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DAVID I. HITCHCOCK, JR.

Interviewed by: G. Lewis Schmidt
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is November 17, 1992 and this is an interview with David Hitchcock. Okay Dave, we will start out with your covering your brief biographical sketch--your education, background, etc., and how it was that you got into the Agency. If you had any

career before that, talk about that, and from that point on we will take your career, assignment by assignment.

Biosketch: Pre-USIA Experience: Education; Korean War/Army; CBS Intern; Senator Smith's Staff.

HITCHCOCK: I was raised in New Haven, Connecticut, but despite that fact, went to Dartmouth and majored in Government and English. I went on to Columbia University where I raced through an MA in Public Law and Government, just before enlisting in the army in the Korean War in 1951. The Korean War was over in 1953, and I was able to get out sooner than I was supposed to.

I went on to job hunt in 1953. A terrible time to job hunt in Washington. The Foreign Service was hiring no one, they were frozen. Senator Joe McCarthy was reigning. I took the tests and passed them, but gave up and went back to New Haven and thought about trying to get into radio doing public affairs work. I applied for a job with CBS and joined their so-called executive training program in about January, 1954. That turned out to be a little bit less elaborate than the title might sound. We ended up delivering mail in the mail room. Everybody there had at least one degree and possibly two. Some of them had produced their own shows on small stations and were trying to break into the big time. You were supposed to go around and sell yourself to some part of the organization. Well, I guess, the only relevant part of this is that during the time I found myself delivering mail to Edward R. Murrow, including mail that came in after he took on McCarthy in one of his regular programs.

In the meantime, I had been hunting for a job in Washington, still, because this was only paying me something like \$35 a week and even in 1954 that wasn't much. Much to my surprise I ended up getting a job as a speech writer for a Senator from New Jersey named H. Alexander Smith. Smith was a senior Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee -- had been Vice President of Princeton and had the idea that the experience of the Hill was very important for people going into Government or other service later on. So he took on two assistants on the legislative side, staggered them and kept them for about three years and then "fired" them -- it was definite that they were there for only about three years.

I eventually became his senior legislative assistant and when it became time for me to leave, he made it very clear that I should go into the Foreign Service, especially USIA.

As you know, Lew, and I am sure others who listen to this will know, Smith was co-author of the Smith-Mundt Act which established USIA, first as a Bureau within the Department of State, in 1948. So he thought very highly of USIA and had already introduced me to Ted Streibert when I was working for him.

1957: Entrance Into USIA. Summary Of Early USIA Assignments.

So I went into USIA and stayed in it until 1992--a career of a little over 35 years. My assignments are unusual only in that I served only in three countries. That was largely a result of having selected service in Japan, including Japanese language training. That took me back to Japan, over the years, four times for a total of 12 years of service. My first assignment was in Vietnam, in Hue, Central Vietnam, in 1957 for two and a half years. That was certainly a fascinating time, just "before the deluge" you might say, perhaps one of the only peaceful times in Vietnam in recent history. Then later on, I also served in Israel as PAO and was PAO eventually in Tokyo as well.

A. 1957 Regional Officer, Hue, Vietnam.

The jobs I had in Washington over the years dealt, except one, exclusively with East Asia. There was a regional job in the State Department, where I was Director of the East Asia Office in the old Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) under John Richardson, Jr. In USIA, I served as Japan/Korea Desk Officer and as EA Policy Officer and eventually as Area Director. So I had a lot of familiarity with East Asia over the years.

B. List Of Washington Assignments.

I would say that, ironically, my career was influenced by two people, who themselves, had a major role in USIA--Senator Smith on the one hand and Edward R. Murrow on the other. I enjoyed telling this story of delivering mail to Murrow when I got the Murrow Award in 1987 at Tufts University.

Rather than trying to go through everything chronologically, post by post, I will just say a word or two about each of them, the Vietnam assignment first.

I was the second PAO in Hue. It was the first post outside of Saigon.

C. Summary Of Hue Activities.

Q: Which years were you in Hue?

HITCHCOCK: 1957-59. Bob Lochner was the PAO in Saigon when I got there.

Q: What was the nature of your work there?

HITCHCOCK: I had two major roles. I was the U.S. advisor to the Vietnamese Information Service in Central Vietnam, and to that end, traveled a great deal with and without Vietnamese officials, advising them on how to get their information program going more successfully. It was a regional post in that sense. We covered Da Nang; we covered the four prefectures of Central Vietnam, as well as Hue.

The second, and perhaps in the end, more important project was to assist the University of Hue and get it going. This was Ngo Dinh Diem's favorite project. He had persuaded some young, talented Vietnamese who had been trained in Paris, Brussels, New York or London, to come back and become the faculty of this first university where everything would be taught in Vietnamese. Everything was taught in French in the universities in Saigon and Hanoi.

In Hue, this faculty was, in effect, writing its own text books as they went along. I helped to cast a net to the US for interested foundations and others who could offer to help get this new university going; to get a Fulbright program going; to launch a major book donation program for the university: these were activities that I was involved in. In the end, another aspect of my job was to be a "morale booster" for this university's faculty, which very soon found itself demoralized by the authoritarian character--not so much of Ngo Dinh Diem's, but of his brother, Ngo Dinh Kanh in Hue, who quickly squashed all intellectual journals and free speech that these young teachers had brought back from abroad with them.

He outlawed dancing. One of my major accomplishments in Hue was to get the government to allow me--it took me a month--to hold a dance party in my house for 12 young Vietnamese faculty members and their spouses, with the curtains down and the music not too loud. There wasn't a dry eye in the house by the end of the evening, because this was the first time...it became a symbol of all of their frustration with the iron rule they found themselves under in Hue, when they thought they were going to practice Jeffersonian Democracy in a free society. [They were very naive.]

Q: To what extent did the government crack down on their curriculum?

HITCHCOCK: It began to do that also, but it cracked down more on their intellectual activities and journals. Some of them were arrested. My wife, Lee, started the first Vietnamese-American Association outside of Saigon in Hue, with my help. You never could tell how many people were going to be in our class, because some of them who weren't there, had disappeared during the night. Of course the Viet Cong was beginning to target district chiefs in the rural areas, not in the city. And they were not targeting us, although I had an armed jeep with me whenever I went up to Quang Tri or went across from the coast inland towards Laos, near the border.

At the beginning of my tour, we were very active in interviewing refugees who were still coming across from north of the parallel, and getting their stories to the VOA.

D. 1960: Japan--Kobe/Osaka For One Year; Then (1962) Fukuoka.

We went on to Japan and language school and after that, a short tour in Kobe. There was a proposal made to combine USIS activities in Kobe and Osaka and, to some extent, Kyoto. Kyoto would maintain its independence and have its own PAO. There would be a

director and deputy director of USIS Kobe/Osaka. Stu Bohacek was the director and I was the deputy. It was a crazy idea...

Q: Was it in Kobe or Osaka?

HITCHCOCK: That was the problem. We had offices in both cities.

Q: The consulate was still in Kobe wasn't it?

HITCHCOCK: Yes. We kept seeing each other going in opposite directions on the train. We would start out in the morning in Osaka and have a lunch in Kobe and a reception in Osaka at night. It was just mad. There was some effort, however, to take advantage of talented Japanese staff and use them beyond the confines of one of those three cities, whether it was the advisor for labor, or advisor for academic affairs, or international affairs, or the cultural arts. We tried to use the best of each of those center's advisers to branch out and get interested in what was going on in the other two cities that would be of interest to USIA.

In any case, after a year in Kobe I was transferred to Fukuoka and became the director of the center there which covered all of western Japan--all of Kyushu Island and Yamaguchi Prefecture, the southern tip of Honshu.

Q: By that time they had closed the center at Kumamoto.

HITCHCOCK: They closed all the centers in Kyushu except Fukuoka. The last center before Fukuoka was Nagasaki, and it had already closed. But there was a Japan-America library still in several cities, including Nagasaki which we tried to support, but that wasn't working very well.

I think the most important thing that we did in those days in Kyushu was with two groups: one was the labor unions, and the second was a left-leaning and very suspicious major newspaper in Fukuoka, Nishi Nihon, which simply means "western Japan newspaper." It would be nice sometime to document this, but over the years, starting, I think, with my predecessor, Charlie Medd, and with those who followed me, we had an enormous effect over time. We were clearly not the only influence on these labor leaders and on that newspaper. The labor leaders were invited to participate in a very large, and effective exchange program which brought Japanese Marxists, labor leaders from the coal mines, shipbuilding, and others of the left in Kyushu, to the States in a group and let them see the dynamism, muscle, wealth, power and influence of the American labor movement and how effective it was.

Q: What evidence did you have that there was any change of opinion on the part of these people after they returned? Did you have a clear indication?

HITCHCOCK: A clear indication of a change in attitude towards the United States in general. A greater respect. Much less harsh treatment of the United States. They were still members of the Socialist Party, most of the unions were, and they had to mouth the usual dogma, but they were just awe struck by how a capitalist society could develop an independent, free, strong, and influential labor movement. They were also influenced by our society, our churches. I made sure they all went to church in a small town. This is an aspect of America that they had never thought about.

Q: In that respect, Kyushu was, of course, one of the first places in Japan that had experienced any kind of Christian influence. Were any of these people influenced by that or was it just a matter of going to church because they wanted to see what it was like in the U.S.?

HITCHCOCK: It was mostly the latter. Very few of them were Christian. There were some. One of the major patron saints and intellectual gurus of the Socialist Party in Japan was Masao Takahashi, who was then a professor of economics at Kyushu University. There was one other, his life long rival who was on the left of the Socialist Party, and Takahashi was on the right. I had one ally in the university who helped me to develop contacts with the left in the labor movement. I think that program was very effective.

The other aspect of our work there was to develop confidence, a really professional relationship, with the regional newspaper. The International Visitors Program, over the years, played an enormous role in getting that paper out of its shell, letting it see the rest of the world as it really was.

The programs we ran at the center always included reporters from the newspaper. I started an English language class just for journalists. In fact, it wasn't really a class. We would read one of the Japanese daily English papers in English and then talk about it slowly in English. We did the same thing in Osaka. Years later some of those young men who were really only my age or younger then became senior editors. One of the people who came to our seminars became the head of Asahi Shimbun later on. These contacts in those early days in Osaka and Fukuoka helped me to get a lot of things done many, many years later in Tokyo.

We also regionalized things. We tried to make Fukuoka a truly regional center by inventing a Western Japan International Journalists Seminar which was held every year in a different city and co-sponsored by the Fukuoka American Center and the local coordinating committee of all the newspapers in western Japan. We did the same thing with labor and with women. I think we were the first center to hold an annual women's seminar on the role of women in modern society.

Q: Dorothy Robins Mowry had not yet come to Japan at that time had she?

HITCHCOCK: She had. She came in with Reischauer in 1061. Ed Reischauer, of course, was my...well Douglas MacArthur II was ambassador when I was at language school, but

I didn't serve under him. Reischauer brought Dorothy in. She heard about what I was trying to do, and it just suited her plans perfectly, so she was a great help in getting prominent Americans, including Esther Peterson, to come down to Fukuoka and participate in some of these seminars.

Q: It must have been very encouraging to Dorothy, because I understand she had some rather rocky times trying to persuade the main office in Tokyo that there was any need for a women's organization in the country.

HITCHCOCK: Absolutely. She and I just plotted a lot of this on our own pretty much. I think Walt Nichols and Frank Tenny were helpful in Tokyo, but Ed Nickel and Bill Copeland, both PAOs at that point, were not necessarily against it, but were skeptical.

So in journalism, women's affairs, labor...and then we started it with university newspaper editors, again regionalizing things. Then I finally figured out that in all of Kyushu we probably had about 25, or even less, well-known professors in economics, law, government. But they were all scattered, and to try to bring a well-known American down there and just have a handful it seemed like just a waste. So, I helped inspire the starting of the International Problems Research Council (Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu Koi) for Nishi Nihon, and with all the universities represented individually. In that way, we would hold a seminar conference two or three times a year in a different campus. We brought Reischauer down for that.

By this time Vietnam was heating up. Itazuke, the US Air Force Base near Fukuoka, was not directly involved, but on the other hand, was supporting the war to some extent. The students were radical already, and Vietnam was a perfect cause for them.

So we had Reischauer coming down for this distinguished group of professors and the university which was supposed to sponsor the talk by Reischauer...the university president came to my office one day looking very sheepish and embarrassed and said that he did not think he could sponsor it at his campus, could I find some other campus? We shopped around, but basically, the universities were all scared to hold that meeting with Reischauer, even though it was co-sponsored by their own organization.

In the end, they came to me and said, "Look you ought to have it right here at the center." One of the things they said I always took as a compliment. They said, "In fact, you are really the most 'neutral' place in town." By "neutral," I think they meant objective. I thought that was remarkable. The Consulate was not in the same neighborhood as the center, and they saw the center as a place where people could come and get information and get the truth. We were never demonstrated against. The Consulate was, but we were not. So that was what happened. We had it had the center, and there wasn't even a demonstration outside.

Q: Who was the Consul General at that time?

HITCHCOCK: It was a consulate not a consulate general at that time. When I got there it was Dick Petrie. He was succeeded by Tom Shoesmith, who, of course, went to the very top as a senior DAS in State for East Asia and Ambassador to Malaysia and is now the President of the American-Japan Society of Washington (Ambassador (Retired) Shoesmith died shortly after this interview was completed.). So the "Fukuoka Kai," or the "Fukuoka Group," meaning those American officers who served there, did well in their careers.

Q: Were you the only American at the center?

HITCHCOCK: Yes. I was the only one.

Q: What years were you there?

HITCHCOCK: In Fukuoka, 1962-65, three years.

1965: Washington--Japan/Korea Desk Officer. Then, 1967, Area Policy Officer.

Then I came back to Washington for two years as desk officer for Japan and Korea under Dan Moore.

Q: Was Dan the head? I thought he was the deputy.

HITCHCOCK: Well he was head for a while. He had been deputy and then became head. He wasn't there for very long. Then Dan Oleksiw took over. After Dan left, John Reinhardt took over.

After two years, I became Policy Officer. That, of course, was during the height of the Agency's role in Vietnam.

Q: When did you first go to the East Asian area?

HITCHCOCK: I went back to Washington in 1965 and was in the area office, then known as IAF, for four years--two years on the desk and two years as policy officer. It was a time when the Vietnam Working Group was going full swing with Sandy Marlowe, Otis Hays, Ted Liu, and Mike Schneider served as special projects officer, working largely with me. We started a series of regional conferences in East Asia on urban affairs in Hong Kong, and on American studies. Again, the concept of trying to bring the talent together in the area to meet with distinguished American speakers.

Since the Vietnam Group handled Vietnam, as Policy Officer I really handled only policy issues. I didn't get into the operational aspects of it.

One of the things that I believe has improved since those days, with a few exceptions, is the integrity of the personnel system of the Agency. It had deteriorated, I think, and a lot

of the power over assignments had shifted from "central casting," you might say, to the area offices. I think the area offices spent much too much time on personnel. This may have been necessary at the time of Vietnam, simply because we were expanding so rapidly that obviously there had to be some special efforts to get people. I was glad to see that under John Reinhardt, the Agency got the areas out of such a major role in selecting personnel assignments. I think it improved the predictability of assignments, the openness of it and the integrity of the whole system considerably.

Q: Was Lionel Mosley the personnel director at that time or had he retired?

HITCHCOCK: He was there at least part of the time I was in the area office. But, frankly, I don't think he prevented this from happening. It wasn't equally so in every area office. It depended on whether you had a very powerful area director. There were several area directors who had the ear of Leonard Marks and who made a lot of the decisions.

1969: A Year in SAIS at Johns Hopkins in Washington.

After that time, in 1969, I went to Johns Hopkins on an academic year at SAIS in Washington. That was really a wonderful year and almost persuaded me to leave the Agency. I took everything for credit, even though, by that time, I was in my late thirties and had been with the Agency for 12 years. I found it a full time job to try to keep up with young grad students who were going through all of this for the first time.

I took all of the exams and wrote all of the papers and managed in that year to write one paper that I got published in Asian Survey in 1971 on Japan and the Soviet Union--joint development of Siberia, decision making in Japanese Soviet relations. I also wrote a monograph on the role of the provincial press in national development in Malaysia and the Philippines--sort of a content analysis which was published by the Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Center in Singapore. So I thought it was a worthwhile year in every respect.

Q: Was Bob Osgood there at that time?

HITCHCOCK: Fran Wilcox was the dean when I got there, and Bob Osgood took over soon after I left. Both of them were good friends of mine. Fran Wilcox, of course, I had known when I was working on the Hill for Senator Smith. He was chief of staff for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Carl Marcy was his deputy. I knew Carl and Mildred Marcy from my days on the Hill, before I knew anything about USIA or even met my wife!

1970: Return To Japan As Deputy PAO. The Changes In Program Engineered By Al Carter.

In 1970, I went back to Japan from the IAF office as deputy PAO under Alan Carter. Alan had all kinds of interesting ideas he wanted to try out. I was the Japan hand. It was a

pretty good combination since I had the language and the background on Japan and he had some revolutionary ideas on how to organize USIS and how to focus its programs on the right audience with a combination of all the tools focused on one issue and one theme.

It doesn't sound very revolutionary now, that is what the Agency still attempts to do, but it was quite unusual to see it done as severely with so much discipline as it was in Japan at that time. He also organized the libraries into what were called "Infomat," with some super graphics done by Ray Komai, a Japanese- American USIS officer who had been involved in inventing the eye logo for CBS in his early days. Certainly the early seventies, Japan was with it...was very much in the groove of US popular culture. The super graphics, etc., that USIA put on all of its buildings in Japan was popular. It was eye catching, and many Japanese imitated it. The "Infomat" concept was essentially to get ourselves into the electronic age, to get information by electronic means, to focus the library schematically, color coded by area of interest...to get all the books we had air shipped, to reduce the quantity. To get the quantity down to about, I think it was to be about 4,000 hot, fresh books, not in depth any longer. We gave away a lot of books and thus were able to pay for bringing Japan the information as fast as possible.

I know that some people will not agree with me, but I think if I had to name one individual in all of USIA who really made a difference in the way USIA operated, not only in one post but around the world, I would name Alan Carter. There was nobody who had as much influence among the career people in the Agency over the way we operated. He wasn't always an easy guy to work for, and our personalities were not particularly compatible, but that doesn't matter. The fact is that he really made a difference, and I think that his influence later on under Reinhardt continued to be on the whole, a good influence.

Q: Al was a very controversial guy. His program in Japan was not unilaterally approved of.

HITCHCOCK: Yes, that is right.

Q: Of course I was looking at it from afar and hadn't much opportunity to observe it. But I know it was highly controversial. You, however, from what you say, felt it was very effective and worthwhile.

HITCHCOCK: It was. It needed moderation a little bit, and I tried to provide that, to soften the corners. To take into account Japanese culture more than Alan would have. On the whole I think he respected that.

Q: At one point he expressed the idea that he didn't want anybody with any experience in Japan in the operation. He tried to weed out those who did.

HITCHCOCK: He certainly backed down on that. I think he respected the ability of those who had the language to communicate with the Japanese. I know he wished he had that ability himself.

1973: Senior Seminar then, 1974, Cultural Bureau, Department of State. As Area Director, CU, For East Asia.

After that, I came back to Washington and was assigned to the Senior Seminar first and then to the State Department in the CU job.

Q: You were in Japan for how long?

HITCHCOCK: Three years. So all together by that time I had had nine years in Japan.

I succeeded Frank Tenny in the CU job as area director for East Asia. At that point in CU, just for those who don't recall exactly what that meant, we had charge of all of the educational and cultural exchange programs which later on, in 1978-79 were transferred to USIA. That included the Fulbright program, the IV program, and the AMPART program which is now returned to being called US Specialists. We also had the private sector programs, with some of the money for private sector programs with each of the area offices. One of the things that made that particularly fun was that I had some money to play with. I could contract with the Asian Society for a study of how Asia is treated in American high school textbooks, for instance. I had to have it approved and cleared here and there, but basically I could do that kind of thing.

A. While In CU, Hitchcock Established "Asian Scholar In Residence" program.

One of the accomplishments that I look back on in those days under John Richardson-- and Bill Hitchcock, who was the senior deputy assistant secretary, was the establishment of what we call the "Asian Studies Scholar in Residence" program. This simply brought Asian professors whose English was up to it to American university campuses to lecture on Asia. That program is still going. I don't think there is anything like it in any of the other areas.

Q: How long do the professors stay?

HITCHCOCK: A full academic year.

Q: This was somewhat akin to the Fulbright program.

HITCHCOCK: It, of course, used Fulbright money but it was somewhat specialized. They had to be people who realized that they were coming here primarily to lecture. They obviously had some research of their own that they wanted to pursue, but they were here primarily as lecturers, not as researchers.

I think that program ought to be expanded around the world. I think area studies in the United States is still not where it should be. It could use more focus of that nature in Latin America and Eastern Europe in particular, where our campuses just don't have enough...

Q: Was the selection of these people from Japan made through the Fulbright Commission?

HITCHCOCK: Yes, usually they were. They were made with the Fulbright Commission's involvement, but the CAO played a major role.

I should have said that when I went back to Japan as deputy PAO I became chairman of the Fulbright Commission as well.

Q: That usually went to the PAO didn't it?

HITCHCOCK: Well, Alan did it for a while and then shifted it to me. When I came back as PAO in 1981, I chaired it again. So I may be the only PAO who served in the same country as Fulbright chairman twice.

B. Another Hitchcock Project While In CU (Begun While Still DPAO/Japan) Was Promotion Of American Studies In Foreign Universities.

One of the areas that I spent a great deal of time on in CU...now I had started this as deputy PAO in Tokyo...is in the area of American studies. I would like to talk about this for a minute because in your outline you also sort of speak of areas where one actually may have accomplished something of a more permanent nature. What I had discovered in Japan, later on, was that the Fulbright program had for years simply been going its merry way of strengthening the quality of young faculty, usually, to teach better in their own field--literature, science, etc. But most of these faculty, junior faculty and doctoral candidates who came under the Fulbright program from various countries, including Japan, went back home benefitting themselves from the program immensely. Probably improving their teaching, but did not to any degree start any new curriculum to deal with the United States. So what you had was better trained foreign teachers, but teaching a small handful of undergraduates who were majoring in American literature and a few who were taking on the very few doctoral candidates; the vast sea of undergraduates in these Japanese universities and universities elsewhere never are exposed to the United States in any kind of general introductory fashion. What are our basic principles? What are the tenants of society in the United States? What is the role of religion? What is the role of individualism, where does this concept come from and how is it carried out in the United States? In other words, not dealing so much with the chronology of American history as with the concepts, ideas, traditions, in a multi-disciplinary, introductory, two-semester course. This is what is still lacking all over the world.

Both as deputy PAO and Fulbright chairman in the early seventies and as PAO in Israel in the late seventies and in Japan in the early eighties and then as area director in the late eighties and early nineties, I made this my number one priority--to try to persuade university presidents, deans, faculty members to introduce such courses. And they should be taught in the local language which meant that you had to have proper level text material. Most of the students would not take courses that already existed on American literature, or whatever, because they were too deep for them. These were kids who were majoring in economics or business management or marketing or whatever. If they were going to take a course outside of their field, on the United States, it was going to have to be in their language and at their level. One had to understand that these kids had never had anything to do with the United States academically except, perhaps, a scattering in world history or social studies in high school and whatever they picked up in other subjects.

We are making progress with this. I made this such a high priority that every PAO has it in his OER goals. Henry Catto endorsed this as a worldwide priority for USIA, giving responsibility to the E Bureau to launch pilot projects with universities in each part of the world. I think that if this works, it will be a legacy that probably overshadows everything else that I have done in these 35 years.

Q: In the selection of the Japanese professors to come over here, was there any particular major area of study that you looked for? Did their exposure here give them any concept of the American political process?

HITCHCOCK: Well, it gave them that. As far as selection was concerned for regular Fulbrighters, there were the usual panels. It was a very objective, a carefully and professionally done thing, in which I played no direct role. What I did play a role in was to try to see that more resources were devoted to scholarships in the area of American studies. In most of the universities in Japan and elsewhere, I found some teachers teaching American literature, so what I was trying to do was to get them to focus on the areas that were being left out. Political science in particular. Economics also. But I couldn't turn my back on American literature people because they were going to be the hard core. If this was going to work it was going to be those teachers who made it work. What they ended up doing in a place like Kyushu University and Hokkaido University was to "team- teach" this course. The literature, political science and history teachers would get together and figure out what they ought to be covering in a year in such a course and then figure out who would teach what. Of course there are many obstacles to this, it is not an easy idea.

Q: Universities are pretty rigid.

HITCHCOCK: The European system of education predominates still around the world, where the university is a very specialized place and you almost enter into your major field the day you enter the door, hardly ever to see any other field until you leave. So you are battling tradition here. The conception of inter- disciplinary study at the introductory level

is not wide spread, but there is a growing recognition that this kind of approach to studying other cultures is essential in an interdependent world. That was the argument that I would make. I would make this argument on a worldwide basis. I would say that this was not just American Studies that we were talking about. We were talking about Japanese Studies, Chinese Studies, German Studies. The major cultures that every young, bright kid in Japan, or the Philippines, or Singapore is going to run in to, willy nilly, once he gets into his/her career. He/She ought to have some proper exposure to--some sort of planned introduction to the ideas and societies of those countries that he/she is going to be working with before it is too late. So the argument was being made not that students should be doing it because we are the United States and we are important, but because the world is going in a direction that requires undergraduates to know at least something about some major cultures besides their own. Put that way, deans and presidents began to nod their heads and say, "You know, you are right. There is something to this, and we are looking at the whole question of core curriculum."

So I think this is taking hold. I think it is beginning to catch fire. Where it has been introduced it has been immensely popular. It has been oversubscribed.

In Israel I got into it. Believe it or not, Israel wasn't any better than Japan. The Federalist Papers had never been translated into Hebrew. No major solid American historical text, like Morrison and Commager, was in Hebrew. I took my own GOE money--I was in Israel for 4 years--and had Morrison, Commager, and Leutenberg translated in two volumes. It is still the core of several survey courses that have started now at Tel Aviv University, Ben Gurion University of the Negev and Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Also I had Pritchett's little book on the American political system translated and finally did one on literary criticism of the United States. These became the mainstays of new survey courses taught in Hebrew for Israeli students. They were not taught in English by American Jews who had immigrated to Israel, which was what I found when I got there -- which were only for students whose English was good enough to take that course. So I think this is taking hold, and if I do any consulting for the Agency at all, and I don't know if I really have any desire to do that, it will be in this area.

Q: Just as a matter of curiosity, Doshisha University (in Japan) has quite a reputation for its American Studies program. Was this integrated in any way with what you were doing or did they go off pretty much on their own?

C. The Now Famous Annual Kyoto Seminar And Its Relationship To The American Studies Program.

HITCHCOCK: The famous Kyoto Seminar that was started with Ford Foundation money and later on, had money from the US-Japan Friendship Commission and elsewhere, brought professors of American studies to Kyoto in July for two weeks--and young assistant professors and instructors as well--from all over East Asia. From Korea, Taiwan and some from the Philippines, but mostly from Japan. It took place at Doshisha University in Kyoto, which is a large private university, started by Christians. Many of the

people with whom I worked most closely in getting this thing to go outside of Kyoto were Doshisha professors and, in fact, I would say Doshisha, along with Sophia and the International Christian University in Tokyo, were the three that have made the most progress in moving in the direction of generalized survey courses for students who are not majoring in anything to do with the United States, but in something else and need this kind of course to round out their education.

The Rise In Stature Of Private Universities In Japan Has Jolted The State (Formerly Imperial) Universities, Although The Latter Are Still Most Prestigious.

Q: In my days in Japan, the International Christian University was in its infancy and had very little standing among Japanese universities. I gather from what I see now, particularly through the Japan-America Student Conference people coming here, that it has apparently attained quite a standing within the Japanese academic areas, because every year there are three or four students from the American Christian University. Is it your opinion that they have advanced in stature substantially?

HITCHCOCK: I think so. I think what has happened is that the private universities like ICU, Sophia, and Doshisha have shown more flexibility in updating their curriculum, and modernizing their requirements than the national universities have. So students going into business, knowing that so much of Japan's business is overseas...students who really have the familiarity, the grasp of language and foreign cultures, are the ones who are going to go places. So you can find ICU placing students in big companies like Sony every year. It has even gotten to the point now where the really good Japanese students are competing for jobs with American banks and firms in Tokyo as well. I think Tokyo University and the other former Imperial universities are still trying to catch up and are plagued by tradition and inflexibility. The Ministry of Education is finally getting a little looser now.

Q: But they remain the prestige universities in the country.

HITCHCOCK: They do. They are certainly for government service--Ministry of Finance and Foreign Ministry. Indeed Tokyo University's first two year campus has one of the strongest American studies program going. In fact, it now has the authority to have four year programs in American Studies, British, French, Chinese and Russian Studies at that campus which is separate from the fuddy-duddy senior campus of the university. You can go there for four years, now, and get your B.A. right on that junior campus. Hiroshima University has gotten permission to do the same thing. So there is a change underway there. And, as I say, as area director I have preached this cause from Australia to Korea. It is going to need vigorous leadership from area directors and PAOs to make it stick. But we have goodies for them. We can offer them Fulbright lecturers they might not otherwise get. We can offer them faculty development grants to retool a young instructor so that he can teach not only literature but the history of literature. We can make good presentations to those particular libraries. We can bring them here as International Visitors to see how we organize area studies. Not American studies, but Asian studies or Latin America Studies.

So this isn't such a revolutionary idea, what I have been advocating and Henry Catto has now endorsed. It is not so much providing new resources for America Studies, but marshaling the existing resources more effectively to see that these are all parts of the same thing. If you want to strengthen the teaching of the United States at the undergraduate level, the existing tools are there in USIA. We simply have to marshal them for that purpose. It is going to take, as I say, central direction. Catto assigned that to the Educational and Cultural Bureau, and its acting director, Barry Fulton, who is sold on the idea. We shall see what happens. Now, of course, we have a transfer of power and I hope this doesn't get lost.

Q: I hope it doesn't. Catto has been particularly good at working on these kind of things and has brought the Agency back to the area where it ought to be operating. He has been very knowledgeable largely because of his background. I am scared to death about a possible time when they get somebody coming in like Gelb again. If that happens, I don't know what will become of it.

HITCHCOCK: We will have to wait and see and keep our fingers crossed. I certainly plan to push this concept with the Agency, if I see it is falling on hard times again because of lack of focus.

The Ultimately Successful Battle To Secure Shares Of GARIOA And Okinawa Reversion
Funds
For Funding Of Educational Exchange Activities.

One other aspect of the work that I did in the State Department, in the years of 1974-77, when I was directing the East Asian Office, deserves some focus because it is kind of an historical nugget in itself. I will try not to make it too detailed.

You, with your background in Japan, recall that after the war the United States spent a great deal of money in Japan for food and all kinds of humanitarian assistance in the first five years. This was called "Government Assistant and Relief in Occupied Areas" with the acronym of GARIOA. The Japanese made it very clear that they would eventually repay this. They paid it all back, I think it was \$900 million over a number of years, for this kind of assistance when they were on their backs. Reischauer, as ambassador, decided that \$25 million of this payment should be set aside to increase educational and cultural exchanges. He got permission to do that. There was an exchange of diplomatic notes indicating formal agreement.

Q: How was that handled?

HITCHCOCK: Well, this was what happened. It was US money, so it was handled by the US exclusively. But, unfortunately, John Rooney, who was then chairman of the House subcommittee dealing with USIA and State, insisted that this Yen account, established in Japanese banks, would simply be drawn down to pay the existing Yen expenses of the

Fulbright program! So there was no incremental increase whatsoever, in the number of exchanges taking place. The Japanese were very bitter about this. They thought this was a betrayal of the agreement, and indeed it was. Ambassador Reischauer and those who followed him resented this, but there wasn't anything they could do about it.

By the time people began to focus on this in the early seventies, \$12 million of the \$25 million had already been spent in this fashion. There was a little over \$12 million left. The State Department had thought long and hard how it could set up some kind of special fund with this \$12 million now that Rooney was gone. Burton Fahs who had come from the Rockefeller Foundation, had been special advisor to the Reischauer in Tokyo and then PAO, had also come up with this idea. There was a fair amount of correspondence among a number of people concerning what to do with this money. Couldn't a special trust fund be set up?

Independent of this, Senator Jacob Javits of New York got interested in taking a similar kind of repayment by the Japanese to the United States and setting up a special trust fund for US-Japan exchanges. The money he was looking at was the repayment by Japan to the United States for the consolidation of US bases in Okinawa. This was at the time of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, 1972. Javits thought that the reversion of Okinawa was the symbolic end of the war and the beginning of a new era. We had moved barracks, offices and consolidated a lot of expensive business in order to give up land in Okinawa which we occupied. We occupied almost half of the island at some point and it was now down to about a third. We paid for that initially and the Japanese were paying us back for those expenses. The idea was to take a certain percentage of that and devote it to exchanges.

The State Department wanted nothing to do with that. They wanted to get the GARIOA funds set aside in some intelligent fashion. Javits didn't want to have anything to do with GARIOA. That was old stuff, war time relief. He wanted this to be a symbol, with the Okinawa reversion. We were running into difficulties with the GARIOA project because the Bureau of the Budget, OMB, was opposed to trust funds. Congress, generally speaking, did not like trust funds either, because they don't control the money as closely as they would like. So we were running into those problems.

The Administration had no position on the matter. It was the State Department, on its own, playing with the idea of doing something with the GARIOA funds.

Q: This was during the Reagan administration?

HITCHCOCK: This was during the Nixon and Ford administrations. We were cooking on this from 1974-76. The people who were pushing hardest, of course, were the academic community in the US. It desperately wanted to get its hands on some of this money. I found I had allies in John Whitney Hall, professor of Japanese History at Yale and in Robert Ward, professor of Asian Studies at Stanford. Both of them, Hall and Ward, had been consecutively the chairman of the US-Japan Cultural Conference,

(CULCON) a bilateral meeting held every other year. I was the area director in CU which was a sort of secretariat for the CULCON sessions. Of course I came from New Haven and knew the Halls well, which helped.

Since I didn't have any authority other than John Richardson's general blessing to try to move this forward, I used, and they were happy to be so employed, Bob Ward and Jack Hall, to make the calls on the Hill to try to persuade and come up with some kind of compromise with Javits.

The idea that we had was to combine the two. To take the \$12 million GARIOA funds that were left and some of the Okinawa reversion money, which came to about the same amount, it was about \$13-14 million, and combine them. Then we would have something that was substantial. We would set up a trust fund and a commission to oversee this.

Senator Javits, in the mean time, had introduced legislation to setup the Japan-US Friendship Commission, with Okinawa reversion repayments only. It had been in the hopper for several sessions of Congress and had just sat there. There were no hearings. He had never discussed it with anybody in the House, which we thought was strange.

So we went to see Ohio Congressman Wayne Hayes, who by that time was the key power on the Hill for the State Department. Hayes made this clear. He said, "Over my dead body will there be any new commission. There are too many commissions now. We ought to get rid of half of them." So we, Jack Hall, Bob Ward and I, cogitated about this and came up with the idea: we didn't need a new commission, we already had one! We have a panel of 12 Americans including 4 officials, *ex officio*, appointed by the Secretary of State to the US panel of the CULCON (Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange)--the Japanese have 12 too. We would simply give these 12 Americans, who include two Assistant Secretaries of State (East Asia/Pacific and Educational and Cultural Affairs), the Director of USIA, the Assistant Secretary of Education, a second hat. They would all become "commissioners" for the Japan-US Friendship Commission!

Javits wouldn't buy it. It was not prestigious enough. Those people were not well enough known. So as a compromise we would add two members of the House, one from each party, and two members of the Senate, one from each party, and the heads of the National Endowment of the Arts and Humanities. All of them *ex officio*, and the Members of Congress *ex officio* and non-voting.

Both Javits and Hayes bought off on that. But we still had another problem. It was clear that OMB was going to fight this all the way down the line if it required a new trust fund. We wanted this money to be the principal earning interest, government securities if necessary, but definitely earning interest. The Javits-Hayes bill was passed by both Houses and went to the White House. I was trying to get support for this, to keep this moving, and tried to use the visit of the Emperor of Japan in 1976 as a vehicle, so that this could be announced while he was here. I got memoranda up through Kissinger, from

Kissinger to the White House, to the President, thanks to Under Secretary of State Phil Habib, a good friend.

So the question was: "What was the White House going to do with this legislation?" We had made all the deals, all the compromises. We still had no Administration position. We had never been asked officially to give a position, fortunately, because we couldn't have said that we favored it, even though John Richardson had given me all kinds of authority to work with Ward and Hall to get it going.

It went to the White House and as happened in those days, OMB sent it around to relevant agencies for comment within 48 hours. I got wind that Justice was going to recommend a veto. Fortunately I had contacts at NSC who were trying to help us. What was the problem? Well, the problem was that Congress had adopted the House version and not the Senate version. The House version did not make it clear that the Members of Congress serving ex officio would not be serving in a voting capacity. According to the Constitution, members of Congress should not serve in any other capacity, and Justice was going to veto it! Of course, I was convinced that OMB had put Justice up to this, because they wanted to bomb this thing anyway. We had 48 hours to get an explanation to the Attorney General from Congress that it was the intent of Congress that the Members of Congress serving on the Japan-US Friendship Commission would serve in ex officio, non-voting capacity.

Here is where I made a small contribution to history. I guess I was sort of a Paul Revere that weekend, because I had served on the Hill for three years and knew both Senate and House foreign affairs staffers. At this point, Pat Holt was Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He had been the number three guy when I was there working for Senator H. Alexander Smith. It was a weekend, and Wayne Hayes had an old timer, whose name escapes me now, but I knew him, who was still working part time for him, and I got a hold of him. I drafted the letter I wanted from Senator Sparkman, who was then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee on the Senate side, and Congressman Clement Zablocki, who was Chairman on the House side. Both the Congressman and Senator were out of town. Holt and the other fellow on the House side had to, in effect, sign the letters for them. I took these drafts around town in my car all weekend long. First I had to go to Pat Holt in Bethesda. He is a tall, lanky Texan. I explained what the problem was, and he said, "I can't believe that." He hauled down the Constitution from a shelf and found that it was right. So he agreed. He would help. So, we got the letters in time. Then we just waited to see what was going to happen. Would OMB or Justice have any reason to oppose it?

We began to put some pressure on. We got people like Bob Ingersoll, who had been Deputy Secretary of State and Ambassador to Japan, and others to call the White House and put in a good word for this legislation. In the end, President Ford signed it. But, if we hadn't managed to get the Congressional intent letters that weekend, it would have died, at least for that time in history.

Just to finish this story, it is kind of nice, poetic justice that just before I retired from USIA, Henry Catto appointed me to the CULCON and the US-Japan Friendship Commission, so now I am a member. So that is a nice story, I think.

August, 1977: Assignment As PAO/Israel At Critical Time As Sadat About To Make His Historic Trip To Israel. Great Pressure In Dealing With Aggressive Israeli Press.

I would like to jump quickly to coming back...well I didn't talk very much about being PAO in Israel, and I ought to talk a little bit more about that, perhaps. It was a critical time--1977-81. I arrived there in August 1977. Secretary Cyrus Vance made his first of seven trips in two years about two weeks after I got there. Sadat arrived in November for the great visit to Jerusalem. I was not only PAO, but as PAOs often are, I was the embassy spokesperson with the press attaché working quite closely with me throughout this tumultuous period. Ambassador Sam Lewis had arrived the same year. We became very good friends.

There were things that had to be done for all these visits, but not only that, trying to serve in those first few months as a kind of a bridge between Israeli and Egyptian journalists. When Sadat came to Jerusalem he brought with him a whole plane load of newspaper editors, journalists, who, of course, had never been there before. They met some of their counterparts and struck up some nice relationships. I went in December or maybe January to Cairo and took with me all kinds of messages from these Israeli editors to their counterparts and met with all the Egyptian editors. We were using our USIS office as a message sender to keep and begin to build some connections between...

Q: Where was your office?

HITCHCOCK: Our office in Tel Aviv. ...as a means of keeping the media in Israel and Egypt in touch with each other those first few months. This was still well before any treaty which came much later. The treaty between Israel and Egypt was signed in 1979 after the Camp David talks. But in those first two years--1977-79--I don't think I had a day off. I had a beeper on my belt and a CB radio in my PAO car if I was going out somewhere on Sunday, because the media in Israel will eat you up. They are fun, dynamic, aggressive, emotional and sometimes their emotions get the better of them.

The Israeli embassy in Washington plays the American press very skillfully. So we had the problem of leaks in all of this negotiation period coming out of Washington with a time frame of seven hours putting us behind the eightball to make a correction before the afternoon papers, which were the two biggest, Yediot Atherat and Maariz, came out--first editions were on the news stands at 10:00 in the morning. If I could get a correction to those two by 6:30 in the morning there could be a box with a statement saying "such and such wasn't so, etc." So I had a deal with those two papers that they could call me anytime after 6:00 AM, and that happened. I had to be awfully careful. I did all this on background or deep background. Rarely did I want to be quoted in the papers.

Sam Lewis and I developed a whole series of backgrounders with the Israeli press and with the American press. Sam became very adept at playing the game of negotiating through the media. A dangerous game. We got burnt a couple of times in those first two years, but on the whole we survived and learned how to do it. I focused a lot of my attention in those years, I had to, on the media and one on one luncheons. I had luncheons three times a week with journalists. I would spend Wednesday, every week, in Jerusalem without fail. I would plan the week so that there would be a whole schedule in Jerusalem on Wednesdays. At that point it was about an hour's ride back and forth. After each of these luncheons with journalists, I would tape a memcon. I often would not know what particular piece of information I was given would be particularly important in fitting the puzzle of other information the embassy was trying to come up with in terms of Israeli intentions.

That the PAO was doing that kind of work at that particular time was probably as important as the Political Counselor at the political end of these negotiations, simply because the network of some of these Israeli journalists was so good within the Israeli government. If the Political Counselor had had these luncheons they would not have been so open, but when the PAO goes, and he is talking about everything from American studies to book translations to the political talks that were going on, they were willing to open up. I have always found that USIA had better contacts across society, except with the Foreign Ministry, than the State Department did, for that reason. It was really critical at that time.

Public diplomacy has come into great play nowadays, but those days in Israel saw public diplomacy in the raw, trying to deal with the press in a volatile situation involving national security of both countries, Israel and the U.S.

A. After Some Battles Hitchcock Persuades Agency To Include Biweekly A Special Section On Wireless File Giving Wide Cross-section Of U.S. Press Comment On Israeli Policies And Actions. Received With Great Interest By Israeli Press And Government.

I started one thing which I think was also terribly important. Israelis, even to this day, have a deep, almost pathological interest in what is going on in the United States. It comes out in their sense of dependence on us, not necessarily affection. I felt we were missing a bet in not providing the influential Israeli leaders with a good cross-section of American media opinion. The Wireless file always put in the staff-use-only side key articles in columns, editorials, but they would be from the Times, the Post, the LA Times, and possibly the Chicago Tribune, and the Christian Science Monitor, and that was about it. I wanted more than that, I wanted a cross section. I wanted the Cleveland Plain Dealer. I wanted the Detroit News. I wanted the Houston Post. I wanted the Atlanta Constitution. I wanted a cross-section of editorial on US-Israeli or Middle Eastern relations every two weeks. Well, everybody said I couldn't do that, it would be too expensive and there wasn't time. We leaned hard. I used an old friendship with Director John Reinhardt to demonstrate how important this was. We got it.

We put it out saying the following are excerpts from a cross section of American newspapers during the last two weeks commenting on US-Israeli relations and the Middle East peace process. Now to make it credible, I asked Washington to give me--to use Ed Murrow's phrase--the warts and all. I wanted the criticism of our side as well as their side. I made sure that there was a balance in these, because I knew there would come a day when some Israeli journalist would attack our bulletin because it was so effective. It was immediately an important thing that leaders, media people, the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry wanted. This is where the Israelis are so good. They have their hands out there trying to find out what American public opinion is, because they have to try to deal with it. It was one thing for the U.S. Government to criticize the Israelis in public. We didn't want to do that very often because it would play into Arab hands. We were reassuring the Israelis constantly that the United States support was there, would always be there when needed. At the same time, we were trying to press the Israelis to show more flexibility. Menachem Begin was the Prime Minister, a very stubborn man, indeed. We let the American press make the critical points for us and that was much better than having me say it or Sam Lewis say it all the time.

So there is another aspect of public diplomacy where I think USIS played a critical role. One never can measure the results, however.

B. USIS Tel Aviv Contracted For Special Poll Done Every Six Weeks On Israeli Public Opinion. Results of Great Interest to Washington.

We also watched the polls. We were doing, with the help of USIA's research office, which USIA paid for, a public opinion rider poll in Israel every six weeks. There wasn't any country in the world that USIA polled that often. And you better believe that the results of those polls were well read in Washington ...they were a hot item. They went in classified form with my comments, cleared by the political section of the embassy. Occasionally we might change the wording now and then to fit the local psychology of the Israelis, but we left the structure of the poll essentially to the professionals in Washington. These polls were enormously helpful in seeing where the Israeli public was going, what their anxieties were.

The organization in Israel doing the polling for us had a contract with Haaretz, which was sort of the New York Times of Israel, and therefore the results of the polls, without naming us, would get into the Israeli press. Usually the polls were showing that the Israeli public favored a more flexible stance in these peace talks. That was obviously another way of getting leverage in the negotiations.

I don't know how USIS could have been more effective in trying to use its resources, both in the polling sense and personal contact sense, in getting American media opinion to the right people in Israel at that time.

Q: Did you have a separate press officer?

HITCHCOCK: I did. It was a small post--PAO, IO, CAO and ACAO in Tel Aviv and a branch PAO running a center in West Jerusalem. In East Jerusalem under the Consulate General there was another USIS officer dealing with the West Bank. So, it was pretty small. We had seven visits from Cy Vance in less than two years. Phil Habib, Robert Strauss and Al Atherton as well. All required USIS support. We would move the whole press section up to the King David Hotel for the Vance visits. The media reaction cable that we sent twice a day was so important that the Ambassador, himself, cleared off on it whenever he could, or else relied on me to have enough sense when something might not...it wasn't a question of shielding Washington from what the Israeli press was saying, but if they were saying certain things about U.S. policy, then we would put a paragraph, "septel follows" or comment saying "The embassy has already denied this charge, see septel" or something like that. We wanted to coordinate because the sensitivities in Washington towards what was going on Israel were enormous, and if this media cable came in naively reporting something that was going on in the Israeli press, all kinds of hell could break loose if the way hadn't been paved for it.

So when we went up to the King David Hotel, the very talented local staffer who did this press summary would get up really early and start working on it. He would put a raw version of it under the doors of Vance, Hodding Carter, Hal Saunders, etc. before they had breakfast. So, again, the enormously valuable role that USIS played in all this...

Again, transcribing, that has become a big thing now with Secretary Baker, but we would transcribe everything...we had a photographer/media guy who had all the badges and passes, a very aggressive Israeli, but charming, with tape recorder. I had a tape recorder with me all the time. We would whip out the tape recorder and get everything that anybody said and immediately get it transcribed and into a cable. For example, when Kamal, the Foreign Minister of Egypt, came to Israel--this was after the Sadat visit and they had set up this political committee, US, Israel and Egypt. At the first banquet at the King David Hotel, Begin insulted Kamal and made references to the Sudetenland, one of Begin's favorite parallels he tried to draw with Egypt similarly eating up Israeli land. I guess he was also referring to the fact that Egypt remained sort of neutral during the war, and if anything, was pro-German to some extent.

The next day Kamal left. Whether it was simply because of the insults at the banquet dinner or whether it was other things, I don't know. We were the only ones who had gotten a few comments as he rushed out of the lobby of the Hilton Hotel in Jerusalem, because we had somebody with a tape recorder watching his door.

You may listen to me talk about American Studies and think that I gave all my time to the long term cultural side of USIA, but we were hot on the public affairs side in those years in Israel. And later on, certainly, with Alan Carter, when I was in Tokyo, we were hot on the public affairs side as well.

Events During Hitchcock's Term as PAO, Tokyo:1981-1984. Special Reference To President Reagan's First (1982) Visit To Japan And The Crafting Of His Speeches.

I would like to turn for a minute to Tokyo as PAO and a few of the things that happened in those years. You mentioned Reagan. One of the things that happened was Ronald Reagan's first, I think, overseas visit to Japan in 1982. This may have been during his trip to Korea as well. One of the first things that happened in the preparations for that--I think the visit was in November--was that in the summer--in July I think it was--White House Aide Deaver came and sat with the country team. A lot of the talk seemed to be about physical security. He seemed bored. I finally spoke up and said that I felt we needed to spend time talking about what kind of image we were trying to cast of the President in Japan. What sort of impression did we want to leave and how would we build that impression? Here is a President who is seen in the Japanese cartoons as a cowboy or a B movie actor with very reactionary views and not much awareness of the rest of the world. How do we overcome this in his speeches and in his public appearances? Deaver perked up, and when the meeting was over he pulled me aside and said, "I want to work with you and your staff. I can see that you are after what I am after." We developed a very good relationship.

I went with him out to one of the scenes that we were thinking of...the Japanese were thinking of having President Reagan go out to Nakasone's summer cottage, which is close to two hours from Tokyo by car. So we went and looked at it with some other people. It is just a little Japanese cottage on a hill. Deaver got up there, looked at it and said, "Don't change a thing. Don't let them pave the gravel road."

A couple of weeks later I got a call, a faint voice from Washington saying, "This is Misty Church. I am a speech writer in the White House and I understand that you are in charge of the public affairs side of the Reagan visit and I want to work with you." Well, that was just great. I couldn't have had a better offer. She was a young researcher, but in charge of doing much of the preparation of the key Presidential speeches including the Diet speech. We had, by that time, composed a TV interview for Reagan and some remarks at two receptions--one for Japanese and American businessmen and one for the media. So we started working together.

She didn't have the foggiest idea about...I don't think she knew where Japan was. She started out by saying, "We want to get some kind of quote like 'Ich bin ein Berliner' in the Diet speech. There must be something where the US and Japan have...When he went to Canada, for example, and the President gave a speech to the Parliament, there wasn't a dry eye in the house because he talked about our comrades in arms. Don't we have something like that in Japan?" I said, "No, I am sorry Misty, but we were on opposite sides of that one." She said, "Well, but what about Korea, we cooperated there didn't we?" I said, "No, no, that is even worse, we can't use Korea either." So I had to lead her along the way. But she knew what she wanted. She wanted some references to early Japanese Meiji leaders who had tried to bring a democratic process into Japan, the first Constitution, etc. We looked up Hirobumi Ito, Fukuzawa and gave her some select quotes.

We came up with a slogan finally. It wasn't "Ich bin ein Berliner." And it won't go down in history like that. It was: "Japanese American friendship is forever." She said, "Yeah, go ahead and put it into phonetics and we will see if he will read it." Nichi-Bei yuko wa eien desu. We put it in phonetics and checked it out with everybody, the language school and so on.

She said also that they wanted to salute Japanese culture. I think I put that in there that the President should find a way to express his appreciation, respect and awareness of the sophistication of this ancient culture. This would rub off some of the cowboy image that remained.

She said, "Good. Find something literary." I decided I would try to find a haiku that had some social, ever so slight, perhaps, reading that could be made of it, some haiku that could be interpreted as having some social consequence. My wife, Lee, and I got out all the haiku books we had and borrowed a few and looked through them. I wanted Basho, because he was the best known poet in Japan. He is the Shakespeare of Japan. I finally found one. It basically goes something like this: Many blossoms in the field, but each has its own special fragrance, or something like that...quality. It was really "many flowers bloom;" almost Mao's slogan. But we got it into the question of cultural values, shared values and diversity in our societies.

Then, of course, I had been working with...I knew who the interpreters were going to be for the Diet speech. It was this outfit that you are probably familiar with now because it is so well known--Simul International. The head of that outfit was a friend of mine, and still is. We wrote in Tokyo a good deal of that speech. Not the political side of it necessarily, but all of the themes. We wrote the opening statement for a TV interview--and they never changed a word of it. We wrote some of the toasts. The historical references, quotes and so on in the Diet speech stayed in.

Then I had a call from Simul and they wanted, my friend, who was going to be in the glass room up above the Diet, the text of the Diet speech. Well, I wasn't at liberty to give it out at all. And yet, I knew what he was saying: if he didn't have the text in advance, there might be references that he would not be familiar with. So, I just, quietly, gave it to him.

As it turned out, thank the Lord that I did, because President Reagan got up there and the speech went fine, and the Japanese had earphones on so there was no oral translation. He got to "US-Japanese friendship is forever" and mispronounced it. Of course, the interpreter was there ready. He immediately corrected the President's mispronounced "yuko wa eien desu," and there was a murmur of approval across the whole Diet hall.

The Basho haiku that Reagan quoted made a bigger hit than anything else in the speech. The Japanese understood that the President was reaching out, that he was tipping his hat, even though somebody on his staff had done this for him. The fact that he took the time to do that was just terrifically important to the Japanese.

I only told that story as an example of something that American political leadership and the State Department forget all too often, and that is: when you are dealing with Asia, it is how you do things, the style of how you do things, the symbolism that you project, that is much more important than the substance, and indeed becomes the substance in large measure. Without it, it is a cold fish, a cold visit no matter how much everybody tries to hide it. It has to be there. If we don't take this into account during the President's visits overseas, we are missing a chance and that is where USIA has a special role to play, I think.

1984-88: Deputy Associate Director, USIA For Management.

I would like to return to my four years as the Deputy Associate Director of Management of USIA. This was after I left Tokyo. I came back and was supposed to be a diplomat in residence at SAIS for a year, and started there.

Q: What year was this?

A. Substance Of Hitchcock's Article In "Foreign Service Journal" On Public Diplomacy.

HITCHCOCK: This was 1984. I started preparing an article for the Foreign Service Journal which came out in April, 1985, on public diplomacy, limitations and opportunities. It was an effort to review what scholars had said about the limitations on persuasion in any context, but certainly through the mass media. I collected in a few pages most of the best known writings by American and British scholars on the subject of "persuasion."

I had two points. One was that there is a real limit...we should never fool ourselves: we are almost never going to be the principal reason why somebody changes his mind or modifies his position. We are going to be at best a small factor in that equation. Secondly, the art of persuasion is enormously limited, particularly the more influential the people you are dealing with are. They are the ones who have already articulated their position and are committed to it, and it is going to be very hard for them to reverse or modify it. Having said that, these scholars go on to say that by providing people with new information you can, over time, have them see your point of view and become aware of different factors that they may not have been aware of before and in time, modify their views. But you cannot often expect to do this through the mass media. If there is no face-to-face contact, no personal relationship, the chances of persuasion through the mass media are minimal.

So these were reminders to, guess who, Charlie Wick, the Administrator of the Agency in the eighties, not to oversell their abilities. On the other hand, not to mistake the potential we have, particularly where we are on the ground with the right information, speaking the

right language, overseas with the right audience, to influence people and to let our media complement that.

And as I wrote in that little farewell thing that USIA just published and in USIA World, it is the media that complements the USIA's efforts on the ground, not the other way around. Putting more funds into the mass media at the same time we are closing posts is not the way to achieve our objectives overseas, if you follow the academic literature that has been written on this subject.

In any case I was at SAIS only two months when Director Charlie Wick insisted I become the Deputy Associate Director, the senior career officer, in the Management Bureau of the Agency under a political appointee who, as it turned out, was a nice guy but not terribly strong. So to a large extent I was expected to run the place while not appearing to do so, for four, long years.

B. "Difficulties" With Charlie Wick.

Charlie Wick and I got along fine. He had come to Japan when I was PAO.

Q: The famous time when he asked for security and armored cars and wanted to carry a gun, etc.

HITCHCOCK: Yes, we got him much of the security he wanted. He had a good trip to Japan. It went well. I think it was really Jock Shirley who probably put him up to picking me for the job.

But in any case, he had fired a campaign worker who had been in that job before me and asked me to do it. So I left SAIS and went back to the Agency. Those were four tough years, because Charlie never had any real interest in management. It was the last thing on his mind, except when something went wrong. The elevator didn't work, or the snow didn't get shoveled soon enough. He had this idea that we couldn't shake, that he could have in his office a computer key board that would allow him to access everything in the Agency at the drop of a hat. He spent a great deal of the Agency's money on a contract with Booz-Allen and Hamilton, to EDS, which was Ross Perot's outfit, to come up with recommendations. He dismissed Booz-Allen and Hamilton because they said, "You don't need it, and besides it is too expensive for you." Then EDS came up with a very dishonest report that tried to please him, but in the end made it clear that it was going to cost an enormous amount of money if he wanted to do it. His instinct was right, that the Agency needed to get with electronic communications. Certainly Worldnet was one of them. Although Alan Carter and I were doing worldnets before there was a Worldnet. We were doing video dialogues before Charlie Wick ever hit Washington. Nevertheless, I give him credit for doggedly pursuing that and getting the funds to get Worldnet going.

Now, on the automation side, he gave us a wake up call, but he did it in such a way that it caused us to spin a lot of wheels and spend an enormous amount of money on studies that never amounted to anything.

1988-1989: A Year At The Center For Strategic International Studies.

So he was a difficult guy to work with, and four years was certainly long enough. He and I were simply finding it too difficult to stay in tune, and I had been there long enough. So when I was given a chance to jump ship and take the diplomatic year that I had been promised at SAIS, at the Center for Strategic International Studies, under Dave Abshire, where Stan Burnett had already moved, I took it. It was a glorious year.

In the management job I had already started, at the request of Deputy Director Stone, to put together the argumentation for keeping the Agency together as one organization, explaining why the VOA should not split off, why parts of us should not go back to the State Department. When I went over to CSIS I continued doing that. I figured that it should be a more scholarly piece. and I set up interviews with about 50 former and present players in public diplomacy--State, NSC and USIA. I interviewed all the Secretaries of State, almost all of the former Directors of USIA, and the NSC heads. I talked with McFarlane and Scowcroft about the role of the Agency as a foreign policy advisor; the location of the Agency, whether the Agency be brought back into the State Department; and the VOA. I also talked to John Richardson, Hodding Carter, Larry Speakes, David Gergen and some of those whom I knew favored bringing USIA back into the State Department, or parts of it.

I found out that none of the top players, whatever the party, from Muskie to Brzezinski, to Scowcroft, to McFarlane, to Shultz, wanted USIA moved back to the State Department. None of them wanted the VOA to be any more independent from USIA than it was already.

I also dealt with some other issues in this monograph that had to do with how State organizes its own public affairs activities, and whether the spokesperson should be separate from the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, dealing with public information in the US, which gets short shrift in the Department of State. I also dealt with the subject of training.

That year at CSIS also gave me a chance to make a trip, paid for by them, to East Asia and I wrote an article on "changing perceptions on the Pacific Rim of the US and the US response," which came out in the Washington Quarterly. I think I have been more prolific than most USIA people while in the career service.

Various Projects Relating To Public Diplomacy Undertaken By Hitchcock At Different Times And Places.

A. Pushing Idea Of Having USIA PAO's Do More Writing And Speaking In Their Own Names Rather Than Through Embassy Officials Or Visiting U.S. Experts.

One of the things that I did in Japan as PAO that I would certainly urge others to do more of...it gets back to the role of public diplomacy. We think of ourselves too much as the middle man bringing American talent out to talk with potentially influential people abroad. Where we have some expertise ourselves and where we are dealing with some very tough issues, like trade, and negotiations in Israel, we should be doing the writing ourselves. We should be doing more speaking ourselves. I never went to a branch post that I didn't have a discussion meeting with media, academics and others, on some aspect of US-Japanese relations, in Japanese.

While I was in Tokyo as PAO I wrote articles that I then got my staff to place in Jiyu twice. One was called, "Improving US-Japanese Economic Relations," and the other was called "Looking At Today's US-Japanese Relations." I also got an article on the economic side in the Sekai Orai and in the bulletin of the Chamber of Commerce of Osaka. Twice they used articles I wrote.

I think that PAOs should do more writing and speaking themselves. Of course, we also draft speeches for the ambassador. But we shouldn't be so modest about our own abilities to put forward US views in our own name, instead of simply always waiting for somebody to come from Washington to do that for us. I think USIS officers who have the expertise, who have Russian, German, or Chinese, should do more of this themselves.

Also, the monograph that I did on public diplomacy makes the point that we are missing the boat in not doing enough reporting on trends--I don't mean just public opinion polling--I mean what is going on in education in the country, in religion, with youth. The traditional political section of an embassy is so busy doing their reports on meetings with the foreign minister, specific negotiations, that in busy embassies these subjects fall between the cracks. I know too many USIA officers who feel their job is not reporting, but program. The job is reporting. To get out there and let Washington have a cultural backdrop for decision making on policies towards their country. Without that, we have foreign policy by people who think they are making it for the people of Indiana, or Louisiana.

Q: You don't get the kind of reporting that you get with a grass roots exposure out in the countryside.

HITCHCOCK: You just have to get the mood, the institutional change that may be going on, and only USIS can do that. I hate to throw another task at USIS but I did. It was partly because of me and this monograph that Director Bruce Gelb started the award for reporting. There are now two awards for reporting. One is for domestic service, which helps the press service to some extent, and the other is for overseas reporting. I think this needs to be emphasized by anybody coming into the Agency at the top: that we have a

role to play in public diplomacy in providing Washington with the mood, the institutional changes in the less sexy areas of the relationship, because they have tremendous influence over whether we will succeed or not in the political and economical issues that we are trying to achieve.

Q: I think this is highly important. I want to make a remark that it is really only within the past ten years or so that it had been possible for USIA to do this without offending the ambassador. There have been a few exceptions to this, people like Jock Shirley and yourself could get away with it and gain acceptance so that the ambassador didn't feel that he was being impinged upon or his area of expertise being invaded. Even more than the ambassador, the political counselor. Even now sometimes you run into this problem because somebody gets excited and they think the USIA people are trying to invade the wrong turf. But it is much more possible than it used to be.

B. PAO Quarterly Letters To Agency Area Directors.

HITCHCOCK: One of the things that I did...I don't know when it started but it preceded me as PAO...The Agency area directors decided at some point that their PAOs should write them a letter each quarter. The format has changed somewhat over the years, but basically it is still continuing. The first section is sort of psychological climate, and the second section is programs, then management, etc. and Dan Oleksiw used to have the final paragraph "What is wrong with Washington."

I put a lot of time into that first section. It was going to be retrospective, reflective, with implications for the future. I said to myself, "Damn it all, I am not going to do this just for Ted Curran, or whoever happened to be running the Middle East office at that point when I was in Israel, I am going to send this as a cable." I would write it up, and the first section only was sent as a cable, cleared with the political section. You mentioned the difficulties of that. Well, indeed, I found sometimes I had to go to Ambassador Sam Lewis to get the political section to buzz off. But I made it very clear that this wasn't political reporting. This was public atmosphere, public climate. I would send it to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, as well as to DOD, OSD, NSC, State and when I was in Tokyo, obviously to neighboring countries there and to CINCPAC and DOD's Washington offices.

When I got to be area director I required five posts to do this, the big ones, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, regularly with the first section of their report. That got pretty good play back here. Some of them were referred to be other agencies as very useful to them. The management role, of course, is one that you had so you are very familiar with it. But by the time I had it, it included personnel as well, the whole thing.

Q: Management had personnel the whole time I was (in those days) Assistant Director, USIA for Administration. It was separated into an independent element, and was only returned to Management in relatively recent years.

HITCHCOCK: Well, it came back in again.

Q: Yes, I knew it did. I think it always should have been there.

C. Quarterly Management Report From Agency To Field Posts.

HITCHCOCK: It is hard to talk about Management, there were so many bits and pieces. There were several things I did that were particularly useful in those years. I started--it is still going I think--a cable which went out about once a quarter to the field, from Management. It was a Management report on everything. I would get the automation people, the finance people, the personnel people, contracts if necessary, security, to do a section. Then I would cut it down and wrap it up as a cable. I think that really helped the field, because I got complaints that Management was out of touch with the field and that the field was out of touch with Washington in these crucial areas. We put more emphasis on language teaching and language requirements while I was in the job. We completely redid, and expanded the Foreign Service Lounge so that there was a decent space for staff to come back to in that terrible building we are still in.

D. Battling State Department On Security Decisions To Put USIS Installations Abroad Behind Security "Bar."

I spent much of my time fighting with the State Department on security issues. After the Beirut Embassy explosion, Shultz just went "ape" on security. There was the Inman report. Before we knew it, we were all going to be behind castle walls somewhere ten miles from the center of town. Trying to reason with State on this. First trying to get the money to do some of the security stuff ourselves. They always wanted to take us over on security issues.

Then trying to get exceptions for our centers because of the importance of access. All of that was handled in our office. Generally speaking, thanks to personal contact with people like Ron Spiers, whom I had known for years, and Foreign Service Director General George Vest, we were able to make some progress.

E. Pushing For Opportunities For Senior USIA Officers To Be Considered For Chiefs Of Missions.

Another of the areas that I also worked hard at was trying to...some years before, the Senate had in one of its reports our authorization bill, stated that USIA and AID senior officers should be considered on an equitable basis for chiefs of mission along with State officers. I tried to get Wick interested in this. There were some very talented people in USIA who deserved that experience--not just minorities and women, but others as well.

When I looked into it I found that the Agency sent State every year a list of all senior officers--all senior PAOs and all the area directors. This is kind of a long list, and obviously it got no attention at State. It was tossed aside. So I got Wick to agree that he would do a letter to the Deputy Secretary of State, actually I think he did it to the

Secretary, and he would send no more than five names. With it would go a complete but relevant file on each of those five names. We began to get a little bit more attention. At the same time, I was working with Vest to get him to pay attention to this.

Q: He was the Director General of the Foreign Service then?

HITCHCOCK: Yes, the Director General of the Foreign Service. I have to say that very few USIA officers got ambassadorships. More, however, got them as a result of their own connections with State than through this system that we tried to work out. I am delighted to see those who have worked at State, get Ambassadorships. But you had a better chance to do this than if you were a senior USIA officer. This is demoralizing and it shouldn't work that way. They should take our advice on who we think will be the best ambassador and not simply reward those who happen to be doing a good job for them at the Department.

Q: I think part of your difficulty on this was that Wick's acceptability over at the State Department was terribly low because they looked upon the man as an uneducated clown with no concept at all of international relations. His recommendations, although they were obviously done by people below for him, apparently were not accepted with the same degree of seriousness as they might have been.

HITCHCOCK: It worked for John Kordek. Later on it worked for Mike Pistor. I think Len Baldyga was offered something that he didn't want. I was offered a small, isolated Far East post and agreed to it with some trepidation and had it approved by Shultz, but it didn't happen because State had misunderstood the White House which had a political appointee for that particular post and insisted. Wick even wrote the White House objecting to this, and the letter came back stating that the White House had no intention whatsoever of providing that particular position to a career service individual, sorry.

But I think it is another area where the Agency has got to focus attention if it wants to keep its senior people who become Career Ministers and have done everything in the Service. You are going to have to provide some opportunities for them. We have the ability to do these jobs. However, even the ones we have...look where they sent Kordek, Botswana; Pistor to Malawi. These are not Career Minister assignments. State wouldn't assign a Career Minister to either of those places.

Q: No.

HITCHCOCK: So that is what we have to put up with. Well, that is nonsense. It is not living up to the spirit of congressional intent. Something ought to be done about it.

My last position with the Agency was as Area Director, coming back from a year at the think tank, CSIS. Incidentally, that is a very good thing to do. It is good not only for the think tank, to have somebody who is in government and foreign affairs, but it is also good

for the Agency, strengthening its contacts with important people and getting around town and have the time to do it.

1989-1992: Back To USIA As Director, East Asia And Pacific Area. Various Efforts To Work With DepState On Matters Of Presidential Speeches To Be Given In Japan Or Elsewhere In East Asia; Otherwise Attempting To Assist In Setting Stage For President Or Other Dignitary Visits In East Asia, Etc.

Back to work at the Agency in 1989-92. For three years I was the Area Director. I will speak to two particular areas where we focused our attention. One I have already mentioned is American Studies--giving it new attention. I was doing it for one area and wanted to get the E Bureau and the Agency, itself, to focus on the undergraduate survey courses for the non-major and get them introduced and get the text material that would be at the right level and the right language. To use the tools of USIA to make this possible.

This was, perhaps, my major accomplishment. But I think the other one is on the other side of the equation again, to public affairs. We were certainly the most active of the Agency's area offices in what you might call public diplomacy with the emphasis on diplomacy. When Prime Minister Chatchai or President Aquino or President Roh Tae Woo came or the Japanese Prime Minister of the day, Kaifu came to the US, we asked the PAO to do a "scene- setter" as we used to do for American VIPs going abroad--President, Vice President, Secretary of State, etc. We would take that scene setter and shorten it, highlight points that we felt the visiting dignitary would probably want to stress, pitfalls that a visit should avoid on our side and the themes that any briefers, such as Dick Solomon, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, after a White House meeting with the President, should stress. The whole thing was about two pages long. We sent it to Solomon, to NSC and in some cases to Carl Ford who was the senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security and East Asia. We did this with every visit.

We also made a point of getting more involved in the preparations of visits from Washington, using my experience with Reagan in Tokyo. Take the Bush visit to East Asia. He went to Australia, Singapore, Korea and Japan in 1991. We actually asked the post to come in with historical references, quotations, all kinds of things that we had successfully put into the Reagan Diet speech in 1982. We took all of this and sat down with the President Bush's speech writer Tony Snow and his staff. The policy officer of EA and I went over and went through the whole thing. They were absolutely flabbergasted. No one had ever done this to them before. Instead of resenting it, they ate it up. They took it all and fed it into their computers and some of it showed up in toasts, speeches.

Then, because, I think, some of the area directors managed to develop very close relations with the NSC, I was able to see, although I wasn't supposed to, could never get it from State, USIA would never have seen a copy of it, some of the drafts of Presidential speeches that were going to be given, when people were still writing in their margins in

the White House. I would go over there late in the afternoon, let's say 7 at night, and pick up a copy and return it by 7:30 in the morning the next day. Particularly, they were interested because they knew I had more direct Japan experience than anybody in the White House at that stage. I can't say that I was terribly successful. We had raised the issue, as had State, of whether the President should go to Toys R Us in Kyoto, given the fact that once upon a time the only thing that Japan could export to the United States was toys. Had we come full circle now, and the only thing that the US could export to Japan was toys? Was this really the message we wanted to send? We were told to "buzz off," that this was a political decision and that was that.

These drafts were constantly harping on "jobs, jobs, jobs," and "free and fair" trade. Well, almost everywhere "free and fair trade" showed up, I took it out, because "fair" doesn't mean anything in Japanese. It doesn't come across. "Equal access," that means something. I took out "level playing field" because that didn't mean anything to them either. President Bush had agreed to visit Kyoto and meet with American and Japanese students-- American students studying in Japan and Japanese students studying American Studies. I was going to get the American Studies theme banged on! But the draft statement was back into the trade issue again. Wrong audience, wrong place! Trying to get that taken out of there and having the other points made, I guess I just have to say that despite some success in the Australian visit and some success in warning the White House that AID's environmental initiative for Asia was not a bad idea but they hadn't consulted anybody. Again it was going to be the US announcing something and consulting afterwards, rather than developing this as a joint effort. The time that the US can do what it wants is over in Asia. It is silly of us to think that it isn't. I don't think this was intentional, it was mindless. They just don't understand the body language that you have to use to get something across. So I tried to kill it as a "presidential initiative," because that is too big a word. So it was announced that the President was discussing with leaders the ways of doing this, etc. and it came out all right. I am only mentioning this to get at the nitty gritty of what we do. The area offices are not simply managers of the field, working on personnel issues, emergency leave, collecting stuff for the weekly report, they ought to be a major player in influencing how we sound, what we say and what the likely impact will be, particularly if it is going to be negative, on our policies overseas in their area.

Polling information should not be just sent over to State and the White House as just polling information, it ought to be analyzed by the area. The area ought to say this is what this means. This is what this suggests to us is happening. A kind of thoughtful analysis is what has been missing. Now, I will say that the present director of research in the Agency has made some real progress in this regard. But I think that, and my monograph gets into this in great detail, the Agency, if it is going to keep its head up and be respected, has got to play this kind of proactive role in Washington as well as with the ambassador and overseas.

Probably this is as good a place as any to close unless you think I have forgotten something in particular.

I don't have any regrets. I didn't particularly want the Management assignment, but I did feel that it was time to have a career officer back in there again. There hadn't been one there for quite a while. The only way to see that sections of Management were working for the field and not for some theory back in Washington was to have some senior field people in the Management Bureau. So it was useful for the Agency even though it wasn't something that most of us would pine to do for very long. Certainly not for four years.

A. Further Efforts To Derail Attempts To Separate VOA From Agency.

To wrap it up, I didn't think we need any more "studies" although I have agreed to help Bob Gosende with something he is putting together over at Georgetown which he wants to get done by inauguration. We do not need to have our roots examined again. We don't need to be pulled apart. VOA certainly should not be any further from us than it is. If anything, the relationship should be closer, collegial. We shouldn't interfere with news. Frankly, I feel that although the editorials, which John Reinhardt initiated, are not very good and we often have to change them, I would rather have the Agency try to work with State in reflecting views through something that is properly billed as US Government's opinion, than to drop it and watch opinion begin to infiltrate into news programs, which is what would happen if you get political appointees over there.

It is better to label it and try to make sure that you have responsible people doing it. I am very unhappy that we have now got State vetting all these editorials. I think if the USIA isn't capable of being clued in enough on our foreign policies to do the editorials and vet them ourselves, we ought to be ashamed of ourselves. The fact that State is now in the act is an unfortunate change which happened because of a decision by Scowcroft which the Agency felt it couldn't fight. We hope it will go away, but that is where it is right now, and it is unfortunate.

Q: You will be lucky if it does. Once something like that gets started it is difficult to get it changed.

HITCHCOCK: We get to see it first before it goes to State, so at least they are not seeing some of the embarrassingly poor or untimely things that are coming across our desk. But still, we ought to be able to do that. If we have a doubt about something, we will call over to State and ask them what they think about it and get their input. This is the way it should be rather than sending paper over to State.

Q: How long does it stay over there?

B. Final Observations On Relations With DepState And Difficulties That Arise With Each Change Of Administration.

HITCHCOCK: Oh, it is a very short turn around. They have 48 hours to turn it around. I think the Agency is in for continued tough times. We are better appreciated on the Hill. Any ambassador arriving on the scene overseas looks around and sees what he has to

work with. AID is out of most of the posts except in Africa. Military aid is down. USIS is one of the few tools that he has to work with and we should take advantage of that, and we do. We are appreciated overseas by ambassadors, on the whole for the right reasons, more than we used to be. But in Washington, it is back to square one with every new administration, to reeducate them all over again. To be active, not to be a pain in the neck, but we have to show that we have stuff that is useful to them. Show that their are dimensions to what we do that are relevant to what they do. Then we can gradually get back to where we are. But we should have people in NSC, on the Policy Planning Staff, which we don't. I am not sure where it stands, Stan Zuckerman is in the Under Secretary for Political Affairs' office, but I fear he will be a kind of fifth wheel. He is not in the chain of command.

Q: The way to do it is if he somehow can create a personal relationship with the people in the direct chain of command.

HITCHCOCK: Well, he can, but even the Political Under Secretary is...special projects guy, Mike Armacost was given Afghanistan and this and that. They are not across the board. The Political Under Secretary often is a pain for the geographical bureaus at State as well. So I don't know how it is going to work, but if anyone can make it work, Stan can. I think we really ought to have a USIA DAS in public affairs, in PA at State. That is where we ought to be. We could be more effective there. I think it is good that we now have three out of the five, possibly four out of the five, geographic bureaus' public affairs office; under each assistant secretary, there is a USIA officer. That makes our lives immensely easier, to have people in those positions. The Agency, I think, has got to be very careful not to mix its priorities. I think there was a temptation in the Bush administration to do that and in the Agency. It went head over heels on Eastern Europe and democracy building in the Soviet Union. Fine. Those are important things, but our role in that is going to be limited. We are an Agency of ideas. But we can "teach" democracy? I doubt it very much.

I think we have to be careful not to hop on too many horses running off in too many directions at once. We have a basic role to play in trying to make our society interesting, relevant, and where there are distorted views of the US as a society falling apart at the seams, to get at those issues and try to make the solutions that we are trying relevant to solutions to problems that most of these countries are going to face in similar ways. Whether it is urbanization, environment, or the homeless, these are problems that are going to be the problems of modern society around the world and our experience with it can be relevant and useful. We have our job to do. We don't have to look for a new mission. Our mission is as stated already, it doesn't have to be rehashed, rephrased. We know what our business is. If we can't make that business important to State, NSC and the Hill, we won't make it more important by trying to do something else, like democracy building.

End of interview