The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project
Labor Series

HERBERT IHRIG

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INTERVIEW

[Note: This interview was not edited by Mr. Ihrig.]

Q: This is Morris Weiss of the Labor Diplomacy Oral History Project. I am now visiting Herb Ihrig, a retired Foreign Service Officer, in his pleasant home on Bainbridge Island outside of Seattle where I am visiting family. We are going to begin this interview with a little bit about his personal background, upbringing, and the source of his interest in labor matters and other political matters. Herb, the floor is yours.

IHRIG: Thank you. I was born in Seattle 79 years ago and spent most of my growing up

life there. My father was in the womenswear business, and so we were in Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and, then, we came back to Seattle. I went through high school in Seattle in the middle of the Depression. I graduated in the honor society but nothing above that. I went to the University of Washington and graduated with a Bachelor of Arts with a degree in Economics. Most of my real interest during the time I was there was in psychology where I was a reader for a couple of quarters and took more of it than I really needed to, I suppose. Among other things while I was there, my eyes were not good enough to get into Naval ROTC, which the University of Washington has. So, I was in the Army ROTC. That was the other option. Options were few there. I took a couple of courses in Naval ROTC because I was interested in boats. I was sailing boats around here. It's as nice a place around here for that as you can find. I raced sailboats. I was in the 1939 Honolulu race and navigated the trip back. I took a navigational course from a naval reserve officer. I was involved with yachting and boats.

Q: You got out of school?

IHRIG: I got out of high school in 1932 and university in 1936.

Q: So that was the depth of the Depression.

IHRIG: Yes. I made the Honolulu race in 1939. I applied for a commission in the navy–this is relevant–around 1940 and, again, my eyes were not good enough to make it. But when Pearl Harbor came, my eyes got better. I was commissioned as an ensign and very shortly went aboard ship on mine sweepers around here. After that–here being Puget Sound and the west coast of Washington–

Q: I gather from our earlier conversation that you also had a home here on Bainbridge Island at the same time that you were...

IHRIG: This was a summer home.

Q: For the family?

IHRIG: It was for the family and myself. There is a picture in 1916 of me sitting in front of the old house. I was about a year old. But the old house was just a summer home. School got out and we went over; Labor Day, we went back. The point of the story is how did I get involved in this sort of thing.

Q: Before that, you had three years between college and your sailing in 1939. Were you working?

IHRIG: I worked for my father in his ready-to-wear store in Seattle from 1936 until 1939, when there was a long shore strike in Seattle and my father went broke. Then, I went to work for Boeing as a shipping clerk's assistant. That didn't appeal to me too much so I applied and got a position with the Washington State Employment Service as a junior interviewer. I went to Mount Vernon but most of the time I was working out of the

Seattle office. When the war started, I had a skid row employment agency. I ran it and walked over drunken bodies to get to the bathroom. It was down on Washington Street, and it was quite an experience, but that was irrelevant.

[Ed. It was relevant that Pearl Harbor was on the 7th of December followed by Herb Ihrig's getting a commission in February.]

IHRIG: I was eventually on a mine sweeper in Hawaii, working in an area around other Hawaiian Islands–Midway, Christmas Island, and that sort of thing. Then, later on I got command of the vessel and Midway was over. I came down with my mine sweeper not too much after the Battle of Midway. It was immediately after the battle for Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands. That was good, exciting naval duty that involved boat handling and that sort of thing. A small navy boat ran over my mine sweeping tail while I was mine sweeping in Tarawa, and it sunk. It was a $14,000 magnetic tail, so I raised all bloody hell. As a result, they moved me and my ship to another island in the Gilberts called Abemama, and I was working there with the discretion of the naval captain who was the island commander. This was British territory. The Gilbert Islands were part of their Pacific world before World War II, and the commissioner for the Gilbert Islands was at Abemama, too. He was interested in the history there. He hadn't known Robert Lewis Stevenson but he'd read him and so had I. We found that part of his writings were on the island of Abemama. So he got permission to go with me when I took trips to other islands and to go to other islands other than just the ones the navy wanted me to go to and help them re-establish native government with British control, of course.

Q: Was this still during World War II?

IHRIG: Oh yes, this was still during the war. As a result of that work, I was given a commendation by the British. Just after receiving orders to a new, bigger mine sweeper on the East Coast, those orders were superseded by my being sent to the University of Virginia for a period of six weeks. It was the military government school there which preceded six months of language and military government civil affairs training. It was given in several places, Harvard on the East Coast and Stanford on the West Coast and many more, but I chose Stanford. I graduated from that course, and one fellow whom I met later is an Assistant Secretary of State. His last name is Anderson. I can't remember what his other name is. But at any rate, he was one of the instructors there. It was under the aegis of the Hoover Institute. I went to the University of Virginia, Stanford, and then down to the presidio, Monterrey, where we were waiting for the war to be over. There were a great many naval officers and even more army officers. All of a sudden we were told we needed to get going for the military. They were going to occupy Japan. They were going to make the invasion. So we started. What was my field? Women's ready to wear didn't have any point to it.

Q: What was your field, did you say?

IHRIG: They asked me. They said, "What were you doing?" I said that I was an interviewer in the United States Employment Service.

Q: That was it?

IHRIG: That was it. I had made a senior interviewer by that time. That was my background, Sir. I saw that we were actually going for real. We needed people that had real background. I asked that they find somebody. It was alright to make me head of the labor section down there. They got, first, a major who was a labor relations officer in the State of New Jersey at that time. He was a very nice guy but I've forgotten his name. He couldn't take over because I ranked him. At any rate, we worked together, and it was quite obvious that we hadn't the wherewithal to do our part of it, if that's what they really wanted to do instead of just keeping us on hold. That is how we happened to get Ted Cohen involved with labor and, whatever he did before, I don't know. He was with OSS and he came out and spent two or three months with us, May until just before August when we took off.

Q: Ted had been in the OSS?

IHRIG: Yes.

Q: In the U.S. or abroad already?

IHRIG: No.

Q: He was in the army?

IHRIG: No. He was not in the military. He was a civilian working for OSS. That was its name then, was it not?

Q: Yes. It was the OSS during the war.

IHRIG: That's where he worked. He knew he could read and write Japanese but couldn't speak it. He could look at a bunch of congee and say this means the home ministry of such and such. I don't know what background he had other than that. The navy called all the naval officers, and we were going to go on Operation Olympic, which was the invasion of Kyushu. The main deal was that the Fifth Amphibious Corps with the Second Marine Division, the Fifth Marine Division, and the First Cavalry Division were involved. About the time the war was ending, we were on our way, being rushed to go with the convoy of ships that were headed for Operation Olympic. Making a long story short, 98 of us and some army were taken by ship to Hawaii and then by C-46s–I think it took five C-46s because they couldn't carry too many people because they had to carry so much gas–to go between islands, and we bounced from various islands that are not relevant but we met the convoy off of Saipan. Everybody else was just a military government officer but I was a deck officer, so the captain put me on watch. The rest of the poor devils were down in the bilge where normally enlisted troops were. I was up because I stood watches on the ship on the way over. We came into Sasebo, Japan, which is really the relevant point to the start of the story, about the 14th of September. I was the

one who went down and ushered a middle-aged or over, very small and very frightened pilot. I got him aboard, and we went up to the bridge.

Q: Do you mean a Japanese pilot?

IHRIG: Yes. He was a Japanese naval pilot. That was my first experience with actually using Japanese. The boat did not sink, and my orders were right so it worked fine.

Q: You haven't told us how you got Japanese language.

IHRIG: Oh, yes. I didn't say it loud enough or hard enough. I was at Stanford for six months learning oral language, not written, for four hours a day, six days a week, then afternoons for five days a week.

Q: So you were not only studying the establishment of new governments but also learning a language.

IHRIG: Yes, we were. I think the Foreign Service course is for six months and then a year and a half. I didn't get that year and a half but I was with the military government team of the Fifth Amphibious Corps. I was a labor officer by divine precept and for no other reason. I hadn't even voted Democratic yet by that time. All of a sudden, I had to provide 2,000 workers a day, 4,000 workers a day, or 7,500 workers a day. We needed 7,000 workers a day for two ships. I don't think we ever got quite that far. Who was the man that dealt with the Japanese government and told the Japanese government fellow what to do? It turns out to be a fellow who was with the Foreign Office. However, he was attached to the Home Ministry of the Japanese government at the time. I got a better than bullying situation with him, and we got as many workers as we could. The issue was transporting them down.

Q: What did they do? Did they just round them up?

IHRIG: The Japanese Labor Office was part of the Ministry of Welfare before we started the Labor Ministry there in 1947. This is 1945. We had just gotten there. They had labor offices but it translates with the Japanese as "diligent labor offices". They were just like, I'm sure, what the Germans had over there. They were control offices. "You go there." That sort of thing. There was nothing democratic about it. They were one of the first things that SCAP put out. Then the labor division of SCAP developed the other kinds of labor offices.

Q: I have to interrupt you every once in a while for descriptions. SCAP was the...

IHRIG: Supreme Command for the Allied Powers. It was General MacArthur's bailiwick. He had a labor division in the economic and scientific section.

Q: By that time was it Killen?

IHRIG: No, it was before Killen. Ted Cohen was there. He was the chief of the labor division, a GS-15. That's what I was doing. The war ended, and they didn't need workers so much and the navy, after one year, went out of the occupation of Japan. I got into Japan on say the 14th of September 1945 and, sometime in the summer of 1946, I was moved to Guam. I was promoted to lieutenant commander, and I very shortly became governor of Ponape and East Carolinas, or the commanding officer thereof. But the natives were used to saying "governor." While I was still in Japan at MacArthur's headquarters, Ted Cohen tried to get me to move up to Tokyo. The Marine Corps commander said that obviously anybody he'd get would not be as good as they think I am so they'll keep me. If they like you, you must be important. A diversion there is the Royal Victorian or whatever it's called. It's a ferry that goes once a day from Victoria to down here.

Q: Oh yes, I took that train once with the family.

IHRIG: This year?

Q: No, no, about five or six years ago.

IHRIG: I was into general military government after the great push of getting all the military divisions–two marines and the army one–in and about that time the SCAP Ted Cohen wanted me but the Marines wouldn't let me go. The Marines went out of the occupation. I went down to Guam. They were still involved with the former Japanese mandated islands, and so I was on Guam and Truk and as governor of Ponape. From there, I got another request from Ted Cohen and the Labor Division in early 1947. I was in Japan from 1945-46, 1946-to early 1947 in the Marianas. They were palm infested islands and also were infested by giant African snails that, it is said, the Japanese brought in as food. I could never find a Japanese who would ever eat one. I made a couple of trips up there to try to sell it to them, and no luck.

At any rate, I am down there, and I'm making as a lieutenant commander $3,700 a year. I am offered $7,300 a year working as a CAF-12 on MacArthur's staff down on economic and scientific general–never mind–on Ted Cohen's labor division. I had some knowledge of Japanese but I got a very good KO graduate right upon graduation; I'd known him before. I could shoot the breeze like we are doing now but not when we got into negotiations or discussions.

Q: You needed a Japanese man?

IHRIG: I needed a Japanese man, and that man, if he has not retired now, is head of Johnson Wax in Japan. I came down, and one of the princes opened the new place down by Odora. That was when I was back in Batan the last time. I came into Japan.

Q: Was that early 1947?

IHRIG: It was March of 1947. As a civilian in the manpower division of SCAP, I went

out of the navy. Making it rather succinct, I was in SCAP until SCAP was over. I was in SCAP under Ted Cohen as director of labor, under Jim Killen as director of labor, and under Chet Hepler. I don't suppose he's still alive.

Q: I don't think so.

IHRIG: Then when the peace treaty was about to be signed, Chet went to ILO, and I became head of a very decimated labor division.

Q: Where was Cohen?

IHRIG: Cohen was long gone. He stayed in Japan as a businessman.

Q: Did he leave the government?

IHRIG: Yes, he did. The government didn't like him very well. Tony Costello was kicked out because they thought he had communist leanings. I don't think they were very sure of Ted. When you are a smart guy and you know what's going on, you can be abrasive to people who have more rank than you do.

Q: He's another one of the people I imagine they may have been suspicious of. He did have a radical background but not a communist background. He was very anti-communist.

IHRIG: At any rate, they moved him out of that, and they kept him for a while but in a place where he could do no harm nor any good, I think. That's why he got out. His career was in Japan. He married a Japanese woman. He had at least one kid that I know of. He left Japan to retirement to Guadalajara, Mexico, in the spring of 1975.

Q: What it amounted to was that Cohen was out, Hepler went off, and you were in charge.

IHRIG: Yes. In the meantime my job turned out to be dealing with the government of Japan trade unions and the Japanese government.

Q: Were you in the Labor ministry?

IHRIG: Yes, I was in the Labor ministry. I wrote the public works bill. Somebody smiled and said, "We still have it but it doesn't look like what you did." The big problem was that they were striking even during the Occupation. My problem as a member of the Labor Division was only during the Occupation, really. Everything was pretty quiet but, as soon as the peace treaty on the 29th of April 1952, with the Korean War on, the Japanese government was glad to keep supplying us. At the beginning of the Occupation under the Home Ministry, the Japanese agreed to supply the labor and pay for it. I've got a paper on this that I wrote in 1957 that is declassified now.

Q: When you say you've got it, do you mean you possess it now?

IHRIG: I have it in the next room, and I would like you to copy it and return it. There are two of them. It was the basic thing that was coming that I finally had to do. Jack Amos was also...

Q: Oh, yes. Is it Jack Amos or somebody...

IHRIG: It was Bob Amos. He was head after Hepler, I think. By that time, I was dealing with the Japanese Defense Bureau for self-defense forces, which had the function for the Japanese government of providing 300,000 Japanese who are working for the U.S. forces. SCAP had the responsibility for Japan, Okinawa, which was not a part of Japan until later, and Taiwan, the Philippines, and Korea. I was first working entirely with Japan in the Occupation and after the Occupation. After the Occupation, SCAP really went out. It became Commander in Chief Far East, CICFE.

So there's no labor division. All of a sudden I find myself in the civilian personnel section of G-1 of the army part but it isn't Commander-in-Chief Far East, it is army post. There are a couple of rear admirals and vice admirals that were on the staff reluctantly. That's when I started to deal. The Japanese were saying that "Alright, we understand that you need people, and we are going to furnish the people but we are going to furnish them under the laws of Japan." Commanders-in chief don't like that kind of noise. Bob Amos is the one who said it, and I was the one who was caught with it. First, the military said, "We're not under any foreign government." They said, "No, you're not doing it." They were in charge of the pay schedules but a lot of these people were practically indentured, I would think. They were handling that part very nicely as long as we had the supreme commander there under the commander-in-chief of the Far East. The sovereign government of Japan had other ideas.

First, I was working with majors and lieutenant colonels and colonels, and this doesn't work. There's got to be a middle point. "We accept no middle point. They are ours. They are paying for them. They are ours." Well, strikes....

Q: By this time had the indigenous Japanese labor movement been formed?

IHRIG: Oh yes. When I returned to Japan in 1971, the man who is head of the armed forces labor union in 1950 or 1957 when I left Japan was head SOYO. It was a pretty politicized set up. The Socialists, all right. The thing about those years, one, I moved from G-1 civilian personnel to J-5 of the joint command, that which is civil affairs and was the rightful place for dealing with that. I was not dealing with colonels anymore because the generals knew you had to find something. Eventually we worked out–and I think this is in both of those papers that I'll let you borrow–that, yes, we would comply with the terms of Japanese law but those terms would be converted into military directives. Therefore, we would not be subject to a Japanese labor relations board or Japanese courts. Now that was a hard one to sell because, before, they had had everything.

Q: It challenged their independence.

IHRIG: Yes. As far as the workers were concerned, they liked working for us but they wanted to be under the government. We were not talking about retirement rights at that time. We thought, from the top general down to me, that the best thing is to get everything right up to the last minute, all your pay right there. Don't save some of it for something like, ok, well...

Q: Don't save some of it for something like retirement?

IHRIG: Retirement. I am dealing from 1952 on either in G-1 or J-5, and I'm dealing with a higher, higher, higher, until I am actually the command's labor advisor. I am only a GS-14 but I'm doing all that. It was a problem. It was a problem in Okinawa. It was a problem in Korea. The same things were happening. Of course, they happened a lot later in Korea but there were people getting mad about it. I recall the commander-in-chief of the Far East under my aegis set forth that U.S. forces had to provide maternity leave because the Government of Korea required it, and the commanding officer said to the chief of staff, "You've got to do something about that." So the chief who was a two-star instead of a three-star general sent a directive of his own that there would be no pregnant employees.

I am dealing increasingly, as it turns out, from 1951 until 1957 when the commander in chief Far East became a naval command out of Hawaii. I had the army taking one position. The navy had some industrial relations experience. The navy yard had a communist union during the war. One naval officer that was assigned to me worked with them and...

Q: Do you mean the Japanese?

IHRIG: No, I mean with the communist labor body in the Brooklyn navy yard.

Q: Oh, a man that was working with you had come from there?

IHRIG: He was a commander. I think he made captain before he retired.

Q: And he'd had experience?

IHRIG: He'd had experience with communists. The point was that most of the admirals of the commander of naval forces Far East considered me a mole, as sort of a navy man.

Q: A navy mole.

IHRIG: They were pretty good. They knew they had to live with this situation. The air force was pretty good because it was new. They knew that the army was awfully bad, so they were not awfully intelligent. The army whom you know thought I was a communist

mole because I was.

Q: It was because you took the practical position of having to deal with these people.

IHRIG: Yes, because I said the answer is not that they're yours forever more. They are employees of the Japanese government. Okay. That got me involved with Warnock and Phil Sullivan.

Q: Now this is Olan Warnock. There is now another Warnock.

IHRIG: This is Olan, yes. Thank you. This is the father of that one.

Q: No. There is no relation as far as I know.

IHRIG: I'll be damned. Alright. I think it was sometime in 1970 something.

Q: So you were dealing with Olan Warnock back in the States. He was not in Japan. Is that right?

IHRIG: He came out to Japan with Phil Sullivan. I had never worked with the Labor Department except as a senior interviewer for about two months in Seattle in 1945. The Washington State Employment Service became the U.S. Employment Service, and that was under the Labor Department.

Q: And Olan was with the Labor Department and Phil Sullivan was with State as the Far East expert.

IHRIG: Yes. I was saying that SCAP, the headquarters, and MacArthur, the person, wanted supremacy. It was their occupation. In fact, the State Department wanted some participation and some advice to offer. They were isolated into a small operations section of G-3, which is operations. There I had worked for the same anti-communist committee with John Steeves. John Steeves was later a military advisor in Hawaii and then later than that an ambassador. We got along very well, and he was helpful to me in terms of practical dealings. The military heads were not, basically. The navy was all, "You got a problem there, Son." Army, navy, air force each one of them has a position on anything you want to hear. Then the union has a position, and the Japanese government is standing behind that position, smirking, not really caring, and so letting the labor union carry the ball. I was getting more and more into the front line of operations and labor relations, which I had absolutely no training for at all.

Q: This was normal labor relations bargaining, striking, etc.

IHRIG: Oh, yes. It was in an international context. The point there was I was doing all that when George Weaver went down with the ICFTU mission to Okinawa. I was sent down there. I was the one who wrote the dispatch with George, then took it back, and it went out as the Far East command.

Q: This would have been by when, because MacArthur left in ...

IHRIG: MacArthur was still there when the Korean War broke in 1950.

Q: Truman fired him about 1951.

IHRIG: Yes, it was 1951, because in 1952 Ridgeway was in command there.

Q: Did it change it much or was the attitude still the same?

IHRIG: Oh, it was pretty much the same attitude. Whereas the army might not have liked MacArthur in some ways, compared with anybody who wasn't army, he was wonderful. That was a problem because it was going up in the chain of command as it was involving Okinawa. There was a problem of indigenous labor in Taiwan for a while and certainly a big one in the Philippines. The Philippines' commander in chief Far East had responsibility for it but SCAP did not. The point was that there–I don't know how to put this–the State Department people cannot get into even the next to the top echelons very much at all.

Q: Do you mean the top echelons of the Occupation?

IHRIG: Yes, I mean of the Occupation. I had help from them. I also had help from some of the Sophia University people that were Americans. But it was a mess. When the Occupation was over, this was after the Korean War had started. I think they were over there during that period of time. Phil Sullivan and Oran Warnock came over. I said I had had about enough of the military because no matter how high you were, segregation existed. I said "There's a job open in Bangkok, an AID labor position of some kind. I would like to be considered for it." They looked at each other, and they looked at me and said, "No. We don't quite know why but the military seems to like you, and what you're doing here is more important than anything you'd be doing down in Bangkok, so you are going to stay. But we will take care of you in the end." And they did.

Q: That's interesting. They made a commitment to you, which they were able to carry it out.

IHRIG: They were able to carry it out.

Q: This would have been about when?

IHRIG: It was during the late 1950s. I was with the commander-in-chief Far East until that dissolved, and that was the summer of 1957. At that moment, the commander-in-chief became navy and was in Pearl Harbor. The army was the one that had most of the indigenous workers in Okinawa, Japan, and Korea. There were a lot of them, so I was transferred over. I was always the department of army civilian rather than becoming a part of navy civilian. They did hire one, and he did something but not too much, I guess. I

was with the deputy director of civilian personnel section of the army in the army command in Hawaii. As that, I spent about 25 percent of my time in Japan, Okinawa, and Korea on labor problems. They were labor relations problems dealing with the military and what they were willing to do, their relations.

Q: You were also working on labor supply problems, ministry type stuff.

IHRIG: For a while during the Occupation, yes, but not labor relations at all. This was the manpower division. I was doing things with Chet Hepler and working with the re-establishment of the labor ministry and the manpower functions in the labor ministry. It became more and more, and as the Occupation ended, it became 100 percent. That was when it became necessary to deal with the unions as unions rather than just get another SCAP directive and stop them.

Q: You had to learn how to deal with them instead of dealing over them.

IHRIG: That's right. It was a very interesting period of time. I was never the deputy director except for a couple of months. I was foreign relations for army, navy, and air force in the Far East. Now they all had civilian personnel people but I was dealing with the director of civilian personnel army, navy, and air force in Hawaii as they related to the commander-in-chief Far East, and I would go out to Japan, Okinawa, and Korea from Hawaii. I certainly met the generals in USARPAC, U. S. Army Pacific. I was working for them. A lot of the papers I wrote were navy papers because they were the joint command that handled it.

Q: But you were still located in Japan?

IHRIG: No. I was out of Hawaii.

Q: Was that until 1957?

IHRIG: The Occupation started on the 3rd of September and ended on the 29th of April 1952. There was still a joint command in Tokyo until 1957. In 1957 the command in the Far East moved back to Hawaii and became a navy rather than an army as joint commander. But I, working for the former joint commander, went as a civilian with the U.S. Army Forces Pacific.

Q: Did it matter much for the understanding of your work whether you were physically located in Tokyo or in Hawaii?

IHRIG: Oh, yes. It did because the directors of civilian personnel of army, navy, and air force were in Hawaii, because it was USARPAC and it was Air Force Pacific Command and it was Naval Forces Pacific. They were the generals but the work was all out there. It was a hodgepodge way of doing things but it worked pretty well. We'd go out with a general in Hawaii or the admiral was saying such and such. "Look, I run this place," says the general in Korea and the general in Japan.

Q: In 1957, when did the commitment they had made take effect?

IHRIG: I was offered the position of labor attaché in Jakarta in the summer of 1959 but I declined it. I had children, one born in 1954 and twin girls that were born in 1956. In 1959 they were at the ages of three and five.

Q: I have you in Hawaii until 1957.

IHRIG: No, No. Excuse me. I am in Japan from 1945 until 1957. From 1945 to 1952, I was with the Occupation; 1952 until 1957, with the joint commander.

Q: I did not understand that, and then Hawaii.

IHRIG: Yes, then Hawaii. I was working on Japanese-Philippine matters. I was having a great time. My family was disgusted.

Q: That's from 1957 to 1959.

IHRIG: That was 1957 to 1961 because I declined it the first time so Bob Kenny went back. Then I got all sorts of letters from Jim Taylor in between. But I made some neat post reports. I went back at one time to try and get a GS-15 position in the Department of Labor. They offered me a GS-14 position.

Q: Was that in Thailand?

IHRIG: I said, "No, thank you." I was doing things in an exciting way at a level I would not be doing, certainly as a GS-14 in there. I am at 1957 to 1961. In 1961 Bob Kenny's second tour in Jakarta ended and they offered it to me again. That time they had two doctors in the embassy, and the kids were that much older so I shifted.

Q: So your first labor attaché post, even though you did all that labor work in Japan, as a labor attaché was in Jakarta.

IHRIG: Right, and that was November of 1961. . I worked in Jakarta with some of the people that were my neighbors in Tokyo. Military colonels are in either the army attaché office or working with the AID mission. There I took on a strictly labor attaché function. I got an offer of a GS-15 job in Korea from the Army Forces Pacific. It was supposed to be "eyes-only," and after everybody looked at it, the ambassador called me in. He said, "Did you see this?" I said, "Yes, I got it this afternoon." He said, "What are you going to do?" I said, "I'm not going to take it." He said, "I think that's a very good idea."

Q: Who was the ambassador then?

IHRIG: He is dead now.

Q: It doesn't matter.

IHRIG: He was a fellow that had come out and worked with Clay in Germany, Howard Jones.

Q: Oh yes, I've heard of him. You then changed from an operational officer in the Far East area to becoming an observer, a less activist role as a labor attaché. How did you take that and what were the advantages and disadvantages?

IHRIG: I had in my own mind determined that what I really wanted was to do what I was doing but I wanted an anthropologist background to do it. I was, on the gut level in Japan, all the time interpreting to the American forces and to the American government how the Japanese felt about things and to the Japanese how the Americans felt about them and then trying to synthesize. I became pretty agile at that. For instance on Emperor Meji's birthday in 1945, whatever day in November it was, the Japanese government had declared a holiday. Even through the whole World War II that was a holiday. We had God knows how many thousands of people working, and the first..."God damn it, who won this fucking ___?" Excuse me. The Marines were outspoken, especially when they were generals, and they were the top and could speak. No way were they going to do that. So I went back and I talked with my opposite number who then was a member who later became an ambassador. He was Foreign Service all the time but he was working as a Home Ministry man. I don't think they even have the Home Ministry any more. It had such a bad reputation during the war. We talked it over, and I went back. I understood it; thought, "we can do this." I said, "But what are you going to do for labor on that day?" "My God, we'll make them come." "You have the power," I said, "but I don't think, from what I understand, it is very practical." "In other words, if they don't come on that day, we are going to fire them all." "Ah, that was where I hoped to get them." I said, "Well, and if they don't come and you fire them, where are you going to get labor?" This is something that the military could not understand. When I was in Hawaii working and went down to talk to them, they were talking about a Laotian general whose name we know.

Q: Pot?

IHRIG: No, this is Wedemeyer.

Q: Oh, you mean American?

IHRIG: Yes. His plan shows 25,000 Laotians doing auto maintenance and things like that. This was the same damn problem back there.

Q: It was a pre-Reagan attitude to the controllers. "If you don't come to work, we're going to fire you."

IHRIG: Yes. There was no way. We gave them administrative leave. We didn't let them take a holiday. They didn't know what it was, and I was becoming real friendly with the

Japanese. It came out that I supervised the college education of one of the two men we were talking about. He was a kid of about 13 in 1945, and I was talking to him and trying to teach him a little bit of English. His father said, "You can't do that. I'm sorry." The point was that the man was arguing with the pronunciation with his teacher who had never heard Americans or the English speak English in his life.

Q: This is an example of the difference between the type of operational work in Japan and ...

IHRIG: In other words, what I was doing in Japan was really inter-governmental relations. I was just doing it from a different post. I was in Jakarta trying to understand and get them to understand us. I was talking to labor leaders, not SOBSE so much, but I am losing my track of which country is which. Anyway, I only had very slight contact with the Communist labor union. They came when I produced Bobby Kennedy. That was the only time I had any contact with them. They were sharp as anything, spoke English very nicely, and made some of my poor Allied trade union leaders look silly.

Q: Was Suharto in at that time?

IHRIG: No, I was there only under Sukarno. The attempted coup was Halloween of 1965, and that's when my next door neighbor and two other generals were assassinated. They were cut up and put down a well. Let me regroup. I am talking about the inter-governmental stuff. We were dealing with the ICFTU trade unions. We were trying to help them but it became very, very dangerous. It became more dangerous, of course, when this coup came.

Q: Who was the ICFTU president coming in there, Matu?

IHRIG: No. I don't think there was anybody coming in. I don't think they would let them in.

Q: Heilie Goldberg?

IHRIG: No, they wouldn't let her in.

Q: Oh, you mean after. He was there with Sukarno. He used to come in.

IHRIG: The labor secretary, Goldberg, was scheduled to go to Indonesia. They thought it was Eric and another guy, and they wouldn't accept him. This was all under Sukarno although Sukarno went out just after I left. The counsel general in Hong Kong called me at my hotel. They took care of helping me. He said, "You'd better come down and look at the traffic." I was there when the coup happened. That's when, gradually, Suharto was the only point of reference. There were no others. Sukarno was just coming to the power of the Indonesian Air Force, which was communist, and to the trade union, which was communist. At any rate, I was there and some college kids came the last day I was in Jakarta and said that Father Nsudian was going to come back and take over and I should

stick around because Sukarno was going to be out. I said, "Yes, yes, patting them on the head." I took off and by the time I got to Hong Kong it was pretty much true. It was the beginning of the end, and Sukarno was exiled to Bengkulu.

Q: Let's go back a minute and ask you to comment on the activities of the American labor movement both in Japan and in Indonesia. The American labor movement was acting in Japan through the ICFTU or separately. They certainly had some people over there. The AFL had a guy I remember, a heavy set fellow, very religious Catholic and an anti-communist from the word go. I've forgotten his name.

IHRIG: What year are you talking about?

Q: In Japan.

IHRIG: What year are you talking about in Japan?

Q: I am talking about the period, the 1950s or maybe later in the 1960s.

IHRIG: Let's see. The first labor attaché was in Japan when I left.

Q: Who would that have been?

IHRIG: I could look that up later and tell you.

Q: It doesn't matter. We have the records.

IHRIG: Yes, I've got records, too. He was one who had some troubles. His direct letters were great but his reporting, they didn't seem to like.

Q: Oh, Skeegan?

IHRIG: Oh no, not Skeegan. Skeegan, I knew in Indonesia. This was a very nice, tall fellow who finally died of cancer sometime when I was in the Foreign Service.

Q: This would not be Silverberg, was it?

IHRIG: Oh, no. He was not the first one.

Q: I was asking about the activities of the AFL, the AFL-CIO, and the ICFTU.

IHRIG: Well, in Japan from 1945 to 1957, the only person that I really had contact with was George Leiber. He would come over.

Q: From the IFCTU at some time or the AFL-CIO?

IHRIG: I wasn't involved with him. If he showed up, I was, but the only real involvement

I had was with the ICFTU to Okinawa mission, which I was definitely involved with, with him. Again, I can't remember names of labor people that came over in Indonesia.

Q: Except for Goldberg, he did come.

IHRIG: He did not come to Jakarta when I was there.

Q: Really, he proclaimed himself a friend of Sukarno.

IHRIG: Yes, he had been but there were the eight years of Bob Kenny.

Q: Oh yes, he was the government man, the labor attaché, your predecessor. As a trade union visitor, Goldberg didn't come at all?

IHRIG: During my time?

Q: Yes.

IHRIG: No. He didn't. Is he still alive?

Q: No, he died a couple of years ago, obstreperous as ever.

IHRIG: I'm learning a lesson now.

Q: Okay, I just wanted to make sure we covered that subject.

IHRIG: My contacts with trade union people were with whoever came over. Before I was a labor attaché in Japan, I had no contact with him at all except for the business of George Weaver in the times that I was labor attaché in Indonesia. I met a lot of them that came over. I took them around.

Q: Were these the pass through visitors that did not stay for great lengths of time?

IHRIG: That's true. The same is true for Japan.

Q: Let's continue, Herb, with anything further you'd like to say about Jakarta, if you have any comments about that.

IHRIG: I think not at this time. I think we have covered that pretty well. I'd like to make sure that we get sequence now. I was a naval officer in Japan from 1945 to 1947. From 1945 until 1957 I was with the Unified Command, whether that was SCAP or commander-in-chief Far East, in jobs that, in the beginning, had to do with SCAP, the Labor Ministry, and the Employment Security Bureau. In the latter days, I worked entirely with the business of indigenous labor, as we called it, in Japan and Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In 1957 when the command changed from army to navy and from Tokyo to Honolulu, I was in the Department of Army Civilian and that's the part

that I have told you about. Then there was the Indonesian four years. Then, because I had been overseas since 1945 and it was then 1965, they thought I'd best be back to the old country and spend two years or more there. I arrived and found Washington, or Annandale where we bought a house, much better than I expected. I was assigned to the Department of Labor in the overseas part of it. During that time, two things happened.

Q: Excuse me, the person in charge of international at that time was Phil Delaney, is that correct? Or Horowitz? It's what we call SIL. The director for labor affairs in the State Department, who would have arranged the assignment to labor, was Phil Delaney?

IHRIG: No. I think it was the black guy.

Q: Weaver was the only black guy.

IHRIG: No. I remember George. Again, I could probably look it up.

Q: No. That's all right.

IHRIG: It was the office of international labor affairs in State. I don't think it was Phil Delaney. Again, I've lost it.

Q: It's okay, now that you are going to lend me that material.

IHRIG: I think that some of that won't be there. The key man at State isn't there.

Q: It may have been as Delaney was leaving but I thought his successor was Horowitz.

IHRIG: Maybe it was Horowitz.

Q: They assigned you to labor.

IHRIG: Yes. That was figured out, I guess, and I just came in and they said here is where you are going to go up the street there. I came, and the first experience that was worth noting was when I was assigned to an inter-agency personnel, I think they called it indigenous personnel, committee at the State Department. It had an ambassador that wasn't doing anything else at the moment as the head of it, an FSO-1 in it, they had me in it, and they had somebody from AID. I was representing the Labor Department. The Pentagon had a person. We printed out that document, which we prepared ourselves with the natives running the press, the Vietnamese running the press. I do not have a copy of it as it was Limited to Official Use. I use that native business pejoratively. But that had something that the Labor Department and I was trying pretty hard to do some negotiations, and that was the very point we were talking earlier about: how indigenous labor utilized by the U.S. armed forces in a foreign country would handle its labor relations and its personnel policies. We came out with something that I was very comfortable with. The ambassador was not very comfortable with it but he finally agreed to it. I was thinking, all right, "Well, I think I know what's our problem. You have

another end user besides us, don't you." So we got that, it was in the report, and we went to Saigon. We sat down as a group. I think Willard Wertz, not the other.

Q: You mean Leo Wertz.

IHRIG: Yes, Leo Wertz.

Q: Yes, he was assistant secretary for management affairs.

IHRIG: Leo Wertz was head of it.

Q: He was George Weaver's predecessor as director of international affairs for the Labor Department but he had moved up to be assistant secretary.

IHRIG: You have to get me back on track.

Q: You were talking about the committee report.

IHRIG: The committee had something on inter-governmental relations, which would fit very nicely with what I had said in the 1957 and 1960 reports that I wrote.

Q: Were the reports that you wrote essentially about only foreign service nationals, as we now call them, employees in Vietnam?

IHRIG: Yes. We were going to win the war, and we were going to stay there for some time. The armed forces were going to utilize the local nationals in a context that would be different when there was peace time. Therefore, we were giving them a pilot of what was going to happen when we won.

Q: Your experience in Japan certainly made you a very good member of the committee.

IHRIG: The ambassador whose name I don't remember–I didn't think that was so relevant. That part was interesting whether it's relevant to the big picture or not. When we came, there was Willard Wertz and there was somebody, a real hard little worker from the executive office

Q: Was he from the Labor Department?

IHRIG: No. He was from the White House. I don't really remember anybody but the State Department guy who was along for the ride and this guy from the executive office. At any rate, we got into this business of "when we win this, we certainly must." Our thinking was, "We can't run the local nationals in the way that we are running them now for the U.S. forces. Of course, the Department of State will anyway but you won't." We had this thing in, and it was pretty good. I know Conden was away. We all appeared at the staff meeting. Ambassador Lodge said, "You are the labor attaché." "Yes, Mr. Ambassador." At the end of this conference he turned to Willard and said, "I'm going to

keep Ihrig here."

Q: Was Willard Wertz there on the committee?

IHRIG: No, Leo. Leo was.

Q: Do you remember where we were in that Vietnam task force?

IHRIG: Yes. I had come back happily to spend time in the United States and work on loan to the Department of Labor. The Department of Labor sent me back to the Department of State as their representative on an inter-agency personnel mission to write a report on what local national personnel policies and practices should be after the situation in Vietnam had calmed down and the United States had won the war. I said that we had sat in a conference with Ambassador Lodge, and Ambassador Lodge had indicated to Leo Wertz that I was to stay and empty the desk of Conden which had a lot of stuff in it. He made it sound better than that but that's basically what it was. The rest of them took off for the first week, and I sat there doing labor attaché work and then finally came back, and we had some more traveling around to do. I met the rest of the group at the mountain, Da Nang, I believe it was. I then traveled the rest of the way.

Q: Had you been to Hue yet, or were you on the way to Hue? It's close by to Da Nang.

IHRIG: I think not. I would have classed the trip pretty much a junket. I think we had pretty well made up our minds what was appropriate to say before we left. But it was very good, I guess, in terms of interrelations with the Defense Department. The Defense Department guy had never been overseas before, and he was a full colonel. He was a delighted disciple of all the capers I pulled on the way down. The report came out, and I think it would be a good thing to try to find. I did not save a copy of it, to the best of my memory.

Q: It would be helpful if we knew the name. Was it called the task force?

IHRIG: I think if you ask for the Leo Wertz report, it would come up.

Q: This is a good identification for the file.

IHRIG: Phil Habib, who is now gone, was the DCM under Lodge. Then, later on, he was back at State when we were getting ready to go. When we came back, we reported to him. That was good fun because he is certainly a tremendous guy. There we went. We went over, we did the report, we printed the report bodily ourselves, and came home.

The next thing of any importance was when Mr. Willard Wertz called me up and got talking. He said, "What's the matter with this office? It doesn't seem to be doing anything. Everything is cranking but I don't see any end. I want to find out some things." This is sort of like our friend who wrote the book, *One Day in the Life of Jim Hoover*, because I wasn't assigned to be very much but the secretary. Wertz said, "I am going to

send you as if you were a foreign labor attaché to some city in America and let you spend ten days there looking at our programs from the outside. Then I want you to make a report that goes directly to me." That I did in all the exuberance of somebody that has nobody but one boss up there. I did, and the Blacks wanted me to give up that and stay in Philadelphia. I was originally going to go to Cleveland but then the secretary seemed to think that things were much too rough and he might have a widow on his hands. It was Philadelphia. I thought it was a very good experience, and he liked it.

Didn't we talk about my going to Sweden initially during lunch?

Q: It was during lunch, so we'll have to cover it here. But let me ask you about Wertz' sending you to Philadelphia. Was that at the time when he was having problems with respect to the Black involvement in the Philadelphia plan? Does that strike a chord?

IHRIG: Well, there was not a Phil Sullivan but a Leon Sullivan up there.

Q: You said the Blacks wanted you to stay there. Why was that?

IHRIG: It wasn't Sullivan, it was somebody else. I stayed at a hotel downtown. There was a subway station in that hotel. I went up and spent all day with whomever had been assigned to me, obviously Black, and we did all sorts of things. I wrote a report thereon but I didn't keep a copy of that either because it went directly to the Secretary. It was an analysis of what somebody from the outside thought of various labor programs and how they took care of the problems or didn't in Black Philadelphia. It was the Black guys that I worked with every day who had a farewell luncheon for me that was strictly a Black kind of luncheon. This fellow says, "I have ulcers. So you know what I do for ulcers? I drink my scotch with milk. That's what I recommend that you do." I haven't needed to yet but they wanted to know what Foreign Service people did and what I did and all that. They didn't so much want to do what I was doing as they wanted me to come in and do what they were doing. They didn't think they were doing enough, and they thought more connections would make a tighter networking.

Q: The burden of your report with Wertz, though, had nothing to do with the work of labor attachés abroad using the concept of a foreigner coming in. Did you get any inkling as to what Wertz did with that report?

IHRIG: No. Not at all, except he liked it to the point that he sent me to Sweden.

Q: Do you mind if I ask Bill Wertz, whom I talk to occasionally, about this and what he thought?

IHRIG: Yes, that's fine. Tell him hello. He and I shared sort of an amazement of office labor affairs. Everybody was very busy.

Q: He didn't get a feeling for it?

IHRIG: Yes.

Q: In a personal sense, I'll give you my analysis of it some other time. But, roughly, my feeling stemmed from the whole concept of doing something as amorphous as international work as against his training as a lawyer where you had a case and a brief and a decision and that sort of thing. He felt a little uncomfortable with things that could not be put in the context of specific problems, specific solutions, specific arguments, specific appeals, and things like that.

IHRIG: Spending my time wisely as I was in the Department of Labor, I was trying to determine where to go for on the next assignment and what I should be compelled to do. There was a really interesting regional labor job for the Mekong area quartered in Bangkok. I don't know how it started but I know how I developed it.

Q: The Mekong area of Vietnam?

IHRIG: The Mekong area in a broader sense is Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Obviously, at that time since we were losing the war, there was no opportunity for dependents there. It was decided that I would go for six months, and my family would come to Bangkok. I would settle them in and go to Vietnam where I would be under the embassy in Vietnam to work on Mekong Valley manpower problems, amorphous, yes? At the end of six months in Vietnam, I would go on a regional job out of the American Embassy in Thailand. That was what I was hoping to do, and I think it was going along very well when I was called to say that I was going to Stockholm. I think this was a result of a talk with the Secretary and that George Meany didn't think it was important to have a labor attaché there, or he'd rather not have one there in whatever context. He said that he didn't have anyone that he could spare for there.

Q: Was there anybody there at the time so far as you know?

IHRIG: Yes. Kalkenan was there and was going. In fact, I think Kalkenan had gone, and he wanted me to take that position. Since George Meany had his call, he would not say he didn't want anyone there. He only said he didn't have anyone to send.

Q: That's an interesting comment in light of the fact that he doesn't send people; it's the State Department that does.

IHRIG: True, but one gets the impression at one stage of the game. I was from abroad and loved being abroad and didn't want to really get into this...

Q: ...morass...

IHRIG: ...well, this context anyway. So, I don't know whether George Meany was told directly by Wertz or whether it all went through. I have a feeling it went from Wertz to the personnel people in the State Department. "Who is this guy, Ihrig, we don't ____. If a cabinet officer wants him to go to Sweden, for heaven's sakes, we want him to go to

Sweden."

Q: Was the assistant secretary Weaver involved in this at all?

IHRIG: I don't know.

Q: He was on the outs for a while with Meany.

IHRIG: It could have been. I don't think we talked about it. So, it was something like the 3rd of January or the 8th of January 1968, when I–and the State Department being very kind--my father, my wife, three of my five children, and one small dachshund took off to Sweden. The life in the Foreign Service is sort of behind all of this. I'm sure that all of them are talking. Anyway, there I was in Heathrow, and we were in route. We could not enter outside of the castled area of Heathrow.

Q: Was that because of the dog?

IHRIG: No, we were just en route so we didn't go through customs or anything but it was also because of the dog. The dog was a very small dachshund.

Q: They didn't want to let him in the country because of quarantine, right?

IHRIG: No, but at one point we looked down from our cage and the dog was being walked across by a stewardess from Pan American to Swedish Airlines. Behind it was a man with a gun. That was 1968 and my twin girls were young enough that they went mad that the dog should be in such danger. Then we arrived and the dog did not arrive with us. Then, all hell broke. The political counselor was out to meet me, and there was a Swedish embassy employee. It's hard to call them local nationals because they are getting good pay, and they don't pay tax on the money they get from us. They are very lusty.

Q: Didn't they have a woman as the authoritative Foreign Service national there in Sweden? At one time they did.

IHRIG: Well, Kalkenan had one that he would have made that way. She was his secretary, contact, and everything.

Q: But you did not inherit her?

IHRIG: I inherited her for a short while, and she didn't like the idea. She was not getting the status that she was interested in. She was probably the one you heard about. That was a side point, really. She was there a while, then she was gone, and I got a very well-placed wife of a banker by the name of Martan, a Belgian who had come some years before to Sweden when it was a Third World nation. I had just about four years there.

Q: Did you have any language problem? Did they give you any language training?

IHRIG: They gave me no language at all.

Q: Did you find it difficult because of that?

IHRIG: Not at all. The head of the labor union at that time, the head of manpower, and manpower in Sweden is something that transcends. He had authority for what were in about twenty agencies in Washington, DC. He showed it to us.

Q: They refer to it as a labor market thing, which involved everything in the labor field.

IHRIG: Oh, yes. It includes retirement and everything. He was a fantastic guy. He was the head of all unions. The man was then a member of parliament also. The head of the union of white collar workers (ECO) was internationally involved all the time, and then the one that had the judges and army officers were both good at English. I can't remember what it was called but I'll show you a going away present I got from him. You couldn't really communicate except through an interpreter with the rank and file.

Q: Let's divert this, if you are willing, to the subject that comes up frequently, and that is the need for foreign language training. There are some posts in which there is no problem; India, for instance, where I was. There are 17 official languages but the only common language is English, so it is no problem.

IHRIG: Did you know how to "speeek" it?

Q: Yes. I got the accent. Then there are some posts in which it is absolutely necessary. Because of the underdeveloped character of the country, they don't have so many English speakers. Then there are some countries like Japan in which there is a disadvantage to a labor officer who doesn't know Japanese, like Silverberg who once complained to me that he got along wonderfully with the people who spoke English. With respect to the majority, however, he had to funnel everything he heard through Moriaso. Did you know Moriaso?

IHRIG: I knew Moriaso from the labor division in the early days. He was a young guy but Mariaso was in the embassy, I would have gotten rid of him if I could.

Q: That's what I heard, and I want to ask you some details on it because, generally, the feeling of people like Silverberg was there's a disadvantage in getting everything I hear from this man through one person because I don't know the nuances of his biases. Most of the people I heard made favorable comments on Moriaso. He got a big business job, but what are you willing to say on the record about the disadvantages of having him.

IHRIG: Well, the disadvantage of course is what we are talking about. The man that I had myself in 1947 and had until I got him in ILO for a short job is now back to heading all the baby powders and stuff for Japan. It's a huge operation, and he was their head of it. But I got him right away, and we had a real relationship. He was a friend. I got nuances from him, and I trusted him, and he trusted me, so we pushed him on to other things.

Moriaso stayed with the embassy, and he'd been there since 1947 or before, and here I was in 1975. It was a hell of a long time. His pay had come up as the relationship between the yen and the dollar had changed, but he was still basically doing what my young consultant was doing for me from 1947 to 1951. He didn't like it. People moved up, and his career was an aberration from the Japanese norm. He was behind everything and very teed off. He didn't go to staff meetings, and he wasn't recognized as the real American expert on Japan.

Q: From your point of view, would it be better to have people quite junior coming up and who can use that assignment as a basis for something in his indigenous surroundings rather than for the U.S. government? For instance, in Britain, we had a tradition of a couple of young people coming in there who felt it was not beneath them but they were on their way up. They had just gotten out of college and this was good experience for them. Do you think the U.S. should try to get these locals and keep them briefly?

IHRIG: Yes. I do. I really was trying to find just such a person. I was told that by the political counselor who had been an assistant labor attaché, Petrie. That's part of another story. We are talking about that part of Japan. Yes. I think it would be a great idea if they can recruit the right people. I was working with Sofia University to do that.

The political counselor then was not Petrie. Petrie had long gone as an assistant labor attaché and was the consul general in Okinawa. He was coming back as a political counselor after this guy. This guy said, "How do you feel about this guy?" I wish he weren't there but I had to have somebody, and I was getting just what Silverberg was getting. I was getting an emasculated version of what he saw in the paper because I couldn't even look at the Japanese paper and know what they thought was important.

Q: But you had some spoken Japanese.

IHRIG: Oh, I had it but it was no good for doing negotiations with the government or with labor unions. That was one of dear Moriaso's things. It worked out that the head of the metal workers Union in Japan or the secretary of that who had something in the international metal workers had somebody higher up there that wanted to have me to dinner but didn't speak English. They wanted two of us, and Moriaso said he didn't think he could come, and I said, "You'd better." And, he didn't. So, all we did was talk about kids because I could speak Japanese about families and all that sort of thing and have a laugh and drink sake but whatever he had come to ask me about never got asked. That's pretty heavy.

Q: We probably should get back to Sweden where we were before I had this off shoot about labor attachés and Foreign Service nationals, which is an important issue. I wanted to get your view on it.

IHRIG: Well, do you want a Foreign Service officer who ascends in various degrees up the ladder as a Foreign Service officer, or do you want one who spends two years of his life learning Swedish and another year learning Arabic? There's a choice there.

Q: Right. I understand that. Sure.

IHRIG: I understand it, too, and I mean that's the problem. I think the answer is what we were talking about and what Silverberg was probably talking about, until the Tokyo mafia and the ruling Foreign Service Officers of the establishment. It just looked like it would be entirely too much to tackle, and so I didn't tackle it. Sofia University had a graduate who at that time was a very famous writer and did talks for me and with me to the military on human relations between employers and employees in Japan. He was rather enthusiastic about getting this guy and saying, "That's the kind that you like." And it might work so that there would be a chain of these things going on. But Moriaso was cast in stone.

Q: Well, before we leave that let me mention one other name and that is Emerman. You raised the question about do you want to have a labor attaché who spends his time learning languages. The other alternative is, at least in cases where language is so important and the country is so important, selecting a person with Emerman's interest in India and having him go through a series of assignments in which you lose him to the labor field but the gain is to the embassy as a whole. Emerman struck me as, especially when he was working with Silverberg, an ideal person to have there, and we have so few people who devote their lives to Japan.

IHRIG: Yes, and he became a labor attaché later on, didn't he?

Q: Oh, he was assistant labor attaché, oh no, more than that.

IHRIG: No. I know he was an assistant to Silverberg.

Q: He became the labor attaché.

IHRIG: After me, I think.

Q: After you, he became a labor attaché then became the head of the political section, and then became the personal assistant to the ambassador who didn't know Hotson who was former Secretary of Labor who didn't know any Japanese and couldn't go into a meeting without Emerman because of Emerman's knowledge of the political context and his knowledge of the language, which everybody tells me was just perfect.

IHRIG: Well, that's it. I think probably what the Tokyo mafia–I can say that now because it wasn't mine. I just thought that Wakinshaw had a pretty interesting thing.

Q: Where was Wakinshaw at the time?

IHRIG: Wakinshaw had the Japan office in the Department of State.

Q: Backstop, I think. I interviewed him in Florida a couple of years ago. Okay, you were

in Sweden where you had no difficulty with the language, and I started asking you questions about employees. I wanted to raise another question, that is, one of your predecessors in Sweden was Oliver Peterson at a time when it was said with pride that you got two for one when you had...

IHRIG: Yes, you had Esther there.

Q: It is terrible nowadays. People think of that as being terrible because the wife is not supposed to be taken advantage of. But Esther was one of the old timers.

IHRIG: Nobody took advantage of her really.

Q: No, but the present context is that if a woman involves herself so much in her husband's job, she should get paid for it, if that's part of the job. According to Oliver Peterson, I think Esther may have agreed. I don't think I discussed this specifically with her. He did find that his language knowledge wasn't perfect, and people there used to tell me that Esther's was better because she got around the community more where there was less English knowledge. As you go deeper down in the society, is there a disadvantage in one of these countries where English is so common but the common people don't speak it.

IHRIG: Yes. That is something that I experienced, but not in Japan because I had to have a translator, though I could certainly get along with the people on ordinary things. Yes, in Sweden it was because all of the top of the employer's federation, of the manpower operation, of the trade union operation at the three levels of the blue collar, while collar, and professional all used beautiful English. There were no problems at all. But to get out and talk to a fellow at a local level, no.

Q: Well, what did your job consist of then. How would you describe it.

IHRIG: In Sweden, it was societal attaché. In other words, it had to do more with the society, not to do with social engagements. It took in all sorts of things because, again, we had a member of the Black Caucus, and two other congressmen over to Stockholm to see how the Swedes were doing the retirement system. There was everything that people want here now. It was one of the kinds of things that I think probably Willard Wertz wanted but Willard Wertz wasn't there anymore. I'm getting from the Swedes, who are trying to talk to the congressmen, a liberal education on what's going on there and how it functions. On the other hand, much less than in Japan or in Indonesia, I was talking to the Swedes about what's the American reaction to things. The one big problem while I was in Sweden was the U.S. and Vietnam. It was a problem, even a problem in families of the embassy. My son wanted to bring home a draft dodger for Thanksgiving. I had to say that I appreciated and approved of what he was saying but I couldn't do it.

Q: You mean one who had actually escaped from the United States?

IHRIG: Yes, there were a lot of these draft dodgers who came over there.

Q: Most of them were greeted very favorably and made heroes.

IHRIG: Oh, absolutely. There are some of the things that are very funny and sad but the point of it is that you are dealing with interpreting one country. Like I come in and ask, because the Department of Labor and the Department of State have asked, that everybody ask all the people going to ILO to go coach. Do you remember that?

Q: Yes.

IHRIG: I went in and here is a guy in a position to handle that particular question–this is like 1972 or something like that–who had been working with me in 1947-48-49 and who had gone to ILO himself. I think maybe he was still one of their main representatives. He just backs up and laughs. "You know before I say a word what it has to be. If I lived in New York, perhaps I would agree to go coach to Geneva. But I live in Tokyo, don't I?" So, that's the end of that. But there's a lot of that kind of thing. I was dealing with the American club on how they handle labor. The Americans could get along with the Swedes all right. There was no problem there.

Q: Well, in Sweden, you referred to the guy being societal, like the social affairs in the European sense, a job in which you were not trying to sell anything to him, you were covering him.

IHRIG: Yes. I was trying to learn about them, yes, and to report back to them on a wider context than it would be on just labor. I mean he was the social welfare cooperatives, all things like that.

Q: They were very strong on things. What about the health plan? Did you have any observations at that time?

IHRIG: No, I did not and don't have now.

Q: Were you covered by their health plan? No, you were covered by our own. I take it that you had four pleasant years there.

IHRIG: I had, yes. I used the long underwear that I bought before I was going to a tropic country instead. I never did get to Bangkok. Do you have any more questions about Japan?

Q: No, I have none at all except I want to go into some general questions after you finish telling me about when you retired, et cetera. Your last post abroad was Sweden.

IHRIG: Yes, that's what I'm going to talk about right now. It's coming time. Our time there was just about over. I was going to get a divorce. I made an appointment for Port Orchard, Washington, in the summer of 1971, and the guy who finally married Barbara happened to be the DCM at that post.

Q: Was Barbara your wife?

IHRIG: She was my wife, and I divorced her after that. The thing that has relevance is that a message came in from Bob Kinney in the Philippines. Bob Kinney wanted to get out of the Philippines badly.

Q: He had had enough of it, yes.

IHRIG: He had his ambassador in Manila wire my ambassador in Stockholm and say that he's contacting Washington but he needed Ihrig to go there, so they should go in April instead of the end of June and take home leave later on because this was very important

Q: You were coming to the decision about retirement.

IHRIG: No, we're not coming to the decision about retirement, we are coming to the decision about where my next post would be from Stockholm. It's the spring, and the ambassador from Manila has sent an "eyes only," that everybody in the damned place saw before I did, that I should bring my family and come directly in March and take home leave at a later time.

Q: Had the decision been made that you were going to go there, or you didn't know about it?

IHRIG: I didn't know about it at all. I wasn't too happy about it. I was thinking about going back to Japan but the point is I was also getting a divorce in the summertime and, therefore, I could not make their time schedule. (The DCM who is still a good friend of mine and who later married Barbara lives down in Oregon. Our wife is now dead.) The urgent message came in from the ambassador in Manila, and it was quite obvious that I couldn't make the time even if I could make the place. So I asked our ambassador to decline and inform State and you people. I think part of that was another "eyes only" message that Barbara and I were going to divorce and that got around to everybody because it was part of the reason for refusing the assignment. It was very embarrassing and, of course, doubly embarrassing for the Deputy Chief of Mission because his administration is his responsibility, and this was getting right into his backyard. I didn't say who it was going to be but everybody knew who it was going to be.

I stayed in Stockholm until June, and we came back and I split with my family, having done the necessary talking to the kids. We decided that it would be better for them to stay with their mom for at least the first year. Then I drove out west because I had orders for Manila then. Before going out west, I didn't mention that I saw Marshall Green, one of my ambassadors in Indonesia and a very good friend in Washington. I told him that it seemed to me that I wouldn't be any better than anybody else in Manila.

Q: Whereas you would be much better than anybody else.

IHRIG: No, I'd be the second best in Japan. Petrie would be the best because he has that

level of Japanese, too, that he can do intergovernmental stuff. Both he and I knew that Petrie who was, I think, in Okinawa as a consul general was going to be picked up as a political counselor in Tokyo. He did get it about a year later and, therefore, it seemed to me that even though I have only a two-level in Japanese, I've lived in Japan for 12 years and I have a spirit of "kimoche" as the Japanese would say. I think that Marshall, at that point in time, felt that he was going to be the ambassador to Japan, and so he just arranged for me to go. Sam Justice said, "Who do you know, what happened here?" I said, "I don't know. I just told them I thought I'd be better in Japan."

First, before Sam Justice made that statement, I went out of here. I stayed in an apartment in Winslow. I had my kids with me and all that. I bought a car and had it shipped to Manila and had my household goods shipped to Manila.

Then I got a phone call from Sam Justice telling me that I wasn't going to Manila. Anyone going to Manila didn't need a briefing but, if I was going to Japan, I had to come back to Washington for a briefing. I got back east to Washington, DC, for a briefing back there, and it was a kind of nose-out-of-joint briefing. Anyway it was not very nice, but I felt that I was going home and thought it was the right thing to do.

I was just about ready to do something when the ambassador in Stockholm wires the Department and says that there's going to be a big labor conference in Stockholm in like eight weeks or something like that. He felts that Wakinshaw was too new, and I needed to go back there. The administrative officer calls me up and says, "You know, you don't get per diem when you're back there because you really haven't left from my point of view." So I went and there were lots of American labor people there. It was a very good conference but it wasn't anything dashing. I was able to introduce Wakinshaw to people I'd been unable to before.

Then I went around the world from there to Bangkok where my stepson was with his wife and spent a day with them and went on up to Hong Kong and then to Tokyo. I was met by a junior officer and a language speaker, you know, from the political section and dumped into a house that didn't have any furnishings. It had been my predecessor's. Who was my predecessor? This is 1971 we are talking about.

Q: I don't remember.

IHRIG: I don't remember either, and I should. Anyway, it had been his house, and he had a large family in it and entertained a lot, and there I was. I established myself there and moved up into the three-bedroom apartment in the now-defunct Drew House. Okay, so there I am in Japan.

Q: Were you there as the labor attaché?

IHRIG: I was the labor attaché, and the local army command demands that I come out to be briefed. My assistant–he took my job and has been there 1957 to 1971–was very nice and did a splendid job. I would have said it just about the same way. In fact, I think I

have said it about the same way. Then, a guy, who was an officer who had been a lieutenant colonel and I had known in this context of the use of labor and the Japanese government and all that back in the fifties, comes in as a two-star general, and he is the head of something in Zama of the army. He takes over the relationship between the military and the embassy, so he comes in or I go out there. I have all sorts of help to help them. I've got a helicopter to take me from Tokyo. I go to a heliport not too far from the embassy and then go down to Zama and then I'm taken back at the end of the day.

Q: What is Zama?

IHRIG: Zama is the army headquarters. Yokosuka is the navy headquarters, and now Yokota is the air force. If they wanted something from the embassy, I was their contact now. I was up there. It was a lot of fun, and it was very good because they came through with some things, which is something-- I guess the first year I was there-- that they didn't give to me at all at the embassy. So the general and I had lunch down at the Sano, and we said, "Look, you agree to this. This is right. I agree that it is right, and my people want it. What do we do? I guess we either have a first-class feud, or...," and although that guy was not part of the Tokyo mafia, he was close enough to it. He was the fellow who was largely in charge of the negotiation of the return of Okinawa and a great guy. He didn't see why that had to be done. "Why do it? If you read it, approve it, you have some responsibility for it, you know." I don't think he wanted to take that responsibility. We waited until he left, and they presented it again. They sent it to me, and it passed.

Q: Did you get as much trade union relationship work in this second tour in Japan as a labor attaché?

IHRIG: Well, I only met the head of Soyo who is the one I said had the armed forces union before. I dealt with the Mayo metal workers.

Q: Do you mean Domay?

IHRIG: Yes, I do, and that very articulate head of them in those days..

That brings me to a very interesting little statement. That guy, I've forgotten his name but I've received Christmas cards from their union for years, called me about the 28th of December, and you know what happens in Japan. It just dissolves.

Q: It disappears.

IHRIG: You've got a five-day holiday.

Q: Oh, is it only five days?

IHRIG: It is from Christmas until the 4th of January now. The Christmas part, they blame us for. Anyhow the call came, and he says, "I don't know whether I know you this well but I think I do. I've got a problem." I said, "I think you know me well enough. What's

your problem?" "Well, they've got this fellow David Burgess. David Burgess was working for UNICEF, I guess, and he had landed in Tokyo for Christmas-New Years, the New Years part anyway. He jumped into this guy's pocket, and this guy wanted to get him out of his pocket and, therefore, maybe into mine. The fellow had a hotel but I took him on New Year's Day.

Q: Did you know David Burgess before?

IHRIG: I had known him before and had a lot of respect for David Burgess but I'm not sure I have so much now. He borrowed a book about the attempted coup uprising in Jakarta from me that I had written pages into and around and edited, and I have never gotten it back nor have I ever heard from Burgess and I have written to him over the years. That's beside the point. At any rate the union knew me well enough to say, "Take him off our hands." I met Burgess and his family while he was doing something for AID in Indonesia when I was there. He was there, and his family considered him something of a wild hare. When they were having all this trouble in Kuala Lumpur because they were getting their sovereignty, he was involved in that somehow because he had spent time in...

Q: ICF union...

IHRIG: Yes, in the early days, and he asked the embassy to send me over for those celebrations. While I was over and the celebrations were going on, the Indonesians burned the British embassy. David Burgess was running around, and his wife and his kids were down at my house because they weren't sure where he was. It was not a time when you should be away from your families, and he was running around like the ardent reporter and analyst and consultant that he is. When I came back, I said, "You had to go, Herb, but David didn't." That gives you some kind of feeling about the kinds of things that were going on there. One guy was assassinated. It was right across the street from me: I heard the shots and sneaked out of the house and heard double time running down the street, and I would say the house was maybe ten feet farther away than that house is from me now. I'm not sure whether he was running around then, but I think he was.

Q: He's a great one for getting involved. He's a minister down in California now. He settled down.

IHRIG: Oh, good for him.

Q: I want to go over a number of specific issues. But, you still haven't retired. You're in Japan. How long did you stay there?

IHRIG: I stayed in Japan from November of 1971 to June 30 of 1975. On 6 July I became 60 years old and retired.

Q: I'm sorry. I thought that Denmark was the last but I realize now that you were an active labor attaché twice in Japan, the second time for a period of almost four years.

IHRIG: I was a labor attaché only once in Japan. The other time I was an international labor consultant and labor relations consultant after a while before I was ready for the military. Then, four years in Hawaii at which time I was still working for who was then the commander, still working on indigenous labor, local national problems and then Jakarta, United States for 15 months, Sweden, and then Tokyo again.

Q: You retired and, since then, you haven't been doing any labor work, right?

IHRIG: I have been doing no labor work at all. I have been studiously avoiding anything that seemed like foreign service stuff.

Q: Until I came!

IHRIG: No. Somebody came ahead of time. There is something I do want to call your attention to but a representative from the Department of Labor got permission through the security of records and all that sort of thing which sometimes makes it difficult to find people and called me from Washington and wanted to come out and talk to me. I said, "Certainly," and he came out and he was studying something. I think he was retired. But I don't know, and I can find his name. I've got a log because I was not just sitting around during those years. I had something like 1,610 different kids staying overnight at my place, something like 10,000-15,000 visits. I was running an outreach for a social service agency here. I'm still doing some computer work for two of them as a volunteer. The point of the story is, what is the point of the story, Herb?

Q: That you've been active. But this fellow came over and he was doing a study.

IHRIG: He was doing a study, or he was trying to get source material for a study. The fact of the matter is that I had a Ted Cohen article written in English for some Foreign Service thing on Japan about the way the SCAP labor policy impacted upon Japanese government labor policy. He borrowed it, and he was going to return it through a Labor Department man who happened to live on Bainbridge Island and worked in Seattle and who died very shortly thereafter without returning it to me.

Q: What is the name of this fellow. I am trying to place him.

IHRIG: Well, I don't remember the name but, as I say, in those days I was keeping logs. He wasn't too smart because he wanted to know how to get here, and I said I would meet him. He took the ferry boat to Winslow, and I met him. Then, I took him to dinner and I sent him back. The next day I was driving down the same road we came up, and there's this fellow wandering around. It looks like it; it must be. It was him. He said, "I took the ferry to Winslow yesterday. I thought I'd see Bainbridge Island today." The point is, he was not too alert, it seemed to me, but I do have records. I want to do that because I'd just as soon have you find out, and I think you need to get it because I think it's very important.

Q: I'd like to and perhaps I can call you in a few weeks and find out if you found it.

IHRIG: Yes, you can call me in less time than that. I'll wait until I have nothing to do in the late afternoon.

Q: Let me ask you a couple of these general questions, and then I think we'll be finished. Is there anything you'd like to say about any personal reactions to the whole period of McCarthyism?

IHRIG: I had none at all. I was in Tokyo. McCarthy was sometime in the 1950s, right?

Q: Right.

IHRIG: It was early 1950s I think. Remember from 1945 until 1957, I was in Japan most of the time. I would come over here for vacations.

Q: Well, what I am saying is, plenty of people were in that sort of position and they were away and all that but as a result of any college activities you, personally, didn't have any problem?

IHRIG: Oh, oh, oh, the only thing like that was there was a fellow who was in my class in Broadway High School, 1932. Before and early during the War, the FBI or army intelligence, it sounded more like army intelligence, went to my folks and went to some other of my high school colleagues to find out whether I was a close friend of his. I wasn't.

Q: Well, you haven't had any experience of McCarthyism.

IHRIG: No. I haven't.

Q: You were fortunate. Do you have any comments on the sort of training or briefing that's good for a prospective labor attaché: university, Labor Department, trade union, a mix of all of them?

IHRIG: Yes. A mix of all of them are useful. We are talking about the fact that there are all sorts of people who become labor attachés. One important point is that I made a lateral entry into Foreign Service and then became a regular Foreign Service officer. With me, they recognized the labor situation, and they took in, to a degree, the manpower part of it. They gave me a wonderful re-orientation as far as Japan was concerned. I got a splendid one. It wasn't at FSI but it was under their aegis, I think, for Southeast Asia and Indonesia. It was essential.

Q: You did not have a labor background in the United States. You didn't study labor; you studied general economics. Was there anything more about labor that you should have known, assuming 20-20 hindsight?

IHRIG: Well, yes. Remember, even in Japan as a labor attaché, I was spending a good amount of my time in U.S. forces labor problems with their local nationals.

Q: You got your training, really, on the ground. Right?

IHRIG: Yes. It would have helped me in my own life to have gotten something in labor relations before I went out to it, yes. But I don't think that you people from the labor movement actually are going to say that you could have a course and teach the philosophy. In a course like that, you are just saying the philosophy and it means something to you but you don't know whether it's going to mean anything to the person or not. There's a small guy who used to work for the railroad workers, very small, very intense. Now he is working for international metalworkers or something like that.

Q: Reb Han?

IHRIG: No, it wasn't. I would remember.

Q: He was with the Metalworkers' Union. Bernstein?

IHRIG: What's his first name?

Q: Meyer Bernstein.

IHRIG: That's it.

Q: He was a great friend of mine, very intense. By the way, he drowned a few years ago in Miami while swimming.

IHRIG: Oh, dear.

Q: Wonderful guy.

IHRIG: Well, Meyer Bernstein wanted to go up to talk up to talk to Dr. Cusna, the head of the Socialist Party labor union. In fact, I guess he was. He was a rich man.

Q: In Indonesia?

IHRIG: Yes.

Q: I knew him. He passed through Paris one time. Yes, he was a rich guy who was sort of sponsored by the U.S. government for a trip to the United States. Whatever happened to him?

IHRIG: I don't know but he was terribly rich and Bernstein was working for the Railroad Workers Union.

Q: Never. It was the Steel Workers.

IHRIG: The Steel Workers, all right.

Q: But he was very involved with the Metal Workers. He was assistant secretary of the Metal Workers.

IHRIG: All right that's it. When I first read about the Indonesian labor scene, I thought, "Gosh, we've got to put our money with the Socialist ones because the other ones are so..."But these guys seemed to be able to talk to both people. Then I found it was only because they gave good dinners. The point I was making is that Meyer-- my son, was with me as an early teenager, and he was just driving us crazy. I was about ready to blast--

Q: You mentioned Meyer's intenseness.

IHRIG: Yes.

Q: It was total involvement.

IHRIG: It was involvement with what he was involved with. When he turned around and we were driving back, my kid was wondering when I was going to blow it because it was pretty heavy. He said, "You know, I really learned something on this trip." Fasten your seat belt, Herb. "What's that, Meyer?" "Good labor attachés don't have to come from the labor movement." Humility Herb. I don't know. What's Kalkonan's labor background?

Q: I don't know.

IHRIG: I don't know either but it's how people react to people. It's as simple as, "This is the assignment. What do I need to know to do it? If I have to go do it now, I'll try." That's what I said to the senior interviewer in the United States Employment Service office in Mount Vernon, Washington. They were looking for me to become director of labor when Ted Cohen left. Thank God I didn't get that assignment because I didn't know enough.

Q: Let me ask you a couple of other questions. Just to finish up on that, in effect, there's a training program going on right now of eight weeks in the Labor Department at the State Department at the FSI, a course that I used to give until 1988. I was talking to the man who's doing it now. How much do they have to know about labor history? In the current situation, how necessary is it? How were you disadvantaged by not knowing the details of American labor history when you got a job as labor attaché in "X" country?

IHRIG: I think very little, unless you have representatives from those unions coming over, and then it is wise to know.

Q: Let me ask you a couple of other questions about your relationships within the

embassies as a labor attaché. I guess within the American government, you had already covered it with Japan when you were with the Occupation and afterwards. But with respect to the status of the labor attaché in an embassy, were you a member of the Country Team? Is that a vital part of it? Was it a necessary condition?

IHRIG: I don't believe I was a member of the Country Team but in Indonesia I was into everything. I was somebody who got kicked out and all of a sudden I was doing negotiations and returning generators and heavy equipment. They wanted me to transfer to administration, and they said, "You got a great career there." but I didn't want it, except I would help them then, and I did. Indonesia, it was a straight family situation. It was super. In Stockholm, it was a colder embassy but I was in everything.

Q: What you are saying is that the relationship through a Country Team, per se, is less important than the ability to be involved in anything that's relevant to your work whether you are on the Country Team or not.

IHRIG: Yes. The ability to be in either the background inclinations or brains to be.

Q: Any comments on the use of USIA to help you with visitors or to send people on grants to the States, etc?

IHRIG: Well, yes. They are a help when you have people with a union you are interested in or you want to be more interested in. When you want to increase your contacts, a trip to the United States is a very excellent way whether you pay for it or anybody pays for it. I don't know. I have rather dichotomous feelings about USIS and USIA. Some of the people are good and some of the people are so PR that it's embarrassing.

Q: What about the use of academics who are there in the country on grants, can you use them at all?

IHRIG: Well, we can take care of the ones that want to use us. But, yes. Very definitely, yes. I will say that this fellow at Sofia University who has written four or five books...

Q: What's his name, Bellow?

IHRIG: Yes, it's something like that. He is Belgian.

Q: I met him. I was very impressed.

IHRIG: Oh, yes, he's a Jesuit. So I go down to Indonesia and all my guys at the embassy are talking politics, like politics of who's going to be doing what, I mean current politics, not how we got that way but where do we go. How can we be right? So, I ended up with three Dutch Jesuits. One of them was actually German but he'd lived in Ireland for seven years so he was very precise like a German is most of the time, but sometimes he would start talking with a brogue. These people made their careers in culture and they were sharp people, probably sharper than I. They were great because you needed to know

something about the culture and the way the culture was developing and the way the culture worked on people and they had the knowledge. In Indonesia learning about the regular law is one thing, something called Adat law, which can be different in different neighborhoods much less counties. That has a terrific bearing on how people think, how people relate, how people relate to foreigners, how people relate to other countries, things that we should really know a lot more about than we do. I also would say that any time that there's somebody that has a hint of a cooperative, the labor attaché gets it. In both Indonesia and Stockholm, if I'd had the time it would have been terrific and I would have been able to interpret to America more in depth the country where I was stationed than I was.

Q: The Jesuits presented problems in India where I served and found them very useful for training trade unionists and they had wonderful training programs. The government is suspicious of them in terms of the allegations that they try to proselytize and get the good Hindus and Sikhs to become Catholics. I find no evidence of that, and as far as I know it's only propaganda because they are a force within the state who have an allegiance outside, not to the Americans but to Rome. That's why they are suspicious but I found no evidence of that, did you?

IHRIG: No. There were two Spanish Roman Catholic priests on Pohnpei, the island that I was commanding officer of. According to the chit chat from the natives (The natives could speak about the same kind of Japanese that I could), Japan had been there since the end of World War I. They took over from Germany who took over from Spain. All right. The point of the story is that the Jesuits on there and the islanders who were either talking to me in English or they were talking to me in Japanese and we were speaking the same kind of, you know, we don't know the word, we work on it. They said that they were partly Roman and partly Protestant. The Romans ...they sent their 12 year-old girls to be de-flowered by the priests because that was quite a holy thing to do. They had an Irish priest from New Jersey or someplace like that who was absolutely wonderful, O'Brien. Again, he was sitting there learning in depth about the culture of the people, what buttons got what reactions, and that's something that I feel as a labor attaché is something important because nobody else has talked about it. USIA, uh uh. They are not getting into it. AID, heavens no. It's not their business.

Q: Of course, USAID gave a whole lot of money to the Jesuits for the creation of labor schools in India.

IHRIG: Wow. Fine.

End of interview