politics. So I grew up in an environment of lots of discussion about national politics and foreign affairs.

*Q: What about religion? Did religion play much of a role?*

GILMORE: Yes. My father was Presbyterian, my mother was Methodist, and they ended up going to the Presbyterian Church. Church was an essential part of my upbringing. I can't remember when I didn't go to Sunday School. It was expected. My father, who was quite a good tenor soloist, was quite active in church music. I was given piano lessons for a while and accompanied him, including when he became the choir director at a small Presbyterian Church. I became the organist at his church when I was in high school. So I was steeped in church music, mostly the Presbyterian variety, before I went to college. One of the ways I got through college was playing organ in a rather large Methodist church in a neighboring town. I earned $100 and later $125 a month, which was not small money then. It helped pay all my incidentals and some of my tuition. I grew up with the church and music.

*Q: Was there a division in your town between the Protestants and the Catholics?*

GILMORE: There was and there wasn't. It was pretty strict in many ways. For example, it wasn't every day that you would see a Protestant and a Catholic "go steady," as we used to say, and subsequently get married.

But, it happened occasionally. My brother did it. This was a mold-breaker for our family. But basically you couldn't help but have very good relations across Protestant-Catholic lines because of the schools. A couple of my school friends became priests. One of them became the President of Duquesne University, which is a Catholic-affiliated university in Pittsburgh. He and I were in the high school band together. The band was also a very important institution in my upbringing. I met my wife there. Our high school band was also a good concert band.

*Q: What did you play?*

GILMORE: I played piccolo and flute. As I indicated, several of my close friends became priests. I lived right on the edge of the Sicilian-American community, which was of course heavily Catholic. All those friends were Catholic. The funny thing is, we didn't, in those days, go much to each other's churches. Maybe for a wedding. But then my mother's sister married a Catholic, a Slovak-American. Swell fellow, a very religious Catholic. So, we quickly broke the barriers ,and in the present generation, four of our five grandchildren were baptized Catholic. We are very comfortable with this. There were clergymen on both sides of the Catholic-Protestant divide who preached against inter-faith dating, let alone marriage. The interesting thing is I knew a lot of them from being a church organist.

*Q: In a way, that generation, the generation before us, was really the last generation to carry on the old tradition. Whatever it was, WWII, the depression or what have you, broke things down.*

GILMORE: Right. And there was one very special factor in my family that played an important but very subtle role over time. My father's mother, who was the only member of her family not born in Europe, had left home at 16 to be married. Her family was a good Catholic family. Her father threw her out when she married my grandfather who was not a Catholic. So, she joined my grandfather's church, which happened to be the Presbyterian Church. She never said much, but she attended church regularly. Largely because of her example, her children and grandchildren

thought it was A-okay for part of the family to be Catholic and part of the family to be Protestant. Still, when the first Protestant-Catholic marriage in the immediate family occurred -- my brother and his wife -- there were some misgivings on both sides. But my brother and his wife are both very strong-willed and they basically said, "Hey. We're going to do this and we want your blessing, but that's it." They were pioneers in their generation.

*Q: In high school... were there any subjects that particularly appealed to you?*

GILMORE: I was always very good in English, especially English and American Literature, and history. Those were the subjects that I excelled in. I was decent at math, and decent at science, but not an avid student of science. I think I would be now if I went back to school. In high school I studied Latin for two years, instead of a modern foreign language. I was pretty good at Latin for the amount of time I spent on it. Those were my best subjects.

*Q: Looking back at your elementary school and high school, can you think of...were there any books that were of particular importance to you that opened your eyes or attracted you or anything like that?*

GILMORE: As long as I can remember, I was particularly attracted to poetry. I remember reading poetry more than any specific book, although I remember liking the Shakespeare plays we read in my sophomore, junior, and senior years. We read one play in depth each year. We read Hamlet, Macbeth and Julius Caesar. Those three. But I preferred poetry, Walt Whitman and Robert Frost and Emily Dickinson particularly. I didn't read all of Frost's works or all of Leaves of Grass, but I remember being influenced by those early on. And also Edna Saint Vincent Millay, whom my mother liked. And a whole series of minor American poets. But early on it was poetry.

*Q: Yes, I was very influenced by Steven Vincent Benét's John Brown's Body, a great look at the Civil War.*

GILMORE: I remember that well. It is, and I remember Steven Vincent Benét and I remember also reading Carl Sandburg, as a young fellow. I don't appreciate him quite as much as an older person, but he was an important influence. And I even at one point thought I would try to write some verse like the two of them, Sandburg and Whitman. It didn't amount to much, but I did have a strong interest in poetry. And then later, novels, British novels particularly. As I went into college, the book I read early and kept coming back to that helped me choose my career, was Darkness at Noon, Arthur Koestler's book.

*Q: Which was based on the Communist rule in... it was Czechoslovakia wasn't it?*

GILMORE: It was based primarily on the Soviet Union. The protagonist, Rubashov, was possibly modeled after Bukharin, Nikolai Bukharin, the young intellectual who was one of Lenin's closest confidantes. He differed with Stalin and was purged. But I remember Darkness as one of the things that took me toward Russian studies in graduate school.

But I have to say, that in high school the biggest interest I had was music. I was one of the

pianists for the high school chorus, which was a pretty good chorus. I was also in the band. I did a lot of vocal accompaniment. It so happens my wife, who was a year younger, was the star soprano, who in fact won the Pennsylvania state forensics three years running, as a sophomore, junior, and senior. I was her accompanist. Our high school had an outstanding bass and I was his accompanist. There was also a flutist who went on to earn a music degree. I was his accompanist too. So I began to do a lot of music. In fact, I was kind of split between music and academics in high school, and probably spent more time on music than I, in retrospect, maybe should have. But it took me to music school – conservatory first. That's where I went to college first, for music.

*Q: How about the Cold War, international affairs? It sounds like you were in a valley in western Pennsylvania; did the outside world intrude much?*

GILMORE: It did a couple of times. I remember in ninth grade civics class the teacher raised the question of whether Truman would or should run again. I remember we had a straw poll, and I remember speaking up for Truman. He was one of my father's heroes. My father used to say, "This guy has guts, and he takes real decisions, and he's got an agenda both domestically and in foreign policy, and he's a leader." The straw poll resulted in a tie; 50% thought Truman should run again; 50% were opposed.

*Q: Must have been the election of 1952.*

GILMORE: Yes. It would be the election of 1952. That was my first real memory of politics. I remember the two Eisenhower/Stevenson campaigns. I followed them very closely. In 1952 Stevenson was pretty popular in my hometown, in the Monongahela Valley and in Allegheny County, which is greater Pittsburgh. Stevenson was not as popular by 1956, particularly because he was considered too intellectual, a bit of an egghead. Yes, egghead was the term that was used.

Eisenhower was admired even though there were some people that thought he didn't know enough about domestic issues, particularly bread and butter economic issues. But I remember having friends with whom I talked politics all the time, friends who were more pro-Ike; I was pro-Stevenson, although not passionately. But I remember being heavily involved in following the campaigns. My father and grandfather wouldn't let the papers and the TV rest during the campaign periods. So, as we ate dinner together, we always discussed politics.

*Q: In 1955, you are graduating from high school. Where did you go?*

GILMORE: I went to Carnegie...what they call Carnegie Mellon University now, but then called Carnegie Institute of Technology, which had not only a wonderful engineering school, but also a fine arts school of quality. The best fine arts school in the area. I went as a piano major, and I went thinking that I was going to make a living doing concert work, particularly as an accompanist and teacher. I was a better than average pianist and a very good accompanist because I'd done so much of it. So I went to Carnegie Mellon for two years. I did very, very well, but only stayed two years because it was clear to me by the second year that I wanted to do something broader than music. By then I had the foreign affairs bug. Bitten.

*Q: How did you catch that?*

GILMORE: I caught it reading about Russia, the Soviet Union, reading about Russian history, 19th century Russia, and reading George Kennan's memoirs. There was a 5-hour a week history course, a year-long history course, required of sophomores in the fine arts school. It was taught by a very particularly gifted teacher by the name of Norman Dawes, a Massachusetts boy, a Harvard graduate and a particularly good teacher. He was an inspiration. He not only taught history well, but he related it to foreign affairs, current events. He was another important influence on my career development. I think the other factor was that I realized that, though I was doing well in music, very well, in fact -- I think I made better grades in music school in terms of grade point average than I did even, subsequently, in regular university -- I decided music was too confining, to do music night and day and all the time. It was too much.

*Q: Yes, once you really launch in that path, there's only one field.*

GILMORE: Right. And I was good, very talented in some ways. But as a steel town boy, although my parents sacrificed to pay for good lessons in high school, I hadn't had the background a real concert pianist needs. The really star pianists, by the time they are 18, can play four or five concertos, and know a huge sonata repertoire. I was behind, although in two years of intensive study at Carnegie Mellon I was making good progress in catching up. It was clear to me that I wasn't going to be a Rudolf Serkin of my generation. [Ed: Rudolf Serkin (March 28, 1903 – May 8, 1991) was a Bohemian-born pianist. He is widely regarded as one of the greatest Beethoven interpreters of the twentieth century.] A combination of things then led me to then apply to the University of Pittsburgh and transfer, which I did after two years.

I transferred to Pittsburgh in 1957 and graduated in 1960. I lost one year of coursework, maybe a year and a bit more, from transferring from fine arts to liberal arts, because many of my fine arts courses, like solfeggio and harmony, and music theory, didn't transfer.

*Q: How did you find, while you were in music, the music crowd? In other words, the people you would be working with. Music is one thing, but the people you would be associating with for the rest of your life. What was your impression of that at the time?*

GILMORE: Well, it was interesting. Many of the students were obsessed with becoming good horn players or clarinetists or pianists. They were more devoted and more disciplined than anything I'd seen. I liked them, but in a way found them sometimes pretty one-sided. But the professors were a different story. My piano teacher for two years was a New York Jew, a dear man, Leonard Eisner, who had been the accompanist for Lauritz Melchior when he toured the country doing solo work. He had also done some solo piano work as a young person. He had had a Carnegie Hall debut and that sort of thing, although he was not well known. We became close friends, and through him I got both a good foundation in piano and a good foundation in Holocaust history. He influenced me deeply. Also, to make extra money, I was the music librarian for the music school, which brought me into contact with the concert master of the Pittsburgh Symphony, Samuel Thaviu, who was our conservatory orchestra conductor. And I served as his rehearsal accompanist when he played the Beethoven and Glazunov violin concertos with the Pittsburgh Symphony. Also, by the way, Samuel Thaviu was of Russian-

Jewish origin. I was heavily influenced by Eisner and Thaviu in a very positive way. Through them I became aware of modern European history from the vantage point of the Jews of Europe who had been forced to flee and whose relatives had been sent to concentration camps and murdered.

*Q: You were hitting the results of the wave of immigrant from Germany, which was such a plus to American cultural life, but sort of devastated German cultural life.*

GILMORE: Right. It was fascinating. I got to know some of the Pittsburgh Symphony's principal players who were our teachers at the music school at Carnegie Mellon. So, for example, the trombone teacher would be the first chair trombonist; the oboe teacher the first chair oboist. Many of them were Jews, just like you said, right out of Germany and Austria who had come to the States as refugees. The principal oboist was a Czech who had also been thrown up by the events of WWII. Also, my Harmony I and Harmony II teacher, was a Russian émigré, a composer of some note, Nikolai Lopatnikoff. Wonderful man, excellent teacher. He was a fan of George Kennan. It's a peculiar story, but Lopatnikoff's influence on me was not only in music, but also in learning about Russia. The more I got into Russia and the Soviet Union, the more I got really interested. So, one of the reasons I left Carnegie Mellon was also to study Russian, which I began at the University of Pittsburgh. I transferred to the University of Pittsburgh after two years. Pitt didn't have a Russian studies program, but I spent two years studying Russian there.

*Q: How did you find your time studying at the University of Pittsburgh? The Cathedral of Learning, I believe it was called, was in a skyscraper....*

GILMORE: Right, it had a lot of cute nicknames. One of them was the Tower of Ignorance.... [laughter]

But in any case, Pitt was very interesting. I could only spend one year living close to campus. When I transferred it was too late to get into a dormitory, so I rented a room from an elderly couple who lived maybe about a mile from the school. I spent three years at Pitt, getting my undergraduate degree. I spent the last two years as what we used to call, "a streetcar student." Except I traveled in a car pool from my parents' home. I didn't spend as much time on campus as would have been ideal, because I lived off-campus the first year, and then at home. Also, my brother had started college, so what limited funds my parents had became even more limited. So I had to pick up weekend work. So I became a church organist. So, I wasn't on campus much, although I did participate in the Pitt glee club, my first year, the only year I could. I also participated in a discussion group which focused on important social and political issues of the day.

But the biggest thing that happened to me at the University of Pittsburgh was that in my second year I was selected as one of the students that showed some promise of going on to graduate school. Pitt had a very forward-looking program for identifying students who might qualify for graduate fellowships, run by a professor they brought in from Princeton. I believe his name was Dr. Heath. They picked me, largely because I was a very good student of American history. I had received some very high marks in the one year of American history I took. Dr. Heath's program

focused me on thinking maybe I could get a fellowship to go to graduate school. I did. I won a Woodrow Wilson fellowship at the end of my senior year. It gave me one year of graduate school. I was accepted by Indiana University's school of Russian and Eastern European studies with some qualms. My undergraduate major was English with a minor in History. At Indiana they thought I was a little light in history and political science. But they took me. So, Pitt proved to be a very good place for me to study for the three years, and I am still grateful to Pitt for picking me out of this mass of students and saying, "Hey, you've got a shot at grad school." Otherwise, I'm not sure I would have felt so confident about applying.

*Q: Grad school was not very much in the cards in those days.*

GILMORE: No, and my parents had not planned on it, and there was no money for it. My brother by that time was a college junior, and my sister was coming along. It was clear my parents were going to be strapped, and they were strapped. At least this got me to Indiana University and got me into Russian and East European studies.

*Q: Indiana, I guess today still, had this Slavic studies program as pretty eminent.*

GILMORE: Right. It was excellent. When I got there, I found I was behind in Russian so I couldn't make rapid progress toward a Ph.D. Dr. Robert F. Byrnes, who was the head of the Russian and Eastern European Institute then, used to want people to be done with their coursework in two and a half years and starting to write their thesis. Well, I spent two years there, one on the Woodrow Wilson fellowship and then one on an assistantship. I had spent so much time studying Russian that although I had the work done for my area certificate, I didn't have my Ph.D. work done. Meanwhile I took the Foreign Service exam and passed. I was married...I had married my high school sweetheart just before going to Indiana. She gave birth to our first child midway through my second year at Indiana. So, I didn't finish there, although it's interesting: I have more than enough coursework for a masters degree, plus an area certificate. When I looked at it some years later, I realized it wouldn't have taken me probably but one more year to finish the coursework for a Ph.D.. The irony was I'd applied for a National Defense Fellowship toward the end of my second year, and I was named an alternate. Meanwhile I had passed the Foreign Service exam, and I decided to join the Foreign Service. When I got to Washington, I was informed by the National Defense fellowship people that I was now on the list. But I decided not to go back and get the Ph.D., but to plunge into the Foreign Service. And I think it was the right decision.

*Q: The Ph.D. is kind of fun to have, but unless you really plan to use it to teach, it doesn't really further anything.*

GILMORE: No. I would have benefited from more study, and maybe more language study, but in Pittsburgh where I grew up, people who were not stupid but not super interested in education had a nickname for Ph.D., which influenced my view of it at the time... "Piled Higher and Deeper," -- Ph.D. What they would say was, "If you are going to get a doctorate, be a doctor, be a dentist." But they would say, "Don't spend your steelworker Dad's hard-earned money by being a professional student. Now, I've moved light years away from that view.

*Q: You graduated from Pitt in 1960, is that right?*

GILMORE: Because that was the first year Pitt operated on a trimester schedule, I graduated in April. Jobs were tight because there was a slowdown in steel, I think a steel strike. So I went to work at a Dairy Queen for a few months and got ready for Indiana.

*Q: At Indiana, did you get caught up in the election campaign of 1960? Nixon versus Kennedy?*

GILMORE: Oh, big time. I got more involved in the election than I should have. I should have spent the extra time studying. I got to Bloomington, with my new bride, by the way, in August of 1960. The major newspaper in Indiana was the Indianapolis Star. It was strongly, strongly anti-Kennedy, and pro-Nixon. On campus, however, you can guess where the sentiments went: they went toward Kennedy, and my family and I went toward Kennedy.

I leaned toward Kennedy for a number of reasons. I had still been a church organist in Western Pennsylvania right up until I left for Indiana. And the Methodist preacher spoke against having a Catholic in the White House, which irritated me to no end. So all that did was strengthen my resolve to think for myself. But also, the Presbyterian preacher in my parents' home church was pro-Kennedy. I said, "Hey, this Kennedy guy is not going to be any more in special communication with the Vatican than any other U.S. president, so let's just look at him for what he is: a war hero, senator who has some ideas. In any case, I read the Indianapolis Star and the Louisville Courier Journal every morning. I remember the Courier Journal was pro-Kennedy, an excellent newspaper out of Louisville...in fact the best newspaper in the U.S in some ways. I spent a lot of time discussing the campaign with my fellow students who were by and large pro-Kennedy. Of course, he squeaked out that victory...I remember we all waited up 'til Illinois was finally registered in the Kennedy column.

*Q: Did the call for public service resonate with you?*

GILMORE: It did. It was one of the things Kennedy said: "Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country." And also we were still very much in the Cold War. I remember one of my professors, John Thompson, one of my history professors and my advisor, had been a Foreign Service officer. He talked about the excitement of it and the importance of it, and the importance of being on the front lines of the Cold War as he would say. We had a number of émigrés at Indiana University. We had 1956 Hungarian refugees. One of them became a dear friend of mine, Charles Gati, a Hungarian American, who had participated in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. He was quite a student of Hungarian politics and history. He later wrote some excellent books, including one on Imre Nagy. But in any case, I got to know as fellow students individuals who were in the political fray, so to speak. One of the Benešes was there,

*Q: From the Edvard Beneš's family of Czechoslovakia?*

GILMORE: Right. So the Cold War was right there on campus. We also had as a professor Charles Jelavich, an American scholar of Croatian origin, married to Barbara Jelavich who was one of the best diplomatic historians of her time, particularly as a teacher. She focused on 19th and 20th Century Balkan and European diplomatic history. So we were exposed to Cold War

every day and it was exciting.

*Q: You mentioned that you got married... your high school sweetheart. What was her background?*

GILMORE: Yes. Carol Louise Kunz. She was of German and English origin. Her maiden name was Kunz. On her father's side, her ancestors were German -- period. Germans from Alsace Lorraine, Catholics. Her mother was a Laverick, although her mother's mother in turn was a Mary Deutsche -- Pennsylvania Dutch. My wife was raised Methodist because her mother was Methodist. She is a very, very talented singer, and her trajectory in high school was clearly toward music school. She is a year younger than I, but we stayed in touch and by the time I was finished with my senior year of college and she was in her junior year, we decided to get engaged. Believe it or not, our parents weren't thrilled about the timing, but they quickly supported it, saying, "These are nice kids. Just so they don't have too many kids too fast."

*Q: What brought you to take the Foreign Service exam?*

GILMORE: I took it first as a junior at the University of Pittsburgh... maybe it was as a senior...one of those two years. I think I took it largely because Dr. Heath and his focus on graduate school had led me to think about what I would want to specialize in. I'd heard about the exam and I took it, and I narrowly missed passing it. In those days, they gave you five bonus points if you'd passed the foreign language portion of the exam. I barely missed passing the foreign language test. That would have put me over the top. Once I took the test, I decided I'm going to take this again, but after I have a little more study under my belt and some more language. So then I took it again in my second year at Indiana University. By that time my Russian was pretty good and I aced the Russian portion. So I passed the exam with some margin. Probably I might have passed it without the Russian, but the Russian gave me five bonus points. Once I passed it...by the way, my wife by that time was very pregnant, it was our second year at Indiana. She went on to finish her degree at Duquesne subsequently...she went back to Duquesne for a semester my second year at Indiana. She was expecting and I didn't get the National Defense Fellowship that I had hoped for, so I just decided to head straight for the Foreign Service. And I was lucky to do it.

*Q: What year did you take the oral exam?*

GILMORE: I took the oral exam in the late spring of 1962.

*Q: Do you recall any of the questions...*

GILMORE: I do recall heavy questions on Civil Rights. While I was a high school student, in my home church the pastor, Rev. John Earl Meyers, became caught up in the Civil Rights Movement and in fact marched in Washington with Dr. King. Rev. Meyers and Dr. King were a powerful influence on me. I had become convinced of the movement's importance having grown up with African Americans and having very close friends among them who were clearly disadvantaged. I'd become interested in it. Rev. Meyers had given me for my birthday in my senior year a membership in the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored

People). I had not solicited it. My parents, by the way, were not happy. But in any case, when I went for the oral exam, one of the examiners, the non-Foreign Service person on the panel, was a fellow by the name of Arthur Sylvester, who happened to be one of the senior African Americans in the Civil Service. He spotted my NAACP membership immediately and started asking me questions about the Civil Rights Movement. After missing one, I hit the rest out of the park. So it was a help.

The other thing I remember is being asked a question, when they saw that I was then working on a master's thesis on a Russian writer by the name of Nikolai Novikov, one of the Freemasons of his time, and a moderate reformer, and a very interesting fellow. They asked me about him and how he related to the later Russian Revolution. I remember that question. I also remember a question at the end of the interview when it was clear that they kind of liked me...they'd noticed on my application that I had said that I would be happy to be part of this "elite" Foreign Service corps. They asked me what I meant by elite. It was clear that they were wondering if I thought I'd be better than anybody else if accepted, or was some smart alec. No, I said, it meant to me "elite" in the sense of carefully chosen. I remember saying that, and then I was ushered out of the room. Within 15 or 20 minutes they called me in and offered me an appointment. One other thing: they laughed and said, "Your shoes squeak, do you know that? Did you get new shoes?" Sure enough I had just bought a new pair of black shoes for the interview because I didn't have any. And I'd bought a cheap pair of black shoes, and apparently they'd picked that up; so they knew what kind of a rube they were dealing with...[laughter]

*Q: [laughter] That's wonderful. How did your wife feel about this?*

GILMORE: She was pleased enough. She had been a very good soldier because we lived in very modest surroundings. Our first child was born in December of my second year at I.U. just after I had taken the exam. When our first child was born, my wife put up with living in a very cramped, old attic apartment. We were clearly well matched. She's someone I'd known in high school. I'd had my first date with her when she was in 9th grade and I was in 10th. We went to the movies. Whatever I wanted to do was all right with her. She's got a very outgoing personality and she's a very beautiful woman. So, she never had trouble interacting with people, American or foreign.

*Q: Was she thinking of continuing, especially because of her singing career?*

GILMORE: Yes, she'd hoped to do that, and I told her I thought she could. Which turned out to be not totally accurate because I spent much of my early career in the Communist world, and singing in public outside the Embassy was a problem. That being said, in our first post in Turkey, we collaborated with a chamber music group organized by a colleague at the Embassy, Louis Kahn, and including very good Turkish woodwind players from the Turkish Presidential Symphony. She was the soloist and we did some concertizing in Ankara, including in the Ambassador's residence when Boston Pops conductor Arthur Fiedler, the leader of the Boston Pops, visited.

Sometimes in our career, for example when we finally got to Yugoslavia, she was able to do quite a bit of singing publicly. But that was different. Yugoslavia was an independent Communist

country as you well know, and many things were possible there that were not possible in the Warsaw Pact member states.

*Q: Sure, you'd go to an opera there, and the lead male would be singing in Russian and the lead lady would be singing in Italian, and the chorus would be singing in Serbian.*

GILMORE: Exactly. I remember that so well. In Moscow, where you couldn't do a thing musically outside the Embassy, the British Ambassador, Sir Duncan Wilson, and his wife, Lady Wilson, were music lovers and had organized a chorus made up of diplomats. My wife, Carol, quickly became the chorus's star soprano. And that enabled us as a middle grade diplomatic officers to have an up-close look at some of the USSR's most famous musicians. The Wilsons' daughter studied cello with Mstislav Rostropovich. My wife and I were invited to a house concert at the Wilsons' residence featuring Rostropovich accompanied by Sviatoslav Richter. On another occasion we attended a concert at the Wilsons' featuring renowned British tenor Peter Pears with composer Benjamin Britten at the piano.

*Q: Great that her talent was useful. You came into the Foreign Service in what year?*

GILMORE: I actually entered the Service in August of 1962, but the paperwork says I came in in September, because the paperwork was always behind. Remember they offered you a reserve appointment, and then an officer's commission, a month later... when the paperwork came through [Editor's Note: The Foreign Service Biographic Registry notes Mr. Gilmore entered the Foreign Service under a reserve appointment in September 1962 and received his Foreign Service commission as an FSO-8 in December 1962]. So my A-100 class started in August of 1962.

*Q: What was your class like? This was is your first sort of close-up look at the Foreign Service.*

GILMORE: It was a very interesting time. I recall that there were 52 of us in two sections. One headed by Chester Beaman, the other by Thomas Duffield. Two very dedicated officers. There were four women officers in my A-100 class. We were the first or maybe the second A-100 class to include women officers. At that time women officers had to resign if they married. It was terrible. I remember being generally impressed with virtually everyone in the class. The person I regarded as the intellectual star of the class died young. He was fellow named Marty Rosenberg. He had served in Laos and then the Department and died in 1967. There were some other very able people in the class; some people that subsequently went pretty far in the Foreign Service: Desaix Anderson, Joe Lake, a couple of fellows who went on to become ambassadors, and Leonard Baldyga and Sam Courtney who rose to the top of the USIA. [Ed: Anderson, Lake and Baldyga have oral history interviews on file with ADST.] It was an exciting time. I found quickly that my wife and I were among those in my class with more modest means. We had just come out of grad school. I borrowed a small sum of money from a fellow graduate student to get our 1952 Ford repaired to drive to Pittsburgh to visit family before traveling to Washington, D. C. My wife, our infant son and I arrived in Washington by train in September, 1962 broke and ready for adventure.

*Q: Yes. I know in my class, Class 1, actually, back in 1955... a bunch of us, as soon as we took*

*our oath, we went to the credit union to take out a loan to get us through to the next....*

GILMORE: I was in that same category. We went to the Credit Union very quickly, and I remember going overseas to my first post, that I had to borrow money for a tux. They said you had to have one, and we bought my wife one gown and a pair of long gloves because they said she had to have them. We didn't even have a car. We borrowed money and bought a used Studebaker Lark, from a local optometrist. When we arrived in Turkey, we owed the credit union something like $1,500 and they made me do something I found very embarrassing. I had to ask my father-in-law to co-sign my loan, which he did.

Do you remember those days?

*Q: Yes, awful.*

GILMORE: Awful.

*Q: You were in Washington during the Cuban missile crisis, October 14-28.*

GILMORE: I was indeed.

*Q: For a bunch of young officers, you must have been sort of wide-eyed, weren't you?*

GILMORE: Yes, we were. It happened when I was in A-100, which was followed by the Consular course. In those days the Department gave all new officers the Consular Affairs Course before going overseas. If you were assigned overseas, and almost all of us were, you took the course. I remember being glued to the TV news on the Cuban missile crisis when I got home in the evenings. By the way, I made a mistake and rented an apartment over in Southwest Washington, DC, because I didn't know any better and because it was cheaper. So I had to get to and from the Consular course at FSI by taking two buses each way. I remember following the Cuban crisis very closely and worrying whether we would blink before they did. I remember Dean Rusk's famous quote, "We were eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other guy just blinked." When I got to my first post in Ankara, of course, I learned there was a piece of the story which I hadn't known anything about from Washington. It concerned the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

*Q: Yes.*

GILMORE: Were they put on the table, or weren't they, and if so, how...and boy, even though I was the Ambassador's aide my first ten or so months in Turkey, some of that stuff was not shared...with me anyhow...I didn't have a need to know.

*Q: How did you find the A-100? Later you got into the educational side of FSI. What was your impression of the A-100 course and all that?*

GILMORE: It was tightly structured, and it was pretty clear that they weren't making up the curriculum day by day, but overall I would say it was uneven. There were some very good presentations. Some of them very practical. I remember one of them was 'How do you use an

interpreter?' I remember a fellow by the name of James Bostain.

*Q: I've interviewed Jim. His interview is part of our ADST collection.*

GILMORE: Yes. I thought he did a good job, showing us how other people's cultural backgrounds and cultural sensitivities would be different than ours. And we had some good speakers over from the department to talk about key aspects of U.S. policy. By and large, I thought A-100 was a good start in the service, but in some ways the best part of it was getting to know the other people coming in with you.

*Q: I think one of my first reactions when I came in, I thought, poor little me and all these fancy people. I quickly learned we all had our strengths and weaknesses and I didn't have to feel inferior.*

GILMORE; I remember we had a discussion once about U.S.-Soviet economic competition because it was very much on our minds. JFK wanted us to go to the moon, but suddenly the USSR had launched Sputnik. One of the other A-100 participants maintained that the Soviet Union was going to outstrip us economically sooner or later simply because the Soviets had tight central control over investments and the interest rate. I remember thinking to myself, "Oh my gosh. I know more than this guy. It's very clear to me from my course in Soviet economics at I.U. that they can control the interest rate all they want, but until they know what something really costs, until they have prices that really reflect the cost of scarce resources and interest rates that reflect the cost of scarce investment resources, they're not going to get anywhere except in those few sectors they throw tons of resources at." So I remember feeling, "Hey, I might be from a more modest economic background than some of these folks, but I think I can have a career with these guys." I remember generally liking most of the folks, generally liking them quickly, and admiring them for what they did.

*Q: Had the draft been breathing down your neck at all?*

GILMORE: Well, it's interesting. Yes, you know I came from western Pennsylvania, where we had what we unofficially called the "voluntary draft." You could have your name put up higher on the list if you wanted to be considered. Well there was a lot of that going on because of the steel mills either being closed temporarily for strikes or because they were shrinking in terms of the employment opportunities they could offer. I was called up for the physical...after I graduated from the University of Pittsburgh and before I went to Indiana, and was given the 1-A designation, so I was draftable. But when they learned I had a Woodrow Wilson Fellowship to Indiana, I was told quietly, that although they could never say it officially, "We have enough people here wanting their names to be put up on the draft, moved up, that you won't be called while you are at graduate school, in all probability." And I was never called again. I kept in touch with them. Once I went into the Foreign Service, I don't think I was ever contacted again. They knew I was in the Foreign Service, and that was it. So, I'm sad about it in a way. In many ways, I would have liked to have been in the service.

*Q: It was a handy thing to have behind you, to understand...*

GILMORE: political-military issues.

*Q: Yes. In the A-100 course, they always ask you where you would like to go. What were your thoughts?*

GILMORE: We used to call it the Soviet Bloc. I said the Soviet Union or the Soviet Bloc. Of course, the policy was not to assign anybody to the Bloc for a first tour of duty. So they said they would assign us, those of us who wanted to go to that part of the world, to one of the "listening post" countries. I was assigned originally to Izmir, Turkey, and just before I was getting ready to go, my assignment was changed to Ankara, which I think was fortuitous. Of course, Turkey was a listening post, but I only some years later realized just how important a listening post it really was, i.e., how many facilities we had up along the Black Sea, plus the U-2 flights to and from Incirlik. And we were flying RB-47s across what was then Soviet Armenia. But I was sent to Ankara as a first post as a rotational officer, a Central Compliment officer.

*Q: You were there from when to when?*

GILMORE: I got to Ankara in early January 1963. And I came out in August of 1964 because I'd been promoted and I'd been selected for Hungarian language training at FSI.

*Q: When you got to Turkey in early 1963, what was the situation in Turkey and our relations with Turkey?*

GILMORE: There was some tenseness over the question of the Jupiter missiles. It was talked about quietly, but not talked about in the Embassy.

*Q: Could you explain what the Jupiter missile thing was...*

GILMORE: Yes, as I understand it. My memory may not be as sharp as I would like it to be. When Nikita Khrushchev put the Soviet missiles into Cuba, and we were determined to have them removed, one of the ideas was to suggest a deal: we would remove the Jupiter missiles that we had put into Turkey—and the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba. By the way, I subsequently learned that the Jupiters were not terribly efficient.

*Q: They were obsolescent...we were planning to yank them out anyway.*

GILMORE: We were going to pull them. Anyhow, there was some talk about offering as part of an arrangement to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba, to get the Jupiters out of Turkey. Apparently, from what I've subsequently read, Adlai Stevenson was one of those who thought that was not a bad idea. I was told, subsequently, that in a formal sense that idea was dropped, although whether there was an understanding that we would be taking the Jupiters out anyhow is another question. I believe the answer to that, although I haven't done careful research, is yes.

The Jupiters in Turkey had been installed without publicity and Turkey's leaders did not want to have them withdrawn a part of a deal to secure the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. They believed that the withdrawal of the Jupiters would leave Turkey less secure.

For a while the idea of a guided missile frigate manned by naval personnel from several NATO countries including Turkey was bandied about. Some in Turkey liked something that would give them some participation in a nuclear deterrent. Our ambassador in Ankara, Raymond Hare, was a very experienced diplomat. Ankara was his fifth ambassadorial post in the Near East. [Ed: Ambassador Hare served in Turkey from April 1961 to August 1965 and has an oral history interview on the ADST website.] Just before Turkey he had been Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and after Turkey he became Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs. I am now virtually certain Hare never believed the multi-manned NATO guided missile frigate idea would be realized. In any case, he carefully avoided commenting on the Jupiters in my presence. Ambassador Hare had very good access to Prime Minister Ismet Inonu and Foreign Minister Cemal Erkin. We had a large military and intelligence presence in Turkey. I remember as his aide working on a paper outlining the extent of our presence. It included the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group to Turkey, JUSMAAG, and the Turkish-U.S. logistics, TUSLOG, missions. I learned quietly and gradually that TUSLOG covered not only logistics for our forces but also a number of facilities for intelligence gathering.

*Q: Yes, these are the ones up along the Black Sea. Telemetry, and listening. I used to do that a long time ago myself when I was in the Air Force.*

GILMORE: Really? It's amazing...one of the people I became a close friend of was a fellow who brought the black briefcase to the ambassador once or twice or even more often a week, U.S. Air Force First Lieutenant David Hall. David couldn't tell me what he did, but he danced around it, and I figured it out from things the ambassador said. But I used to watch David come in to brief the ambassador. Our relationship with Turkey was solid. We were also running a huge USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) mission. I believe Turkey was somewhere among in the top five recipient countries for U.S. assistance. A man by the name of (Stuart) Van Dyke, a very smooth, polished fellow, ran the large aid mission. [Ed: Van Dyke served in Turkey from 1959 to 1964 and his oral history interview is on the ADST website.] One of my jobs as the ambassador's aide was to monitor some of the USAID traffic and brief him of any unusual developments. At that time there was a lot of instability in the Arab world, on which Ambassador Hare was a real expert. I remember there were attempted coups as the Ba'athists were pushing for power in Iraq and Syria. When I would take Ambassador Hare the cables from Baghdad and Damascus to brief him on developments, he'd say, "Summarize them for me, Harry, summarize them." He would know after I'd got three or four sentences out whether the report was significant, as he had a very nuanced understanding of that part of the world. Otherwise, it was an interesting time because there were status of forces issues that had to be resolved with Turkey. I got a look at political-military issues for the first time. I got a look, too, at consular work as I had a rotational tour in the consular section. Also, I did my first political work in Ankara, under the tutelage of Elaine Diane Smith. A very good teacher, by the way. She was one of our genuine experts on Turkey.

Let's see, is there anything else. Oh, the event I remember perhaps most graphically occurred in May of 1963, late May, I don't recall the exact date. My wife and I were awakened at dawn, which in May fell a little before 5 a.m., when the windows in our apartment sprang open with a huge bang. It sounded like a major explosion. It was a Turkish Air Force jet fighter at rooftop

level breaking the sound barrier. An attempted coup d'état by Colonel Alparslan Türkeş and elements from the Harp Okulu, the military academy, was underway. I helped my wife and three year old child move out into the hall and away from the windows and headed for my car. I drove directly to the embassy, which was only a short distance away. When I reached Atatürk Boulevard, the main street in front of the embassy, a Turkish soldier on patrol stopped me and stuck his rifle into my car window. I was able very slowly and carefully to get my diplomatic ID out of my pocket and gain entrance to the embassy. A number of our embassy officers were already there observing events from the roof. When the ambassador arrived a short while later he was cool and calm. The revolt was over in a couple of hours, but I remember it as the most dramatic domestic political event of my tour of duty in Turkey.

*Q: I was going to say... Hare played a very important role on the Cyprus issue. The Turks were ready to invade.*

GILMORE: Right. That came after I had rotated out of the position as staff aide to Ambassador Hare. Inter-communal violence broke out in Cyprus in 1963. There were credible reports in late 1963 and early 1964 that Turkish Cypriots were being forced into enclaves. The Turkish tabloid press gave heavy coverage to atrocities against the Turkish community on Cyprus. At the embassy in Ankara we were watching Turkish military movements very closely from late 1963 and into 1964. In late May 1964 Turkey seemed ready to invade Cyprus in the face of reports of spiraling violence against the Turkish community on Cyprus. In early June, historical records say June 5, Ambassador Hare delivered an exceptionally strongly worded letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Inonu. The Johnson letter basically told the Turks they could not use any military equipment provided by the U.S. to invade Cyprus. Inonu used the letter to do what we thought he wanted to do anyhow, which was not to invade Cyprus. Of course, Turkey subsequently did invade Cyprus.

*Q: That wasn't until 1974...*

GILMORE: 1974, right. But I was no longer Hare's aide in June, 1964. Hare knew exactly what was going on. He knew how much this would be a burden for future U.S.-Turkish relations, and how it would come back to haunt us again and again. But he knew what he had to do. He also was disappointed, but not surprised, that we didn't have more leverage to use on the Greek side.

*Q: Did you get any feel for the political influence of the Greeks, which, next to the Israeli lobby, is probably the strongest one in American politics in this era.*

GILMORE: Right. Ambassador Hare knew quite a bit about it, because he'd been the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. He was careful. He was always a very circumspect person, particularly in any kind of public utterances. But he was well aware of the pressures. He used to say that he wished it would be possible to deal with the Cyprus problem more on the level of statesmanship and less on the level of responding to interest groups' pressures. And he knew exactly what he was saying. But he considered it very much in the U.S. interest to avoid a Greek-Turkish clash. And we did. That being said, I remember him thinking that Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus at that time, was not always the most farsighted or wise leader. Hare was very careful in our public diplomacy not to let us get into a position where the Greek-American

political advocacy groups could land on us.

*Q: How did you find the atmosphere of...as sort of the junior officer and doing rotational work and all, what was your impression of how the embassy worked and your fellow officers?*

GILMORE: There were some very gifted officers in the embassy. Robert Barnes, the DCM, was a very gifted officer. He subsequently became ambassador to Jordan. Bill Dale, the pol-mil counselor, was very hard working and experienced. The USAID mission had a very interesting relationship with the embassy. The economic counselor of the embassy, Wade Lathram, was also the deputy USAID mission director. The idea was to try to keep the AID mission and the embassy on the same wavelength. [Ed: Lathram has an oral history interview on file with ADST which mostly deals with his later service in Vietnam.] The admin counselor was W. Harris Collins, a Southerner, rather laid back...very by-the-book, but also very, very competent. The public affairs officer, Les Squires, was one of the most experienced USIA (U.S. Information Agency) officers in the business. So we had a good team at the top level.

The middle level was uneven. We had some stars like Robert Dillon, then a political officer, who subsequently became ambassador to Lebanon. [Ed: Ambassador Dillion's oral history can be found on the ADST website.] And the embassy housed some special offices like the CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) office, which Norman Armour – an Armour packing company heir, ran. By and large, there were some very able people at the embassy. It was a good introduction to the service. I could see, and I can see even better now that I've had much more experience, that the relationship between the (Central Intelligence) Agency presence and the State presence might not always have been smooth. Although, when I was Ambassador Hare's aide, he was very careful never to make any complaints about that agency, or to involve me as an aide in any aspect of that relationship.

*Q: Now your consular work, wasn't this the time when kids were getting involved with hashish and that sort of thing. Did that come up at all?*

GILMORE: We were very worried about that because the Turkish legal system and the Turkish officials who staffed it were very harsh with anybody found in possession of drugs. The bigger consular problems I recall, the more difficult ones, occurred when I had not yet rotated into the consular section, but was still the ambassador's aide. An aircraft crashed into the center of Ankara with some American passengers. I remember that a fellow junior officer, Kenneth Keller, was the Duty Officer that night. He did a superb job helping to identify bodies and notify next of kin and arranging for letters of condolence from the ambassador – Ken went on to be a distinguished consular officer. I remember one of the passengers was the dependent of an American official returning from a holiday, had some illegal currency on her body. This caused us a bit of a consular problem when this was discovered as her body was identified in the morgue. Otherwise, our bigger consular problems were related to mixed marriages, American citizens, typically American women who had married Turkish exchange students. They sometimes wanted to leave Turkey because they weren't culturally prepared to subordinate themselves to the husband's mother, as expected in Turkey. And I remember also a couple of cases where GIs married Turkish women who might have engaged in prostitution.

*Q: Well, often this is a problem...*

GILMORE: Those were the bigger problems. And also getting visas from the Saudi embassy for TDY (Temporary Duty) U.S. military personnel traveling to Saudi Arabia and having trouble with the Saudis wanting to deny visas to American military personnel whose names might sound Jewish. This was not something we liked. But it was another one of our tasks.

*Q: How did we deal with that?*

GILMORE: Well, basically, we wouldn't tell anybody who was Jewish and who wasn't. As far as we were concerned, we were all Americans. What the Saudis would do was if they saw a name that looked Jewish to them, they just wouldn't issue a visa. I remember one case, an African-American soldier, a strapping athletic fellow, had a name that sounded Jewish to the Saudis and they denied him a visa. He personally thought it was kind of funny. And he wasn't that keen to go to Saudi Arabia, but it illustrated the problem.

*Q: Was there much contact, as a junior officer, with young professional Turks.*

GILMORE: Not as much. My wife had some contacts through the Turkish-American Society, and in fact, in the last months we were there, I believe she worked on a part-time project with some of the young Turkish women there. We had some contacts generated by my wife's musical talent. I was her pianist and we had some contact with Turkish musicians. But overall, not many contacts. Part of it was because I hadn't been given Turkish language training. Although I studied Turkish during lunch hour and became reasonably proficient in market and street Turkish, I didn't learn Turkish well enough to carry on intellectual conversations, and I really didn't learn to read the papers. I could just read headlines.

As a junior officer, my wife and I had some participation in diplomatic life. I remember having my first contacts with the Soviet Embassy there. They were very carefully supervised, and much worried about by our security officials who were worried about people trying to recruit young American diplomats...and properly so. That wasn't much of a danger in my case, but it was good that there was a lot of concern. But, our social life in Turkey was largely within the American community, which was large and varied. We had some military friends like Lieutenant Hall and his wife, people like that. Occasionally, I'd accompany the ambassador on trips. When I would travel with him, I'd see more of Turkey and have more contact with Turkish society than at any other time. And that was particularly rewarding.

*Q: Did you get any feel for the Islamic side of things. Or was that pretty subdued at this point?*

GILMORE: It was pretty subdued. The ambassador's hobby was Islamic architecture, and Seljuk roads, built by the earlier, pre-Ottoman wave of Turks. On one trip, we flew to Istanbul and drove by car into European Turkey. We stopped to see important bridges, mosques, particularly in Edirne, old Adrianople, where there were some wonderful mosques, and also in Babaeski and Lüleburgaz, a couple of the smaller cities on the way. But we didn't really get in touch with religious officials on those trips. The ambassador would often be received by the provincial governors wherever we went. So I didn't really have much contact at all with religious officials.

*Q: Were you tempted to become a Turkish hand?*

GILMORE: The ambassador was very kind to me and took an interest in junior officers. He asked if I had a particular interest. I told him if I couldn't go to Moscow and use my Russian, I wanted to study another Eastern European language. He said he would support that, but he said, "Would you like to study Arabic? There aren't enough Arabists in the service. It's a very large Arab world. If you learn basic Arabic, you'll have a large number of posts you could serve at." I said, "No, I'd prefer to study an Eastern European language." And he backed me, and I was assigned to Hungarian language training. In retrospect, I might have made a better decision, or just as good a decision, studying Arabic. I was interested in Turkey. I became quite interested in Turkey. But I'd had a graduate school course in Balkan history with Charles Jelavich, Balkan history in the nineteenth century. Jelavich's course focused on the decline and collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. And so I'd had a good look at Ottoman history which fascinated me. It is fascinating. Somehow, as appealing as that was, I thought I'd be more interested in serving in the Balkans, per se, or in Eastern Europe. And the ambassador supported me.

*Q: But, also at the time, Arabic was fine, Japanese was fine, but the real sex appeal was the Communist, the Balkan world, or Eastern Europe. I, at that point, was a Yugoslav hand and we really felt we were in the middle of things.*

GILMORE: Yes, you were before me. I remember you from that. And Yugoslavia was important in many ways. In spite what subsequently happened to Yugoslavia, and its loss of relevance to the U.S. once the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact collapsed, it was very important in those days. I was interested in Eastern Europe or I wouldn't have picked Hungary because Hungarian was a hard language. But it turns out that it was very well taught at FSI, and I was young enough to learn languages pretty well then. So I became pretty fluent in Hungarian. Fluent enough to do consular work in Hungarian, which is no small achievement.

*Q: You took Hungarian from when to when?*

GILMORE: I took Hungarian from late August, the third week, whenever it started then, in 1964 until June of 1965, and then went out to Budapest in July.

*Q: Sometimes, in language training, you learn a hell of a lot about the country, not just the language. I must say, I took Serbian with two Serb guys, Jankovic and Popovic, and it served me very well for the rest of my career because of how these people reacted; the emotions and all. Were you getting this sort of background?*

GILMORE: Yes, I had a wonderful teacher, an excellent language teacher, Ilona Mihalyfyi, who was the primary Hungarian language teacher. She and a linguist, August Koski, created the course. And later on, a second Hungarian teacher, Eva Essenyi, came aboard to help teach. Those two ladies, and Eva's husband, who was a former Hungarian military officer, also met with us from time to time. I learned a lot in this course. In fact, between it and area studies, I had a pretty good feel for what I was going to get into in Hungary when I got there.

*Q: What was the situation in Hungary in 1965, both internally, and with America?*

GILMORE: I arrived in Budapest in July of 1965. The Hungarian Revolution of October-November 1956 still cast its shadow on Hungarian politics and U.S.-Hungarian relations. The primate of the Hungarian Catholic Church, József Cardinal Mindszenty, was still in the U.S. Legation. Mindszenty had been convicted of treason in a show trial in 1948. He was freed from prison by the revolutionary government on October 30, 1956, but on November 4 when Soviet tanks had surrounded Budapest and were closing the ring on Imre Nagy and his government and the revolutionaries, he sought and was granted asylum in the U.S. Legation. In the aftermath of the bloody Soviet suppression of the revolution the U.S. took steps to isolate the regime of Janos Kadar who had at first appeared to side with the revolutionaries and then turned coat and returned to Budapest with the Soviet forces that crushed them.

By 1965 U.S. opposition to Kadar was fading. After several years of cautious internal policy, the Kadar regime had relaxed considerably. As a vice consul and visa officer I was in a good position to monitor the changes. Approximately 200,000 Hungarians, a number of them students, had fled Hungary in the face of the Soviet military actions. By 1965 the Hungarian government was issuing visitors visas to former1956 revolutionaries, unless they were wanted for specific crimes. They were permitting these former revolutionaries, who were overwhelmingly male, to marry Hungarian women and permitting the wives to depart Hungary.

The Hungarian government was also beginning to talk about a "new economic mechanism," a significant step toward liberalization. Hungary was very cautious on the foreign policy front, though, because the regime was very careful to demonstrate its bona fides to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, some months before I left, sometime in I think early 1967, some months before I left, the U.S. and Hungary had agreed to elevate relations from legation to the level of full embassy.

*Q: Could you explain what it meant to have representation at the legation level? Legation is not used much anymore.*

GILMORE: It's an older form of diplomatic mission. Basically, a legation would be headed by a minister. In fact, in Hungary, our legation was not headed by a minister. It was headed by a chargé d'Affaires ad hoc, not ad interim, because that suggests that there is an ambassador to come, or a minister to come. Chargé d'Affaires ad hoc on the other hand, is a position to which one can be assigned. Elim O'Shaughnessy was assigned as chargé d'Affaires ad hoc, until he died in Budapest. And then shortly after I left, we elevated the status of our mission in Budapest to embassy and Martin Hillenbrand was named as the first U.S. ambassador.

Perhaps the most dramatic event that happened during my tour of duty in Budapest was a major demonstration against the U.S. and Israel in conjunction with the June War of 1967. The Israelis had the other legation in Hungary. They had developed a pretty solid economic relationship with Hungary. The Israeli legation in Hungary was staffed by the best group of Hungarian speakers of all the embassies and missions in Budapest. All the Israelis had been either born of Hungarian parents or in the ethnic Hungarian areas of Slovakia or Romania. So they all spoke Hungarian very well and enjoyed close ties with Hungarian officialdom. The American Legation was the

main focus of the demonstration, although the demonstrators did stop briefly at the Israeli legation en route to ours.

I, as one of the vice consuls, got to play a special role. Hundreds of demonstrators, most of them Hungarian and foreign university students, descended on the legation, filling Szabadsag Ter (Freedom Square), the square on which the legation was located. They filled the square totally, and Joe Guiliano, our general services officer, who doubled as our security officer, and I were sent out to meet them and accept their petition. They handed us the petition demanding that Israel and the U.S. do X and Y, to end the hostilities in the Middle East and to restore the status quo before the war. When we got back inside the legation, we barely got the door closed -- it was a huge wrought iron door with a glass panel behind it. The minute we got back inside, whack! The embassy's facade and the front door were hit with a fusillade of steel ball bearings. After several minutes of bombardment with ball bearings, the demonstrators turned to small vials of poster paint and ink. They crafted what looked like a Jackson Pollack painting on the front of the legation building. Joe Guiliano and I had barely made it back inside. When we got upstairs with the petition, the legation staff was huddled back away from the front windows. The chargé d'affaires at that point was Richard Tims; O'Shaughnessy had died in September 1966 in office in Budapest. Tims asked me to go into the Cardinal's office and ask the Cardinal if he was alright. The Cardinal was sitting at his desk, which by the way was right next to the front windows. The wooden shutters were down, and there was a steady pelting of ball bearings and poster paint vials, and whatever, banging on his shutters. He said to me in his very formal Hungarian, which translates roughly as, [speaks Hungarian] "Lord Vice Consul, I'm enjoying this symphony of coexistence."

*Q: [laughter]*

GILMORE: [laughter] I reported that and we all had a good laugh. But the Cardinal didn't leave his desk. The demonstration lasted no more than a couple of hours. But it had caused some significant damage to the façade of the legation and to the front entrance.

*Q: It obviously had been well orchestrated...ball bearings, the paint...*

GILMORE: Oh, it was well planned. Joe Guiliano and I had just got the front door closed when the front row of demonstrators knelt down to allow those in the second rank with the huge slingshots room to fire. The ball bearings shattered the embassy's wooden shutters and glass windows. This paved the way for the poster paints and the ink. But the demonstration notwithstanding, our overall relationship with Hungary was slowly becoming more substantial. The presence of the cardinal in the legation and the Hungarian government's sensitivity to it created a unique set of problems for the legation and the Department of State. For example, the Hungarians would issue no visas to U.S. Marine Guards from the time Mindszenty was granted asylum. So, all of the embassy officers, other than the chargé, took turns as Duty Officer sleeping in the building overnight. It was a rather nerve-wracking experience because on occasion the Hungarian special services who clearly knew the phone number, would do tag team phone calls asking us nasty questions like, "How many U.S. presidents were assassinated?" "How do you treat your black citizens and your native Americans?" So, serving as Duty Officer was not always a pleasant thing. That being said, it was a wonderful way to learn about Hungary, if you

spoke some Hungarian and were able to converse with Cardinal Mindszenty. For the record, Cardinal Mindszenty also learned a fair amount of English during the time he spent at the embassy.

The Duty Officer had the task of closing the Embassy, answering the phones, and retrieving immediate precedence telegrams. The Assistant Duty Officer had the task of walking each day with Cardinal Mindszenty in the little courtyard which the legation shared with the Hungarian National Bank. He, by the way, had a prison walk routine down pat. He had been imprisoned twice, once under the Nazis at the end of World War II, and then from 1948-1956 under the Communists. When he walked with me, he spoke mainly about Hungarian history, about the diabolical actions of the Communists, and about his past. The Assistant Duty Officer who walked with the Cardinal also had the task of taking his dinner up on the embassy's antiquated elevator and making sure the legation was secured before departing for the evening. At that point, the Duty Officer for the day would be already upstairs in the small room outside the communications area, making sure that area was secure. The Cardinal often asked the Duty Officer to help him with what he called "work." This often meant helping to translate something, if one knew Hungarian. The Cardinal had a particular interest in Hungarian agriculture, which he followed avidly by reading a whole series of provincial (Communist newspapers. He had a well-developed expertise of agriculture. And, he might otherwise just want to talk. I remember he taught me some poems, very beautiful poems, in Hungarian. He would talk about Hungarian history and perhaps a little bit about his family – he was very close to his mother. He never said a word about his father who was an ethnic German. Cardinal Mindszenty was born Pehm József, József Pehm. In Hungarian, the last name always comes first.

In any case, serving as vice consul in Budapest was a wonderful experience in another way. I had learned enough Hungarian at FSI to be able to do visa work pretty much entirely in Hungarian. Doing visa work gave me very valuable insights into Hungarian society.

*Q: Did you get any protection or welfare cases?*

GILMORE: A few. We were beginning to have social security cases. The U.S. had a block on social security payments to Hungarians for a long time, but then we changed our policy sometime during my time there, or just before I arrived. So we were beginning to get some social security cases. The chief of the section, Cliff Gross, kept a close eye on those cases. Cliff was a very able boss. He was of Hungarian ancestry and spoke fluent Hungarian. Cliff and our other Vice Consul, Joseph Kecskemethy, who was also born in the U.S. of Hungarian parents, both spoke fluent Hungarian.

But in any case, we had our first social security cases. We also experienced the beginnings of more civil relations with the consular division of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Both sides were very cautious for a while. The biggest problem for the consular section, in many ways, was the notification of travel arrangements. The Hungarians required that we notify them 48 hours in advance, 72 hours in advance on the weekend, of any American official traveling to or through Hungary. The consular section ran a kind of constant notification service with the Hungarian foreign ministry. Of course, it was all reciprocal. We required travel notification from Hungarian officials in the States, although we might not have been as thorough about enforcing it as the

Hungarians. A lot of Hungary was closed to official U.S personnel, and we had closed a lot of the United States to them.

The Hungarians stationed uniformed officers and plain-clothes officers outside the front and side entrances to the legation building 24 hours a day. I remember well that a group of senior citizen American tourists once came to visit the legation. The Hungarian uniformed police jumped out of their cars and had a very good look at everyone in that group when they came back out of the legation. Presumably they wanted to make sure the Cardinal wasn't being smuggled out. I remember one other time when we had been making some communications equipment changes, and we had one very large crate that we needed to take out the side door because it was too large to fit through the front door. The crate could have easily held a person. The Hungarians had quite a standoff with us. They wouldn't let the crate come out the side door unless we simultaneously walked with the Cardinal in the courtyard. We refused to do this at their behest. But I guess they waited until the next day until they had seen Cardinal Mindszenty in the in the courtyard doing his usual walk. Then they let the crate out.

*Q: Did you get any feel for the non-official Hungarians. Were they able to contact you in any way? Did you get any feel for how they felt?*

GILMORE: It was hard. The best way to do it was to be in the consular section. You could talk to the visa applicants. It was also good, sometimes, to talk to the "56ers" as we called them, the Hungarian-Americans, who had escaped from Hungary and gone to the U.S. when the Soviet forces brought an end to the revolution. They were allowed to come back to Hungary to visit, and in that sense the Kadar regime had significantly liberalized travel. The 56ers went to their home villages, or to their home apartment areas in Budapest. We could get quite a bit of firsthand feedback from them. And we also talked with the consular customers. We were careful, at least I was careful, not to appear to pump them, because that could have been a problem also. Our Hungarian Foreign Service national consular staff, which was excellent, was under immense pressure to report to the security service, and we knew that. A couple of them would occasionally wink or gesture to give us an indication that they were particularly under pressure.

*Q: The Hungarian regime was pretty hardline, I take it.*

GILMORE: Yes. Our policy toward Hungary was cautious too. From1965 plus the two years I was there, 1965 to 1967, the Kadar regime was steadily relaxing internally. It was looking toward very significant economic reform, which was very carefully prepared. It was apparently vetted with Soviets, vetted with Khrushchev personally and then with his successors. I think it actually kicked in in 1968 or 1969. I later realized when I served in Moscow from 1969 to 1971, that Hungary was much more relaxed internally than the USSR. There were some very good restaurants in Budapest, and some of the other diplomatic establishments, particularly the Latin Americans and some of the smaller European countries, had somewhat more leeway to fraternize with Hungarians than we. The Hungarian services were clearly watching us carefully. We were under pretty heavy surveillance. If we walked downtown from the legation to get lunch, we were always followed on foot. Very discreetly. We learned from a number of our consular applicants, particularly the Hungarian-Americans who had come back to visit, that they were often stopped five, six blocks from the legation and hauled into a little booth and interrogated and sometimes

given a really good scare.

*Q: Budapest was kind of fun. I went to there, to the Gellert Hotel...*

GILMORE: Oh yes, and they had the wave pool there. It was world famous.

*Q: Went to the wave pool, I got mixed up and I walked into the women's dressing room accidentally.*

GILMORE: They're not too uptight about that, though. And the hotel had a good restaurant.

*Q: Yes, yes... cherry soup.*

GILMORE: [speaks Hungarian] they called it, "cold cherry soup." They also had a cold apple soup. The cuisine at four or five of the Budapest restaurants, the Matyas Pince, the Duna Hotel, the Gellert in the park, the zoo we used to call it, those were first class restaurants by European standards.

*Q: Did you get any feel for how the populace viewed the 1956 revolt?*

GILMORE: A little. The best view I got was maybe from our babysitter. We had by then two small children, and we sometimes employed a babysitter from a babysitting service. Her name was Mrs. Reisner. Occasionally, when I would drive her home after a late night babysitting, she would talk about 1956 in a very careful way. She was horrified by the bloodshed and the force which the Soviet forces used to put down the 1956 revolution. She didn't want that to happen again. She didn't want any more Hungarians out in the street demonstrating against the Soviets. In her own family, her daughter and son-in-law, managed to immigrate to France and were apparently living near Paris. So she had a pretty sophisticated idea of what was going on in the West. By the way, by that time the Hungarians were giving exit visas to the retired parents of Hungarians who had left in 1956, including those who had made their way to the U.S. They were giving exit visas to the retired parents of 56ers. It was a sign of liberalization.

But anyway, it was clear to me that ordinary Hungarians wanted no more of revolution. They saw that Hungary faced limitations. There was no way that they were going to be allowed to be sovereign, fully sovereign. The only other way you could sometimes hear references to 1956 was from the spouse of a Hungarian-American who had come back, gotten married under the Hungarian law and applied for a U.S. immigrant visa. Sometimes the spouses would talk a little bit about the impact of 1956. There were some very well educated young Hungarian women applying for immigrant visas. By the way, the Hungarians had an excellent educational system, still, despite the ravages of the war and 1956. But everybody was careful. It was intimidating for Hungarians to come into the U.S. Legation because of the uniformed police, guards and the goons, as we called the plainclothesmen, who stationed themselves at both entrances. A Hungarian had to have a valid reason to visit the legation. Occasionally we would all be reminded of it. I remember once a Seventh-Day Adventist tried to walk in past the guards. He was a big, tall fellow, not old, but with whitish hair. He might have been in his early fifties. The Hungarian guards grabbed him as he got to the door. He got inside, and when he went back

outside several hours later they were laying for him. They beat the snot right out of him right in front of our building. Carried him away. We were under no illusions.

*Q: How about some of the old regime types? Sort of the old families that went way back, were they apparent or were they gone?*

GILMORE: There were a few, in the sciences. There was one, I think he was called Szentagotai, he was a well-known Hungarian scientist, internationally. He was allowed to travel by himself, but not with his family, to conferences. We had one chap, one of our FSNs, Dr. Szatpali. He was the senior Foreign Service National in the General Services Office; a very cultured man. I don't know how he made his peace with the Hungarian authorities. He was very careful, however, with us inside the legation, not to buddy up or anything else, but to always be very precise and professional. The regime had relaxed quite a bit internally by 1965. It was possible for descendants of aristocratic families to live peacefully provided they were not anti-regime and bought Kadar's slogan, "Who is not against us, is with us." Travel abroad, however, would be a problem if you were in any way perceived as less than loyal to the regime.

I'll give you an example of how our official contacts with Hungarians went. My boss, Cliff Gross, and I left post at virtually the same time. We gave a joint farewell cocktail reception. The only Hungarian whose name I had included on the guest list who attended was the pediatrician of our children, Dr. Rosta Janos. A number of Cliff's contacts from the consular section of the foreign ministry attended. It was very official. Maybe one or two of Cliff's Hungarian relatives, his cousins, came. But it was that limited.

*Q: How often places cultured like Hungary would give a little more leeway within the theater, or something like that...*

GILMORE: Yes, that was true. Budapest had a lively cultural scene featuring concerts, opera and the theater. Of course, only a few of us knew enough Hungarian to go to the theater. My boss Cliff did, and he did go to the theater a few times. There was more freedom in the cultural sphere, yes. And there the heavier hand of ideology was not as apparent. In fact, I would say, in their quiet way, the Hungarians had already gone a long way to de-politicize the arts. Again, nothing explicitly anti-regime would be tolerated, but a rather feisty satirical theater flourished by the mid-1960s.

*Q: Cabaret...?*

GILMORE: Cabaret would be the right word for it. The Hungarians as part of the Austro-Hungarian empire had a long tradition of that. I remember once going to a cabaret production with another person who spoke Hungarian. The subject of the evening was "Kik Oek," "Who are 'They'"? Who are these "they" people? "They" want this, "they" want us not to travel; "they" want us not to go and be friends with the Austrians. It was a very clever production, clearly poking fun at the Communist officials, particularly the more bureaucratic interior ministry types. That kind of stuff was going on in Budapest in the mid-1960s. Do you remember the famous phrase, "Goulash Communism"? It applied particularly focused to the Hungarians, of course, for whom goulash is a major dish. And by the mid-1960s, the Hungarians were eating pretty well

again. I remember one of my very close friends, who had been a 1956 Hungarian refugee, had gone to grad school at Indiana University with me, Charles Gati, quite a distinguished historian of Hungary, and a political scientist. I remember him saying that his father, a lifelong resident of Budapest, would tell him how much better life had become by looking at the kind of cold cuts were available by 1965, 1966, and 1967, that hadn't been available in the immediate post-World War II period. So there were these signs, and if you played by the rules and were very careful, you could do better materially in Hungary than in some of the neighboring Communist countries.

*Q: Did you get any feel about how...all this effort put into training the next generation for being good Communists, and as soon as there is a whiff of freedom, it dissolved immediately. Did you get any feel for people saying, "Oh God, I have to go to another Communist lecture," or something like that?*

GILMORE: Yes, you could hear that. Indeed, you could experience that in various ways. I remember once riding on one of Budapest's many crowded trolley buses. I didn't ride them often because they were so crowded. I got on a trolley bus in down town Budapest, and we were packed in there like sardines. A woman was trying to make her way forward and out and she said, "Please let me through. Why are you treating me this way? I'm a Communist." And the whole trolley bus just broke out into a huge heehaw. They laughed, "Oh, she's a Communist. Who is she? What does she think she is? Keep her in the back." [laughter]

*Q: [laughter]*

GILMORE: Well, actually, they let her get out, let her make her way through. But they just razzed this poor lady unmercifully. But you could see that kind of thing. The Hungarians' humor would come out in that kind of situation. It also came out in other ways. Our consular section FSNs were very much under pressure to report regularly to the authorities. Some of the FSN's had been with us for a long time. They would engage in a kind of an eyebrow raising when they wanted to tell you that there was something extraordinary about a case. I remember particularly an FSNs who was one of the most able FSN's I've ever worked with. Her name was "Lili" Olivia Grusz. Mrs. Grusz tipped me off with gestures and a note that a young Hungarian, a doctor who had recently finished medical school in Budapest who came to the consular section unannounced one morning was a Hungarian-American with a special history. She found it amazing that he had gotten a tourist passport and indicated that there must be a special file on him somewhere in the legation. She strongly urged that we find some way to expedite his case. I looked quickly in our special files in a secure area of the legation, and sure enough, the young doctor was a U.S. citizen who was stranded in Hungary as a child during World War II. And I did something unusual. I issued him a tourist visa, informing Washington after the fact, as I realized this might be his only chance to get to the U.S. He is now a U.S. citizen practicing medicine in Florida, I believe. But I remember Mrs. Grusz because it took real courage on her part to tip us off.

*Q: Did you feel yourself under...were there provocations of people coming and claiming and asking for refuge or something like this, or just trying to find out how you'd respond?*

GILMORE: Yes, we occasionally got a provocation. Or else we'd get something we didn't know whether to judge as a provocation. I remember once a young man came into the consular section

and claimed he was a pilot. He indicated he wanted to defect with a fighter aircraft, and asked for coordinates of airports in Austria and Germany. We looked at his request carefully and decided finally we shouldn't give him any coordinates. I remember he flipped up on my desk a wallet with a number of pictures in it, which purported to be cockpits of various aircraft. We judged him to be a provocation. It may have been wrong. But we had developed a routine for handling "walk-ins," as we often did in Communist countries, because the most interesting sorts of people would walk in and offer their services. We knew that some of our more important sources had made contact initially that way. But by and large, most walk-ins were pretty phony and you could kind of smell the phony ones after a while.

*Q: I know. It was actually before my time, which was from 1962 to 1967, and things were pretty loose in Yugoslavia. But prior to that, our local employees would say, they'd have these guys come in asking questions and saying they were trying to find out what we would do for them. And they all wore blue shirts, which was the uniformed police shirt, and police shoes.*

GILMORE: [laughter]

*Q: [laughter] It's one of those things, it would call attention to these kinds.*

GILMORE: Right. Well, you know, anybody who got past our guards had to have an excuse. Of course, the clever walk-ins always would have an excuse. But some got past too easily. But I must say the Hungarians sent provocations regularly enough that we knew to keep on our toes.

*Q: Were you able to get out in the country at all?*

GILMORE: We did some travel. A chunk of Hungary was closed. Remember, those were the days of closed areas. The Soviet Union set the example and we retaliated by closing a big chunk of the U.S. to them. This was pretty much the case with the Hungarians, too. We did some travel…we got out to Lake Balaton, the "Hungarian Sea," as the Hungarians called it. And we got out to Veszprém once. And I guess we drove down to Kecskemét, which is a city in one of the richer agricultural areas, and Szeged. But, by and large, we didn't travel a lot. For example, I never did get to Hungary's second city, which was Debrecen. I always wanted to. I believe it was an area we could travel to only with special notification, but in any case I just didn't get there. And the country was small enough that most of our consular business, virtually all of it, could be easily done from Budapest. We may well have had some social security travel beginning during the end of my tour.

*Q: Social Security travel was a tremendous thing in Yugoslavia, I was doing it all the time.*

GILMORE: Right. It was an amazing way to see the country.

*Q: And they paid for it. Social security paid for it.*

GILMORE: Right. And Yugoslavia was much more open. I didn't get to Yugoslavia until 1981. But, my goodness...Yugoslavia by comparison with Hungary of 1965-1967 was a Western country.

*Q: How about relations between Austria and Hungary. Had they...*

GILMORE: They were very cleverly managed on both sides. My two Austrian vice-consul counterparts, one replaced the other during my tour of duty, were two of my best contacts. One of them spoke very good Hungarian and was partly of Hungarian origin. The Austrians and Hungarians had a very pragmatic relationship on the trade front. And it was strictly reciprocity on the political front. Tit for tat. I remember once, the Hungarians decided all diplomatic vehicles had to be inspected. The Austrians slapped a diplomatic note on the Hungarians the day after they learned of it. In effect it said, "Alright, All official Hungarian government - owned vehicles in Austria have to be inspected." Well, they then negotiated something between them, so sure enough, the Austrians didn't have to go through the onerous inspection to get their plates that the rest of us did. That kind of thing was typical of the relationship.

There was a fair amount of cultural exchange between Austria and Hungary. And the Hungarian State Opera was at a high enough level that you would occasionally have a guest from the Vienna State Opera singing in Budapest. The problem was money. More typically, the guest soloists at the Budapest opera were from Romania or Bulgaria, both of which have respectable opera companies whose singers did not require payment in hard currency.

*Q: The Bulgarians have some great basso...*

GILMORE: Yes, there is quite a good singing tradition in Bulgaria. But by and large, for the Austrians, money was a problem too. Travel between Austria and Hungary was becoming more frequent and routine. I remember we used to drive ourselves to Vienna. All of us in the legation drove out to Vienna to get supplies, and just get out from under the psychological pressure. I remember once at Hegyeshalom, the border crossing point to Vienna by car, a Hungarian driving a Wartburg was stopped in front of us. The trunk was open, and it was chock full of Hungarian red peppers. I remember the Hungarian border authorities going through it pepper by pepper, to see if anything was hidden among the peppers or if any of the peppers had been doctored in any way. The Wartburg was finally waived through. It took us a while to get through the Hungarian checkpoint because the border officials had to phone back to the foreign ministry to report that American officials were crossing at such and such a time, etc." Once we made it over to the Austrian side, we saw that the Austrian border official just looked quickly at the peppers in disgust and just said, "Go." [laughter]

Later that day when, my wife, Carol and I were shopping in downtown Vienna, we saw Hungarians selling red peppers on several street corners. Obviously they sold the peppers for Austrian shillings and then turned around and bought things that were scarce in Hungary. It is also important to bear in mind that the Soviet military presence in Hungary was very carefully managed after 1956. Soviet soldiers, ordinary soldiers stationed in Hungary, were not encouraged to visit Budapest in uniform if at all. So you saw virtually nothing in Budapest of the Soviet military presence, which was still quite large.

*Q: How about the Soviet embassy? Were they calling the shots?*

GILMORE: Well, I understand that the Soviets send some unusually able chiefs of mission to their embassy in Budapest after the 1956-57 events. These envoys conducted a sophisticated and careful dialog with the Hungarian government. There were other channels, especially party channels, that were very important. Kadar would travel to Moscow, that sort of thing. So there was a fair amount of dialog. I assume the more important dialog was in party channels. I'm sure there were security policy channels and intelligence channels, as well.

*Q: How about Czechoslovakia, was there much love lost between the two would you say?*

GILMORE: There was not a lot. The Hungarians, of course, had the Slovaks under their sway in the dual monarchy after the so-called Ausgleich of 1867. Under Hungarian rule, the Slovaks had been pretty well marginalized educationally and culturally. Also there was still a pretty sizeable Hungarian minority in Slovakia in what the Hungarians called the "Felvidek" (upper territory). Between the Hungarians and Czechs and there were always tensions, rivalry, and no great love lost. Of their other neighbors, the Hungarians had even less love for the Romanians and vice versa. There is a very significant Hungarian minority in Romania, one of the largest in Central Europe. The neighbor the Hungarians felt warmest about was Austria. They also had some warmer feelings for Yugoslavia. But that was also a very tricky relationship. In 1956, Imre Nagy, who was subsequently executed after trumped up charges and a secret trial, was accused of being a Titoist.

And, earlier, Laszlo Rajk, one of the Hungarian "reform communists" had been accused of being a Titoist. So, politically, that was a delicate relationship. Of course, there was a significant Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia, living pretty compactly in Vojvodina. Hungary, after the Treaty of Trianon, had been shorn of much of its territory and population. The rump Hungary, "Csonka Magyarorszag," or truncated Hungary, as Cardinal Mindszenty used to call it, had been shorn, in his view and the Hungarian extreme nationalist view, of its former territories in the Vojvodina, Transylvania, the upper region, the "Felvidek" of Slovakia. So, of all their neighbors, it was the Austrians the Hungarians regarded the most kindly. The Hungarians also remembered how well the Austrians had treated the Hungarian 1956ers who crossed into Austria fleeing the Soviet forces when the 1956 revolution was crushed.

*Q: Was there a feeling that the church had a role any more there?*

GILMORE: Well, it was hard to judge. You know, the Hungarians, unlike some of the other Central European peoples were not 90-some percent Catholic. A very significant Protestant minority, mostly Calvinists, accounted for about 20-21 percent of the population. There was also a very small Unitarian minority, representing one or two percent. Probably two-thirds of the population was nominally Catholic. The Catholic church was in disarray because the Hungarians would not allow the bench of bishops to be replenished while Mindszenty was in the legation. So clergy were dying off. Where you could see the church's continuing influence, for example, was if you went to mass on Sunday, at one of the bigger churches, particularly the Matthias Church, the coronation church overlooking the Danube in Buda.

My wife and I were in Budapest on the Tenth Anniversary of the 1956 Revolution. The Mozart Requiem was sung in the Inner City Church (the Belvarosi Templom), one of the bigger churches

near the left bank of the Danube. The place was packed and the mood was highly emotional. There was standing room only in the crush. You could see that the church, at least culturally, still played an important role. The Matthias Church, which stands on the Buda side of the Danube, on Castle Hill, was the coronation church. To be recognized by Hungarians as the King of Hungary, the Austro-Hungarian emperor had to be crowned with the Hungarian crown in the Matthias Church. It was always full on Sunday and very well maintained. But the Catholic clergy were very cautious about being in contact with us. It was not a cool thing for them to be in touch with foreign diplomats, especially Americans. They would have been called in and questioned, and discouraged from being in touch with foreigners, especially Americans.

*Q: What was the feeling in the embassy that you were getting about Mindszenty? Was this a plus, a minus, or...*

GILMORE: Opinions were divided. A number of Hungarian intellectuals, including in the U.S. and the West thought that Mindszenty was out of touch with current political reality. They thought that he was a representative of the older Hungary, the Hungary of the dual monarchy, the Hungary of emperors and kings. And some of them also thought that he had no understanding of the problems of modern urban societies. And in fact he was basically a country boy. Others thought he was a very important national symbol. The Hungarian government was obviously very concerned that he not get outside the legation without their knowledge. They observed him in the courtyard every evening. They were very concerned about what he was up to, what he was doing. In fact, he had no real contact with the Hungarian population. He had two channels of contact: with his confessor, an elderly priest, and with his sister. His confessor was allowed to come to the legation at fixed intervals to confess him. That was all set up through the foreign ministry. His younger sister, his older sister had died, was allowed to visit him twice a year. She was very much a peasant woman, in her colorful dress, with a little basket on her arm, like Little Red Riding Hood going to her grandmother's. She came and brought him something home - made to eat. They would spend roughly two hours together. That was the extent of his connection with the outside world.

*Q: What was the analysis or thinking within the embassy why the Hungarian regime just said "Go"...*

GILMORE: Well, the regime got him out of the country on terms very much in its interest. He was very reluctant to leave, if truth be known, when he was finally asked to leave by the Holy Father in '71. The Pope asked him to make the supreme sacrifice of his life and leave. Hungary. His position was he would not leave Hungary until he received an official pardon for the show trial of 1948 where the charges against him were all trumped up and he was tortured. In fact his heart was permanently damaged by the torture they put him through. And among other things, he was charged with being an agent of the U.S. He was also charged with womanizing. He was stunned by the womanizing charge. And also didn't like anybody to think he was an agent of the U.S. In his view, he had parishioners in the U.S. in the Catholic Hungarian community there. He had visited the U.S. I believe, after becoming cardinal, and before the Communist takeover in Hungary in 1948.

But, basically the tightly controlled Hungarian media didn't mention his name. Our Hungarian

FSN staff were also very careful not to discuss his case. I subsequently learned from the legation's classified files, that one of our FSNs, the head interpreter of our Defense Attaché Office, Dr. Barna Balogh, had served as the interpreter for part of Cardinal Mindszenty's show trial. I found it eerie to know that Balogh was still employed by the DAO. Balogh was a very capable interpreter and translator and extremely cautious when interacting with the legation staff. It was very clear to me, whatever the Hungarian officials and intellectuals said, that the regime was very worried about Mindszenty leaving the legation and very concerned that he not in any way have any unauthorized contacts with any Hungarian movement or any group of people in Hungary proper.

*Q: Well, it's interesting, because he was a great symbol for the Hungarians in the United States, for example, particularly the Hungarian Catholics, who used him for a fare thee well.*

GILMORE: Oh, yes, and his name evoked positive associations. He came from a village called Csehimindszent. Mindszent in Hungarian means "all saints." So his birth name was József Pehm. His father was an ethnic German and he didn't want that German name, particularly after WWII and the Nazis, so he became József Mindszenty, and his name, József Cardinal Mindszenty, just the name conjured up an Hungarian association with the church, and with the saints. While I was in Budapest his TB, which he had originally come down with during his imprisonment by the Nazis, 1944-45, flared up. It flared up pretty badly. So we had to get an X-ray unit in and get him some special medical attention. And a State Department nurse came to take care of him, from, I think, Belgrade. Her name was Ann Laskaris.

*Q: Yes, I know Ann very well.*

GILMORE: She came up to take care of him.

*Q: And Dr. Linski.*

GILMORE: Yes, Dr. Linski, our Regional Medical Officer attached to our embassy in Belgrade. They came up to take care of him. The interesting thing was that Ann Laskaris noticed that he wasn't sleeping in his bed. She reported he was sleeping on his leather sofa. You could see the imprint of his head and his body, and we found out why. He maintained that as long as Hungary was in the situation it was in, he wasn't going to sleep in a bed. He was going to personally make a kind of sacrifice of his body while this was the case. I mean the Cardinal in his way was deeply nationalistic. Also above his sofa --his office, by the way, was the Benjamin Franklin Room, the ambassador's office now, the biggest office in the legation (embassy). In any case, above his bed was a map of Nagymagyarorszag, Greater Hungary, with present-day Hungary, Trianon Hungary superimposed on it. It reminded him every day what territories had been lopped off from historical Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon. So he was a pretty super nationalist.

*Q: How was the Embassy. How did you find the core of the Embassy?*

GILMORE: We were a pretty capable lot. Most everybody who was responsible for political, economic, or consular work was given Hungarian language training. That motivates one. Also, while service at the legation wasn't known particularly for its importance as a career stepping

stone, by and large, the people on the staff were capable and motivated, and several of them were particularly gifted. The thing I would underline is that the success of the language training. Hungarian is not a simple language. It is very different from Indo-European languages. It's very learnable, but it's quite highly inflected, and very different. It was very well taught at FSI. Anybody who had some language capability and some ability to work, went away from FSI with enough Hungarian to do business. So, in that sense, the legation was a competently run place. Martin Hillenbrand [Ed: serving from October 1967 to February 1969], of course, our first ambassador, was a star. Elim O'Shaughnessy, the last Chargé d'Affaires ad hoc, was in his own way one of the senior observers of the [inaudible]. He had been, I think, deputy chief in the mission at Belgrade, and he always thought, and I think rightly so, that had we made it an embassy before he died, that he'd have been named ambassador. But we just couldn't get to that point.

*Q: You left there in 1967. What was your next assignment?*

GILMORE: Yes, left in the summer of 1967, after about exactly two years. I was assigned to the Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff in the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR/SES). I don't know if you are familiar with that office. It was an unusual arrangement. It was a special staff set up in the department, at that time headed by Boris Klosson, and with Arthur Wortzel as deputy. He subsequently succeeded Boris as director. The office was designed to handle all exchanges with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and countries of Eastern Europe. I inherited the Hungarian and Czechoslovak accounts there. It turned out to be a fascinating time, because the Prague Spring occurred while I was there. One of the places we could see the Prague Spring's effects most directly was the number of Czech and Slovak scientists and scholars who were all of a sudden able to get exit visas. These were people we hadn't seen in the West before. We used to say the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences was emptied out by the time of the actual crackdown on the Prague Spring in August of '68. We had tens of important Czech and Slovak academicians, scientists and scholars, in the U.S., and I knew who all of them were and met with some of them. But the exchanges staff was an interesting place to be. Also I was close to the Czechoslovak desk officer, Helene Batcher, and I read all the cables on the Prague Spring, as we watched it develop, and then watched the Soviets crack down on it. Nevertheless, I learned subsequently that service on the exchanges staff wasn't "career enhancing." It was interesting for me, and of course, my goal had been to become an expert on the Warsaw Pact world, Russia and the Warsaw Pact. The exchanges staff gave me another experience with that part of the world, and I think it was by and large very good. , I became quite close to a couple of people in the Czech embassy, the Czechoslovak embassy. One of them, a very senior fellow, sat in my office after the Soviets had sent the troops in, together with the East Germans, Hungarians and Poles, and decided whether he was going to stay in the U.S. or not. By the way, he decided to remain in Czechoslovakia, and he subsequently became a minister. Of course nobody in Czechoslovakia may have known that he was so close to staying in the U.S. But, otherwise, there was not much else to say about that assignment except that it was what got me to the Soviet Union. The director of the office, Boris Klosson, who subsequently became the DCM in Moscow, suggested that I might want to serve in Moscow, and also suggested that I go on a reimbursable detail to USIA. So I did.

*Q: So, in 1969 you went to Moscow for two years, assigned to the press and cultural section,*

*which was very unusual for an FSO in those days.*

GILMORE: Yes. And it did not help my career, initially.

*Q: I would have thought it would have been really career enhancing.*

GILMORE: In the long run, I think it was. I thought it was very useful. But the first efficiency report I got for being the Assistant Cultural Exchanges Officer in Moscow, the first official reaction I got to my fitness report was a letter which said, "You've been ranked in the lower 15% of your class." Before that I had been always ranked near the top of the class. Nothing had happened. I was doing a good job, working in Russian, by the way. If you were the exchanges officer, by God you were working with Russian, and with ministries, and the academy of sciences in person and on the phone. But the State performance panel may have had difficulty evaluating a USIA efficiency report.

They didn't seem to understand how difficult it was to be the educational and scientific exchanges officer in Moscow. And I made a mistake too. I indicated, where you had the opportunity to write your own little paragraph commenting on the report, that in many ways the work I was doing, if this were an embassy in Western Europe, would have been done by FSNs (locally hired Foreign Service Nationals).

*Q: Yes.*

GILMORE: So what I was trying to suggest was that I had now to operate in Russian in a way that was really challenging. But I think it could have been read both ways. But I think the big problem was that the State promotion board literally did not understand the USIA terminology. I don't think they knew what a "USINFO", a USIA channel telegraphic message was. I think they may not have known what an exchanges officer did. But, subsequently, the job I did was taken over by two people: a science attaché and an exchanges officer. So what I'm saying is I did a lot of work. It seemed to me to be very useful too.

By the way, I got to travel some in the Soviet Union. I had daily contact with Soviet officials. I was at the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of Education all the time. And I actually got to work with real Soviet bureaucrats on a very regular basis. So, I thought it was a great experience.

*Q: So, having been in Hungary, how did you find getting into the Soviet empire?*

GILMORE: It was quite interesting. In many ways, the embassy in Moscow, as a whole, was under a very similar kind of surveillance from the police and the security services as the mission in Budapest, so there was comparability there. Soviet citizens were generally much more cautious even than the Hungarians in being in touch with us. Except the ones that you knew, obviously, were licensed, who were instructed to buddy up with you. Contacts with ordinary people were even harder than in Hungary. Contacts were generally easier outside Moscow and Leningrad. I was lucky because I traveled. The whole press and cultural section traveled frequently because we accompanied American visitors, performing artists. I accompanied several

performing arts groups. We traveled all over the Caucasus; all over the Ukraine; traveled to Leningrad a couple of times. We had students one year in Rostov-on-Don, of all places, and I went down to see them. So, I had a first-hand exposure to the Soviet Union that was as extensive during my two-year tour there. So, in that sense, I traveled more than I did in Hungary, but that was because of my work.

*Q: The exchange program, in many ways, it was really a major instrument for getting the message across and getting contact.*

GILMORE: I agree completely. And it was very skillfully run by Boris Klosson, who as I noted earlier, went on to Moscow to be DCM, and in many ways ran the place, not only as a DCM, but as an intellectual force.

*Q: His name comes up a lot. Could you talk a bit about his background and how you saw him operate?*

GILMORE: Well, I saw him in two places: as the director of the Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff, and as the DCM in Moscow. He spoke fluent Russian, very serviceable Russian. He engaged easily with the Soviets; he could be alternately tough and relaxed. He had good contacts with senior officials. He was also a good manager. He understood the Soviets very well; they couldn't fool him on anything that was happening. He also had a good sense of humor. And he inspired loyalty from the staff. He knew what "loyalty down" meant. When he got to the top he cared about his people; he knew what they were going through. For example, if you were the head of the consular section during his time, you'd get a damned good efficiency report because he knew what you were doing and he knew how important it was and how tough it was. That was the kind of person he was. He subsequently achieved the rank of ambassador as an arms control negotiator. But all those of us who knew him thought he should have been ambassador at least once to an important country, and maybe eventually sent back to Moscow as Ambassador. I think the State Department didn't do itself a favor by not getting him into the ambassadorial ranks.

*Q: Boris Klosson, what happened to him afterwards?*

GILMORE: He went to do work on the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) Delegation, with the rank of ambassador. That's the last I saw of him. He may have done work as a senior inspector after that, but he had an important role in the SALT talks.

*Q: Is he alive, still?*

GILMORE: I believe he is dead. His son was a very distinguished Foreign Service Officer, and served as an ambassador.

*Q: By being at the embassy at the time, did you feel that you were on the "A Team"?*

GILMORE: Had I been there in a State position, a typical Foreign Service Officer position, I would have felt more like it. A number of my State colleagues at the embassy would come up to

me and say, "Are you a foreign service officer?" I said, "Yes." "Why are you with USIA?" "Well, I'm on reimbursable detail. I'm doing exchanges work." And they would say, "Oh, you made a mistake. You should be working in one of the State positions." And they would say things about USIA, some of them, that showed they didn't know what we were doing, and they thought we had no real substantive work to do. Of course, anybody who had worked on exchanges or tried to run an exhibit in the Soviet Union would have known it was immensely hard work.

*Q: Yes, it was so important.*

GILMORE: It was crucial. If we wanted to retaliate, for example, if we wanted to cancel some high visibility activity because we were angry with the Soviets politically, you could stop an important high-level exchange or hold it up and send a signal. It was used frequently as a kind of a political tool, the exchanges program. But only some of my colleagues realized that. By the way, my boss in Moscow, McKinney Russell, was a very distinguished USIA officer. Went to the very top of USIA.

*Q: Yes, I interviewed McKinney (and his oral history is on the ADST website)*

GILMORE: And a superb speaker of Russian, and student of the Soviet Union and Russia.

*Q: But it really does show this cultural divide between the State Department and USIA. And I've come from the State Department stable, but I must say that so often the work of USIA got you out and meeting people, if it's the cultural side and the press, and also provided valuable management experience*

GILMORE: Right. When I got to Belgrade as DCM, my USIA experience turned out to be very valuable because in Yugoslavia we had a huge USIA presence with the American centers. You are right, and the Moscow assignment gave me an in-depth exposure to Soviet officialdom. That experience proved of considerable benefit when as U.S. Minister and Deputy Commandant of the American Sector of Berlin I dealt extensively with senior Soviet officials.

*Q: Tell me about some of these trips that you made and groups that you shepherded around.*

GILMORE: Well, for example, I escorted the University of Illinois Jazz Band, which was one of the exchange program participants. Officers in the Press and Cultural sections took turns as escort officer. I escorted half of the band's tour of the Soviet Union. They were very good jazzmen. They were grad students, and many of them were Army vets who were back in university. Cecil Bridgewater, for example, the trumpet and Flugelhorn player, and his wife, Dee Dee Bridgewater, became well known jazz musicians. One got to see real people when one traveled out in the boondocks, even though the Soviet security officials, including the interpreters that were sent with us, tried to keep our groups isolated from ordinary citizens. They couldn't. That kind of group was too much of a magnet. So you got a chance to see another part of Soviet society. Also, you got a chance to work with the Soviet State Concert Agency, the Goskontsert interpreters. They were all carefully chosen. You were with them day and night for three weeks in a row, including at meals, and you got to see how the Soviet Union actually functioned. During the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in 1972, when I had already left the embassy in Moscow

and was teaching at the Naval Academy, my next assignment, I was asked to escort a chamber music group on its tour of the USSR. The group was composed of the Composers String Quartet from New York, the New York Woodwind Quintet, and a stringed bass player. They were top flight American chamber musicians. We played in six cities during the Nixon-Brezhnev summit, the three Caucasus capital cities, and Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. We were taken very good care of, particularly during the summit, because there was an effort to promote a sense of warmth in U.S.-Soviet relations. When we got to Moscow, for example, we suddenly were in touch with a whole series of people from the Bolshoi Orchestra meeting with our clarinetist and oboist. The same thing occurred in St. Petersburg now, then Leningrad. So we got a chance to look more deeply into Soviet cultural life. Also, I got to travel to the three capitals of the Caucasus. I subsequently became the first U.S. ambassador to Armenia in 1993, and it was an advantage to have visited Soviet Armenia years earlier.

When I was the exchanges officer, working for USIA in Moscow, I visited Rostov-on-Don. We had to travel in pairs. We had three graduate students down there - a couple, and then a single student. We'd never had students in Rostov before. It was a rough, tough port city with one of the worst crime rates in the USSR. We didn't know the full extent of it then, because crime was pretty well covered up in the former Soviet Union. But I saw Rostov through the eyes of the American graduate students who were literally struggling to survive down there. The embassy officer who traveled with me, Robert Peck, Bob Peck is now dead – we wrote up some telling reports on that trip.

*Q: What were the students doing there?*

GILMORE: They were graduate students. One was working on getting a Ph.D. in Russian language and literature; another was doing research for his doctoral thesis for a Ph.D. in history. They were assigned to different university faculties. Typically, the only places where long-term exchange students were placed were Moscow and Leningrad state universities. But the Soviets had expanded the program to include Rostov and Voronezh state universities. That experiment lasted only one year. What I'm saying is, the insights you got from working on exchange programs with the Soviet Union were very, very special, and in a closed society such insights were rare.

*Q: But, didn't you, over a couple glasses of vodka, get into heart-to-heart talks and all?*

GILMORE: I was careful, partly because of the danger of provocations. But when escorting performing arts groups you could have a little more of that. In the first place, you and the Goskontsert escorts were out together for two, three weeks. Typically, the head escort on the Soviet side was a fellow in his 50s who had been around, been through WWII. One could drink with some of those escorts. I remember a fellow by the name of Drozdov. I got to know him pretty well. He was guarded and we didn't get into current politics; but we could talk about WWII. He would say positive things about Lend-Lease; he would say humorous things too. The Soviets, for example, called Spam "The Second Front", because they said, "The Americans won't open another front in the West, they'll just send Spam." But you could have more contact and more in-depth contact with Soviet officials when traveling than in Moscow, where the police blanket was all over you.

*Q: Did you get any feel at this time of divisions within Soviet society? That places like the non-Russian republics were just not part of, or weren't going to be part of the Soviet empire, if they had a chance?.*

GILMORE: Well, only hints. One place I got it, of all places, was in Armenia, when I was escorting the chamber music group. When U.S. ensembles performed in the Soviet Union, they had to have their programs pre-approved by the state concert agency. They didn't want performing arts groups to perform any music that they didn't know about in advance. The chamber music groups had three pre-approved programs, and when we sat down with the Armenian State Concert Agency, the escort from the state concert agency in Moscow said, "This is what our guests are going to play." But the representative for the Armenian agency, said, "Wait, you are in Soviet Armenia, and we will decide what our guests are going to play here." So he basically just faced down the Soviet central concert agency's tour manager.

Georgia and Armenia seemed clearly more relaxed than Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev culturally. We had a post-concert party in Georgia featuring new Georgian wine from that year's harvest, and the Georgian officials who attended were a little more relaxed and open than those in Moscow and Leningrad. But the most interesting experience was at the cathedral in Armenia. Etchmiadzin is the seat of the Catholicos, the universal bishop, the head of the Apostolic Church. It is a short drive from the capital, Yerevan. We went there briefly on a Sunday morning. The service of the Divine Liturgy was underway and we observed that the singing was of a very high quality. We asked our hosts why, and they said, "Well, some people from the Opera sing at the church." Well, that would not have happened in Moscow or in Leningrad. If you were an important opera star in Moscow in the 1970s, the last place you could be seen was singing in a church. It would be considered beyond the pale, considered a kind of an anti-regime gesture. So, we saw little differences like that. We could see that cultural nationalism was one way that the Armenian and Georgian republics could show their special Armenian-ness or Georgian-ness.

*Q: Did you get any, I think of Armenian composers and all that...were you able to delve into that at all?*

GILMORE: Well, several people in the group were fans of Aram Khachaturian, and we did visit his museum in Yerevan. But we were still, when we got into our hotels for the night, whether they were in Baku, Tbilisi, or Yerevan, we were still under control. If the participants left the hotel it would be noted. One exception to that was with the University of Illinois Jazz Band in Leningrad. Turns out there was quite an underground jazz scene in Leningrad, and several Soviet jazz enthusiasts just took a couple of guys from our trumpet section home. I didn't know where they were for a while. In fact, one of them picked up a venereal disease. Which was an interesting thing. He mentioned it to me, when we returned to Moscow. I had the doctor at the embassy look at him, and sure enough, it was a venereal disease. But, basically, there were just hints like that, that there was another kind of cultural and social life going on that we at the embassy weren't a part of.

*Q: Did you get a chance to play the piano with these groups?*

GILMORE: Not really, although my musical background helped me with the music groups. But what I did do in Moscow, with my wife as a professional singer, singing in the British ambassador's choir, was occasionally to accompany the choir. There was a British student at the Moscow Conservatory, a pianist, who was better than I, and he did more than I did. But being an occasional accompanist opened doors for me with the musicians. For example, I remember David Glazer, who was the clarinetist with the New York Woodwind Quintet. He and I hit it off because we could talk music, and when he did make contact with some important clarinet players from the Moscow Bolshoi Orchestra, he included me as the interpreter. So, it was that kind of enhancement. And also, with the Composers String Quartet, Matthew Raimondi, the lead violinist, and the second violinist, Anahid Ajemian, and I became good friends. We talked music, and when we met Mrs. (Lina) Prokofieva [Ed: wife of Sergei Prokofiev] who came to their concert in Moscow. Mrs. Prokofieva was a gracious and charming person. - they brought me right in and again I interpreted. So there was an advantage to being a musician. [Ed: For a general description of U.S. cultural programs see: Wilson P. Dizard, Jr., Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2004), especially Chapter Nine and pages 192-195.]

*Q: Who was the ambassador when you were there?*

GILMORE: Jacob Beam [Ed: who served from April 1969 to January 1973]. Boris Klosson was the DCM.

*Q: Now did Beam, was he culturally interested in these things, or was he mainly political?*

GILMORE: He was a career Foreign Service officer, a very shy man personally, very disciplined, with long experience in German and Communist world affairs. He had a dynamite wife, Peggy Beam. She kept Spaso House, the residence, lively with films with subtitles, or films dubbed into Russian with English subtitles. She kept him in touch with the cultural scene, and he encouraged this because he knew what kind of an asset she was. Otherwise, he was very kind, and very courtly, but not a particularly gregarious or outgoing person. But you always knew that he had long experience, and knew where he was. He was also a bit unhappy because Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor at that time, was making some contacts with senior Soviet officials that weren't always shared with the embassy.

*Q: Well, he would appear in Moscow without letting the ambassador know.*

GILMORE: Yes, and it was hard for Beam because he was used to being in every loop. He was a very disciplined and loyal person; it wouldn't have been a problem to bring him in. But I remember before the Nixon-Brezhnev summit, when Nixon came to Moscow, Ambassador Beam did not feel that he was fully kept abreast of developments and preparations.

*Q: Well, this is sort of a nasty side of this. One almost has the feeling that Kissinger, particularly in this early time, was playing the sort of the Iago to Nixon's Othello, or playing on...*

GILMORE: Yes, when Kissinger became Secretary of State, I think it changed a bit. Now I follow him as a columnist, and he's a tremendous national asset in terms of his understanding of

foreign affairs. But you are right, he was operating very much close to the vest, and he was literally cutting the senior State Department people and the top State Department leadership out at that point. I guess Secretary Rodgers was not in the loop on a number of things.

*Q: What was your impression of...did you get involved in the Nixon-Brezhnev summit [May 22-30, 1972]?*

GILMORE: I left Moscow in July 1971, so I was only there with the Chamber music groups. I was the escort, so I was not involved. Subsequently, when Brezhnev came to the States, I was one of the captive audience, on the eighth floor of the State Department when they had a signing ceremony...but, no, I wasn't involved.

*Q: Well then, in the summer of 1971, where did you go?*

GILMORE: I was assigned to INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research) to be an analyst on the Eastern European side. But before I could get unpacked, my assignment was changed to the U.S. Naval Academy as an exchange officer from summer of 1971 to until late May, early June of 1973. I had literally a month's notice to get up there and start teaching courses. I spent two academic years, twenty months, as an exchange officer and a member of the Political Science Faculty. It was a fascinating assignment in its own way.

*Q: What was your impression of the Naval Academy and its educational system?*

GILMORE: I had not known much about it. It impressed me as being pretty strong. It had one aspect that differed from the traditional education system at West Point: the Naval Academy faculty was a combination of civilian and military, and I was assigned to the political science department. It was mostly civilian, including some very good scholars and teachers. The midshipmen were by and large quite bright. They handled a heavy combination of academic and military-related, Navy-related courses.

*Q: Had things changed? Were people still all getting out with a degree in electrical engineering?*

GILMORE: Well, they were all getting the equivalent of an engineering degree at that time, but they were also allowed to have a double major, if they had good enough grades. So, a number of midshipmen would have a second major. For example, you'd get somebody with a combination in engineering and political science, or engineering and English. First and foremost, midshipmen were expected to acquire a solid engineering background. He had to be able to pilot a ship, or supervise people that did if you were headed for the surface fleet, or you had to qualify as a pilot if you were going to be in Naval aviation. But, those who were strong enough to qualify for a double major had a tremendous advantage later in their career because they could move up to "joint" positions. If they did well in their initial military assignments, billets, as the Navy would call them, they would then be high on the list to attend the war colleges. So there was a faster track for the very bright.

*Q: What sort of subjects were you teaching?*

GILMORE: I taught a course that I partially designed myself, called "Communism in Theory and Practice." And I taught a course in Soviet politics which focused heavily on political-military relations in the USSR. The course I taught least well was a course in American government, which I wasn't prepared for when they just threw me into the breach my first semester. But my time at the Naval Academy was a good time for me because I learned to teach. I hadn't really ever taught before. It's not easy. The other thing good about it was that I had to try to explain to bright, young midshipmen who had very little background, what the Soviet system was like and how it operated. Communism in Theory and Practice was a comparative course, I particularly compared the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. I didn't get into China much due to the limited time available. But I spent a lot of time on Lenin's theory of imperialism, explaining how Communism might be attractive as an ideology in the Third World, which it was, and how Lenin's theory of imperialism seemed to explain a lot of things to people in the Third World. It was exciting. At one point I missed a month, because as I noted earlier, the Department asked me to be the escort officer for the chamber music groups touring the USSR during the Nixon-Brezhnev summit. But otherwise, I spent twenty months, including one summer, at the Naval Academy. During the summer I prepared my upcoming courses and took two courses myself at George Washington University. It was a good way to recharge my batteries.

*Q: Did you find, in teaching the midshipmen, that they had come from a rather simplistic view of the Soviet Union and all, and you were sort of opening up the window...?*

GILMORE: In some cases yes, but others were very interested in learning much more about the USSR and Communism. In fact, one midshipman got so interested in Lenin's theory of imperialism that I was worried that he was going to come to believe parts of it. He was very bright. Most of the midshipmen are carefully chosen, and they are very bright. They not only have a good background in math and science, physics and engineering, but they are just plain smart. So it was a mixed picture. You know, I had to pitch the class to the midshipmen who were more oriented toward engineering, but I found very quickly that four or five students in each section -- each section would be 18, 19, maybe 20 midshipmen -- were as bright as any students you'll find anywhere. Some of them were as bright as anybody going to Harvard or Yale.

*Q: Did you, you know, teaching that course, feel under any pressure of oversight, or anything?*

GILMORE: No. It was amazing. I did not. I did not. And the Political Science Department faculty also wrote a book on civil military relations, I think that was the title of it, and I was asked to write the chapter on civil military relations in the Soviet Union. The book was published and became a textbook for specialized courses. So, it was a good assignment, and it gave me a different kind of experience. The hardest thing was travel to and from Arlington. We had moved into our house and there was no housing available for me at the Naval Academy in Annapolis because my assignment came up so late. So I had to drive up there four days a week.

I used to go very early in the morning. But I learned quickly to tape my notes for my classes. I'd read them into the tape recorder the night before, put the tape recorder on the front seat of the car beside me, and listen to my notes on the way up. On the way home, I always listened to classical music, WGMS, once I got close enough to Washington to receive it. But it was a very interesting

year. Our third child was born during that year, and I was able to be home with him a little more because I was at the Naval Academy only four days a week. I was able to help my wife and enjoy the arrival of a new baby more than I would have had I been at Main State ten or eleven hours a day.

*Q: One of the sayings that the Navy puts out is, "There's a right way, a wrong way, and the Navy way." How did you find the Naval atmosphere there?*

GILMORE: Well the traditional Navy culture does seem kind of heavy-handed to outsiders. But, you know, most midshipmen adjusted to it readily. They also adjusted to the civilian faculty and the courses that were taught by civilians. By the way, history, English, and political science were all considered "Bull" courses, Navy lingo for "bullshit." You supposedly can bullshit your way through a test or exam in these courses. But basically, the midshipmen adjusted very well to both kinds of teacher. But I'm confident that the civilian faculty was very important to the development of these naval officers because insularity was a big problem for the Navy. That's changed. By the way, when I subsequently became dean of State's Senior Seminar, the star of the course in many ways was a Naval Officer. His political science background was not extensive, but it was more than adequate. He had the best brain in the class.

*Q: Admiral Crowe was an outstanding example of that. [Ed: Admiral William James Crowe, Jr. (January 2, 1925 – October 18, 2007) served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, and as the ambassador to the United Kingdom under President Bill Clinton.]*

GILMORE: Exactly. I haven't been able to follow the officer in the last couple of years, but if he's not a rear admiral by now, I'm surprised.

*Q: You were there when sort of the end game of the Vietnam War was beginning to play out. Did Vietnam and Vietnamese Communism play much of a role?*

GILMORE: We talked about it a bit in the Communism Theory and Practice course, but not as much as we might have. This was partly because I wasn't very knowledgeable about Vietnam and partly because the midshipmen were getting a huge dose of Vietnam from the military side. The interesting thing was to the degree Vietnam did come up, the midshipmen in my Communism Theory and Practice course had had a more independent view of it than you might think. Of course, they were with me, a civilian, and we were in a closed classroom. But, they became well aware of the antiwar protests. And of course, some of them didn't like the fact that the military was asked to do something that many the country didn't really support. It was interesting to me. These were 18-, 19-, 20-year old midshipmen, and already they were seeing that.

*Q: At that time, the Soviet Union had put tremendous resources into building what was called a Blue Water Navy. It was very impressive. They had some really beautiful and very capable war ships. Did that translate itself into your Communist course at all?*

GILMORE: No, what I focused on in my course on civil-military relations in the Soviet Union

was how the Communist party and, at and different times in Soviet history the secret police, controlled the military, how their control mechanisms worked. We studied the role of the political leader in the officer corps in the indoctrination of the troops. We also studied how NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, or Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del) or KGB (Committee for State Security, or Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti) officers would spot and control potential deserters. We didn't talk much about the military strategy of the Soviet Navy. But the midshipmen studied that in other classes. And of course, as we all thought at that time, the Soviet Union loomed a little larger and was seen as more capable than we subsequently found it to be.

*Q: Harry, before we leave the Naval Academy, did you find sort of almost a sports competition between Army and Navy? Did that spill over into Army being them, and Navy being us?*

GILMORE: That was the key competition, and it was football, the Army-Navy football game. I had a couple of football players in my classes. It was interesting; the powers that be, from the commandant on down, did not want the football players to fail. But they didn't want instructors to break any rules. They did want you to provide special instruction, SI as they called it. So, if you had a football player in your class, you were expected to make sure, that if he got into any kind of grade trouble, he got special instruction. I had one football player, I remember well. He was a bright enough guy, but he couldn't study much during football season. He was carrying a C and I made sure that if he needed special instruction that he got it from me. He was actually capable of B+, even A, if he had just had more time to study. Otherwise, the grounds of the Naval Academy would be properly decorated, shall we say, and there were enthusiastic pep-rally types of events before the Army-Navy game each year.

*Q: But I was wondering beyond that, did you get the feeling as being an outsider, that the Navy was inculcating in these midshipmen the idea that there's a Navy, there's an Army way, and there's the Air Force way, and sort of not trying to bridge the gap between, particularly the Army and the Navy?*

GILMORE: It's interesting. As I noted earlier, the Naval Academy, uniquely among the military academies, had a mixed civilian and a military faculty. They were permanent, the civilian faculty members, Ph.D. holders, in almost all cases. There was a conviction on the part of the civilian faculty that part of their duty was to end the insularity of the Navy. And there was also a strong feeling on the part of some of the military leaders of the academy that the Navy should not be as elitist as in the past. I'm almost tempted to use the word "aristocratic" rather than elitist.

You know, the surface fleet Navy had a long tradition of employing Filipino stewards. In fact, during my first year there were still some Filipino stewards left in Bancroft Hall, which was the cafeteria. That was breaking down, though. Among the midshipmen there would be only a small number who came from old Navy families; only a small number who would be gung ho about that tradition. It was changing. But the emphasis on jointness planning, fighting jointly as they would call it, was much stronger when I got to the Army War College as Deputy Commandant for International Affairs, in 1991-1992. So the difference between 1971-1973 and 1991-1992 was light years.

That being said, since the Army had emphasized jointness much earlier than the Navy, I can't say that comparing the Army War College and the Naval Academy is a completely accurate barometer of what was happening. That being said, when I was detailed to the Army War College I played in some war games at the Naval War College and other places. I could see the change in the Navy by the 1990s. But the Navy was still pretty traditional. I might add another point that I think is relevant. As I mentioned earlier, when I ran the Senior Seminar in my last year in the Foreign Service, perhaps the ablest of a very able group of military officers assigned to the course was a Naval officer. I have to be careful here because there were six members of the armed services in the seminar, and five of them were as capable as any of our State Department people.

*Q: You left the Naval Academy in 1973 and went on to what assignment?*

GILMORE: Well, it's funny. I was assigned to be the Hungarian Desk Officer, but when I reported to work, I was actually assigned to be the Yugoslav Desk Officer. I went to the Yugoslav desk in May of 1973, at the very end of May. The Naval Academy academic year ended early, and I'd had dispensation to study the summer between my two academic years at the Naval Academy, so I owed it to the Department to come aboard early. So I began my assignment as Yugoslav Desk Officer in May 1973. I took over from Herb Kaiser, who was an excellent mentor. As I said, I was originally supposed to be the Hungarian desk officer. I knew Hungarian pretty well and had served in Budapest, but I ended up doing the Yugoslav desk to my great satisfaction over time.

*Q: You were working on the Yugoslav desk from 1973 to when?*

GILMORE: Until the summer of 1975, when I went to Munich. So, two years, and a little bit.

*Q: When you arrived on the Desk in the Office of Eastern European Affairs of the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR/EE), what was the situation in Yugoslavia?*

GILMORE: I knew something of Yugoslav history, because I'd had an excellent Balkan history course with Charles Jelavich at Indiana University. But I didn't know the country yet on the ground. Seen from the desk when I first came aboard, U.S.-Yugoslav relations were pretty durable and very active. There was a strong interest on both sides in maintaining the relationship. The U.S. was very much interested in preserving the independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. It was in our geopolitical interest that Yugoslavia, as an independent non-aligned Communist country, not part of the Warsaw Pact, and not about to be part of it, do well, relative to the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Yugoslavia was an example of diversity in the Communist world. It exerted a kind of magnetism on some intellectuals in Hungary and Poland. Yugoslavia was a model of how a country could be different from Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies and still be, as they would say, Socialists. We would say Communist.

There were difficulties too. The Yugoslavs were very, very preoccupied with anti-Yugoslavia Croatian- and Serbian-American groups that, in their view, were prone to terrorist acts. In fact, there were a number of cases of bombings and attempted bombings of Yugoslav diplomatic and consular establishments in North America – the U.S. and Canada, by both Serbian and Croatian

extremists. The Yugoslavs were preoccupied with threats from these groups, and that was a tough issue to handle. It was also a time when we were expanding our presence in Yugoslavia through the establishment of America centers, which were USIA American centers in the individual Yugoslav republics and the autonomous provinces of Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo. USIA went out of its way to pick able officers to staff those centers. The Yugoslavs were receptive. We also maintained, intermittently, a dialog with Yugoslavia about the non-aligned movement.

Let me back up. The dialog was not focused on the non-aligned movement, per se, but on issues of concern to the non-aligned movement, which was pretty sophisticated and pretty mature. The Yugoslavs leadership cared deeply about the non-aligned movement, and sometime went along with the non-aligned consensus when it didn't seem consistent with their interests. But we had maintained dialog on a number of issues. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Sisco, would see the Yugoslav Ambassador from time to time, and the Assistant Secretary of European Affairs saw him fairly often.

*Q: Who was that?*

GILMORE: It was at one time, Art Hartman. A very able officer. Arthur Hartman. Hartman I remember particularly. I had great admiration for him. [Ed: The assistant secretaries of European affairs during this period were: Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. (August 1972-January 1974), Arthur A. Hartman (January 1974-June 1977).] Also, the deputy assistant secretaries of European Affairs saw the Yugoslav ambassador on a very regular basis. But the U.S.-Yugoslav relationship was not an easy one. You had to work at it.

*Q: Given the strength of, say, the Croatian community and to a lesser extent, the Serbian, both these expatriate communities in the United States, which have settled in Cleveland, Chicago, and to a certain extent in the West Coast...*

GILMORE: There was an important Croatian community in Pittsburgh, but it was an older community which was not hostile to Yugoslavia, and more established, not as radical.

*Q: But, given that, and then the politics, I'm talking about American politics with Congress, did you find yourself having problems with this?*

GILMORE: Well, it was a very delicate thing to be talking to the Yugoslav counselor for consular affairs, who was the expert at the embassy on émigré extremist groups. He was the number three officer, by the way. One had to be conscious of the sensitivities on the Hill of some congressmen and senators that their Croatian- and Serbian-American constituents' rights might in some way be undermined. On the other hand, one had to be very careful too with the representatives of some of these émigré groups when they would come to meet with us. They would often deliberately misrepresent to the émigré press what they heard. In fact, I quickly learned to have another officer with me when I received people from the more extremist Croatian and Serbian groups, because they told fibs about what was said. I would make it very clear that our policy was recognition of the unity and the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, etc. And then I'd see in the newspapers like Danica, a Croatian newspaper in Chicago, I'd see an item distorting what I'd said. In effect, Danica would report that the U.S. was on the side of Croatian

separatism. I had to watch carefully.

Several members of Congress had sizeable constituencies of Serbian and Croatian Americans, and their offices took a close interest in U.S.-Yugoslav relations. Occasionally, I would receive calls from staff aides of some of these senators and representatives. Of course there were some congressmen, like Ed Derwinski -- he was of Polish heritage -- who would be interested in principle in promoting positive relations with all the countries of Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia. So we also had some support on the Hill from people who were more knowledgeable and more balanced. There was considerable support on the Hill for a positive, nuanced policy toward Yugoslavia.

*Q: Did you have any arrests of Croatian or Serbian-Americans, who went and messed around or somehow got in trouble in Yugoslavia?*

GILMORE: The extremists we were working with the FBI on were here in the States. They were the few extremists. I want to be very careful not to sound anti-Croatian or anti-Serb. I deeply respect both peoples and their cultures. I had, by the way, a Croatian-American uncle who was a splendid human being, whose family was the last thing in the world from terrorists. But, there were some cases where we were able to trace suspects responsible for bombings or attempted bombings of Yugoslav consular and UN permanent representative facilities. We were working with the FBI very closely, and a very enterprising FBI officer began to work on applying the RICO statute (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) to some of these groups, which he did successfully. [Ed: The RICO Act is a United States federal law that provides for extended criminal penalties and a civil cause of action for acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization.] But at this point in time, I can't remember whether the real successful steps were taken when I was desk officer or when I came back to the Office of Eastern European Affairs a few years later as deputy director. In both cases, I was very much involved with U.S.-Yugoslav relations. It was during my time as desk officer that the U.S. Government got very serious about these issues. This was partly because Ambassador Malcolm Toon in Belgrade was somebody whom nobody would ever accuse of being anything except the most patriotic American who had an ambassadorial flag. And he would say, "C'mon, we can do better on this." So we had that kind of support. And also the officers me in the Department, from Undersecretary for Political Affairs Sisco and others on down, didn't want to see any of this terrorist activity continue either. In some cases, where Yugoslavia had a consulate -- for example, they had a consulate in Pittsburgh and one in L.A., and a consulate and a UN mission in New York -- some of the officials in charge lived in dread of possible terrorist acts. I remember when I went to Belgrade some years later as deputy chief of mission, I met some of the spouses of Yugoslav officials who, during my time as desk officer, had been stationed in the U.S. The spouses generally had positive memories of the U.S., except on this issue.

*Q: Were there any particular issues this first time, 1973 – 1975 that we were concerned with?*

GILMORE: There was another issue that I couldn't and didn't do anything about at the time, although we did do something about it later. I believe very strongly that ultimately we did the right thing by extraditing him, although it was controversial among Croatian-Americans. That was the Artukovic case.

*Q: Oh, God.*

GILMORE: Andrija Artukovic would have come to the States shortly after WWII, probably in 1948. He entered the States illegally, in all probably. He'd been one of those Croatian Ustashe leaders who probably had escaped Europe via the Vatican Ratlines. He'd been the interior minister in the wartime Independent State of Croatia. From all we could tell from historical records, he had been one of the Croatian officials who oversaw the Jasenovac concentration camp. Jasenovac was, by concentration camp standards, a beauty, where many ethnic Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies (both Roma and Sinti) had been done in, tortured and murdered. He'd gotten into the U.S. illegally, with an assumed name as I remember. He was living on this brother's estate in the greater Los Angeles area. There had been an extradition request by Yugoslavia -- I don't remember the dates, probably in the 1950s. His extradition had not been granted, and he was under a stay of deportation. He had no status, he had no green card. Periodically, State would get a request from the Justice Department whether we saw any reason to change his stay of deportation, whether there were any political developments which affected the case? I remember I looked into the case and discussed it with one of my superiors. I was troubled by it, because it looked to me like there was no question that Artukovic was responsible for mass murder. In any case we didn't do anything about it then except to indicate to the Justice Department that there was no fundamental change in the political situation. But I had a pang of conscience that would repeat itself periodically until some years later. I'll come to that later in my debriefing. But in any case, the Artukovic case came up when I was the desk officer and I remember it clearly was an important matter.

*Q: I had my nose rubbed in it for five years, from 1962 to 1967 as Consul General in Belgrade?*

GILMORE: Exactly. They were very sensitive about it. I assume that the reason for the stay of deportation was we felt that he could not get a fair trial in a Communist country.

*Q: Well, I think it was more than that....*

GILMORE: Well, there may have been more to it than that. Still, I believe that legally a judge stayed his deportation.

*Q: But I think that the real thing was that his brother was a wealthy contractor and contributed particularly to the Republican party.*

GILMORE: Well, there were certainly political strings attached to the case, no question. As I understand it, as we looked at the case back then -- it must have been in 1974 or 1975 -- we looked at the cases as the Justice Department requested and I examined the file. It was clear that Artukovic was living on his brother's estate near Los Angeles. He wasn't involved in any kind of émigré activity that we could tell, he was keeping his head down. But I think his wealthy brother, as you said, had provided for him very well, materially. We checked with the local police in California. There were guard dogs behind a large metal fence and that sort of thing.

Otherwise, just servicing the embassy in Belgrade was a heavy job, with Malcolm Toon as

Ambassador. We had a series of good career ambassadors in Belgrade. Just keeping them informed, running down the various issues, bird-dogging the issues they wanted to expedite was a lot of fun and work.

*Q: Was there much thinking on your part and others about "... after Tito, what?"*

GILMORE: Yes, there always was, and in fact, you remind me that there was a post-Tito contingency study that was prepared during that period. Actually, the Office of Policy Planning (S/P) was responsible for it. Then there was another contingency study later when I was deputy director of the office. But people like Ambassador Toon felt pretty strongly that the likelihood of Yugoslavia falling apart in the post-Tito period, at least in the immediate post-Tito period, was not as great as some anticipated. Tito's health during the mid-1970s was still pretty good. He was still active, he was still traveling all over Yugoslavia as he always did. He'd have meetings with the party leader in Vojvodina Province, in Kosovo Province, with the Serbian party and the Croatian party. He was pretty vigorously in charge, so "after Tito, what?" wasn't as acutely or as frequently discussed as it was later. By later, I mean during my second go 'round with Yugoslavia, as Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European and Yugoslav Affairs, 1978-81, and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Belgrade, 1981-85. By the time I became Deputy Chief of Mission in Belgrade he was dead. But during my time as Deputy Director, it became a much more acute issue, especially when Tito's health did fail, when his diabetes flared up and he had to have a leg removed and then, shortly thereafter, died.

*Q: Were we concerned about other Communist countries messing around in Yugoslavia, or the Soviet Union?*

GILMORE: We watched for that. It was pretty clearly the judgment of our embassy, a judgment which by the way I came to share, particularly once I served in Yugoslavia as Deputy Chief of Mission, that after Tito the Yugoslavs were going to try to cooperate as closely as they could economically with us and the USSR. But when it came to any kind of Soviet meddling in Yugoslavia, they weren't going to have any truck with it. And meanwhile the Yugoslavs did something that we considered very important strategically. In retrospect, it looks just as important as I thought it was then. The Yugoslavs gave no special access to Soviet aviation or the Soviet fleet: no special advantage to them that they did not also give to us. Each of us so-called super powers had the same number of ship visits a year to Yugoslav ports. Very often the Soviet Union would send more ships per visit because they had fewer places to go in the Med, with the Mediterranean Flotilla, drawn from the Soviet Black Sea fleet. But our ships visited Yugoslav ports regularly. The Soviets were not given any special overflight rights. Period. The Yugoslavs were very zealous about that.

And we had a relatively good relationship with the Yugoslav Army. It was not as close as we had in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when there was a perceived Soviet threat, and when we sold Yugoslavia F-84s and F-86s. But we had a good relationship. We would sell certain reasonably sensitive military components to the Yugoslav forces. The process of deciding what we would sell was very carefully controlled, politically. That was one of the things the desk officer had to work hard on. It was in the U.S. interest that the Yugoslav Air Force be capable enough to present a credible defensive deterrent to hostile power which thought to play games. We also

were open to military-military relationships involving some training of Yugoslav officers. It was delicate. Of course an activist ambassador like Malcolm Toon would be very interested in that. We had very able military attachés in Belgrade in my time.

*Q: Well, in summer 1975, whither?*

GILMORE: I was posted to the Consulate General in Munich, to one of the most beautiful posts in the Foreign Service, and a very difficult job but a very good one. The political section of the consulate general had shrunk in size, and two officer positions had, just before my assignment, been combined into one. They covered the domestic political reporting position for Bavaria, which was very important, because of Bavaria's strategic location in Germany. It had been in the U.S. occupation zone, and it was very, very pro-American. The political reporting position had been combined with the position of liaison to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the two U.S. radio stations located in Munich. I was assigned to the Consulate General right after Congress terminated the long-time CIA funding relationship with the radios. A new Congressional oversight mechanism, the Board for International Broadcasting, had just been set up to oversee the radios, including the direct congressional funding of the radios. So I basically had two jobs combined into one. It was a fascinating time. The job got me going in German politics, an interest which I retained to the end of my career. It was also a very difficult time for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. I don't know which one I should talk about first, Germany or...

*Q: Let's talk about Germany first. You were there from 1975 to 1978. Overall, what were the politics that were going through Germany that the U.S. was concerned with? Then we'll move down to Bavaria.*

GILMORE: We were concerned about what became known in journalistic shorthand as the "neutron bomb." The enhanced radiation warhead is the actual name of the warhead in question. The Army had developed an enhanced radiation warhead for the Lance missile. This warhead would be more lethal to personnel while causing minimal destruction to property. Initially, the U.S. hoped to deploy Lance missiles with enhanced radiation warheads in the Federal Republic of Germany. Ultimately, however, in the face of widespread negative publicity, we did not succeed in deploying this system in Germany.

Other issues in U.S.-German relations in the mid-1970s included maintaining the headquarters of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in the Federal Republic. There was some pressure from the Helmut Schmidt government to get these radio stations out of Germany, which we very much didn't want to do. The German government had to issue a license for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. We knew that the Schmidt government, as it pursued its Ostpolitik, wanted very much to be more accommodating to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Not to the point of undermining Western security, but more accommodating. So, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty's continued operation in Germany was an issue. The Bavarian government wanted the radios to stay. The Minister President of Bavaria, Alfons Goppel, who was succeeded by Franz Josef Strauss, was very strongly for keeping the radios in Bavaria. Goppel, by the way, had his own independent standing in the CSU, the Christian Social Union of Bavaria. Strauss also supported the radios strongly. Playing the delicate game of keeping Bavarian support for RFE/RL strong, which wasn't that difficult, but keeping the Federal government content to

continue to license Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty was tricky. It was a time when Radio Liberty, the radio that broadcast to the Soviet Union in Russian and minority languages was in turmoil. The Russian Service had just had an influx of "refuseniks." "Refuseniks" was a term used to refer to Soviet citizens, most of them Jews, who had been originally denied permission to emigrate to Israel. The "refuseniks" hired by RL's Russian Service included some very talented Soviet Jews.

So in the Russian Service of Radio Liberty, there was a tremendous tug-of-war going on over program content. Basically, the struggle was between the older Russian émigrés, most of whom were great Russians who had gathered around the journal Possev – "possev" in Russian means the sower, as in sower of seeds. They were Russian nationalists who wanted to see RL take a particularly hard line toward the USSR, and the "refuseniks." The latter gathered around some relatively younger people, particularly one very gifted but controversial young broadcaster named Vladimir Matusevich. So there was quite a struggle inside the Russian service of Radio Liberty. It spilled over into the press as both sides would try to feed friendly journalists in Germany and elsewhere with material supporting their views. The RFE/RL management tried desperately to keep the controversies under control, and it took a while for the controversy to quiet down. In addition, during my time as liaison with RFE/RL at the Consulate General, there was quite a bit of tension between the American RFE and the staff of the newly created Board for International Broadcasting. My task was to promote dialog and compromise among the managers and respect for the highest professional standards of journalism on the part of all of RFE/RL employees.

And then there was a third issue, and that is the relationship between the radios and some of the CIA people who had been very close to them during the time the radios were financed through the CIA. From what I was able to observe, the CIA had really not tried to manipulate the content of the RFE/RL broadcasts at any kind of micro level. The CIA wanted the stations to exist, they wanted them to reflect overall U.S. policy, and they wanted them to be surrogates for non-existent domestic opposition radio stations in the target countries. In other words, they wanted them to be kind of an ersatz, free radio medium in each of the target countries. Basically, that is what the Board for International Broadcasting wanted too. But the Board for International Broadcasting wanted to be sure no intelligence operations were conducted under the umbrella of the radios. So that was yet another dimension to be monitored. But I think I succeeded in playing a positive role.

*Q: Well, what kind of a role could you play? Because technically, these were not under your guidance.*

GILMORE: No. No, certainly I had no authority over the RFE/RL management. But the standards of what the radios could broadcast were pretty clear. There was quite an elaborate set of written internal guidelines, which, if followed by reasonable human beings, would have produced ersatz, free media, broadcasting to each of the target countries. What was the role I could play? Since the State Department could provide overall policy guidance to the radio management, not to the individual services, I could provide that to the American management in a careful way. Also, people from the management came to me to air their gripes. There apparently had been a tradition of this, a hangover from the past when the CIA had run the radios

and some senior agency officials were responsible for them. But I think also it had to do – I want to be modest here – with my personality and the fact that I knew quite a bit about Eastern Europe, particularly, and also the former Soviet Union, having served there. Also I think the radio management, the American managers of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and the heads of the both radios had confidence in me. So what I basically did was play a kind of conciliator's role, encouraging dialog. So what I basically did was play a kind of conciliator's role, encouraging dialogue. And particularly in the case of the Russian Service, where you had this deep divide between the old émigrés and the new "refuseniks." I think I helped keep the proponents of each view engaged in dialogue through a difficult period.

Also, there was the question of whether RFE/RL could be accredited to the 1976 Olympics, which by the way was a big thing, since the Olympics were a huge topic in all of the countries to which the radios broadcast. In 1976 they didn't get Olympic accreditation. The problem was the Federal Republic didn't put them on the list of its journalists to be accredited. But we laid the groundwork for a more effective campaign for the next Olympics. I was gone by then, but RFE and RL were accredited to the 1980 Olympics.

So there were these issues. They don't any of them sound like they're earth-shattering, but if one knew these countries well, all the Eastern European Warsaw Pact member states and the Soviet Union, these radios were important.

In Poland, the RFE Polish Service was immensely popular and important. Also, the RFE Polish Service developed close ties to the Polish church and the Vatican. We used to say that the RFE Polish Service had an underground connection to the Vatican and then laugh about it. The American ambassador to Poland or an embassy officer would be called in by the Polish government from time to time to receive a complaint about the content of this or that specific broadcast. He'd send a message back to the State Department with a copy to the Consul General, and I would brief the radio management on this. But, in fact, and I should put this bluntly, RFE often knew more than our embassy in Warsaw did about what was going on in Poland. This was particularly the case after \ Cardinal Wojtyla became the Pope John Paul II. In Poland RFE was very much a factor in political as well as broader social and economic life.

RFE was important in Hungary too, although there were allegations that during the revolutionary uprising of 1956, some of the native Hungarian broadcasters of RFE's Hungarian Service – and perhaps encouraged by members of RFE's American management – may have broadcast materials encouraging the revolutionaries in 1956 to take action and to expect outside help, that they didn't get.

In Romania, RFE was an important factor. It was harder to tell what impact Radio Liberty had in the USSR because it was so much harder to do audience research there. But it turns out that RL broadcasts were a pretty powerful influence there too. I'm convinced the more I look at it, the more I learn about the area, that RFE and RL were a very significant factor in producing the broader political context which ultimately led to the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the fall of the Communist regime in Eastern Europe and the USSR.

*Q: Who was consul general in Munich when you were there?*

GILMORE: The Consul General was first Herb Spivack, and then David Betts. I was with Herb Spivack I guess a bit over a year (1975-1976), and then almost two years with David Betts. Both were very able but very different people. Herbert Spivack had just come from Bangladesh where he'd been chargé. He'd gotten into hot water with Secretary Kissinger for allegedly being more sympathetic to the Bangladesh Unity and independence forces than the pro-Pakistan State Department policy would have wanted him to be. [Ed: Embassy Dacca (now Dhaka) was established May 18, 1972, with Herbert D. Spivack as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim. He was replaced in October 1972.] David Anderson Betts was one of the most senior consular corps officers in the State Department. He had had a very successful career as consul general in Manila, consul general in Palermo, and then, after Munich, finally Montreal.

*Q: Well, now let's talk a bit about internal politics. You had Helmut Schmidt as the chancellor, a very powerful figure. And then you had in Bavaria Franz Josef Strauss, Chairman of the Christian Social Union, the Bavarian sister party of the Christian Democratic Union. What were your observations? What were we interested in, in this Strauss-Schmidt relationship?*

GILMORE: Well, you know, we had some differences with Helmut Schmidt, for example, on the so-called "neutron bomb" and other issues. And also there were some problems stemming from the fact that President Carter and Chancellor Schmidt were initially virtual strangers, unfamiliar with each other's very different style and manner. But we were very solicitous of our relationship with Helmut Schmidt, and we were not favoring one leader or the other. We weren't pro-anybody. But we wanted a good relationship with the chancellor and we also wanted to keep a good relationship with Strauss, although there were some issues on which Washington and our embassy in Bonn found Strauss a bit extreme.

For example, Angola. Strauss was strongly pro-Savimbi, and we didn't agree with him on that. He was sometimes considered harder line on the East-West issues than we liked, although I quickly learned that that was largely an illusion. I had a wonderful mentor at the consulate general, Herman Stoeckl, the senior Foreign Service National employee in the political section. He was a Sudeten German, who was very young when drafted into the Wehrmacht after Hitler incorporated the Sudetenland into the Reich with the Munich Agreement in September, 1938. At the end of WWII, Stoeckl found himself in Bavaria with his fiancée, also a Sudeten German. She, by the way, was shipped out of Czechoslovakia at the end of WWII in a cattle car by the Czechs with just the clothes on her back. Stoeckl had been from a Social Democrat family, and by the way wasn't anti-Czech, although he had his issues with the Czechs. We'd hired him immediately after WWII as a public safety official in our military government in Bavaria and he just remained a U.S. Government employee until his retirement. So, he knew Bavarian politics like a clockmaker knows a clock.

We had some important tasks to accomplish during that period. One thing we had to do was to deal with the allegations against Strauss that he'd taken Lockheed bribery money as Minister of Defense. Remember the Lockheed F-104G Starfighter, the aircraft that was involved in numerous crashes in Germany, partly because, by the way, it was not designed for flying in those perpetually cloudy German conditions with tight borders. But in any case, there were allegations that Strauss took what the Germans called "Bestechungsgelde," bribes from Lockheed, the

manufacturers of the F-104. By the way, I could never find anything to confirm that. Meanwhile, we had to deal with an investigation on Capitol Hill that appeared to me might be politically driven. I had to be very careful because there was at least one colleague in Embassy Bonn who seemed to believe the allegations despite the fact that we had nothing by way of proof.

*Q: Who was the officer in Bonn?*

GILMORE: I'm hesitant to mention his name.

*Q: Why not?*

GILMORE: Bill Bodde. Very capable fellow, a good friend.

*Q: I interviewed Bill [Ed: and his interview is on the ADST website]*.

GILMORE: He's a very good fellow and he's a friend. He believed that the congressional investigators had some evidence. If they did, I never saw it. What I wanted to do was basically to preserve the close U.S. relationship with the CSU and not put us on one side or another as to whether these rumors were true. When the congressional staffers came to Munich after they had been to Bonn, I put them in touch with the Christian Social Union. It upset the CSU people a bit. But I was very careful to indicate that we, the U.S. government, were not accusing anybody of anything. That was an issue that could have seriously strained our relationship with the Christian Social Union.

There was another interesting development relating to Strauss and the Christian Social Union. I got a call one day from one of Strauss's senior aides. By the way, I had excellent relationships with Strauss's staff. It was my job. The aide who called me said he had an urgent matter to discuss, and he came to the consulate general to meet with me. He handed me a copy of a letter in pretty darned good English, purporting to be on official CIA letterhead. It accused Strauss of improprieties in his relationship with Lockheed and the F-104 fighters sold to the FRG. Within 24 hours we were able to report the matter back to Washington, both to State and CIA, and informed both the chancellor and then Strauss that it was a forgery. Presumably it was a GDR (East German) forgery. The forged letter could have been very damaging had it hit the press before we clarified it. But, we were able to get an answer back to Helmut Schmidt, to brief him, the chancellor, and Strauss, that this letter was not in any way a U.S. or CIA document. Strauss's office quickly informed the press and emphasized that it was a forgery. So we defanged that issue.

There was one other important issue with Strauss. It was not one that concerned the U.S. directly, but it really roiled German conservative politics for a while. Strauss was very frustrated that the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, the "Black" or Christian conservative parties regularly won the largest number of seats in the Bundestag, the federal parliament, but were unable to form a government because the liberal Free Democratic Party was committed to forming a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party. Helmut Kohl, the leader of the CDU, sought to persuade the FDP to leave the SPD/FDP coalition and to form a government with the CDU and CSU. To everyone's surprise, at

a CSU retreat in the Bavarian spa town of Wildbad Kreuth, the CSU passed a resolution proposed by Strauss calling for the CSU to expand beyond Bavaria and to run in all the German states in the Bundestag elections. Strauss argued that by running candidates outside Bavaria, the CSU could win the few extra Bundestag seats the CDU/CSU/FDP needed to out Helmut Schmidt's SPR/FDP coalition. Kohl and the other CDU leaders were upset and were strongly opposed to the idea. Kohl threatened to arrange for the CDU to run as a separate party in Bavaria. There was a tremendous row between the CDU and the CSU, and Strauss was forced to retreat. This was the kind of issue where the Consulate General's reporting was important.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's Social Democratic Party was weaker in Bavaria than in the other German states with the possible exception of Baden-Wurttemberg. The SPD was well led in Bavaria, but it just couldn't compete against the CSU which was wrapped in the white and blue Bavarian flag. The SPD had internal problems too, especially with the "Young Socialists in the SPD," the JUSOS in Munich, who were among the most radical JUSOS in the Federal Republic.

The head of the FDP in Bavaria in those days was the Federal Minister of Agriculture Ertl. The Consulate General maintained close contact with the Free Democrats in Bavaria because they needed to maintain their ability to win at least 5% of the vote in Bundestag elections. Had they failed to do so, Ertl would have lost his seat and the SPD/FDP coalition government might have fallen.

So we dealt with a range of political issues at the Consulate General. In retrospect, I believe the most important issue to Washington was ensuring that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty could continue to broadcast from Munich.

*Q: At this point, you talked about the neutron bomb, and the use of this weapon became quite an issue. President Carter put a lot of pressure on Helmut Schmidt to accept it. After he went through a lot of political turmoil to get Germany to accept it, Carter turned around and decided not to do it. Sort of an overnight conversion.*

GILMORE: There never was a weapon which the U.S. or NATO called the "neutron bomb." The "neutron bomb" was the name some elements of the media, perhaps fed by Warsaw Pact intelligence agencies, gave to the enhanced radiation warhead for the U.S. Army's Lance missile system. It was a small thermonuclear weapon which would provide minimal blast and heat but release large amounts of lethal radiation. Its proponents saw it as a weapon which could be used against Soviet forces and their allies in Europe without destroying large swaths of the Federal Republic of Germany. The intense negative publicity surrounding the initial reports of possible deployment of this warhead was never overcome and there was never any real political support for it in Germany.

*Q: A so-called capitalistic bomb.*

GILMORE: Right. And what it would do to populations, and everything else. And how it would harm East-West relations. The German media, including some of the more responsible media, had a heyday.

*Q: But this rift between Schmidt and Carter, was Strauss taking any advantage of this? Were we watching this...?*

GILMORE: The interesting answer is "no", and in fact on the big issues, Strauss stood with Helmut Schmidt. We were able to report on these issues from Bavaria because of our very good connections with Strauss's staff. For example, my wife and I went to the CSU annual ball as the guest of Gerold Tandler, secretary general of Strauss's party, and sat with him at his table. If I needed to see him, or Strauss's senior aide, Wilhelm Knittel, I could do so on short order. In any case, on the central issues of trade and security policy, Strauss stood with Helmut Schmidt.

And I have to add here something I learned then, but I learned even more convincingly when I was in Berlin. There's a belief in Germany, in Berlin and in the Northern German states, that the Bavarians are kind of country bumpkins. They speak this dialect, this Bayerisch, which nobody few outsiders can understand, and supposedly they're not very well educated and even backward. Well, it's not only nonsense, it's total nonsense. On the Abitur exam, the examinations at the end of gymnasium (high school), for those going on to university, Bavarians often have the highest, or the second highest results in the country. Also, largely due to Strauss's party (the CSU's) economic policies, many of the companies that were headquartered in Berlin before WWII, which had to fold because of the division of Germany, transferred their headquarters to Munich. Siemens was one example. I should add that now that Germany is reunited and Berlin is again its capital, firms like Siemens are again moving their headquarters to Berlin. And the two southern states, Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg, are the two economic powerhouses, in terms of new technology, in Germany.

Also, Strauss found Helmut Schmidt a very pragmatic, gutsy guy. I remember while I was posted in Munich, Germany faced the famous kidnapping of Hans Martin Schleyer by the terrorist organization RAF (Rote Armee Faktion, or Baader-Meinhof Gang). And Schmidt put the interests of the German state ahead of trying to save Schleyer's life by making a deal with the terrorists. Strauss admired him for that. What I'm saying is that at a level above politics, at least ordinary day-to-day politics, Strauss and Schmidt were often on the same wavelength.

*Q: Did you see the French playing around in Bavaria?*

GILMORE: There was a French consulate general there. They had very good trade relations, but politically they weren't much of a factor. There were very good, cordial relations between Bavaria and France. Where the French worked diligently with the Bavarians and Strauss was, on the European issues especially, getting the European Union (EU) underway. Strauss was an ardent Europeanist, and he had deep respect for the French commitment to the European Union. The other issue where the Bavarians and French played footsies was on EU agricultural policy. The French farmers and the Bavarian farmers have parallel interests. They don't have huge land holdings. They're very dependent on the "right" economic policies in the EU. So Strauss's interests in the European Parliament and Strauss's party's economic interests were very close to the French. But the French didn't have a high profile politically, in Bavaria particularly, and not a low one either.

The British had a consulate general in Munich, too. The high profile foreigners were invariably

the Americans. And of course, we had forces stationed in Bavaria and important military installations in Bavaria. We also had some intelligence cooperation with Bavarians. Interrogating refugees from Eastern Europe and that sort of thing. There was quite a bit going on there.

*Q: Well, then, after this interesting tour, in 1978, you went where?*

GILMORE: I went back to the Department as Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European and Yugoslav Affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR/EE). The name of the office had been changed to include Yugoslavia by name, to distinguish Yugoslavia, a non-aligned independent Communist country from the Warsaw Pact countries.

I was assigned there from 1978 to 1981.

*Q: What were your responsibilities, and what countries did you cover?*

GILMORE: Well, the Office Director and I divided the office into a northern tier and southern tier, basically. The office director was Carl Schmidt, a very able officer. He had served in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and he directly oversaw the desk officers for Poland [Jack Seymour], Czechoslovakia [James Glenn], and Romania [Frank Tumminia]. He selected Romania because he had a particular interest in Romania and because the U.S. and Romania were engaged in some special high-level diplomatic initiatives. I oversaw our relations with Hungary [Tom Longo], Yugoslavia [Darryl Johnson], and Bulgaria [James Glenn]. Carl was the Director, and in addition to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, he oversaw our economic and financial issues because he had considerable experience as an economic officer. Of course, Carl was the Director, and any time he wanted to take charge of a particular issue, he did. And as the deputy, I handled the administrative work under his supervision. The Office of Eastern European Affairs a pretty high voltage operation.

*Q: What were the issues that you dealt with?*

GILMORE: There were so many of them. Henry Kissinger was the National Security Adviser; he then became the Secretary of State. One central question was the question of our overall policy toward the region. Should we have closer relations with those Eastern European Warsaw Pact countries that supported us at the UN, or did favors for us politically, or should we have closer relations with those which were making significant economic reforms and liberalizing internally? Hal Sonnenfeldt, a close associate of Kissinger, was the Counselor of the Department. He took a particular interest in our policy toward Eastern Europe. The key Kissinger-Sonnenfeldt policy decision was that we would reward countries that did things for us diplomatically, like Romania helping with the opening to China, and defying the Soviet Union on certain issues. We used to say U.S. policy divided Eastern Europe into two tiers. Hungary, which was implementing a policy of major economic reform, never made it into the first tier. Romania, which demonstrated independence on key foreign policy issues, did. An NSC policy document defining the policy will be in the archives.

Basically, the office had special relationships with Poland and with Yugoslavia to manage. We were engaged in a very interesting diplomacy with Romania. Kissinger and his Romanian

counterpart, Steffan Andre, would work together on very sensitive, international political issues where the Romanians were pretty well doing their own thing, despite their Warsaw Pact membership.

The big story was the rise of Solidarity in Poland. By the time Solidarity started to forge ahead and show its independence and engineer changes in Poland, Carl Schmidt had moved on as Office Director, and Peter Bridges replaced him. Peter was an outstanding officer as well. He went on later to become ambassador, I believe, to Somalia. [Ed: Bridges served on EUR/EE from 1980 to 1981, according this his ADST oral history. He was Ambassador to Somalia from December 1984 to May 1986.] I'd been to visit the embassy in Rome when he was the DCM. A very capable officer. In any case, we kept the same basic division of labor. Peter followed developments in Poland very closely, and the day-to-day heavy lifting was done by Victor Gray, the Poland desk officer. Victor did a magnificent job and it got him an award. In fact, I wrote the award from Belgrade, after I left the office and became the DCM in Belgrade. I wrote it and sent it back to Peter. We wrote him a Superior Honor Award. Victor had served in Poland, and spoke quite serviceable Polish.

Victor took an orientation trip to Poland shortly after he became the Poland desk officer and when Solidarity was just getting started. He rented a car and drove through Poland. You could do that in Poland; of course he had support from our embassy in Warsaw and our consulate in Krakow. Victor, by the way, had been the Principal Officer in Krakow, a very important posting. That was the home, of course, of Cardinal Wojtyla, who became Pope John Paul II. It was the most independence-spirited part of Poland. In any case, when Victor came back from his orientation trip he reported, "Look, this Solidarity movement is genuine. It's going to go. Something's going to change here. Solidarity, led by Lech Walesa, has just got way too much support for the government to just suppress it." He followed Polish events on a day-to-day basis, and on the key policy issues Peter Bridges, working directly with the NSC, formulated our policy line, i.e., that the U.S. would not interfere in Poland's internal affairs and the U.S. expected all other countries, meaning the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies especially, would respect Poland's independence and not intervene militarily. In fact, Peter Bridges drafted memos, with Victor Gray's input, which went right to the NSC and Brzezinski, we were told. I believe our pro-active policy calling for non-intervention may have been an important factor in staving off Warsaw Pact military intervention a la Prague 1968.

Of course, it would have been very difficult and perhaps impossible to crack the Poles' unity behind Solidarity. Also important was the subsequent emergence of a Polish leader who wanted to head off possible Soviet-led intervention, and basically, some would say, did the Soviet Union's dirty work for it. That was General Jaruzelski. But, in any case, Poland and the rise of Solidarity was the central issue from 1978 to 1981 during my time in the Office of Eastern European and Yugoslav Affairs.

But the office was engaged with numerous other issues as well, including most-favored nation (MFN) trade relations treatment for Romania. We'd given Romania annually renewable MFN treatment. And there was a big challenge to that in 1981, which we beat back. I had to lead that effort because Peter Bridges had moved on in my last month in the office in 1981. There were other issues too, for example, family reunification issues with Bulgaria.

I made a visit to Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in 1981. Jack Perry was our ambassador. I went with him to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry where we raised several longstanding family reunification cases. We achieved movement on some difficult cases. [Ed: Ambassador Perry served in Bulgaria from October 1979 to September 1981 and has an oral history interview on the ADST website.]

*Q: Could you explain what these were?*

GILMORE: These were cases where the Bulgarian authorities would not permit relatives of people that had found their way to the U.S to leave Bulgaria. As you know, if there was anything a congressman would be likely to support and support strongly, it would be a constituent originally from a Communist country who had a family member who couldn't make it to the U.S. because of the Communist country's restrictive emigration policy. Often it would be the children, or the wife and children, of somebody who got out to the West and defected. It was not easy to move these cases because the Bulgarians were very cautious and very, very close to the Soviet Union, and they didn't want to look like they were vulnerable to U.S. pressure. On the other hand, if they wanted to make any positive progress with us, they had to resolve these cases. It may sound like small potatoes, in retrospect, but at the time these were important cases.

*Q: And, of course they were important to the people, to the families.*

GILMORE: Oh, very much so. And it would help on the Hill.

*Q: Now, how would you make your pitch on such an issue? Would there be a quid pro quo or something?*

GILMORE: Well, we would say – we would never horse trade for them – but what we would say is, "Look, if you want to make any kind of progress in your relations with the U.S., you've got to remember, we have a system where it is not only the executive branch which deals with foreign policy, but there's an also important Congressional role." And we'd explain what that role in terms of funding, and what legislation the Congress had to approve. And of course the Warsaw Pact member states all wanted most favored nation trade treatment. Bulgaria wasn't about to get this. We'd say, "If you want to even move toward it, if you want to move toward any kind of economic relationship with the U.S., you'll have to take into account that the fact that we expect freedom of movement, we expect family reunification." And then we would argue that "Although there might be some angry folks down in your bureaucracy somewhere who feel that they've been betrayed by the father, the husband who had defected, and want to punish him by holding the children back, you're going to have to look at your broader interests."

We did that. And also, with Bulgaria, another thing was happening. At the time, it was very significant. It looks now kind of picayune, but it concerns Lyudmila Zhivkova, the daughter of Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria's Communist leader. She had visited the U.S. to talk about her special interest, children's art. Zhivkova had a strongly ascetic personality. Although as Zhivkov's daughter she had become a Politburo functionary, her passion was promoting Bulgarian culture and art. She basically was bucking most of the pro-Soviet-Bulgarian hierarchy, and bucking her

dad, in part, to try to promote a more nationalist Bulgaria, a Bulgaria more reflective of its unique national cultural traditions. When she visited the U.S., I was responsible for helping to coordinate her itinerary. And we, I think, may have made some progress in the family reunification cases through her and through her connections. Deputy Foreign Minister Gotsev accompanied Zhivkova to the U.S. He and I talked on the fringes of her visit. I stressed the importance of movement on the difficult family reunification cases. And then when I visited Bulgaria on my trip to the region we saw movement on some of these cases. Zhivkov's Bulgaria was never about to defy the Soviet Union, but this was the kind of progress that you could make if you worked hard. But to recap those years in the Office of Eastern European and Yugoslav Affairs, the key issues were the special relationship with Poland with the rise of Solidarity and preventing a possible Warsaw Pact intervention in Poland led by Moscow, and close attention to continued U.S.-Yugoslav relations as the Tito era ended.

*Q: You're talking about the Poles keeping Jaruzelski, who was the Defense Minister who basically declared martial law ...*

GILMORE: Right.

*Q: And in a way, he stopped the Soviets from moving in. But this was also the time, in December of 1979, was when the Soviets moved in great strength into Afghanistan.*

GILMORE: Right.

*Q: And this surprised everybody. Afghanistan appeared to be keeping internal order a la 1968 Czechoslovakia. What was your all thinking, is this a new Soviet Union or what?*

GILMORE: Well, the Office of Eastern European and Yugoslav Affairs wasn't directly involved, but the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs who was responsible for our office as well as the Office of Soviet Affairs was Robert Barry, another especially capable career diplomat. [Ed: Barry has completed an ADST oral history interview.] He, as I remember, worked closely with Marshall Shulman, the special advisor on Soviet affairs to Secretary of State Vance, monitoring the Soviet troop buildup and invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan did have an effect on our relationship with the Soviet Union, a huge negative effect. But our office didn't work the issue directly. One could feel the ripples, if one knew what to look for. For example, the Yugoslavs certainly didn't like the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, because it could have been seen by some as the kind of "fraternal assistance" that might be offered to Yugoslavia.

The other significant event that happened on my watch was Tito death on May 4, 1980. As he was dying, we helped the renowned cardiologist Dr. DeBakey of Texas travel to Yugoslavia in a low-key manner to see him. Dr. DeBakey consulted with Tito's Yugoslav physicians. He concluded, by the way, that Tito was very professionally and capably cared for by his Yugoslav physicians. Tito was in a hospital in Ljubljana, in Slovenia; he had to have a leg amputated because of diabetes, and never really got out of his hospital bed.

*Q: What were we thinking about?*

GILMORE: We knew that he was not going to recover. Another iteration of the post-Tito contingency plan was being worked; it was detailed and perhaps a bit unwieldy. The study was coordinated by Policy Planning -- once it was finished, it was no longer an operational document. It had too many annexes, etc. But the preparation of the study had the salutary effect of making the bureaucracy focus on what issues needed to be addressed when Tito passed.

The book-sized post-Tito contingency study contained some proposed demarches, with the dates left blank. These were demarches we might make to the Soviets or some of Yugoslavia's neighbors. There were also talking points we might use with countries that were, like Romania supportive in a quiet way, of Yugoslavia's independence. When Tito died, we arranged for the proper condolence message from President Carter. Carter, by the way, had hosted Tito on his last visit to the U.S. We drafted the other condolence messages and facilitated selection and travel of the funeral delegation from the U.S. Because the study had focused heavily on the post-Tito period, we were primed to give quick support to the collective leadership which took over in Belgrade. Of course, we had in Belgrade, at that point, Ambassador Lawrence Eagleburger. He knew Yugoslavia well and had political courage and political acumen in very high measure. So, in many ways, despite Yugoslavia's non-aligned position, despite its very careful balancing act between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia pulled closer to us, during the initial post-Tito period.

*Q: Well, we've seen this collective leadership, and this thing has never really worked anywhere. I may be wrong, but I mean it's an interim thing. What were we looking at, though?*

GILMORE: We wanted to make sure that our interests in Yugoslavia, its continuing independence, unity, and territorial integrity, were being served. We were under no illusions. We knew that it would be a lot more difficult for a collective leadership to make quick decisions. In fact, it became clear very quickly that the collective leadership in post-Tito Yugoslav was very cautious. The republic "barons," the League of Communist officials, and the government leaders in each of the six republics and the two autonomous provinces, were very jealous of their prerogatives, and the system worked very slowly and very ponderously. But we gave the collective leaders confidence by showing that we were willing to deal with them and by making clear our policy of support for Yugoslavia's independence, unity, and territorial integrity was very much alive.

When Eagleburger left Belgrade on January 24, 1981, David Anderson, a very capable career diplomat, was nominated to be his successor. David asked me to be deputy chief of mission, so in August of 1981, I went to Belgrade. David had arrived in July. [Ed: State Department Office of Historian notes Ambassador Anderson was confirmed by the Senate on July 27, 1981, and presented his credentials on August 19, 1981.]

We were committed to working closely with this new collective post-Tito leadership. And it was clear that they were not able to make quick decisions. It was also clear pretty quickly that some of the things that Tito had feared, and monitored, and managed to keep under control were starting to happen. It was pretty clear, for example, that the Serbian Republic leadership was falling back into a more traditional Serb mode of thinking, and was jealous of the autonomy that

Vojvodina, and in particular Kosovo had – Vojvodina and Kosovo were the Autonomous Provinces of the Socialist Republic of Serbia.

Let me cite an example of how the collective post-Tito leadership functioned. Vice President Bush visited Yugoslavia in September 1983. The leader of Yugoslavia's rotating collective leadership, the President of the Presidency was to lead the Yugoslav side in the talks which are part of any high-level visit. One of the Yugoslav officials who wrote the talking points is now in the U.S., now a U.S. citizen. He told me in confidence some years later that they crafted those talking points very carefully. They then arranged a "murder board" to prepare their leader for his meeting with Bush. The other members of the collective leadership made it clear that he couldn't go beyond the carefully agreed points. So, he conducted a very wooden dialog with Bush. As we know, George Herbert Walker Bush is a highly experienced diplomat, so this exchange didn't impress him very much. Bush's visit to Belgrade came right on the heels of the September 1st shoot down of a Korean Airlines flight KAL 007 by the USSR over the Kamchatka peninsula. Bush was very upset about the shoot down and raised it in forceful terms. The Yugoslav president couldn't handle it. He just responded with a bunch of platitudes. He didn't want to take any firm position and carefully avoided criticizing the USSR.

Vice President George Bush came to Belgrade with his wife, Barbara and they were very, very upset by the shootdown. The Yugoslavs had put out a very careful statement which they thought preserved their non-aligned status in the world, and they didn't really come out and condemn it. So, George Bush beat up on them, or at least tried to. And he didn't have a Tito as an interlocutor. Tito might well have criticized the shootdown, even condemned it; but the collective leadership didn't criticize it. They were super cautious. This was one of the first indications of how much Yugoslavia would miss Tito, would miss his decisive leadership. But, there were also other indications, including differences between the republics on budgetary issues and the question of development funds for Kosovo. Remember, one of the constant battles in Yugoslav politics had been over how much the well-off republics, particularly Slovenia, but also Croatia with its Dalmatian Coast, should contribute to the development funding for the poorer areas like Kosovo. The collective leadership found it difficult to reach a consensus on such issues.

There was one thing that the collective leadership did that was repressive internally. It concerned good old Milovan Djilas, who of course had written his books, The New Class, and Conversations with Stalin, much earlier. He was in Belgrade, living in a house near the Parliament. He was hauled in for questioning. I guess he had been detained for a short time. We found out about it in an unusual way. Our DCM in Paris, Jack Maresca, phoned me, and said Cy Sulzberger of the New York Times, whom he knew well. Sulzberger would have been close to Djilas. The New York Times had helped Djilas, gave him notoriety, and maybe helped him publish his books. That'll be in the archives. We hadn't heard anything about his detention. Sure enough, we did some very quick checking, and the authorities had picked up Djilas. There was no reason for this. He wasn't doing anything extraordinary. Although he was not Tito's favorite person, and he was a thorn in Tito's side, I doubt that they would have detained him if Tito were alive. This was another sign of nervousness. In fact, after some questioning, he was released and put under something like house arrest.

Ambassador Anderson decided to send the number two officer in the political section, Jim

Clunan, to see him. We didn't make any deal about it; we didn't ask anybody's permission. We just sent him over to Djilas's home. Djilas was delighted, gave him tea, and said how happy he was to see him. Djilas talked to Clunan and smiled all over himself. Because you know what that visit meant; it that meant the U.S. was interested in Djilas, and the Yugoslavs ought to think twice before they did anything more harsh. But the detention of Djilas was another indication of the lack of self-confidence of the collective leadership.

During my tour of duty in Belgrade the Yugoslavs ran a very successful Winter Olympic Games in Sarajevo [Ed: 8-19 February 1984]. I didn't get to the Games. I traveled to Sarajevo before and after the Olympics, but I had to run the embassy during the Games because Ambassador Anderson wisely, in my mind, moved temporarily to Sarajevo to make sure U.S. V.I.P visitors were being taken care of. He used his connections to get them the right appointments with the Yugoslav officials who were basking in the publicity of the Olympics. By the way, the Sarajevo Olympics were well run and the Yugoslav built some pretty good infrastructure in Sarajevo. It was subsequently knocked around, I'd say, during the pummeling of Sarajevo by the Serbs. But, in any case, the Sarajevo Olympics were well run. Our embassy did a good job assisting the many Americans who attended the Games. We put the administrative counselor, Vince Farley, in charge of the embassy's involvement, and he won high praise from the Congressional delegation and other official American visitors to the Games.

But there was one other really important matter I want to mention. The Yugoslavs got into major financial trouble. This hadn't to do particularly with the collective leadership; probably it was going to happen under Tito too. Yugoslavia was kind of caught between East and West, economically. The Yugoslavs had taken some large loans from American and European and Japanese banks, and they weren't able to service them. So by late 1982, early 1983 they were in pretty serious trouble. They needed a major bailout. Here we should all take our hats off to our Ambassador, David Anderson, and to Ambassador Alfred Hohl, the Swiss Ambassador, and also to Kenneth Scott, now Sir Kenneth Scott, the British Ambassador. The three of them, particularly David Anderson and Alfred Hohl, played an almost heroic role. I use that word carefully -- in getting Yugoslavia's collective leaders to realize first that they were in trouble, and then in assisting them to work with their creditors to refinance their debt. It was not easy for them to do that. David Anderson was the one who took the message to them, after talking with his British and Swiss counterparts. He went – I was his notetaker, which was very unusual - to see Milka Planinc, who was the equivalent of the prime minister, the Chairman of the Federal Executive Council. David indicated that we knew what kind of trouble they were in. It was serious, we gave her some figures. David said if the Yugoslav leadership was interested, we would be willing to use our diplomatic influence to help them get a rescheduling. Planinc smiled all over herself, but she reacted very professionally. She said she had to take the matter to the collective leadership. She did, and they decided they wanted help. So, David Anderson and Alfred Hohl spent many a night sitting up late with Zvone Dragan, the Vice President of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council and his country's highest ranking economic officer, to work on the rescheduling.

The Swiss ambassador had a special role to play because the head of the Bank for International Settlements in Switzerland was his personal friend. That BIS played a key role in the rescheduling. The Yugoslavs were very reluctant to pledge their small gold reserve as the security for paying their debt. The issue had to go before the collective leadership, and also the

military leadership had to agree with it. Initially, they balked.

In the end, the Yugoslavs agreed to pledge their gold, and the rescheduling went ahead and was successful. It bought them time, time to make some economic reforms, which seemed to be working as I left Yugoslavia in the summer of 1985. But, in any case, the most important thing that happened on David Anderson's watch was the rescheduling. I'm firmly of the belief that had we not gone to the Yugoslavs and told them how urgent we thought their problem was, and helped them push this rescheduling and get it through their own internal structure, they would have been in very serious economic trouble. They would have been in default and would have had a real economic crisis... maybe even something close to a meltdown. I should note that an especially able economic officer, Patrick Nichols, was instrumental in identifying Yugoslavia's looming financial crisis and in helping Ambassador Anderson coordinate the U.S. response. Ambassador Anderson nominated Nichols for the Salzman Award, which Nichols won. [Ed: The Herbert Salzman Award for Excellence in International Economic Performance is a Department of State award made possible by the late Herbert Salzman, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.S. Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. It recognizes outstanding contributions in advancing U.S. international relations and objectives in the economic field. The recipient of the award receives a certificate signed by the Secretary and $5,000.]

*Q: Were we monitoring the ethnic divisions of Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Albanians, Muslim Bosnians, Croatians, Montenegrins, the whole thing?*

GILMORE: Yes, as best we could. We were particularly watching the Kosovo situation. That had flared up before David Anderson got there as ambassador. We had officers down there all the time. There had been demonstrations and student unrest at the University of Pristina in the provincial capital, and it was closed. We were also watching development in Yugoslavia's Republic of Macedonia. We had a political officer assigned to watch each republic and the two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. And, of course, we had the America Centers in each republic. We had to be very careful because center directors were not to be engaged in politics, and, in fact, they weren't. But when the center directors came to Belgrade, we could always sit with them, and they could sit with officers from the economic and political sections, or if what they had to say was interesting enough, the Ambassador. So, we had a pretty good fix on what was happening in each republic and autonomous province. And then we had some very interesting and impressive people on the embassy staff. The Counselor for Public Affairs, Raymond Benson, for example, had been in and around Yugoslavia for years and knew it especially well [Ed: Benson has been interviewed by ADST].

*Q: Right. He was there when I was there, 1962 to 1967.*

GILMORE: Right. And as a USIA officer he didn't do any political or economic reporting, but he had some excellent contacts, especially with the Serbs. So we were watching how some Serbs were becoming more nationalistic. We had some contacts with Slobodan Milosevic who was then a banker. Milosevic's rise to power in Yugoslavia's Serbian Republic began in the final 15 months of Ambassador Anderson's tour of duty, which ended in the summer of 1985. Milosevic was elected to a two-year term as President of the Belgrade League of Communists City

Committee in April 1984. From the time of Tito's death in May 1981, the embassy's political reporting had focused particularly on Kosovo, where there had been real problems already in the late Tito period. They included huge population growth among the Kosovo Albanians.

In any case, we monitored Serb-Albanian tensions in Kosovo pretty closely, and reported regularly on them. We also monitored Serb-Croat differences, particularly the differences on budgetary issues, especially Croatia's desire to keep more of the revenues from Dalmatian Coast tourism. Tourism in Croatia, particularly from Germans, was booming and Croatia was putting less revenue back into the federal coffers. Still, when Ambassador Anderson and I left, and Jack Scanlan came aboard as the new U.S. ambassador in July of 1985, Yugoslavia looked in relatively decent shape. [Ed: Scanlan was Ambassador from July 1985 until March 1989 and his oral history interview is on the ADST website.] The financial crisis was being dealt with through rescheduling. Decision-making was cumbersome, but the collective leadership mechanism was working, and none of the ethnic issues seemed about to explode. Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union's *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* were gathering steam. The developments that would lead to the demise of the Warsaw Pact were yet off in the future.

*Q: Yes, and that was in a way the pressure that kept Yugoslavia together.*

GILMORE: It was indeed, and it was also the pressure that kept the U.S. engaged in Yugoslavia. Once the Warsaw Pact had fallen apart and Germany was reunified, the U.S. was no longer interested in taking the lead and in forging a Western policy of support for Yugoslavia's unity and independence. In fact, we were going to leave it up to the Europeans, as we well know.

*Q: That's when Jim Baker said, "We don't have a dog in that fight."*

GILMORE: Right.

*Q: While you were there, did you see a difference in perspective between our consul general in Zagreb and the embassy in Belgrade?*

GILMORE: Well there was always a question of a differing perspective. One of my tasks as the DCM was to write the performance rating of the consul general in Zagreb; the ambassador would review it. We had some very interesting reporting out of Zagreb, very good reporting. It didn't always match what we in the embassy would have hoped for out of Zagreb, but Ambassador Anderson and I thought it was independent and professional. And there were differences emerging between Serbia and Croatia. Of course, Franjo Tudjman, who subsequently became the strong man in Croatia, was making some noises, and another dissident, named Dobroslav Paraga, was also active. The consulate general had established careful contact with him. The whole issue of Serbs in Croatia, an issue which has now been shoved into the dustbin of history, was still alive then.

Yugoslavia had very little oil. What it did have was largely in Croatia. So, there were energy issues too, but differences in reporting on economic and energy issues between the Embassy in Belgrade and our consulate general in Zagreb were relatively minor. Although, there was always a question of how autonomous the consul general in Zagreb should be. David Anderson had a

light touch. He could also be tough. He was a small fellow, a Scotsman who had been a very good soccer player. Basically, as long as he thought the consul general in Zagreb was being professional and as long as he felt as ambassador he was being consulted on the issues he cared about, he didn't get nervous, he didn't get uptight. He wasn't a control freak like some of his predecessors had been seen to be. But if you go back and read the reporting, it'll be interesting to see how it stacks up in light of subsequent developments. There were clearly important personalities in Croatia who were unhappy with the federation, and we were seeing some of that.

*Q: Well, you left there in...?*

GILMORE: I left Belgrade in summer, August of 1985. I came back to the Department to be the Director of the Office of Central European Affairs, where I remained until August of 1987. Two very interesting years.

*Q: Earlier you mentioned Andrija Artukovic, who was associated with the WWII Croatian Ustashe. Do you want to say something at this point in the chronology?*

GILMORE: Yes, the reason I'd waited, was because the key date of what I want to relate at this point was February of 1986. In other words, after I came back to run the office of Central European Affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs, Artukovic was finally extradited. But what I wanted to say was, with the creation of the Office of Special Investigations in the Justice Department, a much more vigorous effort to look at WWII war criminals got underway. One of the most significant cases that was pending, and as I explained earlier, had not been resolved, was the Artukovic case. In effect, he was under a stay of deportation. He was living incommunicado, as you had mentioned, on his brother's estate in southern California. The Yugoslavs had been terribly frustrated when, as you know as well as anybody, they hadn't been able to have him extradited decades earlier.

In any case, what I want to put on the record is sensitive, but I think important, and that is that near the end of my stay in Belgrade, Mr. Murray Stein - I'm pretty confident that is his name - but I don't keep my papers, because we're not supposed to in this new day and age. Mr. Murray Stein of the Justice Department Office of Special Investigations came to Belgrade. In preparation for his visit, David Anderson sent me to see Milan Bulajic, the head of the Federal Secretariat of Foreign Affairs Office for Legal and Consular Affairs. I mentioned to Bulajic that there was a new office in the Justice Department which was seeking to review some extradition cases. I asked whether his embassy in Washington had reported this. Bulajic had been personally involved, as a much younger man, in the earlier attempt to extradite Artukovic. I believe he was skeptical. But when Stein came to Belgrade, he went to see Bulajic. In fact, as I remember, I hosted buffet dinner for Stein at my home, the DCM residence. The two talked about the case and in the end the Yugoslav government decided that, although it would very difficult to bring together people who could bring new personal testimony about Artukovic, they would try to do it. They did it, and Artukovic was finally extradited in February 1986. He was extradited after Supreme Court Justice Rehnquist turned down a midnight request by his lawyers not to extradite him. As I understand it, and there are others who would be much more familiar with the details, Artukovic was tried in Zagreb, the capital of the Croatian Republic of Yugoslavia. He was found guilty and sentenced to capital punishment. He was quite ill at that time, quite elderly, but he was

found guilty. He died in prison shortly thereafter. [Editor's Note: The court in Zagreb issued a death sentence on 14 May 1986, but a year later the authorities ruled that he was too ill (with senile dementia) to be executed. He died from natural causes in a prison hospital in Zagreb in 1988, aged 88.]

*Q: We're talking about the Reagan administration, they were Republican Californians, and Artukovic's brother was a strong supporter of them financially. Did you get a feeling that this was almost the special investigation unit was being pushed into doing this? It was not politically palatable?*

GILMORE: Well, it's interesting. When Murray Stein came out to Belgrade, it was clear that he was very much determined to see if the Yugoslavs could be persuaded to reopened the Artukovic case, because he knew the file and believed the U.S. Government's position on his extraction would be different this time. But, perhaps surprisingly, I heard nothing politically about the case and our ambassador Anderson was a Reagan appointee to Belgrade. He was open to reexamining this case, and was, indeed, committed to it. Former Ambassador to Yugoslavia Lawrence Eagleburger, who served as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs from May 1981 to January 1982, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1982 to May 1984 and who was acting as a special advisor on Yugoslav affairs to the White House and at the time knew very well what was at stake. I don't know how much political pressure Eagleburger and the other senior U.S. officials might have had to withstand. I assumed that there was some pressure, but it certainly didn't affect what we were doing in Belgrade. We knew that Artukovic's extradition was a very important issue for some Croatian-Americans, but we also knew what the charges against Artukovic were.

*Q: Okay, let's move to the Office of Central European Affairs. What countries were covered*?

GILMORE: That's a very interesting question...[laughter] because it has changed over the years. At that time, it was the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Berlin, Austria, and Switzerland. It was a very busy office, and a lot of voltage passed through that office every day. Lots of Berlin action. The Federal Republic by itself was worthy of an office. We had some interesting issues with Austria, including one with Kurt Waldheim, which I will come to in a little while. And even with Switzerland there was a very delicate matter which I believe I should put on the record -- but it's very delicate.

*Q: Alright, well before we turn to Germany, why don't we do Austria and Switzerland first? So, why don't we turn to Austria first?*

GILMORE: In early 1987, the U.S. Government decided to review the file on Kurt Waldheim, President of Austria and former U.N. Secretary General. His file was put under review because in his 1985 published biography in which he indicated he had been discharged from the Wehrmacht in 1942 and had spent the rest of the war years finishing his law degree at the University of Vienna. Meanwhile, other documents indicated that his Wehrmacht service continued until 1954 and that from 1942 to 1945 he served in Wehrmacht units which had been involved in atrocities against civilians in Yugoslavia and sending Greek Jews to death camps. Although there was no proof he participated personally in the atrocities, there was clear evidence he concealed his role

in the units which did. The question was whether the Department of Justice would put him on the watch list which would make him ineligible for a visa to enter the U.S. as a private individual.

On a Saturday morning in April 1987, Secretary of State Shultz met with Attorney General Meese to consider the issue. The office of Central European Affairs was informed by Deputy Assistant Secretary Bill Bodde, that Meese and Schultz decided to put Waldheim on the watch list. We were instructed to be very careful how we announced it. We were to announce it first to the Austrian ambassador in Washington, Tomas Klestil and then inform our ambassador in Vienna, Ronald Lauder [Ed: Lauder, a political appointee, served as ambassador from May 1986 to October 1987]. The decision to put Waldheim on the watch list was a very heavy blow to the Austrians. Many interpreted it as a black mark against their state. In our contacts with Austrian officials we tried to make it very clear that we respected the institution of the Austrian presidency and did not intend our decision to put Waldheim on the watch list as a signal to the Austrians about U.S.-Austrian relations. Still, the decision meant the U.S. embassy staff in Vienna, the ambassador above all, could no longer have contact with Kurt Waldheim, the President of Austria. It also meant that Waldheim personally was unwelcome in the U.S. It was probably one of the lowest moments in U.S.-Austrian relations in the post-WWII period. That being said, Shultz and Meese took the decision in full knowledge of the facts and I'm sure George Shultz, who was in my view a model of probity, took it after very careful consideration.

*Q: Now, how did this affect your relations with your Austrian embassy colleagues? What were you hearing back from our embassy?*

GILMORE: First, let me say that I had good professional and personal relations with the staff of the Austrian Embassy in Washington. I had served in Budapest and Munich earlier in my career and had traveled to Austria quite often. I admired Austria's principled approach to providing sanctuary for refugees from neighboring Warsaw Pact member states, and my Austrian colleagues knew this.

The officers of the Austrian Embassy in Washington were crestfallen and very sad when they learned of our decision to put Kurt Waldheim on the Justice Department's watch list. An Austrian journalist resident in Washington asked me and my wife to dinner to discuss our decision. He expressed his keen disappointment with it and made it clear that he believed Austrians would see our action as an affront to Austria and Austrians, and it they would resent it and remember it.

Our ambassador to Austria, Ronald Lauder, did not welcome the decision, but I don't know whether he was surprised. He had met Waldheim during Waldheim's tenure as U.N. Secretary General. Lauder's mother, the famous Estée Lauder, had entertained Waldheim and his wife at her Long Island home while he was serving as U.N. Secretary General. In Vienna, Ambassador Lauder found it very difficult to avoid all contact with Waldheim as Secretary Schultz expected.

I would add, though, that a significant development was slowly unfolding in U.S.-Austrian relations. I can't date it specifically by day or month, but by 1987 in the Office of Central European Affairs and at our embassy in Vienna we were looking more closely at what Austria had done in its treatment of it Jewish citizens during WWII and what it had or hadn't done in terms of restitution for Austrian Jews after the war. I made a visit to Switzerland and Austria as

Director of the Office of Central European Affairs some months before we put Waldheim on the watch list. I asked our embassy in Vienna to arrange for me to call on the head of the Jewish community, who turned out to be a young real estate broker. He said he was very glad to see me and noted that I was the first U.S. official to call on him. When I asked about the situation of the Jewish community in Austria, he emphasized in particular the failure of the Austrian authorities to make restitution for property and art, including some very valuable paintings, seized from Jews during the Nazi era. Ambassador Lauder, who had just arrived in Vienna, pursued a vigorous dialogue with the Jewish community during his ambassadorship there.

Meanwhile, Jewish organizations in the United States, particularly those seeking restitution of Jewish property seized by the Nazis, had been maintaining that in sharp contrast to the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria had not really made restitution to Austrian Jews and had been given a free ride by the international community. So, the issue was coming to a head, and it was a touchy one for some Austrian officials. The Austrian embassy in Washington dealt with it very professionally. The ambassador at that time, Tomas Klestil, subsequently became President of Austria, so this was a very high-powered Austrian embassy.

*Q: My understanding...please correct me if I'm wrong...Number one, Austria...going back to the Empire...had a very virulent strain of anti-Semitism there and it showed itself with the Anschluss.*

GILMORE: I understand that's quite the case.

*Q: I've talked to people who served in Austria later, including up to the present day, and they say it's still there in some cases. Unlike other places that made a serious effort to get rid of this nonsense.*

GILMORE: I think there was truth in that. Scholars who've followed Hitler's career closely remind us that Hitler was born near the Austrian-German border, in Braunau am Inn, Austria. He was a housepainter in Vienna as a young man, and a budding artist, or a would-be fine arts painter. They maintain that Hitler learned his anti-Semitism in Austria, in Vienna.

Jews were very important in the cultural, journalistic, and other achievements of Austria. In music alone, the role of Jews was fantastic. There's a parallel, by the way, in Budapest, and some other cities in Central Europe. In any case, there was a virulent strain of anti-Semitism on the streets in Vienna and in certain organizations. I must say, the Austrian ambassador to Washington at the time, Thomas Klestil, didn't at all like his President being put on the watch list, but he handled himself with considerable restraint. Klestil subsequently became Austria's president and was, I think, an able representative of the Austrian state internationally. John Whitehead, who was Deputy Secretary of State during the time we put Waldheim on the watchlist, had a close personal relationship with Ambassador Klestil. They played tennis. But nobody budged when it came to putting Kurt Waldheim on the watch list.

*Q: What about Russian-Jewish refugees coming through Austria and all? Was this still going on?*

GILMORE: Well, the Austrians had been, by and large, magnificent in the way they would handle refugees. They were a model. It's a small country, and they still do it…by the way, they

were getting a little more selective in some cases, particularly those involving refugees who were clearly coming for economic purposes and who may even have a shady or even criminal background. But the Austrians were doing well by refugees throughout this period.

It was an important chapter in U.S.-Austrian relations, although at times an uneasy one. The journalist that I was speaking of, Klaus Emmerich, was a very distinguished journalist with good contacts in Washington. When my wife and I went to dinner with him and his wife after Kurt Waldheim was put on the list, I remember just how downcast he was. He was reviewing in his own mind the whole question of whether Austria's record, in handling the Jewish restitution question, and Nazi war criminals question, was going to come under review. And I think, in a way, it has. There were people in the U.S. government who felt very strongly, and with some considerable evidence on their side, too, that Austria had been given a free ride. Austria really wasn't held to anything like the same standards as the Federal Republic of Germany, which, by the way, made full restitution and went out of its way, and continues in many ways to go out of its way to accept responsibility, if one can ever accept responsibility, for the Holocaust.

*Q: In the 1985 to 1987 period did relations with Hungary come up? Were you seeing a change in Hungary that was affecting Austria?*

GILMORE: I had served in Hungary, so I cared about Hungary. I knew about the Austrian-Hungarian connections. The Deputy Chief of Mission at the Austrian embassy in Washington was very much into the whole question of reconstituting Central Europe, which would have given Austria, and of course Hungary, the Czech lands, and Slovakia, a special kind of satisfaction, a kind of reaffirmation of an historical identity. I could see the Austrians were doing everything they could, bilaterally, to try to work out good relationships not only with the Hungarians, but also with the Czechs and the Slovaks, particularly the Czechs. There were issues. In the case of Czechoslovakia, which had not yet split into two countries, there was a nuclear power plant near the Austrian border that the Austrians didn't believe was safe. But, by and large, the Austrians went more of their share of the distance toward rapprochement with these countries, and I think deserve credit for it. Of course, I would also say it was very much in their enlightened self-interest.

*Q: During this time, were there any reflections coming out of Czechoslovakia? Czechoslovakia was still pretty hard line at that time...*

GILMORE: Yes, we could see it on the cultural side, and Vaclav Havel was pretty much a dissident at that time. The independent Czech intellectuals and dissidents never went to sleep, but they were pretty well muted by the regime, not by their own actions at that time. Of course, the Prague Spring 1968 had been almost two decades earlier, but it still was a powerful memory.

*Q: How about Switzerland? Let's turn to Switzerland.*

GILMORE: This is very delicate. The Swiss embassy in Washington was extremely capable. The ambassador, whose name was Klaus Jacobi, had been a very senior member of the Swiss foreign ministry. He had been number two, the Deputy Foreign Secretary, before he came to the U.S. And his deputy at the embassy, David de Pury, was one of the most capable diplomats I've met

anywhere. They by and large fended for themselves very well in Washington and didn't want to go through the desk for the things they could do directly with other parts of the government. We had no problem with them on that.

There was a very sensitive issue in U.S.-Switzerland relations. I learned about this issue firsthand when as Director of the Office of Central European Affairs when I visited our embassy in Bern for consultations. In accordance with normal diplomatic practice, the embassy arranged for me to visit the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, the Swiss foreign ministry. In the course of my consultations at the ministry, I was asked to meet with the Deputy Foreign Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the second ranking person in the ministry. He asked to meet with me alone.

The Deputy Foreign Secretary asked me to please convey a message to my government. He asked me to convey the message that Switzerland would dearly like to have a career American ambassador the next time around. He observed that we had sent a number of competent and very well intentioned political appointee ambassadors in the recent past. It was the considered judgment of the Swiss government that they would like to have a career ambassador. They believed that U.S.-Switzerland relations would benefit from it. The Deputy Foreign Secretary indicated he would not convey this message in writing.

I carried this message back to the State Department and gave it personally and orally to senior officials. As I remember it, I gave the message to Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Rozanne Ridgway [Ed: Ambassador Ridgeway has a series of oral history interviews under ADST auspice] and Director General of the Foreign Service George Vest [Ed: Ambassador Vest also has recorded an ADST interview].

It was a very touchy time. Our ambassador to Switzerland, Faith Ryan Whittlesey was being investigated – that may be too strong a word – she was under scrutiny from Congress, particularly from Representative Dan Mica (D. FL) and Representative Olympia Snowe (R. ME), now Senator Snowe. She had allegedly misused the U.S. ambassador's residence in Switzerland to host a number of senior Reagan administration officials. I don't want to get into that because I have no --

*Q: It's in the papers. It was certainly something that was in the papers. And Faith Whittlesey drew a lot of publicly.*

GILMORE: Right. I have considerable empathy for her. She was a fellow Pennsylvanian. Her husband had died a tragic death. She raised their children and raised them well. One of them, as I remember, had a learning problem. I believe he was dyslexic. In Bern she was doing what she thought best for the U.S. I mention this matter because I think it needs to be on the historical record. I don't mention it with any malice toward Ambassador Whittlesey.

*Q: This does, of course, raise the subject of assigning political appointees to places where you could get by on English, nice places and all. Such assignments, especially during the Reagan Administration, were currency in kind for the political supporters who got a president elected.*

GILMORE: And many of these political appointees have done wonderful work. I have come to

the conclusion, after many years in the Foreign Service, that a well-chosen political appointee can bring some great strengths to the U.S. bilateral relationship with a given country, particularly if the appointee has access high in the administration. But I just mention this because I think it deserves to be on the historical record.

*Q: I'm looking a list which suggests from 1957 to 1990, we've had two career ambassadors and twelve non-career ambassadors in Bern, which gives you a feel for the Swiss concerns.*

GILMORE: It was interesting. And there were important issues to be dealt with. They may not sound so important to some people, but they were important. Money laundering was one issue we had with the Swiss. Also, some important bilateral relationships were run out of Bern. For example, the U.S. dialogue with Iran to this day is conducted through our embassy in Bern. So, the Swiss capital is also an important diplomatic post for some non-bilateral issues.

*Q: Was the issue of Jewish assets much of an issue when you were there?*

GILMORE: With Switzerland, no, it wasn't at that point. That came later. The issues of money laundering and banking secrecy, and the question of how the U.S. would operate with the Swiss to deal with them were on the agenda. The Swiss were very discreet and determined that any business with us be done on a strictly bilateral basis and as equals.

*Q: Well, turning to, at that time, the two Germanys.*

GILMORE: Yes, there was always plenty of voltage, as I said, surging through the Office of Central European Affairs. Imagine the relationship with the Federal Republic. It was fascinating. Dynamic. Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, who was already about to be the senior foreign minister in Europe, in terms of longevity in office, wrote numerous letters to Secretary Shultz. In fact, we used to say that Genscher writes Secretary Shultz at least once a month and sometimes every Friday. The German foreign office, of course, closes earlier in the day than the State Department. Often on a Friday evening, the political counselor from the German embassy would arrive at the State Department with a message from Genscher to Secretary Shultz.

The Office of Central European Affairs supported and participated directly in the ongoing quadripartite dialogue of the U.S., U.K., and France, the three Western Powers with rights and responsibilities pertaining to Berlin, and the Federal Republic of Germany. This dialogue focused on matters such as West Berlin's ties to the Federal Republic and the administration of the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1976.

My previous service in Germany as Political Officer and the second-ranking officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Munich did not include Berlin matters, so I faced a steep learning curve in my efforts to get a grip on the basics of what veterans of service in U.S. Embassy Bonn and at the U.S. Mission in Berlin called "Berlinery". I traveled several times a year to attend regularly scheduled quadripartite meetings to serve as notetaker at some of Secretary Shultz's bilateral meetings with Genscher.

One important issue from the Reagan administration's point of view was the question of how

German companies could participate in "Star Wars" contracts. A number of countries with advanced technology, like the Federal Republic, wanted to be sure that businesses that flew their flag could participate in the competition for contracts. The participation of German firms was a little more complicated because a chunk of important German know-how and industrial prowess was in the western sectors of Berlin, and how Berlin-based industries might participate...touched on the whole question of Allied rights. So, when we negotiated that agreement, there was quite a bit of detail that had to be worked out. Secretary of Defense Weinberger was the signatory on our side. And, on the German side, they wanted to be careful to emphasize that they regarded participation in "Star Wars" contracts as a commercial issue, not a defense issue. So, Martin Bangemann, the Economics Minister, negotiated for them, and Secretary Weinberger for us.

During my time as Director of Central European Affairs the German Democratic Republic was still riding pretty high. Many people, including a few in our government, thought that the East Germans were doing very well in terms of their industrial prowess. They were, in a way, when compared to the other countries of the Warsaw Pact. But they were, as we subsequently saw, not nearly as successful as the images they tried to portray. But they were on a kind of a roll. The Embassy of the German Democratic Republic brought Katarina Witt, who was then the women's Olympic champion in figure skating. She was a beautiful young woman and also very personable. GDR Ambassador to the U.S., Herter, a competent diplomat, put on a pretty good show in Washington. But we had a number of issues with his government where they were making trouble in our view, particularly concerning Berlin.

Perhaps the most significant issue on my watch was one that my deputy, Michael Habib handled. It was certainly the most exciting. I was out of the office one afternoon on business. When I came back, Mike was just finishing an urgent demarche to the East German Chargé d'Affaires, about evidence that we had of pending hostile activity originating in East Berlin against U.S. forces in West Berlin. And sure enough, it wasn't but a short time later that we learned that the La Belle Disco was bombed in the wee hours on April 5, 1986. We didn't know the target was to be La Belle specifically. A GI was killed and also a Turkish woman. I believe a third country national in Berlin, a resident of Berlin, died. The La Belle bombing was subsequently shown to be an act of terrorism. [Editor's Note; see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986_Berlin_discotheque_bombing]

*Q: It was tied to Libya, which we bombed.*

GILMORE: Yes, but it was also pretty clear that the GDR played an enabling role in the La Belle bombing.

*Q: What was the GDR response?*

GILMORE: They just said they would get the message back to their capital as quickly as they could. I remember they never said much to us, at least in Washington, afterward.

*Q: The fact that we were sending a demarche to the GDR, then the attack, and the administration responded by practically killed Qadhafi in Libya, all this sounds like an intelligence coup.*

GILMORE: Well, we knew who was talking to whom, by the time we got all the intelligence sorted out. It was a whole question of protecting sources and methods. We knew very clearly -- I want to be very careful here, because it's probably still highly classified -- we knew from our very good intercept capabilities in Berlin -- and they were excellent for reasons you might guess -- that there had been such and such a conversation. We knew who was talking to whom.

*Q: Well, with this, and our reaction to this, it certainly wasn't in the GDR's interests to be playing Qadhafi's game, you know?*

GILMORE: And I don't think they would have wanted GIs hurt.

*Q: Was the any indication later that the GDR said, "That's it fellas, no more playing around in our country." And this sort of thing. Were you getting any indication of that?*

GILMORE: We weren't. If that happened, I didn't know about it. Since I subsequently moved from the position of Office Director for Central European Affairs to the position of U.S. Minister and Deputy Commandant of the American Sector of Berlin, I probably would have been aware of any such indication.

There's one other thing I should mention about our relations with the German Democratic Republic before we go on. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Rozanne Ridgway had served as our ambassador to the GDR just before being named assistant secretary. She was seized with the issue of the return and restitution of property and assets of Jews by the Nazis from the part of Germany which had become the GDR. Working closely with the Conference on Jewish National Claims Against Germany, Ridgway had developed a concept for addressing the issue. The GDR had not paid any reparations. In fact, the GDR leaders, led by Honecker himself, maintained that the GDR represented the part of Germany that was anti-Nazi, had nothing to do with the Nazi regime, and was not responsible for its acts.

In any case, in layman's language, Ridgway's concept was to create the possibility for the GDR to earn the hard currency to pay the Jewish claims by giving the GDR certain specific export trade opportunities in the U.S. As ambassador to the GDR Ridgway had already worked on the return of paintings of German-American Lyonel Feininger which had been seized by the Nazis. Ambassador Ridgway may have addressed these matters much more authoritatively in her own oral history. Meanwhile, the issue of restitution and claims of Jews who had lived in what became the GDR was resolved with the reunification of Germany when the Federal Republic took responsibility for them.

*Q: What was your impression of the GDR at that time? We didn't know it, but it was the last few years of existence. Was it dynamic? Ossifying? What was happening?*

GILMORE: Well, their diplomacy in Washington was pretty competent. As I had observed during my assignment as Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, a number of the Warsaw Pact member states began to send capable envoys to Washington. These envoys worked to develop bilateral relations as best they could within the strictures of being loyal to the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Herter, the GDR ambassador, was one of those. My own

judgment was always that the GDR was an artificial creation and wouldn't last forever. I want to be very careful to say I was not prescient and I didn't know the Berlin Wall would come down in a few years, etc. But the more I looked at the GDR, the more I saw it as increasingly in difficulty economically. By the way, that was probably a minority view among "Germanists" in the U.S. and other Western countries. Some of them would say, including some who had served in the GDR, "why, it's the sixth or seventh largest economy in the world". I was always skeptical. I had always found such assertions unconvincing. Basically, the GDR economy was quite heavily dependent on the Federal Republic economy. That being said, we didn't see any serious domestic unrest in the GDR at that point…that was 1985 – 1987. Now, that subsequently changed very, very substantially, but it really didn't change dramatically until 1989. We can talk about that more explicitly when I'm in Berlin.

*Q: In viewing East Germany as economically viable was anybody taking a look at the product quality, rather than the statistics? Because it turned out that the products manufactured in East Germany were not at all up to the standards so that they could really be used by the Western world when they came....*

GILMORE: There was an exaggeration in general, until well into the 1980s, of the economic potential of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. Just think about how we overestimated the size of the Soviet economy. It was smaller than we thought...and of course the GDR economy was very dependent on Soviet and other Warsaw Pact markets for its products. They weren't up to Western standards, with very rare exceptions. Maybe some of the optical equipment by Zeiss, for example, was acceptable at the low end in certain Western markets. But the GDR did have very important markets in the Third World. Their prices...they had no idea what the real value of things was because they had no markets to determine the cost of imputs -- were administered prices. They imported successfully from, and particularly exported successfully to a number of countries in Africa and other places in the Third World. They also had extensive markets in Warsaw Pact member states. I think we maybe didn't look at the GDR economic situation hard enough. But I don't want to be at all critical of our embassy to the GDR. We had a series of very capable ambassadors. John Sherman Cooper, the first, was a former senator and a serious ambassador. And if I could just mention some of the others, Frank Meehan [September 1985 to November 1988] was one of the ablest Foreign Service people I ever worked with. Roz Ridgway [January 1983 to July 1985], another especially able person. Richard Barkley, the last ambassador, Dick Barkley [December 1988 to October 1990] went on to be the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. These were all first-rate people. But I would add that in terms of the Washington analytical community. I don't think we put a tremendous effort into East Germany watching.

*Q: We had this huge apparatus for looking at the Soviet Union. It missed the whole, the major picture. This is one of those things. I guess you get entranced by the Soviets and you can't see what it really is.*

GILMORE: Right. And you look at certain things. The Soviet Union was a very successful producer of certain kinds of military goods...tanks, mortars, personnel carriers, automatic rifles, some aircraft. Some of the Soviet aircraft were very well made and their pilots well trained.

They had access to all the materials we had, all the miracle metals and everything else, they were

able to produce excellent equipment. So you could be mesmerized by that and not focus on the extreme shortcomings in areas like public health and housing. The USSR economy was an abysmal failure in housing. The GDR was somewhat better, but lagged far behind the West. We used to always say that anything that the Soviet Union could do in the way of housing construction, the GDR could copy and execute more proficiently, and there was truth to that. But, when I got into the former GDR after the reunification of Germany, I was able to see how poorly many of the apartment buildings were constructed and maintained.

*Q: Was this Stalin Alley and all that, that you see pictures of?*

GILMORE: Right after the reunification of Germany and Berlin, I remember visiting Halle, Magdeburg, Schwerin, and of course new sectors of East Berlin like Hellersdorf and Marzahn. On close inspection, all the newer buildings were poorly constructed. There were blocs of apartment buildings six and eight floors tall, consisting of mini apartments, literally stacked on top of each other. They were not well engineered and definitely not designed to last the fifty and even one hundred years that some of the apartment buildings of earlier times lasted. But, in any case, the GDR, when I left the office of Central European Affairs in the summer 1987, didn't look like it was in massive trouble with its people. It was hard to judge the question of how much discontent there was. No one that I talked to or read about was forecasting the early demise of the GDR. On the other hand, all those of us who observed the GDR concluded there was a strong, widespread and growing desire for freedom to travel abroad, especially to West Berlin and the FRG.

*Q: How did we look upon the GDR military?*

GILMORE: We thought they were formidable. There was conscription. By and large, the army was pretty well outfitted, in terms of weaponry. It underwent constant training; lots of exercises. Some would say that, soldier for soldier, they were even more capable even than the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany, which was huge. There were approximately 400,000 Soviet military personnel in the German Democratic Republic when I got to Berlin in 1987. Most of them were land forces, although they had a very considerable air capability, which exercised all the time. So, you had to look closely. We would get reports from the U.S. and other allied military liaison missions in Berlin who were an enormous source of good intelligence on the Soviet forces in Germany, about how poorly the Soviet soldiers ate, how they only had one uniform which was made of wool, and how much they suffered in the summer with those hot uniforms. You could find anecdotal evidence that that Soviet Group of Forces was not the capable force it seemed to be on paper. I think we by and large thought the GDR army was capable, given the level of equipment it had. The Group of Soviet Forces, Germany however had better equipment. And as our military planners in the Federal Republic used to say, "The Soviet forces in the GDR have way more tubes than we have." What they meant by tubes was cannon, artillery, tanks with guns and all kinds of firepower.

But by the time I left the Central European Affairs office and went to Berlin, the GDR looked like it had serious economic problems, but it didn't look like it was about to totter. And of course, an important factor in the GDR tottering just two years later was *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* in the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's own conviction of the urgent need for reform. In many ways, the

most important reformer in the GDR was Mikhail Gorbachev. He pushed Honecker hard and you could see it. They were totally on different wavelengths.

*Q: When you were dealing with East Germany from Washington, did you see this earthquake in the Soviet Union at that time with Gorbachev?*

GILMORE: No, I began to see that once I got to Berlin. That's a very interesting chapter too, because I had a very close relationship with my Soviet counterpart in Berlin, who turned out to be a very capable diplomat and a very fine human being. And people may think I'm soft saying that, but it's dead true.

*Q: Yes. Now, how about one of the issues that would come up quite often, and we'd get involved in that, and that is family reunification. We'd have Americans who had relatives in East Germany who are trying to get out. Did we have any cases of that?*

GILMORE: We did, but our ambassador, Ambassador Ridgway, when she was there, her Deputy Jim Wilkinson, and Ambassador Meehan, who succeeded her pushed those cases hard. There weren't many of them, so the GDR resolved a number of them over time, not all of them, but resolved a number of them and earned points with us, so to speak. The real family reunification problem, of course, was between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic where there were other mechanisms in place, including buying people out.

*Q: Yes, I understand this was quite a trade.*

GILMORE: Yes, it was done on a pretty extensive scale. I don't fault the Federal Republic for doing it, if it was the only way to get certain things done. The onus, in my view, was on the German Democratic Republic for selling people, in effect.

*Q: Now, moving to the Bundesrepublik (West Germany), what were the issues that you were mainly dealing with there?*

GILMORE: All the NATO issues, a number of trade issues, including, and as I stated earlier, the special issue of the Star Wars contracts. We occasionally had some differences, not major differences, over Berlin. While the Federal Republic in general understood the importance of maintaining Berlin status...Berlin, of course, was not part of the Federal Republic. Berlin, under international law, was an occupied city, and in the absence of a peace treaty, which there hadn't been, the Federal Republic was not sovereign in the Western sectors of Berlin. This was a sore spot to some German political leaders in West Berlin and Bonn. But by maintaining Berlin's status as an occupied city and refusing to sign a peace treaty which recognized the division of Berlin and Germany, the U.S., Great Britain and France kept the German question open until such time as reunification could be accomplished peacefully. The Federal Republic, of course, financed the Western sectors of Berlin from the federal budget. Subsidized it lavishly in terms of the arts. West Berlin was a mecca, particularly for opera and classical music. Of course, East Berlin was an art showcase too. In fact, I would argue that the cultural power of Berlin, the two parts together during the 1970s and 1980s was unsurpassed by any of the other great cultural cities, New York, Paris, Rome.

But in any case, when it came to some of the specifics of Berlin status, our allies in the Federal Republic and West Berlin would sometimes get impatient. We'd see it at my level, at the office director level. And we'd see it at the level of the assistant secretary, Ambassador Ridgway, and also the level of Secretary Shultz. There seemed always to be some tension over the Federal Republic, and with Foreign Minister Genscher particularly, who after all had a home town in the GDR, Halle, which he cared deeply about. Genscher was extraordinarily capable, by the way. But on another level, we had good personal relationships with individual West German officials and diplomats. We became good friends and colleagues. That being said, they very much worked for Genscher. We always got the feeling, unless Helmut Kohl, who was Chancellor during that period, cared personally about an issue, it was Genscher's view that the FRG embassy in Washington was trying to push.

*Q: Yes. Again, during 1985 to 1987, how would you say your office was evaluating Helmut Kohl?*

GILMORE: I think we saw him as a strong leader, very much in control, and when the opportunity presented itself, totally committed to the unification of Germany and Berlin. We also saw Kohl as giving Genscher quite a bit of latitude at the foreign ministry. I think we also saw him as pretty staunchly pro-U.S., although very much committed to taking full advantage of Germany's economic strength. We always saw him as a leader who was a firm believer in the U.S.-German relationship and in the NATO alliance. He was also strongly committed to close Franco-German cooperation and the building of the European Community. But by and large I saw him as a very tough political leader who had built a tremendous power base in his own party the Christian Democratic Union, over a long number of years, taking care of those colleagues who were helpful by dispensing patronage accordingly. I personally was not surprised when we subsequently learned that some of Kohl's financial arrangements were illegal.

*Q: I was wondering whether we were looking at this. Because both in Germany and France, it sort of came out that an awful lot of money was being dispensed.*

GILMORE: My mentor -- I referred to him earlier in this interview, my mentor at the Munich Consulate General Foreign Service national Hermann Stoeckl -- understood these practices very well. He made it very clear to me how parties were financed in the FRG. He was a calm and careful observer. He had made it plain that he thought Helmut Kohl was very much involved in the fund-raising business including soliciting what he could get from industrialists, and doing favors in return. Here, I want to be careful; I don't want to cast more aspersions on Helmut Kohl and the Federal Republic than I would on the U.S. I mean that's how parties often help to fill their coffers.

*Q: I was interviewing two days ago Robert Strauss, who was at one point our ambassador to the Soviet Union. But as a major figure in the Democratic Party, he was talking about how today in Congress, the collegiality has fallen apart because people on both sides are leaving their posts on Thursday, until late Monday, going back home to raise money. They don't see each other since they are going back and raising money, which is not to the good of the Republic.*

GILMORE: No, it doesn't look like they are focusing on their immediate responsibilities as legislators. But in any case, we saw Helmut Kohl as strong. We saw that when he cared about an issue, that he was very capable of advancing or defending German's interests. But we saw him as a stalwart ally, and also as one very much aware of German's need for a strong U.S., particularly in Berlin.

I remember going to a dinner...Kohl of course visited Washington during my time as Director of Central European Affairs. I remember the dinner that was given for Kohl in Washington was hosted by Chief Justice Rehnquist. For some reason, Reagan wasn't able to host it. The Reagan-Kohl relationship wasn't a real chummy one. But it was close, and I think the two of them saw eye to eye on larger world issues. They were comfortable with each other's leadership. It's clear they relied on each other. But they didn't burn up the telephone lines or exchange a lot of letters. In other words, if there was a close personal correspondence, it was run out of the NSC, not out of the Department of State.

*Q: Well, Genscher was FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei – Free Democratic Party). He came from a small, but crucial party. He was sort of running foreign policy. But in a way, was Germany still hesitant about exerting its power on the world stage, would you say?*

GILMORE: On some issues, yes. Economically, no. When we had to deal with the Germans on sticky issues, for example, German firms exporting dual purpose chemicals to Iran and Iraq, and similar issues, the Germans could be very tough. Very tough and persistent in protecting their economic interests. I remember we were particularly concerned about the FRG's export of certain dual purpose chemicals to Iraq and Iran, particularly Iran.

*Q: Those two countries were at war at that time.*

GILMORE: Right. And the other point was that although we had very good intelligence in some cases, as long as the chemicals were dual purpose, and unless we could be very specific about the end-use problems, the Federal Republic Embassy officials in Washington and their senior officials in Bonn would always say, "Under the German constitution, German firms have a right to export, and we can't interfere with that unless there are very, very specific reasons to do so." By and large, the Social Democrats, as a party, were more responsible on those issues, in my view. But there was always a hauling and pulling between us and our German allies, and there was a certain rivalry, a commercial rivalry as you would expect. Also the Federal Republic was dead set on building Europe. And, of course, whenever there were any differences between the European Community and the U.S., the Germans were right in there fighting hard for the EC position, and fighting well. But by and large I have positive memories of my diplomatic dealings with FRG and Berlin officials.

*Q: Well, it's interesting. Some of the things you've been saying would apply to the French. Except, for some reason, the French, even today, were able to get under our skin and were seeming to talk one side and play...and I don't know if it was a difference in attitude or how it was carried out, or if it was a different policy. I'm talking about working to make France paramount in Europe and selling anything to anybody no matter how odious the regime was; if you could turn a franc, they were doing it.*

GILMORE: Well, the Germans, by and large, were operating very much like the French economically. Some critics of Germany in the U.S. called them "mercantilist." In fact, some people called the Federal Republic the most successful mercantilist country in the Twentieth Century. I wouldn't go quite that far. But there was some truth in that. Where the Germans were careful was on the big time political issues. They worked very closely with the French, and the French-German relationship was extremely important to whoever was Chancellor. The Chancellor and the French President, Mitterrand and Kohl, met regularly, as did Schmidt and Giscard. But the Germans would shy away from clashing with the U.S. on really central political issues. They might back France tacitly, but if they faced a choice between France and the U.S., they would usually duck and not offend the U.S.

But the other thing I should note about that office, the office of Central European Affairs is that "Berlinery" as we called it, constantly generated a major part of the office's workload. The Berlin desk officer position was one of the most challenging middle grade Foreign Service positions I can think of. The officer was always dealing with some problem or another with Berlin, some access problem, some problem where we had to make a demarche to the Soviets. Sometimes we had much worse problems. People who tried to escape were still being shot at the Berlin Wall. So in the Office of Central European Affairs, Berlin issues were the most important and time-consuming issues the CE Director dealt with. Of all the jobs I had in the State Department, I think the CE Director, and of all things, the Yugoslavia desk officer, were the busiest. Although I should quickly add that the Deputy Director for East European and Yugoslav Affairs position was extremely busy too.

*Q: There had been this constant pressure, going back to 1964-68, on Berlin. Codified minutia and there was a big book filled up about what you can and can't do to make sure that your position in Berlin would not be whittled away.*

GILMORE: Right.

*Q: But now, here we're moving towards, really the end game. But we didn't know it.*

GILMORE: Right.

*Q: But did you find a diminution in pressure?*

GILMORE: When I got to Berlin in August of 1987 I found focus on Berlin status concerns on the part of some West Berlin and FRG officials. Paradoxically, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Soviets mentioned their four-power rights on several occasions. Once the GDR had held free elections in March 1990, the GDR was no longer a willing ally of the Soviets. Four-power rights were one of the few levers the Soviets had left.

*Q: But, during this time, 1985 – 1987, were there still attempts of the sort of what I would call nibbling tactics?*

GILMORE: Air service to Berlin was a problem area. In accordance with four-power (U.S.,

USSR, UK and France) arrangements, the only countries whose designated commercial carriers could provide air service to the Western Sectors of Berlin were the U.S., UK, and France. The Western Allies sought to discourage carriers from friendly countries from seeking arrangements with the GDR to fly directly to East Berlin's Schoenefeld airport. For example, we sought to persuade Austria to dissuade Austrian Airlines from arranging direct flights from Vienna to East Berlin/Schoenefeld.

*Q: Why didn't we want that?*

GILMORE: Because it would build up East Berlin as a center of civil aviation and provide an alternative to air travel to Berlin. The Federal Republic, for its own reasons, didn't want Austrian Airlines to fly from Vienna to East Berlin either. But the Austrians, encouraged by the GDR, thought Vienna-Berlin would be a lucrative route and went ahead with it. And guess where their passengers went when they landed in East Berlin? Straight from Schönefeld Airport in East Berlin to West Berlin. So Austrian Airlines did undercut the Allied carriers' providing service to Berlin. We made presentations to the Austrians, saying, "If you want to get passengers to Berlin by air, let them fly to Germany and then on to Tegel Airport in West Berlin on one of the Allied carriers. Although we were not able to dissuade to Austrians, in retrospect I still believe our efforts were appropriate given the situation in Berlin.

*Q: Well, it kept things together.*

GILMORE: The security of the Western Sectors of Berlin was not something the Federal Republic could do a lot about. When the Soviets put pressure on Berlin it was on us, the Allies, and the Allies were resolute in standing up to Soviet pressure. And, of course, the most notable instances of Soviet pressure in Berlin were the blockade of 1948, which triggered the Berlin airlift, the "Khrushchev ultimatum" of 1958 demanding that the Western Powers remove their garrisons within six months or else the USSR would unilaterally sign a peace treaty with the GDR and Berlin would become a free city, and Khrushchev's demands at the Kennedy-Khrushchev summit in Vienna in June 1961 which echoed the 1958 ultimatum.

And of course the Berlin Wall went up in 1961. Although Kennedy took several decisive steps in response, including sending General Lucius Clay, the former U.S. Commandant and hero of the Berlin airlift, back to Berlin, there were limits to what we believed we could do without risking armed conflict.

*Q: I know that much of the time when I was in the Foreign Service from 1955 on, one of the concerns we had was there's going to be World War III and it will start over Berlin. One of the scenarios that one would think about would be somehow an uprising in East Berlin that would get out of hand.*

GILMORE: It would be put down bloodily.

*Q: And then somehow the West Germans couldn't stand aside and things could move out.*

GILMORE: Right.

*Q: Had that scenario, I take it by the time you were dealing with it pretty well, faded away...*

GILMORE: The actual chain of events that led to the opening, or fall of the Berlin Wall, the first free election in the GDR and ultimately to the unification of the FRG, GDR and Berlin included the so-called "freedom prayers" (Freiheitsgebete) on Monday evenings in Leipzig's Nikolai Church. Beginning with a small group on September 4, 1989, the number of participants grew rapidly each week until an estimated 500,000 people participated. We were concerned that the GDR leaders might decide to crack down on the Leipzig demonstrators, but we saw no evidence of this. We were also concerned that the participants in the burgeoning demonstrations avoid contact with the large numbers of Soviet troops stationed in the GDR. I was in almost daily contact with my Soviet counterpart, Igor Fyodorovich Maksimychev, the Soviet nemesis and DCM in East Berlin. He indicated that the last thing the USSR under Gorbachev wanted to see was any conflict between GDR demonstrators and Soviet troops. In fact, the demonstrations were peaceful and orderly throughout.

*Q: I remember, I was an enlisted man in Darmstadt in Germany in 1953, and there were riots in Berlin, in East Berlin. We were all confined to the barracks. I didn't realize how, this could have been quite serious.*

GILMORE: It was and the riots were put down with great bloodshed, or considerable bloodshed. Great is too strong. Considerable bloodshed. There was always concern throughout the 1950s and then in the 1960s that that could happen again. We were always worried about the Volkspolizei, the police that guarded the Wall, because they had orders to shoot. We were always worried about them mowing down citizens at the Wall trying to escape into West Berlin. Or mowing them down at the inner-German borders where the GDR had, at one period of time in the 1970s, installed automatic weaponry, that I recall was triggered by sensors. As we watched events in the GDR evolve, we were also concerned that Soviet troops belonging to the Group of Soviet Forces/Germany might inadvertently be provoked.

*Q: Yes. Can you talk about what your job was and what the situation was in 1987 in Berlin. Sort of set the picture.*

GILMORE My title was U.S. Minister and Deputy Commandant of the American Sector, Berlin. I was the senior State Department official resident in West Berlin. The U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, who, of course, resided in Bonn also had the title Chief of Mission Berlin. (The British and French ambassadors to the FRG were also chiefs of their respective establishments in Berlin (West). The Commandant of the American Sector, Berlin, a two-star U.S. Army general also had the title Deputy Chief of Mission in Berlin. I also had the title Assistant Chief of Mission.

My main tasks were: leading and supervising the work of U.S. Mission, Berlin, including such special institutions as the Berlin Air Safety Center; liaison with the Governing Mayor of Berlin and his cabinet, the Berlin Senate, and Berlin's parliament, the House of Deputies; working closely with the Commandant of the American Sector, Berlin, and our British and French counterparts to coordinate our efforts to protect the security and promote the welfare of the

Western Sectors of Berlin; and finally, to serve as the primary U.S. channel of communication with the Embassy of the USSR in East Berlin on Berlin matters.

When I arrived in Berlin in August of 1987 I saw no palpable indication that fundamental change might soon be in the offing. While the overall atmosphere of East-West debate and the practical improvements fostered by the Quadripartite Agreements of 1971 and the related inner-German agreements had diminished Berlin's potential as a flashpoint of East-West conflict, fundamental differences in the positions of the Allies and Soviets remained, and both sides vigorously protected their positions from perceived encroachments. Meanwhile, the GDR Volkspolizei still had orders to shoot anyone trying to escape over the Berlin Wall.

*Q: Who were some of your top people there?*

GILMORE: At the time of my arrival my deputy, the Political Advisor and DCM, was Jim Williams. Later he received the title of as our special envoy for Cyprus [Ed: Williams has an oral history interview on file with ADST]. Elizabeth Jones was the Economic Advisor. She subsequently served as our ambassador to Kazakhstan and as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. The Administrative Officer at the U.S. Mission was Don Hayes, who went on to some of the most senior managerial positions in the Department of State. Our Legal Advisor when I arrived in Berlin was Donald Koblitz. He was replaced by JoAnn Dolan.

The staffing pattern of the U.S. Mission included several positions which reflected the Mission's special responsibilities. They were: Legal Advisor; Senate Liaison Officer; Protocol Officer; and Public Safety Advisor. The legal advisor's duties included checking FRG legislation for possible inconsistency with allied rights in Berlin before it could be adopted in (West) Berlin. The Senate Liaison Officer was responsible for liaison with the "Senatskanzlei," the staff of the Governing Mayor and the Berlin Senat. The Public Safety Advisor was the Mission's liaison with the West Berlin Police, a vitally important function. In the absence of a peace treaty ending World War II, the allies were sovereign in the western sectors of Berlin, and the West Berlin Police operated under allied authority. This meant that if the West Berlin Police were to take any action which might touch on the Four Powers' area of responsibility, they needed a green light from the western allies. Each month, on a rotational basis, one of the three western allies was the chairman ally, and the relevant minister served as chairman. The Protocol Officer was our day-to-day liaison with the Soviet Embassy to the GDR. The British and French establishments in Berlin had analogous positions.

*Q: Let's start off with relationships. What were your relationships, first with the Soviets?*

GILMORE: My Soviet counterpart, who was also the counterpart of the British and French ministers, was Igor Fyodorovich Maksimychev, the deputy chief of mission at the Soviet embassy in East Berlin. Maksimychev was a senior Soviet German and West European specialist who spoke fluent German and French. He was an extraordinarily capable diplomat, and I grew to admire him quite a lot. I believe it was mutual. By the time my four years in Berlin were over and Berlin and Germany were unified, we had become friends.

The British Minister was Michael Burton, now Sir Michael Burton. I had two different French

counterparts. The first one, Jean-Marc Voelckel, who departed before the Wall "fell." The second was Francis Beauchataud. I had a close relationship with all of them, particularly with Michael Burton, who was the senior allied minister in terms of service. He'd been there about a year before my arrival and stayed on well after my departure.

I would emphasize that I also had close and productive relationships with the two governing mayors of Berlin during my tour of duty. The first was Eberhard Diepgen, a Christian Democrat. The second was Walter Momper, a Social Democrat. Diepgen's coalition lost the election of March 1989, and a new coalition of the Social Democrats and Greens headed by Walter Momper took office. Diepgen again became Berlin's governing mayor near the end of my tour. I had good personal relations with both, although there were some difficult moments relating to issues on which the governing mayor and Senat sometimes got impatient with us.

*Q: Can you give some examples, or an example?*

GILMORE: Some would have to do with very sensitive issues that we couldn't talk about in public at all. I will be careful how I describe this. The Allies were responsible for the security of the Western Sector of Berlin. We made no secret that we took that responsibility very seriously. There was a long history of provocations by the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, so we had to be careful. One of the things the three allies did was conduct surveillance in Berlin. Here I'm talking about surveillance of mail, telephone communications as well as signals intelligence. We couldn't divulge any of that to anybody, except especially cleared people in our own establishment. But those very few Berlin officials who knew or surmised that we were engaged in surveillance sometimes displayed resentment or disapproval.

Also there was a feeling sometimes on the part of Berlin officials that we Americans might be giving priority to projecting our own global concerns with Iranians or radical Arabs. For example, some Berliners seriously questioned the connection between the bombing of the La Belle disco in West Berlin and President Reagan's decision to bomb Libya.

Some Berlin officials felt that the allies' concerns with status issues were an anachronism. I sensed this more on the part of the Christian Democratic-led government when it was in power than the Red/Green Coalition -- the Social Democrats and the Greens. That may be counter-intuitive, but it was the case. But in any case, some officials in the Federal Republic and Berlin felt they had proved themselves good democrats, and they were, and capable administrators, and they were, and that therefore, they should be given even more scope to conduct their affairs in Berlin. The problem was international law, and the Western Allies' right to be in Berlin. That right had been challenged frontally by the Soviets for example by Khrushchev in his ultimatum of 1958 where he basically told the Allies to close their military missions in Berlin and go home close their military establishments, close their military operations in Berlin, unilaterally. We never considered that. We always held the Soviets to what we saw as legal commitments we'd all made in 1944 and 1945 and afterwards, concerning Berlin. In any case, the whole question of Berlin status and what rights status reserved to the Allies could become sensitive to members of the Berlin Senat and the Berlin governing mayor.

*Q: So often, in my interviews with people who dealt in international things note that the French*

*often veer off in a different direction. Did you find this happening here?*

GILMORE: Less. One of the most pleasurable things working in Berlin was the very close relationship we had with the British and the French. The French were very careful about their sovereignty including their sovereign rights in their sector of Berlin. Their sector hadn't been provided for in the original Berlin agreement, which was concluded by the Americans, British, and the Soviets. The French sector was subsequently added at the expense of the other two western sectors. I emphasize that the French were very careful about their Berlin obligations. The French had a very well-staffed establishment in Berlin. They always chose a very capable commandant, and also a very capable brigade commander. Our brigade commanders were usually one-star U.S. Army brigadiers, very carefully chosen. Both brigade commanders I served with went on to bigger things in the Army. One of them went on to earn three stars, the other, two. In fact, the Berlin Brigade commanders went farther in the Army than the commandants, who were already two star generals and very capable as well. But, in any case, the French were careful about how their sector operated. They could be very jealous of their rights should anybody challenge them, but we had no reason to challenge them. The French worked well with us and the British in the various Allied bodies. They had one or two diplomats in their establishment who I would say were genuine stars. There were French diplomats in Berlin as capable as anyone in the French diplomatic service, and destined for the top.

*Q: You're talking about dealing with the mayor and the Senat. Were they both of the same party or were they separate? Were they two different entities?*

GILMORE: The Berlin Senat, as I noted earlier, was the Berlin government. All of the senators...there was a senator for justice, a senator for building and construction, a senator for internal affairs, etc., were part of the Berlin government. The Governing Mayor appointed the Senat. Both governing mayors during my time were heads of coalition governments. The first government was a coalition of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats. Eberhard Diepgen of the Christian Democratic Union headed it; Walter Momper headed the second government, a coalition of the Social Democrats and the Greens. By the way, it was the first time the Greens had been part of a coalition government in Berlin, and there was great apprehension about how we would get along with them. In fact, shortly after Momper was elected in March of 1989, the Commandant, the Political Advisor, and I had breakfast with him and his top lieutenants. By the way, Momper is a very competent, open, very straightforward, friendly man. Very bright as well. And we often had breakfast with him at my deputy's (the POLAD's) residence. The participants were the commandant, the POLAD, and I, and Momper and his chief of staff, and I believe his press spokesman. We went over very carefully the whole question of Allied rights, including the most sensitive areas. We made the point that there was apprehension in some places about Greens being in the government, a concern that they would not understand the special Allied rights and the special Allied responsibilities for Berlin. Momper, I must say, was very careful about Allied rights. The Greens, who held none of the power positions in the Berlin Senate, turned out to be quite friendly overall. We'd have them to dinner or breakfast. They would come, some of them, in T-shirts and tennis shoes and jeans. But they turned out to be fine human beings, the ones we dealt with. And one or two of them, for example, turned out to be very capable officials, and we got along pretty well. Although, I must emphasize, that the Greens really weren't involved with the sensitive issues where status was concerned.

*Q: Well, at this time, was there, when you got out there in 1987, Gorbachev has been in power for some time now. Was there a feeling that we are really entering a new era, and it was positive? Or was there concern when things start getting soft, concessions might be made on Berlin which could make us feel very uncomfortable?*

GILMORE: Gorbachev was very much a factor. His *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* were coming into full flower then, and it was clear that there were deep-seated differences between Gorbachev and Honecker, who had been and was still the strong man in the German Democratic Republic. Of course the reporting on Honecker and the German Democratic Republic was done by our embassy to the GDR. The embassy was very capably led during my time in Berlin, first by Ambassador Frank Meehan, and then Ambassador Richard Barkley. Gorbachev exerted a strong influence in the GDR. He was far more popular than Honecker on the streets of East Berlin and elsewhere in the GDR. In his remarks to the press on October 6 and in his speech at the ceremony celebrating the 40th Anniversary of the establishment of the GDR Gorbachev clearly showed his impatience with Honecker foot-dragging on reform. In his October 7 speech Gorbachev noted the great interest in the GDR in the transformations occurring in the Soviet Union. But I may be getting ahead of the story just a little bit.

*Q: I think we might approach this somewhat chronologically, it probably works. So I'm trying to gather what it was like when you first arrived. Did you have the feeling that big things were going to happen. Or was it entering something that diplomats don't like, sort of a slippery period where things are kind of changing, and when things are changing you don't really know what's going to come out of it.*

GILMORE: When I first got there, there were still incidents at the Wall. In fact, at the beginning of 1989, in one of my earlier stints as allied chairman minister, I had to make a demarche on behalf of the Allies to Soviet Minister Maksimychev because there had been shootings and a death at the Wall. So, the situation at the Wall was still tough. "No Man's Land" and all the various barriers were still in place and the "shoot on sight" order was in force. On the other hand, there was quite a bit going on in inter-German relations. The Federal Republic had its Permanent Representation to the German Democratic Republic, staffed, by the way, with some very capable people, some of the best diplomats in the Federal Republic's service. One of them, the head of the Permanent Representation, Hans Otto Bräutigam, was, I think, the single most impressive German diplomat I had ever worked with. There was quite a bit going on in inter-German relations, particularly in the area of trade. Bonn was trying its best to make life easy as it could, or at least to make life easier for the population of the GDR, while making it clear that it looked toward the day when there would be peaceful reunification. The stated policy of the German Democratic Republic was that there could be German unification in a peaceful Europe through peaceful means, and that there should be free self-determination for the GDR. Meanwhile Bonn's weight in the diplomatic exchanges with the GDR was growing steadily.

The GDR, despite what some folks pointed to as its significant industrial accomplishments, was becoming more and more dependent on the Federal Republic economically. We could see it happening, but it didn't seem to be happening in any pell-mell fashion. It was just a steady, ongoing development. Otherwise, access to the Western section of Berlin still had to be

conducted in the established ways. If you came from the Federal Republic, you had to go through the right check points, with the right documentation. Soviet soldiers controlled your passport, actually it was your ID card, in Helmstedt and then again as you entered Berlin. So, what I'm saying is that many aspects of the Berlin situation hadn't changed really since 1971, since the quadripartite agreement, which the four powers, the British, French, Americans, and Soviets had negotiated to basically simplify, and to an extent codify, Allied travel arrangements. And also, to make it somewhat easier and more regular for Federal Republic citizens to visit the German Democratic Republic. But there was no substantial change, really, from 1971, from the days of the Quadripartite Agreement. Ten years later, the regime established by the Quadripartite Agreement was still very much in operation, and functioning pretty well, given the anomalies of Berlin.

*Q: When you arrived, were the Soviets still testing Allied rights?*

GILMORE: There was less of that. The Soviets still considered it vitally important that the Berlin Air Safety Center supervise air safety in the air corridors. There was a huge Soviet Air Force presence in the German Democratic Republic. The three air corridors, which should basically be seen as three squared tubes, had to be adjusted in accordance with Soviet military aviation exercises, and they were. But the Soviets played fair game within the rules that had been set up for the Berlin Air Safety Center. That worked. The access regime worked. When there was trouble at the Wall, when somebody was either captured or shot, or whatever, the allies would raise it with the Soviets. We didn't get much satisfaction, so to speak. When somebody who sought to escape over the Wall had been captured and we could see them being taken back into East Berlin, we would protest, and our Soviet counterparts would sometimes hint that there were ways that the two German states could deal with these questions. That was code reminding us that the person(s) captured could be bought out, perhaps. But the basics of the Berlin regime were very much in place.

At the same time, the Berlin Senat was reaching out, trying to have contacts with the German Democratic Republic. This was not always comfortable for the Allies. Of course, the allies and the Federal Republic coordinated overall management of the Berlin issues, through the so-called Bonn Group, which met regularly in Bonn. Representative of the FRG Foreign Office and the three Allied embassies met regularly, so there were special venues for discussing Berlin matters. And they were working fine. But there was still very much a Berlin regime that was, as I said, essentially unchanged since 1971, since the conclusion of the Quadripartite Agreement.

*Q: How about the intelligence scene. Popular image is Berlin was loaded with intelligence people who would almost get in each other's way.*

GILMORE: Well, there was a considerable intelligence presence in Berlin. On the military side, each of the three Allied commandants had under his wing an intelligence contingent. The U.S. had an extensive one, not only in terms of intelligence gathering through human intelligence sources, but also a capability in Berlin to monitor military communications which reached across the GDR and actually into Poland. That was all under the "cover," so to speak, of the Berlin Brigade. The British also had good intelligence capabilities. The French had theirs. We were less in close touch with the French on intelligence matters, but we knew they had capabilities too.

The Soviets and the "Stasi" [Staatssicherheitsdienst] of the German Democratic Republic ran intelligence operations of all kinds. Berlin was, in many ways a hive of intelligence activity.

That being said, to my knowledge there were no radically new intelligence "games" being initiated at the time of my arrival in Berlin. There was considerable intelligence activity, but each side pretty much knew what the other side was up to and capable of. Both the GDR and Soviet intelligence services sought to penetrate the U.S. Mission Berlin. We learned of specific penetration efforts when the GDR State Security Service collapsed and was dismantled with German unification.

The most productive source of intelligence on the Soviet military in the GDR (the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany) was the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (MLM). Military liaison missions were established in accordance with post-WWII Four Power agreements pertaining to the occupation of Germany and Berlin. The basic authority for establishing military liaison missions was a Four Power accord dating from 1945. In 1947 the U.S. and the USSR agreed to exchange military liaison missions. The U.S. MLM was quartered in Potsdam, while the Soviet MLM was quartered near Frankfurt. The British and the French had similar agreements with the USSR regarding MLM's. The U.S. MLM personnel would drive over the Glienicke Bridge from Berlin to Potsdam and then throughout the GDR. The U.S. MLM was staffed by top-notch U.S. military officers and was enormously successful in gathering useful intelligence on the GSF/G.

*Q: What were your relations with the Embassy Bonn?*

GILMORE: I had two different ambassadors. The first was Richard Burt; his deputy was Jim Dobbins [Ed: James Dobbins has an interview on file with ADST]. The second was Vernon Walters, a retired general, Lieutenant General Vernon Walters; his deputy was George Ward [ED. Ward also participated in the ADST interview program]. I had good relations with all four. I tended to be more directly in touch with the deputy chief of mission. He wrote my efficiency report, for one thing, and that was the channel both ambassadors and their predecessors, also, preferred. But of course, as chiefs of mission for Berlin, the ambassadors would come to Berlin at least yearly to meet with the Soviet ambassador to the GDR, their counterpart responsible, in Four Power terms, for Allied activities in Germany. So when Ambassador Walters would meet with Ambassador [Vyacheslav I.] Kochemasov, the Soviet ambassador to the German Democratic Republic, I would be at the meeting with the mission's Protocol Officer as note taker. I think the mission's relationships with Embassy Bonn were generally good. I worked hard to make it clear that I saw myself as on the ambassador's team.

*Q: Sometimes in our relations in Berlin, there has been concern from the Berlin perspective that an administration back in Washington might get a little too loose on Berlin. You know, things in Berlin were so scripted, tight, that lack of attention to detail might give away part of the store. Were you concerned about that during this time, which would have been the Bush administration, mostly.*

GILMORE: Not really. Ambassador "Roz" Ridgway, Rozanne Ridgway, who had been our ambassador to the German Democratic Republic, had become Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. She understood that Americans in Berlin and the British could become too enamored of

the fine points of what we all called "Berlinery," and that this could cause problems. She also well understood the importance of maintaining Allied rights, U.S. and Allied rights. So we had no real problem. She followed Berlin closely, not only because she was Assistant Secretary, but because her predecessors did as well. Before he was sent to Bonn, Ambassador Richard Burt, had also been Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. George Vest had preceded Burt as assistant secretary. Vest is, by the way, one of my candidates for top Foreign Service officer of the century. I mean that very carefully. So we had no real issues there. Occasionally officers who had served in Berlin and who were back on a second tour of duty in Berlin in a higher ranking capacity...some of them could get a little impatient with Washington for not being careful about how visitors entered Berlin. Occasionally, we would learn of official visitors, for example, traveling directly to East Berlin, which we legally did not recognize as part of the GDR, rather than via West Berlin. When we negotiated the opening of our embassy to the GDR, we made it clear that it was our embassy "to the GDR," not "in the GDR," for legal reasons. And, occasionally, people who served in our embassy to the GDR would get impatient with what they called "Berlinery." And that was all out there. But by and large, there weren't major frictions.

*Q: How about with the military? One of the concerns was that some young soldier might run off with a tank, or something like that. Did you have any problems of that nature?*

GILMORE: Yes, as a matter of fact, once when I was there, I don't remember the details exactly...a Soviet tank driver took off with a tank and drove it around Berlin. He wasn't trying to hurt anybody. I don't know whether he had drunk too much. I think there were indications that he was all upset because he'd had trouble with his girlfriend. But that was a potential danger.

Our ambassadors to the German Democratic Republic were sometimes concerned that U.S. military assigned not only in Berlin, to the Berlin Brigade, but also those assigned to units in the Federal Republic were visiting Berlin on the weekend, and were using U.S.-Four Power right to go to East Berlin without visas, just showing their ID cards, and buying up a lot of subsidized goods the GDR state had provided for the GDR population, which was needy. So we had a bit of that. And there was also a certain sensitivity from various quarters about possible contacts between the U.S. military establishment in West Berlin and personnel of the Soviet Group of Forces, Germany. Strictly speaking, only U.S. military personnel authorized to have contact with personnel of the GSFG were officers from the U.S. Military Liaison Mission. The MLM was not part of the Berlin Brigade or other U.S. military units stationed in (West) Berlin. The same was true of the British and French MLMs.

*Q: You mentioned that the public safety, i.e., the police function, became important. Were there issues during the pre-fall of the Wall, 1989 period, of police problems in which you became involved?*

GILMORE: No, not specifically. In each sector, the Public Safety Advisor cultivated very close relationships with his West Berlin police counterparts, and all three public safety advisors, British, French, and American, had good relationships with the top officials of the West Berlin police, as did the Political Advisor, my deputy, and I. There occasionally would be questions of whether Allied rights in Berlin might unduly limit or inhibit what the Berlin police could do in a given situation. In fact, when we get to it, I'll talk particularly about the night the Wall opened,

because there was a very important decision – an unprecedented decision -- we had to take, giving the Berlin police more scope for their operations. But, by and large, our relationships with the police were very good, in fact, excellent. Occasionally, the Justice Senator, would drop hints that the Allies were -- and this isn't strictly police work -- the Allies were being a little "cowboy-like," in terms of their intelligence operations in Berlin. We didn't really agree with that, to put it in plain English. We were careful to be circumspect and professional, but we weren't about to be schooled by the Berlin Senat about security matters that we had responsibility for. We would listen, but we weren't about to be schooled.

*Q: This question refers to the bombing of the disco. What about the GDR operating with or assisting either terrorists or its own people messing around with Berlin. Was there much of that?*

GILMORE: Well, we watched for that. At one point, for example, my first Commandant (Commandant of the American Sector, Berlin), Major General John Mitchell, and I were required to have a Berlin police escort for all our appointments and travel around the city. This was because there had been threats against us. They came, we think, from terrorists associated with the Bader-Meinhof gang and their successors who were operating out of East Berlin. It turns out that there was quite a considerable connection between the GDR state security service and the Bader-Meinhof gang and the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction). There was some tension there between us and the West Berlin government. But when it came to the Arabs and the others, we had the ability, and we thought the responsibility, to monitor through various surveillance mechanisms, communications into and out of Berlin. And we were careful to target potential terrorist threats. That's how we came upon the La Belle preparations that I mentioned earlier. As you recall, my deputy, when I was still Central European Affairs Director, had called in the GDR Charge` d'Affaires. We didn't know specifically it was La Belle that was targeted, but we knew from intelligence....

*Q: That was what? Explain what this was.*

GILMORE: I have to be careful. Basically, through our intelligence surveillance capabilities we became aware of information which indicated that a target in West Berlin was being looked at by Arab operatives. We concluded from piecing together various kinds of information that it was Libya that was behind it. We didn't know the target was going to be La Belle. Of course, it was well before I got to Berlin that La Belle was actually bombed. I was still the Director of Central European Affairs in the Department of State. But the La Belle aftermath was still in the air when I arrived. And of course, the U.S. bombed Libya in retaliation.

The reason I have to be careful here is that I did so much work on Berlin as EUR/CE Director that it's hard to be sure where I worked on a given Berlin issue. From Berliner and other German colleagues and friends I heard, initially, great skepticism about why we had bombed Libya. In retrospect, now that the East German state security service has been dismantled, I hope that our German colleagues in responsible government positions no longer have such skepticism about how La Belle happened and why we reacted as we did.

*Q: Did you and your Allied representatives sense that the East Germans were a bit caught off guard by this? Because this doesn't make any sense for East Germans to be housing Arabs who*

*were going to bomb an American-frequented place. What I'm wondering is whether you had the feeling that they weren't going to let this sort of thing happen again, particularly the way we reacted.*

GILMORE: Well, although the East Germans presumably would never have told us so officially, it is possible that post La Belle they may have tightened their monitoring and control of some of these groups. To my knowledge, the East Germans never approached us to acknowledge any connection with the La Belle bombing. Of course, after La Belle we monitored very carefully – even more carefully than before the La Belle bombing – the potential for any further violence in West Berlin, particularly against U.S. forces. But, from what I know, I am absolutely sure President Reagan had the right target in mind when he bombed Libya. He knew where the ultimate source of the action against La Belle was.

*Q: Kind of leading up to the fall of the Wall, I take it events up through the summer of 1989, things are pretty well going in a straightforward manner, the way they'd been going for some years.*

GILMORE: For those of us living and working in West Berlin, the full extent of the East German people's discontent with the GDR regime was at first difficult to assess. We knew there was a considerable pent-up desire on the part of East Germans to travel abroad freely, especially to West Berlin. But the depth of their disenchantment and disaffection with the GDR authorities and the Socialist Unity Party regime became more apparent in September and October, 1989.

The East Germans had a tremendous pent-up desire to travel freely, particularly to West Berlin and the Federal Republic. I think what really began to bring home to me the depth of frustration and disaffection of the people in the GDR was the behavior of those attending the Monday evening "freedom prayer" service at the Nicolaikierche (Nickolai Church) in Leipzig. The first large public demonstration there took place on September 4, 1989. The Monday evening "freedom prayers" had been held at the church in previous weeks, but on September 4 the throng attending the service spilled out into the streets of Leipzig near and around the church. The behavior of the crowd was entirely peaceful, and at each subsequent Monday evening prayer service the number of participants mushroomed, until on October 23 the throng had swelled to 300,000.

Meanwhile, in September, 1989 the Hungarian Government took a very courageous decision. The Hungarians announced that their border guards would no longer honor agreements to turn back GDR and other citizens of Warsaw Pact member states who sought to cross from Hungary into Austria. With this, the Hungarians formally broke ranks with the other Warsaw Pact member states. Heretofore the practice had been that GDR citizens who traveled to other Warsaw Pact member states would not be permitted to travel onward to countries outside the Warsaw Pact without proper documentation. In fact, already in May, without fanfare, the Hungarians had opened their border with Austria to East Germans who had traveled to Hungary. The more enterprising – some might say more desperate – East Germans quickly realized they could drive to Hungary via Czechoslovakia, cross over into Austria, and then proceed to the Federal Republic.

*Q: Yes, going to Hungary through Czechoslovakia, well the Czechs were still pretty...*

GILMORE: Pretty tight. The East Germans traveling through Czechoslovakia, into Hungary and then across the border to Austria were improperly documented, according to GDR law. Of course, the FRG cheered Hungary on, and by the way, rewarded it through economic assistance and political solidarity. Meanwhile, the ferment in the GDR grew exponentially throughout October. In early October, I believe on October 3, Governing Mayor Momper invited the Allied ministers and POLADs to the first of a series of debriefings on what he and Berlin Senat officials, especially Senat Chancellery Chief, Dr. Dieter Schroeder, were hearing in their meetings with GDR leaders. The 40th anniversary of the GDR was October 7, and Erich Honecker intended it to be a huge celebration of the success of the GDR as well as his personal success as the successor to Walter Ulbricht. Gorbachev was coming.

Meanwhile, the "Monday prayers" in Leipzig continued, and the crowds who greeted Gorbachev in East Berlin on October 6 and 7 saw him as a symbol of change and reform. They shouted "Gorbi, Berlin," welcoming him with genuine enthusiasm while largely ignoring Honecker. Honecker was quite ill, and it was becoming clear that he did not have many months to live. Gorbachev's presence gave the "reformers" in the GDR leadership a big boost while delivering a tacit rebuff to Honecker. On October 18 Honecker was ousted. Technically, he asked to be relieved for reasons of health, but there is no doubt he was forced to leave. The Socialist Unity Party chose Egon Krenz as his successor, hoping that the younger and more vigorous Krenz would be seen by the GDR populace as a sign of the regime's commitment to change.

The GDR leadership grappled with the need to revamp its travel regime. Here the U.S. Mission as well as our British and French allies had an interesting window on what was happening. Momper had developed ties to Günther Schabowski, a key member of the SED leadership and the regime's press spokesman. He and Momper met several times, and Momper debriefed us. Schabowski informed Momper about the Politburo and Central Committee's debate of a new travel regulations law. The GDR's first version didn't commit the regime to full freedom of travel and was rejected by the populace. Schabowski told Momper on November 3 that a new version was ready to be promulgated.

In the meantime, on November 4 the first large demonstration in East Berlin took place on Alexanderplatz. Freedom of travel was one of the demonstrators' key demands. On November 6 the party newspaper Neues Deutschland published the text of the new travel law which again fell far short of the expectations of the GDR populace. The huge Monday evening demonstrations in Leipzig continued, and on November 6 the number of demonstrators grew to 5000,000.

*Q: God!*

GILMORE: Can you imagine 500,000 in Leipzig, which is not nearly the size of Berlin. Meanwhile, I should add, and I take great pride in this, the U.S. mission and U.S. Command Berlin had put in place a couple of weeks earlier a round-the-clock operation monitoring developments in Berlin. My deputy/political adviser Jim Williams and Chief of Staff Col. John Counts played the leading role in organizing and overseeing this effort. We didn't know what, ultimately, would happen, but we could see the pressure for change mounting dramatically.

*Q: The Leipzig demonstrations, if it was that big in a not really major city, I would think there would be copycat demonstrations in other places too, yes?*

GILMORE: You could see manifestations elsewhere in the GDR, but the biggest and most significant were in Leipzig, and then very late in the game, East Berlin. The other manifestations included, above all, East Germans getting into their little two-cylinder Trabant cars and driving across Czechoslovakia to Hungary and then over the border to Austria. The question arose of where else they might go. A sizeable number of East Germans traveling in Czechoslovakia sought "refuge" in the Federal Republic's embassy in Prague, refusing to leave until they could travel onward to the FRG. On November 3, the GDR Foreign Ministry announced that these "refugees" could travel back across the GDR in closed trains and proceed ultimately to the FRG.

*Q: As you were watching this, at what point before the very end game, did the Berlin Mission conclude, "This whole thing is going blow?"*

GILMORE: We could see that the new GDR leadership under Krenz did not capture the hearts and minds of the East Germans. Krenz and company were not ready to go nearly far enough with reform. Of course, our embassy to the GDR had the principal responsibility for reporting and analyzing developments in the GDR. As I noted earlier, at the very beginning of October we decided on our own at the U.S. Mission, in close coordination with the U.S. Commandant, Berlin and this chief of staff to prepare daily "sitreps" (situation reports) on developments in and relating to Berlin and allied responsibilities in Berlin.

We realized we were witnessing a burgeoning wave of popular discontent and unrest in East Germany which focused initially on the goal of freedom of travel. But by the third week on October the agenda of the citizens' movements "New Freedom" had broadened to include freedom of the press and free elections.

In response to your question whether we said, "This whole thing is going to blow," I would say we did not know where, ultimately, this wave of popular discontent would lead. And I doubt whether anyone else did either at that period.

In fact, the situation did take a sudden dramatic turn on the evening of November 9. Shortly before 6:00 p.m. GDR Politburo member and spokesman Günther Schabowski held a press conference to report the results of the SED Central Committee meeting earlier in the day. He announced that at the Politburo's recommendation, the Central Committee had decided to put into effect a portion of a new draft law on travel which would make it possible for every citizen to travel abroad at all the crossing points of the GDR. Several of the approximately one hundred journalists present pressed Schabowski on when these new regulations would take effect. Schabowski had not attended the Central Committee meeting. He had been given a slip of paper summarizing the new regulations before beginning his press briefing. He vainly searched his briefing paper for guidance as the journalists asked "Immediately" ("sofort")? "Only with a passport?" and "When does this take effect?" Finally, Schabowski allowed that it must be immediately ("sofort") that the new regulations were valid.

Excerpts of Schabowski's statements were quickly broadcast throughout Berlin and East Germany. Soon East Berliners begin to gather at the checkpoints along the Berlin Wall. They showed their documents and sought to cross into West Berlin. At the Bornholmerstrasse checkpoint they shouted that they had heard Schabowski's announcement and were determined to cross into West Berlin. The GDR border guards had no instruction and at about 10:30 p.m. let the most vociferous of the East Berliners cross. This news was immediately broadcast to virtually every household in Berlin and East Germany. The ranks of those seeking to cross into West Berlin grew like wildfire. By about 11:30 p.m. the guards at Bornholmerstrasse let everyone pass. Soon, all the Berlin checkpoints were open and East Berliners were flooding into West Berlin.

Governing Mayor Momper and his staff had been monitoring the situation closely since Schabowski's press conference. Momper met with key members of the Senat to review and speed up preparations for a possible large influx of East Berliners and other East Germans. He made a brief TV appearance and drove to the wall. At the Brandenburg Gate, where a cluster of West Berliners had climbed onto the wall, Momper urged West Berlin Police President Georg Schertz to take all possible measures to bring order to the surging crowds. Schertz reminded Momper that because the Berlin Wall had been carefully constructed to stand just inside East Berlin, the West Berlin police were not permitted to approach it or the sector boundary.

The Allied chairmanship in West Berlin rotated monthly among the British, French and Americans. The United States was the Allied chairman ally November and I, as the United States Minister and Deputy Commandant of the American Sector, Berlin was Governing Mayor Momper's point of contact with the Allies.

It was sometime after 11:00 p.m. and before midnight when Momper telephoned me. I had returned home earlier from the U.S. Mission where I had briefly checked in with my deputy, POLAD Jim Williams, and other members of the Mission staff. Momper and I were on a first name basis and he came directly to the point. "Harry," he said, "we have a problem." He observed that bedlam was breaking loose at the Wall and indicated that Schertz had told him he and his officers could not physically approach the wall or pass through it into East Berlin because of Allied restrictions. Because of the restrictions, Schertz indicated to Momper that he and the West Berlin Police could not maintain order and were very concerned about somebody being trampled. Momper then added something further that I have not reported exactly until now. He said, "Harry, you know we are going to get the store back soon." Meanwhile, he contended, "the police need flexibility." In accordance with established procedures and because of the acute political sensitivity of West Berlin police encroaching or crossing the sector boundary into the Soviet sector, I should have consulted our British and French allies and higher U.S. authority before responding to Mr. Momper's request. But this would have taken far too much time.

From frequent conversations about possible contingencies, I knew that the U.S. Commandant, Major General Raymond Haddock would favor immediate positive action. I also was sure that the U.S. ambassador to Germany, Vernon Walters and, above all, President George H.W. Bush would want us to do everything possible to ensure the safety of the tens of thousands of Berliners seeking to pass through the wall. I was confident, too, that our British and French allies would share this view. I therefore assured Mr. Momper, on the spot, that the Allies would take

immediate steps to permit greater latitude to the police.

When I hung up, I called General Haddock, who immediately concurred. I then gave appropriate instructions to our public safety adviser, Frank Collins, our official liaison with the West Berlin police. Within minutes, we had given the police the flexibility they needed to establish order at the Wall. Amid the teeming, surging crowds, no one was seriously injured at the Wall that night.

Our British and French counterparts subsequently gave their full support. Although I would have preferred to inform my Soviet counterpart in East Berlin personally and immediately, I decided not to risk complicating the already delicate situation. He and I were in regular contact before and after the Wall opened, and he had indicated that the Soviets, under Mikhail S. Gorbachev, intended to keep their troops away from demonstrators and crowds so long as they were not provoked.

*Q: Well, what did the West Berlin police do in East Germany?*

GILMORE: They went up to and through the checkpoints at the Wall to ensure that the throngs gathered there would be able to cross into West Berlin in an orderly manner. We need to remind ourselves that the West Berlin police were a highly professional force. They were well trained in and experienced with crowd control. Meanwhile, the East German border guards at the Wall were without instructions and had fallen apart. So, basically, what the West Berlin police did was to go through the wall at established corridors at the checkpoints. The key point is that they were able to regulate the flow of the enormous crowds seeking to cross into West Berlin on that historic night. It is also important to note that the West Berlin police took control of the checkpoints and some immediately contiguous areas in East Berlin only temporarily and solely for the purpose of crowd control. They made no effort to remain longer than was necessary to achieve that objective.

I want to emphasize that the throngs of East Berliners and other East Germans who crossed through the Berlin Wall the night of November 9-10 were peaceful and generally quite orderly. As one of my colleagues at our embassy to the GDR later quipped, "Remember that the East Germans are Prussians; they don't step on the grass even when they make a resolution." It was the sheer volume of the crowds seeking to pass through the narrow crossing points in the Berlin Wall which made crowd control so important.

The possibility of negative Soviet reaction to the movement of the West Berlin police up to the Wall and through the checkpoints, although slight, in my view, was very much on my mind that night. I didn't reach my Soviet counterpart, Minister Maksimychev, until the next day. Significantly, he did not express concern about the actions of the West Berlin police.

Maksimychev and I were in frequent contact the days after the Wall opened. He indicated that the Soviets, too, were concerned that there be no clashes between demonstrators and soldiers of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany stationed throughout East Germany. Maksimychev made it clear that the Soviet authorities intended to keep their troops stationed in East Germany away from demonstrations and crowds, so long as they were not provoked.

What I should do now is talk about how within the U.S. Command and U.S. Mission, Berlin and among the three Western allies we had discussed possible contingencies requiring crowd control at the Berlin Wall. I do not want to imply that we had foreseen the chain of events which led to the opening or "fall" of the Wall. We had not. But we had discussed in very general terms what we should and shouldn't do in the case of some kind of large-scale movement of East Berliners and other East Germans near, at, over or through the wall.

The U.S. Command, Berlin had an informal institution called "Top Team." The participants in the Top Team included the Commandant, the Berlin Brigade Commander, the Chief of Staff, the Minister/Deputy Commandant, the Political Adviser and several other senior U.S. military and civilian officials. The Top Team met on an ad hoc basis at the invitation of the Commandant. Traditionally, no notes were taken at Top Team gatherings, and participants were encouraged to "think outside the box."

From informal conversations among top U.S. officials and discussions at Top Team gatherings an informal consensus developed that troops from the U.S. Berlin Brigade should not be used to perform any kind of crowd control function or other police work.

The top Berlin officials of the three Western Allies met periodically – I believe it was usually once a year – to review issues related to the security and defense of West Berlin. The Allies had a plan for the possible contingency of hostile military action against West Berlin. In that forum we also discussed in very general terms what role Allied troops should play in various contingencies. The basic principle of not using soldiers from the Allied brigades at or near the Wall for purposes of crowd control enjoyed the tacit support of all the Allied officials. So when I responded immediately and positively to governing Mayor Momper's request for Allied authorization for the West Berlin Police to approach the sector boundary and the Berlin Wall itself in order to control the massive flow of East Berliners and other East Germans through the checkpoints, I was confident it was the right thing to do in that emergency situation. Strictly speaking, had there been more time, I would have first consulted with higher U.S. authority and then with our British and French allies in Berlin. But there was, in fact, no time for this. In retrospect, I feel very good about my decision. When I talked with my British counterpart, Michael Burton, a short while after taking it, he was totally supportive. So was my French counterpart, Francis Beauchataud when I briefed him. As I noted earlier, when I next talked with my Soviet counterpart, Igor Maksimychev, I indicated in general terms what had transpired. He did not have any specific reaction.

I believe that the professionalism and expertise in crowd control displayed by the West Berlin Police were very important in facilitating the peaceful and secure flow of East Berliners and other East Germans into and out of West Berlin that historic night. The influx of East Berliners and other East Germans was huge. I have a note in my papers which tells me that during the first weekend of the opening of the wall, i.e. Saturday November 11 and Sunday November 12, more than two million East Berliners and other East Germans visited West Berlin. Huge, indeed!

*Q: This was not a flow to the West to leave East Germany. This was just a flow to see West Berlin; to come and see it, and go back, and be prepared to come back again.*

GILMORE: Yes. And here I would observe that governing Mayor Momper and the West Berlin government, the Senat, worked very, very hard in organizing the reception of the flood of East German visitors. One of the most important and difficult tasks was to provide "Begruessungsgeld" ("Greetings Money") for each East German visitor. The visitors had no FRG currency, so the "Greetings Money" was essential. Through an all-out, almost super-human effort the West Berlin government succeeded in disbursing the "Greetings Money" effectively.

The U.S. Army Berlin Brigade gave important logistical support to the West Berlin government's effort. For example, the brigade placed all of its field kitchen and water supply equipment at the government's disposal.

As I remember those heady days immediately following the opening or "fall" of the Berlin Wall, a series of vignettes comes to mind. The first is of a seemingly endless tide of visitors coursing up and down every major street in downtown West Berlin. A number of the visitors are pushing baby carriages. There is a run on any and all shops and markets which sell bananas. There had been no bananas available in East Germany for a long time. On Saturday, November 11, there is a particularly heavy stream of visitors, some in their tiny Trabant cars, others on foot, flowing from Potsdam, across the Glienicke Bridge into Berlin.

Our envoy to the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Vernon Walters, who had also had the title Chief of Mission, Berlin, traveled from Bonn to Berlin on November 11. Shortly after his arrival the U.S. Commandant arranged for Ambassador Walters to take a helicopter ride over the city. The Commandant, his Chief of Staff, Col. John Counts, and I accompanied the ambassador. The helicopter ride offered a bird's-eye view of the scene at the Glienicke Bridge, and it was a sight to behold: a seemingly endless stream of mini two-cylinder Trabant cars loaded to the gills together with a parallel stream of pedestrians of all ages, heading in one direction – West Berlin. Hundreds of West Berliners were packed tightly along the sides of the road. Many West Berliners were thrusting flowers through the windows of the Trabants. Others were handing money to the children. Many of the adults were crying. Willy Brandt, FRG Chancellor and Governing Mayor of Berlin when the wall was erected in 1961, captured the primary emotion of the throngs when he said, "Finally, we Germans have good fortune (Glueck) on our side."

Overall, I was struck by how orderly the huge flows of visitors had been. True, there were a few rougher moments at places like the Brandenburg Gate, where some unruly elements climbed onto the wall to celebrate. But the amazing thing is that in all the tumult surrounding the opening ("fall") of the Wall; no one was trampled or seriously injured. Some people were bumped and jostled, but overall the process was peaceful and orderly.

*Q: Did the Stasi, or the state police, just sort of throw up their hands?*

GILMORE: Well, that's probably a good metaphor to describe their behavior. The Volkspolizei, the people's police, who manned the watchtowers and checkpoints along the Berlin Wall had no instructions, and once the Wall opened, they did not try to impede the surge of humanity passing through the checkpoints that night. In subsequent days, security was tightened where the Berlin Wall meets the Brandenburg Gate in order to prevent people from climbing onto the wall to celebrate. In the first hours after the wall opened, a number of younger people, many of them

West Berliners, had climbed onto the wall at the Brandenburg Gate where the "crown" of the wall was unusually wide. They danced and sang and drank. Some got pretty unruly, and a few fell off the wall and were slightly injured. Otherwise, there were no reports of serious injuries stemming from the opening of the wall.

*Q: What was the feeling within the ranks of your office? Do you feel that this is the millennium or something?*

GILMORE: At the U.S. Mission, Berlin we shared the elation of the overwhelming majority of Germans, East and West, who were enjoying each other virtually without restriction for the first time since the end of World War II. You couldn't help but feel the elation. Families had been divided by the wall. East Germans who had tried to escape over the wall had been killed as recently as February 1989.

By and large, the staff of the U.S. Mission also felt strongly that the course of the United States and its British and French allies had been proven correct. The very fact that the Soviets were again asserting their Four Power rights regarding Berlin and Germany seemed to vindicate our steadfast position on the importance of maintaining our Four Power rights in order to keep the German Question open so that someday we would be able to achieve genuine self-determination for Berliners and East Germans. I think we all felt very good about that.

At the beginning of December 1989 the Soviet Union called for a meeting of the quadripartite powers at the ambassadorial level in the Allied Control Council building in West Berlin. This represented a sharp about-face for the Soviets who had pulled out of the Allied Control Council in March, 1948, maintaining that the Western Powers (U.S. British and French) were destroying the quadripartite basis for governing Germany. The four powers did meet formally in Berlin in 1972 to sign the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin they had negotiated in 1970-71. On December 11, 1989 the Soviet ambassador to the GDR and the United States, British and French ambassadors to the Federal Republic met in the Allied Control Authority building. The call for the meeting was a clear indication that the Soviets had decided that their four power rights were important and relevant. The leader of the Federal Republic did not applaud this quadripartite meeting. Some saw it as an indication that the four powers intended to step in to shape Germany's future, possibly along lines that might be detrimental to Germany's interests. In fact, however, there was only one such quadripartite meeting, and nothing of substance transpired. The United States was not in favor of more such quadripartite meetings.

Attempts to reform the German Democratic Republic failed. Hans Modrow, the German Democratic Republic Unity Party leader in Dresden, became the GDR Prime Minister on November 13, 1989. Egon Krenz was ousted as Socialist Unity Party leader on December 7 and resigned as Chairman of the State Council on December 9. A special congress of the Socialist Unity Party in East Berlin on December 8 and failed to dissolve the party and instead produced a half-baked compromise in which the party became the "Socialist Unity Party – Party of Democratic Socialism." Gregor Gysi was elected chairman of the SED-PDS (here I used the German Acronym) and Hans Modrow and Wolfgang Berghofer were elected as his deputies.

To telescope what happened subsequently, there was an election in the GDR on March 18, 1990.

What emerged was a surprise to most observers. There was a widespread expectation that the newly-reconstructed SED-PDS would probably be the leading vote getter and that while unification with the Federal Republic of Germany would be the ultimate goal, unification would be a gradual process. In fact, the March, 1990 elections, the first and only free elections in the GDR, saw the Christian Democratic Union emerge as by far the strongest political party. And there was a majority favoring unification with the FRG.

A coalition government headed by the Christian Democrat Lothar de Maziere assumed power. Its primary task was to participate in negotiations on unification with the Federal Republic. These negotiations were known as the "Four Plus Two" or "Two Plus Four" negotiations. The "Four" were the U.S., USSR, Britain and France, and the "Two" were the FRG and GDR.

During the "Two Plus Four" negotiations the U.S. Mission remained in close contact with Governing Mayor Momper and his staff. The Mission reported in detail on the issues and problems involved in the reunification of Berlin and its integration with Brandenburg and the other former areas of the German Democratic Republic. I leave it to colleagues in Washington, Bonn and East Berlin to present their accounts of the overall unification process.

On October 2, 1990, the day before the "Day of Unity" celebrating the unification of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic and the reunification of Berlin, the American, British and French commandants and ministers had a final meeting with Berlin Governing Mayor Momper. We presented him with a letter of congratulations signed by all six of us. The letter noted that the three allies' commitment to Berlin was "based on a conviction that freedom, democracy and self-determination must be upheld wherever they are threatened at whatever the cost." It paid tribute to the "remarkable courage, energy and irrepressible sense of humor of the Berliners which helped to keep spirits high even during the rigors of the blockade and in the shadow of the cruel Berlin Wall." The letter also praised the "fusion of Allied commitment and the Berliners' resolve which, together with the vital and generous support and determination of the Federal Republic, laid the foundation for the fulfillment of our hopes." Ambassador Walters came to Berlin for the ceremonies celebrating the "Day of Unity." He was the only American official invited to the celebration. The allied commandants and ministers were invited to a quieter reception in downtown Berlin where we could see the fireworks through the windows.

The unification of the German Democratic Republic with the Federal Republic of Germany and the concomitant reunification of Berlin rendered the U.S. Embassy in Bonn to the GDR and U.S. Mission Berlin anachronistic. Berlin was once again to be the capital of the united Germany. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn would not move to Berlin until the German government moved from Bonn to Berlin. In the meantime, a post called U.S. Embassy Office Berlin would be established. The chancellery of our former Embassy to the GDR would serve as the headquarters of Embassy Office Berlin. Ambassador Walters strongly favored this location because it was very close to the premises of the pre-WWII U.S. Embassy. He also felt we were turning over a new leaf in leaving the headquarters of the U.S. Command Berlin and U.S. Mission Berlin in Clayallee in the upscale suburban district of Berlin called Zehlendorf.

Embassy Office Berlin would cover four German states – "Laender" in German. They were Berlin; Brandenburg; Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; and Saxony-Anhalt. Todd Becker, a veteran

FSO with considerable experience in Germany, had been designated as the principal officer of a new consulate general in Leipzig. Embassy Office Berlin would provide administrative support for Mr. Becker and the Consulate General for an initial period.

On learning that I was to be the principal officer of Embassy Office Berlin, I had originally proposed that I have two deputies during a short transition period. John Nix, my deputy at U.S. Mission Berlin, would focus particularly on closing the Mission and consolidating the administrative and consular work of the new Embassy Office. He would also be our point of contact with the command of the U.S. forces which would remain in Berlin for a limited period at the request of the German government. At the end of the transition period, Mr. Nix would become the permanent deputy principal officer of Embassy Office Berlin.

Meanwhile, James Bindenagel, the former deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy to the GDR, would coordinate the Embassy Office's efforts to establish new and deepen our existing contacts with the leaders and key decision-makers in the four new states. A short time before the "Day of Unity" learned that my two-deputy idea was not accepted and that Mr. Bindenagel was to be given a new position, outside the formal charge of command as my special adviser, as principle officer. When I was informed of this decision, I immediately arranged to meet Mr. Bindenagel at his home to inform him of it.

On the morning of October 4, 1990 Mr. Nix and I drove in my official vehicle from our homes in Zehlendorf to the headquarters of the Embassy Office to assume our new duties. A huge traffic jam prevented us from reaching the Embassy Office by car, so we left our driver stuck in the traffic snafu and walked the final mile or two to the Embassy Office. When we reached the Embassy Office, the local police posted in the square outside the building and initially denied us permission to enter!

Opening day at Embassy Office Berlin was a sad day for the German Foreign Service National employees of our Embassy to the GDR. One of my very first items of business was informing them that their services were no longer required. This was done with dignity and professionalism as their American supervisors personally handed the German FSN employees written notification of termination. It was sad because a number of the embassy's FSNs apparently thought they had a chance of being employed by the Embassy Office. The German FSNs were permitted to apply for positions in the Embassy Office, but in fact there had been a policy decision to terminate all of them.

*Q: Why was that?*

GILMORE: The decision was based on security concerns – a judgment that they had all been compromised.

In the period between the opening/fall of the Berlin Wall and the "Day of Unity" a team of security officers from Washington had come to Berlin to interview the FSN's. I learned of this after the fact and never received a proper briefing on their mission or its results. Apparently, some of the German FSN's from the Embassy assumed that if they came clean about their cooperation with the Stasi or other intelligence services, they would be eligible for employment

in the Embassy Office. I remember vividly the reaction of the driver of our ambassador to the GDR on receiving his notification of termination. He sat down in the motor pool and sobbed uncontrollably for several hours.

I shall note here that a number of the staff positions at the Embassy to the GDR which would at many U.S. embassies had been filled by Foreign Service National employees from the host country were filled by third-country nationals, i.e., non-Germans. Some of these third-country nationals were employed in Embassy Office Berlin.

U.S. Mission Berlin had also employed a number of locally hired Germans and third country nationals. With few exceptions, they served with competence and dedication, some of them for a number of years. All but a handful lost their positions with the closing of the Mission, although some remained on the job during a brief transition period. Not surprisingly, a number of them were quite bitter about what they perceived as unfair treatment by the U.S. Government despite their dedicated service.

Virtually all the U.S. Foreign Service and other U.S. Government personnel at the Embassy to the GDR and U.S. Mission Berlin would have preferred to complete their tours of duty in Berlin by joining the staff of Embassy Office Berlin. Unfortunately for them, Embassy Office Berlin did not have nearly enough positions to employ them all. A number of those who were not offered positions in Embassy Office Berlin and therefore faced curtailment of their tours of duty and early re-assignment were keenly disappointed. Some believed they were treated unfairly. Both the Embassy to the GDR and U.S. Mission Berlin had performed very effectively during the year of upheaval in the GDR and Berlin that saw the fall of the Berlin Wall and the unification of the GDR and the FRG. A number of very capable American professionals had their tours of duty curtailed.

The launching of the embassy office presented tough management issues which made it difficult to foster a sense of team spirit and common purpose. The two most difficult issues were: first, curtailment and onward assignments; and second, housing. I have already mentioned curtailments. American personnel whose tours of duty were curtailed faced the problem of finding appropriate onward assignments outside the normal assignment cycle.

The second issue was inequity in the housing situations of former employees of our embassy to the GDR, on the one hand, and former U.S. Mission employees on the other. The American employees who had been on the staff of the mission had housing which was vastly superior to that of the staff of the embassy. On balance, I believe the embassy office handled these issues with grace and dignity.

Establishing a comprehensive reporting effort on the four “laender” (states) within the embassy office purview also presented a formidable challenge. Three of the laender had new leaders and no real budgets and few or no experienced personnel to perform essential staff functions. Important new issues including privatization and the industrial reorganization of the former GDR and major industrial and agricultural pollution problems needed to be addressed.

Subsequent to my departure on reassignment in the summer of 1991, I understand that the

embassy office subsequently received an award for its reporting. In that regard, I would like to note that more than one colleague at our embassy in Bonn would say to me, "Harry, you folks at the embassy office should remember the old adage about whether the glass if half empty or half full. We think sometimes that your reporting proceeds from the position that the glass is half empty, when you could look at the same set of facts and conclude the glass was half full." These were the kinds of hints I received from Bonn that our reporting was too pessimistic. But, I think, in retrospect, our reporting was very measured, and quite accurate. I believe we did not exaggerate the hurdles in the reunification process for the average citizen of the former GDR. If anything, I think more skepticism and more emphasis on the difficulties in the reunification process might have been in order. But, I'm proud of the role John Nix and my other colleagues at the embassy office and I played in that reporting effort.

Maybe I should present a vignette which illustrates how different the prevailing attitudes of Germans from the former GDR were from those of Germans in the Federal Republic. U.S. military actions against Iraq in the First Gulf war were generally applauded in the Federal Republic, but they triggered a relatively hefty protest against the Embassy Office. The protesters appeared to be generally young people. They carried candles and were in no way noisy or violent. They apparently didn't believe that any use of force against Iraq to compel the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait was justified. The protesters conducted what might be described as a "vigil." They did make access to or egress from the embassy office difficult. The former GDR police force was no longer operating and the West Berlin police were stretched so thin that only a handful could be spared to cover the embassy office. I saw these vigils as a manifestation of Germans who had grown up in the GDR who had helped to make the revolution from below.

*Q: You had this large responsibility in what had been East Germany. Were you picking up signs that... ok, these people had made this revolution from down below, but at the same time, they had been brought up in what can only be called a very controlled welfare state. So, in a way, if you've made your compromise, you can be quite comfortable in this.*

GILMORE: And some were. Veteran observers of the German Democratic Republic used to describe it as a "niche society," where everybody who could, found a little niche and managed to exist and derive as much personal satisfaction as was possible in such a totalitarian state. Clearly, the mentality of the people in the former GDR would take a long time to change. I would add here, another little anecdote that I consider instructive. Christa Wolf, the East German writer, was given an award by an American literary organization, which nobody seemed to want to present in any kind of public way after the unification. So, it was decided that I should present it as principal officer of the embassy office. So I invited her to my office for coffee as I hadn't met her previously. Christa Wolf had not been an advocate of German unification on what she considered the Federal Republic's terms. But she was a thoughtful, dignified and very perceptive person. I asked her how, in general, she thought women in the former German Democratic Republic looked at the whole question of unification and whether they might have some issues with it.

She mentioned two issues. She didn't take a personal position on them but rather just explained them. First, she noted that childcare in the GDR had been universal and free. This would not be the case in the Federal Republic, and she foresaw problems resulting. Women would be less able

to pursue their education or to work full time. Finding full time employment in the former GDR would be difficult in any case because of the economic dislocations resulting from the upheaval in the GDR and the need to adapt to the laws and economic system of the FRG. Christa Wolf's other point was there had been abortion on demand in the GDR. In the Federal Republic, given the influence of the Christian parties (CDU and CSU), there was very strong anti-abortion sentiment and a consensus that abortion should be limited only to some very specific situations. She thought it would be very difficult for East German women to get used to that. I understand that both those issues, particularly the childcare issue, have been difficult ones for women who grew up and worked in the former GDR.

*Q: Was your office getting a good look at the economy of Eastern Europe, what they were producing, or was that more coming out of reports of West German entrepreneurs going out and saying, "Oh, my God."*

GILMORE: Some of us at the Embassy Office had good contacts among West German entrepreneurs who were exploring opportunities in the former GDR. The fact that some of us had been posted in West Berlin before meant that we had contacts with a number of business leaders in West Berlin. We continued to meet with them socially after the Wall opened and after unification. So from these contacts we learned a great deal. The embassy office also had a very talented commercial officer. He, by the way, later became our senior commercial officer in China. His name was Lee Boehm. He was knowledgeable and hard charging and dedicated to identifying business opportunities in the former GDR for American companies. He bumped up against some Federal Republic interests that sought to keep opportunities in the GDR basically to themselves. One area he focused on particularly was power generation. The question was: Would there be an extension of what, in effect, were monopolies from the Federal Republic into the former GDR, or would there be an open market for power generation bids from firms from wherever -- the U.S., France, Japan, etc. We encountered strong protectionist attitudes coming from German officials as well as the power monopolies in the former Federal Republic. Clearly, both the German officials and German entrepreneurs were not interested in seeing U.S. power companies build new power generation facilities in the new laender.

*Q: Did you sense that people away from the situation were so full of euphoria, I'm talking about people in the West, and our government and all, that they weren't seeing things on the ground? Were you sort of the cold dash of realism?*

GILMORE: In a way, I think there was a touch of that. I want to be careful here because I want to be fair. Our ambassador in the Federal Republic, Vernon Walters, was a wonderful gentleman with long experience in foreign affairs. When the Wall fell, he was convinced that reunification would happen very quickly. He was dead right! Ambassador Walters had good rapport with Chancellor Helmut Kohl who moved quickly to seize the historical opportunity to unify the GDR with the FRG. At the same time, I think in fairness that Ambassador Walters and some of his closest aides at our embassy in Bonn, like Chancellor Kohl, underestimated the amount of time it would take for people of the former GDR to accept and internalize the values of the Federal Republic. Even as they embraced the basic democratic political ideals and values of the Federal Republic, they saw themselves as "Ossis" – easterners – and their fellow citizens from the Federal Republic as "Wessis" – westerners. Many of the "Ossis" were proud of what they

regarded as achievements of the GDR in the arts. Some were also proud of the fine nurseries and other childcare establishments.

Officers of the embassy office were in daily contact with the Germans of the east and their leaders. A number of our reporting officers spoke fluent German. Our reporting reflected what we heard and saw. I like to think that it had the effect of tempering and balancing the reporting from our embassy in Bonn which, naturally, reflected the optimism of the Foreign Office and Chancellery.

As an antidote to the initial optimism and even euphoria emanating from some Federal Republic political leaders and government officials, I would point to the views of the veteran FRG politician Kurt Biedenkopf. Initially a protégé of Helmut Kohl, Biedenkopf rose to be Secretary General of the Christian Democratic Union (1993-1997) before falling out with Kohl. With the opening of the Berlin Wall, Biedenkopf focused his full attention on the former GDR and was elected Minister President of the reconstituted state of Saxony in 1990. I would advise anyone who wishes to get a picture of how difficult it was to integrate the Germans of the East to research Biedenkopf's name and read some of the things he said. He made plain how overly optimistic he thought Bonn had been, how much more investment it would take to turn the economy of the former GDR around, and how long and difficult a process it would be before the people of the former GDR would feel they were genuinely a part of the Federal Republic and to share its values and institutions.

He was convinced from the outset, once the Wall opened, that there was going to be quick reunification. That was where the chancellor was. He had good rapport with the Chancellor. He was right, by the way, and he was widely read in history, Ambassador Walters. But, I think, in fairness that he overestimated the degree to which it would be easy and quick, an easy and a quick process for the GDR citizenry to become part of and accept the values of the Federal Republic. Even when they wanted to accept the democratic values, the former East German citizens often didn't accept some of the commercial values. And some of them were kind of proud of the small achievements of the German Democratic Republic and I might particularly mention the free nurseries and childcare establishments. They were proud of that. And we just reported what we heard. Nobody was against German reunification. That had been U.S. policy and we were all aboard. And the other thing was, we were right up, cheek by jowl, with the Germans, before laender, we were responsible for and Todd Becker, our consul general in Leipzig, was given administrative support for a long time by the embassy office. Todd and my staff, we were all right next to real Germans from the East. We had a number of people who spoke good German. We were just reporting what we heard. It was a kind of tempered, to put it nicely, the optimism and the euphoria that was present not only in the U.S. embassy, but other Western embassies in Bonn.

But I would add another point. Berlin was deluged with visitors. First, when the Wall opened, before German reunification, we had all kinds of visitors to Berlin. . When the Wall first opened, before German reunification, we had a torrent of visitors to Berlin. Perhaps the most memorable was a large delegation from the U.S. Senate including Senators Lugar, Moynihan, Pell and a number of other distinguished senators. We also had some visitors to Berlin, particularly following the breaching of the Wall and the actual reunification of Berlin and Germany, many of

them from foundations. Very distinguished and interesting people. And I remember one person, whom I prefer to leave unnamed, from, I guess you could call it a more conservative foundation, but very respectable. Telling us how democracy was really kind of natural to the human spirit, that people would just, when they were released from the fetters and the constraints of the totalitarian school, would naturally gravitate to a democracy. I remember thinking that wasn't my experience as much as it was a very noble thought. For me, democracy was in many ways something that was learned in a series of procedures that had grown up over a long period of time. But, I remember this particular person talking about how easy it would be. I thought to myself, come spend a day with me visiting various different kinds of persons in the former GDR that there was this almost euphoria and optimism about how quickly the East Germans were to become West Germans was widespread.

I would just add one last point, and that is there was a sentiment, reasonably widespread, after the initial months of reunification in the German Democratic Republic that there had been a takeover by the Federal Republic. But I want to stress that by and large Germans in the former East were very pleased and happy to be part of the Federal Republic. But many of them still felt that there had been a takeover that they were just basically just next to the Federal Republic and that it hadn't been a marriage of equals. I would add, finally, myself, that there couldn't be a marriage of equals unfortunately. There was no way that I could see it could be. But I just point out the difficulties that had to be surmounted, and are being surmounted. I think I'll stop there.

*Q: Okay. I just want to ask one question, going back a bit. I've always felt that we played it very well, that we didn't have President George Bush dancing on the ruins of the Berlin Wall, you know the equivalent of people coming over and touting American triumphalism. Was there any problem with that? I can think of an awful lot of political publicity seekers to come over and show off.*

GILMORE: There was a bit of that. And in the case I just described, the gentleman who was going on and on about how easy and automatic almost the transition would be, had a triumphalist quality to some of his pronouncements. George Bush, President Bush, won the deep respect of Germans, almost across the board, and I mean not only conservatives but also Social Democrats, Greens, for his handling of the reunification...

For his dignity, for his knowledge, for his quick support of the Federal Republic, and yet his restraint in letting it be a German show, not putting the U.S. in the leadership and not trying to crow or in any way paternalistic about the role the U.S. and the British and the French had played. During the Airlift, where the building of the Wall... I must say Bush had been very popular among Berliners anyhow. But once the Wall opened, it was clear that the U.S. was going to put its money where its mouth had been about reunification, it was an adulation of Bush. But he never, he and his Secretary of State Baker, never got highhanded about it, never gloated, never crowed. They were the model of professionalism and far-sightedness, in terms of the U.S.-German relationships.

*Q: You were in German until when?*

GILMORE: I was there until August of 1991. Almost exactly four years from the time I had

arrived in August of 1987.

*Q: We have talked about industry, were you picking up anything about East German agriculture? Was this sort of paralleling what was happening in West Germany? Very protected farming practices and all?*

GILMORE: East German agriculture had been really organized on essentially the Soviet model with state farms, collectives. We really didn't get into it very far the roughly nine months I was the principle officer of the embassy office. Nevertheless, as I said, for four laenders, Laend Berlin and three other laender, or state - what we found that I remember, essentially, was some serious problems. They included vast overuse of agricultural chemicals, fertilizers. The whole question of whether large areas of crop land would have to be given a sort of remedial attention to restore the, I guess agricultural people say, the sweetness of the soil, to restore the balance in the soil. The whole question of restructuring agriculture though, was one that really didn't arise during my time there. Surprisingly. When I accompanied Ambassador Walters on his initial calls in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Mecklenburg, I guess we say West Pomerania, and other places, agriculture was not yet on the agenda. The Treuhandanstalt, the outfit that handled privatization, was really looking at privatization of industry, business, and while I think it got into some agribusiness type privatization, to my knowledge, we at the embassy office weren't yet reporting on agriculture. Also, we didn't have an agricultural attaché to give us any specific guidance. I received any and all American business people that came through during my nine months at the Embassy Office, not one American interested in agricultural equipment sales called on me. And as I think I mentioned, our very capable commercial officer, Lee Boehm, was focused very heavily on the question of power generation and whether very efficient American firms who were interested in the GDR market could succeed in entering it in light of the very special interests of the monopolies coming over from the Federal Republic

*Q: What about the concern that really started with Willi Brandt's Ostpolitik, the concern that we had that somehow or another, if Germany became united, it might withdraw from NATO and all, and become a neutral country, an undigested blob in the middle of Europe. When this was happening, was there concern that NATO no longer was as important and maybe Germany might drift off somewhere?*

GILMORE: Yes. And President George Herbert Walker Bush, to his eternal credit, made it very clear that the U.S. was in favor of German reunification and they were making a number of changes in NATO to accommodate the new situation. But NATO was to remain vital, although it was to be adapted to the new situation, and we insisted that a united German state be part of NATO. That was very clear. President Bush was very supportive of that. Of the three Western leaders, Bush, Thatcher, and Mitterrand, Bush was far and away the one the Germans knew they could rely on to be true to his word. We'd always said that if there could be free self-determination for Germany, we would support it. But, he had two strong considerations. As I remember, he articulated them in an important speech. He didn't speak out much on the subject, but in one important speech he mentioned two things: NATO, that the united Germany would be part of NATO, and he also indicated that existing borders in Europe must be respected. I would indicate here that at this point the Kohl-led coalition government had not recognized the German-Polish border, which was a source of great anxiety to the Poles. Later on, there was an

agreement between, or a statement that Germany made, and Poland accepted it, that the new, united Germany would negotiate an agreement with Poland to recognize those borders, which subsequently happened, but after reunification. But Bush put a clear marker down on the Polish border as well.

*Q: But, you're saying Bush did this. What about attitudes within Germany, were you and your fellow German-watchers watching for signs of neutrality?*

GILMORE: There were very important forces in Germany, not only in the GDR, that were not at all in favor of any kind of NATO membership. Opinion in the German Democratic Republic, was changing rapidly, however, particularly after the March 18, 1990 elections which brought to power the coalition government that basically negotiated unification. Still, many Germans would have preferred to see two German states in some kind of federation, and certainly no NATO membership for the Eastern portion of it. Important intellectuals like Gunter Grass, the great novelist, wanted no part of a greater Germany. He didn't want reunification in any case. He wanted a confederation and a cultural nation. But he wanted no part of what was still East Germany, and NATO. Also some of the Social Democrats in the Federal Republic were not at all as convinced about NATO membership for united Germany. The Greens by and large had no interest in NATO period, and probably would have preferred to see a neutral Germany. So the important point is Helmut Kohl, Chancellor Kohl, with his CDU CSU FDP coalition, was convinced of the importance of Germany being anchored in NATO, and being protected by NATO. He also wanted to see NATO change, as did President Bush. Mrs. Thatcher was very strongly for NATO membership. I believe Mitterrand in his way was also very strong about Germany remaining in NATO. But, within Germany itself, it was basically the CDU/CSU the so called sister Christian parties that really wanted Germany to stay in NATO. In fact, Germany did stay in NATO. There was an important document released by NATO in the summer, I believe it was June of 1990, it could have been July, that talked about the kinds of changes NATO would like to see. They included maintaining very close contacts with the former governments of the Soviet Union and the other governments of the East /Warsaw Pact. They also noted how NATO was going to be quite ready to take an active role in negotiating with the Soviets the lowest possible level of nuclear weapons. They also indicated that NATO would only use force in self-defense. The document was carefully worded. It didn't say no first use of nuclear weapons, but it did indicate NATO would only use force in self-defense. The document also indicated NATO was looking to negotiate the lowest possible level of nuclear weapons and also looking particularly to eliminate nuclear artillery shells. In fact, the Federal Republic, in the process of German reunification, undertook not to put Federal Republic forces into the former German Democratic Republic while the Soviet forces were retreating. One interesting thing, though, right in the Two Plus Four Treaty, the two German states and the four powers that had held responsibility for Germany after WWII, the so-called victory powers, make it clear that the German government would ask the U.S., British, and French garrisons to stay under a status of forces agreement during the period that the Soviet forces were returning to the Soviet Union. All this was very carefully negotiated. Clearly Chancellor Kohl wanted Germany in NATO. Foreign Minister Genscher did too, although he was less vocal about the subject. Bush, and Thatcher too and Mitterrand as well. That carried the day. Gorbachev drove a pretty hard bargain, particularly a tough economic bargain in his negotiations on the cost of having Soviet troops return to the Soviet Union and on other financial issues that where he thought the Soviet Union was owed

something by Germany. Gorbachev in the end accepted the idea of a united Germany in NATO, with as I say the force limitations that the Federal Republic was willing to make.

*Q: And, I assume, correct me if I'm wrong, that there was some sort of an agreement, or at least an understanding that the Americans, British, and French would not intrude their troops into the former East Germany.*

GILMORE: On that issue, what I remember, I'm not as expert as the people that actually negotiated the Two Plus Four...what I remember particularly was the Federal Republic limited what it would do. The U.S., and British, and French signaled their intention not to put their forces in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic while Soviet forces were retreating. And, presumably, by implication, beyond. But the key thing was that it was clear that our concept and the concept that the British and French shared with us was that there would be no diminution of security, that we would defend the new Germany as a full member of NATO, and defend it at its new borders. We would give it a defense guarantee. There are people who followed this issue more closely. Robert Zoellick, who was a Counselor at the Department of State and was Secretary Baker's advisor on the whole issue of Two Plus Four agreement and the arrangements to end four power rights with regard to Berlin and Germany. He was the point person on the U.S. side, and there is a very good book I think you mentioned when we were talking here a moment ago, Dick Smyser, his book, From Yalta to Berlin (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), touches this issue, treats this issue in some depth.

*Q: During the time that you had responsibility for reporting on the East German laender. What were we seeing in terms of how they were forming their governments?*

GILMORE: There were different governments in different states [Laender], depending on which political parties were stronger. The Laender whose leaders I was closest to were the New United Land Berlin and Land Brandenburg. In Berlin, Social Democrat Governing Mayor Momper lost the next election, and Christian Democrat Eberhard Diepgen, who was the Governing Mayor when I arrived, again became the Governing Mayor, so I'd known him well.

I was also particularly close, in Brandenburg, Manfred Stolpe , the lay church leader who was so important in pushing the Honecker and then Krenz, but particularly Honecker, in the direction of openness and reform, and became the minister of reform, the minister president of Brandenburg. I was close to him. He was a Social Democrat. In Mecklenburg-Vorpommern I went up, I visited Mecklenburg-Vorpommern with Ambassador Walters.

The impression one got, particularly in the three laender other than Berlin, was one of considerable learning curve, a very steep learning curve for the new governing people. They faced daunting problems. In some cases, they were not quick to deal with them. But, I have to be careful here, because I don't know that anybody could have done more than they did. We reported on the developments in the East, but of course much of the reporting was just begun during my months as principal officer of the embassy office in Berlin. But I remember particularly going to Saxony-Anhalt and Magdeburg, and being horrified by the state of parts of the environment, particularly the river, the Elbe. And, also the apartment buildings that clearly were not going to stand up very long. They were kind of prefabs, built sort of just by crane,

stacking prefab apartments one on the other. They were in bad shape. Of course, there were massive employment problems, because the state industry was up for privatization. In many cases, the Western countries, or potential Western entrepreneurs from the Federal Republic and elsewhere, didn't want to touch the existing corporations, or the existing industrial areas because they needed so much environmental work. They preferred new, as they said, green areas, to acquire new sites and build new industry. So the impression I had, and I don't remember as much as I should having spent a dozen years almost, but the impression I had was that much of the old smokestack industry was not going to survive. A few important industrial activities in the former GDR , for example, Zeiss and optics,. were going to be refurbished and continue. But many of the industries, steel, metals production, were just basically not going to survive. Ship building, for example, up in Schleswig-Holstein on the Baltic coast, was clearly a leading industry of the German Democratic Republic. As I departed Berlin, ship building in the former GDR was in grave danger. There was no industrial policy, and in fact the new federal government specifically eschewed any industrial policy to revive industries like that. So as I left in August of 1991, the overall impression I had was of very considerable and growing unemployment and a major restructuring job which was only getting underway.

*Q: During the time you were there, how did the opening of the Stasi files affect people? From what I gather it was a society that was completely riddled with...it was almost better to burn everything.*

GILMORE; The Ministry for State Security, widely referred to by its nick-name, 'Stasi' was the primary intelligence agency of the GDR. Its extensive espionage and intelligence activities included a massive effort of surveillance on its own people, the population of the former GDR. To accomplish its surveillance mission, it relied on a vast network of informers, with neighbors informing on neighbors and family members informing on fellow family members. As the two German states and their peoples contemplated unification, the issues of who had been a Stasi member or informer, what the copious Stasi files on individual Germans contained, and how one could gain access to the files the Stasi kept on him or her loomed ever larger. A number of people who wanted to participate on the new era, like Ibrahim Böhme, a Social Democrat, who wanted to be... was once of the founders of the revived Social Democratic party... turned out he had been an informer. There were many cases of this.

An Evangelical pastor from the former GDR by the name of Joachim Gauck was given the responsibility for the Stasi files. His title was Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former GDR. As a veteran student of German affairs, I understood immediately the special political and historical importance of his position and I sought to call on him very soon after he got set up in his office. He welcomed my visit and my interest in his work. He made it very clear that he wasn't going to be told by any government or any government official how to handle these issues. He was going to do it in as even-handed a way as he knew how. His idea was that any German, any citizen of the new united German state would be able to see his file, or her file. Herr Gauck and I quickly established a cordial relationship.

I should mention here that as the GDR and the Stasi collapsed both the U.S. Embassy in Bonn and the U.S. Mission, Berlin paid particular attention to possible penetration by the Stasi. By the time I left Berlin I had concluded that there was no indication that any attempted provocation had

led to serious compromise of classified information at the former U.S. Mission. One or another of the individuals involved in the attempted penetrations might have been able to provide detailed biographical information about the Americans with whom they worked. That was probably the extent of it.

One of the issues that brought the GDR down was the travel freedom issue. As I mentioned earlier, the new travel law that was published by Neues Deutschland just a few days before the Wall opened just didn't convince anybody. So that was one issue. Another issue was the Stasi apparatus and its nefarious activities. One of the mistakes that successors to Honecker tended to make was they'd say, "Well we still need some security". They didn't come right out quickly and say they were going to get rid of the Stasi. It was very clear that taking that apparatus down was a very important demand of the populace of the former German Democratic Republic.
By the time I left, and from what I gather, beyond, Mr. Gouk was doing an excellent job, and enjoyed a lot of confidence on the part of the citizens of the former GDR.

*Q: Did we have any policy or stand on whether these file should be revealed? Was there concern saying, "Well, let's get on with it. Let's forget the past."*

GILMORE: No. That's a very important question. No, basically, of course, we wanted to find out what kind of intelligence operations had been conducted against us and we got into that very quickly. I think I can say to future historians that we were effective in getting access to the Stasi records very early on, in terms of that issue. On the broader issue, it was basically an issue we left up to the Germans. It was very clear that they were angry; angry about what Stasi had done, and there was a widespread feeling that maximum openness about the Stasi files was in order. Everybody should be able to see his or her file. My personal judgment was that it was important to let that cleansing take place, although there were some very bitter moments as people learned that their former neighbors and friends had been informers.

*Q: Wives on husbands, husbands on wives.*

GILMORE: It was sick. But basically, the impression I have is that the Gauck Commission did a thorough and effective job. Again, I want to emphasize that after departing Berlin in August of 1991, I was no longer able or had a need to follow closely the work of the Gauck Commission. Meeting Gauck and observing his work was a source of deep personal satisfaction. When I gave my last Fourth of July reception in Berlin in 1991, Gauck attended and greeted my staff and me warmly. He thanked me personally as he came through the line for my early visit to his Commission and indicated that it had given him a sense of moral support which he valued highly. In February 2012 Gauck became the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, a position he continues to hold today.

By the way, I gave a second Fourth of July reception in1991, my final summer in Berlin. Manfred Stolpe, the new Minister- President of Brandenburg, invited the Embassy Office to hold a reception at Sans Souci, the famous palace in Brandenburg. The reception featured a chamber music presentation of Antonin Dvorak's 'American' string quartet in F' major, welcoming remarks by the head of the Brandenburg Landtag, and my response. We then held an American - style July 4 party with grilled hot dogs and hamburgers on the grounds of Sans Souci. It was a

tremendous satisfaction to celebrate our national day there while the process of German reunification was underway and to have been invited to do so by Stolpe, one of the key personalities in the German reunification process. It was also a mark of honor, not for me personally, so much as for the United States, that he wanted us to hold a Fourth of July celebration at Sans Souci, which of course is ceremonially the most important landmark in Brandenburg.

*Q: Were you getting reflections from our consulates in other places in West Germany that they weren't too happy to see the Prussians and the Saxons start coming back into the system again?*

GILMORE: No. Surprisingly. I read very carefully the reporting from all our [posts in Germany, particularly the embassy in Bonn, and I followed the German media closely. The impression I got was that by and large there was a sense on the part of our German friends and colleagues, of elation that they were able to get back together as one family. At least temporarily there was a sense of greater German national cohesion identity and less particularism. Don't get me wrong. Germany is a very conservative society, culturally, and there are important regional differences. Bavarians were still the subject of some jokes, as were the Saxons, and that sort of thing. But, by and large, there was a kind of euphoria about the family being back together again, and that was the dominant feeling.

*Q: Well, then, in August 1991, you left.*

GILMORE: Yes, in August 1991, I left and was assigned to the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, as the Deputy Commandant for International Affairs. This was a position that I sought for several reasons. Certainly I wanted to come home for a while. My mother was widowed and not well. My mother-in-law was also widowed and not well, so those were personal considerations. But also, I thought I needed to kind of recharge my batteries. And, I'm thinking here now of Henry Kissinger's point that when one is working actively in government, one's living on one's intellectual capital. In a sense, I thought I needed to recharge my batteries, or to change the metaphor slightly - replenish my capital. So, I went to the Army War College, which turned out to be wonderful year.

*Q: What was your impression of the men and women who were assigned to Carlisle? In the first place, where were they drawn from? And then you could talk about the education they were getting and their interests.*

GILMORE: There was an increased emphasis since Goldwater-Nickels on "jointness" and fighting jointly. Typically, the students in the class's one-year course were lieutenant colonels, and occasionally a full bird colonel, from the Army ranks. There were also a substantial number of Air Force and Marine officers of equivalent rank. The concept was that both in terms of doctrine and in terms of education and training the officers graduating from the Army War College would be proponents and practitioners of Joint war - fighting doctrine.

A very important ingredient of the Army War College program was the International Fellows Program. In it officers from friendly armies and military establishments, not only Army officers, usually at the brigadier level, spent a year as international fellows. The focus of the International

Fellows program was war at the strategic level. I was particularly impressed with the caliber of the international fellows. The Germans, they sent all these very fine officers. From the countries we used to think of before the Cold War as Third World; it was amazing to see the quality of the people they sent. Many of them were going to be chief of staff at one point down the road in their own military establishments. Some of them became even defense ministers.

I spent a great deal of time with the international fellows. A very able U.S. Army colonel ran the program. I traveled with him and the international fellows and the War College Commandant, Major General [William A.] Stofft, to Latin America. We visited Headquarters, Southern Command, which was still in Panama, and went on to Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and Mexico. Latin America was the special focus of the International Fellows that year.

As an expert on former Communist Europe, I spent many hours studying reports of the demise of the Soviet Union. Much of the work of the War College is done in individual seminars. I spent a considerable amount of time talking to classes and individual seminars about the collapse of the German Democratic Republic and the reunification of Germany. We would then discuss the unraveling of the Soviet Union. That was the year it was literally coming apart. Czechoslovakia was coming apart, too. I took a particular interest in developments in Czechoslovakia, and I suggested inviting the Czechoslovak Permanent U N representative, who was a Slovak, to visit the War College. He came and spoke to the class. I remember very clearly him saying, "Czechoslovakia may well come apart, and if it does, it will come apart peacefully. We'll sort it out." He proved right. By the way, I believe he became the first or second foreign minister of the Slovak Republic. But it was that kind of curriculum.

Also, the Commandant sometimes asked me to host lunches for visiting foreign military delegations. That was an important function. He couldn't always do it himself. So, one week I might be hosting a lunch with the very important support staff from the War College, of course, for say, a Thai delegation, and the next week it might be for a delegation from a small European country. I also spent a fair amount of time getting to know the Foreign Fellows from Hungary and Poland. These countries were now, again, sovereign, fully sovereign and we were anxious to work with the officers they sent. I understand that the Hungarian International Fellow who attended the War College during my tour of duty, quickly rose to the number two or three position in his own military establishment.

*Q: On jointness, did you see any difference between the services? There were Marine personnel, but also Navy officers at Carlisle?*

GILMORE: A few. The aspects of jointness that were of particular importance to the Army at that time were air support and precision munitions. There was considerable emphasis on ensuring that Air Force officers be fully cognizant of Army doctrine and practice, and Army officers, in turn, be fully aware of Air Force doctrine and practice. If one visited the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama that same year, he would have found a number of Army officers in the class. The caliber of the officers, including the steadily increasing number of women officers, attending the Army War College was very high. Anyone who had any notion that somehow Army officers weren't carefully chosen and educated would be quickly disabused of it.

*Q: Agreed. In contrast, however, is the situation of the State Department. Our present Under Secretary for Political Affairs says that he has a little act that he follows with our Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who came up through the military, where he asks, "How about education for leadership, how much have you had?" Colin Powell would say, "Well, I had six years of education." And Marc Grossman says, "Well, I've had two weeks."*

GILMORE: Right, in fact, there were always two, sometimes three State Department officers in the Army War College class. I thought that was very important. I think that benefited both the Department and the individual officers. I kept in touch with one of them. He saw his year in Carlisle as an important benefit. Personally, I believe Foreign Service officers who attend the National War College are always better for it.

*Q: I think, too, it adds, it's a resource too, for people to get a sort of diplomatic perspective. Of course, one of the things that, in my generation, we had this, but so many of us had come out of the military, the draft, like myself, four years as an enlisted man. But I had a feel for the military. Today's generation doesn't have that experience.*

GILMORE: Right. For example, I missed military service. I was too young for the Korean War, and the Vietnam War really began after I was in the Foreign Service. When I began graduate school, I was classified 1-A. My draft board told me, when I checked in with them before heading off to grad school, it would be very unlikely that I would be called up. So, what I learned about the Army and the military, which I consider, by the way, very important, I learned by working with them very closely in Berlin, and also at the War College. I must say what I learned about leadership at the War College came in very handy when I subsequently ran my own embassy in Armenia, and particularly when I spent a year running the Senior Seminar as my last position in the State Department. In the Senior Seminar class included a number of U.S. military officers. I was better able to communicate with them and offer fuller respect for what they knew about the things we were trying to teach to the Foreign Service officers about leadership, because of my experience at the War College.

*Q: Well, then, after... in '92, then, where'd you go?*

GILMORE: I was nominated by President Bush to be the first U.S. ambassador to Armenia. [Editor's Note: The United States recognized Armenia Dec 26, 1991. Embassy Yerevan was opened Feb 3, 1992, with Steven Mann as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.] So, without formally leaving the War College, in August 199, about one year from the time I arrived in Carlisle, my wife and I moved back to Washington, D.C. to attend the ambassadorial seminar together with all the ambassadors - designate nominated to the newly-independent states and their spouses. Unfortunately, the White House was unable to move my papers through the Senate with the papers of the other nominees. I understand this may have been due to a glitch in the White House down at the working level. In any case, I was not scheduled for a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing with the other nominees to the newly independent states. I therefore was not able to go out to Yerevan, to Armenia, as quickly as had been foreseen. The other were confirmed and went out to the field. Meanwhile, I had to wait for a hearing by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Unfortunately, I did not get a hearing before the presidential election, that Fall. When President Bush was not re-elected, the whole question of hearings for the President's next

round of appointees as ambassadors became a kind of political football. Some important voices in the Senate said that they didn't wish to consider any political appointees. They would look at career appointees, but they wouldn't give a hearing to political appointees. I think President Bush's position was pretty clear. It was, "I'm the President, I have the right to appoint ambassadors, I'm either going to appoint who I want to appoint, or we won't go ahead." The long and the short of my story is when President Bush left office, my appointment lapsed, and I was instructed by Secretary of State Eagleburger, who had been named Secretary of State at the end of the Bush administration, that I was basically a non-person and would have no status as an ambassador-designate, once the President left office. So, I redoubled my efforts to learn more Armenian and continued to read everything I could about Armenia and the Armenian-American community, which was large and very active politically. I was basically waiting in the wings. Not many weeks after the Clinton administration was in place, Strobe Talbott invited me to see him. He said that he had looked at my credentials and he had talked to the President about my situation. President Clinton said, "Make it happen. We're going to nominate him again." So, President Clinton re-nominated me. I was given a hearing in May 1993.

So, I didn't get to go to head up the embassy in the Fall of 1992. There was some talk about sending me to Yerevan as Chargé d' Affaires to lead the embassy through what was expected to be a horrible winter and then bringing me back and nominating me again in the Spring.. But Senator Thomas Dodd, among others, made it plain that he thought the Senate's constitutional role should not be circumvented by sending out as Charge d'Affaires a person who is actually the administration's intended choice as ambassador. It just didn't seem right to him. He signaled that he would oppose such nominees if they occurred after the person came back from serving as chargé. So, my wife spent the winter and early Spring in temporary quarters in the Washington, D.C. area.

I worked hard studying basic Eastern Armenian. There was a real problem here. There was no textbook available. At that time, the great majority of the Armenian speakers living in the in the U.S. spoke Western Armenian. And Western and Eastern Armenian, although mutually intelligible to native speakers, are significantly different from each other. But, we found an excellent teacher who was a fluent speaker of both Western and Eastern Armenian, and I studied spoken Eastern Armenian throughout the winter and early spring. Meanwhile, I read the State Department's files, on Armenia and the South Caucasus and the daily reports from our embassies in the region. I also got myself briefed on the issues of concern to the Armenian -American community and its major advocacy groups.

My wife, Carol, and I were fortunate to have another unique and indeed invaluable source of mentoring and counseling on Armenian history and culture, the Armenian - American community and the Armenian Apostolic Church; Edward and Roseann Alexander. Ed was a senior USIA Foreign Service Officer assigned to Budapest as Counselor for Press and Cultural Affairs and I a junior officer assigned to Budapest as Vice Consul when we met as fellow students of Hungarian at the Foreign Service Institute in 1964. I had just returned from my first post, Ankara. In the course of the 10 plus months of Hungarian Ed and I began a dialog - actually it was often more like a tutorial with Ed playing the role of tutor - on the mass deportation and massacre of the Ottoman Empire's Armenians in the 1915-22 period and its consequences. During the months I was waiting for word on my possible nomination by President - elect

Clinton and my Senate hearing, my wife and I met often with the Alexanders who resided in the greater Washington, DC. area. When President Clinton did nominate me, the Alexanders arranged and accompanied me and my wife on a quick trip to New York City to meet the Primate of the Eastern Diocese of the Armenian Church of America, Archbishop Khajag Barsamian, and leading members of the Armenian community in the New York City area.

When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called me for a confirmation hearing in May, Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland made a very positive gesture by asking me to step out of the hearing room to meet with him. He indicated that he would not be able to stay for my hearing but wanted to compliment and thank me for my service in Berlin and to underline his support for a strong U.S. - Armenia relationship. Throughout my tour of duty in Yerevan, Senator Sarbanes was, indeed, a bastion of support for positive U.S. engagement in Armenia.

My hearing went well. I believe the goals I set at my hearing were goals that I largely fulfilled as ambassador. I would just note them briefly. In the statement I submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I said I had several basic goals. One was to spearhead the United States' effort to meet Armenia's emergency humanitarian needs in the face of blockades which stemmed from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The second was to encourage Armenia and its neighbor, Azerbaijan, to work for lasting peace and security for their peoples through good faith negotiations. And the third was to establish a strong U.S.-Armenian relationship based on democracy, human rights, and economic reform based on free market principles. I also had a fourth goal - I didn't announce it publicly then because it was a personal goal which grew out my analysis of the U.S.-Armenian relationship in the twentieth century. My fourth goal was to engender among the people of Armenia confidence in the United States as a reliable long-term partner and friend. When the first Armenian Republic came into being in 1918, the U.S. never got around to sending an ambassador. While we recognized it, we didn't do much diplomatically to support it during its brief existence. We did do very well in mobilizing aid for the many orphans created by what Armenians call the 'Meds Yeghern,' the great Armenian catastrophe, the mass deportation and genocidal massacre of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire from 1915 - 23. The U.S. did very well in terms of providing humanitarian assistance to the orphans. But, as I set out for Armenia, I vowed to myself that the U.S. was going to be present diplomatically this time and was going to be supportive. I vowed and that I would do all I could to ensure that Armenia had a reliable friend and partner in the U.S.

*Q: Well, now, Harry, I have to comment with the breakup of the Soviet Empire many ambassadorial appointments had a political slant. You had an awful lot of people of Estonian descent, or Ukrainian descent, or what have you, ending up as the first ambassadors. And Armenia is probably one of the most politically sensitive places in American political life, Armenians, for a small country, carry a lot of clout. How come they didn't pull out some American-Armenian?*

GILMORE: It's a very good question. I think it was a conscious decision, in part, because to find somebody that the whole Armenian-American community could coalesce around, might not be easy. I mean there could be people, like former governor of California George Deukmejian. He, or someone like him might have been a choice. But, otherwise, there was a strong and conscious decision, I think, made by the Department of State to recommend that the President name a

career person. The feeling was, in part, that the career person would be able to work with all shades of Armenian-American opinion. I personally think that was exactly right.

*Q: But, that's our perspective, the Foreign Service perspective. Sometimes there is a completely different perspective from the White House.*

GILMORE: Very often. It's interesting. I got to know the Armenian-American community fairly well by the time I had my hearing. In fact, in the run-up to my nomination by President Bush, I went around and called on a number of Armenian-American organizations. They were anxious to talk with me, and I found that they welcomed the idea there would be a career diplomat going to Armenia as our first ambassador. They wanted very much to have my ear, and they made it very plain that they were deeply committed to Armenia's survival and desired to see the U.S. launch a massive and effective humanitarian aid program. They also emphasized that they had close ties with the leaders of both parties in Congress and would continue to work closely with their friends in the Congress to support Armenia.. By and large, they welcomed my nomination. And, in fact, one of the reasons I believe that President Clinton decided quickly to nominate me again as was because as he took office, he found there was considerable pressure coming from the Armenian-American community to get an ambassador to Yerevan quickly.

GILMORE: So, I was among the early Clinton ambassadorial appointees. But, it's interesting. To date we have not had an Armenian-American nominated as a candidate for ambassador to Armenia. I think this is in part because the Armenian-American communities, especially its leaders, see it as advantageous to have an experienced career Foreign Service person leading the embassy. Of course, they expect that the ambassador will be committed to Armenia's viability and success as an independent state.

*Q: Okay, Harry, you served in Armenia from May 1993 to July 1995, right?*

GILMORE: Yes. I received my appointment on May 12, 1993 and presented my credentials to President Ter-Petrossian in Yerevan on May 31, 1993. After spending twenty-six months in Yerevan, I requested curtailment when I got word that my widowed mother was critically ill. As her oldest child I saw it as my duty to return to the U.S. As it turned out, my mother was placed in a nursing home and remained alive a couple of years longer. But, I had asked to be curtailed and was reassigned to the Department of State.

*Q: May, 1993, when you went out there, what was the situation that you were facing in Armenia at that time?*

GILMORE: Grim, indeed. Armenia was in the throes of a deep and steadily worsening economic crisis. Many factors contributed to the crisis. Let me begin by outlining the ongoing impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with neighboring Azerbaijan. As a result of the Karabakh conflict, Armenia's border with Azerbaijan had been closed since before Armenia declared its independence in 1991. On March 27,1993, shortly before I arrived in Yerevan, Armenian armed forces, primarily Karabakh-Armenian forces, but with some support from the armed forces of the Armenian Republic, captured Azerbaijan's Kalbajar region. The Kalbajar region borders on Armenia but unlike Nagorno-Karabakh, which is an enclave inside Azerbaijan, Kalbajar is part

of Azerbaijan proper. When Armenian forces captured Kalbajar, Turkey formally closed its border with Armenia, stating that it was acting in response to the Armenian forces' occupation of Kalbajar. In fact, Turkey had de facto closed its border with Armenia several years earlier. So, when I arrived in Armenia in May, 1993, the only borders that Armenia had open were its border with Iran in the South and its border with Georgia in the North.

Landlocked Armenia's most direct access to the sea is via Georgia's Black Sea ports of Batumi and Poti. George declared is formal independence from the Soviet Union in April 1991, but Tbilisi's authority in Georgia didn't go far. In May 1993, Georgia was still in considerable disarray. With the overthrow of populist leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia in January 1992, the authority of the central government in Tbilisi virtually collapsed while that of regional potentates and private militias expanded to fill the power vacuum. Among these regional potentates was Aslan Abashidze, the authoritarian leader of Adjara whose capital was the key Black Sea port city Batumi. Georgia had disintegrated into what might be characterized as a series of fiefdoms, with no overriding central control from Tbilisi. And to get any kind of aid shipment from the U.S. to Batumi or Poti and thence onward to an intended destination in the interior of Georgia or Armenia, was an extraordinarily difficult process. Typically, humanitarian aid cargoes from the U.S. or Europe destined for Armenia and Georgia would be landed in the Georgian ports Batumi and Poti where they were to be transferred to trains for onward shipment to their destination. Often the ships carrying aid stood at anchor for weeks in Batumi and Poti before being unloaded. Once the trains departed the Black Sea coast area they ran a strong risk of being flagged down and stopped by armed men who would quickly climb aboard and examine the cargo. If it was, for example, wheat, they would seize and unload a portion of it as a tax in kind. Trains from the Georgian ports were held up frequently in the 1993-4 period, and the criminal gangs who perpetrated the thefts were well-organized and efficient. So Armenia's basic life lines from the U.S. and the European community, both of which were anxious to provide assistance, ran through a very fragmented Georgia. Mr. Shevardnadze was working to consolidate Georgia's unity, but it was a difficult process and in my first year there the process was only beginning.

Meanwhile President Clinton and President Bush before him were determined to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to Armenia and Georgia. Accordingly, the State Department's Coordinator for Assistance to the Newly Independent States took the lead in developing Operation Winter Rescue, a coordinated concept of operations aimed at demonstrating the viability of surface shipments of containers of humanitarian assistance to Georgia and Armenia via Georgia's Black Sea ports Batumi and Poti. A key element of Operation Winter Rescue's ultimate success was the decision to employ two-person teams from the U.S. On Site Inspection Agency to work with shipping contractor Sealand and local officials in Georgia and Armenia to monitor the shipment of containers of emergency humanitarian assistance from their arrival in the Georgian ports, through their transfer to railroad cars and shipment by rail to Yerevan or Tbilisi and ultimately their delivery to consignees in Armenia and Georgia. We should remember that OSIA was established in 1988 to meet the on-site inspection requirements of our INF treaty with the USSR. In view of their experience working in the former USSR, OSIA personnel were also tasked with assisting with assisting with the distribution of Project Hope shipments.

As a further footnote on travel through Georgia in the 1993-4 period I should also note that whenever any personnel from Embassy Yerevan traveled overland by car or truck to our

embassy in Tbilisi, which we did frequently in the 1993-4, period, we had to be on the lookout for armed bandits. We experienced a number of robberies several kilometers inside Georgia on the main road - I hesitate to call it a highway - from Armenia to Georgia. Typically, an Embassy Yerevan vehicle would basically just get a few kilometers into Georgia when a Soviet-era car carrying plainclothes Georgian males would drive up and force it off the road. Several fellows with carbines or pistols would jump out and order everybody out of the Embassy Yerevan vehicle. They would take the passengers' money and perhaps a personal item or two and quickly drive off. This went on throughout 1993 into 1994.

Armenia is energy poor. Its most important source of energy was the nuclear power plant in Metsamor which had been closed as a result of Armenian Green activity in the wake of the devastating earthquake of December 1988. So, with the border to Azerbaijan closed, the natural gas supply from Russia via Georgia threatened by pipeline closures, and "mazut," the heavy fuel oil widely used in district heating plants in the Former Soviet Union, in short supply, Armenia was desperate for energy. The winter was frigid and schools were closed for lack of heat. Also many of the countless blocks of apartments in Yerevan were frequently without water as the water pumps were powered by electricity.

So, our top priority was to expand our already extensive assistance program. The embassy was run, I think, quite ably for my year or more, by Thomas Price. When I got there, though, Armenia was in a humanitarian crisis. My key task, in the early part of my tenure, and in fact throughout my 26 months there was assistance. We did very well in the end. There was no lack of funding on the U.S. side, in part because of the very active advocacy by the Armenian-American organizations. There was plenty of assistance money. The question was how to get the assistance there because of the fragmentation of Georgia. Of course, we would never try to get assistance in through Iran, because of our Iran policy.

But, in any case, the centerpiece of our humanitarian assistance program my first year in Armenia, and through my second as well was our Winter Warmth program. The idea was to distribute kerosene and kerosene heaters for home heating needs for the particularly vulnerable living in these huge apartment blocks, particularly in Yerevan. And, I add here that Armenia, like a number of smaller highly industrialized countries, is kind of like a tadpole. The head is bigger than the body. Yerevan had half Armenia's population and was the location of virtually all the important governmental and cultural institutions. In any case, in parallel with Charles Aznavour, the renowned French-Armenian crooner and composer, and also in parallel with the European Union, we focused initially on humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable elements of the population. We carefully designed a targeted kerosene home heating program for several categories of people deemed especially vulnerable. They were: nursing mothers, invalids, the elderly, and families with small children. We also put kerosene heaters in the schools.

We had a devil of a time delivering the kerosene to Armenia the winter of 1963-4, my first winter. In fact, much of the winter was over by the time we were able to get the first shipments up from Batumi and Poti delivered to Yerevan. By December 1993 the first ships carrying kerosene had arrived in Batumi where they stood unloaded. Meanwhile, in Yerevan pressure from the media and the public to explain the delay in delivery of the kerosene was growing steadily. When no kerosene had arrived in Armenia by January 29, 1994, we decided we owed a

public explanation. Joined by our AID Representative, Suzanne Olds, I gave an interview to the Armenian news agency Noyan Tapan. A group of journalists, government officials and diplomats attended the interview. I explained that the U.S. Government had created the Fund for Democracy and Development to serve as a partner in mounting large-scale humanitarian assistance programs like the Winter Warmth kerosene program. The Fund had, in turn, concluded contracts with the Georgian State Railways and local shipping agencies. The fund had also purchased yet a further amount of kerosene in Rotterdam and Haifa for follow-on delivery. I indicated that I expected these contracts to be fulfilled. Noyan Tapan published a story under the headline "Kerosene for Armenia Will Be Supplied." The first shipment of kerosene arrived in Armenia later in February. Much suffering had already occurred, many schools were closed. But, when we did begin the delivery of kerosene, there came a kind of surge of renewed hope to many Armenians that they could make a go of it.

I remember personally spearheading the Winter Warmth program. When the first delivery of Winter Warmth kerosene arrived in Yerevan I went out to the tank farm where the kerosene was being transferred to storage tanks. The United States Agency for International Development had sent an expert from Petersburg, Virginia, who knew how to organize and run a tank farm. I welcomed him and met with some of the truck drivers. We began to run tank trucks all over greater Yerevan and its environs. Some of the trucks were pretty decrepit looking, but I remember assisting in loading the trucks to the applause of many Armenians.

Also, I visited schools where kerosene was the only source of heating. I remember vividly, a school just outside Yerevan, not too far from our tank farm. I took my interpreter from the embassy. Although I spoke a fair amount of Armenian, it was clearly foreign Armenian. So, through my interpreter, I spoke with a little girl who was sitting in the back with her coat on - they all had their coats on because you couldn't easily heat the classroom. Her hands were purple. I was very concerned about her. I remember asking her what it was like at home. It was cold, she said. When I asked her what she was eating, she said she was eating one meal a day, the meal at the school, which we were providing. The food at home was for the rest of the family, she indicated.

In addition to kerosene for home heating, we also provided funding for heavy fuel oil, mazut. We also provided massive quantities of wheat and wheat seed. In subsequent years we provided funding for natural gas. The natural gas supply was a very precarious thing, because the natural gas pipeline from Azerbaijan was closed because that border was closed. The other natural gas line which brought Turkmen and later Russian gas down through Georgia was frequently blown up as it came down through the part of Georgia inhabited by the Azerbaijani minority. So, these were precarious times.

I remember vividly the president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, a very distinguished scholar turned independence movement leader, telling me that he wouldn't know how to justify his continued role as president if the Armenian government could not provide enough bread to feed its people. We focused on humanitarian shipments of wheat, and by heavy persuasion and by a lot of work with Georgia, and making sure, by the way, that the Georgians had enough assistance that they weren't sorely tempted to take assistance destined for Armenia from the trains. We finally got an important, consistent aid pipeline working. On balance, I think it's fair to say that we saved

people from malnutrition, and in some cases from near starvation. So that was the fundamental focus of my stay in Armenia.

A second important task was getting the embassy up and running. Tom Price, the Chargé d'Affaires in the months before my arrival, had laid much of the ground work. I saw my top priority as making a team of the embassy staff. This meant emphasizing the idea that the Foreign Service National employees are our co-workers and colleagues.. My previous experience working with gifted FSN s in Ankara, Budapest, Munich and Belgrade persuaded me of the very positive contribution an excellent FSN staff can make to the work of an embassy. I was also convinced that we would find especially well qualified candidates for these positions in Armenia. [I want to emphasize here that Tom Price as Charge d'Affaires had done important groundwork in hiring a first - class FSN staff before my arrival.] I particularly emphasized the idea that the FSN s are our colleagues. They work for us and with us. They become the repository of much of the expertise a given embassy acquires on specific cases or issues. They may not be able to do everything, and in some few instances they can't be included in a specific aspect of a case or task because of its security classification, but that's a challenge for those of us who supervise them. With the assistance of my FSO colleagues, I pride myself on having forged a team of exceptionally capable people at Embassy Yerevan. Of course, the embassy was one of the more desirable employers in Armenia at the time. We paid our staff regularly and well by comparison with other embassies and the United Nations organizations which were the other desirable places to work. We forged an excellent team.

I had other important and pressing tasks as well. One of them was to oversee the renovation of the embassy building we acquired. It was a spacious, centrally located building at a very reasonable price. Situated opposite the Parliament and near the President's office, it put us in a desirable neighborhood. But it was, of course, a Soviet era building. It had been heated by a district heating plant and had no heating system its own. It did not have proper earthquake resistant walls. As attractive as it was by local standards, in many ways it fell short of our standards. As we set about opening embassies in the capitals of the former republics of the USSR, the State Department had done a pre-survey to locate appropriate facilities, and the site in Yerevan qualified. So the decision was made in the case of our embassy building and several others in the former Soviet Union, for example, our embassy in Tbilisi, Georgia; that we would renovate the building while we worked in it.

This is a very difficult proposition, and not one I would recommend unless there are no better alternatives. The overall renovation project was directed by the State Department's Office of Foreign Building Operations Regional Operations Headquarters in Ankara. We faced a number of challenges. In the first place, with the energy shortage in Armenia, the source of power for most of the time was our generator, which functioned much of the time, but not always. It had to be taken down every so often for maintenance. We often had no reliable source of water because the city water pumps weren't functioning for lack of electricity. We kept having to move offices and functions within the embassy as the reconstruction progressed. And we were at the very end of the U.S. pipeline for materials. Very often, we couldn't adhere to organized work schedules because materials didn't reach us in a timely manner, i.e. they couldn't be shipped to us in anything like the time they were expected. Two of the cleared American workers died while we were reconstructing the embassy. In one case, the worker's death was from a clearly reversible

medical condition. There was no reliable energy supply in the local hospitals, and they had no electricity to power a defibrillator. We quickly decided to evacuate the worker, but by the time we got a medical evacuation plane into Yerevan from Switzerland, the doctor who came in on the plane joined the Armenian physician in pronouncing the fellow dead. This sent shock waves through the American embassy staff. The feeling was, "What happens if we get sick?" I have to say that the State Department medical system did not do well. They tried. The regional physician assigned to cover Yerevan was stationed in Athens, but he just couldn't cover all the new posts in the former USSR with the resources available to him.

Reconstruction was hard in other ways. You'd have to move from office to office as the reconstruction progressed. Many mornings when you arrived at the embassy there would be construction dust all over your desk. There would be incessant noise some of the time. And maintaining the security of the embassy through the various phases of the construction was especially challenging. Although I would not recommend 'reconstruct while you conduct business' as a general practice, it did have the advantage of keeping the embassy open throughout the period of humanitarian crisis. At the end of the process, we did have a much more livable embassy building. There's another issue that the State Department ought to consider as it contemplates 'reconstruct while you conduct business' in the future. It is a practical issue which is more important than outsiders might understand. I had to turn the AID mission out of the embassy building during the reconstruction period because there was no room for it. AID had plenty of money and picked up a pretty good rental building. An embassy's coordination with the its AID mission is not an easy thing at best. The AID mission has its own funding and tends to follow its own drummer. This is even more the case when the AID mission is separated from the embassy. Luckily, our first AID Representative, Suzanne Olds, was a real can-do person, who wanted to work with me and with State to achieve goals. We made cooperation happen. But subsequently, when it was time for the AID mission to return to a refurbished embassy, there was immense foot-dragging on the part of AID. Granted, there were practical problems, for example, the issue of access to the airport. We had only a very limited number of passes the whole mission, and I had to make sure that the passes wouldn't stay with the AID mission. The AID mission needed the passes too, so I don't want to go into more detail than that. I just want to underline how administratively tricky it was.

*Q: Armenia is bordered by what states?*

GILMORE: Armenia is bordered by Turkey on the west, Georgia on the north, and Azerbaijan on the northeast and east. And on the south it has a 40 kilometer border with Iran. It's a tough neck of the woods.

*Q: Could we do anything with Turkey?*

GILMORE: Before the Karabakh conflict reached the phase where Armenian forces occupied the area between Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian border, the so-called Kalbajar region of Azerbaijan, we were able to get send some humanitarian assistance to Armenia through Turkey. At one point in 1992 Turkey ran a train loaded with wheat up to its border with Armenia where the cargo was transferred to the broader gauge Armenian railroad. Turkey and Armenia have different railroad gauges. Turkey has a European gauge railroad, and Armenia has the wider

Soviet gauge. But after February of 1993 Turkey closed its border with Armenia and no more humanitarian assistance came through Turkey. Even before that, any U.S. cargo for Armenia that came via Turkey was subject to inspection. Armenian-Americans were up in arms about the inspection requirement, saying the Turks were unduly delaying the delivery of urgently needed assistance. But there was also another issue. After Turkey closed its border with Armenia, it also closed its air space to flights to and from Armenia for a lengthy period. So any flight to or from Armenia had to avoid Turkish airspace. This increased Armenia's isolation.

*Q: What was the problem with Armenian Turkey?*

GILMORE: The problem between Armenia and Turkey goes back to the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. Armenians were one of the minorities in the multi-national empire. There was a large Armenian community in Istanbul, the capital, and an estimated 1.8 to two million Armenians in the empire as a whole. Sources differ over the exact figure. Armenians also constituted significant minorities in five "vilayets," [provinces] in central and eastern Anatolia: Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, and Mamuretulaziz. Without getting into even more detail, I would underline the failure of the Young Turk movement to establish a credible Pan-Ottoman concept, which some of the empire's Armenians might have supported. The more radical Armenian political parties in the Ottoman Empire operated in secret and engaged in acts against the Turkish state, which the Turks saw as terrorism.

During WWI there was great suspicion on the part of the Young Turk leaders that the Armenians were a fifth column, eager to see Russia increase its influence in the Ottoman Empire. Armenians had settled in Anatolia well before any Seljuk or Ottoman Turks came to the region, and there had been a succession of Armenian states in Anatolia, up until 1375. But on the eve of WWI the Young Turk leaders increasingly viewed the empire's Armenians as a fifth column, while the empire's Armenians themselves sought protection from Russia, France and Britain in the face of increasing atrocities perpetrated by the Young Turk leaders. In fact, there were Armenian massacres in Ottoman Turkey on several occasions, beginning in the 1890's. But on April 24, the night from April 24 to April 25, 1915 more than two hundred of the leaders of the Armenian intellectual and cultural and religious communities in Constantinople/Istanbul were taken from their homes and arrested. Most of them, according to our ambassador to the Ottoman Empire at that time, Henry Morgenthau, were sent off into the interior. These arrests marked the beginning of a massive effort by the Committee of Union Progress, the Young Turk leadership, to eliminate or destroy the Ottoman Armenians. Armenians call these deportations and massacres the "Meds Yeghern", which translates as "The Great Calamity" or "Holocaust." Armenian males of military age were pulled en masse out of Ottoman army units where they had only in recent years become eligible to serve, and forced into labor battalions, or else shot outright. In many cases, the Ottoman authorities didn't even use bullets. They bayoneted the victims. Meanwhile, the Ottomans began deporting Armenian women, children and elderly male Armenians from the five vilayets, the five provinces in Anatolia where they were a significant minority, to Deir ez-Zor located in the Syrian desert, near Aleppo. The deportations were witnessed by American consular officials and American missionaries. American religious communities sent a number of missionaries to Ottoman Turkey in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A number of their converts were members of non-Turkish minorities including Armenians. Also, the U.S. had a number of consulates in the Ottoman Empire, staffed by consuls who reported on the Armenian

massacres and deportations. In fact, some of the best first-hand information on the Armenian deportations and massacres comes from them. They reported all this to Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, who made representations to the Young Turk leadership, particularly to Talat Pasha, the minister of the interior. When WWI ended there were very few Armenians left in the new modern Turkish republic which emerged: a small community in Istanbul, and smaller minorities in some urban areas. The presence of the Western diplomatic missions in Constantinople/Istanbul is credited with holding down large-scale massacre activity there against Armenians and Assyrians and others. The earlier massacres of Ottoman Armenians in the 1890's had already produced smaller Armenian diasporas in the U.S. and France. The "Meds Yeghern" triggered waves of Armenian refugees who created or swelled Armenian Diaspora communities in France, the U.S. and around the world. They brought with them a deep hatred for the Turks who had massacred them and had driven them off their ancestral lands. So, without going into further detail, I think I've sketched the reason for the intense dislike Armenians and Turks have for each other. There's a widespread feeling among Armenians everywhere that the Turks owe the successors of the Armenians who were dispossessed of their property, deported and massacred appropriate recompense. Beginning in the 1970's Armenian terrorists began to assassinate Turkish diplomats in revenge for the "MedsYereghn." So, there's all this baggage in Turkish-Armenian relationships. On top of this comes the Karabakh conflict. The Turks and the Azerbaijanis are ethnically and linguistically particularly close. The Azerbaijani-Turkish and the Turkish spoken in Turkey are cousin languages. There are numerous Azerbaijanis in Turkey, and the Azerbaijani national movement, which began in the 19th century and flourished about the time of WWI, and the Young Turk and Ataturkist movements drew on each other for inspiration and support. So, that there is a tremendous affinity between these two countries. So, when the Karabakh conflict broke out, Turkey sided with Azerbaijan. In fact Turkey's policy is that it will not normalize relations with Armenia until the Azerbaijanis and Armenians reach a Karabakh settlement which is satisfactory to Azerbaijan. So, while Turkey recognizes Armenia, there has been no exchange of diplomats and all attempts at dialog have foundered on two issues: the Karabakh issue and the Turkish insistence that the Armenians withdraw or openly deny that they have any territorial claims on Turkey. In fact, the present Armenian Government makes no territorial claims on Turkey. Turkey and Armenia do have fundamentally different views on whether the deportation and massacres of the Ottoman Armenians from 1915 to 1922 constitute genocide, as defined by the UN Genocide Convention of 1948. The U.S. Government has taken the position that to have the terms of the Genocide Convention met, you have to have proof of intent and that there's no proof that it was the intent of the Ottoman authorities to commit what is defined in the convention as genocide. In all fairness, more legal scholars believe that it was a genocide than not. The U.S. Congress has been the scene of numerous genocide resolutions, one of which very nearly passed in the Clinton period. In fact, those in favor had the votes in the House to pass, very clearly. President Clinton wrote to Speaker Hastert and asked him to take the genocide resolution off the House floor, citing our interests in Turkey, and the danger to our American troops there. He did.

The point is Armenians and Turks have not been able to establish a positive relationship. There have been efforts to promote reconciliation. There was a Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission, which was sponsored in part by the State Department. They met. Some leaders of Turkey, some important personalities in Turkey, some important Armenians from the Republic, from the Russian-Armenian Diaspora, from the U.S.-Armenian Diaspora met. They ostensibly

agreed to have an impartial body look at the question of whether the events of 1915-22 could constitute a genocide. The Commission came back and said they could. The Turks said, "This is not possible." The Commission ground to a halt. There were important elements in the Armenian world, particularly the Armenian Diaspora, and world that didn't like it anyhow. I mention this solely because it gives us some sense of how deep the divisions are and how heavy the historical burden is.

*Q: Well, for some time that I was familiar with, a terrorist campaign against Turkish diplomats, such as the consuls general Mehmet Baydar and Bahadir Demir in Los Angeles.*

GILMORE: And Orhan Gündüz in Boston, an honorary Turkish consul, I believe there. When I was deputy chief of mission in Belgrade, Ambassador Galip Balkar, the Turkish Ambassador, was assassinated. His driver as well. Those terrorist activities took place in the '70s and into the early '80s. There was also a bloody airline hijacking at Orly Airfield, Paris, as I remember. Basically, there were two Armenian organizations engaging in this terrorist activity against Turkish diplomats. One was ASALA, the Armenian Struggle for the Armed Liberation of Armenia. The second was the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide. ASALA was basically a left-wing, pseudo-Communist organization whose center of gravity was really the Armenian community in Lebanon. A few Armenian-Americans including Monte Melkonian from California joined with ASALA. Melkonian, by the way, was subsequently killed as a volunteer fighting with the Karabakh Armenian forces. The other organization, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, was, in fact, affiliated with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, although I have seen no open acknowledgment of this by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation leadership. The Turkish Consul General that you mentioned was killed by an individual associated with the Justice Commandos.

That terrorism died out in the early 1980s. It is interesting, in my view, that the terrorists were in effect the grandchildren of the victims of the Armenian deportations and massacres. And secondly, these acts were regarded by the overwhelming majority of Armenians, particularly those in the Diaspora, as justified. The U.S. took great pains to protect Turkish diplomatic establishments in the U.S. and to try to root this terrorism out. We did not issue visas to enter the U.S to certain Armenian Diaspora leaders thought to be responsible ultimately for these actions. This terrorist activity had in fact subsided in the mid-1980s, and hasn't reoccurred in the U.S. The Turks are very sensitive about it, and see it as something that was unjustified.

*Q: In your narrative Nagorno-Karabakh keeps coming up.*

GILMORE: Yes. Nagorno-Karabakh, which basically translates into English as Mountainous Karabakh. The Azerbaijanis call it the Mountainous Karabakh. For that matter, so do the Armenians. Nagorno is a Russian word for "mountain" or "mountainous." Karabakh means "black garden." It's a combination of Farsi and Turkish.

Kara means "black," and bocha, or bagh, means "garden." In any case, the area has been inhabited by both Armenians and Azerbaijanis, plus some smaller other elements, particularly Kurds. The last czarist Russian census, in 1896, showed more Armenians than Muslims in Karabakh. By the way, at that time of that census, the Azerbaijanis were not yet recognized as a

national group. They were considered Turks. In any case, the Armenians, the Georgians, and the Russians just called them Turks. A majority of Karabakh's population was Armenian. The last Soviet census showed 120,000 Armenians, 50,000 Azerbaijanis, and the rest minorities, particularly Kurds. The Kurds were not all Muslim Kurds. Many of the Kurds were Yezidi Kurds, who are non-Moslem. It's important to recognize that the armed conflict in Nagorno Karabakh began before Armenia and Azerbaijan were independent. There had been fighting between Azerbaijanis and Armenians over the area during WWI as well. It was Stalin who awarded Karabakh to the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic. First it was the Azerbaijani component of the Soviet Federation. But, in any case, Stalin made it an autonomous area within the Republic of Azerbaijan with certain minority rights ostensibly guaranteed to Armenians. Armenians never accepted it. The first Armenian Republic was too weak to do anything about it, but didn't accept it. Fighting broke out in 1988. There were massive demonstrations in Stepanakert which is the Armenian name of the capital of Karabakh. The Azerbaijanis called it Khankendi. The demonstrations quickly produced a massive response in Yerevan, where there were huge demonstrations on the streets which generated the Armenian Pan-National Movement, the force that was the harbinger of and the engine that achieved Armenian independence. Meanwhile, in Baku the Azerbaijani People's Front, came into being and quickly metastasized in response to the demonstrations in Stepanakert and Yerevan. There was a pogrom against the substantial Armenian population in Sumgait, which is across the Absheron Peninsula across from Baku. As fighting erupted in Karabakh, the Armenian minority of Baku and Sumgait was pushed out, as was the Azeri minority in parts of Armenia.

*Q: There was some pretty nasty stuff in there.*

GILMORE: Oh, yes. Well the conflict itself was fierce and bloody. The number of people killed as a result of the Karabakh conflict is usually put at 25 to 30,000. It would have been much more a subject of concern to the U.S., had there been any live media coverage. There wasn't. There were no U.S. journalists visiting Karabakh on any kind of regular basis. Occasionally a stringer would report something on the conflict. The point is that the Karabakh conflict didn't make the headlines, didn't make the news on a regular basis. There's also a tradition in the Caucasus of taking hostages. So there were kidnappings. You kidnap an enemy, lock him in your basement, and give him bread and water. You captured him in case you needed a trade-in, because there had been hostage taking on the other side. The fighting in Karabakh was bloody. There was considerable mine-laying, so there were lots of injuries, particularly during and after the conflict as a result of mine explosions. Particularly of children. The long and the short of it is, the conflict ended with a cease-fire engineered by Russia in 1994. The then defense minister, Pavel Grachev, was the key person, supported by all the members of the so-called Minsk Group, which includes the United States, France, and other important countries. The Minsk Group, by the way, was so named because there was to be a conference in Minsk, the capital of Belarus, to end the conflict had the Minsk Group succeeded.

In any case, since 1994 there has been a cease-fire. The cease-fire left the Armenian forces in occupation of about 17% of Azerbaijan. Areas around Karabakh, including the entire region between Karabakh and the Armenian border, and from Karabakh down to the Iranian border are occupied by Armenian forces. The Armenians say that the reason they occupied those areas is to get Stepanakert out of artillery range. And there is some logic to that. In any case, the Azeris,

pointing to the fact that the OSCE has recognized the borders as they existed when the Soviet Union collapsed, say that their territorial integrity must be restored. The Armenians say that Karabakh was never a part of a truly independent Azerbaijani state and note that there are negotiations on a compromise solution underway with the three co-chairs of the Minsk Group of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United States, Russia and France. There were times when there appeared to be progress toward a settlement. And the first presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Abulfaz Elchibey from Azerbaijan, and Levon Ter-Petrossian in Armenia, personally negotiated two times: once in Paris, under the auspices of the French president, and once in Key West, under U.S. auspices. Although the Minsk Group continues to pursue a compromise solution, the Karabakh dispute remains unresolved.

There is some increased sentiment in Azerbaijan for trying to retake Karabakh militarily, but the general assumption is that the Armenian forces are too strong, militarily for now. The most capable army in the Caucasus , pound for pound, is undoubtedly the Karabakh army. They fought well during the Karabakh conflict, demonstrating an ability to operate with combined arms unmatched by the Azeri forces. The Karabakh Armenians also had a long tradition of providing soldiers for the Red Army and the Czarist Army before it; mountain boys who were rough and tough and good shooters. The Armenian Army is probably the next most capable force in the Caucasus. The Azeris have shown themselves to be considerably less capable militarily. So, for the time being, it looks as if the Karabakh Armenians, backed by the armed forces of Armenia, hold the upper hand in Karabakh. Although, there is a concern that as oil pipelines are built, as Azerbaijan's oil and gas wealth generates hard currency, Azerbaijan will be able to buy an army, so to speak, and improve their forces. Azerbaijan is acquiring military education assistance from its ally, Turkey, which is of course a very formidable place to learn soldiery. In any case, the conflict remains unresolved.

*Q: Let's talk about the political system there. Also about the spirit of the Caucasus. One picks up what the Caucuses from Tolstoy and other... this is a pretty unstable...*

GILMORE: The Caucasus is one of the most ethnically complex places on the planet. I've served in the Balkans and in the Caucasus. The Balkans are extremely complex, but if there's any place that I know is more complex ethnically, it's the Caucasus.

*Q: Harry, back to Armenia. Did the United States involved in peace efforts there?*

GILMORE: Very much so. Starting with Ambassador John "Jack" Maresca, the U.S. has had a series of very capable special envoys for Nagorno Karabakh and other disputes in the former Soviet Union like the disputes over Abkhazia and Moldova. Jack was the first and he was the special envoy for Nagorno-Karabakh during the first part of my tour of duty in Armenia.

Jack Maresca was a very capable Foreign Service professional. I believe he is now living in Europe. [Editor's Note: Following his Karabakh assignment, Mr. Maresca headed the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty-affiliated Open Media Research Institute in Prague.] Maresca was followed by Joseph Presel. The basic venue for negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute was not our embassies in Baku or Yerevan. Although our ambassadors in Armenia and Azerbaijan discussed issues related to Karabakh with their host governments all the time because

they were central to both countries, the center of gravity for U.S. efforts to foster a compromise solution to the Karabakh conflict was the Minsk Group of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the CSCE. We ambassadors worked closely with our special envoys and Jack Maresca, Joe Presel, and their successors were in Yerevan and Baku frequently. Strobe Talbott, who was then the senior U.S. official involved with the talks, also visited Yerevan for talks with President Ter-Petrossian. The Karabakh issue was of central importance to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. But it was the Minsk Group and the special envoys who took the lead on the issue.

*Q: Who were our ambassadors in Georgia and Azerbaijan?*

GILMORE: Richard Miles was our ambassador in Azerbaijan during the first part of my tour of duty in Armenia [Editor's Note: Ambassador Miles served from September 1992 to November 1993], and then he was succeeded by Richard Kauzlarich [Editor's Note: Ambassador Kauzlarich served from April 1994 to July 1997]. Kent Brown was our ambassador in Georgia during that period. [Editor's Note: Ambassador Brown served from September 1992 to August 1995.] Kent is now, I believe, working for RJR Nabisco, formerly RJ Reynolds. But, basically, we did get together several times.

I met bilaterally with Kent Brown when my wife and I were his guests in Tbilisi and then again when he visited us in Yerevan. We agreed in principle on the desirability of holding a trilateral meetings of the three U.S. ambassadors in Baku, Tbilisi and Yerevan. Meanwhile, when I first visited Ambassador Brown in Tbilisi he arranged for me to join him in a meeting with Shevardnadze who displayed his famed charm and wit. Ambassador and Mrs. Brown then escorted my wife and me on a motor trip to Georgia's main Black Sea port, Batumi. En route we made a quick visit to Stalin's birthplace, Gori, to see the memorabilia that is still there from the Stalin era. We also stopped briefly in Kutaisi. As our Embassy Tbilisi vehicle approached the internal border with the Autonomous Republic of Adjara, we were stopped by armed officials who identified themselves as Adjaran border guards and insisted on escorting us on the rest of our trip to Batumi. So Escorted by the Adjaran border guards, we proceeded to Batumi, the Black Sea port city which was the capital of Georgia's Autonomous Republic of Adjara and the stronghold of Aslan Abashidze. Abashidze was the scion of a family that had lived in Batumi for centuries. He was very much in charge of Batumi and Adjara at that time. Our visit to Batumi was very timely because Batumi at that point, together with its sister Black Sea port, Poti, was key to the delivery of U.S. aid shipments to Armenia and Georgia. With that in mind, we called on Abashidze and attended a concert in Batumi the next evening as his guests. Shevardnadze, who had traveled separately from Tbilisi, also attended. To our surprise, Abashidze did not cede pride of place to Shevardnadze as Georgia's president. He took the sovereign's seat in the royal box at the ornate Batumi opera hall himself and relegated Shevardnadze to what was clearly a secondary position. It seemed clear that Abashidze was signaling that he was in charge in Batumi, and that those who sought to ship aid via Batumi should understand this clearly.

*Q: Was there any talk of oil lines or oil exploration while you were in Armenia ?*

GILMORE: Yes, a lot. The "Contract of the Century," as the agreement between Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijan International Operating Company was called, was very much in the headlines. At

that point the talks included U.S. companies Unocal and Amoco. Amoco and BP, when they combined, became the primary force in the consortium. The contract had been under negotiation before Heydar Aliyev came to power in Baku. He renegotiated it in 1994. The Contract of the Century was signed and of course the question of pipelines arose. That issue was very much alive, first came the issue of so-called "early oil" pipelines, the pipelines that would take the early production to the Black Sea. Then came the question of longer-term pipelines, with the U.S. government particularly advocating an oil pipeline from Baku to just south of Tbilisi, and around Armenia and down to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. That idea was very much alive during my tour of duty in Yerevan.

So there was a lot of talk about oil and transportation. Gas was just coming on the horizon. Since that time, the consortium has discovered that the Azerbaijani offshore area in the Caspian Sea is a major source of natural gas. So the topic of pipelines was very much alive. Armenia basically was the odd country out, for reasons that had primarily to do with the Karabakh conflict and the Azeri position that no pipelines could be routed via Armenia until that conflict was settled on terms acceptable to Azerbaijan. That kept Armenia out of the picture. Of course, this was a serious problem for Armenia because Armenia is energy poor, and the border from Azerbaijan to Armenia was already closed before Armenia proclaimed its independence.

*Q: Going back to Nagorno-Karabakh. Sometimes there's a solution that everybody kind of understands, such what a Palestinian-Israeli settlement could be, but nobody can get to it. In the long run did you see such a settlement Azerbaijan and Armenia?*

GILMORE: I would say the short answer to your question is no, although I do not want to imply there were and are no possible solutions. There is a fundamental problem on the Armenian side: many Armenians are convinced that there are some important forces in Azerbaijan, often led by the ruling authorities themselves, who want all Armenians out of Karabakh, who want Karabakh ethnically cleansed of Armenians. That's a widespread perception among Armenians. The Armenians view the Karabakh conflict against the background of the Armenians being driven off the Armenian Plateau and out of the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the 1915-1923 period. They see it as a question of Armenians surviving on their historic lands. The first Armenian president, Levon Ter- Petrossian, a distinguished scholar and historian, made the following points to me when I discussed the Karabakh dispute with him early in my tenure. Yerevan, he noted, was not really an Armenian city a century ago. It was city with a mixed population which probably had a Muslim plurality. The composition of Yerevan's population, of course, changed in the course of the twentieth century. But when one looks at Karabakh, he observed, there has been a continuity of Armenian presence and civilization there since much earlier times. So the Armenian perception, Ter Petrossian continued is that the first requirement for the Karabakh Armenians is for security and then self-determination on their historic lands. It means also a permanent linkage on the ground by road and rail to Armenia, so that Armenia can guarantee the Karabakh Armenians' security.

For the Azerbaijanis, Karabakh is also very important. It played a key role in Azerbaijan's national literary-cultural revival. The capital city of Karabakh, Stepanakert in Armenian, and Khankendi in Azerbaijani, is symbolically and culturally important to both nations. So the short answer is that neither side wants to give up what would be necessary to satisfy the other. That

being said, there are theoretical possibilities for compromise. There were several ideas out there. One of them was to govern Nagorno-Karabakh as a special entity based on an understanding between Baku and Nagorno-Karabakh that Nagorno-Karabakh would not be under any direct hierarchical control or direction from Baku but would remain linked with Baku economically. Karabakh's own constabulary would be responsible for public safety.

There was also talk, more by people from afar than people in the region, of a possible territorial swap: the so-called Goble Plan. Paul Goble, an analyst in the in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, presented to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance the idea of a territorial swap: the Armenian 'panhandle,' the part of Armenia extending down to its border with Iran, would be ceded to Azerbaijan while Azerbaijan would cede Karabakh to Armenia. There was considerable opposition to the swap idea. Armenians in the Diaspora, particularly, but also important players in Armenia itself were opposed. They feared that a direct territorial linkage between Turkey and Azerbaijan would bode ill for Armenia. Armenians would be surrounded by people who didn't like them and didn't wish them well. And also Armenia would lose its geopolitical clout, what little it had. The fact that the Armenian panhandle, which in effect separates Turkey from Azerbaijan is seen by many Armenians as giving Armenia a bit of leverage in the region. There's no question that of all the states that emerged independent from the former Soviet Union, Azerbaijan has the closest relationship with Turkey. And Azerbaijani Turkish has a particularly close linguistic affinity with the Osmanli Turkish spoken in Turkey.

There are possibilities for resolution of the Karabakh conflict based on compromise. The Minsk Group negotiators came close at times. They came close in Key West when Ambassador Terry Cavanaugh was the U.S. envoy. . In more recent years, there was regular contact between the presidents of Armenia, Robert Kocharyan, and Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, and their special envoys engaged in extensive discussion. While a solution is possible, in principle, it would take immense political will on both sides.

That being said, without resolution of the dispute, it has not been possible to develop South Caucasus-wide – Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan – economic cooperation. The South Caucasus market is small in any case, but three small individual markets make for less attractive conditions for investors than one more sizeable regional market. Both countries rely on Georgia for access to the sea and location of oil and gas pipelines. The Georgians have tried to foster some kind of dialog. But basically what you have is bilateral relationships, important ones between Azerbaijan and Georgia, and Armenia and Georgia, but no South Caucasus-wide institutions. When I say Caucasus, I am careful to use the terms South Caucasus and North Caucasus, because the North Caucasus, of course, is part of the Russian Federation, and that's a very different kettle of fish.

The Karabakh conflict was extremely brutal. It wreaked great hardships on the civilian population of the region. There was hostage taking. Extensive minefields were laid, and there were numerous maimings of both combatants and non-combatants, including of children. The conflict also generated considerable pressure on Azerbaijan's Armenian minority in and around Baku and Sumgait, and the smaller but still significant Azeri minority in Armenia. The conflict has caused extreme hardship to the peoples of the region, generating large numbers internally-displaced persons and refugees. So, it's an important, unresolved matter.

*Q: When you were there, were there any signs of...well I suppose it would be on the Muslim side, but was there recruitment of Muslim fanatics in other places? We're getting that in Chechnya...*

GILMORE: Right. Azerbaijanis are secular like their linguistic cousins, the Turks from the Republic of Turkey. Secularism is ingrained. Unlike the Turks who are mostly Sunnis, most Azerbaijanis are Shia, although there is an important Sunni element as well. But although they are Shia like the Iranians, the Shiism practiced in Azerbaijan is more restrained and less emotional than that practiced in Iran. Moreover, the combination of the secular state and strong secular political leadership by President Heydar Aliyev has kept emotional religious manifestations under control.

The Russians have pressed the Azerbaijanis not to give succor or refuge to Chechen fighters who might come over the border through Dagestan. Dagestan borders directly on Azerbaijan and in Dagestan itself, there is an important minority, the Akin Chechens. But in any case, Azerbaijan was basically on the side of the allied coalition in the Iraq War. It offered over flight rights and refueling facilities, as needed. And President Aliyev was very careful in his dealings with Russia and others not to be perceived or suspected of aiding Chechen separatists. Armenia, of course, has virtually no Muslims left. There were a few Azerbaijanis in Armenia at the end of the Soviet era. Basically, they were forced to leave just before or at independence as a result of the Karabakh conflict. This wasn't well-noted in the West. The plight of the Armenians in Baku and Sumgait, however, did attract some attention in the Western media.

*Q: What about the Armenian-Americans while you were there? How did you find dealing with them?*

GILMORE: I have to be very clear here. I know the Armenian-American community well, and I have made many friends there. But I don't know all of its leaders personally. It's a large community, nearly a million strong, and virtually all the members of the community care deeply about their ancestral homeland, Armenia, and Armenia's independence. They are very well-organized. As I indicated earlier, I wasn't able to get out to Armenia in the late summer or early fall of 1992 because of the foul up with my papers in the White House. I had more time to sit and read about the Armenian-American community and Armenia in general, and study Armenian before I went out to post. When I got there, of course, I was in frequent contact with representatives of the major Armenian-American organizations. I should say a word about them because they're not always well understood in the U.S.

Americans tend to think of the Armenian lobby, as they call it, as a kind of a single force that is close to being monolithic. That is not at all the case. There are two major advocacy organizations, and there's another important organization I should mention too. And there are numerous other organizations I won't get to. The two major advocacy organizations are the Armenian Assembly of America, and the Armenian National Committee of America. The "Assembly," was founded in 1972, as an umbrella organization over all the Armenian organizations in the United States. Subsequently, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Dashnaktsutyun or Dashnaks opted out of the umbrella arrangement. They established their own advocacy arm called the Armenian National Committee of America. So there are two primary sources of the Armenian advocacy effort in the U.S. Congress: the Armenian Assembly of

America, and the Armenian National Committee of America.

Although the Assembly and the ANCA often work in parallel; they do not have joint committees. The Assembly is not a political organization. It takes no part in Armenian politics as a party. It does not get directly involved in Armenian politics and supports whatever government is in power in Armenia. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation and its ANCA advocacy arm are quite different. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation is a party with a very long history. It was founded in czarist Russia in1890. It's still a player in Armenian politics. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation has a party organization in Armenia; it has seats in the Parliament. The ARF also participates in Lebanese political life having on occasion had representation in the Lebanese Parliament. The ARF also sponsors the Armenian Relief Society, which operates not only in the U.S. and the Republic of Armenia, but also wherever there are Armenian communities around the world. Both the Armenian Assembly of America and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation/ANCA have very close ties to a number of U.S. congressmen and senators. There's been an Armenian Issues Caucus in the House of Representatives since 1995. Depending on where we are in the cycle of elections for the House of Representatives, the caucus normally has 130-140 members. It's quite influential. When a bill which would provide assistance to Armenia is under consideration in the House of Representatives, there are, almost automatically, 140 votes for it. The first co-chairs of the caucus were Representative Pallone, Democrat, N.J. and Representative Porter, Republican, Ill. In sum, there's a strong foundation of support for assistance to Armenia, not only in terms of the two Armenian American advocacy organizations, but also in terms of the Armenian Issues Caucus in the House.

While there's no Armenian issues caucus, *per se*, in the Senate, there have been a number of senators over time who have cared deeply about Armenia and worked to support it. Some of them are now retired. Senator Bob Dole and Senator Paul Simon are perhaps the two best examples. Both were very consistent supporters of assistance to Armenia. Senator Paul Sarbanes also comes to mind. There are more. During my time in Yerevan Senator Harry Reid and Senator Phil Graham visited Armenia. Harry Reid was then the Democratic Whip in the Senate. Phil Graham is now retired. But the foregoing list gives one an idea of what kind of oomph Armenian advocacy has had in the Senate. Harry Reid visited in the winter of 1993-94 when Armenia was in economic crisis and the hardships it created were palpable. Mrs. Reid accompanied him. They stayed in what had been a luxury hotel. It had no hot water, and guests were advised to fill their bathtubs with cold water if they desired to bathe. But this was the kind of support Armenia attracted in the Congress.

There is another very important Armenian organization, which is not an advocacy organization in the classic sense, but has provided assistance to Armenian communities around the world for more than 100 years. It is the Armenian General Benevolent Union. A non-profit organization, the AGBU was founded in Cairo, Egypt in 1906 to promote Armenian identity and heritage. There was an important Armenian community in Egypt during the Ottoman period. The AGBU was founded there in response to the 1905 Armenian massacres in the Ottoman Empire. I mention it particularly because it has a sterling reputation in the Armenian world and has been highly successful advocating for funds for the American University of Armenia.

*Q: You mean like the American University of Beirut, and the American University of Cairo; both*

*highly successful institutions?*

GILMORE: The American University of Armenia was in the process of seeking accreditation in the U.S. when I gave this interview. It has since gained full accreditation. It's partnered with the University of California, whose Board of Regulators serves as the nucleus of the Board for the American University of Armenia. Like AUB, the American University of Armenia has been immensely successful. As Louise Manoogian Simone, Chair of the Armenian General Benevolent Union has pointed out, AUA alumni are the most desirable recruits in Armenia for government service and private industry. The AUA has already shown itself to be a remarkable success.

In closing, let me say that Armenians still care deeply about the issue that really brought them together before Armenia was independent: genocide recognition. There's a strong conviction among Armenian-Americans and, indeed, Armenians everywhere that the deportation and massacre of 1.5 million Ottoman Armenians living in Istanbul and five eastern provinces of Turkey from 1915 to 1922 constitutes genocide as it is defined in the UN Genocide Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. The Armenian-American community strongly supports action by the Congress and President affirming U.S. recognition of the Armenian Genocide. There have been a number of efforts in that direction, and more should be expected. The Armenian-American advocacy groups also advocate for economic assistance to Nagorno-Karabakh which is not recognized by any government. Congress has approved the provision of some humanitarian assistance to Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian-American advocacy groups also care deeply about Armenia's security. Specifically, they want to see continuing efforts by the U.S., together with France and Russia, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group of the CSCE, to bring the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to a negotiated settlement.

*Q: Did you notice the cultural clash between Armenian-Americans when they get up into the mountains of Armenia and all of a sudden they come across their counterparts that they've been hearing their grandmother talk about? They go back to the homeland and they say, "Oh, my God."*

GILMORE: Not so much. Armenians are a "diaspora" people, a people who have been dispersed across several continents by deportations and genocidal massacres. Armenian-Americans who haven't yet visited the Republic of Armenia or its predecessor state, the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia, are often shocked by the hardships the Armenian the people face and how difficult life is. At the same time, they are proud that Armenia has survived as a state, and they are particularly proud of Armenia's rich cultural life. Armenians from the U.S. who visit Armenia may find their first opportunity to meet some distant member of the family. This is very important to Armenians, because so many perished and found their families decimated as the result of the deportations and genocidal massacres in the 1915 to 1922 period. Whole families, if not wiped out entirely, were left without grandparents or aunts, and uncles. So finding a cousin in Armenia may have a very special meaning to an Armenian American or an Armenian from France.

*Q: One thinks of the author William Saroyan, and I'm sure there are others. Did they have an echo in Armenia?*

GILMORE: Oh, yes. Saroyan is a national hero in Armenia. The Armenians were stateless from 1375, when the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia fell, until 1918 when in the aftermath of WWI and the Russian Revolution, a small Armenian state was born, struggled for survival, and ultimately was incorporated into the USSR. During the centuries of statelessness, Armenians were a people with an historic church and liturgy and a language spoken by Armenians scattered across several continents. In his poem "We" the great contemporary Armenian poet Gevorg Emin described Armenia as "a powerful soul with no body." For Armenians, cultural and religious relationships are very important, and in many ways their cultural heroes and religious leaders tower historically over their political leaders. Figures like Aram Khatchaturian in music and Saroyan in literature are widely beloved throughout the Armenian world. The liturgy of the Armenian Apostolic Church is very beautiful, especially as set to music by several outstanding Armenian composers. The Armenian Apostolic Church is headed by a universal bishop called a Catholicos. When one looks back at earlier periods of Armenian history, one does find political and clerical heroes: kings, princes and Catholicoses.

*Q: The French singer, Charles Aznavour, has always kept sort of Armenia in the focus of his work in France.*

GILMORE: Yes, he's widely respected in Armenia. He visited a couple of times when I was there, and the Aznavour Foundation was one of our partners in bringing kerosene heating to Armenian schools. Aznavour, of course speaks fluent western Armenian. As I mentioned earlier, the two dialects of Armenian, when spoken fluently, are largely mutually intelligible. But not in every instance. Aznavour is a hero in Armenia. And the American actress, Cher, who's partly of Armenian origin, was a sensation when she visited Armenia. And there are political figures like former California Governor Deukmejian and California Representative Anna Eshoo who are of Armenian heritage. The Armenians are well aware of that.

When they look back, the Armenians see a huge, long history. An Armenian-American newspaper editor was asked to name the most important events in Armenian history. When he did, he started with 1064, when the Seljuk Turks took Ani, the capital of a medieval Armenian empire. The ruins of Ani stands just inside the present Turkish-Armenian border. It's as if it were yesterday.

*Q: How did the Armenians look upon the Russians?*

GILMORE: By and large, the Armenians see the Russians as pretty positive, in terms of Armenian history. If you talk to individual Armenians and you know them well, and I'm speaking now of Armenians in the Republic, that the Russians can be overbearing and insensitive. But by and large, as a people and as a culture, they respect the Russians. They know Russian well, they know Russian literature. And anyone who knows Russian literature sees a side of Russians which I think can only be described as attractive and impressive. We know the great Russian novels. But Russian poetry, rivals English poetry in terms of its scope and depth.

Politically, the Armenians see the Russians not always consistently but at least in principle, from the 19th Century on, as trying to help Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Trying to provide a

haven in czarist Russia for persecuted Ottoman Armenians. The Armenians are not uncritical. They will say that the czarist Russians looked after czarist Russia's interests first. And they will acknowledge that the Armenian political parties that sought to get organized in Czarist Russia at the end of the 19th Century were subjected to oppression. But by and large, Russians are seen as positive. Historically they're seen as defenders of their fellow Christians. They're also seen as having provided a haven for Armenians. They're seen as the enemy of the great oppressor of the Armenians, which in the Armenian view was Ottoman Turkey. There's a fair amount of intermarriage. An Armenian living in the Republic with a Russian spouse is not an unusual occurrence.

*Q: Well, Harry, maybe it's time to turn to... You left Armenia, when?*

GILMORE: I left Armenia in the summer, August of 1995, right after the first Parliamentary elections, and the referendum on the Constitution. Elections which were not without flaw. I returned to Washington to become the Dean of Area Studies at FSI.

*Q: Let's talk about this. You were the Dean of Area Studies from when to when?*

GILMORE: I was Dean of Area Studies from the summer of 1995 until Area Studies were subsumed into the School of Professional and Area Studies. The FSI director at that time, my boss, Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, proposed to make Area Studies a division of the School of Professional and Area Studies, to change the name from the School of Professional Studies to the School of Professional and Area Studies, and eliminate my position, abolish the position of Dean of Area Studies.

I had selected Dean of the School of Area Studies as my first choice, in terms of the bidding process, when I left Armenia. But when I came aboard I was asked to engineer or co-engineer the amalgamation of the two schools. My partner was the outgoing Dean of the School of Professional Studies, Barbara Bodine, who subsequently was named Ambassador to Yemen, and is now about to be a key part of our transition team in Iraq. In any case, I still believe that the keys to Foreign Service success are in effective language and area studies training. Then come the specialties: consular, economic, and political training. But for all of us in the Foreign Service, area studies in combination with language studies, I think are crucial.

*Q: Amen.*

GILMORE: So I was not in favor, of this merger. I did not advocate or take the lead by any means in urging this merger. But, I understood the logic of it, and Ambassador Schaffer was the doctor. She was the one who had the right to prescribe the remedies. So, I committed myself to making it work. It wasn't easy because many of my colleagues in the School of Area Studies who were very capable professionals were not pleased with it. And also there was a certain tendency on the part of some of the other folks in the School of Professional Studies, particularly at the top, not to realize how important psychologically it was that the new school be called Professional AND Area Studies the School of Professional and Area Studies. But the merger took place and Area Studies has I think, survived. The Area Studies Division Chief, Dr. Andy Memor, I think has done a fine job.

In any case, that was my first position after returning from Armenia. I became for a short period of time the acting dean of the School of Professional and Area Studies during the merger period. Not an easy time. But I am confident we successfully engineered the merger. At that point, Ambassador Schaffer asked me to become the Dean of the Senior Seminar for my last year in the Foreign Service. It was a wonderful experience, but I would have done an even better job in a second year, having been once around the track. But I think the most important thing that I accomplished there was to persuade Barry Wells, who had been the Associate Dean in the School of Area Studies, to move over to the Senior Seminar as the Associate Dean. An experienced educator and administrator, he already is providing the continuity the Senior Seminar was lacking. I pride myself on pushing for his transfer to that position.

During my year as Dean of the Senior Seminar there were a couple of things I was particularly pleased with. Drawing on my experience in Berlin where I worked cheek by jowl with senior American military officers, I emphasized strongly how important it is that we in the State Department and those in the uniformed services understand each other's cultures, how different they were, and how one needed to work hard to understand the other colleague's institutional values in order to be able to communicate optimally and operate with maximum efficiency. I hope I made a positive contribution to the careers to most of the members of that year's Senior Seminar.

*Q: Did you find most of the Foreign Service Officers weren't really aware of the military perspective?*

GILMORE: A number of them weren't. There would be, of course, here and there a person who had previously been a military officer. They were important exceptions. Once you've been an officer in our armed services, although it may have been 15 or 20 years earlier, you develop a basic understanding that there are different cultures in the military and civilian services. The uniformed services sent outstanding candidates to the Senior Seminar. There was some feeling on the part of the some of the State participants that since those candidates tended to be at the Colonel level, they might not be quite as ready for senior positions in their own respective services as many of their Foreign Service classmates. But, in fact, the Navy, Army, Coast Guard and Air Force officers in my Senior Seminar were absolutely outstanding. Intellectually gifted and hardworking, they made a real contribution to the seminar. The Air Force officer won the Senior Seminar's annual prize for writing. His topic was whether U.S. troops should serve under UN command. He made a cogent case for why that was not desirable. The prize, by the way, was awarded by retired Foreign Service people. The Coast Guard Captain's onward assignment was to head up the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. On the State Department side, there were some very able people, a number of whom have become ambassadors. The State Department people, by and large, understood that foreign affairs encompass a much broader preserve than just the State Department. There were a number of CIA officers and USIS officers in the seminar. My conclusion, as I left the Senior Seminar, was that more emphasis on leadership training, although by and large contrary to the culture of the Foreign Service, would be in order. And I hope it's happening.. There are ways of teaching leadership; it's done in the military, at the War Colleges, for example. State now has a school of leadership and management. I hope I helped point in that direction at the Senior Seminar.

*Q: Did you get the feeling that the State Department was still kind of resisting training? I'm talking about the institution as a whole. That, you have some people who have moved up to positions of responsibility rather quickly and often have no formal FSI training. Larry Eagleburger is somebody one thinks about and Tom Pickering.*

GILMORE: Don't forget out present Secretary of State came up through military ranks, Colin Powell and believed strongly in leadership training. We have quoted him here as saying he said he had six years of training, whereas our undersecretary of state for political affairs Marc Grossman said he had two weeks.

There is a kind of a bias on the part of a number of Foreign Service people, a bias against formal training and the belief that a year in training is a year lost. That's not an uncommon notion, as you and I both know. I'm not sure that that bias has diminished. I hope it's diminishing, but I'm not sure it has. Although I personally understand those who hold that bias, because at one point in my career I was not happy to be attending courses, other than language training, or consular training, as needed. But, I think that with Secretary Powell aboard, you could almost feel his belief in educational training. He came to visit FSI early in his tenure and it was clear in his decisions that he saw the importance of training and continuing education. But I would say that after 36 years in the business, and more than five years in retirement looking back, more training is better by far, than not being trained at all. Although I would add a quick footnote and just say very able people, like Larry Eagleburger and Tom Pickering, probably can make do. But I remember even Larry Eagleburger had language training in Serbo-Croatian, I believe, and Tom Pickering had language training in Hebrew, and probably also Swahili. Their language training, presumably included some area studies. So what I'm saying is even they had some training. The Senior Seminar though, I would recommend as very useful for senior leaders. The most useful part of the Senior Seminar in many ways, in addition to the focus on leadership, is the knowledge you get about the contemporary U.S. There's quite a focus on what's going on in the U.S. And I understood the U.S. much better myself after having gone through the Senior Seminar with my students than before. Much better.

*Q: I was in classes, numbered 17, I think, of the Senior Seminar, and I simply came away with a much greater respect for local government than I'd had before.*

GILMORE: Amen. The complexities of local government and the capabilities of the people in it. I agree. I came away a couple of other strong impressions. One was that the prison system in this country was totally broken, and I'm still convinced of that. There are some noble exceptions here and there in this or that state, but basically it's not working. The other thing that I came away with was a strong sense that the lower roughly one-fifth of our citizenry is really getting left behind in every which way: education and health care in particular. But the other thing I came away with was, as you said, was deeper respect for local government, respect for state governments. I also came away with a much better understand of the military services. We made important visits to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to their educational institutions, and their important bases. We had some really hands-on experiences. They can only be helpful to Foreign Service people who hadn't served in the military, and those who have but need to be updated. Also, the kind of strategic thinking that goes on in the services is something we've got to know

about if we are going to be doing work in senior positions in the state department and in key POLAD (Political Advisor) positions

*Q: Well, then, Harry you retired in...*

GILMORE: I retired as of the end of September, the first of October of 1997. Since that time, every year except this past year I've chaired on a contract basis FSI's Caucasus Area Studies course. I've also done some lecturing around the country, mostly on the Caucasus and occasionally on broader foreign policy interests and issues. I've deliberately avoided a 40- hour week work , although I must say when I chaired the Caucasus area studies course, I ended up spending 40 hours a week working on it, thirty-five of them just trying to read and keep current with what was going on in that complicated little part of the world.

*Q: Well, in a way, you must have ended up as sort of a preacher, on the Caucasus, because it's a place nobody thinks about. And it's bloody complicated, as you found out.*

GILMORE: It is, and had CNN been out there, the Karabakh dispute for example would have looked a lot more immediate, and a lot more like something we should do something about, I think.

*Q: Well, I think probably this is a good place to stop.*

GILMORE: I agree. It's been great.

*End of interview*