The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project Information Series

HARRY HAVEN KENDALL

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INTERVIEW

Q: Harry, I would like to begin this interview by having you give us a little background of where you came from, what your experience and education and background were before you came with USIA. From there, if you will progress to what it was that attracted you to, or brought you into USIA and then we will consider your various assignments. So why don't you take it from there to begin?

KENDALL: Lew, let me start off by saying this is my 37th wedding anniversary. Margaret and I were married 37 years ago today.

Q: Congratulations. I'm sorry I interfered with your anniversary. I didn't know.

Biosketch

KENDALL: It's a great occasion and I'm going to tape this interview myself for my memoirs.

My background. I am a Louisiana farm boy, the fourth son and seventh of eight children. My mother was widowed when I was only two years old so her father took her and her children in and put them to work on his dairy farm to earn their keep. We lived near Lake Charles in southwest Louisiana, and one of my chores before school used to be delivering milk to homes around that town. My mother taught school in a one-room rural school to earn money to buy books and clothes for her children. I began school at the age of five, and she was my teacher. I recall that she was much stricter with me than with the other children. When Huey P. Long was elected governor of Louisiana, he provided free textbooks for Louisiana's school children so my mother was relieved of that burden. He also got the state legislature to consolidate the rural schools, including my mother's, to improve the quality of education. I attended one called LaGrange through both primary and high school, and graduated in 1936 at the age of 16 with eleven years of schooling. There were 26 students in my graduating class. When I finished high school my family did not have enough money to send me to a university so they sent me to business college to study bookkeeping and shorthand, but I must confess I was not terribly inspired by the prospect of that type of a career. After finishing, I floundered about a bit and then went to work for an automobile parts house, first as a mechanics helper and then an automobile parts salesman.

1940: Entrance Into Army Air Corps

In 1940 the U.S. Army Air Corps beckoned. As you know, it was the predecessor of the U.S. Air Force. Congress had enacted a draft law that year. The draft board was breathing down my neck, and I knew I would have to go sooner or later. I thought it would be much more interesting to get into some technical aspect of the Air Corps rather than carrying a rifle in the infantry. I had no ambition to be a foot soldier. So I looked at the various possibilities, spoke to the local army recruiter and asked him to let me know when he had an opening in the Air Corps. Shortly afterwards he offered me a choice between being a mechanic in a bomber squadron, a weather man or a radio operator for the AACS--the

Army Airways Communications Squadron--as it was called in those days and still is, though acronym now stands for Airways and Air Communications Service.

Pearl Harbor--WWII Experiences: 1941-1945

I joined the army at the age of 20, went through the usual boot camp procedure, and then was sent to a radio operators and mechanics school at Scott Field, Illinois, near East St. Louis. Six months later I completed a course in Morse code and was assigned to Eglin Air Base, Florida, a flight-gunnery training school, as control tower operator; I was there at the time of Pearl Harbor and took part in training the growing number of Air Corps cadets destined for combat theaters in the European and Pacific theaters. One of the more memorable groups was a B-25 bomber squadron led by then Colonel James Doolittle. I have vivid recollections of watching the B-25's sitting on the end of the runway, flaps down, revving up their engines at full speed for a quick takeoff, and then seeing them jump into the air and wobble uncertainly until they reached a steady flying speed. I also recall watching Colonel Doolittle fill out a flight plan for San Francisco--an extraordinary distance for the short range B-25--and saying to him, "Colonel, I don't know where you are heading, but I would be mighty pleased to go with you." He responded, "Thank you sergeant, I appreciate that, but we are full complement now." It was only when President Roosevelt announced Doolittle's daring raid on Tokyo from an aircraft carrier that I realized I had been involved in the preparations for a historic event in the early days of World War II.

This and other experiences persuaded me to apply for flight training school. I was accepted, but as my flight instructor told me when I flunked a crucial flight test, I was not cut out to be an army pilot. I was chagrined and not a little unhappy about it at the time, but felt better after watching several of my former classmates die in air crashes while training to fly the hot new B-26s. I went back to being a control tower and radio operator and served at several bases in the South until my name came up in June 1943 for overseas assignment. I was back at Barksdale Field in Shreveport, Louisiana, at the time, and it was my fortune to copy the message from headquarters shipping me and several of my buddies overseas. We traveled by troop to San Bernardino, California, where we underwent a brief period of survival training on how to escape a sinking ship. At the time none of us knew where we were going, only that we would be headed out across the Pacific somewhere. In early July some 6,000 of us shipped out of Long Beach on a converted Italian luxury liner, the Conte de Bianco Mano, renamed Hermitage, which had been confiscated from the Italian government with which we were at war. To avoid Japanese submarines we traveled a zig-zag course non stop to Wellington, New Zealand, and thence to Melbourne and Fremantle, Australia, where we picked up a cruiser escort to Bombay. There we boarded a British transport for Karachi, then part of India, and thence by C-47 (Douglas DC-3) transport plane to Assam in Eastern India. After one night in the steaming heat of Assam I was ready to move on. My chance came almost immediately and the next morning I flew "over the hump" of the Himalayas aboard a converted B-24 bomber-transport plane to Kunming, China, where I became a part of General Claire Chennault's famed Flving Tiger squadron, later the 14th Air Force.

That was in September 1943. I worked there for a year as a radio operator sending and receiving messages on the movement of U.S. air transport planes ferrying supplies across the 'Hump" from India to China to supply the Chinese and American forces fighting the Japanese. Our heavy work schedule gave us precious little time to get acquainted with our Chinese environment, but I have vivid recollections of infrequent excursions on foot into the picturesque Yunnan countryside around Kunming. In November 1944 I was assigned, with five other enlisted men--we were two radio operators and four weather observers--to a radio/weather station in Lanzhou, Gansu province, located on the banks of the Yellow River in northwest China, at the southern edge of the Gobi desert, not far from the western end of China's Great Wall. Our task there was to provide meteorological data which the U.S. Air Force in the Pacific needed for forecasting the weather over Japan to facilitate bombing operations. We made all our broadcast schedules but, unlike Kunming, we still had ample time between broadcasts to get acquainted with the local citizenry and their culture. With the help of an American trained teacher, a refugee from Eastern China, I was able to learn enough spoken Chinese to communicate on a social level. One of my most memorable experiences was a 10-day trip on the back end of a truck with a group of Chinese to Kunlun, a Tibetan lamasery in Qinghai province. It was during this period that I began thinking of my post-war career and saving up for my university training. My service in China had opened up tremendous new vistas and I was determined to make the most of them. Subsequently, the GI Bill of Rights gave me and hundreds of thousands of other veterans an added bonus which benefitted us, as well as our nation itself. Nevertheless, even though I became acquainted with the Foreign Service through the American Consul in Lanzhou, a man named Harry Stevens, I did not really envision a foreign service career for myself until much later.

Post-War: Education Via GI Bill

After VJ Day the U.S. Air Force rapidly deactivated its installations in Western China and I was shipped home via troopship through the Suez Canal and the Atlantic Ocean. I'll never forget the thrill of seeing the Statue of Liberty as we pulled into the New York harbor. Demobilization for me came in San Antonio, Texas, on November 2, 1945. I entered Louisiana State University as a freshman the following January. I was thinking of a career in science, but an aptitude test they were giving young men at the time indicated I would do much better working with words so I turned to journalism and political science. I did relatively well in my undergraduate work, finishing in two and a half years at the top of my class in May 1948. I went on to Yale for an MA in international relations and from there to the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for Ph.D. work in political science. Ironically, one school term after I arrived, the person I intended to study under at Chapel Hill transferred to Yale.

Degree In Journalism And Newspaper Experiences Leads To Recruitment Into IIE, USIA Predecessor, 1950

At that time I was torn between owning my own newspaper somewhere in the South or a career in journalism as a foreign correspondent. But my GI Bill and my patience with being a student ran out at about the same time so I applied for and was accepted for a job as reporter for the <u>Charlotte Observer</u> (N.C.). This was in August 1950. Earlier, in the spring of that year, a classmate of mine, Stan Moss, who now lives in Novato, just north of San Francisco, said to me one day, "Harry, I hear there are openings in the State Department for overseas service. Why don't we go up and see what it's all about?

I said, "Stan, I'm going to be a foreign correspondent. I'm not interested in that."

But he persuaded me, and we went to Washington and were interviewed by officials of the Institute of International Education, IIE, the predecessor of USIA. Later, one of the officials came to Chapel Hill to talk to us, but there was no commitment. Time passed and I sort of forgot about it, not knowing that State was going through its security clearance process. I had no idea it would take six months. During that period I had joined the <u>Charlotte</u> <u>Observer</u> and was beginning to enjoy my budding journalistic career. Then one day in December 1950 while I was busily at work on a news story the phone rang and I was offered the choice of Saigon or Caracas at a salary considerably above what I was making. What a choice! Mind you this was long before anyone even thought about a Vietnam War. I had lived among Latinos at the Pan American House at LSU. I felt I would be comfortable with them. But I had also lived in Asia and had studied both Chinese and Japanese government. In the end I chose Caracas for rather personal reasons. I was engaged to Margaret and neither of us was ready for marriage at the time. I figured that if I got as far away as Saigon I'd never get back to get married.

First Assignment: Caracas, Venezuela, Early 1951

So I went to Caracas, and a year later, in December 1951, I went back to Chapel Hill to claim my bride. Margaret has been with me ever since.

Q: Did you have any Spanish language at that time or did that come later?

KENDALL: Yes, I had studied Spanish as well as French as an undergraduate at LSU, and I had done relatively well. I have a curious facility for languages. But I had taken Far Eastern studies too and was interested in Asia because of my wartime experience. Stan Moss had concentrated on Latin American studies. So, as it wound up, Stan went to the Far East, to the Philippines, and I went to Latin America. Eventually I got to the Far East, including Saigon, but that comes later. But with my training and experience in journalism and my experience with Spanish at LSU's Pan American House I had no qualms about going to Latin America.

I got no additional training such as given to our present day junior officer trainees. State was expanding its information services abroad and they needed us badly. IIE gave me a 30 day orientation course at the Department of State and then sent me off to Caracas. There,

John Turner Reid was my public affairs officer and a dear lady named Alice Stone was the cultural affairs officer. It was a three man post, and I came in as an information assistant.

Q: What year was this now?

KENDALL: I arrived in Venezuela on George Washington's birthday, February 22, 1951, and learned my first lesson in the Foreign Service. Never arrive at a new post on a holiday. I landed at the Maiquetia airport on the coast. Caracas is some 20-25 miles away in a valley at an altitude of 2,500 feet and access at that time was along a narrow winding road through the mountains. Heavy rains the night before had caused a landslide, so I had to take a shuttle plane from Maiquetia up to the La Carlota airport in the Caracas Valley. Of course there was no one there to meet me but there was a message telling me where to go.

I spent four years--two tours of duty--in Caracas, one too many for a first post. In December of that year I took two weeks leave and went back to Chapel Hill, N.C. to be married. I tell people I didn't get a Ph.D. at Chapel Hill but I did get an MRS. That was 37 years ago today. Margaret and I have been together ever since and she has accompanied me to every post except Saigon, during the Vietnam War when families were not permitted. We had our honeymoon in Haiti where I spent my last cent and had to borrow money to wire my post to have a driver meet us when we arrived back in Maiquetia.

My objectives in Caracas were to be a good Foreign Service officer. I went in, not as a FSO but as Foreign Service Staff. However, in 1952 I took the Foreign Service exam and passed it. Just about that time John Foster Dulles let it be known that USIA would be separated from the Department of State. Since I saw my career as being more oriented toward the information and cultural rather than the political, administrative and economic side of the Foreign Service, I set aside my opportunity to become a State FSO and stayed with USIS. I have never regretted the decision and thoroughly enjoyed my 29 years as a Foreign Service Information Officer.

My first assignment in Caracas, as information assistant, was to handle radio and motion picture activities. Later I also assumed responsibility for the press function. This was before the days of television, and we had a fairly large film program with several mobile units roving the countryside giving outdoor showings of USIS documentaries in working class neighborhoods. In retrospect, it seems the ultimate luxury, but it was effective in its way. We also serviced a number of radio stations with VOA supplied programs recorded on huge 16-inch platters as well as locally produced news documentaries based on materials drawn from our wireless file. I am uncertain what the term "wireless file" means to today's information officers, but for us at that time it was a news and commentary bulletin transmitted from Washington via Morse code. I felt close to it because of my five years as a radio operator in the U.S. Air Force. However, I didn't copy it myself. We hired a local employee to do that.

USIS Caracas Had Almost Unhindered Access To Venezuelan Media

Q: Let me ask at this time. I've forgotten exactly when it was that Perez Jimenez came to power. Was he in power at the time that you were there? And if he was not, did you have full access to the radio stations? Were they willing to take USIS material or did you have any obstacles to overcome in trying to place yours?

KENDALL: Yes, while I was there he took over power in a rigged election and remained in power until he was overthrown several years after I left. Although the Perez Jimenez government watched the news media carefully, its censorship focused primarily on news that might affect its exercise of control. We had full access to the press. They accepted our materials and used the international news items extensively. This was the time of the Cold War and Venezuela was very much on the American side. Perez Jimenez was a military man and strongly anti-communist, so the anti-communist materials which came out of IPS and IBS found a ready market with the Venezuelan news media which were encouraged by their government to use it. As a matter of fact, some of the packaged, anti-communist materials was so hard-line it sometimes made me gag.

Besides finding a ready market for our media materials, we had full access to the media operatives themselves. I was on a first name basis with practically every press and radio journalist in Caracas. The Radio Broadcasters Association of Venezuela invited me to their annual meetings, and I met with individual members frequently, both officially and socially.

I started to tell you about a radio program we had called Revista Internacional, or International News Magazine. We produced and recorded it weekly for distribution throughout Venezuela. In looking for a personality to do the program, I chose a young man named Renny Ottolina. He was just getting a start, but partly through this program and, I guess, largely through his own ability and ambition, he developed into the number one radio and television broadcaster of Venezuela and remained in that position for many years. Eventually he ran for president of the country. I would like to think that I helped him get started. Unfortunately, during his campaign for the presidency, he was killed in an airplane accident. It was a great tragedy. He was a very fine person of strong moral character and great ability.

But back to USIS in Caracas. We were housed in a very small building, an old residence next to the Embassy in a section of town called San Bernardino, adjacent to the old town of Caracas. John Turner Reid was succeeded by Joseph McEvoy who had been an AP correspondent in Latin America for many years. He was very well known and liked and was fluent in Spanish, but spoke with a pronounced Irish-American accent. He is now retired and lives in Fort Lauderdale. Both he and his wife Ann were wonderful persons with great senses of humor. We got along splendidly.

Q: *Was he the PAO or was he the information officer at that time?*

KENDALL: He was the PAO. I was by then the information officer. As I said earlier, I stayed in Caracas for four years, which is unusual for a young man just starting out his

foreign service career. I'm glad that policy has changed because it didn't do me any good to stay on that long. From a career standpoint, I should have moved on to another post after two years. Yet, because of my long experience at the post I became quite valuable to the program. I knew everybody and everybody knew me. I had three PAOs while I was there--John Turner Reid, Joe McEvoy, and then George Butler. Butler was a former ICA (International Cooperation Agency, later AID) officer who had transferred to USIA.

1955: Transfer To Takamatsu, Japan, But First--

My transfer came up in May 1955, and I got my wish to go back to the Far East. I was assigned to a post at Takamatsu, Japan. I had never heard of the place and had to search for it on a map. By that time, Margaret and I had our first child, a daughter born in Chapel Hill during home leave between my first and second tour in Caracas. We named her Elizabeth Anne and called her Betsy.

--Some Additional Accounts Of Caracas Programming

A. <u>Usage Of Material From USIA/Washington With Heavy Anti-Communist Content:</u> <u>Values And Reservations</u>

Q: Now before we leave Caracas, however, you said that some of the anti-communist material that was being delivered by the media units from the USIA headquarters was pretty heavy stuff. Do you feel that any of this was counterproductive in your programming there or did you cut out the stuff that you thought was so strong that it really would be ridiculous to put it out?

KENDALL: We tended to use most of it because the market was good. I recall particularly the VOA dramatic programs. The Venezuelan radio stations loved those dramas. They were done quite professionally by the VOA Spanish language service and their quality was several cuts above anything available in Venezuela. The radio stations liked them, partly because they were free and partly because their public called in and asked for more. We also arranged a number of direct VOA Spanish language news broadcast feeds. I don't recall how many, but there was a significant number. We used the IPS press materials with discretion, but with 20/20 hindsight I can't really say we were as discreet as we might have been because we, too, were imbued with Cold War mentality. One might even say victimized by it. In retrospect I should certainly have eliminated some of the things that I used rather freely at that time.

Q: Did you think that there was in the population of Caracas and Venezuela, generally, people that were oriented toward an anti-communist viewpoint, so that you were talking to a very substantial portion of the population at that time which was skeptical about this kind of approach to information activities? Did you have any kind of communist element active or submerged within the country itself?

KENDALL: I would say that we had a receptive audience. There was not a strong communist movement. The Perez Jimenez government would have made you believe that there was. But not in Venezuela. They were a relatively unsophisticated audience. We tended to take a broad, mass audience approach to programming rather than the selective approach that we adopted later on. For example, at the time we had mobile film units which would go out into the countryside for a couple of weeks at a time with one or two operators and a good supply of USIS documentary films. These programs were very well received.

B. USIS's Two Main Goals In Venezuela

Q: Did they deal extensively with things that you felt would help the Venezuelans understand the American culture and the American educational background and, generally, what the Americans were like? Was that your prime goal there in Venezuela?

KENDALL: We had two goals. One was to help our audience understand what the Americans are like. The other was to educate them, because the literacy level, the educational level in general, was really quite low. We designed most of our programs for public education on non-controversial topics such as health and culture with only a minor emphasis on political topics. In an evening's program, for example, one could insert a brief political documentary film but if you did more than that you would lose half your audience. As I was saying before, we aimed at a broad audience rather than selected targeted audience groups that became the programmatic approach of USIA later on. We had quite ample resources at the time. In retrospect, I think we were probably given more than we could use intelligently. But when we began shifting to a more targeted approach, we did so at the expense of the mass educational type of program.

C. <u>Anti-American Feelings And Communist Sympathies Scarcely Existent In The</u> <u>Venezuela Of The Early 1950s</u>

Q: Did you feel that the program of an educational nature that you were putting out did help to orient the Venezuelans more in the direction of the United States? And did you encounter any anti-American feeling to speak of. If so was there anything that this might have countered or did you just take what there was and find a receptive audience to help you in presenting a point of view that perhaps got the Venezuelans more acclimated to an American viewpoint?

KENDALL: Let's say they were strongly pro-American to begin with. We did not have an antagonistic audience. This was in the early '50s. The United States was very powerful world wide. We had just recently come out of the second world war as a very strong nation.

Venezuela was benefitting enormously from the American oil companies operating there. The national income was on the rise and people were feeling good about their future. The audience was generally very receptive. We did not have a strong anti-American audience to contend with. In a sense, on the educated level, we were speaking to the converted. On the lower level we were attempting to elevate the educational level of the masses. Actually, we were doing what the national government should have been doing and we were helping them out. In another sense, we were doing what ICA, the International Cooperation Agency, did later when they became part of the Alliance for Progress program under Kennedy and Johnson. We were doing a lot of that work from the resources that we had.

Q: I asked you about this possible anti-Americanism and possible communist influence because not too long ago we inter- viewed Bob Amerson who came to Venezuela shortly after you left. At that time the communist influence was growing and there was a certain amount of anti-Americanism which, based on his experiences, was beginning, he felt was beginning, to arise. He was there during the fall of Perez Jimenez. I wondered if that had existed when you first came and from what you say it apparently didn't, but it arose later?

KENDALL: Bob succeeded me in my job. Let's say there were occasional articles in the press, occasional radio programs which indicated communist influences at work. I recall one incident. I can speak rather freely because this old gentleman involved has gone to his reward. His name was Ricardo Andreotti who was our local press chief. Wonderful Italian gentleman he was and a prolific writer. He was good at black hand letters. If he spotted an article in the press or heard a radio program which he thought was communist tainted, he would send an anonymous letter to that particular radio station or that newspaper saying "We know what you're about. We listen to that program. We read that article. Here are the facts." And he would follow up with a point by point refutation of the item in question.

These were anonymous letters. They achieved their purpose. He was quite good at it. And, as I said, a wonderful person to work with.

So there was some of this, yes, but we didn't find anti-Americanism to be a great problem while I was there. As Bob Amerson told you, the anti-Americanism did grow out of reaction to the Perez Jimenez government because the United States was seen to be supporting the dictator. So the U.S. took part of that blame. The communists, of course, took advantage of this anti-government sentiment to gain popular support.

Bob experienced this problem more than I because he was in Venezuela later on during the reign of the dictator. I was there during the early stages while the authoritarian government of Perez Jimenez was bringing some order out of the previous government's chaos and enjoyed a certain amount of popular favor. Later, governmental abuses increased and that favor dwindled and changed into outright antagonism.

D. <u>The Great Success Of Binational Center Developed Programs In Multi-National Folk</u> <u>Dancing</u>

Q: You indicated that you had another little episode about Caracas that you would like to talk about before we go onto the Japanese experience.

KENDALL: Yes, it had to do with the binational center, the Centro Venezolano-Americano. It was located in the center of old Caracas, right next to the Plaza Bolivar, and was run by Fred Drew who was at that time a binational center grantee. Fred had desperately needed a new location for his center and was encountering problems finding a place to relocate. Finally he decided to choose a suitable area, select an appropriate building, and then negotiate a price for it. There were a number of old colonial homes in the city center so he selected several possibilities and went around knocking on doors. At one door he asked the lady of the house if the place was for sale, and she replied, "Yes, how did you know? We just decided this evening."

The house had a large patio after the fashion of traditional Venezuelan homes and this served as a stage for public programs. The Centro had a sizable clientele of young Venezuelans who came there to study English. Working with Fred, I developed an interamerican folk dance program which drew on the many Latin American ethnic groups from around the continent resident in Caracas. We would invite the various cultural groups from around Caracas--Argentines, Chileans, Brazilians, Peruvians, Mexicans, and even Spaniards from the Canary Islands. All seemed to have their own folk dance groups and all were happy to participate in our program. Renny Ottolina, whom I mentioned earlier, served as master of ceremonies. He had a way of animating groups that brought everyone in the audience into the program. Initially we thought it would be just a small program for our own entertainment, but it turned out to be bigger than the Centro could handle, and we found ourselves renting the Teatro Nacional, the biggest theater in town, which filled to overflowing with enthusiastic audiences. It was an interesting and exciting experience for me.

I also belonged to an organization called The International House which served as co-sponsor. It consisted of a small group of Columbia University alumni who had lived in the International House at that university. I hadn't, but they adopted me. So this International House group, the Centro Venezolano-Americano, and various other cultural groups around the city were involved. We had a tremendous time and brought quite a bit of credit and popularity to the binational center and our own International House group. Now, what good we did in terms of inter-American relations, I can only guess. One can't evaluate these things, but I know they generated a lot of good will and were fun to put on. I thoroughly enjoyed them.

Q: As a matter of fact, I feel, that if you have an American institution which is producing this kind of thing and it becomes highly popular and the USIA program is identified with it, I feel it's a great plus because I don't look upon the information program as just simply informational media oriented. I look upon it as a combined, interacting program. If you developed something that was of high value to the people in the country, entertainment, which to them was a demonstration of their cultural ability, and yet which they associated with American sponsorship, I think that's all to the good. I don't think you have to go out and beat the bushes all the time with a strong, pro-American or anti-communist theme. I think it does a lot of good.

KENDALL: Yes, this one did promote a strong sense of inter-Americanism, the sense that the people of all of the Americas, both North and South were brothers and sisters under the skin. The cultural differences were there to be appreciated, but they didn't divide, they sort of brought us together. That was one program I was very fond of. I guess it did take away from some of my other duties, but we had a great time. Fred Drew spoke of the programs as the Centro's best during his term as director.

Q: When you have what was basically a pro-American or at least a non anti-American population to deal with in those times, something like this which did promote a feeling of interrelationship among the American peoples, I think was no loss to devote a bit of your time to what otherwise would gone to some more stringent and virulent anti-communist activity.

KENDALL: Or writing reports to Washington.

Back To Takamatsu: Director Of USIS Cultural Center, September 1955

Q: Right, especially writing reports to Washington. Let's get back to Japan now. What were you doing in Takamatsu, and let's hear a little bit about that program. You were there quite a while as I recall.

KENDALL: Lew, you had a hand in it, so you would know as well as I. When my time came up for transfer from Caracas I wrote to Kitty Jones, our personnel officer in Washington, and told her Japan would be my first preference for my next overseas assignment. Then lo and behold, she found a Japan position for me. You remember Kitty Jones. She was a charming lady who took good care of all of the USIS Foreign Service types at that time. She wrote me that there was an opening as director of a binational center in Takamatsu. It was the capital of Kagawa prefecture and the principal city on the island of Shikoku. I had never heard of the place, but I was ready and willing to go.

We, Margaret and I and our then two-and-a-half year old daughter Betsy--left Caracas in May, 1955, for home leave and transfer to Japan. We traveled surface all the way, by ship from the port of La Guaira to Mobile, Alabama, thence by rail and car to New Orleans where we bought a Pontiac station wagon to take with us. It turned out to be too long for Shikoku's one lane roads, but we managed anyway. We drove that car to see my mother in Lake Charles, thence to Chapel Hill, North Carolina, to visit Margaret's mother, then to Washington, D.C. for consultation, and 18 days across country to San Francisco where we took it with us aboard the President Cleveland bound for Yokohama. From Tokyo we traveled by train to Kobe and thence to Takamatsu by the old <u>Kansai Kisen</u> ferry. I didn't realize it at the time, but never again during my whole time in the Foreign Service was I to have such a leisurely home leave and transfer.

As I learned in Tokyo, Governor Masanori Kaneko or Kagawa prefecture, had gone to Tokyo to request an American director for the center. When the U.S. Army turned over their CEI-SCAP (Civil Information and Education-Supreme Command Allied Powers) libraries to USIS at the end of the occupation, USIS had converted the Takamatsu library into a binational center and given operational responsibility to the Kagawa prefectural government. In effect, they gave the prefecture a good sized library but no librarian to run it, as the Army had provided. The Governor had found the library very useful in helping his constituents learn about the United States and had been very cooperative in its operation. He wanted another American director and wanted one badly.

I am sure you are familiar with the problem because you were the executive officer for USIS Tokyo at the time. Kaneko had approached you and the PAO on the matter, and as a result Kitty Jones was asked to send a young American officer. I guess that's essence of it. My application for a post in Japan hit Kitty's desk in Washington about the time your request came in, so I was tapped for the job. That's how these things come about I suppose.

I regret I wasn't given any special training for Japan. I went there without knowing the first word of Japanese. So the first thing I did was to get myself a tutor and started learning Japanese. I took daily lessons while I was there. I would not say that I became proficient, but when I left I did an interview in Japanese with the local radio station.

My job was to run a cultural center. There was some connection with what I had been doing in Caracas, but not much. In Caracas I had been an information officer. Here I was to be a cultural affairs officer. It was a general purpose post, and, as I understood it, my job was to help bring American culture to the Japanese hinterland. They were an eager group wanting to learn more.

Takamatsu had been about 95 percent destroyed during one massive U.S. Air Force raid on July 4, 1945, and the whole city had burned down. The place was poverty stricken. The inhabitants were in the process of rebuilding the city and they worked very hard at it.

But they still wanted American culture. They wanted to know what Americans were thinking, what they were doing, and how they could get to know Americans and the United States better. Much has been written about the psychological aspects of post-war Japanese attitudes toward the United States, but for me there at that time it meant being confronted by people who saw their future as being aligned with the national which had resoundingly beaten them in war and they urgently wanted more information about that nation and its people. My job was to provide it for them as best I could with the resources available. I had a staff of Japanese employees who were on the payroll of the Kagawa Prefectural Government. USIS gave me a vehicle and a driver, but other than that I worked entirely with the Japanese staff.

Q: I'm interested. When did you get to Japan?

KENDALL: I arrived there in September 1955.

Q: That's why. Originally when we started, we paid the whole Japanese staff. We simply took them over from the Army and put them on our payroll. I think the man who had been in

Takamatsu was an Army employee and actually stayed on for a while; I'm not certain now, but I think he stayed a year or two. Initially we took over 24 of those cultural centers. It was about 1953 and '54 that Washington began to retrench in the program in Japan, and they said you've got to convert anywhere from six to ten of those centers to a binational status. I guess that had happened just prior to your arrival, and that's why at that time we were not paying the staff of the center. It had passed over to prefectural payroll, and they probably got less money than they did under us.

Regenerating The Center Program

KENDALL: They got considerably less. As a matter of fact it was a real hand-to-mouth existence for them. But they were loyal, they worked hard, they accepted my direction, and at the same time they took me in hand and led me through the intricacies of Japanese culture and government. I was a willing student. I'm not sure I was a very good student, but I was willing.

We had a staff of about ten persons to operate our library, cultural and film programs. The prefecture inherited the old CIE/USIS film library and all of the projectors. These materials, equipment, and the library itself became part of the Japan-America Cultural Center. Governor Kaneko looked upon me, a U.S. Government official, as a means for getting more U.S. oriented material into that library-more books, more USIS programs, more speakers, more visiting artists.

My title was Provincial Public Affairs Officer. I worked under the supervision of the Regional Public Affairs Officer at the American Consulate General in Kobe, first Jerry Novick, then Clifton B. Forster. The RPAO had supervisory responsibility for the seven Kansai region centers--Osaka, Kyoto, Matsuyama, Hiroshima, Takamatsu, and Nagashima. Clif had a lovely secretary, Melita Schmidt, whom he called "Snow White" and he used to refer to us as the Seven Dwarfs. It wasn't very flattering, but Melita made up for the difference by taking care of the needs of the more isolated "dwarfs" such as myself by keeping us supplied with basic necessities from the Kobe Army PX and commissary.

Q: I think Kyoto was still under the Kansai. I don't remember whether the Okayama center had ceased to exist?

KENDALL: The Okayama CIE library was converted to a BNC under the city government, but it was never very active. They lacked a Governor Kaneko. Jerry Novick and then Clif Forster had supervisory responsibility for regional operations, and it was my job to work up my own programs, with the RPAO channeling what support he could to me and the other provincial posts. My programs were very scant at first. Later on we got a system working whereby Clif sent us some first rate Japanese lecturers he was scheduling around the region and occasionally an American lecturer. That was before our AMPART (American Participant) program got into full swing. We made good use of those who came our way.

We also had some visiting artists. One of the more interesting was an American Indian, or Native American as we now say, named Tom Two Arrows, who did Indian folk dances. He was a big hit. Then there was a musician, a harmonica player, named John Sebastian. He was another big hit for a very special reason. The Japanese in the immediate post-war era were trying to reestablish music education in the schools, but they had very little to work with. Governor Kaneko had persuaded the school board to equip the schools with harmonicas, which were very inexpensive, and so each school had its own children's harmonica orchestra. When John Sebastian came to town with his harmonica, playing both classical and popular music, he was met with an outpouring of enthusiasm by teachers and children alike. The schools brought out all their children to hear him. It was a touching thing, particularly when the children honored the visiting artist with a return concert. These were some of the few types of performing artists we were able to get out there in the boonies.

Assistance To Matsuyama Center On West End of Shikoku

These few programs were not enough to satisfy the demand for information about the U.S., so I made a point of getting around to the various towns and villages in Shikoku. There were two Centers on the island, mine and the American Cultural Center in Matsuyama, down in Ehime Prefecture, one of the 14 you mentioned. My Takamatsu territory included Kagawa and Tokushima prefectures; Matsuyama's included Ehime and Kochi prefecture. For an interim period between directors at the Matsuvama Center I commuted there once a week to supervise that program. The trip was four hours by train, pulled by an old coal burning locomotive, and I would always need a bath to wash off the coal dust when I reached my destination. In Matsuyama the American Cultural Center had a studio apartment above the library, but there was no bath in it and so I would go to the public bath at Dogo Hot Springs for a good soak in their mineral waters, always a pleasant experience. Whenever I had to escort an American visitor for some program or other I would stay in a Japanese royokan in the Dogo area. In those days when the exchange was 360 yen to the dollar you could do this without it costing an arm and a leg. In the evening the maids would come around and ask you what you would have for breakfast the next morning. No matter what you ordered it was always ham and eggs. I recall going by the kitchen one night with some visitors after an evening on the town and seeing our breakfast ham and eggs all cooked and ready to be served the next morning. Very efficient, these Japanese.

My assistant at the Takamatsu Japan-America Center, the <u>Nichi-Bei Bunka Kaikan</u> as it was called, was Kaoru Nishimura, a minuscule person about five feet tall. He was a waif of a man with a good Japanese education, an excellent command of English, and a bountiful supply of common sense. He enjoyed the confidence of the Governor and had a good rapport with members of the prefectural government bureaucracy. Even though he had served with the Japanese army in Manchuria during the war, he was a very unmilitary man. He was head of the Japanese staff and served as my interpreter and teacher. We became very good friends and remain so to this day.

Development Of The Japan-America Forum Program On Shikoku

One day, driving from Tokushima to Takamatsu, Nishimura-san and I stopped at a noodle shop for lunch, and a conversation with the owner gave us an idea for a program we could conduct without the necessity of outside resources which were not very abundant anyway. The shop owner, who seemed to be an educated man, complained to us that the people of his town-- the mayor, the school teachers, and many others were eager for contact with Americans, people they could talk to and learn more about the United States which was exercising such an important influence on their lives. The kind of questions he asked matched those I had encountered in earlier discussions with my Japanese contacts, and I felt I could handle them just as well as any lecturer who might be riding the USIS circuit. So out of that conversation we developed the concept for a Japan-America Forum using myself, and my wife as principals and Mr. Nishimura as interpreter. During the course of the next year and a half we met with community leaders in cities and towns all over Shikoku.

Nishimura-san organized them and arranged advance promotion. He would sketch out an itinerary for us and, working through the prefectural government, he would get in touch with the mayors or some other local leader in each town and ask them to organize the local intelligentsia--usually high school teachers, principals, or professionals for a morning or afternoon session of about two hours. On the given day we would meet with the group in the town hall, sip Japanese tea as we are doing here today, warm our hands over a hibachi, and talk about things American and things Japanese.

They wanted to know a lot about American customs. Margaret was with me and the women invariably asked her questions about American family life. One even asked how she could get away from her family to go on that trip with me. Answer: a reliable Japanese amah. The questions concerned American education--mostly primary and secondary but also about American universities--about local government, social customs, enormous numbers of questions. None of them were particularly difficult, but they showed a keen interest as well as wide curiosity about the nation that had conquered them. I remember one delicate situation in Tokushima prefecture where racism in the United States had become an issue. We were going through out usual routine, answering questions about education and schooling, and after each exchange one or more of a group of young men would say, "Well, what about the people in Alabama? What about Selma? What about the discrimination against the Negro?"

This was the period when the struggle for civil rights was going on in the South. Martin Luther King was leading demonstrators and organizing sit-ins against racial discrimination. We could not ignore them and tried to respond as factually as possible. After some time I said "Well, you know, we are not alone. Racism is not confined to any one country. You have problems with it right here in this country with the ETA (the people who work with leather, with dead animals). They do not enjoy the rights of other Japanese citizens." Later, Nishimura-san said to me, "You know, I didn't translate that bit. It wouldn't have done any good. They've got an Eta village right in this town." Nevertheless, despite this rare, negative reaction, we found our Japan-American forums to be one of our most valuable experiences while we were in Shikoku.

Q: Do I understand that you were conducting these forums in each of several locations throughout the island of Shikoku? Was there any time in which you brought a much larger forum group and had a program centrally in the cultural center there? Or was this just a series you did by going around to different parts of the island?

KENDALL: Primarily it was programming myself and my wife because we didn't have other resources. We had similar programs with larger groups in the center with visiting lecturers when we were able to get them. The major thrust of this particular program was taking ourselves south to the towns and villages to meet with local leaders. This wasn't a mass program. It was a selective program for local leaders--mayors, school principals, school board members, high school teachers, and prominent local citizens.

Q: *Did you have materials about America that you could distribute after you left?*

KENDALL: We had some, not very much.

Q: I suppose most of it was in English so it was not really useful to them anyway.

KENDALL: That is correct. However, we were able to use English materials with the English teachers association on Shikoku. They maintained very close contact with us because we were a source of assistance to them in their own programs. They very often came to our center to get such materials as we had. We brought in Fulbright teachers of English or conduct English teaching seminars and then spend several days giving teaching demonstrations at our center itself and in their individual schools.

The Great Impact Of U.S. Cultural Attaché, Glen Shaw On USIS Programming

One person who came on various occasions was Glen Shaw, the USIS cultural attaché in Tokyo. He was a real cultural treasure. As a matter of fact, the Japanese named him a cultural treasure of Japan. He had first gone to Japan in the 1930s and had become thoroughly immersed in Japanese literature and culture and spoke fluent Japanese. At one time he was a columnist for the Asahi Newspapers. You must certainly remember him. He was a tall, gangling man. He must have been six feet six. I recall that his first visit while we were there was to help inaugurate a statue of the writer Kikuchikan in the center of Takamatsu. Kikuchikan was a native son of Takamatsu, and Glen Shaw had translated several of his plays and poems into English.

After the ceremony at the statue Governor Kaneko took Shaw and me on a trip around Kagawa prefecture, stopping at sites of particular interest--a fish farm, a pearl growing industry, temples, and spots of scenic beauty. The Japanese like to have their guests sign visitors' registers and Shaw would compose a haiku for each occasion. His signature in Japanese was a brush profile of himself. He was a man full of good humor who charmed everyone he met. I also recall that when he boarded the overnight ferry for Kobe, Governor Kaneko asked him how he was going to fit his lanky self into one of the five-foot bunks in

the sleeping compartment. Shaw replied, "Well, I'm just going to curl up like a snake and sleep all the way to Kobe." Wonderful guy. He returned later for a series of lectures on American literature and culture.

Governor Kaneko's Exchange Grant To Visit USA, And Its Long Range Results

These were some of the events that highlighted our stay in Takamatsu. There was another of which I feel very proud. It has to do with the "leader grant" program, now called the international visitors program, in which local leaders are invited to the United States to see how we live and to get a better understanding of how the U.S. functions. I persuaded Walt Nicols who was then our field supervisor in Tokyo to arrange a leader grant for Governor Kaneko. Until that time it had been against USIS policy to award leader grants to Japanese government officials, but Kaneko was such an unusual person a decision was made to make an exception and invite him.

Governor Kaneko came to the U.S. for three months and then went to Brazil for another couple of weeks to visit some of the many Kagawa prefecture people who had migrated there in the immediate post-war years. He came back to Takamatsu brimming over with new ideas for improving the quality of life in his prefecture. He told me then and has repeated it many times since that his vision as a boy was to have a bridge over the Seto Inland Sea, the <u>Seto Naikai</u>. But, he said, he had never imagined that Japan would be able to build such a bridge until he had seen the Golden Gate Bridge and the Oakland Bay Bridge and the one over the Verrazano Narrows. He returned to Japan with the vision of using American technology to build a bridge across the Inland Sea. He said, "As I stood there looking at that Golden Gate Bridge and at the Oakland Bay Bridge, I said to myself, if the Americans can do it, we can too."

Shortly after returning from his visit to the U.S. Kaneko began a campaign to get his dream bridge built, and it eventually developed into three bridges. The most important one insofar as Kaneko was concerned, of course, was the bridge from Okayama to Sakaide City near Takamatsu. Margaret and I were pleased to attend the inauguration of the <u>Seto Ohashi</u> (Great Seto Bridge) on April 8, 1988. Unfortunately, Kaneko was in the hospital at the time and could not attend the ceremonies, but he still reveled in the glory of the occasion. Unfortunately, the bridge will probably change the rural nature of Shikoku forever. Nevertheless, Kaneko felt his dream had finally been accomplished and he gave me full credit for helping him to realize it.

Kaneko's visit to the United States also inspired him to other achievements in which I take some pleasure. He visited various museums designed by Frank Lloyd Wright and had one built in Kagawa using Wright's concept of designing the architecture to meld in which the landscape. In New York he met Isamu Noguchi, the Japanese-American sculptor who died recently. On seeing some of Noguchi's stone sculpture Kaneko said, "Well, you know, we have some very fine stonecutters in Kagawa, but all they are doing now is making gravestones. Maybe you could teach them some of your kind of art." He invited Noguchi out to Takamatsu, and today there is a very fine studio a few miles from that city producing some of Noguchi's best artistic stone sculpture. So these are some of the intercultural exchanges we developed about which I feel a certain sense of satisfaction.

In 1957 the word came that USIS was undergoing another budget reduction and would have to close one of its centers. My center in Takamatsu got the axe. This, incidentally came about at the hands of Lyndon B. Johnson, then Senate Majority Leader, as a reaction to some rather indiscreet remarks about the Democrats made by the director of USIA.

Q: That was Arthur Larson, who gave a speech before the Young Republicans Club in Honolulu shortly before he was appointed Director of USIA. He made the remark that during the Democratic years, for 20 years, the United States government had been under an "alien influence". Now that the Eisenhower administration had come into power that was going to be corrected. Lyndon Johnson was not only Majority Leader but also the Nominal Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, which ran Foreign Service appropriations. So Lyndon Johnson took Larson to great task the first time he appeared before the Appropriations Committee, and USIA got its budget cut something like 25 or 30 percent. It took us about six years to get back from that debacle.

KENDALL: One of the results was the closure of my center. That hurt to the quick, but I was compensated by my new assignment. I had done a pretty decent job in Takamatsu, and my reward was Madrid. Joe McEvoy, my former PAO in Caracas, was now PAO in Madrid. He told our personnel office in Washington that he would like to have me join him. So the Agency cut out one good post and gave me another. In effect, they made me an offer I could not refuse.

Reminiscences Of Accomplishments While In Takamatsu

Q: Harry, earlier we were discussing some of the additional things that came your way as a result of your assignment to Takamatsu. I think they are very significant because this was Japan at a time when it was just recovering from the war. Even ten years after the war it hadn't really recovered its own vision of where it belonged and what it wanted to do. What you have been discussing, I think, was a great contribution to the American help that was given Japan. I would now like to ask you to review a few of the things that we talked about.

A. Role In Assisting Establishment Of Successful Best Sugar Growing In Shikoku

KENDALL: I was the only American official on Shikoku. There were two young enlisted men from the Army's Criminal Investigation Division, the CID, who stuck pretty much to their headquarters. But since I was the only public official, Japanese private citizens and public functionaries who needed help from the United States Government would come to me as their first point of contact. For example, the prefectural chief of agriculture for Kagawa, a man named Irimajiri, was trying to expand local sugar beet production. He said they didn't have any dollar exchange and they didn't have access to American sugar beet producers or their technology. Would I, he asked, be so good as to help them out. Mind you, there was no U.S. agricultural official there, no one else for him to turn to, so he naturally came to me. Basically what he wanted was various types of seed he could use for his own agricultural experiments. So, with the assistance of the Embassy's agricultural attaché in Tokyo, I obtained a list of American seeds houses, wrote directly to them, sent them my personal check, and got him his beet seeds. Of course he reimbursed me in yen. But he used the seed very diligently and was able to improve the prefectural beet production. He took me out to his agricultural experiment station on various occasions to show me what was happening. Naturally I was pleased and felt rewarded for my efforts. We have heard from Mr. and Mrs. Irimajiri at Christmas every year since then, more than 30 years.

B. Assisting In Expanding Tokushima Prefecture Lumber Production

On another occasion, the governor of Tokushima sent two of his forestry specialists to seek my assistance in expanding that prefecture's lumber production through the introduction of new varieties of pine. Now, I knew nothing about the lumber business, but their problem was lack of access to information on who to contact in the U.S. They needed seed catalogs. They didn't really know who to talk with or to write to in the United States. Would I please help? Again with the help of the Embassy agricultural attaché, I wrote to the seed companies and got them the seed catalogs. They selected the varieties they wanted, and since they didn't have any foreign exchange either--imagine Japan not having foreign exchange!--I again sent off my personal check and got them their seeds. When I was preparing to leave Takamatsu in 1957, the governor of Tokushima sent his representatives over to Takamatsu with a beautiful bamboo carving of the typical Tokushima dance figures--the <u>Awa Odori</u>-which I have to this day. It is a beautiful piece that my wife and I treasure very much.

C. Ironically--Helping Japanese To Improve Exports Activity

On another occasion the Embassy informed me that they were sending a commercial trade mission to Shikoku to work with Japanese businessmen and government officials and asked me to organize groups in Ehime and Kagawa prefectures to meet with them. I went to the governor of each prefecture and enlisted their assistance in organizing these officials and businessmen. The purpose was--and I laugh about it to this day--to teach the Japanese how to export to the United States. I would say that perhaps we were talking when we should have been listening. But the mission was simply fulfilling the U.S. policy of helping the Japanese get back on their economic feet. They learned their lesson well, perhaps too well.

Those were some of the things that came my way. Another thing I did, and this has nothing to do with being an official American, just that I was an American there, was to serve as judge for English-speaking contests conducted by the Japanese schools. I am sure you have done that many, many times. These were public performances which we did as part of our official presence there. It was fun, we enjoyed it.

To this day, when my wife and I go back to Takamatsu, we find that our friends, the people we met and worked with 30 years ago, are still there and they still remember us. We feel

very good about that. During those 30 years Shikoku has changed from being a collection of poverty stricken, backwater prefectures to a very prosperous island. It's really beautiful, what the people have done with their hard work. They learned their lessons well and their work has paid off. We have returned for two and three day visits a number of times, and I feel good about going back because I think we were able to contribute something when they needed it most.

Q: I know that Japan has changed tremendously since your and my day there. But in the trips which you have made back, although there is a lot of anti-Americanism in various parts of Japan, do you have the sense that perhaps it's less virulent or less demonstrative in the Shikoku area than it is elsewhere? Or do you find a good deal of it there? Or haven't you really been able to judge?

KENDALL: My trips back have been just for a few days at a time. In 1975, twenty years after we left Takamatsu, we returned to Japan for a second tour of duty, this time in Tokyo, and made several visits to Shikoku to see old friends. We have been back three or four times since I retired from the Foreign Service at the end of 1979. Generally, these visits have been managed by our friends in the way Japanese manage visits--with every minute scheduled, and my contacts have been invariably friendly. If there is any anti-Americanism present on Shikoku, I have not personally encountered it, though I do recall that on our last visit we saw a poster in Matsuyama protesting the importation of American beef and citrus fruits, a product of Japan-American trade competition.

<u>September 1957 Departure From Takamatsu;</u> Assignment To Madrid: Films And Exhibits Officer

We left Shikoku September 1957, almost exactly two years after we had arrived, having learned to speak some Japanese, or at least enough to get along. By that time we had a second child, Nancy, born at the Yodogawa Clinic in Osaka in 1956. She was now nearly a year old. Governor Kaneko and a large group of people--there must have been several hundred--came to the Takamatsu pier to see us off and I can still visualize the mass of colorful streamers between the pier and the ferry as we pulled away to the tune of the 'Old Lang Syne.' It was a tearful time. Our beloved amah, Eiko-san accompanied us to Tokyo to look after our two children while Margaret and I enjoyed some of the sights there before abandoning Japan for Spain. We made the return trip across the Pacific in a lumbering old Boeing Stratocruiser, from Tokyo to Wake Island, to Honolulu and then to San Francisco.

Q: *The old stratocruiser that had the bar in the belly of the plane?*

KENDALL: Yes, oh, that was a marvelous airplane. It took us 17 hours to make the trip, but we enjoyed every minute of it. We took a train across country to St. Louis and Indianapolis where we bought a car, a 1957 Ford Fairlane (we had sold our Pontiac station wagon in Takamatsu) and then drove on to Washington for consultation and then to North Carolina and Louisiana to visit our respective families before leaving for Spain and our new assignment.

We arrived in Madrid in November 1957. There was no language problem. My Spanish had become quite fluent in Caracas and I was able to move easily into Spanish circles. We had a much larger staff than in Caracas. It was not as large as the one in Tokyo, of course. I think at the time you and I were in Japan there were about 60 USIS officer in the country. In Spain, I think we had about 20, including the branch posts. I worked in the information section.

Q: Who was your PAO at that time?

Extensive Cooperation With U.S. Air Force In Improving Understanding Between USAF Bases Personnel And Spanish Local Residence

KENDALL: Joe McEvoy was PAO. Joe had been transferred from Caracas to Madrid and he'd asked that I be assigned there when my transfer came up. Jack Higgins was information officer. He handled press, radio, and such television as there was at that time. I took on films and exhibits. I had a staff of about half a dozen people in each section and tried, successfully as it developed, to combine the two into a working unit in support of my major effort during my three-year tour in Spain, a community relations project carried out in conjunction with the U.S. Air Force.

Under the Spanish American Bases Agreement the U.S. Air Force had established a number of bases around Spain; the U.S. Navy had one in Rota. The Air Force was encountering public relations problems out in the provinces where they had set up aircraft control and warning (AC&W) stations. There were about a dozen of these sites around the country, often in isolated areas, each staffed by about 90 to 100 men who lived on base or nearby with their families. The sites had been selected for technical and strategic reasons without regard to cultural or other considerations such as the proximity of a major city. Their presence in rural, unsophisticated areas was creating public relations problems because the local citizens simply didn't understand why the Americans were there or what their purpose was. Some thought the installations were nuclear weapons sites. Their most prominent aspects were two large radar antenna which would go around and around or up and down. The Spaniards referred to them "la loca y la tona," the crazy one and the foolish one.

Successful Development Of "American Week" Programs In Conjunction With Local Spanish Authorities

Most of the American personnel manning the stations had no training in the Spanish language or culture. Even their officers had minimal contact with the Spanish public or even with the officials. My job was to develop a community action program to promote more personal contacts between the American personnel and the people in the communities where they lived. After some consideration we decided to use a program technique called "American Weeks" that had proven popular on previous occasions in Spain. These would be based on a combination of exhibits, films, lectures, and such cultural performances as we could organize. We prepared a large photographic exhibit on the work of the U. S. Air Force at the AC&W sites and exhibits on different aspects of American life and culture, science and industry that would convey an idea of what the American people were like in their own country.

We put on week-long programs in conjunction with local Spanish authorities in provincial capitals, at regional and national fairs, at universities and at city halls. The U.S. Air Force assigned a Spanish speaking officer to work with me and loaned me the Air Force Band for a number of the programs. I recruited lecturers from the Embassy and from visiting American scholars. I even programmed myself with lectures on American movies and a slide lecture on the history of American painting combined with an Agency-provided exhibit on the same subject. My wife, an artist, was amused by my audacity because I had never had any formal training in art, but I took an Agency prepared lecture, translated it into Spanish, and sallied boldly forth. Of course I was careful to let the pictures speak for themselves and never allowed time for discussion. One of our more interesting art exhibits was a collection of original works by American artists resident in Spain. I still have several pieces in my personal collection presented me by participating artists who were grateful for the exposure.

I don't recall how many of these American Weeks we put on, but I have the feeling that I conducted programs in almost every province in Spain during the three years I was assigned there. I felt very good about them because I got to know many of the local cultural and political leaders. You don't get on a first name basis as easily in Spain as in the U.S. It's a much more formal culture, but I got to know many leading Spanish personalities quite well and was able to conduct these programs wherever it seemed necessary.

Perhaps I ought to say briefly how we went about it. If we found a problem in a particular area, say, in Zaragoza where the U.S. Air Force had a major base, I would go to the major of the city and explain our purpose and the type of program we proposed. Then, working with his people, we would develop a week's schedule revolving around our exhibits, some kind of program each day--a lecture, a film showing, a concert--culminating with an open house at the American base where the public would get guided tours of the facilities conducted by Spanish speaking American personnel. These programs generally produced a sense of good feeling or, at least, a better understanding of what the Americans were doing there and why.

Q: Did you ever have any indication afterwards that any of the locally assigned Americans were continuing their contacts with the Spanish after you left?

KENDALL: Yes, on frequent occasions they did. Some of them came to me and said, "Say, I really enjoyed that. I got to know the mayor. I had never known him before." Also, on return visits some of the Spanish authorities would go out of their way to compliment me on the programs and tell me how much they had improved Spanish-American community relations. My Air Force counterpart, a major from Puerto Rico, also kept in touch with the base personnel and told me that things improved noticeably after our American Week programs.

In addition to the U.S. Air Force base programs we also conducted American Weeks in some of Spain's ancient cultural centers such as Salamanca, Sevilla, Villareal, and Valencia. One would really have to be jaded not to have his spine tingle a bit at the thought of lecturing in site as steeped in culture as the University of Salamanca.

Successful "Atoms For Peace" Exhibits In Spain

One of our more successful exhibits, and this is interesting in retrospect, was on atoms for peace. You will recall that we had an "Atoms for Peace" exhibit in Japan too, and that our really big coup was showing it in the Atomic Bomb Museum of Hiroshima. In Spain we showed the "Atoms for Peace" exhibit in four major cities--Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia, and Sevilla. In those days we promoted atoms for peace with vigor, if in ignorance of developments yet to come, and I think we tended to oversell. At least we showed what the Americans thought atomic energy could do. This was President Eisenhower's special program, and we worked very hard at it.

We didn't know nearly enough about nuclear energy in those days. We were driven by visions of a great new energy resource unhampered by the knowledge of the problems of nuclear radiation and residue facing us today. Nevertheless, we looked upon it as a good program, and I enjoyed working with it during my three years in Spain.

I should note that this was during the Franco era. He was at the height of his power when I arrived in November 1957 and was still in control when I left at the end of 1960. I recall watching the parade put on by the government on the 25th anniversary of Franco's assumption of taking power. Their slogan was "On to another 25 years!" Working under a dictatorship such as Franco's has its limitations, one of which can be the illusion of accomplishment in a system where the major sources of information are closely controlled, but I thought we did very creditable work.

You asked me about the Public Affairs Officer. When I arrived Joe McEvoy was my PAO. He was succeeded by Frank Oram who was there when I left. You remember Frank?

Q: Yes, I know him. He was my boss at one time when I was deputy director for Latin America. I've heard a lot of stories about Frank. Was Jake Canter there at that time?

KENDALL: Yes, Jake was our cultural affairs officer. Wonderful person. Jake took over from John Turner Reid who was also there when I arrived. So in Spain I worked under both my previous bosses in Caracas, John Turner Reid and Joe McEvoy.*Q: Now you're* supposed to be the one being interviewed, but the reason I asked you about Jake is because the reason he was there was something I got very deeply involved in. I'll take a few minutes to explain it.

KENDALL: Please do.

Q: Jake was cultural officer in Mexico and he was doing an exceedingly excellent job. He had all the bigwigs of Mexico practically in the palm of his hand every time he put on a cultural event. He got them all. A wonderful person.

The ambassador was Bob Hill, who was a political ambassador and trying to run for Congress from Mexico City. He took a great dislike to Jake. He came up to see Frank Oram who was my boss as head of Latin America and I was the deputy. He said, "I've got to get this guy Canter out of there. He's just too arrogant. Whenever I talk to him he tilts back his head and sort of flares his nostrils, acts as if you've got a bad smell around. I just don't want him there. He's a detriment to the program. So you've got to come down and tell him he has to leave."

I was the guy who had to go down and tell Jake that he was persona non grata with the ambassador. We had to take him out of there and move him to Spain which was a great benefit to Jake in the long run but it was a terribly embarrassing situation at the time.

On the night that I was there preceding the day I had to tell him this, we had some visiting American attraction. I've forgotten, I think it was a symphony orchestra or at least a musical presentation of some kind. Jake had practically everybody of any consequence in Mexico City there and the ambassador was sort of taking a second place. I could see why immediately. Everybody greeted Jake, and the ambassador didn't know two-thirds of these people. Anyway that's how Jake ended up as being the cultural attaché in Spain at a time when otherwise he would have been another year and a half in Mexico City. Bob Hill is dead now. There were a lot of stories about him as ambassador in various places, but we won't go into that.

KENDALL: Thank you for sending us Jake, because he was a wonderful person to work with, a good personal friend.

Q: *That habit is still with him. He still tilts back his head and sort of looks this way and that.*

KENDALL: It may be a hearing problem. I don't hear well in my right ear and I turn my left ear toward the speaker, but that only means I'm listening more closely. As you say, these are personal idiosyncrasies and I think it's rather small of an ambassador to take personal offense at a thing like that.

Q: I think the offense was not at that. That was simply something he devised as a means of getting rid of Jake. He was really jealous of the man because Jake was doing much more than he was.

Kendall's Contacts Throughout Spain During His Extensive "American Weeks" Travels Highly Valuable To U. S. Embassy Generally KENDALL: But let me tell you that not everyone is like that. As I said, I had a great many contacts throughout Spain. My ambassador at the time was John Davis Lodge whom you know well. He and the chief of the political section, whose name I don't remember at the moment, wanted to get a better handle on preparations for local elections which were then under way. They didn't know the local mayors so they came to me for help.

"You know, Harry," the political officer said, "I want to meet the mayor of Almeria and Villareal and several other places. Do you know these people?" I said, "Yes, I'd be happy to introduce you."

So they took advantage of my contacts. Ambassador Lodge was very helpful. He had his own idiosyncrasies which I won't go into, but he did recognize that some of his staff had knowledge and contacts which were quite useful to him. He took advantage of them.

Let me tell you an amusing story about Ambassador Lodge's wife, Francesca Braggioti de Lodge, as they called her in Spain. She was a dog lover and was intensely interested in a program for seeing eye dogs. There were a lot of stray dogs on the streets of Madrid, and she had an idea that she could use them in her seeing-eye-dog program. At this time the Spaniards had not yet developed a program to help remedy this situation and set about an education program to tell Spanish social workers about it. So on frequent occasions she asked me to get documentary films on American seeing-eye-dog training programs.

We would show these films in the USIS auditorium and Mrs. Lodge would enter the auditorium in grand style with two or three dogs in tow. Knowing the Lodges was an interesting experience. They were movie types, public entertainment types. As you know, John Davis Lodge was a former movie actor and governor of Connecticut who was appointed ambassador to Spain by President Eisenhower. In his staff meetings he occasionally referred to his wife's affinity for dogs by remarking, "A dog's life? In my house dogs live a wonderful life."

As a result of these activities I became rather close to Mrs. Lodge. I served her purpose and she appreciated it. When I got ready to leave Madrid Mrs. Lodge asked her husband to hold an official lunch in my honor. She told me to invite anyone I wanted to, up to 22 people. So I invited a number of my Spanish friends. She had a very formal, very lovely lunch at the Embassy residence. Ambassador Lodge gave a little toast in my honor to which I responded, and then Francesca said, "Mr. Kendall, I don't normally give toasts at these luncheons but because you have been so helpful to me I want to say the dogs of Madrid will miss you."

Q: Dog days in the afternoon.

KENDALL: Those are some of the little episodes that make life in the Foreign Service more enjoyable, more entertaining.

Q: *I* think we have covered Spain. You left Spain then in 1960 and where did you go from there?

KENDALL: At that time I had been overseas for ten years. Three posts, Caracas, Takamatsu and then Madrid. I was offered another tour of duty in Spain but I felt that I really needed to get back to the United States to get myself re-Americanized. I should note here that our third daughter, Judy, was born in 1959 while we were in Spain, giving us an American, a Japanese, and a Spaniard, so to speak.

1961: Washington, USIA Llaison Officer With NASA, Working In NASA Public Information Office

We were assigned to Washington and arrived there at the very beginning of the Kennedy Administration. I had asked for a job in the policy division, PP&R, Policy Plans and Research, as it was know then. Someone was needed to serve as liaison with NASA which was putting together its Project Mercury team and was becoming more and more important in our overseas information activities. Hal Goodwin was the Agency's science advisor and when my name came before him he asked Walt Nichols, our former field supervisor in Tokyo, whether I would be able to act independently without the necessity for close supervision. Walt gave me a strong recommendation on the basis of my record in Shikoku, and I was assigned to work in the public information office at NASA headquarters which was then located in the Dolly Madison House just off Lafayette Square. Later we moved over to the Department of Education building on Independence Avenue. I worked there from January 1961 to March 1964, slightly over three years.

While with NASA I traipsed back and forth from Washington to Cape Canaveral, holding hands with the foreign press that came to cover the space launchings from "Ham" (a chimpanzee) up through the end of the Mercury program and into the beginning of the Gemini program. My primary role, however, was keeping USIA media informed about forthcoming developments within the space program, assisting them in coverage of major events and in adapting NASA's information output to our Washington and field requirements. Of course, I also tried to educate the NASA information staff about their tremendous overseas audience and the potential for reaching them through USIA. Since they had no one experienced in handling the foreign press I fulfilled that function for them. I also made it a point to be always available as a prime point of contact between USIA and NASA personnel in arranging programs and handling special requests from overseas posts. Of course, when I went there I knew nothing about space exploration, but I soon became a space addict and developed a broad knowledge of the scientific and manned aspects of the U. S. space program that carried over into my next two overseas posts. It was an exciting and rewarding Washington assignment.

In 1963 I enrolled in the State Department's mid-career course with the idea of going back to Asia. I had gone to the East Asia division and had been assured that I would be sent to Laos as information officer. That pleased me, so I focused on Southeast Asia in my studies at the mid-career course.

Q: *What was the mid-career course at FSI?*

KENDALL: It was an intensive three-months course, concentrating primarily on area studies, similar to but not as broad ranging as the Senior Seminar. It was useful. Unfortunately, when I finished I found that the position at Laos had been closed out, so there I was with my Southeast Asia training and no place to go. I went back to NASA for a while pending an assignment. The Kennedy assassination came about while I was at FSI.

1964: Information Officer--USIS Panama

In January 1964, during the early days of the Johnson Administration, there was a diplomatic break with Panama, our USIS library was burned, and all of the USIS Panama staff except the PAO was dispersed. Then in March, when relations were suddenly resumed, the Agency needed an information officer quickly. So with my Latin American experience I was nabbed and sent to Panama as IO.

President Johnson selected Jack Vaughn as ambassador to go to Panama to pick up the pieces. During this vice-presidential travels he had met Vaughn in some small country in Africa, Chad, I believe, where Jack was chief of an AID mission. Vaughn had impressed Johnson as a very gutsy guy. He'd been to school in Mexico, earning his way through the university as a prize fighter. He spoke a very fluent, very colloquial Spanish.

I worked with Carl Davis as PAO getting the post back on its feet. After about a year Carl was transferred to Washington as head of VOA's Latin American Service. He was succeeded by Hoyt Ware who had spent most of his career with the Associated Press in Latin America, mostly Brazil, and spoke Spanish with a pronounced Portuguese accent.

The major U.S. presence in the area was the Panama Canal Company and the U.S. military. We met regularly with their information officers to coordinate our activities. Of course, I did the usual routine with press, radio, television, and motion pictures. We put a lot of effort into promoting the Alliance for Progress which was the principal emphasis of both the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations.

I spent three years in Panama. I continued the practice I had developed in my three previous posts of getting around the country a lot. I always felt that getting out into the country and meeting people helps to convey a better sense of the United States through personal contact, answering questions, asking them, bringing the information media to bear on specific problems that I encountered. It also gives you a much better understanding of the country and its people than you get from staying in the capital.

Q: This was the period during the Lyndon Johnson era when Johnson was trying to bring about some kind of a reconciliation on the disenchantment of the Panamanians with the Panama Canal Authority and I suppose that coincided with your period there?

KENDALL: Basically, as you may recall, in early January of '64 there were flag incidents in the Panama Canal Zone which irritated the Panamanians quite a bit. There had been a tacit agreement that the schools in the Zone would fly both the American and Panamanian flags. The American students in Balboa High objected to flying the Panamanian flag and took it down. That inspired a Panamanian mob, many of them students too, to invade the Zone which is just across the street from Panama City's main thoroughfare. They tore down the American flags from in front of Balboa High and other schools and burned them. In the melee that followed several Panamanian students lost their lives and this led the Panamanian government to break relations with the U.S. Emotions soared on both sides and there was a lot of very hard feeling. So much of the work that I had to do during my first year in Panama was in assuaging animosities in the Panamanian public. We did this in various ways. One of them was investing a lot of AID money in building schools and roads and hospitals.

Q: By that time you were supporting the Alliance for Progress with information?

KENDALL: Yes. Unfortunately, this alliance turned out to be more a U.S. aid program than an alliance. Although the Panamanian government did participate rather actively in these programs their resources were limited and all too often the projects became handout programs on the part of the United States rather than jointly financed, jointly conducted programs.

Q: Did you feel that after that very serious feeling of antipathy toward the U.S. that there was some diminution of that--that animosities had died down, or was there still a continuing undertow of antipathy towards the United States afterward?

KENDALL: It died down, but the Panamanians have always had a love-hate feeling toward the United States since the time the Panama Canal was first built, since Teddy Roosevelt took Panama.

Q: Made them a country by taking it away from Colombia.

KENDALL: Exactly, the love-hate feeling goes back throughout their history, and you had to understand its psychological aspects to be able to juggle the two sides, to play up the love side and try to play down the hate side. It was difficult, but somehow we managed. I felt that Jack Vaughn did a superior job in this respect. His successor, Charles Adair, was also a very able ambassador and worked very hard at it.

Q: Did he speak Spanish?

KENDALL: Yes. He was a Latin American hand and spoke Spanish quite well. He did not have the vernacular flair that made Jack Vaughn so popular, but he conducted his office with dignity and was well respected by both the government and the public.

I had intimate relations with the press, both the anti-American and the pro-American and even those who were available just for what they could get out of it. You know, if you wanted an anti-American column you could pay a guy and he would write you an anti-American column. If you wanted a pro-American column, you could pay someone--maybe even the same man--and get the same results. Columnists for hire, I guess, is what they were. I should make the point here that never in all my career with USIS did I pay a single dime to get a newspaper column inserted. But there were also quite a few whose integrity was not for sale. I knew them all, their lines, who you could trust and who you couldn't, in the press as well as in radio and television.

Apart from my regular information officer activities, I developed a program for myself based on my NASA experience. Interest in the U.S. lunar exploration program was high at the time so I acquired a set of NASA slides and developed a slide lecture at the binational center, the Instituto Panameno-Norteamericano, and at various schools to help promote what we were then emphasizing in our information output, the U.S. in space.

I felt that we did a commendable job for American interests in Panama; but the problem of the Panama Canal was bigger than any of us, and there were strong differences of opinion among the American officials working in the Embassy and in the Canal Zone about the proper role for the United States with respect to the canal. Eventually they were resolved by the treaty negotiated by the Carter administration. I recall a discussion at my home one night with an official from the Panama Canal information office.

Q: An American?

KENDALL: Yes. An American and a Panamanian journalist whom I respected. We were discussing the pros and cons of the American presence in the canal and how they might be resolved. In part, I was playing the devil's advocate with respect to the American role; and some of the ideas I expressed appeared later in the Carter-Torrijos treaty. The Panama Canal information officer took strong offense and wrote a bitter denunciation accusing me of being anti-American and working against the United States interests from within the staff of USIS. He submitted it to the DCM, very tough guy, and the DCM called me to his office and asked me to defend my outspoken attitude.

Q: What was the ambassador's attitude at that time?

KENDALL: It wasn't the ambassador. It was the DCM.

Q: Yes, I know, but what was the ambassador's attitude?

KENDALL: He was in the difficult position of trying to keep a straddle of two shaky platforms, the American and the Panamanian. I don't think the matter ever reached the ambassador. The DCM said "Harry, maybe you ought to be a little more discreet when you talk in front of these guys."

Q: *What were his personal beliefs? Did he feel we ought to keep the canal or was he sympathetic with our attempt gradually to turn it over?*

KENDALL: I think he tended to be sympathetic with our efforts to turn it over. That was Rufus Smith who later became ambassador to Canada, a very able political officer. I think he sympathized with me and what I was trying to do. It had been a conversation in my own home among supposed friends, where for the sake of conversation you might take one side and then the other at times. The DCM asked me to give him a written reply for the record. I did and never heard anything more about it, though my relations with my PanCanal "friends" became somewhat strained. That episode was one of my more uncomfortable moments in Panama, but it didn't stop me from expressing myself. We spent three years in Panama, many trips up and down the peninsula, many trips to villages, village fairs, out into the boon-docks, into the banana plantations, to country fairs, and entertaining press and television people, all the stuff USIS does.

Q: *Who did you say was your PAO during most of your period there?*

KENDALL: Carl Davis at first. Later we worked together in Santiago, Chile. Then Hoyt Ware. Hoyt was an old AP man. You knew him. Our tour of duty was up in 1967. He went there in March of '64 and left in the spring of '67 with an assignment to Santiago in the same position

1967: Information Officer - Santiago, Chile

Q: Who was your PAO in Santiago?

KENDALL: Jim Echols was there when I arrived. After about a year Carl Davis succeeded him. Do you remember Jim Echols?

Q: I never knew him. Was Halsema there anything that you were?

KENDALL: Jim Halsema had been there earlier, and I knew Jim from service in Washington rather than in Santiago. Jim Echols had come out of the English teaching program and he never felt quite at home with the political problems which confronted us in Santiago, a highly politicized society. He had a tough ambassador, Ralph Dungan, a Kennedy appointee. He left a couple of months after I arrived.

Q: So who was the ambassador then?

KENDALL: Ralph Dungan was succeeded by Ed Korry who had been ambassador in Ethiopia. He had been a correspondent for <u>Look</u> magazine when Kennedy appointed him to the post in Addis Ababa. Nixon appointed him to Santiago. He always liked to remind people that he was both a Kennedy and Nixon appointee. He was an excellent writer and his despatches were considered favorite reading in the State Department. I'm afraid his

promising ambassadorial career ended in the bitterness engendered by prolonged Congressional investigations into U.S. involvement in the whole Allende affair.

My wife and I and our three daughters went to Santiago in July of '67, after home leave and transfer from Panama. Because Santiago is south of the equator it was in the middle of the school year and our children had difficult problems adjusting. I hope in some of your interviews you talk about the problems of families.

Q: I think it's perfectly all right. You don't want just a cut and dried discussion of programming, you want something that gives flavor to the whole experience.

KENDALL: In Chile we encountered a school problem similar to the one we had had in Panama where I had gone in the middle of the spring session. In retrospect I could have done that better. I should have left my family in Washington, D.C. and then brought them down to Panama after I had gotten established. But my family didn't want daddy to go off and leave them. They wanted to go with daddy. So we pulled them out of school in mid spring and moved down to Panama City. The same thing happened to us again when we moved down to Santiago, Chile, except that we left Panama during the summer vacation and they entered the Chilean school system in the middle of the school term, Chile being south of the equator. The children suffered in terms of their schooling and of adapting themselves. It's very hard on kids to move around that way. I think many Foreign Service families don't really understand how difficult it is on the children. They adapt because kids do, but they suffer.

Kendall Becomes TV, Radio, And Exhibit Celebrity Both In Chile And Throughout All Latin America As Spanish Speaking Space Exploration Expert During And After Moon Landing

In any case we went down to Santiago in July. I was chief information officer with three IO's working under me, one exclusively on the AID program, one on the press, and a third on radio, TV and motion pictures. I also served as deputy PAO and in the PAO's absence, as acting PAO. I have many memories from Santiago, but I suppose that most interesting and lasting one was my brief experience as a television celebrity in the guise of a space man.

There was a NASA tracking station in Santiago operated jointly by the Chileans and Americans. The director was a genial, bilingual NASA scientist named Chester Shaddeau and known to all as Chet. At this time the Apollo flights were under way, and one of the TV stations was carrying satellite broadcasts, but they were all in English and the station didn't have anyone with sufficient knowledge of space exploration to tell the audience what was going on. So they asked Chet and me to help them out of explaining in Spanish what the moon landing program was all about. We put on what we jocularly called the Chet and Harry show, a take-off on Huntley and Brinkley.

I remember spending not just hours, but days in front of the TV cameras on Channel 13, the Catholic University station, explaining with models what was happening with the rocket,

with the Apollo capsule, what the astronauts were doing at any given time, and answering phoned in questions from the audience.

Q: How long at one time would you be on the air? Were you on live? I guess they didn't have tape programs then.

KENDALL: They were live programs.

Q: *And how often were the programs and how long did they last?*

KENDALL: Sometimes as long as three or four hours straight, particularly during the Apollo 11 moon landing. This was live television being broadcast in English from the moon. The Chilean audience doesn't understand very much English so we were asked to do a certain amount of voicing over, a certain amount of interpreting. We did that, and during the lulls between action--there were many lulls between action--there would be these phoned in questions. So I became a household figure to be trailed down the street by children seeking autographs.

Q: A real ego trip.

KENDALL: Boy it was an ego trip. I would meet people at receptions and they would say, "Oh, I know you. I had you in my living room. You've been in my house." I don't think I would really want to live that way for very long, but it was fun for awhile.

Q: It's a heady experience for awhile.

KENDALL: It was a very heady experience. On the basis of that experience, Bob Amerson, who was then area director for Latin America, asked me if I would escort the Apollo 11 moon rock exhibit on a tour of the Latin American Area. As you will recall, the Agency wanted to take full advantage of the favorable publicity generated by the Apollo 11 lunar landing, so working with NASA they put together an exhibit on the American lunar landing program. The centerpiece was a moon rock about the size of a walnut brought back by Apollo 11 mounted in a rotating jeweler's display case inside a large plastic globe. A spotlight on the rock and a continuous play tape recording explaining its origin that lent a bit of drama to the exhibit. A copy of this exhibit went to each of the major geographical areas. Since the rocks were considered a priceless artifacts the Agency assigned USIS officers to accompany them to the various posts for display. I was a natural for the Latin American tour, and for six months I lugged that big exhibit and that tiny little moon rock all around Latin America. I went to 19 countries, setting it up and taking it down at each stop, sometimes several times in countries like Mexico and Brazil. I watched hundreds of thousands of people pass through the exhibit. I gave press conferences and lectures. I answered questions at the exhibit, and I appeared on innumerable radio and TV programs, answering questions from listeners. It all became very repetitive after a while, but it was an interesting experience.

In another aspect of the program, USIA, the Department of State, and NASA provided each of our ambassadors with a tiny speck of moon rock imbedded in Lucite and mounted on a decorative stand for presentation to the chief of state in the name of the people of the United States. I am not sure what they did in other areas, but in Latin America most of our ambassadors chose to make the presentation in connection with the visit of my exhibit. And I was asked to go along and give a little spiel about the lunar exploration program. I have photographs of myself with the presidents of a number of countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Chile, Ecuador, and even with Stroessner in Paraguay. It was an interesting experience, but after six months of that I was really beat.

Q: You were spaced out.

KENDALL: I was spaced out.

<u>Chilean Attitudes Toward U.S. Generally Favorable But Strong Communist Movement</u> <u>Existed Openly With Uncensored Media Outlets</u>

Q: What was your impression of the Chileans' attitude toward the United States at the time you were in Chile? Of course we haven't gotten to the point yet where we're seriously accused of doing what we said we didn't do, but actually did do in intervening in the elections of Chile. It hadn't all come out. What did you judge the feeling of the Chileans to be with regard to the U.S.?

KENDALL: Generally favorable but there was an awful lot of very strong communist movement there.

Q: Yes, I know there was and still is.

KENDALL: It was a highly politicized society. It was impossible to get into any conversation without it turning toward politics, mostly internal, but the Chileans were always aware of the two competing American and Soviet influences lurking on the sidelines. My contacts were primarily with the media people. They worked very hard and published their newspapers in a situation of almost complete freedom of the press. There was a communist newspaper, <u>El Siglo</u>, and there were communist radio programs. I encountered the communist editors and journalists on frequent social occasions, and my name occasionally appeared in their columns identified as the "well known yankee imperialist." I'll never forget--and I've repeated this story many times--a communist editor asking me for an interview. "And how will you use this interview if I give it to you," I asked him.

"Oh," he said, "I'll use it against you, of course."

He was quite frank and open about it. If you didn't answer their questions they would still make up something and publish it anyway.

Q: *Did you finally give him an interview?*

KENDALL: I answered some very brief questions from him.

Q: *I* presume you had to take this up with the ambassador before you did the interview, or did you?

KENDALL: As I recall with Carl Davis, the PAO, took it up with him and he said, "Yes, but keep it brief."

Q: Do you think you got much of our point of view across in the non-communist press? Were they susceptible to placement of our materials?

CIA Active In Placing Anti-Communist Materials In Non-Communist Media

KENDALL: Yes, to a certain extent, but I also found that our colleagues from the other agency were also very active, and I often wondered where some of this stuff was coming from, but it had its mark. The Chileans also had their journalists for sale.

Q: Yes, I know, that happened in every country.

KENDALL: It was difficult trying to conduct an out-front type of operation in a situation where you think you're getting something across, and you keep seeing commentaries appear in the press with outward appearances of being locally originated but you know is now written by local journalists. You could be fairly certain where the anti-American, pro-communist materials were coming from but would just have to guess who was placing the other kinds of material.

USIS Had Uphill Battle In Getting U.S. Point Of View Across In Chilean Media; Kendall Felt USIS Was Successful Only To Limited Degree Because Of Powerful Communist Influence

Yes, we managed to get our point of view across in the non-communist press, but it was hard work. However, I must say that at least during the third year of my Chilean assignment I spent far more time out of the country working on area wide programs than I did on the Chilean program. The press work was left pretty much up to Bob Cohoes who was my deputy. He was politically savvy and handled it very well. Last time I saw him he was in Mexico City as head of the regional publications center there, a very able man. So I would give Bob a lion's share of the credit for our work with the Chilean press. Ed Elly worked on the AID programs and deserves most of the credit for what we were able to achieve in that area. Bob Meyers handled radio, TV and motion pictures in a creative and imaginative fashion and had our programs on virtually every important radio and TV station in the country. I take a small amount of credit for his achievements because he had trained under me as a JOT in Panama, but most of it was due to his own native intelligence. After Chile he attended a special State Department course in economics and went on to serve as the

press spokesman for the U.S. delegation to the GATT conference in Geneva, among other things.

Q: *Do you think, within reason, we were effective in Chile?*

KENDALL: Within reason, but we certainly didn't succeed in countering the heavy communist influence. As I said before, the country was so highly politicized it was difficult to make any real mark. You couldn't open a conversation, any kind of conversation, whether it be about art and literature, or culture and travel abroad, anything, without local politics raising its ugly head. It sort of permeated everything, everything you did. Yet I was able to talk to many of the editors and news media people. We entertained a lot in our home. We had a large residence and plenty of space. Margaret did an awful lot of entertaining in those days. Fortunately the rate of exchange made it possible and we had a good staff of domestic help. But I never really felt that we achieved as much as we should have or could have in a less politicized situation.

After I returned from my six months' trip with the moon rock, I was acting PAO while Carl Davis went on home leave. I had been back at post for less than a month when I got a telegram from Washington telling me that my next assignment was Saigon--without family. I wasn't very happy about that. I sat down to think it over for a while. This was in 1970 at the height of the Vietnam war.

July, 1970: Kendall Receives Notice of Assignment To Vietnam

Q: *What month in '70?*

KENDALL: In July of '70.

Q: You were going to Saigon just as I was leaving Thailand where I had been for three years.

KENDALL: So I sat down and thought about it. I asked myself, do you want this or not. I had two choices, accept or resign. Finally, I said to myself, "Harry, that's where the action is. Why don't you try it."

So I did. I accepted.

Q: Were they only requiring you to stay for a year or a year and a half at that time?

KENDALL: It was two years.

Q: Two years.

KENDALL: So I went back to Washington, settled my family in our house in the Wood Acres section of Bethesda, and took off for Saigon. I got there in October of 1970.

Brief Recall Re Chilean Experience Before Discussion Of Vietnam Effort; Overwhelming Communist Exploitation Of U.S. Involvement In Vietnam Finally Defeated USIS Efforts To Defend American Position There

Q: Before we go to your assignment in Vietnam, I think you had been speaking about another experience you had in Santiago. So why don't you cover that now before we go on to the Vietnamese assignment?

KENDALL: This concerned the Vietnam War. We talked of the anti-American, pro-American attitudes there. Talking about these things one begins to recall other things. Each little incident, each little conversation brings up new recollections. The Vietnam war was in full swing at the time. One of our major problems in the information program and getting across an image of an America knowing what it stands for, what it is doing, and where it is going revolved around the Vietnam war.

One of the programs we conducted in the effort to convince the Chileans America was on the right track in Vietnam was sending journalists as well as our own officers on visits to Vietnam to see for themselves. We sent our public affairs officers, we sent journalists, the ones who would go. Some of them wouldn't. I recall that Santiago's leading journalist at the time accepted our invitation and was really looking forward to the trip. To give him an advance orientation, I got hold of a prize winning combat film on the Vietnam war produced by a French team. It was really far too effective. He looked at that film and decided he didn't really want to go.

Q: Scared him to death?

KENDALL: Really scared him. I don't think he had any idea about the ferocity of the combat before seeing that film. But there were other aspects. One of the hotbeds of communism was in the University of Chile's Institute of International Studies. We had good contacts there and worked with their people. But they were one of the most articulate anti-U.S., particularly anti-U.S. action in Vietnam, groups in the whole country. They were very articulate and very effective. They wrote prolifically, denouncing U.S. Vietnam policy as American imperialism on press, radio, and television, repeating the same theme over and over again, so that it would have been difficult for any ordinary listener not to question American motives for being in Vietnam. Of course, many of them were speaking out of their own convictions or simply parroting the communist line it's difficult to say.

As I said, we worked with the University of Chile and brought a number of visiting American professors there to lecture and to interact with the faculty at the Institute of International Studies. Jim Echols, our PAO before Carl Davis, went to Vietnam on the Agency's program designed to help our field officers to tell the Vietnam story and appeared before this group when he returned. I regret to say they tore him to bits. He had learned much but not nearly enough. Another much more effective presenter was Douglas Pike, whom you must certainly know.

Q: He's living right around here now.

KENDALL: Doug is now my colleague at U.C. Berkeley. In fact, he works with me in the Institute of East Asian Studies and heads up our program of Indochina Studies. He had been a USIS officer in Vietnam since 1964 and had published a definitive book on the Viet Cong, so USIS sent him on a world lecture tour meeting with groups like we had at the University of Chile. He had all the information at the tip of his tongue and could mobilize his facts and information into convincing arguments. So when he came to Santiago we took him to the Institute of International Studies. He answered all of their very emotional, heated questions in a factual, non-emotional manner. But even Doug Pike with his great ability didn't win anybody over. He gave them satisfaction because he answered their question, but he agreed later that he hadn't won any converts.

This was an example of the type of work we were trying to do. But we simply could not make any impression. So as a result we just had to withdraw from the arena. The essence of the whole thing is that we finally decided that Vietnam was a losing issue for us. We just had to stop talking about it in our official output because we got nowhere. Every time we said something they used it against us so we finally just responded to questions when asked. It was a definite decision on our part. Ambassador Korry agreed with Carl Davis and me that this was the best way to handle that particular issue. Just don't talk about it unless you absolutely have to. Don't deny it, but certainly don't volunteer to talk abut it with the news media.

These are some of the factors that conditioned my response to my own assignment to Vietnam. I am ready to move over to that arena if you wish to do so.

Q: Let's go on now to Vietnam. You went when?

October 1970: Arrived In Saigon - JUSPAO Economic Policy Officer

KENDALL: October of 1970. My assignment was to JUSPAO, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office. There was already a very large contingent of USIA officers there.

Q: Was that the time that Bob Lincoln was JUSPAO? Barry Zorthian, I think, had left just shortly before.

KENDALL: Barry had left and Ed Nickel was there. Maury Lee was his deputy. Lincoln succeeded Nickel.

Before leaving Washington, I asked the personnel officer, "What is my assignment? What am I going to do?" "Oh," he said, "you're going to be an economic policy officer."

"What do you mean, economic policy officer, I don't know anything about economics."

"Oh, you'll learn, you'll learn."

I suppose that being a Foreign Service Officer means you're supposed to be capable of doing anything. I went there as an economic policy officer and stayed two years. My family, of course, was back in Washington on separate maintenance allowance (SMA) as it was called, and the girls were in school. You were allowed three weeks leave for family visitation every six months. So during the two years I was there I was able to come home about three times to visit my family for three weeks. It was a long hard trip but certainly worth it to see your family. My kids got along surprisingly well. When I came back my daughter Nancy said, "Mommy, we'll have to change our whole pattern now. When Daddy was away we were doing fine. Now we've got to adjust to him again." She was a teenager just beginning senior high school.

Kendall's Opinion On Vietnam: JUSPAO Greatly Overstaffed; Total U.S. Government Made Serious Errors In Foreign And Military Policy As Well As In Specific Judgments

The Saigon job was interesting, but I felt we were grossly overstaffed. We often think of an ambassador's problems in getting to know his own staff, but there the Public Affairs Officer, the head of JUSPAO, had a staff larger than most embassies. I didn't really feel that during the time I was there that I got to know Ed Nickel very well although we had good relations. I knew Maury much better because I had worked with him in Japan. He was a branch PAO in Yokohama when I was in Takamatsu.

Q: Was John Clyne there at that time or had he gone?

KENDALL: I think John was there for part of my tour, but most of the time I was there, he was not. I knew John quite well in Washington. I'd be hard pressed to name all of the people who were there with me. There were many. John Hogan was in Danang; Forrest Fischer was in Hue; Jerry Novick was up in Nha Trang. Brian Battey was in Saigon as were many other USIS officers. Many of my co-workers were military officers with whom I had no previous or subsequent contact. They were intermingled with USIS officers in Saigon and in the countryside in the four corps areas, First, Second, Third and Fourth. Our ambassador was Ellsworth Bunker, one of the grand old men of the Foreign Service. God rest his soul.

Incidentally, Douglas Pike is currently editing Ambassador Bunker's private telegrams to President Johnson for publication by the University of California Press. We obtained them from the State Department under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. They are a very illuminating set of papers.

My job was to maintain contact with the AID and to prepare policy guidances for information output on its various programs, particularly land reform and economic development. Imagine writing guidances for a USIS staff. You ought to be able to just tell them what the policy is and they can follow it, but we had so many people spread around the countryside that it was necessary to communicate to them in writing. I prepared these. They would go out over the PAO's signature, of course.

One Kendall Project - Survey Of Vietnamese Labor Leaders' Opinions On Problems And <u>Possible Solutions -- Felt To Be Good And Useful</u>

I remember one project of which I was quite proud. It was a survey of Vietnamese labor leaders to determine what their main concerns were and what approaches they wanted the Vietnamese government to take towards resolving them. I did it over a period of several weeks, travelling up and down the country with my Vietnamese assistant, a man named Ha Quoc Buu, who is today working with Douglas Pike in our Indochina archive. Buu and I traveled to most of the provincial capitals around South Vietnam interviewing local labor leaders in depth. Then, on the basis of these interviews, I prepared a report which Ambassador Bunker commended for use by his staff.

One of the things that astounded me when I first arrived in Saigon was that we were not conducting a standard USIS type program. We were, in fact, running a ministry of information for the Vietnamese government. We were publishing their newspapers and magazines for them and operating their radio and TV stations.

Q: Were the magazines and newspapers published in Vietnamese or in French or what?

KENDALL: Publish in Vietnamese and English.

Q: In English?

KENDALL: Yes, in Vietnamese and English, mostly Vietnamese. Most of it was written in English and then translated into Vietnamese. Because of this I suppose I was very skeptical about the whole approach.

I went to Saigon thoroughly convinced that the United States was doing a marvelous job and this was exactly what we should be doing. I came away feeling that we had missed the boat.

I felt we really had made some horrible errors in our foreign and military policy, and that many of our top leaders in Washington and Vietnam had made some very serious mistakes in judgment. We were trying to run a government of a country where we not only didn't understand the language, we didn't understand the culture, we didn't understand the people, we didn't understand the history. We knew very little about them yet we were trying to run the country for them. We were fighting their war for them. We were conducting a horribly expensive program in terms of money and lives and effort based at times on what I would call sheer ignorance, though undoubtedly out of conviction that we were doing exactly what was needed to be done. On a more personal basis, I got to know the Vietnamese people quite well. I developed quite a few friends among them. I got to know the country and personally derived a great deal of benefit from my experience there. In terms of my contribution to the total effort, perhaps I added a grain of sand to that huge sandy beach of a sterile U.S. policy. I don't know. I didn't really feel good about it.

I still continue my interests in Vietnam and Indochina after these many years. I conducted a small research project on Vietnamese attitudes toward the Soviet presence and published an article about it in our institute's journal, <u>Asian Survey</u>. I helped a Vietnamese professor write a book which we called <u>After Saigon Fell: Daily Life Under The Vietnamese</u> <u>Communists</u>. It was published by our Institute of East Asian Studies and sold out two printings. It was also translated and published in the Korean language. I work with Douglas Pike in his Indochina Studies Program. I feel good about my own personal experience. I feel very sad about the American experience in Vietnam.

Specific Delineation Of U.S. Errors As Seen By Kendall

Q: Would you care to be a little more specific about three or four of the serious errors that we made without going into too much detail? Would you indicate where the areas of our greatest mistakes were, what they were?

KENDALL: Are you talking about nationally or are you talking about USIS?

Q: Well, I suppose both since the two are pretty well inextricably interwoven. But you said that you came to feel that we had made very serious mistakes in several fields, and I didn't know whether you were talking specifically about the U.S. information program or whether you were talking about our policy generally or a combination of both.

KENDALL: I was referring to our policy generally. We plunged that country into deep war. I'm reminded of a comment by Professor Robert Scalapino who is director of our Institute of East Asian Studies. He was lecturing in Vietnam in 1974 or early 1975. He said a very thoughtful Vietnamese officer stood up and said, "Now, professor, when the United States forces came into Vietnam in 1964-65, you came without our knowing you were coming and it took us a long time to adjust to it. Now, you are leaving us and you're doing it without our knowing it and we don't know why. We have difficulty understanding what United States policy is all about."

Professor Scalapino said, "I couldn't respond to that comment."

A. <u>U.S. Raison d'Etre For Entering Vietnam Conflict Based On Ignorance Of Vietnamese</u> <u>History And Misjudgment Re A Moscow-Beijing Axis</u>

We sent our people to run their government who didn't know the language or the history of the country. I think the grossest error was the whole raison d'etre for intervening in that war. We were intervening to keep the Sino-Soviet alliance from taking over Southeast Asia. We

were trying to protect the Vietnamese from China. The Vietnamese have been fighting the Chinese throughout history and have thrown them out on various occasions. Our leaders didn't seem to know this. We were afraid of the Moscow-Beijing Axis and they can't get together.

Q: *They had already shattered that Axis ten years before.*

B. Trying To Tell Vietnamese How To Run Their Own Government

KENDALL: The decision to go into Vietnam was to prevent monolithic communism from moving down into Southeast Asia, the domino theory. As history has since taught us, communism is no more monolithic than capitalism. That was one basic error. Another was trying to tell the Vietnamese how to run their own government. We manipulated Ngo Dinh Diem and all of his successors. We have enough difficulty running our own government let alone trying to run somebody else's for them. We imposed decisions upon them which they couldn't carry out, didn't have either the will, the means or the ability to carry out.

The murder of Ngo Dinh Diem was in part our own fault even though our people didn't pull the trigger. We didn't tell them to do it but we didn't tell them not to either.

There is an interesting episode from the 1954 Geneva conference which divided Vietnam in half. After the conference Zhou En-lai extended his hand to John Foster Dulles in a gesture of friendship. Dulles walked on past and left Zhou standing there. Here was an opportunity for our leaders to talk to each other to try to achieve some understanding, but Dulles refused on the basis, I suppose, that he considered Zhou En-lai to be evil. It's the same inflexible ideological outlook that inspired Reagan's remarks on the evil empire.

In Vietnam we based our policies on the sense of morality that not only condemns communism as evil, but even the people who live under communism as evil. As we see now, they are desperately trying to get out from under communism.

C. <u>U. S. Made Decisions Re Vietnam Based On American Attitudes Without Seeking Or</u> <u>Listening To Counsel Of Relative Few Who Knew Something About Vietnam</u>

These are just some of the thoughts that come to mind. I would say mainly that the United States had some, very few, experts on Vietnam, but their counsel and advice was not sought and if given, was not listened to. The decisions made by people ranging from President Johnson on down were made on the basis of American attitudes, American reactions to given situations which did not or could not apply to people of the Vietnamese culture. I just think that our country has not really organized its top level decision-making to be able to take advantage of the knowledge and information that is available to us.

U.S. Informational Efforts Did Have Significant Impact On Educated/Literate Vietnamese Concerning Need To Modernize Their Economic And Social Systems

Q: Do you think that our information program in Vietnam had any effect at all, or a very minimal effect, or that it was pretty much useless?

KENDALL: It had a great deal of effect on persuading the Vietnamese people that they really wanted to live like Americans. It had its greatest impact on the literate Vietnamese.

Q: *On the literacy?*

KENDALL: On the literate Vietnamese. I think the ordinary Vietnamese, the ones who had no access to the informational media, were not affected by it except secondarily through their leaders. But yes, we had significant effect on persuading the South Vietnamese that they should modernize their economic and social system. You must remember there was a great deal of travel back and forth, not just Americans to Vietnam but literate and well educated Vietnamese to the United States for training purposes under programs operated by JUSPAO, AID and especially the U.S. military. The Vietnamese are a very intelligent people and they quickly learned to appreciate the benefits of a modern technological society.

U.S. Military Taught Vietnamese Military Art Of Fighting With Heavy Firepower, Which Was Relatively Ineffective For Vietnam War, And To Depend On U.S. Supply Source. When U.S. Terminated Supply Line, Vietnamese Were Confused, Discouraged--Lost Will To Fight

The primary influences brought to bear were the military. But when the crunch came, we just simply withdrew and left them high and dry. We trained them in the use of our technology and our military equipment and taught them to depend on the United States as a source of supply, I think improperly so because they were fighting a war in which the heavy firepower we brought to bear was relatively ineffective. But when we withdrew they didn't know where to turn. We had built up a series of leaders who were entirely dependent on American support, and when they didn't get that support in the final hour they became completely disheartened.

They didn't lose to the communists because they didn't have the equipment, they lost because they had lost the will to fight when their source of primary support withdrew. Maybe we lost the war for them. Maybe they lost it for themselves. I don't know.

Disillusionment With Communism After North Vietnamese Takeover In 1975 Probably Due Mostly To Insensitive Rigidity Of Northerners In Governing

Q: Probably a combination of both. It would be interesting to know and I suppose there is no way of determining now, whether or not there is any residue of feeling about governmental policies about way of life or anything else left in the country as a result of the American presence there for so many years. Most of them seem to have become disillusioned with the communist takeover and the communist government, even those probably who felt sympathetic toward it before it took over South Vietnam. Do you think probably more of that is due to the insensitivity and stupidity of the communists themselves, the government that took over, then it is to anything that the Americans did while they were there?

KENDALL: You have to give much credit to the arrogance and stupidity of the communists and their self imposed policies since the end of the Vietnam War. They had developed their whole system on the basis of military action with everything done for a single cause, which was to gain independence and unity of Vietnam. Once they achieved this purpose they were insufficiently flexible to be able to change over to a peacetime mode of life. The people in power were the same people who had conducted their 30-year struggle for independence. Having attained their initial purpose they did not perceive the necessity for change to conduct a peacetime economy. They overlooked the Chinese saying that "You can conquer an enemy from horseback but you can't rule the people that way." It will probably take a new generation before they will be able to change around completely.

Q: But do you think it's primarily the communists that did themselves in with their own people rather than any residual effect that the American presence may have had?

KENDALL: Yes, there is no question about that. I think for the benefit of your series, it might be well for you to talk to Doug Pike.

Q: We will talk to Doug Pike. I don't know whether I'll get to interview him or whether Earl Wilson will try to do that when he comes back through here in February. But one or the other of us will do it.

KENDALL: He is by far the most eloquent, most knowledgeable about our whole experience in Vietnam. He went there in 1964 as a films officer with the idea of studying the Vietnamese method of field communications and developed that into his classic study of the Viet Cong. He has been working on Vietnam ever since and certainly the most knowledgeable in that field.

Q: *I* think we have probably milked your experience in Vietnam to the extent that is worthwhile on this tape. You went from Vietnam then back to Washington for a time?

1973: Policy Officer For East Asia And Pacific Area

KENDALL: Right. I went there as area policy officer for East Asia and the Pacific. It was a Washington desk job of developing articulating area policy for the media and the field. I left Vietnam in November of '72 and went into the area policy job in January of '73. From the time I arrived until I left in July 1975 the major part of our effort was on Vietnam.

The focus of our effort was on Vietnam. We had several officers on the area staff who had served there. Maury Lee was deputy area director. Frank Scotton was our China officer. Ed Baumgartner was our Vietnam specialist. Several others on the staff, such as myself, had also had experience in Vietnam. The information flow from Saigon and Bangkok was

programmed into the general output, and we tried to combine that with policy directives from the White House and the State Department into meaningful guidance for the Agency media and the field. I'm not sure how successful we were.

My job was coordinating with the Agency media and other area offices. I do not feel that this was a very significant part of my career. I always felt much better when I was out in the field. My area director for the first year was a man named Kent Crane, whom you must have known.

Observations On Kent Crane, Assistant Director For East Asia And Pacific

Q: No, I never knew him personally. I just knew a great deal about him because most of the time he was there I was in Bangkok.

KENDALL: Kent Crane was a Republican political appointee and a hard liner. He had served with the CIA in Indonesia and had worked on Spiro Agnew's team during the 1968 presidential campaign. While Spiro Agnew was in the Vice Presidency, Kent Crane was in USIA. When Agnew resigned, it wasn't long before Kent Crane left. I would not want to go into too many personal comments on this tape, but Kent Crane was a man who had great ambitions for himself.

He was not a man with a great deal of experience in USIA and I don't think he really understood USIA's operational philosophy. I would say that he was not a terribly effective area director and tended to create more enemies for himself than he did friends among the Agency bureaucracy. He traveled a lot, did get out and talk to people, but he was never in agreement with USIA's basic approaches. He had serious difficulties with the Agency director, Jim Keogh. I'm afraid he didn't enjoy Keogh's respect. We worked with him because as bureaucrats you work with your boss. Yet, on a personal basis we got along very well. However, I would rather not go into any further discussions of him.

My role as area policy officer also involved liaison with the various country desk officers in the State Department and participation in their weekly meetings. In this role I encountered a number of Foreign Service Officers whom I greatly admired. Perhaps the most notable was Art Hummel who was our colleague in Tokyo when you and I were in Japan in '55, '56, '57. He was then deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, working under Ambassador Phil Habib. Phil is also a man for whom we all have great love and respect. Habib is retired and lives in this area now, down in Belmont on the peninsula south of San Francisco. We see him from time to time. He is on the board of directors of The Asia Foundation and participates in the World Affairs Council in the San Francisco area, when he is not away on some special project for the White House as he was so much during the Reagan administration.

I liked my colleagues within the agency and worked with them quite well. But as I said before, I do not consider that tour of duty to be one of the more outstanding aspects of my career with USIA. But if you have any questions about it I'll be happy to answer them.

Q: I guess since my experience with the Vietnamese situation was largely from afar, partly from the viewpoint of Thailand, I really am not in a position to ask as many intelligent questions as I might. So perhaps we'd better leave that aspect of your program and move onto your next assignment then.

American Participant Program (AMPARTS) Short Of Funds. Remedy Was To Establish American Position In Tokyo To Learn Of Prominent Americans Traveling In Asia Out-Side USIA Funding And Try To Engage Them To Lecture For USIS. Kendall Assigned To Position, Designated Regional Programs Officer: 1975

KENDALL: After Kent Crane and Maury Lee left, Bill Payeff and Clifton Forster came in as area director and deputy director, respectively. I was with them for the better part of a year and enjoyed working with them. I had worked with Clif in Japan in the '50s and we were very good friends, still are. During that time we were struggling with the problem of how to bring more U.S. expertise to bear in our overseas programs, particularly in terms of AMPARTS, the American Participant or speaker programs. The Agency's budget for funding AMPARTS was insufficient to get more than a small percentage of the people we needed out to the field. We knew there was a great deal of American talent traveling back and forth to Asia, but all too often the Agency or the posts learned about them too late to take advantage of their presence. After some discussion we began to see a solution in the establishment of a regional programs office in Asia to keep tabs on travel by potential participants and somehow arrange for them to take part in our USIS programs. Tokyo was the logical place for it because it was centrally located and had the greatest amount of traffic. Clif and Bill asked me to draw up a project paper for the establishment of an office there, and perhaps on the basis of my having drawn up the job description for it, I got the job.

I must say I was not too happy about it at first because my old friend Leon Picon came back from Tokyo with horror stories about life in that smog ridden metropolis at the time. His stories made Tokyo sound like what Mexico City is today. Of course, the Japanese shortly began cleaning it up, and when I got there in July 1975 things had changed quite a bit.

Q: I remember now, with respect to that.

KENDALL: Yes. That was a very interesting assignment. In preparation for it I visited universities around the country to see what kind of resources I could draw on in terms of professorial talent, who knew Asia, and traveled there with frequency. I went to Columbia, Harvard, the University of Michigan, Chicago, and U.C. Berkeley. One of the people I met on this swing around the country was Robert A. Scalapino, here at Berkeley. He was dean of the Department of Political Science at the time.

Q: Is he still there?

KENDALL: I work for Bob Scalapino now.

Q: Yes, I know, but he left the political science department to take over East Asian Studies.

KENDALL: That's right. Then years ago, in October 1978, he established the Institute of East Asian Studies which has since become one of the most respected institutions of its kind in the United States and abroad.

Through that swing around the country I got to know quite a few professional people who travel in East Asia. Basically the role was to locate speaker talent and channel it to our field posts. So when I got to Tokyo I enlisted the assistance of our other Asian posts and began making an inventory of programmable people such as Fulbright professors already in the area who might be made available to one or more posts. I asked them to alert me whenever they learned of potential talent who might be coming to the area. I found ready cooperation from the various area posts and from the speakers bureau in USIA Washington. The area gave me a budget for travel so that I could send people down to Hong Kong or even to Australia. The posts met the speakers' in country travel and per diem costs and paid them a small honorarium. It was a valuable experience for cooperating academics because it provided them with ready made audiences and contacts with many of their fellow professionals they could not possibly have met otherwise. Whenever I got the name of a candidate I would circularize our posts and they would come back with a "yes" or "no" or with alternate suggestions or request.

Q: You were doing this for the whole area?

KENDALL: For the whole area. From Korea down to New Zealand. I also worked out cooperative arrangements for South Asia and at times even got cooperation from posts in Europe. After the establishment of the Regional Programs Office in Tokyo other areas picked up on the idea. One was set up in London and eventually one in New Delhi, and we worked out cooperative arrangements. As part of the program I also traveled to the area posts to explain the services available and get a better understanding of their country program requirements. During the two years I was on the job I think I made three swings around the area plus a number of short trips for special purposes. I also helped schedule people for Japan. Tokyo had its own program office, of course, so I worked closely with them. I had one Japanese assistant, a charming and able woman named Misa Otake who had served many years with USIS Tokyo before I appeared on the scene. She handled travel schedules for me. During my second year business got so brisk we had to add a secretary.

It was a highly operative program and as a result of my work the Agency gave me a meritorious service award. I had been promised one for my Latin American activities with the moon rock, but it never materialized. I felt amply rewarded when the award also brought me a promotion.

Q: You were not really yourself involved in the actual running of a program within Japan or any other country. You were providing them with what they needed to get across their points in the countries where they were operating.

KENDALL: That is correct. I was really a program coordinator, seeking out talent and getting it to them. In 1977 Eugene Schaeffer took over the RPO job. However, I stayed on in Tokyo for another year as field supervisor and country program officer when I began doing the actual programming. But the regional programs office job was basically recruiting. We called it headhunting, you know. In that position I also worked with Kurt Wenzel in the regional audiovisual office developing videotapes for the field posts, based primarily on interviews with visiting personalities we could not schedule for additional travel. Do you remember Kurt Wenzel's videotape programs?

Q: No, you see I left in 1972. I've been gone from the agency ever since.

KENDALL: I see. We had a regional films and TV center in Tokyo where we produced audio visual materials for the East Asian posts. Kurt Wenzel was a picturesque individual, a German POW who had been captured by the U.S. forces in the North African campaign, spent the rest of World War II in a Texas internment camp, and stayed on in the U.S. after the war to become an American citizen. He was a wizard with films and turned his talents to video as that medium grew. When I arrived in Tokyo he was producing videotapes in rented Japanese TV studios, but because of their high costs he persuaded the Agency to fund a fully equipped studio in the Embassy basement. It served the purposes of both the Japan program and the region. It's location in the Embassy proper made it very convenient for us to produce half-hour videotapes. We invited Tokyo based American journalists to serve as interviewers with visiting American government officials or other resource people and provided the tapes to the branch posts in Japan and around the Asia-Pacific region.

Q: Did you voice them over the English?

KENDALL: Occasionally, for the Japan program. But we did them mostly in English or, when appropriate, used interpreters. In most of the countries around Asia many of the target audiences, if I may use that term, speak some English. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia, in Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and to a lesser extent in Taiwan. Of course, in Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines there was no problem with the language and these videotaped programs were quite useful. Kurt and I worked very closely together on that project.

Last Year In Japan (1977-8) Field Supervisor And Japan Program Officer

Then after two years at it I took over as Japan program officer and field supervisor for the six American Centers in Japan and became a "Shinkansen cowboy," riding the bullet train up and down the Japanese archipelago, looking after the needs of our centers in Sapporo, Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and Fukuoka. It was a rewarding and important job.

Special experiences grew out of my role as regional programs officer and field supervisor for Japan. I met a lot of very interesting people, particularly the scholars visiting Japan. Ezra Vogel of Harvard who was then researching for his book Japan As Number One was

one of them. Bob Scalapino came on various occasions as did Larry Krause, one of America's leading economists who is now on the faculty at U.S. San Diego. There were many others.

One of the more interesting individuals, practically my first recruit, was an expert on waste disposal. Waste disposal is not usually considered a prime concern of USIA, but he was an American expert in a field of increasing concern to many cities in Asia and our posts were hungry for good speakers. I offered him, expecting to get one or two responses, but practically every post asked for him. He did very well, hiking around the garbage dumps of Southeast Asia, telling the local authorities how to better manage their waste disposal problems.

Another individual, more interesting in terms of our programs, was a specialist in American literature named Charles Anderson, professor emeritus from Johns Hopkins University and a superb lecturer.

Q: *Did you schedule them primarily in the universities?*

KENDALL: The posts did the scheduling, in the universities and in our own cultural centers such as the Tokyo American Center. Anderson came with high recommendations and he seemed to get better with each post report, so everybody wanted him, from Australia to Korea and then on into India and Europe. He was perhaps the single most popular lecturer on the USIS circuit that I've ever known. I feel rather proud for having found him. We are still in contact, he's still writing, lecturing vigorously, even at age 85. Marvelous guy, delightful sense of humor, and a real joy to know.

Those were some of my activities in Japan. I got out into the hinterland there too, but spent most of my time in the cities where we had our branch posts.

1978: Assigned To Bangkok As AUA (Binational Center) Director

In 1978 I was up for transfer. I had been in Tokyo for three years and was looking for a new assignment. Having spent so much time in Asia I thought it was time for me to go to Europe again. You are familiar with the practice of having officers express their preference for ongoing assignment in a first, second, third fashion. When the list of availabilities came up, I think I put down a list of 17 posts where I would be willing to go. Bangkok was not one of them. So I got a phone call in the middle of the night from Mort Smith, then area director in Washington. He said, "Harry, we need you in Bangkok to run the AUA Language Center."

"But Mort, I thought I was going to go to Europe again?"

"Haven't got anything decent for you in Europe. That's where we need you. Think about it a bit."

I thought about it a bit and said, "Okay, I'll go."

I had been in Bangkok several times, but I had never been to the language center. I didn't really know what it was about. Milton Leavitt was the man who had been there.

Q: *That was the second time by then.*

KENDALL: Yes, he spent a total of seven years there. He loved it. But he was retiring. So the Agency sent me to Bangkok and I can truly say it was just about the best job I ever had in USIS.

Q: It's a wonderful center.

KENDALL: Wonderful center. And I worked with a grand old man named Phra Bisal Sukhumwit who had established the center back in 1952 under the auspices of American University Alumni Association, a group of returned Thai students from American universities. The fundamental purpose of the AUA was teaching English to Thai students, but we also conducted classes in Thai for Americans and other foreigners. USIS contributed the director, who worked with Phra Bisal, and a director of English language courses--both Foreign Service Officers. The Center was combined with the USIS library which was staffed and maintained by the post but was, is I should say, known as the AUA library. The post also provided for a locally hired cultural director to coordinate Center and USIS cultural programs. Everyone else in the center was employed by the AUA Language Center which operated on tuition income from language classes. I was the manager and administrative director. We had a hundred American teachers, recruited from among the American community, including wives of embassy officials, embassy officials themselves, business people, retired U.S. military personnel, and the like. There were also a number of young American women who had married Thais studying in the United States and come to Bangkok to live. They found a natural outlet for their talents at the center. We trained them all to teach English as a foreign language to our Thai students. This job was handled by Dr. Marvin Brown. Do you remember him?

Q: He was not there when I was.

KENDALL: Marvin trained our English teachers, but his specialty was teaching Thai to foreigners, so he also supervised that aspect of our center program. We had a staff of 77 AUA employees, as I recall. It was like a small university. We had something like 7,000 to 8,000 students throughout the whole year. There were some fluctuations, but we taught a lot of English and ran numerous cultural programs. We also operated the best library in Bangkok.

The Unusual And Wide Ranging Impact Of AUA On Thailand's Literature Population, Both Governmental And Otherwise

Q: I gather you felt that and do feel that AUA has made a tremendous impact in Thailand on behalf of friendship with the U.S.?

KENDALL: It has indeed. It's difficult to find an educated Thai person who has not had some personal contact with the AUA, everywhere from the King and Queen and the royal prince and princesses of Thailand down to humble students. Even today, ten years after I left there, if I mention to a visiting Thai scholar here at Berkeley that I once served as director of the AUA it immediately establishes a bond between us. There are literally tens of thousands of Thai citizens who have gained a working knowledge of English from the American teachers at the AUA.

I recall one very amusing incident quite illustrative of the center's influence. My wife and I and a couple of friends were driving along Petchburi road in Bangkok one night looking for a certain movie theater, and somehow I got lost and found myself going the wrong way down a one-way street. A young policeman stopped me and asked for my driver's license. He wasn't impressed by my American Embassy credentials or by the diplomatic plates. Neither was he impressed by my bright red Pacer.

"Okay," he said, "there will be a fine on this. Who are you? Where do you work?

I gave him my name and told him I was the director of the AUA.

"Oh, the AUA director. I studied English there. That's a fine school. You just turn right around and go this way."

To this day the AUA is one of the leading cultural centers in Bangkok. We conducted lectures in Thai about the United States and also about Thailand. As a binational center we felt it necessary to satisfy both audiences. The Thai language classes are very popular among foreigners trying to get established in Bangkok, and regularly enroll foreign embassy personnel and businessmen as well as their families. The other day I had a visitor from Beijing, a Southeast Asia specialist, and learned that he had studied English at the AUA in Bangkok. I was pleased to note that he spoke quite good English.

All in all it was a very satisfying assignment, and by that time my children had grown up and were going to college. Margaret, my wife, taught English at the AUA all the time we were there. Our youngest daughter, Judy, was at Mills at Oakland and took a semester off to be with us in Bangkok. We put her to teaching English too.

Q: Bangkok is one of the very few USIS posts around the world that I find is almost better recognized and perhaps better understood than the embassy itself. Whoever is the director of USIS and whoever is the director of the AUA out there has a standing in Bangkok that is really almost greater than the ambassador, I think.

KENDALL: That is certainly true. I felt it all the time. I was a member of several committees and organizations and was always given a place of honor wherever I went as director of the AUA. The Crown Princess of Thailand and her sister came there on various

occasions. I recall giving a TOEFL exam to the youngest daughter of the King. She was in Berkeley last year and I reminded her of that. She hadn't forgotten.

Q: Thais were devastated when they changed the name of the program to USICA. They couldn't understand it all.

KENDALL: That was one of the worst administrative decisions to come out of our Washington headquarters. I was certainly glad when the name was changed back to USIA.

<u>1979: Retirement; Employment With University of California's Institute Of East Asian</u> <u>Studies</u>

I went to Bangkok thinking that I would be able to remain on post until I reached retirement age at 65, but early in 1979 there came the Supreme Court decision that we had to retire at 60. Since I was turning 60 in December of that year I started searching for something to do. I was not ready to retire. I was still strong, vigorous, healthy, and eager to continue. But I also wanted to maintain the Asian connection. I drew on my academic contacts and wrote to Bob Scalapino offering him my services. He wrote back saying, "I'm going to be in Bangkok on July 4. Why don't we talk about it then." We did, and I've been at Berkeley working with him as coordinator of international conferences for the Institute of East Asian Studies since May of 1980. Naturally, my contacts built up over 29 years with USIA and especially during my final 10 years in Asia have been invaluable to me in this position. To tell the truth, I still consider myself a member of the USIA team.

End of interview