The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR ARTHUR ADAIR HARTMAN

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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[Note: Ambassador Hartman did not complete editing this interview prior to his death. His editing stops after his departure from London in 1967.]

Q: Tell me where you were born and something about your family.

HARTMAN: I was born in New York City in a hospital that has since disappeared. It is now a garage under or next to the 69th Street Bridge. My parents and my brother were living on Long Island at the time, in Flushing, New York and that is where I grew up -- quite different from the place it is now. Today, Flushing's Chinatown is one of the biggest outside of Asia, but I believe our house is still there as we left it. I lived in Flushing until the age of seventeen -- or from 1926 to 1943. At the time, it was not a Chinese-Indian-Korean community, but a different mix of Long Islanders, with some very old residents, people who went back to the original Quaker settlement (Flushing was one of the very first Dutch settlements). The oldest Quaker Meeting in America was right there on Northern Boulevard in Flushing.

Q: Give me the background of both your parents please.

HARTMAN: My parents were married six years before. They both came from fairly recent immigration, both from Europe. My father's father died when my father was about twelve. He went right to work and attended night school to learn speed writing, maybe even shorthand, which he used quite a bit during his lifetime. I think he took night courses at Johns Hopkins at various times later in life but he had no formal education. One cousin said the family had moved from Alsace in Napoleon's time because it was a rough time for Jews. They had grown grapes in Alsace and so they moved to the wine growing area in Hungary, near Tokaj, but they then acquired a flour mill on the main river to become flour merchants in the town called Miskolc, in the eastern part of Hungary. Apparently, a flood wiped out their mill along with their entire production around the end of the nineteenth century and, being the sixth child in the family, my grandfather Sigmund immigrated to the States around 1870. He then started a business in Baltimore, importing porcelain china from Hungary. He met my grandmother there.

Her name was Jackson, but I'm sure it was Jacobson before that. They had come from New Orleans and her father was an iron merchant -- that is, he designed iron things. It may be mythology but he is said to have designed the main gate going into Arlington Cemetery. My grandfather Sigmund had been married before and had a daughter who,

after they were married, came to live with them. The great mystery in our family is what happened to that daughter. My grandmother, who in many ways was an old battle-axe, pushed her out of the house after my Grandfather died of a burst appendix.

After my parents were married in the beginning of the twenties, my grandmother lived with us on Long Island most of the year, although her house was in Washington DC, where I used to visit her quite often. She would take me around on trolley cars. The station master at Union Station was married to one of her sisters, and used to play in the Sousa band. He was a character I was taken to visit when I was a child, usually when I visited at the Easter holidays. One of my memories of him was that he always pulled quarters out of my ears. Another was that his apartment overlooked an approach to a black cemetery and the marching bands would pass by. He knew many of the people in the bands, although Washington was a strictly segregated town in those days, including on the trolleys. We would go egg rolling on the White House lawn and I can remember my Grandmother's stories about small town Washington society -- including how she and another sister dressed up in all their finery to attend a reception President Cleveland gave after his marriage.

My mother's side was Jewish as well. My grandfather Eddy was born in Odessa, and, according to family mythology, made his way across Europe by various means. He started out as a singer; he used to sing in churches. He had a boy-soprano voice but finally his voice broke when he was in school in Berlin. So he took up trumpet. He played in a band on the North German Lloyd Line and got himself to the United States in 1880. First he went out to what is now North Dakota; it was the Dakota territories at the time. I remember him telling stories about his days out there. There was a German baron who bought a lot of land out there to settle these Eastern European Jews on because he didn't want them living in New York and undermining the good repute of the German Jews who considered themselves higher class. I remember visiting North Dakota at the 100th anniversary of its statehood in 1989, and there was a chapter in the commemorative books on the Jewish immigration in the Dakota territories. My grandfather Eddy stayed out there a few years. And there were stories of selling cigars to Indians and running a train through a barrier. As you can see there were no great tales of good farming. I'm afraid he and his friends were not very good farmers. So he drifted back to the east and got into the real estate business. He lived in New York most of his life.

I think my grandmother came from what is now some part of Poland or maybe Russia. They settled in New York. My mother grew up in New York and met my father when he was in the navy in the First World War. He got influenza and went off to a sanitarium in upper New York State. I think he started to do some work while he was still in the navy involving psychological testing in Saranac, NY. They used people who had been evacuated for various jobs. Then he went into the paper business, first in Chicago and then back in New York.

I became very ill coming out of the hospital after my birth with a blood disease called staphylococcus. This was before they had antibiotics. A young intern at the hospital decided to bleed me. He cut my shoulders open and put my father's blood into my ankles,

changing my blood without knowing anything about blood typing (this was 1926). Thanks to him, I got through this staphylococcus infection; one of the only cases to have done so. My middle name, Adair, is that doctor's name. He later became head of Sloan Kettering, a center that specializes in cancer. My parents decided that it would be safer for my brother to live with my mother's sister for a year, while I recovered from my infection.

Although this was a time of great economic distress, with the Great Depression in 1929, my family was spared many of the hardships many others endured. At home, I don't remember being affected by the Depression too much. We were lucky enough to have my father, who was a man of many talents. The business he started with a friend, Barclay's Tissue, was involved with tissue manufacturing; it made Kleenex and tissue towels, and the manufacturing was mostly centered in Brooklyn. Although my father often talked about the Depression, I did not feel it at home so much because his business got the family through a rough time. We even helped people work some, and at that time we had a couple household servants. There were some social activities to raise money for various things. My father's business took up most of his life and I can remember sitting around the dining room table stapling samples of his product in very well designed folders that were then put in envelopes and sent out to potential customers. One of my father's talents was design. He did all the design of the boxes for Barclay Tissue. I also remember the pictures he would draw and his wonderful handwriting. But seeing my father lead the life of a business man convinced me I absolutely did not want to become one. He was constantly yelling at people on the phone, and worried about his company. I had an absolute abhorrence of business. Watching my father and seeing the strains and stresses he went through to get this business going, to get and keep this business going, because it was a one man affair; I rejected the idea of it. He had no partners. He created and ran it. I didn't want to go into business. My older brother was always the one that my parents expected to take on the company, but I don't think he ever took much of a liking to the idea.

I went to Bayside High School which, at that time, was a new high school built in the '30s in the north end of Flushing. I was always pretty academic, always involved in the educational side. I had some outstanding teachers. One was in government -- I think it was called civics at the time -- and he encouraged me to do all kinds of things. He gave me extra work and we had an honor society. One big writing project was on comparative religions. I think I was drifting away from my Jewish roots in that process. I read, not deeply, about Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, etc, and developed a thesis according to which most religions shared as common bases the same values and that the rest was mythology. I used to do cross country as well, and that was about it for sports. We also had a pool at school and I used to swim but I was not on a team. I did well in school, but my parents were less enthusiastic about my brother's performance and I was always the "good boy" of the two. His year living at our aunt Esther's must have had an impact on him, especially the fact that I was the reason for his departure.

Q: While you were in school, is there anything that sticks out in your mind? Did you do much reading, any activities that would make you standout?

HARTMAN: The family was very interested in music and my mother played the piano. We would go to concerts -- the symphony, the opera -- so I got very interested in that as a child. My aunt, Esther Ostrolenk, was a singer. We used to visit her a lot. She lived in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. We had a close relationship with her and her husband, Bernard, who was a professor of economics at Penn and later at CCNY (City College of New York). My uncle wrote several books on farm economics with Margaret Mead's father who taught at Penn. So they were big influences on me, notably my uncle who always pushed me to get the best education I could, and who probably was one of the reasons I got interested in Harvard; he would always talk about university. He led a couple tours during the summer to Eastern Europe and places where he came from. In fact, he came from Poland and still spoke a combination of Polish and Yiddish; a very intellectual type. He and his brothers were all scientists or professors of various kinds. He was the oldest in the family and he brought his brothers to the US and then put them through university. One became a famous patent lawyer and another was a scientist. Anyway he was a great influence on me; he would go to Paris, Rome and all these places when my childhood was devoid of any foreign experience. I was collecting stamps and post cards at the time, and that was the one foreign feature of my childhood.

It was pretty much a small town life. At that time Flushing and Bayside were small towns. We had a boat out on Long Island Sound and we sailed. I enjoyed reading and our house was full of books. I remember the "Seven Pillars of Wisdom" for example and Durant's history of the world. The radio was coming along and there were a lot of things that were beginning to impinge on the reading time. I can remember hiding under the covers with a crystal radio and listening to the Lone Ranger from WXYZ in Detroit. I also built with a friend a backpack radio I could listen to on my bike. It was a very bulky thing with vacuum tubes. Bicycling was my favorite outside activity. My friends and I discovered an old road near Flushing (that has now been eradicated by the Beltways) that had been constructed by the Vanderbilts and others to get to their homes in Westbury. It was totally unused when we came across it (there were still farms around Flushing in those days) and we found that with a few digressions we could go all the way to Lake Ronkonkoma and Roosevelt Field -- now a giant shopping mall. The only friends from that period that I still see are those from my scout troop, which meets every year for the annual reunions. Scouting was a big thing in my life. We were Troop Number One because Dan Beard, the founder of Boy Scouts of America, was our founder and a long-time resident of Flushing before he moved to upper New York State. We used to go visit him and there were all kinds of activities out at Theodore Roosevelt's house because he was a friend of Dan Beard's.

Q: You were in high school during most of the war. Did you follow the war through newspapers, radio and all that?

HARTMAN: By the time I got to high school, it was 1940, and I remember I was traveling with my father in upstate New York. In the hotel, we heard on the radio that France had been invaded. It was a shocker. I don't think Americans at the time could easily grasp that war was that close. Of course, the big debate was partially dominated by

the isolationists. My father was very much in favor of getting into the war as soon as possible. He thought that was the right side to be on and eventually we were going to have to get involved, so he was very much against the America Firsters even though my mother had been involved in the peace movement. She had been an active member of the Quaker community, and spent a lot of time doing social work with them, and so pacifism was probably her first instinctive position on the war. She also ran across a Marine general leading the peace movement. He was one crazy guy who had fought in Central America, Fulton or some name like that. They used to have these rallies at Town Hall in New York but she quickly dropped all of that when the war began in Europe. Then my parents both got into a lot of Red Cross work. My father, a very civic kind of person, became the head of the Red Cross on Long Island as well as head of the scouting there. He went on to head the board of Flushing Hospital.

To some extent, I did realize what was going on in Germany because there were a couple of Germans in our class, including one girl who took a shine to me and pursued me when I was going with someone else. But I didn't understand much beyond the fact that they had to leave their country. A few came into the congregation while we were still going to the synagogue there. I can remember as a child fearing that the Germans might land on Long Island and round us all up. But I must say that didn't affect our lives very much. My brother finally got into the service in 1942. We followed it then. As a faithful reader of the New York Times, I started following the war closely, and there was a lot of discussion in school about it. The scouts were in all kinds of activities like collecting paper for the war effort. Then of course there were the losses that began to come in, some of whom were older scouts my brother and I had known. Later, after I was at Harvard for six months, I joined the army myself and got into the Army Air Corps; that was when my real experience began.

Q: You graduated from high school in about '44?

HARTMAN: But when I graduated from high school, I spent only six months at Harvard before going into the service. I went to Harvard for the summer of 1943. They had this year-round program to process as many as possible into the army, so I stayed at Harvard for three terms in total. My uncle had finished his career as a full professor at CCNY and he really pushed me to get the best education I could get, and so I tried to get into Harvard and succeeded. I was a government major and very much into constitutional law, political theory and things like that and a little bit of economics. I didn't really like economics. I later met my wife and it turned out she had more economics courses than I had even though I was later hired as an economist. I got very interested in international subjects at Harvard. Rather than put us as freshmen altogether in the Yard, they put us immediately into the Houses because the Yard was full of Navy. My neighbor up the stairway was Professor Salvemini, who, just before 1 got into the army, was airlifted out and plunked down in Rome as the first prime minister of liberated Italy. We used to talk and have meals in the dining hall with residents like the former Chancellor of Germany, Brüning, who was in the next stairwell over in our house. We all used to eat together in the dining room. So there was a lot of talk between these stars and us students. There was also William Yandell Elliott, considered a great Professor in the Government department,

but whom I always saw as a blow-hard on his Oxford experience and a convinced racist. I took his course, however, and found it interesting and it broadened my outlook on the great political thinkers in England of the late nineteenth century. My close friend at that time was a Junior Fellow, Frank Whitfield, who wrote a Russian grammar book and taught Russian at Harvard. We all lived together there in Lowell House. There was a lot of discussion around the table. I really learned the most from contact with that group of people, the Senior Fellows, who were around and available for discussion. Then there was Professor Fred Watkins, who taught political theory. He was a singer and also played the recorder. I took up the recorder and we would play up in the Russian bell tower in Lowell House. This was an intensely intellectual period of my life which I lived with much excitement, having come from a high school that was pretty plain vanilla. I turned 18 in March 1944, and since prior to that I had volunteered for the Army Air Corps, I barely finished my third term there and left for service.

I went off to Fort Devens and then into pilot training in Biloxi, Mississippi, but never got that far because they were full of pilots by then and were "washing" everybody out. Then I became a radio operator, still a buck private, and trained at Scott Field, Illinois, where I learned my radio operator skills and then got into an air transport training group. I was in various places like Charleston and Reno. We ended up in Nevada because we were going to fly over the Himalayas between India and China, nicknamed "the Hump," and there was a mountain right at the end of the runway in Reno. The powers thought that would be a dandy place to practice going over the "Hump." Right about the time the war in Europe ended, which was the Spring of 1945, with the war with Japan still going on, I was shipped overseas to a wonderful place called "Dum Dum" airport outside of Calcutta. We went via Casablanca, Cairo, and finally over to India via Iran. All of that was totally new to me. We had stops at each place so I was able to get into town and see what it was like; a rather hasty way to see the world! I finally ended up in Dum Dum and was part of the group flying from Dum Dum into Chungking and Kunming. I only participated in a few flights because the war was over and they were beginning to redeploy people.

I had a very minor part in the war. I got in at 17 and it was virtually at the end of the war when I got over there. So I didn't see any of the tough fighting and didn't come back psychologically scarred. For me it was almost a lark. I spent time in India. It really was a terrible time in Calcutta because of the famine and people were literally dying on the streets, so that was quite a shock. We had an episode at the base where some crazy American doctors felt there was a disease being spread by the monkeys in the trees and had a plan to come and kill all the monkeys. Finally, somebody had enough sense to understand they might have the biggest riot on their hands with the Indians coming in and tearing us apart for killing all their animals. I remember there was lots of discussion and fear among the people that this guy was about to take us into some very bad times. Some of the officers led an opposition group -- everybody had their pet monkey. They were in and out of all the tents.

We flew with supplies of various things such as gasoline; we would stop at intermediate bases in upper Assam in Burma and then flew on to Kunming and Chungking. By that time we would go on little side trips with some colonel who would be flying the plane

and who would say "Hey I'd like to see Everest." So we would get a view of Everest. We flew various kinds of planes and one time the B-24, which was known to catch fire easily, was used as the plane to carry gasoline. We couldn't smoke at all on that flight. Otherwise we used C-46s, which looked like cigars and whose wings flapped -- great for going through pockets of air and dropping a couple thousand feet-- or B-25s -- for joy riding.

I remember one of our big jobs was to go to Kandy in Ceylon to take the personnel at Lord Mountbatten's headquarters to Singapore, on their way back from the war. So we flew from Ceylon to Penang and then smaller planes took them from there.

Q: Did you get any feel for the Mountbatten headquarters took on almost imperial –

HARTMAN: The biggest impression I had from Mountbatten's headquarters, I think, was the beautiful women surrounding them. But there and in Calcutta was my first brush with British forces. I was a kid just out of Harvard and I went to town. Despite the fact I was a private, I tried to get into the club in the center of town and was discriminated against royally. They only took officers.

That was also my first brush with China. It was quite a shock seeing Chiang Kai-shek's troops kill so-called profiteers who had just bought cartons of cigarettes from some American crewmen. I was very naive at the time, and very opposed to Chiang Kai-shek, because I saw corruption everywhere along with brutality in law enforcement. But I certainly had no idea what the alternative was, and didn't know any of Mao's policies well at all. It was also a lesson in economics and money· -- some of the cigarette cartons traded by Americans were filled with sand and as long as you did not open them, they were as good as gold. Cigarette trading was a big activity among American servicemen; many cartons on our transport planes.

I was then transferred to a little airline that was created to run between Tokyo, Shanghai, Manila, and Canton. We flew there a couple of times and finally I ended up being stationed in Honolulu at Hickam Air Field. Because I could write, they made me an inspector. They were worried that, as people were being let out of the service, the various facilities would not be up to par. I would go out and test the air guidance systems. That took me to a bunch of islands, Kwajalein, Guam, as well as back to Manila and China. I later discovered in a talk with Mike Blumenthal, former Secretary of the Treasury, that when I was flying into Shanghai, he was working in the Post Exchange at the airport. His family was from Germany and fled when Hitler came to power. They had traveled across Siberia, converting to Catholicism to hide their Jewish roots from the Japanese. At the end of the war, he applied for both a South African and an American visa (he was still German at the time) and said he would take the first one that came. Luckily for our country, he received the American visa first. He later went to college in California and went on to his subsequent career.

Then it was very close to getting out of the service time and they gave us a choice of flying old planes back or taking a ship. When I inquired as to who was taking care of the

airplane maintenance, it turned out the best maintenance people had already left. I decided I would take a boat to get home. We came in at San Francisco and they put us on a train to Ft. Dix, New Jersey. In '46 I went back to Harvard.

All the guys who had been in V-l2 navy training at Harvard were invited to come back. So my class, which I think was one of the biggest, was full of V-12, a program that trained people to be navy officers.

It was a diverse class. We only happened to know each other if we were in the same house, but we later got to know each other through reunion activities. There were various activities, clubs, things like that I got involved in when I came back, mostly linked to international things. I got very interested in China, which was a recurrent subject of discussion at that time. General Marshall was sent out to China to see whether he could bring Chiang Kai-shek together with the communists. I knew nothing of Chinese history, but from my experience I was very much of the opinion they needed a change there. I was not very much acquainted with communism nor what communism was doing. When I was stationed in Dum Dum, I wrote letters that were very disparaging of Chiang Kai-shek. The corruption I could see all around the country I attributed to the Kuomintang and the way it ran the country. I think if I reread those letters today, I would think "God what a naive kid."

I was very much against the left wing youth groups however. I had a girlfriend who was politically involved with the Wallace camp, and I got politically involved with the Truman campaign and felt that Wallace had been taken in by a bunch of people. I heard him speak because he was a friend of my uncle's. It just seemed to me that he was the kind of person that overlooked a lot of things in the political situation and was working from his heart and not his head. I was very much on that side of things and probably influenced by people of a similar point of view who knew more about it than I did. This was leading up to the '48 campaign.

We had some professors who came back to Harvard during that period and who were beginning to write the terms of the occupation statutes; they had been high up in the administration planning things like economic warfare. I remember for example Professor John Fairbanks beginning to have influence on government policy and what was going to happen in Japan. In my classes, I wrote mostly about political theory and about law and the basis for all laws. I got very friendly with Professor Friedrich whose specialty was political theory. He wrote the book on Althusius with Watkins. I was very fond of political theory starting as early as the Greeks. I took several courses and got to know the professors. In general, I was very much interested in why things began and how they began. But notwithstanding the interesting things that were happening at Harvard, my memory of that period is that I was trying to get through as fast as possible.

*Q: What were you pointed towar*ds?

HARTMAN: With this speeded up course schedule, and taking more courses, I went to the famous George Marshall commencement speech although I had two more credits to

get that summer before I got my degree. I graduated in September 1947, but still attended commencement in June. The speech left me nonplussed to tell the truth, even though I had enormous respect for Marshall. Then it was on to law school. I wasn't enthusiastic about that, but it was there. It was just assumed I was going to go to law school, and Roscoe Pound was teaching basic law and constitutional law. I got to be very good friends with him. A long-time Harvard Law School Dean, he became one of the most cited legal scholars of the twentieth century. He taught both at the college and the law school and I think I got into the law school based on his recommendation.

But after a while it became clear. I didn't like it -- hated it, hated it. I was attending law school and roomed with my roommate from college, which was a great mistake because he was an astrophysicist, David Layzer. Everybody else roomed with somebody from the law school so they could constantly be doing law together; that's the traditional way of getting through law school. We lived in downtown Boston. I was pursuing Donna on the side for part of that time. She was down at Wheaton College in Norton, Massachusetts. That probably accounted for my lack of interest in what I was doing. But some classes were of some interest. I had a very good and amusing fellow who taught criminal law. Then there was Archie Cox, who taught contracts, and who I later got to know when I worked for Elliot Richardson. But all in all everybody was so intense about it, and they were wrapped up in what I considered to be a lot of verbiage. I kept thinking about what the law should do instead of how it had worked in the past. So I was never comfortable.

In the spring of '48, I got a call from Robert Wright, a distant cousin of mine who lived in Washington. His father had worked for the National Park Service and was put in charge of Catalina Island, off the coast of California, where his talents so impressed the head of Wrigley (the chewing gum mogul) that he was put at the head of the Wrigley company. Anyway, Robert had been hired as part of the Marshall Plan in Paris. He said, "How would you like to go to Europe with the Marshall Plan?" At the time, David Bruce was beginning to put a team together. It was a no-brainer. I said "I would love it. Just let me finish this term at law school." I didn't think I would ever last three years at law school, And I did so poorly that I'm sure I would not have lasted. The more I sat around at law school, the less I thought of spending my life doing that kind of thing and when the offer came to go to Paris, I jumped at it. This opportunity was more in the nature of the kind of experience where you could influence events, where you could be a part of history, and it seemed so much more important and so much more interesting a life than a life as a lawyer, which seemed kind of humdrum to me. I think there is a psychological thing too; you have to look at yourself. In any case, years later all my law school classmates were envious of the interesting work I was doing while they slaved away as junior lawyers exploited by high-rolling partners.

They started a clearance process and I had all summer after the term ended so I joined something called the Survey Research Center which had just been started at the University of Michigan by a fellow named Likert. I interviewed people in order to get information about what was going on where they were serving and his particular project, which I later found out was financed by Naval Intelligence, consisted of interviewing people who had lived or worked in Russia under the communist regime. They were either

Russians who had immigrated, Americans who had served over there, or convinced communists. I wandered all summer around New York City knocking on doors of people who were quite sure I was from the FBI. We were given a bunch of names. I would ask questions about what it was like to live there, where they got their food, what the bureaucracy was like -- building up a body of knowledge of exactly how the system was operating. But instead of archival material, we were getting indirect information based on people's recollections. I had a wonderful time with Professor Mosely from Columbia; he had lived in Moscow during the war in some position in the Embassy. Eventually, my clearance came through, and in September I went to Washington. Alter an interview, I was briefed and assigned to David Bruce's mission to France as a junior economist.

I was hired as an economist to work within the Economic Cooperation Agency's Mission to France, headed by David Bruce. It was specifically a French reconstruction program, and a component of the Regional mission headed by Averell Harriman, which coordinated all Marshall Plan policy and activities in a devastated Europe. Our mission only involved the coordination of the Marshall Plan in France. Americans knew very little about the complexity of Europe's history, and we were attempting to change everything to a new pattern.

One of the interesting things, which I only learned as I was there and talked to people like David Bruce and others, was that, during WWII, a committee was formed in Washington to plan what would happen in Europe after the war. It was an inter-departmental affair, more or less led by the Treasury. That's where the famous Morgenthau Plan came from, the plan that would have made Germany the breadbasket of Europe -- a strictly agricultural place. But along the way there were sub-committees and other groups that were working on sketching a post-WWII future for Europe, and they came up with the idea that, in any kind of reconstruction aid we gave Europeans, a condition should be unification and the elimination of economic barriers between countries. That became the basis for US policy in Europe for the years to come, and a defining principle of European reconstruction.

American strategic vision later got more and more refined, aiming at removing barriers between countries, and that became the modus operandi of the Marshall Plan. We offered to give money but we affirmed that we would not decide where it went, and we said the Europeans had to get together to plan the use of these funds. So they formed the Organization for Economic Cooperation (OEC), which divided the Marshall Plan funds among the European recipients. Then we had a bunch of committees that shared the experience of what worked and what didn't work from country to country. On those committees were representatives of American industry, labor, all kinds of technology groups, transportation, coal and steel, and things like that. It was a big operation, taken largely from our wartime experience organizing the war effort in Washington. A lot of these guys had worked in the various initial agencies during Roosevelt's time. That's how Paul Hoffman got to Washington, as well as Stettinius, Forrestal, and Acheson -- all those people. The same pattern continued in the Marshall Plan with American people from the private sector working on particular parts of European industry.

Our Mission was located on No.4 Avenue Gabriel, right next to the Embassy, and included a Trade, a Finance, and an Overseas Territories Division. I was in the Trade Division, which was headed by George Wood, a man from the Federal Reserve in Washington. I really got my on-the-job training from him. The Marshall Plan was put in place to finance the reconstruction of Europe while maintaining an influence as to how the process was carried out. Our task was to follow the actual uses of the imports financed by the Marshall Plan, and to assure ourselves that these imports were being properly used. The general system was that imports were financed by U.S. dollars after the European countries themselves decided how to split up American aid. When the imports arrived in France and were sold by the French government for industrial or infrastructural projects, the francs received as payments were put into a counterpart account that was then used by the French Government for national projects that we as a Mission had to approve. Thus we got a double use from our funds.

During the first couple of years, Donna and I basically didn't participate in the diplomatic life as such. At the beginning, I don't think I ever went to a diplomatic party. In the ministries that we were dealing with, there wasn't a whole lot of socialization between us, due to the fact that, of course, we were very junior officers. David Bruce, on the other hand, had a great social life and was well known; he was a remarkable man. He could focus on the most mundane kinds of problems in the office and then turn around and go to some big ball out in Versailles, dressed up in some eighteenth century costume. David and Evangeline were just absolutely marvelous that way and they were good for us as young people. I remember this well and so does my wife, all these years later. We learned a great deal from them, going to parties at their house, seeing how they entertained, seeing how they used entertainment to open up pretty closed social circles; we basically got to understand how to get in contact with people in a much more relaxed way. That stayed with us throughout my career.

I think my first salary was something like twenty-eight hundred dollars a year and it gradually went up from there. We had a housing allowance, but it was a modest one, and France was still very affected by the Occupation period-this was 1948. There was rationing when I first arrived, buildings hadn't been rebuilt, and it was kind of a mess. So we started off in a one room apartment, then we had our first child, David, in 1950, and on to two rooms and so forth. During the six years or so I was in France, I think we moved about seven times, slightly up-market each time I would say, even sampling a little bit of the country life when we rented a house bordering the Versailles park. We made many French friends out of the people whom I worked with, although they were not immediately personal friends. We kept in touch with them, and they became personal friends when I went back as Ambassador years later. The personal friends that we made at that time were much more in the sort of bowels of society and in the arts. They were young people like ourselves, sometimes in the neighborhoods where we settled. Actually, one of my oldest and closest friends was our neighbor in one of the buildings that we lived in. He went on to become a big banker. Despite the French reputation for standoffishness and cultural pride and all those kinds of things, I think we made some very fast and close friends.

The great opportunity for me was that young people were very much included in the dynamic of the time. David Bruce was a marvelous man and he created a team around him that was extra-ordinary. He mostly picked very young fellows who knew what they were doing, and he stayed very accessible to them. I was part of this young contingent myself and remember meeting this very bright man -- Bruce -- with a Maryland accent, who was a prestigious figure, from a distinguished family. Throughout my career in Paris, I worked under his indirect supervision, as he left the ECA mission in 1949 to become the Ambassador to France. His principal deputy at the mission was Henry Labouisse, who succeeded him as head of mission. Next down the line was the Treasury Attaché, Bill Tomlinson; he was the most imaginative fellow. He had not been in the forces during the war because he had a hole in his heart from rheumatic fever as a child. When I first worked for him he was 28. He died at 34. He was an exceptional person and a great influence on me. Bill was there as the chief economic advisor to David Bruce. He could visualize all kinds of mathematical formulas in his head without having to write them out; he had an instinctive way of looking at problems before the widespread use of the national accounts system. Tomlinson was key to our team in Paris, because just as David Bruce was the man of prestige, bright, old school, who enjoyed his vacations and weekends, Bill was the workaholic, saying, "This is what we do next boys." My immediate boss, George Wood, would come up to me and say, "You know I'm a PhD in economics, and I go through all the calculations. When I explain problems to Tomlinson, he reaches conclusions without all the calculations. He's decided that the way to get at this inflationary problem is to take this amount out, and he looks around on various accounts, because he knows that it must be found inside the agricultural sector, or he knows that there's something happening on the collection of custom duties." Tommy had an instinctive way of approaching complex economic problems that thoroughly impressed everybody, even though he was resented by more formally trained economists who were around in the mission for his ability to work much faster than them and for his close relationship with top French administrators. He attracted sympathy not only for his abilities but also because of his fragile physical condition. Tommy always managed to find out what was useful, because he had many friends in the administration. Here was somebody who lacked all the normal things that would get a French bureaucrat to even talk to him, and yet they so respected him as an interlocutor, partly because he was likeable, and partly because they would get what they wanted much faster. They knew that if it was just a question of going on the floor at the National Assembly, it would be total chaos. They were getting things through regardless of whether the government was going to be voted out the next week.

Being so young himself, he was eager to work with young people and I learnt a great deal working with him because he would bring me to all the important meetings. On the French side, our closest partner was Jean Monnet, who at the time was in charge of the French organization that apportioned resources in order to get the economy started. He became the continuity in the French administration as governments came and went. Monnet had gotten the support of the US for his own plan, which gave priority to big infrastructural projects to rebuild the French economy.

Q: Was your impression of Jean Monnet a person who could get down to the guts of

things or was he a theorist?

HARTMAN: For Tommy and Monnet, the question was how to keep the politicians from divvying up the resources for pet projects and thus losing the impact on the overall economy. Their idea was to get in needed foreign exchange -- bought materials for the projects that Monnet had outlined in his plan as having a high priority. For example, machinery to get the coal mines going, the electricity grid working, the railroads running, and so on. He then used the counterpart funds for the necessary local expenses. In the end what this meant was that, four years later, the basic French infrastructure had been completely modernized and the economy was ready to take off. By keeping the expenditures under control they were also able to keep inflation from exponentially increasing. Washington, on the other hand, was more concerned with precise planning and details -- all for programming everything down to the last dollar. They created elaborate charts to show exactly where aid was going. In the process, they did create some useful tools to study any economy, like the national accounts system, which had been just a gleam in the eyes of a few economists during the war.

During this time, I was actually sent to work for short periods in the French Planning Commission, with Monnet's people, to make sure the administrative process went smoothly. For example, I checked if the right authorizations had come in from the American side of things to allow for funds to be sent out. This was the way that David Bruce and Monnet liked to work; there was very close cooperation between the French and our mission. But there were resentments on both sides. On the French side of things, there were feelings among some of the old timers about too much American influence. It wasn't so for the younger and smarter economists, some of whom had spent the War in prison camps.

The American diplomats in Paris had similar feelings. Many of the Foreign Service officers in the Embassy felt that this was most irregular and saw that we were going around the French Government process and their Parliamentary system. They resented that a group of young Americans were wielding considerable influence, and that theirs was waning. David Bruce even took over some of their responsibilities, as he was the head of the Marshall Plan in Paris, which combined three agencies: the ECA, which I was a part of; the Treasury, whose ranking officer was Tomlinson, and the Foreign Service, which was affiliated with the Embassy but which sent officers to assist the ECA. So not only did Bruce supervise Foreign Service Operatives, he also acted independently, only consulting with the Ambassador occasionally.

All of this caused a good amount of friction with the old line Foreign Service diplomats, who were very distrustful of these young fresh faces running around dealing with high-ranking French officials and members of Parliament. They had a very conservative and traditional way of doing business and basically they were out of sympathy with the U.S. policy that David Bruce and others were promoting, which was to use our leverage to move Europe toward economic prosperity and unity. When I arrived in France, the Ambassador was Jefferson Caffery, who could not have been more traditional -- right up to having a group of Marines lockstep him to the Embassy from his car every morning.

Foreign Service Officers Ted Achilles, Phil Bonsal, Woody Walner and others were highly suspicious of what we were up to, and were not pleased to have their power diverted by somebody who had all the money, and who had the attention of all the high-ranking administrators in France. Alexander Bickel, who became a law professor and an expert on the United States Constitution, was brought in later in the early 50's and gave the team in the Embassy unflattering nicknames, so they became known, for example, as "Torpid Ted" Achilles and "Faint Phil" Bonsal.

This was the period I met Jean Monnet, who was an extraordinary fellow. Monnet had left school as a youngster because he did not like the discipline. His father, instead of going into a rage, gave him a shipment of cognac from the family enterprise and sent him to America to make his way. He headed out --·this would have been in the early part of the 20th Century -- to California and Alaska. In Alaska, there was a gold rush going on, and he made a fortune with his cognac stake. He said that he learned more from his American experience than he ever could have in school. When he got back to France, he helped run the family business. When the First World War came along, he fought until the Battle of the Marne after which he was honorably discharged, probably because he was his family's sole provider. But his brief participation in the war brought him to realize that there were flaws in the way the French were organizing their war effort, and that they could be producing more. At some point, he wrote a letter to René Viviani, the Prime Minister of the time, outlining a plan for Franco-British cooperation on procurement. Viviani liked the paper so much that he hired Monnet as his assistant, and Monnet later assisted Clemenceau long after Viviani had been put out of office. He ended up heading a Franco-British joint purchasing commission which operated very successfully in the US and greatly enhanced the French and British war effort. This began a career in Government for Monnet, but as an outsider who could impose new ways of thinking on bureaucrats. This was a pattern he would repeat.

His abilities became widely recognized, and in the twenties, he reorganized the railroads for Chiang Kai-shek, as part of the latter's effort to modernize China. He also restructured a Swedish match company when it failed. Monnet then held international responsibilities, as the highest ranking official in the League of Nations, and moved to Wall Street for a while as a partner of John Foster Dulles; it was there that he made many friendships that helped him play a key role during the Second World War.

When France fell in 1940, he made his way to London and then to the U.S. to put together another joint purchasing operation with the British. De Gaulle always felt that Monnet failed him because from the onset he didn't believe in ultra-nationalism, but also because when Monnet came to London, de Gaulle said "I want you to stay here and be my economic advisor and then go back to France with me." De Gaulle wanted him to be in London, but Monnet insisted that he could do the most good in Washington, and de Gaulle never forgave him this; they were never political allies after that.

In Washington, he found his old Wall Street friends in high places and he began to apply his tried and true formula -- get to the decision makers through their advisors and speech writers, a kind of informal network. In effect, the influences of his friends Felix

Frankfurter and Judge Samuel Rosenman helped him change all American production planning. He described to me once how Roosevelt called a meeting about what the production goal should be. Monnet said "double" -- this was the number of planes and tanks the United States was to produce for its war effort. Monnet came without much support from the American industrialists, who never thought we could do it. He said double. In fact, we ended up producing more than that. That was the only way he could be sure the British and French were going to get a slice big enough for what their needs were going to be. John Maynard Keynes once said that Monnet had shortened the war by approximately one year. He was, I think, the only Frenchman I ever knew who operated the way the British do. The British come to Washington as a weaker power, and decide that in order to get their policy objectives accomplished they'll use American power. They're not shy about it, and it isn't beneath them to do it. The more traditional French diplomatists are horrified by this. First of all, they don't want anybody influencing their own politics, and they have a much more formal approach to Washington. They don't see the advantage of trying to influence American policy to accomplish a French objective; it also has to accomplish an American objective.

During this time, Monnet came up with the term "arsenal of democracy," which Rosenman subsequently put into a Roosevelt speech, and a term that both made it into history books and was a political success. It now really embodies the considerable war effort put together by Americans until 1945. That's the way Monnet would capture an idea, make it public and get people moving in the direction he wanted them to go. After the war, he negotiated for de Gaulle's government to carry the French over until an aid program was developed. I began working with him very indirectly in the ECA Mission -- but Tomlinson was his closest contact.

Under the leadership of David Bruce, the ECA essentially supported Monnet's apolitical vision for the future of an economically prosperous France. The deal that was struck between Monnet and Tomlinson was that the Americans would not give their approval to any proposal which Monnet didn't feel fitted in his plans. He was mainly unconcerned with the political process, or by his political advancement; he liked to work from behind the scenes, and wielded considerable influence that way. The ECA understood the value of his pragmatic policies, which consisted in rebuilding France's infrastructure according to his own indicative planning. He thought that once the infrastructure was built, the economy would be ready to takeoff. We, as a Mission, gave him the necessary backing for him to be able to remain aloof from political disputes. He would go to the finance minister and say, "Alright, I control this amount of Francs from the Americans." And we would give him that control. He would then use that power to get the money to go where he wanted it to go, which in short allowed the reconstruction process to remain unhindered by the painful end of the 4th Republic, which was a shaky and indecisive institution, where governments changed every couple of months, and disputes at the National Assembly paralyzed any decision making.

However, Monnet's significant leverage did not allow him to completely ignore the French Treasury, and the Treasury made sure that the Marshall Plan funds were not used in a way that it did not approve of. Thus, Monnet also had a French counterpart from the

Treasury who guaranteed a multilateral decision process, with the Americans, Monnet, and the French Treasury at the negotiation table. Rather than French politicians, there were high administrators taking care of the country's reconstruction process. In those first post-war years, the French political class was hesitant and powerlessly witnessing the fall of its system of government, which was replaced when de Gaulle came to power in 1958. There were conditions to the release of the Marshall Plan funds which were worked out in effect behind politicians' backs, by people like Guindey, who was directeur du commerce extérieur, and we would use our financial leverage to come to him -- at the Treasury -- and say, "get your tax system reformed, and do it in this way." We operated this way because the politicians were saying "We're not going to do it." We would discuss the situation with the French Treasury, and notably people like Guindey, Francois Bloch-Lainé, who was the Treasury director, and Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, who was his successor, so that an agreement would be reached without unnecessary political fuss.

At times, there were genuine disputes between high administrators and Monnet, but they were used by Monnet to get ideas for his projects. People like Guindey and Bloch-Lainé supplied great ideas to him, coming up with useful conditions and rules to accompany the distribution of funds for a given project. Although they provided useful input, the people at the Treasury were affected by the same kind of entrepreneurial paralysis as the rest of the political class, and Marshall Plan funds would not have been used as successfully if it hadn't been for Monnet. The only person that had a real strategy for French reconstruction, and European reconstruction on a whole was Monnet. The French Treasury was mainly involved with solving the many crises that arose after the war, and was so caught up in dealing with existing problems that it had no comparable strategic vision.

Once Monnet had come up with a particular component of his plan, Tomlinson and Bruce would go discuss it with various people in the French administration, and that was how these plans got approved. They would speak with the Governeur de la Banque de France (a little like the Chairman of the Federal Reserve in the States), to the Treasury, to the Ministry of Finance and to any other concerned ministries, such as the Industry or the Transportations Ministries. All these people had incentives to not undermine Bruce's mission because they needed resources controlled by the US: Marshall Plan dollars for importing equipment, and counterpart funds to finance domestic investments.

The main risk of Monnet's plan was inflation, and we had to be careful to not drive prices up uncontrollably. While trying to maintain stable prices, we managed to fund the entire reconstruction of France's infrastructure, to re-equip basic industries, to re-organize the tax system and the way government worked. The funds were not frittered away by pet projects or used to siphon off inflation, which is what the British tried to do. The British, under the influence of an awful Presbyterian called Cripps, just froze the counterpart money in order to handle inflation, and they never did modernize their basic infrastructure the way the French did. Monnet played an essential part in French reconstruction, and had the necessary vision to avoid the mistakes that other countries around France were making.

One of the things we all resented later when de Gaulle came to power in 1958 -- after we had all gone -- was that he took credit for putting the French economy right. I attribute a great deal of merit to Monnet, whose efforts were mainly devoted to restructuring France's basic infrastructure during these first years after World War II. He and de Gaulle always had a very difficult relationship. I once spoke with one of de Gaul1e's biographers who said that in his private conversations de Gaulle almost referred to Monnet as a traitor -- a traitor to France, a traitor to the national feelings of France. It is one of those quirks of history and a real irony that they were thrown together at various points in time, both with great but conflicting visions. The two of them had very different approaches to French reconstruction, de Gaulle's being that you had to get France back into the act as France, and Monnet's consisting above all in close cooperation between European states. De Gaulle eventually accepted this because he had to deal with Adenauer, who was a thorough European integrationist. So all that de Gaulle did concerning the European community was strongly built on what Monnet had done.

Early on, Monnet championed a European reconstruction program that went beyond the recovery of individual and separate states. During the war, his vision for Europe was opposed to that of statesmen like Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau, who sought to punish and weaken Germany by stripping it of its industrial capabilities and converting it into one big agricultural region. Monnet thought that close cooperation between states was the only viable outcome for Europe, and his opinion was echoed in the preamble to every year's piece of legislation on the Marshall Plan. Each year, when Congress passed the authorizing legislation, there was always a clause on encouraging European integration. From the onset, American thinking was, "you shall use this money to promote lower barriers." But there was often a misunderstanding about what this meant, and Monnet was one of the few figures who actually saw a structural integration coming, and not just a lowering of trade barriers. He recognized early on that political unity was necessary in order to create a functional zone of economic cooperation and, to his credit, foresaw what kind of problems could arise out of an economic union deprived of strong political commitments. Only now, with debt crises multiplying in European countries that haven't agreed on a common budget, can we see the full measure of Monnet's insights.

Monnet had a view about how one would go about implementing some of these ideas that they talked about during the war, like creating a European structure that reinforced economic growth. There was a fight with Harriman's office, which was the office for all of the Marshall Plan in Europe, about what this integration meant. Harriman himself was not so much opposed to European integration, but his people at the Marshall Plan mission for Europe were more in favor of a kind of loose, intergovernmental agreement, more in line with the European Payments Union. The French ECA mission quickly became a staunch supporter of really thoroughgoing integration. We adhered to the formation of supranational institutions which could do more than simply facilitate trade between countries, and which could even lead to countries relinquishing part of their national sovereignty. The people in Harriman's mission had to deal with a broader public, and with twelve countries under their supervision, they had to take into account the Greeks, the Norwegians, the British, who did not want to have this closer kind of integration.

There were also a number of people in Washington who felt that a united Europe might be a threat to the U.S. as a trading nation. They were afraid that this European unity was going to interfere with the new global principles, such as free trade, we were trying to get accepted, and with the institutions that were created to support them, such as the IMF or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, a component of the World Bank). There was a big debate on potential European protectionism at the time and it was only solved when we brought Tom Enders back into the department from his Ph.D. work. He did his Ph.D. on the theory of customs unions. He developed the theory that if the formation of the customs union in Europe created growth in that community as little as one-half percent, it was enough to offset all the trade diversion effects of forming a single tariff around the outside of the group. Tom had this theoretical work and Douglas Dillon, who succeeded Bruce as ambassador, didn't understand the theory one bit and was the first one to admit it. But John Leddy was his assistant, and said that Enders' theory sounded good to him, and he went up and testified to that effect. Of course it just demolished the arguments of all those who opposed the Coal and Steel Community because it was protectionist. They had a point on agriculture though; clearly the Europeans were going to protect their agriculture.

That of course is where we had the greatest advantage in the whole post-war period. We were just pouring our food over in Europe because our own agriculture had gone through a revolution and we were producing huge quantities. The Europeans needed it. Gradually, they brought their agriculture back and they had their own revolution, eventually producing surpluses. The competition was really great and instead of freeing agriculture in Europe, as we had begun to do, the Europeans protected it with the common agricultural policy. I would go to these interdepartmental meetings later in the fifties in Washington where guys like Isaiah Frank from our economic bureau would shake his finger at me and say "One day this is going to come back to haunt us. These guys are going to be protectionists on agriculture and we ought to build into all of our agreements that they must remove it within a certain time."

In any case, the treaties that formed these bodies like the IMF and the IBRD included a clause that provided for the formation of either a free trade area or a customs union in Europe, so that those who opposed a union in Europe remained a minority. The planning committees in Washington during the war had really been thinking about a customs union for Europe because they thought these trade barriers made no sense at all. They ended up causing all kinds of conflicts, so why not remove them? Scholars like Professor Friedrich, who had taught me at Harvard, were commissioned to study a possible way of bringing European countries together; he studied all the federations that had existed prior to 1945. He came to the conclusion that what Europe needed was a federation like the one Germany had created in the nineteenth century. He thought "Ah, that's what we need. That will keep our worst instincts under control and will put these countries together so they can never come apart." But Monnet, who was a very practical man, said, "Let's start with coal and steel, that's what we have really been fighting over all these years. We (the French) have a terrible problem with the Ruhr valley now because we took it from the Germans, and they took it from us. It's still a problem sitting there, and it can only be solved if we actually put all these strategic industries based between France and Germany

together." This idea crystallized all of Monnet's previous thoughts for European integration, and was accepted by Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister of the time, who on May 9, 1950, made a speech outlining the French government's proposal to create a federal entity called the European Coal and Steel Community. This Schuman Declaration became famous because it in effect launched the first precursor institution to the European Union.

At the time, the U.S. was attempting to coordinate the recovery of the steel industry across Europe. We were going to various countries and they were saying to us, "We want such-and-such." Of course, the demands greatly outstripped the possibility of support, and we were acting as referees in this competition for assistance. On a European level, our strategy was not really thought out in terms of integrating industries, but rather in terms of rationalizing, of compromising, and of negotiating out bits and pieces. The Schuman Declaration pushed for the creation of a supra-national body which would coordinate resources and put them in common, so that European unity was achieved when this supra-national body was formally created in 1952. But in between the Schuman Declaration (1950) and the creation of the Coal and Steel Community (1952), negotiations took place between six countries (France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Italy) in order to determine the governance and powers of the Coal and Steel Community.

One of the big difficulties through all these things was what was going to happen to the Saar Land. The coal and steel thing was very much centered on industry in that area and quite clearly the Germans wanted the Saar back. It had been switched back and forth since the 1870s between the two countries. I think the French knew from the beginning there was going to have to be a compromise on the Saar, but that was clearly going to be one of the last things that fell into place. And indeed it didn't fall into place until the status of Germany was finally settled in 1954, when it got its sovereignty back.

I played a minor part in the negotiations on Coal and Steel but was brought in from time to time on the Trade Committee and a few times on the Financial Committee. I continued working on the ECA team with Tomlinson and others, but other Americans came to Paris to help negotiate the terms for Coal and Steel. At the meetings, we sat as the German representatives, with the Germans beside us, because Germany had yet to recover its formal sovereignty. We built up a team of a couple of lawyers, a couple of economists, and others who were fully involved in negotiations. Among the ones who came from Germany to do this was Bob Bowie, who was John McCloy's legal advisor in Bonn when he was American High Commissioner for Germany. The State Department officer was Stanley Cleveland, a real Foreign Service man, who died in a plane crash in Africa, and Paul Douglas, the son of the Senator from Illinois, was recruited by the ECA as a financial expert. While I worked part time on the Coal and Steel Community and at the ECA, I witnessed the first talks of West German rearmament.

The beginning of the fifties was a time of uncertainty in the world and of fear regarding the expansionist behavior of the Soviet Union. Much more than Soviet rhetoric, and the menacing allusions to an "iron curtain" being drawn, it was the territorial violations that

the international community was afraid of There was very much a fear of the "hordes" invading neighboring countries, as had happened in the Far East when Chinese soldiers had poured through the Korean border. Germany, as a big territorial mass between the USSR and Western Europe, was a strategically placed country, and it became a priority in our foreign policy to integrate it as soon as possible into a joint defense construction. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, created in 1949, had laid the groundwork for an integrated defense structure, but important questions remained, including: would West Germany be included into NATO? Under who's command?

When the U.S. proposed the integration of Germany into NATO, the French, under the influence of the Gaullists, objected that it would leave too much power to West Germany, and that it would become a dominating country in NATO, as well as in the Coal and Steel Community. While they recognized the necessity to bring Germany in and have a strong defense association, their instinctive suspiciousness about German boorishness took over and led them to propose a solution more acceptable to the French people. In 1950, Monnet convinced the French President René Pleven to put forward plans for the European Defense Community (EDC) which would avoid German inclusion in NATO while creating a military association between the Six involved in Coal and Steel. Without bringing the Germans into NATO, the security of Western Europe would be provided for.

Conrad Adenauer, although he was not keen on the debate of remilitarizing West Germany, supported the European Army initiative as well, afraid that Germans would become second-class citizens within the NATO structure, and hoping that a membership in the EDC would begin the process of restoring German sovereignty. Thus, David Bruce, on behalf of Monnet and Pleven, and John McCloy, on behalf of Adenauer, pushed Eisenhower to support the EDC, and I remember Bruce bringing Monnet to see Eisenhower at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) to try and get American support for the EDC initiative. The EDC was signed in 1950, but not immediately ratified by would-be member states. There ensued years of negotiations over the exact definition of such a community, because it was politically unpalatable in many respects.

I was assigned to the Juridical Committee and occasionally to the Financial Committee of the European Army negotiations. There was a British counterpart who also sat there with the Six. I would sometimes accompany Bruce and Tomlinson to ministerial meetings, where they were negotiating various articles and trying to find ways to get the treaty ratified. I would be invited to some meetings and not others, but I would, on instructions, go see various ministers who were there, in order to communicate messages from the State Department.

For me, it was great lesson in international politics, and young people were very much included in the dynamic of the time. I would accompany Tomlinson and David Bruce as well as a British delegation to these conferences around Europe, where our presence was warranted by the fact that we still occupied West Germany. So before Germany recovered its sovereignty in 1952, I traveled around Europe, to the Benelux, and to Rome, where I specifically remember a round of negotiations at Villa Madama, with "fathers of

Europe" such as Monnet, Paul-Henri Spaak, who was the Belgian negotiator, and Walter Hallstein, the German representative. It was a very exciting time to be around.

Part of our job was to go around and talk to French politicians, and keep them abreast of what was actually going on so they didn't oppose the treaty when it came up for a vote. At that time, Mitterrand (this was before Mitterrand became a Socialist leader), was the minister of interior. I was instructed to go see him in order to inform him about talks but also to gather his ideas concerning the EDC. Martin Herz, from the Embassy, was sent with me to make sure I didn't push too enthusiastically for the EDC. We -- at the ECA -- were supposed to stay neutral and the Foreign Service always suspected us of overstretching our mandate and pushing too hard for these negotiations to come through. For them, it was just a question of passing information along and not getting involved. I called on Mitterrand in his apartment, and entered to see him lying theatrically in his chaise lounge with a velvet jacket on, and he looked like the most effete fellow I had ever seen in my life. I don't think the information he gave us was so important but I really remember the impression he tried to give; books all over the place -- even at that time he was portraying himself as "the French intellectual."

There was a great deal of pessimism regarding the EDC from all sides, and Americans who were not familiar with the negotiations suspected the French of simply stalling German integration into NATO by imposing pointless talks that would eventually lead to no decision. But the U.S. was far from being the only reticent party. Apart from the Gaullists who were opposed to the EDC because it involved relinquishing a part of France's sovereignty, Monnet also gradually realized it was an impossible political project and a diversion from his most important project, the Coal and Steel Community. He had a kind of single-minded way of looking at things; his job was to get the Coal and Steel Community launched and this European Army business he saw as perhaps complicating and maybe derailing it.

My memory of the whole period was that there were a lot of short cuts taken. Various people would oppose, and then a compromise would be found, but not entirely to everybody's satisfaction. There was a constant business of going back to the Germans -- as well as other participants in the negotiations -- and saying, "You really have to accept this, or we're not going to be able to bring this party along, or this individual." From that point of view, it was very untidy and showed a weakness on the part of a variety of governments that dealt with it. The French officials involved in negotiations, and notably Hervé Alphand, who later became ambassador to the U.S. under Kennedy and who was at the time the representative to NATO, were trying to maneuver the debates and when they suggested, "We're going to make this change," we were never really sure if it was for real or whether they were just using their suggestion as an excuse to further delay the EDC.

The other partners were getting fed up as the talks were stagnating. The ratification process had dragged on for some while, and there was increasing irritation on the part of the American government, with Bruce, at least initially, arguing against direct pressure from the United States as counter-productive. Eisenhower was elected in 1953 and John

Foster Dulles was named Secretary of State. The State Department was losing its temper and Dulles made a very dramatic speech promising an "agonizing reappraisal" of policy if the negotiations on the EDC did not reach an end. In effect, the American government was eager to see Germany integrate a defense structure -- be it NATO or the EDC -- and did not want to eternally wait for the negotiations to come to an end. If the European Six could not come to a solution, the position of the U.S. would switch from full support for the EDC initiative to complete opposition -- which meant taking Germany into NATO.

The question was, should we continue to support the EDC and try to get French ratification, or should we switch to a new strategy? We ended up making a compromise in 1954, which consisted in making the French say they would have a final vote one way or the other. At that point, we made very clear our alternative was going to be the integration of Germany into NATO. As luck would have it, the man who became prime minister in 1954 was Pierre Mendès-France, whom Tomlinson had become great friends with from the time he arrived in France. Tommy had a longstanding relationship with him, dating back to his days as the financial attaché to the ECA. In the early Marshall Plan years, around 1948, he made a point of keeping in close contact with Mendès-France, and thought that he was one of the people who understood the economic problems of France. I think Tommy admired him because he was the sort of fellow who was very outspoken and direct; he said what was on his mind and, unlike some of the other politicians, he wasn't reticent when it came to solving a real problem. So when he took over, Tommy was very pleased and resumed contact with him.

I still remember the tension in the embassy when Tommy was called over by Mendes who told him, even before he told David Bruce or Ambassador Douglas Dillon, that he was going to set three conditions to his staying in power. One was domestic legislation; two was getting out of Vietnam; and three was making a decision on the European Army. Dulles was very much against getting out of Vietnam. He hated the idea of the Geneva conference because we were giving the Russians, Chinese and everybody else a say in this. He felt that we were caving in to Communists but he was more or less forced to sign the agreement himself. We got involved in South Vietnam after this, and stayed for nearly twenty years.

It became apparent Mendès-France was going to condition his decision on whether to support the EDC or not on whether some additional conditions could be met in negotiations. He thought that these would be final, and once they were agreed upon, he would put it to a vote and that would be it. So there was a negotiation process that went on, in which some of the things he wanted were not granted by the others. Everybody was getting tired of the whole thing.

During this period, I suspect the British concocted an alternative to the EDC under the form of the Western European Union (WEU). I think this because the British went very silent on the EDC for a while, and were not pushing strongly for it. The idea was that they would create a defense organization incorporating Britain which would bring Germany right into NATO. Basically, they were adding a military component to the already existent WEU. So I think Anthony Eden, who was Deputy Prime Minister at the

time, told his people, “Get to work on something else, and let’s be ready to put it forward.” He maybe even explored the possibility with some of his Gaullist friends.

The final, and in some ways crucial, meeting was in Brussels, when the prime ministers met to decide whether to make last changes or formally submit the EDC for national votes. Robert Rothschild, who was Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak’s chief of staff, had me in his office during this meeting, so I could keep in touch with what was going on in the ministerial meeting. Mendès-France put in his final proposals, and only got them partially accepted by other prime ministers. I was instructed to put around Dulles’ “agonizing reappraisal” statement, which I did.

The meeting was going on, and Tomlinson and I went back to the hotel. Around midnight, Tomlinson was called by Mendès-France, who said, “I want you to come around.” And so I accompanied Tomlinson to the French Ambassador’s house in Brussels, and Tommy was called in to see the French Prime Minister alone. So it was quite a particular scene, me standing in front of the office with Mendes’ top aides, General Koenig, who was one of the heroes of the French military after World War II, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, who founded the political magazine L’Express, and Simon Nora, who was a French high administrator. It was really a cast of characters. Tommy stayed in there for about an hour, and the others were clearly very nervous as to what was going on in their boss’ office. And Tomlinson, who during that period was showing the effects of his heart problem, came out of the office nearly out of breath and said to me, “Let’s walk back to the hotel.” He looked exhilarated, exhilarated in a strange way. He was disappointed, because Mendès-France had in effect told him that he had not obtained the concessions he wanted -- which were impossible conditions for the Germans to accept -- and that he would put it up for a vote at the National Assembly, clearly not giving it his full support and dooming the EDC initiative to failure, but he was sort of philosophical about the whole thing. He said, “You know, it’s really extraordinary. Here I am -- a young guy from Moscow, Idaho, who gets called in by the French Prime Minister because he just wanted to explain to me, as an old friend, what he was doing, and why he was doing it.” Although he was disappointed, my god, Tommy was surprised!

I vividly remember the day that the European Army was voted on at the National Assembly. I went to watch the vote in a space specifically set aside for diplomats, in order to give a report to the Embassy. I knew what to expect after the first seconds of Georges Bidault’s speech on the floor defending the EDC. At the time, he was the French foreign minister, and a notorious alcoholic. He began mumbling his first sentences and it quickly became clear he was very drunk. I got up in the middle of his speech and, by the end of it, had given a phone call to the Embassy telling them not to get their hopes up, and that the EDC was a sure failure. As could be expected, the parliamentarians voted against the EDC.

After the French turned down the European Army in late ‘54, I stayed into ‘55 while we negotiated the extension of the WEU’s mandate and German entry into NATO. I moved over to the NATO headquarters which was in the Trocadero in Paris. I worked with getting the Germans integrated, and sort of cleaning up after the European Army failure.

As soon as the European Army was turned down, the extension of the WEU mandate was put forward. The Germans were clearly ready for this. The military officers had been brought into the European Army negotiations so they were already beginning to form a nascent military force, and in effect there was a negotiation to get Germany its sovereignty back. The Germans achieved their sovereignty; they established a military force, and then they were admitted straight into NATO, participating in the military committee and in the various command structures. They had some excellent people that they assigned to that.

There were surprisingly little residual feelings among commanders in the German military, mainly because the Germans chose well. I can't remember them ever sending anybody that was uncouth. They put forward the officers who had participated in the coup against Hitler, the famous Operation Valkyrie. Some of their children also participated in the negotiations, and notably General Rommel's son, who was Adenauer's advisor. Around the end of these negotiations, the fellow who was Eisenhower's political advisor, Freddy Reinhardt, was sent to Vietnam as ambassador in 1955. He asked me to come out on the economic side of his mission, so I went to Saigon in 1956.

Q: When did you leave Paris?

HARTMAN: Early 1955.

Q: So you were assigned to Saigon.

HARTMAN: Coming to Vietnam after France was a singular experience. I had lived in Paris during the time leading up to the 1954 Geneva Accords, and the societal debate over French involvement in Indochina was at its peak. The French political class was split. The odd thing was that the Socialists, notably Guy Mollet, probably took one of the strongest positions against giving greater independence to Indochina, and broke off the negotiations that had been going on in France for the independence of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Mollet and his crowd were thrown out of the Socialist party because of the kinds of things they were trying to do in Vietnam and North Africa. Mendès-France came along and stressed the necessity of coming to terms with the French colonial experience in the Far-East, and he was always respected for having taken the decision and broken that bind they were in.

Now the U.S, beginning in the early '50s, started financing French efforts in Vietnam as part of our containment policy against the spread of Communism. I was in France just after the Geneva agreements and of course there was a lot of resentment. I would say there was a basic suspicion among a great majority of Frenchmen that we were robbing them of their influence in Vietnam. At one point, a Frenchman said to me, "Much of the money you have given us as Marshall Plan aid has gone out the back door through our efforts in Vietnam." This was hard to believe, but it nevertheless made me realize that we had previously only been dealing with French politicians who were willing to forget most of their colonial history and concentrate on building a modem state in France. They felt

that these colonial issues were just going to drag them down and be obligations. I was brought back to the realities of politics when many figures started opposing decolonization vehemently, and began to understand just how much France's relations with these territories was engrained in people's minds.

We had a program that put a lot of money into arming the French forces in Vietnam and building up the new southern Vietnamese forces. After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Mendes-France came along and made peace with Ho Chi Minh, splitting the country in two at the Geneva Conference in 1954. An independent U.S-backed group took power in South Vietnam, and we moved into the breach to make sure that South Vietnam did not turn Communist. This was Dulles saying we had to support President Diem, and I saw the beginnings of an American military presence in Vietnam.

I had been to Asia at the end of the war, but Vietnam was nevertheless a very different experience for me. It was still a French society but people came from a variety of religious backgrounds. There were Buddhists, separate sects like the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, and many others. Very few of them were Catholic, which did not prevent the country being run -- on a clannish basis -- by the devoutly Catholic Diem family.

Saigon was just a very colonial town, rather like a city in Southern France on the Côte Azure. It was rather sleepy. Ngo Dinh Diem was the President, and both his wife and sister were politically active. It was a family-organized state, which was very common in the region at that time. Diem became the first South Vietnamese President after Geneva, leading the country in a very authoritarian way. His brother was a Catholic Bishop in charge of the area around Hue, which had been the imperial capital of Vietnam, and together they conducted very repressive religious policies against religious dissidents. When we arrived out there everybody (all Americans) had high hopes for Diem, as a non-Communist and non-colonial leader.

The time we lived there was the only roughly peaceful period the country knew for a long while, although there sometimes were minor incidents. I think it was mostly a time when the North Vietnamese were concentrating on getting themselves organized, as we didn't witness any major incursions.

It was a pleasant life. By the time we left Saigon, we had four children -- two girls were born there, adding up to the two boys we had had in Paris. Actually, the man who delivered our two daughters is now an obstetrician/gynecologist in Northern Virginia. There were well trained Vietnamese people around us, and we were gradually integrating them.

We drove all around the country in our own car, a Ford station wagon. We went up to May Tron, Da Lat, and clear across the country to Angkor Wat, in Cambodia. Mac Godly and Martin Herz, who were respectively Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission in Cambodia, hosted us on that trip and brought us to the ruins. We were absolutely amazed by this very different setting, and all young Americans stationed in these distant parts of the world were completely new to the cultures and societies they began working in. We

were lucky enough to not live the compound life that many diplomats today experience in third world countries; my colleagues lived in individual houses spread around the town. We got to know again quite a few French families, but the Vietnamese were quite a bit harder to crack, although we did keep quite a few friends, some of whom are now living in the U.S. It was clear though that we were dealing with an elite, and not realizing at that time that in dealing with that elite, we were also separating ourselves from the bulk of the population.

Q: Ambassador Reinhardt, how did he operate at that time and how did he work with the Vietnamese?

HARTMAN: Freddy Reinhardt was sent to Saigon by Eisenhower to improve relations with Diem and to buttress the growing American influence in Vietnam by overseeing the economic reconstruction of the country as well as advising the Vietnamese on how to build up an organized military force. He was one of the original Russian speakers who was trained in the Balkans. As Eisenhower's former political advisor, he had much experience dealing with communism and military affairs and ended his career as our ambassador in Italy during the time when the U.S. government was anxious to keep the communists out of power there. We had worked somewhat closely together in Paris when he was as an advisor to Eisenhower at SHAPE and I was working on the European Army.

Freddy was a wise fellow and handled himself very well. During his time in Vietnam, he was very careful to not lord his growing influence over his French colleagues. His successor, Eldridge Durbrow, was also out of that same Russian speaking group, and was Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow during the late forties. But Durbrow was a little different in the way he handled himself, mainly because he had more definite views of how we should deal with the Vietnamese and who we should back. It was more obvious to me that he was willing to pull the strings and willing to be seen pulling the strings.

The military presence consisted of about 20 or 30 advisors, and when we left in '58 it had been increased to around 100. Nothing like what happened later on after '58. We were clearly worried about the widespread corruption in Diem's regime, particularly because his family was hoarding a great part of the country's wealth. But the American government thought people were perfectible out in the Far East and you could get rid of this corruption progressively.

At that point it was getting to be quite a large group of Americans in Saigon, because there was already a military advisory group. I think John "Iron" Mike O'Daniel was the first leader of that crowd; he was a tough military figure who led the vanguard of America's military training program in Vietnam. There was also an economic mission that probably had fifty or sixty people in it, maybe more, and there were various groups around the country advising farmers and such.

The Embassy officers were in the AID mission building, not in the Embassy in downtown Saigon. I was working very closely with the governor of the central bank in Saigon, who was a wonderful man. He had been in resistance movements which opposed

both French and Japanese incursions into Vietnam, but he was French trained and his thought processes were really very French. The system we were working on was similar to that we had in France, with US dollars financing imports and counterpart funds being received by the government. However, we never managed to really determine the use of the counterpart funds, and we suspected that they accounted for Diem's accumulation of wealth.

The part of the Vietnamese policy that I observed was not so much involved with political maneuvers, although in talking to Freddy Reinhardt and his successor we economic advisors heard about it fairly often. So the politics and influence of the State Department on that whole area I had no direct experience with. I was in more direct contact with the Treasury Department, which had a lot to do with some of the instructions we got, particularly on bank negotiations. That was my first brush with that area. I must say I understood very little about it.

I advised the head of the central bank on major projects which marked the end of Vietnam's colonial experience and signaled its first steps as an independent country. There was a negotiation going on with the French because they held the assets of the old Banque de l'Indochine machine and it came to the point where those assets had to be divided. The French had agreed the assets should go to the National Banks of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, so I worked with the Lao and Cambodian governors as well. We thought that South Vietnam would eventually share the resources with North Vietnam, so I was an advisor to the governor of the bank on those negotiations. They were trying to divide up a pot of money that clearly belonged to them. This was finally solved and the pot was divided and they got their share of the old reserves of the Banque de l'Indochine. The French were still there but resented our growing influence. They thought they were being taken advantage of by the U.S., having been stripped of their authority by the Geneva Accords which we had participated in. And now we were taking over as the dominant influence. However, some of the remaining Frenchmen were good contacts because they knew that some of us had been to France for quite a while and had participated in its economic recovery.

My involvement in Vietnam at the time revolved around the imports and aid that the Vietnamese were receiving from us. We subsidized their import program and gave aid for projects that developed the country. Some of our subsidies were going towards the acquisition of consumption goods, which Diem's government brought in to keep the population content, and others were directed more at real economic development. In this endeavor, we had to work a lot with the French. In the middle of the country's decolonization process, they still ran the rubber plantations and remained the country's most efficient rice growers. In spite of the fact that the French had left, they were still the dominant influence and of course all the politicians we were dealing with at that time were French trained. Some of them were quite remarkable. I remember one leader "Tu" who also was French trained, a remarkable man who knew exactly what he was doing but wasn't allowed to do it by President Diem. All of the things that later came about were beginning to become evident; Diem was enjoying our support but leading the country to bear hatred against him.

Corruption, which was not ever far from that society in its history, became still much more pronounced -- Diem's family and friends were running things. When someone good would come along, he would very often get shoved aside because he was too good or too honest, and it was discouraging. Obviously, I was there during the calmest period; we could still drive around the country, there being very little difficulty out in the countryside. There was even a period of time when there were hopes that maybe some talks would start between the North and the South. An International Commission had an office in town made up of Indians, Canadians, and Poles to help carry out the Geneva agreements.

But there were beginnings of trouble and you could see the way that Diem handled some of the sects. There were these different sects in the South that were operating in their traditional strongholds and that were being oppressed by Diem's regime; it was very much a kind of warlord operation. We began to realize that all this could go very wrong one day, because Diem had no support from the general population, and in effect the Viet Cong were becoming a force to be reckoned with.

However, at the time we didn't know what was going on between the Viet Cong and Ho Chi Minh. I think it was sort of a heady period when people optimistically thought that a national government was beginning to take form, and of course part of our problems with the French at that time were that we were deliberately encouraging the nationalist aspects of Vietnamese policy as a way of strengthening them. There was a lot of resentment too among some people in the South about the Catholic Presidency and the way that the Catholics tried to control all of the other groups. So I think that we were out of touch with the general population, which abhorred the person we wanted to set up as a stable President for South Vietnam.

Looking back on it I would say most of the Americans there were extremely naive, including me, on the subject of how easily we could reform Vietnamese society. As I said, we didn't interact with the majority of the Vietnamese population, but mostly with the colonial elite from the time of French occupation; very few intellectuals. Among the group of my age level and those who were actually working in the Vietnamese administration, we became very anti-Diem. The things we saw going on were just unacceptable since we were helping to keep the Diem clan afloat by giving them political and financial support. The older administrators thought that the situation would change as a better economy developed. They thought that Vietnamese administrators would adopt new ways of doing things. They asserted that civil society would come along to take care of these things, but I must say I didn't see it coming.

The competent administrators in the South were solid nationalistic patriots, I would say, but I came to think that the greatest patriot of all was Ho Chi Minh. I always had the feeling he could have been turned into a Tito; not one of our best friends, but an opposition figure that could stand up to Mao and the Soviets. Dulles would make these statements about how the Chinese were going to take over. The Vietnamese hated the Chinese and you only had to be there a little while to see how much they hated them. The

Nationalist Vietnamese were very anti-Chinese, they had been dominated by them and the Chinese controlled a large part of the economy in one way or another. Many of the Chinese adopted Vietnamese names but they didn't quite pass. For example, all of our servants were Chinese, and you couldn't mix the two of them. Turning Ho Chi Minh into a Tito would not have been a difficult job. He was smart enough to use the Russians against the Chinese so the Russians could easily have gotten protective of Vietnam, which they eventually did. They took over our base in Nha Trang when we left. But I was still very junior at the time and had no influence on these policy decisions. Years later, when I was in Washington in 1961, Kennedy came in and George Ball was his Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, but also very much the gadfly on Vietnam. I encouraged George, who didn't need much encouragement because he had lived through the French experience, to be very skeptical of U.S. policy in Vietnam. It was impossible to back any group there without its putting all of our money in its pockets, and every group had its interests in mind instead of the population's.

Some in our delegation felt that the people we were dealing with were not going to be the people that were going to save the country. There was certainly a feeling among some that our growing military presence was not a great idea because instead of looking for the democratic elements that were going to run the government in the future, we fell in with the corrupt elements that were running the country because after all they were the ones that controlled the military. I felt that people were trying to impose existing patterns on Vietnam, and that they simply didn't fit. They seemed to want to repeat the Malaysian and Filipino experience.

The model was what went on in the Philippines, where President Ramon Magsaysay became a great American ally. He had largely contributed to throwing the Japanese out of the Philippines, and had rebuilt solid institutions after World War II, keeping close links with the U.S. Of course, the CIA people who had been around Magsaysay were now in Saigon, and they had gone through Malaya and had a success there, with the British commander Gerald Templer restoring some order. Templer was later called out to be an advisor in Saigon. The difference in Malaya was they had pictures of every one of the Communist rebels and they knew where they were, whereas in Vietnam the dissent was much more widespread, not to mention that the regime itself was repressive. In Vietnam, we could see the absence of a political structure, and of people with political experience, and all the economic things that we tried to do would just disappear because the political structure wasn't there to receive them. I'm not sure that we could have done things much differently other than to leave it all and let the Vietnamese overthrow Diem.

The thing that I learned of that time is that you can't just create a political elite. There were a lot of theories formed in that time about how you do this, and we had the Michigan State University out there telling us exactly how to create a political elite. In a sense, I think these people devising theories overlooked other factors, and the countries on which they based their theories were very different from Vietnam, inherently more stable countries. People thought that successes could be repeated, "just find that strong man and give him your support and let him build the government."

I was told by experts at the time that the difference between Vietnam and Malaya was that, in Malaya, the British had the pictures of practically all the dissidents in their society and they could eliminate them one by one; there was a structure in Malaya that they could build on. There was no such situation in Vietnam; we did not know where the rebels were coming from, nor what they looked like. The French, I think, built institutions in their colonial areas which led the locals to accept being part of French society, or a variation of it. I'm thinking of places like Senegal or the Ivory Coast. It was successful; they were willing to have a Francophone poet as a leader in Senegal and it fit into the culture. Vietnam, I found, had not accepted the French model so openly, although I must say in later times I found some of the North Vietnamese leaders talking in ways that you could kind of see and trace their French influences, even though they were supposedly all good Communists and violently anti-colonialists. So many people mistook Vietnam for a stable country, where the Filipino success could be repeated.

There were also a number of people who had been in the AID Mission in Germany, which took care of reconstruction and development. To watch those guys go around thinking they were going to create the changes that took place in Germany out in Vietnam was a real eye opener. There was one fellow in particular who had been instrumental, to hear him talk, in the monetary reform in Germany. He kept preaching to all of us that all you had to do was change the currency and you would straighten out the inflation and everything else in Vietnam. Very confident fellow.

We were seeing that the problems weren't as easy as they seemed to be in Europe. I mean Europe was, I think, treated by Americans as a kind of test case and it was probably the wrong lesson that we all learned. A devastated Europe needed what America could give it. That was hope, enthusiasm, and money. It already had the trained, skilled people. It had the basis and experience; it had all of the things that would make that American contribution a successful tool in an effort to rebuild and reinvigorate an industrial area. Europe had the ability to use aid quickly, and even in the confused state that some of those places were in, there were vigorous people who had experience in the political process, real political leadership. The more I think about the past fifty years, the more I think that it's those elements of political leadership and skill that make situations work or not work and result in disasters or successes.

There was one exception to this rule of importing ready-made solutions and patterns for the reconstruction of Vietnam: Wolf Ladejinsky. Wolf was the man who sponsored the agricultural reform in Italy, Taiwan, and Japan. I remember he had this tremendous collection of Chinese artifacts, mainly vases, which he kept in boxes which looked like hat boxes. They were made to hold individual items. He didn't have his whole collection in Saigon; it was probably in Japan at the time. Wolf couldn't take those back to the States because they wouldn't let them in -- they were Chinese art. I think he moved back to Italy and kept his collection there. I don't know what happened to the collection, whether it went to an Italian museum but it was museum quality stuff. Wolf was in Vietnam when I arrived and was already working on an agricultural reform which he partially carried out but which was again overcome by corruption. They would either run into corrupt Chinese or corrupt Vietnamese, whoever controlled the land. Wolf was one

of the people who worked in the right way, with the right people, and then became quite discouraged because the wrong people began to take over and upset what he put in place. For him, real agricultural reform, which he thought would get down to the peasant level, would empower people so that they would have a say in their areas and get rid of this corrupt element that came in and ripped them off. In effect, the peasantry was getting racketed and we were not doing anything about it. This was what gave farmers the hope that, if the Viet Minh took over, things would be better. There was also sympathy for the Viet Minh because they seemed more honest in having the peasant interest in mind. Needless to say, the Viet Minh were also using strong arm methods to influence them and get them to line up on their side. So to me, Wolf's program seemed to be the one thing that was getting at the real problem: deep discontent in different layers of society.

We clearly misunderstood the situation in South Vietnam at the time. Beyond our support for the wrong leader and our preconceptions about how to reform the Vietnamese system, we knew little about the current influences and inner workings of that society. I can't remember anybody sitting down with me and saying, "That Vietnamese is a front for that Chinese group." When I was there, we only had a handful of people who spoke good Vietnamese. There was a lot of dealing with the Vietnamese in French -- which was the way I did it --·and we were clearly not engaging ourselves with the population as much as we should have. After I left, in 1958, this changed and there was a group of young officers sent in there with a good grip on the language. People like Richard Holbrooke and Tony Lake were sent out there. These officers got more deeply into the society, they really got close and they were the ones who first began to feel that corruption extended very deeply into the military, deeply into the political groups, and it wasn't going to be able to resist the play the Viet Minh were mounting.

In retrospect, our policy in Vietnam was severely flawed, and many people attributed the roots of this military activism to Eisenhower, the retired General. I don't think our policy would have been any different had our President been a civilian, like Adlai Stevenson. I think one of the remarkable things about our policy right up through the present day is that, despite the fact that political leaders enunciate different kinds of doctrines -- first to get the nomination and second to get elected -- they come to a middle ground and carry forward after a period of anywhere from one to two years. This doesn't mean it's always the same common ground throughout the administrations; it's shifted as American opinion has shifted and as Americans have had an experience with the world. Political leadership doesn't get very far from the shift in popular mood and opinion in the United States, which is very important. Take Nixon for example. The policies he advocated for Vietnam changed a great deal between the time when he was Vice-President to Eisenhower and the time he was President at the end of the Vietnam War. The American public got tired of Vietnam, and so Nixon sought to get out of there as soon as possible. Even when they are strong leaders and they're leading the people down the track, there is something that shifts them back and gets them in line with the mainstream of American thinking. To my mind this is a rather hopeful thing. I believe in democracy and therefore I believe that there is a consensus that builds up through the democratic process on a number of issues.

The funny thing is, by this time in my career, I had never really worked in Washington. I was abroad through the beginning of 1958, so from 1948 to 1958 my career was entirely outside the country -- ten years with no experience in Washington. I had not the foggiest idea whom I was writing for when I issued reports, nor what was done with them. We would see these people when they'd come out, mostly in Paris. In Europe, General Marshall and Dean Acheson visited, and then, after Eisenhower's election, John Foster Dulles came and I met him because we were working so closely on the European Army. General Eisenhower I had known because he was over in Paris as the Supreme Commander after the war. But Washington was just a total puzzle. There was this place called the State Department and there were these others. There was Paul Hoffman, who headed the Washington end of the Marshall Plan, and the Marshall Plan people would come through from time to time. I would go back as a Junior Officer on home leave and they would give me a little consultation, so I at least knew where the offices were. It was a totally new experience for me when I was called back to Washington for more work on Europe.

Q: You left there in '58.

HARTMAN: Left there in 1958, came back to Washington.

Q: By this time you had a regular foreign service commission.

HARTMAN: Had a regular Foreign Service commission and I went into the regional Bureau of European Affairs. 1958 was like a cold shower for me because I arrived back in the capital after having been an American diplomat abroad; the lifestyle of a Foreign Service Officer is very comfortable, and it was very different for us to bring up a family back in Washington for the first time. Our fifth child was born in 1961. The only smart thing we ever did in our lives was to buy a house in Washington when we came back, which we still live in. It was an expensive time for us coming back. But looking back on it now, it is nothing like what our young officers have to face coming in with the costs they face today. Literally, we brought this very comfortable house for thirty-five thousand dollars. As a piece of equity or a piece of obligation that a young officer has to take over, it's very difficult coming back to Washington now; I mean more difficult than it was for us at that time.

At the beginning, I worked in the old War Department Building on 21st Street. It had been built by Marshall to host all of our military administration, but was soon replaced by the much bigger Pentagon. This was before the new State Department building was finished on C Street. Our whole area has changed so much. There was the brewery over on the hill on the way to Watergate, and in the Watergate was that nice little restaurant that served popovers. There was no "E" Street throughway or anything like that and so it was a much smaller outfit.

Although political life in Washington was completely new to me, I found that I already knew many people, mostly from my experience in Paris. Douglas Dillon, whom I had known as Ambassador in Paris, was the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. He

supervised a section which dealt with support for European unification. Robert Murphy, who had also been around in Paris as Ambassador to nearby Belgium, was Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and he followed our talks with the Europeans very closely, no doubt instructed by John Foster Dulles, who was Secretary of State. Bob Bowie, who had been an advisor to McCloy when he was High Commissioner for Germany, and a close witness of the European reconstruction process, was one of Dulles' close advisors. Many of the people who came from Europe at that time were people I had worked with earlier on the European Army negotiations. Hervé Alphand was Ambassador here, and had been the French representative to NATO at the European Army Conference; I had worked very closely with him. Many others had come through life that way from different areas of my career. I was working with representatives from all six countries involved in the EURATOM project; they were experts from all the embassies. We would entertain them, and take them out to visit the country.

By this time, I had a regular Foreign Service commission, and I went into the regional Bureau of European Affairs that was headed by my ex-boss from the Trade section in Paris, Lane Toombs. His deputy was Russ Fessenden. They had charge of our relations with NATO, with the European Union, and with the OEC at that time. I fit right in with that and it was only a couple of years after I had left the Common Market negotiations to go to Vietnam. I came back to be the officer in charge of a part of European integration. This process was, by 1958, well under way and the European Economic Community (EEC) as well as the European Atomic Energy Committee (EURATOM) had been formed after the Treaty of Rome in 1957. We had a regional office in the State Department that dealt with this part of Europe (still the same Six). It was specifically involved with the most popular and model European project of the time, which was the civilian nuclear program named EURATOM. Again, this was a Monnet-type operation, which consisted in taking a popular idea and using it as a way of moving forward projects of European integration and political unity. In 1958, I came back to that unit and worked very closely with the people who were trying to get the U.S. to accept this idea of a European civil nuclear program. By supporting EURATOM, we were hoping to promote European integration, and we did not push so strongly for it simply because we thought it would be a good idea to have nuclear electricity producing plants. This caused quite a bit of controversy in the United States because people didn't fully understand the benefits of further integrating and bringing European countries together, especially by developing the potentially dangerous nuclear capability of a group of foreign countries.

The Atomic Energy Commission was the committee overseeing the State Department European bureau's work on EURATOM, and was headed by Admiral Lewis Strauss, who was a major figure in the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear power in the U.S. He very much had the impression that the Foreign Service was giving away the store, and that we were encouraging this European program against the United States' interest. To the contrary, our team at the European bureau, myself included, believed that a project like EURATOM would really seal the deal as far as European integration was concerned, and was in our vital interests. Integration meant having a strong political ally in the form of a united Europe. But Strauss thought, "Why didn't we keep our cooperation with nation states? They mattered and you could hold them to their obligations."

This Committee on Atomic Energy was overseen by a congressional committee called the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which was headed by Senator Anderson, from New Mexico. They had part of the Capitol for their headquarters because it was the only secure place. You had to go through 15 people to get to it. They kept very close control and they didn't like the idea of giving independent authority to the Common Market countries to do self-inspection on their nuclear plants, which was one of the provisions of EURATOM.

It was my first brush with the fact that American government leaders got taped on telephone calls. One of the people I was negotiating with was a European and when I got to Admiral Strauss once, he said, "Why that son of a bitch (naming the guy) I heard what he said back to his guys about me." It was a personal remark that he had made on the telephone. I was caught in a jam. Should I warn my friend he better shut up on the telephone? It got to be a very personal thing. The fellow who was leading the negotiations on our side was Bob Schaetzel. He was very convinced of the necessity to encourage the European movement, and he pushed this nuclear business as a way of pushing European integration. He became almost a spiritual leader and worked very closely with a number of Europeans who were equally emphatic in the necessity of developing this.

I learned about the Congressional process right away because, even though I was a very young Foreign Service officer, I was testifying before the Joint Committee, informing them of the negotiations that were taking place in Europe. Very fast, I learned the centers of power as I was dealing with congressional staffers -- a very pugnacious crowd who ran its own policy and spoke in the name of the Senators. It was an extremely powerful committee; it literally decided what was to be done. There was no way that the Atomic Energy Commission could decide to do anything without the backing of that committee.

The Commission started working very closely with American industry, particularly after the Oppenheimer affair. Oppenheimer was one of the fathers of the atomic bomb, and a major figure of the Manhattan project. After the war, he vigorously opposed the buildup of nuclear weapons and urged for the arms race to come to an end. Strauss, when he was put at the head of the Commission on Atomic Energy, became hostile to Oppenheimer and succeeded in isolating him by revealing his past communist leanings. He even got Oppenheimer's clearance revoked. After this clash with the very liberal Oppenheimer, Strauss relied on industry to provide close collaboration and carry out his policy of nuclear proliferation.

The press was one of the State Department's most important tools in order to popularize our policies on European integration. This signaled a rupture between the way the old guard worked and the way we started maneuvering to advertise our opinions. We had relations with the press all the way through because we were promoting policy in a more activist way. We tried to get the government to listen to what we had to say about European strategy, and the press was obviously a route that we used. David Bruce used to have the press in twice a week just for lunch or sitting around in his office when he was

in Paris. We got to know the senior press people that way. There was a little bit of a split between the more activist position, "this is what we are trying to accomplish," and the more reactive, "we are reporting on what is going on here" kind of thing. We were actively using the press to get across a point of view. This is what this country is about, taking the initiative. We need both activists and good observers because very often the activists I've seen over the years have acted without any knowledge of history and they have knocked their heads against the wall, sometimes getting us into real trouble. It tended at that point to be a kind of dichotomy. I think today you find much more competence in the more rounded officers, and I think some officers have a reputation for being more activists than others just by the nature of their makeup.

I think during all this period there were a lot of skeptics. There were perhaps differences between the old Foreign Service and some of the new Foreign Service. I think the older generation tended to be much more skeptical about American policy supporting this sort of activist policy, which consisted in supporting the move towards European integration. New Foreign Service officers, like myself, had come from various areas, and not just the traditional Foreign Service track; we didn't have the same inhibitions as regular officers, and did see the benefits of having a real policy which we promoted actively. There were exceptions to this trend, and people like Stan Cleveland, who I had mentioned as one of the old Foreign Service Officers, was very enthusiastic about our European policy and pushed it very hard.

One point which fueled tension between the Atomic Energy Commission and the State Department was that the EURATOM project provided for an independent inspection body. Admiral Strauss championed international organizations to regulate nuclear power, and was a staunch supporter of the international organization that got established in Vienna, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We, on the other hand, were trying to push for the creation of the European Nuclear Energy Agency in Paris, which was a kind of supra-national body that served as the EURATOM regulator. We, at the State Department, were calling for a special regime for these six countries -- we supported a special regime of auto-inspection in order to further encourage the growth of the European integration movement. Because it was supra-national, we thought it would be a safe inspection system and would prevent anybody from cheating. The concern was not so much about developing nuclear weapons, as France had already built up a nuclear arsenal, and the Germans had foresworn and we believed them. I think it was mainly to keep track of material. I ran into a buzz saw with Admiral Strauss. He thought that the creation of the European Nuclear Agency in Paris would be a disaster!

It finally came down to a battle between Admiral Strauss and Douglas Dillon, the Under Secretary -- who was also a champion of European integration: should the U.S. endorse this EURATOM project? It was left up to Eisenhower to decide. Eisenhower remembered the time when he had endorsed this European idea, and he decided to support the plan because it strengthened Europe. Strauss, the czar of atomic energy, was just furious. Behind him was Admiral Rickover -- the father of the nuclear navy -- who didn't even like the idea of a peaceful missions program, and particularly didn't like the idea of the Europeans going in any kind of independent direction. He was constantly coming up with

reasons why we shouldn't be cooperating with these folks. But the French went on, and 60-70% of their electricity is now produced by nuclear power based on Admiral Rickover's model of the Westinghouse reactor.

The end of the 50's was a time when American leaders started realizing that arms control was essential to America's safety and that the Russians were technologically more advanced in some aspects of their defense capabilities. Sputnik had just opened a new chapter in the arms race between the States and the USSR, and Soviet nuclear stockpiles were becoming bigger than America's. Eisenhower began to establish negotiations for arms control and started explaining that this great resource should be put to peaceful uses. I had the job of taking the heads of EURATOM around -- along with the people from the Atomic Energy Commission -- and showing them some of these nuclear developments in the United States. I brought them out to Idaho Falls to see all the wonderful research we were doing on various kinds of reactors. During that trip, who should appear but the Russian head of the atomic commission! He was the great inventor of their power reactor, and was out there getting the same tour, because the U.S. government was very anxious to incorporate the Russians into this worldwide system of nuclear control and of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

There was an attempt to open up to the Soviets to see if we could get them involved in some of these projects. We were using the control of this technology, which seemed to be very appealing in terms of politics, as a way of cementing a relationship, and as a way of building a kind of political bridge. In effect, with Khrushchev visiting the country in 1959, it was time for Eisenhower to find a subject which he could engage Khrushchev on. There was a sense that arms negotiations should figure in a relationship with the Soviet Union, and that was being discussed at the same time among all the NATO countries. Indeed, we were just starting to think about political consultations at NATO, instead of relying upon the four country directorate constituted by the U.S., France, Britain, and the USSR. We decided to move beyond the four states system because of the 1954 London and Paris agreements, which fully recognized the statehood of West Germany, and the status of the Soviet Union as an occupying power in the East. As a result, this four powers structure disappeared and when we reconvened similar, four country meetings, it was us meeting with the Germans, the French, and the British. That continued as a forum, and every time we met in NATO before the fall of the Berlin wall, we always had a discussion the night before about the German problem and then usually moved onto other things.

Apart from EURATOM, I was involved with various trade negotiations concerning the European Economic Community. The big question when I arrived in the section of the European bureau dealing with the Common Market was, "How do we somehow or other relate to this Common Market and prevent it from becoming protectionist?" Douglas Dillon was Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, and he proposed the fifth round under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in order to lower tariffs and encourage trading, notably between the EEC and the United States. This round later became known as the "Dillon Round." I was working closely with John Leddy, Dillon's top aide, and with those who were working to get these trade negotiations through.

There was intense controversy at the time over the benefits of negotiating such trade agreements with the European community. Isaiah Frank was in charge of the Trade division in the economic bureau, and said that creating a trading giant like Europe was the greatest disaster we had brought on ourselves. We had created an inner group, so not only did we no longer have a worldwide trading system, we were also making special arrangements for this so called customs union which were going to mess up our business in Europe. While Frank and a bunch of skeptics were more concerned about the isolation of these six countries from the world wide system, we had the argument that this was going to benefit U.S. business interests. John Leddy and Dillon felt that what we had to do was bring down this external tariff that had been created around the Common Market. If we reduced the tariff, we would liberalize trade and it would help the worldwide system. Leddy saw the Common Market, with its customs union and its eventual desire to go even further to an economic union, as something that would benefit us in the end because it would create tremendous economic growth. In order to get this through Congress and give some argument to Douglas Dillon, I had a hand in bringing Tom Enders back to the State Department.

Tom was just getting his Ph.D. at Harvard in a very exotic science called customs union theory. A customs union is a zone protected by a single tariff. I don't know the mathematical economics of what happens when you form a customs trial, but he went through this elaborate calculation, which only Tom could do. He showed that, if the single tariffs protecting the European and American customs unions were to be reduced by only half a percent, all of the trade diversion effects arising from the customs union would be overcome by the economic growth. In effect, outsider traders would benefit from this slightly lower tariff and there would be greater demand. Dillon hoped to get the U.S. and the EEC to lower their tariffs in order to create economic growth. Enders' theory proved to be true, except in one area and that was agriculture.

This is the thing that drove J. F. Frank up the wall because he was one of the few people in the beginning that said, "This common agricultural policy you are talking about is going to be the death of American agricultural dominance in the market." Of course, we had dominated the market because at the end of the war European agriculture was dysfunctional. We had built up a tremendous trade in soy beans which was used to feed cattle as well as the population. Isaiah was right because the common agricultural policy gradually did get us out of this five billion dollars' worth of agricultural business we did in the community, and even began doing us out of business in other parts of the world. In order to support the high prices within the Common Market, the Europeans highly subsidized their agricultural industry. Here we are, forty years later, still talking about it, trying to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The next round of negotiations will come to an end in 2013. John Leddy felt that the Common Agricultural Policy would die of its own weight because sooner or later the European tax payer would get tired of paying all the subsidization. Well, this hasn't happened yet, and the CAP represents nearly half of the European Union's budget.

A very important event for the European bureau in Washington was the election of

Charles de Gaulle as President of France in 1958. It was only a little while after his entry on the scene that I returned to Washington. Those who supported the integration movement felt that de Gaulle's arrival might in fact mean the end of European construction. Some in the State Department had already buried European integration; people like Martin Herz, who was very much of the opinion that nationalism was going to triumph in France, and that all of our European projects were going down the tube. Others still adopted an indifferent position. I can remember having conversations with Foreign Service officers who just felt this was not the United States' business. Why muck around with it? We should accept whatever happens in Europe and our policies should fit in with whatever happens. They weren't so concerned about nationalism coming back into Germany; they thought that German-American relations would always be very close, and that you didn't need this European integration thing to bind Germany in with the West.

However, Monnet began getting the word back to us that de Gaulle wasn't going to kill these institutions, for the simple reason that they had succeeded in modernizing the French economy and made France a prosperous country again -- all of which de Gaulle later tried to take credit for. The word to us was "Relax a little bit because Adenauer is standing firm on these institutions. He will have a relationship with de Gaulle and will call for him to accept European integration."

Konrad Adenauer reassured us when de Gaulle put our European policy in peril. Once, while I was traveling in Europe with George Ball -- the Under Secretary of State for European Affairs -- we had lunch with Adenauer. A note was brought in to him saying de Gaulle had had a press conference in which he said the negotiations to include the British in the EEC were finished, and that he would use his veto to block any further talks of British integration. George Ball was a strong supporter of the British entry into the Common Market, and Adenauer immediately tried to calm down our reaction. Looking back on it, I think Adenauer probably had advance word. He was prepared to lecture us as to how we shouldn't be discouraged by this. The Germans had no interest in seeing a fight between the French and the Americans on this issue. They were always kind of walking a tightrope at keeping a good relationship with the Americans while they had this good and close relationship with the French, who were led by a very difficult President.

I would say that our policy of economic European integration was one that was largely successful. A lot of people look back on it and say "What kind of a monster have you created?" They saw a monopoly zone as well as a formidable competitor forming. I don't think the integration of Europe had a negative effect on the United States. In fact, I think a strong and unified Europe was and has been basically in our interests. At the State Department, we felt that if Americans were really as good as we said we were, we would be able to compete. In a competitive world we would gain more. The American investments in Europe did very well, our trade did very well. There were industries that came along which were genuinely competitive. The agreements we worked on at the European bureau, notably with Douglas Dillon and John Leddy, were designed to keep the Europeans honest, and to prevent them from using protectionist policies in order to overcome straight economic competitiveness. There probably are some places where

European governments were not kept honest, for example on the subsidization of the aeronautical industry, but I think today they are beginning to beg off on the straight subsidies, and the competition is a bit more regular. We supply, even to this day, much of the value of Airbus, and some of our motors equip those planes. What we argued turned out to be true: growth in Europe led to growth in the U.S.

European integration, to my mind, represents much of the future because I don't think there is any way to stop the economic integration of the world. That's the way capital flows, the way technology spreads, and the way money gets made. The efforts of governments to stop this and concentrate their efforts into a more national context are usually not successful. Today, the European Union and the USA have the largest bilateral trade partnership in the world, and our cooperation with Europe has been the basis for our foreign policy for the last fifty years. Europeans do, I think, feel a sense of unity which gives them more strength and confidence as our partner, because we are rather overwhelming on the scale of international relations. I think that's been another trait of the post-war period. We're elephants that kind of tramp around in the garden, and it's a little hard sometime to stop that. This is particularly true when we get into a military relationship, and I think part of American diplomacy's job over the years has been to be sensitive to that so that we don't stomp out all the things that give strength to a society.

When the Kennedy administration came in (this was 1961) John Leddy went over with Douglas Dillon, who had been appointed Secretary of Treasury, to become the Assistant Secretary of Treasury. Dillon and Leddy continued to play a big role in trade negotiations of all kinds because that was their project, and they pushed it very hard. John Tuthill, who had been an aide of General Marshall's, also became a big player because he was in the OEC (Organization for Economic Cooperation) in Paris, which was a European group that came out of the Marshall Plan. Jack decided that now the USAID (United States Agency for International Development) phase should come to an end, and that we should shift from development work in Europe to collaborating as trading partners. These European countries were now all standing on their feet and what we needed was an organization in which EEC countries were full partners. He came up with this idea of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) which became an organization where the United States, the EEC countries, and many other countries that were not members of the European Community could meet and talk about economic issues. In the beginning of the Kennedy administration, the OECD's ministerial meetings would be attended by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Treasury; it was a very important forum to exchange ideas and take the pulse of the global trading situation. It was the model illustration of Europe talking with one voice and the European Community sitting in the OECD as one body, although member states also sent national representatives. That movement continued.

The transition to the Kennedy administration was much smoother than the last one had been, from Truman to Eisenhower. I was in Paris at the time and the new guys in charge were determined to have a clean sweep. This was the McCarthy period, and a bunch of committees were formed to assess the capabilities of Foreign Service Officers. I can remember a visit from two envoys, Roy Cohn and David Schine, who were close aides to

McCarthy and came to Paris to listen around, in order get rid of any person remotely related to Communism. These guys were hardly out of their diapers (both 27 at the time). They came into Paris, celebrated all night long, going to all the nightclubs. They then called people in as if they had judiciary authority, and began naming names, particularly in what was then known as the Mutual Security Administration, which was the successor to the Marshall Plan. It was a very, very unhappy time. These two impostors thought they were pretty much omnipotent, encouraged by the arrival of Dulles as Secretary of State, who had very strong views about disloyalty and being untrustworthy.

The 1961 election took place, and George Ball, who had been the head of the Strategic Bombing Survey in London during the war, was asked by Kennedy to produce a report with Adlai Stevenson on what should happen in Foreign Policy. The transition at the time of Kennedy was quite different because there was actually a transition team. Eisenhower and Kennedy met and agreed this should be a smooth operation, despite the fact some bad things had been said each way. I'm sure there was no love lost with Eisenhower. But he insisted that the transition be handled in a smooth fashion. George Ball did the report out of his law office in downtown Washington. This was one of the first occasions of there being a transition team before they had the law on transitions. The people coming in on the Democratic side were allowed to borrow people from various agencies. Robert Schaetzel and I and one other fellow were borrowed by George Ball to help him in the preparation of this report, which was called the Stevenson report. He delivered it to John Kennedy down at Palm Beach. Then, we were asked to have a more detailed report written on certain issues and that became the Ball report. Ball became Under Secretary of State, and Schaetzel and I became special assistants to him, Schaetzel being senior to me. So at the beginning of the Kennedy administration, I moved out of the European bureau and up to the Undersecretary's office.

Q: You were doing that from '61 until?

HARTMAN: From '61 until I left to go to London in '63.

I was special assistant to George, handling his day-to-day stuff Schaetzel and George Springsteen stayed with George all through his period in government. They were the policy guys but because I had worked a lot on the Common Market George used me from time-to-time on special missions. I remember once getting a telephone call from Foy Kohler, who was the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs saying to me, "Didn't you used to work for us? What are you doing down there?" I said "Well, Eisenhower has made this new deal with the administration that they can have anybody, anywhere and somebody's called me up and said go down there, so I'm there." So he said, "Well, what about your work over here?" In any case Foy and I got along fine after that, but I then went up to be a Special Assistant to George Ball and stayed on there through 1963. It really was my first experience with the seventh floor of the State Department and the way the whole Department worked. It consisted in getting the whole Department to be responsive and work with an administration. That was, I think, just a fantastically valuable experience for a Foreign Service Officer. Many of my colleagues thought of their job as being strictly Foreign Service, and that policy planning in Washington was

another job. They don't so much now -- but it used to be that way. Without that experience, there is just no way to know how foreign policy is really made, and, of course, the relationship with Congress is so important at that point because there is so much that goes on.

These were also the days when people were still monitoring telephone calls, and that was absolutely a fabulous experience for me, when I would sit there as the Special Assistant in the office and Ball would be talking with Kennedy or a Congressman or whatever it was, and I would sort of monitor to see whether anything had to be done. That practice got hit in the head somewhere, I think about ten years later, and it just isn't done anymore. There were a series of incidents that lead to its demise, but at that time it was very common for a young officer up there to listen to important phone calls, and sometimes getting exposed to really sharp talk. I think the experience with the Kennedy administration was mainly, for me at least, learning how in a very activist administration, the top of that building works.

This was also a great job for me because George Ball had been an old friend from these days in Paris when he participated in the Marshall Plan as a lawyer. He had been hired by Monnet, and was himself a dedicated European advocate. George kept his friendship with Monnet, who by that time had left the Coal and Steel Community, and had organized this committee for the United States of Europe. It was a private body made up of leaders in industry and politics to promote the European idea. This was a typical way for Monnet to work, and it had a lot of influence. It had people like Helmut Schmidt on it. There was a recent interview with Schmidt, who became the chancellor of Germany, and he was asked about his relationship with Monnet. He said "He was my God. He was the man who really led us toward what Europe could become."

Ball had always been the unofficial legal advisor and drafter on matters concerning the Coal and Steel Community, notably for Dulles and Dillon. However, he was really very different from Dulles, and never had much respect for Dulles' kind of Presbyterian way of looking at world problems and moralizing. George was much more of a pragmatist. The way he liked to make policy was to give a speech; he would make policy by declaring, "We've got to give a speech on that." This was good because it not only made policy within the building, but it made policy public in the sense that it was communicated to the voters, whose support we actually needed to be approved. He felt he had to convince the public that his policies were the right ones. He would stay up all night and he would be clipping away, taking yellow sheets, stapling them together, and coming up with a speech. He was a joy to work with; a great story teller and vigorous man.

I think George was a good counterweight to Dean Rusk, who was Secretary of State, and who really went the other way. He was much more of a man who dealt with issues bureaucratically, within the system, and he liked to deal very privately with the President and establish his relationships that way. There were many advantages to both sets of qualities. George was fairly influential, and I think in the beginning there must have been some resentment on Dean Rusk's part, but he was too much of a gentleman to really

show it. In the end, I think both held each other in great respect, and they had a very close working relationship.

George was a Washington politician. He knew about the ins and outs of the political process, and had very close relationships with people on the Hill. His way of dealing with the State Department was a bit unusual. Unlike Dulles or Rusk, who built up their own staff and kept their organization far away from the State Department, dealing with the Foreign Service at arm's length and taking policy decisions at an internal level, George seeded the Department with people he knew. When Kennedy was making appointments, he worked very closely with the man who was in charge of recruiting for the administration. Thus, his influence lay not only within his Under Secretary's office but within the State Department. He put people like Mike Blumenthal, into the Economic bureau as the Deputy Assistant Secretary. Mike was the man who had been in Shanghai working at the Post Exchange when I was there after the war. He later rose to the top and became Secretary of Treasury. He was very fond of using people like Tommy Thompson, the former Ambassador to the USSR, and others who were regular State Department people -- people like me.

This put him at odds with Kennedy, who had a great suspicion of the State Department being disloyal, leaking information -- a feeling which carried on into the Johnson administration. George's answer to this was that he preferred having people he respected in strategic places, even if they were Foreign Service and not political.

His relationship with Dean Rusk was always absolutely honest and open, even though they were very different, or it might well have been because they were different. They developed very close bonds mainly because George did all the things Dean was not interested in doing. Dean was totally fixated on Vietnam. I can't remember Dean Rusk having a major role in anything that related to Europe or to international economics. He became obsessed with the Vietnam situation. He and George constantly argued about it. George didn't like the Vietnamese policy. But George had the highest respect for Dean Rusk despite this difference of opinion. George would meet with him at the end of the day and the famous bottle of scotch would go down between the two of them. He would discuss all the things he was doing. Biafra, the Congo -- these were all the areas that George Ball took over, and each time he made a speech about it. That is "U.S. policy is--" and then he proceed to try and carry it out. Kennedy had a lot of respect for him for doing these tough jobs, and I think Johnson as well.

In the Kennedy days, he felt there was far too great military involvement, and then, of course, under Johnson he became the gadfly and fought against people like McGeorge Bundy, who, with his deputy, Walt Rostow, became convinced they could win the Vietnam War.

Ball's own view was formed without any help from me by his having been so closely connected with the French during the post-WWII period. He was also an old friend of Mendès-France, who had cut the cord and ended French involvement in the Far East. He looked upon Kennedy's military policy in Vietnam with horror. He had followed the

French debacle closely, and knew why they were pulling out. It was precisely because there was nothing they could base the civil society on -- all parties were corrupt and the population was very unhappy with its leader. Without that civil society, there was no way to resist what the North was doing both by force of arms and by association with the peasantry, a group that hated Diem. He saw the situation quite clearly, and argued it strongly as Undersecretary for Economic affairs. After Kennedy's death, he maintained and even accentuated his efforts to persuade the administration that U.S. policy in Vietnam was terrible. Even though Johnson did not act upon his advice, he listened to him, and now with the tapes coming out, it is proven that Johnson had his doubts. He never expected George to resign over it, as he did in 1966. There is a very good biography of George by Professor Hill at The College of William and Mary, who describes that whole period very well and the role that George played unsuccessfully. There are those who felt at the time that it would have been better to quit and to have made a public statement, but George stayed loyal to the administration and did not make a show of his dissent, even when his opinion was turning out to be more and more accurate as time went by.

The test of fire for the Rusk-Ball group around the President occurred in 1961, right around the beginning of the Kennedy administration, and it was Cuba. The missile crisis in 1962 was a real test. I was sitting in George's outer office and the meetings were taking place in his conference room, because they didn't want them in the Secretary's conference room for fear that they would be more visible there. I don't know why, since we had the Attorney General (Robert Kennedy), the Secretary of Defense (McNamara), and the Vice-President (Johnson) sort of wandering in and out. This was in the few days when John Kennedy was out of town. He didn't want to come back until his whole group had decided what to do, because they didn't want to tip the Soviets off until we were ready to respond vigorously to what we saw.

I remember the scariest moment of my career in the State Department was when Dean Rusk poked his head out of the conference room and called me over and said "Alright, there's something called an evacuation plan, would you get it for me." I went and got this thing and we began reading through it and we just couldn't believe it. It had the leaders of our country hopping into these helicopters and going off to someplace in the mountains, and their families following with dogs and children; you could just see them on the road somehow with everybody just gladly going into their helicopter while their family followed. The surrealism of some of that civilian defense stuff struck us at the time.

There was an amusing event at that time too. The whole group was in the middle of all this very serious stuff; with Dean Acheson going off to brief de Gaulle and what not, another head poked out of this room. It was Vice President Johnson, and he said, "You know we've been in here eating these sandwiches all day, I'd like a chocolate sundae," so we got him a chocolate sundae.

One of the very valuable advisors we had at the time of the crisis and at many others was Ambassador to the USSR Tommy Thompson. People had great respect for him and there just was nothing that was discussed or decided without talking to him and getting his

view of what the reaction was going to be. He had a very personal relationship with both John Kennedy and Bobby Kennedy, both of whom often sought his advice. He had a lot of influence in actual day to day policy, since he was on the field and had a clear view of what the situation was. For example, a man like George Kennan, who was also very active at the time, never had that kind of relationship with the Kennedy administration. He was never a bureaucratic figure, but more of a marvelous thinker, a historian, and a position maker. He was a rather emotional man too I've found. In a bureaucracy, he was always a thorn because he had a view which may well have been a view quite different from the one that he had had the preceding week, or at least it seemed to be. In a bureaucracy, that just threw things into a state of panic, because people wanted a little consistency, and wanted to go forward in a certain direction.

One of the singularities of working for George Ball during the Kennedy administration was that there was profound distrust between the administration and the State Department. It was with great difficulty and only over a period of time that we overcame this. I discovered that administrations in general tend to come in with great distrust of the Foreign Service -- it's in the American culture, we are automatically seen as being disloyal. After they come in, they begin to put a face on this distrust and see individual performance; they like some of what they see, and they don't like some others. Kennedy used to make these outrageous lectures about how slow and unresponsive we were.

But when you look at the work that actually got produced, or at who was actually solving problems during a crisis, it wasn't the result of Arthur Schlesinger pounding out his memos; it was people who actually knew something about the situation, who were good on their feet, and who were articulate people. It is true that, for a person in the White House, the bureaucracies are sluggish. But when, at the State Department, you are asked for something, the President tends to want it yesterday, or now at the very latest, because he is impatient and because that's what he's thinking about now. The thing that disturbs me as I look back over all the years is that people say "Well, you know, you're alright," or so and so is all right, "but the rest of that place. . ." What they don't realize is that there is no way you can be "alright" unless you've got something behind you, and there is just a tremendous amount of talent there. Sometimes, the State Department doesn't get mobilized properly and is slow to respond to the administration's actions, but there's a danger also in having it too responsive. We've gone wrong in a lot of silly ways because of people who say "Yes Sir" and head over the cliff. We've had some recent examples of that.

The person who felt most strongly that there was occasional real interference on the side of the State Department was Dean Rusk. I think the suspicion usually and primarily comes from the Secretary of State, because below him there are people who try to make things work. The Special Assistants or the Assistant Secretaries have got this situation to deal with, and they can't afford to be standing on ceremony and saying, "Dammit, we're never going to allow those guys over there to do anything." They have to do something, and so they make alliances, and try to patch up relations between the Secretary of State and the State Department, or even between the Secretary and the President's National Security Advisor. I've usually been on that team of assistants so I'm rather prejudiced,

but it seems to me that they have, more than the Secretary, the role of keeping things going.

The distrustful relationship between the administration and the State Department often leads the State Department to be suspicious when the administration appoints people to certain places within the Foreign Service. An administration comes in with some policy ideas that it would like to see carried out, and they should be able to propose appointees for certain jobs. I think there ought to be a genuine competition for jobs below the absolute political level of the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of State. The Foreign Service should be able to put up its best and then, if the administration is unsatisfied in some way, it ought to put up its people and decide at that point, "Alright, we want to have a political appointee in that office." I don't think appointees should be forbidden somehow in having jobs below the Assistant Secretary level; there's a lot of benefit sometime in the seeding of a bureaucracy with talented people. I don't mean just hiding away some incompetent guy, but getting somebody with real ideas. I've seen this happen in administration after administration, with guys that have come in from the Universities, or people coming from a career in business. These people have a real notion of what they want to do, and yield a certain kind of freshness; it really gives a boost to the bureaucracy.

Of course, I think some Ambassadorial appointments are a nuisance to American diplomacy, and I think we've been on a very bad trend in terms of using certain ambassadorships as political plums. Going back to the nineteenth century, when ambassadorships were actually bought and sold, there has always been a certain tradition of rewarding the President's friends in our country. It's one thing to reward a distinguished American who has got something to contribute, or to say that a distinguished American fits in a particular job because you want to convey a certain political message. After all, I started under one of the great political Ambassadors, David Bruce, who held positions in China, Britain, France, Germany, and NATO. He is, I think, maybe the greatest diplomatic figure we've ever known, and there have been others like him who have come in and done remarkable jobs. But it's another thing when people come in because they want the title, they're friends of the administration, and the countries they are representing America in look to them for some statement about what U.S. policies are or what U.S. policies are about, and they get nothing, absolutely nothing. Some countries have suffered more than others because they have always been thought to be places you could put people like this in and it wouldn't matter. I think it generally shows an undervaluation of the role of diplomacy and of the role of diplomatic missions in the culture of America.

Approving Presidential choices is the role of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Up until now, they haven't really had the audacity to weigh in more on the choice of appointees. Constitutionally, there is a certain problem. There is a bias, which I think is a good one in our constitution, that the President's appointee should be approved. Nevertheless, I think that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee could play a much greater role along the lines of the judicial committee in getting quality people appointed; just as the judges are reviewed for example, by the bar association before they are

considered and rated. This was started and actually got a little bit formal during the Carter administration, when a committee that met to review the names of outsiders as well as insiders for jobs was formed. The committee made a recommendation and the President could accept it or not. It was the beginning of a process that, somehow or another, I think ought to get picked up again; that seems to me a sensible idea.

The geographical divide between the areas that Dean Rusk and George Ball took care of was such that I wasn't working on Vietnam but mostly on other parts of the world. In 1962, Kennedy, accompanied by George Ball, met with the British Prime Minister Macmillan in the Bahamas to reach an agreement as to whether the U.S. would help Britain develop its nuclear capabilities. Kennedy agreed to help in exchange for Macmillan accepting to initiate talks leading to Britain's entry into the EEC. We wanted to create strong European unity, which would only happen if Great Britain joined the EEC and did not try to undermine it.

George sent me to Europe so that I could announce Macmillan's serious commitments to apply for membership in the EEC. I first went to Brussels to meet with our representative to the EEC, Walt Butterworth, who was known at that time for being skeptical of British intentions to join the Common Market. I tried to convince him that Macmillan was serious. He seemed disbelieving, and was probably wondering, "Why is this young whippersnapper being sent around Europe to talk to these people?" Out of all the people I met during my career as a Foreign Service Officer, he was, I must say, one of my favorite. He looked old-style, he talked old-style, but he was a character and a staunch supporter of the European idea. A couple years later, I received a call from him because he had suspicions to share with me. He had seen the main assistant of European Commissioner Hallstein at an airport in Iceland, and thought that it may have to do with spying for the Russians. I looked into it, and it turned out the guy was actually traveling to the U.S. to propose! Anyway, Walt insisted on coming to Paris with me because I was going to see Monnet and Jack Tuthill, who was at the time our representative to the OECD.

We wanted to assure the French that the British genuinely sought integration, because de Gaulle highly suspected the British of being a Trojan horse wanting to carry American influence into the EEC. Kennedy felt the British earnestly wanted to get in and that they should be taken seriously. I had to speak with Butterworth first to get him in line because he too suspected the British of wanting in for the wrong reasons. He thought that perhaps the British wanted to integrate the EEC and water it down for it to become a free trade area. I had dinner with Monnet and Jack Tuthill. Monnet immediately saw that this was something that he should take a hand in and try and bring about; he thought that if the top of the British government had made this kind of historic decision of applying for EEC membership, he should help overcome the fears and skepticism of the French government.

My last meeting was with the number three man in the French Foreign Office, who later became the Governor of Treasury and Ambassador in Russia and in Germany. His name was Olivier Wormser. He was always a very tough negotiator and a thorough Frenchman.

I explained how Kennedy and Macmillan had met and how the British were earnestly seeking entry into the EEC. He just shook his head and he said, "You know, the trouble with you and the British is that you think you speak the same language." Wormser, a staunch de Gaulle supporter, was the number one deputy on the economic side of the French foreign office. He made a valid point, by saying that the British were not ready for their entry in the EEC.

Ironically, the agreement eventually defeated itself because de Gaulle was so furious that the Americans were helping the British acquire the bomb (and not the French) that he vowed to veto British entry into the EEC. At the beginning of the 60's, British entry into the EEC seemed impossible and it did not come to pass right away. However, to try and jumpstart further negotiations on British integration, George Ball sent me to London in 1963 as head of the Economic Section of the Embassy.

Q: Today is the 6th of January 2000. What years were you in London?

HARTMAN: I was there in 1963 to 1967. Being George's Special Assistant had been a fantastic experience for the rest of my career. It was my first time working with the administration, and greatly enhanced any understanding I might have had of the dynamic at the head of the State Department. It's not specific to our job; in any profession, getting a view from the top is just invaluable. For Foreign Service Officers to be well-rounded, they should be put, at some point in their career, on the staff of someone in the administration, so that if they don't have it to begin with, they sure learn to have political sense, a sense of public relations, and a sense of responsiveness to political leadership, regardless of administration. I think this already happens to some extent. Our best officers do get into those jobs, those who are the articulate ones, the good writers -- the people who can be used in positions of that kind. I was serving in a Democratic administration and, when I came back in the late 60's, I served in the Nixon administration at that same level, the Assistant Secretary level. I saw it from both sides, and, without that, you can't have a Foreign Service experience anymore. You have got to know Washington as well as know how to deal with foreign governments; at least, if you have any of the top level jobs. I am sure that there are people who are better at Washington and who are better at the job overseas, but at the very top levels you need both kinds of qualities.

I arrived in London in 1963, with my wife and my five children; this was six months before the assassination of Kennedy. This appointment abroad was somewhat of a relief for me and Donna, because my job in George's office had been very intense; things were less hectic in London. In Washington, I had continued working on European integration, and London was a natural place for me to go, as many of us felt that it was the next potential candidate for entry into the EEC. As surprising as it sounds, when I got there the Ambassador was David Bruce, who had, since France, been Ambassador to West Germany. So I was very pleased to find him in London; he'd been quite a figure for me when I was going through my first years in the Marshall Plan.

The deputy to Bruce was Phil Kaiser, who had been an important labor union figure in

the U.S. He took care of all the labor union problems which were arising in Great Britain around that time, and was very much a foil for Bruce because he was a man of the people. Phil prided himself for his close relationship with labor movements, having himself come from the Labor Department. Everybody was anxious to see if labor could be gotten out of the Labour Party, because they were truly the ones who held them in check from doing the kinds of things that a sensible British Labour Party would do. They controlled the party because they had votes in the Labour Party conference. The nationalization was their initiative and they did all kinds of other things which added to the burdens of Britain, meaning that the recovery of Britain's economy was much delayed compared to that of other European countries. It took Margaret Thatcher and a very brave new group in the Labour Party who tossed out the labor unions of the party.

The Economic Minister to the Ambassador, who was senior to me, was a man called Bill Armstrong. This entire group was mixed up in high politics, meaning they saw the cabinet ministers. I didn't so much, as I was working at the underground level. My official work in London concerned trade negotiations which involved American interests. I would help explain or resolve problems that American trade was encountering in England or elsewhere in Europe. When I arrived in London, we were in the middle of a dispute called the chicken war. The chicken war was all about how the United States couldn't get its chickens into the European Community. They managed to come up with regulations that denied us this great export from Arkansas. I remember my first press conference at the Embassy -- a young officer new to London explaining the chicken war to a very doubtful but amused British press corps.

What I really wanted to do, and what Ball wanted me to do, was go to London and get immersed into the politics of the European Community there, because it was the time of their second application to the EEC. Through my work, a goal of mine was to push strongly in favor of British integration. At the Embassy, I succeeded Joe Greenwall as the head of the Economic section. He introduced me around, particularly to the press people and to the pro-Europeans on the Labour side.

I did a lot of speaking around the country. Not saying, "You must join" but finding a way during the middle of trade negotiations to talk about trade and what access to the Common Market could mean for British trade. I wanted to get through the implicit message that there didn't seem to be any other place for the British to go except the European Union, and then kind of educating people about it this one option. I told them that it wasn't simply a free trade area, but that these fellows on the continent had higher aspirations, involving a much more politicized and political union. Certainly, as they moved from the Coal and Steel Community to the European Common Market, it was becoming much more than a trading area, and was evolving towards an economic union, soon to become a monetary union. However, at the time none of us anticipated that the union would form so quickly.

There was a group that worked out of Chatham House, which was a British council on foreign relations that was building up support for joining the European Community. Of course, the business component of that council was made up of the heads of big

manufacturing businesses in Britain, and they were all very anxious to get in the EEC. I encouraged some of my friends on the continent to come on over to London to talk at Chatham House, and by doing so establish communication with the British who were beginning to be pro-European. David Bruce was a very subtle diplomat and so none of us would go out and say "You've got to do this. This is American policy." That wasn't his style and he knew it would be counter-productive in a place like that. What you had to do was go to Chatham House, be on panels, go out and meet political leaders. The first attempt at integrating Britain had failed while George and I were having lunch with Adenauer, so I went there for the second run at the British entry and it was good fun. I met a lot of people who had important national offices, and who could play a role in promoting the European idea within the political class. Denis Healey, who was Secretary of State for Defense, is an old friend now. I came to know many others in the banking area, as I was mostly involved in economic affairs. Our good friend Fredy Fisher was an influential figure at the Financial Times, and later became the editor and one of mine and Donna's best friends. He had emigrated from Germany before the war, and the misguided British had interned him in Australia when the war broke out. After the war, he was put at the head of some administrative area in Germany. Wonderful guy. London was a wonderful experience for me, and I had four terrific years in that capital.

The great thing about London as far as I was concerned was it was the first post I had where we really fit into the community. Our two older boys went to a Quaker boarding school, and enjoyed that to some extent, although not as much as the girls, who, dressed like Madeleine, went to a very fancy school called Lady Eden. Our fifth child, who was smaller, went to a local school. My wife went to the London School of Economics because we had married six months short of her graduation at Wheaton College, much to her father's displeasure. So she completed her work both at the London School and when she came back to Washington, at Catholic University. She finally got her degree from Wheaton 20 years after her class graduated. We lived in a wonderful house on Edward Square -- it was an embassy house. There were two grass tennis courts in the middle of the square which we had access to, and the best pub in London was down the street. We knew all our neighbors around the square quite well. There was the man who first ran the four minute mile, Roger Bannister; Gomer Thomas, the founder of the great beer works in England; and Fredy Fisher, our great friend. It was a real community. We quickly fell in with a man, who, during the war, was one of the chief BBC broadcasters to Europe. His family and mine bought a house opposite the Isle of Wight where we used to go on weekends. It was a good life. In London our social life and our connection with British people came alive.

David Bruce was very good about inviting the Embassy people to the luncheons and dinners he had. We got to meet not only Ted Heath, leader of the Conservative Party, but Jim Callaghan, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time. Wilson, the Prime Minister, was not a figure that got out very much -- at least I never saw much of him. Callaghan was quite skeptical about the European idea, but thought that was the practical thing to do. Bruce kind of trained us. He would invite us to parties at their house and you would watch and see how they did it on a grand scale. We were never able to do that sort of thing but at least you knew how they used their entertainment. Not just for

entertainment but for a purpose. David's luncheons were really sought after by the whole British establishment.

We were working in the new Embassy, designed by the great modernist architect Saarinen. The embassy was controversial at the time because all of the other houses around Grosvenor Square were Georgian mansions. In any case it was a very comfortable place to work. I rode my bicycle very often. I bought one of these bicycles that had a small wheel and I thought that would be enough to get me under the regulations in the park. As I came down Kensington High Street, I could switch over at Kensington Palace and go through Hyde Park to the Embassy. There was this woman who walked her dog every day and she kept glaring at me. There were signs saying "no bicycling" but there was small print giving wheel dimensions under "maids and children". Finally she got a policeman to stop me one day and I pointed out the wheel dimensions which his sign referred to. He said "You must be from Philadelphia, I've heard about those lawyers." Anyway I was kicked out and after that I had to go around. There was a British cabinet officer who rode a Moulton bike and I wrote him and asked him to join me in getting a path through this park.

Working in the embassy itself, we would write reports about various economic things. I was mainly concerned with international negotiations. It never seemed to me that the writing of the reports was a job. The job was going out to see people. My theory is the only reason you have people abroad is to have that contact. When I see these bastions being built to replace our old embassies that cut us off from people, I wonder whether it makes sense for us to still have embassies despite the fact there is RIF (Reduction in Force) now. But even though the main aspect of my work in London was dealing with people, it was very important to have good drafting skills because the Ambassador had set very high standards. Indeed, once a month David Bruce would sit down and draft in longhand these telegrams in absolutely Jeffersonian prose. These telegrams would cover the whole landscape and they would weave in conversations he had participated in throughout the week. They were known as "Bruce grams." Everybody would know immediately when a Bruce gram had been sent out because they would get passed around. Phil Kaiser had to approve everything that went out. He too was a craftsman, but he had to be careful that nothing went out of the Embassy that didn't sound right.

The thing I noticed there was the division between the Political section, Economic section, representatives from the Agriculture Department, the Justice Department, the Labor Department -- and the list goes on. There were maybe 20 different agencies. David was furious about this. He tried to pare it down and questioned why so many agencies had to have representatives abroad. Couldn't they rely on the embassies? I was involved once in the cutting back of agencies abroad, and cutting costs. I discovered incredible stories. We discovered in Bonn a guy who represented us, although he was not part of any Foreign Service mission. In talking to him, it turned out he had a perfect right to be there. The contract for buying a big generator called for periodic inspection and that was once a month. Rather than send somebody from the States every month, they put somebody in the embassy in Bonn. All he did was go out to where these things were being fabricated to inspect them.

Bonn of course was run like an American colony. Gradually the administrative side of things took over and things got more and more comfortable. People began to expect more and more things. Housing in London was beautiful. Housing in Paris was exceptional too -- we actually built a whole series of houses there near the Seine River. The political elites in the embassy insisted on being out of diplomatic compounds and out in the city. I was part of that, I guess, and I would never have lived in a gated diplomatic complex. Being in that kind of setting, there was no way we could have represented the United States, because when there is such a huge group of people, it becomes a closed community. I really think that whole movement toward grouping high numbers of people made it less possible for us to do the main job, the only job, that justifies having an embassy abroad, which is direct contact with societies and populations.

Of course, the main reason that embassies are packed with personnel is that they are a good cover for intelligence programs. I think it is wrong for us to depend on embassies for putting covert people around. The covert people should be out there somewhere else, not in the embassy. The agency was never in favor of that because of the expense. They recruit people who like to have their privileges -- a nice snack bar, a store, protection, good housing -- and this is for people who don't even stay abroad that long. There has been a trend at the agency of having a high turnover rate, because counter-intelligence thinks that if we keep an officer longer than four or five years, they are going over to the enemy, and should be distrusted. Some of the old intelligence agencies used to have people stay a lifetime with diplomatic circles in particular countries, and that is how to get good intelligence. This is a debate that has been going on for a while, and I see no way of changing things. The intelligence people have taken over the staffing of Congress, and it's impossible to even discuss performance of the intelligence system up there.

During trade negotiations, I spent a lot of time on something called the citrus problem. The British had a favorable paraphrase in their trade agreements with Commonwealth countries which favored Jamaican oranges and orange juice over ours. There was an American lawyer in Washington who was a major investor in the group that eventually bought Tropicana. This man kept pointing out to me, "Here is a market where they consume hundreds of thousands more than the American consumers consume in orange juice each year and this discrimination is intolerable." He was supported by John Leddy, Dillon's former aide, who was very actively involved with the GATT. He had become one of our big economic people in Washington, and had been trying to get rid of Commonwealth preferences, because he felt these were against the GATT provisions. The Commonwealth was neither a free trade area nor a customs union, and therefore shouldn't be a discriminatory area of trade.

I remember we were dealing with an extraordinary Jamaican man who was the Jamaican minister of trade. He had been brought up in the middle of Britain and had a real thespian talent. I mean, he could have very well been a great preacher and a great actor. He used to sit in these meetings, which concerned a rather dull subject -- how do you get orange juice into Britain and eventually into the European Community -- and quote Shakespeare, the Bible, and very funny stories right off the music hall stage in Manchester, or

wherever he grew up. Eventually, he was persuaded by this very creative and imaginative Washington lawyer and investor to buy the entire crop of the Jamaican orange groves. Thus, he got the trade preference question out of the way. That was the closest I came to actually doing a trade negotiation. That period of my life was very amusing and I loved my job.

I had specific officers under me, for the rubber agreements, or for the coffee agreements, and there were all these groups that governed trade in particular commodities out of London. So, I let these experts concentrate on trade agreements and was probably less involved than my predecessor, Joe Greenwall, who had been much more of a trade fellow than I was. Because I had become more interested in the political side of what was happening in Europe, I spent a great deal of my time discussing British integration. That took a lot of time and effort.

At the top level of the foreign office, the British gradually became a very European centered group. These were people who went on to become the British representatives on the European Commission in Brussels. There were also young people who later became ambassadors in Washington and elsewhere. The pro-Europeans were just coming up at the time, and when Britain eventually joined the EEC, they were sent off to Brussels where they held some of the most important responsibilities. Christopher Soames was big on Europe, and he became European Commissioner for Exterior Relations. When I later went to Brussels, he was the guy I dealt with all the time. In this group of people was a man named John Thompson who had the religiosity of a Schaetzel in our service. He was totally committed to Monnet's way of looking at Europe. He carried the British through the first negotiations and participated in the second one. Around that time, a political group was formed that was much more favorable to the European Community than either of the two leadership parties. Within the parties, there were also people who were very pro-European and they helped convince most of the politicians that integration was a smart move for Britain.

However, some politicians were a real thorn in this European integration debate because they promised to uphold Britain's national identity. Ironically, the man who swore up and down that he would never let it happen was a conservative politician from Scotland. It took all the efforts of the smaller group of people who were favorable to integration to overcome nationalist opposition. It was not so much that they were convinced Europeanists, like Monnet, but they pragmatically saw that even though they were close to the United States, they were losing their Empire status and they could not afford to stay out of Europe. Acheson's quite unsubtle remark stayed with them, "Britain has lost an Empire but not found a role." The British were also put under pressure by the financial people in London, because there was no doubt in anybody's mind that London was going to become the center of financial Europe. And they were right. All the American banks now are in London, not Frankfurt or Paris.

Our strategy was to convince the British by stressing the leadership they could bring to Europe. I would talk as an economist but I would also use their pride, emphasizing that they could participate in a whole new integrated financial zone in which they would be a

driving force. English was the language of finance. I could talk as an economist so I would always talk from a very pragmatic point of view. I would use their pride. David Bruce made a couple of speeches for which he was criticized, but he just made a few remarks saying "You ought to take the leadership of Europe." And indeed they became one of the leading influences of the European Community, along with Germany and France.

When they were still debating on European integration, the British always felt that the continent had a different set of basic principles. It wasn't the Anglo-Saxon system; it was a centralized government edict almost. That is the way the commission got set up. Monnet used to travel to London very frequently and he would see Ted Heath, the leader of the Euro-skeptic Conservative Party and tell him, "You guys belong in this because what you will bring to it is regularization of legal procedures, thinking of issues in terms of rule of law." He felt the British would be a liberalizing influence, particularly over the French, who had a hold over the Germans, and therefore a stranglehold on policy. They directed policy and particularly the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which was the most protectionist policy of all.

The French felt this, and somewhat resented our efforts to integrate Britain, because it meant a loss of influence for them. They accused Britain of being a Trojan horse for the United States. The British had the same interest in liberalizing European trade policies; they had an agricultural lobby and were also done out of some markets because they couldn't compete. They too had a subsidy system, but it was much more sensible than the CAP. They paid individual farmers who couldn't produce economically. The British joined us against the system the French wanted, which was not only to pay large subsidies to the domestic farmers but then to subsidize their exports. We felt that Britain's entry into the EEC would strengthen it as an institution, but it would also help us solve some of its flaws.

At that point, labor unions in Britain were very prominent, and so Phil Kaiser really had an important job in trying to understand what they stood for. It turns out they were a very leftist group, who had strong political views about the presence of nuclear bombs on British military bases, about the Vietnam war, and about many other issues. By the way, it was around this time that George Ball resigned from the position of Under Secretary because he could no longer endorse our policy on Vietnam. The union people would regularly protest, and were used by Communist sympathizers to mount anti-American displays, although they themselves were not Communists. People felt capitalism was no good, and there should be government controls on everything. The class split in Britain at the time I was there was still extremely grave. I think it is less so today. It became much more acceptable for people with a Liverpool accent to get ahead. This wasn't true up to the war time period. However, it really wasn't resentment directed at the governing class, because the movers and shakers certainly weren't symbols of aristocracy. Ted Heath wasn't, nor was my friend Fredy Fisher. These were people who didn't come from the upper class, even though they got degrees from Oxford and Cambridge.

The socialists, on the other hand, were much more elitist, and so was their intellectual

view. They really were the successors of George Bernard Shaw and Bertrand Russell, who were very much Patricians. That group was not at all of the common man. I can't imagine Shaw being comfortable with half the people he dealt with on the Labour side, except when he was put out as a symbol in a big rally somewhere. While we were there, we became good friends with Russell's disciple, Freddie Ayer. He famously displayed his impertinence by once contradicting a respected linguist during a conference. When the linguist affirmed that it was common in many languages to express a positive with two negatives, but that in no language did two positives make a negative, Ayer commented "Yeah Yeah..." from the back of the room. Ayer was very much at the center of an important intellectual group in London.

They were mainly on the left side of the spectrum in terms of any foreign policy, but mainly did their own thing. They were the group that produced the intellectual plays on the BBC, which were apolitical but left in their general way of thinking about the world and looking down their noses at Americans. I was plugged into that group by Freddie Ayer, who was very much the center of that whole crowd. Tom Stoppard, who wrote Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, was a playwright friend of Ayer's. He was a Czech refugee who mastered the English language in a wonderful way, and wrote very funny things. Words matter to the British and he was recognized as one of the most brilliant people in town.

The McCarthy period really did sour a lot of the intellectual people in England, almost more than in the United States. Many of the authors in Hollywood who had been black listed settled in England. Gradually they were producing films over there and they were plugged into the English intellectual establishment. Their bitterness carried over a lot. I can remember parties at Freddie's house -- this was the height of Vietnam -- where people poked fun at me because they knew I was American. They were quite critical of this mess we had put ourselves in. I guess I was rather disloyal towards my government because I agreed with them. I would also get questions about the Civil Rights movement. Every time I spoke, I would say, "Before you start criticizing us, go look at Manchester and see how you treat British black people, and see what the school systems do. What is public schooling like in this country? Why are all your people going to these elite schools, which only high society can access?"

While I was in London, Kennedy was assassinated, and it had the same effect in London than it had in America. There was a lot of talk at that time about how ungovernable America was, and about the capacity of the U.S. to lead the world after letting something like this happen. Nobody, of course, knew Lyndon Johnson and to them he was a guy out of Texas. You can imagine the confidence or lack of it they had. His uncertainties about foreign policy showed up a lot and were picked up immediately by the British press, which was a very scandal driven type of press. One example of this was when Churchill died and there was a question of who was going to come to his funeral. I was put in charge of this by David Bruce at the embassy. I handled American participation at the funeral, and figured out which American representatives came. I had to go to the Hilton Hotel and tell them that Lyndon Johnson was probably going to come to the funeral. The manager of the Hilton Hotel practically fainted -- he had been the manager of the Hilton

Hotel in Istanbul when Lyndon Johnson had come, and it was the most disagreeable experience he had ever had in his life. Lyndon Johnson's people insisted on changing the whole room and keeping half the elevators for themselves. This guy was just horrified. In the end, Lyndon Johnson said he had a cold and sent Chief Justice Earl Warren. Eisenhower, Dean Rusk, and Averell Harriman also went. I remember David Bruce was very concerned about Harriman's health because St. Paul's Cathedral would be really cold and he would be out a lot. Harriman really had to be there because he knew all the folks and it was a very moving thing for him to see the old man go. His times with Churchill had been the great periods in his life. So David said "Take Averell down to my tailor and get him some long underwear." We went down to Bond Street, saw David's very fancy tailor. I said that we wanted some long underwear because it was going to be cold out there. The tailor looked at him for size and then went into the back room and brought out a box. Averell said, "That looks good to me. How much?" The guy said ten pounds. Averell, who was a very wealthy man, replied "I've never paid ten pounds for a pair of long underwear!" So the guy, knowing why Harriman was there, went back, got a similar box, and brought it out; the price had gone down to half Averell said "That's still a lot of money." He turned to me and said "Have you got any money'?" So I paid for his long underwear and we took it back to the Embassy. Averell's secretary was also there and she looked at me and said, "How much do I owe you?" He never carried any money. I took care of another funeral right after this, which was that of Adlai Stevenson who died in London while walking with his wife outside the Embassy. That, I must say, was a shock.

In 1966, de Gaulle decided to take out France from the military component of NATO. He supported the EEC's institutions because they enabled France to remain very influential in Europe, so we didn't really consider him an enemy of the European idea, but nevertheless his rejection of NATO was a blow to our relationship with him. One of the reasons he pulled out was that we had helped the British with their military nuclear program, but not the French. Our Ambassador to NATO at the time was Harlan Cleveland, whose brother Stanley I had worked with during the early years of the Marshall Plan. So de Gaulle was a pain in the neck because he constantly wanted to show the world he was independent from the United States. The British, even though they were barred by him from the EEC, always tried to keep a relationship with him. He would come over and have a state visit with the Queen and they would ride around in carriages together. He would be invited to speak to Parliament with a big fuss made over him. I think they even put up a statue honoring him in London.

Every time Monnet would come to London, he would meet with David Bruce and I would see him. We all had dinners together and discussed the British candidacy to the EEC. I remember a quirk of his was that he could not sleep in a city. In London, he had this special room that had a view on Hyde Park, where he thought there was less pollution. Had the French been enthusiastic about British integration, they would have had their Ambassador meet Monnet too. Instead, they remained aloof and I didn't see the French Ambassador very much.

[Note: The remainder of the interview was not edited by Ambassador Hartman]

Q: I think this is probably a good place to stop. In '67 where did you go?

HARTMAN: I was asked by the then undersecretary, Nick Katzenbach, to come back and head a staff which he was putting together to coordinate foreign policy, mainly on the operational side. This is pre-Nixon and the whole NSC (National Security Council) structural change. Nick Katzenbach had been brought in from Justice, where he had been under Bobby Kennedy, to try and create a process in the administration to coordinate policy. I have a feeling he was brought in in order to create a balance between the way Bundy and Rostow had been running things (particularly on Vietnam) but as a successor to George Ball who had played a kind of role of opposition to Vietnam and to bring together various department views so as to get a more balanced policy coordination. I became head of the coordination staff.

Q: Well, we will pick this up next time where you are coming in to the Katzenbach operation. You were doing that from '67 to when?

HARTMAN: First of all it was called Policy and Coordination. I was the coordination half that operated out of Nick's office. Nick had several lawyers he brought from the outside. I was there through the end of the Johnson administration, through January '69. I had Larry Eagleburger on Nick's staff before we brought him over from the White House. With the change of administration Elliot Richardson came in and did practically the same thing with Kissinger.

Q: We will pick it up at that point and talk about the issues at that time.

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Today is the 24th of April 2000. We are at the point when you moved over to a job in policy and coordination in 1967.

HARTMAN: That's right. It was the brainchild of the then deputy secretary, Nick Katzenbach. He came over to State at the urging of Robert Kennedy and one of his objectives was to do a better job of coordinating policy among various agencies. He came up with this plan to put together the policy planning function and an interagency coordinating function. I was the deputy for coordination and there was a fellow who was the head of policy planning and coordination. There was staff on the policy planning side and staff on the coordination side. Essentially what we tried to do was to take decisions on specific problems, where there was an interagency problem, and bring it together through meetings of interagency groups. Nick had a good reputation around the government so he was able at his level to have meetings of under secretaries. We were essentially preparing the meetings for them to deal with problems. One thing that was going on was Vietnam. Another thing were all kinds of arms sales in all kinds of places in the world where there was a growing feeling that we had not linked the political issues with the military issues enough. People began to think about limiting either the quality or number of weapons that might be going to certain places that were subject to further

conflict. Behind all of that was a movement in Congress to move in and micro manage many of the policies in the foreign affairs field. That stemmed from the basic distrust that came from the Vietnam experience. This was the late '60s. Johnson hadn't yet announced his decision to retire but clearly there was a lot of turmoil both out in the public and within the administration, particularly among younger officers in the foreign service, about what was going on in Vietnam. That was building into things like "should we establish some sort of a dissent procedure as a kind of safety valve." That is the way it was looked at by people like Katzenbach. To allow people to express views without going out to the press, which of course was the anathema of every president. I can remember Kennedy, and certainly Johnson, and probably every other president, complaining about the leaks that came from various parts of the government. These usually came when there were real policy disputes and people were frustrated when their views were not being listened to, so the natural thing to do was to go to some of their friends. There were others I think for personal reasons and for reasons of not getting their story in the press, a kind of pride, did this sort of thing. That was destructive. There were others who felt they weren't being listened to and this was the only way to go. I've always felt that if you really disagreed with the policies your choice was to get out and say why you were getting out. Resignation was an honorable way to go. You certainly need the channels to carry your policy disputes to a certain level so people have a way of getting their views up to a responsible policy level. Part of our job in Policy Plans and Coordination was to provide such a thing. Indeed we were the birthing place of the dissent channel and Face-to-Face. A young assistant of mine, David Bilcher, was the one who started that. He left the foreign service to head this up. I think it was useful, especially in the Vietnam period. It was much resented by the zealots, but something I think was necessary given the fact there was such controversy over the policy. We also looked into and studied a number of other things; for example the aid program, how it was carried out, whether there should be further reform of the aid program, the mix of military and economic assistance. There were interagency groups on all of these things, some of which I chaired at my level. Others we got other people to chair. I can't remember the exact sequence. When the administration changed in '69 and Elliot Richardson came in as the Undersecretary of State taking Nick Katzenbach's place, he continued the system. Kissinger and the White House established what he thought was a very close NSC coordination procedure with all kinds of documentation, keeping the important policy things out of the channel. But the coordination aspect of that continued under Elliot Richardson and indeed, Elliot, because he had his own special relationships, both with Kissinger and with the Secretary of State, actually took over certain policy aspects. In other words find a policy for dealing with the seas. The Law of the Sea was one of the things that Elliot took over. It turned out it wasn't just a coordination of existing policy implementation but rather it proceeded to develop policies.

Q: I would like to stick to the end of the Johnson administration. Was it your impression at that time that in issues of most natures that came to your policy coordination that the State Department was the lead as opposed to particularly Treasury and the Pentagon?

HARTMAN: In theory this was true but I think it is fair to say the things that were taken seriously on the policy coordination side were not the first rank issues. In Vietnam, for

example, the policy was centered in the White House. The Pentagon and the CIA had a major role. The State Department at that time, except for the Secretary of State who was Mr. Vietnam on our side and very much committed to the policy, Dean Rusk, those important policy issues didn't come into anything that was dominated by the State Department. There were people in the State Department who were very important in the NSC system and were used by the coordinators like Walt Rostow and others. In the end of the Johnson administration there was something called the "non-group." This was something that was winked at by Walt Rostow. Johnson knew of it and it included McNamara, Bobby Kennedy (while he was still there), General Wheeler who was Chief of the Joint Staff. When people like General Westmoreland would come back they would meet with the "non-group" and that was chaired at State. It was assumed that its function was to provide a safety valve for some of these views to be looked at. And to be put against the official views that were going to the president. Walt Rostow would come to the meetings. The meetings were usually held in Nick Katzenbach's conference room. He was more or less chairing the group. He would check very carefully with the Secretary. Nick was considered to be a loyalist so this wasn't upsetting, given Johnson's paranoia about anybody undertaking a policy that he did not have full control of. At one time Tony Lake was the first secretary of that group. Dick Holbrooke took over from Tony Lake. All these guys had had experience in Vietnam. Some of the younger officers came back convinced they should change the policy; others came back and said it was a good policy but just not carried out properly. Some people left at that time thinking it was hopeless; there was no way of changing the policy enough. An overwhelming number of younger foreign service officers were spread around Vietnam in regional groups and very close to people and came back either totally disillusioned or determined to do something to spur a better policy. I participated in a non non-group of real dissidents. There was an admiral -- we met in people's houses -- that was a very uncomfortable period.

Q: What was the non non-group looking at?

HARTMAN: We were trying to be constructively critical of some of the things and very suspicious of the facts that were being presented. We had a couple of people from CIA, and from the old McNamara analytical crowd that he brought in to the Defense Department.

Q: The whiz kids.

HARTMAN: The whiz kids, exactly. We had several whiz kids who would come to those meetings. It never got off the ground because it was too low level, it had no way of plugging in at a real policy level. I would have private conversations with people but I didn't think I was making much headway. By the way, Foreign Service was extended into the White House. Larry Eagleburger was put over as one of the staff in the NSC and was very close to the people around Johnson and very respected by them. That was the first boost to Larry's career. When he came back to the Foreign Service and to the State Department at a later time, he came back at a much higher grade.

Q: You mentioned the information that came in. Were you seeing at your level a

discrepancy between what was coming out of official channels and what you were hearing?

HARTMAN: Basically these younger officers came back believing all this body count business was an absolute loser in terms of public opinion and also that the military and part of the CIA were being unrealistic. Part of the McNamara ethos of that period was these complex reporting systems. People like Robert Komer used and manipulated it to basically back their policy view which was founded on much less analysis and much more intuitive thinking so to speak.

Q: A man's career, particularly military, was based on "Did you show improvement?"

HARTMAN: You can see this in the career of my friend Al Haig, for example, who started out as a major. Once he got everything punched through, within a very short time he became a general. I think it was a perverse system because instead of understanding what the real situation was on the ground there were all these complex analytical tools that weren't an analysis at all but justification for what we were doing and for doing more. Each time Wheeler would come back from a trip or they would send out another general, or Walt Rostow would go out there or McNamara would go out, back would come these recommendations that another hundred thousand troops would do it, or four hundred thousand would do it, and on and on. The turning point came much later when some very senior thoughtful people were put together -- so called "wise men" -- and they punctured the balloon because they came in with a very damning —

Q: Lets stick to Vietnam during the Johnson time. By the time you were involved in this what was happening to you.

HARTMAN: That was not my field except for spending two years in Vietnam in the 1950s. Then I came back and worked for George Ball. Based on the French experience, I was thoroughly convinced we weren't going to win. It was a losing proposition. I was not at the center of the Department's participation in any of this although the committee was staffed under me.

Q: Did you see a solid divide between those who thought we were doing it the wrong way and those who thought a little or a lot more would change the tide?

HARTMAN: People were very cautious. Even in that committee we were constantly trying to find positive things to suggest that would improve the situation or improve knowledge about it. I think a growing feeling on the part of people like Katzenbach and others was that this was not getting anywhere and had to be changed.

Q: What about Tet, January and February 1968? How did that hit your committee?

HARTMAN: I can't remember the specifics, but looking back it was a major blow and so contrary to all the optimistic reports that kept coming in prior to that. So it undermined the credibility of those who were basing themselves on the general reporting that was

coming out. This was before the 1968 election. I can't remember the sequence of events but wasn't that one of the major things that led to Johnson's troubles?

Q: Yes, oh yes.

HARTMAN: Quite to the surprise of everyone. I remember talking to Larry Eagleburger about that time, no one over there knew what was going on when Johnson made his famous announcement -- he wasn't going to run again. A major change. In the background was Hubert Humphrey who kept a low profile but loyally supported Johnson through most of this but never really spoke out. I am certain he had his doubts. He didn't become a leader of any opposing group. I suppose he made up his mind it was bad politics to appear to be undercutting such a policy when our troops were actually fighting. This colored a lot of people's feelings. When you have the troops out there you have to support them. This was used by Westmoreland and others to gain support. The terrible thing to me is to read memoirs like McNamara's. Well, none of us ever saw his doubts.

Q: He also said there were no experts available to him. Actually he heard plenty but he just wasn't listening.

HARTMAN: The terrible thing is we lost 50,000 soldiers. For him to come out now and say he had his doubts and never believed this thing was going to work. Getting back to the bureaucrats, I would say this sort of scheme of putting the State Department in charge of coordination on policy probably worked with the second degree issues. It never worked with the ones that were important and on people's front burner.

Q: Let's talk a bit about arms sales. You were trying to get a handle on arms sales as far as not just selling but also considerations. I thought it was an article of faith with us all along to keep fancy weapons, particularly aircraft, out of Latin America.

HARTMAN: That was certainly the policy and it was held for sometime. It got broken by aging aircraft. Arms sales were used as a diplomatic tool so ambassadors would come in and say we could be friendly with this or that nation by boosting the arms sales. There were particular situations all over the world where that got us into some difficulty. The other big issues were the nuclear issues in Europe. There on the policy planning side, the deputy was Henry Owen, and Henry Owen and Bob Schaetzel came up with a plan for the staging of nuclear missiles in a European NATO force as a way of dealing with the finger on the trigger problem. It was whomped up as a major issue. Could the Europeans think they would be adequately protected by a solely U.S. controlled deterrent. Looking back now it seems ridiculous but at the time it seemed to fit into a policy niche for people like George Ball before he left the State Department. I think he began to think of it as more of a zealots game. People were pushing this to the point of almost creating the problem. The more they pushed and said it was a problem the more you had people within the higher policy ranks of Europe thinking there was a real problem and they had to solve it. Or they jumped on the band wagon for other reasons. They saw it as a way of getting some American technology and also as a way of stationing nuclear weapons in a way that would protect Europe better. That was a big issue. I wasn't directly involved in

it because Henry Owen on the policy planning side was the leader along with Bob Bowie, who was brought in as a consultant at that point, and Schaetzel and other people on the Pentagon side. It came to naught in the end because it got to be so complex: the whole idea of how you put the finger on the trigger, with the President of the United States retaining a veto power, and what were these ships you were going to build and how costly were they going to be. These were merchant ships you were going to put these missiles on and whether it was further destabilizing. There were a lot of theorists in the field who felt this was a non-problem and the way you were solving it would cause more trouble in the end. They also felt it would interfere with some of the negotiations they hoped to carry on with the Russians.

Q: You can have these arguments but you are also talking about Charles de Gaulle who was sitting in France who wasn't playing any of this game at all.

HARTMAN: The French were torn in a way. They weren't playing the game -- it was mainly aimed at the Germans because the Germans were the ones who said they gave up nuclear arms. They were the ones sitting astride the Fulda gap and were the bulwark of the defense against the Russians. You have to remember a whole bunch of events were taking place in Eastern Europe including several near explosions. You had the East German explosion in the early '50s and the Hungarian revolution in '56. Periodically these outbreaks. The nuclear issue was discussed against this background. Also an aging leadership in Russia that was less and less responsive to any kind of sensible discussion. Negotiations were going on with the Russians about limiting nuclear weapons. McNamara, as usual, had his own theories about how this should be done and what the theory behind our deterrent should be, managing that within NATO was a very tricky job. Larry Eagleburger had been shifted off to assist Dean Acheson in preparing a NATO report. I was shifted off to be with David Bruce as he made a report on whither NATO. Usually it came down to whether it was a real problem or not and they felt the commitment of the United States was not as strong as it had been when we were spending all this time and money and effort in the Far East. We were also negotiating at the same time with the Russians and was this undermining the commitment to defend Europe. The de Gaulle problem was there. He had kicked NATO out of France in '64 or '65. Again, that had been influenced by the fact that we seemed to have favored the British. He resented that in nuclear affairs. It wasn't until his successor was president of France and the problem was overcome by deals that Kissinger made in which Pompidou was assured that we would help them. I'm not sure Congress ever found out fully what commitments were made by Nixon and Kissinger, but it did tend to reassure the French enough so they came back into the scheme (never as members of the NATO military) but getting a lot of the benefits. In the Johnson period that was not very high on the agenda and was mainly this lower level of trying to find some way of reassuring the Germans.

Q: In a way it was to keep the process going.

HARTMAN: There were people like Senator Mike Mansfield who were asking why should we keep all these troops in Europe.

Q: Were we taking Mansfield seriously on that?

HARTMAN: The Europeans certainly were. They kept getting these reports from senior citizens like David Bruce, Dean Acheson and others and putting together the "wise man" exercises each time there was a chance of critical voting in Congress to reduce our troops in Europe. All of that stimulated an unease on the part of the Germans and the British as to whether our long-term policy was going to continue to support our efforts there. I think we got through that period well, all things considered.

Q: When one looks at the whole NATO thing, what I consider common sense has prevailed.

HARTMAN: Congress was more taken with things that were going on in Cyprus or Latin America. We had a few CIA disasters along the way that led them to investigate those situations so the main commitment to NATO stayed the same. The Mansfield resolution never got to the point where it was a serious threat.

Q: After the '67 war in Israel under Johnson, we made a full all out commitment of support to Israel, was that a matter of debate?

HARTMAN: I was not involved in that area of policy. The official kind of interagency thing wasn't used at all. This was very high level policy. People would get together and decide it at that level. Nick Katzenbach was very involved. Dean Rusk had become preoccupied with Vietnam.

Q: Did you find Nick Katzenbach was taking care of the secondary issues? Did you feel Rusk was a presence somewhat removed?

HARTMAN: Not removed from that but certainly concentrating, focusing fully on the Vietnam situation. It became an obsession with him. These other things, both under Ball and later under Katzenbach, there was a very close relationship, never any antagonism with Dean Rusk. Dean Rusk was a fine person and they established good relations with him and kept him fully informed when they were having other conversations at other levels. Johnson, like Kennedy, was a great fellow for getting on the phone and talking to people. He had Bundy and Rostow at one point. These fellows were around and pulling the strings in terms of policy coordination of things that were top drawer policy.

Q: Did you feel we had much control over AID (Agency for International Development) or was it driven by who ever happened to be the AID administrator in the country?

HARTMAN: It was a mixture. Foreign Service never took it very seriously other than when the ambassador wanted to be nice to whoever he was accredited to. He wanted to meet their desires in AID and that had a backlash in the Washington community because every time State said they wanted more control over what was going on in AID policy, people would say "Have you guys really studied the situation? Do you know what you are talking about? Are you development economists?" Many of them had gravitated

toward the aid field and wanted to keep it pure, recognizing there were political interests in certain areas and therefore we gave a lot of assistance to those areas. They also recognized it should be administered by people who understood the aid process and development economics. I can't remember the exact timing of a study that we did chair which produced a report for the reorganization of AID. I can't remember whether that was early in the Republican administration or late in the Democratic administration. Jim Schlesinger was on the committee, I was on it, a fellow named Stern, who was one of the senior people in the AID group, was on it. Jim Schlesinger was from the budget bureau. That produced a report which called for a better use of AID funds in terms of both meeting our political needs and using them sensibly in terms of real development. There was a push at the time, in the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) in Paris, to do more to coordinate the policies of the developed world to put up more money for real development, not just for political purpose aid. There was a distinction made between aid that was given for political reasons and aid that was part of the developmental process. More and more of that development aid began to shift toward multi-lateral institutions. Today we practically rely on the regional banks and the World Bank.

Q: This is tape 5, side one with Arthur Hartman.

HARTMAN: We now have a system where the bulk of our aid goes for political purposes. The biggest is Israel, the second biggest is Egypt, the third biggest is the Ukraine (but they don't get very much). The third biggest is a very minor part of it. That was beginning at that time. There was a real push in that committee for treating aid as a serious developmental tool and coordinating it with other countries to get maximum benefit from efforts of all our countries to help with the development problem in the less developed world and to still keep the kitty for political purposes where that was considered necessary. That report led to a major reorganization. We actually changed the name of the organization but I can't remember exactly when that took place. It was a separate institution from State but each time a letter would be sent from the president to all ambassadors saying "You are in charge in your country and the coordination should take place at your level. If you have any problems come back to the Secretary of State and he will see to it that things are coordinated in Washington." In theory that was the system but it depended very much on not only the activity of the ambassador but his knowledge. Very often ambassadors didn't spend the time to master the real problems, so they were looked upon by the aid administrators as people whose advice was purely political -- do more for my client. There were others who immersed themselves in it and actually did a good job and were respected by their AID colleagues. It was an uneven performance. It was also uneven because we had political ambassadors; some of them couldn't have cared less. Occasionally we had a political ambassador who had a development background or an economic background. You can't make generalizations about how all ambassadors behaved in those situations. That became less of a tool than it was in the early part of my career during the Marshall Plan days when the ambassador and AID, who was the ECA (Economic Cooperation Administrator), were very closely connected. In the case of France, the ECA administrator once became the ambassador. He was a very influential person.

Q: Do you recall, I think it was April 22, 1967, there was a colonel's coup in Athens which took over the Greek government and put it under dictatorship until 1974. Do you recall (I think this would be during the Johnson administration.) any debate at that time or dealings at the Katzenbach level?

HARTMAN: This was before my time. I think I was just coming back from London. I, of course, had to deal with that at a later stage in my career when I was assistant secretary and the Turks invaded. I had to study up on that period. There would be an Acheson report that was made at the time on the Cyprus situation. Ball was sent out as one of our envoys to see if he could solve the problem. Henry Tasca was the ambassador when the Turks intervened in Cyprus in 1974.

Q: Anyway this was not a subject during the Johnson time that you found yourself dealing with.

HARTMAN: Not really, although I can remember times when Katzenbach was dealing with it, but it really wasn't until the Nixon administration that it became a policy issue again when we took different positions at different times.

Q: Again during the Katzenbach period, did you feel the congressional side of things? Was this something that would come up in your meetings?

HARTMAN: Yes. Dean Rusk would do the major presentations on overall policy that were very closely connected with Vietnam. It fell to Nick to do a lot of the testifying before committees on special issues. He was a good witness.

Q: Did you feel any reflection of the not great good will between Senator Fulbright of Arkansas, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Johnson over the Vietnam war – did that permeate down to other things?

HARTMAN: Oh sure, because there were people on the staff that were making reports at the time that were very critical. The other thing that happened during that period is that congress increasingly began amendments to the Aid bill to put strings on the authority of the administration and the executive branch to carry out policy. These began interfering in big ways in places like Turkey and later in Pakistan. Each time there would be an amendment that would come along that would say the administration couldn't do certain things. That became a central issue with that particular country. Usually in areas where that country wasn't going to change it's policy because of something congress said. So we ended up by restricting our aid or not meeting commitments we had made and in the case of NATO allies like Turkey it caused serious difficulties.

Q: When the Johnson administration left and Nixon came in in January 1969 you stayed on.

HARTMAN: I stayed on. I was part of a press conference and I was called upon with

Mort Halperin, of all people (who was at that time on the NSC (National Security Council) staff in the early Kissinger period), to explain to the press what our new thinking was on policy coordination and the use of the NSC.

Q: Wasn't that rather odd for somebody at your level to be thrown to the press wolves?

HARTMAN: No, it wasn't the first time but a big thing was made of the new way of using the NSC and reinvigorating it. Of course Kissinger was the NSC head in the White House. He brought to it all of his power but he wanted to make it look as though this was a very firm system. The funnier episode was when I was called into a press conference at the beginning of the Carter administration, with Brzezinski, saying how much they had changed the Kissinger system and how it was going to work so much better. The whole idea under Nixon was to have policy made by the senior people, the cabinet officers in a group chaired by Kissinger in the White House, and then Elliot Richardson's committee of under secretaries supervising the implementation of the policies and making sure they were properly carried out. It worked in some cases and not in others. The important problems were never taken to any of those committees. There were smaller and smaller groups of people dealing with Vietnam for example. Or the China relationship which turned out to be a two-man show.

Q: Did you have a feeling early on that Secretary Rogers was going to be less of a figure and that Kissinger was coming on board? Was that pretty palpable right at the beginning?

HARTMAN: Pretty much. The State Department at the senior level kept being reassured that Bill Rogers was a good friend of Richard Nixon. Rogers reputedly had great influence over Nixon and much of that influence came from his personal contact. He would take these things up in a private way, and the policy debates wouldn't take place in the open. However, it quickly became apparent that Nixon was using Kissinger and Kissinger would say he set the policy. I remember that Nixon wrote his major treatise on what he thought foreign policy should be in a Foreign Affairs article that appeared in 1967 before he ever met Kissinger. Kissinger doesn't like to have that recalled, but it pretty much laid out Nixon's view of the world and what he intended to accomplish. But Henry played an absolutely crucial role and one that Nixon wanted him to play. My difficulty with all of these bureaucratic structures created is they are always ex post facto creations to reflect the character of the leadership. Johnson had one kind of thing. Kennedy had another. Nixon had something that was very peculiar to his way of doing things. The secrecy, the less than frank debates among agencies. The fear of leaks which also existed in the Johnson time. Henry Kissinger always had difficulty in dealing with President Nixon. We later learned in memoirs there was a great distrust on the part of Nixon of everybody including Kissinger. Henry had to play that piece of theater out and carefully built his own staff up. He borrowed people from the foreign service. There were foreign service officers on the NSC staff who did very well and were very loyal toward carrying out White House policy. They were often our channels for finding out what was going on or getting our input in to them. I participated in meetings at my level during that period and they dealt often with an implementation kind of policy on Vietnam or on

military aid problems. Kissinger tended to use the system when he wanted to get support from all the agencies and bring it together and get them all to sign on to something which had probably already been decided. The fear of leaks was carried to all kinds of extreme. A number of times investigators would come to me and ask "Did you talk to so and so and who on your staff knew about this." They would check all the papers. It got to be a paranoid situation. All of that, with Kissinger in the White House and Rogers as secretary of State, with Elliot Richardson kind of making his own way -- he had his own relationship with Kissinger. I'm sure Richardson kept Bill Rogers informed, and it was the kind of relationship Bill Rogers could never have with Kissinger. He was very proud of his position as Secretary of State. I'm sure he felt this was a usurpation and he also thought he was being downgraded. What I think he didn't realize until quite late in the game was how much that was due to Richard Nixon, his old buddy. Rogers was just too nice for what was going on around him.

Q: I've talked to people who worked as staff aides around him and they say he really didn't do his homework. He would talk about golf when he should be talking about the Japanese issue or something else.

HARTMAN: Well, a little bit, but I think he was a lot more attuned to things than people gave him credit for. Pride of place had a tremendous influence on him and his career. He was taken advantage of by a couple of real sharpies.

Q: Back to you though. You were there in '69 until when?

HARTMAN: I went to Brussels I think in '71. Late '71 or early '72 and was only there for 18 months. Kissinger became Secretary of State in what -- '73? I later learned how I was appointed assistant secretary of state from both Kissinger's memoir and some writings of Don Rumsfeld. Don Rumsfeld had been with us in Brussels as representative to NATO. This was before he became Secretary of Defense. When Kissinger moved to be the Secretary of State, Don suggested to Nixon that I be the national security adviser. Of course Henry Kissinger probably had doubts about my total loyalty to him and ability to follow orders so didn't like that at all. So Larry Eagleburger was instructed to call me and see if I would like to be the assistant secretary for Europe. At that time I thought it was because I was well qualified; I was in Brussels handling that whole situation in Europe. I thought I was picked for my special qualities. It was only when these memoirs came out later that it became quite clear this was a sort of a chess game and Kissinger wanted his own man in the White House. He found a good one in Brent Scowcroft.

Q: I would like to take you back to '69- 71 when you were already there. How did Elliot Richardson operate? Did it seem to you that Elliot Richardson and Nicholas Katzenbach were like two sides of the same coin?

HARTMAN: Yes, except that Elliot was much more analytical. He was almost like a dog with a bone. He would get his chops into a policy problem. Very intellectual, very analytical, wonderful mind. Katzenbach was more of an operator. He had come out of the Justice Department and worked with Bob Kennedy. He had been in charge of the civil

rights thing. He was very political whereas Elliot, despite the fact he ran for public office, always struck me as not being a very astute political fellow. One good example of this is "Law of the Sea." He got absolutely immersed in that and came up with a solution which on paper was fine but never had a political chance in hell of going through.

Q: He had good relations with Kissinger.

HARTMAN: Very good relations with Kissinger. He maintained those and I'm sure he kept his boss informed but it was clear that another channel was needed because Kissinger had no way of talking to Bill Rogers and vice versa. I think there was respect on the part of Nixon so that when Elliot was involved in things he took notice as well. Elliot dealt with Vietnam and also a number of other issues that were beyond the coordination point. Whatever he was involved in he would produce thoughtful analysis and policy suggestions that were very much appreciated by Kissinger who obviously was looking for an ally who could put some of this stuff together in a way that made some sense. He really relied on Elliot as far as the State Department was concerned. Elliot worked closely with the assistant secretaries who had good authority in those days.

Q: Talking about '67 to '71 when you were in this coordinating committee -- how did you find the bureaus work?

HARTMAN: We tried to have the bureau at their level carry on in coordination with other departments. It was viewed as much too bureaucratic as far as our participation was concerned. The successful bureaucratic assistant secretaries wanted to run their own show in their way. It was usually based on the personal relationships they had developed with certain people in the pentagon, the CIA, and the NSC. The idea of a formal process to them was anathema and when I later became assistant secretary it was clear to me it was very difficult to do. Very often the policy person you needed was not at your level but at a much higher level. If you could get to that person you got more successful things done. As assistant secretary for Europe later, I dealt with under secretaries. I would deal with people at a much higher level in the NSC. The assistant secretaries were pretty strong in that period and got much stronger under Kissinger because Kissinger by-and-large put career people into the assistant secretary jobs. They spoke with his authority. He later said in his memoirs how much he came to respect assistant secretaries. Part of the suspicion about the foreign service and State Department is sort of inherent in American History -- these are the people who deal with foreigners and therefore are not to be trusted. Some people proved that by becoming excessively tied to the "clients." What I think the Kissinger period shows, more than many other times, is that you should pick really competent people to head up those jobs. All during this period who did presidents turn to? They turned to people like Alexis Johnson -- Mr. Foreign Service if there ever was one. If you go back earlier than that -- Robert Murphy and Libby Merchant, people like that. So that when an administration came in, no matter how much the political people had talked about their distrust of foreign service -- people like Dulles who was terribly suspicious of anybody in the ranks -- they still came to rely on them.

Q: They had quite a small cadre of very professional people.

HARTMAN: Absolutely, and I think that came to a real head in the Kissinger period when almost all of the assistant secretaryships were held by foreign service people.

Q: Moving you back again to the '69-'71 period, in your coordinating different things -- did you get involved in relations with the Soviet Union at all?

HARTMAN: Yes and no. In that earlier period things that Henry Kissinger was doing, where there were particular people on the staff who were used because of their particular qualifications and he by and large put experts together who were the people he came to rely on. He either put them on the NSC staff directly or he drew them out of other agencies and formed smaller units. That happened in that earlier period of talking to the Russians. The principal person was Hal Sonnenfeldt and a couple of senior people that Kissinger would turn to for advise. I worked with Jack Erwin closely in that period and we went to Vietnam together. Henry respected him but he was not a fast talker or bureaucratic type by any means, therefore kind of pushed to the side. Where he got involved -- and he did get involved in Vietnam -- he had a good influence because he was always looking for facts.

Q: You say you went on a trip to Vietnam during this time.

HARTMAN: YES.

Q: What were you looking for and what did you see?

HARTMAN: It was Jack Erwin going out to see what was going on and to get a direct briefing. We went to Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia. He had been an assistant secretary of defense and had a long career in public policy and it was at a time when people were checking facts. Checking judges. Nixon and Kissinger had their own plan of what they were going to do. But clearly things were not going well out there so more and more people were being involved in looking at the situation and seeing whether corrections could be made. We were given briefings by the generals and visited various sites, then talked to the people in Cambodia and Laos. I don't think it had much effect. I think Jack had enough experience so that he felt there were major problems, but I don't think he had the influence necessary to make a major change in policy. Everybody was looking at the negotiations that were on and off during that whole period in Paris and elsewhere as being the way to go. All the other means had been tried and found wanting. Jack didn't have the same interest that Elliot Richardson did in running a bureaucratic system. Elliot was very good at theoretical construct as to how government ought to be run. Jack didn't have that kind of feeling. They were both lawyers but Jack was much more of a dealer with individual policies. Elliot spent a lot of time talking about organization of the department and how it should run, where people should be.

Q: Other than Vietnam during the '69 to '71 period, were you daily coordinating other policy matters in other areas?

HARTMAN: Yes, I think that is when this AID study came in. The new administration came in and wanted to look at it. Also budget problems, congressional strategy got discussed. Particularly some of these Congressional amendments were being put on laws that really hindered our ability to take action. It was all second drawer stuff, not top policy level discussion, which Elliot participated in but not through the structure I was part of.

Q: Did you have any dealings with the revolt of the junior officers in the spring of 1970 when we went into Cambodia and a number of foreign service officers, some junior, signed a letter which was leaked immediately to the press and Nixon got very mad. Did that reach your level at all?

HARTMAN: Well it surrounded us because a lot of this Vietnam sub-cabinet stuff was still going on with Elliot very much in the center of it. He was on the receiving end of all the diatribes in the White House about leaks, about disloyalty, about all kinds of things like that. These were things that occupied him. He was part of the team that was put to the State Department as "You've got to straighten yourselves out." It was during that period that a lot of people were very dissatisfied and going their own way. I formed my own judgment that the only solution was to get out.

Q: Did you feel constrained about expressing your opinion "we had better get the hell out" or by that time had your mood changed?

HARTMAN: There was so much focus on the negotiations and Elliot did participate in the discussions of what should happen at that point and all the meetings with the various negotiators from Harriman to David Bruce, all the people who were sent over there to be negotiators. I can't say how much Elliot was informed about some of the side communications that Henry had, probably not that much. Later, Jack Erwin not at all. It depended on the personality and how closely they were connected with the people who were exercising real power. That power center became smaller and smaller as Nixon got into more and more difficulties. This was in his first term and he was still in control.

Q: Again going back to attitudes, as a foreign service officer moving up towards the upper ranks of the policy apparatus, did you have a feeling that Nixon really knew his part and was taking charge?

HARTMAN: I think there was certain areas where people felt they were getting support and there was a person who took real interest in foreign affairs, who seemed to understand what the big picture was. The Chinese specialists were always very hopeful that some change was going to take place.

Q: The Japanese types were rather unhappy weren't they?

HARTMAN: I don't know, I don't recall any particular group there. In the Middle East it was seen that he was on top of these things. Kissinger was very much in charge of that area of policy and doing all of the negotiating with people from the State Department.

The dissatisfaction came from people who were way out in the periphery and felt they should be more in charge. Over my career what I have found most annoying about my colleagues in the foreign service is the people who are walking the halls. This is a big problem with people who are around after it is clear they aren't going to get the assignments they wanted. I was always very lucky and got good assignments and went from one thing to another. A lot of people didn't and some of them shouldn't. The good people who didn't find a niche or who weren't connected right -- there were all kinds of feelings in the foreign service that somehow the system should work better. My feeling about systems is that if you really work it by the system you aren't getting the best out of the people and sooner or later you have to make qualitative judgments about people, certainly for upper level jobs. The people who successfully ran the department did it by picking good people and using them. That I found for example about George Ball. He brought in outsiders and put them in key jobs and he also took foreign service officers and put them in key jobs. Elliot Richardson the same way. He had a way of using good people he found around him. He also had some outsiders within his immediate staff and I think any political leader coming to the State Department would do the same thing. One thing Bill Rogers fell afoul of was he never had his own people from the outside and the people from the inside were totally frustrated. That was sad. Going all the way back to Dean Acheson they picked good people, they used them, they used the whole place that had very good talent. They were able to find the talent, use it, and put it in the right places so it did the job. Henry, when he moved over as Secretary of State, did the same thing.

Q: There are a lot of complaints about the foreign service assignments process but when you look at it practically, I am impressed by the way we keep good people moving up.

HARTMAN: That is true. What I hear these days though about the bidding process for jobs and the more bureaucratic approach, diversity among other things, has not improved that process. Real talent has difficulty getting itself up at an early enough stage that they don't decide to leave for much more attractive careers outside the government. This is not just true with the foreign service but true of public service generally. Unless you give real authority and responsibility at an early enough stage people don't stay. Working with the Cox Foundation, we are now trying to see if we can help the department get closer to what is going on in the outside world. The ability to use its good talent and give it real responsibility. Giving responsibility is the key thing and it is easier to do when you are in an expanding service than it is when you are in a contracting mode. Those of us that came up in the '50s were fortunate because the jobs were there without enough people to fill them and we were able to move quickly through the ranks.

Q: Looking at it in practical terms, not the political realities -- this should be a golden age for the foreign service. The world is essentially fragmented, lots of opportunities, real challenges but with a contractive foreign service it not —

HARTMAN: It's not just the contraction of the foreign service but there is a skill problem. I'm not sure how you solve it, but I believe the people have been most useful as secretaries of State have been people who were immersed in an area and knew about a potential problem in that area very well. I'm not sure the current system of the way we

recruit and how we don't give them enough training is consistent with producing a quality individual that can become an assistant secretary or be used by a secretary of State or president who wants to accomplish certain things in certain areas.

Q: I thought we might stop at this point. We'll pick this up again in 1971 when you were off to Brussels.

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Today is the 12th of May 2000. We are off to Brussels 1971. What was your job in Brussels?

HARTMAN: I was assigned to the Mission to the European Community. I was the number two in the Mission which is the equivalent of a DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission). Bob Schaetzel was our ambassador, later to be replaced by Joseph Greenwald. The job at that time was to represent U.S. interests during trade negotiations, all kinds of things we had going with the European Community which at that time was just the Common Market but that had an assembly and was plugged into politics in the various countries. It was also expanding. The British were already members so there were a good number of very responsible and very imaginative and creative pro-European British who were working in Brussels at the time. We developed close relationships with the commissioners and each of the commissioners had a separate field of responsibility. They were beginning to get into foreign policy but not seriously; it has been only recently that has happened. They were dealing with problems that were very much on the foreign policy agenda of the United States because there were a lot of economic issues in the early '70s.

Q: You were there from '71-'73?

HARTMAN: Eighteen months roughly. I came back in early '73, just at the time when Nixon was getting into trouble. When I first arrived in Brussels, David Bruce was our ambassador to NATO. There were three missions. There was an embassy in Belgium headed by Robert Strausz-Hupe who was an old time foreign policy guru. There was also David Bruce at NATO, then later Don Rumsfeld who later went on to be chief of staff in the White House and secretary of defense and a leading light of the Republican Party. We were all very close and saw each other a lot. The families intermingled. We tried to keep from crossing our lines in terms of the three missions seeing people who were responsible in other organizations. Sometimes that was difficult particularly with some of the Belgians who were playing leading roles in the community so we had to talk to Strausz-Hupe about that relationship. It fell to the deputies in each mission; me being one of them, to try and make sure that was coordinated and our ambassadors didn't cross each other up. David Bruce was very good about inviting me or Bob Schaetzel or Joseph Greenwald to affairs he had where there were visiting foreign ministers or people he knew we would be interested in. Don Rumsfeld also worked at this, but there was a little less experience. He attracted fewer of the statesmen of the world. David also kept in close touch with the press which was his specialty. He had some very good friends in the press

and they used to come in to see him.

Q: When you speak of the press, was this just the American press?

HARTMAN: It was mainly American but he also had German and French friends who would come by. They were usually a group of people he had kept in touch with over the years that were very close. There were debates in U.S. foreign policy, usually on the nuclear issue, all during this period. NATO was very active, the European Union folks had their views about this although they weren't involved in military affairs. It did go to the heart of the German relationship with France and the general unity of the group.

Q: What were the nuclear issues?

HARTMAN: The same one, both the question of German relationship with nuclear weapons as a deterrent and at that time the push for deployments for the shorter range missiles because of the buildup on the Russian side. Much more emphasis on defense.

Q: This was within your parish?

HARTMAN: Well, not necessarily but it all slopped over. The heart of the relationship between France and Germany was in the bi-lateral sphere and in the European Union sphere because as far as NATO was concerned the French weren't in the military side except for these other indirect means I talked about last time. European Community people were part of the debate. Also there were some very senior people on the Commission at that time who played roles back in their own politics.

Q: You would be interested to know that a colleague of mine, Malcolm McBain, who is a retired British foreign service officer, is working on a series of interviews with former senior British diplomats -- particularly on the European Union side of things. That oral history program is being deposited at Churchill College in Cambridge.

HARTMAN: That will be very interesting because there are still a number of people who were around at that time. Each country, in addition to having their own commissioner, in fact the original French, British, Italian and German each had two commissioners. Each country had an ambassador who represented the council of government in the European Union structure. The British had a fantastic fellow who was the leader of the pro-British element and later went back to being the permanent secretary to the foreign minister. Then went into business and was on the board of quite a few companies. Soames was married to Churchill's daughter and was very much involved in European Union affairs. I used to go to conferences in England and the political leaders were all involved in these discussions and it was the center of politics and international affairs.

Q: Where were the British in this?

HARTMAN: They were in the Community. They were on the more liberal side as far as trade negotiations were concerned but defending the Community. It was a different

situation from when they were outside and there could be more direct relationships with the United States. They were good defenders of that because they had good negotiators, experienced in trade negotiations. They took up the European cause and did it very well. There was a refreshing rejuvenation of the bureaucracy in Brussels when the British came in.

Q: Where were the Germans?

HARTMAN: The Germans were very active. In the early days of the European Union, Hallstein was the president of the commission and very active in structuring the whole thing. Also in working to preserve the prerogatives of the Commission, in fact to the point where other governments got angry with him, especially the French government. He was claiming too much for the Commission. He was acting as though it was another government and that it was a supranational power.

Q: Wasn't this always in the bank?

HARTMAN: It was Monnet's concept. Monnet acted that way when he was head of the high authority of the coal and steel community. Hallstein tried to do it in terms of the Common Market and was partially successful. He gained their entry -- later becoming the model for example in the group of seven where the Commission president was invited as a full participant on the economic discussions. The Germans had a good group of civil servants. Their commissioner was in charge of the actual trade negotiations at one point. We would also discuss things like East-West policy because they had an economic relationship between the countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The head of the foreign department of the commission was a Dutchman and he was a very distinguished former diplomat. He had been in these negotiations from the beginning and was very close to Monnet. He had been a high authority in Luxembourg and then came in to the Common Market commission structure. These people were regular and kept very close tabs with him. As far as Washington was concerned, I think it is fair to say the Nixon administration was not very enthusiastic about a supranational Europe. It ended up, before I came back to Washington, with Henry Kissinger making his speech about "year of Europe and Europe had to choose and were they going to define themselves solely in terms of their opposition to the United States or was there a mechanism for achieving a cooperative relationship with Europe." It led to a lengthy process of discussion about how the relationships with Europe should be organized. My predecessor, Walt Stoessel, was negotiating with the political directors, that is, not with the Commission people but with the political directors for each of the countries, who were a kind of nascent foreign policy establishment. They discussed foreign policy among the members of the European community. Walt was their opposite number and talked to them regularly and they came up with a declaration about their relationships with Europe. That whole relationship of the United States to this bunch of institutions that was beginning to form disturbed Kissinger a lot more than it disturbed me. But I understood what his problem was, which was the Europeans were having these discussions that were outside of NATO, they were reaching conclusions that related to foreign policy and other major policy issues, and we didn't have an input.

Q: Were we seeing any deviations from what were basically agreed on, facing off on the Soviet Union and we are all in this thing together?

HARTMAN: About the basic policy of resisting the expansion of communism, there was no question about that but there were a lot of tactical issues. You had Willie Brandt and you had a lot of discussion which related to the kind of tactics that people in government were going to follow in their foreign policy. The thing Henry hated most was to have that discussed without him present and without him being able to influence it. By the time you were discussing it with them they would say to us "Oh, well, we can't change that because we have just agreed to it among ourselves and it took us so much time to do that."

Q: If I were Henry Kissinger I would be a bit worried about people like yourself and our representation over there -- you had all been in this thing from the beginning and were all true believers -- that you might end up not looking after American interests as he perceived them. Was this of concern?

HARTMAN: There might have been a little bit of concern, particularly earlier on when there was something like the MLF (Multilateral Force) which had already been taken over by the true believers -- the MLF being the way to handle the intermediate missile stuff. But later on I don't think so. Basically what he didn't like was a bunch of people getting together and discussing policy and deciding issues without a U.S. presence and without a U.S. input and without his ability to screw down on their home government, so to speak, to get policy changes. As a way around it, and he had gotten French agreement for it, he had thought of using the quadripartite group. Of course that was resented by the European Community people because it looked like a short cutting of their institution by something we were fully involved in.

Q: You were talking about policy, vis-a-vis the European Community there, were you in the position of saying "Hey, don't go off and start talking about foreign policy without talking to us first?"

HARTMAN: There was a certain amount of that. Walt Stoessel was doing that more in the home government than I was. It was of concern to the NATO ambassador because after all political consultations were supposed to take place in the NATO council. There were economic issues we were dealing with all the time where it was natural for them to get together and indeed we had to recognize this and support the fact that they were acting together. These issues included not only the trade negotiations. Energy policy was beginning to loom very large. There were some other issues of specific negotiations that were affecting politics in the United States. There was a serious effort to get at the institutions that were making European policy. Because those economic issues were so important to the member states of the European Community, and we were beginning to talk about political unity and political consultations, it was something their governments were talking about. You had a lot of bi-lateral talk between the French government and the British government, and the French government and the German government. There

were issues outside of Europe. Things like the Middle East where we were highly suspicious that the French were trying to put together within the European Union a policy different from that of the United States and undercutting what Henry was trying to do at the time in all the negotiations.

Q: Wasn't there cause for suspicion?

HARTMAN: Oh yes. Suspicion. Do we resent that any other government has a policy? Yes there was suspicion and yes there was undercutting and yes they had a different position on many of these issues.

Q: As these talks progress on these oral histories, would you say we are at a tipping point where all of a sudden Europe is beginning to find itself?

HARTMAN: Tipping point, yes. Also you have to remember as far as the United States was concerned this was the end of the Vietnam period so there was a lot of debate in our country about the limits of U.S. power. You had a kind of two-power system in the world. Going back to the Kennedy speech in Philadelphia about the dumbbell: Europe and the United States working together in parallel and having that connection across the Atlantic. It has always been a part of U.S. policy. Some in Washington adopted it reluctantly, thinking that what we were doing was building up a gigantic opponent who would take steps quite different from our policy. Some feared growing neutralism in Europe -- a lot of opposition to nuclear weapons. I never had that fear because I felt the governments I knew about were solidly in favor of the same things we were in terms of their basic policies. But it didn't stop them from time-to-time from putting forward suggestions of policies that either they thought were in their own interests or they wanted to distinguish themselves, for their own political reasons at home, from the United States. After all, the United States in Europe didn't have a great reputation because there was a lot of opposition to what we were doing in Vietnam. That took two forms: the people that didn't think we were doing the right thing there, and then a bunch of other people who thought we were taking power away from where it should be, which was defending Europe and the places that counted, namely the Western Europe industrial and political base. That was a period in which it was revealed that the United States had less real power. It still had leadership possibilities because we were a single government. Very hard to get these European countries to act together and have any kind of influence in the world because they could never put their policies, their strength together and even down to the days of Yugoslavia when they couldn't even put a force together to carry out a political policy. Debate continues to this day as to how powerful Europe is ever going to be, but I think there is more of a balance and Europe is more assertive of its own interests. I don't think the basic parts of their policies vary that much from the United States.

Q: At that time I would think what we wanted was to reduce the Soviet Union. The fact that it sat there would tend to concentrate ones mind.

HARTMAN: That's right and also it behaved in ways that scared responsible leaders.

Their whole effort to build more and more missiles and to arm them with more warheads was as worrying to responsible European leadership as it was to American leadership. So there was a response to be made and there was a certain amount of resentment that we seemed to think the relationship with Russia was a special one for us.

Q: This is the so called detente period?

HARTMAN: Oh, absolutely, and of course the Europeans like Willie Brandt had taken a lead in promoting this. This later proved to be a good idea. It loosened things up in Eastern Europe. There was a feeling that sometimes we put the relationship with Russia on a higher plane and didn't care so much about what was going on in Eastern Europe.

Q: This was very much Kissinger's centric wasn't it?

HARTMAN: He would deny that but I think it was true. Later on, when we get to the time when I was assistant secretary, and the negotiations of the Helsinki agreement, you can see that kind of suspicion, division. They thought there was really something there. Henry in his latest volume of memoirs thinks he invented it but at the time ----

Q: I talked to George Vest, who talks about having his feet chopped out from under him when he was trying to negotiate Kissinger's back door business.

HARTMAN: On that issue, particularly which seemed to have human rights at the core, Kissinger was totally unsympathetic as to what anybody was doing and made fun of it. And made fun of it with D'Amico.

Q: And Dobrynin. At this time were you feeling what was going on here was secondary to the interests of our foreign policy?

HARTMAN: There were great suspicions. What can you do to influence this and certainly tell us what you think is going on. To be perfectly frank, I think in the Nixon period in the mission to the European community there was a peripheral outlook. Because both Nixon and Kissinger (then the national security advisor) were very much for dealing with the top influential folks. In France at that time it was Pompidou and his first assistant who was a very anti-American guy who had been born in Morocco. He had been married to an American. Everybody says being married to an American is the quickest way to make you anti-American. At least among some Europeans. From the point of view of Kissinger and Nixon, their idea was to deal with nation states and this other thing was just something on the side. I don't think they were basically non believers. I think they accepted it as a fact of life and occasionally tried to build it into something that was useful and have it as an adjunct to what the United States was trying to do to pull together, an alliance policy. David Bruce, while he was our ambassador to NATO, was more sympathetic and talked a lot to all these people because he knew them all. Don Rumsfeld less so because he just didn't have that experience. Michael Palace was the British diplomat that we worked very closely with. Michael was the British representative to the European Community and very much involved with Soames who was on the

Commission in these developing British policies and working very closely with us. At the same time he was representing Community interests but he had enough sense of U.S. concerns to work for compromises.

Q: You mentioned energy.

HARTMAN: Energy comes in a lot more when I got back to Washington because the energy crisis took place in '73. I was the guy that organized the energy conference in Washington.

Q: But energy at all on the horizon?

HARTMAN: Yes, there was a lot of talk about nuclear energy, a lot of talk about energy policy. There had been a war in the Middle East in October '73.

Q: What about Libya at that time?

HARTMAN: I had absolutely nothing to do with that. The Italians already had a correct relationship with Qadhafi. So did an American. Armand Hammer of Occidental Petroleum took action with Libya. That was his first step up the ladder to running a major oil enterprise. The thing I took away from all of that was the contact with some remarkable people who either stayed with community affairs or went back to their home governments and became high powered folks. I think of one Italian, Ruggiero, was in the cabinet of the man who was running the Commission and later became head of one of the departments. He went back to Rome, was the minister of trade and then finally the head of GATT the world trade organization. There were a bunch of people involved in this that became influential in their own governments and in the world.

Q: Did you feel you were among a cadre of Americans who were experienced in this and would continue to work in this field?

HARTMAN: Yes, it was more fortuitous than actually planned. I don't think there were a bunch of people in the State Department that really knew what was going on over there. It just happened that we gravitated, and as usual in the State Department assignments are negotiated despite all the rules and regulations about how it should be done and where you should go. It is much more bureaucratic now, but in those days Schaetzel wanted a deputy and I was working for Elliot Richardson or maybe it was for John Erwin, and working closely with people in the White House, and that assignment was arranged. I was only there 18 months because at the end of that period I was pulled back to be the assistant secretary.

Q: During this period were you seeing the rise of nationalist leaders? It would seem to have been fertile ground for a politician to base him or herself in Europe.

HARTMAN: No. It might have happened that way in France, for example, if it hadn't been for the fact that de Gaulle recognized he needed a relationship with Adenauer. So

from the beginning of that relationship Adenauer insisted that Europe be the center. De Gaulle recognized that French leadership of the European group, at that time six nations, gave him more authority than just being the leader of France. Particularly if he could have some control over German policy, and the insoluble ties between Germany and France were the basis for the formation of the European Union. De Gaulle and his people would inveigh against these supra national types, people who thought they could build a federal Europe. Well the Germans favored a federal Europe. They had a federal system within Germany. German leaders were always a little bit afraid of the old trends in Germany coming back. They had lived through a very bad period. So they were more in favor of having these institutional ties. Very close to Monnet's way of looking at Europe and figuring that no individual European state, given the way the world had developed, and given the outsized power of the United States and the Soviet Union, it was natural that everybody said "No we've got to get together and act as one or we're not going to have any influence on the situation. We are going to be satellites of the United States or neutralized by an overpowering Russia." In the end the consensus was to find ways to express European points of view, which in basic terms would agree with the United States. But there would be times, for example, either for tactical reasons or for reasons of policy, where they thought the United States policy was always too close to that of Israel and didn't take into account all the Arab interests in the area. It is only more recently we have had this very good relationship with most of the Arab states and they have come along with the peace process. But we are still the center of the peace process but Europe isn't.

Q: I would think the one place you knew you were going to be breaking your lances on would be agriculture at this point. All those countries had very protective policies, as did we.

HARTMAN: From the beginning the agricultural issue was the one that separated us from Europe and where we had the most political difficulty within the United States. Essentially what the Europeans were doing was protecting their agriculture at higher prices, subsidizing their exports and competing with the United States in its traditional export markets. From the beginning that was a bone of contention. Some of us that took a slightly longer view, it now appears to be a much longer view than I thought, believed that the European taxpayers would get tired of paying this bill. The bill was always moderated by subsidizing their exports as they took markets away from us and that reduced their absolute amounts of money they had to spend on agricultural support. Over the years in negotiations in Geneva and bi-lateral talks we have somewhat lowered the common agricultural policies protective native but it is still a bone of contention and we are now 50 years from the founding of the European Union. The only way to keep agriculture viable in most parts of the European Community is to have some form of subsidization. I see it in the place around where I live in the southwest part of France. It is very inhospitable soil but you put enough monetary and other inputs into it and you grow products. Those products directly compete with the United States. It is most efficient farming by growing grape seed and other oil-type things -- sunflowers, they substitute for our soy beans. Of course the British never liked it because they have a different system of keeping their farmers on the farm. Instead of subsidizing the way the Europeans did, the

British mainly did it on a system whereby the need of the farmer was recognized. Today the bulk of European subsidies go to rich industrialist farmers in the north of France. They don't go to keeping people in my part of the country on the farm. If they changed this system to just focus more on that, in other words keeping the rural life of the country together, we would have less reason to object and of course the bill would be less and they would be less of a competitor on the world market. It is the same problem we had in this country in 1910. We had 35-40% of our population involved in agricultural things and by the time we got out of the Second World War we were down close to 5% and now we are now down to 2-1/2%. Very small. The Europeans, at the end of the war, were up around 20. The French are now getting down close to five but it is done with this heavily subsidized system. The French have always tried to keep control of that policy. The Germans talk a good game as far as liberalizing trade but have the same problem. They had it even more when their country was divided because the people who left Eastern Germany were mainly farmers so the Germans settled them in areas that could only exist with high subsidization. Today that is less true with industrials. Shopping malls are going into the agricultural countryside. But they are also growing more on smaller land.

Q: In '73 you were ripped from the womb of your Brussels assignment and went where and from when to when?

HARTMAN: I've only subsequently discovered there was a memoir of Don Rumsfeld and then a memoir of Kissinger. Don Rumsfeld went back in the bad times of the Nixon administration to help straighten things out in the White House. Apparently he made the suggestion that I should be brought back, when Kissinger moved over to be Secretary of State, as the national security advisor. I found out years later that this horrified Kissinger. As a way of countering this suggestion, which he didn't like at all, he got Larry Eagleburger to call me and say Henry wanted me to come back and be assistant secretary for Europe. I was not about to turn that down. He then picked as the national security advisor somebody he had confidence in and was close to, Brent Scowcroft.

Q: This is tape 6, side one with Arthur Hartman. You were saying career happenstance.

HARTMAN: Plays a major role not in your career choices but how you are chosen and there were similar circumstances in how I was appointed to Paris and Moscow.

Q: Well, '73 to when were you assistant secretary?

HARTMAN: To the end of the Ford administration so '77. Initially it was that very tense period when Watergate was right up there on the agenda. Kissinger was Secretary of State, the winding up of Vietnam was going on. Kissinger had a wonderful feel for how one can move the country's eyes from one issue to another. He was visibly moving eyes away from Vietnam. The China thing had developed and he was developing a relationship with the Russians which was moving toward a more productive kind of thing. Arms negotiations were never a great favorite among the Republicans. There was a lot of opposition among the right wing of the Republican Party toward any kind of negotiations with the Russians. Henry was attacked a lot for carrying them on. As a result

he had to go through a lot of theater which showed him to be tougher. He was tougher. At a time when the Republicans really had neglected defense, he and Nixon were pushing very strongly for an increase in defense spending. As a way of moving toward a negotiation with the Russians but on a basis in which they would think we were for real in terms of the kind of force we had and that they couldn't win that kind of competition. This was at a time when people were moving their missiles. We had multiple vehicles, and "more than one chain on a missile." We had many more than any reasonable person would think you needed to run a deterrent. That was the competition we were involved in with the Russians. We never really knew just how much they were spending on all the duplicate systems they built. It was totally out of control.

Q: I'm told that sometimes the Americans had a better idea of what was going on within the Soviet military through our CIA than the negotiators.

HARTMAN: During the time I was assistant secretary, I would go with Henry to the meetings in Moscow or they would come to the states or we would meet in a middle ground somewhere. One of the resentments some of our negotiators had was that Henry would take up the negotiations with the Russians at that level. He would take it out of the negotiators' hands, and our poor negotiators in Geneva, who were working away with their Russian colleagues on the nuts and bolts towards reducing nuclear arms and reaching agreements, felt they were undercut. Very often they had no knowledge of what Kissinger was up to. That was his method of dealing with problems. It could be uncomfortable. I tried as assistant secretary to have a certain transparency in what we were doing because I thought that was the only way to maintain a policy and get support for it from the public. Also I felt that structure was important. Undercutting our ambassadors by doing things behind their back, having secret meetings here and there, didn't seem to me to be very productive in the end. It was good for the ego of some people.

Q: Talking about this -- were you able to discuss this with Henry Kissinger?

HARTMAN: I did on occasion and I would do my own thing in keeping people informed on a confidential basis, just to be sure they didn't feel they were being undercut. I think things improved after the whole Watergate thing passed. When Ford became President there was a much more regularized process and I attribute this to the character of both Ford and Brent Scowcroft. Totally open and straightforward. Had his arguments with Kissinger about how things were done. He wasn't above having secrets but the main thing was he saw the whole government as having to be brought together and he saw it as a necessary process to keep congressional and public support for the kind of policies he wanted. He was always pushing on that side of Henry.

Q: Did you find yourself and Scowcroft sitting together and trying to figure out what Kissinger was doing?

HARTMAN: No. Henry's relationship with Scowcroft was such that he kept him well informed. While Nixon was still president and took that ill-fated trip to Russia shortly

before his downfall, and we had the terrible spectacle of Brezhnev being nice to Nixon, feeling sorry for him, almost putting his arm around him and saying "Come with me and lets talk. I don't understand what is going on in your country and why your political people are being so mean to you." That whole thing drove Henry up the wall because, first of all, for Nixon to meet alone with Brezhnev, which he did on a couple of occasions, just sent Henry into all kinds of fears. With some reason -- who knows what state of mind Nixon was in at the end. There was also in the entourage Al Haig and a bunch of strong egos and I can remember the corridors of the Kremlin where they were all staying sort of echoing with these fights that were going on within our own delegation. It was a very nasty, bad period. Looking back on it, Henry's role was both an honorable and a good one in keeping this man, who was under tremendous pressure psychologically as well as other ways, from going around the bend. If you listen to the tapes, he was close to it during that whole period. As much as I admired some of the things he did in foreign affairs he was a total disaster in terms of leading the country in a constitutional way. In that period Henry had this additional task as the senior member of the cabinet. We know now from the tapes and other things how dreadfully Nixon treated him in terms of being suspicious and paranoid about what Kissinger was up to. That came to a head, as far as I was concerned, and I get a lot of this information from Eagleburger, Kissinger's first assistant. When I had been the assistant secretary somebody must have come into my office and said to me "Oh, by the way, we are reorganizing the bureau and you've got three additional countries. It makes more sense for them to be in Europe." Two of them were NATO members and Cyprus was there. I must have nodded and said "Okay, I hope you are going to give me some staff to handle this. So we have another office."

Q: So this is Turkey, Cyprus and Greece?

HARTMAN: Yes.

Q: Oh, God!

HARTMAN: Then comes July. There were a bunch of things that took place and Joe Sisco was either an assistant secretary at that time or had been promoted up to be the Undersecretary for Political Affairs. You know that history of what the Greek colonels had done in Cyprus.

Q: For the record. This is when a right wing group on Cyprus overthrew the regular Cyprus government to bring about union with Greece.

HARTMAN: And also in the process came down very heavily on the Turkish population. There had always been an adversarial relationship between the two but it was kept in check at a time when the Greek government wasn't directly involved in the politics of Cyprus. When this crisis finally hit, it was in the middle of the Watergate crisis so it didn't exactly have Kissinger's nor Nixon's attention. Basically Henry's view, without knowing any of the details of the thing, was the Turks are a NATO ally and let's see if we can't help to settle this thing. Sort of the American view that goes back to missions we had sent to Cyprus. The Acheson mission, the Bruce mission, Vance had been sent there

to try and settle this problem in Cyprus. There was a UN involvement there for many years. Then I came along, not knowing a damn thing about it. The Turks had invaded Cyprus and established a separate Turkish regime in the Northern part of the island and in effect divided it. I was sent out by Kissinger to talk to the three governments and then on my way home stop in London. This was where I found that Henry was under great pressure because I got some of the more ridiculous cables on that trip which Eagleburger had been ordered to send to me. Henry misinterpreted a conversation I had with Ecevit, who at the time was prime minister of Turkey and had been a student of Kissinger's at Harvard. Ecevit was a very interesting character, an expert on T.S. Elliot of all things and translated into Turkish "The Cocktail Party" by T.S. Elliot. I went to see him. He gave me a complete history (which I hadn't had before) of the relationship with Greece, the problems of the Aegean and the problems with Cyprus. I reported this and in the reporting I indicated we had to find some way to dampen this down. There was a fear there was going to be a second invasion. I interpreted my instructions to try and see if we could avoid that. Henry was very anxious that I not put pressure on the Turks which would make it look as though we had sided with the Greeks. I thought I had pursued that kind of policy. William Macomber was our ambassador to Turkey and went with me to all the meetings. Then I flew to Cyprus. In Cyprus I get a cable, an absolute zinger, saying "You disobeyed me! You go back to Ankara and you correct the impression you left there." Eagleburger had a way of absolutely carrying out whatever Henry's mood was at the moment. I had no intention of going back to Ankara and doing anything of the kind. I was meeting our ambassador at the time Rodger Davies, (who was later assassinated in Nicosia) and showed him this cable and he just shook his head. So I sat down that night and drafted a cable back saying that wasn't my intention at all. By the time Kissinger got that cable he had passed on to some other crises. Indeed I later learned that was almost at the time he was dealing with Nixon during Nixon's last days in the oval office. I can imagine the tremendous pressure he was under. Ecevit kept me for hours telling me about the history of this conflict. Then when I got to Cyprus, Clerides, the Greek leader there, takes me aside and spends a whole evening with me. Then I go up and call on Denktash, the Turkish leader, and he does the same thing. Of course, Clerides and Denktash had been together as lawyers in London on the Queen's Council. Still to this day they are the leaders of the two sides on the island. I think the Greek side resented that I gave any credence whatsoever to the fact that the Turks had been ill used. The Greeks had in fact oppressed them in many ways. I wasn't saying I was on the side of the Turks. I was just saying "Look there are some things that have to be settled here and you can't expect the Turks to pull out and let you do whatever you want to do up there because they know what that is going to mean." Then I go on to Athens and see Karamanlis, who had been brought back from exile and was a great democratic leader. He gave hope to everybody that Greece was back in a democratic mood. Karamanlis said, "Now we have to be sure you understand what this problem is." So Karamanlis got his man, who later became foreign minister, and said "Now you just take the ambassador in hand and give him a little whisper of what this problem is all about." That went on for five hours into the night. I said what I was supposed to say there and with me was Bob Oakley who knew a lot more of the history than I did. Then we went on to London where the British had a major role to play. Then we went to Geneva and I met with Jim Callahan who was the foreign minister at the time and an old friend from my earlier

London days. Jim and I went to this conference in which nothing was settled and the British had intelligence that the Turks were planning a second shot. Jim offered me a ride to London and I can remember him saying on the plane, "Henry is a good friend of mine. When you go back tell him I don't mind [inaudible] but he has got to show there is a humanitarian concern in most of the initiatives." I said I thought he had, because he had shown humanitarian concern for what had happened to the Turks, but the Greeks didn't seem to want to appreciate them. He said there were things on both sides. The Greeks remember what the Turks did.

Q: We are talking about the Ottoman days, 1923 in Smyrna. All these things have their dates.

HARTMAN: Absolutely. It was a real education to me because that was not a part of the world I ever had anything to do with. In London, Makarios, the Cypriot president ousted by the coup, was staying at the Grosvenor House Hotel and I called on him. He was a wonderful, theatrical sort of fellow and he managed to appear as the Archbishop. He told me how right was on their side, never recognizing anything had been done wrong about the colonels. But if it had, that was past history and that he had not had any dealings with these dreadful people who were trying to pull strings. I doubted this. I think he had been rather close to some of the Nationalists when it happened. Then I came home and faced a barrage from some of my old friends in Congress. Paul Sarbanes and his friend, John Brademas, who later became head of NYU (New York University).

Q: One thing we know about the Greek lobby, after 1974 all of a sudden it came out full blown from the head of Athena.

HARTMAN: Well, I was attacked because they couldn't get their hands on Henry. He was doing his important work of shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, of all these guys who had both Greek and Jewish constituents were a little rough, but with me the gloves were off and they really let me have it. I went up and defended a more even handed policy, which they thought was indefensible and they began attaching all kinds of restrictions to legislation. It was not good. Shortly after this Ford became President. He had a lot of contacts on the Hill and was able to cool things a bit and get things on a more even keel. The scars from that remain with me.

Q: I find you really have to be there to understand the mentality. I served four years in Greece and five years in Belgrade. I have a vision of the European bureau all of a sudden being saddled with these Katzenjammer Kids and here are two NATO allies ready to fight each other. I have talked to people like Bob Dillon and others who are dealing with this down below and all of a sudden they found them selves in the halls of the European bureau which is dealing with cultural policies and wondering what they brought to us. They were like country cousins bringing problems.

HARTMAN: That whole period was fascinating to me and Henry was very good about involving me. In fact, I met him once in the Middle East because we were going on to Turkey, to see Ecevit. He took me along to a meeting with Assad. He said "You don't

know anything about diplomacy unless you have heard this kind of discussion." There they were sort of kidding back and forth -- a typical Henry performance. It was an education. I would go to the dinners in Tel Aviv along with the people who were working on the problem -- I obviously wasn't. It was an opportunity to brief him before we went on. We went on to Tunis and met Mario Soares of Portugal there. Henry was very suspicious of Soares, the newly elected prime minister in a recently democratized Portugal. Kissinger thought Soares was going to take to the communists and we were going to lose Portugal. The Europeans were all telling him this was nonsense.

Q: I have a good interview with Frank Carlucci on his battles.

HARTMAN: When I was assistant secretary, Frank was having his battles with Kissinger and I was on Frank's side. I remember sitting out here on the deck with Frank discussing how we were going to deal with this. And finding this was extremely difficult to get Henry off these things sometimes. He just felt these left wing types, the communists, were going to come into governments in some European countries.

Q: This was the kind of Euro-communism which we felt was communism with a friendly face. How did you handle Congress?

HARTMAN: I went up there and took the heat and carefully explained to them why I thought a more even handed policy was the correct one. If you were going to cut off relationships totally with Turkey, that wouldn't get their troops out of Cyprus. These were a very stubborn bunch of people. They felt they had right on their side because their people had been oppressed and no one was defending them and no U.N. force was going to go in and protect them. These things just boil on and on and sometimes there is separation, which is what is happening in Northern Ireland. In taking Yugoslavia today, it's a separation of peoples and you just don't bring them together. Particularly when the history of antagonism goes back so far and so deep, and particularly when it is drawn along religious lines. The Kashmir dispute, despite the number of Muslims in India, is between a majority non-Muslim country and a Muslim country and it is extremely difficult to solve. Northern Ireland is the same way. Along the way there were a lot of trips. We went to Yugoslavia and called on Tito and got a chance to meet him and that battleaxe wife of his. It was pretty clear Tito guy was holding this place together. A very communist country but with an economy that was flourishing. Exporting a lot. From a personal point of view it was a matchless experience to go with Henry. It was also our Bicentennial. We go to Germany and Helmut Schmidt knows Henry's love of soccer. He arranged a series of meetings to always be at tournament quarter finals and then at the finals. Along the way we went to the Oktoberfest with Franz Joseph Strauss. Knowing Henry's love of beautiful faces he had all the actresses in Munich at this party, lots of drinking. My understanding of German is practically nil so I didn't enjoy it much. Kissinger was always distrustful of Hal Sonnenfeldt's wanting to get himself in the press and Hal had a way of getting forward somehow and being in the picture. Henry, being paranoid as he was, even though this was absolutely no threat to him, it was just incredible and he would unload on me. He would say "Can't you keep this under control?" Hal was the counselor of the department and involved with Henry from the

time he was in the national security advisor's office as well. He rather favored a lot of secret dealings back and forth.

Q: I want to finish up with the Greek-Turkish thing. You were there when we put an arms embargo on Turkey?

HARTMAN: That was done at the behest of Congress.

Q: What were we telling the Greeks and in particular what were we telling the Turks about this?

HARTMAN: There were two periods of time. There was a time when Henry Tasca was ambassador in Athens. He was thought to be friends with the colonels, and there was some reason to believe the agency may have had some relationships there.

Q: I was consul general there from 1970 to 1974 and I was running the consular section and I used to find the CIA was really unhealthy. People would come in to talk to me and they would tell me about the military police beating up people. The CIA station chief would say that according to their sources (the sources being the guys who were doing the beating up) weren't doing this. I think Henry Tasca was there to create good relationships but I don't think he enjoyed the colonels.

HARTMAN: We then sent a great guy as DCM, Monty Stearns, who had a long experience there and knew a lot about it. Tasca was replaces as ambassador by Jack Kubisch. They would brief me. I was always very careful, unlike Kissinger and later Brzezinski, to work with the local ambassador. Fortunately, there was no place where the ambassador was totally incompetent. I guess I did run into that once in Scandinavia where I deliberately avoided him. But where the ambassador was competent it seemed essential to me that we work closely together in case there was any follow-up. It was before I had become an ambassador, but I was very conscious of the fact there was a continuing relationship. I had watched as various governments had sent very good people to Washington and then tried to use that channel exclusively and not deal at all with the American ambassador in their capital. I thought this was an unfortunate way and we should not encourage this way of dealing with them. Al Haig came to feel that way too when he was the Secretary of State. He sent me to Moscow. Use the ambassador there; we aren't going to have any demarches just in Washington and we will keep you totally informed. It is very important if you are going to have any kind of a balanced relationship.

Q: We must have been trying to tell the Turks something since we cut off arms to them. They represented the right flank of NATO and we are in confrontation with an aggressive Soviet Union. We had to be trying to say something about "you know what Congress is like" and trying to explain it.

HARTMAN: Of course the Turks, being the blockheads they were, were not taking any of that. "Come on now we are a substantial government." "Are we or are we not an ally?

What's going on here?" We had to have some pretty fast footwork. I think there was a good bit of turmoil within the Turkish political scene so that it was difficult for them to come out with a position where they could really maneuver. They stopped exercising with the NATO forces. And they began sailing very close to the Greek Islands and they sent out an oil exploration. All this was designed to keep the needle in and tell us they had some authority as well. Most of the European countries were on the Greek side too, except for the Germans who I think were more even handed. We tried to get some of the Europeans to help us, recognizing we were in a bad way as far as the restrictions that had been put on the executive branch by Congress.

Q: Turning to the Portuguese thing. From conversations and reading, I have a feeling that Kissinger at this particular period was of the opinion that time was not with us and communism was on the march. Did you get any of these feelings?

HARTMAN: No, I don't think that was the case. He was obviously very suspicious of the left wing. He had been suspicious of the Germans' left wing because he had been very much against this sort of detente. You won't find that in his memoirs. He had a lot of intelligence reports about people who were surrounding Willie Brandt and others. There were communist people advising, and there was reason to be suspicious. In the case of Soares, here was a group that had come out of the resistance to the old dictator that we always felt more comfortable with and had been a faithful ally of the British for 30 years and during the Second World War had a close relationship with Portugal. The old dictator, Salazar, had a lot of friends in the business community in the United States. So when he got on the phone the suspicion was that the left wing was going to take over and sooner or later could be a communist government. That would be a disaster. Also the situation was evolving in Spain. Franco was nearing the end of his regime and the question was "What kind of transition would take place there?" No one predicted the splendid role that the King, Juan Carlos, played in that transition. I remember going there with Kissinger and again he was very suspicious of some of the groups that were coming along. No one would ever have predicted that the Socialists in Spain would become staunch NATO allies. The Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Solana, was now the spokesman for the European Union. It was felt that things could go very wrong. I remember going to the funeral of Franco with Nelson Rockefeller who was Vice President by that time and was very close to Kissinger and shared these feelings that this thing could go very wrong in terms of who could take over. Everybody had the '30s very much in mind when the communists did take over the democratic groups in Spain. It didn't work out that way partially because of happenstance. The King played this fantastic role. There were some sensible people in Spain, some of whom we were dealing with. When I was commissioned to go over there, the King let me know there was a fellow who was very close to him that I should deal with (this was before Franco died) that would tell me how things were going. With great secrecy he came to Washington but wouldn't come into the State Department because he didn't want it known that he was here. He said "I'll stand next to the light pole outside." This was a one armed fellow with a beard and rather easy to spot and very well known in Spain as a polo player. He would hold the reins under his arms. I talked to him and he said he would send a message when it looked as though Franco was dying because he wanted to be very sure we stepped in to

give full support to the King. I later learned that this guy was one of the top people in Opus Dei. He was a good hearted fellow and he had an interest in the country. But very strongly opposed to the left and wanted to be sure there was no communist takeover. He called in the middle of the night our time. Somehow or other my son (who was 14, 15 or 16 at that time) gets this message. It was supposedly in code. "The old man is dead! He wants you to know." My son made some of flippant remark and hung up the phone. We mounted this campaign to show our support for the King, sending Nelson Rockefeller over to the funeral, and then a series of other things where we met with him. The King was a very simple kind of fellow. He lived outside of Madrid and his wife drove the kids to school. She was Greek.

Q: She was Greek royalty.

HARTMAN: That's right but still they were very simple. We later learned he had many mistresses and the usual thing among high ranking royalty and politicians. A very straight forward fellow who claimed this significant role in standing up when the right wing wanted to have a counter revolution in the parliament. He stopped it cold. I was witness to a very particular part of history.

Q: This is a good place to stop. We talked about the time you were assistant secretary for European Affairs, '73 to '77. First I'd like to talk about Portugal. Let's talk about the oil crises. This is the aftermath of the October '73 war. Then we'll go into the East-West thing and dealing with the European Union and last but certainly not least

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Today is May 17, 2000. Why don't we pick up with a little more about Portugal. I had an interview with Frank Carlucci telling what he was doing. This is something I consider an extremely important episode. Do we take a country which seems to be heading off to the left in Europe but which is a country we could probably be standoffish with or do we try to get in there and engage? It seems like Kissinger was ready to write it off but he didn't. What was your role?

HARTMAN: First of all he was not ready to write it off. He was very skeptical, however, that a fellow like Soares, who came out of the Socialist left wing, would be able to resist other left wing people who were out-and-out communists who were poking their heads above the ground. They were riding high at the time and influencing people in the military. I think Henry's view was it would be the military that would hold things together if you could find one that was a genuine reformer type and not just carry on the Salazar regime. There were some odd ball people, the guys that came out of the Portuguese-African military. I remember an air force general who became president after a bit who was a very impressive fellow. No one was ever quite sure of his political orientation because most of them didn't have a political orientation. There were a lot of people no one really knew. To be fair to Henry, his experience was that a lot of these people coming out of the woodwork that you don't know could be people that were very much under the influence of communism. He was concerned about that. You have to

remember that at that time the Cubans were pouring people into Africa. There was a lot of stuff going on there. Portugal was a NATO member and it would have been a real breach. We all had our fingers crossed about Italy. His Labor Party, Britain, and FTD friends in Germany were telling him they had had contact with Soares and had much more confidence in him and his ability to control things. Henry's feeling was that even if he himself was okay it was a confused enough situation that he could be swept away. He felt like Soares had his finger in the dike. The other thing you have to remember is that it was an extremely difficult time in the United States. We were going through a president going down the tube and all that involved in terms of U.S. leadership. Not an easy time to deal with any of these problems. Frank Carlucci came back with very definite ideas. And Henry in his usual way (I explained last time how he got furious with me on my mission in Cyprus) was up and down getting furious with Frank and a lot of other people around him as he worked out these problems he had to face. I was kind of in between, but very much believing that Carlucci knew what the local situation was. Frank was pretty confident, on the basis of his talks with people there, that this could be brought through and influenced. The thing was that we should be there to have that kind of influence recognizing that Soares probably had some complaints about us. They supported Salazar for so long, now feeling they wanted to turn a new leaf. Maybe with a socialist background having a little neutralism somewhere there. None of us predicted at that time that just a few years later the Spanish socialists would become such stolid NATO types, even supply the Secretary General of NATO. Looking back with hindsight, sure we were probably overly concerned but it sure did turn out well. Soares became a very wonderful sort of statesman of the socialist international, which, because of the normal action and activity, supported some good causes. In fact helped out with some of the anti-communist bulwarks that you needed. Particularly when Eastern Europe began to open up. During that time Kissinger had a lot of skepticism about the possibility. I think I mentioned to you last time, Frank and I sat out on the porch here plotting how we could work him through all the personal problems and others that were around to get the right kind of instructions. It pretty much came out that way and Henry's attention got deflected with a lot of other things. Finally we set up a meeting after that and coming out of the Middle East I met Kissinger and we flew over to Tunisia. We met up with Soares there at a house of Bodega. In any case it was a good meeting with Henry in his usual joking mood and needling the hell out of Soares. I remember Henry expressed great skepticism that he was going to be able to hold back the bad forces and Soares shaking his head and wondering, "Who is this to tell me? I'm in the middle of all this mess." He wasn't sure, he was from the military and clearly he did not want another coup and did not want these fellows coming back a la Salazar taking over the country. He thought it was possible to have a generally democratic government. Meanwhile in Portugal there were a lot of things going on. The peasant movement and all kinds of communist backed activity that required a lot of care and effort, not just on the part of the United States, but there was a lot of talk between us and the British. I think Callahan was still in power at that time. He was a Socialist but a very anti communist sort of person but working with the Socialist International. There was Willie Brandt also very active in the Socialist International. In other words a bunch of characters, and people with money. We had money but the only way we could serve it up was through covert activities whereas the Europeans, the Germans, could give direct support to help a nation's Socialist party and help it come

back. Some of these other forces were probably well supplied with cash from communist sources. There was concern about what was going to happen to the Portuguese territories in Africa, where the Communists were very active. You had these people who were financing the Cubans and therefore of real concern that the fight could be found there. I got in and out of it but it was mainly Frank who carried the ball successfully. After a while Henry came to see it as a great success.

Q: How did we see the other two major communist movements in France and Italy where each represented maybe a third of the vote?

HARTMAN: In France it got 20, 22, 25 percent, it was always very steady. Some people took it quite seriously but until the Mitterrand period, which was much later, there was no question of them coming into the government. De Gaulle did bring them in just after the war and they were in the government for some time. That was mainly a compromise stemming from their attempt to get control. _____ who ran the resistance was trying to hold the country together. We know now from the memoirs that have been written what the communists did and the people they killed off on their side (on the resistance side) to try and get power. I later became a good friend with de Gaulle's police commissioner in Southwest France working out of Toulouse and he said it was a struggle. There was a lot of shooting back and forth after the official war hostilities had ceased. There was a serious attempt by these guys to take over. To people in France it became a joke because it was headed by a guy who was so Stalinist. They were very active in labor unions and very influential in the teachers union. There was a whole left wing tradition which the communists came to represent and were very strong after the war because of the fact they were in the resistance once the Hitler-Stalin pact had ended. A little bit of worry about France, but during the second de Gaulle period, the Pompidou period, and then the Giscard period, not much concern they were going to be able to get into the government. But they had enough influence and they were influential enough in intellectual circles that they played on the natural French desire for standing between the United States and Russia. When I was ambassador there I had to say publicly (I got so mad at Giscard.) "You have to choose sides fellows, whose side are you on?" This was when he was trying to diddle between us and the Russians, led by his old friend Kornyekowski. While there wasn't much concern in France about them actually getting into the government, there was a lot of concern about that kind of belief and closeness to communism or the Soviet Union that it was a worry. We worried about our policies with respect to many things. Although on nuclear matters the French were pretty close to us and tying Germany into the West. So in the end that overcame any guarantee toward neutralism. They were scared stiff that Germany would float around in the middle of Europe. Now in Italy the situation was far different because while you had a Christian Democratic majority, everybody could see that their feet were in sand and they had been in power so long that the corruption was beginning to show. Even in the beginning of the Kennedy administration people were playing around with this so-called opening to the left. There were a couple of very attractive leaders, one of whom came from the upper crust. I think as far as Kissinger was concerned, he was always worried that somebody would turn to this guy and he could come into a coalition and be very influential in leading them toward a more neutral position.

Q: This was a great fault in the Italian political calculation right at the end of the war where the Socialists did not get together. In other words there wasn't a Socialist Party per se whereas in Germany and France you could have a Socialist or a Christian Democratic government back and forth.

HARTMAN: Also there was a great difference between the North and the South both economically and politically. We had numerous needs of Italian leadership. I can remember the needs of Aldo Moro. I used to call him "silent Sam." He would sit there and look glum and his successor did too. I felt very sorry about his murder, but he was not what you would call a vibrant leader of men. The Italians played this role. They played the role also of (I won't call it blackmail.) you need our vote -- well here is our price. We want so and so in the job and it came down to that very often. They weren't taken seriously by the allies in Europe or by us but we had to be careful because we have a large Italian population in the United States. So in things like state visits you had to be careful how you handled the Italians, but they had wonderful civil servants. You would talk to them and they would be so sensible, some of them, and then the politicians would drive you crazy. That is pretty much the way they behaved in the European Community. Although there were some of them who took leadership roles. There was a man who was in the cabinet of several of the members of the European Commission who later became the trade minister in Italy and finally the head of GATT. No one then could have predicted what has happened recently -- communists leading the government, strong NATO partner, participants in Kosovo and other places. Things have changed a lot since the end of the cold war but still politics in Italy is a very weak organization and the corruption that has come out about the Christian Democrats has meant that the strongest party in that country is now almost out of commission. Other parties have taken its place, emphasizing the split between North and South and also some real right wing type of stuff. On the communism front there was that worry, a bit of a worry in Greece about left wing groups there, and a lot of anti Americanism. The young people there were just out of control.

Q: It remains that way too. Still on Western Europe. Lets meld in the European -- was it the union by that time?

HARTMAN: Pretty much, it was certainly moving that way. They were discussing greater financial integration and they also had talked about the expansion of the community. Let me just say something about my tour as assistant secretary. One of the great perks of the job at that time was that we celebrated our bicentennial and each one of the major NATO allies, and the Russians as well, wanted to come and celebrate with us which meant usually they brought some great cultural presentation or the great ships sailed in. I remember the Queen of Denmark on the Danish ship and Helmut Schmidt coming into Baltimore and having a reception on the great German ship. Great things -- operas were presented -- Giscard threw a party on the French lawn behind the French embassy in which the tables were arranged according to the battle line-up of the French fleet as it came to rescue us at Yorktown. Things like that were absolutely wonderful and it was a succession of these things and it was also World Cup time. Henry was going

around Europe managing to be at the semi-finals and the finals of the World Cup in Germany accompanied by all of the stars of the German political spectrum -- the president, the chancellor, just about everybody else -- and it was great fun. We were helicoptering in and out of meetings to make it look like we were working. It was also the time when a lot of stuff was leading up to the Helsinki meeting. This was after Nixon had been forced out of office. And Ford was in. It was an era of good feeling. Henry was working very closely with Ford in that period. There are those who say at that time -- it's hard to believe today -- his attendance at the Helsinki meeting was a political minus because it reduced the support he got from the right wing republicans who always painted Helsinki as giving the Russians their way on the permanence of borders in Europe. Now this is a total fraud because that language was very carefully drafted, I know because I was part of it. It said you couldn't change borders except by peaceful means which is in the U.N. charter. It was not in any way intended or indeed as it turned out, as a way of maintaining Russian permanent control over Eastern Europe. Sure enough within not too many years it ended.

Q: It was picked up by a lot of commentators and newspaper correspondents that this was the price, saying we weren't going to change borders and peaceful means got dropped off for the Soviets to be on board and they didn't realize they were allowing the human rights.

HARTMAN: All of our European friends said "We are not giving up anything, that is going to come by historical change if it ever comes." None of us were going to predict the wall was going to come down at that time. But on the human rights side (which Henry's latest volume takes great credit for) it was highly skeptical to say the least, felt this was going to be a thorn in the side of human real politik with the Russians. From Kissinger's point of view the priority was supposed to be on arms control and better behavior. He always felt that putting your thumb in their eye on the human rights question interfered with these other things which perfected the possibilities of peace which ought to be the first concern of the United States because that was our security.

Q: Lets finish with Helsinki. I interviewed George Vest who felt Kissinger was undercutting him by talking to the Russian ambassador to the U.S., Dobrynin, and he would get reverberations from the East Germans telling the Norwegians the State Department wasn't behind them.

HARTMAN: Let me just say on that. A lot of stuff went on and Henry liked to keep total control. It happened with the arms control negotiators. When Henry finally got in the room with the Russians sometimes he gave away more than they were intending to. In the case of Helsinki, the Russians really wanted Helsinki and I think it was good bargaining in a way. Henry felt this was something they were willing to pay for.

Q: Why did they want it?

HARTMAN: Legitimization. You know Brezhnev used to repeat these speeches to us about the importance of an agreement. They looked at it as the end of the war. We never

had THE real peace treaty. We kept saying "No it isn't that because there are problems that aren't settled and aren't going to be settled in this." That is where this whole border thing came up because we quite rightly did not feel that we were giving anything away. We had no intention of invading Eastern Europe, a la Mr. Dulles, who made great statements about rolling back whatever it was. Each time some brave Eastern Europeans would go out in the street and get shot at we were not there. We did not cross the border. The United States did not cross the border and it was an immoral policy that was meant to encourage defense that somehow or other if they got out in the streets we were going to be there with them.

Q: In the time you were there this wasn't it?

HARTMAN: No, nobody was going to be there. But there was a desire to be supportive of some forces that were beginning to make themselves felt and you can be sure that we were doing what we could through various means -- some overt, some covert -- to help some of the interest groups get organized. The Russians knew we were up to this and were very resentful. Brezhnev saw this as his legacy and Henry saw that as an opportunity to get something. He was always putting off the final decision on that Helsinki conference. Obviously what the Russians wanted was a meeting of all the heads of state, including the Vatican, and San Marino. It was one of the more bizarre gatherings I have ever been in.

Q: The conference was in Vienna.

HARTMAN: Well, much better than that -- one that had no troops whatsoever. There they all were in this great hall with Cinrandi in the background. Were the negotiators undercut? Some of the issues came down to where the comma was going to be in the sentence and that lends itself to great jokes among foreign ministers and between Kissinger and Gromyko about where the comma is going to be in the sentence. But the negotiators thought all of this was very important because it made the point of whether or not human rights were really going to be discussed and whether there was going to be a forum from this and whether you had the right to raise problems about the internal affairs of another country or whether they had the right to say "This is internal affairs and you can't do it." It came down to some very fine semantics in which all of the Western countries were pretty much lined up and we wooed them finally on getting this in there. But it was not enough for the right wing in this country and Ford suffered. He suffered by the misrepresentation of what had happened. Looking back on it, it was a great misrepresentation because history showed very shortly thereafter that this whole crowd was standing on very weak ground and it would collapse. Not only was it not putting the borders in concrete for all time, but it led to a series of views, always with great opposition from the Russians, on discussing human rights in various countries. It enabled us in these meetings to put our finger on this. They at least had to be aware that this interfered with normalization of relations in other things they wanted, which included trade, which included some other things which legitimated them. It didn't legitimate them so far that we were blessing communism for all time. But the right wing politics in this country took it as a blessing of Yalta. I can't remember an American who was ready to

fight the Russians in 1945 to get them out of Eastern Europe. So all these brave guys are standing around saying "You gave it away at Yalta." If you have read the Yalta agreements you know they promised to have democratic elections but they were never carried through. That was not our fault; we weren't prepared to go in there and fight them to get them to do it. Long history -- we can still see it playing out by some of the right wing columnists in the country.

Q: In a way this attitude helped weaken Ford in his own party and Ford lost by very little to Carter so if there had been a little more enthusiastic support it would have been different.

HARTMAN: I think that is right and he was unfairly tarred with this. There were a couple of other things. He had a slip of the tongue about Poland. The man was such a good, lovable fellow that to be treated this way by his own party was really unfair.

Q: Did you get a feeling that everything Ford did was dictated by Henry Kissinger in foreign affairs?

HARTMAN: Well he was pretty soft. Ford did not have a lot of experience but he had some strong views about how the world should look and the kinds of things he would support. He really believed human rights should be discussed. Coming out of a congressional background he had much more of a political feel than his own right wing and than Henry did. I come back to the statement Callahan made to me on the plane as we were coming out of Geneva "Go home and tell Henry to start paying more attention to things like human rights, we can't ignore them." I said that to him and he said "Well I do but we also have interests." In the end there was no way the United States could separate itself from the Europeans who were going in this direction. Henry had a legitimate fear they were going so fast in that direction that the Russians were peeling them off from U.S. policy and the next step would be to tell us "No, you can't have these weapons in Europe. Let's get all the nuclear weapons out of central Europe, not out of the Russian border." That was a legitimate concern that if this were to be used to strengthen the forces which were beginning to appear that anti-nuclear, basically anti U.S., tending toward a neutralist view might be a way of weaning Eastern Europe away from the Russians side by a greater neutrality on the part of Europe. It was a legitimate worry and holding NATO together in those times. Why do you still need NATO. The Russians are so nice, they are signing Helsinki, they are talking about their human rights performance. Why do we want nuclear weapons sitting around. We had to take into consideration all these other factors and in his memoirs Kissinger takes credit for Helsinki. There was a legitimate worry and we got the stuffing knocked out of us. A lot of it was because he wasn't in control of the situation and he didn't like that. Particularly when the German prime minister, Genscher, was on the scene. It was wonderful to see the relationship develop. Henry was never close to him but we used to visit Germany quite regularly -- and not just for the World Cup -- but because Genscher and the people around him were playing around. This was something they had been doing back to the time of Willie Brandt. I think Kissinger felt a lot more comfortable with Helmut Schmidt in control (which he was by that time). So he took any opportunity to go there and discuss things with him.

For a guy like me, an assistant secretary, going along taking notes, it was a great education in high level politics. To watch him joke these guys along but when you read their memoirs you see they really weren't taken in. They all had a good time and they all enjoyed the theater of it. Really what Henry created was theater and he did it beautifully.

Q: When one thinks of Henry Kissinger and Helmut Schmidt sitting in a room together -- these are people who do not treat fools leniently and have strong feelings of intellectual prowess -- how did you find them?

HARTMAN: They got along fine. I didn't know the Pompidou period because I had not yet gone back to Washington. But when Giscard came in, Schmidt and Giscard were so close that they influenced each other to take divisions and this led to Henry's year of Europe. "Are you, Europe, going to form yourself by defining your relationship with the United States?" He kept telling them they had to find some other way to define Europe other than the fact that it is different from the United States because that is always going to get us into trouble. You are going to try to find a policy that is not the United States policy to show you are not dominated by the United States. What are your interests? If your interests coincide with the United States why in the hell won't you join us in some of these things. What the Europeans resented was diktat. Suddenly the United States had a complex political situation in Washington with internal discussions and then suddenly, boom, we come out with a proposal and say to the Europeans "We can't change that because we've all agreed with the bureaucracy in Washington." We were a mirror image of the Europeans because once the Europeans had discussed some policy, they then stuck with it and said they couldn't change it because they had agreed to it. The United States was not there in some European discussions to have an input and this was particularly annoying on things like the Middle East. They weren't playing a role, but they kept coming in. The French would have a proposal, right in the middle of the time that Henry was trying to negotiate something in the Middle East.

Q: Speaking of the French, how did you view them?

HARTMAN: I've come to the conclusion it's just their domestic politics. They need an outside force to blame things on. They often find themselves in a weak position. They are defending a language which is not spreading around the globe. They feel culturally threatened. I helped to start something called the French-American Foundation and we were constantly having meetings and launching studies to see what lies behind this. What basically lies behind it is a feeling that they have a culture worth protecting and it feels threatened. Going back to Monnet, he felt the only way for France to continue to have a real influence in the world and in Europe was to be the head of Europe, not to be the head of France. By piggy-backing on what was then developing as German power, and hopefully eventually getting the Brits in, he felt that Europe could play much more of a role than France could alone. French interests would be better protected by that kind of larger influence. It sort of came to a head in the first stage of my coming back to Washington because we had the oil crisis. This was one of those things that annoyed the hell out of some Europeans by us calling a major conference in Washington to deal with this. You had Jobert who was the French prime minister at the time. The French were

always playing around in the Middle East with their oil companies. We would take a tough position and suddenly we would find the French out there talking about getting in when we stepped back. This was a sufficiently serious crisis.

Q: This was after the October War?

HARTMAN: It was after the October war. Gas prices were high, there was a great shortage, people were lining up at gas stations. All of the governments began to feel pressure so we called a meeting. We called all of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries but we called it in Washington. This was one of those meetings that had a fantastic cast of characters. Not only did the foreign ministers come but also a very distinguished additional group. I had the job of organizing it, but from a substance point of view Tom Enders organized the interagency U.S. division. The meeting was held. It was a major conference with all the crown heads of Europe.

Q: By the way was Japan included?

HARTMAN: If they were, they didn't play a big role. The big roles were played by the French, the Germans, and the British. They agreed on a document but every once in awhile Jobert would call for a meeting with Kissinger. They would go off and Jobert would say "We can't accept this, it's terrible." In the end the French accepted it. It called for setting up an agency. What the French were trying to avoid was a unified position in the West that would threaten all their friends in the Middle East. So anyway it took a lot of arm twisting, and there is no one better than Henry Kissinger on one side and Tom Enders on the other, to go around and get people lined up. In a way it also showed what State Department leadership could be and how you achieve it. You achieve it by having people in charge in the government who really were in charge and by intellectual effort. Tom Enders certainly had that and he worked very closely with Kissinger. He wasn't so familiar with economics but he certainly knew how to negotiate. We got this common position together, the formation of this organization that was going to coordinate policies to hold back on consumption in all of our countries -- the United States being the most wasteful of the lot; but still a coordinated policy to match up with what OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) was doing successfully for the first time in getting prices fixed. We also had our relationships in the Middle East. We did get a common position but the French said "We won't agree to this because it's called the Washington Conference." So the end result of this whole bloody business was that Jobert agreed the meeting could reconvene in Paris and it would be called the Paris agreement. Almost word for word, almost the exact same thing was agreed there, the French bought on, all the rest of us were ready to buy on but it became the Paris Agreement. The organization was set up as an adjunct to the OECD in Paris. To begin to get some common standards, to begin to have policies that could be put against this monopolization that had taken place through OPEC and it held for quite a while and it got countries to adopt some decent policies.

Q: I just finished interviewing Quincy Lumsden who is an oil expert and was an ambassador in the United Arab Emirates and an Arabist and he worked for them about

five years and just there left quite recently. It is quite active, its dealing with pipe lines and other things are happening. Oil is no longer as important as it was.

HARTMAN: But the International Energy Agency is?

Q: IEA, yes.

HARTMAN: I haven't followed it in years. Again the French tried to lead Europe. This is something Europe should form -- its group. We had no objection to Europe being a single entity in this thing if they wanted it to be but the French didn't want that. It would mean they wouldn't have a representative there. They would only be represented through the European Union

Q: I take it Jobert was a particular problem?

HARTMAN: Yes, a real problem. As someone said later "He had an American wife." He was born in Morocco and I think that colored his life because he never felt accepted by French France. He came from a poor background and also liked theater. When he finally became the foreign minister he found his position was greatly enhanced by portraying himself as the Kissinger foil. He was always doing battle with Henry. My view was that we were responsible for the making of his reputation. He was never much help to us. People like Giscard were a hell of a lot more helpful. He knew more about finance and the real world and he had better connections with the Germans. He was very closely connected with Helmut Schmidt. It was during this period that Giscard formed something called the library group. They were the four finance ministers and kind of the equivalent of the Quadripartite group on Berlin but he saw it as a way for France to have influence on these important economic issues. Of course he was one of the leaders and in Germany he had Helmut Schmidt who equally wanted to have greater influence. He didn't have a stellar character in the United States. Our Secretary of the Treasury went to this meeting and the British didn't have a very strong guy either. It was during that short period when the conservatives were in. This was pre-Thatcher. The library group was the precursor of the group of seven (now the group of eight). Here was a group of people getting together and discussing high economic policies. It created all kinds of resentment among those who were not part of the group. Very much like our Quadripartite group that was supposedly meeting on Berlin but was discussing everything around the world. The French enjoyed that because on one hand it weakened institutions like NATO where people were supposed to have confrontation. The library group as it developed to the group of seven certainly weakened the OECD. OECD never had the kind of political clout that NATO had for coordinating economic policy. It was a useful organization and it did do very good things. The French liked it.

Q: Why was it named the library group?

HARTMAN: Because they met in the library in the Chateau in Vieux. I haven't seen it written up as the precursor of the group of seven. What happened after that was the Italians got furious because they weren't in it. When we said okay to the Italians, we got

the Canadians and then of course the Japanese, who at that time had a major economy in the world. The latest of course is that for political reasons we let the Russian nose under the tent. That whole process became bureaucratized and what the leaders liked particularly was that it was a place for coordination of economic policy. Kissinger built up a strong team so State played a healthy role, even though we didn't have charge of any particular economic policy. Getting coordination with other countries was a very important role which was recognized by domestic agencies. That is how you get into foreign economic policy, you don't get in it because you have a constituency. You get in it because you have the policy clout and intellectual creativity to show those guys how to do things and get international support. That happened very well. Ford had put together a good team around him in the White House so later those things were well coordinated. I think it was at this period that we got an energy secretary. I know Jim Schlesinger was it at one time. When I was sent to Paris in the Carter administration it seems to me he came over. That's the energy story. We were front and center as a department in the development of those policies.

Q: You and your fellow officers in the State Department must have had a good feeling because you and Henry Kissinger were playing a leading role.

HARTMAN: Absolutely. We were never that much a part of the game before or after. Before he left, Acheson's days, and the formation of the Marshall plan. It gradually went into other hands, it was no longer a State Department thing.

Q: Well lets turn to the Soviet Union. *How did we view it? You were assistant secretary from when to when?*

HARTMAN: From '73 to '77. All the time that Henry was the Secretary of State.

Q: During that time, how did we view the Soviet Union? Was it an aggressive power or was it something we were learning to live with?

HARTMAN: In the initial part of the Nixon administration the defense buildup was neglected. Meanwhile the Russians were spending like mad and with their terrible system of allowing the military total control about how weapons were developed they would tell each of these design centers to get them an intercontinental missile. Missiles that have ten warheads, whatever. If more than one of the design centers actually came up with a design that worked, they built both of them. Our people were very concerned at this time that they were moving toward a very strong position and one in which we had to be concerned from a security point of view. One of overwhelming strength. That led to our desire, Henry's desire particularly, to negotiate these reductions in nuclear weapons and putting caps on the specific types of weapons which were most threatening. Obviously the MIRV warhead was one of the more dangerous ones. There was also the moveable weapons that you couldn't pinpoint. With submarines that were moveable, we had ways of knowing where they were and dealing with them, but when they began to get into these bird weapons that could be moved around, it became an even greater threat. At the time Henry was National Security Advisor, some of the first agreements negotiated in

that period were by a team led by ACDA. At that time ACDA was headed by someone who did most of the negotiating.

Q: This is the Arms Control Disarmament Agency?

HARTMAN: Right. But at key times Henry would continue his discussions with Dobrynin and Dobrynin was very smart and would lead Henry to believe that he had a lot more influence than he ever did at home. Sometimes the negotiators were told about their conversations and sometimes not. Henry carried that relationship over to the White House. Dobrynin was still around, Henry would see him from time-to-time and plot out what was going to happen at the next meeting when he would get together with Gromyko. If you read Dobrynin's memoirs they are quite accurate about his influence in Washington and how he was able to do things here. He led people to believe that he was the channel and that he had a lot of influence at home. He certainly communicated and it cut our ambassador in Moscow almost totally out. Al Haig, when he became secretary and I was sent to Moscow, promised me that would not happen.

Q: In the European Bureau you had a very powerful Soviet section. What was their reading on Dobrynin?

HARTMAN: They were very angry about it because half the time they didn't know what the discussions were. Above us you had Hal Sonnenfeldt. He was the Counselor of the department, brought over from the NSC staff and was a Russian expert. Henry brought him into the NSC staff. When Henry came over to the department he appointed Hal Counselor so my relations with Hal were always a little tense but I managed to develop a relationship with him. He and Henry always had a tense relationship. If Hal would get his picture in the newspaper, Henry would be furious. Hal had a way of sticking the needle into Henry. He would come into his office with a bunch of headlines in various newspapers and get Henry's blood pressure up about things that had happened. He did it deliberately as a way of riling him. I used to be furious because I would have some serious things I wanted done and along would come this guy who knew how to work on Henry's paranoia. Our Russian group was out of it and feeling resentful about that. The Moscow embassy was too, Walt Stoessel was there. I tried to keep them informed. When we went there I insisted that they always be part of the thing but to be fair about it the decisions were made by a small group around Henry. He had Dan Roldover, who was an expert on arms control and carried a little computer that worked out all the little things. Then there was Bill Hiland who had a long experience and knowledge of Russian leadership and usually somebody from the CIA playing a minor role, and Hal. When it came to arms control that was the group that discussed things. There was a lot of support from General Scowcroft, who at that time headed the National Security Council. The relationship with Brezhnev was still very much Kissinger. Henry would go to Moscow, first under Nixon, when we had that dreadful meeting which ended up almost in Yalta but was named Orianda which is the next town because nobody wanted to call it Yalta. Brezhnev was very anxious to get Nixon down there, almost as a father figure. He recognized a man who was under great threat and stress and he kind of threw his arm around him which made Henry very angry because they would go off alone and of course

that never should have happened. Al Haig got very upset too. Nothing much happened at the end of the Nixon period, although they were talking about limits and putting the finishing touches on one of the SALT treaties. It picked up again and Ford had several meetings. Brezhnev was in Helsinki. We also had one out in Vladivostok which was a rather bizarre meeting. It took place in a sanitarium north of Vladivostok.

Q: What was that about?

HARTMAN: It was one of the periodic meetings. I guess we had one in Japan so we arranged another meeting with Brezhnev in which some arms control stuff was discussed. Here we were in the frozen waste just north of Vladivostok -- one of Henry's topics was keeping up this running fun game. To be an observer at that was amusing and scary in many ways. He managed to suck these rather peculiar characters into his web. I don't think they gave away positions but at least we got them talking seriously about issues and occasionally reached agreement. There were a variety of discussions that took place on arms control and the other things that were going on. Brezhnev kept saying "Of course you know Vladivostok is a closed city and you can't see it but if we really reach some good agreements I'll let you see Vladivostok." So on our last day -- the airport was north of where we were and Vladivostok was south of where we were -- he took us in a motorcade through Vladivostok and it was very beautiful. Of course, it was at night. It looked a little like Hong Kong because the lights were on mountains and there was a lot of water. We got our tour and then we got on a train which took us up to an airfield where the President's plane was waiting. We later learned that Brezhnev had taken the train across Siberia to get there. I don't know whether it was because of his health or not.

Q: Later, Brezhnev's health was a real problem. By '79 one wondered who was running the show.

HARTMAN: Of course this was the subject of great joking because his doctors had told him to stop smoking. Somebody had made a thing that looked like a multiple re-entry vehicle that had cigarettes in it and he was rationed to taking one out of this thing every once in awhile. While the interpreters worked after he had made a presentation on a subject, he would run out. One time someone from Texas gave him a suitcase that had all kinds of good things in it -- liquor, spurs and all kinds of stuff. He would come back in and while you were trying to listen to the interpretation of what he had said he would be running around in the background showing this stuff. Gromyko would be sitting there stonefaced, not participating in anything. He was the butt of some jokes and didn't enjoy it for obvious reasons. He was the one Henry had to deal with. There was a fellow named Alex Androvsky, who was the middle man and was the political and foreign policy and security advisor to Brezhnev. He was the link to the foreign minister and also with the military. It was interesting who would show up at these meetings. Bill Hiland was good at looking across the table and saying "Why is he here and who is he representing?" We really didn't know too much about who the policy makers were and sometimes the military people would show up in mufti. Security people would show up in mufti also. So picking them out of a crowd was one of Bill's things. I can't remember how many times we went to Moscow. We would meet them at conferences at various places -- Geneva, we

had several meetings with Gromyko -- then we had meetings with Brezhnev when Ford went there. There was a constant stream of meetings during these periods in which arms control always played a major part, also the negotiations on the Helsinki agreement, Middle East because Henry always liked to dangle in front of the Russians the idea that he was involving them. Gromyko was feeling diddled because he knew that Henry wasn't really involving them. People like Mr. Primakoff were wandering around with a KGB hat on. Had very close relations with some of the Arab leaders and was trying to put a spoke in our wheel in the middle of these negotiations. Again Henry played this as theater but there was an undercurrent to the whole thing of how to keep them from playing the spoiler. We didn't have much control over their policy, but by weaning some of these other interests they had in reaching agreements into a discussion, you hope to at least moderate their behavior. There was always one part of these discussions that would have to do with behavior. Behavior was in Central America; behavior in Africa; why are you sending all these Cubans around? If you want to be treated like a world power and somebody who is responsible, not for conflict but for civility, you have to watch your behavior because we notice these things. It was part of communication with a dying regime which I think wanted to have a stable situation because it was the beginning of a transition in their peculiar system which didn't understand transitions very much. It was an interesting theory to observe, and looking back on it it was a theory where a certain amount of stability was built into the relationship with lots of attacks from the right wing of the United States and a little bit from the left wing too, that we were neglecting human rights. It was worthwhile at a time when worse people could have taken over. In the end what determined the transition in Russia was the fact there were at least a few in the next generation coming along, but led by Andropov of the older generation, who understood their basic position was weak. Weak because they spent too much on arms; weak because they never built a civilian economy and didn't know how; and the communist system just wasn't meeting the kind of standards the rest of the world was beginning to share.

Q: Speaking of weakness, this was at a time when our Vietnam effort went down the tubes. Did this affect our relationship with the Soviets?

HARTMAN: It did, but in a funny way, not as much as you might have thought. When Nixon ordered the bombing of Hanoi while the Russian delegation led by Kosygin was there, a lot of people would have thought that was almost a *casus belli* -- what he had just done. Of course the Russians were putting stuff in there and that was the only way the Vietnamese could keep going. Again Henry told Nixon the idea of opening up to the Chinese was the recognition that there were possibilities of different policies on the part of those two powers. A recognition contrary to Dulles' belief that the Vietnamese were somehow in the Chinese pocket. The Vietnamese hated the Chinese and there was never a question of their getting in their pocket with wars along their border. The Chinese helped to a certain extent in what was going on there but it was really the Russians. It played a role and made the Kissinger experience difficult. How do you continue to talk to these folks that you know are the principle suppliers of the people who are beating your brains out on the other side. That showed in the end we would not be able to win so the negotiations started with some Russian participation.

Q: I thought we would cut off at this point and move on to Paris. One question -- what about Canadian-American relations?

HARTMAN: By the time I got there it was the Bureau for Canadian and European Affairs and we began to make some serious progress. We set up these joint commissions that dealt with difficult border, water, and fishing issues. The Canadians put some really first class people on those commissions. We didn't for awhile. They did good work. They had, for example, the former justice of one of their high courts. He did a bang-up job running one of these commissions. Congress was very active because these were heavily political issues in the states along the border or states that had similar interests. Trudeau was the prime minister. I think it was Henry's view for some reason that Trudeau was also trying to be an international statesman and would occasionally take positions that were not quite the same as Henry's. There was always an element, like the French, of "how do you distinguish yourself from those Americans to have a Canadian policy." There was also the fact that Canada was not unified -- they had this split between the French speaking and the English speaking. Their federation was vulnerable and playing in the middle of it was something the American government didn't control but was American cultural imperialism just by virtue of our weight south of the border. The fact was that the border was permeable and television programs were shown on both sides.

Q: Something like 95% of the population was within 100 miles of the American border.

HARTMAN: Absolutely and you could feel a certain amount of sympathy but there wasn't a hell of a lot you could do about it. We formed some special commissions, had to twist Henry's arm to go up there. I can't remember when there was a presidential visit. Finally getting them into the group of seven was a real help. Then they had a way of participating as full members and were there with the top level table. They also played significant roles in some difficult places where they were able to furnish troops. I'm thinking of some of the situations in Africa. One of the things that annoyed Americans, Trudeau was all for having a good relationship with Cuba. That was one of the ways they distinguished themselves from us. In the end, we would have made more progress if we had a Canadian-type policy towards Cuba because we would have gotten at the Cuban society in ways that would have been antithetical to keeping old Castro in power. That was the experience in Eastern Europe -- the more Western influence that penetrated those countries with knowledge, communication, radio and television the weaker the regime. With Communism not as able to be any kind of a draw because they couldn't run an economy, historians can argue over whose policies were better. But we had wonderful meetings up there including one where Henry spoke in front of an open mike that he didn't know was open. The Canadian newspapers were great ones for scandal sheets -- they would pick up anything and use it. That was their way of defining themselves as independent spokespersons. Anything they could find to beat us up with, they would use it. Through it all was this question of how were they going to maintain any kind of Canadian content in publications. They would pass a law and we didn't like it. Time Magazine didn't like it because it was restricting their ability to get up there. I remember lots of meetings in which we discussed how to deal with these situations in Canada and our guys didn't want to take us out of any of the political "givins" across the border. I had

good friends in the alliance I used to go up to visit.

Q: This is probably a good place to stop. After you return from France we will pick up "going to France" since this is '77 and we need to see how things went.

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Today is the 28th of November 2000 so it has been sometime since we have done this. You are off to France but how did you get the appointment -- 1977 was it?

HARTMAN: Yes, it was the beginning of the Carter administration and Cy Vance, who was an old friend, was appointed Secretary of State. He had a transition office on the ground floor of the State Department, and he called me down. I was assistant secretary for Europe, and he said "Art, this administration is not going to keep anybody who worked for Henry Kissinger, so I'm afraid you're going to have to move on to something else." I said I had expected to move. He said "How would you like to go to Paris?" It took me about two seconds to say, "Well, that's a nice offer for a career officer." Very few career officers had gone there. There was Jefferson Caffery in the old days. There was bold Ambassador Dunn. There was Charles Bohlen. That was it for career people in Paris, so I was delighted. I was sworn in by my predecessor who, by that time, had come back to be the Deputy Secretary, the man who had been Richard Nixon's law professor, Ken Rush. He had been ambassador in Germany. There must have been a period of transition. I was assistant secretary -- must have been a long time while they were approving a lot of people -- because I remember in the spring giving a press conference with Zbigniew Brzezinski and others about the system they were going to install. It was going to be so different from Kissinger's system. He was making a lot of claims for how this was going to be objective and the president would get good advice and he would be a totally neutral national security advisor, wouldn't interfere with cabinet officers. I expressed some skepticism and said, "You've got the new boys and I guess I represent the old boys and pardon me for being skeptical that this system is going to work exactly as it has been portrayed." I was around there through the spring.

Q: Were you feeling the beginning of Brzezinski trying to emulate Kissinger?

HARTMAN: I got very suspicious because one of Zbigniew Brzezinski early statements was that "Unlike Kissinger they weren't going to pay as much attention -- totally preoccupied -- with the Russian relationship." My thought was that I would want to see that day since they happened to be our principle enemy at that point. He said a number of other things that meant his primary objective was to be different and not be accused of being like Henry. Henry was larger than life.

END TAPE 7, SIDE A

It was quickly apparent that Carter was a detail man. I think much of his policy sense was good, but he never distinguished between setting a strategic goal and making sure everybody followed that and immediately getting his hands dirty in the details of policy.

One thing in that period that disturbed me was the anti nuclear -- here was a guy who had been a nuclear engineer -- and yet he had people around him who were against nuclear power. Even at that time I felt strongly about the cleanliness of nuclear power. There were obvious problems about what you do with the leftover stuff and it was also an interim solution to the energy problem. We had been talking at the energy conference about what was going to happen. It was clear to me we needed an alternative to oil; you needed an alternative to burning all this stuff that was dirtying up the atmosphere. That administration came in with some of these ideological views and although I am more in sympathy with democrats, even though I am an independent, that disturbed me. Ideology had no place in making decisions on this kind of stuff. I was around through that spring and there was a NATO heads of government meeting I went to in London. That was Jimmy Carter's first big play in the diplomatic world.

Q: What was your impression of him? The people in NATO were sizing this new guy up.

HARTMAN: I think unfairly. I'll get to that when I talk about his visits to France. During that period when I was still around as assistant secretary, there were a number of things that were taking place and of course it was a time when the rest of the world was making comparisons. Henry Kissinger and how he did things and the sort of contacts they had with him, and Jimmy Carter, who was a very different fellow, and Cy Vance who was particularly different. Cy was a man who was much more deliberate; he was a lawyer. Much more deliberate in the way he said things. Later I would come back to Washington, or meet Cy in Paris, and he could never believe that Brzezinski was undercutting him. He said, "But we used to have Thanksgiving together." And I said, "Come on Cy, that is not the way you judge bureaucrats in this town." In my mind the best national security adviser that has ever been in that job is Brent Scowcroft. I always had the feeling that Brent was truly neutral in trying to get all the points of view to the president. He would lay out eventually his own view but it was always very clear that he was presenting everybody's view and doing it well. I had trouble with other national security advisors.

Q: Were you feeling the fine hand of Brzezinski while you were assistant secretary? Was it and his staff beginning to intrude?

HARTMAN: He built up a very competent staff. They began to do policy papers. The policies differed quite considerably from the ones we had been following. Sooner rather than later, President Carter, Brzezinski and the others really decided they had to have a relationship with the allies. This was going to mean they would have to deal with them seriously, and not have a confrontational relationship. Now I have reached the stage where I don't remember all the details of all the issues. There were nuclear issues, issues of putting weapons in place in Europe as an answer to the challenge of what the Russians were doing.

Q: There was the SS 20 versus the Pershing?

HARTMAN: There was that. Maybe it was unfair, but it certainly was strongly felt by both Giscard and particularly by Helmut Schmidt that the Carter administration would

push them in a certain direction and then back off and leave them hanging politically. Schmidt particularly felt this in a couple of issues where he had really fought against views in Germany that were against what we wanted to do. This was on the nuclear problem.

Q: It was on the nuclear neutron bomb.

HARTMAN: It was certainly on that. But what they felt was that once committed, Carter should have stayed with it. Otherwise they were going to be hanging out to dry in front of their public and he didn't have enough concern about their political position, once a decision was there, and perhaps they didn't have the same kind of input they felt they had in the previous administration. Henry would always make jokes about the Europeans -- who should I call when I'm over there, where do they speak with one voice -- so in reality one can't say that he took them as seriously as he should have. I was arguing at the time that they should be taken more seriously even though they didn't appear to be totally united. I had more sympathy with them and I thought some of the positions they were taking were not that bad. There were times when I thought we should be pushing them.

Q: When you were still assistant secretary, were you getting the feeling that Jimmy Carter was very much his own man? I don't mean this in the nicest sense possible. He was very comfortable with himself once he made up his mind.

HARTMAN: Yes, particularly on details. Over a period of time he did develop a strategic view and I'm sure Zbigniew Brzezinski helped him with that. I think it was a question of how one goes about governing with objectives rather than details. When you preoccupy yourself with details you very often get into this policy bind where other people are merrily going down a road that they think you are pointing in the direction of and suddenly you switch because you see another detail that should be taken care of. I have a sympathy for countries outside the United States who are trying, in their way, because it is in their interest to have a close allied relationship with the United States, to follow things. So much happens in Washington on policy prior to our consulting with outside powers. There is a congressional debate. People put amendments on legislation. The president has to make a deal with some people on the hill or he gets into a fight politically with them. So U.S. policy begins to get entrenched. Then we go out to everybody else and say "Well, we would like to consult with you fellows about this policy but we are very much imbedded." And they would have seen it in our newspapers.

Q: Still sticking to the assistant secretary period. How did you feel about the Germans, French and the British -- their embassies were playing the policy game in getting to congress and the NSC -- not really by-passing the State Department?

HARTMAN: It is very difficult to tell. You would have to see their dispatches to know and you would have to know how much credence their leaders put into their dispatches. The most successful ambassadors I've seen in Washington are a couple of the British ambassadors who came. They were sent because they could establish a relationship with the president of the United States. This happened in the Kennedy period and a couple of

other periods where they were very successful. Obviously language played a role. I remember a Frenchman, Hervé Alphand, who also managed to get a good relationship with the president. The Germans have had several good ambassadors. The Germans were also very good at another thing. First of all they put a lot of money into developing a relationship outside the government in the United States. The German Marshall Fund is today's outgrowth of those efforts. They used to bring parliamentarians and Lander presidents. There was a constant stream of visitors from Germany who met with our legislators and were taken seriously. I can't remember a French delegation ever being taken that seriously, and I don't remember many British parliamentarians except those of the well known ministers who would come to Washington. So the Germans have been successful in that way of getting their point of view across and presumably when they went home they also had a better picture of what was going on in Washington. That never overcame the disappointments of a man like Schmidt who felt keenly that the Carter presidency had somehow been part of his downfall -- that it had undermined his authority. Giscard d'Estaing didn't have the same problem because the French always kept rather aloof from the issues that the United States was most interested in. Giscard, I think, shared Schmidt's view of Carter and had a number of arguments with us and the president about certain specific policies. Early that summer I was on a trip in Europe and we decided (my wife came over) to have a look at the house. I remembered that house as a place where I had my office years before, facing the garden. When I went through the house this time I discovered it was now an upstairs bathroom. I remember that office very well because I was working with David Bruce at the time and he was the representative to the European Army Conference and to the Coal and Steel Community and he had his headquarters in there. We were there for a couple of years while the French messed around with the ratification of that treaty. So that house had a familiar feel to it. My wife was very anxious to come over and see it. Then she went around to museums in the U.S. collecting the art that would go on the walls. The museums were very good about loaning art. We went right to the director, and there was a system in the department for taking that art and making sure it was properly cared for. Both in Paris and later in Moscow the museums were very good to us about that.

Q; How about confirmation? Any problems?

HARTMAN: No. Ken Rush left the embassy as soon as the election was over so he was out of there in January. There was a Charge from January until I arrived in the summer. There were five of us who came up. Several senators spoke in my behalf. I don't remember any serious questioning. There may have been something about Cyprus. If Senator Sarbanes from Maryland, who is of Greek descent, was there I'm sure he asked me something. Senator Matthias was on the committee. I stayed on as assistant secretary because there were these meetings. I think that London meeting of the NATO heads of state was something that intervened and therefore I didn't take over in France until that was finished. We slept one night in the embassy, in the ambassador's bedroom, and I remember there was a thumping noise and we finally determined it was a rock band playing. The walls were shaking and I asked if something was going on downstairs and got a no. We were next door to the British embassy but I couldn't believe it was coming from there; it sounded like we were next to a discotheque. I later found out it was

Commonwealth Day and the British had a big party and a dance. I mentioned this to my British colleague after I arrived and he said "How do you think we feel, we were over it the whole time." I got there in '77 and stayed until '81. I presented my credentials to Giscard, who is a very stiff necked guy. One of his peculiarities was that he tried to establish a kind of imperial -- I think he felt the French people liked having an imperial whatever around its president. That common man democracy was not in order. That was another thing he held against Jimmy Carter. Carter was a great one for being "Mr. Ordinary Fellow," he would carry his suitcases, he wore a raincoat that was very ordinary. I remember when he and Giscard went to visit the Normandy beaches. It was raining and misting, but Giscard had no overcoat on and here was Jimmy Carter in his raincoat. Giscard was a nose in the air fellow. He used to claim his descendants from Admiral d'Estaing.

Q: Or the battle of the Chesapeake.

HARTMAN: In the revolutionary war he was the commander of the fleet. Historians in France have made a joke of that because there was no connection whatsoever. His father was a business man and not from any kind of royal or imperial family. One of his peculiarities was when you went to a dinner -- and this was true when I called on him after he had left the presidency -- in his own apartment he was served first. It only happened with the kings of France. When he came in it was always last. After all the guests were there and had been circulating, a door would open and he would come in. Another personal thing -- for years I tried to get him to come to the house. I genuinely thought that ambassadors should entertain. Before I had gone to Paris, Isaac Stern, an old friend of mine, said "I'll go to France and would be happy to perform at your house but you have to use me for some purpose. If you want the president of France to come, I would be happy to be the fellow that draws." Sure enough I got Isaac to promise to come and play at the house and invited Giscard. Never heard for days and then my wife got a call from Madame Giscard saying she hadn't known about this invitation at all, thought it was terrible it hadn't been replied to, and said she was coming even if he didn't. Sort of accepting for both. We said fine and gave her the details. That afternoon I got a call from Giscard's chief of staff and he said, "Art, the president is a little concerned. Is this going to be some kind of a demonstration." I asked what he was talking about. He said, "We know Isaac Stern and we know how friendly he is with Israel. Is he going to make a speech about French policy on Israel?" I said, "What are you thinking about? This is an invitation to come here and play. It's going to be a lovely evening and not a political evening in any sense of the word." I never found out for sure, but I knew Giscard was probably standing over him while he made that call. They came and it was a lovely evening and Stern played on the violin that Isaac had created a piece for the violin on, like The Bishop's Ring. Here he was playing a piece created by a French composer and it was a wonderful evening. There were about 150 people there. Let me say something else about France. I talked to a number of people before going there and had made up my own mind watching how things work. It is very difficult for an American ambassador to have really great influence on Washington policy. It is an odd time when you do. I found in Russia that I had to come back to Washington to have any influence, but it is the sort of thing you have to do in your own way and establish your own contacts. I thought the

thing I could do, looking at French society in general, would be to really try to get into the intellectual elite that governs that country. It is an elite that is intellectual in their own sense -- it is interest in music, literature, the history of France and most of all it is interest in talking. They love to talk, and talk. So I thought that was a proper use of the house -- having these people come in and having attractive things that could be brought in from America to get a French audience in and build up a reputation that there is an American interest in culture.

Q: In the United States you have the talking heads who are the commentators. In Britain you have the chattering class. You have the intellectuals in France. They are very important.

HARTMAN: Everybody takes an interest in the latest book prize. The language is something they all try to protect. It is a losing battle because English is more and more used internationally. The French are the ones who feel most strongly under threat from the English language because they try to protect their language and its use in various international fora. Getting in with that group and convincing them there was somebody representing the United States who had an interest in their culture, who had an interest in bringing American culture, which they might mistake for McDonalds and common public culture and dismiss. Yet when you talk to Frenchmen, they are interested in jazz and movies so there are conflicts between those who take our culture seriously every day and the intellectuals who fear it is coming in and destroying something which is purely French. The other thing we determined to do was to get around the country because the regions are quite different and the sources of political power of various people in Paris comes a lot from their roots in the provinces.

Q: People in the Chamber are often heirs.

HARTMAN: They had what they call multiple functions. They were mayors, and deputy mayor was the common title of practically everybody which meant they were deputy in the parliament not an underling of the mayor. Deputy in the parliament and mayor of a city somewhere. The thing that was also apparent, this was the fifth republic in France, was the parliament didn't have that much power. It was the government that got itself elected and had a majority and was able to rule. The president was elected for a period of five years and he was able, particularly when he had his own party, being de Gaullist and UDF which is a right of center coalition of groups to achieve the things he wanted. Giscard governed for a number of years with that kind of a coalition. He also had to govern at one point with a socialist majority in the parliament and that created a difficulty for him. Mitterrand later had it also -- cohabitation. Almost the whole time I was there Giscard was the president of France. I think I mentioned earlier that when I was assistant secretary we had this Quadripartite group. That was always annoying to the Italians and others who felt left out. It gradually got expanded to the group of seven. But it was Giscard and Schmidt who invented the group of four and they invented it when they were finance ministers together. I think it was called the library group originally. That was the name of the library in the Loire where they met in one of the chateaus. It was the American secretary of treasury, the French minister of finance, the German minister of

finance and the British minister of finance. This was something the president of France, now the top of his government, wanted to continue. Yes, we were happy to do it so we wouldn't get the Italians and Canadians mad at us. We thought maybe that was an institution that could get some things done, whereas NATO was now more cumbersome with so many more members. There were meetings of the four. One of the meetings I attended with President Ford before I went to France was in Martinique, in the Caribbean. That kind of relationship, particularly with Giscard's imperial point of view, and recognizing also it had been de Gaulle who had originally suggested an inner group. But he didn't want the Germans involved. He wanted the British, Americans and the French to be a kind of guiding spirit in any organization that was formed which gave France a more prominent position. He thought they could influence American policy more directly. So Giscard was interested in this inner circle at the same time he asserted leadership within the European group. In other words, France as the inspiration for greater things in the European group. France was the closest ally to Germany which gave them authority because Germans generally followed French policy when the French laid down the law to them. The Germans always wanted to keep that close relationship. They often followed French policy even when they had doubts about it, particularly if there was a conflict between following the French and being with the Americans. Giscard liked the idea of these get-togethers where he and I would meet with Schmidt, the chancellor of Germany. He came from the finance side; there were a lot of economic issues; they were the guys that guided policy within the European Union which was moving toward greater integration. One of the myths in French politics is that the Americans always objected to this. Having been one of the ones who was part of the team that supported integration and even fostered it to begin with, I could go to a French audience or anybody in France who came up with this idea and say "Wait a minute, the Americans practically invented this and we pushed for integration, we built it into the Marshall Plan and we supported you in the European army long after a lot of people thought we should go for just getting Germany into NATO."

Each time there was greater integration economically in Europe our major fear was trade discrimination. Each time we would suggest a GATT negotiation to lower the trade barriers. That had pretty much worked except in the field of agriculture. The United States was never satisfied that the GATT negotiations treated agriculture as it should be treated in keeping open the European market. For example, we had almost a monopoly on soy beans which was the great feed for animals. They probably regret now that they switched to another kind of feed which caused mad cow disease. American soy beans were the basic feed for animals in Europe, and we had a tremendous trade at zero duty. The French kept trying to eat away at that. The Common Agricultural Policy was essentially a French construction which was designed to favor French agriculture which was higher costs. The common agricultural policy of the European Union subsidized French agriculture, subsidized the exports of European agricultural products not just French. The Germans went along with it because they had a population of farmers that came from East Germany and there were uneconomic small farms in Germany. Although they made speeches about how uneconomic the common agricultural policy was, they basically supported it because it met their political need. These were constant things that were going on in the time I was in Paris where we had difficulties with the French. While

the negotiations were going on in Geneva or in Brussels, we would get our point of view across, not just to the government. I would have interviews with press people, I would talk to politicians and try and get a view across which was not the view of the political methodology in France: the United States was just out to dominate them; we were unfairly using our trade position. We had some bad trade positions and I admitted those, but I had to publicly argue that basically we were in favor of a more liberal trade regime in the world. Frenchmen had to get away from some of their protectionism which they gradually did.

Q: How would this protectionism fit in with dealing with the intellectual class?

HARTMAN: In different ways. The so called intellectual class is not a unified class, for the most part it is quite leftist so it starts off with a basic anti American bias which at that time was political. While I was there a change was taking place. Young philosophers came along who for the first time made a dent in the overall Marxist outline of the French intellectual classes which came from the Saar. All the people the intellectuals revered in their universities were all leftist. They were all Marxist with a sort of French variety of Marxism and a heavy communist party. The greatest shock to them was the beginning of the downfall of regimes in Eastern Europe where Marxism was getting a bad name.

Q: Czechoslovakia in '48 and '68 —

HARTMAN: There was a German rebellion, Hungarian and the Polish at various times, and all of these things were debated within the French intellectual class, but the shockers didn't come until later. They still revere Sartre. Sartre was the greatest apologist for Stalin and many of them don't understand what an evil regime that was. There were several Frenchmen who did and they began leading this rightward shift of the French intellectual classes, particularly in philosophy. Philosophy is a broad name for a whole line of French thought. This goes toward rather anti capitalist results. You can see it today in the works of this guy who attacked McDonalds. Meanwhile, France has become very capitalistic. It has invested a lot of money in the United States. The United States has a lot of investments in France and the operation of the system became much more open than the intellectuals ever thought it should be. Still, there are great differences. They protect their environment. Their schooling system is quite leftish in the sense that the teachers are almost all from a left wing background. They instill in the youngsters this idea that the state has to say this and direct that. It comes straight from the Napoleonic times. The combination of centralization in the French system and this kind of leftish intellectual thought -- even de Gaulle took advantage of it and made a very strong central government which argued very much with the economic basis of Marxism. He had a few advisors around him who realized they couldn't follow a purely Marxist policy. On the economic side it was much more open and free and the relationship with the Germans was interesting because the Germans kept them honest. They had to compete with the Germans and therefore they couldn't have that kind of structure that held them in an inferior position. Although the Germans also went in the direction of building in these tremendous social charges and putting unions on company boards. The French and the Germans both have a problem now of how they reform their system to get rid of a lot of

this stuff that clogs up and causes a tremendous burden on the taxpayer. Their tax rates are very high. So far they have accepted that. As they get to be more competitive in an open world system they are going to have to deal with these problems.

Q; Did you see any impact on the going to the United States of young college graduates? Like going for a year to Harvard Business School or just going on trips. Was this beginning to penetrate?

HARTMAN: Yes, I think the new generation that came along was a very different group of people. I think in the post-war period a lot of what we see now of the extreme right wing was small shop-keeper kind of stuff. Today France has an economy that is dominated by what they call hypermarket which is even bigger than Target or one of the groups in this country. In fact they own some of the biggest mall shopping areas in this country. That whole way of life of small shops and small towns hasn't disappeared yet. The small shops keep going in the small towns despite the fact that on the outskirts of town they have these bigger shops. The problem that began to appear while I was there was a "brain drain" particularly in the high tech areas. Many young Frenchmen who want to get ahead have gone to the States and are now part of the American corporate structure and some are the leaders. They are well trained in science and math and linguistics and they get ahead. Maybe it is a contrast with our educational system which is not producing as well as it should. More and more you see these people who have been educated outside the United States, including Russia. It doesn't have a liberal education system but it does teach them how to use their own language and how to use math and physics. They have become much in demand as you move into a high tech structure. Some of those young Frenchmen are coming back to France today, but at the time we were there there was also a feeling among the young people against the nationalized enterprises. Toward the end of the period I was there, Mitterrand won the election for president and he came in with a raft of nationalizations. He took over the Socialist Party when Guy Mollet, who had been head of the Socialist Party, was discredited.

Q: This is tape 8, side one with Arthur Hartman.

HARTMAN: Mitterrand, with great astute leadership, and I must say not much in the way of intellectual consistency, played the field. He came in and there was a wave of nationalization and the rest of the time he spent in power he denationalized. It became evident there was no way they could continue to support this kind of nationalized enterprise. They sold off a lot and that helped the French treasury and made them more competitive in fields they needed to be competitive in, with the United States, Germany and England. I remember during our period one of the griefs that Giscard had with us was our position on nuclear energy. France by that time had moved up to 60% or 70% of its electricity from nuclear power. Yet coming out of the United States, also coming out of Germany, were these doubts being expressed about nuclear energy and countries like Sweden voting nationally to get rid of all nuclear power. Nobody talking about how to cut back on the gases in the atmosphere using nuclear energy and what seriously do you do to get rid of the problem of what is left after you use nuclear material. That was the principal fear that people had. The French were way ahead on that -- they created a

reprocessing plant, which today is under attack by Green Peace and others. But at least they tried to deal with the problem of what to do with nuclear waste. The French always had a much longer range view of this kind of nuclear power. I remember having talks with their minister of science and nuclear energy -- it was all under one man. He said "What we are talking about is maybe a 100 year period. After that somebody is going to find out how to use hydrogen. That means you can use sea water to produce energy; hydrogen energy will be clean; there will be other ways so we are talking about this period during which you want to cut back on the use of coal and oil which is not only wasteful of the chemicals you can get out of those things and use in industry, but it is also doing something to destroy the atmosphere." The big problem was going to be in China and India where they were burning coal. Here centralization played very much to France's advantage because virtually unhindered they built up a nuclear industry. There was very little French public outcry. There were no greens there at that time but now there are greens -- that was a disease they caught from the Germans. They were able without too much trouble to get these plants built around the country with public confidence in them. By virtue of the centralization they had well trained people running them. They had a single system instead of a variety of nuclear plants. They had one system which was the American system, the old Westinghouse system, and there was a greater level of public confidence in how the system was run and its safety. Now it is beginning to breakdown because of a couple of incidents -- not serious ones -- but the French public was much more accepting of that kind of thing. During the time I was there, there was a lot of discussion about France's relationship with Africa. Again there is a mythology in French politics that the Americans somehow wanted to take over their position in Africa. There was nobody in the United States, with the exception of a few in the black community, who gave a damn about Africa. In fact we neglected Africa as has become very apparent in more recent times. The thought that somehow or other we were trying to push France out of all these positions is crazy. The French tried to protect their economic position in every one of these countries. Giscard himself got into trouble because he received some jewels at one point from the emperor of the Central African Republic (a thoroughly bad guy). It is now becoming apparent that most of the top French politicians had their hand in African policy somehow, and in a bad and very corrupt way. The result was that these regimes were also quite corrupt. Some of them were headed by very strong people. In the case of, say, the Cote d'Ivoire, the Ivory Coast, there was a wonderful man who kept things together, Houphouët-Boigny. He was a great French poet and wrote in French and was loved. At the same time their successors discovered the thing was not held together by strong democratic roots. The evidence of that is now being seen all over Africa. So we had some clashes on African policy. We had clashes on Middle Eastern policy.

Q: What does an ambassador do? Here you are representing a powerful country in another country where we often have disputes. What did you do -- say an African policy or a Middle East policy -- how would you deal with it?

HARTMAN: First of all I would talk to the French government and try to get rid of any idea they had that we were behind something. The French always thought we were trying to push them out of Algeria. A lot of their problems in Algeria came from America by

covert action. Part of this comes from the fact that John Kennedy, when he was a senator, took a trip to Algeria and spoke out for the democratic process and independence for Algeria. You could find American politicians talking about independence for these countries, and the French took that to mean that our whole government was concentrated on doing something in those areas and this just wasn't true. There was an underlying cooperation though on approaches to Russia. Sometimes it didn't appear in public policy statements because the French were always trying to show a difference between their public position and their private one which was rather closer to our position than they would ever admit publicly. This came to a head at one point when Giscard, under the influence of a communist head of a very large food producing organization in Southwest France, known as the Red Capitalist, was pushing to differentiate France from the United States. Giscard had as one of his principle advisors this descendent of Polish parents of an aristocratic variety, Poniatowski.

Q: Poniatowski was a general in Napoleon's army.

HARTMAN: Exactly. Again Giscard's friends were people who had this air of being aristocratic and he listened to this guy. Using the plane of this red capitalist, he worked up a trip to see some Russians officials to arrange a visit between Giscard and Brezhnev at a time when there was a lot of tension in our relationship. It seemed to me that statements were being made by Giscard and others high up in the government saying France was in the middle. That it didn't have a strong position about democracy or connections with the west but it was kind of playing an intermediate role. I made a public speech in which I said "At some point France has to choose sides. What are we fighting?" Giscard took great offense and I got a call from the same director general in the Elysee saying "Art, what are you up to? That is an attack on what our president is trying to do." I said "He deserves it." Much later, many years later, when Giscard was well out of office, he admitted the greatest mistake he made during that period was this effort to somehow -- it was on Afghanistan at that time when we were being very vocal about what was going on in Afghanistan.

Q: This was December '79 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

HARTMAN: And he was trying to play middle man and also there was a lot of tension in Poland at that time so arranging this meeting in Warsaw would have blessed the Polish communist strongman, Jaruzelski. From all points of view it was the wrong thing to do. I had a great friend who at that time was secretary general of the Quai d'Orsay the French Ministry –

Q: Secretary General being the top foreign service officer?

HARTMAN: This guy was very knowledgeable. He had been their expert on Russia many years, and with winks and nods he said "Right on." They had been very much against this whole thing. It was the White House equivalent Elysees playing its own game in foreign affairs without consulting the experts.

Q: Did you have the feeling there is something within the French psyche that has to tweak the nose of the Americans?

HARTMAN: It isn't the psyche so much as this business of protecting the language, feeling under threat from that respect, dealing with a major industrial power that seems to be wanting to come in and dominate their structures. A much more modern economy which could out compete many of their old industries. They could never believe the Marshall Plan was totally neutral. That it built up its basic infrastructure or that it gave assistance. There is a kind of rethink of policy for that period now. You find French historians today saying, "Oh, well, we didn't get much from the Marshall Plan because the Americans were pushing us to hold on in Vietnam and we put as much money into Vietnam as the Americans gave us in the Marshall Plan aid." It is almost true, but the kind of aid we gave France went into basic infrastructure, which really got them back on their feet and trained a lot of their people. It did a lot for the French economy but was somehow drained off because it is true there was a time in the '50s when we were encouraging them to stay in Vietnam. That kind of "anti Americanism" you have to put against the fact they are in love with parts of American culture. One of the experiences we had in Paris was we became very friendly with a young singer, Jessye Norman, and she was idealized by the French public. For one thing she had a French teacher and she pronounced French better than any French singer did. It was that way too with Leonard Bernstein. It was because of his musicianship and his modernism. That was the thing that got France out of a kind of trough where everything that was French was creative. It kind of ended in 1910. They had very little influence after that. But they had made great contributions prior to that. Their art, the New York school -- La Bobo, which was the museum that was built in honor of Pompidou after he died but became the museum of modern art in Paris and filled with American stuff. I would say some of it was not great quality. The great artists of that period -- Jackson Pollack, the fellow who did all the flags, Jasper Johns -- all the names you can think of were the ones the French thought of as being the great artists of that period. The post war was dominated by American artists, many of which came from the New York school. Not much in the way of American literature came over, although they did like some of the current leaders like Norman Mahler, and Roth. By and large they looked down their nose at American popular culture. They enjoyed the movies but felt they were dominated by bad influences and that they were bad influences on their children.

Q: How would this translate when you were having the intellectual groups over to your house?

HARTMAN: We would have these discussions. There was another group of people in France who were very pro-American and they were usually older people. We tried to get into this younger, newer, less Marxist intellectual class. There were a number of them around. People like Foure, who taught half a year at the University of Chicago and half a year in France and had a lot to do with the rethinking of French history from the revolution on. A lot of what was left in France, and the Marxists took, was the French revolution. They completely changed its basis to modernize it and justify their position of the Marxist view of how society should be organized. The other thing is the

unquestioning deification of Napoleon. We went to a dinner at the French Prime Minister's house in which he invited a descendant of Napoleon and put him in the place of honor where he was the host. It was so astonishing to us. I think the British Ambassador was there. We looked at this and said, "Can we really believe what we are seeing?" This was Raymond Barre, a totally modern man and wonderful economist. There he was (I think under the influence of his very Hungarian wife who also had ambitions in the imperial field). The thought that Napoleon, who had killed millions of people in Europe and Frenchmen by the thousands, and then abandoned his troops as he came back, still is held in a godlike position in that country. There are books by American and British authors that really have taken on the myth of Napoleon. They honor him for the giving of the law and they think the civil law code is the greatest thing since sliced bread even though it denies people a certain amount of rights under current ethics. The fantastic bringing in to France of all the treasures. Our capitalists have done the same thing, but Napoleon's imprint on France is something that for an outsider, particularly anyone who reads any of the stories of what he did and the way he led France into these slaughters, not only slaughters of Frenchmen but slaughters of Europeans of all varieties. When you talk to Frenchmen about this they say, "You are just applying modern concepts, this is the way the world was in those days and he did great things."

Q: I think it was Margaret Thatcher who made the remark in the 1989 celebration of the 200th anniversary, "I don't know why we are celebrating this, it brought nothing but doom and disaster to the French for 15 or 20 years."

HARTMAN: Another thing that never happened in France was a Margaret Thatcher. Margaret Thatcher broke the British Unions and helped the Labor Party move into a modern position. People had hoped that Mitterrand would do the same thing. Having taken over the Socialist Party, bringing the Communists into the government, which he did, that somehow or other he would double-cross all of them and enable the modernization to take place. In a sense that happened with denationalization, but he never really got at the problem of the tremendous number of French bureaucrats on the French payroll -- from teachers to transportation to electricity -- the unions still control those major aspects of French economic society so that it is very difficult to see how reform is going to take place.

Q: I remember seeing on French T.V. about the breakdown of the income tax offices, which are small offices throughout the place which add enormous expense to the payroll but they are in every little town.

HARTMAN: Living in a little town in the summer there, it has it's own post office and it has its own delivery every day including Saturday. You get used to this and you can see why it is difficult to get rid of it. The French like having the service which gives them something. I sit on the board of something called the French-American Foundation now which tries to be a means of communication between the two societies. One thing we try to do is bring to America something the French really do right which is early education. They really do this right. They start before the child is born and give mothers special treatment. Children are treated more healthily, they then are given free access to

preschool, then school. It is a much better system in terms of a social approach to a healthy young population. Later it gets into the schools where it puts on blinders and their education leaves a lot to be desired. That kind of communication is what I find interesting to do. We use the house a lot for bringing in people who can talk about these things. For example, we have a good friend who is an architect and he introduced us to a number of architects and there was also an architectural prize in Paris. We would find out about things like that. Someone was going to get a prize, in this case it was an Irishman who was also an American citizen. We used him by bringing him to the house and gave him time to talk and show his efforts. I later brought him to Moscow. This is Kevin Roach. He could show what he was doing and it knocked the French out because it was so modern in the sense that it fit a desire and need in the society. We used musicians, we used architects, we gave prizes where the French were honoring Arthur Rubinstein. We invited all our musician friends to come, French musicians as well as American musicians, and Daniel Barenboim, who was leading a French orchestra, came. Also, French composers were honored. There was a man who had received the Nobel Prize in medicine, and we had a dinner honoring him. Something else I should say, again I thank Larry Eagleburger. I was a not rich career officer going to Paris. It was still a time when you could have funds that were unaccounted at the State Department that the Undersecretary for Management had control over. They were used for entertaining at the State Department and things like that. Larry gave me an allocation. There was no way I could have done the things I did in Paris without the allocation he gave me. I would justify and voucher these things back to them, but it enabled me to entertain. For entertaining, a lot of people think you have a bunch of cocktail parties. No way. Each one of these dinners and receptions had a purpose and the purpose was to get into that level of society where you have the governing class. I've always been thankful to Larry for having done that. The other interesting thing that was done in this period -- Cy Vance's best friend had been the dean of the law school at Yale and went to London as ambassador. He got in touch with me, with Richard Gardner who was our ambassador in Rome at that time, and the ambassador in Germany who was Walter Stoessel, and the ambassador to the European Communities, which at one time had been Deane Hinton but later became Tom Enders. He started the tradition of our meeting at one of our embassies for a week end. In addition to visiting around the town he would have a party and bring in the British political and intellectual class and we would go to Germany and the same thing would happen there. We would go to Rome and the same thing. And the European Community in Brussels. I guess the ambassador to NATO was in this too, a fellow from Georgia. This would happen two or three times a year and our discussion would usually focus on a problem where the Europeans had a slightly different view from the Americans and there was a clash on policy. After our discussion and suggestions for how to deal with these problems, he would go back to Washington and talk to his friend Cy Vance. This was another way to influence policy out of Washington. The trouble was he was talking to Cy, and Zbigniew thought he was running the world. In many cases these were areas where Cy was more accepting -- not wishing to jam down the throat of the Europeans a particular policy whereas Brzezinski amplified some of the defects that Carter suffered from -- of the shifting of a policy that so annoyed men like Schmidt and Giscard. I guess Mrs. Thatcher was still in England so our friend was dealing with her. This little group -- it was fun for us because we got around to see these other capitols and we would all be

put up at the embassy and get to meet and hear from the political groups the ambassadors were dealing with in each country.

Q: You spoke about seeing Carter close up, could you talk about that?

HARTMAN: First of all his mother, Miss Lillian, came to visit and Donna took care of her and showed her around. She was a remarkable woman. This is an elderly woman who went off to the Peace Corps in India. There was a lot of under estimation of Carter and the Carter family, particularly in Europe. There was a feeling they were not serious, and even among Americans because he came from Georgia and had that thick southern accent, people dismissed him intellectually. Many of the things he did were not bad at all and history seems to have looked more kindly on that period. He came to France while Giscard was still president and Giscard laid on a royal type visit but he was dealing with a fellow who wasn't very royal. So there was a clash of PR on the whole subject. Giscard laid on a special train, magnificent meal, with eight glasses arranged in a row. Jimmy Carter wasn't exactly a teetotaler but he wasn't that interested in wine. The real crisis came when Carter's people said he wanted to stop at Lisieux which was on the train road from Paris to the Normandy beaches. This absolutely horrified Giscard; the Catholic saint who was a nun from Lisieux that Carter wanted to honor was someone who was very prominent in middle class American Catholicism and not what Giscard, a good Catholic, would have considered a high grade saint. The thought of having anything to do with this cult built around this saint from Lisieux was to this snobbish Frenchman an absolute horror. As I recall, we arranged it for the trip back so Carter got off at Lisieux and did his thing there while Giscard went on home on the train. I may not have that exactly right, but I do remember the horror on the faces of the people in the elite as we went about this. The other thing that was becoming more apparent in America's dealing on these more and more frequent visits was the role of the Secret Service. I may have said when we were discussing a trip to Rome we had once, how the Pope's men beat out the American Secret Service. They are a cast of thousands now. They fly in their own planes, they take over everything, they put their telephones around in various places -- they take over the place where the president is going to visit. In most countries there is a resentment about this. As one of the French security people said to me "We've had five attempts on the life of our President, Mr. de Gaulle, and none were ever successful." They looked at me with one dead President and his dead brother, then later Ford was shot at and Reagan was shot at and hit. They thought they had a good security system and then for these guys to come in an bully their way around, which they do, there was a lot of resentment about this. People felt the way American presidents began traveling with many plane loads of people coming in was a little ridiculous. Then Carter stayed in the guest house with the president. He gave a lunch at the embassy and decided after that he would walk to the Elysees Palace down Champs-Elysees. His guys just pushed everybody aside and took over that part of the Champs-Elysees. At the end of that visit we invited all of the police and all of the people on the French side in for a buffet lunch to thank them. There were so many noses out of joint because of this bullying by American protective groups we felt we should make it up to them. I saw that again in Russia where everything was pretty much under control and it was difficult to see why – and I can remember back in the Nixon period where Nixon was persuaded to go to a conference at Yalta only we named

it something else. We flew in Brezhnev's plane and the American security guys were out of their minds. Now, when chiefs of state are visiting around a lot more and when they go to meetings of the Group of Seven or Eight, the Americans have five times the number of people and have to take over a whole hotel. It doesn't look as though the Americans are the old Americans, the simple folk who don't put on a lot of airs but rather act like bullies. It is a bad image we give the world when we do this. We don't get that much more protection than these people have.

Q: How about the Quai d'Orsay? Did you feel they understood America?

HARTMAN: It was mixed. In the year 2000 I went to a party in New York for the 90th birthday of a French diplomat, Francois du Bois. He represents a side of French diplomacy that was horrified by the anti NATO aspects of de Gaulle's policy. He himself had never been connected with the Vichy group. There were some pro-Americans who came out of the Vichy era, including Giscard. Giscard's family were very much Vichy people. But he did not have that same pro-Americanism that some of them had in order to try to escape their Vichy roots. The de Gaullists were very much in the Quai d'Orsay but there were others, while not anti de Gaulle, who at least saw the world as it was and saw the necessity of having a close relationship with the United States. Some of them had the same view the British had which is, "You've got this big elephant over there with all this power, lets use it." The British would come into Washington and ask how they could influence American policy to suit British ends and they were successful sometimes. Sometimes it screwed up the other relationships, like when they got the American missile to carry on their deterrent force long after the British had funds to support it. The French never had that and the French never knew quite how to use American strength to meet their goals. They always felt they had to be seen holding off the Americans. That always created tensions in our relationships. People who knew a lot about Russia and had served there became absolute anti-communists. Francois du Bois was very much this kind of guy. He was totally pro French but he always had good friends on the American side. He tried to use our power to be consistent with French interests and became an expert in deterrence, an expert in non- nuclear warfare. He wrote many articles which really provided the knowledge and understanding of what it was all about. So they didn't feel this discussion between the Americans and the Russians was somehow aimed at them. Many of the decisions taken in this Russian-American negotiation undermined a French deterrent. Kissinger spent a lot of time convincing the French that we weren't doing that. Today, the French and British deterrents, particularly if we go down to a thousand warheads, people are going to ask themselves if they should be in these negotiations -- and I think they will be. In fact I think we will have a minimum force, both on the British side and the French side.

Q: What about NATO cooperation during your '77 to '81 period. How did the French fit into NATO at that time?

HARTMAN: Beginning in the Nixon-Kissinger time, when they began talking frankly to President Pompidou, arrangements were made so the French could participate in NATO planning, but without it becoming public knowledge. This suited the French to a "T". I

always thought they should be made to admit this was happening because otherwise they are going to have the freedom to criticize publicly while they get the advantages of dealing with us privately. I came to accept that. Al Haig was supreme commander in Brussels when I was ambassador. Al would slip into town on various occasions and talk to the head of the French military. They came up with a scheme for joint planning of the use of French forces in case of emergency. How the French First Army up there right next to the German border would be used.

I thought these were very useful. I resented the fact the French didn't have to pay the price of a little public acceptance of the fact this was going on and that it was of great benefit to the French from a security point of view. Recognizing that politically there was no way any French politician could come up and say this was the greatest thing since sliced bread. When Mitterrand was elected, one of the things I insisted on was that somehow or other knowledge of this sort of arrangement be transferred to him and his team so they had a more realistic view of what the real relationship was, as distinct from the one that might have appeared to him in public. The result of this was that his defense minister had the same kind of relationship, his military guys continued these talks so that beneath the surface there was a close cooperation between French military planners and the American NATO planners. Al Haig didn't do all this himself, but his commander who was closest to the border there did the planning with the head of the French First Army Group.

*Q: At this time in '79-'81 I was consul general in Naples and I talked to Admiral Crowe who was the commander South, and I asked about the French. He said "The French na*vy *is my strong right arm. I'm not sure what the Greeks and the Turks are doing except watching each other but the French are right there with us all the time and they are very good."*

HARTMAN: This showed later in the Gulf War where the French put real forces in. It showed up in Yugoslavia where, despite the fact we keep talking about all these Americans, the French have the largest presence there. Without the fear that some guy was going to get shot. The French forces understood they might get shot.

Q: What about Afghanistan and Iran. We are talking about November-December '79 when our embassy was taken over and we had a hostage crisis for 444 days and the beginning of the war in Afghanistan with the Soviets. How did that affect you?

HARTMAN: I don't remember the specifics, but my former deputy was Bruce Laingen and he was the senior hostage. Personally I was caught up in what was going on there. I think the French were sympathetic. The French have always had this odd relationship. For example Chirac was head of a group that had relationships with both Iran and Iraq. Prior to the war in Iraq, Chirac led delegations to Baghdad and it was always in support of French economic interests there. The oil companies, Elf Aquitaine, selling aircraft. It was the principle area where the French were able to sell their high performance aircraft in competition with the United States that had withdrawn from the competition because we didn't like the policies that were being followed. During my time in Paris Khomeini

was exiled, the Ayatollah, and he was living just outside of Paris. The chief of my political section, Warren Zimmerman, was designated by me and by Washington to go out and see the Ayatollah. The French of course were wondering what was going on here. Are the Americans making a deal. Remember this is a time of great conflict involving Kissinger, David Rockefeller and some others thinking we pulled the rug from under the Shah. I believe very strongly that he pulled the rug out from under himself with the excesses of his time there, and there was the beginning of a peaceful transition but the Iranian military fell down on the job. They had the power to take over at one point and the real debate between Kissinger and those who followed the Carter policy at the time was "Did we give enough support there or were we flabby and therefore allowed them to feel they were being thrown to the wolves." My own feeling was that whole thing had become rather putrid. But this is always true of the end of a regime of a strong virtual dictator. I can't remember if the French played a role and how this was handled. When we sent a force in there to liberate the captive diplomats that was done so poorly it contrasted with the way the Israelis had moved into Uganda to liberate the people at Entebbe. Again the French felt Carter, at the last minute, had pulled the plug. He hadn't gone all the way to allow the thing to be successful. It's debatable whether it could have been successful or whether the planning wasn't right.

Q: As ambassador did you and your colleagues talk among yourselves or were you concerned that you really couldn't trust Carter?

HARTMAN: No. You do get a certain amount of localitis and Giscard and Schmidt both had this feeling and asked "What are you guys up to? Is your guy really carrying through on this or is he changing his position." That was not a good period in terms of a high level feeling of confidence that a policy was going to be carried out. They all read about the disputes that were going on in Washington under Carter -- between Brzezinski and the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State on policy. They felt they were on very shaky ground. Another thing that happened in my period in France was when Mitterrand won the election. At the same time Reagan was winning the election in the United States and there was a question of how those two regimes were going to exist together. I remember I had a dinner at my house for Vice President George Bush who was sent over. One of the people I invited was head of the Renault auto works, but who was an industrialist and not a dyed in the wool Socialist. The chief person on the other side of the table was the prime minister who was also the mayor of Lyon, and I introduced him to the head of Renault. Shortly after that the head of Renault was made ambassador to Washington because it was thought by Mitterrand and his prime minister at the time that having this fellow who was an industrialist, and a man who had a lot of experience in the United States, would be a good idea. He was responsible for the link with American Motors. The French were right, he was somebody that the Republicans could talk to and he presented a different image of France.

Q: Was Mitterrand running against d'Estaing? He was a man who was a socialist coming out of the left wing. How are you reporting and explaining? What was your feeling as this group came in?

HARTMAN: I had some young officers, one in particular, who was so close to the Socialists that he became kind of a spokesman in our group because he was absolutely convinced they were going to come into power. He was convinced that Mitterrand was the greatest thing since sliced bread. He felt Mitterrand would bring them into the modern world. He felt that another party coming in and taking over was a good thing. I had to constantly pull him back and remind him there was an American interest there. We didn't know what direction that was going and the French were going to decide it. This was not something where the United States should come out and say it was good for France. He felt I was an old foreign service officer who really didn't understand these things. Mitterrand did come in and brought the Communists into the government, did nationalize a lot of things, which was a very bad policy. But on foreign policy he expressed to us a stronger view about Communism and about Russia than some of the things we had experienced with Giscard. Particularly Giscard's playing around in the middle. Looking back on it, it was in Mitterrand's interest, as a kind of balance to the Communists that he brought in as a way of getting better control over the economic policy of the country, to have a more pro-American foreign policy against Russia. There he certainly didn't want the Communists to influence his foreign policy. Having a closer relationship with us even than under Giscard was in his interest. My successor felt that Mitterrand -----

Q: Was this Evan Galbraith?

HARTMAN: Yes.

Q: He came into the embassy thinking of it as hostile territory.

HARTMAN: Absolutely and felt he could speak out about French politics the way I, as ambassador, did once when I thought Giscard had really stepped on toes of a sensible East-West policy. But I would never have commented about the domestic situations in France the way he did. Although I believe myself that the Socialists have gone much too far and a lot of my friends who were more on the right wing side felt that Mitterrand coming to power was practically like a Communist take over. I have never heard such bitterness. This man who had been Giscard's science, nuclear energy, and technology fellow. In talking to him he sounded like he was going to take a gun and go out into the streets to stop this terrible takeover. There was a lot of division in France which came out at that time with many of the old Vichyites taking the right wing position; others that had been with de Gaulle were also taking a right wing position, despite the fact that de Gaulle had brought Communists into the government the first time. That was the end of my period in France.

Q: I have one further question. What percent of time were you dealing with the Communist party -- 25-30%.

HARTMAN: It was always a big debate in the American State Department, particularly when Kissinger was in charge, about having any contact at all. There were guys on the democratic side, particularly people like Arthur Schlesinger who had come out with this policy about the opening to the left and how we should be encouraging this opening to

the left in Italy as a way of getting rid of the corruptness. Looking back on it, it was not a bad idea because the Communists in Italy were independent of Russian influence. Today you have a transport minister in France who is a Communist and, who is probably one of the more outspoken people, who is having to modernize the system that is dominated by the Communist unions. In that period the American government didn't want people mucking around -- going off and having conversations with the Communists. There weren't any Communists in France that you could say were like the Communists in Italy who were really modernizers and aristocrats. There wasn't anybody really like that so I continued to have a very restricted view of our contacts with the Communists except where they held official positions. There was also the relationship with the CIA. The CIA had a number of ideas about how they wanted to have a certain penetration in some circles in France. I allowed one operation -- looking back on it, it was ludicrous -- and I regretted having approved it. It didn't cause any great harm but it was stupid. It involved putting a listening device in the house of an intellectual in France who might have had interesting conversations about what was going on. There was a regular liaison function. The people who were in charge of their equivalent of either CIA or FBI were some people I considered to be right wing nuts. So I discouraged that kind of thing. I discouraged this because I thought this guy was putting arms around the country. Later stories have now come out about the bad role he played in a number of places, including in Africa where he was arming all the wrong people and trying to get us to participate in this. I think I was kept pretty well informed by the head of station in the embassy as to what they were up to. I probably never got the whole story, but I quizzed them carefully and when I went back to Washington I made sure that I talked to the upper reaches of the CIA to try and get them to be square with me about what they were up to.

Q: The French have a broad diplomatic reach all over the world. Did you find them to be useful in that?

HARTMAN: Not terribly because it was uneven. Where they had a policy that was against ours we would have arguments about it but I didn't think their people could be very influential. I didn't know too many of them in key places. It was mainly governed by what the Quai d'Orsay did and I had a close relationship with the folks who were running the Quai d'Orsay. During this period François-Poncet was the foreign minister and I had a good personal relationship with him which continues to this day. He had been Giscard's right hand man in everything before he became foreign minister.

Q: One last question. Did Carter's policy of emphasis on human rights have influence in France at all?

HARTMAN: Yes, I think a man like Giscard would have thought, "Well a successor, that doesn't represent national interests." On the other hand there were a lot of people in France of the non-governmental variety who were very interested. This appealed very much to the new, right wing intellectuals and the new philosopher groups. The other guys who were more Marxist were overlooking anything that smacked of excess in anti human rights behavior on the part of Communists. There was a growing movement in France worrying about human rights in Africa. Worrying about some of the excesses of the

people that the French had traditionally supported in places like this -- the Congo being one example. Now there is quite a group of people who are focused on human rights affairs and perhaps in a more positive way than ours -- the Doctors Without Borders who go into places where people are being oppressed to help them are much more active. I think the French had the feeling our government was supporting Green Peace as a way of getting at the French government's nuclear support.

Q: When did they blow up the Rainbow Warrior.

HARTMAN: When the French began that crazy security service they have. They sent somebody in to blow up the Green Peace ship that was interfering with French tests in the Pacific. It was always my feeling these guys were out of control. And indeed they were. I didn't want our guys to have anything to do with them because they would get themselves in trouble sooner or later and it would be bad public trouble.

Q: Well we will pick this up next time when you have finished in France in 1981 and you're off to Moscow.

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Today is the 12th of December 2000. So you are ending in Paris in '81 and you have the new Reagan administration coming in.

HARTMAN: It has been in for some time. I was kept there while they began establishing their relationship with Mitterrand who also had come in a short while before. My main function in that time was to make contacts and keep them abreast of the situation. Al Haig had been named the Secretary of State and Al called me in shortly after the new administration took over and said, "There is no way you are going to stay in Paris. President and Mrs. Reagan have lots of friends who want to go there and maybe they have friends who want to go to Moscow but I think we should have a professional person there. How would you like to go to Moscow?" I said, "It sounds wonderful to me but I am not a Russian expert. I don't have the language." He said, "That is alright because you have been dealing with the Russians during the Kissinger period and you understand the kind of things we are trying to do and we are going to have a more balanced relationship." The first thing he did was get Dobrynin out of the State Department basement. Referring to the fact that Henry had let Dobrynin drive his car down into the basement. Al was looking for symbols, one of which was to put Dobrynin on a normal footing. The other thing he said to me was, "Whenever we receive Dobrynin we will insist that you have access to somebody you want to see over there." I took all of that with a grain of salt, because my experience with Washington administrations had been that he persuaded me that that was what ought to happen. I had been making contacts on the outside looking toward retirement after Paris because I thought I had pretty much done it all.

Q: How old were you by this time?

HARTMAN: I was only 55 but about that time you begin to think maybe you could do one more career. I had always been interested in economics and business and I had a lot of friends so I was talking to people about the possibility of going in with a consulting group or on a number of boards. I thought I had enough time between 55 and 65 to do some good things. I was also playing around with the idea of maybe taking on a major cultural center and running it. They were looking for somebody to be head of Lincoln Center. At one time they were looking for someone to head the Kennedy Center. I also found out at that time they were looking for people to go out and raise money. That didn't appeal to me as much as running a big center. But I decided to go to Moscow. Went back to the States in the summer and decided to really spend a lot of time with the language. There was a woman, Madam Belacousse, at the Foreign Service Institute, and she gave me some tapes and worked with me. I reached an agreement with the State Department that she could come with us. She spent about six months with us. Until the first of the year of '82, living in the house, going with us on trips, talking to us all the time and that was a great help. The other thing I did was spend a month up in Maine. While there I called on my predecessor, Tom Watson, who had an island off Camden. We also saw a lot of our children that summer. So it was relaxing and a good interlude between Paris and Moscow.

Q: What was Tom Watson telling you? He was sent there to be a business contact and then Afghanistan happened. The whole idea was to build relations but they hit the pits at that point.

HARTMAN: He was a very disappointed man. Tom's crusade was arms control and he was very interested in it; worried about the future of the world with all the nuclear weapons around, and just felt that had the highest priority. So he was very disappointed with the arrival of an administration which seemed to be saying it wasn't really going to negotiate with the Russians on these matters. It was going to look after U.S. security and let the rest of it fall where it may. He left Moscow as soon as the election took place. He had some health problems around that time too. But when I saw him he was in good shape. Had a new boat and was sailing around and later while I was in Moscow I had a message from him -- he was sailing near Antarctica in his boat. Very vigorous guy, wonderful wife, but devoted to that part of diplomacy that went to arms control. With Afghanistan things came to a halt in a number of areas. You have to remember Poland was also going on at that time. There were a number of steps we took that interfered with normal kinds of communications with the Russians because of what was going on there and our fear they might be tempted to intervene. It was not a good time for someone who was interested in making progress. People didn't understand that Tom had actually had a long relationship with the Russians. He was a pilot and had ferried planes into Moscow. He told me when he came there he had lived in what is now the Islamic Embassy. I went over and visited them and they showed me where Tom had come in to see them and showed me where the U.S. pilots lived when they came during the war. He was not someone who was unfamiliar with the Russian scene. Also he had a business way of putting his eye on a particular objective. He had a good deputy who was a foreign service officer who later ended up as head of the Watson Center at Brown. The Russians had to pay a lot of attention to him. As usual, they were split between their views of an

administration and official relations and their feeling that they had finally gotten what they wanted which was a big business man. Years before they had tried to get David Rockefeller.

Q: Were they thinking this was where the controlling interest is, sort of a continuation of a capitalist representative?

HARTMAN: From the Russian side that is what they had dreamed of and they, of course, had a rather distorted view of what America was and how it is run. Dobrynin, because he was on the East coast, and very much taken in by the establishment, encouraged that kind of view. It goes back to the 20s -- Henry Ford built some plants over there. The only people they wanted to deal with was Mr. Big, wherever Mr. Big was. It reflected their ideas of how big they were and how you had to do things. Particularly anybody involved in an industry that was vertically oriented. That was exactly what they had done from the beginning. So I spent the summer briefing and getting myself in the proper frame of mind to go over. Then I came back to Paris and was sworn in by my consul general. I can't remember what the exact details were but there was something I had to finish up with the French. I was sworn in in Paris. The Moscow embassy had use of a C-9 plane, which was a plane they use for hospitals but it had seats in it. It played an important role in Moscow because it was a way of bringing things in -- both equipment and food and other things for the commissary and getting people in and out free. This was a good thing for morale. People could get on that plane and go to Frankfurt and spend a couple of weeks then pick up the next flight. The plane flew into Le Bourget airport in Paris and I got a good send-off from the people at the embassy.

Q: I want to take you back. Did you find the Soviet Mafia in the Department of State (you had been the head of the European Bureau) how did they react to your getting the job?

HARTMAN: There must have been a certain amount of resentment. I must say they were all very good about briefing me. I went to all the agencies including defense, the CIA, NSA, and of course some of the domestic agencies. There were quite a few people in the embassy in Moscow who represented all of these interests. Some of them I had known from my French days because every time I went to Washington from France I would do the rounds. And I went up on the hill and talked to people there. There were a number of people who showed an unusual interest. I remember Bill Bradley, the senator from New Jersey, for example. People don't realize he made 15 trips to Moscow. Even before he was a senator he was interested in what was going on over there. He is an ex basketball player so the Russians were delighted that he would play basketball over there. He came several times while I was ambassador. There were others on the hill who had long term interests in relations. Some of whom were particularly interested in the arms control aspect. Others had come into it because their states were very interested in agricultural trade. Then I saw a number of business people. I felt some of them played a less than helpful role because many of them, particularly the top leaders of the U.S.-Russian Business Council- I felt were too anxious to push their business interests against U.S. policy with respect to some of the political problems. Later, when they had meetings in Moscow, I had great difficulty with them. The Russians would make these political

speeches against the Reagan policies, and the business men would all sit there nodding and agreeing. Occasionally I had to call them to order which some didn't like at all. I felt there were U.S. interests involved and they certainly shouldn't be coming to Moscow and nodding at everything the Russians were saying when the Russians were just manipulating them. The Soviets at that time were past masters at manipulating U.S. groups. I watched them do it with the Council of Churches in Geneva. I watched them doing it with something called Doctors for Peace with the fellow from Harvard who got the Nobel Prize. It was always a problem -- the Russians would get these people over and then use them, not for the substance of what they could have contributed to the Russians. Like how to run their economy; how to improve their health system, but to get them to sign on to their propaganda and their goals. The Russians would keep at me on the question of Reagan saying "the evil empire" and I would say "What do you think as a Russian? I'd say, you are an evil empire, not for what you've done to these Americans but what you have done to your own people. When are you going to discuss that?" It depended on where they were on the scale. If they were in the intellectual circles they sort of nodded and said I was right. If they were in the government circle they were horrified and felt this was an administration they would never be able to deal with. What I really found was that when the Russians felt threatened they would decide they weren't going to have anything to do with us. They could never mean it because we were the only power in the world they wanted to deal with. In effect it concerned their own status as a super power. There was no thought of them turning to Britain or France or Germany. However, the propagandists would always slyly say this to people. But there was no way they could not talk to us. Then on our side, clearly the administration was split. In the beginning there were more who were ideologically inclined and who didn't believe there was a good arms control agreement. They were the dominant force on the defense side and also did what I thought was necessary at that point. They continued to buildup what the Carter administration had started when they realized the Russians were building all kinds of systems that we had not provided a counterpart for. They put quite a bit of money into balancing out the multi-headed missiles the Russians were building in the strategic force. They also continued the policy of dealing with the problem of shorter range missiles in Europe. Al Haig was in favor of talking with the Russians. He had the first conversation with Gromyko in New York. He always made sure I was there and this was an accepted principle.

Q: You mean you weren't stuck with the Kissinger idea of going off and meeting with the Soviets off in one corner and leaving you out?

HARTMAN: That's right. He spent entirely too much time talking to Dobrynin. As far as Washington is concerned, because Dobrynin was an astute observer and people opened their hearts and files almost to him and he became part of the Washington scene. People would openly discuss with him the policy differences -- "Can't you do this to help us because we really want to get on with this negotiation with you." But when Dobrynin gets to describing what was going on in Moscow, it is nowhere near reality. I think he had much less influence in Moscow than he always claimed, and I don't think he took the positions he said he took in these private tête à têtes with Henry and some of the others in Washington. I don't think he was ever a good influence as far as convincing his own

government that their policies should be changed in some way or moved in some direction. He was mildly helpful in some of the arms control negotiations because he really understood all the technical details. Very often Gromyko would get them wrong, then there would be some explaining in the back room about what our proposals meant. I think in that area he played a fairly useful role. Smart fellow, so people were interested in speaking to him. One of the quirks of the Soviet system -- he was an aircraft design engineer. At the end of the war Stalin decided he needed undiplomatic diplomats. Dobrynin was picked out as somebody they wanted to bring into the foreign service to give it a little more oomph from people who had done real work in their lives. Generally the groups that would come to visit Moscow were people of good heart who wanted to see better relations and were almost all prejudiced against the Reagan administration, thinking it had spoken out too loudly about "evil empire." I would spend a lot of time with these groups saying to them, "Look, if you want better relations, you've got to talk frankly to the Russians, not only about what your interests are, but about what you see around you. If you see things you don't like, tell them. It's the only way to have a decent relationship." I had some success with some and no success at all with the Doctors for Peace who just thought I was the skunk at the wedding.

Q: What were the Doctors for Peace after?

HARTMAN: They were after doing something about the nuclear problem. They were concerned we were going to blow up the world. I remember saying finally to this doctor from Harvard, who was part of the public health faculty at Harvard, "There is a disaster in this country in the health area. Why aren't you guys worrying about health? You are dealing with the man who has the most to say. He was the cardiologist to the politburo. Impress upon him that he has a disaster going in this country." They thought I was terrible for not worrying about the nuclear power. So I didn't get on well with them and they didn't get on well with me. Now the Russians have discovered they have a health disaster, and these guys could have been helpful in the period of changing the way they were dealing with problems. They had a wonderful health system for the Politburo and nothing for the rest of the country.

Q: Did you talk to President Reagan before you went out and did you get any feeling about him and the NSC before you went out. This would be in '81, so it is still early days.

HARTMAN: Yes, he was very good, and both Al Haig and later George Shultz. Every time I came back to Washington I would see the President. He commanded or led by ideas, by myths. He didn't want to get into the details of a lot of things. I can remember when Gromyko was coming to Washington the first time. I went to the White House for a briefing in the oval office. The President started off, as he did with many conversations, telling Irish jokes. I, who can't remember a joke from one day to another and I was in awe that he could reel off these jokes. He had been doing this for about ten minutes when finally Mike Deaver spoke up -- you have to remember Mike was closer to Mrs. Reagan -- and said, "Mr. President, this may be one of the more important meetings you are going to have of your administration. So I think we should get down to business." Good-naturedly. Reagan said "oh sure" and we would talk. He would take it all in. I can

remember Henry Kissinger saying at one point that Reagan's great gift was that he knew how to play roles. Once he got himself into the right frame of mind for the role he was going to play, he played it well. Not in the beginning, but later on he began to feel it was important. They had taken care of a lot of domestic stuff, the defense buildup -- here I give a lot to Mrs. Reagan's influence -- that he had to worry about dealing with these folks. Some things happened in the meantime and, to go back to our arrival in Moscow, these were the bad old days. Brezhnev was still around. Gromyko was there, acting like Gromyko, the foreign minister, except by that time he was also a member of the Politburo. Unlike the Gromyko I had first sat in meetings with, who was very much the spokesman for the Politburo in foreign affairs, he now spoke like a Politburo member. And did become one of the senior members of the Politburo and I think very influential, to the detriment of their own policy. He was a hide-bound kind of fellow and believed nothing good could come out of the West, despite his experience. He had more of the view of what was going on in the rest of the world than anybody else in the Politburo, but he was essentially a yes man and saw where the power lay. Power in the Politburo was beginning to form around the succession to Brezhnev. Andropov was clearly Mr. Big. More and more Gromyko began playing the role of supporting whatever Andropov wanted to do. He also recognized that Andropov was a modernizer. It was Gromyko who didn't support the second choice when Andropov died, but he did support the third, namely Gorbachev. Maybe it was because of his support that Gorbachev got the nod. I think he was Andropov's choice to be his successor. The guy who came in between was Chernenko. I remember first seeing Chernenko in meetings with Brezhnev and lighting Brezhnev's cigarettes. The inner dynamics of that whole group were interesting to observe. I arrived in Moscow and was greeted by the press corps at the airport. I gave a statement with a few little jabs in it -- I was very interested to find out about Russian history and culture. I represented a government that wanted to deal with the Soviet Union, but on a basis of facts, and to begin to overcome some of the warmonger business. Arrived and went to Spaso House, which is a magnificent place, and began a very interesting period in the lives of both myself and my wife. Very much like in Paris, it was the use of that house that enabled us to get out and make contact with the local population and particularly with the intellectuals. The KGB tried to control everybody I saw, and there were some people who had a little more leeway than others. They were mainly in the cultural area, so I focused very much on the cultural area. I tried to bring people over who they would want to see. We had concerts at our house. We had films at the house. All of this to bring in that group that could exercise a little bit of its own desires to have contact with outside cultural influences. But the Russian foreign ministry was a great place for playing games. They would order everybody to stay away when we had somebody they didn't like. They particularly didn't like the idea that I was seeing the "dissidents" -- the people who had married Americans, who weren't allowed out of the country, and Jews who had been very much oppressed and were on the list to try and get out but had not yet made it. We had events practically every Saturday where we would always invite all of these people to come and see a movie, which gave them an opportunity to have contact with each other in a fairly open way. However, you had to be careful because there were also KGB plants who were listening and reporting. Of course, our staff was also listening and reporting. That didn't bother me because I felt this was a closed regime and, if they choose to listen to what you are saying, that's another way of

communicating; so rather than fight that or say I'm not going to talk because of a microphone, I would give briefings. For example, when congressional delegations came I would say, "We are going to brief at Spaso House and I hope the system works well because it's another way of telling these folks what we think. Some things we won't talk about in that setting so we will go to the embassy and talk about them." It didn't hurt to mention people's names because they knew exactly who we were seeing around town. Most of the dissidents would want to have contact with us for protection so they want the KGB to know they had contact with the Americans.

Q: What were you getting from them? What were they saying about Brezhnev, the war in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union economy -- what was the initial thing you were getting?

HARTMAN: I met with Gromyko shortly after I arrived. He always treated me like a kid. His normal greeting was, "Oh, you've gotten taller." We would have this sort of exchange, which I think in his mind meant he had first met me when I was a smaller kid at Kissinger's side. He had a pleasant side to him but a bite when it came to anything that was important in terms of policy. I never thought he was a guy who listened very much when we were trying to say things to him that might alter his judgment. His judgment seemed to be pretty well formed before he had any discussions with anybody. I gave him the impressions I was authorized to give, both by Al Haig and later by George Shultz, that we were prepared to talk but about serious things. We wanted this propaganda exchange to stop. I would see Arbatov (head of the USA Institute), who I never got on well with; I got on very well with his son. Arbatov was the officially designated person to have contact with Americans. It was his job to maneuver those relationships to support Soviet policy. I would have arguments with American academics sometimes about what the real role of Arbatov was. There was something in what they were telling me, because I later learned that Arbatov had protected a number of these young researchers and experts and these guys later turned out to be pretty good guys. I mean Kakoshen, for example, who later turned out to be the only civilian senior level in the defense department. In other words, Arbatov successfully ran an institute that had good experts in certain fields. As they became more and more expert, they thought less and less of Soviet policy, so there were good and bad things. His relationship with me was normally bad because he was always trying to make propaganda points. I can remember one episode particularly. I had invited as one of my people to attract Russian thought, Murray Fishback. Murray was the outstanding expert on Russian health problems. The statistics of the health situation -- Russian drinking -- what happens to young men who smoke and drink. Murray, in the good old fashioned way of finding these things out, read provincial newspapers and other things. He got his information from raw sources, but of course the Russians didn't like what he was writing. So when I asked Murray to come over as my guest, they refused to give him a visa. I said, "this is very simple. "I understand Dr. Arbatov wants to go to America. So he will not get a visa until you give Murray a visa." Well, they were horrified. Arbatov went up in smoke. All kinds of American academics would call me and ask how I could do that. They insisted they had planned their whole program around having Arbatov there. I said, "Very simple, tell them to give Murray Fishback a visa. They are not allowing somebody in that knows more than they do about what the real situation is." It was based on what Murray was telling me in his writings

that I got into this argument with the Harvard doctors, because they didn't want to talk about what Murray was finding. When they came over, they were shown the cardiac institute and all these wonderful places the politburo could go and the great work being done in these hospitals, not the fact that 80% of the hospitals didn't have hot water. Fifty percent of the hospitals didn't have running water and the doctors were not well trained. They didn't have the proper kinds of pharmaceuticals -- all that ran over their heads, but they didn't care because they were interested in the big issue which was nuclear control. Murray finally came because he got a visa but as usual the Russians were playing games. They wouldn't let him see anybody. Murray said, "I don't care, just let me walk down the streets because by talking to people in stores and walking down streets I will find out more than if I got to see the minister of health or anybody else." What I found was when I invited people in, people came to talk to him. I knew they were aware of his writings and there were some people there who cared. That tit-for-tat kind of thing was very much in the hangover from the really bad days of our relationship with the Soviets. During the early part of my stay in Moscow you had Brezhnev dying, (inaudible) being the representative of the Reagan administration. Then you had Chernenko dying and Bush came as the representative. One time with George Shultz and once without George Shultz. Also with a delegation of very interesting (inaudible). Then you had Chernenko dying and Gorbachev coming.

Q: When you arrived, was your embassy political section primed to be (inaudible) in what was going to happen?

HARTMAN: Not so much, they were a marvelous bunch of people. We had a lot of very good language-trained officers. Living in that closed atmosphere they did a lot of things for themselves. This was before we lost our Russian staff. It was a filthy building. In the winter the mud was terrible. We were crowded into a central area where you would go to a snack bar or go into another part of the building where they were doing repairs to the cars. It was a whole community. This was before they built the new area and it was not a nice life. These guys all enjoyed it. Their families seemed to enjoy it. They were active in school affairs and they were doing a good job. It wasn't that they had secret friends that told them things -- there was no way to have a secret friend. They had a good way of sniffing out stuff and reporting it. While you can do a lot of things from analyzing documentation in Washington and elsewhere, there is something about having good people on the ground who could sniff and feel and get it. They had a lot of contact with "dissidents" and many of these people had been high up in the old Soviet administration and were discouraged by it. Not just the Jews, there were others.

Q: I'm told one of the tools that was used very often was the town meetings where people were invited to come in and ask questions and our guys would sit there and listen to what the gripes were.

HARTMAN: There was a little bit of that. I think the USIA people did that. Access was controlled and you couldn't tell whether these people were carefully briefed before they came and acting only the way people wanted them to act or not. I think it has been proven that you can't have total control. People were beginning to think about the past and also

there were beginning to be a few little changes. You could see it in some of the literature. There were a few semi-independent publications that were beginning to write articles that got a little bit into past history. A lot of them hid under the cloak of Khrushchev and his denouncement of Stalin. From that you had a few historians who began to write a few things. This had this group of nationalists who were real Russians and began criticizing what they saw that was bad in the Soviet system and what Stalin had done to the country. By that time you could criticize Stalin -- Lenin you couldn't yet criticize. They were getting more contact with the world too. The Russians tried to control exactly where we were able to move around the country. I tried to break that down by asking to go to places, and then we had a reciprocity agreement so Dobrynin couldn't go to some of the places he liked to see. He loved to take his grandchild to Disney World so one time, with tears in my eyes, I said he couldn't go to Disneyland until I could go someplace I wanted to go. Again, we were criticized by some Americans for being so petty. It was the only way for us to break through. When we traveled around we would always have very good language officers with us, people who were knowledgeable about the area, and they would use me and my trips to get involved with those parts of the country and see things that individual officers couldn't see. On the official international side, each time one of these Russian leaders died Bush would come over, there would be talks and promises of further talks. During this time we were dealing with things like the CSC [Council on Security Cooperation] talk of human rights. They were very interested in developing economic relations. We finally began a new set of arms control talks. After an initial time when the more ideological side of the Reagan administration took extreme issues in what they wanted in the way of positions, it got more reasonable. Things were done until, toward the end of my time, Paul Nitze was talking to his counterpart and began to reach some understandings of a major deal for cutting back on the most dangerous type of missile and the number of warheads.

Q: You were there during the SS-20 versus Pershing?

HARTMAN: No, that was a little before. Another thing we had in Moscow, to the annoyance of some of our colleagues. The British, French, German, and American ambassadors would get together -- the so-called Berlin group. The excuse was that we had Berlin things to talk about, but in fact we met once a week and swapped stories about what was going on. There was a cooperation among those four embassies that was invaluable. The Italians were not included because for a good part of my time in Moscow, their ambassador was in the pocket of the Russians from A to Z. Later he accused me in an article in the Italian papers of having done him in, which of course I hadn't. I never said anything to his government about this, but I think it became evident even to them that this guy was in the pocket of the Russians. There were a series of very good French, German, and British ambassadors who I learned a lot from. We had a broader relationship with them and we had more contacts and they valued that. That relationship also shored up some of the relations back home among the governments. When people like Margaret Thatcher would come, the Brits would invite me over and we would have a chat. Then when the German Chancellor came, the Germans would invite me over and we would have a chat as part of the briefing of that leader. Of course when the French came, they were all friends of mine and I would see them. During the first

couple of periods it was very tough because there were all kinds of tit-for-tat things that were annoying in your every day life. Things about supplies; things about buildings; things about staff. The KGB had an organization that allowed them to have their property and do all kinds of things. Gary Wooten vetted their staff -- had meetings with the staff once a week where they were asked to report. Some of our staff would ask us what they should report this week. This was something else, particularly our congressmen couldn't understand how could we have these people in our house. I said, "They are here anyway, why not have somebody." They said "Your chauffeur, you can't have a conversation in your car." I said "I can't have a conversation in my car anyway. They have means of projecting on to the windows until they can hear a conversation. We can't watch the car 24 hours a day and know somebody hasn't slipped something into it." Actually, we became very friendly with the two chauffeurs, who were very good and did their job well. I'm sure they reported whatever they thought was worth reporting. On another aspect of things: we got as deeply as we could into cultural affairs and I had a very good cultural officer. I'm still working with him because we have a foundation that does exchanges, Gregg Gruof. Gregg knew the country well -- had relatives who were still there. His aunt was first chair in the Moscow symphony orchestra. The family had come to America in the first part of the 20th century, Chicago, and some of them had stayed in Russia during this period and he would find out things from his family about life under Stalin. That was one thing that changed under two of my predecessors. Originally the State Department security people would not allow anybody who had any whiff of relationship in Russia to come over there. Then people saw that was silly -- if you had somebody who knew what he was doing and knew full well what the risks were, and didn't feel there was a risk as far as the Russians using his family to put pressure on him. So you had people like Gregg Gruof who were invaluable. He introduced me to the poets, the musicians, the people who really were the guts of cultural life and quite separate from the communist leadership. This allowed these people to come forward because Russians had a great desire to promote their culture. These people were in that tradition. Although a couple of them were nominally in the communist party, they really couldn't be called true-blooded communists. They were Russians. They would invite us out to their dacha and Peredelkino. Peredelkino was the place where most of the cultural group had dachas. The famous author of Dr. Zhivago, Boris Pasternak, is buried there in a cemetery. We went to visit his grave. We also talked to people who had been with him in his dying days. Because he had been a kind of dissident and had been mildly critical of some of the things that were going on, the Russian security people kept him apart, tried to dispose of the house after he died. His daughter and some of the other people in the area managed to maintain it. The KGB even threw the piano out and tried to break it up. There was a whole series of people who wanted to maintain these traditions and who lived in absolute squalor but had a good life. They talked to each other. They had poetry readings and played marvelous music together. This was the guts of the Russian intellectual elite. You had a few people coming along in the theater world who gradually, through hints and writing about things that seemed far from the current world -- like Boogotof, for example, who created this whole image of another world in order to be critical of what he saw going on around him and was finally shot by Stalin in the late '30s. They wrote in allegories as a way of expressing themselves. It was true also of these folks. We got to see them when we went up to Leningrad. Gregg came with me once when we went down

to Odessa. My grandfather had come from Odessa. There was absolutely no sign of any synagogues there in Odessa. Although I did see the Jewish star on one of the buildings. I asked the guide what that was and she said she didn't know, it was a building from the old days. What people thought when the Soviets were misleading them, sometimes was just lack of knowledge. Nobody wanted to ask any questions about the old days because that got you into trouble. Very often they knew nothing about the period that had gone before. But in every case we found people who would talk. I remember in Odessa I went to call on the guy who was head of the Chernomorsky Flot which is the Black Sea fleet, the civil fleet, that had cruise ships going all the way to France. He controlled all the shipping lines out of that part of the country. His real interest was in soccer and he had his own team which was at the top of the league when we visited him. He had trophies all around the room. We talked soccer. He was totally straight on that subject, and on the subject of his fleet and what his ambitions were for the future. He was going to be just like any other fleet manager, cruise line guy, and shipping manager in the world. In the course of conversations like that they tell you about the water system -- it was polluted because they built these things next to the water source. Things are leaking out of the refinery and gradually you get a picture of a totally uncaring administration on the subject of what they were doing to their own country. I reported experiences like that. Another time, Boris Pasternak's house was preserved against the regime which didn't want it preserved. We also met this wonderful woman, Chukoskiva, who was the daughter of a man who wrote and illustrated children's books. This you found more and more in Soviet Russia. They were icons, not people created by the Soviet regime but people who either came out of Russian history or Russian cultural life. They could continue to produce this amazing music. They could continue to produce composers like Shostakovich and performers like Richter. Occasionally they were used by the regime but they were top-class musicians. I can remember talking to Isaac Stern and I asked him, "Would you be willing to come to Moscow because I know you have a lot of contacts and used to play with all the great performers here and you knew them all when they came out to the West?" He gave me the name of a Jewish dissident who was in jail in Moldavia and he said, "If they would let her out I might think of coming." He later did come, but after my time. I was always looking for opportunities like that to make contact with this group, because they were such icons, and the fact the Americans were paying attention to this side of their history gave us a natural connection. The big success I had was in persuading Horowitz to come, because if there ever was an icon he was it. He had left the country and they had always heard these stories about him and it was like the Bishop's ring -- it was a direct connection with the greats of the 19th century. Here was a man whose teacher had been the old Rachmaninoff with the old group that formed around the composers of the 19th century. Peter Gelb was sort of a son to Horowitz in his later days and he would talk to Horowitz and his wife. He is the one who talked him into having concerts again. He recorded them and made wonderful records. Peter is now the head of one of the big studios in Hollywood. It was Peter who brought him out of his shell.

Q: How old was he?

HARTMAN: In his 80s. Horowitz the great pianist had psychological problems during his career but was beginning to play again. There was a long negotiation. We called on

Horowitz in New York in his apartment. His wife was the daughter of Toscanini, a very strong woman who ran his life, and he had a nursemaid who was an Italian woman who was terrific. We were negotiating to bring them over and allow him to play before Russian audiences, which we knew would be the main event of my period in Moscow. A lot of things had to be done. He only ate fresh Dover sole so my clever staff managed to negotiate with B.A. (British Airways) to fly in Dover sole every day, and our good Italian cook was able to meet all his needs as far as his wife was concerned (who was Italian). We arranged for him to arrive a few days early to get himself in the feel of things before actually playing, because he was an older man. It was an emotional thing for him, when I met him at the airport

His sister had lived in the Ukraine and married the economist Lieberman, who had been the advisor to Khrushchev and had advised Khrushchev on this new way of organizing the Soviet system. She came up with her husband (this was the daughter of his sister). He hadn't seen her since he left Russia in the '20s. She was at the airport and it was a very emotional thing for him. In the days he spent with us they would come to the house. At that time he had infantile interests. He loved to watch "shoot em up" VCR tapes he had brought with him. He would watch these all night and go to sleep about 6:00 A.M., then wake up and have breakfast about noon or 1:00 o'clock. So we would get a chance to talk to this woman, who was the daughter of Lieberman, and she would tell us experiences about Lieberman and how later he was rejected for undermining Soviet policy. It was contacts that were interesting. Horowitz didn't practice very much but he played our piano a bit. We had several dinners while he was there. I can remember one where he played some mazurkas and we had a ballet man from New York there. He and my wife danced and Horowitz held out his hand and said "kopeki, kopeki" as if he were a pianist in a dance hall somewhere that was getting paid for playing. He was an extraordinary individual, and when he played at the major symphony hall, tickets were impossible to get. All kinds of people pulled strings, one of which was the son of a politburo member who was very fond of music. Horowitz was at his very best. He made fun of the cameramen who were taking pictures of him because there was a whole VCR produced -- Horowitz-Moscow. Technicians from Switzerland did the recording, but the Russians watched all of this because it was so professional and so well done. People in the audience at this concert were crying. Here was a man who played in the romantic tradition of the 19th century and had known all these other folks. Indeed there was a little house on the street behind Spaso House where Scriabin had lived, and I said to the Russians, "I think maybe Horowitz would like to take a walk and we will go around the corner and stop in." They arranged the whole thing, including having Scriabin's niece, who was a lady in her 80s, there and a piano that Scriabin had played on. He played a little bit on it. Here was an alley behind Spaso House that I had never seen, but it turned out to be Scriabin's house. It is that sort of thing that really plugs you in to Russian society. Their reverence for that kind of individual, for Scriabin, for Pushkin, for these people who had an iconic position in their cultural history. From our point of view we quickly learned that was the way to go. If you could make contact with the Russian people through your admiration for the same kinds of people they admired, it was a way of making connections. All the propaganda they had been hearing was overcome by this interest the American Ambassador was showing in their real culture. These were the

people who later in the Gorbachev period were allowed to come forward and express themselves. Gorbachev's real contribution was that he allowed a certain amount of free speech. He allowed people to discuss real issues. This began a change in the way Russians communicated with each other that permitted them to have a more realistic view of what their history was like. It was very dangerous for the system. Eventually it led to people saying it had been an evil system and they had to get rid of it.

Q: Were you picking up signs of decay in the economy and the political commitment of the populace?

HARTMAN: Well, we certainly saw these things. I don't know any analyst or any of us who felt this whole thing would collapse in our lifetime. I think we all had an exaggerated view of the ability of central control to maintain that control, even as it loosened up some of the reins. Later, after I retired, I was invited to China to talk to their general staff. I remember the Chinese generals saying, after I had been there three days talking to them about what was going on in Russia, "This guy Gorbachev is crazy." This old Chinese general said, "He thinks you have to have political reform in order to have any kind of working economy. We are never going to do that." This was before Tiananmen Square. Clearly he started something which ate away at the very basis of the communist organization. That was his major contribution. His major fault, and the one I had arguments with his advisors over, and he had some good advisors, he had this man Alexandrof who was very good and Yakovlev. Yakovlev had gone to Columbia University. He did some dirty tricks too along the way, but he always felt that a change had to take place; and to this day, where Yakovlev is in charge of a commission, he is stirring up the embers of the bad things that happened in the Stalin period. These were people who gradually began what they call perestroika, that is, having an opening, to do things which they didn't realize were as subversive as they came to be. The real argument I had with most of them at that time was with Gorbachev on economics. He had been in charge of agriculture in the politburo before he became general secretary. The only thing wrong, he felt, was they hadn't really tried to make communism work. He was thoroughly convinced that you could make communism work. I would point out to some of these guys the foolishness of this. I called on the head of the (inaudible), for example, and said, "How do you set all the prices in the country, which they claim to be doing through a price committee? You must be throwing darts at a dart board, because there is no other way." I remember one of the guys telling me, "All we need is a bigger computer. You just sell us a (inaudible) computer and this system will work. We know how to fix prices, how to decide who should produce what, and what people need. We just need a bigger computer to do it better than the guys with pen and ink." That group lost believers in the system, including Gorbachev. They never understood what a market economy had to be. Never had a full appreciation of how much the military was taking out of the economy. Even our CIA estimates underestimated the amount -- something like 50% of the industrial production was in one way or another going into military stuff. You can't take that much out of an economy and not fail to satisfy the consumer needs of people or the health system, the basic infrastructure -- all those things that keep a country going if it wants to join the developed world. The resources were just not going into these things. Eventually I think Yeltsin did see this, Gorbachev, no.

Q: Did we get any reading on Andropov? He had been the head of the KGB. How did we view him when he took over?

HARTMAN: First of all, there was a propaganda campaign. He let himself be interviewed both by Russian reporters and others. The fact that he liked jazz music, and read some other authors, a whole image was built up of somebody who was into more modern thinking. Clearly, as head of the KGB, he had access to information about the outside world that nobody else in the politburo really did. When you look at Gorbachev's background he had actually spent a couple of months driving around France. The one guy that no impression from the West ever made a dent in was Gromyko.

Q: You can see him in pictures during World War II.

HARTMAN: He was 28 years old when he became foreign minister. The guy was un-remarkable. A lot of them were that way. They wanted careers and they just wanted to please whoever was in power. But at the end of his life Gromyko did become a power in his own right. At key times in the politburo he came down in favor of putting Gorbachev in, but he also came down in favor of pursuing a policy in Afghanistan.

Q: You were there from '81 to '87. How did the war play while you were there?

HARTMAN: The Soviet government didn't say much to its people. When we would go out cross-country skiing -- the Russians have a way of having cemeteries wherever- and in one place where we used to ski, there was a cemetery and suddenly a couple of military graves began to appear, then you began to hear about mothers who tried to get their kids out of the service. The Russian military treated their recruits in the most brutal, awful way. One reason they never had a fighting force that was any good was because of the way they treated their younger people. They never had a staff Sergeant level group that was anything but brutal, and the officers paid no attention. It was revealed more in Afghanistan. There was a reaction as bodies began coming home which was never discussed in the press. It was only when the mothers started criticizing and getting organized. In the intellectual circles some criticism also occurred. The West was making such a fuss about this, and communications began to appear that Russians could hear. The electronic revolution had begun to arrive, so they were plugged in better to the outside world and real information which couldn't be hidden by propaganda. Another interesting sideline on the period is we had two Pentecostal families living in the embassy who had run into the embassy to escape. They were there when I arrived. George Shultz took a great interest. When he came over the first time he wanted to meet with them. I told him a little about the history of this group. They were a fascinating bunch of people. Almost typical of Russian doctrinaire view of whatever they were doing. During the time these two families were in the embassy, living on the ground floor of the old building, they had a religious schism and wouldn't talk to each other. Then the boy of one family got interested in the girl of the other family and you had a Romeo and Juliet thing going on. That whole thing was a constant soap opera. This was something Reagan took an interest in. Every time he would see a Russian he would say, "Unless you can solve that problem

there is no way we are going-" This is what I mean by "leading with a few truths." Gorbachev shrugged, he couldn't believe that the President of the United States was that interested, so they decided to do something about it. They were helped by a wonderful guy on our side who had always taken a lot of interest in Russian stuff, Olin Robison. Olin was a Baptist minister from Texas but later became an academic and the president of Middlebury College. He now is the president of Salzburg Seminary in Austria. Olin took on a couple of jobs for various presidents to solve problems like this. He was the one that really had the most influence on the eventual settlement, which was to get one of these Pentecostals to agree to go home. She was allowed out, which was enough to convince all of them that if they went back they would get out. That is how it was solved. Since that time some of the preachers around the United States have taken credit for having done this, but it was Olin Robison who did it.

Q: During this period when Andropov died and Chernenko came in, were we worried about some instability. That this was a nuclear power -- was this a danger to us?

HARTMAN: Those who were interested in negotiations were really disappointed because it was quite evident, that, with that kind of turmoil at the top or no top -- that we weren't going to make any serious progress. There had always been a question of how to convince the military to go along with some of the ideas that were being inserted by the people who knew about arms control. There were very few military who really knew what they were doing. There were some attached to delegations but these guys were not commanders. They weren't high up in the military. They became military specialists and it was always a question. I can remember in the '70s when we were meeting with Brezhnev and President Ford in Vladivostok. Every once in awhile Brezhnev would go out of the room; we would learn later that a general was back there in that room, and he would go back there and talk to him about what we were discussing. At that particular time, we were trying to reach some conclusions on types of missiles and numbers of warheads so he had to get that all cleared with his military. It has only become clear since we have been able to get into some of the archives and talk to people that the politburo itself was kept in the dark about the actual cost of the Russian military effort and what exactly they were doing. The defense secretary was on the politburo and he was a military officer and I think even the military had no way of computing costs. It was the old communist cost system. You never estimated the actual cost of producing something. At various times the military had competing teams designing their missiles. If both teams came up with a successful missile they would produce both. That is what led to this feeling on our side that there was a real threat there. We couldn't understand why they were producing so many. We later found it was just a fluke of their system. Their system never had to justify, nor did they pay attention to, the neglect of the rest of the economy due to the fact they were putting so much of their resource base into these military side effects. Yes, the place was deteriorating but I still can't remember anybody who said, "In my time the Berlin wall is coming down."

Q: I talked to someone who said a great speech was made in Berlin in October 1989 that nothing is going to happen in the next 50 years.

HARTMAN: Cap Weinberger is developing the theory that it was Reagan standing on the wall and telling Gorbachev to take that wall down. Cap says it was solely due to our interventions. The fact that we had a strong defense posture and they couldn't outspend us was important. The fact that we stood to contain them was important, but that regime brought itself down. There were a couple of good decisions and one of them was the advent of Shevardnadze. When Gromyko finally gave up the ghost and Shevardnadze was brought in -- he was brought up from Georgia to be on the politburo -- here again you learn about what made the Soviet system work. One of the things was that a lot of guys that first got to know each other as leaders of the Komsomol (the youth organizations of the communist party) in their regions developed these lifelong relationships. Gorbachev got to know Shevardnadze when they were both Komsomol leaders. Shevardnadze, who had a speckled history -- he had been interior minister and done some nasty things in Georgia -- the guy became a humanist as foreign minister and had a tremendous influence. I think we owe a lot to Shevardnadze in the non-intervention in Poland. There was certainly a lot of pressure in the politburo to go in there and clean that situation up. They didn't do it. The contributions, it seems to me that Gorbachev made, and which we owe a lot to Shevardnadze for: he got out of Afghanistan; he got out of Eastern Europe without a fight; and he began opening up that society so people would talk to each other, learn more about their history and eventually how bad communism had really been for them. Shevardnadze had a hell of a lot to do with that. He is still resented by the old communists as one of the guys who brought the regime down.

Q: How about when Shevardnadze came in -- was he your point of contact?

HARTMAN: Yes, I would go see him. This was where I began to feel that a real change was taking place. I would usually get an appointment late in the afternoon, the sun had gone down, and we would be sitting there in the semi-darkness. I can remember one time he said, "There is a film that is going to come out soon by a Georgian film maker. It is called Pakalania which means redemption." The film involved a kind of mythological thing with bodies coming out of graves and stuff like that. He said, "This Georgian producer came to see me, when I was head of the communist party in Georgia, and showed me the script and said he wanted to make that film." He said, "It took me three hours to read this thing through that night. I couldn't get out of my chair." He had been so moved and it made him think so much of the members of the families that had been shot in the '30s. All of these things kept coming back to him. He called him in the next day told him they were going to make that film. He didn't know whether it would ever be shown but they were going to make it. Of course it was made and was a fantastic film. To us it was unbelievable. I went to the opening in Moscow. When he came up to Moscow it took him about a year to get people to agree to show this film. All of intellectual Moscow, and some of the party leaders, were at this film opening. It was the most moving experience I have ever had. Here we were sitting in this big theater on Pushkin Square. After the film was over not a person in the audience could look another person in the eye. There was no talk between people. They sort of gradually floated out to the doors. Husbands and wives talked to each other and they kind of looked off. They were all so moved by this film they just kind of drifted off and went home, but they couldn't face each other. Because I'm sure each one of them had recalled what happened to

grandpa or grandma, what personal friend of theirs had been dragged off. However, that wasn't what the picture was about. It was about a character who was clearly in the graveyard. The whole thing was done in ways that had nothing to do with reality. Every person in that audience understood exactly what that film was about. That is the kind of thing that brought that regime to its knees.

Q: Did you have any discussions with Gorbachev himself?

HARTMAN: Yes, but very rarely. Only when somebody very senior would come, and the reciprocity held because the Russian Ambassador didn't get to see Reagan either. When a senior group of senators would come or a minister other than the Secretary of State; obviously when the Secretary of State came we would go to see Gorbachev. He played tricks just like the old guys. He tried to exclude me. I remember once he said they should have a smaller meeting, stay out of the way. George Shultz would not play those games. He did it with President Reagan in Geneva, to the horror of some of Reagan's advisors. But Reagan had thought of it and almost planned it himself. We were meeting in a house that belonged to a private individual. There was a guest house down by the lake, and the President had it all fixed up with a fire in the fireplace. They traipsed off with just the interpreters and talked down there. That had a tremendous influence on Gorbachev. That was their first meeting. He couldn't understand Reagan's interest in things like the Pentecostals or his saying to him how bad a system he represented. But gradually he began to see: well this is a man, he's got certain ideas, which I don't believe, and I had to convince him he was wrong. During the course of the conversation, the President sort of said (because we saw the notes of the interpreter), "You know what we ought to do is to be looking toward a non-nuclear world." Of course that horrified Cap Weinberger and all the generals. How the hell do you get to a non-nuclear world, how do you prove it. It was the way Reagan thought -- big picture -- these are dangerous weapons, what do we do with them? Get rid of them. That played out several years later in Reykjavik, Iceland. During that summer Paul Nitze and his opposite number negotiated a rather good scenario for what we were going to do in Iceland to agree on the next steps towards arms reduction. They must have come in and briefed Gorbachev. This is my theory because the archives don't show this yet, but I'm pretty sure I'm right because I've talked to a number of participants. After he described what they had agreed on, Gorbachev must have said, "Is that all you guys have got? Let me at them. I can take care of this guy. He wants a non-nuclear world. I'm going to talk to him in those terms -- to hell with your preparations." And that is what he did. He came in and started talking about getting rid of all nuclear weapons. As I say, these guys like Richard Perle, Cap Weinberger and all these other guys were just horrified by this. Paul Nitze understood better, I think, what the dynamic was up there and was anxious to go for a reasonable agreement. Nitze thought they could take care of this with a statement saying, "Eventually maybe we should get to this but we won't get there for awhile." Gorbachev held onto this position for so long that it broke up the meeting. He felt he could get much more of a commitment out of Reagan based on his reading of his opposite number. These meetings were fabulous for finding out about things and talking to people. While Gorbachev and Reagan were meeting alone, and later just the two foreign ministers -- Shevardnadze and George Shultz-

Q: Which meeting are we talking about?

HARTMAN: This is Reykjavik, in an old white school house on a barren cliff with the wind blowing through because this is wintertime in Iceland. The rest of us, all the advisors, were upstairs in the school house talking to each other. I remember Yakovlev and Akhromeyev, the marshals, big cheeses of the Soviet military, were both there. In a conversation in which Yakovlev and Akhromeyev were participating, they found out they had commanded small marine units in Leningrad during the war and they never talked about that aspect of their earlier careers. Then Paul Nitze was particularly good at sitting somebody down and getting him to talk about himself, his family and things that were far away from what we were doing. This was my technique too. The most revealing discussions were the ones where people talked about themselves or their family or history and got away from anything where they had to stick to the propaganda line or official policy line. I was fascinated by that, because we were there together for hours.

Q: Everybody was quite nervous about the two principals by themselves?

HARTMAN: Oh boy, were they ever! Perle was going out of his mind. They couldn't do what Paul did, which was to have this kind of conversation. Paul always treated his opposite number as a human being. He found he could get a lot out of them on a human level. It didn't always change the official position, but at least it made for a kind of exchange that was human and civilized. And a guy like Yakovlev was, we later see it in his career even to this day, he was that kind of person. I think he has played a useful role in the whole post Soviet period. I remember a time in Madrid, after the 007 shoot-down when a Korean plane was shot down. George Shultz was furious about that. It wasn't just the incident itself. It was the fact that the Russians were saying that either it did not take place or they were continuing to say, once they had admitted it had taken place, that it was a spy plane. George was the kind of fellow who felt strongly about something that involved human beings -- after all hundreds of people died.

Q: Including a congressman.

HARTMAN: Including a congressman, that's right. George began the Madrid meeting by saying, "I don't want to discuss anything until we have discussed this." Gromyko said, "If that is all you are going to discuss, I'm not going to stay here." They stood toe-to-toe, even though they were across the table from each other -- never sat down. The meeting finally broke up. George had no success in moving Gromyko. Gromyko was really a pain in the butt. There was no way of talking him out of a position and particularly in something like that where he was in total denial. He didn't want to discuss it -- it was none of our business. That is why it was such a change with Shevardnadze. I can remember the first time Shevardnadze came to Washington. George had a couple of us with Shevardnadze over to his house. It was a modest house in Spring Valley, and he decided he was going to cook steak the way George Shultz cooked steak. He built a fire in the fireplace and when the fire finally got down to coals he took this beautiful thick steak out and threw it on the coals. Everybody looked at him and said "We've never seen

anything done this way. How is it going to turn out?" Of course it came out beautiful. You scrape off some of the ashes and eat it. That made a big impression on Shevardnadze. The fact that he would take him into his home, this was an American family living modestly. He had a lot of respect for Shultz. Later on, when Mrs. Shevardnadze was ill, and they weren't quite sure what it was, George arranged to have her treated in California. It was a close, human relationship that was built up in that period. These are the things people don't take into account when they think of an ambassador's life. There is the official level and exchanges you have, particularly in a society like the Soviet society. It is not a relationship of friendship and cooperation and alliance but is very much antagonistic, where they try to use you and you try to get through to them. The life there is very different. You are thrown back much more on your own people and living with other ambassadors. Indeed, some of our closest friends were the Pakistani Ambassador, the Indonesian Ambassador, the Egyptian Ambassador. At one point the Egyptian Ambassador arranged a tour of about five ambassadors (us included and our daughter) to go on a boat up the Nile, see Abu Simbel. He took us around Egypt. He had been the former head of the police there, so he knew a lot about what was going on in Egypt. You really develop very close relationships with your colleagues. It was like being in enemy territory. We were all treated the same way. Even those who were supposedly more friendly toward the Soviet regime were all treated the same way. This organization was the one that gave out the favors and allowed you to do certain things. We all suffered from the same system, even those who were supposedly befriended by the Russians.

Q: I've just had an interview with Tom Macklin. Tom was talking about dealing with this. Did you have the feeling that in a way the KGB was trying to throw a spanner in the works as things were beginning to warm up? I'm thinking of the problem with the embassy and the attempts to penetrate it.

HARTMAN: I think these were permanently in the relationship. First of all, let's talk about the building. The initial agreement on building the two embassies was made back in the '70s. This is the new embassy in Moscow. My predecessor as assistant secretary for Europe was Walt Stoessel, who later became ambassador both in Germany and in Russia. Walt, who knew Moscow, was very tough on the agreement we were going to sign with the Russians about building these embassies. He particularly objected to a part which allowed the Russians to prefabricate pieces of it off-site. Dobrynin came in to see Henry Kissinger when he was national security adviser. He said, "Dammit, Brezhnev is coming to town, he wants one of the big agreements that we are going to sign, this one on building the two embassies. Your guys in the State Department are being difficult about this." Henry naively believed Dobrynin more than he believed his own staff, and ordered this agreement be signed. Walt did under protest. Sure enough, when we got to the actual building of the building, it was in this off-site building process that the Russians built spying devices into the building of their system. To this day I don't think the intelligence community knows exactly how that system was supposed to work. It was something quite different from what we thought it would be and what we did, because in the building of their building, we put little microphones in various bricks around the building. I remember at one point the Russians had a press conference and showed all the things

they had found in their bricks. Damned if they didn't find every one of them. We went through and tried to pick out stuff in our building but a couple of things turned out to be old cigarette packages that had got caught in the cement. Typical Russian sloppy fashion. One theory I've heard was the whole building was supposed to resonate from microwaves that were put on it and conversations could then be picked up. After Yeltsin got in and appointed a private lawyer as head of the KGB, he gave Bob Strauss what he said were all the plans for the embassy that they had made to do something to it. Whether they revealed all or didn't, I don't know. When I got to Moscow, I found Washington was in a total state of disorganization.

Q: This is tape 10, side one with Art Hartman.

HARTMAN: On the building of the embassy I found there was no central coordination that brought together the building people and the intelligence people -- both counter intelligence and intelligence -- and it was really my going around town talking to the FBI and the CIA that caused a committee to be formed that got hold of the problem. Our builders were building and could have cared less about what system might be put in or how it was going to be done. I think there was a general feeling that they were going to protect themselves by building the rooms. The thought that the rooms might be compromised in some way wasn't there. We brought along a number of American workers to do the sensitive parts of the building but eventually they called it quits because there was no way to cleanse the things. So they stopped the Russians. It was after that (after my time) that they settled on a way to destroy the top of our building and put on another one. This was Jim Schlesingers suggestion for how to cure the problem. The Russians went on to build a very beautiful building here in Washington which I'm sure they enjoy very much and it is a great entertainment place.

Q: Also it dominates the area around the National Cathedral and according to experts you can focus your antenna on any phone system in the Washington area.

HARTMAN: There are different experts, and some say the position up there made no difference, but the technology now is such that you can do this from almost any point and even satellites can do it. I recently visited our embassy in Moscow and it is quite interesting. You have to go through three check points before you get to see the ambassador, and there are these wonderful entertaining spaces on the ground floor and the first floor. I said to the ambassador, "This must be wonderful to have all this stuff." He said, "We never use it." I asked why not and he said, "Because no Russian wants to come in here and go through that many check points -- the thick glass doors -- so we entertain at Spaso House where people can just walk in and also at restaurants." So much for this new hundred million dollar building or whatever it is. The whole security thing, and you know I was caught up in this marine thing.

Q: This is the Sergeant Lonetree case?

HARTMAN: Sergeant Lonetree. He was a very unhappy Indian, who before this episode was discovered, my wife and I kept an eye on him because he always seemed to be on the

outs with his colleagues. We invited him to Thanksgiving dinner because Lonetree seemed lonely. It turned out that one of the Soviet women in the embassy had taken him in so to speak, and the man she described as her uncle was a KGB handler and was asking him to do various things. I think a later thorough analysis revealed none of the things -- which at the time were headlined in the newspapers here -- that he had gotten Soviet agents in the night into the CIA area and they were able to get into the files -- did not happen. He did give them the layout plan of the embassy but the Russians knew pretty much where everybody was, and there were only certain places that were secure and those were the rooms we had built to be secure. We had ways of monitoring those to see that nothing was heard on the outside nor projected inward. The paranoia was evident during that whole episode -- to the point where I went up to Congress and said 90% of what I said and did I wanted the Russians to hear because it was another way of communicating with these people. They were horrified and thought, "Here is another ambassador who doesn't care about security." The worst people sometimes on security were these visiting congressional delegations. They would sit around in the snack bar and talk, including the lady who is now the senator from Maine, who was then in the House, Olympia Snowe. She came over there, "How terrible it is the Secretary of State is going to have to hold conversations in a Winnebago." All of this was blown up and I later learned from a Russian friend that the Soviets had blown this up publicly. They had put out a lot of little stories about how important the Lonetree penetration had been because they wanted to take our eyes off the Aldrich Ames case, where they actually had somebody who was revealing to them the innermost real secrets.

Q: He was equivalent to a Kim Philby with the CIA.

HARTMAN: Oh, boy, and he knew all the operations and all the people who were our contacts in Russia. To have Cap Weinberger make the statement he did on the Lonetree case, that this was the greatest loss we ever had in the intelligence field. I knew the head of the Marine Corps and we both knew this was not true. He, (P. X. Kelley), was obviously not just protecting the marines, but they had known enough about the details of it to know this was a poor sap who could have done a lot of damage but didn't. He revealed it himself when he got to Vienna, Austria, and was approached again. I remember we had one meeting in Vienna. We were standing around waiting for -- I can't remember who the foreign minister was, maybe it was Shevardnadze -- to come and I see Lonetree there. So I took George Shultz, who was a former Marine, over to meet him and said, "Here is a Marine who used to be with us in Moscow." It was shortly after that - maybe it was because of that conversation -- that Lonetree went to the security officer and said, "Hey, I'm into something that is deep." He went to jail and we tried to get him out earlier than his sentence, which was for years and years. He is finally out now and somebody told me he was trying to make contact with this Soviet woman because he genuinely loved her.

Q: Did you find that the heavy hand of security came down on the embassy -- I'm talking about our security -- we are just going through a spate of that right now because of a few listening devices and the loss of a computer in the State Department. Did that happen to you all?

HARTMAN: I think it is true. My quarrel with the security people has never been that you shouldn't have security, but you should have it in the right things. There are things that are important to keep secure and then there is a lot of stuff that is classified in order to keep it away from the American public. I think security is diminished by the more stuff you try to put under that tent. I have always been in favor of having unclassified posts. My successor in Paris has now succeeded in doing it. I was going to try it, for example, in Russia, when we were opening up Kiev. I said, "Kiev is isolated, it is way out there and the reason we want to have people in Kiev is so people can go out and talk, and see what the situation is and we don't need a big classified embassy with marine guards and special communications equipment. If they have anything to tell us of a classified nature, let them come back to Moscow, go into our secure area and prepare a report that can really be classified. Otherwise most of what we do is exchanging real information with real people, and it is not secret." My successor in Paris closed all the consulates, so he has volunteers from the embassy (hasn't added any new staff), and he has created unclassified offices in five places around the country with young officers, who for the first time get a lot of responsibility at an early age. They have contact -- I know the guy in Bordeaux is beside himself with his luck. He gets to talk to Juppé, the former prime minister of France, who is now the mayor of Bordeaux. And Juppé is delighted because the Americans have a presence in Bordeaux. They help business men, the visa stuff goes back to Paris. There is no need for security guards because nothing is classified down there. My successor is convinced that the moment he walks out the door, (this is Felix Rohatyn), the bureaucracy in Washington is going to close these places down as a danger. Yet everybody in it is a volunteer. They all know somebody can throw a bomb through the window because you are never totally protected. My DCM in Paris was shot on the street as he walked out of his house. A military officer was killed on the street because people followed him, knew who he was, and wanted to make a statement by killing him. So anybody who serves overseas is taking a risk. The question is, do you totally negate the purpose of having people abroad by building such a security net around them that they can have no contacts with the local population. I don't think the Crowe report, which calls for building these very secure embassies, takes enough account of what it is we should be doing abroad so that people who know what the risks are go abroad, but you don't have any unnecessary activities. Seventeen people in Nairobi were doing vouchers. You could do vouchers in South Dakota, you don't have to do them in Nairobi. With (inaudible) communications, I think we can redesign -- and there are some new studies on reform of our whole foreign operations that call for a redesign of what we have abroad, the reasons we are abroad, and what we do -- so that we better communicate; that we have better security for that communication which is necessary for secure purposes. That we have fewer people, and those people who are over there, knowing what the job is, and knowing what the risks are.

Q: By the time you left there in '87, how did you feel things were going?

HARTMAN: I felt there was a much more stimulating political dialogue, but that the Soviet economy was getting nowhere. Mainly because the old guard, and Gorbachev himself, didn't understand what a modern economy was about. There were a few people

in the system who wanted some change, but each time they were batted down. So when you would go to these annual meetings of the supreme Soviet, the first thing would always be a four hour lecture by the head of the plant. He would say, "This is exactly how we are doing things. This is the price." Crazy. We all knew it was crazy and some Russians knew it was crazy.

Q: Were we able to begin to get bright young Russians to go to business schools and things of this nature?

HARTMAN: We didn't have enough of that. We should have been focusing much more on exchange programs. Exchange budgets were cut all during that period. The Chinese understood the importance, and maybe you are going to find out how subversive it really is. There are 200,000 students in this country today. We have maybe 1,000 Russians today. We should be doing much more of the exchanges. Some of the reformers came in after I left, and I still have a lot of contacts with Russia. We might, at some point, talk about what is a post-foreign service career. I've gone through that.

Q: Alright. This might be a good place to stop and maybe have another session talking about your experiences in the post foreign service and what you brought with you. You retired in '87.

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This is the last tape of the interview with Arthur Hartman. Today is the 4th of January 2001. We are now picking up the time on your post retirement career. Can we talk about François Mitterrand -- we may have covered some of it but I'd like to get your impressions of him sort of in a capsule.

HARTMAN: In 1954, when I was first in France, I was part of the European Army negotiating team and part of our job was to go around and talk to French politicians, and get them abreast of what was actually going on so they didn't oppose the treaty when it came up for a vote. At that time, Mitterrand (this was before Mitterrand became a Socialist) was the minister of interior. I called on him in his apartment, with Martin Hearst, who was at the embassy at the time. This guy was lying in his chaise lounge with a velvet jacket on, and he looked like the most effete fellow I had ever seen in my life. Books all over the place. Even at that time he was portraying himself as "the French intellectual" and of course playing around with lots of women. An opportunist, who after the Socialists stubbed their toe in a big way, and Guy Mollet was thrown out, he in effect took over the party and it became his way to power. He fought to become president several times unsuccessfully and then finally was elected. When I was there, just before I went to Russia, he had become the president. George Bush was sent over to sort of make contact with him, as one of the first things the Reagan administration did. Even at that time the guy had such an ego. All during that period he would build these monuments. There was the great monument out at the Defense, a big square thing.

Q: This is the Arch de la Défense.

HARTMAN: Well, behind the famous arch at the Champs Elysees. It was going to be a human rights center. Then he went into building a national library. They had the most beautiful library in the world in the Marais, one of their old buildings. They built this thing with four towers, and the books were all up in the towers. That is the last thing you want to do with books, expose them to the sun, and the elements, and the heat. The people are all down in the basement. It was typical of him and his culture minister, Mr. Lyon, who came from Marseilles. Big splashes in a sort of French intellectual way. The odd thing was he was closer to us than Giscard probably, in terms of policy on NATO and things like that, because he was always looking for a balance against the Germans who were obviously much stronger. I'll just get to the part that I knew about in my post-career. Through a friend, I joined one of these odd things. Having served in Russia, people asked me to be on advisory groups because they were interested in doing business in Russia and my friend, Paul Douglas, got me involved in Elf Aquitaine, which is one of the big French oil companies. At that time, headed by a scientist and a guy that was intellectually interested in everything that was going on, not just oil. He brought Elf Aquitaine into the modern world by starting a chemical company, a drug company, and I think he even went into women's cosmetics. He put together this advisory group and gave us jobs to do before each meeting. We all had to come prepared on some subject. I, obviously, on foreign affairs and Russia, where Elf had some very big interests. There were a lot of more distinguished people on this advisory committee -- the head of the Deutsche Bank, the man who was later assassinated; John Sawhill, who later became one of the big environmentalists in the United States, and was an expert on energy. Also Paul Douglas and a number of other people, particularly industrialists in France -- the head of Club Med, the head of the big cement works -- all these people were on this advisory committee and suddenly Mitterrand appoints someone else. We all get a letter from this guy, all of us, particularly the head of the Deutsche Bank, you can imagine how he reacted to this -- saying, "I don't need any advice, I know what I am going to do" -- and dismissed it. No meeting, no thank you for what you've done, just dismissed it. It turned out that was the fellow who scraped off profits from Elf, part of which went to the Socialist party, part of which I'm sure went into Mitterrand's pocket and unfortunately, part of which went into Kohl's campaign in Germany and finally brought him down. Luckily, there were a good bunch of lawyers and prosecutors in France and they went after this guy and put him in jail. The case is still pending, and it is quite clear how it is going to come out. Also involved in this is the mistress (who was working for Elf), of the guy who was the former foreign minister.

Q: Was this the whore of the republic? She wrote a book called "The Whore of the Republic," Christine something or other.

HARTMAN: That whole thing, and now with Mitterrand's son it shows -- - -- -

Q: I was watching French TV last night. Gilbert Mitterrand was defending his brother. He had just got five million francs for advice.

HARTMAN: One of the things you look at across Europe these days is that practically all

of the governing forces have run into corruption problems -- Germany, Italy, France, even a little bit in the U.K., and certainly in Belgium. Politics is in trouble in Europe.

Q: Were we seeing this as a growth of American style politics such as TV?

HARTMAN: No, no, this comes from accepted ways of doing things in the past, which they gradually, sometimes looking at us, tried to change. That was how political parties were financed. Chirac, the present president of France, is right smack in the middle of all this now because he used his position as mayor of Paris to get all kinds of privileges and money into his party that he started, the RPR. He is up to his ears in it. They are accusing the mayor of Paris, but it is quite clear that Chirac, when he was mayor of Paris, did the same thing. It discredited him, and it discredited his prime minister of one time, Juppé (he has gone back to be mayor of Bordeaux now), but who also was caught in this same sort of thing. I think all over now they are changing their ways of how politics is financed, and it is a question of whether it comes from big industry, or people that have business with the government, or whether it comes directly from the way politicians can take money away from people because they control industry, or they control contracts.

I think today we wanted to talk a little bit about what life is like after. I've thought all during my service that when you get toward the top of your career, you have to have one foot out because there is no way you are going to escape being tainted by the administration you work for. People are going to want you out of the way. I described how, when I was assistant secretary for Kissinger, I had already thought when a new administration came in it would be difficult. So I was already talking to some of my business friends about another career outside. But along came France. After France, the Reagan administration came in, and I didn't think there was much hope, so I started talking again to some friends, but along came Moscow. So it was four years later and I was getting older but still with enough chance to do something outside. Also, during the time you are a career officer, you don't have an opportunity to build any kind of capitol for your children; we have five children. College bills to pay, etc. At the time of leaving Moscow I made a lot of speeches, which during your first year out is a good way to make money.

Q: What do you mean by make speeches?

HARTMAN: Industrial associations, Insurance Brokers of America, Burlington Railroad at its annual convention.

Q: How do you go about this? Do you just say I want to make a speech?

HARTMAN: Word of mouth. I didn't have an agent, some people have an agent. An executive say of Burlington Railroad would ask if they wanted to have a speech on Russia. I would develop an amusing pattern and people were pleased with it. Usually I was the straight guy in the morning session, and then in the afternoon they would have Mark Russell or somebody like that to entertain them. It was always at a big golfing resort in the desert out in California or down in Florida. I also talked to a number of

Jewish groups, because I had come out of Moscow and there was the whole thing with Jewish immigration. There also were some people trying to get out. So talking to these Jewish groups built up a case for getting Sharansky out, and for getting some of the other people who were in jail out. Those speeches paid well. I think the highest I ever got was $15,000.00 for a speech. Kissinger, at that time, was getting $25,000.00 and more. It only goes for about a year. After that you are old news and nobody asks you to come around unless it is a university, which I gladly did, and where they don't pay. But it was good to have that contact with the students. Making these speeches you make more contacts. For example, I made a speech at a university in Indiana, where my wife comes from, and her grandmother actually graduated from DePaul. Who should be on the board there but one of the top guys at Boeing. He said, "Hey we have a lot of stuff we are trying to do with the Russians and we need some advice." I got a contract as a consultant with Boeing which went on for a couple of years. I did that with a number of other companies -- General Atomic, because I was interested in pushing nuclear energy, because I thought that was the cleanest kind of energy. General Atomic was working on a new type of reactor that was going to be safe, and would be the reactor of the future, and not like the old ones. That was unsuccessful because when the Clinton administration came in the first thing they announced was, "We aren't going to do anything nuclear." Senator Ribicoff, of Connecticut, is an old friend and he came to me and said, "Art, I'm on an insurance board." Walt Stoessel, who was my predecessor in EUR, and also in Moscow, had been on this board until he died. So Abe said, "Would you like to go on the board?" It was ITT Hartford, part of the ITT group. He said, "Why don't you come to New York and I'll introduce you to Rand Araskog and others who run ITT, but who are also on the ITT Insurance Board." So I did that and they asked me to come on the board. That was a fabulous experience. First of all, I knew nothing about how the insurance business worked. It was going more and more international so I had an opportunity to advise them on international things. We would meet around the world. We met in Holland, in England, and various places around the country. Then another old contact I had, a Dutchman, introduced me to a guy who was head of Dreyfus Funds. I would see him socially every once in awhile and finally he said, "How would you like to go on the board of some of my funds, the Dreyfus funds?" I said, "Fine but I'm on an insurance board and I'm not sure under the old SEC rules that is possible." They checked, and apparently at that time under the SEC law it was legal. I'm still on that Dreyfus Board, that is the one thing I've kept. ITT put me off when I became 70. I got on a Venture Capital board, and this was a guy who had invented a wrist watch that you could communicate to. This was before the modern things which now work very well. In this case he made a deal with Seiko, the watch company, and it worked on the FM carrier signal. He had a lot of investment from a big Hong Kong firm, so I went on that board. That didn't turn out very well because it was before it's time, it was bulky, although it still operates on the west coast. They still have a system whereby you use it. It is in between a pager and the ability to send messages. It was bought out by Seiko in the end and I got off that board. The First American Bank got into trouble. Clark Clifford, (the advisor for Truman), called me up and said, "We are in a lot of trouble." They were involved with this Middle East bank. I asked a couple of my friends and they said, "Apparently the SEC and others, and the attorney general in New York, are very anxious to get some people on that board to make sure it stays straight and that the other people get off the board." So I went on that board

until that bank was sold. It took about nine months because the SEC at that time, didn't usually approve somebody being on a bank board, insurance, and an investment fund board. All of that meant I really got a look at the financial industry from a top level view.

Q: One talks about being on boards. What did you do?

HARTMAN: First of all, you get into the business that board runs and you participate so you have to learn about insurance, and you participate in decisions about how the company is run. The president comes to you. The CEO comes to you on the board and suggests certain things. You have to approve his compensation, the strategies are presented and discussed. Usually the boards are made up of a variety of people. Although there are boards, but I was never on one, that are totally controlled by some maniac who runs the company, and he puts all his friends on and they are there as yes people. The boards I was on, however, were a lot of work. You study the documentation and financial figures before you go there to discuss these things. The main thing I was doing on a for profit basis was consulting, (again that tapers off after you have been out two or three years).

Q: Were you running into a phenomena when you were on these boards, that attracted a lot of criticism in specific cases of the tremendous gap between the compensation for say presidents of firms and what the working stiffs were getting?

HARTMAN: In the financial field, what was happening was the working stiffs were also getting a lot more money and you had to compete with other places. For example, at Dreyfus, to run those funds you had to compete with other investment banks, and other fund managers who were hiring the best guys away from you. So gradually, what everybody did, was try and link the compensation to performance. In an up market that is fairly easy to do. No one knows yet what it is going to be as the market declines, and particularly as one of the favorite ways they do this is through stock options. If the price declines then these guys never get a chance to exercise their options. Or else they go back to the board and say, "Please do it at a lower level." So they finally do make their money. I had been trained in economics, and I worked a lot of jobs in economics in the foreign service so it was not a difficult transition. It was a totally different career. The other things, not so much on the profit side, around 1994 after things began breaking up in the Soviet Union, I decided these government programs were not going to work as far as really getting a market economy started. They worked with the government, they worked with the national bank, that never changed, the banking system in Russia was a mess. So I was working on the idea that what we ought to get was an investment fund, and then we would go and find entrepreneurs who had begun to appear in Russia and in other countries of the former Soviet Union and back them. This involved raising quite a bit of money, which we started to do in 1993. I ran into some people in New York who had exactly the same idea, and were from the business sector, who knew how to set up an equity fund. In the end we raised one hundred sixty million dollars with another guarantee from OPIC, which we then had to get rid of because the bureaucracy was so bad at OPIC that we no longer could-

Q: OPIC being? (Overseas Private Investment Corporation)

HARTMAN: The U.S. organization that permits guarantees. We had ten million from the World Bank through it's IFC window. We had ten million from the EBRD, which is the European Bank, set-up to encourage enterprise in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Those guys gave me a lot of trouble. They put people on my board, (I was chairman of the board), who constantly raised all kinds of bureaucratic points which caused us hell. But we also had some excellent people from the private sector on the board, and we were finally able to put together a really good team in Moscow. That was the essential thing, to run these investments. They put people on the boards of these middle size investments and now we are six or seven years into a ten year fund. We have paid back over two hundred forty million dollars on the one hundred eighty million that was borrowed. Aside from the fact that it was Russia, I hadn't known much about equity investing but I have learned a lot in the last five or six years. We have had only one investment that has gone sour, and that was where the Russian mafia tried to get into a series of markets we opened around Moscow, in partnership with this duty free outfit from Ireland. As soon as I saw the hand of the mafia I said, "We will write it off, I don't want you guys being threatened by these people because they are tough players." We wrote it off -- a million dollar loss. Other than that, we have had success with a chain of restaurants, and a beer company we just sold to Intergroup. We have a paper company. We have a logging operation out in Sakhalin, which has been good ecologically. It has taught them a lot about ecology out there. We have a cement company. The most successful thing we had was a cellular phone system which we actually sold. It went onto the New York market and is now quoted on the New York Stock Exchange. Very successful. Now the managers in Moscow are going to run their own (inaudible) and we no longer have a board, but I'll be on an advisory committee to that group.

Q: Talk a bit about how you saw the break-up of the Soviet Union when you got in around '94. We just hear the horror stories about the mafia.

HARTMAN: Obviously, a lot of things went wrong. What went right I think, was that they did privatize most of that stuff that could be turned into other kinds of businesses. It obviously made a lot of people a lot of money to begin with. My hope is that some of that will start coming back in now when things are beginning to settle down. It is quite clear, you don't get a change in a society like the Russian society overnight. I think it will take three generations before you get anything that looks like a society based on some kind of law and politics that is reasonably stable. They have had some transitions with elections, which is a step in the right direction. They have somebody in charge now who is doing some bad things in terms of civil rights. He is going after only the (inaudible) who control the media, which is bad, because that media has been relatively free. This is Putin. But on the economic side, he is doing a few good things. My view has always been that what you have to do is build up this middle ranking enterprise level to get people trained to do things in the right way. That is, to have a long-term business interest; to have transparency in their businesses; to believe in the rule of law, apply it and pay their taxes. We found some people like that in Russia. I think, by example, if they are successful then others will come to believe that is the way to do business. At a lower

level, despite all these stories you see, there is a lot of that going on. As you get away from Moscow and St. Petersburg, and as you get into some of the better run provinces -- you need a good governor who is honest and is not on the take all the time in order for that kind of enterprise to flourish. It's a beginning, and I thought this was one way to help by having good people in Moscow. Our staff there is mostly Russian. Two have graduated from the Wharton School in Philadelphia. The top man is American and number two is a Frenchman, all of whom have had about ten years experience running businesses in Russia. Actually the big crash in '97 was the best thing that could have happened to us, because we were manufacturing products that were competing with imports. When the exchange rate went kablooey, we had no competition from imports any more and our businesses began to flourish. That was luck, but what isn't luck is the way you go in and train these people and get their books to be run on GAAP accounting. You get a transparency, you get them to know they can't cheat minority share holders, and it is a constant battle but the rewards are there. One of the fights I had was with these big organizations like the World Bank, IFC, and EBRD. I kept insisting we had to pay our people in Moscow a lot of money to keep them there. I kept saying to these people who lived in Washington and London, "How would you like to go work in Moscow, how much would you have to be paid?" It got so bad I finally wrote to Jim Wolfensohn, the head of the World Bank, and another friend who was head of the EBRD at the time, and said, "Get these guys off my back. They will ruin what looks like something that is really going to work." They did, and we pay these guys very well now, and now they get 20% of all the profits. That was another thing I got involved in, and I did so because I felt there was something to be done. That's pretty much the profit side.

Q: One of the things that had been a distinguishing feature of the Soviet economy was the central economy, and the products coming out were lousy. Was quality control a problem when you got started on this?

HARTMAN: People didn't know what good quality was until after the fall of the Soviet Union. At that time they imported a lot of stuff but only the higher apparatchiks could get at it. They had a special store in central Moscow, where you could go and see foreign products. Or when they traveled abroad, (which they thought was a great privilege), they would buy stuff and bring it back. When things liberalized, these products came in like mad. They had a lot of oil and gas and stuff like that so there was foreign exchange to buy these products so people got a look at what the West produced. The Japanese, the Koreans, and everybody were in there with their products. When the crash came it cut off these imports but by that time there were a number of Russian manufacturers who had some experience with the West. For example, our paper company had practically a monopoly on paper for fax machines and reproduction. But it had to be good quality, so they came up with a product that finally could substitute for a foreign product that previously had been imported. Same with the brewery. People used to buy Heineken in Moscow when they could get the dollars to import it. Then they liked our brewery. Finally, it was bought by the biggest brewery in the world -- Interbrew of Belgium. Quality gradually improved after they got a look at other products. It isn't that they are bad at these things, they just don't know how. Our team isn't composed of heavy experts in every field, so when we were trying to modernize a cement plant, we went to the

biggest cement works in Switzerland and hired a couple of guys to redo the whole plant. Same thing happened in the beer works -- we hired the head of Perrier in Europe to come in and run the Georgian Water Company -- bottled water. I think in the end we are going to sell it to the Perrier folks. That's how we get out of our investments. They make good missiles -- they go up to where they want them to go. It isn't that they are incompetent, they just were never organized in a way that was veered toward profit and cost. The costing in the old Soviet Union was terrible. They didn't worry about real cost. The cost was only what they were budgeted. It had nothing to do with the real value of the product. They never had to market price anything. That would require a generation of change to get over that. That is the profit side of what I got involved in. Then there was the whole non-profit side of post career. Shortly after I got out, I got a call from Elliot Richardson's wife, Ann, who at that time was on the nominating committee for the Harvard Board of Overseers. She asked if I would like to run and I said, "sure." It was something that interested me, and I had maintained my connections with Harvard over the years. She said, "Okay, one of your classmates will call you and tell you how you have to do this." One way was to join the Harvard Club in New York, so they would get the New York voters from Harvard to know you, and they would put an article in their little bulletin. Another classmate, who was the head of a greeting card company in the middle West, passed the word among all my classmates. I got elected to the board and was on the board of Harvard Overseers at the time when there was a lot of controversy about investments in South Africa. We had a couple of people on the board who were voted in on a write-in basis. That is, they were young people who were opposed to all the things the Harvard Corporation was doing because they weren't tough enough on South Africa. It finally ended up that Bishop Tutu was selected to the Harvard Board of Overseers and was a colleague of mine on the board. It was a very unusual experience, because one of the things you do on the Overseers is you join certain committees to review the work of schools or departments. You learn a lot about what those schools or departments are up to. Depending on how the president of Harvard wants to use the Board of Overseers, you are either carried around, (as I told Derek Bok, the president when I first came on), like a rabbits foot to avoid evil, or when he runs into a problem. Neil Rudenstine succeeded him, and Neil really used the Board of Overseers to do things he wanted to do that he was having trouble with. Either with the faculty, former students, or alumni. It was a very good experience. You are thrown in with a bunch of extraordinary people. Hanna Gray, for example, was on the Board with me most of the time, and then she became an officer of the corporation at Harvard. She is the former President of the University of Chicago. The head of the National Science Foundation was on the board.. Al Gore was on the Board, along with Steve Dormer, number two at Microsoft. Armstrong, from AT&T. There were a bunch of people who brought all kinds of different points of view to the Board. There were six elected each year for six year terms, so there were 36 of us on the Board and we would meet four or five times a year.

Q: What areas or specialties were you concerned with?

HARTMAN: I became a great fan of the library system, and worked with the man who was the head of all the libraries at Harvard, as well as the man who was the head of the college library. There was the University libraries, and the medical faculty, and the law

school, the science fields, the theological school. There were all these libraries, and we were the group that looked at all the libraries. It became apparent to me, and I finally became the chairman of the committee, that there was a terrible problem at Widener Library, which is the main library at Harvard. It had not been modernized since 1913. It was a fire trap, books were not treated properly. Harvard was one of the first places to build an off-site storage place for books that weren't used too often, and a lot of its books were shipped out there over the objections of a number of the old faculty. It was a very successful program. People could get their books back in half a day. They just couldn't go down a line of books and see everything that was on the shelf. Gradually we developed a system of computerized cards so you knew exactly where the book was, and you could at least see the titles. In the modern way books are produced, you are going to soon be able to see a précis of what is in the book. We finally put enough pressure on the corporation, even before they raised the money in the campaign, to start a major reconstruction project at Widener Library. I was succeeded by a friend of mine, who was an editor of the *Economist* in London, and he put in one of our last reports, "I would hate to be the president of Harvard when I was approached by the New York Times correspondent the day after the fire." He stuck that in and it was enough to get the attention of the Corporation. They put up 30 million dollars to get the thing started. That was necessary because it takes three years to plan that kind of major reconstruction. The thing is almost finished now. Two years before I left the board -- four years into my term -- I was elected president of the board and that was quite an experience, because you have to work closely with the president, with the secretary of the university and the corporation. Before my time, John Whitehead was the president, and he was there during the time we were in a presidential search and Neil Rudenstine was picked, and all of us played a role in that. There is a lot of politics involved. There were a lot of people who objected to Neil Rudenstine, old alumni.

Q: What was his background?

HARTMAN: He came from Princeton where he was the Dean. He was an academic scholar in Elizabethan literature and a lot of the scientific community said, "Oh no, no, we need a scientist." Some people thought his very simple background should be held against him. There was one old guy I had to have lunch with twice to calm him down. He was one of the big contributors of the university. He said, "No this is terrible, his father was a guard." I said, "What's that got to do with this man who has made a career in university life?" I think he may have come from the Mellon Foundation. In any case it was quite an experience of sitting on the board of a major institution and total non-profit activity. I spent a lot of time going up to Cambridge, going around the country looking at other libraries and working with them.

Q: One hears about faculty battles, did you find yourself getting involved?

HARTMAN: On some visiting committees, yes. And there was the Dean of the College. Because the Dean of the College is the next important person at Harvard, he had some problems with some of his departments. He would use the visiting committee as a way at getting at those problems. In the whole fight in modern linguistics and romance language

departments, you know you had the Foucault kind of deconstructionism and the question was, "Is that all you are going to have. Are those people just hiring people like themselves or are they permitting sufficient diversity?" Another problem at Harvard was getting tenured women. The pool was not very great and you didn't want to reduce the quality -- so how do you do this? How do you train and encourage young women who are getting wonderful offers?

You train young women and encourage them to go into academic life rather than going to Wall Street and running a big fund. There were very few women in science, so how do you encourage that? I must say, diversity was one of Neil Rudenstine's big achievements. Also, getting various parts of Harvard to talk to each other. They were all sort of independent (inaudible). I can remember going to talk to John MacArthur, who was the dean of the business school, and saying to him, "There are so many areas the business school could help the rest of the university with, and yet they maintain their own fund raising. We could blow up the bridges on the Charles and you wouldn't care." He said, "I have to care about one thing, I've got to keep the Harvard name." I said, "If you are going to keep the Harvard name, dammit, you've got to participate." Finally, all the deans came around and the other great achievement of Neil Rudenstine was this interdisciplinary set of programs that he set up and trained, that brought the medical school faculty together with the scientists, and social scientists, and economists so that areas that really needed an interdisciplinary look got it. The college is another thing. Certain kinds of science and its effect on industry and economies helped. All of these things were areas he had a tremendous impact on. For that he is going to be missed. Then, he had the most successful funding campaign ever. He raised 75 million dollars.

Q: I've heard Harvard has more money than God.

HARTMAN: It was due to the campaign, but the Harvard investment group had one of the most successful records of investing. The endowment has just grown leaps and bounds in this up market. I hope they do as well, or at least stabilize things in the down market we have.

Q: One of the big concerns that caused considerable comment has been, during this period the growth of what has been termed "political correctness" in other words, "thinking right" which boils down to thought control. Was this an issue?

HARTMAN: Only in a couple of the departments. One of the jobs of the president of Harvard is every appointment gets approved by the president. That means he has to study exactly what the peer review process has been, and he has to talk to the deans. On a couple of occasions, in a couple of departments, they found that people were somehow or other, because of the way the area developed, producing the same kind of thought. They had to break that down to diversity in thought and diversity in people. The academic side was kept under control with the faculty, as it should be, but there were times when the faculty wanted outsiders to have a look and they were distinguished professors. The head of McGill was on our board. The president could turn to our board for a number of things. People with business interests; people with academic interests; the general public

-- to reflect on exactly how the university should be reacting. Once they got over the South African problem, there were few big political issues where the university students were camping out. Certainly after Bishop Tutu came to the board. He was a wonderful man by the way. He only came to a few meetings, but when he did, it was always good to have him there. I did that and my wife got on the board of her college, Wheaton College in Massachusetts, and went through a fund raising campaign and the picking of a new president. The current president is actually Bill Rogers' daughter. Bill just died.

Q: Yes, Secretary Rogers died. I guess it was yesterday.

HARTMAN: His daughter is president of Wheaton College. My wife also joined a group called the Faberge Foundation that does good works in bringing along young artisans in St. Petersburg, and we both go to meetings of that group. I spent a lot of time just out of Russia, on Jewish problems, before the break up of the Soviet Union. There was tremendous pressure for Jewish immigration, and a lot of people who were maltreated in that period that we had worried a lot about when I was ambassador. I was invited to go to Israel by Ambassador Harmon, who was then the head of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. I talked to them and met quite a few of the people that used to come to our Saturday open house in Moscow. They finally got out and went to Israel and were living there. The Una Chapman Cox Foundation was founded by Mrs. Cox on the basis that she had been saved by a young foreign service officer when she insisted on getting off a cruise ship. Her family founded the King Ranch in Texas, so she had a lot of money. She was on a world cruise and she got off the ship without papers, and was thrown in the clink. This young foreign service officer came and rescued her, and she liked the way he talked and did things. She left her entire estate to help the foreign service.

Q: I have to point out the young foreign service officer was a consular officer.

HARTMAN: He was, but no one knows his name. She has since died, but there is always a foreign service officer as trustee of this foundation. I did that for one tour. Now I'm still head of something called the Policy Council that advises the foundation on where it should give it's money. Now it has built up an investment -- I think it is up to about 12 million dollars. So we have almost a million dollars each year we can give to various things. We have supported one of the major studies of the reform of the foreign service that was done under Frank Carlucci. There are about four or five of these studies, and we are in the process of getting them to the new administration to see if we can't get some real reform. Everybody knows reform is needed to transform the foreign service from what it was in the cold war period, to whatever is going to be needed in the 21st Century. That is taking quite a bit of time. I'm also vice chairman of the American Academy of Diplomacy. Joe Sisco is the chairman, and Bruce Laingen is the president. Again, we use this as a pressure group to get change, and get support for the foreign service and the State Department. This year we gave awards to Senator Lugar and former Senator Nunn for what they have done on this Russian program, which is the most creative bit of diplomacy I've seen in the last 20 years. Those are the principal areas that my life has turned into. I advise the younger foreign service officers who reach a certain point in their career to look forward to this time. For one thing, you do make some money and it helps

you out. It is also very satisfying. Some of my friends get into ecology, they get into non-profits, they get into directorships of business organizations. You develop a lot of talents in the foreign service and in a foreign service career that are very useful on the outside and appreciated by people. Used as a basis to tell people, "Hey this is the quality of the people we have in the foreign service." For example, on this ITT thing, Larry Eagleburger was on the top board of ITT before he came back into government. I remember people saying to me at the time, "Where do you learn these skills." That kind of thing is very useful in addition to being very profitable to a young foreign service officer. We have examples all over. Carlucci is a former foreign service officer. Craig Johnston, who is vice president of the American Chamber of Commerce, had gone out and become one of the heads of a very large chemical company. After he worked for me in Paris, he left the foreign service, and the Cabot corporation -- then came back in as an under secretary for management. Now he is out again as vice president of the Chamber of Commerce. I would love to see him come back in again in this reform period, because he knows how things work in the department. You see this all over. Joe Sisco has had an amazing career following his service. He is on a number of boards, he and his wife both. All of this indicates to me there should be a certain fluidity, and people should not fear leaving the service and going on to something else. For one thing, it opens up the ranks so younger people can get more senior jobs. If you stay on until the very end it makes for a very stultified process down below and discourages many of the better officers who could themselves be promoted into higher jobs.

Q: Going back, during the Clinton administration when Strobe Talbot was running things, what was your impression of efforts to bring Russia and the other areas of the newly independent states into the world?

HARTMAN: Once I left the government, (and that was in '87 when Reagan was still president), I can't remember anybody in the government calling me and asking what I would do. Strobe was an old friend. One of the things I did in my post career, the people at the U.S.-China Committee came to me. They said they had an invitation from the Chinese general staff to put together a group of people who knew what was going on in Russia under Gorbachev to come and talk to them. So they asked if I would head such a group and I said I would. Among the people I took to China with me were Strobe Talbot, Condoleezza Rice, and a couple of academics. We went off to China and talked to the general staff for about three days and toured around China, finally ending up in far Eastern Russia to see what was going on there. I have always felt the Clinton administration, and indeed the Bush administration, once it turned to Russia, had paid too much attention to the government and not enough attention to encouraging some of these civil organizations -- like business, like non-governmental organizations. There was some of that, but it was done ineffectively. By getting themselves so far into dealing with the government, it seemed to me they were losing sight of what had to happen and what changes had to take place within society. They couldn't, or didn't, insist on enough conditionality by the government for what they were doing to get real change. I think they came to realize this after the crash -- for example the banking system was totally corrupt and needed to be made over. There were some very good technical assistance programs. Russia today has a very good nascent SEC because IFC, the World Bank

group, sent an advisor in to work with the guy who is heading up their securities and exchange commission. He spent two years there. He was a New York lawyer who knew all about investment funds and how you organize a market. He even spoke Russian. He sat next to this guy for two years who could turn to him and get advice. On the books, they have a pretty good system. Former Senator Bradley actually proposed this and got some legislation through. What you need is a major, major exchange program. The only way you are going to have a big change in that society is to get more people exposed. Not just in the United States, but to the West generally, and to the way things are done outside their country. They have very little experience in that field. So if I am ever asked by my friends in the new administration, I will tell them to put your focus on people. Put your focus not just in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but around the country. And above all, use people who have real knowledge of what is going on there. Often these enterprise groups that handle small investments in places like Eastern Europe and Russia are headed by people who don't have the foggiest idea of what Russia is. So they go over there, and they fritter the money away, and it doesn't do any good at all. There are plenty of people around now who have good experience. One of my old classmates, a retiree from Debevoise & Plimpton one of the big New York law firms, is Rod Perkins who volunteered because he has always been interested in Russia, as a retiree to go and run the office in Moscow. He has done a great job there. Not only getting business for Debevoise, but he advises people in the Russian government on how to develop this rule of law everybody talks about. I have another foundation (Foundation for International Arts & Education) I am chairman of that does exchanges in the cultural field to try and help museums. It is run by the guy who was my cultural attaché in Moscow, Greg Guroff. We have been working closely with Georgia. We've been working closely with other parts of the former Soviet Union and we recently had an exhibit of art that has been here since the beginning of this century. It comes from provincial museums in Russia. The money we make on that goes back to those provincial museums, and we make sure it gets there and is used properly. Every stage of the way you have to make sure that any money involved is being used for the purpose that it was intended for.

Q: It sounds like there certainly is a life after the foreign service. What skills that you brought with you from your foreign service experience have been particularly useful?

HARTMAN: Engaging with other people. Trying to bring points of view together. Public speaking. An ability to get a point of view across. Knowing where you have to go, either in a foreign government, or in a foreign society. The power points. You learn a lot about that here in Washington. I was in the State Department in key times. Have a lot of friends on the Hill and a good experience at working with them. Another thing we recently tried to do was to get the foreign service to break out of this business of not allowing foreign service officers to have real contacts on the Hill. Actually discouraging it.

Q: I think this is one of the major weaknesses of the foreign service -- they have so inhibited the people at the middle level from giving out information.

HARTMAN: That is the first thing in this report that is coming out. To break that down to become an information spreader, rather than an information garnerer. The whole

attitude toward classification has got to change. Ninety percent of what is classified is classified to keep us from embarrassing ourselves, or telling our own government and people what we are doing. It has nothing to do with its real security measure.

Q: Well, I want to thank you very much, it has been enlightening for me. I think one of the other things -- by going to other countries all of a sudden, like you are going to the Soviet Union -- you have to be a quick learner in this business. All of us have to be like paratroopers -- we land in unknown territory and we have to quickly orient ourselves and learn there.

HARTMAN: I think that is right. You also have a certain empathy for how things are done. So often, Americans start ordering things around and say, "This is the way you should do it." Sometimes you have to encourage patterns that are already inherent in the culture in order for things to change.

Q: Absolutely.

End of interview