

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR JAMES E. GOODBY

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date: December 10, 1990
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INTERVIEW

[Note: This transcript was not edited by Ambassador Goodby]

Q: I wonder if you could give us a little about your background, kind of where'd you come from.

GOODBY: Well, I was born in Providence, Rhode Island, and moved, almost as soon as I was born, back to where my father and mother were actually living, which was in the small town of Lebanon, New Hampshire. I lived, until I was about twenty-one, in New England, and I don't believe I ever left it, except perhaps for a day trip along the Hudson at one point, as I remember. I went to school in Haverhill, Massachusetts.

Q: What school was that?

GOODBY: Well, I went to Haverhill High School. And then, after I left Haverhill High School in 1947, I went to Harvard College and graduated from there in 1951.

Q: What was your major there?

GOODBY: I majored in geology. I was interested in science and always had been, but, as I began to think more about the world, I began to get more interested in foreign affairs. And, as time went on, I realized that science probably wasn't the area that I wanted to spend my life in. When I was a senior...I happened to graduate early, I took some extra courses and finished Harvard in three and a half years and was wondering what to do.

It was then of course during the Korean War, and one of the things that I thought of was the Foreign Service. And I thought of it mainly because I happened to see a poster in one of the college halls about the Foreign Service examination. So I signed up for it and took the examination, I think it was in the spring of 1951.

After that, I got a job rather quickly with the Army Engineers. We were at that time building the DEW line, so-called, the Distant Early Warning line, radar to defend ourselves against attack from the Soviet Union. Also building bases in Greenland at a place called Thule, and they needed geologists to do some work for them on permafrost and ice characteristics and so forth. And, since I had done some work in that area, they hired me. I spent a little over a year working for the Army Engineers.

Q: Were you up in Thule?

GOODBY: No, I was working in a refrigerator in Boston, in something called the Frost Effects Laboratory. But they flew down samples from Thule, and samples from these places up in northern Canada where the radar was being built. And my job was to take small samples of these materials and look at them under a polarizing microscope and describe them and try to say what I could about the strength characteristics of them. Fairly interesting, but, again, I was fairly well convinced also I didn't want to spend my life doing that.

I did, actually, during that time, take a leave of absence, and went to graduate school at the University of Michigan where I again studied geology--things like optical crystallography and so forth.

And, while there, I learned that I had passed the Foreign Service examination--much to my surprise, because I hadn't really taken any courses at all in foreign affairs, except for one government course, I think. But I passed it, and, when I went back to Boston, to the Frost Effects Laboratory, I knew it was probably a matter of time, if I passed the oral, before I'd go down to Washington and leave the Army Engineers.

And I did take the oral. Passed it. I talked there very largely about things that I knew about. I had a very nice interviewing team, and they were kind to me and recognized that I didn't know much about foreign affairs. So we talked about the San Andreas fault. There had been an earthquake out in California recently at that time, so we talked quite a bit about that and other things that I could talk about, and I managed again to squeak by that.

So I went down to the Foreign Service. Left the business of being a geologist, and, in September 1952, I joined the Foreign Service.

Q: Did you have a class that you went in with at that time?

GOODBY: Indeed I did.

Q: Could you kind of describe the makeup of the class, and also could you characterize kind of how they saw the world and their mission to it?

GOODBY: Yes, I think there were twenty-two people in the class. Two of them were women, the rest were men. I think nearly all of us had not served in World War II, but a couple of us were veterans of World War II. There were, in other words, a couple of people who were in their '30s, thirty-five or -six. I happened to be twenty-two at the time, I was the youngest, and most of the others were in their mid- to late '20s. Most of them had done some graduate work; they all had specialized in foreign affairs. I was, I think, the only scientist among them. And they had a little different cultural outlook on the world than I did, at least it seemed to me. They were much more familiar, it seemed to me, with the world than I was. That is to say, they seemed to know about what life was probably like in foreign countries. And I was, as I saw myself, highly provincial, and I didn't really think that I really knew as much as they did.

Q: Well, you'd been on the Hudson at one point.

GOODBY: I had been as far as the Hudson River, that's right.

I can't tell you that they had large views about the world, although it was, of course, a pretty exciting time. In 1952, it was in the depths of the Cold War. I do remember during that time that George Kennan was PNGed from Moscow, and we did talk about that quite a lot.

Q: PNGED means basically kicked out. Persona non grata.

GOODBY: Persona non "grataed," right. And we talk about a lot of quite specific things, you know, about details of life in the Foreign Service and things we were doing. Some of the people were young marrieds, and I had just recently gotten married and was wondering about their life. It was very much a kind of a nuts and bolts kind of conversation. I don't recall that we ever really did get into large geopolitical issues.

Q: But I'm wondering, just trying to catch the spirit of the times, did you look upon this as a career? I mean, was this what most of you were planning to do for the rest of your lives, or was this an interlude?

GOODBY: Well, I think most of the class saw it as a lifetime commitment. At that time, I wasn't sure I did want it as a lifetime commitment, partly because I felt a little bit out of it, as I suggested already. In fact, what happened to me of course was that I did finally go into

the Air Force in 1952, right after I finished the basic officer course, and spent about a year in the Air Force.

Q: What were you doing in the Air Force?

GOODBY: Well, I was going to school almost all the time, because the Air Force was trying to stockpile technically trained people. I think the Air Force expected there was going to be a major war sooner or later with the Soviet Union. That, in fact, was part of the ethos of the time that I had difficulties with. But there was just a lot of that kind of thinking, that indeed we were in a prewar period. Not just the Korean War, but that there was going to be a major showdown with the Soviet Union sooner or later.

Q: While you were doing that, I was in the Air Force at the Army Language School studying Russian.

GOODBY: Out in Monterey?

Q: Yes, out in Monterey. So that was what we were getting ready for.

GOODBY: So, anyway, I was studying in the Air Force to be a communications officer. And I spent a lot of time at Scott Air Force Base in Belleville, Illinois, across from St. Louis, Missouri.

Well, of course, in 1953, Eisenhower managed to negotiate an armistice agreement, and the Korean War in effect ended. And all of us officers were told that we could either stay on permanently and make a career out of it, or get out right away. And I chose to get out right away.

This was in the late summer, and I applied to Harvard for their international affairs program. They had a master's degree program at that time; it was more or less the precursor of the present Kennedy School. They accepted me very quickly, I suppose because I was about to be a veteran. And I went back to Harvard and spent a year there, of a two-year program, studying international affairs (for the first time in my life) to try to catch up with some of the things that I had felt I had missed along the way.

With that thought that all this time, of course, I was on leave of absence, or military furlough, as they called it in the Foreign Service. And I had thought I would go back, but, on the other hand, I did feel a little uncomfortable about the whole thing.

So, towards the end of my first year in this two-year master's program, a recruiting officer came along from the Atomic Energy Commission. I took an interview and heard what it was all about, and it seemed to be a very interesting combination of foreign affairs and science, so I thought that matched my particular interests and background pretty well.

So, at that time, I retired for the first time from the Foreign Service and took a job with the Atomic Energy Commission, where I stayed from July of 1954 until the end of 1959. That was a very interesting part of my career and one that of course shaped all the rest of it.

Q: Could you explain what you were doing?

GOODBY: I was actually hired to work on ore procurement problems. We and the British, during World War II, had established something that during the war was called the Combined Development Trust. It was established in the Quebec Agreement in, I think, 1943, as I recall it. By the time I got to it in 1954, it was called the Combined Development Agency, but it was still a joint American-British effort to corner the market on uranium, basically. We had contracts with a great many places where the British had particularly good connections--Portugal and Australia, and South Africa at that time, and Belgian Congo, of course, where some of the original uranium came from that we used in the atomic bomb programs.

Anyway, it was my job to work on the Combined Development Agency with the British Embassy at that time. It was fairly interesting, but, again, my heart really wasn't in that kind of thing. And I very quickly got involved in the issues of nuclear weapons testing, because we had just started testing hydrogen bombs at that time.

Also, by the way, this was during the hearings in the case of Oppenheimer, who had been accused of being too sympathetic toward the Soviets. So I ran into those hearings, this was during my first year in Washington, at the Atomic Energy Commission.

Q: How did they play there, particularly as a junior officer in the field?

GOODBY: Well, they played very badly with me. But, for most people, they kept quiet about it. Of course, there was a very secretive atmosphere around the Atomic Energy Commission at that time and it was still regarded as a sort of a mysterious place. There really was some of that atmosphere; wartime secrecy had carried over and people were pretty close-mouthed about the whole thing. I was frankly shocked by the Oppenheimer hearings, and thought occasionally of leaving the Atomic Energy Commission, but I always convinced myself, as I did later on whenever I had difficulties with government policy, that I could probably do more working inside than I could outside to affect the way things worked in the government. I don't know whether that was a rationalization or not, but that's what I thought at the time.

Q: But, as a practical thing, unless you really carry a lot of weight, you really can. I mean, otherwise one can always be miffed about the zigs and the zags.

GOODBY: That's right, sure. I could have gone back to graduate school, and indeed I did think about doing that, but, in the end, I stayed on and gradually worked my way into disarmament, as it was called at that time, the words arms control hadn't been invented yet.

One of my very first jobs, once I got through the basic training program at the Atomic Energy Commission (which was interesting in itself, by the way), was to do a study of the case of the dusting of the Japanese fishing boat the Fortunate Dragon.

Q: I was going to say Lucky Dragon. It was the Fortunate Dragon.

GOODBY: Yes, well, Lucky Dragon probably would be an accurate translation, too. It turned out not to be lucky, of course, because they got a pretty severe dusting...

Q: When did this thing actually happen?

GOODBY: Well, I believe it was in '54. I spent about six months going through this basic training program at the Atomic Energy Commission, which involved my visiting the whole atomic energy program, from the mines all the way up through the actual processing into weapons. It was a very interesting kind of training program. But, during that time, this hydrogen bomb explosion took place, at Eniwetok I think it was. We had declared a danger zone, and the fishing boat was outside of it, but the explosion was larger than they expected and the winds carried its fallout to well outside the zone, and these poor fisherman were subjected to a pretty heavy dosage and I believe subsequently at least one or two of them died as a result.

Well, that created, obviously, a considerable stir, especially in Japan, and in India as well, and so the whole subject of nuclear weapons testing became a prominent issue from about that time on.

Also at that time, in 1955, Eisenhower began to get fairly seriously interested in disarmament, and began to ask his agencies to think about these issues. And so one of the first things I did in 1955, also, was to begin to wonder how one could control nuclear weapons, how could you get rid of them.

We had on the table, of course, at the United Nations for quite some time the so-called Baruch Plan.

Q: Bernard Baruch.

GOODBY: Bernard Baruch--financier, advisor to presidents, very skillful operator. As you know, I'm sure, a plan had been devised by Robert Oppenheimer and Dean Acheson, who was then the Under Secretary of state, to, in effect, establish an international monopoly over all atomic energy enterprises. And, in the context of that kind of a monopoly, with verification a part of it, we offered to give up our nuclear weapons altogether and to throw in with anybody else on the peaceful development of atomic energy. The Soviets, of course, turned it down, mainly because they had determined by that time that they wanted to be a nuclear power also, not surprisingly.

Anyway, that plan, which was introduced in 1946, I guess, was still the only position we had on disarmament right up to the time I joined the Atomic Energy Commission in '54, and it was obvious that something was out of date. The Soviets had already tested in 1949, and the British also were becoming a nuclear power, and the French showed some signs of it. So we began to think about disarmament, and I began to get at that time into these studies about what to do.

But the test ban negotiations remained my major job. And, in 1956, the United Nations, at our suggestion, created something called the UN Committee on the Effects of Ionizing Radiation.

I should tell you that that committee, among other people, was the brainchild of Ron Spiers, who had been my first boss at the Atomic Energy Commission.

Q: Later was ambassador to Turkey, Pakistan, I think, and Under Secretary for management.

GOODBY: That is correct, and, as of now, is at the UN as the Under Secretary general for political affairs. But he was at the Atomic Energy Commission when I first went there in '54, and he and I worked together for a while, and then he went back to the State Department in 1954, '55. But I saw a lot of him; during that time that I was there we were working together quite a lot.

In any case, we established this Committee on the Effects of Ionizing Radiation, and I became the assistant to the head of the American delegation. It was just a small delegation, just two or three of us I think. Dr. Shields Warren, who was a professor at Boston University Medical School and had been among those involved in the Manhattan Project, the project to build the atomic bomb, was the head of the US delegation. I worked with him and helped him do the drafting and went with him to meet with people and so forth.

And that was my first contact with the Russians. Because the Russians, of course, sent a well-qualified scientist, and Shields Warren and I would meet with these Russians and talk about ionizing radiation. And it was fairly clear that we and they had some common interests, in that both of these countries intended to continue nuclear weapons testing, and both wanted to try to put this whole issue in some perspective. That is to say, they didn't want there to be such a panic that the whole idea of nuclear testing would be considered by the rest of the world to be beyond the pale.

And I don't mean by that that the report we produced was deceptive, because I consider it still to be one of the most honest and clear-cut reports that had been released up to that time. And probably that's still the case, in terms of its effect on the effect of radiation on the populations.

But there were countries, the Indians for example, who were seeking to outlaw nuclear testing altogether. And it was fairly clear, from that encounter with the Russians, that that

was not one of their objectives at the time. So it was an interesting insight for me into the great-power relations at that particular point.

Q: Well, while we're on this, because I think it's important in the foreign policy context, were there pressures on you from the American military saying don't hem us in, we've got to get these things? I'm always amazed at how often one has to keep testing. Or did the Atomic Energy Commission itself, as you were with them at this particular time, did it have its own drive...? What were some of the pressures?

GOODBY: Well, you've got to remember that at that time the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission was a man named Louis Strauss, who had been an advocate of going ahead with developing and testing and producing the hydrogen bomb. And he had been among those, with Edward Teller, who thought that J. Robert Oppenheimer was a little too soft on the Russians and so forth and brought security charges against him.

And so, from the very top of the commission, there was a very, very hard line about testing, a position that I considered was not really justifiable in the sense of trying to downplay the effects of radiation.

I mean, a common sort of thing they would say is that, well, you get more radiation from flying in an airplane than you do from fallout, or you get more radiation from wearing a radium-dialed wristwatch than you do from fallout. That was the kind of line they were taking, and of course it overlooked the fact that you had the choice of whether you wanted to fly in an airplane or wear a radium-dialed wristwatch, whereas children, babies and so forth, were being subjected to strontium-90, which goes into the bones and can cause cancer.

They were so completely dedicated to preparing if not for a war with Russia, then at least being well prepared for one and deterring it, that they were willing to overlook the environmental and health problems that were being created by nuclear testing.

I didn't agree with that at all, and ultimately it caused me to leave the Atomic Energy Commission, under some circumstances I'll tell you about later on.

But, in any case, there were of course pressures from the military, as you suggest, to continue testing. And, in terms of arms control, the military, right away, wanted to ensure that testing would be continued and that the American superiority in nuclear weapons would be continued and so forth. So there really wasn't any interest on the part of the military--far from it--in arms control. And that was fully shared by the top levels of the Atomic Energy Commission--with some exceptions. Some of the commissioners had a little more favorable view, but certainly not Louis Strauss.

By the way, there were two scientists who were brought into the commission after Oppenheimer was found guilty of security problems, mainly to placate the scientific community, although it didn't really work. One of them was a Nobel prize-winner named

Willard Libby, who had invented the carbon-14 system of dating ancient fossils and remains. And the other one was John Von Neuman, who was a man who probably should have been a Nobel prize-winner, but he died at a fairly early age, and he had done quite a lot of work on gain theory, the theory of gains, brilliantly. And I worked more or less directly with him for a while, because, fairly soon after this period I'm talking about, '55-'56, the president appointed former Governor of Minnesota Harold Stassen to be his special assistant for disarmament, and Stassen began to set up a bureaucratic interagency committee, and Van Neuman was appointed to be the AEC representative on it, and I was his assistant for that purpose. I didn't work in the same shop as he did, but I worked as his advisor, generally speaking.

Well, also at about this time, '55-'56, Eisenhower advocated the establishment of something that was then, and is now, called the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the idea that we could begin to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy. And I became involved in the very first sessions of an international working group that was set up to try to draft the draft statute of the Atomic Energy Agency. And so I was the Atomic Energy representative, in a sense, although my title was technical secretary for the conference. And met a lot of fairly interesting people there, too: Ambassador Zarubin, then representing the Soviet Union; Ambassador Couve de Murville, who was the French ambassador to Washington at that time, later foreign minister; a brilliant Indian scientist named Homi J. Bhabha, who was the father of the whole atomic energy program in India, later killed in a plane crash on Mont Blanc, in Switzerland. And a number of others: Jerry Wadsworth was our American representative, Jerry Smith was his alternate, and just a lot of quite fascinating people. And we did, of course, succeed in establishing this International Atomic Energy Agency. A draft was approved by that working group after not very many weeks of work, and I was present and observed all of that.

And so there were a couple of things fairly interesting: the beginnings of the nuclear test ban negotiations, in effect; the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency; the U.N. Committee on Atomic Radiation.

And then, in '57, I was appointed to be the Atomic Energy Commission representative to the US delegation in the five-nation disarmament talks that took place in London in that year. This was a kind of a legacy of the old Atomic Energy Commission of the U.N. that had been established to work out the Baruch Plan and was succeeded. And in this group were included the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, France, and Great Britain.

This was only the second or third year, I guess, that this disarmament committee had been in operation and it hadn't done very much. But, of course, Stassen was politically ambitious and had Eisenhower's support, at that time, anyway, and wanted to do something with it. So that particular session of 1957 lasted over six months, and I was there for nearly all of that time in London. And we came fairly close to reaching an agreement.

There were a lot of interesting episodes that we can talk about if you want to get into that detail. Among them, for example, Stassen was kind of end-running the whole NSC process

in Washington in giving the Russians a proposal that had been only tentatively approved by the NSC. That led to his being called back and very severely chastised.

Q: Was this by Eisenhower or by...?

GOODBY: Well, John Foster Dulles, mainly. After that, Stassen was pretty much finished. That was at the end of May of 1957.

But nonetheless he persevered. That was the beginning of all the NATO consultations on disarmament. And I went with Stassen to Paris, I think it was in the spring of '57, to begin the first consultations we ever had with NATO, and helped hold up the maps to show what we were doing with regard to European security issues. Fairly interesting development.

Q: Could we talk just a bit about the NATO reaction?

GOODBY: Sure.

Q: What was your impression of the people you would talk to at NATO in the discussion? Bloody weapons certainly are a deterrent to the Soviets, but, at the same time, if they're used in such a confined place, it could mean very quickly the end of Europe faster than anyone else. I mean, did you get some of this ambivalence there?

GOODBY: Not very much in NATO, because NATO had not been very far developed at that time as a political institution. There was, of course, the North Atlantic Council, and we were speaking with the permanent representatives at that time in the North Atlantic Council, but they were fairly silent, they asked a few questions. And I might tell you that that has not changed very much over the years. They feel uncomfortable in getting into things that they're not altogether familiar with, and nuclear issues is one of those things that, at least in the past, they hadn't felt familiar with.

No, most of the discussions that made an impact on me were those with the various delegations in London, from the British and French, of course, and others as well. We had very close contacts with the Indian High Commission in London, and with the Japanese and various others, so one got a pretty good picture from that vantage point of what was on their minds.

There was, on the part of the allies, not surprisingly, a pretty deep suspicion of the Soviet Union. Again, remember we're still in the Cold War, in the depths of it really, and even to talk with the Russians was, you know, really rather unusual. And there we were, of course, talking with the Russian military, which was not done so often. I frankly think that there was a good deal of cynicism and skepticism.

But there were a few people there who wanted to achieve something and thought it was possible to do it, I think. One of them was a man named Jules Moch, who was the French representative. He had been the minister of interior in France, who had cracked down on

the Communists. He was a pretty tough guy, but he nonetheless really seemed to be quite sincerely convinced that something needed to be done in the field of arms control, and he always leaned in that direction whenever he could.

The British representative was, I think, Selwyn Lloyd, who, I believe, later went on to become foreign minister. He was much more neutral. I mean, one didn't sense that he was particularly interested one way or the other.

The Canadians were; they clearly were interested. I don't remember who their representative was. But they were pushing then, as now. It seems to be part of the national thinking in Canada. They wanted to get an agreement if they possibly could.

And of course Stassen wanted one, for his own reasons, you could say.

Q: Did you feel that he was very much a political animal? I mean, was this the driving thing?

GOODBY: He was very much a political animal. You know, it was about this same time, after he left the arms control business, that he tried to dump Richard Nixon and get rid of Nixon as the vice president, because he thought that the future of the Republican Party was dependent upon that. And, in a sense, he was right about that. But of course he didn't succeed, even though I guess Eisenhower gave him his blessing to try to do that if he could.

So you had Stassen very much wanting an agreement; you had Jules Moch seeming to; and the rest of them pretty, you know, neutral. The Canadians, yes, but not playing too large of a role.

So the dynamics of it were: you had the Americans pushing pretty hard, in the form of Harold Stassen. Of course, there were people from these various agencies that were not necessarily all that interested. Stassen did almost all the work on his own. He'd do his own speeches more or less off the cuff, devise his own tactics, and was kind of a one-man show. And the rest of us were trying to influence him as best we could.

Met a lot of very interesting people, by the way, during that time. Stassen always made a point of trying to see whoever it was that passed through London. So I met Prime Minister Nehru of India, and I met his sister, Madame Pandit, who was then the Indian high commissioner. I met just an awful lot of interesting people. Jimmy Doolittle came through, and so forth.

So that failed in the end; nothing happened.

The next year, however, things began to happen.

Q: This would be 19...?

GOODBY: This would be '58 by now. We established two committees. One was a committee to determine whether it would be possible to monitor nuclear weapons testing adequately. And this was something that was pretty much organized between the State Department and the science advisor at the White House, Tistiakovsky. People like Ron Spiers and Phil Folly and Jerry Smith were very active at that time in the State Department in trying to see what could be done. So I think you can say that the State Department was really out in front of nearly everybody.

By this time, I think Dulles had become more or less convinced that probably arms control and disarmament, as it was called then, was serious. He had gone into this, as you know, with a very hard-line position about the Russians, but towards the end of his career and his life (he died soon after his resignation from office), he really became, I think, convinced that we should at least test the Russians. Up to that point, he didn't want anything to do with them.

But with the help of some very bright people around him, like Ron and Phil Folly and Jerry Smith, and with the help of scientists in the White House--Tistiakovsky, Spurgeon Keeny, who was Tistiakovsky's advisor and is still around town here, they were able to convince the president to suggest to the Russians that we set up a committee to see if we could verify nuclear testing.

Q: Among the technical developments, wasn't the U-2 used as sort of a sniffer of test material?

GOODBY: Well, no, we weren't detecting with it. We did that with bombers that were flying around, which were designated by an acronym that I don't recall. The U-2 was always a high-altitude surveillance plane. I don't know that it did actually do any sniffing; I think it was pretty much photography and probably radar.

Fifty-eight then was a fairly important year because not only was this nuclear testing system investigated, but also the president proposed a conference on surprise attack. Because that was of course one of the great worries that we had, that we didn't know much about the Russians. And you were right to point out the U-2, because there were vast spaces in the Soviet Union where it was obvious that something was happening, but we weren't quite sure what. And that was one of the reasons that people were so nervous and so much on guard at that time about the possibilities of Russian attack. So the president said let's have a technical meeting to see what we can do about surprise attack, and I was actually assigned to that delegation as the Atomic Energy Commission representative.

Q: When you quit as Atomic Energy representative, was Louis Strauss...

GOODBY: Pronounced "Straws," he didn't like "Strauss."

Q: Well, I'm sure he was very precise.

GOODBY: Well, he was Virginia born and bred, and that's the way they pronounced it down there.

Q: Were you under a pretty tight leash because of coming from this commission or not?

GOODBY: Not terribly. What I always tried to do was provide what I thought were the views of the Atomic Energy Commission to the rest of the delegation, but I always tried to establish, vis-à-vis the Atomic Energy Commission itself, what I thought the possibilities might be for some negotiations. It was a kind of a delicate role to play, and I don't know whether I played it well or not, but I always tried to be honest with both sides, if you will, trying to let people like Stassen or other people know what I thought Louis Strauss's opinion was. But also, within what I thought were the parameters of the Atomic Energy Commission position, I tried to find as much flexibility as I could, always keeping the AEC informed of what I was doing. I wrote letters every week back there to describe what was going on and what I was doing and so forth.

And of course at that time there wasn't that much to negotiate about, to be honest. I mean, the Soviets were not all that forthcoming, although their position by that time had evolved to favor a nuclear test ban, and they were pretty active in promoting that. And part of that was serious and part of that was propaganda, I'm convinced, and was convinced then.

In any case, this conference on surprise attack got underway late in the year of '58, and was fairly interesting but also totally unsuccessful, although we hadn't completely different objectives.

The Soviet delegation was headed by a man named V. V. Kuznetzov, who later became, I guess, deputy prime minister; in any case, he was fairly high up in the hierarchy.

And our delegation was headed by William C. Foster, who later became the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency when it was established in the Kennedy era. And a lot of quite important people. We had Jerry Weisner, later science advisor; and Tistiakovsky, who was the science advisor, was a member of it; and various admirals and generals; and Albert Walstetter, Henry Rowan, all quite important people in the defense field, were members of this very large delegation.

And a lot of the first ideas about the problems of vulnerability, and problems about basing weapons and so forth, came to a head during that time as people began to think about how would you present the issue of surprise attack to the Russians. It was kind of an interesting phenomenon.

There were, by the way, eleven, or twelve, or thirteen countries involved in this conference, including, I think for one of the very first and only times, Albania.

Well, that failed.

Fifty-nine was not a particularly good year for me because I began more and more to feel a little bit isolated in the Atomic Energy Commission.

Things came to a head one Saturday morning, around the fall of that year, when I was summoned down to the Carnegie Geophysical Laboratory, where Willard Libby had a laboratory where he continued to do some work. And he had with him a man named Alfred Dodge Stauberg, who was a brigadier general and head of the Division of Military Application in the Atomic Energy Commission. And the reason for my being summoned down there on this Saturday morning was not to talk about nuclear testing, but to be accused by Willard Libby of undermining the Atomic Energy Commission and not being sufficiently loyal to the commission's position on nuclear weapons testing. General Stauberg, incidentally, supported me and said I'd been doing a good job and all that. But it was obvious that Willard Libby was not very comfortable about me and what I'd been doing. So I decided that probably the time had come to leave the commission, and subsequently did.

It was one of those times in one's career when you recognize you have certain objectives and standards, and if you're not comfortable with where you are, then you ought to leave.

Q: Well, Libby was a scientist.

GOODBY: He was a chemist.

Q: What was his thrust? How did he look at it and look at you looking at it?

GOODBY: Well, his view was that nuclear weapons testing had to continue. He was basically in the camp of Edward Teller, and if you can imagine what Edward Teller was probably saying, you can imagine what Libby was saying--laboratories have to be kept active; you have to continue testing; any restrictions at all were dangerous. I can't tell you that he was thinking of it so much in anti-Soviet terms, if you will, as probably Teller was, but he was certainly thinking of nuclear testing as something that was absolutely indispensable to the well-being of the weapons laboratories.

Q: Looking at it (if this sounds like a pejorative term, I don't mean it) in the limited way. I mean, he was looking at it as a process.

GOODBY: Yes, he was looking at it as a process that was necessary, and that anything or anybody who interfered with this process was causing problems.

Well, as I say, I decided at that point that I'd had it, and decided that I would leave and begin looking for a job. And at that point I was befriended by the Department of State. The Bureau of International Organizations asked me if I would come and work for them as a Foreign Service reserve officer, and I agreed. This was a man named Myers.

So I left the Atomic Energy Commission at the end of 1959, and the first of January I went back to the State Department as a Foreign Service reserve officer, and, heigh-ho, there to work on arms control and disarmament affairs.

If you want to come back at any time, by the way, to any of this Atomic Energy Commission period in my career...

Q: Well, I don't want to leave this if there are any facets or incidents that struck you as being interesting, for example, anything dealing with the Soviets or any of the other delegations.

GOODBY: Well, some of the discussions I had with the Soviets at the U.N. and other places suggested to me that there was a little discomfort, if you will, among some of the younger Russians with the Stalinist policies. Stalin had died, of course, in '53, and by the time I got into it, the Khrushchev-Bulganin team was there, although Khrushchev hadn't yet emerged. And I think there was a sense among some of the younger people--people that came of age when Gorbachev came into power--that Stalin had been on the wrong track, and that a lot of this animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union was their fault. You never heard that, of course, in any of the official propaganda, but it was interesting that some of them would, tentatively at least, acknowledge that there was a problem, and that they had perhaps generated more opposition than was in their own interest, and that probably that was a mistake.

That was, I suppose, during a time when some of the younger people, people in their '20s and '30s, were beginning to wonder if, with Stalin out of the way and policy a little more fluid (bear in mind there was a fairly significant detente period in '55, the Austrian State Treaty and all that) they couldn't really push the kind of policy that now we see Gorbachev pushing. Of course, that was not to be, for various reasons, but I think what it suggests to me now (I didn't think about it so much then) is that some of these people now in power probably had been thinking quite a long time about whether they were really right to push the Cold War quite as hot as they did.

So that's one insight, which comes more, I suppose, with hindsight than at that time. But I do remember conversations quite distinctly, and remarked on them at the time, about their basic attitude.

Also the military contacts, which I saw a lot of, because, being in the Atomic Energy Commission, I tended to be involved in a lot of military meetings other than strictly diplomatic political meetings.

Q: These were Soviet and American military?

GOODBY: Soviet and American military. Rather interesting, because, even though we were deadly enemies at the time, these military people got along better than anybody else, and it was obvious that they had these professional ties that were kind of holding them

together. And they had some pretty interesting conversations. Not profoundly serious conversations, but there was always a kind of rapport there that caught my attention from the very beginning.

Also I guess you could say Harold Stassen and how close we came to an agreement in '57. There was, I think, an awful lot of opposition in Europe as well as in Washington as to what he was trying to do. I think the odds were pretty much against his being successful, but it is conceivable that, had he played the game a little more carefully in the middle of the year of '57, he might have come up with some kind of an agreement. It would have been probably not as significant an agreement as what he was shooting for, but it might have been possible.

And one has to ask whether that would have been a good thing or not, in hindsight, because some of it had to do with setting up special inspection zones in the middle of Europe, and the Russians, of course, were aiming at promoting the division of Germany, and if we hadn't in fact set up some zones of that type, one can ask: Wouldn't that have solidified the division of Germany? Or wouldn't it have made any difference?

But, in any case, it was the kind of an agreement that would have been negotiable, which would clearly have had some kind of a zone in Europe, and maybe even some limitations on nuclear testing at an earlier stage than in fact turned out, and probably some limits on the overall size of the military forces in the United States and the Soviet Union.

So there could have been an agreement, I suspect, although I wouldn't say the odds would be very high--something like fifty-fifty--but that's a lot higher than they'd ever been in any of the post-war period.

And so I think you can say that it was during Eisenhower's administration that we began to legitimize negotiations with the Russians, which up until that time had been frowned upon and hadn't been thought to be very useful. And although, as you were suggesting earlier, the US military was not much in favor, they did come along. Although their recommendations were always highly conservative, nonetheless they bought the idea that there might be some talks and participated in them.

Q: I wonder if you could talk a little, from your vantage point, about the thinking about the feasibility of war using nuclear weapons. I remember when I was in Frankfurt in '55 and '58, I'd see these damned big atomic guns, artillery pieces, huge things rumbling through the streets.

GOODBY: Yes, 280 millimeter.

Q: When you get down to it, they fired a shell about what? Twenty or thirty miles. I mean, that's not very far. But how were the military thinking about using this? And also any feel about how the Soviet military was thinking about this sort of unknown quantity?

GOODBY: Well, I frankly think that the military was extremely shortsighted on this. They saw it as their winning card, you know, and they felt that the United States had a technological advantage over the Russians, that we were outnumbered by the Russians in manpower, but that what gave us the edge was the nuclear weapon.

Of course, it's well known that what Eisenhower did was to reverse the policy of Truman, which was to keep nuclear weapons rather sequestered, and in effect to put them in the hands of the military and give them the green light for using them for whatever they wanted.

You can argue about what Eisenhower's ultimate intentions were, but the fact of the matter is that it was during that time that the military began to think that nuclear weapons were available for almost anything. In other words, they really were substitutable for practically every conventional weapon that had hitherto been used.

So they began to develop artillery shells and depth charges and air defense weapons. They seemed to think that they could be used, and what they began to think of was that if the strategic balance was such that we would be deterred (because the Soviets had begun to develop ICBMs), that they could use battlefield weapons, and we'd have a superiority in that for a while, and that would deter.

So I grant that they were probably thinking in deterrent terms, but they also really did, a lot of them, think that there was going to be a war. And people I was dealing with were, I thought, not really as sensitive to the massive destruction that would result as they should have been.

In the end, of course, they did deter a war, you can say they were successful, but it was, I suppose, a matter of luck and maybe a matter of the Soviets not really intending to attack anyway.

But it was, I think, a fairly dangerous period, because we were getting these weapons out into the hands of the troops, and our control over it really was not well developed at that time. We did not have these permissive action links that we have now.

Q: What is a permissive action link?

GOODBY: Well, it's essentially a device that prevents an atomic bomb from being used unless certain codes have been built into it. So that if a bomb is captured by anybody who doesn't know those codes, it's unusable, can't be detonated.

But we didn't have those at that time, and there were these bombs being put over there in Europe, scattered around the countryside. They were all, of course, carefully under guard, I don't mean to imply they weren't, but I think that that period was a fairly dangerous one.

But, again, quite, I thought, a lack of sensitivity on the part of the average military people about what atomic bombs were all about. They began to see them as just an improved version of a conventional weapon, and that was really very shortsighted.

Eisenhower himself, of course, always thought of nuclear war as almost the end of the world, and he more or less spoke that way. I often tell my classes, when discussing this period, you have to have a certain ability to deal with cognitive dissonance in the atomic energy business. Eisenhower was convinced, or at least said he was, that atomic bombs would pretty much be the end of civilization, yet, at the same time, he was willing to allow them to come into the hands of troops for practically every known weapons use under the sun. So how one reconciles I don't know, but he did.

Q: You were in IO, International Organizations.

GOODBY: I was in IO, which was then doing the arms control work.

Q: This was still under the latter part of the Eisenhower period.

GOODBY: This was the last year of the Eisenhower administration. By this time, Christian Herter was the secretary of state. We had succeeded, in '58, in getting some test ban negotiations going. And, because of my unpleasant derangements with the AEC, I was happily not asked to continue to work on the nuclear test ban when I got back to the State Department, but rather to work on what was then the ten-nation Disarmament Committee of the UN. That has since evolved into what is now called the UN Disarmament Commission, I guess it was called, the committee on disarmament of the UN that meets in Geneva and includes, I guess, forty or fifty countries. But at that point it was ten nations, and it was in effect a successor to the five-nation conference that I had worked on in '57 with Harold Stassen.

The effort had been made to gin up an American position on it, which frankly hadn't been very successful. They had called in an outside expert named Coolidge, from Boston, and he'd put together a team of people to see what could be done about, in effect, moving more or less consciously away from the old Baruch Plan and building, of course, from what Stassen had done. Stassen by this time was out, he was no longer in the government. The ten-nation conference had a man named Eden, who was a lawyer. I've forgotten his first name now, but he was the US representative, knew nothing about disarmament, and was rather skeptical about the whole thing. So it was not a very productive year, frankly, in that field. It was fairly productive in the nuclear testing, but I was not involved in that at that time.

So, 1960, I was mainly backstopping the ten-nation disarmament committee, without any significant results to report to you. It was a kind of a very unproductive time.

The only interesting thing is that organizationally, of course, it was the political season. And, in a speech at the University of New Hampshire, John Kennedy had said there were

fewer than one hundred people working on arms control in the US government, and something ought to be done about that, and he talked about establishing some new kind of organization.

That prompted the Eisenhower administration to ask Ed Gullion, who had been involved with Stassen and with me in these talks in London, if he would set up some new organization that could be responsive to this criticism. And so what Gullion did was to recommend that there be something set up called the US Disarmament Administration, which was to be a part of the State Department more or less like AID is, or was.

That was, in effect, put into force, and I became a member of the US Disarmament Administration towards the end of 1960, along with Ron Spiers, Myron Wyler, and a number of other people. So that when the Kennedy administration came into office, those one hundred of us who had been working on arms control were more or less concentrated in this US Disarmament Administration.

In 1961, in order to fulfill this campaign pledge to do something, John McCloy, who had been called down by Kennedy to help him set up the arms control side of things, did recommend, with the help of William C. Foster and other people, that there be established something that became known as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

John McCloy was somebody that was very much admired by Kennedy, and Kennedy hoped in fact McCloy would become the secretary of state or defense or almost anything, but McCloy didn't want to do that at that time, nor did he wish to become the head of the Arms Control Agency. But he did play a pretty big role in setting it up and helping it along through its early years. I got to know him fairly well.

All of us who were then in the US Disarmament Administration were transferred to another part of the building and put under the flag of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, so I was a part of the initial group that established that particular agency.

William C. Foster became the first director of it. A man named Adrian Fisher became his deputy. And what Foster wanted to do, of course, was to make the agency a little more visible, and so he did call in two or three fairly senior American ambassadors. And so I became a member of the staff of Jake Beam. I'm not sure he had been ambassador at that time, although he might have been ambassador somewhere.

Q: He was later, at least, ambassador to the Soviet Union.

GOODBY: He was later ambassador to the Soviet Union and to Czechoslovakia. I guess he was in Czechoslovakia in '68.

Q: He was ambassador to Poland in '57.

GOODBY: I'd forgotten where it was, but he was ambassador to Poland by then and he came back. And Hank Byroade, who was then ambassador out in the Middle East or South Asia somewhere, was also called in and became a counselor and so forth. So the whole situation was enriched by bringing in these various people, who, to be perfectly honest, were themselves probably rather more cynical about the whole arms control process than some of these other people were.

Q: I'm wondering if you could talk for just a minute about here you were, you were on this, did you feel you were on the periphery of the Department of State? I mean, sort of organization, administratively and all, how were you all treated, included in policy decisions, and all this?

GOODBY: Well, no, we didn't feel that way. I didn't feel that way at all, because in fact we had direct access to the White House. The first years of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency were probably its best years, because we had the backing, in effect, of John McCloy, who was, you know, *the* senior American anywhere. And Bill Foster had developed a pretty good working relationship with the White House. Butch Fisher was a Democratic pol, if you will, a very fine man, I liked him very much. He had been the legal advisor for the State Department when Dean Acheson was secretary of state, and he had very authentic Democratic credentials. Bill Foster actually was a Republican, I think.

By the way, towards the end of '60, I became the officer in charge of nuclear test ban negotiations, and so I went back to my old favorite subject--nuclear testing.

And so that when the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was established, hierarchy was we had an International Affairs Bureau, headed by Jake Beam, and Ron Spiers was his deputy, and I was working with Ron Spiers. Oh, and by the way, Tom Pickering was working for me.

Q: Tom Pickering, I might, for the record, say, has been one of our most distinguished career ambassadors. Currently is ambassador to the United Nations, but has been to Israel, Latin..., Nigeria. I mean, he's been all over. He's sort of the troubleshooter for the various administrations.

GOODBY: That's right.

But I had a very free hand to work on the test ban negotiations as I saw fit. And, despite this hierarchy I mentioned, I was not troubled by it. The point of it is that there wasn't anybody in the State Department that was really very much interested in this or wanted to take it over, and so the turf was ours.

I can tell you that the process that I quickly developed was to work out a very close working relationship with the British Embassy. The test ban negotiations at that time were essentially being run by the US and the British on the one side, and the Soviets on the other.

We had a man named Arthur Dean, who was a lawyer from Sullivan and Cromwell. Charlie Stelle, a Foreign Service officer with China background, was his deputy. And Stelle and I had a very good working relationship.

Essentially what I quickly discovered was that President Kennedy, although when he came into office he had no real interest, I think, in arms control, did rather admire Harold Macmillan, then the prime minister of Great Britain, and would tend to listen to what Macmillan said. So that whenever I had some ideas that I thought ought to be put in Kennedy's ear, I would talk to the British Embassy. And the British Embassy would send a message to London, who would give it to Harold Macmillan, who would then give it to Kennedy. And it worked like a charm for about three years. So that was the way we did business.

I won't necessarily go into all the details, but many of the suggestions that in fact led to the successful conclusion of the Test Ban Treaty in 1963 went via this channel: from me to the British and Macmillan and back to Kennedy.

Q: Well, where were you getting your ideas?

GOODBY: From myself.

Q: So they were self-generated.

GOODBY: Yes. Well, you know, when you are involved in a negotiation, or you're running one, you look at a situation and you see things that need to be done and so forth.

Let me tell you a few episodes.

Q: Sure.

GOODBY: Towards the beginning of 1962 I became convinced that we probably would not get a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which had been our objective, although Eisenhower had also talked about an atmospheric test ban. So I devised the idea that we would develop two new treaties. One would be a revised Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the other a Limited Test Ban Treaty, one that would ban tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and in space, but not underground. The problem with underground testing was that we could detect it only by seismographs, and at that time the science of seismology was such that with these very low yields it was thought that they would not be distinguishable from small earthquakes.

So, mainly during the summer of '62, I worked very closely with Butch Fisher and some others, George Bunn, who was the general counsel of ACDA at that time, and Betty Getzlahl, who had been working for Hubert Humphrey and was very close to Butch Fisher, so she was kind of a Democratic politician, too. The four of us were really working on it closely together and we developed these two treaties.

Tom Pickering and I did most of the drafting on the Limited Test Ban Treaty. I would give it to the British, they would react to it.

Funny thing is that we didn't have any difficulties with the Pentagon, to speak of, in those days, because they had been told by Kennedy to give us support. At least I think they had been, because they did give us support. And there was a man named Captain Bud Zumwalt, who later became chief of naval operations and then became quite a right-wing guy, which surprised some people.

Q: Yes, but he was a very innovative thinker at the time.

GOODBY: Yes, at that time, essentially I would call him and tell him what I wanted to do, and he'd say fine. He obviously had been given a green light by John McNaughton, who had been the general counsel of the Department of Defense and then became, I think, assistant secretary for international security affairs. And apparently they had some confidence in me and what I was trying to do. So there was none of this elaborate interagency machinery then that one had to worry about, at least in the test ban negotiations. So I just had a surprisingly free hand.

These two treaties that we developed, which in the case of the Limited Test Ban Treaty I wrote most of it myself and Tom Pickering would do some of the drafting as well, when we finally got to the point where the British were able to accept it, I gave a copy to John McNaughton. And he noticed, at the top of it, it said "Draft Number Five," and he commented to the effect "Why didn't they give it to us earlier?" But he took it in good grace. You know, what we had done was actually go through five drafts with the British before giving it to the Defense Department. You never would do that nowadays, of course.

But they adopted it, and in August, I think it was August 27, 1962, we introduced these two treaties and told the Soviets: Take one or the other. A new comprehensive test ban based more on adversary inspection--the Soviets inspect the US; the US inspects the Soviets. Use black boxes, i.e., seismographs installed in various places in the US and the Soviet Union. Some on-site inspection. And, for that reason, of course, we surmised the Soviets wouldn't accept it, and they didn't. And they didn't want the Limited Test Ban Treaty either. They obviously at that point were moving towards the Cuban situation. And of course the Cuban missile crisis broke in October of '62.

After that, came a period of detente. The usual speculation for its cause is that looking down the atomic barrel made both Khrushchev and Kennedy want to do something about it. And there is clearly a lot to that. The other factor, though, was China.

Q: Because it was about that time when...didn't Khrushchev and the Chinese do their thing, on the same week, if I recall? I remember a cover of Time magazine showing that. And one other thing happened.

GOODBY: Yes, this was when the split began to develop. And I think clearly what was going on was that Khrushchev had decided that he couldn't fight a two-front war, and that he had been faced-down in Cuba, and he simply needed to make peace with the West. I mean, that's what it was all about. And the China factor was, I think, a major piece of it, although you don't hear Soviets saying that so much. I asked some of the Soviets about it. But I'm convinced that it was the case.

Q: Prior to the Cuban thing, you had been off and on in contact and understood sort of the Soviet thinking.

GOODBY: Yes, and I was in touch with the Soviets during the missile crisis, too.

Q: But, I mean, prior to that. I mean, here Khrushchev was coming into power. In many ways Khrushchev is looked back upon now as sort of an innovative person, maybe somewhat uncouth but basically thinking of new things. Were you seeing any changes in Soviet attitude one way or the other as he achieved power, and then of course his fall?

GOODBY: Well, most of what I saw from Khrushchev was nothing but trouble. He was of the view that, since 1957 and Sputnik, the Soviet Union had this edge on us in atomic weapons--the ability to deliver them to targets. It's well known now, of course, that they didn't have the edge at all, but he tried to play it that way. And he tried to squeeze us on Berlin. You know, 1961 was just a very bad year. I think it was probably the low point in US-Soviet relations, and I think led directly to the Cuban missile crisis. I think Khrushchev completely misread Kennedy, and felt that perhaps by installing these weapons in Cuba he could make a giant step forward in terms of redressing the balance. And indeed he could have. If we'd let him get away with installing a lot of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, it would have resulted in a balance much, more equal between the US and the Soviet Union than was the case up until that point. And so it wasn't just a question of the politics of it all, but I believe he really would have made a big step forward in terms of the situation in nuclear power equations.

So he was nothing but trouble. I mean, he broke the moratorium on nuclear testing that had been put into effect by Eisenhower and had these gigantic nuclear weapons tests, which we're still feeling the results of in terms of strontium-90. I don't regard him at all as a benign character. But, for those of us working on arms control, you know, you keep plugging away it and hope for the best.

I thought, at the end of '62, that there really wasn't much hope that we could do very much through traditional negotiations. And so I drafted a memo saying that the president should announce that we would not test henceforward in the atmosphere and we would not be the first to resume testing in the atmosphere. I drafted that, and it was signed by Bill Foster and sent to McGeorge Bundy. That was December 7.

Q: He was the head of the NSC at the time.

GOODBY: He was then the president's advisor for national security affairs. That was in December of 1962. And we were authorized to inquire of key senators what would their view be of that. Most of them that we talked with said it would be all right; they didn't think there was any problem with that kind of thing.

But that was interrupted by the willingness of the Soviet Union to accept on-site inspections for the first time in the nuclear test ban negotiations. And they said they would accept three inspections.

Now I mention this because the idea in that memorandum, and even more or less the precise language, later found its way into the president's American University speech, on June 10, 1963, I think it was, in which he announced that the United States would not be the first to test in the atmosphere.

Q: Had this been vetted through the British?

GOODBY: I had talked to them about it, yes, and they were supportive of it.

So, in other words, the president's June 10 speech, which is seen as one of his major speeches, the idea in it that had to do with not testing in the atmosphere, came from that memorandum that I drafted and Bill Foster sent over to McGeorge Bundy. And it had been put on the shelf because it had been hoped that perhaps we could get a comprehensive test ban agreement, which in arms control terms of course is far superior to just an atmospheric one.

We had some very secret negotiations, the details of which have not yet been revealed, I think. Bill Foster, myself, Charlie Stelle, and Alezr Kolovsky as interpreter. And that was it. We met first with the Soviets alone, and then finally the British joined us. David Ormsby Gore, who was the British ambassador and had been the British representative to the test ban talks, joined us after a meeting or two.

In effect, what we tried to do was to tell the Soviets if you will describe to us what on-site inspections would actually consist of, so that we can determine the quality of these individual inspections, then we'll talk about numbers. The reason for that was that, frankly, Weisner, and even Dean himself, had encouraged the Soviets to think that maybe we could live with three on-site inspections.

But it was pretty clear to most of us that the Senate, which was not all that enthusiastic about a comprehensive test ban anyway, was not likely to ratify a treaty with only three on-site inspections. And so we were hoping that if the Soviets could say, "Look, you can go and do anything you want to in these inspections and don't worry about it," then we could go to Congress and say, "Well, look, here's what they'll let us do, and we're absolutely convinced we then will have the things we need." Then we thought we would have a little more flexibility. Whether we could go down to three I think most of us doubted, but we

thought maybe we could do five. The official position, I think, was seven or eight at that time.

It sounds like small potatoes now, but it was that sort of thing that was making the difference between go and no-go in terms of senatorial ratification.

The Soviets turned us down cold. Three was it, and they would not talk about the modality of inspection, so we accepted three.

We did talk with them successfully about placing these automated seismographs at various points. I took one of these *National Geographic* maps, like you have on your wall, over to the Soviet Mission and put x's on it where we would want ours in the Soviet Union, and they did the same. So we made a little headway there.

But after a few sessions it was evident that they had no flexibility at all, and we sort of called a halt to it.

And so, again, it looked as though there was just no hope for...

Q: Did they seem sort of disappointed they weren't getting it? I mean, the people you were talking to?

GOODBY: They seemed a little disappointed, because they thought they had a signal from us. And indeed they did. I don't want to be too critical of people like Jerry Weisner, who was a friend of mine, or Arthur Dean, who...I don't know whether he's still alive now or not, frankly. But they did lead them to think that we might accept three, and there was actually no authority for them to do that at all. And in the end it didn't become the US position.

Well, at that point, I had another idea, and that was that maybe we ought to send a special mission to Moscow to see if we couldn't revive all of this. Because it had basically collapsed in a kind of an unpleasant way. I mean, it was not anything like some of our earlier "unpleasantnesses," but you said, rightly, that Khrushchev was probably disappointed. I mean, we got a sense of this sort of sour mood, which was unfortunate because we had thought that, after Cuba, maybe some real détente could take place.

Q: Did you get the feeling that for both sides Cuba was a shaking-out point of maybe they really better get serious about this?

GOODBY: Yes, there was that, but also, as I say, it was China, too. And let me tell you about that, because, again, I used the route going to the British Embassy and said, "What do you think about sending a special mission over to Moscow to try and see if we can't talk to Khrushchev directly about this?" because I couldn't think of anything else to do at that point. The idea of an atmospheric ban was shelved in the White House, and I didn't want to pursue it just then. The British accepted this, and Macmillan sent a letter to Kennedy proposing that we make this one last attempt to get the thing going again.

Well, when this letter came back, Jake Beam and I went to see Tommy Thompson, whose title then, I believe, was deputy Under Secretary for political-military affairs, or something like that. He, of course, was the leading Soviet expert in the nation at that time. I recount this because his view was that we should not trouble the Russians at this point, because it was right in the middle of the final breakdown of the Chinese and Soviet relationship. This was around March or April of 1963, and he's said, "No, let's not send the mission to Moscow." I didn't agree with him at all and I thought we should. He said, "The Russians will be so busy dealing with this Chinese thing that they'll be preoccupied and it won't do any good." And I disagreed and recommended to Beam and to Bill Foster that we go ahead and endorse this. Of course, it had been my original idea anyway, so I was kind of stuck with it, but I felt it was important to do anyway.

And so we accepted that, and that was the reason that Averell Harriman went to Moscow in that year.

What happened, of course, then, we made the offer to send a mission in, I guess, April or May. And the Soviets did accept it, because of the reasons I mentioned to you earlier: they couldn't fight a two-front war. I think by that time they decided Khrushchev needed, in effect, a move towards cooperation with West. And he was determined, I think, to do that, and he saw the test ban as a vehicle for doing that.

So Kennedy was able to announce, in that June 10 speech, that this mission to Moscow had been accepted--my thought originally (not to brag about this, but it is one of the few things I'm happy about in my early career). He announced the atmospheric test ban thing, which was also my idea.

And Khrushchev very quickly accepted, in a speech he made in East Berlin a couple of weeks later, that he liked the idea of not testing first in the atmosphere. So we picked up that.

And, you see, this signaling from the top, as I sometimes call it, is fairly important. Khrushchev had been burned already in the three on-site inspections; now he heard Kennedy say, okay, no tests in the atmosphere, and it reassured him. It may not have been a big deal, but I think it provided some comfort to Khrushchev to think, well, now he's dealing with somebody that can really speak for the US government.

And then Harriman was sent over with instructions to see if he could get a comprehensive test ban, but, if not, to get this Limited Test Ban Treaty--that we had drafted. I had drafted it with Tom Pickering back in 1962. It had been on the table for a year, and the Russians hadn't shown any interest in it. So Harriman had that with him.

What happened was that Gromyko said, "Okay, how about a nonaggression pact between us?" We turned that down. It was obvious, of course, they were moving towards trying to align themselves with the West and had already broken with China at that point. And very

quickly they said, "Okay, we can't buy a comprehensive test ban, but can live with the Limited Test Ban Treaty."

And so, with very minor changes, this treaty that Tom and I had drafted in 1962 became accepted by the Soviets and was then submitted to the Senate by Kennedy and ratified.

And so that's kind of the story of the test ban. I got out of it just as it was ending. To my great regret, I did not go to Moscow; I had already left ACDA then to become a member of the policy planning staff. But I felt that I made some very important contributions, and others have recognized that, too. I was invited up to the Kennedy Library for the 25th anniversary celebrations, in recognition of what I had done. So I am very pleased about that particular effort; I had a lot to do with it.

I mention this not only because I'm proud of it, but I think it does show you what a young Foreign Service officer can do under the right circumstances, if you have the initiative and are willing to stick your neck out.

Q: And also do you think, too, that the bureaucracy was somewhat limited?

GOODBY: The bureaucracy in the State Department was out of it basically. I mean, all these talks I had with the British, I never went to the British Desk. There wasn't any political-military setup at all, to speak of, in the State Department at that time. There was a very small unit. The beginnings of the political-military bureau were set up... In fact, I guess the first guy was a deputy assistant secretary, or something like that, for political-military affairs, who reported to Tommy Thompson and Alex Johnson. And there were maybe half a dozen people--people like Sey Weiss and Leon Sloss--and no Foreign Service officers at all. I mean, there wasn't that interest in the Foreign Service, unfortunately, because the Foreign Service was missing a very important aspect of foreign relations. But, you know, they thought, well, that's military; it's someone else's business. Happily, though, my background in the Atomic Energy Commission made me think completely differently about that.

But there I was, you know, in '63 I was thirty-three years old and I had been working on that since I was about twenty-four, and finally we got a test ban out of it all. So I devoted a lot of my earlier days to that.

No, ACDA at that time was not isolated and sort of out of it as it is now to some extent, because the only important negotiation going on then with the Russians, which was the nuclear test ban, we were basically running it.

Q: You had a president who was really committed to it, too.

GOODBY: A president who was committed to it, again I think not so much originally because of his own personal commitment to arms control, but because of a feeling that he wanted to cooperate with Macmillan.

I heard... In those days, people did keeping of telephone conversations without too much scruples. At one point, I remember Jake Beam and I were called up to George Ball's office.

Q: He was Under Secretary of state.

GOODBY: And Ball said to us, "Listen to this recording." It was a recording of a conversation that he'd had with Kennedy. Kennedy had just been talking with Harold Macmillan, and he said to George, "George, Macmillan thinks that Eisenhower was a good man, but he never followed through on any of these things that he agreed to do. That's especially the case with the test ban, and I want to be able to follow through on these things." And so, you know, the impact on me of hearing Kennedy's voice, talking, as he thought, in private to George Ball about what Macmillan and he had been talking about, convinced me that there really was this obviously...

Q: Rather than the sort of rhetoric that gets canned and comes out and you feel there's nothing behind it.

GOODBY: That's right. That's right. No, that was authentic and convinced me that the British connection was terribly important, as it was. I mean, Harold Macmillan is really, in my mind, the unsung hero of the whole test ban. He never gets any credit for it, but, to the extent that he really kept the thing on tracks, I think more than anybody else he really did that. I hope it will come out some day. When the British papers are released, we'll probably see some of that stuff.

Q: After you left arms control, you moved into policy planning. I wonder if you could tell about what you were doing and some of the problems you were dealing with and people and all that.

GOODBY: Right. Well, let me just say, as a final comment on that particular period, that is to say the period up until the Cuban missile crisis and the ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, that one impression I had, up until that point began to fade away at just about that time, was namely that, especially among the military, there was a very widespread feeling, a conviction almost, that there was sooner or later going to be a war with the Soviet Union. When I was at the Atomic Energy Commission, and even when I was in the Arms Control Agency, that seemed to be just an assumption that was made by a lot of people.

I have to admit I was concerned that that might very likely be the case, which is one of the reasons I spent a lot of time on arms control, thinking that might do something to head it off.

And during the Cuban missile crisis, of course, it looked to a lot of us who were on the scene then as though that kind of prediction might come to pass.

I was at the United Nations during the Cuban missile crisis and heard President Kennedy, over television, up in the top floor of the US mission. The meeting was presided over by Adlai Stevenson, and he was pretty glum about the whole thing. He cautioned us all to take this very seriously--and I can assure you none of us needed that caution--but nonetheless he wanted to make sure everybody gave a proper sense of the somber nature of the whole thing.

I asked of him a question, which I guess today still no one knows the answer to exactly, as to whether there were in fact nuclear warheads already in Cuba, because, if there were, they could easily be mated with the nuclear missiles, and the Soviets would be ready to go. He didn't seem to know the answer, and I'm not sure people today still know the answer to that.

But another kind of impression of those times--meeting Soviet diplomats in the hallways in the UN one got the impression they also expected a war out of this. And I suppose they had some instructions to let it be seen that way. We were talking, of course, frequently about the quarantine and whether the Soviet ships were going to turn around and turn back. And the Soviets were just assuming they would not turn back. And I really did have the impression that the Soviet diplomats believed that they would not turn back.

Q: Well, nobody was really fully informed or really knew.

GOODBY: Yes, that's right, nobody except a very few people in the Kremlin, no doubt.

So that was a scary time. I remember people talking about leaving town. I was in New York and my family in Washington, and of course that was not the easiest time.

But, after the Cuban missile crisis, and, more especially also, after the test ban, I think that we did turn a corner. I didn't, after that, have the feeling that war was considered very likely, even by the people who were in the business of preparing for that.

Well, that brings me to my first job with the Policy Planning Council.

Q: This would be 1963.

GOODBY: This was 1963. At that time, Walt Rostow was the counselor of the department and the chairman of the Policy Planning Council. You may remember that he had been a supporter of the presidential candidate John Kennedy, one of the supporters from the Cambridge group. Walt was a professor at MIT. And his deputy was Henry Owen, who had been in the department for quite a long time as an economist and had a lively interest in Europe and in nonproliferation and a variety of things.

The things that were obviously on Walt Rostow's mind at that time, and on Henry's mind especially, were two things. One was the beginnings of the Vietnam War and the other was the multilateral force. And let me speak to both of those in a little bit.

My first job I'll mention because it was of some interest, and I will not mention most of the others because they're not of any special interest.

But there was a feeling, particularly among the top people in the Kennedy administration, that Eisenhower had let the whole nuclear weapons issue get too much out of hand, and that there were a lot of nuclear weapons around, and that the idea of a nuclear war was just kind of a spasm war--everything lets fly and you don't know how to stop it. And there were a lot of people in the Cambridge group, Harvard and MIT, that thought that should change.

And one of them was a man named Thomas Schelling, quite a prominent figure in academic circles, who had done a lot of work on games and modeling of various diplomatic situations as well. He persuaded Walt Rostow that there ought to be a study of what was called war management and termination. And the basic idea was to try to get away from the idea of just sort of a massive, all-out attack on the Soviet Union and try to think about a more managed kind of conflict, and especially how do you stop that kind of a nuclear war. Walt persuaded Maxwell Taylor, who was then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs at that point, to use an NSC apparatus, over which the Joint Chiefs had control, to do this study of war management and termination.

The group involved was called the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council. And it was a quite interesting group, because it had been established during Eisenhower's time to do reviews of the results of a thermonuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The net assessment, in other words, was what happens to each country in the event of that kind of a war.

Well, it was a fairly influential group, because Eisenhower paid close attention to it. He wrote, later on in his memoirs, about how impressed he was by what he heard from that group about the results of a nuclear war, how there would be just absolute devastation, and he spoke publicly about it. A lot of that information came to him through this Net Evaluation Subcommittee.

Well, it had been exclusively a military group up until 1963 when it was assigned this project on war management and termination. And I was the first State Department official assigned to it. It was quite an interesting experience for me, because, believe it or not, up until that time, although I'd been working on nuclear testing and a whole variety of things, I had never gotten very far into the whole subject of war planning and the SIOP, the Single Integrated Operational Plan, and all that. And so this was really the first time that they lifted the veil for me and I began to understand all of the various plans and other thinking about use of nuclear weapons. So I learned a great deal during that exercise.

What we finally decided, I might just add by way of general interest, was that we needed some better management of nuclear weapons, run out of the White House probably, and recommended that, rather than try to get into the idea of how do you actually plan a nuclear war; we didn't think that was our business. But we did urge that the White House try to get a better way of controlling a nuclear war. And of course subsequently, not right away, that

was adopted. In fact, much later, it was adopted. And now, of course, the White House has very elaborate command and control procedures. But we were the first ones to get into that idea that somehow there ought to be a managed nuclear war, and that the White House ought to be intimately involved and not just turn the thing over to the military who would then let fly with everything.

Q: What was the reaction of the military towards you and towards this change?

GOODBY: Well, I think they were rather pleased to have me in the group, because it gave them a little bit of a window into the thinking outside of their own circle. One thing they felt a lack of during the Kennedy administration was political guidance.

One of the merits of the Eisenhower administration was that with all this very elaborate NSC machinery that he set up, although it was highly overdone and rather cumbersome, it did give bureaucrats and the military a sense of what was the general line, if you will, of the Eisenhower administration.

Kennedy abolished all of that. There was, as a result, a certain vacuum in the military as to just what it was the political authorities wanted. And, although I was of course not a political appointee, and not by any means a member of Kennedy's inner circle, at least I had a connection with somebody who was, Walt Rostow, and I was able to, I think, give them some insight. So they, I think, basically welcomed me there. I think the reason I was able to learn so much as I did was because they were very frank with me and opened up the trade secrets and the crown jewels and all that in a way that I was taken right into their company.

They, on the other hand, were very skeptical of this idea of war management and termination. And I think they had good right to be, at that particular point, because we couldn't do it; there wasn't the command and control capacity to manage a nuclear war. And they didn't really feel that nuclear war was something that you ought to treat as a conventional war. And, on that issue, I shared their point of view one hundred percent. In other words, the idea that you would consider nuclear weapons the same as kind of a nuclear artillery and plan to use it in increments did not really appeal to me, at least at that point. And, at that point, it simply wasn't feasible to do it anyway, because we just didn't have the tools to do it with.

Now, of course, with satellites and highly sophisticated command and control procedures, we can begin to do that. But, even now, we really would have trouble with managing such a conflict.

Q: To me, this whole idea of, well, if we send a message by one explosion here that takes out a city of 50,000, they'll do this. It just seems to me, a complete layman, these things are so terribly destructive that I can't imagine a military commander, once it started, saying, "Well, gee, they sent a better signal than we did, therefore we're going to quit." I mean, there's always the hope. And then you move into that wonderful acronym MAD, Mutually

Assured Destruction. At that time, from about '63 to '67, was there the feeling among the military that these things were really winnable?

GOODBY: Well, I think there was a feeling among the military that these were horrendous weapons that really would come close to destroying civilization. And yet there was in the military a certain competitive instinct which always came to the fore, which gave them the sense: "Well, somehow or other we can win this." And in fact, of course, in those times the United States did have a just overwhelming superiority over the Soviets. Even at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, we had, oh, just hundreds more nuclear weapons than the Soviets had. And, under the best of circumstances, the Soviets would have been pretty lucky to be able to deliver some nuclear weapons on US territory, whereas we could probably, even at that stage, have done just about as much damage to the Soviet Union as we can now. So, in terms of relative power, we were way ahead, and of course the military knew that and were fairly confident about it. But, even then, there was no military man I met in that particular setting that was optimistic about a nuclear war. I mean, every one of them knew exactly what it would entail and knew that even if a few American cities were struck by nuclear weapons that it would involve millions of deaths. So they were very much aware of that and not at all anxious to have a war with the Soviet Union. Of course, I wasn't working with the generals at that stage, I was working with people who were colonels and Navy captains, and all of them had served in World War II and in the Korean War as well and had a pretty healthy appreciation of what war was all about. So they were not at all anxious to get into a conflict.

But their basic idea was that if you get into a war, you do not hold back, you do not give the enemy the initiative. And that is almost a basic precept of the military doctrine that I think has probably prevailed ever since the time of Clausewitz, and it certainly still prevails today, as we can see in the Persian Gulf.

And their worry was that, okay, you send a signal, as you were suggesting, by a nuclear weapon, and you give the enemy the initiative, and he comes back with everything he has. And their preference would be, if we're going to get into a nuclear war, then let's go in it with everything we have and hope for the best. And that was the basic philosophy.

So they were not too much taken by the Kennedy idea about managing war. In fact, although I think Kennedy had a good point, namely that Eisenhower had failed to manage the nuclear component as well as he should have, I think some people around Kennedy just felt he could be micromanaged. And probably that experience they had in the Cuban missile crisis made them think that.

I think today and I thought then that was a mistake, to think that you could, once in a nuclear war, control it as readily as one could a conventional war. Even a conventional war is hard to control; in nuclear war, you're going into the unknown. And that's certainly something that the military felt very strongly then, and I suspect they still do think that.

Q: Well, I was just wondering, as you were talking, what would be the State Department connection with planning, outside of the fact that you're a civilian and aware? Because, when you move into a nuclear war, the niceties of diplomacy in other countries really fall by the wayside very quickly.

GOODBY: Yes, that's right. No, the State Department would have almost nothing to do with it. I remember writing in the report that we did in that particular study on war management and termination a piece about war aims. What I wrote, I remember to this day and I think is probably still true, is that war aims would be achieved probably by the method of targeting that we used, and that you would not really achieve much of anything else. In other words, you would destroy a country you attacked with nuclear weapons, and we in turn would suffer massive damage, and to expect that beyond that we would be capable of negotiating or occupying or otherwise achieving a certain more-nuanced aim in a war like that was just out of the frame of reality in those days, and still today I think that. Although today, of course, there are many more refinements in the targeting than there were then, thirty years ago.

Well, I stayed with the Net Evaluation Subcommittee for another one or two studies, two studies, I think, and the next one was on NATO. And there we also ran into a disagreement with the top people in the Kennedy administration--not over fundamentals, but over implementation mainly. What Kennedy wanted to do was to change NATO strategy away from the idea of heavy reliance on nuclear weapons, which was the Eisenhower notion, and to what was called flexible response, something that Maxwell Taylor had been advocating for a long time and that Kennedy felt was the right approach.

That doctrine said that you do not use nuclear weapons automatically, you try first to see what you can do with conventional, in effect. I supported the basic policy and hoped, in a study that we were asked to do in that evaluation subcommittee, that it would be shown that that was a feasible policy.

Well, we traveled to Europe and talked to a lot of military commanders and concluded that in order to have a successful conventional defense, there was a great deal of work that needed to be done. You just couldn't adopt that kind of a strategy without making some pretty significant changes in the way the military was structured, and basically said that in our report to the NSC.

Briefed Maxwell Taylor on it, who was a little taken aback, but not nearly as taken aback as Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense. We briefed him on the findings of the report one morning, and he was highly critical and said we hadn't taken various things into account. And of course there were some things we hadn't taken into account. Our basic stance, though, was not that we were quarreling with the idea that we ought to have a good conventional defense in Europe, but that we were moving too fast in trying to persuade the NATO countries that it should be done basically overnight.

The result of that was that the Net Evaluation Subcommittee was essentially discontinued. Secretary McNamara was, as you remember, a very powerful man. I think by this time it was probably in the Johnson administration; I think Kennedy had been killed by that time and Johnson had taken over. And McNamara was even more powerful in the Johnson administration, at first, than he was in the Kennedy.

Q: What was the motivation behind McNamara's disagreeing? Was it because you were running against what was essentially a political decision and you were coming up with, say, the hard facts, that this won't...?

GOODBY: Yes, essentially that's what it was.

Q: And it was going to cost a lot of money?

GOODBY: Yes, yes. He just felt he had enough trouble in trying to overcome resistance in NATO and he didn't need any more resistance, especially from within his own building, because actually that is where we were sitting, in the Pentagon, all this time.

So he arranged with the president that that was the end of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, which in a way was too bad, because something like that was needed, and still is needed, and other things have not quite taken its place. It was a very useful thing, in my opinion.

But the next thing we did was an interagency study, more or less the same framework, on China. And this led me straight into the Vietnam situation.

You may remember a lot of the thinking in those days was that China was out to do us in, and that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations both regarded China as a major threat.

Q: And also at that time wasn't it still considered a very close ally of the Soviets? I mean, it was monolithic still at that time.

GOODBY: Well, it wasn't quite monolithic, because of the split that had begun to be evident during the period '63, '64. By now it was almost '65, I think we're talking about. So there was a split that was in evidence, but a lot of people didn't believe it. I mean, you're right to say that the general attitude had not changed sufficiently to recognize that there was a China that had its own set of interests and that these were different from the Soviet Union's.

More significantly, people like McNamara attached a great deal of importance to some of the propaganda the Chinese were putting out. McNamara, for example, appended to one of his annual reports to Congress a speech by Lin Bao, which talked about how the Communists would take over the country areas of the world, that is to say, the Third World, and that would mean that the cities, i.e., the First World, were surrounded and that they would inevitably fall. McNamara and others in the administration took that kind of threat

really very seriously, so we were asked to take a look at China and so forth and come up with some conclusions.

Well, the only point about that I want to mention is that there were some people that I worked with in the State Department who, generally speaking, were very hard-line kind of guys. And one was a man named Seymour Weiss, who later on became the director of the Political-Military Bureau. He's known as a very, very hard-line kind of man, but he and I saw eye-to-eye on the question of Vietnam.

And there again is where I ran into a few problems with my distinguished boss, and good friend, Walt Rostow, who by this time had become convinced that we had to fulfill our obligations in Vietnam, and that meant escalating, if necessary, to do that.

Well, as a result of this study, Sey Weiss and I came to some conclusions about the feasibility of trying to get into a conflict that might somehow or other involve China as well as Vietnam.

We asked to have a meeting with the secretary of state, Mr. Rusk, and with the assistant secretary for East Asian affairs, William Bundy. And we took the occasion not just to fill them in on this study we were doing, but to raise a series of questions about the desirability of getting into a conflict in Vietnam, using China as sort of an indirect way of getting at the issue.

I remember the response vividly to this day, because it showed me the kind of thinking that was going on with regard to our Vietnam policy. And this was, again, '64, '65. What Secretary Rusk said...and, by the way, I admire Secretary Rusk, I think he is a brave and courageous and devoted man, and in general did a good job, but his thinking about Vietnam was clearly the result of his experience, you know, years ago. Because what he said, when we talked about this, was, well, Japan was able to walk all over China, and therefore he wondered why we would have so many difficulties in dealing with Vietnam, or even with China if it came to that. The discussion I don't remember any more in detail, but that was the general thrust of it; namely that experience during World War II, when of course Secretary Rusk was an officer in the China-Burma-India area, had convinced him that there was no great military problem involved in dealing with this kind of situation.

William Bundy's response was yes, he understood how difficult it would be, "but if only we could pull it off," were the words he used, it would be a tremendous thing to do. In other words, his judgment was, maybe you could say, a little more nuanced than Secretary Rusk's. In a sense he did acknowledge that there were going to be problems, which we were trying to point out, but he thought the stakes were so high that it was worth taking the plunge in order to see if we couldn't win, and that would have some really dramatic results.

So that was my experience in hearing high-level thinking. And frankly we didn't get much of that, even in the policy planning staff.

Q: Well, did you have the feeling that there was sort of a self-sealing process, that they knew what they wanted, and problems that were raised by various groups of experts were sort of listened to, but there wasn't much penetration?

GOODBY: Yes, I think you could say that. And that was certainly the attitude that Walt Rostow had. Walt was at this time still with the Policy Planning Council, but, you may remember, he became the national security advisor to President Johnson and left the council in, I think, sometime about '65 or '66. But, while he was still in the council, we did have an occasional meeting on Vietnam, and I did raise some of these feasibility issues. He just was not of a mind to listen to this, and made a comment once to the effect I needed to get a lot more fine-grained about my analysis, which meant, I suppose, that he had concluded that the logistics of the situation and all the other fine military points were well in hand. He'd been assured of this by McNamara, and therefore there was nothing to worry about.

So the basic conclusion I come to is one that I've seen happen over and over again: people's mindset comes from experiences they had in their '20s and '30s, and, by the time they get into positions of power, they come at a lot of these issues with a certain set of expectations and assumptions, and it's very difficult to shake those. And I think that was clearly the case with Dean Rusk, who was operating on the basis of things he had learned twenty years ago when he was in World War II at that point. And as far as Walt Rostow was concerned, a very fine man, I enjoyed working with him, but it was just impossible to talk with him about Vietnam. As you suggest, he had his mind made up, and questions about the feasibility of the whole thing were just almost impossible to discuss.

Q: Looking beyond Vietnam at China, how did your group see China? Was it a menace, or was it going to be so self-absorbed that really the Third World was not much of a target as far as the Chinese were concerned?

GOODBY: Well, I think we came out more on the latter, that it was very much self-absorbed, and that what essentially we needed to do was keep it that way and keep it contained. I don't recall that we had any strong feelings in the group--which did include some China specialists, people like Joe Yager for example--I don't believe we concluded that we needed to take any special measures to deal with China, that its threat was not as great as they were trying to portray in their propaganda, and that we could get by this period very nicely.

So the major thing of interest there is what I mentioned about Vietnam, and maybe we can take a look at that part of it. And the expert advice, to the extent we had done the study and felt we knew what we were talking about, was: This is going to be an awfully hard thing to do in Vietnam, and are you sure you really want to do it? And the conclusion was: Yes, they felt they really wanted to do it. Which of course was brought out very nicely in a book by Les Gelb and Richard Betz later on, called *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked*. And that's right, they got all of the mainstream advice, and all of the advice that went contrary of the notions of getting involved in Vietnam were discarded, which was a great shame.

One final point about the Policy Planning Council. This was the period when we were trying to sell the multilateral force, which was an idea that was championed especially by Henry Owen, who had been the deputy chairman of the Policy Planning Council. The idea was that there should be a way of bringing the Germans into the nuclear area, and that we would do this by having a sea-based missile force in which the Germans would have some degree of control. The United States would ultimately be able to veto the use of nuclear weapons, but there was going to be a sea-based force using missiles that would be owned and operated by a group of NATO countries. The whole story of that is out in the public record, so I won't get into that in great detail except to say that here was another instance of a policy being adopted without very much critical analysis, at least from the standpoint of a critical analysis of what's wrong with it. The MLF story has been pursued at great length and people have written books about it, so I don't need to dwell on it. But I was not very enthusiastic about it, and, despite the fact that my area of expertise was primarily Europe, I managed to stay away from it and not do very much in that area.

Q: Well, how about within your group? I mean, you were an expert group. This was really a political decision wasn't it?

GOODBY: Well, it was a political decision that was made almost without very much thought by political leaders, including both Kennedy and Johnson. And, bureaucratically, Henry Owen was a very skillful and clever man and managed to keep a policy going that didn't really have very deep-rooted support anywhere in the government. And finally it did collapse, of course, but not without quite a bit of activism throughout the government, and a certain amount of political difficulty in the end for the German officials involved, Ludwig Erhard included.

I did once visit the only ship that was ever put into the fleet that was destined to be a part of the multilateral force. It was called the U.S.S. Claude Ricketts after a former, I think he was, chief of naval operations who had been a supporter of the idea, and who had died and they had named this ship after him, after that. I remember to this day, I was there with one of my friends from the Policy Planning staff, named Fred Weil. This was a multinational crew that they had on board, and we heard one crewman, not quite understanding what another crewman said, and he was sort of saying, "What did you say?"

And Fred automatically said, "I said hire not fire!"

He thought that was a pretty good comment about the difficulties of a multinational crew.

It was said that it was a multinational fleet, of course, that won the Battle of Trafalgar, to which the response was "Yes, it did win the Battle of Trafalgar, no telling what it could do today."

Well, I left the Policy Planning Council after four years.

During that time, by the way, I ceased being a Foreign Service reserve officer and went back to being a regular Foreign Service officer. I had to take a step back in my grade and a slight pay cut to do that, but I wanted to get back into the regular Foreign Service. I had decided I didn't want to just continue being an expert on atomic energy and disarmament all my life, and so I made that move. But I found it, frankly, very hard to get back into the mainstream of the Foreign Service.

Q: This was 1967, was it?

GOODBY: Yes, this was 1967. I finally managed to get a job, but, again, it had to do with atomic energy--I just couldn't escape that, as much as I wanted to.

Q: I assume it was somebody sitting there saying, "My God, we've got to have somebody dealing with atomic energy, and here we got somebody."

GOODBY: Yes, that is really what it came down to. I really actually wanted much more of a just ordinary line job, but, since I hadn't really had that kind of experience, I wasn't able to land that kind of a job.

Q: What grade were you at that point?

GOODBY: I think it was FSO either Three or Four, I've forgotten now. I took a step back, I think from a Three to a Four, and so I believe I was an FSO Four when I was trying to land this kind of a job.

Anyway, the job I did finally land was with the US Mission to the European Community, in Brussels. And my job was to follow the activities of the European atomic energy community, which was called EURATOM. And that turned out to be a fairly interesting job, for a variety of reasons.

The boss there, the ambassador, was a man named Robert Schaetzel, who had been quite close to George Ball and who was a real...zealot I think is not too strong a word, about European unification. And he had a habit of calling the situation in Europe a "pre-federal Europe," as though it were going to suddenly become the United States of Europe. Of course, they may, but this, you remember, was 1967, and things weren't looking so good at that point.

And the deputy was George Vest, so that was my first experience at working directly with George Vest.

The interesting thing, I guess you could say, during that time there were two aspects, quite apart from the European Community, which is an interesting thing in itself. We went through one of the de Gaulle vetoes of British entry, and all those sorts of things. Common agricultural policy was established, and the Community was taking shape in some interesting ways.

But, from my standpoint, the two interesting things were the fact that the United States was negotiating at that time the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). And that treaty established the International Atomic Energy Agency (which you remember I also had something to do with much earlier) as the instrument that would verify that countries that signed the treaty as non-nuclear powers were in fact not developing nuclear weapons. And the issue came up of whether that particular obligation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty would overrule the responsibilities of the inspection service of EURATOM, because they had their own inspection service. And so I was involved in the negotiation, which led ultimately to EURATOM's inspection service being recognized by the IAEA and by the participants in the Nonproliferation Treaty as the responsible agent for monitoring the activities of EURATOM with respect to peaceful uses of atomic energy.

But that negotiation went on during the two years I was at the US Mission, and was one of the main things I did, and it was a very interesting operation.

Q: What were some of the objections? This would seem to be fairly straightforward, either you let A or B do the inspections.

GOODBY: Well, there were two things involved. One was, of course, can you have a regime in which some important countries in effect seem to monitor themselves, whereas everybody else has to go through the IAEA. It was a case of discrimination, and it wasn't clear...

Q: Would this be the United States and Great Britain?

GOODBY: No, it would be the European Community--the six nations, at that time, of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Benelux. [That's five, unless Benelux is considered as two.] And they would have their own inspection service, you see, under this scheme, whereas everybody else that was in it, all the Third World countries that signed up, would have to go the poor man's route, if you will, and have the IAEA do it for them. Furthermore, the Soviets, who were the main party we were negotiating with, were not very enthusiastic about it either, because they thought that the Germans might somehow be able to circumvent the obligations through the EURATOM inspection service. So we had to be pretty careful about that.

I personally favored using EURATOM, because I was also a supporter of European integration and I felt that that was needed to help integration along.

The thing, though, that one should remember was that the Germans at that particular stage, especially those working on atomic energy matters, were very, very sensitive about being discriminated against. I don't want to suggest that they had an interest in keeping the nuclear weapons option open at that stage, because certainly the politicians did not. But there were, I think, some people in the German atomic energy program that had in mind maybe at some point they'd want to get into nuclear weapons. And they, in fact, were laying

a very good basis for doing that if the politicians ever made that decision. So they were not very anxious to be discriminated against any more than they already were.

And so there really were some fairly sensitive things to deal with there--on all sides in fact.

So that was a fairly interesting operation. It came out in the end of course that EURATOM did do the safeguards, and that was recognized by all the parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty, and that's the way it's still done.

Q: What was your feeling then? Because later it became quite an issue, of the European countries' industries that were involved in this type of work, and things getting to...one can think of, right off hand, Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, you know, perhaps Brazil or some other places.

GOODBY: Well, of course, some of those countries you mentioned never did sign the Nonproliferation Treaty. I think that the issue of EURATOM was not one of the major reasons they didn't sign the Nonproliferation Treaty. It was all very much local politics: Brazil versus Argentina; South Africa feeling hemmed-in by the black nations of Africa; Israel by the Arabs, and so forth; India and Pakistan. All of these nuclear issues turn, as most politics do, on local politics. And the fact that EURATOM had its own special privileged inspection service under the IAEA rather than an IAEA inspection service I don't think made any particular difference whether a country signed or accepted IAEA safeguards or not. If that was your point.

Q: But was there much concern that the business interests and imperatives of the industrial groups working on nuclear matters in these various European countries at that time would cause a leakage of this equipment or information?

GOODBY: Yes, absolutely. Not so much in the sense you're talking about, but... I guess I didn't emphasize this. One of the major concerns that the Germans and others had was that their nuclear industry, just from the commercial standpoint, would be compromised somehow through the IAEA. And they did, I think, feel that they had a major commercial stake in ensuring that this NPT regime did not make it difficult or impossible for them to have commercial advantages. And I think they felt that they'd be better protected under the EURATOM safeguard system than they would under IAEA, where all kinds of people from places that might be interested in having their own nuclear industry might be competing with the Germans and others. So the commercial side was a big factor, yes. Not so much from the concern about leakage of nuclear energy secrets as such, but feeling that somehow the ability to export reactors, the ability to conduct business in a normal commercial way, would somehow be compromised. And I think we persuaded them that that was not very likely to happen. And in the end, of course, the Germans did sign the NPT.

The other particularly technical thing that I was monitoring at that time was the issue of whether the United States was enjoying such an enormous superiority over the Europeans that the whole idea of a European Community was going to be impossible. This all came

from a book written by a man named Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber, which was called *Le Défi Américain*.

Q: Yes, The American Challenge.

GOODBY: His thesis was that the United States had become so overwhelmingly superior in technology and other things that essentially the United States was beginning to run Europe. And it was my job to follow that debate and so forth.

And it was a fascinating time, because, in fact, during that period from '67 to '69 when I was at the European Community, the United States did have considerable advantages and owned a lot of industries in Europe, and our technology at that stage did get most of the advantages that the Europeans lacked.

Well, the Europeans, of course, made up for it. They haven't quite caught up with us in many areas, but they did organize themselves so that that became a less important factor. And now I think you can see the European Community's really beginning to shape up into the kind of community that my friend Ambassador Schaetzel was hoping it would become back in the '60s. It's taken a lot longer than he anticipated, but it's moving that way.

Well, a lot of interesting issues in those two years, but I won't go into all of them because I think they're not of general interest. But I did, I must say, get a view of Europe that has always remained with me and has colored my thinking about Europe, namely that if the United States looks at Europe only through the NATO perspective, which is what a lot of us tend to do, you miss a lot of what Europe is about. And there really was this what they called the "European idea." And de Gaulle at that time was talking about "Europe--from the Atlantic to the Urals." And there really is a strong sense of "Europeanness," which I was exposed to through my work in the two years I was with the US Mission to the European Communities. And that made a big imprint on me. I realized there is a strong sense of drive, not quite as strong as my friend Bob Schaetzel thought, I think, at that time, but nonetheless a powerful idea there that...

Q: But this is also an idea, I mean, you were getting it from where you were that it was also the United States delegation and those were also pushing this.

GOODBY: Yes, that is true. Bob was, as I've said, a very strong, almost zealous, type of guy on European integration and tended to get people that were like-thinkers. I was one of those. I wasn't, I guess, quite as full of zeal as he was. Nor was George Vest. George Vest was a much more neutral kind of person on these things. There was a feeling that this mission had a special role to play.

Q: What was the imperative behind this? That this would take care of European wars, or that it would give us a strong ally in the long run against the Soviet Union? Because, I mean, obviously today we're concerned about it as a competitive rival.

GOODBY: Yes, well it was all those things. The idea, of course, Jean Monnet had was that you need to establish a United States of Europe, first of all, in order to put behind Europe the terrible civil wars that have damaged Europe so much over the centuries. And that process of putting wars behind began, of course, with the European coal and steel community, which in effect was the Schuman Plan, which said that the German and French coal and steel industries would be merged, and later other countries joined. And that then led to the European Economic Community, et cetera. And it was Monnet's idea that you approach this thing through functional needs, and then it would develop into a political institution. So his first thought, and the thought that we had too at that time, was that European integration will mean that wars between France and Germany and Britain and all these countries will be a thing of the past, because it would no longer happen that they could become a one-country, in effect.

And the other part of it was that we want a strong Western Europe to take over some of the defense burdens from the United States. And this was an idea that I think nearly everybody shared across the spectrum. We didn't have any special insights into that in the US Mission that other parts of the US government didn't have; that was a generally shared belief. Which I still believe; I think that we do need a strong Western Europe.

And of course there are going to be disputes between us. I would say at that time we were a little more willing to make concessions in order to promote European integration than we are now. And that, of course, is right. They were then just getting started, and now they're a very strong group, so we shouldn't be as easy on them now as we were then.

But, yes, if you're suggesting a little bit of "clientitis" involved there, you're right, there was a bit of clientitis. And not, I think, totally unjustified in that particular case, because we were dealing with something new under the sun. It's one thing to say you're too pro-French, for example, to represent the United States properly, but it's another thing to say, when you have this curious new thing emerging, that people shouldn't look at it with a certain amount of sensitivity and sympathy and understanding. And I guess that's what we were trying to do. I don't think we went too far in suggesting that we should be supporters of it. But that basically was our line, that we should be supporters of it.

And of course at that time we were already getting into some pretty vigorous disputes over agricultural trade. Chicken wars and all these other wars were already happening, so we were not, of course, rolling over and playing dead every time some trade issue came up.

But on the basic principle that yes, there should be a United States of Europe (even though some of us thought that was a little romantic), the basic idea was one we all would have supported in that mission and tried to promote as best we could.

But I'm glad you asked that, because that was a part of the ECO ethos of those times. I'm not sure whether it's still the ethos, but it was then.

Well, I went back to the United States in 1969 and took a job with the European Bureau, where I had not served before despite the fact I'd been working on European affairs quite a lot. And my job was officer in charge of defense policy affairs in what was called RPM. The initials originally stood for Regional Political-Military, and basically what it was doing was NATO. A fascinating two years I spent there before returning to NATO again to be the counselor for political affairs at the US NATO.

In those two years I suppose the thing that was most noteworthy was the episode when Mr. Brezhnev made a speech saying, "Come taste the wine." This was a speech that he gave in Tbilisi, and it had reference to the idea of US-Soviet negotiations on conventional arms reductions.

Now let me go into the background of this.

Q: Please.

GOODBY: Senator Mike Mansfield, by the time I got to the State Department's NATO office in 1969, had almost annually for some years been promoting something called the Mansfield Amendment. And the idea was to essentially say we don't need American forces in Europe anymore, they ought to be pulled out. And sometimes there were conditions attached to it, like the Europeans had to spend more, in fairness, or something of that sort.

In 1971, towards the end of my tenure there in the European Bureau at that point, there was a particularly strong sentiment in the Senate that the Europeans were not doing enough to take care of their own defenses, and that American forces probably ought to be pulled out. Of course, the scene, you may remember, was also during the Vietnam War, and there were feelings the Europeans hadn't backed us enough. And there was in general kind of an anti-military sentiment that had begun to build up in the Senate.

One of the ways in which we thought we could head off this sentiment would be to get into some negotiations with the Russians that would, instead of having unilateral US pullouts from Europe, have us negotiate pullouts, with the Soviets also withdrawing.

We did begin to talk to the NATO countries about that, and they did begin to send signals, but the Soviets seemed not to be interested and never really responded to these signals of ours. We had a Reykjavik communiqué, for example, in which we talked about it.

Various efforts were made, but, as of '71, in the spring, we were still not successful in getting the Russians to say yes, they'd negotiate with us on this, and pressure was mounting in the Senate that would have our American troops withdrawn from Europe.

So this speech that Brezhnev made about negotiations came in the midst of a very critical debate in the Senate about the latest version of the Mansfield Amendment. And it was really touch-and-go. In fact, in retrospect, if you look at all the numbers of senators that

voted for one version or another of the Mansfield Amendment, it was a majority of the Senate. It was that close.

Well, as soon as I heard this speech that Brezhnev had made, I drafted a telegram to Jake Beam, who was then our ambassador in Moscow. And you may remember I worked with him earlier on in ACDA. And the telegram, I believe, was signed out by the deputy secretary of state, or Under Secretary of state. I think it was Elliot Richardson at that point. And it instructed Beam to go in and see Gromyko and tell him we're interested in getting into a negotiation.

Q: He was the foreign minister at the time.

GOODBY: At the very same time that we sent that telegram, Dave Abshire, who was the assistant secretary for congressional relations, and I worked together to make sure the Senate knew that we were beginning to get into a negotiation, or at least it looked that way.

So that particular episode turned the tide and meant that the Mansfield Amendment was defeated.

And more, perhaps, importantly for the long run, it was the beginning of the negotiation that just culminated last month in Paris, in November 1990.

Q: And the world has turned a number of times.

GOODBY: Quite a few times, that's right. But this negotiation, in effect, began with that telegram. Or, maybe more importantly, with that speech by Brezhnev in the spring of 1971.

Q: But essentially we have been sending out sort of signals for some time that we'd like to do something about this, but there's been no response.

GOODBY: There's been no response, no.

And we wondered at the time was this just a bureaucratic mistake, or was it a deliberate ploy by Brezhnev to encourage the Senate to vote against the Mansfield Amendment. I thought at first that it was probably a mistake, just some kind of bureaucratic momentum that had been built up. But I became convinced later on that in fact it was a deliberate plan by Brezhnev to try to intervene in the debate in the Senate, because, I concluded, he felt it was in the Soviet interest to have American forces stay in Germany and not to depart unilaterally.

I was talking just a couple of weeks ago with a Soviet researcher who contended that that speech had never been cleared with anybody in the Kremlin, and that it was a speechwriter's gimmick, and that when Jake Beam went in to see Gromyko, Gromyko didn't know what the speech was all about. So you can take your pick: Was it a choice or not?

Q: You can take your pick. And, given bureaucracies and the way governments work, this can often happen.

GOODBY: It can often happen. But I'd love to know who that speechwriter was, because it made a dramatic difference in the whole course of history. If that speechwriter was just acting on his own, I must say he was quite a courageous man (or woman).

So that was one of the more interesting episodes.

Other things that I was doing during that time had to do with trying to build up NATO conventional defenses. This was President Nixon's particular effort to deal with the burden-sharing problem. It was something called AD-70, I guess it was called, which meant Alliance Defenses for the Seventies. And it led to, actually, some degree of improvement in burden-sharing, in the sense of the Europeans doing a bit more to build up the conventional side of their operations.

I also got involved during that time in the first SALT negotiations. Those negotiations led to an agreement, you remember, in 1972. And there was a European angle, in the sense that the Soviets wanted an understanding that we would not transfer any information to any European country about nuclear weapons.

Well, we had a deal, as you know, with the British to help them with the Polaris and Poseidon missiles. And the other Europeans as well didn't want to be in a position where, at some point in the future if we wanted to help them, we'd be stopped from doing that by this SALT I Treaty.

So there was quite an elaborate negotiation, in which I was somewhat involved, to work out a kind of a noncircumvention formula that would let us in fact continue doing what we had been doing to cooperate with the British in giving them weapons technology. And it kept it open for other countries as well, if we wanted to. And indeed we did later use it in supporting France, for that matter. So I was involved in that aspect of it.

The other issue had to do with what were called forward-based aircraft, and the Soviets wanted to take those into account. Those were our American airplanes that we had deployed in Europe, and they were equipped with nuclear weapons. The Soviets wanted those to be included; and we said no, we need to have this negotiation limited just to the central strategic forces, the B-52 bombers and the ICBMs and the sea-launched ballistic missiles. And we succeeded in that.

So I was involved at those points in the beginnings of the SALT I, and the very, very beginnings of these conventional forces that, as I say, just led to an agreement, after many years, last month.

I left the job of officer in charge of defense policy affairs to go back to Brussels, in 1971, where I became the counselor for political affairs, and I stayed at NATO headquarters in

Brussels from 1971 to 1974. I worked for George Vest, at first, who was in fact the chargé when I went there, and later for Ambassador David Kennedy, who had been the Nixon administration's secretary of the treasury. And after Kennedy left, I worked for about a year and a half or so for Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld, who later became the secretary of defense in the Ford administration.

Interesting people. Certainly Ambassador Kennedy's main interest was in shoe quotas, as it turned out. And just to show you how politics works and how the Foreign Service works, he had been, in effect, assured that his job at NATO headquarters would not be limited to dealing with NATO affairs, but rather would deal with establishing a kind of a managed trade, quotas on Spanish shoe exports to the United States in particular. And so his notion was he wasn't going to be around NATO very much; he was going to let that be done by one of his entourage that he brought with him. And we had a little bit of a bureaucratic tussle (which George Vest handily won, I should tell you), in the sense that Ambassador Kennedy understood after a time that the NATO job was a fairly serious one, and that if he was going to hand it off to anybody, it had to be handed off to the professional staff at the US Mission to NATO and not to somebody who was an amateur brought in by Ambassador Kennedy. Ambassador Kennedy accepted this. He never really did get very much interested in NATO affairs, and after, I think, less than a year, he left. It was not a particularly elevating time for me, at that point, in thinking about the way we run our foreign affairs.

Q: What sort of reaction were you getting to this type of attitude from your colleagues? I'm talking about the members of NATO, other missions.

GOODBY: Well, they didn't talk about it very much, and we didn't raise it. There are some things one doesn't like to talk about. You know, the dirty laundry one keeps in one's own house basically, and we did it that way. So I can't say. I mean, I imagine they had the same sense that I had, but I don't know for sure.

Q: No, but I did want to bring out that...sort of the dirty laundry aspect. You work, I assume, sort of as a team to take care of the problems and bypass the nonworking, or noninvolved, ambassador.

GOODBY: Yes, yes.

Ambassador Rumsfeld, of course, was completely different. He was a youthful, quite conservative, very dynamic man that had been a congressman from Illinois and then had left the Congress to go into the White House and work for Richard Nixon. Nixon became rather fond of him, evidently, and named him to be the head of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Rumsfeld and Frank Carlucci had been roommates at Princeton, and so that's where Carlucci got his political start, too, working with Donald Rumsfeld in the Office of Economic Opportunity. Later on, Rumsfeld got involved in various other things, and as Watergate began to descend on the White House, Rumsfeld very cleverly managed to get out of that and become ambassador to NATO in something like 1973, I guess. So, in effect,

always had clean hands so far as I could see. He was, in my opinion, a very fine, outstanding kind of public servant, and I regret that he hasn't reentered public life.

But his role in NATO was really quite important, because he did come to trust me and trust the other members of the staff, after a certain period of trial and error. This whole business of diplomacy was a little bit new to him. I was at that time involved in some fairly serious negotiations with our NATO friends, on two things. One was on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), where the Europeans were interested in moving towards acceptance of some kind of a conference that would deal with security issues. The United States was much less interested. Henry Kissinger, in particular, had absolute zero interest...

Q: He was at that time head of the National Security Council.

GOODBY: Yes. He became the secretary of state, however, while I was at NATO headquarters. I suppose it was just after the end of the first term, so I think he became secretary of state in 1973. [Head of NSC 1969-75; secretary of state September 1973-January 20, 1977]

Q: Well, one of the things is, I had an interview with George Vest, when he was carrying on some of these negotiations, talking about Henry Kissinger in his role of national security advisor basically telling the Soviets on the side, "Well, we really don't care about this," which was helping to undermine Vest's negotiating position.

GOODBY: Yes, I think he probably was secretary of state, though, and not NSC. We can check the dates, of course, but I think it was shortly after the 1972 elections that Kissinger became secretary of state, and the period I'm talking about was '70-'72. I guess Kissinger probably was still there at that time.

Q: Then how did you work in this environment when you were working on something but getting next to no support?

GOODBY: Well, the thing is, as you know, there are some areas where top political officials don't pay that much attention to what's going on, and the CSCE in its details was one of those things, frankly. So what I did was this, we launched a study in NATO not very long after I got there. In fact, I think it had just been started. My predecessor, incidentally, in this job was Larry Eagleburger, the deputy secretary of state, and he had been the political counselor until 1971 when I took over from him. And this project of a CSCE was not anything he had much of any interest in. He felt more or less the way Henry Kissinger did about it. I believe the study in NATO, however, had just gotten underway as Larry was leaving, and I, in effect, inherited the thing.

And I was much more interested in it; I really thought there was something to this idea. And so, when the thing began to really develop, mainly because of European countries' interest in it, the technique I used was to, in effect, work out a backstopping arrangement with a

man named Arbor Floyd, who was then the officer in charge of political affairs in the NATO office in the State Department. And what we would do is that I, with the help of some of my colleagues, Leo Reddy, for example, in our staff in NATO, would dream up these ideas about how do you cooperate with the Soviets on human rights, for example, or on economic cooperation, or on security. And we would then send these ideas back to Washington--in a telegram, all quite aboveboard--and in effect we would say, "Unless you have serious reservations about it, we will probably float this next Tuesday." And Arbor Floyd would always come back; he always wanted to have a good paper trail showing that there was some response. And so he was quite good, he got us responses almost all the time, which in effect said, "No comments, go ahead," something to that effect. But, frankly, people were not paying any attention to it.

Q: Just for the historical record, this became sort of a framework for developments that happened in the revolutionary year of 1989 to 1990.

GOODBY: Yes, that is exactly right.

Q: But, at the time, this was considered sort of an up-in-the-air, airy-fairy type of thing.

GOODBY: Yes, that's right. For example, my friend Tom Niles, who later became ambassador to Canada and I was ambassador to the European Community, had just come to work for me at NATO headquarters from a job that he'd had in Moscow. And he commented to me not long after he arrived that in Moscow the embassy thought all this was a lot of hokum, and yet here we were at NATO headquarters, beaver away on this issue, and he was a little taken aback by the energy we were devoting to this project.

This, of course, was the period late '71 and 1972, for the most part. And during that time we did lay the basis-- between ourselves, in the political section at US Mission NATO, and our home office, in effect the European Bureau-- for almost everything that's been done since in the CSCE, because we were, in effect, the lead horse in NATO. Americans always are the lead horse, in general, in NATO (nice thing about it). And we did have a lot of these ideas. The other allies, of course, did make their contribution, but we had more horses than they did and we were pretty active. And so a lot of these things that finally got into the negotiation when George Vest took over later on in 1973 up in Helsinki, and then later on another American ambassador in Geneva took on the job, a lot of those ideas had already been floated, you see, during that period that I was at NATO headquarters.

In any event, I was telling you somewhat earlier that Rumsfeld sort of observed what I was doing and, after being a little bit worried by it, finally decided it was okay, so he gave me the green light. Occasionally, in fact not occasionally, about maybe once or twice, he would go into the interpreters' booths and look through the glass window at what I was doing there, and kind of monitor what was happening, just to get a sort of hands-on feeling about what it was. But he came to trust me, and I liked him, and we had a good relationship. But he did give me a free hand, and that was much appreciated by me.

Q: Because of its importance in later times, this sort of the borning of CSCE (a horrible acronym)...

GOODBY: Yes, it is. It wasn't its first acronym either, but it came to be the last one.

Q: Did you find yourselves sort of becoming, you might say, ideologues? I mean, was this something that was being generated within the American NATO staff in Brussels, with only mild interest from different levels in Washington? Also, what were the attitudes that you were getting from the other NATO delegations on this thing?

GOODBY: No, I don't think we were ideologues. In that sense it wasn't comparable to the period I described earlier when I was serving with our US Mission to the European Community. There was no particular ideology about the CSCE.

And just to give you an illustration of that, George Vest, as I mentioned earlier, was chargé when I went to NATO in '71, and was still chargé when our ministerial meeting of December 1971 rolled around. And so he delegated to me the task of negotiating the NATO ministerial communiqué. Usually the NATO DCM does this, but, since he was chargé, he came to me to do it.

Well, one of the main issues was what attitude should the NATO ministers take about entering the negotiations in Helsinki with the Soviets and others on this kind of a conference. The secretary of state at that time was William Rogers. And the American position was one that was certainly approved by Henry Kissinger and then the NSC staff, namely that we didn't want to go to such a conference in Helsinki, we weren't ready for that. And so William Rogers wrote out for me, in his own hand, what he thought the communiqué should say. And in effect it said, "No, we're not going."

Well, I got into that all-night drafting session (they always last all night, those NATO communiqué-drafting sessions). The French came in with a position that said, "We want to go right now." And most of the other Europeans said, "Well, we'll go at some point in the future when we're more ready to take on this kind of negotiation." That impasse went on all night long. And finally, the next morning, I presented to Secretary Rogers all these bracketed pages of disagreement.

Q: He was there at...

GOODBY: This was the NATO ministerial meeting, so he was there for that meeting along with all the other NATO foreign ministers.

He was not a man that liked to get into a lot of nitty gritty with his colleagues (and I don't blame him for that), and so when he saw these three pages, practically, of bracketed language, he was really quite upset. I remember I had labeled one of these "The US Position," because in fact he had written it down himself in his own hand.

And he was persuaded, mainly by George Vest who was brilliant at these things, that probably the thing to do was go towards the sort of middle-of-the-road position that all the other Europeans had had, which said, in effect, "We'll go to the meetings with the Russians and others in Helsinki, but not right now. But we're going to prepare very carefully for that." In other words, we then began to accept the position that we would indeed go to that kind of a meeting. And the secretary of state decided that was okay with him. And the French fell off their position that we should go right now, i.e., '71. And so we saved the day for Secretary Rogers.

In fact, he even made a statement in the ministerial section about the "so-called US language," which offended me somewhat because that was his damn language that I had been defending all night long. I should have been smarter and dropped off myself, but I thought it was an important enough issue that probably he should do it, and that is what he did.

But, you see, from then on, December '71, we were committed, in effect, to go to a CSCE at some stage.

Q: Well, I don't want to over dwell on this, but I'm still trying to capture the feelings at the time. What did we see as the Soviet reason for wanting this? Or what were they were interested in doing?

GOODBY: Well, what I think most of us saw was what I really still see--not now, under the Gorbachev administration, but up until 1984, '85 what I saw was a Soviet policy that thought pan-Europeanism worked in the Soviet interest. Because the Soviets were a European power, and to the extent that Soviet influence could be exerted over Western Europe, as well as Eastern Europe, through some mechanism like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, this would advance Soviet hegemony in Europe and reduce American influence (not to mention hegemony) in Western Europe. So I saw that as essentially an offensive action by the Soviets, designed to increase their influence and reduce ours.

Q: I mean, this was it, rather than establishing firm borders.

GOODBY: Well, no, I've been describing what I would call the offensive aim of the Soviets; I believe that was a part of it. The other part of it was a more defensive aim, namely to establish the borders that, in particular, divided the two Germanies. So I think there was a maximum and minimum objective. The minimum was simply to have a surrogate peace treaty ending World War II and establishing the division of Germany and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. And the more offensive aim, which I think was a part of their policy, was, in effect, to drive us out. Not necessarily drive us out, but to exert greater Soviet influence over Western Europe.

Well, since it was clear by the fall of '71 we were going to such a conference, the task then became one of trying to extract as many concessions as we could from the Soviets that

would make the opposite happen, namely increase our influence in Eastern Europe and decrease chances for the Soviets to exercise influence in Western Europe. In other words, we, as often is the case, had a kind of mirror image, as far as I was concerned. I don't regard that as an ideological kind of point of view; it was an exercise in trying to see whose interests could be most served by something that we evidently were going to have to deal with. We could no longer, after December '71, ignore the fact that sooner or later there would be such a thing.

And so 1972 I spent in trying to devise a whole series of measures that would, if accepted by the Soviets, mean that society in Eastern Europe would basically, fundamentally change, namely human rights, freedom of expression, ability to travel without reference to borders.

The slogan we used at the time was: "Freedom of Movement of People, Information, and Ideas." And that was translated by us into all kinds of very specific and concrete proposals about the rights of newsmen, the rights of businessmen, the rights of families to be reunified, et cetera, et cetera. In other words, we took that basic notion that we want to influence Eastern Europe, and we expressed that policy in hundreds, literally hundreds, of very concrete obligations that the Soviets would have to accept if there was going to be an agreement that in effect would ratify the frontiers.

And even on the ratification of the frontiers, we said, first of all, that these frontiers can be changed peacefully if they wanted. And on that I might tell you that deal was finally struck.

Of course, I did not get into the negotiations in Helsinki and in Geneva; I left NATO in 1974, so my job was basically to set the stage and give our country, and the other NATO countries as well, the ammunition to deal with this.

And so, even on frontiers, in the end, the Soviets did not gain very much. Because there were several provisions that were negotiated which in effect vitiated their claim to these being the final frontiers. One was the ability to change them peacefully. One was that if any frontier had been imposed by force, i.e., the Baltic States, this was not something that was going to be recognized as binding and legitimate. And there was just a whole series of things that tended to undercut that Soviet claim that these frontiers were immutable.

And, in return, we got a whole lot of obligations, which of course one would have to be hopelessly naive to think the Soviets were going to accept, implement, or live up to.

But nonetheless what we hoped would happen in fact did happen, namely that people in Eastern Europe did become aware of these obligations on the part of their governments, because their governments all signed it, every last one of them. And these documents, as they're called, the final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, became passed around from hand to hand. People like Vaclav Havel, now president of Czechoslovakia, went to jail because of it, et cetera. So it became a kind of a Magna Carta in Eastern Europe. That's what we were hoping would happen, and that in fact is indeed what did happen.

Well, back to the '71, '72 period. So a lot of the work we did was below the level of visibility of people like Henry Kissinger and William Rogers, and was done by us bureaucrats, if you will, working on a lot of nitty gritty stuff, much of which ultimately found its way into the Helsinki final Act.

I should tell you also that at about this time the European Community was beginning its expansion into the field of political consultation. The French had a very good team at NATO headquarters. The ambassador there was a man named François DeRose, and the deputy chief of mission was a man named Jacques Andreani, who happens now to be the French ambassador here in Washington. And Andreani left Brussels in something like late 1972 or early '73, as I remember, to take over this job of managing political consultation within the European Community on behalf of the French government.

And what he did...I don't know to this day whether to be offended or to be happy about it, but he basically took all of these ideas that we had been developing in NATO, at least the ones he liked the most, skimmed them off like so much cream and put them into the European Community as their position. And so the first act of political consultation by the European Community was to steal all the ideas that we'd been working on for a year and a half or so in NATO and make them their own.

But, of course, in the end, that helped, because the European Community, when it finally did go to these negotiations with the Soviets, had a set of positions that were more or less like ours. So it was all right, but, you know, it was one of these things, you felt like suing him for breach of contract laws. But, anyway, that shows you that we were fairly successful in developing positions. You know, it really did work out.

One other thing I was doing matured mainly in 1973, and that was, these negotiations that I mentioned earlier, with the Russians on conventional force reductions, came to a head in 1973 when the Russians finally did accept there would be a negotiation. And it was because of Henry Kissinger's diplomacy that the date was set for beginning the CSCE talks sometime late in '73, as I remember, in tandem with what became known as the mutual balanced force reductions talks, the MBFR. The deal that Kissinger struck I don't think was a very smart deal, and it wasn't even necessary to have that deal, but, anyway, it was understood that we would have the MBFR, and the CSCE would begin about the same time. I think maybe MBFR a month before CSCE, something like that.

The bureaucracy in Washington had come up with a position on MBFR in the spring of 1973, and it was decided to try to work the thing through NATO and see if we could come up with a NATO position, because the negotiations would not be just between the US and the Soviets, but between a NATO team and a Warsaw Pact team. So, along about March or April of '73, this position was given to me to negotiate.

I was then, of course, the counselor for political affairs, and I was the US representative in something called the Senior Political Committee in NATO headquarters. And so it fell to

me to try to negotiate this US position with the allies. And that's what I spent from March through October doing that year, meeting two or three times a week, almost every week, right through the summer, which, as you know, Europe, they lack communications.

Q: Yes, oh yes.

GOODBY: It didn't happen that year.

It was a very interesting negotiation, which took a lot of time and got into a lot of details, because each country had its own separate interests, you know. We used to joke about how the Turkish position was that all those Soviet troops in central Europe should be withdrawn to Siberia and beheaded. Because their worry was that these troops would finally find their way back to the Turkish frontier, you know, and that the Germans would benefit from this agreement and the Turks wouldn't. And the Norwegians had a similar stance. Every country had its own particular positions, so it was multilateral negotiation at its most intricate and most interesting, with fifteen NATO countries involved in it.

We did finally succeed in negotiating a common position. And I think that was probably the first and only time we've ever done that in NATO. Because, after that, they began to go the route of people coming from capitals and having special meetings. And so the job was taken out of the hands of the permanent delegations, which I always thought was a shame because I thought we probably should try to build up NATO headquarters to be an instrument that could do these things. But that was not the case.

Q: Was this just a purely bureaucratic fight rather than an attempt to say, okay, we're going to get more European "Communityish" and so let's work on the capitals?

GOODBY: No, it was mainly a bureaucratic power play. We're leaping ahead a little bit, but it came out in these negotiations on the intermediate-range nuclear forces, during the Carter administration in particular. Les Gelb, in 1977, became assistant secretary for political-military affairs, and, under his leadership, the idea of using the US NATO delegation as a place to negotiate arms control was abandoned. Over my opposition, by the way, but it was abandoned. And from that time on, people coming from their various national capitals were used to negotiate arms control, with the role of the permanent delegations in Brussels being greatly diminished. Which I thought was a bit of a loss.

And, before 1973, we hadn't really done much negotiation either, in Brussels, because these were bilateral negotiations we'd done up until that point, nuclear negotiation with the Russians. We had kept NATO informed though periodic briefings, and had kept countries like Britain and France a little more closely informed, but there was never any negotiation.

So '73 was really the first and only time that we ever did negotiate an arms control position in NATO headquarters, which was later used when these talks began in October or November of '73, and remained the basis for the position almost to this day. It became the NATO position, which the Soviets finally accepted in large part. These positions of course

changed later on, but for about ten or fifteen years those positions remained pretty much unchanged. And that's what I did in '73.

The other interesting thing that transpired during my time in NATO headquarters...well, there were quite a few things actually, but the other thing worth mentioning here, I think, is the Year of Europe.

The war in Vietnam having finally come to an end, Henry Kissinger decided (for reasons that I still don't quite understand) that he wanted to make a big deal out of Europe. I sometimes call it the "rectification campaign," because it seemed almost to be a case of his feeling the Europeans were getting out of line and they had to be brought into some kind of disciplined, more monolithic position. At least I got that kind of sense of it. I don't suppose that it was quite that bad, but a lot of Europeans thought it was that, and I have to admit a little bit rubbed off onto me, I guess.

The Year of Europe, I believe, was '74. I think he may have made the speech in '73 in which he announced this great plan. But, anyway, it created a rather bad impression.

Q: It was almost condescending, wasn't it?

GOODBY: It was quite condescending, you're right. It was as though, well, now it's Europe's turn, Kissinger will settle your hash and take you in hand, and, you know, we'll take care of things.

Well, one of the things that was mentioned by Kissinger, in, I guess, his very first speech on the subject, was a new Atlantic Charter. A lot of that was done privately behind the scenes by Kissinger, but a lot of it also was done at NATO headquarters, and I had a pretty big hand in that. It was an issue that Don Rumsfeld had an interest in because Henry Kissinger was directly involved. And so Rumsfeld and a man named Bob Goldwyn, an assistant from St. John's College that had worked with Rumsfeld in the past and that Rumsfeld had brought along to NATO, worked with him also on this. But I was the main, I guess you could say, lead horse on it. And so I cooked up a lot of language for it. We worked directly with the French and other delegations.

One of the main things that I did was try to put behind us this big issue about is it a good or bad thing that there are two countries in the alliance that have nuclear forces. It had been one of these big ideological disputes for a long time about whether it was desirable or not.

Q: These were the French and the British.

GOODBY: The French and British. And one of the reasons for the MLF that I probably didn't mention earlier was we didn't want the Germans to have nuclear weapons, and we thought so long as the French and British did, that it would be almost inevitable that the Germans would have them. And so part of the MLF strategy was to prevent the French

from getting nuclear weapons and to roll back the British, which in turn led to the Skibol episode and great political crisis. But I didn't cover that, so we might as well let it pass.

But, anyway, in this Atlantic Charter I worked out some language with the French that in effect endorsed these nuclear capabilities. I think it was a good thing to do. It's not one of those things that made a whole lot of splash, but in effect it did put behind us this whole issue of whether the United States endorsed the French nuclear capability or did not. And that Atlantic Charter did that if it didn't do anything else.

Q: You keep mentioning the French coming up with ideas in NATO. France doesn't belong to NATO, does it?

GOODBY: Oh, they belong to NATO. They don't belong to the integrated military side of NATO. I mentioned their team at NATO headquarters, they are represented in the North Atlantic Council. They have a permanent representative who was duly assigned by his government to NATO headquarters and took a full part in all the deliberations. As I said, his name was Ambassador François DeRose, and he was one of the ablest and most senior of French diplomats.

Q: Did you feel any inhibitions or any problems because the French have not put their military forces into the NATO command?

GOODBY: No, not because of that. I mean, we did feel inhibitions during that period because the French had a really obnoxious foreign minister for a time, whose name was Michel Joubert. And he had an American wife--I don't know whether that has anything to do with it or not. But he was extremely nationalistic and extremely suspicious of the United States and its every act. He and Kissinger just had a bad time together, and it was unfortunate that, during this Year of Europe, Joubert, the foreign minister, was part of that period.

We had very good relations with DeRose, though I won't say he was pro-American, but he understood power relationships and how things stood, and he was a highly experienced man and a very sophisticated man. He and Rumsfeld, for example, hit it off very, very well.

So we had no particular problems with them over those issues, but you remember that it was 1973 we had the Middle East War, and also it was in, I think, 1973...

Q: For the record, this was October of '73, between Israel on one side and Egypt and Syria on the other.

GOODBY: Yes, that is right. And it was just as we had finished this MBFR negotiation that this Middle East War broke out in, I guess, late October of 1973. And it was also during that year that Nixon had signed an agreement with the Russians called the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement. And the French were highly suspicious of that, even my friend DeRose, who was usually above such things. When this Middle East War broke out, we did

a whole lot of things, including putting our forces on nuclear alert and so forth, without really consulting very effectively with NATO headquarters. And I can say that, because I was there and I noticed the absence of it.

Well, the French were really very much disturbed by this whole sequence of events, and DeRose and some of the French were putting all of these things together, as Europeans sometimes do--the Year of Europe, the Middle East War, and this agreement on prevention of nuclear war--and coming to the conclusion that the United States was going through some kind of reversal of alliances. I mean, that's exactly what we heard at NATO in those days, '73 and less so in '74, that the United States was going through a process of dropping its relationships with its NATO allies and shifting to a relationship, almost bordering on alliance, with Moscow. Despite the Middle East War, we went onto a nuclear alert because of what they were doing, and they still saw it that way. And they said, you know, you don't inform us of these things because that's the way you behave under these agreements you now have with the Russians. It was really a highly suspicious environment and one that was rather unpleasant. And the French were, I'm sorry to say, in the forefront in peddling that notion that we were somehow dropping the traditional links and going off with the Soviets arm and arm.

Q: I'm just putting this forward, but really, from the outside, not having dealt with them but just from what I've observed, it seems that the French are always trying to see patterns, and usually horrendous patterns and changes that just don't make sense to, you might say, the Anglo-Saxon mind. I don't know, did you find this?

GOODBY: This is right, but a lot of Europeans do this, too, and the French are especially prone to it. They think there must be some rational reason behind everything, you see, and usually there isn't any rational reason behind anything. But they always are looking for it, and when they saw things like the Year of Europe, which they always had some suspicions about, and these funny agreements that Nixon negotiated with the Soviets, and then the Middle East War, in which we didn't really keep them properly informed even though their lives were at stake in effect, they did find a pattern, as you suggest, and the pattern was reversal of alliances, not an unknown thing in the days of Metternich and Castlereagh and Talleyrand.

Q: And the new Kissinger.

GOODBY: And with Kissinger being expert in those things, I guess they thought, well, there it is, that's what he's up to now, he's becoming a modern-day Metternich.

In 1974 I left NATO headquarters. I'm happy to report that there was an Atlantic Charter signed and I had something to do with it--I have an autographed copy at home--and that period was put behind us. It was not a very useful thing, that Year of Europe, and the Charter itself was not of any great consequence.

But we did get started during that time on two negotiations that are very important now: one the CSCE, and the other the MBFR.

I might mention in passing that I was chargé at the US Mission in NATO in July of 1974, because the foreign ministers were meeting at that point in Ottawa, there to sign the Atlantic Charter and have one of their summer meetings. And it was at that point that Nixon came through on his last European swing before resigning. He resigned August 9, 1974, and this was July, I believe.

I went out to receive him at the airport and talk to his advance party and so forth and so on. And I was really shocked by his mien. Actually it was the first I'd seen Nixon close-up in quite a while. He had been at NATO headquarters and I'd seen him before, but this time he came through the receiving line and I shook hands with him. And his face was like a wooden mask. I mean, it was heavily painted, in effect, a kind of orange color, which I guess he liked because it made him look tanned. But it was just like a face carved out of wood--no expression. And I thought, "My goodness, what this man is going through." It was obvious that he just was not himself and not sort of the former Nixon who was, as I had remembered seeing him, a much more animated kind of person. But this was a guy that obviously had in mind, you know, "Who is this guy? Is he for me or against me?" And that was kind of the sensation I had as he went through that receiving line.

Anyway, it was a short visit. He gave a talk and went on Moscow and then he went on to resignation. So that was the last time I saw him, and it was quite a shocking experience to see a president of the United States looking like that.

Well, in the summer that I went back, and I arrived back in Washington just a few days before Nixon resigned, I became the deputy assistant secretary, or deputy director it was called then, of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. I had originally actually been asked to take the job by Seymour Weiss, who I mentioned earlier. Sey had run into trouble with Kissinger and had been appointed ambassador to the Bahamas. I told George Vest that if he wanted to get somebody else that was of course his prerogative and I would understand, but he said he'd like me to stay and be his deputy. So I was happy to do that because I had worked with George in a couple of places and this was now the third time I had worked for him and it was a nice easy relationship.

In any event, the day before Nixon announced his resignation, all of us at the rank of deputy assistant secretary and above were called up to the eighth floor of the State Department by Secretary Kissinger and we were informed that Nixon was going to resign. Kissinger made a little speech in which he said that the accomplishments of President Nixon in the field of foreign affairs had been very considerable (those were almost his exact words). He then commented about President Ford, who would be taking over, and that he expected to be working closely with him. It was kind of a pep talk, you know, not to be too upset by this, but also not to be in a mood of gloating or good cheer about this, obviously, that Mr. Kissinger was quite seriously affected by this. Of course, he himself had been going through a bit of personal anguish at this point, as we all know. So it was a very somber

meeting, I must say, to be told that a president of the United States is going to resign the next day--the first time in history, I guess--and to hear from this man who was now close to the pinnacle of the American government telling us how we should think about it and connect ourselves. So it was kind of an interesting and rather moving experience.

Well, I then took on the job of deputy assistant secretary of state (I'll use that title because it's more understandable) of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and stayed in that job for about, I guess, almost three years.

Q: I have you from 1974 to 1977.

GOODBY: Yes, '77. A fairly interesting period. Since I was by this time now at a supervisory level where I wasn't able to get into so much of the actual drafting of things, I didn't have the feeling that I was quite as directly involved, but I was supervising a great deal of things that went on.

And just to mention a few of them, I continued to be involved in the SALT negotiations, which were still going on. And, let me tell you, it was a very awkward thing to try to establish a State Department position on the strategic nuclear talks knowing that Henry Kissinger at that time was both the secretary of state *and* the president's national security advisor (though he didn't keep that for long, but that was still the case when I first went there). So, in briefing the State Department representative, what we had to do was go and talk to the deputy secretary of state, who was going to be going to these meetings in the White House. And it was frankly a rather feckless exercise I thought we were going through, because we knew very well it didn't make any difference what we said to him, that Kissinger had his own way of arriving at positions. But nonetheless we had to go through the motions. And so I would go and I would see...I think it was Mr. Ingersoll at that point, and brief him about what we thought the position should be. He would ask a few questions, but I think he himself realized that it was kind of a waste of time. But that was the kind of thing we were going through, and there was a lot of that unsatisfactory kind of arrangement.

It was also during this time that I became aware of the very, very deep...well, I don't know whether the word hatred is right, but certainly dislike, I guess, between Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and Secretary of State Kissinger.

And my exposure to this came about especially because I had been working on the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe--defensive, this was not arms control, this was what kinds of nuclear weapons should we have there--and I had been working with a man named Don Cotter, who was the secretary of defense's special assistant for nuclear energy, a position that was established many years ago, and there's always been somebody in that slot.

He and I agreed on quite a few things, and one them was that we, if at all possible, ought to try to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in Europe, bring them more up to date, get rid of the antiquated ones, and so forth. A lot of these nuclear weapons in Europe had been there a long time. There were about seven thousand of them altogether, and it was a lot

more than we needed. And there were a lot of uses that we were putting them to that were, in that day and age, 1974 and '75, just not really useful. And there were some new aircraft coming in, and so forth.

Anyway, in my position, that was my responsibility, to work with the Defense Department on modernization plans. So Cotter and I had a pretty good relationship and we agreed on a lot of things. But of course I always made a point of keeping the secretary of state's inner office, if you will, informed. And that meant, primarily, Hal Sonnenfeldt, who was then the counselor of the department. And Sonnenfeldt, of course, was reporting all of this to Kissinger.

Well, I mention this because this particular modernization program became one of the excuses that Ford and Kissinger used to get rid of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. They became concerned--unduly concerned, I think, and perhaps even deliberately concerned, if you will--that Schlesinger was out to denuclearize Germany. It is true that if you make certain assumptions, that the numbers of nuclear weapons that we had in Germany were going to decrease fairly significantly. And it is also true that Schlesinger in fact was rather interested in reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons in Germany, because he felt, for military reasons, it was not desirable to have a lot of vulnerable nuclear targets in the front regions where they could be overrun. And we did have aircraft that could be used from Britain with nuclear weapons. And so he, in a way, was going about that. But I didn't think it was going quite as far as the secretary of state concluded it was.

In any case, at a certain point all this was taken out of my hands anyway and became quite a source of contention, in which it's pretty clear to me in retrospect that Kissinger made Mr. Ford believe that Schlesinger was out to denuclearize Germany without properly taking into account all the political factors. That wasn't the only issue that Schlesinger was fired over, but that was one of the issues.

At that point then, Secretary Rumsfeld, my friend from NATO headquarters, became the secretary of defense. He had been brought back by President Ford to become the chief of staff in the White House, and I saw him frequently during that time.

But, when Mr. Rumsfeld became secretary of defense, almost immediately they had a meeting of the Defense Review Committee, which was a committee consisting of Defense and State to deal with defense issues. It had almost never met, because no secretary of defense liked to be put in a position where somebody in the NSC apparatus was running the Pentagon. (The Pentagon has been much more successful, by the way, than the State Department has been in keeping out of the clutches of the NSC.) But, anyway, for, I think, almost the first time in history, they had a meeting of this Defense Review Committee, which Rumsfeld chaired and Kissinger went to not as chairman, but as one of the members sitting around the table. And I went with him and so did Hal Sonnenfeldt.

What it, in effect, did was change some of the plans that Schlesinger had started for the nuclear dispositions, in Germany in particular. And one of the things it did, which I think

actually was desirable, was to determine that the F-16 aircraft was going to be nuclear-equipped as well as conventionally equipped. Doing that, in effect, solved this problem that Kissinger was worried about, about how many nuclear weapons were their going to be in Germany.

But it was all quite an elaborate kind of show, in effect, to sort of bring an end to the Schlesinger era and show that the Pentagon was solidly behind Kissinger on this whole issue. And it was one of these kinds of theatrical things that I enjoyed watching at close hand.

Q: Well, you know, something that every once in a while surfaces is the tremendous number of artillery shells and everything else, nuclear shells and different types of weapons. I mean, I've seen studies, which appeared in the Washington Post in the last year, discussing this. And I must say I was absolutely horrified, because all projections were that there was a very good chance that the Soviets could really move very quickly, particularly during most of this era. And then you get the old military theory of: Use it or lose it. So it just meant that central Europe, Germany, would be one big nuclear bonfire, practically.

GOODBY: Well, it could very well be. Actually, these nuclear weapons are arranged so that even if they were captured by the Soviets they couldn't be used. So, being overrun is not a big, big deal.

But there were times in the past when I was involved with some issues that were rather like what you're hinting at. There was a time, when I was in fact still a fairly junior officer during the Policy Planning Council days, that the American military commanders in NATO wanted to have predelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons. And they wanted that in three different categories. One was in a category of what they called atomic demolition munitions, or ADMs, and these of course were deployed in almost the front lines. They were inserted in holes drilled into bridges, for example, and they were placed in forests so you could blow down the forest and make tank passage difficult. And they wanted predelegation of authority to use those, you see.

Well, our concern in the State Department was that if that were granted to the military commanders, it would be almost inevitable they'd be used, because there would be no percentage in having them there if they weren't used. So that meant there would be nuclear war from day one, and that was not what we thought "flexible response" was intended to mean.

So we struggled really against that for, oh, probably two or three years. Finally it was done away with, but the military commanders came back just about every year. There's an annual dispersal plan for nuclear weapons in Europe, which the State Department had to approve every year, and I was always one of those that had to concur in it and tell the secretary of state what was in it. And so we fought that battle for about three years. Mr. McNamara, to his credit, was with us on that and finally killed it altogether.

But, you are right, there are a lot of artillery shells still around in Europe, and they're not, in my opinion, of great value. We are beginning to pull them out now, and there will be a negotiation, probably this next year, in which we will try to get rid of quite a lot of the nuclear material we still have in Europe. Not all, but quite a lot of it.

Well, anyway, back to the Political-Military Bureau. Another thing that I was rather pleased to do was begin to develop something that was called NATO standardization. The NATO armaments picture was a mess: every country had its own particular favorite weapon, and there was hardly any standard equipment at all. It makes trying to fight a war together almost impossible. More than that, it struck me that if you could get some of these large defense industries working together, American and European, that this was another one of those integrating factors. You see, even at that time I was still a zealot to some extent--not as much as Bob Schaetzel, but still a zealot to some extent--on integration of Europe, and I wanted, of course, an American role in it. So I promoted this idea quite vigorously of NATO standardization. And it began to take off. It became actually quite a lively topic, even more importantly during the next administration, of President Carter. But that was the time I pushed it, with Rumsfeld's help, you see. He and I knew each other quite well, and he became rather supportive of the idea, too, and did as much as he could. But there's, of course, a limit to how much you can do with that.

Q: Was this being fought by American industry?

GOODBY: Not especially, no, because American industry was in a pretty good position to be able to dominate any lash-up between American and European industry. It was not being fought by most industries, but it was being fought by the French government. I mean, they saw it for what I thought it was, namely a way of integrating defense industries on a transatlantic basis, and they didn't want it done that way, they wanted it to be done purely on a European basis. So they really did quite vigorously oppose it and helped to diminish some of the political impact of it.

But nonetheless it kept on as a policy for quite a few years, and in fact still is our policy, and it has had some successes. So that was something I got started during that time, in the sense of bringing it up to the political level, you see; it had always been bubbling around at the technical level. So I did that.

Let's see, I guess the main things I remember are that, plus working with George Vest on any number of issues that came up in the political-military arena. We finished, for example, the Diego Garcia negotiation, which resulted in a base down there in the Indian Ocean. And a lot of things involved in European arms control. But I was happy to not have so much to do with arms control during that period, because I'd spent an awful lot of time on it and I was much more interested in getting myself involved in some of these other activities.

Q: What was your impression of the Ford administration during the time that you were doing political-military affairs?

GOODBY: Well, I had a very positive impression of the Ford administration. And let me tell you that it was during the Ford administration that I first really got to the "political" level in the Department of State and began to understand the interaction between the White House and the politicians and the career service in a way that I had seen before but had never personally experienced. And so, for the first time, I began to have regular dealings with the seventh-floor principals and with the White House people.

Q: Seventh floor being where the office of the secretary of state is located.

GOODBY: And the deputy secretary and others. I had worked, you see, at NATO headquarters as the political counselor at our mission to NATO at a time when Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld was the ambassador. He became Ford's chief of staff when Ford took office as president, and I continued the relationship that I had with Mr. Rumsfeld during that time. And then, within about a year or less, Rumsfeld became the secretary of defense after Ford fired James Schlesinger. And so I saw quite a lot of Rumsfeld, and also saw quite a lot of Kissinger. And my impression of both of them was highly favorable. They were of course, in a sense, historical figures, particularly Mr. Kissinger. But Rumsfeld also had, I thought, a very profound sense of public service and very clear ideas about what he wanted to do. (Not all of which I happened to agree with, by the way.) But, on the whole, I thought it was a very good team that the Ford administration put together.

The problem of course was that it was in office only for two years, and during that second year it became a rather politicized kind of operation, so that things that might have been done during that time had to be put on the shelf. So that second year of the Ford administration was a little bit frustrating.

Q: I wonder if you could explain a little about...here you were, deputy assistant secretary for political-military affairs (and we run into this every four years), how would a political campaign affect, say, your operation?

GOODBY: Well, I suppose the most obvious example of that was the SALT negotiations. Mr. Kissinger had managed to work out an agreement, which President Ford became involved with also of course. And there was a framework agreement worked out on SALT at Vladivostok, when Ford met with Brezhnev shortly after he came into office. I think it was in November of 1974, Nixon having resigned in August. That was a quite important agreement, but it ran into trouble.

Ran into trouble with Don Rumsfeld, to begin with, who felt that there was a need to develop cruise missiles. (As we see them being used in the Gulf today, maybe he was right.) Mr. Rumsfeld felt also that there was a gray area involving the Backfire bombers, the Soviet's naval air arm, if you will, which had a long-range capability that many people thought could make it a strategic bomber capable of hitting the United States.

So an internal dispute sprang up, which delayed things for a while. And then, as the election approached (and by that I mean within a year or so of the election), then-candidate Reagan began to attack Ford's policy as too soft on the Russians and too weak on defense.

Q: This would be from the Republican side.

GOODBY: The Republicans. He was trying to take over the presidency by becoming the Republican candidate and nudging President Ford out of the picture. In other words, Reagan was challenging a sitting Republican president, which isn't done so often.

But the result of that was that these very promising negotiations on SALT were put on the shelf, and for the last year or so it was just kind of a spinning of wheels. Much of which I was involved in, but regrettably it was just an operation to keep things going and nobody really expected much of anything to happen. So that was one obvious example.

Another case less obvious. Administrations sometimes do things at the end of their term so that they can kind of have something on the record just in case--just in case they lose, or just in case they win, either way they want to have something there that will make them look good, frankly. So, towards the end of the Ford administration, a quite large study was engineered, if you will, by the White House and the Defense Department, which had to do with what our defense policy should be. I got involved in that, and it was really quite interesting, but of course all for naught, because, although we worked long hours and spent a lot of time, the Ford administration was defeated in the end by Jimmy Carter and all of that policy work pretty much went down the drain.

So an awful lot of wasted time because of these presidential transitions. Wasted time in terms of opportunity costs in the case of the SALT negotiations, because we lost a good year when things could have been happening and they didn't. And wasted time in terms of people trying to do things that don't have any outcome, as in the case of this study on defense, which, as I said, was a fascinating and pretty serious study, but, when Jimmy Carter came in, of course they started all over again. So I think it was a very good example of the wasted time.

I might move into the Carter administration.

Q: Yes, but here you have basically the professionals putting something together, and it may have political overtones at the top, but basically you're looking at this as professionals. I'm talking about the defense plan, but this could be relations with Patagonia. And then a new administration comes in. Could you explain, from your point of view, how you saw the transition and how they dealt with the subjects?

GOODBY: Well, I can tell you quite vividly how I saw the transition. I saw the transition from a small office where I tried to hang on as a Foreign Service officer without a job for several months. When I mentioned to you that this was my first time that I began to

experience the political interaction with the Foreign Service, this was one of the things I had in mind. Let me just give you one little story.

In, I think, late December, early January of 1976-77, Secretary Kissinger asked me if I would undertake a visit, highly secret at that time, to Paris to talk with the French about some cooperation that he had promised them to consider in the field of anti-submarine warfare. The French, of course, had then and have now a strategic nuclear capability mounted on submarines, and they wanted to get some support from us on anti-submarine warfare. Well, Kissinger asked me to go and I arranged it. I took with me an admiral, and we had some very interesting and, I would even say, fairly significant discussion for the first time with the French in Paris on the possibilities of some cooperation in that area.

Q: This is on the anti-submarine as opposed to the targeting?

GOODBY: Yes, that is correct. The French wanted to get some help so they could understand more about Soviet attack submarines, which are of course the main threat to their sea force. We hadn't ever done anything with them up to that time, and they thought that in order to have a viable strategic nuclear force they needed a little bit of help from us. So this was one of those exploratory talks that sometimes happens, something without commitment but enough to raise the veil a little bit for them to understand what we did and give them some help.

Well, that trip took place around the middle of January, and when I got back from that trip, I found that I had been replaced as the principal deputy assistant secretary for political-military affairs and somebody else had been designated to take my place.

Q: Where did that somebody else come from, by the way?

GOODBY: Well, he came from within the Foreign Service, but it was a man that had worked closely with the incoming assistant secretary, and I had not worked very closely with the incoming assistant secretary.

Q: Who was the incoming assistant secretary?

GOODBY: Well, the person involved, to be very frank about it, was Leslie Gelb, who had been a *New York Times* correspondent, and he selected Reggie Bartholomew as his deputy, which of course was his perfect right and a very good choice indeed. But it meant that I, at that point, had no particular assignment. And so I arranged with a friend of mine in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research that I would occupy an empty office until I found myself a job. And that is how I observed the transition, from afar, if you will, although from within the building.

Well, I won't dwell on that except to say that that particular operation that we had started with the French was of course interrupted because of the transition, and it took a very long

time for it to be revived, and, since I dropped out, I'm not sure actually whatever did happen. But it again was one of those wasted kinds of things that happens in these things.

Q: Well, just to give a little of the feel for something like this. I mean, after all, here you are, you've worked under various administrations, other people are working on something. I mean, after all, dealing with the French on submarine matters, or a strategic plan for the defense of Europe, can't get terribly partisan.

GOODBY: Well, you might think that.

Q: But when people come in, what's the problem? Is it ego? Is it, well, we don't want to find ourselves boxed in? But, I mean, at a certain point there must be, say, okay, well, what are the things, looking at it in an objective light and saying, well, this is a little partisan, but this isn't, or something like that. It sounds almost ego.

GOODBY: Well, it is ego, I think. That's probably as good a word for it as any, because every administration simply wants to make a distinction between itself and its predecessor, and it has to do it in some visible way. You notice that when President Bush came in, even though he was the vice president in the Reagan administration and had worked closely, presumably, with all of these people, he didn't take very many of these Reagan appointees and instead brought in his own. Part of it is loyalty. Politicians place great stock in that, and they think that if they appoint their own people that the loyalty factor goes up. And there might be something to that. But the other factor is simply making a distinction.

I was talking with former Secretary George Shultz about this not too long ago, and he said that what Bush wanted to do, of course, was to make sure that this was Bush One and not Reagan Three.

Well, that's fairly typical of what any president wants to do. When President Carter came in, he wanted to make sure that the administration had his imprint, and he didn't want it to be a lot of holdovers from the Ford administration.

So I might just tell you one little vignette about this. It was either the morning of the inauguration day or the day before, I've forgotten which, but I was invited by the secretary of defense, my friend Donald Rumsfeld, to go over there for a little farewell party in his office. He had a number of people there, the one I remember most was Elizabeth Taylor, who was then married to Senator Warner. So we had quite a nice little celebration. I had parked my car in the basement of the State Department. I had been told that, since I was leaving the high office I held, I had to turn in my pass for the basement garage, and I did that. When I got back from seeing the secretary of defense and Elizabeth Taylor, I found a ticket on my car. They didn't waste much time in declaring me persona non grata. But that's one of the things you run into.

Well, what of course happened at this stage, the Carter administration was very strong on affirmative action, and they wanted to populate the higher reaches of their administration

with minorities and with women and with people that would show that the Carter administration meant what it said about wanting to take measures that would bring in people that had previously been excluded from high office.

Well, I applauded that, but at the same time it worked against my getting another assignment, you see, in the administration. And so it was a very frustrating time for me; I tried for seven months to find a job of some kind, operating out of that little office in the Intelligence Research Bureau.

And some ironic things happened. Sometime around February or March I was asked by the White House if I would come over and help them prepare for a summit meeting that the president had arranged with NATO members that was going to be held in London. So I was lifted out of my office in the Intelligence and Research Bureau and taken over to the White House and given an office in the Old Executive Office Building. And there I worked with the president's advisors in designing the substance of the summit meeting.

And what I did (and this was an interesting kind of holdover, if you will, kind of policy), I had been working on the process of trying to standardize NATO military equipment when I was principal deputy in the Political-Military Bureau, and it's a very difficult thing to do, requires administrations to work at it consistently, and I thought it was important that the Carter administration try to take up where the Ford administration had left off, so I worked into the summit meeting communiqué a statement saying that we would try to continue and even intensify work in trying to standardize military equipment.

Which meant, by the way, closer economic collaboration, because it meant companies on both sides of the Atlantic would be working together. It wasn't just that I was interested in the military aspects, which I was, but that I saw this as an integrating effort, which I thought would have some very profound political and economic effects as well.

Well, I actually sold that to the Carter administration, and it became one of the main lines of their policy. And I did that while, if you will, without a job and on loan from the State Department to the White House. And so it did appear, this item, in the communiqué that finally emerged from the London summit meeting of NATO.

I went to London with the president. I flew back with the president on Air Force One. The communiqué was a great success. He wrote me a little note, signed by himself, saying what fine work I had done. And then I went back to my little office in INR and still didn't have a job.

Q: While we're on that, as the White House was putting this together, were there professionals (or however you want to describe them) working with you, or was there a political component of people who had to be kind of educated into the realities of NATO?

GOODBY: It was a mixture of both. The person that was more responsible than anyone else for getting me over to the White House was a man named Henry Owen. You may

remember from our earlier conversations that I had worked for Henry Owen when I was a member of the Policy Planning staff in the '60s. He had left the government during the Nixon administration and had become director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution and had remained there for about eight years. He was a Democrat. President Carter brought him back in to the White House to work with him, as it turned out, mainly on economic matters. And Henry Owen became the head of what they called the sherpas, that is to say, the people that prepared the summit meetings on economic matters.

Q: Sherpas being the bearers from Nepal who help the fancy mountain climbers get up to the summit. They accompany them and do all the work.

GOODBY: That's right. The summit that these sherpas helped with was with the seven industrialized nations working on economic policy.

But, anyway, Henry Owen knew me and knew my background and wanted some help on the NATO summit, because he had been given responsibility for that, so he asked me to come over to the White House. So you can say, in that case, that he had a political responsibility, but he'd been a thoroughgoing professional for most of his career until he left the administration when Nixon came in.

And there was another Foreign Service officer who was working with me who had been brought in by Henry Owen. I can't remember his name offhand, but he was an economist.

So it was quite a professional job. But we also had some speechwriters that we had to work with, because we framed the president's speech to NATO and wrote some of the substance that we put into it and handed it over to the speechwriters, who were a group of quite young--and by that I mean probably in their late '20s, early '30s--people who had a certain enthusiasm but not very much knowledge about any of the things we were dealing with. So we did have quite a lot of back and forth with these people.

But I give the Carter administration high marks for this, it wasn't politicized in the sense that there were people coming in that were just there for the title of ambassador, which sometimes does happen. And it was really quite a good operation, as I saw it during that point that I was actually over on the White House side.

But I still didn't have a job. That was about April, and it wasn't until August that I finally did land a job.

Q: Well, just to get a little feel about it. There you were, I mean, you obviously knew a lot of people, you'd had a high position. How do you go about finding a job? I mean, you're in the Foreign Service, but did you find that people shunned you because you didn't have a job? How does one go about this?

GOODBY: Well, I spent part of my time going around talking to people and trying to find out if there were any jobs. And of course there weren't, at the level I was looking for. And

then I decided, well, I'd better get out of the administration for a while and do some academic work, which I'd always had an interest in. So I began to think about a job in a think tank and actually spent some time preparing proposals for that.

But the main thing, you see... What happened is this--and this is also fairly typical. You remember I worked with George Vest when he was the director, or assistant secretary now it's called, of the Political-Military Bureau. He had been designated to become ambassador to Pakistan, but that fell through for one reason or another. Then he had become assistant secretary for European Affairs, and he wanted me to be one of his deputies. And so he asked me, way back, as soon as I got back, I guess, from London, in April or May, if I would be the deputy assistant secretary of state for European Affairs. So I said, "Yes, I'd like that very much." So I sort of put on hold the idea about going to a think tank, and put on hold all the other things that I was doing, and waited for this to materialize. And it did not materialize for months and months because of this affirmative action program, because the senior people managing the political process for the president felt that they wanted either a minority or a woman in the job. Well, George held out for me because he wanted me to work on European security issues, an area in which I probably had more background than almost anybody, if you will, and he succeeded. But what he had to do, he had to promise that his next appointment would be a minority or a woman, and he followed through on that. But it meant that I was basically, from about May through August, doing nothing. And, again, you know, quite a bit of wasted talent around because of things like that.

So, anyway, I finally came back into active service, if you will, as the deputy assistant secretary for European Affairs in August of '77, and became responsible for NATO, and ultimately I became responsible for Northern Europe, which meant the Scandinavian countries, and responsible for Central Europe, which meant Germany, both Germanies at that, East and West, and Austria and Switzerland. So, by the time I left the Bureau to become ambassador to Finland, I had the majority of the countries of the European Bureau in my jurisdiction, plus all of the security areas.

Q: Just to get the framework, you left in 1980.

GOODBY: I left in 1980 to become ambassador to Finland, yes.

Q: During this '77 to '80 period, with the Carter administration in, how did we see the Soviet threat?

GOODBY: Well, we saw the Soviet threat, I suppose, about the way anybody else did. But you mentioned earlier that security issues should be an area that is relatively free of politics, but of course it isn't. The Ford administration had to defend itself against charges that it was tolerating a decade of neglect of our strategic forces. (This was a charge that Ronald Reagan brought to bear against Ford, a Republican president.) And the Carter administration had to defend itself against charges that it was being a little too soft on the Russians as well.

The Carter administration had, during the time that I was without a job, decided to present new proposals to the Soviets. Again, part of it was to distinguish between itself and the Ford administration. So it proposed some ideas that went well beyond what the Soviets were prepared to consider. It offended Mr. Brezhnev, which is not anything I would worry about very much, but it meant that there was quite a setback in the early stages of the Carter administration to the process...

Q: I was told, in one of my interviews, that when Vance went to Moscow, he was sort of warned: "Don't overdo this." But he went with high hopes that...

GOODBY: Well, there were some very serious mistakes made, which had the effect of making President Carter look as though he was rather weak and vacillating. And this damage was done to the president during the first year of his administration. Some of it he did to himself; some of it, his advisors, I have to say, were not too helpful to him.

For example, Secretary Vance, a man for whom I have great regard, found it necessary to give a press conference in Moscow in which he tried to describe the situation he had run into. And the whole business became bogged down over issues that I think were really less than central, which I think caused the president a great deal of damage at that point.

Some of it the president did to himself, because, later on, in, I think it was, June, the president decided to cancel the B-1 bomber. Now, there were probably very good economic and technical reasons for that--the history of the B-1 bomber, even today, is one that doesn't look too brilliant--but the way he did it, without taking account of the fact that security decisions are political, resulted in further damage to him.

So that, by the end of the first six months of Carter's administration, both through what I regard as mishandling of the SALT negotiations and some mishandling of the B-1 decision, he was really rather badly damaged. And I don't think he ever really recovered from that.

So, when you speak about the attitude toward the Soviet Union, Carter had the basic policy of trying to shift the focus away from what he regarded as excessive preoccupation with the East-West balance, and he wanted to address more seriously the North-South relationship, that is to say, the developing world. That was one of his major interests. And he found that he was not able to do that, because the East-West dimension was so critical to national security. And he made himself, in the end, so vulnerable to charges that he didn't understand the need to maintain a strong defense and that he didn't know how to deal with the Russians that this was a very critical injury done to his administration.

Now basically I think there was nobody in the administration who had any particular attitude toward the Soviets that was much different from anybody else's. Of course, there are extremes: people that don't want us to deal at all with the Russians; and some that feel that the Russians are not to blame at all, and we are. But there wasn't much of that in either the Ford administration or the Carter administration. So it was a pretty middle-of-the-road thing in terms of Carter's approach toward the Soviets. But he made these very serious

political decisions that I think really damaged him. He was not an experienced politician in terms of the national scene, and it led to his downfall.

Q: Were you getting emanations, particularly from the political leaders in Germany, sort of unhappiness about Carter and all?

GOODBY: Oh, absolutely.

Q: What were you getting and how were you passing this on?

GOODBY: Well, we didn't have to pass it on, because the White House was very clear that there were problems and that some of them they had generated.

Again, the president did himself a terrible injury. Here's a president that doesn't know a lot about foreign affairs, has some general interest in it, but, in terms of being somebody like President Bush is, who has lengthy experience in it, he had no experience in it, to speak of. And what he did was set up a foreign policy apparatus in his administration where the two principals were at complete loggerheads about what it was that ought to be done--Brzezinski, having a very hard-line, anti-Soviet viewpoint, and Vance, who wanted to do some business with the Soviets but who also thought the North-South part of it was important and wanted to downplay the Soviet side a bit. Vance, thinking that there was some arms control business to be done with the Soviets; Brzezinski, a little less sure of that. And the president, not having really a policy of his own, tended to pick and choose between these two policy views. And the result was a policy that was really quite chaotic.

There's a famous speech that the president gave, I think it was in that first year, which began as kind of a Brzezinski speech and wound up as a Vance speech. He, later on, said it was quite deliberate, but the fact of it is that that was a very good example of the lack of coherence. And the problem was two advisors with completely different ideas of the world and a president who didn't have enough knowledge himself to impose his own view on the system.

We became, of course, aware very early of the problems that the president had with Helmut Schmidt.

Q: Helmut Schmidt was at that time the chancellor.

GOODBY: He was the Social Democratic chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, in a coalition which included the FDP leader who is none other than the foreign minister, Genscher, who now, many years later, is still the foreign minister but now in coalition with the Conservatives in Germany.

Well, I mentioned earlier the very high quality of the people that Ford had in his cabinet--Rumsfeld and Kissinger. And these people knew Europe. Rumsfeld had lived there for two years, after all, as ambassador to NATO. Kissinger, of course, basically was a

European. The Ford administration, and the Nixon administration before him, had a very good relationship with the Germans. I think that probably secretly, and maybe not so secretly, most Europeans were hoping the Ford administration would carry on. They knew them, they admired Kissinger, they respected, at least, Rumsfeld. And so, when President Jimmy Carter came in, this was actually somewhat of a blow to them. So the relationship was off to a kind of a rocky start from the very beginning because the team that they knew had disappeared and a new team had come in. They knew, of course, Brzezinski, but they didn't really like him very much. Brzezinski was seen by them, I suspect, as a kind of a hard-line guy that was going to be very hard to work with. They saw Vance as somebody they knew, but they didn't know him very well. He was not a man that really developed very close relationships, as I saw this operation.

And then things began to go wrong over very simple things. I worked with a man named Robert Hunter. Bob was the chief of the NSC European branch, if you will. And we ran into trouble consistently, from the very beginning, about simple little things like Helmut Schmidt having lunch with President Carter. Now in most administrations a president would find it necessary to have a very warm and close and cordial and visibly good working relationship with the head of one of our more important allies, probably most important ally in terms of Western Europe. But this president did not see it that way. And part of that was caused by Brzezinski, who had rather anti-German feelings and was very distrustful of Helmut Schmidt. Jimmy Carter got wind of what it was that Helmut Schmidt was saying about him behind the scenes, which wasn't very positive, so that became almost instantly a rather vigorous dislike between Schmidt and Jimmy Carter. And the advice that was being given to the president by Brzezinski was not really helping matters at all.

And there I was, of course, in charge of Central European Affairs, and I got involved in all of that.

Q: Well, okay, all of a sudden you have this chemistry thing coming up. Is there any way you can work on damage control? Because you can't have this sort of thing and have a good foreign policy.

GOODBY: Well, of course. And the damage control consisted of Bob Hunter, who understood the problem very well. He was and is a very, very solid man. But he was operating under some restrictions; he couldn't really do a whole lot. And what we did (and when I say "we," I mean by that the State Department machinery, most importantly George Vest, who was my assistant secretary at that time), we just had to keep going back and back, and we had to tell them that you can't do this. So we'd get a turndown from the White House for a meeting between Helmut Schmidt and Jimmy Carter, and we wouldn't accept it, we'd go back and say you can't do it. So that was the damage control. It was damage in the sense that the Germans knew that we were running into these problems, so we couldn't conceal this fact. But at least we kept hammering away at the White House, with the help of Bob Hunter, who was a kind of a secret ally, if you will, to have these meetings and these discussions that were so important.

Q: Were you able to use Secretary Vance to say, "For God's sake, go tell the president this is really screwing up things"? Somehow one does get the feeling that Brzezinski played an almost poisonous role in there. Maybe this is overstating it, but I haven't had much in the way of good accounts.

GOODBY: Well, no, I believe that, fairly early on, Secretary of State Vance lost the opportunity to develop a close and intimate working relationship with his president, Jimmy Carter. Now you could perhaps blame Brzezinski for some of that. I think you have to blame President Carter himself for some of that. But also Secretary of State Vance deserves some blame. Again, I say that with great regret, because I respect Secretary Vance; he's a very fine man and had a great integrity. But, for some reason or another, he did not develop that rapport with the president that is important. And it's essential for a secretary to do this kind of thing. The result is, he was neither willing nor able to do this kind of private, behind-the-scenes talk with President Carter that you would think would be necessary in a case like this turmoil we had with the Germans throughout the whole administration.

A secretary of state, like the one we have now, Baker, or like Kissinger, or like a lot of others you can think of--Acheson...

Q: Dulles.

GOODBY: Dulles, all the successful secretaries of state would have a rapport with a president that would permit them to, you know, go to Camp David and spend a long weekend with the president and say, "Look, whether you like Helmut Schmidt or not, this is one of our most important alliance relationships in the whole world, and we've got to make the best of it." To the best of my knowledge there was not that type of relationship between Secretary Vance and President Carter that would have permitted that kind of frank, behind-the-scenes talk and that kind of advice. It was a much more formal kind of relationship.

And the result of that was that Brzezinski, in the end, I think captured access to President Carter and consistently fed the president advice that I think in some cases was not helpful to our relationships with Europeans in general, not just with the Germans. And, again, I say that with some regret, too, because I know Brzezinski and have worked with him quite a long time, he's a brilliant man. But he did have certain instincts and certain very firm positions, as well as, I must say, a certain feeling about his own turf, that made it a very difficult administration and I think did lead also to the president's downfall.

The president had two major problems. One I've referred to was the lack of national experience and his inability to make political judgments on the national scene that would protect him and preserve his power to make these decisions. And the other, the fact that he had appointed people to his administration that were not able to work together. And he himself did not have the understanding, the *fingerspitze* view, you know the thing you get, a feeling of foreign affairs that would permit him to steer a straight course between these

two people. And those facts, in the foreign affairs field, killed him; in the security field, killed him.

Q: Franklin Roosevelt appointed people who disagreed violently, but he was able to actually play one off against the other and had a delightful time doing it.

GOODBY: That is right. If you can do that and become master in your own house, fine. Roosevelt could do that. Of course, Roosevelt's foreign policy was not always straightforward either, but he had some kind of general set of principles that guided him, so that in the end he came out where he wanted to, even if there were a lot of zigzags in between.

In Carter's case, the zigzags had nothing to do with the ultimate objective. He had no firm set of principles that guided him in how he was going to conduct foreign policy, so the zigs and the zags were completely random and had nothing to do with the ultimate objective.

Q: Well, speaking about the Carter administration, particularly in Europe and particularly in Germany, you were there during the neutron bomb business, weren't you? Could you explain what it was and how this developed and how it worked out?

GOODBY: Yes. Well, I was very much involved in that. The neutron bomb was something that I think I may have referred to before in some of our conversations. It was a nuclear weapon in which the blast effect of the explosive was minimized and the radiation effect was maximized. The purpose of it was to be used against these thousands of Soviet tanks that we thought might be invading Western Europe. The idea was to have a weapon that would minimize the effect on civilians--collateral damage, as it's called. And you do that by trying to minimize the explosive's blast effect so you don't knock down a lot of buildings and kill people in the process. But you wanted a weapon that would penetrate through this armor of the Soviet tanks and disable or kill the Soviet soldiers inside, and that's what the radiation was supposed to do.

This was called the enhanced radiation weapon, but it became quickly known as a neutron bomb because Walter Pinkus, then and now a reporter for the *Washington Post*, picked it up.

It was not particularly secret; it was buried, however, in the budget of the Energy Department, which of course runs the weapons laboratories. And President Carter, when first he was asked about it, said he didn't know anything about it. Again, I think, a mistake for a president to get to the point where he says he doesn't know what's in his own budget, but that's what he said.

There wasn't a whole lot of US response to this Walter Pinkus story about the neutron bomb. He played it up as something that was rather a serious issue, and it became, in Europe, quite a serious issue because the Soviets got onto it right away, and of course the Germans always are sensitive about nuclear weapons. And this neutron bomb became

known as kind of the capitalist bomb, because it would save buildings but kill people--that's the idea of capitalism that the Soviets tried to put across.

Well, the issue got involved in politics, of course, as always (security is not immune from politics). The Congress got onto it and tried to play it up a little bit. There was no particular public response in the United States to it. So Carter essentially, in the United States, had a free ride; he could basically do anything he wanted to.

What he did do was say we'll study the issue. Okay, that's fine, but the thing simmered on, and in Europe it did not die as an issue, it became quite a public debate in the press and even in the streets. This was during the latter part of Carter's first year, which was quite a disastrous year in many respects.

I was then, as you know, responsible, at the end of '77, finally, for security in Europe, and I urged that we try to get this thing settled. I assumed that the president wanted to proceed with this neutron bomb, because he had never given any indication otherwise. And so we worked out a strategy in NATO (by this time the issue had dragged on into the spring of '78), and the strategy essentially consisted of working out an agreement whereby those countries, like the Dutch, for example, that were not particularly anxious to take on nuclear weapons would be able to step aside, not say anything, and NATO would make a decision, which would be announced by the secretary-general of NATO. It was kind of an elaborate scheme, but it was well on its way to success.

The Germans, incidentally, had taken the view that they did not want to be the only ones to accept the neutron bomb. Helmut Schmidt said, "Look, we don't want to be singled out." The Germans have a longstanding policy of avoiding what they call singularity. They did not want to be the only ally in whose country nuclear weapons of that type were stationed. And so we spent a bit of time making sure that other countries would accept the idea of neutron bombs being stationed on their territory.

And then we developed a scheme, and this was mainly because of Helmut Schmidt, that we would trade the neutron bomb for something, if the Soviets were ready to engage in arms control.

So here, you see, you're beginning to get all of the pieces that later became part of the theater nuclear forces negotiation, or intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiation: no singularity; various allies have to take the neutron bomb; a negotiating offer to the Soviets so we will not deploy this weapon, if the Soviets will give us something.

We never did really settle on what that something would be, but there were talks about their reducing the number of tanks (which is what the neutron bomb was supposed to be there for) and we wouldn't deploy; or perhaps they'd do something about the SS-20, which was the new Soviet intermediate-range missile targeted on Western Europe. We never did quite settle whether it would be the tanks or SS-20s, but we were clear there would be an offer.

So that if the Soviets were ready to concede something--either tanks or SS-20s--we would not deploy the neutron bomb.

So all of that became part of this NATO package that we were working on. All of this is pretty much written up in the books, but let me just tell you my own involvement in it.

I did devise the strategy in the NATO package and, quite specifically, the tactics and the scenario in NATO that would lead to a decision.

Everything was ready to go and there was going to be a meeting of the NATO Council. I think the first meeting was going to be on a Monday, and the next meeting was going to be on a Wednesday; it was going to be a two-phase kind of thing. And at the Wednesday meeting, as I remember it, the secretary-general of NATO, Joseph Luns, would make the announcement that the allies agreed that the United States should go ahead and produce this bomb, and it would be deployed in due course, and so forth.

Well, I got to my office on Monday morning and I found a note on my desk saying that the president had decided to cancel that meeting of NATO.

After I looked into it, I found that that weekend he had been in Georgia and he had somehow not understood what was happening, that we were on our way to a NATO decision.

He had been given a memorandum on the Friday beforehand, which I'd had a hand in drafting, from Secretary of State Vance, from Secretary of Defense Brown, with a note on it from Brzezinski saying, "Here's what's going to happen next week, boss. NATO's going to have a meeting. They'll discuss it. There'll be another meeting. At the end of that, there'll be an announcement by the secretary-general, Joseph Luns, that we can go ahead and produce this neutron bomb. It'll be deployed in various countries in Europe when it's finally ready. And an offer of arms control negotiations will be made to the Soviets."

The president, although he'd been given information about this (the NSC was fully in the picture, had been throughout), the president somehow didn't realize until the very last moment this was happening, and he canceled this.

Again, this came to my attention later exactly what happened, but what did happen is the president had a meeting that Monday with Vance and Brzezinski and Brown, the secretary of defense, and chewed them out for getting him out on a limb where he didn't want to be. And he, in effect, killed it at that point.

There were various statements put out about how we would do this and that, produce something that might be usable later on, but it was, in effect, a walking away from a decision.

And that, which took place, I think, in the spring of 1978, further put the nail in Jimmy Carter's coffin. Because you had that on top of the B-1; the vacillation over the nature of the arms control proposal to make to the Soviets; the neutron bomb. And that basically so seriously damaged President Carter's ability to make decisions, in the field of nuclear weapons especially, that when the much more important issue came up of shall we deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles, Pershings and cruise missiles, in Europe, he had no choice but to go ahead and do it.

Now you can make a case that it might have been wise not to deploy INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) missiles: they were there essentially for a political purpose; there wasn't any really tremendously important military advantage in them. But, by the time the decision time came for that, President Carter was so weakened he could not look at it objectively. Because all of his advisors--Brzezinski, Vance, and Brown--had been so badly burned by this, and felt the administration was so badly burned, that they left him no choice.

Q: Well, was this sort of Carter's, you might say, populist instinct, or Rosalynn Carter, or almost an ego thing, feeling that the bureaucracy had maneuvered him into something that he didn't want to do? I mean, why was there this reaction against this?

GOODBY: Well, again it comes back to the problem that he had with Helmut Schmidt. Because he, I think, saw this as Helmut Schmidt trying to put the blame for this...what Carter thought of as an unpopular decision, on Carter's back. Now, in the United States, as I've said, there was hardly any public reaction to this. It was just not an issue.

Q: It seemed kind of like a good thing, actually.

GOODBY: Kind of like a good thing. President Carter, so far as his own domestic political scene was concerned, could make whatever decision he chose to make; it was just not an issue. And, therefore, for him to accept this decision, which probably would put the onus of a decision that was unpopular in Europe on his shoulders, that he saw as something that was unfair and that was being pushed on him by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and he just wasn't going to do it.

In other words, he personalized this relationship with Helmut Schmidt to the point where it led to really so much damage to his administration that it was one of the things that led to his not being reelected.

Now it isn't so often that foreign affairs figures in whether a president is going to be reelected or not. Sometimes it happens in wartime. Sometimes it goes the other way. But usually it's domestic issues. And, of course, in the United States, in the campaign of 1980, it was domestic issues, too, because of the high interest rates and so forth, but also Carter further damaged himself through his handling of these kinds of issues that we've been talking about.

And it was a tragedy, because whether the neutron bomb was the right thing or the wrong thing, it could have been handled either way. I mean, if the president said, "Look, I don't want to do this," and said that right away, then we would have managed NATO in such a way that it would have gone away. If he'd said, "Go ahead, boys, get it done," again we would have got it done in a way that would have not caused him any damage at all in the United States and very little in Europe. And that's what we were on our way to doing, that latter scenario, when he pulled the rug out.

And Schmidt just couldn't believe it. We sent a delegation over to talk to him that consisted of Warren Christopher, who at that time was the deputy secretary of state, and George Vest went with him. I don't know whether George Vest has talked with you about that experience or not, but Christopher and George Vest went to see Helmut Schmidt at his home in Hamburg, and Schmidt just couldn't believe it. He just couldn't believe it. It was so incredible to him that the thing was all set up, and that he... Schmidt also had invested some personal prestige, because the Social Democratic Party, by and large, was against it. They have a very strong passivist element in the Social Democratic Party in Germany. Schmidt had worked like a Trojan to overcome that, and had succeeded in doing it, only to have Carter pull it right out from under him. And it just was the end as far as Helmut Schmidt was concerned.

Q: Let's talk a little about the reaction within the State Department, particularly in your area. I mean, after all, if a president sort of puts you out on a limb and then saws it off, this must have made you all gun-shy, didn't it? Was there a feeling, well, let's not rock the boat or put anything, because this was a president you can't depend on? You know, you were maybe not articulating it, but there must have been some of this feeling there, wasn't there?

GOODBY: Well, yes and no. I mean, I don't want to appear naive (it's a terrible thing to be, you know), but my feeling has always been, and my experience always has been, that whatever a president does, however foolish it might be or even wrongheaded, the tendency among the career people is basically to say: "This is the boss, and what he says goes, and we're going to do the best we can to make him look good." And that was the experience I had in this case, too. There was, of course, the usual murmuring behind the scenes, and the rolling of eyes, and the shaking of heads, but there was no pulling back from giving him the advice that we thought would be important to help him do his job.

And that's been my experience, even during the time when we had Henry Kissinger basically running the foreign policy with Nixon, and the State Department pretty much cut out of it, with Secretary of State Rogers basically not knowing what was happening. My experience, even then, was that the Foreign Service was really quite loyal in carrying out its duties, even to a president who was basically on his way out, in the Watergate situation.

Now, on the other side of it, it's of course important that the Foreign Service get the kind of guidance it needs and the decisions it needs from the White House. Otherwise, you are working in the dark.

This decision the president made on the neutron bomb led to a need for the president to make a decision pretty fast on another pending issue that had been bubbling along ever since the days that I told you about when Jim Schlesinger was working on this issue of modernizing the nuclear stockpile in Europe. Namely the issue was: What are we going to do about longer-range missiles in Europe? And I would say we all felt that, given the president's decision on the neutron bomb, a decision on INF had to be made, it had to be clear cut, it had to be worked out with the allies, and there could be no going back from it.

So, in that sense, the experience led us to say to the president: "You've got to give us a decision right now. We cannot operate in the dark the way we did on the neutron bomb. This would be catastrophic."

So it had its impact all right, but not in the sense of making us pull back from telling the president what we thought he needed to know and what he needed to hear from us. I want to make that distinction very clear.

Q: But it did mean that you certainly wanted to get stronger commitments than before.

GOODBY: Of course. And this was not just because it was in our interests because we could then do the job properly, but it was in his interest. Couldn't operate this way again.

Now I might say this, that the full issue of how to respond to the Soviet SS-20 and whether we needed to deploy longer-range nuclear weapons in Europe was, in my view, a very complex one and did not have a clear cut answer. I felt that we should think long and hard about deploying longer-range systems in Europe.

The last time we had long-range systems in Europe was during the early part of the Kennedy administration. And, as it happened, as part of the Cuban missile crisis deal, we agreed, quite secretly, that we would take the Jupiter missiles out of Turkey. We had planned to take them out anyway, and we told the Soviets that we would get them out, and, by the mid-summer, I think, of 1963, we did take the Jupiters out of Turkey. These were the last long-range missiles we had had until this issue came up again, first during the Ford administration and then, quite definitively, during the Carter administration.

I was very sensitive to the problem of intra-alliance difficulties that would arise if you began to deploy these long-range missiles. I was concerned about the effect on NATO; I was not particularly concerned about the effect on the Soviet Union. Although I had been very much involved with negotiations with the Soviets through arms control, my interest, my background, my expertise really has been Western Europe security affairs. And so, when I have given advice, it's usually been with that particular angle in mind rather than the effect on the Soviets. I was very sensitive to German problems, to French-German problems, to British-German problems, and I just thought that we were perhaps asking for a lot of political difficulties if we deployed these long-range missiles. And it was not quite clear to me that they were needed in terms of military requirements. And I think that it has been borne out that they were mainly a political weapon, if you will, designed to show that

we could respond to these SS-20s, which the Soviets were deploying, which are a very-much-improved method of striking at important military targets in Western Europe.

One of the reasons that we got into this business at all was that, on the conservative side of the spectrum in Germany, the Christian Democrats were trying to make a bit of an issue out of whether the Germans were being deprived of information and knowledge and so forth on cruise missiles. They saw this as the new technology that was destined to revolutionize strategic relationships. And, partly from American sources, people like Albert Walstetter, they became sensitized to the negotiations on SALT, which they thought threatened the possibility that Germany or the United States, but especially Germany, would be able ever to have any role in the field of cruise missiles.

And that, quite frankly, was the origin of the whole necessity to do something about these INF missiles. It had something to do with SS-20s, but it mainly originated with internal German politics. And that, in turn, was stimulated by Americans who were telling them that they ought to be worried. Which is something that always happens in our societies. We're so intertwined with one another that a man like Albert Walstetter can go to the Germans and tell them they ought to be worried, and they begin to pick it up as a political problem.

And so it became Helmut Schmidt's political problem. He responded to that by a quite-famous speech that he made in October of 1977 at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, in which he in effect said we've got to do something about the SS-20s and about intermediate-range nuclear forces. What he said was that we will have a SALT agreement that will codify parity at that level. We have Soviet superiority at the conventional level, and, at the intermediate-range nuclear forces' level, if the SS-20 is allowed to keep going, it'll give them superiority there, too.

Later on, Schmidt tried to interpret that speech as saying all he wanted us to do was take up SS-20s in the SALT negotiations, because we'd been deferring that, thinking it was one of these forward-based nuclear issues that we'd always been trying to defer. But it was interpreted in Europe and in the United States as a call by Schmidt to either deploy intermediate-range missiles ourselves or somehow get rid of the SS-20. So, from that time on, the pressure was on us in Washington to make a decision. And the pressure became the decision to deploy.

What I had tried to do, even after that speech, as I recall, was to try to get a rational discussion going about what was the importance of cruise missiles, because I did not regard them as the answer to all of the problems the Germans had.

And so, under my direction, a paper was prepared. I think the main author of it was John Hawes, who at that time was in the European Bureau and went shortly thereafter to the Political-Military Bureau. And it was kind of an objective discourse about the pros and cons of deploying cruise missiles. Unfortunately, it was not too well handled in Europe. I was not myself directly involved in that aspect of it; I'm not sure it would have been better

if I had been. But it was played by some of the people in Europe, and I think probably with some American help, as a way of kind of putting the cruise missiles on the back burner and walking away from that.

So, again, more pressure on the United States: Do something about SS-20s. Do something about cruise missiles.

And I finally concluded that the relationship with Germany was so important that we had to go down this road of deploying missiles. And, of course, the neutron bomb episode only reinforced that need. So that the decision to deploy really in effect was made in the minds of people in Washington long before the decision actually was made within NATO.

The decision to deploy was made in December 1979 in Brussels. I was there at the meeting of foreign ministers and defense ministers.

But the decision really was made, in effect, more than a year earlier, when it became apparent, because of the damage the president had done to himself over the neutron bomb episode, that we had to somehow recoup that loss. And the Germans, with the help of this unfortunate speech of Schmidt, began to put us under pressure to go ahead and deploy. And I think, further, we had no choice. And, from that point on, in early '78, I was supportive of that, although I had very serious misgivings about the whole enterprise.

And, frankly, although there were riots, demonstrations, and great pressures against this deployment for several years in the streets of Germany, as it turned out, of course, there was a successful negotiation that got rid of the SS-20s. So you can argue in one sense the decision was a correct one.

But, on the other hand, all of this discussion and dialogue not only about the INF, but also about the neutron bomb, so sensitized the people of Europe, and especially the people of Germany, to the whole nuclear issue that today it's almost impossible for us to deploy any new nuclear weapons in Germany. So I think it's debatable whether it was a wise decision or not, even at that point in time when we had a highly successful negotiation that got rid of the SS-20, if our intent was to retain some kind of nuclear capability in Germany as a deterrent. We lost that ability because of those decisions that we made about the neutron bomb and about the INF.

Now, in the long run of history, with all these revolutionary changes taking place in Moscow, maybe that's no longer important. But I can assure you, if there's ever a return to a hard-line Communist regime in Moscow, we are going to regret the day that we ever moved ahead in such a way that made it impossible for us to modernize our nuclear forces in Germany. Germany is on its way to being denuclearized. Again, maybe in the situation where you have a continuing democratization in the Soviet Union it doesn't matter very much, but we have lost an option that I suspect someday we might want to have.

Well, the INF was an issue then that I spent a lot of time on.

I should tell you another very important reason for this decision. Again, it had little to do with INF; it had to do with the SALT negotiations. Because Les Gelb and the administration, particularly Secretary Vance, concluded that in order to have the Senate ratify the SALT Treaty, which was of utmost importance to them, we could not be in any way vulnerable on the charge that we were unwilling to help the Europeans with these intermediate-range nuclear forces. And so, in order to have a SALT Treaty, therefore, we also became hostage to that need for the SALT Treaty, in the sense that, again, the option of not deploying INF became practically nonexistent. And, in the end, of course, SALT II wasn't ratified at all and doesn't exist today.

Q: But it's obeyed.

GOODBY: Not any more. No. No. It was for some years, but it was rescinded by President Reagan, and today there is no restriction on our nuclear forces at all at the strategic level.

Q: Tell me, how did you view the people of Germany? Because right now we're in the middle of a war with Iraq, and you have very strong neutralist, basically anti-American, youthful demonstrators out there. Did you see Germany as having a strong sort of potential anti-Americanism? I'm thinking particularly because it appears that so many of the teachers of the younger generation and the educational system is, if not Marxist, quasi-Marxist, or at least of the Socialist, anti-American ilk. Did you see that as a problem?

GOODBY: Yes, of course. It is a problem. It was a problem. And, you're right, the way the university system in Germany has been set up it's destined to almost create that kind of a problem. And it has two interesting aspects to it.

One is that tenure and seniority are so important in the German university system that, once you get tenure and once you get seniority, it's almost impossible to move you out. Which means that the younger faculty members coming up, looking for a job, trying to get tenure themselves, trying to get established in the university world, are enormously frustrated, because it turns out they can't get into it because all the positions are held by people in their seventies and '80s, even, who are not willing to go.

Well, I think, in addition to making some of these young professors frustrated, it does have a tendency to radicalize them, too, to some extent. This, in addition to the fact that a lot of the more idealist people of course are and have been Social Democrats who tend to not make a moral distinction between the Soviet Union and the United States, and this whole younger generation is being exposed to this kind of a viewpoint.

Now I don't think its roots are at the stage yet where it's critical. But it does mean that in Germany you have an underlying, fairly substantial body of public opinion that is neutralist in the sense of not agreeing with everything the United States does, but, more importantly than that, I think, not making a moral distinction between communism in the USSR, as it's

been practiced up until recently, and the kind of system we have. And that's what I find so ominous.

Now, again I say, I don't think it's reached the critical stage, because the Germans are pretty sensible people and they're exposed to the world and they're Europeans. And the European sense, by and large, is not quite that way. So I think there are antidotes to it. But the way the university system is structured and the general political background in that country is such that there is, of course, always going to be a problem.

Now, how do you deal with it? I think you deal with it by having sensible policies about our relationship with the Soviet Union, and about the European Community, and about the Third World. And of course a lot of this began with our involvement in Vietnam, in which the Europeans became as involved as we did, emotionally. And then I'm afraid it may be picking up again because of the Iraq situation, but that's another story.

Back to the Carter administration. The decision was a successful one. It was worked out well. It was managed much more from the White House and from the NSC staff than the neutron bomb had been, because they didn't want anything to go wrong this time. But I was involved, all of us were involved, and, just mechanically, as the way it was handled, it was done pretty well. No complaints at all.

I think that probably brings us pretty much to the end of my time in Washington during the Carter administration. There were a lot of other things that went on, of course. Well, I guess I should tell you one episode that almost slipped my mind.

In August of 1979, I, as it happened, was the acting assistant secretary for European Affairs. In August, you know, everybody goes on vacation. Secretary Vance was away; George Vest, the assistant secretary, was away; I think Brzezinski was away. There was a kind of a rearguard left, and I was the rearguard for European Affairs; I was the assistant secretary.

Well, it turned out to be a very active period. First of all, the Soviets were having a book fair, and they refused to allow some American books at this fair, which caused us to have to protest the situation to the Soviets. Secretary Vance called me about that and I went ahead and made the protest--fully agreed with him on that.

Next thing that happened, we learned that there was going to be an article coming out in *Aviation Week* to the effect that there was a Soviet brigade in Cuba.

Q: Oh, God.

GOODBY: This we had to do something about--both about the story and about the situation. By the time I got onto the scene, Marshall Shulman, who was Secretary Vance's advisor for Soviet Affairs, special assistant to the secretary in the State Department, had already talked to the Soviet Embassy about our worries about some kind of organized Soviet force that might be in Cuba. He had been alerted to this by a senator, Richard Stone,

of Florida, who had picked up some information somewhere or other about this. And the story had begun to make the rounds. I had not, frankly, been aware of it, because Soviet Affairs, bilaterally, was not my particular responsibility, but I did become aware very quickly after I was in this job of acting assistant secretary. I began to work with David Newsom, who was then the Under Secretary, and what we did was try to work out a plan to contain the situation.

Now, as it turned out, we probably made some errors, and I accept the responsibility for the errors. But there was, during the initial negotiations over Cuba during the Kennedy administration back in '62 and '63, an understanding that there would be some Soviet ground forces allowed to remain there. And that had been lost in history--at least it was lost to me because I'd never been aware of it. But nobody seemed to know about it anymore. And, rather than kind of dismiss the thing as something that had been agreed to long since, everybody assumed it was something that somehow was new. I would have thought maybe somebody on the Soviet Desk might have had a record, or that maybe Marshall Shulman might have known something about it, but nobody did. And so I accepted the idea that this was something new. I didn't think it was a terribly serious thing to have a Soviet brigade there, because it wasn't able to do much of anything, but nonetheless it was obvious that there were some political problems in it.

Well, in order to contain this, we did two things. Number one, we prepared a statement for the press in case the story did come out. And I wrote that statement for the press, and it is available even today. It was released, in fact, by Hodding Carter, who was the spokesman for the State Department then. And that statement that I worked out essentially said it didn't make any great difference; it was not something that was essentially changing the situation at all. And, from all I was able to understand, from the military advice we were given and from the political advice we were given, in fact it didn't make any difference. But of course it was of some political importance.

Well, we concluded, after a meeting with the NSC people, that we had to inform some of the key senators that might see this story, so that they'd be aware of what was going on. And it was agreed that David Newsom would call Frank Church, who was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at this time, and also call, I think, one or two other senators; I think perhaps Robert Byrd was one of them he had to call.

Well, I guess, in retrospect, that probably was a wrong decision, because Frank Church was fighting the battle of his life to be reelected (as it turned out, he wasn't reelected), and he saw this as something that would jeopardize his fortunes as senator if he didn't put out his own story. Again a mistake was made. He called Vance. I think it was Vance; it might have been Newsom. I have forgotten now which one it was. But, whichever one it was, the senator was told to go ahead and do what he had to do. Wrong advice. He should have been counseled to keep quiet and that it would be taken care of. Maybe that wouldn't have been possible. But he understood, from his conversations with either Vance or Newsom, that he had to do what he had to do. I think it was Vance, I don't think it was David Newsom at all.

And so he put out this story that said unless that Soviet brigade is removed from Cuba, we won't be able to ratify the SALT II Treaty. So the worst of all possible worlds, you see, then--he came up with this story which put us straight in the context of SALT II. And of course it got into the press right away and became quite a cause célèbre.

At that point, the statement that I wrote came out. And I think things could have been contained, frankly, but then after a while Vance did come back from vacation, and I ceased being acting assistant secretary, and I don't think Vance really played this very well. Because, rather than play it down, he also took the line that, well, something has to be done, and we can't accept the status quo. In other words, rather than say it doesn't really make any difference (which it didn't), he accepted the view that the Soviets would have to do something about this Soviet brigade if we were going go ahead and ratify SALT II. Of course, nothing ever was done about it, and SALT II, for a whole lot of other reasons, was not ratified (the other reasons being the Afghan invasion).

So I have to say that, although my own involvement was not one I'm awfully pleased with, I do think the handling of it by Secretary Vance was not very good either. So I look back on that as one of these unfortunate episodes.

Q: Well, another ramification perhaps was there. I did an interview last week with Ralph Earle, who was handling the SALT negotiations at the time, and he said that the Soviets felt that there was something very insidious, not insidious, but this was the Carter administration no matter what... I mean, they had better information about our agreements than we had about our agreements, and that nothing had happened. This Soviet brigade was there, Earle said, looking at this later, and it looked like this was probably a once-a-year sort of National Guard encampment. These were basically probably rather sedentary troops, and they got them together for two weeks and sort of had them run around obstacle courses and all this. But the Soviets felt that this was a great change in the Carter administration. All of a sudden, why were they making a fuss about this? And this had an effect on SALT, and he felt it might have even carried over into the feeling that led up to Afghanistan. Not completely, but the idea was that there was something behind this whole thing, rather than basically a lack of keeping good records, in a way.

GOODBY: Yes, that's right, but, you know, the Soviets shot themselves in the foot on this one.

It was known, of course, that there were Soviets troops in Cuba--nobody disputed that. That had been a known fact for years and we'd been monitoring this.

There was a famous episode about how there was a soccer field there, and we knew from that there had to be Europeans, because the Cubans played baseball, and so that told us something. I think it was actually Kissinger that said that.

Anyway, we knew there were Soviet troops there. The only question was: Are they organized as a military unit? That was what the intelligence community had been observing

for a long time. And they were finally concluding, in the midst of all of their worries about other things, that they probably were organized as a brigade. Well, again, that's one of the reasons that I put out this story that it didn't really make that much difference, because we knew they'd been there, and the only question was are they organized or not. And that can't make a big difference.

But the Soviets shot themselves in the foot, because, when Shulman raised this with them, which was well before those events of August, they could very easily have come back and said, "Well, look, the agreement we reached, back in the days of the Cuban missile crisis, stipulates that we can have a brigade in Cuba." I'm not actually sure the agreement was that clear, but it could have been handled by simply helping us with the record. You're right, we should have kept better records; we should have had a better historical memory, but we didn't. And the Soviets, maybe they didn't either, because they didn't really come back and tell us this. Maybe that was just the suspicion of the Carter administration, which was pretty strong by that time. Or maybe it was the civilians and the military in the Soviet Union not conversing, which happens even today. Or maybe they lost the records. I don't know, but they had an opportunity to come back and help us with this, and they did not. And we should have been in a position to do better than we did. But it was a case of errors on both sides, I think, assuming you wanted to contain the problem.

But I do say that, when Secretary Vance came back and said we can't accept the status quo, and kind of escalated the whole thing, and when he also told Frank Church go ahead and put out your statement, I don't believe this was well considered. And I think we could have just ridden along with the statement that Hodding Carter put out, and put it out again, and put it out again, and put it out again, and then it would have gone away. But we ourselves allowed the thing to escalate to a major confrontation over something that didn't have to be.

Q: Well, also, I mean, a little bit, you were mentioning this was August. August is a month where normally not much happens. If the government's away... Well, a lot of things happen because it's basically a rather slow news time. I mean, you don't have the organs of government of any country...I mean, Europe takes off in August. So that the press often has people of a more...the second or third stringers are usually there, and they're looking to make their...they smell raw meat. I mean, there are a lot of things going together so that August can be a time of...I can't remember the term, but it's the crazy time. I mean, things get blown out of proportion.

GOODBY: That's exactly right. But, here again, you know, you have a case of this SALT II Treaty and the desire to protect it distorting sensible policies. I've already mentioned how the desire to protect SALT II was one of the factors that led to the decision to deploy these intermediate-range missiles in Europe, which, you know, maybe was a good idea or maybe it wasn't, but it was not considered by the administration as important on its own, but important because of SALT. This was part of the rationale. How to deal with the Soviet brigade in Cuba was seen by the administration not as a factor was it important or not, but how do you protect SALT. And it led to these decisions that Vance made, which I think were not really quite right. And, had it not been for the SALT factor, he might have made a

different decision. Which, in the long run, I think would have been better, because SALT wasn't ratified anyway.

Q: Were you still with European Affairs in December of '79 when the Soviets went into Afghanistan?

GOODBY: Yes, I was. But, before that, let me tell you another episode that also happened in August. It was a very difficult month.

There was a Soviet ballet dancer, whose name, I believe, was Vlasov, who had defected. He had defected either in Washington or New York.

Q: Was this the Kirov?

GOODBY: I guess this was the Bolshoi Ballet.

Q: It might have been the Kirov Ballet, I'm not sure.

GOODBY: Anyway, this man was married to another ballet dancer who was also on this tour, whose name, I believe, was Galina Vlasova. And this man told us that he thought his wife also wanted to defect, because they had talked about it, and, therefore, he said, "I wish you would interview her and give her a chance to stay here if she wants to." Well, this came to our attention. I was again acting assistant secretary then, and I consulted with the Soviet Desk. The head of it then was a man named Bill Shinn. And Bill very wisely said to me, "You know, there's an Aeroflot flight that leaves tomorrow. They may try to get her out on this thing, so we better do something about that."

And so I said, "By golly, you're right."

I called Warren Christopher, who was then the acting secretary, Vance being away. And I couldn't get to him right away; he was at a lunch somewhere. He finally got back to me, and I said, "Look, we've got to do something about having the Immigration and Naturalization Service station somebody to make sure they don't forcibly get her on that Aeroflot flight."

And he said, "You're right, I'll do that."

And so he called them, and they did station some INS people at the gate just in case they'd try to get her in. Because we somehow or other couldn't get to her, for some reason, I don't know why that was.

But these stupid agents of the INS saw this woman, in the midst of a bunch of thugs, being rushed into the airplane and didn't stop it--just let them go right by--and she got on the airplane. This was reported to us, that it looked as though she had been not necessarily of her own free will going on an airplane, and so we decided we had to interview her no matter what. So we gave the order that the plane was not to be allowed to take off. So they moved

some trucks in front of the airplane and said, "Let that woman off so we can interview her." And they refused. And so this standoff continued for about three days.

I had in the Soviet chargé at the time, who was none other than Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, now the Soviet foreign minister. And I talked with Bessmertnykh about this episode and said, "We're not trying to make any big deal out of it. All we want to do is interview her, because we have evidence, from her husband among other people, that she wants to defect. And, in such situations, it's normal for us to be allowed to talk with her. If she doesn't want to defect, doesn't want to stay here, we'll put her back on the airplane and she can go right away. We're not going to try to hold her up."

Well, the Soviets in Moscow, no doubt, decided to make a big thing out of it, and so they played up how we were kidnapping the whole airplane and refusing to let her go and so forth and so on. And it got quite a bit of attention for quite a while.

But we finally solved the problem. A young fellow on the Soviet Desk had a brilliant idea that we take one of these mobile lounges (of which they had them in New York, I guess, it was at Kennedy) and move it up to the side of the airplane and she'd get into the mobile lounge. She would not be visible to anybody as having actually got off the airplane. We would interview her in the mobile lounge, and, if she didn't want to stay there, she could go back on the airplane. And that's what happened--she didn't want to stay here, she wanted to go and didn't want to go back to her husband, apparently. And so she went back to Moscow. I think she later did defect.

The whole episode was over and done with in about three days, but it was one of those things, you know, where you stay up late at night.

In the end, I even had to deal with Brzezinski about it. When I talked about this relationship, one of the things I had in mind was that particular episode, because Brzezinski called, wanting to talk to the acting secretary of state, Warren Christopher. I was with Christopher in his office, and Christopher said he didn't want to talk to him. He said, "You talk to him." So I talked to Brzezinski, and it had to do with some aspect of reciprocity: Were we going to be given something or other that we were giving them? And so I said, "Yes, we will." And we worked it out.

Incidentally, the man in New York on the other end of the telephone line from me and from Warren Christopher was Don McHenry, who became the UN ambassador partly because of that. I didn't get anything out of that, but he did.

Anyway, the episode was over, and that was the month of August.

Q: What was your impression of Warren Christopher? He was there for some time, but he's almost a faceless person. That's only maybe because I haven't talked to the right people. But how comfortable did you feel he was with foreign affairs?

GOODBY: Well, he did some good things. For example, the way he got onto this business of the Aeroflot airliner. He did it very well, very smoothly, very nicely, handled it effectively. He handled, of course (and something I didn't know anything about), the hostage negotiations quite well, very effectively.

For reasons I probably won't get into, I don't think he particularly valued my services, although he gave me very high marks for handling the Red airplane episode when I did work directly with him. But I think he was a little distrustful of the career service. I don't know why that was, but I had the sense that he was somehow not willing to work with us. I can't say that specifically, because I didn't have that many dealings with him except for this Cuban thing, and there we worked very well together. I don't know what the problem was. I agree with you, he was a little bit faceless, and was so to me. I never quite knew where he stood on things. He may have been caught in a bind, too.

Q: I'm told he's a man without a sense of humor, which often means that you don't get to the person there.

GOODBY: Well, that's certainly true. But he did not have a defined policy profile to me, if I could put it that way. I never knew what he wanted or where we stood, and I don't really know exactly what he was working on. He wasn't working very much on European Affairs. Again, I give him great credit for the way he handled the hostage negotiations. It seems to me that he really did very well at that. But, unfortunately, a kind of a cipher, if you will, in the policy process, at least in things I was dealing with. And, again, a personal relationship that for some reason I think went wrong between him and me, unfortunately.

Well, at the end of that year came the Soviet invasion. Also, while I was in Brussels for that meeting of the foreign defense ministers that decided on the INF deployment, I had a call from Washington, saying they were going to put me forward to be ambassador to Finland, and did I want that?

I said, "You bet I want that!"

So I was, by January, waiting to see what happened. I didn't know what was going to happen at that point.

I was involved in some of the discussions about how to react to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And in some of those, actually, I was involved with Warren Christopher, who was involved in that particular episode. We did talk about cutting off agricultural products to the Soviet Union--an embargo on grain--and about canceling our participation in the Olympics that were going to be held in Moscow in 1980. And I supported those things; I thought we did need to react. I felt that we needed to do something other than just make a statement. We did talk about what would the effect be, and perhaps we didn't analyze the way in which the grain market would be rearranged, if you will, later on to accommodate the Soviets. I think we assumed that cutting off American grain would have a dramatic effect on the Soviets. It didn't, as it turned out, they would get more grain from Argentina

and a few other places. And I guess, now, the whole picture is that we're trying to get back in the grain market. But, as I said, I supported it at the time; I thought it would be effective.

Again, I guess it turns out to be that we don't have enough of an analytical capacity in the State Department, perhaps, to look at things like the historical record on the Cuban brigade or the effect of a grain embargo on the Soviet Union. Because these decisions were made by us kind of sitting around a table assuming we knew, and we didn't know.

Q: Did the intervention of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan, on Christmas Eve of 1979, come as a surprise? Also, what was the initial reaction within the European Bureau as you saw it?

GOODBY: Well, it came as a surprise, and the initial reaction was that this was a pretty serious thing. I mean, nobody was playing it down. And the problem was we didn't know where they were going to stop. There were people, and Brzezinski was one of those, who said that, wow, what this means is that they're going through to the Indian Ocean. I don't think we were quite ready to accept that idea, but nonetheless it was something we couldn't put out of our minds either, because we didn't know exactly how successful the Soviets would be or just what would happen. So we did see it as a very, very serious thing. I mean, we took seriously all of the statements that were made by high administration officials, some of which we wrote: first Soviet military action outside of the Warsaw Pact since World War II; danger to Pakistan, the problem of Baluchistan, that province just south of Afghanistan that was kind of shaky as to whether it was going to become independent or remain part of Pakistan.

No, it was very worrisome. It was one of those things that we couldn't find any face to put on it that would make it look good. I mean, I could put an honest face on the Soviet brigade in Cuba and say that that was nothing to worry about; I could not do that with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nor could anybody else.

Now we had to react and we had to react fairly fast. We reacted in the way we did perhaps on the basis of inadequate analysis of what it would all mean, but we had to do something, and we chose these particular kinds of things. And I did support it and did voice my agreement to it in the discussions we had. As I said, we were at that point working with Warren Christopher, who had been assigned the job of trying to put together a package of appropriate responses.

Q: So the ranks were pretty much united, would you say?

GOODBY: Yes, I thought so. I didn't hear anything otherwise. Again, maybe some of us felt that Brzezinski was being a little overdrawn when he was talking about the Soviets on their way to the Indian Ocean, but we did worry a bit about Baluchistan, that Pakistani province that I mentioned.

Q: And at that point nobody had a real feel for how well the Afghans could hold off against Soviet intervention there.

GOODBY: No, we did not. And a lot of discussion at that time was again probably misguided, but we were recalling how the Russians occupy these Muslim areas and, if it took twenty or thirty or forty years to subdue them and make them a part of the Soviet empire, they did it. And we thought the same thing would happen in Afghanistan and Baluchistan; we thought it conceivable that the Soviets in fact were going to incorporate Afghanistan into the Soviet Union. So that was how worried we were, and none of us knew enough to know whether the Afghans would really resist or not.

Q: We all forget about it, but much of the business of the Soviet Union, particularly on that southern flank, was done in relatively recent times.

GOODBY: It was, and some of it after the revolution.

Q: After the revolution, the grabbing off of the various "stans."

GOODBY: That's right. It's hard to recall what the Soviet Union was like in those days, after we've had these few nice years, but we saw the Soviet Union as an empire that was prepared to expand its territory, and, once it had done that, then who knew what might be next? Maybe the Indian Ocean was next.

Q: Well, you were in the EUR Bureau, although you were dealing mainly with Western Europe and northern Western Europe. Brezhnev was getting fairly on, I'm not sure he wasn't doddering yet, but...

GOODBY: No, but he was pretty close to it.

Q: Who did you feel was running the country and what was their goal?

GOODBY: Well, I don't think any of us knew very well, but we thought it possible that the Soviet military was playing a larger role. We, I think, really saw the barons, as we called them, of the Communist Party, namely Gromyko, as playing a big role. I think Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov was still alive then. In other words, there was clearly a group of very senior Communist officials around Brezhnev that we thought were in cahoots with the Soviet military, and that this cabal was basically manipulating Brezhnev (who was probably ready to be manipulated) to take more aggressive actions.

Now there were debates for a long time about: Does superiority in strategic nuclear forces mean that the Soviet Union will become more adventurous? I argued that it would not, but, on the other hand, it is a fact that the Soviets did become more adventurous in the period when Brezhnev thought he had a pretty good strategic force. Now, when you say Brezhnev, you're probably talking about this group of very senior people, not Brezhnev himself.

Q: And we're also talking about, really, incursions into Africa--Ethiopia, Angola...

GOODBY: We're talking about incursions into Africa, the whole business--Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia. And then we saw this culminating, of course, with the invasion of Afghanistan.

Of course, that really gave people a field day, you know, who felt that we'd been neglecting our strategic forces. And, of course, Reagan was able to campaign on that. He finally did become the presidential nominee and won the election. And part of it was that we had allowed the Soviets to gain this margin of superiority, which permitted them to do things like go into Afghanistan, and we had to correct this. And, of course, that led to the mandate, as Reagan saw it and the Congress saw it, for this tremendous build-up, the biggest in peacetime history, that took place in his administration.

I learned finally, I think it was in February or March of 1980, that the president had decided to nominate me for ambassador to Finland. I guess it was in February, probably, which was record time, since I first heard of it in December. I was confirmed by the Senate and went to Finland in March of 1980 and presented my credentials in April of 1980 to President Urho Kekkonen, who was the grand old man of Finnish politics, having been president for almost a quarter of a century at that time.

History books will tell you all about Kekkonen and all that, so I won't dwell on that, but, needless to say, it was not a particularly pleasant time to go to Finland, for a variety of reasons. The main reason, of course, was the Afghan War.

The Finns had always been painstakingly neutral between the Soviet Union and the United States. During the Vietnam War, for example, whereas the Swedes criticized us vigorously for our participation in Vietnam, the Finns never did. By the same token, when the Soviets went into Afghanistan, the Soviets didn't criticize them either. And they made it quite clear they were going to go to the Olympics and they were not going to embargo anything. So it was clear before I went that Finland and the United States had very different ideas about the seriousness and the meaning and how we should react to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And so it was not a normal time. In a normal time during the Cold War we would have had some problems, but we wouldn't have had this really quite sharp difference about how to react to a certain situation.

Furthermore, Finland can be a pretty interesting place to talk to Soviets, who, at the time I was there and before, were a quite heavy presence there. But I was under instructions not to talk to the Soviet Embassy at all.

Q: Oh, yes, I remember that period.

GOODBY: That's right, because of the invasion of Afghanistan. So part of the job, which would have been mainly some kind of liaison with the Soviets and getting their views about

things and providing some reports to Washington, was not there because of this. So it was a little more complicated than things normally might have been.

In presenting my credentials to the president, he mentioned something about Afghanistan. And so I took it upon myself to give him some unvarnished views about what the Soviets had done--not the normal kind of conversation for that kind of ceremony, and perhaps I was not wise in doing that. He said, well, he didn't want to get into an argument about that, and so we ended the conversation. But that was my first kind of official business, to complain about the Soviets to the president of Finland, who didn't see it that way at all.

Q: The Finns, having once been part of the Soviet Union, went to great lengths to get out of it.

GOODBY: Having once been part of the Russian empire.

Q: The Russian empire, yes. There must have been a certain amount of feeling, you know, if the Soviets are ready to jump into Afghanistan, they'd sure be ready to jump into us again if we took a different turn. I mean, I would think this would be sort of a sub rosa feeling there.

GOODBY: Well, Kekkonen felt, and a lot of the officials in Finland felt, that they had a working relationship with the top officials in Moscow, including Brezhnev and everybody else, that would permit them to escape. They put a lot of store on this personal relationship, and the Soviets do, too. I mean, they did value Kekkonen because they knew him. And then there were a couple of crises, long before I got there, in which the Soviets had pretty much said, "Okay, Kekkonen is our guy and we'll do whatever you want." I mean, that's putting it a little bluntly, but it was that kind of a relationship, and they were depending pretty heavily on that.

Now it also turns out that Finland is a fairly conservative place, probably more so than the other Scandinavian countries are, and that, when you're talking about the man in the street or the business leaders or people in education, you don't have this kind of thing we were talking about earlier that you do find in Germany, there's not this sense of moral neutralism between the United States and the Soviet Union. I mean, they know the Soviet Union for what it is. They don't like it; they have to do business with it.

The telling thing there is, of course, that about ninety-nine percent of the people there learn English, and hardly anybody bothers to learn Russian except those who have to do business with the Russians. And then the other telling story is that these student exchange programs are far and away more vigorous in Finland per capita than anywhere else in the world, and they come to the United States. And there's a tremendously supportive, very pro-US atmosphere in Finland.

But the official stance was not to criticize the Soviets. And the thing that bothered me more about Finland, I guess, than anything else at that time was a kind of self-censorship in the press, so that the press didn't want to say anything critical about the Soviets either. And

that's only now beginning to ease up. But, at that time and for a long time before I got there, the press just felt that it was not in Finland's interests for them to say anything critical about Moscow. And I found that kind of self-censorship more troubling than a foreign policy that catered to the Soviets. That I could understand, given their position. And I guess I could intellectually understand self-censorship, but I had real problem with the way it was handled there.

In any case, to make a long story short, I was in Finland only for about eighteen months. I went during the last year of the Carter administration. In April, not long after I presented my credentials, we had the famous botched operation to rescue our hostages in Tehran. And, when I heard that, I said to myself, "Well, that's it. Carter's not going to get reelected." And I realized, from that moment on if I hadn't before, that I was going to be faced with a change in administrations, and I suspected, things being what they are, given my previous experience, that I would probably be out. And Carter did lose the election.

I went back to Washington early in the new year and asked to be allowed to stay and said why I thought I should be. And I was assured at that time that Secretary of State Haig had agreed with that and thought that I'd only been there less than a year at that point and that I was doing a good job and should stay.

What Haig did not know was that, in that campaign against Frank Church for senator from Idaho, Reagan had promised the new senator, Symms, who had defeated Church, that as a reward he would let the senator designate an ambassador if he were elected. And the embassy that they let Symms designate was Finland. The reason for that was that there was a man in Idaho who had been a Mormon missionary in Finland just after World War II, had married a Finnish woman, and had a ranch called the Finlandia Ranch. And he badly wanted to go to Finland as ambassador, and apparently he had helped out...

Q: Was this Mark Austad?

GOODBY: No, Mark Austad was there before Sam Ridgeway. This was a man named Nyborg, I think it was.

In any case, there was this deal between Reagan and the senator-elect from Idaho to give them Finland. The State Department didn't know that. I got back, feeling pretty good, told people I'd been told I was going to stay on. And, about a month or so after that, I got a telegram from the director general of the Foreign Service, saying, "I regret very much to inform you..." that the president had decided otherwise. So I kind of kept it quiet. And, finally, of course, it came out in July, and I did stay until August of 1981. I was there about as long under Reagan as I was under Carter, as it turned out.

I knew before I left that I was going to become the deputy head of the strategic arms talks delegation, so I knew I was going to a fairly interesting job. But I did, very frankly, regret that I worked like a dog, and my wife did, too, to make a go of it as ambassador and develop the contacts you have to go. And, again, one of these wasted things.

Q: Because in eighteen months you really... It takes a long time to penetrate, particularly a conservative society like that.

GOODBY: It takes a long time, that's right, and I had gotten to the point where I really did know people. I knew the political scene. I was, if I do say so myself, a pretty effective ambassador, and then I was pulled out.

My relationship with the president of Finland, Mr. Kekkonen, actually became rather good. And, unprecedentedly, he came to visit me in my office in my embassy when I was leaving, and then went to my reception that I was giving at a garden there in August. It was his last official public act, because a day or two after that he went to Iceland on a state visit, and just about as soon as he got there he suffered a stroke and never again...

Q: How old was he?

GOODBY: He was eighty-one. He came back to Finland and was totally incapacitated, so that visit to the American Embassy in Finland was the last official thing he did in Finland before left office.

I don't want to skip over my year and half, because it was tremendously interesting and a period I look back on with great pleasure and with regret it ended so soon.

I spent a lot my time on public affairs, because I discovered that the American presence in Finland was not in the form of business or anything else, but that it wasn't much there. We never had visitors; there weren't any American businessmen; there's no American community. The thing that made an impact was American popular culture--a lot of movies--and, other than that, practically nothing aside from these student exchanges.

So I made it a point to visit practically every town and city in Finland in the year and a half I was there. And I did that. I had a regular routine worked out: I would go off on a trip and I would try to go to about three cities in about three days, and I would meet with the city council and the mayor, and if there was a Communist Party, I would meet with the Communist Party.

I was, I think, the first ambassador, by the way, to meet with the head of the Communist Party there. He couldn't believe it--asked for my card.

And we, I think, established a pretty effective American presence in that way. I'd go off, I'd give a talk, I'd visit a university if there was one, visit factories. I acted like a politician, in other words. And it did work out; it worked out very well.

Also, because of my background in arms control, I had a pretty good dialogue with the government on those subjects. And I was instrumental in helping them to be relieved of the fear that because we were deploying these cruise missiles in Germany, that we were going

to be violating their neutrality. That became quite a popular issue at one point, and I worked with the government in Washington to help us make a statement on that subject.

I thought we also needed to work out a more formal network of linkages with Finland, and so I succeeded in negotiating a whole string of agreements, on things not very important, but I was following the Henry Kissinger principle of trying to develop a network of agreements. And we had agreements on science and business and travel and everything under the sun.

I spent a lot of my time writing letters to people in the United States asking them to come to Finland, it being a time when we weren't visiting Moscow. You know, normally you'd get a lot of people going to Finland on their way to Moscow, but nobody was going to Moscow, so we didn't have people coming. And I succeeded in getting people that wouldn't otherwise come, but came because I asked them to. And we had a pretty good string of visitors, but nothing like what it would be under normal circumstances.

And I got a few cultural events to come to Finland. And gave a lot of interviews to the press about everything under the sun, from economics, which I didn't know much about, to arms control, which I did.

And made, if I can put it immodestly, quite a splash in the eighteen months I that was there. People looking back now, Finns in particular, think I must have been there a lot longer, because I really worked a lot harder in the job probably than most people would. And my wife did as well. Both of us thoroughly enjoyed it. Established good Finnish contacts we have to this day.

But that was a side of the story that isn't particularly historical in point of view.

Q: But it does give a feel for what an ambassador does under difficult circumstances.

GOODBY: I did develop some good working relationships, by the way, with some of the politicians and also with some of the key government officials. Kekkonen, being the age he was and the physical condition he was in, was probably not running the government in a direct sense any more than Brezhnev was in Moscow. So the people one had to get to know were people that were close to him. And I did get to know them quite well and, I think, got across the American point of view pretty effectively on these things.

Q: Was the Reagan election sort of a shocker to the Finns?

GOODBY: No. I'll never forget, it kind of offended me, but there was quite a famous cartoonist in Finland called Kari, who drew cartoons for the leading Finnish newspaper there called the *Helsingin Sanomat*, which has a tremendous circulation, serving about the whole population of Finland, practically. And, after Reagan defeated Carter, he had a cartoon that appeared, almost the day after, showing Reagan coming by to pick up Carter to

go to the inauguration. Reagan was dressed in formal clothes and top hat, and it showed Carter dressed as a clown.

I resented it, frankly, but what it did show was that there was a significant body of opinion there that felt that Carter was just not a serious person as a statesman. I think that's the impression he made there and in a lot of other places in Europe, regrettably, because he was a good man in many respects, as is seen by the things he's done afterwards.

But that was the impression I had, you know, they were kind of relieved that Reagan came in. And the view they took, and the view I frankly had too, was that, well, a lot of people come into office saying one thing, and then become more moderate as they get in there. Well, it became apparent that Reagan wasn't going to become more moderate. And his relationship with the Soviets, of course, was the thing they were looking at mainly. Their worries began to grow after he came in, but the initial feeling was one of relief: Why, here's a serious guy in getting rid of this clown. That's the way they thought of Carter. Sad.

Q: Jim, you left Finland in 1981 and then became a strategic arms negotiator from '81 to '83. I wonder if you could say how you got the job, particularly since the Reagan administration had come in and here was a Republican replacing a Democratic administration. You'd had a job as ambassador, and I would have thought that it would have been very easy to end up on the ash heap, or something like that.

GOODBY: Well, who says I didn't?

Well, I'll tell you what I know about how it was that I got back into the Reagan administration. I mentioned, when we talked last, that I had first been told that Secretary of State Haig wanted me to stay on in Finland, but that that was overtaken by a White House decision, and that I had been informed some time in May that I would be leaving the post of ambassador to Finland.

About a month or two later, sometime probably in late June or early July, I received a call from a man that I had known in NATO when I was there by the name of Lieutenant General Edward Rowney. Ed Rowney had been with the US component of the Military Committee of NATO, I believe, when I was there. And I knew him slightly; we had seen each other and had dinner together a few times and that sort of thing. He had resigned from the Carter administration's SALT negotiating team to protest what he considered to be an inadequate agreement and had become counselor to the presidential candidate Ronald Reagan and helped him formulate his position on the SALT Treaty, which, in short, was considered by Reagan and by Ed Rowney to be fatally flawed, for a variety of reasons.

Ed Rowney had been expecting to become director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, but at the last moment had been told that that would go to somebody else, namely to Eugene Rostow, and that he, Ed Rowney, would take over the strategic arms control negotiations. He, in effect, would be the chief negotiator in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. And Ed Rowney assumed, and had good reason to assume, that that

meant he would be running two negotiations. One would be the strategic arms talks, and the other would be the negotiations that had just gotten started at the end of the Carter administration, and that is, the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

So Ed believed that he needed two strong deputies that would be permanently in place in each of those two negotiations. And, knowing me and having received some advice from the State Department, he called me, in Helsinki when I was still there, from Washington and asked me if I would be interested in becoming his deputy to run the strategic arms talks. He had somebody else in mind to do the other negotiations, but he wanted me to do that part of it.

I believe the reason that he thought of me was not only because we had known each other slightly, but that he believed that it would be advisable for him to have a State Department representative in place as his deputy since he himself had been representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And I think he felt it was politically advisable to have some kind of a balance. And he did consult with Ambassador Walt Stoessel, who at that time, I believe, was still the Under Secretary. I believe he went into the Reagan administration as Under Secretary for political affairs, later was elevated to become the deputy secretary of state.

But at that point this is where these curious things come in. Walt Stoessel and I had known each other for some years, partly because of my responsibility in the European Bureau for German affairs, and I had gotten to know him quite well at that stage and knew him even earlier. In addition to which, his chief assistant was a man named Gary Matthews, whom I also had known very well, partly from that episode involving the Soviet airliner and all those crises we had together.

Q: The ballet dancer.

GOODBY: The ballet dancer and all that. And Gary had been a real tower of strength. I had actually sounded him out about whether he'd be willing to be my deputy chief of mission in Finland. As it turned out, he couldn't do it, but we had a very good relationship. I admired him and we were close friends, in effect.

So all of these things came into place, and I was asked, in effect, to take over the strategic arms talks. Well, that sounded pretty interesting, and so I agreed to do that.

But, even before I got back to Washington and certainly not long after I got back to Washington, it was changed so that the job was no longer quite as significant as I had thought it was going to be, in the sense that Ed Rowney, instead of running two negotiations and therefore leaving me pretty much in charge of the strategic arms talks, had been informed that he was going to be the head of only one of these two negotiations, namely the strategic arms talks, and Paul Nitze had been asked to take over the other negotiation. So that I was still deputy, but Ed would be there full time and therefore the scope of my responsibilities would be somewhat less. But I was still interested enough in

arms control so that I didn't complain about that, and went ahead and went back to Washington with that assignment.

I got back to Washington in late August and reported in for duty right away. And found, when I started looking into the situation, that, although the Reagan administration had been in office for about eight or nine months by that time, there was no progress at all in deciding what the new administration's policy on strategic arms negotiations should be.

That was partly because the people around the president, and, I believe, the president himself, had felt that we had gotten carried away with arms control, and there was no great interest in moving terribly expeditiously.

In addition, the Defense Department had in place a very strong team, consisting of Fred Eclay, as Under Secretary for policy, and Richard Perle, as assistant secretary for international security policy, and the two of them were not especially interested in negotiating with the Russians to begin with. And so Richard Perle very skillfully channeled the energies of the administration (what energies there were on arms control, which were not very great to begin with) into what he believed should be a kind of a long-range discussion of what was in it for us. In other words, rather than look at the specific arms control negotiation that Reagan inherited from Jimmy Carter, the idea was to take a kind of a stocktaking and rather a long-range view.

I had no objection to doing that; it sounded like a reasonable thing to do, but it was obvious, the longer I was there, that it was just a device to avoid getting into negotiations. And it became fairly clear that Richard Perle hoped that arms control would be something that would fade into the woodwork and not have any particular priority attached to it.

Well, thanks to Secretary of State Haig and others that worked with him--Larry Eagleburger, who was then the assistant secretary for European affairs, and Richard Burt, who was then the assistant secretary for political-military affairs--the State Department understood, I think correctly, that, for European reasons among other things, it was incumbent upon us to take arms control seriously and get back into negotiations with the Russians, especially since a deal had been struck, after all, at the end of December 1979, under the Carter administration, that the price for European acceptance of deploying cruise missiles and Pershing IIs was that there would be some negotiations with the Soviets to see whether we really needed to deploy these or not. And that applied not only to the intermediate-range nuclear forces, but also, of course, to the strategic arms talks. So the pressure began to build to develop a concrete position for the Reagan administration.

Well, the one thing that Reagan had said during the campaign that was our basic guidance was that he considered the SALT II Treaty not only flawed in certain respects, but also basically a license for buildup.

And, in that, he had a good point, because the limits on warheads were practically nonexistent, and you could easily foresee that there was going to be a continuing of the

MIRVing (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles), a buildup in that MIRV capability on both sides so that you would wind up with somewhere between fifteen and twenty thousand in strategic nuclear warheads without any particular controls over them except that that was imposed by the limits on launchers of these ballistic missiles that had been arranged during the Carter administration with the Soviets.

And so the guidance we had was that we ought to try to go for reductions.

Well, the interesting thing to me at that point was that, as we talked with the experts and the people that had much greater knowledge of strategic matters than I did at that time, it wasn't clear what could be accomplished by reductions. Reductions for what purpose? You could reduce nuclear warheads and, if a nuclear war took place, the average citizen wouldn't notice a difference, because we had such a large number of these nuclear warheads that even cutting by a third or fifty percent really wouldn't make that much difference in terms of damage to civilians, in effect.

So what we did was devise a rationale that had to do with strategic stability, namely you want to reduce those systems that are potentially first-strike weapons, weapons that have a very short flight time and that could be used, in effect, for a surprise attack.

It was a logical rationale, all right, but, when you did that, it had an impact on the Soviet strategic forces that was much greater than the impact on American strategic forces. Because that type of short-flight-time weapon is clearly the ICBM, and the Soviets had put something over seventy percent of their strategic forces into that category. Whereas we had a much more diversified strategic force structure, including a lot of bombers, which had slow flight times and were therefore not a very good first-strike weapon, and submarines, which could ride out an attack and therefore did not need to be considered a first-strike weapon, and which, in fact, at that time didn't have first-strike capabilities anyway because of lack of accuracy.

We recognized that this would impact on the Soviets more than it would on us, but we thought that was a pretty reasonable approach, so we developed it. And developed it, interestingly enough, in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff much more than we did with the civilian part of the Department of Defense. As it happened, the collaboration between Rick Burt and me, on the one hand, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand, became quite close during that period of, by this time, 1982, because it was the spring of the year before we really did get seriously engaged in trying to devise a position for strategic arms talks. Which, by the way, became known as START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) at that time, rather than SALT, which it had been earlier--a shift from limiting to reductions.

The good collaboration, of course, did not go unnoticed by the civilian people in the Defense Department, especially Richard Perle, who didn't like that very much, but there wasn't a whole lot he could do about it.

I won't go into all the details of how we put it together, but suffice it to say Rick Burt arranged with Secretary Haig that we would come up with a compromise position that would try to bridge all of the gaps between the State Department, the Joint Chiefs, and the civilian part of Defense. And the secretary of state, in effect, sprung it on the NSC in the form of a draft speech for Ronald Reagan to make. In the Reagan administration, a lot of decisions were made in the form of speeches, because that was the way Reagan thought about things and it was an easy way for him to make a decision. If he wanted to give a speech and we wanted a policy made, then the junction of events worked very nicely. And that was done actually a large number of times, to my own personal knowledge.

In this particular case, I drafted the speech, or that part of it that dealt with strategic arms talks, which the president gave at Eureka College, his alma mater in Illinois.

Q: When was this?

GOODBY: I think it was in April of 1982 that he gave that speech. And I picked up in that speech some ideas that actually George Kennan had been voicing during that past year. Kennan had said there's no reason why we can't have a fifty-percent reduction in US and Soviet strategic forces.

We did include warheads, by the way, which had not been included in the Carter administration, and we did include the numbers of ballistic missiles, and, included in that, nondeployed missiles as well as those actually deployed on launchers. So there were some fairly important shifts in the substance, and good shifts, I think, as it turned out, over what had been the case in the Carter administration.

But, in any event, as we looked at the numbers, I realized that we were talking about a sort of a one-third reduction in the...my memory's a little bit hazy now on this, but I think it was a one-third reduction in the number of warheads, and I think it actually was a fifty-percent reduction in the number of launch vehicles. So I put it that way in the speech to sort of simplify things. Rather than talk more quantitatively than that, I put it that way. And the president used that speech; he decided he liked it. And, to some extent over the objections of the Defense Department, he adopted this position.

Q: Was Richard Perle in there throwing bombs at you, trying to stop you?

GOODBY: Yes, he had a number of bombs he was throwing. One of the more legitimate bombs he had was that he wanted to include limitations on throw weight, which, in effect, is the limiting capacity of a ballistic missile. He thought that was a measure of merit that should be included, and a lot of the debate was about that. There was some question about how you'd actually do it, and some question as to whether it was negotiable, and some question as to whether you really needed it if you could get a limit on warheads and on the numbers of ballistic missiles.

Other bombs he was throwing were things like we had to include nondeployed ballistic missiles, even though he acknowledged in some of our private meetings that there was no way to verify where they were, but he said it's better to have some handle on it than none, and that argument carried the day. So a lot of his positions were accepted, but not all of them. His basic tactic was to load onto this negotiating position as many difficult and almost impossible things as he could think of, and he got by with some of it, but not with all of it.

The other objective he had was just to stall the negotiations as long as he could. And the device we used, of having Haig, in an NSC meeting, spring on this group without really any prior notice the language for a presidential speech, was the way we overcame the basic delaying tactics that Richard Perle had been introducing into the interagency talks.

Well, it was not an ideal position in many respects. The ideal position that one wants to have in these strategic arms talks is to get away from a large number of MIRV missiles and to try to reduce the number of warheads on each missile. You want to do that because you want to reduce the incentives for first strike on either side, and the larger the number of warheads on each missile, the more valuable a target that is and, by the same token, the more incentive there is to use it or lose it, as they say.

Now what we did, because this was the way the Joint Chiefs wanted it, you sensed, was to say we're going to have a position that will limit ballistic missiles at just about the number that we had planned to have, in the form of our then-Minuteman III and our planned MX missile and the bombers and so forth. And, of course, that was a position that did not necessarily enhance strategic stability, although the argument we made was that, by reducing Soviet capabilities fairly dramatically, you at least do something to reduce the dangers of first strike.

But it was not an ideal position. In addition to which, the position resulted in our deferring limits on cruise missiles to a later stage, because these also were slow flyers, as the president called them.

And so, when we finally got into the negotiations with the Soviets, which was in the summer, I think June it was, of 1982, we had a position that was well-nigh nonnegotiable and, not only that, was not ideal from the strategic stability standpoint. But it was the best we could do under the circumstances prevailing, which in fact did prevail through most of the Reagan administration. There was just deadlock constantly between State and Defense, and the White House usually split the difference instead of deciding one way or the other. And so it was just a very unpleasant kind of...

Q: Who in the White House was doing this splitting? I mean, was this just, would you say, more on the political side than a belief?

GOODBY: Well, in the White House, originally they had Richard Allen, who was the NSC advisor. He left after a time because of a wristwatch scandal, as I recall. And then...

Q: Judge Clark, wasn't it?

GOODBY: Yes, Bill Clark, who had been the deputy under Haig, went over there. And it was largely he, with the assistance of some experts from the military as well as from the civilian side. They had some good people at the staff level, and they were acting under instructions, basically, you know, don't make too many waves, keep things in order. So they would find some way of accepting some ideas of the State Department and some ideas of the Pentagon, and the result was kind of a mishmash, which really was not very good policymaking, but there that was.

Well, the interesting thing is that I had to visit the secretary of state just before these negotiations began, with Rick Burt, to talk about this issue of nondeployed missiles. We were talking with Haig, and it was clear he was really kind of preoccupied with things and not very happy about the White House. He let a few things drop; didn't say a whole lot. But he had to go to the meeting the next day of the NSC on this issue of nondeployed missiles, and we were pumping him up for that occasion. And, as it turned out, that was the NSC meeting where he was called into a back room at the White House and basically fired. So I saw him on his essentially last day as secretary of state to brief him on the strategic arms talks.

And I saw him again, but from a distance, because, just as we were leaving to go to Geneva for negotiations, he appeared in the State Department auditorium to announce to the assembled multitude why he was leaving. And he left almost immediately after that, his place taken, of course, by George Shultz.

So off we went to Geneva, with a secretary of state out and a new one in and the whole thing in some disarray.

But we did our best. We tried to present a case to the Soviets that would make some sense. They weren't buying it. Essentially, that whole six months went by with basically spinning of wheels.

It seemed to me pretty clear that we ought to try to get cruise missiles into the picture somehow, and so I developed a position that amounted to a two-phased idea, that we would first do the ballistic missiles, the fast flyers, and then we would move on to the slow flyers, which meant that we would include bombers and cruise missiles. They had been excluded pretty much altogether, you see, in the first decision-making in the White House. So I arranged that, and the position was accepted, over some objections again from Richard Perle. Again, I wouldn't say this was an ideal position, but it was the best we could do to get something going.

Q: What role was General Rowney playing in this?

GOODBY: It was a funny thing, I had and still have, so far as I know, a fairly good relationship with General Rowney. I always was up front with him about what I was thinking and what I was recommending, and he seemed generally supportive when we were talking in Geneva. But he had a very close relationship with Richard Perle and I think was very much influenced by Richard Perle's thinking. And he also had a man that he usually kept back in Washington named Colonel Sam Watson, who was his...I think he actually called him his "rear echelon," from his military days. And Sam's job, and it was a very intelligent thing to do, was basically to keep General Rowney informed of what various people in Washington were thinking about various issues. And so General Rowney basically would side with Richard Perle, is what it comes down to, if he had a choice. And he almost always did have a choice. And he almost always tried to take the position that he was not just a negotiator, but also a policy-maker, and that he had a voice in the process that was equal, in his view, to that of any major department. In other words, he didn't think of himself as an employee of State or Defense or ACDA, but as an independent person that was the president's man. I can't criticize him for that, I think that was probably the right approach. But it meant that he always tried to take a position and cast a vote, and, in effect, most of those votes were siding with Richard Perle. Not always, but, generally speaking, that was the way it went.

Q: Were you working under him?

GOODBY: Yes, it was a very difficult situation.

Q: What you've been saying is you had a position, which was essentially that of the State Department, which went to the White House. Defense was coming in with the Richard Perle position. But the man you were working for was on the Defense Department's side. It sounds confusing.

GOODBY: General Rowney's rear echelon man, Sam Watson, once told me that I had the toughest job in Washington. And I think he was basically right. I was, of course, representing the secretary of state. At the same time, I was vice chairman of the delegation. And I had a position that was confirmed by the US Senate. In other words, I was not, strictly speaking, a deputy in the sense that I was totally beholden to the head of the delegation. I had an independent position, which I think the title of vice chairman kind of reflected. In the event that the chairman was not there, I would be the chairman of the delegation. Of course, every agency had a representative there, and all of us nominally worked for the chairman of the delegation, but all of us at the same time were paid by our various agencies and reported to them. I had the same experience when I later became the head of the delegation myself, and it is not an easy thing to do from anybody's standpoint, whether you're the head or whether you're the deputy.

Q: It sounds like an ideal thing for the Soviets to sit back and drive wedges.

GOODBY: Well, yes. And of course they had their own set of problems. But I would say the delegation quite loyally (and I apply that to myself as well) worked for General Rowney and never really allowed the Soviets to drive wedges.

And Rowney had a pretty strict set of rules about how he wanted us to behave. He didn't really want much informal contact with the Soviets, in contrast to what most other delegations did. So we observed that; we hardly ever went out to lunch with them--never, of course, without his permission. And there really wasn't that much formal or informal contact between the Soviet and US delegations, except that that took place between General Rowney and his counterpart. What he did was, almost always (I think there was only one exception to it), he would meet alone with the Soviet ambassador, Victor Karpov, with interpreters, and I was never in those meetings, in contrast to the way Paul Nitze did it. He always met with his counterpart and always had his deputy with him, who, by the way, was Mike Lippman, a man who later took the INF negotiations.

So, in effect, the head of my delegation chose to operate pretty much on his own, and therefore the only real contact that I had with the Soviets was in the so-called post-plenary session, where everybody was paired off with his counterpart. And my counterpart was a man named Obokov, who is now vice minister of foreign affairs in Moscow, but he was the Soviet foreign minister's representative, so of course I was, generally speaking, paired with him. We sometimes rotated and I would pair off with sometimes the military, sometimes the Military-Industrial Commission representative, et cetera, but, generally speaking, it was with Obokov that I was speaking--in a highly stylized way, I have to admit, and I can't really tell you that there were any real negotiations, but we did understand where each other was coming from, and it was not a very promising negotiation.

So, when I did things like try to insert the cruise missiles and bombers into the negotiations, it was always letting Ed Rowney know about this, but always then working through the State Department apparatus, which, in turn, then had to go to the NSC to fight the battle. And we did succeed in winning that battle; we did put bombers and cruise missiles in, but at a second stage. So the first stage was, of course, going to affect the Soviets quite dramatically and us hardly at all.

So the first part of the negotiations transpired without much of anything happening, except, as I described, that one step forward.

The year '83 rolled around and not much happened again. But a rather strange episode transpired, which I will not get into in great detail because it has been in the press and it can be found there. At a certain point in time, the administration decided to replace Eugene Rostow as head of ACDA. I don't know exactly what all the concerns were, but, in any case, he was replaced with a man named Kenneth Edelman, who had been Jeane Kirkpatrick's deputy at the UN and who was kind of a political figure, a young fellow basically rather on the conservative side. And Ed Rowney thought that he should advise this incoming director of ACDA about the people he had working for him; I think he saw himself as kind of a private advisor to Edelman to tell him how he really ought to run this shop.

The long and the short of it is that he did a memorandum for Edelman saying what he thought of all the people in ACDA and what he thought also of his delegation. He gave this to Edelman, and it somehow got leaked to the press. And the press had quite a field day with it. They called it the "Hit List," because, as it turned out, General Rowney didn't think well of very many people and he had an asterisk beside the names of two or three or four members of his delegation, including me, and the asterisk said something to the effect: "Agreement at any cost," which meant, I guess, that we wanted to negotiate with the Russians. He was very harsh on the Joint Chiefs' representative; basically the asterisk in his case said: "OTL," which meant out to lunch, which was highly unfair because he was a very good man. The only man he had good words for was the representative Richard Perle, as it turned out.

Well, Rowney's career came perilously close to an end at that point. And so did Kenneth Edelman's, because there was a lot of hue and cry in the Congress about let's get rid of these people, and this is nonserious, et cetera, et cetera.

And I will say that I think I can claim personal credit for holding that delegation together for about six weeks while this was going on.

Q: It must have been very, very difficult. You know, from what you're saying--and I have to add that I think anybody reading this transcript should also read the one I did with Ralph Earle, who was also dealing with Rowney--Rowney comes across as a...and maybe I'm being unfair, but, what in popular parlance is a loose cannon. And, in a way, I mean maybe serious in his thing, but he wasn't dealing in the real world of negotiations.

GOODBY: No, Rowney had a particular point of view about how you negotiate with the Russians, which I will not say was wrong, it essentially said you just sit tight, give them the most outrageous position you can think of, and wait for them to come around. And, you know, in some cases, some places, that's the right thing to do, and I don't criticize that.

This "Hit List" also was a kind of a silly thing to do; when you talk about people, you probably ought to talk about them without leaving a paper trail. Everybody knows that sometimes you try to size people up for a new guy and say this is what I think of them. But, in this particular case, it was unwise of him; but not only unwise, it was really quite unfair in some instances. I never regarded myself as wanting an agreement at any cost, for example, nor did I believe that the admiral that was so harshly criticized was "out to lunch." In fact, he was a very good man and his career was damaged by that. I must say, I think my career was damaged by it, too. There were some people who decided to leave the delegation right then and there, and did.

But I kept it together. I kept a low profile; we never talked to the press about this at all. Ed Rowney was not there a lot of the time during that six-week period, he was out fighting for his life. And I kept it together, kept everybody more or less loyal to what we were trying to

do. And it's, I think, to my credit that the thing did pass away in time and we finally got back on an even keel.

Ken Edelman, who I think could have been blown out of the water by that, thanks me every time I see him for helping him to remain as part of the administration, and calls it "my finest hour." I don't think it was my finest hour; it was kind of an unhappy and unpleasant experience.

In any case, that's what I did, and we finally did the delegation back together, with some new people in it.

I was told by Ed Rowney at a certain point, after it had all blown over, that I probably should leave the delegation. He said to me that there was no chance that I would ever become the head of the delegation because it would not go to a State Department person. I was not quite clear just what the reasons were for his suggesting I should leave, but I took him fairly seriously at that, because, to some extent, I thought my credibility had been damaged because of all the publicity about where I stood, which in fact was quite erroneous publicity.

So, after one more round and after consulting with Larry Eagleburger, I decided I probably should leave. I went to see Larry and I told him that I thought my position was pretty close to being impossible, with all the publicity and trying to run a State Department position while at the same time working for a man who had a quite different point view from what I had, and I thought perhaps it would be better if somebody else were to go and take my place.

At the same time, I did have some ideas about how the negotiation might proceed in the future, and I developed these. And it essentially amounted to trying to correct what I did think was a not ideal position, as I told you, just with regard to strategic stability. And so I developed a position, in Geneva, which amounted to trying to get rid of MIRVed warheads by, in effect, allowing more missiles that would have single warheads and fewer missiles that would have many warheads. So that if you had, for example, six thousand warheads, you could have six thousand missiles, one warhead each, or, if you chose to have ten warheads, you could only have a very limited number of such MIRVed missiles. The idea being to try to correct the problem of these preemptive temptations of having too many weapons with too many warheads on them.

That position I basically sold to the Department of State. They accepted it, and we began to move with it in the NSC apparatus. Again, as I always did, before I even sent it to the State Department, I told General Rowney what I was thinking about and gave him a paper. At first he was rather neutral towards it; he later came out against it. But it, I believe, would have become a US government position in the fall of 1983, except that just at that moment KAL 007 took place, the shootdown of this Korean airliner over the Kamchatka Peninsula of the Soviet Union. And of course that put the whole US-Soviet relationship in the deep freeze, and any possibility of negotiating anything was then out the window.

At just about that time or shortly before, I had been notified by Eagleburger that I would be the State Department candidate to become head of a new negotiation that was going to begin in 1984 in Stockholm as a result of the Conference on Security and Cooperation's deciding to establish a negotiation on confidence-building measures, which means transparency of military activities. I was asked by Eagleburger would I do that, and in fact I had some indication that might happen, and I told him I would.

And so, in August, I think it was, I was informed I would become head of the US delegation to the...the long title is the Conference on Security and Confidence-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the shorthand was Conference on Disarmament in Europe, or CDE. It was to begin with a preparatory session in Helsinki in November and then move into the full session in January.

This was, of course, a multilateral conference, very different from the bilateral US-Soviet negotiation in that it had thirty-five countries--all the NATO, Warsaw Pact, all the neutral countries, with a grand total of thirty-five.

And the objective was, as far as the US was concerned, could we open up the Soviet Union so that it would become a more transparent sort of place in terms of military activities.

Q: Just to round this off, what happened to Rowney?

GOODBY: Well, let me begin by saying that when we began to deploy the cruise missiles and the Pershing IIs in Europe, that is to say, the intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Soviets had made it pretty clear they would walk out of the negotiations. So these deployments began in November of '83, and the Soviets did almost immediately walk out of both the INF negotiations and the strategic arms talks. So that effectively there were no negotiations from the time I left in September of '83.

There was one round, which began in September and went on through, I think, early November. Nothing happened except there was a talk about a build-down of forces. It was an idea that had been cooked up by some people on the Hill. It didn't really have much merit, but the administration decided to accept it and made some minor adjustments in its position, which had no serious impact on the real position.

But the Soviets walked out and there were no negotiations until 1985. I think the negotiations resumed in something like March of 1985. So that Ed Rowney remained head of the delegation, and a good friend of mine named Sol Polansky took my place, and the two of them cooled their heels, in effect, during all of 1984. And when Secretary Shultz finally renegotiated the structure of these negotiations with the Soviets, the president designated a whole new team. He designated Max Kampelman to be the overall leader of the delegation, and to take the strategic talks it was John Tower, and Mike Glickman became the head of the INF talks. So in effect General Rowney was no longer head of the delegation as of almost the time I left. And, although he did stay in his office with the title

of negotiator and assistant to the president and secretary of state for arms control, he never again exercised any particular influence. He actually stayed on into the Bush administration and only resigned, I think, within the past six months. But he was effectively without influence from the end of 1983.

Q: Well, one further question before we turn away from sort of the major nuclear issue. Did you run across people in the Pentagon who really sat around and figured out, well, if the Soviets only kill twenty-three million here, but we're able to kill twenty-five and hit a strategic thing...? I mean, I find that in the long run when you're talking about nuclear targeting and all this, I mean, if they're really used, we're talking about at least the end of civilization, practically. Did you find people, though, who really--and my bias is obviously showing--but who really were sitting down and playing these games? How did you feel about this, and how about the people behind this who were actually thinking about targeting? It just seems sort of unworldly.

GOODBY: Well, yes, but it isn't necessarily the military that were thinking in this way. These ideas very frequently came from civilians and from quite respectable civilians. For example, Paul Nitze has written on this subject quite publicly for quite a long time. And his basic attitude is that, in order to maintain deterrence, you must be able to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that there is no situation in which they could conceivably have what is called escalation dominance.

And the favorite case that people like Nitze use to describe the situation they're concerned about is: Supposing the Soviet Union launches a first strike against land-based US ballistic missiles. They could, with the balance being what it was in those days and I suppose still is, eliminate a very high proportion of those land-based ballistic missiles. And they could do so, because these missiles are fairly far removed from civilian centers, with fairly low casualties. When we say fairly low, we're probably talking maybe ten million or so, right? The Soviets then say to the president of the United States, "Let's negotiate a peace. And, if you don't negotiate a peace essentially on our terms, we will have to launch a counterattack. And, of course, if you launch an attack on us, we will destroy your cities." The president is then faced with the situation of either negotiating or facing the prospect of losing not ten million, but a hundred and fifty million Americans. What does he do in that situation?

Well, that's the favorite paradigm that is presented. And the answer to that is, well, you have to have the kind of capabilities that will prevent the Soviets first of all from damaging a lot of your ballistic missiles, which means you have to make them mobile and you have to hide them, et cetera, et cetera. And you have to make sure you have a sufficient residual capacity so you could actually strike back at his missiles, which means you have to have a secure second-strike counterforce, which is a lot harder to do than to have a secure second-strike city-busting, if you will, kind of force.

And that's the rationale that, actually, Jimmy Carter accepted, with the help of Zbigniew Brzezinski. And that is the doctrine we still have. Of course, the military do what they're told, and they basically have taken the position that if that's what we want, then they have to

have the warheads to hold at risk, as they put it, a very large number of Soviet targets. So the number of warheads keeps going up.

I have always felt that that was a highly fallacious and almost irresponsible way to analyze what the problems were in the world, and so do a number of others, but the fact of the matter is, our voices haven't carried. In the kind of world we're in, we are still trying to find a way to have a secure second-strike counterforce and the possibility of fighting what they call a protracted nuclear war, as though nuclear weapons were sort of like an artillery exchange in which you just keep firing at each other off and on over a year or two. And I consider that to be so unrealistic that I'm surprised anybody takes it seriously, but that's the actual position we're in right now and why I think it's so important to get on with these strategic arms reductions. Which, by the way, even as we speak, have still not been negotiated; ever since I left them, nothing has happened since.

Q: So a lot of talk, but...

GOODBY: A lot of talk; no action.

Q: All right, we're now back to '83.

GOODBY: Back to '83. I became the head of the US delegation to CDE.

Q: By the way, did you have to have Senate confirmation for this?

GOODBY: Yes, of course, I did have Senate confirmation.

Q: What about your...what was the term that Rowney used?

GOODBY: "Agreement at any cost."

Q: Did this become a problem with the Senate?

GOODBY: No, it never did; nobody took it seriously. Just to make sure that I had somebody respectable on my side, I had my senator from New Hampshire introduce me. His name is Senator Rudman and he introduced me as somebody that he knew. In fact, I had seen him quite a lot, and he knew my family, et cetera, et cetera, so he introduced me. But I don't think it was necessary because the question really never came up. Jesse Helms never put any hold on it. I did have to talk to Jesse Helms's staff, to a man named David Sullivan, whom I know fairly well. It had to do mainly with who was I going to appoint as my deputy.

Q: Jesse Helms, by the way, is a very conservative senator from North Carolina.

GOODBY: Senator Helms, I think, wanted to make sure that I had a deputy that they thought would be acceptable. As it happened, the man they had in mind was the one I had in mind, too, so it was no problem. But there was never any issue in the mind of Senator

Helms about my negotiating prowess or my attitude toward the Soviets. That's the interesting thing about it (I'm glad you brought it up), there was just no question at all. So I was confirmed.

The position that I was handed--and I say that because I had nothing to do with putting together the US position; it had all been done before I got into this job--was a fairly humdrum list of things that said let's give advance notification of military activities and have on-site inspection and observation of military exercises. These are all ground force exercises, maneuvers out in the field, that's all it is. And the zone we were talking about did not include the United States; it was basically from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Well, I was very much concerned that we were going to be faced with a large Soviet propaganda move, and I was also a little worried as to whether the Soviets were actually going to show up, since they'd walked out of all the other talks. So my first move was to go to the policy planning staff and say, "Look, here are these proposals. Can you help me in trying to put them into the larger context of what it is we're trying to do in Europe?" Because I wanted to sell these to the public, and I thought I had to sell them to the public, as something that was going to do something constructive, and how to do it was in my mind.

I got no help at all from anybody, basically. This was a negotiation that had such a low priority and was of so little interest that frankly the policy planning staff couldn't care less.

So, just to leap ahead, I had to begin to develop my own ideas. And what I did basically was to put this into the context of surprise attack and of miscalculations. I sold these ideas, as time went on, as something that was designed to reduce the risk of war. And I developed a quite elaborate theory about what the purpose of it was. And so, whenever I'd talk to the public, I would never talk about things like giving advance notification forty-five days in advance of whenever a division goes out of its barracks, because I thought that would not be understood in the larger sense. And so I always sold these things as something designed to reduce the risk of war--a new approach to arms control. And I still do that, by the way, but it was done without any help from anybody else.

Q: But it was just low priority rather than philosophic?

GOODBY: It was very low priority; nobody attached any importance to it. And my contribution in that essentially was to try to design a theory as to why we were doing these things. And I did that and sold it. And I think, because we did have public support (mainly in Europe, because in the United States the public was not very much interested), we were able to, in effect, carry the day.

One other thing. On my way to Helsinki for these preparatory talks, I stopped off in Bonn for consultation and I asked the Germans how they thought I should deal with the Soviets, what was their view. And I got some very good advice from a man--and I've never forgotten this--he said, "If I were you, I would try to have a private meeting, very early on, with the Soviet ambassador. They'll be suspicious. You will be, of course, in a position where

you've got the KAL 007 in the background. We've got the ongoing deployment of the INF missiles that are going to be a problem here in Germany, and the Soviets will probably try to make a big thing out of it. I think it's in your interest to try to meet with him and try to get things straight."

I thought it was a good idea, and so as soon as I got to Helsinki I had somebody call the Soviet Embassy, and I said I'd like to see Ambassador Grinevsky privately. I think that surprised them a little bit, but I did that, within just a day or two of the time I got there. I had a private coffee with Grinevsky in a downtown restaurant. Of course, I knew Helsinki quite well, so I picked a nice, quiet restaurant with a private room. I had with me one of my Soviet experts from our own delegation, a woman from the State Department, and I had an interpreter, of course, and Grinevsky did the same.

We hit it off very well. Grinevsky was an interesting figure. He had been involved in the negotiations on SALT in the very early days. I had never met him, but I had heard of him. And he had gotten out of arms control and had become their assistant secretary for Middle East affairs. This was his first time back into arms control in about fifteen years, or twenty years maybe. But he was quite an interesting character, and I developed a very good relationship with him.

He, by the way, then took over the negotiations on the conventional force reductions in Europe, where he still is. But that was the beginning of our relationship, and it was a good one, and I thanked the German who gave me that advice.

The Soviets, as you can see from the fact that I talked to them, did not walk out of the negotiations. We still weren't sure they'd actually show up in Stockholm, but they did.

I was co-chairman of the delegation with Secretary George Shultz. I sat beside him at the table as we heard a series of foreign ministers speak (it opened at the foreign ministers' level), and when the Soviet foreign minister spoke, it was of course Andrei Gromyko. He gave one of the harshest Cold War speeches that I've ever heard--and I've heard a lot of them. He obviously had been burned by this worldwide reaction to the shootdown of a civilian airliner, and he was fighting back, and he fought back very, very harshly.

I watched the back of Mr. Shultz's neck get redder and redder, and I was a little afraid he was going to get up and walk out. And he probably would have been justified, but we sat it out. I still have pictures of a few of us sitting there with frowns on our faces and downturned mouths and so forth; we look pretty grim.

But the funny thing is that Shultz had a private meeting afterwards with Gromyko, and it was really the beginning of the resumption of the Soviet-American dialogue. There was some serious business talked about. I was not in that meeting, but there was some serious business discussed.

So we overcame the first bad moment and went on from there.

The negotiation during most of 1984 was characterized by repeated Soviet attacks on the deployment of our American cruise missiles and Pershings in Germany. I was under quite a lot of pressure from some of the Defense members of my delegation to attack the Soviets. And I did that, but I decided that I wanted to keep the focus of the discussion on our terms and not go over totally to their subject. So I would program it so that about once every three times I would have a prepared speech. I knew what they were going to say, and I always came back, roughly one out of every three times, with my own harsh speech attacking them for something or other and defending our position.

But the strategy of keeping the focus on our subject matter and taunting the Soviets about unwillingness to negotiate was the right strategy. It carried the day: the neutrals swung around to our side; the public swung around to our side (to the extent there was any public); and we basically had the Soviets isolated within about six months.

That was helped by another one of these policymaking-by-speeches that we engaged in. I had had a talk with the Soviet delegate, Ambassador Grinevsky, outside a restaurant, which happened to be a restaurant on a boat in the harbor in Stockholm, and we'd been walking up and down the wharf. I reported this discussion, of course, and in the first paragraph I mentioned about a walk on the wharf. And of course it resonated in Washington because there had been the famous "Walk in the Woods" between Nitze and his Soviet counterpart. And, as you may know, there is a *National Intelligence Daily*, which is kind of an intelligence newspaper that gets circulated to all of the high-level officials in Washington, including the president, and they highlighted this as called "The Walk on the Wharf." It was slightly calculated on my part to try to get some attention to this poor conference, which had so little attention in Washington, and that did it.

And the basic idea that Grinevsky said is: "Why don't we take an agreement on not using force and combine with it a number of confidence-building measures?" And I thought actually that was the right approach and had already been thinking along those lines, so I reported it pretty much that way.

I neglected to say earlier that the Soviet approach, which I suspected was going to be highly propagandistic, not only amounted to an all-out attack on our deployment of INF missiles in Europe, but also was a series of proposals that we should have a ban on chemical weapons in Europe; a ban on nuclear weapons in Europe; a non-use of nuclear weapons pledge; a reduction in defense budgets as well as a non-use of force agreement; and various ideas that were essentially propagandistic.

We would occasionally launch an attack on them, but, again, the whole strategy that I designed and sold to our NATO Caucus was to say: "Let's keep talking about our proposals and show that we're ready to negotiate and they're not." And that strategy worked out very, very nicely.

The Walk on the Wharf idea commended itself to Washington, and I received a back-channel message from the Bureau of European Affairs in late May of 1984 saying did I think the president could say something useful on this idea of non-use of force and confidence-building measures in some speeches that he was going to make on a trip to Europe he was then planning for June of 1984?

And I said, "Yes, I do, and here's what he ought to say." And I sent back a paragraph saying that if the Soviets are ready to negotiate seriously on confidence-building measures (CBMs), we would be willing to discuss with them combining that with a non-use of force agreement along the lines of that already in the UN Charter.

I had some expectation that I would be told in advance what the president might say, if he was going to say anything at all, and that there would be some chance to talk with our NATO allies.

As it happens in these things, the president made the speech, with my paragraph in it, and there was no opportunity to consult at all with the allies. And I was summoned on the carpet by my NATO friends in Stockholm, who asked me why they hadn't been notified of this in advance. Because there had been some thinking, which I didn't happen to share, but some thinking that this non-use of force agreement was something that we would dump on the table at the very last moment as a way of bringing the Soviets around.

My strategy was to isolate the Soviets and bring pressure on them by basically showing we were ready to negotiate; and I thought that if we had a willingness indicated to negotiate on those terms--non-use of force plus CBMs--that this would bring more pressure on the Soviets than holding out on something we had actually agreed to anyway in the UN Charter.

And that proved to be the case, and the allies finally got over their hurt feelings. I never did tell them the speech was written by me, and I don't know whether they surmised it or not.

Q: But you can't write a speech, give it to the president, and then tell people, because you don't know whether it's going to come off or not. So there you were.

GOODBY: No, I had no idea whether it was going to be used. So I just couldn't tell them anything, and, by the time the president had given it, I thought better of any advice that I had put it into his mouth.

Well, it was the right strategy, and, within a fairly short time, the Soviets began to come around and began to talk seriously about working groups and so forth.

I had a lot of difficulty in my backstopping operations in Washington. The way these negotiations worked, you would usually work for about two months at a time and then go back to Washington and have a review. And that's what we did. Every time I went back, I always tried to make a little headway in trying to develop the position for the next round.

Richard Perle himself did not think it very important, so he basically had one of his deputies doing his backstopping, a man named Doug Feith, who was a kind of a...I won't say clone, but he thought very much the way that Richard Perle thought on these things. I had to do an awful lot of negotiating with him before I ever got to the stage of negotiating with the allies, not to mention negotiating with the Russians. And a lot of this I frankly thought was not any business of the Department of Defense at all. It was tactical issues, issues of the working groups, et cetera, et cetera. But I tolerated it and went along, and they, as a result, had quite a big voice in the mundane things that I believe a negotiator should be responsible for, namely the tactics and the pacing and so forth.

We did begin to make some headway, so that by the end of '84 we actually had set up some working groups, which meant that we were beginning to talk about things we wanted to talk about.

When Secretary Shultz left the delegation in Stockholm in January of '84, his parting words to me at the airport were (and these are almost the exact words he said): Stay close to your Soviet counterpart. Mr. Shultz I always found to be fairly laconic; he never explained to me why he wanted me to do that. I simply presumed that he felt that it was important to keep channels open to the Soviets.

And so, using that instruction from him, I came up with the idea that I should invite Grinevsky to Washington during one of these breaks in the negotiations. And I did that fairly early on. Grinevsky said because of tense relationships he didn't think he could come, but they wouldn't mind if I went to Moscow. And that I did do in the summer of 1984. I've forgotten the exact month it was now, but that began a series of back and forth--Grinevsky did come to Washington later; I went back to Moscow again--there were three such things. And that had never been done before in negotiation with the Russians, that we would have a head of delegation in session...

Q: What did you do, use the period to sort of get them to talk to your backstoppers back in Washington?

GOODBY: Yes, I did. I did part of that. And I used it to try to just bring things along. I had, of course, people from the delegation who would sit with me when he came to Washington. And I ran him around Washington; I had him go over to the White House and talk to the NSC staff. Exactly, that's what I did. I suppose he did the same thing when I went to Moscow, because he'd have somebody from the military there and so forth.

By the middle of 1985 I became pretty well convinced that we would have an agreement. And I had some personal reasons for wanting to get out of this situation that I'd been in for so long of living out of a suitcase. I guess since basically '82 I'd been doing it. Three years. I decided I probably should leave at a certain point, and I went back and told the Department of State that I thought I wanted to take some time off and just get out of it. I was a little bit fed up with the way the backstopping was going on, because it was fairly impossible for the Reagan administration to settle anything, and there was constant fighting

between State and Defense, so I was not all that happy about it. But there were other, more personal, reasons that also led to my feeling I wanted to get out. So I indicated that was the case. And a very good Foreign Service officer named Bob Barry was assigned to take my place.

I gave what I thought was going to be a farewell party (although I didn't tell anybody that in Stockholm), on the Fourth of July, where we had the head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Dante Fascell, and Steny Hoyer and a few others, and I gave quite a big reception and luncheon for them. And that was my farewell, July 4, 1985.

Well, great tragedy intervened. A great tragedy for Bob Barry, and probably in a way for the world, because his son was drowned in the sinking of a fishing boat in Alaskan waters sometime in...I think it was the middle of August.

There had been another one of my visits to Moscow laid on for late August, and my plan had been to go with him and simply to introduce him and not to really say anything substantive, because I was leaving and he was too new to have much of anything to say about the subject. And that's what I told the Interagency Committee that my plan was, that we would go to Moscow basically to meet people, and that I was not expecting to do anything more than introduce him.

He called me, all broken up, one night in August and said that he had to go to Alaska to identify the body of his son. It was the most painful thing I can imagine a father having to do. It was just awful. And he said, "Would you mind carrying on for me?" And, at that point, it was frankly not clear to me that he would ever come back to these talks. I said, "I would, Bob," and that was that.

Went back into the State Department. I'd actually already left and had become a diplomat-in-residence at Georgetown, and had a pleasant two weeks trying to get myself organized, when I was called back. I had been planning to go back anyway for that brief trip to Moscow, but I didn't think that was going to be anything more than a week or so at most.

Well, as it turned out, that was a fairly significant turning point in the negotiations, brought about by that personal tragedy. Because, when I got back, I found that the secretary of state had been speaking with the Soviet ambassador, then Dobrynin, along lines that I had been urging but that had never been accepted by the Interagency Committee, namely that it was about time for us to sit down and start negotiating an agreement. Because I was concerned that if we let that drag on and on, we'd come down to the final days and it wouldn't be so much the Soviets that would be under pressure to come up with concessions as we would be. Because it was crystal clear that all of the allies wanted an agreement (I was kind of holding them back, but we couldn't hold them back forever), and we'd get an agreement that wouldn't be as good as it would be if we started and did it in a painstaking way early on.

The Pentagon wouldn't buy that, because their argument was if we start negotiating an agreement on non-use of force (which by then had become the national policy, of course),

they'll simply pocket that and we'll never get these CBMs. And I said, "Look, leave that to the negotiators. We can handle that." But it never got through. And frankly that was one of the reasons that I was kind of fed up, because I was being told by the Pentagon how to negotiate. It had nothing to do with substance; it was just tactics.

Well, Secretary Shultz had seen this, and I had actually talked to him about it in my last meeting with him when I thought I was leaving. I told him I thought that's what we should do. So I don't know whether he talked to the president, or how he did it, but, in any case, he told Dobrynin we ought to start negotiating and let's get on with it, and he kind of put it to Dobrynin that it was their fault, which of course it wasn't. But Dobrynin got on his high horse and said, "Well, we're ready. Why aren't you ready?"

So I read that record and I realized I could not go to Moscow at that point and just say "Hi, this is Jim Goodby. How are you these days?" And I told Mike Armacost (this being August again, everybody was away and Mike Armacost was acting secretary) I said, "Mike, I can't go to Moscow, this having happened, the secretary of state having told Dobrynin we're ready to negotiate, and not have any ideas about how you might do that."

And he said, "You're right. Why don't you do a memorandum to the NSC staff." The national security advisor at that point was Bud McFarlane.

I said, "Okay." And basically the idea I had was that I would go to Moscow and get some thoughts about how we would structure working groups, which had become drafting groups that would actually draft things that we wanted done, namely the CBMs that we wanted. I don't know how McFarlane handled it--of course, as it turned out, there was a lot of stuff going on in the "Irangate" business at that time and probably they were preoccupied--but in effect I got the green light.

Now I may have made a mistake in that at that point I did not choose, nor did the NSC choose, so far as I know, to inform the Defense Department of what our plans were. And, in retrospect, perhaps we should have done that, but we did not at the time. I still regard it myself as basically a tactical matter for a negotiator to settle, and not something that required Defense Department approval anyway, but nonetheless...

I went to London first and there met, in some quadripartite talks, with Rozanne Ridgway, assistant secretary for European affairs. We met with the British and the French and the Germans in what they called the quad talks, which were rather private but had been going on for some time ostensibly under the Berlin rubric. In effect, it was used as kind of a steering group for how we would deal with the Russians and other things.

I made a presentation to this group, and all of my counterpart delegation heads from those three countries were there and heard me say what I planned to do, which was that I planned to go to Moscow to try to work out an understanding about how to begin the drafting of an agreement in this negotiation in Stockholm, and they all approved. I told them we're not

going to settle anything there. If anything happens, we'll report it back, and we can either take it or leave it. And that was the way it was left.

So, on the first of September, I arrived in Moscow. And, after sparring around with my Soviet counterpart for several hours, we finally began to talk serious business. In effect, what I did was to arrange that he would accept a series of working groups basically built around our proposals. And it was, in my mind, and still is, in my mind, a pretty good outcome, because in effect it committed the Soviets to negotiating on our terms.

I reported this discussion back-channel to the State Department. And I received telegrams of commendation, both from Mike Armacost and from Assistant Secretary Rozanne Ridgway, for what I had achieved. I received those commendations even before I went back to meet with the NATO Caucus, which happened to be meeting in Bonn in early September instead of in Stockholm.

I went back and I reported quite meticulously what had happened, and I told them I thought it was a pretty good deal. There were still some loose ends, and I said that, as I left, it had not been fully accepted by Grinevsky. He had not fully endorsed it, and I said that he has some ideas that I think we have to knock down, but I think it can be done.

There was a certain amount of consternation in the US delegation when they heard me reporting this.

I should tell you that at that point I came back from Moscow with the worst flu I ever had and I was feeling miserable. And I was in no mood to be too conciliatory towards the Pentagon, especially since I expected to be leaving anyway.

The man who was representing the Defense Department had been given some instructions by then to block, under any circumstances, any beginning of negotiations of an agreement. That was his instruction, so when he heard me talking about how we might begin actually to do this, he was terribly upset, because he could see his job kind of going down the drain. He immediately reported back to his headquarters what had been going on. And I said to him, "Look, if you want to make a complaint, go to the top, because the White House knows what I've been doing." (And indeed they did.) And I said, "There's nothing I can do for you; I've done what I've done. We'll have to, of course, work this all out with the allies. You have your crack there at shooting down the agreement, if there ever does happen to be an agreement."

Well, that resulted in Secretary of Defense Weinberger writing a letter to Bob McFarlane, complaining that I had exceeded my instructions, and he detailed just how I'd done that. Happily, since the White House already knew what I was doing, they didn't feel they had to respond. But it was just left hanging there. Again, not necessarily a happy event for me, but it did not result in my being chastised, as Nitze was when he had his famous "Walk in the Woods," because the White House knew exactly what I was going to do, as did the

secretary of state. It was a relationship with the Pentagon that I'd rather not have had, but nonetheless there it was.

Well, we went back to Stockholm from Bonn, and there I circulated a paper saying exactly where I thought we were with the Russians, and telling them that I would probably be meeting again with Grinevsky because there were still these loose ends over terminology and so forth. And the NATO Caucus said, "Okay, go ahead and see what you can do."

By this time, by the way, Bob Barry had finished his business, this tragic business with his son, and had decided he was going to come back into the negotiations. After a time, he finally did get back into them, in, I think, October or November.

My deputy, whom I had selected, never quite approved of the way I did business with the Russians. He had a rather different view of this.

Q: Who was your deputy?

GOODBY: His name was Len Hansen. He was the ACDA representative and had his own particular point of view, and I had mine. We got along reasonably well, but he just wasn't comfortable about the way I handled the Russians--just basically a different philosophy.

The way I left it with the Soviets was that anything we did had to be approved by the NATO Caucus. And, after two or three meetings, I finally did work out with Grinevsky an arrangement that I thought was okay, and I left it in the hands of my deputy basically to finish the job.

I don't know exactly what happened after I left (because I did leave in early October), but there was a little bit of static, especially with the British, about what they called this gentleman's agreement that I had struck. And I was really rather irritated by that because the British representative had been in on this from the very beginning and had approved, and knew, through all my conversations with the Soviets, that nothing was settled at all until the NATO Caucus agreed, and that I quite specifically reserved our position.

In the end, the NATO Caucus accepted essentially everything I did, word for word. And these drafting committees did get underway by the time Bob Barry came over. And an agreement was reached within a year on the basis that I had negotiated.

And that was the end of my tour as head of that delegation. It ended with mixed results: good results in terms of negotiations; rather unpleasant results in terms of my relationships with various people, which I regret. It's not known, I think, even to this day, the extent to which the White House, and certainly the national security advisor, was fully informed of this and endorsed what I did.

Which, again, was one of the unfortunate things about the Reagan administration. They never quite were able to come down on one side or the other and say this is right, this is what we want.

Q: Well, you had a secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, who was continually making speeches and all which were really the province of the secretary of state.

GOODBY: That is right. It was not until the seventh or eighth year of the Reagan administration, after Weinberger and Perle had left, that the secretary of state was really able to run foreign policy. And he had a field day and did a lot of good things in that time that could have been done earlier on. We could, today, have, probably, a strategic arms agreement that we still don't have even after beginning those negotiations, as I mentioned, in 1982. And here we are, eight years later, and we still don't have anything.

I will wind up by telling you that I went back to my diplomat-in-residence job here at Georgetown University and enjoyed it so much that I quite seriously thought I would retire. I remained as a diplomat-in-residence here for a couple of years, and in the winter of 1987 I told Ron Spiers, who was the Under Secretary for management, that I planned to retire, that I had had a long and happy career, by and large, and that I wanted to get into the academic world and sort of round out my life that way. He urged me not to do it and said, "Look, why don't I put you in for ambassador."

Incidentally, I had been up for ambassador to Turkey the year before that, in '87, I think. The secretary of state had endorsed that and it had been sent to the White House. The then-ambassador to Turkey had gotten wind of it and he shot it down. He was a man that had certain right-wing credentials.

Q: Strausz-Hup .

GOODBY: Strausz-Hup it was indeed. The White House never acted on this, otherwise I would have gone to Turkey probably in 1987, which is where I actually did want to go.

To make a long story short, it was arranged that I would be assigned as ambassador to Greece. This went through the works and took a very long time. The process began in January of 1988. I went to the White House on Groundhog's Day to have my interview to see if I was politically acceptable, and I seemed to be. The process continued for a long time. It was not until something like, I think, June, that the agrément request finally went to Athens. And nothing happened. It went on for weeks. I asked a former ambassador to Greece was that normal. He said it was not normal. He said, "You ought to have an answer within three weeks at the outside." And, after waiting just about six weeks, I finally went to the Greek Desk and I said, "Look, this is really becoming ridiculous. And I think it not only ridiculous and inconvenient for me, it is unseemly. It doesn't make us look good, and it's kind of embarrassing to me personally. It even could do me some permanent damage if this goes on this way." Well, they agreed and they sent a telegram that basically told the Greeks

to shape up and give us an answer one way or the other. And, within the day, they came back and said fine, okay, no problem, agrément.

Well, by this time, you see, it was July.

Q: Of an election year.

GOODBY: Of an election year. President Reagan called me to inform me that he was appointing me ambassador to Greece. I thanked him. We had a pleasant conversation. I mentioned that I had seen him give a talk to the Atlantic Council a couple of days before, where I had also been a speaker just before lunch and he was the speaker after lunch, and so we had a pleasant laugh over that. And so my name went to the Senate.

(I'm telling this story in a little detail because it's kind of typical of the way things work.)

I went down to see the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Claiborne Pell. I think the date was the 29th of July, 1988. There was about one week left, I think, before the Democratic National Convention was going to take place, and it was already clear that Governor Dukakis was going to be named the Democratic standard-bearer. I went with a man from the Congressional Relations Office of the State Department, a political appointee. The two of us got into Claiborne Pell's office, and, before I could do much more than say hello, how are you, he said, "We are not going to act on your nomination at this time." He said that if Governor Dukakis is elected, he no doubt will have his own candidate, or may, at any rate. In the back of my mind was "Greek-Americans."

Q: Dukakis being Greek-American.

GOODBY: Yes. He said, "On the other hand, if George Bush is nominated and elected, then probably he'll reappoint you."

I said, "Well, why don't we just have the hearings anyway, and then we can settle all that later on."

He said, "No, I don't think we want to do that."

And so, after a few pleasantries, we left. On the way out to our car, I asked my colleague from the Congressional Relations Office of the State Department what I should do now. And he said, "Retire."

Well, I thought maybe that's what I should do, and began to think again in terms of going back into academia.

The thing simmered along from late July to November. And, sometime around Thanksgiving, I had a call from the White House. I was told that the president has decided

to go ahead with recess nominations for quite a few jobs. This was, of course, after the election and Bush already was the president-elect. And I said, "Well, does President-elect Bush or his team know about these recess appointments?" And the answer was they did not know. I said, "Well, let me think about this overnight and I'll get back to you in the morning." It was then late afternoon.

That night, I called the director general of the Foreign Service, George Vest. He did not know about these recess appointments. I said, "Can you find out whether the new team knows about this, because I'm not sure I want to go to Greece unless this is something that the president-elect knows about and approves."

Again, I had in the back of my mind the Greek-Americans, because obviously, the election being the way it was, both sides had some reason to appoint a Greek-American to Athens, and I just saw myself going there for a few months and being kicked out. And I didn't want to repeat my Finnish experience, where I'd been there for not very many months before I saw that I was leaving.

So George checked out the thing and called me the next morning. He said, "They did not know about it, and, not only that, they're unhappy about it." A few days later, he said, "I've talked also with the secretary of state-designate," (remember, the secretary of state was named right away by George Bush) "and he doesn't like it at all."

And I said, "Uh oh, this doesn't look good to me."

I called around to a few other of my friends who had been also named in this category, and they all just decided to accept. I checked it out with Ron Spiers. He said, "You know, if I were you, I wouldn't do it."

So, rather reluctantly, I called back the White House and said, "I don't think I want to take this recess appointment. I'd rather take my chances with the new administration when it comes in and see if they're ready to declare their position for me or give me some other position."

They said, "Okay, if that's what you want."

So I was the only one of some, I think, thirty-five people (not all Foreign Service, of course) that turned down that recess appointment in November of 1988.

And I didn't get the appointment to Greece. I remained on the records ambassador-designate to Greece, but, as it turned out (and I learned this later from a man who worked for the president-elect, a man named Sam Watson, by the way, whom I mentioned earlier), it had been decided much earlier than that by the president that he would appoint a Greek-American.

It turned out to be a man that had apparently arranged that the Greek-American Orthodox archbishop of North America would sit beside Barbara Bush at the nominating convention of the Republicans. This man arranged this, and the spotlight was on them long enough for the picture to come across that Greek-Americans were not all for Dukakis.

In any case, the decision had been made before I ever turned the thing down that they would have their own candidate. And I thought that might be the case, so I decided it wasn't a very auspicious beginning for that kind of a job. And there it was.

I never did get the appointment to Greece, by the way, as you can tell.

Not too long after that, I was asked by the inspector general of the department of state if I would come back into the State Department once again and do the first inspection that had ever been done of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I told him that I knew a lot about the agency, I probably had biases, and that he should be aware that I had had these various episodes with General Rowney and the secretary of defense, and that he should be careful. He said, "I know all about that. Don't you worry. I want you in the job." So I accepted.

That led to my leaving my job at Georgetown, by the way, but I did decide I'd go back in and do the thing. I frankly had some hopes that the administration would find a job for me, since I didn't think there was any reason for them not to find a job for me, but that's another matter.

Went back in. I did this job for them; produced a report. It is being acted on even today--it takes a long time to do some of these things. Did a couple of other inspections for them, some special things that the inspector general wanted done. And still nothing had been offered to me by this new administration. I decided I would leave, and so I retired on June 2, 1989.

Received very nicely the Distinguished Service Award of the Department of State from Larry Eagleburger's hands. I might tell you that in '85, when all of this business with the secretary of defense was coming out, I also received the Presidential Distinguished Service Award. There is some indication my services were not totally unappreciated in the White House and the Seventh Floor of the State Department.

But that was the end of my Foreign Service career. I went, the next day, out to Stanford and spent a very pleasant summer there considering whether I would take a job they offered me. In the end, I turned it down and went to Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh instead. So that's the end of it.

Q: Well, that's not the end of it. I mean, it's all a continuing story. But now I want to thank you. I think you've given some remarkable insights into not only what you did, but also how the process works, or it doesn't work, or what have you.

GOODBY: It's a pretty grim process.

Q: It's a pretty grim process, but this is what we're trying to get.

GOODBY: You know, it's funny, but, as I look back on all of these administrations, I think the happiest and most agreeable experiences I had were during a very short time of the Kennedy administration. Because I had a sense we were all on the same team, we were all working for the same thing, and it was really the most liberating kind of experience that I have ever had. After that, I can't say I ever had it so good in terms of feeling that the whole administration, and not just the State Department or the Foreign Service or the European Bureau or whatever wants this, the whole administration wants it. If all the administrations could recapture that sense of teamwork, we'd be doing so well. Maybe this one does, I don't know, I'm not in it. So that's the story.

Q: Well, I thank you very much. Fascinating.

End of interview