

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

DAVID T. JONES

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is March 16, 1999. This is an interview with David T. Jones. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Let's begin at the beginning. Could you tell me when and where you were born and something about your family?

JONES: Okay. I was born on December 22, 1941, in Scranton, Pennsylvania. My parents were Scrantonians. My entire background in that regard was Northeast Pennsylvania, the United States, back to colonial times. My father was an architect, and an industrial designer. He graduated from the University of Pennsylvania. My mother was a dietician and a housewife. She graduated from Pratt Institute in New York City, NY. I was educated in the public school system in Scranton. I went to the University of Pennsylvania and graduated in 1963 with a degree in political science.

Q: I'll move you back a bit. Where did you go to grammar school?

JONES: I walked to grammar school. The school was the school that my mother and my uncle had attended: Alexander Hamilton #19 school in Scranton. Scranton, in that era, was a dying anthracite coal town. For a century, they had dug anthracite coal out of the Lackawanna Valley. When they had dug all the coal out of the Lackawanna Valley, Scranton just shriveled up, like most natural resource town. A town that had been 140,000 people in the 1940s when I was born and during World War II steadily went downhill. Right now, they say that the principal industry in Scranton is Social Security. The population is about 80,000.

Q: What classes were most interesting to you?

JONES: I was really interested in just about everything. I was, however, particularly interested in history. There wasn't a concept for me of "political science" or "international relations." These disciplines didn't exist. On the other hand, the very first thing that I remember being interested in on an international relations format was the Korean War. I was perhaps eight and a half when the war started in 1950. I followed it very closely in the daily newspapers and in Time magazine. One of my father's little stories about me was that during the Korean War when I was about nine years old, somebody asked, "Well, what do you think should be done about the war?" I piped up and said, "I like MacArthur's views on the subject!" All of a sudden, that ended the discussion of the Korean War, and it went on from there. I don't remember this instance, but there were those that thought I was saying too much already.

Q: When you got to high school, did you concentrate in certain areas?

JONES: At that point, my major interests were science and chemistry. So many of us at that era were particularly focused on what was happening in those fields because of “sputnik” and what this meant for East-West struggles. One of the things that most interested me at that point was science. I was academically equally strong at that point in both sciences and in history and social studies. Actually, I graduated first in both the science and history curriculums at the Central High School, which was the college preparatory high school for the Scranton area.

Q: Were you thinking about what you were going to get to?

JONES: Yes. My interests at that point were in science. That was the direction in which I was headed academically and personally. This was what I was most interested in studying professionally at the time. At the same time, I read an enormous amount of history – Civil War history, World War II history, a wide range of military history.

Q: Did service abroad strike you as being interesting at that time or did that come later?

JONES: No, I wouldn’t say I had any special interest in service abroad. Although my parents were really quite educated for the time – at university level – they were not traveled. Neither one of them had been further outside the United States than to Canada. I did not have other relatives who had traveled widely, although this was also a very highly educated family, certainly for the day and the era. I didn’t really think of “Let’s go to Europe or anywhere else.” My personal horizons really until I went to college were pretty limited. I don’t think I had traveled further south than Washington, DC, by the time I was a senior in high school or further north than a brief trip to Canada in the same period of time. I had been as far west as Pittsburgh. This is a pretty limited circumstance geographically. I think of it in comparison to the life that my children have led or for that matter the life that my wife has led. But academically, my interests were almost between pages of books. This was also not even a period when there was a lot of television available – at least in my family which didn’t have television until I was about 12 years old.

Q: You were in high school from when to when?

JONES: ’55 to ’59. My family came a little bit late to television. We didn’t have a television set until ’54, something like that. I was always sort of dismissive of television except for a handful of shows.

Q: Milton Berle, of course.

JONES: I never saw Milton Berle. It doesn’t register at all. I saw a little bit of Sid Cesar. I saw a little bit of “This is Your Hit Parade.” I did enjoy almost all of the episodes of “Victory at Sea.”

Q: This was the U.S. Navy.

JONES: Yes. There were follow-on aspects of U.S. Air Force. It was real footage, something that was very different. That tied in very tightly with my interest in military history. So, I saw a fair amount of that and did that kind of reading and watching.

Q: Did you get down to Gettysburg?

JONES: Yes. And to Valley Forge as a boy. I had studied the Gettysburg battle as part of my Civil War history reading. I may have seen some of the fortifications around the Philadelphia area. I also was very interested in the Kenneth Roberts books. Rabble in Arms. Oliver Wiswell. Oliver Wiswell was very interesting for a lot of different reasons.

Q: For me it was a seminal book because it was the first time I got the view... This was written from the point of view of a loyalist. It was the first time I thought, "Gee, there is another side."

JONES: There is another side. I had not thought about that. The first time that I had seen anything positive ever written about Benedict Arnold was Arundel and Rabble in Arms. On my trip to Canada with my father, we partially retraced the route up the Kennebec River. We got to Quebec City. The interests were often military history, historical. My dad, when the family sat around the table, we talked history.

Q: While you were doing this, was McCarthy a topic? This really hit a lot of people.

JONES: It was interesting. I probably at least so far as the reading of what he was trying to do – and I'm eight or nine years old – I think I might have had some innate sympathy for him until my father made a point to me. He said, "Well, what McCarthy is saying is that he can stand around and belabor Bill Jones (my dad's name) and then beat him about the head and shoulders and when I'm proved innocent, all McCarthy does is turn around and say, 'Oh, it was really his brother, Dave Jones (my uncle).'" That immediately gave me a visceral illustration of just how unfair in little boy terms McCarthy was being. That was a very pointed way to make the illustration of what McCarthy was actually directed at.

Q: You went to the University of Pennsylvania from '59- '63.

JONES: Yes. Then I stayed another year and got a master's and came back and worked on a Ph.D.

Q: At the University of Pennsylvania... This was '59. Was it politically active or did you kind of go there, get your degree, and leave?

JONES: You recall that this was my father's school. It was also my uncle's school, who had been there 10 years earlier. So, to a degree, I felt proud of going to the same university that my father and my uncle had gone to. Initially, I was trying to be a chemist.

I was seeking a bachelor's of science in chemistry. I found I just wasn't going to be a chemist. I just couldn't do the work. I might have found myself, if I had graduated, capable of being only a rather bad chemist. I went on looking over what I was going to do if I was not going to be a chemist. I found not too much to my surprise that the other thing that I had always been interested in, history, was also available and available with people and professors who were brilliant and able to elucidate their points in a manner in which no high school teacher had ever been able to do. At the same time, I looked at the circumstances and felt that being a history major was a dead end. I thought that history would lead you to be a history teacher or, as one of my fraternity brothers had done, go out and be selling soap for Proctor and Gamble. So, I entered political science instead. I found that this was a far better intellectual fit for me than otherwise had been the case. I found a number of professors, including a former Foreign Service officer by the name of John Melby.

Q: I interviewed him about two years before he died.

JONES: I made arrangements to try to see him while I was in Canada and he died before I was able to get to see him. It's just far enough away from Ottawa that I was trying to arrange it while going to Toronto and I just didn't make it. I had great respect for him and found him to be a fascinating man. At the same time, another professor there, Robert Strausz-Hupé, was for me a seminal influence. Strausz-Hupé had in rigorous and structured form the inchoate ideas that I was feeling when I was in my late teens and early 20s. His personal influence on me intellectually was really quite substantial.

The university at the time had less of the Berkeley feel that Berkeley had. I never was at Berkeley, certainly not at that time. But the University of Pennsylvania was a much more conservative operation. Whether it was more conservative partly because of the Wharton School influence or not, I'm not quite sure. But there was some ferment on campus directed against a couple of professors and an institution that had done some military contracting. There was not the kind of sympathy on the Penn campus for protest or use of marijuana or things of that nature.

Q: This also came a little later, didn't it?

JONES: A little later, but again, to a degree, I sort of bracketed all of these timeframes. I was at Penn from '59 to '64. Then I was in the military for a couple of years. I came back from '66 to '68. Then I was back for another year from '71 to '72. One of the other influences that I also have to make clear early on is that I spent a lot of time in one way or another with the military. I elected to go into ROTC. A proposal made to me by my father and a couple of his friends who indicated that it was much more pleasant to serve on active duty as an officer than an enlisted man, and looking at the circumstances associated with the draft, no reasonable individual could bet that they were going to be able to avoid the draft. You looked at it, and the statistics were simply that as an able bodied young man, you were likely to serve a couple of years in the military. My father had never served in the military. The judgment, reluctantly on my part rather than enthusiastically,

was that I would be better off going through ROTC and taking a commission and working at that level. The results over a lifetime were extremely positive.

Q: Which ROTC was this?

JONES: Army ROTC. I wouldn't have qualified for any other program. I wore glasses. The Navy at that juncture wouldn't permit anybody in without 20/20 vision. Penn did not have an Air Force ROTC program.

Q: What about Strausz-Hupé? He's still alive and apparently still rather busy. You were going up to interview him.

JONES: I saw him on Friday.

Q: He was ambassador more times than not. He was ambassador how many times?

JONES: He was ambassador starting in about 1969 to Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) and following that to Belgium. Then to Stockholm. Then back to NATO. He was dismissed as a political appointee when Carter won. As a result, he left his first round of diplomatic assignments in roughly April of '77. But after Reagan was elected, he was brought back and served in Turkey for about eight years.

Q: We're talking about when you were a student. What were you getting from him? What was he teaching? Did he have an approach?

JONES: Yes, essentially he looked upon and evaluated international relations and foreign policy on the basis of power and national interest. His basic international relations course went through the elements of power and national power and worked on discussing what was really national interest. He used his own textbook and also a textbook by Hans Morgenthau. They were both very standard pieces of work. At the same time, he had released a book that in my generation quite a number of people either read or were influenced by it indirectly, The Protracted Conflict. This was a judgment that our efforts to deal with the Soviet Union were going to take a very long time, that it was going to be a struggle in time as well as in space and that we had to gear ourselves for a confrontation that was going to last for a very extended period of time. People have translated that into saying either that Strausz-Hupé hated the Russians or was a Cold Warrior. There was shorthand commentary of that nature, which I personally think is incorrect. Strausz-Hupé had not the slightest interest in war. He just simply had a very high regard for freedom and independence and felt that these could best be preserved by a close association between the United States and Europe, which were the twin pillars of his own life. He worked as a consequence much of his life to develop both of these areas and to link the United States and Europe as closely as possible.

Q: What was his background?

JONES: He was born in Austria. He was young enough to have missed the “Great War.” He came to the United States in his early 20s along with another young man for whom I think he was sort of half-guardian. He wrote all of this in an outstanding autobiography called In My Time. Then he spent a little while doing odd things like being a picture framer in the basement of Marshall Fields in Chicago. Then he moved slowly into investment banking and managed to make a success out of this, I think in New York, but certainly in Philadelphia. About 1925, he married a woman who already had children. I think she was divorced. She was an heiress from a man who had very substantial railroad money. They bought a farm on the outskirts of Philadelphia, a home that he said he’s owned for 70 years. It’s an old farmhouse that’s slowly been reconstructed over the decades. Little by little, he became more engaged in teaching, instruction, and study at the University of Pennsylvania, where I think he got his doctorate about 1940. Then he became a lecturer there. He ran part of a strategic intelligence group at the University of Pennsylvania during the war. Again, as things slowly developed after the war and throughout the rest of his academic time at Penn, he became one of the major founders for the discipline of international relations. He provided a good deal of the intellectual structure for foreign affairs purposes for many of the American conservatives. In this regard, he had connections slowly but steadily increasing on the political side with people like Hugh Stott, who was a senator in Pennsylvania, and with Goldwater, and then more and more with Reagan, for whom he provided commentary, briefing, and insight on foreign policy. While much of the American conservative establishment was business oriented and not terribly articulate in dealing with foreign policy other than “better right than dead,” Strausz-Hupé was far more intellectually supple than that and developed theses and approaches that presented the conservative movement more intelligently.

Q: You were a sophomore during the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon campaign. This is one that engaged an awful lot of people of a generation, more or less your generation, regarding political service and so on. Did that hit you or your immediate group?

JONES: Certainly I was interested in it personally. I would also say that Richard Nixon was one of my early heroes on. I thought that he was smart and intelligent and tough minded. If I could have voted in 1960, which I could not because I was not old enough, without any question, I would have voted for him. At the same time, I could also see the personal appeal of John Kennedy. He came through the campus in a motorcade during the election period. I went down to see him. I was not the least bit interested in voting for him. Indeed, I thought he had all the flaws associated with him that were being brooded about at that time. But as he passed and waved to us, I found myself clapping and cheering in response. He did have a visceral effect on people. I will also say that his inaugural speech, which I always found interesting because it didn’t have the Massachusetts accent that many of his other speeches subsequently did – it was almost as if he had deliberately set aside his accent to make this speech – but the speech itself is definitely one of the great speeches of modern America.

Q: And the spirit that went with it. This was beyond politics. It energized a generation, including certainly a generation that came into the Foreign Service. This was pretty good

stuff. Government service was a good thing. Going overseas, you might make sacrifices, but you were joining a worthy cause.

JONES: I was not stimulated in that way by John Kennedy. If anything, I guess I would say that I was much more engaged in finding ways to make sure that the Soviets did not win. This was not a question of going forth to do good. As a result, I sneered at Peace Corps. I found the Peace Corps as a trivial and essentially valueless operation. But my personal view was that under no circumstances could we yield to Soviet aggression, that if I had learned any lesson, I had learned the “no more Munichs” lesson. As a result, I was certainly led down the direction into full and total support for our intervention in Vietnam, which was a catastrophe. If I learned a lesson from history, I had learned one of the wrong lessons or a lesson that turned out wrong.

Q: Many of us had that. When you graduated in 1963, you served two years in the Army?

JONES: It's a little more complicated than that. Although I graduated in '63, I had also sub-matriculated into graduate school and I went immediately on into graduate school. In graduate school, I had even more exposure to people like John Melby, to Strausz-Hupé, and to William Kintner, who later was ambassador to Thailand, to people within Strausz-Hupé's institute, the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, and even perhaps more importantly at the time - and this is another major component of my life at that period - to Chinese studies. The woman that I married I met on the very first day of classes at the University of Pennsylvania in 1959. She is Chinese-American. She was born in the Soviet Union in Novosibirsk. Her father was a Chinese diplomat who had been in the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1949. Eventually they escaped. They left Russia in 1949, went to Sweden, and spent a year in Sweden and came to the United States in 1950. They lived in New Jersey before my wife came to the University of Pennsylvania in 1959. Incidentally, I met her though studies in chemistry. She continued on in her career and got a Ph.D. in chemistry and eventually left chemistry after doing research for a number of years and entered the Foreign Service in 1974. She has just retired herself in October of last year. So, the combination of things that I was studying in that period '63-'64 were international relations but very much also Far Eastern studies.

Q: When did you get married?

JONES: I got married just a couple of months after I went into the military. I went into the military in July 1964 after completing my master's in May 1964. So, I then went through the standard infantry officer basic training, intelligence officer basic training, going to Benning, Fort Meade. I went to jump school at Benning. Right after jump school in December 1964, I was married.

Q: What were you doing in the military?

JONES: I was an intelligence officer. The major aspect of it was a 14-month tour of duty in Korea. At that juncture, I went almost directly from my honeymoon to Korea. I had

made a decision that if I were interested in Asia after a tour in Korea, I would really be interested in Asia. So rather than looking for other assignments that could have kept me within the United States, I sought an assignment in Korea. I had been assigned to Fort Bragg. I actually arranged with another officer who was assigned to Korea. He didn't want to go to Korea. People think, "Why would this man want to leave his new bride and go to Korea?" But I was very interested in the Far East at that point and the two of us walked down to the Pentagon together. We were just interchangeable second lieutenants and they interchanged us. This to me is an illustration of just how flexible the military can be in contrast to the reputation that the military always has for being incredibly high bound and inflexible. But again, to give you an illustration of how things are curious in life, my college roommate in 1963-1964, also entered the military, also went to Fort Benning about a class in school behind me in the military. At that juncture, they were offering an opportunity to spend your two years on active duty as an intelligence officer with the CIA. I had taken the exam for the CIA while I was at the University of Pennsylvania and come to DC and been told, "Well, Mr. Jones, when you get out of the military, please call us." So, if I had been a class behind in entering Benning instead of in the class in which I entered, almost undoubtedly I would have taken up the same option that my colleague did, who spent a career at the CIA, and at the end of two years active duty military had already spent two years at the CIA, and never left and not have taken up the Foreign Service option which I also had.

Q: Tell me about Korea. You were there '64-'65?

JONES: Yes.

Q: What was your initial impression of Korea? Where did you serve? What were you getting out of it?

JONES: This was my first experience of being out of the country. This was the first time that I had been further west than Chicago. I had been as far west as Chicago for a fraternity brother's wedding. I had never been to California. I was so ignorant of circumstances that when I saw the APO number with California on it, I thought I was going to spend time in California. I was quickly disabused of that conclusion. The only time I spent in California was to transit San Francisco, and I had time only to go out and be part of a tourist group and be driven to the top of the Mark and through Chinatown and then back to the airport to get on the plane to fly to Korea.

For Korea, it was an illustration of how limited what you learn from books and pictures and film can be in contrast to what you learn about a society when you are on the ground. If you study the Far East at all, you learn about rice and rice culture and how important rice is in the entire society and irrigation and irrigation patterns; and in China in flood control, all of the things associated with that. But until I was actually on the ground in Korea and saw my first water buffalo in a rice paddy, I suddenly had a quantum jump in understanding of the entire group of material that I had learned before.

Korea in 1964-'65 was truly struggling. The war was obviously over. The peace had been in effect for 10 years, but it was still a very battered society. I don't know if you have been back since '51 or '52 or whether you had returned to Korea...

Q: I went back in 1976.

JONES: It was a society in which manpower and buffalo power was still far more important than mechanical power. One of my vivid images is of a man and his wife struggling to push a heavily loaded charcoal burner, those cylindrical coal-impregnated pieces of fuel for briquettes up this long hill in front of the Yongsan compound. They were really putting their backs into it. Another recollection for me was an oxcart passing in front of the Blue House – the equivalent of the White House – in downtown central Seoul. You still saw bullet holes in any structure that was still standing. This was also a society, unfortunately, when the very best thing that could happen to a Korean woman was that she have a liaison of any sort with a western male. You could go out and hire a woman for a dollar. It was really pathetic. It was demeaning. But it was accurate that virtually any Korean female from Miss Korea on down could be made available without an awful lot of effort. At the same time, the Korean males seemed to be rather indifferent to a good deal of it. It was sort of “Well, men and soldiers require women.” There wasn't some incredible proprietary pride that somehow they were being debased because the American soldiers that were there were handling large numbers of prostitutes. I recall one piece in a Korean newspaper – and this was at the time when we were beginning to shuffle our forces to go to Vietnam – it appeared to be an argument over whether Korea should participate in Vietnam. The bottom line judgment was that it's much better that Korean divisions go to Vietnam than that the Americans pull a division out of Korea and sent it to Vietnam. This also was a pretty straightforward approach on their part.

At the same time that the society was as impoverished and battered as it was, there was to me an enormous sense of the energy and the effort and the commitment that the people themselves had. Everybody was studying, I mean everybody. The woman who was running the elevator had a book. The guy who was your lavatory attendant doing your shoes was studying. These were people that if they could pull themselves up by their own bootstraps would break their knees before they would quit. It was just clear in that way that if they had the chance, if they were given the opportunity, there would be more. But, boy, you looked at it at that time and thought that this was a society that had a long way to go. There was so little that was actually available. There was only, in effect, one significant highway in the country and that was headed toward the demilitarized zone, the main supply route [MSR]. That was the only significant piece of highway at the time. There was also a reasonable highway that went to Inchon. There was a rickety old railroad that went to Pusan. As a group of young intelligence officers, we all got together and took the train to Pusan. This was the experience that we were going to have. As an intelligence officer at that time, I was studying order of battle. It was North Korean forces that I was studying more than South Korean forces. You had a serious sense for how tough any fight would be. The North certainly appeared to be very well armed, very well organized. Their commitment appeared to be rock hard. They certainly seemed to be focused on liberating

or conquering the South. They at that time still had excellent relations with both China and the Soviet Union. It was a difficult set of circumstances that the South was perceived to be facing.

Q: What was the feeling you were picking up as a junior officer about the ability of the South Korean army?

JONES: We thought it was a pretty good army. Certainly we thought the ROK [Republic of Korea] forces were tough. We thought that they were an awful lot better army than they had been in 1950. We were also slowly moving the main U.S. military forces off the front line. At this point, the ROK forces were holding almost all of the Demilitarized Zone. At the same time, I had a brief experience with the U.S. embassy there. I had passed the Foreign Service exam. At one juncture, I actually went down with another officer just to see what the embassy looked like. We went on the compound and some American Foreign Service officer invited us to step in and chat. We had a pleasant conversation with him. I don't remember the man or anything about the conversation, but it was pretty much a positive experience in that manner. But at the same time, the Eighth Army got a batch of documents that the embassy no longer wanted. They were excess or extra copies of various studies, intelligence studies. They were all secret documents and they were sent up without any handling forms or restrictions. We thought that this was incredibly sloppy and unprofessional. We sat down and everybody filled out their pink handling forms and put them on these embassy documents that had been sent over to us. Our attitude was, "Gee whiz, how can these people be so insecure."

We, in our excessive commitment to security consciousness, not only had the person sign it but then somebody double-checked every signature. The poor guy who was an enlisted man who was responsible for many of the classified documents, the phrase would go along, "Well, there are no friends when classified documents are concerned." The infinite control effort for what in retrospect, of course, was very trivial material gave us this "Gee whiz, how could these people at the embassy be so casual?"

Q: What was the word of wisdom that you were getting as an officer about the threat from the North and how likely it was that they might attack and if they did, what would happen?

JONES: We were stuck intellectually with the feeling that we were always prepared all the time, that, no, they weren't going to come tomorrow, but we had to be prepared for this possibility. There was also the feeling that it would be a hell of a fight, but that everybody was always confident enough to think that we would win. Nevertheless, there was the feeling that this would be one hell of a fight. The distance between the Demilitarized Zone and Seoul and the level of defenses were at that time nowhere near the level of ROK defenses that there are now. There was a lot of worry over whether the North Koreans had been able to build up with newer equipment. They recently had gotten various inputs of weaponry from both China and the Soviet Union. It was a worrisome set of circumstances. In retrospect, we are concerned about once every other year about a

threat from the North. This has gone on now for close to 40 years. But in 1964-'65, it was only 10 years ago that this had happened. There were many people that had been there "when" and were back for one reason or another. Probably my biggest project during this period was to work out with the ROK intelligence G2 an order of battle for the North Korean battle, a strength composition, disposition of their forces, table of organization, and equipment for North Korean forces from the top of their Ministry of National Defense all the way down to their rear rank privates and their armament. To complete that project, I did something that, again, in retrospect, I think most people would have considered me to have been rather foolish: I extended my tour of duty in Korea by a month to finish this job. I was actually asked by at least one senior officer whether undue pressure had been put on me to extend to do this job. I suspect again, people thought it was either so unusual that I would not rush home to my new bride or they were wondering whether I had some Korean mistress on the side that I was reluctant to return home. But I will once again say that I simply wanted to finish that particular job. I felt that nobody would finish it if I did not complete it. I was about two-thirds of the way through it at that juncture. One of the things that pleases me in retrospect and amuses me at the same time was a letter that a couple of my ROK counterparts wrote to my wife saying that despite all of their "efforts to tempt your husband, Mrs. Jones, he was not temptable."

Q: Of course, anybody who has served in the military, particularly in the earlier times in the Far East, temptation was everywhere.

JONES: Temptation cost a dollar. The women were personally attractive. This was not as if you were hauling somebody off of 14th Street or something along those lines. Again, to say the least, with a Chinese wife, I had no prejudice against Oriental women

Q: What about information about an order of battle? I would think it would be very difficult to get good information. Where did it come from? What was your impression of what you were putting together?

JONES: In retrospect, the information and the product was probably limited. It was probably best on the lower levels and some things along those lines. What we had were a series of defectors, people who had crossed the line from the North and who were then picked up, who surrendered to the South and went to interrogation camps that were also on the outskirts of Seoul. They were debriefed. People just simply worked their way through what they knew little by little and squeezed them and interrogated them. Actually, a book that you might be familiar with called "P.S. Wilkinson" - one part of this man's experience was being an intelligence officer in Korea and dealing with interrogation and interrogation camps for North Korean defectors. The information on certain levels was reasonably good and we rationalized how much some of these people knew by saying that, "Well, these people don't have a great deal to do. Occasionally they move from unit to unit, and they sit down and talk with each other about everything they had done and what they had done, and it fills up their time. The fact that this or this individual knows a gigantic amount is a reflection of the fact that he moved around a little

bit in Korea and did that.” What I did not know at the time was all of the sensitive intelligence that was available. Although we had access to what was called then “Church Door,” which was photo intelligence, of the North and that gave us a good deal of insight as to what was happening in a purely mechanical “digging in the ground” basis. We did not have the type of electronic intercept, at least at my level in my capacity, that other officers in Korea did have. I remember one instance where a senior officer came in and asked me to document whether such and such was happening. I provided from the information that we had this type of material. He accepted it. Presumably, he thought it could be used to prove to people to whom you could not release the electronic intercept material that such and such had been happening. At the same time, a group of we young officers said, “Hey, there is a unit here that has been carried on the books for X years. We haven’t heard of this unit in this many years. We think it should be dropped.” They looked at us and said, “No.” Again, in retrospect, it appears clear that they had some other form of confirmation that this unit was still operating even though there had been no other confirmation of it over the time. I would say that we had for the era and for the intelligence a pretty good picture of what was happening. Of course, it was intelligence in slow motion. A great deal of what was happening north of the border was virtually frozen into place and had been frozen in place for years and years and years. It was not like Vietnam, where I never did serve, where information that was 24 hours old might as well be a history text. Here, if you had information in Korea from defectors that was three, four, five years old, it was useful information because so little was changing and so little had changed.

Q: You came back in '64. What did you think of Asia?

JONES: My experience in Asia had been Korea on the south side. I made a trip of about a week on leave to Japan. Of course, that was like stepping from one world into another. It was a dramatic and very interesting turnabout. I saw some of the most interesting aspects of Japan, both Tokyo and then when I took what was then the absolute innovation of the bullet train to Kyoto. I went to the shrine at Nara. I was fascinated by that, found it very interesting. Probably my major pleasure in Japan was being able to have a glass of whole milk. All the milk in Korea that was drinkable was reconstituted. That had its own taste problems. On return from the Far East and from Asia, I was still extremely interested in the Far East, extremely interested in Asia, and was pursuing my academic studies at that time in Far Eastern affairs, particularly Chinese politics, history, culture, and things of that nature.

Q: You went back to the University of Pennsylvania.

JONES: Yes.

Q: How long were you there?

JONES: I was there from '66-'68. I continued my graduate studies at that point working for a Ph.D. I took my Ph.D. prelims. I took and passed the Ph.D. prelims and began

preliminary academic research associated with that time. I was focused on studying the People's Liberation Army [PLA] and its evolution and progress. I continued also to do study on other Far Eastern areas. I worked with a man by the name of Hillary Conroy on Japan and Japanese studies. I'm not sure whether John Melby was still there by then. I don't think he was. I believe I also had a course with Professor Alan Rickett, a specialist in modern China, although he started modern China somewhere back around the 12th century. The last lecture of the second semester covered China from 1912 to the then present, which I thought was a little unfair. But when I came back, it was also a period of time when the Cultural Revolution was taking place in China. We were very interested in that. It was also, of course, the time when our commitment in Vietnam reached the tip point of moving out rather than in after the catastrophe of the Tet Offensive.

Q: What about your wife and her family? Were they still connected to China, interest and all that?

JONES: This was a very Americanized family in many ways. My father-in-law elected not to stay in the Chinese cocoon in New York. When they moved to southern New Jersey, he had a chicken farm near Vineland, NJ, for a number of years and then both he and his wife worked in a Kimble Glass factory. His wife eventually went back to school and got a nursing degree. They were effectively the only Asians in the area. My wife was the only Asian in her high school and five years later her brother was the only Asian in high school. Both of them were the valedictorians of the high school. Yes, they had a very tangential connection still with China. There were relatives in Taiwan. My wife's mother was still in China. My father in law's stepmother and his stepbrothers and a sister were in China. But contact between anyone in China and anyone in the United States at that period and really until 1972 was very indirect, very third hand, very "wrote to somebody somewhere else who would forward a message." Writing back was equally laborious. Finding out anything about what was happening to any of your relatives in this regard was very chancy and very sporadic.

Q: What about the Foreign Service? When did this cross your horizon and how did you deal with it?

JONES: It crossed my horizon about my junior year in college. Partly it was stimulated by having met John Melby. It was, "Well, what do I do with myself? The Foreign Service sounds interesting." What did one do with a political science degree where you're studying international relations? Almost with a delightfully blasé spirit, I assumed a career in diplomacy might be interesting. How do you go about this? Well, you take this exam. Okay, I'll take the exam. What do you do? Well, you go down to the post officer at 30th Street and Market and you go to this huge room that is full of people and take the exam. Well, of course, you had to write in on time and get yourself registered and so on. But that was it. It was without any question the most difficult exam I have ever taken in my life. No question about it. One way or another, I left the exam sure that I had failed. There was just no way that I could have passed that exam. Instead, a couple of months later (I took it in the fall of 1962 after I had just entered my senior year), I got notice that I

passed it and they gave me a stack of forms to fill out and material to write up, an autobiography to write, and told me to come up to the UN Mission in New York to take the oral exam. That was in January of '63. I was a second semester senior.

I went up to New York and had the classic exam of me at the end of a T-shaped table with three examiners. They asked me questions. I answered questions.

Q: Do you recall any of the questions?

JONES: I think I remember being asked to name the countries that were then in the EU, which wasn't the EU at that point. I think I got them all. I also remember suggesting that the military was our first line of defense, which suggested that I hadn't read or at least not internalized the little pamphlet that said that diplomats are our first line of defense. I remember vaguely one of the hypotheticals, but I don't remember the specifics about the hypothetical question. Partly I don't remember it because I spent time listening to and talking about "hypotheticals" in the current Board of Examiners, so I can't remember them. I was asked a fair amount of personal background in history and what I had done and where I had come from. I think, if anything, they might have wondered whether I was too young to be passed. I had just turned 21. I think it helped me that I made it clear to them that I was not interested in immediately entering the Foreign Service, that I had a master's degree that I wanted to get, and I had two years of military service that I had to perform. I was not going to be presenting myself at their doors until I was about 24, which I think they thought was probably better than not. Oddly enough, somebody suggested that I might benefit from a public speaking class, which may have stuck in my head because I had never been considered to be insufficiently oral or lacking ability to project. I had had high school dramatics and I can still fill an auditorium with my voice unamplified. That was it so far as my recollection out of it. Other than waiting for the baby to be born, although you didn't know whether the baby was going to be born in the antechamber waiting for them to come out and tell me whether I had passed. I also had the impression that one of the people who was giving the exam was not in the best of physical condition. I think he might have been using his Kaopectate or the equivalent of that. He didn't seem to be all that enthusiastic about the job at that juncture.

Q: Were you able to postpone it until you had finished graduate school?

JONES: At this point, you had this 30-month clock that supposedly started from the day you had taken the very first written exam. The clock ran but the clock also was suspended when you went into the military. So, I kept track of my clock. But I didn't immediately want to enter the Foreign Service when I came back from Korea. I still had an academic focus that I wanted to complete. I did have a State Department experience at least in the summer of 1967. At that time, they were still giving paid internships. I applied for that internship. It was competitive within the university. It wasn't selected by the Department of State. It was selected within the university community. I remember that I was initially the alternate rather than the primary selectee. The primary selectee was bumped because he apparently was not physically qualified. He could never have physically been in the

Foreign Service. As a result, the Department bumped him. He came to me and asked, in effect, why I thought I was qualified to have been the intern. I told him that, in effect, I had already passed the exams. He went away mollified, if not satisfied, by the fact that I really was better qualified than he was to be an intern for that summer.

Q: What were you doing as an intern?

JONES: It was a bit of an off-putting experience. It wasn't the kind of experience that I would recommend as an intern. I was in IO/UNP. I spent a good deal of time trying to transcribe commentary that was coming in from the UN during that period. I vaguely remember trying to rewrite parts of a manual. Admittedly, I also did have a two week break. I had to go off and do two weeks of Army Reserve training. But the head of IO at the time was certainly very well qualified. There were other members in the office, people like Tom Carolyn and Rob Jones, who were personally interesting, competent, thoughtful. I can't say that the experience itself was particularly stimulating either intellectually or professionally. I didn't feel that I was given much of a chance to do much of anything. I actually before that had had a number of relatively negative comments about people who were associated with the Foreign Service, people who were talking to people who would say, "Yes, I met that Foreign Service officer and he was pretty unimpressive" or "He just seemed to be interested in playing golf" or "He was an arrogant, unpleasant son of a bitch and I certainly wouldn't want to have anything to do with people like that." So, I would say the most positive aspect of the internship in '67 was that I met people with whom I had a degree of personal and intellectual respect. They did seem to be intelligent and personable individuals. As a result, I wasn't reluctant to enter the Foreign Service itself.

Q: When did you come in?

JONES: I came in in June of '68.

Q: What about the Ph.D.?

JONES: I didn't finish it. I went back again in '71-'72 to Penn and worked again on it for a year and finished about two-thirds of the dissertation and then just essentially ran out of time. I took a year's leave without pay after my first tour. I worked at it sporadically after that, but frankly, I couldn't be the kind of Foreign Service I was trying to be and still finish the degree. So, I have satisfied myself subsequently with a wide variety of writing. But the degree, I didn't finish it.

Q: Could you describe your entering Foreign Service class and your impressions of the people you came in with and your basic training?

JONES: It was an interesting class, an interesting range of people. It was still much more heavily male than not. It did, however, have the first substantial selection of African-American officers. I remember all of them. I stayed in reasonably close touch with all of them that stayed, people like Chuck Baquet, Bob Perry, Greg Johnson, Aurelia Brazeal,

Hartford Terry Jennings, Leonardo Williams, Ed Williams. I remember all of them pretty clearly. There were also a number of USIS officers who disappeared. Some of them I never saw again after I left the class and I have no idea what happened to them. There were several very sharp people who subsequently became ambassadors: John Glassman (his interests were a mix between the Soviet Union and Latin American affairs), David (who became an ambassador in an African post), Joe Snider (a very smart officer who has just retired), and a man who might have been as good as any of them who stayed one tour and left for the Agency and spent a career with the Agency before retiring (Incidentally, he was not in the Agency beforehand). He actually had an extended period of time with the Foreign Service. He became distinctly disillusioned with the Foreign Service as a consequence of one of his assignments and found the Agency much more attractive and to his liking and he spent his career there.

Q: What about Vietnam? Tet was January of '68.

JONES: The most important aspect about Vietnam was whether we would be assigned there and who would be assigned there and who wouldn't. This was going to Combined Operations and Regional Development (CORDS). The CORDS people were very much a part of our commitment, certainly the State Department's commitment, in Vietnam. What it finally came down to was that every unmarried officer who had not had military experience was sent to Vietnam. That was not greeted with overwhelming enthusiasm. It was more of a "Gee whiz, I didn't really want to do this" than outright animosity to our commitment there or the circumstances of the commitment. I don't think people realized how dangerous it was in real terms. The number of people that we lost in Vietnam was at that point unknown. Despite my own personal interest in Asia and in Vietnam, I had been assigned to Paris. I asked, "What would the circumstances be for changing the assignment to go to Vietnam?" In effect, it was going to be a longer tour in Vietnam than I was prepared to do after having just spent a year in Korea. I wasn't in the end willing to leave my wife again for what looked like a two year tour unaccompanied in Vietnam. But my personal interest at that time in Vietnam was still to have the war won and to see the war won and that it was a commitment well worth making. I don't remember people in class being outspoken in their objections to Vietnam or critical about our key policymakers at the time (Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara). I didn't hear any criticism that I remember of them. You also have to recall that it was just at this juncture also that the Soviets seized Czechoslovakia and killed the Prague Spring. I remember another Foreign Service officer and I, a man by the name of Tom Lauer, looked at each other and said, "Of course that's what they should do." For us, it was completely predictable. It was exactly what the Soviets, acting as the kind of antagonists that we were confident they were, should do. They did it, and it wasn't any surprise to us at all. But if anything, that was a reinforcement of my personal views on the necessity to continue the protracted conflict, to steal Strausz-Hupé's title again, in dealing with and handling a relationship with the Soviets.

Q: Did you go to Paris then?

JONES: Yes, I did.

Q: From when to when?

JONES: The spring of '69 to the summer of '71. We arrived approximately in May of '69. We had just missed "les evenements," (the events) the uprising and the rioting that so characterized Paris in the spring. As students were rioting, they definitely would have had all the young political officers (actually, we were multifunctional in a way, but we weren't coned. We were doing everything at that time, doing reporting. But they probably would not have objected for the young officers in the embassy to have been on the Rive Gauche just trying to get a sense of what was happening.

Q: What were you doing in between?

JONES: It was a combination of language training and as I was originally assigned to do an economic/commercial job, I spent time at the Department of Commerce. I also spent time taking the perfectly standard consular visa course. That's essentially what absorbed the period of time from the several months that we spent at FSI to the time when I left for Paris. Very fortunately, my wife and I went to Europe on the SS United States. It was very close to the end of that type of travel opportunity. It was a wonderful opportunity.

Q: What was your wife doing during this time?

JONES: My wife had been doing a variety of career-oriented jobs. After she got her Ph.D., which was approximately in December of '66, she went to do research. She did tobacco research with the Department of Agriculture in laboratories on the outskirts of Philadelphia at Radnor. Then when we moved in the summer of '68 to Washington, she worked again for the Department of Agriculture doing research on dairy products. She published a variety of papers in journals and left the Department of Agriculture to accompany me to Paris at that point. She worked at the Department of Agriculture until about April of '69.

Q: What was your impression of the embassy in '69 when you arrived?

Today is April 2, 1999. David, let's talk. You're off to Paris in '69. What were you doing in Paris?

JONES: This was the first tour. This was a standard first tour Foreign Service officer's exercise. It was my first experience in Europe. It was my first Foreign Service assignment really. Everything before that almost close to a year had been a combination of language training, visa training, passport training, familiarization also at the Department of Commerce, where ostensibly at least, I was appointed in Paris as a commercial officer. This was at a time when there was still a commercial section, an economic/commercial

officer. There was still a commercial sector in the Department of State. When I arrived, I found actually to my great satisfaction that I was not going to spend two years being an economic/commercial officer. I was and would be still far more interested in doing political work. What they did in Paris with first tour junior officers was, I understand, relatively standard in the larger posts, to put you on a rotation. Essentially, you spent six months in four different sections in the embassy. So, the first of my tours of six months each was in the economic section. I never did go to do straight commercial work. There had been and there still is a commercial trade center in Paris. There is a big operation there. While I might have expected to go to it originally, I never went there. I just did straight internal analysis for economic affairs in Paris for six months.

Q: You were in Paris from '69 to when?

JONES: Roughly July of '71.

Q: Who was our ambassador at this time?

JONES: When I first arrived our ambassador was Sergeant Shriver. Subsequently, it was Arthur Watson. Shriver was a Kennedy connected operator. He was interesting and popular as ambassador in Paris both with the French and pretty much with the embassy. Shriver was interesting, articulate, vigorous, dynamic, did a lot of outreach things, was very interested in youth, which made younger Foreign Service officers interested and interesting. He was, however, also absolutely maddening in some of the things that he did. One of them was that he was always late. He absolutely drove people up the walls because he would not arrive on time for the things that he was doing. There is one little anecdote where he was out on a provincial tour. The ambassador would go out to different sections of the country and have meetings and give speeches and receive little awards and taste wine and all sorts of things of that nature. He arrived very, very late for something. He gave a remarkably extensive and profound apology of how deeply unhappy he was, how sorry he was he had been late and delayed. Of course, the audience forgave him. The next night, he, however, was also scheduled and he was also incredibly late to his next dinner, etc. He faced an audience and gave again an extended, detailed apology of how he had run late and done this and that, etc. This time, they were considerably less forgiving because he had perhaps forgotten that it was the same audience. They weren't all that thrilled. But as a dynamic presence in France and as a dynamic presence in the embassy, Shriver very much was that. On his Fourth of July exercise, for example, instead of having a standard Fourth of July, he put together circumstances in which people were dressed in colonial costume and organized games for handicapped children, which was very much an interest of Eunice Shriver. The Special Olympics, that were still evolving, were done by them. It was refreshing. He was different in that manner. He was not the kind of pinstriped ambassador. On the other hand, he arrived in Cardin suits wearing Guccis and looked every bit as elegant and expensive as any man possibly could.

Q: What was France like at this time? This was a year after the events of '68. This was

their trauma time. How did you find France, particularly Paris?

JONES: I guess they sort of say that every young man should spend some time in Paris and every old man should go back and regret the time that he didn't take more advantage of being a young man in Paris. I guess you have to put it in the context of who I was and what I didn't know. I was remarkably untraveled to be a Foreign Service officer in the terms of 1999. Maybe in the terms of 1969 I was more typical in that manner. But this was my first European experience. It was also my first experience with the French, for whom intellectually I really didn't care very much. This was the France that had thrown NATO out of the country, led by Charles de Gaulle.

This was a France for whom many Americans didn't care very much in regard to their foreign policies. It was a France that seemed to be more interested in putting a stick in our eye than giving us a pat on the back for whatever we were doing. As I spent more time there, at least I began to appreciate the rationale for what the French were doing and why they had done it that way. Although I never cared for it, at least I could understand it a little better. Although it will probably seem curious, I was not initially particularly interested in going to France. It wasn't my choice of countries because of the points that I have just outlined. But as a country to be in at the time, it was very interesting for some of the points that you raised and interesting also because it was the period in which de Gaulle, in effect, left power and arranged a rather grudging transition between him and his then loyal deputy, Mr. Pompidou. This left de Gaulle himself in a sort of semi-retreat, retirement, exile from which nobody knew exactly what he would do, or when he would do something, or what pronouncement he would issue upon the politics and the personalities of the day. As he was always ready and willing to write memoirs and more memoirs and announce in his Olympian tones what he thought was best for France, it did make things politically interesting because you didn't know what would happen. There was this process of transition from which de Gaulle, having lost a totally trivial referendum on a topic that, frankly, I can't even remember – the point was that de Gaulle always put these referendums as “do what I want or I leave.” This time with a sigh the French population decided on a tertiary issue that they had had enough. So, he up and left. The politics of the period were still relatively calm to the extent there was not rioting in the streets.

Q: There had been though in May-June of '68.

JONES: Yes. That was before I got there. There was still tiny, slight, distant echoes of what had happened, but there was not a renewal of it. The French government had managed to break the alliance between labor and the students. They had offered sufficient enough in the way of offerings and commentary to the students and given them certain changes in how the educational system was operating and promised more money and less crowding and things along that line and got the students off their backs. As a consequence, the students were never really able to restimulate anything on the level of the disruption and the popular unity between themselves and labor unions. Students riot every spring. Who cares? The students are rioting. As a result, the police will come out

and set themselves up and put themselves in a position where the students start focusing on them and then they'll have a great riot. Some of the students will get tear-gassed and a few of them may get bopped on the head. A certain number of the CRS (French riot police) will have injuries that will be cited. That's springtime in Paris. But in '68, it was the combination of the students and the labor unions who were able to create much more havoc and upset and disruption in the city and elsewhere in France. But it had very substantially calmed in '69.

Q: Your first job was in the economic section. In an embassy like Paris, you're really down in the bowels of the economic section as a first tour officer. What were you seeing and what were you getting from your more senior colleagues about the French economy?

JONES: It might amuse you to note that I had the best office in my entire Foreign Service career when I was the most junior officer in Paris. I was sitting right above the ambassador's office looking out over the Place de la Concorde. Why did I have that office? Well, because the economic section wanted to preserve it and they needed to put an officer in it, so they put me in it. I have a picture of me against the Place de la Concorde looking out over this astonishing, memorable, historic view. What I think we did at this point – and again what you have is a young officer trying to get trained and not so much in economics because I don't think they expected me ever to become an economist – was how to begin to be a Foreign Service reporting officer and analyst. So, a great deal of what I was doing was as close to the bottom rung of that level of the Foreign Service as you're likely to get: writing economic analysis from newspaper material to put into airgrams, not a telegram; on the lines of very classical dredge it out of the newspapers, new translations; this kind of work. What I think we gathered and what I would say that I gathered was that the French economy was doing reasonably well. It was, however, a very traditional government-run, centrally directed economy. The problems associated with it were not enormous problems. This was a sophisticated, high tech society. What I noticed as much as anything from that portion of it and from other times was how organized the French ruling establishment was, how carefully educated they were, how they had come up through great schools of one sort or another where. If you read their bio sketches, they had all been educated at the same type of very high level, very carefully trained, very professorial-type universities. They were all deeply enmeshed in the French way of doing things, in French culture, in French history, in the virtues of France, in every element of it – its language, its cooking, its wine, its cheeses... You go right down the line. Those people at the top were very, very, very French. You either liked this or you didn't like this. There are still almost 30 years later very, very positive aspects of what I could say are the French and France at that time. For example, they were and still are receptive to the use of nuclear power, something that we have managed to destroy as a basic source of power in the United States. The French were very practical about its development, its application, its utility for their society. If you want an organized and directed societal elite running society, that was certainly France at the end of the '60s and the beginning of the '70s.

Q: Was there still the "defi americain?"

JONES: Yes, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber.

Q: Had that started?

JONES: Yes.

Q: Could you explain what that was?

JONES: It essentially was a book by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, who argued that the American challenge, “le défi américain”, was a substantial challenge to Europe and France and the Americans were doing it better, that the French, the Europeans, were going to have to change their approach, their style, in virtually everything. It was not just by any matter just political. It wasn’t limited to economics. It was, again, on top of almost everything else, cultural. The American cultural challenge was a worldwide challenge. You can shorthand it down to the “cocacolaization of the world”, but Servan-Schreiber didn’t take that approach. It was a positive view that America was making this challenge and it was not an unworthy one. It was one in which the French in particular had to respond because they consider themselves to have a powerful alternative culture or a culture that they consider definitely superior to English/American culture. So, as a result, it was a challenge that France would have to meet and perhaps change to meet effectively.

Q: In our embassy in Paris, did you find a certain division among the officers, not necessarily according to France, but those that were almost Francophiles and those that were almost Francophones? Was there a fissure within the embassy?

JONES: No, I wouldn’t say it was that clear a split. There certainly were Francophiles. There were people that adapted themselves more totally to French culture. These are the ones that whose clothes were more French in style, who worked very hard to get more deeply into French culture and French cooking and French wines and cheeses. In other words, they were trying to make themselves more effective interlocutors with the French by being closer to them as appreciators of their culture and their qualities. The other side of the group I don’t think appreciated France any less but they believed that they would be more effective Americans if they didn’t try to become second class French. There was no way that an American diplomat would become as French as the French and still be an American diplomat. If you attempted that route, you would be criticized implicitly by the French for not a particularly high quality French person. If you, in effect, did the equivalent – if they came to dinner and you served them chili and beans – they couldn’t argue with you that your choice of wine had been less than exquisite and your soufflé had fallen. All they could say was, “That’s an American meal. Maybe I don’t like it. Maybe I’d rather eat anything else if it was made in France,” but they couldn’t claim that you were a second class or lacking a quality to being a real Frenchman. In honesty, there is nobody, unless you have lived at the very top of French society, that can be as French as a Frenchman. I think you could also overstate this division. There were certainly no sets of arguments in the embassy over “You’ve gone native.” The French wouldn’t let you go

native at this point. This was still, if not daggers drawn, a recognition that we were still only a couple of years from the time in which de Gaulle and the French had expelled NATO from France and, in effect, absented itself from the unified defense planning aspect of NATO, although France continued to sit, as it still does, on the North Atlantic Council and in Council meetings at NATO. But it did make for tension. It made definitely for bad feelings. It left some residual problems for the U.S. military still being handled in France as they had closed facilities and rushed off to Belgium with considerable deal of speed and not as much planning as they might have liked to have had.

Q: What were you doing after the economic work?

JONES: The next set of work I went on to was to do consular work. In this regard I was relatively standard as a consular officer, although all I focused on or was focused on was citizenship services. I may be one of the rare Foreign Service officers who never issued a visa. Because of that, I don't have these endless visa stories.

Q: I would have thought in the consular section, particularly in citizens services, you would have had a French national staff who really were doing most of the work. I would assume they were a very competent staff.

JONES: There were. There were good professional longtime staff. But for American citizenship services, you also had a fair group of American consular officers. The biggest issue was the replacement of passports. This was the biggest citizenship problem. Occasionally, you had a death. Occasionally, you had a certain number of people seeking welfare and support. You had individuals in the U.S. seeking missing children who were wandering around Europe somewhere and they vaguely thought, "Well, they said they were going to be in Paris in August" or words to that effect. So, you had circumstances like that. As a result, all of us as young consular officers met a fair number of Americans in circumstances that were difficult for them. What I did at that time was meet as my supervisor one of the smart, tough senior consular officers, a woman by the name of Mary Chaverini. Mary is one of these people that had a very untraditional Foreign Service career. She was then and certainly would be now one of the very few Foreign Service officers without a college degree. She started as a secretary, was a technician of one sort or another and became an officer. Through dint of absolutely relentless search for perfection and consummate attention to detail, she got very close to the top of her profession and finished as the consul general in Palermo after her tour in Paris. I was impressed by her professionalism and her exceptionally good judgment on risks of various people and her attention to detail and desire to see not a single error crop up anywhere. That bothered more people than not. It didn't bother me. I was able to appreciate this. But there was at least one young Foreign Service officer for whom she totaled his career by the type of Efficient Report that she wrote on him and who disliked her immensely and undoubtedly continues to dislike her. But other than that, she taught me a combination of patience and even more attention to precision and detail than I had appreciated before. There obviously were not many people like her. If I remember a story out of the consular section, it would be that I had been, if not duped, at least sympathetic

to a young couple that came in with a lost passport story. They were certainly perfectly legitimate Americans. Mary insisted that they be issued a much more limited passport, a very short duration passport rather than a full duration passport. Subsequently, they turned out to have been involved in narcotics of one sort or another and were arrested later in their relatively short time in France. I recognized that one of the problems of being a consular officer is eliminating your implicit trust in your fellow citizens. You might be more suspicious automatically of some foreigner who is trying to get a visa from you, as you have every reason to be, but I think it's a little harder to be axiomatically suspicious of your fellow citizens who are legitimately presenting information showing that they are citizens. That was a bit of education.

Q: Did you get involved in any Americans caught up in the French legal system, prisons or other aspects?

JONES: A little bit, but not as much as some of my colleagues and friends. What you had at that time and what you still have is a lawyers list and we regularly referred people who had specific kinds of problems to this list of lawyers. I did go at one time to a trial. This was also at the point when the Vietnam Peace Talks were going on in Paris. There was a completely separate delegation within the embassy that was handling the Peace Talks, although I knew a couple of people in there. At the trial I attended the young man was facing the standard drug charges. I got the results of that trial and reported. In this case, I reported them to Ambassador Phil Habib, who was acting as our head of the Talks at that point, and stood there while he talked to the mother of the young man back in the State and conveyed to her the sad story that her son was going to spend jail time. I remember him saying, "Well, unfortunately, they also managed to bring in the fact that he had had a previous problem, which made the French even less sympathetic than they might have been." The French are not terribly sympathetic in their legal system. There are a number of people that suggest that French law is not to give you a guide to conduct but to assess blame after the fact. That was more of an approach to their traffic laws, for example.

Q: This was the time, '69-'71, where all hell was breaking loose around the world because of our involvement in Vietnam. Did that manifest itself at all other than the Peace Talks? Did you find it was an embassy almost under siege by the French? How was Vietnam playing at that time?

JONES: I think there was the sense that it was winding down with the beginning of the Talks, with the fact that Johnson elected not to run again, with the suggestion that we were on our way out, although very slowly, rather than continuing to prosecute the war at the level which we had, let alone build up to prosecute it with even more intensity. I certainly don't think there was a great deal of sympathy in France for the United States. There might have been a degree of grim amusement. They had been there, and we thought we could do it better. The fact that we were now lying flat on our face in the shit from which they had only barely and unpleasantly extracted themselves amused them, maybe amused them a great deal. But there was also perhaps a degree of "I told you so-ism" or "If you had really wanted to do this job, why didn't you help us when we were asking for

assistance” or “You were so arrogant as to tell us how to do the job and now you are in the process of screwing it up and getting screwed by it that we have already gone through.”

Q: Were you having demonstrations?

JONES: Certainly nothing that 30 years later gives me a twinge. I’m sure there were demonstrations. The French are always demonstrating against something. Part of it is because their unions are intensely politicized. There was both a communist union and a socialist union at that juncture. The communists were significantly stronger as a political force in France at the end of the ‘60s and the early ‘70s. You had regular one-day strikes by the CGT, the communist union. But because they were not well financed and they didn’t have real war chests, they couldn’t go out and close things down for weeks and weeks at a time. Their tactic was the sectoral strike – public utility workers, transportation workers, one group or another that would come out and have marches down the Champs-Élysées. But so far as specific violence associated with it, I don’t remember that level of violence. I remember confusion, certain periods of upset when the Metros were not working or the buses weren’t working and you had problems like that. Then you would always have people asking, “Is this going to be a repeat of May of ’69?” It just wasn’t so. I suspect that you could go to the newspapers and say it was a much more volatile and dramatic period than I’m remembering it as, but I’m not remembering a level of personal drama. I’m not remembering any riots against the embassy – windows broken, stones thrown, or having to withdraw people from some of our outlying buildings. We were spread all over the city, at least six different annexes where our people were associated. I would say that there was a struggle on our part to get our culture not accepted but to have our culture get an opportunity to present itself more comprehensively. You had in the economic section, which I should have remembered at the time, various fights over appellation (names). We, in the past, had labeled our wines as “Burgundies” or “Bordeaux” or labels like that. The French were just simply saying, “You cannot possibly bring a wine to France that has that kind of label on it because it isn’t from that region.” We were, at that juncture, arguing with increasing pressure and some degree of success that our wines were winning international blind taste testing. As a result, slowly over the last 30 years, our wine makers have become sufficiently confident of themselves that they’re able to say, “This is a Napa Valley red” and they’re not trying to label it in the way that the French quite correctly, although definitely irritatingly, were saying, “If this says ‘Bordeaux’ on it, it must come from Bordeaux.” I think we’ve gotten past that. One of the successes of the last generation has been that American wines have sliced out a niche in markets around the world for a certain type of quality and effectiveness in taste.

Q: Where else did you serve in those two years?

JONES: They rotated us to each section. I spent a certain amount of time, maybe less than six months, in the administrative section. I did a certain number of studies for them of the nature designed to keep this young person busy and try to induce him into doing more work in administrative affairs. If anything, I was almost irritated because they gave me

excessive praise for work that I thought was pretty trivial or certainly excessive praise for work that I thought was exceptionally easy and shouldn't have been praised at the level that it was.

But the most important work that I did in Paris and the most important work as a consequence for the rest of my Foreign Service career was done in the political section.

Q: In this period, what were you doing?

JONES: What I was doing was pretty standard internal domestic political section work. Let me talk a little bit about the political section. This was to me the equivalent of the "class the stars fell on" so far as West Point was concerned. During this period, in the late '60s and the early '70s, a man by the name of Robert Anderson was the political counselor. He went on to have at least a reasonably successful career as ambassador. Bob is dead now, unfortunately. Anderson was a very smart and very interesting man. As a person, you would not want Bob Anderson as your enemy. But as a friend, Anderson would be very interesting. He showed off in special ways but he also showed off in ways that were sufficiently clever so that you took a lesson. Anderson once was, so the story goes, reproached by a member of the Inspector General's staff for having given excessively high ratings to his political section members. Anderson turned around and figuratively tore a stripe off this guy and said that he had spent his entire career getting to the point where he would be political counselor in Paris and be able to select a team of the very best Foreign Service officers that he could assemble and that he had indeed assembled such a staff and that under no circumstances would he rate them less than exceptional. I could run down the list of these people and I will do so just to tell you how incredibly successful these people were. They were at that time almost all FS-03s, which is the 01 equivalent today.

Q: About the equivalent to colonels.

JONES: Yes, they were all colonel equivalents. All of these became ambassadors; Patricia Byrne, who was running East Asian affairs; John Condon, who was the labor counselor; Robert Frowick, who was the French communist and communist affairs officer; Alan Holmes, who has just retired; and Mike Glitman. Alan was the head of internal political affairs in Paris. Mike handled political-military affairs. Then there was also Andy Steigman, who was handling African affairs. Steigman, although he left the Foreign Service and has been out of the Foreign Service for probably 20 years, was also himself very successful as an Africanist. Steigman was one of the very few people at the time who actually was so far out of step as to wear a beard. This was at a time when any serious professional was clean shaven. Today, it's a sort of generational change that people wear beards and they don't wear beards. I've grown a beard three times in my life and now I'm clean shaven. But at that time, I would not have worn a beard as a serious Foreign Service officer and Steigman was virtually unique in so doing.

Q: He is teaching diplomatic practice at Georgetown. He's written books on the Foreign

Service. He's been sort of a professional's professional.

JONES: Indeed. I have not seen him in a long while, but I have a great deal of respect for him.

During that period of time, during the 6-8 months in which I was in the political section, which was also broken by going back to the consular section because they brought all of the junior officers back to the consular section to handle the summer rush and the summer flow of semi-catastrophes during July and August, I worked for both Holmes and Glitman being shared by them in this work. Each of them are exceptional professionals and most of the rest of my career was designed to find opportunities to work with one or another of them. Indeed, in the rest of my career, I worked for Holmes at least twice and for Glitman at least twice.

What I did as a political officer was, again, a very standard young domestic political officer reporting style. I did biographic analyses and ran the biographic files. I did a certain amount of analysis from newspapers, reading material and making presentations on the basis of this both either for political-military affairs or internal domestic affairs. Both Glitman and Holmes appreciated my writing style and gave me a certain amount of leeway in this regard. One of the interesting projects that I had was associated with the arrival of the new ambassador, Arthur Watson. He was one of the scions of the IBM empire, son of the IBM founder and a very senior Republican businessman. In contrast to Ambassador Shriver, Mr. Watson was obsessively punctual. He would run meetings in which if you were late, you contributed a dollar to a general fund that went into some charitable operation. It meant that you were on time. Watson was very tough on his more senior officers but also rather lenient and engaged with his younger, more junior officers. This was interesting also in a way. We had a certain amount of contact with him that was unusual for the time. He would pick up the telephone and call you directly, which, for somebody who was hierarchical and thinking as I already was, was surprising and flattering even. But for his senior people, he was very demanding and very tough on them. That made them less happy.

But one of the projects that Watson was engaged in was an assessment of everything that was going on in France that had a government connection whether it was being run efficiently and cost effectively. So, each one of a wide number of officers were sent out and required to do assessments on different aspects of American presence in France. I ended up looking at the American battlefield monument cemeteries throughout France. There was one that was far down in the south of France that I didn't get a chance to see. I visited as a result all of the battlefield cemeteries in northern France and also in Luxembourg. I went out on a trip with my wife in my then new car. This was a very interesting interview, reporting, gathering of information process. At the same time, it gave me some additional insights into how the American presence in Europe is permanent. As a consequence of the report, I suggested that the cemetery operations could be run more efficiently, that they were really something of a sinecure for a fair number of older, retired noncommissioned officers (NCOs) that were getting relatively good salaries

for a rather low amount of work, and that many of the cemeteries were not particularly heavily visited even 30 years ago. Certainly our World War I cemeteries were not. On the other hand, it also gave me an appreciation for the politics associated with this. You could give this kind of a job only to a naive, incredulous junior officer who would actually go out and not have an appreciation for the sacred cow status of the American Battlefield Monuments Commission operations throughout the world and in the United States. So, the embassy and I in particular got a blast back from Washington saying that, "This person doesn't know anything about what he's doing." By and large, that was the way it ended. Watson wasn't able to budge the Battlefield Monuments Commission to do anything. But it was an interesting experience for me personally to have had this opportunity.

Q: The battlefields came into a certain amount of prominence not too long before when de Gaulle had removed NATO from French soil. Supposedly the remark was, "Do you want us to remove our graves, too?"

JONES: Yes, there was that line, but it also was a throwaway line. The French just sort of shrugged it off. "You want us out of France? Shall we dig up our dead and take them home, too?" The 25th anniversary of D-Day was also at that time. That was 1969. There was a feeling that the French participation was very grudging, that it was not at a level that we would have appreciated. The French participation was "correct," but it was minimalistic rather than maximalistic.

I also participated in at least as an observer and viewer the July 14th marches and parades by the French. I was struck by the fact that these were the most militaristic parades that I had ever seen. My conclusion at the time was that it reflected the fact that France did not want to become a secondary military power, but it was forced to do so by geopolitical reality. In one of the parades, it was the first time that the Foreign Legion had participated in many years. They were back out again there. But a comparable American parade would have had floats and cheerleaders and marching bands and the girl for the day waving from a convertible. But this was a serious military parade that was marching right down the Champs-Élysées to the heart of Paris. That also gave me what I thought was a little insight on the French and the France of the day.

Q: Did you have any contact with the French officialdom at a lower level? Was there an attempt made on either part to get the junior officers in the French foreign affairs bureaucracy and the American and other embassies together?

JONES: No. We were not used as junior officers at the level in which we are now forced to use junior officers. We were very correct in most of our dealings with the French. As a matter of fact, there was an extended period of time in which our diplomatic list was limited. We were supposed to be matched with the number of diplomats that the Russians were permitted to have in France. This meant that actually for a number of months, I was not on the diplomatic list, and there was something of a scramble to eventually put me on the diplomatic list officially. I don't remember exactly when I was, but as a third

secretary, eventually, I was slowly squeezed onto the diplomatic list. It made for one interesting experience when I was sent out to do a little representational swing in an area of France. All of the political section officers were being sent out to do short regional trips to both show the flag a little bit and to get some insight to what was happening locally. Although I barely remember the specific details, I went up into northern France for a couple of days and had a couple of meetings. One of the meetings that I had was with a French provincial official who had hauled out the diplomatic list and was asking, in effect, "Mr. Jones, are you CIA," although he was not putting it that way. He was trying to make it clear that since I wasn't on the diplomatic list or at least not on the copy that they had, just who was I? It took me some degree of protestation, a relatively extensive effort to describe, at least to profess, that I was not otherwise connected, that I was a legitimate American diplomat and Foreign Service officer. After listening to me for a while, they were willing to accept this. Whether they believed it, I don't know. But at least they had had this young man squirming in front of them while they looked at this particular curious representation of American diplomatic life there. I'm not exactly sure whether they viewed me as a toad or a poisonous insect or whether they were just willing to say with a sigh, "All right, this American wants to listen to us. We'll give him the party line." That's what they did. They just talked to me about local circumstances of how things were operated and how things developed and the like. It was an interesting experience in that manner, giving me a chance to practice my French and have the chance to see another part of France. My wife and I – this moves into the social, cultural aspect of it – this was when we first became parents. We were parents of twins, which was a rather abrupt surprise. We had not anticipated twins. It was at a juncture when we did not use x-rays. People had gotten to the point where they didn't want to use x-rays anymore for fear and concern for the children. They had not really developed sonograms effectively enough and they weren't available, even at the American hospital in Neuilly. So, they did the standard listen to the heartbeats bit. Although my wife, who is not a very large woman and wasn't any larger then, was very, very pregnant and she was identifiable from 100 yards because they had never seen anyone quite so pregnant. We used to say that she was the most pregnant Chinese woman in Europe at the time. They would say to her, "One baby, Mrs. Jones. A big baby, but only one baby." It wasn't until the children were delivered that we realized that there were twins. Nevertheless, we tried as much as we could to travel within France. They were born in October 1969. We traveled with them and sometimes without them as much as we could throughout France. We traveled to Belgium, into Germany. We hit various places as extensively as we could around Paris. We traveled to a degree to the South of France, but we did not get as far south as Marseille. But elsewhere, we did what we could under the circumstances and appreciated the opportunity a great deal. This, too, was an opportunity where what they say was the truth, that there are two French – the French in Paris, the Parisian, and those outside of Paris. It wasn't a night and day exercise, but you came to realize that if you compared the Parisian with anybody, you compared them with New Yorkers. New Yorkers are unpleasant, hostile, irritating, difficult. You can get into an argument with any cab driver. They have no interest in you except for whether or not they can extract something from you. Although Parisians, although not exactly with the same characteristics, had the same level of indifference to anyone who was not a native-born citizen of Paris. Outside of

Paris, it was much less so. They disliked Parisians. That always gave you something to talk about. You also got a deeper sense for the history, the culture, and the society and just what France was in comparison to other places in Europe or the world.

Q: Here you are under Bob Anderson. Did you have the feeling that we were reporting on the internal politics out in the provinces but that the real game was being played in Paris and what was happening out in the provinces was interesting but more a practice run rather than the real game?

JONES: I think you've hit it absolutely. If anything, most of the officers were very reluctant to waste any time doing one of these regional trips. They were ordered to do so and they would do their one or so obligatory regional trip. But the action in France was then, as has been historically, centrally directed. This is a society that is run out of Paris. People have pointed out that at least at that time almost every country that had had a city of one million had at least a second city of one million or more. But France was the exception for this. In France, there was only one city of a million inhabitants or more and that was Paris. You could say that Paris was the center of everything. If the United States has an economic center in New York and a cultural center somewhere else and a political center in Washington, in France there was only one center for everything. It was Paris. You look at the roads and went out on the road and the roads all are marked in miles to Paris when you are looking in the direction of Paris. The center of operations, the center of whatever was happening, the center of our interest in France, was in Paris and what the French officials were doing. As the political section was broken down, it was broken down regionally and functionally, and those people with specific regional interests whether it was Africa or the Middle East or European communist affairs, or Russia, etc., we had our specialists dealing with those. If it was labor or political-military issues, we had an officer following those approaches. We found them in Paris. You weren't going to get anything that was useful in the way of information other than the general political feelings or sociological sense outside of Paris. You could get a certain amount of flavor. You might do it just to have an opportunity to go someplace else and get out of Paris for a while, but the conclusion was – and I believe accurately – that you would find all you really needed to know about what was happening in France from your connections in Paris. Those were domestic political connections as well. French office holders can hold office at multiple levels, not just on the national level. A member of parliament will be also a mayor. He may hold other ranks in between. So, these deputies in the National Assembly would also be able to be local spokesmen at the same time. This is a very curious phenomena. It must exist elsewhere in the world, but I haven't encountered it outside of Paris, where you have this kind of interconnection between local provincial and urban leadership and national leadership. Of course, France is not a federal state. France remains a very centrally directed country.

Q: How did we view the French Communist Party at that time?

JONES: We were very hostile to the French Communist Party. There was only one officer in the entire embassy, Bob Frowick, who was permitted to have any contact with the

French communists. We did not deal with the French Communist Party in any official way other than this very tangential and not terribly frequent degree of association by Frowick, who had reasonably good contacts with them. Of course, it was much to their interest to be as open or approachable or willing to meet the Americans as possible. But I can't recall specifically that he did have occasional meetings with their most senior figures – George Marchais, for example.

Q: Wasn't the feeling that the French Communist Party was a tool of the Soviets or was there a different dynamic?

JONES: Certainly this was the most subservient Communist Party in non-communist Europe. There was no euro communism at that point, certainly not reflected in France. This was a slavishly Moscow-oriented Communist Party. They made it a virtue. This was a very, very old line, very Moscow-directed, Moscow-accepting Communist Party. They had themselves deep roots in French society from the commune. They certainly saw themselves as still potentially being able to gain power. They were running at better than 20 percent of the electorate and it seemed to be an unbreakable 20 percent. They put deputies into the National Assembly. There were substantial portions of the area that were clearly a "red belt" outside of Paris and in the Parisian suburbs. I believe that we did not want to be in the position of giving the communists any suggestion that we had the slightest degree of sympathy toward their interests and we certainly did not want to give the French government the slightest intimation that we had any sympathy with the communists. For that reason, it was made very clear to us as officers in the political section that only Bob Frowick would have liaison with the French communists. No one argued the case. There was an acceptance, more grudging than not, that we did have to know what the communists were doing. But there was no real interest in associating with them.

Q: You left there in '71. Whither?

JONES: At that point, I left to go on leave without pay. I was still very interested in completing my Ph.D., which I didn't finish. But I thought I would be able to write a dissertation in a year. I was also faced with what seemed to be a greater likelihood than not that I would be assigned to CORDS as my next position. We sent hundreds of our junior officers there over the period of time of the war. Although I was a wholehearted supporter of American participation in Vietnam, by 1971, it was clear that anyone who went there was a fool. There was nothing that was going to happen that was going to be positive, helpful, or useful to American interests or let alone to personal career to go there. It was with a degree of disgust on my part but with a degree of recognition that there was also no particular desire on my part to separate myself from my wife and children, who were still just a little over one year old to go there. So, I was also interested in going back to the University of Pennsylvania. That's what I elected to do. I got a year's leave without pay and returned to my wife's hometown, Vineland, New Jersey. I also got a dormitory room at the University of Pennsylvania and spent much of about a year in working on my dissertation, writing chapters. This was roughly '71-'72.

Q: What was your dissertation on?

JONES: It was focused on the role of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in the period of the Cultural Revolution. I was doing a number of analyses on the army itself and its development and its role leading up to the Cultural Revolution and certain aspects of it during that period of time. I made reasonably good progress on it. I completed several chapters and I still think that I had done most of my research for the chapters involved, but I ran out of time, or I ran out of energy, or I ran out of my ability to do two things at once. That pretty much finished the dissertation, although I continued to work on it sporadically for another year. But it, too, eventually was something that I couldn't do simultaneously with my jobs at the Department of State. At this time also, however, it became clear that my wife could enter the Foreign Service. There was a change of the law and the interpretation of the law at roughly this juncture, approximately 1971/'72, where two things that had previously prohibited her from being an FSO were eliminated. One was that you had to have been a citizen for 10 years before you could become a Foreign Service officer. My wife was naturalized in 1963. There had been no expectation that she would have a Foreign Service career before that. The more important prohibition was that a married woman could not be a Foreign Service officer. When you look at it in the retrospective of 30 years, you wonder how in the name of Heaven we managed to run until 1971 with a prohibition against married women being Foreign Service officers. But we did. Also at this time, the officer efficiency reports included comments on the spouse of the Foreign Service officer. Again, something which today people would look upon and say, "Why in the name of Heaven would you have something like that in the report?" But it was very standard up until the early '70s. What it did was stimulate my career development officer to look at the very positive observations that my political section supervisors had made about my wife and say, "David, this is exactly the kind of woman that ought to take the Foreign Service exam." That sort of surprised us. We had never really thought of my wife having a Foreign Service career until then. Indeed, her family's diplomatic experience had been somewhat more negative. It had not been a life of luxury to live as a Chinese diplomat in the Soviet Union during World War II. There are all sorts of good stories that I'll let her tell if you wanted to hear them about her family history. We began to move in that direction. When we moved to Washington after I had spent the year at the University of Pennsylvania and in Vineland, New Jersey, during this period of time, our children got through the terrible twos and did things of that nature. She taught mathematics at the high school from which she had graduated as valedictorian and had been selected to teach mathematics by the principal that had been there when she had been the valedictorian. Then the school board forced her to leave and, in effect, fired the only Ph.D. they had in their school system because she didn't have teaching credentials. So, she spent a little bit of time during that year taking education courses at a local community college and doing her practice teaching. She became a credentialed educator so far as the State of New Jersey was concerned. That was one of the alternatives we were considering. She also could have gone back to research at the Department of Agriculture, where she had rights for rehiring. But in the early '70s, it was not a lush market for chemical researchers. This was a down time for them and they were not hiring, so that

was not an option that she was going to pursue immediately. The consequence of it was that I had at the University of Pennsylvania renewed my contacts with the Foreign Policy Research Institute with Bill Kintner and although not with Strausz-Hupé because he was out doing his various diplomatic assignments at that time. I did a certain amount of research work for the Foreign Policy Research Institute while I was working on my dissertation as well.

Q: After your year, your wife took the Foreign Service exam?

JONES: What we did was, we finished our year in Philadelphia and Vineland, New Jersey. We returned to Washington. at that juncture, I had an assignment with the Intelligence and Research Bureau [INR] as the Korean analyst for INR. Also, in the fall of '72, my wife took the Foreign Service exam. Then some months later, roughly in the winter of '73, she took the oral exam. A year later, she was brought in as a Foreign Service officer in January of '74. But during the period from the fall of '72 until the summer of '74, I worked as the Korean analyst for INR.

Q: From '72-'74, you were in INR. What was the situation in Korea?

JONES: This was the period in which Park Chung Hee moved to take full control of the government and the society again. There was a time until then when there had been the expectation by some, perhaps the hope by others, that he would step down and allow if not a restoration of democracy, perhaps more of a general switch of leadership. People were hoping that this would be the beginning of a slow transition from direct or slightly indirect military rule into a functioning democracy in Korea. Phil Habib was the ambassador in Korea. Obviously, we were disappointed. It did not happen. This was also a period of time in which we were concerned as we had been regularly every couple of years that the North Koreans were going to invade. This was also the period of the surprise '73 war in the Middle East. We extrapolated the concerns of a surprise attack, the Egyptians and others in the Middle East, into the potential for a surprise attack in Korea from the North. Here at the time, the military balance was still one in which we were not at all convinced that the North could not successfully attack the South. The North and South in military terms still seemed to be pretty closely balanced. The North also had a good deal of support both from China and Russia. It looked as if they were very effectively balancing off the Chinese against the Russians for an increasing level of support to them. Pyongyang would ultimately play its Beijing and its Moscow cards. At that time, Russia and China were themselves in intense political conflict. This was still at that point where countries played off the United States and the Soviets against each other could find ways to get more support. Here the North Koreans played one communist country off against the other. Pyongyang was able to do that.

This was also a period in which Kim Tae Jong was kidnapped. The kidnapping came at a time when we were unclear just to what degree the South Korean government was willing to interfere with its own citizenry. I'll say again that, in this juncture, I made a mistake. I was a poor judge of whether the South Koreans would have directly involved themselves

in seizing Kim Tae Jong. I thought that it had been some other group that had done it rather than the representatives of the South Korean government. The North had done some of this kidnapping previously. I thought the North Koreans had been involved in the kidnap and seizure of Kim Tae Jong. But it turned out otherwise.

Q: What sort of information were we getting out of North Korea? Was this part of your province?

JONES: Yes. Frankly, much of the information we were getting was lousy. Let's say it was extremely limited information. I spent a great deal of time reading the Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS] transcripts to try to get some sort of insight as to what the North Korean leadership and society was doing and how it was operating. It was largely regarded as the most closed society in the world at that time. An alternative might have been placed in Albania. It was certainly one of the most difficult areas to get any specific information on at all. We had very, very rare reporting from neutrals of one sort or another who might have visited the North. So, the information that we had would largely be regarded as sensitive intelligence type information. I suspect it remains sensitive intelligence. But the best of our information was very limited information. It resulted in us creating constructs where we had to lean always on the worst case. Most of the information that we obtained was military-oriented in one shape or form. This was the most collectible information. We simply had nothing other than what the North Koreans wanted to provide to us directly from their publications to determine what the society was doing.

Q: One of the mindsets that was around about Korea was that Park Chung Hee is a dictator, there should be more democracy, but at the same time, Park Chung Hee was doing a remarkable job economically in taking what used to be considered a basket case and turning it into a real dynamo of energy, and that the Koreans were often called the Irish of the Orient, the idea being that if they ever got a democracy, they would be basically rather weak and divided and it might give an opportunity for the North. Was that in play at all then?

JONES: I would say the first part of your comment is accurate. There was serious discussion as to whether we should attempt to reverse Park's reaffirmation of power when he did so. Phil Habib was inclined to try to do more, more pressure, more direct and public U.S. pressure rather than the degree of public dissatisfaction that we evinced, but we never suggested that we would withdraw or reduce our military presence or our military support on the degree and level that we did subsequently in Greece. The sense remained that the stakes were still so high in Korea and that the North was so potentially threatening or that the fear that there would be a renewal of the war whether the North could win or not that we would not risk reducing our support. The potential for war by miscalculation on the part of the North was another unknown. We had no idea what the North was thinking. Since we didn't know what they knew, and we knew we didn't know what they knew, that meant that they could be thinking of anything. Their rhetoric remained very aggressive, very confrontational, very much a stimulus to worst case

thinking. So, there was the fear that if we implied that our commitment to South Korea was less, we would be in the position of duplicating the hideous mistake that we had made in 1950. If then by miscalculation in this manner, we forced ourselves into Korean war reviviscus (renewed), it really would be a catastrophe, not that we didn't believe that we couldn't ultimately win that kind of a war. It was just that the costs involved in winning that type of a war would be significantly higher than we wanted to pay for the potential objective of pushing Park out even if we could - and there was no assurance that we could by upping the pressure on Park force him to reverse his decision to retain power. So, with the stakes as high as they were on the downside, as low as they were on the potential for success, and as unclear as to what the result would be if we did stimulate his departure, the conclusion was that we should make the better of a bad case.

There was no question in my view that South Korea was steadily improving itself. This was one of the areas that has interested me throughout my career in which I've had a couple of Korean experiences. I still follow the society and the operations there tangentially at least. This was an occasion of relatively short remove from my first experience, which was in 1965. Here I am, back in 1972, so I am still pretty close to it. In 1971/'72, I could tell from the statistics that Korea was really beginning to pull itself up by the bootstraps in the way that I suggested in some of my earlier comments. The society and the economics were working. I did not have the opportunity to make a visit to Korea during '71-'72. I regret this, but this was not when they had any money to send INR officers out to their regions. But I could see that things were clearly getting better. Park had made certain decisions actually against the recommendations of the economists such as building a superhighway from Seoul to the south where others had suggested that there were much more effective ways to spend his money than the ways in which they did. But the combination still of very heavy U.S. economic and military assistance plus Korean natural willingness to work extremely hard, to be entrepreneurial and to defer consumption, resulted in spending a good 20 years plus in building a society that economically has been quite successful. Park was one of the people that pushed, led, directed, helped set up a society, and an economy, that with all of its many flaws (which an economist could happily point out to you) nevertheless clearly was starting to move the South ahead of the North. There were people in the mid-late '60s and the early '70s looking at North and South and saying that the North had the better of the potential economies, the better of the natural resources, the better of the hydroelectric power. There was the belief that its population was going to give it certain advantages while the South, which was primarily a rice growing agricultural area that had been substantially destroyed, and which had very limited natural resources was going to have worse problems. What was it going to do with all of these people and its limited opportunities?

I don't remember myself spending any time on the South Korean domestic politics as it might have been in a post-Park Chung Hee government. That was something that we just weren't reviewing or analyzing or working on at all. What I seemed to do was to spend a great deal of time writing, rewriting, and rewriting again material in INR which seemed to combine the worst of academic writing with the most labyrinthian, convoluted, and infighting directed aspects of the Department of State. You realize only in retrospect that

INR is a place where they put young officers who don't know any better and old officers who don't have much of a future.

Q: What was the role of INR with policy? Was there any policy that could be changed at this time?

JONES: Of course, that was part of the problem of INR and it still remains part of the problem of INR that it has very little policy effect. As a young officer – and I'll never say that I was a particularly bureaucratically savvy officer – I did not realize how little effect INR had. I was still more academically inclined than operationally directed. With the exception of two years in Paris, my career had been an academic one. I was still interested in a Ph.D. I still had some abstract theoretical thought of teaching at a university. I looked upon INR as the State Department's research arm, the State Department's academic element. If I got a particular aspect of understanding of the academics versus operations in government, it was a recognition, at this point, that the academics have a substantially limited knowledge of what was or has happened and they are always a substantial amount, months if not years, behind the reality of what is happening. Nevertheless, it took me a while to realize that INR's influence on what is actually happening at policy levels is very, very limited. It's a function of the fact that the expertise and the immediate knowledge is usually on the desks. That is where senior policy levels are going to draw their recommendations, draw their most pertinent policy related papers. If you are a semi-academic, yes, you could write in INR. But the number of people in INR who at that time had very little knowledge of the areas in which they were operating and attempting to be and claiming to be experts was much higher than those who had had substantial or relatively recent experience in the field who were assigned to INR. The people with the expertise who had gone back and forth to the country were the people on the desk.

What I slowly got myself into doing was providing more support for the specific Korea desk officer and working with them, a man by the name of Don Ranard. Don was a very smart, tough, old Korea hand.

Q: He had a very strong point of view opposed to Park Chung Hee.

JONES: Yes. Ranard ran the Korea desk at the time when I was the Korea analyst for INR. He repeatedly called in South Korean representatives and told them in no uncertain terms that their activities with Koreans living in the United States were unacceptable.

Ranard was very professional. He was supported by another officer who went on to do work in UN affairs by the name of Wesley Kriebel. I've lost touch with Kriebel a long time ago, but he also had Korean experience, although he was doing more Korean economic work at that time.

Q: Ranard was objecting to the activities of what was known as the KCIA, the Korean CIA.

JONES: We were also very interested in the activities of Kim Chong Pil [KCP], who was a close American contact in Korea and who continued to give us a wide variety of insight as to what was happening, in his view at least, in Korean society and Korean politics at that point. We got a great deal of information that seemed to be sourced from very senior Korean officials during that period. But beyond that, there isn't a great deal. We spent more time worried about and analyzing to the extent that we could what was happening in North Korea.

Q: Did we see the opening with China which happened around this time as changing the equation?

JONES: Only in retrospect, only to the extent that we began to wonder whether Chinese support for Korea might be lessening a little bit, whether the Chinese themselves were also perhaps putting a little bit of a rein on what Pyongyang was able to do. There was some suggestion that the South Koreans might be slowly beginning to open lines of contact with China that previously they had had no opportunity to do. We were keeping careful track of the countries with which North Korea and South Korea had diplomatic contact and diplomatic relationships, trying to push the South Korean case forward and detract from the North Korean case with countries of this nature. That was one of the ongoing projects that INR studied and handled on a month to month basis and on which I put out regular reports.

One of the things that we were interested in was an opportunity for China and South Korea to reach some level of contact. There were the beginnings at this point of meetings, usually always in some third country, that suggested the beginnings of indirect contact or a lessening of axiomatic hostility, ideologically driven, by Beijing to South Korea. The South kept tossing out lines of potential contact and implying that there were economic opportunities for China to deal with the South.

Of course, this was still tied into what type of relationship South Korea had with Taiwan, which was something that obviously would have been high on Beijing's agenda. If South Korea wanted a better relationship with Beijing, it would have to reduce its level of contact with Taiwan. I can't remember the status of it at that point, but this was one of these slowly evolving relationships.

We were also concerned about the degree of contact and how South Korea and Japan were going to develop. South Korean and Japanese relationship was very tense. South Korea had a combination of very realistic historical animosity and ongoing competition toward Japan. Japanese continued semi-disdain connected still with a "Well, we really should do something for them" not quite noblesse oblige, but "Well, we really do have to do something for them. It's not so much we were wrong as that the Americans keep pushing us to do something." You had this type of a gritted teeth relationship between them where the South Koreans were always eager to take offense and play the blame game.

Q: There was also a little North Korean activity in Japan which was used against...

JONES: The North Korean group of agents and supporters.

Q: I can't remember when Park's wife was assassinated, but I think the assassin had ties to this Japanese group, which didn't help matters.

JONES: I can't remember that tie, but Park's wife's assassin was certainly North Korean directed and sponsored. The North throughout this period continued to do the wildest, most idiosyncratic kinds of assaults on the South. If you had a paranoia against what was going to happen from the North, it was well-honed paranoia. Every so often, you found one of these huge underground tunnels that had crossed under the DMZ. Later they blew up a substantial portion of the South Korean cabinet while they were in Burma. It was just astonishing action.

Q: It continues. They keep picking up these damned small submarines.

JONES: Yes. Every so often, there was something of that nature. The North had regular infiltrators that were caught. It was always a bloody, ferocious firefight in which you could say that the northern infiltrators seemed to literally be quite willing to die and to kill everybody they possibly could before they died. You talk about fanaticism. If the fanatic is on your side, he's wonderful. He's tremendously courageous and outrageously brave and you think he's the perfect soldier. If he's on the other side, he's obviously a crazy, ideology driven, drug hopped up madman. Well, at the same time, if you look at it with some perspective, fanatics are also terribly courageous and you have to wonder how the society is able to motivate them to this level of activity. This was the type of person that you were getting from the North.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point? You left INR in 1974?

JONES: Yes.

Q: Where did you go then?

JONES: I went to the area in which I spent much of the next dozen years or so of my life: the NATO desk and EUR/RPM. From there I went to assignments at NATO and back into EUR. It was all political-military directed work which I would say ran from that time until roughly 1992.

Q: We'll pick this up in 1974.

Today is April 19, 1999. You were in NATO affairs from 1974 to when?

JONES: Essentially straight NATO affairs from 1974-1980, first on the desk from early 1974 until the summer of 1976 and then a switch to U.S. Mission NATO in the summer of '76.

Q: Let's concentrate on '74-'76. What was your job?

JONES: I won't quite say that it was a supernumery desk position but it was within a subpolitical section within the NATO desk certainly for the first stretch of time on this. We were doing support work for the Political Committee at NATO. We were also doing work for the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society [CCMS], which was an environmental and scientific type of NATO subcommittee, an effort to make NATO a little less military and show a kinder and friendlier face to NATO. Even at that time, there was some concern that NATO shouldn't be viewed as a straight military alliance. It was also the tag ends when I arrived of the Year of Europe and the CSCE declarations, the Helsinki-related declarations. These were in the final phases of being created. The man for whom I originally went to RPM to work for, Robert Frowick, who is the man running the NATO summit right now, the 50th anniversary summit, was a deputy subdirector or section director within RPM at that time. He had been the general drafter, creator, organizer, of many of the Year of Europe declarations and Helsinki-related declarations.

Q: I'm trying to pick up attitudes. Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State. I would have thought that things like the Helsinki Accords would have been viewed by people like yourself working with NATO would be that this was all fine but it really was something of no real consequence that was mostly PR.

JONES: There was an element to it that said that the Russians were getting a better deal out of this than we were getting. One phrase from the time was, "The Russians have got their half loaf and we're going to have to fight for ours." The point for the Russian half loaf was the guarantee of borders, that borders were not going to be changed other than by the most democratic means. It looked as if under those circumstances what we had done was put a seal on the permanent division of Germany. The side of the loaf for which we would have to fight which was being presented now as a touchy-feely-kind of thing, was the openings that they were supposed to guarantee, the greater freedoms, the greater access to publications, to information, theoretically greater flows of movement of populations. There were people who thought that it would never come to pass, that it just wasn't going to happen, that the Russians would stonewall us and we would get nothing out of our side of the CSCE. What it proved very slowly over about 15 years and more is that it was far more successful than we thought it was going to be at the time. The series of CSCE review conferences always seemed to be a fight uphill, but we were steadily able to put the then-Soviets on the defensive in the way of humanitarian, human rights, openness of populations, greater elements of discussion, exchanges of publications, things of this nature. Most of the people who had as much a military spin to their thinking as a political spin to it didn't think they were going to be all that successful.

Q: What was your particular bit of NATO?

JONES: At the beginning, it was a very small bite, not much more than a nibble to the extent of assisting in the preparation of instructions for people at NATO in one of the subcommittees, the Political Committee. It was not even a very senior NATO committee. And also work on the Committee on Challenges of Modern Society, which again in retrospect actually people had more hopes for as something that was being kicked off, something that might be quite dynamic and dramatic in its prospects, which has continued on but as a very tertiary element of NATO, and I don't think has ever developed anywhere near to the level that they hoped it might in scientific.

Q: In many ways, it's been superseded by more global organizations, hasn't it?

JONES: I guess so. There have been other things that have emphasized global outlooks and global aspects for environment. Perhaps it never got anywhere because it was never possible for it to. Even my wife will tell you at some point that the science that was presented in the way of projects to be done in CCMS was science that couldn't get funding anywhere else because it was pretty poor science. The things that they would bring out, like an electric powered vehicle, were also things that were being done in many other places probably more effectively. So, I was involved with this for perhaps six to nine months.

Then I moved to another section within RPM. That proved to be more interesting and more productive in many ways. This was dealing with the Nuclear Planning Group, the NPG, and a variety of political-military studies that were being done on the utility of nuclear weapons use under certain circumstances and the development of certain new types of nuclear weaponry, enhanced radiation, and reduced blast. They were almost abstract political-military concepts at least at my midgrade level. I see myself as more of a political-military technician working on these studies than anything else.

Q: I'd like to probe the feeling about nuclear weapons. To the layman, you look upon Europe and tactical nuclear weapons seem to be a complete oxymoron. How can something be tactical and be nuclear? How did you approach it and as you went on this thing, did you change? How did you feel about what people were talking about?

JONES: That is a marvelously complex subject with all of the iterations that you suggest. How did I personally feel about it? I felt that the weapons could be used. I did not feel that the use of one nuclear weapon or even substantial numbers of nuclear weapons meant that there was without any question going to be a world annihilation. I felt that nuclear weapons in Europe were absolutely necessary for us to be able to hold off the threat of a Soviet attack. There was a complex NATO European working group going on here as to where and how a war could or might be fought and under what circumstances. I remember the very first NATO nuclear-oriented meeting I attended. I was still ignorant about some of this. At the same time, we were urging an increase in European conventional force capabilities. There was a three percent plan in which we were steadily pushing the Europeans to increase conventional capabilities across a wide spectrum of

weaponry and of capabilities. Only one element of this spectrum was improved nuclear weapons and improved nuclear capability. But the question that I raised in effect was, “Why are you Europeans so resistant to increasing conventional capabilities?” I will never forget a German response that said, “We have no interest in making Europe safe for conventional war.” They had been there. They had done that. They wanted – or at least this group of Germans representing that government at that time – very clearly wanted it understood that there would be a nuclear war if there was a war. They did not want a situation in which they were going to be forced into an extended conventional slugging match with the Russians. As a result, we had elaborate scenarios as to what would happen under which conventional circumstances. We did not believe that we would be able to hold for an extended period of time with conventional weapons. Then the question would come as to what type of a nuclear scenario you would use? I bought into this. In honesty, I still think it not only would have worked but did work. We did indeed convince the Russians that if there was going to be a war it would end by being a nuclear war, that we would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons. I don’t think we would have hesitated. We would have thought, but we wouldn’t have hesitated. We would rather have gone to nuclear weapons than to have lost Europe as a result of a fight with the Soviets. We just weren’t going to lose Europe. We had convinced ourselves and the Europeans that a loss of Europe to the Soviets would mean a very, very isolated America and eventually our loss as well, that we would end by losing our own freedom and security if European freedom and security were lost. As we were not willing to expend the financing or the social commitment to build conventional forces to a level that we thought we would be able to stave off a Soviet attack, we depended as well on nuclear weapons to do so.

At the same time, there were doubters. There were a set of European doubters as well. This was a question of whether our use of nuclear weapons would result in heavier strikes by the Soviets in which case the argument was that we would only lose the war faster if we resorted to the use of tactical nuclear weapons within Europe. This was an argument that, happily, was never resolved by real testing. But it was an ongoing, persistent argument.

Q: Did you get involved at all with at least the fruits of these people in the Pentagon who were sitting around planning, “If we lose 20 million people and they lose 25 million people, we’re coming out ahead,” playing at the mega scale about nuclear exchanges?

JONES: No, I didn’t see that type of study. I worked a little bit on certain hypothetical exchanges on a lower level and whether some of these scenarios would work to our benefit. In particular, there was one case which came out all positive for NATO. That was how we used nuclear weapons to beat back a perspective amphibious assault by the Russians, which was a very clean study in all manner, shapes, and forms. It was clean because none of this weaponry landed, in effect, on NATO territory. It was all maritime. There was less as a result of an expectation perhaps that the Soviets would respond with nuclear weapons or they would have fewer immediate massed NATO targets in the same way.

In the same manner, just about this time, we began studying a variety of new advanced nuclear technology in an effort to find ways to make our nuclear weapons more usable on a tactical basis. These were the enhanced radiation weapons or enhanced blast weapons and a variety of what they called “earth penetrator” weapons to use against a particularly hardened facility’s air base or underground command post, things of this nature. But the effort to use what later became known as the neutron bomb was indeed conceived of as a very humane exercise on our part, an effort to deal with the problems of Soviet armored formations. Their armor was just large enough and heavy enough with thick enough armor that our regular conventional weapons were seen as not that effective at that juncture. We were just beginning to talk about precision guided munitions, which were also very expensive. Our conventional anti-tank weaponry was not deemed to be that powerful or effective. The soldiers using it were regarded as pretty vulnerable in trying to use it. Consequently one of the things that they turned to was, “How can we use nuclear weapons, our most powerful and effective weapons, against armor formations in a way that would be tactically effective and less damaging to the area in which they would be fighting?” We never moved away from a recognition that this was our own territory on which we were fighting. No one was ever thinking of carrying the attack to the other side.

Q: Except for interdiction.

JONES: Right. But there was no talk about taking an opportunity to unify Germany if they were foolish enough to attack us. It was always a recognition that we would be killing our friends or at least people who were not particularly hostile to us. We never thought that Warsaw Pact allies were particularly hostile to the West or particularly combat effective so far as that was concerned. There was some concern about the likelihood that the Russians would push these people to the front of the assault and force us to waste our weaponry on inferior troops while they were more or less behind Warsaw Pact formations. But the nuclear philosophy was also not a last ditch philosophy. We were not going to put ourselves in a situation where we wouldn’t choose nuclear weapons until we were at the point of defeat. That was also both an American concern and a European concern.

Q: During this '74-'76 period, we had a plan for the worst. How did we view the Soviet threat and the likelihood that the Soviets might do something and why?

JONES: I’m not sure I was particularly introspective at that point. There was an ongoing, endless concern that the Russians were just one or two steps away from being able to exploit a failure on our part. This is only six years away from the time in which they crushed all resistance in Czechoslovakia. Soviet willingness to beat their own people into submission over and over again was very pointed. It was something with which young officers or mid-level officers of my generation had been the abiding foreign affairs aspect, that Soviet influence was behind virtually all the problems that we could specifically identify around the world, and Europe remained the area in which we could lose the most the most quickly if we were not constantly on guard. This is why there were ongoing, endless concerns about the degree to which communists were active in France or in Italy.

It's also just about pre-eurocommunism. Whether the communists were going to be able to put a more cleverly adroit face on their nefarious actions.

Q: During this time, were people you were with concerned about the American army because of the abrasion that Vietnam caused on its fighting power?

JONES: Yes. There was a recognition that the Army was not what it had been. There was serious concern that the Army had not managed to emerge from being blamed for losing the war that the civilians had actually lost in Vietnam. But the retrospective problems of transitioning from a draftee army to an all-volunteer army and the questions as to whether an all volunteer army would work, whether it would be the right kind of army that we wanted were still in play. We were still struggling with drug associated difficulties in the military and particularly in the Army. I don't know how long it took for us to get to a point where we were more confident in the military capabilities of this new all volunteer army. Perhaps by the end of the '70s, the early '80s, we were beginning to be more confident that the Army had turned the corner and that the all volunteer military was working. But in these early-mid-'70s, it was still an army that needed recovery time. Individual officers that I met, individual mid-level field grade officers that I met, these were all very capable people, but they were also very dubious about the all volunteer army. They were afraid that what you were going to get was an army that no longer reflected America and as a result of which the population itself wouldn't support. They were also concerned that it was going to be a pretty stupid army. The people that they were going to get weren't going to be from any university background. They were also going to miss, they believed, the better class of ROTC graduate officers who were from better schools and had always provided also something of a leavening effect within the military. There were those that were afraid that we would start moving toward a pretorian military, that it might erode the concept of civilian authority over the military. You did not have, in effect, a draftee army that reflected the wide range of the population. There were people that remembered enough out of the French experience in Algeria and wondered whether we would start moving in the direction of an army that was politicized in some ways and divorced from control in others because it was an all volunteer military. These were mid-level major/lieutenant colonel officers who didn't really like what they were seeing in this all-volunteer army. Perhaps they and I didn't like it that much because we didn't know what could be done with it.

Q: It was a step into the unknown.

JONES: Well, in some respects it wasn't. Historically, we had not really been a draftee military. We had been an all-volunteer military. But it was the first time we were trying to meet circumstances that saw global responsibility rather than fighting Indians or being only a defensive force, having only a few thousand people. There were a lot of people that looked at the pre-World War I military, which was an all volunteer military, and said, "This was not a very good military. This was a Chinese army military," the phrase being "You don't make good iron into nails and you don't make good men into soldiers." That was the kind of military that people recall in From Here to Eternity, James Jones military.

They thought that was the kind of all-volunteer military we would get. Well, we are very fortunate – it hasn't turned out that way. But in the early '70s, people certainly weren't sure about that.

Q: Within your circle, not at the higher regions, what was the thought process about members of NATO? For example, this was a very critical time with Portugal. Did that come into play at all?

JONES: That was a little bit before my time. But, yes, we were certainly worried about communists in government. Indeed we set things up at NATO so that we had confidence in the Portuguese ambassador there. But we put real limits on what he could do and see, and we managed our way around the fear of communists in government in Portugal. At the same time, we began thinking of a Portuguese military modernization program. How can we strengthen their military? How can we make sure that their military remains involved in NATO military things? Some of this was a long ongoing program that I'm not sure has ever even really come to an end. But it involved a variety of areas in which we tried to strengthen the Portuguese military, particularly the Portuguese navy. Maybe that was Azores-related. There was a long ongoing frigate construction program for the Portuguese navy. But the Portuguese army was also one about which people were concerned.

Q: What about the French? They were sort of in and out. Would they be with us, ahead of us, behind us?

JONES: The French were always infuriating. If you took a description of the French at the time, you would feel in some ways that they ranged between irritating and infuriating. At the same time, there was recognition that on a very quiet military-to-military basis, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, SACEUR, had been working out arrangements with the French military. SACEUR had always been an American. I can't remember when General Al Haig was out there, but he was SACEUR in approximately that time. The fact that the French had military divisions in Germany for the defense of Germany gave us always the sense that they would fight in a clear Soviet attack on Germany – not because they loved the Germans, but because keeping the Russians further away from the French border would obviously be to French benefit. There wasn't much fear that the French would make a separate deal with the Russians. That was occasionally bruited about as a worst case possibility. It was something that the Russians would try from time to time in their discussions of "no first use" aspects of nuclear weaponry. But the French never left the North Atlantic Council [NAC]. They were always represented at the next step below the NAC, the Senior Political Committee [SPC]. They were always represented there. They were also always represented on the Political Committee, which was again another step below the SPC. But they had stayed out of the military side and as a consequence they also stayed out of the nuclear planning aspect. We very deliberately always kept a seat in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) for the French. The French were never closed out of these meetings so far as us removing their nametag and options. We also kept a seat for the French in the discussions on Mutual and Balanced Force

Reductions (MBRF). They didn't participate, but we kept a seat. These were for discussions of conventional forces and conventional force reductions. This is something that I also got involved in substantially while I was at NATO later, although not in this first two years-plus on the NATO desk.

Q: What about the smaller countries – Holland, Denmark, Belgium, Norway? They had rather substantial neutralist groups or at least groups that had not as much a tendency to feel they were on the frontline. How were they?

JONES: These countries did not send their “neutralists” to NATO, first of all, nor were their governments neutralist or ambivalent about NATO. As you indicate, in the Netherlands, there was a neutralist element. Historically, the Dutch have been neutral at times in European conflict. I would say that the Belgians were not. The Belgians were strongly committed to NATO. The Nordic countries were involved but not engaged. NATO, working on consensus, as it does, in theory allows any single country to stop a NATO consensus. That could mean that the totally unarmed and indefensible Icelandic community could stand up and say that they refused to go forward with a particular level of agreement or particular proposal. In fact, however, this just didn't happen. None of the Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Norway, Iceland – ever prevented a significant NATO action from going forward. You had intelligent questions from them and you had an implicit recognition that their military contribution was likely to be marginal (certainly from the Danes and nothing from the Icelandics, but Norway, given its geographic position had serious concerns about its own vulnerability and, as a result, was also as strongly committed to NATO as it could be also with the expectation and the plans that NATO forces would be sent to Norway to help defend it in case of a Soviet attack). There were regular war games and there was steady commitment of forces to the defense of Norway. So, Norway was a strong NATO player and not neutralistic. Nor were the Italians. Over a period of time, the Italians wanted to be considered a significant player in NATO on the level of Germany and the UK.

The Italians also, despite a significant Italian Communist Party, slowly but steadily became more committed to and more willing to commit to support of NATO. Their ability to do so financially was always in question. Their ability to make real improvements in their forces was never at the level that we would hope. But politically they were much stronger than we thought they might be. Particularly through the '70s this commitment on the part of the Italians grew steadily stronger, and our concerns and fears about what eurocommunism might mean and particularly eurocommunism in Italy turned out to be less pointed than we thought they might become. I'm not going to say that the absence of attention to the eurocommunism phenomena would have been justified, but we and the Italians fortunately were able to deflect the Communist Party in Italy.

Q: How about Greece? Cyprus had been invaded. We had an arms embargo against Turkey. Greece seemed to be far more interested in confronting Turkey. Turkey to some extent was tied up in the Greek business. Particularly American political support was not there. Did that cause disquiet with the group you were with?

JONES: This was always a problem. It was only later in my own career that I became more involved in Greek-Turkish issues. But it was, has been, and remains a problem within the NATO structure. It has been absolutely impossible to work out a relationship between Greece and Turkey over the last quarter of a century. Ever since the Turkish seizure of the northern part of Cyprus and the division of Cyprus, the relationship between Greece and Turkey has been very barbed. This has meant a constant effort within the NATO councils to work around the problems or not to raise specific issues within the Defense Planning Committee or the Defense Planning Questionnaire, the DPQ, in which various commitments of each country's forces are laid out. The point is that neither the Greeks nor the Turks have ever agreed on how the Defense Planning Questionnaire should be resolved. We have struggled with this problem year after year after year over the acceptance of certain forces in certain areas as legitimate or not. As a result, NATO was regularly dragged into what NATO itself considers not to be its argument, that this is a bilateral argument; why do they insist on fighting the bilateral argument in the NATO arena? The NATO arena is designed to fight the Soviets. Why do you insist on fighting each other within the NATO arena? As a result, it was very difficult not to find an area in which the Greeks or the Turks, on any given day, might decide to make this particular NATO quorum a subject for their personal fight. It became very tiresome, always having to manage the Greek-Turkish problem. For the most part, the NATO representatives there of Greece and Turkey were not themselves personally hostile. You would see, well, all right, they've had instructions from capitals to go out and pound on the table in this manner or some new representative at the foreign ministry has seen this as an opportunity to put one in the eye of the other. So, then the rest of us, whether it was Americans, Brits, Germans, Belgians, or somebody else, would try to find some way to mediate it or to get them to withdraw the point or to agree to disagree and to move past their specific bilateral problem to get on with the overall NATO issue for the day.

Q: I realize you were at a relatively junior level of this NATO thing. But when you were talking to colleagues, how did we see a conflict breaking out? What were some of the hot points?

JONES: There was always the potential for a problem in Berlin that would spin out of control. Berlin was such a potential hotspot. People now forget that we had a garrison out there that was totally isolated, hundreds of miles away from the rest of the force structure. It was as a result both totally vulnerable in some ways and absolutely indispensable in others. There was always the fear that for one reason or another the Russians might decide to seize Berlin, that Berlin would just become so much of an irritant or that they would decide to make a point for us against everything else on Berlin and that war could begin over Berlin. There was certainly always the concern within the military that we were not strong enough to be able to handle a Soviet attack and the fear that if we weren't strong enough, how long could we last, and why or how the war would start, let alone whether the war would start, we couldn't predict in this manner. Each time we ran regular NATO wargames, so called Wintex, the Winter Exercise, and Hilex, the high level exercise, in which we created artificial scenarios but the point of which was still that

fighting would begin. These were procedural exercise drills, how we would respond, what was available in our books to react in certain ways, what demarches could be made, what organizational structures would be activated, and then a step-by-step procedure through controllers providing information and responding to reactions by the various NATO committees and councils. These “games” were played with seriousness. They were certainly played seriously at NATO. The ambassadors were engaged, every mission was engaged, fully. It was not played by some small cell within the mission that was doing it with a yawn. It was played seriously by all the ambassadors and most people believed by very high level foreign and defense officials in the ministries throughout Europe. To a certain extent, it was real. It was real to the extent that these were serious plans made by serious people to get your team ready in a worst case.

On the other side of it, it was illustrative that we were demonstrating to the East, to the Warsaw Pact and to Moscow, that we were serious and that this was serious organized NATO response, that we were ready if they were ever so foolish, misguided, or mad to attack us. That’s why we would run through an escalation scenario in which it ended with NATO use of nuclear weapons. Now, the NATO use of nuclear weapons at that point blurred to what would be done or how long it would be done or how much NATO use of nuclear weapons would be engaged. But it was a clear illustration, although all of this was classified at the time and held secret, there was also an expectation that the Warsaw Pact and the Soviets in particular would know the broad outlines of what we were doing so there would be no misapprehension on their part that they could seize a portion of the West and hold it. There was the fear that they might be able to drive to the Rhine and stop, seizing West Germany. You looked at the distances and the logistics base and it was a relatively short distance from the Soviet jump-off points to the Rhine. There was the common concern that our requirement for forward defense was not militarily wise. The political requirement to fight for every inch of German territory, when tactically it might have been far more efficient to withdraw a substantial distance, could make things militarily worse than might have been the case if we were able to do what would have been militarily wise although politically impossible. We couldn’t get to a point of saying, “Well, the very best thing to do with the Soviets and a Warsaw Pact attack would be to withdraw to a line of defense along the Rhine River.” You could make that case and then try to shorten our lines. We were also having serious logistical problems. We no longer had straight logistical lines of communication through France. Our lines of communication and our lines of resupply were very awkward indeed. We might hypothesize on a best case that in an instance of Soviet attack the French would reopen their facilities and allow us to move supporting operations through France, but with no prior planning for this happy eventuality, we couldn’t depend on it. This meant that the political requirement to defend every inch of Germany, let alone by the Germans, who would have to defend every inch of Germany, could have made the circumstances for the defense of NATO perilous.

Q: Who was your chain of command at that particular time?

JONES: The circumstances were such that at NATO we were transitioning from Don

Rumsfeld, who was a particularly dynamic guy as an ambassador. He later became SecDef. He was a very dynamic, very vigorous person who drove people at NATO very, very hard. He had a DCM there, Gene McAuliffe. The description was that McAuliffe, if you were on a slave galley, would fight his way to the point where he was the man who had the drum so he could pick up the pace. Rumsfeld would scream. Instead of McAuliffe being a buffer, he was an amplifier.

Within RPM, there was Edward J. Streator, who was a consummate professional. He had a deputy named Arva Floyd, who was also very good. Then within RPM, there was Bob Frowick, for whom I worked at first. Then in the nuclear planning aspect of RPM and on conventional force issues, there was Jerry Christianson, who subsequently left the Foreign Service and went to work on the Hill for Senator Pell and also became and was for many years the staff head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the majority. He was a very smart man also. Subsequently Streator left to become DCM at NATO, a job for which he was exceptionally well suited. He was replaced as head of RPM by one of the very finest Foreign Service officers of this era, Alan Holmes. Floyd left as deputy and was replaced by another excellent officer, Jerry Helman, who eventually became an ambassador as well. So did Streator. So did Holmes. After Christianson left, another outstanding officer by the name of John Hawes came to head that particular section of RPM. Hawes was in the latter part of his career deeply involved in political-military work and became a senior deputy in the political-military bureau. He was an absolutely outstanding officer who is now traveling with his senior Foreign Service wife. He retired and stayed as a dependent. The structure of the organization within RPM and with NATO had a very high quality group of officers.

The overall effort... I've gotten you in some respects down into the weeds. NATO was endlessly involved in senior ministerial councils. NATO's work qua work was incredibly laborious with endlessly long hours and astonishingly detailed and, at the same time, it was paid enormous attention by senior people. You just knew all the time that NATO, that RPM, was one of the focal points of whatever was being done. This meant very, very long hours, weekend hours for the Department of State. The problem was accentuated by the time differences at NATO. With it being six hours ahead at NATO, if they worked until midnight at NATO and drafted telegrams and got them out, they would have arrived at the opening of business in Washington, whereupon if Washington worked all day until midnight, they could send off instructions and they would be sitting at NATO when NATO opened for business at 6:00 AM. So, by madhouse type of effort within the Department and at NATO, you could work 24 hours a day. You would have same time turnaround at a time when communications were certainly very good but not the incredibly good communications that we now have. So there were people who said that "RPM" really meant "revolutions per minute" for the frenetic quality of our work.

Q: You left there in '76 and went where?

JONES: I went to the U.S. Mission at NATO. My job in RPM was a combination of training ground and recruitment center for people at NATO. It was time for me to go

overseas. I had been back since '71. This was a good opportunity to go overseas. I was "well and favorably known" by the people at NATO. I had visited some of them. The DCM at NATO, Ed Streater, had been the head of RPM at the time that I was working there. He made it clear to me that he was interested in bringing me to NATO under those circumstances.

Q: You were in Brussels from '76 to when?

JONES: 1980.

I should also step back at least at one point to note that it was at this juncture, the '74 timeframe, that my wife entered the Foreign Service. Her first tour was with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA]. She was endlessly helpful to me on the arms control side, bringing me up to speed on technical issues associated with arms control and disarmament points. There was a major ongoing effort at this juncture to work on a comprehensive test ban, an issue that we in RPM followed somewhat tangentially. There was also the ongoing SALT discussions again an issue that in RPM we followed tangentially but always needed to be aware of because of its prospective NATO angles. All of these efforts were subject to endless consultation with the Allies. This was being done at every level. You could not consult with the Allies more often. It became a ritual: what is it that we haven't done lately? Well, we have to consult with the Allies? Is it on SALT? Is it on MBFR? It is on Comprehensive Test Ban? Is it on nuclear non-proliferation? We were endlessly sending out teams of briefers and discussants on just about any topic under the sun. So, midlevel officers were always preparing briefing papers, talking points, background material, etc. Teresa was always giving me good insights on how things would work on a purely technical side for arms control issues.

Q: When you started out in '76, what aspect were you working on at NATO headquarters?

JONES: I was what they call the executive officer. It's a curious, almost NATO, phenomena type of position. It's not the ambassador's staff assistant. It's closer to being the DCM's DCM, where you were the general controller for virtually all paper within the mission while at the same time you were also giving support to the ambassador. I also had a couple of dossiers associated with the political section but which fell under my special purview anyway and they were the nuclear dossiers. I was able to retain them and follow on the work that I had been doing in RPM at NATO.

Q: The Carter administration came in in early '77. You like everyone else was watching the campaign. How did you feel before the Carter administration came in? This was quite a difference between the Ford and the Nixon administration and Kissinger. Here comes Carter.

JONES: This was my first change of administration in the Foreign Service. I had come in in '68 just as the Nixon administration was about to arrive. Here it was, '76. The juncture

in which I arrived at NATO was also the point at which a new ambassador arrived, Robert Strausz-Hupé, who had just gotten the assignment that he had hoped for and sought throughout most of his life and been extremely interested in obtaining. He had slid from Sri Lanka, then Ceylon, to Belgium. He had spent a couple of years in Belgium. Then he had been sort of bumped out of the ambassadorship in Belgium and gone to Stockholm. His wife died while he was in Stockholm and he arrived in NATO just a little bit ahead of the time in which I arrived. I had known Strausz-Hupé previously as an undergraduate student at the University of Pennsylvania. I had met him occasionally subsequently. I had been, because of that association, his control officer when he was preparing to go out to NATO but had been in Washington. I had been something of his control officer while he was there. Then I was arriving at NATO at the same time he was breaking in at NATO. Certainly Strausz-Hupé and, as a result, the rest of the Mission overtly and to the degree that I could sense personally were quite satisfied with the Nixon-Ford administration. Although almost every Foreign Service officer is pretty careful about expressing political views or associating themselves in any direct way with a political party, there was no active dissatisfaction that I recall with the Nixon-Ford administrations and certainly a general willingness, if not enthusiasm, to continue on with Ford as President through the rest of the decade. Certainly Strausz-Hupé obviously wanted that to happen. To the extent possible, he tried to work to make sure that he was viewed as an effective ambassador at NATO at this period.

Q: Following the political campaign, was there disquiet about where Carter and his administration would stand on NATO or not?

JONES: A transition is always one in which you don't know what's going to happen. I suppose in strategic terms, yes, you know what's going to happen. Carter wasn't going to pull the U.S. out of NATO. But what would happen with the projects and the programs that were going forward whether it was NATO modernization, nuclear modernization, what our attitudes would be on specific individual issues, it's much harder to say. In retrospect, I don't think we thought that Ford was going to lose. You can get pretty divorced from reality even with polls and things of that nature. We tended to expect that Ford was going to win and that Carter was not viewed as tremendously able. After all, he's this former governor from an end of the world kind of state. What was his background? Things like that. I won't say that we were shocked that he won because you saw the polls, you saw the numbers, you saw that Carter was leading, you saw that Ford could lose. But I don't think we really thought that Ford was going to lose and that Carter was going to win. We thought that way just because it was, if anything, because it was easier to continue with what we were doing with the leadership that we had and with the directions that we had. You always find that our allies are just as happy to continue with the leadership that we have on the "devils we know" basis than the angels we don't.

Q: After Carter won the election and was setting up shop in '77, did you find that there was a lot of consultation at least unofficially with European allies coming to you all and saying, "Who the hell is this guy and what does it mean?"

JONES: Yes, there were people visiting. There were people who were coming from Washington quickly to consult with the allies to reassure the allies. We had then Vice President Mondale. We had people like this very quickly coming to NATO in early 1977 to consult, which was really to reassure and to say all the right things so that people would – not that they didn't expect us to say the right things, but to actually hear the right things being said. That was fine. So, this was part of the "get together with the allies, tell them that they're all loved, that we'll continue to be reliable partners." This was how we were trying to work the process. Since I hadn't gone through it before, it was new to me. It was an incumbent ambassador who was going to be replaced, a political ambassador who was going to be replaced but didn't really want to go. So, Strausz-Hupé was trying to demonstrate to Washington how bright his work was, how many fresh, clever ideas he and the mission had. We had a series of "big think" projects. They were thoughtful, intelligent, coherent pieces of work that Strausz-Hupé inspired to the Mission to go off and write. Individual people worked on them. God only knows what they said. But I remember them in these general terms as being intelligent, thoughtful, coherent pieces of work in which Strausz-Hupé hoped to be allowed to stay on perhaps six months at least to give him a full year at NATO. It turned out pretty quickly that he had wasted his time and energy, that they were not going to leave a senior post like NATO filled with what they considered to be a Cold War Republican hawk. Everyone, including Strausz-Hupé, who thought that he had a ghost of a chance of staying on under those circumstances, was woolgathering. He didn't. He was told, in effect, to vacate by the end of March of '77. He did with some of the unnecessary ill grace associated with these kind of departures. I was much involved in his effort to write a final speech to the North Atlantic Council. This is a traditional farewell address in which they offer and give the ambassador a memento, an award, a plaque, a plate, things of this nature. I was involved in some of the drafting but it was Strausz-Hupé's speech that he wrote and that he sent to Washington for clearance. Well, the people in the European Bureau were equally nervous about anything that was being said. They didn't know whether they were going to be replaced or how they would fit in with the new administration. They were very touchy over what Strausz-Hupé was saying or what they thought Strausz-Hupé was trying to say, Strausz-Hupé arguing back, saying, "I wasn't trying to do this" or "What I'm saying is exactly what the new administration is in the process of saying." But it turned out to be one of those gritted teeth exercises on both sides where you had a man who was then about 74 and was trying to say what he expected would be almost his final statements. It was not that. He finally did give a presentation which in many respects was brilliant. He gave a speech that was close to an hour long in which he made not a single verbal misstatement, not the tiniest little verbal slip or blip. It was a remarkable thing in that manner. Most of us can't speak two minutes without an "Ah" no matter how hard you work on your own speechmaking. It was something of which I remember the format and not the content. But the *tour de force* presentation that he gave was remarkable in its own way. The commentary that EUR had made on the speech with a perspective of about 20 years (I reread it all last summer when I was working through Strausz-Hupé papers) was silly but it reflected the angst of transition. Nobody knows what's coming and the more senior you are, the more worried you are about what's coming – because you're the ones under the gun, while people at midlevel come and go. For young major lieutenant colonel equivalents such as I

was at the time... Okay. It was just a question of who your boss was going to be. You hoped that there would be decent guys rather than crazy guys.

Q: I would imagine that the neutron bomb, enhanced tactical weapon, became a hallmark of the Carter administration. Could you talk about that? Explain what the issue was and particularly with Helmut Schmidt and how we were seen at your level.

JONES: In many respects, this was something that I was involved in from the very beginning. I was involved in it to a degree on the Washington side. It was something in which I was engaged throughout my NATO career and in which I followed on and which was one of the major strands of my entire Foreign Service career. It goes back to the question of nuclear weapons being one aspect of NATO's modernization program. It is part of the entire three percent real increase in budget and improvement of NATO's defensive capabilities. One element of this effort was tactical nuclear force modernization, "TNF modernization." There was a full range of discussion of what was needed, how it was needed, and under what circumstances it was to be used. Part of it was based on the problem that we foresaw of using aircraft as the major delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons. These aircraft were vulnerable in certain ways. We had dual capable aircraft which theoretically delivered conventional weaponry during the conventional battle but were also being reserved for the potential of delivering nuclear weapons. There was a conceptual problem. You were going to use all of your aircraft to fight the war on the conventional basis. But you assumed you were going to be losing aircraft and losing ground during the conventional war. You had to reserve in your mind and plans a certain number of aircraft for the delivery of tactical nuclear weapons. What would happen at the juncture when the war itself was raging and perhaps even in the balance but you had drawn down your conventional aircraft, your dual capable aircraft, to the point in which you only had enough left to give your nuclear strikes? Would you then have to pull all of those aircraft out of the battle in order to prepare them for using nuclear weapons? At the same time, it would mean that the conventional war that was perhaps at a tip point was now going to be lost, forcing you to go nuclear. At the same time, was this the type of signal that you would end by giving to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces that your aircraft had now been withdrawn, so you were about to go nuclear? Would that preempt nuclear strikes on their part to avoid getting a nuclear hit from us? This was a very serious conceptual problem. At the same time, we were reluctant to go through the political and military upgrading of our tactical nuclear missile force in Europe. This was at the time when the Soviets were beginning to deploy SS-20s. The deployment of Soviet SS-20s was seen and viewed as an increasingly serious threat by the Europeans, particularly by the Germans. They were saying, "We have to have a response to this. We have to have an American response to balance the Soviet missiles." Otherwise, the Soviets might come to the conclusion that the Americans would be willing to sacrifice existing forces in Europe to preserve the United States from any nuclear strikes while only if the United States deployed nuclear weapons in Europe would we be able to threaten the Soviets appropriately with intermediate range weaponry that would assure that if a war started there wouldn't be a "burnt space between two green spaces." Well, our first response was essentially a political-military reaction rather than a political reaction. Our first reaction

was that our existing strategic forces and nuclear forces in Europe were more than enough to counter the increase in Soviet intermediate range nuclear weapons and their SS-20 deployments. We were hypothesizing at that point that the SS-20s might be just a replacement for their SS-4s and 5s, which were obsolete by that time for a number of technical reasons. They were much more vulnerable than the 20s would be. The 20s were mobile, the 20s had multiple warheads, the 20s were solid fueled or better fueled, all of these aspects that made the 20s a clear modernization. We sent a couple of high powered briefing teams to NATO in the late summer of '76 in an attempt to convince the Europeans that our strategic systems, our SSBs, submarine based ballistic missiles, which were nuclear submarines that were actually allocated to SACEUR, were sufficient NATO responses, committed dedicated forces to counter the SS-20s. We thought we had convinced them. We seriously thought that we had convinced them. Until Helmut Schmidt spoke in London. I can't remember the date of it. He forced us to conclude on a political level that the force deployment that we had, our current strategic forces, were not sufficient to respond to the new SS-20 deployment. So, we then got into and began discussions on both a military and a political level with the Europeans. What became the High Level Group and the Special Consultative Groups began to meet and work out a question of how we would respond.

Q: This was approximately when?

JONES: This is around '77. After a great deal of effort and consultations with the Europeans, we had gotten their technical acceptance of these weapons. Whether they expected them to be used, I have no idea. But the credibility of NATO nuclear use was always regarded as one of the key elements of deterrence. I did not hear demurs from my European colleagues and other NATO diplomats about the use of these weapons or necessarily other nuclear weapons. On nuclear weapons specifically, the only system about which they appeared to be unhappy was the atomic demolition munitions. That concern devolved into a long argument about "prechambering" for specific areas and whether you would drill the holes ahead of time for the use of atomic demolition munitions. There was reluctance to do this; it was more political than military reluctance. It would drive home to the guy in the neighborhood that the likelihood of using a nuclear weapon was right there. On the flip side of it, the Germans had developed special equipment that would allow the drilling of emplacement chambers for atomic demolition munitions on relatively short order. But the technical decision that we could move ahead with enhanced radiation weapons was one that had been made. It had been endorsed. It had been approved at the various levels within NATO. My recollection sense is that it had been endorsed at a ministerial meeting by the acceptance of the report. The study being done on these weapons and the general NATO approval as a result meant that the alliance was regarding enhanced radiation weapons as part of its military capability.

Q: I did an interview with Vlad Lehovitch, who was in Bonn. He was saying that the neutron weapon was viewed with a certain suspicion by the left within Germany and other places because supposedly it destroyed people, not property. This sounded very capitalistic as opposed to communistic, where it's much better to destroy property and if

people go, that's too bad. Helmut Schmidt, who was a socialist, had been reluctant for political reasons to endorse this. Jimmy Carter as our President was pressing him very hard all the time. Were you aware of this?

JONES: This was certainly an element of it. You had Schmidt in power and you had Schmidt and the Socialists for the first time in many years in power in Germany. There was concern about the left side of the ruling party. No matter where you went in Europe, the left was hostile to nuclear weapons, was hostile to NATO, was hostile to the neutron bomb, or fostered the "ban the neutron bomb" exercise. Indeed, your recollection is correct that the communists said that the neutron bomb was the perfect capitalist weapon, that it killed people and preserved property, our response was that the neutron bomb was the perfect communist weapon because it would kill capitalists and preserve the means of production. But that was a propaganda tit for tat exercise. There was a clear expectation that the Europeans were not only going to be on board... We had argued and persuaded them that they should accept these weapons and this philosophy and this report. Yes, we had. Lehovitch's recollection is also perfectly clear that on the left in Germany and on the left everywhere, they were not enthusiastic about nuclear weapons. They were certainly not enthusiastic about nuclear weapons that looked as if they could be used. They were even less enthusiastic about nuclear weapons that looked as if they might be useable in their neighborhoods. There was a "not in my backyard" view of nuclear weapons. Whether these people were no longer screaming, "Better red than dead," we thought of them as exactly the same type of people that would find any excuse to surrender. Well, we were also in the situation where we couldn't force the allies to take these weapons. They had to invite us to make these deployments. This was orchestration, in that they knew that they had to ask; and they knew that if they asked, we would make the deployments. So, Schmidt got far enough out on a limb that he endorsed the deployment. This is my sense, that there was indeed no question that Schmidt, who had to be the leader on this subject because the key deployment of nuclear weapons presumably would be in Germany, whether there were ER weapons in other areas. The most likely storage facilities would be in Germany, so Schmidt had to make this kind of endorsement. He did. Then Carter decided to rethink it all. His decision to rethink it was a type of decision that was completely inexplicable at the time. I had one ambassador for whom I later worked, Reg Bartholomew, who was in the NSC at that point and was dealing with this issue. He said to me years later that he received an endless stream of phone calls, and he answered none of them. He said that somebody came to him and said, "Yes, Reg, your lack of an answer was profound." We had no answer. There was no explanation. There was no defense for what the President had done. We got Helmut Schmidt out on a limb, and we sawed it off and left him standing there in midair. There was no way in which you could figure this decision on Carter's part. It left one speechless. All we could do as a result was say, "Well, we're rethinking it. It's delayed rather than stopped. We're reconfiguring." Try to make some sort of rational explanation out of what was going on in his mind. It was, "Well, what's the parallel? Paul on the road to Damascus? This Rose Garden decision...?" This decision left us with no idea on how it had happened. At that point, there was the general expectation that European confidence in Carter just disappeared. Ostensibly, they met with him, everyone was very straightforward, we were

all together, one for all, all for one, but there was the feeling that Carter had lost essential trust or essential appreciation in his decision making, that he was not reliable, and that everything that followed after that, what happened in his reactions to the Russians in Afghanistan, in his reaction to the seizure of American hostages, the Europeans always said the right thing and could be bulldozed into doing things like not participating in the Olympics in Moscow, okay, but it was that they were going through the forms with us because they had no other choice than to continue to play on our team. But the team captain was just not reliable.

Q: How did this effect you all? Did you have the same feeling?

JONES: It was one of these situations where, when Carter was elected, I said, "What we really need is a successful President. We have had a series of terrible problems. We had Kennedy assassinated. We had Johnson destroyed in office. We had Nixon's Watergate. We had Ford who was never considered presidential timber before he became President, almost a caretaker President. Whether you're in favor of Carter or you voted against him, what we really need is a successful presidency, whether it was four years or eight years." I had some serious hopes for this. I thought that Carter was a very bright man. I'm always in favor of people that know something about nuclear energy and, as a result wouldn't have had, I thought, an implicit fear or terror of nuclear energy as a conceptual basis of use. It was something for which I had serious hopes. As it was, his steady deterioration in the polls was, even with the foreign policy failures that I thought he had engaged himself in and been involved in, still puzzling. I couldn't understand why his standing in the national polls declined as much as they did. Some of it I could see. Well, we really did have much higher rates of inflation that anyone wanted. We had had difficulties of that nature. But at the same time, I was saying to myself, "We don't have domestic upheaval in the way that we had when our cities were burning at the end of the '60s. We don't have real depression. We have an economic recession. We aren't engaged in a foreign war overseas. We're just out of Vietnam. Why is this man so far down in the polls?" NATO was in Brussels with an endless flow of visitors that we had and the total ability to get just about anything in the media provided total information. I could see what was happening factually and not have a feel for it. On one visit, I came back to the United States as an Army reserve officer on a two week active duty tour. I saw two of my friends who were liberal Democrats. I went through the litany that I went through with you and said, "Is he really a 26% President?" They said to me, Dave, he's worse than that." Then the each gave me little vignettes on the level of his scheduling play at the White House tennis court and rewriting dedications badly on memorial plaques that left people with the sense that he was a good man and would have been great as your next door neighbor or your Sunday school teacher, but as a President, he was failing and just failing steadily. This was the impression that seeped out slowly but steadily wherever you were.

Q: This must have been rather disquieting as you moved ahead with NATO. Was there a feeling that we weren't as strongly led a nation as we might be?

JONES: It's something of a leading question. The fact is that the allies continued to play

on our team because this was the only team in town, and they didn't have any other choices. There were areas in which people were trying to push ahead. We thought we had brought the SALTII treaty to conclusion. This was a great success. I was involved with at least moving documents back and forth to Vienna in the last days and bringing material back to NATO so we could have briefings to explain what was happening to the allies. The allies were enthusiastic about the prospects for SALTII. They hoped to be able to move on to a SALTIII that was more tactically nuclear engaged or intermediate range engaged rather than the strategic arms reductions which SALTII was to be. We had hopes at least that MBFR was going to make some progress. We were regularly engaging the Russians with packages of proposals even though this was seen as a very long range slugging match in Vienna. These were exercises in which we were engaging the Warsaw Pact and trying to find ways in which to move beyond the confidence building measures of CSCE into something that would be real conventional force reductions. There was a nuclear package in the MBFR proposals that were being worked, the so-called Option 3. But these were areas in which, at least on the political-military side, aspects of NATO strategy were being steadily worked out. It was an incredible, and incredibly busy time.

Before I came over to talk to you, I thought I was going to have more time to prepare for this than I did in reading my diaries for the era. What I did was to get my diary from 1977. What I remember from reading this material is that a lot of it is just strictly personal. Our third child was born at NATO. Our children were about eight years old at that juncture. There are things of that nature. But looking at it, I see again the appalling hours which we worked, where regularly I was at the Mission until 9:00 PM and it was early when I left at 6:30. We worked every Saturday at least half a day. The relentless pace of this work was completely and totally exhausting. I have to say that it was one of these situations where I was in my mid-30s and by the end of the first year, I was beginning to think I was an old man. The only way I realized how totally exhausting the pace was was when I went back to the States for two weeks for an Army Reserve tour and worked from 8:00 AM until 5:00 PM and found that I had incredible amounts of energy. I went out and saw my friends and we went to dinners. I had all sorts of energy. I recognized that it wasn't that I was getting old at 35. It was that NATO was so all consuming, so totally exhausting, so completely engaging, that there was nothing left of virtually any of us at the end of a given working day. To have anything left over for family, for personal life, for much of anything except sleep was rarely available.

Q: How did the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan hit us? Was this just an affirmation that it was really an aggressive force?

JONES: It was a real shock. NATO certainly didn't expect or predict that this was happening. We thought that Afghanistan was a sufficient enough Russian puppet that there was no need for them to do anything of this nature. We were more concerned that they were about to invade Poland and seize and overthrow the Polish government. We called emergency meetings and pulled people together and had consultations. Then we issued sanctions and things of that nature. My feeling was that we thought the Russians would make short work of anything in Afghanistan; that it wouldn't be any serious

problem for them. We never predicted that Afghanistan would become as politically brutal for them on any level of equivalence as Vietnam had been for us. If anyone had said, "Afghanistan will be Moscow's Vietnam," we would have laughed at them. Of course, it was never at that level of societal equivalence for them, but it became a brutally draining exercise. In some respects, we learned nothing from the Russian experience just as they had learned nothing from our experience in Vietnam, that trying to pacify a nasty, well armed, bloody minded people is a hell of a fight. We didn't learn from the Russian experience in Afghanistan when we tried to impose our will in Somalia. So, that element of it, that portion of it, had much less effect on NATO than any of the other combination of events then in play. The seizure of our people in Teheran, the fear that the Russians were going to invade Poland and do to the Poles what they had done to the Czechs – these were more immediately pertinent than what was happening in Afghanistan.

Q: The Poles at this point had been going through reform.

JONES: Yes. This was communism with a more human face. This was Jaruzelski in control but seen as a more liberal Polish communist. There seemed to be some question about the Soviets' perception of the Poles as a reliable ally. There was some perception that they were worried that their lines of communications through Poland might be less secure under the type of Polish government that was evolving. The entire question was one of how much strength Solidarity was gaining and whether Walesa was going to be a destabilizing figure so far as communist rule in Poland was concerned. There were flat predictions from very competent intelligence analysts that the Russians were going to move, that there was just no question, that it was just a matter of whether they moved today or tomorrow or next week or whenever. They just felt that the Russians were going to move on Poland.

Q: Was this accepted that if they did move, we would not intervene?

JONES: Yes. There would certainly be no military intervention. We would leap and scream politically, we would offer new sanctions of one sort or another, would take them to the UN, and would denounce them pillar to post. We would make them look as black as we could around the world to make political points wherever there was somebody who was a doubter that the Soviets were the unmitigatedly nasty SOBs that we all knew them to be. That sounds pretty hard line, doesn't it? But there were no peaceniks at NATO.

You have to let me spend a minute or so talking about the Mission itself. This was not an embassy. This was a giant political-military section. It was a 90-person political-military section, of which the diplomats were only one portion of it. There was an entire floor's worth of some of the most capable mid-rank military officers I have ever encountered. This was an exercise on their part of preparing for war, of preparing with the feeling that the military had throughout this period that they were going to have to fight outnumbered and win or there was no future for the West. Day after day, you got this reflection not necessarily from what they were saying or from the people out in the field, but they planned... When they ran their exercise, it was not always known whether this was for

real or this was an exercise. Were the Russians going to come through the Fulda Gap? Were we going to be able to hold them? Was there any chance of holding them conventionally rather than having to go nuclear? Although we were morally, intellectually and politically prepared to go nuclear, this was nothing that anyone looked forward to. There was always the fear that the Russians were 10 feet tall. There was always the endless recollection of what their units were like, how tough their armored forces were, how much artillery they had, how capable they were in military terms. All the numbers were always recounted straight out so it was obvious that their numbers were always much greater than ours, let alone adding in their Warsaw Pact forces. It was a source of constant tension in a way that recedes into the background like a dull headache that only becomes a migraine occasionally, but you always knew it was there if you spent a little bit of time thinking about why we were there. It was a regular worry. The NATO mission, as an operation, as a result was really driven by the United States. We were the locomotive that was hauling the entire apparatus all the time. As a result, our meeting schedules were amazingly intensive and frequently intrusive. The schedules were such that we had a major meeting every Thanksgiving Day. It was impossible to prepare for the ministerial meetings that were later early in the month of December unless we had a wide range of preministerial meetings. That required for us, as Americans, to be meeting on Thanksgiving Day every single year – not all day long, fortunately, but every single Thanksgiving Day, we were running tough, infinitely detailed preparation meetings where every single word and phrase was struggled over and consulted upon, trying to get 15 NATO nations to agree. It was a very, very detailed task requiring just endless patience, endless consultation, endless flexibility and discussions with Washington, with key allies, with the NATO international staff, and good leadership and good fellowship.

Q: Was there the feeling there by 1980 by the time you left that America had pulled up its socks and its military was getting better or was there concern about the capabilities of our military?

JONES: By the time I left NATO, there was no reason to know one way or another whether Carter was going to win and continue nor were we out of the “America held hostage in Teheran” problem. We were just at the beginning stages of INF deployments, which was one of the things with which I was much engaged for an extended period of time leading up to a 12 December 1979 combined ministerial decision.

Q: Could you talk a bit about that?

JONES: Let me back off on that and give that to you the next time.

Q: Today is May 3, 1999. INF. What does that mean and what were you doing? This is the '76-'80 period.

JONES: Yes. The INF issues were the intermediate nuclear range force issues. They were

a spin-off, an evolution, from theater nuclear force modernization topics, about which we have had a little bit of discussion already. The entire exercise was designed to bring matching U.S. intermediate range nuclear forces into Europe on a modernized basis to counter Soviet SS-20 deployments during this time period. There were long, convoluted, and extremely agonized-over political set of decisions in Europe throughout this entire period. The Europeans were probably even more nervous concerning it considering the problems that they had had with the neutron bomb exercise, and it took them a long time to convince us that they were truly serious about the requirement for a U.S. counter to SS-20s. We had argued during this earlier timeframe that U.S. strategic forces, that U.S. SACEUR committed ballistic submarine missiles were sufficient to counter the modernized SS-20s. The Europeans, however, did not believe that and believed that it was indeed necessary to have a visible U.S. component on the ground, something that would not be able to fly or float away, something that was not an aircraft, not a submarine, but a visible commitment by the United States on the ground. The exercise then began throughout 1979 to work on a series of Special Group [SG] and High Level Group [HLG] analyses of what would be a proper and sufficient counter to the Soviet SS-20s. The HLG effort was to examine what the hardware would be, what appropriate mix of ground launched cruise missiles [GLCMs] and Pershing IIs, which was a follow-on with longer range and greater accuracy, to the Pershing I, which had been deployed in Europe for many years. After a great deal of discussion within the HLG and examining various mixes of missiles, they came up with a final combination of Pershings and GLCMs. GLCMs had a “TERCOM” guidance, a terminal ranging guidance, that followed contours of the earth and allowed for much more precise targeting than had ever previously been the case.

Q: What were you doing?

JONES: I was an action officer at NATO doing a good deal of the support for the SG, the political side of this effort. In this case, it was an effort for us to locate substantial European basing countries, countries that would accept U.S. cruise missiles. The Germans did not wish to be the only European host for INF. They wanted another host that was actually on the European continent. That is, a host that was not the UK. So, we had an extended ongoing persuasive diplomatic exercise with each of our European allies to determine who else would accept cruise missiles or Pershings.

Q: You're saying the Europeans said we should have something that's not going to fly or float away. At the same time, we were trying to persuade people to accept them.

JONES: Yes, that's a good point. The point essentially was the politicized concerns that we were getting from the European populations at the same time. The officials who were at senior levels in the European governments, also wanted to make sure that that it was being done in a way that their populations – or at least the left side of their political spectrum – could be forced into accepting rather than the deployments being viewed as something that the Americans forced on them. The Germans, while they were willing to do this, didn't want to be the only target in Europe. As a result, they were an object for

Soviet pressure. So, we spent a good deal of time on this. Fortunately, about in May 1979, the Italian government, which we had not expected to be forthcoming and be receptive for a basing agreement because of the relatively strong presence of an Italian Communist Party (CP), indicated to us that they would be willing to accept INF basing. So, with the Italian agreement, we then were able to work harder on several other European allies to be willing to accept basing. We worked in particular for the Belgians and the Dutch to accept these systems. It was this type of process which also, then from the Dutch side, led to a second parallel track. The first track would be the deployment track of the systems. But the second track would have to be, in the Dutch view (and this had quickly become the general European view), that we had to have a negotiating track as well, that we had to be able to offer to the Soviets a proposal that we would not deploy if they did certain things. The primary requirement on our part was that they would have to withdraw, destroy, do something with their SS-20 missiles, or severely limit them in some manner. This was not by any matter being spelled out at that point, but there was perceived a need to have a political negotiating track for the INF effort as well as simply a deployment track to counter the SS-20s on the ground. We also recognized that it would be easier to sell deployments to European populations if we deployed in the face of Soviet recalcitrance to negotiate meaningful agreement. The expectation was not that the Soviets would agree. I don't think anybody expected the Soviets to agree to anything. But for us to have a better and more effective political cover for our own deployments, the political track was regarded as vital.

Q: Did you sense that this deployment was almost being forced on the Americans because of the SS-20s? Or were they saying, "I'm glad they did it because now we can put these things in?"

JONES: This was a curious ambivalence. Certainly at the beginning in about 1976, we argued vigorously to the Europeans that we didn't need anything more. This was going to be an expensive exercise. Making these systems was not going to be cheap. At the same time, there were people within our own structure that wanted to deploy more effective modernized theater nuclear forces because of the problems that I've explained a little bit earlier on what would happen if you used aircraft to provide your nuclear strikes. As a result, there were certainly people in the U.S. when these systems were being developed that wanted to be able to deploy them and deploy them fairly extensively to give themselves, in their argument, a better ability to handle any conventional war that might evolve. At the same time, there were also people that saw these as better, more effective nuclear systems with far better guidance and accuracy as a consequence and that viewed them as prospectively a heck of a lot more effective than the nuclear systems that we had in Europe at that time – old Pershing Is and only the aircraft that were able to deliver nuclear strikes at an intermediate range. As it evolved, it came to this more or less famous 12th of December 1979 decision in which all of this effort was supposed to be brought together and everybody was supposed to be agreed at that point and sign off on a deployment decision. This first group was the defense and foreign ministers meeting together at NATO for a Defense Planning Committee. It turned out to be perhaps the most chaotic meeting that I ever was involved in in my career. As it evolved, neither the

Dutch nor the Belgians were finally agreed on their willingness to accept INF deployment.

Q: I assume before you had the meeting that they were supposed to be all on board.

JONES: Yes. Again, that was our expectation. We were having Special Group and High Level Group meetings about once a month or once every other month as this evolved. Indeed, as far as I ever had the sense going into the meeting, we thought that it was ready.

Q: This meeting was in December 1979.

JONES: What happened at that meeting was that, without recalling the details precisely, both the Belgians and the Dutch were not as decided as we believed them to be. There was enormous effort put on them. Reg Bartholomew, who had become the head of the Special Group meeting, tells a story of how he had one of these senior foreign ministers in a corner and was pounding away at him and somebody came up behind him and said, "Say, old chap, you really shouldn't be pushing him quite so hard. Let me." It was the British foreign minister who wanted to put him to one side and hammer on the Dutch. So, this was a meeting that ran on and on and on. As a consequence, the special celebratory *vin d'honneur* at the end of it was never held. For me, this was particularly interesting in its own way because it was my 15th wedding anniversary. The very first thing in the morning I got up early. I went to the store. I got chocolates and then went to the airport to meet David Aaron. I met him at the airport at something like 7:00 a.m. in order to get back to this meeting. At the meeting itself, we then struggled for hours and hours and hours on this session. The meeting itself broke up sometime well past 8:30 p.m. in the evening with what they believed then to be agreement and actually was sufficient agreement. Then I spent another two and a half hours or so writing my portions of reporting telegrams on this meeting, after which I liberated a bottle of champagne from this never held *vin d'honneur* and took it home, and my wife and I had chocolates and champagne at 11:30 at night on our wedding anniversary. But we did get enough of an agreement for it to go forward and to have it announced that we did have an agreement for deployment. It was clearly designed to be one that would be held in conjunction with negotiating proposals that would be eventually created, eventually devised, to work with the Soviets. That is how the INF agreement itself got started.

From there on, for the rest of the time that I was at NATO until the summer of 1980, we worked on the evolution of the Special Group, which had then become the Special Consultative Group. We began and continued to design possible hypothetical proposals that could be made to the Soviets and how deployments would be arranged and in what timing sequences. Our own deployments. How the agreed upon new INF systems, the GLCMs and the P-IIs, would eventually be made. What countries would get them in what timeframe, when they would arrive, what would arrive at different times, which countries would be the last to have deployments. In each of these countries as years went by and the negotiations were very slow and there were ruptures in the negotiations that were held eventually with the Soviets in Geneva, the negotiations were very complicated and very

slow. There were efforts on the part of the Russians to come to some sort of an agreement to prevent U.S. deployment efforts and, on the Allied side, to get parliamentary agreement in each one of the countries for the deployments. What you had on December 12, 1979, was a commitment to do so, but, as time went on, each of the countries involved in effect had an election. The election was fought at least partially on the fact of the existing commitment to accept INF deployments. At each juncture, the Soviets and their sympathizers within the individual countries attempted to put enough pressure on the electorate or offer blandishments of one sort to counter their threats that there would be a change of government, which would have reversed the NATO decision.

Q: It wasn't completely Soviets and their supporters, but also the indigenous socialist left-wing groups in Europe who just didn't like nuclear weapons.

JONES: I agree with you completely. These were members of the old left and members of the new left. When I said Soviet sympathizers, it means that to the extent that these people sympathized with the Soviets on this particular issue, I would say that they were Soviet sympathizers. Again, throughout this entire period, what I was doing was working on some of these issues simultaneously, both the end of SALT II, which had come to a conclusion in early 1979 and which I provided a tiny little part of the drama by flying to Vienna to pick up the text of the SALT II agreement and bringing them back to NATO for distribution. We need to demonstrate the small degree to which they had anything to do with the Allies so that the Allies would be able to see that the text of the agreements did not threaten their interests or NATO interests.

I also worked and continued to work through 1980 when I departed on MBFR, that is, conventional force reductions in Europe to match conceptually, at least, the nuclear reductions, about which we were talking to the Soviets at all times. But MBFR has now been lost from memory and is one of the failures of negotiating history. But for quite a number of years, it was a primary focus of our negotiations with the Soviets and, for that matter, with the Warsaw Pact as well. Since it dealt with conventional forces throughout Europe, we had a NATO Warsaw Pact negotiation in Vienna. I vaguely remember it started in '73. You can see that it had already been running for six years by the end of the '70s. There also there were elements of a nuclear package involved in these MBFR negotiations, a so-called Option 3, an option which would have withdrawn a certain number of nuclear weapons and reduced a certain number of aircraft and missile systems. But, for me, for the most part, I was working on the MBFR Working Group. This dealt more with technical studies that were being prepared for the negotiations for our side. Some of these negotiations lasted internally for more than a year. We worked on what was called Associated Measures Paper. That system and discussions of it within the Alliance ran for probably about a year and a half. I remember arranging a birthday party for the Associated Measures Paper at its one year mark. The measures that were being discussed are those that were linked to what kind of an agreement you might have in the way of confidence building of one sort or another, notifications, types of inspection routines, what kind of inspections might be held, how they would be held. We had another major paper that was called a Flank Security Paper, which was a special concern

to both the Nordics and of very special concern to the Turks, who were convinced for any number of reasons that if the Russians reached agreement on force reductions in Central Europe, they would pull them back to threaten the northern and southern flanks. So, the Turks and the Nordics in particular wanted agreements to any MBFR presentation that would guarantee that the Soviets did not simply reshuffle their forces and put them in positions that would create greater insecurity for Greece and Turkey, more prominently for Turkey, and, for Norway in particular, in the north.

Q: What was the attitude during this period? This was the Carter administration, which came in a little bit starry eyed as far as thinking things could happen. At least this is my impression. Was there concern in NATO that the United States might not show sufficient will and be too interested in agreement?

JONES: Well, I've already gone through with you in some detail the associated elements of the neutron bomb fiasco. My feeling is that there was a spillover into extraordinary, convoluted, detailed discussions that literally went on for more than a year and a half on some of these papers and some of these studies. There was and had been for many years also the feeling that MBFR's negotiations were really designed to prevent what were then called "Mansfield Amendment reductions." Senator Mike Mansfield had, in effect, said, "If you don't reach agreement, we should withdraw forces." Partially to stave off the Mansfield Amendment reductions that would have been unilateral U.S. reductions, The U.S. and NATO started the MBFR reductions, negotiations at least, to hold off congressional pressure to take unilateral force cuts. Unilateral U.S. forces cuts would have been seen as an indication that we were losing a commitment to Europe and/or stimulated Europeans not to build up their forces in response but to cut their forces as well, which, in theory, would have made all of Europe more vulnerable on the one side to a potential Soviet conventional attack but at the same time might have made the prospect of a nuclear war in Europe more likely if the Soviets had attempted a conventional attack and we had been even less able to withstand a conventional attack and had to respond with nuclear weapons sooner rather than later. But there was also always the feeling that there was a good deal of a "place-holding" operation going on in Vienna to talk a great deal about these reductions without a true expectation at that they would come to fruition. An analyst in INR named Robert Baraz, who since has died, used to think that we might find ourselves out-clevered by the Russians by eventually presenting them with the proposal that we didn't expect would be accepted but the Soviets would say, "Done." He used to put it this way. "If you stand in a shower bending over looking for the soap long enough, somebody is going to..." But that never happened with MBFR. MBFR despite efforts by its leadership, which apparently took it more seriously than other people within the establishment, continued to flail vigorously during the late '70s/1980.

Q: We're talking about December 1979. Our embassy had been taken over in Iran. We were worried about that falling apart. And then the invasion of Afghanistan. I would have thought this would have stiffened the spine.

JONES: Well, we did immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have a frenzy

at NATO of senior people coming for consultations and a very high level of effort to determine what could be done and what we could do. This led to more sanctions being placed on the Soviets and an effort to do things. This was the stimulus to stop holding the 1980 Olympics. But in NATO, there was a sense of shock in this regard. We did not expect this type of action against Afghanistan. We believed that the Soviets had as much control over Afghanistan as they had any need to or desire for, that we had been in effect pushed out of the competition in Afghanistan, and that we had lost the influence battle in Afghanistan to the Soviets. When the Soviets invaded, it was our sense that they would make rather short work of any afghani resistance. We just didn't think that the Afghans would be able to hold up against them very long. Yes, there would be places in the Khyber Pass that nobody would be able to go to in small units, but, so far as actually controlling everything of Afghanistan that needed any controlling, the Soviets wouldn't have any trouble doing that. At the same time, we were also extremely incensed about what had happened in Iran. Of course, as diplomats, we felt even more angry that these were our people that had been seized, were being held, and that nothing was going on. We felt that nothing was being accomplished, that we were acting weak. I personally felt that we should indeed make far stronger threats against Iran to force the return of our people under whatever circumstances were necessary to get them back. I felt that all we were doing in the long-delayed exercise over our captured hostage diplomats was to set up a circumstance where the same kind of incident would happen again and again and again. We were unable to respond effectively. Then when we attempted and failed in Desert One to actually do something, it was an even less happy an incident and episode.

Q: Particularly seeing what the Soviets did in Afghanistan, did this change the equation as far as you all were concerned about stiffening NATO as far as accepting cruise missiles and Pershings and that sort of thing?

JONES: It was at least a momentary endorsement of the decision which literally had been made only days earlier. The point was that over a period of time this stiffening softened and wore down and we had to refight the battle in every election campaign that was held in each of the perspective basing countries with the Soviets at the same time having started in their discussions in Geneva to urge us to push for a variety of freezes and no deployments that would leave them with very substantial numbers of SS-20s and us with nothing in the way of deployments. There were complicated proposals put forward that still would have left us with a handful of deployed INF but we would not have equality with the Soviets and that also was the bottom line on our proposals. Whether we built up to these ceilings or not, our agreements with the Soviets had to be based on equality in the way of deployments.

Q: In the summer of 1980, where did you go?

JONES: I ended my assignment at NATO and went to the Cyprus desk. This was an assignment that had turned up almost at the last minute. I didn't get the assignment until May. There had been various other assignments that had looked as if they were possibilities or more like actualities and didn't turn out to be that way. It was probably the

influence of Allan Holmes that got me the job as the Cyprus desk officer over an individual who would have been the initial choice of the Southern European office director. So, I became the Cyprus desk officer in the summer of 1980.

Q: You did that until when?

JONES: Until the summer of 1982. It was a standard two-year desk officer assignment.

Q: This was one of the points of contention in the world at that time. What was the situation vis a vis Cyprus when you arrived there? I'm sure this had been off to one side and was one of those "minor annoyances" when you were in NATO.

JONES: Yes. This was a constant neuralgic problem at NATO. The Greeks and Turks simply could not come to an agreement on virtually anything, but by and large we were able to keep the problem confined. It started far, far back in history. You can start centuries ago, but you can really start in 1974.

Q: July 14th 1974.

JONES: Yes. The Turkish troops moved in to Northern Cyprus and occupied a very substantial portion of the country.

Q: After a Greek effort to take over the island themselves.

JONES: A very hard-line right-wing leader, Nikos Sampson, who would have been supported by what was then also a Greek military dictatorship. During the same period, the island had been only very tenuously under control for many years. There had been decades of rioting, decades of essentially Greek Cypriot pressure on Turkish Cypriots who were a minority of the population. During the period from the late '60s through the early '70s, the Turkish Cypriots were pretty much pushed out of any political influence within the Cypriot government and very marginalized in Cypriot society. It was a period in which, really I would say, the Greek Cypriots had overwhelming control of the island, its economy, the society, and the like. It was just that when the Greek Cypriot right-wing leader attempted what was a coup that the Turkish government landed troops to prevent it from happening, and you had a vast refugee flow which now would be called "ethnic cleansing" at the end of which there were virtually no Greek Cypriots in the northern half of the island and no Turkish Cypriots in the southern part of the island. In 1980, this was still a relatively fresh circumstance. There had been a steady assortment of peace plan proposals of one sort or another designed to end this separation and generate a new government, create a new governing structure of one sort or another, secure the withdrawal of the Turkish military forces, and mend the breach between the Greek government and the Turkish government. These bilateral relations, while never particularly good, had gotten particularly bad since 1974 to the extent where it was impossible to reach agreement on things like the Defense Planning Questionnaire at NATO, which gives NATO authorization for force deployments and circumstances for

each country's armed services. You had endless arguments over where Greek and Turkish forces could legally be placed, whether there would be any implicit recognition of these forces if they were included in a NATO document with the Turks always claiming that their forces on such and such islands were NATO-committed and the Greeks contending that these islands were not Turkish island but Greek islands. It's been a situation that had never been resolved.

Q: Was the Turkish military arms embargo still on when you were there?

JONES: The arms embargo had been lifted by Carter. At this point, you also had the Turkish military coup in October of 1980. At that juncture, where there had been tremendous societal upset, rioting, terrorism, and great turmoil within Turkey, the military moved to throw out the civilian government and impose order, which they did quite effectively. We as a government had no real objection to this. I think we said a few *pro forma* things about the role of democracy and the need to have free elections and things of that nature. But neither the Carter government at the time nor the subsequent Haig-Secretary of State-Reagan government had any real problem with the fact that the Turkish government had moved in this manner to secure order. There was always the concern that a destabilized Turkey could go communist.

Q: What was the feeling when you took it over? You hadn't been dealing with it before. From our point of view, okay, we had to make noises, particularly because of the Greek lobby and all, but essentially it was pretty much a done deal. The Turks were on this side to the north and the Greek Cypriots on that side. Efforts made to allow the two groups to get back together again were something you had to do politically, but it just wasn't going to happen at least in the near future. How did you feel about it?

JONES: I used to say years later that you had to change Cyprus desk officers at least every two years. Otherwise, you got to the situation where your officer had seen it all, knew that nothing would ever work, and refused to believe that anything could work. Therefore, you needed a new Cyprus desk officer every other year who would come in with a fresh view, new hope, new inspiration, and an effort to resolve the problem. No, in 1980, there was still a feeling that something could be done partly because at that juncture people looked at the Middle East and said, "Oh, my God, we will never, ever, ever be able to solve the Arab-Israeli problem. We just can't. The Arab-Israeli problem is impossible. Is there anything easier?" Then they looked at Cyprus and said, "That looks easy in comparison." Cyprus is an easy problem. It's something that any student in Political Science 101 could sit down and draw up an equitable, honest, fair, workable Cyprus agreement. The only problem is that it would have to be accepted by the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, neither one of whom would trust each other under any circumstances. They had just had too long, too hard, too difficult a communal relationship where the problems were so intense, the rioting was so frequent, the unease certainly on the part of the Turkish Cypriots so intense that any kind of an agreement that could be sold to the Turkish Cypriots would have to have included a kind of guarantees and almost admissions of guilt on the part of the Greek Cypriots for their actions in previous years.

This proved to be impossible for any Greek Cypriot government to accept.

When I say that we were hopeful about solving it, indeed we were hopeful. We had made two years earlier a relatively serious proposal, the details of which now escape me, but it had atmospherics which people thought had been a proposal that if the Cypriots – and these are the Cypriots talking – had been a little less doctrinaire on it that it was an agreement that fell into the possibilities for being worked out. That's the way that people were still looking at the Cyprus problem. You had a man at the head of the Southern European Office, Ed Dillery, who had been the deputy chief of mission in Cyprus. He never left me with the impression that this was an impossible problem that we were just going through the motions on it. I, on the other hand, coming to this with absolutely no knowledge of it, said at the very beginning, "Well, we give so much in the way of military support to the Turks, we ought to be able to put real pressure on them." Ed was very polite to me in saying, in effect, "Well, Dave, it's not quite that easy." I listened to him, but it took me some while to understand why it was not so easy, that the Turks were people willing to cut off their nose to spite their face, and we had larger equities in dealing with the Turks, for example, how we were going to retain a Turkish bulwark in the Middle East, in a very unpleasant neighborhood, and particularly maintain defense against the Russians. Damaging the Turks economically, militarily, and consequently politically for the benefit of the Cypriots didn't seem to have a great deal of logic behind it. You might be making a major effort to sacrifice a "whale" in order to save a "sardine" or to benefit a sardine. It didn't mean that people were not interested in benefiting the sardine. Nor was it just something that ambitious people who looked at the Cyprus problem looked at it and said, "Well, there is a Nobel Peace Prize for the person that can solve it." In comparison to the Middle East, it was a lot more solvable a problem because the logic of it looked so clear, that you really ought to be able to construct a bicameral legislature with guaranteed seats and guaranteed this and that, a continued United Nations presence, and a good deal of economic assistance to each side to buy an agreement. This was what people were attempting to do. This is what I was involved in for about two years. One level of this was an exercise stimulated by the British with us and through the United Nations. We had the British come to us and say, "We think there is a window of opportunity this year." This was in late 1980. This was based on who happened to be in power at which time. They said that they, the British, would not hesitate to put a lot of pressure on the Cypriots to come to some sort of agreement if we, the Americans, would put a comparable amount of pressure on Ankara to tell the Turkish Cypriots that they had to agree.

At that point, there was a newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary General for Cyprus. He was a former Argentine foreign minister named Gobbi. This man was indeed vigorous, energetic, intelligent, and dynamic. He started going to shuttle back and forth to Cyprus to offer various proposals under various circumstances, efforts to create patterns of land management that would result in reductions. Proposals included the amount of ground that the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish forces had seized and perhaps bring a captured city that was an absolutely magnificent potential tourist spot called Famagusta back into service. This was at a time when the hotels that had been

abandoned still had the possibilities of being rehabilitated, brought back into life relatively quickly. It had only been six years since they had been abandoned. While they had been damaged and there had been deterioration, the feeling was that there was an incentive of hundreds of millions of dollars in property that could be brought back into use. The thought was that perhaps the Greek Cypriots would be willing to make certain concessions to the Turkish Cypriots if the first thing that they did was withdraw from this particular city, which wasn't really being used at that point either. It was abandoned and was cordoned off with barbed wire, guards, and the rest of a security infrastructure. Gobbi went back and forth and was incredibly vigorous and innovative in this manner. We thought he was quite credible. We discussed his efforts with one of the leading political appointee figures in the UN, Brian Urquhart. We were talking enthusiastically about the prospects for what Gobbi was trying to do. I'll never forget his line: "Yes, I, too, think Gobbi can walk on water, but I wish he would start at the shallow end."

What happened is that after a more than substantial amount of effort on the part of Gobbi and indications of progress and then indications of less progress, it just kept going without a great deal of anything happening. We then had a change of administrations. With the change of administration at the end of 1980, beginning of 1981, Al Haig was in. You had Larry Eagleburger, who was P at this point. Eagleburger had a long professional association with Reg Bartholomew, who was his deputy or his colleague at Defense and elsewhere in different positions within the Department of State or at the NSC. At the end of 1980 with the termination of the Carter administration, Bartholomew was removed from director of the PM Bureau and as a result head of the NATO Special Consultative Group. He was replaced. But the question then was, what were they going to do with Bartholomew. He was retrieved from studying German, where he had been studying it, while sitting in the Foreign Service Institute and waiting to do something. Eagleburger had gone forth looking, ostensibly on Haig's behalf, for a "very special person" to be the Cyprus negotiator. Various names had floated up and batted down. Finally, Bartholomew's name came to the fore. Bartholomew became nominated as the Special Cyprus Representative. This was an interesting appointment. Then I became Bartholomew's support person for this entire exercise. I remember telling Bartholomew that I was not all of PM, that I was not all of EUR, but I was all he had. Bartholomew proved to perform very adroitly in this position against the expectations of almost everyone that saw him get the job. Bartholomew had no background in the area, and his reputation had been one of an individual who always tried to get an agreement, pushed extremely hard to get agreements, and was extremely active in so doing. As a result we expected that he would create trouble rather than resolve trouble. But instead Bartholomew appreciated the limits of the possible and recognized that the Special Cyprus Representative was indeed more of a place-holding exercise to respond to Greek-American and Cypriot-American concerns and that he would do his best to find out what could be done and do that whenever possible. But he did not try to generate negotiations, agreement for its own sake, or just to generate dust in order to say that he was in command of the whirlwind. What he did for a period of about a year was to travel regularly to the United Nations, travel to London, travel to Cyprus, and talk to the senior people on all sides attempting to find whether there was any leeway for serious

negotiations, and whether there was any prospects of arrangements that would fall into an acceptable category. I went along on all of these meetings and saw a number of these people and came to the conclusion that there was simply too intense a level of suspicion, that the Turkish Cypriots in particular, led by Raul Denktash, who was their “president,” was probably the smartest person in the group, and he realized that the Turkish Cypriot community was significantly weaker than the Greek Cypriot community in virtually every way – socially, politically, and economically – and that an integrated Cyprus would mean within a relatively short period of time a Cyprus that was completely dominated by the Greek Cypriots. As a result, he always found ways, reasons, and rationales to make sure that progress was as limited as it could be. The Greek Cypriots, who would have had to make a deal to which no one could say “no” in the way of making a tremendous offer, an offer that was so obviously so generously designed to heal the differences, they might have been able to reach across Denktash to make this type of an agreement. The Greek Cypriots weren’t willing to make that kind of an offer, at least partially because they continued to hold the moral high ground. Their country was the one that had been invaded. It was the Turks who were holding the occupying force. It was the Greek Cypriots who continued to have all level of international recognition. It was they who could take the issue to the United Nations on a year-to-year basis and get a resolution denouncing Turkey and Turkish action. It was they who were prospering economically and they who would have to make the admissions and give up substantial elements of their own power and authority to get an agreement that would reunited Cyprus. In my view, they never thought it was worthwhile. It was far more pleasant to be able to belabor the terrible Turks than it was to make the hard compromises that would have been necessary to reach agreement.

Q: What about Clerides, who was the other Siamese twin? Denktash and Clerides had been dancing around forever on that small island.

JONES: At the time, Clerides was in opposition. It was Kyprianou. None of these people ever die or go away. They are all still there. Kyprianou, Clerides, Rolandis, and Denktash have been the major figures in Cyprus politics for about 35 years.

Q: They all went to high school together or something like that.

JONES: There is the intimidation that they all know each other perhaps too well. The only one of the Cypriot leaders who was prominent in the 1960s who had died is Makarios. But all the rest of them continue now, older and older, to play exactly the same kind of games with one another. They used to say about Kyprianou that he could only have one toilet facility in his home because if he had two, he would have terrible accidents because he was never able to make a decision.

Kyprianou at the time was also apparently having a variety of mental cum physical problems. As a consequence, no one found him particularly reliable as an interlocutor. They just didn’t think that they would be able to get agreement out of Kyprianou. You were also at the point where Andreas Papandreou was about to return to power in Greece.

As a consequence, it was harder and harder to reach agreement or any expectation that there would be agreement between the Greeks and Turks that would make it possible to come to an overall agreement on Cyprus.

Q: How did you find Congress? I went to a meeting one time of American Greek Cypriots. They had the usual run of congressmen and senators of Greek ancestry talking about "25 years of Turkish tyranny on Cyprus." That was the title of the thing. They seemed to be completely oblivious to the fact of what precipitated this whole thing. That was the attempt to take over the whole island. How did you find dealing with Congress? Was this just a burden?

JONES: Congress was certainly part of the equation. I have said a number of times that if there were as many Turkish-Americans in the United States as there are Greek-Americans in the United States, we would probably have a more balanced policy on Greek-Turkish-Cypriot relations. But as a consequence of the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus, you had a situation in Congress that initially had led to the embargo on arms to Turkey, something that was worked out only very slowly over a number of years, when we found that we simply couldn't influence the Turks and we were damaging our own relations not only with the Turks but making it easier for the Soviets during this period. But one of the things that I was involved in was still another sop to Congress. Every 60 days, the Department of State had to prepare a report on Cyprus. Every 60 days, your Cyprus desk officer ground out a report talking about addressing what issues had come up and how we were working to resolve this problem. It became pretty formulaic at some juncture. But nevertheless, this was something that in its inception, which was close to the time when I was on the desk, was being addressed reasonably seriously as something that we had promised to Congress and were producing. We were also still giving economic assistance to Cyprus, which in all reasonable terms of what was required for a country's development, Cyprus had no need for it at all. It was a relatively nominal sum. I remember about \$15 million. It was nickels and dimes, but first it was supposed to be directed to relief for the refugees. But when you went and saw the level at which the "refugees" were living at the end of six years, they weren't living badly at all. These were not people who were living in tents or anything of that nature. Finally, they moved to create a scholarship fund that was designed and has been designed and it may still be going on – I'm not sure – to use the money that was involved in this funding - or perhaps it was half of it - to generate a scholarship fund that would bring Cypriots to study in the United States.

Q: Anything for Turkish students?

JONES: This was Cypriot students at large. I assume that there was at least the option that Turkish Cypriot students could apply. I think there were some that did. I don't think it was run through the U.S. government. I remember it being run through something like the Fulbright Commission on Cyprus, something of this nature.

Another thing I was involved with was missing persons activities. During 1974 and

during the Turkish occupation of the North, a number of people disappeared. One of these was a young American Cypriot who had disappeared. So, we spent a great deal of time pressing for information on these people. They also slowly created a set of intercommunal talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in order to address the issue of missing persons. This, too, was about as convoluted and disputational as you can imagine – over which lists would be exchanges under what circumstances, what information would be provided about people, how you would talk about the cases. There were Turkish Cypriots missing as well as Greek Cypriots missing.

Q: By that time, I assume that everyone was assuming that these people were all dead.

JONES: Let's say everyone who didn't have a vested personal interest in it or a political reason to keep the issue alive. The leader of the Turkish Cypriots had declared them missing Turkish Cypriots all dead in order, he said, that the families could get on with their lives. But for the Greek Cypriots, it was a different case. The fact that there were missing people always generated reports in the same way that our POWs have generated reports for the last 25 years. They would find or hear some intimation of somebody that was being held in a Turkish prison – never in Turkish Cyprus; there would be reports that they were holding some poor Greek Cypriot. As a consequence, you had regular – I won't say "orchestrated" because it's unfair to say that someone's grief is orchestrated, but I might also suggest individuals whose husband's, father's, son's, brother's were missing were exploited by propaganda in Greek Cyprus to keep the issue of Turkish barbarity and excess and the "terrible Turk" as alive as it possibly could be. At that point, you could hypothesize at the six, seven year mark vaguely that one or two of these younger people might somehow still be alive. You couldn't automatically discount the fact that, well, here is a report. The report says that somebody says, or somebody heard, or somebody saw, or somebody listened to an individual who said they were somebody of that nation. So, among other things, we talked to the Turkish Cypriots about this, particularly about the American Greek Cypriots. We were told bluntly that Denktash himself had gone looking to try to resolve some of these specific issues. He was told and told us that there wasn't going to be any answer, no answer that would be satisfactory to us. In effect, implicitly he told us that they were indeed all dead. But this did not mean that you were not going to have these extended discussions and intercommunal talks. Of course, the next spinoff would be, "Well, if they're dead, if you think they're dead, or if you believe they're dead, where are they? We want the bodies back." Then, of course, where would the bodies be and under what circumstances would they have died? Would this provide additional opportunity to charge the Turks with atrocities of one sort or another? For that matter, there were people that just threw up their hands in confusion. They said that some of these people were undoubtedly killed during the coup, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. They didn't know what happened to them. Were they killed? Were they buried secretly somewhere? Was somebody particularly outrageous or obnoxious? Did they haul them away from their Northern Cyprus homes and push them into a ravine and shoot them full of holes? It's certainly possible. What you're talking about was significantly fewer than 100 people. I remember 25-75. It didn't mean that the individual tragedy wasn't as vital as if it were 775 or 75,000. But nevertheless, in absolute terms, the

numbers of missing people were really pretty low. But that didn't mean that the intensity of the discussion was not very, very high.

Q: After your two years of doing this and you've run out of every option you could think of with these implacable antagonists, what did you do?

JONES: I moved on with Bartholomew. He became the Greek base negotiator. I'd like a chance to review my own diaries a little bit more so I can have a better chance to give you a more complete sense of it. The issues involved were that we had an old longstanding agreement with the Greeks on our defense and economic cooperation. This was an agreement that was virtually not able to be cancelled. It was tied to Greek participation in NATO and it was, as a consequence, an agreement that was very satisfactory for the United States. We did not care whether it was changed or not as a consequence. But with a Papandreou government, there was a fresh impetus on the part of the Greeks to force a new agreement with us. At the same time prior to that, there had been regular efforts on our part with previous Greek governments to have a revised DECA [Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement]. But the pre-Papandreou government, a conservative government-

Q: Karamanlis?

JONES: Karamanlis was the president at the time. They were never able to decide whether the revised Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and Defense Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) with the United States was supposed to be a new agreement or was supposed to be a device to win reelection for them. In other words, a device that would show that they had gotten the better of the Americans. This had to be a deal to show they had gotten tremendous benefit from the Americans. That they had gotten a deal that would balance off the perception that the Americans favored Turks over Greeks and, therefore, would justify the reelection of the conservative government in Greece. Well, there was an extended set of negotiations around 1980 led by the ambassador on the spot, McCloskey, with a support team that was essentially led out of the embassy. This support team struggled heroically with the Greeks for months and months and eventually failed. The effort failed.

Q: Why don't we pick it up then? You've given the background to '82 when you went with Reg Bartholomew to work on Greek base negotiations, what had happened up to that. We'll pick it up in '82.

JONES: Great.

Q: Today is September 23, 1999. Greek base negotiations. We've talked about the background. Can you talk about what were the issues? What were the particular points that you were having to deal with in '82, and how did you and Bartholomew operate?

JONES: To a certain extent, I'm not as fully prepared for this as I would have liked to have been. I've gone over a certain number of my notes, but I've ended about six months short of the conclusion of the base agreement negotiations themselves. Let me give you more of the material that I have refreshed myself on and give you some of a sense for what was happening.

We had had this longstanding relationship with the Greeks with a basing agreement which, very much in our interests, was tied to the duration of Greek participation within NATO. There was no terminal date for the U.S.-Greek base negotiations agreement. That meant that when we had had previous rounds of negotiations and discussions, if they failed, it was no skin off our teeth. The status quo continued unless the Greeks chose to interrupt their relationship with NATO itself. Well, that wasn't in their interest obviously because NATO was viewed by the Greeks as one of their shields against the Turks. So, they were by and large hung up on how they would get a better agreement with us without having to damage their relationship within NATO. The previous conservative governments had looked at the base negotiations and their longstanding agreement with the United States as also a domestic political problem with Papandreou and his socialists, PASAK, who were involved in constant criticism of the Greek government and the U.S. for these bases and the government for maintaining the relationship.

Q: Talk about PASAK.

JONES: What happened as a consequence was that the Greek conservatives were always at sixes and sevens as to how they would come to any new arrangement with the U.S. For an extended stretch of time, they tried to find an agreement, and there was a set of negotiations in 1980 which ultimately failed. With these negotiations, the conservatives were trying to find a defense support and assistance package that would be large enough for them to say to the population, "Well, we won the negotiations, and now you should reelect us." Well, they were never able to find a package that they considered large and secure enough for them to say that they had won the negotiations and be able to take it to the population and into an election. As a consequence, when they were forced by the parliamentary term running out to hold the elections, they lost. Here we had PASAK and the socialists in power. That was not perceived or expected to be a lot of fun. Papandreou was even more pointedly hostile to us than he was in later years, reflecting the belief that the United States had connived with the colonels to oust the previous Greek government and had particularly been hostile to him while he was in opposition. But, nevertheless, there was renewed pressure for a new set of Greek base negotiations. This led to a requirement for a lead negotiator. Bartholomew, who had been the Special Cyprus Coordinator, was tagged to be the Greek base negotiator. This was no special kudo or special privilege for Bartholomew. In effect, he was given a set of negotiations which were expected to fail. First of all, we didn't think we would be able to come to a successful arrangement with PASAK or an agreement that the Greek socialists would let us have and second, because we didn't give a damn whether they failed or not. If they failed or didn't come to an agreement, the status quo simply continued. But Bartholomew

went about the preparations for it in a very sophisticated way. For this I give him a great deal of respect. What he did was start at the very beginning. He pulled out all of the documentation and material that we had available on the previous round and went through these inch-by-inch and line-by-line. He then went and co-opted or at least neutralized perspective Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff concerns. He worked very carefully on this, making it clear at all levels that the State Department wasn't going to negotiate away their bases, which was their implicit thought. They suspected that any time you put State Department officials in a room with foreigners, the State Department will give away the store and just do anything to get an agreement. Well, Bartholomew was probably better placed than a lot of people to counter this kind of problem because he had spent time at Defense. He had been head of the Political-Military Bureau. He had some very substantial senior level support in the State Department, specifically Larry Eagleburger, who at that time was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and who was backing Bartholomew in that manner. Bartholomew went around and met with all of the concerned agencies. In this case, it was the NSA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Defense, to discuss in very substantial detail what they wanted and how they wanted to go about it. One of the little litanies that he constantly reiterated was that, "We want to know what you want because you're going to have to live with this agreement." This preparation and this transition period took much of the fall of 1982.

At that point, Bartholomew was transitioning out of being the Special Cyprus Coordinator, where I was his support person, and transitioning in to being the Greek base negotiator. There were a number of trips to New York to wind up his activities as special Cyprus coordinator and hand these off to Chris Chapman, who previously had been the DCM in Paris and was almost assassinated while there. Chapman's terminal assignment at the Department was as the Special Cyprus Coordinator.

I continued to try to transition out of being the Cyprus desk officer while helping Bartholomew get ready for this Greek base exercise.

There were interesting administrative elements to it. It shows another side to Bartholomew, one that was particularly interested in pomp and ceremony. Instead of just grabbing a room and a desk and a secretary and starting away on it, he spent a substantial amount of time on getting special quarters arranged for him, carpeting, furniture being requisitioned that reflected in his position his status as the U.S.-Greek base negotiator. The hypothesis on this was that he anticipated perhaps having rounds with the Greeks in Washington for these negotiations or meeting senior Greek authorities in these offices. This was the hypothesis behind it. He also worked vigorously to make sure that he had a very extensive and full travel budget and a large representational budget. He really worked much harder than I've seen other Foreign Service officers work to secure these "perks," although I'm sure it's not unique. But he worked very hard on the amenities and the trappings of being this particular individual. Actually, it was the first time that Bartholomew was ranked as an ambassador even though this was a special ambassadorship. But this was the first time that he had the personal rank of ambassador.

So, he saw all of these privileges coming along with it and he wanted to be very sure that he had them all. I won't say that he went down an itemized checklist, but he certainly must have had a mental checklist on how this was to be done. I, working as his executive officer, spent a fair amount of time with the EX office in EUR to get this done. What was interesting also was that they gave it to him. That result was, as much as anything, an illustration that Bartholomew really did have seventh floor backing at a level that I wasn't able to appreciate as simply a midlevel officer. He had authority to fly business class or first class on his flights to Europe. He had authority to use military air. That wasn't that hard, but the first class or business class travel was relatively unique almost 20 years ago.

The preparations in Washington included a great deal of detailed review of the previous set of negotiations and obtaining some sense for what was still available in forms of military assistance that could be packaged and offered to the Greek government. It was also when we looked at each of the bases; we reviewed each of the bases as we needed to know in more detail about what each one of them did. There were four bases. Two were within Athens vicinity proper. One was called Hellenikon, which was the military half of the civilian airfield. Essentially it would be as if the British government had half of National Airport. One was a naval communications in the suburbs called Neamakri, which also had a variety of special communications elements attached to, subordinated to, incorporated within the facility. Then there were two facilities on Crete. One was a gigantic facility at Heraklion. The other was a combined U.S. and NATO facility at Suda Bay. The facility at Heraklion since it's now been dismantled, was really a very sophisticated and extremely useful electronic intercept site. The facility at Suda Bay was a combined facility with NATO, but it had a variety of important supplies prepositioned there. It was a very good harbor and an excellent overall naval facility.

We started this exercise then in our first round of negotiations leaving on October 20, 1982. Demonstrating just how sharp Bartholomew was on this topic instead of going to Athens directly, he went to the major military commands in Europe. We had started in Washington having seen senior people within the Department of Defense. He met with Frank Carlucci, who was then Deputy SecDef. He met with Richard Perle and talked to him extensively. He talked to senior people within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I believe that he spoke to General Lincoln, who was head of NSA at that time. The NSA was our intelligence intercept and decoding facility. Each one of these organizations pretty much designated a senior, trusted point of contact for Bartholomew with John Monroe at NSA; an Army colonel in the Department of Defense named Jim Hinds; and an Army lieutenant colonel on the Joint Chiefs of Staff who was also a Greek foreign area Army officer named Dwight Beech. Beech had had previous assignments in Athens, was a Greek language officer as well as being the representative from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on our team, he was also an expert on Greeks substantively while none of the rest of us had had any specific experience with Greece *per se*, although Bartholomew and I had worked on Cyprus and you can't work on Cyprus without working on Greece and Turkey.

The preparation effort. We went first to Frankfurt. At that point, we were at UCOM and had discussions with their senior generals. General Patch was the head of that.

Bartholomew reviewed all our objectives of reaching an agreement with the Greeks but not an agreement that was unsatisfactory to the defense operations. We then flew back to London and had an extended session with the Chief of U.S. Naval Operations Europe, CINCUSNAVEUR. After that, we flew once again to Germany and had more discussions within Germany and finally flew on to Athens. About October 27, we had what turned out to be really the only full formal negotiation opening with the Greek negotiating team. Here again, to preface the way the negotiations went, there was a very distinct decision on Bartholomew's part to hold a different kind of negotiating. Instead of having full negotiating teams with spinoffs for subgroups, Bartholomew elected to do it alone. He had the DCM in our Athens embassy, Alan Berlind, along with him partially as his note taker and partially as his expert on Greece. But for the many, many meetings that followed this, which were held with the Greek deputy foreign minister Yanis Kapsis, Bartholomew pursued the approaches to the discussions himself.

That approach led to a number of bureaucratic pullings and haulings, particularly within the embassy in Athens. Here again, Bartholomew elected an approach that I can only describe as different. He set up the DECA team as specifically separate from and gated off from the rest of the embassy. We were within the embassy, but we were within a suite of rooms that had been vacated for our purposes with a gate on them that could be opened only by those of us who had the combination for it. While there was one member of the embassy staff, their political-military officer, Peter Collins, who was part of our group, the rest of the embassy was assiduously excluded. It was a unique circumstance where they were not permitted to see our traffic or read our incoming or outgoing messages. We did not brief anybody other than the DCM and the ambassador, and Ambassador Monteagle Stearns pretty much held himself apart from these. Stearns I think believed that these negotiations would fail and that they would turn to him again to pick up the pieces since the previous ambassador had failed. Stearns wanted to keep clean hands on this exercise, where they would let Bartholomew do his thing until it didn't work out, and then Stearns and the embassy would be able to put up their hand and say, "Your special negotiator from Washington came and did his thing and it didn't work. What that demonstrates is that the resident ambassador should be the negotiator for these kinds of negotiations." This also illustrates again one of the underlying questions of how do you do one of these special negotiations? Do you do it with the embassy team, who is expected to be expert, coherent, well plugged in, but perhaps too close to the government, having other fish to fry, having other points of leverage that can be applied to them implicitly if not explicitly? Or do you do it with a special team from Washington that has nothing to win or lose except the negotiations but presumably lacks the substantive expertise on the intricacies of the Greeks in this case, their history, the issues in play, and perhaps wouldn't be supple enough to recognize ploys being presented by the other side, or perhaps not be able or interested in making the implicit or explicit tradeoffs with other issues that might be in play in the bilateral relationship. That was one of the issues that U.S. foreign policy faced during this period in the early '80s when doing base negotiations and a whole bunch of them that played out in different ways. We had them in Greece first, then subsequently under Bartholomew as ambassador in Spain. We had them in Spain, where he reversed his own position and decided that "where you sit is where

you stand,” and actually he had a hell of a difficult time as the negotiator for the Spanish base agreement; there are people that feel that he “lost” this time. You had another one for the Azores in which, in effect, we did send something of a special team to negotiate in the Azores. But what we came down to was, how does it seem to be best on each one of the agreements? This also was true of the Turkish effort. We had a different approach. It worked differently in each issue and on each base negotiation, there were different sets of tensions. In this instance by sending the special team from Washington, which was if not a first, at least a first in dealing with the Greeks. We had had one full failed round before and there had been previous abortive efforts to reach agreements with the Greeks which simply didn’t work out. But this effort by Bartholomew, in this manner, was designed to try something new.

Q: What was the reading when you got there on Papandreou and PASAK? What did they really want?

JONES: This became one of the ongoing exercises. We certainly knew that PASAK was hardly friendly to the U.S. PASAK and Papandreou were continuing to be cozy with the Libyans at a time when we certainly were far more hostile to Qadhafi and the Libyans than the Greeks were doing. It was the Greeks that were more pointedly difficult with the Turks than we thought was necessary at that time, at a juncture when we thought perhaps there were chances to reach agreements to lessen tensions with the Turks, but this was not on the Greek agenda. This was true bilaterally with the Turks, trilaterally through Cyprus, and multilaterally in NATO, as well as directly bilaterally with the U.S. As a consequence, there were things that Papandreou wanted from the U.S., things like a presidential invitation to visit, that he never got. But what did they want as an agreement? We thought that they wanted at least some of the bases eliminated. That would be their great victory, that they would remove specific bases from Greece. One of the most obvious ones was Hellenikon. It was a flashpoint at all times for demonstrations. The Greek Communist Party, which stood even further to the left than PASAK, stimulated demonstrations. There were endless labor fights associated with specific individuals and specific elements of the union that operated on Hellenikon. It was a highly visible U.S. presence in a country that wasn’t terribly thrilled with us. That led to constant tension, tension that PASAK was quite happy to exacerbate on a regular basis. If they could make us uncomfortable in Hellenikon, if they could push us into a position where we would conclude that we were better off doing what we were doing in Hellenikon someplace else (because we also flew major important missions out of Hellenikon that were fairly obvious kind of flights), we could have been manipulated, nudged, into giving up our position in Hellenikon.

Q: But wasn’t the other shoe that we kept saying, “Okay, we understand your problem with us and we’re not that happy with you. We have our friends the Turks over here who will probably do better by us.” Anything that we do for the Turks is a negative as far as any Greek government is concerned.

JONES: You’re right and this was one of our counterstatements. Bartholomew would

regularly say, “We don’t stay where we’re not wanted. We assume that this agreement is beneficial to you” and note the various things that we were doing bilaterally and multilaterally in the way of military support and assistance and the like. Nevertheless, trying to use the Turks against the Greeks has its downsides as well. The more you deal with the Greeks, the more you like the Turks. The more you deal with the Turks, the better the Greeks look. For all of their intensity in being difficult, we also could note that, at the end of the road, we tended to get what we wanted from the Greeks in the way of port calls or overflights. We would be under constant challenge and there would be a constant irritation associated with this. There would be constant arguments and difficulties on it. But in the end, we tended to get what we were specifically seeking.

It was just that getting there was not half the fun. On the other hand, we always had the feeling that the Turks were sort of like us – the bluff, hardy type. But trying to get a Turk to change his mind when he had said “no” was impossible. If you added up the entire column, the Turks really didn’t give us as much as we might have thought we were getting from them. We just assumed that we had a better relationship with the Turks because they didn’t yell and scream and hissy fit all the time. They just said “no” and didn’t go much further beyond that. The Greeks made a great deal of commotion over the entire exercise, leaving us completely exhausted, worn out and unhappy and hardly noticing almost that we had gotten pretty much what we had wanted when we went into these discussions.

I think PASAK in the end wanted and needed something that looked like a victory for them. Otherwise, there was no way that they could rationalize having come to terms with us. We were, after all, their *bete noir*. We were what they had been so critical of for the conservative opposition to be dealing with us. They have to have some strong rationale of their own for reaching an agreement with us at all. Thus this negotiation actually was the long, slow process of discovering what they wanted, what were their bottom lines, and how they fit into what we could agree to as an acceptable arrangement ourselves. One of the things that the Department of Defense always resisted was a prioritizing of what their most important base was and what their most important activities within these bases were. They were convinced that if they had given us any priorities, we would immediately lop off the bottom line and say, “How fortunate you are that we saved your top three.” So, we never got the Department of Defense to prioritize its activities at least during the process of our negotiations. Perhaps we could have made judgments of our own, but we weren’t doing that. We were trying to instead develop a full appreciation within ourselves as a team for exactly what we were doing in support for the Greek government, what agreements were extant with the Greek government, what could be developed in the way of military assistance and support, and what could be done in the way of special economic cooperation so that it wasn’t just a Defense Cooperation Agreement, it was a Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement. We could provide what would be viewed as more and more available general support for PASAK coming to an agreement with us.

In that first round, which ran until October 16, we went out after this initial meeting with the Greeks on a formal team by team basis to each one of the bases. We flew to each one

of them separately and we had extensive discussions with the people on the site in Heraklion and Suda Bay and Neamakri and Hellenikon and got a very good sense of what they were doing, how they were doing it, why it was important – things along this line. Again, this was all preparation for Bartholomew. The bottom line for this would be that Bartholomew was astonishingly well prepared. He was, instead of being the neophyte negotiator in Greece who was going to be chopped up by this canny old journalist expert in Greece, Yannis Kapsis, far better prepared than Kapsis. Kapsis took effort this casually in the way that, “Well, we always assume that as citizens of our country, we know our country and its problems and issues.” While that’s certainly true in a way, that may not be true on very specific sub-elements of it and a very specific set of issues. Bartholomew, by the combination of the prior preparation for readings of the previous material and endless work on the negotiation while he was in Athens and to this degree his support team gets some credit, nevertheless, mastered, internalized, and used extensively a briefing book that at the end was probably about three inches thick. While Kapsis used to refer to it jestingly as “Bartholomew’s brains,” it was a reflection of Bartholomew’s personal preparation and his ability when given one problem, no matter how complex and how difficult, to master it so comprehensively that there truly would have been no one in the world who was better prepared or more able to work at that problem.

One of the other issues that we faced immediately, which was one of the reasons for preventing the rest of the embassy from virtually any access to us, and to the negotiating information, was the thoroughly unprofessional, in Western terms Greek press. The previous negotiations had been plagued with rumors, leaks, misinterpretations, and misinformation to which the embassy and the Greek and U.S. governments had to respond to in one manner, shape, or form. When literally nobody in the U.S. embassy spoke to the press in any manner, shape, or form and nobody in the embassy except the ambassador, DCM, and one individual in the political-military section had any access to our material, we closed down any information that could be attributed to the U.S. government by the Greek press. It didn’t matter to us whether the Greeks made all sorts of statements that were incorrect. If accurate information was in the Greek press, then it would have had to have come from the Greek government and we could task them for having leaked and why were they leaking this material? As a matter of fact, to give you an illustration of how inaccurate the Greek press could be, they reported the instance in which we flew to Naples to talk to the then head of CINCSOUTH who was Admiral Crowe, who later became our ambassador to the UK. We spoke to him and came back on the same day. The Greek press had us going to Naples on the wrong day in the wrong type of aircraft to meet with the wrong person and coming back at the wrong time. But there was simply nothing that was in the Greek press that could be trusted. We did, however, to keep witting of what was going on in the Greek press, have an individual from USIS, a Greek national, come in on a daily basis and tell us what the Greek press was saying about the negotiations. We simply listened to hear him out and said nothing.

For the first round of negotiations, we only had three people on the U.S. team. It was Lieutenant Colonel Beech, Bartholomew, and myself. This lasted until well into November. We came back and immediately went into the same type of round robin

discussions and review that had characterized the exercise prior to going out. Bartholomew briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the “tank” about how things had evolved. We started again a series of working group studies on how the negotiations were evolving. When we went back the next time, which was the second round between the sixth and the 21st of December, we had an expert, Colonel Jim Hinds, from the Defense Department, also accompanying us. The negotiations settled down into this pattern where Bartholomew would go out – oftentimes at what would be relatively late in the evening in U.S. terms – after what would be the end of the normal working day, and spend many hours in discussion with Kapsis, usually accompanied on his side by Alan Berlind. But Bartholomew would then come back and we would debrief. We used the secure facility, the “bubble,” within the embassy constantly.

Q: It's basically a plastic room within a room.

JONES: Yes.

Q: I've spent many hours in there.

JONES: We spent a good deal of time in that facility reviewing. We were concerned about security as one of our sub-element type of problems. We were concerned about security in two directions against terrorism within Athens because the November 17 movement, which remains extant, was certainly very active at that time and every so often, about once a year or once every other year, a U.S. government official was killed. So, as a consequence, we were at least somewhat aware to very aware of this type of problem. We had a Greek bodyguard and an official escort when we traveled. We had secured rooms within the Hilton Hotel. We always used the same rooms. We had them swept periodically for potential electronic eavesdropping. We had one instance, which was never explained, in which someone was seen in Bartholomew's room. We were never able to determine who this individual was, what they were doing there, or anything associated with that, which left people a bit nervous. There was at least for me a curious combination of tension, pressure, and semi-holiday associated with many of the experiences and times there. So we could understand Greece better, we toured. We went to a number of the famous sites – the Oracle at Delphi, Mykonos, Crete, elsewhere within the country from time to time, trying to get both a sense of the country historically. We all read deeply on it, but yet the curious hours that we were keeping, the night and day exercises in which we were at the embassy early in the morning, late at night, on weekends, on U.S. holidays, and the tensions associated with operating in an area that we considered – if not as hostile as the Soviet Union potentially dangerous in ways that not even the Soviet Union could match – were unique.

Q: You don't worry about assassinations in the Soviet Union.

JONES: You didn't worry about being assassinated or killed by accident in the Soviet Union. If anyone had been killed in the Soviet Union, you would assume that it would have been deliberate. But the November 17 assassins were and have remained very

mysterious. Their ability to strike without being able to be tracked down has been one of the enduring mysteries of Greek domestic terrorism. I personally felt that our driver wasn't a terribly smart driver in security terms. He persistently drove down the most crowded street and made a turn to our hotel which hung us up for an extended period of time making that turn. It left me continually feeling that a man on a motorcycle zipping up a side street and turning while we were there could fill our unarmored vehicle full of holes in seconds and continue zipping up what was the main street in Athens and away into the distance without being caught at all. As a consequence, I often walked back from the embassy rather than take the automobile.

Q: You mentioned security and leaks. There are two major lobbies in the United States in foreign affairs. The Israeli lobby is renowned. Anything that comes out of our embassy in Tel Aviv is said to appear on congressmen's desks faster than they can get to the Secretary of State. The Greek lobby is very big. Were you concerned about reporting back to Washington and friends of Greece in Congress particularly or not?

JONES: I don't really feel that this was a specific problem at that time, partly because the Greek government at that point was not the Greek government that was most loved within Congress or even within a lot of the Greek-American community. What they would have wanted was an agreement that benefited Greece and, to the extent possible, disadvantaged Turkey and aided Cyprus. But it was also a low-key negotiation because so little was expected of it. This was a type of negotiation that we anticipated would fail rather than succeed, and it didn't matter to us whether it succeeded. If we had a question relating to the Hill, it was going to be how we would present any agreement that we reached? Would this be a treaty or would it be an executive agreement? In the end, we certainly thought that we were better off with an executive agreement. Trying to get a treaty through Congress was even harder 20 years ago when we had had even less a record of success than we have had in the late '80s and early '90s with a certain number of the arms control agreements and general international agreements which have been presented successfully to Congress as treaties. But it had been very difficult to get anything other than a generalized base agreement in an executive agreement form through. That was what we finally elected to do. So, as we went on and we continued to try to work on some portions of our exercise such as what form this agreement would take, we had a draft agreement that we were working on, we had various preambles that were evolving, and we worked on them and slowly began moving toward an exchange of text and discussions of this nature. All of this was gamed out. One of the things that we were particularly interested in was clandestine reporting on what was happening within the Greek government and how they were viewing it. We worked very closely with a lot of people within the embassy to try to get the best judgments that we could on what the Greek government was thinking and how it was thinking these thoughts. Indeed, there was one instance where a senior official in the Greek government was reported as saying to another senior official in the Greek government, "Well, suppose we ask them to leave and they won't?" The reflection somehow was that, if we were anywhere near as powerful as the Greeks and PASAK believed we were, we wouldn't have had any problems at all. But it was in retrospect this sort of struggle on their part to understand what they could secure from us as much as our

effort to understand what they were willing to settle for and what they really wanted out of the agreement that might be interesting in diplomatic historical terms and senses. How does a relatively new socialist government work its way through a relationship with a country that is both overwhelmingly powerful, immensely potentially valuable to it as a counter to its hereditary enemy, and yet not at all in sympathy with its personal ideological objectives? How does this work? PASAK had a circle to square. Our strength in the overall historical aspects, the fact that we did have a theoretical, if not real, Turkish counter to put forward, and our ultimate indifference to whether we got an agreement or not, were very substantial strengths.

Q: We're going to stop at this point.

Today is September 29, 1999. We're really working on the '83-'85 period. We're beginning to talk about the intermediate range missile problem?

JONES: Not at this point. Let's just finish the Greek base negotiations. At the beginning of '83, we were still involved in the base negotiations with Bartholomew as the negotiator and a relatively small team of people as our negotiating backup group. What happened between the early part of 1983 and mid-July was that we went back and forth to Greece four more times, each one of which was about a three to five week segment of time except the very last point when we went back for about four days in mid-July to wrap it up. It remained a very contentious process. Bartholomew continued to meet virtually alone with the deputy foreign minister, Yannis Kapsis. These sessions would often begin very late in the evening for Americans, which put the pressure on us, but which was not so intellectually and physically different for the Greeks. You would start after what we would consider a working day over and sometimes well into the evening and then run for hours, sometimes many hours, of discussions between Bartholomew and Kapsis. We continued to negotiate almost on a basis of implied hostility rather than on anything that would reflect the fact that we were both NATO allies. For example, we never socialized with the Greek negotiators. The money that had been allocated for representational activity was never used. The contacts, although they were ostensibly friendly and social and Bartholomew met with Kapsis, were really just very tough, very difficult negotiations.

Q: Even when we negotiated with the Soviets, there usually was a time when everybody would break and go off and have snacks, tea, or vodka off in little groups and kind of work around the edges. Was this on purpose on the Greek side, on our side, mutually?

JONES: You're certainly right in how we dealt with the Russians in the INF negotiations in which I was involved. We always had a certain amount of social engagement, and that was one of the areas in which people floated ideas "unofficially" but always officially in reality and tried to get some indication as to what their thinking was. But this was, in my view, much more a decision on the part of the Greeks not to socialize with us. We had

programmed a good deal of representational money that we could have used if they had been more interested in reciprocal parties and socializing and points along that nature. The only light aspect of it during this period was that for part of one round, several of us were able to bring our wives to Athens. Although they didn't socialize with the Greeks either, it was slightly easier because between the period of October and July, about nine months of work, we were out of the country close to half the time, which was not unbearable but, nevertheless, almost all of us had young children or other requirements at home. Being able to bring our wives there once, and that was the case for me and also for Bartholomew, made things just a little easier. It gave them a little better sense of what we were doing and what we were enduring because our negotiations went on despite the fact that they were there. They were perhaps touring or doing things of that nature, and then we would socialize in the evening with wives. But with the Greeks, we didn't socialize at all. Frankly, I have no recollections of any of the individual Greeks involved in their team operations or their support. It's possible that I only met them at the very first introductory meeting.

I also have to say that by the time we got to mid-June, we thought the whole thing had fallen apart. At the end of our sixth round, we didn't think we were going to be able to come to closure. We had exchanged texts and, at a point where we thought we had just about wrapped it up, the Greeks came in with a very extensively revised new text which was completely unexpected and largely unacceptable. So with a substantial amount of regret, we packed up and went home. In the intervening four weeks before we went back in mid-July, there was an effort in part directed by the Department and by Ambassador Stearns to get the Greeks to think more realistically about elements of the proposal and the negotiations that they had been pushing. Stearns had kept himself pretty far out of the negotiations. That was partly out of irritation that he had not been given the responsibility to do the negotiations. It was partly also an effective tactic of having that guy from Washington be the "bad cop," while he was the very knowledgeable and extraordinarily congenial Monteagle Stearns who would be able to serve if necessary as the "good cop." In effect, what happened was that there was some additional compromise on each side of the Atlantic. One of the things that had been worked over most extensively was the question of the duration of this agreement. We reached a term of agreement which was for five years. What we had done in the process was largely strip the agreement down to address less in the way of defense support and status of forces. It was much closer to being a bare bones agreement, a much shorter agreement, than previous extensive aspects and extensive agreements on base negotiations. The result was an agreement in which technically we gave the Greeks very little of what we thought we might have to yield. Indeed, Bartholomew had constructed a labyrinth of "withholds" that we would not give the Greeks unless we were pressed or in return for some aspect of the negotiating more attractive language here and a concession there. In the end, he had held onto almost all of these. In theory, the Greeks could have gotten a significantly better agreement for themselves, but they did not. At the same time, we believed that the Greeks did get the kind of agreement that ultimately they wanted, which was one with a time limit associated with it instead of the open-ended agreement that had previously been the case. But as none of the individual bases were affected, that was also sufficiently satisfactory to

us. When we went back to Greece, there was the standard flurry of emotional intensity with a good deal of back and forth in the way of telephone calls within the Department to people in the U.S., within the Greek government, and also a session with Papandreou which wound up some of these elements of aspects of criminal jurisdiction. For example, who would have what authority over American military servicemen who were in Greece? As there had been a couple of incidents involving Americans, and the Greeks handled them in ways that certainly dismayed the U.S. military forces there, we were standing very hard on the continued existence of the current Status of Forces Agreement, which gave us authority over our own people rather than the Greek government having authority over them.

We had a certain amount of fun during this period as well. One of the touches of humor was associated with Bartholomew having broken his commitment to stop smoking. This was at a time when everybody smoked everywhere and this was particularly true in Greece, where Greeks smoked even more heavily than Americans. But Bartholomew would be in the “bubble” and he would have his cigarettes but he would not be able to find matches. As a consequence, the team, even the nonsmokers among them, started carrying matches and when Bartholomew started patting himself for matches, we would start tossing books of matches at him. We ended also at a party back in Washington in which my wife had drawn a large cartoon figure who was actually a European caricature of the American Western hero. This Western cowboy hero was “Lucky Luke.” Lucky Luke was so fast on the draw that he could outshoot his shadow. We had Bartholomew as Lucky Luke, the gun slinger. Kapsis was the shadow who was fully of holes. All around him were stapled and pasted books of matches and it just simply said, “For our matchless negotiator.” So, that was a cute denouement to the exercise.

Q: I'd like to go back to the feeling at the time. There must have been the feeling both with the military and with State of thinking, “Okay, but we've got to figure out how to get the hell out of Greece. Greece just isn't that friendly a place anymore.” This old brothers in arms business was almost dead by then.

JONES: I wouldn't say so at all. This was certainly not the case by anybody in the military. Every single one of them wanted to maintain every base. We did not want to leave. We wanted to be able to stay doing the things that we were doing, particularly both at Hellenikon, Neamakri, and Heraklion. All of those were facilities from which, at that point, we couldn't do what we were doing there in the way of intelligence collection by anything other than extremely expensive alternatives. Now we have satellites that are doing most of our SIGINT and ELINT work, but in 1982 and as far as we could tell into the future, that just wasn't the case. Hellenikon was a very useful transit point when we were headed into the Middle East; it was very useful for our entire military airlift. Neamakri was regarded as one of our primary relay stations for all sorts of diplomatic communications. It really wasn't anything that we wanted to get rid of. Suda Bay was again also regarded not only as an extremely useful NATO base for the Mediterranean but an area which we had prepositioned a certain amount of war material. Although it was the smallest of our bases, we didn't want to give up any of this.

Q: Was there the feeling at any point that the Greeks might just say, “Get out?”

JONES: Again, that was conceivable. At that juncture, before this DECA, we had an agreement that tied our bases to Greek participation in the NATO agreement itself. So, the Greeks really could not leave as in “throw us out” without also leaving NATO. NATO was regarded by them as something of a shield against the Turks. So, they had a variety of complex problems as well. Also, NATO was a mechanism in which not only could they shield themselves against the Turks, but they could also belabor the Turks and give Ankara a good deal of difficulty so far as getting assistance from NATO, so far as working in great cooperation with NATO. Of course, NATO requires consensus and, if the Greeks were there to prevent consensus, the Turks couldn’t get certain things multilaterally that they would if the Greeks had suddenly and totally withdrawn from NATO and evicted U.S. bases. Also, there was certainly a problem for Papandreou because you still had a situation among Greek conservatives, who believed that the American presence was also a shield against communism. If the Americans, who had saved the Greeks from communism, were suddenly evicted by this substantially left of center government there are people within the Greek government that thought that it could stimulate still another coup despite the fact that the Greek military was hardly either in good condition or in good favor within the Greek population. I mentioned to you in the last session that there was this question that we understood and circulated at an intimate, high level meeting of PASAK activists where one of them said something like, “Well, suppose we told the Americans to leave but they wouldn’t?” To us, even at the time, we couldn’t believe that they could believe that if we were directed to depart we wouldn’t depart. Bartholomew as part of his negotiating presentation was saying, “Our assumption is that these bases are as useful to you as they are to us, and we don’t stay where we’re not wanted,” which was a useful negotiating ploy but it was also the truth. As Bartholomew tended to say, it had the Kissingerian virtue of not only being a useful presentational point but also the truth. So, no, we didn’t want to leave. If we had been told that we would close down these bases or we had to close this base, we would have done so. We took our bases out of France, and we certainly didn’t want to leave France in the mid-‘60s either. Probably we wanted to leave France even less than we wanted to leave Greece. But we did. All of our bases in Greece were of substantial military utility at the time. As time has gone on, the things that they were doing became less necessary and less useful. My understanding is we have closed almost all of them, if not all of them, by now.

Q: When did you have your farewell party and get on to something else?

JONES: I wrapped up my work in this in the middle of July 1983. At that point, I had already been assigned as a Pearson Fellow for a year on the Hill.

There was one additional stretch of problems with the DECA agreement which as one might imagine was based around both the duration of the agreement and the translation of the English into Greek. Bartholomew, although he is very linguistically talented and was

learning Greek as he went along, wasn't interested in Greek writing, which is something completely different. There needed to be an official translation that was accepted by both sides. We got hung up on the word for "terminating" the agreement. In Greek, the original translation implied that the agreement "terminated" at the end of five years. In the English translation, it was "may be terminated" or "is terminable." We didn't want a situation where we had agreed that the agreement just ended like that at the end of five years, that there had to be a more open-ended aspect for negotiation allowing the Greeks to take an action to terminate it. So, after a good deal of struggle back and forth, which didn't get completed until early September, 1983, we did come up with language that implied that there could be negotiations afterwards and that the DECA certainly did not terminate automatically at the end of five years, that there still had to be specific action by the Greek government to bring the agreement to an end. As a result, there were still other series of base negotiations and each of the countries with whom we were negotiating immediately grabbed hold of the Greek model to see what they could get from it in the form of additional benefits. But as I said, we got to a point where I was effectively finished with the negotiations, and I had been nominated and given a Pearson Fellowship on the Hill. These are congressional fellowships which send Foreign Service Officers, about 10 of us a year at that time, to offices in the House and in the Senate. It's been a program that's been in effect now for more than 20 years. I don't know how useful it is for each side. We seem to go to our friends and never to our enemies. Our enemies at the same time are never interested in having us. So, it becomes a self-reinforcing cycle that certain congressmen and senators seem to have an in on getting a Pearson or a Congressional each year.

Actually, I had an interesting preliminary experience on this. Although I had bid on a Pearson, I was not by any matter sure that the base negotiations were going to be finished in a way and at a time that would allow me to take it up. As a consequence, although I was bidding on other assignments within the Department, I accepted the Pearson because if I had accepted an assignment in EUR or on another desk or in PM and then wasn't able to take it, there would either be a lot of hard feeling. I certainly didn't want to leave the negotiations until they were completed one way or another. But taking a congressional, which was simply a benefit – you could always find another person willing to go to the Hill at the last minute – was something that wouldn't give me problems and was also an interesting assignment to take. But in the process, you see the list of Congressmen and Senators on the Hill. There is also a list of those who have said that they would be interested in having a State Department officer for a year and those that had already had them in the past and were still interested in having yet another. I went up to Teddy Kennedy's office to see what might be arranged there. Here, I put my cards on the table right off. I said, "I'm a conservative Republican, but I'd still be interested in working in this office." There was this long silence as the man who was in charge of getting people for Kennedy's staff thought about that for a moment and then asked, "Why?" I said, "Well, wherever Kennedy is, there is going to be action. He is one of the major figures in American politics and is an interesting and dynamic figure. Under those circumstances, I would be interested in working for him. But I thought that you ought to know at least that my personal political preferences are other than his personal political preferences. But I

didn't think that it would prevent me from doing a good, professional, technical job for him under whatever circumstances. Nevertheless, I wanted him to know what my circumstances were politically." Well, they said, "Thank you, but no thank you."

I went looking elsewhere. I ended by interviewing once more with a senator who at that time was virtually unknown. This was Gary Hart of Colorado. Hart was interesting to me because he appeared to be particularly devoted to something that was of interest to me, which was military reform. He did have a cerebral, intelligent reputation. At the same time, he also had what was then a tertiary level presidential campaign in the works. So, what I thought would happen was that he would very quickly find himself ending his presidential campaign, but I would have had at least a minor insight into what was happening in a presidential campaign by one figure or another. Then I would have what would be a standard Senate related experience because he was on the Armed Services Committee, and I thought that I would find out a good deal of the inner workings of the Senate in American foreign policy and in American domestic policy. As it turned out, I had an extended experience in a presidential campaign.

Q: So you ended up with Gary Hart. Can you talk about your year there, '83-'84?

JONES: What I was for the Hart staff was the person with real professional expertise in foreign affairs. Hart did not have somebody on his staff, certainly not at the beginning of fall and through the early part of winter, who had real background and expertise on arms control, on any number of foreign affairs and foreign policy issues. Hart was very busy in this regard; he was busy campaigning. During this period of time, I cranked out endless memos, comments, short briefing papers, official statements on virtually every aspect of the arms control issues of the day, issues like "build down" or the MX missile or Anti-Satellite (ASAT). It just went on and on because he had idiosyncratic desires and needed to separate himself both from other Democrats and from the Reagan administration at that juncture. I began work on a very extensive white paper on foreign policy for him. There were others drafting it, but in effect, I was the coordinator for this general topic and worked on it for several months at least. He was a very distant person. In contrast to almost all politicians that I have met subsequently or have heard of, he operated at a very distinct remove from his staff. Other than a small coterie of people with whom he had an intimate, personal, longstanding relationship, he was not political. He did not spend any time with his office staff. As many of the people who joined any political personality's staff (whether it's a campaign staff or whether an office staff), it's to get a sense for what a particular politician is like. This was a major disappointment for many of the people. Indeed, I had at least the pleasant initial experience within a couple of weeks after the time I had gotten to the office. There was a retreat seminar where we stayed overnight, had discussions, and listened to Hart. I thought that was an indicator of the manner in which the office and Hart would work. I said something to that effect to somebody else in the office, and they said that was the first time they had seen Hart in six months. Indeed, that turned out to be pretty much the case throughout the entire period of time that I was there. He did not talk to members of the office staff individually. He didn't do that sort of standard walkthrough that you expect, whether the boss is an ambassador or running a

small business. As a result, he dealt with paper. We pushed paper forward to him. He acted on it. What happened, of course, if you remember the history of the time, is that the Gary Hart phenomena against Mondale became a remarkable illustration of how somebody could rise out of nowhere or rise out of an unexpectedly low status, one in which he ended by winning the New Hampshire primary or coming in a very, very close second. Then he went on and had a number of other victories in some of the early primaries in Maine, in Massachusetts, in Florida, in Rhode Island, in Connecticut, while at the same time Mondale was also piling up points. But it wasn't obvious, one way or another, that Mondale was going to win the nomination. Hart, while still an outsider, was nevertheless generating a degree of excitement. What was interesting to me at that time was the degree to which everybody came looking for information about Hart. As I was the person dealing with foreign affairs at that point on his staff, a number of people from embassies and from elsewhere that suddenly developed a great love for me personally. Oh, they couldn't wait to get to meet me. Oh, how interested they were in me. It was one of those circumstances where those people that come to see you and profess interest in your ideas and your comments are not the slightest bit interested in you personally. They're interested in you because you are the U.S. government in situ in the country in which you happen to be located. Or in this instance because, boy, they didn't have the slightest idea what Gary Hart was like or what his foreign policy positions were or anything along those lines. All they could do was grab the nearest warm body that they could locate, in which case that was Dave Jones. They would try to pump me for whatever they could extract. So, that was an interesting, intellectual social experience.

Q: Were you getting guidance or was this David Jones sitting there looking at the ceiling and saying, "Well, I think this should be Hart's foreign policy" and, therefore, writing papers and they disappeared and you didn't know what was coming out?

JONES: You got a certain amount of staff guidance and you had a certain amount of previously written Hart material; that is previous positions that he had taken in return or response to constituent letters that had been designed and cleared. You had issues that you were asked to expand upon, develop, and you might get a sketchy set of comments on them. But then what happened to the work was often puzzling. You would perform the work or you would get a draft statement done or you would provide input to a speech or you would comment on material that others had produced. After that, you went on to the next problem of the minute, not even the problem of the day. You would simply get these kinds of requests. Or as you suggested, the other side of it is, you saw a problem coming, or you saw an issue emerging, or you saw something in which it looked obvious that there was going to have to be a position by the Senator/candidate and did something to respond. Again, in theory, a candidate is supposed to keep his campaign separate from his office. This is a legal requirement as to how one spends money. The Senator's staff was supposed to be doing work that was associated with the Senator rather than with the candidate. Of course, that line didn't blur. That line was just trampled upon other than in the most obvious ways. He did not specifically assign people who were being paid by the federal government to go out and campaign for him in New Jersey or things like that. But at the same time, certainly people in the office staff were encouraged to take leave that

would be unpaid or marginally paid in comparison to what they were getting in the office and go out and campaign for him as loyal employees of Gary Hart. Now, it didn't go over that well for some of the people on the Senate staff partly because Hart had developed no personal affections among them. Indeed, at the very end, there was a major request that people spend their weekend campaigning for Hart in New Jersey. Nobody responded. I thought that that was an interesting illustration of the lack of loyalty that he inspired. Because of my position and Hatch Act rules at the time, I had nothing to do with his campaign and did not go out to any of the specific campaigning events. There were times when as the foreign affairs advisor or a member of his foreign affairs support team, I would go to a speech that he was giving in public that was also obviously campaign-oriented but, nevertheless, it was something that I felt that I could go to without any questions being raised about why I was there.

In the end, however, I got into a very specific controversy that complicated my personal position there. This was the question of what position Hart would take on Jerusalem. While this is an absolutely classic position which turns up for years and years and years in political platform planks and things of that nature where the candidate would say, "Jerusalem should be the capital of Israel" or "I will act to make Jerusalem the capital of Israel," I argued to the contrary, that Hart should not take this type of position, that it was the wrong position to take, that it was diplomatically incorrect, that it was in contradistinction to our commitment to various UN resolutions, and that he would be much better off not taking this kind of position. Well, essentially, the Israeli lobby pretzeled him. Arguing for this approach was a very unpopular position to take within the staff. Although I initially got agreement that he shouldn't take that position, he ended by taking it.

Q: Particularly when the New York primary was coming up.

JONES: The New York primary. I was told at the time - and I have no way to refute it or confirm it - that the money that was not "hard money," that was not specifically committed and annotated money, that American Jews supplied 50% of the "soft money" that was directed to candidates. That was given to me as the rationale for the reason that he took the position that he did on Jerusalem. It was an interesting factoid. At that point also, and obviously because Hart was being seen as a more realistic candidate, he got more people of a foreign affairs nature on his staff directed toward him. More people joined this staff. My personal role became much, much less. So, while it happened in mid-winter that they began adding more foreign affairs staff, by April or May, it was pretty clear that I didn't have any significant role in foreign affairs on the staff. I became much less interested in the job. There was also a constant shakeup within both the Hart Senatorial office and the campaign as they struggled to find some way to transmute lead into gold. The person that I had a close relationship with professionally and intellectually, his legislative assistant, his LA, Kent Hughes, who subsequently did a good deal of work both in Democratic politics and in the current administration in the Department of Commerce as an Assistant Secretary for International Commerce, was fired. He was fired. Other people came in to try to help manage Hart. There were two of them who at one

point had a discussion, the upshot of which was one saying to the other, "I'll keep him focused if you prevent him from being such an unpleasant person." The other said, "Oh, you have the easy job." The second said, "Well, I chose what I wanted to do. You're responsible for the other side of it." In the end, when I left, Hart was as much of an enigma as when I came in.

Q: People make somebody into what they think they want him to be. I think we're going through this phenomenon with George W. Bush as a candidate. Hart had that rugged look. Later, he was sunk by sex. But I would have thought that even at an early stage, he would have had an awful lot of young female groupies around who would see a handsome man. He seemed exciting. Politics is like musk and it attracted. You would have found this going on in the office. I'm not talking about real sex, but about people, women particularly, who wanted to just get close to the presence.

JONES: I think you could say that generally about the Hill. One of the things that I observed during the year on the Hill was that the young women there are at a high level of attractiveness. They were significantly more attractive as women than the young men were attractive as men. It was just true. So, the fact that this was also specifically true within Hart's office wasn't surprising. At the same time, like a number of men in politics at that juncture, he was gaining credit with what were then barely being called "feminists" for putting women in substantial positions within his office. He had several women, at least one of whom was not particularly attractive, doing serious work for him within his office. At the same time, his press secretary and a couple of his press people were really quite attractive women. He also had minority groups within his office. He had a range of significant women providing input for him.

Now, whether he was specifically involved with any of these women, I don't have any idea. That was a problem almost four years later. What you could tell was that his wife was not a happy woman. His wife was not a secure woman. There was one instance when we went to his home as a group because he was participating in a debate, and we were there to watch it on television as part of an office activity. His wife just was so insecure. Instead of being in the obvious position of, well, she was the head of the household, she was a senator's wife, she was the hostess for our group that was coming here, I might have looked at her as the equivalent of "Mrs. Ambassador," who I would have expected to have met us graciously and in effect directed us to this, that, and the other, where things were all laid out, everything set. But unfortunately, Mrs. Hart just seemed to be very worried, very tense, very willing to be secondary to virtually anybody else who wanted to take a prominent position in this group activity. At the end, I felt vaguely embarrassed for her, vaguely concerned that she wasn't being treated fairly, or she didn't allow herself to take the position that was hers by definition. So, it was a curious operation and a curious exercise. My conclusion for all of this was that I was a child of the executive rather than a child of the Hill. I ended later by writing an extensive article that was published in the "Foreign Service Journal" about State Department congressional relations and things of that nature, which I thought was a useful piece of prose.

Q: While you were there, did you get involved in answering inquiries from the State Department and that sort of thing? Was there much in the way of interplay between Hart's office and the State Department?

JONES: Certainly not in the manner of the State Department directly of asking me to do anything or asking me to provide any specific information about what Hart was doing. There was a good deal of exchange in the other direction, where, since I was constantly being asked for information on obscure areas for which I had no knowledge, I would call a desk officer or somebody and ask for instant expertise, enough information so that I could provide some sort of intelligent comment or commentary. There were things, for instance, like Soviet leader Andropov "dropped off" (died) at one point during the midst of my year with Hart. He was the Soviet leader at that time. Chernenko was brought forward. I provided brief sketch information which certainly didn't come totally out of my own head. On the other hand, a great deal of the arms control material was information on which I did have personal background and knowledge from NATO, and I was able to argue for positions that were probably closer to those of the administration or at least those of standard U.S. arms control positions, whatever administration it was, than the more liberal and discursive sets of ideas that were always bubbling up out of the left of center.

When I then ended my experience with the Hill, I had been told earlier in the year that I was going to be the Greek desk officer. To the extent possible, while I was on the Hill, I tried to do all the studying that I could do about U.S.-Greek relations, Greek congressional relations, and people who were on the Hill who had interest in Greece. I tried very much to get ready for the assignment in this manner. I also had the good fortune to be promoted, which was again clearly a reflection of the work I had done on the Greek DECA and the Greek base negotiations than anything else. You could say that Reg Bartholomew got me promoted or his success dragged along with him the people that had been associated with him on his team.

I left the work on the Hill by the early part of June. I elected not to have, for example, any connection with the nominating convention. If I had waved my hand vigorously, I might have been able to go to the Democratic National Convention although it was clear that Hart was going to lose. It might have been something to go there. But in retrospect, it might have been a useful experience to have, but I was tired of Hart, and I was tired of the Hill and I was eager to get started on Greece and picked up that exercise. After some vacation, I went from the Hill to the Greek desk in early July 1984.

Q: You were on the Greek desk from early July 1984 until when?

JONES: Only for a little more than a year. I left the Greek desk at the very end of July and started in the PM bureau at the beginning of August 1985.

Q: What were the issues on the Greek desk when you arrived?

JONES: The issues were still Papandreou related issues, trying to build and continue a relationship with the government that we considered to be implicitly hostile, if not actively hostile. There just seemed to be nothing that Papandreou did or would do that was not an irritant to a conservative U.S. administration. Papandreou continued to play footsie with the Libyans, continued to make overtures to the Russians and was invariably obstructive in any relationship with the Turks. So far as his relationship with us was concerned, we just had an absolutely constant, unending set of irritants associated primarily with our military relationship.

Q: At that point, was preserving our military relationship about the only thing we really cared about with Greece?

JONES: On reflection, I can't say yes, but I would also say that the sets of issues associated with the military concerns were the overwhelming set of issues with which I dealt while I was on the desk. These really did run through an almost endless litany of aspects associated with our bases and other military issues. We were trying to develop a new Status of Forces Agreement, a SOFA. We were talking about defense industrial cooperation, another major set of concerns. We had a wide variety of questions associated with military procurement for Greece, surplus U.S. military equipment whether they were F-5s, whether they were F-4s. We had begun to get into the problem of being able to develop an F-16 purchase for the Greeks, an exercise on which I spent, along with PM and DOD, a good portion of the year working on this issue. General Dynamics wanted to be able to develop a sale of F-16s to the Greeks. We had constant problems with nuclear powered warships, whether they would be able to visit Greece, and under what circumstances. We had a number of nuclear storage sites in Greece. We had a very extended set of internal discussions about how we should handle these, whether we should continue to hold nuclear weapons in Greece, whether we should take any of the obsolete nuclear weapons that we had in Greece out and reposition them someplace else, or have them destroyed as a number of these weapons were there for what seemed to be political rather than military reasons because the systems to which the weapons would be mated were no longer in Greece. But taking the weapons out might have been translated as sending a political signal that we didn't think the Greeks were trustworthy. So, we would go around and around in this type of a circle.

Q: Even in my time there was a concern about the safeguarding of nuclear weapons on Greek soil. This is not a stable country.

JONES: Well, this was another element of the discussion. One side of it would say, "Well, you can only secure them by getting rid of them." The other side would say, "Well, we can certainly secure them better by upgrading the facilities by doing this, that, and the other." One side would say, "That's expensive and unnecessary. The systems themselves aren't necessary any longer. We should withdraw them." Then the other side would return to say, "But the political concern of withdrawing them and perhaps not withdrawing them from Turkey would suggest that we don't trust this government, which

would make things worse than leaving them there.” We didn’t make the judgment that they were really insecure, that they were potentially subject to destruction or to terrorist seizure, and we never felt that they were anywhere near that level of insecurity. Nevertheless, there was always the technical possibility that things might not be as secure as we would desire them to be. So, we had this semi-constant sub theme.

We had, at the time, a couple of significant political events during the year that I was there. Papandreou in effect refused to support the continuation of President Karamanlis as president. That position was a surprise to us, although Karamanlis was a very distinguished conservative politician. We believed that he and Papandreou had created a *modus vivendi* in which Papandreou was provided a certain amount of shelter on the right by keeping this very respected figure in this very senior position. Conservatives felt that as long as Karamanlis was president, he might be able to prevent excesses on the part of Papandreou that otherwise would be a real problem for conservatives in Greece. Well, as a consequence, we thought that he would retain him or at least not argue against him as president. But instead, to our surprise, Papandreou and PASAK said that they would not support Karamanlis’ continuation as president. Karamanlis then said he wouldn’t run for president. The point was that the presidency in Greece at that time was decided by parliamentary vote rather than a popular vote. If Karamanlis did not have PASAK support, he wouldn’t be able to be president. He wouldn’t campaign for it because it was beneath his dignity as a former prime minister himself, a man of such a revered, respected position, a man who had, if not created modern Greece, led Greece back from the period of time in which the colonels had been running the country and had refused to cooperate with the colonels when they seized power earlier in the 1960s. But we were wrong.

Then again, as a bit of a surprise, the Greeks moved to hold elections roughly in May. There were people within the embassy that believed that the conservatives would win. Indeed, the ambassador wrote a telegram predicting that the conservatives, the New Democrats, would win. We were puzzled about that. The rest of the embassy sent a telegram predicting that PASAK would continue in power. We thought that perhaps the ambassador didn’t really believe that the conservatives would win but felt such a prediction that was what Washington at least wanted to hear and take counsel of this hopeful possibility rather than what most of the rest of us regarded as the more realistic expectation that, whether we liked him or not, Papandreou was sufficiently popular and the conservatives still sufficiently unpopular that he would win again. And he did. Papandreou did win again. I guess I had the classic desk experience at that point. The election was on a Sunday. By mid-afternoon, the election results were in. I went to the Greek embassy information office and picked up their official statement. I went to the Department to write up a memo for the Secretary in this regard. So, you have an early evening in the Department. I sat down and composed a one page memo to the Secretary telling him the results of the Greek election. Then the office director came in and spent four and a half hours rewriting and retweeking and retwiddling this one page memorandum until, as a consequence, I didn’t leave at least until midnight. That was an illustration of the manner in which the office director, Bill Rope, operated. Rope had had no experience at all with Southern Europe before coming to be the office director. He had

been a China hand and was very controversial in that capacity. He was an intelligent, dynamic, and exceptionally difficult, controversial, irritating, and vindictive individual. I'm pleased and delighted that he never became an ambassador. He did as much as he could to become an ambassador but he also managed to have the knack for infuriating his superiors as well as alienating his subordinates. Despite a high level of both intelligence and industry, he certainly never got where he wanted to get in the Foreign Service.

This was an illustration of the work that I was doing. It was for the era and the period a classic desk officer's work. I had one subordinate on the desk. For the life of me, it's almost hard for me to remember what he was doing, except, as I told him, "You will do everything I don't want to do." It was not that there wasn't a lot of that to do, but it was more the economic and social aspects of U.S.-Greek bilateral relations. I handled all of the political, political-military issues. This went through an extended day by day struggle with all agencies and within the Department on virtually every minute element of our political-military relationship, trying to get the bases agreement to work effectively, trying to deal with labor problems on our bases, etc. There were specific, very left-wing labor elements whose interest in their jobs was secondary to their interest in creating labor difficulties for us. I don't think there was any way in which we could have handled some of these people, but our inability to meet their demands gave them a constant *caché* with the left-wing Greek press.

By early January 1985, I had been asked to be the deputy director for theater military policy in the PM bureau. I was approached by people within PM. It became clear that I was also the candidate of the negotiator for intermediate nuclear forces, Ambassador Mike Glitman. And there were other people who were joining PM at that point. One of the deputy assistant secretaries, John Hawes. Ultimately, the PM assistant secretary, Allen Holmes also supported me for the job.

All were quite happy to support me for this position. The new office director of TMP was a particularly intelligent and vibrant woman with Civil Service background, Jenonne Walker. Although she had also had CIA background and a certain amount of diplomatic experience, she was not a career Foreign Service officer. I was brought on essentially to be the deputy for nuclear issues and particularly for intermediate nuclear range forces negotiations and their concerns. As a consequence, I, in effect, broke my standard two-year desk assignment in order to take this position, which was of considerably greater interest to me personally.

Q: While you were on the Greek desk, did Cyprus rear its ugly head?

JONES: Cyprus was a standard set of problems and concerns but I can't say that there was anything special going on at that point. At the very end of my time on the Greek desk, I was working on an interagency group paper for how our relationship with Greece should be handled. I worked on that and was the primary drafting officer on that for most of a month. To give you an illustration of the intensity with which we were working on it, I came in on the Fourth of July and worked for 10 hours on it from about 8:15 AM until

6:15 PM before going out to watch the fireworks on the Mall with my family. But I was the primary drafting officer for this exercise of an interagency review on U.S.-Greek relations. To be absolutely frank, I have no idea what happened to it after I left. Another thing I was involved with was a secondary, but still time-consuming, effort to rewrite the Greek Area Handbook that the American University was doing as part of the endless series of area handbooks. The Greek Handbook was much in need of updating. As a result, all of the draft chapters came to the desk for revision. I don't know how many hours I spent on that. What I have from my memory is a virtually totally exhausting experience that only on rare occasion ended at what was official "close of business" (COB). The norm ran an hour, two hours, three hours after COB and almost invariably included work for an extended period on Saturday. While this was the norm in the mid-'80s, it's become even worse now as I gather from my discussions with colleagues on desks.

Q: Did you find yourself on the Greek desk being in the European Bureau but representing "unruly barbarians?" In other words, did the upper command of EUR really care much about Greek relations?

JONES: The upper level of EUR was simply forced to deal with Greek issues. Greece had been part of EUR for about a decade by then, so it was out of NEA. Greece was always considered the more European element of the three countries because Greece was causing problems with Turkey, with whom we had many irons in the fire; within NATO, which was even more important; with the Russians, which was vital; and with the Hill in domestic concerns to make sure that they got at least their fair share of defense assistance and security, which was politically potent. The senior levels of EUR and certainly one deputy assistant secretary was devoted full-time to Southern Europe (SE) affairs, although SE itself was not a huge office by any means. Greece-Turkey-Cyprus issues – Greek issues particularly; Papandreou because of his special personality – got a great deal of U.S. attention.

Q: You were doing PM work from when to when?

JONES: From the summer of '85 throughout much of the rest of my career – certainly the summer of '85 through the end of 1987 when the INF treaty was completed and then for much of another year in which we got the INF treaty approved within the Senate. Then I had a sabbatical year, a fellowship, and went from there to be technically assigned to PM but operating out of the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, where I spent a little more than two years as the chief's foreign affairs advisor before my final, real Foreign Service assignment in Canada between '93 and '96.

Q: We'll pick this up in '85 when you moved to PM.

You wanted to add something.

JONES: One additional concern that we encountered in Greece was the problem of terrorism. We had come in the late spring of '85 to the conclusion that Greek terrorism was sufficiently enough a problem and the Athens International Airport was sufficiently insecure that we issued a tourist advisory on going to Greece and going through the Athens International Airport. Well, under those circumstances, this action just drove the Greek government and Greek-Americans absolutely up a tree. What we had done was just shoot a bullet through the Greek tourism industry. Nevertheless, we certainly believed very clearly that security at the Athens International Airport was very poor. Well, what happened indeed, after a great deal of thrashing, was a virtual total Greek cave-in on this topic and commitments to upgrade security at Athens International Airport. This was a reflection of the tremendous terrorist incident in Rome. We managed to get security commitments to upgrade the Athens International Airport. We backed away from our tourist advisory. But it was also a reflection of how poorly we thought of Greece and the Greeks at that time. I won't say that we gave them an awful lot of notice on the tourist advisory. There had been warnings. There had been concerns. There had been indications of our problems with security at Athens International Airport. But at the same time, we were quite happy to throw down this gauntlet and tell them that they were so weak on terrorism – also because we had never at that juncture gotten any real responses on our efforts to get them to take serious commitments to hunting down the November 17 terrorists, who every year or so would kill an American official. But it was as much as anything illustrative of the poor nature of our relationship with the Papandreou PASAK government at the time that this tourist advisory was issued.

Q: We'll pick it up next time in '85 when you were moving over to PM.

Today is October 18, 1999. You've gone to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. You were there from '85 to when?

JONES: That's a little hard to figure. Although I was in PM, I was attached to PM for different aspects of my career up through '92. For this particular portion, we're talking about the summer of '85 to the summer of '87, during which time I was the deputy in the Theater Military Policy Office in PM.

Q: Let's talk about that. '85-'87.

JONES: PM at that time was a big bureau. Although it still had a director, it didn't have an Assistant Secretary at that point. During the period of time in which I was there, the director became an Assistant Secretary, and PM's real power became recognized also with the legality of having an Assistant Secretary as the head of the operation. Within PM – in my view at least – there were two substantial flagship offices. One was dealing with strategic nuclear policy, SNP. That dealt with the START negotiations, the residue from SALT, the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative], and questions of ABM concerns, things of

that nature. The office for which I was the deputy director was the Theater Military Policy Office [TMP]. It was headed at that point also by a brand new director, Jenonne Walker, who was and has been and remains something of a controversial personality. She had a CIA background and origin. Then she was lateraled into the Foreign Service. She operated at one stretch of time essentially on CSCE-OSCE issues. She was assigned to Stockholm. But she was always something of a stormy petrel in Foreign Service terms. She remained, and was at this instance, a GS rating (civil service) in what was oftentimes a major Foreign Service position. She was also regarded as more liberal than the normal tone of officials dealing with arms control. She was in constant arguments with officials elsewhere in government. It really didn't matter where in government – whether they were in DOD, at NSC, or whether they were other people within the Department of State. She was in a struggle in this manner many, many times. On the other hand, she was also an exceptionally bright and very hardworking official. She is the type of woman that was willing to stay 10 extra hours on the one tenth chance that she could get a word or two changed on a draft or a set of instructions. This was simply the type of approach that she took on the work with which she was dealing. The work that she was doing was certainly 98% of her life. She expected commensurate commitment from the people that were working for her. I had the good fortune in some respects of living close enough to the State Department so that no matter how brutal the hours I was working, I could pick up the telephone and my wife would be at the C Street entrance at State before I finished turning off my Wang, closing safes, and getting down to C Street myself. In other words, I could get my wife to the front door of State in about seven minutes, and then I would be home in seven minutes. But for those people that were not as interested in, dedicated to, or willing to work those hours, Jenonne was more difficult on them and just generally harsher in her personal regard for them.

TMP as an office really did cover a gigantic range of arms control issues. Theater Military Policy started with the most obvious, the INF negotiations, but it also had PM responsibility for MBFR, for other conventional aspects of arms control. They were also dealing with the CW, or Chemical Weapons Treaty in draft. They were also dealing with remnants of the BW, or Biological Weapons aspects. They dealt with the CD, the Conference on Disarmament, which was connected with the UN which came up annually with large numbers of papers and documents to clear. Ostensibly, TMP was designed to have two deputies for its office, but throughout the two years that I was there, I was *de facto* the only deputy. We had two different officers that came in for very brief periods of time, a couple of weeks or a month, but they for a variety of reasons – one retired and the other had another position he thought was going to be more useful for him professionally – they left. That was a disadvantage in the fact that it gave me a great deal of extra work. Instead of splitting the work so that I was dealing with INF issues and the other deputy was dealing with all other conventional forces issues, I dealt with all of the issues, although Jenonne, whose expertise was greater on conventional forces issues, tended to deal more with them on the specific matter. On the other hand, it was an enormous professional advantage for me to have this incredible range of material with which to deal and to be able to handle it and to demonstrate that I was able to handle it throughout the two years that I was there. Nevertheless, on an overall basis, reviewing my own diaries

and notes in preparation to talk to you today, I found that once again I was working absolutely appalling hours. In retrospect, you can only say that you can work these hours if you're young enough and energetic enough or perhaps foolish enough to start work in the vicinity of 8:00 or earlier every morning and then work about 12 hours and do this day after day after day. There was one period of time I noted in my diary that I had gone home once with my carpool during the course of a month. My carpool left at 5:30, which was a half hour after the State Department's official close of business. So, this was the norm – 6:30, 7:00, 7:30, 8:00 and well past 8:00PM.

Q: As I interview my Foreign Service colleagues, some talk about the tremendous hours. In retrospect, was more considerably more accomplished by working 12 hours than eight hours?

JONES: I can't say. I never worked eight hours. That's sort of a flip response. But in a serious way, the question wasn't whether you were accomplishing more sometimes as to whether you were trying to extend every effort to accomplish that which could be accomplished. There was an enormous amount of interagency struggle. This reflected a combination of true ambivalence on the part of the more conservatively oriented officials both at the NSC and in some places in the Pentagon, in DOD versus in JCS. But it also was a reflection of the enormous complexity of almost all of the issues with which we were dealing and the ability of very bright people, all of us, dealing with these issues looked into them more and more deeply and, with each level of examination, they found a greater complexity that needed exploration and resolution of individual issues.

Q: What would you do? You're working long hours dealing with nuclear matters. But what were you doing?

JONES: I will try to put together some of this activity for a day. For example, what you had during the course of a normal day is, you would start with communications and discussion with Geneva, which had ongoing discussions and negotiations with the Russians on INF virtually every day. If they were not meeting formally, they were meeting informally. You would get a telephone conversation with them to give you some of the insights that had happened during the course of the day. During that period, immediately after that, you would sit down and write a note to the people in the front office to inform them as specifically and clearly as you could addressing this. During the course of the early morning, you might also have gotten a question or several questions from the press people to be dealt with immediately and cleared throughout the government within a matter of a couple of hours or less to handle the questions and the answers that were going to be set up for the noon briefing. I almost failed to mention, but in passing we might have six inches or more of telegrams that would have come in from around the world dealing with all of the arms control and NATO-related issues that I mentioned at the beginning of this discussion. To the best of your ability throughout the course of a day, the evening, or the weekend, you should be trying to learn and deal with exactly what you are having there. You would be involved in the process of creating guidance for each of the delegations that were out there or people that were going out on

delegations. You might be involved with the preparations for people who were coming back from Geneva to have briefings and discussions in Washington. You were engaged in creating and designing briefing books for what was called the Special Consultative Group [SCG] at NATO. The SCG was headed by the U.S. and chaired by the head of the PM Bureau. This was designed on a virtually monthly basis, although sometimes it seemed more frequent than that, to go to Brussels, to NATO, and discuss with the allies exactly what was happening at this point. In preparation for this or in preparation for any of our own major initiatives in arms control, we would have interagency meetings. These interagency meetings were to discuss either what the other side had done and why it had done it and what our assessment and analysis of this would be and what our judgment of it would be. A paper would be drafted that would be put to the Secretary or perhaps even to the President and would take hours and hours of discussion on a line-by-line basis. During the course of this period under discussion, we also created, analyzed, reviewed, critiqued, and finally in Geneva in early '87 presented a draft INF treaty. Again, this was something that both lawyers and political elements looked into with intense concern. This was material that we would be dealing with over a great deal of time and with a great deal of effort. We had regular visits by foreign embassy representatives who would come in for consultation; they wanted to know what our views were on a recent initiative on a particular type of weapons system or how it was going to be handled – German Pershings, nuclear warheaded GLCMs, would we go to conventional warhead GLCMs, etc.? If you had a meeting with these particular foreign representatives and the head of the PM Bureau, you'd write a reporting cable on that exchange. Oftentimes, toward the end of the day, you would sit down and write an Official-Informal telegram, an OI, to the Geneva delegation to inform them what the specific developments were on INF during the course of the day or the last couple of days. At the same time as the TM deputy, sometimes I was sitting in for the office director. Jenonne would occasionally be away for a few days, for a week, on her vacations or things of that nature. I would be managing and reviewing the work of everybody else dealing sometimes with odds and ends type of issues such as how one handled the U.S. nuclear weapons that were stored in Greece or how the problem of "poison rain" as a Cold War problem in Southeast Asia would be discussed and managed. We were in the process, at different times, of having questions as to whether CW was being used in Southeast Asia. We had one U.S. army chemical officer who was assigned to our staff who worked on these kind of CW issues extensively, exploring to try to determine whether CW actually was being used and we had a variety of operations in connection with the Thai government to try to obtain samples and review possible exposures by individuals who had been sickened in one way or another by this "yellow rain."

Q: Did Iraq come up then? Had Saddam Hussein started his chemical warfare?

JONES: Iraq doesn't impinge on my mind at this juncture. It was much more a question of whether Soviets or Soviet supplied individuals were using CW in one manner or another.

Q: Libya?

JONES: No. It's possible that Libya came up, but the Theater Military Policy office's focus was almost invariably on Europe.

Q: Listening to you talk – and I've interviewed people like Jonathan Dean and others – the explosion of the nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 50 years later the fallout seems to be of bureaucracies all over the world staying very long hours with lawyers and everybody else involved and talking about this. They seem to have created a terrible challenge to bureaucracies of how to deal with it. The point is, they haven't been used since then.

JONES: I think you've made the point that for all of the arms controllers, no matter how conservative or how liberal they might have been in their personal origins, the point wasn't just that they not be used but that your own security as a nation be retained regardless of what level of armament you had. It was not the objective of arms control to eliminate weapons. It's to enhance security. You can argue very effectively that a disarmed world could be a very insecure world, while a very heavily armed world could indeed be a rather secure world – if people recognized that the consequences of using weapons are greater and more invidious than the consequences of not using them and pursuing your national objectives without using the weaponry that may be available to you. One of our tag lines was “enhanced security at a lower level of armament.” If that could be obtained by negotiation, that indeed would be the effective objective. But the negotiations were not ends in themselves. There were people – you mentioned Jock Dean – who believed that Dean was caught up in the belief that obtaining the agreement was more important than enhancing security. Dean was criticized in that way. The INF negotiations, with which I was most familiar and most devoted to, always had that particular Sylla facing us on one side. The Chribus was total failure and not getting nothing out of the negotiations. Of course, at the same time, we not only had to be prepared to walk away from the negotiations at any juncture, the Soviets had to recognize that we were so prepared, that our objective was to improve security, and in the INF portion of it, to improve not just U.S. security but European security generally and eventually, as our negotiations proceeded, to improve security worldwide by the elimination of this particular class of weaponry.

Q: Did the fact that you were now in the middle of the Gorbachev reforms in the Soviet Union quicken the pace?

JONES: I think there is no question about that. Gorbachev's Soviets made agreement possible. Before then, we were not “going through the motions” because the motions were incredibly intense. But the likelihood and the prospect of an INF agreement that would be acceptable to the United States and its allies was much lower. We had certain set dissiderata that only the Gorbachev Soviets were willing to meet. Until Gorbachev presented a series of proposals that met our most intense concerns, it didn't look as if we were going to be able to get an agreement. What we would be doing would be continuing to negotiate, pushing forward one set of ideas that would be unacceptable to them, with

them pushing forward another set of ideas that would prove unacceptable to us. But Gorbachev did slowly present a series of proposals that allowed a number of items. There were several major things that were included in the INF agreement that Gorbachev presented that made it possible. One of those was that we would not include the nuclear weapons held by the French and the British in the agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Ostensibly, you can make a good case that they should have been included, but we managed successfully to argue, and the Soviets were ultimately willing to accept that those weapons were going to be excluded. After a great deal of back and forth as to whether there should be a residual number of INF systems permitted, but not in certain areas in Europe, we were able to move this issue to what they called a “global zero,” that is no intermediate range nuclear weapons. We also moved this agreement to include a number of shorter range nuclear systems, which wiped out another subclass of nuclear weapons that would have been very difficult to verify. Slowly, over a period of time, we got Soviet agreement to types of inspection and verification procedures that had not previously been acceptable to them but the absence of which would have made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get a treaty first through the Department of Defense and then ultimately through the Senate. But, yes, your bottom line has to be that the change in Soviet regimes associated with Gorbachev’s judgment both as to what the Soviet economy could stand, how the most effective approach by the Soviets to attract Western European support would be designed, and what image Gorbachev wanted to present. *Perestroika* and a general opening of the Soviet Union was the image that he wanted to present of the Soviet Union and what generated these changes.

Q: Here you are, in Political-Military dealing with this. What is the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] doing?

JONES: ACDA was obviously one of the major actors in this entire process. They had overall administrative control of the delegation. They also provided the basic structure and logistic support for the arms control negotiations, not just INF but the other arms control negotiations. They were also the people who officially chaired the interagency group, which meant that they provided the first drafts of instructions. It was their lawyer who was the person who was a primary drafter of the INF draft treaty. So, ACDA, in many respects, was the lead agency within the arms control procedure, but in some respects, it was sort of like being the proprietor of a hotel with a bunch of unruly guests, none of whom could be evicted and each one of whom had a veto over who went out the door in the morning.

Q: Wasn’t there any effort at any point to take this away from Political-Military and put it in Arms Control or dismantle the Arms Control Agency? It seems like a duplication.

JONES: You’re a long way away from any ability to dismember the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which had a specific congressional resolution creating and sustaining it. What you did have within the Department of State was questions as to who would be the lead actor within State. The argument was always between the EUR bureau and particularly the NATO desk as to how much authority it had over these issues versus

the Political-Military Bureau, that said, in effect, "These are arms control issues. They aren't local geographic issues. As a consequence, we have the lead." We were very fortunate during this era that some of the battles that had been fought between PM and EUR over this and other issues when people like Rick Burt or Reg Bartholomew were head of PM and people like Larry Eagleburger headed EUR were over and gone. This was an instance when you could have said that there was something of an era of good feeling, when Roz Ridgway was the head of EUR and Allan Holmes was the head of PM. Each of them was rational; whether they did so deliberately, or implicitly, I don't know, but there was nowhere near the level of disagreement between the two of them that there had been between their many, many predecessors and successors for that matter. But Holmes was clearly given the lead on these issues with the recognition that, so far as going to Brussels was concerned, we were playing our game in EUR's ballpark. Of course, whenever we went there, we were supported by the NATO staff and backed up by U.S. Delegation NATO personnel.

Q: How did you feel about the Soviet team during this '85-'87 period? What was your impression?

JONES: At that point, I really hadn't met them personally. The reflection that we got back from the delegation is that they were competent, able, not particularly innovative or creative, that they were indeed directed by, and run by, what they were being told on instructions from Moscow. If they changed a position, we would know about the change in position. There was not a great deal of subtle nuance being presented in any of these instances. When the Russians made a change, it was usually a change that was reflected in a high level, highly visible, well publicized speech.

Q: During this time, how about with the Pentagon? You had officers from the Department of Defense on the staff. But during this '85-'87 period, was there a noticeable difference between the thrust of the Department of State and the Department of Defense?

JONES: As always, I suspect this is a little bit more a question of nuance than a question of radically differing approaches. Within the Department of Defense, it was generally perceived that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not innately hostile to arms control. Without me being able to remember or name specific individuals within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they were not ideologically opposed to arms control. That was a professional exercise in enhancing the security. There certainly have always been a fair number of military officers who think that the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely and, at the same time, the requirements to secure them, to protect them, and to train on them, detracted from the opportunity and ability to train for what they considered to be more likely conventional weapons to be used. Essentially tactical nuclear weapons ate up manpower and resources in the requirement to secure and protect them. So, even setting aside the ideological question of whether nuclear weapons were so terrible and horrible that, if they were used, it would mean the end of the world and the annihilation of everybody involved, the military oftentimes did not have some visceral commitment to nuclear weapons. This

position was regardless of the fact that the weapons that we were talking about eliminating in INF were indeed the newest, brightest, just-arrived Pershing IIs and ground launched cruise missiles in particular. On the other side, there were people within the Department of Defense – the most obvious name being Richard Perle – whose commitment to any type of arms control that was not very much to the national advantage of the United States was pretty limited. Perle's ability, because he again without question at that era was one of the most intelligent, active, able, and well-connected official in government, was well known. Perle was simply able to get things done or more prominently not get things done. He had people working for him on issues such as Doug Feiff and Frank Gaffney, both of whom have continued through the present to appear from time-to-time in newspapers and out of think tanks of a conservative nature like CATO. These two people were also extremely bright and very able and had some basic questions that continually had to be raised. Because they were intelligent and able enough to raise these questions, they constantly had to be addressed. There were people in the NSC who were also dubious about any arms control that was not very, very much to the U.S. advantage. Instead of resolving the issues, they weren't resolved. The issues were then kicked back for more analysis, more assessment, more review, more study, and more discussion. This, I guess I would say, was a difference within the Department of Defense to begin and it was reflected within the Department of State as to how to get to an agreement that was in the advantage of the U.S. and in the advantage of NATO and our other allies, but not so much to the disadvantage of the Soviets that they would find it unacceptable and just reject it out of hand. We did not have, in my view, at any point on the INF negotiation people who were not willing to walk away and let the whole thing collapse. Up until the day before the treaty was signed, the delegation was willing to quit. The delegation was led by exceptional people. Ambassador Mike Glitman is probably the best Foreign Service of his generation. He certainly was the best in my experience as an FSO.

Glitman's overall ability was unparalleled and his ability to move this particular set of negotiations further was unique. He worked exceptionally hard with extraordinarily good effect to bring it to completion. While, of course, every negotiator is limited by the flexibility given to him and the ability of others to respond to flexibility and good ideas on the other side of the table, his ability to move the process forward and do his very best with the material that was given to him and create bricks when there sometimes appeared to be neither straw nor clay was quite remarkable.

Q: How about the NSC? The '85-'87 period was one of considerable turmoil in the NSC because of the Iran-Contra Affair and a rapid changeover. Was there a general thrust coming from the NSC?

JONES: There was one particularly able Army officer there, a man by the name of Donald Mahley. There was also another colonel, Bob Lenhard, who has since died. He later became a general. Mahley was one with whom we dealt frequently. Then there was another man by the name of Sven Kramer, who was a civilian on the NSC staff dealing with INF and nuclear issues generally. In my view, he was uninterested in nuclear

agreement and more interested in finding ways simply to spin the negotiations out. So, topics such as Iran-Contra were certainly items of which we were aware, but they were not INF directed. I can't measure any effect that this type of activity might have had on elements of the NSC staff that were dealing with arms control, whether that be CW, BW, MBFR, INF, or any of these issues. But there were times in retrospect it was clear that it was never clear. When you're digging the ditch, it's sometimes unclear whether you're going in a circle or heading straight forward, you're just focused on throwing dirt out of the ditch. There were certainly times when our ditch was being dug in a circle and many, many circles within themselves.

Q: Political-Military Affairs in '87 – how had things progressed by that time?

JONES: Well, here, what I will tell you about is a series of transitions for me in this period. Up until the summer of '87, originally I was assigned - actually in the late fall of '86 - to go to Islamabad, where I was going to be the political-military officer for Arnie Raphel. Ambassador Raphel and I had hit it off very well and I was expecting and planning to take up my assignment in the summer of '87 after having received this assignment in the fall of '86. But what happened was that roughly in April, I encountered family medical problems, and we simply could not go to Islamabad. So, I was faced with the question of what do I do and how do I get it done? For a number of months, we worked to find, create, and put me into a position on the INF delegation. This was something that took quite a good period of time to do because... I'm not sure why. The creation of the position was opposed by ACDA. Me going to it was opposed by another group at one juncture. But, finally, it was possible. I was assigned to it in July of '87. So, what eventuated from there was the question of how I got to Geneva and what work I would do with the INF negotiations for the theoretical year to which I was paneled into this position. Throughout the entire period, we were sending out one officer per round for support to the INF delegation. We would send one officer from TMP to go out and give them assistance in drafting and recording and work of that nature. But the position that was created for me was to be Glitman's special assistant. For several months, and I haven't had a chance to review this yet, I stayed within the Department of State working as Glitman's liaison officer on the spot within the Department gathering information for him in the process of drafting and writing and representing him and the delegation in the meetings that were being held in Washington at that time. So, for several months, I continued to support the INF negotiations both within TMP and support the delegation in Geneva from my position in Washington. Ultimately, I went to Geneva in October. That period turned out to be the most intensive two months of the negotiating process, during which we brought the negotiations to completion. But before then, I felt that it had been a very successful two years. I got a Superior Honor Award out of it and learned an enormous amount.

Q: Can we talk about Geneva?

JONES: I'm not ready to talk about Geneva.

Q: We'll pick that up next time.

JONES: One of the oddities that happened during this period was a reflection of some of the discussions that Reagan and Gorbachev had had in Geneva about the total elimination of nuclear weapons. PM and other offices at State went through an interesting exercise in determining what a non-nuclear world might look like in the way of armaments, and how one would try to create a security system for the United States without nuclear weapons. Most of us went through this process somewhat tongue-in-check but, nevertheless, it was one of the more intellectually interesting exercises during the period. We had a couple of younger Foreign Service Officers who were assigned to TMP – two men, Tom Reich and Bruce Pickering, who did some interesting blue-sky drafting that turned into a respectable paper for something that would be the equivalent of the Martians landing on Earth, but nevertheless it was an interesting thing for them to do.

Again, to step back, we had a very good office of professional people, a mix of several military officers who were assigned as exchange officers often dealing with special issues such as nuclear powered warships, chemical weapons, and CW issues generally. These officers – Stan Richie, Stan Weeks, and Dave Lambert – were also intelligent, active officers, usually on the lieutenant colonel to colonel level, and went on professionally from there. We also had a number of very bright midlevel officers, several of whom worked on INF – Doug Kinney; Ron Bartek; who had come over from CIA and then became a GS at State; and Mark Mohr. Both Mark and Ron spent extended periods of time in Geneva working in support of the delegation. Then we had almost a separate subgroup of people that worked on CW treaty issues – BW issues, conventional forces issues. This was also the period of time in which MBFR was brought to a conclusion. MBFR became an effort to create Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement, a CFE. It was decided to have it as CFE when the thought of having a Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Agreement, a CAFÉ, was advanced, it was concluded that such an abbreviation might be considered a little flip by the media and not entirely serious. So, we transformed MBFR, which had definitely run out its time, into CFE. Ambassador Blackwill for reasons that I probably knew at the time but have now forgotten, desired to close down MBFR as a negotiating exercise; he felt accurately that it had come to no successful conclusion in the many years in which it had run. Indeed, there were quite a number of people that buried a career or at least a substantial portion of their career in a commitment to a conventional forces agreement in Europe which never worked out at all. The MBFR treaty process had been started (some people thought to fend off the Mansfield Amendment requirement for reductions of forces in Europe, which would have been done unilaterally) slowly evolved over the years into this endless process which Congress eventually began to regard as simply an exercise to prevent the Mansfield Amendment from coming into effect. There was a degree of reality to that conclusion, but there was also a degree of feeling that we were having a great deal of difficulty coming to any sort of agreement with the Soviets and, in this instance, the Warsaw Pact as well over what acceptable conventional force levels would be. If you've spoken to Ambassador Dean in any detail, he could give you material by the pound in which this was done. Dean's reporting was often viewed with considerable suspicion because he had a tendency to

provide a 20-page reporting cable on a two hour meeting and bury somewhere on the 17th page an important vital suggested change that people would occasionally miss. Because it was put in there in the manner in which it was, people felt that he then exploited this kind of work inappropriately. If not quite telling tales out of school, I'm giving an impression that I'm sure Ambassador Dean would dispute vigorously, if not violently. But that was the impression that he left. Indeed, it was almost a requirement to provide a summary. Initially, early in the negotiations when he was in charge of them in Vienna, there were no summaries on these 20-page reporting telegrams, which made them even more of a challenge to read.

Q: We'll pick this up in the '87-'89 period when you're in Geneva and the treaty process in Washington.

Today is March 3, 2000. '87-'89 in Geneva. What were you doing?

JONES: It's a little less than '87-'89, but what I'll try to talk about today is my experience with the INF negotiation at the end of the year, 1987, and the work that was done with the treaty ratification until the end of May 1988 and perhaps if we still have time I'll talk a bit about what I did in the following year, which was to have an Una Chapman Cox fellowship, a sabbatical. What I had been doing in the late summer of '87 was trying to find out what I was going to do next in the Foreign Service. I had been unable to work out an assignment. The assignment that I had to Pakistan was canceled because of family medial reasons. As a result, I stayed on in the Department. At that point, the most obvious suggestion was that I continued to work with Ambassador Mike Glitman on INF, which had been the major topic which I had worked on as the deputy in the Theater Military Policy Office in PM. In any event, for a couple of months as a result of that, I was Glitman's man coordinator in Washington on INF issues. Then, starting in late September, I moved to the U.S. delegation for the INF in Geneva. We were now at this point very much under the gun. The President had announced on September 18 that INF as a treaty had been agreed upon in principle. On September 20th, Glitman was supposedly told by the Secretary that they wanted the treaty done by October 20th, which made it potentially a very exciting month. It didn't turn out that way, but that was the initial impetus that we were given in late September. I arrived in Geneva on September 21st. Glitman had been coming from a different part of Europe. We met in Paris and went into Geneva together. I settled in in a curious role of being the major reporting and drafting officer for the delegation for the next two and a half months. This put me working also with the State Department representative at INF, a senior Foreign Service named Leo Reddy.

The exercise in Geneva was a very complicated, multifaceted, interagency exercise on the U.S. side and then dealing with the Russians on the other side. Within the delegation, we had representatives from each of the agencies – ACDA, OSD, JSC, and the State Department. At the same time at the head of the delegation there were actually two

ambassadors, Mike Glitman and John Woodworth, a representative from OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) who was also tied personally to senior people in OSD or at least ostensibly he was to be responsible to them. Woodworth had been a longtime career DOD civilian with a great deal of experience at NATO, where I first met him in the late '70s, and then in various arms control capacities within the Department of Defense. He was indeed and still is a very knowledgeable individual on arms control and he remains a personal friend as well. But you can see what a dual-hatted, two ambassador situation and a multi-agency operation can bring in complexity. There was also a CIA representative initially. Each of them was also responsible to their home agencies and communicated by Official-Informal telegrams and "secure voice" as well as arguing their cases in Washington and in Geneva. Each side that thought themselves a loser in one set of arguments would then carry their argument either to their special representatives in Geneva or send their arguments back to their agencies in Washington so the arguments could be reviewed and renewed again. To handle our discussions, we worked many hours and almost every day in the "bubble," the secure facility within almost every embassy. These discussions would last hours and hours on many points. Then you would deal with the Russians. People dealt with the Russians on multiple levels. You had a substantial number of two-on-two negotiations in which Glitman and Woodworth would meet with their Soviet counterparts, Obukoff and Mekvedeff. You would have those meetings. Then you would have more complete groups of the INF delegations on steering groups. These often met twice a day. We would meet alternately in the U.S. delegation or we would go "down the hill" to where the Russians were centered. It was always amusing as to how we would meet one another. It was as ritualized and formalistic as a May Day parade as we would walk in and the Russians would be standing in rank order line, and we would get out of our vehicles and walk through their rank order line shaking hands as we went through this exercise. When they came up the hill to see us, we would do exactly the same thing and there would be a yell throughout the delegation just before the time of their arrival that, "The Russians are coming!" mocking the movie title. We would rush into line knowing that holes would be left in the line for the people that were still rushing to make their spot. There were times when the Russians were virtually coming through the door and our people were hustling into position in order to shake hands and say, "Good morning" or "Good afternoon" or "Isn't it a beautiful rainy day today?" Then you would go into the conferences and discuss. The discussions were almost without exception led only by the senior people.

Later, as the negotiations became even more intense and the work became more focused on specific items, we broke down into groups handling each of the specific treaty protocols, one for verification and inspection, another for "elimination" or the destruction of the INF system. There were other people that were working on the exchanges of data which were highly statistical and highly intelligence related. Overall, there were people that were working on the format and the legal language associated with the treaty.

Q: Hanging over this whole thing, was there the feeling that the Soviet Prime Minister, Gorbachev, and the American President, Reagan, had been getting together... They wanted this and you guys had better come up with something?

JONES: Well, clearly, we had this impetus when the president had announced that the treaty was finished. It had to be worked out. But at the same time, there was an almost curious willingness by the delegation that we would sink the ship rather than have a bad treaty. There was not a single dove in this delegation. That didn't just mean that there was only a question of how fully plumed the hawks were. Any dove would have been eaten alive at the first bubble meeting. It simply wasn't that way. We perhaps by being willing to sink the whole treaty at the end regardless of how much we desired to get it, to complete it, we were absolutely convinced that we were still better off to have no agreement than to have a bad agreement or to have an agreement that was a good agreement in technical terms but couldn't be ratified.

Q: Were you getting any feel for your counterparts in the Soviet delegation, what they were working under?

JONES: In retrospect, my feeling is that they had an impetus to complete the treaty, but by no means did that entail being particularly cooperative. It was much more "Here is a problem, Americans. How are you going to solve it?" Certainly this was true on the technical end, "Here is a problem, Americans. You think this is so important. We're willing to take it another way. You find a way to solve it that won't bother us."

Q: In other words, the onus kept being thrown into the American lap?

JONES: Certainly that is the way we felt. You get yourself into a curious hothouse environment of enormous intensity and great pressure from all directions in this effort to complete it. At the same time, there were certainly people in Washington within the office of the Secretary of Defense who did not care if it ever were completed. There were at least one or two people within the NSC who didn't care if it was ever completed. Toward the very end of this session, a representative in OSC, Frank Gaffney, who is still prominent in conservative circles and writes a column in the "Washington Times" about once a week, resigned because he was informed that he was not going to be promoted to Richard Perle's former position as the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs but, in effect, the primary person within the Office of the Secretary of Defense dealing with arms control issues. He resigned and said that we should slow down the INF process rather than push it forward. There was a representative within his office dealing with inspection, who was so ritualistically difficult that the difficulty could only be considered in my view obstructionism rather than principled concern that the very last conceivable possibility for verification had not been explored. So, yes, you did have a great impetus to get the job done, but you had some very serious conservative objections. They turned out to be objections that could be overcome, but they were overcome by a combination of great care during the negotiating process and the political impetus to move forward. There was also a degree of cooperation by the Russians that previously would not have been anticipated, a required degree of openness on their part which I think they found almost personally disconcerting, such as the degree to which information on intelligence holdings and specific holdings of different missiles and locations for them

had to be provided to the Americans. There was one Russian military officer who said, “We don’t even give this to our foreign ministry officials.” Now they were forced to publish it in a data exchange. Each portion of these exchanges was clearly very painful for them. It was indeed as if they were making sacrifices, which in a more open society such as ours was information that wasn’t being hidden. We had very little to hide, and they had, in the past, a great deal to hide. That is what made some of our problems particularly intense.

Our intelligence judgments and projections as to how many missiles of this nature they had were based on projections as to how many could be pushed out of a factory given certain production type runs. As a result, we had a high range and a low range. The Russian data figures came in much closer to our low end projection, which generated a conservative storm of criticism of saying, “Where are all these missing missiles? There is a hidden SS-20 force somewhere. We have to be able to find it.” Then they would hypothesize a kind of anywhere, anytime, everywhere, all-the-time inspections in the Soviet Union, which were impossible and deliberately presented not to find the ostensibly missing SS-20 missiles but to make sure that the treaty couldn’t be completed because their level of trust in the Soviet Union was so little under any circumstances that their position was that any agreement was worse than no agreement.

Q: Also, looking at production figures played to... We always assumed that the Soviets were more efficient than common sense would have told us they were from observing how they built other things, that factories were doing an extremely efficient job of producing missiles when they probably were not.

JONES: I’m not sure how the production projections were made, but if you think that they’re going to run three shifts a day and push out missiles 365 days a year, and that this is their major focus to produce this missile rather than another one; then, at each level, you push the theoretical figures up. If you take other projections, you put the numbers further down. However, in the end, we would have been happier if they had come in a little closer to the midpoint in our estimates. What it did was to make it harder for us to say where those missiles that we didn’t find might have been and we had to find additional mechanisms to prevent the possibility that these theoretical missiles existed. We had to tie down and prevent any flight testing. We had to tie down and prevent any training in these systems. We had to tie down the movement of systems in and out of their major SS-20 production facility, which was also producing other missiles. So, we had to find devices and mechanisms that would allow us to inspect for SS-20s while not catching technical/intelligence information on their other missiles that were being produced at the same time. This required a lot of creative thinking and creative drafting. Then we had to find a facility on our part that would allow the Soviets an equal facility to inspect. We weren’t producing that system anymore, but they still had to have something to inspect. We found a facility. We were able to find a method to inspect their facility that proved acceptable.

The work that I was doing there turned out to be an incredibly intensive drafting

experience. Since I went to almost every steering group meeting and was debriefed by Mike on almost every one of his two-on-two sessions, plus doing the basic drafting requests for guidance from Washington on outstanding issues, plus doing end-of-week roundups on where things stood in the negotiations each week, plus writing Official- Informal telegrams to the PM Bureau and other people at State to keep them up to speed on what was happening, I never worked harder in my life for a more extended period of time than those months in Geneva. At the end, we counted up that I had worked 33 consecutive days. Our normal workday at the beginning of this process in September was 12 hours. At the end, it was at least 14. I by no means will say that I worked harder than most. The amount of work that I was doing was on the high end of the group, but there were many people that were working even longer hours and harder and, of course, with much more responsibility than I had specifically. I tried to be creative in the manner in which I did my drafting for guidance.

Q: Your piece of the action was to go around and draft for the different components? The technicians were working and then you would draft?

JONES: We would have the meetings and exchanges. I became very close to the person that would give the immediate record of what was most prominent that was happening in a special steering group meeting or what were the most immediate responses that were happening in the two on two meetings or what fresh guidance needed to be done, what was the status of old guidance or existing material, and what we were going to have to accomplish during this period. So, that was the kind of work that I did by and large.

Q: Was your feeling at the time that while you were all willing to go down with the ship if you had to, were the military members and the State Department members, were you a team or were you going in different directions?

JONES: The delegation in Geneva was a team. That's a reflection of the guidance and energy that Mike Glitman put into it. In the end, he managed to persuade and co-opt the agency representatives who were there, persuade them that what we were trying to do and the manner in which we were trying to do it was correct, and that there was nobody who had the slightest intention of selling us short by a millimeter. As a consequence over a longer period of time, the OSD ambassador, John Woodward, suffered professionally by not being more obstructive or more difficult or more of a mouthpiece directly for his OSD principals. Instead, he stood on his principles and continued to push for the obtainable treaty. So, the group in Geneva was a very substantial "team" in that manner and worked on it very effectively. At the same time, my illustration of our willingness to accept a failure was the delegation photograph that was taken late in November. This was a ritualistic exercise in that the Russians would come over – perhaps in other years we had gone to the Russian delegation – and we would take joint delegation photographs of everyone who was there on this round of the negotiations. This time, we were in an absolute panic day. We were struggling to try to complete this exercise. We had just sat down and taken our formal photograph, and we were about to leap up and go away and back to our work when the executive secretary of the delegation, an Army Lieutenant

Colonel Jeff Ankley, said, “Stop. Wait a minute.” He went to the side and opened a box and out of the box he pulled a series of bags that had eyeholes on them labeled “INF delegation.” Every single one of us was given a bag to put over our heads. This was to be the photograph of the “delegation in exile” if we failed. So, a number of us still have these bags – and I have mine framed and mounted as part of an INF memorabilia package. It is a juxtaposition of the delegation that succeeded and the delegation that failed. We were in hysterics as a result of this photograph session, but it reflected a reality that within days before the agreement was supposed to have been completed we were willing to take the ship down if it didn’t meet our needs and satisfaction. Throughout the process, we also had people coming to Geneva to solve problems or to buck us up in one way or another. We had senior people from the Department and from Washington come at a couple of different junctures during these final days and final month to put additional impetus behind some of the specific issues. While I didn’t mention that the entire structure for negotiating these nuclear arms control agreements was really quite complicated. INF was only one of three elements being negotiated. The other two elements with separate negotiations ongoing in Geneva were on strategic arms or START and on Star Wars, space armament, SDI. Over this entire structure there was a senior negotiator, subsequently the Counselor in the Department, Max Kampelman, a very senior and very longtime expert professional in various arms control general negotiating frameworks. He had a vested interest in how this entire process was running. Although it became clear over the months and over a couple of years that the only one that was going to be completed in the near term was an INF agreement, at the beginning of the process, there was at least some thought that each of the three would move forward in tandem and there would be one magnificent, overall, incredibly large agreement covering all aspects of nuclear armament. With considerable adroitness, the INF negotiators moved into a separate track policy in which each was able to move ahead at the speed that was appropriate for it and what the negotiating traffic could bear. But that still meant that there was this overall ostensible framework, one portion of which has never been completed. But this framework theoretically existed for many years and they still operate within the framework of how we were going about the negotiations. But what it did was lead Kampelman to come back about November 16th to deal with his senior counterpart on the Soviets side, Vorontsov, in effect waiting for him to turn up delayed progress on core issues in the treaty for somewhere between 10 days and two weeks, although people continued to struggle forward with more specific elements of it. Then finally on the 23rd and 24th of November, Secretary of State Shultz came to Geneva along with some senior people within the Department both in the European Bureau (Charlie Thomas came) and the Assistant Secretary from the Political-Military Bureau (Allen Holmes was there). Again they attempted to push forward some of the more specific problem issues and to generate more attention on the individual protocols that were being negotiated to try to solve problems of “elimination” and areas of that nature. Probably by the end of November when the Soviets had provided technical information, official exchange of data, on the 24th of November, that indicated that they really were committed to completing the agreement also.

This final willingness of the Soviets on November 24th to provide this kind of information

would have made it very difficult for them then to have walked away from a treaty. The amount of information that they provided, which had not previously been provided, assuming that it was accurate information, would have been a level of commitment on their part that would have been very difficult to walk away from and would have been considered a serious loss, a serious breach of Soviet security, if nothing had resulted from the exchange of information. Without us realizing that as clearly as we should have at the time, in retrospect, it would have been very difficult for them not to have completed the agreement having made this data exchange. This is why the data exchange was delayed as long as it was. They had information that we didn't have. We had information that was virtually public knowledge, almost down to the last millimeter of length of our systems. So, what they knew about us was perhaps 95% or more of the information. What we knew about them was maybe 50%. In the end, until they provided the information, we really didn't know how many systems they had. Then, of course, we got into the extended fight to prove the number of systems that they had provided but was accurate.

Q: When you say a "system," what do you mean?

JONES: What I meant was a missile that fell into the requirements of the INF treaty, the 500-5,000 kilometer range, that it was ground launched, either a ballistic missile or a ground launched cruise missile (a GLCM) and that it was a weapons carrying vehicle.

So, the last week of November and the first week of December '87 became an even more intense effort to get the Treaty language right and to complete the legal elements of it, and to have a legally acceptable treaty that would be signed. By then it had been announced that this treaty was going to be signed between Gorbachev and Reagan on December 7th. It didn't turn out to be December 7th because there were other people that said, "Do you know what December 7th is?" But there were, indeed, people whose sense of history was so minimal that signing the first significant arms control agreement with the Russians on Pearl Harbor Day was something that had slipped by them. You wonder still if there are people with a sense of history that feeble, but there are people that just missed that point. In any event, the treaty objective signing time was then to be on December 8th. But this didn't make it any easier. There is always a benefit to a forcing event, but all it does is ratchet up the pain rather than make it easier. People work longer hours and become more and more tired. Some years later, I saw a psychological study that said that when you're sleep deprived, it doesn't mean that you can't continue to work. You can indeed continue to work based on various stimulants whether they're simply coffee or whether they're anything more powerful than that. But what you lose is flexibility. You lose intellectual adroitness, a suppleness, a facility, a way to find an answer around a problem other than just continuing to hammer your head directly at the problem. Unfortunately, the brute force exercise of trying to complete the problems that way was what we often were forced to resort to. "Do you want this agreement or not?" "Alright, then this language, or this comma, or this word would have to be the ones that were agreed." Some of these exercises ended in very arcane studies of the Russian language versus the English language and the translation of each. One of these words resulted in the exchange between one of our senior negotiators and the senior Russian negotiator. The senior

Russian negotiator seized upon what was considered an infelicitous U.S. term, but, because it was delivered at such a senior level, it could not really be gainsayed. So, it then became our effort to find a Russian phrase and translation that would not damage us or harm the manner in which the treaty could be interpreted either by the Russians or by the U.S. Senate. As a consequence, our very adroit Russian translator spent a good deal of time with dictionaries and ultimately did locate a word that was sterile, old, but accurate Russian, and it was the term for our English word that we insisted upon. The Russians, of course, didn't like it because it deprived them of the flexibility that they had seen and seized upon. But in the end, it was the very last word in the treaty that was agreed. We left it at that. But the process itself had generated a level of exhaustion that left some of the people on our side virtually prostrate. At the end, we had one of these significantly memorable exercises where at midnight on December 6th, entering December 7th, we had a treaty signing, initialing essentially, ceremony between the head of the Russian delegation and Mike Glitman. We all gathered around this. We had glasses of champagne. We had tears from pure exhaustion. It was the first time that I had seen people cry from happiness. The combination of it was striking. We were just standing there, and all of a sudden there were just a whole group of people, including myself, with tears streaming down our face. It had taken so long and it had been such an incredible effort to get it to this point, which was as close to being the last minute as you conceivably could have.

We went from there to a very different type of exercise. You would think people who were going to fly to the United States would fly by civilian airlines, the Americans on our airlines, the Russians on their airlines. But instead, because we could see that we were going to need every minute and we just simply were not going to be able to depend on commercial air, we got a military aircraft to fly us to Washington. We took the senior Russians along with us, which was even more unique. We not only took the senior Russians along, we took their word processor, which was about the size of a small refrigerator. In the "refrigerator," buried in the core, was their copy of the text. Along with it came a little Russian secretary who had apparently typed every single word of every single aspect of their draft. We, at the same time, had it on what is now an absolutely archaic and totally antiquated disk. We took one disk with us which had our copy of the treaty in electronic form along with paper copies. On the off chance that the plane didn't make it, we FedExed copies of the disk to Washington at the same time. During the process of this exercise, we had a C-141, which I've you've never flown in a 141, it's like flying inside a vacuum cleaner. It is just incredibly noisy. It is designed to bring cargo and paratroopers. It's not designed to bring little old ladies politely from Los Angeles to Hawaii. But some of us fell asleep and we would wake up and eat a second bad lunch from the military rations that we had had. But during this process also, we had additional levels of initialing ceremony. Although the exercise was one in which two of the protocols had not been completed or not been officially initialed by the negotiators – and while we had initialed the main text and the elimination protocol in Geneva at midnight, we had not initialed the exchange of data memo of understanding or the inspection protocol. So, these were initialed with the Russians sitting on one side of a table in the front of the plane and Mike sitting on the other end of it. They would pass the

papers from one to the next and we initialed it. To show you the creative aspect of the executive secretary, LTC Jeff Ankley, he sometime early on in the fall had gone out and purchased 50-75 ballpoint pens and made sure that each and every one of them worked by starting them. So, during the course of the original initialing at midnight, Mike sat with a pen and he would initial it and then put the pen into a box, pick up another pen, initial it, and put that pen into the box. These pens were then that evening distributed to the individual members of the delegation. As the initialing went forward on the plane, we went up and handed Mike the pens that we had been given and he would use them to once again initial one of the protocols and give the pen back to us. So, that was that kind of creative exercise. It was very exhilarating; very exhausting. We arrived on the 7th. The treaty was initialed on the 8th. The people that went to the treaty signing were almost all in total those in Washington. The people that had done the work in Geneva got to see it on television at a party that we held separately at a Marriott hotel that was actually put on for us by a corporation that had contributed to it. We saw this happen and we saw Ronald Reagan say, "Trust but verify," which was the core of the agreement itself. From there, we started on the exercise to ratify the treaty.

We had to believe that the easy part of the entire experience was ahead of us, that we, having done all this work for so many years and having put so much effort into the completion of the treaty and with the President and Gorbachev having signed it in such a high level and highly visible operation, would have a relatively smooth and straightforward path to getting it ratified by the Senate. It turned out to be wrong. It was not as hard to get it ratified as it had been to get it negotiated, but it proved to be far more difficult than anybody had expected.

Q: Ever since the League of Nations treaty was rejected by the Senate, it's been an article of faith that you want to get some Senate representation on major treaties in at the beginning, at the takeoff as well as the landing. Had there been any such effort to keep informed or to keep the Senate knowing what was going on?

JONES: Yes. There are people that ignore history such as on the 7th versus the 8th of December. But these were not the people that were in the overall review of how the treaty was being negotiated. What you had for many years was a Senate oversight group, which was invited to come regularly to Geneva and look in on, discuss, and meet with the negotiators on both sides. For quite a number of years, we had this process and this group was supposed to be a relatively small group of people that were going to be there in the Senate likely a long time and had an interest in arms control, were not going to be constantly rotating because it did require a degree of expertise, and, as a consequence, also their staff people. So, the structure was there. Unfortunately, it didn't work as well as the structure should have in theory. What happened was, over a period of time, the entire negotiating process on arms control at large had gone very slowly. It was not really obvious until close to the end that we were likely to get an INF treaty. A certain number of people in the Senate, if the vote isn't on an issue that is going to take place tomorrow or that's not a constituency sensitive problem, don't pay a great deal of attention to it. The material associated with the treaty was complex, arcane, detailed, lengthy, and as a result

not something that an individual normally sat down and cuddled up with. At one point, to illustrate to you that there were also slippages on the Senate side, we had a batch of questions directed to us from Senator Byrd's staff and office reflecting a treaty text that didn't exist anymore. It was old. But somehow they had never gotten him the updated, complete, final treaty text. But, no, we were aware of the need to get this through the Senate. We were particularly aware also of the need for Republican administration to get it through a Democratic Senate in an election year. Yes, this was a very popular treaty. It was endorsed by everyone from the VFW to the League of Peace. It was widely popular throughout the country. It was wildly popular within our European allies, all of whom wanted it. It got to the point where Kissinger, who wasn't enthusiastic about the treaty, said that it should be approved because not approving it would be more damaging to NATO than approving it would be, which is the damming with faint praise that Kissinger is often able to do. But nevertheless, there was this definite inherent tension between the Executive and the Legislative Branch. The Senate had just returned to Democratic hands after six years in which they had not had controlled it. They had just resumed control of the Senate in '86. This circumstance meant that they were not going to be taken lightly. It became one of those instances where how do you endorse something that you know the Republicans want to use to run on in the next election without saying, "Gee whiz, the Republicans did such a great job. Isn't this wonderful? President Reagan's enormous expenditures of defense money have paid off with an INF treaty." At the same time, how do you turn down something that is very, very popular and essentially something that the Democrats had always wanted: more arms control. The people that wanted it least were the conservative Republicans. Why do we as liberal Democrats give something to this handful of conservative Republicans by being so obstructive that we then look as if we are just being deliberately destructive and political? The administration, after a very heavy initial dose of publicity associated with the signing itself did not go out as it had in SALT I, SALT II, and attempt with a group of people that we used to call the "SALT sellers," to beat up on any opposition and to sell the merits of the treaty throughout the country. Essentially, they felt that the treaty was selling itself. Indeed, it was and remained extremely popular throughout the entire process. The question became how to get it through all of the various hoops and over all of the hurdles that were being put in front of it. It became the view of the people that had negotiated it and were trying to get it through the Senate that the Democrats couldn't really oppose it, but they wanted to give it enough nicks and scars and damage to show that "we Democrats are smarter than you Republicans were," and this is not fatally flawed, but it's definitely not anywhere near as good as you'd like it to be. We're going to have to fix it up. So, the process was getting it through the process without having to accept reservations or amendments that would have been damaging, made it impossible for the Russians to ratify it, or force us back into negotiations with the Russians in a way that would protract the exercise even further. These were the problems. They became in the end at times almost as intensive and extensive to deal with as the original negotiations in Geneva.

Q: What was your role in this work?

JONES: My role was defined in the overall structure in which the operation was put

together. Ostensibly, there was overall leadership out of the White House and an effort through the NSC to orchestrate extremely carefully all of the testimony and all of the responses to questions that were posed so that no one would be saying anything that would be contradicted by anybody else. Under that regime, each of the individual agencies, particularly DOD and JSC, and to a degree also the CIA and particularly the Department of State and the Arms Control Agency, had individual working groups that were set up for INF ratification. The State Department had an INF ratification task force that was headed by the previous State Department representative in Geneva, Leo Reddy, and I was the deputy for that task force. Ambassador Glitman, Mike, was set separately as a general resource for the community. He ended by testifying to more committees on more issues than anybody else. Although we were devoted obviously primarily to the Senate, we also did briefings for the House. This structure then within the Department of State had me as the deputy for this task force. There were other people from within the Department of State, the European Bureau, the Political-Military Bureau, and in particularly the Intelligence and Research Bureau, who were designated as representatives on the task force. We were to do everything that we could to provide testimony, to provide speeches, to provide backup information, analysis, and among other things what turned out to be the longest, most complicated, most difficult process: to answer the questions that were posed by individual senators and official staff members. We had package after package of questions that were brought to us. Ultimately, we had more than 1,000 questions that came to us in packages, which were designed not just to ask questions about the treaty but to ask questions about virtually everything else that had the slightest connection with arms control and administration foreign policy. Because the administration was under the gun to answer these questions, we had to devise appropriate responses in one manner, shape, or form. As the questions came in packages, we also had made a decision that we would not return the questions as they were answered but return them as packages. Unfortunately, in almost every package, there was at least one problem question, a question perhaps on which the administration would be divided and which complicated answers – or ways to avoid an answer – had to be created. So, we had and were faced with this ongoing problem.

I was the orchestrator of these questions. Going back through my diary, all I can say is that for weeks and months we pushed this package forward, were answering questions on that package, or we handled another. The most complicated, labyrinthian, and extensive questions were asked by Senator Helms.

Q: Jesse Helms of North Carolina, an archconservative.

JONES: Whether “arch” or not, he was definitely a strong, direct, and committed conservative who believed that the treaty was wrong. He had some able staff members who created sometimes puerile but oftentimes difficult and intensely complicated questions which needed to be answered one-by-one-by-one. Then, having answered the questions, they had to be cleared legally. Then they had to be cleared with every other agency that had an input on this. As were the questions that were directed to their senior testifiers. You started with testimony. After the testimony, sometimes coincidental with

it, and sometimes before it, you had questions. The questions had to be answered in one way or another.

We had another problem though. This is the problem of what was called the Abraham Sofaer Doctrine. Sofaer was the legal advisor to the Department of State at the time. He devised this doctrine in association with the Anti-Ballistic Missile or ABM Treaty. What he said was that the administration could make judgments or adjustments to what the text of the treaty said based on the classified record that we had held, whether or not that classified record had been shared with the Senate and whether or not that classified record perhaps was at variance with what the administration had said to the Senate officially in testimony. Well, as there was, as there is today, still an intensive ongoing debate as to what we should do in relationship to the ABM Treaty, Star Wars, the Strategic Defense Initiative, things of that nature, the Democratic Senate was certainly not going to let the Republican administration get away with a treaty, a brand spanking new shiny treaty, such as the INF treaty without making their points on the lack of validity, in their view, of the Sofaer Doctrine. So, they demanded was that the official record be presented to them. The official record then became a subject for intense negotiation as to what exactly composed the official record. Finally, it was recognized that it would have been all of the formal presentations that we made and all of the specific direct accounts of the meetings themselves, not, however, our request for guidance or our backchannel Official-Informals. But reconstructing the official record itself became a major exercise on our part for an extended period. What I had done was the quick, extended summaries of these individual meetings and these steering group meetings that were being held in Geneva. There were also, however, semi-verbatim records of these negotiations and discussions that had not been completed simply because they were very long, and the people that were doing them in some instances were very much engaged in doing other things. For example, the translator-interpreters who were present at the two-on-two meetings between Glitman and his counterparts were to be done by the interpreters who had been taking notes as they accompanied the principals. But they for many other reasons had not produced the full text. So, this full text had to be produced, and it had to be negotiated as to what exactly was being given to the Senate, who would have access to the documents and under what circumstances they could be read. No copies of them were to be made. Things of this nature. Eventually, we set up something like five cubic feet of documentation to be held in a room in which senators or very specifically designated Senate staff were to be permitted to go and read. In the end, virtually nobody looked at them. Certainly, nobody spent any extended period of time on them. It was simply another exercise in political accountability rather than technical accountability of the negotiations themselves. But we did have a very extended set of discussions. The Intelligence Committee testimony was almost all classified. We had testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee and then before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While the Foreign Relations Committee, headed by Senator Pell, was willing and indeed eager to get the treaty through, the Armed Services Committee was less enthusiastic or more skeptical and more focused on generating questions and creating a more intense analysis of the treaty. This was headed by Senator Nunn. While Senator Nunn has and retains a well deserved reputation for intelligence and concern for defense

issues, he can also get himself and has gotten himself into situations where one wonders why he is taking the position that he is. Aside from that, I'll never quite understand why Senator Nunn decided to oppose U.S. participation in the Gulf War to the degree that he did. But he did. I think politically and historically, we suffered for it. Likewise, I am profoundly skeptical of his technical reasons for finding ostensible fault with the INF treaty, but he came up with two objections. One was what was called the "Double Negative Problem." This related to a relatively obscure portion of the treaty, which stemmed from the fact that the Russians used the first "stage" of their SS-20 in their SS-25 as well. So, while they were banned from producing this particular stage of the SS-20, they did not want to be caught in a situation where we would prohibit them from producing the SS-25 as well. But at the same time, neither could we permit an unlimited exception that they could simply produce endless "stages" for a missile that really could be the SS-20 as well. So, what we did was to devise a relatively complicated exception which said that a missile stage section which was outwardly similar but not interchangeable with another missile was permitted on a one time circumstance. We could do it as well. We could produce one stage of the Pershing II if we wished to for another missile so long as it was not directly interchangeable with a Pershing II. Senator Nunn chose to see that as a "double negative" in which he argued that that would allow them to produce a stage that was outwardly in effect interchangeable with the SS-20. Our answer as the negotiators was that, no, it wouldn't; something that was identical and interchangeable with an SS-20 stage would be an SS-20 stage and, therefore, banned. That was one portion of the Senator's argument.

Then there was another one which we got involved in arguing. It was called the "Futuristic Debate." This was an exercise in what conceivably could be done with future systems that might fall into the range that the INF systems included. We got ourselves wrapped terribly around the axles in whether there were "black," compartmented systems that people were conceiving of, whether you had some sort of Star Wars phaser type of weapon that conceivably could be mounted on a ground launched cruise missile. We then began arguing over what was a weapon and what wasn't a weapon. A problem for us became there, if you managed to create some sort of an exception for a ground launched cruise missile that wasn't carrying a warhead but theoretically might at some future time carry something that might be regarded as a weapon, you left yourself totally open for the Soviets to do the same thing. The problem was that there was simply no way to distinguish between a ground launched cruise missile carrying a conventional warhead or some future system and a ground launched cruise missile that was carrying a nuclear warhead. So, we had had to ban them all. But in this argument over what future weapons would be, we got ourselves into a situation where we exchanged letters between Shultz and Shevardnadze but the exchange didn't satisfy the Senate. It satisfied the people that weren't looking for invidious misunderstanding, but it didn't satisfy the most lawyerly of lawyers. So, the team including Shultz went back to Geneva on the 13th of May. I wasn't with this group. Shultz left and announced that agreement had been reached and everything was fine; then the negotiators, Glitman and his Soviet counterpart, spent 10 hours negotiating on a paragraph that lasted all night long, the contents of which I have not the slightest idea, except that, in some way, it was an effort to nail down finally,

completely, and absolutely that ground launched cruise missiles would not be involved in any future weapons. Of course, what we have done is to use ALCMs [air launched cruise missiles] and SLCMs [sea launched cruise missiles] to handle any of these futuristic type weapons or to handle the navigational type radar, the observation type systems that will surveil the battlefield. The fact that we set them aside for ground launched cruise missiles and prohibited them really hasn't restricted us in the slightest. But the process, from something that people had blithely imagined was going to be finished sometime in March after a Christmas break allowed people to relax a bit and organize themselves for a quick run through the entire treaty and a rapid ratification, just started to drag. The more it started to drag, the more people got worried, that something was going to go wrong, somehow that would foul it up, somehow the obstacles that were being put forward, in our view created artificially, were going to lead people to a sense of exhaustion. We feared a conclusion of "well, no, we weren't going to be able to get it done; maybe we had better defer it until after the election." The President and the executive branch created another force in that regard. That was that they were going to go to Moscow, have a summit. At the summit, they were going to sign the treaty officially and formally, and exchange ratification instruments. This created what was an artificial deadline but which became the forcing event to push people out of the committees, out of the committee discussion, end the endless rainstorm of questions, and actually move us to official debate within the Senate. We knew that if we could get the treaty to the floor, there wasn't any question that it would be able to be done. In a test vote earlier, there had been something like a 91 to six vote on it. That had made it clear that it wasn't going to be a problem – if we could get it there to have it voted upon. So, for essentially the last week in May, we moved our operation from the State Department to the Senate. Again, we over-prepared. We created huge briefing books for both individual senators and for the leaders in this debate. We wrote floor speeches for people that we assumed would be sympathetic. Most of them were never used. We created answers to every question. We created responses for every amendment that we believed might be presented, trying to beat back even the most ostensible motherhood-type of amendments such as "You will adhere to all previous treaties as well as to this treaty" or "We think that this treaty should be done in conjunction with conventional forces reductions," all of the things that sounded good that would either make it almost impossible to get the Russians to agree to it or would tie the hands of the administration in further negotiations. Well, this was possible finally. We sat in the Senate and listened to a lot of people make sometimes a little better educated presentations than others did, but for the most part, "speak for the record." In the end, we did indeed finish it with a situation that was predicted: the vote was 93 to six. That obviously reflected overwhelming satisfaction by everybody. But we had, of course, Jesse Helms able to vote against it. Among others, one of the more puzzling people that voted against it was Fritz Hollings. He is supposed to be so ostensibly noble, and one of the people that pursued Nixon throughout his career. I have never quite understood why Hollings elected to vote against the treaty. Helms I could understand. He just simply opposed the treaty and opposed anything to do with the Russians.

Q: What was the feeling? Was it postpartum blues?

JONES: I think there is always a degree of that. I remember noting the fact that there was a sadness in a way that this incredibly long effort had finally come to an end even though it had been the successful end that we had all sought. We did do a little bit of “after action” work to the extent of going around to people in the Senate, to staffers, and to people within the Department to try to determine what lessons we should learn from this – lessons that we thought were going to be applied perhaps fairly quickly to a START treaty, which again people thought was much closer to being completed than it turned out to be and much more complicated.

START almost had to start over again. But we did a series of what I think were useful, even thoughtful, analyses of what it meant to deal with the Senate under these circumstances, why we had had problems associated with this exercise, and what might be done to do it better.

Q: While you were having these questions, were you doing any checking with your Soviet colleagues to make sure you weren't getting out of bounds?

JONES: I would tend to say no, except on a couple of very specific areas. There were some extremely technical points that we did have to make almost tiny wording changes. Although we had all read the treaty itself, the text of the treaty, literally 100 times, we found there were tiny little grammatical difficulties. In some cases, they were periods or a word or things that were missing that we had to send a corrigendum (correction document) on these. We did have exchanges with the Russians to try to fix some of these points on “futures” and on the “double negative” to resolve these issues that had been generated by the Senate Armed Services Committee. But the thousand questions plus themselves, no, we didn't go back to the Russians.

Q: Did you have any feeling that proponents of missiles – cruise missiles and land based intermediate range missiles – within the military, within the Pentagon, were there any people that you had the feeling were going around, behind, whispering to people in particularly the Senate staff trying to sabotage this? There is always a camp of people. Maybe they build the missiles or they've been trained in the missiles and want to keep these things.

JONES: I would say less so than might be imagined, particularly not within the uniformed and military services. There were certain people – Richard Perle and Frank Gaffney in particular within the Office of the Secretary of Defense – who believed that (and this was certainly true with the concept of a conventionally armed cruise missile) that this particular type of system on a ground launched basis had a great potential. What has happened is, they have been proved right in the potential of accuracy from this type of missile. But we have used it from air platforms and sea platforms instead – and not nuclear. But we have now the incredible, precision guided munitions that are able to land within a square meter. If those had been retained on a ground launched missile basis, presumably they would be just as effective as the air and sea launched systems. It just turned out that it was impossible to make any distinction between the nuclear armed and

the conventionally armed cruise missile. They simply were identical. You could not tell the difference. You could stand there and verify that “this was a conventional cruise missile and have your hand on it.” You left the base and people would pull out a nuclear warhead from a bunker and it would be a nuclear armed cruise missile instantly. It was simply that easy to make an exchange. But within the uniformed services, they believed what in the end many of us believed: that the entire INF treaty was a very important but very limited first step in an arms control regime with the Soviet Union. The INF systems were very important for the Europeans, far more than they were for us. It was at best a secondary system so far as what the U.S. was using for its military and political security. For the Europeans, it was on a far higher basis. What we managed to do was to eliminate not just for the Europeans but for a variety of our Asian allies what was perceived as a specifically threatening system designed against them. Nobody bothered to argue or discuss the fact that strategic systems can always “shoot short.” People elected to view this reality with a degree of psychological blindness that can be amusing but is, nevertheless, real that “if these systems aren’t designed specifically to hit us, we won’t be hit.” Therefore, the Europeans saw the INF systems and designed to specifically threaten them. As a result, we first created the counter with our deployments and then finally the effort to eliminate them all, which was very satisfying to the Europeans.

Q: In many ways... The deployment of an SS-20 and our counter, these were really political moves anyway.

JONES: Yes, they were. They were not militarily useless. They had very specific military rationales for their deployments. But the stimulus for them was certainly political. As a result, in the end, they were argued for and against on a political basis in many instances, seen as a major political counter, and played in a very political way within Europe and then also by the Soviets in saying, “Well, look, this is part of our overall European homeland. Look at what we have done with you Europeans to demonstrate genuinely our desire for peace.” So, there were political, psychological “propaganda” advantages to the elimination thereof just as there had been political advantages to their initial deployment.

But, no, to step back, I will once again emphasize that I don’t think the uniformed military services were objecting, certainly not in any significant way that I ever encountered, to the treaty. They did buy onto it. Perhaps some of them bought onto it in the same way that senior military figures will indeed accept civilian control and resign if they object. If the most senior people in your civilian establishment say, “This is what we should be doing, Admiral So and So,” they will say, “Yes, Sir.” We can believe when we disagree personally with what our major political leadership is doing that it wasn’t a smart idea and we would appreciate a little more military objection to our political leadership decisions, but in the end, no. You really have to have military services that support the executive’s decision or resign.

Q: This takes us up to when?

JONES: Essentially to the end of May 1988.

Q: Then what happened?

JONES: For me, I had been faced during the winter of '88 and the early spring with what I was going to do next. At the same time, we were working until 7:00 or 8:00 at night, most nights, on this treaty ratification process, which was far harder and longer than I ever conceived it would be. I still had to look for something to do next. It turned out that in at least once instance I wasn't fast enough to put my desires and interests forward. As a result, in that position, the people that would have supported me and said they would have supported me said, "Unfortunately, we are now officially committed to Mr. X rather than to Mr. Jones." As a result, what it turned out in the end is that the personnel system came to me and said (This was supposed to have been in one of their discussion circles) that, "Maybe Dave Jones doesn't want another 12 hour a day job. Maybe if we offered him this (which turned out to be the Una Chapman Cox sabbatical fellowship), it would be what would be most appropriate for him at this time." At that point, I knew nothing about the Cox fellowships. I had the vaguest recollection that it was something which a few people a year got a year off to do. My personnel supervisor said, "Well, why don't you write down briefly what you would want to do for a year off if you did this?" I sat down in front of my WANG and I wrote a one page statement about some of the things I might be interested in doing in a year off. I gave it to my wife, who gave it to the Personnel Assistant with my saying, "Is this along the lines of what I should write if I'm to apply for this?" They took it and said, "Yes, we'll award you the fellowship if you want it." That was one of the only things I've ever done in one draft. It certainly was the only thing that I had done for years and years in one draft. But they awarded me the Una Chapman Cox fellowship for the year to begin in August of 1988 and to run for a year until the fall of '89. I believe in effect that they had awarded the fellowships earlier to the couple of people that were going to receive them, but one of the recipients for whatever reason had declined. These goodies normally don't end up at the very end of the assignment process just sort of floating out there. They are assigned early deliberately to get them done. But it turned out that one of them was available. I looked like a candidate who might benefit from it, and did it.

The fellowships themselves are really sort of fascinating in their own way. They come with at least a little perceived history associated. This lady, Una Chapman Cox, had been traveling at one point in India and encountered some sort of difficulty – whereupon your ever present, brilliant consular officer had waved his magic wand over it and made the problem go away. Ms. Chapman Cox, who lived in Texas and had at least some oil/real estate/cattle wealth, was so delighted, pleased, and amazed that any official American was there to exercise this assistance for a mere American citizen, while traveling, that she put out a substantial sum of money, the interest from which was to be used for the benefit of the Foreign Service. The organization exists and has existed for quite a number of years. There is a foundation in Washington usually headed by a retired Foreign Service Officer usually of ambassador level and has worked on various projects associated with the advancement and the development of American support for the U.S. Foreign Service. It's not a widely known organization. It doesn't seem to get a great deal of publicity. It

has been involved in things over the years like helping to finance a TV program that ran on public broadcasting about what several different Foreign Service officers did at one point in their career. But what it did that most benefited me and ultimately benefited my wife also, who qualified for a Cox fellowship, was to fund at that period two and sometimes three Foreign Service Officers for a year of sabbatical. At the same time, the Department continued to pay us our salaries while the Cox Foundation came up with \$25,000 which we were permitted to use pretty much as we desired. The manner in which these funds were to be directed were to support our sabbatical year, whether this was travel, office space, office equipment, research materials, books, manuscripts, hiring somebody to do some research work for you, things of this nature. You were not supposed to buy an automobile, travel across the country, and then sell the automobile to your satisfaction. Nevertheless, the desire on the part of the Cox Foundation was to find people who would be able to use this opportunity for a combination of intellectual enhancement and general stimulation. It was not supposed to be used to go back to college and get another university degree. But while the Cox people did not care at all what you did with it, the Department preferred to see something a little more structured. Different Cox winners over the years have worked on various manuscripts, have done certain research projects, have involved themselves in community activities, or have done very little or maybe even nothing, but, nevertheless, because there is really no onus so far as the Foundation is concerned with what you have done with the money and what you haven't, it is a free year.

Q: What was your project?

JONES: Well, I had a variety of what I would say were multiple projects. I had seen many people in my life start off with the equivalent of "Let's finish my Ph.D. thesis" or "Let's write a book" and get themselves deeply into their project but find that at the end of a year they were maybe 60% finished, had a stack of paper, and that was what they had. I honestly wanted to accomplish something. So, my focus was that having spent about 20 years in the Foreign Service, I was no longer sure that I could write as anything other than a bureaucrat. I wanted to know whether I was still capable at all of writing anything that somebody else would be willing to publish, that somebody else would find better than, "Gee, that was an outstanding memo to the Secretary." So, I conceived of a variety of different things that had been irritating me or nudging at me for years. One of them was a pure amusement exercise. For years, I had come in through the entrance at C Street and looked at the names on the memorial plaque and read what had happened to this or that nameless person. Particularly these were the plaques on the left hand side, the west side, of the entrance. These were people that had existed and died far before anyone had been in the Foreign Service as far as I was concerned. What I wanted to do was to find out a little bit about them, to do some research on them, to find out who these people were, what they were like, why they were there, when they happened to die, and if necessary what they died of. I started this project along those lines. I did a series of sketches and studies that eventually were published in State magazine on people like Thomas Nast. I had seen Nast listed there and said, "Gee, I'm sure that's not the guy that was involved with the political cartooning, the enigmatic donkey, the guy who flayed the corrupt

regime in New York, Boss Tweed.”

Q: Cartoons got him identified in Portugal or something like that.

JONES: There was this guy by the name of Thomas Nast who had died down in Guayaquil of yellow fever. It turned out that it was that Thomas Nast. At the end of his career when he had been on his uppers, he was given this counselship in Guayaquil. He spent about a month there before he got caught up by yellow fever and died.

Another man that interested me, partly because of the INF and other experiences, was a man by the name of Madden Summers. He was listed as having died of exhaustion in St. Petersburg in 1917. As somebody that had spent a lot of time exhausted, I wondered just what Summers had done that had qualified him for death by exhaustion. There was indeed enough material to find that Summers had been, in effect, chargé for the entire time in which we were struggling with the transition between the various temporary and provisional Russian governments and the Bolshevik government. There was a great deal of perfectly understandable and very modern interagency backbiting and inter-embassy backbiting for which Summers, who ultimately became also the senior Western representative in St. Petersburg at the time, was trying to care for all sorts of things simultaneously, including the movement of people out to safe-havens and the coordination of other consulates that were opening, and lost the struggle with his own personnel who were at sixes and sevens with him, and the Department. He proved that the adage that hard work never killed anybody was wrong. He really did die of exhaustion.

Q: Were you doing a series of these things?

JONES: Yes, including one in which I had 6-10 shorter vignettes about people on which I simply didn't have the information for a long article. I did an article on the memorial plaques and the origin of the plaques themselves. Essentially, these were warm-up pieces for some significantly more major work.

Then I worked with Leo Reddy, who had also not been particularly well rewarded for his work as INF State representative. He went to CSIS for a year. But the two of us combined on an extended monograph on “burden sharing” as a concept and whether this was the right issue to be talking about so far as our relationship with the Europeans was concerned. I did a good deal of research and writing and combined with Leo to produce this as a monograph that was published by CSIS in their series. Then I worked on an article that was, in effect, titled, “Negotiating with Gorbachev's team,” which was a study of the end game in Geneva. I put that together and published that in Orbis, which is a foreign affairs magazine run by the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. I then wrote an article on the prospects for a chemical weapons treaty, which was one of the things that I was familiar with because I had worked on elements of it as the deputy office director in the Theater Military Policy Office in PM. I worked on that issue and published an article of that nature in the Washington Quarterly. Throughout this time, I also started for the first time to write fairly extensively for the Foreign Service Journal. I

felt that this was perhaps a time in which I could try to give something back in the way of writing, argument, and analysis. I wrote one article about the State Department relations with Congress, spinning off of the fellowship that I had had earlier and spent on the Hill for a year, which was a Pearson congressional fellowship. I evolved the article from that particular experience. I wrote a couple of pieces that were INF related that I put into the Foreign Service Journal. One was a set of vignettes, little stories, out of the treaty experience. One was a question of what the INF treaty would mean for NATO and how it would develop. I wrote an article on political ambassadorships, what I thought it meant for the Foreign Service and how that was developed, and the Journal published that one also.

I did some traveling, which took me in two directions. These were two major trips – one to Europe and the other to the Far East, where I had not been in more than 20 years, almost 25 years. The focus on this was what did the INF treaty mean to Asians? What would it mean to the Far East? In that extent, I started by going to a conference in Hawaii. From there, I flew to Japan, had discussions in Japan. I flew from there to Korea and was in Korea for the first time since I had left there in 1965. I had a sense of what had happened and developed in Korea. The embassy had discussions with people, arms controllers, within the Korean community. I was then able to go to China, had made contacts through the embassy there, and saw people within the Chinese government to ask to talk to them about what their view of the INF treaty was and what it would mean. I did the same thing in Japan. Finally, I went to Taiwan and talked to representatives from our facility, the American Institute, and to people in the Taiwan government. It was also very beneficial. At the same time, I included more than a little touring in it and was able to see things that I had never seen before or had not seen in many years, I had a delightful time. It was useful and I produced an article that was published by Asian Survey as a consequence of those meetings and discussions.

Q: It sounds like Cox got quite a bit of money out of this one.

JONES: Well, I got a lot for it, but I also wanted to be very sure that I couldn't be charged with having done nothing. The other thing was, I kept very meticulous financial records and produced a steady stream of almost monthly reports to the supervisor, Joe Montville, who was ostensibly overseeing this project within the Foreign Service Institute's hierarchy. He was the person that was overseeing the entire exercise.

Then, after having said I wasn't going to write a book, I won't say I started to write a book, but what I started to do was to assemble the material that could theoretically have been a book. Some of it was to get colleagues of mine to write chapters of what might be a book associated with the specific areas in which they had worked. A man who had been our chief lawyer provided material. A man who had worked within Washington as an insider, a subsequent ambassador, Roger Harrison, wrote an item for this. He was our ambassador in Jordan during the Gulf War. During the INF period, he was one of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries in PM. Another man who was a colleague and who was pretty much in charge of working through the elimination protocol, Ronald Bartek, who is

now a private citizen contractor and a consultant in the Washington area. He provided a chapter. I did a great deal of writing on this in an effort to assemble a text that possibly could be used in some manner, shape, or form in a published way. One of the biggest elements of it was the Senate and the INF ratification process, which I published as a monograph out of the Army War College.

Q: The Cox fellowship ended when?

JONES: In the fall of '89.

Q: That puts you at the wrong part of the assignment cycle.

JONES: Yes and no. Of course, I was bidding during the summer and the Cox sabbatical was something that could be shortened a little bit or spun out a little bit. Again, it was one of these situations where I got an assignment that I very much wanted, beat down the bureau, and had to have the assignment directed into the position that I wanted. The bureau appealed, went to P [the Under Secretary for Political Affairs], and P reversed my assignment. The Director General had endorsed my assignment. The European Bureau sought to overturn the decision of the Director General who put me in that particular decision, for which I was eminently qualified – not that the person who didn't get the position was unqualified, but at the time, I was more qualified than the person who got the position. But I was not the choice of the European Bureau. The head of the bureau at that time, the Assistant Secretary, wanted this individual who was a close personal associate of his from a previous assignment. So, the European Bureau appealed to then Under Secretary for Political Affairs Larry Eagleburger, who endorsed the European Bureau's position. I would have been the deputy in EUR/PM, a position for which from something like six years of NATO experience and the experience on the INF negotiations and various awards that I had won in association with that and the fact that I had just been promoted into the Senior Foreign Service while I was on the Una Chapman Cox sabbatical certainly qualified me for the position.

Q: What happened?

JONES: After a good deal of back and forth as to what would be the next best thing for me to do, I elected to take the position of being the Foreign Affairs Advisor for the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army, which was an assignment in Washington in an area in which I had a good deal of personal and professional expertise. I took that assignment in the fall of '89.

Q: You did that until when?

JONES: Until the summer of '92.

Q: We'll pick it up then.

Today is July 28, 2000. 1989-1992, you were at the Pentagon. How did you get the job and what was it? What were you doing?

JONES: This position was a POLAD [political advisor]. In the end, it had a lot of different names depending on for whom you were working – foreign affairs advisor was the final label for me. But it is a capacity that goes back to World War II when Bob Murphy was a diplomat assigned to the most senior levels of American military command to provide diplomatic and foreign policy advice. The numbers of POLADs has varied over the years. Essentially we have sent one senior ranking Foreign Service officer to each of the commanders in chief (CINCs) around the world. At the same time, there has been a POLAD assigned to the Coast Guard and to the Chief of Staff of the Army at the Pentagon.

Q: You were with whom?

JONES: I was with two Army chiefs. The first was Carl Vuono from the time I arrived in the late fall of '89 until June of '91. Then he was succeeded by Gordon Sullivan, who was chief for another three years.

Q: There was not one assigned to the Navy?

JONES: No.

Q: Was there any particular reason for that?

JONES: No. Some of these were traditional. Some of them, there were people assigned to CINCs. There has been one assigned to SHAPE, SACEUR. There has been one at Norfolk for an extended period.

Q: One down in Naples, too.

JONES: The one at Naples has ended. They may have taken the one away that was assigned in the UK. There was one assigned to one of our senior commanders there. At one time, there was also a POLAD with the senior military commander in Stuttgart. There has been one assigned off and on at NORAD, sometimes yes, sometimes no. And there has been one assigned to CENTCOM. That process has expanded and contracted in the numbers of people that have been sent there. But for an extended period at least, for quite a number of years prior to the time that I took the job, the position as POLAD to the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Secretary of the Army was held by George Barbis. I think he had the job for about eight years. He enjoyed it immensely and got along with a series of chiefs whom he tended to have met when they were more junior commanders, although still general officers, and pursued that relationship quite effectively when they became chief.

Q: Let's move to the '89-'92 period. What was your job?

JONES: The POLAD's job is a very flexible one. You're assigned to give the senior commander, your boss and solely your boss – you don't report to anybody else – you advise. Specifically, the Chief of Staff of the Army is your sole rating and reviewing officer, and that is the person that writes your efficiency report. You have a direct pipeline to your commander. But again, this circumstance is very individual. It will depend upon your personal and professional relationship with the man. It may change when the commander is replaced. People cycle through all of these jobs very quickly. If you have a two-year or a three-year assignment in a POLAD position, the odds are that you're going to deal with at least two commanders. So, my specific job was to provide foreign affairs advice and counsel to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army. That evolved in many ways from that point. The Army has been one of the elements that has been primary in my own life. I spent two years on active duty and then I remained as a Reservist for a total of 28 years of Army service. So, I was very interested in the Army. That's one of the aspects that led me to consider and then accept an offer to be a POLAD. That plus the fact that I had a previous personal and professional relationship with one of the very key staff officers for the Chief of Staff of the Army, a man who ran an in-house "think tank" and hot-potato-handling group for the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief's Analysis and Initiatives Group [CAIG]. But because this man knew me and approached me at a time when I was interested in a follow-on assignment from my Cox sabbatical session, I became interested in it as a possibility and that's where I ended working. So, the Chief of Staff of the Army is not a commander in the way that the CINCs at CINCPAC or CINCSOUTH or SACEUR are commanders. As a result, he is a support person, a very senior support person and one of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – but he is not a commander. As a result, his emphasis and interests are organizational, logistical, personnel-related, development of what the Army will look like in the future, and to a degree more of its foreign relations with other armies. He is the only Washington-based chief that had a POLAD. It was easier for me to remain closely in touch with what was happening at the Department of State and elsewhere within government than it is for the POLADs who are assigned hither and yon, a long way from Washington and a long way from having any relationship with the Department of State, and, consequently, oftentimes feeling "out" of what was happening. So, I keep circling around what I was doing (in this explanation) because so much of it was coordination, organization, counsel, and advice. On a day to day basis, I could be at the State Department for several hours. I arranged to attend the Pol-Mil Bureau's regular meetings, which is something that the previous POLAD couldn't do. For some reason or another, he had decided that he wouldn't be given this access and not asked successive directors of Political-Military Affairs. I said, "Well, nothing ventured, nothing lost." I asked the Assistant Secretary for PM at that point, Dick Clarke, whether I could sit in on his standard staff meetings. All of the POLADs are technically controlled by the PM Bureau. And he agreed. So, a couple of times a week on a scheduled basis, I would be at the Department of State both making it clear to PM what the Army was doing and what the Army was interested in around the world and on a Pol-Mil basis and gathering

information on what would be of interest to the Army, particularly in arms control issues. Then, on a regular basis, I would go to individual desks in individual State offices and bureaus, particularly if there was an issue of Army interest in a particular country or a trip that the Chief of Staff of the Army was planning to take or a trip from which he had just returned. I would be obtaining material, organizing briefings, providing debriefings, and topics of that nature. At the same time, the Chief of Staff of the Army was the host for a virtually endless stream of counterpart visits.

The chiefs of staff of various armies around the world would come to Washington for insight, comment, discussions, and then go off around the United States for visits with and exposure to American military units and particular types of equipment, areas that they may have asked to see, or for that matter possess. There was also equipment and techniques to which we wished to expose them. These schedules would usually begin in Washington with sessions with the chiefs and then they would go to the field. I was involved in the organization, planning, scheduling, and preparation for these kind of meetings.

Q: Let's just take a random example. Let's say the chief of staff of the Brazilian army is coming. What would you do?

JONES: Once again, you will not be surprised that the Army really prepares for these events. If the chief of staff of the Brazilian army is coming, it's because he has been scheduled to come – a year and a half or more. The schedule for which visits the chief of staff of the army will receive and which trips he will make are scheduled at least a year ahead of time by a detailed set of proposals, each one of which are justified, rationalized, etc. Probably several months ahead of time, there would be the beginnings of a preparation with an action officer on the Army staff, who might be a foreign affairs officer [FAO] and who would usually be the FAO for the particular country or the particular area, assigned to be the action officer for this type of a visit. This action officer would then begin to build a Washington schedule and build a set of briefing papers and talking points and discussion areas. This is something that I would be coordinating with this particular action officer. I would be giving him diplomatic guidance, insight into the area, particularly if I happened to know more about the area than others.

Q: Let's say Brazil and this is not your area. Would you call the desk?

JONES: Absolutely. I would call the desk. I would go to the desk and talk with them, pick up papers and material that might not be available to the Army staff, although the Army staff also got the huge array of normal reporting traffic that our embassies produce. But if there was something that was more esoteric, something in which the Department of State had a special interest – perhaps we were going to be engaged in selling M1 tanks to Brazil or something of that nature – I would be talking to the desk to arrange for this discussion. It could very well also be a situation in which this meeting was very esoteric, and very complicated. It was very important for us to have a positive effect on the Brazilian chief of staff of the army. We might call in or request briefings by senior U.S.

officials or citizens, including perhaps the American ambassador to Brazil if that official was going to be in town at some point. We would arrange for him to come to the Pentagon and talk to the chief of staff of the army. Or if that were not the case, the office director with one of the key desk officers come to talk to the chief. From there, you would develop a "book." The person in charge of all counterpart visits is the "DAS," the abbreviation is not the Deputy Assistant Secretary, but the Director of the Army Staff. In my case, in this instance, it was a very intelligent, very able "three star" Lieutenant General Don Parker. Parker had a start off little axiom which said, "You only have one chance to make a first impression," which meant that he really wanted these things to go right without being tremendously overbearing about it. He was a large happy bear of a man who every so often, but not without cause, would show you why bears have large teeth and not every bear is going to be happy all the time. He could administer a most professional chewing out. Happily, I was never at the biting end. He would run through the preparations for the visit and these invariably started with an arrival ceremony, a full welcoming ceremony at Fort Myer with an honor guard and a pass through and official words, and a return to the Pentagon for a formal call on the Chief of Staff of the Army. From there, the Chief of Staff of the Army would host a lunch or, if he didn't host it, someone senior on his staff would host it. Then they would go to a roundtable in which all of the issues that had previously been agreed for discussion would be chewed over. Both sides would be making presentations. They would be telling us about their interests, concerns, how their army was operating, what it needed, and what its problems were. We would be giving a combination of wide general overall briefings about what our army was doing, where it was going, and subjects along this line. You then ended usually the day with a dinner at "Quarters 1," the residence of the Chief of Staff of the Army on the Fort Myer base. All of this was done with great professionalism. As part of the preparation in between the reviews given by the DAS, there would be an IPR, an In Progress Review, in which the Chief of Staff of the Army would be briefed by the associated members of the army staff that were going to be connected with the meeting.

Here again was an illustration of some of the basic standard operating differences between the Army and the Department of State, that is, who briefed the Chief of Staff of the Army. Who briefed the Chief of Staff of the Army, the most senior military man in the Army? Usually a major or a lieutenant colonel briefed him after having had his briefing and his presentation reviewed by two or three echelons of other senior military officers. But it was the major or the lieutenant colonel, who was the action officer and/or the foreign affairs officer, who was, in effect, in charge of the briefing. None of these briefings were the type of standard Department of State oral briefing where you sit down and chat with your boss. They were very structured, very organized, flip chart briefings that themselves were as orchestrated as the computerization available in the early '90s permitted. Every action officer was an expert in making slides and charts for briefing books - again, something that is either an amazing phenomena for somebody at that level or totally useless depending on your views and attitudes toward this process. But it was a very structured environment. Everybody had a specific seat assigned to them. Almost at every instance, when you approached the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army or one of the standard briefings, you would look at the seating plan. Outside the office, one of

the aides to the Chief of Staff of the Army would have this seating plan available. If you were looking for yourself, you could point to where you were headed and go off in that direction. That's either astonishingly over structured or a refutation of the totally casual Department of State approach where often the only person who knows where they're sitting is the host and everybody else comes in and sort of scrambles around and if you're the note taker, you're trying to get close enough to actually hear what's being said or words to that effect. The military plans for all of these little time-wasting inefficiencies by creating a structure into which each peg is placed.

Q: During this period, you got in when the Bush administration came in. Several issues... One was Panama. The other was Somalia. The change in relations with the Soviet Union with the end of the Soviet Bloc. Yugoslavia. Then the cooling of relations with China. The Gulf War. There may be others. Panama came first.

JONES: Let's talk about Panama a little. It arrived at just about the time when I arrived. I came in in November. I went to an affair called the Conference of American Armies in Guatemala. I want to talk about that a little bit more subsequently. But then the exercise in Panama came off on December 20th. I had been on the job only about two weeks at that point. What can I say about Panama? I never visited it. The Chief of Staff of the Army went there at one point to see troops, but I did not go along on that particular trip. The question about Panama was why you had to find something for every military service to do. This was so organized a participation by every single service that it almost was a bit amusing. At the same time, the military and the Army in particular had made a tremendous effort to be exceedingly careful about civilian casualties. It didn't always turn out that way. There were charges that a lot of people were killed who were civilians. But there was definitely a great effort on the part of the Army to avoid civilian casualties and to avoid monuments or structures that they thought were or would be very prominent symbols for the Panamanian people. There was one statue in Panama City that they identified as particularly important to Panamanians and paid a great deal of attention to avoid hitting it.

This was an operation run by Max Thurman. Thurman was the man who invented the slogan "Be all you can be." Thurman subsequently died relatively soon after that of Hodgkin's disease, of lymphatic cancer. But during the time in which he was there, he was in command of SOUTHCOM, and he was the overall commander of the force that moved into Panama. The Army was pleased at the way it operated. They were pleased with the effectiveness of the manner in which they had operated and pleased with their equipment. They looked upon this as a far better operation than Grenada had been – let alone other exercises like the long commitment in Lebanon in which our forces had gotten themselves blown up. This effort was seen as a very high level of professionalism.

Q: I've interviewed somebody who noted that our POLAD to SOUTHCOM wasn't around at the time. There were two things that were maybe minor but at the same time I thought that a POLAD might have done something about. One was, our embassy was kind of left open. There weren't troops around just to make sure nobody went after the

embassy. But the other one that had a terrible effect in public relations was when Noriega took refuge in the Papal Nuncio's palace; the troops surrounded it with boom boxes and bombarded it with raucous music. A POLAD would have said, "Hey, cut it out, fellows." It sounded cute, but it just seemed that there wasn't a little hand there working on touches.

JONES: Well, I have to admit I don't know anything about that. I recall that the boom box exercise didn't last very long. Noriega eventually elected to leave after a great deal of pressure was put on the Papal Nuncio to expel him. At least we were smart enough not to go marching into the Papal Nuncio's quarters and haul him out by his heels. Whether that was the result of diplomatic advice or just good judgment on the part of the military, I don't know. I will add the point right here that, at general officer and senior staff and Washington senior staff level, you really didn't have any klutzes. You had a remarkable assortment of very intelligent, very capable people. One of my wife's observations was – and I will agree on this – that it was a lot easier to see why a man was a general officer than why a man was an ambassador. That wasn't because of the ribbons and decorations that they might have been wearing. The number of colonels that I encountered who certainly were far above the ostensible capability of a colonel, both in their personal effectiveness and the authority that they held, was quite remarkable. So, my role as a POLAD wasn't to constantly say, "Oh, you stupid idiots, how could you have done something like that?" It was much more an addition of a final brush stroke or a secondary level detail or a suggestion that you might be interested in this approach or this approach as well. This was really not a question where you would have had to have a senior diplomat throwing himself in front of the leading combat platoon saying, "Don't go into the Papal Nuncio's quarters."

What the circumstances were around the U.S. embassy, I simply don't know. I don't know how fast we got people there. I don't know what level of warning was delivered to the embassy. I don't know whether the embassy people were advised to evacuate. This was something that you could see coming, so far as Noriega's declaring war on the United States. There was an amazing degree of shin-kicking on his part until we picked him up by the scruff of his neck and tossed him into the dust bin of history. What I would say is that the military was very pleased with its performance overall. They were pleased with the way they had operated out of Panama. They were pleased at the degree of control over which they exercised their violence. They were certainly well satisfied with the manner in which their equipment operated. And it gave the Army a level of satisfaction in their new capabilities in the '90s that had been dissipating and certainly was not the type of feeling that they had after the Grenada operation.

Q: Let's look at the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dramatic changes at the end of 1989 and Eastern Europe. This was the war that the Army was preparing for – on the plains of Europe. All of a sudden, with that in '89 and thanks to Gorbachev, that ended. Did the Army have another mission? Were they hauling out Plan B now that you no longer had to worry about the Poles, the Czechs, the Hungarians?

JONES: It was slower motion than you express. People were waiting for other shoes to drop before there was an expectation that radical change was going to be required. There was in August 1990 the attempted coup against Gorbachev, which was reversed and overturned. At that point, people began to believe that there was going to be the opportunity for serious change within the Soviet Union and with the Russian military itself. They did begin outreach planning for work with the Russians. There was a visit by the Chief of Staff of the Army to Russia that was on again and off again. Finally, he did go. There were plans for and proposals for visits by Russian military officers to the United States in a fairly extensive program run out of a major U.S. university to expose them to some elements and views of democracy, aspects of this nature. There were plans and programs to reconvert a major U.S. military school for dealing with Russians in Oberammergau into a more general school for Russians and Americans. All of these were ideas that were being explored. There was a clear recognition that no one wanted to play “triumphalism.” One of the points that I dealt with a great deal for more than two years were the details and developments of the Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement. This was a spinoff of the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions. This was an exceptionally complicated set of negotiations for the reduction of military equipment and access to these areas to watch the destruction of it, the inspection of these, distribution of this equipment, how it could be reorganized, where it was going to be sent and stored, or given to other countries in other ways. This was a significant interest for the Army, although the Army wasn’t a player. The Army could play only through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which were the representatives on these negotiations. But because of the Army’s interest, this was something that I followed for them, and I got repeated briefings and wrote quite a variety of analytical memos and notes keeping the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff aware of what was happening in the negotiations, and aware of what the Department of State was thinking. In that degree, this reflected what we were doing and planning and thinking. One of the things that I was engaged very early in 1990 was what was called “Reforger.” Reforger was an annual exercise that brought U.S. forces to Europe in ostensible response to a Warsaw Pact military buildup and possible invasion. So, each year, we would exercise our plans, bringing substantial numbers of U.S. forces from the States, some to move into prepositioned material – what they called POMCUS sites [prepositioned overseas material configured in unit sets] – to have them join in a possible response to an invasion. Well, these exercises and others of similar ilk went on constantly and continued to go on. During my time with the Chief of Staff of the Army, I was in Europe several times with the Chief. Almost every time, he went to bases and units in Germany, saw what they were doing and how they were doing it, and discussed with the commander of Seventh Army, who most of the time there was General Saint, exactly what was being done and how the exercises were developing. But these were clearly going to be scaled-down exercises. The last big Reforger had been run, and the staff recognized that they were now going to have to do a much wider variety of command post exercises and map exercises. The day in which you would run massive numbers of troops through German potato patches was over, and you simply had reached a point where the German civilian population would no longer be receptive to seeing their forces, let alone foreign forces, doing substantial damage every year to farms and fields and the rest – even though they were paid on the spot for any damage. There were damage

assessors coming along right with the troops. Somebody crossed your potato field instead of going on another piece of terrain, and there would be somebody there to assess the damage and pay on the spot. But it was a psychological change that people could sense was coming. As a result, they were making plans to respond to this type of problem. We could see that there were going to be force reductions associated with the Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement. This would be something that simply was going to happen.

Another area that I became involved with – this was something that I had had an interest in for a number of years – was burden sharing. This is, how do you persuade the allies to do more while we're doing less? There was an ambassador for burden sharing in the Department of State, H. Allen Holmes, who had been the Assistant Secretary in PM and then eventually ended his career as an Assistant Secretary for a number of years at the Department of Defense. I've always regarded Allen as one of the princes of his generation in the Foreign Service and have the highest regard for him. But during this burden sharing ambassador period, he was being given a place holder job at State because they didn't want to dismiss him. He spent a couple of years working around the margins of major activity with this role. One of the things that he did that I wasn't involved in was going around the world to do what he said was the equivalent of "rattling a tin cup" during the Gulf War and getting contributions of all sorts. But in the capacity in which I dealt with him, he had as his key military action officer a young lieutenant colonel who had come from the CAIG. So, I was also involved with him. What I did was to carry water for both sides on burden sharing issues, make sure that Holmes had access to our senior military commanders, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, the Vice Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Staff of the Army. There were people of comparable rank on the Army Staff go to State and talk with Holmes about the wide assortment of burden sharing problems and issues – what we needed, what we were most interested in, getting what we were interested in, and securing a relationship with the Germans in particular. There were projects that we were seeking to have them support – even if we no longer wanted to support them, we still wanted perhaps to maintain the capability – and what would be the best tactics to take in making these approaches. Holmes and the Army staff would use an occasional intermediary on this work on burden sharing issues, which the longer we moved into an almost post-Cold War period, the more this was of interest to the Army.

Q: Did you see a change in the Army... One of the big things in the Army that everybody talked about – I remember this back in the mid-'50s when I was a vice consul in Frankfurt – was the Red Army coming through the Fulda Gap. That was in a concise way how we looked at the threat. Obviously, the Red Army was not going to come through the Fulda Gap since the events of '89. Was there a dramatic shift in forward thinking about, okay, what are we going to use our army for in Europe?

JONES: Again, I suspect that more of this thinking happened later than we might project or at least later than I remember it happening. Within six months of Panama, we were into the Gulf. The Gulf aftermath probably absorbed a year. At that point, of course, you had an enormous amount of change, shifting of units, forces, and concentrations, and great satisfaction from the success of it. But to get back to Europe, for this period, we could see

that militaries were being reduced. We visited just about every one of the military command senior military Army officers. We were at different points during this two year period with the British at least twice, with the French, with the Italians, with the Germans twice, with the Dutch... So, in effect, we hit all of these senior European allies. At each level, they told us clearly and we recognized that their force levels were being reduced and that their army was going to be restructured. Some of them were moving closer to an all-volunteer force or a substantially greater number of volunteers, and we heard that they were running into budget plans problems. All the way along the line this was clearly what was seen. We knew that there were going to be problems maintaining force levels. We anticipated as a result that our own force levels would fall. The Army was always concerned about its own strength and what level of strength it could maintain. The Army did think into the future to the extent that the senior officers insisted that they would not create or not fall into the trap of becoming a "hollow army." This was one of their major themes. Another major theme was that readiness was absolutely essential. This was a key phrase by Carl Vuono at his retirement parade and speech where he delivered in the strongest possible way "Never compromise with readiness." This meant that they were willing to take reduced force levels if the operational tempo for the troops that remained was high and that the forces were properly equipped. So, the Army was at the same time steadily examining alternatives for the weaponry that it was going to need and the concurrent support material. They had come to the conclusion that there was not going to be a new tank out into the out-years, that there simply wasn't going to be anything other than the Abrams and the Abrams variants that they had. No one was going to design a completely new tank. They were quite satisfied with the Bradley fighting vehicle, which was also a replacement. They were pleased with their multiple rocket launcher, which was just being phased in at that time. Their focus had become more directed at the logistic support vehicles that would be necessary to keep up with and maintain this extremely rapid moving combat force that they had. So, there was indeed a certain amount of planning and emphasis on how one prepares this army of the future, what one does with it and how they do it. The Chief of Staff of the Army in the early '90s was in the process of revising operational texts personally with an amazing degree of attention. The equivalent would be if we had the Secretary of State working on a FAM [Foreign Affairs Manual]. But the Chief of Staff of the Army was working on the basic operations manual for the Army. It wasn't that he was writing it, but he was engaged with the detail.

To step back, as an aside, I was constantly struck by the ability of these very senior officers to pay enormous attention to detail without getting lost in it. They truly were able to get down to the quality of the material for the Army green shirt while at the same time being able to handle and be equally comfortable with wide strategic policy development affecting the Army. On the other hand, they were very Army centric. One of the things that I also noted was the Army Operations Center during the Gulf War, which met every single morning very early in the morning, 7:15-7:30, and they would talk, giving an overview of circumstances. It would be on the line of, "Yes, we have our legs – they happen to be the Marines. We have some eyes – the Air Force. We have a left arm – the Navy. But the most important thing is our strong right arm." Then they would spend 95% of their time discussing Army issues associated with the gigantic level of detail and

complexity associated with moving and preparing the Army for the operations in the Gulf. These people were able to handle detail in great detail but also able to move to the most complex and abstract levels of strategy.

Q: Let's talk about your role and your observations of the events of August 1990. When Saddam Hussein moved in August 1st into Kuwait, where were you? What was the reaction within the military? What started to happen?

JONES: It was very interesting. Just before that time, we had had a briefing from planners at CENTCOM.

Q: This was General Schwarzkopf.

JONES: Well, it was his planning officers but not Schwarzkopf personally. They talked about the threat in that area. It was almost an abstract circumstance at that point. They talked about how hard it would be to get there. Indeed, they didn't think we could get there in time. Certainly the prospect of trying to defend Saudi Arabia against an Iraqi attack was seen as so daunting as to be virtually impossible. We were concerned that we would be defeated if we arrived in the time frame that we could program. The first troops we could get there were airborne troops, and some people said they wouldn't have been a speed bump on the road. Then after that, you were talking about perhaps forces from other countries and our 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, which was the first available force. But on top of that, and subsequently, we had an intelligence briefing by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Army Staff. He came and the Army Vice Chief received the briefing. As somebody who had been an intelligence officer, I could see that they were going through the various warning indicators. Somebody asked him, in effect, "Well, how much warning time would we have if Saddam moved against Kuwait?" He said, "We have been warned." In other words, we wouldn't have anything much more than the fact that, "Well, we hear the tank engines have turned on now" and that would be about the level of warning that was available. We had all the warning that we could have. It was a time in which, if anything, the U.S. was being counseled not to take abrupt and precipitous action by the Saudis and by the Kuwaitis. Who had more to lose than the Kuwaitis?

Q: And they were telling us to "but out" almost.

JONES: Yes. They were telling us, "We can take care of this. We have handled this before. Don't do something provocative that Saddam could seize upon as an excuse. We've had this type of *contretemps* before with him. We think that it's manageable. So, don't send highly visible naval forces to ride up and down the Persian Gulf. Just wait it out. We can deal with this." Well, there were no people that had more to lose than the Kuwaitis, and they were literally caught asleep. All you can say was that they were "Pearl Harbored." At that juncture, you could say that militarily we weren't surprised. The classic problem of intelligence is measuring capabilities and intentions. You knew all about their capabilities, and you knew nothing about their intentions. We're always taught

as intelligence officers to measure only their capabilities and respond to their capabilities. If you know their intentions today, you may not know them tomorrow. They may not know them today, so how can you measure or assess their intentions? In the end, that becomes impossible. You have to take what you believe their intentions are into account. But the military planners are forced to deal with intentions and intentions alone.

Q: Let's talk about where you were and how we responded.

JONES: What I was dealing at that point with was that the President's decision to intervene showed that he had larger testicles than I did. I just was afraid from the briefings and information that I had had that we wouldn't be able to do the job, that we wouldn't be able to get there in time if Saddam elected to continue to move south into Saudi Arabia, to prevent him from doing so without an incredible effort on our part. But it didn't happen that way.

Q: We're talking about capabilities. Looking back on it, how well do you think we had the Iraqi military pegged?

JONES: We were very well organized to move material. This is something that the Army does very, very well. Year after year after year, they send people to Command and General Staff School at Leavenworth. Year after year after year, they develop plans to move units of all dimensions, sizes, shapes, and backgrounds, with appropriate supporting material there. This is not an "ad hocery" exercise. That was one of the most impressive parts of what I saw work. No one was making it up as they went along. They had plans and they had capabilities, and they matched plans and capabilities to take the actions that they did. But the decision to exercise those capabilities against the prospect of problems was a political decision. It was made at the presidential level.

Q: What were the briefings saying? What were the capabilities of the Iraqi army that you were seeing before?

JONES: The capability of the Iraqi army, in retrospect, it seems that it was much overstated. We were very concerned about the casualties that we expected to face. I made one note at the turn of the November or so to the extent of saying that, "The Iraqi defenses were regarded as terribly tough" and that we wouldn't be able to breach them in a straight on attack. This was certainly the decision at about Thanksgiving. This was a complicated military decision.

Q: By Thanksgiving, we had already committed ourselves to put defensive troops in.

JONES: Yes. We had made the decision in early August to move troops there and we had been in the process of moving troops in massive numbers. But there was an added level of decision that was made after the Thanksgiving timeframe. It became complicated because at that point people were saying, "Well, we have enough forces there to defend Saudi Arabia." But that wasn't the objective. The objective was to liberate Kuwait: "This

will not stand.” So, how did you go about doing this? How long could we keep our troops there? This was seen as a complex political and social-cultural atmosphere in which to operate. So, after a certain period of time, we were going to have to rotate forces. We were beginning to think of which forces, which divisions, would be rotated and changed. Or could we actually directly invade Kuwait and expel the Iraqis? I did not make this trip, but there was a trip made by the Chief of Staff of the Army and some of his key support people and they looked at the plans that were presented by Schwarzkopf, which were for a direct frontal assault on the Iraqi positions. They deemed them inadequate plans. They thought they were unimaginative and that they could very well be ineffective, certainly with the troop strength that we had there. So, at that point, we made a decision to start moving troops from Germany. This move, in its own way, was sort of startling. What it did was, it emphasized our conclusion that the possibility of a war in Europe was virtually nonexistent. We took two divisions out of Germany as well as more divisions from the U.S. At that point, it became clear that we were going to attack. We could not maintain the level of troops in Saudi Arabia that we had moved there indefinitely with no force rotation. We didn’t have sufficient forces left to rotate them, and we weren’t just going to let our troops sit there in the desert forever. So, it became clear that we were going to attack. But if anything, by no means was there a lot of enthusiasm on the Army Staff for a full scale war.

Q: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was Colin Powell at this point. He made it very clear that he didn’t want to do this. Did you feel that he was in sync? Were the Army commander and Powell both in general accord?

JONES: From what we can tell later from books written later, it did indeed appear that Powell was not enthusiastic about a war. This seems to have been reflected in his very initial advice in August about which I was just recently reminded by some newspaper columns. Powell was more inclined to let the situation in Kuwait stand and simply make sure that we saved Saudi Arabia. The military – and this is standard generals on the Army Staff – these people were hoping that a solution could be obtained diplomatically. It’s a silly truism to offer, but it’s still very true that it’s the military that does all the dying. This observation is even more true at the senior Army level, since the young people that were out there were often their sons and daughters. In the military at senior levels, you will often find that you have a general officer, and one of his children is a son or a daughter who is a captain or a major and in a combat unit. This was certainly true for the Army staff. You cannot help but realize this circumstance. They would mention it casually: “Yes, my son is out there as a captain with the such and such recon. Squadron” or “My daughter is a captain with a Patriot missile battalion” or just on down this line. Carl Vuono, the Chief of Staff, had two sons, both of whom were in Desert Shield at that time. Don Parker, the Director of the Army Staff, who I mentioned earlier, had at least one child who was engaged in this way. So, their desire for a blood-curdling, hand-to-hand combat exercise was zero. There were no “war lovers” on the Army Staff. That’s what I’m trying to project to you.

Q: We have an interview with Gordon Brown, who was POLAD to Schwarzkopf. What

was your role?

JONES: My role was a coordinative, informational role in many instances, trying to get people who knew something about the Arabs to talk with us and discuss the situation with the Chief of Staff of the Army, obtaining information and views at the Department of State as to what their thinking and perspectives were, and making sure that the Army Staff knew this, writing briefing memos and commentary on what I saw as the circumstances evolving for the Chief of Staff of the Army and senior staff people. I cannot say, as a result, since this was not a combat/commander operation for the Chief of Staff of the Army, that I knew things like war plans. I didn't know war plans. I knew that we were certainly also thinking about things like how to end a victorious war. There was a full section of Army planners doing this kind of thinking – what next afterwards? Things like, what will we do with our forces when the war is over? How will we get them back? How will they be distributed? Where will they return? What equipment do we want to leave where and under what circumstances? Things of this nature. But a certain amount of this planning was being done in the dark because we didn't know what was going to happen.

Q: During the war, one of the disquieting things is the way the war ended. Schwarzkopf was told to arrange a cease-fire and he wasn't given many instructions. When you talk about how to end a victorious war, it sounds like some people sitting down with some rather concrete ideas of what to do? How did this translate itself to Schwarzkopf?

JONES: Schwarzkopf was an individual planner. He got instructions through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs rather than the Army staff. The Chief of Staff of the Army was a support and supply chain for them. What did the CINC on the ground need and what was the best way to get it to them? When I mentioned the visit of the Chief and Army staff to the Gulf and their review of or their observation of his plans, their response that they were not good plans, were not things that were thought out with Schwarzkopf so much as they were their private observations that this was not a good plan. This "straight" attack was not going to be a very productive approach. But an enormous amount of what the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff was engaged with was the most detailed of minutia, things like how to more effectively protect the rotor blades on helicopters because they were eroding more quickly by desert dust. There was a full program to wrap the rotors in a protective covering. You would have constant reviews at the daily briefings in the Army Operations Center of the available equipment, what percentage of it was on-line, what was needed in the way of spare parts, what was in the pipeline, how it was being delivered, and what the capacity of various ships were.

Q: I want to go back to your role. How did you find the State Department during this time of crisis and the Army? What sort of things were you getting in passing?

JONES: A good deal of it was not relevant to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. We were still doing a certain amount of standard work. A certain number of visitors were still visiting. A certain number of other plans and other information was ongoing. The Department was

working its diplomatic approaches. You would hear the results of it or you would see indirectly through reporting telegrams. Some of the events were on CNN, which was on TV in everybody's office all the time as to what approaches were being made. The Army really didn't have an input into this. The best I could do in this regard was to try to keep people informed as to what was happening, if they had missed something.

Q: The conclusion of the Gulf War must have given a terrific boost to the feeling of the capabilities of the military.

JONES: Without any question. One of the observations by Carl Vuono was, "What a shame we had to have a war in order to show America how good their Army was." It was that kind of a recognition that we really were incredibly good, so much better than people had thought we were. Up until now, the analogue had been Vietnam. The point was that Vietnam was almost 20 years in the past, and that the number of people that were now on active duty who had had Vietnam service was surprisingly few. These people were for the most part senior military commanders. One of the men for whom I had remarkable respect for was Barry McCaffrey. McCaffrey is our drug czar. But McCaffrey, when I first encountered him, was a brigadier general on the Army Staff in charge of operations and planning. He was assisted by another incredibly able man, Dan Christman who currently is the head of the military academy at West Point. But the two of them had intelligence and energy that were remarkable, as capable as any two men that I've met anywhere. It was McCaffrey who was in charge of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, which made the sweep around our left and really did the most dramatic part of the fighting for the war. The consequence was a profound recognition that the combination of new equipment and new tactics, so-called "air land battle" military tactics, had been amazingly successful, and that while, yes, we were using these skills against the Soviets' idiot cousins, the skills were indeed so overwhelming and so astonishing in their capabilities that I think there was a far greater sense of confidence about our ability to handle any threat anywhere, if we wished to go forth and handle it. But at the same time, people remained very careful about triumphalism. This is not a set of people that are a bunch of muscle flexers. If you find muscle flexers, they're down at a much lower level when the general feeling is that you have to motivate the troops by bravado. But here again, I recall the mature steadiness with which so many of the people who had microphones shoved in their faces by the media made mature and balanced statements. They would say, "Well, I'm afraid, but I have great faith in my men, my leaders, and my equipment. I am confident that we will be able to do what we're asked to do." This was not "John Waynism." It was in its own way a remarkable refocusing on what kind of a military, including the Reserves, that we actually had on hand.

Q: At the end of this, the Army was still focusing on the whole future. Both the Gulf War and the changes in Europe occupied them up to the time you were there, until '92.

JONES: Yes.

Q: Did Somalia come up on your radar at all?

JONES: No, Somalia just didn't matter. There were people that were engaged in Somalia later, whom I knew who were on the Army Staff, such as Tom Montgomery, who was a lieutenant general dealing with a lot of the Somalia work at the end when he was there. But Somalia really wasn't on the Army's radar.

Q: By the time you arrived on the scene, had relations with the Chinese Mainland military been just cut off?

JONES: Yes, because of Tiananmen. There had been plans for senior U.S. military people to go there and visit. They had been scheduled and there had also been plans for senior PRC military to come and see us. All of those plans were put aside. Indeed, relationships with the Chinese embassy here were, as a consequence, more restricted. They had beefed up their staff with the expectation that they were going to have a much more extensive relationship with the United States. But they just didn't. I was one of the people that was able to talk with them and meet with them. I had a steady series of lunches and dinners with Chinese military representatives. But this was all very casual. This was just a way of keeping the channel open.

Q: Did you find that the Chinese understood that this was going to be a down time?

JONES: Yes. It was one of those things where, "Gee whiz, we wasted this administrative exercise by sending these two additional lieutenant colonel types here, and now we can't really use them. But okay, alright." The other things that we were engaged in were a couple of different sets of meetings with the Taiwanese military. It had a substantial and active group here with a liaison office. There were regular, about once a year, meetings to talk about what military equipment could be purchased and sold. We were always interested in being able to do as much as we possibly could with the Taiwanese. I won't say there was an open door, but there was real receptivity to them in this manner.

Q: How about the Israeli connection? Was that at a higher level that bypassed and went through Congress?

JONES: There was an Israeli connection. To a degree, there was an irritation with the Israeli military. The Chief of Staff of the Army – this was a trip on which I accompanied him – in early 1990 made a trip to the Middle East in which he visited counterparts. After first seeing the Reforger in Germany, he went to Jordan, Egypt, and Israel. The Israelis wanted to brief him on a particular military topic – I assume it was a weapons exercise – and only wanted to brief him. He wouldn't take the briefing. He said, "If I can't have some of my people in with me, I don't want the briefing." They also did expect a degree of cooperation that we didn't always accept. There was no question that we had a substantial respect for them in purely military terms. In the Middle East, we had in that "walkthrough" with seeing the three armies, there was no question at all that the Israelis were head and shoulders, another dimension, than the Egyptians or the Jordanians. At the same time, they also were far more casual about their expertise. It was very "Israeli" in

the way in which they went about their briefings and presentations to us. They had a string quartet come in and play for the Chief of Staff of the Army at the formal dinner. The formal dinner was held in a hall that gave me probably more the sense that I was in a high school cafeteria than anything else. The four Israeli instrument players came in in just ordinary fatigues, winter fatigues, but just fatigues. They did it that way. In contrast, the Egyptians put on a display of almost pharaonic excess with a waiter behind each heavily carved and gilded chair for the formal dinner. At the same time, when they showed us their military expertise, it was no more than a training demonstration. It wasn't an exercise of 1/100th the professionalism that the Israelis demonstrated in the exercise that they had.

At the same time, we were also involved in tank production. One of the places that the Chief visited was a production facility that General Dynamics was just putting together and building in Egypt. The line was being developed that was going to produce eventually about 500 M1s for Egypt.

Q: These are tanks.

JONES: Yes. These were Abrams tanks. This was a gigantic exercise both in financial and political terms. At that point, General Dynamics had already put \$500 million into the facility. But it was also a real reflection on our part of our effort to move and keep the Egyptians thoroughly out of the then Soviet Russian orbit by replacing all of their old Russian armor with American Abrams tank armor and then, at the same time, respond to their desire to gain the expertise associated with producing them themselves. So, instead of buying Abrams tanks from the U.S., they were going to create this gigantic production facility that would produce them and then perhaps in the longer run permit them to sell them elsewhere in the Middle East.

So, the Israeli connection was there. During the Gulf War, the major effort was to keep the Israelis out of the war.

Q: I have interviews with Bill Brown, who was our ambassador there, and Chas Freeman, who was ambassador in Saudi Arabia. Chas Freeman was trying to keep the Saudis in and Brown wanted to keep the Israelis out.

JONES: The third person that you may talk to is Roger Harrison, our ambassador in Jordan, who, in effect, ruined his career by – I won't say being an apologist – but trying to explain why Hussein could not give the level of support to Desert Shield/Desert Storm that some of the other countries did. He attempted to explain to Washington exactly what was happening and that they should not belabor Hussein to the degree that we were clearly inclined to do. This was not something that Baker or for that matter the President wanted to hear; Harrison never got another embassy and retired as a consequence fairly soon after the end of his embassy in Jordan.

Q: Is there anything else we should talk about during this period?

JONES: Let me talk a little bit about something that would have escaped my attention or even my thinking at all before going on the Army Staff. That was an organization called the Conference of American Armies, the CAA. The CAA really was an institution that absorbed a gigantic amount of time, almost a disproportionate amount of time without any question, by members of the Army Staff and the Chief of Staff of the Army himself. What it has been is an organization in which the United States tried to bring all of the other armies of Latin America into a regular set of meetings, cooperative discussions, and exchanges of techniques. It is an attempt to develop a productive, effective alliance of armies throughout the hemisphere. This was of particular interest to me because it was the very first experience I had as the Chief's POLAD. I went to Guatemala for the meeting of chiefs that's held every two years. We were there. It was interesting and informative. But then the next host for this meeting was to be the United States. As a result, for a good two years, we planned at a very high intensity to bring these men to the United States and hold about a four day conference in Crystal City, Virginia. They set up an operation that absorbed 25 army officers and enlisted men headed by a very effective colonel, Leo Vasquez, and we planned it step by step, day by day, exercise by exercise. At this point, for this period of time, the executive for the Conference of the American Armies was the United States. So, all of the coordinative work, all of the briefings, the efforts to keep American armies on a high level of coordination, cooperation, and to the degree possible even military effectiveness, was run out of this group. This officer, Vasquez, and I spent a good deal of time together working on his projects and programs and finally this meeting that ran for four days in the fall of 1991 went off very effectively. But what it did in its own way was to prevent more trips by the Chief of Staff of the Army to Latin America, since he knew that all of these commanders were going to be coming here.

Another thing that was of particular interest to me and the Army was an effort to develop better bilateral and trilateral relations with South Asia, with the Indian army and the Pakistani army. Here you had a situation where for decades we had been considered to be closer to the Pakistanis, and the Russians were closer to the Indians. Well, the Indians were no fools. They recognized that as the Soviet Union was in a state of implosion, we were going to have to be engaged. So, there was a visit by their chief of staff of the army, a man named Rodriguez, who was Portuguese rather than pure Indian in origin, and a very clever, very articulate man who was able to make references to Winston Churchill and Yogi Berra. He came as an official visitor. Shortly afterwards, the commander of the Pakistani army came. We had very productive and interesting discussions and meetings with them. One of our efforts was to see whether there was a possibility of greater exchanges and a closer army-to-army relationship between us and the Indians. To a degree, that effort was going to be run out of Hawaii with the army forces there. These people were slowly trying to build a set of exchanges, joint training ventures, military meetings, briefings, students to one another's schools, efforts of this nature. Then the Chief of Staff of the Army, in one of the last trips I made, in May of '92 went to India and Pakistan, and there was some hope that we might be able to serve as a conduit to develop somewhat improved Pakistani-Indian relations. The Chief of Staff of the Army was

willing to do this in Pakistan. This was Sullivan by now, who replaced Vuono. He said that "If there is anything that I can do to foster this relationship, I'd be willing to go back." But as far as I know, it did not so transpire. Each side took the opportunity to complain to us vigorously about the nefarious attitudes, aspects, expectations, and approaches of the others. We got nowhere on that. Unfortunately, relatively quickly after that, the Pakistani army chief died abruptly. No one was quite sure why he died except that he fell over dead. His wife was convinced that he had been poisoned. They even went so far as to do tests on him. But in the end, it simply seemed that this very fit, very capable, very athletic man, had just died. That also took away one of the potential interlocutors. Before you knew it, we were back into the kind of circumstances where the Pakistani Army had repoliticized itself and there wasn't any opportunity. At the same time, I am not sure whether the Indian military has been able to take advantage of the opportunities for greater contact in dealing with the United States before there was their latest round of nuclear weapons testing.

Q: I would think that the Indians would find themselves by this time being somewhat disturbed that they had the Soviet Union as their supplier. The Soviet Union itself was going down. Also, confrontations between American equipment and Soviet equipment with the Israeli air force over Syria and the Gulf War, the Soviet material was showing badly. Of course, it was poorly manned. But at the same time, the material itself did not seem to be up to the caliber of the American.

JONES: I think you can say that that was a concern. But it wasn't one that they were expressing all that vigorously. If anything, you would have had the other side of it; the Indians wanted to make sure that the Pakistanis didn't get more capable American equipment. Indian industrial ability has been rising. They are and were more and more capable of producing basic equipment themselves. Of course, not just land-based equipment but other weaponry. For a long time, they thought they would be able to get, without any serious difficulty, the leftover material from the old Soviet Union. I have no idea how they equipped themselves and reequipped themselves over the last years other than making sure that their nuclear weapons systems had gone up. Obviously, they have the capability of intermediate range missiles as well.

Q: Is there anything else we should talk about?

JONES: Interestingly enough, one of the things that struck me the most and ended by conditioning a certain amount of my own activity and thinking subsequently was the Clarence Thomas effort to get Senate approval of his appointment to the Supreme Court. From October '91 onward, most senior officers and most officers had to very carefully alter their approach and relationships with any women on their staff. I was struck in retrospect at the intensity with which everyone was following the nomination hearing proceedings.

Q: We're talking about sexual harassment charges.

JONES: Yes. And how people were simply listening to the hearings day after day. I went from my office at one point to a reception and found that every single person at the reception had rather reluctantly left the reporting of the hearings to come to the reception. What it did was to change totally the casual nature of having a discussion one-on-one with a woman. It made me transform my personal style. Subsequently, any meeting that I had with a woman, I had to have a door open. If at all possible, I wanted to have a secretary in another room. It was a very, very defensive decision on my part to avoid being placed in a circumstance where I could be charged with something for which I had no guilt. It was reflected in discussions at that time. I think the rest of this decade has been a conditioning one for cultural and business attitudes.

Also at this point was when in early 1992 I got the word that I had been assigned as the political minister counselor in Ottawa. I began my own preparations for going to Canada.

Q: We'll pick this up the next time when you're off to Canada. You were in Canada from '92 to when?

JONES: '96.

Q: Today is October 5, 2001. In 1992, you went to Canada as political counselor. Let's talk a little about the embassy first, in Ottawa. Who was the ambassador? What sort of a political reporting staff was there and how did that develop?

JONES: The ambassador had also literally just arrived. His name was Peter Teeley. Pete Teeley was an interesting guy. He had a very close connection with George Herbert Walker Bush, having been a public affairs staffer in charge of some of his campaign press during the '88 campaign. He had been in and out of government in that regard, but he was given the appointment and obviously would never have taken the appointment if he didn't expect that the Bush presidency was going to continue on into '92-'96. Nevertheless, he had just arrived and was barely getting his feet on the ground at the same time that I had arrived. I had met him in Washington. He was a very pleasant man, intelligent, thoughtful. At that point he had a very young wife, who had been the press photographer for Bush at one point in his government, and a couple of young children. Teeley was also a recovering cancer victim, so there was some additional poignancy associated with this man who was then in his early 50s with a very young wife and two young children. In effect, and by summing up the Teeley administration before it began, it was one of the very shortest that you were likely to have. He left on February 20th. During the time that he was ambassador, he was also out of the country a fair amount of time. His mother became quite ill while visiting Ottawa, was medically evacuated, suffered extensively from pneumonia, and then died. So, I won't say that Teeley ever put a definitive stamp on the embassy. At the same time, there was a very substantial turnover in the senior staff. Not only was there a new political counselor but there was also a new economic counselor, and a new agricultural counselor. The defense attaché also was new. The

longest lasting incumbent was the DCM.

Q: Who was that?

JONES: That was Todd Stewart. He stayed one more year and then he was replaced by James Walsh.

As a political section, I had a pretty standard section. It had a labor counselor, two political officers, and a political-military officer, and two secretaries. Again, the action within the political section was really a pretty standard bifurcation. On the one hand, it consisted of making demarches to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the like so that they understood what we wanted them to do (or at least were able to appreciate what we were trying to do) or got a straight briefing from us on developments that we thought should be of interest to them. The other side of it was our reporting and analysis of what was happening in Canadian domestic affairs and what was likely to be happening. All of that, of course, was not done just from the embassy. There were and still are consulates in Halifax, Quebec City, Montreal, Toronto, Calgary, and Vancouver that provided a certain amount of additional provincial level analysis and reactions from those parts of the country. The political section coordinated the overall reporting for the country through the consulates as well.

Q: When you arrived, how would you say the role of the Canadian embassy in Washington was? I would think you would all be all in play together.

JONES: The Canadian embassy and the U.S. embassy each had a special set of problems. Essentially, our relationship with Canada is so close and it meets in so many dimensions and so many facets that sometimes it's the role of the embassy simply to try to catch up with what is happening in Washington and in Ottawa. You have a situation in which many of the senior people in both governments know and are comfortable enough with one another to pick up the phone and just call. Since we don't even have international dialing code problems, you just pick up the phone, dial the local area code, you can be in your colleague's ear that very moment. But no, on another side, we did not deal specifically with the Canadian embassy any more than the Canadian embassy dealt with us. By definition, your embassy deals with their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. You end by knowing a little bit more sometimes of what was happening in Washington when you got a report from your Canadian colleagues. Getting a report from the State Department in Washington about what was happening at the Executive Branch level or within the White House was sometimes far more difficult – indeed totally problematic.

Q: To get down to the substance, when you arrived there, how would you say the status of relations was? Then what were the issues you were dealing with?

JONES: Essentially relations with the Canadians are almost by definition good. The Canadians have a major stake in maintaining good relations with us. They have a number of throwaway phrases associated with us such as, "The Americans are our best friends

whether we like it or not.” The truth of it though remains that on better than 95% of all of our issues, the relationship runs very smoothly. The overwhelming weight on the relationship is the economic rather than the political relationship throughout most administrations. There are times when there are disconnects between administrations. That was particularly true during the Trudeau government era when there were a number of disconnects between a liberal government and a Republican administration. But that was not the case initially. What we had in the Canadian government, at that point, was a progressive conservative Tory government that had been in power since 1984 and the then Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, had made a major point out of being America’s best friend. His throwaway phrase in that regard was that every morning when he got up he thanked God that he was living next to the United States and assumed that every morning the Americans woke up and thanked God that they were next door to Canada. But underlying all of that comment was a very strong relationship between the Republican administrations during 1980 and 1992 and the Tory government that existed in power between 1984 and the fall of 1993. There were times when Prime Minister Mulroney was not just the first but the foremost in support for foreign policy in the United States – times such as when we removed Noriega from Panama or earlier than that when we had sent air strikes against Qadhafi and Libya. He was front and center in promising Canadian support for the U.S. after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. So, the baseline level of support for American foreign policy from Canada was very strong and very clear.

The problem, which will evolve over time, was that the Tory government was extremely unpopular and was in effect entering the fifth year of its mandate, entering its fifth year because it was hoping against hope that its fortunes would improve. It was hanging on as long as it possibly could. The Canadian government is parliamentary in style, and it has a five year period that it can run out between elections and the ability to choose when it goes to the polls by its own volition rather than any preset electoral schedule. But, traditionally, most governments go to the polls at the four year mark or around then. A government that is hanging on into the fifth year is one that is in very bad condition.

Q: What were we seeing that made this government unpopular?

JONES: It was a combination of the all strikes that you could possibly have against a government. At first it was running into a recession. Mulroney promised by endorsing the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] that there would be great prosperity. Second, Mulroney had implemented a national sales tax called the goods and services tax, the GST. This was done for very good financial reasons and indeed replaced another tax of essentially the same category and dimension. But this tax was also identified clearly on the bottom of every sales slip while the previous manufacturing sales tax had been buried within the total cost. So, you had a seven percent national sales tax, a very painfully obvious sales tax and one that was roundly disliked.

Then Mulroney had attempted to struggle with the national unity question for Canada, a longstanding historic difference between English speaking Canada and Quebec. One of his baseline commitments when elected in 1984 had been to resolve this problem. He had

undertaken so with energy, creativity, and failure. This first failure, which was called the failure at Meech Lake, was rejected by Quebecers. The second effort on constitutional reform to resolve the national unity problem was in process when I arrived. Instead of dealing only with Quebec affairs and problems, it was to address problems Canada-wide in a very comprehensive manner. But this effort was very divisive throughout Canada. That made the Mulroney government even more unpopular.

On top of that, there were style problems. The Mulroney government was viewed as at least somewhat corrupt, perhaps not more corrupt than normal and not corrupt on the level that you will find outside of western democracies, but nevertheless there were enough people at a reasonably senior level who had struggled with malfeasance type questions while in office that there was an impression that it was not a good government.

Then finally Mulroney's personal style, one of a glad-handing, mellifluous-voiced exaggerator, who dressed beautifully and whose wife was always impeccably turned out with perhaps not Mrs. Marcos' selection of shoes but nevertheless a very fine assortment of couturier goods and the like, also left people feeling that this was not "Canadian," that he was too "American" in style. This combination of things had driven his popularity down into the low double digits. Mulroney used to joke about this and say that more people believed that Elvis was alive than were supporting him at that time. That's essentially the core set of his problems with Canadians. Canadians really were in a position that they were simply waiting for the opportunity to pound the living daylights out of the government and the Tories and replace them. So, of course, the government, having no special desire to be pounded into sand, held on hoping, like the old story of Mr. Micawber, that "something would turn up."

Q: From the embassy perspective, what did this mean for the United States? You knew the tidal wave was coming more or less. But were we seeing what's in it or what's not in it for us?

JONES: Well, obviously, yes. My throwaway phrase in this is, "The time to really get to know the government is when it's not the government." We could read the polls as well as anybody else. Part of our job was to go out and make all the contacts, connections, associations, linkages, with those that we expected to be senior players within the coming Liberal government as we could. This was just our job. We knew it was coming. My predecessor had been working on it. I simply plunged into the same kind of process of analysis and review. I oversaw the writing of an extended series of cables. For instance, I remember writing one six months ahead of time saying, "Prime Minister Jean Chretien, what does this mean?" Things of this nature. We were always going out to speak with people who we knew would be key within the Liberal government about what Liberal foreign policy would look like or what liberal defense policy would look like. We had opportunities to meet with the people who became the senior members of the establishment. We had meetings with Chretien, with other members of the establishment such as Sheila Copps, who became the Deputy Prime Minister, and John Manley, who became the Minister for Industry, and Paul Martin, who became the Finance Minister, and

just right down the line of senior people in the Liberal government.

Q: With this group, were we seeing a different attitude towards the United States?

JONES: Well, yes. The Liberal government had at least on paper a far more skeptical view of American foreign policy. Ostensibly, they were saying that they wanted to review NAFTA, which was in its final stages for agreement. The existing Free Trade Agreement, or FTA, was the result of the arguments associated with the 1988 election. The Free Trade Agreement had been in effect, but it hadn't been producing the economic benefits that Canadians had believed it was supposed to produce. Just about everybody was in a mild recession. In the United States, it was that mild recession – “the economy, stupid” – that cost Bush his reelection. This circumstance is best described that when the United States catches cold, Canada gets pneumonia so far as economic downturns are concerned. The Canadian finances were poor. They were running significant deficits at all times. Unemployment was above 10%. Inflation was higher than that in the United States. There were a series of the kind of economic indicators that left people pretty unhappy. So, the fact that the Liberal opposition, the Liberal Party, was saying things like, “We think that NAFTA should be renegotiated” were at least a warning signal. The question had been, who is the leading individual so far as foreign affairs? Well, the shadow foreign minister was Lloyd Axworthy, a man who was a very liberal skeptic of United States policies. When he ultimately became foreign minister in 1996 – he did not become foreign minister immediately, but when he ultimately became foreign minister in '96 – U.S.-Canadian relations on many foreign policy issues became much more pointed and irritable. So, knowing what his general policies were because he was a left-wing liberal from the Vietnam era who had a Ph.D. from Princeton and his issues and interests were those of people that graduated from liberal schools in the 1960s, one could anticipate problems. Also, the Liberals were rather skeptical of U.S. policy, even as obvious a policy as resisting Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. They were quite critical of the Mulroney government initially. Eventually, they came around and gave support, but we saw that as rather halfhearted support. Canadian views on defense are really rather feeble, but the Tory government at least verbalized a little more positively while the very first thing that Jean Chretien said he was going to do was to cancel the purchase of a major set of helicopters that were and still are very badly needed by Canadian forces. But he argued that these were “Cadillac gold plated helicopters” that were far too expensive and he was just going to cancel these. And there were other aspects in which we simply looked at Canadian foreign policy and thought that it was going to be likely less supportive of U.S. foreign policy or U.S. economic interests in NAFTA than would have been the case if the Tories had continued in office. We didn't say that the world was going to come to an end or that the 4,000 mile undefended cliché that exists between us was going to change dramatically, but we expected more problems with the Liberals.

Q: Was this your first time serving in Canada?

JONES: Yes. I had not been to Canada since 1967 when I had been to the Montreal Expo. My entire Foreign Service career and my entire career in government had never taken me

to Canada, although I had met and dealt with Canadians while I was at NATO.

Q: Looking at Canada, one of the things that comes up often is the Canadian concern, "Poor little us and great big you. You've got to be nice to us." The other one is that it's been said that the Canadians really don't have any great sense of unity. We had our Revolutionary War and our Civil War and things which went across – real trials. The Canadians, it was sort of handed to them by the British government. This has caused a country without... There is no theme to the pudding.

JONES: That's more obvious from the outside than from the inside. One of the first things you were cautioned about when going to Canada was that Canadians did not consider it complimentary to say, "You're just like us." Indeed, if you look at the externals, they are very obviously similar. You have first world, high tech, freedom loving, human rights respecting, democracy in which both the major leadership elements of both countries speak English, understand each other's issues, and can pick up the telephone and dial directly and talk to each other. The similarities look more obvious than the differences. Yes, you're in Canada. You can get your automobile repaired. Water will be pure to drink. You can go to a hospital and expect to get better rather than worse medical care. These things are all true. But in its core, I consider Canada very different from the United States. Canadians themselves are unnecessarily worried about their similarity to the United States. The core of the difference lies in the difference between the U.S. system of division and balance of powers and the Canadian system of parliamentary rule, which is true across the country. A parliamentary system, without belaboring it under these circumstances, is simply very different in the levers of control that are exercised, in the manner in which influence is delivered, and the manner in which the population is governed. That point is defining plus there are obvious differences in the views that Canadians have toward how public health should be delivered, how crime should be handled and managed; what the right to bear or not bear arms should be; the degree to which aboriginals, which is the Canadian term for first nations, Indians, should be compensated and assisted, and the emphasis – even greater than that in the United States – on the rights of women and minorities and the protection accorded these groupings. It's a very different society. It's a very different society in many of its facets and at its core.

There is also the essential difference between what the key problem of Canada continues to be, which is national unity. While we say that the United States solved its national unity problem, not in a way that is necessarily to be emulated, in a bloody civil war, but following the Civil War, the United States changed in description from the United States "are" to the United States "is." Canada has never ultimately resolved this issue. Part of the problem is that Quebec could indeed be an independent country. There is no question that Quebec has the size, the resources, the economic strength, the skill of its population, the quality of its government leadership, to be a quite workable and effective small state of about eight million people whose trading level relationship with the United States was about eighth across the world. It could work. But whether it would be a smart idea for Quebecers to do this or it would be a very disruptive set of circumstances, how long it

would take to sort these things out, and the rest, that's a completely different story. We can explore that at whatever length you wish later. But I don't consider Canada as a country akin to a themeless pudding.

Q: I'm going under the assumption that dealing with the Canadians, it was easy to get to see their officials and officials to be, that it was a fairly easy governmental structure to work with.

JONES: I would say that is correct. The level of access that official Americans had with official Canadians was very high of course. There was a division as to whom you saw. The ambassador saw ministers, the DCM perhaps might do so in the absence of the ambassador. But outside of that among government officials and within normal members of Parliament, people of that nature, you could pick up the phone and ask for an appointment and sooner or later you were likely to get that appointment. People also spoke very frankly to you. They assumed a degree of confidentiality on your part and you assumed that your questions could be asked in a straightforward manner and you normally got straightforward answers. This was as true among Quebecers as it was among English speaking French Canadians and English speaking non-Quebecers. Quebecers in particular wanted the United States to understand exactly what it wanted, exactly what it was trying to do, exactly how it was going to go about it, and to emphasize that it could do so without being a security, economic, or political concern to the United States. So, wherever you went, you had a lot of access, particularly on political, national security, and defense issues. On things that were of financial concern, they were more careful, more reticent, held their cards closer to their chest. These were issues and problems that were very high financial value. But on the areas in which the political minister counselor was dealing, I would say that I was almost always able to get good access and clear indications of what Canada was interested in knowing and clear indications of what they were willing to do.

Q: One knows that the Canadians are extremely effective and have been around for so long in Washington and they know the Washington game, in which the Department of State plays essentially a minor role. It's the White House, Congress, the media, maybe the think tanks. It's a diverse field. What was the game as far as our embassy in Ottawa? What were the places you had to touch?

JONES: The situation in many respects was completely different. Canadians find out very quickly, if they don't already know ahead of time, that getting the President on board is just part of their problem, and that 100 different senators and 435 congressmen can be individually very important on a special issue. In Ottawa, it's the reverse. Almost nobody counts except a senior minister, or somebody within the Prime Minister's Office, or the Prime Minister himself. Individual members of Parliament are sometimes referred to in a derisory manner as "potted plants" or "trained seals." They leap up and applaud during the day-to-day question period, discussion, and debate. But as individuals they are completely invisible 100 yards from Parliamentary Hill, as Prime Minister Trudeau memorably put it. So, the people that you need to know or need to have on board to

deliver an answer are your senior “Mandarins” within the specific bureaucracies or a minister or a member of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). These are not huge establishments. It’s not as if you’re working through anything like an American style bureaucracy. One or two men in the PMO might be the individuals who would be the key “go to” persons so far as a difficult problem was concerned. A man named Eddie Goldenberg has had this position with Prime Minister Chretien throughout his entire prime ministership. He has been the Prime Minister’s chief “fixer” in this manner and presumably will be as long as Chretien remains Prime Minister.

Q: Is it called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

JONES: It used to be External Affairs. Now it’s the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade [DFAIT].

Q: You got there in '92. How important were they from your perspective?

JONES: The things that I had to do, had to be done with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. My point, so far as the first half of my portfolio as political minister-counselor was concerned, was to deliver demarches and seek their support. By and large, the things that we were trying to accomplish were not really highly visible foreign affairs foreign policy issues. A lot of things looked as if they had just ended. This was the “end of history” era. One subject in which we were engaged was to get their participation in a maritime interception force, a Gulf interception force, in the Persian Gulf. This effort involved a series of ships that rotated and were inspecting traffic moving in and out the area toward Iraq. We wanted the Canadians to provide a vessel and made a series of demarches in this regard. Eventually they agreed to do so. Over my entire period of time there, to skip ahead, we regularly went to them on foreign affairs related issues – assistance that we hoped they would provide in Haiti or assistance that we hoped they would provide in Bosnia in the way of contributions to joint multinational forces that were being created. I think that, more or less, we were successful. There was one time that we were not successful and that was when we attempted to persuade the Canadians not to withdraw from the international peacekeeping force in Cyprus. They had come to the conclusion that they had provided a battalion for about 25 years, and that 25 years was enough. Although we attempted to persuade them to stay because they had been very successful in their presence there, they decided that it was too large a continuing commitment to finance any further for a point that they thought was obviously open ended, not likely to be resolved, and not have a level of tension that required them to be the peacekeepers any longer. In effect, they were probably right in that judgment. In the intervening eight years, nothing has happened on Cyprus to gainsay their decision to depart. There was no horrible flare-up of fighting, and there has been no progress in resolving the standoff on the island. Despite the fact that I was personally worried that the absence of peacekeepers from the Canadians might lead to a breakdown and a resumption of significant hostilities, I was wrong.

Q: What about the Canadian military? How did we evaluate it? The world was changing.

The Soviet Union was breaking up. But we were getting involved in Bosnia. We were looking around for solid troop commitments and effect troop commitments.

JONES: This is an interesting question. It's one that I spent a fair amount of time studying. To a degree, I spent some time on it before going to Canada. One of the trips that I made with General Sullivan when I was the foreign affairs advisor to the Army Chief was to Canada to look at Canadian forces. The estimates that we made of Canadian forces from the time I got there, which I made one of my personal areas of interest, were ones that were steadily negative. It was a judgment that we made with increasing regret. We saw and recalled that in both World War I and World War II Canadian military participation had been outstanding. In World War II, Canadians put over a million of their citizens into uniform out of a population of about 12 million, which was very directly comparable to the commitment that the United States made, which was about 12 million in uniform out of 140 million. As almost all of the Canadians who served were volunteers, it was even more remarkable. Canada didn't have conscription until almost the end of the war and virtually none of the people that went overseas were draftees. So, Canadian participation in World War II was really quite striking. At the end of the war, I believe they had something like the fifth largest army, the fourth largest air force, the third largest navy, and they were well positioned to have been able to build nuclear weapons had they desired. They had a heavy bomber force. They were operating an aircraft carrier, at least one. This was a very, very capable military. Throughout the core of the Cold War, the Canadians put a very effective brigade into Europe that was there full-time. They had an air wing stationed in Germany. The brigade was a unit that I saw during a NATO Exercise Reforger where I went to the field in Germany and saw various units, including the Canadian brigade. It was a very fine unit. The Canadian expertise in peacekeeping was rooted in the fact that they were first and foremost fine soldiers. It's certainly been one of my conclusions, and one of the conclusions with the military with whom I've dealt, that before you can be an effective peacekeeper, first you have to be a good soldier. But the Canadians, like everybody else around the world, with the collapse of the Soviet Union elected to take a "peace dividend."

The amount of money in proportionate terms and even in real terms that was committed to Canadian defense fell steadily. Their force levels fell steadily. This was pointed out by military commentator after military commentator, including the man who led their forces in Bosnia under the United Nations connection, Major General Lewis McKenzie, who very quickly noted that there were more Toronto policemen than there were Canadian infantrymen. It just went all the way along the line. The Canadians had steadily reduced military capability in virtually all fields. They have a basic societal problem that has developed over the last 50 years that has become akin to the old Chinese saying that "just as you don't make good steel into nails, you don't make good men into soldiers." Canada has sort of buried their very small military in penny packet units spread out of sight of the population in small bases across the country. There is no social-political cache to having been a former soldier. For example, no general officer has ever become prime minister. If you think of the number of generals who became President of the United States, there is simply no comparison. When I arrived in Canada, there were out of a Parliament of about

300, I don't think there were five people who had had military experience. In the United States, the number of people with military experience in Congress has steadily declined, but our World War II generation also became very much engaged in politics. Canada's World War II generation is not reflected in their Parliament. To a degree, that may be a reflection of the fact that politics in Canada is more of a young person's game than it is in the United States. You can get involved in Canadian politics at a lower level for less money than is true in the U.S. Because the party system oftentimes presents you with a lot of safe writings and constituencies, if you can get into one of those, you are going to win. The party label is far more important than individual personalities in getting you elected or defeated in Canada. But still, the point is that Canadians seem to do this younger while we seem to wait until we've had a full career before we enter politics. Canadians will go into politics in high school in serious youth parties associated with the individual national political parties. They can be running for office in their 20s. The burned out, about to be defeated Tory Party that had been in office for eight years, had most of its leadership quit and not run in the 1993 elections, these were people in their 40s or at their most early 50s.

Q: When the Clinton administration came in, what was your impression of how it dovetailed... The Clinton administration came in before the Tory government lost.

JONES: Yes. Of course, the Clinton administration was elected in November of '92. It came to office in January of '93. The Tories were still in power and would be until October '93. So, there was a certain amount of overlap. At the same time, the Tories tried to develop a relationship with the Clinton administration. Mulroney did indeed meet with the President. This was a standard kind of scheduling. The first foreign leader that American presidents usually meet has been the Canadian prime minister, even if very briefly. Mulroney was adroit enough so that, while it would have been obvious simply from looking at the circumstances that he would have preferred George Bush to have been reelected, he had never said anything that was so publicly supportive of Bush during the campaign that it would have been impossible for the Tories to have a reasonable relationship with the Clinton Democrats. John Major, on the other hand, had made it more painfully clear than was appropriate that he wanted Bush to be reelected. So, there was a desire on the part of the Tories to have the best relationship they could have with the incoming administration. At the same time, it was very much in the Liberals' interest to try to get to people to Washington to sell their side of the case. After all, they said, we are the government in waiting. We are going to be the government as soon as there is an election. Don't waste your time with these people. By and large, they were successful in making this point. We did what we could with the Tories as long as the government was in power. We were planning, expecting, analyzing, doing our biographic work, and doing our studies that were designed to see what the new government was going to be like.

Q: On foreign policy issues, during this first period, did Cuba come up?

JONES: No, not really. Cuba was generally viewed almost with a smile as the way in which a conservative Tory Canadian government would use to differentiate itself from the United States. The Canadian policy toward Cuba, which is recognition and engagement,

has not changed and was the same as long as Castro has been the leader of Cuba. But we were not pushing them on Cuban issues at this juncture.

Q: Were we almost considering Cuba being a throwaway and Canada showing us how different they were could hit us with that and we'd shrug our shoulders and get on with more important things?

JONES: This was the point in which the Mulroney government would differentiate itself to its critics from those who said, "Oh, you're just a lackey of the Americans" and they would say, "No." There were other points of difference that they could find on specific African issues. They had been stronger earlier on for the elimination of apartheid and on not dealing with South Africa. So, it was not a question of the Canadians invariably under the Tories leaping up and saying, "Yes, Sir" to the Americans. No, we didn't have any major problem in them holding this particular point of difference. We would have preferred it not to be the case, but it wasn't an issue that we were going to make primary in a relationship that was going so very well in so many other ways.

Q: In many ways, particularly in matters such as Cuba and Africa, the Canadians from our perspective didn't count for much anyway, did they?

JONES: Canada is at best a second level power. Its presence around the world is very thin. They have points and they have issues to make in Africa through what used to be the British Commonwealth, now just the Commonwealth, and they have a certain amount of leverage in this manner. But it's on the margins rather than primary. Working through UN peacekeeping operations, they had a presence in many places around the world. At this point, they took special pride in having participated in one level or another in virtually every single UN peacekeeping operation. So, you could say Canada was "punching a little bit above its weight." It was a member of the G7, now the G8. It had done all of its peacekeeping. It could be seen by a number of countries as an interlocutor with the United States. Or, if you can't really deal with the U.S., maybe you can work an angle with the Canadians. There were times, although I can't put a finger on it for specifics, in which the Canadians would carry our water in areas where we were not going to be given anything other than a dismissive hearing but in which our interests and those of the Canadians were not significantly different. The Canadians were willing to make points along the same lines that we would like to have heard. So, I wouldn't overestimate their weight, but I wouldn't just drop it out of hand.

Q: With Canada in these early days, how did we see the Quebec separatist movement? Did we see this as still being a viable possibility or did we see this as beginning to fade?

JONES: If anything, we saw it beginning to rise. Although there had not been a referendum since 1980, the major efforts that the government had made to resolve the national unity question had either failed or were struggling desperately in this first year. The Quebec government was run by the Liberals – and this is a provincial Liberal, and they are always very different from the national parties – but the Parti Québécois, the PQ,

was strengthening. There is no question about that. The Liberals were weakening. You could say there was a reasonable to good likelihood that the PQ was going to win the next election, which would be held in 1994. As a result, I spent a fair amount of time dealing with the Quebec separatists and the Parti Québécois. On the national level, the Bloc Québécois had really just been formed. The leader of the Bloc Québécois, Lucien Bouchard, had been a close personal friend of Brian Mulroney's but broke with him over disagreements over how the Meech Lake Accord was to have been drafted and how it ultimately failed. He took out of the Tories a group of about eight or nine members who were Quebecers and he formed this small party. The DCM and I met with Bouchard twice during the course of my first year there in an attempt to get to know who this man was, what he was doing, and how he struck us. He was very impressive. He had learned English in his 40s. It was good, workable English. He was clearly an extraordinarily well read man in English, not just in French. He was thoughtful, articulate, smart... So, we didn't run around saying, "Well, he's going to do fantastically," but he was a respectable very small party leader at that point. On a more general basis, 1992-'93 was the last period before traditional Canadian three party politics shattered completely. Canada in 1992 had three parties – a New Democratic Party, which is a socialist party; the Liberals; and the Progressive Conservatives, the Tories. You had this tiny splinter group of Bloc Québécois, which had broken off who were Quebec nationalists. You had a single individual from the west, Deborah Gray, who represented the Reform Party. But after the 1993 election, which has continued in '97 and 2000, although this is outside of my purview right now, Canadian politics completely changed. The Liberals are labeled the "national governing party." Over history, they've probably run Canada two-thirds of the time. When they get themselves into a position where there has been a hideous depression or they have more than normally arrogant, Canadians have been willing to vote them out and turn to the natural opposition party. The natural opposition party normally consists of the west, a selection of dissidents within Quebec, and certain numbers of Ontario and Maritime voters. But following the 1993 election, you had a group of regional parties with a regional opposition element, where you had the Bloc Québécois, which held the majority of the Quebec seats, the Reform Party, which held the majority of seats in the west, a splintered social democratic party (NDP) which had just become less and less relevant and more and more marginalized, and a very powerful Liberal Party. One of the major rocks on which Canadian politics came apart was one of the first things that I encountered when I came to Canada; this was a national referendum, the first in more than 50 years, on national unity. The government presented the Charlottetown Accord, designed to fix a substantial number of constitutional problems in Canada. It was an evolution from the Meech Lake Accord, which had been designed to fix only Quebec problems. With the failure of that effort came a decision that they had to address the problem Canada-wide. Meech Lake had been approved by Quebecers, but it failed in a couple of other provinces.

Q: The Maritime provinces, didn't it?

JONES: Meech Lake failed in Manitoba and in Newfoundland. In Newfoundland, they had approved it and then the approval was withdrawn. In Manitoba, one man refused to

give unanimous consent to continuation of the parliamentary session discussing it, and it ended without them being able ever to take a vote on it. But nevertheless, there were serious problems in the review process for Meech Lake. The emphasis consequently was that they really had to address problems nationwide regarding issues like what kind of senate reform there was to be, what the position of aboriginals should be, as well as specific problems associated with the role of Quebec within Canada. This was brought to a national referendum. When the presentation was made initially, it had support across the board. Every significant member of the power elite in Canada, all the major newspapers, as well as all of the national party leaders with the exception of the Reform Party, all of the provincial party leaders and opposition parties – everyone supported it. But during the course of the campaign, a situation developed in which more and more people became less and less comfortable, not perhaps with the elements which might have been the goodies for others but on the elements that were supposed to be attractive to them. It was never enough or it was never done in the right way. On a province by province basis, it failed in all of the key provinces except Ontario. It failed in one of the four maritime provinces, in Nova Scotia. It failed in Quebec, much to the surprise of many people. It failed in the west. Canadian aboriginals, who voted on it separately, also rejected it. It was one of those situations in which all of the elites were on one side and the majority of the people were on the other. So, that, in effect, ended serious effort at constitutional reform for the rest of this decade. There have been things that happened after I left of which I'm fully aware because I follow events in Canada very carefully. But for the rest of the period of time in which I was in Canada, people were dealing with the ramifications of the failure of the national referendum, the constitutional fatigue that followed it, and the combination of irritation and anger felt in other parts of Canada because Quebec was being offered a special deal or in Quebec because they wouldn't give them the rights which they should have been normally accorded.

Q: This interview is dealing pretty much on the first year you were there. Any developments then that you would like to comment on?

JONES: Yes. The other point was that as we were seeing the Tory government play itself out, one of the issues that came up was, would Prime Minister Mulroney resign and give them a chance for a facelift, some revival? This was a major point of discussion. Indeed, what you had was a situation, as often happens in Parliament, where nobody knows what the leader's plans are going to be. Every leader holds this decision as close to his vest as he can. The minute he indicates what his plans are, he's dead. He's not a lame duck; he's a dead duck. Well, Mulroney was so good at this that in the departure interview Ambassador Teeley had with Mulroney (and Teeley saw him maybe around February 18th), Teeley said in his reporting telegram that he would be amazed and flabbergasted if Mulroney did not continue in office. By February 24, Mulroney announced that he was resigning. So, you can see Teeley with years of American political experience – it wasn't as if he was some businessman or academic who became an ambassador – he was a political analyst/observer/political animal/media expert, he was completely, totally, absolutely faked out by what Mulroney kept in. But then you had the next question: who was going to replace Brian Mulroney? You had an interesting contest within the Tories.

They generated a good half dozen candidates. The leader from the very beginning was a well regarded and carefully groomed woman named Kim Campbell. Although she was relatively new in politics – she had only been elected in 1984 – she had had a series of good portfolios. She was the justice minister, which is in Canada considered a key cabinet ministerial position. After that, she became the defense minister, which is not a very prominent ministry in Canada, but since she was the first woman to be the defense minister, it was also considered to be something of a plus. It was clear they were trying to give her a series of appointments that would lead her to a leadership prospect. Well, she was the frontrunner from the beginning. But another younger Tory, Jean Charest, was encouraged to run by Mulroney to provide a little competition. Charest had been not much more than a minister of sports. I think he might have been the minister of health. But that, too, was not a very prominent position. He was not expected to give much opposition. But it turned out otherwise. Charest caught on with a lot of young enthusiastic, energetic, bilingual, French-English capability... He looked right. He looked like the kind of man that every young woman would like to say, “Well, he’s a teddy bear. He’s not a sex object, but he’s very nice.” He was not threatening to any man either while at the same time being an individual who, if not regarded as intellectually brilliant, at least could give a hell of a good speech, look very dynamic, and had that perfect combination of French-English bilinguality. So, by the time you had reached late March during which there had been a series of debates and a lot of effort, there was something of a question as to whether the Charest tortoise “would overtake the Campbell hare.” There were people that looked at Campbell and said, “Maybe we’ve made a mistake. If we had not all rushed to leap on her bandwagon, maybe we would have been better off to have gone with Charest anyway.” Well, they had a good rousing, exciting, old fashioned convention held in Ottawa, and Campbell won; but she didn’t win overwhelmingly. She won professionally because of the work that had been done in her favor by the team that had been assembled and put together beforehand, and because she very adroitly at the last minute made a compromise with one of the other candidates and got him with his votes to come on board with her. She had very little growth room if she had not won on the first ballot as she did. As a result, we had Kim Campbell become the first woman as prime minister in Canada in early June. We also had then notification of the nomination and the expected arrival in Canada of Michigan governor James Blanchard, who had a variety of interesting background aspects to him and the expectation that he was going to be the Secretary of Transportation rather than what he got. But that’s another story.

Q: Maybe this is a good place to stop. We’ll pick this up going into ’93.

Today is March 19, 2002. You’re political counselor.

JONES: I’m political minister-counselor in Ottawa.

Q: Where do we pick up?

JONES: The summer of '93. We have gotten through the first year that I was there. I arrived in August of '92. At that point, the most interesting initial element was the arrival of the new ambassador, Ambassador James Blanchard, who was previously the Governor of Michigan. He has subsequently written a book called Behind Closed Doors. It created a minor stir in Canada and had absolutely no resonance in the United States. Among other things, an observation he made which I have used subsequently is that Canadians and Americans view each other through a one way mirror constructed along the border of Canada and the United States. Canadians looking south see everything that's happening in the United States and we looking north see only our own reflection in the mirror. But Blanchard was a one of the illustrations of why it is difficult to claim that only career professionals should be ambassadors. It's not that he was so much better than any career Foreign Service officer would be as ambassador. It was simply that he was one of the people that could say, "Well, I'll talk to the President about that" and indeed could pick up the phone and call the President. I could pick up the phone and call the President, but the President is less likely to answer me than he was to answer Jim Blanchard.

The other circumstance that made it helpful for people in Ottawa, in comparison to people who had suffered under other political ambassadors, was that Jim Blanchard is a politician. Of all the types of people that become ambassadors who are not career ambassadors, whether they're academics or businesspeople or politicians, if I had to endure one as the political ambassador, I would prefer it to be a man who has been a politician. I draw that conclusion essentially because politicians realize that the staff is not their enemy. They deal with civil servants whether they're governors, or on their staff in the House, or whatever their position is, but they realize that civil servants are there to serve the leadership of the day and they will serve the leadership of tomorrow just as they served the leadership of yesterday. They aren't your enemy. They're pieces of functional machinery to get the job done. The other side of it is that most politicians are likeable. You rarely find a politician who is very unlikable – maybe Joe McCarthy was considered an essentially unlikable politician. Most politicians, who go elsewhere in the world, still carry with them the essential aspect of electability, that people like them.

Q: Could you explain where Blanchard's power came from?

JONES: Blanchard's power came from being the first governor to endorse Governor William Clinton of Arkansas for a nomination to the Democratic candidate to become President. Blanchard met Clinton relatively early on, was one of the people that supported him early, was the person that organized his campaign in Michigan, and he won Michigan, although Blanchard was defeated, subsequently, in the race for Governor, a very close defeat, but he was still defeated. As a result, people tagged Blanchard to be one of the people in the Clinton administration. Indeed, Blanchard had been promised that he was going to be the Secretary of Transportation. He says this openly in his book: "I was promised that I was going to be the Secretary of Transportation. The announcement was going to be made shortly." He found that he was not going to be the Secretary of Transportation when there was an announcement on CNN that Pena was going to be the Secretary of Transportation. He was told quietly that there was just one white male too

many in the Cabinet and, as a result, he lost out. So, they sort of came to him and said, “What do you want? What would you be interested in doing?” My understanding is that he had a number of ambassadorships, including the ambassadorship to Germany, offered him as a possibility. He chose to be ambassador to Canada. Subsequently, he said that he had always wanted to be ambassador to Canada, that he had had close relations with various Canadians, dealing as he did out of Michigan, and that this was a place that he knew something about intellectually and personally, having visited or traveled or met individuals who had been provincial premiers, aspects of that nature. As a consequence, he took that particular position. Also for a while, his wife worked in Personnel at the White House. She, too, was reasonably well connected within the White House circle. So, Blanchard because he knew Clinton early, because he had connections within Congress (He had been a representative before he became Governor), and because he had spent some time at least with Clinton’s staff, had a respectable heft in that he was able to call people around town, call people within the White House itself, and get a hearing on the issues that were important to him and important to Canada.

Q: How did he bring himself up to speed when he arrived there? This is true of anybody – when you arrive in a new country, particularly as ambassador, and you’ve done some reading, but you go to your staff and ask what’s up.

JONES: Here again, Blanchard deserves substantial credit for doing something that was very smart. He immediately started a full and comprehensive tour of Canada. He traveled for a substantial period both west and east, hitting major spots, meeting each one of the U.S. consuls, and consul generals and had the full range of high level appointments with provincial premiers, senior politicians in the provinces, individuals of that nature. So, instantly, he would be in a position and was in a position to say, “Well, I met so and so at such and such a place” and, with the exception of virtually nobody else, have had a wider grasp of what was happening in Canada from having seen it on the ground. This isn’t all that easy. Canada is continental size. It took probably, although he didn’t travel every single day, much of a month of travel time. He did it in some sections. At first he took a long western tour. Then he went to the Maritimes. He separately went into Quebec and to Ontario. But as a result of that, he gathered a “gestalt” of Canada that put flesh on the bones of fact and briefing papers and briefings that his staff had given him. He didn’t take anybody other than his wife from the embassy along with him on this trip. He was met at each point by the consul generals in the areas in which he was going to travel. It worked quite well for him.

Q: Starting in the summer of ’93, what were the issues that you were looking at and dealing with?

JONES: The primary issue for ’93 was when there would be a federal election and just how massive a defeat the Tories would absorb. It was clear and had been clear even before I arrived in Canada that it would have taken a substantial political miracle for the Tories to have been reelected in ’93. They had been in office for two terms. Although they came in because of a variety of Liberal disasters, and the Liberals had just worn

themselves out as a party, during the eight years in which the Conservatives had been in control, they had put in a hated goods and services tax, a GST. They had run themselves directly into a depression, not by anything that they had done but by the same bad accident that “the economy, Stupid” defeated George Herbert Walker Bush and also was driving the Tory Conservative numbers down to virtually the single digits. Mulroney had attempted with great energy and substantial goodwill to create a circumstance in which Quebec would sign on to the constitution. He reopened the constitutional question based on his original campaign in 1984 that he would bring Quebec willingly and eagerly back into full Canadian participation. In two substantial, even monumental, efforts, including the national referendum that I discussed earlier, he failed. The failure left Canadians even more irritated and divided than they had been before and left the Quebecers essentially highly alienated as a result of this effort. Then, finally, on top of that, you had an endless sleaze factor. The Tories having been out of power for many years got back into the trough with all four feet – and not just the one or two feet that you would normally expect in the trough. There were endless scandals of essentially minor nature, but attrited away popular approval and left the impression of a fundamentally dishonest party.

Brian Mulroney personally, although his glad-handing, almost bombastic, style of speech and action went over well as an Irish politician in some areas, for others, and particularly the fact that he dressed with elegance and his wife, if not Imelda Marcos in the number of shoes that she purchased, was also very fashionably dressed and very prominent on the Canadian social scene generated a level of personal irritation to the effect that this was not “Canadian” somehow. As a final thought, he liked the United States. He gave the U.S. a great deal of specific and general support in a way that few Canadian politicians and certainly no Liberal politician would ever do. So, all of these things combined created a circumstance in which Mulroney said that more people believed that Elvis was alive than were willing to support the Tory Party. What happened as a result was that Mulroney resigned and there was a party campaign in which the first woman ever to become Prime Minister in Canada, Campbell, became Prime Minister. Of course, she then had to suffer the opprobrium of being a “Mulroney in skirts,” as Jean Chretien put it, plus having all of the overburden that I just described, and although there was a flash of popularity that associated with the newness of having a feisty younger woman in charge of their country, she ran into the same kind of problems that I have just outlined and a number of her own as well. As a politician, she had advanced too fast. It would be as if Geraldine Ferraro somehow had become President with all of the baggage that she might have had associated with it and no real national leadership experience. Well, Kim Campbell had only been elected in 1984. She had never run a national campaign. She had held a couple of prominent ministries within the Mulroney administration. She had been the Justice Minister. She had become the Defense Minister. It was a position that they had put her into because they wanted to give her a certain amount of exposure and experience in this area. She was somebody that the leadership was grooming. With a “Hail Mary” pass type of political maneuver, they made her Party leader and consequently Prime Minister.

Q: This campaign was going on in '93?

JONES: Yes, in the summer. They knew that an election had to be called. They have a five-year window, and the election had to be called by late 1993. Any Canadian party that goes into the fifth year of its mandate is a party that's in desperate trouble. Most of the time, they go somewhere in the late three to early four year mark, and that's seen as the appropriate time. If you run into the fifth year, you are expected to lose.

Q: Were you telling the new ambassador, "Make your due obeisance to the party in power, but you'd better start getting close to the Liberals?" Was that just self-evident?

JONES: It was self-evident. It was something that you walked around and did all the meeting and greeting at the official level. I don't even know which of these senior Tories that were in government he did meet. It was during the summer and the government was closed. Since the government was closed and then almost immediately went into campaign mode, I'm sure he met some of the people who were ministers in the Campbell government, but most of them he wouldn't have met. For a good two years beforehand, the embassy was working full time to meet and cultivate the people that had anticipated would be senior leadership in the new Liberal government.

Q: You said something that strikes the difference between the American system and the British system, which the Canadians have to some extent, and that is the government was closed. In the United States, life goes on. When you say the government was closed...

JONES: What I meant was that Parliament was in recess just as Congress would be in recess. It was not that there was nobody at all minding the store, but that you did not have normal political activity in Ottawa during the summer.

Q: In the parliamentary system, it tends more to close down than in the presidential system, doesn't it?

JONES: Yes, because the parliamentarians are also the ministers. What you can do with a parliamentary system that you can't do with the American political system is largely identify from the shadow cabinet the people that will be having prominent positions in the next government, assuming that it is the government. The phrase that I've always used is, "the time to meet the government is before it becomes the government." It is certainly far easier for political counselors, economic counselors, etc. to meet the key and senior members of the opposition in a country such as Canada than it is to meet ministers who are essentially the point of contact for the ambassador, and the ambassador reserves them to himself.

Q: Were you and your team putting together the new government and were you able to get out and meet them?

JONES: Yes. This was just normal political work. You looked at the people that had the shadow ministry portfolios and you tried to get a chance to meet them and talk to them. People that were prominent and active within the Liberal Party or who had been for a

number of years and the people that were deemed to be closer to the Prime Minister, part of his basic entourage, you tried to get to meet them and at least develop points of contact there. But these were all very standard. The man who is now Deputy Prime Minister in Canada, John Manley, was simply a normal standard Member of Parliament from Ottawa, although he was considered to be a very smart man and was expected to have a cabinet position. So, we obviously met him. The man who was the shadow foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, didn't immediately become the foreign minister. Within about three years after Chretien won the election, he became the foreign minister. It was true for other senior people within the Chretien establishment. They either became senior people within government or they were senior advisors close to him. By no means will I say that we met and knew them all, but we did have a fair number of solid contacts within what became the government, and we were able to make at least some reasonable judgments about what kind of people these were.

Q: Were you seeing trouble on the horizon with the new government coming in, which I take it was working to keep itself somewhat separate from the U.S.?

JONES: You have a situation in Canada where they really have only one foreign relationship. That is with the United States. Their "be all and end all" in foreign affairs is their management of their relations with the United States. Their A-team is directed to dealing with their issues, problems, circumstances, and relationship with us. So, at the same time, our predominance in North America in the economy, on the continent, in the world, is so massive that they have to get along with us. It's one of these "we're best friends" whether they like it or not. The relationship is one that has to work. They are our largest trading partner, but we are overwhelmingly their largest trading partner. Right now, the trade relationship is about two billion Canadian dollars a day each way. It's an enormous trading relationship. It's the largest trading relationship in the world. But it's even more important to the Canadians than it is to us. Something like 80-85% of their exports go to the United States. This moved up over the years. I think it was 60-65% when I first arrived in Canada in '92. But the Free Trade Agreement and now the North American Free Trade Agreement has stimulated trade to the extent that has been magnificently advantageous economically to the United States, Canada, and Mexico, but it has made Canada even more reliant upon the United States than was the case in the past. So, what we have a situation where for eight years the relationship had been extremely good. Brian Mulroney in some instances was virtually our only supporting voice in some things that we did. While the role of the opposition in a parliamentary system is to oppose, there were times that we thought that the Liberals took more glee and more seriousness in their pointed opposition to what the United States was doing or intended to do than what would suggest that the relationship would be smooth, calm, and congenial. Indeed, the Liberals had talked about during their election campaign renegotiating NAFTA, which had been completed. At different times in the past, they had been pointedly critical or very slow to get on board in support of the U.S. effort to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in '91 for the Gulf War, and rather skeptical about the need to do so. Finally, they smartened up, but it was not something where they gave an instant response of support. "This could not stand. This had to be changed."

Q: In a way, that one seems clear.

JONES: Yes.

Q: At least to a professional Foreign Service person. But was it visceral on the Canadians that they just didn't want to get on board?

JONES: I honestly don't know, but I think to a degree it reflects the foreign affairs ignorance of the Prime Minister. The foreign affairs ignorance has persisted. It has been consistent. He has little or no interest in foreign affairs and less competence in it.

Q: This is Chretien?

JONES: Yes. As Prime Minister and as leader of the opposition, Chretien, had and has very little sense for foreign affairs. I say that he has perfect pitch for domestic politics and a tin ear in foreign affairs.

Q: How did we prepare ourselves for the election and what happened?

JONES: We did not expect that there were going to be major problems, although these flags were at least available for viewing. We thought it was going to be a situation, as is so often the case, of "where you sit is where you stand." It is much easier to oppose for the sake of opposition than it is, when you are in power, to change everything that has been done. We hoped and anticipated on the basis of the track record of U.S.-Canadian bilateral relations that we would have a reasonably good relationship. In preparation for the election, which was in October, once the writ was dropped, which is their phrase for calling the election on a specific date, the Political Section did a comprehensive series of telegrams outlining how Canadian politics work, what the baseline descriptions of each of the parties were, where they stood, how they viewed life and politics. I set up a reporting schema by the consulates so that on a weekly basis they put in a short sketch as to how things were evolving in their area of responsibility. Then we followed the election campaign quite closely. I had the interesting experience of joining the Liberal election entourage with a media seat for about four days. I rode around on the plane with them and the bus... These were transits around Ontario and Quebec. It was toward the very end of the campaign. This was something that I understand that people in the embassy had done previously. The media buys a seat on the plane for a period of time and I - or the embassy - bought a seat for me to go around and travel with them. Previously, I had done some visits with Members of Parliament who were campaigning again and gone to some rallies to see how they were working and evolving. I saw Chretien work while he was on campaign as opposition leader. I met and talked with people that I had known before from the run-up to this campaign and new people as well. So, this was an interesting experience. What I found was that Chretien has an almost reflexive set of comments that are, if not absolutely hostile, at least strongly skeptical about the United States - things that he didn't need to say. He would make comments like, "We're not going to be the 51st

state of America!” Who had invited him to be? “I’m not going to be Bill Clinton’s fishing buddy,” the reference being that Brian Mulroney had spent a fair amount of time with George Herbert Walker Bush as a visitor and colleague and things of that nature. Okay, that’s fine, but were these relevant comments to make on campaign? And he didn’t make them just once. He made them at every other campaign stop that he hit. Was this necessary?

Q: Did you find this hostility reflected by his members of the campaign staff that you came up against?

JONES: No, I won’t say that this was an overwhelming aspect of the Liberal Party by any matter or means. They, too, are friendly, congenial, personable, and very approachable. I had enormous amounts of access. Virtually anybody would talk to you. Virtually anybody at almost any level in government would talk to you. Indeed, it was a skepticism that was evident in Mr. Chretien and it was also a skepticism certainly about American foreign policy and foreign affairs by Lloyd Axworthy, who eventually became Foreign Minister. Mr. Axworthy is one of these people who, because he had a Ph.D. from Princeton, is convinced that he knows how the United States should run its foreign policy better than we do and doesn’t hesitate to tell us very loudly exactly how we should be doing it, why we should be doing it the way that he thinks we should, and does so in a way that is totally counterproductive for his own interests.

Q: At the time, when Chretien and company would talk about not wanting to be the 51st state, basically using the United States as the straw man on which to win some votes, did we treat this with a certain amount of a shrug because it didn’t make much difference?

JONES: We weren’t belaboring this and we certainly said nothing in public. This isn’t our business in that way. I think Canadians are always under the impression that Americans pay no attention to them at all and, consequently, they can say anything about us that they care to. On the other hand, when someone’s pissing down your back, you’re sort of silly to call it “rain.” From time to time while I was on the trip, I made it clear to Chretien’s minders that I didn’t think that that was a terribly productive line of approach. But I wasn’t saying anything in public and I wasn’t saying anything to the other media on the bus or on the plane or anything of that nature. I just sat and listened and took note. But again, it was an exercise of an illustration of the inner man and not even necessarily what we were predicting. We certainly were not predicting that there was going to be essential hostility in our foreign policy or economic relations.

Q: We didn’t think this was going to go back to Diefenbaker times.

JONES: Or even to the earliest and most pointed Trudeau period, where there was very pointed hostility all the time. Of course, you could also say that so many things had changed that there were almost by definition going to be fewer points of controversy. A lot of the controversy between the United States and Canada during the Cold War era was in their view that we were not being sufficiently supple in our relationship with the Soviet

Union. After all, how could they possibly be an “evil empire” or be told that they should collapse and take down the Berlin Wall? That was just ridiculous. Of course, by 1993, there was no Soviet Union. Apartheid in South Africa had ended. There were no Contra battles going on in Latin America. There was a great deal of democracy where there had been a great deal of dictatorship in South and Central America. So, as a result, many of the points of neuralgic conflict in foreign affairs between the United States and Canada had pretty much evaporated. Now, the fact that the U.S. policy in almost all these issues had turned out to be correct is a point that the Canadians would never accept or admit. But nevertheless, the issues weren’t there.

Q: It left them with Cuba.

JONES: Yes.

Q: Of all the issues, that’s a throwaway.

JONES: Well, it’s an issue on which we have – I won’t say agreed to disagree, but since we have, in effect, disagreed on it for 40 years, it remains a baseline for a Canadian foreign policy expert to differentiate themselves from their views on foreign policy with the United States. So, while we thought then, think now, and will think in the future that the Canadians are on the wrong side of history so far as Cuba is concerned and, as I politely told my Canadian colleagues, that they had better advise their investors there to make all their money they can now because when the government changes, they certainly will not be the preferred investors in a new Cuban government. But okay, you make your choices. If the Canadian government continued to align itself with Castro’s Cuba, that’s their choice.

Q: Let’s go on with what you were up to.

JONES: We simply watched the election evolve and did our analyses as we went along. Of course, beforehand, I wrote the proverbial kind of predictive telegram of a smashing Liberal victory, and that’s exactly what it was. It created circumstances in Canada that exist today. It virtually annihilated the Tory Party, which went from a majority of something like 160 seats – they had an outright majority and they were reduced to two seats. The Prime Minister and virtually every member of the Cabinet was defeated. It left a Liberal government with a majority and it shattered the opposition into these three pieces: the tiny remnant of the Tories; a Reform Party, which grew from one seat to more than 50 seats and dominated the entire west; and the Bloc Québécois (BQ), which is a separatist party and seeks the independence of Quebec. That totally destroyed the Tories in Quebec. The BQ didn’t gain a seat anywhere else but got enough seats to become the official opposition, which left a number of people scratching their heads because the opposition is supposed to be the loyal opposition and this was a palatably, identifiably, and certifiably disloyal opposition. This group was led by probably the most interesting and charismatic Canadian politician of the 1990s: Lucien Bouchard. He is one of these stormy petrels of politics who has ranged Churchill-like across parties being different

things at different times and then being the same thing again. He had been a senior member of the Tory government, a close friend of Brian Mulroney's, broke with Mulroney over one of the constitutional accord solutions, one called Meech Lake, and set up his own party that was carved out of a hunk of the Tory party and a couple of Liberals called the Bloc Québécois. He did that prior to the election. They had something like 11 members. But in the 1993 election, they virtually swept Quebec with about 54 seats. That put them in a very curious position of being the official opposition and, in theory, advancing the interests and attitudes of all Canadians in opposition, but by and large clearly devoted to the independence of Quebec. They were regarded as and regarded themselves as the vanguard in Ottawa to prepare for separation from Canada. What you had still was a province in Quebec that was headed by the Liberals on the provincial level. It was not until 1994 that they had a provincial election that ousted the Liberals and put in the Parti Québécois. But back to the federal level, the other major winner from this election was the Reform Party. This was headed by another extremely interesting, charismatic, and highly intelligent Canadian politician, perhaps the second most interesting and intelligent politician in Canada in the 1990s, Preston Manning. Manning's view was that the West had been systematically disadvantaged and cut out of real power and authority in Canada at the federal level because of the manner in which the parliamentary system works. The parliamentary system rewards the parties where the greatest population is. If you don't have the population, you don't have the seats. If you don't have the seats, you don't have the influence. There is no substantive political equivalent to the U.S. Senate, where small groups of populations and small areas can have a blocking power and influence at the federal level. The Canadian West is less populated than Ontario and Quebec and has significantly less influence. The Tories had promised the West that they would bring them more into the center of power and authority. At the end, the Westerners, particularly as headed by the Reform Party, came to the conclusion, correctly, that the Tories had continued to pour their fiscal preferences into Ontario and Quebec. The Reform Party was sufficiently convincing that it changed the circumstance from one in which virtually all of the representatives in Alberta were Tories to a situation in which there were no Tories in Alberta and every Tory in Alberta was defeated. So also was the case in British Columbia and less so in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, but there were representatives in these provinces. Where the Reform Party failed completely and totally was east of the Ontario-Manitoba border. They had one seat in Ontario at that point and no seats in Quebec or in the Maritime Provinces. So, you had a situation in which the Conservative Party in Canada was now in three segments – the old Tories, the Reform Party, and the Bloc Québécois. There is a socialist party, the New Democratic Party, the NDP, in Canada and they, too, in 1993 lost very substantial numbers. They had about 40 seats going into the election and were reduced to about 19. So, that, too, suggested the marginalization of the left and a real socialist view in Canada, partly because people hypothesized as a result of the end of the Cold War the Soviets had failed politically and a recognition that socialism wasn't working and had failed economically. These divisions that were manifested in 1993 have persisted through the present and the present election, although the Bloc Québécois has declined somewhat and Reform changed its name, restructured itself, and gained a few seats. The Tories in two elections went up and then back down. It's a little hard to go anywhere except up when

you have two seats. In the '97 election, they went up to 19 seats. But then in the 2000 election, they declined to 12 seats, the minimum for official party status in Canada.

Q: What did we see was in it or not in it for the U.S., this division of the west becoming quite discontented and not really attached to the government and then the Maritimes? Did we see any problems here for us?

JONES: Not at the initial structure. It was simply a phenomenon that the Conservatives had totally and absolutely collapsed. They had been as thoroughly repudiated as any party in democracy virtually ever has been. The concern and the obvious foreshadowing was that this was headed to a constitutional crisis in Canada, that a referendum was clearly coming on Quebec independence, as it was also very easy to predict that the Quebec Liberals were going to be defeated whenever they went to provincial election. That meant that there was going to be a referendum on Quebec sovereignty. That was what we were most focused on and most interested in. In a longer view, the continued division of a conservative party has meant that the Liberals have totally dominated Canadian politics, and I have said that it's Liberals as far as the eye can see so far as the predictability of Canadian politics well into the next decade. There simply is nothing and no likelihood of a coherent conservative rejoining that would make it possible to oppose the Liberals, who stride the center of the spectrum. They are what is called in Canada the "natural governing party" and they are an extremely effective political force. They will move slightly to the left or slight to the right as economic, social, etc. circumstances require and they win elections. They are extraordinarily effective politicians and they run by what used to be the maxim of the Old Democratic Party in the U.S., spend and spend, elect and elect.

Q: After the new government comes in, from the point of view of our embassy, was there any adjustment? What was our goal?

JONES: Our first and primary focus was concern over NAFTA. It was an issue that the Liberals had made one of their key points in their campaign: they were going to renegotiate NAFTA. That left every person who had ever had any association with this agreement with their hand on their forehead wondering what this was going to mean. Nobody knew exactly what it was going to mean. There was some upset in Washington about what this meant, how it was going to act out, how people were going to act as a result of it, and what the Canadians were going to do. As it turned out, the Canadians and the Liberals made some minor suggestions, and had some very minor adjustments, as far as I can recall, in NAFTA. Ambassador Blanchard played at least a reasonably helpful role in telling Washington fairly directly and telling people within the White House and in the presidential entourage to stay calm, don't get excited, let's wait this one out a bit. Blanchard met with Chretien even before Chretien officially assumed power as prime minister. Their transition is very quick. Their transition between a defeated government and a victorious government is a couple of days, not any extended period. We got the impression, at that point, that things could be worked out, as they were. This was what we had hoped for and expected, but it was nothing about which we were assured. That

generated a degree of tension within the embassy where you expect something is going to work out but you don't know because you have no control over what the other side eventually does. Of course, they are on record as saying that they're going to do something that would make that which we wished to accomplish much more difficult. They didn't do it. That was helpful.

Q: As things kept rolling along, did you find that this new government was relatively easy to work with?

JONES: We started just back into our long laundry list of specific issues and problems on foreign affairs. The foreign minister who was selected was Andre Ouellette. He was not a career foreign policy expert either. He was essentially Chretien's Quebec manager. He had been a longtime Liberal. His position was pretty much to listen to his foreign ministry staff. So, we were not faced with a lot of specific crises. Most of the crises we were not faced with were those crises that had evaporated from the Cold War, from the end of apartheid in Africa, from significant increases in democracy in Africa and in Latin America, and the end of many of the guerrilla exercises that had been running either in Nicaragua or elsewhere. Since we didn't have these problems in which we would be doing one thing and the Canadians would be feeling that we should be doing another, and we didn't have foreign policy direct conflicts. The issues that were largely in play were former Yugoslavia exercises. Here you really have to have somebody who was an expert in Central Europe, Yugoslavia, and the former Yugoslavia, to sort your way through who was doing what, to whom, when. The Canadians had had UN subordinated forces in Bosnia and elsewhere for a good stretch of time. They continued to do so. By and large, they supported the efforts that we were attempting to do to stabilize one part of former Yugoslavia or another. So, we were engaged in constant coordination on demarches and on policies for the area. The Canadians with whom I dealt were largely skeptical about greater involvement in the former Yugoslavia and wanted to let the Europeans work it out to the degree that was possible.

Q: This brings up a point. How did the Canadians feel themselves? Did they feel themselves to be North Americans or Europeans? Bosnia brought a division there.

JONES: The Canadians view themselves now as North Americans. I think they have increasingly done so as the relationship with Europe distances itself, as the relationship with the United Kingdom is reduced, and as the UK itself grows closer to Europe. The Canadians in the late 1980s entered the Organization of American States, which they had declined to do previously, as full members. They had previously been observers. They had not really wanted to be associated with all those tin pot dictators who were under American influence. They committed themselves within NAFTA and by joining the OAS even more so to a continental North American view than a European view. By definition, the Canadians had paid less and less attention to military concerns. With the end of the Cold War, they grabbed onto the peace dividend immediately, drove their spending in defense terms both in real and in absolute terms to much lower percentages of their budget, pretty much withdrew all of their forces from Europe, and focused, to the extent

that they continued to have any real military interest, on peacekeeping exercises either UN related or not.

Q: How did things flow after that?

JONES: The relationship was a reasonably straightforward, solid working relationship on the many individual demarches and issues in foreign affairs. This was simply a constant flow. We presented in the course of the year hundreds of demarches on issues of every dimension to the Canadian government, sometimes seeking their support, sometimes simply informing them of our views and positions, as is naturally standard consultation in foreign affairs terms. One issue that did arise was that on cruise missile testing. We had had a longstanding agreement with the Canadians to fly, test cruise missiles over certain areas of their northern provinces. This was designed so that we could perfect our terrain contour matching radar.

Essentially the cruise missile agreement had expired. We thought it was still a useful agreement to have. I'm not sure whether I mentioned that the reason that we wanted to do it was because the terrain in Canada was a close approximate of the terrain over which such cruise missiles would have to fly for strikes against the old Soviet Union. The agreement had proceeded throughout the time of the Cold War without difficulty, but there were, of course, always individuals who were critical of any such agreement with the United States including environmentalists who claimed that it was scaring the elk, I think. The politicians in Alberta who were representing those areas were Reform Party politicians, so as a result they had no weight in the decision-making. Although we had been told that the Canadians were going to renew the agreement, three days before the Secretary of Defense, Perry, was due to visit, there was a conference of the Liberals in Ottawa. At that conference, the young Liberals voted that they should discontinue this agreement with the United States. The government decided that since the young Liberals had so said, that was going to be government policy. Now, that to me was the limpest kind of excuse that I had ever heard from a government. It also was an embarrassment certainly to the career professionals within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to a degree their Department of Defense because we had not been informed that this was going to be their policy prior to its public announcement just a couple of days before the Secretary of Defense arrived.

The Secretary of Defense was very gracious and just sort of let it pass along. But it was illustrative of the manner in which the Canadian government can make essentially ideological decisions.

Q: Did you sense any pulling back on our side, saying, well, let's do what we have to, but let's not initiate anything new?

JONES: I wouldn't say that. You had a liberal but democratic administration in power in Washington and you had Liberals in Canada. They were more philosophically in tune than not. The issues that we were presenting and trying to get support on were by and

large straightforward issues that had less contention associated with them. Over the next couple of years, one of the issues that was one in which we most steadily worked and tried to find a solution was that of the military dictatorship in Haiti. The Canadians had a certain domestic interest in Haiti. There were a fair number of Haitians who happened to be in the “riding” (parliamentary district) of the foreign minister. These Haitians were strong supporters of the Liberal Party. So, the Canadians had an interest in a positive resolution for Haiti. We were groping, as we did for an extended period of time, with all of the issues associated with the military rule and the ouster of Aristide from Haiti. So, we had a steady stream of cooperative efforts and consultations and policy discussions with the Canadians on how to manage the regime change in Haiti. The Canadians participated at a modest level in the force that eventually did oust the military dictatorship. They had and may continue to have a presence in Haiti in the way of RCMP [Royal Canadian Mounted Police] trainers for the Haitian police. These people, being French-speaking, had an entrée that many Americans would not. They also attempted to train Haitian police in Canada. They tried to encourage Haitians who were residents and even citizens of Canada to contribute positively to the success of a new regime in Haiti. So, we were really pretty congenial in this regard. In a couple of other areas, although these were more economic than political, we were working on improving the relationship. One in which Ambassador Blanchard had a particular interest was a modernized Civil Aviation Agreement. He found, much to his displeasure, that it took an inordinate amount of time to get from Ottawa to Washington, that he had to fly through this or that place or fly on a very small plane. There simply was no convenient connection between Ottawa and Washington. There had been repeated failures in attempts to modernize the Civil Aviation Agreement, essentially because of Canadian aviation protectionism. It was one of Blanchard’s efforts from the time he arrived. After quite a long extent of time, an aviation agreement was solved at the same time that President Clinton visited, which was in February ‘95. You can see that it was at least a year and a half effort on the part of Blanchard to get this particular problem solved.

Blanchard also worked on another one of the neuralgic economic problems, the issue of Pacific Coast salmon. Here all I can do is shorthand it to say that it’s a problem of too many fishermen chasing too few fish. It has been a problem akin to that of softwood lumber that is on the endless, repeating “laundry list” of issues that come up. Out of our entire economic relationship of the magnitude that I’ve earlier described, maybe five percent comes under problems of one sort or another. These problems constantly change, but some of them repeat. Among those are things like fishing, softwood lumber, and magazine publication. They are essentially economic. They don’t become really political until they become very pointed or reach crisis level. But these were also problems in which the ambassador worked and on which I was somewhat aware but I was not directly engaged.

Q: Did they call it External Affairs?

JONES: It used to be called External Affairs. While I was there, they changed it to Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade [DFAIT].

Q: Did that name imply anything?

JONES: It was meant to imply that there was a greater economic component in DFAIT than in the past, but part of the decision to change was that “External Affairs” was close to being a “Britishism” that seemed to be a part of the past and which they wanted to modernize and update.

Q: How did you find dealing with the professionals in those places? Were you dealing mainly with career Canadian diplomats when you were over there? Were these sort of the experts? Or did political appointees go down fairly far?

JONES: Political appointees really don’t exist on the scale that they exist at in the U.S., at least at the ministerial level. The political appointees will be involved in the Prime Minister’s Office and the Privy Council Office. If you had to give a very rough analogy, you would say that this was equivalent to the White House staff and the NSC. These are people that can have the position of: where does the 800 pound guerrilla sit? The 800 pound guerrilla sits wherever he wants to. So, a man who is a close personal, longtime associate of Prime Minister Chretien by the name of Eddie Goldenberg puts his hand in any issue that he considered to be of importance. He was engaged in many bilateral U.S. issues. Goldenberg essentially is a very adroit “fixer” who wants to solve problems and move forward on these. He is not an ideologue. So, you had someone such as Goldenberg involve himself at times in specific issues. But the people with whom I dealt were virtually invariably career professionals. They were very high quality. As I suggested to you earlier, Canada’s primary requirement is the management of its relationship with the United States. The emphasis is on management to Canada’s benefit. When they work it most effectively, they can leverage their position and our disinterest in certain areas to their advantage. Their people are invariably intelligent, well trained, hard working, and effective. They were also almost invariably quite straightforward. They gave you clear opinions of their position, and clear views of where our positions were, right or wrong. When they made demarches of their own, they were well staffed, intelligently presented, good pieces of work.

Q: Were they working to repair a certain amount of the tenor of Chretien as far as foreign affairs go?

JONES: Remember also during the initial portion of the time when I was political counselor there, the foreign minister was Andre Ouellette. He was not out making waves. Lloyd Axworthy was consigned to an enormous and complicated bureau that overviewed health and human services and a wide variety of things of that nature, a whole variety of things in which he was not terribly well suited to do, but that was the assignment that he got. It’s a very difficult, very complicated, enormous assignment. He managed it in that way.

Q: When did you leave Canada?

JONES: The summer of '96.

Q: I think we've laid the groundwork. Were there any major developments?

JONES: What I have mentioned is what we could see coming was the development of a referendum for Quebec sovereignty. This was a situation in which the groundwork had been laid. The foreshadowing with the enormous majority and support that had been given to the Bloc Québécois in 1993. Then we headed into an election in Quebec in 1994 in which it was very clear that the PQ, the Parti Québécois, were going to win. We anticipated this victory. Once again, we had gone out and spoken to many of the people in the Parti Québécois and tried to get a sense for where they were coming from, what they were going to do, and how they were going to go about it. Here also you have a situation in which Canadian political leadership is almost across the board intelligent, hardworking, sophisticated intellectually and politically, and recognized what could be done by politicians in a North American 21st century constituency. So, we had a situation in which the PQ was also a known quality. It was not as if this was the first time they were seeking election in Quebec. They had been elected earlier and defeated earlier. While they expected to win the election in 1994, this was not an election being run by a bunch of wild haired, wild eyed fanatics who were headed toward cobblestone erected barricades. These were a group of sophisticated people who were a combination of parties and views both directed to obtaining Quebec sovereignty. I met with the man who at that time was the deputy head, the number two man, in the Parti Québécois, Bernard Landry. He is now the "prime minister" of Quebec. The woman who is now the head of their foreign affairs operation, Louise Beaudoin, and a variety of other PQs who have obtained substantial levels of influence in their party. Another man of particular interest is Jean-Francois Lisée, who wrote a book called In the Eye of the Eagle, which was an extended and sophisticated compilation of American views on Canada and Quebec which he constructed largely from FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] documents that probably should not have been released. Subsequently, we have been far, far more careful about what was released related to Canada. But what actually these documents and that book illustrated was that Quebec separatists are quite eager to tell Americans what they are going to do and why they are going to do it, because they don't want us scared. They want us informed rather than surprised. That was the case for me and it was the case for other American diplomats prior to me and subsequent to me in dealing with these people, and this party.

Q: The election came in '94.

JONES: Yes. Roughly October of '94.

Q: How did it come out?

JONES: It came out with a very substantial victory for the Parti Québécois. It was not, however, as large a victory as they had anticipated and which the polls had suggested they

would win. Because of the manner in which votes are distributed and ridings are gerrymandered, it gave them a substantially larger majority in Parliament, their National Assembly, than they would have if it had been a straight differentiation of the vote, although they did get actually a technical majority of the votes cast and certainly a majority of the French-speaking Québécois who had voted. So, they were very firmly in control of the government. As they had had previous people with experience in government, they were not starting from a ground zero of ignorance. Their leader, Jacques Parizeau, was a sophisticated London trained economist with very substantial skills both in politics and in economics and a fine English speaker. Their deputy, Bernard Landry, was also an economist and a lawyer who speaks three languages - Spanish as well as reasonably good English. The head of their combination of culture and foreign affairs, Louise Beaudoin, is a French-trained but English-speaking, very effective spokesman for sovereignty in that manner. So, you had a group of people about whom you could say, "Well, we know they are headed toward a referendum." Their effort and their requirement was, how do we hold a referendum that we're going to win. How do we marshal enough support, how do we organize ourselves so that we're able to win this referendum? It's the most important thing we're going to be doing. It's the objective that we've set out for. It was what Quebecers anticipated when they elected us. How do we go about it and do it?" They thrashed about trying to figure the best approaches and solutions, what question to pose, how to pose it in a way that would be one that was not "Do you support independence of Quebec with no relationship to Canada subsequently," the kind of question that the federal government in Ottawa would have posed. They wanted one that was vaguer, one that suggested a future relationship, one that suggested that it would happen only after an offer was made to the federal government for a renewed relationship or a radically changed relationship, one that was ambiguous in a way that would be interpretable in a positive light for them. In the end, it didn't really matter what the question said. It meant that if you voted yes, you were going to have an independence Quebec. If you voted no, you were going to have the existing relationship. All of the intellectual fibrillation associated with how this went about perhaps was important, but I think essentially it was unimportant. So, too, the PQs efforts to go forth and have a series of complex studies. The studies were done, and then they were suppressed because they didn't like all of the answers that had come out of all of the studies. It was a situation in which they had to mobilize support. You had a circumstance in which you could anticipate that better than 90% of the non-French speakers, those who were English-speakers, Anglophones – those who had originally spoken a language other than French or English were called Allophones – would vote against sovereignty while what percentage of the French-speakers, who were still better than 70-80% of the population, was an unknown. What percentage of these Francophones would vote for sovereignty? Sovereignty has its attractions and its liabilities. While Americans can't see what possible attraction independence would have for Quebec and why anyone would want to break up a country as successful, positive, and good to live in as Canada, a certain basic percentage of Quebecers feel very much to the contrary. That percentage has always run at 30-40%. The job of sovereigntists was to boost it an additional 10%, from 40% to over 50%. Throughout 1994 and 1995, that was what they worked to do. We could see this coming. The only question was when they would announce the referendum for and at what time?

They selected in the end October 30th 1995.

I want to digress a little bit and talk about two points. One was the devastating illness that Lucien Bouchard, the leader of the Bloc Québécois, suffered in December 1994. He was struck by necrotizing fasciitis, which in layman's terms comes out to "galloping gangrene," an infection which has a very high percentage fatality. As a result of this, Bouchard went almost instantly to death's door. He suffered the amputation of his leg. He made statements as he was going into the operating room that were translatable as "Continue the effort. Continue the work." Here you had the man who was already considered to be the most dynamic pro-sovereignty politician coming out in a situation after his amputation as almost a heroic character. Some people referred to him as "St. Lucien" and said that it had been a miracle that he had survived.

Let me just set that as one of the factors in the coming Quebec referendum and talk for a moment about how American politics changed a bit with the November 1994 elections. That left us in a situation where the Republicans for the first time in most people's living memory were in control of both sides of Congress. It left a very much weakened President Clinton. But at the same time, there had been preparations for a presidential visit to Ottawa. It would have been the first visit on a presidential level in quite some time. George Herbert Walker Bush had never visited for whatever series of reasons – and I think they were Gulf War related. Through the first couple of years of his term, President Clinton had not made a visit. But an official visit was scheduled for late February 1995. This generated all of the horror associated with any presidential visit. Anyone who has ever been a Foreign Service Officer knows that the visit of a President, a visit that is not almost a spur of the moment visit or a visit that is not directed into a specific short, multilateral meeting, is just an endless disaster for the embassy associated with it. It's great glory and magnificent prominence and just a tremendously unending workload for the staff and the group that comes. At the same time, learning to love the White House staff, let alone the Secret Service, is not the easiest thing for either the embassy or the host country. Anyone who has ever borne up under the visit of the Secret Service knows that these are testosterone-charged confrontations between local security services and the Secret Service, most of whom would like to come armed like Rambo and have the local security services in the position of being Tonto to our Lone Rangers. Well, that doesn't go down very well in most areas, and it didn't go down very well in Canada either. As a result, in at least one instance, the traditional laying of the wreath by the Head of the State at the national war memorial, which was within about a block of parliament, was canceled because the Canadians refused to permit us to put snipers on all the building surrounding the monument. Ambassador Blanchard recounts one instance in which a driver and two huge security guards, one from the RCMP and the other from the Secret Service, were jammed into the front of the presidential limousine because while the Secret Service, of course, demanded that their person be present, the RCMP also claimed that it was responsible for the protection of a visiting dignitary in their country. There was always the question of just how much weaponry would be brought by how many people. In a Canada that is very significantly unarmed, the amount of weaponry that the Secret Service was going to bring was - let alone the total numbers of the Secret Service that

actually arrived - such that verged between impressive, awe inspiring, and ridiculous. But that depended, of course, upon the observer. Nevertheless, this was an exercise in which the President came, spoke to Parliament, had a variety of meetings, brought his full American entourage with him. They had a variety of meetings. Certain agreements were signed, particularly the Civil Aviation Agreement. Things worked out reasonably well. There were a couple of clever elements to the parliamentary speech, one of which was that the Prime Minister said that regardless of the President's current political circumstances, he should know that no president who had spoken before Parliament had ever failed to be reelected. President Clinton responded in an aside to show just how intellectually quick he was, he said never had he so believed in the "iron laws of history" than hearing what Prime Minister Chretien had just said. He also took account of the fact that he had just delivered himself of one of the longest and most turgid State of the Union addresses by saying that he promised that he would not speak as long as he had spoken before Congress in the State of the Union. Obviously, this worked out very well. The Prime Minister and the President had a good relationship. They had a boys' afternoon out with wives in a pleasant spot on the Rideau Canal, the canal being frozen at the time. Mrs. Clinton went ice skating on the canal, having had some ice skating experience as a girl. They had a visit in which, according to Ambassador Blanchard, they went away considerably more upbeat in spirit than they had been certainly in the early days after the November election.

The other element of the visit of some interest to me was that I was responsible for Secretary Christopher and the monitoring of his work and his meetings. Unfortunately, after his first meeting, the Secretary became ill and was hospitalized briefly in Ottawa and Deputy Secretary Talbott took over for the meetings and circumstances that followed that.

This was a very successful visit. Perhaps all presidential visits are condemned to success. This had the same result.

In any event, following this, we began to focus even more pointedly on the run-up the referendum in Quebec. I was meeting regularly with the federal group that was monitoring how the federal government was going to handle and coordinate the "No" campaign, the "Yes" campaign being run by the Quebec sovereigntists and the Parti Québécois. So, you had two umbrella groups in Quebec, the Yes and the No campaigns. They had a variety of financial restrictions and controls associated with who could contribute money and how it came. As a result, one of the endless arguments was the degree to which federal intrusion into what was the responsibility of Quebecers to determine was one of the sub-themes in the referendum. By early September 1995, the Quebec government announced the official question, which was a vague, elliptical question that had a variety of circumstances to it, including reference to a large document that had been developed beforehand as to what kind of circumstances had to be created for a new relationship between Quebec and Canada. The point really was that if you voted "yes," you were going to have an independent Quebec in one form or another. If you voted "no," you would have a continuation of the existing circumstances.

What happened was that the early days of the referendum went quite badly for the Yes forces. They did not get the bounce from a debate in their National Assembly that they had hoped for. The ripostes by the provincial liberals had been sharper and clearer. The pro-sovereignty team was less effective in its own presentations. The fact that a group of studies associated and commissioned for sovereignty had been suppressed was a negative for the sovereigntists. Generally, this campaign was not going well.

What happened in early-mid October was that Lucien Bouchard, who had opposed having the referendum at exactly the time for what it was scheduled and had been a secondary character in the campaign until then, was, in effect, brought to the fore and virtually given control of the remaining portion of the campaign. Bouchard had a “career year” type of campaign. This was a man who had come back from death’s door, who was viewed as a monumental figure, and that his efforts were all but miraculous in survival. He is a man who was not a natural politician. He had even been a rather poor politician in his early stages. But he developed communication and speaking skills that were as good as any Quebecker has seen in a generation. People just flocked out to see him. People rushed just to touch him. People went wild over him. He was able to say things that would have left a normal politician lying in the gutter like a dead dog. He said, in effect, “Well, Quebec’s white women should be having more babies.” Instead of saying, “My gosh, you racist sovereigntists pig,” it wasn’t quite the equivalent of, “Well, I’m bearing your baby.” But there was just no negative resonance; this was the kind of statement that an average politician could never have made and survived. Bouchard, as a result, virtually single-handedly drove the Yes vote up. He drove it up to the point where immediately prior to the referendum it was too close to tell. Quebec polling is very sophisticated. It’s as good as polling anywhere in the world. They were polls not done by a couple of hundred people, but they were polls done oftentimes by well more than 1,000 out of a population of seven million. We were getting polling that should have been accurate to within one or two percent. But you had a problem in the polling. Although the Yes vote was leading and often leading by a significant percentage, four to six points, you had a significant number - 15% or more - that would say they were undecided. Historically, the “undecided” wasn’t really undecided, but they weren’t willing to say to a pollster what their viewpoint was. Their viewpoint was that they were federalists, that they would be No supporters. Historically, they had broken at 2/3 in favor of the federalists and 1/3 in favor of the sovereigntists. So it became an extremely difficult judgment call as to how it was going to work out. I made several trips to the Montreal area at the time, spoke several times to Yes and No group leaders, including in particular Bernard Landry. Each side expressed confidence without being willing to say that, “Yes, we are sure that we are going to win.” So, the weekend before the referendum, the embassy caucused on what the result was going to be. I said that the No vote was going to win, that the federalists were going to win, that it was going to be very close but the federalists were going to win. I said that we should be able to send a telegram to the Department making that prediction. The ambassador declined, suggesting a “too close to call and Canada will still be here on the morning of the 31st”-type of telegram, which is the telegram that we sent. The weekend before and the week before had seen a great deal of action on everybody’s part, in particular during this period of run-up to the referendum, the question of the position of

the United States to this event was a key element or certainly was viewed that way. We had had for a relatively extended period a set piece statement that we ended by calling the “mantra.” It was that “We have had an excellent relationship with a strong and united Canada. However, the choice of Canada is for Canadians to decide.” This is paraphrasing at best. During the course of the referendum, in consultation between Canadians and Americans at a very senior level, there was the feeling that we should weigh in a little more strongly. This was certainly the position of Ambassador Blanchard. We orchestrated a statement by Secretary Christopher when Ouellette, the foreign minister, visited on October 18th. The Secretary came up with a statement that I still have at hand. He said, “The United States places great value on its excellent ties with a strong and united Canada. These ties have been carefully cultivated and a different entity could not take this type of relationship for granted.” That unfortunately was a statement that was not sufficiently clear or was reported in a muddled and mangled way in the press so that it really wasn’t clear what the Secretary had said.

It wasn’t really clear what the Secretary had said. In any event, it was decided that something more prominent, more pointed, would have to be said. Here, too, we, and particularly Ambassador Blanchard, orchestrated at a press conference on October 25th or 26th a statement in response to a planted question at a presidential press conference where the President said something that was viewed as a stronger endorsement of a strong and united Canada and not being able to see how a country as successful as Canada would have a need to be changed. Unfortunately, that particular statement by the President came out at exactly the same time that Bouchard and Chretien addressed national audiences on the referendum. So, while the President’s statement was reported and had some media prominence, by no means did it have the weight or attention that it might have had if it had been delivered at a point when something less dramatic than dueling spokesmen for the life of Canada was on national television. As a result, although subsequent polls said that voters had taken into account the view of the U.S. on this, there really isn’t any indication as to how they felt about this, whether they divined that the U.S. didn’t want this to happen and therefore they voted that way or they divined that the U.S. didn’t want this to happen, which would have been clear to anybody with a fourth grade education, and therefore voted in favor of it. We had a polling result that said that perhaps as many as 20-25% of Quebecers took this into account when we voted, but we have no idea how it affected them. It’s just one of those interesting things that we were heard but whether we were agreed with or simply heard remains unknown. Also this final week stimulated a major federalist rally in the heart of Montreal which was led by a number of Canadian politicians, in particular the Minister for Fisheries, Brian Tobin, a very dynamic and energetic politician from Newfoundland, and others who gathered a “Canada loves Quebec” rally in the center of Montreal. This effort was designed to demonstrate to Quebecers the depth of federalist feeling and Canadian support for Canada from sea to sea to sea and that Quebec was in their view and in Canada’s view an integral part of Canada and they should vote No. There are people that feel that that the rally was a vast success. There are others that look at polls and say that it was a negative, at least according to some polls. But it happened and it was part of a demonstrable campaign to rally support in favor of federalist Canada and for Quebec to remain in Canada. I didn’t

attend that rally but one of my political officers did. We sent him down along with it. He said that it was a dramatic and effective rally. I attended a rally that was held in Hull, Quebec, just across the river from Ottawa, on Sunday the 29th immediately before the vote. That, too, even though it was conducted in a steady rain, was a major rally of thousands of Canadians who were attempting to demonstrate support for a united Canada and a Quebec that remained within that framework.

On October 29th in mid-morning, I got a telephone call from Bernard Landry, who said that he just wanted to inform me that their polls now conclusively demonstrated that the separatists were going to win and that he wanted me to be aware of that fact ahead of time for whatever I wanted to do with it. During the course of the day, I informed the ambassador, the DCM, and the desk that this was the information that Landry had conveyed. The ambassador said – and he apparently conveyed this also to the desk and to others in Washington – that on the federalist level, they were now convinced that they were going to win.

The result was about as close as it conceivably could have been. We sat and watched a very interesting mechanism for determining this vote. It was a fever thermometer that ran back and forth across the bottom of the television set as to where the vote was. It started significantly above the 50% line. Slowly during the course of the evening, it declined until the sovereingtists ended with 49.4% of the vote and the federalists got 50.6% of the vote out of something like a 93% turnout for eligible voters. So, you can see that it had been a very substantially mobilized society on an issue that as closely divided Quebecers as almost could have been possible. As a result of that vote, the Premier of Quebec, Jacques Parizeau, and his deputy, said some nasty and bitter things. Parizeau was quoted as saying on the night of the election that they had been defeated by “money and the ethnic vote.” While that was accurate, it was certainly nothing that was acceptable to be said either by sovereingtists or by federalists. Of course, you could have said that they were equally defeated by the number of French-speakers who didn’t vote for them. But it was clear that probably something like 95% of the Anglophones and Allophones had voted against them. Whether money had anything to do with it, certainly there was heavy campaigning by the federal government to retain a unified Canada. It would have been totally derelict in their duties if they had not done so. As a consequence within something like a day, Parizeau resigned and then the question became who would assume the leadership of the Parti Québécois and the PQ’s government. Although it appeared and was obvious that Lucien Bouchard was really the only choice, it took a stretch of time for reflection and consultation and other discussion before Bouchard actually moved from Ottawa to Quebec City and became Prime Minister of Quebec. Actually, the ambassador and I saw Bouchard the day that he left Ottawa finally on something like December 13th, 1995, and had one of these generally not terribly memorable conversations other than Bouchard saying that he had just come from a long conversation with Jean Chretien, which he didn’t really reveal but that it was much longer than he had anticipated having with Chretien, and that he was indeed committed to the independence and sovereignty of Quebec. In discussions which we did not know until they were revealed in his book, Ambassador Blanchard had had far more extensive high level conversations with

Canadian politicians and leaders than he conveyed to his senior staff. He also had a conversation with Preston Manning to the effect that Manning had asked how the Canadian debt should be handled if Canada separated, which is something that Blanchard revealed in his book but which he had not bothered to tell anybody else, at least anybody that I knew of on the staff beforehand and which was certainly more revealing than would have been anticipated in a subsequent public account. Blanchard also said that subsequent to the referendum that he had a couple of conversations with Bouchard on how Canada and Quebec should resolve their differences. Again, to my knowledge, these were not reported, or if they were reported they were reported in channels which I never heard and I have never subsequently encountered anyone who had heard about these conversations, let alone any upshot from the conversations. But we move now into 1996. At that point, people spent a good deal of time ruminating over what the next steps for Quebec would be, whether it would mean there would be another referendum in the near term or whether it would be something in the further term, how Quebec and Canada would resolve their continued differences, whether some of the promises that the Ottawa government had made so far as giving Quebec additional powers and position and circumstances would come into effect for whatever. Bouchard decided that what he wanted first to do was to prove that sovereigntists could really demonstrate good government, that they had spent the first year of their mandate preparing for and really running this referendum, and that now, if they were going to be successful, they had to show that they were a real working, effective government and worthy of an endorsement to be an independent country. That was the focus that he followed for the rest of the time that I was in Canada. There were polls that suggested that this was an effective approach, that he was gaining strength and sovereigntist support. There were sovereigntists, however, who were very skeptical and critical of Bouchard that he had never been part of the “pure and hard” *pur et dur* sovereigntist campaign, that he had been in too many camps at too many times throughout his life, and that they were never totally convinced that he was an absolutely committed separatist. It’s almost like a man who has an absolutely beautiful, gorgeous, and attractive wife and can never quite become convinced that she is totally committed to him and is so critical and skeptical and suspicious of her that in the end he drives her away. Actually, in the end, Bouchard, although he ran and won an election in 1998, left Quebec and Canadian politics in 2000 partly because he was no longer interested in struggling with those who didn’t believe that he was sufficiently committed to sovereignty or that his path to sovereignty would eventually get them there. That with the exception of one other generalized topic, NORAD, is about all that there is left.

NORAD has been in effect for a period of time back into the 1950s. It has a U.S. commander and a Canadian deputy. They are responsible jointly to the heads of government of Canada and the U.S. It has been responsible for air defense over North America throughout the period of the Cold War. It has slowly grown into a system that is supposed to at least recognize and provide alert for any ballistic missile attack. It has also, however, been a point of question at times for Canadians as to whether they wish to continue this agreement, whether it sucks them into subordination to the United States and whether it reduces Canadian sovereignty to have this agreement. This has been reflected in questions concerning how the agreement itself operates and how long they

should renew the agreement for each time. What we did throughout a fair portion of the time that I was political minister-counselor was to work on NORAD Treaty renewal. This was batted back and forth between the Department of Defense, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the U.S. government to try to find a formula and appropriate language that would get it done. Well, it got delayed and it got delayed. Although it in theory could have been one of the pieces signed when President Clinton visited in 1995, it ended by not really being agreed until March of '96 in an agreement that probably made the technical specialists a little happier but didn't really change the scope and thrust of the agreement from where it had stood previously.

In any event, I continued as political counselor until the end of July 1996 doing the standard things that I had done until then. I left on August 1, 1996, and returned to Washington. I spent time doing various assorted assignments. I did some work on "benchmarking" for the Department of State, what works best at other agencies, other companies, or organizations outside the Department of State. I worked for a stretch of time on human rights reports during the period of mid-October to the end of January 1997, the annual creation of the Department's Human Rights Country Reports assessing the status of human rights in countries around the world. I spent another stretch of time working on Freedom of Information declassification and review while on active duty. Then I retired roughly at the end of January/early February 1998.

Q: After you retired, how have you occupied yourself?

JONES: It's been very busy. It's been even extraordinarily busy. My wife and I have produced a weekly for the National Coalition for Advanced Manufacturing (NACFAM). Its focus is on improving industrial productivity in the United States and research and development funding on the federal level for math and science in the United States as well as efforts to improve the workforce skills of normal American labor so that the labor force of the 21st century can deal with the technology of the 21st century. We started this in January of '99 and have produced them for three years, 50 copies, 50 editions every year. Now we're well into another year of this activity. It's a sophisticated document drawn from Internet research every week done in a Wall Street Journal style with one page of approximately eight summaries of important developments during the course of the week. Each one of these précis has a backup document associated with the précis on the front page; additionally there is a weekly selection of material in the form of government grants, web sites, forthcoming conferences, and Internet publications that are associated with government, economic, and other associated aspects for productivity and general economic action.

Then I have continued to work as a WAE [While Actually Employed] contractor equivalent for the Department of State. I worked and have worked for a number of years assisting to prepare the Human Rights Report. I've done that through this year, which made it the sixth year that I had worked on them. I've also done a fair amount of declassification and review for a number of years. I have published really quite extensively in Canada and the United States with articles and columns in the Foreign

Service Journal, in a number of Canadian publications from Policy Options, which is a publication associated with McGill, with an on-line magazine called Ehgloo, and probably about 30-40 pieces in the Canadian equivalent of The Hill, a weekly called The Hill Times in which I comment on Canadian-U.S. bilateral issues. I probably write and publish at least one piece every week.

Starting on April 1st, I will begin another project in which I will be working with the State Department's historian as a contractor on a specialized project relating to the Middle East. This is an effort to put all the wild material in chronological order relating to the last two years of effort in the Middle East in the Clinton administration: what was promised, to whom, how, and in what manner. This is going to be a classified study that will be available for further diplomatic effort as we continue our struggle to bring something that looks like peace, or at least a cease-fire, in the Middle East.

Q: In other words, you're busy as hell.

JONES: Yes. And I've also from time to time contributed my views on oral history with the good Mr. Kennedy.

Q: I want to thank you very much.

End of interview