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INTERVIEW

[Note: this interview was not edited by Gerald Hyman]

REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNANCE

HYMAN: I was at CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) for nine years or so. I'll make this brief because I don't think it's very interesting. I went from AID (United States Agency for International Development) to CSIS and worked on a governance program which I felt was underappreciated. I should have emphasized that

more when I was director. It was one of two regrets that I had actually, was that other parts of the democracy effort were emphasized, and governance I thought was not, and that was my fault; I was the director so I could have done something about it.

Q: Well you had to bring along the whole apparatus of program decision-making of course.

HYMAN: Well yes and the governance area itself was divided into a bunch of different things and the team wasn't all that coherent and each one was doing his or her own part of the governance thing. So, it really didn't have a gelling dimension. But I could have done something about that and I didn't. And so one of the things I wanted to do after I left was to concentrate on governance. So, this opportunity came up in the form of a man by the name of Rod Hills who had been among other things for a while the chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission. More prominently is his wife, Carla Hills, who is literally eight inches from you on that side of the wall.

Q: Okay.

HYMAN: And so Rod and Carla Hills established, more he than she, this program at CSIS. These think tanks are not as independent as they may seem. You've got to raise the money for your program. So, they put some money in for this program. They called it a trust but it wasn't really a trust; it was a sinking fund. And to make a long story short, over about nine years it sunk. Rod had been the main person interested in it. And he was unhappy with CSIS and the new building. I don't know if you know about the new building over there.

Q: Yes, I do, absolutely.

HYMAN: So, he thought it was too crammed and too costly and this and that and our overhead was too high. You know it's like all overheads; when you come to this overhead business initially you think are you crazy? 25, 30 percent for nothing? And then it turns out 25 percent is low. So, he never quite understood that because that 28 or whatever it was that CSIS charged was not any substantially more than anybody else would have done.

Q: Right. And universities are double he overhead

HYMAN: Way more, yes.

HYMAN: So, I told him that many times but whatever. So, as this program was getting to the sinking point he was looking around for some other possible home for it and he didn't find one. And then he was not well but not at the edge of anything, just had a series of falls and this and that, heart problems. Long story short, he fell, broke a leg, was taken to Georgetown I think it was. So, they did a surgery and fixed his leg and then they discovered he had a heart problem. They knew he had a heart problem but an imminent

heart problem. So, Carla took him up to Baltimore, to Johns Hopkins and they performed some surgery there and he died on the surgical table.

Q: Oh, what a tragic story.

HYMAN: Very. So, the result of that was that no additional money was going to go into it. He was going to put more money in but just to keep us floating until he figured out a "new home." And so, Carla said well why don't you just come over here. And I said well but CSIS doesn't normally let programs go to some other place. That's part of how they make their money is they rent you this office space, would be about $60,000 a year if it were at CSIS. A smaller office was $45,000, so.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And then you pay for everything else, your computer, your printing, your telephone, everything is on top of all that plus 28 percent or 29.

Q: So, you weren't really theirs; you were just a client.

HYMAN: I was there for nine years.

Q: No, no but you weren't theirs. That is, they didn't own you in a sense.

HYMAN: No but CSIS doesn't own anybody.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: If you don't raise the money, I mean they're very nice and very polite and that kind of thing but the president makes it very clear if you can't raise the money your program is going to end. Period.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: I mean there's not a lot of emotion about it. They may float it for a while but not more than that. So, it's an eat-what-you-catch kind of place. I mean he's very clear about that; there's no ambiguity about it.

Q: Right. Well did you have staff? I know we've got to go back to this thing but did you have staff?

HYMAN: Yes, yes, I didn't have any staff, I never did because I didn't want to draw down the endowment more than it was already being drawn down and I didn't really need the staff. So, I had nothing, unlike other programs.

Q: Right. So, you were pretty portable when it came time to-?

HYMAN: Yes, it was just me. So, she said come over here and CSIS said okay but then after a while they said well look, you're either a program or you're not. So, there still is a nominal program there but it's not even listed on the website anymore. And it's nominal only because we're trying to find some other place possibly. But if there is another place it won't be with me. I mean I've run my course on this; it's now been 12 years.

Q Right. Are you able to do any of your activities from here?

HYMAN: Yes. So, part of how we raised money for this program was through consultancies. So, I got a salary and all the money from the consultancies went into the program. Fair enough. No problem with that. So, part of what floated the program was the difference between what I made and what it cost us to be there.

Q: Right. Well I suspect we'll come back to this later in the interview.

HYMAN: Sure.

Q: But it seems to me you were ahead of your time, because although we talked about Democracy and Governance (D&G), it was democracy that got the attention. I don't know whether people just found it boring to think about governance or-

HYMAN: I think that is part of it actually. But it was very clear, Ann, for many years that the biggest problem in the consolidation of democracy where there had been a transition was the performance failures of the new democratic government.

Q: Right, yes.

HYMAN: And so, people said well wait a minute. Yes, we wanted this and this and this, wanted elections, wanted free press, etcetera, etcetera, but we also want a government that performs. And if you guys can't provide it then what good is that? And that has still not pervaded the so-called democracy and governance community yet. All kinds of other things do, human rights and this and that and the next but not that.

Q: Well maybe it's easier to focus on the external trappings of democracy programming.

HYMAN: Maybe, yes. These are very difficult problems because you have so many of these countries, including after these "transitions," there are entrenched elites who are often nepotistic or corrupt or kleptocratic or all three and they don't want to give all this stuff up. And so, you can talk all you like at AID about political economy analysis but if you don't understand and come to terms with governance it's just blowing in the wind.

HYMAN: Which, by the way, is what happened in Sudan, South Sudan.

Q: Okay. Well I hope we get to that but I mean clearly that's what happened at the end of the Soviet period.

HYMAN: Absolutely.

Q: And I didn't realize this but I've just finished the John le Carré autobiography, "The Pigeon Tunnel,"-

HYMAN: Yes.

Q: -and he said the same thing happened after World War II in Germany, that a lot of the Nazi leaders managed to get entrenched again in business and political elites and maybe the interesting contrast is when you look at what happened in Iraq when the U.S. stopped the Ba'ath leadership from continuing to perform.

HYMAN: I didn't know that that was the case. I knew there were some, I didn't realize it was pervasive. It would be really interesting to look at how that got changed in Germany. The problem is that in Iraq and as you point out the purge of all the Ba'athists, that's where the expertise was.

Q: Exactly.

HYMAN: So, you're going to purge the army, which of course makes an enemy of people with guns.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: Then you're going to purge all of the civilian side which is where the expertise lies, and then you're going to turn it over to them and say well, they're going to throw flowers at us. Well, how can that possibly be? So, these Germany industrialists, that's where the expertise was.

Q: Exactly.

HYMAN: And that's probably the same in Japan. Do you know Japan has these *ibotzus*, these conglomerates of banking, manufacturing, finance and trade. And we consider that a monopoly because they were vertically integrated. And so, MacArthur broke them up. And I don't know how long it was after he broke them up and they were back together again. Toyota is just an example of it.

Q: Yes

HYMAN: Mitsubishi. I mean, these were pre-war companies; they didn't just arise out of the ground. Now, Honda is a different story but the others-.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: So, they had the organizational structures, they had the personnel, they could call people back; so they changed the name on the door, which is exactly what happened

in Central Europe. You know, yesterday you were the Communist Party, today you're the Socialist Party. And it was the same office, same people, same everything; the only thing that was different was you've got a little thing on the door that was different.

Q: Right

HYMAN: And that was clear, too, in my travels in the Balkans early on and I said that. But again, nobody wanted to listen to that because we were all in a big victory lap.

HYMAN: I remember talking to some workers in a small town in Bulgaria and these were rudimentary workers, these were not managers of any kind. And I said well guys, this was early on, '91 I think it was, I said isn't this a good thing for Bulgaria? And they said no. Don't you understand what's going to happen now is that the people who used to be managers are now also going to be owners.

Q: Right. No checks and balances.

HYMAN: Yes. So, they're going to own it and manage it and they're going to take the profits for themselves. And this was way before all of this happened.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: I mean these guys could see it because the same people were in the same offices. Instead of a red hat they had a blue hat, okay.

Q: I'll send you a clip from the le Carré's piece. Basically, the people who saw this happening said, doesn't anyone else see what's going on here?

HYMAN: There was a bit of a purge of Nazi but it was relatively shallow.

Q: Right, exactly.

HYMAN: The allied command, Eisenhower and of course Marshall, wanted to put Europe back on its feet and so however that was going to happen was okay as long as there were some checks and balances. So many of these countries had nominally a transition and they simply didn't perform and then that was compounded by the big man deciding that term limits were not a good idea and why shouldn't he continue and with that you get Mugabe and Museveni and all these-

Q: The line is long.

HYMAN: Yes. Museveni was this great hero, etcetera, etcetera. Well it turned out not quite true.

Q: Not so much.

HYMAN: Yes. And so, to me I don't know whether there is an answer and I certainly don't know whether assistance can be useful in that respect. But I passionately believe (to the extent that you can get passionate about governance) that it is a problem and it's still undervalued in the way in which people talk about all these countries.

Q: Right. Well I hope you're writing on that subject and I hope you continue to write on it.

HYMAN: Yes, I should do more than that. It would be easier to do, I think, if I had a good solution to the problem.

EARLY BACKGROUND: GROWING UP ON THE NORTH SIDE OF CHICAGO

HYMAN: So, date and place of birth; I was born in Chicago in 1942. So, my parents were Holocaust survivors. They survived. My mother's father survived by going to Shanghai, which is where a whole lot of Jews went, well not a whole lot, a fair number of Jews went.

Q: They got out?

HYMAN: Because it was an international city and they allowed people to come in.

Q: Do you know when they left?

HYMAN: Yes, sure. My parents left in '38, which was just at the last possible moment, and my grandfather, my mother's father left later than that. And her uncle, who also went to Shanghai, and one of her brothers also went to Shanghai. The problem for exits at that point, of course so late in the day, was who would take you. And there were visa restrictions in the U.S. You had to come in under the quota and you had to have a personal guarantor so that you weren't going to go on welfare.

Q: Right. And who was theirs?

HYMAN: My father's father had had a distant cousin in Chicago and I don't think they ever met, but he provided these visas for my grandfather, my grandmother, my father and his sister (my aunt). My aunt and my two grandparents. And my grandfather's sister also got out, and there were a couple that wound up in New York but not under his protection. So, those were the ones that got out under his umbrella. My mother's mother never did get out so she was exterminated.

Q: Were your parents married when they left?

HYMAN: No. They knew each other in Germany and they got married shortly after. They I think intended to get married but then during the mid-1930s that was not the first thing on anybody's mind, I guess.

Q: Right, right.

HYMAN: And my mother had a cousin, also a distant cousin, and that distant cousin also lived in Chicago and she provided a visa for my mother. Or she didn't provide the visa, she provided the guarantee that you needed to get the visa.

Q: Did they know English at all?

HYMAN: Yes, they did know some English because the German schools taught English Neither one of them ever went beyond high school which in the Germany system is much more difficult anyway, right, because they have these tests and all that kind of stuff. I don't think my mother ever had any ambition, I think, to do that (go beyond high school). But she lived in Heidelberg and that was a university town.

Q: University town, yes.

HYMAN: So, she knew a lot of people, a lot of students in the university. My father lived in a small town not very far from Heidelberg but it was a small town. So, then they came here, they met, I don't know exactly how, on some blind date or some club or whatever. And so, they came here, they married, and my grandparents on my father's side lived in the same apartment building that we lived in in Chicago. It was small apartments, of course, efficiency apartments. And so, I knew them quite well and German is a second language to me; I grew up speaking it because they didn't speak English or very barely.

Q: Right, right.

HYMAN: But my father and my mother did and we spoke English at home, which is too bad, really. We should have spoken Germany because I would have had so much better grounding in it.

Q: Right. But there was a lot of prejudice about outsiders.

HYMAN: Well they wanted us to be assimilated. Yes, well there was that and then those were the days when immigrants were supposed to be assimilated. This was not a multi culture whatever whatever. If you came from Italy or Poland or whatever your kids were supposed to be assimilated. And they were. So, Chicago had a lot of ethnic neighborhoods in the inner-city.

Q: Still does.

HYMAN: So, when I say I'm from Chicago it's not like most of the people you meet around here who are from someplace called Buffalo.

Q: Right. You got to says South Side or-.

HYMAN: Yes. So, I was on the North Side, about a mile from Lake Michigan, or a mile and a half. And my grandparents, as I said, lived in the same apartment building and then my parents moved there. There was a shortage of apartments because of the war and so there were not very many apartments available. And finally someone that they knew was moving from an apartment to a house in the suburbs, of course, and so they got that apartment which was not easy to do. You had to stand in line and this and that. So, we moved not very far from the older place, from the other place we were living but this was all carpeted. We moved to the other side of the street. So, where we initially lived was, let's say, two blocks north of this street and we moved half a block south of this street. That street was the dividing line for high schools and north of that street was a high school that was not great but much better than the high school I went to.

Q: Did your parents know that?

HYMAN: Yes, they knew- well, they moved first. Again, we were kids at that time so then they didn't move and so the question was where would I go to high school. So, my mother was distraught that I wasn't going to go to this other school which wasn't great, it was just decent.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And alternatively she thought that I should go to a private school that was not so far from the house. My father was adamant that I should go to a public school and so I did. And that high school was a really formative element in my life. Academically it was rock bottom. Well maybe not rock bottom but pretty close.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: But socially it had- have you ever heard of the Cabrini-Green Homes?

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: Okay, the Cabrini-Green Homes was in this district. So, that we had Cabrini-Green students. After a while they tore all of those things down but they tore Cabrini-Green down much earlier but long after I was in high school. So, these were black kids who were living in these large high rise apartments. They were the second generation of the great migration of blacks from the South. But there was another migration that people don't remember much but it's relevant to the election just now (2016) and that was from Appalachia. And this was-

Q: Poor white?

HYMAN: Poor whites who worked in mines or small, you know, manufacturing things and they moved to Chicago because it was still an industrial center. So, during my childhood, first of all there was still a stockyard where thousands of animals were brought to get slaughtered. One was on the South Side, one on the North Side but in the

summertime if the wind was blowing in the right direction you could smell it. And then there were also factories. And I remember the whistles at noontime and the whistles at 5:00 and so on and so forth. And they were in my neighborhood and they were all over the city, okay. So, this was the magnet for these Appalachian migrants. So, they were in the same area or a lot of them were in the same area. Well they didn't get along too well.

Then there was a whole lot of different people from different groups that used the name of the group but you didn't know what it meant. For example, a close friend, a couple of close friends were Serbs. And it just never occurred to me, what's Serbia.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: It just never occurred to me. I mean they were, okay, so and so was from Lithuania, so and so was from Serbia, so and so from _____.

Q: Wasn't there a big Swedish community?

HYMAN: It was a Swedish group but not in that neighborhood. Further north.

Q: Further north, okay. So, you were north of Lincoln Park.

HYMAN: I was just west of Lincoln Park.

Q: Okay.

HYMAN: The school is west of Lincoln Park. Where my parents moved was north of, just a block or so north of Lincoln Park which ends at this street, this dividing street, and it runs all the way through the southern part of town. This was, I won't go into it but this was a result of homestead planning, city planning. Because the city burned down in the 19th century and like all the other Great Lake cities it was a port and a manufacturing center - steel and iron ore and all that kind of thing. There were big steel mills in Gary, as well.

Q: So, those jobs brought poorer people to that area.

HYMAN: Right. And in this particular area. Now farther north and other parts of the city were better off, there were other parts of the city that were worse off including the Southwest Side or the South Side, which was a black ghetto basically, at the time they called it. Now they call it an inner-city black area or whatever. I don't know what the proper politically correct term is but in those days it was called a ghetto. And then on the West Side of the city, the lake is the eastern part, so as you go west that was also a poor area and it's now become a big Hispanic area. But there weren't that many Hispanics, there weren't that many Latinos in those days. There were some for sure and we had some in our school. Anyway, so this school was this wonderful-

Q: Amalgam.

HYMAN: -amalgam, right, and you were in the same homeroom as these kids.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: It turned out they put me in the so-called achievement homeroom or something like that. Just to give you one idea, we started out with 600 freshmen, I think. I think that's right. And we ended with 100 graduating students. So, at 16, which was the legal age, there was an exodus of a lot of these kids because they had to go earn money.

Q: Girls and boys?

HYMAN: Girls and boys, more the boys than the girls. So, we were a small alliance; 30 of us were in this so-called homeroom. And that group was pretty tight. I'm still in touch with a number of them.

Q: Is that right? Have you had reunions?

HYMAN: Oh yes. Now we have email. In those days we wouldn't have that. So, I still am in email contact with one of them and she's in contact with some of the others that are still in the city. We didn't have, I think, the huge debilitating drug dimension but there certainly were a lot of fights, rumbles as they used to be called.

Q: With weapons.

HYMAN: Mostly with brass knuckles. And some knives but mostly brass knuckles. And I certainly went more than once to the police station to get some of my high school friends out if I could.

Q: Were you sort of left alone, you weren't forced to take sides?

HYMAN: Yes, I was. There was an email exchange the other day with this person I mentioned. I said there was a story in the paper about this scourge of harassment where people, kids beat up on each, you know on Facebook and this and that.

Q: Bullying?

HYMAN: Bullying. And I said to her no, I don't remember that. Did we have any bullying? I don't remember that. There certainly could have been because there were guys that were pretty tough. But I don't remember was any of that. There were other things but not that.

Q: Interesting.

HYMAN: And certainly not among the girls which is apparently where this is even more prevalent than the boys. Why I don't know. But anyway.

One last thing because it gets to the Trump election in a way as well. The other boys, as opposed to people like me, went to a school which is now one of the five schools in the country that had the highest AP (Advanced Placement) something or other, something called Lane Tech. That's a magnet school on the North Side, Northwest Side, and it was a technical school. So, the top of the pecking order there were tool and die makers, kids who went to high school to learn the trades, electrical, plumbing, carpentry, etcetera, as I said tool and die makers.

Q: Did they have to apply to get in?

HYMAN: No, no, you could just go there. But that was their curriculum. So, I started there actually but I mean I wasn't interested so much in being a plumber and so-

Q: Your mom probably wouldn't have allowed you.

HYMAN: Probably not. Anyway, the tool and die makers, who used to make a lot of money compared to the others, are now out of business, right?

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: Because computers do all the tool and die making.

Q: Right. Were they unionized at one point?

HYMAN: Oh sure. But nobody does tool and die making like that anymore so union or not union they just don't do it

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And this is the real story, my view, more than trade. We are in the midst, in my opinion, of a revolution in the production, consumption and distribution of goods and services.

Q: Because there's been another Industrial Revolution.

HYMAN: Yes. And nobody's going to be hiring these people anymore. It's not just that, you know, that they're poorly trained or something; cars don't get made that way anymore. Computers don't get made anymore. You've now got robots that are learning how to be better robots.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: I mean, Chipotle I think it is, they're going to get around their minimum wage in Washington by eliminating all these jobs and give you an iPad when you walk in the

door. And so you're just going to sit there and you're going to order your own food. And then they have one person who delivers it.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: They're not going to have a whole lot of people walking around there taking your order. Well, that hollows out a whole lot of jobs, not because they're in Mexico or not only I should say because they're in Mexico but because they're not anywhere.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: All these Japanese firms that are coming in doing these automobile things in Tennessee, Kentucky, they're not hiring anywhere near as many people as they used to.

Q: I think the sociologist in me thinks we may need to redefine what a job is or what a lifestyle is where the job is not a major feature

HYMAN: Exactly. And all these people who are angry, feel abandoned, in my opinion correctly, are unfortunately asking for the wrong thing. They think someone's going to come in there and bring these jobs back and they're not. Those jobs aren't coming back. Now other jobs may come back but then you'd better be skilled enough to take those jobs, A, and B, those jobs aren't going to last. It's going to be like the tool and die makers. How long do you think those jobs are going to last until somebody comes up with something else? So, all this creative destruction has an effect on the workforce and on jobs and on lifestyles.

Q: And on politics clearly.

HYMAN: And on politics. So, all these people who say I'm not doing very well and more importantly my kids are going to not do as well as even I am doing are right.

Q: Yes, absolutely.

HYMAN: I think the problem is that no one has explained that very well and I fault President Obama for that and the reason I fault him for it is because he had, I believe, the intellectual and rhetorical ability to make that clear.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And he didn't do that.

Q: But it's the inconvenient truth that nobody wants to hear.

HYMAN: Exactly. But if you're in the Industrial Revolution in England you're not going to want to hear it but the fact of the matter is-

Q: It's going to happen.

HYMAN: -it's going to happen, yes.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: So, you better hear it and then what to do about it.

So anyway, I'm sorry to have gone off on that.

Q: No, but that's very interesting. I think that your high school experience was probably very formative.

HYMAN: Very, very, I mean, first of all, of course, there was the immigrant Holocaust thing; secondly there was the high school thing.

Q: Of the hundred that graduated how many went to college?

HYMAN: Ah, okay, I forgot to say that. I think one or two went on immediately. The others, like the two women that I'm connected with, they could not go on because they were supporting their families. One of their fathers owned a bar, her parents or someone had to work that bar, and they couldn't. But this group was such an incredible inspiration. Almost all put themselves through college on their own as they were working through the city college system. There's a place called Navy Pier which is now a big fancy area. Well in those days it wasn't. It had been a naval base, hence Navy Pier, and the University of Illinois created an extension college campus but in those days it was Navy Pier.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: So, they went to the community colleges and they just worked themselves up and they wound up in, some of them at least, wound up in good jobs. So, of course the problem with a reunion is that the people who come are usually the people who did reasonable well. And the people who didn't don't come because they're embarrassed and so on and so forth and they may not have the money. So, we had a big reunion a couple of years ago and a whole lot of people, not just this little group, turned out to be accountants and this and that and the next or had worked at… Oh, one of our colleagues worked at Montgomery Ward but that didn't last very long because Montgomery Ward has gone out of business. So, you have this constant turmoil of job loss.

Q: And, how many of them were drafted?

HYMAN: So, then there was the draft. You know, not a lot were drafted and I wasn't drafted but that's because there were plenty of volunteers, both because that is what men did from that area and secondly because it offered more upper mobility. And so there were enough so that they didn't have to do much of a draft in my area. If I had been on

the other side of the street that I mentioned to you it would have been a whole different story. But I was in the district-

Q: Where there were already plenty of volunteers.

HYMAN: Plenty of volunteers.

Q: Interesting.

HYMAN: Now I don't know how many. I'm sure they did draft but and then the draft rules changed as the war wound down. So, I had a 2S (student) deferment initially because they didn't need people like me. By the time they got to 500,000 recruits, then it was a whole different story. Then we had lottery and so on and so forth.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: So then came, for me at least, the question about college and there had never been a doubt in my family whether my brother and I were going to go to college so the question was where to go. And we had a high school guidance counselor but this was a sort of a half-time job.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: So, their geographical vision was Northern Illinois. And if you really wowed them, you might go to Madison. But if someone had said to me have you thought about applying to Princeton I would have said where is that?

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: But I also hadn't thought about going to the moon, you know. It just wasn't in your world view that that was a possibility. So, I did apply to Madison where actually I had an uncle, the husband of my father's sister, taught and I really did want to go there. But I also applied to the University of Chicago and I got in. And I got in on the basis of noblesse oblige. I mean they didn't say that but I'm sure that's true because they wanted to do something for the city that they were a part of.

Q: So, you were an inner-city kid and part of whatever quota there was.

HYMAN: So, then I moved to the South Side which is where the University of Chicago is; it's in that ghetto, it's a little island in that ghetto or was in those days. Well, that was the polar opposite of the high school I went to. It attracted all of the sort of Bronx High School of Science top whatevers. So, it had all these people and it was an intellectual place. This was a place for the mind. We were a community of scholars, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera. I mean it was a very, in a lot of ways, disgusting but nevertheless that's the tone that was there.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: I'd never read a book in high school and certainly hadn't had to read a book review or maybe I read done one. All of a sudden, on the first day, they give me Hobbes and they say on Wednesday we're going to discuss this.

Q: Right. Didn't it have a great books orientation.

HYMAN: Yes. And so we all had to take the same courses, not like the Harvard cafeteria style, one from this, one from that; these were specific courses for two years.

Q: Right. The core curriculum.

HYMAN: Core curriculum. And everybody took the same courses. Of course, they didn't have the same instructors but they had the same courses, same readings. Great books. Anyway, so I was completely out of my depth. And every Friday I went home on the elevated to the North Side of Chicago and Friday night I went to this high school where they had things you could do; I've forgotten what they all were.

Q: Basketball games I'm sure.

HYMAN: Basketball and this and that and the next and theater and blah, blah. Every Friday I went home; I could barely wait to get to Friday. And the ride back to the University of Chicago was not a pleasant one.

Q: You felt over your head.

HYMAN: I was completely over my head. And it took two years to get grounding. And I'll collapse the rest of this; so, I stayed there for my Masters and PhD in anthropology. So, I really liked it a lot at the end of my senior year but I would never have imagined that I would want to stay there one minute longer than I had to.

DOCTORAL RESEARCH IN MALAYSIA

Q: Yes. What drew you to anthropology?

HYMAN: It was an intellectual thing more than anything else. Part of the core curriculum was a course on social sciences and what was the difference between sociology, anthropology, etcetera, etcetera, and how did they go about looking at things. The core issue in the curriculum was what was called ideas and methods; came from Aristotle.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: And the theory was that depending on the inquiry, that's the term of art, you have a different set of potential methods and different certainties. And you couldn't apply

the certainties of physics to art history; just a different inquiry. And so the purpose of mixing all these things together was to look at these inquiries and say well what are they trying to do, how are they trying to do it, how do you evaluate that and so on and so forth. So, one of the lecturers, one of the people that became peer lecturer in one of these seminars was an anthropologist, reasonable well known I guess, and he gave this really grand talk and that was it.
His name is Clifford Geertz.

Q: Oh, yes. Very well known.

HYMAN: So, I was his student in graduate school. He was at Chicago in those days; he went to Princeton later. And he had given this lecture really on Indonesia and I thought it was great.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: And he said how can you tell anything about human nature which is presumably what the other social sciences are supposed to be about if the only people you're looking at are people like yourself. You need to go looking at other people. How do they put the world together? Otherwise if you don't do that then how do you know how much of the conclusions you're reaching is idiosyncratic to your group but different from other groups. And I think the only way you'll know that is by going to some other group.

Q: So where did you do your field work?

HYMAN: I did two pieces of field work. For my Masters I did a piece of work in a very small town near Juno on a kind of thing called the potlatch. And then for my PhD I went to Malaysia. I was going to go to Indonesia which is where he did his work but I couldn't get a visa. This was 1967 and-

Q: Oh yes, the bloody revolution-

HYMAN: Well, Suharto came in but Sukarno had been anti-American so nobody knew in that interregnum what was going to happen in Indonesia. And somewhere in Jakarta was my application for a visa. Anyway, I took Indonesian at Yale for a summer and the language in Malaysia and the language in Indonesia are pretty close, sound, structure, the language. And so I went to Singapore and I'm trying to get a visa for Malaysia, where I also didn't have a visa but I got a tourist visa for three months. And in those days Malaysia was much different than it is now, as was Singapore.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And that was three months and then you could petition for another three months and finally you could try to get a longer-term visa. So, I did that and I went to a small village and essentially with took up residence with my Malaysian mother. I just

tried to learn the language from her. So, by the time I went back to Kuala Lumpur on this visa problem I spoke Malaysian and so that was the end of that, you didn't have to do anything else.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: If you could, you know, keep ahead of conversation. There wasn't a long line of people who wanted to go to Malaysia so it wasn't that big a deal. So, I stayed in that little village for less than two years.

Q: Right. And your thesis again?

HYMAN: Yes. So, that was the third element of my intellectual development that made a big difference-- the time I spent in that little village. My thesis was on economics, religion and politics in this county, district, it was called ____ County. And it centered on the economic part of it not because it was the thing I was most interested in, (I was interested in the politics), but because the politics was a function of Malay, Chinese and Indian interactions and they interacted only in the marketplace.

Q: And each had a role.

HYMAN: Each had a role. The Malay, who I lived with, were absolutely certain, as was confirmed in the literature, that they were being ripped off by these Chinese middlemen. So, I did a little bit of hunting around. I was unsure what I would do. Geertz was totally uncommunicative. And so I finally wound up doing a thing on economics, particularly on rubber, on the production and marketing of rubber. Marketers in the district were, all but two of the 17 were Chinese and the other two were Malay. And my view was that these Chinese were ripping off my neighbors. So, I said well, I'd use a methods approach. You'd better check this out, or how do you know.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: And more importantly how much was because the government was studying cooperatives and the idea was to eliminate these middlemen.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: So, I wanted to figure out how much we, meaning the government, could take away from all of this and redistribute it. So, to make a very long story short, which I won't bore you with, I get a random sample of all these 17 dealers, I bought a ton of rubber, I dried it, labeled it, took it to the smokehouse in a nearby town, which is what these guys would have done. They would have sold it, I didn't sell it. I took it there; I said can I have this smoked and then I'll sell it to you at whatever the prevailing price is. So, I did that and again, I'll make this brief, I compared the prices that had been paid for it. I had two young kids [do the asking] because you have the whichamacallit effect, the Heisenberg Effect. I didn't want to be sitting there when they were doing this thing,

right, because who knows what but the price would be different. So, the kids went in there and said listen, we'll buy your rubber but we're going to buy only some sheets. Well the sheets we bought were based on a randomized selection; but these kids were supposed to hold it up and smell it and etcetera, etcetera, etcetera, and pretend that they were making a market decision sheet by sheet. In fact, they knew which dealers they were supposed to buy from because it was in the randomized table.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And so we bought a ton of rubber in little parts and we labeled it, had it smoked and the difference between the price we got for the smoked rubber and the price that the middleman had paid the primary producer for the rubber was one percent.

Q: And you were shocked.

HYMAN: Completely shocked.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: I said to myself well what do you think a monopolist is going to say, we're ripping these people off? No, they're going to say we're barely scraping by.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And I had 17 different dealers and a ton of rubber. I didn't just go to one place and say well that was just that one place, very peculiar.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: I got a random sample of all of the entire universe of people who are buying rubber in that district. So, that was almost as shocking as getting Rousseau and Hobbes on the first day of college. Because I didn't know what to make of it. I thought, you must be wrong, how can this possibly be, how can this be. The literature says it's not like this, people say it's not like this, etcetera. So, I thought well maybe it is. What if it is? What if the market is so efficient that these guys are competing against one another but why were they able to do that and stay in business? So then I started listening to what they were saying, and they said well, we don't own the rubber market. My wife, who stays at home and doesn't do anything, quote, she's the one who sits with the scale and we know all these people and we know the quality of their rubber so all she has to do is sit there, they bring the rubber to her, she weighs it on the scale and she pays them. That's not what I do. I do other things. And not only that but we have some condiments and small things that people can buy. So, the literature said oh well then, they're just gouging these people on these condiments. Well, they weren't. And not only that but they would lend money. And the literature would say, well you're just screwing these guys on their loans. Well, they weren't doing that either. So, they were putting little pieces together to make a whole.

Q: A life, yes.

HYMAN: Yes. Most of them are not living high off the hog. Now, once you enter the town where the second order guys were, they were doing alright. But these primary guys were just all over this district on rural roads, dirt roads, places that were hard to get to, etcetera, etcetera, buying from these primary producers.

Meanwhile there was also a plantation economy in rubber. So, I talked to those guys about how they did this stuff and the rubber middleman said listen, these guys are producing terrible rubber. The difference between good rubber and bad rubber has nothing to do with the tree. The tree produces the same latex no matter what. The amount of latex is what matters depending upon how you treat the tree but not the latex itself. And so if you process it with acid and so on and you do it in a clean place in a controlled way you can do really good rubber. If you put all kinds of dirt in there then it degrades the quality of the rubber and therefore it degrades what the marketers are willing to pay for it.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: So, all of that I found out by doing this research. And then I said maybe rubber isn't unique because if these Chinese guys are doing rubber why aren't they doing rice? If it's so much better why don't they just shut the rubber shop and go do rice because rice is a seasonal crop, it's more capital intensive for one thing. I began to listen to these middlemen in a way I hadn't before and it turned out that the rice dealers didn't feel they were making that much more either. But they did higher volume and they did a higher volume because you had to be able to process the rice for not too long; you couldn't just have it sit around.

Anyway, long story. So, that made me rethink my democratic socialist approach to things.

Q: The miracle of the marketplace-

HYMAN: Yes. Maybe the market works. Maybe you should rethink all these things that you thought all these years. Maybe you should take the market seriously.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And of course, University of Chicago had been the home of Milton Friedman. And I had interacted with some of his students. And we'd argued about all this stuff and somehow they always got the better of the argument but I didn't think much of it until I had this eureka event with the rubber. And I thought well gosh, what if Friedman's right? What if the market is a better way of doing things? And this was, again, at a time, this was in the late '60s, nobody was saying stuff like that.

Q: Nobody was saying that?

HYMAN: Including the World Bank. So, that was my dissertation.

Q: Fabulous. Did you ever publish it?

HYMAN: I tried to publish it and I couldn't get it published. I tried it at Chicago and I tried it at Princeton I think it was, and they took forever and ever and ever; they took years to get back to me that the editor changed , this or that changed, was still interested, blah, blah, blah, blah. And finally I had to give up on it.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: I shouldn't have; I should have done something else with it. But anyway.

Q: So, you actually became more of an economist.

HYMAN: Well that was the focus of my dissertation. I still did a lot of political stuff and religious stuff.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: So, one of the political parties in this country was a so-called Islamic Party. Now this was 1967 so this was way before Iran, which was 12 years later, let alone Osama bin Laden and stuff like that, right. So, my original intent was to go to the part of the country where they controlled the state government and see what they were about. But this was a completely esoteric topic, Islam and politics. I mean, nobody was interested in that except a couple of academics. So, I went up there and there were just too many anthropologists in that little area.

Q: Tripping over each other, yes.

HYMAN: And so I thought we're going to all talk to the same people about the same thing. So, I went to the other side of the country where all these Chinese were. One of the reasons I went there is because the real appeal of this Islamic Party to the Malays was not about Islam, it wasn't about sharia. It was "we're Muslims and they're not." All the Malays were Muslims and very few of the Chinese, if any, were. And the same thing with the Indians because they were Hindu mostly.

Q: So, it was a proxy for something else.

HYMAN: Exactly. So, I was interested in okay, how do these guys, how do they deal with each other in these districts where there's a lot of Chinese, not just a couple. So, that was another part of what I did.

So, it happened to be that there was an election. I'm sorry to keep going on here but there was a horrible election at the end of my stay there, it wound up in a big race riot in 1969. May '69. And I was in my village. And just one last snippet on that, so another advisor working in the area that I stayed away from partly because he was there, came through Kuala Lumpur so I drove to see him. And I said to him (this was as the election was getting closer), and I said to him, now I may be wrong about this but I think there's going to be big trouble here in this election. Because these rallies were getting more and more vituperous and more and more emotional. And these are people living side by side together, with Chinese living across the street. And I said to him, I think there's a potential here for a real blowup. He said no, no, you're just imagining these things, you're just pessimistic, etcetera, etcetera. I said I don't know; I go to these rallies, you know, and I hear what people say and I talk to people afterwards. And there's just a growing polarization between these communities, particularly the Chinese and the Malays. And on the day after the election the place blew up. It blew up in Kuala Lumpur. They expected trouble in Penang, which is another town, and so the then prime minister had the Sarawak Rangers called in and they were fierce. Sarawak was part of Malaysia too. So, Malaysia has East Malaysia and West Malaysia so I was in West Malaysia. East Malaysia has Sarawak and Sabah and Borneo, on the island of what used to be called Borneo.

And so there was a curfew, which they imposed after this riot, these guys were going to enforce that curfew and they were going to shoot to kill. Not great but they were equal opportunity shooters. So, unlike in Kuala Lumpur where they called out the army, which was a Malay army. The army in effect took sides and did a lot of rampaging in the Chinese area but not in the Malay areas.

Anyway, that was a big turning point in the country, the roundup of Chinese, affirmative action program for Malays, a lot things can be said about that which I won't burden you with.

Q: No, it's hardly boring. But weren't there a lot of Chinese who left?

HYMAN: There were some Chinese who left; not so many. Actually, a lot of people left, but what they really did was hedge their bets, which is exactly what the Chinese are doing in China today. So, buy a house in Vancouver, send your kids outside for university, stay back there and run the business but if you have to leave make sure you have some money you grab, make sure you have a house to go to, make sure you have a visa to enter abroad and that's what they did.

Q: Interesting.

HYMAN: I won't go into it but in those days Singapore was a basket case. We don't remember that anymore.

Q: People don't remember that. I saw an analysis maybe 10 years ago that in 1960 the per capita income in Egypt and in Singapore was roughly the same.

HYMAN: I don't doubt it. Singapore existed in those days to load these sheets of rubber onto boats and they walked them up the plank. This was not mechanized. There was a huge plank, very high because these were big ships, and they would carry these things on their back, hundreds of pounds, well more than a hundred pounds I imagine, and then they would dump them into holds. So, Singapore was a trading area but it didn't have anything there other than a port; it had no natural resources and so on. And it was thought of as a basket case. Now everybody says "oh sure, it's as small place, homogenous, blah, blah, blah." Well nobody said that at the time. It's like the people who say Secretary Clinton should have been in Michigan. Well where were they four weeks ago? I don't remember a whole lot of clamor said go to Michigan. She was supposed to be in Pennsylvania. That was the key turning point and that's what she did.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: Okay, so it's easy to see this once it's over. So, there's a lot of revisionist thinking about Singapore in my opinion. So, that was a big turning point in my life also, partly because of my experience living in this rudimentary community; you know, there were no walls, there were just clapboards on studs. They were trying to eke out livings and so on and so forth. They didn't have a lot of time to speculate on this, that and the next. And the Chinese are very practical, at least the ones in Malaysia. They weren't so interested in esoteric discussions; they were interested in much more practical things. And the Malays really did feel put upon.

HYMAN: So, these travels were unique and formative experiences, as was my university and graduate education. and etcetera, etcetera. By the way, one last, one quick thing-

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: -during my senior year in college and my first year in graduate school I drove a City of Chicago bus.

Q: Really?

HYMAN: Yes. Well several of them. And I did it the next year also. And that was a great job. You got paid quite well and that's how I earned my tuition. But going through the city on these buses-

Q: Yes, you see a lot.

HYMAN: Sure.

Q: And was there- was it a straightforward process to get that job?

HYMAN: Yes.

Q: Did you need to know someone?

HYMAN: No, no, no. You just applied. It was only a summer job. It was a summer job because a lot of the permanent drivers wanted to take vacation so they had to have somebody to drive the buses. And so they offered the job to college students. Well, you had to be over 21. I don't know if you had to be in college or not but anyway over 21. And you're only employed for whatever it is, July, August, part of June.

Q: It was enough to get you through college.

HYMAN: Well there happened to be a bus terminal near where my parents lived and so I was able to just go there. I took my lunch, which is not exactly a cool thing to do. I lived at home, they didn't charge me rent, and I just saved all the money from this thing. Took as much overtime as I could get and paid my tuition.

So, that was another element of my education because I drove from way north, from north of Wrigley Field all the way to 100 and something or another on the South Side, depending on which route you're on. And that was through some not so good neighborhoods.

Q: Yes, yes. But you never had any problem?

HYMAN: Oh, I had a couple, not, nothing that was serious. I had one guy that was, you know, threatened to hold me up and I sort of pushed him down the stairwell of the bus, shut the door and moved on.

Q: So, does Chicago still feel like home to you?

HYMAN: Yes, it does, yes.

Q: Do you still have family there?

HYMAN: Well my mother died about two years ago or three years ago so at the end of her life I went there a lot more than I had before because she was healthy. I went every month in the last part of her life. But I didn't go anywhere because she was infirm so I relieved her home companion so they could have a weekend and stayed with her. But she wasn't very mobile and not all that interested. She was in her 90s. So, I did go back, yes.

Q: And it feels like home?

HYMAN: Oh absolutely, yes. It hasn't changed a lot.

Q: Yes, it's interesting to have that kind of grounding.

HYMAN: Yes. So, that feels much more like home than here but I've been here for a while, years, so.

POST DOCTORATE TEACHING AND LEGAL TRAINING

Q: So, after you finished your doctorate you didn't go immediately to AID I'm pretty sure.

HYMAN: No, no, no. I taught at Smith College for a decade, anthropology and sociology and a course on economic development with an anthropological kind of perspective on it.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And then I went to law school because I still wanted to go back to Malaysia and still wanted to work on joint ventures because I thought if the market is really all that effective the way they're going to get ahead is partly going to be by getting into joint ventures and moving up the value chain.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: So why don't I do something that will help that. And being an anthropologist at Smith College wasn't very close to that. So, I went to law school and then I practiced law at a large firm here in Washington.

Q: Where did you go to law school?

HYMAN: In Richmond, Virginia. I didn't even apply to Chicago because I mean by that point I had been there 30 some odd, 30 years or something like that; grade school, high school, etcetera, etcetera.

Q: But you'd had enough of New England after 10 years?

HYMAN: Well no, I liked New England a lot but I'd had enough of the liberal arts college rules and I mostly wanted to go to law school so I could try these joint ventures which in fact didn't turn out that well. I didn't do that many of them here in Washington.

JOINING USAID AND THE BEGINNING OF THE EUROPE PROGRAM

HYMAN: And so, how I got to AID. I took an Indonesian language class at Yale before I went to Malaysia, and I continued to connect with a couple that was in that class afterwards. He went to Berkeley and I went to teach at Smith. Then he came back here on an IPA (Inter-Agency Personnel Agreement) to DOD (U.S. Department of Defense). This was in Bush 39.

Q: Oh, the late '80s.

HYMAN: Or maybe it was under Reagan. Anyway, he was having lunch with Carol Adelman. He had been in Indonesia so he was an Asia guy in a part of DOD that was a sort of policy shop, thinking about larger than just military.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And Carol Adelman was at that time head of AID's Asia/Near East Bureau. And so she was thinking about developing a democracy element, a governance element in ANE (Bureau of 'Asia and the Near East...

Q: Open Markets, Open Society.

HYMAN: Exactly. You may be one of the three people that remembers that other than Carol and me.

Q: Okay.

HYMAN: Exactly. And it was called the Democratic Pluralism Initiative, which is what she titled it. But she didn't know what this was going to be about. She had no idea. She just knew, or thought, maybe we should look at this.

So, she was having lunch with this language colleague of mine, at the White House I guess it was, or wherever he was and he said she was looking for someone to start this program. And there were no democracy programs in those days except if you want to talk about Greece, ancient Greece.

Q: Well there was some funding for IFES (International Foundation for Electoral Systems) that went way, way back.

HYMAN: There was some money funded for IFES and LAC had an administration of justice program but it was limited to courts and limited to justice. So, that was it. But it wasn't a systematic democracy and governance program. Jim Michael was instrumental.

Q: On the Latin America side?

HYMAN: On the Latin America- well there was only Latin America as far as I know and it was a result of the nuns who, you know, Kissinger came back, yadda, yadda, got to do something about the courts, etcetera. But it wasn't even beyond that as far as I know. So, this was in the early part of 1989 and my friend said well I have this friend who's an anthropologist, worked in Asia, also a lawyer, maybe he'd be a good person to start this kind of program. Because, again, nobody had any idea what this was going to be about. So, she looked at my resume, I guess, and thought well maybe so. So, I had an interview with her -- totally unsubstantive as I recall -- and she hired me. Now she did that as an AD so, there was no tenure involved in that.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And so then, 1989 was sort of a hallmark year for Europe. Well, AID had three regional bureaus, Africa, Latin America, and ANE. Well, they knew Europe wasn't in Latin America.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: They also knew it wasn't in Sub Saharan Africa.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: So, they put it in ANE partly because ANE had a couple of little programs, one was in Ireland for example, the Tip O'Neill fund.

Q: And they had one in Italy.

HYMAN: Exactly. So, they had these snippets of programs that nobody paid much attention to because they were earmarks and they didn't do any work in the former Soviet Union and they also didn't do any work in Western Europe. There was no need in Western Europe and they weren't going to do it in Warsaw Pact countries. So, all of a sudden bam, this thing blows up. So, I walk in the door in ANE and there was a "taskforce" on Europe. They said well you're on the taskforce and I said I have never been to Europe. I'd been to London once on my way back from Malaysia to go to the library. That's it. So, they say that's good enough for us; you're on the taskforce. And it was headed by Dick Brown and Marge Bonner, who had been relieved of their duties on the Egypt desk to do this Europe thing, about which they also knew nothing. Don Presley was the economics person.

Q: Right, okay.

HYMAN: Paul _____ was sort of one of the program kind of people. Oh, we had, I guess we must have had a unit where these guys would look over your scopes of work and stuff like that. Ron Redman was one of them. They don't even have those now. I think Brian did away with that.

Anyway, so there's one of those (program office) and so on. And a contracts officer was assigned to it. So, that was the taskforce. And so we wound up responsible for devising programs in Central Europe, initially only Poland, Hungary and what was then Czechoslovakia. That was under the so-called SEED Act, Support for Eastern Europe and Democracy.

Q: Yes, I remember the SEED Act.

HYMAN: So, the word "D" (democracy) appeared in the act. And not only that but unlike other parts of the world these people actually wanted to have not only a market economy, they also wanted democracy, they wanted to be a part of Europe. And so they

were open to assistance in this area. It's not like you had to cram it down their throat. And so our first task was to do Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. And very shortly thereafter the dominos fell in the rest of Central Europe so very shortly after that was Romania and Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

So, there was a PMI, do you remember PMI?

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: PMF now, who was looking for a rotation. She was in FM, that was her hone base, and she was looking for a rotation. And I don't know if she wandered by or if she, I forget how it was but she stopped in and said can you use me. So, it was just me and Tom Nicastro. That was the democracy office but he had other things; he covered education and all kinds of other things. So, I was a junior DG person reporting to Tom who reported to Dick Blue who reported to Barbara Turner. That was the pecking order.

Richard, he's no longer Dick. Okay, in those days he was Dick.

So, she came in and I didn't think much about her, I was thinking what's she going to do. She's going to be there a couple months. But Tom was more of an empire builder than I was, and he said sure, come on in and why don't we take you as your LPMI. That was Susan Kosinski, now Fritz. And so she changed her home base to what then became a division in the technical assistance part of ANE and she stayed with it forever, until she went to management.

And then Catherine Stratos joined us. She's in economic growth now. Anyway, long story short or not so short. So anyway, so ANE then got carved up because Carol and Roskins were in, to use the technical term for this, pissing matches with each other.

Q: Right, yes.

HYMAN: And so Roskins said well, I may not be able to get rid of you but I can cut your empire down. ANE started in Manilla and went all the way to Morocco. And then included Europe. And he said well I'll fix that. So, he took Near East away, and then it was Asia and Europe and then finally Europe split off also. So, when we first started this we were kind of a large global world and my attention never was back on Asia again.

Q: Right. So, you stayed with Europe and Carol Adelman?

HYMAN: Yes, so I stayed with her because she is the one who brought me on and of course you stay with the woman who brought you. So I did. And I went with Europe because that's where she went.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And also that's where the need was greatest because Asia, I think, was much more quiet.

Q: I forgot that Carol spent time on the Europe program before she left

HYMAN: Oh yes. It was, yes, definitely. She was the lead for the Europe program until the end of the Bush Administration.

Q: Okay. And then Tom Dine came in.

HYMAN: Tom Dine came in. And more importantly Barbara Turner.

Q: Right. But Barbara didn't go to the Europe program until later, no?

HYMAN: She stayed with Carol for a while and then I can't remember where she went but then she came back with Tom Dine after Carol was already gone.

Q: Okay.

HYMAN: So, I've known Barbara for umpteen, umpteen years.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: And Tom, who I'm still in touch with.

So, Carol brought me in and as a result of that she often called me to the front office to talk about things that I shouldn't have been involved with. They were not part of my job. But we got to be close and we still see each other from time to time.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And so, I wouldn't say I was like a DAA (Deputy Assistant Administrator) but I was often in the room with her and David Merrill and I shouldn't have been there. If anyone, Barbara should have been there. I should not have been there. So, we had Barbara and Dick Blue and Tom Nicastro and me, and I'm reporting to all these people.

Q: So, they probably resented you.

HYMAN: Exactly. So, I felt very uncomfortable doing this. I mean it wasn't a way to make friends and influence people.

Q: And you were an AD that whole time?

HYMAN: I was an AD and I wasn't even a division chief because it wasn't even a division.

Q: Right, right. But it probably tells you how isolated someone like Carol felt at the top where everything was so pre-chewed and digested but you can't ask the questions.

HYMAN: I guess so. She must have felt that way because again, it's not just democracy that we talked about. We did talk about that but we talked about other things. She called me up there all the time and I would sort of try to sneak up the back staircase.

And okay, so in the early days of the Europe democracy program Europe was the big kahuna. They had more money for this area than everybody else. And also the grantees that were doing any of this work were very small because there wasn't much of a program anywhere.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: Except the NED. You know what the NED (National Endowment for Democracy) is?

Q: Yes, I do. Yes.

EARLY DEMOCRACY PROGRAMMING

HYMAN: So, all of a sudden there was this cache of funding and the need for working in this area. So, our first job was to think through how is this going to be organized. The organization was just Tom and me. So, I sort of came up with this four-part distinction which was elections, which is what we called them, elections and political processes, still called that, still called that; the Rule of Law, and we didn't call it AOJ (Administration of Justice), we called it the rule of law.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: Because it should have been broader than just the courts and the administration of justice. It should have included and did human rights, other kinds of things. How do you organize a society that's truly law-determined and based on a rule of law with integrity? So, it was Rule of Law was the second one. Again, we just didn't choose AOJ.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: The third was civil society.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: And the fourth was governance. And that is basically still the same four areas, at least at AID.

Q: Now did you and Susan and Tom hash that out over time or did you get to that pretty fast?

HYMAN: Susan was pretty junior and her area was FM. I mean she was at Syracuse, she came from Syracuse. I think it was Syracuse. Or Maxwell. So, she was definitely, absolutely in the conversation. But the distinction is the one I came up with and we talked about it and they said okay. But we didn't have a big bureaucracy. This was just two of us and the third guy was doing other things, education, etcetera. Tom was not fully on this.

And so we organized ourselves that way and we put out grants that way. And the organizations that responded to this were small. So, NDI, which existed as a NED core grantee, IRI which was also a NED core grantee; small, very small. The AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations), which was then divided, they had one, this goes back before us, way before us, so they had a Latin America operation, they had an Africa operation, they had an Asian operation and they created a Europe operation. It was many years later that they combined them in to the Solidarity Center. And there were big fights about that.

Q: I'm sure.

HYMAN: Because all these guys had their own turf and they were ancient guys who had built these programs.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: Okay so there was the Solidarity Center and then there was the Chamber of Commerce. These were the four NED grantees. And IFES. Those were the only ones really around that did this kind of stuff in any serious way.

So, NDI, I doubt if they had more than 20 people, maybe 30. It's now like 3,000 or something like that. And Brian Atwood was the president and Ken Wallach was the vice-president. And there were other people there, Tom Melia and so on and so forth but they were just a tiny organization.

Q: Just doing their thing.

HYMAN: Yes. Just scraping by with NED grants mostly and some AID grants but not very much because Latin America didn't have these programs. So, we were big, and this was a big shift for them in those days because it was a big increase in money.

So, I got to know these people reasonably well because there weren't that many of them, including Brian. So, when Brian came in I should have left AID.

Q: I'm sure.

HYMAN: And Brian kept saying I'll see if we can keep you on. Because I had known him, I was responsible for probably by that time 60 percent or more of NDI money. And so he said well I think you should stay. Let's see if we can't keep you on. And so there

were many pink slips and finally I stayed on as an AD. Then I think because they wanted the job for a real Democrat he asked me to convert to the Civil Service. I would never have done that in a Republican administration and certainly not in a Bush Administration because that burrowing in I find repugnant.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: I figured well if the head of the agency and a Democrat is saying he wants me to stay on I don't know if burrowing in is exactly the way to think about this. So why don't I stay on for a while. And I did in the Europe bureau.

Q: As an AD?

HYMAN: As an AD. But then converted to Civil Service later on because then he created the Global Bureau, about which I don't need to tell you. So, he created the Democracy and Governance Center in the Global Bureau. I went to him more than once and I said Brian, I don't know; Europe is still up in the air, do you want me to stay in Europe or do you want me to go to the Global Bureau. What do you want me to do? And he said well I don't care, why don't you decide. And I said well I'm here at your service, I'm an AD so I think you should tell me which of these is more important to you. Anyway, he didn't so finally I was sort of persuaded to go to the DG Center and we created it from scratch, of course. So, it was unlike health and economic growth, where these people all knew each other. But you remember that the technical offices were all in the regional bureaus.

Q: Right

HYMAN: So, Brian's view was well, if you're going to do something in Morocco and they already tried that in Bolivia why don't you learn from each other. Why are we geographically stove piped? Of course, there was huge resistance from the regional bureaus.

Q: Tell me about it.

HYMAN: For turf reasons, right? Yes, so the usual bureaucratic brouhaha. So, he was starting this new Democracy Center and I felt well, I really owe it to him to see if I can contribute to that because he's the guy that's keeping me on, so I did. And I became the sort of head of the strategy part of that new Center. Chuck Costello was the director of the Center and after a while Jennifer Windsor was the Center deputy.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: But you know Jennifer was only able to take that role because she too converted into an AD. She was way too junior. She was a PMI in the Africa Bureau. Well as a GS- 12, you can't move to an assistant deputy division chief if you're going to follow the rules. That's how that job became political and it still is because once it's in the plum book you can't get it out.

Q: Can we go back to when Europe was just setting this program up and for the first time there was money and a lot of it for democracy and governance programs. Did you have to fight within the Europe bureau for your share of the funding for democracy?

HYMAN: Not really.

Q: Because I don't think it was earmarked specifically for democracy programming.

HYMAN: No. But first of all, Carol wanted to do the program. Secondly, there was enough money. So, we had enough money; the problem was to figure out what to do with the money.

Q: Yes, okay. Because after a while I'm sure there must have been some elbows thrown.

HYMAN: Absolutely. But as I said when we first started I'm a bit iconoclastic about this sort of stuff so I just didn't feel it was worth our time to get into a brouhaha about a half a million dollars.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: Our problem, I thought, was how do we do this well. I don't want to spend a lot of time sitting around here arguing with some other office about how much money they're getting and we're getting. We've got enough to do what we need to do; how do we do it?

Q: So, related and I'm really interested in making sure we tell the Washington side of all of these stories. You must have had to go to the Hill to explain or did Carol do all of that?

HYMAN: She did most of it, she did most of it.

Q: So, I'm interested in your interaction with the Hill, dealing with outside interest groups, dealing with the press if you had to. How did that happen?

HYMAN: And dealing with State.

Q: And dealing with State.

HYMAN: So, first of all, the SEED program was only supposed to be three to five years and it was only supposed to be for those three countries. Then all these others came out and so they never changed the title but Bulgaria is not supposed to be part of this.

Q: Right, yes.

THE BALKAN WAR

HYMAN: Oh. So, one quick thing. Susan Kosinski wanted to go to the northern tier, to Poland.

Q: Of course.

HYMAN: Why not, right? And she said I want to go there, why don't you go to the Balkans? So, a little bit of a role reversal here, right? I'm the senior person here.

Q: How did we get to this?

HYMAN: Why is she going to Hungary and I'm going to these workers in Bulgaria. How did that happen, you know? And Bulgaria was not a great place to go but neither actually was Poland in those days but it got better quickly and so did Hungary and so did Czechoslovakia. So, I was still, again, to use the technical term, schlepping around the Balkans for a couple years in these places including Yugoslavia.

Q: So, you probably saw what was coming.

HYMAN: Saw what was coming and talked to Karadžić.

Q: Oh, did you?

HYMAN: Yes. And like Malaysia raised the flag when I got back to Eagleburger. Well actually to his deputy, his special assistant. Are you interested in this story or not?

Q: I am. I am absolutely

HYMAN: So SEED had a coordinator in State. Not at AID. The coordinator was Eagleburger, the deputy secretary of state.

Q: Right, right.

HYMAN: And he was not uninvolved. I mean he had an assistant, a guy he brought in, Bob Barry.

Q: Okay, yes.

HYMAN: And Bob Barry was the person who made most of the decisions for him. Of course, he discussed this with Eagleburger but he was the one who was the point person.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: And he had a small staff also which ultimately grew to some large office over there. But it was only about five people at the time. And one of them was a guy from USIA (United States Information Agency), which still existed at that time, and he and I

took a trip to try to figure out the Balkans, just what was going on there. And it was Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. Not Albania. Those three countries. And he had already been in Bulgaria as a Fulbrighter or something so he said you go to Bulgaria and then I'll meet you in Romania. So we did. So, we did that and we went to Yugoslavia, the capital of which, of course, was Belgrade which had an ambassador for the whole country. So, we went to Belgrade and then we went to Zagreb and then we went to Sarajevo. And we talked to people, you know. And in Sarajevo there was a tiny USIA office, a field office which of course those kinds of things don't exist anymore, right?

Q: Right, right.

HYMAN: So, there was an American library and the usual, you know, the old USIA. So, we hung out. So, he (USIA) said well what would you like to see. And we said well we like to get a feeling for what's going on here. And he said well you know there's some tension growing in this area but more importantly why don't I take you, there's three different ethnic groups here converging in the city. Which was a wonderful place, Sarajevo, in those days.

Q: Yes, I've been there.

HYMAN: I mean the Olympics had been there. It was very international, very cosmopolitan. So, we said yes, okay, let's do that. He said well, there's a rotating governorship. This was just a province, it was just a part of Yugoslavia. It was not a separate country of any kind.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: No pretense of becoming that. So, they had a rotating governorship between the Bosniaks, the Serbs and the Croats. And the guy that was there at the time but was not going to be there very much longer was a Bosniak, who was Izetbegović. And so we went to see Izetbegović just to pay a courtesy call. So, then he says well you understand that we're surrounded, the Croats don't like us, the Serbs certainly don't like us, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera; this is going to be a problem here unless Belgrade steps in mostly to defend the Bosniaks against their rapacious neighbors. Then we went to see the Croat guy who I don't remember and he told us the same story except you've got to realize that the Croats have been at the wrong end of the stick.

Q: And it all started in 1296?

HYMAN: Exactly. It started in 1054.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: Whatever it was, the Battle of 1054. Anyway, so we heard that side and then we went up in the mountains a little way and to a kind of hunting lodge kind of place. We walked in and there's a huge table at least as long as this room behind which are sitting a

bunch of 60-year-old men and Jeremy Curtin, a USIA guy, and a USIA guy from out there and me. So, we sit down and in the middle is this guy, white hair, and he says I'm actually a psychiatrist and I'm only doing this to help my community. And I'm a poet. And I said help the community, right. Well see you don't understand.

Q: Prevail?

HYMAN: No, not prevail, survive. He starts a lecture that went on for at least an hour, maybe 90 minutes. And it begins with the Battle of 1054. You've got to understand, says he, that we have been living under the thumb of the Turks for 500 years and the Turks think they're going to take this thing away from us now, the Turks now being the Bosniaks who were the same as he but just had converted over 500 years ago and didn't care that much about religion anyway.

Q: Right, right.

HYMAN: But they were referred to as the Turks by him and by lots of other Serbs. So, they were not the Bosniaks, they were not the Croats. Then, says he, we had another little episode under the Croats. They were then called Ustaše. These were the Nazis, Croats.

Well, we've been tortured, we've been raped, we've been pillaged, we've been abused for 500 years, A, and B, we saved Vienna. We the Serbs from the onslaught of the Ottoman emperor. Well, let me say to you, said he, we're not going to let that happen again. During this entire time he had a piece of 8-1/2 by 11 paper and he was drawing a map of Bosnia with all these different dates and stuff like that, doodling as he's going through this hour-long thing in which he says, you understand that there are Serbs in Croatia that are in an enclave and there are Serbs in Sarajevo and there are Serbs sprinkled throughout this province. I'm here to tell you, not again. Never again, to use the Holocaust Museum's slogan. We're not going to let that happen. We are going to create a contiguous space that we can defend for the Serbs and we will either do it with or without the JNA, the Yugoslav national army, which was of course mostly Serb. One way or another that's what we're going to do.

Q: And this year, which year would that have been?

HYMAN: This would have been 1991 or 1990- somewhere in there. So, at the end of this again, hour, hour and a half-

Q: This was all through translators?

HYMAN: You know, it must have been. I don't know if he may have spoken English. But Karadžić, it turned out this was Karadžić. I didn't know Karadžić; nobody knew Karadžić.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: Karadžić was a local community leader as far as I was concerned. That's what the USIA guy said; these are just community leaders, Izetbegović and whoever the Croat was and Karadžić. And we didn't pay any attention to their names any more then, you know.

So, we got this story, it got more and more impassioned and vituperative every day we were out there. So, at the end of this session we had with him I said do you mind if I take your doodle? Whoosh. Here you are. The doodle you could see the marks all the way through the paper of, yes. So I took it back to Zagreb and we had an out brief with Zimmerman, the then-ambassador, and I said you know this area, you've been here, you've done this before and you've been in Yugoslavia for a long time. I think we've got a problem out there in Bosnia and I think it's one that we could contain but somebody better pay some attention to it if you're going to contain it. Because right now they're not armed, they're not whatever.

Q: They're just angry.

HYMAN: They're angry at each other and they want protection. Each one wants protection, so we should try to figure out how to do that. Because if we don't they've told us they're ready to do some stuff here. Nobody predicted what happened but it's not hard to see what was coming. And they all said: I know this area, I know them, we know about these people, we've got it under control. Okay. So, I took it back to Washington, gave the same briefing in the bureau, also of interest.

Q: To whom?

HYMAN: Well to, I think it was Don Dynore, or someone below him. So, I got nowhere and by that time I had gotten to know Eagleburger's assistant, got to know him through the bureau. This was before the 1992 election so this was still under Bush, Bush Senior, Bush 41.

And so I went to this guy, a guy by the name of Ken Juster, who stayed on for quite a while. I shouldn't have been up talking to Ken Juster. I was way too junior to be doing that.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: But anyway, I did. And we got along reasonably well and we still are in touch with each other. And so I said Ken, let me tell you this story that we heard in Sarajevo. Response? Well, no, it's just not a problem. Eagleburger knows this, everything is okay, I don't know why you're worried about it. So, I still have the map and at some point I'm going to try to get it back to Bosnia.

Q: You should.

HYMAN: And give it to someone because it's, it was the beginning.

Q: Yes. You didn't frame it?

HYMAN: I didn't frame it. I should have but I wanted to frame it in a way that you could see both sides because you could see how deeply these passions ran.

The one last story about Sarajevo was that we also went to lunch at the Holiday Inn, which became infamous, of course, with some journalists and people like that. It was a beautiful day, spring day, warm, pleasant, sat on the terrace, had lunch. And so by this time I had been to these places and I went around and I said to them well what ethnic group are you with. I can still, as much as you're sitting here, remember this woman said to me I am a Yugoslav and so are the others.

Q: Apparently not.

HYMAN: Not, didn't last long.

Q: Yes. This is your story, not mine, but I can remember, I think it was 1970, Yugoslavia was doing a census and the question of citizenship came up. "are you a Yugoslav". And people were so incensed that they could not choose Serbian, Croat, etc. that the census takers were being run out of town.

HYMAN: So, that was a big element. And then when I went around to Romania and Bulgaria with Jeremy, we went to Romania and all around Romania and I went around Bulgaria. That's not the first trip to the Balkans; I made several trips to the Balkans.

Q: Ceaușescu was still in power?

HYMAN: Ceaușescu was when I first was there. And I met a guy who, how I met him I don't remember. We had to go to the park and walk around the park-

Q: Because of microphones?

HYMAN: Microphones.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: Nothing, nowhere was safe. And even in the park you didn't know-

Q: Who was lurking behind the bush.

HYMAN: Exactly.

Q: Wow.

HYMAN: Later in time he and I went around the country, around Romania. But that was a long time ago as well so lots of things have changed in all of these countries.

Q: You said you thought that people resented that you had these relationships that you shouldn't have had as a junior person.

HYMAN: I don't know that anyone even knew about the Juster relationship except maybe Carol and she was fine with it. Because, we were in the State Department building in those days. So, it was just up in the elevator, not like a trip somewhere.

Q: And you'd run into them at the post office or-?

HYMAN: Lots of places, you know. And of course he was on the eighth floor, seventh floor I guess it was. I was on the third. So, it didn't take long.

Q: So, do you have any thoughts on those dynamics?

HYMAN: Just on the resentment business, I may have been imagining it because nobody said that much to me. But I could see, you know, Barbara is pretty command and control, what are you doing here, blah, blah. And I got along fine with her. I never had a problem with Barbara at all. Nor with Dick Blue for that matter or with any of them. But I could tell [them thinking] what is this guy-

Q: The rogue employee.

HYMAN: Yes. What's he doing up in the AA's office talking about stuff that I should be up there or at least up there with him.

Q: Yes, I'm sure that's right. Maybe you want to think about it but I'm really curious about relations with the Hill, if you had any.

HYMAN: Yes. I didn't have any. LPA (Legislative and Public Affairs) was, including after the Global Bureau, was very reluctant to let us up on the Hill.

Q: Was that Kelly at that time?

HYMAN: Kelly Kammeer initially but then- no matter who it was it was in LPA -they wanted to control the access.

Q: Yes. But Hill staffers know ways of getting around that.

HYMAN: They do. But I was never one of the people that they called. I didn't have much relationship with the Hill, personally, at any time during the whole thing.

Q: So, it was mainly relations with State Department?

HYMAN: State Department. I got along very well even as a group.

Q: And it probably helped your program to have that good working relationship.

HYMAN: Helped the program but as you know I was very much of a team player and so we tried to work these things out together. It wasn't as though there were huge ideological splits or anything. So, the question was how to make this thing work. That was the real question. And then we had an answer that they were pushing.

Q: So, a couple of the stories that you've told have the same kind of theme, which is you're picking up stuff at the grassroots level and when you take it to people who in theory know more about what's going on than you do they say no, no, no, no. You must be mishearing it. And I'm wondering did you ever have a situation where you were hearing that kind of conflict and it didn't blow up?

HYMAN: That's a good question because there are plenty of conflict places, South Sudan obviously was one of them.

Q: Well and we're going to get to that. But I'm just curious.

HYMAN: There are some places where it hasn't yet. I did a democracy and governance assessment some years ago in South Africa where the team was three South Africans and me. They were all, well two were white and one was Indian, and we disagreed at the end of the assessment about how tenuous stuff was in South Africa. So once again I said but look at what's happening here. There's this guy Malema who is this upstart in the ANC (African National Congress) but he's got support. And he says all of these outrageous things but he's still got support and maybe Zuma's going to get rid of him but he's not going to get rid of this feeling.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: And the populace and the feeling that the white population hasn't gotten what was bargained for, the corruption, etcetera, etcetera. All of that was what Malema was saying but in a very incendiary way. And I said to this group I think that's got to be a core part of this report. You're exaggerating, oh things are okay; yes, there's Malema but Malema's this little guy, he's a young fellow, he's trying to make a mark for himself. We went to see one of the justices on the supreme court, we went to see all kinds of fancy people and we didn't see Malema. But it was the same kind of thing. Now it still hasn't blown up but I can see the potential for it. The tinder is there. And Malema is a flamethrower.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: And he's not the only one. So, here's another example. I didn't do really a lot of work in Kenya. And then of course that blew up in the 2007. Pakistan, I would say, is one that has definitely the potential for-

Q: But it hasn't happened yet.

HYMAN: Not yet, not yet.

COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

Q: I'm hoping maybe today we can go through lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union, Bosnia, then leading up to other crises and certainly including Southern Sudan.

HYMAN: So, I think where we left off was Karadžić telling me that he wasn't going to let this (subjugation of the Serbs) happen again, which he didn't. So, it was the JNA, the army he thought was not sufficiently supportive of him but more importantly of course we had the bombing of Belgrade and the intervention of the NATO alliance. That was later, of course. He started the thing up and we had all these atrocities, including the massacre at Srebrenica. And it wasn't just Karadžić, of course; he had Mladić, the general, and others as well. I mean, you don't want to go through all the details of that?

Q: No. But I mean a focus especially on your observations and especially what do you think we did right, what do you think we could have done better.

HYMAN: Well, as I said last time I think the most important thing we could have done better is to have pushed earlier. I think if we had done two things earlier; one, talked to him and talked to others about what kind of security needs each of these communities felt they had to have. And to try to provide that to the best extent we could. And then second is to made it very clear that if he did launch hostilities we were going to intervene and it was going to be pretty strong and pretty quick. But that would have required the Clinton Administration, by that time, to have reached a conclusion that it was ready to use military force in a non-defensive posture. The U.S. was not attacked, U.S. interests were not at stake in a direct way and so the use of U.S. forces in an environment like that was, I don't if unprecedented but certainly not very common. I'd have to think back where there are other cases like that where we intervened.

Q: And we'd just sat out Rwanda.

HYMAN: Yes. I'm just thinking; when was Rwanda?

Q: It was just before that because a lot of people were complaining-

HYMAN: We hadn't done it (intervened) in Rwanda. Yes. Okay, fair enough. So, I was just thinking the same thing; was Rwanda later than that or earlier than that.

So, the Serbs were Slavs and kindred of Russians in their view and vice versa, I think. I think the Russians think the same thing. Certainly, the Serbs were their allies. So, there was a risk of escalation, confrontation. I think that the main thing is to have done things earlier. As I said, in my personal view we went to see Zimmerman, the ambassador; I

went to see not exactly Eagleburger himself but his special assistant and people were just dismissive of the concept that somehow or other this thing was going to blow up into an ethnic war. You know, ethnic wars were over; we weren't going to do that anymore.

Q: Although Zimmerman ultimately resigned from the State Department

HYMAN: Yes. And I know he claims that he did things and he may well have because I wasn't at State so he may have done things after that. But he didn't take seriously the debrief that we had with him. Okay, so we were only two people. I don't know what else he heard, I don't know what other reports he was getting. He may have had good reason to dismiss those. But the fact is he did dismiss them significantly before any violence of any kind had taken place. As I told you, we had this wonderful spring day, we sat on the porch of the Holiday Inn with these journalists. It was spectacular. You couldn't have asked for a better environment and they were very clear: this was Sarajevo in particular but Bosnia as a whole and even Yugoslavia as a whole were multi-ethnic. There was a Yugoslav identity they felt they had. That had been the policy of Tito who enforced it with arms and strength and maybe didn't build the kind of intercommunal relationships that he might have or should have, I guess, to prevent it from blowing up. In any event, no one except for Karadžić and to some but a much lesser extent Izetbegović, said anything like there's a war coming up here or there's violence or these communities are going to go at each other or there's potential for inflammation here. In fact, Izetbegovic never left the governorship. He stayed in as governor of this province, then country

Q: Right.

I want to go forward to other conflicts but at that time you were in the DG (Global Bureau, Democracy and Governance Center)?

HYMAN: No. This was before the DG center.

Q: Okay. So, you were still at-

HYMAN: At ANE.

Q: Yes. Okay. Well let's then go forward. So, we've talked about the role of State and your role and it's my recollection that you had on the ground information that people in a position to make decisions were not giving credit to. Because Malaysia was another example.

HYMAN: Right. Although I wasn't at State during that. That was during my graduate study days.

Q: And Kosovo is much later, I guess.

HYMAN: Much later, yes.

Q: Maybe you could talk a little bit about how you even thought about doing democracy and governance programs in the former Soviet Union once it had collapsed.

HYMAN: We, perhaps incorrectly, almost surely incorrectly, essentially took the same structures that we had created, those four areas (elections, rule of law, civil society, governance), and applied them to the former Soviet Union. I never took a trip into the former Soviet Union like I have in the Balkans and continue to in the Balkans. I did, let me think; I went to Moscow I think briefly. I went to Kiev once briefly. But I never did the kind of on the ground reconnaissance that I did in the Balkans. And in the Balkans it was not just in the former Yugoslavia. It was also in Bulgaria and Romania. And as I mentioned to you, I kept going back to those places whereas I didn't go back to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was not in the Carol Adelman sphere. Remember I was mentioning to you there were some disagreements, I would say, between Carol Adelman and Roskins. So Roskins created a different operation for the Soviet Union and that was with Malcolm Butler and Barbara Turner and never the twain should meet after that. So, Barbara was the DAA equivalent or whatever, I've forgotten what the structure was exactly, but the Carol Adelman side never was part of the planning for that. We simply gave over in a quiet way to our colleagues who were part of the NIS it was called there for a while. Remember, they fumbled around about what we're going to call this. First it was the former Soviet states and then it was the new independent states and so on. But since I was with Carol Adelman and she was not in that operation they never asked my opinion about it, except at the lowest levels. So, the people that did the democracy and governance work in the former Soviet Union, were who I had worked with previously, but they were sort of lower level than I was in the Europe bureau. I've forgotten how the structure was in the NIS operation because I wasn't part of it.

Q: Well, they had a notwithstanding authority that allowed them to go out and bring in PSCs and so I think they did that a lot.

HYMAN: Yes. Did they have a separate democracy operation or was it part of a technical assistance?

Q: They did. Well, if you think about your four categories it seems to me it was very heavy on civil society.

HYMAN: Yes.

Q: There was some judicial training but the governance side of it was almost totally lacking. That's my recollection.

HYMAN: Yes. And the elections work? I'm sure that must have gone on. Well anyway, I wasn't intimately involved in it because of bureaucratic divisions.

GLOBAL BUREAU DEMOCRACY CENTER

Q: Okay. Well then, you got involved with the Democracy and Governance Center early on.

HYMAN: Very early, yes.

Q: Do you want to talk a little bit about how that shaped up and your role in shaping it?

HYMAN: Sure. So, as I mentioned to you the last time I was struggling in my own mind and with others about whether I should stay in ENE (EUROPE/NEAR EAST) which was still in its early formative period, or should I go to the Global bureau and finally decided to go to the Global bureau. When I got to the Center, there were only, I'm not sure there were half a dozen people there.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: There was Chuck Costello, Jennifer Windsor, Patrick _____ I think by that point was there. I've forgotten, I think he may have been a PSC even, I don't remember. And maybe one or two others. Oh, the woman who became his wife, Pat Eissmann her name was. And she and Jean North came from PPC or she came from something called the IPC. Trying to remember all these acronyms. It was an inter-studies policy operation. Anyway, they were floating around so they got grabbed into this thing.

Q: Right. And I think the interesting thing, it was very short-staffed because the agency didn't have many programs so there weren't a whole lot of people already in AID that you could steal from the regional bureaus.

HYMAN: Yes. And there was resistance by the regional bureaus to sending anybody over. And Brian's idea was fought and that was to send all of the technical people but one or possibly two who were left, supposed to be left in the regional bureaus to "advise" the AA about these technical areas but the expertise, the bodies and so on were all supposed to come to the Global bureau. In the end most of them initially did and then the regional bureaus built back up again. But the one that resisted was ENE. They now were separate, and for whatever reason, maybe it was because Tom Dine, Brian never pushed that bureau in the way that he pushed the others. So, the Africa bureau, LAC and Asia bureaus, they did most dealings with us initially. But then for various reasons including turf but not just turf – we'll get to that in a minute – so we started. My view was that the first thing we needed to do was get ourselves up and running. I mean we needed to have things that we could offer the field. Okay. So, as far as I know, except for Chuck, I was the only one who had any experience in AID programming, and I had only been there for a couple of years. So, the first year that I was in that operation mostly I did RFPs for vehicles that we could use to make available to the field missions, with our technical engagement in the scopes of work, and they could "buy into" so that they wouldn't have to create their own. And so-

Q: Which was a model that the other Global centers that had more of an established track record, already had..

HYMAN: Yes. Well, we didn't have any. So, my first year, as I recall almost all of it but I'm sure that can't be right, was writing the scopes of work for, I don't know, six, eight, 10 IQCs and then being on the selection panels and also for what was then called leader with associate grants.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: Which acted like IQCs in a lot of ways except they were assistance instruments instead of acquisition instruments. So, we did that too and we put about eight or some odd number of such instruments into place so that we could have something to offer the field because my feeling was you're not going to get anywhere unless you can offer the field something that will be helpful to them.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: You're coming in and saying we're the new Center of blah blah, I mean, that and a dollar will get you a beer somewhere. So, we have to make ourselves useful to the field, which isn't to say we shouldn't have an input but primarily our job was to be useful to the field.

Q: Right. Was another issue in establishing that usefulness that the whole DG area was so new that you didn't have counterparts in missions to work with?

HYMAN: Yes, so let me come to that too. So, yes, that was one thing. So, there weren't that many people in the field that were DG officers and there wasn't a DG backstop. Ultimately, we found Backstop 16 which was the backstop for these program people, the Ron Redman's. Well, they would review the scopes of work for things to make sure that they touched all the bases.

So, we borrowed that backstop. It was only later that the Agency insisted there should be a DACHA backstop and that the DG officers should be in that backstop rather than program. So, we had some backstops but as you point out we didn't really have a lot of technical officers out there. And of course, Chuck knew how to do all of this stuff. He'd been a mission director.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: But he wasn't going to sit around and write scopes of work, so that's what I did most of the first year.

The bigger problem, I think, in my view and this was a difference of opinion between Chuck but more Jennifer and me -- by the way, we're very good friends so this never got personal. It was an ideological difference -- was how to establish democracy in the agency as kind of a core element. They established what personally I think was sort of a juvenile slogan, and I told them that, actually for the office, which was "kick ass."

Q: That's Jennifer.

HYMAN: Yes. Mostly it was Jennifer. I don't think Chuck would have come up with it but he bought into it, which is we're going to go in there and we're going to hammer this thing, etcetera, etcetera. My view was the opposite. And so my view was that either we convinced the agency, the missions, everybody that this was a good thing to do, not only for itself but for the larger development portfolio, or this was going to go the way of the dodo bird once Brian walked out the door. This was going to be like other initiatives that other administrators, including Brian as it turns out, wanted to start. And if you don't institutionalize these initiatives, if you don't convince your colleagues that there's value to them, who's going to champion them once you leave? Well, that meant compromise. Well, that was a dirty word, I think, for Jennifer and to a lesser extent Chuck. So, I was the head or became the head of a unit called the strategies unit. And the strategies unit was to do a variety of things, some of which was whatever else the others didn't do, including interagency or interbureau. Everyone who was in the center was supposed to have both a sub technical area of one of these four areas, Rule of Law, etcetera, etcetera, but also be part of a center geographic team. Well, mostly they fought the latter. Everyone that came in afterwards they were Rule of Law, that was what they were doing, they were not about- who cared- why did they have to worry about Somalia. And my view, again, differed from Chuck and Jennifer's. I said if you don't backstop these countries, if we don't know what's going on in these places we're not going to be of any use to the mission and we're not going to be of any use to the front office. You've got to know what's going on there, not just Rule of Law, what's going on and not only that but we are supposed to be training democracy officers not just Rule of Law officers. So, when you're the backstop for Somalia you're supposed to know everything about what's going on in Somalia, not just the Rule of Law program. And you better not favor the Rule of Law programs just because you're a Rule of Law person. Well, I never was able to get that done very well.

Q: So, people were more interested in and associated with the particular sub sectoral approach than with a geographic region.

HYMAN: There were a couple of reasons for that, one of which was that the team leader, in those days they were called team leaders -- after it became an office there were division chiefs, now I think they're team leaders again, it went back and forth, including in – with AEFs (personnel evaluations). And yes, the regional coordinators had input, but a lesser input. So, all the regional coordinators were on the strategies team. That was one of their responsibilities. Another responsibility was to be at the table, so to speak, at every review, every mission, country strategy.

Q: Right, CDSS

HYMAN: Exactly. And they had different names as we went through the years. But the five year- as I recall at the time there were only three places in the world that still had five year plans; one was the Soviet Union, the second was India and the third was AID.

So, every mission had a five-year strategy and it came to Washington and it was reviewed. My team was responsible, the strategies team was responsible for going to those reviews and raising questions, or not, about the democracy, potential democracy programs. I'll come back to this in a minute. So, that was the second thing.

The third thing was to try to develop a framework for doing democracy and governance strategies. How do you approach this problem outside of Europe where they all wanted it while in other places in the world they didn't want it? So, how were we going to think about coming up with and advising missions as to what programs would be the most useful in Chad or in Bangladesh which we didn't have to do in Europe because they already wanted these things, less so in the Soviet Union. So, that was a third area.

Then there were interagency meetings and there was inter-bureau where all of that fell to the strategies team.

Q: So, did you have a lot of contact with Justice Department, and with State?

HYMAN: No, not a lot, I would say, but some with State. This was also the time of what I believed at the time and I think has been born out to be the case was a big loss for democracy and governance when the agency consolidated in the new building. Because in the old building we were interspersed on the floors along with everybody else and so you would have informal contacts with your State Department colleagues. You would find out about meetings that weren't necessarily on the speakerphone in the building. You found out also- you had relationships with those folks and you built them and so you knew things, you found out things, you participated in things. Once you moved five blocks away, it was a trip. Previously, it was not a trip to go to a meeting anymore for you than for anybody else in the building going from floor three to floor seven or six or four; everybody had to do that. Well, everybody didn't have to get on a bus and go from 14th Street to 21st. And you say well okay, it's only from 14th Street to 21st Street, how big a deal is that? Well, it's 20 minutes or 30 minutes or whatever it is so every meeting is a half hour on the way and a half hour on the way back. Not only that but you don't even know that they're happening because you don't meet these people in the hallways, you don't see them, you're not part of it. You have to be invited. Well, they're not going to necessarily say oh, don't forget our AID colleagues over there on 14th Street. This is State which has its own ego dimensions to it. When we were in the building these things just happened organically. And so I was involved in all kinds of meetings that later I wasn't involved with because I didn't even know about them. It's not that they would have prevented me; I just didn't even know that they happened. Again, mostly it was on the Europe side because those were my initial contacts but it was for others as well. And so I remember saying look, this is going to kill us. This is going to eviscerate our influence in the most important decisions by not going over there. Okay, well, so, I wasn't the administrator, Brian was. He wanted to do it (the move to RRB), we did it. In my view the cost wasn't I think so much the case for other technical areas because their connection to their State Department colleagues wasn't as close. So, the health people --

you know this better than I do -- didn't seem to have as close ties into the everyday operations of State as the democracy and governance office did.

Q: Right. It's mainly with the desk officers, and IO.

HYMAN: The desks hurt badly and our office, our sector hurt badly. The others were less affected.

Q: Maybe less affected but they were no less oppositional to the move-

HYMAN: Oh, is that right? I did not know that.

Q: And it could be bureaucracies are inherently conservative and don't like change but it was more than that.

HYMAN: But the gains to us of having our consolidated operation a mile away or half a mile away were not as great as the losses. So, for example, the contracts officers moved over from Roslyn to the Ronald Reagan Building. You didn't see your contracts officer all that often. It was not a big deal to go over to Roslyn once in a while, whereas it was a big deal to go to every Kosovo meeting because they happened all the time. Your contracts officer and you met intermittently. And I know this because as I said I was very connected on the contract side because I was putting these IQCs together. So, it's not like I wasn't connected to the contracts people it was just that it wasn't a big deal. It wasn't often. It wasn't often enough to outweigh the cost of proximity to the State Department.

Q: And that's in '97, I think.

HYMAN: Yes, it was much later, I admit that. It was well into Brian's term. And the building had to be built so that took a long time. I remember for example, just to go back to this business about how we related to our colleagues, I went to a session on Morocco. So, I had a team and I said to the team okay, you go to the ones where we really don't think it's a major problem, where you think issues are fairly clear, where we're not engaged. If there's any kind of a problem let me know and I'll go with you. So, one of them was Morocco and I went to the meeting and the mission director, Jim Bedner at the time, said he didn't want any democracy program in Morocco, they were concentrating their program in a certain part of the country and that wasn't an area that there was going to be much into governance work yet, etcetera, etcetera. At the time there was a rule that Brian established that said - look, we only have these things every five years. We're not going to do this every single year. We're going to do this every five years. And in the intervening period between strategy one and strategy two you don't get to challenge the strategy. You've already approved the strategy. So, you can go and look at implementation but you don't get to look at the strategy. So, I said gee Jim, I don't know. It looks to me like there's potentially some problems in Morocco on the political side that are going to affect the country and affect your program. Are you absolutely sure you don't want to at least look at the possibility? No, we think we know what we're doing and we've got a program and that's just a low priority, we don't have enough money and

we're not interested. We don't have people and this and that. So, I said look, let's make a deal. Why don't we forgo the DG potential objective -- this was strategic objectives, by the way -- but let me come back to you two years from now or three years from now and let me at least raise the question again during your review. Not to redo the whole strategy but just to reconsider whether you still think this is right. And if you do, fine, let's just go forward without a democracy objective.

I got back to the office and you would have thought I was Benedict Arnold. String the sucker up from the lightbulbs. What do you mean? Don't you understand what kick ass means? Okay. One year later Jim Bedner came back and said I think we need some work done in this area. I think we could have alienated him by taking this to Brian. First of all, you couldn't take everything to Brian. And secondly, I think we would have alienated him, not just for that but for every other mission he was going to be in. Why not create a colleagueship and say well okay.

So, I went out to Morocco at his request to do this democracy strategy for him in his mission in Morocco. Now, in my view that was a better way to ensure that your colleagues looked at the program with non-turf eyes and looked at it a little bit more openly and said well, do we have a political problem as well as an economic and health and education problem here. Is that to some extent what's standing in the way of some of these other things? So, my view was to integrate democracy in the mission programs and to show how can it work not only for its own self but for the benefit of health and education and economic growth in particular. Those two (democracy and economic growth) I thought went together and of course those were the non-discretionary accounts. So, both of them were sitting there vulnerable to all kinds of things because they weren't earmarked.

Q: So, as you think about the way you engaged with missions, are there particular programs that you think having the DG component really made a difference? Any that stand out?

HYMAN: I don't know. I think it would be worth going back and looking and when I became director of the office I asked us to do that and we did do a project but it was not well done in my view. I was disappointed in the result and I had championed it as the strategy team leader and then as the director. First, you'd have to ask where was any assistance successful at all. And then you'd have to ask to what extent did political factors play a role and then third, to what extent did the democracy program help on that side. So, you'd have at least a three-level kind of discussion and I was never able to get support for that kind of look.

There were certainly places where I think it became a central or more central part of the portfolio than people thought it would. Nigeria would have been an example of that. Kenya, Uganda. Now, were we successful in Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda? Not very I would say probably. I think I'd have a hard time and this was something that democracy and governance people certainly don't want to address let alone admit to because the implication is well, if this isn't doing any good why are we doing it whereas I was very

willing to look at it square in the face, you know: is this doing any good, are we getting anywhere with this, are we getting anywhere on its own terms and are we getting anywhere insofar as it helps the larger portfolios.

I guess Nigeria might have been a good case. I never worked in Latin America because I didn't have Spanish and although of course as an officer director by the time I became one in the Global bureau I could have just gone down to any of these places. What would they have done; they wouldn't throw me out. I just felt it was an imposition because these missions worked in Spanish. I mean internally they worked in Spanish. And all their counterparts assumed they spoke Spanish. So, it wasn't like going to Chad where people didn't necessarily expect that everybody who showed up spoke French let alone any of the Chadian languages. In the other parts of the world there was a little bit more give and take about language but not in Latin America, I felt, and so I never worked in Latin America because I didn't want to burden my colleagues. So, I had people who spoke Spanish that were working with me and so I said well why don't you do this. The Latin America team leader was a Spanish speaking person. So, that person did Latin America. And there may have been some good cases like that. There were certainly some attempts in Central America but if you look at Central America now I think you'd have a hard time saying that any of what we did there has worked very well. Certainly, not the Rule of Law. I mean AOJ, as I mentioned last time, was the corner of the LAC proto democracy program. And INL was not that active in this area and if it was it had a more constrained mandate in its own mind than it does now. Now it gets involved in all kinds of Rule of Law stuff. I don't think I could say that we were very successful in Central America and I don't know enough about Chile, Peru and-

Q: Colombia?

HYMAN: And Colombia. Certainly, Plan Colombia made a difference as far as I can understand. I know AID was very important in those countries and can we take some credit for the success of Chile and Peru. Latin America is an exception; Venezuela has maybe done pretty well, Ecuador I guess. Obviously big problems in Brazil and Argentina now but it seems to me they're going to get over that and so it's not like Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa or parts of the Middle East. Southeast Asia has done extremely well. How much of that- Malaysia, which I know well, didn't have an AID program of any size. Singapore never did. Indonesia did. Maybe we can take some credit for the transition, helping the transition after Suharto in Indonesia. Thailand, where we had a big program-

Q: A long time ago.

HYMAN: Yes, exactly, a long time ago, was now a big problem, right? Vietnam didn't have a program in those days yet and when it did it, did not want a democracy program so it only had an economic growth program and may still only have an economic growth program. It might have had a health and education program.

Q: It does, HIV.

HYMAN: I mean of these two sister areas, in my mind sister areas of economic growth and democracy. I say sister because the problems are similar. People don't object to a health program. Even dictators don't object to a health program. But when you get to economic growth and free markets and democracy and competition that's what they don't want. They don't want competitive things; they want to run the place.

Q: Control, yes.

HYMAN: Yes. Health, education, fine. Everybody should have health and education. But the politic economy of the country gets sticky because there are entrenched interests that don't want these kinds of reforms whereas an education reform normally doesn't rise to the level of- except within the education bureaucracy, I'm sure, but at the national level the president doesn't get all-

Q: Hot and bothered?

HYMAN: engaged with how many K through 12 teachers there are going to be or where they are and so on. So, the two, in my mind always the two sisters should have been more cooperative areas: economic growth and democracy.

Q: But you were competing for very limited funds.

HYMAN: We were competing for money but more importantly I think the economists still remained pretty skeptical of the democracy area and my democracy colleagues never wanted to learn enough economics to be able to talk to their colleagues. So, never got to where it should have, I think.

Q: So, earlier you were talking about institutionalizing a program and no doubt the vehicles that you put in place not only helped the field but helped channel the way they thought about democracy and governance. One test of institutionalization, when Brian left (and he was the patron saint of democracy), was- was there retribution? Was there recidivism of any sort?

HYMAN: No, I don't think so. So, I think in that respect my approach won out. I think it would have been worse if we had been in a kick butt mode all the time but since I was the one who went to these meetings I've got to say that I reported absolutely every conversation that I had where I compromised something.

Q: Right. And you tried to be collegial-

HYMAN: Yes.

Q: -and it paid off.

HYMAN: I think so. I think there were democracy officers that became mission directors. Not a small number. So, they rose through the ranks of the missions. That's one. Another is that I don't think there are very many missions that say we don't want to have this program because we can't afford it but it's not become an ideological thing, why do we have to have this whereas it was initially. There were a lot of people, a lot of people in the agency who thought and had a good reason to think that this was intervening in areas that we should not be engaged in. We the U.S. Government, we the U.S. people; these were internal political problems number one and number two it is going to poison every other part of their program.

Q: All four areas or particularly the administration of justice programs?

HYMAN: Actually less the administration of justice program. The elections and the civil society, media and programs like that. I haven't heard anyone say that there is resistance now. Part of that is socialization; a lot of the mission directors grew up with this so they just assume that's part of programming. But that wasn't the way it was originally. And I think it would have been a mistake to have brushed aside their objection. They had a good argument. It wasn't one that I thought would carry the day or at least not carry the day everywhere but I did think it was not something you should just crush. And so it has become institutionalized much more.

There was one other area that I personally engaged in even when I was the director of the office and that was recruitment. HR (human resources).

Q: Right.

HYMAN: So, I personally, both as the director and before that as the strategy team leader, went to the annual assignment meetings; who was going to go where, who was going to get what positions, what was going to happen. I thought, first of all, if you don't take care of your colleagues and know what's going on and so on you're letting them down so you're not representing them very well but more importantly where do you want the best officers and how do you want this thing to work so that mission directors felt they had a team player. And vice versa, there was room for career growth for your democracy officers. So, I went every year to the panels.

Q: Did you have to force your way in?

HYMAN: No, they were pretty good about it. By the time I'd become an office director there weren't many office directors that went to that meeting but I did.

Q: And at that point you knew all of the democracy officers.

HYMAN: Sure, because they'd all been recruited. And the other area of recruitment that I went to personally was the PMF jungle. I don't know if this still happens but we had a very, a very systematic way of doing that. Everybody who came to our table saying I want to be a DG officers, everybody who came got a 15-minute interview. After that they

got a half hour or a 45 minute or maybe even one hour interview, the best of them, and the ones who got through that were called back or could do it wherever they were and we did a case study. And they had to write up a case study and a panel of people from the office would interview them about why they chose this and that and the next. Now, this was for one PMF.

Q: Right. But did you always get one PMF?

HYMAN: Yes. We didn't always get the one we most wanted because State or CIA or DOD or whoever else was at that thing too, not just AID. So, there were people who preferred to go to State and so on. But we certainly did a prioritization as rigorous as we could within the framework of the two days and then after that. And that took a long time, took a lot of energy to have all these people who were doing all these many, many assessment exams. But we didn't have that many PFMs and so I felt well, you'd better get the best ones. And so that was on the PFM side.

And then on the assignment process, when people moved I felt we should be active at the table representing what we thought was the best decision for the individuals but also for the agency. So, in all of those cases you would be engaged with people that were not your democracy and governance colleagues. HR wasn't, you know, that wasn't their job.

Q: Or the program people.

HYMAN: Program people, etcetera, etcetera go to the table on these annual reviews. And again, I was an office director, not initially but later on. So, office directors for Economic Growth, Health and Education certainly weren't there in the assignment discussions.

Q: They may have cooked it behind the scenes beforehand.

HYMAN: They may well have but they weren't there. And so when a director of an office is there…

Q: Shows up and you're sort of the senior guy.

HYMAN: Yes. And you convey some respect to your bureau and the front office of the bureau as well as to the mission director especially if you're not a jerk, which I tried not to be. I can't say I always succeeded. So, all of these were, I thought, ways in which we could institutionalize our area.

Q: Did you have budget battles too or did someone else fight those?

HYMAN: We did have some budget battles but I don't remember that that was the major problem. It didn't take a lot of money to do the democracy governance work. You are providing materials for the most part, etcetera, so the budget was secondary I would say. I can't say there weren't ever any. I don't remember all of the meetings but I don't recall that budget was the major issue.

Q: So, thinking back on that period where you're putting together a whole menu of services, which were the key contractors or grantees in your mind, the ones that really grew and performed global services?

HYMAN: Yes. The most vocal on the grant side were the democracy grantees, particularly NDI and IRI but also labor. A little less of the chamber of commerce group, which is called CIPE, the Center for International Private Enterprise, because they had roots and connections into the EG people as well so DG was not their only source of funding. So, those certainly, those three were major players.

Since I worked on this framework I mentioned to you about how you conduct a strategy assessment, that was done with a team of people who were recruited through a contract, an IQC, and MSI was a major one. And Lynn Carter- you know her?

Q: Not well.

HYMAN: She's at MSI and she was a very important colleague. And then she brought in a couple of people into a group. I won't go into the details of how we came up with this framework but -- unless you want to -- and she brought in a couple of people that turned out to be important, people that we could get as consultants on different- short-term consultants. So, this was MSI. There were lots of others there, national state courts and so on and so forth but they tended to be fairly narrowly focused and so I think they didn't play as great a role maybe. You know, you couldn't run the program without dealing with NDI and IRI all the time because of their connections to the Hill.

So, I had lunch yesterday with Ken Wallach for the I don't know how many years we've been doing that. We did it more often when I was in AID than we do now. It was often a three-hour lunch, it wasn't yesterday but that's because it began with an hour and a half of railing against contractors.

Q: Right. I do remember Ken's arguing that USAID did not adequately credit the role of volunteer labor.

HYMAN: And not only that but giving too much money to the contractors who were only in it for profit and so on and so forth.

Q: And MSI's probably what he had mind.

HYMAN: Oh yes, he had MSI for sure in mind. I mean, it wasn't the only one but it was one of them. Some of those firms don't exist anymore or were bought out or whatever. MSI is now part of a big California company called Tetra Tech.

Q: Oh gosh, yes.

HYMAN: Which bought ARD which originally was called Associates in Rural Development and none of these NGOs (non-governmental organizations) any longer use their original names because why should they only be doing rural development; they should be doing everything which they do so they're not ARD and I think there may be four people who remember that it was Associates in Rural Development. MSI had a pretty innocuous name. Then there was DAI, which still exists. There was DI, which went under and now there's a DI but it's a different one. Anyway, so some of these things don't exist anymore but I would say that for me at least NDI, and MSI on the contract side, were probably the most useful and collegial acquisition colleagues. Who else?

SOUTH SUDAN

Q: Yes, we can come back to that. I don't know whether you want to take a short break but I'd love to have you now set the stage for South Sudan and your role and how this fits in the whole trajectory of D and G.

HYMAN: Okay. So, South Sudan didn't pop up on my screen until later, just to be clear, so I stayed at the Center and then I went back to E&E for a short time as an office director. So, I was an office director back in E&E but it included democracy but also the social transition programs. So, there were two technical offices when I got back to E&E, only two. One was economic growth and the other was this other thing, which was democracy and social programs and stuff like that.

Q: Right. Why did you move? Was it a new administration or were you tired?

HYMAN: You know, I don't remember when I did that. They created this thing, they asked me to come back as the director of that office. By that time the ENE and NIS had been merged and so it was all one operation, the E&E Bureau.

Q: It was after Brian left?

HYMAN: Yes. The consolidation of ENE and NIS was earlier and then Gerri Donnelly came in as the head of that democracy office and I was her deputy along with Maryann Riegalman. And then I went to the Global bureau and then when I came back Gerri was not there anymore, Maryann Riegalman may have been there. Anyway, I became the office director. Now, why did I go back? I can't remember exactly. And then when Andrew Natsios, in the Bush 43 administration came, Andrew came in and he asked me to take on the office directorship. And as I mentioned to you, by the time that happened Jennifer had been the head of the Democracy Center and Chuck had left.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And Jennifer was the head of the Democracy Center as a political AD.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: So when she left, Andrew needed a political person, a person who could pass that was political. So, he asked me and he said you know, you can go back, you can revert at the end, yadda, yadda, yadda, but please do this, etcetera. So, I did.

Q: As an AD?

HYMAN: I gave up my Civil Service status and went back as an AD to head the Democracy Center on the theory that I could go back to civil service, but that's the way it goes. So, when I came back Andrew, in my opinion wrongly, eliminated the Global bureau and created large independent technical bureaus: DACHA and a health bureau and so on. I thought Global was the right way to go. I thought we should have had a closer relationship with our other centers but okay, you can only fight so many battles at once and that wasn't the biggest one for me. So, when I came back he was already going to create DACHA on the theory that democracy or political stuff anyway was part of the reason that we had so many conflicts. And so the BHR bureau was now going to become the DACHA bureau. BHR, just for your tape recording here was a humanitarian assistance bureau, humanitarian affairs. So, it then became DACHA, Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, and he moved DG into the DACHA bureau, which I said I thought not a good move. For one thing, conflict wasn't the only issue that we were dealing with around the world so what are you going to do with all these other sustainable development countries, of which there were a lot you know-

Q: Right. That were having DG problems.

HYMAN: -in Southeast Asia and Latin America and so on and so forth. And then Roger Winter became the AA of that bureau.

Q: So, let me just be clear again. You headed the Center, then you went back to ENE and-

HYMAN: Okay, so I started in ENE then I went to the Global bureau as a strategies team leader then I went back to E&E as an office or division chief or maybe office director I guess it was. And then I came back when Andrew eliminated the Global bureau and moved democracy into DACHA, and created a separate bureaus for health, education and so on. So, he went back to the original way things had been before Global was created.

Q: And asked you to head it?

HYMAN: Asked me to head it. And the AA, the assistant administrator for that bureau was Roger Winter. Well, Roger Winter had really, I think, I'm sure this is unfair to him and he would contest it probably but I think it's not hugely exaggerated to say his ambition was to get to the independence of South Sudan. Everything else in the DACHA bureau was secondary as far as he was concerned.

Q: And he came in with that goal?

HYMAN: Exactly. That was his intention. Okay, well so you can say listen, he's a political person, he comes in, he has a goal. In a way it's good. He had an idea of what he wanted to get accomplished. I think my difference with Roger was then fine, but don't head the DACHA bureau. I mean, you're head of the DACHA bureau, you've got to be head of the DACHA bureau not just the Sudan super desk officer. Because there are all kinds of other stuff that's going on in this bureau. And I understand you don't have an emotional tie to them very much but okay, then don't take that position. Let someone else have that position, you find some other way to do this. Okay I don't say he didn't do any of the other things but his heart wasn't in anything other than in South Sudan.

So, one fine day I'm sitting in the office doing whatever, probably reading a scope of work or something, and I get called and Roger says can you come up. And he said I want you to go to South Sudan. Now, this was before the comprehensive peace agreement. And it was a little bit like the Europe thing, I said South Sudan, Roger, I don't know anything about South Sudan. It was like when I said to them when I was in the Asia bureau why do you want me to go to Europe; I don't know anything about Europe. I don't know anything about South Sudan. And not only that I'm an office director. I've got a lot of other things on my plate. I've got an Africa team leader in my strategies unit; she's great. Let her go to South Sudan. She knows South Sudan better than I do, she cares about Africa, that's why she's the Africa person and we have a whole team that works on Africa. I'll find you a person to go there. Not me. Well, he answered, you should be in South Sudan by such and such a date.

Well, okay, in those days the war was still going on. So, to get to South Sudan you had to go to Kenya, to Nairobi, then you had to get a plane, a different airport, not the regular airport, to go to a tiny crossroad training village. It wasn't even a village, just a bunch of shops. And from there you got onto a two, three seater and they flew you over the mountain and into South Sudan and into the camp of Garang, which was just on the other of the border, and that's where- that was in SPLA/SPLM (Sudan People's Liberation Army/Sudan People's Liberation Movement) hands. They controlled the area but they didn't control most of the rest of South Sudan. So, you would fly in there and from there you would do whatever you were going to do. So, that's what happened. So, I did that and I went around the country to the places we could go which did not include Juba, for example, which was at that time a garrison town, one of three or four garrison towns in the South, meaning that they were garrisoned by the Sudan army and you couldn't go in there, not doing what we were doing.

Q: Were you traveling on your diplomatic passport?

HYMAN: Yes, but once you got into South Sudan then there was squat. You had to go to the SPLM/SPLA person here in Washington to get a special SPLM/SPLA stamp on like a piece of green paper or something. That was your visa. So, we did not get a Sudan visa. We were in the country illegally really.

Anyway, so I went around. When I say the country from now on I mean South Sudan; South Sudan was part of a bigger country and I didn't go to the North, I never did go to

the North. So, I went around what is now the country of South Sudan to the extent that we could and that meant primarily hitching rides on UN planes that were delivering food and they let us hitch onto them. Or the Norwegian government provided some planes as well. The two main countries engaged in South Sudan were U.S. and Norway. The third was the UK but the two leading countries were U.S. and Norway. And Andrew was a personal friend of, you know, his Norwegian counterpart and so on so this was a bi-country, bilateral effort. Bi in this case literally bilateral. So, they had some planes that they gave to the SPLM and sometimes those were available. And so we flew above the areas of actual conflict and flew into Malakal and other kinds of places like that.

Q: How long were you there when you were doing this reconnaissance?

HYMAN: It would be about two weeks or maybe a little bit longer in each trip. These were pretty difficult trips. There was no place to sleep. There was no place to get food. We took our food with us. On one of them at least, maybe two, I went with a colleague, accompanied him really more than anything else much to his chagrin I think although we got along fine. I was just extra, literally extra baggage physically as well as in other ways. And he knew the country very well and he was always after people; he was a scout, you know, nothing, no problem for him to be in these places. As I recall the first trip or maybe the second it was in summer so you would go to these places and they were- do you know what a tukal is? A *tukal* is a mud house - a circular thing with a thatch roof. Well, they didn't last very long, especially in the rains and they would be rebuilt. So we went there once and for example I remember very well we went there and they would always make room for us, you know, empty a tukal -- emptying a tukal didn't take a lot because they were emptying them all the time. But graciously they gave us their homes. These places were like ovens because during the day they would just hold the heat.

So, at night when it cooled down you were sitting inside this oven until it cooled down. So, most of the time we just slept outside. Now, you couldn't have done that in the rainy season, couldn't have done it except in certain times of the year when the flies were there but you weren't bitten and killed by malarial mosquitos and stuff.

Q: And you had to travel pretty light so you couldn't bring tents.

HYMAN: Yes, very light. You had to bring your own food. The biggest problem was water. And I never emotionally as opposed to intellectually appreciated the centrality of water until that trip. I don't know why we didn't take more water with us because we were on a plane; we could take as much as we wanted but we didn't. So, we were rationed with these little water things. And your main question was whether the next plane was going to bring water or not. And if it didn't you were going to die because the alternative was well water or river water. Well, they were full of parasites so you had your choice as to whether you wanted to die of thirst or die of some internal disease

Q: Dehydration, yes?

HYMAN: That was one possibility which is the one I chose as opposed to ingesting some- because I figured maybe I'll get out of here and if I get out of here then I don't want to take these parasites with me. And even if I don't get out of here I'll spend the last days in complete agony with these parasites because I had no immunity of any kind to any of this stuff whereas the local people had at least some. So, food, after a while you just didn't eat. First of all, it was very hard to digest. If you don't have water it was very hard to digest food and certainly meat.

Q: Did you have, what, MREs (meals ready to eat) or-?

HYMAN: We didn't have anything. We depended on local produce. This OFDA guy had known to go to the market and we bought some stuff there, onions and oranges and stuff like that and so we certainly ate the oranges. He was more up for this than I was; he had done this more often and so he did eat from time to time some of it. He would make cook some of the onions with some meat. They had beef because they were prosperous. But I couldn't even look at it let alone digest it.

We finally got back to Nairobi. We wound up in one of these Holiday Inn in Nairobi which had one of these buffets that goes on for twice the length of this room. And I couldn't eat any of it. I knew well enough that I had best spend the next couple of days rehydrating and not going to any of this stuff that was on the table. It wasn't all that enticing because I was so dehydrated. Even by the time we got back to Nairobi, I knew better than to take that stuff. Yes. So, it took a few days until I finally could even finally eat some food, a couple of days anyway. So, I remember that trip very well because we wound up in so many tiny little places. We had two elderly Sudanese with us who knew each other, had been among the last of the Sudanese who went to the British schools that were in some of the towns and they had been to a couple of these schools. And we went to visit a couple of those schools which of course were abandoned. And so they were the last of the South Sudanese who had gotten at least a rudimentary elementary education. So, this was a country that had gone through, by that time, already two generations or maybe one and a half of no education. These guys who were in their 60s and looked like they were in their 90s.
HYMAN: So, I met with them.

Q: -casing it out for what kind of programs they needed

HYMAN: Precisely.

Q: Were you also listening to what kind of support there was for an independent Southern Sudan?

HYMAN: There was universal support for an independent South Sudan.

Q: Right, even if they didn't understand exactly what did that mean.

HYMAN: They didn't necessarily know but they knew that they were fighting against the North. What would happen after independence they didn't have a clue. They just knew that this wasn't the first civil war. This was the second major civil war. And the first, which had been a generation earlier, they had lost. So, there was no discussions about an alternative to independence. Now, were there some people in the villages or in these little hamlets; they were cattle camps. And these cattle camps had second thoughts about it; but I don't remember hearing any of them and if they did they probably kept their mouths shut because everybody was in favor of independence. So, that wasn't the question and nobody was addressing what happens afterwards including USAID.

Q: Right. Just assumed.

HYMAN: Yes, it was going to be good. And Garang of course was the leader and he was very charismatic and he was going to lead and so on and so forth. So, that was among the first trips I took. I don't know if it was exactly the first one. And so then I became part of the secondary South Sudan grouping. There was a primary group which was Roger, Brian De Silva, Kate Almquist and Andrew. I wasn't in that circle and I didn't spend my day talking about South Sudan all the time.

Q: Had you worked with Andrew before? Why did you pick you?

HYMAN: I don't know why he picked me. Really, I don't know. I didn't work with him. He had been head of OFDA but nobody worked with OFDA on the technical side of the sustainable development programs. It was a separation bureau and a separate operation. Just as an aside, when we finally did get to be DACHA and I go to these weekly senior staff meetings with the DACHA AA, this was later, and of course. OFDA was there and Food for Peace was there, as was OTI and so on, I can't tell you how much I came to admire OFDA in particular but Food for Peace too. So, we'd come into these meetings and as usual the way AID's meetings were held were a joke as far as I was concerned. The AA would go around the room and there would be two conversations with 11 voyeurs.

Anyway, so I sat through these meetings on Monday morning or whenever it was, Monday afternoon, usually Mondays I think. We'd learn that over the weekend or earlier in the week some catastrophe, some cyclone or hurricane or tornado or whatever had happened. And he'd go around the room and he'd get to me and he'd say you know, don't I have that memo yet. And I'd say well, we got it back and the font size is not exactly right and the margins need to be adjusted.

Q: Real gripping stuff.

HYMAN: Exactly. And we'll have it to you by tomorrow afternoon, I hope.

Then you'd get the OFDA person and he'd say now, there was this cyclone in Bangladesh or somewhere. Yes, well we have 750 tons of rice that left port on Saturday morning, it will take us a day to get there, we'll have it offloaded by Tuesday afternoon.

So, we're sitting there saying your font size is too big and they've sent 750 tons of something or other somewhere. And just like it was nothing. Or the Fairfax police fire unit was already landed and looking through the rubble or whatever. They just were so professional and they were so calm about it and they had their act together in a way that I don't think any of the rest of the agency did, really.

Q: Was that Len Rogers or had he left by then?

HYMAN: No, Len Rogers was my DA but the guy that was the OFDA lead was a guy by the name of Mike Hess. Len was the person I reported to theoretically and actually.

Anyway, so I went back to South Sudan again, more than once, but the second particularly memorable time was after the CPA, the Conference of Peace Agreement had been signed.

Q: And date?

HYMAN: You know, 2005 I think.

Q: Yes, maybe.

HYMAN: And so we went again went to Garang's camp and all of the commanders were there and most of the people that Garang wanted to have his inner circle and part of his new government. And he didn't get to the camp until a few days after we were already there. He was going around to try to sell the CPA and he did the same thing after we were there and it was on one of those trips that his helicopter went down.

Q: So, why did he feel he had to sell it if everybody was already in favor of it?

HYMAN: What he felt he had to sell was the compromises he had made. So, for example there was a five-year transition period; what was going to happen during that time, etcetera, etcetera.

So, you know, all of us sat around with him and sat around with each other and our job was to try to put together the proto ministries. So, that's kind of heady stuff, sitting around and talking about the justice ministry or the whatever ministry.

Q: Did he have strong ideas about which-

HYMAN: He didn't participate. these were recommendations that were made by working groups to him but they were made by people he trusted to be the next education minster or the next justice minister or the next whatever. It became quite autonomous at first and then it became a separate independent state after the referendum. I know there obviously were frictions because they appeared ominously afterwards. But they weren't obvious unless you knew these people a lot better than I did. On the face of it it was a pretty congenial session. And then there was a meeting with Garang and various different

people presented these different proposals to him and so on and etcetera. And we left and went home.

But then I went back several times during the transition period for a variety of assessments, this and that. And then after independence. So, the last time I was there, I'd have to look it up on my screen, I think it was two summers ago. It was in the summer, and was to review what was going to happen to the democracy strategy and particularly to pay attention to the potential for conflict or to actual conflict by that time but not just that. And so I did finish a report and left. And then it was, I don't know, three, four or five months after that when the thing just blew up.

But the potential for that was there. And I had started an article which I never finished, should have called "The Uncertain Future of Democracy in South Sudan," in which I talked about some of the groups that are in South Sudan and their historical animosities with one another, in particular the Nuer and the Dinka. So, in anthropological literature this is classic; there was a classic study of the Nuer and the Dinka. One guy did the Nuer, another guy did the Dinka so these were very, very well known cases in anthropology. So, there were a half a dozen really central cases that set the tone for anthropology as an empirical matter as opposed to thinking about symbolic stuff. And a couple of cases were the Nuer and the Dinka. There was another one on the Trobriand Islands, which is in the Andaman Sea by Malinowski. So, I knew the Dinka and the Nuer through books. No one had to tell me how they were organized; I already knew that.

Q: Or their hostility to one another.

HYMAN: Oh yes. Now, their hostility to one another goes way back but it was a more ritual hostility, number one, and number two was fought to the extent there were actual battles with primitive spears, not Kalashnikovs. So, at first there were raids mostly by one against the other for cattle and for women. So, you would capture a woman and you would make her your wife. You didn't eat her, you didn't rape her; you married her. So, that had been there for quite a long time and the number of casualties was low. It was mostly raiding. And not only that but these raids went below the Nuer Dinka level so they were segmentary. The groups within the Dinka that raided one another and so on below that and below that and below that. So, the Dinka Nuer conflicts were just one element of this raiding that took place all the way down both sides. But now it became less but not entirely less of one Dinka group against another Dinka group but rather the Dinka against the Nuer and now with real weapons and substantial deaths. And that took place during the war, including by Garang against the Nuer, Machar's group, and vice versa.

Q: So, I was going to say do you think Garang could have kept it together?-

HYMAN: I think he might have been able to. I don't know. I was always unsure. You know, he talked the right language for sure, definitely. And all the people around him, no matter what their group, parroted that language. Once the thing had become a country and the oil began producing and real stakes were at hand, would he have been able to keep a lid on it. I don't know. I'm not so sure. His charisma was substantial but would it have

bridged these, not just the ancient and well established conflict relationships. There were more ritual and raiding than real conflict in the war sense but there were also personal ambitions. There are allocations of ministries at stake and then there was the oil.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: So, would he have been able to keep control of the corruption, of the nepotism, of the greed? I don't know. He claimed he did. He knew it was going to be a problem. He had a guy who was sort of a father of anticorruption writing, a guy by the name of Klitgaard, come and address all these people while he was still alive about the potential for corruption and of course they all said they weren't going to do it. But when there's resources at stake, commitments to integrity don't always last.

Q: So, just back in that period, were you tripping over Andrew all the time because he certainly was in Sudan a lot?

HYMAN: I didn't go there at the same times that he did. I mean he knew I went and we talked about it.

Q: And he probably wanted you to come talk to him-

HYMAN: Yes, yes. So, I interacted with Andrew. It was a little bit in the same way as what I said about ENE. I mean what was I doing up there talking to the administrator? I was an office director.

Q: Right. Well as I think about it, in your career, were you working in some distant venue or backwater area that no one cared about?

HYMAN: Rarely.

Q: Yes. You were working in the area that Brian was principally interested in and the area that Andrew was principally interested in. And it wasn't Carol Adelman's principle interest but she certainly protected it.

HYMAN: Yes. I sort of took the position, Ann, that I should take the difficult assignments. It was like why I got to the Balkans. I mean, I could have insisted no, no, I'm going to go to Prague and drink wine and whatever. I thought why should I do that; I may as well spend my time on the hard, harder problems. And secondly, Roger said he wanted me to go so it wasn't as though I could resist. I mean I did say there are other people, why me. But then once I went then of course you become involved in the country and also Andrew was interested, Roger was interested, etcetera. But again, I was not part of that inner group of three or four people.

Q: But they trusted you

HYMAN: Yes. I don't know what they discussed when I wasn't there, of course, but yes. Yes.

And there again if I can just one more sentence here, I think they were too invested, all of them, but particularly Roger and Brian. They had grown up with these guys at Indiana or Iowa rather where Garang got a PhD and so on. And they kept saying no, no, we know these people, we've been there, we know them.

Q: These are good guys

HYMAN: Yes, we know these people. And I think they were not willing to ask in any other than ritual way well, wait a minute, what happens if this happens or what happens if that happens. And are they really as committed to this way as you think they are. And what if they aren't. What's our fallback position. But the idea of a red team, which the military has, doesn't exist as far as I can tell in any part of the civilian government. The red team is the group that's supposed to poke holes in your plan.

Q: Ah, right.

HYMAN: But what if the enemy does this. What if the enemy does that? Why are you concentrating all of your forces? Or why are you dispersing them. That kind of grilling and gaming and so on that goes on in the military just doesn't happen at all on the civilian side. And I think to its detriment because they take the strategy they think is going to work but they don't say well what if it doesn't. Or what are its weaknesses.

Q: Well traditionally that was the role of the program officer but I think it ignores the fact the program officer has someone he reports to who may really want the program and sometimes interpersonal relations get in the way.

HYMAN: Sure.

Q: But I hadn't heard the term "red team" but it makes a great deal of sense.

HYMAN: So, I think they were too invested and weren't able to see the possibilities. Now I don't know what they would say now; I haven't seen Roger since this thing blew up and certainly not since all the corruption and so on and so forth. He's got to be pretty deflated, I would think, and probably doesn't want to talk about it. I haven't seen Andrew to talk about it.

Q: I don't think he's talking about that very much although he keeps saying he's writing a book a

HYMAN: Well he wrote a book.

Q: I know he did.

HYMAN: But that was before this all blew up.

Q: Yes, yes, exactly. So, would you say that early on, both because of the work you'd done in other conflict situations and because of your training as an anthropologist you had concerns about it sticking?

HYMAN: Yes. I would say that I didn't have burning concerns but I kept saying to myself well, what happens if, I mean what if this doesn't go in the great beneficial beneficent way that everybody says it's going to go. Have we thought about that? And I went out during the CPA period and did an evaluation of the major proto ministries. There were only a couple of us on the team; I can't remember how many there were, I'll have to look, but a couple people were on it, and I took the major ones. So, I took the bank, the proto bank, I took the president's personal office, yes. And I took the finance ministry. And I took, I think I took also the law ministry and the other guy got whatever else. And it was very clear that the reason they wanted an assessment was we were paying very large amounts of money to some very senior people to give advice to these ministries as to how to structure themselves. And so again, I used a more anthropological method and just sat down and talked with these guys, said what's going on here and what are you doing and so on and so forth. So, one guy who was on loan from Justice or Commerce and he was a senior executive service guy. He was sitting out in Juba supposedly giving advice to the bank. I don't know where he was from, which agency. And they wouldn't tell him how much hard currency they had and he said well, I know you have hard currency, you're hiding it, I understand that, but how much do you have and what are you going to do with it because that's going to be the backbone of your new currency. They wouldn't tell him.

Q: Did they not know?

HYMAN: Oh, they knew they just didn't want to divulge it to him. So, what was he doing? The law guy, I think, I think it was even the banking guy, wound up teaching Excel 101 to some incoming uneducated staff as they were going to join this ministry because they wouldn't let him in to any of these other things. So, I wrote all this up. And I said you're paying $250K, $300,000 a year for these guys and they're not doing what you're thinking they're doing.

Q: Because they can't get access.

HYMAN: They can't get access. They don't want them here. They're not going to tell you they don't want them here but they're going to marginalize them which is what they're doing. I don't know why AID doesn't know about this and AID doesn't do something about it, mainly sit down with these ministers and say either you want these people or you don't but we're not going to spend $500,000 with overhead and so on and so forth to keep these people here so they can teach Excel 101. We can send someone to teach 101 for a lot less than that. And these guys have jobs. So, this is not a good use of our resources. But they didn't.

Q: They didn't?

HYMAN: No, because I guess they didn't want to rock the boat. So, this don't rock the boat problem is a constant issue.

Q: Absolutely.

HYMAN: And not willing to face up to what's going on right in front of your eyes. I mean you didn't have to be a super anything, just ask these people, sit down and say what do you do all day. So, there was another team of two that was in the finance ministry. This guy was in the bank that I'm talking about; a couple in the finance ministry. The woman had managed to worm her way in, she was a South African, and she had managed to get herself inside. The other guy did not. And she had managed to do it by doing all kinds of work maybe. But as a whole they were not doing what they should have been doing.

Q: Right, right.

HYMAN: And so the readiness of these ministries to meet their functions was very clearly, to me, uncertain because that's why these guys were supposed to be there in the first place.

Q: So, think about the budget. I've got some theories about why in the face of evidence that this was money very poorly spent, AID would continue to fund it. But at that point Congress had appropriated funding specifically for South Sudan. Is that correct?

HYMAN: Oh yes.

Q: And there were outside interest groups that were very strongly lobbying for a robust response. And I don't know what the State Department role was but presumably they wanted this to happen too.

HYMAN: Sure.

Q: So, all of those things probably put pressure on AID to stay the course-

HYMAN: Yes. And the mission director's orders as far as he or she was concerned was to keep the ball rolling, do what you need to do to support the transition. That was the first, second, third, fourth and fifth objective. So, he or she would have had to take some heat to say-

Q: We can't spend this money well.

HYMAN: Yes. And this program that I'm talking about was not a tertiary program off in the boondocks someplace. This was the U.S. technical advisor to the central bank of South Sudan. Or the finance ministry of South Sudan or the president's chief of staff.

Those are the ones I touched. So, if they weren't going to get the finance ministry right and they weren't going to get the bank right, what was going to happen?

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And we did not go into the military.

Q: Yes. But there were separate channels.

HYMAN: Yes. There might have been but I don't know about that. But we didn't do it, AID didn't do it and we didn't meet with them.

Q: Right. What were you hearing from the Hill during all this? Just go, go, go?

HYMAN: Yes. I wasn't hearing anything personally but that's what-

Q: You didn't talk with staffers personally?

HYMAN: No, I wasn't supposed to go talk to the staffers. Andrew was going to do that or possibly Roger.

Q: Okay. So, did you leave AID shortly after the Sudan situation?

HYMAN: No, I left, well, I left in 2007 at the very end of the year I got this opportunity as I mentioned to you to work on governance in this program at CSIS so I took it.

Q: And have you stayed engaged with AID on some of these issues?

HYMAN: A little bit, yes, sure, because I've done some consultancies, especially on these assessment strategies.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: But I took the view that the new office director didn't need me hanging around second guessing what he was doing. I know him very well because he was one of my division chiefs. And we're friendly. It's just I didn't think it was good for me to be-

Q: Yes, sort of looking over his shoulder.

HYMAN: Yes, the office director that never would leave.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: So, I figured he should make those decisions, if he wants me as I am. It's not like we don't know each other. And I'm available any time he wants; I told him that. But I didn't think I should hang around.

Q: Right. So, I've got a question, this will sound like coming out of left field, but given your history of working on these transitions with AID and then afterwards, what would your advice be to AID on programming in Cuba?

HYMAN: Ah. Wow.

REFLECTIONS ON PROGRAMMING IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS

Q: I'm sure you've been asked.

HYMAN: No, I haven't actually. And I don't know Cuba well. General advice to all of these transitions is be careful of the Kool-Aid.

Q: Yes. You get too excited about things-

HYMAN: This is going to be a transition, it's all going to be great, the new guys are going to come in, they're wonderful, they love all the things you love. Okay, well it's probably true but what happens after that. And what's your planning for after that. And what are your thoughts about well, okay, where are the signals we're going to look for for problems. And what do we do if we find those signals. And nobody wants anything but the best for these countries so certainly one hopes that the transition goes very well.

Q: Yes.

HYMAN: But some of the others haven't and we should be at least intellectually prepared and I would say programmatically prepared in case we see signs that the thing is moving in the wrong direction. And then get in there early; don't wait until the thing is already a basket case.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: You've got greater leverage earlier on before people become invested in their positions and in their programs and so on. So, watch what you're doing. Not to be negative about it but just to be realistic about it. What's going on in this place? How do we keep touch? How do we honestly keep touch? Are people free to say the positive and the negative?

Q: Right. Don't shoot the messenger if it's negative. Yes.

HYMAN: Yes. How do we instill into our people and then any other people going in the idea that yes, that's what we're trying to do here but we understand that these transitions don't always go the way they are scripted to go and we want you to be alert to the early signs that things are not going well. And let us know. It doesn't mean we're going to do something immediately but we want to watch, we want to be skeptical in the best way,

productively skeptical I guess you could say. Making sure that we watch what we've seen before and try to learn from it and try to say well is there something we can do.

Q: Right. So, among the early signs that I've just heard you talk about in the case of Sudan the fact that the proto ministries were not interested in having the U.S. looking over its shoulder and were holding cards really close; that would be one thing.

HYMAN: That was one of them. I mean, whoever was watching the army should have seen the factions within the army. Now, I never was sent in to do that, wasn't my area and I don't know if anyone did but someone should have.

Q: Yes, right. So, always pay attention to the army.

HYMAN: The army, yes. And the party. So, there was a lot of feeling that the army- the SPLM -was this wonderful party of people who wanted nothing but liberal democracy. Well, there were factions within the SPLM all the way along and including once they got into the legislature and once they got into positions in the ministries and nobody wanted to hear the dissidents within the party. I mean, they were not people who had ever been in the party but they just felt that it was being taken over. They were very clear. But there weren't that many of them. And nobody wanted to hear that.

Q: Yes, so be careful of our own blinders.

HYMAN: Exactly.

Q: Thank you.

Are there other success or failure or thoughts you have that would be useful? Because these eventually will then be available and hopefully someone will take the time to read and learn from your long experience.

HYMAN: Well that will be great. Eastern Europe and to a lesser extent because of bureaucratic issues the Soviet Union were certainly the big ones that I was engaged in. There were a few others in Southeast Asia but I didn't play so much of a direct role there. And then South Sudan. I did go to Nigeria a few times and they were eye opening experiences. I went first when Abacha was the dictator. And there was room for programming in those days anywhere really in the AID mission. And then afterwards- you know that too was a transition that had great promise and turned out better than most, I would say.

Q: Really? Well the corruption is still epidemic.

HYMAN: Oh, corruption is huge but it hasn't yet undermined the potential. Nigeria is a place that could blow up easily into a violent conflict. Not just the oil part but the north and the south, Muslim versus Christian, the various different groups. The Ibos already did that in Biafra.

Q: Right, right.

HYMAN: So, it's a difficult situation. Congo, of course. I didn't spend any time in Congo except I made one trip there but I did spend some time in Nigeria.

I told you I took this trip to South Africa and pointed out to my team and the mission about Malema and that didn't get anywhere. And I would predict that there are going to be rough roads ahead for South Africa, just the same kind of thing. I mean, if you listen you can see this thing happening.

Q: Right. So, do you think your training as an anthropologist really helped you to listen?

HYMAN: Yes. I would say it was less the theoretical training as careful listening. I forgot who it was that said listening with a third ear. So, number one, listen carefully. And number two, extract what you're hearing in your own mind and say well, what is that person saying, who is that person. Is there some reason that that person takes this position and another person takes a different position? What are we actually hearing here. How do we tell these stories? Going back to Malaysia, you know, the Malays had one story, the Chinese had a different story. The Malays said the story here is that we are being exploited. The Chinese said no, no, there's a free market here, it's all very competitive and the problem is the Malays don't want to put in the labor to do it.

So, at the very least listen to what they're saying. And say to yourself- second lesson, I think, which to me is a critical lesson of anyone who has integrity as an academic or analyst or intellectual, whatever you want to call it, is to constantly, constantly question your own assumptions.

Q: Right. And be clear about your biases.

HYMAN: Exactly. What am I assuming here? And what's the basis for it? And is it right? And does it hold up to the evidence? And does it still hold up to new evidence? And I think that is not so easy to do but I think it's critical because otherwise you just plow ahead with the same concept that you had and you're not willing to, even if you listen you're not willing to change. So, those two things; listen carefully and ask yourself well, does that accord with what I assumed here was going on.

Q: You probably also have some lessons to impart about bureaucracy.

HYMAN: Oh yes, well that's a whole other story. Yes, I think this sense of turf just destroys the potential for better work. If I were back, I would say you know, as far as I'm concerned, folks, I mean I don't wish us badly here but tell me where has democracy promotion worked. Give me a couple of cases because I can give you a lot where it hasn't.

Q: Yes? Can you give any where it has?

HYMAN: The Baltics. Until recently I think the countries of Central Europe, but Poland and Hungary are doing some things that I think were not where they said they were going to be when they were young people.

Q: Right. And yet they have a lot of the- popular support.

HYMAN: They do, yes, yes, sure. But Orbán was a young democracy kind of roundtable guy when I first encountered him. Now the country has changed, situation has changed.

The Balkans, surprisingly I would say, stayed the course.

Q: Yes. Possibly Indonesia?

HYMAN: Indonesia. Yes, I think we helped the Indonesians do what a lot of them wanted to do.
Latin America, which I don't know well for reasons I've mentioned to you. Southern Africa, Ghana - I think it's not great but it's good; better than a lot of other places for sure.

Q: Right. And it's both an economic story and a governance story.

HYMAN: And political. And I wanted to spend a little bit more time in Ghana than my scope of work allowed but I had a hypothesis I'd like to test which was that Flight Lieutenant Rawlings was personally, I think, responsible for a lot of the success -- I don't know if it's true but I'd like to test it -- for doing two things. First of all, for giving up his presidency in the constitutional way.

Q: Right.

HYMAN: And secondly for changing his mind about economic policy and moving toward markets and away from state owned cooperatives and cocoa boards and price setting and all that kind of stuff. Which is the lesson I learned in Malaysia. And he changed his mind about it and he opened the economy. And I think that unfroze a lot of potential in Ghana that would have been still bottled up if everybody has still to work through all these state operations.

Q: Right, right. Do you think the U.S. played any role in helping him to change his mind?

HYMAN: You know, I don't know. I don't know about that. And I may be wrong. I may be overestimating those two factors and overestimating Rawlings. But I'd like to ask people about it.

Q: Yes, it's an interesting question. I assume you are in favor of the Mo Ibrahim Prize.

HYMAN: Yes. I don’t know how much difference it makes but sure, yes, all those things. They don’t hurt for sure.

Q: Great. Well, thank you very much.

HYMAN: You’re very, very welcome.

End of interview